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AUTHOR: Joseph DiFilippo, Hons. B.A. (York University, Toronto)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. A. Shalom

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Introduction

Philosophy has carried out its quest for a unifying principle of experience from two mutually exclusive positions, that of **immanence** and that of **transcendence**. These starting points rule out the very possibility of compromise. If one adopts the attitude of immanence one forfeits thereby the attitude of transcendence. Conversely, the attitude of transcendence demands the complete and unequivocal denial of the attitude of immanence. Historically, this polarity is most strikingly witnessed in the philosophical methodology of British Empiricism on the one hand and that of the continental philosophies on the other. The latter extend from the period of Kant and Hegel through to Husserl and the spawning and flourishing of the phenomenological movement.

When Hume sought out criteria for establishing personal identity he performed an act of reflection but found only a fleeting succession of impressions and ideas whose ordering principles were custom and association based on habit. Because Hume was the progenitor of the strict empiricism that had begun with Locke there was no reason to examine anything but the immediate given. Although Hume operated within the confines of an 'idea' ontology, his analysis never successfully distinguished 'idea' or 'thing' from 'consciousness' or 'that which was conscious of.....'.
The necessity for transcendence in formulating a coherent theory of the self was first perceived by Kant whose analysis nevertheless bore a marked resemblance to Hume's. Kant's reiteration that there is no inner intuition of the subject itself, that, "in inner intuition there is nothing permanent"\(^1\) begins where Hume's analysis had ended. Indeed, Kant's statement reminds us of Hume's renowned statement: "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or another...I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception."\(^2\)

Kant's profound originality here consists in his characterization of the problem which had plagued what he called rational psychology. The problem, in short, was that empiricism had mistaken the 'experience of unity' for the 'unity of experience'. Kant never tired of arguing that such a unity must be operative in constituting the representations of experience (inner and outer) in order to provide for the possibility of ascribing those experiences to oneself. Such self-ascription conditions the expression of our empirical self consciousness. Yet, this is not to be taken as signifying the need for an awareness (Hume's 'immediate perception') of the subject who is that unitary 'I'. The fundamental unity of consciousness is not identical with the perception of a unitary subject. The concept of the 'transcendental unity of apperception' is not to be grounded in the empirical search for personal identity. The demand for the discovery of the constitutive factor responsible for connecting the temporal succession of appearances, is the irreducible problem of the self. But this in no
way implies, and here is the source of what Kant called the 'transcendental illusion', that this unity is to be derived from such a temporal succession. The empirical concept of the subject of experience must follow from, not sustain derivation of 'the unity of consciousness'. The search for the latter is the search for the universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience itself; no support can or should be expected from empirical observation. Any solution arrived at by means of such a procedure would, ab initio, presuppose that experience whose unitary structure is being sought. It would be finding the unity of consciousness in that which was being unified. A manifest absurdity. At least, so Kant believed.

This criticism marks the point of departure for Kant's analysis of the concept of the self. Admittedly, Kant's eventual formulation is riddled with mystery and confusion, but unlike Hume's, Kant's prescription invites interpolation and the general task of reconstruction. The immanence inherent in Hume's position predicts its inevitable incoherence.
Part I: The Remnants of Pure Reason

Chapter I

Seeking Out the Remnants

There are three or four fundamental problems associated with Kant's concept of the self and it is around these problems that a theory of the self must develop. These problems shall be fully explicated when we come to them, such difficulties as the relationship between the transcendental unity of apperception and the faculty of inner sense; the enigma of collating the four selves, transcendental, noumenal, empirical, and moral into a coherent concept of the person.

There is a host of subsidiary problems which conglomerates around the essential ones. In this paper, part of my task is given over to tracing these difficulties out and presenting a fruitful discussion of them. I have found it necessary to take some provisional measures to avoid being lost amidst a sea of recalcitrant concepts. One of these, the most important and noteworthy one is the postponement of any mention or discussion of Kant's concept of the moral self until the third and final chapter of the essay.

I have come to see that Kant's failure to work out a consistent theory of the self is one of the most serious shortcomings of the entire programme of the Critical Philosophy. This paper is, in large part, an attempt to retrieve what I believe to be the salvageable remains of this programme.
1. Transcendental Unity of Apperception

Our first questions are plain. How do we account for the acquisition of self-knowledge? Do we have direct knowledge of the subject to which we attribute the capacity for the organization of our experience? Is our self-knowledge limited to and by the actions and reflections making up our experience? We know that we are individuals acting, intending, perceiving, willing and believing but do we know how it is that our perceptions and conceptions are taken up and understood as unified, belonging to one consciousness and only one consciousness. Simply stated, how do we explain the fact that all of our thoughts are bound together in one mind? This is not, as it may seem, an evident question. The force of the problem captured by this question can be illustrated by example. Suppose that the following sentence is written on two separate sheets of paper: "Water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen." The first sheet is torn into seven separate pieces each of which contains a word of the sentence. The second sheet is left intact with the complete sentence written on it. Now, take seven people and to each person give one scrap of paper so that each person knows which one word is written on his/her own scrap of paper. To an eighth person give the second sheet so that when it is read, the entire sentence will have been understood. Now, each one of the seven will have knowledge of only one word, this one-'water', the second one-'is' and so on to the seventh person. Try as each one might (ruling aside random groping), knowledge of the complete sentence will never be attained by any of the seven. None of the seven individuals will have acquired an
awareness or consciousness of the seven words arranged in just that order which gives the sentence its meaning. Each man has a consciousness of one word but only one man has a consciousness of the seven words. The point is that one consciousness of seven words is not the same as seven consciousnesses of one word each. We can show part of what Kant took to be the essential character of the self if we can bring out and elaborate upon this difference. This example provides us with an account of consciousness that is distinctively Kantian. Of the complex nature of consciousness nothing is more fundamental than its unity. It is this unifying function of consciousness that realizes and sustains our experience of the world, conditioning even the conditions of our possible experience both intuitively and discursively, namely, the conditions of Space, Time and the Categories.

This unity Kant calls the 'transcendental unity of apperception' or the 'original synthetic unity of apperception'. Some of the most important problems surrounding Kant's unstable because always developing conception of the self belong to the relationship between this transcendental unity of apperception and the more familiar notion of empirical self or psychological 'I'. It is difficult at times to see whether Kant has been successful in effecting a working connection between these two concepts. If this relationship can be cashed out in terms of our 'possible experience of the world', that is, if the versatile activities of the empirical self do, in fact, depend upon an a priori unifying structure then Kant's accomplishment is indeed significant.
Throughout the investigation it is imperative that we keep one question ready at hand: Are we here dealing with a 'split self', that is, two separate selves whose functions are so disparate as to be irreconcilable? Or, is the empirical self merely the representation in outer sense of the self 'in itself'- the real self?

"It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation is impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. All the manifold of intuition, has, therefore a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it can not be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again original apperception, because it is that self-consciousness, which, while generating the representation 'I think'..., cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. The unity of this apperception I likewise entitle the transcendental unity of self consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge arising from it. For the manifold representations would not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness." (B131-B132)

This rather lengthy passage, although not a complete testimony to the nature of apperception in general, is a definitive statement of the two most essential ingredients of the transcendental unity of apperception, i.e., spontaneity and unity. The former, as we shall see, marks a direct contrast with 'inner sense' which is presented as the passive side of the same self. Kant, wisely so I believe, marks the distinction between the 'I think' as original apperception and the subject 'I' as empirical apperception. It is here that we receive for the first time the notion that the first principle of both knowledge and self-knowledge is itself not knowable.
in experience **qua** appearance. As it does not belong to the sensibility, intuition of it is not possible. More important, its characterization as spontaneous tells us that Kant does not view the transcendental 'I' as having any participatory role in the conscious activity of the understanding; nowhere are we to find an active transcendental 'I', not even in our private experience of the understanding. It cannot be thought. Kant outrightly confuses this caricature of the transcendental 'I' by referring to the understanding as its source. The understanding does not function without reflection and deliberation since it is dependent on intuition for its content. I do not see how a spontaneous act which gives rise to a representation that accompanies and conditions every thought content could arise from the understanding. This would mean that the spontaneous act manifests itself only after what it conditions appears, in other words, it both predates and postdates its product. If Kant, as is most likely, is referring here to that faculty which contains the pure concepts (Categories) then he is not, 'ipso facto', speaking of the understanding which thinks.

The 'I think' supplies a unified consciousness without which thinking would be disparate and unconnected. The simple formation of a judgement would be quite impossible. The unity of apperception while necessary to the possibility of knowledge is itself unknowable; it is completely non-determinable. As such, it has drastic implications for Kant's model of the self. Consider: A non-determinable 'I think' provides the subject with the knowledge that it thinks but what it is **qua** thinking remains completely undetermined. Right off, Kant has condemned such notions as personal identity and selfhood, for they
could never be derived from the original unity of apperception. In order for such a derivation to be carried out the original unity of apperception would have to contain an intuition but then it would no longer be pure apperception.

Descartes, it will be remembered, claimed that it was this very 'whatness' of the self that was the foundation for all succeeding human knowledge. What is more, he discovered it through mere introspection. The source of the unity of consciousness and its identity, Descartes claimed, was just the consciousness of thinking itself. Then came Hume, who with his sceptical arguments demolished the certainty of the Cartesian cogito and indeed, woke Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Hume asserted that what he observed when searching for the self was "... some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure."\(^5\) Nor was Hume unaware of the unifying role of the self: "But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference."\(^6\) It is this referent that Kant calls the 'unity of apperception'. But the unity of apperception is an active power of the mind in contrast with the passive 'inner sense'. As such it must belong to consciousness even though Kant identifies it as a function of the mind- the understanding- and construes its activity as transcendental.\(^{Al19}\) Yet this activity must be of something but as undeterminable and unthinkable no such conclusion can be consistently drawn. As I shall discuss later, Kant declares quite unequivocally in the often ignored 'Paralogisms' that such knowledge of the self is out of the question. Thus, on the one
hand, Kant wants to claim self-identity for the innumerable representations of the mind, while on the other, he refuses to grant knowledge of the source of the identity (to 'what' the identity is of) other than that the source is an a priori activity. The following passage supports, I believe, this interpretation; again, that consciousness of an a priori unity is not itself knowledge of even a determinable subject let alone a determinate empirical subject. Kant does not have the material to warrant such an inference.

"I am conscious of the self (clearly from what follows, 'self' is meant as empirical, or what is, I assume, the passive reception to outer intuitions) as identical in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my representations, and so apprehend them as constituting one intuition. This amounts to saying that I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations - to be entitled the original synthetic unity of apperception - under which all representations that are given to me must 'stand, but under which they have first to be brought by means of a synthesis." (B135)

This fundamental non-determinability of the transcendental unity of apperception as the highest principle of human knowledge is, as an activity, that of a transcendental self. We shall see later that Kant's analysis leads us, or rather, forces us to identify this supposed transcendental self with a noumenally conditioning self. As this involves considerable textual work, I have postponed the task to a later chapter.

Leaving aside this identification, there is a second somewhat more obvious way of demonstrating the non-cognitive nature of the transcendental ego. This can be done by appeal to Kant's theory of
knowledge. Knowledge has its limitations in what the mind is conscious of as appearance. As a spontaneous activity, the transcendental ego never presents itself as such, ergo, nothing can be said of the activity excepting the inferential claim that it has to universality and necessity.

2. Kant's Dilemma

Although Kant begins unfolding the meaning of the original synthetic unity of apperception by using the term 'I think' as the spontaneous activity that accompanies all representations, unlike Descartes, he cannot give any epistemic status to what is discovered by means of reflection. If Kant were to claim that what the 'I think' reveals, is or can be known with a certainty unobtainable by knowledge of objects his covenant with a metaphysics of experience would be trespassed. If the self is to be known at all then according to Kant's own theory of knowledge, it must be known with nothing more than intuitive certainty, that is, as an appearance. But if the self is itself only an appearance, how can it stand in a 'knower-known' relation to itself. More precisely, how can the self, as an intuition, stand in a passive relation of 'knower-known' to itself in accordance with the conditions of sensibility. Secondly, if the self is conceived as limited by the sensible conditions of space and time, must the whole 'way of ideas' of a noumenal self be abandoned? Or, if we agree to uphold the role of a noumenally conditioning agency, must we be satisfied with the orthodox but uncritical characterization of this aspect of Kant's thought, that is, that acceptance of the noumenal-
phenomenal distinction be mute and indefensible. If this aspect of Kant's thought, certainly the most troublesome, demands our quiet consent as the *sine qua non* then the 'pure milk' of the Kantian gospel offers little insight into the perplexing problems we are trying to sort out. For my part, I have little doubt that such a position need be seriously entertained, as I intend to show throughout the course of this paper. Nonetheless, this compounded problem is one that Kant struggles with throughout the *Critique* and we will presently look at one of his attempts to resolve it (*Bl*53-Bl59). Afterwards, I shall discuss his rejection, transcendentally, of a known 'personal identity' which bears directly on this problem (*Paralogisms*-1st and 3rd).

"How the 'I' that thinks can be distinct from the 'I' that intuits itself (for I can represent still other modes of intuition as at least possible) and yet, as being the same subject, can be identical with the latter; and how, therefore, I can say, "I, as intelligence and thinking subject, know myself as an object that is thought, in so far as I am given to myself ((as something other or)) beyond that ((I)) which is ((given to myself)) in intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am to the understanding "_..." (*Bl*55)

In order to even articulate the problem, Kant is forced into using schizophrenic language about the 'I'. In doing so, he refers, as is customary throughout the *Critique*, to the self as both 'passive' and 'active' (inner sense and apperception). How can the active 'I think' which is surely distinct from the passive 'I' of inner sense, be known as specifying the identity of the subject when I can know myself only as I appear to myself, that is, in varying
intuitions and thoughts. The subject must, at one and the same time, appear to itself and yet transcend itself as that appearance if it is to know that self. This problem, though common to a good many other philosophers, is, to my mind, greatest for Kant. The problem itself, however, reveals something of the nature of the self which I shall attend to towards the close of the paper; for now, in order to understand Kant's attempt to solve this dilemma, we must turn to the relationship of inner sense and apperception.

3. Inner Sense and Apperception: Kant's Schizophrenic Self

"This is a suitable place for explaining the paradox which must have been obvious to everyone in our exposition of the form of inner sense: namely, that this sense represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected, and this would seem to be contradictory, since we should then have to be in a passive relation (of active affection) to ourselves. It is to avoid this contradiction that in systems of psychology inner sense, which we have carefully distinguished from the faculty of apperception, is commonly regarded as being identical with it." (B152-B153)

This passage marks one of those rare occasions where we find Kant openly acknowledging the existence of a threatening problem. The representations of inner sense are characterized by their temporal order (succession, coexistence and duration) whereas those representations of outer sense, although having a common temporal form, are primarily spatial and supposedly 'receive' their temporal form from inner sense (the imposition doctrine). Ignoring the very suggestive possibility that by 'empirical self' Kant means 'bodily self' or the
self insofar as it is body, it becomes less confusing to see why Kant incorporates inner sense into his rank of salient mental capacities. The sensibility is affected by appearances only; the self is not such an appearance, ergo, something further is needed to account for the appearance of the self to itself. Inner sense appropriately fits this condition. It is worthwhile drawing out the implications that this notion of inner sense would have for a cognitive self if it (inner sense) were to function without the spontaneous activity of the original synthetic unity of apperception. I hope in this way to mark the importance of considering inner sense and apperception as necessarily reciprocal faculties interacting to produce the subject's unified experience of his/her world.

Since the faculty of inner sense intuits the self only as it is affected by varying states and disposition, e.g. cold, happiness, and never as it is affected by a disposition or state marked 'self', inner intuition—although it would be ordered because of the form of inner sense, time—would lack any consciousness of its ordered intuitions or of the continuous identity of each tuition as belonging to itself. In short, Hume's problem would become Kant's. The doctrine of inner sense suffers in two ways: (1) Its conclusions are unacceptable in light of Kant's more critical teaching; (2) Its very formulation as a "passive relation of active affection" is increasingly burdensome and problematic. Yet, as we must admit, as a capacity for inner intuition, the doctrine of inner sense is absolutely essential. Kant cannot do without it. The connection of the two within Kant's architectonic is re-emphasized in a line from (A107) where inner sense
is identified with empirical apperception which, immediately following is adamantly distinguished from transcendental apperception.

"This original and transcendental condition is no other than 'transcendental apperception'. Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named 'inner sense', or 'empirical apperception'. (A107)

Kant has led us up to this problem of the relation between inner sense and transcendental apperception already equipped with the advance he believes can be made upon it. This ploy is characteristic of Kant's approach to difficulties which he knows to be very subtle and capable of generating a whole new series of puzzles if not handled properly. One of the recurring symptoms of this technique is Kant's muteness as to what is actually going on in certain passages or what the purpose, aside from the stated one, actually is. So here, what Kant must do can be readily anticipated. Inner sense must combine with the transcendental apperception in order to provide a unity of consciousness. This, again, is quite plain but what is more interesting is the way Kant sets out to do it. Kant's method serves to reveal the irreducibility of the self to a single faculty, whatever it may be, operative in human action; furthermore, it creates the suspicion that whatever reconstruction is performed on Kant's material for a theory of the self, it will be committed to this position. 8

Formally, the relation between the transcendental unity of apperception and inner sense can be accurately described as the combination of the active and the passive forms of intuition and
understanding (agent-patient). Apperception as an 'act of unity' acts upon inner sense and thereby 'determines' it. In Kant's terminology the term 'determine' and its cognate terms are some of the notoriously opaque words whose meaning is as great as their obscurity. In this case, 'determines' would seem to suggest that the transcendental apperception is the condition for the possibility of inner sense. Since the understanding deals only with concepts and never intuitions it cannot be said to deal with the synthesis of the manifold in intuition. It has as its synthesis the principle of synthesis itself- the self-conscious unity which presupposes any "activity of synthesis" in the understanding or sensible intuition. The understanding is able to abstract from the content of sensible intuition the spatial and temporal form (relations of outer objects?) of the manifold thereby giving itself an intuition inwardly or as Kant obscurely puts it, "...is able to determine sensibility inwardly." (B153) This it is able to do solely because of the nature of inner sense which contains the pure manifold of time which is metaphorically 'imposed' upon the now internalized outer intuition.

The section of the text that I am trying to clarify is steeped in mystery and confusion. What follows is an alternative approach to the same problem. The understanding by means of what Kant now calls the 'transcendental synthesis of imagination' (instead of apperception) acts upon the passive subject's inner sense.

"Thus the understanding, under the title of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, performs this act upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is, and we are therefore justified in saying that inner sense if affected thereby." (B153-B154)
The phrase 'acts upon' is misleading, to say the least. This activity, if Kant is to be consistent, is transcendental and therefore, can only mean that the very consciousness of the synthetic unity presupposes the empirical synthesis of the manifold in intuition. The term 'presupposes' is taken to mean that the 'I think' determines each part of the manifold as belonging to a single consciousness. Of course, it does not determine the content of the manifold but only its spatial form. This then combines with the form of inner sense-time-to 'internalize' the intuition.

Kant is trying to explain for the first time the nature of the interaction between our capacity for spontaneity and our faculty for receptivity. The results are despicable. However, the improvements offered later on tend to minimize the importance of this first failure. I cannot pretend to make comprehensible Kant's supposed explanation of the vital relationship. A testament to the hard core obscurity of the passage is the extensive treatment it has received by the commentators Weldon and Wolff, within the broader context of discussions of the doctrine of inner sense. Although both arguments are clearly attempts at a reconstruction of the original text, they do offer some insight into what Kant himself might have meant. Unfortunately, the arguments are too lengthy to repeat here; I refer the reader to Wolff's analysis as it incorporates Weldon’s.10

The import of the interaction of apperception and inner sense is captured partially by this line:

"The understanding does not, therefore, find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but 'produces' it, in that it affects that sense." (B155)
.... and the following footnote (B157):

"I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting that our inner sense is affected by ourselves. Such affection finds exemplification in each and every act of attention. In every act of attention the understanding determines inner sense, in accordance with the combination which it thinks, to that inner intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding...".

At any rate, I shall postpone final treatment of the difficulties until we have looked at some related matters.

4. Paralogisms of Pure Reason

We come now to the Paralogisms. Kant is here seeking to confront the problems which arose as the result of his formulation of the structure of mental and transcendental activity in the Transcendental Deduction. To the questions; 'What is self?', 'Is it substance?', 'Can the existence of a person be demonstrated?', Kant must address himself. Reluctant to give up all hope of establishing some ground for these doctrines, Kant casts them as 'natural illusions' which follow from a transcendental (transcendent) concept of the subject.

"I conclude from this transcendental concept of the subject, which contains nothing manifold, the absolute unity of this subject itself, of which, however, even in so doing, I possess no concept whatsoever." (B398-A340)

Although the 'I think' is non-specifiable, acting solely as the principle for the unity of consciousness, it allows us, by supplying unity to the ways in which we are affected by inner and outer intuition, to separate the 'I' which is the object of inner sense and the body
which is the object of outer sense. Kant now wishes to extend the role of the 'I think' in self knowledge to the 'soul', that is, we must now investigate how far the 'I think' will carry the concept of the 'nature of the soul'.

Nowhere else does Kant refer to the object of inner sense as 'soul'. It serves to distinguish the empirical self which is determined in experience from the self not determinable in experience. By adhering to the scholastic terminology, Kant leaves no doubt in the mind of the reader as to the kind of issue being discussed, i.e. non-critical.

Thus, the 'I think' is to be treated as the foundation for a 'rational' doctrine of the soul, not an empirica1 doctrine. Inner experience is conceived as a way of coming to know objects of reflection, sensation or states of the subject in general, apart from the particular content that any of these might represent. There is a very telling remark here about personal identity whose importance Kant does not seem to have noticed. The concept of a 'person' is what Kant would call elsewhere, an Idea of Pure Reason. We can never produce criteria for self identity having the status of confirmable bits of knowledge. To prove that the soul has identity, says Kant, is just as arduous a task for the understanding as is the effort to prove that the soul is immaterial substance, simple and incorruptible. (A345-B403)

In the 1st Paralogism, that of Substantiality, one brand of the traditionally metaphysical conceptions of substance is introduced. This is the doctrine suggesting that the 'I' is the subject to which or in which all mental contents belong. Thus, mental contents are
mere accidents of the self whose individuation results from its being as substance. The speculative conception of substance regards the permanent in appearance as undergoing no existence change, i.e. it neither comes into nor goes out of existence. The only change is a qualitative change amongst the attributes adhering in the substance. Such results cannot be obtained from the critical conception of substance as a pure category for this demands applicability in the permanent in appearance. The 'I' does not contain such permanence; although it conditions any thought as a ground for its possibility, it is never presented as an intuition apart from the though content (attributes) which accompanies it. We can rightly conclude, says Kant, that the first formal syllogistic fallacy is the attempt to identify the logical subject 'I' with the knowledge through intuition, of such a permanent actual subject. Kant concludes:

"The proposition, 'The soul is substance', may, however, quite well be allowed to stand... if, that is to say, we recognize that this concept signifies a substance only in idea not in reality".

(A351)

The 3rd Paralogism contains a parallel fallacy of arguing from the identity through consciousness of the subject in changing temporal representations to the numerical identity of the subject in itself. What Kant suggests here hints at the proposal for using the doctrine of the 'I think' as the ground for a coherent theory of personal identity- a single permanent subject that is responsible for the unifying processes of consciousness and that can be identified as such. This poses a monumental problem. Kant is faced with the task of characterizing a 'real' self, i.e., not self consciousness or the
empirical self but the self which is aware of itself as being identical throughout time— as a "thinking being". Now, identity and permanence are both determinations of the 'I', characteristics assumed by a thinking subject to be attributes of himself. However, since the real self is itself unknowable, these characteristics can only be inferred from the permanent in appearance, that is, from my spatial- temporal relations as an outer intution for others. Thus, Kant says:

"What matter may be as a thing in itself (transcendental object) is completely unknown to us, though, owing to its being represented as something external, its permanence in appearance can indeed be observed." (A366)

From the fact that my body presents itself as a public object in the phenomenal world, throughout a series of appearances— successive representations— self identity can be inferred. In so far as I am in the world as appearance, that is, as body, there is no problem in conceding action at time $t_1$ and at time $t_2$ to the same person. Self-identity is dependent on the spontaneous activity of apperception and as such, it is the formal condition for any thought. Since this apperception is essentially unknowable I cannot show from the fact that such identity is a logical presupposition for unified experience that anything in appearance (body, sameness in time as observed by another) is the phenomenal or empirical extension of this transcendental subject. From the logical condition of a transcendental subject I can make no claim about the existential status of the self. What prohibits Kant from making this move? There are at least two important reasons. The transcendental criteria are universality and necessity, neither of
which can be elicited from an empirical self which has taken up the capacities of a transcendental ego. Secondly, to posit a conception of a phenomenal self whose capacities range from the transcendental to the phenomenal stands in open conflict with the first half of the Critique.

Nonetheless, Kant is here on the threshold of conflating two stubbornly distinct concepts of the self. The phenomena-noumema distinction and the forceful implications of this doctrine become apparent. Either we blindly posit a busy transcendental ego as the subject of the activity described as transcendental or we can forfeit all knowledge of the concept of a transcendental self while assuming for practical purposes that the activity of this self is operative in our experience. Clearly, both suggestions are desperately inadequate. Yet, thus far, Kant has nothing better to offer. We will be obliged to perform a sizeable excision before Kant's theory becomes presentable. To this, the principal task of the paper, we now turn.
Chapter II: Synthetic Activity and the Unity of Consciousness

There is a certain peculiarity about an essay dealing with Kant's concept of the self that does not begin by appealing immediately to Kant's work on practical reason. If Kant scholars are in agreement about any one issue it is that the practical works pose the difficulties and the pitfalls which the First Critique, owing to the nature of its task, was able to avoid. The principal difficulty was to provide an explanation of the interaction of man and nature without the sacrifice of freedom or natural necessity. Since practical reason for Kant simply meant reason in its non-theoretical use, that is, its function in human action, it was natural to expect from the two treatises on practical reason a thorough discussion of some of the fundamental concepts related to the problem of the person, the concepts of freedom, rational agency, willing and autonomy. And we are not disappointed. Both the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason contain ample evidence of Kant's acute awareness of these problems. However, when we approach the penultimate section of Part III of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and we witness Kant, once again, confronted with the antinomy of freedom and natural causation, we are forced to retreat to the Critique where, in the 'Antinomy of Pure Reason', Kant had first attempted to resolve the oppressive contradiction. The explanation accompanying the argument in the Foundations is, it must be admitted, rather meagre and one not
versed in Critique doctrine could not be faulted for thinking that Kant had shirked the entire problem. Nor is this instance unique. Time and time again we are forced to appeal to the Critique in an effort to arrive at some sort of comprehension of a passage which is crucial to the understanding of an argument being advanced in the Foundations but upon which Kant spends only four or five lines. ²

There is also a purely heuristic advantage to limiting the initial formulation of the theory of the self to the Critique. By introducing the development of the theory with an account of how the demand for a coherent theory of the self is implicit in the Critique alone, I am able to accentuate the material in that first work that I believe to be essential to satisfying the demand for consistency and coherence.

Finally, it seems to me that one would be quite mistaken in supposing that Kant had written two entirely different kinds of work, one dealing exclusively with reason in its theoretical use and the other outlining and describing reason in its practical employment only. Kant's method is strikingly similar in all of his works on reason and morality. Consider the two questions, posed in the Critique and the Foundations respectively. "How are synthetic a priori propositions possible?" and "How is the categorical imperative possible?" One of the most onerous tasks of the moral treatises is the demonstration of the validity of the categorical imperative, that is, showing how the categorical imperative is able to bind human beings qua rational agents to specific substantive policies of action which they adopt. In other words, how is the categorical imperative applicable to experience?
Likewise, in the Critique, Kant is faced with the problem of demonstrating the applicability of the categories to experience. Common to both of these questions is the germinal problem of the whole Critical Philosophy, namely, how can the pure concepts of the understanding be operative in experience if they are not derived from experience.

These are not coincidental methodological similarities but reveal what Kant often hinted at obscurely, that the moral works, especially the Foundations, investigate those questions of rational agency, freedom, autonomy upon which the Critique had already pronounced judgement. I am not suggesting that either the Foundations or the Critique of Practical Reason were composed, as it were, under the auspicious condition that they not violate the limitations mapped out for reason in the Critique. What I would like to make clear is this: a conflict arises when the doctrine of the first Critique is set beside that of the Foundations. This occurs, to some extent, because Kant is doing in the Foundations what he said could not be done in the Critique. Fortunately or not, this is not the final word on the matter; if it were, we could simply evaluate the arguments for each particular work and reject the least defensible one. But the conflict arises not only as a result of the comparison of practical reason with the theoretical but is implicit in the conception of human reason put forth in the Critique itself. In general this conflict takes the form of, or finds expression in, the one overriding and omnipresent dichotomy in Kant's work, that is, the distinction of appearance and reality. As I see it, the uneasy relationship of the theoretical and the
practical is simply a mode of the more general relationship of the idea of nature as phenomenal but with its source or underlying conditions as noumenal in character. Yet, it is only in the practical works, especially the Foundations, where human action comes to be considered both as a bit of behaviour causally related to other phenomena, namely, events, and as the free and autonomous non-phenomenal participation of an agent moved by reason, that the conflict becomes the open and confessed warfare that it really is and has been all along. The source of this truly puzzling aspect of Kant's conception of the self is his doctrine of pure reason but it only becomes a problem which gives rise to antinomies and paradoxes of various sorts because pure reason is practical. This is why, although I consider the moral works essential, I maintain that the doctrine of theoretical reason is too valuable to a reconstruction of the theory of the self to be subordinated to the doctrine of practical reason. Indeed, it becomes quite obvious to the reader immersed in Critique doctrine that both the Critique of Practical Reason and the Foundations can usefully be described as tangents to the Critique rewritten to make room, not only for faith, but for a free, autonomous and rational will.

1. Kant's Conception of the Pre-Critical, Metaphysical Theory of the Self and its Relation to the Idea of the Unity of Consciousness

We saw in the first chapter that the whole Critical Philosophy is, more than anything else, a philosophy of the self. And we noted how peculiar it was to find that Kant nowhere expounded anything even remotely resembling a theory of the self aside from the isolated remarks
on the different selves that people his doctrine. This remark now
stands in need of some qualification however, most notably it must be
pointed out how Kant could possibly have ignore discussing these
various selves when one or another of them is either referred to
directly or implicated on almost every page of the Critique. The fact
is that when Kant forces himself to examine the notion of the self which
he knows to lie at the core of his work what he turns to is not an entity
denoted by the terms 'empirical self' or 'moral self' but the function
that each of these capacities has in the synthesizing activities
which ultimately produce our familiar world. In other words, Kant
never confronts the question of what these capacities are that
perform their respective tasks. Kant's tendency to avoid this kind
of question is consonant with the programme of the Critical Philosophy
itself, or, at least, one of its critical tenets. Kant, in the Preface
to both the 1st and 2nd editions of the Critique was quite explicit
when speaking of the failures and pseudo-achievements of what he
called 'speculative metaphysics'. Particularly directed towards that
metaphysical view of the self, Kant sets out to reveal the weakness
of any position that considers the 'thinking self' to be a self-
subsistent reality. The force of Kant's argument here can be easily
summarized.

What are actually rough logical inferences of the concept of a
'thinking self' are mistaken for real properties of a transcendent
substance. Kant is most clear about this at the beginning of the
'Paralogisms':

"In all judgements I am the determining subject
of that relation which constitutes the judgement. That the 'I', the 'I' that thinks, can be regarded always as subject, and as something that does not belong to thought as a mere predicate, must be granted. It is an apodeictic and indeed identical proposition; but it does not mean that I, as object, am for myself a self-subsistent being or substance. The latter statement goes very far beyond the former, and demands for its proof data which are not to be met with in thought, and perhaps (in so far as I have regard to the thinking self merely as such) are more than I shall ever find in it." (B407)

Again, at B409:

"The analysis, then, of the consciousness of myself in thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever towards the knowledge of myself as object. The logical exposition of thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object."

This inherently misguided theory of a super-sensible self nevertheless poses a threat to the Critical Philosophy, at least so Kant seems to believe. The danger here is the proposition, 'I am a being which thinks' from which the following proposition is inferred, 'I am an individuated and simple substance'. The fact that Kant seriously considered this sort of faulty inference should tell us that he has some sympathy for its conclusion if not its logic.

It is worth quoting the following lengthy passage for later we shall find Kant forced by his analysis of freedom and determinism to accept something strikingly similar to what he here castigates.

"Indeed, it would be a great stumbling block, or rather would be the one unanswerable objection to our whole Critique, if there were a possibility of proving 'a priori' that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that consequently (as follows from this same mode of proof) personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter. For by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond the world of
sense, and have entered into the field of noumena; and no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further into this domain, indeed of settling in it, and, should our star prove auspicious, of establishing claims to permanent possession. The proposition, 'Every thinking being is, as such, a simple substance', is a synthetic a priori proposition; it is synthetic in that it goes beyond the concept from which it starts, and adds to the thought in general (i.e. to the concept of a thinking being) the mode of (its) existence: it is a priori in that it adds to the concept a predicate (that of simplicity) which cannot be given in any experience. It would then follow that a priori synthetic propositions are possible and admissible, not only, as we have asserted, in relation to objects of possible experience, and indeed as principles of the possibility of this experience, but that they are applicable to things in general and to things in themselves—a result that would make an end of our whole critique, and would constrain us to acquiesce in the old-time procedure." (B409-B410)

The problem with this sort of outright disavowal of traditional metaphysics is that Kant's formulation of the unifying functions of consciousness simply borrows too much from it. In the Critique alone, we find Kant vacillating between two quite incommensurable theories of the self, both astonishingly incorporated into the epistemic fabric of that work. When Kant sets out to analyze consciousness, its unity, origin and operation he sometimes treats the activities of the transcendental ego as real manifestations of the person. What we are presented with is a thoroughly psychological account of how experience is constructed. Then, when he has done with this analysis, he reverts to the non-committal position of epistemologically justifying our judgements about experience. This inner conflict warrants a separate analysis. The passages which
most evidently bear witness to this struggle in Kant's thought are found at A16-A17, including the footnote at A17n(a). The subject of this section (3) of the 'Transcendental Deduction' in (A) is the necessary condition for a possible experience, the unity of consciousness.

Kant begins by explaining what we have discussed at some length in Chapter 1, that, as cognizing beings, any knowledge that we might have, perceptual or intellectual, is subject to the condition that one is able to identify say, a percept or a proposition as one's own, in my case, as mine. In order for a series of such percepts and concepts to become knowledge for me they must be brought under or more simply, experienced by a single consciousness.

"For in me they can represent something only in so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected."\(^3\)

Kant then formulates this attribute of consciousness into a principle which is applicable to any and all representations, here described as "...the transcendental principle of the 'unity' of all that is manifold in our representations...". In order to give a useful explanation of this sentence and the one immediately following\(^4\) I must appeal to a passage at B135-B136. (There are others which make the same point but this is the least complex). There are two points that I am intent upon making. First, that Kant describes this 'unity' as a transcendental principle because this unity is itself a product of a further act of synthesis, **transcendental synthesis**. Secondly, that this activity of transcendental synthesis is construed as the real activity of the
experiencing subject. This is the legitimate task of a transcendental ego to which is ascribed an ontological status that is not reducible to a mere epistemic category. Here is the statement:

"This amounts to saying, that I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representation - to be entitled the original synthetic unity of apperception - under which all representations that are given to me must stand, but under which they have also first to be brought by means of synthesis".

Kant is claiming that when we become conscious of some representation or thought, the 'becoming conscious' is accompanied by the awareness of the fact that the content of my consciousness is unified and 'mine'. This is why Kant calls the synthesis a priori and necessary. Necessary, because this unity is a very possibility of awareness and a priori because the identification of the content of my perception as 'mine' is supplied not by the percept in question (that is, the content) but by the unity of consciousness. (In a moment, we will have to search for the source of this unity of consciousness). Thus, Kant says, in describing a priori necessary synthesis, that it is original and synthetic. Original fits in quite well with the a priori and dispels any temptation to think that the identification which proceeds from the unified consciousness is a mental process of any kind which, indeed, would be an embarrassment. 'Original' can only mean that my awareness of this unity of consciousness is much like my awareness of an acute pain and most unlike the way in which I gain complete awareness of a noise that I strain to hear. Even better, I cannot become aware of a certain mental state and at the same time not know that it is 'mine'. If I have a pain, to say that I also have
an awareness of the pain is, at best, verbose. Problems of other minds and identity across time aside, Kant has at least taken out a subscription to the (1) primordial and (2) atemporal nature of the unity of consciousness. I cannot see that 'original' makes sense under any other interpretation. The term 'synthetic' is another matter and behaves, I think, as a sign-post warning us of a host of imminent perplexities. Hopefully, the necessity for introducing this passage on behalf of A16-A17 will now become apparent.

The term 'synthetic', detects, I contend, the primary act of synthesis - transcendental synthesis - for it clearly connotes the fact that although our awareness of this unity of consciousness is original, the unity itself is produced by an act of synthesis which predates our awareness. The last phrase in this passage confirms this:

"... but under which they have also first to be brought by means of a synthesis ((productive act of combining))".

The two occurrences of the term 'synthesis' in this passage have vitally different denotations. The first should be understood as the unity produced; the second, as the activity of combining itself.

So there would seem to be two senses of the term 'synthesis' which Kant never probably distinguished. 'Synthesis' as the unity produced and which is the result of the activity of a transcendental synthesis, and secondly, the transcendental synthesis itself whose unifying activities are atemporal since they predate the unity of consciousness which is the necessary condition for the possibility of experience. The atemporality of the transcendental synthesis can
rightly be inferred from (1) the fact that we are totally unaware of any such activity and, (2) that Kant clearly construes the transcendental synthesis as an act which produces or brings about the unity of consciousness. Thus, its activity must occur before its product is realized. This is indeed an embarrassing situation. Kant is presenting transcendental synthesis as an activity which the mind performs but of which we are never aware. There are many passages, both in deduction (a) and (b), where this 'unity-producing' capacity of transcendental synthesis is clearly meant.\(^5\)

We can now return to A116-A117.

Up to this point, our analysis has revealed that the two conceptions of 'synthesis' disclose two corresponding levels of mental activity. The first level is the unity which is presupposed in so far as we are consciousnesses that experience the world around us in a familiar way - perceiving, thinking, believing. Our capacity for experience of this sort is referred to by Kant as empirical consciousness. But the unity presupposed by this empirical consciousness (that is, the synthetic unity) can not stand on its own. We have yet to explain why, and from whence comes this unity or, in Kant's famous phrase, how is experience possible?\(^6\)

The explanation of the implications of this question is in large part the second and most important level of mental capacity - the transcendental. Notice that I say capacity rather than activity, for it is unclear in what sense any faculty construed as transcendental can properly be described as 'active'. But, if it is not to be so described how else can meaningful talk about it be possible? This is just the
sort of dilemma that Kant acutely felt, concerning the transcendental nature of his description of mental life. The footnote appended to A16-A17 shows Kant entertaining two opposed characterizations of 'transcendental' consciousness, one purely epistemic and the other clearly psychologicist.

Before moving on to this passage however, I would like to make one note regarding the role of the concept of the 'transcendental object' in the expression of unity. At A106, Kant says: "...for this object is no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis". Here we have stated in unusually clear terms the function of the concept of an object in general - the transcendental object. The employment of the concept of the object equal to X supplies the unity that any and every perception must have in order for it to be an object for us. The way in which the different parts of a representation are connected (or the connection amongst different representations) allows us to refer the different representations to a common focus which is the object - the source of each of them. This, of course, leads to the expression of judgements, the only valid form of expression that knowledge for Kant, can take.

2. Transcendental Activity: The Crux of the Problem

Nowhere else, so far as I have been able to detect, does Kant so openly admit to the difficulty which goes to the heart of the revolutionary character of his critical philosophy. It requires a voluminous amount of exegetical detail to sort out the complicated web which links together the familiar notions of transcendental unity
of apperception, transcendental ego and activity of synthesis. The familiar German and English commentaries attest to this. I am neither prepared nor do I think it necessary, to present on behalf of the analysis which follows this kind of evidence. Where I offer some reconstruction of my own or where I freely interpret Kant, I supply the desired corroboration of the whole.

As I have briefly mentioned, any attempt to work out a Kantian theory of the self is obliged to deal with the generative characteristic that Kant, at times, so earnestly attributes to the mind. In doing so, it is natural to expect that this synthesizing activity be located at some one focal point, that it have a source or an agent which can be said to be responsible for such activity. We have seen that this way of looking at the synthetic processes which constitute our experience forces upon our interpretation an atemporal and unconscious element, namely, transcendental activity. We are led to believe, given the argument of the 'Transcendental Deduction', that transcendental synthesis is an activity that the mind performs but which we are never and can never be aware of. Furthermore, the synthetic processes are preconditions for consciousness itself - that is, neither self consciousness nor consciousness of objects is possible until the synthetic activities have run their course. Since we are never aware of such processes, can never know them as conscious activities, it is hardly credible to describe and talk about them as if they were mental; it simply does not explain anything or rather, it explains everything if anything. We are limited in our knowledge to appearance and it is therefore perhaps understandable if we were to
model transcendental activity after normal mental activity. But this simply will not do. For in order to consider such activity as mental (in the dynamical sense) we could only attribute it to the self we know through appearances - the empirical self. But Kant has repeatedly told us as he tells us paradigmatically in this footnote (A116-A117), that empirical consciousness is a product of this transcendental activity; thus, the empirical or phenomenal self cannot be both the product and the generator of this process.

"This proposition ((the sentence ending A117, quoted above)) is of great importance and calls for careful consideration. All representations have a necessary relation to a possible ((conditioned)) empirical consciousness. For if they did not have this, and if it were altogether impossible to become conscious of the, this would practically amount to an admission of their non-existence".

Here, Kant comes as close as anywhere to stating the dependency of the consciousness of objects upon a consciousness of an empirical self. (He does of course, assert that consciousness of self is dependent upon consciousness of objects, making the dependency relation reciprocal but that is not to be discussed here). If we are to conceive of what representations 'represent' as existing at all, it must be possible for them to be thought and/or apprehended by a conscious mind. However, empirical consciousness can never, of itself, contain the conditions which would enable it to take up representations in just that way that they would be ordered, unified and understood. (If this were not the case, remember, Kant would be no better off than Hume). This is the function of a transcendental consciousness.
"...which precedes all special experience, namely, the consciousness of myself as original apperception".

If we were to take Kant on his word, we would be forced to cast aside this statement for I simply do not have consciousness of myself as original apperception. 7

But Kant, as is not uncommon, goes on as if he had never written such statement, for a few lines further we find him claiming:

"But it must not be forgotten that the bare representation 'I' in relation to all other representations (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is transcendental consciousness. Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us".

Just what is Kant refusing to commit himself to? He is not in the least doubtful that a 'transcendental consciousness', properly arrived at, will mitigate the necessity of supposing a second order activity of synthesis which generates the consciousness of the self and the consciousness of objects. For in the same passage, Kant positively affirms:

"It is therefore absolutely necessary that in my knowledge all consciousness should belong to a single consciousness, that of myself. Here, then, is a synthetic unity of the manifold (of consciousness), which is known a priori, and so yields the ground for synthetic a priori propositions which concern pure thoughts... The synthetic proposition, that all the variety of empirical consciousness must be combined in one single self consciousness is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general."

Rather, whether we can derive, from the necessity of supposing such transcendental consciousness, the existence of an entity 'I' represented
by the representation 'I' and to which this activity of synthesis can be ascribed, escapes all verifiable criteria. (Remember that, for Kant, representations have the essential function of referring to something beyond themselves). So, Kant judges, we must suspend speculation.

What would Kant's judgement be if we were to imagine that one was forthcoming? On the one hand, he would be saddled with a metaphysical theory of the self, the consequences of which would be disastrous for the Critical Philosophy, something with a Leibnizian monadic structure, selfless and yet active. Or, on the other hand, if he were to outrightly discount any such resort, Kant's theory of pure apperception and pure concepts, i.e. his theory of transcendental activity, without which is Critical Philosophy totters perilously, is thereby rendered selfless.

Our problem becomes all the more burdensome because it is we who, in the last analysis, must choose between these two. Kant, so to speak, over reacted when it came to making judgement - he confirmed, perhaps unintentionally, each with equal tenacity. There is abundant evidence in the Critique alone to support either of these contentions. Kant writes repeatedly as if the transcendental unity of apperception were the supreme condition of experience and the fountainhead of the processes of synthesis - the transcendental deduction both in (a) and (b) is inundated, as I have stated previously, with this kind of language. Yet, Kant is insistent that the old metaphysical view of the self as simple substance, no doubt thinking of Leibniz's monad, should be refuted once and for all. This is the task he takes up in
the 'Paralogisms'.

Kant's doctrine of transcendental activity is at once too fundamental and too intriguing to be relinquished on the basis that it fails to satisfy a criterion of pre-Kantian metaphysical theories of the self. It is too fundamental because without it, his theory of mental activity which includes the notions of 'synthesis', rule governed activity; the relation of the Categories to experience and to the determination of Objectivity - would all have to be overturned. This may be puzzling doctrine but it is nonetheless fruitful. It seems to me that the modes of cognition of the mind and the relation between subject and experience must be assumed to be something like what Kant describes. Consider the following:

No explanation of consciousness or of the unity-conferring activities of synthesis can be given within the confines of experience, that is, within the limitations of a phenomenalist ontology. Neither consciousness nor self consciousness are conceived as alternate preconditions of experience, although both condition the possibility of appearances. It is directly stated by Kant, as I have pointed out throughout this discussion, that the real problem is providing an account of the unity with which both self consciousness and consciousness are endowed. This unity therefore, cannot be explicated in terms of consciousness, since de facto, it lies outside of consciousness as its progenitor. That some explanation of consciousness, however, is necessary, is evident if we simply reflect that the fact of consciousness would remain inexplicable and merely contingent. Thus, any explanation is by the very nature of what it seeks to explain - transcendental; in
Kant's sense of the term - 'pure a priori and universally necessary'.

It is at this point that Kant appeals, and understandably so, to noumenal conditions. The activity of 'synthesis' is the one noumenal condition which it is absolutely essential to assume. Kant's own description of its operation is modelled after the conception of conscious empirical synthesis and embodies the notion of rule governed activity just as the latter does. Furthermore, as I have already indicated, Kant, in attempting to remain faithful to his empirical model of mental activity, conceives the transcendental ego as the seat of the activity of the noumenal conditioning. But in doing so, he describes either the purely functional aspect of the transcendental unity of apperception or he refuses to state emphatically that such unity conferring activity is essentially unknowable by us, although it presence has to be assumed.

This, it seems to me, makes the identification of the noumenal self with the transcendental ego ultimately inevitable, albeit unsatisfactory. Transcendental ego or synthetic unity of apperception is used to describe the activity of the condition of consciousness, whereas noumenal self is the proper correlate to this 'active condition'. Kant, of course, could never admit to its place.

Thus, we find Kant employing a miserably impoverished phraseology in 'Subjective Deduction', section 2. Here we are supplied with, what seems at first glance, an explanation of the mental activity of synthesis. Indeed, nowhere in the Critique do we find a more helpful and insightful account of the processes of synthesis. But nowhere in the 'Subjective Deduction' does Kant state or assume, in spite of the misleading
language, that synthesis is a conscious mental activity; nowhere, that is, are we attributed with an awareness of synthetic processes such as 'Reproduction in Imagination', 'Recognition in a Concept' or 'Apprehension in Intuition'.

If we are to reconstruct a coherent theory of the self out of the textual material, it is essential that the reproductive function of the mind be incorporated into the account. To this end, some attempt must be made to make sense of these 3 functions of synthesis, especially that of 'Reproduction in Imagination'. The last, conjoined with the more familiar 'Recognition in a Concept' is said to be the means by which unity of consciousness and unity of apperception are produced. Kant speaks throughout the Critique from the 'Transcendental Deduction' onward, about the synthesizing activities of the mind, with regard to intuition (sensibility) and concepts (understanding).

Synthesis is even conceived, as I have tried to make clear, as being productive of both consciousness and self consciousness. It is the processes of synthesis, not the over-estimated and misunderstood transcendental unity of apperception that is the ultimate precondition of experience. Until some definite interpretation is given to the aspect of mental activity, mystery and confusion will prevail. Nothing fruitful can arise from an attempt to compare theoretical reason with practical reason unless an understanding of the underlying conditions of cognitive awareness is arrived at.

3. A Note on Kant's Phraseology

Kant's unfortunate language combined with his admittedly over-
complicated and confused style of writing, has justifiably won for itself a notoriety within the ranks of scholars, students and commentators. I, too, must make some tangential remarks on the obstacles posed by this confusing language here in the heart of the 'Transcendental Deduction'. Those who feel that the 'Transcendental Deduction' is worth gambling one's time and energy upon, know of the literature which has grown up around it. Jonathan Bennett, in his Kant's Analytic, has called the 'Transcendental Deduction' "a botch", which, "since it contains some good things, is not a negligible botch". 8

Commentators are in complete disagreement about how the thread of the deduction is to be understood. One maintains that the psychologistic variant of Kant's theory of transcendentalism must be completely excised from the body of the Critique while another argues that without the outright adoption of psychologism, no sense can be made of Kant's doctrine. The truth of the matter is that Kant is to blame for the lack of unanimous interpretation of such germinal questions.

The section we have been examining in the Critique, A96 to A128 provides us with numerous examples of the kind of language that has excited the anger of even the most careful reader. Kant's language is unfortunately suggestive of deliberate cognitive processes: "It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to know the object". (A105)

This otherwise sensible statement remains forever evasive because the verb 'produced' preceded by the pronoun 'we' characterizes the unity necessary in our perception of objects as a separate and
isolatable entity, as if it were the actual product of an elaborate but essentially unknown mental process.

In the 'Metaphysical Deduction' (A77-B102), Kant first presented a definition of 'synthesis'. It is, however, hopelessly unhelpful. For example, he describes the "act of synthesis" in the following way:

"But if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up and connected".

This kind of language conjures up an image of mental activity comparable to an assembly line process over which presides a transcendental ego, putting together a colour with a shape, fitting these together with a sound, until finally just the right perceptions have been conjoined in just the proper order to produce the unified object.

If we were to take Kant at this word, that is, if the notion of synthesis and all it entails, hinged on the belief that 'unity' was the result of a performance ultimately determined by an industrious ego, there would be little of lasting value here. However, there are to be found here extremely valuable insights into the nature of cognition, or more generally, into mental capacity. As is not unusual with Kant, he is most important where he is most obscure, but this, one should think, has to do with the very nature of the task. Kant's insights, which he was always struggling to express in better ways, exceeded his ability to express them. For many of the, it is obvious that he never did manage to get very clear, but this, for my part is to be taken as a testimony to both the difficulty of the ideas and to Kant's understandably inadequate attempt to express them. Let me say that I am not in any way, excusing either Kant or his doctrine; I think it is
evident that throughout, I have been content with nothing less than
stripping the central notions of their obscurity and rejecting them, if
nothing remains. I have conceded and will continue to concede very
little - the doctrine must account for itself.

Kant was not aware of the opacity of the nature of synthesis.
In the 'Metaphysical Deduction' (A78-D103) he flatly states that
synthesis:

"...is the mere result of the power of imagination,
a blind but indispensible function of the soul,
without which we should have no knowledge
whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely
every conscious".

Realizing that this would not do, he went on in that part of
the 'Subjective Deduction' that we are about to analyse to provide
some detail of the workings of synthesis. Much of what emerges, is
a picture of mental capacity, which for the first time, can be taken
literally and which we can use fruitfully.

4. The Nature of Synthesis

(A) Unity of Subject = Unity of Object

The nature of the self that is conceived along the lines we
are developing here is so to speak, three-dimensional. By this, I
mean, that it must be possible to look at the self from three
categorically different but mutually inclusive perspectives: (No. 1
Organizer, No. 2 Patient, No. 3 Agent). It is not so difficult to
discover evidence for (No. 2) and it is quite simple to discover (No. 2)
directly, and, although (No. 1) must be presupposed in any judgement
of experience no observable evidence of the presence of (No. 1) which
can serve to differentiate (No. 1) from either (No. 2) or (No. 3) can be readily secured. Nor can (No. 3) be observed as constituting something which is not at the same time (No. 2) and presumably (No. 1). All of this seems to point to the impropriety of breaking down what can only be understood as a single unity. This would be convenient if true, but it is not.

Our problem is just this: how can anything be a (No. 1), (No. 2) and (No. 3) together? While experience points to the necessity of the unity of the self, reason, in its theoretical use, is unable to conjoin these singular concepts into a workable whole. Very generally, this is the problem posed by Kant's own analysis of mental activity; identifying the functions attributed to the various selves and then determining their relation one to another. That this is one of the essential problems of the whole critical philosophy is indicated by Kant in the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' (B), where the Cartesian 'cogito' is made the primary premise of that crucial argument.

At the risk of sounding redundant, I shall state once again that Kant's failure to clearly formulate this problem and come to grips with it constitutes perhaps the most serious overall shortcoming of his work. Spelling out the Kantian conception of what it is 'to think' is therefore of paramount importance.

To think, is to determine an object, that is to say, knowledge is acquired through the determination of an object by means of concepts. By standing under, (being brought under) what calls "the unity of thought" - commonly but erroneously supposed to be the transcendental
unity of apperception - the manifold in intuition becomes the object. However, as I have tried to show, the transcendental unity of apperception cannot itself be the ultimate condition for objectivity since it acquires this unity only as the result of synthetic activity which Kant, as we shall see, attributes to the reproductive imagination. One of the more important enthymenes in the Critique is the proposition expressing the correlation between the form of thought and the form of the world. It is for this reason that the "Subjective Unity" of transcendental apperception must also be considered an "Objective Unity". Unity of the self presupposes unity in the object and unity in the object presupposes unity of the self. Self-consciousness is conditioned by consciousness of an object and consciousness of an object is conditioned by self-consciousness; the two thus mutually condition one another. If we ask why this is so, we need only recall the relation between the transcendental unity of apperception and inner sense upon which I remarked in the first chapter, particularly the role of inner sense. Inner sense has, as its formal characteristic - time. For any phenomenal object to be an object 'for me' it must be presentable to inner sense. The empirical ego, which is the self qua phenomenon, is perceived then, just this way. It is the representation of inner sense as an object (I represent inner sense to myself), and this I can do because time is "... the mode of representation of myself as object". (B 54) As well as the mode of representation of all outer intuition. Inner sense, as receptivity, is passive, not spontaneous and demands an object if I am to be conscious of my existence qua empirical ego. Addressing himself to this, Kant says:
"It ((consciousness of my existence in time through inner experience)) is identical with empirical consciousness of my existence, which is determinable only through relation to something which, while bound up with my existence, is outside me." (Bxln)

The consciousness of my empirical ego that arises from the representing of inner sense as an object, Kant suggests, is made possible only because there is something which stands in the relation of 'being outside' to me. Now this relation of 'being outside' refers, obviously I think, to spatial ordering as opposed to the temporal ordering of inner sense. It is essential to demonstrate this as plainly as possible. In order to be aware of myself as phenomenon, that is, as an external object (i.e. to have empirical consciousness), the existence of objects outside me is necessary. Why? Existence qua phenomenon is conditioned by the form of outer sense which in turn implies the imposition of a spatial order. The fact of spatial orderliness implies spatial relatedness amongst distinct, individuated objects. Thus, consciousness of myself qua phenomenon (empirical consciousness) means that I have consciousness of my existence qua phenomenon amongst externally related phenomena. While the empirical self is a condition for any possible experience, consciousness of myself as empirical presupposes consciousness of a group of related objects outside this self:

"The reality of outer sense is thus necessarily bound up with inner sense, if experience in general is to be possible at all; that is, I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me, which are in relation to my sense, as I am conscious that I myself exist as determined in time." (Bxlin)
This analysis of the reciprocal relation between the two forms of consciousness is unfortunately not that given by Kant for he merely states that some such relation should, indeed, must hold between them without giving any further indication or explanation of its significance. We shall see however, that the reciprocity belonging to this relation between self-consciousness and consciousness of an object is by no means simply the arbitrary result of our analysis. It is an essential ingredient in Kant's concept of experience and one which must be called upon in reconstructing the theory of the self. Subject and Object are polarized but they are not independent opposites. On the contrary, the principle that correlates them is that the formal unity of thought is the formal unity of the object. The essential problem now becomes that of accounting for the unity which, Kant maintains, the self in its normal cognitive proceedings, somehow confers on experience and upon the empirical ego which, whilst being an immanent part of that experience is also the phenomenal representative of the true self.

(B) The Subjective Deduction: Some Comments Upon a Commentary

I shall hold the 'Subjective Deduction' proper at bay for a while longer. Given the infamy that the 'Transcendental Deduction' of the 'First Edition' has attracted over fifty years of erudite analysis I dare not approach any part of it without first making some qualifying remarks. The whole text of the 'Transcendental Deduction' (A) has been excused by Vaihinger and Kemp Smith as a hastily put together collage of various passages themselves written down by Kant at different times. Furthermore, given the fact that Kant's most
important and revolutionary theories were the product of a long period of struggle and growth, it is maintained that each part of the 'patchwork' reflects Kant's thought at one particular time - a particular stage in this growth, a time at which Kant's thinking had not yet matured. It must be remembered that nowhere else is the 'patchwork' theory applied more thoroughly by Kemp Smith or brought to bear with more relentlessness than in the 'Transcendental Deduction' (A). Due to the widespread influence of this interpretation, H. J. Paton was incited to come to Kant's defense. He maintains that most of the contradictions and dilemmas attributed to Kant under the 'patchwork' theory are apparent only and that closer attention to Kant's own words (in particular, that the Critique be considered as a whole) would reveal the consistency of the main threads of Kant's doctrine.

Ignoring the question of the historical accuracy of the 'patchwork' theory it must be admitted that it is supported by some excellent exegetical analysis. Reading the 'Transcendental Deduction' (A) in accordance with the reordering of the passages suggested does indeed remove some original mystery. However, the enlightenment that accompanies the theory should not be mistaken for the resolution of any of the most fundamental contradictions of the 'Deduction'. The 'patchwork' theory does not answer or solve any genuinely philosophical problems; rather, its value is to be found in its heuristic import, that is, aside from its accuracy it aids us in understanding why Kant in the space of three successive paragraphs flatly contradicts himself. Take as example, the question of fundamental importance- of the application of the Categories to
experience. Are the Categories applicable to empirical objects and if so, does this imply that the understanding (or the imagination) as the seat of the Categories, is a necessary condition for the consciousness of objects, just as the form of sensible intuition is the sine qua non for the presentation of appearances to a subject? The assumption that the relation between the Categories and phenomena stands in need of corroboration may seem somewhat post facto since Kant in the 'Schematism' gives an explanation of how the Categories as a priori concepts are related to experience. But this was not always Kant's teaching. At the beginning of the 'Transcendental Deduction' (A84-A92, B117-B124) in the section entitled 'The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction'. Kant had not yet arrived at one of the major tenets of the critical philosophy, that consciousness of an object involves not only the a priori conditions of sensibility but also the a priori conditions of the understanding. The fact of consciousness implies both intuition and concept. Yet, here Kant is unequivocal:

"The Categories of understanding, on the other hand, do not represent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition. Objects may, therefore, appear to us without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of the understanding; and understanding need not, therefore, contain their a priori conditions."

(A89-B122)

The contention is that appearances, in so far as they are apprehended, are so, independently of the understanding. For the pure concepts of the understanding bear no relation to the sensibility which relates to objects as particular representations. On the contrary, the pure concepts (the Categories) "...speak of objects through predicates not of intuition and sensibility but of pure a priori thought. They relate to
objects universally, that is apart from all conditions of sensibility."
(A88-B120)

This remark and others like it would lead us to believe, as Kemp Smith has rightly suggested, that at the time of the writing of this section, Kant was labouring still under the 'Dissertation' principle, "that 'sense representation' reveal things as they appear, 'intellectual representations' things as they are." Kemp Smith however, goes further, unjustifiably I think and maintains that Kant is directly asserting that the pure concepts are applicable only to things-in-themselves. There simply is no statement of Kant's to that effect and Kemp Smith is unable to produce anything that might stand as a credible defense of the contention. Actually, Kant seems to have been at the time this passage was written, in a transitory stage, somewhere between the 'Dissertation' doctrine and the later more mature Critical doctrine which in the very next section is taken up.

Two paragraphs later, in the section entitled 'Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories', we find Kant's first statement of the more mature position which was not to find its complete development until later in the Critique. Also, it directly contradicts what was just asserted at (A89-B122):

"Now there are two conditions under which alone the knowledge of an object is possible, first, intuition through which it is given, though only as appearance; secondly, concept, through which an object is thought corresponding to this intuition."
(A93-B125)

This passage still begs the question somewhat, for it is maintained that it is through intuition that we come to know the object as appearance and that it is by means of concepts that we think the
object. This is not yet the revolutionary Critical hypothesis, that the a priori concepts must themselves be immediately applicable to intuition if the intuition is to become a representation for us, that is, if they are ever to exist for a consciousness so endowed as ours. At any rate Kant does us favour of clearing the air at (A94-B126):

"The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts has thus a principle according to which the whole enquiry must be directed, namely, that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experience, whether of the intuition which is to be met with in it or of the thought." 13

As my interest is not that of judging previous exegesis I need make no further comment on the question of the Categories except to re-emphasize my reasons for introducing it at all. The 'patchwork' theory and the reshuffling of the text that it recommends is of incalculable aid in untying seemingly inextricable knots that confront the student of the 'Transcendental Deduction'. The example I have chose clearly demonstrates this. We are now, give the internal evidence, able to perceive some sense in the juxtaposition of such apparently contradictory passages. However, we are no clearer about, nor have we gained any insight, into the problem which it is the purpose, after all, of these passages to discuss. Furthermore, any studious reading of the text reveals the uneasy relationship between such passages as those I have just referred to. After a single reading of the Critique it becomes sufficiently evident that here we will find no consistent set of doctrines. The 'patchwork' theory serves to remind us that the Critique is the product of an extended struggle between different sets of theories, often incommensurable theories which, moreover, continued in their
parallel development to influence Kant's writing. The problem then becomes that of detecting the effect of suppressed and supposedly rescinded theories - and here the 'patchwork' thesis offers refreshing counsel. Nonetheless, we do not therefore have the licence to discard the incriminated passages. To do so would be to lose more than what was bargained for. Sections (A88-A89); (B120-B122) for example, of the above analysis could not and should not be accorded lesser weight than those sections (A93-A94); (B125-B126) which reveal a more progressive doctrine. First of all, (I am carrying through the example to affirm my point) the text simply does not allow it; there is nothing in passages (A84-A92); (B117-B124) which provides evidence that Kant had taken up a newly found view regarding the pure concepts and their experience-relation. What is more, the entire section is cast in hypothetical form. Kant - and this is unusual for him - speaks in the subjunctive mood.

"Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be in accordance with the conditions of its unity. Everything might be in such confusion that, for instance, in the series of appearances nothing presented itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer to the concept of cause and effect. This concept would then be altogether empty, null, and meaningless. But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would nonetheless present objects to our intuition." (A90-A91) (B123)

It is evident that the simple logic of this argument is conditional in form. All the more reason for considering the content tentative in the mind of the author. Secondly, the flagrant contradictions were no doubt obvious to Kant but the fact that they were not excised from
the 'Second Edition' shows, it seems, that if they are taken as steps in a linear development their presence is justified, indeed, necessitated, in order to provide earnest readers with an honest portrayal of the itinerary of the concepts involved.

Finally, let me say that all of this will, I hope, serve to reflect my estimation of the bearing of the 'patchwork' theory upon the 'Transcendental Deduction' (A), especially the 'Subjective Deduction' contained therein. To this, at last, we may now turn.

(C) Subjective Deduction Proper (A98-A104)

The literature on the 'Subjective Deduction' is pregnant with assessments of the doctrine known polyonymously as Psychologism, Psychologism of Transcendental Idealism or, Subjectivism or again, Subjective/Dogmatic Idealism. Those with which I have some familiarity in one way or another seek to mitigate the force of the doctrine within an otherwise healthy body of transcendental metaphysics. It is worthwhile mentioning that almost all of the excisions performed on what I shall call Kant's Constitutive Epistemology has been carried out at the hands of representative of contemporary Anglo-Saxon epistemology. Since my aim is to be as brief yet as clear as possible, I will not pursue whatever disagreements I have with such of these that I have read save to express an overall sentiment. When Kant is at his best, when he is most insightful there is no thinker better able to bring together the complex web of disparate and seemingly unassociated factors into a necessary unity. But, as I have mentioned previously, Kant's conceptual apparatus and his linguistic repertoire are more often than not, pushed beyond the
limits of their capacity to capture truly the implications of this unity. Thus, the permanent corrigibility of the central doctrines. This is just the place for the Ango-Saxon philosophers, who, with their piecemeal concerns and analytic techniques, seek to discipline what must appear to them to be the unruly insight of Kant's vision. Nowhere is this figurative casting more evident than in the recent criticism of the psychologism of the 'Transcendental Deduction'. Yet, Kant's reconstructed view of the relation between the self and the world need not be interpreted within the narrow confines usually accorded it by this contemporary British contingency. They have understood this relationship as meaning that through the regulative processes of 'apperception' the non-observable but nonetheless 'abiding' I produces or manufactures its world; or, without the unity which the synthetic processes bring to our experience, nature would know and chaos. Accordingly, demolition was wholesale, however unsavoury. But how often has Kant repeated that intuition is given and experience is an admixture of the given and the spontaneous. The fact of the unity of our experience is explained ultimately along Kantian lines developed in the 'Subjective Deduction', by appeal to the fact of the unity of consciousness. In explicating the former in terms of the latter Kant, unwittingly perhaps, committed himself (and many others) to a host of absurdities. He imbued the understanding and the imagination with almost miraculous powers and it is absolutely essential that these powers not be blindly inherited in a reconstructed Kantian theory of the self. Paradoxically, we will have to kick away the scaffolding to improve our view from the top. First, the ascent.
The 'Subjective Deduction' is to be valued because it supplies the following aid to a strained theory of mental activity:

(1) In it we receive a glimpse of what Kant means by *syntheses*—the three processes described are clearly instances of empirical synthesis, also viewed as the consciousness-conditioning synthesis.

(2) Kant is forced, by means of the comparison of conflicting reports as to the nature of the faculty of imagination, to admit to the dual purpose of his account, the logical (transcendental) and the dynamical (psychological).

(3) By salvaging what is salvageable from the above and then collating the results of our analysis we can arrive at the beginnings of a theory of the self that, at least, coheres.

The 'Subjective Deduction' begins not with the mention of synthetic activity but with a reminder of the role played by time in human knowledge and experience. Time conditions the possibility of any representation whether it arises from outer (external objects) or inner (internal objects) intuition.

It is implied here through Kant's use of the term *a priori* that the non-empirical aspects of our experience, notably the Categories, must, insofar as they affect us, do so in a temporally ordered fashion.

When we ask why Kant prefaces the 'Subjective Deduction' with a remark about the nature of time that has been made on numerous occasions thus far in the Critique, we come up against a fundamental but generally unstated connection in Kant's thought. Time and the postulated activity of synthesis would seem to be the two indispensably necessary conditions of experience which are most unquestionable. This fact alone is not surprising; rather it is the relation in which these two indispensables stand to one another. Although both are viewed as
necessitating experience, the threefold activity of synthesis is made to condition our awareness of time. Thus Kant argues from a tautology of the form: "Everything which happens, happens in time.», to the conditions of this self-evident yet absolutely necessary fact of experience. Our awareness of time is not immediate; it is mediated by the ordering relation that exists amongst representations. It is therefore, a piece of derivative knowledge whose ground can be discerned by merely tracing this derivative aspect back to its source. Time is a given—a condition for any representation 'qua' representation for us—but as the form of its passive abode, inner sense, it has no active capacity whatsoever. Both the relations of its manifold, a priori or empirical, and consciousness of time rest upon the activity of synthesis. Until I perceived the subtlety of the connection between time and synthesis the fact of the unity of consciousness remained utterly inexplicable. Now, although still somewhat unconvincing, Kant's argument and its applicability to the concept of the self can be fruitfully extended.

The next seven paragraphs, although Kant never once seeks to reveal the importance of unity in human experience, contain the core of Kant's finest attempt to give a coherent explanation of the unity that we qua selves must presuppose at every moment and, let me emphasize, that qua selves we experience. The unity which is presupposed in our knowledge of experience, in all its forms, and the unity which we as existent beings experience in an infinity of ways, must be distinguished for they refer to two conflicting strains both of which were allowed to develop, each suppressed at different stages of Kant's work but each
always exercising an influence upon the outcome. The result of course, is that the discernment of Kant's own convictions, aside from his writings, has been left to his philosophical executors.

(1) Insofar as Kant gives an account of the presuppositions implicit in our know-of experience, 'unity', the apex of the pyramidal structure of these preconditions, is to be considered the concept amongst a complicated web comprising our conceptual background which most evidently bears the defining marks of objectivity, universality and necessity. Thus, the term 'unity' and its cognate expressions are referred to as 'transcendental' in their employment. This explanation of unity constitutes the transcendental ground of all knowledge. Furthermore, by disassociating permanently the concepts of 'transcendental' and 'synthesis' we can dismiss Kant's complete repertoire of transcendental activity referring terms and expressions such as occur at (A102): "transcendental act of the mind"; "transcendental faculty of imagination"; "transcendental synthesis of imagination" (101). What I am not however, dismissing, is Kant's conception of the active capacity of the intellect. We should not commit Kant's error of referring to the former when the latter only can be significant. In Kant's truly Critical doctrine of transcendentalism, the activities of a productive imagination are absent as well as the careless tendency to refer to acts and faculties as 'transcendental'.

(2) When we consider the fact that our experience is more than unconnected fragments of sensa and percepts, that we, that is, qua beings-in-the-world experience unity conceptually and corporeally, we begin to intimate that aspect of our experience which Kant struggles to express in his conception of a threefold synthesis. Kant's explanation of this unity is given in terms of the relationship between a threefold empirical synthesis and time. There are passages, which shall be pointed out, in which Kant talks as if each empirical synthesis were paralleled by a transcendental one. But it is clear from the text that 'Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition' and the 'Synthesis
of Reproduction in Imagination' concern data immediately given and previously given respectively. Furthermore, the examples chosen by Kant to illustrate the synthetic activities all involve empirical concepts familiarly used in everyday practice, such as 'counting' and customary acts of recognition (A101).

The re-interpretation that I offer preserves the transcendental nature of synthetic processes without thereby ascribing them to an inaccessible transcendental limbo. This involves, as I have been suggesting, frequent adjustments to Kant's cumbersome phraseology. The processes themselves, for which Kant is answerable, involve the empirical 'given'. However, these synthetic processes combined with time, order and combine the given by means of both a priori and empirical rules to bring about our consciousness of a conceptually unified experience; we cannot therefore be said to be fully aware of, although we are always performing, activities in which synthesis is involved. Thus, while synthetic processes are partially non-conscious we do have awareness of their presence in experience. The non-conscious factor has nothing to do with anything that might be regarded as transcendental apart from their epistemic treatment. It seems to me that Kant attempted to capture something of this non-conscious aspect of the synthetic processes by describing the second and most vital process as the 'Reproduction in Imagination'. That reproduction plays a key role in bringing about a unity of consciousness is witnessed by the fact of memory, an appropriate model for reproduction. There is nothing elusive or evasive about this aspect of mental capacity unlike the parallel case for what Kant in the second edition Deduction calls the 'Productive Imagination'. The only common ground
between these two notions is strictly nominal. I am however, completely ignoring the activity described by Kant as that of the productive imagination as treated in the Second Edition largely because Kant is there overly influenced by a distorting subjectivism. The difference between the reproductive and productive imaginations alone, intimates the different frameworks within which Kant was operating at the time each was written. (Incidentally, sections (98-A104), if the Kemp Smith-Vaihinger theory be accepted, were written "on the eve of the publication of the Critique").

I shall now present briefly the argument forwarded by Kant on behalf of the threefold synthesis before articulating what I believe can be reconstructed from it. First, the synthetic processes are introduced as conditioning time. Consider the experience of 'counting' from 1-8. In order for '8' to be comprehended as having followed upon the previous unit of the series, the complete series must be sustained simultaneously. Otherwise consciousness of '8' would be impossible—we would in fact be unable to distinguish '8' from '5' or '2053'. This, I take it, is Kant's meaning of the 'Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition':

"This act I name 'Synthesis of Apprehension', because it is directed immediately upon intuition which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which could never be represented as a manifold and as contained 'in a single representation', save in virtue of such a synthesis."

In order however, for the apprehension of the 'successive' character of the series '1-8' to be possible, each unit in the series must be reproduced when each new unit is reached. When '7' is reached, '6'
must be re-apprehended or reproduced as preceding '7'. Otherwise, '7' would merely be a symbol unconnected to the series.

"When I seek to draw a line in thought or think of the time from none noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representation (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained; none of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise." (A102)

The reproductive activity of synthesis would be deprived of all import if the unit '6' reproduced when '7' is reached were not identified as that '6' which was just previously thought. In other words, the mind must have a thorough understanding of the business at hand—we must know what we are about. If I could not recognize '6' as that '6' which was just counted, '7' would constitute an entirely unrelated—thus new—experience and the apprehension of the series 'qua' series would be abrogated at that point. Consciousness of number and of serial order would likewise never arise.

It is easily seen how these three conceptually distinct but commonly inseparable activities generate order and our consciousness of time. There need be nothing contrived or portentous about it, for Kant makes use of a fundamental and often ignored fact of experience, rule-governed activity. The reason we generate the specific order which is found in the series '1-8' is that we are simply following a rule, in this case the empirical concept of "counting to the number
'8'". If we wish to count, this is what must be done - generating a series of units which, ending with '8', forms a unity. Nor can there be any serious doubt that the successive activities of reproduction and recognition 'in a concept' generate our consciousness of unity. By following the concept of the number '8' both our consciousness of time, represented in the succession of units from '1-8' and the consciousness that the '8' we have arrived at is the synthesis of the previous seven units intuitively apprehended and reproduced, arises:

"If, in counting, I forget that the units, which now hover before me have been added to one another in succession, I should never know that a total is being produced through the successive addition of unit to unit, and so would remain ignorant of the number. For the concept of the number is nothing but the consciousness of this unity of synthesis.

The word 'concept' might of itself suggest this remark. For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation." (A103)

(D) Transcendental or Noumenal?

It should be evident that neither consciousness of objects nor self consciousness constitute ultimate conditions for the possibility of any experience whatsoever. Rather, they mutually condition one another and can be said to condition the possibility of appearances. The real problem providing an explanation of the unity that both consciousness of objects and self consciousness manifestly exercise. This is, so I have argued, what Kant unwittingly describes in this way; 'the transcendental unity of apperception; and the 'objective unity of self-consciousness'. After disentangling Kant's though from the logico-dynamico confusion, sorting out the
truly transcendental—a purely epistemic category—from the psychological, which contains the core of the meaning of the activity of synthesis (for Kant), the meanings of the terms 'transcendental', 'synthetic unity', 'synthesis', become significantly altered and capable of fruitful analysis. This does not mean that there is nothing that bespeaks of darkness but it is, to speak figuratively, not that darkness which J.N. Findlay has said, "has brought Primal Night back into philosophy." It is foolhardy to expect from Kant's concept of experience an explanation of the unity-conferring capacity of the mind that at the same time falls within the bounds of that experience. This does not imply that the 'bounds of sense' are thereby trespassed. That this unity cannot be explicated in terms of simply conscious activity is a demand of the tacit principle of consistency. The sources of this unity lie outside of consciousness. Thus, I have insisted all along, any explanation of the unity of consciousness is 'de facto' transcendental since it conditions the necessary and universal yet incorrigible facts of consciousness and time. From whence then come synthetic processes? Granted their empirical effects and presence—this is certainly not their source. The appeal is to noumenal conditions. The activity of synthesis must be assumed to be essentially noumenal. Kant's description of its activity is modelled after normal mental activity and in order to remain faithful to this model he posits a correlate subject of this activity equal to the task—the transcendental ego. But the transcendental ego is merely a categorial function in Kant's extensive epistemology. The real culprit here is the noumenal self,
unintuitable despite the splendour of its indispensable role (it is however, indirectly knowable, as I claim in the next section).

If at this point, we were to take Kant at his word, our analysis would grind to a halt, for although the synthetic processes ascribed to the noumenal realm fit comfortably into Kant's model of mental activity they conflict outrightly with every major tenet of Kant's critical teaching, especially this principle; that all knowledge is knowledge of nature, that is of appearances. Although we can, by inference from normal mental activity, describe the operations of the synthetic processes, their real nature must always be concealed from us. Any analysis that therefore views experience as terminating in 'the objects of the horizon' would have to be overturned. Yet it is not unKantian to hold, what our analysis leaves us holding, that just such a position can be, not only intelligible but useful in broaching the problem of the nature of the self. We must now attend to the demands of these two criteria-intelligibility and explanation.

(5) The Rudiments of Reconstruction

In (A108) Kant introduces a crucial statement of identity: "The self which combines distinct representations to produce an object comprehensible to any self which is rational must know itself as the being which performs this act of synthesis at every stage of its activity." Kant characterizes this aspect of mental activity:

"The identity of function whereby it ((the mind)) synthetically combines it ((the manifold)) in one knowledge."

The 'identity of function' is however indistinguishable from the
'identity of the self' to which are assigned temporal predicates; for in the sentence immediately following the aforementioned, Kant no longer speaks of the 'identity of function' but of 'the identity of the self'. Consciousness of self is said to be nothing but consciousness of the "unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts...". I have quoted the entire passage below as it is essential to the theory of the self that is implicit in Kant's work:

(A108) "The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to concepts, that is, according to rules which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected. For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it sub-ordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules."

It will be recalled that earlier in this essay I termed Kant's epistemology 'constitutive' and I suggested that the analysis of Chapter 1 might lead us to the hypothesis that there was an as yet, unexplored relationship between the way in which the self, 'qua' subject of its experiences comes to recognize (know) its world and the way in which the self 'qua' agent (of its world) constructs (constitutes) its world. I realize that this phraseology is no more acceptable than Kant's overly metaphorical language, nonetheless it does serve to communicate the germ of what is
an essential part of Kant's theory. The passage quoted above en-
courages us more than anywhere else in the Critique, to draw just
this conclusion. Moreover it seems to me, that only a minimal
degree of interpretation is required-Kant's own words strongly suggest
some such view.

Basic to Kant's discussion of his numerous selves is the
relation between the agent or subject and its activity and experience.
That is, Kant maintains throughout that there is a reciprocating
relation between these two, more generally, between the knower and
his world. In fact, it is along these lines that the neo-Kantians
and Hegel for that matter sought to develop their respective brands
of Idealism. Nor should this have been unexpected. Obviously,
Kant is acutely aware of the determining role of the activity
(spontaneity) of the subject. Indeed, many philosophers have con-
strued Kant as saying that it is through our original activity as
subjects that we actually make the world and its objects. In other
words, we come to know ourselves as we discover our world. Un-
fortunately, they have forgotten, at the same time, that Kant in-
terpreted this in a uniquely Kantian fashion. Because we can never
know ourselves by directly intuiting ourselves as we are 'in-our-
selves' there must be some indirect route to self-knowledge. And
that route is just the world of objects in which we are able to dis-
cover ourselves as manifestations of the way we are 'in-ourselves'
without the aid of course, of direct intuition of the 'in-itself'.
In other words, we come to know ourselves by generating our experience.
This it seems, is just the position that Kant is hinting at in this
passage. The two consciousness, (1) self-identity (that I am I-self knowledge) and (2) metaphorically bringing together (literally, discovering) the world by means of synthesis according to rules, become one and the same consciousness. I can only come to know myself as this person and not that person by constructing the world by means of synthesis of reproduction in imagination in accordance with formal categories and circumstantial rules, in the one way that will make both the world and myself knowable to me, namely, as a series of sensible and coherent appearances. In this sense then, we do come to know ourselves by making our world. Kant says:

"For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act..."

A necessary condition for self-knowledge is knowledge of my self-activity, which is just to say that my being as subject (noumenal self) is inexorably tied to my activity as agent (moral self) and the only way to discover this relation is mediately, by means of the empirical self. After all, the empirical self is the self as known.

My proposal to view original apperception as contingently related to the primordial (primal, basal) activity of synthesis stands in need of more defense and I think the following passage supplies it:

(A111-112) "In original apperception everything must necessarily conform to the conditions of the thorough going unity of self-consciousness, that is, to the universal functions of synthesis, namely, of that synthesis according to concepts in which alone apperception can demonstrate a priori its complete and necessary identity. Thus the concept of a cause is nothing but a synthesis (of that which follows in the time series with other appearances) according to concepts;
and without which such unity, which has its a priori rule, and which subjects the appearances to itself, no thoroughgoing, universal and therefore necessary, unity of consciousness would be met with in the manifold of perceptions."

Kant is saying something here about objectivity which bears directly on our main point and upon which I shall comment. The thrust of the passage however, is the confirmation that the unity of self-consciousness and therefore the unity of apperception rely on the synthetic processes here stated in their universality, i.e. as functioning by means of the categories, the most a priori rules (concepts) of synthesis. Thus, it is by means of the categories in general (quantity) and empirical concepts in particular (number) that all the contents of consciousness are bound up in a unity.18

Kant's remarks here on objectivity, to the effects that the contents of consciousness 'obtain' the status of objective reality by being brought into necessary connection with one another are to say the least, conspicuous. Here we witness Kant falling back on his pre-Critical psychologistic doctrine of 'transcendental synthesis' to explain objectivity. I have deliberately ignored this entire issue but the fact that Kant gives up the transcendental synthesis argument in defense of 'objective reality' and replaces it with the brilliant argument of the 'Second Analogy' augurs will for my contention that the terms 'transcendental' and 'synthesis' do not belong together in Kant's theory of the self.
Part II: The Concept of Reason (Rational Self)

As Activity

In this second part my aim, once again, is to be as brief and concise as I can possibly be, although this is no light task when the available body of literature looms up before one's eyes. I shall be least of all concerned with Kant's moral philosophy 'per se' but avidly interested in what Kant thought were the conditions for the possibility of a real morality. Appropriately then, I have chosen to limit my textual sources to the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. This work, moreso than the Critique of Practical Reason provides wholesome remarks on the concept of 'freedom', 'the will', 'willing', 'rational agency' and 'autonomy', all of which are germinal to any concept of the self, be it Kantian or otherwise.

Chapter I: Beginnings of an Idea of the Moral Self-in the Foundations

1. The Obliquity of the Moral Self

The Foundations can adequately be viewed as the first testing grounds for the elaborate structure of human reason expounded in the Critique. The onus is on the Foundations, published three years before the Critique of Practical Reason, to allocate smoothly the
respective functions to pure and practical reason and yet, demonstrate that speculative and practical reason are in fact, nothing more than two aspects of the one only possible reason. Kant himself assigns this task to the work:

"As a preliminary to a metaphysics of morals which I intend some day to publish, I issue these Foundations. There is, to be sure, no other foundation for such a metaphysics than a critical examination of a pure practical reason, just as there is no other foundation for metaphysics than the already published critical examination of pure speculative reason. But, in the first place, a critical examination of pure practical reason is not of such extreme importance as that of speculative reason, because human reason, even in the commonest mind, can easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and completeness in moral matters, while, on the other hand, in its theoretical but pure use it is entirely dialectical. In the second place, I require of a critical examination of a pure practical reason, if it is to be complete, that its unity with the speculative be subject to presentation under a common principle, because in the final analysis there can be but one and the same reason which must be differentiated only in application. But I could not bring this to such a completeness without bringing in observations of an altogether different kind and without thereby confusing the reader. For these reasons I have employed the title, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, instead of Critique of Practical Reason." (Preface, Foundations, Pp. 8-9)

It might seem from this passage that the burden of reconciliation falls to the second Critique but the arguments there proffered in sections 1-3, chapter II of the 'Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason' are of meagre import when compared with the arguments of the 'Third Antinomy' of the first Critique and the second and third sections of the Foundations. I shall of course, appeal occasionally to the second Critique but there seems little evidence that this work marks any considerable advance on its earlier counterpart in those problem-regions common to both.
The problem for Kant's theory of the self may be characterized in terms of the relations amongst the three selves that dominate the *Critique*. The problem is this: If the transcendental unity of apperception is taken to be, at least functionally, identical with the transcendental ego then either it must be the case that we are all as empirical selves distinct phenomenal expressions of the one universal real self; or, each empirical self has its own correlate transcendental ego. The first interpretation reduces Kant's theory to some kind of mysticism and is so incongruous with his actual teaching as not to deserve the slightest attention. The alternative has at least the merit, however negative, of revealing Kant's failure to think out the consequences of his theory of intellectual capacity, for on this account, we are left with the one identical world despite the separate activities of individuated transcendental egos. Furthermore, it is seriously damaging to the possibility of consistent relations existing amongst the various selves if we consider how more than one transcendental ego can be posited; for after all, person 'A' as transcendental ego maintains a world order consisting of appearances, a condition which demands the exclusion of any other rational being, for such a being escapes the causal laws in accordance with which the objective world is ordered. There is no room for more than one conscious mind. This theory simply will not do in this form. It is along the lines sketched out in the last chapter that a reconstruction can be founded.

Yet, even this does not represent the full force of the difficulty when an attempt is made to amalgamate the selves of the
Critical philosophy. For we have yet to consider the moral self.
Generally, the very possibility of human agency, that is, of action
for which an individual or group may be held accountable because
they can be assumed to have acted freely and without constraint,
generates for reason an antinomic relation between its two applica-
tions, theoretical and practical. Corresponding to the sides of this
antinomy are the self qua empirical and the self qua moral. Kant
employs the distinction between the phenomenal self and the noumenal
self in proposing a resolution of this famously known 'Third Anti-
nomy'. I am qua phenomenon subject to the causal laws of all of
nature, which all bodies demonstrate - thus, I am merely a body
amongst bodies. More important to Kant's ethical foundations, qua
phenomenon I am a pulsating flow of sensory activity and feeling,
displaying an emotional behaviour which, predictable or not, conforms
to a general causal sequence. I am a sensuous and passionate creature
whose behaviour is completely and causally determined. Here is
Kant speaking on behalf of empirical man, the anthropological
phenomenon:

(A550- "... and if we could exhaustively investigate all
B578) the appearances of men's wills there would not be
found a single human action which we could not predict
with certainty, and recognize as proceeding necess-
arily from its antecedent conditions. So far, then,
as regards its empirical character there is no
freedom; and yet it is only in the light of this
character that man can be studied - if, that is to
say, we are simply observing, and in the manner of
anthropology seeking to institute a physiological
investigation into the motive causes of his actions."

Yet, as noumenal self, I am rational, free and capable, as agent,
of deliberate action, action that I decide to commit often only
after painstaking cogitation. From the standpoint of an observer, someone who perhaps knows me well and is familiar with my weaknesses and strengths, my action in a given instance may be predictable. A behaviouralist may even wish to adduce evidence linking my past behaviour with the present, weighing various conditions all to show that, given the proper environment, I can only act in this way.

He may go so far as to suggest that it was inevitable that in this particular case I should act in this way, perhaps claiming that the whole history of mankind was the sublimated and sole determinant of my behaviour. All of this, Kant retorts, has no effect on the practical decision which only I can make; the rational, moral agent. Knowledge that I shall act in such and such a way is applicable only in so far as I am phenomenon. How does Kant even try to fight his way out of this dilemma? Without now referring to the 'Third Antinomy' of the Critique let us turn to an examination of the relevant sections in the ethical treatises.

2. The Argument of the Foundations

In the first section of the Foundations Kant presents what he believes to be the ordinary but rational conception of morality. His purpose is to argue from such basic, unquestioned moral beliefs to the highest most supreme principle of morality, all the while claiming that such a principle is implicit in the moral beliefs of everyone as the later philosophical explication will show (Section 2 - 'Transition from the Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysics of Morals'). Since I am not interested in Kant's moral philosophy 'per se', I shall not question Kant's moral convictions about the
common moral consciousness from which arises his conception of duty and obligation. Kant's argument culminates in the formulation of the categorical imperative, which he must go on to prove is unconditionally and universally valid for all rational creatures.

The argument is valuable for our purposes because it establishes the relation between the two germinal concepts of will and reason. I have analyzed the argument into six rather composite propositions, none of which stand in any sort of logical relation to the others (399-401) 19-20.

(a) **First Section: Popular Moral Philosophy**

(i) The only thing which is unconditionally good is a **good will**. (393) 11.

(ii) The good will is good because of its own activity of willing, i.e. of itself rather than on account of its capacity for realizing an objective or set of ends. (394) 12.

(iii) The proper function of reason **qua** practical reason is to produce a will good in itself - a will which is the highest unconditional good, the condition for all other good motives or objectives, i.e. desire for happiness. The concept of such a will is, Kant claims, part of the ordinary moral consciousness of persons. (393) 14-15.

(iv) A good will is exemplified in action **from duty or for the sake of duty** rather than in accordance with duty or because of an inclination towards a specific end. (397-398) 16-18. "It is better that a man be beneficent not from inclination, that is, because he has a warm and sympathetic disposition
but from duty - even though he have a cold and indifferent temperament."

(v) Three propositions of common morality:

(a) In order to be morally worthy action must be done from duty.

(b) An action done from duty derives its moral worth not from the end which is to be brought about through it; rather, in the maxim which determines it, that is, the principle of volition. Ends are indifferent to the agent who acts from duty. Thus, such a will must be moved to action, if not by any material end, by the formal principle of volition.

(c) Duty is action necessitated by respect for the law. Nothing can determine a will which acts from a sense of duty except (objectively) the law and (subjectively) respect for the law. Since desire or inclination can never be the determining ground for morally worthy action, there remains only one's conception of the law to determine the will.

(vi) Conclusion: Only a will which can act from a conception of the law is an unconditionally good will. But only a rational being can conceive of the law as such, therefore, only the will of a rational being can be an unconditionally good will, that is, only rational beings can be moral.

Kant rightly asks what such a law must be that can determine a will on its own. It is: that universal conformity to the law as such be the guiding principle of the will. "(I should never) ... act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law." (401-402) 20-21

Kant's argument here unfortunately obfuscates the indispensable nexus between the concept of a good will and the possibility of morally worthy action. To begin with, by 'good will' Kant means a will which is unconditionally good, good in all circumstances
and situations; or more accurately, in spite of circumstances. In other words, only that individual whose actions are determined not by impulse or desire but by conception of what would be right or wrong for any rational creature in circumstances identical to the given one, can be an estimable moral agent. The enthymeme here is that it is possible for any individual to be moved solely by such a conception, in other words, by reason alone. If it is possible, which Kant attempts to prove in the sections that follow, then morality itself becomes possible. Kant, of course, in this first section simply assumes that it is possible for rational beings to be moved by such concepts. We shall await Kant's own confrontation with this assumption before examining it ourselves. Granted this assumption 'pro tem' duty, described as 'action necessitated by respect for the law', becomes the obligation which any rational creature stands under to be moved not by inclination or desire, but by the conception of the law.

The Kantian notion of duty, although common-place in itself, can be appealed to in articulating the reason-will relation. Action done in conformity with duty must have as its motive duty itself if it is to be worthy or moral esteem. Action done in conformity with duty but whose motive is the desire to live up to one's duty is thereby not a morally worthy act. This of course, does not mean that the action is immoral but simply that it makes no sense to hold a person responsible for any action based upon inclination (the desire to do one's duty) since such an act is merely an event in a causal series. Now, according to Kant's theory of knowledge in the Critique,
all phenomenal events are temporally located occurrences and as such are governed by causal laws. States of the empirical self are viewed as determined by an antecedent causal series. This is to say that human behaviour is to treated like any other phenomenal event that is causally determined, such events follow necessarily from preceding events or states. All of nature demonstrates this universal causal pattern and instances of behaviour, human or otherwise, are no different than any other natural event on this account.

Thus, Kant is forced by his doctrine of psychological determinism to view action whose motive is some inclination or desire as causally determined behaviour. Now the full force of Kant's difficulty should become apparent. By Kant's own admission, action done for the sake of duty itself is categorically different from action motivated by desire or a set of specific ends. One way of characterizing the difference is to say that the two kinds of action are committed for different sorts of reasons, the one, for the sake of duty, the other, to fulfill an unsatisfied desire. The latter sort of action, as we have shown, are subject to Kant's theory of causal determinism. But as appearances constitute the terrain of empirical knowledge in Kant's epistemology, anything transgressing this limit can never be an object of knowledge. Action done for the sake of duty, if it is to be morally worthy, must fall outside this limit in order to escape the universal law of causality and thereby allow of being conceived as a responsible act - an act attributable to human agency. But is this be the case,
then by the demands of Kant's own epistemology there is absolutely no way that such action can be discerned as such. Thus, Kant's dilemma. Either we admit to the possibility of action carried out in accordance with a causality different than that of natural causality or we admit to action that is completely free from any sort of causal law whatsoever (Kant, in fact, does talk of a 'free causality'). This produces two troublesome implications. First, the supposed universality of the causal law becomes tendentious. Even more problematic than this, acts which are really moral-done for the sake of duty - escape empirical verification, for we have no way of distinguishing with certainty an act committed for the sake of duty from an act based upon inclination.

"It is in fact absolutely impossible by experience to discern with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, however much it may conform to duty, rested solely on moral grounds and on the conception of one's duty. It sometimes happens that in the most searching self-examination we can find nothing except the moral ground of duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that good action or such great sacrifice. But from this we cannot by any means conclude with certainty that a secret impulse of self-love, falsely appearing as the idea of duty, was not actually the true determining cause of the will ... even the strictest examination can never lead us entirely behind the secret incentives, for, when moral worth is in question, it is not a matter of actions which one sees but of their inner principles which one does not see." (406-407) 27

The alternative is even less attractive; we can simply deny the possibility of the kind of moral action that contravenes natural law.

Although Kant characterizes the problem as generated by
reason itself it is plain that the whole difficulty presents itself in the first place because the person is the only being who is not only rational but unique in a second more important way, that is, the person is a will which must somehow relate to a potent and sensuous counterpart in its nature. Kant's model has the person struggling to suppress his impulsive sensuous nature in order that he might obey the unceasingly demanding reason. The possibility of morally worth action depends on how successful this 'willing' is in procuring the power of reason to assert itself in the face of flow of involuntary sensuous impulses. Kant's attempt at a solution of this lies in ingeniously bringing together the concepts of reason and will to produce, in turn, the concept of the self involving free and autonomous action. The question becomes: "How can pure reason be practical?" However, it is yet premature to comment on this programme of Kant's.

(b) The Moral Law

I am obliged to include a brief discussion of the moral law as it is formulated in the first section not only because the whole previous argument of 'Section I' is supposed to lead up to it but even more important, is Kant's conviction, supported by a number of arguments, that the validity of the categorical imperative is inextricably bound up with the fact that humans are rational beings. As is the habit with Kant, long awaited arguments on crucial points are compressed into a few brief and obscure passages. The short paragraph now before us (402) is just such a passage. It contains Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative, that law, whose
conception is capable of bringing about a certain action (determining the 'will'). The law as stated here in non-imperative form is:

"I should never act in such a way that I could not always will that my maxim should be a universal law."

Before examining this first expression of the moral law, we should look closely at the four lines containing the germ of Kant's argument here:

"Since I have robbed the will of all impulses that could come to it from obedience to any law, nothing remains to serve as the principle of the will except the universal conformity of its action to law as such."

'Robbed the will of all impulses'. This phrase poses a particular problem. Why, one asks, should any individual choose to act if all material incentive has been withdrawn? Or, even more forceful, how are we to conceive of the possibility of human action whose motive borrows nothing from the material conditions which the self qua phenomenon exists in? Kant, in attempting to capture the criterion of universality for the categorical imperative, has in what is perhaps a hurried and badly drawn up draught of an argument, forgotten that any action no matter how pure a motive it may have, is tied necessarily to some empirical condition. After all, this is one of the defining marks of an act! Let us suppose that person X is that rare individual who, in all his actions, holds the good as his objective and in carrying out any particular action his sole guiding principle is the categorical imperative; that is, he examines his proposed course of action to determine if such behaviour could be consistently carried out by any and every rational being in just such circumstances. Supposedly, this test satisfies the univer-
sality criterion. Notice however, that the universality criterion does not imply abstraction from all empirical conditions, in fact, just the opposite is the case. Circumstances remain constant and are applied to every individual qua rational being by means of the universality test - the test for the consistency of the maxim upon which a particular mode of behaviour is based. But this, unfortunately, is not what Kant says. His argument holds that the desires and inclinations of a particular self could never constitute good reason for acting - the only good reasons for acting are those reasons which are good reasons for all persons qua rational agents. Now, while the categorical imperative may certainly be a guiding principle for action in so far as it can be used as a test for the validity of maxims, it could never be the only condition for action because in the absence of desires or a set of specific ends, it can never alone supply sufficient incentive for action. Kant's mistake therefore lies in confusing reasons for acting with the validity of maxims. However, the confusion has the single merit of revealing the past struggle, already underway in the Foundations, between the noumenal aspect of the person and the phenomenal. If we were only noumenal selves there would be no problem whatsoever of following the categorical imperative, in fact, qua perfectly rational agents it would be the only determinant of action since there would exist no sensuous element to conflict with it. This conception of the dual self seems to be the only feasible excuse for this first untidy formulation of the moral law.

The statement of the moral law is straightforward with the
exception of the phrase, 'that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law'. What it means to 'will' a law we shall try to discover when we approach the full-blown discussion of Kant's conception of 'will'. This we shall do in the next section.

The 'Second Section' of the Foundations is at once the most dense and the most important of that work. In it we find Kant's definition and treatment of the will; his theory of rational agency and what in fact turns out to be the only treatment of the concept of freedom that we are to get from Kant in this work. Although 'Section III' is supposed to deal with freedom, the discussion there is actually redundant for it leans heavily upon the notion of rational agency developed in 'Section II'.

I must once again issue the reminder that my analysis of the Foundations is not to be construed as a commentary upon indiscriminately selected portions of the work. I have extracted from the Foundations those passages which contain Kant's attempt to work out his conception of a noumenally conditioned moral self while at the same time holding on to the major tenets of the epistemological structure of the Critique. This attempt reaches its climax in 'Section II' but that is not to say that those parts of 'Section II' and 'Section III' which I do not discuss are not important to Kant's moral philosophy on the whole. It is important to realize this at the outset for the thesis of 'Section II', virtually identical with that of 'Section I', to prove that the categorical imperative is valid for all rational agents, is argued for within sections (412-421); comprising a mere one-third or one-quarter of the whole of
'Section II'. As it is, I am at pains to resist the temptation to consider some of the arguments contained in these two sections, such as the ultimate formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant's exhilarating conception of man as the only end-in-itself and of the community of persons as forming the Kingdom of Ends. But these doctrines are not pertinent to our thesis - especially to one that is already too lengthy.

This then, is my proposal. I shall begin by discussing Kant's conception of the nature of the will. Then, comes a discussion of the concept of the causality of reason. Within the context of Kant's treatment of noumenal causality will be included an analysis of rational agency. What plagues Kant's theory of causality is actually endemic to a number of other issues taken up here; especially noteworthy is the relation between reason and desire. Both of these conundrums are circumscribed by the ominous phenomena-noumena distinction, although Kant could never admit to its influence. I shall have something to say about autonomy and freedom as treated in 'Section III' but this chapter adds very little to the core of the argument of the Foundations; it does not advance any new arguments on behalf of practical reason. Kant himself admits as much.

(c) Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysics of Morals

Once again, I have for the sake of clarity, divided this chapter into a number of propositions expressing the order of the argument. This is merely an indication of the sequence of the arguments al-
though it is also a very curt summary of their individual content.

(I) Definition of 'will' and 'imperative' and the discussion of the difference between a 'good will', like man's and a 'holy will' like God's. (412-413) 33-35

(II) A discussion of the nature of imperatives and the degrees of command an imperative might have, hypothetical and categorical. There are two sorts of hypothetical imperatives, rules of skill and counsels of prudence but only one kind of categorical imperative-commands of morality. (414-417) 35-39

(III) Kant finally faces the problem of how imperatives are possible. The real problem of course, being the demonstration of the validity of the categorical imperative to rational agents. (417-420) 30-43

(IV) The actual derivation of the categorical imperative. (420-421) 43-44

(V) The remainder of the chapter consists of examples of and elaboration upon the categorical imperative as derived in (IV). In the process, Kant derives a number of alternate formulae of the categorical imperative:

(1) The formula of the Law of Nature
(2) The formula of humanity as end-in-itself.
(3) The formula of autonomy. (We shall be specifically concerned with this).
(4) The formula of the Kingdom of Ends, a community of self-legislators, i.e. autonomous.

What remains in (436-448):
(1) A summary of the argument of the chapter.
(2) A statement of the autonomy of the will whose defense is postponed supposedly until the next section.
(3) A discussion of the root problem of all traditional moral theories, e.g. Utilitarianism, namely, that they all assume a will which is heteronomous.

None of these pose any noteworthy problem nor do they provide us with any further arguments.
Chapter II: Reason and the Will

1. The Concept of the Will

The passages occurring between (412-421) as I have already indicated, are the most important in the Foundations. Accordingly, they will receive due consideration.

As in 'Section I', Kant here begins his argument on behalf of the categorical imperative with a discussion of the concept of the will. Only now we receive a definition, though sparse, marking a considerable advance on 'Section I'.

(412) "Everything in nature works according to laws.

The opening section of the argument proper seems to serve the express purpose of reminding the reader familiar with the Critique of one of the fundamental doctrines there developed, that everything in nature happens in accordance with laws. One sort of law, a law without which it would be impossible to conceive of any event as happening, is the causal law. The validity of this universal law of nature was proven in the 'Second Analogy'. It is by means of this law that all phenomena stand in relation with one another, without it order amongst events, both mental and physical, would be inconceivable for rational beings. Will is defined as the capacity, peculiar to rational beings, "of acting according to the conception of laws", i.e. according to principles. (412) 34

First of all, the will is related directly to action carried out
in accordance with a rational being's idea of the law. What now is the nature of this relation between will, action and rational being? There are two clues. It is in virtue of the will that a rational being is capable of law governed action at all-the key here is the term 'capacity'. We can carry this yet further, for when we say that it is by means of the will that such action is possible, this can only mean that the will in, as yet, some obscure sense, brings about action which is carried out solely because of the rational being's idea of the law. The notoriously neutral phrase, 'according to', actually gives this causal relationship away. At any rate, this interpretation is confirmed when, at the beginning of 'Section III', Kant characterizes the will as the "kind of causality of living beings in so far as they are rational." (440) If it is by means of the will that law-governed action is possible for rational beings it must not be thought that the 'law' here is identical to the law or set of laws governing, say, the motion of bodies in space. As a temporal-spatial object, the body which belongs to and is manifested by the empirical self obeys the same set of objective laws. Thus, from the standpoint of an observer the individual exhibits a certain kind of behaviour which can be predicted by a set of principles and laws, either those of the psychologist or the physicist. Such behaviour, whether predictable or not, exhibits its own particular brand of rule-governed activity and as part of the spatial-temporal domain must follow the same laws overseeing all phenomena-especially the causal law. This sort of law-governed behaviour is not what Kant means when he states that rational beings
can act in accordance with their conception of the law. The laws which are objectively valid for persons \textit{qua} rational beings cannot be the laws applicable to phenomena, for reasons we have seen; action in accordance with the latter could never be morally estimable. The laws demonstrated by the objects and events in the phenomenal world do not satisfy the single criterion of moral worth, that duty be the sole motive of action.

The will then, is conceived as affecting the agent in such a way that he/she is thereby enabled to act lawfully. How it affects the agent becomes clear if we simply attend to Kant's opening sentence of 'Section III':

"Will is a kind of causality of living begins in so far as they are rational."

Here is a rephrasing for our purposes without altering Kant's meaning:

"If living beings are rational then will is a king of causality for them."

The will affects the agent through reason; or it is the efficacy of reason that determines the action. Thus, there is a causal relation between reason and action in which, plainly, 'willing' is viewed as the causality of reason. Conjoining this reshuffled definition of the will with that given at the beginning of 'Section II' we get:

"Willing is the causality of reason through which all rational beings are determined to act in accordance with the idea of laws."

It is best that we reduce this proposition to its simplest and least deceiving form by revealing the term 'will' and its cognate express-
ions for what they are. To have a will is simply to be capable of being determined by reason alone. Plainly, we must now scrut-
inize Kant's conception of this newly-found causality, the causal-
ity of reason, if we are to continue with our analysis of the con-
ception of will.

2. The Causality of Reason

The above analysis gives us a more adequate understanding of the concept of will because it removes the misleading character-
erization of will as a faculty which is the seat of voluntary action and replaces it with the concept of 'willing' which is an integral part of reason. If Kant were merely suggesting that rational beings are unique in that they are endowed with a capacity for volition, there would hardly be anything worth troubling about in his succeeding use of the concept. But Kant is saying much more than this. The uniqueness of 'willing' of rational agents is really found in the fact that their actions are caused by reason, that is, by the conception of laws or principles, or simply by thought. Thus, to say of a rational being that it has a will, is to state that such a being can be moved to act by forming an idea which is to be realized in action, or in Kant's terminology of the Critique, by having a representation of the end to be realized in action. In other words, Kant is arguing that the occurrence of a representation of some particular end to be realized in the mind of the empirical ego is all that is needed to bring about an act. Strictly speaking, it is not all that is needed, for laws and/or principles must connect my proposed course of action to the end, for this connection is itself
in the process of taking an intuition, bringing it to concepts, synthesizing these on various levels, to produce a meaningful judgement. One of the concepts employed by Kant is called a 'representation'. It has the advantage over cognate expressions such as 'idea' in that its very name indicates its function, namely, to represent. Now the very nature of 'representing' implies that what is representing is numerically different from what is represented. Thus, my representation of 'a bay colt in Lincoln Fields' points to or, more familiarly, refers to the objects denoted by the term 'colt' and the proper name 'Lincoln Fields' are of themselves unable to bear meaning. Likewise, the occurrence of a mental event consisting of a bay colt galloping in Lincoln Fields is forever barren of meaning. It is my thought of the bay colt galloping in Lincoln Fields, that is, my representation of this event that is the vehicle of meaning. Let me apply this distinction to the example of the cold beer. What moves me to go to the refrigerator and take out a cold beer that will satisfy my desire is simply the thought of the cold beer. The occurrence of the piece of knowledge that my refrigerator contains a bottle of beer which in turn, I know will satisfy my thirst, is a causally connected mental event but it is not what causes me to rise from my chair and walk to the refrigerator. It is the representation 'cold beer' 'qua' content of consciousness that moves me and it moves me as an end which I have adopted. How the thought of the cold beer can move me is the one most important problem in the Foundations. It is a problem for philosophy itself but one which is acutely felt by Kant given his
theory of knowledge, some of which we have noted in this connection in the Critique. For rational beings, cognizing is merely the having of meaning-bearing contents of consciousness, namely, representations whose function it is qua content of consciousness to refer to something beyond themselves. When Kant states that only rational beings can act in accordance with the conception of laws or principles it is to this cognitive process that he refers. As meaning-bearing contents of consciousness the distinctive trait of thoughts qua representations is their atemporality. Thoughts qua mental events are phenomenal events occurring in the minds of empirical selves no different than other events. As such, they are temporally located, which means, amongst other meanings, that there is some thought which precedes and follows each of them. Such is not the case with thoughts qua contents of consciousness which represent. To put the matter as simply as possible, it is the meaning that the occurrence of the mental event 'cold beer' has for me that moves me to act. But qua meaningful content of consciousness the thought 'cold beer' is not temporally situated. Kant's difficulty arises when he formulates the possibility of action based on reason in terms of an antithesis between temporally located effects and an atemporal cause.

As was the case with our analysis of the unity - conferring synthetic activity of theoretical reason, we are once again pushing Kant's theory of cognition to its limit when applied to practical reason.

I have given the above analysis of Kant's concept of the
causality of reason in the hope that it would make Kant's case for the efficacy of reason in its practical aspect more defensible because more sensible. The analysis borrows from the common-place distinction between thoughts as mental contents unto themselves and thoughts as intentional contents of consciousness capable of referring to something other than themselves. It is plain that if Kant's concept of practical reason, which he now states as simply theoretical reason in so far as it moves a rational being to action, is to make any sense at all, it is in terms of the intentional function of the contents of consciousness that the relation between reason (will) and action must be viewed.

To conclude on the causality of the will of a rational being: To have a will is to be capable of being determined to act directly by reason. We can account for the efficacy of reason by considering thoughts as intentional elements of consciousness. Practical reason thus becomes possible only in a being which has a will because as Kant states, 'to have a will is to be a being for whom reason can be practical:"

"...will is nothing else than practical reason."
(412) 34

3. The Possibility of Morally Certifiable Action

Once again, recall Kant's statement that only a rational being has a capacity of acting according to a conception of laws, i.e., according to principles. We are now in a position to expand on this proposition. We can specify the way in which reason effects
us. To be affected by reason means to conceive of laws (or what is simply the conception of the law), that is, to be moved by one's understanding of a principle. Now, according to Kant's theory of morality, part of which we have seen in this section, true moral action is that action whose motive is the universal moral law—the categorical imperative. Thus, the thought of the moral law, Kant claims, is a sufficient condition for action. Given our analysis, it is the meaning or sense of the moral law 'qua' content of consciousness which is the thought that constitutes the reason for acting.

As was forecasted at the beginning of this chapter, no certifiable instances of action brought about by a thought or representation **qua** content of consciousness can ever be produced. Viewed as a series of causally related mental occurrences, as Kant's theory of psychological determinism of the *Critique* demands, there is no problem of enumerating such instances, but of course, what is thereby verified bears no cognitive significance, that is, it lacks intentionality, and therefore sense and meaning. The problem, specifically for Kant's moral theory, is to show that a person chooses to act because of, or for the reason of, the categorical imperative and furthermore, that that person at least believed that such a choice was connected to the end to be realized. It is obvious that no amount of scrutiny of mental occurrences can supply this sort of evidence!

How does Kant come to grips with this problem? The truth of the matter, it must be admitted, is that he doesn't and never
did. Whether or not he was aware of how the problem had penetrated all of his work on moral philosophy is unknown. However, it is difficult to believe that Kant could ever have been aware of the numerous conflicts that were implied by his failure to come to some honest conclusion concerning the role of noumenal causality and phenomenal causality, without having perceived at the same time that his concept of the self was floundering desperately and threatened the consistency of his major work. It is true that there are variously located remarks throughout Kant's works which treat of the status of noumena as purely speculative in terms of our knowledge of them and as neutral, ontologically. But these remarks must be given very little weight when we comprehend the unmitigated but often disguised influence that the whole concept of noumenal activity was allowed to exercise in the most crucial sections of Kant's most important works. That this is the case is evident, it is to be hoped, from the body of the present essay.

To return to our problem. The question then, of whether or not a rational being can be moved by reason in the sense defined above, is optimistically postponed by Kant to the last section of the *Foundations*. But our optimism, if not his, is shortlived. In the final section of the above work, Kant unequivocally declares that it is impossible to discern, in accordance with the criterion of knowledge of the *Critique*, whether a rational being can ever be moved to act by reason alone. It is here that Kant's equivocation is most annoying and telling. If Kant were being truly faithful to his doctrine of psychological determinism, the whole programme
of establishing real morality would at this point collapse. If he were to assert outrightly that it is, in fact, possible to discern action caused by reason, then the Critique and its 'Copernican Revolution' totters. So Kant engages us in the same sort of fence-straddling that we met with in our analysis of the Critique. Although we cannot discern with certainty instances of purely rational action, we must assume its possibility. In other words, we must assume the existence of a noumenal moral self.
Chapter III: A Sketch of the Theory of the Self

1. Superego vs. Empirical Self

I now want to corroborate my contention that a noumenal moral self is doing some essential work, by arguing that the Foundations also demands the assumption of the operation of a non-empirical self—what can only be the conception of the noumenal moral self. This can be done easily enough and independently of the above, by recourse to Kant's conception of the relation between the faculty of reason and the faculty of desire.

We know that the criterion of moral worth is action done dutifully, that is, not in accordance with but for the sake of duty. What this means simply, is that Kant holds the not unfamiliar conviction that the only morally edifying act is that carried out for the sake of what is right. Now, categorical imperative aside, the determination of the right in different circumstances very often depends on one's pre-philosophical convictions, one's unorthodox or orthodox religious beliefs. For example, those who have reacted against the doctrines of Catholicism after a childhood and adolescence immersed in its doctrines and mores, are often unable to rid themselves of a penchant for self-sacrifice manifested in frequently incalculable ways. In other ways, the specific reprimands and warnings of our individuated superegos are in large measure tacitly inherited from a complex web of cultural and religious traditions, even those whose influence upon our behaviour and attitudes we
think have been abrogated.

Now, Kant's inherited pre-philosophical convictions about morally righteous behaviour is reflected in his persistent characterization of morally perplexing circumstances as engagements between what ought to be done and what one desires to do - between a paternally overseeing reason and a tumultuous, seething but ever repressed desire. This passage provides a picture of Kant's view of this relation:

(412-413) "If reason infallibly determines the will, the actions which such a being recognizes as objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary. That is, the will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the will is subjugated to subjective conditions (certain incentives) which do not always agree with subjective conditions, in a word, if the will is not of itself in complete accord with reason (the actual case of men), then the actions which are recognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is constraint."

We need only look at Kant's choice of examples to verify this. A grocer who knows he should deal an unwary customer the correct change but secretly desires to cheat him. The person who prefers indulgence to the cultivation of his natural gifts; he who, upon considering suicide, hesitates to carry out the act. That man who borrows money, knowing at the time that he will not be able to repay it. (422-423) 45-47. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant explicitly opposes the experience of sexual stimulation, characterized as lust, with the threat of reprisal if the steps are taken to release the urges experienced:
Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired object and opportunity are present. Ask him whether he would not control his passion if, in front of the house where he has this opportunity, a gallows were erected where he would be hanged immediately after gratifying his lust. We do not have to guess very long what his answer would be.

Kant actually has two conceptions of the nature of the relation between reason and desire and, as might be expected, one is used when he is considering the possibility of action done solely as an effect of reason-morally worthy action. The other, which Kant considers to be the commonplace view, is invoked when he is discussing action carried out prudently, with some private interest at heart. In this case, reason and inclination are conceived of as complementary forces in the realization of an end. I have a desire or inclination for some particular end and I deliberate the most efficient means to achieving it. Under the former conception, however, no such co-operative (or conflicting) gestures between reason and desire can even be possible, because, as we have already discussed, the possibility of morally worthy action rests upon the absence of any interest or desire borrowed from experience - only the righteousness of the law can be the determining ground of the will.

As I have just remarked, Kant frequently brings reason and desire together as combatants in the struggle which results if a particular inclination - be it sexual or otherwise - is completely repressed, in morally righteous action. Now, whether the relation between reason and desire be harmonious or whether they be opposed to each other, in order for such a struggle to take place we must
presume, given Kant's definition of the will as the causality of reason, that the war being waged is between noumenal and phenomenal forces. Now such a struggle is absolutely inconceivable according to the Critique. In fact, it is impossible for reason and desire to have anything at all to do with one another even if desire designates the end and reason plans the itinerary to that end. Kant's epistemology, as I have often enough pointed out, rules out the possibility of co-ordinated activities between them. The drama of the supposed struggle on the part of reason to constrain an impulsive and involuntary empirical ego would have to unfold in an ontologically undetermined realm where the atemporal causally interacts with the temporal. Yet, if a categorical imperative is to be possible there must be some relation between reason and desire. Not only would the categorical imperative be impossible without it but action of any sort would be inexplicable on the strict arguments of the Critique. If not, then the person is qua phenomenon completely determined by a variety of animal desires, feelings and emotions and there would be no moral law to speak of. Or, qua noumenon, the categorical imperative would be inapplicable for as completely rational, I would possess not merely a good will but a 'holy' will, as does God. In this case, since there would be no essential counterpart to man's nature, no imperative would be necessary; only one course of action would be possible, that of a completely rational will.

I think it is clear now that Kant's analysis of will invites him to invoke noumenal forces to make room for a morally active
self. Kant's notion of will and of what it means 'to will' is a pivotal conception for his moral theory. For if Kant could sufficiently prove that the person can be moved by reason, then both freedom in the positive sense of initiating the causal series, and autonomy, the freedom to determine oneself in accordance with necessary laws (of one's own making), would become mere corollaries. This is why I have chosen to limit my argument here to the concept of the will to the exclusion of the more ethically oriented notions of autonomy and freedom. These latter are, no doubt, crucial but they are not of essential importance to clearing the way towards a coherent theory of the self.

2. The Emergence of a Theory

I have gone far enough in the treatment of Kant's material. The seminal conceptions have been sufficiently identified, interpreted and freely interpolated. The theory which is only now emerging bears all the marks of this punishing process. The inadequacies of the theory are in keeping with the nature of the task, especially at this, the formative stage.

What we must do, as I have proposed, is to conceive of the efficacy of noumenal causality as in fact we experience it, that is, as contents of consciousness—thoughts, representations, ideas, that exist for us in virtue of their meaning or sense. As cognitive beings, such contents of consciousness posed as ends and reasons for acting, are the source of an alternate form of causation than the natural law. I am not claiming that this alternative resolves any of the dilemmas which are so apparent in a Kantian theory of the mind but it, at least, permits us to append to our proposed theory the
concept of the self as activity, that is, more simply, the self of human action.

(1) We can never know ourselves by directly intuiting ourselves as we are 'in ourselves'.

(2) There must be some indirect route to self-knowledge.

(3) That route is just the world of objects in which we are able to discover ourselves as manifestations of the way we are 'in ourselves' without the aid of the direct intuition of the 'in itself'.

(4) We come to know ourselves by making our experience, in the sense that we have given this.

(5) A necessary condition for the knowledge of the self is knowledge of my self-activity, that is;

(6) My being qua subject (noumenal self) is inseparable from my activity as agent, as the being for whom the having of meaning and sense, such as in the positing of ends and reasons for acting, are ways of construing action. We thereby give an account of the experience of a causality other than that of natural law (the activity of the noumenally conditioned moral self).

(7) The only way to discover this is by the mediation of the empirical self. After all, the empirical self is the self as known.

From these seven propositions we may derive the following: We have three representatives for the various levels of selfhood:

(1) Transcendental Self: (A) Inner sense-passive

(B) Apperception-Active and the universal condition.

(2) The Empirical Self.

(3) The Noumenal Moral Self

We can characterize these according to their role in the determination of our experience:

(1) The Determining and Non-Determinable
Now, although my experience is made possible by the conditioning efforts of the determining activities of synthesis whose source, we have shown, must be assumed to be some form of noumenal agency, we are faced with the peculiar fact that the same experience is made determinable in terms of the empirical subject or ego. Thus, the determining (which is not determinable) determines what is determinable 'determinably'. How do we give an account of this radical transformation, the product of which is the way I experience and come to know my world? The response must come in terms of the synthesizing activities of the mind by which the self organizes its world. What we discover is that the self, in the perpetual act of synthesis, comes to recognize (know) its world as it constructs (constitutes) it. On this hypothesis, a coherent acting self will be a prerequisite for the soundness of Kant's constitutive epistemology. There is a dynamical activity being played out between the subject and his world in which each one depends on the reciprocal activity of the other; experience may be given but the subject shapes it. Thus, Kant's theory of the self must contain the active capacity of reason. It is this active capacity of reason that is reflected in the above formulation, or rather, re-formulation of Kant's theory.
Footnotes

Introduction


2. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, (Selby-Bigge), Book1, Part IV, Ch. 6.

Part I, Chapter I

3. Due originally to Brentano, this example or a variant of it has been used by many a philosopher including Norman Kemp Smith in his *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Pg. 459.

4. All references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the Kemp Smith translation and follow that pagination. (St. Martin's Press, 1965).


6. Ibid, Pg. 251.

7. The brackets and sentence within them are mine.

8. The section of the text here being analyzed is: B153-B155.

9. If anything in the *Critique* stands in need of explanation, it is the doctrine of the transcendental imagination and of transcendental activity. I deal with this, in my own way, at some length later on.


Part I, Chapter II

1. Hereafter referred to as the *Foundations*
2. For example, a passage which comes to mind is the one in which Kant derives the categorical imperative. He actually carries out the derivation in eight lines (Ak. 420-421) although he has just said a few lines before that the question of how a categorical imperative is possible in the first place would be postponed until Section. So, in effect, what Kant has done is to state the categorical imperative leaving the defense of its derivation until Section 3. The problem, obviously being that even the astute reader, upon first reading, is left feeling somewhat puzzled if not downright confused.

3. Just in passing, I should like to add that much contemporary exegesis on Kant, concerned with the language in which Kant's theory of consciousness is expressed, views this characterization of a single consciousness as a condition for knowledge as, at best, trivial and at worst, a serious misunderstanding, which, as it happens, has gone on to plague philosophy no end. I might try to capture the texture of this criticism by the following example. Liken the condition of a 'single consciousness' to the condition presented by this table for the sustained elevation of this book at a height of approximately four feet. There is as much propriety in calling the table the one necessary condition for the described state of the book as there is in treating the fact of a single consciousness as a condition for knowledge. Speaking facetiously, the table can be easily replaced without altering the state or position of the book, whereas no such contingency plan would aid our possession of knowledge if we could so readily replace a single consciousness.

4. "Since this unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetic, pure apperception supplies a principle of this synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition."

5. See (b) 130, (B) 143

6. In this section, the problem of the unity of consciousness, viz. the source of this unity - conferring activity is discussed. This is a difficulty that any analysis of Kant's concept of the self must come to grips with early despite the fact that it has, with one or two notable exceptions, been passed over in otherwise genuinely estimable commentaries. The seat of the unity of consciousness, the unity of mental activity and of experience, has generally been assigned to the transcendental ego, which of course, only adds to the confusion instead of removing it and sinks Kant deeper into the quagmire of 'transcendentalism' where he does not belong and need not be.

7. This, however, does not suggest that I do not have an original, i.e. primordial awareness of myself that differs from the awareness of reflection. This is my conception, as I pointed out a few pages back, of the term 'original' and it proves
to be a key notion to gaining some head way when we are stalled by conflicting doctrines. See the next section.

8. Bennett, Jonathon, Kant's Analytic, page 100.

9. Some clues as to how this comes about are supplied by Kant's conception of 'Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination'.

10. A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', Norman Kemp Smith; Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, H.J. Paton. The literature concerning this debate can be found easily in these two works.

11. Underlining is mine.


13. Underlining is mine/


15. This aspect of the unity of consciousness I have described early in the first chapter; thus there is no need to present a detailed description of Kant's own argument.

16. Here we see what I have already drawn attention to, Kant haphazardly fluctuating between two significantly different modes of expression about the mind's activity, the one purely functional and the other substantive. When Kant is engaged in the former more cautious way of talking he is generally trying to seek out and define that element of knowledge which is not immediately given, namely, the non-empirical, trying to discover how such knowledge is reflected in our judgements of experience (synthetic judgements known 'a priori'). But when he resorts to the more substantive and more committed mode of speech (especially in that part of the Critique which is truly critical) it is just at that point that the text becomes evasive. The result, is ambiguity on Kant's part and confusion for the reader. However, once we gain some understanding of the operations of the faculties and activities that Kant attributes to the mind by analyzing such key concepts as 'synthesis', 'transcendental apperception', we will find at least, less mystery.

17. Once and for all, this does not imply that the 'I' gathers up and literally 'creates' the world, physical or otherwise. Indeed if this were Kant's meaning, I would be far away from these passages. This would mean that (1) the self was somehow outside the world and (2) that the self had creative powers
which were other than cognitive (intellectual intuition?).

18. We can always know with certainty the formal conditions of our experience, i.e. those that are necessary and universal because they are spontaneous—their source is the 'self-activity' of the subject. We can never know the content of our experience with a corresponding certainty because the source of such knowledge is the passivity of the subject, its receptivity. The correlate subject of this 'experience' in each case is not of course, the same. The transcendental ego in the former and the empirical ego in the latter. This is also why the empirical ego is determinable but never completely determinate and why the transcendental ego is non-determinable but determining. To be so it would have to become the self 'in-itself'. The relations of these terms shall receive complete explanation in the last chapter of the next part. Kant emphasizes that there are necessary and universal rules which do pertain (e.g. numbering) and laws which must pertain (categories). Thus the certainty of form. But that these rules and laws must be the set of rules which we think necessary can never necessarily pertain. Thus, the contingency of content and the ensuing uncertainty of empirical knowledge.
Bibliography*

I. Translations of Works by Kant


The Forms and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds (1770). This is the more familiarly known, Inaugural Dissertation. Translation by John Handyside in Kant's Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings on Space, pp. 35-83. Chicago and London: Open Court, 1929.

* This bibliography is comprised of those books and articles on Kant's work which I found most exciting, helpful and most important, relevant to the problem at hand. It is naturally a select list which is not designed to represent the full extent of my reading of Kantian literature.


II. Studies of Kant


III. Articles on Kant's Work


A Note on the System of References

All references to Kant's works in this thesis are given as follows:

1. All quotations from and references to the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* are from the translation by Lewis White Beck (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1968). In this translation, the page numbers of the *Konigliche Preussiche Akademie der Wissenschaft* edition (Berlin, 1902-1938), the standard reference for Kantian works, appear in brackets in the text within the first line of each Akademie page. I have adopted this method of reference. In addition, however, I give the page number of the Bobbs-Merrill edition. The page number of the Akademie appears first in brackets, followed by the page number of the Bobbs-Merrill edition outside the brackets. Thus, reference to the opening paragraph: Ak. (393)11.

Throughout, the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* is referred to simply as the *Foundations*.

2. All quotations from and references to the *Critique of Practical Reason* are from the translation by Lewis White Beck (New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956). The method of reference is the same as that used for the *Foundations*.

3. All quotations from and references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the First Edition (A) or the Second Edition (B) as is customary (Kemp Smith translation). Wherever applicable I give the first and second edition references.

Throughout, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is referred to, simply, as the *Critique*.

4. All references to writings by other authors are given in full as they occur.