FREEDOM AND THE FOURFOLD

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IN THE THOUGHT OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

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by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to draw out of Heidegger's work, and to argue for the thesis, that freedom saves its essence in the region of the truth of Being. In relation to freedom, this region is called "the free". The usual idea of freedom, whether it be self-realization, self-perfection or self-determination, attaches itself to the fact of self-causing-itself, whether this be an I-self or a we-self. Heidegger challenges this idea of freedom because it leaves the nature of the self assumed and unquestioned. He insists that the truth of self cannot stand without awareness of what is other than it. Heidegger puts his thesis succinctly in the form of a challenge in the "Letter on Humanism".

> "Whether the region of the truth of Being is a blind alley, or whether it is the free where freedom saves its essence, everyone may judge for himself, after he has tried to go the pointed way, or better to go a better one, which means to pioneer a way appropriate to the question."

Though the fourfold relationship of earth, sky, gods and men is not mentioned explicitly in this challenge, it becomes clear in the study that the eventual unfolding of the whole event of freedom saving its essence in the free requires the unfolding of this relationship which

Martin Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), p. 174.

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binds into the free. For Heidegger freedom is vindicated rather than dissolved by saving its essence in the fourfold. Depending on the stance taken, it is possible to see Heidegger's thought as an attack on freedom if it remains confined to the self and thus truncated. At the same time, his thought can be seen as a reassertion of freedom when it is restored to its proper hidden ground. As a whole unity, his work is a long hard sustained attempt to think the truth of modern freedom together with the truth of reverence and submission, the truth of what is revered.

To try to do justice to the gradual unfolding of all the components of the thesis of freedom saving its essence in the fourfold, I have examined chronologically eight of Heidegger's works stretching from 1929 to 1959. They are <u>The Essence of Ground</u>, <u>The Essence of</u> <u>Truth</u>, <u>What Is Metaphysics</u>?, Epilogue, "Toward the Determination of the Place of Engagement", "Letter on Humanism", "The Thing", "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", and "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky". Along the path of his thought, Heidegger unfolds gradually the whole of what is occurring while freedom saves its essence in the free. His thought about freedom and the fourfold may be said to consist of two steps, as long as it is understood that the first step is not <u>merely</u> a means to the second, but rather continues to be a necessary part of the whole of what is occurring.

The first step concentrates on human existence which Heidegger describes as threefold transcendental freedom whereby we stretch from

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our current situation to the world we project. For humans, he suggests, truth (1) arises out of the tension that we are in the midst of beings (2) and also that we let beings Be what they are (3). Transcendental freedom is threefold freedom toward the ground, the transcendental basis of the truth of all current beings, both human and objective. At the time this first step was taken in the early works, it was already understood as incomplete and preparatory. Before the fourfold region of the truth of Being could be unfolded it was necessary to show that threefold human freedom toward the ground occurs in a zone of transcendence. It is not possible to move directly from the current modes of being to the truth of Being, because part of that unfolding is the truth of threefold freedom. With the second step from freedom to the region of the truth of Being, Heidegger tries to study how human freedom is determined or attuned by the region it is in, in a way which does not dissolve it, but rather liberates it. The great difficulty and danger is to study this matter in a way which is appropriate to its strangeness, and which is nonetheless rigorous.

The completion of the second step occurs when the region of the truth of Being, called "the near" and the zone of transcendence called "the far" are declared both to be "the same". They belong together and thus also necessarily remain different. This "completion" is at the same time worked out by Heidegger as the cooperative effort of thoughtful and poetic production of the truth of Being. They are the same because each operates according to its own laws, and both

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. . belong or dwell into the free. The completion is also a restoration of what is present and immediate, after a bold investigation of the truths of future and past "heritage". The "mature" human threefold had to include also the acceptance of what is present before the full unfolding of the fourfold truth of Being was possible. The truth of "the same" draws together human thinking and making in the unhidden foreground while restoring awareness of their heritage in the hidden background. When freedom returns to its matter or element, it saves or hides its essence and is thereby vindicated.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Interpretation of Heidegger's Thought

Eventually, any student of Martin Heidegger's thought must face the difficult question of what it is they are doing when they try to interpret such a strange and difficult thinker. Heidegger's thought is famous perhaps most of all for being strange and this is what makes the question of interpreting him particularly hard. Walter Biemel has put the question well when he divides the usual approaches to Heidegger into two types, both of which, he suggests, are unsatisfactory. To approach Heidegger from any traditional position (and language) succeeds only in establishing the nature of that position with regard to Heidegger. On the other hand, to "interpret" Heidegger from within his position and language is either to do superfluous work or to pretend to improve on "the master". Dissatisfied with both of these types of approach, Biemel proposes instead that we admit "that we cannot give an interpretation of Heidegger". No one he suggests has appeared yet who is capable of carrying on a real dialogue with him. The great difficulty comes with Heidegger's strangeness. What we can do, Biemel goes on, is

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Walter Biemel, <u>Heidegger</u> (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1973), p. 125ff. and Walter Biemel, "Poetry and Language in Heidegger", in Joseph J. Kocklemans, ed. <u>On Heidegger and Language</u> (Evanston: Norwestern University Press, 1972), p. 65ff and p. 99ff.

prepare for a possible future dialogue by trying to make the strangeness visible and thereby coming a little closer to Heidegger. This preparation he calls "Auslegung". Interpretation, which we cannot attempt yet in relation to Heidegger, is "Deutung".

If Biemel is right in his characterization of what is denoted by "Deutung", I of course agree that we should resist it in our approach to Heidegger. But the resistance would not be a result of our inadequacy, but rather the heart of what we learn from Heidegger. Biemel thinks that "Deutung" involves <u>transcending</u> the work that is interpreted. If we try to interpret Heidegger in this way, we would have to pretend to know his meaning better than he knows it himself. We would have to reveal the essence or ground which rules in his work and thus pretend to equal or surpass him. An example of such an interpretation, Biemel suggests, is Heidegger's 2 own interpretation of Kant in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.

I do not introduce Biemel's position in order to take issue with him primarily; I think his work is excellent. His account of the approaches to Heidegger and of his strangeness, formulates an important question very well. Nor do I want to settle a question of the difference in meaning of the German words "Deutung" and "Auslegung". My concern is to draw out the point of that distinction

Martin Heidegger, <u>Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik</u> (Bonn: Cohen, 1929).

and to clarify in English words what I am trying to do by interpreting Heidegger.

Heidegger himself engaged in "transcendental interpretation" in his early works (of which the Kant book is one), but he moved decisively away from this sort of stance in his later work. To approach his work with the desire to transcend it or "to reveal its true meaning or ground", is now, and even if a greater thinker emerges, still will be, another of the "traditional approaches" which succeeds only in establishing the nature of a language and position vis-a-vis Heidegger.

To say that "Heidegger cannot be transcended" is most emphatically, not to suggest that Heidegger has grasped the truth once and for all. On the contrary. But it does suggest that we must turn into the essence of the language of transcendence, into what rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines in this language.

What then is interpretation if it is no longer "transcendental", and if it is not even preparing for such an interpretation in future? For the strangeness and the <u>greatness</u> of the thinker remains. Whether Heidegger is a "great" thinker can of course be debated, but I for one think that he is. With such an assertion do I fall humbly at the feet of the master? Or do I secretly pretend to be his equal in order to judge his work to be great? Neither suggestion brings out the basic point. I am equal to Heidegger in this sense, that I too

am here; I too, think, build, and dwell in the same world. It is the degree to which his thought helps me to experience what is occurring, that leads me to judge his thought to be "great". To make such a judgment does not situate me on a scale near or equal to Heidegger as a thinker. (In this matter I accept Biemel's account and I situate myself <u>well</u> below him.)

When we judge a thinker to be a great thinker, it can <u>only</u> be because that thinker says what is true of the world (and time) we are in. If there is a "ground which rules in the work" surely it is this. We do not judge thinkers from a "standard of great thinking" in itself to which we all have access. This distinction of judging from what we are <u>in</u>, rather than from a standard of thought, touches the heart of what Heidegger means by "thought <u>of</u> Being" as opposed to thought which remains metaphysical.

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Insofar as we continue to consider interpretation an attempt to transcend the work interpreted in order to draw out "the key to the work", or the hidden ruling essence of the work, we continue to focus on thought itself rather than submit thought to Being, thought's matter. As long as we are in fact confined to that realm of thought itself, our efforts to "interpret" Heidegger remain pretentious. In that realm, even to assert that he is a great thinker would be a pretense, for we could only make the assertion from an equal or greater ability ourselves.

We are faced unavoidably with the task of thinking in the

world and time we are in. In this attempt, we can get help from other thinkers, some of whom clearly "dwarf us" in the matter of thinking ability. But in the process of learning from them, we can never abdicate our own experience from which we must try to judge when they help us, when they do not and even when they are leading us astray. With a thinker as great as Heidegger (who is even stranger, because contemporary), it is all the more difficult to interpret his work. It seems far-fetched to decide whether he is leading us astray when even to get to the point of hearing what he is saying is so hard. Nevertheless, interpreting I think cannot be separated into components of this kind; first one hundred years of what is he saying and then later, is it true? An attempt merely to clarify or translate what is being said (postponing the question of its truth) would do great damage to the essential character of Heidegger's work. We need somehow to "engage" ourselves with the work without taking a "cocky" stance.

The strangeness of the thought is a response to the strangeness of what is now happening in the world. The struggle to think about new events demands changes in thought and language. We naturally resist any thinking which weakens our attachment to the modes of thought we are familiar with. Contrary to widespread opinion, Heidegger never rests in a position of contempt for the familiar modes. He does not exhort us to leap right out of them

into an utterly new and strange mode. Such an exhortation would be a perfect example of a kind of transcending, an obsession with thinking itself as <u>method</u>, which Heidegger calls "subjectism". His approach instead is to try to take the current modes as a "point of departure". He tries to unlock what is illusory in the limits of these modes, so that we can be "retuned" into a deeper and truer experience of what is occurring, which does not <u>replace</u> the current modes, but rather completes our appreciation of what binds us in and through them. Heidegger often characterizes the current modes in the word "representation" (Vorstellen). In the lecture called "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky", he says that his task is:

> ". . . an attempt to retune our usual representing into an unusual, because simple, thinking experience."³

Because Heidegger insists on a connection with what is familiar and clear (while he calls it in question and enters strange other realms), it must be possible to write clearly and without mystification while interpreting his work. This I assume in this thesis. But that is not to say that this is not a staggering task. Much of the interpretation is necessarily tentative and it is very hard to sound definite when your work still has so far to go. But the principle stands. Heidegger's work is difficult enough that

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". . ein Versuch, unser gewohntes Vorstellen in eine ungewohnte, weil einfache, denkende Erfahrung undzustimmen." Martin Heidegger, <u>Erlätterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung</u>, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1971), p. 153.

it can be exploited by those who seek to mystify. This means we have to work harder in the opposite direction. And there is also the constant danger of getting lost in the intricasies of Heidegger scholarship, which, in effect, is to succumb to a more prevalent and a more insidious kind of mystification where the thinker "no longer offends anyone".

To try to avoid these subterfuges, it is necessary to insist that a bridge be built from <u>our</u> experience, represented in this instance by thematic considerations about which we can be clear, to Heidegger. Such an approach makes no claim to be the "key" to Heidegger. The meaning of the word "interpret" is to mediate or "to be an agent between two parties". The agent attempts to translate what is offered by one party into terms the other can understand even when there is news involved. He doesn't claim that his translation completely and utterly grasps what is offered.

However difficult and therefore tentative, the attempt must be made to remove some of the obstacles which make it so hard for us to learn from Heidegger. One gap is that between German-speaking-European experience and English-speaking-North American experience. And with Heidegger the difficulty is compounded with the gap between his strange way of speaking and normal or current language. A constant feature of his work is to examine what seems clear, until it is shown to be inadequate or incomplete — whether this be a

word or a concept. If we are thoughtful and responsive to the whole of what is happening, the word or concept "shows itself" to be incomplete. This "self-showing" presents itself in what Heidegger calls "pathways through language"; they are the building blocks of his thought. The major challenge to an interpreter is to render these revelations accessible.

Obviously then, even though this thesis is not about the question of language specifically, it would not be possible to build a bridge to Heidegger's thought about anything, without expecting to rethink our relation to language. For example, the sort of exact scientific argument in which all the key words are "factors" and all are ostensibly defined; such an argument would not get near to what Heidegger is saying. Nor does he have an "analysis" or a "method" which can be conveniently laid out ahead of time by defining a group of key words. Heidegger tries to let words and language speak to him "inside the matter" concerned. Thus .the continuous task in the interpretation of his work is to provide access to these forays through language. Even when "words" are not brought into the centre explicitly, I have found that a thoughtful study of key words (in the manner we learn from other passages of Heidegger's) usually helps to catch the heart of his intention.

And so the study abounds with thought about words, their meaning, history, etymology and their grammatical interrelation.

It may seem at times that a kind of word-mysticism is being indulged in, that thought has surrendered to etymology -- such a criticism has often been levelled at Heidegger. But he is well aware of this danger and intends to avoid it. It is necessary to enter the realm where such danger exists. Otherwise we remain locked within the most recent meanings of words, within the necessarily limited experience of our most recent ancestors. It is part of the task of this study to make it possible to judge whether Heidegger has helped to open for us a deeper experience of language (and thus of Being) in part with the thoughtful use of etymology.

2. Freedom and the Free

(a) The thesis of the thesis

No one could hope to interpret the whole of Heidegger's published work in a study of this kind. I have chosen to confine myself to one "region" of his thought which pertains to freedom and its relation to what he calls "the fourfold" of earth and sky, mortals and gods (das Geviert). I have tried to draw out of Heidegger's work, and to argue for the thesis that freedom saves its essence in the region of the truth of Being, a region which he calls "the free". Heidegger puts the thesis succinctly, in a form which is a <u>challenge</u> as well as a thesis, in the "Letter on Humanism":

"Whether the region of the truth of Being is a blind alley, or whether it is the free (das Freie) where freedom saves its essence, everyone may judge for themself, after they have tried to go the pointed way, or better, to go a better one, which means to pioneer a way appropriate to the question."⁴

This thesis, as it is expressed here by Heidegger, seems to ignore the fourfold, but it will become clear that the full unfolding of the essence of the free demands the unfolding of the fourfold as well.

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(b) The two decisive steps in Heidegger's thought about freedom.

Heidegger's thought involves two decisive steps. In the terms of freedom they might be characterized as follows: (1) The current familiar modes are not <u>absolute</u>. (These "modes" include ways of perception, types of thought, political constitutions, economic structures, legal traditions and way of speaking which encompasses and pervades all the others.) All of these modes are "historical" in the sense that they "came to be" at one time or another. They have not always been here. All of these modes are in some way conditioned by our freedom. (2) But this freedom is itself conditioned and contained. As Heidegger would say, it is by and for Being. We are determined or "attuned" by the truth of Being. Being prevails through us. We are preserved and claimed by Being and this occurs both negatively and "positively" in (or on) a <u>way</u> which not only does not dissolve freedom, but which "saves freedom's essence". Without such determination freedom cannot finally stand or prevail.

⁴"Ob der Bereich der Wahrheit des Seins eine Sackgasse oder ob er das Freie ist, worin die Freiheit ihr Wesen spart, möge jeder beurteilen, nachdem er selbst versucht hat, den gewiesenen Weg zu (continued)

As it is understood in Heidegger's first step, freedom describes the necessary move out of <u>mere</u> immersion in the current modes (as if they were absolute). But to move out of <u>mere</u> immersion does not mean we are no longer immersed. And in the same way, the freedom of step one remains after its determination is named. The steps are sequential but nothing is ever left behind and what is discovered and named along the way must also in some sense have been already there from the start. In any case, the steps are not like stepping stones.

The first step brings us to "the nothing", to indeterminacy. Concretely, it begins to make us aware of the zone in which we live and move <u>in relation</u> to objects. The current modes seem to operate as if there were no such zone or horizon. Freedom, which seems groundless or "abysmal" connects us with objects, and, in that way "traverses" the zone between us and them. Without this growing awareness of the zone or horizon, understood in the early work primarily as the zone of the ecstatic openness of temporality, the questioning of the truth of Being (instead of just the truth of beings) could never have begun. The object-beings which surround us could never have been seen as <u>things</u>, denied an appearance, which unfold the rule of the <u>region</u> of the truth of Being, "the free". The first decisive step from the current modes to the zone

4 (continued) gehen oder, was noch besser ist, einen besseren, das heißt einen der Frage gemäßen Weg zu bahnen." Martin Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), p. 174.

of transcendence in which free grounding cccurs, breaks the spell of the subject-object obsession which blocks the greeting of the truth of Being.

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The current modes operate as if what is occurring is: human subjects representing things as objects. There is a relation: subject-represents-object. It is assumed to be correct but what is involved in the assumption is no longer called into question. Heidegger shows that this relation occurs in a zone around and between the two, which he calls in the early work the zone of transcendence. The first clear signs of determination show in the fact that this zone is <u>given</u>. We are "thrown" into it. We don't make it. We don't have a choice about being free, though freedom confronts us with choices. The zone of transcendence seems to be an unavoidable and groundless abyss, which brings to the centre of concern the terrifying question of how, if at all, we are determined in (at least in part) a negative way.

Step one exposes this problem; step two begins to allow the truth of Being to unfold. In spite of appearances, this truth did not stop occurring while the horizon was discovered. It can be allowed to unfold now (after step one) in full awareness of its strange negative character. How does the truth of Being guide us and direct us <u>via</u> freedom which remains in some way abysmal or negative?

The difficult problem which confronts us at the end of step one is that freedom may be given, but the <u>content</u> which emerges (what Heidegger calls at this time "the project of the world") can only seem to be another "world view", a kind of "useful abstraction" with which to get what we want. Thus the task of step two: to examine the <u>assumption</u> of a standard, not as a concept but as a "regional" <u>event</u> that is occurring. However shrouded in mystery it may be, without it no <u>true</u> proposition could hold.

(c) Determination as the basis of change.

We find ourselves in the midst of "things" and there may arise in us the desire to change parts of the world we are in. Such a desire, which involves rejection of part of what is occurring, cannot be explained away with psychological and sociological "origins". But neither can it just be accepted at "face value". It needs to demonstrate its legitimacy in some way, to demonstrate its authenticity or its authority. If those who resist change appeal to the legitimacy and efficacy of the established ways, we can point to the historical genesis of these ways out of (in part) the efforts of people like ourselves. But what guided their efforts? Freedom and change are obviously part of the way things are, but how do they fit into the whole? To what does the desire for change submit? Heidegger tries to bring the will to

change back into harmony with the whole of what we submit to, in which change is in some way already occurring. If he is on the right track, freedom <u>saves its essence</u> in the region of the truth of Being. The most difficult matters of our allegiance to law, language and political authority are concerned in his thesis on freedom and "the free".

If the region of the will to change is at the same time a region of submission, the result is not slavery or a chastened quietism. On the contrary. But it also is not a clear-cut aboveboard <u>policy</u> either of reform or revolutionary change. Those sorts of results are forms of the dissolution of freedom, which has given way to what is called "positive freedom" which frees people from freedom. Heidegger rejects such a stance as vehemently as he rejects an "existentialism" which asserts the absolute and absurd negative freedom of man from nature.

(d) The definition of freedom in the later work.

What then is this "freedom" in Heidegger's thought, if it is neither "negative freedom" nor "positive freedom"? It does not simply merge the two, such that the strength of each is cancelled. Nor does it seek a "synthesis" which is a "way out" of the dilemma posed by these two extreme poles.

Freedom is not an idea, or a concept or a notion. The word freedom according to Heidegger (in "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky")

<u>says the essence of the free</u>. The word "essence" (Wesen) is meant verbally. The "essence" of the free means the way in which"the free" rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines. It does not mean a "general principle", (abstract, universal) drawn out of various instances of "the free". "The free" (das Freie) is what rules and unfolds. It denotes the <u>region</u> or room in which and through which we are enabled to encounter the things in the world and which enables us to be what we are. Freedom then is the ruling and unfolding of a region called "the free".

(e) The region called "the free"

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"The free" is an adjectival-substantive phrase similar to "the good" and "the beautiful". It is completely wrong to think of it as denoting an abstract or general principle derived from various free situations or instances of freedom. Nor does it denote "the sum of everything that is free". Just as the adjective "free" and the verb "to free" are earlier in language than "freedom", so "the free" names a concrete <u>region</u> which is the primary datum in the whole matter of freedom. In the German language, there is the phrase "in der Nähe" which means "nearby" or "in the neighbourhood". Literally translated it means "in the near" or "in nearness". "The near" names a region just as "the free" does.

Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u> . . ., p. 181. ". . . wie Freiheit das Wesen des Freien, sagt M**e**nschheit das Wesen des Menschen."

(f) The temporal and spatial character of the region.

What does Heidegger mean with the word "region" (Bereich)? It could be said that the region is "at the same time both spatial and temporal", but this skims over the problem at the heart of Heidegger's thought. We tend to think of (to picture) a region as something spatial. And when we speak of a "temporal region", this seems to be analogous rather than primary. In careful analysis we prefer to conceive a spatial region and then "put it in time" or allow it "to move through time". Thinking of time in this way, we participate, according to Heidegger, in a tradition as old at least as the thought of Aristotle. For Heidegger, time conceived in this way is not allowed to be what it is. Instead, it is determined "beforehand" by a particular conception of what beings are -- the Greek conception of being as the presence of the present. Under the domination of this conception, time becomes a sequence of timeless "nows". The past is what once was "now-present". The present is what is now present. The future is what will be nowpresent.

In <u>Being and Time</u>, Heidegger showed his awareness of the pre-determination of the traditional concept of time, which meant for him that it could no longer be used. He then tried to develop a new concept of time and temporality, truer to the phenomenon, and the result is the "zone" of "ecstatic openness". This zone of time

Martin Heidegger, <u>Sein und Zeit</u> (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927).

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as ecstatic openness is the same as the zone of transcendence; it is the zone of freedom which completes the first step of Heidegger's thought about freedom. Unlike the disparate "sequence of nows" in the traditional concept, the new thought about time concentrates on the unity of the three tenses (now called three "ecstasies"). They are a threefold-unity, existing as three only in tension with their unity. The whole result of this three-one tension is an open zone in which transcendental freedom as the threefold "freedom toward the ground" occurs. The new concept of time allows past and future to be contemporaneous with present because it restores to what has been and to what comes out of the future what is proper to them. This thought about time and freedom remains perhaps the strangest and most difficult of Heidegger's thoughts. It is this thought about time which makes it possible to hear the richness of Hölderlin's naming of the holy.

It must suffice at this point to say that "the free" incorporates this thought of time as region. But this "temporal region" of ecstatic openness is not a replacement of our usual conception of region as <u>spatial</u>. These questions of the meaning of spatial and temporal cannot be isolated. If "temporal" has been rethought, then "spatial" must be as well. Our usual notion of space (as "atemporal", so to speak) is also called into question. Heidegger's region of the truth of Being includes not only the

rethinking of the threefold time but also of the "fourfold" which gives room or space.

(g) The relation of freedom and truth.

Heidegger's discussion of freedom is deeply imbedded in his discussion of truth. The region is the region of the truth of Being. There is a sense in which we can say that Heidegger stands with those who say "the truth sets us free". But this remains abstract and could be misleading until we say what he thinks the happening of truth is. Very briefly, Heidegger believed from the start that truth is disclosure or revelation. He was directed by his interpretation of the Greek word " $\dot{a}\lambda\eta\Theta$ translated literally as "unhiddenness" or "unconcealment" (with emphasis on the \propto -privative). In the first step of his thought, such an interpretation lent weight to the discussion of freedom as grounding, which brings the truth out of concealment. At this point, concealment is conceived as inauthenticity (as mere immersion in the current modes). Later he came to see the other half of the implication of the word "unconcealment" more deeply and fully. All revelation presumes a veiling, all unconcealment is necessarily at the same time conceal-This widening of awareness coincides with the second step in ment. the discussion of freedom. The freedom which grounds the truth of the current modes is itself grounded in the truth of Being.

> "Freedom . . . is the essence of truth (in the sense of rightness of representation) therefore only because

freedom itself arises from the original essence of truth, from the rule of mystery in error."⁷

"Concealed and always concealing itself is that which liberates, the mystery."⁸

The "step back" (both step one and two together), which is the step into the development of the truth of Being is the step from "freedom to untruth". In speaking of the rule of mystery in error, Heidegger names what is happening as a <u>double</u> concealment. Along with inauthentic, mere immersion in the current modes, there rules the mystery which liberates. When we "free ourselves" from mere immersion, we still face concealment. The "double concealment" names the dual structure of the "two steps" in its negative character. And to put it this negative way as well is essential; it shows that these "steps" call attention to what is <u>happening</u> not just to what we do.

After the second step, Heidegger shows that not only is the efficacy and necessity of calling the current modes into question concealed. Also concealed is the mode of the determination

[&]quot;Die Freiheit, aus der in-sistenten Ek-sistenz des Daseins begriffen, ist das Wesen der Wahrheit (im Sinne der Richtigkeit des Vor-stellens) nur deshalb, weil die Freiheit selbst dem anfänglichen Wesen der Wahrheit, dem Walten des Geheimnisses in der Irre, entstammt." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 93.

[&]quot;Verborgen aber ist und immer sich verbergend das Befreiende, das Geheimnis." Martin Heidegger, <u>Die Technik und die Kehre</u>, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962), p. 25.

of freedom, were it revealed. The present situation militates against "rebelling" in the name of the legimacy of the current modes. In so doing, it militates as well against a true submission. <u>Complete</u> freedom needs to be aware of this "double need" which Heidegger calls the rule of mystery in error, the rule of double untruth as part of the truth of Being.

(h) Mystery as the region and the matter of "the beyond".

Heidegger interprets the German word "Geheimnis" (mystery) quite literally, as he does the words "heimlich" (secret) and "unheimlich" (uncanny). The way we are at home, is in some way secret, concealed, unknown and thus uncanny. We are liberated by a region which is mysterious or full of mystery. The mystery is the ruling and unfolding of the home region which conceals itself and in so doing frees and enfolds us. For Hölderlin and Heidegger, the experience of region is of something sent or given. We are freed, more originally because we belong into the region of "what is sent" (das Geschick). With this discussion of the rule of mystery as what is sent, there arises a need for the most careful and delicate distinctions. For some staunch liberals, a phrase like "the rule of mystery" spells coercion in the name of a fraudulent "other world", invoked by an elite to justify their rule. For some opponents of liberalism the phrase may sound like a roundabout justification of formless pluralism, because it seems to

push what is decisive into impotence because nothing can be said about it. In fact Heidegger argues constantly against coercion, against the "other world" and against formlessness. We are liberated and determined but not coerced. If the determination can be called liberation, this is because it completes but does not cancel or replace the first step of the disclosure of freedom as the groundless ground of the current modes. We are required to listen and respond to the whole of what is occurring. What occurs simply does not do so in a way which warrants blind following. It occurs in a very strange way, in a partly negative way. In our Western tradition, this strange way things happen has found manifold expression. According to Heidegger, all of these expressions have been what he calls "metaphysical". They have in different ways tried to "climb out", tried to find a "way out", tried to transcend the world they are in. They may have posited a "world beyond" or they may have asserted their ability to "think beyond" what is given.

Where does Heidegger stand in this matter of "beyond"? He speaks of "belonging into the region . . .". He does not say "belonging <u>in</u> the region . . .". The German phrase is "in den Bereich zu gehören". The accusative clearly indicates movement of some sort. If it were "belonging <u>in</u>", it would mean either (1) we are not now where we belong (implying we could be somewhere else) or (2) we are

already inside the region and no movement is needed. Differing from both of these meanings, Heidegger's accusative indicates that we are "in" the region and that this "being-in" needs movement.

It is often difficult to remain in touch with this discussion of "regions". We allow ourselves to slip back into a "conceptual" sort of discussion and within that sort of discussion, Heidegger's statements continue to sound mystifying. But he wants to jolt us back into "trusting" the experience we already have, which supposedly has been discredited by modes, which are in fact derived from and impossible without the very experience they supposedly discredit. If we take thought back into the region we are in, or rather if we allow it again to be in this region, we begin to see what is mystifying in the merely conceptual form of thought.

But we need to be wary of oversimplifying what it is to keep in touch with the region. The "retuning" into the experience of where we are is a matter of immense difficulty. For a start there remains a tendency to think of region in a particular way, that is, in a <u>spatial</u> way (and that means a particular form of "spatial"). And even if we begin to get a sense of the meaning of region as "ecstatic openness" we tend to forget its negative quality. We are not in touch with region when we picture in our minds a volume of enclosed space we are in, that is as far as we can see, hear, etc. To say a phrase like "the region of speechlessness" continues to

sound mystifying unless we allow the region to be more than an opening in which we can speak, see and hear.

Heidegger's thought about "belonging into . . . " must be his way of dealing with the matter which formerly has been dealt with in "the language of the beyond". To begin by putting the matter in a way which may at first seem facile, Heidegger clearly opposes the notion of "an other world". This is a misplacement of Being. Over against this misplacement, Heidegger stands with those who bring things back down to earth. But he also opposes the primacy of "this world" and the primacy of "human freedom". Obviously there is a vast difference between the primacy of the other world and the primacy of this world, but in one deep way they are the same. They both seek to transcend. They are both metaphysical. The matter which led to a division into sensible and super-sensible worlds is not dealt with by choosing instead "just the sensible". And just as little can there be a return to the super-sensible. Heidegger's question is what rules in the difference, in "the between", the strange negative-positive region out of which and in which we are liberated.

Heidegger's questioning led him to examine the literal meanings of key metaphors, first of all of "beyond" ("jenseits", meaning literally "that side" or "the other side"). In the same league are "before" which supposedly has at least three distinct meanings,

(logically "prior", temporally "prior" and spatially "in front of"), and "behind", "above", "beneath", "around", "in the midst of". Heidegger discovered that these 'metaphors' mean what they say. They are descriptions. We can't say "beyond" and then say that we mean it "figuratively" or "symbolically". When we speak of "transcending to the world beyond", do we mean to another world "like this world but perfected"? Heidegger eventually stopped using transcendental language because he came to see it so heavily laden with the misplacement of Being to the detriment of Being. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche's attempt to think beyond good and evil is the completion of the misplacement of Being, whereby it became possible for thought to respond to the matter which brought this misplacement forth. Transcendence is the way in which Being has found expression in our history, culminating now in the planetary rule of technique. This tradition is our sole access to Being. In ceasing to overcome, we do so, in debt to the tradition of overcoming.

> "The introductory definition (in <u>Being in Time</u>): "Being is the transcendens absolutely" compresses into one simple sentence the way in which the ruling and unfolding of Being has hitherto cleared itself for man."⁹

When Heidegger speaks of "belonging into . . . " a region, or something "ruling behind", or "hidden rule", we can at least be sure

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"Die einleitende Bestimmung "Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin" nimmt die Weise, wie sich das Wesen des Seins bisher dem Menschen lichtete, in einen einfachen Satz zusammen." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 168. that he does not mean there is another world to which we owe our allegiance. The "into" indicates rather that the region is not our possession and it indicates the permanent need for our movement in cooperation with the movement of the whole. But the region we think we are in (or "into") is still the one we <u>are</u> into. We have a lot to learn about it, for we block our awareness of it in so many ways. The current modes of the world we are in, are conditioned by free openness. This openness or open region is groundless. The groundlessness is the veil of Being. All these things are true of one and the same region.

If we examine what is occurring we must discover that part of what is occurring is not <u>immediately</u> accessible to us. To transcend is to focus on this part of what is occurring alone, explaining it either in terms of "where it comes from" or "how it is thought". Heidegger tries rather (1) to focus on this part <u>and</u> (2) at the same time to see its interconnection, however strange, with the rest of what is occurring, and that means with what is occurring immediately. What is ruling and unfolding is past and future as well as present. But past and future only "rule via" what is present. What is ruling is not only man, but also earth, sky and gods, though they rule in the mode of withdrawal leaving us to our own resources. What rules is hidden in part but it also includes the immediate. Heidegger opposes the positivists when he describes

what is occurring in terms of <u>all</u> the origins, including those which rule in a hidden and thus negative way. But he also opposes those who would mystify with "the hidden origin or rule", because <u>he insists on the connection of the hidden and unhidden rule</u>. (i) Three "models" of the experience of the region.

I suggest the following three "models" of what the experience of the <u>region</u> means in Heidegger's discussion: (1) the perceptual (2) the political (3) the productive. All three help to show what is implied in all the discussions of the region. They should not be "reified" or considered to be sub-categories of Heidegger's thought. I hope only that they might help to render that thought accessible, by speaking about its implication in the terms of more familiar experience. And even within this limitation, they are not intended to exhaust the implications by any means.

(1) The first model is "perceptual", the region in which our perceptual encounter with the things occurs. There is always a danger with this model, of misconstruing this regional encounter as purely spatial, but a great deal can be learned even within such a misconstrual. It is a major jump to become aware of the priority of the region and the encounter over its two participants, the subject and the object. In <u>The Essence of Truth</u>, Heidegger calls attention to a region, "the open" (das Offene) in which there are two simultaneous occurrences: (1) we represent the things, that is, we

make propositions which agree with the things, (2) the things make themselves known to us by crossing the space between themselves and us, while at the same time staying where they are.

(2) The second model is "political", the region with obvious temporal or historical implications. This temporal implication makes the use of the word region here a little more strange and "analogous". But the political region is quite "primal" and genuine. The Greek word " $\pi \dot{\phi} \lambda i \varsigma$ " once denoted the region where the Greeks were at home. The political region involves both the historical "situation" we are in, and the "place" we are in thinking both geographically and with regard to the matter of political authority. Both our <u>allegiance</u> to constituted authority and our responsibility for <u>change</u> occur within a political (historical and geographical) <u>situation</u>.

Heidegger seldom speaks directly and explicitly about politics as we normally conceive it. We can, however, learn a great deal from some of the few statements he did make. In 1953, in the <u>Introduction to Metaphysics</u>, he allowed a phrase to stand which had been written in 1936 for a lecture: ". . . inner truth and greatness (of the national socialist <u>movement</u>)". And he added in 1953, in parentheses: "(the encounter of planetarily-defined technique and 10 modern man)". Both the words "inner" and "encounter" (Begegnung)

". . . inneren Wahrheit und Größe dieser Bewegung (nämlich . . . Begegnung der planetarisch bestimmten Technik und des neuzeitlichen Menschen). . ." Martin Heidegger, <u>Einführung in die</u> <u>Metaphysik</u>, 2nd edition (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957), p. 152.

have clear "regional" implications. (This is drawn out especially in the discussion of "in" and "region" in chapter four, on the conversation about engagement into the region.) Heidegger sees the movement (Bewegung) of national socialism having an awareness of what we are <u>in</u>, in the modern world, that is "region-less" or "homeless", planetarily defined technique. Presumably this awareness brought the Germans to the brink of a free relation with this technique, but "external" realities engulged and swallowed the movement; under Hitler's leadership the regime became another "metaphysical" one. The problem of politics of this time is homelessness or regionlessness. This is another reason why any talk of "political region" seems strange. But to articulate the <u>way</u> we are without a home, is for Heidegger, to think the dimension through which we can learn what our home is.

(3) The third model is "the productive", the region which draws attention to the obvious: production shapes the world we are in. This production includes thought, art, building, working and loving. On a simple level, how we build and rebuild our homes literally "determines" the kind of space or room we live in, not only in the "pure" perceptual sense, but also in the sense of its capacity or incapacity to help us be peaceful and to handle what concerns us. The same can be said of building and preserving towns and cities. And of course our country. And at this time we inhabit

the whole planet in a way which brings this larger dimension as well, necessarily into the matters which concern us.

Heidegger speaks about the essence of modern technique which now rules over the whole planet in "productive" terms. "Gestell" is his name for the essence of modern technique as a region in which we are "provoked to provoke" everything and everyone. Provocation does not allow the region to come near and thus does not allow us to be at home. At the same time, however, becoming aware that technique is provocation does make us aware that we are producers, or beings that bring truth out of concealment. The predominance of "now" time which cuts off past and future and the predominance (in provocation) of the human producer oblivious to what is produced, together conceal the ruling origins of threefold time and four-fold play. As such they conceal or preserve the home region in homelessness.

(j) Freedom and the "clearing" (Lichtung)

The region called "the free" can be experienced (1) as open, but also (2) as enclosing. This dual experience is involved in the word "Lichtung" (clearing). The word can mean a clearing in the forest or a lit-up space. The verb "lichten" means to clear, to light up, and also to lighten (as opposed to making heavy). The region of the free is like a clearing in the forest. The forest surrounds the clearing and thus enables it to be a clearing (like

an oasis which is such because of its desert surrounding). The boundaries of the clearing are the "ending" of the forest at the edge of the clearing: they are not only the stopping of the clearing at the edge of the forest. The clearing is bounded and determined by the end of the forest.

Freedom is the disclosure of Being and this disclosure occurs in part as Being's self-concealment. Thus freedom is, properly considered, no longer just the ruling and unfolding of the cleared region, but rather the ruling and unfolding of the border or boundary region where there occurs a <u>clearing and</u> concealing.

> "Freedom is the clearing-concealing (lichtend Verbergende), in whose clearing (Lichtung) the veil wafts which covers the way of all truth's coming to be and lets the veil appear as coverer."¹¹

But even with this widening of our awareness of what a "clearing" involves, there is still the danger of missing the whole of what Heidegger's second step intends. The forest is not "something which surrounds clearings". The forest does do that but we haven't said what the forest is when we say that. Being is only "the ground of freedom" from the standpoint of freedom.

"Die Freiheit ist das lichtend Verbergende, in dessen Lichtung jener Schleier weht, der das Wesende aller Wahrheit verhüllt und den Schleier als den verhüllenden erscheinen 1\st." Heidegger, Die Technik . . ., p. 25.

"But what still appears as ground from this point of view is presumably something else, once it is experienced in its own terms -- something as yet unsaid according to which the essence of metaphysics, too, is something else and not metaphysics."¹²

To allow that the forest is the bounder of a clearing still does not give the forest (of which the clearings are a part) proper credit. This is still to think of it as "set up" primarily to provide enclosure. And at the same time, in corollary fashion, proper credit is not given to the clearing if it is represented as "grounded". Transcendental-metaphysical-representational thinking fails to give proper credit either to the forest or to its clearings.

To stand in the middle of a clearing is to stand in the forest. When speaking of borders and boundaries, we tend to think of the actual edge where the forest meets the clearing. But if we are in the forest when we are in the middle of the clearing, then the forest and the clearing must "end" there in the middle as well. The forest determines, <u>pervades</u> and encloses the clearing at every point. An analogy from Heidegger's thought about death might help to clarify this strange determination. Death consists not only in the fact that we will cease at some future moment. We also end at the moment of birth. It also means there are limits

"Allein das, was so noch als Grund erscheint, ist vermutlich, wenn es aus ihm selbst erfahren wird, ein Anderes und noch Ungesagtes, demgem# auch das Wesen der Metaphysik etwas anderes ist als die Metaphysik." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 197.

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to how far we can see, hear, touch and smell. And it concerns the fact that we live within a particular language, in a particular epoch and in a certain region. Then strangest of all, but most pertinent to the point at hand, when we look inward we also reach a limit beyond which we cannot penetrate. Death is the whole of the ways we <u>end</u>, including the nothingness which pervades us within. The clearing is not only bordered at the edges by the forest, the clearing is pervaded by darkness. At every point the clearing is dependent on the darkness out of which it comes. Thus "the border region" surrounds the clearing also in the sense of pervading it.

(k) Freedom and the border region of self and other.

To "save the essence of freedom" we need to bring what is <u>other</u> than human and <u>other</u> than things into the centre or into "the middle". The middle of the question of freedom is no longer the character of <u>self</u> but rather the border region between self and what is other: This border region is not a "Heideggerian concept"; it is the region we are in though we may in varying degrees block the experience of it as it is. In a mysterious, wonderful way this region enables the encounter between us and things. The fact that we reach an abyss when we examine ourselves and the things around us, that we reach a point for example where all clear guidance seems to fall away or break off; this fact has

been thought through by many. What sets Heidegger apart is that he fastens himself to this groundlessness, to nihilism, and, although he does not stand within the Christian faith or within Judaism, he comes to see in this nihilism a necessary "positive" and preserving event.

The step from the truth of immersion in the current modes to freedom, brought us face to face with freedom's abysmal quality. But this abyss is not an end in the sense that examination stops there, but rather in the sense that our end is that through which we are defined. In his early work, Heidegger studied the negativity of the region in two ways, as the "ontological difference" and as "the nothing". The ontological difference, he called "the not between beings and Being" and the nothing was the "not" as "Being experienced out of beings". One achievement of Heidegger's thought between 1929 and 1949 was to come to appreciate that these two "nots" are "the same" insofar as they "belong together in the 13 prevailing of the Being of being". Until the ontological difference is brought into its sameness with the nothing, it tends to overemphasize the human responsibility in the operation, as transcendent freedom. Until the nothing is brought into its sameness with the difference it tends to overemphasize the departure from things and allegiance to what is beyond.

> 13 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 21.

The usual idea of freedom, whether it be self-realization, self-perfection or self-determination, attaches itself to the fact of <u>self causing itself</u> (whether this be an I-self or a we-self). Even the kind of freedom wherein it is asserted that we are "set free by the truth", can remain self-oriented. The truth is given "from beyond" so to speak into the region of freedom already intact. One of Heidegger's approaches to the question of freedom is to examine the idea of self causing itself, and to show that the nature of this self is, in this idea, assumed and unquestioned. This assumption needs to be faced. What this self is, is determined in some way. To appreciate the whole of what rules and unfolds in the self it is necessary to accept the border region between self and other.

To be free means to be freed. On the face of it, such a statement seems to be either another version of the "positive freedom" which I have suggested is untenable, or a linguistic subterfuge. For negative freedom, it is assumed, only stands as absolutely unconditioned. (Existentialism is the radicalization of the stance of liberalism, of the stance of the freedom of man.) But Heidegger engages "the between region" and shows that freedom and determination occur together. The self is determined out of the region where self and other meet in a way which does not coerce though it is the sine qua non of "freedom" and "self" having meaning in the first place.

3. The free and the fourfold.

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(a) The fourfold binds into the free.

The fourfold (das Geviert) is a relationship (Verhältnis) between four "components" of earth and sky, mortals and gods. The relationship is called "a gathering", with both the verbal and substantive senses of the word involved. The gathering occurs when <u>things</u> are, providing and defining the room in which we dwell. The complicated interrelation of the four components is called mirror-play; none of the four stands on its own except out of its standing together in unity with the others.

> "The mirroring, binding into the free is the play that betroths the four each to each out of the folding hold of the appropriation."¹⁴

The mirror play of the four binds each of the four (thus including the mortals) into the region called the free which at the same time sets each of the four free into its own. In the folding and unfolding of the fugal dance of Being there is a <u>hold</u> which encloses us and opens a place for us to move. We cooperate in a fourfold operation like one voice of a quartet or a four part fugue. Our freedom is part of the essence of the free. It is conditioned by (in the mode of being a part of) the binding into and being bound into the free. We are called <u>mortals</u> because we are able to be aware of death as death, we are able to "end", we are able to let

[&]quot;Das ins Freie bindende Spiegeln ist das Spiel, das jedes der Vier jedem zutraut aus dem faltenden Halt der Vereignung." Martin Heidegger, <u>Vorträge und Aufsätze</u>, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954) p. 178.

what is <u>other</u> than us, Be. Putting the capacity for death as death into use means the cooperative <u>production</u> of things, which gather the fourfold and thus unite us with what is other than us. (b) The "history" of the fourfold in the works examined:

The Essence of Ground

In the group of works examined in this thesis, the fourfold is not unfolded explicitly until "The Thing" (1950). But the "matter" of the fourfold makes itself felt from the start in various ways. The final unfolding in "The Thing" is the culmination of a long road from the twenties to the fifties. In The Essence of 15 Ground (1929) Heidegger poses what he calls the "problem of ground" and suggests that this problem can only be approached by first describing the horizon in which the essence of ground occurs. The problem of ground is the question of Being. What is "the project of the world"? Heidegger begins the treatise by situating his treatment of the problem of ground in the history of metaphysics, which he briefly sketches, beginning with Aristotle. Heidegger reports that Aristotle asserted that there are three first principles or grounds $(\alpha \rho)$ and four "causes" (χi) which are also called grounds ($\langle \kappa \rho \chi \kappa \iota \rangle$). In all, there are seven grounds making up a threefold division and a fourfold division. Heidegger questions (the question of Being) the unity of the threefold, the unity of the fourfold and the connection of all the seven.

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 21ff.

15

Various expressions of these divisions appear throughout Heidegger's works and the unfolding and interweaving of <u>Heidegger's</u> threefold and fourfold (with the cooperation of the poet) is the major theme of this thesis.

Because the treatise on the <u>essence</u> of ground presents the ground itself, only as a problem, the fourfold is deliberately not unfolded. It is deemed necessary first to describe the threefold grounding in the horizon of transcendence in order to bring the negativity of the problem into the center of concern. The task of the treatise is to describe the heart of free transcendence as groundless. The result of this focus is to present the fourfold only as causality which needs to be transcended or grounded in freedom. What is other is not yet unfolded because it is thought to be necessary first to describe the self. (c) The history of the fourfold: The Essence of Truth

In the discussion of truth and freedom in <u>The Essence of</u> <u>16</u> <u>Truth</u> (1930), the matter of the fourfold is always present though it is never mentioned as such. Heidegger says of this lecture that it continues to leave the region of the truth of Being not unfolded. To a considerable extent, it operates still within the horizon of <u>The Essence of Ground</u>. At the same time, in its decisive steps it is part of "the overcoming" of this horizon. Step one leads from truth as propositional correctness to freedom. Step two leads from

> 16 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 73ff.

freedom to the rule of mystery in error. These steps correspond to the "structure" of truth which Heidegger illustrates with reference to not only his "own truth" but also to "mediaeveal truth" and "Kantian truth". The structure of truth is fourfold in a way which anticipates the later work. We (#1) correctly represent, propose or correspond to an object (#2) only because the thing (#3) corresponds to an essence (#4) which we know beforehand. This whole relation is not a matter of <u>coercive</u> predetermination because freedom (and thus negation) is the middle term or focus of the four components. This middle term, freedom, is the essence of the free. It occurs in the region where the threefold and the fourfold meet and interweave. In Mediaeval truth, this middle region was called creation; in Kantian truth, world reason; in Heidegger's truth, the rule of mystery in error.

Things come toward us and hold us and at the same time we take them in or represent them. Truth is the unity of these two movements. The ground region is the unity of these two movements. The ground region is the unity of the threefold. It is the meeting place or gathering place of all the seven origins as they are rethought (or rather as what matters in them is rethought) by Heidegger. When he speaks in <u>The Essence of Truth</u> of a "more original" truth, we can read this quite literally as a truth which includes more of the seven origins, however hidden their rule may be.

(d) The history of the fourfold: What Is Metaphysics? (Epilogue)

The epilogue (1943) to What Is Metaphysics? (1929) takes up again the matter of the negativity of Being which attunes or determines us. The zone of transcendence and the region of the truth of Being are called the "nots" of the ontological difference and the nothing, the not between beings and Being, and the not of Being itself seen from beings. The Essence of Ground brings the problem of man's nothingness in the midst of beings to the centre of concern. The objects are not absolute; they are conditioned by or grounded in freedom, itself groundless. But this groundless freedom receives its determination from the more original truth of Being, which operates as the not of the nothing, the veil of Being. What enables the epilogue to be the break-through that it is, is the assignment of the task of "receiving the nothing" in part to Hölderlin. Receiving the nothing (Being) is both saying Being and naming the holy. Heidegger says the truth of dread (Angst) and then we can hear Hölderlin's naming of awe (Scheu), which clears and enfolds a dwelling place for mortals.

Four of Heidegger's Hölderlin studies had appeared at

	17
	Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 99ff.
	18
	Heidegger, Erläuterungen, "Heimkunft/An die Verwandten"
(1943)	, "Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung" (1936), "Wie wenn am

Feiertage . . ." (1939), and "Andenken" (1943).

this time. These studies tell of the naming of the holy, but it is in the epilogue that something more is said about the cooperation of thinker and poet in the engagement into the region of the truth of Being. The matter of this cooperation comes to be the way in which the threefold is understood in the context of the fourfold in the later works, especially 'Hölderlin's Earth and Sky". (e) The history of the fourfold: "Toward the determination of

the place of engagement" and the "Letter on Humanism" 19 20

The conversation (1944) and the letter (1946) are about thought and the essence of man engaged into the region of the truth of Being. Their main preoccupation is the nature of this region, and especially with its being the same as the zone of transcendence. They continue to draw out the nature of the nearing of Being while showing its reciprocity with man as the "essence of the far", as the being who reaches out to the world. They also begin the task of thinking "the near" and "the far" together with what is actual. There was a tendency in 1929 and 1943 to concentrate first on the "not" of the future, (what is not-yet toward which we project), and then on the "not" of the past, (what is no-longer but nevertheless remains to be established). The future and past "heritage" only rules via what is present and actual, and the works between 1943 and 1949 make this point and thus prepare the way for

Martin Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u> (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1959). 20 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 145ff.

the works on homelessness and the fourfold.

(f) The unfolding of the fourfold in "The Thing".

In the conversation and the letter the region of the truth of Being is given different names such as the region (die Gegnet), the clearing (die Lichtung), the homeland (die Heimat) the near (die Nähe) and the free (das Freie). There are many hints and outlines given in these works about how the fourfold is involved in the nearing of the region, but the fourfold mirror-play is still not fully unfolded until the lecture on "The Thing" (1950) . In the description of the pitcher, the threefold and the fourfold are both unfolded together. They are gathered in the pitcher's ourpoured gush, the gift of wine and water. In this description, Heidegger unfolds how the mirror play of the fourfold which holds us is mediated in the thing, the pitcher. The pitcher (as a threefold thing) is able to take in and to keep and thus to gather or grasp and to give out what is given, the gift of the fourfold, the wine and water which gathers earth and sky, mortals and gods. Things mediate the nearness of Being, at the same time mediating the farness of man. With the unfolding of the fourfold and the threefold together Heidegger believes that he has shown how the world "worlds" or rules.

> 21 Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 163ff.

"The nearing of the near is the true and sole dimension of the mirror play of the world." $^{\rm 22}$

(g) Man as producer who dwells into the free in "Building, Dwelling, Thinking".

"The Thing" and "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" are complementary. They both speak of man and Being with both threefold and fourfold unfolded together. Being is emphasized in "The Thing" and man or rather "the essence of man" is emphasized in "Building, Dwelling, Thinking". The phrase "to dwell into the free" brings to language what it is for the threefold and the fourfold to belong together. To dwell is to spare (schonen) the fourfold, to remain preserved into the free, to remain in the mirror-play which binds into the free. To say "into the free" is to concentrate on the fourfold as a unity. The same thing is said concentrating on "the fourness" of the fourfold, when "into the free" is said to be "on the earth", that is, "under the sky", that is, "before the gods", that is "into the communality of the mortals".

What we are and what we do is earth and sky, gods and mortals together. We are sons of the earth ("human"). Standing on the earth which bears us, we stand at the same time under the temple

"Das Nähern der Nähe ist die eigentliche und die einzige Dimension des Spiegel-Spiels der Welt." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 180.

23 Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 145ff.

of the sky, which guides us with its rhythms and encloses and opens the region of light in which we meet one another. In this region, though the gods have withdrawn, we remain concerned by what is holy and what unholy. And no one of us can find what is holy by whimself. (Just as "man" binds and is bound into the free with the three others.)

We spare the fourfold when we produce things. In one event or operation we free and are freed. The peace (Friede) which comes in being freed cannot be separated from the cooperative production which frees. To <u>dwell into</u> the free is <u>to stay</u> with the things: to <u>be on</u> the earth and <u>under</u> the sky is <u>to save</u> the earth and <u>to receive</u> the sky. To <u>remain before</u> the gods is <u>to anticipate</u> or <u>wait</u> for them. <u>To belong into</u> the communality of mortals is <u>to put</u> the capacity for death as death into use. Dwelling needs building and to build is to build out of dwelling. Production cooperates in the gathering of the fourfold in things which determine the structure or home region in which we belong. Production allows things to determine the room in which we dwell.

The region of the truth of Being is the whole rule of the threefold and the fourfold. It is "the free where freedom saves its essence". This thesis of Heidegger's can and should be taken in two complementary ways: (1) "Modern freedom" which understands itself essentially as "freedom <u>from</u> coercion" can only survive and

continue (that is, can only save itself from disappearing from what is occurring) if it sees deep in itself the ground region where it is attuned and determined by a "more original" truth. (2) But "saves" also means "preserves", "keeps hidden or enclosed", "holds back". Heidegger draws out the fact that to free means to enclose, protect and preserve. "Freedom saves its essence in the free" means also that freedom "learns to die", that freedom acknowledges that part of what rules it is other than it and it allows this other to be what it is, however mysterious. The free is the region of the liberating rule of mystery in error. In the free, freedom allows itself to be ruled in part by what remains unknown, unspoken and veiled. Freedom saving its essence is both the vindication of freedom in its continued unfolding and the preservation of its source. Freedom saving its essence is what is occurring in this time. It is the self-dissimulation of the mediated fourfold in the immediacy of the terror of homelessness.

(h) The self-dissimulation of the fourfold in the essence of modern technique.

All this talk of the fourfold seems either utopian or nostalgic. Things mediate what binds us into the free and sets us free into cur own. But things do not come near. They are denied an appearance. We must <u>become</u> mortal. We need to learn to dwell. Doesn't this mean that we are not yet free or that we are no-longer

free? As a <u>whole</u>, the threefold and the fourfold rule for the most part in the mode of being denied. Thus the rule which "houses" us, announces itself as a <u>need</u> for a home region. Determination announces itself in indeterminacy, nearness as "distancelessness", homeland as homelessness. The region of the free announces itself in the tyranny of modern technique. Now that we are no longer sure who speaks the truth, we begin to learn again what truth is and how it happens.

Heidegger's mature doctrine describes Being as modern technique, and at the same time asserts that change is occurring out of the essence of it. Man can enter into, engage or encounter the whole essence of technique and only in this way will "freedom save its essence". Man is the guardian of language which is the house of Being. When man learns to dwell in the whole of what is occurring, this dwelling is accomplished by thinking and building each according to its own laws. This cooperation between thought and building as the essence of man is exemplified for Heidegger in the cooperation of the thinker's discovery of homelessness and the poet's naming of the homeland out of this homelessness.

The earth continues to be mangled and the sky "explored". What concrete difference does it make to say that the gods have flown rather than to say we have swept away old superstitions? Humans seem to be decisively fragmented. It is not hard to see

the desire to flee the world (so prevalent in this century of "disillusionment") to the past or the future, to the woods or into the interior of the mind. And this is only to speak of some few who even have a choice whether to flee or not. This century has produced the vision of the wasteland and the air-conditioned nightmare. The two typical responses to the world so envisioned have both been catastrophic: (1) "Heroic" disdain for what is occurring and the consequent sanctioning (often tragically unwitting) of the bludgeoning of what is present in the name of some vision of past or future. (2) Contempt for such "idealism", which in reaction to it, clings to what is immediately present as if it were an heirloom, reinforcing the forces which resist and block change.

Heidegger's thought about the essence of technique, homelessness and the coming of the fourfold is his way of engaging this problem. In the course of his work he moves from a stance of overcoming to one of ceasing to overcome. A surface look gives the impression that he moved from the "early heroic" to the "later acquiescent". But the appearance is false as I hope this thesis will show. The attempt to show that it is false led Heidegger and leads his students to think a lot about the relation of early and later work. The integration of the "two stances" into a "dual stance" can be expressed as "entering into the ruling, self-governing,

unfolding and declining of what is occurring, that is the selfdissimulation of the fourfold in the essence of modern technique. Freedom consists in thought about what is not-yet experienced of the essence of technique in technique, and in building what is no-longer preserved of the essence of art, when it is conceived as aesthetic. Heidegger sees his task to have been to think about the double danger with which modern technique engulfs us. He believes that this thought makes it possible to hear the richness of Hölderlin's art. The cooperation appreciates the truth about this time which Heidegger thinks Hölderlin named when he said

> "But where the danger is That which saves also grows."²⁴

Does "the ruling and unfolding of modern technique" say what is occurring? Does "homelessness" express the way we experience what is occurring? Can we hear the announcement of "the homeland" out of this experience? If we accept this cooperative saying and naming, we give credence to what I would call "the strange character of reverence for tradition in the time of modern freedom". <u>Our</u> <u>only access to what is given or delivered to us</u> is what is given us in the world and time we are in. Thus reverence can only be restored by <u>freedom saving its essence</u>, not by a leap "out of freedom back to reverence". The ruling and unfolding of modern technique is not the

24 "Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst Das Rettende auch." From "Patmos", quoted for example in Heidegger, Die Technik, p. 28.

result of the "coming of modernity", nor as the achievement of the bourgeois class. It is these things but <u>more essentially</u> it is the completion or "full-ending" of the whole Western tradition of transcending.

- 4. Heidegger's "answers": What is occurring and what it is to enter into the essence of what is occurring. (What is the free and what is freedom?)
- (a) The strangeness of Heidegger's answer which does not propose, as we expect, that we "do" something or "change our consciousness".

According to Heidegger, we are being attuned or "retuned" through homelessness to be at home. The thoughtful experience of the self-dissimulation of the fourfold is strange and difficult because we have become strangers to the simple truth. We are homeless strangers in our own home. One of the reasons that Heidegger's thought seems to mystify, to seduce and entice, is the fact that he calls all the usual accepted categories into question. This means that if we take him seriously, we have to prepare ourselves for an unusual sort of answer, and not too quickly condemn him on the basis of what he <u>appears</u> to say from our usual <u>perspective</u>. He has not written an "ethics" or a "politics" but his thought is ethical and political from start to finish.

It often seems that Heidegger forsakes the "real world we

all have to survive in", that he "brackets" the concrete world in order to deal with some deep inner world, the world of origins. But he makes clear that the rethinking of the usual categories is a return to where we already are. He is not withdrawing from the real world. Is he suggesting then a "change in attitude" or a "change ("raising") in consciousness" in the midst of this real world? This is precisely not what he is urging. The words "attitude" and "consciousness" are not neutral words any more than "account" or "concept" are. They have a particular meaning which participates in a particular vision of "the way things are". And this particular vision prejudges the issue that Heidegger wishes to question. This way of speaking conceives the problem ahead of time in a way which precludes the kind of original questioning that he suggests. The same kind of prejudice operates if we speak of "values needing to be changed". All these ways of speaking for Heidegger are variants of "metaphysics", the most important recent example being "the transcendental philosophy". In modern Europe, metaphysics developed in the direction of the predominance of the transcendent will. Metaphysics culminates in what Heidegger calls subjectism.

"Subjectism" is the conception of what is other as "objective" in order to transform it. To make another change of attitude or shift in consciousness would be merely to continue in this rule of

will, of subject, of self. To stop "just changing attitude" is in part an act of will: we "will the non-willing". But the whole of the change is something sent. We experience homelessness in the predominance of will, whereby everything is "objectified" in terms of subject. The fact that everything is defined in terms of transcendent, conscious will, announces its own rootlessness. Another change in consciousness would not be an essential change. It would merely continue to secure the predominance of what is already real. The other origins which remain in oblivion (for example, the earth) nevertheless continue to rule. The meaning of "the will of the non-willing" in part, is the necessity of preserving the "other origins" via what confronts us in this time. Reaching to what is not-willed must occur via the current predominant mode, the will. This is our immediate heritage and our only access to the whole. But it cannot be separated from the whole to which it provides access. And thus the act of will which wills non-willing is not essentially a "change in attitude", or "consciousness", when "essentially" means in terms of all its origins including those whose rule is concealed. There are of course "changes in attitude" and these will continue to occur. But more of what rules in them is announcing itself.

Because Heidegger speaks against changes in attitude, does not mean that he is a "determinist" who "leaves things up to destiny".

Whether modern man will encounter global technique remains for Heidegger an open question! What will come is never <u>certain</u>. We may still be swamped by technique and therefore it seems as if something like a choice exists.

> "Whether also thought then, ends in the pushing of information, or whether there is defined for it a "going under" into the protection of its heritage which is hidden from it, remains the question. It (the question) directs thought now into the region this side of pessimism and optimism."²⁵

Heidegger does not present us with a "fait accompli" which he achieved along with Hölderlin. His thesis that freedom saves its essence in the free is a <u>challenge</u>. Just as in the early work we were confronted with a choice to be authentic or inauthentic, we now need either to <u>respond</u> to what <u>claims</u> us or to remain oblivious to it and thus a slave. (For what claims us rules in any case.) The response is not <u>essentially</u> a choice or an act of will, just as the essence of man is not man. But the essence of man also includes man as he is now, and no one knows if the change will occur.

Stepping back from mere consciousness is at the same time stepping back from mere doing (tun). And just as the experience

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"Ob dann auch das Denken im Informationsgetriebe verendet oder ob ihm ein Unter-Gang in den Schutz durch seine ihm selbst verborgene Herkunft bestimmt ist, bleibt die Frage. Sie verweist jetzt das Denken in die Gegend diesseits von Pessimismus und Optimismus." Heidegger, Wegmarken, "Vorbemerkung" (1967). of what rules consciousness does not <u>replace</u> consciousness, but rather <u>completes</u> it, so <u>waiting</u> does not replace doing. Essentially, originally, technique is not a human doing, but humans are needed (provoked) for it to occur. If we think of modern technique in relation to the seven origins which Aristotle named, it <u>seems</u> that only two of the seven rule visibly. (And these survive in a truncated, derivative way.) Of the three "first principles", "the first point from which a thing comes to be" and "the first point from which a thing is known" survive. And knowing is conceived in terms of "coming to be". "The first point from which a thing is" has dropped into oblivion along with knowing in relation to it. Of the four causes, the third, which we translate "efficient", predominates and in separation from the other three it appears as "creation ex nihilo" instead of "assembly" or "production".

Thus, a certain kind of knowing and a certain kind of making characterize the foreground of origination. Heidegger's original thinking concerns itself with the other four origins which rule in the background, <u>along with</u> those in the foreground. Nor does he ignore the difficult relation between background and foreground. (b) One part of learning to be free is learning that thinking is not "thinking in order to act".

The usual idea of what it is to have a free relation to the world, often consists of defining what is occurring scientifically

<u>in order to</u> do something with it or about it. We have only to think of physics, biology, sociology, psychology and economics. According to this idea we think in order to act. We define the world in order to engage it.

But Heidegger directs our awareness to the fact that to define the world is in itself to act! It is a revelation. At the heart of each of the modern sciences there are moments of poetry and original thought which are obscured under the demand of "objectivity". Heidegger too set out to describe what is occurring in order to do something about it. In the course of the attempt he discovered that "the in-order-to" is already in what is occurring. (Thought listens to what is coming toward us out of the future in what is occurring. This enables us to hear what remains out of what has been in what is occurring, which is established by the poets.) The thinker and the builder both act in the sense of producing or ushering forward what it is to dwell where we dwell. The thinker and the builder both act according to their own laws and neither acts in order to serve the other directly. They do serve each other indirectly since they both serve the same dwelling; they both dwell in the same place.

In order to encounter global technique as what is, modern man as thinker and builder needs to be liberated from what Heidegger has called the technical interpretation of thought. Thought is not

theory which exists to provide practise with models of how to act and what to do. Such a view of the matter, for Heidegger, perverts both thought and building as the twin producers of dwelling. Thought is <u>for</u> dwelling, not building. Building is <u>out of</u> dwelling, not thought. Thought questions about what is holy, but it brings no "way of salvation" (Heilsweg). Thought questions the legitimacy of institutions but does not institute or "legitimate".

(c) The thinker, the poet (builder) and everyone.

Heidegger asserts that being human is dwelling into the free and this is accomplished by thought and poetic building. This does not mean that Heidegger and Hölderlin, the thinker and poet, accomplish dwelling for all of us poor ordinary people. It does not mean that we "just dwell" (if we are lucky) and remain in debt to a very few poets and thinkers who provide us with a region to live in. Hölderlin's assertion that man dwells poetically on this earth, obviously refers to all men, not just poets or the few great poets in their moments of greatest song. The same applies to Heidegger's thought about thought. There is such a thing as master craftsmanship but what it grasps is what is sent and confronts all of us. The great thinkers and poets are such because they say and name what concerns us all and preserves us all. We all dwell in the world and time we are in; we all need to work, need to think, need to build.

(d) The "dual stance" in relation to law and language. The "practical" meaning of freedom saving its essence in the free.

What then is occurring and how do we handle it? What does it mean to say that we must <u>learn to dwell</u> where we already are? Should we learn to love computers? Should we decide to smash them? What does it mean concretely "to enter into the ruling and unfolding of technique or of nihilism"? The crux lies in the meaning of the <u>whole</u> of the ruling origin. (Not only the negative forces which rule in a hidden way, but also the "immediate" forces which rule "up front".) How can we embrace technique without being or becoming a technocrat? What happens to our acceptance of the foreground when we also accept the background? Submitting to the whole must mean in some sense, the rejection of the foreground, at least insofar as it pretends to be the whole. Our relation to the foreground becomes a <u>dual</u> matter of accepting and rejecting. This is always what we face in our relation to law and to language.

There are two ways of destroying reverence for law and language: one is strict adherence to the letter which ignores the spirit, of which the letter was vehicle. This letter then becomes an alien prison which chokes off spirit. The second way is to react so strongly to the first way, such that spirit becomes so antagonistic to the only articulation it knows, the prison, that it develops a contempt for articulation of any kind. It is thus incapable of

bringing to pass an authentic new letter, a new expression of what is old. In its obsession with spirit, it is liable to treat articulated law and language as a mere means, as an instrument or a technique. The difference between this second destruction of law and language and true reverence for law and language, which nevertheless breaks the walls of the prison, is very hard to hold. It must be worked out in fear and trembling in the mesh of what is occurring. It has to do with the ability to enter into the essence of tradition rather than seeking to transcend it.

(e) The task of thought and "religion". Engaging the free, the region of the truth of Being in the mesh of what is occurring.

To be able to enter into the essence of the tradition which is given to us, is to be able to accept it whole. Heidegger asserts that "a free play-space" still is granted to historical tradition 26 in which necessity can speak to us and claim us. But whether this is so, can only be proved if it <u>occurs</u>, that we respond to the claim. It could also be that we become more and more engulfed by cybernetic planning.

What is the place of religion in this challenge of Heidegger's (in which he invokes Hölderlin)? There is some debate about the true meaning of the Latin "religio", but if we accept both sides of the debate, the meaning would be something like: "Binding: the

"... daß geschichtlicher Überlieferung noch ein freier Spielraum für ihren Anspruch gewährt bleibt." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, Vorbemerkung.

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thoughtful rereading of the tradition". The word "thoughtful" points to the necessity for the continual rereading of the old in full awareness of what comes toward us out of the future in our own time. Without such awareness, we are not able to revere the tradition. "The tradition" includes (for the West) not only the coming of the holy in the Greek, Hebrew and Christian "namings" but also our more immediate heritage, the revelations within the era of "modern freedom" such as those of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche. (Again it must be remembered that the greatness of these revelations refers to what was revealed -- the tradition is the work, thought and building of everyone.)

The task of thought, according to Heidegger, is:

"... the surrender of thought up to now to the determination of the matter (Sache) of thought."27

"Thought up to now", that is, transcending, culminates in the triumph of modern technique to which we adopt a dual stance of accepting and rejecting. We accept it insofar as it is part of the essence of technique. The "matter" is the whole of what rules in modern technique. We reject technique in the name of what is not-yet experienced in it, as its essence. It is thus rejected insofar as it denies its essence.

"Die Aufgabe des Denkens wäre dann die Preisgabe des bisherige Denkens an die Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens". Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 80.

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(f) Immediate and mediate direction and freedom. Technique as self-dissimulation of the fourfold.

Immediacy (and indeterminacy) should be understood as "regionlessness" or absence of region, where the absence is not a "mere nothing" but rather is a mode of the rule of region. The four components of the fourfold are sometimes called "world regions", but their character as separate regions operates out of the middle (die Mitte) which mediates (die mittelt). We are a region but we dwell into the region of the free, into the middle of the four in our cooperation in the nearing of things.

The basic meaning of "immediate" is "non-mediate", that is, it denotes the absence of middle, of region. We have come to think of what is immediate as in some sense "all there is". We say that it means "direct", that is "directly verifiable by sense as opposed to accepted by faith or authority". We have come to fasten ourselves to the immediate, about which there is no mystery or uncertainty.

But what is occurring is that direction emerges indirectly, so to speak. The way direction rules is indirectly. What is immediate speaks of the mediate which remains concealed and thus preserved in its rule. The laws come out of chaos. Language comes out of silence. A work of art is such because it preserves its source in dwelling. It works against its own absolutization to the detriment of that about which it speaks.

"Freedom is the clearing-concealing, in whose clearing the veil wafts which covers the way of all truth's coming to be and lets the veil appear as coverer."²⁸

To identify the "directive" with what is direct in the sense of immediate is to mystify; it is to hide the fact that mystery liberates. It is to refuse to face up to the fact that we are strangely attuned, indirectly claimed.

5. The selection of the works examined in the thesis.

In the interpretation of Heidegger's thought, it is possible to expand indefinitely on any theme as it unfolds in relation to other themes, all of which together make up Heidegger's "question of Being". I have found it necessary to apply internal principles in delimiting what works I wanted to consider in order to draw out the thesis that freedom saves its essence in the free and the fourfold. I have chosen those works which I felt were necessary to make clear what the whole thesis is and to argue along with Heidegger for it.

Anyone who studies Heidegger's thought soon becomes aware that they will probably continue to learn from him as long as they continue to try. This is true, I think, whether they are clear from the start about some fundamental disagreement with him. And because we continue to learn, it is difficult to say at any point along the

28 "Die Freiheit ist das lichtend Verbergende, in dessen Lichtung jener Schleier weht, der das Wesende aller Wahrheit verhüllt und den Schleier als den verhüllenden erscheinen 14/t." Heidegger, Die Technik . . ., p. 25.

way: this is definitely what Heidegger is saying. There is simply the necessity to try to say as clearly as possible what we think he is saying at the point where we are and to say whether we agree. A similar necessity confronts me, writing a thesis on one theme of Heidegger's thought. To isolate a theme is a kind of abstraction, but a necessary one when trying to write a coherent work of the proportion of a thesis. The line must be drawn where this theme meets with other ones, such as Heidegger's "debates" with Plato, Kant, Schelling, Nietzsche, and the other "nearby" themes such as the questions of science and technique, and language and poetry. It has of course, been impossible not to touch on some of these questions but I have tried to make clear that the line had to be drawn to exclude a serious treatment of these other questions.

Heidegger's advice to a student who asked him from where "thought of Being" is directed, was to stay on the path or <u>way</u> in 29 genuine <u>need</u>. Heidegger emphasizes repeatedly that his work is on a path, which responds to necessities which make themselves clear along the way. The thesis that freedom saves its essence in the free, into which we are bound by the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and gods, emerged piece by piece during the years between <u>The Essence of Ground</u> and 'Hölderlin's Earth and Sky". And the path

"Bleiben Sie in der echten Not auf dem Weg . . ." Heidegger, . Vorträge, p. 185.

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is not yet ended. That the works selected are examined in chronological order should be seen in the light of this advice of Heidegger's about his own work. The works are selected, especially in the first four chapters, primarily to draw out particular phases in the gradual unfolding of the whole thesis.

Among the group of early works which are usually considered to have been written in the same horizon, <u>The Essence of Ground</u> stands out as an obvious starting point for this thesis, because it is explicitly about freedom. It describes the nature of "transcendental freedom", as Heidegger conceived it at that time, as the threefold freedom toward the ground. In two crucial places in the treatise, Heidegger ties it directly to the main thesis of <u>Being and</u> <u>Time</u>. I therefore deemed it unnecessary to examine the scattered remarks about freedom in that work.

<u>The Essence of Truth</u> was written only one year after <u>The</u> <u>Essence of Ground</u> but it was revised repeatedly over the ensuing decade and Heidegger has declared it to be a very important lecture out of the period of the "turn" or transition from early to later work. Besides this, it is a work about freedom. It demonstrates how freedom is the hub or middle term which joins propositional truth to the rule of mystery in error.

The epilogue to <u>What Is Metaphysics</u>? was selected for three reasons which are essentially all part of one reason. This work

begins to unfold the region of the truth of Being. It takes up again the question of the nothing and thus continues the overcoming of metaphysics. It does this by introducing the cooperative accomplishment of the poet who names the holy. It thus begins to "complete" man as the threefold "essence of the far" with the nearing of the near, a beginning which is indicated in the phrase "freedom of sacrifice".

The conversation "Toward the determination of the place of engagement" and the "Letter on Humanism" are chosen because they draw together the achievements of the previous fifteen to twenty years into the stable position which predominates in the later works. The conversation concentrates on the region (the near) and pays special attention to its relation (of sameness) to the zone or horizon called the far and the thinking which pertains to each. The letter draws out in greater detail the matters of double level negation, the poet and the naming of the holy, the relations of thought and poetry and the relation of the region (here called clearing and homeland) to the zone of transcendence as it is set out in the early work. This is the work from which I have taken "the thesis of the thesis".

In the selection of works for what remains (chapters 5, 6, and 7), chronology is less important than the subject matter. "The Thing" and "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" were selected because

they finally, <u>explicitly</u> unfold the fourfold along with the threefold. They are complementary in the sense that while they both unfold both threefold freedom and the fourfold binding into the free, one ("The Thing") concentrates on Being and the other concentrates on man. Chapter seven includes a cursory look at the lecture on technique, but examines especially the lecture "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky". This chapter adds the last piece to the thesis as a whole by including not only the unfolding of the threefold freedom and the fourfold binding into the free but also the "self-dissimulation" of the fourfold in our actual immediate situation. CHAPTER ONE: FREEDOM IN THE ESSENCE OF GROUND

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CHAPTER ONE

1 "FREEDOM IN THE ESSENCE OF GROUND "

Introduction

1

1. The Discussion of Freedom in Heidegger's Early Work Concerns the Zone of Transcendence

Heidegger wrote his treatise called <u>The Essence of Ground</u> in 1928, one year after the publication of the first section of <u>Being and Time</u>. In an important new preface to the 1949 edition, he stated that the treatise defines the ontological difference, which is, as he put it in the preface, the "not between being and Being". This "not" between being and Being refers to the fact that freedom, which occurs in the zone of transcendence, is not only the "ground of ground", that is, the source of the reason for things and humans being as they are; as this ground, freedom is at the same time groundless or abysmal. That is the problem which this work poses, to be taken up in later works.

The treatise is divided in three parts. The first division describes the "problem" which "ground" poses. It is suggested that this problem can only be taken up within a zone, the zone of transcendence. The description of this zone makes up the second division. These preliminaries make possible the third division,

All references to this work are from the edition of the treatise published along with several other works: Martin Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u> (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967).

which describes the essence of ground proper. The essence of ground is a threefold "grounding", the relation of freedom and what grounds. Freedom is freedom toward the ground.

In this work, Heidegger takes "step one" in the thought about freedom. The current modes are not absolute, they are grounded in freedom which is itself groundless or abysmal; freedom is finite. The problem of how the current modes are grounded, of how the objects and ourselves are grounded, draws our attention to the zone of transcendence, through which this grounding occurs in a threefold manner corresponding to the three in one unity of the ecstatic openness of time. But the unity of the threefold, that is "what grounds" itself, remains concealed; the search for this unity comes up against the "not between beings and Being".

In the preface of 1949, Heidegger indicates that this work falls short of its goal. The whole matter of this "failure", which is the same as the failure of the other early works like <u>Being and Time, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</u> and <u>What is</u> <u>Metaphysics</u>?, is not simple. According to the preface, the work was not yet able to see the sameness of the not of the difference with the "not of the nothing". This other not is "Being experie ged out of beings". The result of the failure (looking at it as something which later could be overcome) is a tendency to continue to overestimate the human component of what is occurring, and also to underestimate Being <u>in being</u>. At the same time, the failure remains a necessary access because it remains true to a "failure" which is the character of this time. It remains necessary to bring the problem of man's nothingness within being to the centre of concern.

2. The Reason for Beginning the Survey with This Treatise

The Essence of Ground is ideally suited to begin the consideration of Heidegger's thought about freedom. It was written one year after the publication of <u>Being and Time</u> and there is no doubt that it coincides with the thought of that work in the (relevant) matters of freedom and the zone of transcendence. At several crucial points in the argument, Heidegger explicitly draws our attention to <u>parallel</u> passages in <u>Being and</u> 2 Time.

The discussion of freedom begins in the context of the "not of the ontological difference" rather than "the not of the nothing" which is the topic of <u>What is Metaphysics</u>? because that is the way it occurred with Heidegger. Where freedom is mentioned as essential and then left assumed in the latter, the former is for the most part a treatise about freedom and transcendence in detail.

See for example: Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 58.

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A. The Illumination of Freedom in the Zone of Transcendence with a Constellation of Words: "Transcendence", "The World", "Self" and "Umwillen"

1. Transcendence (Transzendenz)

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The German word "Transzendenz" is the only Latin-based word in the constellation. Heidegger suggests it is equivalent to the Germanic "Überstieg". Terrence Malik translates this word into the English "surpassing" but there is a lot to be said for a more literal translation such as "climbing over". It is important to retain the meaning that the "ground" is also the base from which we climb out. The situation we are in is never left or escaped. Heidegger leaves us in no doubt about the importance of "situation". In 1956 in <u>Toward the Question of 4</u> <u>Being</u> he makes the same point again; and again in relation to the word "Über". Ernst JÜnger has set himself the task of crossing "over the line" of complete nihilism. Heidegger prefers to say something "about" this line. The German "Über" can mean either "trans" or "de", that is either "across" or "about". There has been some change between 1929 and 1956, but the roots of the

Martin Heidegger, <u>The Essence of Reasons</u>, trans. Terrence Malik (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 35.

This work is also included in the collection called Wegmarken, pp. 213 to 253.

matter have already been struck in The Essence of Ground.

It is important to note that Heidegger is not suggesting a new view of "transcendence". He believes he is describing the elemental meaning of this word which remains the controlling "factor" despite the myriad of different popular uses of the word. And the etymological evidence is on his side. Both in Latin and in the Indo-European base, the primary meaning of "trans" is "through" not "above" or "beyond". The emphasis is on the "boundary" between here and there; the Latin "termen" or "boundary-stone", which comes from the same IE root *ter_ along with "term" and "terminus", illustrates this emphasis.

Transcendence, Heidegger says, is something which happens to a being; it defines the distinctive character of that being; it makes Dasein (which is sometimes translated literally as "Being-there", but is better left in German) what it is. "Dasein" is not equivalent to "man", but rather is what makes man what he is. Dasein "climbs out" but in such a way that it continues always to climb out. It does not climb out to "some place" and leave behind the place where it was. Thus to say that this being "is transcendent" is to say that it is always still transcending.

Transcendence is not only a temporal matter; it definitely

5 See for example: Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 24.

has a spatial connotation. The space, or play-room or leeway which transcending encircles has a "from which" and a "to which" it climbs. The "to which" contrary to frequent usage, is not properly called "the transcendent"; rather it is what Heidegger calls "the world". The "from which" he calls being itself (das Seiende selbst). This is the being in which Dasein finds itself situated, including "other Dasein" and also "beings at hand", that is things or objects. Thus climbing, in being, out to the world, is the basic constitutive feature of Dasein.

Transcendence is the zone or horizon which must be laid bare as a preliminary to the eventual question of the essence of ground. Before we can get to the bottom of the question of why things are as they are, we have to see how the current modes and the attendant notions of subject and object are grounded in freedom, which occurs in the zone of transcendence. This zone is the basis of the <u>relation</u> between subject and object. Heidegger points out that the history of the concept of transcendence shows both an extremely subjective stream and an extremely objective stream. These are something like the "innermost" and "the beyond". He sets himself the task of overcoming this division, but he is clear that the <u>access</u> must be through the "ontological" interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject. Freedom must be

seen to be freedom toward what grounds (that is, transcendence) before the essence of what grounds can be laid out.

2. The World

What then is this world which is such an essential feature of transcendence? It is "that to which" Dasein climbs. Without it Dasein could not relate to itself, to other Dasein or to "Being at hand". The world is not the aggregate or sum total of everything, humans and things, but rather what is "prior" to and thus defines "being as a whole", or literally "being in the whole" (das Seiende im Ganzen). Without this prior "definition", we could not encounter any particular being. As Heidegger puts it, the world means the how of the Being of beings rather than the beings themselves. Heidegger's use of "the world" cannot be identified with the "objective" use, in which we think of the sum total of all the objects "out there" which could, theoretically, be catalogued by exact science. At the same time he does not intend a thoroughly subjective, pluralist notion whereby we say that we all live in different "worlds", that we all have our own world-views or constructed ideologies through which we see other people and things. There is no doubt that he is concerned to speak about "the world that we all are in". But again, as in the matter of transcendence, the access must be the interpretation

of the subjectivity of the subject, until it becomes aware of what it is <u>in</u>. The "objective" world is not in this way abandoned, for in its current scientific mode the objective is only what is posited by the subject. Getting to the heart of the subject will at the same time get to the heart of the object.

Though it may seem at first that Heidegger is using "the world" in his own special sense, it should be pointed out that he thinks he is drawing out the elemental meaning of the word which underlies all the historical uses. He sketches the history of uses in the West of "cosmos", "mundus" and then "Welt" and finally "Weltanschauung" (worldview). Without going into the details of this account, it can be said the reason for giving this history is to open up the whole <u>matter</u> of the world as it has occurred since the Greek down to the current predominance of "world-view".

The "problem" of the world is nothing less than the problem of how "the fourfold" is, comes to be and is known. The fourfold makes an appearance in this treatise with the mention of Aristotle's four "causes" ($\alpha \iota \tau \iota \alpha$). Heidegger also notes that Aristotle calls these causes "origins" ($\alpha \rho \chi \alpha \iota$) as well.

Heidegger, Wegmarken, pp. 21,2.

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These four causes or occasions are given the name of origin or ground along with the three origins (proper) which Aristotle defines as "the first point from which a thing is, comes to be or is known". Heidegger's account of the threefold dispersal of grounding is clearly the rethinking of the matter which Aristotle thought as the three origins; but at the same time, it is supposed to shed light on the ontological distinction as it applies to the fourfold "causes-origins". According to Heidegger, Aristotle failed to 7 articulate the ontological distinction fully, although his naming the causes origins does seem to point to this matter.

There is an important footnote at the end of the second division of <u>The Essence of Ground</u>, in which Heidegger ties the task of the treatise together with the task of the published section 8 of <u>Being and Time</u>. The task is a concrete revealing sketch or project of transcendence in order to attain the transcendental horizon of the <u>question</u> about Being. Against the accusation that <u>Being and Time</u> works from an anthropocentric standpoint, Heidegger argues that the sketch of transcendence is a necessary preliminary to the question of Being. In the terms we have been considering, the free and transcendental qualities of the three origins and the

> Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 66. 8 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 58.

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four causes which are also origins, must be clarified prior to the question of Being as ground.

> . . . by elaborating the structure of transcendence of Dasein, "man" comes into the "centre" of the picture so that his nothingness within being as a whole can and must start to become a problem.⁹

Thus the world is relative to Dasein (which makes man what he is), but this, Heidegger insists, does not necessarily mean that it is "created by" Dasein. It means that Dasein is such that the world is problematic for it. The root meaning of the word "problem" is literally "something thrown forward". Dasein brings itself to clarity in the project of the world as a problem. One of the two key verbs in the first explicit definition of freedom in the treatise, is "vorwerfen", literally "to throw forward" but usually translated "to reproach or blame". There is a reproach of being in the projection of the world. The difficulty which the early works present is: (1) They take a necessary road in the clarification of the transcendence of Dasein which stands in the midst of things and lets the world rule (walten) or "world" (verbally understood: welten). (2) And yet this stance can be misleading because it must "set aside" temporarily the question of Being, the question

"... durch die Herausarbeitung der Transzendenz des Daseins "der Mensch" so ins "Zentrum" kommt, daß seine Nichtigkeit im Ganzen des Seienden allererst Problem werden kann und muß.", p. 58.

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of the unfolding and ruling of the world, while the horizon which lets it rule is clarified. Since the world by definition never stops ruling or unfolding, there is an element of artificiality in "setting it aside" while we clarify our method, metaphysic or stance in the midst.

3. <u>Self</u> (Selbst)

The climb from being to the world not only enables Dasein to encounter "Being at hand"; in this climb it also first encounters itself. It makes a Self (Selbst) of itself. In throwing forward the project of world "over against itself" it sets up the tension and reflection of selfhood. It is a being which can Be; as such it is a free self, it holds itself over against it self. Thinking from inside the self, the world is, so to speak, only "one half" of the tension, even though the self becomes a self only in letting the world rule. The world thought from inside the self however does not exhaust what the world is.

Just as nothing can be encountered without <u>presuming</u> the world it is in (however much this is usually forgotten), in the same way, no individual self, whether an I-self, a you-self, a he-self or a she-self can be or be encountered except by <u>presuming</u> the neutral "Selbst". This matter of self as neutral ground which grounds person (I and you), gender (he and she) and number (I and

we, you and you [plural], he, she, and they) is difficult but crucial. The sameness (self hood) of "I" and "you" entails their difference as well. Or as Heidegger puts it, the self is what 10 makes possible the choice between egoism and altruism. In the same way an encounter between sexes needs both sameness and difference. A conversation cannot occur between two people unless they are in the same zone, temporal, spatial and linguistic. Since they are able to communicate, they must be projecting the same world; this means they are part of the same self.

Heidegger is arguing that the project of the world and the free self are "truths" about our lives. They are not things we need to "get around to" doing. But also true is the <u>actual</u> fact that these truths are forgotten. This forgetting is not a matter which can be quickly overturned with a shift in attitude. We actually are egos, and Heidegger takes that fact seriously. He does not suggest that the ego or the individual is an illusion which we need to transcend. The last sentences in the treatise makes reference to the relation of the "I" to the self, as well as making a fundamental statement about the essence of man, from the stance of the early work.

And so man, as existing transcendence surpassing in possibilities, is a being of distance (or farness or

10 Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 54.

the far). Only through original distance, which he establishes himself in his transcendence toward all being, does there come into the climbing in him the true near(ness) to the things. And only the ability to hear into the distance accomplishes for Dasein as self, the awakening of the answer of its Dasein with others, peing with whom it can put the "I-hood" to work, in order to win itself authentic self.¹¹

Terrence Malik's translation of the phrase ". . . es kann die Ichheit darangeben . . ." could be quite misleading. He renders 12 it as ". . . it can surrender its individuality . . .". In fact, the core meaning of "darangeben" is "to set to work". The "I" becomes what it is, properly, when it puts itself to work in a communal Being with others and thus reaches selfhood, which does not dissolve the "I" when grounding it.

4. "Umwillen"

The word "Umwillen" is difficult to render in English because it is so tied to a peculiarly German language context. It appears in such phrases as "um Gottes willen" (for God's sake) and "umwillen seiner" (for his or its sake). The word always denotes "for the sake of . . ." and it never occurs without a particular genitive substantive whose sake is invoked. Thus Malik translates

¹¹ Und so ist der Meusch, als existierende Transzendenz über schwingend in Möglichkeiten, ein Wesen der Ferne. Nur durch ursprüngliche Fernen, die er sich in seiner Transzendenz zu allem Seienden bildet, kommt in ihm die wahre Nähe zu den Dingen ins Steigen. Und nur das Hörenkonnen in die Ferne zeitigt dem Dasein als Selbst das Erwachen der Antwort des Mitdaseins, im Mitsein mit dem es die Ichheit darangeben kann, um sich als eigentliches Selbst zu gewinnen.", Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 71. 12 Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, trans. T. Malik, p. 131.

it as the "for the sake of . . ." This translation works in most cases but occasionally it could lead a reader astray and in addition it drops the root of "will" which is an important point about the word. In balance, I suggest it is better to leave this word in German, as in the case of "Dasein". One of the advantages of Malik's translation is to bring forward the English word "sake"; its clear connotations help to clarify the meaning of the German "Sache" which is at root the same.

The Umwillen is the project of the world in the terms of willing or wanting. And just as no being can be encountered without presuming the world, the Umwillen is presumed in every case in which we will something or want something. The German word "seinetwegen" means in English "on his or its account" or "for his or its sake". The word points to a particular ground or reason (for an action) which presumes necessarily the Umwillen. Thus Heidegger says the Umwillen is the "ground character" of the 14 world. It is the project of world insofar as this grounds will. It is what will is for the sake of. The will projects and produces that for the sake of which it wills.

Dasein is by virtue of willing something for the sake of which it exists. Dasein exists for the sake of itself; in

13 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 85. 14 Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 53.

transcending, it becomes what it is. But this means it is exercising its ability to Be, and as such, it is existing at the same time for the sake of the Being of other beings, for they have the same origin. They are being-at-hand, and the Dasein of And at the same time also it is existing for the sake others. of Being toward itself. In that Dasein achieves its own Being, which is to transcend, to Be there in the zone of transcendence, it has the "inner" possibility of Being-in-the-world. It makes contact with its origin and thus can encounter other people and things which are of like origin. To say that "Being toward itself" is contacted, is to remind us that Being must not be conceived in terms of beings whether they be Dasein or Being at hand. The word Umwillen shows that transcending is willing. The way in which the world project occurs is in our willing that for the sake of which we will. Heidegger warns that willing is not to be thought of as one of several ways of connecting such as representing, judging and rejoicing. It is not a faculty in psychology. Rather 15 it is the transcendent foundation of all these modes of relation.

B. The Definition of Freedom

After the clarification of "Umwillen" and of the place of

15 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 59.

"will" in transcendence, Heidegger proceeds to the first explicit definition of freedom, what it does and what it is.

But that which (according to its essence), projecting, throws forward and always produces something like the Umwillen, is what we call freedom. Climbing over toward the world is freedom itself.¹⁶

The heart of freedom for Heidegger at this time is expressed in transcendence toward the world. Transcending is the way in which we move to meet the world coming toward us. Freedom is understood partly in terms of transcendence and partly in terms of the world which it rises to meet. Because the emphasis of the early work is to clarify the zone or horizon of the question of Being (the world), in these early definitions of freedom, the emphasis falls more on the rising to meet than on what is met. Another indicator of this emphasis is the detailed presentation of the <u>threefold</u> dispersal of grounding, which describe the relation of freedom toward what grounds, in contrast to the postponement of the

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Was nun aber seinem Wesen nach so et was wie das Umwillen überhaupt entwerfend vorwirft und nicht etwa als gelegentliche Leistung auch hervorbringt, ist das, was wir Freiheit nennen. Der Überstieg zur Welt ist die Freiheit selbst. Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 59.

consideration of the <u>fourfold</u>, which in a later work like <u>The Thing</u> is seen to be the mirror play which binds into the free and which 17 "worlds" world. But the verbs used to describe the movement of rising to meet what is met, are carefully chosen in the awareness that the "climbing over" does not "create" the world, that the threefold does not create the fourfold.

The first verb is "vorwerfen" qualified with "ent_werfend". I have translated "vorwerfen" literally as "to throw forward". It is usually translated as "to reproach or blame" which points to the rejection of or tension with the current situation in relation to what could possibly Be. The project of the world calls the existing situation into question; it makes it <u>problematic</u>, that is, literally, "something thrown forward". "Entwerfen" is usually translated "to project" or "to sketch", and the noun "Entwurf" is usually "project" or "sketch". The use of project is correct but it ignores the root meaning of the German word. The negative prefix "Ent-" points to the fact that the throw is the result of our being thrown (geworfen). We don't choose to be free, we are thrown into freedom. And the prefix also points to the fact that we are thrown in a negative or abysmal way.

The second verb is "hervorbringen" which means "to bring

17 Martin Heidegger, <u>Vorträge und Aufsätze</u>, (Pfullingen, Neske, 1954), p. 178.

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forward" or "bring forth". This verb also calls attention to the fact that freedom is a vehicle of what it ushers forth. The will forms (bildet) the Umwillen but this is seen as letting or allowing the world to rule. By climbing over toward the world, we let the world rule. This is the meaning of the "transcendental freedom" of the early works Though it is not intended, the emphasis of the early works with their postponement of the question of Being itself tends to give the impression that the world rules <u>because</u> we let it. The access is at times confused with the whole origin. But there can be no doubt that Heidegger was already well underway toward the overcoming of this difficulty in 1929. The verb "hervorbringen" and the verb "bilden" are key words in the appreciation of poetry and poethood in the unfolding of the fourfold in later works.

C. Freedom and What is Binding. The Introduction to the Discussion about Negative and Positive Freedom

Freedom wills the Umwillen and holds it over against itself. It sets up a tension of opposites which gives it its character of self. This tension is the ground which makes possible the sense we have that something is binding. "Binding" implies both the existence of a limit which determines us, and at the same time the possibility that we can ignore it. Man can be a free self because he can be under obligation to himself. When we remember that Dasein is of like origin to being at hand and other Dasein, it is clear that freedom is what enables anything at all to be

18 binding.

This reciprocity of freedom and what binds it introduces an important question in Heidegger's thought about freedom, the question of the relation of negative and positive freedom. I shall set out briefly what I mean by these "two freedoms" and then say what Heidegger's position is at this time with regard to them.

Negative freedom means essentially freedom <u>from</u> outside coercion, whether this be actual imprisonment or some other subtler form of infringement. In this understanding of freedom, what it is <u>for</u> tends to be left out of discussion. It is assumed that will take care of itself in one way or another. The point is to keep some sort of space free for individuals and groups to do what they want to do. For example, Heidegger suggests that "spontaneity" means essentially that the self causes itself with no cause outside it which determines it. It is thus a negative way of speaking of freedom. The most commonly accepted notion of freedom is this negative one, though there is of course widespread disagreement about how it can be "secured".

Positive freedom concerns rather where freedom comes from and what it is for. It points to the <u>truth</u> "which will set us free". It points to where we stand as opposed to what we stand against.

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Heidegger, Wegmarken, pp. 59, 60.

The difficulty with positive freedom consists in deciding how the truth "occurs".

Neither of these two kinds of freedom ever occurs in a pure form. Where negative freedom asserts itself in its most radical form, there remains a covert positive stance of some sort. And extreme versions of positive freedom always assert that there is something from which we are set free by the truth. Heidegger is thus no exception in his refusal to stand in one pole or the The question is how did he strike a balance? A clue can other. 19 be taken from his critique of spontaneity. It is not rejected, but rather shown to be grounded in transcendence. When free transcendence is shown to be groundless, it becomes clear that there is a reassertion of negative freedom at a more original level which grounds the negative freedom of spontaneity. But this more original freedom is freedom toward what grounds; it is freedom which projects the world and is situated in the midst of beings. Freedom seems to be both positively and negatively determined in a way which is focussed on transcendence (which is able to bridge the ontological difference). This ontological difference, positively, means the Being of beings; negatively, it is the not between beings and Being. Since this early treatise has not yet seen the sameness of the not

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 60.

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of the nothing with the not of the difference, and since the unfolding of the truth of Being has been postponed, the work tends to emphasize our freedom <u>from</u> what surrounds us. That which guides this freedom is named but its content is partly obscured (partly left deliberately undeveloped).

The cue that can be taken from this introduction to the theme is that Heidegger's struggle to arrive at the truth about freedom focusses on two pairs: the Being of beings and Being itself, and the not of the difference and the not of the nothing.

D. The Essence of Ground Is the Relation of Freedom and the Ground. Freedom Is Freedom Toward the Ground

In the third division of the treatise, Heidegger approaches the matter which gives the work its title, the essence of ground.

The essence of ground is the transcendentally-arising threefold dispersion of grounding in world project, preoccupation with being, and ontological founding of being.²⁰

The essence of ground is this threefold <u>grounding</u> which connects freedom to the ground, so to speak. This threefold grounding is transcendence; it gives content to transcendence; it shows how transcendence opens up "leeway" or room to move for Dasein. Freedom is not the ground; it is "toward" the ground. And freedom is not, strictly speaking, the grounding. "Grounding" describes the relation between freedom and the ground. Heidegger states that this relation

"Das Wesen des Grundes ist die transzendental entspringende dreifache Streuung des Gründens in Weltentwurf, Eingenommenheit im Seienden und Ontologische Begründung des Seienden." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 67.

is one in which grounding "offers freedom and takes ground". Because of the limits of this work, most of which are deliberate, the freedom "side" of the relation predominates. There appears, for example, the statement that "freedom is in this threefold way, freedom toward the ground". This appears to identify freedom with grounding. But the argument that such an identity is not the case is also present. The full elaboration of how it is not the case must wait for later works.

Before describing the threefold grounding, I want to say something about the two words "ground" (der Grund) and "grounding" (das Gründen) from the verb "to ground". In the opening sentences of the treatise, Heidegger ties his use of "Grund" together with Aristotle's use of "apy". This word is used by Aristotle firstly to refer to three principles or origins which are defined as "the first point from which a thing is, comes to be, or is known". Heidegger "translates" these into "Was-sein" (what-Being), "daß-Sein" (that-Being) and "wahr-Sein" (Being-true). His later description of the threefold dispersion of grounding clearly corresponds to this earlier threefold. But Heidegger also pointed out that the word " $\pi \rho \chi \eta$ " is also given to the four "causes" (" $\pi i T i \pi$ "). These four are not only "causes", but also "grounds". The whole complex matter of the threefold and its unity, the fourfold and its

"Gründend gibt sie Freiheit und <u>nimmt</u> sie Grund". Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 60.

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unity, and the way in which these groups are woven together is introduced in this treatise. It cannot be settled within the scope of this treatise, however. We can only assume at this point that the problem of "ground" refers not only to the threefold, but also in a preliminary way, to the fourfold.

The word "gründen" in ordinary German usage means "to lay the ground for something". It is in a sense ambiguous since laying the groundwork for some could mean creating out of nothing and for others articulating the ground which is already there. Heidegger uses the word as a noun (das Gründen) and he means the word to carry a "two direction" meaning. The relation, which grounding is, offers freedom and takes ground. As I have said, the emphasis of the early work at times makes it seem as if what occurs is that we lay ground, we take ground and thus in effect we seem to take freedom, or at least to give it its content.

In the phrase "freedom is freedom toward the ground" 22 (Freiheit ist Freiheit zum Grunde) , Heidegger expresses his conviction clearly, that freedom is necessarily a relation to what grounds it. Freedom does indeed involve abysmal indeterminacy and is thus equivalent to liberty in the sense of not being coerced, but more essentially it is also a relation to what

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 60.

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determines it.

The three ways of grounding are establishing (Stiften), taking ground (Boden-neh m en) and founding (Begründen). How do these three together "offer freedom"? Establishing points to the ability we have to discern the <u>Being</u> of beings, it refers to the "to what?" of our climb over. It is the project of the world or of that for the sake of which we will. It refers to the fundamental <u>understanding</u> of beings which we must have beforehand, in order to encounter any one being.

At the same time, such an encounter with a being, also assumes that we have taken ground in the midst of these beings. We are situated in a place from which we climb. We are "taken in" or predisposed or preoccupied by beings. Heidegger places great emphasis on the reciprocity of these first two ways of grounding. Neither can occur without the other. The phrase "at the same time" is used advisedly, because Heidegger states that these two ways of grounding are "contemporaneous" (gleichzeitig), though establishing has, in a non-temporal sense, a kind of priority. This priority hinges on the predominance given to the "transcendental horizon" in the early work. The project of the world is thus from the start the crucial factor. How do we climb out to something like the

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 62.

Unwillen? But the ways of grounding are contemporaneous. At several points the threefold in this work is said to correspond to the three ecstasies of time in Being and Time.

> Project by world and preoccupation by beings as ways of grounding belong to <u>one</u> temporality. because they jointly carry out its temporalization. This correspondence [between the unity of temporality and the unity of the three ways of grounding] exists because transcendence is rooted in the <u>essence</u> of time, that is however, in its ecstatic-horizonal constitution.²⁴

The parallel analysis of "Being-in" in <u>Being and Time</u> shows the same polarity, there called understanding (Verstehen) and situatedness 25 (Befindlichkeit). The polarities correspond respectively to the future and past ecstasies of temporality. Thus establishing (Stiften) has a clear future orientation, not forgetting that this must be thought ecstatically. Here again a subtle change will occur over the next decades. Establishing, according to Hölderlin is assigned to poets and poets establish "what remains"; they establish "the oldest of the old". The elaboration of the meaning of this "reshuffle" of threefold in which there is, in a sense, a shift from future emphasis to past emphasis, must wait for the examination of the thinker and poet in later works.

"Entwurf von Welt und Eingenommenheit vom Seienden gehören als Weisen des Gründens je zu einer Zeitlichkeit, sofern sie dereⁿ Zeitigung mit ausmachen." "Diese Entsprechung aber besteht deshalb, weil die Transzendenz im Wesen der Zeit, d.h. aber in ihrer ekstatischhorizontalen Verfassung wurzelt". Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 62. 25

Martin Heidegger, <u>Sein und Zeit</u>, (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927.).

What then is the third member of the threefold dispersion of grounding? Aristotle's third "origin" or "first principle" is "the first point from which a thing is known". Heidegger's translation of this origin is "Being-true". In Being and Time the third category in the analysis of "Being-in" is "talk" (Rede). The third way of grounding is called "founding" (BegrUnden). The discernment of Being in the project of the world and the discernment of being, are unified in the discernment of the ontological difference, which is the ontological foundation of ontic truth. Another way that Heidegger puts this matter is to say that proof (Assweis) is the unity of possibility (Möglichkeit) It is crucial to note that this sort of unity and basis (Boden). called "belonging together", is at the same time, a difference. Only a unity which preserves the difference gives the room to move which we have. At one point Heidegger calls this room "Spielraum" Freedom seen in the light of this threefold or "room for play". grounding is connected with enabling or grounding the question why. Just as the room for play has the double connotation both of not tied down and enclosed, so the question why assumes both that something is unknown and yet knowable.

Heidegger only touches briefly on the question of the

26 Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 66. 27 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 62.

<u>unity</u> of the three ways of grounding. There is such a unity, but he suggests that it cannot be properly appreciated at the "level" of questioning within which this treatise moves. He does point, however, to the teaching of <u>Being and Time</u>. We know from <u>Being and Time</u> that care is the Being of Dasein (\gtrless 41) and the meaning of care is temporality ($\end{Bmatrix}$ 65). In <u>The Essence</u> <u>of Ground</u> a crucial one-sentence indicator is ventured.

> . . . establishing, taking ground and justification arise, each after its own fashion, from the care of existence and permanence which itself is only possible as temporality.²⁸

E. Freedom as Ground and Abyss; Freedom as Finite

In the preface of 1949, Heidegger calls the ontological difference which the treatise defines, "the <u>not</u> between being and Being", (das Nicht zwischen Seiendem und Sein). He calls it a "not" because the central thesis of the work is that the essence of ground is at the same time a "non-essence". Freedom as the ground of ground, as the grounding unity of the threefold is the abyss or non-ground of Dasein, (Ab-grund des Daseins). Freedom is finite. That is, quite literally, it is <u>end like</u>.

To take the first step from the current modes to the freedom which grounds them is a terrifying matter. Especially

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". . . Stiftung, Boden-nehmen und Rechtgebung je in ihrer Weise <u>der Sorge der Beständigkeit und des Bestandes entspringen</u>, die selbst wiederum nur als Zeitlichkeit möglich ist." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 67.

when the current modes are not being considered as vehicles of Being but rather as products of freedom, the question of Being having been postponed in order first to attain the zone of transcendence. Two basic points are made here: (1) Freedom must be seen as the ground in which everything is rooted. One way of putting this is to say that everything is historical, or temporal. Our way of experiencing ourselves and objects is not absolute but rather is in many ways a product of history. (2) At the same time, this freedom is surrounded and pervaded by an abyss of darkness. We have to make choices not knowing fully what is occurring. We have limits, we come to an end. The word "finite" touches the difference and thus it has a strange dual import. On the one hand, the end or limit defines or determines us. At the same time, it is the point beyond which we cannot go and so we confront in this sense the abyss beyond. The point which determines us is at the same time the point where we confront an abyss. How we are determined out of this point of the not of the difference is the problem which this work poses. It brings man's nothingness within being to the centre of concern. That we are free is determined; we are "thrown" into freedom. There is no way to avoid this fact, we are powerless in the face of it. And so the resolution of one matter poses a deeper more original problem.

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 70.

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F. The "Failure" of the Treatise and the Problem of the Essence of Truth

Heidegger argues, as I have said, that <u>Being and Time</u>, and thus also <u>The Essence of Ground</u> by implication, does not operate from an anthropocentric standpoint. The purpose of the examination of man and his freedom was to bring his nothingness within being to the centre. To make the nothing the problem, "what is thrown forward" is the connection between the transcendental horizon of the question of Being and the question itself. The not of the nothing is Being seen from beings.

Thus in 1928, Heidegger points out that his study of man always has Being as its guiding concern. But in 1949, he came to see that Being as the not of the nothing is <u>the same</u> as the not of the difference. The treatise fails to appreciate this sameness just as the lecture of the same year, <u>What is Metaphysics</u>? fails to appreciate the sameness from inside the not of the nothing. <u>Both</u> of the works are operating within certain limits which prevent them from achieving what they strive for.

The whole question of the resolution of the status of the early works in relation to the later must be left to chapter 4. At this point my concern is to draw out the essential problem which <u>this</u> work poses and to show how it leads naturally to the question of the essence of truth. From the vantage point of the later work, the problem of this work is the failure to give proper credit to the Being of <u>beings</u>. Malik cites an example where Heidegger rethinks a passage about the principle of 30 ground. The 1929 treatise concentrates on how statements about beings are <u>not</u> about Being or the <u>essence</u> of ground. This is correct but only half the truth. It is safe to add the crucial example of Aristotle's fourfold which seems to appear in this treatise only in order to be transcended. But from the vantage point of 1929 the problem is not yet seen in this way.

The problem is the abysmal origin of the world project. The problem of this work is that the crucial element in transcendence, the world for the sake of which we "climb over" remains undeveloped. The fact that this is deliberate does not change the fact that we are required to "hold our breath" until this world in some way makes itself credible. Until this occurs, the argument is <u>in</u> <u>effect</u> an argument for freedom and for the necessity of <u>world-views</u>. Heidegger suggests that the lecture of the same year on the nothing was intended to complement this work. It presumably was intended to make the world project credible in some way. And it certainly got this task underway. The task is carried on in an epilogue added to this lecture in 1943, which I examine in chapter three. But at the same time, we know that <u>What is Metaphysics?</u> also fell

Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, trans. T. Malik, p. 134, n. [9].

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short. Thus the problem of the "incredibility" of the world
project remains posed. Out of the incredible comes the credible;
this is the question or the matter of the essence of truth.

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CHAPTER TWO: FREEDOM IN THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH

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Introduction

1. Transcendental Freedom and The Essence of Truth

The lecture called The Essence of Truth, though first published in 1943, was written and delivered in 1930, only one year after the appearance of The Essence of Ground and What is Metaphysics?. During the decade following its first delivery, the lecture was frequently revised and as such it is representative in a detailed way of this crucial time of transition in Heidegger's thought. During this time, Heidegger was to have continued the project announced in the published section of Being and Time. But the task, it seems, could not be carried on within the method and language of its beginning. At the same time of course this period brought important political events. In 1933 Heidegger was appointed rector of Freiburg University and he endorsed the national socialist regime which had just come to power. Ten months later he resigned his post and withdrew into a stance of opposition to the regime. His studies at the time of the withdrawal show that he did not withdraw from politics, but rather began to engage a more fundamental problem of politics, which might be called the problem of what it is to be at home. The studies and lectures of

All references to this work are from the edition of the lecture published along with several other works. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967).

this period and in the following years focus on the work of Nietzsche, Hölderlin and the Ionian thinkers, with special emphasis on the question of language poetry and thought. Otto Pöggeler has shown that the studies of this time are intensely 2 political. For example, in 1934 Heidegger changed the lecture topic "The State and Science" to "Logos". What might appear to be a withdrawal from a political to a "logical" discussion, is in fact a move toward a more genuine and fundamental problem of politics. In Germany in the thirties, the question of whether "home" is a matter of race or <u>language</u> had loomed into decisive importance.

In some ways, Heidegger's early thought about the temporal, transcendent horizon of the question of Being was powerless against the aberration of racism which eventually captured the national socialist movement. It had exposed the terrifying abyss at the heart of the liberal system and thus was enormously helpful in calling this system into question. The crucial matter of how this abysmal freedom is <u>itself</u> guided and grounded remained "the next item on the agenda". Or, at least, so it seemed at the time. In <u>The Essence of Ground</u> the project of the world, on which transcendence and the ontological difference

Otto Pöggeler, <u>Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger</u> (Freiburg/München, Verlag Karl Alber, 1972), pp. 18-9.

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depend, remains a matter of faith. Negative freedom, conceived as freedom from coercion, was grounded in the zone of transcendence. But the problem of the nothing and of truth is posed.

From Heidegger's concern in 1929, the problem of truth is the problem of what determines groundless freedom. This is the expressed concern of The Essence of Truth written and delivered one year later. At the same time it will be useful to keep in mind the problem as seen from the vantage point of 1949. In the new preface to The Essence of Ground, Heidegger diagnoses the failure of the early works to appreciate the sameness of the not of the nothing and the not of the difference. In approaching the determination of groundless freedom, Heidegger is also approaching this sameness of the not of Being itself and the not of the difference between being and Being. Also in 1949, Heidegger added a new section to the concluding note to The Essence of Truth. He states that the lecture ought to have been completed with another on the "truth of essence". What is occurring during this transition period is also then the beginning of "the unfolding of the truth of Being". But this is not accomplished in the lecture, though several revisions were made pertaining to this very question. The fact that truth of Being is not yet unfolded means the lecture is in many ways more of a genuine bridge from the early work to the later.

2. The "Second Step" in the Thought About Freedom and the Structure of The Essence of Truth

<u>The Essence of Truth</u> was first published in 1943 with a concluding note written in that year. (The note was lengthened in 1949.) In this note Heidegger makes two important statements about the lecture which help us to read it as the work of transition that it is. In the first place he notes that the work "remains metaphysical" in some respects. As I have tried to show, such a statement does not mean the work is in this regard worthless. The failure of the early work is <u>still</u> a necessary access to the later. Nonetheless it is important to know what is not occurring in these works.

> The decisive question (Being and Time, 1927) about the meaning, that is to say (Being and Time, p. 151), the region of the project, that is to say, the openness, that is to say the truth of Being and not only of being, remains intentionally, not unfolded.³

Insofar as this lecture remains an early work, there may be very little change in the treatment of freedom. Certainly this statement must remind us continually that something decisive in the change must wait for the discussion in the epilogue to <u>What Is</u> <u>Metaphysics?</u> of 1943. In that work as well, important changes are still to come.

Die entscheidende Frage (Sein und Zeit, 1927) nach dem Sinn, d.h. (S.u.Z. s. 151) nach dem Entwurfbereich, d.h. nach der Offenheit, d.h. nach der Wahrheit des Seins und nicht nur des Seienden, bleibt absichtlich unentfaltet. Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 97.

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The lecture also begins to touch upon the type of thinking which belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics (die Überwindung der Metaphysik). The second important statement in the concluding note declares that its two decisive steps are part of the overcoming.

> [In] its decisive steps which lead from truth as rightness to ek-sistent freedom and from this to truth as concealment and error, it effects a change in the questioning which belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics.⁴

This way of characterizing the lecture, as "taking two steps" sums up the dual movement forward and back, from the current modes forward to the freedom which grounds them and from freedom back to the truth of Being. And the structure of the work is symmetrical and cyclical, in which four sections, corresponding respectively on either side, revolve around the hub section about "the essence of freedom".

The words "Uberwindung" and "Uberwinden" have a difficult history. Originally they are rooted not in "winden" (to wind, turn) but rather in "winnan" (to win). Folk etymology later confused these two. Therefore no connotation of "turning" can be attached to these words. Clearly the dominant meaning is "winning over", and the usual translation of current uses of the word renders "überwinden" as "subdue, overcome, conquer, vanquish". There is, however, a use of this word which I think illustrates the heart of Heidegger's use. The phrase "es kostete ihm große Überwindung" can be translated "it cost him great self-restraint (or great effort)" or "he did it with great reluctance". The great effort and reluctance bring out the whole original meaning of "win" (to strive, struggle, fight). We are naturally predisposed to struggle, which entails not only the desire to change but also the pull to remain the same. Both elements are to make "winning" as struggling conceivable. "Self-restraint" describes the identity of these two (continued)

In <u>The Essence of Ground</u>, the first step to essistent freedom was taken; this step brought the problem of man's nothingness within being to the centre of concern. Now, in <u>The Essence of Truth</u>, the second step into the negative truth of Being is taken as well. The first step is repeated in the terms of truth. The second step is then taken in a formal sense. We are told that the truth of Being is deliberately "not unfolded". This work on truth still needs a "companion" just as the work on ground needed one. In the latter case the companion was the lecture of the same year called <u>What is Meta</u>physics? The companion to the work on truth is the same lecture

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elements of struggle. The "opponents" are two sides of the same self. The same opposition is expressed in "Verhalten" (behaviour, encounter) and in "Verhältnis" (relationship). With this meaning in mind, the phrase "overcoming of metaphysics" means something like "metaphysics overcoming itself". The usual understanding of the phrase assumes that Heidegger, with no acknowledged allegiance other than his own insight, confronts something alien, "metaphysics", and seeks to destroy it, to conquer and replace it. Rather, Heidegger seeks to "enter into the essence" of what is occurring. Overcoming, rather than conquering, means something more like tilling the ground, loosening it to help growth. It might mean "struggling-in-the-midst" if we take the root meaning of " $\mu \epsilon \tau \alpha$ " (which is in most ways parallel to the Latin "trans" and the German "liber") as "in the midst of".

on "the nothing" with a new epilogue added in 1943.

3. The Essence of Truth and the Overcoming of Metaphysics

With the qualification in mind that the lecture only takes the second step in a limited sense, it is possible to begin to show some of the consequences of entry into "the overcoming of metaphysics". This word "overcoming" (Uberwindung) remains an important word for Heidegger even after he stopped using the language of transcendence. It is one of the foci of his struggle during the thirties and forties. In fact, the translation of the word as "overcoming" could be quite misleading. "Conquest" is certainly wrong. At this point it must be sufficient to remember that the meaning of this word turns on what is still being learned at the time this lecture was delivered. (a) Freedom is the hub of the problem which pervades Heidegger's argument about truth and essence. It is the "middle term" of the two decisive steps in the argument. (Rightness to freedom; freedom to mystery.) Freedom seems to be the axis around which overcoming revolves. The revelation of freedom is a necessary way of access from truth as propositional correctness to truth as the mystery of Being. To appreciate truth in this dual way, and thus a dual freedom at the axis, is the task which the work sets for itself. Freedom is no longer the "terminal" point, in the narrow

sense of the word, as it was, in effect, in The Essence of Ground. Freedom is the source of rightness and the recipient of mystery. (b) The "change" in freedom runs parallel to a change in the truth of Being which it rises to meet. The step from freedom to truth as concealment and error, is a step from the zone of transcendence to the "region of the truth of Being". Heidegger says of this region that it is "not yet experienced". The "non-" in "nonessence" and the "un-" in "untruth" point to this region. The negative side of truth is being allowed to operate. The unfolding of the region of the truth of Being requires the vindication of the negative side of truth in all its complexity. And as the negative world becomes less of a mirage the fourfold, though it is never named as such in this work, becomes more credible. At this time, the project of world, the assumption of what is essential, is called the rule of mystery in error. (c) The beginning, at least in outline, of the development or unfolding of the region of the truth of Being allows the debate about negative and positive freedom to deepen. The same being which is "negated" because it is seen not to be absolute but rather conditioned by freedom or history, now receives an indirect

> 5 Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 90. 6 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 93.


"vindication" because mystery rules in <u>error</u>. Heidegger is struggling to restore a sense of the Being of what is negative, in a time in which what is negative is assumed to be a "mental" or unreal category, simply a matter of subjective will. Of course the predominance of positivism is essentially nihilism. This Heidegger tries to demonstrate in the first step; he tries to bring "man's <u>nothingness</u> within being to the centre". One illustration of the predominance of positivism is that there is a tendency to want to say "the negative" <u>is positive</u>, in trying to speak of the negative being more than subjective or "mental".

The danger which accompanies an attempt like Heidegger's to break through the omnipresent subjectivism-positivism is enormous. In political matters the great danger is to lose all actual ground in the desire to reassert hidden roots and origins and to "set things right". In religious matters there is a danger of over-emphasizing the <u>transcendence</u> of what is holy. In this lecture Heidegger is still very much embroiled in the struggle to resolve this complex matter of ground, transcendence, overcoming and submission.

(d) The structure of the lecture illustrates the nature of overcoming. The introduction which precedes the eight numbered divisions discusses the question of truth in relation to the struggle between questioning philosophy and common sense fastening itself to what is immediate. The eighth division returns to this question when drawing the lecture to its end. Working toward the centre from either end, the divisions continue to be related in order, groupedsymmetrically around the axis division called "the essence of freedom". The first decisive step from truth as rightness to freedom includes divisions one, two and three which describe stages or levels of this step. The second decisive step from freedom to mystery in error includes divisions five, six and seven.

The symmetrical or cyclical quality brings to mind 7 Heidegger's letter to Prof. Richardson in 1962, in which he clarifies what has occurred in the "turn" in his thought, as a completion of the whole. This whole is characterized in the "subject" matter referred to in the titles "Being and Time" and "Time and Being". The structure and the decisive steps of <u>The</u> <u>Essence of Truth</u> anticipate the completion to a considerable extent. The contents are as follows:

William J. Richardson, <u>Heidegger: Through Phenomenclogy</u> to Thought, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), xvi - xix.



Because of the importance of the structure of the lecture, I follow the divisions of the text in division of this chapter. (e) The lecture might easily have been subtitled "On Freedom", since the essence of truth, it is said, is freedom. Or it might have been called "On Freedom as the Essence of Truth". And if the lecture had been completed by a second on "the Truth of Essence", the whole might easily have been called "On Freedom as the Essence of Truth and the Truth of Essence". In the concluding note of 1949, Heidegger included the crucial "statement" that the essence of truth is the truth of essence.

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 96.

A. Heidegger's Introduction on Common Sense and Philosophy

Philosophy looks for the essence of truth, the one thing about every truth that makes it a truth. Immediately this raises the problem which philosophy has faced from its beginning, which separates it from all other pursuits. Common sense asserts that no matter how hard you look you will never find "truth" but only "true instances". "Truth" is an idle and harmful abstraction. The philosopher's open-eyed stance which calls everything into question is not only unnecessary because everything is simple and straightforward; it also causes trouble, confusion and unhappiness. Heidegger seems to point to the unavoidable clash between philosophy and common sense. Identifying the common sense stance with sophism he suggests that sophism arose at the same time as philosophy, not before it, and these two have been "companions" ever since. The unavoidable clash is also a reciprocity of sorts. This strange reciprocal tension introduces the matter of the rule of mystery in error. In terms of freedom the questioning, essence-seeking philosopher appears as "libertarian" from the point of view of everyday life. Everything is plain as day and we ought just to get on with what obviously needs to be done. One way of seeing Heidegger's task is to see it as the justification of questioning. This justification leads him into the negative region of the truth of Being.

B. The current concept of truth is agreement or correspondence: the first of three divisions which together make up the first decisive step from truth as "rightness" to ex-sistent freedom.

Heidegger begins the division with the distinction of two different meanings of the word "true". We speak of something being true when it is authentic or <u>genuine</u>, and by this we mean that it <u>corresponds</u> to the idea we have had beforehand about what it is. When we say a coin is genuine for example, we mean that it complies with our pre-established idea of a coin which is not counterfeit. In this first sense of "true" then, the true thing (Sache) is true because of a <u>relation</u>; it corresponds to a preconceived idea.


In the second use of "true", a proposition (Satz) is said to be true because what it intends or means corresponds to a thing. The current concept of truth is agreement (Ubereinstimmung) on two different levels of thing and proposition. Heidegger goes on to note an important point about the relation of these two relations.

> "Propositional truth (Satzwahrheit) [is] only possible on the ground of the truth of the matter (Sachwahrheit), of the correspondence of things to intellect (adequatio rei ad intellectum)."⁹

"... ist ... die Satzwahrheit nur Böglich auf dem Grunde der Sachwahrheit, der adequatio rei ad intellectum." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 76.

The true relation of the immediate propositional level is grounded in a "reverse" relation at the level of the "Sache". In passing, it can be noted once again that the German "Sache" has the same root as the English "sake". Remembering the meaning of the Umwillen as that for the sake of which the will wills, it can be said that "Sache" carries the whole connotation of what we make of things "prior" to our representation of them, in the "careful" project of the world. The truth of proposing or representing (vorstellen) of things must presume "the correspondence of the things to what they are". There is no such thing as simple "unassuming" truths. All truths presuppose a thorough going vision of what the Being of beings is, and of what humans are. The current modes are no exception in this matter. Their truth exhibits a structure as truth always has. A diagram might help to illustrate the structure.

The Current Concept of Truth



Heidegger introduces the mediaeval concept of truth, "veritas **£**st adequatio rei et intellectus" and adds two points to the understanding of the structure of truth. (1) A formula of this kind can be misleading because it hides the fact that two formulae are actually involved in the concept. It is a relation of two relations as well. (2) The mediaeval version of truth is the immediate precursor of the modern one; it has the same structure, but <u>it</u> admits openly that the "truth of the matter" gives the warrant for the other truth. The structure of the mediaeval version is as follows:

The Mediaeval Concept of Truth


A. Veritas **&**st adequatio rei ad intellectum

things created agree with 2 divine intellect
 B. Veritas & adequatio intellectus ad rem (warranted)
 human intellect agrees with 4 things created

Kant's modern version of the truth, the transcendental version, seeks to explain how objects "right themselves to our perception". He no longer accepts the revelation of creation as such an exeptanation. His version can be put as follows:


The Kantian Concept of Truth

A. Reason



With these three concepts of truth Heidegger is outlining the <u>essential</u> structure of truth. In each of the three cases, there is a relation of two true relations, in which one is grounded in the other. Each operates within a vision of the Being of being (position 2) and of man (position 3) and each thinks of "object" in two ways (positions 1 and 4). Thinking of the four components as a relation between two relations draws attention to the middle point or the hub around which all four are situated. And this is Heidegger's goal in the analysis of the structure of truth, to draw our attention to this middle point which is in our experience a <u>place</u>, which he calls the inner possibility of agreement.

Before proceeding to the second division where the place of the occurrence of the essence of truth is examined, I want to note in passing the way in which the structure of truth shows both the threefold grounding and the fourfold world, though the latter is still "deliberately left not unfolded" in this lecture and appears only in the form of the fourfold structure of truth as shown above. Diagrammatically the threefold might be set out as follows:



The place of the experience of the essence of truth is the middle point of both threefold and fourfold.

C. The inner possibility of agreement is the open region: the second of three divisions which make up the decisive step from truth as rightness to **ek**-sistent freedom.

Heidegger asks what is the inner possibility of agreement. This agreement we now know is the harmony which exists between thinking and Being, between man, being and Being. Heidegger is suggesting that nothing less than this is involved in every "harmless" assertion that a statement corresponds to a thing. There are no "ahistorical, or merely logical" assertions! The current modes are just as much in question as any cultural "mores".

Agreement is a relationship (Beziehung) which occurs in space, or room even though a statement seems to have no spatial quality. It accurs in a "reach" or region (Bereich). Heidegger calls it the region of relation (Bezugsbereich). There can be no doubt that the region in question is closely related to the "zone of transcendence" of The Essence of Ground. 11 The reach is like the climb from being to Being which characterizes transcendence. The region is now named "the open" (das Offene). Before we spoke of the necessity of assuming an idea of something in order to see it. This seemed a rather "logical" discussion about presuppositions. But now Heidegger seeks to describe what occurs, what we experience. Our experience is of a region in which two things happen at once: we represent (vorstellen) the things in that we let them take their position opposite us as objects (Gegenstände); at the same time, in order for this to be possible, the things must traverse (durchmessen) the open space toward us, while still remaining opposite us, in some sense, self-sufficient. The region in which these two relations occur at once, called "the open", is not the product of representing. Representing enters into and takes over something already there.

Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, pp. 79, 80.

10

The meaning of the word "reach" goes deep into the history of the West. The Indo-European root is *reig- (to stretch out) and this is closely related to the root *reg- (to stretch, straighten) from which comes the "cpeyecr" (to reach, stretch out) (continued)

Our encounter with things in the open is the inner possibility of the agreement between statement and thing. Things manifest themselves to us; they "represent themselves" by coming across the open while remaining objects. They enable a statement to right itself according to them. The statement that propositional truth is grounded in the truth of the matter has now been demonstrated as part of our experience. One matter remains to be thought in the third division of the first step. The encounter with things in which representation "rights itself" is not only possible because the beings make themselves known; it is <u>also</u> possible because Being makes itself known such that representing has a standard (Richtma⁵) ahead of time. The inner possibility of rightness is the encounter but the encounter must be grounded.

D. The ground of the enabling of rightness is freedom: the third division which completes the decisive first step from truth as rightness to ex-sistent freedom.

Heidegger is unfolding gradually more and more of the character of this "idea we have beforehand" which is a sign

11 (continued)
and the Latin "regere" (to stretch, extend, make straight; to rule)
and the English "region". The German words "reichen", "Bereich",
"Reich", "reich" and "zureichend" all belong to this family of words.

that we discern the <u>Being</u> of beings. Now he asks what is the ground of the criterion we invoke necessarily when we say something is right or true. The answer which completes the first step is freedom; the essence of truth is freedom. How does it occur that a representative statement has direction (Weisung) to right itself, or to tune itself? How do we obtain a standard? The answer is the assertion of freedom and its reciprocity with what binds.

> "... that this postulate (Vorgeben) has already freely given itself into an open for something manifest, ruling out of this open, which then binds all representing. Free self-giving for a binding right is only possible as Being-free toward the things manifest in the open. This <u>Being-free</u> points to the essence of freedom, up to now not conceived. Encounter, which stands open, as the inner enabling of rightness is grounded in freedom. The essence of truth is freedom."¹²

The first step from truth as rightness to existent freedom is now complete. Freedom is the ground of the encounter of man and beings. At this point in the argument there is not a decisive change from the 'first step' taken in The Essence of Ground, the

12

"... daß sich dieses Vorgeben schon freigegeben hat in ein Offenes für ein aus diesem waltendes Offenbares, das jegliches Vorstellen bindet. Das Sich-freigeben für eine bindende Richte ist nur möglich als Freisein zum Offenbaren eines Offenen, Solches Freisein zeigt auf das bisher unbegriffene Wesen der Freiheit. Die Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens als innere Ermöglichung der Richtigkeit gründet in der Freiheit. Das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Freiheit", Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 81. change comes with the taking of the second step. But once again, it must be noted that this first step is a necessary one, and one which is never abandoned. It remains true that truth as rightness, representation, the current modes, these are seen once and for all to be conditioned by freedom. However abysmal and terrifying and dangerous, it nevertheless remains an unavoidable fact. But it is not the whole truth. How it remains when the step into the region of the truth of Being is taken concerns the not of the difference and the not of the nothing.

Before proceeding to the heart of the matter where step one and step two meet, Heidegger underlines the point that freedom as the ground of truth is unavoidable, by noting that truth is 13 not thereby surrendered to the discretion (Beli^{eben}) of man. The usual view of truth insists that it is imperishable and eternal, whereas man and "his" freedom are perishable and the source of untruth. Truth is "beyond" us and cannot be confused with untruth which is our doing. Heidegger opposes this "selfevident" split between eternal-true and temporal-free. He suggests that the nature of man is still in question, along with the way in which freedom is and is not his doing or his possession. In the same way the location and origin of untruth remains in question.

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 82.

13

E. The Fourth Division: "The essence of Freedom"

(1) Freedom receives its essence from the more-original essence of truth; freedom is the hub of the problem of truth. (2) Freedom as "letting being Be" and "engagement into the open". (3) Negative and positive freedom in religion and politics. (4) Freedom and step two from freedom to mystery.

(1) Two common assertions about freedom are a) that it is a property or attribute of man and b) that it means the state of being unrestrained or not being coerced. Heidegger "opposes" both of these assertions not by taking the opposite stance -- that freedom is "really restraint" and has nothing to do with man -- but rather by pointing to our experience. In our experience, truth and freedom operate together. They meet in a hidden essential ground region where truth rules and unfolds. In this groundregion freedom receives (empfängt) its own essence from the "more 14 original essence of the uniquely essential truth". Only through this ground region does freedom become the ground of the inner possibility of rightness.

"die Freiheit ist nur deshalb der Grund der inneren Möglichkeit der Richtigkeit, weil sie ihr eigenes Wesen aus dem ursprünglicheren Wesen der einzig wesentlichen Wahrheit empfängt." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 83.

14

The same freedom which is the ground of truth (as rightness) receives a more original truth. The fact that a standard is used in representing led to the assertion of freedom as the ground of truth. Now we see that freedom receives the standard. It receives what it has beforehand. Because it receives the standard, freedom can discern Being and thus can let beings Be.

"Freedom reveals itself now as the letting-Be of being."¹⁵

Step one demonstrates that the current modes are conditioned by freedom in the zone of transcendence. This step, by itself seems groundless or arbitrary, but is a necessary prerequisite to the revelation of true submission, that is, a submission which frees as it determines.

(2) It is important that the definition of freedom at this point (as letting being Be), refers to the Being of beings, the ontological difference; the matter of negative and positive freedom in relation to questions of religion and politics focuses on the problem of Being and beings. But before proceeding to these matters, I want to clarify the meaning of "letting being Be" and "engagement into the open".

"Freiheit enthüllt sich jetzt als das Seinlassen von Seiendem." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 83.

In the whole matter of "letting being Be the being that it is", being traverses the open region and the representation which occurs includes a standard giving itself freely into the open. This free, self-giving is "Being-free" toward the things manifest in the open. In <u>The Essence of Ground</u> it was said that freedom lets the world rule or "world". This same matter is here restated. The self-giving of a standard is the project of the world. Being free is letting being Be. Thus far, no decisive change has occurred in the account of freedom, and Being remains undeveloped. The concern is still completely with its reception, with its being allowed or let in.

The receiving of the Being of beings is not passive or acquiescent. It is called <u>engaging into</u> the open and its open-16 ness. The open (das Offene) names the region as such and the openness (Offenheit) names the "regioning" or opening of the open region. For the Greeks openness was " $\tau \nota \ a h \theta \dot{t} a$ " which Heidegger translates as "das Unverborgene" (the unconcealed or the unhidden). Truth he suggests should be understood as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) to recover more literally the Greek word " $a \noth \eta \theta \dot{t} a$ ", which continues to preserve the full and genuine meaning of "Wahrheit". Truth is what-is-revealed (Entborgenheit) and revelation (Entbergung). Freedom as letting-being-Be or receiving

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 84.

16

the Being of being is engaging in the revelation of things.

The criterion or standard is "taken" by representing, when being manifests itself or gives itself in the engaging.

> "Engaging in the revelation of being does not lose itself in this, but rather unfolds itself into a stepping back from being, so that being manifests itself as what it is and how it is, and representing approximation takes a standard out of it."¹⁷

Freedom as engaging into the open seems then to co-operate with being which manifests itself as such, that is, in its Being. To call freedom "ek-sistent" is to say this another way. Freedom "sets itself out" to being as such. The root meaning of "eksist" is "stand-out". Setting-out is here equated with exsistent free Dasein. Truth as disclosure or revelation is preserved (verwahrt) in ex-sisting, in engaging through which the there (Da) of Dasein is what it is.

(3) Freedom understood as engagement or entering into the revelation of being as such is neither negative nor positive

17

"Das Sicheinlassen auf die Entborgenheit des Seienden verliert sich nicht in dieser, sondern ent_faltet sich zu einem Zurücktreten vor dem Seienden, damit dieses, in dem, was es ist und wie es ist, sich offenbare und die vorstellende Angleichung aus ihm das Richtma⁽²⁾, nehme." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 84. 18

This word "Eingelassenheit" which I have translated "engagement" might also have been rendered "entering into" to bring into the open the accusative sense of movement which "in die . . ." entails. The word needs to be noted carefully because it is the forerunner of "Gelassenheit" which is considered in chapter four. The attempt with one word to unite and preserve as different, negative and positive freedom points to the heart of my concern in this thesis, to show how freedom saves its essence in the region of the truth of Being. At this point however, (continued) freedom. Nor is it a mixture of the two in the usual sense. As he did in <u>The Essence of Ground</u>, Heidegger opposes the notion of negative freedom, which understands freedom as the choice to go this way or that without coercion. And he adds his opposition to "positive freedom" which he defines here as "readiness for something demanded and necessary (and thus some sort of <u>being</u>)." <u>19</u> (Underlining mine).

The debate about negative and positive freedom can be deepened at this point when Heidegger is on the verge of taking the second step from freedom to untruth. The attempt to describe a particular concrete stance in terms of freedom needs to consider the distinction of negative and positive freedom. In Heidegger's case we saw in <u>The Essence of Ground</u> that this factor of negative and positive takes on complexity with the factor of transcendence and the ontological distinction between Being and being. At this point in <u>The Essence of Truth</u> a new factor is emerging. Not only are positive and negative freedom complicated by the difference

18 (continued) (before step two) the matter of the unity and difference of positive and negative freedom is being considered only with the horizon of the receiving of the Being of being. 19

". . . Bereitschaft fur ein Gefördertes und Notwendiges (und so irgendwie Seiendes)." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 84. between Being and being; they are also influenced by the way and the place in which Being and being are experienced. To concentrate on standing in the open region <u>receiving</u> the Being of being is still to think of Being as the ground of being, and being as grounded in Being. In this way neither Being nor being is allowed to be what it is.

The attempt to let "Being itself speak" responds to this problem. At the same time however it tends to heighten the problem of thinking being only as grounded in Being. Negatively speaking, all these problems show themselves in the difficult relation of the not of the difference to the not of the nothing.

Adding this new factor of the place of the stance gives some idea of the strangeness of this question in Heidegger's thought. It is not surprising that he is attacked by some as "libertarian" and by others as "conservative". His rejection of "readiness for <u>being</u>" suggests that he accepts something like "readiness for <u>Being</u>" but being ready for Being clearly includes the negative, the nots of the difference and the nothing. The full resolution of this matter must wait for the epilogue to <u>What</u> <u>Is Metaphysics</u>? and the conversation about the region and the letter on humanism (Chapters three and four). At this point it must suffice to have indicated some of the problems which are the context of the second step.

The questions implicated in the second step are quite concrete. They are of enormous importance to religion and politics.

One way of looking at this question Heidegger is wrestling with is to consider a problem in the study of religion. How do we study religion without explaining it in the horizon of the method of study? Perhaps the study is either an unjustified imposition or it is itself a quasi-religion. If we are "within religion" is there any need of this study, assuming it is not theology? If we are outside religion, do we study it to <u>destroy</u> it whether we know this or not? These questions can only be approached in a discussion of the nature of <u>tradition</u>, what it is to be inside it or outside it. In the history of the West, this matter of tradition focuses in particular on the relation of particular religious traditions to <u>the</u> traditions and "religion".

One important way of understanding the Western form of transcendence is to note the existence of different appreciations of what is holy. Our heritage includes for example both the holiness of the absolutely transcendent and the holiness of everything and everyone. Heidegger's struggle can be seen as an attempt to think about what is holy. In the letter on humanism he speaks of thinking the truth of Being as prerequisite to thinking the dimension of what is holy. Along the way from 1928 to 1951,

Heidegger seemed to swing back and forth between the poles of Being itself (comparable to the holy as <u>other</u>) and the Being of being (comparable to the holiness of being). In 1951 he feels that he is able to stand in the <u>whole</u> tradition of what is holy, rather than in the Greek pole or in the Hebrew-Christian pole.

> "The failure (Fehl) of God and the god-like to emerge is absence. Absence is not nothing. Rather, it is the presence which first must be appropriated of the hidden fullness of what has been, and so gathered, of what prevails of the god-like in Greece, prophetic Judaism and the preaching (Predigt) of Jesus."²⁰

The problem of the zone of transcendence is that it understands Being as the ground of beings. It does not let "Being itself" speak. But the attempt to let Being speak, which could be seen as the attempt "to transcend transcendence", sometimes leads Heidegger to press very hard the matter of Being <u>as opposed to being</u>. He moves dangerously close to "forsaking being for the sake of Being". I am thinking especially of the epilogue to <u>What Is Metaphysics</u>? written in 1943, where Heidegger is treading the most difficult and dangerous path to the point

[&]quot;Der Fehl Gottes und des Göttlichen ist Abwesenheit. Allein Abwesenheit ist nicht nichts, sondern sie ist die gerade erst anzueignende Anwesenheit der vorborgenen Fülle des Gewesenen und so versammelt Wesenden, des Göttlichen im Griechentum, im Prophetisch-Jüdischen, in der Predigt Jesu". Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), p. 183.

where he can write that "Being can prevail without being." The implications of such a position for politics are terrifying, and Heidegger changed the passage in question in 1949 to "Being never 21 prevails without being." At the same time, the necessity of thinking Being itself remains an essential supplement to the thinking of the Being of beings. The attempt of 1943 was necessary for the position of 1949 in which the not of the nothing, which is not abandoned, is seen to be <u>the same</u> as the not of the difference. It was this strange problem that led Heidegger to 22 begin speaking in 1949 of the Being of being as "Seyn", an old word for "Sein" which Hölderlin used.

(4) I have anticipated some of the problems of the second step which emerge in the years between the lecture and the concluding note of 1949. Returning now to the fourth division of the lecture proper, Heidegger makes, toward the end of the division, what he calls "the decisive step". He announces again the fact of untruth. Part of the fact of freedom is the fact of untruth.

". . . historical man also cannot let being Be the being that it is and how it is." 23

21... da⁵ das Sein nie west ohne das Seiende,". Before 1949 the passage read "... da⁵ das Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende,". See Prof. Richardson's account of the "altered epilogue". William Richardson, <u>Through Phenomenology to Thought</u> (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 563-5.

²²See for example the concluding note to the 1949 edition of The Essence of Truth. Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 96.

²³". . . kann der geschichtliche Mensch im Seinlassen des Seienden das Seiende auch <u>nicht</u> das Seiende sein lassen das es ist und wie es ist." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 86.

Letting being Be being as such is at the same time <u>not</u> letting it Be thus. Simulation, hiding and misplacing (verstellen) necessarily are involved. In freedom, the non-essence of truth comes to light. But since this freedom is not the property of man but rather <u>it owns him</u> and makes his historical existence possible, the non-essence must be part of the essence of truth itself. Truth and untruth belong together essentially and this is beyond our power though it comes to light in freedom, which is ground as well as abyss. Only because they are together, <u>essentially</u>, is it possible for them to be opposed at the level of true and untrue <u>propositions</u>. This sort of truth is quite literally abysmally difficult. Heidegger is suggesting that it is unavoidable.

If we want to complete the questioning of the essence of truth, we need to reach now into this more original region where the complete essence of truth includes untruth.

> "The determination of the place of the non-essence of truth is not additional filling-in of a gap, but rather the decisive step into the posing of the <u>question</u> of the essence of truth which reaches to [what is questioned]."²⁴

24

"Die Erörterung des Unwesens der Wahrheit ist nicht nachträgliche Ausfüllung einer Lücke, sondern der entscheidende Schritt in die zureichende Ansetzung der <u>Frage</u> nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 87. The introduction of words like untruth and non-essence is not of itself enough to indicate what this decisive step is. In <u>Being and Time</u> and <u>The Essence of Ground</u>, these words also appear. Nor is the fact that freedom owns man or "authenticates" him new in this lecture. <u>The decisive step is the determination of the</u> <u>place of the non-essence of truth</u>. (Die Erörterung des Unwesens der Wahrheit.)

Where is this place of the non-essence of truth? In <u>The Essence of Ground</u>, Heidegger stated that ground not only has its essence but also its non-essence, but there was no suggestion of any "region" other than the zone or horizon of transcendence. The non-essence of truth also <u>comes to light</u> in freedom, that is in ek-sistence. In <u>Being and Time</u> inauthentic disclosure necessarily accompanied authentic disclosure. But the attempt to let Being speak as the nothing leads Heidegger to find a deeper foundation of inauthenticity in <u>mystery</u>. We were already powerless in the face of freedom; mystery incorporates a region which is hidden from freedom as well.

There seems to be a "place" or "region" of the essence of truth-untruth, which is <u>not</u> the realm of freedom, which is other than the zone of transcendence. At first sight, this suggests that freedom may be deprived of its status as the "ground of ground". Perhaps it only seemed to be the source?

Another possibility is that the invoking of this "extreme other" is a temporary aberration, the attempt "to transcend transcendence", which is later set right in the return to the difference in 1949. As it turns out, neither of these impressions are true, though both touch on important problems which are involved in the making of the second step. In the concluding note of 1943, Heidegger makes a statement which could be applied to his early, middle and later work. It was not modified in the 1949 concluding note.

> "The thought attempted in the lecture comes to its fullness in the essential experience, that only through Da-sein, into which we can go, does a nearness to the truth of Being prepare itself for historical man."²⁵

This statement at the very least establishes that Heidegger does not leave Da-sein, freedom and transcendence behind when he introduces the "truth of Being", which is here called again "nearness" or "the near". The problem of the appearance of <u>two</u> regions, of a new region of truth-untruth in addition to the horizon or zone of transcendence is taken up especially in chapter 4. The conversation which Heidegger called "Toward the determination of the place of engagement" makes this matter of zone and region its special concern.

It should be clear that step two is not one of construction to reception. Step one already made it clear that freedom <u>receives</u>

"Das im Vortrag versuchte Denken erfüllt sich in der wesentlichen Erfahrung, da⁴) erst aus dem Da-sein, in das der Mensch eingehen kann, eine Nähe zur Wahrheit des Seins für den geschichtlichen Menschen sich vorbereitet." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 97.

its essence. Step two is from an already receptive freedom to untruth. It steps back and accepts the <u>whole</u> "realm" of what is negative. Negation is not merely part of the nature of freedom. It also breaks in upon the realm of freedom already negative. The appearance of two regions is parallel to the two "nots" of the difference and the nothing. In one sense, the second step brings the not of the nothing to bear on the not of the difference. The result is the "two level" or "double-region" character of negation. It is not only concealment but also the concealment of concealment. The not is no longer just the limit of the horizon, the edge which is as far as our grasp reaches; the not is also the enclosing darkness which makes it possible for there to be a limit - for there to be a beginning of the horizon.

One way of seeing this step is as a vindication of the kingdom of negation. And this is of course the point where Heidegger treads the most dangerous ground. Does he welcome evil? The realm of negation includes death, sleep, night, silence, but also struggle, anger and chaos. At the very least, Heidegger is suggesting these are unavoidable. We can "overcome" nihilism only by entering into its essence.

This "hub" section of the lecture began with freedom as the completion of the first step: freedom is the horizon of truth. This freedom is given: it gives itself; it receives its

essence. The second step "enters" the region where, or from where, it receives this essence; it "enters" the region of the nothing which is Being, seen from being.

But in this lecture the step is taken only in a formal sense. The work remains at the same time an early one insofar as it leaves the truth of Being undeveloped. In the next chapter (3), I will consider the epilogue to <u>What Is Metaphysics</u>? wherein this "failure" no longer applies.

F. The Essence of Truth is Concealment. The fifth division is the first of three which take the second step from freedom to untruth.

Heidegger leads into this division by asking how we can grasp or get hold of the <u>negative</u> essence of truth. The essence of truth discloses itself as freedom through which our encounter with every particular being is made possible. Every particular relation or encounter is <u>tuned</u> by its being "in the whole" (im Ganzen). This mood (Stimmung) which attunes (abstimmen, durchstimmen), this attunement (Gestimmtheit) is not something grasped or psychologically felt. It is not a feeling. It is <u>the</u> relation <u>in</u> a region, here called "the whole" or "what is whole" or "wholeness". An encounter is attuned by the manifestness of being "in the whole". But the "in the whole" <u>appears as</u> the ungraspable. Its essence is such that it cannot appear alongside the being that is in it. Beside this being it thus <u>seems to be</u> nothing. As part of the same event, the concealment or hiding of being <u>in the whole</u> necessarily accompanies the revealing of a particular being.

The non-essence of truth is thus this necessary concealment of <u>being in the whole</u> which discloses itself in freedom -- that which defines (bestimmt) everything is thus itself undefineable. It tends to be forgotten amid what can be grasped and secured. As in the case of "the world", the whole does not refer to the sum total of all beings. The "objective universe" of science is exactly that which is most oblivious to being "in the whole".

> "Letting-Be is in itself at the same time a hiding. In the ek-sistent freedom of Dasein there occurs the hiding of being in the whole, there is hiddenness."²⁶

G. The <u>Negative</u> Truth as Hiding: the sixth division is the second of three unfolding the second step from freedom to the negative truth.

The previous division undertook to show how <u>truth</u> includes a hiding. Now Heidegger wants to describe <u>untruth</u> as hiding. The appearance may have been given that hiding was the necessary accompaniment to the piece-by-piece acknowledgment of being with emphasis on knowing. This hiding at the level of revelation is, however, an <u>echo</u> of what is not-revealed as such. The nothing is

²⁶ "Das Seinlassen ist in sich zugleich ein Verbergen. In der ek-sistenten Freiheit des Daseins ereignet sich die Verbergung des Seienden im Ganzen, <u>ist</u> die Verborgenheit." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 88.

the not-revealed side of the revealed truth. It is "older" than the hiding which accompanies the encounter with particular beings. At this point Heidegger is approaching what he is later to call "the oldest of the old" and what he calls in the epilogue to <u>27</u> <u>What Is Metaphysics?</u> "the remaining" which is established by the poets. It is "eternal" understood as that which has endured since the dawn. In this lecture, it is called the mystery (das Geheimnis). The mystery is not hiding or concealment. It is the hiding of the hidden in the whole.

There are two ways to look at this now-double level of concealment. Both are involved in Heidegger's use of "mystery" but unless both are included, one may give a false impression and the import of the second step will be lost. (1) The concealing of concealment does mean (but does not only mean): the fact that revelation entails concealment, is concealed by being forgotten. But this double negation by itself still operates only within the horizon of revelation. (2) Mystery also means that there is a negative region, the not of the nothing, of which the negative zone of transcendence, of the difference, is, so to speak, an echo. Since this "region" is not the zone of transcendence even in its negativity, all attempts to "represent" it or get hold of it must fail. It is at this point that there seems to be two regions, and until their

". . . im Bleibenden". Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 103.

relation is unfolded in the later works, the status of freedom seems very much in doubt. The conversation about this region is discussed in chapter four. In this lecture Heidegger speaks of the not-yet experienced region of the truth of Being.

"The authentic non-essence of truth is the mystery."

The word "mystery" like the word "Geheimnis" carries at the same time both an affirmative and a negative sense. It is literally "what is closed". At the same time, it is what encloses us. "Geheimnis" in the same way means something secret which is at the same time our home. There are very few words which continue to carry this double sense. For example, the word "immediate" has lost its sense of being the negation of mediate, and come to mean "direct".

The "affirmative" side of mystery attempts to name the region of the open insofar as it is not the product of transcendence but rather in some way "already there". The negative side of mystery is the not of the nothing which is "older than" the not of the difference. The region of the truth of Being is and is not. It is "affirmative" and "negative". It is day and night together. <u>Our</u> yes and no is the echo of the yes and no of the truth of Being.

The step from the current modes to freedom makes us aware of the responsibility for these modes. They don't rule us absolutely.

"Das eigentliche Un-wesen der Wahrheit ist das Geheimnis." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 89.

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We are not closed up or enclosed strictly by <u>them</u>. This is the meaning of Heidegger's word "resolve" (Entschlossenheit) which literally means "not being closed up" (in being). Being free in this resolved way we become aware of the concealment which accompanies or characterizes freedom. At the same time, however, this responsibility for beings again and again tends to lead us away from the concealment at the heart of freedom where mystery "operates" back into this or that project in the midst of beings.

By settling ourselves in the level of beings we do not <u>allow</u> the mystery to rule. But it rules still; and via the very forgetfulness which does not allow the mystery to rule. The fact that we attach ourselves to particular "truths", to this and that practical concern, is now said to rest (secretly) not only in the hiding of being in the whole, but also in the hiding of this hidden; in the mystery.

Heidegger is now pointing to the "in" character of our "stand". Although, as he says, he is still not developing the truth of Being in this work, just as the project of the world which we are <u>in</u> was not developed pending the preparatory laying-out of the horizon of this project. The whole matter of <u>ek</u>-sistence needs to be completed by <u>in</u>-sistence. We stand out into something we are already in. What is that "region" we are <u>in</u>? At this point, Heidegger states that our ability to <u>insist</u> on things, to attach

ourselves to them, is based in the mystery which rules in the insistence of exsistence.

H. The negative truth as error: the seventh division is the third of three which completes the second step and at the same time "closes the circle" back to the first step. Freedom is the essence of truth as rightness because it arises from the rule of mystery in error.

Erring is transcending "in-reverse", so to speak. As Heidegger puts it: "Error is the essential counter-essence of the original essence of truth". In The Essence of Ground transcending was described as climbing out from in the midst of being to the world. Now erring is described as being driven round, away from mystery toward the practicable. Reaching out is paralleled with a being pushed in. Error then is also the zone that transcendence is. It is room to play (Spielraum) in which insistent existence turns remembering and forgetting. Freedom is as much a matter of error as it is a matter of transcending. Freedom, taking measure of things, revealing things, always forgets the hiding this entails, and is thus always in error. It is part of our human way of being to err. This is both an oppression and at the same time necessary, for it conveys the mystery. We are in a sense doubly oppressed. The human condition is a turning in the double need of the forgotten rule of mystery and the oppression of error. The first step unveils the zone of

"Die Irre ist das wesentliche Gegenwesen zum an fänglichen Wesen der Wahrheit". Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 92.

transcendence which is at the same time the oppression of error. The second step then accepts the rule of mystery in error. In other terms, the first step unveils the not of the difference. The second step then accepts the not of the nothing. Necessity (Notwendigkeit) is understood as this twofold need (Not).

This completion of the second step from freedom to mystery in error, thus "closes the circle" and leads back to step one from current truth to ex-sistent freedom. Transcending is now seen to be climbing out into what it is already in.

> "Freedom conceived out of the insistent **Ex**-sistence of Dasein is the essence of truth (in the sense of rightness of representation) only because freedom itself arises from the original essence of truth, from the rule of mystery in error."³⁰

We begin and must begin with truth as rightness and see that its ground is freedom. But freedom can only be this ground because it is ruled by the <u>original</u> essence of truth the rule of mystery in error. The full appreciation of truth and freedom as dual is the completion of a whole. Returning thus to the structure of truth we may illustrate "Heidegger's version of truth" as follows:

1	being	agrees with	2	the rule of
				mystery in error
3	insistent existent transcending	agrees with	4	being
	20			

"Die Freiheit, aus der in-sistenten Ek-sistenz des Daseins begriffen, ist das Wesen der Wahrheit (im Sinne der Richtigkeit des Vor-stellens) nur deshalb, weil die Freiheit selbst dem anfänglichen Wesen der Wahrheit, dem Walten des Geheimnisses in der Irre, entstammt." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 93. The Being of being is the rule of mystery in error. The "idea we have beforehand" is completed, at least in outline, by this "determination of its place". It should be noted yet again that, according to Heidegger, the "truth of Being is not unfolded" in this lecture. Thus the completion of the circle here described is only a formal outline of what Heidegger later came to see as a genuine completion. The decisive steps prefigure the overcoming of metaphysics but the lecture otherwise remains metaphysical.

I. The dual stance of philosophy as thought of Being. The eighth division of the lecture returns to the question raised at the beginning.

The eighth division of the lecture returns to the question of philosophy and common sense. Born at the same time as philosophy, common sense is the predominance of the level of <u>expression</u> in the question of what is true. This is the level of the immediate or self-evident truths in which we are <u>all</u> immersed. It is a necessary counterpart to the <u>essential</u> questioning which philosophy has entailed from its dawn. Questioning and expressive insistence are co-dependent.

Freedom is not only the transcendental ground of truth as rightness; it is at the same time the kingdom of error. In this dual way it is the vehicle of the rule of mystery. Thought of Being thus has a dual nature or stance.

"Its thought [philosophy's] is the engagement of the mild or weak which does not deny itself the hiddenness of being in the whole. Its thought is at the same time not being closed to the strong or rigorous which does not burst open the hiddenness but urges it undamaged into the open of grasping and thus into its own truth."³¹

Philosophy seems to be free from beings and to have no clear guide since Being remains indeterminate. Kant expressed this "problem" of philosophy when he suggested that philosophy must demonstrate that it is the keeper of its own laws. Heidegger goes a long way toward agreeing with Kant on this matter, especially in opposition to a position which makes philosophy an "ideology" or the expression of a culture. But, according to him, Kant's subjectism made it impossible for him to ask whether philosophy

"itself, first is not held and determined to the holding through the truth of that whereby its laws are laws."³²

The epilogue to <u>What Is Metaphysics</u>? undertakes the task of the unfolding of the truth of Being through which the determination occurs.

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"Ihr Denken ist die Gelassenheit der Milde, die der Verborgenheit des Seienden im Ganzen sich nicht versagt. Ihr Denken ist zumal die Ent-schlossenheit der Strenge, die nicht die Verbergung sprengt, **a**ber ihr unversehrtes Wesen ins Offene des Begreifens und so in ihre eigene Wahrheit nötigt." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, pp. 94-5. 32

". . . ob sie nicht selbst erst gehalten und zum Halten bestimmt wird durch die Wahrheit dessen, wovon ihre Gesetze je Gesetze sind, . . ." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 95.

CHAPTER THREE: FREEDOM AND THE BEGINNING OF THE UNFOLDING OF THE TRUTH OF BEING IN THE EPILOGUE TO

WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

CHAPTER THREE

"FREEDOM AND THE BEGINNING OF THE UNFOLDING OF THE TRUTH OF BEING IN 1 THE EPILOGUE TO WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?"

Introduction

1

1. Unfolding the Truth of Being, Transcendental Freedom and the Different Perspectives of 1943 and 1949

Heidegger wrote an epilogue to his lecture, <u>What Is Meta-</u><u>physics?</u>, in 1943. This work is extremely compact, even cryptic, and it is a major statement of the results of the previous decade of study, as well as being a "foreword" to the lecture of 1929. The work is quite hard to understand because it tries to describe a very unusual experience. A great deal of interpretation is needed to dispell the impression that Heidegger is succumbing to mystification with the poetic and "quasi-religious" language he uses in the work.

To take seriously the dimension where we are tuned or attuned, is not for Heidegger to do psychology. And this claim immediately must be seen as debatable, for the area of "mood" has been conceded long ago to psychology, perhaps even more thoroughly in the English speaking world than the German. The assertion that mood is more than psychological dates back to the earlier works, where subject and object are said to be grounded in transcendence.

All the references to this work are from Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), pp. 99-109.

But the challenge to psychology becomes much more formidable when the full nature of attunement is unfolded in the lecture <u>What Is</u> <u>Metaphysics?</u> and in its epilogue. The fundamental thrust of Heidegger's work comes to the forefront, dramatically in these works.

It is my interpretation that Heidegger eventually came to appreciate the danger of "the nothing" abstracted from its sameness with the ontological differences. Being never prevails without beings. This is the final stable expression of the matter. In the terms of psychology, the bald challenge to psychology came to see itself in the midst of the current predominant psychology. The essence of man is revealed and concealed in what we are now, "psyche". The current modes are not abandoned when grounded in free transcendence. Nor are both of these "levels" abandoned when the region of the truth of Being is unfolded. But the dramatic thrust of the epilogue does need to be tempered somewhat, in later works.

The epilogue is about the occurrence of the truth of Being; at the same time it is about this event as an experience. The two decisive steps in the overcoming of metaphysics demand the unfolding of the truth of Being, but this cannot be achieved by ignoring the still-necessary access of the transcendence of Dasein. Thus it is that this work continues to focus on the threefold "farness" while it begins to unfold the fourfold "nearness". In <u>The Essence of Ground</u>, Heidegger called man an "essence of farness". Man needed to hear into

the distance in order to be near to the things. The <u>experience</u> of nearness was however left not unfolded. In the epilogue farness remains; this can be seen in the continued emphasis on the word experience (Er<u>fah</u>rung). But now as well, the nearness of the truth of Being, which eventually is seen to attune and determine the experience, is unfolded.

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Unfolding the truth of Being therefore does not mean abandoning what is immediate for the sake of something "esoteric", even though this work seems sometimes to do this. Struggling to let forgotten Being speak again in the midst of the predominance of being, Heidegger moves close to a position which asserts "divine transcendence". This is one way of seeing one of the several moments of the struggle to get the question of Being "into the clear" during two decades. The early work, in effect, asserts a kind of "human transcendence" because the question of Being is not unfolded. In the epilogue the truth of Being is unfolded, which is close to "divine transcendence". The eventual stable position, expressed from 1945 on adopts a dual stance in relation to transcendence: (1) In a way, both types of transcendence, "human freedom" and "divine freedom", are Transcendence is accepted as the way in which Being has come accepted. to language up till now. It is our tradition; our task is to think the matter it expresses. (2) Transcendence is defined as beginning

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 71.

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with one or the other freedom and grounding the other in terms of the first. By itself, that is without the matter expressed, such transcendence is abandoned. And the assertion that the two transcendent "nots" must be seen to belong together in "the same" is a decisive rejection of either one, kept separate. In fact, the two types of transcendence are in some respects very much alike, when separated from the other.

Even if it is true that the epilogue has a dangerous tendency, it is a bold work and deserves to be taken seriously in its own right. It taps the realm of <u>attunement</u>, and this remains a fundamental part of the whole of Heidegger's position, just as the abyss of freedom of the early work remains a part of this whole. Both of these parts are affected eventually by being in the whole, but the heart of what they uncover remains. When studying the matter of attunement we need to look at it both as a revelation and as something which later will be modified by its membership in the larger whole.

Heidegger comes to use the word "<u>mere</u>" (blo⁶) more and more, to take account of the difference between a truth separated or abstracted from the whole, and that same truth seen in the whole. For example, I can say that the current modes <u>remain</u>, when they are grounded in the zone of transcendence but that they are no longer merely what they were. Or the abyss at the heart of transcendence

remains when the truth of Being is unfolded but it is no longer <u>mere</u> abyss. A great deal hangs on this word, for it expresses the dual stance in relation to things. Heidegger accepts the current modes; but his acceptance of them is vastly different from those who acquiesce in them. I think that it is quite wrong to suggest that Heidegger has lodged himself in an esoteric region with no effective connection to what is familiar and real. At the same time Heidegger arms me with arguments against "adjustment" to what is "real". It makes all the difference in the world whether we accept what is occurring immediately as "all there is" (and nothing more), or whether we accept it as part of what <u>is</u>. That is, whether we accept merely them or accept them along with what grounds them and makes them true as well as correct.

The epilogue can be seen from the point of view of 1943, when it was written, as a supplement to the works on the ontological difference. Beginning with man and the transcendental horizon of questioning, we are led to a dark hole where an assumption occurs without which all our structure collapses. "A standard is taken" when freedom lets being <u>Be</u>. But the "place" where this determination occurs is a "ground-region" a negative region. The overcoming of metaphysics is an overcoming because it faces this ground-region itself rather than <u>merely</u> focussing on what truth came out of it into the clear.

Along with that 1943 perspective it will help to bear in

mind the perspective of 1949. It points out the failure of the early works (both <u>The Essence of Ground</u> and <u>What is Metaphysics?</u>) to see the sameness (as well as the difference) of these respective "nots" of the ontological difference and the nothing. My interpretation is that the dangerous tendency of the failure to see the sameness of the nothing and the difference, is still evident in the 1943 epilogue. In 1949, Heidegger felt it was necessary to alter the epilogue in some crucial respects and to write a substantial new introduction to <u>What Is Metaphysics</u>? subtitled "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics". The concern throughout this work of 1949 is to insist that we can think the ground of metaphysics without thinking against metaphysics.

> A thought, which thinks on the truth of Being is to be sure no longer satisfied with metaphysics; but it also does not think against metaphysics.³

We are missing what Heidegger is about if we look for the latest transcendental exposé of what is "really the root" of what previous thinkers thought. Heidegger closes the introduction with a question which puts the stance of 1949 well. The current preoccupation with being (ego-subject and thing as object) led Heidegger in his work both on the ontological difference and the nothing in different ways to overemphasize Being. Both were necessary parts of the way and both contributed lasting components to the final stance; but they

"Ein Denken, das an die Wahrheit des Seins denkt, begnügt sich zwar nicht mehr mit der Metaphysik; aber es denkt auch nicht gegen die Metaphysik". Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 197.

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needed to be tempered.

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What remains more mysterious, this, that being is, or this, that Being is? Or with this reflection do we not yet reach into the nearness of the riddle, which has occurred with the Being of being?⁴

2. Freedom and the Nothing. Dread in What Is Metaphysics?

It was clear to Heidegger from the start that the works on the difference and the nothing were "companions" to each other. In <u>The Essence of Ground</u> the project of the world is a problem 5 which brings man's nothingness to the centre. The crucial feature of transcendence is conditioned by the credibility of Being as the nothing. And in <u>What Is Metaphysics</u>?, the same point is put the other way round.

> Without original manifestness of the nothing, no self-Being and no freedom.⁶

Dasein's being held into the nothing on the ground of hidden dread is the climbing over of being in the whole: transcendence.⁷

The attempt to describe the nothing and its attunement to us through dread is the attempt to make credible the project of the world. The

"Was bleibt rätselhafter, dies, da⁴ Seiendes ist, oder dies, da⁴ Sein ist? Oder gelangen wir auch durch diese Besinnung noch nicht in die Nähe des Rätsels, das sich mit dem Sein des Seienden ereignet hat?" Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 211.

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 58, note 59.

"Ohne ursprüngliche Offenbarkeit des Nichts kein Selbstsein und keine Freiheit." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 12.

[/]"Die Hineingehaltenheit des Daseins in das Nichts auf dem Grunde der verborgenen Angst ist das Übersteigen des Seienden im Ganzen: die Transzendenz." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 15. "not" of the nothing is Being seen from being, according to the 1949 8 preface to The Essence of Ground.

Heidegger asserts that we are attuned at all times by the nothing, manifesting itself as dread (Angst). This "ground mood" operates at all times even though it is hidden and we are seldom aware of its operation. It is not something which can be proved logically or psychologically. But that does not mean it is baldly asserted with Olympian disdain for logic and psychology. Heidegger's approach is rather to begin with the current notion until critical self reflection shows the "incompleteness" of these current notions. The path which opened itself up in step one which moved from the current modes to transcendental freedom, is now, in the epilogue, matched with a similar movement in step two from transcendental freedom to the region of the truth of Being. The current modes "make themselves known" as incomplete. Within these modes we experience what is occurring in a truncated way. The steps from logic and psychology to a more complete experience are not alternatives to logic and psychology; they are completions and thus vindications of them. In any case, the "validity" of the step from the modes to transcendence is based on an "experience", the experience of the zone of transcendence, of time as ecstatic openness. And the "proof" of the ground region of the nothing is also an experience (Erfahrung). Its legitimacy must be different than that of an inference.

> 8 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 21.

In <u>The Essence of Truth</u> Heidegger tried to show that our encounter with beings (including our "encounter" with ourselves) 9 occurs in a region which he called "the open". And its reciprocal 10 counter essence was called "error". A dual occurrence was noted in our encounter with things. They are represented by us and they "represent themselves" to us by coming toward us and staying where they are. Thinking of this occurrence now in terms of the nothing manifest as dread, there is a similar dual movement. When beings are seen in the whole, they are no longer a ground which holds us (or at least so it seems). As such they "back away" from us and at 11 the same time "press in" upon us.

In the experience of dread, all the things we are familiar with seem to lose their validity or authority, although they were, perhaps, never conceived beforehand as "having authority". They simply did have authority. Dread makes everything seem accidental or capricious, the conglomerate product of an infinitely complex history of caprice. And the same mood strikes down whatever innocent feeling we had about ourself. The self or the sense of self, or the individual consciousness, this too seems merely the truncated product of a peculiar historical development. The loss of faith in the authenticity of the self as it is experienced, is perhaps the

Heidegger, Wegmarken, pp. 79-80. 10 Ibid., p. 91ff. 11 Ibid., p. 9.

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most devastating part of the "backing away" of beings.

As the familiar things and also ourselves as we know ourselves slip away, they become quite alien. This great conglomerate of capricious "stuff" becomes at the same time a terrible, inescapable <u>oppression</u>. The experience of dread is the awakening of the awareness of oppression. As such, it is an indispensable permanent part of Heidegger's position. But <u>alone</u>, this awareness can drift into an absurd and dangerous extreme. The world is an alien prison, a wasteland, an "air-conditioned nightmare". It is clear that if matters were left in the horizon of the nothing and dread alone, beings would be little more than the <u>occasion</u> of our discovery of a true home which is absolutely <u>other</u> than them. The region of the truth of Being would then be yet another abstract "world" beyond. There is a "dangerous tendency" of this kind in this work, which could perhaps be attributed to the subject of the nothing.

A. Attunement and the Nothing in the Epilogue to What is Metaphysics?

It is a most difficult matter to remain aware of what the second step entails. The first step already reaches freedom as <u>received</u> rather than <u>constructed</u> by us. We don't make the zone of transcendence; we are thrown into it. What needs to be superseded is confinement in the region of transcendence. In terms of language, we can say confinement to the region of speech as expression. Freedom is thought as something given, but our horizon is still what is in

question. What being thrown is, is postponed until it is established that we are thrown. The second step begins the attempt to unfold the throwing or giving, which of course never stop occurring when it was "postponed". This is what is meant by beginning to unfold the truth of Being.

We come to a wall through which there seems to come guidance or direction. The wall is the difference between beings and Being. But it is not exhaustively defined as the limit of our grasp. The wall is also the edge of the darkness facing us, surrounding us, pervading us, enclosing us, without which there could not be the open zone of our grasp. The second step begins to let the not of the nothing "speak"; this means to accept or appreciate the dark region of speechlessness, without which speech could not be. Being defines us in "soundless speaking". Expression bespeaks what is inexpressible, of which it speaks. To appreciate the whole of what we are, where we are and what and who we are with, we need to widen our appreciation to include the determination (Bestimmung) of the soundless voice of Being (lautlose Stimme des Seins). We must be ready

. . . to experience in the nothing, the width and room (Weiträumigkeit) of that which gives every being the warrant to Be. That is Being itself.¹²

It is important to be clear that Heidegger is not using phrases like

". . . im Nichts die Weiträumigkeit dessen zu erfahren, was jedem Seienden die Gewähr gibt, zu sein. Das ist das Sein selbst." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 102.

"the voice of Being" and "the soundless voice of Being" in a metaphorical or "quasi-poetic" way. This is not just a manner of speaking, or a matter of taste of which we may or may not approve, as in the case of a phrase like "history tells us . . ." or "science tells us . . ." He is definitely not trying to be esoteric, thinking about "Being" or about "Being speaking". Heidegger knew well that this word "Being" is "impractical" because no one seems to know what it means. There is a widespread suspicion that it is a fiction or a mystification, and many who wouldn't go that far prefer to leave the matter alone, assuming they are even aware of anything of this kind being the matter. And yet Heidegger makes it his lifetime concern. He suggests that the word has ridden the crest of a long history into its own oblivion. We seem now to have an almost insurmountable tendency to separate ourselves from Being when we speak of it, and so we declare it to be alien. If this forgotten alien Being is then said to speak, we feel this is "poetic" anthropomorphisizing and as such a mystification.

Speaking of Being and the nothing in terms of the family of words with the root "*stimm-", Heidegger claims to confront a concrete matter, occurring. This family is one of two which are very important in the matter of attunement or determination in this work, and in fact throughout Heidegger's work. The other "family" is grouped around the root "*mut-". These two families of words are closely allied; this is illustrated in the translation of "Stimmung" as "mood". Between

them, they draw together a widespread group of meanings which help to disclose the region of determination which grounds and vindicates freedom.

Some of the members of the family of words with the root "*stimm-" are "Stimmung" (mood), "Gestimmtheit" (attunement), "Ubereinstimmung" (agreement, harmony), "Stimme" (voice) and "Bestimmung" (definition, determination). Also members of this family are the English words "stem" and "stamen". The Indo-European root of all these words is "st(h)a"(to stand). This family of words gathers together a constellation of meanings including attunement, agreement, mood, definition, determination, stem (as what connects to ground on which a stand occurs) and <u>voice</u>. The oldest of the German words with "*stimm-" is "Stimme" (voice). The ground meaning of this old word is a voice in the sense of a judgment rendered, a "vote" in the old sense of "vow".

Some members of the group of words with the root "*mut-" are "Mut" (courage), "vermuten" (to assume, presume), "Gemut" (heart), "Anmut" (grace), "zumuten" (to bid or demand). Also a member of this family is the English word "mood", which originally meant, like the German, "Mut", "mind, heart, courage". All these words are connected to the Indo-European verbal root "*mē, mô" (to strive after something, to vigorously demand it, to be excited about it). A number of the words closely related to those mentioned are words for

<u>anger</u> as the specific nature of the courage in question. And Duden suggests that "Mut" also originally was more specifically a matter of anger (Zorn). The basic concern of this family of words seems to be the phenomenon of people being stirred up to will something angrily and courageously, along with what determines or demands this movement. The words gather together the matters of demands, courage, struggle, mood, assumption and the graceful assignment of meaning.

These two closely allied families and the constellations of meaning they draw together are evidence for Heidegger of how Being speaks in language. If we learn our relation to it, language is our all-pervasive genuine "bedrock". The discussion of courage, dread, awe and being-at-home may hopefully begin to show how this is so.

B. Courage, Dread, and Awe and the Region of the Truth of Being.

One thus in his essence, called into the truth of Being, is always from there attuned (gestimmt) in an essential way. The clear courage (Mut) toward essential dread (Angst) warrants the mystery-filled possibility of the experience of Being. For near by the essential dread as what terrifies (Schrecken) of the abyss, there dwells awe (Scheu). It clears and enfolds that region of human essence inside which he remains at home in the remaining (das Bleibende).¹³

13 "Der also in seinem Wesen in die Wahrheit des Seins Gerufene ist daher stets in einer wesentlichen Weise gestimmt. Der klare Mut zur wesen haften Angst verbürgt die geheimnisvolle Möglichkeit der Erfahrung des Seins. Denn nahe bei der wesenhaften Angst als dem Schrecken des Abgrundes wohnt die Scheu. Sie lichtet und umhegt jene Ortschaft des Menschenwesens, innerhalb deren er heimisch bleibt im Bleibenden." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 103. Hardiness (Tapferkeit) knows, in the abyss of what terrifies, the seldom-met room of Being (Raum des Seins) out of whose clearing (Lichtung) every being turns back into what it is and is able to Be.¹⁴

Heidegger asserts that we are attuned by the nothing; but this means we are attuned by Being, for the nothing is Being seen from being. This matter is experienced as two moods, dread and awe, which are said to dwell near one another. It was said that dread manifests the nothing; now it is seen that dread <u>and</u> awe manifest nothing as the veil of Being. Being as the nothing is then experienced as room (as well as time) as clearing which acknowledges its hidden source.

The access to these moods of dread and awe are courage (Mut) and hardiness (Tapferkeit). There seems to be a circular movement or operation with courage and hardiness as middle terms. Starting with them, we can move in either direction in the cycle. (1) Courage faces dread and appears to be <u>cut loose from all</u> <u>allegiance</u>. It enables the experience of awe and terror as providers of genuine enclosure. They "strike us dumb" and thus surround and enclose us. (2) Courage and hardiness are also a result, nurtured by the oppression under which they arise. They are nurtured and determined in the way that something "startling" enables a "start". Something of this meaning is contained in the words "awestruck" and "terrorstruck". To be "terrified" here means to be left speechless

[&]quot;Die Tapferkeit erkennt im Abgrund des Schreckens den kaum betretenen Raum des Seins, aus dessen Lichtung erst jegliches Seiende in das zurückkehrt, was es ist und zu sein vermag." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 103.

before what terrifies, in such a way that there is a genuine encounter with something other than us which impinges on us. Only this makes it possible to be at home rather than lost in a wilderness of our own making.

This dual aspect to courage, hardiness and dread can be drawn out by thinking about these words: "Anger" and dread (angst) come from the same Indo-European root "*angh" (to narrow, compress) as does the German word "eng" (narrow). Similarly, anger can be seen as that which bursts out of what is occurring, but also as that which is nurtured by the compression or oppression of what is occurring. The word "tapfer" (hardy) originally meant "solid, concise, compact" and later came to mean "courageous, bold, hardy". The clear whole meaning is that the hardiness comes from being pressed and made compact. The German word for compact is "gedrungen" literally meaning "struck, forced through or pressed". It now becomes clear in a more concrete way what Heidegger meant when he said in <u>The Essence of Truth</u> that we are doubly <u>oppressed</u> (bedrängt) 15 that we turn in the double <u>need</u> of the rule of mystery in error.

Together, the moods called dread and awe manifest the nothing (Being). The manifesting and what is made manifest together are the truth of Being. Dread is a kind of collective awareness of the uncanniness which pervades everything "canny" or familiar. It is awareness of oppression. It enables an awareness of "the region

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 93.

of speechlessness" which pervades speech. Now awe is said "to clear" (lichten) and "to enfold" (umhegen) the region of our essence where we dwell at home in what remains. These two verbs are carefully chosen to express the new awareness of the region of the truth of Being which is now in play. The verb "lichten" and the noun 16 "Lichtung" which is usually translated "clearing" remain crucial for Heidegger in the next two decades. At this point it should be pointed out that all the meanings of "lichten" (lighting, lightening, clearing) retain awareness of the complementary surrounding darkness, heaviness or enclosure. The verb "umhegen" carries the same double connotation but lays emphasis on the "other half" so to speak. It enfolds only by opening room. It protects and preserves by freeing.

In conjunction with dread which manifests the nothing, Being manifests itself by clearing and hiding or concealing itself. Only this disclosed-closed region is our essential home and the essential room of other beings.

C. "The freedom of sacrifice" and "what is noble in poverty".

17

This thought answers to the claim (Anspruch) of Being, whereby man surrenders his historical essence to the simplicity of a single necessity (Notwendigkeit) which does not necessitate by coercing, but rather creates the need (Not) which fulfills itself in the freedom of sacrifice (der Freiheit des Opfers). The need is that truth of Being be preserved (gewahrt) . . .¹⁷

"Dieses Denken antwortet dem Anspruch des Seins, indem der Mensch sein geschichtliches Wesen dem Einfachen der einzigen Notwendigkeit Überantwortet, die nicht nötigt, indem sie zwingt, sondern die Not schafft, die sich in der Freiheit des Opfers erfüllt. Die Not ist, das die Wahrheit des Seins gewahrt wirgen. ..." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 105.

16 The meaning of the "clearing" is discussed in the introduction and in Chapter Four.

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The sacrifice is the expense of the essence of man into the preservation of the truth of Being for being, which expense is lifted out of all coercion because arising out of the abyss of freedom.¹⁸

Original thought is the echo (Widerhall) of the favour (Gunst) of Being in which what is unique (das Ein^zige) clears itself and lets itself occur: that being is.¹⁹

Whether we want to be coerced or not, this is not how we are determined. When we succumb to coercion of any kind we have abdicated our true determination. Heidegger is asserting that necessity confronts us not directly but with need, to which our response or answer must have the character of "the freedom of sacrifice". Free response is guided or claimed through need (Not). This stance of the freedom of sacrifice can be seen as "rebellious" in contrast to clear-cut obedience. But Heidegger wants as well to qualify the stance of autonomy. At the end of The Essence of Truth, 20he spoke of what holds philosophy whereby its laws are laws. Philosophy is "the keeper of its own laws" as Kant suggested, only in contrast to the attempts to make it epiphenomenal or "ideological". Heidegger agrees with Kant that philosophic thought cannot serve a

"Das Opfer ist die allem Zwang enthobene, weil aus dem Abgrund der Freiheit erstehende Verschwendung des Menschenwesens in die Wahrung der Wahrheit des Seins für das Seiende." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 105. 19

"Das anfängliche Denken ist der Widerhall der Gunst des Seins, in der sich das Einzige lichtet und sich ereignen läßt: das Seiendes ist." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 105. 20

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 95.

particular religious revelation or scientific thesis. Now, in the epilogue the way in which philosophic thought is held by the nothing (Being) is unfolded. Thought answers the need that the truth of Being for being be preserved. Thought like anger is nurtured along the way of the double oppression of need created by necessity.

The need "fulfills itself" in the freedom of sacrifice (Opfer). Freedom was "freedom toward the ground" and "letting being Be". Now it is called "the freedom of sacrifice". This phrase can be misleading unless some thought is given to the whole meaning of "Opfer" which is in some ways quite different from the English "sacrifice". "Thank-offering" is perhaps a better translation since the meaning of "sacrifice" has been forgotten, and also the word "offering" has the same origin as "Opfer". The Latin word "operari" (to be active or working) also has a specific religious use (to serve godhead through offering). The basic meaning, reflected also in the Latin word "opus" can be seen from the Indo-European root "*op-" (to work, to bring to a stand, to earn, to win). Heidegger's meaning, when he says that need fulfills itself in the freedom of sacrifice, seems to be the following:

We are determined because there is <u>work</u> that <u>needs</u> to be done, and done freely, that is without direct guidance. The need for free work implies the courage for dread which manifests the nothing. At the same time it manifests the encounter with the clearing of Being which makes it possible for beings to Be. The beings are produced

in response to the nothing (Being). The freedom of sacrifice is productive work as a response to the nothing (Being).

But how else could humanity find its way into original thanking were it not so that the favour of Being through the open connection to itself grants to man what is noble of poverty in which the freedom of sacrifice hides the treasure of its essence.²¹

The phrase "what is noble in poverty" must be carefully thought through since it may appear to justify poverty, like the old phrase "the poor are always with us". Between the need which we experience and its source, necessity, there lies the abyss. We experience this source as the mystery of Being. The need means poverty for us, which is at the same time the vehicle of the mystery of Being. The mystery of Being is what is noble of poverty. The poverty of need conceals in itself but also makes operative the nobility of what endures, what Heidegger sometimes calls "the oldest of the old". It becomes clear in the conversation on the place of engagement (see Chapter 4) that "nobility" means "heritage" (Herkunft) and heritage means what comes toward us from both future and past.

The circular operation of freedom and the truth of Being begins to show through clearly in these compact statements of the epilogue. Later in the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger asserts that

[&]quot;Wie anders aber fände je ein Menschentum in das ursprüngliche Danken, es sei denn so, daß die Gunst des Seins durch den offenen Bezug zu ihr selbst dem Menschen den Adel der Armut gewährt, in der die Freiheit des Opfers den Schatz ihres Wesens verbirgt?" Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 106.

freedom saves its essence in "the free". Here in the epilogue this assertion appears in the statement that Being grants the open connection to itself and that the freedom of sacrifice hides the treasure of its essence. Without farness there can be no nearness; and vice versa.

22

D. The "dangerous tendency" of the not of the nothing, still evident in 1943. The components which will eventually temper this tendency are also present.

In this discussion of the manifestation of nothing in dread, the status of beings is not yet clear. At times they seem to be merely the occasion of our getting beyond them. For example, Heidegger speaks of sacrifice (Opfer) as "the departure (Abschied) from beings 23 on the road to the preservation of the truth of Being". In The Essence of Ground Heidegger said he was trying to bring man's nothingness within being to the centre. We "take ground" in the middle of beings but this involves at the same time a project of the world which "occurs negatively". Until this project of world becomes more credible (because developed) we are left in a terrible loneliness shorn of the authority of the beings we were and of the beings all around us. Now in the epilogue (which "carries" the lecture What Is Metaphysics? with it), the authority of Being and the nothing is unfolded through the examination of dread and awe. But the sense

> 22 Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 174. 23 Ibid., p. 106.

that awe must depart from beings remains. It is not at all clear how awe's clearing involves beings.

The original root meaning of "Abschied" according to Duden, is "death". It means literally "to have been cut, split or separated off". It is also closely related to "distinction" (Unterschied) and "decision" (Entscheid). Heidegger seems to be pointing to a necessity for a parting with beings as prerequisite to the decisive step (Entscheidende Schritt) from freedom to the truth of Being. He is clearly trying to think the matter which others have expressed for example as the need to die before we can live. A Christian might say we must die in relation to "this world" in order to be saved. The Eastern doctrine of desireless action or non-attachment to things seems to be a response to the same matter. And within each of these traditions, the debate occurs whether something like "otherworldliness" which entails a kind of quietism, is or is not involved; or whether this "other-worldliness" justifies a transformation of "this world", or whether there are other possible interpretations.

One of the greatest problems of the twentieth century has been the tendency to see the modern world as a wasteland of decay, an air-conditioned nightmare, or as "the system", and then seeking to transcend it either by escape from it or by radically transforming it. Something is always invoked for the sake of which the abandonment or destruction is justified: "the pure self or spirit", "cosmic consciousness", Dionysus, the body, sensuality, peace and love. Often

appeal is made to reconstructed old traditions which have been "betrayed" in the modern world; but no tradition exists for us except the tradition which is now what we are and what surrounds us. The past can only be appropriated truly in the full light of the acceptance of what is immediate and what comes out of the future toward us. This is what Heidegger means by the contemporaneity of time: all three "ecstasies" at once. How to accept the present and future and past as well is the difficult matter Heidegger is struggling with. A common phenomenon is a response to the danger of appeal to past or future with a slavish attachment to what is really present (as a kind of heirloom). One eventual result of Heidegger's struggle is the development of a dual stance toward these things which are "really present". In the epilogue, he is still on the way toward this position. I am suggesting that he is still, at this point, over-emphasizing the departure from things.

Professor Richardson has spoken about "the case of the 24 altered epilogue". Heidegger changed a crucial passage of the epilogue in the 1949 edition in a way which illustrates that he himself came to see the need to temper the tendency still present in the 1943 version. I will quote the passage in question from the 1943 text, adding the 1949 additions and changes in square brackets.

William J. Richardson, S.J., <u>Heidegger. Through Phenomenology</u> to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. 563.

24

Without Being, whose abysmal, but still not unfolded essence, the nothing sends to us in essential dread, every being would remain in Beinglessness. However this also is [as the abandonment of Being] æan not a nugatory nothing, if it belongs to the truth of Being that Being indeed ["indeed" changed to "never"] prevails without being, that being never prevails without Being.²⁵

It seems that the point that Heidegger wished to make in 1943 was that without Being (the nothing) beings would be "Beingless", a kind of absurdity. But the phrase he used was "would remain in Beinglessness" which is in a way exactly what he wanted to say was our present situation. We remain (bleiben) in Beinglessness and this is not <u>mere</u> nothing because Being continues to prevail "without us" in the sense that what rules continues to rule when we are oblivious to it. Thus in 1949, the addition of "as the abandonment of Being" makes even clearer that "Beinglessness" is Being's abandonment of us <u>whereby it</u> continues to rule us. And by 1949 it is no longer possible to state that "Being indeed prevails without beings". The point that "Being still rules in spite of beings" and thus the passage is changed to "Being never rules without beings".

With this suggestion of the dangerous tendency it would be wrong to give the impression that the epilogue is "way off base".

[&]quot;Ohne das Sein, dessen abgründiges, aber noch unentfaltetes Wesen uns das Nichts in der wesenhaften Angst zuschickt, bliebe alles Seiende in der Seinlosigkeit. Allein auch diese ist [als die Seinsverlassenheit] wiederum nicht ein nichtiges Nichts, wenn anders zur Wahrheit des Seins gehört, da? das Sein wohl [in 1949 "wohl" changed to "nie"] west ohne das Seiende, da? niemals ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 102.

Many of the components which are later seen to temper the extreme "otherness" of the nothing, are already present here. The work thus has a kind of tension or confusion which is the natural result of the struggle that is underway. The problem is the sameness and difference of the two "nots" of the ontological difference and the nothing, with especially the sameness not yet out in the clear. But the ontological difference is evident in this work in some ways and its presence "tempers" the nothing. Necessity does not rule directly, but as need (Not). The nothing (Being) manifests itself as dread and awe just as in The Essence of Truth we were said to stand under a 26 double oppression called there the rule of mystery in error. The word sacrifice (Opfer) seems to reflect the tension and confusion for it is called a departure on the one hand while on the other it anticipates the project of the world as productive work.

E. Poet-language-thinker and the region of the truth of Being

Between <u>What Is Metaphysics</u>? and its epilogue lies the decade of Heidegger's engagement with the poet Hölderlin. Heidegger had posed a question which he could not answer with the terms in which he had put the question. But only because he had put the question and failed to answer it could he hear an answer in Hölderlin's poetry. The statement that awe dwells near dread, and clears the region in which we humans dwell quite clearly refers to the answer Heidegger hears in Hölderlin's work.

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 93.

26

One consequence of the engagement with Hölderlin is Heidegger's rethinking of the "threefold relation" into the terms of the co-operative work of thinker and poet in language. In <u>The Essence</u> of Ground Heidegger pointed out that Aristotle thought this threefold as "the first point from which a thing is, comes to be, and is known". Heidegger himself had thought through this matter in <u>Being and Time</u> as the ecstatic openness of temporality and as "Being-in" which is 28 constituted by understanding, talk and situatedness. In <u>The Essence</u> of Ground he thought the matter as the three ways of grounding; establishing, founding and taking ground. This threefold grounding described the nature of transcendental freedom of "freedom toward 29 the ground".

The threefold relation describes the "essence of man" for Heidegger. In <u>The Essence of Ground</u> he called man an "essence of 30 farness" pointing to man's capacity to transcend, and thus to be the horizon of Being. Now in the epilogue the threefold is "poet, language, thinker". This new threefold continues to have a temporal quality and an experiential or "far-like" quality, but the truth of the "room" of Being, the "nearness" of Being, is now being developed at the same time, in the same place. One result of the development of the truth of Being is a shift in the order and structure of the temporality of the threefold. The change is first of all a tempering

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 21ff.

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²⁸Martin Heidegger, <u>Sein und Zeit</u> (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927), Section V, pp. 130-180. ²⁹Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 60. ³⁰Ibid., p. 71.

of the "historical" and "future-oriented" emphasis of the earlier Transcendental freedom has an emphasis on "that which is work. thrown forward". "Establishing" (Stiften) was declared to be "prior" to taking ground though simultaneous with it. It was "prior" in the sense of a fundamental assumption which was described as the project of the world thrown forward. In the epilogue, the thinker's future orientation seems to be access to the poet's past orientation. The poet now is assigned the task of establishing and he establishes "what remains". It is however dangerous to make too much of these temporal cross-references, for the unity of the three ecstasies tends to be forgotten. With this qualification in mind, I would like nevertheless to suggest that Heidegger shifts emphasis of what is "prior" from the future in 1929 to the past in 1943. And in 1949 there is a kind of tempering and balancing of both of these in a renewed assertion of the immediate present.

The way in which the threefold of 1943 has changed points to the fourfold now being unfolded. The emphasis shifts to the threefold in its capacity to express or <u>produce</u> the fourfold to project the world, to engage the width and room of Being. Man (freedom) had been thought as the horizon of the question of Being. Man now is thought together with Being (the free). Dread is thus called one of "the standing places of the essence of speechlessness". One name

> 31 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 61.

for the nothing is speechlessness or literally "languagelessness" (Sprachlosigkeit). This is the common origin or heritage (gleicher Herkunft) of both poet and thinker.

Heidegger says in 1943 that nothing is known about the relation of these two who dwell near (the common heritage, the 32 emphasis of 1943) but also widest apart. In 1949 Heidegger added the passage on "poetizing" and thanking, springing out of original thinking, to make the special point that thinking needs "poetizing" and thanking to be able to be thinking. The 1949 addition counteracts the 1943 tendency to overemphasize <u>original</u> thinking which preserves speechlessness; it reasserts the also-essential need for the dual productive <u>completion</u> in poetic and thanking <u>action</u>.

Speech or language as a <u>clearing</u> points back to its origin or heritage, the width and room of speechlessness. As this same clearing it is also a dual co-operative achievement of poetry which names the holy and thought which says Being.

> Out of long-preserved speechlessness and out of the careful clarifying of the region cleared in it, comes the saying of the thinker. Of like heritage is the naming of the poet. However, because the like is only like as the different, and because poetry and thought are most purely alike in the care of the word, both are at the same time

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 107.

in their essence most widely cut off. The thinker says Being. The poet names the holy.³³

The outline is here for the work of two decades to follow, not to mention the work of the previous decade which finds its culmination. The assertions about language are taken up at length in the chapters which follow. At this point I want to mention only one important point that comes out in this passage. It is the meaning of "the word". The "carefullness" (Sorgsamkeit) of the word is common to poet and thinker; this is the same as saying their heritage is the region of speechlessness and its clearing. "The word" seems to express the unity of language (as thought and poetry) with language as speechlessness. Like "term" it stands at the difference.

"Word", "Wort" and "verbum" all come from the Indo-European root "*wer-" (to speak) from which the Greek verb "21,444" also comes. The clear implication of this root is that <u>speaking hides</u> <u>thought</u>. This is the root meaning of "irony". Speech as the revelation of things at the same time necessarily conceals them. We do not consciously choose to conceal and thus "become ironic"; rather by speaking at all we are at the same time ironic. Thus Heidegger

33

"Aus der langbehüteten Sprachlosigkeit und aus der sorgfältigen Klärung des in ihr gelichteten Bereiches kommt das Sagen des Denkers. Von gleicher Herkunft ist das Nennen des Dichters. Weil jedoch das Gleiche nur gleich ist als das Verschiedene, das Dichten und das Denken aber am reinsten sich gleichen in der Sorgsamkeit des Wortes, sind beide zugleich am Weitesten in ihrem Wesen getrennt. Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 107. suggests that only when language is in line or in tune with "the word" in this sense will the hidden springs and sources of language flow forth again.

Only when the language of historical man arises out of the word, is it in tune. But if it stands in tune, then the granting of the soundless voice of hidden springs beckons to it. 34

The phrase ". . . is it in tune" translates "ist sie im Lot". More literally it means "is it plumb" as is said in house-building.

F. Finitude and "full ending". The ontological difference and the nothing.

Heidegger closes the epilogue with a statement of his own on the nothing as the veil of Being, and with a passage from Sophocles' <u>Oedipus at Colonus</u> which he suggests is a "word" in the sense I have described, and thus indicates the entry of the Greeks into the unknown truth of Being. Heidegger's statement is as follows:

> The nothing as the other than being is the veil of Being. In Being every being, sent, has originally fully ended itself already.³⁵

The passage from Oedipus at Colonus is:

αλδ αποπαύετε μηδ'έπι πλείω Θρήνον εγείρετε πάντως γαρ έχει τάδε κύρος. 36

"Erst wenn die Sprache des geschi**dt**lichen Menschen aus dem Wort entspringt, ist sie im Lot. Steht sie aber im Lot, dann winkt ihr die Gewähr der lautlosen Stimme verborgener Quellen." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 107.

³⁵"Das Nichts als das Andere zum Seienden ist der Schleier des Seins. Im Sein hat sich anfänglich jedes Geschick des Seienden schon vollendet." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 107.

³⁶<u>Ibid</u>., p. 107.

Heidegger's translation of this passage is:

Doch la&t num ab, und nie mehr fürderhin Die Klage wecket auf; Überallhin nämlich hält bei sich das Ereignete verwahrt ein Entscheid der Vollendung.³⁷

The following English translation of the German is suggested:

But cease now and never henceforward Lift up the lament For what has occurred holds preserved within itself (namely in every direction) a decision of full ending.

The word " $\tau c \kappa v \rho c \epsilon$ " with " $t \chi \epsilon t r$ " usually means "to have or to hold supreme power, authority, influence". The various uses of the phrase always contain indications of authority, validity, security or certainty; the meaning of <u>defining</u> or <u>determining</u> is clearly intended. A translation along the lines of "what has occurred has authority in itself" would seem warranted. Heidegger's translation is more specific about how this is the case. It draws Sophocles' statement closer to his own on the question of the "fullending" of being in Being, with the phrases "decision of full ending" and "holds preserved within itself (namely in every direction)".

The word decision (Entscheid) speaks for the continued presence of the threefold in the context of the fourfold. The finitude or "endlikeness" which was disclosed in the works on the not of the ontological difference remains but is now completed with the full ending of the not of the nothing. The not of the ontological difference is an echo of the not of the nothing (Being). The phrase "holds

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 108.

preserved within itself (namely in every direction)" refers to the poet's preservation of the word in the naming of the holy.

In 1943, the not of the nothing seems to be "a second negative level" which completes the not of the difference. There is however a tendency at this time to overemphasize this full ending of the nothing; the position of 1949 tries to restore the balance by asserting the sameness of these two nots in the ruling and unfolding of the Being of beings.

 . . the same in the sense of what belongs together in the ruling and unfolding of the Being of beings.³⁸
 The end as the limit of our grasp belongs together with the end as that which determines and defines us. The whole belongs together
 with the past.

The word "end" cannot be confined to a temporal meaning. This applies as well to the word "completion". The meaning of ending temporally is a secondary one which is already implied in the original. The original meaning of "end" is "something lieing opposite, in front of or before us". (The Indo-European root is "*anta-, *anti"). The meaning bespeaks "what is there" and thus our orientation or position opposite. In the discussion of finitude in the context of the ontological difference, the end is the abysmal quality of the zone of transcendence. In the context of the nothing, the word "full" is

38

". . . das Selbe im Sinne dessen, was im Wesenden des Seins des Seienden zusammengehört." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 21.

added to "end". In a literal and original sense, the threefold transcendental temporal horizon is now "filled" with the fourfold region of the truth of Being, veiled as the not of the nothing.

The relation of the region of the truth of Being, that is, the relation of "the free" to the zone of transcendence is the concern of the next chapter (four) in which the conversation about the determination of the place of engagement and the letter on humanism are examined.

CHAPTER FOUR: "FREEDOM AND THE FREE"

CHAPTER FOUR

"FREEDOM AND THE FREE"

Introduction

During the years between 1943 and 1949, a group of works appeared in which Heidegger continued "to unfold the truth of Being". I have tried to show in chapter three how he unfolded the region in the 1943 epilogue in a way which still needed tempering. In the years immediately following the appearance of the epilogue the "doctrine" is becoming more stable as Heidegger draws together the earlier tendencies into a harmonious whole. In the works of this period it becomes clearer what it means to say that freedom saves its essence in "the free" (the region of the truth of Being). The difference from 1943 might be characterized as becoming clear that freedom is not overruled by "the free" but rather is vindicated <u>in</u> it.

All the works of this period have two predominant concerns: (1) To identify and describe the region of the truth of Being and at the same time to describe its relation to the horizon or zone of transcendence of the early works. (2) To describe the kind of thinking which corresponds to this region of the truth of Being, and thus to describe the "essence of man". These two concerns, though it is not always pointed out explicitly, are the same as identifying the region as "the free", and describing how freedom saves its essence in this

region.

1

In 1945, Heidegger recorded a conversation which he held presumably with two friends around that time. He published the conversation under the title: "Toward the determination of the place of engagement"¹(Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit). A year later the Letter on Humanism appeared, in which Heidegger answered some of the political and ethical questions posed by the French philosopher, Jean Beaufret. In 1949, a new 17-page introduction to <u>What Is</u> <u>Metaphysics?</u> was published with the subtitle: "The Way back into the Ground of Metaphysics". And in the same year there also appeared a new preface to <u>The Essence of Ground</u> and two new paragraphs in the concluding note to <u>The Essence of Truth</u>. This chapter contains an examination of the first two of these works, the conversation and the letter.

All the works between 1945 and 1949 contain an <u>explicit</u> further attempt to reinterpret the earlier work of <u>Being and Time</u> (1927) <u>The Essence of Ground</u> (1929), <u>What Is Metaphysics?</u> (1929) and <u>The</u> <u>Essence of Truth</u>. This concern of Heidegger's with the relation of his earlier and later work is not a scholarly exercise born of a passion for consistency. Rather this matter of "the turn" in his thought, is itself crucial in the understanding of his mature "doctrine", and thus, for my purposes, for his mature doctrine of freedom. The concern is not to show how the later Heidegger got to where he is as

On the translation of "Gelassenheit" as "engagement", see below.

a matter of historical interest. The meaning of "completion of" as opposed to "replacement of" the earlier stance is exemplified in the relation of the earlier and later work.

Section I: On "Toward the Determination of the Place of Engagement"

Introduction

1

1. Translation of the title of the conversation.

The name Heidegger gave to the conversation of 1944-45 is "Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit". To translate this title as I have is unusual in two ways. (1) Normally "Erörterung" is translated "explanation" but Heidegger intends to convey the special literal sense of this word, coming out of the root word "Ort" which means "place" or "point". The special meaning of "erörtern" is to explain in terms of <u>determining</u> points. In relation to a place or region, the verb means "to situate". During the conversation, it becomes clear that the "place" out of which "Gelassenheit" is determined is the region in which it is situated. (2) Normally "Gelassenheit" is translated as "composure, calmness, imperturbability". These words focus only on part of the whole meaning which Heidegger intends with the use of this word. They focus on the apparent state of mind which is a <u>result</u> of where they are. They ignore the sense of being-in a "room" which gives the composure which is needed to be in it.

All references from this work are from: Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1959).

"Releasement" is inadequate because it has an inescapable overtone of quietism. Heidegger specifically states that this word cannot mean the abdication of human will in the face of the rule of God's will. He also makes a special point of this word "arising naturally" in the course of the conversation. This gives the important cue as I see it. Just before the word arises in the conversation, the phrase "sich einlassen in" is used. There is no translation in either Cassel or Brockhaus which justifies the translation of "releases itself to" for this phrase (as Anderson and Freund render it). It can mean: "to engage in, to have dealings with, to enter into (conversation), to answer (accusation)". From these, I choose "to engage in". This cue, based on the proximity of the two expressions "sich einlassen in' and "Gelassenheit" in Heidegger's text, does not constitute as such howeve: a justification for translating "Gelassenheit" by "engagement", My case rests on my interpretation of Heidegger's intention in his use of "Gelassenheit".4 2. The three participants in the conversation.

The conversation takes place between three persons; that they are <u>three</u>, as well as their special <u>temporal</u> orientation and their <u>co-operation</u> with each other is meant to be instructive. The three are called "Gelehrter" (literally "the learned one", or the scholar),

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 31.

2

Martin Heidegger, <u>Discourse on Thinking</u>, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (Harper Torchbook edition; New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 59.

Along with "releasement" (used by Anderson and Freund) I have considered and rejected other possible translations such as "patience",

"Lehrer" (the teacher or what is at root the same "the learner")

"submission", "relaxedness", "endurance" and "engagedness". As f see it, all of these words fail to convey Heidegger's meaning on two counts. They overemphasize passivity and thus remain "subjective" in the sense that concentrating on an extinguished will is still an emphasis on the will. None of these words carries the whole meaning which I think Heidegger intends with his use of "Gelassenheit". His main point is surely the connection to the region and how this occurs. And it is made clear at several points in the conversation that the way it occurs must not be described exclusively on the side of either action or passion. To let things Be is not to leave them alone, but rather to have something to do with them. This point is made quite decisively in The Essence of Truth as well. (See chapter two, p. 118-9 and especially note 18,) Whenever "lassen" and related words occur in a discussion, Heidegger makes it clear that he does not think these words describe a capitulation into inactivity. At the same time, he does not "redefine" words like "lassen", "gelassen" and "Gelassenheit" so that they are made to seem "active" as opposed to passive. The meaning of "Gelassenheit" includes both will and that to which it submits, because there is still a need for will in order to submit to what is occurring.

It is tempting to leave this word in German, since no English word provides an exact parallel in every respect. I decided, however, that with such an important word, an open attempt to interpret it was desirable. There is too much danger that the thought focussed in this word could be ignored. I have chosen the word "engagement" because it combines meanings of active involvement, passive involvement and connection or relation between components. The word means both the action of engaging and the state of being engaged. Though it retains a connotation of the will in its active and passive participation, it focusses on the connection between the subject and its situation.

It might be suggested that this translation could be misleading for two reasons. (1) The word "engagement" appears not to convey the current meaning of "composure", however much this may be only a "surface" awareness of the whole meaning of the word. (It is never Heidegger's way to ride roughshod over the current meaning of a word.) It must be admitted that this is one way in which the two words are not quite parallel. I would argue however that both meanings clearly imply each other. For example, the meaning for "gelassen" of "restrained" (beherrscht) implies what rules and restrains. "Even-tempered" (gleichmütig) implies that which attunes or tempers us. And, in the same way, the whole meaning of "engagement" includes the calm strength and endurance which is born of genuine connection to what is occurring. (2) It might also be objected that "engagement" is misleading because of its association with the meanings of "politically engaged" and the meaning of the French word "engagé". These words call to mind primarily the will and thus the translation could be doubly misleading. I agree that such a reading is possible. I merely want to point out again therefore that "engagement" is intended to retain this connotation of will as part of its whole meaning. But the whole focusses as well on the connection and submission which must guide such action. In the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger uses

and "Forscher" (the scientist, researcher or more essentially "the questioner"). Together, these three, literally "learned one, learner, and questioner" constitute a united threefold; this co-operating threefold of the conversation "stands for" man, engaged into what is occurring. The scholar and the scientist are not just foils for the teacher (Heidegger) to put forth his doctrines.

A. The relation of the region of the truth of Being to the zone of transcendence of earlier work: The meaning of "willing nonwilling". "Engagement" as a name which arises naturally in the conversation. Language and the region. Liberalism as transcending toward "the nameless".

The topic of the conversation is thought. But this is because 5 thought is "the drawing out of the essence of man", and therefore the topic is "the essence of thought". The conversation wants to penetrate the strange truth that to know what something is, we look away from that something. It is obvious that "essence" is not used here in the sense of the general characteristics of all particulars involved. In this conversation Heidegger is using the word "essence" in the sense which he defines later in <u>The Question about Technique</u> as the way in which something rules, governs itself, unfolds and

the phrase"'l'engagement' by and for the truth of Being". (Wegmarken, p. 145.) In this other work which has the same concerns as the conversation, Heidegger does not hesitate to describe what is occurring as "l'engagement" (engagement) as long as we accept that it occurs by and for the truth of Being and not merely the truth of beings. (Compare the rejection of positive freedom as readiness for something demanded and necessary (and thus some sort of being) chapter 2, p. 120.)


⁵". . . Wenn das Denken die Auszeichnung des Wesens des Menschen ist . . . " Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, p. 29.

6 declines. In the 1949 concluding note to <u>The Essence of Truth</u>, he mentions a meaning of "essence" in which the word is understood verbally and denotes Being (Seyn) as the ruling difference between 7 Being and being.

We are to begin with thinking, but our concern is to be the way in which thinking rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines, which will take us away from thinking. The three begin with the traditional concept of thinking as representing which is a kind of wanting or willing (Wollen). (Kant's characterization of thought as spontaneity is cited as a prime example.) They realize that they are looking for the way in which the <u>will</u> rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines which will take them away from the will though they start there. The teacher encapsulates the matter of what the session seeks in the words "I will non-willing" (Ich will das Nicht-Wollen). This phrase is a new statement of Heidegger's "dual stance" which focuses directly on the relation of the zone of transcendent will and the region of the nothing.

The modal auxiliary verb "wollen" means, in English, "to want to . . ." or "to wish to . . .". Like the English verb "to will", it comes from the Indo-European root "*wel-" (to will, wish, hope, choose). The German word for "choose" (wahlen) comes from

Martin Heidegger, <u>Die Technik und die Kehre</u>, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962), p. 30. 7 Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 96. 8 Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 30.



the same root. The German "Wille" (will) and the English "will" are later developments out of the verbs. In English, we also use "will" as a future auxiliary, whereas the Germans use "werden" (become) in both future and passive constructions. "Werden" stems from a different root "*wer" meaning "to turn".

The way in which will rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines leads into non-will. How can we let ourselves into the essence of will which includes non-will? The phrase bridges two components: (1) the willing of the "I will" which willingly renounces willing. (2) something which remains outside will and cannot be willed. At first sight, the components seem to be unbridgeable. The step that must be made is the one from logic and psychology to the experience of farness and then of nearness. Heidegger is careful to point out that we remain in the zone of the transcending will. We are not yet weaned from will. We live in the time of the completion of metaphysics which can be characterized as "the will to will". The region of the truth of Being is not-yet experienced. But does not this world which continues to be real reveal its own incompleteness which entails the dark gulf around it, pervading it, making itself felt? The answer to the bridge between will and non-will only begins to come when the name "engagement" arises out of the conversation searching for this bridge. And this engagement is discussed in the subjunctive mood, to indicate that it enters

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 90.

a region supposed.

"Teacher: Had I already the right engagement, then I would soon have been lifted out of such weaning (from will)."10

The name "engagement" is given to the three along the way of the conversation. The teacher specifically notes that no one of them has designated their threefold stance as engagement. Heidegger wants to be sure we don't think of "engagement" as a new "concept" of thinking. The scientist used the phrase: "to be able to let ourselves into the sought-for essence of thought which is not a willing". The teacher jumps at this way of putting the matter, declaring it essential. He might have said the scientist had "found it with the gods" if the gods had not flown. This means that the absence of the gods has been the aiding 'force' which has sent the word to the three via the conversation. The scholar notes that the scientist has spoken not for himself but for all three. This means that he speaks for language; through him, language speaks. The scientist then pays tribute to the night which covers and gently coerces all three and thus gathers them into a successful naming of what concerns them.

Names are themselves regions with a threefold temporal reference. The name cannot be thought apart from the named (past) and the nameable (future). When they are appreciated in this way,

10 "Lehrer: Wenn ich nur schon die rechte Gelassenheit hätte, dann wäre ich des gemeinten Entwöhnens bald enthoben." Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 32.

> Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, p. 47. 12 Ibid., p. 31.

names become a bedrock. Just as living somewhere means living in a region where past and future impinge on the present, dwelling in language cannot confine a word to its current expressive connotation. Later in the conversation, the teacher speaks of genuine naming in 13 which the named, the name and the nameable are all given their due. "Engagement" is an example of the fruit of such naming.

The teacher's statement on naming as the named, name and nameable, is a response to the scholar's question whether naming is an arbitrary act of will which wrests names out of "the nameless". Putting the question this way, the scholar exposes here in terms of naming, something which the established stance usually hides about itself. It seems to confine itself to the realm of transcendent will, to the realm of freedom, but in fact it sets out the limits of this realm by extending the will beyond it in a negative way. The realm beyond the realm of names is declared to be certainly, once and for all "nameless". This is a clear-cut assertion about this realm just the same as it is to say that the realm is named. Heidegger is trying to unmask the hidden part of the nature of established "liberalism": that it depends upon a hidden fundamental assumption -- the region of the nameless. His objection to this liberalism, once it is unmasked, is twofold: (1) the statement that the region is nameless is an unwarranted assertion of will *******

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 46.

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beyond its own realm. It cannot state anything about this realm either positive or negative. (2) the statement closes off the region, and hides its operation which is not a matter of will. His way of putting the matter brings the two regions of will and non will back together in part by replacing "the nameless" with "the named and the nameable" which are interwoven with the name in an inseparable triad. This should be seen at the same time as a curbing of will, a withdrawing of will from "the region of the nameless", and at the same time an entry into this region in the sense that its operation is being unlocked and let Be.

Under liberalism, we live under the strange tyranny of closed openness. The "open society" rests on the permanent closure of the other as "the nameless". Appearing to assert this world over against the other world, the rule of the other continues. At the hands of this new transcendence of the ego, the transformation of this world is far more thorough. If nothing can be known of what the world is, the will is no longer beholden to anything other than itself. Liberalism is, in this sense, nihilism.

Heidegger's stance is not conservative if by this we mean opposition to freedom in the name of what has been named. Heidegger's dual stance purports to enter into the essence of nihilism. Freedom (and nihilism) are thus vindicated by the saving of essence, by the entry into the region of the truth of Being, into "the free". In the terms of naming, the authenticity of the name is vindicated by

its entry into the naming which combines the named, the name and the nameable. Though it appears that freedom consists in the terrible struggle to wrest names out of the nameless, the whole truth is more than this. The terrible struggle remains but finally "the nameless" is meaningless apart from the named and the nameable. The root meaning of "trans-" is the Indo-European root "*ter-" meaning "through". It points not beyond to the other, nor to the capacity we have to wrest self out of other, but rather to the boundary between self and other, to what the Romans called the "termen". The boundary is the place of both sameness and difference. Freedom saves its essence in the free when it recognizes and allows its onefold-twofold determination.

In <u>The Essence of Ground</u>, Heidegger spoke of a "place" in 14 which transcending occurs. He called it the zone of transcendence. In this conversation about the place of engagement, he now speaks of "the region". The question the three discuss is whether this zone and region are two, or one, or both two and one. The region is not the zone of transcendence but also it is not an alternative or replacement of it.

The transcendental zone, the zone of ecstatic openness, in which transcendental-horizontal thinking occurs, is the region in the mode of its being turned toward us, in its being viewed or represented

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Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 33.

by us. What then is the region itself? An analogy might help: "I myself" am the father of my child. But that does not exhaust what I am. Thus "I myself" am not the father of my child, though I am <u>never</u> separate from being the father of my child. The "itself" and the "myself" in phrases such as these does not point to a kernel or nucleus to which all attributes or relations are accidentally added. The "self" of "itself" or "myself" points rather to the sameness which pervades all the different parts of someone or thing. Similarly, it is said of the region itself:

> "Scholar: You mean that you are in the near(ness) of the essence of the region and yet far from its "(it)self"?

"Scientist: But the region itself and its essence cannot be two different things, . . .

"Scholar: The itself of the region is presumably its essence and the same (ness) of its self."¹⁵

To speak of the region itself is to speak of its oneness and twoness

15 "Gelehrter: Sie meinen, daß Sie in der Nähe des Wesens der Gegnet seien und ihr selbst doch fern?
"Forscher: Aber die Gegnet selbst und ihr Wesen können doch nicht zwei verschiedene Dinge sein,
"Gelehrter: Das Selbst der Gegnet ist vermutlich ihr Wesen und das Selbe ihrer selbst."

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 65.

at the same time. It is both identical and different. The region together with its essence (the way in which it rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines), that is, its "regioning", is both two and one.

Transcendental-horizon al representation occurs in a zone, the zone of transcendence, but this zone is not encountered as what it is. Rather it is the assumed, unthought means which enables us to see objects. We define the horizon and the zone of transcendence in terms of objects and of our representation of them. That is, we define the horizon from our point of view. Heidegger's "first step" in his early work was to define this zone as what it is, but the crucial component, the project of the world was deliberately not unfolded. Now in the "second step", this ommission is being remedied. We can say that we "look out into" the open field of vision, or circle of vision. We look out into something which is there, not only because we are looking out into it.

> "Scientist: The horizon is thus still something other than horizon. But according to what has been said, this other is the other of itself, and thus the same that it is."¹⁶

The "openness itself" is other than or more than "that into which we look out" but it is at the same time the same as the horizon. The "openness itself" completes but does not replace the transcendental

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"Forscher: Der Horizont ist demnach noch etwas Anderes als Horizont. Aber dieses Anderes ist nach dem Besprochenen das Andere seiner selbst und deshalb das Selbe, das es ist." Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, p. 38. horizon.

B. The region itself, width and while, and the "regioning" of mortals and things.

To the question of what this "openness itself" is, the teacher answers:

"Teacher: It appears to me like a <u>region</u> (eine <u>Gegend</u>) through whose magic everything which belongs to it turns back to that in which it rests."¹⁷

The first important name to arise out of the conversation was "engagement". Now with the naming of the region, the place of this engagement is being determined. And it is made clear that what is being discussed is not "something like <u>a</u> region" but rather <u>the</u> region, the basic phenomenon from which all other regions derive their name.

The meaning of the German word "Gegend" is obviously crucial and the three discuss this meaning, pointing out for a start that it cannot be identified with "coming toward us". This would be to continue to operate merely within the transcendental horizon. They decide to use, as well, an older form of word, "Gegnet", which is said to mean "free width" (freie Weite). With this meaning the old word comes closer to naming what is in question. It comes closer to expressing the freeing-enclosing and yet open separating nature of the region which is called both a width and a while.

¹⁷ "Lehrer: Mir komint es so vor wie eine Gegend, durch deren Zauber alles, was ihr gehört, zu dem zurückkehrt, worin es ruht." Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 38.

"Scholar: Thus the region itself is at the same time width and while. It stays (or "whiles") into the width of rest. It widens into the while of free turning-into-itself."¹⁸

A statement such as this one is very difficult to interpret in current English (or German) without sacrificing its wealth. Heidegger is trying to express a dual reciprocity between time and its moving and turning and room enclosure and rest. The old word "Gegnet" which means "free width", brings out these crucial reciprocities. The root meaning of "width" and of "Weite" is "to go asunder". The root meaning of "free" is "to hold together". Heidegger interprets the "free" in "free width" to denote a "staying" (Verweilen). The word "Gegnet" is suited to name the dual, "contrary" character of the region in question which comes toward and withdraws, which nears and "fars", which holds together and goes asunder.

Anderson and Freund translate "Gegnet" as "that which 19 regions" placing emphasis on the <u>verbal</u> quality in the word. It is true that Heidegger intends a verbal meaning to be included, but this should not be the exclusive connotation. The archaic verb, to which "Gegnet" is closely allied, according to Duden meant "entgegenkommen" or "begegnen". These mean respectively "to advance, to come to meet halfway" and "to encounter". But we need to remember

18 "Gelehrter: Demnach ist die Gegend selbst zumal die Weite und die Weile. Sie verweilt in die Weite des Beruhens. Sie weitet in die Weile des frei In-sich-gekehrten . . ." Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, p. 40.

Heidegger, <u>Discourse on Thinking</u>, trans. Anderson, Freund, p. 66.

that we are specifically warned in the conversation that the "coming toward" is only half or "one side" of what is occurring.

The origin of the German preposition "gegen" (meaning "opposite, against") is not known. (The root is the same as the second part of the English words "again" and "against".) The word "gegen" was used to translate the Latin "contra" and was expected to denote its meaning. The word "Gegend" is a translation of the late Latin "contrata[regio]" which could be translated as "[bounded land] lieing opposite". From this same source come the Italian "contrada" and the French "contree" and (through the old French), the English "country".

Clearly both "contra" and "regio(nem)" contribute to the meaning of "Gegend" and "Gegnet". "Regio" is means "direction" from the verb "regere" (to guide, lead, direct, rule). In the case of "contrata[regio]" a derivative meaning of "boundary" or "limit" is intended, just as we often use "region" in a non-legal or non-political sense. The sense is true of course in the use of "country" which can denote the "countryside" as well as "one's country". The word "contra" is formed from two roots: the old Latin "com-" meaning "with, together with" and the comparative suffix -ter which appears for example in the Latin "alter" meaning "the other (of two)". According to Klein:

"Contra originally denoted the being together of two things compared with each other."²⁰

The root "*ter" which is also the source of the "-ther" in "other" means literally "through" or "beyond". It is the same root which is the source of the "trans" in "transcendence". In a sense we can say that the root meaning of "contra" unites the two "opposites" of "with (us)" and "beyond (us)". And there is no doubt that Heidegger wants this meaning to accompany "Gegend" and "Gegnet".

If we allow the region to have this two-in-one character, such that it not only comes toward us but also at the same time pulls itself back, withdraws, or conceals itself, then the things which appear in the region can no longer have the character of "objects" (Gegenständen). They no longer "stand opposite" as the German word expresses it. But perhaps it is better to say things are no longer merely objects. They are no longer exhausted by our representation of them whereby we "let them stand opposite us". Just as the region surrounds us and shows itself to us as the horizon, so (it now seems) the thing shows itself (and conceals itself) as the object which appears in the horizon. And in the same way we human beings are no longer completely or essentially characterized as "the ones who represent objects", though our essence as humans shows itself and conceals itself as the transcendental ego which underlies representa-Thus the connection or relation between ego and object partly tion.

Ernest Klein, <u>A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of</u> the English Language (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1966), Volume I, page 344.

20

conceals the relation of engagement and thing.

The way in which the region rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines, that is, the way in which the region "regions", as Heidegger puts it, has a dual character corresponding to its appropriation of man and of things. The unfolding of the region with respect to man is called "Vergegnis", with respect to things, "Bedingnis". These again are hard words to translate. The most important thing to bear in mind about them is that they are introduced to express a kind of relation which could not be expressed . properly in the early work. In The Essence of Ground, for example, the subject matter is the ontological distinction. Heidegger tries to set out how ontic truth is only made possible by its base in ontological truth, the grounding in free transcendence. Now this relation is discussed in a "complete" way. The background which spans both poles of the foreground distinction between ontic and ontological is neither one of these. Ontic truth consists in a relation of correspondence between ego (subject) and object. This could only be understood as grounded in the zone of transcendence in which the relation occurred. This is what I have been calling the "first step". Now that the zone of transcendence is seen to be the "side of the region turned toward our representing", the grounding in the zone of free transcendence is seen itself to be directed by the region. But this direction by the region does not leave the

"ontological distinction" intact and add a new factor. Rather it is an attempt to rethink the whole occurrence of truth all at once, retaining the insight of the difference but no longer allowing it to predominate to the exclusion of the truth of Being in beings. In The Essence of Ground the status of ontic truth, the status of the beings which confront us "immediately" is highly derivative. This is due to the attempt to think the transcendental horizon of the question of Being, to which end the development of truth of Being itself is put temporarily aside. The result was a heightening of one side of the truth about things. They are not, as they appear, absolute. They are conditioned by our freedom. We can "say no" to what surrounds us because we or others like us once had to "say yes" to them or else they wouldn't be here. By itself, this part of the truth is a crazy and dangerous abstraction. And yet in the whole truth it can never be abandoned. It is only abandoned as absolute. The second step which is needed to complete this one-sided doctrine of freedom leads us to see that the guidance which enables us to "say no" to objects comes through these same objects. The submission which guides rebellion does not obey "far-out" esoteric authority. It says yes to the same objects to which it says no. For these objects are no longer merely objects, they are "things" "disguised as" objects. The tradition we revere confronts us directly, though we learn to see it as "the side turned toward us" of the regioning of the region.

The region is not the "transcendental basis" of the relation of man "in itself" and thing "in itself". Nor is it the transcendental basis of free transcendence, which in turn is the basis of the relation of ego and object. By naming the regioning of the region as Vergegals and Bedingnis, Heidegger is trying to "neutralize" the mistake of making of this transcendental separation a "fundamental ontology".

C. Engagement as "waiting" rather than merely doing or representing.

At several points in the conversation, the three become apprehensive about an apparent tendency in what they are saying. They seem to be losing their grip on clarity and at the same time advocating something like quietism. Every time they try to get a grip on what they are talking about, they realize that they are trying to <u>represent</u> it or to <u>will</u> it. But the very topic of the conversation bridges into what is not-willed. The frustration comes because the previous way in which clarity could be achieved is now in question. How then can clarity be achieved in the more original questioning? "New" sources of stability and rigour emerge along with the attempt to break "new" ground. The course of the conversation, a pathway through language, is itself a guide. The word "engagement" for example arose naturally in the attempt to discuss the matter in question.

Closely allied to the apparent loss of clarity and rigour is the appearance that the possibility of decisive action has dissolved into the ocean of what occurs and is "not our doing". The stance of engagement, when compared to <u>willful</u> action, seems a form of quietism or aimless drifting. The scientist asks:

"What in the world am I to do?"²¹ The teacher's reply **LS**?

"Wir sollen nichts tun, sondern warten"²² The usual translation is something along the lines of:

"We should do nothing but wait."

This is the statement which is invoked to prove that the "later" Heidegger had a failure of nerve (or regained his senses, depending on where you stand) and became a quietist. But in the conversation, the clear implication is not that waiting is an alternative to doing but rather that waiting <u>completes</u> doing. Before the passage in question, it is suggested:

> "Perhaps there is concealed in engagement, a doing higher than all the doings of the world and the machinations of mankind."²³

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"Forscher: Was soll ich dann in aller Welt tun?" Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 34.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 35.

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"Gelehrter: Vielleicht verbirgt sich in der Gelassenheit ein höheres Tun als in allen Taten der Welt und in den Machenschaften der Menschentümer . . ." Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, p. 33.

A translation which does not mislead therefore should be something like:

"We should not do (things), but rather wait (them)." For the sake of better English, perhaps "watch (them)" or "guard (them)" might be better.

"We should not do (things), but rather guard (them)."

One of the reasons this passage is misread, is that readers often ignore the extensive rethinking of the essential meaning of "warten" (to wait). We are accustomed to think of "waiting" as a pause before we get back into the action. We understand waiting negatively in relation to will and action. Waiting is passivity. For Heidegger this use of the word makes absolute a surface meaning of the word which is all that is not forgotten in a world where will, and thus the language of action-passion are predominant. But the whole, genuine meaning of "warten", he would claim, has not been rendered impotent because it is eclipsed in this way. It is only this whole meaning of "warten" which could <u>complete</u> doing rather than replace it.

The verb "warten" meant originally "to hold a lookout". It developed out of the noun "Warte" which meant "the place of lookout" (Ort der Ausschau). The root is connected with the verb "wahren" and the essential meaning is being <u>aware</u> or wary, being on <u>guard</u>, watching, protecting. The English verb "to wait" does not come from the same root though it is quite similar. It means

essentially to watch, to wake, to be fresh, lively, wide awake.

To be watchful and aware does not mean to be passive. It does not mean to stop acting and let God act, for example. The three expressly dissociate what they are saying from Eckhardt's notion of "Gelassenheit" which is described as being passive to 24 God's will. Heidegger definitely is not returning from human transcendence to divine transcendence!

The scholar suggests that this waiting doesn't offer us much comfort. But whether it does or doesn't is not the point. This continues to read the matter only in terms of our point of view. To be watchful cannot confine itself to the realm of what is comfortable and/or comfortless. What then are we left with? We cannot stand with our egos or with objects, with will or what is represented. Doesn't this cast us adrift? "Half the truth" is that <u>yes</u> it does. Heidegger never abandons the abysmal freedom of his first step when it is completed in the second. The corollary of wonder is terror. If we stop fooling ourselves about the "reality" we are and are immersed in, the abyss opens up. What is true emerges out of chaos.

Without denying this abyss and chaos, there is direction! We have our "way" or our "path". The path we are on is how truth emerged out of chaos for us. (The conversation about engagement is

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, pp. 33, 34.

one small example.) Thinking always stops when we concentrate on the truth that emerged and forget the emerging. The teacher makes a passing reference to "what is revolutionary" (das Revolutionare) 25 about which he apparently spoke in an earlier conversation. The clear implication in this later conversation is that being revolutionary is <u>entering into the essence</u> of tradition rather than abandoning and replacing it. We should, it is suggested, go into what rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines in the thought up to now. We should think what is later called the <u>matter</u> of thought up to now (Sache des bis**h**erige Denken). "Going over" (Ubergang) can only occur from where we are.

Waiting has no object. As soon as it represents what it is waiting "for", it is no longer waiting. Waiting for objects understands waiting only in the horizon of will. One crucial example of "no longer waiting", is the naming of "the nameless". This is doubly dangerous because the naming is hidden. In genuine waiting, that on which or for which we wait must be left open.

"Teacher: In waiting, we leave open that on which we wait." "Leaving open" does not mean simply to refuse to "tape down" the truth. By itself, a stance like that would be no more than a formless pluralism. Rather this leaving open is more essentially allowing the

	25	
	Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 35.	
	26	
	"Lehrer:	Im Warten lassen wir das, worauf wir warten,
offen."	Heidegger,	Gelassenheit, p. 42.

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open region which surrounds and pervades us to engage us. Waiting is being held in the region.

> "Teacher: Waiting is the relation to the region. And waiting means: to engage the open of the region."²⁷

Heidegger describes the way in which we engage the open of the 28 region as "belonging into that on which we wait". The accusative in the phrase "in das . . ." denotes being in in a way which needs movement. The movement of the relation of man to region is a "leaving open" and a "belonging into". Belonging (gehören) comes from hearing (hören) which means originally "to perceive, to look at". The Indo-European root is "*qeu-" (to look at, observe, perceive). "Gehören" in modern German has lost the meaning of hearing (looking). The middle high German antecedent still meant "hear, listen to . . ; respond, obey". (The verb "gehorchen" means to respond or obey.) But from the earlier meaning, there developed the meaning of "to befit, to be due, to be proper" and this came to mean "to belong to". "Belonging into" means looking out into the far in a way which responds to the near. The response is thus at the same time a submitting and a rebelling. To wait is to accept both.

To wait is to stay with saying both yes and no. This simultaneous yes and no can be seen on "two levels", our relation

"Lehrer: Das Verhältnis zur Gegnet ist das Warten. Und Warten hei4t: auf das Offene der Gegnet sich einlassen." Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 48.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 50.

27.

to the region and our relation to objects. We are already appropriated to the region, and also are not appropriated in the sense of fully aware (wahrhaft). We need to look out. We belong <u>into</u> the region. The yes and no of our appropriation by the region is parallelled by a yes and no we must say to objects to the "current modes", to "technique", to tradition, to "thought up till now".

In the memorial address (1955) which was published along with the 1945 conversation in <u>Engagement</u>, Heidegger puts the matter of the dual stance in more obvious terms, that of our stance toward the technical objects which pervade our lives.

> "We can say 'yes' to the unavoidable use of technical objects, and we can at the same time say 'no', insofar as we restrain their complete domination of us whereby they warp, confuse and lay waste to what we are."²⁹

". . I would like to name this stance of simultaneous yes and no to the technical world, with an old word: engagement to the things."³⁰

To enter into the essence of what is occurring is to "hold ourselves free" at the same time as to accept what is occurring. To hold ourselves free in step one meant to see the current objects inside

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"Wir können 'ja' sagen zur unumgänglichen Benützung der technischen Gegenstände und wir können zugleich "nein' sagen, insofern wir ihnen verwehren, dab sie uns ausschließlich beanspruchen und so unser Wesen verbiegen, verwirren und zuletzt veröden." Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, pp. 22-3. <u>30</u>

"Ich möchte diese Haltung des gleichzeitigen Ja und Nein zur technischen Welt mit einem alten Wort nennen: <u>die Gelassenheit</u> zu den Dingen." Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, p. 23. the horizon of ecstatic openness which brings future and past to bear on what is present. Now with step two, this horizon is the side turned toward us of the region of the truth of Being, into which we belong. The completion which is accomplished in this conversation holds the first step together with the first and at the same time outlines the "vindication of beings" which had been negated in the first step. The zone of transcendence (ego and object) is the side of the region (man and thing) turned toward us.

During the conversation, an exchange between the teacher and the scientist draws out the relation of the two steps in the terms of "what is sent" and of history. The scientist announces that he has come to see that ego and object, which are the cornerstones of modern scientific thinking, are not "true for all time". They are <u>historical</u>. The method of the physical sciences is not simply given;' it has been constructed by free men. The scientist is willing to take step one, but he is not yet able to follow the teacher in taking the second step. The history of freedom in which our essence as humans comes to be, does not receive its stamp from us but from the region. The history of freedom is the side of the history of the region, turned toward us. This assertion is crucial; it marks Heidegger's entry into the essence of historicism.

> "Teacher: Only insofar as the <u>essence</u> of man does <u>not</u> experience its stamp from man but rather from what we name the region and its regioning does the history you are

on to occur as the history of the region."

"Teacher: What is historical rests in the region and in what occurs as the region, which, sending itself to man, regions him into his essence."³²

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Whether it be characterized as free transcendence, history, authenticity or inner authority, the zone of the occurrence allows us to negate the existing state of affairs (which includes the current mode of knowing and even our own current way of being) such that we are no longer enslaved by and in them. But this zone is also not absolute. It is the region revealing and concealing itself as the zone or circle of transcendence. To wait is to will non-willing, to let ourselves belong into the region of the truth of Being which conceals itself as it reveals itself.

D. The relation of different meanings of "in"

What does it mean to be "in" or belong "into" the region? And what is the relation of "in" in that sense to the meaning of "in" in something like "inwardness"? From the start of his thought up to the present, Heidegger has been concerned with the meaning of the preposition "in". Associated with the basic word are a group of words and phrases which help to bring out its meaning. Some examples are "inne werden" (to become aware), "innig" (heartfelt),

³¹"Lehrer: Nur insofern das <u>Wesen</u> des Menschen <u>nicht</u> aus dem Menschen sein Gepräge erfährt, sondern aus dem, was wir die Gegnet und ihre Vergegnis nennen, ereignet sich die von Ihnen geahnte Geschichte als die Geschichte der Gegnet." Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, pp. 55-6.

32 "Lehrer: Das Geschichtliche beruht in der Gegnet und in dem, was sich als die Gegnet ereignet, die, dem Menschen sich zuschicken ihn in sein Wesen vergegnet." Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, p. 57.

and in this conversation, "Inst#ndigkeit", which is invoked to name the stance which wills non-willing, and thus is neither active nor inactive, but at the same time is "resolute".

The relation of the spectrum of meanings of "in" is brought out in the two steps in the thought about freedom. Roughly speaking we tend to think of the two basic meanings of "in" to be: (1) internal, interior with the basic meaning of the psyche as subject, and (2) inside or within in something which emphasizes the enclosure in which someone or something is. Again, roughly speaking, Heidegger's first step focuses on the first meaning and suggests that it occurs in a zone, the zone of transcendence. The second step further develops what this zone is and how it unfolds in a way which must draw together both meanings of "in".

1. When people rebel against current modes and established systems, they often appeal to "inner authority" or authenticity. Heart, conscience and reason are invoked in opposition to <u>external</u> <u>authority</u>. The "in" here seems on the one hand to negate what is "outer" or external, as the existing state of affairs is identified. On the other hand, it carries the connotation of something literally inside us. This internal authenticity is thought to be the basis of our freedom. The current meanings of "innig" (intimate, heartfelt) "inständig" (urgent, earnest) and the English "insistent"

tend to concentrate on this "inward transcending" meaning of "in". Part of Heidegger's first step is to name the <u>zone</u> into which free Dasein is thrown, which draws together the two meanings of "in". But the zone is not entirely credible because the truth of the region itself is not unfolded.

2. If there is a way to distinguish authoritative rebellion from sheer caprice, the authoritative rebellion must try to demonstrate how it is a submission. The zone of transcendence must be shown to be the region of the truth of Being. If the project of the world is not unfolded, "Being-in-the world" will seem only to be "standing-out" into a zone. When the world unfolds, this standing out is at the same time a "standing-in" the region. The literal meaning of such key words as "ex-sistence" and "ecstasy" points to this "standing out into". The literal meanings of "insistence" and "Inständigkeit" refers to "standing-in". The region operates ("regions") in a way which makes us stand out into what we are standing in. According to Duden,

> "The preposition 'in' originally indicated situation, extension and movement in space and time, out of which the manifold figurative uses developed."³³

³³"Die Präposition 'in' gab ursprünglich Lage, Erstreckung und Bewegung in Raum und Zeit an, woraus sich die vielfältigen Übertragenen Verwendungen entwickelten." <u>Der Große Duden Herkunfts-</u> wörterbuch (Mannheim: Dudenverlag 1963), Band 7, p. 284.

The German "inne" contains some of the meaning of "in" as "within" (something). The English "inner" is originally a comparative of the now archaic English "inne". Literally, "inner" means "more within" what we are in. The German phrase "inne werden", according to Duden means "gewahr werden". To become inward means to become <u>aware</u>. The association of inwardness and awareness supports the connection of "standing-in" with "waiting". The root meaning of both "warten" and "wahren" is the place of the lookout, which being wary, guards and protects.

Leading up to the discussion of "Inständigkeit" the teacher tries to suggest the way in which we combine inwardness and "withinness" in our belonging into the region of the truth of Being. The occurrence of truth involves the matters which are expressed with two groups of words which are associated with the closely related roots "*wahr-, *wehr-" (wary, protect) and "*währ-"(last, endure).

> "Teacher: In engagement, there could be concealed a persistence which consists purely in the fact that engagement becomes ever more purely aware of its essence [the way in which it rules and unfolds], and lasting out into this, stands within it."³⁴

The short poem called "Inständigkeit", which is introduced into the conversation might be translated as follows:

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Lehrer: In der Gelassenheit könnte sich eine Ausdauer verbergen, die rein darin beruht, da³ die Gelassenheit je und je reiner ihres Wesens inne wird und, es ausdauernd, in ihm steht." Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 59.

"Never one truth alone To receive whole The unfolding truth For wide permanence, Plant the mindful heart Into simple patience Of the single great struggle Of noble remembering."³⁵

"Of noble remembering" translates the phrase "Edlen Erinnerns". The scholar and teacher define "noble" together. To be noble is not only to have heritage or origin, but also to dwell or "while" <u>in</u> the origin of essence, that is to dwell in the region of the truth of Being. The historical way of reading what is occurring gives us an almost overwhelming tendency to interpret the words "origin" and "heritage" as if they point to a "beginning back in the past". But for Heidegger, the whence (woh<u>er</u>) of heritage sees the past (what has been) and the future as "the same". The three speak of what is "before" thought or "prior" to thought, that which cannot itself be thought because it is where thought begins. Thought, to be thought, must have that which is not thought "before it", which attunes it. This "before" or "prior" does not only mean

35,	"Nie ein Wahres allein,
	Die wesende Wahrheit
	Heil zu empfangen
	Fur weite Beständnis,
	Bestell das denkende Herz
	In die einfache Langmut
	Der einzigen Großmut
	Edlen Erinnerns."
Heidegger,	Gelassenheit, p. 60.

"back in the past when it began" nor does it mean only "transcendent ground" or "logical presupposition". Heidegger tries with this "prior" to express again the matter which gave rise to all these various expressions of the meaning of what is prior. The scientist says:

"In the immemorial then, is the essence of man engaged to the region." 36

The German words for the phrase "from time immemorial" which means literally "from time out of mind" are "seit unvordenklicher Zeit". The word "unvordenklich" is as unusual in German as "immemorial" is in English. Heidegger means the phrase "Im Unvordenklichen" to rename time after the completion of standing out (ecstatic openness) with standing-in.

To say "noble remembering" is to say "immemorial remembering". It's another way of putting "willing non-willing". Remembering for us usually means a nostalgic recollection of the past, considered as indulgent unless it can be turned to good use <u>now</u>. We tend to overlook the important ways in which the future guides the way we remember, the way we re-think or re-read what has been. The Latin "memor" means "mindful" and it comes from a root "*mer-(s)mer" which is itself a <u>reduplication</u>. The French word for "same" is "même" and comes from the same root. The movement of re-thinking is needed for the region to stay the same.

"Forscher: Im Unvordenklichen also ist das Wesen des Menschens der Gegnet gelassen." Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 61.

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The German word for remember is "erinnern", literally meaning to become more inward or inner, more within what we are in. This means to become mindful of where we are which means to stand in or to dwell or "while" in our origin or heritage which is other than thought. The essence of thought is not thought. The essence of man is not man.

> "Scholar: . . . dwelling in his origin, man would be attuned by what is noble of his essence. He would assume the noble mind."37

Here Heidegger gathers the family of words with the root "*mut-", to sum up the strange dual way in which truth recurs, in which the region of the truth of Being "regions" us and the things.

Assuming or presuming (Vermuten) is waiting; it is engagement standing-in. The scholar and the teacher take note that this noble assumption because it is "immemorial" needs to be "supposed". We need to speak of the ruling and unfolding of the region in the suppositional mode since we belong into the region and cannot simply indicate it. The scholar says:

> ". . . dwelling in his origin, man would be attuned by what is noble of his essence."³⁸

If the thinking heart were to be noble minded thought would be thanks. Thought as thanks draws out two important facts about

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37 "Gelehrter: . . . in seiner Herkunft weilend, wäre der Mensch vom Edlen seines Wesens angemutet. Er vermutete das Edelmütige. Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 64. 38

. . in seiner Herkunft weilend, wäre der Mensch . . ." Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 64.

thought "saving its essence". Thought is not spontaneous or self-causing. That it thanks points dramatically to the source which calls it forth. At the same time, the thanking is not "for something". The limit of thought prevents it from defining that which it thanks. It is determined at a point beyond which it does not go. In the same way, freedom "saves its essence" in the free: (1) by becoming aware of its source which determines it and (2) by letting this source conceal itself.

E. The relation of "the far" and "the near"

In The Essence of Ground Heidegger stated:

"Der Mensch ist ein Wesen der Ferne."³⁹

This is not an easy statement to translate. It needs to be read in full knowledge of the whole project of the work which was to describe the zone of free transcendence as the threefold grounding. If we add the knowledge we have from later works about the meaning of "essence", the statement could be translated freely as follows:

> "Man is a ruling, self-governing, unfolding and declining of the far (the zone of free transcendence, temporality) as ecstatic openness."

In 1929, freedom and the essence of man are identified with a region called "the far". In 1945, this <u>same</u> freedom and essence saves <u>its</u> essence in the region called "the near". The region called "the free" is the far seen as the near and the near seen as the far. Coming to

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 71.

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the far, we come into the near. We remain far but now as part of stepping back into the near.

"Teacher: . . . waiting engages itself into the open itself . . .

Scholar: into the "width" of the far . . .

Teacher: in whose nearness it finds the "while" in which it remains.

Scientist: Remaining, however is a turning back."⁴⁰ The three look at this relation of far and near on two levels. One level can be indicated. ("We come into the near of the region and at the same time remain far from it.") The other level requires the subjunctive. (". . . then the region itself would be the nearing and the "faring", the region itself would be the near of the 41far and the far of the near".)

The reciprocity is drawn out in the discussion of Heraclitus' one-word fragment #122, which the scholar introduces at this 42 point. The one-word "statement", " $A \gamma \chi \iota \beta \kappa \sigma \tau \prime$ " is usually translated in German as "Herangehen" which means "going toward". The scientist suggests that this word perfectly handles the essence of modern science which advances on objects, which attacks nature, in this way letting it come into word. Within the horizon of modern science, "waiting" can only appear a counter-movement, that is

40"Lehrer: . . . das Warten in das Offene selbst sich einläßt . . . Gelehrter: in die Weite des Fernen . . . Lehrer: in dessen Nähe es die Weile findet, darin es bleibt. Forscher: Bleiben aber ist ein Zurückkehren."
41 Heidegger, <u>Gelassenheit</u>, pp. 65-6. <u>heit</u>, p. 42.
42 Ibid., p. 68f.

"stopping going toward". But looking deeper into the meaning of the Greek word, it is seen to mean literally "Nahegehen" (to go near). "To go toward" can be seen more originally as "to go near" and this in turn can be <u>rethought</u> as "to go into the near" or "to engage oneself into the near". This old saying which could be rethought provides the three with the most beautiful name for what they have found.

The scholar also notes that the name also names their walk 43on the field-path that day which led them deep into the night. The scientist, earlier, had given credit for the discovery of "engagement" to the night. With this sort of reference, Heidegger is trying to situate thought back in its element. The night refers to the path, the situation which we are in. We in the West (the evening land) live in the time of the world's night. Becoming aware of where we are, we become aware of this night. At one point, the teacher mentions that the night has made them more aware, through 44waiting, and more clear-headed. The dark indeterminateness nurtures us as sleep and rest prepare us for a new day.

The matter of clear-headedness and the night is taken up at greater length in chapter seven on "Hölderlin's earth and sky" where Heidegger's debt to Hölderlin in this matter becomes clear.

43 Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 70. 44 Ibid., p. 61.

At this point it must suffice to note that the conversation ends "back in the night" to remind us that it was the silent ruler throughout. The last exchange about the night is poetic and "childlike" and hence it touches the roots of philosophy. The passage holds together because of two constellations of meaning which adhere to two families of words. One concerns the near (die Nähe), for example, "mahe" (near), "nach" (after, toward, according to), "Nacht" (night), "Naht" (seam), "Nachbar" (neighbour), "nähren" (feed, nurture), "nähern (to near, sew), "Näherin" (seamstress, literally one who brings different pieces of cloth together). The other concerns the stars (die Sternen), for example, "staunen" (astound), "start" (stiff), "stellen" (put, place), "sterben"

The stars are the stars of the night. (Threefold transcending is the nearing of the far and the "faring" of the near.) The night astounds the stars (The stars are far; they are the far; they are, in <u>The Turn</u>, seen to be the poet and thinker's separate works 45 which guard the word.) Night nears the stars in the far. (Night reveals the nearness of poet and thinker and thus the nearness of past and future and of the nothing and the difference. Night nears the sameness of the region and the zone.)

Heidegger, Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 44.

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Section II: On "Letter on Humanism"

Introduction

1. Thought and the Region Together

In 1949, Heidegger published the <u>Letter on Humanism</u>, a revised and expanded version of a letter written in 1946 to Jean Beaufret. Beaufret had written to Heidegger raising some questions which occurred to him while reading Heidegger's "Plato's Doctrine of Truth". Heidegger chooses for discussion the question: "How can we give meaning again to the word humanism?" The discussion sheds light eventually on two other matters raised by Beaufret: the relation of ontology and possible ethics, and the strange way that thought is guided.

This is a work of enormous scope. The letter marks a culminating point in Heidegger's thought and it draws many questions together, any one of which warrants careful thought. In trying to interpret the work, I can be concerned only to try to draw out what pertains to my theme of freedom and the fourfold and more specifically what I have called the two predominant concerns of this period from 1943-49: (1) What is the region and what is its relation to the zone of transcendence? (2) What kind of thinking occurs if we belong into the region?

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All references from this work are from: Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), pp. 145-194.

Since the letter does not divide into convenient sections, it is not possible to separate points on thought from points on the region, and this is a good thing. Such a separation might tend to feed the illusion that these two divisions are something like "Heidegger's version of subject and object". The fact that he published a major statement in the form of a letter is not accidental. It should be seen to further the attempt to think "in the mesh" of what is occurring. A letter is more like a conversation, and thus closer to speech than a treatise. The same sort of point is made in the conversation about engagement. The three converse on a walk in the night. At the end of the letter, Heidegger states that we need less philosophy and more attention to thinking, less 47 literature and more cultivation of the letter. At the beginning, he warns of the dangers of written as opposed to spoken word.

> "Strictness of thought consists, in contradistinction to science, not merely in the artificial, that is the 'technical-theoretical' exactitude of terms. It rests on the fact that speaking remains purely in the element of Being, and lets the simplicity of the manifold dimensions of Being rule."⁴⁸

The written word then must "remember" that it exists to serve the spoken word, by thoughtfully composing what needs to be said. A letter, unlike a treatise, retains more of a connection to what matters.

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 194.

⁴⁸"Die Strenge des Denkens besteht im Unterschied zu den Wissenschaften nicht bloh in der Künstlichen, das heiht technischtheoretischen Exaktheit der Begriffe. Sie beruht darin dah das Sagen rein im Element des Seins bleibt und das Einfache seiner mannigfaltigen Dimensionen walten 146t." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 147. 2. Thesis on Freedom and the Free

Thinking must remain in its element and thus the "two predominant" concerns, the region and thought cannot be considered separately. Bringing them back together is the first major point for which Heidegger argues in the letter. This coming-back-together is one important way of seeing the meaning of the later, complete thesis on freedom. The thesis is both a <u>challenge</u> and a <u>statement</u>; it appears most succinctly in the letter:

> "Whether the region of the truth of Being is a blind alley or whether it is the free (das Freie) where freedom saves its essence, everyone may judge after he has tried himself to go the pointed way, or better, to go a better one, which means to pioneer a way appropriate to the question."⁴⁹

Freedom cannot be associated especially with either thought or the region. At no time can we step out of the region to "prepare a horizon" or method with which we then examine where we are or what we are in. And also, at no time can we go beyond the horizon we are necessarily in, which is the way we are in the region.

Freedom (and thus thought) saves its essence in the free, the region of the truth of Being. This means two things at the same time:

(1) Thought is freed finally from being "theory" which exists to

⁴⁹ "Ob der Bereich der Wahrheit des Seins eine Sackgasse oder ob er das Freie ist, worin die Freiheit ihr Wesen spart, möge jeder beurteilen, nachdem er selbst versucht hat, den gewiesenen Weg zu gehen oder, was noch besser ist, einen besseren, das hei?t einen der Frage gemäßen Weg zu bahnen." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 174.

serve praxis. It is itself one of the two basic forms of action or production. Thought acts in that it thinks.

(2) Thought <u>submits</u> itself to the region, which, as we saw in the conversation, shows one side of itself as the zone of transcendence. Thought, Heidegger suggests, using a French word, is "1'engagement" by and for the truth of Being.

Engagement by and for the region of the truth of Being is freedom saving its essence in the region called the free. Thought, which, in a sense constructs the horizon of transcendence, saves its essence when it acknowledges this horizon as the side of <u>the</u> <u>region</u> turned toward us. Then the zone of transcendence is no longer seen as something constructed to enable action. The zone or horizon ceases to have its absolute, arbitrary character and so in one way, it "loses ground". But Heidegger insists that it is completed, not replaced. It is vindicated rather than dissolved when it acknowledges the way it is rooted and guided.

Again at this point, it is necessary to see that Heidegger does not have in mind something like the following: Thought transcends the world we are in. But this thought in turn is guided in an utterly mysterious way by "the region" which is "even more transcendent than thought". This would only be a restatement of the position which names the region "the nameless". What Heidegger means with "freedom saving its essence", he says here, is like a fish that has been on dry land getting back into its element, the water.

"Thought doesn't overcome metaphysics by climbing higher than it or over it or by going beyond it in any direction whatsoever, but rather by climbing back into the nearness of the nearest."⁵⁰

Thought's element is language; as he states here, language is "the house of Being". Our connection with Being up to now is in the language up to now. Language is itself the region, with thinker and poet as its guardians. And language too, though it is the region, has showed itself in the "language of transcendence". Where we must begin is where we are now. And what makes this acceptance of where we are, so difficult to handle, is the strange character of reverence in a time when the tradition is in a sense so irreverent. Accepting what has been given to us at this time, means in part to accept the predominance of the refusal to accept what is given. This is one truth about the water we must swim in. If we are honest, we need to admit that this water makes us what we are. At that point, we have a chance to begin to experience more of what is occurring along with and through the immediate world of subject and object. In relation to the zone of transcendence, ego and object seem purely negative. We have transcended them and discovered that they emerged out of our free historical character. What we are (from day to day as conscious egos) and where we are (understood as concrete institutions) in a sense/deprived of all meaning and efficacy. The completion of the zone as the region

"Das Denken Überwindet die Metaphysik nicht, indem es sie, noch höher hinauf steigend. Übersteigt und irgendwohin aufhebt, sondern indem es zurücksteigt in die Nähe des Nächsten." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 182.

restores the positive in ego and object while retaining and grounding the negative. Ego and object are the way in which the essence of man and the thing reveal and conceal themselves in this time.

On the relation of the region to the zone, the letter does not change anything decisively from the points made in the conversation about engagement. But points merely touched on are drawn more broadly. And new words are introduced to name the region, and they prove to be decisive in view of later works. The words are "clearing" (Lichtung) which is attached to the verb "to clear" (lichten), and "home" or "nation" (Heimat). The letter also considers the relation of thought and the region to "the dimension of the holy" and to the whole realm of what is negative. "The holy" and the negative are both crucial "middle terms" of the relation of freedom and the fourfold. They cannot be by-passed if we are to appreciate what Heidegger means by freedom saving its essence in the free. Finally, the letter also contains a discussion of ethics in which Heidegger says why he thinks all his work is already "ethical" and how it stays within limits which prevent it from giving the sort of practical guide which is usually asked of it.

A. The "clearing" (Lichtung) and its relation to the zone of transcendence, and to the early works.

In the early works like <u>Being and Time</u> and <u>The Essence of</u> Ground, the zone of transcendence is called "Dasein" (literally,

"there-Being") and transcending is called "Existing" (existence). In the letter, Heidegger recalls an important sentence from <u>Being</u> and Time:

"Dasein's "essence" lies in its existence."⁵¹ This statement has often been invoked to "prove" that Heidegger is an existentialist, which is popularly understood as the "reversal of essence and existence". Heidegger wants to dissociate himself from this "existentialism". The "there" (Da), he says, was from the start considered to be "of Being" (Sein), even though the truth of Being was not unfolded. Now in the letter, the "there" is called "the clearing" (die Lichtung) of Being. We are "placed free" (frei gestellt) into this clearing, unlike plants and animals, and thus, what is the same, we have language (or it has us) and they do not. Language is the region, the clearing the house of Being.

> "Language is the clearing-concealing on-coming of Being itself."52

The phrase "clearing-concealing" (lichtend-verbergende) is crucial for the meaning of freedom and truth in the later work. When Being clears itself it opens up room to move; at the same time it withdraws and thus encloses, guides and limits. The concealing or hiding is thus not merely tacking on a negative factor to the positive factor of clearing as opening. Without the hiding, there can be no clearing.

"Das "Wesen" des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 156.

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"Sprache ist lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins selbst." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 158.

When Being comes to language, it approaches and withdraws, it opens and closes.

The key word is essence (Wesen). Heidegger points out that he put this word in italics in the important definition in <u>Being and</u> <u>Time</u>, to indicate that he was rethinking the meaning of the word in connection with its relation to "Existenz". Essence needed to be rethought in relation to the new thought about time as ecstatic openness. The rethinking of "essence" occurs gradually and appears in works from 1927 through to the most recent works. The phrase "clearing-concealing" is one way of pointing out that essence for Heidegger is attached neither to "esse existentiad" nor to "esse essentiad. And it also cannot be identified with either "the actual" or "the possible".

The difficult struggle that Heidegger is engaging with this word clearing might be expressed as follows. We find ourselves "lodged" in a particular situation (temporal and "spatial"). When we realize that we are responsible in some way for what occurs in this situation we are discovering our free <u>historical</u> character. But then our free historical character "rediscovers" its "situatedness". It rediscovers that it is destined or determined though in a way which makes the historical path the way in which guidance occurs. Putting this struggle another way, it could be said that Heidegger is struggling with the question of "history" and "eternity". In the course of his struggle it is clear that he has had to rethink

both words such that the usual definitions no longer suffice. Eternity no longer means "timeless", but rather something like "what has endured since the dawn". History no longer means merely the shaping of things by man in temporal sequence. In the conversation about engagement, the important "second step" led to the "history of the region" of which the history of free transcendence is the side turned toward us.

Much of the thinking about history in relation to the region focuses around the word "Geschick" which Heidegger relates directly to "Geschichte" (history). The word is often translated as "fate" or "destiny". I prefer to translate it "what is sent".

It is important always to remember the "double level" meaning of this word "Geschick". Its power, like that of "clearing" is to point in two directions. On the one hand, it denotes what is immediate, what is unavoidably here for us now; on the other hand it points back to a "sender" or a source. In the letter Heidegger is trying to find words to remain true to both levels, to the immediate and to the whole. A very free translation of his meaning is as follows: Being comes to what is sent (zum Geschick) in that it gives itself. To give itself or send itself, it must at the same time hide itself or deny itself. Saying itself it must fail to say itself (deny = versagen). It must negate itself. And later Heidegger states that "Being comes to language, clearing itself". We know that thinking in terms of language (in which we

dwell), this means it clears - conceals itself. Becoming aware of the whole, we still remain where we always were. Appreciating the whole does not "widen the scope of our transcending". Rather we step back and allow what is hidden to rule along with the unhidden. We learn the relation of saying to what is said and what is sayable.

The paragraph which is quoted following, is crucial for the thesis about freedom and the free. It sums up Heidegger's stance toward transcendence, his own early work, and in some ways also the current state of affairs.

> "The introductory definition "Being is the transcendens as such" takes the way the essence of Being has cleared itself to man up to now, together into one simple sentence. This backward-glancing definition of the essence of Being out of the clearing of beings as such remains unavoidable for the approach to the question of the truth of Being which goes prior to thought. In this way, thought witnesses to its essence as sent. It is far from the presumption of wanting to start over, and to declare false all previous philosophy. Nevertheless, whether the definition of Being as plain transcendence already names the simple essence of the truth of Being [the way it rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines], that and that alone is first of all the question for thought which tries to think the truth of Being. Therefore, it is said on page 230 that first out of the "sense", that is out of the truth of Being can one understand how Being is. Being clears itself to man in the ecstatic project. But this project does not create Being."53

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"Die einleitende Bestimmung "Sein ist das transcendens schlec hin" nimmt die Weise, wie sich das Wesen des Seins bisher dem Menschen lichtete, in einen einfachen Satz zusammen. Diese rückblickende Bestimmung des Wesens des Seins aus der Lichtung des Seienden als eines solchen bleibt für den vordenkenden Ansatz der Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seins unumgänglich. So bezeugt das Denken sein geschickliches Wesen. Ihm liegt die Anmadung fern, von vorne anfangen zu wollen und alle vorausgegangene Philosophie für falsch zu erklären. Ob (continued) Freedom saves its essence not by transcending tradition, but by accepting it and entering into its essence. At the same time the tradition itself is one of transcendence, and we are thus confronted with the strange need to cease transcending while accepting the tradition of transcendence.

B. Homeland and homelessness. Hölderlin and Heidegger.

In a passage of the letter, which is difficult because it touches on so many questions at once, Heidegger introduces the words "homeland" (Heimat) and "homelessness" (Heimat-losigkeit) into the discussion. It becomes clear that these two <u>together</u> help us name the region of the truth of Being. The encounter with the region is a matter which demands the co-operation of thought and poetry. Homelessness and homeland seem to be the "saying" of Being and the "naming" of what is holy respectively. Heidegger sees himself as taking up the thinker's task to think of or say Being. He acknowledges his debt to other thinkers and especially in the matter of "homeless-54 ness" his enormous debt to Nietzsche. About the homeland, Heidegger's

53 (continued)

jedoch die Bestimmung des Seins als d**e**s schlichten transcendens schon das einfache Wesen der Wahrheit des Seins nennt, das und das allein ist doch allererst die Frage für ein Denken, das versucht, die Wahrheit des Seins ²¹ denken. Darum heißt es auch S.230, daß erst aus dem "Sinn", das heißt aus der Wahrheit des Seins, zu verstehen sei, wie Sein ist. Sein lichtet sich dem Menschen im ekstatischen Entwurf. Doch dieser Entwurf schafft nicht das Sein." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 168. 54

Heidegger gives some indication here of how much he learned from Nietzsche and also some lines about his interpretation, that Nietzsche was not able to "leave metaphysics". The scope of this thesis and the particular works which are here considered do not allow me to enter into the difficult debate about Nietzsche and "Heidegger's Nietzsche". Heidegger published two volumes of his interpretation of (continued) experience leads him to suggest that the poet Hölderlin has named 55 what can be named in this regard. The poets name what is holy. They establish "what remains", using Hölderlin's phrase. The thinker says the truth of homelessness and the poet names the truth of homecoming.

To appreciate what it is for freedom to save its essence in the free, we need to appreciate these "two truths" together. Freedom in <u>The Essence of Ground</u> was the ruling and unfolding of "the far", of the threefold grounding in the zone of transcendence. Of these three, the primary way of grounding, "establishing", was described only in outline as "the project of the world". The unfolding of the world was postponed because Heidegger believed at the time that it was first necessary to clarify the horizon or zone of this unfolding. He assumed at this time that the unfolding could proceed as soon as the horizon was clarified and man's nothingness in the midst of beings had been thus brought to the

54 (continued)

Nietzsche. All that needs to be stated here is that Heidegger acknowledges an enormous debt to Nietzsche in this matter of "homelessness".

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It is clear that Heidegger feels this naming of the homeland out of homelessness has political implications. It would be wrong to have the impression that Heidegger's turning to the poet (in a certain special sense, a turning to religion) means a withdrawal from political concerns. In this connection, it should also be remembered that it became an all-important political concern of Heidegger's in 1934 to think homeland as <u>language</u> rather than race. (See for example Otto **P**8ggeler Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger (Freiburg: Alber 1972), p. 19). It is however not within the scope of this thesis to enter into the very large questions which Heidegger's political statements raise. Nor are these brief and cryptic remarks sufficient to base a firm conviction about "Heidegger's political stance". It must suffice to suggest that "the holy" cannot be abstracted from politics any more than ontology can be abstracted from ethics. centre of concern. What eventually did occur was in a way the same as expected, but also it was quite different. The early thought was a necessary access to the unfolding of Being, but in a different way than was expected. In attempting to think the horizon of Being, thought came face to face with its own limits. This is part of the meaning of "homelessness". To see this truth of homelessness (here again acknowledging an enormous debt to Nietzsche) at the same time made it possible to hear the poet Hölderlin's naming of the holy. It is necessary to think the truth of homelessness, to be able to hear the strange truth of the coming to the homeland. The complete doctrine of freedom must include both the thinker's truth and the poet's truth, both the far and the near. The hidden rule of the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and gods, operates in the predominance of homelessness which dissimulates and denies it.

The meaning of the "homeland" does not come out very much in the letter. The question will be taken up again in the study of "H&lderlin's Earth and Sky" in chapter seven. But one point is made rather forcibly which deserves mention here. "Homeland" is a word which seems obviously associated with national patriotism, and yet Heidegger stresses that H&lderlin's use is not essentially patriotic or nationalistic, but rather is thought out of the "history of Being". Heidegger uses the adjective "Being-historical" to refer to what was called in the conversations "the history of the region". Human history was described there as the side turned toward us of the history of the region. In his appreciation of history as the history of Being, Heidegger expresses his attempt to say together what matters "historically" and "eternally". The homeland that Hölderlin names is neither "timeless" nor "man-made". It is a rethinking of what matters in both of these expressions. Bearing this in mind, we can understand why Heidegger says of Hölderlin's "national" song:

> "The "German" is not said to the world so that the world may be healed thanks to the German essence, but it is said to the Germans so that they along with the other peoples with whom they share what is sent may become world-historical" (cf. Hölderlin's poem "Remembrance"). The homeland of what it is to dwell historically is the nearness to Being."⁵⁶

C. Thought of Being and the dimension of the holy. Heidegger on religion. The co-operation of Heidegger and Hölderlin and the "closure of the hale". The hale and the grim.

In the epilogue to <u>What Is Metaphysics?</u>, Heidegger wrote 57 that the thinker says Being and the poet names the holy. Not much

"Das "Deutsch& ist nicht der Weltgesagt, damit sie am deutschen Wesen genese, sondern es ist den Deutschen gesagt, damit sie aus der geschickhaften Zugehörigkeit zu den Völkern mit diesen welt geschichtlich werden. (vgl. zu Hölderlins Gedicht "Andenken". Tübingen Gedenkschrift 1943 s 322). Die Heimat dieses geschichtlichen Wohnens ist die Nähe zum Sein." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 169. 57

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 107.

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was said about this matter, but it was clear that the strange cooperation of poet and thinker had come to the centre of his thought as a result of his "encounter" with Hölderlin. In the context of the discussion of "clearing", "homeland" and "near(ness)" in the letter, he takes up again this question about Being and what is holy.

> "In this near(ness) [of Being] is accomplished if at all, the decision whether and how God and the gods deny themselves and the night remains, whether and how the day of what is holy dawns, whether and how in the rising of the holy, an appearance of God and the gods can begin anew. But the holy, which is first of all only the essential room of godhood (Gottheit) [of the essence of God, of the way in which God rules, governs himself, unfolds and declines], which itself again only grants the dimension for gods and God, only comes into appearance if beforehand and in long preparation, Being itself has cleared itself and is experienced in its truth. Only thus out of Being does the overcoming of homelessness begin, in which not only man but also the essence of man wanders around."⁵⁸

This statement is exemplary of several which examine the relation of "thought of Being" to the dimension of the holy. The allusion at the end of the quoted passage is possibly to Nietzsche's statement that modern man looks everywhere and sees only himself. The "essence"

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"In dieser Nähe vollzieht sich, wenn überhaupt, die Entscheidung ob und wie der Gott und die Götter sich versagen und die Nacht bleibt, ob und wie der Tag des Heiligen dämmert, ob und wie im Aufgang des Heiligen ein Erscheinen des Gottes und der Götter neu beginnen kann. Das Heilige aber, das nur erst der Wesensraum der Gottheit ist, die selbst wiederum nur die Dimension für die Götter und den Gott gewährt, kommt dann allein ins Scheinen, wenn zuvor und in langer Vorbereitung das Sein selbst sich gelichtet hat und in seiner Wahrheit erfahren ist. Nur so beginnt aus dem Sein die Überwindung der Heimat_losigkeit, in der nicht nur die Menschen, sondern das Wesen des Menschen umherirrt." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 169. of man includes as well the region of the truth of Being which Hölderlin experiences as a homeland. One feature of the statements about Being and the holy is the various "stages" which the relation contains. In another passage, the stages are set out quite systema-59 tically. The main point seems to be that we are engulfed in metaphysics and we cannot step outside of this and question about God and gods "as we always have". The question about gods must be imbedded in the world as it is now. This means a long preparation which will lead us back to being aware of what "god" means. Awareness in this case means an event, not a logical game which separates a region of "god-language" within which we can "be religious". Heidegger is not talking about "raising consciousness", "changing attitude" or obtaining a "correct analysis".

One of the important middle terms (of the stages) is the <u>dimension</u> of the holy which can be thought only out of the awareness of the openness of Being. Appreciation of the dimension makes it possible to ask whether God or gods approach(es) or withdraw(s). In "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky", a later work, Heidegger suggests we will not be able to hear the richness of Hölderlin's word unless

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[&]quot;Erst ans der Wahrheit des Seins 145t sich das Wesen des Heiligen denken. Erst aus dem Wesen des Heiligen ist das Wesen von Gottheit zu denken. Erst im Lichte des Wesen von Gottheit kanngedacht und gesagt werden, was das Wort "Gott" nennen soll." Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 181-2.

we listen out of what concerns us and surrounds us. Heidegger himself obviously feels he was able to hear this richness because of his thought of Being, beginning with the free transcendence of "Being-in-the-world". Hölderlin, for Heidegger, names what is holy in this time, which he calls the time of double need, of the no-more of the gods who have fled and the not-yet of what is 61 What is holy is the night. But Heidegger could not coming. have heard Holderlin's word if he had not first rethought time as ecstatic openness. In the letter to Professor Richardson (1964), Heidegger reminds us that the "early" work is still a necessary 62 access to the later work, in this time. It is almost the same to suggest that thought of Being is a necessary access or preparation for the experience of what is holy.

The debate about Heidegger and religion raises the difficult questions of the tasks of philosophy, theology and poetry. These questions became, for Heidegger, after his encounter with Hölderlin, the centre of his concern. He felt it was necessary to rethink

Martin Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung</u> 4th edition, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1971), p. 156. 61

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"Es ist die Zeit der enflohenen Götter und des kommenden Gottes. Das ist die dürftige Zeit, weil sie in einem gedoppelten Mangel und Nicht steht: im Nichtmehr der entflohenen Götter und im Nochnicht des Kommenden." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 47. 62

William J. Richardson, S.J., <u>Heidegger, Through Phenomenclogy</u> to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. xxii.

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what the tasks are and also the relations between them as they are carried out. When his thinking stabilizes he no longer mentions theology, he speaks of "the end of philosophy", and the two tasks which remain are thinking and "poetizing" or building. When considering his position on theology, then, it is important to remember the complexity which is introduced by calling into question the traditional categories and tasks. This is what makes it difficult to answer easily a question such as: "Is Heidegger a religious thinker?"

Heidegger is not a theologian because theology no longer takes us to the ruling centre of things. Scattered individuals and communities live in faith, but they are <u>in effect</u> only one of various "ideological enclaves". Heidegger put this matter as follows in "Whither the Poets?":

> "The default of God means that no god any longer gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally and by such gathering disposes the world's history and man's sojourn in it."⁶³

The withdrawal of the gods and the God to come not yet having arrived, this <u>absence</u> in the sphere of what is holy is a ruling factor. This rule is what is meant with the holiness of the night. We are in the night which followed "yester<u>day</u>" and which precedes the new

63 "Der Fehl Gottes bedeutet, daß kein Gott mehr sichtbar und eindeutig die Menschen und die Dinge auf sich versammelt und aus solcher Versammlung die Weltgeschichte und den menschlichen Aufent halt in ihr fügt." Martin Heidegger, <u>Holzwege</u> (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1963), p. 248. dawn of tomorrow. In such a time, according to Hölderlin, the poets are like the wine-god's holy priests who fared from land to land in the holy night. Heidegger expressed very well what he thinks we must do and cannot do in relation to the gods in this time of night, in "Remembrance of the Poet".

> "This "failure" of the god is the reason for the lack of "holy names". Nevertheless, because the discovery in being reserved is at the same time near, the failing god sends greetings in the near of the sky-like. That is why "god's failure" is yet no lack. Therefore, too, the people of the country may not attempt to make to themselves a god by cunning and thus put aside by force the supposed lack. But neither may they accommodate themselves merely by calling upon an accustomed god."⁶⁴

Heidegger is reported to have said:

"As philosophical thinking is related to Being when Being speaks to thinking, so faith's thinking is related to God when God is revealed in his word."⁶⁵

And in the passage from "Remembrance of the Poet" he said later:

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Der "Fehl" des Gottes ist der Grund für das Fehlen "heiliger Nahmen". Weil jedoch der Fund als der gesparte gleichwohl nahe ist grüct im Nahen der Himmlischen der fehlende Gott. Deshalt ist "Gottes Fehl" auch kein Mangel. Darum durfen die Landesleute auch nicht dahin trachten, durch Listen einen Gott selbst zu machen und so mit Gewalt den vermeintlichen Mangel auf die Seite zu bringen. Sie dürfen aber auch nicht darin sich bequemen, auf einen gewohnten Gott sich nur noch zu berufen." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 28.

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As reported by James M. Robinson, "The German Discussion of the Later Heidegger", <u>The Later Heidegger and Theology</u>, <u>New</u> <u>Frontiers in Theology</u>, ed. J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, vol. 1 (New York, 1963), p. 43. "So for the poet's care there is only one possibility: without fear of the appearance of godlessness he must remain near the failure of the god, and wait long enough in the prepared proximity of the failure until out of the proximity of the failing god the initial word is granted, which names the High One."⁶⁶

In this time, the poet, in a sense, takes the place of the theologian. The poet announces that this time is not a time of the revelation of God, but rather, the time of the double hiding of gods and God, in which the coming new day is glimpsed coming toward us. The poet builds according to the laws of poethood, not according to the laws of philosophy. Heidegger always warned theologians too, not to forsake their bedrock in "faith", for the sake of the latest in philosophy. Thinker and poet are near to each other in that they dwell in language.

Heidegger is not suggesting an approach to religion which has already been found wanting in the early approach to Being. We are not asked first to describe the horizon of the religious question, as if religion would wait upon a philosophic preparation for it. If God speaks or does not speak, this is not a function of philosophy. We cannot decide that we need religion and then

[&]quot;Darum gilt für die Sorge des Dichters nur das eine: ohne Furcht vor dem Schein der Gottlosigkeit dem Fehl Gottes nahe zu bleiben und in der bereiteten Nähe zum Fehl so længe zu harren, bis aus der Nähe zum fehlenden Gott das anfängliche Wort gewährt wind, das den Hohen nennt." (trans. Werner Brock). Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 28.

set up a project to get it or get it back. The truth is we are lost and homeless in this time. This is the inescapable fact of this time; Being announces itself in the uprooting of every being by technique, man cut loose from his essence. Awareness of this truth allows us to hear Hölderlin's holy word that this homelessness is the holy night and the day of what saves is growing in it.

Heidegger's early thought about time as ecstatic openness was about all three "tenses" or ecstasies, but it had a clear future emphasis on what is projected forward. The encounter with Hölderlin led him to shift emphasis back to "what remains"; this is evident in the stance of 1943. In the period from 1943 to 1949, he came to see the need to reassert the present and immediate against the tendency to regard it as a desert or wilderness redeemed only by escape to the past or future. The continuing need for thought of Being and thought of the dimension of the holy is not "methodology" but a response to what now is true. The completion of the zone as the revelation-concealment of the region does not replace the real immediate zone. This is why the talk about the region itself remains suppositional rather than indicative. We do not yet dwell. We need to struggle in the reality of the zone and belonging into the region. The strife for us is not over. Heidegger is resisting the tendency (ever more and more prevalent) to escape the situation we are really in, with a "return to religion". Reveren for tradition means for us in this time not only the recollection of

the old and holy words of the Greeks, Hebrews and Christians but also the acceptance of the truths of modern metaphysics and of the immediate reality which engulfs us. The acceptance of the revelation and concealment of our own epoch means the strange necessity to cease transcending while accepting a tradition of transcending.

In the passage about the dimension of the holy, Heidegger uses the two different words "heilig" (holy) and "heil" (hale, whole, healthy, uninjured). "Das Heilen" means "the healing". "Das Heile" I am translating as "the hale". According to Duden the history of the word "heilig" which now means holy in the sense of "consecrated, revered, godlike", is not clear-cut. It may come from "heil" (hale, whole) or it may come from a word meaning "bewitched". In balance, I would say that Heidegger emphasizes the former meaning of "hale, healthy and healing". For example, in as crucial a statement as what follows, he uses "hale" rather than "holy".

> "Thought accompanies historical ek-sistence, i.e. the humanitas of homo humanus, into the region of the rise of the hale."⁶⁷

Thought of Being leads humans to the region of the rise of what

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"Das Denken geleitet die geschichtliche Eksistenz, das heißt die humanitas des homo humanus, in den Bereich des Aufgangs des Heilen." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 189.

heals. What heals is both the night itself and the rising of the new day which is coming. In the terms of freedom, we can roughly translate this to mean that free transcendence leads or accompanies us to "the free" where it saves its essence. In The Essence of Ground, freedom involved the abysmal struggle of making choices and decisions in the face of destiny. Now this same struggle is seen as the side of the region turned toward us. The struggle which freedom involves echoes the struggle of Being itself (Being itself is called "das Strittige"). Being "says itself" and "denies itself". In terms of what heals, Heidegger states that what is evil (das Böse) appears at the same time as what heals in the clearing of Being. The hale and the grim do not appear together because of human inadequacy but because of the way of Being's prevailing. It is "das Strittige". The terror of homelessness as well as the homeland comes from the whole.

Along with the hale there appears the evil (das Böse) but it is immediately stated that "mere badness of human action" is not what is intended. There can be no question of attributing the hale to "the beyond" and the ill or evil to human failure. Also not intended is the placing of either the hale or the evil <u>merely</u> beyond us. To say what "Böse" means, Heidegger introduces the

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 189.

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words "bösartig" (malicious, wicked), "grimmig" (enraged, furious, violent, grim), and "Grimm" (anger, animosity). The root meaning of "grim" comes from the Indo-European root "*ghrem" (thundering, terrible, cruel, fierce). The whole is both grim and terrible and hale or healing. This is true both of the region itself and of the side of it turned toward us.

D. On "the negative" or what is negative as the not of the ontological difference, the not of the nothing and the not of saying no.

Heidegger introduces a group of "negative-words" which describe the different levels or components of what is negative. Under the domination of the current mode of "positive" thinking, people tend to assume that negation is a matter of "personal values". Since everything that is is now defined from the start as positive, the negative must be "subjective", the ego (the subject, the one who posits) being all there "is", other than what is posited. Heidegger's main point is to suggest that object and ego do not exhaust the possible "sources" of the negative. From the start, his thinking concentrated on what is between ego and object which grounds their relation. And from the start, this zone of relation was seen to be indeterminate (in positive terms). Nevertheless in this abyss there occurs a determination. The not of the nothing (Being) attunes us through the not of the ontological difference (between beings and Being). 4. 0

Negation is not the product of an arbitrary negating subject. As Heidegger puts it, the nothing "nots" (nichtet) and thus appears as the "negateable" (Nichthaft). To this, the "no" we say, responds. Thus saying no is in a sense twice removed from being the whole source of negation, though it remains as response an indispensable part of that whole. When a person says no to something, he may be doing so appropriately. As change occurs, negation and affirmation are both needed. But both must see themselves as response to what is occurring in the turning of the double not of Being. We are not in charge of what is sent.

"Only Being grants rising to the hale and to the grim the push to the unhale."⁶⁹

The double need is a double concealment which we can look at in three ways: (1) It is the double concealment of the not of the ontological difference and the not of the nothing. The two works written in 1929, <u>The Essence of Ground</u> and <u>What Is Metaphysics</u>? examine these two "nots" respectively. According to the new preface of 1949, neither of the works is able to convey the sameness of each 70 "not" with the other. (2) It is the double concealment of the zone of transcendence and the region of the truth of Being. The current modes of ego and object conceal the fact that they are

"Sein erst gewährt dem Heilen Aufgang in Huld und Andrang zu Unheil dem Grimm." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 191. 70 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 21.

grounded in free Dasein. This free Dasein is itself dependent on a withdrawal or concealment of Being, and thus this truth is doubly concealed from the point of view of the current modes. This chapter is devoted to the understanding of the sameness of the zone and the region. (3) It is the double concealment of the nameable and the named. A word is a region with future and past heritage.

In the 1949 preface to <u>The Essence of Ground</u> Heidegger states that the two "nots" are:

> "the same in the sense of what belongs together in the ruling and unfolding of the Being of beings."⁷¹

The zone and the region are "the same", the two "nots" are the same, the nameable and the named are the same. They are the same in the sense that they enable the twofold accomplishment of the same whole.

The sameness indicates a return to the <u>present</u> situation as it really is, now also being able at the same time to appreciate its whole essence. The yes-saying and no-saying to immediate objects and current modes, is now aware of its situation in the region of the truth of Being. A statement of Goethe's, which Heidegger quotes at the end of Toward the Question of Being illustrates this point.

> "When someone looks upon word and expression as holy witnesses, and does not bring them into quick instantaneous exchange like coins and bank notes, but rather wants to know them exchanged in general spiritual activity as true equivalent, one can not blame him, if he warns how customary expressions, which no longer offend anyone,

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". . . das Selbe im Sinne dessen, was im Wesenden des Seins des Seinden zusammen gehört." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 21.

nevertheless perpetrate a bad influence, darken opinions, a false direction."72 distort conception and give whole fields The later doctrine of freedom is well expressed in this statement of Goethe's. The second half of the statement can be seen as transcending the current modes (words) insofar as they drag down, confuse, oppress and mislead us. The completion which makes this no-saying possible is in the first half of the statement which speaks of words as holy witnesses and true equivalents. And even the words which mislead are holy witnesses. Transcending is not understood fully until it is seen also to be erring. Climbing out is standing in. We say yes to the same words which mislead us for that very reason: that they mislead us, oppress us, anger us and give us courage. Freedom as the struggle in the midst of the current modes, saves its essence in the free Freedom says (and this means at the same time that it "denies") the essence of the free. Freedom's struggle is a response to or echo of the struggle of yes and no in Being itself.

E. The question of ethics and practical guides for action. Heraclitus on the strange home of man.

⁷² "Wenn jemand Wort und Ausdruck als heilige Zeugnisse betrachtet und sie nicht et wa, wie Scheidemünze oder Papier geld, nur zu schnellem, augenblicklichem Verkehr bringen, sondern im geistigen Handel und Wandel als wahres Äquivalent ausgetauscht wissen will, so kann man ihm nicht verübeln, da^{/2} er aufmerksam macht, wie herkömmliche Ausdrücke, woran niemand mehr Arges hat, doch einen schädlichen Einflu⁴ verüben, Ansichten verdustern, den Begriff entstellen und ganzen Fächern eine falsche Richtung geben." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 253.

Thinking does not come up with a clear-cut political programme or with ethical precepts. This is distressing because we have been expecting for so long to receive the "handle" from the study of what is occurring. Where else can we turn for practical guidance in ethical and political matters, if not to thinkers? Thinkers, like Heidegger, show the inadequacy of the social sciences, for example, in this regard, and then they don't give us a new "social theory". They seem to stand back with Olympian detachment, as if urgent practical matters were not pressing in on us from all sides.

For a start it must be stated that Heidegger does not believe that all politics, building and responsible activity in public affairs ought to grind to a halt, because thinking does not provide "theory" for practical action. It becomes clearer in a later work, "Building Dwelling Thinking", that poetic building operates in the immediate arena according to different laws than those of thinking (though they are alike in their place of dwelling). In any case, Beaufret's question about the rapport of ontology and a possible ethics cannot be quickly answered within the categories it uses and thus the expectations it has. Heidegger does try to answer the question, however, because he knows that, in spite of its categories, the question rises out of something which matters to him as well as to Beaufret. The rethinking of the categories is

crucial because Heidegger has been trying to deal with this matter in all his thinking and yet people still ask when he is going to get around to doing it. Because of the predominance of a traditional conception of what it is to deal with ethical and political matters, people are often incapable of seeing an answer unless it comes in the traditional form.

Heidegger's "answer" then must begin with a reassertion of the task of thinking.

"The answer goes: this thought is neither theoretical nor practical. It occurs before this distinction. This thought, insofar as it is, is the recollection of Being and nothing more. Belonging to Being because thrown by Being into its truth's "becoming-true", and for it, taken into the claim, it thinks Being. Such thinking has no result. It has no effect. It is sufficient for its ruling and unfolding that it is. But it is in that it says its matter (. . . seine Sache sagt). To the matter of thought there belongs historically only one thing, the saying which accords with what matters to it. Held by what matters, its binding quality is essentially higher than the validity of science because it is more free. For it lets **B**eing Be."⁷³

This answer responds to a rephrasing of Beaufret's question by Heidegger, one which takes into account that Beaufret's question seems to assume that Heidegger's "thought of Being" is theoretical,

[&]quot;Die Antwort lautet: dieses Denken ist weder theoretisch noch praktisch. Es ereignet sich vor dieser Unterscheidung. Dieses Denken ist, insofern es ist, das Andenken an das Sein und nichts außerdem. Zum Sein gehörig, weil vom Sein in die Wahrnis seiner Wahrheit geworfen und für sie in den Anspruch genommen, denkt es das Sein. Solches Denken hat kein Ergebnis. Es hat keine Wirkung. Es genügt seinem Wesen, indem es ist. Aber es ist, indem es seine Sache sagt. Der Sache des Denkens gehört je geschichtlich nur eine, die ihrer Sachheit gemäße Sage. Deren sachhaltige Verbindlichkeit ist wesentlich höher als die Gültigkeit der Wissenschaften, weil sie freier ist. Denn sie läßt das Sein-sein." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 188.

ontological and thus not-yet-ethical. Heidegger answers in effect that ethics and politics are basically matters of "where we are" or "what we are in". The words " $\eta' \partial \beta$ " and " $\pi \delta_{\beta} \lambda_{1} \beta$ " are both "regional", for Heidegger. Thus, his thinking of the region of the truth of Being, which began with the thinking of the zone of transcendence, has from the start been "ethical" and "political" thinking, if we no longer confine such thinking to a traditional conception of what an "ethics" or a "politics" is.

The last sentences of the quoted answer contain a clear reference to "the free" in this whole matter. Thinking the region of the truth of Being, letting Being Be, thinking Being as the "house" in which we dwell, saying what <u>holds</u> us; this is freedom saying the essence of the free, or freedom saving its essence in the free. Being free is reaching what holds, claims, binds, frees: the free, the region of the truth of Being.

Heidegger is saying that to expect his thought to yield a practical programme is to fail to see that it has already done what it had to do. Thought is not "theory" which for Heidegger would mean essentially that it is "a science of what is occurring, conceived in advance as something to be used later in action". Thought is not a "picture" or "world view" which is achieved by abstracting oneself and stepping out of the action (that is, by transcending). It is not a blueprint for future action and transformation. <u>As thought</u>, it is already part of the action. That is, it produces dwelling alongside

poetic building. Language is the house of Being. Thinking produces it and guards it in <u>its</u> way and poetic building produces it and guards it in <u>its</u> way.

Near the beginning of the letter, Heidegger not only dissociates himself from "theoria" as he suggests it is used by Plato and Aristotle; he goes so far as to see the roots of the conception of thought as "ideology" already in these great thinkers, even when they assert the independence of thought from practise.

> "In order to learn to experience purely the so-called essence of thinking - that means at the same time to consummate it - we have to free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thought, the beginning of which goes back to Plato and Aristotle, where thinking itself was a " $\tau \epsilon \chi \gamma \eta$ ", the procedure of reflecting in the interest of doing and making. But here already the reflecting is seen from the point of view of "mpages" and " $\pi oin \sigma$'s". Therefore thisking is, when taken in isolation, not "practical". The characterization of thinking as " $\Theta \epsilon \omega \rho i \alpha$ " and the definition of apprehending as "theoretical" behaviour occurs already within the "technical" interpretation of thinking. This interpretation is an attempt in reaction to differentiate thinking as a separate function of equal validity with acting and doing. Since then, "philosophy" has been in the constant crisis of having to justify its existence before the "sciences"."74

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"Damit wir erst lernen, das genannte Wesen des Denkens rein zu erfahren und das heißt zugleich zu vollziehen, müssen wir uns frei machen von der technischen Interpretation des Denkens. Deren Anfänge reichen bis zu Plato and Aristoteles zurück. Das Denken selbst gilt dort als eine $\tau \epsilon \chi r \eta$, das Verfahren des Überlegens im Dienste des Tuns und Machens. Das Überlegen aberwird hier schon aus dem Hinblick auf $\pi \rho \kappa \xi_{15}$ und $\pi o i \eta \tau i \beta$ gesehen. Deshalb ist das Denken, wenn es für sich genommen wird, nicht "praktisch". Die Kennzeichnung des Denkens als $\Theta_{ii0}\rho i \alpha$ und die Bestimmung des Erkennens als des "theoretischen" Verhaltens geschieht schon innerhalb der "technischen" Auslegung des Denkens. Sie ist ein reaktiver Versuch, auch das Denken noch in eine Eigenständigkeit gegenüber dem Handeln und Tun zu retten. Seitdem ist die "Philosophie" in der ständigen Notlage, vor den "Wissenschaften" ihre Existenz zu rechtfertigen." For Heidegger the assertion of pure contemplation could not stand against the tendency to <u>use</u> theory, because it was at root a defensive move, a withdrawal from action (supposedly). All the while, he suggests, it was it-self action, or part of the action.

Since Aristotle's systematic thought and the <u>school</u> of Plato, there has been a tendency to separate two stages of thought. Ontology tells us what is, or what is occurring. Ethics tells us how to act. These distinctions are not "mistakes" for Heidegger, but they have come to stand on their own and thus to obscure the matter they express. "Thought of Being" attempts to recall this matter; not to refute its previous philosophic expression. Heidegger originally called his thinking a "fundamental ontology" to call attention to this matter, but the meanings necessarily attached to the word "ontology" led him eventually to abandon this name.

Sophocles and Heraclitus never wrote treatises on "ethics" but we don't consider their work unethical or pre-ethical or notyet-ethical. What matters in the word ethics is brought out by Heraclitus in his three-word fragment (number 119) which speaks of the "ethos" of man.

" $\tilde{n}\Theta cs$ $\tilde{a}\gamma\Theta \rho \omega \pi \psi$ $Sai \mu \omega \gamma$."75 The proper translation of " $\tilde{n}\Theta vs$ " is abode, home, or place of dwelling, according to Heidegger. All Heidegger's thought about

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 185.

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the zone of transcendence or of ecstatic openness, which leads to the thought about the nothing and the region, all this is "ethical" in the deepest sense.

Heidegger's interpretation or translation of the fragment leads him to suggest that it means:

"Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of God."76

Heidegger's own experience was that his early thought of Being enabled him to hear the richness of Hölderlin's word about the nearness of God as it prevails in this time. Thought of Being enabled thought about the dimension of the holy without which the holy word could not be heard.

A further point is made about the fragment, lest the impression be given that we are human only by "transcending" occasionally into a relation to the beyond. Parallel to such an impression would be the opinion that only the very few poets and thinkers, who wrench themselves out of the morass of everyday life can get out to edge where what matters takes place. Aristotle recorded an anecdote about Heraclitus: When visited, as a "thinker of note", he disappointed the visitors, when they found him warming himself by the stove. Seeing their disppointment, he tried to hearten them, saying "There are also gods present here".

". . . der Mensch wohnt, insofern er Mensch ist, in der Nähe Gottes." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 185.

The strange and unfamiliar <u>pervades</u> the familiar at every point; it does not impinge occasionally at the edges. Thus Heidegger proposes that the fragment could mean:

"The (ordinary) home to man is the openness for the presence of God (the extraordinary)."⁷⁷

The "ordinary home" is in a sense vindicated, in relation to the tendency (to which ordinary people also are prone) to malign it in favour of the exciting or unique. This is not said to make people "accept their lot, however meagre". It is said to try to help unlock the richness and <u>strength</u> which is everywhere in our midst and is often eclipsed. Putting this same matter in a different way, the ordinary life which appears so secure and closed is part of the operation of the strange and insecure which is at the same time terrifying and saving.

A great thinker or poet is one who helps unlock the strength that all have. They help people to see what is going on everywhere. Insofar as they attract followers who need to believe that their "leaders" are oracular, they have failed. To expose the illegitimacy of the entrenched established system could be to foment a worse situation and to cause greater pain to no avail, if <u>all</u> that occurs is a "transference" of authority. I interpret Heidegger's later work in part as an attempt to redress some of the apparent dangers of his earlier work which replaces the authority of "the system"

"Der (geheure) Aufenthalt ist dem Menschen das Offene für die Anwesung des Gottes (de Un-geheuren)." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 187.

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only with abysmal freedom (for the project of the world is not yet credible). This doesn't mean that he moved from being revolutionary to being "evolutionary". It was more like moving from being a "libertarian" or "gnostic" revolutionary (at least in effect, or by default) to being a more "down to earth" revolutionary. He came to see the limits of his work as a thinker, which is only part of what is occurring. The questioning thinker cooperates with those who establish, in the accomplishment of Being. He does not establish himself. Establishing is done by poets, workers, historians, scientists and rulers. One of the compelling meanings of "the step back" is the realization that everything doesn't depend on you. "What is revolutionary", Heidegger suggests in the conversation, is entering into the essence of what is occurring: this is the encounter of planetary technique by modern man. The word "revolutionary" then does not have for him the meaning of "violent overthrow of the existing system". But his use of the word also does not exclude such an event as part of what will occur in "what is revolutionary". There is some evidence that Heidegger believes that sudden changes must occur and that time suddenly becomes ripe for "ontic" changes which consummate "what is revolutionary". There is for example the state-78 ment in "The Thing" that the world "worlds" suddenly presumably.

Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), p. 178ff.

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The point I want to make here is that the change from early to later thought is a move away from the revolution of the few toward the revolution which is occurring. This is in part how I read his appreciation of Heraclitus' fragment.

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In the <u>Introduction into Metaphysics</u>, Heidegger portrays the human part of the "unconcealment" of the TTojlls as a joint effort of poet, thinker, priest and ruler. These four <u>each in</u> <u>their own way</u> help to build the dwelling place of man. Though the task of thinking changed along with its relation to poetry, and though the relation of poet and thinker to ruler and priest seems to "drop out of sight", Heidegger clearly <u>continued</u> this early task in the later works; he continued to contribute <u>his part</u> in building the dwelling place of man, the region of the truth of Being, the free.

F. What remains to be said?

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In the epilogue, conversation and letter, several outlines have appeared which indicate the structure of the unfolding of the truth of Being. The phrase "freedom of sacrifice" suggested the possibility that work might focus this unfolding. At several points it became clear that production, thoughtful and poetic, might complete the picture. The account of the region and its regioning in the conversation mentions not only man as part of the regioning

Martin Heidegger, <u>Einführung in die Metaphysik</u> (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953).

but also <u>thing</u>. But again this matter is not taken up at length because other concerns are uppermost. The word "being" (Seiendes) does not appear very often in the later works. The reason is that beings are being considered as "things" in the nearness of Being. The later stance which I have suggested is stabilized in 1949, tries to restore an appreciation of immediate objects and the way in which things (and thus the nearness of Being) announce themselves in this time. Until this final step is taken, the Being of beings which Heidegger called "Seyn" in 1949, is not being unfolded. The world is neither "this worldly" nor "other worldly", this was made clear in the letter. But the world is not being unfolded until it is seen as the "thinging" of the things.

The works between 1943 and 1949 can be seen as the rethinking of what <u>thought</u> is and where it is, in the light of the encounter with Hölderlin. With regard to freedom the rethinking is summed up in the thesis that freedom saves its essence in the region of the truth of Being, in the free. The task of this thesis is, however, to discover the relation of freedom and <u>the fourfold</u> of earth and sky, mortals and gods. The three chapters which follow unfold the richness of <u>Hölderlin's word</u> as well, that the mirrorplay of the fourfold which is mediated in the things, rules and binds into the free and sets us free into our own.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE FREE AND THE FOURFOLD IN "THE THING"

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE FREE AND THE FOURFOLD IN "THE THING"

INTRODUCTION

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1. The thing in the horizon of ecstatic time and the fourfold.

Heidegger delivered the lecture called "The Thing" in Munich in 1950. It was originally one of four works composed in 1949 and grouped together under the title of "A look into what is". Two of the other works are examined briefly in chapter seven. "The Thing" is the first published work in which the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and gods becomes explicit and predominant. In this chapter for the first time the <u>whole</u> theme of freedom, the free and the fourfold appears. Chapters six and seven cover the same theme in its complete form with different emphases; they do not add decisive new factors.

The title of the lecture is "The Thing". But the thing does not isolate itself to be examined apart from that in which it stands. Nor can it be abstracted from its relation to us. We perceive it; it impinges on us. Heidegger begins therefore by asking what

All the references to this work are taken from Martin Heidegger, <u>Vorträge und Aufsätze</u> (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), pp. 163-186.

nearness is or what "the near" is. How does it stand with the near? This, it appears, is the proper way to ask after the things; they are the essence of the near, when essence is understood verbally (just as the verb "is" in the question "what <u>is</u> the near?" is understood) and means the way in which the near rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines. The near does not let itself be experienced immediately; therefore we ask about it by examining what is in it, the thing.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that at this time, according to Heidegger, things are experienced "once removed" so to speak. They are experienced insofar as they are denied an appearance. This denial is not mere nothing but rather the way in which the thing rules in that which denies it an appearance. Thus nearness or the near is doubly removed; it rules via things which rule in being denied an appearance. All of this must be kept in mind during the examination of the thing, (a pitcher), which Heidegger undertakes. This pitcher he describes is not a nostalgic or utopian dream. It is not the pitcher as the Greeks experienced it. Nor is the merely the pitcher as we one day may experience it. And to exclude these two possibilities does not leave the conclusion that Heidegger is describing the actual pitcher we often use currently, which we, poor fools, thought was "just a pitcher". Heidegger is saying that the actual pitcher we all know is an "object" which is ruled by the thing whose appearance is denied in it. The object is merely present.

Its past and future are only former and future "being present". Once this object is seen in the context of the zone of ecstatically open time, the past and future reference are no longer merely nostalgic or utopian; they impinge, in the way of what is no-longer and not-yet. The impinging of what is no longer and what is not yet is the ruling of what is denied an appearance, and thus the real or actual pitcher is not covered over or mystified but rather completed in the whole context in which it stands.

The zone of ecstatic openness which "completes" the object is what Heidegger calls "the far" or "farness". He points out 2 that when nearness "remains out", farness also "remains away". When we think only in terms of objects, we ignore "the far" which is itself the side of "the near" turned toward us. Heidegger's examination of the pitcher as a <u>thing</u>, first draws out its relation to "the far", the temporal <u>threefold</u>, which is the continuing appearance of free transcending, now "embedded in the thing", rather than abstracted as the horizon of questioning. The examination then proceeds via the emptiness of the pitcher which does its holding, to "the near"; the <u>fourfold</u> of earth, sky, mortals and gods is gathered in the gift of the pitcher's outpoured water or wine. The mirror play of the fourfold is said to bind into "the free".

"Was ist die Nähe, wenn mit ihrem Ausbleiben auch die Ferne wegbleibt?" Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u> . . ., p. 164.

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"Das ins Freie bindende Spiegeln ist das Spiel, das jedes der Vier jedem zutraut aus dem faltenden Halt der Vereignung." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 1**%2**. It thus becomes clearer and more concrete how "freedom saving its essence in the free, in the region of the truth of Being" involves the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and gods.

Heidegger is now solving the problem which he posed in <u>The</u> <u>Essence of Ground</u>, when he expressed some dissatisfaction with Aristotle's rendering of the whole matter of "first principles" (or grounds) and "causes" (or occasions). The problems at that time concerned the unity of the threefold of " $\stackrel{\sim}{\approx} \rho \chi \alpha \iota$ ", the unity of the fourfold of " $\stackrel{\sim}{\alpha} \iota \tau \iota \alpha$ ", which were also all called " $\stackrel{\sim}{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha \iota$ ", and the relation of the two divisions and thus the relation of all seven "origins". (In short, the question of Being). The task of <u>The Essence of Ground</u> was to rethink the threefold as the <u>horizon</u> of both the threefold and fourfold. The crucial member of the threefold, <u>establishing</u>, which involved "the project of the world" was forced by the limit of the task of the moment, to remain empty. The threefold could not stand without the fourfold which gives content to the project of the world.

Now in <u>The Thing</u>, both threefold and fourfold are unfolded together. They operate together in the thing, the pitcher. Heidegger expresses this when he states that "the thing things the world". Both freedom and determination are described together as they occur in the operation of things. Freedom survives because determination occurs in a way which needs work and struggle and thus leeway is

"Das Ding dingt Welt.", Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 179.

4

given. We are directed through the way on which we go and through the need in which we stand.

2. The mode of argument and the use of language in "The Thing".

In this lecture, as Heidegger puts it, the truth of Being is I have tried to show some of the temporal and regional unfolded. implications of this change which is the result of "the turn" in Heidegger's thought. The change shows itself in the mode of argument and the use of language. The way in which "the world" is "credible" or rings true for Heidegger in these later works shows itself differently than the usual sort of reasoned argument. The kind of credibility which was lacking in The Essence of Ground is itself found wanting, and the new kind of credibility shows itself in a certain relationship to language. This does not mean that reason and argument are abandoned for murky half-poetic assertion. Just as the object is not replaced by "the far" and "the near", so the clarity of speech as it is now used is not abandoned when this is brought into connection with its whole context, what the words have named and can name.

Heidegger's style and method changes to introduce more and more etymological material. It is no accident that this lecture includes crucial forays into the history of words and also a 5 definitive statement on the use of etymology. The outstanding

Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 173.

examination of the whole meaning of a word is the one into the word "thing" itself, which opens our awareness of the original <u>verbal</u> meaning of the word and the way in which this old meaning is related to the current frozen objective meaning of the word.

And, I have found that my own style benefitted from following Heidegger in the introduction of more etymological material. The dangers of such a change are to slip into archaisms without noticing it or to ride roughshod over the current meanings of words in the name of "old and true" meanings. This is certainly not Heidegger's intention, as he clearly states; nor is it mine. Heidegger is careful about the difference between what has been and what is present, at the same time as he declares them to be contemporaneous. If we live only within and through language in its current meaning, we confine ourselves to a thin surface meaning, to the experience of ourselves and of our immediate forefathers. Looking at the whole meaning, we share the experience of all since the dawn. What language is, also includes its changes and thus the reality of our immediate understanding of it. To this also we have to be true.

A. The absence of the near and the far and the hydrogen holocaust

Heidegger begins the lecture, pointing out that what he means by "nearness" or "the near" is not to be confused with the radical shortening of distances in time and space which is accomplished with modern technique. The state of "distancelessness" which

technique achieves is a denial of appearance of both the far and the near as Heidegger sees these. If a hydrogen holocaust were to occur, it would only confirm this state of affairs.

> "Is not this merging of everything into the distanceless more uncanny (unheimlich) than everything bursting apart?"⁶

Heidegger uses the word "unheimlich" in a literal as well as current sense. "Uncanny" means "un-home-like". This negation of "home-like" is however evidence of a sort for what is home-like. Thus the absence of the far and the near, this uncanny distancelessness, this <u>homelessness</u> of which holocaust would be a consummation; this is what is occurring in this time. When we accept this as such, that it is not occurring <u>merely</u> because of our human failures, then we can hear how it is that the far and the near also rule this time. The near is failing to come near, the far is not experienced; this completes the state of homelessness or distancelessness.

B. What the pitcher is, as a thing rather than merely as an 7 object. The threefold, the emptiness and the fourfold.

6

Heidegger asks us to consider a pitcher or a jug (Krug).

"Ist das Zusammenrücken in das Abstandlose nicht noch unheimlicher als ein Auseinanderplatzen von allem?" Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 164.

The examination of the pitcher is on p. 164ff.

If we let the pitcher "speak for itself" (its name as a thing is vessel), we can no longer describe it as an object. It does stand opposite us, but that is not what it is as a thing. That it is represented by us or made by us also misses its "thinghood". It is a "vessel" (ein Gef) which means it grasps (fast) or holds. But what does the grasping or holding? According to Heidegger it is the empty space or emptiness (die Leere) which is shaped by the bottom and sides of the pitcher. Just as the thing is not an object, the emptiness is not a "vacuum". What is true of this emptiness is not exhausted by describing it scientifically as "absence of matter". According to science, if there is no "liquid" in the jug, then there is a "gas"; if no gas, there is an artificially induced vacuum. With its exact representation of the pitcher and its emptiness, science says something quite obviously correct, which annihilates "things" from the start. Science participates in the rule of distancelessness. Our familiarity with and acceptance of this way of thinking which compels thinks to be objects and water and wine to be liquids, is uncanny in two ways, for Heidegger: (These two ways correspond to what has been called previously the double concealment, the rule of mystery in error, the double need and the double level of negation.) (1) The rule of scientific thinking maintains the delusion that it alone gives knowledge. (2) At the same time, the predominance of scientific

thinking allows the deeper delusion to flourish (usually unwittingly) that things would come near if we stopped annihilating them with science.

The fact that things do not come near is not a function merely of <u>our</u> activity, positive or negative. To put this in more popular terms: we are deluded if we think that we can set things right merely by putting different, good people in charge of the technical system. In the terms of this thesis, that is why the first step from "the acceptance of objects" to the freedom which grounds them (the far), needs to be completed with the step from freedom to the rule of mystery to the double-level, negative way in which the region of the truth of Being prevails.

The emptiness does the holding and so it must lead to the pitcher's essence which is being a vessel. Heidegger looks carefully at what holding is and suggests that it is the gathering of taking, keeping and pouring out (nehmen, behalten, ausgießen). The holding consists in both the capability of taking in what will be poured into the pitcher and the ability to retain what was poured in. Pouring out is the unity of these two; it is what the pitcher is fitted for. Holding (future and past) occur in the giving of the outpouring. As the holding by the pitcher's emptiness, Heidegger has drawn once again the temporal threefold. The juxtaposition of 'the three verbs which constitute "gathering" is strikingly similar

to the threefold grounding in <u>The Essence of Ground</u>. In each case the three ecstasies of time are involved. That this is not a far-fetched correspondence is indicated in the word "tense" from the Latin "tenere" (to hold, grasp, have, keep).

There are three obvious differences in the threefold as it appears in the holding of "the thing". In The Essence of Ground the third unifying member of the triad which corresponds to the present tense (or ecstasy), is "founding" (Begründen). In "The Thing" it is "pouring out" as a giving. The change from founding to giving is a function of the completion of the far in the near and it will be made clearer in the discussion of "the world" later in this chapter. The second change concerns a reversal of verbs and tenses which has occurred after the early work. In The Essence of Ground, "taking ground" (Boden nehmen) has a past reference. We find ourselves situated in the midst of things created in the past. In tension and contrast, the project of world which establishes (stiftet), looks to the future. After his encounter with Holderlin, Heidegger came to see "taking ground" as the saying of what is not-yet experienced as the essence of what is occurring. Establishing, he came to see as naming what remains, or what is no longer experienced in the essence of what is occurring. Thus in The Thing holding as "taking in" has a future reference and as "keeping", a past reference. The third change is a result of the later stage in Heidegger's thinking, which I have

called the stance of 1949, which restores a part to the present tense as well. The emphasis is not only on the far, or on the far and the near, but now on the far and the near embedded in the thing.

Taking and keeping are for the outpouring which is a giving out (aus schenken). The two "gather themselves" in the third. This verb "sich versammeln", expresses the first great discovery about the nature of the thing. It gathers the three tenses. In 8 the opening passage of Patmos, which is so crucial for Heidegger, Hölderlin mentions that the "peaks of time" are gathered and the "dear ones dwell <u>near</u> to each other on mountains farthest apart". It is obvious therefore that Hofstadter should not have omitted

> "Near and Hard to grasp is the God But where danger is That which sayes also grows. In the darkness dwell The eagles and fearless The sons of the Alps go out over the abyss On lightly built bridges. Therefore since massed around are The peaks of time And the dear ones dwell near to one another, Tired on mountains farthest apart, Grant innocent water, O give us wings, to go over Loyal-mindedly and return."

8

This passage is quoted in "Heimkunft/An die Verwandten", Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, 4th edition (Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1971), p. 21. 9

Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, transl. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 172. the mountain "analogy" in the crucial naming which goes as follows:

"We call the gathering of mountains, the mountain range (das Gebirge). We call the gathering of the twofold holding into the outpouring, which as a being together, first constitutes the full presence of giving: the poured gift (das Geschenk)."¹⁰

The threefold gathering of future past and present provides the vessel with its holding which is for a giving. (The gathering of thinker and poet brings back to language its future and past heritage.) But the gift also includes what is given out, what is taken in, retained and given out, namely the water and wine. The emptiness gathers not only the holding but what is held, the gift of water and wine.

We are about to see how freedom saves its essence in the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and gods. We do not appreciate the poured gifts of water and wine unless we see them whole, see them together with their sources. Water is the gift of the marriage of sky and earth. Rain and dew fall, mingle with rock and earth to yield spring water. Similarly with wine. The way Heidegger expresses "the presence" of the earth and the sky in the water and wine is the verb "weilen", which is difficult to render in English. The earth and the sky "dwell" or "while" or "rest" in the water and wine. An analogy might help but also it has limits. The water or wine we

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[&]quot;Wir nennen die Versammlung der Berge das Gebirge. Wir nennen die Versammlung des zwiefachen Fassens in das Ausgieben, die als Zusammen erst das volle Wesen des Schenkens ausmacht: das Geschenk." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 170.

pour didn't just happen. Someone fetched it from the well or tended the vines or worked in the filtration plant. Their work dwells in the water or wine. The earth and the sky stay on in the water and wine and this is what "stays us" (verweilt uns) or gives us a place or a while (eine Weile).

The gathering of earth and sky might be acceptable to many after they have stifled their "natural" propensity (born of the scientific spirit) to suspect such semi-poetic talk. A more difficult step is the gathering of the other two members of the fourfold. The poured gift not only gathers the mortals (the humans); it gathers the gods. As a drink (Trunk) which quenches (stills, quiets, stays) thirst, and heightens communality, the gift gathers the humans to the earth and sky.

"But sometimes, the pitcher's gift is also given for consecration (zur Weihe)."¹¹

The libation is not a derivative form. The deepest meaning which rests in the "gush" of the outpouring wine as gift and giving is the stilling of the celebration of the feast of the gods. Drink for us is the "echo" of libation to the gods! Heidegger illustrates this close connection in the use of the words "Trunk" (a drink which quenches thirst) and "Trank" (a celebratory drink in which the giving to the mortals present is first of all appreciated as giving

"Aber das Geschenk des Kruges wird bisweilen auch zur Weihe geschenkt." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 171.

11

back to the immortals what they have given). (The closest of parallels may be drawn with the difference between speaking and invoking (celebratory speaking).

The history of the words "Trank" and "Trunk" records the fact that we humans experienced the matter as Heidegger puts it forward. We "naturally" tend to think that libation is an analogous formal ritual and thus a "mystification". Such a view rests mainly on the "scientific-historical" attempt to discredit religion as a "projection", using the argument of historical genesis. This argument can be refuted from the history of language, but that isn't the main point here. Heidegger wants to assert nothing less than the fact that we cannot appreciate drinking as what it is, a gift, without also seeing its origin and fulfillment in libation.

Examples from the history of language only help us to understand the whole experience in question. In English the matter (which appears in the relation of "Trunk" and "Trank") is more difficult, but the record lies in the word "drench". As a verb in old English, it meant "to <u>give</u> to drink". Klein reports that ". . "drank-jan" [is the] causative of "drincan" (to drink)". The verb "tränken" in German, similar to the English "drench", survives with the meanings: (1) to water (animals) (2) to soak, steep, drench. The "drenching" of plants and animals, now is

conceived as "giving ourselves a drink". Originally this drenching was known to be the "echo" of the rain's drenching of the earth and hence all of us. Libation is "giving back what is given"; it acknowledges the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and gods in the gift of water and wine. The root meaning of the German "Gu&" (gush) is sacrifice. The Indo-European root "*ghu-" means to offer in sacrifice (Opfer). The same root, in its meaning of "to invoke" is the origin of the Germanic words "Gott" and "God".

The fourfold is gathered. Heidegger sums it up as follows:

"In the gift of the outpouring, earth and sky gods and mortals dwell <u>together all at once</u>. These four, at one because of what they themselves are, belong together. Preceding everything that is present, they are enfolded into a single fourfold."¹²

The pitcher as a thing stands at the point of convergence of the four. The gift of the gush is a gift because it "stays" (verweilt) the four. It actively appropriates (ereignet) them. It gathers them. The move from "weilen" to "verweilen" should dispell the possible impression that "origins" linger on passively. On the contrary, Heidegger is suggesting that they still <u>preserve</u> us, just as truth preserves and warrants rather than being something which

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[&]quot;Im Geschenk des Gusses weilen <u>zumal</u> Erde und Himmel, die Göttlichen und die Sterblichen. Diese Vier gehören, von sich her einig, zusammen. Sie sind, allem Anwesenden zu vorkommend, in ein einziges Geviert eingefaltet." Heidegger, Vorträge, pp. 171-2.

"just lies there" waiting to be uncovered. We know the gift as such when we know that we, as one of the four, are appropriated or "stayed" into the jug's gift.

> "The essence of the pitcher is the pure giving gathering of the onefold fourfold into a while."¹³

The threefold holding (freedom) enables the nothing to hold the gift which holds or stays (the free). To stay (verweilen) is to "provide a region", just as "verwahren" means to preserve in the sense of enclosing or providing limits. The region in this case then, is called "eine Weile", a while, a place in time. The staying (Verweilen) is said to be "gathering-appropriating". Just as mountains gather in ranges, the fourfold gathers itself in things and thus provides the region. The thing is a gift which <u>gathersitself</u>. Our participation, it would seem, is a cooperation in the operation whereby the fourfold mediates itself in the thing. This gathering movement begins to make clear why Heidegger begins to speak of the thing verbally. The thing "things"; it gathers.

C. The relation of thing as inanimate object to the "verbal" thing, with the help of thought and etymology.

To speak of a thing "thinging" seems at first to be the height of mystification. (Almost as bad as "the nothing nothings".) We

[&]quot;Das Wesen des Kruges ist die reine schenkende Versammlung des einfaltigen Gevierts in eine Weile". Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 172.

find this mystifying primarily because we have been accustomed for so long to think of "things" as inanimate objects. How is it that these two radically different ways of thinking about thing still use this same word? Heidegger introduces a discussion of several words, Greek, Latin, French, Italian, German and English, which draw out the relation between object-thing and verbal-thing.

The old high German word "thing" meant "a gathering to deliberate a contested matter". It seems that the event of the gathering of deliberaters was called "the thing". Heidegger focusses rather on what gathered them, what "caused" them to come together. It is this factor of "gathering" alone, that is his <u>concern with the old word</u>. He is not <u>arbitrarily</u> dredging up an old word and suggesting that it be revived to replace thing as object. The factor of "gathering" is drawn out because thought about the matter remains guided by what has already been in process and has been called the "gathering-appropriating" staying of the fourfold. Heidegger seems to suggest here that the old word referred to the gathering of the people, but that this gathering is one quarter of the fourfold's gathering of itself in the thing.

People are gathered by matters which have a bearing on them, which are pertinent, which concern them. These are matters of <u>discourse</u> which translates the German of matters which stand "in Rede". The connection is made here with the Greek " $\mathcal{E}(\mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{U}})$ " (to deliberate)

and with the Roman "res" (a matter for discourse). The Latin "causa" is almost synonomous with "res". Its primary meaning survives in the French "la chose", and the English "case". The normal understanding of "cause" and "causality" are derivative.

"Only because "causa", almost synonomously with "res", means "the case", can the word "causa" later come to mean cause in the sense of the causality of an effect."¹⁴

The thing gathers the other three at the same time as it gathers us to deliberate about what matters in it. Heidegger introduces deliberation into this matter with two things in mind. What the thing is, in part, needs us to say it. At the same time saying properly hides and preserves (it denies) what it says.

The current English "thing" retains, sometimes, the full meaning of the Roman "res" as, for example, in a statement such as "he knows how to handle things" (that is, what matters to him). But, we still need to understand how the word thing can be used that way, and also as "frozen inanimate object". According to Heidegger, Roman thought allowed the meaning of the "realitas" of "res" to be confused with and then submerged in the meaning of "ens" (from the Greek "ow") meaning "what is present". The meaning of what concerns and thus gathers humans is buried under the result, the presence of what gathers. The relation between things and man

"Nur weil causa, fast gleichbedeutend mit res, den Fall bedeutet, kann in der Folge das Wort causa zur Bedeutung von Ursache gelangen, im Sinne der Kausalität einer Wirkung." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 174.

is buried under the presence of things, separated from man. (What impinges and how it impinges is submerged under the impinging.)

The same change occurs with the German "thing" or "dinc". "Thing" becomes universally applicable for anything that is, in any way. In this way the word is gradually abstracted from the engagement of humans and the region, and then it becomes possible for a "thing" to be a figment of the mind, an "ens rationis". For example, Heidegger cites Kant's use of thing as something which is, that is, something which is represented as an object (Gegenstand) 15 by human self-consciousness. The Kantian "thing in itself" (Ding an sich) seems to contradict this assertion but, for Heidegger, this "concept" is tacked on to the primary concept of "Gegenstand" and thus it is essentially meaningless, something which "stands opposite" with "no opposite" (ein Gegenstand-an-sich). We can speculate that the "thing in itself" is one way in which Kant continues to appreciate that which lies beyond our finite knowing. Heidegger is suggesting that it is no longer adequate, and the rethinking of what is un-

Here, as elsewhere, it must be noted that the difficult matter of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant cannot be debated in this thesis. In this instance, the example Heidegger uses is cited not to "score a point" against Kant, but to show what Heidegger means about the changing use of the word "thing" and what he thinks is Kant's part in this use.

unspeakable must include as well a rethinking of the phenomenal or speakable realm. The consideration of "the thing" has both "sides" in mind.

Heidegger's use of etymology in the investigation of some of the words pertaining to "the thing", has obviously not been unrestrained word mysticism or nostalgic antiquarianism. The old words and the current words are approached under the guidance of what matter is at hand. The old meanings and the current meanings are approached thoughtfully.

> "The truth then, here and elsewhere, is not that our thinking lives on etymology, but rather that etymology remains directed first to give thought to the essential content involved in what dictionary words (die Wörter) as words (als Worte), name in a way which is not unfolded."¹⁶

The second use of "words" takes in the past and future heritage of a word, the named and the nameable as well as the name.

D. (1) The thing as the ruling, self governing, unfolding and declining of the near. (2) The gods and (3) the mortals.

(1) After the inanimate object-thing is seen in the context of the <u>verbal</u> thing, Heidegger proceeds to a detailed consideration of the thing as the nearing of the fourfold. The thing is the ruling, self-governing, unfolding and declining of the near. It is the

¹⁶ "In Wahrheit steht es darum hier und in den Übrigen Fällen nicht so, da³ unser Denken von der Etymologie lebt, sondern da³ die Etymologie darauf verwiesen bleibt, zuror die Wesensverhalte dessen zu bedenken, was die Wörter als Worte unentfaltet nennen." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 173.

nearing of the near in which the far is not replaced but rather is preserved. My concern in this section is to make clear especially what this essence of near means in terms of the mortals and the gods. (In chapter seven, the earth and the sky are given their due.) The question in a thesis about freedom and the fourfold, must be: What has happened to man as a ruling, self-governing unfolding and declining of <u>the far</u>, in this essence of the near? Is our freedom and our experience (Er<u>fah</u>rung) declared to be illusory, or merely a means of access soon to be superseded once and for all by a solution?

The earth preserves us by bearing us and nourishing us. The sky covers us; it is the path of the sun, moon and stars, the seasons, the changes of light and dark, the clouds and the blue. Heidegger carefully notes that we cannot speak of any of the four 17 without at the same time thinking of the other three. This point is reiterated faithfully after <u>each</u> of the four; for my purposes it is especially important that it is true of both men and gods. Heidegger wants to avoid both human and divine transcendence. It is a mistake to "begin with" either God or man's horizon and then ground the other in terms of the first.

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For example: "Sagen wir: die Sterblichen, dann denken wir die anderen Drei mit aus der Einfalt der Vier". Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 177.

(2) The gods or the "god-like" are called the beckoning messengers of "godhood" (die winkenden Boten der Gottheit). Drawing from clues in other works, I assume that "godhood" (which is usually translated "divinity"), means "the essence of God" and thus could be rendered as "the ruling, self-governing, unfolding and declining of God". "God" means, probably, "the one invoked (called)" or "the one to whom sacrifice is offerred (poured)" from the Indo-European roots "*gheu-" and "*ghau-". Both invocation and sacrifice contain affirmation and negation together. The one who is invoked is both "said" and denied a hearing (because it is also unspeakable). The essence of God is thus called "the hidden ruling of the god-like".

"Die Göttlichen" is translated as "the divinities" by 18 Hofstadter. I choose rather the "gods" or "the god-like" because the root meaning of "Gott" and "God" is closer to Heidegger's intention than that of "divinity". The word "Gott" was originally neuter (and thus both male and female), but with the coming of Christianity, it was changed to masculine "der Gott" and "der Herr Gott". In contrast the words "divine", "divinity" and "deity" all come from the Latin "deus" which comes from the Greek " $\Delta \zeta \circ \varsigma$ " (Zeus), which has the same roots as the old Indian "dyauh" (heaven, god of heaven). All these words derive from the Indo-European base "*dei-" (to shine) whence also comes a host of words meaning "day,

Heidegger, Poetry . . ., transl. A Hofstadter, p. 178f.

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heaven, visible, clear". Heidegger's attachment to Antigone indicates the degree to which he would restore awareness of the gods of the earth. And according to Hölderlin and Heidegger, we live in the time of the world's <u>night</u>.

But this point should not be overemphasized; Heidegger sometimes calls the gods "die Himmlischen" (the sky-like, "the coverers") as well as "the immortals" and "the god-like". But gods, however sky-like, are also earth-like and "human", according to the statement that the four are never apart. Humans are sometimes called "the sons of the earth" by Hölderlin. This difficult matter of the special relation of gods to sky and mortals to earth is taken up in chapter seven.

In "The Thing" Heidegger states:

"Out of the hidden ruling of these [the god-like] God emerges (erscheint) into his essence . . [ruling, self-governing, unfolding and declining]."¹⁹

And in a parallel passage in "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", he states:

"Out of the holy ruling of these, God emerges in his presence (Gegenwart) or he withdraws (himself) into his concealment."²⁰

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"Aus dem verborgenen Walten dieser erscheint der Gott in sein Wesen . . ." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 177.

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"Aus dem heiligen Walten dieser erscheint der Gott in seine Gegenwart oder er entzieht sich in seine Verhüllung." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 150. In some way, God approaches and withdraws "out of" the approaching and fleeing of the gods. This back and forth quality of the godlike is expressed with the word "winken" (to beckon or signal). The beacon shines and speaks for that which is hidden. "Der Bote" is usually translated "messenger" but Heidegger wishes to convey much more than this. The verb "bieten" (to <u>offer</u>, bid) and the word "Gebiet" moved from "order, jurisdiction" to "region (Bereich) over which the power of the order stretched". The gods, in their beckoning define a region within which we can be at home. HBIderlin called the gods the angels of the house (earth) and the 21 angels of the year (sky) in the poem "Homecoming".

Heidegger notes that their way of emerging removes God and 22 gods from comparison to what is present (das Anwesende). In "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", God, when he emerges, is said to emerge into his "preserving opposite" (sein Gegenwart). The "hidden rule" must provide the key to these different meanings of "present". The essence of God (Wesen) is not presence (<u>Anwesen</u>). The presence of God as "granting himself or preserving, opposite" allows the possibility of withdrawing into concealment (and still ruling in this withdrawal). Because the gods and God rule in withdrawal as the holy night, freedom does not dissolve in the essence of the

21 Hiedegger, <u>Erlåuterungen</u> . . ., p. 11. 22 ". . . das ihn jedem Vergleich mit dem Anwesenden entzieht." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 177.

near. Freedom as the essence of the far saves its essence in the essence of the near. The region is given in a way which presents us with a task, with the <u>need</u> for <u>work</u> and sacrifice. Our freedom is a response to this need.

(3) As the fourth member of the fourfold, Heidegger calls humans "the mortals" (die Sterblichen). In "The Thing" Heidegger states his mature doctrine of man. In The Essence of Ground, man was called an "essence of the far" (Wesen der Ferne). The ruling and unfolding of the far was described as the threefold "freedom toward the ground". In Being and Time, this was called, among other 24 things, "freedom toward death". In the context of the discussion of the thing as the essence of the near, it becomes clearer what "the ground" and "death" are about in this freedom. Death liberates us; it frees us into our own limits. It encloses us and provides room to move. It engages us and thus gives us something to engage. If death is denied, the other is denied and we wander aimless and homeless in limitless "space". Learning to die, becoming mortal, is leaning to dwell where we are.

We may get closer to Heidegger's use of "dying" and "death" by looking at the history of the word "sterben" and some other related words. To begin with, the word refers only to humans, not to animals. Animals stop breathing, but we are "capable of death as

Martin Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u> (Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1967), pp. 60-71. 24

Martin Heidegger, <u>Sein und Zeit</u> (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927), p. 266.

death". Animals do not speak and they are not free in the complete sense. The English word "starve" has the same roots as "sterben", and it once meant die from cold as well as from hunger. Perhaps it once was as wide as "sterben". The words "stern", "strenuous", and "star" are all closely related to "starve". In German a similar group of words are related to "sterben", namely "Stern" (star), "streng" (rigorous), and "starr" (hard, stiff). All these words taken together indicate for "sterben" (to die) a meaning of "stiff, taut, hard, fixed" along with "strain, effort".

Clearly, this connotation is appropriate to describe "rigor mortis" occurring at the end of a life, but unless we look deeper we will see no difference between ourselves and the animals. It is just as wrong to confine death to the moment of actual expiration as it would be to confine birth, bearing and raising to a moment. These important moments are part of extended phenomena. This is not to mystify them. "Actual" death is part of a life of dying. As Heidegger says in "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", we become mortal "that there may be a good death". By this, he does not nean that we blindly focus on the inevitable end, but rather that knowing the end must come, we will "die well" if we are now doing what we must do. Awakening ourselves to the fact of death, makes us see our life as what it is.

The "actual" temporal end is not mystified. But added to

the awareness of death in this way is the awareness of death as "spatial" limit or end. Or rather, temporal and spatial connotation are merged in the idea of death as an end to our life. We necessarily are placed in one place just as we are placed in a "place" in history. We can't see beyond the horizon. We experience the world through our own particular language. But most of all: we are the mortals, we are not the gods, or the earth or the sky. Dying is both being what we are and letting the other three be <u>other</u>, be what they are.

Life is not only a linear "string of years", cut off at each end by birth and death. It is also a "sphere of influence" chopped off at its outer reaches. But a third stage is necessary to get closer to Heidegger's meaning. Life is not only surrounded by darkness spatially and temporally; it is pervaded (durchstimmt) by it. Death is inner as well as outer. It's not merely that we know who we are and there are enemies at the gates; the "enemies" are everywhere.

The pitcher's holding is done by the <u>emptiness</u> (die Leere). In the same way we are held from within, as well as surrounded, by death. This is the meaning of the statement: "Death is the shrine of nothing". We are surrounded pervaded and supported by nothing; it enshrines us. Death means that we live in a "house". We are given a temporal and spatial clearing without which we couldn't

have room to work and move. Death liberates us.

Dying is closely related to thinking which "steps back". Two passages from Heidegger's poems "From the experience of thought" illustrate this:

> "To think is to confine yourself to a single thought that one day stands still like a star in the world's sky."²⁵

"The sail of thinking keeps trimmed hard to the wind of the matter." $^{\rm 25}$

Heidegger speaks often of <u>rigour</u> in thought, and how this differs from exactitude in modern science which demands things to conform to what is calculable. Learning to die means bidding farewell to the security of the narrow confinement of "logic". This too is not the whole; it too is <u>held</u> and pervaded by nothing. Unless we call the logic of the day into question, we never give it the credit that is due it, by ignoring the whole source of what allows it to secure us.

The concern of "The Thing" is the essence of nearness or the "nearing of things". Thus the section about mortals, unlike

25

Martin Heidegger, <u>Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens</u> (Pfullingen: Neske, 1947), p. 7, p. 11.

"Denken ist die Einschränkung auf einen Gedanken, der einst wie ein Stern am Himmel der Welt stehen bleibt."

"Das Denken bleibt hart am Wind der Sache."

the somewhat different parallel passage in "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" is primarily about humans insofar as they are <u>conditioned</u>, as they receive Being, insofar as they are bound. In "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" the humans are considered still <u>in</u> and as <u>relation</u> to Being, but the emphasis shifts to <u>their</u> "task" of building, dwelling thinking, as <u>sparing</u> (schonen) the fourfold.

Heidegger calls death "the shrine of nothing" (der Schrein des Nichts). Death surrounds and pervades us; as nothing, it enshrines us. The genitive here means "by nothing" as well as "for nothing"; death as nothing enshrines, therefore death enshrines nothing. "Schrein" means a "container" or "holder", usually a box or chest of some sort. At one time it meant especially a coffin. The "Schreiner" was the coffin maker. This word now means in South Germany, a cabinet maker or carpenter. Along with its associations with death, through coffin-making, the word also carries a connotation of the sacred, <u>mystery</u> and secrecy. It is related to the Latin "scrinium" which has similar meanings. The old English word "scrin"

See Appendix at the end of chapter six.

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meant "the Ark of the Covenant". Ark comes from "arcanum" (a secret or mystery enclosed in a chest), from the Latin "arcere" (to enclose, ward off), cognate with the Greek, " $\vec{\alpha}\rho \ltimes \hat{\epsilon} \iota \Upsilon$ " (to keep off), and " $\vec{\alpha}\rho \ltimes \hat{\iota} \circ \zeta$ " (safe, sure).

By calling death as nothing a "shrine", Heidegger indicates that it contains, encloses, and protects by warding off; it secures and makes us safe, at the same time as it preserves mystery:

> "Death is the shrine of the nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that is merely a being, but which nevertheless prevails, even as the mystery of Being itself."²⁷

This passage deserves careful attention because it is strikingly similar to the altered passage of the epilogue to "What Is Metaphysics?". The appearance of the important word "mere" (blog) signals the change which assures us that death is not a complete parting with beings, i.e. a complete negation of beings in the name of Being. "Being itself" can no longer be falsely construed to base a kind of dangerous "libertarianism". Being itself is "Seyn", the ruling and unfolding of the Being of beings, since Being never prevails without beings. Nothing, of which death is the shrine, "is never something that is <u>merely</u> a being". That means that it prevails through beings as well as being other than them. The far and the near are embedded in the thing. The threefold holding and the fourfold holding are woven together by the holding of death.

"Der Tod ist der Schrein des Nichts, dessen nämlich, was in aller Hinsicht niemals etwas bloß Seiendes ist, was aber gleichwchl west, sogar als das Geheimnis des Seins selbst." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 177.

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The phrase "shrine of the nothing" means that death as the nothing operates by enshrining. This might be called the stance of Heidegger "after the turn". Death is here "completed" in the context of the thing as the essence of the near. At the same time, the phrase continues to mean also that death enshrines the nothing in the sense that without death, the nothing could not operate. This is the position of Heidegger "before" the turn, for whom man is the essence of the far. After the turn, we are bound into the free, but freedom continues to be the necessary access which enables us to be bound. Freedom participates in the production of what binds it. Production is at the same time an approach and a response. Death is at the same time a withdrawing and an enclosing. Death is the shelter of Being (das Gebirg des Seins). (1) It preserves and hides Being. (2) It is Being's way of giving shelter through the fourfold.

The important verb "bergen" is used to describe Being's sheltering and "self-sheltering". "Gebirg" is a collective noun made from this verb by Heidegger. It is related to castle (Burg) but not to mountain (Berg). The Indo-European root of "bergen" is "*bhergh-" (to preserve or to save). If we remember the use of the verb "verbergen" (to conceal), especially in the double concealment of the rule of mystery in error, we are in a position to

See appendix 2 at the end of this chapter.

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understand how Being's concealment liberates us. To conceal means to provide with a home. "Bergen" and "verbergen" are closely allied to "weilen" and "verweilen" and also to "wahren" and "verwahren".

We are a relation to Being (Ver<u>h</u><u>H</u><u>I</u>tnis) because Being holds us or shelters us. The sheltering, in which we take part, provides a "play space" or room to move. Heidegger emphasizes that we must <u>become</u> mortals. "Werden" (to become) and "wahren" (to preserve) both come from the Indo-European root "*wer-" with the respective 29 meanings of "to bend, turn, twist" and "to cover, preserve". According to Duden, the connecting link between these two meanings of the root is the activity denoted in the verb "flechten" (to plait, braid, intertwine). Originally the preserving cover was a plaited, woven tent. The plaiting, twisting and turning gathers strands (four perhaps). In the same way, as we <u>become</u> mortals by responding to the turn, we inherit a preserving enclosure.

Dying is having an end and thus allowing what is other to be what <u>it</u> is both in itself and in relation to us. One way of not being mortal is not to see other persons except as our own image of them, that is, not loving them or letting them be free, or letting them grow. In the same way our freedom can only be, along with the freedom and difference of the other three members of the fourfold, each of which prevails in its own way. Freedom saves its essence

> 29 See Appendix 1.

in the free. Where do we "leave off" and what is <u>other</u> begin (now thinking spatially as well as temporally and inwardly as well as outwardly)? We look everywhere and see only ourselves. "Giving credence" to what is not us and not a thing (nothing) as the <u>container</u>, takes into account the limits of consciousness and expressive construction. When they become properly aware of what they are, they see themselves as <u>response</u> to what is other than themselves and is given to them. The response is to what is <u>needed</u>.

Heidegger's "change" from "rational animal" to "mortal" can be appreciated in that way. When he speaks of the step back from thinking which calculates and represents, to thinking which responds and recalls, he does not substitute "thinking animal" for "rational animal". Both elements of the ancient name for humans merge and change in "mortal". By calling ourselves "animals" we define ourselves as <u>living</u> beings. The exclusive focus on life conceives death merely in terms of life, namely as an abrupt end to it. Heidegger wants to point out that such a conception cuts us off from all that is other than us, which preserves bases and supports us. It cuts us off from <u>relation</u> to (by) Being, whereby death as nothing encloses and pervades us. We need to die to live. Calling ourselves animals, we obscure the basis and concentrate on the "expression", life.

Heidegger is neither anti-rational nor anti-life because he

calls us "the mortals" rather than the "rational animals". The difference that this dual name ("rational animal") implies is retained, but the difference is based in a deeper sameness. This can be closely related to other famous pairs: "QUTIS" and "METAQUIT,", science and thought, determination and freedom, is and ought, nature and history, nature and culture. The leeway that has existed between accepting and changing (rejecting) (as expressed in the dual "rational animal") is not lost in "mortal". The leeway is given; we are bound into it through the mirror-play of the fourfold which needs man as one of the four. He can respond in error or in mystery. The mirror play "needs" man. The earth, sky and gods claim us each in its way in the thinging of things. "Need" here has the double sense of active, transitive conditioning and determining (the essence of the near) and also of reaching out in need, want, lack (the essence of the far). The way this needing occurs is the rule of mystery in error. The rule is hidden; the voice is "soundless"; we are set free into our own. This is the way

the need in which we turn determines us and frees us. The fourfold needs the pitcher as the gathering of itself; it is not that we need a pitcher and then use the four to gather it.

- E. (1) The fourfold, the free, freedom and "religion". (2) The world, and entering into the essence of transcendence.
- (1) The naming of the fourfold as four is completed and Heidegger

moves to discuss their unity and interrelation. The move leads to the first explicit mention of "the free" in the lecture. There are three sentences which bring out the relation of the fourfold, the free and freedom.

- "The appropriative mirroring sets each of the four free into its own, but it binds the free ones into the onefold of their being toward one another."
- "The mirroring binding into the free is the play that betroths each of the four to each out of the folding hold of their appropriation."
- ". . . each is expropriated, within their (mutual) appropriation, into its own."³⁰

There is a complex interrelation called a "mirror-play" without which no one member of the fourfold can be truly what it is "by itself". The interrelation gathers, preserving at the same time the fourness and the oneness of the fourfold. From our view, as one of the four, we are freed, we are bound into the free, we belong to the four as a onefold. At the same time, we are free, we have freedom, we are

"Das ereignende Spiegeln gibt jedes der Vier in sein Eigenes frei, bindet aber die Freien in die Einfalt ihres wesenhaften Zueinander."

30

"Das ins Freie bindende Spiegeln ist das Spiel, das jedes der Vier jedem zutraut aus dem faltenden Halt der Vereignung."

"Jedes der Vier ist innerhalb ihrer Vereignung . . . zu einem Eigenen enteignet." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 178. set free into our own, we belong to the four as four. The fourfold cannot be thought of as <u>merely</u> four, or as <u>merely</u> one. We mortals are appropriated into the onefold simplicity of the fugal relation; at the same time, we are "expropriated" into our own. With the words "ereignen", "enteignen", "vereignen" and "ereignis", Heidegger is trying to express the strange and difficult relation between authority and authenticity. Freedom and authenticity are not properly understood <u>merely</u> as "self-initiation", as autonomy or separateness. Rather the "self" ("eigen", "selbst", " $\alpha \sqrt[y]{UTO}$ ") as separate, can only be, because it is bound into the free and is thus set free into its own.

In <u>The Essence of Ground</u>, freedom disclosed itself as what 31 enables us to be bound. In "The Thing", the fourfold mirror play binds into the free in which freedom saves its essence. The far and the near are now together. Freedom encounters religion. According to Klein, there are two possible origins of the Latin "religio" from which our word "religion" stems; both are compatible with freedom and the fourfold as they are here related. Klein suggests that Cicero's etymology is the more likely, namely the derivation from "relegere" (to go through again in reading or in thought). This would make the meaning of "religio" literally "that which one goes over again in thought". The less probable (says Klein) but more widely accepted origin of "religio" is "religare" (to bind up, bind

Heidegger, Wegmarken, pp. 59, 60.

together). Taking these two meanings together, "religio" could mean "that which, thoughtfully appropriated, binds us".

Things, as the essence of the near, are denied an appearance. The mirror play of the fourfold binding into the free cannot be "heard" until thought of Being makes possible thought of the dimension of what is holy. After his homecoming, Hölderlin said in a letter that all the holy determining places are gathered round 32 the holy determining place where he now finds himself. This is his joy (Freude). This frees him. And in his letter to a student, Heidegger states:

"The default of God and the god-like is the essence of absence (ist Abwesenheit). This essence of absence however is not nothing, rather it is the essence of the presence, which first must be appropriated [thoughtfully] of the hidden fullness of what has been, and thus gathered, what prevails of the god-like in what is proper to the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism and in the public proclamation of the word of God by Jesus. This no-more is in itself a not-yet of the veiled arrival of its inexhaustible essence."³³

32
Martin Heidegger, Evläuterungen . . ., p. 158.
33

"Der Fehl Gottes und des Göttlichen ist Abwesenheit. Allein Abwesenheit ist nicht nichts, sondern sie ist die gerade erst anzueignende Anwesenheit der verborgenen Fülle des Gewesenen und so versammelt Wesenden, des Göttlichen im Griechentum, im Prophetisch-Jüdischen, in der Predigt Jesu. Dieses Nicht-mehr ist in sich ein Noch-nicht der vehüllten Ankunft seines unausschöpfbaren Wesens." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 183. See app**z**ndix 3 at the end of this chapter. (2) The appropriating mirror play of the fourfold is called "the world". We are now more ready to accept a statement which did not stand up in The Essence of Ground.

"World prevails in that it worlds."³⁴ In The Essence of Ground, it was stated that freedom lets the world 35 rule, but the ruling or "worlding" of this world is deliberately left not unfolded. The unfolding is postponed until the transcendental horizon of Dasein is disclosed, without which the question of Being cannot be asked. Freedom is in a threefold manner, freedom toward the ground, but the most important way of grounding is establishing, which projects the world. Because the unfolding of the fourfold is postponed, the impression is given that the world is the construction of grounding and transcending; it seems no different than a "world view", the product of freedom and imagina-The "solution" if it can be called such appears in The tion. The threefold is retained and the fourfold is unfolded as Thing. They stand together in the thing. The thing "things" the well. world, as Heidegger puts it. But the solution does not mean that the world and the fourfold have now been transcended or described as grounds along with the threefold grounds. The fourfold is not the completion of the "explanation" or "clarification" of Being. Instead, the solution is a recognition of the limits of transcending,

34 "Welt west indem sie weltet." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 178. 35 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 60. grounding, explaining and clarifying, and an entry into the <u>essence</u> of these.

The recognition of the limits of transcending is not an abandonment of it. Part of the entry into its essence is to accept that transcendence is the way that "things are" in this time. In the "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger made clear that "the transcendens 36 as such" is the way in which Being has come to language up to now. Nor is the recognition of the limits of transcending the usual "liberal" capitulation in the face of the "nameless". To enter into the essence of transcendence means to accept that transcending (metaphysics, technique, nihilism) is what is occurring but <u>also</u> to think about the whole matter (Sache) which this transcending expresses. The essence of transcending is the whole way in which it rules, governs itself unfolds and declines. Freedom saves its essence in the free.

The world as it rules in the thinging of thing includes "something" which is not clarifiable, provable or "grounded". The human will to know and to clarify may try to transcend or climb over the essence of the world but in so doing it only falls down under it. But the next move is not to see the limits of finite knowledge and busily go about clarifying everything (recognizing that this is of course limited when pushed). The next move is to

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 168.

36

appreciate what this rule of the world is also on <u>its</u> terms and to face up to the strange and difficult relation between what is unspoken and what is spoken. Only in this way will causes and grounds be fully known as what they are.

One approach to this matter of the world which is ruled out by Heidegger is the treatment of the united four as if it was a "reality" (ein <u>Wirk</u>liches), as if it were the "effect" of Heidegger's <u>work</u>, (or of anyone's). It is not anything willed, represented or expressed which explains the four "members". Also wrong, would be the treatment of the four as separate "realities" and choosing, for whatever reason, to "begin with" one of them (for example, either with "man" or with "God") and then explaining the others in terms of it. It would be just as wrong to pretend to "begin" simultaneously with four separate realities and then proceeding to conceive their interrelation. The entry into the essence of transcendence is at the same time a "critique" of various forms of <u>mere</u> transcendence which in differing ways abstract themselves from what is occurring.

Freedom and transcending are not unconditioned; they are conditioned by what matters which determines them in a way which binds them into the free and sets them free into their own. This stable position of Heidegger's comes to expression in the lecture on the thing; the pitcher allows both threefold and fourfold to

rule. And so Heidegger calls humans "the conditioned ones" or 37 "the be-thinged ones" (die Be-Dingten). This culminating point loses a lot in translation from German to English, since the German word for "to condition" is "bedingen" and a very common opinion about freedom is that it means "unconditioned" (unbedingt). A word in English which demonstrates something of the same point is "because". An argument could be made for calling humans "the becaused", especially if we remember Heidegger's discussion of the original meaning of "causa". In any case, the point is that we are <u>determined</u>, <u>defined</u>, <u>conditioned</u> by the nearing of things by the nearing of the near which does not dissolve freedom and the far, but rather fully ends it.

F. The retention and completion of free struggle in compliancy.

At the end of the lecture, in a passage of great difficulty, especially to the English reader, Heidegger considers the question of the relation of struggle and compliancy in the mirror-play of the fourfold. The passage hinges around a group of words, many of which come out of Hölderlin's poetry about the fourfold. The passage, I think, shows that Heidegger believes firmly that free struggle is not only not dissolved in the compliant fourfold, but rather is "won" or made possible as part of the whole "operation".

"Wir sind - im strengen Sinne des Wortes - die Be-Dingten." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 179.

37

To make this point, I have found it necessary to argue against what I take to be the tendency of Hofstadter's translation - to overplay compliancy at the expense of the struggle.

The "fouring" of the fourfold is called the "round dance" (Reigen). In "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky", Heidegger makes clear how important and rich this word is. In current German, the word "Reigen" calls to mind a dance performed at athletic tournaments between two long rows (Reihen) of dancers. The word "Reihentanz" often is translated "round-dance" as well. The words "Reigen" and "Reihen" are closely related, like circular and row dances. Dances performed in circle formation usually involve concentric circles as well, and thus become in a sense also "rowdances". What we call "square dances" also shift in and out of circle and row formation. And row-dances (such as the Virginia Reel) always involve circular formations both in the engagement of partners and in the engagement of the whole of the rows. "Reigen" and "Reihen" both come from the Indo-European root "*rei-" (to scratch, tear, rip, rend, split) from which the word "Riss" (rift) also comes. With the introduction of the word "Reigen", the mirror play takes on the meaning of "dance", "difference", and "reciprocal engagement". This deserves comparison with the plaiting, weaving motif which connects turning (werden) with preserving (wahren).

Heidegger states:

"Der Reigen ist der Ring, der ringt, indem er als das Spiegeln spielt."³⁸

Hofstadter translates this statement as:

"The round-dance is the ring that joins while it plays as mirroring."³⁹

An important element of struggle which the words "ringen" and "Ring" connote along with their other meanings is ignored in this rendering. According to Duden, "Ring" meant earlier the circle-formed gathered group of men, the ring-formed gathering for judging (Gerichtsversammlung). "Ringen" comes from the old high German "ringan" which means "to move in circles or back and forth; to exert oneself (sich anstrengen), to labour at (sich abmühen); to struggle (kämpfen)". The old high German "wringan" became "mixed up" with "ringan" because not only their sound but their meaning is so close. Our English words "wrench", "wring" and "wrong" come from "wringan". The meaning of "king" and "ringen" fits obviously with that of "Reigen". The joining of the fugue of the fourfold includes the battle between the new gods and the old, it includes the decision of what is holy and what unholy. There is no denying that this passage emphasizes lightness, play and pliancy but this completes the struggle, it provides room for the struggle. Heidegger and Hölderlin are talking about peace and rest which occurs together with struggle and movement, not which consists in escape from movement. To guard against giving the

³⁸Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 179.
Heidegger, <u>Poetry</u> . . ., Hofstadter, p. 180.

impression that Heidegger has lapsed into quietism, the following translation of the statement is suggested.

"The round-dance is the ring that wrings in that it plays as reflecting."

The gathered prevailing of the wringing of the mirror-play of the world is a riddle (Rätsel). Heidegger calls it "das Gering". With due hesitation, I suggest the translation of "insignificant union" for this difficult word which appears again in "H&lderlin's Earth and Sky". The current meanings of the adjective "gering" are: "little, small; tiny; wee, puny; unimportant; ordinary; low, humble; petty". Earlier on, it combined meanings of "light, fast, dexterous" and "bad". In the letter on humanism, Heidegger showed how Heraclitus told his guests that there are gods present in the midst of what is lowly and trivial. Something of the same meaning is contained in "Gering". Most of the words which give the meaning of "gering" can be seen in two ways if we think within the context of thought which accepts its matter and no longer seeks to surmount the whole and to explain the whole. "Unbedewtend" (unimportant) can be taken quite literally as denoting something for which meaning (Bedeutung) is not appropriate. "Gering_fllgig" (insignificant) literally means that which is not signified. When thinking steps back, it accepts the hidden rule as well as the unhidden. In From the experience of thinking, Heidegger said:

"Thinking's saying would be stilled in its Being only by becoming unable to say that which must remain unspoken. Such inability would bring thinking face to face with its matter."⁴⁰

Heidegger brings forward a cluster of words to help us to understand what he means by the ruling of the world and the place of freedom and struggle in this rule. These words are said to mean what the old high German words "ring" and "gering" meant. They will shed light on the meaning Heidegger intends for "der Ring" and "das Gering". The words are:

- (1) schmiegsam (pliant, flexible, supple; figuratively submissive)
- (2) schmiedbar (capable of being wrought)
- (3) geschmeidig (pliant, smooth, supple, malleable)
- (4) flgsam (pliant, suitable, submissive)
- (5) leicht (light)

The three main meanings in all of these words are "pliant", "submissive", and "light". At first sight, the connotation of struggle present in "Reigen" and "Ring" seems to have been lost here. But the operation is now seen as a whole. We are given a situation that warrants struggle and work. The fourfold is "pliable", this means we need to "ply" back and forth as we engage in its operation.

"Die Sage des Denkens wäre erst dadurch in ihr Wesen beruhigt, dag sie unvermögend würde, jenes zu sagen, was ungesprochen bleiben mub." Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, p. 21.

⁴⁰

There is room to go to and fro. Things are able to be wrought or worked.

To "ply" means "to use, wield vigorously a tool or weapon, work at, go to and fro". The words "work", "Werk", "wirken", and "wrought" come from the Indo-European root "*wer-" in the meaning of "plait, weave, surround with something woven". The basic meaning that comes out in the cluster of words which give meaning to "ring" and "gering" is: there is room for work, and work needs to be done.

"The mirror-play of the worlding world wrests (as the insignificant union of the ring) the united four into the authentic pliancy, the workability of its essence [of the way in which it rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines]."⁴¹

It must not be forgotten that <u>our</u> struggle consists of a turning in a <u>double</u> concealment. Not only is the near mediated through its nearing, through the nearing of the things which are in it. This nearing too is denied an appearance. In the allpervasive "distancelessness", things are annihilated. Things do not come near. Should we turn our backs on the "wasteland of technique" and search for the few and far between "things"? Heidegger

"Das Spiegel-spiel der weltenden Welt entringt als das Gering des Ringes die einigen Vier in das eigene Fügsame, das Ringe ihres Wesens." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 179. See Appendix 5 at the end of this chapter: "The prefix "*ent-".

dissociates himself from nostalgia and utopianism, so the thing can not be thought as fourfold and ignored with respect to framing (Ge-stell). The rule of the fourfold can only be heard after a long preparation which thinks the truth of the essence of technique. We live in a world of representing; we need to wake up and attend to what is occurring. The decisive step back from mere representing to responding (andenken) is a beginning. This is not a change of consciousness or a shift in attitude. All attitudes and views remain inside the metaphysical representing. Winning it over or entering into its essence also lets what is represented Be. Heidegger doesn't pretend we can suddenly magically no longer be where we are. He never loses sight of the real situation in which we are enmeshed.

"So we question in the midst of the domination of the distancelessness." 42

But, responding and recalling, we allow thought to be called forth by what it is not. Thought's home is in the nearing of the near. It allows itself to be needed and claimed by the world.

The letter to Buchner. The directive of "thought of Being" as G. the way and need.

Two weeks after the lecture "The Thing" was delivered, Heidegger answered a letter from a student who asked:

"From where does thought of Being receive its directive?"43

42 "So fragen wir inmitten der Herrschaften des Abstandlosen." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 180. 43 "Sie fragen: woher empfängt das Denken des Seins die

Weisung." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 182.

A few points about this question will help to understand the "answer" that is given. First the phrase "from where?" (woher?) indicates a "place" from where direction comes. Second, thought of Being refers to thinking which no longer merely "represents" but rather "responds". Third, the word "Weisung" (directive) comes from the root "*weid" (to see, to know). It belongs to the zone of transcendence rather than to the region of the truth of Being, which presumably is the place "from where" the directive is received. The question then focuses on the relation between the zone and the region.

At the end of the letter, the "answer" is given; no <u>credentials</u> or proofs are possible.

> "Everything here is (the) way of corresponding which hears and examines. (The) way is always in the danger of becoming an erring way. To go along such ways needs practise in going. Practise needs hand-work. Stay on the way in genuine need, and learn the hand-work of thinking, making errors but not being derailed."⁴⁴

Basically the directive is experienced as way and need (Weg, Not). Need is what we are "in", that which speaks to us or claims us.

44

"Alles ist hier Weg des prüfend hörenden Entsprechens. Weg ist immer in der Gefahr, Irrweg zu werden. Solche Wege zu gehen, verlangt Übung im Gang. Übung braucht Hard-werk. Bleiben Sie in der echten Not auf dem Weg und lernen Sie un-ent-wegt, jedoch beirrt, das Hand-werk des Denkens." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 185. See Appendix 4 at the end of this chapter: "Way and Need".

Way necessarily erring, is the careful response. Just as thought of Being is thought by and for Being, way is by and for need, response is by and for claim.

> "The response stems from the appeal and releases itself toward it. The response is a step back before the claim and an entry into its language."⁴⁵

Way and response seem roughly equivalent to freedom and "the far". Need and claim are roughly equivalent to "the free" and "the near".

When Being speaks to us or claims us, it includes need as well as actuality; in the language of metaphysics, it includes also necessity and possibility among its modalities. Being-nolonger and Being-not-yet claim us as much as Being-actual. As Being-no-longer, Heidegger cites the naming of " $\dot{\alpha}\lambda\dot{\eta}\Theta\dot{z}\iota\alpha$ " " $\lambda\dot{c}\dot{\chi}c\varsigma$ " and " $\dot{Q}\dot{v}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ "; he calls this the early uncovered has-been. Being-not-yet, he calls the veiled coming of what announces itself in the turn of the forgottenness of Being into the preservation (or saving) of its essence. The whole claim of Being includes these two "nots". And needs cannot offer credentials like mathematical axioms. It is not possible to prove logically that freedom saves its essence in the free, in the region of the truth of Being. There is room to respond and response is never to a binding proposition. The response is thoughtful of Being already

"Das Entsprechen entstammt dem Anspruch und ent_143t sich zu ihm. Das Entsprechen ist ein Zurücktreten vor dem Anspruch und dergestalt ein Eintreten in seine Sprache." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 182.

come to language.

The only way to learn to think is to start thinking in what we are in. Going along the way needs practise and practise needs hand-work. Hand-work is what thinking is. Here Heidegger describes the strange circular interrelation of claim and response; of the far and the near; of freedom and the free. The old high German word "uoben" meant "to follow the craft of farming (Landbau treiben)". In middle high German, "ueben" meant "to cultivate (bebauen) to enclose, tend, to practise or ply a trade, to set into work, to make use of continuously". The word comes from the Indo-European root "*op-" (to do [perform, execute, accomplish] something, or to complete, to practise). From the same root come the Latin words "opus" and "operari" and the German words "opfern" (to offer in sacrifice) and "Opfer" (sacrifice). To practise, to work, to do something, to act, to handle things, is here seen as the realization, completion, production, of Being. In the letter on humanism, Heidegger said:

> "But the nature of action is to accomplish something, to bring something to completion. To accomplish, to complete; that means: to unfold something so that it reveals the fullness of its nature, to escort it into that fullness, <u>producere</u>. Thus only that can really be accomplished which already is."⁴⁶

46

"Aber das Wesen des Handelns ist das Vollbringen. Vollbringen heißt: etwas in die Fülle seines Wesens entfalten, in diese hervorgleiten, producere. Vollbringbar ist deshalb eigentlich nur das, was schon ist." Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u>, p. 145. The translation is by Cyril Welch. Thus it is that practise <u>needs</u> "hand-work". The original meaning of "Hand" was "the grasper" ("die Fasserin" or "die Greiferin"). Thought's grasping is <u>work</u> which responds to genuine need which bespeaks that which holds thought. Freedom's threefold holding shapes the pitcher's emptiness which holds the fourfold gift of water and wine. APPENDIX 1

Turning, Weaving, Preserving

"Werden" (to become) used in auxiliary status in future and passive formations, comes from the Latin "vertere" (turn). Originally it simply meant "to turn, expend oneself"; gradually it came to mean "to turn into, or to become something". "Werden" along with "werfen" (throw), "würgen (like OE wringen). "Werk" (a work), "wirken" (effect), and "Wert" (worth) comes from the root "Wurm" (worm) and from the Indo-European root "*wer-" (to bend, turn, twist) (in German, drehen, biegen, winden, flechten). "Flechten" (to braid, plait, intertwine) provides the link to another meaning of "*wer-" (to cover, preserve) from which all the words related to "wahren" and "wehren" derive. Originally this root meant "to plait or braid, to cover with a plaited tent" later it became "cover, guard" and eventually rested at "preserve" (hüten).

"Flechten" is thus the connecting link between turning and preserving. The family of words related to it is also illuminating. Its Indo-European root is "*plek-" (to plait, braid, intertwine). This comes from "*pel-" (to fold). [The German "falten" (to fold) is obviously crucial in the account of the gathering fourfold.] From this root come the Latin words "plectere" (to plait, braid) and "plicare" (to fold, bend). "Plicare" is refashioned from "*plecare" on analogy from compounds.

These compounds give an idea of what important matters are indicated by this family of words; "complicare" (here the connotation

of confusion, seeing double [the meaning of fold], and hiding is brought out), "explicare" (to unfold, explicate), "implicare" (to infold, involve, intangle [here the connotation of gathering, conditioning, "be-thinging" comes out]).

Perhaps the most important word in this connection is "ply" (bend) from "plicare".

APPENDIX 2

Turning and Changing

"Kehren" (to turn over) has no sure connections in the teutonic or Indo-European roots. It means "to mend, to turn (over), to put to use (in German, [um]wenden). It has a strong tendency <u>not to stand on its own.</u> Mostly, it is prefixed, as in "bekehren" (to convert) and "verkehren" (to associate with, traffic with; run, ply). "Einkehr" means "turning in, putting up at an inn, turning in for the night" and figuratively "contemplation, self-communion". It can be compared closely to "weilen" (to while or rest) which also has the meaning of "übernachten". The old meaning of the verb "wesen" was "Übernachten" and "aufenthalten" (to stay, dwell).

"Kehren" is quite close to "wenden" (to wend or wind) and thus is related to a group of words "wandern" (to wander) "wandeln" (to change) and "winden" (to wind, turn) which come from the root "*wendh-" (to wind, twist). In the 1949 introduction to <u>What Is</u> <u>Metaphysics?</u>, Heidegger speaks of "a change in the essence of man with which a transformation of metaphysics can proceed" (ein Wandel des Wesens des Menschen . . . mit welchem Wandel eine Verwandlung 47 der Metaphysik einherginge).

What is revolutionary in this time is to turn in to the essence of man and of technique.

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 197.

APPENDIX 3 Default and Proclaiming the Word

"Fehl" (default), "fehlen" (to fail), "fail", "false", and "fault" all come from the vulgar Latin "*fallire" from the Latin' "fallere" (to deceive [in German "tauschen"]). The meaning of "lack" closely related to "need" survives more in the German "Fehl" than in the English "failure". "Der Fehl Gottes . . ." (the default of God) belongs to the whole realm of negative truth which Heidegger is rethinking as <u>not merely negative</u>. Deception, denial, error, misplacement, withdrawal and danger; all these are now thought inside the mediate rule of mystery.

"Predigt" is usually translated as "preaching" and thus considered only as a human speaking. But Heidegger means this word to be taken in its essential, literal sense: "announcement or proclaiming of the word of God", that is, as a <u>response</u> which brings forward the <u>claim</u>. "Predigen" comes from the Latin "praedicare" which combines "dicere" and "dicare". "Dicare" means "to speak in a <u>celebratory</u> way" (<u>feierlich</u> sagen). "Prae-" indicates "in public". This word "praedicare" is the origin of "predicate" and "predicament"; it can be related to Heidegger's understanding of "Wesen" as <u>verbal</u> in phrases like "the thing things" and "the world worlds".

"Announcement" and "Proclaiming" translate the German word "VerkUndigung". Its meanings are "(Auf)lösung (undoing, solution of a riddle, dissolution of a contract), Aufhebung (conclusion of a

meal, end of a meeting, cancellation of a contract); Verweigerung
(refusal, denial); Entlassung (dismissal, release)". All these
words are pervaded with the <u>difference</u>: solve-dissolve, conclusionsplit. The meaning of "predigen" centers on clearing-concealing.

APPENDIX 4

The word "Weg" and all the words related to it become more and more important to Heidegger. The title, <u>Unterwegs zur Sprache</u> says a great deal of this. In <u>From the Experience of Thinking</u> Heidegger wrote:

> "Way and weighing (Weg und Waage) Stile and saying On a single walk are found

Go bear without halt Question and default On your single pathway bound.⁴⁸

"Way" and "weighing" both come from the Indo-European root "*wegh-" (to move, to carry). In German the meanings are "sich bewegen (to move), schwingen (swing, whirl), fahren (to drive, go), ziehen (to pull, draw). To move (bewegen) has the double meaning of (1) spontaneous movement and (2) determination. The other verbs schwingen, fahren and ziehen are the same. We move and the way moves us; these are simultaneous "Weg" (way) and "Bewegung" (movement) contain for Heidegger both these meanings plus the "weighing" which results.

And the meaning of "away" (in German, "entfernt") is also

48 "Weg und Waage Steg und Sage finden/sich in einen Gang Geh und trage Fehl und Frage deinen einen Pfad entlang. Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung . . ., p. 5. contained in "way". Because we are on the way, we remain in part a ruling and unfolding of "the far" (die Ferne).

The word "Not" (need) comes from the Indo-European base "*naw", meaning "to tire or fatigue". It is our essence to be needful; we are needed by Being. We are not self-sufficient but we are essential to the whole.

APPENDIX 5 The Prefix "ent-"

The matter of the survival of freedom in the context of the fourfold is illustrated in the cluster of verbs with the prefix "ent-". In the lecture, two of the important ones are "enteignen" (to expropriate) and "entringen" (to wrest [from]). In the letter, there are added "entsprechen" (to [co]respond), "entstammen" (to stem from), and "sich entlassen" (to release oneself). All of these words can be connected to the crucial word "Entscheidende" (what is decisive). And three other important verbs for Heidegger can well be kept in mind also: "Enthüllen" (disclose), "Entschliejen" (resolve) and "entbergen" (reveal).

The prefix "ent-" connotes opposition and separation. It literally means "away from something" (von etwas weg). We are justified to associate all these verbs with the continued decisive survival of the zone of the far. All the verbs contribute to an understanding of the meaning of the "liberation into authenticity" (die Befreiung ins Eigenen). At the same time each "ent-" verb is connected with a verb which indicates its connection to the near. "Enteignen" is dependent upon "Vereignen" and "ereignen". "Entsprechen" can only be thought togehter with "ansprechen" (the circular relation of response and claim). What is decisive is the between region where both clearing and concealing are acknowledged. The step back is the step back into the between.

CHAPTER SIX

"FREEDOM, THE FREE, AND THE FOURFOLD IN 'BUILDING, DWELLING,

.

THINKING'"

CHAPTER SIX

"FREEDOM, THE FREE, AND THE FOURFOLD IN 'BUILDING, DWELLING, THINKING'"¹

INTRODUCTION

1

One year after "The Thing" in 1951, Heidegger delivered a second lecture which includes the unfolded fourfold --- "Building, Dwelling, Thinking". It is very much a work complementary to "The Thing". Both lectures are about man and Being with the unfolding of threefold and fourfold together in the production of things. They complement each other because "The Thing" emphasizes the nearing of things and "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" emphasizes the dwelling of man.

The title of this lecture shows that the threefold itself as it is now appreciated in the region of the truth of Being, is the primary concern of the work. This work faces the question of what man is and what freedom means inside the fourfold. This threefold in 1951 is, in a sense, the same as the threefold of 1929 (The Essence of Ground) when man was called "an essence of the far".

Martin Heidegger, <u>Wegmarken</u> (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), p. 71.

All references taken from this work are from: Martin Heidegger, <u>Vorträge und Aufsätze</u> (Pfullingen, Neske, 1954), pp. 145-162.

But the later lecture no longer leaves undeveloped that which freedom <u>assumes</u> in order to be what it is. It shows how freedom saves its essence in the free. Freedom is building and thinking ach of which is rooted in and accomplishes dwelling.

Heidegger begins the lecture by announcing that he will attempt to <u>think</u> about <u>building</u> and <u>dwelling</u>. He continues to be a thinker but he is going to talk about building. The lecture is an "attempt at thinking" from start to finish, but very little is said explicitly about what thought is, unlike such works as the conversation on engagement and the letter on humanism. The thought in this case is about building and dwelling and thus it is for example about the provision of dwelling, of which thought itself is not capable. There is a distinction here which bears noting. Thought is saying something about building (and dwelling) all the while following its own laws. These are to say what

3

One of the problems writing about Heidegger in English concerns the translation of nouns made from the infinitive form of verbs. It is a common practise in German to take a verb like "bauen" (to build) and to make it into the noun, "das Bauen". The title of this lecture contains three such nouns. It is usual to translate these nouns into the present participle in English, in this case, "building" primarily to retain the "verbal movement" which Heidegger clearly intends. In the all-important case of "Sein" (to be) the custom is to translate it as "Being", the large "B" assigned to it because in this case the present participle is also used in German, "seiend" (being). No one could pretend that this customary "solution" is completely satisfactory. The frequent use of participial nouns is quite unusual in English and it takes a lot of getting used to. In balance, I feel the risk of sounding strange is worth taking and thus I have followed the tradition of the participial nouns. It should be remembered that for other reasons, it would be equally justified to put this sentence in this form: To be free is to build and to think, each of which is rooted in and accomplishes what it is to dwell.

matters, to be <u>of</u> Being, to be rooted and to accomplish in <u>its</u> way, dwelling. Following these laws, thought says of <u>building</u> that it too accomplishes dwelling. Thought asserts that both thought and building dwell and that each operates or accomplishes dwelling in its own way. At the end of the lecture, Heidegger says that we build <u>out of</u> dwelling and we think <u>for</u> dwelling. Keeping these distinctions in mind, it becomes clearer that "builders" have something to learn from thought about what building is, but what they learn also turns them away from thought as such when they build. They build out of dwelling and thought does not build.

> "Thought . . . traces building back into that region into which everything that <u>is</u> belonge."⁴

We usually think of building as constructing for a purpose. Heidegger suggests that building properly appreciated, is accomplishing what already is. We dwell into the free and building accomplishes this dwelling into the free. It receives its directive from out of the free into which we already dwell. This is what enables building to erect "determining places." Essentially, we do not build in order to dwell (later), we build in response to dwelling, to complete it and bring it to its fullness by ushering it forward out of what is not-yet and no-longer. When building is the essence of dwelling, it is being, and Heidegger shows that the word "build" comes from

". . . verfolgt das Bauen in denjenigen Bereich zurück, wohin jegliches gehört, was ist." Heidugger, Vorträge, p. 145.

4

the same root as "be" which means "to dwell". Dwelling is inseparable from the essence of dwelling (building). There is no such thing as dwelling and <u>then</u> building, just as little as there is such a thing as building and then dwelling.

Dwelling is dwelling into the free which means on the earth, under the sky before the gods and into the belonging together of the mortals. The essence of dwelling, that is "dwelling-building" is "to handle the fourfold beautifully". This is to handle things, to stay with the things: to save the earth, receive the sky, anticipate the gods and usher the capacity for death as death into use. Dwelling as thinking and building greets the room, the house of Being in which it dwells.

A. The threefold in the zone and the threefold in the region of the truth of Being.

5

In <u>The Essence of Ground</u> freedom occurred in the zone of transcendence; it consisted of the three ways of grounding, Heidegger's rethinking of Aristotle's three first principles or grounds. In that work freedom consisted essentially in justified "founding" (begründen) which could be seen as the unifying and focussing of the other two ways of grounding, taking ground (Boden nehmen) in the midst of beings (already present) and establishing (stiften) which consisted of reaching out and projecting the world. Freedom operated

Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 21ff.

5

in the leeway created in the stretch from the situation to the possible future approaching. The "leeway" also was considered to be <u>spatial</u> as well as temporal; the zone in which freedom operated was not considered to be merely historical. But due to the preoccupation of this early treatise with reaching out, the "spatial" side of the region remained rather thinly drawn. The complementing of reaching out (time as ecstasy) with enclosure which is gradually accomplished in the turn, means that the threefold of 1951 no longer suffers from the postponement of the unfolding of the <u>room</u> in which we dwell. In 1951, we are free because we dwell into the region of the truth of Being, that is, we build and we think and accomplish our dwelling in this region.

There is a one-to-one correspondence between the 1929 and 1951 triads. But various changes have occurred along the way between the two. The changes, together with what stays the same, help us to see what "has happened to freedom" in the turn. Some of the changes were set out in the discussion of the threefold holding of 6 the thing. The three changes described there were (1) the change from "founding" to cooperation in a giving, (2) the movement of "establishing" from future to past which coincides with the assignment of establishing to poets, not thinkers (which means the same as assigning it to builders, not thinkers) and (3) the restoration of the efficacy of the present, immediate foreground along with the

See chapter five, page 255.

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past and future background, in the embedding of what matters in the "thinging" of the thing.

I want now to emphasize this third point because it is drawn out in the 1951 threefold of building, dwelling, and thinking. There was a great danger in the early appreciation of freedom both in its earliest expression in 1929 and in the later one of 1943. This danger was to develop freedom first in terms of "the far" and then in terms of "the near", in abstraction from what is actual. Freedom tended to be seen as an escape from what is occurring in the foreground (or an attack on it), first in terms of the projected future and then in terms of the already "fully-ended" past, in terms of the future and past background. The outward reach forward is vindicated with the inward push from behind but the complete return home needs also the return to what is actual.

In 1929, all three ways of grounding are, in a sense, "background". Establishing and taking-ground are (in 1951 terms) like building and thinking only insofar as they are rooted in dwelling. Without the foreground, they are <u>abstract</u>. In 1951, dwelling can only be what it is, when it is produced into the foreground by building and thinking. The actual foreground, now including its background, is dwelling being built and thought. With this awareness of the background, the foreground is seen to be oppressed with a double need, a double hiding. We do not yet dwell (think-build)

just as the things do not yet come near. This is the meaning of Heidegger changing from a libertarian revolutionary to a "down to earth" one.

The basic point which must be gleaned in this discussion of the return to the foreground is that "the region of the truth of Being", "the free" is not meant to be a doubly removed determining force "even farther away than the far". Freedom "saving its essence in the free" is a return to the concrete world "into" which we dwell, think and build.

B. The relation of language and man.

Heidegger has written a great deal about thinker and poet as the guardians of the word. In the other works which have been examined, the threefold unfolded into "poetry language and thought". This threefold of building dwelling thinking then seems to change two of the categories. In fact, however, there is no change. We dwell in language "the house of Being" and the builder "establishes" just as the poet does. The discussion of language, for Heidegger, is not a withdrawal into a special field which does ground work for later application. The drawing of poetic production as building in this lecture is valuable because it makes this point so powerfully. When Heidegger states that building receives its directive from the fourfold and thus erects determining places, we should also bear in mind the holy word which Hölderlin shapes out

of the determining place where he at last found himself to be at home. The Greek temple was built in the same way as the Hebrews prophesied and Jesus spoke the word of God.

This lecture continues the kind of "argument from language" which is so crucial in "The Thing". And between the two lectures 7 Heidegger wrote a third, entitled simply "Language" in which he states that the "abyss" of language conceals within itself a height and a depth which together span or stretch around a home, a "dwelling place for man". The kind of turn which expresses itself in the rooting of thinking and building back into dwelling, involves first of all a fundamental rethinking of our relation to language. The fact that we are homeless, that we wander about willing and representing with no guidance, is expressed most of all in the fact that we conceive language as if it were a tool we use to get what we want.

> "Man acts as though <u>he</u> were the shaper and master of language, while in fact <u>she</u> (language) remains the master of man. Before all else perhaps it is the reversal (Verkehrung) of <u>this</u> power-relationship by man that drives his essence into homelessness."⁸

Martin Heidegger, <u>Unterwegs zur Sprache</u> (Pfullingen: Neske 1959), p. 11ff, especially p. 13. 8

"Der Mensch gebärdet sich, als sei <u>er</u> Bildner und Meister der Sprache, während <u>sie</u> doch die Herrin des Menschen bleibt. Vielleicht ist es vor allem anderen die vom Menschen betriebene Verkehrung <u>dieses</u> Herrschafts verhältnisses, was sein Wesen in das Unheimische treibt." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 146.

We think we are free because we use language to get what we want, but in thinking this is what is occurring, we remained enslaved. Insofar as we are free -- we build and think -- it is because we dwell in language. Freedom says the essence of the free. Freedom saves its essence in the free.

C. The first question: What is dwelling? Part one: Building as dwelling.

The lecture is divided into two sections asking the following two questions:

1. What is dwelling?

2. To what extent does building belong to dwelling? The first question can be divided into two parts, of which the first deals with building as dwelling and the second deals with dwelling into the free and the fourfold. Roughly speaking, the first question moves from the foreground into the background and the second moves from the background forward.

Heidegger begins by considering the current <u>view</u> that building is essentially a means to the end of dwelling. This is obviously <u>correct</u> but it fails to get to essentials. Language tells us that "building is in itself already dwelling". It is important to note the movement made here because Heidegger makes it over and over again. The current meaning of a word, in this case "build" (bauen), is not the whole meaning of the word. The word is not a tool or

"symbol" which can be defined at will. We do not define it; we dwell inside it; it speaks to us also of what it named and can name. The whole meaning does not "contradict" the current meaning. Once we appreciate the whole meaning, the current meaning springs to life as never before. The correct view that building is a means to dwelling will not be set aside when we appreciate that building is already dwelling.

The study of dwelling becomes then first of all a study of the whole meaning of "bauen" (to build). There are some differences in the German "bauen", and the English "build", but also there are two important parallels. The root of each is the same and the devolution of meaning is closely parallel in each. An important difference which needs to be brought to the fore, for those who do not know one of the two languages, is that "bauen" still means "to farm" as well as "to build". It is less of a surprise for a German speaker to hear that "build" originally means "dwell", because a farmer is called "Bauer". The word "Nachbar" (neighbour) is quickly understood as formerly "Nachgebauer" (nearby dweller or nearby farmer). It is easier for a German speaker to see the unfolding of the original "bauen" (to dwell) into the two meanings of tending what grows and erecting what does not grow.

The basic change from building as dwelling to building as erecting occurs in the same way in both languages, however.

Heidegger wants to make the point that the whole meaning still operates in some way.

"That language "takes back" the authentic meaning of the word "bauen", dwelling, is evidence of the originality (das Ursprüngliche) of these meanings; for with the essential words (Worten) of language, what is authentically said easily falls into oblivion in favour of foreground meanings . . . Language pulls back its simple and high speaking from men. But its original calling doesn't thereby become dumb, it only is silent."⁹

The investigation of "bauen" uncovers three important matters:

- 1. Building is authentically dwelling.
- 2. Dwelling is the way that mortals are on the earth.
- 3. Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that tends what grows, and into the building that erects buildings.

To repeat,

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1. "Building" like "bauen" comes from the old word "buan" meaning
"to dwell" or "to stay in a place". This meaning survives in
the last syllable of "neighbour" and "Nachbar".

2. The fact that building means dwelling tells us that dwelling is not one of several distinct human activities. It is not, for example, separated from working. Looking deeper into the root

[&]quot;Daß die Sprache die eigentliche Bedeutung des Wortes bauen, das Wohnen, gleichsam zurücknimmt, bezeugt jedoch das Ursprüngliche dieser Bedeutungen; denn bei den wesentlichen Worten der Sprache fällt ihr eigentlich Gesagtes zugunsten des vordergründig Gemeinten leicht in die Vergessenheit . . Die Sprache entzicht dem Menschen ihr einfaches und hohes Sprechen. Aber dadurch verstummt ihr anfänglicher Zuspruch nicht, er schweigt nur." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 148.

meaning of "build", we discover that building as dwelling means <u>being</u>. The Indo-European root "*bhu" means "to dwell, to be, to exist, to grow". It is the source of the English "be" (from the Middle English "been, beon" from the Old English "beon"), the German "bin", or "bist" and cognate with the Latin "fui" (I have been) and "fio" (to become), and the Greek " $Q\sqrt{\epsilon_{t}}$ " (to make to grow) and " $Q\sqrt{\sigma_{t}}$ " ("nature").

The root "*bhu" is one of three which are combined to make up the modern verb "to be". The same three roots go to make up the German "sein". In addition to *bhu- "to dwell", there are: the Indo-European "*es-" (to be) and the Teutonic "*wes-" "to remain". The point that Heidegger uncovers is that building dwelling and being are at root united.

3. Building as dwelling is comprised of two elements. First building (as "bauen" meaning "to farm") is tending or cultivating the growing things, that is the things that don't have to be made. Second, building means making houses, ships, bridges, and other things. These two gradually unfolded into their own separateness. Their common origin is usually forgotten, but in German this is preserved in the fact of the two meanings of "bauen" (to farm and to build). In English, there is little or no evidence currently of a use of "build" similar to that of "bauen" (to farm). But the word "bower" preserves the meaning of dwelling. We are used to (gewohnt) or

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"habituated" to the fact that building is dwelling; we lose awareness of it. We "see clearly" only the ways dwelling is brought into the action. These two ways of building, being different, appear to have no connection, because we have lost awareness of the deeper unity which the two branches of building (along with thinking) accomplish.

The way of grasping the whole matter is converted. It is not that we conceive of a desired way to dwell -- and then build with that in mind. In the language of 1929, the concern was founding (Begründen), a ground of concrete action. This was to be clarified out of the tension between a project of "the world" and a foothold in the establishment. The spirit of this concern was: life can begin again after we "found" a new synthesis. Now in "Building Dwelling, Thinking" we must learn to dwell where we already are: the unity is all around us, it pervades us. If we open ourselves to it, we are given the way (Weise) or directive (Weisung) how to be on the earth. It should be emphasized that Heidegger does not abandon the search for a directive, when he reverses the matter of founding and states that the "worlding of the world" is not a matter for grounds, for explanation. The way in which the directive is sought reverses. In a way, it only comes when it stops being the centre of concern. We only learn what we are and how to be when we stop being obsessed with that and thus cut off our awareness of

what is other than us. To step back away from this focus on "human freedom" is <u>not</u> to surrender and collapse. Heidegger's assertion is that only this step back can vindicate freedom.

A consensus only will come if we all become aware of what we are all in together. The consensus will come, but only if we step back and realize that a genuine consensus is not merely constructed; it is a response. One way of expressing the change is the following conversion: (1) How can I do what I want to do? (2) What needs to be done that I can do? It is important to note that the second formulation <u>completes</u>, and does <u>not</u> replace the first; it completes in the sense of "perfects", rather than in the sense of "finishing a process".

The completion acknowledges the "fundament" as what is happening, what prevails, what is going on. Heidegger is only a fundamental thinker in this new sense which bows to the fundament of what is <u>already</u> given. The position of 1929 taken by itself, implies that what really counts is the "founding" we do when we synthesize world project and status quo to make reasonable action possible. Now in 1951 the ground is Being, the rule of mystery in error. Unavoidable is the truth of need, the way in which what occurs, occurs. The change is to learn what thought is <u>in</u>, what building is <u>in</u>; to learn the limits of thought and building and thus at the same time what guides and grounds them, and how they are both different and the same.

Two common attacks on Heidegger appear to contradict each other but they serve to draw out what Heidegger has to say to builders. They draw out the outline of an answer, for example, to those who ask Heidegger for a "social theory". (1) One common attack on Heidegger is that he forsakes clarity and positive thought in the name of a hazy, poetic or quasi-religious way of speaking which offers no practical models for concerted action on obviously pressing matters. (2) Another attack accuses Heidegger of colossal arrogance because he fails to stay within the limits of thought and enters the contentious realm of "values", properly the province of religion.

1. Heidegger's thought appears to acquiesce, in effect, if we expect from it what it does not try to supply. The refusal to supply models for practical action is in fact a solid stand which Heidegger takes. Thinking does not build. This is one way in which Heidegger asserts he is <u>observing</u> the limits of thought. It would be false to bring forward "blueprints" which thinking may not provide. To say that thought does not provide the blueprints is intended to turn builders back to the genuine source of their building "technique", namely the need in which we dwell. Action (in this case building) should not apply theory; it should accomplish dwelling. Thinking accomplishes Being by thinking against itself and thus leaving building in the open, just as in psychotherapy, talking

neutralizes itself until what we are comes forward.

2. It is possible that Heidegger might accept that a tendency in his earlier work could be called arrogant. After the encounter with Hölderlin, he accepted that poets establish "what remains". And in addition, both thinker and poet must bow to what is actual. In retrospect, it seems that too much was attempted by thought when it tried to think by itself, the transcendental horizon of the question of Being. There is a clear sense in which Heidegger in the early work in effect is beholden to no one and thus is beholden only to "the nothing" in his portrayal of the phenomena. After the turn, the limits of thought, in the matters of naming the holy and what is actual, are accepted and thought through with the help of the poet. But the entry into the negative region is not abandoned in this change. On the contrary, Heidegger does not consider it arrogant to refuse to stay within the limits set by the current liberal scientific mode of thinking as representation. This way of thinking hides its own arrogance in this regard. It enters the region of the truth of Being only to declare it certainly and definitively nameless. As a final statement, this is as arrogant as naming the region "causa sui". We do not have a choice about confronting this region; we do have a choice how we will respond to it.

D. Question one: What is dwelling? Part two: <u>Dwelling</u> into the free. Handling things beautifully and being free.

Assuming that we are convinced that building is the essence of dwelling, what then is this dwelling? Heidegger proceeds with the study of dwelling by looking into the word "wohnen" (to dwell). The result takes us to the heart of the new appreciation of freedom in the context of the fourfold. The Old Saxon "wuon" and the Gothic "wunian" mean "to dwell or stay in a place" just like "bauen", but "wunian" also gives the key to how this dwelling (or staying) is experienced.

> ""Wunian" means: to be satisfied, to be brought to peace, to remain at peace. The word for peace (Friede) means the free, "das Frye", and "fry" means: preserved from harm or threat, preserved from . . . i.e. spared (or handled beautifully). To free means authentically to spare. The sparing doesn't only exist in that we do nothing against the spared one. Authentic sparing is <u>something</u> <u>positive</u>, and happens when we leave something beforehand in its essence, when, expressly, we "hide" something back into its essence, as the word says, free it: enclose it. To dwell, to be brought to peace means: to remain enclosed into "das Frye", that is, into the open, that spares everything into its essence. <u>The ground-pull of dwelling is</u> this sparing."¹⁰

"Wunian heißt: zufrieden sein, zum Frieden gebracht, in ihm bleiben. Das Wort Friede meint das Freie, das Frye, und fry bedeutet: bewahrt vor Schaden und Bedrohung, bewahrt -- vor . . . d.h. geschont. Freien bedeutet eigentlich schonen. Das Schonen selbst besteht nicht nur darin, das wir dem Geschonten nichts antun. Das eigentliche Schonen ist etwas <u>Positives</u> und geschieht dann, wenn wir etwas zum voraus in seinem Wesen belassen, wenn wir etwas eigens in sein Wesen zurlickbergen, es entsprechend dem Wort freien: einfrieden. Wohnen, zum Frieden gebracht sein, heißt: eingefriedet bleiben in das Frye, d.h. in das Freie, das jegliches in sein Wesen schont. <u>Der</u> <u>Grundzug des Wohnens ist dieses Schonen.</u>" Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 149.

To dwell is to be at peace and peace (Friede) is the result of the free. The German word for peace is quite literally the past form of "free"; peace means "freed". The free frees us; it preserves us from harm. It sets us free by allowing us our time and our rule. We are given the shelter of our own way of being. To be free means to be loved, sheltered and preserved. To be free is to be enclosed and therefore at peace. Heidegger expresses this matter with the 11 old word "Schonen", to spare (or to handle beautifully). Sparing, he says is the "ground-pull" of dwelling. To dwell is to experience the active positive sparing which is occurring whereby we are freed and are free.

There is a very strong feeling of submission in this passage on the free. Our being free means essentially that something is done for us and to us. The word "free" itself points not to our autonomy but rather to the freeing to which we are heir, which is the source of the free room to move that we are in. This interpretation is given overwhelming support from the history of the meaning of the word. "Frei" and "free" come from the Indo-European root "*prai" (to guard, spare; to love). In German, the meanings of this root are "schützen, <u>schonen</u>; gern haben, lieben." In English, according to Klein, the primary meaning of the Old English "freo" was "beloved, friend; to love". This developed into the modern meaning

See Appendix at the end of this chapter.

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of "free" because the terms "beloved" and "friend" were applied as a rule to the free members of the clan in contradistinction to slaves. A similar process occurred in German but the "guarded and protected" side is there more prominent. The loved ones, the "friends" are those who stand fully guarded by the legal system of the community in contrast to the foreign born unfree. Eventually the meaning split into "outer" political and "inner" spiritual freedoms, and then to the "general" meaning of "unbound, independent, uncovered".

The passage on the meaning of "wunian" calls attention to the truth that freedom has a background. Freedom needs to usher forward what is given to it. This is what it means to say that freedom (Freiheit) bespeaks the ruling self-governing, unfolding and declining of the free. Freedom saves its essence in the free. To say that freedom <u>dwells</u> into the free is to concentrate on the fact that freedom is a response to a claim which concerns us or "goes toward us" in a way which houses us and determines us, but does not necessarily coerce us. We are freed and spared by the fourfold which binds into the free. But the freeing and sparing cannot occur without our cooperation (thinking and building). We are needed to cooperate in the operation, in the freeing which frees us. This is the way Heidegger names the "circular" situation we are in. One surprising point that emerges is that the word "free"

illustrates this strange circularity, of which the current modern meaning of freedom tells only half the story. And "dwell" and "spare" are similar in this regard. These words all participate in the dual truth that we are bound into the free and set free into our own. To be freed means to be freeing. We dwell, build, free, spare and enclose in cooperation with the fourfold which binds us into the free.

The phrase "in das Freie" means "out into the open", "into the country", "into the open air". It means into <u>the</u> region bounded by the earth and the sky, on which and under which we dwell. This region is something more than our projection. It is the free; it frees us; it is our home. It provides us with food and drink and shelter. We are beholden to it and we need to cooperate in its preservation which is also our preservation.

E. Question two: How far does building belong to dwelling?Building, the fourfold and the provision of room.

It is probably no accident that Heidegger used the word "inwiefern" in this second question for his concern in this second section is what is occurring in the foreground (building) now that we have the background (dwelling) in mind. In the terms of freedom, the concern is for what is happening with freedom, with the far, with man, here as the builder, now that he is seen as dwelling into the free (the fourfold, the near). The zone we

stretch out into is already there. What does this make of our stretching? The bridge, a <u>thing</u> which Heidegger decides to examine in this regard, gathers the fourfold; this is how it mediates room to us and to the other three. <u>But there would be no room</u> if the bridge were not built. Building the bridge is our freedom. This is our cooperation in the fourfold's gathering which binds us into the free and sets us free into our own.

The bridge is an example of a thing built, which does not grow. Heidegger makes clear that he is going to speak of the building of the bridge as it authentically is. He is referring to the awareness we now have of building as the essence of dwelling into the free. He is not trying to pass over our current conception of what building a bridge is. At all times we have to remember that things do not come near in a <u>double</u> sense in this time of double need. All these levels cannot be handled at every point. Here he wants to speak about building as the essence of dwelling though later in the work he notes that <u>we still must learn to dwell</u>.

The bridge gathers the earth as landscape around it, it is ready for the sky's storms, it gathers and grants structure to the life of humans and it gathers, whether acknowledged as such or not, a passage that crosses before the gods. These are not poetic or symbolic attachments to something that is "merely a bridge". Rather "the mere bridge" which is quite <u>correct</u> and certainly <u>real</u>, is an

". . . <u>das Wohnen erst lernen müssen</u>". Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 162.

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abstraction, a <u>view</u> of the bridge from a particular, scientific, exacting point of view. This real bridge denies the bridge as thing, an appearance.

Heidegger's preoccupation in this passage about the bridge is how <u>room</u> is granted in the nearing of the thing. He uses three main "space-words" (Stätte, Ort, Raum) which give the details of 13 how this granting occurs. We have the possibility of a stay with the things because they gather the fourfold in a way which grants a "standing place" (eine Stätte verstattetwird). The bridge allows a place because it is, as a thing, a "determining place" (ein Ort). The thing, as determining place gathers the fourfold and grants a standing place. Out of that, the ways and places are defined through which the wider "room" (Raum) is cleared.

"Raum" and "room" come from the same roots, the Feutonic adjective "*ruma" and the Indo-European "*re^{Wu} meaning "wide, open". The basic meanings of both words are "wide, roomy, free-given, made free and empty". I think there are obviously good reasons for retaining these meanings by translating "Raum" as "room" rather than space, in spite of the problem that the scientific meaning of "space" is also "Raum" in German. "Space" comes from the Latin "spatium" which Heidegger associates explicitly with one change in the meaning of space well on its way toward abstract algebraic space.

Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 154ff.

Room is made into a place for dwelling by being freed into its limits or boundaries. This boundary ($\pi\epsilon\rho\lambda$, $\delta\rho\iota\sigma\mu\delta$) is temporal and spatial. This is now an account of the horizon of transcendence as the <u>clearing</u>, with the whole of the truth of Being being unfolded.

"Room is essentially what has been cleared, what has been let into its bounds."¹⁴

But the horizon is not simply given. The determining place (Ort) is what does the gathering, clearing and emptying of the room. The builder's stretching out is also needed for there to be a determining place. The room is not empty until it is emptied, just as the emptiness of the pitcher had to be shaped by the sides and bottom of the pitcher. The various "rooms" which make up room receive their essence not from the availability of abstract space, but from out of the determining places. Room comes from the fourfold but only through the things as determining places and these are built.

When we think of a thing as a determining place, we think of it as a place where we end and thus where we begin. The border or boundary, in German, "Grenze", in Greek, " $\pi \acute{\epsilon} \rho \Lambda \varsigma$ ", is that place from where our essence begins. The thing as determining place makes a place free, <u>empties</u> a place, it enables the place to hold us. We are not free because we float free and unconditioned in abstract

"Raum ist wesenhaft das Eingeräumte, in seine Grenze Eingelassene." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 155.

"space". We are free because the fourfold frees in the nearing of things which need our cooperation.

We are conditioned by our "surface" vision of things and space, to conceive of our relation to them in something like the following way: We are at position "A"; there is a measurable distance "x" between us and a "thing" at position "B". We account for room in terms of measured intervals. For us the room is only the measuring of it. The name for room which has been reduced to abstract measured grid dimensions, is "extensio". And modern physics abstracts further into hypothetical algebraic space. This is the final stage of the abstraction of number from thing. Number acts as if it were a law unto itself and "constructs" room.

"Heidegger's room" is not something that once was real or one day may be real. It isn't being put forward as a better way "to look at space", to replace the current predominant view of abstract space. The region that Heidegger is talking about is part of the truth along with this real abstract space. It is however emphatically <u>not</u> a matter of consciousness raising which will enable us to grasp Heidegger's room behind space. It is the concentration on consciousness and attitude which promotes the reduction of things to representations and of room to space. The point is to let <u>it</u> Be. Heidegger gives two examples to illustrate what he is 15 getting at. (1) If we think of a particular thing (place) such

Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 157.

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as the old bridge of Heidelberg, what is happening is not that we "bring the bridge into our heads <u>here</u> by representation" but rather that the thinking goes there to the bridge which is the source and director of the thinking. (2) Insofar as we dwell in a whole room, that is, pervade and persist throughout it, only then is it possible for us to go through it and to be at different places in it. Heidegger says for example that he can walk through the lecture hall to the door only because he is already there.

If we go for a walk in the country we can stop at some point and orient ourselves by noting that we are standing at point "x" looking at such and such a view. A few moments later we may forget that way of experiencing, and in retrospect, we could note that we simply were in that region on a walk. The experience of being in the whole often occurs also in games when skills and position-play have become second nature. Heidegger's point seems to be that conscious orientation is a particular way of experiencing which is <u>derivative</u>. When we are conscious of where we are, and are conceiving what is over against us, we remain at the same time still in the whole region., aware or not. Dwelling into the free is not a matter of consciousness.

Dwelling means "into the open". That means "on the earth", "under the sky", "before the gods" and "into the belonging together of men". At this point Heidegger seems to exit from the discourse to name again the four, earth, sky, gods and mortals in a passage

almost identical to the one in "The Thing".

The earth is the serving bearer. The sky is the moving path of the sun moon and stars. The gods (or the god-like) are the beckoning messengers, through which god appears and withdraws. The mortals are the humans, who are capable of death as death. When naming any one of the four we necessarily also think of the other three, but do not concentrate on the unity.

The mortals are in this fourfold in that they dwell, meaning basically, in that they spare. That is, they are freed and they help in the freeing. The freeing is the fourfold gathering itself when the thing "things world". For the mortals, helping in this freeing is a "fourfold sparing" (ein vierfältiges Schonen).

The fourfold sparing understood in its unity, Heidegger calls the "staying with the things" (der Aufenthalt bei den Dingen). This staying understood as four is called saving the earth (die Erde retten), receiving the sky (den Himmel empfangen), anticipating the gods (die Göttlichen erwarten), ushering their own capacity for death as death into use (Brauch).

In this fourfold way the fourfold is preserved in the things in which or with which we stay. It is the preserving of the fourfold in <u>things</u>, that shows how building as tending and constructing is an integral part of dwelling, is an accomplishment of dwelling.

F. Building as establishing, as the production of the things which house us. The problem of building and dwelling in a homeless time.

Our relationship to room is dwelling, in which we spare the fourfold in things, thus helping as the determining places provide The determining places, where nothing and thing meet, are room. houses of the fourfold. Things condition us by "housing" us in the widest sense and building is the production (Hervorbringen) of such things. Building responds (entspricht) to the nearing of things, that they are determinative. Building, because it sets up determining places, is an establishing (Stiften). Building plays along with things, it cooperates in the fourfold's binding into the free. Only while building does the builder receive the directive from the fourfold. It is only in the building of what needs to be built that we receive the direction how to do this. Dwellings essence is the sparing and preserving of the fourfold in the building of things which "house" the dwelling. Planning does not ground anything. If it is true building, it is already grounded, in that it responds to the need which claims it. Planning produces the fourfold.

We are obsessed with <u>making</u>. This is what we think building is. But making is only one quarter of a whole operation which properly appreciated is a giving. Thus even the quarter "making" refers to, is not properly appreciated. Authentically, making is

gathering, as part of the giving of what gives and thus what is given. "Hervorbringen" (to produce) translates the Greek " $\tau \iota \ltimes \tau \iota$ " from which the word "technique" comes. But Heidegger is not suggesting a return to the Greek way of production in reaction to the mindless subjectivism of modernity. Our encounter with the fourfold can only be through modern technique, through the world and time in which we dwell. The only way we can be at home is to learn to dwell where we are, in the homeless and distanceless world of technique.

Building, for us, will only be possible when we learn to dwell where we are, for building is letting-dwell. Heidegger cites the example of the people of his native area who were able to build in the situation where <u>they</u> were. Where <u>we</u> are, is of course quite different, but in one way it is the same. Dwelling, for us too is the basic ground pull of Being.

> "The authentic need of dwelling rests in the fact that the mortals always search again for the essence of dwelling, that they first must learn dwelling."¹⁶

The peculiar character of <u>our</u> need in this time Heidegger claims, is to become aware of homelessness as the failure to see this authentic need. The danger is double in this time for the danger

"Die eigentliche Not des Wohnens beruht darin, daß die Sterblichen das Wesen des Wohnens immer erstwieder suchen, daß sie das Wohnen erst lernen müssen." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 162.

is hidden. As the double need dawns in the announcement of the essence of technique, homelessness ceases to be a misery.

"As soon as man gives <u>thought</u> to the homelessness, it is already no longer a misery. It is, correctly thought and well held, the sole summons which <u>calls</u> the mortals into dwelling."¹⁷

Our acceptance of what is delivered to us is in one way similar to the "conversion" of those in other times. At the same time, it has its unique character, for our immediate tradition is the heritage of freedom. Thought about homelessness enables us to hear the call into dwelling. This is the essential point which is taken up in chapter seven. Freedom in this time needs to appreciate both the immediate reality of technique as "Gestell" and the rule of the fourfold in and through it.

Heidegger closes the lecture with a statement which expresses his version of the relation of theory and practise.

> "But how else could the mortals respond to this call than by trying on their part, on their own, to bring dwelling into the fullness of its essence? They accomplish this if they build out of dwelling and think for dwelling."¹⁸

Both thinking and building <u>belong</u> to dwelling. They are two ways of dwelling. Dwelling is what it is, only when it is accomplished by thinking and building. Thinking is <u>for</u> dwelling; this is <u>its</u> way of accomplishing dwelling. This means that it is not for

"Sobald der Mensch jedoch die Heimatlosigkeit <u>bedenkt</u>, ist sie bereits kein Elend mehr. Sie ist,recht bedacht und gut behalten, der einzige Zuspruch, der die Sterblichen in das Wohnen <u>ruft</u>." Heidegger, <u>Vorträge</u>, p. 162.

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¹⁸"Wie anders aber können die Sterblichen diesem Zuspruch (continued) <u>building</u> (it is not "theory") except insofar as building is dwelling. Building, to be building, is not <u>for</u> dwelling; it accomplishes dwelling by being <u>out of</u> it. Both thinking and building fail to accomplish dwelling when they fail to listen to each other. Each belonging to dwelling, must appreciate the other which also belongs. In this they are the same. But each has its own laws and responsibilities and neither can usurp the other.

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entsprechen als dadurch, das sie an ihrem Teil versuchen, von sich her das Wohnen in das Volle seines Wesens zu bringen? Sie vollbringen dies, wenn sie aus dem Wohnen bauen und flydas Wohnepdenken." Heidegger, Vorträge, p. 162.

APPENDIX "Schonen" (to spare)

According to Duden, "schonen" a middle high German verb which is now archaic, meant "to treat or to handle beautifully (considerately and carefully)". Three other words, not archaic, are closely related to it, and help to lay out its whole meaning in Heidegger's use of it. They are "schon" (already) "schön" (beautiful) and the English verb "to show".

The adverb "schon" was formerly connected with "schön" (beautiful). It separated from it in the thirteenth century after which its meaning went from "in beautiful fitting ways" through "perfectly, quite, utterly" to the present meaning of "already, previously". If we take note that the meaning of this word changed in such a way that the whole meaning gradually fell back out of sight, we can understand how the verb "schonen" dropped right out of use. The word "schon" often appears in German only as an abstract affirmative emphasis.

The adjective "schön" (beautiful) comes from the old High German "sconi" (shining, beautiful, pure) like the English "sheen". Its basic original meaning is "what is seen; imposing, considerable; stately, fine-looking; handsome (literally meaning "graspable"); important; eminent, conspicuous." "Schon" and "schonen" develop out of "schön" and then break off and lose sight of it. But clearly we could not treat or handle something beautifully and considerately unless it were considerable, treatable, graspable. This is the meaning that Heidegger wants to convey: we spare, we are spared. We handle beautifully, what is beautiful, just as we work the workable and ply the pliable.

The English verb "show" illustrates the same point. "Show", like the German "schauen" (to look at) and also all the other words mentioned here, come from the Indo-European root "*(s)qeu-" (to look at, observe, perceive). "Show" originally meant "behold, look". It is only in modern English that the "foreground" meaning has superseded the whole such that the meaning now is causative: "to cause to be seen".

CHAPTER SEVEN: ON "HÖLDERLIN'S EARTH AND SKY"

CHAPTER SEVEN

1 ON "HÖLDERLIN'S EARTH AND SKY"

Introduction

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Heidegger first delivered the lecture "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky" in 1959. Viewed from the concerns of the thesis, this lecture stands out from the other Hölderlin studies, because it draws together <u>all</u> of the components of the theme of freedom, the free and the fourfold in the full acceptance of the reality of what confronts us immediately in this time. All of these components were also present in "The Thing" and "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" and it is important to remember this fact. It would be a great mistake to think that the fourfold is encountered "by itself", after which there is a "return" to what is immediate. It is clear on the contrary that, for Heidegger, we never leave the immediate; it remains our <u>sole access</u> to what is mediate, and it is an "access" which continues to be needed, not one which can be

All references to this work are from: Martin Heidegger, Erlästerungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (4th edition, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1971), pp. 152-181.

It should be noted that I am examining this work because it completes the theme of freedom and the fourfold, and for this reason alone. I make no attempt to enter into the question whether Heidegger is right in the way he reads Hölderlin. Nor do I try to say anything definitive about what his reading of Hölderlin is, on the basis of only one work out of the several which he wrote on the poet. Thirdly, I am not attempting to "solve" the question of the (continued)

discarded once we reach the destination. Nevertheless, the emphasis in "The Thing" and "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" was on what is mediate. The titles speak for this fact. Things do not yet come near. We need to learn to dwell. We do not yet think. By contrast, "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky" brings both the immediate and the mediate into the centre of concern. Finally, it is both of these and <u>their</u> relation which tells us what Heidegger means by freedom.

In a foreword to the Stuttgart delivery of the lecture, Heidegger said what he is attempting in the lecture. This statement can serve as an indicator of what this chapter is about:

> "It is an attempt to retune our usual representation into an unusual, because simple thinking experience (The retuning into the thinking experience of the middle of the infinite relationship --: out of Ge-Stell as the self-misplacing occurrence of the fourfold.)"³

The immediate familiar reality we are used to, Heidegger "sums up" as a way of thinking and perceiving, representation or representing (Vorstellen). It is important to note that the base-word of "vorstellen" is "stellen" (to put or to place). The simple and mediate region of the truth of Being we are not used to. We do

2 (continued)

3

relation of philosophy and poetry, or to concentrate on Heidegger's "answer" to this question. In the course of arguing the thesis of freedom and the fourfold, these matters of Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin and the relation of thought and poetry have necessarily been introduced, but they could not be treated adequately without embarking on two or three other thematic studies.

Es ist ein Versuch, unser gewohntes Vorstellen in eine ungewohnte, weil einfache, denkende Erfahrung umzustimmen. (Die (continued) "not yet dwell" in it. Our freedom saves or hides (preserves) its essence in this region called the free, but it depends on being true to both the usual immediate and the unusual mediate. Freedom is the hub of these two, it hinges on a "retuning" (Umstimmung) which connects or relates the immediate and the mediate, which connects where we are "now" with where we are "not yet" and "no more". Heidegger names the two "poles" Ge-Stell and the fourfold. (Heidegger's use of "Ge-Stell", sometimes written Gestell, is not successfully translatable. Its meaning must emerge in the course of the study. At this point it should only be noted that the word focusses and gathers the meaning of "stellen" and the family of words which surround it.) "Ge-Stell" does not rule on its own. It is said to be the self-misplacing (Sichverstellen) of the fourfold. What rules in "what is placed" is also "what is misplaced".

It is clear that Heidegger is suggesting that to be free, we need to be aware (this does not mean "conscious") of what is occurring, what we are in and how we respond to what claims us. There are two steps which, together, make us aware of the whole of what is occurring. First we need to become aware that our immediate

3 (continued)

Umstimmung in die denkende Erfahrung der Mitte des unendlichen Verhältnisses--: aus dem Ge-Stell als dem sich selbst verstellenden Ereignis des Gevierts.) Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 153.

experience of ourselves representing, is the operation of Ge-Stell. Second, Ge-Stell is the self-misplacing of and by the fourfold. If we are to experience thoughtfully the whole meaning of freedom saving its essence in the free, we need to be aware of this "constellation" of Ge-Stell and fourfold.

I. Representation as Ge-Stell and its relation to "Freedom".

To a certain extent, the lecture, "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky", assumes some familiarity with the meaning of representation and Ge-Stell, which is, so to speak, the "starting point" of the retuning, the foothold in what is "real" and immediate. I have felt therefore that it would be helpful to lead up to the examination of the lecture with some preliminary remarks on the matter of representation, Ge-Stell, and freedom. To this end, I have drawn evidence here and there from another work, <u>The Question about Technique</u>, a work which centres on the meaning of Ge-Stell.

It must be carefully noted that I am not examining this work in the way I have done the others in this study. In no way am I attempting to "do justice" to this work, which enters deeply into the question of the relation of modern philosophy, modern science and technique. To engage in this question would require a study of all Heidegger's other works on science and technique. Nor do I try

Martin Heidegger, <u>Die Technik und die Kehre</u>, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962).

to examine adequately Heidegger's laying-out of the phenomenon of "provocation" and its relation to "poetic production". These necessary limitations mean that my consideration of "Ge-Stell" must be seen as <u>limited</u> and <u>partial</u>. My concern is only to introduce the question of the retuning taken up in "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky". Ge-Stell, then, is seen here primarily only as part of what it is, the current predominate mode of representation.

"The Question about Technique" was called, at first, "Das Gestell". It was delivered in 1949 along with three other lectures, "The Thing", "The Danger" and "The Turn", under the overall title of "A Look into what-is" (Einblick in das was ist). This title has the double meaning which refers both to our lookingout into what is, and Being's "flashing-in" or glancing into what is, which includes both mortals and things. (Heidegger points out in "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky" that "Einblick" and "Einblitz" are at root the same.) The lecture about technique begins with the statement that to question about technique is to prepare a free relation to it. A free relation would be one which connects our essence to its essence. The disclosure of Ge-Stell prepares <u>the</u> <u>free relation</u> or encounter of technique and man. The free relation itself is the fourfold.

Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 167.

5

As always, Heidegger begins the inquiry with a familiar or "correct" view. With regard to technique, there is the usual opinion that it is "a means to an end" and something done by humans. Technique is just something we employ for getting something we want. Heidegger pursues this <u>view</u> of technique until it shows its own incompleteness. To illustrate what is occurring in this move, I suggest the "model" of our experience when we perceive an object.

If we thought carefully about what is occurring when we perceive something, we might characterize the event as: subject represents object. The object is a "cluster of sense data" which we represent (project, imagine) as a thing. The whole event of the perceiving of the thing is not something which we control. Data are given and there is some question what enables us to organize and identify clusters of data, but we tend to ignore these "problems" because we can't talk carefully and exactly about them. This is where Heidegger's point comes in. (1) Because we tend to ignore that the subject is not completely in charge of perception, we also tend to forget that the objects (represented) are not absolute. (2) And we also miss what determines both subject and The subject's "will to represent" and the object's object. "representability" seem to fit together, to correspond. How is this possible? (1) As something placed (ein Gestelltes) an object perceived is also something misplaced. (2) We the subjects are also

"placed" or employed (bestellt) to place and misplace things. This is not something about which we have any choice. What is occurring in perception is that things are being represented and we are needed as part of the representation. The "matter" (about which we can't speak accurately) comes toward us and we perceive it. It is this "coming toward" (or nearing) which Heidegger focuses on: (1) What are we <u>in</u> and what is this "matter" <u>in</u>, such that it can come toward us? Heidegger suggests that in representation of objects, we <u>assume</u>, without articulating it, a <u>zone</u> of transcendence, the region we look out into, in which what occurs occurs. (2) How is it that we know "ahead of time" how to organize what comes toward us <u>correctly</u>? How do we even know that something comes toward us which is <u>other</u> than us?

When he names what is occurring Ge-Stell, Heidegger makes two basic points about our usual representation: (1) When things are placed as they are now, they are at the same time misplaced. Part of what they are is ignored (that they come toward us: in what? from where?). Things as objects represented by subjects are not absolute, they are grounded in a zone where a <u>relation</u> occurs. (The misplacement of things when they are represented is still, as placement, a revelation of what is.) (2) Representation is not a human <u>mistake</u>. Representing and placing are not something which humans as subjects control, either positively or negatively, though they are

of course obviously a necessary part of these events. The point is to see them as this <u>part</u>, responding to what claims them. It is not so that we once responded, and then started "creating" ex nihilo, and now we need to learn to respond again. Rather, as humans we <u>always</u> respond. Part of the peculiar character of representing is that it has gradually come to forget that it too is an authentic response to an authoritative claim.

Transferring these two basic points into the discussion of technique, it should be pointed out that Heidegger is saying something about the present state of affairs which both exposes its incompleteness as presently experienced and vindicates its authority. Technique is <u>correctly</u> but <u>incompletely</u> conceived as a human doing and a means to an end. The usual correct view hides two parts of the unfamiliar whole truth about what it is. It hides what comes toward us (which we represent) and what is "behind" us which guides our response. Becoming aware that what is occurring is Ge-Stell, we become aware that we, as representing subjects, are not "in charge" of representing. We are needed or claimed or gathered by Ge-Stell.

> "Ge-Stell names the gathering of those placings which place man, that is, which provoke him to reveal what is real in the manner of employing it as resource."

"Ge-stell heißt das Versammelnde jenes Stellens, das den Menschen stellt, d.h. herausfordert, das Wirkliche in der Weise des Bestellens als Bestand zu entbergen."

6

(continued)

"We now name that provoking claim which gathers man to it, to employ what reveals itself as resource -- Ge-Stell."⁶

Representing things is not a matter of human subjects making the world. Rather, it is the way the world is revealing itself in this time, which includes the employment of humans to employ the rest of what is and themselves as natural and human resources. This way of revealing misplaces what is. It is, and is not, what is. Its great danger lies in the fact that it conceals the fact that it conceals. It hides its heritage (what comes toward it and is behind it). At the same time, it is, in part, an authentic revelation of what is, because it has this heritage. A free relation to technique must be wary of the whole of what is occurring with it; not only its foreground (what is correct) but also the background heritage (what is true) which includes what comes toward it and what is behind it. The essence of technique includes both the foreground and the background. If we continue to try to do something about technique without being wary of the whole of what rules it and ourselves, we continue to be slaves of it. We do not yet encounter To be free we need to listen to the whole of what what encounters us.

6 (continued)

"Wir nennen jetzt jenen herausfordernden Anspruch, der den Menschen dahin versammelt, das Sichent bergende als Bestand zu bestellen -- das <u>Ge-stell</u>." Heidegger, <u>Die Technik</u>, p. 20, p. 19.

is sent.

7

"The unconcealment of what is, always goes on a way of revealing. What is sent of the revelation always rules man throughout. But it is never the fate of a coercion. For man only becomes free insofar as he "belongs into" the region of what is sent and thus becomes a listener, but not a slave.

The essence of freedom is originally not attached to the will or even only to the causality of human willing. Freedom allows the free to rule, the free in the sense of the cleared, that is the revealed. It is the happening of revealing that is of truth [the essence of what warrants and preserves] to which freedom stands in the nearest and most inward relationship. To reveal always belongs into what it is to preserve and conceal. Concealed and always concealing itself is what liberates, the mystery. All revelation comes out of the free, goes into the free and brings into the free. The freedom of the free exists neither in the unboundness of arbitrariness nor in the boundness of mere laws. Freedom is the clearing-concealing, in whose clearing the veil wafts, which covers the way of the prevailing of all truth and lets the veil appear as the coverer."/

"Immer geht die Unverborgenheit dessen, was ist, auf einem Weg des Entbergens. Immer durchwaltet den Menschen das Geschick der Entbergung. Aber es ist nie das Verhängnis eines Zwanges. Denn der Mensch wird gerade erst frei, insofern er in den Bereich des Geschickes gehört und so ein Hörender wird, nicht/aber ein Höriger.

Das Wesender Freiheit ist ursprünglich nicht dem Willen oder gar nur der Kausalität des menschlichen Wollens zugeordnet. Die Freiheit verwaltet das Freie im Sinne des Gelichteten. d.h. des Entborgenen. Das Geschehnis des Entbergens, d.h. der Wahrheit, ist es zu dem die Freiheit in der nächsten und innigsten Verwandschaft steht. Alles Entbergen gehört in ein Bergen und Verbergen. Verborgen aber ist und immer sich verbergend das Befreiende, das Geheimmis. Alles Entbergen kommt aus dem Freien, geht ins Freie und bringt ins Freie. Die Freiheit des Freienbesteht weder in der Ungebundenheit der Willkür, noch in der Bindung durch blobe Gesetze. Die Freiheit ist das lichtend Verbergende, in dessen Lichtung jener Schleier weht, der das Wesende aller Wahrheit verhüllt und den Schleier als den verhullenden erscheinen läbt." Heidegger, Die Technik, p. 25.

The thesis of the thesis is that freedom saves its essence in the free. What this means in relation to "Ge-Stell" is drawn together in this passage. The free and its essence, freedom, can only be clarified together in the mesh of what is occurring. It is not possible to speak of freedom "by itself" and then bring it into a larger discussion also about the free. Ge-Stell is a way of revelation (the one which is sent to us) and like all ways of revelation, it is always at the same time a hiding or concealment. The special quality of Ge-Stell is that it also conceals the fact that it is a way of revelation at all, and thus it is a double concealment. In any case, willing and representing are the "expressions" of freedom but not its origin and not the whole of its essence. We become free when we belong into what is sent. We are ruled by Ge-Stell. We are held into the free. The way we are ruled is not coercion but rather a claim to which we respond. We have no choice about the rule of Ge-Stell; we either belong to it or we are coerced by it when we ignore it.

The <u>essence</u> of freedom includes what claims it. It includes the whole of what rules and unfolds in it. When we think or produce art, we are <u>responding</u>; inside what we are in. We are saying and naming what <u>needs</u> to be said and named. The saying and the naming are never what is said and what is named, for freedom saves its essence in the free. Freedom vindicates its unhidden side by preserving its hidden side! All revelation is a clearing and a

concealing and freedom is only <u>essential</u> when it clears <u>and</u> conceals, when it is aware of the hidden source of the revelation which liberates. All revelation comes out of the free: it clears, it lets the clearing rule in its unhiddenness. All revelation goes into the free: it conceals, it lets the free rule in its hidden way. All revelation brings into the free: clearing and concealing, Ge-Stell gathers and rules.

> "Wherever man opens his eye and ear, unlocks his heart and gives himself freely into thinking and struggling, forming and working, asking and thanking, he finds himself everywhere already brought into the unhidden."⁸

If humans open themselves to the <u>essence</u> of technique, they find themselves <u>already</u> taken into a liberating claim. The awareness of Ge-Stell enables the turn into the truth of the fourfold. The more we become aware of the <u>need</u> that we do not yet experience what is warranted and lasting of technique, in mere technique, the more we can become aware of the richness and mystery of what we no-longer preserve of what is warranted and lasting of art in mere aesthetics. For Heidegger, thought and art cooperate to bring forward or produce the "essential room" in which we dwell.

[&]quot;Wo immer der Mensch sein Auge und Ohr öffnet, sein Herz aufschlie⁵t, sich in das Sinnen und Trachten, Bilden und Werken, Bitten und Danken freigibt, findet er sich Überall schon ins Unverborgene gebracht." Heidegger, <u>Die Technik</u>, p. 18.

II. "Hölderlin's Earth and Sky". Ge-Stell and the fourfold.

Introduction

Two of the forewords to this lecture yield indications of what it attempts. I have already mentioned one, the attempt to retune our usual representing into a thinking experience of the middle of the infinite relationship. Heidegger, the thinker, seeks to retune our usual representing into the thoughtful experience of the middle of the infinite relationship which is named by HBlderlin the poet. Freedom responds to the free. Thought and poetry respond to Ge-Stell as the self-misplacing of the fourfold.

"What you seek, it is near, it encounters you already."⁹ Having some limited awareness of the character of Ge-Stell from section I, it is now possible to learn how this "gathering to place" is the self-misplacing of the fourfold. This will complete Heidegger's thesis that freedom saves its essence in the free, the region of the truth of Being into which we are bound by the fourfold's mirror-play.

The second indicator is the answer to the question why a thinker thinks about a poet and his work. Heidegger says he is asking nothing less than whether we of this age can "belong to what Hölderlin has named". Hölderlin has named what is holy in this age. He has

"Was du suchest, es ist nahe, begegnet dir schon." (Heimkunft/An die Verwandten). Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 10.

named the fourfold misplacing itself. He has announced a cominghome in the homelessness of what Heidegger calls Ge-Stell.

The lecture can be divided into three main divisions in which Heidegger examines a letter Hölderlin wrote to a friend, examines the poet "Greece" which sings about the fourfold, and draws some conclusions about the relation of Hölderlin's fourfold to what he has called Ge-Stell. The retuning of our usual representing is described by Heidegger, using Hölderlin's words, as the coming of great beginning to what is lowly or insignificant. This is the outline of Heidegger's stance concerning the whole of what is occurring in the West in this time.

A. What poethood meant for Hölderlin, and the poem "Greece".

Before proceeding to the study of the letter, Heidegger discusses what he thinks Hölderlin meant by "poethood" and what he thinks we should bear in mind when approaching a poem as "something named". There is no "one true way" into what Hölderlin has named. What is named, "the poem" (das Gedicht) is itself a "pulling back and forth between sound and meaning" as Valery put it. Heidegger's translation is "zögern" which means originally "to pull back and forth repeatedly" though it is usually translated now as "to delay". Heidegger specifically dissociates the meaning from that of "schwanken" (also "delay, hesitation" but with the connotation of "bendable" and thus "unsure"). By contrast, "zögern" is a decisive pulling back

and forth, one which follows the necessity of the matter. If the poem itself is "hesitant" by necessity, how much more cautious must be the listening to it and the thought which helps to make possible a listening to it?

The lecture is not a "contribution to Hölderlin research", its concern is rather something preparatory, a matter of thought (eine Sache des Denkens), namely the re-tuning into the thinking experience of the middle of the fourfold, of the infinite relationship. But though this is a matter of thought, the region where the retuning occurs is "the realm of poetic naming", and thus the matter in question is Hölderlin's earth and sky. It is necessary to think about a retuning which occurs poetically out of "poethood" (Dichtertum). Heidegger quotes from Bettina V. Arnim, to say what poethood meant for Hölderlin, and how this is missed in the usual literary and aesthetic categories.

> "And thus <u>God has needed the poet</u> as arrow, to speed his rhythm from the bow, and one who isn't sensitive to this and doesn't entwine in it, never will have either the destiny or the purity of strength to be a poet, and he is too weak to be able to grasphimself in subject matter, or in the earlier or later modes of imagining our "tendencies", and no poetic forms will reveal themselves to him. Poets who rehearse themselves in the given forms can also only repeat the spirit once given; they perch like birds on a branch of the tree of language, and "weigh themselves"[or "move to and fro"] on it, according to the basic rhythm which lies in its root, but do not fly up like the eagle of spirit, bred by the living spirit of language."¹⁰

"Und so habe den Dichter der Gott gebraucht als Pfeil, seinen Rhythmus vom Bogen zu schnellen, und wer dies nicht empfinde und sich [nicht] dem schmiege, der werde nie weder Geschick noch Athletentugend haben zum Dichter, und zu schwach sei ein solcher, als daß er sich fassen könne, weder im Stoff, noch in der Weltansicht der früheren, (continued)

10

To think about the retuning of representation into the thoughtful experience of the fourfold, we need to learn something of what it is to be poetic. This will enable us to experience misplacement as the self-misplacement of the fourfold. The retuning leads us into the region out of which the poet names, when poethood is understood as staying on the branch of language, receiving and repeating the rhythm, vibrating out of the roots (embedded in the soil), not taking flight like an eagle inspired only by the <u>living</u> spirit of language and forgetting its roots in <u>death</u>. Language is the way we are joined with what is other than us. The word "Umstimmung" which I am translating "retuning" is obviously pivotal in this work. It can be connected to Heidegger's discussions of truth as agreement or harmony (Ubereinstimmung) and mood (Stimmung). In this lecture it connects also, above all, with the four voices (Stimmen) of what is sent.

The poem which Heidegger chooses to examine is the third version of "Greece" which invokes in its opening line, the whole

^{10 (}continued) noch in der späteren Vorstellungsart unsrer Tendenzen, und keine poetischen Formen werden sich ihm offenbaren. Dichter, die sich in gegebene Formen einstudieren, die können auch nur den einmal gegebenen Geist wiederholen, sie setzen sich wie Vögel auf einen Ast des Sprachbaumes und wiegen sich auf dem, nach dem Urrhythmus der in seiner Wurzel liege, nicht aber fliege ein solcher auf als der Geistesadler, von dem lebendigen Geist der Sprache augebrütet." (Bettina V. Arnim, Sämtliche Werke ed. W. Oehlke. Bd. II S. 345). Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 154.

matter of the poem, the four voices of what is sent, the ways of the wanderer (the poet). To my knowledge, there is no published English translation of this version of the poem. I therefore submit the following attempt of my own, hoping it might help in the understanding of Heidegger's thought about the poem.

11

Greece

O you voices of what is sent, you ways of the wanderer For in the blue, school (of eyes) Far back in the raging of the sky Like the blackbird, sounds song 5 Of clouds, (certain) serene mood Well-tuned by God's Dasein, the thunderstorm. And calls, like looking out To immortality and heroes; Many are the memories. Whereupon 10 Sounding, as if of calf's skin The earth, out of devastations, attempts of the holy For in the beginning the work forms itself Follows great laws, science And tenderness and wide sky, afterward (mere veil) 15 Appearing, sing clouds of song. For safe is the navel of the Earth. Caught by name in banks of grass are the flames and universal Elements. But over in clear reflection lives theaether. But silves 20 On pure days Is the light. As sign of love A good bit blue the earth [18 [But like the round dance 19] At the wedding] To what is lowly also there can come Great beginning.

11

<u>Griechenland</u> (Third version; words in square brackets from the second.) O ihr Stimmen des Geschiks, ihr Wege des Wanderers Denn an der [Augen] Schule Blau, Fernher, am Tosen des Himmels Tönt wie der Amsel Gesang 5 Der Wolken [sichere] heitere Stimmung gut (continued) 25 But work days, wonderfully, to love man God has on a garment. His face conceals itself with knowings And covers the lids with art. And breath and time covers

30 What is terrible, so that none, nor the soul Loves him too much with Prayers. For long already stands open Like leaves, to learn, (or lines and angle) Nature

11 (continued)
Gestimmt vom Daseyn Gottes, dem Gewitter.
Und Rufe, wie hinausschauen, zur
Unsterblichkeit und Helden;
Viel sind Erinnerungen. Wo darauf
10 Tönend, wie des Kalbs Haut
Die Erde, von Verwüstungen her, Versuchungen der Heiligen

Denn anfangs bildet das Werk sich Großen Gesezen nachgehet, die Wissenschaft Und Zärtlichkeit und den Himmel breit lauter Hülle nachher 15 Erscheinend singen Gesangeswolken. Denn fest ist der Erde Nabel. Gefangen nemlich in Ufern von Gras sind Die Flammen und die allgemeinen Elemente. Lauter Besinnung aber oben lebt der Aether. Aber 20 An reinen Tagen [silbern Ist das Licht. Als Zeichen der Liebe Veilchenblau die Erde. [18 [Aber wie der Reigen 19]Zur Hochzeit,]

- Zu Geringem auch kann kommen Großer Anfang.
 25 Alltag aber wunderbar zu lieb den Menschen Gott an hat ein Gewand.
 - Und Erkenntnissen verberget sich sein Angesicht Und deket die Lüfte mit Kunst. Und Luft und Zeit dekt
 - 30 Den Schröklichen, daß zu sehr nicht eins Ihn liebet mit Gebeten oder Die Seele. Denn lange schon steht offen Wie Blätter, zu lernen, oder Linien und Winkel Die Natur
 - 35 Und gelber die Sonnen und die Monde, Zu Zeiten aber Wenn ausgehn will die alte Bildung

(continued)

35	And more yellow the suns and the moons,
	At times, however
	When the old establishment of the earth
	Having become named through events, wants to go out,
	bravely fighting as in the heights,
40	The earth leads God. Unmeasured steps
	He limits however, but like blossoms of gold
	The soul's powers and its relations unite themselves.
	That more lovely on earth
	Beauty dwells and some spirit
45	Associates itself with men more communally.
	It is sweet, then under high shade of trees
	And hills to dwell, sunny, where the way is
	Paved to the church. But for one travelling
	Out of love for life, whose feet obey, always measuring,
50	More beautifully bloom
	The ways, where the land
	11 (continued)
	Der Erde, bei Geschichten nemlich
	Gewordnen, muthig fechtenden, wie auf Höhen führet
40	Die Erde Gott. Ungemessene Schritte
	Begränzt er aber, aber wie Blüthen golden thun
	Der Seele Kräfte dann der Seele Verwandtschaften sich zusammen,
	Dab lieber auf Erden
	Die Schönheit wohnt und irgend ein Geist
45	Gemeinschaftlicher sich zu Menschen gesellet.
	Sub ists, dann unter hohen Schatten von Bäumen
	Und Hügeln zu wohnen, sonnig, wo der Weg ist
	Gepflastert zur Kirche. Reisenden aber, wem,
	Aus Lebensliebe, messend immerhin,
	Aus Lebensliebe, messena immernin,

50 Die Füße gehorchen, blühn Schöner die Wege, wo das Land

(StA II, S 257f) Heidegger, Erläuterungen, pp. 154-6.

B. Hölderlin's letter to a friend, Böhlendorf: the essence

of the Greeks, the determining place and the height of art.

According to Heidegger, Hölderlin is saying something in this poem "Greece" about the <u>relation</u> of the earth and the sky and also that this relation receives its tuning or definition out of a "richer relationship" (the fourfold) though this is never named as such in this poem. Before we can hear what Hölderlin is naming he suggests we need to say something also which doesn't try to <u>surpass</u> what is said by Hölderlin. Rather it is a preliminary necessary to allow a contact with what Hölderlin named. We need to listen, he says, "from out of what concerns us in the present age." We need to know that representing is Ge-Stell before we can hear the wealth in this poem.

Hölderlin wrote a letter to his friend Böhlendorf and Heidegger points out that the letter tells something of what made him write a poem about <u>Greece</u>, just when his concern was coming home to his own time and land. Heidegger draws out three main points from the letter which he thinks will help us to hear what the poem names:

(1) The letter shows the fact that Hölderlin first became clear about "the authentic essence of the Greeks" at this time of his homecoming, and also shows how this occurred.

(2) In the letter, Hölderlin announces that he has arrived at a "determining place" or point (Ort) which has enabled him at last to preserve in memory the ways of the wandering. And he pays tribute to a special <u>light</u> wherein such remembering moves.
(3) Hölderlin makes a crucial statement about "the height of art".

(1) Beginning with the essence of the Greeks, Heidegger discusses Holderlin's use of the word "athletic":

> "What is athletic is what is heroic, "warlike" in the sense of " $\pi o \lambda \epsilon \mu \alpha$ ", that struggle which Heraclitus thought as movement, in which and for which gods and men, what is free and slavish come out into the appearing of their essence."¹²

The Greek word " $\hat{\chi} \hat{\theta} \hat{\lambda} \hat{\epsilon} \hat{\omega}$ " means "to struggle, to wrestle, to grasp, to bear" (in German, "kämpfen, ringen, fassen, tragen"). Heidegger here identifies Hölderlin's focus on what is "athletic", with Heraclitus' thought about movement. The uncovering of what frees takes struggle. According to Heidegger this part of the matter "captured itself" in the "heroic body" or the athlete of Greek sculpture.

A complementary part of the Greeks ability is the "power of reflection" (Reflexionskraft). Heidegger calls it the ability to let shine back what shone purely in itself and thereby came into presence. Together these two powers bring what is beautiful into

¹² "Das Athletische ist das heldisch "Kriegerisch" im Sinne des $\pi o \lambda \varepsilon \mu o \zeta$, jenes Kampfes, den Heraklit als die Bewegung denkt, in der und für die Götter und Menschen, das Freie und das Knechtische ins Scheinen ihres Wesens herauskommen." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 160.

appearance. This, for Hölderlin is "the essence of the Greeks". They are the ones whose struggle brought what is beautiful into appearance. Hölderlin names this essence (Zärtlichkeit). According to Heidegger, this word was used by Hölderlin in an "unsentimental, far-reaching" meaning which has since been forgotten.

The history of the meaning of "Zärtlichkeit" is complex but judging from Heidegger's approach I believe the best translation for its use by Hölderlin in naming the essence of the Greeks would be "grace" or "gracefulness". The current meaning of the word is "affection", "tenderness", "amouressness", and Heidegger implies that it has a strong element of sentimentality to it. The older meaning is the same as that of the word "Anmut" usually translated as "grace, charm, sweetness, gracefulness". The history of the meaning of this word too is instructive. Originally it meant literally "the meaning put on something", but put in the special way related to the word "Mut" (courage), something perhaps like: "the meaning attached to something due to the heart's striving after it". From this meaning it developed into "desire, joy, pleasure" and then into "alluring quality" that is, "charm, gracefulness, grace".

The oldest meaning of the adjective "zart" is "delicate, weak". As time went on it came also to mean "soft, gentle, fine"

and then also "dear, valued, trusted, charming, delightful". The power of reflection is the gentle loving quality which lets what shines shine. Grace combines the athletic striving and the gentle letting Be which enabled the Greeks to unveil what is beautiful. Grace is what is proper to the Greeks. (The word "grace" comes from the Latin "gratia" which means "favour shown to another, kindness, loveliness, charm, gratitude". It comes from the base *gwer- meaning "to praise, welcome". "Charm" means essentially "song".)

The word "Mut" is instructive in another way. It has the same root as the English "mood", (namely the Indo-European root "*me-" "to strive"). The "retuning" which Heidegger has said is the matter of thought of the lecture and which leads us into Hölderlin's understanding of poethood -- means in one sense, a change of mood: Hölderlin has seen what is proper to the Greeks, that is, their "mood" or tuning. He states in the letter that the mood of the Germans or the "moderns" is "Nüchternheit" (clear-headedness). The retuning seems to involve a proper appreciation of the essence of these two moods together in what is coming in the midst of the present situation, which Heidegger has called "Ge-Stell".

The adjective "nuchtern" is a cloister word meaning originally "not having eaten or drunken anything yet". The word was taken from the Latin "nocturnus" meaning "night-like" and was transformed by

being combined with the Old German "uohta", meaning "early twilight" or "dawn". It referred to the "sober" temper or mood of those at the earliest services. By the time of Middle High German it had come to mean "sober", the opposite of "drunk", and later it added the shades of meaning of "prudent, discreet, cautious".

As Heidegger reads Hölderlin's letter, what is proper to the Germans is clearheadedness and sobriety, but the homecoming does not mean an abandonment of the "grace" of the Greeks which he had wandered out to see but now must leave behind. Nor does it mean a substitution of the grace for the sobriety. Michael Hamburger, writing of Hölderlin, makes that point as well.

> ". . . he came to reverse the conventional view by stating that what was proper to the Greeks was their 'holy pathos', or 'holy drunkenness' as he calls it elsewhere, though Homer was 'spirited enough to acquire occidental Junonian sobriety', its complement. The moderns on the other hand, should turn to the ancient Greeks to learn 'holy pathos' because cold sobriety is what is proper to them. The matter is complicated by Hölderlin's discovery explained in the same letter of 1801, that 'the free use of what is proper to one is the most difficult thing of all'; it 'must be learnt just as much as what is foreign to one'."¹³

(2) Hölderlin refers in the letter to a determining place which he has reached, out of which he was able to name the essence of the Greeks. And he makes the statement:

	13					
	Michael	Hamburger,	<u>Hölderlin</u>	(Middlesex:	Penguin	(D54)
1961),	xxi, xxii.					

"that all holy determining places of the earth are together around one determining place . . . is now my joy."¹⁴

And this place shows the earth and sky as what they are together. The determining place which frees and brings joy (Freude) is the holy.

"As the building of the sky, the earth preserves and bears the holy, that is, the sphere of God."¹⁵

The lightning and the thunderstorm, seen not as isolated event, but rather as the heightened focal point of the relation of earth and sky, is called by Hölderlin the Dasein of God, literally the "Being-there of God". Heidegger points out that the German "Blitz" (lightning) is the same word originally as "Blick" (glance or look), and in the look, is Dasein.

"Earth and sky and the gods hidden in the holy, for the quiet-joyful tuning of the poet, everything in the whole of the original rising nature is "coming-toward".¹⁶

"Daß alle heiligen Orte der Erde zusammen sind um einen Ort . . . ist jezt meine Freude." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 161. 15

"Sie birgt und trägt als der Bau der Himmlischen das Heilige, d.h. die Sphäre des Gottes." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 161.

16

"Erde und Himmel und die im Heiligen verborgenen Götter, alles ist für die still-freudige Stimmung des Dichters im Ganzen der ursprünglich auf_gehenden Natur gegen wärtig." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u> p. 161.

¹⁴

The "philosophical light", Hölderlin says, is around his window. For Heidegger, this means the ability of the Greeks to bring what is beautiful into truth is working again out of this determining place where Hölderlin finds himself, the place where all the holy places gather and the holy, the sphere of God opens once again.

(3) Thus it is for Heidegger that Hölderlin says that he now understands not only what is true about the Greeks, but also the height of art <u>overall</u>, and therefore what he thinks he is doing with his poetry. Art includes all ways in which anything is brought to a stand, or secured, or "serenified". Heidegger says this as follows:

> "Art is, as the showing letting-shine of the unseeable, the highest type of sign. Ground and peak of such showing unfold themselves again in saying as poetic song."¹⁷

Showing, and what is shown, are response to "what is to be shown", to what is true, to beauty.

> "Dwelling poetically man brings everything that appears, earth and sky and holy, into the shining forth which stands for itself, preserves all, man brings it to a certain stand in the shape of the work."¹⁸

"Die Kunst ist als das zeigende Erscheinenlassen des Unsichtbaren die höchste Art des Zeichens. Grund und Gipfel solchen Zeigens wiederum ent falten sich im Sagen als der dichtende Gesang." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 162.

18

"Der dichterisch wohnende Mensch bringt alles Scheinende, Erde und Himmel und das Heilige, in den für sich stehenden, alles verwahrenden Vorschein, bringt es in der Gestalt des Werkes zum sicheren Stehen." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 162.

¹⁷

This means establishing (Stiften) or building. This is what it is to project the world. The world worlds in poetic dwelling that remains perched on the tree of language.

The unity of the whole of the four remains unsaid in the letter. The establishing and naming of the richer relationship which determines the union of earth and sky needs a "song", the poem "Greece". But before considering the poem, Heidegger calls our attention to two short phrases, with which Hölderlin did name the whole of the fourfold. The phrases are:

> ". . . worklike (real)/for the whole relationship, together with the middle."¹⁹

"more graceful infinite relationship"¹⁹

The word "unendlich" (infinite or literally "unendlike") Heidegger writes "<u>un</u>-endlich". He reminds us that Hölderlin meant the word in the sense used in Hegel's and Schelling's speculative dialectic -that is, meaning "not-one-sided" or "non-finite". This means Hölderlin is making the point that the four are not cut off and separated in one-sidedness. They belong together in the relationship. Each of the four is set free into its one-sidedness out of the nonfinite middle, which mediates all. As <u>non</u>-finite, the relationship is more graceful or loving (zartere), that is, it is more preserving and freeing.

"wirklich/Ganzem Verhältnib, samt der Mitt."

19

"zartere unendliche Verhältniß". Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 163.

C. On the poem "Greece". The song about the fourfold.

Heidegger points out that in its first version the poem's opening line read:

, You ways of the wanderer". The space was left blank which was later filled with:

"O you voices of what is sent, . . . " 20 As Heidegger interprets the poem, Hölderlin is singing about what determines or tunes poetry. Hölderlin sings that it would be sweet to stay in the secure ways which "lead to the church", a way already paved, but the poet is a wanderer a traveller. For love of life the poet confronts death. And this wandering also submits; here too "the feet obey". When new life comes out of holy chaos, the poet catches it in song.

"The mortals die death in life. In death the mortals become "non-mortal"."²¹

The "non-finite", the "non-mortal" speaks to us as the voices of what is sent. They are the sounding which sends us what is sent. The sky sounds as the serenifying tuning of the clouds. The clouds are "well-tuned". They hide and preserve the approach of God. The earth is the second voice which sounds. Its sounding is resounding; it is the echo of the sky. Like a drum, it resounds and reciprocates

20

"_____, ihr Wege des Wanderers". "O ihr Stimmen des Geschiks, . . ." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 164.

²¹"Die Sterblichen sterben den Tod in Leben. Im Tod werden die Sterblichen un-sterblich." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 165.

the beats of the thundering sky. In this reciprocating resonance, the earth and sky are always held together as lovers; they preserve each other, each lets the other be what it is in preserving it.

The earth is "behind great laws" (the poem continues) which are named science and gracefulness. Heidegger suggests that these are the " $\sqrt{c}\mu c \iota$ ", the directives (Weisungen) of which Antigone speaks which bring things into their essence. Heidegger says of them:

"Unwritten, because unwritable, they define the non-finite connection of the whole relationship."²²

Antigone says that no one has ever looked into the place from where they come. This is, in a way, the answer to Buchner's question: From where does thought receive the directive?

The earth sends itself into great laws called science and gracefulness. (Wissenschaft und Zärtlichkeit). Science is here identified (as with Fichte and Hegel) with philosophy. "Gracefulness", as we learned from the letter to Böhlendorf, describes the "popularity" of the Greeks.

> "Popularity is the ability of the highest inclination toward, and of uttermost sharing in, what a people is destined to meet as what is strange in their nativeness."²³

22

23

"Ungeschrieben, weil unschreibbar, bestimmen sie den unendlichen Zusammenhang des ganzen Verhältnisses." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 167.

"Die popularitas ist das Vermögen der höchsten Zuneigung zu dem, und der Hubersten Mitteilung an das, was als das Fremde ein Volk in seinem Einheimischen geschicklich trifft." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 167. Here is Heidegger's precise statement of what he thinks Hölderlin meant with the difficulty of learning what is proper to one, and what is strange to one. The word "Popularität" comes from French and Latin origins. What comes naturally to people and is favoured by them due to their birth, their national origins. The second of the named "great laws" is "gracefulness" which we know from the letter is the "popularity" of the Greeks.

Together, science and gracefulness, simple and enriching, hold the earth open to the sky. Through these great laws we participate in giving form and prevalence to the relation of earth and sky. Through these laws we are "earth-like" and "sky-like" together. Heidegger takes pains to point out that the "clouds of song" appear "afterward", that is, after the union of the earth and the sky. Thus "song" (Gesang) is skylike-earthlike. The call of the singer is a looking out to the non-mortal, which conceals what is Godlike, the sphere of what is holy, a looking out from the earth into the breadth of sky.

As the sky's lightning glance <u>sounds</u> to us, so the song responds as <u>looking</u> and calling. The "blue, school of the eyes" is the source of what is heroic and holy. The looking out and calling is response to the looking and calling of the sky. The poet is tuned, called and in responding is the third voice of what is sent, the mortal. The fourth voice is God's. As Heidegger puts it:

"The ones thus calling become thereby themselves a voice of what is sent. The "love toward what is not mortal", that is toward what is Godlike, "is of&God" (from "What is God" St.A II, p.210, 6ff). Such love belongs to God, but remains something strange in which he sends himself as in clouds of song. For God also still stands under what is sent. God is one of the voices of what is sent."²⁴

The loving and preserving of what is not mortal, of what is other than mortal, is love toward what is godlike, what is invoked; it is of God. (Freedom toward the ground is freedom of sacrifice.)

Heidegger suggests that according to Hölderlin, God rules and unfolds by concealing "itself".

". . . unseeable, it sends itself in the strange."²⁵ The "of" in the phrase "the love toward what is godlike is of *a*. God" contains both the meanings of love "by" God and for "God". That which we seek, it is near, it encounters us already. The singers are necessarily "blind"; God hides himself. This is the need for art. ("Caught by names in banks of grass are the flames".) The voice of God, hiding itself, spares mortals from what is terrible. The forming and naming of what is essential in

"Die also Rufenden werden dadurch selber zu einer Stimme des Geschicks. Ihre "Liebe zur Unsterblichkeit", d.h. zur Göttlichkeit "ist eines Gottes". ('Was ist Gott?' St A II, S.210, 6ff.). Solche Liebe gehört dem Gott, bleibt jedoch ein Fre mdes, darein er sich so wie in die Gesanges-wolken schickt. Denn auch Gott steht noch unter dem Geschick. Der Gott ist eine der Stimmen des Geschicks." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 169.

25

24

"Unsichtbar, schiket es sich in Fre mdes" ('Was ist Gott?') Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 169.

poetic production, knowing and art are the "garment" God wears. The word "Kunst" (art) is a noun developed from the auxiliary verb "kUnnen" (can, be able). Its original meaning was "knowing, wisdom, knowledge" and even "science". Later it was used also as "ability, faculty, skill, knack". After the 18th century it referred to the four fine arts: painting, sculpture, poetry and music. Heidegger takes Hölderlin's meaning to be that God gives men knowing and art, to hide its face. Art protects the eyes schooled by the sky, like eyelids.

> "There are four voices which sound: The sky, the earth, man, God. In these four voices what is sent (destiny) gathers the whole non-finite withholding. But none of the four stands and goes one-sidedly for itself. None is in this sense finite. None is without the others. <u>Non-finitely they hold themselves to one</u> another, are what they are out of the <u>non-finite with-</u> holding., are this whole itself."²⁰

"Four" is not here a count of four members of a group. It connotes rather the unity of the Gestalt of the <u>non</u>-finite relation of the four voices. The unity is sent; it is what is sent (das Geschick). It sends the four to each other. It keeps them gathered. What is sent, Heidegger presumes is what Hölderlin calls "the middle" (die Mitte) which mediates the four each to each.

26

"Vier Stimmen sind es, die tönen: Der Himmel, die Erde, der Mensch, der Gott. In diesen vier Stimmen versammelt das Geschick das ganze unendliche Verhältnis. Doch keines der Vier steht und geht einseitig für sich. Keines ist in diesem Sinne endlich. Keines ist ohne die anderen. <u>Un</u>-endlich halten sie sich aneinander, sind, was sie sind, aus dem <u>un</u>-endlichen Verhältnis, sind dieses Ganze selbst." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 170.

"What is sent gathers the four into its middle shapes it, originates it into the authentic awareness."²⁷

In Middle High German times, the word "Geschick" had the substantive meaning of "event, what has come to pass, order, form, shape of things". Earlier it had a primarily verbal connotation connected with verbs meaning "let happen, affect, join, order, enjoin". Its current meaning is either "dispensation, fate" or "dexterity, adroitness". There is obviously a close similarity to the meanings of "Kunst" and "Gestalt"; this gives some idea of what Hölderlin and Heidegger mean with "what is sent".

What is sent bridges the difference between authority and authenticity. This is the meaning of "Innigkeit". The word "innig" means "<u>heartfelt</u>, sincere, deep, responsive and intimate" and "responsive" implies a claim. Because it is the middle, what is sent is the beginning, literally the "catching-on" (An-fang). Such a catching on reaches out to find itself already held. As a "catching on", a beginning is not something which is gone now, and just was at the start. Rather it continues to come or to arrive. It continues to reach out to what holds it.

The "great beginning" continues to come in this time when the union is "insignificant" because holy names are lacking. This

"Das Geschick holt die Vier in seine Mitte zu sich ein, nimmt sie an sich, fängt sie an in die Innigkeit." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 171.

27

is how he interprets Hölderlin's statement:

"To what is insignificant also can come Great beginning."²⁸

The meaning of this statement is the same as Heraclitus' meaning when he said, warming himself by the stove, "There are gods present here also". The apparently poor, ordinary, insignificant place to which Hölderlin found himself coming home is the place around which all holy places are gathered.

As Heidegger interprets Hölderlin, the coming of the great beginning to what is insignificant ("the West", the evening land, which Heidegger calls Ge-Stell), is likened to the round dance at the wedding. Men and gods celebrate the bridal feast of earth and sky. The way through what we are <u>in</u>, to the greatness of what is coming needs the sacrificial celebration and struggle which acknowledges what is other than us and cooperates with it.

> "The marriage is the whole of the intimacy ["in-eachother-ness] of: earth and sky, man and gods. It is the feast and celebration of the non-finite relationship."²⁹

The time of the coming is called the "stillness of completion". This is called "insignificant" in the same way that "small" (klein) meant "fine". Just as "zart" means "delicate, fine", "gering" as a

28

"Zu Geringem auch kann kommen

Großer Anfang." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 171. 29

"Die Hochzeit ist das Ganze der Innigkeit von: Erde und Himmel, Menschen und Göttern. Sie ist Fest und Feier des unendlichen Verhältnisses." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 173.

strengthened form or "fortified" form of "ring" means "light" or "pliable". This matter can be allied with the discussion of "ring" and "gering" in Chapter Five. The beginning, the "catching-on" comes in the form of the beautiful constant struggle, the rounddance. That which liberates and brings peace needs plying, striving, erring, straying to leeward and "making up the leeway".

Heidegger says the round dance is the Greek chorus ($\chi \circ \rho \circ \varsigma$), singing and dancing the celebration of God, in which the gods also participate.

> "We are not able to exhaust the riches of the word "round dance" said in simple awe. For it names the richness itself, namely of that which would like to come."³⁰

The dance of the maenads he thinks can only be properly appreciated as a <u>response</u> to the Gods themselves in the dance. And it is only the dance and song <u>on the earth</u> that makes the round dance as great as it is. The fire of the sky, shielded by clouds, brings dew and rain to the earth. And Hölderlin speaks of the fire of the gods; the richness is "hot", though it is imprisoned. Heidegger suggests he is saying that our freedom is into the free, that our life is necessarily under Gods just as we necessarily wander on the earth, under the sky. And these three are all bound together

"Wir vermögen den Reichtum des in einfacher Scheu gesagten Wortes "Reigen" nicht auszuschöpfen. Denn es nennt den Reichtum selber, nämlich dessen, was kommen möchte." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 174.

and also bound together with us, the fourth member of the fourfold.

D. The shaping of the ruling and unfolding of what is godlike in this time.

The gods have flown! But what then does it mean to say that human life is an <u>image</u> of the godhood in <u>this</u> time? What the word image (Bild) means and what the verb "bilden" means is obviously crucial for the relationship of the four as it concerns especially the "ways of God to man". In the letter to Böhlendorff, Hölderlin uses these words in two passages (Heidegger quotes the letter in full).

> ". . . the light in its effecting, shaping nationally and as principle and in the matter of fate, so that for us something is holy . . ."³¹

". . . it [what the poet does] belongs to the holy shape that we shape."³¹

These passages can help us to understand Heidegger's view of what it is to shape what is sent or to name the holy (as he interprets Hölderlin), but first, something can be said about the history of the meaning and use of the words "Bild" and "bilden".

". . . das Licht in seinem Wirken, nationell und als Prinzip und Schiksaals/weise bildend, daß uns et was heilig ist, . . ."

"... er gehöret dem heiligen Bilde, das wir bilden." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 158.

Currently, the word "Bild" usually designates the work of painters and graphic artists, to a lesser extent, that of sculptors, and sometimes (figuratively) that of literary "workers". Earlier, it meant "copy, likeness, image"; "model, example" or "product, shape, structure". It probably comes from the German root "*bil" meaning "miraculous power" or "portend, wondrous sign". The original meaning of the word, then, is probably "(sign of) wonder". The verb "bilden" is a united form of two verbs which meant respectively "to give a matter shape and prevalence" and "to copy a form". When these two were united, the New High German "bilden" was associated with God's creating and also the creating of handicraft and art.

According to Heidegger, Holderlin's wonder in the letter comes from his conviction and experience that he is being shaped by what is holy and thus is able to shape the life of mortals. And this is back in the land which actually bears him, from which he has wandered. A new beginning is coming back in the land from which the gods have flown. Heidegger makes a great deal of the fact that Hölderlin emphasizes the loyal minded return of the poet from the past to the actual and immediate present. In the same way, Heidegger emphasizes the necessity of the thinker's return from what is coming toward us out of the future to what is immediate. In order to respond to the whole of what is occurring, we need also to accept what is occurring immediately. Greatness and new beginning is here,

not in escape. The strength for change lies inside the mesh of what is occurring immediately as well as mediately. Freedom seems to lie in the ability to reject what we are born to. Heidegger is saying that freedom lies in being at peace (Friede) in what bears us, and that <u>this</u> gives us the strength to turn and change.³²

E. What is occurring and what it is to become mortal, to enter into the essence of what is occurring. The coming of great beginning to the West, the land of evening. The relation of Ge-Stell and the fourfold.

According to Heidegger, the coming of the great beginning that Hölderlin is talking about brings "what is insignificant into its non-significance". This is a possible translation of the phrase "das Geringe in sein Geringes". What seems trivial and to signify nothing, is so because it trivializes and/or ignores part of what rules it, necessarily hidden. Because part of what rules is hidden and reveals itself indirectly in what is sent, it seems insignificant. It is forgotten, just as the fact is forgotten, that constitutions are written by real flesh and blood struggling human beings like ourselves.

32 This matter might be illuminated by thinking about Milton Acorn's beautiful poem which ends: "I've tasted my blood too much To abide what I was born to." Earlier in the poem the lines appear with "love" where "abide" is at the end. Though these lines appear to speak only of transcendence born of oppression, the base of the poem, like all of his poems, is love.

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(continued)

Heidegger goes on to say that "the insignificant" is "the

West", "the land of evening". The coming of the great beginning is

the coming of a new dawn which can only come when the West (this time)

32 (continued)

"But my mother's look was a field of brown oats, soft-bearded her voice rain and air rich with lilacs: and I loved her too much to like how she dragged her days like a sled over gravel."

We need to learn love, to learn to abide, to wake up and be fully aware of what is happening. This emphatically does not mean that we need to stop resisting oppression (or to stop trying again to start resisting it). The strength for resistance too is given. It is not that the oppression is what is given to us, and if we resist, it is strictly up to us, to "overcome" what is given, to make a new world with sheer will.

> "My deep prayer a curse. My deep prayer the promise that this won't be. My deep prayer, my cunning My love, my anger, and often even my forgiveness that this won't be and be."

Both love and anger are given. If we are loved, we love; if we are oppressed, we are angry. Milton puts the second half of this truth vividly, at the start of the poem:

"If this brain's over tempered, consider that the fire was want and the hammers were fists."

Milton Acorn's first book of poems is called <u>In Love and Anger</u>. The poem "I've Tasted My Blood" is from: Milton Acorn, <u>I've Tasted</u> My Blood (Toronto: Ryerson, 1969), p. 1. becomes what it is, a land of evening. If representation is experienced as Ge-Stell, the coming of the fourfold is preserved. To become aware of the essence of technique is to open the richness of the height of art, which names what is holy. Heidegger does not yearn for a revival of a "past era" or for an escape to a misty future dream. The coming of the new dawn is what is occurring and Heidegger takes up the question of how it is possible to assert that at one and the same time we are part of the grip of both Ge-Stell and the fourfold.

> "Does something called "the west" still prevail? It has become Europe. Its technical-industrial sphere of influence already extends over the entire earth. And the earth is already considered a planet in interstellar cosmic space, which is deployed as the sphere of action of man. Earth and sky of the poem have disappeared. Who would say where to? The non-finite relationship of earth and sky, man and God appears destroyed. Or has it never yet appeared out of the gathering tuning destiny as this non-finite relationship purely allowed into our history, not yet become present, not yet, as the whole, established in the height of art? Then also it couldn't be destroyed but rather at worst only misplaced and denied an appearance. Then it would fall to us to mediate on this denial of the non-finite relation. To meditate on a matter means: to let it "say itself", to listen to it, from where it is said, namely in Hölderlin's poem, for us in the present era." 33

33

"Ist das Abendländische noch? Es ist Europa geworden. Dessen technisch-industrieller Herrschafts-bezirk überzieht schon die ganze Erde. Diese wiederum ist bereits als Planet in den interstellaren kosmischen Raum eingerechnet, der zum geplanten Aktionsraum des Menschen bestellt wird. Erde und Himmel des Gedichtes sind entschwunden. Wer wagte zu sagen wohin? Das un-endliche Verhältnis von Erde und Himmel, Mensch und Gott scheint zerstört. (continued) To stay with what Heidegger is saying in this passage, it is necessary to bear in mind at the same time the "perceptual" discussion of representation (Vorstellen) as part of GeStell and the "more majestic" discussion of what is now occurring in the west. The "retuning" that Heidegger seeks refers to both of these. The object is "misplaced" (verstellt) when we represent it, and we are not the controllers of this placing. These are truths of Ge-Stell. The tendency might be to assume that some mysterious, demonic force called Ge-Stell is in charge of what is occurring and we can only wait for the end or for some other more powerful force (completely <u>other</u> than us) to intervene on our behalf. This sort of thinking is becoming quite prevalent again, but it is most decidedly not Heidegger's thought. For Heidegger this misplacement is seen as

33 (continued)

Oder ist es <u>als</u> dieses un-endliche Verhältnis noch niemals rein gefügt in unserer Geschichte aus der Versammlung des stimmenden Geschicks erschienen, noch nie Gegenwart geworden, noch nie als das Ganze gestiftet ins Höchste der Kunst? Dann könnte es auch nicht zerstört, sondern im Hubersten verweigert sein. Dann stünde es mit bei uns, dieser Verweigerung des un-endlichen Verhältnisses nachzudenken. Einer Sache nachdenken heißt: diese sich sagen lassen, auf sie hören, wo von ihr gesagt ist, nämlich im Gedicht Hölderlins für uns im gegenwärtigen Weltalter." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 176.

the self-misplacement of the fourfold, which includes man as mortal cooperating with earth, sky and gods and man, provoked to provoke what is as resource. The essence of God includes advance and withdrawal and the same is true of the essence of man. Heidegger is claiming that new life is coming again <u>in its being denied an</u> appearance, in what he calls Ge-Stell.

The fourfold is denied; it is "not signified". Art, which brings what is unseeable to stand, has no place in this world. But this "night" is still the rule of the near. Heidegger quotes 34 Valery from a letter written after 1919 called "The crisis of the spirit". Valery asks if Europe will become what it actually is, a "mere cape of Asia", or if it will remain what it appears to be, "the pearl, the brain of the earth". Heidegger answers, fifty years later: It has in a sense become both. It is a mere cape, but as technical-industrial calculation, it remains the brain of the world. And Heidegger adds a third question, which is rather more like a prayer. It questions back into Europe's beginning.

> "Must Europe as this cape and brain first become a land of evening, out of which another morning of world destiny prepares its dawn?"³⁵

Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 176.

34

"Muő Europa als dieses Kap und Gehirn erst zum Land eines Abends werden, aus dem ein anderer Morgen des Weltgeschicks seinen Aufgang vorbereitet?" Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 177. For Heidegger, it is a fact that the world is "through and through European-Western-Greek". Gestell is given. The question is: how will this change? What is happening now? Heidegger "assumes" that at the heart of this fact, change is possible out of the saved greatness of the beginning.

A great deal hinges on the meaning of this "assumption" (Vermuten). We need to understand how Heidegger uses these words "vermuten" and "Vermutung". The latter is usually translated as "conjecture, supposition, surmise, guess-work, assumption". With this meaning, compared to Gestell, this "assumption" about change appears idle fancy or perhaps wishful thinking. But the assumption which Heidegger announces here is really nothing less than the gift which is tuning us and "tempering" us into a new epoch. What <u>we</u> know ahead of time, or <u>assume</u>, is this gift. The word "Vermutung" means literally the giving and receiving of a "mood", the "encouraging" ("Mut" means "courage"). The assumption is the taking on, the appropriating of something. It is not the conception, thought of as abstract product of the mind, which rationalizes or generalizes a field of action.

Two sentences from the book <u>Out of the Experience of Thinking</u> might help to make this meaning clearer. They both turn around the family of words which relates to "Mut", related to our English "mood".

"All our heart's courage is the echoing response to the gracefullness of Being (Seyn) which gathers our thought into the play of the world."³⁶

"When thought's courage stems from the demand of Being (Seyn), then destiny's language thrives."³⁷

In the discussion of the meaning of "Zärtlichkeit" I looked at the history of the words "Mut" (courage) and "Anmut" (gracefulness). (See Section B) These sentences of Heidegger's claim that part of what is occurring is the heart's striving, assigning meaning and thus gathering the world, in <u>response</u> to what we are <u>in</u> which <u>claims</u> us (Seyn). We are being retuned. We are being "encouraged". This is the meaning of "assumption" (Vermutung).

The beginning becomes "present" to us <u>only</u> in what we are in, the "insignificant" the West. In this case, "present" is the word "Gegenwart" which Heidegger interprets quite literally as something coming toward us which preserves us and thus frees us. Entering into the essence of or engaging what is occurring, we are encountered by it. We need to become mortal. We (as Westerners, 38 as "rational animals") need to step back and let the coming occur.

[&]quot;Aller Mut des Gemüts ist der Widerklang auf die Anmutung des Seyns, die unser Denken in das Spiel der Welt versammelt." Martin Heidegger, <u>Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens</u>, (Pfullingen: Neske 1947), p. 17. 37

[&]quot;Stammt der Mut des Denkens aus der Zumutung des Seyns, dann gedeiht die Sprache des Geschicks." Heidegger, <u>Aus der Erfahrung</u>, p. 9.

³⁸We need now, for example, to acknowledge that we live on this planet with others, who are part of other great beginnings.

We don't notice yet the need out of which the non-finite relationship of the four calls. We don't allow ourselves to be "encouraged". When we "hold ourselves back", the encouragement prior to thinking comes

> "But where could we step back to? Into the holdingback which anticipates. It is at the same time the encouragement (assumption) which precedes and bases thought. Such holding back anticipates what is coming, through trying to experience what <u>is</u> coming toward us."³⁹

According to Heidegger, what shows itself now is that the unity of the four voices of what is sent concerns us (or literally "goes toward us") by denying itself or misplacing itself. If representation experiences itself as part of "the gathering which provokes us to provoke", as part of Ge-Stell, we are becoming mortal. That we are driven begins to teach us what we are.

> "The man of this earth is demanded namely, through the unconditional rule of the essence of modern technique, together with technique itself, to employ the whole of the world, as a uniform resource secured through a last formulation of "the world" and through that calculable."⁴⁰

39

40

"Doch wohin könnten wir zurücktreten? In die erwartende Zurückhaltung. Sie ist in sich zugleich das vordenkende Vermuten. Solche Zurückhaltung kommt dem Kommenden/dadurch zuvor, dab sie zu erfahren versucht, was gegenwärtig ist." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 178.

"Der Mensch dieser Erde ist nämlich durch die unbedingte Herrschaft des Wesens der modernen Technik samt dieser selbst herausgefordert, das Ganze der Welt als einen einförmigen, durch eine letzte Weltformel gesicherten und von daher berechenbaren Bestand zu bestellen." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 178,8 Part of the rule of Ge-Stell is its own concealment of the source of the power in its demanding. This source is the middle of the whole relationship of earth, sky, mortals and gods. The <u>supposed</u> rule of man as the rational animal or the "creator ex nihilo" which is part of the illusion of Ge-Stell, conceals the genuine power we have as <u>mortals</u>, <u>in cooperation with the other three</u>. The supposed <u>exclusive</u> power of man as subject, necessarily portrays what is <u>other</u> as soundless, as <u>immediate</u>, or non-mediate. But this soundless and abysmal immediacy and indeterminacy which surrounds the subject, conceals the middle of the truth. The mediate misplaces itself as the immediate.

> "The demanding ruling in the domination of the essence of modern technique, holds before all to be outside the realm of experience, that from where the ordering power of the demanding receives its commission. What is this? It is the middle of the whole non-finite relationship. It is, purely, what is sent itself. The uncanny encircles the globe, such that now what is sent meets the man of this age <u>immediately</u>, not first through a sounding of its voices. Soundless, what is sent goes toward man -- a mysterious sort of stillness."⁴¹

"Die in der Herrschaft des Wesens der modernen Technik waltende Herausforderung hält allem zuvor Jenes im Unerfahrbaren, von woher die verfügende Gewalt der Herausforderung ihre Schickung empfängt. Was ist dies?

41

Es ist die Mitte des ganzen unendlichen Verhältnisses. Sie ist das reine Geschick selber. Das Unheimliche umkreist den Erdball, daß jetzt das Geschick den Menschen dieses Weltalters unmittelbar trifft, nicht erst durch ein Tönen seiner Stimmen. Tonlos geht das Geschick den Menschen an-eine rätselhafte Art von Stille." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 178.

To become mortal would be to return home to the land of evening where we are. This is a land from which the gods have flown and in which what is coming is not-yet experienced. To be aware of "homelessness" would be to face the terrible, the <u>immediacy</u> of what is sent; but this homelessness is the homeland's self-denial. Homelessness saves and preserves or reserves the homeland. Freedom saves its essence in the region of the truth of Being, the free. The immediate conceals and <u>preserves</u> the mediate, the middle of the fourfold.

Hölderlin does not name the fourfold explicitly in the poem because he is responding to "something" which hides itself and rules in that way. As evidence of such a rule Heidegger cites Heraclitus' statement that fugal harmony or joining which denies its appearance is a higher ruling than one which comes to light. What rules in what is said, for example, is never only what is spoken but also what is "denied" (versagt) in what is said. What rules in what is placed is also what is misplaced (verstellt). What rules in what "whiles" (weilt) is also what is "stayed" (verweilt). What rules in what rules (waltet) is also what is allowed to rule 42 (verwaltet). "Freedom allows the free to rule."

The truth is such that it necessarily denies itself, as

"Die Freiheit verwaltet das Freie . . ." Heidegger, <u>Die</u> <u>Technik</u>, p. 25.

42

it reveals itself. If we open our eyes, ears and hearts in the midst of our loving and struggling we will experience what is occurring as the fourfold misplacing itself as Ge-Stell (which itself hides the fact that it is a way of revelation and not merely "subjects representing objects".)

> "It is the marriage of earth and sky as men and "some spirit", that is,a god, let beauty dwell more communally on the earth. Beauty is the pure shining of the unhiddenness of the whole non-finite relationship together with the middle. The middle however is as the mediating joining and ordering. It is the join of the relationship of the four, which saves its appearance."⁴³

Beauty (die Schönheit) is the essence of the beautiful, the essence of what shines. The essence of what shines is the <u>whole</u> of what rules, governs itself, unfolds and declines as what shines. What shines includes what is unhidden and what is hidden. These are parts of the <u>same</u> shining. The zone of transcendence, "the far" is the side turned toward our seeing of the region of the truth of Being, "the near", "the free".

"That which you seek, it is near, it encounters you already."44

"Es ist die Hochzeit von Erde und Himmel, da die Menschen und "irgend ein Geist" d.h. ein Gott, gemeinschaftlicher die Schönheit auf der Erde wohnen lassen. Die Schönheit ist das reine Scheinen der Unverborgenheit des ganzen unendlichen Verhältnisses samt der Mitte. Die Mitte aber <u>ist</u> als das mittelnd Fügende und Verfügende. Sie ist die ihr Erscheinen sparende Fuge des Verhältnisses der Vier." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 179. 44

"Was du suchest, es ist nahe, begegnet dir schon" (Heimkunft/An die Verwandten), Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 10.

⁴³

Heidegger calls " $Q\dot{v}\sigma_{l}\varsigma$ " (die Natur) the dawn of the great beginning. We cannot separate this name from what was named; and yet the name is also ruled by what it named which <u>it</u> is not. In this sense, Heidegger is able to say that the beginning has been <u>preparing to come</u> since the dawn. Beauty is called into work (is named) to save it to preserve it as what it is, not to lay it bare. Thus " $Q\dot{v}\sigma_{l}\varsigma$ " is, and is not the beginning. Nevertheless, because in this time the voice of the joining is soundless, as preparation and help to attend to it, we <u>need</u> first to hear how the Greeks gave words to <u>their</u> dispensation. Our access to what matters is the tradition.

By learning from nature Heidegger suggests, Hölderlin <u>remembers</u> the thought of the stillness of completion or the peace of wholeness (Vollendungsruhe). It belongs to what is shaped by what is holy, which Hölderlin wants to shape. When what is established of old "wants to go out", God leads the earth by uniting goldenly the souls powers and relations. The unmeasured steps which we must take are also guided! Nature, in Holderlin's sense is <u>over</u> gods and men, and yet we are able to endure its rule. Heidegger says that Hölderlin knew also that what rules in what holds (haltet) is also what withholds itself (sichverhält) (the non-finite relationship, "das Verhältnis⁵). He knew how "what is insignificant" is related to "what is great". A line from a late version of "Patmos" goes:

"But it's difficult To behold what is great in what is great."⁴⁵

The lines about the same matter in two other versions of "Patmos" are:

"Near But difficult to grasp, is the God But where danger is, there grows Also what saves."⁴⁶

"Full of goodness (He) is; but no one grasps God by himself. But where danger is, there grows Also what saves."⁴⁷

It is difficult to grasp, to behold, to contain the fourfold as what rules in this time. But the beauty which brings joy, which frees is here too. This is Hölderlin's word. Heidegger closes the lecture with Hölderlin's poem, also called "Greece", written in the year of his death. It names "the old saying" which remembered,

is still abroad, the saying from the Greek dawn which will help us hear the soundless voice of the fourfold in the experience of our world and this time. The old saying tells of an inexhaustible source, the source of the dawn and of the land of evening. The power and splendour of the fourfold is still to be reaped.

45

"Schwer ists aber
Im Großen zu behalten das Große."

(Patmos) Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 180.

46
"Nah ist
Und schwer/zu fassen der Gott.
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst
Das Rettende auch.

M. Hamburger, Hölderlin, p. 193.

47"Voll Güt' ist; keiner aber fasset
Allein Gott.

New life comes again out of the essence of man, from the essence

of the "one who thinks".

". . . as freedom (Freiheit) says the essence of the free, human nature (Menschheit) says the essence of man." 48

To say is also to deny and thus to save. To save is to reserve and thus to preserve.

49

Greece

"As men are, so life is splendid, Men are, from nature, often powerful, The splendid land is not hidden from men With charm appears the evening and the morning. The opening fields are as in the reaping days With spiritedness all around is the old saying, And new life comes again out of human nature Thus sinks the year with a stillness down.

May 24, 1748

48

Your humble servant, Scardanelli.

47 47 (continued)
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst
Das Rettende auch."
M. Hamburger, Hölderlin, p. 203.

". . . wie Freiheit das Wesen des Freien, sagt Menschheit das Wesen des Menschen." Heidegger, <u>Erläuterungen</u>, p. 181. 49

"Griechenland

Wie Menschen sind, so ist das Leben prächtig, Die Menschen sind der Natur öfters mächtig, Das prächt' ge Land ist Menschen nicht verborgen Mit Reiz erscheint der Abend und der Morgen. Die offnen Felder sind als in der Erndte Tage Mit Geistigkeit ist weit umher die alte Sage, Und neues Leben kommt aus Menschheit wieder So sinkt das Jahr mit einer Stille nieder.

Den 24 ten Mai 1748

Mit Unterthänigkeit Scardanelli.

. :

Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 181.

Heidegger suggests that we read the strange signature of the poem, both its date and the name, as an indication from Hölderlin that he is sending himself (and thus bringing and joining us) into a strange place.

> "In the year of his death, Holderlin said a poem out into the reserved region of the non-finite relationship."⁵⁰

"Im Jahr seines Todes sagt Hölderlin ein Gedicht in den verschwiegenen Bereich des unendlichen Verhältnisses hinaus." Heidegger, Erläuterungen, p. 180.

CONCLUSION

To conclude this study very briefly, I want to begin with some of Heidegger's statements about freedom during his seminar with Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929. I think they show that the central point remains the guiding concern in all his thought about freedom.

> "The question: How is freedom possible, is contradictory because freedom is not an object of theoretical comprehension, but rather an object of philosophizing. All this can only mean that freedom only is and can be in liberation. The single adequate connection to freedom in man is the self-liberation of freedom in man."¹

"The terminus a quo is my central problematic. The question is: is the terminus ad quem with me quite so clear [as with Cassirer]. For me it exists not in the whole of a philosophy of culture, but rather in the question: $\tau \dot{\iota} \ \tau \dot{o} \ \ddot{o} Y$? For me the problematic of a metaphysic of Dasein grows out of this question."¹

"I have not given the freedom to myself although I can only be 'I myself' through being free."1

As I read these statements, they mean the following: To be

"Die Frage: Wie ist Freiheit möglich, ist widersinnig, weil Freiheit kein Gegenstand des theoretischen Erfassens ist, sondern ein Gegenstand des Philosophierens. So kann das nichts anderes heißen, als daß Freiheit nur ist und sein kann in der Befreiung. Der einzige adäquate Bezug zur Freiheit im Menschen ist das Sichbefreien der Freiheit im Menschen."

1

"Der terminus a quo ist meine zentrale Problematik. Die Frage ist: Ist der terminus ad quem bei mir ebenso klar? Der besteht für mich nicht in dem Ganzen einer Kulturphilosophie, sondern in der Frage: $\tau \acute{\iota} \ \tau \acute{o} \ \acute{o} \lor$? Von dieser Frage her ist für mich die Problematik einer Metaphysik des Daseins erwachsen."

"Die Freiheit habe ich mir nicht selbst gegeben, obwohl ich durch das Freisein erst ich selbst sein kann." From Guido Schneeberger, Ergänzungen zu einer Heidegger-Bibliographie mit vier Beilagen und einer Bildtafel. (Bern: Suhr 1960), p. 21, p. 23, p. 23.

free, which means to think or as it is put here, to philosophize, to be in the act of philosophizing, is not a concept or an idea we can isolate or grasp. Rather being free is an event occurring in the mesh. The great strength of Heidegger's thought, which was evident at the start of his work, lies in its return to its element, the whole of what is occurring. The only way to know what freedom is (or what thought is) is to be free in what is occurring, to begin to let thought respond under the demand of what is occurring. То question about freedom is itself already part of what it is to be free. The "terminus a quo" is the starting point or place where we are, which Heidegger calls existence. To say that this free existence is a "liberation" means that free acting and producing is needed for us to "free ourselves". This freedom is connected inescapably to the freedom of others and it is already connected and beholden to the things all around. The difficult question is how this freedom is guided and determined in its self-liberation. We are connected to each other and to things and to "the whole of what is occurring" in a way which determines us by liberating us. We are determined and liberated in a way which demands cooperation and response, which demands "self-liberation". This whole of what is occurring in which we are and are free is the "terminus ad quem", which remains, in its wholeness, mysterious, and without which the problematic "immediate" "terminus a quo" could not arise. Being a free self in the mesh of

what is occurring, could not be what it is without being both alone and not alone, without being both undetermined and determined. Heidegger's thought about freedom, the free and the fourfold can be seen as the attempt to do justice to both termini (a quo and ad quem) and to allow the whole of what is occurring to unfold in a way which retains the truth of the difference between the termini while showing that they are the same.

Along the path of his thought about freedom, Heidegger struggled gradually to allow all the various components of the whole to unfold. He never abandons, while continually rethinking, the terminus a quo, which is humans "reaching out" into what they are in, the threefold freedom toward the ground. The terminus ad quem which is the nearing of things as the world-play of the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and gods unfolds in a way which demands and needs the "reaching out". The gradual attempt to think these two termini together led through several moments and I have tried to take note of these in the chronological study of the works about freedom and the free. Heidegger's boldness led him into the heart of the various parts of the whole, which, as parts, were great dangers, but the basic question continued to draw him back to the whole. In the statements of 1929 there is a danger of what might be called "human transcendence" because the terminus ad quem is not yet unfolded, and freedom and thought appear in effect to be merely abysmal and thus

1

the "project of the world" appears to be no different than a worldview. In 1943, I have suggested there is a danger of something analgous to "divine transcendence", in the concentration on the mysterious terminus ad quem. Common to both of these earlier dangers is "transcendence as such" which tends to forsake the immediate and present in the name of thought (future) and poetry (what remains but is no longer present). The works in the remaining years of the fourties bring the free and temporal threefold terminus a quo to its maturity by restoring an awareness of the present and immediate through which alone what is ahead and behind can rule. The stage is then set for the complete unfolding of both threefold and fourfold termini together; with regard to freedom, the complete unfolding finally succeeds in describing freedom as liberation and doing justice to all the components in this event. I have tried to demonstrate this completion in the study of three works about the fourfold, which emphasize respectively the terminus ad quem, the terminus a quo and then both of these in the full light of the present and immediate reality.

What is it to be free? It is to act (to produce in the sense of "to bring forth") in the mesh of the whole of what is occurring. Heidegger tries to restore awareness that there is rigour in the obedience to hidden rule. The immediate truth which is not hidden, he suggests, cannot be fully appreciated apart from what is hidden and also true. Far from undermining the efficacy of the immediate,

this obedience to <u>both</u> hidden and unhidden rule as part of what is the same whole, restores a sense of solidity to what is immediate. It is only the fact that the immediate seems now to be losing its solidity that enables us to think again what is solid and mediate. In the terms of freedom, it is the fact that we are in a crisis about it, that makes possible its vindication. What Heidegger attempts is a vindication of freedom by attempting to reopen awareness of the whole of its essence, its matter, or its element. This is the truth of determination which is liberation. Freedom is capable of vindication. It can save its essence in the region of the truth of Being, the free. Heidegger's thesis is a challenge rather than a command. Because it is a vindication of freedom it invites us to <u>decide</u> for ourselves whether what he says is a true response to what is decisive.

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