

**THE ENGINEERING OF AN ENEMY:
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, UNITED STEELWORKERS, CANADIAN LABOUR
CONGRESS, AND INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL, AND SMELTER
WORKERS LOCAL 598**

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**A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
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Abstract

As global politics realized a fundamental realignment with the end of the Second World War, the Canadian state desired the formation of a national consensus over its newly developed Cold War policies. It set about this task through the use of anti-communist rhetoric to facilitate a repressive and intolerant atmosphere where dissent of state policies could be identified as subversive and dangerous. In promulgating this Cold War ideology, Ottawa was wary of the illiberal approach that characterized American McCarthyism. Rather, Ottawa adopted a strategy of “privatizing” its anti-communism through the use of extra-state actors. By “farming” out its repressive activities, Ottawa could portray itself as a neutral defender of liberal values, while at the same time facilitating a climate of repression that would further its policy aims. Attendant to this, the extra-state actors used this state facilitated framework in order to advance their own interests and agendas. This strategy was starkly illustrated by the USWA raids against IUMMSW Local 598 in 1962. The interests of the state, the Catholic Church, CLC, and USWA coalesced around the elimination of Mine Mill local 598 as a representative of miners in northern Ontario. The Catholic Church sought the elimination of a progressive secularizing force in the Sudbury community that threatened the Church’s institutional reproduction. For Steel, the acquisition of over 17,000 dues-paying members and the elimination of IUMMSW as a competitor in the membership rich northern Ontario mining communities. While the state prospered from the virulent anti-communist environment and the elimination of a potentially militant union from control over the largest source of nickel in the non-

Communist world. Thus the boundaries demarcating the state from civil society are less clear than some would have us believe. The U.S.W.A./Mine Mill events illustrate the nuance in the relationship between the state and private actors in the mobilization of ideological hegemony.

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*Diabolism on the one side and divinity on the other still
survive as basic factors in the process of political control.*

-Charles E. Merriam

Chapter 1 Introduction

In September of 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a code clerk from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, defected to Canada bringing with him official Soviet documents proving the existence of a Soviet spy network operating within the country.¹ The effect of these revelations would auger a fundamental realignment in the arena of global politics. Prior to the Gouzenko affair, the Soviet Union had still been considered an ally, albeit with some suspicion.² The Gouzenko affair would solidify western animosity towards both the Soviets and Communism in general. In the words of the British Chiefs of Staff, "recent developments make it appear that Russia is our most probable potential enemy, far more dangerous than a revived Germany."³ The subsequent spy trials would place Canada at

¹ Merrily Weisbord, The Strangest Dream: Canadian Communists, The Spy Trials, and the Cold War. (Montreal, QC: Vehicule Press, 1994), 141.

² Robert Bothwell, The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War. (Toronto, ON: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 14.

³ Ibid., 15.

the centre of world politics, and announce to the world the onset of the Cold War.⁴

The effect of the Gouzenko affair on both the Canadian government and public would be dramatic. Prime Minister MacKenzie King would authorize both a formal investigation under the auspices of a Royal Commission and the use of draconian police powers under the War Measures Act to arrest those implicated in the Gouzenko revelations.⁵ The extraordinary measures taken up by the Canadian government were justified by claiming the existence of a "Communist conspiracy in Canada that threatened the safety and the interests of the state itself."⁶ Indeed the findings of the Royal Commission validated this appraisal. The report described a system of subversion that emanated from the Soviet embassy out into Canadian society. According to the report, the Communist conspiracy acted on innocent members of Canadian "front" groups.⁷ These groups could masquerade as any legitimate cultural, professional, or political organization, from trade unions to scientific organizations, but were really

⁴ Weisbord, 1994., 145.

⁵ Ibid.,144. Detainees were denied *habeas corpus*, the right to be brought before a judge within 24 hours of arrest, and isolated from communication with the outside world: no newspapers, radios, or visits from family or legal counsel.

⁶ Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1994),74.

⁷ Ibid., 83.

facades for Communist subversion and espionage. The Commission claimed these groups would act as a fifth column, "a secret army," recruiting and indoctrinating unsuspecting Canadians.⁸ According to Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse in their authoritative study of the rise of the Canadian security state, the Commission's findings claimed to reveal:

a state of mind or a predisposition to subversion dormant in the body of the citizenry. Communism they reported, and the wide network of organizations that served it, threatened the security of the state, not from without, but from within. The report was a call to arms in the new Cold War. Aroused Canadians were expected to respond, and the report was designed to draw the line between honest dissent and dangerous subversion so that loyal Canadians could properly take sides.⁹

If this was the intended design of the Commission's report, it seemed to have the desired affect. According to British High Commissioner Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, "the most obvious effect of the enquiry has been to cause a sharp reaction against Communism." Furthermore, "the affair had revived

⁸ Ibid., 95.

⁹ Ibid., 82.

former prejudices, and fear of Communism was now general throughout Canada."¹⁰

It is within this highly charged and polarized atmosphere of fear and suspicion that any analysis of events during the Cold War must be situated. The fear of Communism and Soviet domination were very real, both within the Canadian government, and within the Canadian public. The findings of the Royal Commission warned Canadians that Communists could be conspiring anywhere, infiltrating the most innocuous and respectable of organizations. It is only through this lens of near hysteria that actions undertaken during the Cold War can be properly deciphered. Such is the case of one of the most tumultuous events in Canadian labour history: the United Steelworker's (USWA) raid of Mine Mill (IUMMSW) Local 598 in Sudbury Ontario in 1962.

Local 598 was identified almost from its outset as one of the Communist "front" organizations so integral to the Soviet conspiracy as outlined by the Royal Commission. The accuracy of this label has been an unresolved point of contention in academic scholarship since the climax of events in 1962. Even today there exists competing discourses on who was ultimately responsible for the demise of Local 598. On

¹⁰ Public Record Office, London England. Dominions Office 127/75. High Commission to Viscount Addison, August 17, 1946. cited in Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994.

the right of the political spectrum, the actions of the USWA are excused as an unfortunate, but necessary response to Communist domination of one of the largest locals in Canada.¹¹ On the left, the Catholic Church and the USWA are portrayed as using anti-communism as a means to destabilize and undermine an otherwise democratic trade union. However, much of what has been written on the subject has restricted itself to the localized events in the Sudbury area and has not attempted to situate the Steel raids in the broader context of Cold War politics and the coalescence of seemingly divergent interests between the Canadian state, the USWA, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), and the Catholic Church. This paper seeks to explain the events that led to the USWA raids of 1962 within the framework of a Canadian state attempting to formulate a Cold War consensus through a strategy of partial privatized anti-communism that enabled extra-state actors within civil society to pursue their own interests while contributing to the aims of the state. This strategy of privatized state sponsored repression served the interests of the state by portraying an image of itself as a neutral arbiter and defender of liberal democratic values, while facilitating a climate of repression and intolerance that

¹¹ For example see Frank Southern, The Sudbury Incident. (Toronto, ON: York Publishing, 1978).

furthered its aims of securing a national consensus over its Cold War policies. Also, this paper seeks to demonstrate that within this climate of state-assisted, privatized anti-communism, the USWA, CLC and the Catholic Church developed a mutual interest in undermining the leadership of IUMMSW Local 598. The USWA stood to gain the membership of one of the largest locals in Canada, while eliminating its prime competitor in the membership rich mining and smelting industries, while the Catholic Church stood to eliminate a progressive secularizing force within the Sudbury community. It will be argued that the social unionism of Mine Mill Local 598 was perceived as a real danger to the Church's ability to influence its membership, and that the USWA's more conservative business unionism was deemed more palatable to the interests of the Church. Emphasis will be placed on the role of the Catholic Church due to the contested nature of scholarship over this issue. While the documentary record is replete with information on the actions and the motives of the USWA and the CLC, it is less so with the Catholic Church. Indeed this lack of evidence has been interpreted as proof that the Church played no

substantial role in the USWA - Mine Mill conflict.¹²

However, by pursuing an analysis from the macro-level of Canadian national politics during the Cold War to the micro level of the events in Sudbury leading up to the USWA raids, I endeavour to show that the actions of the Catholic church in Sudbury were consistent with the actions of the Church against other perceived Communist dominated unions, thereby revealing both an interest and a strategy to undermine Communist influenced trade union leaderships both in Canada and the United States. Furthermore, it will be argued that the actions of Church officials in the Sudbury events could not have taken place without the knowledge and approval of Church leaders, thereby implicating the Church as a whole. Ultimately, while this paper may not prove conclusively that the Catholic Church was intimately involved in the demise of Local 598, it is hoped that the weight of the evidence presented will cast serious reservations on the hypothesis that the Church was a neutral observer in the USWA-Mine Mill struggle.

¹² Brian F. Hogan's detailed study of the role of the Catholic Church in Sudbury best argues this position. See Brian F. Hogan, "Hard Rock and Hard Decisions: Catholics, Communists and the IUMMSW- Sudbury Confrontations." (Paper presented to the Canadian Historical Association, University of Montreal, May 30, 1985).

Chapter 2: The Canadian State and the Privatization of Anti-Communism

With the revelations of the Gouzenko affair and the growing hostility between the Soviet Union and the West, a substantial geopolitical realignment was underway. This realignment would manifest itself in a set of policies loosely termed the "Cold War Consensus." For the West, these policies were mainly centred around the establishment of the Truman Doctrine, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the institution of the Marshall Plan, and the Korean War.¹³ Each policy represented a substantial military, economic, and political realignment following World War Two. In the case of Canada, as in other Western aligned countries, governments recognized the necessity of mobilizing their respective publics behind these new political realities. As Whitaker and Marcuse inquire, how could Canadian public opinion be most "efficaciously brought into line with the new perspectives on global alignment and the foreign commitments these required from taxpayers?"¹⁴

¹³ Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 270-72.

¹⁴ Ibid., 262.

The Canadian response to this question borrowed heavily from the American reaction, albeit with important reservations. The formation of the Cold War consensus in the United States relied heavily on the propagation of anti-communist rhetoric in order to enlist the support of traditionally isolationist segments of the American electorate while marginalizing dissenting or alternative opinion.¹⁵ The goal was to "scare the hell out of the American people," in order to "bludgeon the mass mind," with the Communist threat in a manner "clearer than truth."¹⁶ Anti-communist rhetoric would serve the purpose to mobilize the populace against the Communist enemy while acting as a political control mechanism by creating a dichotomized world view between "us and them " that preyed on the patriotism of the American populace.¹⁷

In Canada, "scaring the hell" out of the country proved to be just as effective a public opinion strategy.¹⁸ Whitaker and Marcuse note that "Ottawa seized upon the strong anti-communist and pro-American elements already present in

¹⁵ Ibid., 262.

¹⁶ Senator Arthur Vandenburg, quoted in Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New. (New York, N.Y: Columbia University Press)., 20, 27.

¹⁷ For the functions of anti-communism as a political control mechanism, see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. (New York, N.Y: Pantheon Books, 1988)., 29-31.

¹⁸ Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 263.

Canadian society and carefully built upon them to fashion a consensus that excluded or downplayed other elements of Canadian opinion."¹⁹

Vital to the crafting of the Canadian consensus was the use of anti-communism as a safeguard against sectors of the Canadian population that were perceived as constituting possible opposition to Ottawa's Cold War policies. These included segments of the English Canadian conservatives, Quebec isolationists, and the social democratic labour movement. With the assistance of anti-communist rhetoric, Ottawa would succeed in not only quieting possible opposition, but ultimately enlisting the vital cooperation of these sectors in promulgating Ottawa's Cold War aims.

External Affairs minister Lester B. Pearson would be an especially vocal proponent of Ottawa's anti-communism. Pearson would be vociferous in his duties of "scaring the hell" out of the nation likening Communism to an "oppressor on a scale surpassing Nazi Germany."²⁰ "The crusading and subversive power of communism," declared Pearson, "has been harnessed by a cold blooded, calculating, victoriously powerful Slav empire for its own political purposes."²¹ The Soviet Union and Communism in general were portrayed as

¹⁹ Ibid., 261.

²⁰ Ibid., 266.

²¹ Ibid., 265.

on a ceaseless march against the democratic nations of the West. According to Whitaker and Marcuse, such government pronouncements served as an attempt to solidify public support for increased militarization and membership in NATO. Pearson thereby used the ubiquitous communist menace to summon a militaristic defensive posture within the Canadian populace.²²

Ottawa's militaristic anti-communist rhetoric found a sympathetic ear among English conservatives. While segments of traditional Tory conservatives were viewed by Ottawa as harbouring latent anti-Americanism and strong nationalist sentiments that could prove implacable in the formation of a Cold War consensus,²³ Whitaker and Marcuse argue that Tory opposition to the Cold War never really materialized.²⁴ Tory loyalties to Britain had faded, and those that did not found agreement with Canada's anti-communist stance and that of Britain. This, coupled with Communism's threat to propertied interests and established wealth allowed the anti-communist argument to be well received by conservative English Canadians.²⁵

²² Ibid., 265.

²³ Ibid., 263.

²⁴ Ibid., 263.

²⁵ Ibid., 263.

A more difficult segment of the population to co-opt was the Canadian Left, characterized by the CCF and segments of the trade union movement. Indeed, Whitaker and Marcuse argue that Ottawa's strategy to mollify the Left was key in formulating the Cold War consensus. Whitaker and Marcuse go as far to argue that the Cold War was waged against the Left; that anti-communism was used not only to suppress Communism, but also to domesticate Canadian social democrats into compliant and obedient devotees to Ottawa's Cold War policy.²⁶ Thus Canadian social democrats served to legitimate the Ottawa's Cold War policies by forming a consensus that included every "legitimate and democratic tendency from the Tories on the right to the CCF on the left."²⁷ Ottawa could thereby claim unanimous support for its policies across the political spectrum.

For the CCF, aligning itself with the federal Liberals constituted a tactical political consideration. Recognizing the mood of anti-communism throughout the country, the CCF had the option of either criticizing government policies and face the prospect of being associated with communism, or adopt a vehement anti-communist position and try to distance social democracy from any association with communism in

²⁶ Ibid., 266.

²⁷ Ibid., 267.

the public mind. Given the degree of animosity between the CCF and the Communist Party of Canada, due to a history of political conflicts between the two parties, the CCF determined that embracing anti-communism would not only reassure a fearful public, but also contribute to the demise of the CPC which had been the prime competitor in seeking the allegiance of the Canadian working class.²⁸ However, the downside of the CCF's anti-communist position was to be the constriction of open debate and democratic discourse within the Canadian Left. The CCF adopted its anti-communism with all the fervour of the forces of reaction, enforcing a unanimous party line intolerant to dissent.²⁹ Any opposition to state policies such as NATO membership and the Marshall Plan, were chastized as communist sympathy, with dissenters given the option of either remaining silent or leaving the party.³⁰ Those party members suspected of communist sympathies were frequently purged, the most pertinent to the discussion being Bob Carlin, CCF MLA for Sudbury and

²⁸ Ibid., 268.

²⁹ Ibid., 270.

³⁰ Ibid., 270. The most divisive internal struggle within the CCF took place in Manitoba, where two sitting CCF MLAs were expelled for being too closely associated with Communists. See Nelson Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of the CCF/NDP. (Winnipeg, MB: University of Manitoba Press, 1983), 37-62.

former Board member of the IUMMSW.³¹

By adopting such stringent anti-communist principles, the CCF essentially vacated its position as a voice of dissent during the Cold War. However, of equal value to the Canadian state was the role of social democrats in policing the labour movement. In this respect, the strategy of Ottawa diverged markedly from Washington's. By having the labour movement police itself, the Canadian state could forgo the heavy handed anti-communist legislation enacted in the United States such as Taft-Hartley.³² Indeed Prime Minister St. Laurent was quite vocal in his support for self-policing within the trade union movement. "No one will convince me Canada needs a Taft-Hartley Act" he declared, citing trade unions as free associations of society that were to be "trusted with the burden of the Cold War."³³ Thus the Canadian state chose to "privatize" its anti-communist efforts within the labour movement by encouraging the labour movement to

³¹ Mike Solski and John Smaller, *Mine Mill: The History of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers in Canada, Since 1895*. (Ottawa, ON: Steel Rail Publishing, 1985), 126. Solski and Smaller argue that the CCF refused to endorse Carlin in an effort to discredit Mine Mill due to Carlin's refusal to support the deportation of suspected Communist IUMMSW organizers.

³² The Taft-Hartley Act required American unions to demonstrate that they were free from Communist influence to the satisfaction of the regulating body. If they could not meet this criterion, they would be effectively denied the protection of the state in the enforcement of regulations covering industrial disputes, conciliation, and certification for bargaining. See Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 349.

³³ *Ibid.*, 195.

"clean its own house."³⁴ It can be argued that Ottawa was better served by this strategy of privatizing the regulation of political beliefs because such "moral" campaigns are difficult for a liberal democratic state to undertake with any degree of success. Social theorist Mariana Valverdes argues that liberal democratic states portray themselves as neutral arbiters of opinions circulating in civil society. Such states also have a structural commitment to non-interference in private beliefs and activities of a moral and/or cultural nature.³⁵ Similarly, David Garland argues that liberal democratic states are structurally committed to constructing ethics as a field of private opinion and behaviour, and thus have found it convenient to leave such tasks to private agencies that face no such constraints.³⁶ Thus in undertaking such a decidedly illiberal campaign to purge union members based solely upon their political beliefs, the state preferred to maintain its distance. Certainly Ottawa was wary of being perceived as abandoning liberal values. St. Laurent was cognizant of the criticism that had been directed at the MacKenzie King administration in its enactment of the War Measures Act to

³⁴ Ibid., 354.

³⁵ Mariana Valverdes, *The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925*. (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart, 1991), 25.

³⁶ Ibid., 165.

deal with the Gouzenko revelations.³⁷ Therefore the Liberals urged not to "throw away the baby freedom with the dirty bath-water, communism."³⁸

Despite these pronouncements, Ottawa hardly approximated the role of neutral arbiter. Sociologist Nikolas Rose contends that the liberal democratic state will assist such private agencies through the provision of a legal framework that will facilitate or legitimate the private agency's actions, and that the state will provide funding and information to ensure the success of the campaign.³⁹ This is exactly the role that Ottawa would play in its efforts to assist the labour movement in its communist purges.

The federal Liberals assisted the purging of the trade union movement by opening a conduit between conservative trade union leaderships and the RCMP. The RCMP's coterie of informers and its extensive surveillance of suspected "security threats" within the labour movement was put at the

³⁷ Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 66.

³⁸ "Must Not Abandon Freedom with Anti-Red Law- Pearson." Toronto Daily Star, (March 10, 1949).

³⁹ Paula Maurutto, "Private Policing and the Surveillance of Catholics: Anti-Communism in the roman Catholic Archdiocese of Toronto, 1920-60." In Gary Kinsman, Mercedes Steedman, and Dieter K. Buse, editors. Whose National Security? Canadian State Surveillance and the Creation of Enemies. (Toronto, ON: Between the Lines, 2000)., 38.

disposal of anti-communist union officials.⁴⁰ The Ministry of Immigration also cooperated, preventing the entry of suspected communist organizers from the U.S. into the country.⁴¹ Thus Ottawa acted, in Whitaker and Marcuse's words, "as a friendly facilitator of private purges while maintaining an arms length relationship in public."⁴² The purges were further assisted through vocal government encouragement and through legal sanction, as the courts turned a blind eye to those individuals expelled from their unions despite fundamental violations of civil liberties.⁴³

Through this assistance, trade union leaders were able to exercise the same expulsionary powers that characterized American Taft-Hartley. The most pronounced were the efforts of the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) to purge its affiliates of all suspected Communists. These state facilitated

⁴⁰ Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 354. Note that the Canadian state had a vested interest in purging IUMMSW Local 598 of Communists that went beyond mobilizing popular consensus for Cold war aims. The Sudbury basin provided for close to 90 percent of all nickel production in the non-Communist world. Canadian security agencies were extremely concerned that such a key military resource was under the control of a suspected Communist dominated union. See Mercedes Steedman, "The Red Petticoat brigade: Mine Mill Women's Auxiliaries and the Threat from Within, 1940's-70's." In Kinsman et al, 2000., 58, 69, 13f.

⁴¹ Reg Whitaker, *Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration*. (Toronto, ON: Lester & Orpen Dennys Ltd, 1987)., 148-177. State immigration controls were used as a prime weapon against the entry of Communist organizers into Canada. Business pressure was intense to stop the flow of Communist organizers into the country after the passage of Taft-Hartley, expected to induce a mass-exodus of Communists into Canada. See Whitaker, 1987., 154-164, and Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 193.

⁴² Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 355.

⁴³ Ibid., 347, 354.

powers allowed the TLC to suspend any union from the Congress simply for electing an officer deemed to be a "person espousing Communism."⁴⁴ The assignment of the accusation of "communism" was so arbitrary that it was soon associated with any union member who opposed the "pillars" of Liberal Cold War policy: namely, NATO membership, the Marshall Plan, rearmament of West Germany, and non-recognition of Communist China.⁴⁵ Thus the trade union definition of "communism" coincided remarkably well with opposition to government policy.

However, the Canadian trade union leadership should not be portrayed as hapless pawns of Ottawa's machinations. Segments of the leadership stood to gain substantial power and benefits by purging their unions of radical, left-wing influence. As Whitaker and Marcuse demonstrate, the purging of suspected Communists from the trade union movement greatly assisted the more conservative segments of the labour movement in consolidating their power and "transforming these organizations into the more conservative world of business unionism."⁴⁶ Furthermore, the international unions stood to make serious membership gains by eliminating union radicals who generally supported greater national autonomy

⁴⁴ Ibid., 349.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 354.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 361.

and independence for Canadian unions. Thus during the purges more than 20,000 workers transferred from Canadian locals to international unions, bringing with it a substantial financial windfall.⁴⁷ Finally, the purges essentially eliminated the CCF's only rival within organized labour, thereby positioning the party as the only viable political vehicle for working class politics within Canada.⁴⁸ And yet the purges could not have been carried out without the consent of the rank and file membership, which unfortunately was consistent in its approval of anti-communist resolutions.⁴⁹

The consequences of the purges for Canadian labour were dramatic. While the public nature of the purges served to contribute to the repressive atmosphere of the time, the expulsions and purges drove some of the most effective and committed organizers and activists to the margins.⁵⁰ The effect of the purges on individual unions would be disastrous.⁵¹ For IUMMSW, its expulsion from the CCL following allegations of Communist infiltration denied it the protection and the assistance of the Congress thereby leaving

⁴⁷ Ibid., 361.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 361.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 357.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 352.

⁵¹ Other unions expelled from the TLC included the United Fisherman and Allied Workers Union (UFAWU), and the Canadian Seaman's Union (CSU), with purging of left-wing officials in the Port Arthur Trades and Labour Council, the Toronto Trades and Labour Council, the International Chemical Workers, the International Carpenters and the Vancouver Civic Employees Union.

it extremely vulnerable to strikebreaking and the raiding by the USWA that was to occur in the near future.⁵²

The anti-communism practiced in Canada was unique in that the state felt secure enough to privatize its efforts and allow external actors to self-police themselves.⁵³ In each instance, the goals of the state and extra-state actors merged over a common agenda. Similarly, Ottawa was also able to privatize its anti-communist efforts in conjunction with the Catholic Church, both to secure the allegiance of an isolationist Quebec public for interventionist foreign policy and to formulate an anti-Communist outlook within the Catholic population.

French Catholic Quebec was viewed by Ottawa as a prime impediment to the institution of Canadian Cold War foreign policy. French Quebec's historic defiance of the Canadian government's foreign adventures, typified by the fierce battle over conscription, made it highly suspicious of

⁵² Allegations of Communist domination of IUMMSW in Canada led to suspension from the CCL in August of 1948, followed by permanent expulsion in March 1949. Expulsion of the International from the CIO occurred in February 1950. See Hogan, 1985., 5. For a more detailed account of the expulsion of IUMMSW see Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 86-110.

⁵³ S.D. Clark argues that the absence of repressive legislation in Canada as compared to the U.S. should not be cause for celebration. Clark argues that the rise of a McCarthy denotes a greater realm of freedom and tolerance within the U.S. system. Canada's tighter system of elite political control essentially prevented the rise of a Cold war demagogue. S.D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 215-16, Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 286.

the foreign interventions that characterized Ottawa's Cold War strategy. Thus Ottawa had to skillfully manipulate Quebec opinion to drag it out of its isolationist shell. To do this it needed to let loose the communist bogey on the French population. An excerpt of a Pearson speech is illustrative of this tactic. The key to the struggle versus communism according to Pearson,

was the spiritual - if I may use that word without misunderstanding - nature of the struggle against revolutionary communism, which makes its appeal, on ideological grounds, to a large section of our people who previously had been suspicious of overseas entanglements.⁵⁴

Such pronouncements constructed Quebec isolationism as advantageous to the march of world communism, thereby associating all those who would put Quebec nationalism before the goals of the Canadian state as dupes for the international machinations of Moscow. The reference to the spiritual is also an "indirect reference to the vehement anti-communism of the Roman Catholic Church" still dominant in Quebec society.⁵⁵ Ottawa recognized the value of Church support in undermining Quebec isolationism and opposition to Cold War policy due to the Church's influence in both civil

⁵⁴ Ibid., 265.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 265.

society and in the Duplessis government.⁵⁶ Prime Minister St. Laurent would be even more direct regarding the Soviet peril to Catholic audiences. In a speech to the Richelieu Club in Quebec City, St. Laurent singled out a Catholic bishop in the audience and suggested that Soviet domination would result in the bishop's imprisonment, as had occurred to many clergy in Communist led countries.⁵⁷ Not that many senior Catholic officials in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada needed any significant cajoling to adopt an anti-communist stance. Anti-communism also served the Catholic Church's own interests. As Whitaker and Marcuse argue, fear of communism reinforced the Church's own position within society and enhanced its social control. Furthermore, communist ideology posed an atheistic and materialist challenge to Catholic teaching aimed at the significant constituency of the Catholic working class.⁵⁸ The Church did not need Ottawa's prodding to recognize the potential threat communism posed to its influence over its membership. Indeed, Catholic social teaching had a long history of opposing communist and socialist ideologies. However, to fully comprehend the

⁵⁶ Ibid., 296-299.

⁵⁷ Maurutto, 2000., 46.

⁵⁸ Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 295. Certainly the experience of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe must have been cause for alarm with such a massive part of the European Catholic constituency living under Communist rule.

ideological and theological aversion to communism, it is essential to investigate the formation of Catholic anti-communism from its beginnings.

Catholic anti-communism did not originate with the onset of the Cold War. Indeed to fully understand Catholicism's religious and ideological opposition to communism, it is necessary to outline the development of Catholic social thought from the incipient moment when communism as an ideology first appeared on the world stage. Opposition to communism within Catholic social doctrine was apparent as early as 1846 with the publication of the social encyclical *Qui Pluribus*. The encyclical described "so-called communism" as a "damnable doctrine which is already everywhere in conflict with natural law."⁵⁹ The most developed condemnation of communism would be spelled out in Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (RN), at the end of the nineteenth century. This encyclical, along with *Quadragesimo anno* (QA), were to be signal documents in the development of Catholic social thought because, as Gregory Baum states, "[i]n a purely abstract way, all Catholics assented to the

⁵⁹ Norbert Mette, "Socialism and capitalism in Papal Social Teaching." In John Coleman and Gregory Baum, editors. *Rerum Novarum: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching*. (London, U.K: SCM Press, 1991)., 24.

Church's official teaching."⁶⁰ These encyclicals thereby defined the official Catholic worldview that would be built upon for decades to come.

Pope Leo XIII in the RN would castigate both socialism and liberalism as attempting to undermine the "divinely willed inequality of human beings in social matters (as opposed to their equality as children of God), and thus of the necessity of a hierarchal division of society."⁶¹ There was an inherent suspicion within Catholic social theory that modern industrial society and the ideologies it spawned had fundamentally disrupted the divine order of society. What was at issue for the Church was not the existence of a class divided, hierarchal society, but rather the existence of a class divided society marked by violent conflict. Norbert Mette argues that Catholic social teaching, rather than the transcending of the capital - labour antagonism in the classless society, that there instead was a plea that this conflict should be transplanted to become a "flourishing collaboration between the two in a class-free society."⁶² The Church idealized the stability of organic society in the feudal age,

⁶⁰ Gregory Baum, *Catholics and Canadian Socialism: Political Thought in the Thirties and Forties*. (Toronto, ON: James Lorimer & Co., 1980), 72.

⁶¹ Mette, 1991., 25. When the Church did make distinctions between communism and socialism, they were equally condemned as "pursuing the same goal, albeit with different means and methods."

⁶² *Ibid.*, 32..

"when those who owned the land - then the ruling class - saw themselves as the protectors of the people who lived and worked on their territories and as the promoters of the common good."⁶³ Thus the conflict between classes could be rectified were the wealthy to resume their paternalist obligations to the poor that had characterized the feudal era. The conflict engendered by industrial capitalism was thereby the result of "individual and isolated defections from true morality, and not the manifestation of a social law."⁶⁴ The onus was therefore on the wealthy to align their conduct with right moral principles. Accordingly, Leo XIII counseled that social justice depended upon "a change of heart by those who held economic and political power." While Leo XIII advised offering moral counsel to the rich and powerful, if they didn't listen or were "simply impervious, Leo XIII counseled the Church to acquiesce."⁶⁵ Concomitantly, the working classes, while encouraged to form mutual associations, were advised to reject the theories of class struggle advocated by socialism. Although the Vatican promoted participation in trade unions, it "opposed any revolutionary activities; unions were to seek

⁶³ Baum, 1980., 72

⁶⁴ Allan Latham, The Catholic and National Labour Unions of Canada. (Toronto, ON: MacMillan, 1930)., 6.

⁶⁵ Michael Welton, Little Mosie from Margaree: A Biography of Moses Michael Cody. (Toronto, ON: Thompson Educational Publishing, 2001)., 130.

co-operative approaches rather than attempt to dominate business relations."⁶⁶ Leo XIII rejected the socialist idea that class warfare was "the necessary dynamic of history's forward movement."⁶⁷ Renzo Bianchi argues that the RN, while seemingly critical of ruling groups was actually a mask for Church interests. Ultimately the encyclical protected the ruling class "upon whose good will much of the power of the Church rested."⁶⁸ Bianchi argues the encyclical accomplished this by "appeasing working class Catholics with abstract criticism of the rich and stigmatizing their participation in any potentially disruptive social movements."⁶⁹ Thus the underlying concern of the papal encyclical is institutional protection and power.⁷⁰

However, Mette argues that the social teaching of Leo XIII encountered socialism in a predominantly nascent form which had only just recently found expression in parties and their bonding together to form the Internationale. With the success of the Russian Revolution and the realization of the fragility of capitalism due to the Great Depression, Pope Pius XI recognized that the RN needed to be updated to take

⁶⁶ Maurutto, 2000., 48.

⁶⁷ Baum, 1980., m78.

⁶⁸ Michael J. Schuck, "The Ideological Uses of Catholic Social Teaching." In Coleman and Baum, 1991., 49.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 49.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 49.

account of the changing times. Pius' Quadregesimo Anno would engage a more fully formulated socialism of the time as well as providing a scathing denunciation of the abuses of monopoly capitalism. The QN condemned the new shape of monopoly capitalism while chastizing the solutions offered by revolutionary socialism. Once again, the Church's criticism of capitalism focused on the morality of owners rather than any inherent injustice attributed to the system. The viciousness of monopoly capitalism was attributed to the "economic greed of the rich.... produced by the moral and spiritual failure of the bourgeoisie....and the breakdown of Christian morality in the Western world."⁷¹ The Church's prescriptions for remedying the ills of monopoly capitalism called for the reform of institutions and the correction of society's morals to foster and promote harmony between the classes, no fundamental restructuring of the economic system was entertained.⁷² Indeed, socialism's focus on primarily the economic was seen as the source of the doctrine's incompatibility with the teachings of the Church. Pius argued that socialism's wish to reconstruct society through changes exclusive to the economic realm failed to address the profound spiritual

⁷¹ Ibid., 84.

⁷² Steve Rosswurm, "The Catholic Church and the Left-Led Unions: Labor Priests, Labor Schools, and the ACTU." In The CIO's Left-Led Unions. (Steve Rosswurm, editor. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1992)., 125.

transformation necessary for the construction of a more just society.⁷³ Furthermore, socialism's materialist conception of the world wished to "build society without reference to God, the creator of humanity, and without obedience to the divine laws."⁷⁴ Socialism's materialistic and secular conceptions of the world were fundamentally contrary to the interests of the Church. Furthermore, socialism's insistence on the use of state intervention in traditionally private spheres of society would not only deny a place for Christian principles in social life, but as Francois Houtart argues, would encroach upon, and limit the social space in which the Church traditionally operated, thereby threatening its institutional reproduction.⁷⁵ The incompatibility between Catholic social teaching and socialist doctrine was succinctly expressed by Pius when he stated that, "whether socialism be considered as a doctrine, or a historical fact, or as a "movement," wrote Pius, "If it remains socialism, it cannot be brought into harmony with the dogmas of the Catholic Church."⁷⁶ Pius would conclude in no

⁷³ Mette, 1991., 87.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 86.

⁷⁵ Francois Houtart, "Religion and Anti-Communism: The Case of the Catholic Church." In Ralph Milliband, et al, editors. The Socialist Register, 1984: The Uses of Anti-Communism. (London, U.K: Merlin Press, 1984)., 358-59.

⁷⁶ Mette, 1991., 87.

uncertain terms that; "No one can be at the same time a sincere Catholic and a true socialist."⁷⁷

Thus the Church's official position frustrated any possible reconciliation between the two doctrines. Catholic men and women involved in socialist movements were now pressured to choose between their politics and their religion.⁷⁸ These pronouncements would inform Catholic social teaching for decades to come and explains the Canadian Church's ideological opposition towards communism during the Cold War. Furthermore, these encyclicals would provide the basis for the Church's moral and educational campaign against communism during the Cold War. Thus, an understanding of Catholic social teaching is essential in order to situate the unique form of anti-communism that the Church would come to profess.

The Catholic Church's role did not end in delivering the French Quebec constituency to Ottawa's Cold War aims. The Church was also a significant partner in the construction of anti-communist public opinion in English Canada. Paula Maurutto's study of the Catholic Church in the Archdiocese of Toronto portrays a Church involved in the active policing of its own members, operating independently of law

⁷⁷ Ibid., 87.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 92.

enforcement agencies but "intertwined with state political initiatives."⁷⁹ Maurutto argues that the Church exercised "philanthropic" control over its membership by seeking to minimize the influence of communism through the regulation and reformation of behaviour.⁸⁰ The regulation of an individual's subjectivity was uniquely suited to a private actor rather than the state, given the possible quandaries involved with a liberal democratic state entering the "private sphere" of ethics and morality.⁸¹ While the specific actions of the Catholic Church in Ontario will be dealt with more broadly in the following section, it is important to recognize the influence the Church had in the construction of a Cold War, anti-communist outlook, and how these actions were supported by a complex social theory that served the interests of both the Church and Ottawa.

In order to assess the success of Ottawa's Cold War strategy of privatizing its anti-communism it is necessary to gauge the mood of public opinion during this period. While public opinion research was in its infancy at this time, there did exist a number of commercial polling organizations that regularly conducted measurements of Cold War opinion in

⁷⁹ Maurutto, 2000., 37.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 37.

⁸¹ Ibid., 38.

Canada.⁸² The general picture from these data show a Canadian population fearful of communism and the Soviet Union, but not very knowledgeable about either. Whitaker and Marcuse rightly call the image of communism in the Canadian public mind as an enigma, not surprising given the distorted representation offered up by the state, the Church, political parties, and the media in general.⁸³ This fear of an unknown, yet ubiquitous communist threat manifested itself into extremely authoritarian attitudes within the Canadian public. For example, 79 percent of Canadians polled agreed that foreign Communists should be barred from entering Canada. 68 percent were willing to outlaw organizations described as "largely Communistic," and 62 percent were willing to deny freedom of speech to Communists and "Communist sympathizers."⁸⁴ Indeed, many of these attitudes went far beyond what Ottawa was willing to legislate in regards to restrictions on Communism. But given Ottawa's penchant for privatizing its anti-communist efforts, this is not surprising. Through its use of extra-state actors, Ottawa was able to facilitate a highly repressive political atmosphere

⁸² Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994., 279-80. Many of these polls were not very sophisticated and rife with methodological errors, however they are the only measure of Canadian public opinion at the time.

⁸³ Ibid., 280.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 282-83..

while maintaining the facade of a tolerant liberal democratic state.

To the degree that these data are reliable, it seems that Ottawa's Cold War strategy of mobilizing the public through the use of anti-communist rhetoric was a qualified success. This is not to state that Ottawa alone was responsible for the engineering of anti-communist attitudes within the Canadian populace. Certainly, Ottawa took advantage of latent Soviet hostility within the Canadian public, especially after the revelations of the Gouzenko affair. Rather it suggests that Ottawa built upon, and fashioned an anti-communist consensus by skillfully manipulating prior fears within the public mind.⁸⁵

Furthermore, Ottawa's device of privatizing its anti-communist efforts allowed it to portray itself as a neutral arbiter committed to liberal democratic values. Much is made of the fact that Canada did not reproduce the harsh repressive state policies characterized by McCarthyism that plagued our American neighbour. However, through the existence of shared agendas and interests between the Canadian state and private extra-state actors, Ottawa was able to achieve a similar state-sanctioned form of repression while maintaining its distance. In effect, Ottawa's tactics closely corresponded with

⁸⁵ Ibid., 261.

Gramscian notions on the mobilization of hegemony. Antonio Gramsci argued that in specific historical situations, certain hegemonic institutions of civil society, such as political parties and organized religion, are transmuted, into constituent components of the state apparatus. These agencies of civil society thereby mobilize hegemonic consent over the individuals under their particular jurisdictions.⁸⁶ Reg Whitaker explains this strategy as the distinction between "state repression" and "political repression." While state repression refers to the use of the legitimate means of coercion practiced by the state, political repression refers to the exercise of coercion "outside the state system proper" but originating in the wider political system.⁸⁷ However, both Gramsci and Whitaker maintain a state centered focus that neglects the self-interest that motivated these extra-state actors to work in accordance with the aims of the state. To be sure, this assistance to the state would not have been as forthcoming if it had not been in the interest of these groups to cooperate. What is integral to understanding the actions of the Catholic Church, CLC and the USWA in undermining Local 598 is the existence of shared agendas that allowed

⁸⁶ Joseph V. Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process. (Oxford, U.K: Clarendon Press, 1987)., 28.

⁸⁷ Reg Whitaker, "Fighting the Cold War on the Home Front: America, Britain, Australia, and Canada." In Milliband, et al, 1984., 24.

these groups to act in concert with the state. Furthermore, the reinforcement of a dichotomous world view that contributed to the polarization between "us and them" facilitated the efficacy of red-baiting as a means and as a strategy by these extra-state groups to undermine public sympathy and create fear and suspicion versus the union. However, while these groups acted on their own behalf, it is imperative to emphasize that these actions took place within a climate fully endorsed and facilitated by the Canadian state.

Chapter 3: Anti-Communism and the Catholic Church in Ontario

The Catholic Church in Ontario would share the same distrust and fear of communism that characterized the official Vatican position and Catholic social teaching in general. Sociologist Paula Maurutto notes that during the Great Depression in Toronto, the Church engaged in a protracted battle with the Communists for the allegiance of Catholics through a network of charitable services from soup kitchens, private welfare, shelters, etc, all vying to preempt the influence of similar Communist inspired services. For Maurutto, these services seemed to have less to do with alleviating systemic poverty within communities than as a vehicle for moral proselytizing. Thus prior to the onset of the Cold War, the Catholic Church had already perceived the Communists as a threat to its ability to secure adherents within the community. The use of private charities and relief agencies as instruments of moral reform and anti-communist education would be an integral part of the Church's strategy of inoculating their membership from the influence of the Communism. Indeed, the Catholic Church's existing networks and prior experience in ideological battles with the

Communists made them a pivotal ally of the province as communist hysteria mounted with the Gouzenko revelations and the spectacle of the Spy trials. In 1945 the Conservative government of Ontario, led by George Drew, sought an alliance with the Catholic Church to engage in an ideological battle with the perceived communist threat.⁸⁸ In a letter to Archbishop McGuigan, Drew warned that the "Communists have more votes than ever before. They have an active, vigorous, well-financed organization. I believe their propaganda will continue to be as active as ever."⁸⁹ Drew encouraged the Church to engage in an intensified counter-propaganda campaign against communism, arguing that "there is a very real need for an educational campaign showing what their purpose really is."⁹⁰

The Church would zealously commit itself to this moral and educational campaign against communism, with strategies ranging from weekly sermons, study groups based on the encyclicals, vehement denouncements of communism in the *Catholic Register*, and the sponsorship of an organized speaker series. An integral part of this strategy was the

⁸⁸ Drew was an ardent anti-communist who went so far as to request military intervention from Ottawa to quell the 1945 UAW strike in Windsor. See Donald M. Wells, "The Origins of Canada's Wagner Model of industrial Relations: The United Auto Workers in Canada and the Suppression of "Rank and File" Unionism" in *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*. (Vol. 20, No. 2, Spring 1995)., 210.

⁸⁹ Maurutto, 2000., 46.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 47.

proselytizing of anti-communism to recent Canadian immigrants.⁹¹ According to Maurutto, the Church viewed their religious devotion, which did not conform to Irish standard practice, as promoting idolatry. The Church viewed their foreign values and customs as prone to superstition and radical ideologies, and were thereby perceived as ripe for Communist organizing.⁹²

However, what is most pertinent to the discussion at hand is the proliferation of Catholic sponsored labour schools in Ontario and the northeastern United States to counteract perceived Communist penetration of labour unions. The use of labour schools to undermine Communist domination of trade unions seemed to be a favoured strategy of the Catholic Church during this period. Indeed, the Toronto Labour School became known for its "leading role in unmasking communism," within the labour movement.⁹³ These schools concerned themselves with "communicating the Church's social teaching to working people as an alternative to

⁹¹ Ibid., 39. The majority of these new immigrants arrived from Central and Eastern Europe, many of them practicing or nominal Catholics.

⁹² Ibid., 39. The state was also concerned with the perceived susceptibility of new immigrants to Communist ideologies, advocating "guidance" and "protection" from Communist recruiters. For a more detailed account see Franca Iacovetta, "Making Model Citizens: Gender, Corrupted Democracy, and Immigrant and refugee Reception Work in Cold war Canada." In Kinsman, et al, 2000., 154-167.

⁹³ Ibid., 48.

communism."⁹⁴ However, an unstated purpose of the schools seems to be the creation of alternative leadership cadres to challenge the control of Communist influenced unions. This strategy was illustrated by numerous schools during the 1940's in the United States. The Xavier Labour School of Manhattan's efforts to overthrow the leadership of the Transport Workers Union (TWU) and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE), is a case in point.⁹⁵ IUMMSW locals were also targeted by Catholic sponsored labour schools prior to the events in Sudbury. The case of Father Joseph F. Donnelly's efforts to undermine the leadership of IUMMSW locals through Connecticut based labour schools is illuminating in this regard.⁹⁶ According to labour historian Steve Rosswurm, the Connecticut schools directed their efforts "to a small and special group" within the local membership. The rationale behind focusing on a smaller group rather than persuading an entire membership was that the leadership of the labour movement was "carried in a very few hands."⁹⁷ The schools focused on "those who mattered most," and from this group would flow the "sound principles

⁹⁴ Rosswurm, 1992., 122.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 124.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 226, 21f. These efforts seemed to be coordinated primarily through the "Diocesan Labor Institute of Hartford" between 1942-47.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 128.

and planning of the Church's social teachings"⁹⁸ As will be shown, this strategy of selecting a small minority to challenge incumbent union leaderships would be played out with striking similarity in the Church's conflict with Local 598.

In Ontario, Catholic labour schools would be created in both Toronto and Windsor.⁹⁹ The behaviour of the Pius XI Labour school in Windsor would remain consistent with its American cousins, although less strident in its anti-communist rhetoric.¹⁰⁰ While the officials of the school insisted that their goal was not to gain control of Communist influenced United Auto Workers (UAW) locals in the area, this is exactly the strategy the graduates of the school employed.¹⁰¹ The graduates of the school ran an alternative slate of candidates under the name "Rank and File Action Committee" in the leadership elections of UAW local 195.¹⁰² With their subsequent victory, the new leadership set out to "clean out the feeder plants" of communism throughout the area, traveling to Oshawa, St. Catherines, and Toronto to support rebellion against left-wing leaderships.¹⁰³ Pius XI graduate Wilfred Blackburn was unequivocal in his insistence that the

⁹⁸ Ibid., 128.

⁹⁹ Maurutto, 2000., 48.

¹⁰⁰ Brian F. Hogan, "Catechising Culture: Assumption College, the Pius XI Labour School and the United Auto Workers, Windsor, 1940-50." in Canadian Catholic Historical Studies. (No. 55, 1899),86.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 90-91.

¹⁰² Ibid., 94.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 95.

change-over in leadership was due to the efforts of the labour school. Blackburn attributed the success of the reform slate to the work of the school in "providing the educational background necessary for disaffected men to organize their grievances and to offer an alternative labour philosophy to the membership."¹⁰⁴ As will be seen, the strategies employed to combat communism by these Catholic labour schools are noteworthy for their striking similarity to the actions undertaken in Sudbury.

As will be shown, both the moral and educational campaign outlined by Maurutto, and the actions of the labour schools in Ontario and the northeastern United States would be replayed with remarkable consistency in the events in Sudbury. What this suggests is that the Catholic Church's actions against Local 598 were not a localized incident or a unique exception. Rather, they conform to the actions of the Church throughout Ontario and the United States. Thus Hogan's argument that the Church played no role in the USWA-Mine Mill struggle is immediately suspect as the Church in Sudbury was attuned to the behaviour of the Church in other industrial centres where communism was deemed a present danger.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 94.

Chapter 4: The Catholic Church in Sudbury

The actions of the Catholic Church in the City of Sudbury in regards to the Local International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers would closely correspond to the actions of the Church towards other perceived Communist "front" organizations in Ontario and the United States. While the Church in Sudbury had confrontations with Communists before the appearance of Mine Mill Local 598, these were sporadic instances in which Communist agitators attempted to influence individual parishioners.¹⁰⁵ With the official certification of Mine Mill as the bargaining agent for the employees at INCO and Falconbridge in December of 1943, the Church perceived a much larger and ominous target for Communist subversion. The reasons for the Church's concerns are immediately evident when one views the Catholic composition of both the City of Sudbury and the Local Mine Mill membership. Sudbury was almost two-thirds Roman Catholic as compared to one-half for the rest of

¹⁰⁵ Frank A. Peake, and Ronald P. Horne, The Religious Tradition in Sudbury: 1883-1983. (Sudbury, ON: Journal Printing, 1983)., 94.

Canada at the time.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, of the over 17,600 members of Mine Mill, 70% were self identified Catholics.¹⁰⁷ Thus Catholics were the clear majority, and the Church had an ample stake in retaining the allegiance of such an enormous Catholic community.

With the appearance of Mine Mill came the similar anti-communist tactics employed in Toronto. Catholic inspired study groups aimed at the miners began at the incipient moments of Local 598. Fr. Albert Regimbal established two study clubs in 1942 called Le Cercle Archambault,"which followed the union movement "very closely and were critical of the Mine Mill constitution for being more than socialistic, very far left."¹⁰⁸ With the Gouzenko revelations still fresh within the collective mind, 1947 witnessed accusations by a CIO special investigation that the Mine Mill International was "maintaining communist associations."¹⁰⁹ With the subsequent expulsion of Mine Mill from both the CCL and CIO in 1949 and 1950 respectively, the Catholic campaign against Mine Mill became more emboldened.

¹⁰⁶ J.E. Havel, Politics in Sudbury: A Survey of Mass Communications, Political Behaviour and Political Parties in Sudbury. (Sudbury, ON: Laurentian University press, 1966), 7. At the time of the 1961 National Census, 61.6% of the population of Sudbury were self-identified Roman Catholics, as compared with 45.7% for the rest of Canada.

¹⁰⁷ Hogan, 1985., 40, 27F.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 8.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 5.

The influential editor of the *Catholic Register* urged workers to reject the "red-dominated" union of Mine Mill for the more moderate USWA during a 1949 election, stating that a union "dominated by Communists is not to be trusted."¹¹⁰ By 1950 Fr. Regimbal established a new study club, "La Voix Ouvrier," consisting of some twenty-five miners. Hogan notes that by this time Regimbal had "the clear intention of getting rid of the Mine Mill union."¹¹¹ The study group issued newsletters and provided discussion groups based upon the social encyclicals.¹¹² Regimbal's study group would also recruit the talents of James Kidd, former Local 598 president, vocal opponent of the incumbent Mine Mill leadership, and eventual USWA organizer to address the study meetings. With Kidd's assistance the "Voix Ouvrier" group met with Claude Jodoin, president of the CLC and with representatives of the USWA to begin working on an alternative to the Mine Mill union.¹¹³

Coinciding with the formation of the "Voix Ouvrier" study group was the formation of another study group headed by Fr. J.J. Delaney in 1953.¹¹⁴ This group of Lively and

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 39, 13f.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 8.

¹¹² Ibid., 9.

¹¹³ Ibid., 9. Note that the TLC and CCL merged to form the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) led by Claude Jodoin in 1956.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 9-10.

Creighton miners also studied Catholic social teaching on labour issues and was in contact with the Catholic Labour School in Toronto.¹¹⁵ While Fr. Delaney dismissed the idea that the study group was designed to undermine the incumbent Local 598 leadership, he was nonetheless convinced of their Communist sympathies.¹¹⁶ However, Delaney was equally wary of involving the Church in labour matters, due to the possible negative image it would create in the minds of committed Catholic unionists should the Church be perceived as attempting to destabilize their union.¹¹⁷

Thus the component parts for the full campaign against the Mine Mill leadership in 1959 had been put together. The membership of Local 598 and the City of Sudbury had been informed of communism within their midst. The crucial Church, CLC, USWA collaboration had been set in motion, and the strategy of Church guided workers' education through study groups had begun. The last piece was to be the creation of a Catholic labour school program to coordinate these efforts in a direct challenge for control of Local 598's leadership. This would be achieved with the arrival of A.J. Boudreau and the creation of the Northern Worker's

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 10.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 11. Delaney remarked that there was "little doubt that the direction of union affairs had a strong communist flavour."

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 11.

Educational Program (NWEF) in 1959. The stage was set for the eradication of communism from the nickel belt.

Before investigating the content and purpose of the NWEF and its subsequent consequences for Local 598 it is necessary to address the allegations of the Catholic Church, CLC, and USWA that the Mine Mill union was in fact dominated by Communists. Upon further investigation it will be shown that while Communists were a part of the Local, it is unlikely that the union was Communist dominated. Rather the union's radicalism was, to an important degree, an expression of anarcho-syndicalism borne out of its Western Federation of Miners (WFM) heritage. Furthermore, it will be argued that the primary threat that the Local presented to the Catholic Church was its unique form of social unionism that contained the distinct possibility of making the Catholic Church less relevant within the community of Sudbury.

While Communists were evident within the Local 598 executive, they were never more than a small minority. As Cameron Smith shows, between the period of 1949 and 1959 only five out of the thirty-seven members that served on Local 598's executive board were openly Communist, with one a

member of a sympathetic ethnic organization.¹¹⁸ Many of the allegations charging Communist domination of Local 598 stem from the existence of Communists on the International and National Mine Mill boards. However, to make this connection is to seriously misunderstand the internal structure of the Mine Mill union. Mine Mill was a federation of locals structured along the same lines as the Western Federation of Miners. This involved a horizontal structure which granted the locals an enormous amount of autonomy as compared to more hierarchal union structures.¹¹⁹ As Smith states,

in Sudbury the local signed collective agreements, not the national or the international. The local held the purse strings. Dues were paid to and held by it, and it doled out funds to the national and the international offices, which is the reverse of the normal situation. Neither the national nor the international had the power to override decisions by the local.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Cameron Smith, Unfinished Journey: The Lewis Family. (Toronto, ON: Summerhill Press, 1989), 514. It should be noted that within anti-communist rhetoric, the existence of *fewer* Communists within an organization was cause for even greater alarm. As Michael Parenti notes, anti-communism argues that the "Communist's demonic resourcefulness seems to defy the ordinary laws of political action...as their lack of numbers is their strength." By this twisted logic Parenti concludes, "it should be our goal to *increase* the number of Communists in order to deprive them of their devilish strength.' (My emphasis). See Parenti, The Anti-Communist Impulse. (New York, N.Y: Random House, 1969), 43-4.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 515. Note that Local 598 operated on radically decentralized lines, contrary to Marxist-Leninist forms of organization. It is curious that were Mine Mill a Communist dominated union that it did not adopt the organizational structure favoured by the Communist Party.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 515.

Former Local 598 president Mike Solski was adamant about the autonomy of his local from Communist influences.

It's a lot of crap, I was president of the biggest local in Canada - 18,000 members - and the certification was with the local, not the international. I could tell the international president to go to hell if I wanted to and if I could convince my members to back me up. For somebody to tell me that I was dominated by one political party or another was a whole lot of nonsense.¹²¹

The only power the international or national offices held over its locals was the power of persuasion, other than that the locals were completely autonomous.¹²² What the detractors of Mine Mill could not seem to grasp was that a union with radical, socialist principles like Mine Mill did not automatically align it with communism and Soviet control.¹²³ The parameters of debate were so narrowly confined within the dichotomous worldview of "us versus them" that any deviation from the status quo was immediately equated with the Communist menace. However, a further explanation may also be considered. IUMMSW representative Clinton Jencks describes Mine Mill as a "democratic rank and file controlled

¹²¹ Ibid., 515.

¹²² Ibid., 515.

¹²³ That all radical ideologies were immediately aligned with Communism and Moscow illustrates the power of the dichotomous worldview present during the height of the Cold War.

union with direct election of union officers and direct membership referendum on constitutional changes."¹²⁴ This would seemingly make the union's organizational structure highly representative of its members' wishes. There is the distinct possibility that given Mine Mill's radical social unionism and its successful organizational capabilities, that its detractors, such as the USWA, CLC, and the Catholic Church which operated along more centralized and hierarchal lines, found it impossible to fathom that such an organization could operate without some sort of external direction.¹²⁵

The idea that a working class organization, run by its members, could design such a novel and successful social apparatus within the Sudbury community may have been deemed impossible by the union's detractors due to elitism and class prejudice. The democratic organization of this union may have been perceived as anathema to the more top-down authoritarian structures that characterized organizational structures throughout the rest of Canadian society. Rather than accept the possibility that working class people had the

¹²⁴ Clinton Jencks, "We're Still Here.": A Panel Reviews the Past and Looks to the Future.' in Mercedes Steedman, Peter Suschnigg, and Dieter K. Buse, Hard Lessons: The Mine Mill Union in the Canadian Labour Movement. (Toronto, ON: Dundurn Press, 1995), 146.

¹²⁵ For a discussion of USWA government, see Lloyd Ulman, The Government of the Steelworkers' Union. (New York, N.Y: John Wiley & Sons, 1962) For the Roman Catholic Church see Karl Rahner SJ, et al. Obedience and the Church. (Washington D.C: Corpus Books, 1968). For hierarchal tendencies in the CCL see Abella, 1973., 67-8.

creativity and capability to run their own affairs, a Soviet puppet master was considered a more realistic explanation.¹²⁶

However there is a limit to which this analysis can be pushed. For while Local 598 did demonstrate significant democratic organization, it would be ill-advised to romanticize the local as an idealized expression of participatory unionism. As will be shown, the local suffered from a significant amount of membership apathy in regards to democratic participation. Indeed, this apathy would prove instrumental in the campaign to undermine the incumbent leadership. Thus there is a contradiction that needs to be addressed: how could Local 598 be a participatory democratic union, while at the same time producing a measurable amount of apathy in the rank and file? To answer this question it is necessary to address the changing nature of industrial relations during the post-war period. Certainly Mine Mill demonstrated a long history of rank and file direct action and solidarity from its incipient moments as the Western

¹²⁶ Such elitist notions versus democratic organization by working people have a long historical precedent. See Chomsky, 1996., 84-93. Representative of these ideas is Elite theorist Robert Michels who argues that “the incompetence of the masses is almost universal throughout the domains of political life; and this constitutes the most solid foundation of the power of leaders...Since the rank and file are incapable of looking after their own interests, it is necessary that they should have experts to attend to their affairs.” See Robert Michels, “The Oligarchical Tendencies of Working Class Organizations>” in Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization. (Edited by Eva Etzioni-Halevy, New York, N.Y: Garland Publishing, 1997)., 246-47.

Federation of Miners to its eventual certification at INCO in 1944.¹²⁷ However, after certification at INCO came the gradual institution of a Wagner model of industrial relations. As Donald Wells explains, this model was designed to ensure labour- management peace and is "centered on bureaucratic, economistic collective bargaining by union elites and precludes a politics of class mobilization, particularly in the workplace."¹²⁸ While the institutionalization of labour - management relations resulted in impressive material gains for workers, it essentially "severed mass militancy and solidarity, on the one hand, from contract bargaining and administration, on the other."¹²⁹ Thus the implementation of the Wagner model, while institutionalizing the union's role in the industrial relations process, effectively bureaucratized union grievances thereby thwarting the efficacy of spontaneous rank and file direct action. With certification in 1944 and with subsequent negotiated contracts, this model of industrial relations was gradually implemented into the industrial relations process between Local 598 and INCO management. In the period between 1944 to 1951, Local 598

¹²⁷ For examples see Jim Tester, *The Shaping of Sudbury: A Labour View*. (Sudbury, ON: Mine Mill, 1979)., 33-5., Clinton Jencks, "We're Still Here." In Steedman et al, 1995., 145-6., and Solski and Smaller, 1985., 97-108.

¹²⁸ Wells, 1995., 195.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 195.

secured many of the staples of a Wagner model of industrial relations, including a recognized grievance procedure, seniority rights, union security, dues check-off, overtime pay and substantial wage increases and improved benefits.¹³⁰ This may go some way to explaining the existence of apathy within segments of the Local 598 membership. With the responsibility for securing gains effectively ceded to union elites, coupled with a rising standard of living and increased employment security for the rank and file, active participation in the union may have been considered increasingly unnecessary by segments of the membership. Thus, despite Local 598's WFM inspired democratic structure, the demobilizing nature of labour management relations during this period required less active participation by the rank and file than had characterized a previous era.

However, the institutionalization of a Wagner model was a gradual process, and Local 598 did not display the economistic tendencies that the model purports to entrench. A large section of the membership was active in union affairs and this is best illustrated by the substantial contribution the union made to the social life of the Sudbury community. While the union did concern itself with "bettering the

¹³⁰ Solski and Smaller, 1985., 108-9.

immediate living and working conditions of its members,"¹³¹ it also went far beyond the normal operations of a bread and butter union in securing purely material gains for its workers. The union showed a distinct tendency to "move beyond the narrow economic struggle between the worker and the boss and to deploy its resources towards achieving programs that would enhance the complete lives of members, their families, and the communities in which they lived."¹³² This involved providing financial support to striking workers in other unions, taking an active part in pushing for legislative reforms and electing labour members to legislative office, organizing the service sector, to providing needed medical equipment to community hospitals.¹³³

However probably the most significant contribution to the Sudbury community was the extensive cultural and recreational programs provided for by the Local. Nels Thibault emphasized the union's community responsibilities in an address to the Sudbury Chamber of Commerce:

A union's responsibility must include recognition of assistance it can render through participation in community projects relating to health, welfare, educational, and recreational needs...Great

¹³¹ Ibid., ix.

¹³² John B. Lang, "One Hundred Years of Mine Mill." In Steedman, et al, 1995.,13-14.

¹³³ Ibid., 14, and Smith, 1989., 317.

possibilities are afforded a union to provide facilities for its own group as well as assisting in others.¹³⁴

As Dieter K. Buse notes, what the local achieved in regards to cultural and recreational contributions to the Sudbury community was the creation of an "organized workers' culture."¹³⁵ Through the efforts of Recreation Director Weir Reid, the union embarked on an impressive cultural and recreational program. These involved everything from union sponsored dances and sporting events to ballet and theatre groups.¹³⁶ However the jewel of the union's program was the 166 acre summer camp on Richard Lake. By 1954 the camp could accommodate up to two hundred campers in ten dormitories. The camp included an ecological program, devotional services (both Protestant and Catholic), comprehensive children's programs including Red Cross, Royal Life-Saving, canoeing, boating, archery, baseball, volleyball, hiking, nature study, arts and crafts, pottery, wood carving, metal craft, folk and square dancing, and other activities too numerous to list.¹³⁷ The camp and the other union sponsored activities were essential to the lifeblood of

¹³⁴ Dieter K. Buse, "Weir Reid and Mine Mill: An Alternative Union's Cultural Endeavours." In Steedman et al, 1989., 274.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 269.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 274-76.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 277.

the community especially given the fact that few such activities were provided for by the City's small recreation department with its underdeveloped parks and meager budgets due to lack of financing (the mining companies paid no local taxes).¹³⁸ However, the success of the camp made it a prime target in the campaign to slander the union. The Regimbal study group associated with James Kidd made the camp a key part of its strategy to undermine the incumbent leadership.¹³⁹ The group attacked Weir Reid as a Communist and circulated rumors about the camp as a venue for the socialist indoctrination of children.¹⁴⁰ Reid would be further slandered in the conservative Toronto Telegram, accused of heading a Communist cell and kidnapping children to indoctrinate with Communist propaganda.¹⁴¹

The fate of the camp will be discussed at length further on, but suffice it to say that the camp was a powerful symbol of the union's "good deeds" within the community. The fact that it was so vehemently attacked with such incredible accusations suggests the power it was believed to have by Mine Mill's detractors. Furthermore, the scope and diversity of activities offered by both the camp and other union

¹³⁸ Ibid., 285.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 270.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 278.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 280.

sponsored events seriously threatened the ability of the Church to influence its adherents. The secularization of many of these activities under union auspices meant the Church could not use its own activities as vehicles for moral and educational persuasion.¹⁴² The success of the camp, and the enormous Catholic membership of both the union and the City participating in its events, must have posed a threat to the Church's influence. The Church simply could not compete with the scale and breadth of the union's cultural and recreational activities. As Ruth Reid, a union activist and camp volunteer notes, "this was a Mine Mill town in the 1950's. All the community activities were run by Mine Mill. Everyone from the mayor and his family to the local doctors' wives and children were at the Mine Mill hall for some reason."¹⁴³ The fact that officials of the Church were complicit in slandering the camp and its Director points to the possibility that it perceived the influence of the union in its

¹⁴² The Church has always professed a strong opposition to the secularization of social life as it denied a place for Christian moral principles, thereby contributing to the moral and ethical malaise that the Church viewed as the source of conflict within modernity. For a fuller examination of the Church's opposition to secularism, see Philip Gleason, Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century. (Oxford, U.K: Oxford University press, 1995),. 261-62.

¹⁴³ Steedman, 2000., 59.

traditional domain as deeply threatening.¹⁴⁴ Kenneth Westhues argues that in an environment where the majority are Catholic, the less Catholics can perceive an alternative to the Church, the more the Church becomes for them a fact of life.¹⁴⁵ The existence of such a powerful and competing alternative in the community's social life must have been cause for concern. Given that the camp was such a significant influence in the development of young children and future Catholics, it is possible that it *was* perceived as a secularizing force that threatened the institutional reproduction of the Church itself.¹⁴⁶ With this in mind it is now possible to return to the anti-communist campaign initiated in full swing by 1959 to usurp the incumbent leadership of Mine Mill Local 598.

¹⁴⁴ While I can only speculate on the perceptions the Church had of Mine Mill's cultural and recreational activities, it is not without historical precedent that Church groups fear the secularization of activities previously under their exclusive control. See Valverdes, 1991., 161., and Houtart, 1984.

¹⁴⁵ Kenneth Westhues, "Stars and Stripes, the Maple leaf, and the Papal Coat of Arms." Canadian Journal Of Sociology. (No. 3, Vol. 2, 1978), 254.

¹⁴⁶ Personal correspondence with Dieter K. Buse, July 12, 2002.

Chapter 5: The NWEF: "Boring From Within."

In September of 1958 Mine Mill Local 598 engaged in an ill-advised strike that would have dire consequences for the incumbent union leadership.¹⁴⁷ Former local president Mike Solski argues that INCO forced the union into a strike position due to its unwillingness to negotiate.¹⁴⁸ Regardless of Solski's opinion, the fact was that INCO was in an extremely powerful bargaining position at this time. The company had stockpiled nickel and other metals through overproduction and speed-up. This allowed INCO to continue delivery to customers throughout the thirteen week strike, severely undermining the union's leverage.¹⁴⁹ Unable to gain significant concessions from the company, the union ended the strike with marginal gains at best. The union managed to secure wage increases of only one percent in the first year, two percent in the second, and three percent in the third.¹⁵⁰ The failure of the strike would create severe divisions within the union that would be strategically exploited by Mine Mill's detractors. Of serious concern was the size and allocation of strike relief during the work stoppage. Brian Hogan notes that

¹⁴⁷ Lana Tremblay and Susan Vanstone, Mine Mill Heritage Tour of the Sudbury Region. (Sudbury, ON: Mine Mill-CAW, 1995), 8.

¹⁴⁸ Solski and Smaller, 1985., 132-34.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 134.

¹⁵⁰ Smith, 1989., 516.

many workers found it inconceivable that "a union of over seventeen thousand workers had accumulated such small financial reserves to support their position after a prolonged strike free period."¹⁵¹ Further contributing to these suspicions was the release of a pastoral letter issued by Bishop Alexander Carter that implied financial mismanagement and lack of accountability by the Solski leadership.¹⁵² These feelings were further exacerbated among striking workers when complaints of favouritism and patronage in the distribution of strike relief emerged.¹⁵³ The notion that CLC affiliation would have made strike relief more generous began to circulate, along with the rumors of financial malfeasance by the Solski administration.¹⁵⁴ The leadership was also accused of acting in an autocratic manner, dismissing criticisms from the rank and file. John Lang argues in his exhaustive history of Mine Mill in Sudbury, that while the Solski leadership did demonstrate belligerence towards internal dissent at this time, it had more to do with the atmosphere of red-baiting and unfounded accusations of Communist domination that created a culture of paranoia

¹⁵¹ Hogan, 1985., 17-8.

¹⁵² Ibid., 16.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 18.

¹⁵⁴ John Lang, A Lion in a Den of Daniels: A History of the International Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. Sudbury, Ontario 1942-1962. (Guelph, ON: Masters' Thesis, University of Guelph, 1970)., 221-2.

within the leadership which resulted in the closing of ranks.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, the strike had mobilized a large constituency of formerly apathetic workers to become involved in union affairs. The abject failure of the strike became the only measure of Solski's leadership in their eyes.¹⁵⁶ This created a rift in unity within the union which was skillfully exploited by the USWA, CLC, and Catholic Church campaign to undermine the incumbent leadership.

During the October of the 1958 strike, the Catholic University of Sudbury introduced its "Northern Worker's Education Program" under the tutelage of Alexander J. Boudreau with initial enrolment estimated at between 101 and 150 miners.¹⁵⁷ Boudreau was a vehement anti-communist from Nova Scotia who had served on the Committee on Subversive Activities for the Public Service Commission in Ottawa.¹⁵⁸ While much has been made that Boudreau was "parachuted" into Sudbury for the sole reason of undermining Mine Mill, there is no evidence to suggest this. However, it is not difficult to discern from Boudreau's background and the interests represented by the University of Sudbury which side of the battle lines the University would represent. The

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 226.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 227.

¹⁵⁷ Hogan, 1985., 45, 67f.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 21.

president of the University, the Very Reverend Emile Bouvier, was vociferously anti-labour. In his book, *Employers and Workers*, Bouvier outlines his views on industrial relations, noting that trade unionism inevitably leads to communism and that workers are prone to "loafing" and do not "accept supervision and the employer's authority."¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, the University's "Conseil des Directeurs" included R.D. Parker, vice-president of International Nickel and H.J. Fraser, president of Falconbridge Nickel Mines.¹⁶⁰ It is safe to assume that the leadership of the University was not composed of sympathetic fellow travelers.

From the outset of the NWEF, the USWA, CLC, and the Catholic Church were heavily involved in its formation. Boudreau approached Bishop Alexander Carter to garner the support of local pastors. According to Boudreau, Carter "knew everything about the situation...and said he would help in any way he could," asking his parish priests in the Sudbury area to select four miners each to participate in the program.¹⁶¹ Similarly, James Kidd provided a list of persons to Boudreau whom Kidd recommended as potential

¹⁵⁹ Gerard Picard, "A Book That Will Please Employers." Labour/Le Travail. (March 2, 1951).

¹⁶⁰ Annuaire de L'Universite de Sudbury pour L'Annee Academique 1959. (Sudbury ON: Universite de Sudbury, 1960)., 5.

¹⁶¹ Hogan, 1985., 22.

participants within the program.¹⁶² The USWA and the CLC also provided a large majority of the materials to be used in the course and James Kidd has hinted that the program was partially subsidized by the Steelworkers.¹⁶³ In a letter to Larry Sefton of the USWA, Kidd was explicit in what role he saw the program playing:

Much of the course is based on the structure of the Congress (CLC) and the United Steelworkers, which is very important in view of our *long range objective*. Professor Boudreau who is head of the Extension Department has repeatedly asked me to arrange my work so that I can be in Sudbury to take over the students when they have completed the course and set them up to lead other study and action groups.(my emphasis).¹⁶⁴

Thus the workers enrolled in the course would become familiarized with the procedures specific to the CLC and the USWA. They were essentially being trained to adopt leadership roles within a USWA organized union, while being members of IUMMSW. While the USWA and CLC material primed the students in the organization of the soon to be

¹⁶² Letter from James Kidd to A.J. Boudreau, January 6, 1959. (Laurentian University Archives: James Kidd Fonds, File: Correspondence with CIO, USWA, CCL, and Other).

¹⁶³ Solski and Smaller, 1985., 138.

¹⁶⁴ Letter from James Kidd to Larry Sefton, March 24, 1959. . (Laurentian University Archives: James Kidd Fonds, File: Correspondence with CIO, USWA, CCL, and Other).

raiding union, Boudreau offered a more "worker-friendly" version of anti-communism, drawing heavily on the social encyclicals to play on the fears of Catholic members and drive a wedge between their loyalty to IUMMSW and their faith.

The content of the NWEF dealt with industrial relations, the rules of parliamentary procedure, organizational techniques, economics, and the benefits of cooperative enterprise over monopoly capitalism.¹⁶⁵ In this Boudreau closely followed the teachings of the social encyclicals, stressing a collaborationist solution to the conflict between workers and employers. Boudreau taught that cooperative endeavors were not to replace the system of free enterprise and individual initiative, but rather to eliminate the greed and avarice within men. Like the encyclicals, Boudreau identified societal conflict with moral defects within the individual.¹⁶⁶ Boudreau also chastized liberalism as contributing to the breakdown in Christian morality. However, here Boudreau seemed to diverge from the mainstream of Catholic social teaching, claiming that liberalism was the preparatory stage

¹⁶⁵ Smith, 1989., 516.

¹⁶⁶ A.J. Boudreau, "Lesson Seven: Cooperative Movement." (Laurentian University Archives: Laurentian University Fonds, File: Worker's Educational Assoc. – Course on Communism).

for the spread of communism.¹⁶⁷ Essentially, Boudreau argued that the liberalization of society, with its restrictions on the role of religion, prepared the way for the communist destruction of Christian ethics and morality.¹⁶⁸ From this, Boudreau devoted a large section of the course to the evils of communism and its danger to the "Christian democratic, free world."¹⁶⁹ Thus Boudreau's unique form of Catholic anti-communism was much more palatable to the sensibilities of workers who had lived experience with the injustices and vagaries of industrial capitalism, and would have likely bristled at uncritical praise of pure free enterprise.¹⁷⁰ His teaching, while recognizing the inequities under monopoly capitalism, proposed a "third way" between capitalism and communism. However, following official Catholic social teaching, his analysis neglected to recognize any structural deficiencies within the capitalist system. In this way, Boudreau's teaching corresponds with Bianchi's argument that Catholic social teaching appeases working class Catholics

¹⁶⁷ A.J. Boudreau, "The Establishment of Liberalism: How Badly Are We Brainwashed?" (Laurentian University Archives: Laurentian University Fonds, File: Worker's Educational Assoc. – Course on Communism).

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ A.J. Boudreau, "Lesson One: Communism is an Evil Tree." (Laurentian University Archives: Laurentian University Fonds, File: Worker's Educational Assoc. – Course on Communism).

¹⁷⁰ This is not to suggest that the encyclicals were tailored to the lived experience of Sudbury miners. Boudreau's use of the encyclicals remained largely consistent with historical Catholic social thought.

with abstract criticism of the rich while stigmatizing their participation in any potentially disruptive social movements.¹⁷¹ Yet while Boudreau spoke to the injustices of capitalism, his venom was mainly reserved for the spectre of communism that had enveloped the region.

Boudreau's lessons on communism could be easily dismissed as vulgar Cold War propaganda given the almost farcical statements made in his lectures.¹⁷² However, this would dismiss the very real levels of communist hysteria that existed during this time in Sudbury, and it would fail to recognize that Boudreau's course materials reinforced what the workers had been hearing all along: that the doctrines of communism sought to destroy all that the workers held dear, and it was emanating from their local union halls.

Boudreau's course on communism stressed the ability of Communists to infiltrate and use legitimate organizations as front groups to increase their power, defined as "boring from within." He discussed how Communists within these organizations attempt to capture key positions and then push an agenda directed from Moscow onto unsuspecting citizens

¹⁷¹ Schuck, 1991., 49.

¹⁷² A.J. Boudreau, "Untitled Lecture Notes." (Laurentian University Archives: Laurentian University Fonds, File: Worker's Educational Assoc. – Course on Communism). Boudreau accused the following persons and organizations within Canada of being Communists: L.B. Pearson, John Diefenbaker, the Conservative party, Liberal Party, CCF, Ku Klux Klan and the Anglican Church.

who unwittingly aid the spread of communism.¹⁷³ Such pronouncements corresponded closely with the accusations leveled against the incumbent Mine Mill leadership.

Boudreau also played on the fears of the Catholic majority by emphasizing the atheistic component of Communist doctrine. Boudreau stated that "a complete denial of the very existence of God is the basic principle of Communism. God does not exist. The greatest paradox of Communism, however, is its diabolical hatred of God, who does not exist."¹⁷⁴ Similarly, Boudreau argued that the thought of Marx, Engels and Lenin was designed to;

gradually soften, and eventually break down the established morality which had been the heritage of centuries, based on Christian principles: Indeed all civilizations based on a belief in God. The basic idea was to confuse, and change if possible, the existing Christian morality and ethics on which all enduring civilizations are built.... The primary aim of atheistic communism is to hasten the demise of organized religion...¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ A.J. Boudreau, "Lesson Four: Communist Fronts." (Laurentian University Archives: Laurentian University Fonds, File: Worker's Educational Assoc. – Course on Communism).

¹⁷⁴ A.J. Boudreau, "Lesson One: Communism is an Evil Tree." (Laurentian University Archives: Laurentian University Fonds, File: Worker's Educational Assoc. – Course on Communism).

¹⁷⁵ A.J. Boudreau, "The Establishment of Liberalism: How Badly Are We Brainwashed?" (Laurentian University Archives: Laurentian University Fonds, File: Worker's Educational Assoc. – Course on Communism).

Boudreau did not restrict these ideas to the classroom. In a series of weekly radio addresses he commented on the dangers of atheistic communism and how Communists will "infiltrate the Church to gain a certain amount of respectability," using the Church as a vehicle to make contacts and to indoctrinate other members, all the while carefully concealing their atheism.¹⁷⁶ Boudreau thereby put the whole Catholic community on alert for Communist subversives within their midst.

A further component of the course was a segment devoted to "leadership training." While not overtly stating it, this section seemed designed to encourage the participants in the course to assume leadership positions within the union. The course material flatters the participants noting that "a leader is usually more intelligent than his followers, but not too much more." It also stresses that leadership ability is "innate and a gift" that the participants must already possess "otherwise [they] would have quit before now."¹⁷⁷ It seems patently obvious given the content of the course and the interests backing it, that these participants were being groomed for leadership within the Mine Mill union. Certainly

¹⁷⁶ A. J. Boudreau, Radio Address, (November 1959, Laurentian University Archives).

¹⁷⁷ A.J. Boudreau, Lesson Eight: Leadership." (Laurentian University Archives: Laurentian University Fonds, File: Worker's Educational Assoc. – Course on Communism)

this seemed to be James Kidd's unstated "long term objective."¹⁷⁸

The effect of the course on the participants was realized with the formation of a reform slate of candidates that would challenge the Solski leadership in the strike delayed March elections under the banner of "The Committee for Democratic and Positive Action."¹⁷⁹ The majority of the reform slate were graduates of Boudreau's NWEF.¹⁸⁰ Don Gillis was chosen to head the reform slate, the only high profile member not to have graduated the NWEF program.¹⁸¹ The reform slate would be able to tap into the discontent still prevalent after the disastrous thirteen week strike, the rumors of financial mismanagement, and accusations of communism, winning the March election by the slim margin of fifteen votes.¹⁸² John Lang argues that the mobilization of so many previously apathetic workers, politicized by the strike, led to the victory of the Gillis slate.¹⁸³ The new leadership would instantly set to work to further discredit the Solski regime and consolidate their power.

¹⁷⁸ Letter from James Kidd to Larry Sefton, March 24, 1959. . (Laurentian University Archives: James Kidd Fonds, File: Correspondence with CIO, USWA, CCL, and Other).

¹⁷⁹ Solski and Smaller, 1985., 138.

¹⁸⁰ Hogan, 1985., 138.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 26.

¹⁸² Smith, 1989., 517.

¹⁸³ Lang, 1970., 225.

Chapter 6: Destabilization

According to Solski, the new executive began a program of destabilizing the union to prepare for raiding by the USWA at its first meeting.¹⁸⁴ Clandestine meetings between the new executive, CLC officials, and the USWA were held in Sudbury and Ottawa to devise a plan to allow Local 598 to leave IUMMSW for ultimate membership in Steel through affiliation with the CLC as a first stage.¹⁸⁵ The plan to destabilize the union included manufacturing differences between the local and the IUMMSW national office to sway workers that CLC affiliation would better serve their interests.¹⁸⁶ The degree of external direction furnished to the new executive was impressive. Indeed James Kidd outlined the program for the newly elected officers in a letter to Larry Sefton of the USWA. Kidd noted that in discussions with Boudreau that part of the new executive's strategy would be to prepare a financial audit of the former administration and that Weir Reid would be discharged as he is a "dedicated

¹⁸⁴ Solski and Smaller, 1985., 140.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 142.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 143.

commie."¹⁸⁷ The new executive would follow the Boudreau/Kidd plan to the letter.

Exploiting the rumors of financial mismanagement, the new leadership immediately commissioned a financial audit of the Local's book-keeping practices. The person selected for this task would be Alistair Stewart, a former CCF MP and member of the CLC affiliated United Packinghouse Workers.¹⁸⁸ The choice of Stewart was heavily influenced by the CLC and Boudreau. In correspondence between Boudreau and Donald MacDonald, Secretary-Treasurer of the CLC, Boudreau thanks MacDonald for the advice to retain the services of Stewart during a trip to Montreal paid for by the CLC.¹⁸⁹ What is curious is that the reform slate had accused the Solski leadership of being subordinate to outside (Communist) influence, yet clearly it is Boudreau and Kidd making decisions for the new executive in this instance. The purpose of hiring Stewart became evident when he had concluded his audit. Stewart presented a report that cast more suspicion on the financial legality of the Solski administration, insinuating theft of union funds until libel

¹⁸⁷ Letter from James Kidd to Larry Sefton, March 24, 1959. (Laurentian University Archives: James Kidd Fonds, File: Correspondence with CIO, USWA, CCL, and Other).

¹⁸⁸ Solski and Smaller, 1985., 140.

¹⁸⁹ Letter from A.J. Boudreau to Donald MacDonald, March 25, 1959. (Laurentian University Archives: Box f49.2, File CLC 1950-1967).

worker's and the Sudbury community that the Solski leadership had been somehow corrupt.¹⁹⁴

The Gillis executive picked up on Stewart's critique of the management of Mine Mill's cultural and educational activities in order to, in Solski's words, "diminish community respect for Local 598's cultural and recreational achievements so that the entire structure could then be dismantled."¹⁹⁵ Following the program laid out by Boudreau and Kidd, Wier Reid would become the focal point of the new executive in its efforts to slander the youth camp. Lurid stories of Reid's Marxist leanings and his recruitment of youth into communism were planted in the *Toronto Telegram*, by NWEF graduate Ray Poirier, A.J. Boudreau and *Telegram* reporter Frank Drea.¹⁹⁶ This slander campaign resulted in the dismissal of Reid from his position without consultation with the membership, with Gillis arguing that the new executive board should have the authority to appoint new staff without consultation.¹⁹⁷ Solski supporters circulated a petition denouncing the dismissal and demanding a meeting to discuss the discharge. The Catholic Church ensured a pro-Gillis turn

¹⁹⁴ Lang, 1970., 236.

¹⁹⁵ Solski and Smaller, 1985., 142.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 142. Reid would eventually settle a libel suit against the *Telegram* out of court. However, by that time the damage was already done.

¹⁹⁷ Lang, 1970., 229.

out when the Catholic Seperate School Board sent students home with leaflets urging their fathers to attend the meeting.¹⁹⁸ The meeting overwhelmingly voted to endorse Reid's dismissal.¹⁹⁹

As Dieter K. Buse argues, the victimization of Reid represented more than just an attack on a single individual. "It undercut the philosophy of all individuals having the opportunity to develop themselves spiritually and physically," which was what the cultural and recreational activities embodied under the direction of Reid.²⁰⁰ These values were being destroyed as the struggle within Local 598 continued. Within a few years after the Reid dismissal, the dance schools closed, the theatre disbanded, registrations at the camp declined, and the program was diminished.²⁰¹ By 1962, with the eventual decertification of Mine Mill and the ascendancy of the USWA, dances and community involvements decreased as the "Steelworkers eliminated such "fringes" from U.S. "bread-and-butter" unionism. The material cutbacks reflected a spiritual demise."²⁰² The attacks on Reid and the

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 230. Solski argues that the Separate School Board's actions were an "implied appeal to support the Gillis administration." See Solski and Smaller, 1985., 142. It is ironic, if Solski's statement is correct, that while the Church accused Reid of indoctrinating the young, they saw no problem with using children as a propaganda conduit of their own.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 231.

²⁰⁰ Buse, 1995., 280.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 280.

²⁰² Ibid., 280.

cultural endeavors of Local 598 was the beginning of the end for Mine Mill's unique form of social unionism within the Sudbury community. Buse notes that Mine Mill had offered workers "an alternative to leisure without culture," and that the "Catholic Church and others had found these efforts objectionable and sought to eradicate them."²⁰³ Mercedes Steedman argues that this occurred because "Mine Mill's social unionism challenged the hegemony of a local political and social elite that had long assumed the right to take care of the community."²⁰⁴ The opponents of Mine Mill had identified these activities as a powerful symbol of the union's commitment to the health and welfare of the community, and in their drive to discredit and undermine the influence of the union, they destroyed an impressive manifestation of organized working class culture within the community.

Cognizant of the threat to the existence of Mine Mill in Sudbury, the national office made a concerted effort to win Local 598 back into the IUMMSW camp in the next November election. Nels Thibault resigned his position as national president to contest the election against the Gillis leadership. Boudreau and the Gillis administration recognized

²⁰³ Ibid., 286.

²⁰⁴ Steedman, 2000., 59.

this challenge by stepping up their efforts to associate the national office and the Thibault slate with communism.

Boudreau appealed to the Catholic community to contribute funds in the "defence of our religious principles and our democratic way of life."²⁰⁵ In a letter addressed to "Fellow Catholic Citizens," Boudreau warned that:

subversive elements are presently at work, and endeavoring to gain control of an important sector of our economy and our social life. They are few in numbers, but well organized, WELL FINANCED and well known. It is imperative that we secure sufficient funds to counteract their iniquitous campaign.²⁰⁶

In a fund raising letter by Boudreau's assistant, Julian Pezet, to the Catholic organization the Fatima Circle, he was equally adamant about the imperative need to mobilize against the Thibault slate:

We are presently conducting an all-out war in Sudbury against Communist forces that are controlling the Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers. In fact, in the November 17th elections, next Tuesday, Nels Thibault is trying to regain control of Local 598 for the Communist Party.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ Mike Solski Collection, File One, Letter from Boudreau to Fellow Catholic Citizens, October 13, 1959.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Letter from Julian Pezet to Mrs. Stan Martin, Regent of Fatima Circle, November 12, 1959. (Laurentian University Archives: Laurentian University Fonds, File: Worker's Educational Assoc. – Course on Communism)

Boudreau attempted to situate the struggle in terms of a "last ditch fight between Christianity and Communism."²⁰⁸ He also leveled accusations against the IUMMSW national office at every opportunity. Speaking to a convention of hydro utility commissioners, Boudreau claimed that the national IUMMSW union "is controlled and run by Communists."²⁰⁹ Boudreau's speeches would become widely publicized in the local media during this time, reaching a significant audience. According to Mercedes Steedman, the local press sent "fear into all good Christians, Protestant and Catholic alike, by running stories about the atheism of communism. Popular Cold War discourse produced a steady diet of anti-communist sentiment and rumors about the possibilities of communist infiltration into everyday life."²¹⁰ These stories fuelled fears within the community that communism, embodied by IUMMSW, could "spread its tentacles into the family, the school, and the media. Such forms of subversion gave every

²⁰⁸ "Gillis vs. Thibault called Last-Ditch Fight Between Christianity, Communism." The Sudbury Daily Star. (Friday, October 23, 1959).

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Steedman, 2000., 64.

citizen the responsibility for combating this evil. It placed everyone on guard."²¹¹

The focus on the family as a site of potential Communist subversion was a significant anti-communist tactic, and is worthy of mention. Accusations of communism promoting "free love" and undermining the sanctity of both marriage and the family were commonplace.²¹² By stressing the possibility of communism undermining the family, the Gillis forces moved the struggle away from the terrain of the workplace (where Communists had proved effective and competent), to the private sphere of the family, the bedrock of identity, where outside encroachments were vigorously protected against.

Within this climate of near hysteria leading up to the November elections, attention was further focused on Sudbury's labour struggle with the arrival of the Catholic Social Life Conference between October 9 to 11th.²¹³ Indeed John Lang argues that:

²¹¹ Steedman notes that the family was an "ideologically contested site" during the Cold War. It was thus considered a potential site for subversion, with local elites "quick to recognize the significant influence that Mine Mill men and women were having on local family life. Hence the popularity of Mine Mill's social unionism soon became part of a larger political and cultural struggle for the hearts and minds of Sudbury's working class."

²¹² Maurutto, 200., 39.

²¹³ Hogan, 1985., 26.

the tone of the campaign was not set at a meeting of trade unionists but at a Catholic Social Life Conference held in Sudbury....Sudbury Mayor Joseph Fabbro stated that a possible reason that Sudbury was chosen as the site for this conference "was the feeling here and abroad that we are a hotbed of communism for all the North American continent - a dubious honour indeed." He reflected further: "If nothing more were gained from this conference we trust that people will realize the grave responsibility they have in respect to the teachings of communism and remain constantly alert to them." The message was made more clear the next day when the Sudbury Daily Star appeared with the headline "Must Prove Sudbury Not Communist Area."²¹⁴

The Sudbury conference was the largest gathering of Catholics ever in Sudbury. It drew bishops, priests, and hundreds of the most involved Catholic journalists and social activists from across the country.²¹⁵ Brian Hogan argues that the location and timing of the conference had no role in influencing the upcoming labour elections apart from contributing to a certain climate in the city.²¹⁶ However, the presence of prominent Catholic officials berating communism within an environment so charged with anti-communist sentiment was likely conducive to influencing those workers

²¹⁴ Lang, 1970., 255.

²¹⁵ Hogan, 1985., 27.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 27.

caught between supporting their faith or their union. While there is no documentary evidence to suggest that the Conference's timing was anymore than coincidence, at the next conference in Halifax two years later, Don Gillis addressed the conference paying tacit tribute to the:

support granted him by the previous conference held in Sudbury in 1959, [and] outlined the support he had received from the Roman Catholic Church. In his address he stated: "As a result of a three year course sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church in Sudbury, a group came out and ousted the Communist group from the Local."²¹⁷

While the new executive spared no expense in associating Thibault with communism, Gillis was portrayed as a respectable and notable personality. During the Royal visit that year, Gillis was presented to the Queen, and a developing relationship with Prime Minister Diefenbaker was prominently displayed in the press.²¹⁸ Portraying Gillis as the model Canadian citizen, with the support of the Canadian establishment, while associating Thibault with "foreign" and "alien" ideas, would have allowed the Gillis camp to draw upon powerful patriotic and xenophobic sentiments amongst

²¹⁷ Ibid., 28.

²¹⁸ Solski and Smaller, 1985., 143.

white, Anglo-Canadians. It could also prove instrumental in persuading foreign born immigrant communities of whom to support. Further persuasion came in the form of "The Torch," a rabidly anti-communist and pro-Gillis newsletter, published by the "Federation of Ethnic Groups of Sudbury."²¹⁹ Sudbury was home to many prominent ethnic communities, including substantial Italian, Polish, Ukrainian, and Finnish constituencies, all with representation in the union.²²⁰ Thus, immigrant communities, concerned with their assimilation into wider Canadian society would have had little doubt as to which group represented "acceptable" expressions of "Canadianism."²²¹

The effect of this massive wave of publicity was a record turn out for the November election and a decisive victory for the Gillis administration.²²² The demise of the Mine Mill union was further assisted by the actions of the state. An attempt by Falconbridge workers to disassociate with Gillis by applying for a separate National charter was

²¹⁹ For a sample see The Torch (Sudbury, ON. No. 8, 1961).

²²⁰ Tremblay and Vanstone, 1995., 21-41., See Havel, 1966., 8.

²²¹ The "Canadianization" of newly arrived immigrants was also a prime concern of both state and private charity organizations. Officials viewed the willingness of immigrants to adopt a 'Canadian life-style' and Canadian citizenship as a "victory against the Soviet Union and as proof of the "moral superiority of Western democracies like Canada." See Franca Iacovetta, "Making 'New Canadians': Social Workers, Women, and the Reshaping of Immigrant Families." In Franca Iacovetta et al, editors. *A nation of immigrants: Women, Workers, and Communities in Canadian History, 1840's-1960's*. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1998)., 487-8.

²²² Solski and Smaller, 1985., 143.

summarily dismissed by the Ontario Labour Relations Board.²²³ With the opposition convincingly defeated, the Gillis administration embarked on negotiations for the eventual transfer of Local 598 to the USWA. The entire executive board met with Jodoin and Sefton to discuss CLC reaffiliation and eventual transfer to the USWA.²²⁴ By 1961 open Steel raids of the Mine Mill membership began.

²²³ Ibid., 143.

²²⁴ Ibid., 145.

Chapter 7: Epilogue

On September 15, 1961, at a meeting in the Sudbury Mine Mill hall, a sign up campaign began urging Mine Mill members to join the USWA. According to Solski, Local 598 stewards, appointed by Gillis, acted openly as agents for the USWA.²²⁵ With the intentions of the Gillis administration displayed so openly, a growing section of the membership attempted to block the open raiding by Steel. Gillis found it increasingly difficult to command majorities at membership meetings and resorted to cancelling all membership meetings rather than face the prospects of electoral defeat.²²⁶ INCO further exacerbated the situation by refusing to enter into scheduled negotiations until the status of the union was settled, essentially issuing an ultimatum to the membership to decide their future as soon as possible.²²⁷ The national office made several attempts to prevent Local 598 assets from being employed to assist the raid. A petition of over 6,000 members supported the action, but Gillis applied for and received an injunction blocking any such action.²²⁸ The state would play a determining role in the final demise of Mine Mill, providing

²²⁵ Ibid., 152.

²²⁶ Ibid., 152.

²²⁷ Ibid., 152.

²²⁸ Ibid., 152.

crucial assistance and support to the raiders. Following Nikolas Rose's thesis that the state will assist extra-state actors through the provision of a legal framework that will facilitate or legitimate the private agency's actions, the courts acted at every opportunity to support the USWA and hinder IUMMSW. Lang notes that;

in granting the injunctions requested by Gillis the courts had put themselves in the position not of an impartial arbitrator but of an accomplice to the Gillis - Steel strategy... the courts made possible a situation in which Gillis and five members of his Executive Board were being paid salaries by the entire Local 598 membership, to work for the Steelworkers in the raid against Mine Mill.²²⁹

The Canadian state would eventually abandon all pretence of neutrality by openly supporting the USWA in the raids.

George McClelland, RCMP Director of Security and Intelligence urged more support for the USWA, in order to help Sudbury workers "lift the yoke of communism off their backs."²³⁰ Justice Minister E. Davie Fulton would publicly support McClelland's comments, while U.S. Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg declared in Ottawa that he hoped for a

²²⁹ Lang, 1970., 304.

²³⁰ Smith, 1989., 325.

USWA victory.²³¹ Even Prime Minister Diefenbaker displayed his support by appointing Don Gillis as a labour representative to a NATO conference.²³² Not to be outdone, the Ontario provincial government named Gillis as its labour representative on the Ontario Economic Council (OEC).²³³

With such a vast array of forces lined up against Mine Mill it is impressive that in the final instance, the USWA would win its certification in 1962 as the new bargaining agent at INCO by a majority of only fifteen votes.²³⁴ Perhaps even more impressive were the actions of Mine Mill workers at Falconbridge, who despite the combined forces of the Canadian state, USWA, CLC, and the Catholic Church, defeated Steel certification in 1962, 1965, and 1966.²³⁵ By 1967, IUMMSW had merged with the USWA, with only Local 598 in Falconbridge rejecting the merger. It remained the sole Mine Mill local in Canada until 1993 when the membership voted in favour of a merger with the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW). However to this day it retains its Miners' heritage as Mine Mill - CAW Local 598.²³⁶

²³¹ Ibid., 325.

²³² Solski and Smaller, 1985., 153.

²³³ Smith, 1989., 572, 74f. The OEC was a government funded "think-tank" that produced conservative economic policy proposals. The OEC was disbanded in the 1980's.

²³⁴ Solski and Smaller, 1985., 154.

²³⁵ Tremblay and Vanstone, 1995., 9.

²³⁶ Ibid., 9.

Chapter 8: Conclusions

In Brian Hogan's essay, "Hard Rock and Hard Decisions," he argues that while some "clerics were concerned for reform and involved in promoting change," there is, "no indication of united, co-coordinated efforts aimed against the Mine Mill union or its executive."²³⁷ While Hogan is certainly correct in pointing to the lack of documented evidence indicting the Catholic Church as conducting a co-ordinated, united effort to undermine Mine Mill, the actions of the Church reveal both a strategy and an interest in the demise of Mine Mill Local 598.²³⁸ While there exists no "smoking gun," document or otherwise, directly implicating the Church, the actions of Church officials, such as Bishop Carter, Fr, Regimbal, and A.J. Boudreau, and the actions of Church institutions such as the Seperate School Board and the University of Sudbury do suggest a unified effort to undermine the union. Furthermore, given the extent to which these individuals and institutions were involved, is it possible that the Church was oblivious to their efforts to undermine Local 598? The actions undertaken against Local

²³⁷ Hogan, 1985., 31.

²³⁸ Though Bishop Carter's support for Boudreau's efforts could be construed as "official" support, especially given the authority residing in the Bishop's position within Church hierarchy. See Joseph Lecuyer, "Obedience to the Bishop." In Rahner, 1968., 70.

598 were not without risk. Many Catholic union members were fiercely loyal to the union and the perception of Church meddling in union affairs could have seriously jeopardized the legitimacy of the Church in the Sudbury community. The possible adverse consequences of these actions coupled with their high visibility within the community make it very unlikely that the Church was oblivious to the actions of its officials in Sudbury. If this was the case then the Church's silence on these matters almost constitutes approval.

Further undermining Hogan's thesis is the marked interest the Church had in seeing Mine Mill's social unionism and community involvement halted. The attacks on Weir Reid by the Regimbal - Kidd group and Boudreau coupled with the use of Catholic Separate School children to "get the vote out" against Reid show the Church was active in the efforts to undermine the power of Local 598's cultural and educational activities. The fact that Mine Mill had a virtual monopoly on the community's social life due to the failure of other organizations to fill the void, represented a powerful and threatening secularizing force within the community. The Church's support of the USWA's more materialist orientated "bread and butter" unionism and the deterioration of the union's cultural activities after the Steel takeover suggest a

strong motive for assisting in the efforts to displace the more progressive Mine Mill leadership.²³⁹

Finally, the events in Sudbury closely corresponded to the actions of the Catholic Church throughout Ontario and the northeastern United States. The strategy of using Catholic sponsored labour schools as a means to challenge Communist dominated trade unions was used in Manhattan, Connecticut, and Windsor using similar tactics as the NWEU. The moral and educational campaign conducted in Sudbury to slander the union as a Communist front closely corresponded to the tactics employed by the Archdiocese of Toronto. Thus there can be no argument that Sudbury was a localized exception. The behaviour of the Church in Sudbury conformed with the anti-communist efforts of the Church in other North American industrial centres, revealing a wider strategy and interest to rid communities of perceived Communist influence practiced beyond the confines of the nickel belt.

In conclusion, the events in Sudbury can only be properly understood within the broader context of Cold War politics in Canada. The Canadian state relied upon the services of extra-state actors, like the Catholic Church, to mobilize consensus for its Cold War policies through the

²³⁹ Note that after Mine Mill's demise, cultural endeavours began to be offered by both the City and Church groups. See Buse, 1995., 286.

medium of anti-communist rhetoric and by providing the necessary support and assistance to facilitate their actions. The desire to cooperate with the Canadian state was motivated by each actor's self interest in witnessing the demise of Mine Mill. For the Church, the elimination of a powerful and competing secularizing force that jeopardized its ability to influence its substantial membership within the Sudbury community. For Steel, the chance to win one of the largest locals in Canada and expand into the membership rich mining and smelting industries. Finally, for the state these agencies offered a way to portray itself as the defender of liberal democratic values while at the same time assisting to inculcate the population with a virulent anti-communist ideology that helped mobilize popular consensus for its Cold War policy aims. Mine Mill Local 598 represented a left-wing, democratic, working class unionism in an era where radical socialist leanings could not be distinguished from Communist domination and Soviet control. The union's detractors exploited this polarized environment, using the climate of fear and suspicion engendered by the Cold War to engineer the union as an enemy of the state, of religion, the community and the family. Ultimately, the existence of the union collided with the interests of the state, USWA, CLC,

and the Catholic Church in the fulfillment of their own political agendas. In the face of such a powerful onslaught of established power and privilege, Canadian labour lost a distinctive form of independent unionism and working class culture that has rarely been duplicated.

The Mine Mill - USWA struggle during the Cold War offers a prescient lens in which to view the strategies employed to mobilize ideological hegemony and secure popular consensus in today's contemporary political climate. Indeed the familiar rhetoric of the Cold War has returned to create a new ubiquitous enemy: terrorism. Discourse analyst Robert L. Ivie characterized the rhetorical essentials of Cold War discourse as follows, "the nation's adversary is characterized as a mortal threat to freedom, a germ infecting the body politic, a plague upon the liberty of humankind, and a barbarian intent upon destroying civilization."²⁴⁰ The rhetoric employed versus today's enemies is strikingly familiar. To quote the New York Times, " the perpetrators [of terrorism] acted out of hatred for the values cherished in the West as freedom, tolerance, prosperity, religious pluralism

²⁴⁰ Robert L. Ivie, "Cold war Motives and Rhetorical Metaphor: A Framework of Criticism." In Martin J. Medhurst et al. Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology. (New York, N.Y.: Greenwood Press, 1990)., 72.

and universal suffrage."²⁴¹ Correspondingly, the U.S. President remarks that these "enemies of freedom" hate us because of democracy, free speech, freedom of religion, and that we must defend the enlightened values of Western civilization from the encroachments of the new enemy.²⁴² This manufactured binary of "us versus them," "east versus west" and "civilization versus barbarism," has again created the all too familiar polarization of opinion that deems all dissenting viewpoints as collusion with the enemy.²⁴³ Illustrative of this are the ominous actions of "The American Council of Trustees and Alumni" (ACTA), who in a bizarre form of contemporary black listing, published the names of about 100 academics who were deemed too critical of the U.S. and not sufficiently patriotic in the new "War on Terrorism."²⁴⁴ Even the American left has fallen victim to this binary, accusing those who would criticize U.S. foreign policy for contributing to the September 11th attacks as "apologists of terror" and associating their conduct with

²⁴¹ Quoted in Noam Chomsky, "The Ideological Campaign." 9-11. (New York, N.Y: Seven Stories press, 2001)., 31.

²⁴² George W. Bush. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. (Washington, D.C., September 2001. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001

²⁴³ For a discussion on the dangers of such a totalizing and homogenizing binary in contemporary "terrorism" discourse, see As'ad AbuKhalil, Bin Laden, Islam, and America's New "War on Terrorism." (New York, N.Y.: Seven Stories press, 2002)., 18-30.

²⁴⁴ Fareed Marjaee, "The ideological Genealogy of the Current Demonology: The Axis of Evil Cabal and the Case of Iran."in Z Magazine. (Vol. 15, No. 5, May 2002).

assistance to the enemy, thereby serving notice as to the acceptable limits of "dissent."²⁴⁵ Within this new Cold War-esque climate the actions of the state in the Mine Mill-USWA struggle are also instructive to understanding the reach of state repression. The role of the Canadian state and its use of extra-state actors to secure its policy goals blurred the boundary distinctions between private and public, the state and civil society. Any contemporary study of consensus formation within a national context must take this into account. While we experience the inauguration of another campaign to mobilize public opinion through the creation of a new ubiquitous enemy, it is imperative that we remain cognizant of the fact, so well illustrated by the events of the Cold War, that state sponsored repression does not begin nor end solely with legislation. The institution in the United States' of the federal government's "Citizen Corps" as a means to privatize the monitoring and policing of suspected terrorists is an illustrative example.²⁴⁶ However, Canadians may have a

²⁴⁵ The most vocal commentators accusing the radical left of being apologists for terrorism are Michael Walzer, Jeffery Issac and Christopher Hitchins. For a sample of this debate see Michael Walzer, "Excusing Terror: The Politics of Ideological Apology." *American Prospect*. (October 22, 2001). For a response to these accusations, see Paul Street, "Towards a 'Decent Left?'" *Z Magazine*. (Vol. 15, No. 7/8. July/ August, 2002), 61-8.

²⁴⁶ Through "Operation TIPS," the U.S. federal government intends to recruit both public and private employees to monitor and report on suspicious activities conducted by other Americans. www.citizencorps.gov/tips.html

more urgent need to be wary of this strategy of privatizing state repression. The ability of the Canadian state to mobilize its hegemony through constituent elements in civil society has often been a more necessary component of state policy than that of our southern neighbour. The inability of the Canadian state to mobilize nationalistic and patriotic sentiments to the same degree as the United States, due in part to the regionalism of the Canadian polity, make mobilization through organizations within civil society that command more legitimacy over its constituents a preferable strategy. This, coupled with the neo-liberal evacuation of the state from the public sphere would only augment the possibility of this option. Thus it could be speculated that any attempts by the Canadian state to mobilize popular opinion and repress dissent in the current political climate would inevitably involve the cooperation of extra-state actors. Thus the parameters in which we identify the existence of state repression is significantly beyond what we would regard as the normal purview of the nation state.

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