

**The Classical Greek Mercenary  
and his Relationship to the *Polis***

The Classical Greek Mercenary  
and his Relationship to the *Polis*

By

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the role of the Greek mercenary in the history of the Greek city-states from the Dark-Ages down to the end of the Lamian War in 322 B.C. It does not address the strategic and tactical uses of mercenaries on the battlefields of the eastern Mediterranean, but illustrates the social, political, and economic positions of mercenaries both inside and outside of the *polis*. The principal purpose of this work has been to demonstrate the central role of mercenary service to Greek society and history. This role is demonstrated in the accepted nature of mercenary service among Greek citizens. Greek mercenaries came from all the regions of the Greek world and from all strata of Greek society. Mercenary service was important in forging links between individuals and communities *apodemia* and, as such, it was a means by which foreigners and foreign rulers could exercise their power and their influence over the Greeks.

Historians have studied the military uses of mercenaries.<sup>1</sup> They have also studied specific aspects of mercenary service, such as pay,<sup>2</sup> or specific regions and

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<sup>1</sup> Parke, H. W. 1933. *Greek Mercenary Soldiers from Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Griffith, G. T. 1935. *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>2</sup> Krasilnikoff, J. 1993. 'The Regular Payment of Aegean Mercenaries in the Classical Period.' *Classica et Mediaevalia* 44: 77-95.

campaigns in which they served.<sup>3</sup> Never before has one work examined mercenary service as a socio-economic problem for the whole *polis* period.

The sources for this work come from every type of Greek literature. Historians such as Thucydides and Xenophon have provided the narrative and military contexts for the adventures of mercenaries. Philosophers have illustrated attitudes towards military service overseas as well as the status at home. Technical writers, for example the fourth-century strategist Aeneas Tacticus, have provided information on a variety of important issues concerning mercenaries. Forensic speech writers have illustrated how ordinary men served at home and abroad with alacrity and seemingly without care, while political speeches have shown the concern with which some saw the growth in the numbers of Greeks abroad. As well as the literary sources, the coinage of the period has promoted an understanding of payment and the relationships between the employer and those in service.

By looking at Greeks who left the *polis* to serve abroad, either for a short campaign or for their entire lives, a clearer insight into the history of the city-states is achieved. In this study the focus of Greek history shifts

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<sup>3</sup>

Seibt, G. 1977. *Griechische Soldner im Achaimenidenreich*. Bonn: Habelt; Nussbaum, G. B. 1967. *The Ten Thousand: A study of Social Organisation and Action in Xenophon's Anabasis*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

from the inclusive communities of the Greek mainland to the tyrants and kings of the Mediterranean and the Near East. The Hellenistic world which emerged after Alexander, (and therefore beyond the scope of this thesis), embraced this wide geographic arena. In their work the Greek mercenaries of the *polis* period exemplify the continuity of one time frame to the next. The mercenaries aided the synthesis of east with west and as a result they laid the foundations for the world of the Hellenistic monarchies.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The discipline of ancient history enabled me to accomplish many things. It prevented my becoming a lawyer or an accountant and it allowed me to live for a number of years in <sup>N</sup>orth America. It is a subject which utilises a variety of methods and provides great scope for dreaming as well as for intellectual stimulation. I hope that it continues to be a source of much that is both wise and good for many years to come.

The creation of this dissertation owes everything to those with whom I have worked and befriended in Canada. My supervisor Professor Daniel J. Geagan gave me the greatest of freedom to pursue whichever avenues I chose. He has spent hours revising my appalling prose and was always there when I needed advice and support. I cannot begin to thank him for his consideration. Professor Evan W. Haley, as teacher, patron and friend, deserves particular mention for his encouragement and assistance. Professor Bernice Kaczynski has also always been a force for encouragement and optimism. I would also like to thank Professors Kenneth Sacks and John Buckler for their helpful criticisms and comments regarding the material of this dissertation. The Library of Oxford University was extremely helpful with regard to unpublished materials researched in this thesis. Finally a word for McMaster University which, in these times of growing financial

turbulence and constraint, saw fit to provide a foreigner with scholarships and teaching for a full four years.

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David and Kate Trundle, my only relatives in Canada, have been constant in their assistance and many kindnesses. Upon my return to the United Kingdom I shall miss them greatly. My father Reginald Trundle has never failed me in times of financial or psychological stress. This dissertation, however, is dedicated to my mother, Elizabeth Trundle, without whose unconditional financial and loving assistance none of the following would have been possible. Such assistance is a testament to family feeling thousands of miles away from home and I am grateful to her for so much besides.

As always any and all the mistakes which lie within this work are without a shadow of a doubt my own.

## ABBREVIATIONS

- CIG* Bockh, H. A. ed. 1828-1877. *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*. Berolini ex Officiis Academiae, vendit G. Reimeri Libraria.
- Diehl Diehl, E. ed. 1949- *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca*. Lipsiae: in Aedibus B. G. Teubneri.
- Dittenberg. *SIG* Dittenberger, W. ed. 1915-1924. *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (3). Leipzig.
- Edmonds Edmonds, J. M. and Meineke, A. eds. 1957-1961. *Fragments of Attic Comedy*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- FGrH* Jacoby, F. ed. 1923- *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill.
- FHG* Muller, C. ed. 1841-1870. *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecarum*. Parisius: A Firmin Didot.
- Hicks and Hill Hicks, E. L. and G. F. Hill, 1901. eds *A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- IC* Guarducci, M. ed. 1935-1950. *Inscriptiones Creticae*. Roma: Librario Della Strato.
- IG* 1924- *Inscriptiones Graecae*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Kock Kock, T. ed. 1976. *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*. Utrecht: Hes.
- LSJ* Liddell, H.G and R. Scott and H.S. Jones. 1940. *A Greek English Lexicon*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- M&L* Meiggs, R. and D. Lewis, 1969. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- OGIS* Dittenberger, W. ed. 1903-1905 *Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*. Leipzig.

- RE* Pauly-Wissowa. Pauly A., G. Wissowa and A. Kroll. 1893-1974. *Real-encyclopaedie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. G. Wissowa, Stuttgart.
- SEG* 1923- *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*.
- Tod M. N. ed. II. 1948. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.



References to secondary sources follow the social science formula utilised by Sealey, R. 1991. *Demosthenes and his Time: A Study in Defeat*. References to primary sources follow *OCD* guidelines. All translations are from LOEB editions unless otherwise stated. The traditional spelling of Greek proper names follows Latin rather than Greek practice. Greek terms, however, have been transliterated. It seems far more sensible to use the Greek *xenos* and the plural *xenoi* rather than the Latinized *xenus* and *xeni*. The spelling of Greek proper names follows the Latin. Other Greek words are transliterated directly.

The maps are from Richard Talbert's *Atlas of Classical History*. Routledge and New York.

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
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GREEK COLONIZATION  
(8th-6th centuries B.C.)




Colonies which established further colonies marked are underlined. Numbers denote founder as follows:

- |                       |                                       |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1 Chalcis and Eretria | 11 Sparta                             |
| 2 Achaea              | 12 Teos                               |
| 3 Procaea             | 13 Teos & Clazomenae                  |
| 4 Locris              | 14 Andros & Chalcis                   |
| 5 Colophon            | 15 Paros                              |
| 6 Miletus             | 16 Chios                              |
| 7 Rhodians & others   | 17 Aeolis                             |
| 8 Megara              | 18 Samos                              |
| 9 Corinth             | 19 Athens                             |
| 10 Thera              | ⊕ Trading station ( <u>Emporium</u> ) |




# THE AEGEAN WORLD



LOCNIS Region/district  
PNDOS Mountain range



6 A B C D





## **INTRODUCTION**

This investigation concerns Greek mercenary soldiers. It is not a chronological history of Greek mercenaries. It is an analysis of the mercenary phenomenon from a perspective which is both non-military and non-narrative. Its purpose is not to discuss the battles in which Greeks in foreign service found themselves. Indeed there is a noticeable, and deliberate, absence of discussions regarding strategy, tactics and warfare in general. There is a need for studying the Greek mercenary in the light of a wide range of social and economic factors and over a broad geographic area. The picture of Greeks fighting *apodemia* which is presented herein differs from previous studies of Greek mercenaries which have tended to be either chronologically based accounts of where mercenaries fought,<sup>1</sup> or socio-economic and thematic studies of mercenary life which have concentrated on specific regions or on themes like pay or equipment, or on specific armies.<sup>2</sup> The Greek mercenary as illustrated here was part of classical Greek life in all its aspects. It is an analysis of the Greek mercenary as a political, social and economic phenomenon of classical history.

Chapter one introduces and lays the foundations for what follows. It begins with a short narrative discussion of the historical context of Greek mercenary service from about 750

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<sup>1</sup> Parke 1933; Griffith 1935.

<sup>2</sup> Roy 1967; Nussbaum 1967; Seibt 1977; Marinovic 1981; McKechnie 1989; Krasilnikoff 1993.

B.C. to 322 B.C. It explains why the chronological boundaries of the thesis are both relevant and tenable. It continues with a discussion of the treatment that mercenaries have received in recent historical commentary and notes the significant position that mercenaries should enjoy as part of the study of Greek history. Modern definitions including modern political definitions as noted in recent 'rules of war' provide useful answers to questions of the image and perception of the ancient Greek mercenary from both an ancient and a modern perspective. The first chapter ends with a discussion of the image, both ancient and modern, of the ancient Greek mercenary. The modern image of a mercenary is ambiguous. This perception arises from ancient Greek literary sources. These sources may illustrate a dichotomy between the mercenary soldier and the Greek ideology of loyalty to the city-state. As well overseas connections might have created networks of family or guest friendship which conflicted with relationships to the *polis*. Yet, as this thesis attempts to demonstrate, mercenary service was integral to maintaining connections abroad and to the civic loyalty of Greek citizens.

The second chapter examines the identities of Greek mercenaries. It begins with the words that were applied to mercenaries and demonstrates that the choice of words was a product of socio-economic changes in the Greek world from the eighth to the fourth centuries B.C. The second section assesses the provenance of mercenaries. The earliest

mercenaries came from the eastern Mediterranean. By the fifth century the Greek mainland, and particularly the Peloponnese, was providing by far the bulk of men serving in both Sicily and Asia. This regional disparity needs explanation. The military specialties of the soldiers who fought abroad are assessed. Were they heavily armed hoplites or more lightly armed peltasts? Do these specialties reflect the type of men who were able or likely to take mercenary service? This has important ramifications for the social and economic backgrounds of the men in service. While mercenaries came from all strata of Greek society, the lighter equipment opened employment to men of lesser status. The increasingly important phenomenon of age and age classes among Greeks with reference to mercenaries closes the chapter.

The third chapter analyses the reasons for mercenary service. Much of this chapter discusses the reasons for the explosion in numbers of Greek mercenaries which occurred in the fourth century B.C. Three phenomena need discussion: first, the domestic reasons that made men keen to leave their homes to serve overseas, second, the rewards, like pay and booty, which they hoped to gain abroad, and finally, the employers who solicited service from the Greeks and the reasons why they needed mercenaries. This last proves vital. Demand more than any other factor best explains the high level of Greek mercenary employment in the fourth century.

Chapter four addresses the payment of mercenaries. It

studies the methods used by commanders to assemble money for pay, the types of payment that were made, and the amounts that were provided to mercenaries in service. The Greeks appear to have made little deliberate distinction between the words for various types of payment, and it is almost impossible to establish the value of pay to a mercenary.

Chapter five discusses the process by which mercenaries got started in the business. Mercenaries were hired in many different regions, probably by word of mouth. The problem of recruiting bonuses is discussed, as well as the nature of the relationships between employer, general and the various commanders with the men that they hired. The chapter ends with a lengthy discussion of who provided mercenaries with their armour. It concludes that mercenary service was open to all but a very few and that paymasters and generals could utilise networks within the Greek world for their hiring needs.

The final chapter examines a variety of relationships. These range from command structures to family ties and friendships at home and abroad. Mercenary generals appear as international statesmen who built networks across the eastern Mediterranean in the fifth and fourth centuries to assist in their political positions at home through their connections abroad. Thus they were no different from their ancestors in the Homeric world where guest-friendship and gift-giving were a part of life and community abroad. Mercenary service was

part of this greater world beyond the Greek mainland, and its role in international politics of the classical age was clearly important.

This thesis seeks to demonstrate that mercenary service interacted with Greek society in many ways. The mercenary, as the concept is understood today, was not familiar to the Greeks, but service for a foreign power in an imperialist endeavour was not perceived as bad or immoral, but was an accepted part of Greek life. Only when it transgressed other boundaries, like those of professionalism and service against one's own *polis*, was it frowned upon. The study of the Greek mercenary can illuminate many aspects of society both in the Greek cities from which mercenaries came and in the tyrannies, kingdoms and empires which they served.

**I**

**MERCENARY IMAGES**

### Historical Background

This study addresses Greek mercenary soldiers down to the end of the Lamian war in 322 B.C. In all historical writing chronology and periodisation require explanation. The *terminus ante quem* is easily achieved. There is no way, however, to know when the first Greek mercenaries appeared in the Aegean. It must have been very early in Greek history because of the endemic nature of war in ancient society. The first literature that the Greeks created, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, cannot be used definitively yet to demonstrate the presence of 'mercenaries.' The first recognizable Greeks appeared in overseas service certainly during the Lyric age (the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.). The poet Archilochus was a self confessed mercenary.<sup>3</sup> An early proverb notes that the Carians were the first men of the Aegean basin to embark on mercenary service. Herodotus supports the notion that the Carians were the first Aegean mercenaries. Carians and Ionians served the Egyptian pharaohs of the Saite dynasty in the seventh century B.C.<sup>4</sup>

The evidence for the appearance of mercenaries from the Greek world serving non-Greeks abroad, comes from long after the so-called 'dark age.' Changes had taken place on mainland Greece. The most important of these was the appearance of the

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<sup>3</sup> Diehl, 40.

<sup>4</sup> Hdt. II.163; Pl. *Lach.* 187 b; Parke 1933, 4; Griffith 1935, 236.



*polis* or city-state. This was literally a central place (*acropolis*) and surrounding farmland, as well as the body of free male inhabitants who enjoyed the rights (and responsibilities) of citizenship (*politeia*).

A change had also taken place on the battlefield. Dark age society had been aristocratic, and warfare justified the nobility's socio-economic position. At some time between 800 and 550 B.C. a new kind of warfare was introduced into the Peloponnese.<sup>5</sup> This was hoplite warfare. It involved heavily armoured infantrymen - called hoplites after their large convex round shield (*hoplon*) - fighting together in a tight formation called a phalanx. The hoplite phalanx required a number of well equipped protagonists, and therefore each state needed enough citizens with an economic base sufficient to afford the requisite arms and armour. For this reason the hoplite and the citizen farmer became synonymous in the *poleis* of the early classical period.<sup>6</sup>

These political and military changes on mainland Greece coincided with the great wave of Greek colonisation in the Mediterranean. From c.775 B.C. to 550 B.C. the Greeks founded as many as one thousand new city-states in the Mediterranean. These new city-states came to be founded and defended by the

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<sup>5</sup> Snodgrass 1965, 110-22, claims that the hoplites played little role in the political developments in the *poleis*, notably in the rise of the tyrannies. See also Holladay 1982, 94-103; Lorimer 1947, 76-138; Cartledge 1977, 11-27; Salmon 1977, 84-101. The last has successfully demonstrated that an early date for its appearance is not out of the question. Krentz 1985, 61, tries to straddle both arguments by pointing out the importance of arguments regarding the transitional phalanx developing from the eighth to the late seventh centuries B.C.

<sup>6</sup> Hanson 1995, 327-355, for a discussion of the changes which took place in Greek warfare and their relationship to Greek socio-political institutions.

new hoplite warriors. At the same time as this great colonisation, eastern influences infiltrated the art and thought of mainland Greece. Knowledge of the world beyond the Aegean created opportunities for Greeks. The presence of the Ionians and Carians serving in Egypt illustrate the new opportunities of the age.

In the later eighth until the early sixth century B.C. the Greek city-states of the Peloponnese and Sicily, and in the middle of the sixth century the city-state of Athens, came under the rule of Tyrants. These 'extra-constitutional strong men,' more often than not beneficial to the states which they ruled, may well have come to power through the presence and support of the hoplite-citizen-farmer.<sup>7</sup> Ironically the tyrants appear in the sources as the first Greek employers of mercenaries. They used such men primarily as bodyguards and as tools to subordinate the people over whom they ruled.

The rise of the Persian empire in the middle of the sixth century changed the political context of the Near East. The Persians did not initially utilise the services of Greeks, mercenary or otherwise.<sup>8</sup> By their conquest of Egypt in particular, but also because of their domination of smaller states in the eastern Mediterranean, the Persians gave more stability to the whole region and reduced the need for

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<sup>7</sup> Andrewes 1963, 20. Salmon 1977, 93-101, argues the point that the tyrants had the latent support of the hoplites. Berve 1967 does not mention the hoplite phenomenon in relation to the tyrannies of the Greek mainland.

<sup>8</sup> Hdt. III.140, for a story in which Darius noted that he had no need of Greeks and that few of that nation came to him for service.

soldiers other than Persians, Medes and their allies.<sup>9</sup> The few recorded mercenaries served as bodyguards to the tyrants of the Greek mainland and Sicily, and even these must have vanished by the end of the sixth and early fifth centuries with the overthrow of almost all the Greek city-states' tyrants.

In the last years of the sixth century the Persian empire had extended its domain over the Greek cities of Ionia. There is little recorded mercenary activity on the mainland from the late sixth century to the latter years of the fifth. There is also very little evidence for the Persian empire east of Mesopotamia. Consequently Greeks in service abroad are not part of the narrative of events from the fall of the tyrannies to the end of the Peloponnesian War. This said, it is possible that Greek mercenaries made up Aristagoras' forces in his campaign in Naxos. The revolt of the Ionian cities in the early years of the fifth century was followed by the so-called Persian Wars in which the Persians failed to conquer the Greek mainland. Subsequently Athens established an empire in the Aegean. The fifth century closed with the Great Peloponnesian War and Athenian defeat. Mercenaries appear to have played no part in the events of the Persian wars and a peripheral role in the Peloponnesian War. There is evidence, however, that

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Jeffrey 1976, 124-125, notes the number of occasions in which the Spartans in particular had opportunities to involve themselves overseas, many of which they declined to act upon. Greeks are found in Persian service in Ionia at the end of the sixth century, for example see Hdt. V.30-31 and 34 in which Aristagoras spent all of his money (*chremata*) in fighting. Most of this was presumably used for paying soldiers whom he had 'hired.'

Greeks, particularly Peloponnesians, found service with the satraps (Persian governors) of the western parts of the Persian empire at this time. The lack of direct evidence for Greek mercenaries in service overseas, however, does not mean that in the later fifth century there were not already many in that profession.

Mercenary numbers exploded at the end of the fifth century. Tyrants reappeared in Sicily and provided employers for men from the Peloponnese. The Syracusan tyrant Dionysius I was willing to hire as many men as he could for his wars against the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians in turn, after their defeat on the Crimissus, became large scale employers of Greek mercenaries themselves.<sup>10</sup> Of far greater consequence was Persia. In the early fourth century the central authority of Persia began to disintegrate in the western part of the empire. This was prefaced by the failed coup of Cyrus the Younger. He was the brother of the Great King, Artaxerxes II, and in 401 B.C. he led an expedition into the heart of the Persian empire to overthrow the King. His army included over ten thousand Greek mercenary hoplites, most of whom were Peloponnesians. While Cyrus and the Greeks won the ensuing battle fought at Cunaxa near Babylon, Cyrus himself was killed. This left the Greeks a great distance from home without an employer. Their story of courage and desperation

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10

Diod. XVI.81.4; Plut. *Tim.* XXX.

in returning to the Aegean basin is told by Xenophon.

The experiences of Cyrus and his Greeks provided a model for future events. From 401 B.C. to 330 B.C. there were a number of attempts made by satraps of the western provinces to assert their independence from the Great King. The limited sources do not say how many satraps tried to revolt from the empire. The deterioration of Persian imperial unity led to the prolific employment of Greeks to uphold the authority of the Great King or to carve out and defend a part of his empire from him. This period also saw Greeks serving the city-states of the Greek mainland. By the later fifth century warfare had become a year round affair in the Aegean and citizen-farmers would find it impractical to campaign overseas. By the fourth century the appearance of specialist soldiers on the battlefield - archers, slingers and lightly armed troops - forced states to hire these troops from amongst trained professionals. Such trained professionals were not found amongst amateur-soldier-farmers who were able to fight in a phalanx, but not able to conduct complicated manoeuvres on the battlefield nor to use special weapons. Partly for these reasons, the fourth century B.C. was an age of specialisation and of professionalisation. Both year-round warfare and specialist forces opened new avenues for Greek mercenaries. The result was a boom in the number of Greek mercenaries recorded by the literary sources, and this boom has been called the Greek mercenary explosion of the fourth century

B.C.

The Third Sacred War, fought between 356 and 346 B.C., illustrates the role of mercenaries in the fourth century. The small *polis* of Phocis seized the holiest of Greek shrines at Delphi and with it the ample resources provided by the dedicatory offerings. Neighbouring cities disputed the Phocian claim to the site, and war followed. Phocis was small, but the money that the Phocian generals were able to mint from the temple dedications paid for enough mercenaries to withstand invasions successfully over a ten year period. Had events worked in their favour and had the money sufficed they might have held off their enemies indefinitely. They failed, but, like Dionysius I, they had demonstrated what might be achieved by a state or an individual with enough resources to command the best professional soldiers in Greece.

Philip II had helped to defeat the Phocians. Philip was the king of the growing power of Macedon. The rise of Macedon provided another region of employment for Greeks abroad. Philip had ample resources to pay soldiers who were Macedonians. Philip's national and in some ways 'professional' army was the tool with which his son Alexander conquered Persia. Macedon was not the first among Greek mainland states to have a standing and professional army. The Arcadians had established a core of trained and maintained troops at the inception of the Arcadian confederacy in 369 B.C. Thebes had a similar group of men in the 300 strong

Sacred Band, and even Athens maintained in the *Ephebia*, which trained young adult citizens to be soldiers, what might loosely be termed a professional and standing military in the fourth century B.C.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, Philip's army was in many respects professional and national. It was these professionals who decisively defeated the amateur-citizen hoplites of Athens and Thebes at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C. This victory allowed Philip to dominate the Greek cities of the mainland. The professional soldier had progressively become more common on mainland Greece in the fourth century and eventually supplanted the amateur - farmer - hoplite.

Philip's son and successor, Alexander III (the Great) conquered the Persian empire in less than a decade. He used many Greek mercenaries in the process, and his adversary, the Great King Darius III, employed as many as 50,000 to oppose him. One might say that Alexander's whole army was professional. It left the Aegean basin in 334 B.C., and ten years later very few of those men returned to that which they left behind. When Alexander died in 323 B.C. the Greek world was changed forever, and the Hellenistic period (323 - 30 B.C.) had replaced that of the Classical just as a Greco-Macedonian empire had replaced the Persian.

The last event that is relevant to this thesis occurred

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All these professional cores are discussed later in this thesis.

at Alexander's death. A few of the cities of mainland Greece began the Lamian War (323 - 322 B.C.) by rebelling from Macedonian rule. Its conclusion provides the chronological conclusion for this work. Historians describe the Lamian war as the last independent struggle of the Greek cities for their liberty.<sup>12</sup> But there are other reasons for concluding this thesis in 322 B.C. that have more to do with the study of Greek mercenaries. After 322 B.C. international relationships changed. The men who ruled the Hellenistic world did so by commanding loyalty not through nationality but by personality. The dominant generals of this age were all Macedonians (with the exception of Eumenes), and their Greco-Macedonian soldiers were in no way obliged to serve any of them by terms other than personal friendship, loyalty, or hope of reward. National or cultural ties no longer played any part in the decision of one man to fight for another.<sup>13</sup> A third and final factor makes 322 B.C a sensible concluding date. From the end of the Lamian war the sources cease to distinguish between the mercenary, the citizen, and the professional soldier. Indeed, once all soldiers had become professionals, studying the mercenary becomes more difficult, because, as Parke states,

instead of simplifying our task, this prevalence of the mercenary makes it the more difficult. For when once all soldiers have been reduced to one professional type, our authorities cease often to

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<sup>12</sup> Carey 1932, 6-9, states 'Antipater broke with the principle of Philip and frankly converted the Greeks from allies to subjects.'

<sup>13</sup> Griffith 1935, 41.



distinguish the mercenary as such. All fighting men are *stratiotai* and *pezoi* or *hippeis*.<sup>14</sup>

The terminology after 322 B.C., along with the other factors, would compel a different thesis and a different set of questions. If this work went on to discuss the wars of Alexander's successors, it would lose sight of the classical *polis* and the concept of the citizen - amateur - soldier - farmer whose adaptation and specialisation is crucial to the decline of the *polis* and the creation of the Hellenistic world.

### History and The Mercenary

Ludmila Marinovic observed the importance of studying Greek mercenaries because,

[le] mercenariat influa donc sur tous les secteurs fondamentaux de la vie grecque et en subit en retour l'influence: économie, politique, affaires militaires, idéologie.<sup>15</sup>

The study of war and of politics has gone hand in hand with the study of the classical world. Herodotus and Thucydides recognised the importance of warfare to the study of their present and their past.<sup>16</sup> Books on Greek military systems, equipment and tactics abound. Many of them have relevance to the study of Greek mercenaries and to the study

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<sup>14</sup> Parke 1933, 208-9.

<sup>15</sup> Marinovic 1988, 282.

<sup>16</sup> Hdt. I.1; Thuc. I.1.

of Greek society as well. An example that is of particular interest to this work is Best's *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare*. It is a study of military rather than of mercenary significance, but the fact that some mercenaries were peltasts illustrates an overlap in subject matter. Its conclusions explain the development of Macedonian military systems in the context of soldiers who served in the eastern Mediterranean in the fifth and fourth centuries. In recent years there has been a trend to analyse the relationship between war and society rather than to relate the events concerned with war, politics, strategy and tactics on the battlefield. There have also been attempts made to come to grips with the relationship between the individual and the individual's experiences in combat.<sup>17</sup> Both these trends have appeared in the study of modern warfare pioneered by the work of John Keegan among others.

Jean-Pierre Vernant is quick to point out the public nature of warfare in the Greek state.<sup>18</sup> Mosse noted that in the traditional city-state,

d'une part l'armée n'est rien, que la cité elle meme; mais d'un côté, c'est la cité qui n'est rien qu'une troupe de guerriers.<sup>19</sup>

Warfare was a participatory and societal, rather than

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17 Hanson 1989.

18 Vernant 1974, 28.

19 Mosse 1968, 221-9.

merely a personal, phenomenon. Victor Davis Hanson's work, concerned as it is with the integral relationship between hoplite warfare and the city-state's farming population, is important to any understanding of the Greek city.<sup>20</sup> The social context of the warrior at home and abroad and the symbiotic nature of Greek hoplite warfare is well illustrated in these works. Pritchett's *magnum opus* on *The Greek State at War* gives detailed accounts of aspects of military terminology which have less to do with tactics and campaigns and more to do with the nuts and bolts of warfare for the Greeks themselves.<sup>21</sup> Ronald Ridley exposed the hoplite as citizen, and there is clearly more to come in this area of the study of Greek antiquity.<sup>22</sup> The mercenary was a reflection of society because of the integral relationship between war, social organisation and politics.

Military systems and problems overlap into all areas of Greek society. It is, for example, impossible to write on the economy and society of the ancient Greek world without discussing in some way the military's involvement with Greek life.

The mercenaries explored in this thesis were military men. Mercenary service is as old as war itself, and because

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20 Hanson 1989, 32-8; 1995.

21 Pritchett 1971; 1979; 1974.

22 Ridley 1979, 508-548.

of this it is integral to the historiography of the Greek world which has been obsessed with warfare from its inception.<sup>23</sup> Mercenaries appear in all the major text-books at some point or other, but rarely do they get more than a passing reference. They are usually mentioned as a phenomenon of the fourth century B.C., and this might lead to further discussion. John Fine's excellent narrative of Greek history is a case in point. In this work mercenaries receive only such treatment as is needed to demonstrate both their growing numbers as a sign of city-state decline in the fourth century and the growing contemporary turbulence in the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>24</sup> The importance of mercenaries cannot be belittled. In the hoplite city-state, itself perhaps the most significant political institution that the Greeks produced, war was incredibly political. With the appearance of the mercenary 'war cease[d] to be political.'<sup>25</sup> Yet mercenaries appear as minor *addenda* in the activities of the great wars and the great figures of the fifth and fourth centuries. Despite this, Alexander and Darius III may have employed 100,000 Greeks in their war for Asia.<sup>26</sup> Even the most recent work on Alexander mentions these mercenaries fleetingly, yet

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<sup>23</sup> All warfare is done with the purpose of reward, however that reward might manifest itself.

<sup>24</sup> Fine 1983, 532-4, notes that the mercenary phenomenon was a symptom of the turbulence of the fourth century. In a work of over 680 pages of text Greek mercenaries are referenced only three other times (63: as an alternative to Archaic colonisation; 214: for Argive mercenaries with Pisistratus; 565: for their growing importance to Sparta as illustrative of their importance to Greeks generally).

<sup>25</sup> Vernant 1974, 34.

<sup>26</sup> Parke 1933, 179, 183, 197-8; Griffith 1935, 20-1; Arr. *Anab.* I.12.8, II.8.6.

their role was clearly substantial.<sup>27</sup>

Economically mercenaries were of major significance. De St. Croix cites Greek mercenary service in the important role as the first large scale illustration of hired labour.<sup>28</sup> This is rarely expressed even in works that deal with the development of wages on the Greek mainland. Most historians would agree that there was a relationship between war and economic activity.<sup>29</sup> The most recent article on the subject of the economy of the Greek world in the classical era has to deal directly with the decline of the citizen hoplite through the period.<sup>30</sup>

Greek mercenaries were also social phenomena, and this is reflected in the historiography. Not only were military men an integral part of the Greek *polis*, but mercenaries abroad were also socially significant. Mercenary armies were like small cities outside of the *polis*. Davies notes of mercenary service in the fourth century B.C.,

[i]n this way [mercenary service] emerged as a social role, precipitated both by the poverty, skill and ambition of individuals and by the needs of governments.<sup>31</sup>

To this can be added Nussbaum's sociological analysis of the

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27 Bosworth 1988.

28 De St. Croix 1981, 182.

29 Finley 1973, 172-3, claims that empire and economic activity and wealth are strongly intertwined. The point is best made by Williams 1976, 22 and Jenkins 1972, 175.

30 Burke 1992, 220-23.

31 Davies 1978, 187.

ten thousand Greeks who participated in the failed coup of Cyrus the Younger at the end of the fifth century B.C.<sup>32</sup> Nussbaum presents this army, the first roving Greek mercenary army, as if it were a city-state, and the relationships found within the army are examined to determine the political, economic and social nature of its structure.

The Greek mercenary received its first and fullest treatment from two books published in the 1930s. The first of these, H. W. Parke's *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, stands as a monument to the study of the subject in the period considered by this thesis. Published in 1933 it is a thorough narrative of campaigns and commanders of mercenaries down to the battle of Ipsus. Parke's work is, in short, a history of the Greek world from the perspective of Greeks in service for and with foreign powers. This thesis owes much to that book and it remains the standard work on the subject of Greek mercenaries before 301 B.C. Parke does not consider what a mercenary is, nor does he concentrate on the major themes of mercenary service, nor analyse motivations of mercenaries. His chronological account and narrative style must, however, be seen as basic to the study of Greeks in foreign service.

The second of the two major studies of the subject and the successor to Parke's work chronologically both as a narrative and as a publication, *The Mercenaries of the*

*Hellenistic World* by G. T. Griffith, is a far more penetrating and thematic approach to the lives of mercenary soldiers in the period from Philip and Alexander to the decline of the Hellenistic kingdoms in the second century B.C. The evidence for this period is more plentiful and diverse than that for the period of the classical age. This allows for the production of a different kind of book. More analysis of terms of service and the payment of mercenaries in this period is possible. Griffith's analysis of Hellenistic armies, which were primarily made up of professionals whom he considers to be mercenaries, provides both technical and methodological context for the study of this subject.

There are more recent works which have considered Greek mercenaries in detail. Andre Aymard's '*mercenariat et histoire grecque*' is a fundamental work and remains the most complete recent treatment of the problems of mercenary service.<sup>33</sup> This article is a historical survey of Greek mercenary activity which divides mercenary service into two phases; the seventh to sixth centuries and the fourth century B.C.<sup>34</sup> He addresses several important questions including the reasons for mercenary service, especially those which explain the explosion in the fourth century B.C. The article ends rightly with the statement that '*l'histoire de la guerre se*

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<sup>33</sup> Aymard 1967, 487-498.

<sup>34</sup> Aymard 1967, 487-498.

trouve parfois en prise directe sur l'histoire sociale.'<sup>35</sup>

More specifically Gunter Seibt's *Griechische Soldner im Achaimidenreich* is a discussion in the framework of historical narrative of the Greek mercenaries who fought with the Persians from the sixth to the fourth centuries B.C. He analyses the motivation and the remuneration of mercenaries in the final section of his work, and, of great interest, he explores the reason why Persians employed Greeks in such numbers in the fourth century from the all important Persian perspective.<sup>36</sup> His work, however, is regional and does not by its nature examine the whole phenomenon of mercenary service. Paul McKechnie's monograph *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century B.C.*, a subsequent publication to his D.Phil. thesis *Greeks Outside the Polis* attempts to redress some of the problems that Parke overlooked in his narrative.<sup>37</sup> Within this book the fourth chapter is devoted specifically to mercenaries. It attempts to illustrate in a realistic fashion the way that both generals and men lived. His work tries hard to present a less romantic and poverty stricken image of mercenary service, a point he makes in implicit juxtaposition to Parke. Like Seibt, he analyses the motivations of such men and discusses the status and position of mercenaries in the

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35        Aymard 1967, 498.

36        Seibt 1977, 121-45.

37        McKechnie 1989, 1985.



fourth century within the context of the problem of a growing number of exiles and wanderers. Of equal importance is the study by the Russian historian Ludmila Marinovic on fourth century mercenaries and the decline of the city-state. This last work sees mercenaries as a fundamental cause of the decline of the city state in the fourth century.<sup>38</sup> In the first part of her book she surveys the history of mercenaries in the period.<sup>39</sup> She then assesses the work of Xenophon, Aeneas and Isocrates in turn. Each writer highlights a different aspect of mercenary life; Xenophon army organisation, Aeneas the Tactician for state internal security, and Isocrates the general circumstance of Greek mercenary service.<sup>40</sup>

More recent and significant works about aspects of mercenary service have appeared. The practical and economic background of the Greek mercenary explosion of the fourth century B.C. has been addressed by Harvey Miller.<sup>41</sup> Roy's important article on the mercenaries of Cyrus the Younger analysed through Xenophon's *Anabasis* discusses many of the aspects which are addressed in the following pages.<sup>42</sup> Roy has

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38        Marinovic 1988, 270-299.

39        Marinovic 1988, 19-132.

40        Marinovic 1988, 136-196, 197-236, 237-269.

41        Miller 1984, 153-60.

42        Roy 1967, 287-323.

insights into the way the army was recruited, maintained and the prospects that the men hoped for after the campaign.

There are many works of less overall impact to the study of Greek mercenaries. These articles or chapters within more general books on Greek history deal with aspects or questions concerning mercenary service or history. For example, the etymology of important words has received some discussion in several papers. P. Gauthier's article, 'les *xenoi* dans les textes atheniens de la second moitie du Ve siecle av - JC,' discusses the status of men who may be termed as foreigners in relationship to Athenians.<sup>43</sup> A recent study of *epikouroi* in Thucydides assists in the definition of such terms.<sup>44</sup> Words which illustrate payment to mercenaries are discussed in all the important studies of mercenary soldiers. Of particular importance here is the chapter on military pay in Pritchett's *Ancient Greek Military Practices*.<sup>45</sup> Very recently pay has been re-assessed by Jens Krasilnikov, and his findings need some consideration.<sup>46</sup>

Many historians see the development of state pay (for example in jury service) and the development of coinage and a monetary economy to have had some relationship to each other.

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43 Gauthier 1971, 44-75.

44 Lavelle 1989, 36-39.

45 Pritchett 1971, 3-30.

46 Krasilnikov 1993, 77-95.

It would seem logical that military pay and the use of coinage are related. The work of Sally Humphries is helpful in demonstrating the connection between state service (which might itself be military) and a monetary economy at Athens, for example.<sup>47</sup> The mercenary profession may also be related to the development and production of coinage. Of particular interest is numismatic evidence itself and mercenary service. There are general works on Greek coins which provide context and illustrations. Of particular interest to this study is R. T. Williams' *The Silver Coinage of the Phocians* which contains analysis of the coins minted for the Third Sacred War (356-346 B.C.) during which the Phocians raised numerous mercenary armies to defend their claim to the Delphic oracle.<sup>48</sup> Phocian coins of the fourth century are rarely found in general books on coinage and this makes Williams' work very valuable.

The men who led mercenaries have received far more attention than the men who served in the ranks. Parke and others concentrate their study on the major figures who shaped the destinies of mercenary service. The generals and rulers are discussed at length in the work of Lengauer and, more importantly for this thesis, that of W. K. Pritchett.<sup>49</sup> The latter's chapter on the so-called *condottiere* of the fourth

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47 Humphries 1979, 1-26.

48 Williams 1976.

49 Pritchett 1974, 56-116; Lengauer 1979.

century B.C. sheds important light on the 'non-mercenary' nature of these fourth century generals, particularly from mainland Greece. His argument has been incorporated into this work as a means of demonstrating the accepted and important role of mercenary service and the relationships forged through such service in the eastern Mediterranean.

The question of who armed mercenary soldiers has been a vexed one in recent years. This debate was sparked when McKechnie claimed that employers were the primary source of arms and equipment.<sup>50</sup> This flew in the face of an orthodoxy, followed by Parke, that mercenaries provided their own equipment. David Whitehead has attempted to defend the orthodox position of mercenary arms in a recent article, and then still more recently received rebuttal from McKechnie.<sup>51</sup> This question, along with many others that are under assessment by scholars of Greek antiquity, has kept alive discussion of Greek mercenaries and the context of Greek society from which they came.

### **What is a Mercenary**

The obscure terminology employed by the Greeks for mercenaries does not aid the historian who wishes to study the subject. Chapter two below notes that the terms used for

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50 McKechnie 1989, 80-5.

51 Whitehead 1991, 105-113; McKechnie 1993, 297-305.

mercenaries by the Greeks also had other meanings. Wage-earner, juryman, or guest-friend or foreigner can all be translated from the Greek word most commonly used for the mercenary. The two chief modern English scholars of Greek mercenaries agree that the professional quality of the Greek mercenary was crucial. Parke notes that '[t]he mercenary was a professional and ultimately the professional ousted the amateur from all important warfare.'<sup>52</sup> Griffith claims that '...the professional soldiers of the ancient world were mercenaries.'<sup>53</sup> It is surely not a tight enough definition simply to claim that a mercenary was a professional. Andre Aymard sought more rigid criteria. To him being a professional was not enough:

Tout mercenaire est soldat de métier...mais la proposition ne doit pas se retourner. Car un soldat de métier peut servir... dans l'armée de son pays ou de son souverain.<sup>54</sup>

In assessing the mercenaries of the classical Greek world this point must be borne in mind. It should be recalled that many Athenian rowers and soldiers were paid for their work by the state. This may have occurred as early as the Persian wars. Similarly Spartan soldiers were professionals in all but name. They were clearly not mercenaries and, at the same time, would have been offended to have thought that they earned a monetary

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<sup>52</sup> Parke 1933, 1.

<sup>53</sup> Griffith 1935, 1.

<sup>54</sup> Aymard 1967, 487.

wage.

Aymard goes still further in seeking an accurate definition:

... le mercenaire, en se liant par contrat envers son employeur, accepte l'éventuel sacrifice de sa vie sans être juridiquement obligé ni sentimentalement incité à courir un tel risque. Ni patre, ni chef, ni cause à quoi il se devoue: il sert dans une armée qui, camaraderie et esprit de corps à part, lui demeure étrangère.<sup>55</sup>

In concentrating on both obligation and sentiment Aymard raises the notion that a mercenary had to have no conscience about the cause(s) for which he fought. By implication the mercenary cannot, therefore, be judged by the commentators, but by the man's own standards of himself. It is feelings that are subjective only to the soldier or mercenary himself and not any absolute criterion upon which a man can, and cannot, be called a mercenary.

One dictionary definition of a 'mercenary' highlights the professional aspect of the term.

A person who works merely for money or other material reward; a hireling...A person who receives payment for his or her services; *spec.* a professional soldier serving a foreign power.<sup>56</sup>

In 1977 the Geneva Protocol was published to supplement the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It was produced because of changes which had taken place in the character of modern

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55 Aymard 1967, 487.

56 *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* 1993. s.v. Mercenary.

warfare. One such change was the prevalence of mercenaries.<sup>57</sup> Article 47 defines a mercenary. According to this document a mercenary is any person who:

- (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
- (b) does in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
- (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party;
- (d) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
- (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
- (f) has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.<sup>58</sup>

The receipt of remuneration and of foreign service in a military capacity, as well as employment, all appear to be crucial in understanding the phenomenon of mercenary service. Employment is the most rigorous point in analysing the mercenary. Someone employed to serve a nation, state, sovereign, or political institution other than that of which he is a citizen or even a resident is a mercenary. He can have at the time of employment no stake in the state or the nation which employed him beyond remuneration for his services. This takes Aymard's views of obligation and

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<sup>57</sup> Roberts and Guelff 1982, 387.

<sup>58</sup> Roberts and Guelff 1982, 414.

sentiment one step further. Foreigners, for example the metics who fought for the Athenian *polis*, had a stake in the society for which they fought. That stake might have been either industry or family. They were not mercenaries, even though they were not citizens of the state for which they fought. This would have remained true even if they had been paid.

The Geneva Protocol definition, combined with the dictionary term, serves well to demonstrate what a mercenary is. An employer and employment were of key concern, combined with regular remuneration and careless service abroad. Like the metic, the mercenaries of the Greek world must be distinguished from raiders (*leistai*) and pirates (*peirates*).<sup>59</sup> These were not men specifically employed by any state or sovereign, but might have been independently eking out livelihoods by stealing property from settled communities or travellers. In similar fashion privateers, who often were employed specifically to raid specific regions, were also not mercenaries.<sup>60</sup> Like the raiders and pirates they were not remunerated regularly. Their rewards came from the booty that they could steal from their victims. It is, however, quite likely that many mercenaries resorted to the life of a raider or a privateer at one time or another in their careers. At

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<sup>59</sup> McKechnie 1989, 101-41. McKechnie makes the observation that *leistai* were land based and *peirates* were sea based raiders at 106.

<sup>60</sup> Jackson 1973, 241-53.



this point they ceased to be mercenaries at least for that moment. Indeed many mercenaries would have ceased to have been such once their employment ended.<sup>61</sup> Notably Cyrus' mercenaries were no longer mercenaries after his death. On their march back to the sea they were more akin to raiders than to mercenaries. Griffith notes that the profession of piracy (and no doubt he would also mean here *leisteia*) 'had much in common with the mercenary calling' and attracted similar types of people.<sup>62</sup> A relationship between employment and remuneration is what makes the mercenary what he is; the Greeks recognised the importance of this in the fact that they named their soldiers of fortune something other than simply soldiers or raiders. This thesis is concerned with men who found military employment abroad - what the Greeks called *apodemia* - outside of the community - and were, at least in theory paid for this service essentially outside of the city-state from which they came. It will demonstrate that mercenary service was both an acceptable and even respectable form of employment for many in a changing Greek world.

### The Image

The figure of the mercenary conjures up a number of images in the contemporary mind. The romantic soldier of

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<sup>61</sup> Griffith 1935, 310-1; McKechnie 1989, 92.

<sup>62</sup> Griffith 1935, 262.

fortune can be juxtaposed with the contemporary, politically defunct, and notorious symbol of imperialism. Two hundred years of modern nationalism have discredited entirely the concept of soldiering independently of patriotic service.<sup>63</sup> In fact for much of this time western nationals have been prohibited from serving in the armies of foreign powers without the sanction of the state. The U.S.A. was the first country to successfully prosecute a man for 'disturbing the peace by privateering.' The U.S. government contended that it was a crime that is not found on a statute.<sup>64</sup> As a result, overseas service without permission became a common-law crime. The Americans followed with their own Foreign Enlistment Act in 1795, which was the first of its kind, an act that was stiffened and made permanent in 1818.<sup>65</sup> *The Immigration and Nationality Act*, section 349, provides for the removal of American nationality from a person enlisting to serve overseas.

The British, while not legislating against foreign service before the Americans, appear to have been the first to put barriers against their nationals serving abroad. In 1561 Elizabeth I produced a Royal Proclamation forbidding sailors

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<sup>63</sup> Burchett 1977, 179, notes that the French Revolution and the American War of Independence were the catalysts for a major change in attitude towards the mercenary. Mockler 1985, 4-5, cites the fact that the British used German and native 'mercenaries' as the primary agents to suppress the colonists, and this explains American distaste for mercenary service, even for themselves.

<sup>64</sup> Wharton 1970, 49-89. The case is the United States vs. Henfield, 1793.

<sup>65</sup> Section 959 of the *U.S. Code*, title 18, under the heading, 'Enlistment in Foreign Service.'

from accompanying Scottish expeditions against the Portuguese.<sup>66</sup> She went on to prohibit recruitment for service against any country with which England was at peace. Subsequently parliament enacted legislation prohibiting service against the crown in the 18th century. By the early 19th century Britain had agreed in a treaty with Spain to prevent British nationals from helping insurgents in South America. Britain's desire to remain neutral and the pressures from European and American nations on the British government to prevent their nationals serving in the wars that they were fighting, primarily the Federal Government of the United States, increased the need for Britain to create stiff legal boundaries on British subjects from serving abroad. This culminated in the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. It prohibits British subjects both from mercenary service and from mercenary recruitment.

The Canadians have their own Foreign Enlistment Act, passed in 1937. It is very similar to that of the British government. Belgium makes foreign enlistment illegal in their *Code Penal*.<sup>67</sup> Oddly, Sweden does not prohibit enlistment overseas, but does prohibit recruitment on Swedish territory provided that the Monarch give permission for such service.

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<sup>66</sup> Holdsworth 1922, VI.308.

<sup>67</sup> Daloz 1968-9, Article 135, loi 15 Juin, 1951, article 99.

Alone of western nations are the French. They still maintain a standing mercenary army and as a result have the most lenient legal and ideological attitude towards mercenary service.<sup>68</sup> This is peculiar given that they were among the first of all nations to explore modern nationalism during and after the French revolution.

The notoriety of the mercenary is perhaps responsible for the enduring fascination that accompanies a lack of public respect. Contemporary perceptions have to a large extent been formed by the popular treatment of the theme in works such as *The Dogs of War* and *The Wild Geese*.<sup>69</sup> Despite the tinge of romanticism which these books display, the figure of the mercenary is not a good one. In recent years mercenaries have not distinguished their profession with service for honourable causes.<sup>70</sup> Governments have used mercenaries to fight undercover and illicit wars across their borders and to prop up regimes which have a less than spotless record.<sup>71</sup> Ideologies of citizenship and nationalism and the appalling behaviour of the mercenaries themselves alone do not create

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<sup>68</sup> Mockler 1985, 13. The French Foreign Legion regularly receives the loudest cheers in the Bastille Day Processions. The French *Code Penal*, Article 85, prohibits recruitment for overseas service on French soil, but does not seem to have any reference that prevents French nationals enlisting for such service. No Frenchman has ever been charged with this offence despite occasions, notably in the mid-1970s, when they could have been.

<sup>69</sup> Forsyth 1974; Carney 1977; Geraghty 1983. The first two here were made into films bearing the same titles.

<sup>70</sup> Burchett 1977, 209, makes the point well that the war in Angola in particular 'shattered once and for all the myth of the 'Soldier of Fortune' with its catalogue of sadism and butchery, racism and stupidity, military incompetence and vainglory, lies and cheating and plain unmistakable cowardice and desertion of mates.'

<sup>71</sup> Best exemplified by Rhodesia whose declining manpower, struggle to maintain white supremacy, and the war against the communist regime in Angola relied heavily on a pool of 'white' mercenaries from western Europe.

the complete picture of the mercenary. Historiography has played its role to create the mercenaries' tarnished image. Books carrying titles like *The Whores of War* underline the seedy side of mercenary service. This image dates back to antiquity.<sup>72</sup>

The ambiguity of the figure of the mercenary is evident in Greek ideology and conception. Antiquity plays its role in bringing to the modern world the image of the foreigner, fighting for pay in a foreign land. In theory the Greek city-state was a body of free men who lived within a defined territory whose mutual goals were independence (*autarcheia*) and freedom (*eleutheria*). This group formed the political body that, at the very least, ratified that state's decisions in an assembly (*ecclesia*). Membership in this community was theoretically justified by fighting on the battlefield as a defender of the state's land (*chora*).<sup>73</sup> This was made possible for an individual possessing enough resources to provision himself with arms and armour, or as at fifth century Athens by rowing in the fleet, for which the thetes needed nothing but bodily strength. A professional and standing military, therefore, ran contrary to the ideal of the citizen and the city-state. It flouted the amateur nature of the farmer-cum-soldier. As warfare became the province of men in

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Burchett 1977.

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See Hom. *Il.* XII.310-21, for the integral relationship of social and economic status to the battlefield; for another example see Hdt. I.30, who notes the story of Tellus, the world's 'happiest man' who died in battle for his city-state.

the state who held neither land nor citizenship, the citizen lost his independence in the state because in order to protect his freedom he came to rely on the services and the skills of others. Worse than this, the employed professional may not even have been a member of the community.

Other factors made the mercenary into a pariah. Mercenaries had a relationship with the establishment and maintenance of tyranny. Tyranny, while seemingly benign in the sixth century, became anathema in democratic Athens in the fifth.<sup>74</sup> Tyrants were perceived to rule their states through armed force and by disarming the citizen population. This armed force was usually, but not always, provided by outsiders. Herodotus recognised this relationship in his *Histories*.<sup>75</sup> The career of Pisistratus is particularly illustrative.<sup>76</sup> The citizens in previously democratic Syracuse recognised this situation and the role that hired arms played in their 'subjugation.' For example Diodorus makes Theodorus claim that,

[Dionysius I] has taken the property of the private citizens together with their lives and pays a wage to servants to secure the enslavement of their masters...for the Acropolis which is guarded by the weapons of slaves is a hostile redoubt in our city; the multitude of mercenaries (*misthophoroi*) has been gathered to hold the Syracusans in slavery

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74       Andrewes 1963, 22-3.

75       Hdt. V.55, 65, 71, 91, 94, VI.35, 102, 103, 107, 123, VII.6.

76       Hdt. I.61.3.

(*douleia*).<sup>77</sup>

The Athenians took this position to the extreme. Their police force was made up of public slaves who were not even Greeks in order to prevent hired men from providing the basis for a coup. The fourth century writer Aeneas Tacticus recognised the dangers of having a group of mercenaries within the city walls. His treatise is full of advice against allowing such men too much freedom of movement, association or numbers.<sup>78</sup> It illustrates well potential political attitudes towards mercenaries.

The Greeks had no specific word for the man who served a foreign power for pay as modern languages do.<sup>79</sup> The terms that were most commonly employed for such men were either euphemisms or interchangeable with things that had nothing to do with military service; for example *misthophoros* might just as easily refer to a jury-man as to a mercenary and *xenos* to a foreigner or guest.<sup>80</sup> The ancient Greek terminology leads to the conclusion that the Greeks perceived of their mercenaries in an ambiguous fashion.

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77 Diod. XIV.65.2-3.

78 Aen. Tact. X.7, 9, XII.2; Whitehead 1991, 110.

79 The Latin word *mercenarius* is the root for the French term 'mercenaire' and the English 'mercenary' and can refer to one who serves a foreign power which is independent of the state of which he is a citizen for remuneration. The German word 'soldner' comes from the Late Latin *solidarius*, itself from the Latin *solidus* a term for a solid gold coin. This refers to the fact that the man was paid for service as was the wage-earning *misthophoros* of the Greek states.

80 See ch.II, 53-65, and Parke 1933, 231. Words like *epikouros* (helper), *misthophoros* (wage-earner), *misthotos* (hireling), *doryphoros* (spear-earner) and *xenos* (foreigner) could all be applied to persons other than mercenaries in antiquity.

The earliest sources do not mention mercenaries specifically. Homer refers to guest-friends (*xenoi*) and certainly never treats his heroes as anything less than aristocratic or their motives as anything other than noble obligation. Homer's aristocrats served one another militarily as part of networks of guest-friendship (*xenia*) and family alliance.<sup>81</sup> There is never any suggestion in the *Iliad* that those chiefs who accompanied Agamemnon did so as mercenary captains. Clearly the poems demonstrate that one individual represented the interests of many men who came with him across the sea. These men seem to have been connected by tribe (*phyle* and *obe*) and by nation (*ethnos*). The poets of the Lyric age give glimpses into overseas service, and there is some suggestion that Archilochus was himself a mercenary, along with the 'unknown Cretan,' Hybrias.<sup>82</sup>

All of the Greek evidence which specifically deals with mercenaries, however, dates from the fifth century and later. This chronological dimension is important for the image of the mercenary. Post tyrannical and therefore democratic Athens provided the context for the production of the literature upon which the mercenary's image was and must be constructed. Herodotus mentions mercenaries sparingly. His evidence is crucial for the early tyrannies, but he is at least

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<sup>81</sup> Finley 1954, 106-14; Murray 1980, 48. See ch.III, 155-161, and ch.VI, 296-301.

<sup>82</sup> For such overseas' service see Parke 1933, 4, and for Archilochus specifically see Diehl II, frags. 1, 2, 3, 6, 13, 40, 60.



sympathetic to a group of Arcadians who join Xerxes 'because they had nothing.'<sup>83</sup> Thucydides rarely mentions mercenaries, and his attitude towards them is neutral. The hatred that Mantineans, who served for both sides at Syracuse, had for each other, and were 'persuaded by pay,' is of more interest to him than the fact that they are essentially mercenaries.<sup>84</sup>

The diversity of evidence in the fourth century, and the related fact that mercenary service appears to have been more common, provide the historian with more perspectives of the hired foreign soldier. At first glance the orators appear to condemn mercenary service and those who performed it. Demosthenes describes such men as wretched (*athlioi*) and lacking resources (*aporoi*).<sup>85</sup> His tone in one speech condemns individuals for apparently mercenary behaviour.<sup>86</sup> He is (not surprisingly) rude about Philip II's mercenaries.<sup>87</sup> Isocrates has similar things to say about the nature of the mercenary and its dangers to the *polis*.<sup>88</sup> He is also disparaging of the perfidy that hired men demonstrate in the performance of their

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83 Hdt. VIII.26.

84 Thuc. VII.57.

85 Dem. IV.46, XII.27.

86 Dem. XIX.287. In this speech he gives Epicrates the name of Cyrebius - Offal - for being a *misthotos* of Chabrias.

87 Dem. II.15-17. See also Theopompus *FGrH* 115 frag. 225 for the appalling behaviour of Philip's foreign companions and friends.

88 Isoc. V.96, 121, IV.168.

military duties.<sup>89</sup> Plato ostensibly condemns mercenary service.<sup>90</sup> Aristotle thought that professional soldiers were less likely to die fighting bravely than citizen militias.<sup>91</sup> This evidence combined with the ideal of the city state would seem to show that the mercenary was not perceived favourably. But was this really the case in the Greek world before 322 B.C.?

It has been noted that warfare had a direct relationship to citizenship in the Greek city states. There was certainly nothing which was considered bad about military service. The case that mercenary service was acceptable begins with Xenophon. The works of Xenophon illustrate that mercenary service was not undertaken for the purposes of pay alone or that those who took service were social outcasts and criminals. His positive assessment of the army of Jason of Pherae indicates his opinion of the quality and value of the well-trained and well-led mercenary army.<sup>92</sup> Xenophon had been a mercenary commander himself. Perhaps for obvious reasons he does not portray the men with whom he served in a bad light. In fact he is often positive about both their status and their motivation. As the reader of this work will note, his

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89 Isoc. VIII.44.

90 Pl. *Leg.* 697 e.

91 Arist. *Nic. Eth.* III.8.9.

92 Xen. *Hell.* VI.1.5.

*Anabasis* is invaluable and his proximity to the lives and careers of the men he led makes him the most utilised of all sources of evidence. His biases, however, need to be taken in hand. Many scholars point out that he had no interest portraying the men on the campaign as wretched, miserable or driven to service.<sup>93</sup> It is not known when he wrote the work, but it should be remembered that it could have been the nostalgic memories of an old man.

Xenophon was not alone in his assessment of the honourable nature of mercenary service. Legal speeches from Athens provide a wealth of information about the interaction of the mercenary and his home. Plenty of such examples demonstrate that there was nothing shameful in serving overseas in the fourth century, particularly Isaeus' *Meneclēs*, written for two young men who fought with Iphicrates in Thrace in the mid-380s B.C.<sup>94</sup> The speech *On the Estate of Nicostratus*, also written by Isaeus, illustrates that the deceased served the last eleven years of his life overseas.<sup>95</sup> Neither speech attempts to hide the fact that these men were mercenaries. The speech *Astyphilus* demonstrates that the speaker considered it prudent to note that he took service

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93 Parke 1933, 29; Griffith 1935, 3; McKechnie 1989, 80.

94 Isae. II.

95 Isae. IV.

abroad only when Athens was not at war.<sup>96</sup> It is clear that little else prevented him from such service. The very fact that his overseas service is mentioned in the speech at all would suggest that popular opinion saw nothing at all wrong with such service. In a similar vein, the ease with which Athenians found service with foreign dignitaries during hiatuses in their state service and the predominance of such service during the fourth century demonstrates a certain respectability of foreign service.<sup>97</sup> Only Sparta seems to have viewed mercenary service with less flexibility. Spartiates had to gain permission from the ephors before leaving Laconia.<sup>98</sup> Sparta seems unique among Greek states in this respect. No doubt the reason lay more with their obsession with their diminishing numbers and the need to keep all the Spartiates in service for the state than with hostility to foreign service. Peloponnesians took pride in the fact that men came to hire them abroad. Lycomedes is made to note this point by Xenophon.<sup>99</sup>

The forensic speech writers, and more importantly the juries for which they wrote, did not perceive of mercenary service itself as a bad thing. A second look at the

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96        *Isae. IX.*

97        *See Chapter VI, 273-286.*

98        *Isoc. XI.18.*

99        *Xen. Hell. VII.1.23.*

philosophers helps to bear this point out. Plato's disparaging statements regarding mercenary service with the Persians in his *Laws* refer to Greeks in the service of barbarians against other Greeks (whom he calls friends - *philoï*).<sup>100</sup> The fourth century philosopher Chrysippus claimed that if the sage could not reign himself, he could 'dwell with a king and go campaigning with a king.'<sup>101</sup> The Stoic's views of service abroad and the ideal of the philosopher-king both come close to the modern definition of mercenary. Even the most condemnatory references, found in the speeches of both Demosthenes and Isocrates, were not necessarily against the mercenary himself, but against those things which undermined the ideal of their city-state. Despite the references to poverty and the wretchedness of the wanderer, their ultimate concerns were not with the mercenary phenomenon but with the plight of their city-state and in some ways the Greek world generally. Mercenary service was, after all, one of many concerns which they had. Isocrates opposed the expense associated with Athenians payment for mercenaries.<sup>102</sup> He also opposed the character of the men hired by his state to serve, but he did not condemn the service itself.<sup>103</sup> He applauded

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100 Pl. *Leg.* 697 e.

101 Plut. *Mor.* 1043 c.

102 Isoc. VIII.46.

103 Isoc. VIII.79.

the citizen hoplite.<sup>104</sup> The foreign service was not what Isocrates feared, but the fact that these men wandered outside of their state for want of their daily bread and that they gathered together in such great numbers that they created a threat to the settled communities of the Greek world.<sup>105</sup> Demosthenes agreed with this position.<sup>106</sup> He at least was also realistic enough to recognise the necessity of the mercenary's existence in the armies of his state, particularly armies that had to serve overseas.<sup>107</sup> Aeneas Tacticus, paranoid as he was regarding outsiders, makes no real effort to prevent his readers from hiring mercenaries in the first place. Indeed, mercenaries appear in his treatise as an accepted part of the siege preparations for defenders and attackers alike.

Wage-earning was viewed as dishonourable by the elites in antiquity. Wage-earning meant a loss of independence and an acknowledgement of lower status. When Demosthenes refers to Nicias as the hireling - *misthotos* - of Chabrias he does not mean to incite shame for the overseas service which the two men had done in Egypt, but from the notion that one man was

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104 Isoc. VIII.48.

105 Isoc. IV.168.

106 Dem. Ep. 9.9.10.

107 Dem. V.28-9.

hired for pay by the other.<sup>108</sup> Again in the case of Homer's aristocrats there was certainly no shame in the gifts and alliance between Achilles and Agamemnon which ensured the former's loyalty to the latter. Both men would have been horrified if these gifts had been likened to a wage. In modern western societies the opposite is true. Wage-earning and professionalism are not viewed as bad, but payment for foreign service is. It was not the service for the foreign powers that was at fault in antiquity, witness Plato and Chrysippus, but the wage-earning.

Towards the end of the period considered by this thesis Alexander's Corinthian League outlawed Greeks from serving the Great King during his Persian invasion. Alexander punished the Greeks who took such service.<sup>109</sup> He was not, however, punishing them for being mercenaries. He was not even punishing them for serving with the Great King. He was punishing them for deliberately serving against him. Thus, he punished only those men who had become mercenaries after the war had begun. He hired into his army the remnants of Darius' 50,000 who surrendered to him in 330 B.C. without punishment and under the same terms under which they had served the King.<sup>110</sup> He himself employed countless mercenaries in his

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108 Dem. XIX.287.

109 Arr. *Anab.* I.16.6; Plut. *Mor.* 181 a, *Alex.* XVI.

110 Arr. *Anab.* III.23.8, 24.4.

Asian campaigns.

As this work notes, a change can be detected during the reigns of Philip and Alexander in the nature of military service. These commanders won their battles with Macedonian professionals. All scholars agree that mercenaries played a large role in Alexander's campaigns. Parke notes that that role was limited primarily to separate expeditions, garrison duties and founding colonies.<sup>111</sup> Griffith notes that mercenary service in the age of Alexander was 'no longer a bare livelihood; it had become an adventure and a short cut to fortune.'<sup>112</sup> By the later fourth century, the professional soldier had replaced the amateur as the major contestant on the battlefield, just as the kingdom had replaced the *polis* as the primary feature of Greek - or Hellenistic - political life. Parke identifies this point etymologically.<sup>113</sup> In the period before 322 B.C. the citizen soldier was called a *stratiotes* and the mercenary needed to be identified by a different and special term. After the Lamian war it is the citizen who needs the special term and the professional, more often than not a mercenary, who is referred to as simply a soldier - *stratiotes* or *pezos*. Thus professional warfare had become the norm and gained respectability as other areas of

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111 Parke 1933, 192-5.

112 Griffith 1935, 21.

113 Parke 1933, 209.



life became specialised and professional. This latter trend is notable throughout the fourth century. The citizen amateur was a thing of the past.

The wars of the successors did little to enhance the reputation of the professional soldier and therefore the mercenary. Historians identify a number of reasons why this was the case. The destruction of the enemy became detrimental to the mercenaries' future employment. Such destruction might bring an end to a campaign, and this would mean the end of service and therefore of payment. Professional soldiers must have hoped for lucrative and safe postings, like garrison duties, rather than arduous campaigns against distant opponents. The ease with which mercenaries might be induced to change sides, as happened to Eumenes at Gabiene, or to turn and flee while facing superior odds also proved detrimental to their image in the Hellenistic world.<sup>114</sup> Finally the baggage train (*aposkeue*) of the armies of the successors became the end rather than the means of warfare.<sup>115</sup> There can be little doubt that these post-Alexandrian images influenced later historians who wrote about mercenaries. This influence must have contributed to the climate in which the historians who wrote under the shadow of the growing power of Rome considered the problems of Greek history.

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114 Diod. XIX.40.

115 Parke 1933, 207; Griffith 1935, 50-1.

Roman Republican citizens were amateurs like their Greek predecessors. The Romans had the aristocratic anti wage-earning ethos of the Greeks. Cato's work on agriculture begins with a condemnation of working for *merces*.<sup>116</sup> In spite of the fact that Romans are never found serving as mercenaries themselves, they still had the word for mercenary - *mercenarius* - and they used such mercenaries in their campaigns. In some senses the *auxilia* were mercenaries with long term contracts. The absence of Romans serving foreign commanders is attributable to the success of Roman Republican arms, the regularity with which Rome went to war in the period, and the plunder that could be taken following Roman standards. Each gave Romans no reason to seek service elsewhere. Greeks writing under Roman power, notably Diodorus Siculus and his successor Plutarch, both moralise about the disreputable nature of mercenaries and mercenary service.<sup>117</sup> By this time Rome had established an empire with an army of professionals. These professionals were drawn from the Roman citizen body and from Roman subjects and allies. The concept that military service for money went along with one's citizenship was well established by Plutarch's day.

The perjorative view of Greek mercenaries illustrated in the Greek sources from the Roman period comes from a number of

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116 Cato, *Agr.* 1.1.

117 For examples see Diod. XV.61.1-3 and Plut. *Ages.* XXXVI-XXXVII.

perspectives. Romans viewed the Greeks as a defeated people by the first century B.C. The philhellenism demonstrated by Flamininus in the early second century B.C. had soured. Roman perceptions of Greek infidelities and 'squabbling' had resulted in bloody and violent upheavals on the Greek mainland. The Greek philosophers and teachers of rhetoric offended Roman conservative opinion. Romans saw Greeks as seemingly non-patriotic. They had plenty of historical illustrations to draw upon. The activities of pragmatic Greek generals in their internecine wars of the fourth century showed rapacious individuals aiming at private gain. The complex international diplomacy of the Roman conquests in which all of the larger powers of the Greek world, at least from a Roman perspective, acted with little consistency or loyalty demonstrated 'Greek faith.' It comes as little surprise that the Greek mercenary was viewed in a poor light. Whether as soldier of fortune or as careless adventurer, the ambiguous image of the mercenary has its roots in classical antiquity.

**II**

**WHO WERE GREEK MERCENARIES**

## INTRODUCTION

Gisgo (in 341 B.C.) sailed across with a fleet of seventy ships. His force also included a force of Greek mercenaries; the Carthaginians had never before hired Greek soldiers, but by now they had come to admire them as irresistible troops and by far the most warlike anywhere.

Plutarch, *Timoleon*, XXX.

The foregoing chapter has discussed the importance of mercenaries in the general circumstance of Greek history and historiography. What follows is an examination of who these Greek mercenaries were. Important in this analysis are the regions and cities from which they came; the positions they held, political as well as economic, in their respective societies; the kind of troops that they were, hoplites, peltasts or specialist light troops; veterans or new recruits; old men or young. All of this will develop a clear picture of the integral relationship between what might be termed mercenary service and the eastern Mediterranean in the middle of the first millenium B.C.

## MERCENARY TERMS

The Greek word for a soldier was *stratiotes*. In the last chapter the neutrality of this term was noted. The term carried no meaning in the text, nor did it define the type of soldier on the battlefield. In order to be more specific the Greeks defined types of soldiers by the kind of equipment that they employed; hoplites, archers, and peltasts are all

examples. When it came to describing mercenaries the nouns employed also might denote a relationship between the soldier and either his equipment or, more tellingly, his employer.

A common and early term for a mercenary and one that illustrates the point of relationship to a man's equipment or livelihood is *doryphoros*, or more literally spear-bearer.<sup>1</sup> This seems to have been a standard word for a bodyguard, but it clearly defined the relationship that the man's spear had to his livelihood. The *doryphoros*, as the term denotes, was not necessarily a mercenary. As was often the case *doryphoroi* could be hired locally to defend the body of a tyrant of the city-state from which they came.<sup>2</sup> It might just as easily be translated as a professional spearman.

*Epikouros*, literally helper or assistant, is not a specific term used of a mercenary. Parke describes it as an 'euphemism' to disguise the pejorative nature of the soldier who received remuneration for service.<sup>3</sup> Homer appears to have used the term to refer to an ally.<sup>4</sup> *Epikouros* is the most common word used for Greek mercenaries in the Archaic period. 'I shall be called an *epikouros* like a Carian!' the poet

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<sup>1</sup> RE. vol. V, 1579 s.v. *doryphoros*; *LSJ* 144.

<sup>2</sup> Ephorus, *FGH* frag. 179; Thuc. VI.15.3; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* XVIII.3 and 4. Ar. *Eq.* 448. Xen. *Hiero*, VI.5, for *doryphoroi* as Dionysius' bodyguards specifically.

<sup>3</sup> Parke 1933, 13. Parke does not cite Plutarch, but could easily have done so, as Plut. *Sol.* XV. 2-3 notes that the Athenians used euphemisms to cover up the 'ugliness' of things with 'auspicious and kindly terms.'

<sup>4</sup> Lavelle 1989, 36.

Archilochus sings in the seventh century.<sup>5</sup> Hermippus cites a proverb in which 'epikouroi from Arcadia' are listed as Athenian imports.<sup>6</sup> Herodotus uses this term all but exclusively to describe mercenaries.<sup>7</sup> Thucydides uses this word more than any other to describe mercenaries. It should be noted that the majority of its use comes in the first four books of his history.<sup>8</sup> The term *epikouros* all but disappears in the histories written after the later fifth century B.C. Xenophon is a case in point. He uses the term only twice in the *Anabasis*, a work devoted to mercenaries.<sup>9</sup> On both of these occasions the word is used not as a noun, but as a verb, and not to describe the profession of a soldier, but to describe aid given to soldiers suffering from medical disorders. Xenophon's *Hellenica* is no different. On only one occasion is the term used as a noun for mercenaries.<sup>10</sup> On all other occasions it serves as a word denoting aid, succour or assistance.<sup>11</sup> Arrian uses *epikouros* only as a reference to

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5 Diehl, 40.

6 Hermippus, frag. 63 (Kock, I, 243).

7 Hdt. I.64.2, 154.4, II.152.14, 163.2-3, 168.12, III.4.2, III.11.3, 11.12, 45.14, 54.6, 145.15, 146.13-19, VI.39.14, VII.189.3.

8 Thuc. I.115.4, II.33.1, 70.3, 79.3, III.18.1, 34.2, 73, 85.3, IV.46.2, 129.3, 130.3, 131.3, VI.55.3, 58.2, VIII.25.2, 28.4, 38.3.

9 Xen. *An.* IV.5.13, V.8.21.

10 Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.23.

11 Xen. *Hell.* IV.6.3, 83, VI.8.3, 5.40, 47, VII.4.6.

aid received rather than to a type of soldier.<sup>12</sup>

A term which appears to refer to mercenaries in the later fifth century B.C. is *xenos*.<sup>13</sup> This word could denote a foreigner or a stranger. It usually referred to a Greek from another city-state. It might also refer to a guest-friend, a foreigner bound to a family and household not by ties of blood, but by bonds of hospitality and reciprocity. P. Gauthier has recently argued that in inscriptions dealing with the Delian league the Athenians of the mid-fifth century B.C. referred to their subject-allies as *xenoi*.<sup>14</sup> In spite of this the Athenian historian Xenophon used the term exclusively of the mercenaries who served with him under Cyrus the Younger in the attempted coup of 401 B.C. All of the 13,000 Greeks who fought at Cunaxa cannot have been the guest friends of Cyrus! Like *epikouros* there is a certain euphemistic quality to the term *xenos*. How much better was it to be a guest friend of the Great King's brother than a hired helper?

The *xenikon*, a term derived from *xenos* was used to denote a body of mercenaries. This term found particular favour in the fourth century when used to denote the group of mercenaries hired by the Athenians for service in the Corinthian war at the isthmus itself. They found fame under

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12 Arr. *Anab.* VI.5.4.

13 RE. vol. 9a, pt. 2, 1442-3, s.v. *xenos*.

14 Gauthier 1971, 44-79; Finley 1954, 104-5. Finley notes the 'confused symbolic' of all dealings with strangers in the Greek world and the resultant ambiguity of the terms that were used.



Iphicrates and became known as the *xenikon* in Corinth.<sup>15</sup> *Xenik[as]* is used only once in the *Anabasis*, but extensively in the *Hellenica*. It is only once found in Arrian.<sup>16</sup>

The term *epikouros* does not survive into the fourth century as a word for a mercenary. *Xenos* is used often by Aeneas the Tactician writing in the middle of the fourth century.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, these terms are increasingly replaced in the sources by a word first used by Thucydides for mercenaries, but which was also used for any men who drew regular pay from any source and for any service - *misthophoros*.<sup>18</sup> After Thucydides' time and through the fourth century *misthophoros* became the most common term for the mercenary. Xenophon used it extensively in his *Hellenica*.<sup>19</sup> Those hired for money or persuaded to serve for pay - *misthotai* and *mistho peisantes* - appear in both Herodotus and Thucydides.<sup>20</sup> The orators also use terms like hireling - *misthotos* - to denigrate their political opponents.<sup>21</sup>

Diodorus' Histories span the period (and beyond) discussed

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15 Ar. *Plut.* 173; Parke 1933, 49-54.

16 Arr. *Ana.* III.23.

17 Aen. *Tact.* X.21, XII.2, XIII.1, 3, XVIII.14.

18 Thuc. I.35.4, III.109.3, VI.43.1, VII.57.3, 9, VII.58.3.

19 Xen. *Hell.* II.4.30, III.1.23, IV.2.5, 4.9, 14.

20 Hdt. I.61.3; Thuc. I.60, IV.80.5.

21 Dem. XIX.287.

by this thesis. Diodorus wrote long after the fourth century and was clearly influenced in his choice of terms by subsequent phenomena. He uses the term *misthophoros* almost exclusively, even though he must have followed the earlier Greek historians who did not use such a word. An example would be his choice of *misthophoroi* over *xenoi* in discussing those accompanying Xenophon on the *Anabasis* of 401 B.C.<sup>22</sup> When he does use *xenos*, it appears with the notation that such men were paid.<sup>23</sup> Arrian also wrote long after the events he describes. He too uses *misthophoros* prolifically, although not exclusively. Arrian uses *xenos* in conjunction with *misthophoros* - foreign wage-earners. It is a phrase found only twice before in the Greek texts, in a speech delivered by Demosthenes in 351 B.C. and by Aeneas Tacticus.<sup>24</sup> It is a term which is remarkable in its similarity to the meaning of a modern mercenary, for it incorporates elements of both foreign service and professional remuneration.

It seems that a succession of terms was applied to the Greek mercenary from the seventh to the fourth century B.C.<sup>25</sup> Specifically there was a development from the euphemistic assistant or *epikouros* to the more practical and specific wage

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22 Diod. XIV.19.3.

23 Diod. XVI.28.2.

24 Dem. V.28; Aen. Tact. XII.2.

25 Parke 1933, 20-21. Parke notes this transition briefly by citing the replacement of helper with 'wage-earning peltast.'

earner - *misthophoros*. *Xenos* appears only to have served without qualification as a generic term for Xenophon in his *Anabasis* and might perhaps be seen as a euphemism in itself, a point that should not be lost when assessing the reasons for the change of terminology.

The reasons for the transition begin with the meaning of *epikouros*. The verbal form means to give aid, to help and to protect. It neither has a military connotation, nor does it define any specific relationship, whether between individuals, national or financial. When Herodotus uses the term he has to use qualifications to denote a relationship between the *epikouros* and another person. Thus on two occasions he has to note that *epikouroi* were paid.<sup>26</sup>

Thucydides, unlike Herodotus, was familiar with and used the term wage-earner.<sup>27</sup> He leaves himself free to use *epikouros* in other ways. Thus, when he uses the term, it appears to represent allies rather than mercenaries.<sup>28</sup> He is still not totally converted to the term wage-earner, because on one occasion *epikouroi* are also *misthosamanoi* - hired for pay.<sup>29</sup> Thucydides' literary successors abandoned *epikouros* as a noun. Xenophon illustrates this better than others in his

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<sup>26</sup> Hdt. I.154.4, III.45.14; this point is made by Lavelle 1989, 36.

<sup>27</sup> Thuc. I.35.4, III.109.2, VI.43, VII.57, VII. 58.

<sup>28</sup> Thuc. I.115.4. He uses the word to denote aid I.32.1, 5, 33.1. He also juxtaposes the term with *misthophoros*, I.35.4.

<sup>29</sup> Thuc. IV.52.2.

*Hellenica* and *Anabasis*. The orators use *epikouros* in the sense of help and assistance, in defense, legally, medically or for friendship.<sup>30</sup> Only once is it used as a term to denote military assistance from auxiliaries.<sup>31</sup>

The most striking illustration of *epikouros* for mercenary service is given by Plato. He calls the second tier of social status in his *Republic*, the silver tier, *epikouroi*.<sup>32</sup> It makes clear that these men were neither to be paid nor to come from outside of the state. He has to use the term in conjunction with 'hired' to imply a separate meaning.<sup>33</sup> The word had developed and was not able to represent the mercenary soldier. In the *Nicomachian Ethics* Aristotle used the term *epikouria* for the concept of assistance rather than mercenary service.<sup>34</sup>

*Misthophoros* literally means a wage-earner and is derived from the word *misthos* - wage. This wage could be paid in land, favours or coin.<sup>35</sup> Coins in the Greek world were relatively new in the late fifth century, and the payment of

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30 Isoc. IV. 168, XI. 22, *Ep.* 9.79; Dem. XXI.99, 205, IL.50, LVIII.61.

31 Isoc. XIX. 38.

32 Pl. *Resp.* 415 a.

33 Pl. *Resp.* 419 a 10.

34 Arist. *Nic. Eth.* VIII.13.11, 14.2, 4.

35 See RE. vol. XV, 2078-95. *Misthos* literally means wage. *Misthos* was paid to members of Athenian juries and to public workers, generally in obols or drachmas. See ch.IV.170-173.

regular wages in coin would also have been novel.<sup>36</sup> A wage-earner need not have been a military man, but anyone in receipt of regular wages. In the Athens of the late fifth century this could be anyone on state business: a juryman, a public temple-builder, a Delian League commissioner, a soldier, or a sailor.<sup>37</sup> The growth of the Athenian league meant a growth in the number of people earning regular wages from the Athenian state.<sup>38</sup> The sources demonstrate a steady development of *misthos* paid to Athenian citizens throughout the fifth century. At the same time there would no doubt have been a growth in the acceptance of the term *misthophoros*. Its use appears therefore in Thucydides who was writing in 431 B.C. and later, but not in Herodotus whose subject matter, at least, pre-dates 479 B.C.<sup>39</sup> Humphries has tried to demonstrate that the Great Peloponnesian War may have acted as a catalyst in the movement of Athenian citizen farmers away from incomes derived from their land towards state income - *misthophoria* - generated by the Athenian empire.<sup>40</sup> If this thesis is correct, it would certainly support the position that the term *misthophoros* appears in the sources at the right

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The appearance of coins in Attica is ascribed by some to the early sixth century and by others to a much later date. The debate hinges around whether a passage in Plutarch, *Sol.*, can be believed or not. Those who follow the numismatic evidence favour a later date, about 520-10 B.C. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1274 a 9, claims that state pay was a relatively recent development in his day.

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Parke 1933, 231. Parke cites Lysias, XXVII.1 and 2. See also Burke 1992, 215, n.63.

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Humphries 1979, 14-16; Burke 1992, 216-7, n.73.

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Thuc. III.17.4 used it of remuneration of Athenians besieging Potidea in 428 B.C.

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Humphries 1979, 14, 16-7, 24.

time and supersedes other terms for mercenaries through the fourth century.

Another reason for the growth of the term *misthophoros* was military rather than economic. The development of year-round campaigning during the Peloponnesian Wars of the latter half of the fifth century B.C. forced the state to require professionals. Thucydides plainly means regular wages when he uses the term *misthophor[an]*.<sup>41</sup> Xenophon uses this word in the same way.<sup>42</sup> Both writers are pivotal in the transition of terminology from assistant to wage-earner. It is obvious that regular wages and professional service go hand in hand. It is safe to conclude that professionalisation of military service in the period around 401 B.C. created the need for clearer terminology in the Greek world.

At the same time that *misthophoros* was becoming the accepted term for mercenaries in the Greek world there is evidence of an explosion in the numbers of Greeks in overseas service in the eastern Mediterranean. This explosion may also explain the use of less euphemistic terms than 'helpers' and 'guest-friends.' Such great numbers of men prepared to lay down their lives at the prospect of regular wages cannot have warranted such imprecise terminology.

A final point dealing with the notion of remuneration and

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41 Thuc. I.35.1, VI.24.3.

42 Xen. An. V.6.23, 26, VI.1.16, VII.1.3.

the implied relationship between individuals that this conjures up needs discussion. The concept of a wage carried with it a pejorative connotation in antiquity. It implied income earned from labouring for another person and was not honourable for a free-man. It denied a free man both *eleutheria* and *autarcheia*. In this sense the orators use words that derive from wage or hire frequently. *Misthotos* is a good example of this and is used with derogatory venom against Demosthenes' opponents.<sup>43</sup> The reverse is true in Isaeus' speech *On The Estate of Menecles*.<sup>44</sup> Here the speaker mentions only that he took service with Iphicrates. The full sense of the juxtaposition is well illustrated. The *Iliad's* warriors followed other men to Troy to take service in the same way. The term *misthophoros* was perjorative. Terms like *xenos* and *epikouros* disguised the real relationship between the mercenary and his employer. Xenophon, therefore, describes all the Greeks serving with him on the *anabasis* either as *xenoi* or simply as soldiers or hoplites. He reserves the term *misthoporos* for the mercenaries who fought against them on the campaign.<sup>45</sup> Despite this he notes that his men - *xenoi* - were paid *misthos*. He disguised their real

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43 Dem. XIX. 287.

44 Isae. II. 6.

45 Xen. *An.* IV.3.4, 4.18, VII.8.15. See also Xen. *An.* I.4.3, for 400 Greeks who deserted Abrocomas described as *misthophoroi*.

nature with another euphemism.<sup>46</sup> He does nothing of the sort for others and uses the more perjorative term throughout his *Hellenica*.

Historians have long argued over the meaning of the terms used by Arrian for Alexander's mercenaries. Arrian uses both *xenoi* and *misthophoroi*. Berve believes that when Arrian uses the term *xenoi* in any context, he means the original mercenaries who came from Greece with Alexander and *xenoi-misthophoroi* refers to such men.<sup>47</sup> Parke doubted the truth of this and Griffith challenged it, claiming that while it was logical until the battle of Gaugamela, it did not hold up to scrutiny for the Macedonian battle line described by Arrian at Gaugamela.<sup>48</sup> He went further to suggest that it was an overly elaborate way of making a military distinction. Griffith has demonstrated that Berve is incorrect. Arrian mentions *misthophoroi* too early and uses both terms indiscriminately.<sup>49</sup> What is interesting is that *xenoi misthophoroi* are separated from the Greek *misthophoroi* at the battle of Gaugamela.<sup>50</sup> Was there meant to be a difference between Greek wage-earners and foreign wage-earners in Arrian's source? It is possible that

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46 Xen. *An.* I.2.11-12.

47 Berve 1926, 144.

48 Parke 1933, 188-90; Griffith 1935, 16, 29; Arr. *Anab.* III.9.4, 12.2, 13.3-4.

49 Arr. *Anab.* II.5.1, 9.1.

50 Arr. *Anab.* III.9.4.



Arrian sought for a more accurate term than the professional soldier to describe Alexander's mercenaries.

The trend in terminology away from euphemisms coincides with developments in the Greek world which removed the soldier from those who farmed the land. There followed a period of transition in the later fifth century B.C. and then the eventual professionalisation and specialisation of the Greek world in the fourth century. This created a world in which all soldiers were professionals, and accordingly the sources makes it all but impossible to distinguish the citizen soldier from the mercenary and the purely professional soldier. This transition can be traced etymologically from the helper and assistant to the wage-earner on the battlefields of the eastern Mediterranean.

#### **PROVENANCE**

Greek mercenaries came from all the regions of the Greek world. In the section which follows, the Greek world has been divided into seven geographically related, but artificial areas. The first and foremost of these is the Peloponnese. This region provided by far the largest number of mercenaries that the sources record in the period from 500-322 B.C.; the most prominent part of the Peloponnese in the sources is Arcadia. The next most prolific area is central Greece; this includes Attica, Boeotia, Aetolia (prominent as a mercenary supplier in the third century B.C., but not nearly so

important in the fourth), Thessaly and Phocis. The Greek islands form the third area, notable for Crete's provision of specialist troops and for the proximity of islands like Rhodes and Cyprus to Persia and Egypt. Asia Minor is the fourth region. The first Greek mercenaries hailed from this region, but there are surprisingly few found in service after the rise of the Persian empire. The western parts of the Greek world, Sicily and Italy, are the fifth region. A collection of states under the heading of the north form the sixth region, this represents the northern Aegean and includes the area from Chalcidice to the Chersonesus. The last area represents the city-states of Africa; Cyrene and those in Egypt.

#### THE PELOPONNESE

By far the largest number of Greek mercenaries in the sources originated from the Greek mainland, principally from the Peloponnese. The first Peloponnesians who were persuaded by pay on the mainland appear in Herodotus, when a group of Arcadians approached the Great King Xerxes after the battle of Thermopylae because they had nothing.<sup>51</sup> Thucydides notes that Arcadians were persuaded by pay into service.<sup>52</sup> The Corinthians sent out a force of volunteers from Corinth itself along with men persuaded by pay from the rest of the

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51 Hdt. VIII.26.

52 Thuc. I.60.

Peloponnesians.<sup>53</sup> In 424 B.C. Brasidas had Peloponnesians who were persuaded by pay.<sup>54</sup> The people of Mende received aid from Peloponnesians who were there to 'aid them.'<sup>55</sup> Finally the Spartans employed the *epikouroi* of the Persian Amorges. There is a strong implication that the Spartans hired these men because they were Peloponnesians.<sup>56</sup>

Peloponnesians formed the nucleus of the army of Cyrus the Younger. Cyrus was determined to hire men from the Peloponnesians 'of the best sort' from the outset.<sup>57</sup> At least 6,700 of the 13,000 man army gathered by Cyrus came from this region. Many of these came with Cyrus' *xenoi* on the Greek mainland and seven hundred with the Spartan general Chirisophus.<sup>58</sup> Peloponnesians made up a sizable proportion of the participants known by name on this campaign described by Xenophon. Of fifteen named generals twelve were from the Peloponnesians. Fifteen of twenty eight captains were also from this region and of the thirteen known enlisted men there were seven from the Peloponnesians.

Peloponnesians also served Dionysius I the tyrant of

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53 Thuc. IV.129.3

54 Thuc. IV.80.5.

55 Thuc. IV.123, 132.

56 Thuc. VIII.28.4.

57 Xen. *An.* I.1.6.

58 Xen. *An.* I.3.3.

Syracuse throughout his career in Sicily. Dionysius hired mercenaries from the Lacedaimonians in the Peloponnese.<sup>59</sup> On a number of occasions Dionysius sent men with ample funds to recruit mercenaries in the Peloponnese.<sup>60</sup> The Peloponnesians under the tyrant may have numbered in excess of 20-30,000 at any one time.<sup>61</sup> Clearly Sicily was a region that was ripe for mercenaries. Dionysius' primary reason for hiring great numbers of mercenaries from the Peloponnese was to wage a defensive war against the Carthaginians on the island. In response to Dionysius' success the Carthaginians also sent to 'Europe' to recruit mercenaries.<sup>62</sup> It was not until after the Crimissus did were they convinced to hire in the Peloponnese.<sup>63</sup> Alexander also sent to the Peloponnese to collect soldiers.<sup>64</sup> The fact that Peloponnesians served in his mercenary forces is well attested.<sup>65</sup>

The most numerous of Peloponnesians who served in the fifth and fourth centuries were those from Arcadia. Inscriptions demonstrate that Arcadians had relations with

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59 Diod. XIV.44.1-2.

60 Diod. XIV.58.1.

61 Diod. XV.17.3; Parke 1933, 68. Parke bases this figure on Diod. XVI.47.7.

62 Diod. XIV.47.3.

63 Diod. XVI.81.4; Plut. *Tim.* XXX.

64 Arr. *Anab.* I.24.2, II.20.5.

65 Arr. *Anab.* I.17.8.

foreign dynasts in the fifth century.<sup>66</sup> It has been noted that by the later fifth century the Arcadians had become proverbial mercenaries.<sup>67</sup> Xenophon makes Lycomedes say that whenever anyone wants to hire mercenaries they hire Arcadians because they were both the most numerous of Greek peoples and the most warlike.<sup>68</sup> This point is illustrated by a faction in Notium which called in *epikouroi* from Arcadia.<sup>69</sup> The mercenary traditions of Arcadians can be identified specifically in the Persian wars.<sup>70</sup> Mantineans served with both sides at Syracuse.<sup>71</sup> *Misthophoroi* of Arcadia were engaged by the Corinthians in the Great war.<sup>72</sup>

The fifth century traditions were given full expression by the great numbers of Arcadians who served with Xenophon and Cyrus in 401 B.C. Arcadia provided more hoplites than any other single region on the *anabasis*. The city-states of Parrhasia, Stymphalus, Methydrium, Mantinea, Epitalia, Orchomenus and Lusi were all represented.<sup>73</sup> Xenophon says

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<sup>66</sup> Tod 93, for reference to seven Arcadians slain in a day by a Lycian dynast. The commentator accepts that they were in Persian service. *SEG XXXVII 676*, for an epitaph to Pantias of Tegea whom the commentator concludes served with Leucon the ruler of Panticapaeum. See also Hicks and Hill 136, for an honorary decree set up by Arcadian mercenaries to Leucon.

<sup>67</sup> Hermippus, frag 63 (Kock. I.243). Hermippus wrote as early as 430 B.C.

<sup>68</sup> Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.23.

<sup>69</sup> Thuc. III.34.2.

<sup>70</sup> Hdt. VIII.27.

<sup>71</sup> Thuc. VII.19, VII.57.

<sup>72</sup> Thuc. VII.58.

<sup>73</sup> Xen. *An.* VII.4.18.

that more than half the army were Arcadians and Achaeans.<sup>74</sup> J. Roy estimates that there were some 4,000 Arcadian hoplites with the army.<sup>75</sup> Of all those whom Xenophon names on the *anabasis* two thirds are from Arcadia. Notably only four of the fifteen *strategoï* were Arcadians. The disproportionate nature of this figure combined with the small number of captains named is worthy of discussion.

Clearly some of Cyrus' soldiers, and therefore some Arcadians, had served with him as garrison troops before. Xenias, from Parrhasia in Arcadia, commanded the mercenary force in the Ionian cities under Cyrus' auspices.<sup>76</sup> Arcadians served as both hoplites and peltasts; the latter were commanded by Aischines the Acarnanian.<sup>77</sup> Arexion the Arcadian accompanied the expedition as a soothsayer.<sup>78</sup>

After 399 B.C. Arcadians as a group distinct from Peloponnesians are not heard of again in the sources. Many of them must have stayed with the remnants of Cyrus' army in Spartan service in Asia Minor during Agesilaus' campaigns. There is a question mark over whether they found service as mercenaries after the foundation of the Arcadian league in 369

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74      *Xen. An.* VI.2.10.

75      Roy 1967, 308.

76      *Xen. An.* I.2.1.

77      *Xen. An.* IV.8.18.

78      *Xen. An.* VI.4.13

B.C. They are not specifically mentioned as serving with the great mercenary commanders of the fourth century B.C., notably the Phocians and Philip in the 350s and 340s or Alexander and Darius III in the 330s B.C. It is possible that a nationalism engendered by the new Arcadian league and the 10,000 strong assembly-cum-army that it heralded made Arcadians stay in the Peloponnese and not leave to seek service elsewhere. There is one exception which dates to the mid-fourth century B.C. from Thrace and refers to Arcadians in service overseas, but it is not certain that they were mercenaries.<sup>79</sup>

Apart from the Arcadians other specific groups from the Peloponnese served as mercenaries. The largest group of soldiers present on the *anabasis* after the Arcadians were those from Achaëa. Roy estimates perhaps 2,000 went on the expedition.<sup>80</sup> The named Achaeans are numerically well represented amongst the senior staff, but not one enlisted man is named by Xenophon. This is hardly surprising, as Xenophon has a propensity to name officers rather than men. Like Arcadians, Achaeans are not mentioned again as serving as mercenaries until Diodorus lists the troops of Alexander at Gaugamela.<sup>81</sup> Diodorus is clear that all the mercenaries who fought with Alexander in the battle were Achaians. This is

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79 Dittenberg. *SIG* I.3.209. See also Tod 93, for seven Arcadians in overseas service.

80 Roy 1967, 308.

81 Diod. XVII.57.4.

difficult to substantiate and Griffith seems to have the answer in suggesting that there was an error made in copying the text.<sup>82</sup> It remains, however, difficult to believe that Achaeans did not serve overseas between the 390s and 331 B.C. It is equally difficult to explain why Achaeans would have ceased to serve overseas. The Achaean league did not appear until after the time of Alexander the Great, and inscriptions from this period demonstrate that Achaeans still served as mercenaries.

Lacedaemonians who were also Spartiates did not serve as mercenaries.<sup>83</sup> Spartan kings and officers, however, developed a tradition of overseas service. Due to the limited human resources of Sparta they found themselves increasingly in command of allies and mercenaries through the fifth and fourth centuries. Spartan law prevented Spartiates from serving outside of Laconia without the permission of the Ephors.<sup>84</sup>

Apart from the generals about whom there is more known, Xenophon mentions two Laconians serving with the Ten Thousand.<sup>85</sup> The latter, Dexippus, was a *perioikos*, but the former's status is not defined. Another Laconian at the court of the Thracian Seuthes killed Dexippus. Xenophon clearly

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<sup>82</sup> Griffith 1935, 17, following Diod. XVII.57.4 and Arr. *Anab.* III.12.2. The confusion lies with the words *archoi* used by Arrian and *Achaioi* by Diodorus as Griffith considers the possibility that a misreading occurred at some point in antiquity.

<sup>83</sup> Xen. *An.* I.4.3, notes that Chirisophus was sent to Cyrus in an official capacity.

<sup>84</sup> Isoc. XI. 18.

<sup>85</sup> Xen. *An.* IV.1.18, V.1.15.



wished to distinguish these men from the other Lacedaemonians who were on the expedition who seem to be or to once have been Spartiates. Clearchus was a Lacedaemonian exile. The other Spartans on the expedition were exiles like Dracontius.<sup>86</sup>

After the success of Gylippus, Spartans appear in Sicily in the later fifth and through the fourth centuries as adventurers hoping to set themselves up as tyrants. Pharax and Gaesylus are good examples of this.<sup>87</sup> They have to be seen as individuals more 'on the make' than on mercenary service. The rule that prevented Spartans from leaving Laconia without permission of the Ephors must have curtailed the number Spartans overseas. Dionysius I hired 'Lacedaemonians,' but these must be Peloponnesians rather than Spartan citizens.<sup>88</sup> By the mid-fourth century the mounting problems confronting the Spartan state in the Peloponnese must have eventually prevented Spartiates from exercising influence abroad.

Egypt and Sparta had a special relationship. Plutarch insists that Agesilaus was acting as a mercenary in Egypt on his campaigns there.<sup>89</sup> He must have taken Peloponnesians with him who were mercenaries serving for pay. Diodorus describes

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86      *Xen. An.* IV.8.26.

87      *Plut. Dion.* 48-9 for Gaesylus. *Plut. Tim.* 11 for Pharax. Gaesylus hoped to emulate Gylippus.

88      *Diod.* XIV.44.2 for an example of the use of Lacedaemonians when he means Peloponnesian or even Greeks, see also *Diod.* XIV.22.3-4.

89      *Plut. Ages.* XXXVI.

Lamius the Spartan serving in the revolt of Nectanebo.<sup>90</sup> Finally Polyaeus preserves the name of Gastron, a Spartan commander in Egypt, but gives no date.<sup>91</sup> Parke implies that this man continued in service after the departure of Agesilaus.<sup>92</sup> If Gastron remained in Egypt to fight in a private capacity he may have been a mercenary.

Messenia, to the west of Laconia, provided mercenaries for Dionysius I. A force of 3,000 escaped the Spartans and fled to Sicily in 399 B.C., and a further group went to Cyrene and joined the forces of exiles there.<sup>93</sup> Only one Messenian is named in the sources, Aristomenes who served with Dionysius.<sup>94</sup> The Messenians found in service were men who had fled the Spartans and had nowhere else to go. After the destruction of the Spartan land empire Messenians are not mentioned in mercenary service abroad again. As with their northern neighbours the Arcadians, they were left with an independence and a tradition to defend against further Spartan intervention after 369 B.C.

Corinthians served Agesilaus in Asia Minor.<sup>95</sup> The only

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90 Diod. XV.48.2.

91 Polyaeus, *Strat.* II.16.1.

92 Parke 1933, 112.

93 Diod. XIV.34.3.

94 Polyaeus, *Strat.* II.31.

95 Plut. *Ages.* 21.

named Corinthian mercenary, however, is found on an inscription from Egypt dated to 362/1 B.C.<sup>96</sup> It is to be noted that not one Corinthian is attested in any of the major campaigns of the fourth century. Corinthians attended Dion, Timoleon and were members of Philip's and Alexander's *hetaireia*.<sup>97</sup>

Other Peloponnesians specifically mentioned in the sources include four who are named from Elis. Two of these Eleans served with Cyrus.<sup>98</sup> The third, Alcias, led one hundred and fifty Eleans for Alexander into Asia.<sup>99</sup> The fourth was Psaumis who appeared in Sicily early in the fifth century to found the city of Camarina.<sup>100</sup> A Tegean served in Leucon's kingdom in the early fourth century,<sup>101</sup> and one each is attested from Sicyon, Megara and Asine.<sup>102</sup> Finally, Xenophon mentions a group of Aenianians in service with Cyrus.<sup>103</sup>

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96 CIG III. 4702; Hicks and Hill 122.

97 Diod. XVI.73 and Plut. *Tim.* 29, refer to Demaratus of Corinth who found service with several prominent figures in his lifetime.

98 Xen. *An.* II.2.20, VI.4.9-10.

99 Arr. *Anab.* I.29.4.

100 Pindar. *Ol.* V; Diod. XI.71.5-6; Demand 1993, 55.

101 SEG XXXVII, 676 is an epitaph of Pantias, a Tegean, in the service of Leucon I of Thrace (389-49 BC).

102 Xen. *An.* I.4.6, for Pasion the Megarian. III.4.47, for Soteridas of Sicyon. V.3.4, for Neon of Asine.

103 Xen. *An.* VI.1.7.

The citizens of Argos are singularly under-represented among the major Peloponnesian states in service abroad. Only one Argive exile is noted by the sources.<sup>104</sup> It might be worth noting that 1,000 Argives helped Pisistratus to win the battle of Pallene and establish his tyranny at Athens in the middle of the sixth century.<sup>105</sup> No doubt the internecine wars with Sparta left Argive citizens with onerous obligations in defense of their land and the deaths of 6,000 Argives at the hands of Cleomenes in 494 B.C. must have left them with little superfluous population to become mercenaries either from need or desire in the fifth century.

#### CENTRAL GREECE

By far the most prolific numbers of mercenaries from central Greece came from Attica. Almost a fifth of all named mercenaries came from Attica prior to 322 B.C. Most Athenian 'mercenaries' were commanders. These were the great generals of international politics in the fourth century: Xenophon, Iphicrates, Chares, Chabrias and Leosthenes. Ordinary Athenians also fought abroad. The vast majority of the information was written by Athenians. Historians like Xenophon were more likely to remember men from Athens who took service abroad, and the orators are almost exclusive in their

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104      *Xen An.* IV.2.13.

105      *Hdt.* I.61.3. Parke 1933, 7, thinks they need not have been mercenaries as they all came from Argos.

Atheno-centricity. In the fourth century Athenians used mercenaries extensively. The sources are prone to vagueness; when they note the peltasts of the Athenians they could easily mean Athenians who were peltasts or (perhaps more accurately) peltasts in the pay of Athenians. If the former were the case and Athenians were serving as peltasts under the likes of Iphicrates, then the numbers of Athenian mercenaries would be drastically augmented.<sup>106</sup>

Before 401 B.C. Athenians did not appear as mercenaries for anyone. No doubt it would be naive to suggest any reason other than the combination of the imperial demands of the state and the ability of the state to employ all of its citizens in one capacity or another. Xenophon records eight Athenians serving with Cyrus in 401 B.C. While this is a high percentage of named individuals, Xenophon may well have remembered his fellow Athenians more readily. An Arcadian hoplite is made to say that Athens provided no men for the campaign.<sup>107</sup> He might have meant that Athens provided no contingents of men for the campaign. It appears that the majority of Athenians present were either captains or generals; only one attested man, Ariston, is not qualified as an officer.<sup>108</sup>

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106 Parke 1933, 48-57.

107 Xen. *An.* VI.2.10.

108 Xen. *An.* V.6.14. Nussbaum 1959, 21, believes that this man was an officer as he was sent as an ambassador of the army.

Athenians are not found serving as groups or regiments throughout the fourth century. Aeschines describes Atrometus who fled the tyranny of The Thirty taking service in Asia.<sup>109</sup> Dion took an Athenian to Syracuse.<sup>110</sup> Diodorus records individuals serving in Egypt and Persia.<sup>111</sup> Athenians in Egypt are further attested by an inscription. A votive monument to an Egyptian deity in the Delta lists the names of men who had a relationship to an Egyptian pharaoh (probably Tachos) in the fourth century.<sup>112</sup> Half of the ten men named on this document were Athenians. Commentators propose that they served with Chabrias in the Delta in the 360s, but it is equally possible that they played a role in his earlier campaigns between 386 and 383 B.C.

Athenians also fought against Alexander at the Granicus, and these must have served as a group.<sup>113</sup> An Athenian embassy asked Alexander for the release of Athenian survivors. Charidemus, granted Athenian citizenship, began and ended his career as a mercenary.<sup>114</sup> He died in Persian service after he

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109 Aesch. II.147.

110 Plut. *Dion*, 54, *Tim*. 11.

111 Diod. XV.48.2; Isoc. *Ep*. 8.8.

112 *CIJ* III. 4702; Hicks and Hill 122. Hicks and Hill's commentary dates the inscription either in the 380s or the 360s.

113 Arr. *Anab*. I.15.

114 F. Landucci Gattinoni, 'I mercenari nella politica ateniese dell' eti di Alessandro. I. Soldati e ufficiali mercenari ateniesi al servizio della persia,' *Ancient Society* 25 1994, 33-61 has a general discussion of the themes of the mercenary's interaction with Athenian politics.

fled from Alexander.<sup>115</sup> Pausanias records that Apollodorus, an Athenian mercenary who had served Arsites the Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, was buried in the Ceramicus.<sup>116</sup> His place of burial confirms he was a citizen.

Forensic and political speeches circumstantially illustrate the lives of ordinary Athenians who served others. The two brothers in Isaeus II are well known examples.<sup>117</sup> A man called Nicostratus died overseas after eleven years of service.<sup>118</sup> Astyphilus served 'wherever else he heard of an army being collected he went abroad holding command,' and it cannot be doubted that these latter were mercenary armies.<sup>119</sup> Demosthenes accuses two men - the 'disgusting Nicias' and Epicrates - of being 'the hirelings of Chabrias' in service in Egypt.<sup>120</sup> Those who served Meidias received similar scorn.<sup>121</sup>

It is interesting to note that the Athenians used mercenaries extensively in the fourth century.<sup>122</sup> Isocrates expressed concern over the spectacle of Athenian citizen

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115 Arr. *Anab.* I.10.6.

116 Paus. I.29.10.

117 Isae. II. 6. The speaker is the son of Eponymus.

118 Isae. IV.

119 Isae. IX. 14. This speech can be dated to 371-366 B.C. That Astyphilus was a mercenary is implied by his taking service wherever and whenever he could.

120 Dem. XIX. 287.

121 Dem. XXI.139.

122 See generally Ober 1985 and specifically Munn 1993, 6 n.7, 28, 48-9, 55-7, 177-9.

rowers watching professional infantrymen do their fighting for them.<sup>123</sup> There were Athenians who did fight, however, as the brothers of Isaeus II and the survivors of Granicus illustrate. Despite a reputation for complacency towards military service which the Athenians had in the fourth century, they are still found serving all over the Mediterranean from the 380s to the 330s B.C. Even to the end of the Lamian war men like Leosthenes provided military experience founded in military and (possibly) Persian service. If Worthington is correct his family had also experience of mercenary service.<sup>124</sup>

Thebans and Boeotians first appear in service with Cyrus in 401 B.C. Xenophon lists three men from Boeotia, including his friend Proxenus who was a general.<sup>125</sup> Later in the fourth century Theban power increased on the mainland. As a result of this the Persian King asked the Thebans, as he was wont to do of all Greek states in the fourth century, to send a general and 5,000 men.<sup>126</sup> These men may well have been Thebans, although the removal of their Theban commander for a Persian replacement may suggest that they were not.<sup>127</sup> A

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123 Isoc. VIII.48.

124 Worthington 1987, 489-91, following *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1631 which reveals a Leosthenes active in Athenian politics. See also Diod. XVII.111.1-2.

125 Xen. *An.* I.1.11. Proxenus enlisted 1,000 men, it is not known how many were Boeotians; II.1.26, V.6.19, 21, 25.

126 Diod. XVI.34; Dem. XXIII.183.

127 Parke 1933, 124.



Boeotian appears on a votive inscription found in Egypt.<sup>128</sup> Diodorus mentions Lacrates who was a Theban commander besieged at Pelusium during Artaxerxes' invasion of Egypt.<sup>129</sup> Clearly therefore they fought on both sides at some point in the conflict.

In the century following Alexander's death Aetolia became a traditional source of mercenaries. Aetolians appear fleetingly before 322 B.C. Like many states they must have produced a number not found in the sources. Thucydides notes Aetolians hired to fight at Syracuse in 414 B.C.<sup>130</sup> In the middle of the fourth century Elis received a thousand elite troops from the Aetolians.<sup>131</sup> Arrian mentions Lycides an Aetolian commanding mercenaries for Alexander to garrison Egypt.<sup>132</sup> Finally, an Aetolian commanded the remnants of Darius III's Greeks in the wilderness around the Caspian Sea.<sup>133</sup>

The Phocians gained infamy in the Third Sacred War by their employment of large numbers of mercenaries 'of the worst sort.' Nevertheless, apart from those who became mercenaries

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128 *CIJ* III. 4702; Hicks and Hill 122.

129 Diod. XV.49.1.

130 Thuc. VII.57.

131 Diod. XIV.15.1-2.

132 Arr. *Anab.* III.5.3; Parke 1933, 181.

133 Parke 1933, 185; Berve 1926, no. 230; Arr. *Anab.* III.21.4; Curt. Ruf. V.9.15.

after the war, only one Phocian mercenary is ever named, Patron. Like Glaucus, he was a commander of the Greeks who remained loyal to Darius until his death.<sup>134</sup>

Known Greek mercenaries from northern central Greece, with only one exception, are found only with Cyrus. A thousand hoplites arrived with Menon from Thessaly.<sup>131</sup> He brought with him five hundred peltasts from northern Greece: Dolopians, Aenianians and Olynthians. Only two other Thessalians are mentioned on the expedition.<sup>132</sup> Thessaly was famous for its cavalry. There is nothing to show that Thessalians served as mercenary cavalry, although they were a crucial part of Philip's alliances and Alexander's invasion army. Thessalian autocrats, on the other hand, were great employers of mercenaries. Jason of Pherae was noted as having the most powerful army on the mainland during his brief reign.<sup>133</sup> Some of these men must have been Thessalians. Pelopidas was able to hire men in Thessaly. West of Thessaly were Acarnania and Ambracia. The latter provided one man who served with Cyrus.<sup>134</sup> Bianor the Acarnanian fought for the

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134 Parke 1933, 185, Berve 1926, no. 612; Arr. *Anab.* III.21.4; Curt. Ruf. V.9.15.

131 Xen. *An.* I.2.6.

132 Xen. *An.* I.1.10, V.8.23.

133 Xen. *Hell.* VI.1.5.

134 Xen. *An.* V.6.16, VI.4.13.

Great King against Alexander and escaped from Issus.<sup>135</sup> Men from the western coast of the Greek mainland joined both Demosthenes and later Timoleon.<sup>136</sup> Dion also found men willing to serve him on his route to Sicily.<sup>137</sup>

### THE ISLANDS

The islands both in the Aegean and in the eastern Mediterranean provided mercenaries from the end of the fifth century through to the campaigns of Alexander. Islanders served the Athenians as part of their naval empire, and there are several instances of commanders in the fourth century, particularly naval commanders, going to the islands to raise the necessary manpower.<sup>138</sup> In the classical and Hellenistic periods the island of Crete provided specialist mercenaries in great numbers. Cretans were noted as archers. Rhodes was another provider of specialist forces: namely slingers.

As an illustration of the importance of a reputation for specialist mercenaries, Crete appears to have been the most prolific of the islands in the provision of mercenaries. The first attested Cretan mercenaries served in Egypt in the early

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135      *Arr. Anab.* II.13.2.

136      *Plut. Tim.* XXX.

137      *Diod.* XV.31.7.

138      *Xen. Hell.* VI.2.11-12, *Dem.* L.24, XL.36.

part of the fifth century B.C.<sup>139</sup> Cretans may also have served with Amyrtaeus in the later fifth century.<sup>140</sup> Cretans fought for both sides at Syracuse in the late fifth century.<sup>141</sup> Clearchus had two hundred Cretan archers in his service for Cyrus.<sup>142</sup> Cretans served here also as hoplites.<sup>143</sup> A Cretan is found serving with Agesilaus in Asia Minor, perhaps a man who had served with Cyrus.<sup>144</sup> The sources do not illustrate Cretans as mercenaries again until Alexander invaded Asia. Here they formed a contingent of archers in the Macedonian army.<sup>145</sup> Nearchus, a friend of the Macedonian King was a Cretan who also led mercenaries for him.<sup>146</sup> A Cretan named Mnasicles, an experienced soldier, deserted to the citizens of Cyrene.<sup>147</sup>

Geographically Rhodes was perfectly placed for service in both Egypt and Asia. Rhodians served with Cyrus. Xenophon

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139 *SEG XXVII*, 1708 and 1709. These are graffiti found in the temple of Ramses II, dated to the early fifth century; Masson 1976, 305-6, no. 1, 307-8, no.2.

140 Pedrizet and Lefebvre 1919, nos. 405 and 445. The authors note that it is possible these men were Boeotians, but given the script and the date they conclude that they were probably Cretans.

141 Thuc. VII.57.

142 Xen. *An.* I.2.9, III.3.12, IV.2.28, 8.27. They were commanded by a Cretan.

143 Xen *An.* V.2.29

144 Xen. *Hell.* VII.5.10.

145 Arr. *Anab.* I.8.4, II.9.3, III.5.6; Diod. XVII.57.4.

146 Arr. *Anab.* III.7.2.

147 Diod. XVII.20.1.

implies that the Rhodian hoplites carried slings as well.<sup>148</sup> Individual Rhodians are found serving in Egypt.<sup>149</sup> They also attained great power looking after the interests of the Great King.<sup>150</sup> The most famous of the Rhodian mercenaries who achieved such status was Memnon whose family worked for the Persians primarily against Macedon.<sup>151</sup> His older brother Mentor fought against the Persians before his Persian service.<sup>152</sup> Rhodians are also found in Macedonian service.<sup>153</sup>

Cyprus was also in a good geographical position for overseas service to eastern kingdoms. A number of names of mercenaries from Cyprus have been discovered from a temple wall in Karnak.<sup>154</sup> Other Cypriots must have found service in the east although no one is cited. The other islands all provided small numbers of named mercenaries. The only named mercenary from the islands in Spartan service was Symmachus of Thasos.<sup>155</sup> He followed in the tradition of the famous

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148      *Xen. An.* III.3.16, 5.8.

149      *CIG* III. 4702; Hicks and Hill 122. Amyrtaeus the Rhodian is the most prominent name on the stele.

150      *Xen. Hell.* III.5.1.

151      *Dem.* XXIII.187; *Arr. Anab.* I.15.3, 20.3.

152      *Arr. Anab.* II.13.2.

153      *Arr. Anab.* III.5.2; Parke 1933, 191; Berve 1926, no. 35.

154      *SEG XXXI* 1549-1555 for Graffiti found on the walls of the chapel of Achoris which date to the first quarter of the 4th century B.C. See also Masson 1981, 229, 374.

155      Polyaeus, *Strat.* II.1.27.

Archilochus, resident but not native of Thasos and self-confessed mercenary. Temnos provided one man on the *Anabasis*.<sup>156</sup> One Chian and one Samian are also found with Cyrus.<sup>157</sup> Cleinius the Coan was a commander of mercenaries of Nectanebo.<sup>158</sup>

### THE WEST

The Sicilian mercenary, like the Arcadian, was proverbial.<sup>159</sup> Coincidentally tyranny was a recurring phenomenon for the cities of Sicily. There was clearly a relationship between tyranny and mercenary service. The tyrants of Sicily provided ready made employers for Sicilian Greeks at the beginning and again at the end of the fifth century. The largest Sicilian city, Syracuse, produced two named members of the *Anabasis*, one of whom commanded three hundred hoplites.<sup>160</sup> These men may well have been part of the Syracusan contingent sent to fight the Athenians in the Aegean in the latter stages of the Peloponnesian war.<sup>161</sup> No other mercenaries from the island are mentioned anywhere. This

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156 Xen. *An.* IV.4.15.

157 Xen. *An.* IV.1.27, 6.20, the Samian. I.7.5, the Chian.

158 Diod. XV.48.5.

159 Parke 1933, 13; Zenobius, V.88. Remarkably only a few are known.

160 Xen. *An.* I.2.9, 10.14.

161 Xen. *Hell.* I.1.18, 1.26, 27.

could have been the result of local needs for fighting men throughout the chaotic fourth century. Notably, however, the greatest Sicilian tyrant, Dionysius I, employed most extensively from Italy and the Peloponnese.<sup>162</sup>

More surprising than the Greeks from Syracuse serving with Cyrus are the Greeks from Italy found on this campaign.<sup>163</sup> It suggests the cohesiveness of the Mediterranean and may say much for the fame of the Great King's brother. Half a century later a Thurian nicknamed the exile hunter served Philip II.<sup>164</sup> Less surprisingly, Greeks from cities in Italy served in Sicily, and Nypsius the Neapolitan commanded the second Dionysius' fleet.<sup>165</sup>

#### THE NORTH

The northern parts of the Aegean bordered the loose federations of Thrace. The Thracians fought as specialist light troops. The Greeks of this region adapted their warfare to compete with the Thracian light troops. In turn both the Thracians and the Greeks of this region provided the Greeks of the mainland with specialist forces. It should come as no surprise therefore that the commander of the Greek peltasts

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162 Plut. *Tim.* XXX.

163 Xen. *An.* V.1.1, for a Thurian and VII.4.7, for a Locrian.

164 Plut. *Dem.* 28.

165 Plut. *Dion.* 41; Diod. XV.18.1.

was Episthenes, one of two men from Amphipolis.<sup>166</sup> Two Dardanians fought on the *anabasis* as well.<sup>167</sup> Alexander left an Olynthian in Egypt with mercenaries.<sup>168</sup> Clearchus of Heraclea served as a mercenary in his youth.<sup>169</sup>

### ASIA MINOR

Herodotus recalled that 30,000 Ionians and Carians served Psamettichus.<sup>170</sup> After the establishment of the Persian empire only a small number of Greeks from Asia Minor are evidenced in the sources. Xenophon identified a Milesian buccaneer.<sup>171</sup> Milesian exiles served with Cyrus; he was most certainly their patron.<sup>172</sup> Mysians from north-eastern Anatolia accompanied the expedition.<sup>173</sup> Ctesias mentions Milesians with Arsites in the late fifth century, but these may have been allies.<sup>174</sup> It is remarkable considering the proximity of the region to the greater kingdoms of the Near

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166 Xen. *An.* I.10.7. Note that Olynthians served Clearchus as peltasts because Clearchus spent some time in Thracian lands.

167 Xen. *An.* III.1.47, V.6.19, 21, VII.2.1, 5.4.

168 Arr. *Anab.* III.5.2; Parke 1933, 191.

169 Polyaeus, *Strat.* II.30.

170 Hdt. II.163.

171 Xen. *Hell.* II.1.30. This man is described as a *leistis*.

172 Xen. *An.* I.1.11, 2.2.

173 Xen. *An.* V.2.29.

174 Ctes. L.



East that so few Greeks of Asia Minor are found in service. The next chapter will attempt to provide an answer.

### AFRICA

The Greeks of Africa provide only three names, all in Egyptian service, and all from the same inscription, although each from a different part of that continent. The reason for this may be the same as the one that explains the paucity of mercenaries from Asia Minor.<sup>175</sup> Service for the Egyptian monarchs was both a legacy of their residence and an accessible opportunity. It is hard to believe that the monarchs did not avail themselves of these men in their own country. Isolation from the Greek world cannot have been a factor for such a limited number of Greeks in service. Even Cyrene can be found employing mercenaries from the later fifth century to the time of Alexander the Great.

### CONCLUSIONS

The mainland provided the vast majority of mercenaries according to the sources in the later fifth and fourth centuries. The regions on the perimeter of the Greek world by this time provided very few. This is remarkable. It is even more remarkable because Ionians were among the first mercenaries and Sicilian mercenaries were proverbial. The

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*CIG* III 4702; and Hicks and Hill 122.

mainland was the furthest point from tyrants in the west and monarchs in the east. Such solitary rulers were the main providers of employment for mercenaries. There is an irony that states which were politically opposed to both the concept of tyranny and more especially oriental monarchy themselves provided the majority of mercenaries by the fourth century. This is a problem that will need discussion in the chapter which follows.

#### RELATIONSHIP TO SOCIETY

This section discusses the status of men who served as mercenaries. Status might be defined by the social or economic background from which a mercenary came. It might also reflect the political status, exile or citizen, that the mercenary had at the time of service. Some mercenaries were exiles. Not all mercenaries were displaced in this manner, and some returned home after one short campaign, while others stayed away for many years in spite of their ability to return and despite the fact that they owned land at home. These men and their situation will all need attention.

To be outside of the community implied a low status in Greek society regardless of the era. Homer mentions the *hiketes* who must beg for food, Tyrtaeus cites the tragedy of the displaced exile in penury outside of his community, and Isocrates was concerned about the wanderers - *planomenoi* - in

Asia Minor.<sup>176</sup> Not all mercenaries were true exiles or outsiders, but they were by definition outside their own communities.

Mercenaries also came from all strata of Greek society. The generals who began campaigns with mercenary forces came from higher social and economic levels than the men whom they led. This was not always the case in the field. There are examples of men who elected their leaders for their abilities rather than for their social status. Conon illustrates both factors in one man according to Isocrates. He was a well born Athenian who came to the generals of the Great King with only his experience, for he was an exile and lacking resources. They hired him for his abilities, but his status would have helped.<sup>177</sup> Captains formed a group in the hierarchy mid-way between general and recruit.<sup>178</sup> Their social status probably reflected this intermediary role.

The sources rarely illustrate a mercenary's status. In the earliest period nothing can be discerned for the rank and file. The groups of men who followed the Peloponnesian nobles to Sicily no doubt came as part of tribal units. The only named men that are discernible in these early mercenary

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<sup>176</sup> Finley 1954, 56-65; Tyr. X.1-5; Isoc. V.121.

<sup>177</sup> Isoc. V.61-2.

<sup>178</sup> See ch.VI, 255.

endeavours were the aristocrats who were friends of Gelon.<sup>179</sup> Their names appear on a stele commemorating a chariot victory in the Olympic games. In the Greek world nothing could be more aristocratic than a connection to horses.

Xenophon's *Anabasis* provides the most detailed information on mercenaries and mercenary life. Xenophon himself did not lack resources. He had a shield bearer with him on that campaign.<sup>180</sup> The other generals were also well born. Clearchus at one time had been (and Chirisophus was) a Spartiate.<sup>181</sup> Proxenus was a wealthy Boeotian.<sup>182</sup> Philesius and Xanthicles were condemned to pay twenty minae and Sophaenetus ten minae.<sup>183</sup> These costs they could no doubt afford from their private wealth or else they would not have been sentenced to bear the amounts. Some of the men were Laconian *perioikoi*.<sup>184</sup> One man on the *anabasis* was even an ex-slave.<sup>185</sup> Xenophon notes that the men had no other resources than their arms and their valour. He is surely only referring to the resources which they could draw upon at that

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179 Pind. *Ol.* VI; Paus. V.27.1.

180 Xen. *An.* IV.2.21.

181 Xen. *An.* I.1.9, 4.3.

182 Xen. *An.* I.1.11, II.2.16.

183 Xen. *An.* V.8.1.

184 Xen. *An.* V.1.15.

185 Xen. *An.* IV.8.4.

moment of the campaign and not their personal fortunes. Incidentally, the reference occurs during the bleakest moment which the Greeks faced on the expedition.<sup>186</sup>

In a crucial passage Xenophon refers to the character and status of the men who served with him for Cyrus.<sup>187</sup> He says that

most of the soldiers had sailed from Greece to undertake this service for pay, not because their means were scanty, but because they knew by report of the noble character of Cyrus; some brought other men with them, some had even spent money on the expedition while still another group had abandoned fathers and mothers or had left children behind with the idea of getting money to bring back to them... Being men of this sort they longed to return in safety to Greece.

Here, then, is an image of men who were not from the lowest strata of society at all. According to Xenophon these were men who had left homes and perhaps even farms behind them. The men's desire to return home to Greece could mean that they had something to return home to. This passage, however, has sparked controversy. Some argue that Xenophon is nostalgically recalling his own past and at the same time eulogising the ruffians he served with on campaign. They cite the fact that Xenophon's own suggestion for the foundation of a city in Asia Minor had just been rejected by the men and that he was therefore keen to demonstrate the men's ambition to return home to the Greek mainland from honourable motives.

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186      *Xen. An.* II.1.12.

187      *Xen. An.* VI.4.8.

Isocrates' opinions support this.<sup>188</sup> He says that the men who served Cyrus were...

...not picked men, but men who, owing to stress of circumstance, were unable to live in their own cities.

In another speech he calls them failures.<sup>189</sup> This image is rhetorical. It should be noted that Isocrates wished to draw attention to the success that these failures had achieved against the Persians. A similar image is recalled by Alexander's speech before the battle of Issus.<sup>190</sup>

The vast majority of the men on the *anabasis* were hoplites.<sup>191</sup> Chapter five below discusses the provision of equipment. This is an important question for the status of mercenaries. It should not be assumed that if the men provided their own equipment they were of a higher status than simply the vagabonds and landless wanderers driven by poverty into mercenary service because they could afford at the very least the trappings of hoplite equipment. They may well have come from the hoplite classes, whatever that meant in the later fifth and fourth centuries. By the later fifth century, however, the hoplite's equipment and hoplite status may have

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188 Isoc. IV. 146.

189 Isoc. V.90.

190 Arr. *Anab.* II.7.8.

191 Xen. *An.* I.2.9. Xenophon is explicit on this point.

had little relationship.<sup>192</sup>

The fact that most of the hoplites on the expedition were from Arcadia and Achaëa may also suggest that the men were poor rather than wealthy. Neither of these regions is noted for its wealth in antiquity. Nevertheless they rejected Xenophon's offer to build a city in Asia, and this might suggest that they were unwilling to stay away from Greece. Many, however, must have 'become accustomed to a life of a soldier' and joined with the Spartans in Asia in 399 B.C.<sup>193</sup> The Peloponnesians under Dionysius I did not reject offers of land and citizenship in Sicily at about the same time as the remnants of Cyrus' army joined Thibron in Asia.<sup>194</sup> These men need not have come from areas with little to which to return, but they may genuinely have found life more agreeable as a soldier, with regular pay and plunder. The point of status remains unclear. Xenophon's men rejected the offer of a city because, as Xenophon claims, they were keen to return home. It still remains unproven whether if they had anything to return home to.

The men who followed Cyrus were clearly both the rich and the poor.<sup>195</sup> The orators provide much of the evidence for the

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192 Burke 1992, 220-2. Equipment is discussed at length at 213-32 below.

193 Xen. *An.* VII.8.24.

194 Diod. XIV.78.2-3.

195 Xen. *An.* II.6.20.

rest of the fourth century. Isocrates' disparaging statements about Xenophon's mercenaries reflect his general attitude towards them. He highlighted their poverty in 380 B.C.<sup>196</sup> In 346 B.C. he noted that the Athenians employed vagabonds, deserters and fugitives.<sup>197</sup> In one speech he is sympathetic to such men who were 'wanderers from want of their daily bread' but here juxtaposed his concerns that such desperation was a danger to every one in Asia.<sup>198</sup> Demosthenes echoes Isocratic disdain for the general circumstance of mercenary service. He describes mercenaries as both *athlioi* - wretched - and *aporoï* - lacking resources and notes their poverty.<sup>199</sup> Whenever the satraps disbanded their armies Asia Minor was overrun by displaced Greeks supporting themselves by plunder.<sup>200</sup>

The general attitudes of the orators regarding the poverty of mercenaries are not borne out by specific examples of men who served overseas. Forensic speeches illustrate the lives of men who were neither generals nor those who conform to the generalisations of political oratory. The two brothers in Isaeus II were able to give twenty minae as dowries to each

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196 Isoc. IV.168.

197 Isoc. VIII.44.

198 Isoc. V.121.

199 Dem. IV.46, XII.27; Parke 1933, 229. Note also that Parke calls to mind their prevailing penury following Dem. XIV.31.

200 Diod. XVII.111.1.



of their two sisters.<sup>201</sup> This money was provided before the two men went off to serve with Iphicrates in Thrace. Schaps' conclusions that the dowry represented as much as eighteen per cent of the family estate would lead to the assumption that they came from a reasonably sized estate in Attica.<sup>202</sup> Nicostratus died abroad leaving the not inconsiderable estate of two talents.<sup>203</sup> He died as an Athenian in good standing as his testament was worthy of a trial at Athens.

The status of mercenaries at home no doubt influenced the way in which they approached their mercenary status abroad. Socrates warned Xenophon that service with Cyrus might jeopardise his position in Athens.<sup>204</sup> The men who had served with Cyrus and Xenophon and who subsequently took service with the Spartans illustrate that for them at least mercenary service was becoming more of an end than a means.<sup>205</sup> Men like Nicostratus stayed abroad for considerable periods of time. Others obviously went abroad only briefly, such as the brother in Isaeus II and Astyphilus who served both the Athenian state and with other armies as well. Both these men clearly

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201 Isae. II.3, 5.

202 Schaps 1979, 74-81, for a discussion of the dowry, 75, for the figure of eighteen percent. This would put their estate at a value of about 200 minae or five talents; no small sum.

203 Isae. IV.

204 Xen. *An.* III.1.5.

205 The fact that many of them stayed on in the service of the Spartans makes Xenophon's statement at *An.* VI.4.8 regarding the Cyreans' desire to get back to their homes and families seem dubious, but Roy 1967, 319, rightly equates Xenophon's use of the term 'home' with the Aegean basin and not literally their home city-states.

maintained close ties to their native state. The men who had fought with the Phocians in the Sacred War had no intention of returning to their homes after their defeat. They are found campaigning all over the Mediterranean.<sup>206</sup> The same would appear true of those who escaped Issus and found themselves in Greece serving under Agis.<sup>207</sup> The ultimate examples of this were the mercenaries who followed Alexander into the east. Many of these never returned, although, if Diodorus is to be believed, they desired to see the sea again.<sup>208</sup>

Many mercenaries were exiles. Exiles were a problem of the fourth century. The fourth century saw an increase in exilings along with an increase in the destruction of cities.<sup>209</sup> With exile came loss of property at home along with any status.<sup>210</sup> Mercenary service provided one of the few avenues for income outside the *polis*. It created the opportunity for connections to be made abroad that might enable reinstatement at home. Exiles were themselves employers of mercenaries, and as early as the Peloponnesian War they were hiring mercenaries to help reinstate themselves

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206 Diod. XV.61.4.  
 207 Diod. XVII.48.1.  
 208 Arr. *Anab.* V.27.5; Diod XVIII.7; Griffith 1935, 34-36; Parke 1933, 209-10.  
 209 McKechnie 1989, 101-160.  
 210 Dem. XVIII.48. Isoc. V.

in their home cities.<sup>211</sup> Milesian exiles fought with Cyrus in return for promises from the prince that he would assist in their rehabilitation at Miletus.<sup>212</sup> Four of the named mercenaries with Cyrus were exiles.<sup>213</sup> Exiles from Corinth served with Agesilaus in Asia.<sup>214</sup> 3,000 Messenians were driven from the Peloponnese and took service in Sicily.<sup>215</sup> Many of those who fought with Darius against Alexander were exiles. His satraps also had exiles in their armies.<sup>216</sup> Some scholars have tried to connect Alexander's decree for the reinstatement of exiles in the city states of the mainland with his demand that his satraps disband their personal armies.<sup>217</sup> If this was the case then the implication is that many of the men who served in these armies were exiles. He was aware of this fact. He may have hoped that the decree would prevent these men from wandering disruptively throughout Asia.

It should be noted that not all mercenaries were exiles and that not all exiles were mercenaries. The fact that a man

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211 Thuc. I.112.4, III.34.2, VIII.100.2; Diod. XII.27.3.

212 Xen. *An.* I.1.7, 2.2.

213 Xen. *An.* I.1.9, 7.5, IV.2.13, 8.26.

214 Plut. *Ages.* XXI.

215 Diod. XIV.34.3.

216 Arr. *Anab.* II.1.5; Parke 1933, 180; Worthington 1987, 389-91.

217 Griffith 1935, 34; Bosworth 1988, 148-9; Diod. XVIII.8.2.

was exiled did not mean he had to become a mercenary as his only means of survival *apodemia*.<sup>218</sup> Only a small percentage of those mentioned by Xenophon with Cyrus were described as exiles. There is enough evidence to suggest that those who were mercenaries had very different relationships with their native states and many different reasons for serving overseas. These reasons will be explored in the following chapter. Nevertheless it is clear that many of the men in service on this campaign were men who could have returned home if they had wished.

#### TYPE OF SOLDIER

The Greeks were noted for their use of hoplite tactics. It was no doubt this that first attracted overseas attention and created a demand for Greek troops. The hoplite ethos and its relationship to the freeborn citizen-cum-farmer meant that it was not decent for the gentleman to fight as a lightly armed *psilos*. For these two reasons it is unlikely that the first Greek mercenaries were anything other than hoplites, and there is nothing to contradict this in the sources.<sup>219</sup> The most relevant text in the debate over what kind of soldiers served through the fourth century is that of J. G. P. Best, *The Thracian Peltast*. Best concludes that hoplites were more

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<sup>218</sup> McKechnie 1989, 101-60. Outsiders could become a variety of things abroad.

<sup>219</sup> The term *doryphoros* indicates a spear earner; a man who made his income from carrying a spear, just as a *peltaphoros* earned his income and his description from the type of shield that he carried and earned his living from. The main offensive weapon of the hoplite was the *kontos* a long thrusting spear.

commonly required for service in the east with the Persians and the Egyptians, while peltasts and light troops primarily served on the Greek mainland as mercenaries. Indeed he states specifically that...

the majority of mercenaries who fought in Spartan and Athenian armies in Greece proper in the fourth century were peltasts.<sup>220</sup>

Hoplites on the other hand were in demand outside of mainland Greece, and the Persians and other eastern potentates sought out Greek hoplites to fight for them.<sup>221</sup> This occurred no doubt because they lacked heavy infantry as shock troops, but did not lack native levies of specialist cavalry and light armed troops.<sup>222</sup>

Thucydides does not specify the type of troops who fought on the mainland as mercenaries. Nevertheless, by the later fifth century light troops had begun to influence and play a greater role in Greek warfare. Demosthenes learned the hard way that Greek light troops could be effective against hoplites in his campaigns in central Greece. Similarly the cities of the northern Aegean were clearly influenced by the peltasts with whom they had to deal in order to survive. Best, following Thucydides, argues that no native light troops

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220 Best 1969, 134.

221 Xen. *An.* I.1.6.

222 Hdt. IX.63; Pl. *Leg.* 697 e; Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.8.26.

existed at Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian war.<sup>223</sup> This war created a demand for specialist troops. While Parke is overly general in his adamant claims that there were no citizen *psiloi* during the Peloponnesian war, that war also created demand for specialist light troops.<sup>224</sup> This was first met by overseas supply. By 411 B.C. the Athenians had adapted their own resources to provide levies of troops from Athens. Hence, five thousand sailors appear equipped as peltasts in 411 B.C.<sup>225</sup> Best notes that those who fought in the revolt against the thirty tyrants were not hoplites.<sup>226</sup> Subsequently, Greeks on the mainland were clearly operating as specialist troops by the end of the Peloponnesian war and Greek light troops were found with Cyrus in numbers.<sup>227</sup>

Xenophon is precise that 11,000 Greek hoplites formed the core of Cyrus' army. In addition to this there were small numbers of Cretan archers and Rhodians with slings.<sup>228</sup>

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223 Best 1969, 36; Thuc. IV.94.1

224 Parke 1933, 48.

225 Best 1969, 37; Xen. *Hell.* I.2.1.

226 Best 1969, 42; Xen *Hell.* II.4.15. The terms used are *peltophoroi* and *petrobolai*.

227 Xen. *An.* I.2.9, 200 Cretan archers and 800 Thracian peltasts, 2.6, 500 Dolopian, Aenianian and Olynthian peltasts, 2.6, 300 peltasts with Pasion of Megara (though these men may not have been Greek).

228 Xenias had 4,000 hoplites, Proxenus had 1,500 hoplites, Sophaenetus had 1,000 hoplites, Socrates had five hundred hoplites, Pasion had three hundred hoplites (Xen. *An.* I.2.3). 2.6: at Colossae Menon had 1,000 hoplites. Clearchus had 1,000 hoplites. Sosis had three hundred hoplites and Agias had 1,000 hoplites (Xen. *An.* I.2.9).

Xenophon describes a contingent of Arcadians as Peltasts.<sup>229</sup> It is remarkable that the majority of hoplites on the campaign came from Arcadia and Achaëa despite the poverty of the country relative to the two most powerful states on mainland Greece in the Persian wars: the Athenians at Marathon in 490 B.C., or to the Spartans in 479 B.C.

The development of lighter troops and the relationship that this might have had to the growth in professionalisation of military service through the fourth century is still debated. The *anabasis* had demonstrated the need of light troops by hoplites.<sup>230</sup> The most famous regiment of light troops fought at Corinth during the Isthmian (Corinthian) War. They were all mercenaries and they were all peltasts.<sup>231</sup> They defeated the Spartans at Lechæum, and must have influenced others to fight with, and as, peltasts.<sup>232</sup> All other sources refer to Iphicrates' peltasts as mercenaries or foreigners.<sup>233</sup> The peltasts at the Isthmus retained their composition when

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229 Xen. *An.* IV.8.18, refers to the peltasts of the Arcadian division - *oi de kata to Arkadikon peltastai* - who were commanded by Aischines the Acarnanian. There was also the Arcadian division of hoplites - *to Arkadikon hoplitikon* - under the command of Cleonor of Orchomenus.

230 Best 1969, 78; Xen. *An.* III.4,25-30, IV.1.17-19, IV.3.7-8. Best notes the significance of light troops by showing that 50% light troops died on the campaign as opposed to only 25% of the hoplites.

231 Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.34-5, for the mercenary peltasts of Iphicrates. See also Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.9, 16.

232 Plut. *Agex.* XXII.

233 Best 1969, 93. *To xenikon* or *misthophoroi*. Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.9, 14; Polyæmus, *Strat.* III.9.57; Ar. *Plout.* 173; Dem. IV.24.

Chabrias took over command.<sup>234</sup> In 349 the Athenians employed 2,000 peltasts.<sup>235</sup> Peltasts appear more frequently in the sources through the fourth century. For example, 3,000 peltasts served with Euagoras in the 380s.<sup>236</sup> Parke claims that after the outbreak of the Olynthian war Sparta hired only peltasts. If this is true, it would support Best's claims of the demand for peltasts on the Greek mainland.<sup>237</sup> This is demonstrated by the force raised by Polytropus in 370/69 B.C.<sup>238</sup> The notorious armies used by the Phocians in the Sacred War also included 1,000 Greek peltasts hired by Philomelus.<sup>239</sup> Greek peltasts even served the satraps in the east by the middle of the fourth century.<sup>240</sup>

Parke claims that the peltast was the most common type of soldier, along with other specialists, by the beginning of the fourth century. This view is supported by a passage in Diodorus, repeated with less detail by Nepos, eulogising the deeds of Iphicrates. It is a digression set in 374 B.C. in which Diodorus notes that Iphicrates introduced changes to the

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<sup>234</sup> Best 1969, 96. Also note that Diodorus always calls the peltasts of Chabrias *misthophoroi*. See also Diod. XV.32.5, for the peltasts of the Athenians.

<sup>235</sup> Philochorus, *FHG* frag. 132.

<sup>236</sup> Isoc. IV.141.

<sup>237</sup> Parke 1933, 83; Xen. *Hell.* V.3.4.

<sup>238</sup> Xen. *Hell.* VI.13-14, 17.

<sup>239</sup> Diod. XVI.24.2.

<sup>240</sup> Nep. *Dat.* (XIV), 8.2.



hoplite panoply.<sup>241</sup>

For instance, the Greeks were using shields which were large and consequently difficult to handle; these he discarded and made small oval ones of moderate size, thus successfully achieving both objects, to furnish the body with adequate cover and to enable the user of the small, on account of its lightness, to be completely free in his movements. After a trial of the new shield its easy manipulation secured its adoption, and the infantry who had previously been called hoplites because of their heavy shield, then had their name changed to peltasts from the light pelta they carried.

This presents intriguing problems. It is unclear when he introduced these reforms. Does the historian mean that these reforms were introduced at the time of the eulogy or at some time in the life of Iphicrates? Of more importance is what Diodorus means by hoplites being called peltasts. It is possible that he meant by this that all hoplites now adopted peltast equipment. Diodorus himself does not determine specific troop types often, preferring to use the generic terms *stratiotes* for soldier or *misthophoros* for mercenary without explanation. This is a preference which he continues even after his statement about the transformation of hoplites into peltasts.

Following this passage from Diodorus, Griffith, like Parke, assumes that the majority of the mercenaries in the fourth century were peltasts. He supports this statement by

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Diod. XV.44.3; Nep. *Iph.* XI.1.3, 4.

citing Arrian.<sup>242</sup> Arrian claims that when Alexander wanted speed from a unit of his army he took with him the Macedonian phalanx, but left behind the mercenaries and the heavy troops. Griffith realises this passage might suggest that the mercenaries with Alexander were heavily armed. He adds, however, that the phalanx itself might have been more lightly armed than the peltasts of its day and that the mercenaries were peltasts which were heavier than the phalanx. Griffith, Arrian and Diodorus combine together well to imply that Iphicrates' reforms, creating as they did a more heavily armed peltast, were prolifically adopted in Greece and especially by professional troops.

Hoplites continued in service after 373/2 B.C. The Persians continued to employ such troops in number. Polyaeus, perhaps a questionable source, notes that Pammenes' force which went to Asia in 353 B.C. contained few light troops and at the same time Orontes had 10,000 hoplites.<sup>243</sup> Darius employed 50,000 Greeks to fight Alexander. There is little to suggest that these were not hoplites. Arrian notes mercenaries armed with *hopla* at Miletus and 30,000 hoplites at Issus.<sup>244</sup> The fact that the heavily armed were left behind by Alexander when he needed speed could support just as easily

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242 Griffith 1935, 17; Arr. *Anab.* III.18.1.

243 Polyaeus, *Strat.* V.16.2, VII.14.3, 4.

244 Arr. *Anab.* I.19.4, II.8.6.

the view that the mercenaries were hoplites as the view that they were heavy peltasts.

The debate about mercenary equipment will never be solved, but Diodorus' and Arrian's statements apply to the Greek mainland and armies that originated on the mainland. Even the Athenians employed hoplites in the mid-fourth century.<sup>245</sup> The armies of the Great King required Greek heavy armed troops. There is nothing to suggest that they went out of their way to hire mercenary peltasts from the mainland as Best has illustrated. Hoplite mercenaries continued in service in defense of the Persian empire during Alexander's invasion. How these hoplites, and indeed all hoplites, were equipped in the third quarter of the fourth century B.C. is another question entirely and one that needs attention.

#### AGE

Robert Sallares proposed that the best model for the analysis of Greek society was age classification.<sup>246</sup> The consummate military state of Sparta was clearly framed by certain age classification, and other Peloponnesian states must have followed this practice. There is even some evidence

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245 Isoc. VIII.48. He notes that even the Athenians employed troops armed with *hopla*.

246 Sallares 1991, 160-92.

that Athens also paid attention to age barriers.<sup>247</sup> Greeks abroad must have taken with them practices from home. The speaker in Isaeus II states that having reached military age he and his brother took themselves off to Thrace to serve with Iphicrates.<sup>248</sup> These men must have been still young. There is no reason why they would not have served their two years in the *ephebeia* from eighteen to twenty. The youngest mercenary recorded is found in Xenophon, an eighteen year old.<sup>249</sup> Age was important to Xenophon as a description attached to members or groups in the army.<sup>250</sup> It seems to have played a role in the organisation of the ten thousand. He implies that the younger men brought up the rear of the army on the march, and this would conform with the normal military practice of placing the fastest units in the rear of the column.<sup>251</sup> The young were also given specific and difficult tasks.<sup>252</sup>

Thirty years old was a line that demarked younger and older men.<sup>253</sup> This seems strange, for in Sparta the line

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<sup>247</sup> See Ridley 1979, 533-5, who notes that whatever the *ephebeia* was it was related to age. P. Siewart 1977, 102-111, tried to show that the *ephebeia* had roots in the fifth century. Sallares 1991, 175, leans on passages in Herodotus, V.71.1 and Thucydides, I.126.3-12, regarding the conspiracy of Cylon to illustrate the importance of age classes to Athenian society. See also Finley 1981, 156-171 and Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.

<sup>248</sup> Isae. II.6.

<sup>249</sup> Xen. *An.* VII.4.9.

<sup>250</sup> Xen. *An.* III.4.19, IV.1.27, 3.10.

<sup>251</sup> Xen. *An.* III.2.37.

<sup>252</sup> Xen. *An.* III.4.42, VII.4.3.

<sup>253</sup> Xen. *An.* II.3.12, IV.3.46, VI.4.25.

between the young - *oi neoi* - and the old - *oi presbyteroi* - occurred at forty years of age.<sup>254</sup> Xenophon less surprisingly refers to this age as a line of demarcation.<sup>255</sup> With the large number of Peloponnesians that were in the army it should not be surprising that Spartan practices were followed. The ages at which differentiation was made might differ from state to state. Despite the fact that those between thirty and forty were still considered 'the young' at Sparta, it should be noted that forty divided 'old' from the rest. Thirty was nevertheless an important milestone as it divided members of the military assembly from ordinary warriors.

Mercenaries fought overseas for many years, and therefore some men would have reached their thirties and beyond during this service, even if they were very young at the outset of their service.<sup>256</sup> The youngest of Cyrus' recruits who remained in Asia with Agesilaus must have been at least twenty four years old in 395 B.C. Most of them would have been older.

Xenophon and Isaeus suggest that mercenaries' ages were relevant to both service and to organisation. There was clearly no age at which a mercenary had to stop service, just

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254 Cartledge 1977, 21.

255 *Xen. An.* V.3.1.

256 For example the Athenian Nicostratus mentioned in *Isae.* IV. 8, who served overseas for eleven years continuously.

as there was no age when a man had to stop serving his state.<sup>257</sup> Age does not seem to have been a determinant for generals.<sup>258</sup> Age and authority were synonymous in antiquity. Xenophon implies that this was no different in mercenary service.

### CONCLUSIONS

The terms for mercenaries changed over the polis period of Greek history as the Greek world changed and the number of men in service abroad grew. By the later fifth century the type of Greeks who served as mercenaries was not limited to specific status groups or age classes. Men from all strata of the Greek city-states served abroad. These men were predominately from the Peloponnese and when they served non-Greek paymasters they were principally hoplites. By the later fifth and the fourth centuries the definition of a hoplite was less rigid than it had been in the Archaic age (as shall be discussed in chapter five below) which allowed the poor to serve. Why Greeks in general and Peloponnesians in particular were able and willing to serve overseas is the subject of the next chapter.

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Hanson 1989, 89-95; Plut. *Ages*. XXXIII. Agesilaus was still serving overseas in his eighties. The silver shields who had served with Alexander were all said to be over seventy.

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Finley 1981, 156-7. Finley notes that there was no age limit for generals. The ages of the various generals at their deaths is listed in the *Anabasis*. Xen. *An.* II.6.15, Clearchus was about fifty years old. II.6.20, Proxenus was about thirty years old. II.6.30, Agias and Socrates were about thirty five years old. Attention should be drawn to Xen. *An.* III.1.25, as Xenophon, then about twenty five years old, implies this was considered young for generalship.

III

WHAT MOTIVATED GREEK MERCENARY SERVICE?

### INTRODUCTION

What motivated mercenary service? Motivation is rarely expressed in the sources and there is no document to explain the specific needs that took men *apodemia*. Most of the literary evidence comes in a narrative and circumstantial form. Ancient authors were interested in the problems and practicalities facing the employers and commanders of mercenaries rather than those of the men they led. Motives, therefore, need to be inferred either from the kinds of men who took service or from the rewards that they received during and after service. By the fourth century mercenary service had become very common. The reasons for this prevalence of Greek mercenaries, domestic and external, will aid in an understanding of Greek society. The reasons that led men to seek employment overseas is integral to an understanding of the Greek city states.

The early Greek historians made little effort to explain motivation. This was true of Thucydides. Thucydides' history is concerned with political hostilities. He was keen to demonstrate the friendship of one people and the hatred of another in order to establish the political significance of those involved in his war. This was exemplified by his presentation of those who fought for both the Athenians and the Syracusans in Sicily.<sup>1</sup> Xenophon's only statements with

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Thuc. VII.57.



regard to the motivations of those on the *anabasis* are questionable. His well attested belief that most of the men were not in need and that they had followed Cyrus because of his good name and reputation has been considered a biased one.<sup>2</sup> Xenophon had a purpose for writing and he was hardly likely to describe the army as full of poor men seeking a livelihood who came on the campaign for such a base reason as pay. Neither of these historians used the term wage-earner extensively. This must reflect both their attachment to the citizen-soldier and to the ideal of the city-state. In the last chapter the explanations for the terms that were used for mercenaries demonstrated that in the fourth century more practical terms replaced euphemisms. Did this mean that more practical considerations of a mercenary's motivation became more prevalent in fourth century thought or that the fifth century writers were simply idealistic?

The orators were more sceptical of mercenaries. Isocrates, with as much rhetoric as truth, describes the men with Cyrus as unable to live in their own cities and as failures.<sup>3</sup> It has already been established that both he and Demosthenes were disparaging towards mercenaries.<sup>4</sup> The aristocratic ethic of the Greeks did not accept the notion of

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2 Xen. *An.* VI.4.8; Roy 1967, 319.

3 Isoc. IV. 146.

4 Dem. XXIII. 129 and *Ep.* IX.9.10.

working for money. The more professional and specialised fourth century slowly accepted this notion. The term wage-earner appears more frequently in the texts written after the fourth century.

Commanders are more prominent in the sources than the rankers. The reasons why they took service are discussed more fully also. As these men had status at home and were usually rich as well, it is conceivable that their motivation was different from that of the men they employed and led. The treatment of individuals therefore should be regarded as less than representative of the whole picture. Unfortunately these individuals are the only ones which illustrate specific mercenary service. Generally the rank and file appear only as groups and never as individuals with personalities.

The rewards of mercenary service are referred to frequently. The references are perhaps misleading if applied to the concerns of ordinary mercenary soldiers when they embarked on the campaign. The rewards do not necessarily illustrate the reasons why men left their homes in the first place. It is important to recognise that the rewards might be incidental to service. They were ongoing within a mercenary's life, a means rather than an end in themselves. They were perhaps not the realisation of the aspirations which induced men to leave their homes.

In addressing the question of motives it is equally important to recognise the difference between negative and

positive forces. Factors that would have made men unwilling to stay in their homelands were not necessarily the things for which they actually left their homes. These negative forces provided the context for mercenary service. They did not provide the reasons for such service. Much of this context, like most of the mercenaries, came from mainland Greece, although the evidence in specific is extremely Atheno-centric, and most of the mercenaries seem to have come from the Peloponnese. Once this context has been established the discussion will try to pin-point the positive factors that motivated mercenary service through a variety of *prima facie* circumstantial evidence.

#### CONTEXT

Before the fifth century the only large number of Greek mercenaries found in service abroad were the thirty thousand Carians and Ionians who took service with Psamettichus. The sources make this appear to be an isolated incident of mass Greek hiring. Otherwise mercenaries appear only in the service of local and Sicilian tyrants. The period 479-322 B.C. saw an explosion in the numbers of known mercenaries serving in the Mediterranean. In this period the number of mercenaries increased steadily almost in a staged development. This increase peaked after the Great Peloponnesian war in 404 B.C. From this time to the death of Alexander the Great large numbers of Greeks are found serving throughout the Greek and

Persian world. This chapter will go far in explaining the reasons for the mercenary explosion by examining the specific motivations that took men abroad. The historian Harvey Miller

asks the pertinent question: . . . the main consideration of the professional soldier would have been the strength of the economic pressures causing him to hire out his sword instead of embracing a safer more stable and comfortable civilian occupation.<sup>5</sup>

Miller's article focuses on the domestic pressures that would have taken men overseas in search of a livelihood. It does not explain the motivation for military service, but merely provides context. As Miller points out, the period saw natural, military, political and economic factors all coming together at once.<sup>6</sup> Population expansion<sup>7</sup> combined with wars,<sup>8</sup> exile,<sup>9</sup> famines and inflation,<sup>10</sup> to destabilise the Greek mainland. McKechnie noted that men who left their *poleis* needed an income, and De St Croix claimed that the first appearance in antiquity of hired labour on a large scale was

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5 Miller 1984, 153.

6 Miller 1984, 153.

7 Parke 1933, 14 n.1.

8 Beloch 1912, III.1 314; Parke 1933, 228.

9 Parke 1933, 228 n.1. McKechnie 1989, 22-29. McKechnie illustrates that the increase in outsiders after the Peloponnesian Wars was rapid. Before this time large scale exilings were rare. The largest single figure for exile is of 3,000 Messenians in 401 B.C. (Diod. XIV.34.3 and 5). In general McKechnie points to the destruction of cities and the strife of the continued warfare of the fourth century.

10 Miller 1984, 153. He claims that the only information that is available comes from Attica and that there is nothing to suggest that conditions were different elsewhere. This argument is not sustainable, for Attica suffered occupying Spartan armies throughout much of the war and the Peloponnesians did not. Dem. XX. 32, LVI. 7 is evidence that bread prices had fallen and farmers needed capital to diversify their crops in order to survive. This capital required the mortgaging of 'hereditary' family estates. Xen. *Oec.* III. 6 and II. 1 note that the result of the mortgaging was the decline of the citizen farmer. Parke 1933, 229-30, stresses this economic trend after the great war and points to the creation of larger estates as well. Attica, however, cannot be representative of all of the Greek world.

in mercenary service.<sup>11</sup> These two notions provide the basis for the assumption that mercenary service was a direct result of domestic pressures that pushed men *apodemia*. But the domestic factors outlined above cannot explain specifically why men left their homes in such great numbers to seek service abroad. They can only illustrate why some Greeks would not have wanted or were unable to remain within the *polis*.

Other forces of context need to be mentioned. Military service was a personal and natural feature of the lives of Greek citizens.<sup>12</sup> The speaker in Isaeus II makes it seem normal for men having reached a certain age to do military service *apodemia*.<sup>13</sup> Isaeus IX is similarly matter of fact about service abroad 'or anywhere that he heard an army was being raised.'<sup>14</sup> If the state did not require a citizen's arms, there seems to have been no concern about serving for another power. This phenomenon was borne out most prominently by the attitude of the Athenian commanders, and their attitude no doubt was reflected by the men who served with them. Greek citizens were not opposed to service, and, whether in peace or war, military service was accepted.

The city states' armies were theoretically made up of

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11 McKechnie 1989, 28; De St Croix 1981, 182.

12 Ridley 1979, 511-13.

13 Isae. II. 5. Parke 1933, 232.

14 Isae. IX. 14.

hoplites, fighting in a phalanx. The great advantage of a hoplite phalanx, from a farmer's perspective, was the minimal amount of training which it required.<sup>15</sup> The ideal of the amateur warrior, therefore, was well ingrained in Greek psychology.<sup>16</sup> Mercenary service, especially before 404 B.C., was not a daunting proposition, for it involved bodyguard or garrison duties, and neither of these required action in the front line.<sup>17</sup> When the opportunity for service appeared, it was natural to take it up, if one was so inclined. The readiness of Greeks to fight must be recognised because it was part of the essential nature of a citizen.<sup>18</sup>

Other important factors in Greek society of the fifth and fourth centuries would have made mercenary service a serious consideration for any citizen in achieving his livelihood. The Greeks did not practice *primogeniture*; all the sons divided inherited property evenly amongst themselves.<sup>19</sup> When properties and available land were limited, friction and poverty resulted.<sup>20</sup> The estate might be large enough to

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15 Pl. *Lach.* 182 a-e, is the best illustration of the lack of skills necessary to perform well in hoplite battle. See also Hanson 1989, 29, 32-8; Hanson 1995, 305-6; Snodgrass 1967, 48-77; Wheeler 1982, 224. There are those who disagree with the view that hoplite warfare and the hoplon did not require training, among whom are Frazer 1942, 15-16; Cawkwell 1978, 150-153. Plato, *Rep.* 374d, is the only primary evidence which definitively supports their position.

16 Vidal-Naquet 1986, 93-96.

17 Thuc. VI.55.3, VIII.28.4, 38.3; Xen. *An.* I.7.3, 9.

18 Vernant 1980, 28. See also 18-20 above.

19 Lane Fox 1985, 211, 222; Pl. *Leg.* 740 e, claims colonies were the answer to the problem of population explosion.

20 Isac VI.10-11, XII.9; Dem. XL.10; Lys. I; Just 1989, 33-9.

support only one household. In this case only one son might be able to marry and have a family.<sup>21</sup> Perhaps as a result of this, the brother of the speaker of Isaeus II lived overseas. The speaker managed the estate they both owned in Attica. Perhaps they had come to an arrangement that benefitted the family. No doubt it was not uncommon for one or more sons to seek a livelihood *apodemia*, and one avenue of livelihood abroad was in mercenary service.

Greece is a mountainous and small country prone to breeding more people than it could support. This situation created a great colonisation movement of Greeks seeking new lands in the eighth through sixth centuries B.C. No mercenary expressly sought land, and land was rarely used to pay mercenaries in the Classical age. Nevertheless by the early fifth century B.C. all the apparent avenues for colonisation overseas had been exhausted.<sup>22</sup> Only imperial colonies were possible, for example Athenian cleruchies in the Aegean basin. It was no coincidence that this period found the Greeks embroiled in warfare for almost two centuries until Alexander set in motion the second wave of colonisation in the east.

The Greek world had become economically more complex by the later fifth century than in any previous age. The introduction of coinage combined with a growth in trade had

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<sup>21</sup> Polyb. XII.6.B.8, for the reference to the Spartan practice of polyandry.

<sup>22</sup> Boardman 1964, xx, Murray 1980, 110-11.

produced this new situation. The Athenian situation provides supporting evidence. Sally Humphries argues that in the fifth century the economy of Athens became specialised and divided.<sup>23</sup> Slaves worked for the production of food and artifacts. Citizens worked for the state and the empire. These latter received *misthos* for their service, whether it was in the military or in the law courts. The new Athenian empire made this situation possible. The rich had opportunities in the empire to enrich themselves and to fight great wars. The citizens were paid for their services for the state. The result was a professionalised citizen body which became dependent on state pay and a satisfied aristocracy able to exploit a lucrative overseas empire. After the Athenian defeat these avenues for state pay and lucrative overseas income were closed. Because of these factors Athenians appeared in the Aegean on their own initiative throughout the fourth century. The situation in the Peloponnese was different. Changes to this region must have lagged behind those at Athens, and the war affected the region differently. Nevertheless by 383 B.C. Sparta allowed states to provide cash, instead of men, to Sparta's military resources. This might illustrate the monetisation of the Peloponnese.<sup>24</sup> Jonathan Davies observes that the economic forces of the

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<sup>23</sup> Humphries 1979, 15-6.

<sup>24</sup> Xen. *Hell.* V.2.21.



fourth century were making,<sup>25</sup>

[s]tates whose citizens had previously formed a seasonal unpaid army [which] were dragged willy nilly into a more monetary public economy and into endemic financial crisis.

It is possible that mercenary service replaced lost state pay and production that was not met at home. Athenian citizens were not found in service before the end of the fifth century. The reason no doubt lay with both the needs and benefits of imperial Athens. The Peloponnesian states were no doubt affected by an increased monetary economy and certainly by the general specialisation of the Greek world as well.

The Peloponnesian Wars have been seen as a catalyst for mass mercenary service.<sup>26</sup> It is argued that they accustomed men to military service and that they professionalised soldiering through long term service which was no longer constrained by seasonal service combined with overseas campaigns.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, it is thought that the wars were economically disastrous to small Greek farmers.<sup>28</sup> While much of this was no doubt true, there are a number of points that need qualification. Mercenary service had existed long before

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<sup>25</sup> Davies 1991, 187.

<sup>26</sup> See 110 below; Parke 1933, 20, states that 'The Peloponnesian War, through the damage which it inflicted on the greater part of Greece, was the proximate cause of Hellenic decline, and also by the consequent unrest produced an abundant supply of soldiers for hire. But the Peloponnesian War was also the cause of a new demand for professional soldiers in Greek warfare. By its long duration and by the distance and complexity of its campaigns it rendered the old type of citizen soldier gradually more obsolete.'

<sup>27</sup> Diod. XIV.37.1.

<sup>28</sup> Parke 1933, 229-30.

the Peloponnesian Wars.<sup>29</sup> The agricultural economy of Attica was ruined by Spartan and Theban invasions. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Peloponnese remained unscathed by warfare, and this is where the bulk of the mercenaries came from throughout this period. The Peloponnesian wars do not therefore provide the full answer.

Social forces in the Greek world may also have acted as factors pushing men overseas. The decline of the *polis* as an integral unit and its inability to provide employment for all its citizens have been used to explain the mercenary explosion.<sup>30</sup> Athens fits this pattern of decline which led to its citizens taking mercenary service. Conversely, the states of the Peloponnese were still in transition from tribal organisation to the city state in the fifth century. Elis is known not to have *synoecised* until 470 B.C.

The Greeks often said that they lived in a poor country. It appears especially poor when compared rhetorically to the wealth of the east. This poverty is borne out ecologically. The actual poverty of the Greek world in itself, however, cannot explain the rise of the Greek mercenary phenomenon in spite of statements by orators like Demosthenes.<sup>31</sup> Even Athens had poor citizens in the fifth century. It would seem

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<sup>29</sup> Parke 1933, 3-19. Roy 1967, 323. The latter argues that the Peloponnesian War was a middle period in the staged development of mercenary service.

<sup>30</sup> Parke 1933, 20, states that '[t]he mercenary soldier would not have emerged prominently in the fourth century history if the Greek states had not already begun to decline.' See also Parke 1933, 228-30.

<sup>31</sup> Dem. XIV.31.

likely that poverty was endemic in the Peloponnese throughout the fifth century. But poverty is only a negative force that made men unwilling to stay in their circumstances at home. It was not necessarily the thing which drove men abroad to become mercenaries.

The opportunities that the various *poleis* afforded to their members at all levels of society must also be taken into consideration in any analysis of the background to mercenary service. As discussed above Athens' empire had provided good opportunities for men to do well for themselves under its auspices. After its collapse Athenians had to establish themselves *apodemia* on their own initiative. This initiative was reflected in the activities of other states' citizens. Both Proxenus and Coeratadas, the Thebans, were not exiles and desired to be generals.<sup>32</sup> As a result of this desire they sought out an army to lead. The question needs to be asked why they felt that they could not achieve this through leading armies for Thebes? The process of selection and the opportunities presented by the *polis* may well have seemed limited. Sparta provides a good test case. The Spartans who are found all over the Mediterranean in the fourth century may be indicative of the limited opportunities available in their own *polis*. Paul Cartledge made the point well that it was the kings who wielded most of the power at Sparta. Men like

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Xen. *An.* II.6.17-8; VII.1.33.

Brasidas and Lysander exercised far more power *apodemia* than they did at home. The latter even felt it necessary to amend the constitution to make himself eligible for the kingship.<sup>33</sup> Ambitious men like Clearchus felt it necessary to leave their own states at the risk of dire consequences to make their names abroad.

These contextual features of the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries go far to explain the availability of men for service overseas. They do not in themselves explain the reason why Greeks and why so many mainland Greeks found service abroad. The Great Peloponnesian Wars had occupied all the Greek states for much of the fifth century. These wars coincidentally end before the mercenary explosion. The war and its effects also do not adequately provide the answer for the fourth century phenomenon. The mainland was not at peace for long either as Sparta was almost immediately at war with Elis and busy trying to establish itself in the Aegean.<sup>34</sup>

### REWARDS

Factors that made men ready to take up the sword abroad were one thing. What were the factors that made wars abroad attractive? At a very basic level there was pay. Pay was a

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<sup>33</sup> Cartledge 1987, 18.

<sup>34</sup> See Davies 1990, 163, who points to the peace of 404 as providing context and opportunity for employment overseas. This was true, but the Peloponnesian league had much on its plate, and the Athenians were busy with their own civil war. The Spartans were at war with Persia by 399, and the Corinthian war began in 396 and lasted until 387/6 occupying much of the mainland for many years. The fact that both of these struggles provided employment for men *apodemia* was incidental.

product of service and was provided during and at the end of a campaign. Pay, in reality, was low and often infrequent.<sup>35</sup> If it was paid at all, it ranged between two obols and nine obols a day.<sup>36</sup> This may not have had any relationship to the perception that would-be mercenaries had of their foreign service. Day to day remuneration was a means rather than an end. Nevertheless, the wealth of the east was legendary and must have seemed attractive. Ordinary men were also attracted to service by the prospect of pay. Thucydides twice mentions men who had been persuaded by pay.<sup>37</sup> Dionysius I's mercenaries were certainly attracted to service by offers of pay.<sup>38</sup> The same is true of all those who served Phocis.<sup>39</sup> The Great King, Carthage and potentates of Egypt were equally adept at offering large sums to attract large numbers of Greeks.<sup>40</sup> It is unlikely that pay by itself would make a man rich or provide a veteran with a pension at the end of service.

While pay in itself would not create wealth, the desire for such riches played a role in the decision of mercenaries

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35 See chapter IV on Mercenary Pay.

36 Parke 1933, 231-3. See table I below.

37 Thuc. I.60; IV.84.5.

38 Diod. XIV.44.2; 62.1.

39 Diod. XVI.30.1; 36.2.

40 Diod. XVI.81.4, for the Carthaginians, XV.29.1, for the Egyptians.

and commanders to take service overseas. The Cyrean general Menon's primary purpose was wealth.<sup>41</sup> As a general he was unlikely to be poor and was motivated for greater rewards than subsistence. The creation of material wealth was a very different proposition than earning wages. The fabled wealth of the Great King and his legates must have led men to befriend them. Similarly, the motivation behind any activity even in Thrace was in part economic. Greece had a limited amount of mineral resources, and the mines and timber of Thrace must have attracted Greeks to the region.<sup>42</sup> The access to the grain supplies of the Black Sea must also have been a serious consideration particularly to Athenians. Hence Iphicrates' marriage into the family of Cotys left him in a splendid position to exploit these resources. He was not alone in this endeavour to curry favour in this part of the Aegean for cash.<sup>43</sup>

The kings of Sparta also sought foreign service to generate wealth. It would appear that their motivation was to better the national income of the state. For example, at the end of his career either as an ally or as a mercenary Agesilaus appeared in Egypt with the intent of making money

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41        *Xen. An.* II.6.21.

42        Borza 1987, 32-52.

43        *Dem.* XXIII. 130-2. Iphicrates was the son in law of Cotys. Charidemus had a similar relationship with another Thracian prince Chersobleptes. Conditions in Thrace were obviously well liked by Greeks, as they had been trying to establish relationships there for many decades. Note the families of the *Alcmaeonidae* and *Miltiadae*. Also the two brothers in Isaeus, II. 6-14 took themselves off to Thrace and met with financial reward in this region.

for the Spartan state.<sup>44</sup> Ironically the money was required to pay Sparta's mercenaries in the Peloponnese.<sup>45</sup> So the economic problems that were created by Sparta's declining Spartiate numbers and the resultant need to pay mercenary troops to fight these wars in the Peloponnese were alleviated by the expertise that Agesilaus and others could bring to the battlefield and the money that these wars provided. A strange cycle was established whereby war overseas became motivated by the need to finance war at home.

Even if men were not attracted to service by the prospect of pay, they were certainly motivated by offers of higher pay or bounties. These were usually offered to incite loyalty or to induce greater risks. Lysander was aware of this lesson during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>46</sup> Forensic speeches illustrate the importance of a commander maintaining the confidence of his men by payment of wages and rations in the fourth century.<sup>47</sup> Athenian commanders when their money ran out were often deserted by their crews, even by Athenian crews.<sup>48</sup> Most of the men on the *anabasis* were motivated to stay on the

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44 Plut. *Ages.* 36; Parke 1933, 90.

45 Cartledge 1987, 392.

46 Xen. *Hell.* I.5.4.

47 Dem. L. 11, 14, XLIX. 6.

48 Dem. L. 23.

campaign by pay.<sup>49</sup> As Nussbaum rightly points out, with their employer dead their motivation was only to get back to the sea alive.<sup>50</sup> Once this had been achieved they then turned their attention to getting a little something in hand to take home with them. In the short term Xenophon's mercenaries, like any soldiers, desired food or food money (*siteresion*) to survive.<sup>51</sup> Pay was only a prospect for the future.<sup>52</sup> This short and long-term motivation was demonstrated by the contract that was made with Seuthes. They were to receive rations while they served and pay as a result of service.<sup>53</sup>

Payment of higher wages to men who had done good service or brave deeds was common in professional armies. Philip and Alexander used this incentive in their armies.<sup>54</sup> Dionysius exhorted his mercenaries with promises of bounties.<sup>55</sup> The army of Jason of Pherae discussed in the *Hellenica* demonstrates how successful and common this strategy was and how a professional army could be motivated by donatives and

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49 Xen. *An.* I.2.11, 3.21, 4.13.

50 Nussbaum 1967, 147-9, 154-5. He sees three stages in their motivation; survival, return with something in hand and finally their future employment.

51 Xen. *An.* I.2.19, 3.14, 5.6, II.2.3, 3.26-7, III.2.21. Note also that one of the advantages of Clearchus as leader was his ability to provision the army, see also Xen. *An.* I.6.8.

52 Xen. *An.* I.2.12, 3.21, 4.13. The last two references for the implication that pay was promised. See also chapter IV.

53 Xen. *An.* VII.2.36.

54 Diod. XVI.53.3. Diodorus recognised Philip's donations for good service. Arr. *Anab.* VI.10.1, 11.7 for Abreas 'the double pay man' in Alexander's army. This was clearly a mark of distinction for deeds done.

55 Diod. XVI.12.3.



higher pay for ability.<sup>56</sup> In Jason's army pay was hierarchical based on the fitness and skills of each man.

There were better ways than day-to-day payment for a mercenary to make himself wealthy. There was not enough pay to allow a man to save for the future, and generals and employers often withheld payment anyway to tie their men to the army.<sup>57</sup> It was not an adequate motivation for mercenary service; it was a means to living rather than an end. Plunder was by far the most lucrative form of material reward. The desire for plunder drove those who returned from Cunaxa to some desperate actions. Aeneas fell to his death attempting to catch an expensive robe.<sup>58</sup> Xenophon and his friends mounted a raid on a wealthy farmstead no doubt for this very purpose.<sup>59</sup> Men followed the army of Epaminondas into the Peloponnese with plunder alone in mind and with no intention of fighting.<sup>60</sup> This desire must have been the case too with those men who entered Samos in the 360s and Cyprus in the 350s.<sup>61</sup> From the employers' perspective plunder was an easy

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56 *Xen. Hell.* VI.1.5.

57 *Xen. An.* I.2.12 for the arrears of Cyrus to his men. See also *Xen. An.* VII.5.16, 6.27, as Scuthes tried to avoid payment to the troops.

58 *Xen. An.* IV.7.13.

59 *Xen. An.* VII.8.11-19.

60 *Plut. Ages.* XXII.

61 *Diod.* XVI.42.3-8; *Arist. Oec.* II; *Isoc.* XV.3; Parke 1933, 108.

opportunity to pay the troops both directly and indirectly.<sup>62</sup> According to Demosthenes war made the payment of Athens' mercenaries possible.<sup>63</sup> Clearly employers relied heavily on war paying for itself in a way that peace could not.

A strong motif in the *Iliad* is the stripping of a dead hero's armour by the victor.<sup>64</sup> This prospect, accompanied by the establishment of a trophy strewn with captured arms at the end of the battle, must have motivated mercenaries as it did all soldiers.<sup>65</sup> Men who had gained the opportunity to fight may well have had romantic ideas of gaining exotic arms to decorate their homes in later life.<sup>66</sup> Plunder in this sense took on a more symbolic value, and the desire for it would not have been economic, but the high value of bronze ought not to be over-looked. The evidence for symbolic motivation amongst mercenaries specifically is not good. It was none the less an important element of the ideology of the ancient soldier.

If land-hunger, poverty and exile were the negative forces that sent men overseas, property and citizenship *apodemia* must have appealed greatly to men in foreign service. Evidently this was not what the majority of the Ten Thousand

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<sup>62</sup> Xen. *An.* I.2.19, VII.2.36, shows Seuthes converting plunder into pay. Polyaeus, *Strat.* II.10.9; Arist. *Oec.* II, illustrates Timotheus ironically selling food to the besieged Samians in order to pay his troops.

<sup>63</sup> Dem. V.28-9 notes that war booty would pay the mercenaries.

<sup>64</sup> Hom. *Il.* XVIII.21. Achilles is pricked by the news that Hector has taken his armour from the dead Patroclus.

<sup>65</sup> Pritchett 1974, 246-75.

<sup>66</sup> Plut. *Tim.* XXIX.

desired, at least on the march home, as they rejected Xenophon's proposal to create a city in northern Asia Minor.<sup>67</sup> On the other hand, the mercenaries of Dionysius I in Sicily accepted the prospect of land and citizenship when they were offered.<sup>68</sup> It should be noted that employers saw this as a last resort. They would not have had the opportunity had there been enough resources to settle their problems in some other way. The appeal of Timoleon for Greeks to emigrate to Sicily yielded 60,000 people.<sup>69</sup> Chabrias' campaigns in Egypt appear to show that mercenaries had settled there or at the very least lived there in the fourth century.<sup>70</sup> Alexander's campaigns generated a vast colonisation of the east. Some of these colonists were mercenaries. Clearly many settled because they could go no further because of wounds, age or fatigue, and not because settlement was their ambition. The Bactrian revolt illustrated that not all the men were happy to be deposited in the east, but the fact that they followed the king so far east must say something about their relationship, or lack of relationship, to their homes.<sup>71</sup>

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67      *Xen. An.* V.6.15-19. Xenophon gives the reasons for the rejection a little later at *Xen. An.* V.6.20-30.

68      *Diod.* XIV.7.5, 78.1-3, 8.3.

69      *Plut. Tim.* XXIX.

70      Burnett and Edmonson 1961, 74-91.

71      *Diod.* XVII.99.5-6, notes the discontent of those Greeks left in the far east and accordingly they attempted to return. *Arr. Anab.* V.27.5, states, '[a]s for the Greeks some you have settled in the cities you have founded and even they do not remain there of their own free will.'

### REPUTATION

Military service was a normal part of life. The rewards for that service were not only material. They were also personal. Classical societies attached great honour to the successful soldier. Isaeus' speeches keenly demonstrate that it was important to distinguish oneself even in mercenary service.<sup>72</sup> Xenophon's analysis of his mercenaries is also full of praise for the brave deeds done by his men.<sup>73</sup> The concept of 'manliness' was important to all Greek societies. The crucial place of the Iliad in Greek ideology was not just theoretical and poetic, it extended onto the real battlefields of the classical world.

The rewards for *kleos* were even more extensive to the successful general than the successful soldier. The relationship between military leadership and political power at home was an important one. This phenomenon is very well illustrated in Roman society as well.<sup>74</sup> *Philotimia* - love of honour - can be identified at all levels of Greek society. The stigma of cowardice on the battle field was by contrast repugnant.<sup>75</sup> Clearchus cannot have been alone in his love of

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<sup>72</sup> Isaeus II. 6. the speaker claims, '[h]aving proved our worth there (on campaign in Thrace) we returned home...'

<sup>73</sup> Xen *An.* II.6.30 and IV.7.12. Xenophon often cited men whose deeds were brave or who when dead ought to be remembered as brave men.

<sup>74</sup> Harris 1979, 17-35.

<sup>75</sup> Tyr. VIII. (11-12); Hdt. I.63. All these illustrate this theme well. Xen. *An.* I.3.18, V.2.11; Plut. *Tim.* XXV, illustrate this phenomenon with mercenaries.

war, and the mercenaries under his command on more than one occasion are driven on by their fear of being perceived as cowards by their colleagues.<sup>76</sup>

Reputation must have played a role in mercenary service. The generals who served the Great King received their share of honour for their achievement either through his own patronage or through the reflected honour bestowed by the people of their home state. This is best illustrated by the activities of Conon for the Great King.<sup>77</sup> The *Anabasis* mentions the search for fame and reputation as a motivator frequently. Xenophon realised the great name he might achieve through commanding Cyrus' mercenaries.<sup>78</sup> He was equally concerned that his name might not be besmirched.<sup>79</sup> Proxenus campaigned for the fame and reputation that he would gain from being a general.<sup>80</sup> There were no doubt some 'hot-heads' whose primary reason for mercenary service was reputation, but it is unlikely that this drove the majority of men into mercenary armies. Nevertheless it should not be overlooked as an important factor in the decision, secondary though it may have been, of men to take service abroad.

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76        *Xen. An.* II.6.6-7.

77        *Diod.* XIV.39.3; Strauss 1986, 125-9.

78        *Xen. An.* VII.1.27.

79        *Xen. An.* VI.1.21. See also VII.1.21, 6.7-10, 49.

80        *Xen. An.* II.6.17-18.

### LENGTH OF SERVICE

The length of service abroad for one or more employers must be indicative of the original purpose of a man's mercenary service. A division can be made as to the type of service that was sought overseas. Death apart, two motives dictated short term service. The first motive might be a specific goal whereby the mercenary's hope to return to his *polis* was assured from the outset, and service was for only one or two, perhaps sporadic, campaigns. This would suggest the mercenary had something to which to return. The brothers in Isaeus II provide an example of this type of service. One of these men had land which he returned home to manage.<sup>81</sup> Another example is seen in Agesilaus campaigns for money in Egypt.<sup>82</sup> Apart from the generals of Athens, who frequently served for short terms the various powers of the Mediterranean, there is very little specific evidence of common soldiers who appear on campaign and then return to their homes.

The second factor that dictated short term service was a change of circumstance. Defeat during a campaign or the loss of an employer might be reasons for adventures to be cut short. The Cyreians who went home as soon as they could get

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81 Isae. II.12.

82 Plut. *Ages.* XXXVI-XL.

transportation represent men who fit the latter example.<sup>83</sup> They might have hoped to have stayed with Cyrus longer, had he lived on as Great King. They offered to serve Artaxerxes in any capacity he may have wished after Cunaxa. It is also clear that not all of the Cyreians wanted to return to their homes after the campaign, as their continued mercenary service with the Spartans demonstrated.<sup>84</sup>

Long term service demonstrates three possible examples of motivation. Firstly, that return was not and never had been an available option because of legal stipulations or some other impingement. The exile, for example, could not return home even if he wanted to. Not to say that there were not exiles who did want to get back to their homes. The Milesian exiles fought with Cyrus in part because of his promise to them that he would reinstate them at Miletus.<sup>85</sup> Until such time as they could be reinstated it is not surprising to find exiles who chose the life of a mercenary.<sup>86</sup> It needs to be said again that not all exiles were mercenaries and vice-versa. The Messenians who fled the Peloponnese had no option of return while Sparta was still the dominant power in Greece,

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83        *Xen. An.* VII.2.3.

84        Roy 1967, 320; *Xen. An.* VI.4.8. Roy believes that their desire was to return to the Aegean basin and not necessarily to their native city-states.

85        *Xen. An.* I.1.7.

86        *Xen. An.* I.2.2.

and so they undertook service in Sicily.<sup>87</sup>

Secondly, were there men who possessed the ability to return to their *patria*, but had no intention of doing so from the start of their service? The earliest example is found in Thucydides. After the Peloponnesians defeated Amorges, they hired his Peloponnesian *epikouroi*.<sup>88</sup> This would suggest that these men were professional long-term soldiers. The best examples of men who had no intention of returning are ambitious individuals like Clearchus. He had clearly staked out from the start his ambitions from the start to abandon Sparta. His hope to carve out a small tyranny in Thrace was shared by others.<sup>89</sup> Nicostratus died *apodemia* having served overseas for eleven years.<sup>90</sup> One of the brothers in Isaeus II also lived away from Athens. His motivation is not stated, although interestingly a feature of his not living at Athens was his solitary condition.<sup>91</sup> Most of those who had served with Cyrus stayed with the army to fight with Seuthes and then with the Spartans after 399 B.C., and this would suggest that they had accepted the life of a soldier.<sup>92</sup> Regrettably the

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87 Diod. XIV.34.3.

88 Thuc. VIII.28.4.

89 Parke 1933, 100 n.1. Parke lists the fourth century despots who appeared in the Mediterranean basin.

90 Isaeus IV.8.

91 Isaeus II.12.

92 Xen. *An.* VII.8.24; Diod. XIV.37.1.



death of their employer changed their circumstances so drastically that there is no way of knowing what their original intention had been.

The last two categories are difficult to differentiate. The third group were those who planned to return no matter what had happened, but changed circumstances made them stay in service. The last group were men who hoped to return once a specific goal had been achieved, but continued in service because of the failure of the attainment of that goal. Their continued service was designed only to achieve what they wished. Some Cyreians perhaps fell into this category.<sup>93</sup> Defeat or victory might discourage or encourage continued service. Defeat in central Greece must have been a consideration of the mercenaries of Phocis in the 350s and 340s, and having survived the Sacred War they followed Phalaecus into the Peloponnese. These men waited for two years for employment. This must indicate at the very least a reluctance to return to their homes. Of these some went to Sicily with Timoleon and others went to Crete with Phalaecus. These remnants found themselves employed by Elean exiles until defeat led to either their enslavement or execution.<sup>94</sup> The evidence does not tell us where most of these men originally came from, but it is clear from their lengthy and distant

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<sup>93</sup> Parke 1933, 34. Parke suggests that not all wanted to return home.

<sup>94</sup> Diod. XVI.59.3, 63.5, 78.4; Plut. *Tim.* XXX.

campaigns that they were or had become professional soldiers.

The mercenaries who followed Alexander east were numerous to say the least. The attraction of a successful campaign in the rich Orient must have attracted many men to Alexander. Parke's figures of 42,700 Greek mercenary foot soldiers may only illustrate the tip of the iceberg.<sup>95</sup> There could well have been more to whom the sources do not refer. Their motives can only be guessed at. The fact that they were taken so far east and that many served for long periods especially in eastern garrisons would suggest that their perception was the same as many of those discussed above.<sup>96</sup> In a similar vein the men who had served Darius were hired in the 330s, most of them specifically to defend the empire. They were still employed and loyal to Darius almost four years later.<sup>97</sup> Alexander hired them into his service when they surrendered.<sup>98</sup> There is nothing to suggest they did not wish to take this service. The motivations of those in these last two categories are vague. The evidence does not clarify changes in circumstances clearly or specifically.

#### PROVENANCE

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95 Parke 1933, 198.

96 Griffith 1935, 21-2.

97 Arr. *Anab.* III.24.5. Some of Darius' mercenaries predated the League of Corinth; Diod. XVI.89.3; Curt. Ruf. VI.5.6. Parke 1933, 185. Parke estimates that some of these men had been in service for at least seven years.

98 Arr. *Anab.* III.24.

The provenance of mercenaries might explain the reasons why men served overseas. In the fifth and fourth centuries the majority of mercenaries came from the Peloponnese. The first prominent group of mercenaries are the Arcadians. There is evidence of Arcadians serving abroad early in the fifth century in Herodotus and also in inscriptions.<sup>99</sup> Arcadians appear as mercenaries in Thucydides.<sup>100</sup> Peloponnesians are mentioned by the sources throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>101</sup> Was it possible that the large numbers of Peloponnesians, specifically Arcadians and Achaeans, were the result of something regionally specific that motivated men to seek employment elsewhere?

Poverty provided an important context for mercenary service. Some have seen specifically the poverty of the region of Arcadia as the key to their men taking service abroad.<sup>102</sup> There is nothing to suggest that the specific poverty of the Arcadian or Achaean region as opposed to any other led these men overseas. They were not the only regions of Greece which were poor. Other regions do not appear on the record as being traditional hiring grounds of mercenaries. The healthy population of Arcadia, mentioned by Xenophon's

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<sup>99</sup> See Hdt. VIII.26, for Arcadians who approached Xerxes '...because they had no living and wanted to be employed' after the battle at Thermopylae and for other fifth century Arcadians see *SEG XXXVII. 676*; Tod 93.

<sup>100</sup> Thuc. III.34.2, VII.57.9.

<sup>101</sup> Xen. *An.* VI.2.10; Roy 1967, 308. Roy believes that two thirds of the hoplites on the expedition were from Arcadia.

<sup>102</sup> Parke 1933, 229.

Lycomedes, may have been one reason for the supply of Arcadians for mercenary armies.<sup>103</sup>

Archaeological and literary sources provide evidence of numerous cities in the Peloponnese. Nevertheless the fully synoecised *polis* was not a feature of Arcadian and Achaean society in the fifth century. The tribal nature of Peloponnesian society might go some way to explain the availability of Peloponnesians for service abroad. This would make it easy for employers to locate an individual tribal leader who could summon a group of men to follow him with little difficulty.<sup>104</sup>

Another phenomenon of the Peloponnese in the later sixth to early fourth centuries was the dominance of Sparta. This meant that Arcadians, Achaeans and Messenians had little prospect of serving for their own regional interests, but were required to serve the interests of Sparta. It would not be surprising if many men willingly took service abroad for other powers, even at the instigation of Sparta, rather than serving Sparta directly. Two factors support this thesis. References to Arcadians as mercenaries disappear after the creation of Megalopolis in 369 B.C. Could it be that with the unification of the Arcadian league the men of Arcadia had a cause of their own for which to fight and ceased to follow the flags of

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103      Xen. *An.* VII.1.23.

104      Hanson 1989, 122-5. He discusses the importance of a tribal structure to hoplite warfare with reference to the Peloponnese.

others? Secondly, the reverse is true of Athens and Sparta. Athenians are not found in independent relationships with foreign potentates in the period from 479-404. This is the time that Athens was most powerful and able to employ all of its citizens. Prominent Athenians did establish relationships both before and after the period of greatness in the fifth century. These men still maintained their relationship with Athens. Spartans were not allowed to serve abroad without permission of the state. They are only found acting independently of the state after the Great Peloponnesian War.

The Spartans needed Peloponnesians to serve in Spartan causes as a result of the Peloponnesian league. Before the 430s this league had fought wars only on the Greek mainland. Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnese prevented foreigners from hiring in the region without Sparta's express consent.<sup>105</sup> During the Peloponnesian War, however, Sparta sent forces commanded by Spartiates beyond the boundaries of the Peloponnese, even overseas.<sup>106</sup> These forces consisted of Peloponnesians.<sup>107</sup> As a result of Spartan involvement in the Aegean world, therefore, more Peloponnesians must have come into contact with opportunities for overseas service than at any time previously.

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<sup>105</sup> Isoc. XI. 18.

<sup>106</sup> Thuc. IV.78.1, 80.5.

<sup>107</sup> Xen. *Hell.* II.2.20, IV.6.2, V.3.26, VI.3.8.

Arcadia was a traditional supplier of mercenaries before the Peloponnesian Wars. The origins of Arcadian and Peloponnesian service are vague. Arcadians served with Agamemnon in the *Iliad*.<sup>108</sup> In the later fifth century commanders requested the services of such men in number. Cyrus specifically told his commanders to hire Peloponnesians.<sup>109</sup> Dionysius I sent to the Peloponnese when he needed mercenaries.<sup>110</sup> Even Alexander recruited from there.<sup>111</sup> Taenarum in the southern Peloponnese was a well known gathering place for the recruitment of mercenaries by the later fourth century.<sup>112</sup> In short the Peloponnesians were considered by employers to be the best men for mercenary service and seem to have been considered so from very early in Greek history. Not all the men hired in the Peloponnese were from Arcadia, or even necessarily from the Peloponnese. Despite this latter point, the explosion in the number of mercenaries in the fourth century was a regional phenomenon. Greeks from the Peloponnese and the mainland were by far the most prominent of Greeks who found service.

Historical parallels might explain why Arcadians (and

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108 Hom. *I.* II.610-614.

109 Xen. *An.* I.1.6.

110 Diod. XIV.44.1, 58.1, 62.1; Diod. XIV.84.1. Agesilaus hired men from the Peloponnese for his campaign in Boeotia in the 390s.

111 Arr. *Anab.* II.20.5.

112 See chapter V 218-9 n.63.

Peloponnesians) were so prominent in service abroad. One such historical parallel can be identified with medieval Scotland.<sup>112</sup> The tribal nature of Scottish highland society and the dominance of the nation by its southern neighbour produced a nation of mercenaries. Scottish soldiers created a tradition for mercenary service that lasted for over five centuries, and Scots served rulers from Byzantium and Russia to Ireland.

A hypothesis that might explain the prevalence of Peloponnesians as mercenaries might lie with the employers who gave them the opportunity to serve overseas and not with the domestic context of the Aegean. Thus the motivation of the native population was a secondary consideration. A cycle of demand was escalated, but not created, by the Peloponnesian Wars. This cycle was influenced by the employers and not by the men. Peloponnesians fighting for Sparta overseas developed a reputation in the lands in which they fought. They were therefore sought out by foreign employers. Similarly, by being overseas the Peloponnesians were able to accept the opportunities of further service abroad.<sup>113</sup> Peloponnesians at home and other groups who came to the Peloponnese for the purpose of mercenary service in the rest of the fourth century could exploit this cycle. They could

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112 Henderson 1989; Simpson 1991.

113 Roy 1967, 298.

expect to find employment as mercenaries as a result of the reputation and relationships created in the fifth century.

The situations of other regions reinforce the point. The Aegean empire of the Athenians, unlike the Peloponnese, bordered areas where overseas service was possible. The lowest numbers of mercenaries found in service during the fourth century came from the Anatolian mainland. This region was controlled by the very powers which hired most extensively. Employers did not want men who lived so close to their own lands in service. The service close to one's homeland diminished the dependency of the mercenary on the employer or commander and created vested interests in the nature of the campaigns.<sup>114</sup> It also affected the relationship between the men and the employer. If Ionians had enabled satraps or even the Great King to achieve their goals, then Ionian autonomy might have been a necessary reward for such assistance. Mainland Greeks could easily be hired, used and sent home with little political ramification.

There is another point worthy of note. The non-Athenians in the Delian league served primarily in the fleet as rowers and not as hoplites.<sup>115</sup> As a result of this they were not the type of soldiers, hoplites or specialist troops, which employers wanted. These men, therefore, did not have the

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<sup>114</sup> Hdt. VIII.19, notes that Themistocles considered it possible that the Ionians and Carians might be detached from the Persian forces and see IX.103-4, in which the Samians and Milesians fought against the Persians at Mycale after their defeat.

<sup>115</sup> Parke 1933, 17.



opportunity to impress employers to seek them out. Where predominant numbers of Greeks from regions other than the Peloponnese are found, they served as auxiliary troops. They were from areas which had reputations for providing specific types of soldiers for campaigns: archers from Crete and slingers from Rhodes.<sup>116</sup> Homer notes that the Arcadians were 'skilled in warfare.'<sup>117</sup> Wheeler, following Hermippus, Ephorus and Zenodotus Theophilus, suggests that teaching and studying *hoplomachia* - hoplite warfare - developed first in Arcadia.<sup>118</sup> A fragment from a poem dated to the time of Pheidon of Argos suggests that Argives had been soldiers without equal in the Greek world.<sup>119</sup> These examples all illustrate that the Peloponnese had an early reputation for warfare. Sparta's martial prowess cannot be overlooked. Due to Spartan military successes in the sixth century and a reputation which was second to none in the Peloponnese eastern powers approached Sparta for alliances as early as Croesus.<sup>120</sup> No doubt Arcadians and other Peloponnesians could exploit their connections to Spartan military proficiency and

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116 They served through the fourth century to judge from Xenophon's *Anabasis*, I.2.9, III.3.12, IV.2.28, IV.8.27, V.2.29. Cf. the Cretans with Alexander who appear to have been archers, Arr. *Anab.* I.8.4, II.9.3, III.5.6, 7.2; Diod. XVII.57.4, 20.1. Rhodians were regarded as gifted slingers, but even on the *anabasis*, III.3.16, they were not all slingers.

117 Hom. *Il.* II.611.

118 Wheeler 1982, 225-226; Zenodotus, *FHG* IV. 516 frag 5; Hermippus and Ephorus, *FHG* III 35 frag 1; Ephorus, *FGH* 70 frag 54. Greek traditions agree with the relationship between the hoplite and Mantinea in Arcadia. Pausanias, VIII.32.5, 36.2, states that the hero Hoplodamus protected the pregnant Rhea from Cronus. Krentz 1985, 58, notes that the evidence need not identify Mantinea specifically, but the Peloponnese is not in doubt.

119 Murray 1980, 78; Snodgrass 1967, 71.

120 Jeffrey 1976, 124-125.

reputation.<sup>121</sup>

Gelon, a predominant early employer of Arcadian mercenaries, encouraged noble families of Arcadia to enter his household.<sup>122</sup> It may be that his reason lay with the connection they provided as hiring grounds of the best soldiers in Greece. Employers need not have looked further than the Peloponnese for fighters in their armies. Peloponnesian and therefore Greek origins for mercenary service lay with the development of hoplite warfare. The employers approached the Arcadians giving them the opportunity to serve overseas. The rugged nature of Arcadia and the availability of Arcadians, illustrated as early as 480 by those Arcadians who approached Xerxes because they had nothing, was only the background to the employment provided by the rulers of the east.

#### DEMAND

The role played by the fifth century wars in the explosion of mercenary numbers was not socio-economic. It gave the Peloponnesians the opportunity to serve in numbers in the Aegean basin. When it ended the coincidence of a great coup in the Persian empire combined with the great needs of Dionysius I at Syracuse, provided the opportunity for Greeks

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The suggestion that Arcadians who had served under Spartan officers and 'in the Spartan army' and so were attractive to overseas paymasters was made by John Rich of the University of Nottingham to whom I am most grateful.

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Pind. *Ol.* VI,7, 74, 101-5. Hagesias had a special relationship with both Stymphalis and Syracuse. He had to be a noble as he was a victor in the chariot race at Olympia; Paus. V.27.1; Parke 1933, 11.

to find service abroad in great numbers. The political situation now took precedence. This point strengthens the argument that it was demand that was the driving force for the explosion of mercenaries in the fourth century.

Demand, and not supply, was the key to mercenary service. There are after all no mercenaries without employers. This is illustrated by looking at the instances of large scale mercenary employment in the fourth century B.C. outside of mainland Greece. Greeks generally, like the Arcadians earlier, were the preferred soldiers of the day.

The two major venues of employment for Greek mercenaries serving as hoplites in large numbers were regionally peripheral to the Greek mainland. The first, and by far the foremost, of these was the Persian empire fighting either for or against the Great King. The second, but to a lesser extent, were the tyrants of Sicily and their enemies the Carthaginians in the west. In both cases the sources state that these employers always sent to the Peloponnese on the Greek mainland for their mercenaries. There must be a reason.

Greek writers regarded the quality of Greek hoplites as second to none. This was especially true of Greeks who fought against natives of Persia and the Persian empire. The Persian Wars had demonstrated the quality of the Greek hoplite against the native troops of central Asia in a pitched battle. These latter were lightly armed infantry and cavalry whose primary

weapons were missiles. Herodotus suggests that the closing stages of the battle of Plataea illustrated that it was not the difference in bravery or strength between the two forces, but that it was a fight between armed Greek hoplites and unarmed men.<sup>123</sup> It was also a struggle, he said, between men wise in the use of their arms and men who were not. Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* ends by lamenting the decline in the quality of Persian forces since the empire's creation.<sup>124</sup> Xenophon even went so far as to suggest that the Persians could not function on the battlefield without a Greek contingent.<sup>125</sup> Isocrates agreed that the most useful part of the Great King's army came from the Greek city-states.<sup>126</sup> The reasons for Greek successes were psychological as much as they were military. Plato summed up the Persian dilemma.<sup>127</sup>

And when [the Persians] come to need the people to fight in their support they find in them no patriotism or readiness to endanger their lives in battle; so that while they have countless myriads of men they are all useless for war, and they hire soldiers from abroad as though they were short of men, and imagine that their safety will be secured by hirelings and foreigners.

The psychology of Greek hoplites has been related to

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123 Hdt. IX.63.

124 Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.8.6; this is a point not lost on Seibt 1977, 121-162.

125 Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.8.25.

126 Isoc. IV.41.

127 Pl. *Leg.* III.697 e.

their agrarian and city-state roots.<sup>128</sup> Victor Davis Hanson cites Aristotle to demonstrate that citizen soldiers would die fighting the enemy rather than run away.<sup>129</sup> The psychology of the citizen hoplite, according to both Plato and Aristotle, made them better soldiers. It has been shown above that these citizens earned reputations and created demand for their services abroad. The men Aristotle juxtaposed to the steadfast citizen hoplite were the Greek professional soldiers of his own day - *oi stratiotai*. This is in some way ironic because the reason that mercenaries were hired was the reputation of bravery earned by the citizens in battle, a reputation which the professionals of the later fourth century, in the eyes of Aristotle, failed to live up to. The Persians may not have felt the same way as these Greek philosophers about troop quality. They hired and used Greeks prolifically.

The fifth century had been a period of relative stability for the Persian empire. Of the western satrapies only Egypt had been in revolt and had sought the aid of Greeks in the form of an alliance with Athens. The Persian empire in the first half of the fourth century ceased to be at all stable. At times it began to disintegrate. The career of Cyrus the Younger is a case in point. He was responsible for the

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128 Hanson 1995, 37-44, 327-357.

129 Hanson 1995, 44; Arist. *Nic. Eth.* III.8.9.

western satrapies of the empire. His coup against the Persian King required Greek hoplites to form on the battlefield a cohesive and strong central corps around which his native troops could quite literally swarm. The increasingly independent satraps of the western Persian empire who followed Cyrus' time did the same thing. They sent ambassadors to the Greek mainland to enlist men to fight for them against the Great King - men they could no doubt send back to the mainland with little or no responsibility after their work was done. In turn the Persian King needed Greeks to fight the Greeks of his Satraps, and so was created a vicious circle that only promulgated a huge Greek mercenary migration eastward.

The same historical circumstance is illustrated in Sicily. Autocrats had disappeared from the city-states of the island just after the Persian Wars, but they reappeared in the last years of the fifth century. Greek tyrants were reluctant to use citizen troops for fear they would overthrow them or would interfere in the running of the state. To them foreigners were both more convenient and more loyal than the citizen body. Dionysius I at Syracuse needed Greek hoplites first to prop up his regime and second and more importantly for the numbers involved to fight off successive Carthaginian invasions. The sources state that the Carthaginians felt that they too needed Greeks as a result of defeats they suffered on the island themselves, and thus another cycle of demand

created by Greek success pulled Peloponnesians westwards.<sup>130</sup>

In conclusion the reason for the employment of so many Peloponnesians in the fourth century cannot lie with the factors which made them available for service. It lies in the increased demand of employers on the periphery of the Greek world. Demand was created by a decline in the centralised authority of the Persian empire and by the reappearance of tyranny on the island of Sicily, notably at Syracuse, at the end of the fifth century. This demand gave to mainland Greeks, poor and rich alike, notably in the Peloponnese, opportunities to leave behind them their domestic pressures in greater numbers than previously.

Many scholars point to the poverty and the social backwardness of the Peloponnese to explain the prevalence of Peloponnesians in overseas service. This cannot be denied, but it does not explain why so many Arcadians found service. Much of the Aegean was poor and the populations of many city-states must have been full of men who would have gratefully accepted mercenary employment. The northern regions of the Greek world - particularly Aetolia, which later became a prominent provider of Greek mercenaries, had similar socio-economic conditions to the Peloponnese in the fifth century. Athens serves to illustrate the converse of many of the points discussed above. The Athenian empire kept Athenian citizens

employed throughout the seventy-five years of its duration. Athenians are only found serving overseas after the Peloponnesian war. Opportunities to serve the state and establish oneself abroad from this time had to be done without the mechanism of the empire.

### POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The turbulent political problems of the city states could lead men into service overseas. Civil disorder resulted in exile. Exiles were a common feature of the Greek world in the period of the mercenary explosion in the fourth century. Exile cannot be seen as a motivator for mercenary service nor mercenary service the natural choice of career. Not all exiles became mercenaries, and even of those who did not all were disenfranchised. For example among the Athenians who took service overseas to escape the thirty tyrants was a man who was motivated by his poverty.<sup>131</sup> A speech by Demosthenes claims Timotheus undertook service with the Great King to avoid the prosecution for which the speech was written. This is rhetorical embellishment; the charges did not necessitate the departure of a man of Timotheus' stature from Athens.<sup>132</sup> Athenian courts regularly tried generals in service of the

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131 Aesch. II.14.7.

132 Dem. XLIX.6, 9, 25.



state, and generals must have taken them in their stride.<sup>133</sup> Conon was a refugee from Athens in the 390s. He embarked upon mercenary service in order to assist his own government.<sup>134</sup> Men like Charidemus left Athens to escape Alexander and in turn served the Great King.<sup>135</sup> Memnon and Mentor the Rhodians had far more options by serving the Persians than they did in their native Rhodes. As Persian power and influence reasserted itself in the Greek world, it is not surprising to find Greeks rising to positions of power and authority at the Persian court.<sup>136</sup>

On occasion mercenaries found themselves serving the interests of their states or their own ideals. It is not always clear whether this was by accident or by design. This was the case of many mercenaries who served Spartan commanders and were therefore fulfilling obligations of the Peloponnesian league.<sup>137</sup> This was also true of the Milesian exiles who served with Cyrus.<sup>138</sup> No doubt some of the men who fled with Phalaecus into the Peloponnese were Phocians who feared to

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133 Pritchett 1974, 4-33, who notes the regular and expected nature of such trials; Hansen 1975, 59, perhaps unrealistically likens the relationship between juries and generals as resembling 'the sword of Damocles' for the general.

134 Diod. XIV.39.3.

135 Diod. XVII.30.2; Curt. Ruf. III.2.10.

136 Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.6.

137 Xen. *An.* I.4.3. The 700 mercenaries under Chirisophus were probably Peloponnesians.

138 Xen. *An.* I.2.2.

remain in central Greece.<sup>139</sup> Those Greeks who fought against Alexander did so in part to avenge Chaeronea and to free the Greeks from the Macedonians. The transfer from Asia to Europe of 8,000 men to serve under Agis against Antipater must surely display such a desire.<sup>140</sup> The fact that these men were by now outcasts from the Greek world and shunned by the most powerful man in Europe cannot have encouraged them to return to their homes individually. Their reinstatement in their cities could only come through a change in the political circumstances in the cities of the mainland and the Near East.

Alexander's 'Exiles Decree' can be regarded as such a political change. In theory it enabled all those involuntary wanderers and outsiders to return to their cities.<sup>141</sup> There have been many theories as to Alexander's purpose.<sup>142</sup> Badian points to the decree as directly relating to mercenaries.<sup>143</sup> He is probably correct not only because of their status as outsiders of cities (voluntary or forced), but also because the timing of the decree was closely related to both Alexander's call for his satraps to disband their mercenary

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<sup>139</sup> Diod. XVI.59.3. It is equally possible that they were reluctant to stay in an area which according to all the traditions was devastated by the Sacred War.

<sup>140</sup> Arr. *Anab.* II.13.2.

<sup>141</sup> Dittenberg. *SIG* 3. i. 312; Diod. XVII.109.2, XVIII.8.1-7.

<sup>142</sup> Both Tarn 1948, i.112 and Wilcken 1932, regard the decree as an act of wisdom and statesmanship, while Badian 1961, 27 and Hamilton 1973, 136-7 are 'more realistic.' The decree can be related to the wanderers of Asia who posed a threat to peace. It may also have been designed to give those in the disbanded armies of the satraps, Diod. XVII.106.3, a place to go. Badian notes the numbers of mercenaries returning to the Greek mainland as a growing problem. Alexander may have acted to disrupt the internal politics of the Greek cities by asking them to take back their exiles, Bosworth 1988, 223. Whether benevolent or malicious the decree transgressed the League of Corinth's principles.

<sup>143</sup> Badian 1961, 25-31.

armies and the arrival of men under both Athenodorus and Leosthenes in the Greek mainland from Asia. Hornblower cites the possibility that the decree was related to Alexander's desire that the Greek cities recognise his own divinity.<sup>144</sup> Gods created exiles and only they could reinstate them. To Hornblower, therefore, Alexander was divinely solving the problems of the Greek world. This point may seem facile, but it illustrates the fundamentally important position of the powerful in the destinies of ordinary people in antiquity.<sup>145</sup>

#### **PATRONAGE**

In this final section the factor which appears conclusive as the motivator of all mercenary service will be examined. The employer or the commander was responsible for the employment and service of any mercenary. The terms and conditions he served under, the nature of service he undertook, the rewards that he received at the end of his service were all provided by the commander. It was this man who generated the desire for the mercenaries to serve more than any other, for it was through him that whatever motivated mercenary service, whether negative or positive, would be gained. Without his employer the mercenary, as a mercenary, had nothing.

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<sup>144</sup> Hornblower 1983, 289-90; *Hom. II. XXIV.531*.

<sup>145</sup> The difficulties of restoration of exiles with regard to redistributed property and assimilation into communities are well illustrated in inscriptions, for example, Tod 201 and 202. Repatriation as remuneration is discussed in chapter four below.

Philosophers eulogised the concept of service with a good king.<sup>146</sup> This suggests a philosophy of patronage common in the Greek world known as guest-friendship. The concept of guest-friendship was established early in the dark ages. In the early fifth century Gelon encouraged prominent Arcadian families to come into his household.<sup>147</sup> Parke notes the parallel with Philip's policy of encouraging foreign *hetairoi* at his court.<sup>148</sup> This parallel can also be seen in the men who followed the three adventurers Cyrus, Dion and Timoleon as their companions who were not relatives or natives of the generals' respective states.<sup>149</sup> The attraction of all service must be seen in the light of mutual patronage. The influence these Arcadian families must have had on the Peloponnesians to serve overseas in Sicily cannot have been negligible. The roots of mercenary service may lie with 'Dark Age' guest-friendship modelled upon the connections of the kings in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* whose military obligations present an early picture of patron and client relationships through services rendered and received.<sup>150</sup> The tribal nature of the Peloponnese would no doubt have assisted in the formulation

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146 Plut. *Mor.* 1043 c-e. See also 1061 d; Strab. 301, 310.

147 Pind. *Ol.* VI; Paus. V.27.1, for three Arcadians of status; Hagesias of Stymphalus, Phormis of Maenalus and Praxiteles of Mantinea.

148 Parke 1933, 11, 161-2.

149 Plut. *Dion*, LIV.

150 Finley 1954, 111-113.

and running of these services.

Analysis of the *Anabasis* clearly displays patronage as a motivation for service. The death of Cyrus left the generals to seek a new patron: Artaxerxes through the mediation of Tissaphernes.<sup>151</sup> This need was made more pressing by the fact that they were in foreign territory. Once the army was safely back in the Greek world Xenophon found Seuthes as a suitable patron. Seuthes proved invaluable to an army that otherwise would have had to winter in difficult country without resources.<sup>152</sup> In the end the Spartans presented themselves as employers and patrons acceptable to the men.<sup>153</sup> The men entered this patronage through their captains, and the captains through their generals knew that their own worth depended upon this hierarchy.<sup>154</sup>

Ultimately the man at the top not only dictated but motivated all service. Cyrus represented all that the men hoped to achieve. The men realised that their personal goals could only be achieved through him.<sup>155</sup> Xenophon's reason for attending the campaign was explicit; to befriend the Great

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151      *Xen. An.* II.5.11-2.

152      *Xen. An.* VII.3.13.

153      *Xen. An.* VII.8.24.

154      Nussbaum 1967, 32, 36-8. Nussbaum sees the captains as the hinge in the social organisation of the army between the men and the generals.

155      *Xen. An.* I.9.16-7.

King's brother.<sup>156</sup> The patronage that men like Clearchus received as a result of his friendship with Cyrus was key in his efforts to dominate parts of the Hellespont.<sup>157</sup> Menon's desire for wealth was made possible by his patron's ability to provide him with the resources to achieve it.<sup>158</sup> Proxenus was given his opportunities to command and to gain reputation through Cyrus.<sup>159</sup> Xenophon refers several times to the bounties to be had from friendship.

Subsequently the generals of the fourth century were all keen to ingratiate themselves with the potentates of the Mediterranean basin to broaden their own power base and to further their political careers at home. In the case of some of these men, like Agesilaus, that which was good for them was also good for their states. Sources, like Demosthenes, reflect these relationships as cynical and detrimental.<sup>160</sup> Demosthenes' view of Athenian mercenary commanders was highly charged, and his speech which damns Iphicrates and Charidemus illustrates this attitude.<sup>161</sup> It should not have been the case; Conon's victory at Cnidus, achieved through the

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156      *Xen. An.* III.1.4.

157      *Xen. An.* II.6.4.

158      *Xen. An.* II.6.21.

159      *Xen. An.* II.6.16-7.

160      *Dem.* XXIII.129-32, 141, 149.

161      *Dem.* II.28.

patronage of the Great King, enabled Athens to reestablish much of the city's former prestige. No doubt the good ties that were established by the generals were good for the *poleis* that they served as well as themselves.

It is apparent that overseas service for Athenian generals in the fourth century was normal and accepted behaviour.<sup>162</sup> Almost all the prominent Athenian generals are found all over the eastern Mediterranean in service at some point in their careers. This must be related to the decline of the Athenian empire and the lack of opportunity that the state provided for generals to gain the necessary glory, funds and connections to fuel political careers at home. Similarly the matter-of-fact nature of service when there was not a state obligation also needs to be stressed. A combination of everything that has been discussed in this chapter led them into service. It seems that an offer of service with the Great King meant a great deal.

A relationship with the Great King meant that one had become a great man. Thracian princes were one thing and had their uses, and the Egyptian Kings and western satraps were another, but the relationship with the Great King and his family must have meant so much more to the Athenian generals of the fourth century. Relationships between great men was accepted and expected. The Great King provided more than just

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This point is discussed more fully in chapter VI. 280-292.

wealth for men who sought service.

The mercenary general can be said to have been motivated by desires for wealth, fame and reputation. He also wanted the status earned by campaigning in foreign wars which would reflect his status well at home. All of these things, however, were only attainable (and were known to be only attainable) through the one thing that they sought more than anything else, the patronage of a powerful ruler. Like the men they commanded the commanders could only command *apodemia* if there was an employer to finance their services. This was an important consideration, and on more than one occasion it was the employer who requested that a general be sent. Where there is evidence for such requests it was made for a specific general as well.<sup>163</sup> Only if the general was in trouble might he have approached a ruler.<sup>164</sup> Agesilaus illustrated the irony of his initial employer's position in Egypt by supporting another claimant to the Egyptian throne against him. Clearly Agesilaus thought the rewards would be better if the king owed him his throne as well as his services.<sup>165</sup>

In the fourth century the importance of patronage was well illustrated in all the activities that can be called mercenary. Iphicrates' relationship with Cotys almost led

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<sup>163</sup> For examples see Diod. XV.42.4, 59.4, 92.3; Nepos (XI).2.4; Plut. *Arr.* XXIV.1.

<sup>164</sup> For example, Diodorus, XV.39.1-2, notes that Pharnabazus persuaded the Great King to offer the Persian fleet to Conon which he did after Conon had sought refuge with Euagoras subsequent to Aegospotami.

<sup>165</sup> Plut. *Ages.* XXXVI-XL; Diod. XV.92.2.



him into a war with his own *polis*. Memnon and Mentor found in the Great King a great patron who allowed them to become the most powerful Greeks of their day. The followers of Dion and Alexander were no doubt motivated by the rewards that their respective adventures would bring. The quest for patronage did not end with the generals. Mercenaries were so dependant on a good commander that their lives depended on it. Commanders could send them on difficult missions, place them in the hottest part of the battle-field or even leave them stranded there.<sup>166</sup> The employers and generals could dictate their futures through a bad campaign, or even their death by a cynical decision.

### CONCLUSIONS

The employers and the commanders were the keys to mercenary service. It was these men who determined the opportunities for service, for rewards and for final settlements. Without them poor men remained poor in their native lands, exiles remained wanderers and glory-hunting *metics* waited for their state to give them the opportunity to fight. Pay and plunder were critical to a mercenary's survival and continued service. Domestic circumstances provided contextual background to that service, but the employer was crucial. The explosion of mercenary service in

the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C. is not explained by examining the effects of the Great Peloponnesian war on citizens becoming accustomed to warfare or to the economic problems it created. Similarly the explosion did not occur because of regional poverty and political exile. It was the need of employers for Peloponnesian Greeks specifically that was the driving force for mercenary service. This need in itself was created by the turbulence of the western Persian empire and the chaos of Dionysian Sicily. The political situation in the Mediterranean created a greater need for larger numbers of mercenaries than ever before. These mercenaries were Greeks. They were Greeks because it was the employers who selected the provenance and type of men they hired. They chose Greek hoplites from the Peloponnese. Without this choice and consequent opportunity there would have been no explosion.

**IV**  
**PAY**

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine the payment of Greek mercenaries in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Remuneration for military service is central to this thesis primarily because the true mercenary requires regulated and accepted payment.<sup>1</sup> Pay and professionalism are synonymous. A man who earned money in the service of the state was a *misthophoros* - a word that has already been identified with mercenary service. It was not the job which he did, but the relationship he had to his remuneration (*misthos*) which gave him this name. Jurors, soldiers and rowers were all *misthophoroi* as were mercenaries.<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that Xenophon calls the mercenaries serving with Cyrus *xenoi* - foreigners or guest friends - which may be explained by Xenophon's perception of the relationship which the men had with their employer. It may also reflect the lack of a regular income, which in Xenophon's consideration did not make the men professionals. The Greek mercenary was a professional at least while he was in service, but this does not mean that the remuneration needed to be in coin. Indeed cash was not necessarily the primary goal of mercenaries nor the purpose of mercenary service. A mercenary could make his living through

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1 See chapter I, 29-33.

2 Parke 1933, 231.

other means of remuneration.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter will first discuss how the employers and generals found the money which they needed to pay their troops. It will next examine the types of remuneration available to the mercenary as well as when and how that wage might be transferred. How much a mercenary might expect to receive is also of central importance to this discussion of wages. The chapter ends with a discussion of the theory and practice behind the incomes which were received. Whether the mercenaries received what they had hoped for when they began their service (and how often they received a living wage) is an important reality amid the often theoretical information provided by the sources.

### The Means

It was not a cheap endeavour to pay mercenaries. Employers and generals generated enough money to pay mercenaries in a variety of ways.<sup>4</sup> Tyrants exiled families and used their property for capital and land donations.<sup>5</sup> Some rulers had the luxury of revenues from a large taxation base - *eisphora*.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Hallock 1971, 588-611, relates the transfer of livestock, grains, and wine as remuneration for services to the King in the Persian empire. The important, but unquantifiable factor of booty is discussed so thoroughly by Pritchett 1991, 68-203, that it is not discussed in this chapter.

<sup>4</sup> Miller 1984, 156-7, discusses some of the means by which the employers, tyrants, and generals raised capital to pay their men.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.45-6; Diod. XIII.93.2.

<sup>6</sup> Hdt. III.89-117, for what appears to be an accurate list of the huge revenues available to Darius I in 520 B.C.

Others imposed increases in taxes to pay their men.<sup>7</sup> Dionysius I even debased the metal content of his coinage.<sup>8</sup> To pay their soldiers some borrowed against the prospect of their success.<sup>9</sup> Others had natural resources at their disposal such as metal deposits.<sup>10</sup> Other commanders adopted sacrilegious methods to coin enough money to pay mercenaries.<sup>11</sup> Diphridas ransomed the daughter and son-in-law of a Persian satrap in order to pay his troops.<sup>12</sup> Jason of Pherae supposedly got money from his mother by doing tricks for her.<sup>13</sup> Aeneas the Tactician advised getting the wealthier citizens to provide - *xenotrophein* - mercenaries. He recommended that the state and its citizens should share the cost of hiring on the understanding that once hostilities ended the state would reimburse its citizens the costs which they had incurred.<sup>14</sup> The least responsible way to pay for mercenaries was to have them feed themselves from the lands which they were serving in and to have the war pay for itself.

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7 Arist. *Pol.* V. 1313 b; Parke 1933,72. Dionysius I of Syracuse was noted for such increases in *eisphora*.

8 Arist. *Pol.* 1313 b.

9 Dem II. 36; XLIX. 6.

10 Diod. XVI.8.7; Borza 1995, 37-55, describes how Philip II improved the mines at Philippi. Diod. V.38.2-3 notes the fortune of the wealth of the Carthaginians in Iberia, no doubt some of it from mineral deposits with which they were able to hire mercenaries.

11 For example, Diod. XV.13 describes Dionysius I plundering temple treasuries. See also Diod XVI.30.1, for the most famous of these instances which was the plundering by the Phocian generals of the Delphic dedications.

12 Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.21.

13 Polyaeus, *Strat.* VI.1.2 and 3.

14 Aen. *Tact.* XIII.1-3.

Booty taken from campaigns could be used as payment for the mercenaries.<sup>15</sup> Alternatively it might go into a common fund from which the men would then be paid.<sup>16</sup> This is best illustrated by the contractual arrangements of Seuthes with the army of Cyrus.<sup>17</sup> The booty captured would be converted into pay by the agents of the king. They had to gather their food from the land. Seuthes' responsibility was minimized and he benefited well by the arrangement. He paid the Greeks in kind with raw booty and little money.<sup>18</sup>

### **Types of Payment**

Scholars have listed the types of payment that were available to both citizen and mercenary soldiers.<sup>19</sup> The wages paid to mercenaries came in different forms. It was not necessary for an employer to discharge his responsibilities in coin alone.<sup>20</sup> The discussion below concentrates on pay which employers provided to their men during campaigns. It should be remembered that some men served for broader and more elusive rewards. As has been demonstrated in discussing

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15      *Xen. An.* VII.3.10; Kresilnikoff 1992.

16      *Xen. An.* V.3.4, for the division of booty, V.1.12, VI.6.37, for the presence of a common fund. III.3.18, for its presence early on the campaign.

17      *Xen. An.* VII.3.10.

18      *Xen. An.* VII.7.53.

19      Pritchett 1971, 3-30; Gabrielsen 1980, 151-5.

20      Modern companies do the same thing through the use of luncheon vouchers, company cars and other perks.

motivation, the friendship and patronage of great men were considered better rewards than any wage which could be earned anywhere.<sup>21</sup> The patronage offered by the rich and the powerful in the Mediterranean and the prospect of their help in any future endeavour must have been of crucial importance to all who served foreign princes and made up for a lack of funds at the outset of campaign. Cyrus promised the Milesian exiles that he would restore them to their city once he was Great King.<sup>22</sup> If Alexander's Exiles Decree is seen in this light, then such a pronouncement supported by the power of a great man was grand remuneration for services rendered by many of his mercenaries.<sup>23</sup>

Mercenaries did receive wages in coin. The minting and subsequent survival of coins used by great employers of mercenary armies in the later fifth and fourth centuries B.C. demonstrate the prolific usage of coins for the payment of mercenaries.<sup>24</sup> Anecdotal evidence also points to the use of coins for the payment of mercenaries.<sup>25</sup> In addition to and

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21        *Xen. An.* 1.9.

22        *Xen. An.* 1.2.2.

23        Badian 1961, 16-43; Bosworth 1988, 222, notes that mercenaries might have petitioned the king for such help. Tod 201 and 202 exemplify some of the issues raised by the restoration of outsiders into the community.

24        Humphries 1979, 11-12 and Burke 1992, 223-4, discuss the monetization of the Athenian state as a result of empire and which subsequently operated on a cash economy at one level with regard to those who took service with and for the state. Williams 1965 and 1976, 22, shows the direct relationship between military independence and the coining of money for the purposes of warfare. This is most evident with regard to the mercenaries of Phocis. Diodorus, XVI.36.1 and 56.5, mentions two separate mintings of coins for the Third Sacred War. The survival of coins with the names of the Phocian generals Phayllus and Onymarchus proves these mintings took place. Other coin hoards prove that mercenaries were in possession of coined money in Sicily that came from all over the Mediterranean.

25        *Plut. Ages.* XV, for the Laconic statement by the Spartan King that he was being driven from Asia by ten thousand archers. The symbol on the Persian Daric was an archer.



instead of the payment of cash, food and other types of sustenance to a certain value might have been paid to the soldiers while on some campaigns. There was money for the primary purpose of payment of food expenses (*siteresion* or *sitarchia*) or money for travelling expenses (*ephodia*). There was also payment in kind of food stuffs for subsistence (*trophia* or *sitos*) directly from captured booty. There were bounties that were handed over at times of success.<sup>26</sup> There were also rewards for bravery, good service and specific deeds of heroism.<sup>27</sup> Jason of Pherae paid his mercenaries for their strength and ability.<sup>28</sup> Finally, Dionysius gave Leontini's territory to his mercenaries.<sup>29</sup>

Much recent scholarship has centred on the systems of payment in the Greek world. As Krasilnikoff has noted,

it is a widely shared opinion that the terminology of payment separating regular and ration payment was not developed until the emergence of the great mercenary armies in the fourth century.<sup>30</sup>

The relationship between the great mercenary armies and the appearance of more strict terminology is extremely important. It illustrates the trend toward a more professional and specialised age. Ludmila Marinovic considered that the

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<sup>26</sup> Plut. *Dion*, XXXII, for Dion's presentation to his mercenaries of 100 minae; Xen. *An.* I.4.13, for Cyrus' promise of five minae to each mercenary on their arrival at Babylon; Diodorus, XVII.64.6, notes that Alexander gave his mercenaries two months pay.

<sup>27</sup> Diod. XIV.53.4.

<sup>28</sup> Xen. *Hell.* VI.1.6.

<sup>29</sup> Diod. XIV.78.1-3.

<sup>30</sup> Krasilnikoff 1993, 78.

salaries of mercenaries and the accumulation and circulation of coinage which resulted was one of the causes of the decline of the Greek *poleis*.<sup>31</sup> It cannot be taken for granted that the chronological coincidence of the age of the great mercenary armies and the appearance of money were related. In mercenary service this professionalisation is well illustrated by the movement away from euphemisms to describe the mercenary soldier.<sup>32</sup>

The lexicographers note and define the main terms used for military and civil payment in the period before 322 B.C. in distinctive ways. Thus, *misthos* is described as a salary for services rendered.<sup>33</sup> *Epitedeia* was a general term for provisions. *Tropha*, derived from the verb 'to feed' - *trephein* - meant food. *Sitos* was grain, the raw food stuff that was used to feed the army. The term *eis sitesin* also applied to provisions. *Ephodia* could be defined as travelling expense money. Finally *siteresion* was money provided for the purchasing of food. *Sitarchia* was another term that might be employed in such a way. All of these terms appear in the sources.

It has been debated whether the Greeks applied any systematic meaning to these terms. The debate hinges on the

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31        *Marinovic 1988, 270-274.*

32        *See chapter II, 55-67.*

33        *RE. vol. XV. 2. 2078-95.*

definition of the term *misthos* juxtaposed with the other terms for payment and provisioning of the army. One group of scholars believes that *misthos* meant a salary (the implication being that it was paid in cash) and that *trophai* and *eis sitesin* in particular were the raw material for subsistence.<sup>34</sup> Another school claims that the ancient authors considered no specific difference to the terms that they used and that the words were, in effect, synonymous.<sup>35</sup> Pritchett, while effectively adhering to the former school, tried to illustrate that while these terms were synonymous in the fifth century, they ceased to be in the fourth.<sup>36</sup> The reason for this, he stated, was the rise of 'the great mercenary armies.' This opinion has been successfully challenged. Philippe Gauthier in discussing the term *xenos* at Athens demonstrated the general synonymy of *trophai* and *misthos*.<sup>37</sup> In a more extensive work on the payment of state officials Gabrielsen found that the views of the latter of the two schools was more consistent with the evidence.<sup>38</sup>

There is some room for discussion. Gabrielsen's work did not deal specifically with military payment. Mercenary

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34 Hansen 1979, 10; Griffith 1935, 268. The debate hinges on the loose definitions of Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 62.6 and 42.3, and the fact that both these references can be interpreted one way or the other.

35 Jones 1969, 5-6; Ehrenberg 1943, 229 n.1.

36 Pritchett 1971, 4-6.

37 Gauthier 1976, 20-34. Demosthenes, IV.23, however, distinguishes between both *trophai* and *misthos*.

38 Gabrielsen 1980, 67-79.

payment and the types of pay which mercenaries received needs attention from the military perspective. The introduction of *misthos* in the later fifth century did lead to the introduction of the man who earned such a wage - *misthophoros*. This in itself ought to suggest that the Greeks did give some thought to the specific meaning of their words. Gabrielsen makes much of the fact that *misthos* was intended to buy rations and that rations might be intended for payment. These two phenomena go far to illustrate why there was such a blur between terms.

All of the terms for payment were used for the provisioning of men on campaign. Even *misthos* was used to provision the men. Scholars have noted that *misthos* was synonymous with other general words for army remuneration. *Misthos* could even be payment in kind, i.e. *trophai* and *eis sitesin*.<sup>39</sup> Did it have any specific meaning? Men who received *misthos* - whether jurors or soldiers - were called *misthophoroi* because of their special relationship to a salary. *Misthos* alone defined the *misthophoros*. Remuneration in *misthos* was not always in cash or money, even though there are examples when it was entirely in cash. For example, *chremata* could be represented by *misthos*.<sup>40</sup> *Misthos* could also be paid in Persian Darics.<sup>41</sup>

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39      Dem. XVIII.260.

40      Diod. XVI.28.2, 30.1.

41      Diod. XIII.70.3.

The Phocians certainly paid their mercenaries in coin. *Chremata* were extracted from the Delphians to pay the mercenaries; a number of coins minted by Phocis for the war survive.<sup>42</sup>

A term for food (provisions) was often used in relation to the amount of money which reflected its value.<sup>43</sup> Food could be paid in cash, although money for food (technically *siteresion*) could have been part of a *misthos* payment.<sup>44</sup> A specific example of a *misthos* payment aimed at sustenance comes from the *Anabasis*.<sup>45</sup> It is unlikely that the men to whom Cyrus paid four months *misthos* at Caustru-Pedion were able to save this money, and it must have been spent on food on the subsequent march. *Misthos*, therefore, was used to purchase food and became, in effect, grain-money. If *misthos* was meant as a salary, it would follow that it was paid for services rendered at the end of a period of work and not, as here, in the middle of a work period. Cyrus paid four months' *misthos* when he only owed three.

*Misthos* was not a salary in its modern sense. It was paid, or at least valued, by the month.<sup>46</sup> It did not represent

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42 Diod. XVI.28.2. See also Williams 1976, 22-56.

43 Thuc. V.47.6; VIII.29.1; Xen. *Hell.* I.6.12-13.

44 Krasilnikoff 1993, 80.

45 Xen. *An.* I.2.11-12; Krasilnikoff 1993, 84, argues this point.

46 Xen. *An.* I.1.10, 2.11 and especially 3.21.

money which had a specific purpose (for example, provisions or armour) nor did it need to be paid entirely in coin. It is, however, possible that some part of a *misthos* payment had to be made up of coin. The scholars who note the synonymy of the terms *trophia* and *misthos* cannot prove that coinage was not required as part of a *misthos* payment. *Trophia*, on the other hand, could in some part be paid in coin.<sup>47</sup> It is possible that *misthos* represented payment for specific services, both already or yet to be rendered. The *trophia* provided by Cimon to the Athenian people can be juxtaposed to the *misthos* provided by Pericles in the 'Radical Democracy.'<sup>48</sup> The word *misthos* was originally used for pay to state servants and soldiers. Hence Athenian troops received *misthos* at Potidea.<sup>49</sup> By the fourth century *misthos* was being paid to mercenaries. Pritchett's statement regarding the influence of the great mercenary armies on payment systems and terms seems to have some truth. The appearance and spread of coinage in the Athenian empire of the late fifth century were coincidental to the appearance of *misthos*.

*Trophia* was food or sustenance in a generic sense. *Trophia* might be associated with *ephodia*.<sup>50</sup> *Trophia* could be

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<sup>47</sup> See Demosthenes, IV.28-9, who states that military pay (*trophia*) needs to be paid. He then states that he proposes that *siteresion* be paid to the men and that they should make up their full *misthos* from plunder. All these terms are, therefore, inter-related, and yet coinage, in the form of the two obols paid to the men for *siteresion*, was still part of their full *misthos*. See also Gabrielsen 1980, 71.

<sup>48</sup> Plut. *Cim.* X.1-7.

<sup>49</sup> Thuc. III.17.4.

<sup>50</sup> Dem. XXIII.209.8; Plut. *Mor.* 79.160.B.2. .

associated with *sitos*.<sup>51</sup> *Tropha* might also be denoted by its cash value.<sup>52</sup> *Siteresion* (food money) was clearly akin to *tropha*.<sup>53</sup> Thus *tropha* was a general term used to cover a variety of terms.

*Ephodia* literally meant supplies for campaigning and they were expressed primarily in terms of food, but also as the expenses which the food would cost. The word occurs often in Demosthenes, but sparingly in other authors. It was a necessity for any army.<sup>54</sup> Like other forms of remuneration it was a problem for the general.<sup>55</sup> It can be referred to in terms of the cost of the provisions.<sup>56</sup> It was clearly and primarily food.<sup>57</sup> It is, therefore, not surprising that it can be identified with both *tropha* and *epitedeia*.<sup>58</sup> Demosthenes implies that it is not *misthos* and other monetary capital.<sup>59</sup> A connection to money was possible.<sup>60</sup> For example

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- 51 Diod. XIV.63.3.
- 52 Dem. V.28.
- 53 Harp. *Lex.* 273.11-2, states that '*Siteresion: to didomenon tisin eis trophen.*'
- 54 For examples see Dem. LIII.7.2-3; Ar. *Ach.* 53.4.
- 55 Dem. XIII.20.7-21.1.
- 56 Aesch. I.172.2-3.
- 57 Andoc. *Alc.* 30.3-5.
- 58 Dem. XXIII.209.8; Plut. *Mor.* 79.160.B.2.
- 59 Dem. XXV.56.6-8, L.19.5-6. See also Lys. XII.11.3-4.
- 60 Plut. *Alex.* XV.2-3.

Callicratides gave his soldiers five drachmae of *ephodia*. This was clearly meant as travelling expenses rather than food, because it was paid to them after their journey.<sup>61</sup>

*Ephodia* is often expressed as a cash value if not in itself capital. In all such cases it is a lump sum held by the generals.<sup>62</sup> There is, however, never any suggestion that it might be *siteresion*. Demosthenes' decision not to use *siteresion* in certain passages, combined with the fact that he does use *ephodia* often elsewhere must lead to a belief that he saw them as different things. It may be that they were the same thing, but paid to different soldiers or for different reasons. In sum *ephodia* is either food for a forthcoming campaign, expenses paid after a journey to join a campaign or the provisions for the men on a campaign bought by the general.

Employers determined the amount of *ephodia* that they had available to them in terms of days,<sup>63</sup> and even months.<sup>64</sup> The five drachmae paid by Callicratides is the only known amount of *ephodia*.<sup>65</sup> Regrettably this lump sum gives no indication of the typical amounts paid to troops on campaign.

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61      Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.12-3.

62      Dem. XIX.158.3-5, XXV.56.6-8, LIII.8.8-9; Plut. *Ages.* X.5.4-5.

63      For example see Dem. XXIII.209.8-10.

64      Dem. XIX.158.3-5; Epicharmus. IV.85.5; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.24.

65      Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.12-3.



*Sitos* is grain. It is the staple on which much depended. It is often referred to in terms of its essential nature to a campaign or to survival and also as the chief necessity of all provisions.<sup>66</sup> The sources are often specific in illustrating *sitos* as distinct from other forms of provisions.<sup>67</sup> It is commonly distinguished from *oinos*.<sup>68</sup> That it was not a term to express simply all provisions is clear from the uses of *epitedeia* for both *sitos* and other goods.<sup>69</sup> *Sitos* is often referred to separately from the other provisions.<sup>70</sup> The implication is that *sitos* was a part of the provisions of an army and this is more definitely proven by the fact that nowhere in the sources is grain juxtaposed with *ephodia*. Diodorus twice mentions *sitos* in connection with *trophia*, and this is hardly surprising given the derivation of the latter.<sup>71</sup>

*Sitos* might be supplied by the state,<sup>72</sup> or by the commander

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<sup>66</sup> Thuc. III.27.3, 52.1. See also Xen. *Cyr.* IV.4.4; 5.1; Diod. XII.68.5, XVI.41.4, 75.2, XIX.106.2.

<sup>67</sup> For examples see Xen. *An.* II.2.16, IV.4.9, *Cyr.* I.2.8, *Mem.* I.3.5, III.14.2, 3.1; Diod. XI.57.7, distinguish *sitos* from *opson*. Xen. *An.* II.4.27, *Cyr.* VI.2.22, *Vect.* IV.45.2, distinguish *sitos* from *probata*. Thuc. VI.90.4, VII.24.2; Xen. *An.* II.4.27; Isoc. XVII.57.3-4; Lyc. *Leoc.* XVIII.8-9, XIX.1; Dem. XXXII.15.2-3; Diod. XV.3.3, XVI.75.2, XII.50.5. Plut. *Tim.* XVIII.4; *Dionys.* XLI.1, distinguish *sitos* from *chremata*. Dem. L.17.2-4, distinguishes *sitos* from *misthos*. Andoc. *De Redit.* XI.10, distinguishes *sitos* from *chalkon*.

<sup>68</sup> For example, Xen. *An.* I.4.19, II.3.14, IV.4.9, V.8.3, *Hell.* II.1.19, *Cyr.* VI.2.22, 28 *Mem.* II.9.4, *Vect.* IV.6.3-5, 45.2; Dem. XLII.20.6; XXX.6; XXXI.2-3; Arr. *Anab.* IV.21.10; Diod. XIX.94.3, 97.1. Thucydides, VII.87.2, is the only time *sitos* is distinguished from water (*hydros*).

<sup>69</sup> See Xen. *An.* II.3.14; *Cyr.* IV.4.1, where *epitedeia* is used for both *sitos* and *oinos*. Interestingly Arrian all but distinguishes grain from the *epitedeia* gathered in India at *Anabasis*, V.21.1, where the *sitos* was separate for the other food stuffs, but still part of the *epitedeia*.

<sup>70</sup> For examples see Arr. *Anab.* V.21.1; Diod. XIII.88.6, XIV.63.3, XVI.67.2.

<sup>71</sup> It appears very like *epitedeia* in its relationship to grain in a passage of Diodorus, XIV.63.3.

<sup>72</sup> For examples see Thuc. V.47.6; Diod. XIV.79.4, 95.7.

at a price.<sup>73</sup> It might be procured by the individual soldiers on the campaign either by purchase from the market that accompanied the army,<sup>74</sup> or from local inhabitants.<sup>75</sup> Finally *sitos* might be taken as plunder.<sup>76</sup> It was rare for the commander to provide free *sitos*, and it seems that mercenaries purchased what they needed while on campaign.<sup>77</sup> The commander's responsibilities ran only as far as ensuring that *sitos* was available to the men.<sup>78</sup>

As there is no direct evidence of *sitos* paid to soldiers, it is not possible to establish the regularity and amount of *sitos* if it was used as remuneration. Nevertheless the value of an army's *sitos* might be noted.<sup>79</sup> Thucydides preserves the fact that the Athenians in the mines at Syracuse received just two *kotylai* - about one pint - of grain a day over eight months. This must have been the barest of minima required to survive.<sup>80</sup>

*Siteresion* literally means grain-money. It is most

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<sup>73</sup> Xen. *Hell.* V.4.56; Andoc. *De Redit.* XIV.2-4; Dem. L.17.2-4. Diodorus, XVII.94.4, records that Alexander gave grain as a monthly allowance to the wives of the soldiers under his command.

<sup>74</sup> Xen. *An.* I.5.5 and *Hell.* III.4.11.

<sup>75</sup> Xen. *An.* I.4.19, 5.10; Diod. XVI.13.3.

<sup>76</sup> For examples see Xen. *An.* I.2.19; Diod XII.63.1, XVI.13.3, 56.2.

<sup>77</sup> On this point see Aristotle, *Oec.* 1350 a 32, 1350 b 7 and particularly Griffith 1935, 266.

<sup>78</sup> Well illustrated by Arist. *Oec.* 1351 b.

<sup>79</sup> Xen. *Hell.* V.4.56.

<sup>80</sup> Thuc. VII.87.2.

commonly translated as money paid by the employer for the purchase of rations while on campaign. It was akin to *trophä* as it was used to feed the troops.<sup>81</sup> In the employers' perception it might even have substituted for *trophä*.<sup>82</sup> The *Anabasis* demonstrates that *siteresion* as an alternative to provisions was important to the army's needs.<sup>83</sup> It is juxtaposed specifically to 'salary' only once anywhere.<sup>84</sup> Demosthenes distinguishes between full pay and *siteresion* with the words *misthon enteles* having previously included *siteresion* as part of the full wage.<sup>85</sup> This would suggest that *siteresion* could be considered as part, but not all of a 'full wage' paid to mercenaries in the mid fourth century. Demosthenes and Xenophon illustrate that the responsibility for the payment of *siteresion* rested firmly with the employer, and the passage from Xenophon specifically illustrates that the army expected this.<sup>86</sup> Demosthenes differentiated food-money from both money (*chremata*) and bullion (*argyrion*).<sup>87</sup> It is almost certain, therefore, that *siteresion* only refers to

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81 Harp. *Lex.* 273.11-2, which states, '*Siteresion: to didomenon tisin eis trophen.*'

82 Dem. V.28.

83 Xen. *An.* VI.2.4.

84 Dem. L.10.4-6.

85 Dem. V.28.1

86 Dem. L.10.4-6, V.28; Xen. *An.* VI.2.4.

87 Dem. V.28.3-4.

the purpose for which the payments were to be used and that was for the specific purchase of provisions for the campaign.

The amount of *siteresion* paid was of concern to employer as well as to employed. Demosthenes refers to it as a monthly expenditure to be borne by the employer.<sup>88</sup> The amount was reflected in the number of days for which supply was held.<sup>89</sup> No author explains when and how often the *siteresion* might be paid. It would serve little purpose, however, to pay money specifically as *siteresion* at the end of the month or at the end of service, because such a payment could not be used for the purpose for which it was given. Clearly where food was available either as plunder or in the possession of the employer, it would have served in the place of *siteresion* to spare the employer any responsibilities.<sup>90</sup> This might explain why *siteresion* appears so rarely in the sources.

Demosthenes mentions that *siteresion* ought to be paid to mercenaries in Thrace at the rate of two obols a day.<sup>91</sup> The figure is hypothetical as his plan was never put into operation. It would seem to agree in the view of most researchers with the basic requirements of men in service. Demosthenes is keen to note that *siteresion* was a part of what

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88 Dem. V.28, L.10.4-6.

89 Dem. L.24.10-12.

90 Xen. An. 1.2.19.

91 Dem. V.28.1

he refers to as a full salary. It could be assumed from this that a full salary was higher than two obols a day in the mid-fourth century.

*Sitarchia* was like *siteresion*. Its purpose was the same in that it was paid to the troops to purchase their food. Aristotle notes that it was, like *siteresion*, a part of *misthos*.<sup>92</sup> It would seem that in this instance Timotheus gave his men three months grain without charging them. Gabrielsen concludes that the amount spent on provisions was termed *misthos* by Aristotle and that the philosopher wanted to differentiate between 'monetary payment and rations in kind.'<sup>93</sup>

#### Time of Payment

Regular remuneration was reckoned by the month. Occasionally the sources refer to such remuneration in terms of its value on a daily basis. It is difficult to assess at what times in the month (and how often) wages and other remuneration was paid. A passage in the *Anabasis* refers to payments which will be made at the New Moon.<sup>94</sup> This might refer either to the start or the end of the month. Some forms of remuneration could only have been paid at the start of the

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<sup>92</sup> Arist. *Oec.* 1350a 32-1350b 7.

<sup>93</sup> Gabrielsen 1980, 155.

<sup>94</sup> Xen. *An.* V.6.23.

month. Subsistence money (*siteresion*) would have been useless to the man at the end of the month for which it was paid. Callicratides gave his men *ephodia* as expenses after they had arrived for the campaign.<sup>95</sup> They must have spent money themselves to get to the campaign just as some of Xenophon's troops were said to have done.<sup>96</sup> It is not necessary that the money specifically paid at the end of the month for services rendered was a salary - *misthos* - as Griffith claims.<sup>97</sup> It has been noted that the four months of *misthos* paid near Tarsus when Cyrus only owed three both confuses the term's meaning and identifies that one month's *misthos* was paid in advance. It is clear that there was no set time for the payment of *misthos*.

The financial relationship created at a mercenary's hiring did much to establish the pattern of payment that would continue on in the rest of his employment. The evidence is misleading with regard to whether money changed hands at the start of a mercenary's service. There are many passages which state that as soon as a general had secured funds he hired mercenaries.<sup>98</sup> Similarly, the great employers sent their ambassadors to Greece with large sums of cash in order to hire

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95 Xen. *Hell.* I.6.12-3.

96 Xen. *An.* VI.4.8.

97 Griffith 1935, 265. He notes this point as being 'obvious.'

98 For examples see Diodorus, XV.15.2, 14.3, 70.3, 90.2, XVII.14.1.

mercenaries.<sup>99</sup> Both these statements would suggest that money was required 'up front' in the hiring process. A signing fee may well have been employed to bind a man or a group of men to their promise of service.<sup>100</sup> At other times, however, a promise of the amount of wages to be paid was enough to hire a body of men.<sup>101</sup> Both signing fees and promises of cash no doubt did apply at one time or another, but was the signing fee part of the payment of mercenaries? There is evidence to suggest that the perception that a recruiter had money was enough to draw men into service, even if no money was paid out.<sup>102</sup> The reverse of course was true as well, and men would desert if they thought there was no money available to their commander.<sup>103</sup> If the man was given cash at the start of his service, did these advances set a pattern for the rest of his regular payments? An up-front payment might need to be followed by advance payments to keep the loyalty of a force.

Commanders regularly found themselves in arrears with payments to their men.<sup>104</sup> This would suggest that the men stayed on the campaign in spite of the lack of pay and that

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99 As occurred under Dionysius according to Diodorus, XIV.62.1. For other examples see Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.2 and Isoc. V.96.

100 Dem. L.7. This passage demonstrates that advance payments assisted in the raising of rowers for the manning of ships for the Athenian fleet.

101 Diod. XIV.44.2, XVI.12.3; Xen. *An.* I.4.11-2.

102 Dem. XL.36.

103 Dem. L.11.

104 For examples see Diod. XVI.17.3, 72.1, not to mention Cyrus and Seuthes in the *Anabasis*.

they were paid towards the end of their service for services rendered and that therefore they did not expect payments in advance. Similarly their hopes for their future must have lain with things other than pay. It was rare for mercenaries to revolt from their employer over pay.<sup>105</sup> They were clearly more interested in provisions and sustenance while on campaign and the booty that they might have been able to carry home with them after the campaign's completion.

#### Amount of Pay

Determining the amount of pay that a mercenary received in the fifth and fourth centuries is complicated by the lack of data. This is compounded by the many different ways that a mercenary could expect to be paid. In addition the amount to be paid in theory and what was paid in practice makes it almost impossible to suggest exactly what a mercenary received. The problem discussed below pertains to the amount of pay that the employer gave to the mercenary as defined by their contract. The presence of so many different kinds of pay makes it almost impossible to demonstrate the value of military service. Booty was of varying quantity and quality to the successful soldier.<sup>106</sup> It was of paramount importance to the mercenary's income. The limits of this section

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<sup>105</sup> For examples see Plut. *Dion*, 50; Xen. *An.* 1.3.21. 4.11. Note that neither resulted in a total defection.

<sup>106</sup> For good discussions of booty as part of the mercenaries' wages see Parke 1933, 233; Griffith 1935, 273 and especially Pritchett 1991, 68-203.



encompass only what an employer paid to the men under his command and will not speculate about the amount of booty that might have been available at any single time.

The captains and generals received twice and four times as much pay as regular troops did in any mercenary army.<sup>107</sup> There were also men who were awarded double or even triple pay for their military prowess or efficiency in the armies of Jason of Pherae and Alexander.<sup>108</sup> Similarly, rewards and bounties for successes were regularly associated with campaigns and clearly boosted the income that soldiers may have expected.<sup>109</sup>

Most scholars agree that wages for mercenary service went down through the fourth century. Parke notes the downward trend of wages, juxtaposed to the rising cost of living through the fourth century.<sup>110</sup> Griffith agrees with Parke.<sup>111</sup> He is yet more pessimistic as to the situation facing the ordinary soldier. He sees the few occasions when mercenaries received lucrative remuneration as few and far between and that on the whole mercenaries in the fourth century lived

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107      *Xen. An.* VII.3.10, 6.1.

108      *Xen. Hell.* IV.5.1; *Arr. Anab.* VI.10.1.

109      For example see *Xen. An.* I.4.11, in which promises were made to the Cyreians and *Plut. Dion*, XXXI in which the Syracusans gave Dion's mercenaries 100 minae.

110      Parke 1933, 231-3.

111      Griffith 1935, 273, 298.

'from hand to mouth.'<sup>112</sup> Like Parke he views the high pay of Cyrus, Jason of Pherae, and the Phocian generals as 'notable exceptions' to the rule. McKechnie, who is more interested in the 'level of prosperity' of mercenaries, is less eager to pursue the deflation of mercenary wages in the middle of the fourth century than Parke and is almost positive in his assessment that mercenary pay was not that bad.<sup>113</sup> He is supported most recently by Krasilnikoff.<sup>114</sup> Miller avoids the downward trend, while not discarding it entirely, he relates the available manpower to the amount of wages paid. He concludes that 'on the whole formal wages were low.'<sup>115</sup> He blames the failure of wages to keep pace with inflation on the fact that they decreased in real terms in the fifth and fourth centuries rather than that they declined in themselves.

In the fifth century mercenary wages were linked to the amount of money paid to troops for citizen service overseas. The precedent set by the Athenian payment of troops and jurors is reflected in the one drachma a day paid for themselves and another to support their servants.<sup>116</sup> The development of the payment of citizens had a long history through the fifth

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112 Griffith 1935, 273.

113 McKechnie 1989, 89.

114 Krasilnikoff 1993, 95.

115 Miller 1984, 155.

116 Thuc. III.17.4.

century. The fact that the mercenaries of Cyrus were paid a daric a month, which is almost a drachma a day, must reflect a common pay scale at the time and have some links to previous stratiotic *misthos*.<sup>117</sup> Indeed Roy believes that the contract between Cyrus and these men reflects a tradition that dates back through the fifth century and was not simply created for the campaign of 401 B.C.<sup>118</sup>

The first chronological reference for the amount paid to men in service comes in Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles* for payment to men in the service of the state.<sup>119</sup> In 480 B.C. Thetes received two obols a day for their services. In the same year each man embarked by the Areopagus was given eight drachmae for their families?<sup>120</sup> Gomme, following a passage in Plutarch's *Pericles*, believes that one and a half drachmae a day was paid to citizens training on triremes in the 450s.<sup>121</sup> On the whole the evidence prior to the Peloponnesian war for the money paid to citizens of Athens, and as ever it is only Athens that provides any direct evidence, is very patchy.

Thucydides cites nine examples of the amount of *misthos* paid to soldiers and sailors serving in the Peloponnesian war.

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117 Xen. *An.* I.3.21.

118 Roy 1967, 316.

119 Plut. *Them.* X.

120 Pritchett 1971, 11.

121 Plut. *Per.* XI.4; Pritchett 1971, 8.

One drachma a day is the common rate, but in 412 *nautoi* in the fleet received a meagre three obols a day.<sup>122</sup> Aristophanes confirms the accepted one drachma for service in the year 425.<sup>123</sup> The *Wasps*, however, illustrates that three obols a day was a wage that the recipients were 'happy to get!' in the same year.<sup>124</sup> But in the same play two obols appears to be the rate for a campaign.<sup>125</sup> On the basis of this second passage Ehrenberg suggests that two obols a day was the common rate for Athenian service overseas.<sup>126</sup> As a minimum, two obols relates well with the food-money (*siteresion*) suggested by Demosthenes for subsistence in Thrace in the mid-fourth century.<sup>127</sup> Xenophon has Lysander's ambassadors trying to get Cyrus to pay one Attic drachma a day to *nautoi* in order to attract sailors of the Athenian fleet to their cause in 407.<sup>128</sup> The Persians agree to four obols a day *misthos* to replace the figure of three.<sup>129</sup> This would suggest that for

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122 Thuc. III.17.4, VI.8.1, 31.3, VII.27.2, VIII.29, VIII.45.2, 45.2, 101.13.

123 Ar. *Ach.* 159; Griffith 1935, 295. Griffith assumes that the figure of one drachma given by Aristophanes is not serious. He believes it is for a combination of *misthos* and *sitos* and is therefore two thirds of a hoplite's income.

124 Ar. *Vesp.* 682-685.

125 Ar. *Vesp.* 1188-9.

126 Ehrenberg 1970, 228 n. 2.

127 Dem. IV.29.1.

128 Xen. *Hell.* I.5.4.

129 Xen. *Hell.* I.5.7.

sailors at least four obols was above the basic amount that they could expect. As a result, one drachma was a really good wage. At the end of the fifth century the money that Cyrus paid to his *xenoi*, one drachma a day, was well above the average amounts noted for other types of military service.<sup>130</sup> Some have suggested that this was because of the gravity of the cause and others cite the rarity of Greek hoplites in eastern service.<sup>131</sup> It may have been neither, and a drachma was the 'going rate.'

The great employers of mercenaries in the fifth century came at the end of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth centuries. There are no figures to illustrate what Dionysius I paid to his mercenaries. He was generous in these payments especially in times of need.<sup>132</sup> He also paid them *misthos*.<sup>133</sup> The first large mobile army of mercenaries provides the first real glimpse of the rate of pay for mercenaries in the field. Cyrus' army of Greeks contracted at a daric each month, which is approximately five obols a day, as their basic salary. This was raised to seven and a half obols a day, or a daric and a half a month, when the men began thinking that the real

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130 Plutarch, *Alc.* XXXV.4 notes that in 408 B.C. Alcibiades paid his sailors three obols a day.

131 Parke 1933, 232-3.

132 Diod. XIV.8.6, 44.2, 62.1, XV.47.7, 91.4.

133 Diod. XIII.95.1.

target of the expedition was the Great King.<sup>134</sup> Timasion and Seuthes promised them the same as Cyrus had done originally.<sup>135</sup> Xenophon also points out that Thibron said that he would also pay them a Daric a month.<sup>136</sup> Cyrus' generous payment of a Daric a month was clearly less of a precedent and more likely to have been accepted practice for mercenaries in the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>137</sup>

There is another problem with regard to the amount of payment provided to mercenaries. The money provided to the men would have been high had it been *misthos* in addition to expenses paid while on the campaign. Once deductions for food are taken into consideration, the Daric a month becomes much less valuable than otherwise it would have been. Some scholars believe that Cyrus gave his men free *sitos*.<sup>138</sup> Indeed, nowhere in the *Anabasis* are the men given free *sitos*. The same is true of *siteresion* which is not paid to Xenophon's men by any of their commanding officers.<sup>139</sup> In reality it would appear that the men had to pay for their food themselves

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134      *Xen. An.* I.3.21.

135      *Xen. An.* V.6.23 notes that Timasion promised one Cyzicene a month. *Xen. An.* VII.2.36 also details Seuthes' promise to pay to each soldier one Cyzicene.

136      *Xen. An.* VII.6.1.

137      Roy 1967, 309-10.

138      Griffith 1935, 267.

139      *Xen. An.* VI.5.4, for the fact that Cyrus had made *sitos* available to the mercenaries.

from the markets that were available to them. Only occasionally on the outward march were they allowed to plunder the countryside.<sup>140</sup> The only possible evidence to the contrary is the fact that Cyrus paid *misthos* to the men in advance.<sup>141</sup> This *misthos* may in reality have been money for food which Xenophon neglected to call *siteresion*.

The evidence for payment of mercenaries in the period 399-322 B.C. is poor. There are only two pieces of written documentation that have any value at all. The first comes from Xenophon's *Hellenica* and concerns the Spartan decision to allow their allies in the Peloponnesian League to furnish money instead of men to the Peloponnesian league.<sup>142</sup> The league decreed the payment of three Aeginetan obols (i.e. four and a half Attic obols) for each man which each state would normally provide. The figure of three Aeginetan obols has been taken to represent pay for mercenaries who would replace the troops normally sent by member states. This is supported by the fact that Xenophon uses *misthos* in the passage.<sup>143</sup> There are problems with this. *Misthos* is only used with regard to the cavalry and not the infantry.<sup>144</sup> The money does

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140      *Xen. An.* I.2.19.

141      *Xen. An.* I.2.12.

142      *Xen. Hell.* V.2.21.

143      Griffith 1935, 296.

144      *Xen. Hell.* V.21.4.

not need to be related to the pay of mercenaries.<sup>145</sup> The Athenian league assessed its taxes in relation to the amount a state could afford. The Spartans welcomed this new system, in much the same way in which the Athenians in charge of the Delian League saw it as a benefit in the fifth century for their own citizens' pockets as well as for the control of their league. The Spartans could have used the money to pay fewer professionals, some of whom no doubt came from Laconia, who would also be a more effective fighting force than amateur citizens.<sup>146</sup> In any case, this figure of four and a half Attic obols (three Aeginetan obols) a day as *misthos* might be used as a base line for the payment of mercenaries in 383 B.C.<sup>147</sup>

The other piece of evidence concerns mercenaries directly. It remains questionable. In the *First Philippic* produced in 351 B.C. Demosthenes outlines a plan for financing an Athenian army in Thrace.<sup>148</sup> McKechnie thinks this evidence is of no value because it is only hypothetical and the plan was never adopted.<sup>149</sup> Parke also questions its value, but he willingly uses it to strengthen his argument that mercenaries were

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145 Williams 1976, 54 n.2. Williams thinks that this was intended for Spartan citizens and not mercenaries.

146 The professional cores of citizen levies were becoming common through the fourth century B.C. For example the Thebans established their Sacred Band and the Arcadian league the *epilektoi*. Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.13 notes the 'Eleian Three Hundred.' In 349 B.C. the Athenians even had *epilektoi* at Tamynae.

147 Parke 1933, 232.

148 Dem. IV.28.

149 McKechnie 1989, 89.



poorly paid, advising that 'Demosthenes is trying to be as economical as possible.'<sup>150</sup> Williams, more ingenuously, tries to use Demosthenes' figure to provide a model to demonstrate the rate of pay given to Phocian mercenaries in the Third Sacred War, which was fought at the same time that the speech was produced.<sup>151</sup> The two obols suggested by Demosthenes is not referred to as a salary - *misthos* - at all, only as *siteresion*, and this would suggest that it was not wages. It was after all suggested as an economic solution to Athenian problems. If the *siteresion* was meant as salary in itself, it was low. The mercenaries' primary income was to come from plunder. Demosthenes notes that recourse to this would make up a mercenary's full pay - *misthon enteles*.<sup>152</sup> Griffith appears to be confused in assuming that *misthos* and *sitos* can be combined in Demosthenes' plan to produce a wage of between four obols and one drachma a day.<sup>153</sup> Demosthenes mentions only *siteresion* to be paid to the men. No other provision for the men is the state's responsibility.

The Third Sacred War kept thousands of mercenaries employed in central Greece at the same time as Demosthenes produced his

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150 Parke 1933, 232.

151 See Williams 1976, 53-4. He states that it is hard to see how '[i]t might be argued that this sum is a ration allowance not pay (*siteresion* not *misthos*) and that regular pay would be expected in addition.' Nowhere does Demosthenes say that the money to be paid was anything but *siteresion*. Williams here seems correct to suggest that Demosthenes is arguing 'that the mercenary soldier [was] guaranteed subsistence and transport (the ten triremes) to an area where by plunder he could make up his full pay - *misthon enteles*.'

152 Dem. IV.29.

153 Griffith 1935, 297.

*First Philippic*. It is regrettable that Diodorus, the main source, never says how much the Phocian mercenaries were paid. They were paid above the average, for on several occasions the generals raised the rate of *misthos* by fifty to one hundred per cent, and so they attracted the 'best' mercenaries in Greece.<sup>154</sup> Williams using Demosthenes' two obols a day concludes that (if this had been a daily rate) the total wages' bill for the Phocian mercenaries would have been 1,622 talents.<sup>155</sup> A higher figure for the wages paid to each mercenary may be countenanced based on the fact that Demosthenes' figure was low (it did not consider the special increments) and the mercenaries need not have been employed all year round. Williams states that Isocrates' statement that Athens had spent more than a thousand talents on mercenaries in the Social War would make mercenary wages higher in the middle of the fourth century.<sup>156</sup> It is necessary to consider other variables in this campaign as Timotheus also had thirty triremes under his command. Unfortunately neither of Williams' sources refer to the Phocian situation, while Demosthenes was dealing with

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154 Diod. XVI.25.1, 30.1, 36.1.

155 Williams 1976, 54, working on the fact that there were 8,000 mercenaries serving for ten years produced the following equation: 8,000 (men) x 1/3 drachma (2 obols per day) x 3,650 days (the duration of the war) = 9,733,332.3 drachmas or 1,622 talents (total wages' bill).

156 Isoc. XV.111. Williams deduces from the statement that Timotheus had with him 8,000 peltasts for the ten month siege of Samos and only 1,000 talents to prosecute the war that wages would have been high. A simple calculation reveals that had all this money been paid to the peltasts in this period they would have earned two and a half drachmas a day, a figure which would seem unreasonably high for any military service in the fourth century. See Moysey 1985, 221 following Polyaeus, III.10.9-10 to the effect that only 7,000 mercenaries served with Timotheus at Samos.

*siteresion* and not *misthos*, and furthermore it is not known how many mercenaries Athens employed during the Social War. Williams believes that the 8,000 men with Timotheus on Samos were the only mercenaries employed by the Athenians in that war, but there could easily have been more. Accordingly, Williams optimistically proposes that the daily wage for the 8,000 Phocian mercenaries was conceivably four Attic obols a day.<sup>157</sup> He supports this view by drawing on sources from the very late fourth century.<sup>158</sup> Diodorus is clear that in order to raise troops quickly the Phocian generals twice offered wage increases. McKechnie, primarily following the evidence for the Phocian campaigns, postulates that mercenaries were not that badly paid in the middle of the fourth century.<sup>159</sup> It is regrettable that the basic wage, upon which the subsequent increases were entirely dependant, is never mentioned.<sup>160</sup> In the end there is no way of telling how well off those who flocked to Phocis could become. It can be concluded that the worst that the Phocian mercenaries received after their increased wages was four Attic obols a day. The highest that they could have been paid cannot be known. If it

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Accordingly Williams 1976, 54, suggests an equation for the cost of the Phocian war. The total for the ten years of the Phocian war would therefore be less than 3,500 talents, following the equation; 8,000 (men) x 3,650 (days) x 4 Attic obols (daily wage) = 19,466,664 drachmas or 3,244.4 talents (total cost of the war).

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Williams 1976, 54, n.6, following Menander, *Peri Keiromene*, 190 cited in Edmonds 1134 (dated to 313 B.C.); Menander, *Olynthia*, frag. 357 in Edmonds 698-9 (dated 314 B.C.)

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McKechnie 1989, 89. This is view more recently discussed by Krasilnikoff 1993, 93.

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Diodorus remains unclear on this point. Twice he states, (Diod. XVI.25; 30.1), that the basic wage was raised half as much again and a third time (Diod. XVI.36.1) twice as much as the basic wage. There is no implication that the second raise was based on the already inflated wages from the previous one.

is assumed that they received no more than those who followed Cyrus fifty years previously, then the incredible figure of two drachmas a day might be postulated.

The evidence for later in the fourth century provides little information for mercenary remuneration. Alexander's Macedonians received no less than forty drachmas a month.<sup>161</sup> There is nothing to suggest what he paid to his mercenaries. By the end of his Persian campaigns money was not an object for him and his wealth would have been astronomical. It is possible that the mercenaries received almost as much as the Macedonians did, if not more, and that the great successes of Alexander in the east left all who accompanied the Macedonians (and survived) well off from pay, donations and plunder.<sup>162</sup>

The wage that a mercenary received in the fifth and fourth centuries stemmed from what their citizen counterparts could hope to be paid by the state. At the same time, these citizen soldiers were not the only men in receipt of *misthos*. There was a definite relationship between wage earning in the service of the state as a hoplite as there was for the service of the state as a juror.<sup>163</sup> The figures for skilled and unskilled labour demonstrate an approximation to mercenary

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<sup>161</sup> This point is mentioned by Parke 1933, 233. Alexander paid his allies one drachma a day and Parke rightly says there is no reason to believe that he paid his mercenaries more or less. Parke states that '[t]he only safe conclusion is that the Macedonian common soldier received definitely less than four stater a month (probably Attic, and so equal to forty drachmae) which was pay of a higher rank. The allies were paid one drachma *per diem*.'

<sup>162</sup> Plut. *Alex.* XL, records the great indulgences of Alexander's followers after his victories. See Diod. XVII.64.6; Plut. *Alex.* XLII, for Alexander's donations.

<sup>163</sup> Parke 1933, 231.

wages ranging as they do from between three obols to two drachmae a day.<sup>164</sup> The worker might be paid piecemeal rather than by the amount of time that it took to do the job. The status of the employee might also have played a role in the amount received rather than the job that they did. Labourers were very similar to the Greek mercenary in this respect. Mercenaries were paid both for their success on campaign and for their status within it, as an officer or an ordinary soldier. Moses Finley noted the abstract nature of both labour and wages for work done, as opposed to the value of a product.<sup>165</sup> Military service did not produce a product which could be purchased. A soldier's value was determined in less tangible ways. Alison Burford has stressed that there was little correlation between a profession and a wage. Professionals were not paid for what they did, but were paid according to their status.<sup>166</sup> Mercenaries were professionals only insofar as they could expect remuneration for a service that they rendered to an employer. The fact that some soldiers were remunerated with higher rewards than others after their successes on campaigns demonstrates that there was a value that could be placed on success. The sources however demonstrate that the reward was more for bravery (*andreia*) and

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164 See table II.

165 Finley 1973, 65-66.

166 Burford 1972, 121. See 27-32 above which notes the importance of regularity of a wage to professional military service and subsequently chapter 52-63 above which notes the importance of the term *misthophoros* and regular wages.

physical fitness than actual individual skill (*techne*) at waging war.<sup>167</sup> This seems untrue with regard to rowers in a trireme, the *thranites* was better paid than the other rowers lower in the ship. Even if the *thranites* received money for his status rather than his ability, there is enough evidence to suggest that value was placed on the best rowers and that they were paid the best wages.<sup>168</sup>

The two attributes for which rewards were given to the infantry, bravery and fitness, were both expected of the Greek citizen in pursuit of normally acceptable goals within the city-state. Like these, hoplite warfare was an expected attribute of the model citizen within the state. *The Laches* portrays hoplite warfare as a thing that cannot be taught or learned. In Nicias' opinion only fighting in single combat required knowledge or learning.<sup>169</sup> The level of pay for the officers further bears this point out. The *lochagoi*, literally file leaders, were paid double that which the rank and file were paid in every instance where pay strata are recorded. They were paid for their position in the front line as much as for their rank.<sup>170</sup> This is an ideology which is

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<sup>167</sup> Isocrates, V.I.9, bears this point out as men who risked more received higher wages. For other examples see Xen. *Hell.* VI.1.6 which notes Jason rewarded the lover of toil (*philoponos*) and danger (*philokindynos*) in war.

<sup>168</sup> Dem. L.30.

<sup>169</sup> Pl. *Lach.* 181 d - 182 c.

<sup>170</sup> Xen. *An.* III.1.37. The onus placed upon these men was great. They were supposed to set an example of great bravery in times of war, see especially Xen. *An.* V.2.11, for the 'manliness' of the captains on the *anabasis*.

found in the fourth century and is found in Homer.<sup>171</sup> It is interesting in this regard to find that Abreas, called the double pay man by Arrian, is in fact the double lot or fortune man. The word used of his reward - *moira* - was regarded as one's destined lot on earth. The payment and the fate of the man were interlinked both in Homer and in Arrian.<sup>172</sup>

Skill (*techne*), at least in theory, played little role in hoplite warfare. Morale and courage had far greater roles to play on the battlefield and formal training was very limited.<sup>173</sup> If this view of skill was the reality there is little doubt that the Greeks would see no reason to base a pay system on one's skill or ability in the field as opposed to one's bravery.

The payment of *misthos* at Athens, and on the Greek mainland, was introduced for citizens in state service. There is no evidence to suggest that it was introduced to pay skilled and non-skilled labourers. If Humphries' analysis is correct, and a two tiered economic system existed at Athens by the late fifth century, in which citizens received coinage for political and military service, then citizenship and the receipt of *misthos* had become mutual. The wage-earner was therefore a state employee. He was not, however, paid for the

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171 Hom. *Il.* XII.310-321.

172 Arr. *Anab.* VI.10.1. See Adkins 1972, 19, but also Hom. *Il.* XXIII.78-80, for illustrations of *moira* as inescapable destiny.

173 Specifically see Hanson 1995, 305-6; Ridley 1979, 534-544. Ridley sees very little formal military training in Athens.

performance of a craft or for the production of a product. As a state employee he might be a hoplite on state service abroad, and as such the wage was not for the military service, but for the state service. Hoplite warfare was not a craft. For a man to have a craft was neither honourable nor honoured in the Greek state.<sup>174</sup> Craftsmanship was associated with work. Wage earning was also bad as it ran contrary to the Greek ideals of self-sufficiency and freedom. It was bad enough for the *misthophoros* to take a wage for service under an employer, even if that employer was the amorphous state. To be associated with a craftsman, and therefore with a slave or with a hired man, was stigma. The monies paid to mercenaries in the fifth and fourth centuries ranged from one and a half drachmae a day to a paltry two obols a day proposed by Demosthenes. This suggests that wages declined during the period despite specific moments of greater prosperity. The decline in wages which is often referred to by historians may not be so glaring as they surmise. If Cyrus' men while on the *anabasis* did not receive expenses in addition to *misthos*, then mercenary wages were low even at the start of the fourth century. Provisions might have cost at least two obols; thus in real terms Xenophon's colleagues received three to four obols a day.<sup>175</sup> Some mercenaries like Nicostratus died

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<sup>174</sup> Vidal-Naquet 1978, 141-2, argues that the manoeuvres of the fleet were described in terms of skill in direct juxtaposition to the operations of the army.

<sup>175</sup> Dem. IV.28; Ar. *Vesp.* 682-5.



wealthy, but most did not.<sup>176</sup> Inevitably supply and demand affected the amount that mercenaries were paid. No doubt demand dictated the payment of mercenaries as well as the type of mercenaries who served. Clearly those who fought with the Phocians and Dionysius I were better remunerated than those unlucky enough to serve less desperate or less wealthy paymasters.

### Theory and Practice.

This chapter has so far dealt with the theory of mercenary payments. Theoretical payments in the sources, however, were a far cry from the reality for the men of the line. The importance of patronage has already been implied in chapter III above and is discussed extensively in chapter VI below. The general's success or failure meant a great deal to everyone in the army. There is even a frightening lack of confidence demonstrated by soldiers (and sailors) in service with regard to provisioning, let alone payment on campaign.<sup>177</sup> The mere possibility that a commander was running low on resources was enough to cause the men to desert to another employer, as happened to the Athenian trierarchs. Cyrus was able to withhold payment for three months before he was 'forced' to hand over wages (*misthos*). But Cyrus was a

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Isae. IV.1. Nicostratus died leaving two talents after eleven years of service overseas.

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Dem. L.7-11; XL.36.

Persian prince and would be Great King. His person alone, not to mention his cause, must surely have been enough to keep the troops loyal to him while on the campaign. In spite of Diodorus' claims that he was very generous to the men on the march to Babylon, there is no concrete evidence that they received anything from Cyrus after he paid them four months *misthos* at Caystru-Pedion.<sup>178</sup> He made promises to them all of donatives and pay once the war was won. These promises disappeared with his death. This situation is an excellent illustration of the bind that the mercenaries were in. If they succeeded in putting Cyrus on the throne, they would have been well rewarded. Defeat left them with nothing. At the same time the employer had everything to gain in the event of victory. In short, he had nothing to lose by the employment of mercenaries from across the sea. Cyrus proved that if men perceived potential gain from following him, then there was nothing that could stop him gaining an army to do whatever it was he required. Seuthes provided nothing for the men who served with him. His contract with Xenophon is more like an alliance rather than employment.<sup>179</sup> The army foraged for their own food and Seuthes paid them from the booty that they had seized from the war. Seuthes on the other hand got a crack fighting force of heavy infantry that enabled him to

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178      Diod. XIV.19.9, 21.6.

179      Xen. An. VII.3.10.

greatly enlarge his kingdom in Thrace. Despite the fact that he was paying them from the booty that they raised for him, he was still unable to pay them what he had agreed. It took a great deal of shrewd negotiations from Xenophon to get money out of the king.<sup>180</sup>

The promise of wages was often used to hire mercenaries in the fourth century. Cyrus was not the only employer who commanded troops who followed him more in the hopes of a big reward (including plunder) than for regular receipt of pay. Polyaeus records that Iphicrates regularly withheld pay to keep the men from deserting.<sup>181</sup> Timotheus had his men work to produce materials that he could sell to make up the wages he owed to them.<sup>182</sup> Demosthenes hoped to pay the men *siteresion monon* and have them make up the rest with plunder.<sup>183</sup> The fact that poverty would keep the men both loyal, mean, and hungry no doubt also appealed to commanders and employers alike.<sup>184</sup> There were no pensions and no responsibilities placed upon the employers for the men under their command. If a mercenary died, that was one fewer man to pay. In short,

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180 Xen. *An.* VII.7.25-46.

181 Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.9.51.

182 Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.10.9.

183 Dem. IV.29.1; Parke 1933, 232. The latter notes the author's belief in the practical possibilities of the plan to pay the men from the recovered booty in the war.

184 Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.9.35, notes that when his army was poor, Iphicrates would march to the sea coast and to the uninhabited areas where soldier's expenses would be low, but when his finances were good he took them to cities and to rich countries where they would spend their money and their subsequent poverty would make them fight harder.

mercenaries were an efficient way to run an armed force especially in view of the employer's ability to hire and fire when and if the situation demanded.

V

**HIRING GREEK MERCENARIES**

## INTRODUCTION

Mercenaries were available throughout the later fifth and fourth centuries. Nowhere in the sources do commanders have problems in hiring men because of their lack of availability. Even when they were in the most unlikely of settings, for examples outside of urban centres or away from the coast, commanders could hire men quickly and easily and even for a spur of the moment campaign.<sup>1</sup> But hiring mercenaries could well have involved a well established, technical and understood process. Roy considered that mercenary hiring systems developed long before the mass hirings of Cyrus the Younger and the fourth century.<sup>2</sup> Marinovic proclaimed that it was through the fourth century that a system of *louage* developed.<sup>3</sup> The following analysis will illustrate the problems and the nature of hiring mercenaries in the Greek world.

## HIRING

There were four different interest groups concerned with the hiring process - employers, generals (*strategoi*) commanders (*lochagoi*, *phrourarchoi* and *archontes*) and soldiers. In the previous chapter these interest groups

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<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Pel.* XXVII. Pelopidas in Thessaly was able to hire mercenaries to campaign with him when he could not take the Theban citizenry.

<sup>2</sup> Roy 1967, 316.

<sup>3</sup> Marinovic 1988, 267.

reflected differing pay strata. On occasion the employer and the general were one and the same person. Without the presence of the employer who could provide reward there was no possibility of mercenary service. The opportunity for employment must have played a major part in the hiring process. Without a war to fight men could not be employed. Bodyguards - *doryphoroi* - would have permanent employment and like garrison troops were hired through the connections that they had made with employers.<sup>4</sup> Mercenaries hoped that loyal service might lead to positions with wealthy dynasts which were lucrative and less dangerous than those held by front line soldiers.<sup>5</sup> The large scale hiring of mercenaries took place in the period after the later fifth century B.C.

It would seem natural that the soldier would associate his service with the individual with whom he had served or for whom he was serving. The speaker of Isaeus II and his brother took themselves off to Thrace with Iphicrates and not with a specific military unit.<sup>6</sup> The man that they associated with on the campaign was their commander, and the fact that he was an Athenian like themselves is telling in the way that they became Greek mercenaries. Xenophon was an old *xenos* of Proxenus, who was also the reason that Xenophon went on the

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4      *Xen. An.* VI.4.8.

5      *Xen. An.* I.4.15.

6      *Isac.* II.6.

campaign into Asia.<sup>7</sup> He says many men brought others with them, and this seems to be an allusion to a hiring network.<sup>8</sup> Cyrus relied on his overseas friends (*xenoi*) for recruiting men for the *anabasis*. Xenophon called Proxenus, Sophaenetus, Socrates and Aristippus *xenoi*.<sup>9</sup> These relationships aided the hiring process, and trusted companions would be recalled to serve many times over. They provided the connections that gave opportunity for service from employers to generals to the men of the line.<sup>10</sup>

The employer dealt with mercenaries through intermediaries. For their part the generals held high enough profile to have personal dealings with major employers - kings and princes. They could approach the employer themselves,<sup>11</sup> but some employers might request a specific general to command armies for them<sup>12</sup> or even to raise men for a campaign.<sup>13</sup> The

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7 Xen. *An.* III.1.4.

8 Xen. *An.* VI.4.8. According to Xenophon men brought other men with them. See also Xen. *An.* I.1.9, which notes that Clearchus became a close colleague of Cyrus with the express view of establishing power through hiring mercenaries.

9 *Xenia* and *philia* are fully discussed in the next chapter on pages 296-305.

10 Xen. *An.* I.7.4, makes Cyrus clearly say that many of the men would not wish to return home, but remain in his service. Refer again to Xen. *An.* VI.4.8, for those who knew that being the friend of Cyrus would be worth more than any money that they could make in the short term. For another example of this see Xen. *An.* VII.8.11, as Xenophon wanted to give rewards to specific captains to whom he was close (*philoí*).

11 Isoc. V.61-2, for Conon who approached the generals of the Great King while in exile. See also Xen. *An.* I.1.10, for an officer of Cyrus who approached the prince himself, Arystippus.

12 Xen. *An.* I.1.9-11. Here Xenophon attests this as the most common way that Cyrus raised his armies on the Greek mainland, through men like Proxenus. See also Diodorus, XV.29.3, who notes that Pharnabazus, while acting for Artaxerxes, requested Iphicrates to command his invasion of Egypt while Diod. XV.29.1, records that Acoris sent for Chabrias. Plutarch, *Ages.* XXXVI, shows that Agesilaus was offered a command in Egypt.

13 Xen. *An.* I.1.11. This was clearly a function of the general as well as the captains and other officers under his command.



presence of intermediaries between the employer, the general and the men is well attested.<sup>14</sup> The importance of such a role is demonstrated by the kinds of men sent on these expeditions. For example, the Carthaginians sent senior ambassadors - *presbeis* - to hire 'european' (and therefore not likely Greek) mercenaries.<sup>15</sup> Knossian *presbeis* also hired those who had fled with Phalaecus at the end of the Sacred War.<sup>16</sup> Even the city-states themselves were not above acting as intermediaries for the employment of mercenary troops. This was certainly true of the Spartans,<sup>17</sup> and the sources also point to Thebes<sup>18</sup> and Argos as doing the same thing.<sup>19</sup> The exchanging of hired Greeks can be found among potentates of the east.<sup>20</sup> It would be of great interest to know how these states collected the mercenaries that they sent overseas and whether they were citizens. Did the state merely act as the loosest of go-

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14 This point is discussed below, but for examples of intermediaries see Xen. *An.* I.1.6, for *phourarchoi*; I.3.20, for *oi hairatoi* or deputies between Cyrus and the men; Diod. XVI.62.1, for *archontes*; Isoc. V.96, for *xenologoí* and Aeneas Tacticus, XXII.29, who attests the presence of a *proxenos* between state and the mercenary.

15 Diod. XIV.47.3.

16 Diod. XVI.62.3.

17 See Xen. *An.* I.4.3, for the fact that the Spartans sent an officer with 700 mercenaries under his command from the Peloponnese to assist Cyrus. Diodorus, XIV.58.1, notes that they gave their permission to employers to hire as indicative of this phenomenon and Diod. XIV.44.1-2, for Dionysius I hiring mercenaries through the Lacedaimonians.

18 Diod. XVI.34.1; Dem. XXIII.183. Thebes acted for the Persian King in sending Pammenes with a mercenary force to Asia. Diod. XVI.44.2, Lacrates the Theban had the same task. See Parke 1933, 124. Parke claims that the men under Pammenes were not Thebans as they would never have allowed Artabanus to remove their commander. Note, however that Prichett 1974, 90-2, claims that Pammenes was not himself a mercenary, but was leading men for his home state Thebes who may well have been mercenaries themselves.

19 Diod. XVI.44.2, notes that Argos sent 'the flatterer' Nicostratus in command of men for Artaxerxes' invasion of Egypt.

20 Diod. XVI.42.2, for the Egyptian king Tachos, who sent Tennes 4,000 Greeks under the command of Mentor. See also Lewis 1977, 59, who follows Thuc. I.115.4 and Diod. XII.27.3. Lewis believes that the 700 mercenaries were gifts from Pissuthnes.

betweens and were the mercenaries paid only by the employer? In the case of Sparta some control over the Peloponnesians was exercised from home.<sup>21</sup> Whatever the truth, the Spartans required an employer to obtain permission from them to recruit in the Peloponnese.<sup>22</sup> In times of war it is unlikely that other city-states allowed their citizens to fight for foreign powers, although there is no evidence of this stipulation being applied outside of Sparta.<sup>23</sup>

Isocrates describes the *xenologos* or hiring officer as a prominent figure in the early fourth century.<sup>24</sup> This man made his living by acting as a go-between for the employer and the employee. It is not clear as to whether he was a soldier himself or a professional recruiter. It could be that Isocrates is making a point in his usual rhetorical way against the general trend towards 'professionalisation.' Only one of the men whom Cyrus had recruited for him is described as a *xenologos*, and he is Clearchus.<sup>25</sup> It is more often used as a verb for recruiting especially by Diodorus.<sup>26</sup> It is not

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21 Diod. XIV.78. Dionysius sent the commander of his mercenaries, Aristotle, back to Sparta to stand trial.

22 Isoc. XI.18.

23 The Athenian orations do have examples of men who slipped in and out of Athens for short term gain; Isac. IX.14, presents a man always careful to fight for Athens as well as going abroad. Isac. IV. 29, notes the reverse was true of Chariades who never served the state as a soldier nor made any other contribution.

24 Isoc. V.96.

25 Xen. An. I.1.9; Diod. XIV.12.9. Diodorus uses the word as a verb in this instance while Xenophon uses the word *lambanein* to describe the action of Clearchus the *xenologos* in recruiting men for the campaign.

26 Diod. XIV.12.9, XV.2.4, 90.2, 91.1.

used prolifically as a noun in the sources. Gabrielsen identifies the use of *xenotrophein* to describe the hiring of mercenaries.<sup>27</sup> This is interesting as it has a connection to the remuneration provided to mercenaries.

Aeneas preserves an obscure illustration of state and mercenary relationships when he writes,

[w]henever a man who has a turn at the watch does not report for duty, his *lochagos* should at once sell his position - *autou parachrema ten phylaken apodostho* - for whatever it may bring and put another man on guard to take his place. Then the *proxenos*, the same day, should pay the money to the man who has purchased the post, and on the following day the *taxiarchos* should impose on the *proxenos* the customary fine.<sup>28</sup>

This passage appears to suggest that the intermediary was responsible both for the provision of the mercenary and for his deeds after hiring. Aeneas had made it clear that the two other officers mentioned would be citizens of the state.<sup>29</sup> Yet, while the passage is vague, it can be explained by reference to an earlier statement of the same author. Here he stated that

[t]he wealthiest citizens should be required to provide mercenaries - *xenoi* - each according to his means.<sup>30</sup>

The captain received money from a citizen to procure

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27 Gabrielsen 1981, 154; Dem. XI.18; Aen. Tact. XIII.1.

28 Aen. Tact. XXII.29.

29 Aen. Tact. XIII.2.

30 Aen. Tact. XIII.1.

another mercenary - who was then reimbursed by the contractor. It strongly implies that a common procedure was well established in the relationship between state and contractor in the middle of the fourth century B.C. It might illustrate that the arrangement made by the Peloponnesian league in 383 B.C., whereby states provided coin instead of soldiers for the league's army, did in fact mean that the Spartans hired men directly with the money provided by the member states.<sup>31</sup> This passage by Aeneas also suggests that the contractor had responsibilities that went beyond just the provision of soldiers.

The *Anabasis* demonstrates that the man who recruited, whether a *xenos* or a *xenologos*, was also the man who commanded in the field. Cyrus commanded his *phrouarchoi* to enlist men for him in the cities that they were garrisoning.<sup>32</sup> It is unclear if all of these men went on the campaign, although Xenias and Pasion, both of whom had served Cyrus for some time and probably as garrison commanders, were initially on the campaign. The generals in the cities of Ionia must themselves have delegated to lower ranking officers to find men to fill the ranks of the ten thousand. Nussbaum and Roy believe that the *lochagoi* enlisted the very *lochoi* that they led on the

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31      *Xen. Hell.* V.2.21.

32      *Xen. An.* I.1.6.

*anabasis*.<sup>33</sup> There is no evidence that corroborates this, but it is a suggestion worth considering. Two out of the five *lochagoi* connected with Xenophon were from central Greece, and one was from the north.<sup>34</sup> As Proxenus was a Boeotian it would not be surprising if his seconds came from this region also.<sup>35</sup>

The sources demonstrate that men of intermediary rank (*lochagoi*, *phourarchoi* and *Archontes*) had great influence in what might be termed as 'contractual' relationships established between the employer and the army. This is most noticeable when there was friction between the employer and the army. Nussbaum documents this intermediary role thoroughly in the *Anabasis*.<sup>36</sup> The crucial role played by the commanders is demonstrated in other instances of employment. The best example is that of the refugees from the Sacred War. In this instance the commanders of the army were able to dictate to their general Phalaecus exactly where they were willing to serve.<sup>37</sup> Middle ranking officers commanded the

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<sup>33</sup> Nussbaum 1959, 16-29, 1967, 33; Roy 1967, 317, following Xen. *An.* VI.4.8. This point is explored further in Ch.VI.

<sup>34</sup> Xen. *An.* III.1.26. The central Greeks were Apollonides who masqueraded as a Boeotian and therefore probably was based there, III.1.31, Polycrates of Athens. See Xen. *An.* VI.4.1, for the northerner who was a man called Pleisthenes from Amphipolis. For the other two see Xen. *An.* III.4.47, Agasias was a Stymphalian and Soterides was from Sicyon.

<sup>35</sup> Xen. *An.* III.1.26, for Apollonides of Boeotia, IV.5.24, for Polycrates of Athens. Xen. *An.* III.1.31, for Agasias the Stymphalian, III.4.47, for Soterides (a common soldier) from Sicyon and IV.6.1, for Pleisthenes of Amphipolis.

<sup>36</sup> Nussbaum 1959, 16-29; Roy 1967, 315. In Roy's opinion all the disputes were politico-geographic and the complaints of the men, through the medium of their officers, concerned not pay but where and against whom they would serve.

<sup>37</sup> Diod. XVI.62.1, notes that the commanders (*archontes*) had the ability to make their general return to the Peloponnese in the belief that he had secured them employment in the west. Diodorus, VI.62.3, shows that the commanders attended a meeting which decided the terms under which their men would serve.

loyalty of the men who served with them. Charidemus was able to desert his employers with the men under his command upon the appointment of Timotheus as Commander-in-Chief of Athenian forces in Thrace.<sup>38</sup>

An employer who needed mercenaries could rely on chance to provide him with the men that he needed to serve.<sup>39</sup> In times of crisis he could summon men from abroad or send ambassadors to collect them.<sup>40</sup> Reputation was a major factor that drew men to one man's service.<sup>41</sup> Money was another strong drawing point. The thought that someone had access to money, either through his connections or through his endeavours, was enough to draw men to seek employers out.<sup>42</sup> By way of illustration the opposite was true. Men who did not have confidence in their employer's abilities to pay them would desert.<sup>43</sup> In addition mercenaries were drawn to areas

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38 Dem. XXIII.149.

39 Hdt. VIII.24, for the Arcadians who approached Xerxes and asked to be taken in to service; Xen. *An.* VII.2.2, 36, for Seuthes who had the same chance encounter when Xenophon arrived in his neighbourhood. Plut. *Dion.* XL, notes the surprise arrival and hiring of mercenaries at Leontini. Arr. *Anab.* II.13.2-4; Diod. XVII.48.1-2, refer to Agis hiring the bulk of those who had fled from Issus in 333/2 to make common cause against Macedon. Finally, Diod. XVII.9.1-2, notes that the Athenians used Harpalus' mercenaries for their last attempt to revolt from Macedonian hegemony in 323 B.C.

40 Diod. XVI.61.4.

41 Xen. *An.* VI.4.8. This is the best illustration of this point. See also Diod. XIV.34.3, as great tyrants like Dionysius would also have drawn men from the Greek world into his orbit who sought service. The Persian king and his satraps must also have exerted influence that drew men to them. For examples see Diod. XIV.39.1-2; Isoc. V.61-2.

42 This was no doubt always true of the Persian Kings, whose wealth was fabled. For examples see Xen. *An.* I.1.9-10, VI.4.8; Diod. XIV.64.1, XV.15.2, 29.1, 90.2, XVII.61.2, 64.5; Dem. L.14; XLIX.36; Plut. *Ages.* XXXVI.

43 Cyrus must have commanded great loyalty out of the fact that he was good for his debts as brother of the Great King and potentially the Great king himself. Seuthes needed to be more up front with money in his dealings with the Cyreans as would anyone who had hired men for service who did not command a reputation. Dem. L.14, demonstrates this clearly with Athenian members of the fleet but it must also have been a strong feature of other mercenary endeavours. Polyaeus' *strategema*, III.9.51, of Iphicrates illustrates this point well. Iphicrates kept back a quarter of the men's pay to keep them in service.

of strife, and it helped if those areas provided good opportunities for plunder. This was true of Samos and Cyprus where men came in great numbers.<sup>44</sup> Employers could also, as has been demonstrated above, get their friends to send them men who were already hired. There is evidence of bands of men being hired *en masse* from one employer to another in the sources.<sup>45</sup> This makes Bosworth's theory that Alexander wanted his generals to release their mercenary armies so that he could hire them somewhat dubious.<sup>46</sup> It would have been far easier for him to hire them directly through his generals while they were settled under commanders who had already negotiated terms. This thesis has already noted that there was a similarity between mercenaries and those who were unfortunate enough to find themselves outside of their communities. Isocrates was concerned about the groups of men - *planomenoi* - accompanied by their families wandering about Asia.<sup>47</sup> McKechnie notes this phenomenon and notes that these *planomenoi* came together to form larger groups of men.<sup>48</sup> It was perhaps these large and well organised groups that

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44 Isoc. XV.3; Diod. XVI.42.3.

45 Diod. XVI.42.2.

46 Bosworth 1988, 148-9; Diod. XVII.106.1. Bosworth cites Pausanias, 1.25.5, as evidence that suggests that the Greeks who had served with Darius and the Satraps were to move into Persia. Even he does not agree that this happened entirely. He can cite that Alexander needed mercenaries and that the king had asked Antipater and others to send him reinforcements. This, however, does nothing to suggest the real reason for his decree. Artaxerxes had done the same thing in the 350s and he did not subsequently hire these unemployed men into his service.

47 Isoc. V.121.

48 McKechnie 1985 (unpublished diss. Oxford University), 154, 1989, 90.

Isocrates feared.<sup>49</sup> Isocrates identified this phenomenon when he used the term *syllaxis* to describe a band of 3,000 men 'joining together' for service under Dracon of Pellene.<sup>50</sup>

Diodorus' account of the raising of Phocian armies demonstrates clearly a synthesis of factors listed above. The chance happening of a war provided the opportunity.<sup>51</sup> The offer and availability of high pay through the temple monies which were pillaged<sup>52</sup> and the area of strife located in the heart of the Greek world all leant themselves to easy hiring. Nowhere do the sources suggest that Philomelus and his successors had difficulty in hiring men for their campaigns, despite the moralising tone of Diodorus regarding the evil deeds of the Phocian generals.<sup>53</sup>

The evidence thus provided suggests that word of mouth was enough to assemble men for a campaign.<sup>54</sup> This seems true even if the call for troops was not sent out as happened with Phocion and Euagoras in Cyprus who were inundated with

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49 Isoc. IV.168; V.96, 121.

50 Isoc. IV.144.

51 Diod. XVI.23.1.

52 Diod. XVI.25.1. Philomelus raised pay by half as much as was typical, 30.1, and then by half as much again. Later, Phayllus offered double the regular amount of pay (Diod. XVI.36.1).

53 Diod. XVI.30.1, 32.4, 37.2, all relate the abundant resources and hiring mercenaries.

54 The verb *akouein* - to hear - may not be evident, but passages like Xen. *An.* VI.4.8, in which it is implied that the word for hiring was abroad must illustrate this point.



mercenaries.<sup>55</sup> The fact that men were drawn to mercenary service through word of mouth is also well illustrated by the activities of Astyphilus in Isaeus IX. This man always signed up for service with the Athenian army '...and anywhere else that he heard of an army being collected.'<sup>56</sup> Clearly these latter were mercenary armies. That Greeks must have passed on to other Greeks availability of service and news of good employment is also well attested.<sup>57</sup>

As there was no chance for large scale service without an employer, the opportunity for service was paramount. There were long periods when would-be mercenaries were waiting for employment. Some men had farms that they could return to at these times.<sup>58</sup> According to Isocrates, as the fourth century progressed groups of unemployed soldiers wandered Asia in search of areas of strife and employment.<sup>59</sup> Ports were usual centres of hiring.<sup>60</sup> Employers often sent their ambassadors

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<sup>55</sup> Diod. XVI.42.8. Word of Cyprus' affluence reached many soldiers who voluntarily came over from the opposite coasts of Syria and Cilicia in hope of gain from the war.

<sup>56</sup> Isae. IX.14. According to this Isaeus speech Astyphilus 'served first at Corinth then in Thessaly and again throughout the war and wherever else he heard of an army being collected.'

<sup>57</sup> Diodorus, XVI.29.1, notes that Acoris did many favours for the Greeks in his service and so attracted more to join him, this can only have been achieved through the connections of those Greeks in his service. See also Diod. XVI.42.8, regarding Cyprus' wealth reaching abroad and attracting many soldiers to the island and for interest the fragment in Antiphanes' *Stratigotes* of two soldiers discussing the wealth of the island.

<sup>58</sup> Isae. II.

<sup>59</sup> Isoc. V.152.

<sup>60</sup> Diod. XIV.36, 79.1-2, for Thibron and Agesilaus using Ephesus as a hiring centre. Arr. *Anab.* I.20.2, notes Alexander hired men from Halicarnassus. Xen. *An.* I.1.6, for the garrison commanders of the 'cities of Asia Minor' who appear to have been able to hire mercenaries for Cyrus from their cities. In other words the cities were a central gathering place for hire.

to the Peloponnese to hire mercenaries.<sup>61</sup> As a result of this the ports of the Peloponnese feature heavily in the sources as hiring locations, notably Corinth.<sup>62</sup> Taenarum can be identified as a location where mercenaries gathered in the age of Alexander.<sup>63</sup> Its geographic location was ideal for travel to east or west. Employers were also able to find mercenaries outside of the cities. Dionysius and the Carthaginians had little trouble hiring in Sicily,<sup>64</sup> Pelopidas collected men in Thessaly,<sup>65</sup> and Clearchus was able to raise men in the Chersonesus.<sup>66</sup>

Once contact had been made with a group of men some organisation must have been applied to regularise the number of men in each company. For this reason ambassadors were required who would count an army's numbers. These men were called *exatastai* by the Athenians.<sup>67</sup> Although there is no evidence that other states employed such men, they would have been a necessity. These men were open to bribery by the

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61 Often the sources just say that men were hired in the Peloponnese as at Arr. *Anab.* I.24.2, II.20.5 and Dem. XIV.58.1. Diodorus, XIV.62.1, notes that Dionysius hired from the Spartans in the Peloponnese.

62 For examples see Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.11-2, 5.11; Diod. XV.6.5, XVI.66.2.

63 Diod. XVII.9.1, 21.1, 111.1. Taenarum was a site to which mercenaries and employers were oriented in the period of Alexander's campaigns.

64 Plut. *Tim.* I, XXX.

65 Plut. *Pel.* XXVII.

66 Xen. *An.* I.1.9.

67 Aesch. I.113, notes a man called Timarchus who was one of many such men. They clearly had great responsibility and were vulnerable to bribery by deceitful generals. In another speech, Aeschines, III.146-147, refers directly to *exatastai* padding the numbers of the mercenaries in their armies. See also Parke 1933, 149.

generals whose goal must have been to exaggerate their own army's numbers.

The employer next needed a means of effecting a 'contract' between himself and his mercenaries. This must have been done personally through chains of command. Nussbaum's point about the captains hiring the men with the implication that the captains were connected to their superiors has relevance here.<sup>68</sup> There must have been something more tangible, however, than just a personal contact that 'contracted' the men to their commanders. Were lists of the names of those in service taken at the time of hiring, for example? The sources for Athenian naval practice note that lists of those who served aboard triremes were kept.<sup>69</sup> A passage in Diodorus states that the Phocians signed their mercenaries on - the verb used is *apograpsein* - in the Sacred War.<sup>70</sup> *Apograpsein* is a legal term of enrollment or registration on a Deme list.<sup>71</sup> It could suggest that in this instance employers physically registered their mercenaries. This is the only instance of actual listed enrollment, the sources more commonly use the verbs *xenalogein* and *lambanein*

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68 Nussbaum 1959, 16-29.

69 Dem. L.10.

70 Diod. XVI.30.2.

71 *LSJ* 195.

to refer to hiring.<sup>72</sup>

The term contract must be used with care, because the image it summons up is one of a modern legal relationship. Before the age of the successors no known document between an employer and his mercenaries describes conditions of service.<sup>73</sup> The sources detail those terms only circumstantially. A very loose definition of a modern contract may serve to illustrate mercenary practice before 322. The components of this are (1) an offer (2) an acceptance and (3) consideration.<sup>74</sup> Mercenaries served for one kind of benefit or another, even if it was simply food or food money. This benefit would constitute the consideration which would have applied, whether equally or differentially, to all those in a single unit of recruits. As consideration must always have been the result of an offer and acceptance of agreed terms of service, then something resembling a contract applied.

What symbolised this 'contract?' Elsewhere in this thesis it has been demonstrated that mercenary service could have emerged through guest-friendships formed by Arcadian nobles. These nobles must have received gifts in return for their *proxenia*. The gift symbolised and witnessed the

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<sup>72</sup> Diod. XIV.34.3, for *xenalogian*; Xen. An. 1.1.9; Diod. XV.2.4, 90.2, 91.1, XVI.73.3, for *lambanein*. Dem. XI.18 Gabrielsen 1981, 154, *xenotrophein* for the act of hiring..

<sup>73</sup> OGIS 266.

<sup>74</sup> Cheshire and Fifoot 1993.

relationship between households.<sup>75</sup> It should be noted that the first mercenaries are not always called *misthophoroi* in the sources, but both *xenoi* and *doryphoroi* - foreigners and gift earners, especially in the sources written before about 350. The relationship between gift-giving and *xenia* was well established in Homeric Greece.<sup>76</sup> It is still notable in the classical world, as demonstrated by the gift to Dion from his mercenaries in Syracuse and by Xenophon's relationship with Seuthes.<sup>77</sup>

By the time of the mercenary explosion in the later fifth and fourth centuries mercenary service must have needed more formal methods for hiring. Individuals who took up service, rather than tribal groups following their chieftain, must have needed some way of demonstrating their status as employed. Coins may provide an answer. The Greek cities introduced coinage in the sixth century.<sup>78</sup> Whatever the origins of coins, by the later fifth century they were commonplace. The prevalence of coinage at this time solved the problem which

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<sup>75</sup> Finley 1954, 66; Murray 1983, 48; Hdt. I.69. In this last reference Herodotus notes that gifts formed an alliance between Sparta and Croesus.

<sup>76</sup> Hom. *Il.* IX.12-56, for service rendered by Achilles.

<sup>77</sup> Plut. *Dion*, XXXI; Xen. *An.* VII.3.20. Note also the gifts - *doreais* - which honoured Agesilaus when he left Egypt at Plut. *Ages.* XXXI.

<sup>78</sup> Scholars are divided along two separate lines as to the reason for the invention of coinage. That it originated to ease trading is rejected by Wallace 1987; Kraay 1964, 74-91; Will 1954, 209-31. All support the theory that coinage was part of the growing city-states' attempts to centralise and display their power. Burke 1992, 213, notes that coinage was originally part of the archaic gift giving economic structure. Arguments that the ability to mint coins demonstrated autonomy are best illustrated by Moses Finley 1973, 166-9. The economic benefits of coinage were, therefore, circumstantial. Sally Humphries 1979, 14-7, demonstrates that coinage at Athens fuelled a citizen economy through imperial tribute as opposed to grass roots economic activities. Recently, however, Martin 1985, 6, has argued that the 'idea that coins functioned purely as political symbols misrepresents the fundamental significance of Greek coins.'

mercenaries and their commanders had in denoting whether a man served another man or not.<sup>79</sup> The coins paid to individual soldiers symbolised the fact that they were wage earners. Is it possible that these coins established a 'contract' between mercenary and employer? A model may be offered for the coin as symbolic of a relationship in the practice of the English navy in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The 'Press Gang' attempted to secure a man's service through the 'giving' of the *King's Shilling*. A man who had taken such a coin whether by accident or design was deemed to have a contract to serve. The mercenary may also have recognised such a contract by the taking of the coin of a city or more commonly of an employer. This would explain the need for employers to obtain funds before hiring as the coins were necessary in the hiring process. The sources are littered with examples of employers who raise capital first and then go out to hire mercenaries.<sup>80</sup> This also explains the appearance of the names and images of individuals on coins for the first time at the end of the fifth century. Before this time only the Great King or images associated with communities or magistrates of communities had appeared on coins. Tissaphernes minted coins with his own image on one side and Greek symbols on the other in order to

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For reference to military campaigns as the impetus for the minting of coinage specifically, see Williams 1976, 22. He states that 'for it has been shown that in the fifth century Arkadian (sic) confederate coinage exceptional mint activity was often connected with military campaigns.' Jenkins 1972, 175, claims that it 'was probably in the connection of the crisis (of the Carthaginian invasion) and for the hiring of mercenaries that these two cities had recourse to the mintage of gold coins, usually a sign of emergency measures as at Athens in the same period.'

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For examples see Xen. *An.* I.1.9-10, *Hell.* VI.1.27; Diod. XII.14.1, 15.2, XIV.44.2, 62.1, XV.2.4, 14.3, 15.2, XVI.73.3, 30; Dem. L.7 (references to advance payments); Diod. XVI.91.1 (Orontes needs *chremata* for hiring - *xenologian*).

pay the Greeks in his employ.<sup>81</sup> Pharnabazus minted coins in a similar fashion.<sup>82</sup> A coin of Mausolus illustrates this phenomenon, and the coin implies a strong relationship with the Mausolan building program at Labraunda.<sup>83</sup> Thracian kings at the end of the fifth and early fourth centuries demonstrate the interest in individual symbols and Greek characters on the obverse and reverse of the same coin.<sup>84</sup> A coin of Tachos of Egypt is also evidence for this.<sup>85</sup> The most important evidence for this practice comes from the Phocian generals Phayllus, Onymachus and Phalaecus in their production of silver and bronze coinages for the Sacred War. The surviving coinage from Phocis bears their names.<sup>86</sup> In a recent article Josette Elayi has documented that Phoenician employers of Greek mercenaries minted 'pseudo-atheniennes' coins.<sup>87</sup> These coins were accepted at Athens on condition that they were of good quality metallic content. Elayi contests that Greeks

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81 Jenkins 1972, 103, picture nos. 218 and 219, illustrates the head of Tissaphernes minted at Miletus in 411 B.C. The reverse is an Attic owl juxtaposed with the legend *BAS* for Great King.

82 Kraay 1966, pl.718. The coin has the face of the satrap on one side and the prow of a ship on the other. See Hornblower 1982, 155, who considers that this coin was minted for Greek sailors at Cnidus.

83 Jenkins 1972, 136, picture no 319, *British Museum Catalogue*, 7. It should be noted that the reverse of this coin carries a Greek image, that of Zeus Labraundos. This is discussed by Hornblower 1982, 277, 309-312.

84 Youroukova 1976, 13, shows coins of Seuthes carrying Greek letters *SEUTHA ARGYRION* and 17, for Cotys represented by *KOTYS* and *KOTYOS*.

85 Jenkins 1972, 141. It is an inscribed gold coin of Attic type.

86 Williams 1976, 50-2. Williams states '[t]he presence of the general's name on these coins suggests that they were to be used for mercenaries and must therefore be rated as part of their wage.' See also Diod. XVI.56.

87 Elayi 1992, 321.

demanded coins which imitated Greek fashions, but this need not detract from the employer's requirements of identification. The coin symbolised a dual relationship. It reminded the recipient of who payed and employed them and symbolised the relationship between employer and employed. The soldier held the coin as a gift to symbolise his relationship to his employer. The possession of coins minted by the Phocians after the Sacred War was unsurprisingly a criminal offence.<sup>88</sup> Coinage therefore had two functions, one remunerative and the other symbolic. The coins paid to mercenaries functioned rather like the coins minted by the city-states which were symbols of power and independence as well as of economic value.

This point might be taken further with regard to temple treasuries. It is possible that temples were used as depositories for minted money as proof that the employer had money to pay the men and that this represented the good faith of the employer to pay the men as well. There is no evidence to suggest that this took place in the period before 322 B.C., but what evidence there is might suggest the possibility that such storage established the relationship between employer and the army through the services of a god. The god became a witness of the relationship between the men and their employer.

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Diod. I.60.1.



Roy suggested that there was far more than just money at issue in the contracts between employers and mercenaries. The men under Cyrus were concerned not just with their wage, but with the job for which they had been hired.<sup>89</sup> The renegotiations which occurred after the campaigns had actually begun changed the circumstances of their employment (consideration) both with respect to their mission and, as a result of that, the amount of money that they received for their work. Even more telling is the 'contract' established with Seuthes.<sup>90</sup> A clause within it set limits upon the geographical areas within which the men would serve. Thus the terms were 'politico-geographical' in nature. Other examples illustrate the politico-geographical factors in contracts for hiring mercenaries.<sup>91</sup> To illustrate this point further, disputes that might be termed contractual were never restricted to the amount of pay provided. The biggest disputes occurred in times of major crisis or fear where the men demonstrate a lack of confidence in their commander.<sup>92</sup>

### EQUIPMENT

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<sup>89</sup> Roy 1967, 313; Xen. *An.* I.3.1, citing the word *misthothēnai*.

<sup>90</sup> Roy 1967, 315; Xen. *An.* VII.3.

<sup>91</sup> Diod. XVI.61.4, for the mercenaries who fled the Crocus Field in the Sacred War and who would not follow Phalaecus to Magna Graecia. Demosthenes, L.14, makes his point in a non-mercenary context. He states that the men on Polycles' trireme refused to stay in service in the belief that they might return to Athens more efficiently in other employment.

<sup>92</sup> Xen. *An.* I.3.1; Plut. *Tīm.* XXV; Diod. XVI.62.1. The latter is the best of the examples here for the Phocian commanders who oppose the plans of Phalaecus to invade Sicily and Italy for employment.

This section proposes to discuss the relationship of mercenaries to their equipment with a view to discovering whether in Greek society lack of resources or the need for patronage constituted a restriction from mercenary service. It is an important question in understanding who mercenaries who fought in land armies were and where they came from. The ownership of armour and weapons was one of the three restricting factors on military (let alone mercenary) service; training and social background are potentially the other two, and they are dealt with elsewhere. All three factors arise directly from the methods employed by and from the ideology of soldiers using specialised equipment. First, what was this equipment and what were the minima that enabled a man to take his place on the battlefield?

The sources refer to three principle types of soldier; light troops (*psiloi*), peltasts (*peltastai*), and hoplites (*hoplitai*). The two former types were lighter armed than the hoplites and of slightly less interest here. Despite Diodorus' statements that around 371 B.C. hoplites were called peltasts, it has already been noted that most of the mercenaries in service outside of the Greek mainland were hoplites. *Psiloi* carried no shield and wore no armour; they skirmished on the flanks of the army with javelins and stones. It is difficult to imagine that any man could have been excluded from the army on account of lack of resources to be a *psilos*.

The peltast derived his name from his shield, the *pelta*.<sup>93</sup> This was made of wicker or wood and provided the most basic protection. Originally the Greeks believed the peltast came from Thrace. The peltast wore no body armour and a felt cap and the principal offensive weapon was the javelin. Through the fifth century and into the fourth the Greeks became more familiar with the techniques of light infantry. Greek cities began to utilise the services of peltasts and peltast equipment influenced that worn by Greek citizen infantry. Consequently, Peltast equipment appears to have become heavier.<sup>94</sup> The basic peltast equipment remained the same as it had been originally. A man could fight as a peltast with a wicker or wooden shield and a set of javelins.<sup>95</sup>

The hoplite or heavy infantryman is described by historians from Herodotus onwards and has been depicted on Greek pottery from as early as 675 B.C.<sup>96</sup> Traditionally these hoplites were armed with bell bronze cuirasses, helmets and greaves. Some evidence for arm, foot and thigh guards exists as well. A thrusting spear provided offensive capabilities, javelins and a short thrusting or slashing sword were also

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93 Best 1969, 3-8; Parke 1933, 51.

94 Sekunda 1986, 13.

95 Warry 1981, 51-52. The biggest restriction on the peltast was skill. Unlike the hoplite, who needed only a basic level of skills as shall be seen elsewhere, the peltast needed to throw a javelin and skirmish in a loosely organised group successfully.

96 Lorimer 1947, 76-138; Salmon 1977, 84-101.

available. All of these pieces of equipment underwent changes as a result of individual preference or fashion from the seventh through the fourth centuries B.C. The key piece of equipment that all hoplites had in common was a shield *hoplon* (sometimes referred to as the *aspis*).<sup>97</sup> This was a round concave shield made of wood fronted by bronze and backed by leather which gave the hoplite his name.<sup>98</sup> It was held on the left arm by a central armband (*porpax*) and a hand grip (*antelabe*) found just inside the shield's rim, and a shoulder strap relieved some of the shield's considerable weight.<sup>99</sup> Some note that it was the presence of both *porpax* and *antelabe* which defined the *hoplon* and the way that it was used.<sup>100</sup> Others, however, consider that because the *pelta* also had grips for arm and hand that the *hoplon* could be used in the same way and so play a role in more loose formations of combat.<sup>101</sup>

The hoplite's equipment determined the kind of military engagement which was possible. The *hoplon* must have been at its best employed as part of a group. Aristotle explains that

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97 Cartledge 1977, 12; Lazenby 1985, 30.

98 Diod. XV.44.3.

99 Hanson 1989, 67-8.

100 Lorimer 1947, 83; Hanson 1989, 65-71.

101 Krentz 1985, 53; Snodgrass 1967, 53-4.

the hoplite was all but useless without formation - *syntaxis*.<sup>102</sup> But was the *hoplon* all but useless to the individual fighter engaged in one to one combat? Frazer, Cawkwell and Krentz have all questioned whether the hoplite did not and could not fight one on one.<sup>103</sup> They have also questioned whether hoplite warfare was a rugby scrum and therefore whether it did not require skill and training. They can point to one passage from Plato's *Republic* which states that a well armoured hoplite is useless without knowledge of the use of his equipment.<sup>104</sup> *The Laches* seems to imply a distinction between the terms *hoplomachia* and *monomachia*.<sup>105</sup> *Hoplomachia* must have been a very different prospect to single combat - *monomachia*.<sup>106</sup> By its very definition hoplite warfare was a communal effort.<sup>107</sup> Skill and training were subordinate to morale, agility and bodily strength.<sup>108</sup>

In Greek military parlance the hoplite phalanx pushed the

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- 102 Arist. *Pol.* 1297b17.
- 103 Frazer 1942, 15-16; Cawkwell 1978, 150-153; Krentz 1985, 51-61.
- 104 Pl. *Rep.* 374d.
- 105 Pl. *Lach.* 183c-184d.
- 106 Wheeler 1982, 224; Vidal Naquet 1986, 111.
- 107 Hanson 1989, 29, 32-38; Snodgrass 1967, 44-77. See 112-3 above.
- 108 Hanson 1989, 38; Wheeler 1982, 229-230; Krentz 1985, 58.

enemy back.<sup>109</sup> The hoplite's shield could not be manoeuvred quickly because of its weight. It could only protect part of the left side of its holder's torso and upper legs. The real value of the *hoplon* lay in its use by one man as part of a group (or *phalanx*). In this group it protected the left side of both the man who held it and the right part of the man to the holder's left. This overlapping protection occurred all the way down the unbroken line. There was therefore no need to protect the flanks and the backs of individual hoplites with a manoeuvrable shield. The wall that the *hopla* of each rank presented not only created a solid defensive front, but also allowed for the rear rankers to push their companions forward. In turn, however, this placed a great responsibility on each man to hold his place in the line so as to maintain the integrity of the *phalanx*.<sup>110</sup>

Individual preferences, fashions, and resources played their part in determining how each hoplite was armed. Even citizen hoplites of the sixth and fifth centuries displayed their own styles of panoply.<sup>111</sup> Over time there was a gradual movement away from heavier and 'superfluous' equipment like foot, thigh and arm guards, and eventually these were

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109 For illustrations of such a push see Thuc. I.6.70, IV.96; Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.3-15; Diod. XV.53-56; Plut. *Pel.* 20-23. Peter Krentz 1985, 55, notes that Homer uses *otheo* and *othismos* in his battle scenes, but denies that this indicates hoplite warfare. Frazer 1942, 15-16, in an article entitled 'The Myth of the Hoplite Scrimmage,' denies that any of the evidence cited here indicates hoplite warfare, but is merely conventional military terminology. To Frazer the concept that hoplite warfare was like a rugby scrum is a fallacy. The rear ranks of the *phalanx* were reserves who prevented a break-through in the front line and continually replaced the army front line a view which is not offered in this dissertation.

110 Tyrt. VII. (11-12); Thuc. I.6.70, IV.96; Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.3-15; Diod. XV.53-6; Plut. *Pel.* 20-23.

111 Chase 1902, 61-127; Ridley 1979, 520; Thuc. VI.31.

dispensed with entirely.<sup>112</sup> As well bronze cuirasses were replaced more frequently by linen ones. The javelin, seen on such vases as that from the estate of Prince Chigi dated to the middle of the seventh century, seems to have disappeared from the hoplite's armoury by the fifth century also. This tendency to lighten hoplite equipment no doubt made hoplite panoplies cheaper and made hoplite warfare more accessible.

By 490 B.C. the panoply had become light enough for a sustained charge such as that at Marathon. While men like Nicias, Dion, and Xenophon were noted for the quality of their arms in the later fifth century, there is evidence that some hoplites had abandoned body armour by this time a trend which was well sustained by the fourth century.<sup>113</sup> Even those who still wore armour had the option of a semithorax or half cuirass in the fourth century.<sup>114</sup> Sekunda argued that hoplite equipment became lighter in this period. He has also suggested that subsequent to their defeat by Philip the Athenians began to make their panoplies heavier in the 330s.<sup>115</sup> This is a point he has since rejected, attributing this re-equipment to the 360s.<sup>116</sup> The *hoplon*, however,

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112 Lorimer 1947, 132-3; Connolly 1981, 52.

113 Hanson 1989, 70; Ridley 1979, 520; Sekunda 1986, 13. Ridley states that this is connected to a lessening of hoplite status, while Sekunda cites the influence of peltasts on hoplite warfare.

114 Polyaeus, *Strat.* IV.3.13.

115 Sekunda 1980, 148.

116 Sekunda 1986, 47.

remained integral to the phalanx itself and to the hoplite. Indeed the very name of hoplite must surely denote one who carried a *hoplon* no matter what else they carried in the way of arms.

It was impossible, then, for any man to become a hoplite without possessing at least a *hoplon*. The hoplite was part of a community of fighters. His shield determined this role. As Plutarch says,

Men wear their helmets and their breast plates for their own needs...but they carry their shields for the men of the entire line.<sup>117</sup>

Representations on vases of shields display the variety of blazons used by individual Greeks on their shields. This makes it difficult to discern the material they represent. Extant archaeological remains, most notably from Italy, demonstrate the importance of bronze to the shields of the period, and literary references illustrate this point. Were all shields so lined? If most shields were not faced with such expensive material and were made of wood alone they would not necessarily have survived in the archaeological record. There are many instances in the sources where shields were shattered by the clash of battle.<sup>118</sup> Such shields were unlikely to have had bronze fronts. Nor were soldiers likely

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117 Plut. *Mor.* 241. f. 16.

118 Xen. *Ages.* I.26; Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.8; Diod. XVII.34.2.



to have used shields like those dedicated in temples.<sup>119</sup> Finally, it would have been necessary only for the front ranks to have the really well fronted shields and well armed men, for these faced the brunt of the enemy's charge. Even in the fourth century these men were also the generals and officers. The shields of those at the rear could well have been of inferior quality.

The rest of the equipment would no doubt have been useful but not essential to those men whose place lay towards the rear of the phalanx. Even a spear may not have been necessary for those at the back of a victorious phalanx, seeing that it was useless for those men caught up in a defeat. Thus by the end of the fifth century and throughout the fourth the bare minimum for participation in hoplite warfare was a *hoplon* with a wooden frame covered by linen or leather.

#### STATE PROVISION

The citizen had traditionally provided his own equipment for service in the civic phalanx. The shield hanging above the hearth was a symbol that the home provided the state with a hoplite and that the citizen was responsible to the state and the home for its defence.<sup>120</sup> It also proved that he had the resources to provide such equipment. There was a

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119 Paus. IX.16.3; II.21.4; Diod. XVII.18; Shear 1937, 140-143, discusses a bronze shield found in the Athenian agora.

120 Ar. Ach. 57, 278; Plut. Mor. 241.

triangular relationship among the concepts of hoplite and citizen and the man of resources; resources which were founded on land.<sup>121</sup> At Athens some equipment was provided by the state, although it is unclear as to when this practice began. The practice of the state providing a panoply to the sons of war dead can be detected in the 380s.<sup>122</sup> The author of the *Athenian Constitution* noted that a shield and spear, the two key arms of the hoplite, were presented to second year ephebes in the fourth century.<sup>123</sup> Pasion dedicated 1,000 shields to the city in the Corinthian war. A large proportion of these (778) were still listed in the inventories twenty years later.<sup>124</sup> Some of these were no doubt used to arm citizens, although they may also have had a dedicatory and non practical function. Diodorus mentions that the Thebans received extraordinary donations from Demosthenes, and with them they equipped all of their citizens who lacked heavy armour.<sup>125</sup>

It is often assumed that Philip and Alexander equipped the Macedonian army. On several occasions Alexander gave his troops arms. Polyaeus says that the *stratiotai* - soldiers -

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121 Ridley 1979, 519; Ar. *Ban.* frag. 232; Burke 1992, 222.

122 Pl. *Men.* 249 a.

123 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.4.

124 Dem. XLV.85.

125 Diod. XVII.8.5; Dem. XXIII.1.

received semi-thoraxes or thoraxes.<sup>126</sup> Alexander himself must have given the 30,000 sons of his men whom he had trained in Macedonian techniques, the so-called *epigonoi*, their armour.<sup>127</sup> None of the references to the Macedonian army are helpful. That army was a national one. Arms could have been provided by the state or the king as a matter of policy. The evidence does not specify which of the *stratiotai* - soldiers - received these donations; mercenary or Macedonian.

From the inception of its socio-political system Sparta created a different relationship between the soldier and his equipment. Men were no doubt allowed to carry arms without *Spartiate* or other special status, but helots were not, and being a hoplite at Sparta carried with it a social status (at least in theory). The shield must have been symbolic to the holding of a *kleros*.<sup>128</sup> As Spartans were supposedly *homoioi* socially and militarily, the ideal must have been related to conformity in arms. All Spartiates may have received *hopla* through state mechanisms. Plutarch records the praise given to Agesilaus for not augmenting his arms with ornaments, and this implies that there was an ideal of uniformity.<sup>129</sup> If Spartiates had a regulation issue and did not provide their

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126 Polyaeus, *Strat.* IV.3.13.

127 Plut. *Alex.* LXXI.

128 Lazenby 1985, 30; Plut. *Pel.* I.

129 Plut. *Ages.* XIX.5.

own arms, there can be no doubt that some *homoioi* were still better armed than others. By the fourth century Spartan hoplites, like the other Greeks, had shed most of the body armour. Conformity had been reduced to the shield.<sup>130</sup>

Three things can therefore be demonstrated with regard to hoplite warfare. First the conformity of shield was the key to fighting in the phalanx. Second there was a gradual reduction in the amount of armament carried by hoplites through the seventh to the fifth centuries B.C., and only a wooden *hoplon* and a spear were required by the late fifth century B.C. for qualification as a hoplite. Finally there were men whose equipment came from the state in the cities of the Greek mainland by the early fourth century B.C. By the fourth century men fought in the phalanx whose socio-economic status need not have been high, and lack of resources need not have brought exclusion from the phalanx.

#### **Who Armed Mercenary Soldiers?**

An important consideration in the hiring process for mercenaries was the provision of arms. The traditional answer has been to assume that mercenaries provided their own arms and armour.<sup>131</sup> Paul McKechnie has recently questioned this position noting, for example, the poor and vagrant nature of

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It is worth noting that Peloponnesian states not only had tribal affinities, but dressed in common, for examples see Plut. *Ages.* II.7; Xen. *An.* I.2.26, V.2.28-32.

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Parke 1933, 105-6.

mercenaries who were described *en masse* by the fourth century orators.<sup>132</sup> Some notable evidence supports his thesis. David Whitehead has argued for the old orthodoxy in response to McKechnie's position.<sup>133</sup> The debate is an important one, because if mercenaries were required to provide their own weapons the poorest members of any community would have been excluded from mercenary service. In addressing this question no scholar has yet defined exactly what equipment constituted the bare minimum for a hoplite or a peltast. The cost of the equipment has been discussed, but this must have been affected by the amount that was required.<sup>134</sup>

The question of provision of equipment should be viewed in the context described above. McKechnie and other dissenters cite the graphic and emotive orations of Demosthenes as to the type of men in mercenary service. According to McKechnie the *athlatoi* and *aporois* could not have afforded to provide their own *hopla*.<sup>135</sup> Logic would also dictate that a mercenary who provided his own arms was paid more than one who did not. It is ironic, however, that those who subscribe to the orthodoxy that mercenaries provided their own equipment also conclude that mercenary service was poorly

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132 McKechnie 1989, 80-5; 1994, 297-305.

133 Whitehead 1991, 105-113.

134 McKechnie 1985 (unpublished diss. Oxford University), 329-34; 1989, 81 n. 12, discusses the evidence for the cost of equipment.

135 Dem. IV.46, XII.27.

paid. McKechnie cannot disagree about poor pay, but does about the idea that the employer provided the mercenary's arms.<sup>136</sup>

There are two references which show occasions when commanders did provide equipment to their mercenaries, one in Diodorus and one in Lysias.<sup>137</sup> Xenophon never states categorically whether or not Cyrus provided his soldiers with equipment. Circumstantial factors weigh heavily in the debate about Cyrus' Greeks. The very fact that many of Cyrus' mercenaries came from areas that were less well developed politically, economically and socially has been used to suggest that the Arcadians and Achaeans could never have afforded their own equipment. P. Roy sees Xenophon's description of the uniformity of equipment worn by the Greeks on the campaign as evidence that their arms came from a single source.<sup>138</sup> This must be questioned. At its basic level hoplite equipment was uniform because it had to be. The fact that the tunics were all red, a point made by Roy, is irrelevant, as it was a common colour for soldiers to wear. It was used by all military states, and the Peloponnese was certainly no exception.

Another passage in the *Anabasis* alludes to the ownership

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136 Parke 1933, 233; McKechnie 1989, 89-90 (pay), 80-5 (arms).

137 Diod. XVI.41-2; Lys. XIX.1, 43.

138 Roy 1967, 310; Xen. *An.* I.2.16.

of arms. The Persians told the Greeks to hand over their arms as they had once belonged to the Great King's slave Cyrus. The defeat of Cyrus made the King their owner. Implicitly this statement suggests that Cyrus had owned and provided the Greeks' equipment.<sup>139</sup> But there is little more than implication here. This was rhetoric for a specific situation to emphasise the defeat of the Greeks and their vulnerability without their arms. There was no mention of armour at the first interview between the Greeks and the Persians. The Persians might have perceived Cyrus as commander and paymaster and therefore as the owner of the weapons wielded by his men. All ancient peoples saw the enemy's weapons as part of the victor's spoils. Alternatively, Xenophon could have misunderstood a clause in the negotiations which might have allowed the Greeks to go home free if they handed over their weapons. This passage cannot be used to prove either case for the provision of weapons.

At about the same time as the *Anabasis* campaign Dionysius,

having hired many skilled workmen...got them to make many panoplies of arms...he distributed models of each kind because he had gathered mercenaries from many nations for he was eager to have every one of his soldiers armed with the weapons of his people, conceiving that by such armour his army would for that very reason fight to best effect in armour to which they were accustomed.<sup>140</sup>

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139      Xen. *An.* II.1.8.

140      Diod. XVI.41.1-5.

A little later the tyrant,

made 140,000 shields (*aspides*) and a like number of daggers and helmets and he made 14,000 well made and designed cuirasses. These he distributed to the cavalry and to the captains and to mercenaries in his bodyguards.<sup>141</sup>

These are the most conclusive statements that great numbers of mercenaries were given arms. There are earlier references that allude to this possibility, but nothing so explicit nor about so great a quantity.<sup>142</sup> Dionysius II did a similar thing once he had disarmed the citizens of Syracuse.<sup>143</sup> All of these examples have a Sicilian context. Was the Sicilian practice typical in the rest of the Greek world? If it was not, the evidence shows that at least some employers would provide equipment. It also may explain the success which Dionysius had in raising men.

McKechnie, following a reference in a speech by Lysias, notes that Athens provided peltast equipment for recruits sent to help Euagoras in 391 B.C.<sup>144</sup> Whitehead, however, claims that the state merely provided naval transport and that Aristophanes and his friends provided the equipment.<sup>145</sup> This changes little, because arms were still provided for the men,

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141 Diod. XVI.43.2-3.

142 Thuc. VI.72.4; Diod. XIII.96.1.

143 Diod. XIV.10.2, XVI.9.2.

144 Lys. XIX.1, 43.

145 Whitehead 1991, 108.



regardless of who provided them. If the question of exclusion from mercenary service is of paramount importance in this discussion, then Whitehead's claims are not relevant. Equipment was provided to mercenaries in this instance regardless of the size or the extraordinary nature of the expedition.

The rest of the evidence cited by historians is all debatable. When Dion landed at Corinth he besought the Corinthians to collaborate with him in setting free the Syracusans, and he himself began to gather mercenary troops and to collect suits of armour.<sup>146</sup> Diodorus records that he handed over 5,000 suits of armour to those Syracusans who were lacking panoplies.<sup>147</sup> Regrettably there is no mention in this passage of mercenaries and not a specific reference to mercenaries receiving armour in the whole episode.

In a stratagem related by Polyaeus, Iphicrates, while in Acre, and subsequent to a conspiracy against him, seized some of his mercenaries' arms before driving them out of his camp.<sup>148</sup> The orthodoxy states that this was a punitive and defensive measure; it need not imply that Iphicrates was the original owner of the arms.<sup>149</sup> McKechnie rejects the notion

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<sup>146</sup> Diod. XVI.6.5.

<sup>147</sup> Diod. XVI.10.1.

<sup>148</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.9.56.

<sup>149</sup> Parke 1933, 105-6.

that the men were to be prevented from joining the enemy by stating that he need only have confiscated their offensive weapons.<sup>150</sup> Whitehead rightly suggests there are many alternative explanations for this seizure of the arms.<sup>151</sup> Perhaps Iphicrates was aware that these men might seek employment with the enemy, or this was a punitive measure to prevent (or at least obstruct) their further employment. The reason for this stratagem is hopelessly ambiguous.

The fact that states stockpiled weapons has been touched on above. The purpose of this stockpiling is pertinent to this debate. If states stockpiled weapons to give to mercenaries, then a more than atypical willingness to arm mercenaries hired for service is demonstrated. Both Dionysius I and II had stockpiles of weapons.<sup>152</sup> The Athenians also had such a stockpile in the *Chalkoteke*.<sup>153</sup>

Nowhere in the sources, however, is it suggested that these weapons were kept for distribution to mercenaries. McKechnie believes that the purpose of the Athenian stockpile was distribution, although to whom is not stressed.<sup>154</sup>

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150 McKechnie 1989, 84.

151 Whitehead 1991, 107-8.

152 Plut. *Tim.* XIII.3; Diod. XIV.41-3; Aen. Tact. XXX.1. The latter warns against allowing mercenaries near to arms.

153 For example *IG II2* 1424 a 126-140.

154 McKechnie 1989, 85.

Whitehead has an answer.<sup>155</sup> He states that if the *Chalkoteke* was an arsenal, and not a storehouse for dedicatory votives, its contents would not have been almost exactly the same in the inventory that took place 350-49 B.C. as the one twenty years earlier. In both of these states, Athens and Syracuse, confiscations of citizen weapons by the state occurred in the late fifth century. The 'state' was in a position, although how is not clear, to limit the accessibility of weapons to its people. They must have felt that confiscation would serve some purpose. In the case of the Greek mainland there is nothing to suggest that stockpiling was designed to give weapons to mercenaries in times of need. The fact that Aeneas Tacticus does not mention this is surely another argument, albeit from silence, against the fact that it was common for states to distribute arms to mercenaries.<sup>156</sup>

The ambiguity of the evidence is clear. What it does show is that some were prepared and in a position to provide mercenaries with weapons. The very dearth of explicit statements must tell us something of the way that such activity was viewed. Perhaps the fact that Dionysius I did provide arms might have been so strange as worth comment. Yet Diodorus fails to say, if he knew, how the men serving with Phocis in the Sacred War were armed. These men were the dregs

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155 Whitehead 1991, 109.

156 Aen. Tact. X.7.18-9, XII.2-13.4, XXII.29.

of humanity according to his moralising account. If they had been armed by the Phocians it is surprising that this fact was omitted, since it was still another slur upon both the employer and the ignoble and lowly men they hired.

In response to McKechnie's argument can be cited some notable examples of mercenaries who did bring their weapons to campaigns. In some cases it is less than clear where their armour came from originally, but at least they had their own weapons when they arrived. In the *Anabasis*, for example, the Rhodian slingers and the Milesian exiles all brought their weapons with them.<sup>157</sup> In the case of the Rhodians, the skills necessary to use such weapons makes this not surprising. Xenophon himself had a splendid panoply in addition to more work-a-day armour.<sup>158</sup>

Xenophon comments that Agesilaus held competitions for the best armed of his troops, and especially for the *lochagoi* who had brought the best armed men.<sup>159</sup> The prizes consisted of *hopla*, which seems somewhat anomalous considering the competition. Yet, it might have been a symbolic reimbursement to a captain who, in fact, had provided the best equipment to his men. Whitehead sees this as proof that these men in Asia came forward ready armed and that the *lochagoi* recruited them

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157      *Xen. An.* III.3.16-20, I.2.6.

158      *Xen. An.* III.2.7.

159      *Xen. Hell.* IV.2.5.

in such condition.<sup>160</sup> This may be stretching a point. The passage does not show where the arms came from in the first place. The prizes went to the *lochagoi* and not to the men, and this may indicate that it was the *lochagos'* responsibility to arm the men upon recruitment; the *lochagoi* were rewarded for arming them well. It has been noted that commanders required money for recruiting and this might be another indication of a signing bonus or even as part of the payment they received. This latter point would allow a commander to provision a soldier with equipment, a soldier to participate in a war, and as a result would require no payment while on campaign. The arms become the payment and allowed the surviving mercenary to continue in service, with or without the commander. This once again raises the question of a hierarchy of pay to men who owned *hopla* and those who did not. There is, however, no evidence that this was the case.

After the settlement of the Sacred War the remnants of Phocis' mercenary army were made to give up their weapons. Besides being a symbolic gesture of defeat by Phalaecus' men, it could also have served to punish those men by the loss of their potentially income generating arms. Philip would have known how much such a confiscation would have hurt a mercenary. He was punishing them for their part in the war. Whitehead does not make this point, but stresses that Diodorus

notes how Phalaecus' men drew swords on their leader after their removal from Phocis.<sup>161</sup> This indicated that they had 'rearmed' themselves after their surrender. It is also possible that Philip had allowed them to keep their personal weapons. Whatever the case Whitehead is correct to suggest that in this particular incident the weapons seem to be the personal property of the mercenaries involved.

Finally Whitehead cites that after the satraps were instructed not to keep personal armies by the Great King the demobilised soldiers supported themselves by pillaging Asia Minor.<sup>162</sup> There is a strong implication that the soldiers retained their own arms to enable them to support themselves independently of an employer. These latter cases are a little too circumstantial to be classified as evidence for the case that as a rule mercenaries brought their weapons with them. They seem to suggest that mercenaries might bring weapons with them.

In sum, there is conclusive proof for both armed and unarmed men being hired. There is, however, a great deal of ambiguous material. Which of the two situations was more common? The passage concerning Dionysius would seem to suggest that in that particular instance many men were armed by the tyrant. No doubt men who had been armed in such a way

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<sup>161</sup> Whitehead 1991, 112; Diod. XVI.62.2.

<sup>162</sup> Whitehead 1991, 112; Diod. XVII.111.1.

were relieved of their equipment only reluctantly and so could prove difficult to disarm and dismiss. Furthermore a mercenary so armed might take his new weapons and find service elsewhere; perhaps this had been the fear of Iphicrates. Situations of this sort would suggest that, if the bulk of the Ten Thousand had been armed by Cyrus, the arms they carried became their own upon his death. They were instantly propelled to independent future employment. It is always possible, although there is no evidence, that arms were part of a mercenary's payment for service. They could certainly be used again for the benefit of the mercenary after service. It was a big risk for an employer to arm men with no resources. These men may eventually prove themselves not only desperate, but difficult to deal with if and when relations turned sour. Such men had no stake anywhere. The provision of arms added a further complication to the relationship between employer and employee. Nevertheless, it could work to the employer's advantage if he had the resources to provide equipment and the power to keep his employees in line once they were armed.

#### **EXCLUSION**

Could the poor man afford to fight, and, if he could not, was he armed by his employers? In view of the fact that hoplite equipment was limited to a *hoplon* (and a spear) hoplite warfare was no longer the exclusive preserve of the rich, if it had ever been solely that. To turn out in hoplite

panoply and to fight at the back as a 'pusher' - from the standard Greek word employed for hoplite warfare *othismos* - one did not need the full armament. The Arcadian and the Achaean would not necessarily be excluded from providing themselves with the equipment that they needed to serve Cyrus or from seeking employment with the Great King. In short, it was not necessary to arm a man sufficiently, albeit scantily, for mercenary service. But an employer could provide, if that was needed, and clearly the fact that Dionysius did provide equipment suggests that not all could afford to arm themselves. In view of the barest minimum requirements for hoplite warfare on the one hand and the agency of employers on the other it would seem that all but a few had too little resources to serve in mercenary armies in the fourth century. Indeed Burke notes well the decline in the socio-economic status of the citizen hoplite in this period at Athens, and Jones acknowledges that there were many poor hoplites.<sup>163</sup> All scholars agree that citizen hoplite warfare remained the principal type of combat on mainland Greece in this time. In that warfare, whether fought by citizen or by mercenary, the generals and the captains formed the well armed front line, but they still needed the men of the file to give them the necessary push - *othismos* - from behind. How the relationship between the mercenary and his employer changed as a result of

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<sup>163</sup>Burke 1992, 219-21; [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* I.1-2; Pl. *Leg.* 707 a-b; Jones 1957, 31.



who had provided their equipment is a question that will need more discussion in the next and final chapter.

**VI**  
**RELATIONSHIPS**

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter will consider the relationships of Greek mercenary soldiers in order to determine whether communication networks operated in the Mediterranean, and, if they existed, how they functioned. The basic relationship between the mercenary and the employer was one of remuneration, and so the employer can be referred to as the paymaster or *misthodotes*.<sup>1</sup> The less euphemistic words used to describe the mercenary demonstrate this relationship clearly, especially *misthotos* (hireling) and the more common *misthophoros* (wage-earner).<sup>2</sup>

The giving and receiving of remuneration was a key part of the relationship between the men and their leaders. The generals received money from their employer for the hiring of men.<sup>3</sup> The generals were the link between the ultimate paymaster and the men in their employ. The financial relationship between the men and their employer or paymaster extended beyond the receipt of funds. It was associated with their status within the army and their relationship to each other. Economically this was demonstrated by distinctions in

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<sup>1</sup> Xen. *An.* I.3.9; Diod. XIV.81.5.

<sup>2</sup> See 59-63 above.

<sup>3</sup> See 173-4 and 209-13 above. Xen. *Hell.* I.1.31, notes that Hermocrates received money from Pharnabazus...and collected mercenaries. Xen. *Hell.* II.1.12, for the fact that Cyrus paid Lysander and appointed captains for the fleet. Xen. *Hell.* VI.1.5, illustrates that Jason bought loyalty by paying the men, VII.1.46, for Euphron also buying the loyalty of the men under his command by paying them. Xen. *An.* III.6.4, shows that Clearchus raised an army with money provided by Cyrus.

their payment.<sup>4</sup> This was expected to reflect their qualities as men and as leaders on the battlefield.<sup>5</sup> What follows, however, will demonstrate that the remunerative relationship was not necessarily fundamental to the relationship between the men and the leaders.

### ORGANISATION

On campaign there was a hierarchical military structure. At the top was the employer. This man was not necessarily the paymaster, as the Great King's appointment of a paymaster to Conon illustrates.<sup>6</sup> The employer and or paymaster was often present on the campaign, although of all the employers the Great King rarely appeared in person on the battlefield. Most employers who acted in a command position had with them an element of native forces from their own domains whom they commanded personally and which legitimated their role as leaders.<sup>7</sup> On occasion the presence of the employer on the battlefield with the general led to friction.<sup>8</sup> Cyrus' role was certainly one of arbiter among the Greek armies which

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4 See 188 above and also *Xen. An.* VII.2.36.

5 *Xen. An.* III.1.7, 1.37.

6 *Diod.* XIV.81.5.

7 *Xen. An.* I.1.5, 8.5. Cyrus had a large number of barbarians from his satrapies. The Persian Kings always had with them native forces commanded separately from any Greek mercenary force. As other examples, the tyrants of Sicily had contingents from their own cities and the kings of Macedon also had their own forces from their kingdoms. The Phocian generals certainly had Phocians in their armies. Some of these must have retired from Phocis with Phalaecus upon his withdrawal from the city after the Sacred War.

8 *Dem.* XXIII.132, for the strained relationship between Cotys and Iphicrates might best illustrate this. The Thracian's ambitions conflicted with Iphicrates' loyalties. It appears that the latter's men remained with Cotys rather than with Iphicrates. For other examples see *Xen. An.* I.3.9 and *Diod.* XVI.62.1.

accompanied him. When 2,000 men transferred from one Greek general to Clearchus, Cyrus allowed these men to remain under the latter's command.<sup>9</sup> This suggests that the paymaster, at least this paymaster, had a role in 'selecting' who commanded whom. Beyond this, Cyrus was in command, and the Greeks followed his orders, which he delivered through the Greek generals or *strategoï*.<sup>10</sup>

The *strategoï* were the lieutenants of the employers. On occasion the employer would use men as lieutenants who were not generals. They were usually men of high status and independent of their cities. They might serve in multiple roles, as recruiters, as diplomats, or as both. The Persian satraps in the western part of the empire acted as intermediaries between the Great King and the Greek cities or generals. The Persian King and satraps preferred to use Greek legates in the Greek world. Occasionally, they used men called *hyparchoi* to deal with Greeks.<sup>11</sup> Demosthenes describes a man called Philiscus, a Greek, as the greatest of all the *hyparchoi*.<sup>12</sup> This implies that the role was one commonly employed by Persians. Philiscus was a mercenary, like

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<sup>9</sup> Xen. *An.* I.3.7, for the transfer, 4.7, for the fact that Cyrus allowed Clearchus to keep them.

<sup>10</sup> Xen. *An.* I.4.11, 2.17, 20.

<sup>11</sup> An official title used to denote a man in the service of the Persians. He need not be a Greek and seems to have had an ambiguous role that might be based on the holding of land or some connection to the Great King. Cook 1983, 177-8, cannot draw an adequate distinction between the *hyparch* and the satrap. Hdt. VI.42, describes Artaphernes as *hyparchos o Sardion* - *hyparch* of the Sardiens. He was the man who ruled the city for the Persians. Many such *hyparchoi* ruled cities for the Persians in the western empire.

<sup>12</sup> Dem. XXIII.142. Parke 1933, 107-8, sees him as the 'subordinate' of Ariobazarnes and thus implies a specific relationship between Ariobazarnes and Philiscus.

Charidemus, a diplomat, a recruiter, and a tyrant.<sup>13</sup> *Hyparchoi* reached high positions within the Persian empire, as illustrated by Mentor and Memnon.<sup>14</sup> The satraps of the King were also instrumental in hiring and firing Greeks in the service of Persia. The King could no doubt use these overseas officers to observe his satraps; the satraps could use them as liaisons to the Greek cities as forces that were outside the Persian empire.

Artaxerxes' invasion of Egypt demonstrates the need that the Persians felt to watch over their Greek employees. The three contingents of Greek forces each had a Greek general and a Persian *hegemon*. Clearly the latter's role was to oversee the 'loyalty' and actions of the Greeks.<sup>15</sup> Notably, the Greek commanders under Memnon were also called *hegemones*.<sup>16</sup> This is a term that appears twice in the *Iliad* and is used of three Athenians connected to Chabrias.<sup>17</sup> The *hyparchos* had a connection to the Persians, as did the satraps and the *philoï* of the Great King discussed below, but one that was more than transitional. The career of Philiscus demonstrates that it was also multi-functional. He was clearly a person whom the

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<sup>13</sup> For his three 'careers' see Dem. XXIII.141, for that which resembled Charidemus the mercenary; Diod. XV.70.2, for diplomat and recruiter and Burnett and Edmonson 1961, 74-91, for his tyranny at Abydos.

<sup>14</sup> Although neither of these men are referred to as *hyparchoi* in the sources.

<sup>15</sup> Diod. XVI.47.1.

<sup>16</sup> Diod. XVII.25.6.

<sup>17</sup> Hom. *Il.* XII.62, XVII.333; Aesch. *Il.* 71-2; McKechnie 1985, 156.

King could call upon at any time to serve in any capacity.

The *strategoï* were employed by the satraps and kings to lead campaigns rather than to function in a variety of diplomatic roles. These generals were commanders in the field and paid the men directly. They played an important and intermediary role between the employer - paymaster and the lower officers and soldiers of the line.<sup>18</sup> A mercenary general could be a very powerful statesman like Iphicrates, or simply a man who had come with other men on a specific campaign, like some of the generals on the *anabasis*, who appear to have had little validation from, or through, their home governments.<sup>19</sup> The generals' status is never clearly defined, although they did not need to be prominent within a city-state. On the *anabasis* the generals each commanded an army (*strateuma*). The armies were of various sizes and could be very small.<sup>20</sup> In short the *strategos* was the commander of a military force, but had a relationship with the employer and paymaster that made him different from, and senior to, the lower ranking officers.<sup>21</sup>

Xenophon refers to the *hypostrategos*, or lieutenant-

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18 Nussbaum 1967, 32-9, following Xen. *An.* I.1.6-11, 3.8, 4.11, 4.13, generals and captains, 7.2.

19 Xen. *An.* I.1.2, Xenias, 2.3, Socrates and Sophaenetus, 2.6, Meno.

20 Xen. *An.* I.2.3. Note that Pasion had only 300 hoplites and 300 peltasts.

21 The generals on the *Anabasis* were *strategoï* by virtue of their connection with Cyrus. Isocrates, V.61-2, suggests that Conon was connected personally to the King.

general, as next in command.<sup>22</sup> The implication is that he was the deputy of the general and that in the event of the general's death or removal the *hypostrategos* took over command of the army.<sup>23</sup> There is no specific distinction made between this officer and the *strategos* or the *lochagos* in the remuneration that he received. Similarly there is nothing to suggest a special status or role other than the one of stepping into the general's shoes when necessity required. His existence might only have been symbolic as a sensible contingency measure, given the prospects of death for generals of Greek armies.

The *lochagos* was the next in seniority in the command structure.<sup>24</sup> The *lochagos*, or captain, as discussed previously, was concerned with hiring.<sup>25</sup> As the general was a fundamental link between the employer and the captain, so the captain fulfilled a similar function between general and men.<sup>26</sup> On the *anabasis* campaign the captain appears to have commanded a *lochos*, and is portrayed as a figure with a number of responsibilities. The generals interacted with the group

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22 Xen. *An.* V.6.36; VI.4.11.

23 Xen. *An.* III.1.32, for the general statement on their position and VII.4.11 for Neon the Asinean replacing Chirisophus for whom he had previously been *hypostrategos*.

24 Xen. *An.* III.1.32, notes that the captain was next in line for the generalship after the *hypostrategos*. It is not explained which captain, for within the various divisions of the army there must have been many captains to each general.

25 See chapter V above.

26 Nussbaum 1967, 32-39. Nussbaum devotes a whole section to the interaction of the captains with the generals and the soldiers in Xenophon's *Anabasis*



of captains as a senior statesman might with a *polis* council.<sup>27</sup> They also represented the army as ambassadors to external forces.<sup>28</sup> Nussbaum notes that it was rare for a common soldier, as opposed to the commanders to speak in the assembly.<sup>29</sup> Captains could intervene to help men under their command.<sup>30</sup> According to Xenophon they were socially superior to the men and were paid more.<sup>31</sup> Xenophon makes much out of the fact that the captains were supposed to be braver than their men and that they took this responsibility seriously.<sup>32</sup> Certainly officers led files in the phalanx, a point that Xenophon makes in his other works.<sup>33</sup>

The Greeks with Cyrus were divided into separate but numerically unequal units, each commanded by a different general. Each of these units is called an army (*strateuma*). Within these armies the basic units of hoplites were the *lochoi*. Xenophon notes that the *lochos* numbered about 100 men

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27 For examples see Xen. *An.* I.7.2, II.2.3, III.5.7, IV.4.12, 6.7, V.2.8. All these references illustrate that the captains served as a council that took issues to the assembly.

28 There are many examples of this. Xen. *An.* II.2.8, III.5.14, V.6.14, VI.2.7, and they attended Seuthes' banquet VII.3.15, VII.2.17.

29 Nussbaum 1967, 39, identifies one instance of a common soldier speaking following Xen. *An.* III.2.32.

30 Xen. *An.* VII.6.7, 17.

31 Xen. *An.* III.1.17, for status, VII.2.36, for pay, and see 155-93 above for remuneration in general.

32 Xen. *An.* III.1.37, IV.1.27, V.2.11.

33 Xen. *Mem.* III.1.8. Here he says the most reliable men were always placed in the front and the rear of the phalanx. Hom. *Od.* XI.419, notes the *promachoi* who fought in the front ranks.

on this campaign and was led presumably by a *lochagos*.<sup>34</sup> Parke cites Polyaeus to illustrate the close relationship between the captain and his unit.<sup>35</sup> There is no reason to doubt this intimacy in the light of other examples of intermediary commanders demonstrating power over their men on mercenary campaigns.<sup>36</sup> Xenophon also notes commanders called *pentecosteres* (or *penteconteres*) commanding units called *pentecostyes*. These were formed specially for the *anabasis*.<sup>37</sup> The presence of an officer called an *enomotarches* (or *enomotarchos*) implies the presence on the campaign of the unit called the *enomotia*.<sup>38</sup> There is nothing to distinguish these commanders from the captains in terms of wages received and there is nothing that determines their status.<sup>39</sup> What is of interest is that all these titles for units on the campaign with Cyrus were basic to the Spartan army.<sup>40</sup> The *lochos* and its commander the *lochagos* were also fundamental elements

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34 Xen. *An.* III.4.21, IV.8.15; Nussbaum 1967, 32, for the *lochos* of 100 men led by the *lochagos*. Note that a *lochos* clearly was not officially set at 100. Other references note different numbers. Polyaeus, *Strat.* II.5.1 and Diodorus, XV.34.2, note the *hieros lochos* of Thebes which was 300 strong. See also Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.30, 4.20, 5.10, for the *lochos* of the Spartan army which was very much larger at 640 men two of which made up a *mora* in Xenophon's day.

35 Parke 1933, 105, following Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.9.56.

36 Dem. XXIII.149, for Charidemus and his sizable command abandoning Timotheus. To illustrate this further, a glance at the battlefield arguments amongst the Spartans, notably at Plataia and Mantinea, demonstrates how Greek troops would not necessarily obey blindly but would follow lesser officers flouting the orders of the *stratego*i.

37 Xen. *An.* III.4.21-2.

38 Xen. *An.* III.4.21, IV.3.26.

39 Nussbaum 1967, 15, following Xen. *An.* III.4.21.

40 Lazenby 1985, 5-11, 41-44, for specific discussion of the organisation of the Spartan army in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

within the Spartan army.<sup>41</sup> According to Thucydides four *pentecostyes* made up the Spartan *lochos*.<sup>42</sup> The smallest unit was the *enomotia* which is mentioned by Thucydides and Xenophon.<sup>43</sup> Only the Spartan *mora* is absent from the *Anabasis*. Given the large number of Peloponnesians present on the campaign, however, it should come as no surprise that the familiar Spartan model of military organisation was used.

Other ranks in Cyrus' mercenary army can be identified. Lycius was the *hipparchos*.<sup>44</sup> A *taxis* commander called Aischines might officially have been a *lochagos*, as he is not called a *taxiarchos*. Men were organised into *taxeis* two hundred strong for a special purpose and unit.<sup>45</sup> Other mercenaries served in a *taxis* later in the fourth century; it should be noted that they were Athenians.<sup>46</sup> Nussbaum surmises that the *taxiarch* was the non-hoplite equivalent of the *lochagos* or of an intermediate commander between him and the general. Clearly he played a different role in armies such as the Athenian where the *taxis* did form a unit separate from the

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41 Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.30, 4.20, 5.10. There were twelve *lochoi* in the Spartan army. Xen. *Lac. Pol.* XI.4, XIII.4, attests the presence of *lochagoi* in the Spartan army as does *Hell.* III.1.28, 2.16, and also *Lochagoi* in the army, 1.26, VI.2.18.

42 Thuc. V.68.3.

43 Thuc. V.67.3, describes in some detail the command structure of the Spartan army before the battle of Mantinea.

44 Xen. *An.* III.3.20. Not surprisingly *hipparchos* was a title held at Athens by the two cavalry commanders.

45 Xen. *An.* IV.3.22; Nussbaum 1967, 32. Xenophon describes Aischines 'having' (*echon*) his own *taxis*. For the presence of *taxeis* on the *anabasis* see Xen. *An.* VI.5.11, each having 200 men. It should be noted that the *taxis* was not a part of the Spartan army organisation. It is possible that Xenophon's influence, or terminology, is at work in the creation of such units on this campaign as he was an Athenian. The *taxis* is a unit attested at Athens, there were ten *taxiarchoi* in charge of the recruitment and administration of, presumably, tribal *taxeis* of cavalry.

46 Isac. IV.18.

*lochos*.<sup>47</sup> There were men who commanded specific units; for example, Episthenes commanded the light armed troops. Stratocles was in charge of the Cretan archers.<sup>48</sup> There were also special rotating commands which suggest that each *lochagos* functioned in a way similar to that of a *prytany* in Athenian democratic practice.<sup>49</sup> The *Anabasis* uses generic terms for commanders like *archontes*, which are found also in other mercenary armies, and demonstrates the important role they played in campaign decision making.<sup>50</sup> This term, it should be noted, is used by Xenophon to describe *oi protostatoi*, 'the front rank men,' whom he describes in that passage as *archontes* or 'leaders.'<sup>51</sup> It is possible that some of these terms derived from other origins than Spartan or Athenian military terminology.

#### SOURCES OF AUTHORITY

There were three ways in which officers might be selected. Their superior, whether employer or general, might promote them or award them with command, or they selected themselves in so far as they were the employers, or they were

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<sup>47</sup> Nussbaum 1967, 32, n.2, following Xen. *An.* III.1.36, for *Taxiarchos*. Note the Macedonian *Syntagma* where each file was a *lochos* commanded by a *lochagos*. Here a *taxiarxos* was second in command of the *Syntagma*.

<sup>48</sup> Xen. *An.* I.10.7, IV.2.28.

<sup>49</sup> Xen. *An.* IV.7.8, V.1.17, VI.5.

<sup>50</sup> Xen. *An.* II.2.20, V.7.10. It is referenced elsewhere, Diod. XVI.70.2; Isaeus IX.4, for specific reference to a man who always held command abroad and at home.

<sup>51</sup> Xen. *Lac. Pol.* XI.5; Xen. *Men.* III.1.8.

elected by the men serving under them.<sup>52</sup> The authority of the officers in mercenary commands derived from the mercenaries' consent as expressed by their willingness to follow. Officers thus found themselves in an ambiguous position. They could not be too harsh for fear that the men would desert, but could not be too soft in case military discipline would collapse. Mercenary armies fought beyond the scope of domestic political authority. Money played a role in buying their loyalty and with it their consent to leadership, but it was not the only thing that enabled commanders to lead.

Certain city-states provided a greater number of commanding officers for mercenaries overseas than others. This would suggest that the provenance of a commander could be the source of his authority over mercenaries. This was certainly true of Spartans whose military position in the Peloponnese was unparalleled until 369 B.C. Even Spartans who had become exiles commanded authority.<sup>53</sup> The sources contain a preponderance of Athenians serving as 'mercenary' commanders. The power of Athens' reputation might suggest some link between the perceived predominance of a city-state and the relationship of patria to one's status overseas. The *Anabasis* illustrates this well. Almost all the known

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Diod. XV.51, notes the selection by employer while Plut. *Dion*. XXII shows Dion selecting himself. See also Xen. *An.* VI.2.12, where the Arcadians elect their leaders. Nussbaum 1967, 52-61, following Xen. *An.* II.1.46, claims that the officers were elected from a core group of officers and not by the men after Cunaxa.

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Xen. *An.* I.1.2, Clearchus is an example, although whether he did so because of his personality or his heritage is questionable.

Athenians on the expedition were officers.<sup>54</sup> To this can be added other illustrations. The predominant Greek cities all played roles in providing generals commanding the Persian King's mercenaries: Athens provided Iphicrates, Argos Nicostratus, and Thebes Pammenes.<sup>55</sup> The Spartans provided generals for the King's enemies in Egypt and for their allies in Sicily.

Social status played a crucial role in the initial military hierarchical position of mercenaries. This social status was reflected in the connections of the officers in the field, at home, and abroad, to prominent individuals. The sources illustrate the perceived relationship between social status and the ability to lead by example. This is a theme of Xenophon's writing and no doubt reflects the writer's prejudices.<sup>56</sup> An officer's responsibility to lead the attack as the file leader was still dominant even in the armies of the Hellenistic Kings.<sup>57</sup> The relationship between the officer as file leader and as both the best armed and best payed was

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54 Xen. *An.* III.1.47, Xenophon the general, IV.2.13, Amphicrates the captain, V.6.14, Ariston the captain, VII.3.28, Gnesipus the captain, VI.5.11, Phrasias the captain, IV.5.24, Polycrates the captain, III.3.20, Lycius the hipparch. Xen. *An.* IV.2.13, the Athenian Cephisodorus was not an officer.

55 Diod. XV.41, XVI.43, XVI.34; Dem. XXIII.183.

56 Xen. *An.* III.1.21.

57 Asclepiodotus, *Tact.* II.8, III.6 discusses the Macedonian *syntagma* and II.2, notes that the best man - *aristos* - was in the front.

evident throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>58</sup> The source of authority therefore amongst mercenaries was social standing derived from both provenance, reputation, and example.

This conception of authority in mercenary armies is and was theoretical. Even within the city-states an element of consent exercised through a vote of the men at arms, symbolised by the assembly, gave officers their authority.<sup>59</sup> In the field a more democratic element of consent enabled troops to decide who should command them. In dangerous situations and despite the often passive nature of military assemblies, in the *anabasis* and in other campaigns the army's agreement to an officer's wishes played a crucial role in action taken. The power and involvement of the *stratiotai* was dictated by the circumstances in which the army found itself. For example, it was only after the army was out of danger that soldiers of the Ten Thousand began to replace their officers with men they liked rather than men they feared or respected.<sup>60</sup> The fact that the elected commanders were short

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Ridley 1979, 514 n.24, makes the point well that the position of the *strategos* at the head of the phalanx meant that the dangers to that man were great. Defeat would almost certainly mean the death of the *strategos*. Examples include Hippocrates at Delion, Cleon at Amphipolis and Nicostratus and Laches at Mantinea. Note also the two generals of one tribe who fell in 460/59 B.C. and the four out of ten in 430/29.

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The Athenians elected their generals, rather than drawing them by lot, from the ten tribes. Xenophon laments their lack of training at Xen. *Mem.* 1-5, as does Thucydides, IV.28. Spartan practice is more telling and more interesting as Xenophon, *Hell.* III.1.4, IV.8.21, V.2.24, maintains that the Lacedaimonians sent out and appointed (*epistemi*) their officers. He may well mean the assembly appointed them. On occasion, however, the ephors were involved, Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.32. In this example Anaxibius was appointed as harmost of Abydos. How good generals needed to be strategically in the fifth and fourth centuries is debatable, but even the 'Radical Democracy' recognised the need for election and retention of generals.

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Xen. *An.* VI.2.11.

lived in their commands demonstrates that an officer's status came from more than popularity at a given moment. The character of Proxenus is a case in point. His positive and pleasant attitude gave him little authority at critical moments in the field.<sup>61</sup> The irony is evident; in order to enforce authority consent had to be tested to the full. Only if the officer had the right character, background and, most importantly connections, could he succeed in commanding the men beneath him.

Cyrus commanded his Greek employees through a combination of reputation and potential.<sup>62</sup> Cyrus was commander-in-chief with a general staff that included just one Greek, Clearchus. The Persians perceived Clearchus as the most powerful of the Greeks, a role that he 'assumed' from the start.<sup>63</sup> His personality played a monumental role in this.<sup>64</sup> Xenophon distinguished Clearchus from the other Greek *strategoï* at the outset. The other generals he describes as the prince's *xenoi*, who lacked experience. Clearchus is not introduced as a *xenos* and by juxtaposed implication as experienced.<sup>65</sup> When

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61 Xen. *An.* II.6.19-20.

62 Xen. *An.* I.9, III.1.10, VI.4.8.

63 Xen. *An.* I.6.5. Cyrus invited Clearchus to a council meeting perceiving him to be the man most honoured by the Greeks. Xen. *An.* I.3.1, illustrates his special relationship with Cyrus.

64 Xen. *An.* I.3.7, demonstrates the confidence he inspired and see II.2.6, for the way that men obeyed him because of his wisdom. Xen. *An.* II.1-15, demonstrates that personality played a major role in leadership.

65 Xen. *An.* I.1.9. Clearchus and Cyrus make each other's acquaintance. Only later does Clearchus describe himself as the *xenos* of Cyrus.



Clearchus beat a man from Meno's army with a stick, the men of that army were outraged. Were they outraged at the beating or at the fact that it was not their commander who administered it?<sup>66</sup> Either way the incident demonstrates that Clearchus believed himself to have an overseeing role toward Greeks of other generals' commands. He assumed this role as the result of his relationship with Cyrus, his experience and his Spartan heritage as well as his character. As Xenophon states, men did not serve him because they loved him, but because he could get the job done.<sup>67</sup>

#### SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND FAMILY ABROAD

It has been noted earlier in this thesis that tribal elements of Greek service overseas may help explain the presence of the early Peloponnesians in service in Sicily.<sup>68</sup> The group ethos of the tribe rather than the individual or family ethos within the more rigid *polis* structure of Athens would certainly have eased relations across the seas for areas like Arcadia and Achaea.<sup>69</sup> It has also been noted that the mercenary was an outsider from his community. These outsiders often had families with them, and they needed either to create

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<sup>66</sup> Xen. *An.* I.5.11.

<sup>67</sup> See Xen. *An.* II.6.13, for his men's necessary dependence, II.6.7-12, for his abilities.

<sup>68</sup> See chapter III, 153-158.

<sup>69</sup> While there were many 'cities' in the Peloponnese it is questionable to what extent *synoecism* had occurred in these regions by the sixth and fifth centuries. An example might be Elis which did not become synoecised until 470 B.C.

artificial social structures abroad or to bring with them traditional ones from home.<sup>70</sup> Finally the relationship between military organisations and social structure in Greek society seems to have been very strong.

The presence of messes in mercenary service illustrates relationships rooted and formed at home. The *Anabasis* contains one reference to a *syssition*.<sup>71</sup> The presence of such a mess-system here is not surprising, given the number of Peloponnesians and the importance of the mess at Sparta. Sparta was not the only state that had messes and their equivalents. Athenians also served in messes overseas.<sup>72</sup> The context of the evidence is legal, a trial to establish the rights of the claimant to an estate. It suggests that the relationship between 'mess-mates' was regarded as a special one. The similarity of Greek practices from *polis* to *polis*, and the significance of Athenian *hetairiai* in Athens politically at home and militarily overseas, might be worth acknowledgement. Hanson notes the social control on Athenian hoplites exerted by relatives and fellow demesmen who surrounded them.<sup>73</sup> The Spartans found honour expressed in the mess, and clearly the mercenary did also. It has been noted

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70 Tyr. X.1-5; Isoc. V.121..

71 Xen. *An.* V.8.5.

72 Isac. IV.18.

73 Hanson 1989, 122-5.

above that Spartan organisation might have played a role in the formation of mercenary armies overseas. The Dorian nature of the Peloponnese and the large number of mercenaries who came from that region ought to demonstrate that mess-systems and tribal systems, closely associated as they both were with military structures,<sup>74</sup> were common in mercenary service if not always identifiable in the sources.

Nussbaum points out the presence of a large (and passive) 'civilian' population with the army of Cyrus. All mercenary armies must have had such an accompaniment. The sources rarely refer to these retainers and camp followers. Only once does Xenophon refer to a specific retainer, his own shield bearer.<sup>75</sup> He cannot have been alone in having such a bat-man. The Spartans had such *hypaspists* and on occasions used helots.<sup>76</sup> Xenophon's *hypaspist* disappeared during an action. Whether he was a regular combatant under Xenophon's command and employment or a civilian in the wrong place at the wrong time is not stated.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Toynbee 1969, 369, suggests that there was a direct relationship between *sussitia* and *enomotia* on the battlefield. This possibility is also discussed by Lazenby 1985, 23. Herodotus, I.65.5, mentions these two terms in the same phrase. Plutarch, *Lyc.* XII.3, refers to the military nature of the *sussitia* as does Arist. *Pol.* 1271 a 27, 1272 a 2; Xen. *Lac.Pol.* V.2. It is not doubted that Peloponnesians would share common cultural threads. For example, the three Dorian tribes can be detected throughout the Peloponnese. Dorian festivals like the Carneia were celebrated at Argos, *IG IV* 598; at Epidaurus, *IG. IV* 2 1.71.49; at Sikyon, *Hdt.* V.68.2. The Carneia's relationship to military matters ought to be noted here. The various armies of the Peloponnesian states all had similar institutions, *Hdt.* VI.92; *Thuc.* I.107.5, V.59.4. 72.3; Tomlinson 1972, 175-86.

<sup>75</sup> Xen. *An.* IV.2.20.

<sup>76</sup> Xen. *Hell.* IV.5.14; *Hdt.* VII.229.1; *Thuc.* IV.8.9.

<sup>77</sup> Two points of interest here. First, Xenophon's statement, *Xen. An.* VI.4.8, that some Greeks brought others with them might refer to such retainers. Second, the *hypaspists* were an integral part of the army of Alexander and so makes it possible that such men regularly fought alongside their commanders.

Some mercenaries had families. These families either travelled with them or were left behind in a stronghold. Very occasionally the evidence highlights a specific mercenary with a family in his polis.<sup>78</sup> Cyrus had the wives and children of the men who deserted him under guard at Tralles.<sup>79</sup> These deserters were from among his long serving garrison regulars. Men such as these were more likely than transient mercenaries to have settled families. These families were likely to be in the keeping of the employer.<sup>80</sup> Women and children even appeared on the campaign of the Cyreans.<sup>81</sup> Xenophon refers to those who remained on the expedition as having families at home whom they longed for.<sup>82</sup> He wants, however, to portray his mercenaries as citizens at home and not as the motley crew who in the words of Isocrates were unable to live in their own cities. Nevertheless wives and children occur elsewhere in the sources during the fourth century. Pelopidas' mercenaries left their families at Pharsalus while they campaigned in Thessaly.<sup>83</sup> No doubt other mercenaries took their families

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78        *Isac. II.* The two mercenaries discussed had sisters at Athens whom they provided for.

79        *Xen. An.* I.4.8.

80        *Xen. An.* I.4.8.

81        *Xen. An.* V.3.1. There is nothing to identify the status of these women and children.

82        *Xen. An.* III.1.3, 4.46

83        *Plut. Pel.* XXVII.

around with them and even on campaign.<sup>84</sup> For most itinerant mercenaries the maintenance of wives and children at home must have been almost impossible, and no doubt many who served or settled far from home did so by abandoning family. Of course, if they had families to which to return, and if they did return, the nature of mercenaries and mercenary service would appear much less itinerent.

There is evidence that family members fought alongside each other *apodemia*. The brothers in Isaeus II are the only tangible example. Victor Davis Hanson's work is of relevance here with its emphasis on the importance of family and other social relationships to the integrity and fighting ability of the hoplite phalanx.<sup>85</sup> There is little reason to doubt that hoplites who were relatives fought side by side with members of their home *polis* while on overseas service. Inscriptions demonstrate the possibility that fathers and sons fought together as mercenaries.<sup>86</sup>

This raises the question whether the profession of arms as a mercenary was inherited. The first mercenaries must have established overseas links that enabled their descendants to serve overseas in their turn. The same is true of the officers and their sons who served a specific dynasty or

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<sup>84</sup> Plut. *Alex.* XXII, alludes to this very possibility. More tellingly, Isoc. IV.168, states that there are men 'wandering with their women and children in strange lands... compelled ... to enlist in foreign armies.'

<sup>85</sup> Hanson 1989, 122-5.

<sup>86</sup> *SEG XXXI*. 1552, 1554. These names were found on the walls of the chapel of Achoris at Karnak in Egypt and demonstrate that one mercenary was possibly the son of the other.

court. The fact that certain regions featured prominently as recruiting grounds in the years 404-322 must suggest that service in these regions, and by implication amongst certain families, became expected and accepted.

Ordinary men may also have had family ties to those kings or dynasties which they served. Amyrtaeus, a Rhodian who appears to have led men in Egypt in the 380s or 360s, bears the same name as the 'King in the Marshes' described by Thucydides in the mid-fifth century.<sup>87</sup> Perhaps the Rhodian's father knew and honoured the 'King in the Marshes' by calling a son after the Egyptian. A similar situation may be illustrated by inscriptions of the names of Carians who served Psamettichus in the sixth century.<sup>88</sup> One of these Carians bears the name Psamettichus, in spite of the fact that his father had a Greek name. It is possible that an employer's good deeds or reputation influenced the naming of mercenaries' children.<sup>89</sup>

It has been established that relationships in armies under the same employer did cut across city-state boundaries and that no rules governed whether commanders commanded men from their homes or from elsewhere. Unfortunately the *Anabasis* gives only general details about the make up of the

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<sup>87</sup> Thuc. I.110; Hicks and Hill 1901, 122; *CIG* III. 4702.

<sup>88</sup> Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3.

<sup>89</sup> See Habicht 1990, 561-577, who illustrates that Greek name-giving reflected political alliance.

units of the army. But epigraphic dedications from other armies also demonstrate this multi-political dimension of mercenary service. An early fourth century dedication in Egypt demonstrates that five Athenians and five other Greeks from different states all participated in the offering.<sup>90</sup> Were these men part of the same unit or even part of the same 'mess?' On this dedication prominent position is given to Amyrtaeus, a Rhodian who established the table before the shrine. Was he their commanding officer? They must have had some military relationship even if they were part of the same army. It is possible that they were all *lochagoi* and therefore did not serve together in the same unit. A parallel group can be found in contemporary inscriptions from Karnak listing a group of men all from Cyprus.<sup>91</sup>

### NATIONALISM

All these men were Greeks serving together in the same armies. Were mercenaries the first united group of Greeks in history? The concept of 'Greekness' has received much attention recently.<sup>92</sup> Employers hired Greeks because they were perceived as the best troops available.<sup>93</sup> Greek sources

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<sup>90</sup> Hicks and Hill 122; *CIG* III 4702.

<sup>91</sup> *SEG* XXXI 1549-1555.

<sup>92</sup> Cartledge 1993, 9-17.

<sup>93</sup> Plut. *Tim.* XXX.

make the distinction between Greeks and barbarians and are no doubt responsible for a marked, even artificial, distinction between the two. Even taking into account the polarizing and moralizing nature of philosophers, politicians and historians, there is evidence that taking money from the 'barbarians' was deemed unworthy by some.<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless Greeks did take barbarian money. Greeks also had relationships with barbarians that went beyond the financial.<sup>95</sup> Greeks, however, are never found serving in nationally mixed units.<sup>96</sup> As has been shown, the necessity of liaison between Greek commanders and Greek men was paramount, even to a man as admired by Greeks as Cyrus.

Greekness and Greek unity are most evident in times of crisis. All commanders of Greek forces before a battle with non-Greeks appealed to the Hellenic nature of their cause. This was, no doubt, a *topos* of Greek historiography. Alexander went further and used arguments negating the cause of the enemy. The enemy's mercenaries, he said, served against a Greek cause for pay and poor pay too.<sup>97</sup> The *Anabasis* illustrates the 'otherness' felt by Greeks towards

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<sup>94</sup> Xen. *Hell.* I.6.7, has Callicratides state that it is unworthy for Greeks to pander to the Persians for the sake of money. For anti-Persian sentiment, see also *Hell. Oxy.* I.2, which states that some Athenians after the Peloponnesian war were afraid of giving the state a bad name by helping the Persians.

<sup>95</sup> The family connections of Iphicrates, Memnon and Mentor for example. Note the synthesis of Greek and native culture in Asia Minor during the fourth century B.C.

<sup>96</sup> Best illustrated by the separate nature of those on the *anabasis* alongside the host of Cyrus and by the troops with Darius III at the end of his life. The most notable sign of separation occurred during the retreat of Darius where the troops who had remained loyal to the bitter end even offered to 'hide' the Great King in their contingent away from the less trustworthy Persians.

<sup>97</sup> Arr. *Anab.* II.7.4.



'barbarians.' Crisis and fear emphasised this feeling. Cyrus' death resulted in his generals' exhortation to the Greeks that they were special and powerful.<sup>98</sup> The suspicion which was felt towards Apollonides when Agasias alleged he was a Lydian demonstrates the pragmatic xenophobia of ordinary Greeks.<sup>99</sup> Once the army's security had been achieved by reaching 'The Sea', however, xenophobic exhortations gave way to more political distinctions and inter-polis rivalries emerged.<sup>100</sup>

The national argument that distinguished Greeks from 'barbarians' can be taken too far. On only one occasion do Greeks of one side defend Greeks from the other against a Persian force.<sup>101</sup> In another instance, Greeks remonstrated against Hellenic mercenaries serving the Carthaginians against the 'Greek cities' of Sicily.<sup>102</sup> These instances have to be put into context. The evidence comes from Plutarch and Diodorus, neither noted for their objective reports of national themes. The examples are also distinctive in their rarity, and Parke is quite correct to juxtapose the former of

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98        *Xen. An.* III.2.10-3. Note that the Greeks, II.1.16, were happy to see Phalimus, the hoplite battle expert with Tissaphernes, because he was a Greek.

99        *Xen. An.* III.1.31.

100       *Xen. An.* VI.2.11.

101       Diodorus, XVI.49.5, explains that during Artaxerxes' invasion of Egypt the Greeks defending forts at Pelusium, having surrendered with terms, were attacked by 'barbarians' who wanted their belongings. The Greeks serving with the Persians protected their kin from their allies. Their commander successfully explained these events away to the Persian King.

102       *Plut. Tim.* XXI.

the two instances with the 'ruthless methods of Nicostratus,' another commander of Greeks in Egypt against other Greeks.<sup>103</sup> Seibt makes the point that more Greeks died in the service of the Persian empire than in fighting for the Greek cities.<sup>104</sup> This point should be well taken. Persian Kings, satraps, and Sicilian tyrants employed Greeks in great numbers, often to fight against other Greeks. Even on the mainland employers throughout the fourth century had little trouble hiring Greeks to fight either mercenary or citizen opposition. There was little conception of 'Greekness' to those who enlisted.

This last point is especially illustrative because at the height of mercenary service some Greek political commentators and some Greek political developments suggest that ethnic identity as Greeks was superseding the concept of the city-state as an autonomous and ideal unit. These concepts go back to the fifth century, but are often seen by modern commentators as themes of the fourth century. They are exemplified by notions regarding 'common peace' (*koine eirene*) among the Greek city states of the mainland.<sup>105</sup> Peace between the Greek cities would then enable a common Greek cause against Persia, which was another theme of Isocratean

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103 Parke 1933, 168; Diod. XVI.48.3.

104 Seibt 1977, 12.

105 Ryder 1965, for the general discussions about this subject. Note that Xenophon never refers to this theme but Diodorus uses it often. The only fourth century reference to it comes at Dittenberg. *SIG* III 182; Tod 145.

oratory.<sup>106</sup> John Buckler has recently explained, however, that such ideas are anachronistic political conceptions which had little currency in antiquity.<sup>107</sup> Prolific mercenary service in the fourth century bears this point out as Greeks often fought against each other for foreign paymasters. Finally the mid-fifth century had seen the first steps towards federalism, which involved sacrificing the autonomy of a city-state at home to a common foreign policy with a number of cities as part of a league.<sup>108</sup> This would suggest that in practice (and at the grass roots) mercenaries were anathema to these developments, and yet, in spite of this (or as a cause of this), mercenaries were also a major theme of the fourth century themselves.

### LOYALTY

An important element of Greek mercenary service was loyalty. The image of the late Medieval Italian mercenary is one of a man who transferred his loyalty from one side to another at the drop of a coin.<sup>109</sup> It has been noted earlier that Greek commanders faced the possibility of desertion on a

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<sup>106</sup> For example see Isoc. V.120-121.

<sup>107</sup> Buckler 1994, 99-122.

<sup>108</sup> For example, both the Achaean league emerged as a federation of twelve cities in the early fourth century and the Aetolians had united into a league or sympolity by 367 B.C.

<sup>109</sup> Mockler 1985, 7-14, for a brief discussion of the nature of medieval mercenary service.

daily basis even amongst citizen recruits.<sup>110</sup> It has also been noted above that leadership of mercenaries reflected contingency and perception. Mercenary commanders and men also transferred their allegiances. As has been shown the reasons did not necessarily involve payment. Bribery might induce men to abandon their leader.<sup>111</sup> Confidence in a commander's abilities to provide food or remuneration played an important role, but faith in his ability to succeed and to bring the men safely back from a campaign was paramount.<sup>112</sup> The reasons for desertion might be personal.<sup>113</sup> Agesilaus' abandonment of Tachos for Nectanebo provides an interesting case of desertion overseas. The sources neglect to give the real reason why he left one for the other, but animosity cannot be disregarded.<sup>114</sup> Perhaps Agesilaus felt more confidence in Nectanebo's abilities. Alternatively, he may have felt he could dominate Nectanebo more easily than he could Tachos.

There is another side to this. Mercenaries could and did remain loyal. They did so despite great odds against them and

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<sup>110</sup> Dem. L.11, for naval recruits deserting from the Athenian fleet. See also Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.9.38, 59, 63, for Iphicrates' 'ingenious' stratagems to keep the men in service by withholding their pay.

<sup>111</sup> Plut. *Pel.* XXVII. Plutarch demonstrates that mercenaries could be bribed to subvert them from one side to another.

<sup>112</sup> Xen. *An.* I.3.7, for confidence in Clearchus, 4.3, for the 400 *misthophoroi* who transferred from the service of Abrocomas. Xenophon states no reason for this, but it would seem the reputation and prospects of Cyrus' campaign must have been a factor.

<sup>113</sup> Dem. XXIII.149, notes that Charidemus deserted Timotheus for what must have been personal reasons. Note also, Plut. *Tim.* XXV and Diod. XVI.78.5-6, for the desertion of 1,000 mercenaries from Timoleon before the battle of Crimisus. Diodorus states that the desertion occurred because the men lacked faith in Timoleon's judgement and ability to win the battle.

<sup>114</sup> Plut. *Ages.* XXXVI-XXXVII, states that it was treacherous for the king to behave in this way. There had been a dispute between both Tachos and Agesilaus over the position of commander-in-chief of the war.

the lack of pay. As with desertion the presence of charisma was important. Cyrus' mercenaries stayed with him even though they were scared of going against the Great King. They continued out of shame before each other and before the prince.<sup>115</sup> This is not the perceived way that mercenaries behaved in Renaissance Italy. The majority of Timoleon's mercenaries did not leave him at the Crimissus despite good reason to do so.<sup>116</sup> Dion's mercenaries received generous offers from the citizens of Syracuse to come over and join them, but they stayed with their leader.<sup>117</sup> Men could be found serving Phalaecus some years after the Sacred War was over. This man, if the sources are reliable, had little prospect of success and little respect. The Greeks facing Artaxerxes' invasion of Egypt even fought against their Egyptian colleagues because the latter wanted to surrender to the enemy!<sup>118</sup> A similar illustration of desperate mercenary loyalty is provided by the Greeks with Darius III during his last days. Despite the fact that their situation was hopeless they did not abandon the king and in the end proved more loyal than his own countrymen, who murdered him.<sup>119</sup>

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115 Xen. *An.* III.1.10.

116 Plut. *Tim.* XXV, notes that 4,000 of 5,000 stayed with him and formed the back-bone of the army.

117 Plut. *Dion.* XXXVIII.

118 Diod. XVI.49.8.

119 Arr. *Anab.* III.16.2; Diod. XVII.27.2; Curt. Ruf. V.8.4. The latter has a very prosaic account of the events and of the loyalty of the Greeks.

*Pathos* must have played some role in the actions of those Greeks who stayed loyal to Darius. The retention of loyalty, like the holding of authority, was based on more than pragmatism. In short, loyalty was a personal thing. There was no scale that illustrated whether men would stay or desert. Mercenary forces often found themselves in new circumstances with a new paymaster. These circumstances were important but not crucial as the illustrations of blind loyalty demonstrate.

Flexibility was invaluable to success. Mentor's readiness to serve, first an Egyptian, then Temmes of Sidon, and finally the Persians was the background to his rise to power. Clearchus and the Ten Thousand were equally pragmatic. After the death of Cyrus they sought Tissaphernes to take them into service.<sup>120</sup> They even suggested that the King and Tissaphernes could use them against Egypt. Once back in the Greek orbit they casually discussed which power they should serve at the end of their journey: Coeritades, the Spartans or Seuthes.<sup>121</sup>

### **MERCENARY GENERALS**

The basis of all mercenary service was a relationship. It was a relationship based on employment and on contact with

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120      *Xen. An.* II.5.11-14.

121      *Xen. An.* VII.1.33, 2.2, 3.20.

people *apodemia* who were powerful and dependable enough to provide remuneration either in financial or other terms. Networks which can be traced across the eastern Mediterranean demonstrate that underlying 'mercenary service' is a far more complex set of inter-state and personal relationships. Commanders who served abroad were not just privateers and emigrant warriors. They were statesmen doing what statesmen had always done in establishing overseas relationships which were useful to themselves and their home state. At the same time the city-states were duplicitous in this activity.

It has long been argued that the fourth century was an age of specialisation. The decline of the city state was the result of the separation of the citizen farmer from the soldiers and the politicians of the state.<sup>122</sup> In a recent article Lawrence Tritle tried to show that the degree of separation between Athenian generals and politicians was not as great as has been assumed.<sup>123</sup> More recently, however, Debra Hamel has illustrated that the traditional conclusions hold true.<sup>124</sup> Fourth century Athenians did witness a more marked separation between those who served the state as generals and those who worked in politics than they had seen in the previous century. This specialization, combined with

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122      Marinovic 1988, 297.

123      Tritle 1993, 125-129.

124      Hamel 1995, 25-39.

the prominence of hoplite warfare and the decline in the unity of the western Persian empire, seems to have determined a steady flow of military expertise from the Greek world to the east.<sup>125</sup> A chapter in Pritchett's *The Greek State at War* on the fourth century *condottiere* demonstrates that the Greek generals who were part of this 'flow' were less mercenary and more responsible to their home governments than Parke in particular has argued.<sup>126</sup> Pritchett's conclusions are followed below in order to establish the complexities of inter-state politics and service abroad in this period.

The Athenian *strategoi* who served overseas are far more prominent than others for whom there is evidence. The Atheno-centric sources account for the fact that individual Athenians feature so heavily in the sources. Demosthenes led Arcadians who came to Syracuse for pay.<sup>127</sup> He did so as an Athenian general serving his city. Athenian generals would lead men persuaded by pay throughout the fourth century. Did they serve their city or themselves on some of these campaigns? A fore-runner of such military servants might be a man named Lycon. He was an Athenian general in service with Pissuthnes in 411 B.C. At first glance it appears he was a mercenary commander, but Hornblower, following an inscription which

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125 Xen. *An.* II.1.7, for Phalinos, the expert in hoplite warfare who was with Tissaphernes, might illustrate this point.

126 Pritchett 1974, 56-116.

127 Thuc. VII.57. Interestingly some Arcadians came from their friendship with Demosthenes.



shows that the Athenians sent pay to men in Ephesus, postulates that Lycon may well have been acting with state blessing.<sup>128</sup> Lycon's mercenary nature is therefore blurred. He is the first of many generals who found service abroad. This foreign service did not necessarily mean they were simply mercenary adventurers.

Xenophon became a mercenary leader as a matter of circumstances. He was not even on the *anabasis* as a combatant initially. Even then he was only a mercenary commander in the truest sense from the time that the army agreed to serve Seuthes to the time they left his employment. Until that time he was the commander of a group of desperate men trying to leave the Persian empire. Athenians also provided two captains on the expedition, but no other generals and notably no men.<sup>129</sup>

Iphicrates became famous in the 390s. He served Athens both as a commander and as a *strategos* throughout his lengthy career. Whether he was *strategos* or archon is not of relevance here. His overseas connections are at issue. Pritchett is emphatic that he was 'controlled by the home authorities' certainly until 388.<sup>130</sup> He served the state loyally and at many actions from the battle of the long walls

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128 Hornblower 1982, 31-32; M&L 77 (line 79).

129 Xen. *An.* IV.2.13, Amphicrates, V.6.14, Ariston. The other Athenians may well have had rank but are not listed as such. It would be strange if they were not rank holders based on the fact that the Athenians sent no body of men that are known on the expedition.

130 Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.34, notes that 1,200 peltasts were sent to fight the Spartan Anaxibius at Corinth in 388 B.C.

to the Social war of the 350s.<sup>131</sup>

Iphicrates had three connections overseas of crucial importance. The first of these was Pharnabazus and the Persian King. Pritchett argues away the mercenary nature of this service.<sup>132</sup> He was with Conon at Cnidus, an action that was of benefit both to Athens and to himself. Diodorus states that the Athenians sent Iphicrates to the Persians at the request of the Great King.<sup>133</sup> The request is significant in its context. The Persians had already made the Athenians recall Chabrias from Egypt. They asserted their power over Athens again in their request for a general. He remained accountable to the Athenians and the conclusion to his Persian service reveals this as much as its inauguration.<sup>134</sup>

The second of Iphicrates' overseas connections, in Thrace, is not so obviously state-controlled. Demosthenes is the main source and is keen to paint many Athenians in a poor light.<sup>135</sup> The initial question centres on the nature of Iphicrates' service there -- official or unofficial?

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Pritchett 1974, 63. References to Iphicrates in the service of the state from the 390s to the 350s are as follows; *Xen. Hell.* IV.4.9; Orosius, III.1.21; *Diod.* XIV.91.2-3; *Xen. Hell.* IV.5.13; *Dem.* XIII.22, XXIII.198, Aisch. III.243; *Deinarchus*, I.75; *Paus.* III.10.1. *Xen. Hell.* IV.5.19, V.1.25; *Diod.* XIV.9.2, notes that Iphicrates became *strategos* in the 380s. *Xen. Hell.* VI.2.13, has him at Corcyra replacing Timotheus in 373/2 B.C. The Athenians compelled him to return after 371 B.C. and the ratification of King's Peace, *Xen. Hell.* VI.4.1, 5.49. Iphicrates returned to command against Epameinondas. *Nep.* (XI).3.2, again *strategos* in 368 B.C. *Dem.* XXIII.149, notes that Charidemus served under him with a band of mercenaries. Aisch. II.28-29, for actions during the Social War in the 350s.

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Pritchett 1974, 68.

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*Diod.* XV.29.4, for the summons of Iphicrates in 377/6, 41, 42.4, the reason given is his strategic skill. Also referenced by *Nep.* (XI).2.4; *Plut. Art.* XXIV.1; *Polyaenus, Strat.* III.9.38, 56, 63.

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*Diod.* XV.42-3. A dispute arose between Iphicrates and the satrap and Iphicrates returned to Athens. The Athenians told the Persians that they would deal with him as they saw fit.

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*Dem.* XXIII.130-2.

Secondary to this, but no less important, is the role he played in subsequent anti-Athenian actions made by Cotys. There was certainly Athenian diplomatic activity in Thrace. No source cites Iphicrates as present. Some sources attest to Iphicrates acting against the Thracians.<sup>136</sup> The sources are unclear as to whom Iphicrates served in Thrace.<sup>137</sup> He became the son-in-law of Cotys and so had little choice but to maintain this connection once Cotys became the enemy of Athens. Despite the dreadful situation in which he found himself - fighting against his own *polis* - he nevertheless refused to attack Athenian strongholds and gained the enmity of Cotys as a result. He managed to escape exile and *atimia*, which Pritchett suggests is a testament to his innocence in the matter.<sup>138</sup>

The third and last of his connections further demonstrates his ambitions to having family connections in the north. Amyntas the king of Macedonia adopted Iphicrates, and, despite the lack of evidence for mercenary activity in Macedonia, textual evidence suggests an Atheno-Macedonian alliance signed in 373 B.C. The point can still be made that Iphicrates was acting in the capacity of a statesman.

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136      Nepos (XI).2.1. Seneca, *Controversiae*, VI.5. Harpocration, Drus (Theopomp. *FGrH* Frag. 161); Polyasenus, *Strat.* III.9.4, 41, 46, 50, 60, 62. All refer to the enemy being Thracians.

137      Nepos (XI).2.1, says Seuthes; Dem. XXIII.129, says Cotys. Neither states whom it was he fought against. Parke 1933, 55, following Beloch 1912, 56, n.1, suggests the possibility that he served both in turn without changing sides and alludes to the possibility that they were both fighting against Hebryzelmis of the Odrysae.

138      Pritchett 1974, 66. Pritchett adds cynically that it may also say something of the attitude of the Athenian Demos.

In short, Pritchett maintains that there were occasions when he acted independently of Athens in this career, but there is only one occasion where he seems certainly culpable of disloyalty. This was in the naval engagement with the Athenians while serving Cotys, and even this has come under question.<sup>139</sup> The evidence therefore is ambiguous about the mercenary nature of Iphicrates' behaviour. The connections that Iphicrates maintained abroad in Thrace and Macedonia were familial and no different from the connections of Athenians like Miltiades. Certainly his Persian service can be seen as both of great benefit to the state and officially sanctioned.

Chabrias has been seen as the professional *condottiere*, but the evidence does not bear out this statement. He served the state on numerous campaigns.<sup>140</sup> Notably he had strong connections to Egypt.<sup>141</sup> The dates of his Egyptian service are disputed.<sup>142</sup> The sources state he was in Egypt privately.<sup>143</sup> Pritchett may overstate the argument that an alliance between the Athenians and Egyptians explains his

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139 Pritchett 1974, 66-7.

140 Chabrias served the state from the 390s to the 360s and the references to this service are as follows; Dem. IV.24, states that he commanded mercenaries in the 390s. Nep. (XII).2.2; Xen. *Hell.* V.4.14, notes that in 379 B.C. he commanded Athenian peltasts. Diodorus, XV.34.3, claims that he won the battle of Naxos in 376 B.C. Chabrias was sent to Corinth to replace Iphicrates. He commanded at victories at Euboea and the Cyclades. Dem. XX.76, states that he was in charge of Athenians at Thebes. Chabrias was with Athenians when he defeated Epaminondas at Corinth. *IG* II2 111 18, illustrates he was *strategos* in 363/2.

141 Theopomp. *FGH* frag. 105 and Nep. (XII).3.4, for the fact that he preferred to live in Egypt.

142 Diodorus, XV.29, dates his service of Acoris to 377/6 B.C., but Parke 1933, 59, thinks all his Egyptian experience should be compressed from 386-80 B.C. and that Diodorus was wrong.

143 Diod. XV.29, for Chabrias in service with Acoris and, 92.3, for his service with Tachos.

presence there.<sup>144</sup> There were other Athenians in Egypt serving with Chares.<sup>145</sup> In spite of the private capacity in which Chabrias served the Egyptian king Tachos, the Athenian government was still able to force his retirement from that service.<sup>146</sup>

Chares served the state through the 360s and 350s.<sup>147</sup> Accusations against Chares of being a roving *condottiere* cannot be supported. The nature of Athenian wars in this period left generals few options to provide for their men but to pursue seemingly independent actions. Demosthenes is scathing in his attacks against such generals, but the implication is still clear that they were theoretically acting for the state.<sup>148</sup> Pritchett sees the final year of the Social war as crucial to Chares' reputation as a mercenary. In this year he served with Artabazus in a revolt against Artaxerxes (Ochus). Diodorus states his reasons were not personal gain, but to spare the Athenians the expense of maintaining his

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<sup>144</sup> Diod. XV.29.2, says he went there without having secured the vote of the demos, but Athens had an alliance with Egypt at the time he wrote this.

<sup>145</sup> Dem. XIX.287, refers to the brother in law of Aischines Nicias and a Curebius, neither in a complimentary manner.

<sup>146</sup> Diod. XV.29.3.

<sup>147</sup> Pritchett 1974, 77-85. As strategos he assisted Phleious against Argos. He transferred to Oropus in the same year 366. He later appeared at Cenchreai in the Corinthia with a fleet. In 361 B.C. he was appointed to succeed Leosthenes at Peparethus. In the social war he was with the Athenian expedition to Euboea, next in the Chersonesus, and finally he fought in a battle off Chios.

<sup>148</sup> Pritchett 1974, 80-85, makes much of the nature of this speech as a *topos* against Chares and the fact that he was acquitted: the result of the trial, while unknown, would suggest little of his real guilt. Chares' actions against Athenian allies are often regarded as those of a privateer. Aischines, II.90, says that Chares has been brought to trial but his silence suggests that he was acquitted and this would suggest some due process by the state. For Athenian generals as plunderers in pursuit of personal gain, see Dem. II.28, VIII.24-9, XXI.173, XXIV.12, LI.13. For Chares specifically see Aisch. II.71, Plut. *Phoc.* XIV.

army.<sup>149</sup> The siege of Chios could not be relieved, and the army could not be brought home. As Pritchett says, 'we may reasonably assume' that his decision to remain was based on sound strategic sense.<sup>150</sup> Robert Moysey following Diodorus, Isocrates, and Demosthenes notes that Chares was 'forced' to join the satrap as his unpaid mercenaries were ready to abandon him anyway in hopes of the 'ready cash' offered by Artabazus.<sup>151</sup> Whether it was out of concern for Athens or the pragmatic requirements of his men, his decision was not one of a completely independent commander. There is evidence that the Athenians approved of the action which he took.<sup>152</sup> Furthermore, when Artaxerxes asked the Athenians to rein in their general, they did. Like Chabrias and Iphicrates before him, Chares was controlled by the state. His career, like theirs, demonstrates the power of Persia at Athens.

Marinovic describes Charidemus as typical of a new style of emancipated generals in the fourth century.<sup>153</sup> Charidemus was only a 'notorious mercenary' commander before he was awarded Athenian citizenship.<sup>154</sup> Demosthenes paints a picture

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<sup>149</sup> Diod. XVI.22.1. Pritchett 1974, 78, notes here the bad state of the Athenian economy as a result of the war. Isoc. VII and VIII, note the exhaustion of the city. Dem. XIX and XXIII, both note the limited resources of the state in the mid-350s.

<sup>150</sup> Pritchett 1974, 78, following Dem. IV.19.

<sup>151</sup> Moysey 1985, 221; Diod. XVI.22.1; Isoc. VIII.44; Dem. IV.19, 24.

<sup>152</sup> Diod. XVI.22.1; Dem. IV.19, for Chares' contact with Athens and his subsequent sanctioning by the state.

<sup>153</sup> Marinovic 1988, 289-290.

<sup>154</sup> IG II 2 118, notes that he was awarded a golden crown and the title of *euergetes* by the Athenians. Pritchett 1974, 80-5, agrees that IG II 2 118, mentions him honourably.

of a man permanently disloyal to the state.<sup>155</sup> These sentiments were in response to his abandonment of Timotheus and the resulting 'disasters' for the Athenians in Thrace. Juxtaposed to the Demosthenic image are his commendations from the state.<sup>156</sup> Pritchett's conclusion must be recognised, that the epigraphic record, frequent election to the generalship, and the patriotic close to his Athenian career should go a long way to discount Demosthenes' picture of a man permanently disloyal to the Athenians.<sup>157</sup> He died in exile at the Persian king's court. This was the result of his enmity to Alexander -- something he somewhat ironically had in common with the patriotic Demosthenes.<sup>158</sup>

Unlike those generals listed above, Conon was an exile from Athens after his escape at Aegospotami in 405 B.C. He resided with Euagoras and later served the Persians in a private capacity.<sup>159</sup> By his victory at the Battle of Cnidus he did more for Athens than he might have done as an Athenian in Athenian service.<sup>160</sup> The sources are clear that his

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155 Dem. XXIII.149.

156 Pritchett 1974, 89. The Demos crowned him three times following Dem. XVIII.114, and also in inscriptions as recorded in the treasuries of Athena, *IG II.1496.28, 32, 36.*

157 Pritchett 1974, 89.

158 Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.6. Charidemus went to the Persian court after fleeing Alexander in 335 B.C.

159 Diod. XIV.39.1.

160 Diod. XIV.39.3. Conon accepted the command on the grounds that he hoped that he might win great renown and the leadership of the Greeks for his native country.

motives were patriotic. He was not a mercenary, and the actions he took subsequent to his naval victory demonstrate that Conon and the Persians were keen to put Athens in a stronger strategic position than it had been since the Great war.

Two other 'patriots' who sought service overseas were Conon's son Timotheus and Phocion 'the Good.' The former like his father served with the Great King.<sup>161</sup> Phocion took service with the Satrap Idrieus, along with Euagoras.<sup>162</sup> The reputations of Timotheus and Phocion as Athenian statesmen and servants have been second to none. They illustrate the ease with which Athenian statesmen could serve the state as *stratego*i in one year and serve an overseas paymaster in the next.<sup>163</sup> The struggles against the Macedonians reveal the complexities of patriotism and overseas service. Parke notes the depth of Athenian involvement with the Persians in the 330s by citing Didymus. For example, Chares was dispatched to attend a conference with the generals of the King.<sup>164</sup> Apollodorus appears in the service of Arsites at this time. He was an Athenian who did not die an exile and may have had

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<sup>161</sup> Dem. XLIX.25, 28. Parke 1933, 75, contradicts the evidence and states that Timotheus was not a mercenary and always served Athens. The speech claims that Timotheus fled to Persia to avoid the prosecution, but Pritchett 1974, 4-33, noted the frequency of trials of generals at Athens. They must have taken many of them in their stride.

<sup>162</sup> Diod. XVI.12.

<sup>163</sup> Dem. XLIX.6, 28. Timotheus was no sooner in the service of Athens as general in 374/3 B.C. than the Athenians removed him, and then he set sail for service with the King. Phocion served Idrieus, but returned to Athens for his election as *strategos* in 349/8 B.C., a point not lost on Parke 1933, 166. Such phenomena were true of all the men discussed in this chapter.

<sup>164</sup> Parke 1933, 178, n.1, following Didymus, X.55.



patriotic ambitions for service.<sup>165</sup> Another Athenian patriot and general who had served overseas was Leosthenes. He had served the Persian cause, and was not alone among Athenians in this endeavour against Alexander.<sup>166</sup> He was commissioned by the Athenians to collect mercenaries and lead their forces in the Lamian war.<sup>167</sup> On the one hand his service in the Lamian war was official, while on the other his service of the Persians was patriotic.

Prominent Athenians served overseas with alacrity in the fourth century. All of those for whom there is evidence of such service did so without prosecution by the state. The Athenians did not punish even the seemingly culpable Iphicrates. Their 'mercenary' nature must be disputed. Only Chabrias never served a Persian master. The Persian role in the affairs of Athens in the fourth century, when viewed from the perspective of these relationships, seems omni-present. The Persians' perception of the Greeks in this period, used as they were to utilising foreign (but conquered) expertise and innovations, and their ability to request and replace Athenian generals at will, demonstrates a role akin to that of overlord.

There were Athenians who did not counterbalance their

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<sup>165</sup> Paus. I.29.10, for the fact that he did not die an exile, for he was buried in the Ceramicus.

<sup>166</sup> Diod. XVII.25.6. Ephialtes and Thrasybulus two *strategoí* whose surrender was demanded by Philip, 15.1. Arrian, *Anab.* I.10.4, mentions Ephialtes but not Thrasybulus. See Worthington 1987, 489-91.

<sup>167</sup> Diod. XVII.111.3.

service overseas with service for their home state. Some Athenian commanders fought in Egypt and Persia, but are not attested fighting for their homeland.<sup>168</sup> Men like these must have found foreign service more congenial and more regular than service on behalf of the state. It goes without saying that these men were never powerful nor prominent in Athens. Conversely there were many prominent Athenians who are not known to have served overseas. Their reasons were the same as those of men who did (excepting men like Diophantus). They were busy with domestic power. Thrasybulus can serve to illustrate all of these men. He was the enemy of Conon. He did not serve the Persians. Like Conon, however, he was a patriot and an imperialist who was not opposed to an alliance with Persia if it meant maintaining Athens' power. When Conon returned to Athens from Cnidus and Persian service in 393 B.C. Thrasybulus' power waned. There is nothing in the record to suggest that individual Athenians shunned Persian service. Conon demonstrates well that friendship overseas could mean power at home.

Known Spartans, like Athenians, were commonly leaders and employers rather than mercenary soldiers. Those Spartans who found themselves in the position of the roving mercenary commander were either exiles like Clearchus,<sup>169</sup> or men

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<sup>168</sup> Diod. XV.48.2. Diophantus the Athenian is also mentioned by Isocrates, *Ep.* 8.8, as being in Asia before 350.

<sup>169</sup> Xen. *An.* 1.2.9.

appointed to lead mercenary troops for and by the Spartans like Chirisophus.<sup>170</sup> Appointments by the Spartans to lead mercenaries were common.<sup>171</sup> Spartans must have had experience of leading other Greeks into battle as a result of their special relationship to the Peloponnesians. Spartan kings were not different. Plutarch describes Agesilaus as a captain of mercenaries with little reputation.<sup>172</sup> Parke is still more disparaging.<sup>173</sup> Agesilaus was allied to the Egyptian cause and therefore not a mercenary.<sup>174</sup> He was a King of Sparta and had advisors just as he had when he campaigned in Asia Minor against the Persians for his *polis*. Other Spartan commanders served in Egypt.<sup>175</sup> All the Spartans who left Laconia did so initially on matters of state. Some went on to become rogues like their famous fore-runner Pausanias. Spartans campaigned overseas as part of state policy. They commanded mercenaries

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170 Xen. *An.* I.4.3, for Chirisophus and V.6.36 for Neon of Asine who replaced him. There were other men who were Spartans on the expedition who are not cited as officers such as Cleonymus a hoplite and Dracontius an exile, IV.1.8.

171 Diod. XIV.78.1-3. Aristotle the commander of Dionysius' Peloponnesians was arrested and sent back to Sparta to stand trial (for what is not stated, although disobedience to the tyrant is implied). As with Brasidas, Gylippos and Clearchus, Spartan policy revolved around one or two Spartans going overseas to lead allies or mercenaries.

172 Plut. *Ages.* XXXVI. Plutarch states that Agesilaus diminished his reputation by his service in Egypt and yet recognises at XXXVII that he was there as a representative of the state.

173 Parke 1933, 90, states that 'Agesilaos in his old age had to turn *condottiere* to earn the wherewithal to augment Sparta's military strength and in striving to procure mercenaries he founded for Spartan kings a tradition of mercenary service.' And at 111 he notes, '...he (Agesilaus) persisted in maintaining the elaborate pretence that he was only an ally (of Egypt) and representative of the Spartan state.' It is hard to see that as king of Sparta, with advisors and 1,000 Neodamode hoplites, he could be anything but an ally of the power he was fighting with and a representative of the state he ruled.

174 Diod. XV.90.2. Tachos has *Lakedaimonious sunmachein* who are not, therefore, mercenaries, and at 92.2 he is made to claim that the Lacedaimonians dispatched Agesilaus with 1,000 hoplites to fight as an ally. See also Xen. *Ages.* II.28-31, for the assessment that Agesilaus wished to liberate Asia Minor through his alliance in Egypt.

175 Diod. XV.48.2, for a man called Lamius; Polyaeus, *Strat.* II.16.1, records Gastron, a Spartan commander in Egypt.

put under their charge by their state and were supposed to be fighting for their state. Athenian commanders found their role overseas tempered by their state as well. How much they differed from the Spartans is not easy to suggest.

The Spartans 'ran' the Peloponnese almost as a recruiting centre for themselves and for their allies and friends abroad. They illustrate well that state policy and mercenary hiring were intertwined. The fact that Spartan permission had to be obtained before hiring could take place demonstrates this.<sup>176</sup> Chirisophus was sent to Cyrus by the Spartans with seven hundred men,<sup>177</sup> and Dionysius I of Syracuse was able to send Spartan officers of his mercenaries back to Sparta for trial.<sup>178</sup> These examples illustrate that the Spartan state was involved in the provision of officers for service with Sparta's friends and allies overseas, not to mention that the Spartans maintained some control over these men after they were dispatched.

Timoleon commanded mercenaries, but was not a mercenary himself.<sup>179</sup> The nature of Corinth's relations with her satellites was special.<sup>180</sup> The actions of Timoleon were an

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176 See chapter V, 205-206; Diod. XIV.44.1, 58.1.

177 *Xen. An.* I.4.3, *Hell.* II.1.1.

178 Diod. XIV.78.1-3.

179 Diod. XV.65.2. The Corinthians voted that Timoleon assist the Syracusans.

180 The Corinthians seem to have exercised more political control over their satellites than other states. For this specifically see Graham 1964, 118-152.

extension of Corinthian foreign policy. Like Sparta, Corinthian commanders of mercenaries acted for the state. The same was true of the Phocian mercenary commanders. These men were not mercenaries themselves. They were the employers. They were also Phocians supporting the cause of Phocis as best they could. Only after the battle of the Crocus Field and his expulsion to the Peloponnese did Phalaecus turn into a commander of itinerant mercenaries. This cannot be said about his predecessors. He was, therefore, forced into mercenary life, and there was no way he could return home to Phocis.

Thebes was no different from the other states. Only Proxenus acted privately in leading a contingent of men on the *anabasis*. Just as the Persians did with Athens, they requested service from Thebes in provision of general and mercenaries for service. Pammenes led mercenaries into Asia at the bequest of his home government. He was not therefore a mercenary himself.<sup>181</sup> The little known Lacrates commanded the first contingent at Pelusium for the Egyptians.<sup>182</sup> Nothing can be said of this man's ambitions or relationship to his employer and home.

The famous Rhodian mercenary leaders Mentor and his brother Memnon under their Persian masters reached pinnacles

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<sup>181</sup> Diod. XVI.34.1. He was hired at the bequest of Artabazus and he won two victories. See Polyaeus, *Strat.* VII.33; Pritchett 1974, 91. Parke 1933, 124, claims the 5,000 that went with him were mercenary adventurers because Pammenes' removal and replacement by Artaxerxes' brother could only have been tolerated by non-native Thebans. Dem. XXIII.183, notes that Pammenes may have been with Philip at Maroneia and then later in the Phocian war according to Lenschau *RE*. vol 18 1949, 298.

<sup>182</sup> Diod. XV.49.1

of success unparalleled by Greeks previously. Rhodes is situated in the eastern orbit of the Greek world. It is not surprising that men from this part of the world found service with the powerful men of the east.<sup>183</sup> The family's ties overseas began with Artabazus, with whom Memnon went into exile at Philip's court after the failure of the satrap's revolt.<sup>184</sup> Mentor took service with a rebellious Egyptian ruler.<sup>185</sup> This Egyptian sent Mentor to Temmes of Sidon along with the men under his command. Almost immediately Temmes died and Mentor appears in Persian service.<sup>186</sup> The Great King saw the skills demonstrated by Mentor and promoted him.<sup>187</sup> His influence in Persia was enough to reinstate his brother and brother-in-law.<sup>188</sup> Memnon was as successful as his brother. Darius considered him one of his best commanders.<sup>189</sup> He was made commander of the war against Alexander after the battle of Granicus.<sup>190</sup> His death was a serious blow to the Persian cause.

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183      *Arr. Anab.* II.1.5 notes the presence of another Rhodian in the Persian King's service as commander of the garrison at Mytilene.

184      *Diod.* XV.51.3.

185      *Diod.* XV.45.1, for Mentor commanding mercenaries in Egypt.

186      *Diod.* XV.50.7. Mentor became very powerful in the service of the Great King especially in recruiting Greek mercenaries and through his relationship with Bagoas.

187      *Diod.* XV.52.1.

188      *Diod.* XVI.50.7.

189      *Diod.* XVII.7.2.

190      *Diod.* XVII.29.1.

The two Rhodians led large numbers of men employed for a Persian King. They achieved more than any Greek general could hope to achieve. Memnon became the second most important man in the Persian empire. His domains were the same as those held by the Great King's brother Cyrus almost seventy years before. It is, however, because he is a Greek that he is seen as special. Had he been a Lydian or Mede would he have been seen as a mercenary or merely a servant and friend of the king? They were individuals from an eastern Mediterranean island serving the best available option for their success. They became much more than just mercenary generals; they became, like the Athenian generals and the Spartan kings, powerful statesmen in their own right.

It is possible to conclude from this section that the mercenary commander was a more complex figure than a *condottiere*. Most of the Athenians served their state with more loyalty and regularity than any reckless adventurer. Before the Delian league and empire Athenian aristocrats made their money overseas. The Alcmaeonidae and Miltidae had strong connections with the Hellespont in the later sixth century B.C. The empire of the fifth century had occupied all levels of society in work and lucrative rewards politically and economically. There was no need for dynastic connections because the *polis*, with its attached empire, was the only dynasty that was of any value at that time. With the fall of this empire the aristocrats particularly needed foreign

connections once again. These connections could be forged through service as generals overseas. Just as Miltiades forged successful bonds with Hellespontine despots in the later sixth century, so the generals did the same in the fourth on a much wider level. They served the Athenians loyally for the same reason that they went overseas. They wanted power based on the money and allies they could make abroad, but power that they could wield at home.

#### **XENIA AND PHILIA**

Alcibiades established a relationship with Tissaphernes in 411 B.C. which illustrates the importance of friendship in international politics. On several occasions Thucydides notes that he was attempting to make Tissaphernes a friend (*philos*) to the Athenians.<sup>191</sup> Only once does Thucydides make Alcibiades imply that he was a friend of Tissaphernes himself.<sup>192</sup> The Trierarchs on Samos perceived that Alcibiades was the Persian's friend.<sup>193</sup> Finally, Alcibiades promised that he would make Tissaphernes a friend to the Trierarchs and afterwards the King also.<sup>194</sup> Friendship of powerful people either to a state or to individuals clearly meant a great deal

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191 Thuc. VIII.50.1, 2, 52.1.

192 Thuc. VIII.47.2.

193 Thuc. VIII.47.2.

194 Thuc. VIII.48.1.



to those who had secured it.

Xenophon's description of the relationship of all on the march up country in 401 B.C. demonstrates that Cyrus' prospects reflected both his ambitions and ability to command.<sup>195</sup> The over-riding importance of friendship cannot be ignored. *Philia* played a major role in all of the relationships of those on the *anabasis*.<sup>196</sup> It can also be demonstrated at a lower level amongst mercenaries serving overseas.<sup>197</sup> The nature of *philia* needs some attention.

*Philia* was present in Athenian domestic politics. Strauss, following Connor, notes that *philoï* referred to 'one's own people': a group who set out to help one another politically and privately.<sup>198</sup> It had an element of public as well as of private life. He recognises the proximity in this relationship to the small and political dinner clubs - *hetairiae*, discussed above in their connection to mercenary service overseas. He also recognises the possibility that there was no need for equality between *philoï*.<sup>199</sup>

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195 Xen. *An.* I.3.17, notes that the Greeks needed Cyrus to get away and could not without him. 4.15 cites that Menon told his men that the results of service with Cyrus would be captaincies and anything else that they desired. 6.5, notes that Clearchus was the most honoured by the Greeks in the eyes of the Persians. 7.4, notes that Cyrus tells Greeks that they would be the envy of those whom they went home to but that they would probably want to stay because of the appreciation they would receive from him. VI.4.8, states that some men had brought other men with them.

196 Xen. *An.* I.9, for the notion that Cyrus' friendship was better than a monthly wage. See also I.3.6, 3.12, 4.15, 5.11-2, III.1.4.

197 Isac. IV.18. The speaker is keen to point out that the claimant and the dead man, who were both mercenaries in service together in some capacity, were not *philoï*.

198 Strauss 1986, 26, following Xen. *Mem.* II.6, states that, '[a]n Athenian entered politics to help his *philoï* and to hurt his enemies.'

199 Strauss 1986, 27, for the concept of 'one's own people' and its connection to to public life.

Among employers and the mercenaries they commanded there is evidence of *philia* - friendship. Cyrus had friendships in the Greek world. These friendships might extend to an entire polity. The Lacedaimonians, for example, owed him a debt of gratitude for his role in the Ionian war.<sup>200</sup> Friendships made things possible. Proxenus had achieved much through the friendship of the foremost men of his day.<sup>201</sup> Menon's position was even more flagrant. In order to get the wealth he desired he set out to befriend the most powerful men of the day who could no doubt protect him from those he had abused.<sup>202</sup> Proxenus told Xenophon that the friendship (*philia*) of Cyrus was worth more than his native state.<sup>203</sup> Friendship was given practical execution at the end of Xenophon's tale as he enables his friends to gain rewards from a raid.<sup>204</sup> A final illustration from the *Anabasis* comes in a speech by Clearchus to Tissaphernes. Having extrapolated at length about the possibilities of friendship with Cyrus he says that '[i]f you were to be a friend to any, you would be

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200 Xen. *Hell.* II.1.1.

201 Xen. *An.* II.6.17, states that Proxenus, 'through the friendship - *philia* - with the foremost men of his day, was able to hold his own in conferring benefits.'

202 Xen. *An.* II.6.21, states that Menon, in order to get great wealth, 'desired to be a friend of the most powerful men of his day in order to commit unjust deeds without suffering the penalty.'

203 Xen. *An.* III.1.4.

204 Xen. *An.* VII.8.11.

the greatest possible friend.'<sup>205</sup>

In the Greek sources the Great King also had *philoi*. Cyrus noted that the satraps of Persia were the King's 'friends.'<sup>206</sup> Mentor, in being promoted, was raised above all other of these *philoi*.<sup>207</sup> Clearly friends in a Persian context meant something more than a passing acquaintance. In being a friend of the King an official and an honorary relationship between the King and his subordinates was recognised.<sup>208</sup> Mentor, as a friend of the King, did him services. Diodorus notes that one of these services was recruiting men from the Greeks.<sup>209</sup> At the root of the Rhodian's success was his relationship with Artabazus a Persian satrap. This relationship enabled him to move into a closer relationship with the King.<sup>210</sup> Hornblower thinks that Mausolus' granting of *proxenia* to Knossos of Crete was motivated by hopes of obtaining Cretan mercenaries.<sup>211</sup>

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Xen. *An.* II.5.14. Xenophon makes Clearchus say to Tissaphernes: 'Again take those who dwell around you. If you were to be the friend of any you would be the greatest possible friend while if any were to annoy you, you would play the part of master over all of them in case you had us for supporters for we should serve you not for the sake of pay but for gratitude we should feel and rightly feel toward you the man who saved us.' See also Xen. *An.* II.1.20 where he says that his mercenaries 'shall be more valuable as the king's friends if we keep our arms.'

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Xen. *An.* I.7.7.

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Diod. XVI.52.1-3.

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Olmstead 1948, 290, notes that Themistocles was granted the status of 'friend' of the Great King as a purely 'honorary title.'

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Diod. XVI.50.7.

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Dem. XXIII.157. Demosthenes notes that the good fortune - *eutychia* - of both brothers was the result of their relationship through marriage with the satrap. It should be noted that Persian Kings and their families were forbidden to marry foreigners of any status. This would have been another factor making close 'relations' with the King's court difficult.

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Hornblower 1982, 135. The evidence is an inscription from Labraunda published in the same volume, 366.

The Persians were not alone in having these connections of friendship abroad. Among other dynasties the term *hetairoi* or companions was common. Dion had a group of men who accompanied him to Sicily from the Greek mainland.<sup>212</sup> Diodorus describes Philistus, the commander of Dionysius' mercenaries, as *pistotatos de ton philon tois dynastais* - the most faithful of the dynasts' friends.<sup>213</sup> The best illustrations of this outside of Persia are the *hetairoi* (companions) of the family of Philip and Alexander. Alexander had friends (*philoï*) who were Macedonians,<sup>214</sup> but the sources are clear that the Greek companions enjoyed a special status with the Macedonian court, and Nearchus of Crete even commanded in Alexander's navy on the journey from Indus to Babylon. Perhaps unsurprisingly the successors replace the word *hetairos* with *philos* at their respective courts in Asia.<sup>215</sup>

Xenophon calls all but one of Cyrus' Greek contacts *xenoi*.<sup>216</sup> Clearchus, while he was the exception, still calls

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212 Plut. *Dion*, XXII. The word here is *hetairoi*. Indeed, Plutarch's description of the generous spirit of Dion as a banqueter fits well with the image of a Homeric aristocrat, see Murray 1980, 47, discussing dark age relationships says '[f]or *hetairoi* seem to have been attracted by such displays of personal generosity, by the reputation of the leader and by ties of guest-friendship (*xenia*), more often than through marriage or through blood connection.'

213 Diod. XVI.16.3.

214 Diod. XVI.94.4, XVII.37.3.

215 Billows 1990, 246. An interesting exercise in cross cultural exchange is noted here. The Greek term for friends of the Persian King became adopted by Macedonian kings hoping to be seen as Persian successors. See also McKechnie 1989, 204-212, for a general discussion of Greek *philoï* after Alexander.

216 Gauthier 1971, 44-79, for a general discussion of the meanings of this word to the Athenians.

himself a *xenos* of Cyrus in a speech to the Greeks. He told them that Cyrus became a *xenos* of his. In the same speech he comments that he must choose between the friendship (*philia*) of Cyrus and that of the men. This speech suggests there is little to distinguish being a *xenos* and having *philia*.<sup>217</sup> Proxenus and Xenophon were *xenoi* but Proxenus promised that he would make Xenophon a *philos* of Cyrus.<sup>218</sup>

*Xenia* and *Philia* must have a relationship here. The differences lay in whether relationships were personal or official and in the individuals involved in these relationships. The Great King may have had friends (*philoï*) but did not have guest friends (*xenoi*).<sup>219</sup> Cyrus had *xenoi*. Cyrus' friendships were personal and the connections of the Great King official. It was still possible, as Proxenus realised, to be a friend (*philos*) of Cyrus. This was personal as Cyrus was not the Great King. Chapter three above noted the potentially crucial role of *xenia* in the development of Greek mercenary service from the Peloponnese.<sup>220</sup> In the fourth century part of being a *xenos* and of *philia* was recruiting mercenaries and doing military service. The *philoï* of the Great King recruited mercenaries. Apart from those

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<sup>217</sup> Xen. An. I.1.6, for exceptional treatment, 3.3, for *xenos*, 3.5, for *philia*.

<sup>218</sup> Xen. An. III.1.4.

<sup>219</sup> Cook 1983, 135, noted that '(t)he Persian King recognised no equal in the world.'

<sup>220</sup> See chapter III, 153-158.

involved in the relationship there seems to have been a further difference between these two relationships. The abstract concept of friendship (*philia*) encompassed both a *xenos* and a *philos*. The concept of *xenia* is rarely used.

### INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The cities viewed mercenary service as an extension of personal politics at home. Conon was not only exonerated for his Persian service but applauded with a statue in the Agora. Cnidus was not an Athenian victory in spite of the presence of notable Athenians and an Athenian admiral.<sup>221</sup> Friendships, as with *hetairia*, must have created bonds beyond the domestic political realm and extended into foreign politics. Nicias and Curebius received slanderous insults as the *misthotoi* of Chabrias in Egypt. These men must have had connections with him at home, and these were probably political connections.<sup>222</sup> The brothers in Isaeus II speak casually of travelling to Thrace with Iphicrates. Nicostratus fought abroad for eleven years but maintained enough connections in Athens to warrant a case over his property in the city's courts.<sup>223</sup> Above all, Astyphilus exemplifies the upright man who served his country

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<sup>221</sup> Lys. II.60, for the Persian victory and similarly, *Hell.Oxy.* II.1.

<sup>222</sup> Dem. XIX.287. Note here that Strauss 1986, 26, makes the admirable point that examples of common foreign policy abroad are most readily identified with regard to friendships and clientelism at home.

<sup>223</sup> Isae. IV.

and others without comment.<sup>224</sup>

The connections of mercenaries and their relationship to their various polities went far beyond the expediency of war and the moment. All of the prominent Greek city-states traded in mercenaries at some time or other between each other and the peoples of the eastern Mediterranean. The Athenians provided specific generals for the Persians at the Persians' request. Thebes and Argos did the same, and it has been illustrated above that the various overseas adventures of the Spartan kings were part of a state policy to increase Spartan income in order, almost ironically, to pay for mercenaries at home by serving abroad. Even non-royal Spartans who served in Sicily maintained strict ties to their *polis*.<sup>225</sup> There is nothing to suggest that the Spartan commanders of Dionysius' mercenaries were different in their role to that played by Gylippus in Syracuse's hours of need.<sup>226</sup> Dionysius was an ally of the Spartans who, even in their direst moments during the upheavals of the 360s, and in recognition, no doubt, for the help the Spartans had given him in recruiting mercenaries from the Peloponnese, remained loyal to them.<sup>227</sup> Mercenary service was one way of demonstrating and cementing alliances

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224 Isac. IX.

225 Plut. *Dion*, XLVIII, for Dionysius' negotiations with the help of Pharaoh the Spartan

226 Plut. *Dion*, XLIX. Plutarch notes that Gaesylus claimed he would lead the Syracusans as Gylippus had done.

227 Diod. XIV.58.1, as an example of Spartan assistance and see chap V, 204-206. Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.20, notes that Dionysius sent mercenaries (Celts) to assist the Spartans as a reciprocal gesture.

and establishing inter-state relationships.

In the days before the mercenary explosion of the fourth century Arcadian nobles had relationships with Sicilian tyrants, the Alcmaeonidae had a special relationship with Croesus and with Cleisthenes of Sicyon. The Miltidae had relations with Thracian princes as did the Peisistratidae. During the years of the empire Athenians had no need for connections overseas. When the empire fell these connections were 're-established.' It is interesting to note that families were involved in mercenary service to specific dynasties. Conon and his son Timotheus both served the Great King. The brothers Memnon and Mentor did also. Worthington has argued that the father of the Athenian Leosthenes, a known mercenary, had also served (as a commander) in Persia.<sup>228</sup> It might be noted that Iphicrates' son by the same name appeared on an embassy to the Persian King during Alexander's invasion.<sup>229</sup> These family connections enabled employers to tap into already established and trusted relationships for service.

The employer was all things to the mercenary. Without the employer the mercenary had no service. As Cyrus illustrates the future goodwill of a powerful man meant everything to the men in his service. The opportunity to

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228      Worthington 1987, 489-91.

229      Arr. *Anab.* II.15.2.



serve a great man was in actuality worth more than wages. Once a mission had been achieved the rewards might never stop coming. The reciprocity of the relationship can be summed up by the words of Xenophon, acting himself both as commander and as benefactor. First, he hoped that he could bring some benefit to his men and, as the men said to him, '(n)ow is your chance ... for we could render you service and we could make you great.'<sup>230</sup> The potential of mercenary armies was seen in the fourth century. The relationships which cut across societies and states in the eastern Mediterranean leave little doubt that at home and abroad mercenary service was part of the complex international world.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Mercenaries have played an important role in many historical narratives. Greek history is no exception. Indeed, the singularly important role of mercenary service in Greek history is coincident to the importance of warfare to Greek society. Mercenary service was further amplified in importance by the explosion in mercenary numbers in the fourth century B.C. Greek mercenaries were one of the significant phenomena of that century. They enabled the Greeks to move from being a people on the periphery of the great civilisations of the Near East to one which dictated its destiny, as mercenaries played a central role in the conquests of Alexander. The significance of the mercenary phenomenon was central to Greek life. The opening chapter illustrates this centrality in the social, political, and economic spheres.

It has been recognised that the soldier who fought abroad for another's community did not come into conflict with Greek ideals. Two legacies of Homer's epics illustrate this. The first of these made war an honourable pursuit. In Homeric ideology social and economic power reflected a prominent role on the battlefield. The second of these legacies was *xenia* - guest-friendship. *Xenia* tied together families which were distant and not blood related by means of gift-giving and tradition. Aristocrats created networks of guest-friends throughout the Aegean basin. This assisted travel, and the reciprocity of these relationships facilitated trade in luxury

goods. Thus, the mercenary as a warrior abroad could be seen in the tradition of the warrior and guest-friend of Homeric poetry.

The mercenary, however, was an ambiguous figure in Greek ideology. He was both a foreigner and a specialist. The foreigner as an outsider was perceived as dangerous by settled communities. He was also seen as a shameful figure because he was dependent on those he served. As a professional the mercenary was a specialist, and this conflicted with the ideal of the citizen-cum-soldier-overseer of the classical *polis*.

The ambiguity of the mercenary in Greek conception is reflected in the different terms that the Greeks had for soldiers who served foreign powers. These terms changed over time from words like ally or helper (*epikouros*) and unsurprisingly guest-friend or stranger (*xenos*), to more accurate terms like wage-earner (*misthophoros*) and foreign wage-earner (*xenos misthophoros*). It would seem this change was related to two factors. The first was the transition of Greek city-states towards more monetized economies. In the fifth century Athenian citizens received *misthos* for both civil and military state service. Consequentially, Athenian citizens who received *misthos* were called *misthophoroi*. At the same time soldiers who served foreign powers began were also called *misthophoroi*. This latter term replaced all the other terms in its proliferation by the later fourth century, and is used almost exclusively by Diodorus. By Alexander's

time, the foreign wage earner was recognised for exactly what he was. It is surprising that the Greeks of the later fourth century did not introduce a specific and accurate single word to mean a soldier of fortune.

The second factor which determined the transition of terms probably was the prolific numbers of mercenaries who took service in the fourth century. It would have been difficult for the most rhetorical of writers to term several thousand men as either the guest friends or the helpers of a dynast.<sup>1</sup> Terms like *epikouros* were euphemisms and could no longer serve the purposes of meaning which were required.

Mercenaries came from all over the Greek world and from all strata of society. Desperate exiles fought for mercenary commanders alongside those who had land and status in their own communities. Two things which might be important in the study of Greek mercenaries emerge from the identities of mercenaries in the fourth century. First, by far the greatest number of mercenaries came from the Peloponnese. The second was that most of the mercenaries who served outside of the Greek mainland for the Persians, Egyptians, and Carthaginians were hoplites. Light troops and peltasts on the other hand served the states of the Greek mainland. These two things lead to the conclusion that mercenary service was driven by demand.

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In spite of the fact that this is what Xenophon tries to do in the *Anabasis*.

The poverty or troubles in native Greek regions and the rewards which employers could provide each contributed to Greek service abroad. But these factors created the context by which men willingly served abroad. They cannot explain the prevalence of mercenaries in service in the fourth century. The numbers of Greeks in service abroad in the fourth century B.C. lay with the needs of employers for men to fight for them. The political destabilisation of both Sicily and Anatolia created this demand. Hence, employers sought Greek hoplites and specifically Peloponnesians for service. The dynasts did not ask the Greeks who lived near to or inside their territories because of fear of uprising or demands for autonomy. They may have realised the weakness of their employer's military capabilities. Mainlanders could be returned to their homeland or were dependent on their employer abroad for all things.

The employers paid mercenaries through a variety of methods and types of pay. Employers raised capital through ingenious methods. Only twice do the sources note that land was offered in lieu of pay, and on one of these occasions the men rejected the offer. Essentially there were three types of payment: food, money for food (expenses), and money. The terms used by the sources, however, are so vague that nothing definite can be said about their meanings. Greek writers appear to have used some or all of these interchangeably.

The vagueness of terminology for payment and the

confusion regarding whether mercenaries received payments in cash, food, expenses or a combination of each, prevents a definitive conclusion on the amount of pay mercenaries received. This amount, nevertheless, seems to have declined from the fifth century to 334 B.C. Cyrus paid a drachma a day to Greeks in 401 B.C., while Demosthenes suggests only a third of this amount as food money (and no pay) half a century later. The general run of paltry pay, however, was interspersed with periods of relative prosperity, for example during the Third Sacred War 355-346 B.C. While such periods enabled men to cope with leaner times, there is still no way of knowing how mercenaries could become wealthy on pay alone. There is equally no way of determining the 'going rate' for mercenary service in the fourth century or earlier. As with determining all employment the paymaster was responsible for the livelihood of his men. The sources make it clear that employers were adept at withholding payment and deceiving their soldiers to maintain both their loyalty and dependency.

Overseas contacts made mercenary service possible. In Archaic times this may well have been facilitated by tribal social relationships. Tribal chiefs could easily make contact with rulers abroad. Their tribes were perfect 'armies in waiting' for the purposes of overseas service. In a demand driven industry like mercenary service this meant that regions would have enjoyed reputations for military service, and employers would return to them again, creating a cycle of

employment. This cyclical relationship among demand, reputation and tradition would go far to explain the prevalence of Peloponnesians in service.

The fourth century B.C. is portrayed as an era of specialisation and professionalisation of the Greek world. In the more complex society that was emerging mercenary employers needed means to hire men that lay beyond tribal relationships. The ideology of Homeric *xenia*, however, continued into this time. The large numbers of Greek mercenaries in service must have meant not all men served with a chief and in a tribe. The identity of these men as employees may have become a problem. This problem might have been solved by the minting of coins specifically for the payment of mercenaries. Coins may well have identified men as belonging to an army and by implication to an employer. Thus, Philip made it a criminal offense to hold a coin of the Phocian generals after the Sacred War. Coins need not have had only a monetary value for exchange. They might have been part of a complex patronage system in the eastern Mediterranean. It is possible that the coin represented a mercenary's contract.

Mercenary service was an integral and accepted part of international and domestic society and politics. City-states and generals made connections overseas by providing and leading mercenary armies for great rulers abroad. Within these armies there were state and brotherhood style organisations that reflected domestic social groups.



Mercenary service had strong connections to *xenia* as a word, but also as the concept of the aristocratic warrior wandering beyond his community and fighting for others. The roots of mercenary service may well have lain with Homeric guest-friendship. Friendship - *Philia* - also had connections with overseas service. Greeks made friends abroad through military service. The power that they gained overseas they then utilised at home; for example, Conon gained power at Athens after Cnidus in 394 B.C. to the detriment of his opponent Thrasybulus.

The phenomenon of overseas connections which satisfied domestic ambitions is exemplified by the history of Athens. While Athens had an empire during the fifth century aristocratic families worked within the state as part of the state's apparatus. Their ambitions were satisfied by the empire. They did not need connections with overseas dignitaries, familial or otherwise. In contrast, the periods before and after the Athenian hegemony Athenian statesmen married into families abroad and served foreign powers prolifically. Mercenary service was integral to these relationships. Indeed, as a theme of Greek history from earliest times to the era of Alexander mercenary service played a great part in Greek social, political, and economic history.

**APPENDIX A**  
**PROSOPOGRAPHY**

Prosopography of Greek Mercenary Soldiers<sup>1</sup>

Name	Provenance	Reference
Aeneas	Stymphalus	Xen. An. IV.7.13 He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Aeschines	Acarnania	Xen. An. IV.8.18 He was a <i>taxiarch</i> on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Aeschylus	Rhodes	Arr. Anab. III.5.3 He was appointed <i>episkopos</i> of the mercenaries in Egypt by Alexander.
Agasias	Stymphalus	Xen. An. IV.7.9 He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Agesias	Stymphalus	Pind. Ol. VI He was an aristocrat who had connections with Gelon at Syracuse and may have assisted Gelon to recruit mercenaries from Arcadia in the second quarter of the fifth century B.C.
Agesilaus	Sparta	Diod. XV.90.2; Plut. Ages. XXXVI He was a Spartan King whom Plutarch claims became a

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<sup>1</sup> Not all the men listed here were in fact mercenaries. Their names have been compiled from those men who have, at one time, been described as mercenaries by the historical commentators. The references are for the first time they appear in a source and are only for evidence that suggests that they were mercenaries.

mercenary by serving with Tachos and Nectanebus in Egypt in 362 B.C.

Agias	Arcadia	Xen. An. II.5.31  He was a replacement general on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Alcias	Elis	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> I.29.4  He commanded Elians for Alexander and was most likely an ally rather than a mercenary.
Alcimenes	Achaea	Plut. <i>Dion</i> , XXII  Described as the foremost of the Achaeans. He aided Dion to reconcile with his mercenaries in Sicily during Dion's attempt to liberate Syracuse.
Amphicrates	Athens	Xen. An. IV.2.13  He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Amyrtaeus	Rhodes	CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122  He dedicated the table for offerings at a temple near Memphis. He served in either of Chabrias' campaigns in Egypt, 386-380 B.C. or 362-361 B.C.
Androcharis	Nisuria	CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122  One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s

or 360s B.C.

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|-------------|---------|---|
| Antimenidas | Lesbos  | <p>Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1285 a 35;<br/>Diehl 1922, no.50</p> <p>He was the brother of Alcaeus and perhaps a roving warrior.</p>   |
| Antiphilus  | Athens  | <p>Diod. XVIII.17.6</p> <p>He succeeded Leosthenes in 322 B.C. commanding Athenian mercenaries in the Lamian War.</p>   |
| Apollodorus | Athens  | <p>Paus. I.29.10</p> <p>Arsites, Satrap of Phrygia, employed this man, and he commanded the army sent to help Perinthus against Philip II in 340 B.C. for Persia.</p> |
| Apollinides | Boeotia | <p>Xen. An. III.1.26</p> <p>He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> and believed by the Greeks to have been of Lydian origin.</p>                                     |
| Apollonidas | Corinth | <p>CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122</p> <p>One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s or 360s B.C.</p>                         |
| Archagoras  | Argos   | <p>Xen. An. IV.2.13</p> <p>He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i>.</p>   |

Archias	Thurii	Plut. <i>Dem.</i> XXVIII  This man, known as the exile hunter, was employed by Philip II.
Archilochus	Paros	Diehl 1922, no.40; see Burnett 1983, 17, for a memorial inscription.  He was a self confessed <i>epikouros</i> of the later eighth century B.C. and a Lyric poet.
Archylus	Thurii	Diod. XIV.52.6  He was a commander of Dionysius I of Syracuse.
Arexion	Arcadia	Xen. An. VI.4.13  He was a soldier on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Aristeas	Chios	Xen. An. IV.1.28  He was a <i>taxiarch</i> on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Aristippus	Thessaly	Xen. An. I.1.10  He was a <i>xenos</i> of Cyrus in the <i>Anabasis</i> .
Aristoboulus	Athens	CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122  One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s or 360s B.C.
Aristod[a]mus	Cyprus	SEG XXXI.1554

Graffiti found on the walls of the temple of Achoris at Karnak and dated to the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.

Aristomedes	Pherae	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> II.13.2; Didymus, IX.45
		He was an enemy of Macedon who served Darius III against Alexander.
Aristomenes	Messenia	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> II.31
		He served as an ally of Dionysius I tyrant of Syracuse.
Ariston	Athens	Xen. <i>An.</i> V.6.14
		He was a soldier, probably a captain, on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Aristonymus	Methydrium	Xen. <i>An.</i> IV.7.9
		He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Aristotle	Sparta	Diod. XIV.78.1-3
		He was a commander of mercenaries serving with Dionysius I of Syracuse. He was arrested by the tyrant and sent back for trial in Sparta for unspecified charges.
Arystas	Arcadia	Xen. <i>An.</i> VII.3.23
		He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Asander		Arr. <i>Anab.</i> IV.7.2

He commanded Greek mercenary reinforcements for Alexander.

Astyphilus Athens

Isae. IX.14

He often served abroad and always held command in the years before his death in @371 B.C.

Athenodorus Imbros

Dem. XXIII.170; IG II (2) 1.126

He served with Artabazus and with Berisades a Thracian prince. He gained Athenian citizenship for his role in a treaty between Athens and the princes of Thrace in 357 B.C.

Athenodorus

Diod. XVII.99.6

He tried to lead the Greeks of eastern Asia in a failed coup against Alexander through which he hoped to bring them back to Greece in 324 B.C.

Atrometus Athens

Aesch. II.147

He was banished by The Thirty and took service in Asia.

Balsamon Cyprus

SEG XXXI.1549

Graffiti found on the walls of the temple of Achoris at Karnak and dated to the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.

Basias Arcadia

Xen. An. IV.1.18



He was a soldier on the *anabasis*.

Bianor	Acarmania	<p>Arr. <i>Anab.</i> II.13.2; Dem. XXIII.170; <i>IG</i> II (2) 1.126</p> <p>He served Amadocus, a Thracian prince, and gained citizenship for his role in the treaty between Athens and the Thracian princes in 357 B.C.</p>
Biton		<p>Diod. XVII.99.6</p> <p>He assassinated Athenodorus and briefly succeeded him in the leadership of the Greek revolt in Bactria of 324 B.C.</p>
Boiscus	Thessaly	<p>Xen. <i>An.</i> V.8.23</p> <p>He was a soldier on the <i>anabasis</i>.</p>
Callimachus	Parrhasia	<p>Xen. <i>An.</i> IV.7.8</p> <p>He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i></p>
Callipus	Athens	<p>Plut. <i>Tim.</i> XI, <i>Dion</i>, LIV; Diod. XVI.31.7</p> <p>He followed Dion to Sicily and was an adherent to the Academy. He was responsible for killing Dion, became tyrant, mercenary leader and was assassinated himself.</p>
Caranus		<p>Arr. <i>Anab.</i> IV.3.7</p> <p>He commanded eight hundred mercenary cavalry for</p>

Alexander.

Cephisodorus      Athens

Xen. An. IV.2.13

He was a captain on the *anabasis*.

Chabrias            Athens

Dem. XX.76; Nepos, *Chab.* XII.2.2; Plut. *Ages.* XXXVII; Diod. XV.29.1, 92.3; Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.11

He gained fame commanding mercenary peltasts at Corinth. He served with Euagoras on Cyprus in the early 380s B.C., with Achoris in Egypt from 386-380 B.C. and with Tachos in 362 B.C.

Chares              Athens

Dem. IV.24

He served with Artabazus in 357-355 B.C. and as a general of Athens from the 360s commanding mercenaries.

Chariades          Athens

Isae. IV.18

He was a claimant of the estate of a fellow mercenary, Nicostratus, who died abroad in about 371 B.C.

Charidemus        Athens

Dem. XXIII.129-32, 149; Arr. *Anab.* I.10.6; Diod. XVII.30.2; IG II (2) 1.126

He was born on Oreus and was a mercenary who served with Iphicrates in Thrace. He deserted the Athenian army when Timotheus

replaced Iphicrates as general in the region. He served with Cersobleptes the Thracian prince and gained Athenian citizenship for his role in a treaty between the Thracian princes and Athens in 357 B.C. He served Athens as general, but died at the court of Darius III in 333 B.C.

- |             |            |  |
|-------------|------------|--|
| Chirisophus | Sparta     | Diod. XIV.19.5; Xen. An. I.4.3   |
|             |            | A general sent by the Spartans to help Cyrus on the <i>anabasis</i> .                                    |
| Cleander    |            | Arr. <i>Anab.</i> III.12.2   |
|             |            | He commanded the so called 'old mercenaries' at Gaugamela in 331 B.C.                                    |
| Cleanor     | Orchomenus | Xen. An. II.5.39   |
|             |            | He was a replacement general on the <i>anabasis</i> .  |
| Clearchus   |            | Arr. <i>Anab.</i> I.22.7, III.6.7  |
|             |            | He was commander of Greek archers for Alexander.   |
| Clearchus   | Sparta     | Xen. An. I.2.9; Plut. Art. VIII.3-7; Diod. XIV.12.2, 19.7  |
|             |            | He was a renegade who befriended Cyrus the younger and led the Greeks to Cunaxa on the <i>anabasis</i> . |
| Clearchus   | Heraclea   | Muller FHG III.526   |

He served with Mithridates of Cius and Parke suggests possibly served Timotheus.<sup>1</sup> He became tyrant of Heraclea in the second quarter of the fourth century B.C.

Cleinius            Cos

Diod. XVI.48.5

He commanded 7,000 Greeks for Nectanebus in an unknown fort on one of the Nile channels during Artaxerxes' successful invasion of Egypt in 348 B.C.

Cleonymus          Sparta

Xen. An. IV.1.18

He was a soldier on the *anabasis*.

Conon                Athens

Isoc V.96; Diod. XIV.39.1

He was an admiral who survived Aegospotami and dwelt with Euagoras on Cyprus. He sought service with the Persians and in 396 B.C. won the great victory at Cnidus commanding the Persian financed fleet.

Crithis              Ionia

Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3.

One of nine names etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C.

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1

Parke 1933, 97, following Dem. XX.84.

- Damocritus      Crete (?)      *SEG XXVI.1708*
- Graffiti found on the walls of the temple of Ramses II at Abydos and dated to the early fifth century B.C.
- Deiares      Aesch. II.71
- He appears to have been a roving commander of mercenaries who found service with Chares in the middle of the fourth century B.C.
- Deinarchus      Corinth      Diod. XVI.73; Plut. *Tim.* XXIV
- He was a follower of Timoleon who fought with him at Syracuse.
- Deipyrus      Aesch. II.71
- He appears to have been a roving commander of mercenaries who found service with Chares in the middle of the fourth century B.C.
- Demaretus      Corinth      Dem. XXIII.295; Diod. XVI.73; Plut. *Tim.* XXIV
- He was a follower of Timoleon who fought with him at Syracuse.
- Demaretus      Sparta      Plut. *Mor.* 220 a
- He served Euagoras in the 380s B.C. against the Persians.

Demetrius	Athens	<p>CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122</p> <p>One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s or 360s B.C.</p>
Democrates	Argos	<p>Xen. An. IV.4.15</p> <p>He was a soldier on the <i>anabasis</i>.</p>
Dexippus	Laconia	<p>Xen. An. V.1.15</p> <p>He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> and a <i>perioikos</i>.</p>
Dion	Syracuse	<p>Plut. <i>Dion</i>; Diod. XVI.6.4</p> <p>He was exiled in 367 B.C. from Syracuse and led a mercenary army to liberate the city from Dionysius II in 357 B.C. He is not really a mercenary.</p>
Dioppeithes	Athens	<p>Dem. VIII.8, 21-4, IX.15; Arist. <i>Rhet.</i> II.1383. 13</p> <p>He was an Athenian general who 'illegally' sacked towns belonging to Philip II in 342 B.C.</p>
Diophantus	Athens	<p>Diod. XVI.48.2</p> <p>The source is unclear. It says that he had served the Egyptian King during an unsuccessful attempt by the Persians to conquer Egypt prior to their invasion of 348 B.C. which was a success and in which</p>

service.		he was not in Egyptian
Docimus	Tarentum	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> IV.2.1  He was a commander in the army of Philip II of Macedon.
Doricus		Diod. XIV.7.7  He was a commander under Dionysius I.
Dracontius	Sparta	Xen. <i>An.</i> IV.8.25  He was a soldier on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Elesibus	Ionia	Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3  One of nine names etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C.
Ephialtes	Athens	Diod. XVII.26.2  He was an exile who fought with Memnon for Persia against Alexander as a commander of mercenaries.
Ephippus	Olynthos	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> III.5.3  He was appointed as an <i>episcopus</i> of mercenaries in Egypt by Alexander.
Epicrates	Athens	Dem. XIX.287  Demosthenes gives this man the name 'Offal' as the

'hireling' of Chabrias with whom he took service.

Episthenes	Olynthos	Xen. An. VII.4.7
		He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Episthenes	Amphipolis	Xen. An. I.10.7
		He was a <i>taxiarch</i> on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Epiteles	Cyrene	CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122
		One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s or 360s B.C.
Erigyus	Mytilene	Arr. Anab. III.6.5
		He was a follower of Alexander given command of reenlisted cavalry in 330 B.C.
Euagoras	Cyprus	Diod. XVI.42.3
		He was the grandson of the Cypriot King Euagoras who found service with Idrieus, the Satrap of Caria, in the Persian invasion of Cyprus in 350-349 B.C.
Euclideanes	Corinth	Plut. Tim. XIII
		He was a commander under Timoleon in Sicily.
Eudemus	Cyprus	Plut. Dion, XXII



He was a follower of Plato at the Academy and went with Dion to liberate Syracuse.

Eumachus

*SEG XXIII.767*

An inscription on a hydra found at Montagna di Marzo dated to the late sixth or early fifth century B.C. He may have been a mercenary if the letter *phi* is amended to *theta* to create *misthotos* or *misthophorus*.

Eurybotas            Crete

*Arr. Anab. I.8.4*

He was the commander of Alexander's Cretan archers.

Eurylochus        Lusi

*Xen. An. IV.7.11*

He was a replacement captain on the *anabasis*.

Eurymachus        Dardanus

*Xen. An. V.6.21*

He was a captain on the *anabasis*.

Euthymus            Leucas

*Plut. Tim. XXX*

He was a follower of Timoleon who led an expedition into the Carthaginian part of Sicily.

Gaesylus            Sparta

*Plut. Dion, XLIX*

He likened himself to Gylippus in his role in Sicily and in 357 B.C. he reconciled Dion with Heracleides.

Gastron	Sparta	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> II.16.1  He was a commander of mercenaries against the Persians at some time in the fourth century B.C., date unknown.
Gaulites	Samos	Xen. <i>An.</i> I.7.5  He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Glaucus	Aetolia	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> III.16.2  He was a commander of the remnants of the Greek army that accompanied Darius III towards Bactria in 330 B.C.
Glaucus	Paros	Pouilloux 1955, 85; Diehl 13  Addressee of many of Archilocus' poems.
Gnesippus	Athens	Xen. <i>An.</i> VII.3.28  He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Hagesermus	Ionia	Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3  One of nine names etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C.
Hegesander	Arcadia (?)	Xen. <i>An.</i> VI.3.5  He was a captain on the

*anabasis.*

- Hegesistratus Arr. *Anab.* I.18.4  
 Darius entrusted this man with command of the Milesian garrison after Granicus in 334 B.C.
- Heracleides Aenos Dem. XXIII.119  
 He had connections with Cotys whom he murdered with his brother, Python.
- Heracleides Maroneia Xen. *An.* VII.3.16  
 He was a Greek in the service of the Thracian dynast Seuthes in 400-399 B.C.
- Heracleides Syracuse Plut. *Dion.* XII; Diod. XVI.6.4, 16  
 He was a commander of Dionysius II's mercenaries and became a mercenary leader in his own right during intrigues to become tyrant of Syracuse.
- Hieronymus Athens Diod. XIV.81.4  
 He commanded the Great King's fleet in the absence of Conon in 396/5 B.C.
- Hippias Arcadia Thuc. III.34.2; Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.2  
 He commanded Peloponnesian mercenaries for Pissuthnes the governor of Sardis and was killed along with his

		command at Notium in 428/7 B.C.
Hybrias	Crete	Diehl II 128; Parke 1933, 4
		Archaic poet who crafted a mercenary war-song.
Hyperballon	Crete (?)	SEG XXVI.1709
		Graffiti found on the walls of the temple of Ramses II at Abydos and dated to the early fifth century B.C.
Iphicrates	Athens	Diod. XV.29.1-2; Dem. XXIII.129; Polyaeus, Strat. III.9
		He was a famous general of the Athenians who was responsible for military innovations. He commanded mercenaries for the Athenians at Corinth in the 390s B.C. He found foreign service through Pharnabazus and was with Conon at Cnidus. The Persians asked him to lead their invasion of Egypt in 377/6 B.C. He became the son in law of Cotys of Thrace whom he served and was adopted by Amyntas, the Macedonian King.
Lacrates	Thebes	Diod. XVI.42.3, 49.1
		He commanded Boeotians for the Persians in the invasion of Egypt in 348 B.C.
Lamias	Sparta	Diod. XVI.48.2
		The source is unclear. It says that he had served the

Egyptian King during an unsuccessful attempt by the Persians to conquer Egypt prior to their successful invasion of 348 B.C. in which he was not in Egyptian service.

Laomedon	Mytilene	Diod. XVIII.3.1; Arr. Anab. III.6.5; Muller FHG.668
		He was a member of Alexander's military staff.
Larichus	Mytilene	Arr. Anab. III.6.5
		He was the father of Erigyus and Laomedon and probably was a <i>hetairos</i> of Philip.
Leon	Thurii	Xen. An. V.1.2
		He was a soldier on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Leonymus	Ionia (?)	Hell. Ox. XV.5
		He seems to have been a garrison commander at Caunus in the 390s B.C.
Leosthenes	Athens	Diod. XVII.1.1-2, 111,3; Paus. I.3.1
		He fought with Darius against Alexander and was general in the Lamian War.
Leosthenes	Athens	Diod. XV.95; Polyaeus, Strat. VI.2.1-2
		He was the father of Leosthenes who commanded in the Lamian War. He was exiled in 362/1 B.C. It is

possible that he took service with the Persians as a result of this.

Letodorus

Diod. XVIII.7.5

He commanded 3,000 Greeks in the revolt of the upper satrapies after Alexander's death in 323 B.C.

Leptines

Plut. *Dion*, LVIII, *Tim*. XV, *Mor*. 553 d

He was a subordinate of Dion who led an insurrection that resulted in Dion's death. He was exiled by Timoleon in 342 B.C.

Lycidas

Dem. XX.131

He was a mercenary and slave of Chabrias who possibly received citizenship at Athens.

Lycidas

Aetolia

Arr. *Anab*. III.5.3

He was left in Egypt as commander of the garrison of mercenaries by Alexander.

Lycius

Syracuse

Xen. *An*. I.10.14

He was a soldier on the *anabasis*.

Lycius

Athens

Xen. *An*. III.3.20

He was a cavalry commander on the *anabasis*.

Lycomedes	Rhodes	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> II.1.5
		He was in the service of Pharnabazus and commanded a garrison at Mytilene during Alexander's <i>anabasis</i> .
Lycon	Achaea	Xen. <i>An.</i> V.6.27
		He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Lycon	Athens	Ctesias, 52.
		He was a Greek who betrayed Pissuthnes to the Great King's forces in the late fifth century B.C.
Lycophron	Pherae	Diod. XVI.37.3
		He was expelled from Pherae by Philip II and took his troops to Phocis where he joined Phayllus in the Sacred War.
Lysicritus	Athens	CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122
		One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s or 360s B.C.
Lysimenes		Xen. <i>Hell.</i> VII.1.46
		He was a commander under the tyrant Euphron of Sicyon in 367 B.C. and was removed in favour of Euphron's son.
Mandrocles	Magnesia	Nepos, <i>Datames</i> , XIV.5.6

He was appointed to the temporary command of the Greeks who had gathered at Ace for the Persian invasion (that never took place) of Egypt after the removal of Iphicrates and before the arrival of Timotheus in 373/2 B.C.

Memnon                    Rhodes

Dem. XXIII.158; Arr. *Anab.* I.12.8, 15.3, 20.3; Plut. *Alex.* XXI; Diod. XVI.51.3, XVII.7.2

He was the brother in law of Artabazus and the brother of Mentor. He served the former and subsequently was the ablest of Darius III's generals in the war against Alexander until his death just after Granicus.

Menidas

Arr. *Anab.* III.13.3

He was a commander of mercenary cavalry under Alexander at Gaugamela.

Menon                    Larissa

Xen. *An.* I.2.6; Diod. XIV.19.7

He was a general on the *anabasis*.

Mentor                    Rhodes

Diod. XVI.42.2, 50.7, 51.3; Dem. XXIII.158

He was the brother in law of Artabazus and the brother of Memnon. He served the King of Egypt after being exiled in 354 B.C. from Persia after the failure of Artabazus' coup and subsequently Temmes of



Sidon and Artaxerxes III of Persia. He achieved as much as Cyrus the Younger had as brother of the Great King in the Persian empire.

Mnasicles	Crete	Diod. XVIII.21.5
		He was elected commander of mercenaries who had left Taenarum for Cyrene in 322 B.C.
Mnasigenes	Boeotia	CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122
		One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s or 360s B.C.
Mysus	Mysia	Xen. An. V.2.29
		He was a soldier on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Nearchus	Crete	Arr. Anab. IV.7.2; SIG (3) 266
		He was a member of Philip's <i>hetairoi</i> and commanded mercenary reinforcements for Alexander in 329 B.C.
Neagenes		Diod. XV.30.3
		He was a commander of mercenaries lent to him by Jason of Pherae and became tyrant of Histiae in 379 B.C.
Neon	Asine	Xen. An. V.6.36
		He was a replacement

general on the *anabasis*.

Nicarchus	Arcadia	Xen. An. III.3.5  He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Nicias	Athens	Dem. XIX.287  He served with Chabrias in Egypt either in 386 or 362-361 B.C.
Nicodemus	Athens	Diod. XIV.81.4  He commanded the Great King's fleet in the absence of Conon in 396/5 B.C.
Nicomachus	Oetae	Xen. An. IV.6.20  He was a <i>taxiarch</i> on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Nicon	Pherae <sup>1</sup>	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> II.35  He is described as a 'freebooter.'
Nicostratus	Athens	Isae. IV  He was a mercenary who served for eleven years continuously before dying abroad in about 371 B.C.
Nicostratus	Argos	Diod. XVI.43; Theopompus, frag.121  He was sent to serve with

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This is Pherae in the Peloponnese and not in Thessaly.

the Persians in the successful invasion of Egypt in 348 B.C. He was known for his flattery.

Nypsius	Naples	Diod. XVI.18.1; Plut. <i>Dion</i> , XLI
		He was a commander of Dionysius I of Syracuse.
Ombrion	Crete	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> III.5.6
		He was appointed as commander of the archers with Alexander.
Omysob...	Ionia	Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3
		One of nine names etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C.
Onasander	Cydonia	Pedrizet 1919, no.405; <i>IC</i> II, 109
		Inscription on the shoulder of a statue of Seti II at Abydos denoting a mercenary in the service of Amyrtaeus, perhaps in the later fifth century B.C.
Pabis	Colophon	Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3
		One of nine names etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C.

Pammenes	Thebes	Diod. XVI.34; Dem. XXIII.183
		He was sent by Thebes in command of mercenaries in 355 B.C. to aid Artabazus in his attempt at revolt.
Pantias	Tegea	SEG XXXVII.676
		An inscription on white marble from Phanagoria and dated to the early fourth century B.C. in the reign of Leucon I the king of Thracian Panticapaion.
Pasi (ph) on	Ionia	Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3
		One of nine names etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C.
Pasion	Megara	Xen. An. I.2.3
		He was a general on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Patron	Phocis	Arr. Anab. III.16.2
		He was a commander of the remnants of Darius III's mercenaries who stayed with him on his final march towards Bactria in 330 B.C.
Peitholaus	Pherae	Diod. XVI.37.3
		He was expelled from Pherae by Philip II and took his troops to Phocis where he joined Phayllus in the

Sacred War.

Phalaeus	Phocis	Diod. XVI.38.6, 61.3
		<p>He was the commander of the forces of Phocis which surrendered to Philip at the end of the Sacred War. He led the remnants of his army into the Peloponnese and sought service on Crete where he perished serving Cnossians in a siege of Cydonia.</p>
Phalinus	Zacynthos	Xen. An. II.1; Diod. XIV.25.1
		<p>Xenophon describes him as an expert in hoplite warfare who was serving with Tissaphernes in the campaign against Cyrus the Younger.</p>
Phanes	Halicarnassus	Hdt. III.4
		<p>He was a commander of mercenaries for Amasis in Egypt in the later sixth century who deserted to the Persians and betrayed his employer and his comrades to Cambyses.</p>
Pharax	Sparta	Plut. <i>Dion</i> , XLVIII; Diod. XIV.79.5; Plut. <i>Tim</i> . XI
		<p>He was a Spartan 'rogue' who had attempted to liberate Sicily only to become a tyrant in the 360s B.C.</p>
Philesius	Achaea	Xen. An. III.1.47
		<p>He was a replacement</p>

general on the *anabasis*.

- |             |        |   |
|-------------|--------|---|
| Philiscus   | Abydos | <p>Dem. XXIII.141; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> VII.1.27; Diod. XV.70.2</p> <p>He was in the service of Ariobarzanes. Demosthenes called him 'the greatest of all the <i>hyparchoi</i>.'</p> |
| Philistus   |        | <p>Diod. XVI.16.1; Plut. <i>Dion</i>, XXV</p> <p>He was a general of Dionysius I of Syracuse.</p>   |
| Philocrates | Cyprus | <p>SEG XXXI.1553</p> <p>Graffiti found on the walls of the temple of Achoris at Karnak and dated to the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.</p>                              |
| Philocreon  | Cyprus | <p>SEG XXXI.1551</p> <p>Graffiti found on the walls of the temple of Achoris at Karnak and dated to the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.</p>                              |
| Philocreon  | Cyprus | <p>SEG XXXI.1550</p> <p>Graffiti found on the walls of the temple of Achoris at Karnak and dated to the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.</p>                              |
| Philon      | Aenos  | <p>Diod. XVIII.7.1</p> <p>He was elected general by the Greeks of the upper satrapies who revolted on the death of Alexander in</p>   |

323 B.C.

- Philonides      Crete      *SEG XIV.376*
- Inscription on a white marble stele dated to 330-323 B.C. He was the son of Zoitus now in the museum in Patris.
- Philophron      Diod. XVI.48
- He was employed by Nectanebus to command 7,000 Greeks at Pelusium against Artaxerxes' successful invasion of Egypt in 348 B.C.
- Philostratus      Athens      *Plut. Dion, XXI*
- He was the brother of Calippus and the follower of Dion on his Syracusan adventure.
- Philoxenus      Helice      *SEG XXXVI.718*
- Inscription on a gray limestone block dated to 490-480 B.C. found at Gorgippia.
- Philoxenus      Pellene      *Xen. An. V.2.15*
- He was a captain on the *anabasis*.
- Philoxenus      Cyprus      *SEG XXXI.1555*
- Graffiti found on the walls of the temple of Achoris at Karnak and dated to the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.

Phocion	Athens	Diod. XVI.42.7
		He was only in foreign service once. He served the Persians in their invasion of Cyprus in @350 B.C.
Phormis	Maenalus	Paus. V.27.1
		He was connected to Gelon of Syracuse and it is suggested he enabled the tyrant to hire mercenaries in the early fifth century B.C.
Phrasias	Athens	Xen. An. VI.5.11
		He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Phryniscus	Achaea	Xen. An. VII.2.1
		He was a replacement general on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Polycrates	Athens	Xen. An. IV.5.24
		He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Polyphontes		Aisch. II.71
		He is found serving under Chares in the late 350s B.C. and is described as a roving mercenary leader.
Praxiteles	Mantineia	Olymp. Vol. V. no.266
		He was connected with Gelon of Syracuse and may have helped to recruit mercenaries for the tyrant.



Procles	Naxos	Diod. XIV.15.1-2  He was a mercenary commander whom Dionysius I of Syracuse won over with promises and gifts.
Proxenus	Boeotia	Xen. An. I.1.2; Diod. XIV.19.7  He was a general on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Psammetichus	Ionia	Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3  He was the son of Theocles and heads the list of nine Greeks found etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C. He may well have been named in honour of his employer.
Psaumis	Elis	Pind. Ol. V; Diod. XI.71.5-6; Demand 1993, 55.  He founded Camarina in Sicily in 460 B.C.
Pyrrhias	Arcadia	Xen. An. VI.5.11  He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Pythodorus	Athens	CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 122  One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s or 360s B.C.

Python	Aenos	Dem. XXIII.119  He recruited mercenaries for Miltocythes of Thrace around 360 B.C.
Python	Ionia	Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3  One of nine names etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C.
Samolas	Achaea	Xen. An. VI.5.11  He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Silanus	Macistus	Xen. An. VII.4.16  He was a soldier and trumpeter on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Silanus	Ambracia	Xen. An. I.7.18  He was a soldier and soothsayer on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Simon		Dem. XXIII.170; IG II (2) 1. 126  He served Amadocus of Thrace and received Athenian citizenship for his role in a Thracian-Athenian treaty of 357 B.C.
Smicres	Arcadia (?)	Xen. An. VI.3.4  He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .

Socrates	Achaea	Xen. An. I.2.3; Diod. XIV.19.7  He was a general on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Sopaeus		Isoc. XVII.3  He was in the service of Satyrus I in the Tauric Chersonesus as commander of his army in about 400 B.C.
Sophaenetus	Stymphalus	Xen. An. I.2.3  He was a general on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Sosicles	Athens	CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122  One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s or 360s B.C.
Sosis	Syracuse	Xen. An. I.2.9  He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Soterides	Sicyon	Xen. An. III.4.47  He was a soldier on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Strabax		Arist. Rhet. II.1399 b 1  He was a mercenary who was made a citizen of Athens. He appears in Theodectes' <i>Nomos</i> which was quoted by Aristotle.

Stratocles	Crete	Xen. An. IV.2.28  He was the commander of archers on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Straton	Caruandus	CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no.122  One of eleven names on a votive monument near Memphis, dated to the 380s or 360s B.C.
Symmachus	Thasos	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> II.1.27  He was the only mercenary named in Spartan service. Parke dates this man to 370-369 B.C. <sup>1</sup>
Telemachus	Corinth	Plut. <i>Tim.</i> XIII  He was a commander under Timoleon sent to garrison 'The Island' after the departure of Dionysius II.
Telephus	Ialysus	Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3  One of nine names etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C.
Tharisthenes	Crete	Pedrizet 1919, no.445; <i>IC</i> II, 109  One of two names found inscribed found between a statue of Ramses and the offerings' table at Abydos

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1

Parke 1933, 88.

believed by the editors to be a Cretan in the service of Amyrtaeus in the later fifth century B.C.

Theocles	Ionia	Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3
		<p>This man's son was called Psammetichus who headed the list of nine Greeks found etched on the leg of Ramses II's statue in the temple of Abu Simbel in Nubia and dated to the reign of Psammetichus II, 594-589 B.C. He may well have named his son in honour of his employer and was therefore likely to have been a mercenary himself.</p>
Theogenes	Locris	Xen. An. VII.4.18
		<p>He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i>.</p>
Theopompus	Miletus	Xen. Hell. II.1.30
		<p>This man is described as a <i>lesten</i> and served with the Spartans at Aegospotami.</p>
Thibron		Diod. XVIII.21.1
		<p>He was a mercenary of Harpalus whom he murdered and taking over his army of 6,000 men led them around the Aegean.</p>
Thiocritus	Crete	<p>Pedrizet 1919, no.445; IC II, 109</p>
		<p>One of two names found inscribed found between a statue of Ramses and the offerings' table at Abydos</p>

believed by the editors to be a Cretan in the service of Amyrtaeus in the later fifth century B.C.

Thorax	Boeotia	Xen. An. V.6.19
		He was a captain on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Thrasius		Diod. XVI.78.3
		He was a commander under Timoleon who had previously served the Phocians in the Sacred War. He revolted before the battle of Crimisus and perished along with his command in Italy.
Thymondas	Rhodes	Arr. Anab. II.1.6, 13.2
		He was the son of Mentor and was promoted after the death of his uncle Memnon by Darius III in his war with Alexander.
Timagoras	Cyprus	SEG XXXI.1552
		Graffiti found on the walls of the temple of Achoris at Karnak and dated to the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.
Timasion	Dardanus	Xen. An. III.1.47
		He was a replacement general on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Timasitheus	Delphi	Paus. VI.8.6
		He fought with Isagoras in his failed coup at Athens and was executed after he

was captured by the Athenians.

Timocrates	Rhodes	Plut. <i>Art.</i> XXI; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> III.5.1
		He served Tithraustes in the late 390s B.C.
Timocrates	Syracuse	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> VII.4.12; Plut. <i>Dion</i> , XXVII
		He was the commander of mercenaries sent by Dionysius II to help Sparta capture Sellasia in 365 B.C.
Timoleon	Corinth	Plut. <i>Tim.</i> VIII; Diod. XVI.66.2
		He led a mercenary army to liberate Syracuse from tyranny and subsequently restored order and power to Greek Sicily from 344-341 B.C.
Timonides		Plut. <i>Dion</i> , XXX
		He was a commander under Dion in Sicily.
Timotheus	Athens	Dem. XLIX.25, 28.
		He was a famous Athenian general and the son of Iphicrates who found service with the Persian King in 373-372 B.C.
Tolmides	Elis	Xen. <i>An.</i> II.2.20
		He was soldier and herald on the <i>anabasis</i> .

Xanthicles	Achaea	Xen. An. III.1.47 He was a replacement general on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Xenias	Parrhasia	Xen. An. I.1.2 He was a general on the <i>anabasis</i> .
Xenophon	Athens	Xen. An. III.1.47 He was a replacement general on the <i>anabasis</i> and also wrote the narrative of the campaign.



**APPENDIX B**

**PROVENANCE**

KNOWN PROVENANCE OF MERCENARIES<sup>1</sup>

PLACE OF ORIGIN	NAME
Abydos	Philiscus
Acarmania	Bianor
Acarmania	Aeschines
Achaea	Phryniscus
Achaea	Samolas
Achaea	Alcimenes
Achaea	Socrates
Achaea	Xanthicles
Achaea	Lycon
Achaea	Philesius
Aenos	Philon
Aenos	Python
Aenos	Heraclides
Aetolia	Lycidas
Aetolia	Glaucus
Ambracia	Silanus
Amphipolis	Episthenes
Arcadia	Basias
Arcadia	Arystas
Arcadia	Hippias
Arcadia	Pyrrhias

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1

\* indicates that the man received Athenian citizenship. ? indicates that there is doubt over the provenance of the mercenary. Note that there are twenty three named mercenaries for whom there is no known provenance and who do not appear in this list.

Arcadia	Nicarchus
Arcadia	Agias
Arcadia	Arexion
Arcadia?	Smicres
Arcadia?	Hegesander
Argos	Archagoras
Argos	Nicostratus
Argos	Democrates
Asine	Neon
Athens	Atrometus
Athens	Conon
Athens	Epicrates
Athens	Iphicrates
Athens	Demetrius
Athens	Philostratus
Athens	Timotheus
Athens	Amphicrates
Athens	Hieronymus
Athens	Dioppeithes
Athens	Ephialtes
Athens	Phrasias
Athens	Antiphilus
Athens	Pythodorus
Athens	Phocion
Athens	Diophantus
Athens	Gnesippus

Athens	Apollodorus
Athens	Sosicles
Athens	Nicostratus
Athens	Lysicritus
Athens	Lycon
Athens	Xenophon
Athens	Astyphilus
Athens	Aristobulus
Athens	Nicias
Athens	Ariston
Athens	Nicodemus
Athens	Callipus
Athens	Cephisadotus
Athens	Lycius
Athens	Leosthenes
Athens	Polycrates
Athens	Leosthenes
Athens*	Charidemus
Athens	Chariades
Athens	Chabrias
Athens	Chares
Athens*	Simon
Athens*	Strabax
Boeotia	Mnasigenes
Boeotia	Proxenus
Boeotia	Apollonides

Boeotia	Thorax
Carunados	Straton
Chios	Aristeas
Colophon	Pabis
Corinth	Apollonidas
Corinth	Demaratus
Corinth	Timoleon
Corinth	Euclides
Corinth	Telemachus
Corinth	Deinarchus
Cos	Cleinias
Crete	Philonides
Crete	Ombrion
Crete	Nearchus
Crete	Thiocritus
Crete	Eurybotas
Crete	Tharisthenes
Crete	Hyperballon
Crete	Mnasicles
Crete	Stratocles
Crete?	Clearchus
Crete?	Damocritus
Cydonia	Onasander
Cyprus	Balsamon
Cyprus	Philocreon
Cyprus	Philoxenus

Cyprus	Timagoras
Cyprus	Aristodamus
Cyprus	Eudemus
Cyprus	Philocrates
Cyprus	Euagoras
Cyprus	Philocreon
Cyrene	Epiteles
Dardanus	Eurymachus
Dardanus	Timasion
Delphi	Timasitheus
Elis	Alcias
Elis	Psaumis
Elis	Tolmides
Halicarnassus	Phanes
Helice	Philoxenus
Heraclea	Clearchus
Ialysus	Telephus
Imbros	Athenadorus
Ionia	Theocles
Ionia	Pasi (ph) on
Ionia	Omysob...
Ionia	Psammetichus
Ionia	Python
Ionia	Leonymus
Ionia	Hagesermus
Ionia	Crithis

Ionia	Elesibus
Laconia	Dexippus
Larissa	Menon
Lesbos	Antimedes
Leucas	Euthymus
Locris	Theogenes
Lusi	Eurylochus
Macistus	Silanus
Maenalus	Phormis
Magnesia	Mandrocles
Mantineia	Praxiteles
Maples	Nypsius
Maroneia	Heraclides
Megara	Pasion
Messenia	Aristomenes
Methydrium	Aristonymus
Miletus	Theopompus
Mysia	Mysus
Mytilene	Laomedon
Mytilene	Erigyus
Mytilene	Larichus
Naxos	Procles
Nisuria	Androcharis
Oetaea	Nicomachus
Olynthus	Ephippus
Olynthus	Episthenes

Orchomenus	Cleanor
Parhassia	Callimachus
Paros	Archilochus
Paros	Glaucus
Parrhasia	Xenias
Pellene	Philoxenus
Pherae	Lycophron
Pherae	Peitholaus
Pherae	Nicon <sup>1</sup>
Pherae	Aristomedes
Phocis	Patron
Phocis	Phalaecus
Rhodes	Timocrates
Rhodes	Amyrtaeus
Rhodes	Thymondas
Rhodes	Memnon
Rhodes	Mentor
Rhodes	Lycomedes
Rhodes	Aeschylus
Samos	Gaulites
Sicyon	Soterides
Sparta	Gastron
Sparta	Aristotle
Sparta	Pharax

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1

This is Pherae in the Peloponnese and not in Thessaly.



Sparta	Gaesylus
Sparta	Agesilaus
Sparta	Dracontius
Sparta	Chirisophus
Sparta	Clearchus
Sparta	Lamias
Sparta	Demaretus
Sparta	Cleonymus
Stymphalus	Aeneas
Stymphalus	Agasias
Stymphalus	Sophaenetus
Stymphalus	Hagesius
Syracuse	Heraclides
Syracuse	Timocrates
Syracuse	Lycius
Syracuse	Dion
Syracuse	Sosis
Tarentum	Docimus
Tegea	Pantias
Thasos	Symmachus
Thebes	Pammenes
Thebes	Lacrates
Thessaly	Aristippus
Thessaly	Boiscus
Thurii	Archias
Thurii	Archylus

Thurii .

Leon

Zacynthus

Phalinus

## **TABLES**

Table I  
Military Pay Rates

Date	Type	Reference	Amount <sup>1</sup>	Comments
480	—	Plut. <i>Them.</i> X.3	2 ob.	Support for the families of the Athenians at Troezon.
480	—	Plut. <i>Them.</i> X.4	8 dr.*	Paid by Areopagus to each man who embarked on the triremes.
428	<i>misthos</i>	Thuc. III.17.4	2 dr.	1 dr. + 1 dr. for <i>hyperetes</i> .
425	<i>misthos</i>	Ar. <i>Ach.</i> 159.	2 dr.	This is for Thracians and is more than the <i>thranites</i> received.
422	<i>misthos</i>	Ar. <i>Vesp.</i> 682-5	3 ob.	For military service overseas.
422	—	Ar. <i>Vesp.</i> 1188-9	2 Ob.	For a <i>theoria</i> to Chios.
420	<i>sitos</i>	Thuc. V.47.6	3 Aeg. ob.	For a hoplite in the quadruple alliance.
420	<i>sitos</i>	Thuc. V.47.6	1 dr.	For a horseman in the quadruple alliance.
415	<i>misthos</i>	Thuc. VI.8.1	1 dr.?	60 talents = one month's pay for 60 ships.
415	<i>misthos</i>	Thuc. VI.31.3	1 dr.	State furnished for <i>nautoi</i> bound for Syracuse.
413	—	Thuc. VII.27.2	1 dr.	For Thracians at Athens.
412	<i>trophai</i>	Thuc. VIII.29.1	1 dr.	Tissaphernes to sailors in Peloponnesian fleet.
412	<i>trophai</i>	Thuc. VIII.29.1	3.3 ob.	Tissaphernes promised to give to sailors
412	<i>misthos</i>	Thuc. VIII.45.2	3 ob.	For <i>Nautoi</i> in Athenian fleet.
412	—	Thuc. VIII.101.1	3 Chian Tassastai	For each man in the Peloponnesian fleet.
411	<i>misthos</i>	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> I.5.4	1 dr.	Lysander tries to get Cyrus to pay Spartan <i>nautoi</i> .
411	—	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> I.5.5	4 ob.	Cyrus agrees to pay <i>nautoi</i> 30 minai for each ship a month.
411	—	Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 35.4	4 ob.	
411	<i>ephodia</i>	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> I.6.12-3	5 dr.*	Callicratides gives each <i>nautos</i> 5 dr. as travel expense money.
408	—	Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 35.4	3 ob.	Alcibiades hard pressed to pay his sailors 3 obols.
401	<i>misthos</i>	Xen. <i>An.</i> I.3.21	1 Daric+	Initial wage to the Cyreians.
401	<i>misthos</i>	Xen. <i>An.</i> I.3.21	1.5 Darics+	Increase in wage by Cyrus.
401	—	Xen. <i>An.</i> I.4.13	5 minae*	Promise for successful campaign.

1

Amount is daily unless otherwise specified.

399	<i>misthos</i>	Xen <i>An.</i> V.6.23	1 Cyzicene+	Timasion to pay from first of each month.
399	-----	Xen <i>An.</i> VII.2.36	1 Cyzicene+	Seuthes promises to give to Cyreians.
399	<i>misthos</i>	Xen <i>An.</i> VII.6.1	1 Daric+	Thibron promises to pay the Cyreians.
383	<i>misthos</i>	Xen <i>Hell.</i> V.2.21	4 Aeg. ob.	Money for men in the Peloponnesian league.
351	<i>siteresion</i>	Dem IV.28	2 ob.	Suggested rates for mercenaries in Thrace.
336-23	-----	IG II(2) i 329	1 dr.	Pay to allies of Alexander.

\* = payment or promise of one time payment or gratuity.

+ = Rate of monthly payment.

Table II

Non-Military Wages

Job Description	Amount <i>per diem</i>	Date	Secondary Source	Reference
Dicast at Athens	3 obols	424 B.C.	Ar. <i>Vesp.</i> 689-90.	
Architect	1 drachma	Burford 1969, 106		VI.96-7, XIX 27-32
Flute Girl	2 drachmae		Arist. <i>Ath. Pol.</i> 50.2.	
Skilled Craftsmen				
at Athens	1 drachma		Burford 1969, 140-1	IG I. <sup>2</sup> 373-4
at Delphi	1.5 drachma	356 B.C.	FD 19.40	
at Delphi	2 drachma	344 B.C.	FD 19.88	
at Eleusis	2 drachma	329 B.C.	IG II. <sup>2</sup> 1672 II	
at Delos	1.5-2 drachmas	late 4th c.	IG XI. <sup>2</sup> , 199 c. 41-5	
at Epidaurus	1 drachma	370 B.C.	Burford 1969, 164	

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