ART AND THE REPRESENTATION OF MIND
Ad Reinhardt
ART AND THE REPRESENTATION OF MIND

A Study of the Psychoanalytic Sources of the Aesthetic of Adrian Stokes

By

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation is an attempt to understand the inner structure of aesthetic experience in terms of the theory of mind developed in the psychoanalytic writings of Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein, and an examination of the way in which the psychoanalytic insights inform the aesthetic constructed in the work of Adrian Stokes.

There are three stages in the discussion. In Part One, 'Art and Early Freudian Theory', Freud's theories of neurosis, dream and the joke are considered. It is argued (a) that aesthetic views commonly associated with the theories of neurosis and dream frequently misrepresent Freud and, moreover, are not in themselves of the first importance; (b) that Freud's theory of the joke is the most apt focus for aesthetic discussion; but (c) that the picture of the mind on which the theory of the joke depends stands in need of elaboration and refinement.

In Part Two, 'The Picture of the Inner World', Freud's later writings and the Kleinian modifications of Freud's views are considered against the background of discussions in Part One with the purpose of identifying a theory of mind which offers greater resource in the understanding of aesthetic experience. Attention is directed particularly to re-
vised ideas about the unconscious, about the ego and its activities, and about phantasy and phantasy-forming.

In Part Three, 'The Aesthetic of Adrian Stokes', the aesthetic which emerges in Stokes's writings is examined with special reference to the psychoanalytic background. It is argued that Stokes's early writings, until 1951, introduce the frame of an aesthetic which is further elaborated and enriched in subsequent writings which make explicit use of Freudian and Kleinian material.

The dissertation is introduced with a Prologue which (a) provides a general intellectual mise-en-scene for the enterprise; (b) declares the assumptions and aims which are considered appropriate in the understanding of aesthetic experience; and (c) reviews some of the focal points of the argument.
There are matters concerning the presentation of the essay which require comment.

First, the essay is divided into three Parts each of which contains extended chapters on broadly-construed topics. Two devices are used to mark internal breaks within chapters: the first, a four-line spacing, indicates a continuation of theme but with a shift in focus; the second, an eight-line spacing divided by asterisks, indicates a new theme.

Second, to avoid prodigious numbers of footnotes, abbreviated references in parentheses follow quotations from works frequently cited. A list of abbreviations follows the Preface. References are written with the abbreviated title followed by a page number (viz '(AS 50)'); references to the Standard Edition of Freud's works also include the volume number (viz '(SE XXI 17)'; references to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason specify first (A) or second (B) edition pagination (viz '(CA 88)' or '(CB 94)'). Reference to works infrequently cited may be found in the Notes following the text, along with comments upon the text. Notes are signalled in the text by a parenthetical number (viz '(1)'). A Bibliography and a Selected Bibliography of the Works of Adrian Stokes follow the Notes.
I gratefully acknowledge some unusual forms of assistance which have been invaluable. First, study in London during 1974-5 was supported by the Faculty of Graduate Studies, McMaster University. While in London I had the good fortune to be able to discuss certain matters with Richard Wollheim, Grote Professor of Mind and Logic at University College, London. Professor Wollheim's work in aesthetics and psychoanalysis is the notable precedent for my own project, and the model to which I would aspire. I thank Professor Wollheim too for permitting me a copy of his unpublished Inaugural Freud Memorial Lecture, 'Freud and the Interpretation of Art'.

For some months while in London I had the inestimable advantage of living at Adrian Stokes's home in Hampstead. Ann Stokes, his widow, generously allowed my free access to quite unobtainable volumes of Stokes's works and to his library. I was also provided a vivid picture of the man whose writings I have found an unfailing stimulus. My gratitude to Ann Stokes is an embarrassingly small return for her many kindesses.

My supervisor, James Noxon, has over the years been considerate far beyond the bounds of supervisory attention. If his criticisms have sometimes been harsh they have invariably been delivered with engaging wit. I would also like to thank Professors Costas Georgiadis, Andrew Brink and T.C.
Williams. Discussions of art with Professor Georgiadis, and of psychoanalysis with Professor Brink were particularly valuable to me; and Professor Williams encouraged the taming of an unruly draft.

The cartoon epigraph is taken from Ad Reinhardt's series entitled 'How To View High (Abstract) Art'. It first appeared in PM, 24 February 1946.
ABBREVIATIONS

Complete description of the following works will be found in the Bibliography and Selected Bibliography of the Works of Adrian Stokes following the Notes.

AS   Adrian Stokes Art and Science (1949).
CF   Adrian Stokes Colour and Form (1937 and 1950).
CJ   Immanuel Kant Critique of Judgement (Trs 1969).
CM   Adrian Stokes 'Concerning Art and Metapsychology' (1945).
CP   Melanie Klein Contributions to Psychoanalysis 1921-45 (1948).
DP   Melanie Klein (Et al) Developments in Psychoanalysis (1952).
GC   Adrian Stokes Greek Culture and the Ego (1958).
GL   Adrian Stokes A Game That Must Be Lost (1973).
IA   Adrian Stokes The Invitation in Art (1965).
IK   Hanna Segal Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein (1973).
IO   Adrian Stokes Inside Out (1947).
LR   Melanie Klein (With Joan Riviere) Love Hate and Reparation (1937).
MA   Adrian Stokes Michelangelo (1955).
PC  Melanie Klein  The Psychoanalysis of Children (1932).
PI  Adrian Stokes  Painting and The Inner World (1963).
QC  Adrian Stokes  The Quattro Cento (1932 and 1968).
RN  Adrian Stokes  Reflections on the Nude (1967).
SM  Adrian Stokes  Smooth and Rough (1951).
SR  Adrian Stokes  Stones of Rimini (1934 and 1969).
ART AND THE REPRESENTATION OF MIND
An Essay in Psychoanalytic Aesthetics

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PROLOGUE

Consider the aesthete. Art is his life, and his life, so Oscar Wilde would say, is his art. It seems to many an inane and extravagant presumption: one more fanciful habit from the aesthete's obsessive wardrobe. But then contempt for the aesthete can itself often be curiously shrill. It is sometimes declared, as Wilde himself came to know, as a fervent moral mistrust, and sometimes as a harsh intellectual suspicion. T.E. Hulme once contrived both forms of disapproval in writing in 'A Lecture in Modern Poetry',

A reviewer last week spoke of poetry as the means by which the soul soars to higher regions, and as a means of expression by which it becomes merged into a higher kind of reality. Well, that is the kind of statement I utterly detest. I want to speak of verse as plainly as I would of pigs - that is the only honest way. (1)

The porcine soul is of no interest, however, least of all to the pig. The aesthete, on the other hand, finds his own soul utterly absorbing, and he discovers that it is an absorption served by art. For art, he insists, is a mirror to reflect what Pater once called 'that perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves' (2). And pigsty plainness, pace Hulme, is too ungainly in the delicate web.

Such, I would suppose, are the aesthete's thoughts. But they need not be mere elegant gestures. Oscar Wilde, for instance, could deliver his views with reflective direct-
ness. 'Art', he once wrote,

even the art of fullest scope and widest vision, can never really show us the external world. All that it shows us is our own soul, the one world of which we have any real cognizance. And the soul itself, the soul of each one of us, is to each one of us a mystery. It hides in the dark and broods, and consciousness cannot tell us of its workings. Consciousness, indeed, is quite inadequate to explain the contents of personality. It is Art, and Art only, that reveals us to ourselves. (3)

The remark forms an apt preface to my concerns.

The intellectual provenance of the aesthete's vision is not obscure. Or it is no more obscure than that Kant should be thought a central figure in the Romantic tradition. And although the ascetic Kant might seem no congenial ally for the delicacies espoused by the aesthete, it is nevertheless at the heart of the Kantian aesthetic that it is the soul which alone 'gives life' to the work of art (CJ 164).

It is, in fact, the Kantian tradition of studies in aesthetics and theory of mind which affords a philosophical mise-en-scène for my project. And it is worth noting this at the outset. For the customary interests of contemporary philosophical aesthetics - at least until very recently - are remote from my own, and there will be no occasion on which to refer to its literature (4).

But what specific elaboration of the aesthete's vision may the appeal to Kant be thought to provide?
'Soul in an aesthetical sense', Kant was to write, 'signifies the animating principle in the mind'. And he immediately added to this a claim which reveals an essential feature of his aesthetic views:

Now my proposition is that this principle is nothing else than the faculty of presenting aesthetic ideas. But, by an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible. (Cf. 175-6)

For Kant, in other words, the structure of our aesthetic experience is significantly different from the structure of our experience in the objective world: for example, in the world of Hulme’s pigs. And it seems to me that this view identifies our most fundamental problem in discussing our experience of art. For if that experience cannot be properly articulated in terms of our customary conceptual ordering of experience — where we find that language never quite catches at its subtlety — our understanding of it remains so far indistinct and elusive. To insist, with a Hulme, on brutal plainness at this point is just to indulge the unprepossessing habit of breaking a butterfly on a wheel: it serves only omnipotent intellectual vanity to pretend that our experience of art is more neatly ordered than it really is. Our task, however laborious, must be to penetrate to that peculiar condition of the mind which occurs in aesthetically confront-
ing a work of art.

Kant's own endeavours in this task are of course deeply interwoven in the complexity of his philosophical weltanschaung. But a cursory review may serve to establish their general direction.

It was out of what Kant resonantly called 'the flux of inner appearances' - that condition of the mind in which 'no fixed and abiding self can present itself' (CA 107) - that his elaborate construction of the mind began to take shape. And while the Critique of Pure Reason was primarily addressed to determining the nature and significance of our conceptual ordering of experience, the mental processes which are thought to underlie the possibility of such ordering are, at the same time, those processes which are invoked to explain the inner structure of aesthetic experience. For in Kant's view, what permits the possibility of creating conceptual order out of the flux of inner appearances is the original power of the imagination to 'synthetise' those appearances. And it is this process of imaginative synthesis which produces the kind of representation which Kant calls an aesthetic idea.

The theory of synthesis is notoriously obscure. But a significant aspect of its obscurity consists in the invisibility, as it were, of the mental process. As Kant puts it,
Synthesis in general...is the mere result of the power of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no knowledge whatsoever but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. (CA 78; CB 103)

The remark quickly recalls Wilde's view of the mysterious workings of the soul which consciousness is inadequate to discover, but which our experience of art can reveal. But what Kant directs our attention to is not a condition of the mind which is exclusive to our experience of art: it is, rather, a condition of the mind which underpins our mental life generally - an imaginative activity which runs its subterranean course throughout our experience.

The idea has a ring of familiarity to the twentieth-century ear, accustomed as it is to Freud's insights into the uncanny world of the unconscious imagination. And its familiarity is not so coincidental. Kant was no Freud, certainly, but the Kantian idea of the synthetising mind, and its subsequent exploration in the work of Kant's successors, Schiller, Herbart and Schopenhauer, is deeply influential in Freud's thought. And as Michael Podro has suggested in a discussion of this Kantian background,

...it is not a matter of 'spare parts' from discarded ed theories which Freud takes up and re-uses in his own construction of the mind; rather - to change the analogy - it is as though what had originally been learned as a game had become something more important - ideas developed with particular clarity with respect to art were no longer primarily related to art but are seen to characterise the procedures of mental life as a whole. (5)
There is then, one might say, some natural justice in the attempt to return Freud's momentous explorations of the inner world to the particular matter which seems to have been so provident for the trend of psychoanalytic thought - to the matter of the inner structure of aesthetic experience. And it is that attempt which initiates and sustains the essay

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The intellectual scope of psychoanalytic theory is vast, and in discussing its insights I shall try to carve out a route which is directed by certain assumptions and themes which seem to me germane to the aesthetic project.

In the first place, while my principal concern is with the condition of the mind in our experience of art, it is necessary, I believe, to set that concern within the context of a general understanding of the idea of art. That is to say, while it is what the Kantian would call the 'subjective' aspects of art - the subject's experience of art - to which I primarily address myself, I do not thereby mean to evade a proper acknowledgement of the 'objective' aspects of art - the object (the work of art) which occasions the subject's experience. I shall take up this issue in a moment in connection with the role of Adrian Stokes's
work in the essay.

To remain for the moment with the idea of aesthetic subjectivity, it is clear that two distinct subjective points of view may be adopted in describing the experience of art: the point of view of the artist himself, and the point of view of the spectator. And it is almost always the case that one point of view tends to prevail over the other in any discussion of art. This seems to me unsatisfactory. The history of art notoriously attests to radical disengagements of an artist's experience of his own work from his audience's experience of his work. And while there will always be misunderstood artists and misunderstanding audiences (and misunderstanding artists and misunderstood audiences), I take it that a principal aim of the aesthetician is to make sense of these unhappy hostilities in discovering a point of view which is neutral between the artist and the spectator.

This assumption of neutrality, it might be thought, will be hard to maintain in seeking the service of psychoanalytic theory. For where psychoanalysis has explicitly turned its attentions upon art it is invariably the artist, not the spectator, who is the central figure. Indeed, it is commonly thought that the locus classicus of the whole psychoanalytic approach to art is Freud's intriguing essay on Leonardo: the 'psychopathography' of an artist, as
Freud calls it.

It is in fact the case that Freud's writings specifically on the subject of art follow the trend of the Leonardo essay. But in acknowledging this, I do not mean to suggest that this will be a major source of difficulty in the use which I shall seek to make of Freud's work. For Freud's writings on art, for a number of reasons, will not be my main concern. Rather, I shall concentrate at first on the researches into the condition of the mind in neurosis, in dreaming, and in joking. It is in the course of discussing these researches, I believe, that we shall best be able to identify what is — and importantly what is not — relevant to the understanding of the inner structure of our experience of art. And what is relevant here, I shall try to show, entails neither the elevation of the artist's point of view nor the spectator's.

What I had in mind a moment ago in talking of the need for a proper acknowledgement of the objective aspects of art is perhaps best explained in reference to an otherwise gnomic remark which Stanley Cavell is reported to have made: namely, that 'for Kant in the *Critique of Judgement* a work of art is not an object' (6). What, I suspect, Cavell had in mind here is that for Kant, and for the Kantian aesthetic tradition generally, the work of art is regarded less as an
object in the world and more as the occasion of certain processes in the mind. And it is of course a constant danger in electing to explore the condition of the mind in our experience of art that one can, literally, lose sight of and touch with the object which occasions the condition. At worst — and this tends to occur in so-called Idealist aesthetic theory — the work of art becomes, as it were, a ghostly apparition which hovers in some indistinct region beyond its actual sensible embodiment.

It is absurd to think of a work of art in this way. Whatever else a work of art is, it is a mode of expression in a particular kind of sensible medium. A work of art has a highly specific 'objecthood', as I shall 'call it: it is an object with determinate (visual, tactile, aural) dimensions; it exists in the same objective world which is occupied by Hulme's pigs (though we generally segregate the pigs) (7). And it is in connection with the discussion of Adrian Stokes, in Part Three of the essay, that this point may be made most forcibly. For Stokes's aesthetic is, so to speak, weighted with the solidity of stone and thickened with the texture of oil paint. In fact Stokes was always to regard architecture as 'the Mother of the arts', and part of what he had in mind was that any work of art shares in the edificial externality of a building.

What is crucial for my purposes in the essay, however,
is that when Stokes comes to borrow heavily upon the psychoanalytic insights which I discuss in Parts One and Two none of this sense of the objecthood of the work of art is lost. For it is an essential feature of the psychoanalytic account of the mind which I seek to reconstruct — and a point which especially concerns me in Part Two — that the imaginative activity which underpins our aesthetic experience (and indeed every aspect of our experience) projects its own kind of objecthood — a veritable corporeality. The mind, on this account, is very much of the body. And art, Stokes insists, is as much of the body as it is of the mind. It cannot be said that for Stokes, unlike Kant, the work of art is not an object. What is intriguing and important about Stokes's aesthetic is that the work of art is revealed as a 'subjective object', as a reviewer of Stokes's writings recently put it (8).

There is one further aesthetic theme which underlies my project, and again it will have a special force in connection with Adrian Stokes's work.

One of the reasons that I shall concentrate on Freud's general researches rather than on his writings on art is that, in the writings on art, Freud was always much more concerned with the content of art than with its form. And this concern is in fact closely related to the point I ment-
ioned earlier: namely, that in most of Freud's writings on art it is the artist, not the spectator, who is the central figure. For Freud's general tendency in his writing on art is to think of the work of art in much the same way that he thought of the dream: that is, the manifest content of the work of art is often considered to disguise a latent desire on the part of the artist. And this attitude is, once again, commonly thought fundamental to the psychoanalytic approach to art.

But this - I shall call it the search for a psychoanalytically informed 'image in the content of art' - is no part of my aim. For it seems to me correct to object that the search leaves the essential art-ness of the work of art untouched. There is nothing which is aesthetically distinctive in the content of art. Indeed, it is a demand which I think we are entitled to make of any work of art that its content be rooted in the context of our most fundamental and universal human concerns. What is aesthetically distinctive in the work of art is the specific use which is made of content: not, for example, the artist's desire as such, but the way in which the work of art constructs or reconstructs that desire. In other words, it is the form of the work of art which is aesthetically distinctive. It is, hence, my aesthetic theme to discover a psychoanalytically
informed 'image in the form of art'.

The phrase, 'the image in form', is Adrian Stokes's. And in his selection of Stokes's writings, Richard Wollheim properly, I think, chooses the title The Image in Form (9). For though the phrase occurs late in Stokes's work - in a lecture included in the last volume published before his death - it can be said to name a prevailing concern evident from the start.

Of course to distinguish the form from the content of a work of art is a perilous exercise. That is, while it is not an unreasonable first intuition that the content of the work of art is that which the work of art represents, and that the form is the work's mode of representation, the intuition is vulnerable to the slightest pressure. But in writing of the image in the form of art it is not at all that Stokes presumes upon some such artificial and insecure distinction between form and content. In fact much of Stokes's work points exactly to the need to escape the conventional rigidity of such distinction. As we shall see, Stokes assimilates a great deal of what would generally be thought to fall under the idea of content to a conception of form: for example, he talks of the formal significance of perspectival representation, of qualities of light, and of colour. Indeed, in talking of the image in form Stokes can be thought to identify a specific content in form. If
this at first sounds strange, it is nevertheless the idea in which, I believe, Stokes's notable aesthetic achievement lies. For in articulating the image or content which resides in the form of art Stokes allows a definite grasp upon a notoriously elusive idea. And of course insofar as it is form which is aesthetically distinctive of art, not content, then this is the critical consideration in coming to understand the condition of the mind in our experience of art.

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Some comment is required, finally, on the structure and presentation of the essay. As I have indicated, there are three Parts to the essay and they stand to each other in a number of relations.

Part One, 'Art and Early Freudian Theory', is conceived of as introductory to Parts Two and Three in two distinct ways.

First, my aim is to explore Freud's early, seminal researches into neurosis, dream and the joke in order to discover those insights which bear significantly on the understanding of the condition of mind in our experience of art. And it is in virtue of this process of discovery that it becomes possible to identify those aspects of the mind which stand in need of further investigation if the
aesthetic project is to find fulfilment. Freud's earlier work is suggestive, certainly, but it turns out to stand in urgent need of elaboration and refinement. That is the enterprise in Part Two which itself constitutes an essential background to the ideas discussed in Part Three.

Second, Freud has perhaps suffered more from the abuse and misuse of his ideas than any other mandarin figure in intellectual history. This is manifest at its most distasteful level in that cheap variety of 'Freudianism', as it might be called, which is the occasion for the knowing wink or for prudish revulsion. Unfortunately the attitude has a resilience and a pervasiveness which leaves one unsure how far one can assume what is obvious in Freud's work. And one has to add here that one had better make very sure, for it is regrettable that, at least until recently, Freud's work has barely figured at all in the context of philosophical studies of mind. But what is perhaps more curious, and more worrying, than this is that certain critics and commentators, often of considerable stature, seemed to have formed highly peculiar conceptions of Freud's endeavours. And this is particularly the case in connection with Freud's contribution to the understanding of art. When a critic like Trilling (whom I discuss in the chapter on neurosis), or the major representatives of the Surrealist school of art (whom I discuss in the chapter on dream) can alternately castigate or
celebrate Freud in virtue of ideas which he simply never held, then there is something too seriously wrong to be neglected. And of course in not neglecting these issues, in opposing in considerable detail what seem to me to be manifest misapprehensions of Freud's work, I shall hope to support my own train of thought which leads to Part Two.

Part Two, 'The Picture of the Inner World', has, again, two roles to play in the essay.

First, as I've intimated, it is intended as an examination of the elaboration and refinement of those insights into the nature of mind which were identified in Part One as having a special bearing upon the understanding of the condition of the mind in our experience of art. Here I shall draw upon both Freud's later metapsychological writings (in the first chapter) and upon certain of Melanie Klein's extensions to and modifications of Freudian views (in the second chapter). And what I hope to achieve in this is a general account of the inner structure of the mind which offers the most productive resource for the aesthetic project.

Second, in reviewing the central ideas employed in Freud's later work and, particularly, in Melanie Klein's, I mean to establish a proper — and the necessary — background to an understanding of Adrian Stokes's work. For,
with considerable sanguinity, Stokes tended to assume a very close familiarity with the psychoanalytic insights upon which, explicitly and (more often) implicitly, his aesthetic stands. Of course Part Two is rather more than an informal concordance for Stokes's writings insofar as it develops out of the discussions of Part One, but it is intended to have at least that function.

It is in Part Three, 'The Aesthetic of Adrian Stokes', that the aim to reach an understanding of the inner structure of our experience of art finds a destination. If this suggests that it is the focus of the entire essay, despite the extent of the preceding discussions, then the suggestion will find confirmation in the fact that it has seemed to me appropriate to adopt the title of the final chapter on Stokes as the title for the essay as a whole. (It is also true, though irrelevant, that it was what seemed the impenetrable obscurity of Adrian Stokes's later work which first prompted the exercise.)

It is not only, however, that in the course of examining Stoke work I seek a vindication of the preceding labours. As I . . . already implied, Stokes seems to me to provide a particularly compelling articulation of two extremely difficult issues in the discussion of art: first, with respect to the tension of subjectivity and objectivity; and second, with respect to the idea of form in art.
But there is one further satisfaction I find in Stokes's work. In a remark which occurs in one of his earliest works, and which I take to be central to his aesthetic, Stokes writes,

The process of living is an externalisation, a turning outward into definite form of inner ferment. Hence the mirror to living which art is, hence the significance of art.... (QC 15)

It is a remark which gives expression to the aesthete's vision. For once Stokes has translated the idea of 'inner ferment' - 'that perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves' - into the language of psychoanalysis, he is able to show just how art can 'reveal us to ourselves'. The work of art, he tells us, offers a representation of the mind - an objectification of our subjectivity.
PART ONE

ART AND EARLY FREUDIAN THEORY

Introduction

1
Art and Neurosis

2
Art and Dream

3
Art and the Joke
INTRODUCTION

Freud's thoughts on art are well-known. Or are they? To be sure, it is commonly enough believed that Freud showed us that the artist is essentially a neurotic; that his work is motivated by an otherwise frustrated desire; that his art is therapeutic for certain disorders of the mind; that the work of art itself is a model of a neurotic symptom, or a dream, or a daydream; that the work of art may be understood through a process akin to the interpretation of a dream; that art inherits the vast universal symbolism of dreams. For these insights, it is further believed, our understanding of the fascinations of art is permanently indebted to Freud.

Every one of these beliefs is false. It is false that Freud maintained them, and it is false that they contribute to the understanding of art. Furthermore, the beliefs are confused: they draw upon vague notions of the import of Freud's enterprise, and they are nourished by misconceptions of central Freudian precepts.

To hack a way through the thickets of misunderstanding is a major aim of Part One. But while there is a clear need to do justice to one of the seminal figures in human history, and a satisfaction in the attempt to do so, this is not the only aim of Part One. What directs the exercise
is the ambition of the essay generally to come to an understanding of the condition of mind which underlies our experience of art. And while Freud's theories of neurosis and dream, and the essays on art which stand in connection with those theories, do not serve the ambition directly, as it is frequently supposed, they do serve it indirectly. For it is in the course of their discussion that we shall, I think, be able to sift out some of those ideas which, if only so far suggestive, seem to hold out some promise. In particular, the idea of phantasy, though at this stage it is uncomfortably vague, seems to be worth investigation, and so too do ideas about the unconscious activities of the mind in dreaming. And although this is curiously indeterminate with respect to Freud's available theoretical resources, the essay on Leonardo includes some useful pointers in connection with the use the artist might be said to make of phantasy.

It is, however, with respect to Freud's study of joking that what may at first have seemed to be the somewhat ad hoc procedures in the earlier chapters begin to assemble in a rough order. For, I shall argue, it is in Freud's theory of the joke — for Freud himself the 'first application' of his ideas to matters of aesthetics — that our way becomes clearer. It is the theory of the joke which first allows us a glimpse of those activities of the mind
which appear to be of particular aesthetic interest.

What is unfortunate here is that the picture of the mind upon which Freud's ideas about joking seem to depend is never convincingly articulated by Freud. Indeed, I shall argue, Freud displays an uncharacteristic resistance to following out the train of thought which his ideas generate. And if I am right to think that it is this kind of picture which is essential to the aesthetic project, then the next obvious step is to see how far it might be elaborated. This is the step to Part Two, 'The Picture of the Inner World', and the step which takes us to Freud's later and much refined theories, and to their development in the work of Melanie Klein. Thus, if what I called 'the thickets of misunderstanding' have been cut down a little, and if a path to the understanding of the inner structure of our experience of art has been opened up, the purpose of Part One will have been achieved.
It is not always clearly acknowledged that Freudian psychoanalysis does not merely seek an account of the pathologically disturbed mind, but also explicitly tries to weave such account into the fabric of a general theory of mind. And this ought to be obvious in view of the way in which Freud consistently addressed such non-pathological phenomena as parapraxes, dreams and jokes, and moreover regarded such phenomena as the proper introductory material of psychoanalytic theory: for instance, in his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (vilo SE XVI 379).

But to say this is simply to insist upon a recognition of the breadth of Freud's concerns. There is a further point. And that is that, for Freud, accounts of the pathologically disturbed mind are, and should be, continuous with an account of the normal mind: indeed, it is Freud's point, such accounts are often very closely continuous. This is nowhere more apparent than in Freud's theory of neurosis. Thus, when we come upon such remarks of Freud's that we are all ill, that we are all neurotic, we need not take them to be (somewhat implausibly) diagnostic of the general human condition so much as an acknowledgement that the continuity of accounts of the pathological and non-pathological permits no clear theoretical distinction between neurosis and normal-
As Freud was to put it,

Since this outcome [neurosis] depends mainly on the quantity of the energy which is...absorbed, you will easily see that 'being ill' is in its essence a practical concept. But if you take up a theoretical point of view and disregard this matter of quantity, you may quite well say that we are all ill — that is, neurotic — since the preconditions for the formation of symptoms can be observed in normal people. (SE XVI 358)

And Freud added that what, in practice, discriminates health from neurosis is just 'whether the subject is left with a sufficient amount of capacity for enjoyment and of efficiency' (SE XVI 457).

On this view, then, it is quite natural that the theory of neurosis can come to seem relevant to the understanding of the artist: not because the artist is essentially neurotic, but because he is a man.

But I will seem here to formulate a position which runs strikingly counter to prevalent beliefs about the relevance of the theory of neurosis in the understanding of art. For it is commonly thought that it was Freud himself who argued that the artist is in essence a neurotic, and, perhaps even more strongly, that it is actually in virtue of his neurosis that he comes to produce art.

Such a view, I shall insist, is wholly in error. There is indeed a temptation curtly to dismiss it, for in terms of the practical criterion which Freud himself proposes for the discrimination of health and neurosis, the man who is
capable of producing works of art, and of making a life out of doing so, manifests no obvious inhibition upon efficiency. No doubt an artist, as much as anyone, can find himself at times unable to undertake or to complete the tasks he sets himself, but it would be absurd to suppose this to be endemic to the artistic condition.

Still, the view that neurosis and art are deeply connected, and that Freud in particular maintained this, is too deeply entrenched not to require further examination. What, then, I propose, is, first, an account of Freud's theory of neurosis itself, and subsequently a discussion of the view I take Freud to hold of the relation of neurosis and art. At the same time I shall refer to views which have been espoused by certain commentators on Freud.

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Freud's theory of neurosis is, of course, an extensive subject. Hence, I mean to look at the shorter, somewhat popularised version of the theory which Freud presented in his Introductory Lectures. There are certain difficulties and shortcomings in this version, but I think they need not concern us (1).

A further introductory point might be made. It is that Freud at first restricted his theory to what he called
the 'transference' neuroses — roughly, those neuroses which are accessible to therapeutic treatment insofar as the patient is able to act out his neurosis in relation to the analyst. Those neuroses in which transference does not occur — notably the 'narcissistic' neuroses — do not at first fall within the scope of Freud's theory. And this turns out to be extremely significant. For it was only when Freud came to investigate the narcissistic neuroses that the theory of mind — in particular an account of the nature of the ego and its activities — which will appear vital to the aesthetic project first begins to take shape. The point is that while the transference neuroses are articulated in terms of the libidinal, or sexual, instincts, the narcissistic neuroses concern what Freud at first called the 'ego-instincts'. But it is in connection with the idea that indeed there are such ego-instincts that Freud's later work begins its rapid theoretical development.

Neurosis, Freud believed, was the result of a certain kind of psychical conflict, and his clinical experience led him to the conviction that the unruly party to the dispute was invariably libidinal impulse. Where a sexual desire asserts itself, and where it is frustrated — that is, where it comes into conflict with other, non-sexual desires — then the condition is ripe for the development of neurosis.
Evidently, the frustration of a sexual desire need not, and generally does not automatically lead to the development of neurosis. (It is one of the cruder mistakes of what I earlier called 'Freudianism' to suppose that such a view is any part of Freud's theory.) Most of us are able to cope with the frustration either simply by enduring it, or by finding some alternate, though intrinsically connected, activity through which the desire may be satisfied— in other words, through what is called sublimation. But the endurance of frustration, or the capacity for sublimation, are not in every case possible. For importantly—and this is a critical point to which I shall return—the endurance of frustration or the capacity for sublimation are made possible by the power of the individual ego to contain or to redirect libidinal energy.

Let us, then, suppose a case in which a subject just does lack the means to cope with frustrated sexual desire. What, according to Freud, will occur is a regression, a retracing of the steps along the original path of libidinal development. That is to say, the desire will seek satisfaction in the form or forms which supplied satisfaction at regressively earlier points in the individual's sexual development—points which have been marked out by particular fixations.

But even where this occurs, and the desire does indeed
discover this regressive form of satisfaction, this does not yet amount to neurosis. In fact it constitutes another form of disturbance: namely, perversion, classically manifested in the fetishist.

But this brings us close to the idea of neurosis. For, as Freud frequently put it, the neuroses are 'the negative of perversions' (e.g. SE XVII 50). One further condition determines the development of neurosis, and that is that the expression of the original sexual desire, even in the attenuated mode of perversion, is itself proscribed by the subject. And though at this point the desire seems to have lost any possibility of satisfaction, it has by no means lost its force: as Freud puts it, it is yet 'sustained by an energy to which we probably know nothing comparable in normal mental life' (SE XVI 259). And it is this energy which now erupts in the formation of neurotic symptoms.

Thus, for Freud, the aetiology of neurosis. But, of course, there is more to add. For if we have considered the question of why it is that a libidinal impulse should find its way back to certain fixational points in development, we have as yet little idea of how this can come about. And here we must introduce the idea of phantasy.

There are two connected points concerning the role of phantasy. First, if the analyst is to make any therapeutic progress with the symptoms in a neurosis, he needs to dis-
cover to what fixational points in development they are related; and second, the subject himself must have some means of finding a path back to those fixational points. In each case the role of phantasy is central. Freud writes,

All the objects and trends which the libido has given up have not yet been given up in every sense. They, or their derivatives are still retained with a certain intensity in phantasies. Thus the libido need only withdraw on to phantasies in order to find the path open to every repressed fixation. (SE XVI 373)

A question occurs here about how the subject can have tolerated those phantasies which lead him straight back to fixations which he has repressed without this having brought him into conflict with the repressing agent itself, the ego. But Freud has an answer:

These phantasies have enjoyed a certain amount of toleration: they have not come into conflict with the ego, however sharp the contrasts between them may have been, so long as a particular condition is observed. This condition is of a quantitative nature and it is now upset by the backward flow of libido on to the phantasies. As a result of this surplus, the energetic cathexis of the phantasies is so much increased that they begin to raise claims, that they develop a pressure in the direction of becoming realised. But this makes a conflict between them and the ego inevitable. Whether they were previously preconscious or conscious, they are now subjected to repression from the direction of the unconscious. From what are now unconscious phantasies the libido travels back to their origins in the unconscious — to its own points of fixation. (SE XVI 373)

There are, we shall see, certain difficulties in Freud's conception of phantasy, and this is regrettable for it also becomes clear how central the conception is to the aesthetic
discussion. For the moment, however, I am more concerned with the general structure and development of neurosis, and it is perhaps now clear enough what this amounts to without being entirely specific about the nature of phantasy. The neurotic is, as it were, a man victimised twice over. Threatened first by peculiarly intense libidinal desire, he is forced to regress to fixational points through phantasies which themselves take on the intensity of the original desire; at this point, however, he is further victimised by the same harsh force which had repressed those fixational points in the first place. The doubly frustrated desire can, in the end, find no outlet but in neurotic symptoms.

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How far does this picture of the neurotic provide a parallel for the artist qua artist? Hardly at all, I should say, though there are interesting points of comparison, and certain unequivocal differences which may help us to identify those points at which we might seek an understanding of the artist's inner life. But it will be useful to look first at what has often been made of an alleged parallel here.

It is a remnant of Romantic theory that the artist is, in some striking way, disabled, and that it is in virtue of this disability - madness, eccentricity, alienation or
whatever - that he is able to produce works of art. The idea might conveniently be designated the 'Philoctetes Syndrome', after Edmund Wilson's famous essay on the Sophoclean character in The Wound and the Bow.

Philoctetes, a Greek warrior, comes to possess an unerringly accurate bow, but he is also afflicted with a painful and incurable wound which suppurates with such repugnant odour that he is ostracised by his compatriots. It becomes clear, however, that Philoctetes must be recalled from his exile, for his skills with the bow are indispensable in the taking of Troy and the defeat of the Trojans.

The legend, Wilson argues, has an oddly compelling force, for we are inclined to think of there being a strong conditional connection between Philoctetes' wound and his possession of the bow; and, Wilson suggests, one aspect of this is our thought that 'genius and disease, like strength and mutilation, may be inextricably bound up together' (2).

The Philoctetes Syndrome does indeed have a kind of universal appeal. And a modern reading of the syndrome might well be that the artist is essentially disabled by a neurotic illness which is, however, the source of his talent. The reading, though, has found a vigorous opponent in the critic, Lionel Trilling, who, in two of the essays collected in his volume, The Liberal Imagin-
ation, has attempted to argue its spuriousness. (3).

Trilling takes up his position with reference to Charles Lamb's essay in defence of the sanity of genius.

There, Trilling tells us,

Lamb is denying that genius is allied to insanity: for 'insanity' the modern reader may substitute 'neurosis'. 'The ground of the mistake', he says, 'is that men, finding in the raptures of the higher poetry a condition of exaltation, to which they have no parallel in their own experience, besides the spurious resemblance of it in dreams and fevers, impute a state of dreaminess and fever to the poet. But the true poet dreams being awake. He is not possessed by his subject but has dominion over it ... Where he seems most to recede from humanity, he will be found the truest to it. From beyond the scope of nature if he summon possible existences, he subjugates them to the law of her consistency. He is beautifully loyal to that sovereign directress, when he appears most to betray and desert her... Herein the great and the little wits are differenced; that if the latter wander ever so little from nature or natural existence, they lose themselves and their readers... They do not create, which implies shaping and consistency. Their imaginations are not active - for to be active is to call something into act and form - but passive as men in sick dreams.' (4)

There is no doubt, I think, that Lamb's apostrophe to genius is wholly proper and perceptive, and so too is Trilling's extrapolation: namely, that the artist is always 'in command of his fantasy, while it is exactly the mark of the neurotic that he is possessed by his fantasy' (5). But then Trilling immediately goes on to say that 'Freud's assumption of the almost exclusive hedonistic nature and purpose of art bars him from a perception of this'.
Trilling's reading of Freud seems to me crude and mistaken, though it is difficult to challenge it directly since Trilling fails to specify the source of his belief about Freud's view of art. Hence I turn to Freud himself; and, first, to that point in Freud's lectures on neurosis where he interpolates some remarks about the artist.

Towards the end of the lecture on 'The Paths to Symptom Formation', in which he discusses the role of phantasy in the formation of symptoms, Freud writes,

I should like to direct your attention a little longer to a side of the life of phantasy which deserves the most general interest. For there is a path that leads back from phantasy to reality - the path, that is, of art. (SE XVI 376; Wide SE IX 153, SE XI 50, SE XII 224, SE XIII 187, SE XX 64.)

The artist, Freud continues, is indeed a man 'not far removed from neurosis': that is to say, in response to a frustration of instinctual needs the artist is likely to turn away from reality and to transfer his interest and libidinal energy into the wishful constructions of phantasy, whence the path might lead to neurosis. But there is an important qualification: for Freud adds that, in this, the artist is 'like any other unsatisfied man'. His bare removal from neurosis is not specific to his artistic condition, but rather - and this is the point which I have already made in an earlier context - general to his human condition. And the point is made even clearer once
one realises that the (non-instinctual) aims which Freud attributes to the artist — 'honour, power, wealth, fame and the love of women' — are by no means unique to the artist, and moreover, are not aims exclusively satisfied through artistic activity — indeed, artistic activity can hardly be thought even the most likely to achieve such aims.

But, of course, if all that Freud had in mind in talking of the path back to reality through art is that the artist's employment of phantasy can, as it were contingently, achieve such realistic aims as honour, power, wealth, fame and the love of women, then the point would be of little interest. Clearly, though, Freud meant more than this. For what, he believes, is specific to the artist's employment of phantasy is his capacity to 'work over' the phantasies in such a manner that he avoids being propelled along the course of potential neurosis, that is, away from reality. For the artist, unlike the neurotic, Freud claims,

...understands how to work over his day-dreams in such a way as to make them lose what is too personal about them and repels strangers, and to make it possible for others to share in the enjoyment of them. He understands, too, how to tone them down so that they do not easily betray their origin from proscribed sources. Furthermore, he possesses the mysterious power of shaping some particular material until it has become a faithful image of his phantasy; and he knows, moreover, how to link so large a yield of pleasure to this representation of his unconscious phantasy that, for the time being, repressions are outweighed and lifted by it. If he is able to accom-
plish all this, he makes it possible for other people once more to derive consolation and alleviation from their own sources of pleasure in their unconscious which have become inaccessible to them. (SE XVI 376)

Freud's point here just is no less than Lamb's about the poet's having dominion over his subject. And in making it he precisely denies Trilling's accusation that he fails to see that the artist is in command of his phantasy: the artist, like the neurotic, may be committed deeply to his life of phantasy, but, unlike the neurotic, he is not possessed by it: indeed in his dominion over his artistic material the artist manifests his lack of neurosis and finds the path which leads back from phantasy to reality.

Though Trilling is quite wrong in his reading of Freud in this respect, the issue is not, however, settled beyond dispute. For, it will be said, if Freud is clear enough at this point that art and neurosis are not 'inextricably bound up together', at others he appears to be led in a quite different direction. In fact, paradoxically, this appears to occur in Freud's own essays on particular artists, and notably in his essay on Leonardo. And although Freud is reported brusquely to have announced that 'We forget too easily that we have no right to place neurosis in the foreground, wherever a great accomplishment is involved' (6), he himself seems at times to have forgotten.

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From the claim that artistic activity is quite unlike neurotic behaviour, it by no means follows that no artist is neurotic. And indeed, Freud believed, many artists are, as a matter of fact, also neurotics: notably, for instance, Dostoevsky, of whom Freud wrote in a late essay, 'Dostoevsky and Parricide'. But the essay need not detain us. For in considering the neurotic aspects of Dostoevsky's personality, Freud explicitly declares that he has nothing to say of Dostoevsky the artist, and for much the same reason that he denied the right to think of any great accomplishment in terms of neurosis: he writes,

Dostoevsky's place is not far behind Shakespeare. The Brothers Karamazov is the most magnificent novel ever written; the episode of the Grand Inquisitor, one of the peaks in the literature of the world, can hardly be valued too highly. Before the problem of the creative artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms. (SE XXI 177)

If this is true of Freud's discussion of Dostoevsky, no less, we might expect, should it be true of his essay on Leonardo. But Freud is not nearly so decisive here. For, although he explicitly maintains that, unlike Dostoevsky, 'we have never reckoned Leonardo as a neurotic' (SE XI 131), the whole tenour of the discussion suggests something very different. That is, not only does Freud try to reveal in Leonardo the regressions in phantasy to early fixational points in Leonardo's libidinal development — exactly as we might expect in the tracing out of the course
of a neurosis - and thus to provide an account of Leonardo's alleged idealised homosexuality and its influence in his adult life; more than that, Freud seems to treat Leonardo's paintings as central to, and expressive of, Leonardo's neurotic conflict. For example, Freud writes of Leonardo's late work, The Madonna and Child with St Anne,

...it suddenly dawns on us that only Leonardo could have painted it.... The picture contains the synthesis of the history of his childhood; its details are to be explained by reference to the most personal impressions in Leonardo's life. (SE XI 112)

In other words, it looks as if Freud is not only prepared to think of Leonardo's art as symptomatic, but also, in so doing, to think that we may reach an aesthetic understanding of the art, an understanding of the details of the painting itself.

There does indeed appear to be some difficulty here with respect to the consistency of Freud's beliefs about the relation of art and neurosis. Yet, it seems to me, there is a possible reading of the Leonardo essay which will not seriously undermine the claims I have so far made about those beliefs. That is, I want to say that the Leonardo essay should not be taken strictly literally. The essay, I think, is in large part illustrative of the kind of thing that Freud wanted to say about neurosis in general (and also about dreams, as we shall shortly see):
Leonardo's art and his artistic development no more than conveniently parallel the manifestation of neurosis and the development of neurosis, and do not constitute the symptomatic manifestation of neurosis and its development. In other words, I want to say, the Leonardo essay should not be thought diagnostic of neurosis in Leonardo; and hence the point of Freud's saying that 'we must expressly insist that we have never reckoned Leonardo as a neurotic'.

Perhaps this view will seem merely an ingenious attempt to evade an obvious conclusion. Why, it might be asked, risking the possibility of misunderstanding, would Freud have chosen to write about Leonardo simply in order to illustrate aspects of his general theory? But there is surely a natural answer here: namely, that in writing about the great artist, Freud could rely upon the immediate cache of his subject, upon our interest in and curiosity about a mandarin figure in human history. And this, at the time, must have been of enormous use to Freud in the furtherance of psychoanalytic thinking, for of course otherwise he was bound to illustrate his theses with respect to evidence obtained from his own clinical practice with quite anonymous patients. One might, that is to say, regard the Leonardo essay as an evidently striking testimonial on behalf of the penetration of psychoanalytic
thought - as an exercise in the public relations of psycho-
analysis (7).

'Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood' is a 
complex and extended piece, and Freud concerns himself 
with such a variety of aspects of Leonardo's character 
and life that I shall attempt no more than a partial re-
view. I want to suggest, primarily, that there are two 
successive stages in the development of the essay.

Freud first addressed himself to Leonardo's report 
of a childhood memory in which, as he lay in a cradle, a 
vulture swooped down upon him, opening his mouth with its 
tail and repeatedly striking its tail across his lips. 
And Freud's first point, reasonably enough we must thínk, 
is that this can hardly be a memory of an actual event. 
But it is, Freud goes on, significant as a phantasy, and 
what is especially to be remarked is the way in which 
Leonardo has transposed his phantasy onto a particular 
period of his infancy: the period, we may imagine, during 
which he was still suckled at his mother's breast.

The understanding of the phantasy, Freud then sugg-
est, is made available in much the same way in which it 
is possible to understand a dream: that is, we can call 
upon associations to the elements of the phantasy. Obv-
iously Leonardo's cannot be produced, but then the ele-
ments of the phantasy have a fairly common frequency in dreams, and Freud had no hesitation in drawing upon his clinical experience in order to suggest what these elements might associatively signify. The vulture's tail, for example, might signify the penis; and the vulture's inserting its tail into the infant's mouth might then signify fellatio. (Freud adds here an elaborate association to the vulture itself, but this, to an important degree, is discredited by his mistranslation of the word 'nibbio' in Leonardo's report, which means 'kite' and not 'vulture'.) In other words, it is Freud's point, the phantasy has a strong erotic content, and a content which, Freud was further led to suggest, might well indicate passive homosexuality.

But the really curious feature of the phantasy, as I have said, is the way in which it seems to have been elaborated around what we might think of as Leonardo's real childhood memory of being suckled, or at least around Leonardo's memory of his mother in early childhood. On what grounds, then, might such a memory have been elaborated in such apparently erotic manner?

The answer which Freud proposes is that Leonardo's sexual phantasy life was linked very strongly to the unusual history of Leonardo's early childhood, such little history, at least, as is available. We know that Leon-
arido was illegitimate, and that the first few years of his life were spent exclusively in the company of his natural mother. In the circumstances, Freud suggests, it would be natural to suppose an intensely affectionate relation between the mother and the child. Subsequently, when he was about five, Leonardo was taken into his father's household to acquire a new mother, his father's legal wife. And at this point, Freud suggests, it would be natural to suppose a fairly severe repression of the early infantile affections.

Of course the speculative nature of Freud's suggestions is quite apparent, but they are not arbitrary. For Freud was struck by the similarity of Leonardo's early circumstances to those cases with which he was directly acquainted in which the subject had developed a particular mode of homosexuality. And if we add to this the evidence of the homoerotic content of Leonardo's phantasy, and also what appear to be indications of homosexual desires in Leonardo's adult life, then there is good reason to suppose a strongly homosexual strain to the artist's character.

This completes what I have wanted to call the first stage of the Leonardo essay. And it is not, I think, implausible to suggest that here Freud has been concerned to a significant degree to illustrate the potential of
the psychoanalytic reading of character, particularly with respect to the resources of dream-interpretation. Of course the suggestion cannot remain unqualified. First, for instance, the vulture phantasy is considered only on analogy with a dream; second, though certainly Freud did not discount this possibility in his theory of dream-interpretation, the associations to the elements of the phantasy are not Leonardo's, but rather, as it were, universal associations (8); and third, and most significant, the associative trains do not so much directly reveal the structure of infantile sexuality as simply lead to that which, independently, there is some reason to suppose.

Freud's subsequent concern is to map on to the early course of Leonardo's psychic development certain aspects of his adult life and career. And here, in what I shall call the second stage of the essay, it is Freud's principal thought that 'Slowly there occurred in [Leonardo] a process which can only be compared to the regressions in neurotics' (SE XI 133). In other words, my suggestion is that the second stage of the essay is concerned with illustrating certain aspects of the theory of neurosis.

There are, Freud suppose, two significant fixational points to which Leonardo would have been likely to regress: the first (in reverse order of original development) marked
by the period in which he was taken into his father's household; and the second marked by the period in which he was in the exclusive company of his natural mother. With the first, a period in which we may imagine a severe repression of the earlier infantile eroticism, Freud associates the middle years of Leonardo's life in which he came more and more to occupy himself with scientific investigation and in which his artistic creativity seems to have been inhibited; and with the second, a period in which we may imagine an uninhibitedness in emotional expression, Freud associates the last great phase of Leonardo's painting. Since it is only in connection with the second of the fixational points that Freud introduces a discussion of Leonardo's artistic works, I shall here neglect the first.

Freud concentrates on two paintings, the Mona Lisa, and the later Madonna and Child with St Anne, though, as we shall see, he was also to make an extremely interesting comment upon the last of Leonardo's paintings, the figures of Leda, of John the Baptist, and of Bacchus. And it is the famous Giaconda smile, which also characterises the subsequent paintings, on which Freud rests his interpretation. It was the smile, Freud speculates, which recalled Leonardo from the inhibition upon his creativity by releasing the repressed memory of Leonardo's early, intense attachment to his natural mother: that is, Freud writes,
...we begin to suspect the possibility that it was his mother who possessed the mysterious smile—the smile that he had lost and that fascinated him so much when he found it again....(SE XI 111)

If indeed the famous smile can be supposed to have had such special significance for Leonardo, then it becomes especially interesting to examine Leonardo's subsequent elaborations upon the motif in the later painting: first, for instance, in *The Madonna and Child with St Anne*. And what is striking here is that the smile is portrayed on the faces of both the Madonna and St Anne. But there is, too, another curious feature of the painting: for though of course St Anne is the Child's grandmother, Mary's mother, Leonardo paints them as women of more or less the same age. Freud is here immediately led to suggest that Leonardo, as it were, provides the Child with two mothers, and that this is, on his part, a further recall of the two mothers of his own childhood. More than that, Freud adds, the peculiar pyramidal configuration in the painting suggests that Leonardo attempts to reconcile the two mothers of his childhood, and hence to reconcile the two early periods of his life which had remained in conflict.

Freud's reading now develops further, for, he points out, Leonardo's recall of his attachment to his natural mother is not without its menacing aspect, and this perhaps accounts for the odd equivocality of the smile. For, if
Freud's speculation is correct, Leonardo's natural mother's devotion was fateful for him: in 'the violence of the caresses, to which his phantasy of the vulture points' (SE XI 115-6) can be found the source of Leonardo's later homosexual desires, insofar as the repression of the early eroticism had, we should suppose, brought Leonardo to proscribe the desire of such caresses from another woman. Instead, he would identify with the giver of such caresses, and seek as the idealised objects of his own sexual desire boys in his own image. And it is at this point that Freud turns to the androgynous figures of the last paintings: for if Leonardo's recall of his attachment to his mother was accompanied by a realisation of her influence upon the course of his life, then we should not be surprised to find the phantasised mother-figure conflated with the boy-figures to whom Leonardo had been drawn. And these last figures, as Freud puts it, are indeed

...beautiful youths of feminine delicacy and with effeminate forms; they do not cast their eyes down, but gaze in mysterious triumph, as if they knew of a great achievement of happiness, about which silence must be kept. The familiar smile of fascination leads one to guess that it is a secret of love. (SE XI 117)

Manifestly, these last points take us a good deal further than the view that this second stage of the essay illustrates certain aspects of the theory of neurosis. Indeed, we shall see, these last points embody a thesis which can
be no part of a theory of neurosis. But before taking this up, let us remain with the comparison of Leonardo's regressions and the regressions of the neurotic - at least as far as Freud himself was prepared to remain with it. And this, we might now say, is not that far. For, in the end, Freud is led to assess his own comparison in a particularly restrictive way. He asks rhetorically, as if to lend to support to what he has said, 'Can it be that there is nothing in Leonardo's life work to bear witness to what his memory preserved as the strongest impression of his childhood?'. Immediately, however, he adds,

Yet if one considers the profound transformations through which an impression in an artist's life has to pass before it is allowed to make a contribution to a work of art, one will be bound to keep any claim to certainty... within very modest limits; and this is especially so in Leonardo's case. (SE XI 107)

Again we encounter Freud's familiar reserve about permitting psychoanalytic theory to trespass upon the dignity of art - however much we might believe the psychoanalytic parallels have taken us.

If my reading of Freud's illustrative purpose in the Leonardo essay does not yet carry full conviction that Freud was perfectly justified in saying that he had never reckoned Leonardo as a neurotic, then, as I have just intimated, his points in connection with the last paintings are quite decisive. For Freud's interpretation of these suggests that Leonardo can in no sense be regarded as condemned, like
the neurotic, to the haunting, repetitive world of phantasy. If Freud is right, then Leonardo's last works seem to reveal the quite un-neurotic manner in which Leonardo became aware of the roots of his sexual phantasy, and, indeed, of the way in which he might be thought to have worked through that phantasy in what would be, in psychoanalytic terms, an entirely healthful way of coping with potential neurosis. For, as Freud puts it in a last remark on the androgynous figure paintings,

> It is possible that in these figures Leonardo has denied the unhappiness of his erotic life and has triumphed over it in his art, by representing the wishes of the boy, infatuated with his mother, as fulfilled in this blissful union of the male and female natures. (SE XI 117-8)

If anything is clear about the neurotic, it is that he exactly lacks the means of such triumph over his unhappiness. That is his tragedy. And indeed, in stark contradiction with Trilling's view of Freud, Freud's Leonardo is 'in command of his fantasy, while it is exactly the mark of the neurotic that he is possessed by his fantasy'.

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If it is by now apparent how little Freud sought to urge that art and neurosis are 'inextricably bound up together', there is an important issue which remains. For now the
suggestion that artistic activity and neurosis are actually incompatible, or may be in particular cases, is strong. And so far we know very little of the mechanisms in terms of which this incompatibility might theoretically be represented.

The suggestion is sometimes made that art in fact is therapeutic for neurosis. But there are, I think, two reasons at least for regarding the suggestion with extreme caution.

In the first place, the suggestion can be made at a strikingly crude and superficial level, almost as if the practice of art were analogous to some physical exercise which is therapeutic for a bodily injury. But it is ludicrous to suppose that it is the mere wielding of a paintbrush, or the chiselling at stone which is therapeutically efficacious (though it may, of course, be usefully diverting). And it is extremely difficult to give the suggestion any more detailed elaboration. (For, if we take as the paradigm of art's therapeutic value, the apparently therapeutic value of his art for Leonardo himself, then, though we are not bound comically to urge that one need only paint like Leonardo in order to resist neurosis, about the only thing that can be said is that if one can develop something like the psychic capacities which enabled Leonardo to work through his phantasy, then
art, to the degree that it is the means of expressing this working through, may well be therapeutically efficacious. But this is a largely vacuous claim: for to develop something like the capacities which enabled Leonardo to work through phantasy is already to have discovered an exit from potential neurosis, whether or not this ultimately expresses itself in art. We need to say, first, what this capacity amounts to, and second, how this capacity could come to have characteristically artistic manifestation.

This brings us to a second reason for caution in thinking of art as therapeutic for neurosis. For, however suggestive Freud's remarks, in particular his remarks about Leonardo, it is quite unclear, at this point, on what theoretical resource Freud is drawing. That is to say, since working through phantasy is a capacity which amounts to the dissolution of the potentially pathogenic force of libidinal energy through the binding or containing of those energies within the range of the ego, then we are once again thrown back on the difficulty to which I have already drawn attention: namely, that in the earlier stage of his career, Freud had very little to say about the nature of the ego and its activities.

Still, however little Freud could at this point elaborate upon the suggestiveness of the Leonardo essay,
it does, I think, have an intriguingly proleptic quality. For not only does it anticipate the area of research to which, much later, Freud came to turn his theoretical attentions, it also anticipates much that was to become of central concern to post-Freudian psychoanalytic theory. For instance, the regressions which Freud attributes to Leonardo might well be designated — to employ a phrase frequently used by the school of ego-psychologists led by Ernst Kris — 'regressions in the service of the ego': that is, regressions with benign effect. And though Freud was at first almost exclusively concerned with the malignant effect of regression in neurosis, it is perhaps to the Leonardo essay that subsequent psychoanalytic advance owes a great deal more than one would be likely to expect. I shall want to take up this issue, and to return to the essay itself later, in Part Two in connection with Freud's developing account of the ego, and with the extensions to that account which are offered in the work of Melanie Klein.

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It might be said that I too precipitately draw attention to apparent theoretical lacunae in the early stages of Freud's work. For Freud did have available to him the concept of sublimation, and he did write at one point that the artist's
constitution 'probably includes a strong capacity for sublimation' (SE XVI 376). Could it not be that Freud's views of Leonardo could find articulation in terms of sublimation: for example, a sublimation of his early intense attachment to his natural mother?

But I reserve the discussion of sublimation to this late point for two reasons. The first is that, although the idea of sublimation has come to have common currency as an allegedly central Freudian notion, it is never, I think, in Freud's writings a very precise notion. The second, and more important, is that, as I earlier pointed out, the idea of sublimation itself depends upon an account of the nature of the ego and its activities: specifically, the ego's capacity to re-direct libidinal energy.

However, Freud does make some particular claims about sublimation which are worth examining here: the more so because they can be made to connect up with an important issue in aesthetics.

It is axiomatic, for Freud, that libidinal trends readily attach themselves to non-sexual activities. (One might interpolate here, it is precisely this axiom which engenders a familiar kind of antagonism to Freudian theory: for where Freud discovers libidinal perseveration in apparently non-sexual activity, he is often thought gratuitously to sexualise any form of behaviour. I shall have more
to say on this matter in Part Two (9).) To this, Freud significantly adds, 'this displacibility and readiness to accept a substitute must operate powerfully against the pathogenic effect of frustration' (SE XVI 345). Thus, in that we have already encountered the claim that a capacity for sublimation diverts the path to symptom formation, it will come as no surprise that sublimation is regarded by Freud as 'only a special case of the way in which sexual trends are attached to other, non-sexual ones' (SE XVI 345). But what, we must now ask, characterises sublimation as a 'special case', and how can it come to seem relevant to artistic activity?

The principal feature of sublimation for Freud is the degree to which a libidinal trend attaches itself to what he calls a 'higher' aim: an aim which is roughly thought of as 'social' or as of 'special cultural significance' (SE XVI 345; vide SE XI 54) - at any rate, an aim which, unlike a sexual aim, is distinctive in its lack of self-interest. Obviously this characteristic is so rough as to include an enormous range of human activity, and to this degree there is nothing very specific about its association with artistic activity. But the interest here lies, I think, in the way in which this association draws attention to an extremely important, if sometimes neglected, aspect of art: namely, the irreducibly social and public nature
of art - what is sometimes called the 'institutionality' of art. And what is meant in saying this is not simply that art is, as a matter of fact, a social and public enterprise rather than a resolutely private one, but that art is, as a matter of intelligibility, bound within the domain of public convention and decision. This is important, and it constitutes a serious challenge to what is sometimes asserted: for instance, in the Romantic conception of the artist as merely the medium of his Muse, as giving pure voice to inner inspiration - a conception which, one may add, is closely connected in the Romantic imagination with the idea of the artist as gifted in a way which is thought to depend upon some alien, abnormal and even diseased quality of character: the Philoctetes Syndrome, as I have called it.

Still, it might be objected, however exaggerated and dramatised the Romantic conception here, it nevertheless contains an aesthetic truth which the argument on behalf of the social and institutional character of art seems blatantly to deny. That is, the argument urges that a work of art is nothing more than that which can conventionally be regarded as a work of art, and this seems too strongly to give art over to its audience in such a way as to deprive the artist of any aesthetic authority or imaginative influence over his work. But this is to miss the point:
for all the argument really urges is that the artist cannot have sole aesthetic authority over his work, and that his creative intentions cannot be resolutely egocentric. As Richard Wollheim has put it,

What a poem is is in part a social fact, or the consequence of a social fact, though not an arbitrary social fact. Nor, of course, is it a fact after the event. In other words, the poet is guided in what he writes by this social fact: he does not necessarily have to wait until he has written whatever it is, and then learn from society whether it is a poem or not — like a gambler waiting to discover whether he has won or lost. (10)

And we may add to this that the artist can, at least to some extent, choose which social fact is to be his guide (that is, he can choose what kind of art he is to produce); and he can also, at least to some extent, choose amongst the conventions and decisions which make up the social fact, neglecting some, emphasizing others, and indeed creating some new ones (that is, he can create a particular character for the kind of art he is to produce). What he cannot do, however, insofar as he wishes to present his work as a recognisable instance of art, is to isolate himself from every convention and decision which would constitute the social fact which gives sense to his activity. No more than I can simply declare a word to have a new meaning (although I can, at least to some degree, modify and extend its meaning) — I must first establish its use within a recognisable social context.
It is with respect to this sort of demand that the idea of sublimation becomes particularly relevant. For of course sublimation is simply the accommodation of a libidinal trend to an acceptable, non-egotentric, social mode. And the analogy here points once again to the difference between the artist qua artist and the neurotic. The neurotic cannot sublimate his libidinal desire: its intensity and inflexibility inevitably carry him away from social reality, and what issues in symptomatic form has sense only with respect to his own inner world. Even if the artist resembles the neurotic in respect of a deep commitment to phantasy, his desires are not intractable and inflexible: they are channelled and modified by the social reality of art. And of course this gives further sense to Freud's claim that art can constitute 'a path that leads back from phantasy to reality'.

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My general purpose has been to show, with reference to Freud's own views, as well as to general argument, that there can in the end be no collusion between strict neurosis and art. But two thoughts might occur. The first is that, insofar as I have already argued that for Freud neurosis and normality are closely continuous, then, in general, the separation
of the artist from the neurotic cannot be altogether so abrupt. And the second is that, if the artist were so unlike the neurotic, then it would not be easy to understand why Freud frequently brought the artist into a discussion of neurosis. There is, I think, just one response to each of these thoughts, but, importantly, it reveals an oddly restrictive feature of Freud's concerns with art.

If we recall that Freud was able to discuss Leonardo's life and work in terms which closely parallel the way in which he might have discussed the neurotic, though he insisted that he did not regard Leonardo as a neurotic, then we ought to be able to say what it is, in the first place, which permits the parallel. And the answer here is that Freud attributes to Leonardo much the same desires which we might expect to encounter in the neurotic.

Here it might triumphantly be exclaimed that if indeed this is the case then Freud really does bring the artist into extremely close association with the neurotic: they share the same desires. But this is to forget a crucial point. For Freud never claimed that there are desires which are in themselves intrinsically neurotic desires. As I indicated earlier, it is not the specific desire which distinguishes the neurotic from the normal man, but rather the quantity of energy (together with certain constitutional factors) which is invested in the desire. In other words, it would
not, then, be surprising to discover desires in Leonardo which we might expect to encounter in the neurotic, because we might encounter those same desires in anyone at all, neurotic or normal. (One should perhaps here add, the homosexual nature of Leonardo’s putative desires notwithstanding, for Freud by no means regarded homosexual desires as in themselves pathogenic, or as indicative of neurosis (11).) And to say that we all may have the same desires as the neurotic is, evidently, one way in which to affirm the continuity of neurosis and normality.

But this quickly brings us to the second point. For if a belief in the continuity of neurosis and normality would immediately suggest that the artist may well fashion his work around desires which we may all have — and indeed, for aesthetic reasons, we expect this kind of universality in art — then it is natural enough for Freud to turn to art and to artists in illustration of his claims. And this is no more obvious, of course, than in Freud’s citing Oedipus Rex or Hamlet in discussing the most momentous of human desires, the Oedipal desires.

It is here, however, that we come upon what I called the oddly restrictive feature of Freud’s concern with art. For, in appealing to desires which might be manifest in a work of art, Freud clearly addresses himself to the content of art, not the form. And, as I argued in the Prologue,
however much understanding this might provide of the human condition generally — and we must assume that this was always Freud's primary and passionate concern — what it does not provide is an understanding of the specifically and distinctively aesthetic qualities of art.

Freud was very well aware of the partiality of his concern with art. Again and again we find him disclaiming any capacity to bring psychoanalytic insight to bear on art — that is, I would suggest, on the aesthetic form of art. For instance, we should recall his reserve in the essay on Leonardo in the face of the 'profound transformations through which an impression in an artist's life has to pass before it can be allowed to make a contribution to a work of art'. But Freud is, at one point, quite explicit about this. For he writes at the beginning of his essay on 'The Moses of Michelángelo',

I must say at once that I am no connoisseur of art, but simply a layman. I have often observed that the subject-matter of works of art has a stronger attraction for me than their formal and technical qualities, though to the artist their value lies first and foremost in these latter. (SE XIII 211)

If there is yet a great deal more to explore in Freud's work and its contribution to the understanding of art, then it should be remembered just how limited Freud himself would have thought his own contribution to the matter. It is regrettable that some of his disciples and aficionados have
not shared in Freud's deep and acute sense of intellectual responsibility. Their guilt, in this respect and in others, I now propose to argue, is strikingly manifest in their use and abuse of Freud's theory of the dream in connection with aesthetic understanding.
There is an anecdote according to which the Surrealist hero Saint-Pol-Roux would, on going to sleep each night, post a notice on his door declaring that 'The Poet is Working'. Doubtless the frivolous gesture will seem to some exactly to characterise the quality of the Surrealists' attachment to Freud's theory of dream, and probably no more so than it might have seemed to Freud himself. Indeed Freud was once to write to his friend, Stefan Zweig, to say that he had come to regard the Surrealists as 'complete fools' (1).

Still, Surrealist whimsy and Freud's obvious hostility are not conclusive evidence to indicate the degree to which the Freudian theory of dreams is central to Surrealism. And this is a matter of some interest: for if Surrealist art is strongly committed to the theory, then this is likely to cast light on the contribution of the theory to the understanding of art.

In fact, I shall argue, Surrealism is not committed to the theory of dreams, except in trivial ways, but to argue this will, I think, introduce some crucial points in connection with the nature of Freud's theory of dreams. I shall consider two aspects of the issue here: first, the fact that, in his theoretical writings on Surrealism André Breton seems to make a good deal out of Freudian
views; and second, the fact that Surrealist art itself suggests a strong Freudian influence.

Two points might justifiably be made about Breton's theories about Surrealism. The first is that they are startlingly unfreudian. The second is that they are barely theories of art.

For the first, there is a striking example of Breton's divergence from Freud on a quite fundamental issue. In recommending that art explore the rich and undiscovered territory of the id, Breton thought it was part of the merit of his recommendation that thus art might achieve 'the abolition of the ego by the id' (2). It is impossible to believe that this would not have horrified Freud, since it was always his principal therapeutic aim to strengthen a weak or disabled ego in order to meet and contain the demands of the id: indeed, it might be said, his clinical practice was with 'abolished' egos. And in view of Freud's deep respect for art, it is highly implausible to suppose that he thought through art one might actually invite the abolition of the ego by the id. Indeed, we saw in Freud's discussion of Leonardo the strong suggestion that Freud considered art efficacious in the binding of the id's energies, or, what is the same thing, in the building-up of the ego.
The point here quickly brings us to bear on the claim that Breton's theories are only barely theories of art. For, generally speaking, Breton was much more interested in the ends which art's alleged abolition of the ego might achieve than in the art itself. That is to say, Breton regarded what he called 'psychic automatism' - the idea he derived from the Freudian method of associating to a dream without the interference of the critical faculties, and exemplified primarily in the Surrealists' 'automatic writing' - as 'exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern' (3). It was, for Breton, of largely didactic value: a means, he wrote, 'which we persist in promoting the moment it is a question, not basically now of producing works of art, but of casting light upon the unrevealed and yet revealable portion of our being' (4). And this didactic function becomes even more apparent once Breton came to see in Surrealism a profound political and social significance:

Psychic automatism...has never constituted an end in itself for Surrealism.... It was a question of foiling, foiling forever, the coalition of forces that seek to make the unconscious incapable of any sort of violent eruption: a society that feels itself threatened on all sides, as bourgeois society does, rightly thinks that such an eruption may be the death of it. (5)

We encounter that classic type of the French intellectual mind: the tenacious and tendentious grasp of an isolated point which is ultimately made to find its glory as an
expression of *épater le bourgeois*. It is a long way from art, and an even greater distance from Freud.

If we consider Surrealist art itself, however, a more interesting issue arises: namely, that if there is little rapprochement between Surrealist and Freudian theory, then the quality of Surrealist art might suggest that the art itself readily makes itself available to Freudian theory. For the most striking quality of Surrealist art is its dream-like vision and composition: for example, the strangely projected distance and flat timelessness of de Chirico's *Piazza d'Italia* (1912), or his *The Anquish of Departure* (1913-14); the hallucinatory but meticulously detailed absurdity of much of Dali's painting (6); the disturbingly incongruous juxtaposition of imagery in Ernst's *Of This Man Shall Know Nothing* (1923). Indeed, the description which Ernst offered along with this last painting, which in fact was dedicated to André Breton, sounds very much like the description of a dream. -Ernst writes,

The crescent yellow parachute stops the little whistle falling to the ground. The whistle, because people are taking notice of it, thinks it is climbing to the sun. The sun is divided into two so that it can spin better. The model is stretched out in dreaming pose. The right leg is bent (a pleasant and exact movement). The hand hides the earth. Through this movement the earth takes on the importance of a sexual origin. The moon runs through its phases and eclipses with the utmost speed. The picture is
curious because of its symmetry. The two sexes balance one another. (7)

We might then consider whether, in presenting themselves as artistic analogues of the dream, Surrealist paintings invite interpretation and understanding in a manner not unlike the interpretation of dreams. And while there is the obvious danger that the paintings might pointlessly be contrived to elicit such interpretation (a danger to which Magritte once archly drew attention in the deliberate sexual symbolism of his still-life called The Explanation: a painting of a penile carrot inserted in the vaginal neck of a bottle) this need not be the case. And where it is not, where a psychoanalytic interpretation of the work in question seems to provide genuine illumination, then perhaps we might see what general form such interpretation might take in the understanding of non-Surrealist art as well.

Such, at least, is a line of thought which might be developed, and it seems to hold out certain prima facie attractions. But whether or not it can fulfil its apparent promise is a matter which lies close to the heart of a central, and sometimes misunderstood issue in Freud's theory of dreams.

It would be wise at the outset to follow Freud in distinguishing two separable aspects of the theory of dreams: the theory
of dream-interpretation on the one hand, from, on the other, the theory of dream-construction, or, as Freud liked to call it, of dream-work. Freud always felt that too many readers of The Interpretation of Dreams had damagingly confused these two aspects, although, it must be said, Freud tended to be peculiarly suspicious of possible misunderstanding of his theory of dream. Still, we have in fact already encountered an instance of this kind of confusion in Breton's writings. It will be recalled that Breton derived his conception of 'psychic automatism' from the idea of associating to a dream — an idea which, we shall see in a moment, is instrumental in the possibility of dream-interpretation. But Breton talked of psychic automatism in terms of the unconscious mechanisms which are operative in the dream, and such unconscious mechanisms are of course part of the dream-work.

Let me then be quite clear: the claim I mean to examine is that Surrealist art, perhaps exemplarily, invites interpretation in much the same manner that one might interpret a dream; and the aspect of Freud's theory with which I am here exclusively concerned is the theory of dream-interpretation: that is, the technique for discovering the latent dream-thoughts in the manifest content of the dream.

It is a point of the first importance that, with one
qualification which I shall come to in a moment, Freud was always to insist upon 'the impossibility of interpreting a dream unless one has the dreamer's associations at one's disposal' (SE XXII 8). Since his insistence here is not always generally recognised, it is perhaps worth brief explanation.

Associations to the elements of a dream are not, for Freud, simply a methodological convenience for the analyst in penetrating to the latent dream-thoughts. That is, the relation of the associations to the dream-elements is not exhausted in the fact that the associations are somehow just prompted by the dream-elements. Rather, Freud puts it, the dream is 'an abbreviated selection from the associations' (SE XXII 12). The associations are not of course themselves the latent dream-thoughts — the relation between the associations and the dream-thoughts is highly complex, though it need not concern us here (8) — but they do supply 'all the explanations, transitions, and connections which the patient's intellect is bound to produce in the course of his approach to the dream-thoughts' (SE XXII 12). And since the dream-interpreter needs to discover the course of the approach to the dream-thoughts before he can properly identify what they are, then clearly the dreamer's associations are indispensable to him.

But now, the indispensability of associations in the
interpretation of the dream rather changes the thought that Surrealist art might invite interpretation in the same manner. There was no indication, that is, that the artist's associations to the elements of his work might be required in interpretation. Still, this should not surprise us: for if we can continue to think of Breton as representing Surrealist thinking, then it is plain that he was simply not aware of this aspect of Freud's theory. For instance, Breton once enthusiastically compiled an anthology of dreams which he then sent to Freud for comment; presumably he did not anticipate the abruptness of Freud's reply that

A mere collection of dreams without the dreamer's associations, without the knowledge of the circumstances in which they occurred, tells me nothing, and I can hardly imagine what it could tell anyone. (9)

But it is not here only that whatever form of interpretation the Surrealists had in mind it was manifestly not the Freudian form. There is a more general difficulty. For if the form of interpretation is now modified to include the artist's associations, it is hard to see how they can come to seem relevant to an understanding of his work as art, and not just as a surrogate kind of dream. That is to say, if they are to have a place in the understanding of art, then it will be necessary to attach some special significance to the associations with respect to the structure of the work generally, in the same way that the dream is a selective abbreviation of the dreamer's associations.
But then if, in the understanding of a dream, what governs the selection and abbreviation of associations is not crucial (and Freud readily acknowledged that this is effected 'according to rule, that we have not yet understood' [SE XXII 12]), then manifestly, in the understanding of art, it is crucial: for here what must authoritatively govern any putative selection and abbreviation of associations is consideration of the formal unity of the work of art. And, I have already argued, it is the articulation of just this formal aspect of art which we must regard as distinctive of any significant understanding of art. The artist's associations, in other words, add nothing to our understanding of his work in this respect, though they may of course add to our understanding of his particular character.

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Earlier, I referred to one qualification which Freud allowed concerning the indispensability of a dreamer's associations in the interpretation of his dream. The qualification is that there is a kind of case in which a dream-element might be interpreted without recourse to the dreamer's associations: the case, namely, in which the dream-element is a readily comprehensible symbol. And we have already
come across a case of this kind in Freud's discussion of the signification of the vulture's tail in Leonardo's phantasy.

At this point a serious objection is likely to be made to my procedure. For in so far neglecting the matter of dream-symbolism I will be thought to have deliberately misled in rejecting the idea that there is much point in bringing the techniques of dream-interpretation to bear on the understanding of art. Of course, it will be said, the principal motive for wanting to claim that a work of art may be understood in the same way as a dream is the belief that a work of art — in particular a Surrealist work of art — actually inherits the symbolism familiar in dreams; and the principal resource in coming to understand this symbolism, it will further be said, is the more or less hieratic iconography which Freud supplied for the dream.

My procedure, however, has this justification. The idea that Freud claimed to interpret dreams in terms of a common and wide currency of symbols is just wrong, and an early source of the error is exactly the prevalent failure to acknowledge the role that Freud assigned to associations in dream-interpretation. It is only when once that role is made clear that it is appropriate to go on to discuss the role of symbolism, for, as we shall see, it is an
essentially secondary role.

The technique of getting a patient to associate to his dream, Freud admitted, sometimes - though not often - failed: no amount of perseverance could elicit an association, or an association of any significance. Occasionally this failure had to do with the occurrence of negative transference in the course of treatment, where its force could block the emergence of any association for the patient. But, Freud noted, the failure of association need not occur as the result of negative transference: sometimes a dream-element just could remain resistant to association, both inside the analytic situation and outside.

The failure puzzled Freud. At first he worried that it suggested a defect in the technique of association. But he soon came to realise that the failure to associate 'regularly occurs in connection with particular dream-elements', and this in turn suggested the operation of a 'fresh general principle': namely, that the failure to associate regularly occurred when the dream-element could easily be translated 'with our own resources' (SE XV 150). In other words, where the dream-element appeared to have familiar symbolic significance.

Freud's first instinct in the light of this discovery was, however, extreme caution. This was understandable
enough. For of course the theory of dream-interpretation, in its employment of the technique of association, had primarily set out to establish the interpretation of dreams on firm empirical ground. The appearance of symbolism in dreams threatened to return the theory to the tradition of the 'popular dream-books', as Freud disdainfully called them, which purported to decode every element in dreams.

'Regard for scientific criticism', Freud wrote,

'forbids our returning to the arbitrary judgement of the dream-interpreter, as it was employed in ancient times, and seems to have been revived in the reckless interpretations of Stekel. (SE V 353)

But it was not mere scientific piety which led Freud to resist attaching too much significance to symbolism in dreams. In the first place, the comparative infrequency of the failure to associate, and the otherwise wide success of the technique of association, inclined him to regard symbolic interpretation as no more than a useful supplementary aid. But, more than this, he came to be convinced that symbolic interpretation could only yield results when 'introduced into' an interpretation suggested by the associations. 'Dream-symbols', he wrote,

frequently have more than one or even several meanings, and, as with Chinese script, the correct interpretation can only be arrived at on each occasion from the context. (SE V 353)

In other words, Freud was very far from prepared to regard symbolism in dreams as at all hieratic. There are two
considerations here. First, Freud attached no specific sense to the idea of a symbolic relation: indeed, he believed, 'it shades off into such notions as those of replacement and representation, and even approaches that of an allusion' (SE XV 152). And second, what Freud called the 'plasticity' of the psychic material, particularly in dreams, gives no assurance that what appears to be a dream-symbol in fact bears its common symbolic signification. 'Often enough', he claimed,

a symbol has to be interpreted in its proper meaning and not symbolically; while on other occasions a dreamer may derive from his private memories the power to employ as sexual symbols all kinds of things which are not ordinarily employed as such. Moreover, the ordinarily used sexual symbols are not invariably unambiguous. (SE V 353)

To make the point shortly, even where a dream-element did appear to be a symbol, Freud was extremely reluctant simply to read off a common interpretation. And it is perhaps worth dwelling on the point, for it diverges radically from the popular conception of a 'Freudian symbol'. That is, I think, what is frequently confused in the popular conception is, on the one hand, the possible sexual signification, for instance, of some object or image or dream-element, with, on the other, its actual employment in a sexually symbolic manner. And what determines the latter is the context in which it appears - a context which is identified by associations. The confusion is
evident in sillier forms of advertising, but strikingly so in what purports to be a revealing anecdote, no doubt apocryphal, concerning a student of Freud's who pointed out that Freud was smoking a cigar — obviously a phallic symbol. The humour of the story is supposed to consist in the petulance of Freud's alleged response to the effect that cigars are not always phallic symbols — as if this response were a manifest contradiction of everything Freud had said.

Still, however far these remarks serve to identify the proper, modest, role that symbolism plays for Freud in the interpretation of a dream, it is nevertheless true that symbols sometimes do appear in a dream, and that Freud claimed sometimes to be able to interpret them quite readily. It may well be, then, that whatever technique Freud employs here may also appropriately contribute to the understanding of symbolism in art. But what, we must now ask, is this technique? What are the 'resources' to which we can appeal which assure us that the symbolic translation is not either arbitrary or a matter of mysterious virtuosity?

Freud's answer is clear and straightforward. But it fails to contribute anything to the understanding of art. The meaning which we may attribute to a dream-symbol is not a meaning uniquely identified by psychoanalytic theory:
it is acquired from a fund of sources to which we all have access: from
fairy-tales and myths, from buffoonery and jokes, from folklore (that is, from knowledge about popular manners and customs, sayings and songs) and from poetic and colloquial linguistic usage. (SE XV 158-9)

So far from providing a specific iconography of dreams, Freud simply relies upon the continuity of dream-symbols with symbolism generally. And it is a vital point that, in interpreting a dream-symbol, Freud's resources are no different from those of the iconographer in his interpretation of art. And they both, crucially, include the resource of art itself. In other words, dream-symbolism lies no deeper than, and hence does not explain, symbolism in art

Of course the nature of symbolism generally, in art or the dream indifferently, remains a perplexing issue: we should like to know, for instance, the exact nature of the symbolic relation itself, and we should like to know the origin of symbolic relations and the reason for their ubiquitous presence to us (on this point, Freud speculated that symbolic relations remain as traces of 'an ancient but extinct mode of expression'. (SE XV 166)). But dream-symbolism has no strong claim, Freud asserted, to be the proper place from which to undertake an investigation of symbolism in general: 'The field of symbolism',
he wrote, 'is immensely wide, and dream-symbolism is only a small part of it; indeed, it serves no useful purpose to attack the whole problem from the direction of dreams' (SE XV 166). One might perhaps go further and say that it is not an understanding of dream-symbolism which is more likely to yield an understanding of symbolism in art, but rather, in view of the greater accessibility of art in comparison with the dream, that an understanding of symbolism in art is more likely to yield an understanding of dream-symbolism. This is a point, I think, which Freud himself would have found congenial, for frequently in his interpretation of a dream he appealed to the evidence of a literary text when he came upon some recalcitrant dream-symbol. It is not at all that the dreamer is supposed to command a vast unconscious literary resource, but rather that the appearance of the same image in literature indicates the way in which that image has already commended itself to us as of particular symbolic value.

The theory of dream-interpretation, I have wanted to suggest, is largely irrelevant to the understanding of art. But it seems to me useful to have pointed this out at some length. For it is commonly assumed that if psychoanalysis has anything to contribute to the understanding of art, it can do so in virtue of some analogy between the work of art and a
dream (or a neurotic symptom) such that the techniques of psychoanalytic interpretation may be employed. And what seems to be forgotten in this is that the techniques of psychoanalytic interpretation are primarily directed towards the understanding of the dreamer (or the neurotic), and only secondarily to the actual phenomenon of the dream (or the symptom). Thus, if there is any appropriate analogy here, it is between the dreamer (or the neurotic) and the artist. Such analogy would anyway, I argued in the Prologue, unnecessarily constrict the understanding of art. But, I argued in the previous chapter, there is no analogy between the neurotic and the artist. The same thing may be said - and for virtually the same reason - about the dreamer.

Freud's famous formula for the dream is that it is 'a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish' (SE IV 160). That is, the wish or wishes embedded in the dream-thoughts latent in the manifest content of the dream are such that they cannot be allowed to reveal themselves directly; and so, via the processes of the dream-work, the dream-thoughts are distorted, transformed and given a more or less acceptable disguise which permits the satisfaction of the prompting wish or wishes in the course of the dream. It is, however, this distortion and disguise effected by the dream-work, which renders
the dream so peculiar. It is, Freud writes,

...a completely asocial mental product, it has nothing to communicate to anyone else; it arises within the subject as a compromise between the mental forces struggling within him, it remains unintelligible to the subject himself and is for that reason totally uninteresting to other people. Not only does it not need to set any store by intelligibility, it must actually avoid being understood, for otherwise it would be destroyed; it can only exist in masquerade. For that reason it can, without hindrance, make use of the mechanism that dominates unconscious processes, to the point of a distortion which can no longer be set straight. (SE VIII 179)

Dreaming, in this respect, is no activity for the artist. As I argued in the discussion of the neurotic and the artist, there are clear reasons to insist upon the sociality of the artist's work, upon its public accessibility and institutional intelligibility. If we are to think of the unconscious processes of the dream-work as instrumental to any degree in the creation and understanding of art, then the problem is to say how the artist might exploit and manipulate these processes such that the final effect is not, as in the dream, an irreversible distortion and unintelligibility. In fact, this is simply another way of putting the problem which occurred in connection with the artist's use of, and command over, his phantasy. But then this is really not surprising: Freud precisely wanted to argue that 'the mechanism of dream-construction is the model of the manner in which neurotic symptoms arise'
(SE XV 183).

But if dreaming itself is an activity quite unlike art, this is not all there is to say. For if we now turn to consider the nature of the individual processes of the dream-work, we shall find certain interesting aesthetic connections and resemblances. And this will serve to restore my general theme in the discussion of Freud's early work: the theme, that is, of a theory of mind which is appropriate to the understanding of art. For it is with the theory of the dream-work that we are introduced to what Freud was to call the 'primary process' of the mind.

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There are, Freud argued, four separable processes of the unconscious dream-work (though the fourth, we shall see, is somewhat problematically a part of the dream-work): namely, condensation, displacement, representation and secondary revision. I shall consider each in turn, and in each case I shall try to indicate what bearing they might be said to have on art.

Condensation in the dream is evident in the fact that 'the manifest dream has a smaller content than the latent
one' - a fact brought about, Freud explains, 'by latent elements which have something in common being combined and fused into a single unity in the manifest dream' (SE XV 171).

For example, it is a common enough feature of dreams that different people may be condensed into a single figure: a composite character who looks like one individual, yet dresses like another, and behaves like yet another, while we are sure, with that curious brand of dream-conviction, that it is none of these individuals but someone else.

This perplexing array of fused and combined elements, however, is a quality readily apparent in the work of art: particularly in poetry. Indeed Freud himself drew upon this parallel in discussing condensation in dreams. He writes:

Any one thought, whose form of expression may happen to be fixed for other reasons, will operate in a determinant and selective manner on the possible forms of expression allotted to the other thoughts, and it may do so, perhaps, from the very start - as is the case in writing a poem. If a poem is to be written in rhymes, the second line of a couplet is limited by two conditions: it must express an appropriate meaning, and the expression of that meaning must rhyme with the first line. No doubt the best poem will be one in which we fail to notice the intention of finding a rhyme, and in which the two thoughts have, by mutual influence, chosen from the very start a verbal expression which will allow a rhyme to emerge with only slight subsequent adjustment. (SE V 340)

Poetry of course characteristically depends upon condensation-effect - a fact once nicely expressed in Ezra
Pound's thought that poetry consists in 'gists and piths' — and not only in the obvious structural respects to which Freud alludes. The highly-wrought texture of the poem also demands fusion of sense and rhythm with metre, with imagery, with considerations of phrasing and intonation, with phonetic effect, and so on. And the finest poetry will display an inexhaustible network in the analogue of the composite character in the dream — the unified poetic configuration in, say, the first four lines of Shakespeare's sonnet:

That time of year thou mayst in me behold
When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang
Upon these boughs which shake against the cold,
Bare ruin'd choirs, where late the sweet birds sang.

It would be an interminable process to try to set out the threads of meaning intertwined within the poetic structure in just these four lines in order to catch, for instance, the tonal quality of 'yellow leaves, or none, or few', or the representational significance of the transition from the ending of the second line to the beginning of the third, or of the adverbial modification of 'ruin'd'.

The issue here is connected with the notorious critical debate about the paraphraseability of a poem, for the point is that the condensation in a poem, like the dream, is not a readily transcribable form of expression. As Freud puts
it, condensation in the dream is

...a very unusual kind of transcription of the dream-thoughts: it is not a word-for-word or a sign-for-sign translation; nor is it a selection made according to fixed rules — as though one were to reproduce only the consonants in a word and to leave out the vowels; nor is it what might be described as a representative selection — one element being invariably chosen to take the place of several; it is something different and far more complicated. *(SE XV 173)*

And as much, here, for the poem, or indeed any work of art, although Freud is right when he points out that the clearest exemplification of condensation is the way in which the dream — like the poem — handles words. *(The classic example is the 'Autodidasker' dream where a number of thoughts converge in the composite word which is a condensation of 'Autor', 'Autodidak', and the name, Lasker (vide *SE IV* 298-302).)* But the issue of paraphraseability is not, I take it, the sole preserve of the literary critic: in fact it seems to me to refer to that feature of all art of which Kant was prompted to say that 'language...can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible' — in other words, to that feature of art which I identified as a major theme in the aim of pursuing a psychoanalytic approach to art.

The second achievement of the dream-work is displacement, and what Freud had in mind is the way in which the dream seems to be 'differently centred' from the dream-thought:
where, as he puts it, 'the psychical accent is shifted', and where 'a latent element is replaced not by a component part of itself but by something more remote - that is, by an allusion' (SE XV 174). A simple illustration can be found in the dream reported to Freud by a young woman patient who, at the time, was deeply involved in a sexual affair (vide SE XV 192). The woman dreamed of having been pursued by her lover; she fled to her flat, whereupon she locked the door against her lover; when she looked out through the peep-hole she saw the man sitting on a bench, weeping. The interpretation of the dream - and here I simply represent Freud's conclusion, not the interpretative process - revealed a strongly sexual symbolism: the pursuit symbolised the sexual act; the barring of the door, a contraceptive method; and the man's weeping, the emission of semen. But what is relevant here is not, as one might be inclined to think, that it was the woman herself who had sexually barred the door. In fact, it turned out on her lover's report, she desperately craved a child; it was he who had insisted on contraception. In other words, what occurs in the dream is a displacement of the insistence on contraception: the lover, not the woman, barred the door.

In this sense, displacement is a natural way in which
to construe a broad range of features evident in a work of art: from, at its most general, representation itself, to allusion, imagery and metaphor, and, at a formal extreme, symbolization. And if within that range we should also want to include irony, parody and perhaps caricature, then there is a further connection which may be made with Freud's views. For Freud was well aware that it is the work of displacement which can produce comic effect in the dream. (One might add here that Freud's awareness of this was significant in his turning later to a study of the joke.)

The parallels here may seem too vague to be of much interest. But there is, I think, a point of high aesthetic generality which might be extracted. It is connected with the fact that for Freud the work of displacement in the dream is the principal reason for not taking the dream literally, at face-value (while the work of condensation, on the other hand, creates a distortion within the face, as it were). But it is an important aesthetic issue, particularly in recent years, whether or not a work of art can, or should be taken literally, at face-value. It is, for instance, the avowed purpose of Minimal art (also called 'literalist' art, in fact) to approach, as they say, 'the condition of non-art': that is, to create objects which are virtually indiscernible from objects which are not art by eliminating as far as possible the conditions under which the created
object could be regarded, for example, as continuous with traditional art objects, and so to come closer and closer to compelling the spectator to take the objects quite literally - as, for instance, a mere juxtaposition of metal girders. Evidently the whole enterprise could make no aesthetic sense if the understanding of art were really a matter of literal understanding: the premiss of the enterprise is of course that the understanding of art is not literal, and that the self-conscious endeavour to be literal in presenting an object as art is one way in which to demonstrate this. And the point here does not depend upon the widespread agreement that Minimal art does make aesthetic sense: for to object to Minimal art on the grounds that its objects can in the end be taken in no other way than literally is to imply that that which can only be taken literally cannot be art. Or, to return to the Freudian terminology, to say that we expect displacement values in art.

The third achievement of the dream-work, representation - or, more accurately, the capacity to represent the dreams-thoughts in visual imagery - is, Freud remarks, 'psychologically the most interesting', and this, I think, is no less the case with respect to visual representability in art.

Freud had in mind the way in which the dream overcomes
difficulties in representing certain aspects of the dream-thoughts — notably abstract expressions, or grammatical and logical relations — which are not usually, nor easily rendered pictorially. He cites, for example, the 'Opera' dream, of which an initially perplexing feature was that the opera orchestra sat at the base of a high tower, while the conductor directed their performance from the top of the tower, rushing around the railings which enclosed a small platform, and perspiring profusely. The interpretation was eventually suggested by Freud's knowledge of the personal life of the woman whose dream it was. She was, apparently, deeply sympathetic to one of the orchestra musicians, a Hugo Wolf, whose career had been ended by insanity. Thus, Freud suggested, it is the woman's musician friend who conducts the orchestra, and his position at the top of the tower represents her belief in his greatness: he 'towered above' other members of the orchestra. The fact that in the dream he is caged by the railings and rushes about violently, represents both the musician's surname and his insanity (vide SF V 342-3).

The difficulty in representing such dream-thoughts of greatness, insanity and a particular identity, and hence the ingenuity which representation in the dream demands, Freud compares to representational difficulties in the visual arts: he writes,
The incapacity of dreams to express such things must lie in the nature of the psychical material out of which dreams are made. The plastic arts of painting and sculpture labour, indeed, under a similar limitation as compared with poetry, which can make use of speech; and here once again the reason for their incapacity lies in the nature of the material which these two forms of art manipulate in their effort to express something. Before painting became acquainted with the laws of expression by which it is governed, it made attempts to get over this handicap. In ancient paintings small labels were hung from the mouths of the persons represented, containing in written characters the speeches which the artist despaired of representing pictorially. (SE IV 312)

Despite Freud's sanguine assurance that painting has become acquainted with the 'laws of expression' - that indeed there could be such laws - representability in art remains a perplexing problem. That is, while doubtless there are certain conventions which operate in our visualising capacities - 'prejudices of vision', as they are sometimes called - the problem is not so much what they are as how they come to operate in our visualising capacities: this, I take it, is one reason for saying that representability is 'psychologically interesting'. The fact that there is a conventional relation, for instance, between the word 'tower' and the image of a tower no doubt enables us to understand a reference, but what it does not explain is how we can, as it were, see the word 'tower' in the image of a tower.

To elaborate. There is an Anthony Caro floor sculpture - a cylinder which joins at an angle to a flat bar which in turn joins to a vertically elevated beam - which
bears the title 'Smoulder'. (And, incidentally, if Freud's allusion to 'small labels' used as auxiliary representational aids in 'ancient paintings' seems slightly comical, one need only think of his point being made with respect to the significance of titles, particularly in Modernist art.) What is, I think, intriguing about the Caro piece is the way in which the title draws attention to (and does not merely declare there to be) a certain visual feature of the sculpture: for one cannot articulate the representationality of the sculpture here other than by seeking some conventional semantic equation between the word 'smoulder' and a set of descriptions which approximate to the sculpture; and of course the sculpture is not itself that set of descriptions. It might be objected that all one really requires here is some such notion as 'visual resemblance' (presumably to be employed in talking of the resemblance of the sculpture to - the smouldering of a smouldering object?). But, notoriously, the notion of resemblance does not help here: resemblance is internal to any repre-

senting relation, since one could not detect the resemblance of, say, a sculpture to what it purports to represent without first seeing that the sculpture does represent. The point I make here is that, as much in art as in the dream, one can only go so far in the articulation of visual repr-

esentation before one comes up against the brute psycholog-
fact that an object is just seen to represent another, and it is from that fact, I should say, and not from any conventional semantic equation, that one must start in the investigation of aesthetic representation. And the issue of representability in dreams embodies a clear reference to the psychological fact.

If I have seemed to make a good deal more out of the aesthetic affinities of Freud's ideas about condensation, displacement and representation than is really warranted, then let me make my purpose clear. I have intended nothing more than merely to allow these aspects of the dream-work to suggest aesthetic issues — although these issues are by no means peripheral in aesthetic discussion. I have not intended to imply that these aspects of the dream-work contribute any special penetration of the aesthetic issues, though I think it true that they offer useful ways in which to construe the aesthetic issues. But to the degree that this is so, to the degree that the achievements of the dream-work are to some degree replicated in art, then this suggests the possible collusion of what are for Freud unconscious processes of the mind in the creation and understanding of art. Of course the possibility here yet stands under the important qualification that the primary function of the dream-work is to distort the dream-thoughts to the point of
rendering them unintelligible, and this, I suggested, is an extremely serious qualification if the processes of the dream-work are to be thought at all relevant to the public accessibility and institutional intelligibility of the activity of art. Again it is a question of how far unconscious processes might be exploited and manipulated in the service of art. But if we now consider the fourth achievement of the dream-work, or at least what Freud at first regarded as the fourth achievement of the dream-work, secondary revision, then perhaps some progress might be made with respect to the problem.

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Inevitably, to the degree that condensation, displacement and representation work upon individual elements of the dream-thoughts, or the latent content of the dream, they provide the merest juxtaposition of elements in the manifest content: that is, with respect to these processes, the dream as yet has no coherence and unity. It is, however, the purpose of secondary revision to connect up the elements of the manifest content in some intelligible form. As a result of secondary revision, Freud writes, 'the dream loses its appearance of absurdity and disconnectedness and approximates to the model of an intelligible experience'
(SE V 490). This is interesting since, to recall, earlier I drew attention to the way in which the unity of the dream seemed largely to be determined by the set of the dreamer's associations to it, and to how this suggested a clear dis-analogy with the work of art, whose unity is governed by considerations of aesthetic form. But it now looks as if the unconscious processes of the dream-work can in fact, in themselves, provide a unity and coherence which is not simply determined by the set of the dreamer's associations.

Unfortunately, as I have intimated, there is an un-accommodating problem here. For it is not quite clear that secondary revision is indeed a part of the dream-work. Freud is just ruefully equivocal on this point in The Interpretation of Dreams; and in fact, some twenty-two years after its first publication, he was to declare that secondary revision 'strictly speaking does not form part of the dream-work' (SE XVIII 241). The problem is obvious: for insofar as secondary revision introduces intelligible form into the dream, it seems then precisely to strain against the fundamental distorting purposes in the dream and actually to operate in the service of the conscious and rational thought which the dream seeks to evade. Freud indeed goes so far as to claim that secondary revision is 'a psychical function which is indistinguishable from our waking thought' (SE V 489), but if secondary revision is a part
of the dream-work then his claim manifestly contradicts another which he makes just a few pages later: namely, that dream-work proper diverges further from our picture of waking thought than has been supposed even by the most determined deprecator of psychical functioning during the formation of dreams. The dream is not simply more careless, more irrational, more forgetful and more incomplete than waking thought; it is completely different from it qualitatively and for that reason not immediately comparable with it. (SE V 507)

There is, I think, no real resolution of the unclarity which surrounds the idea of secondary revision in Freud's work. But at one point he makes a significant connection between secondary revision and phantasy which, I want to suggest, helps to make the issue a little more tractable. And the connection here of course allows the re-introduction of a theme which, in the previous chapter, seemed to be so central to the discussion of art. Moreover, it re-introduces the theme in an extremely important way: for, as I have already said, the idea of secondary revision seemed to indicate that the dreamer is somehow in command of the unconscious processes of the dream-work, and the difficulty discussed at length in the previous chapter was the analogous one of how the artist could be said to be in command of his phantasy life.

In the course of his discussion of secondary revision, Freud comments that there is a kind of case in which secondary
revision is to a great extent spared the labour of, as it were, building up a façade for the dream — the case, namely, in which a formation of that kind already exists, available for use in the material of the dream thoughts' (SE V 491)

And the kind of formation Freud has in mind here is a phantasy. That is to say, in certain cases, so Freud says, a dream will reproduce a phantasy or phantasies, and this aspect of the dream is characterised as 'more fluent, more connected' (SE V 493). Freud cites in illustration the 'Autodidasker' dream which embodies a phantasy of a conversation Freud had in mind to introduce on the occasion on which he next saw a certain Professor N., in which he would say 'The patient about whose condition I consulted you recently is in fact only suffering from a neurosis just as you suspected' (SE IV 299). In other words, the reproduction of a phantasy in a dream will provide just that air of intelligibility — and indeed, in the 'Autodidasker' dream, of high articulateness — which secondary revision would otherwise seek to effect, and hence which it will prefer simply to take over.

But at this point the connection of secondary revision and phantasy might look to be very easily explicable. For where there has been the suggestion that secondary revision is a mental function 'indistinguishable from our waking thought' this must seem to be confirmed in
that Freud at first talks here of 'conscious day-time phantasies' (SE V 491-2); and he is even more specific when he goes on to suggest that secondary revision in fact simply 'seeks to mould the material offered to it into something like a daydream' (SE V 492). Thus, it seems to be quite clear, secondary revision is really not a part of the unconscious processes of the dream-work, but rather a form of that conscious imaginative process which builds coherent, intelligible daydreams.

But this is not all Freud has to say. It is clear that he did not intend the term 'phantasy' as a mere synonym for 'daydream'. For though in introducing the idea of phantasy he says (ironically enough, as it turns out), 'I shall perhaps avoid misunderstanding if I mention the "daydream" as something analogous to it [i.e. phantasy] in waking life', he immediately goes on to distinguish conscious phantasies (of which daydreams are, it is not quite clear here, either instances or analogues) from unconscious phantasies (SE V 491-2). Thus, the difficulty of identifying the process of secondary revision with respect either to conscious or unconscious thought is not at all resolved by associating secondary revision with phantasy, but indeed compounded: for phantasies themselves, it appears, are either conscious or unconscious.

In discussing the idea of phantasy in connection with
neurosis and art, I was deliberately unspecific about the exact nature of the phantasies concerned. No doubt it was a clear enough implication that it is unconscious phantasy — that is, phantasies which have been repressed — which are crucially pathogenic in neurosis, and further that it was Leonardo's unconscious phantasy life which was, allegedly, allied in a significant way with his art. But now at this point the distinction between conscious and unconscious phantasy clearly demands detailed articulation. For instance, is it that unconscious phantasies are simply repressed conscious phantasies? And if this is so, does it not then place unconscious phantasy beyond the reach of the ego's control? For, after all, what is repressed is repressed in the first place to avoid confrontation and conflict with the ego.

Such questions press hard for an answer, particularly insofar as the idea of phantasy increasingly seems to be pivotal in the psychoanalytically-informed understanding of art. Unfortunately, at this stage in Freud's work, no answers are available. It is not just that his conception of phantasy is unclear either. The difficulty is that, gradually, the whole idea of the unconscious undergoes quite radical revision, and, along with this revision — and indeed a focal point of the revision — is a modified and deepened view of the nature and activities of the ego.
It is to this extremely complex matter that I mean to address myself in Part Two. And until all the theoretical ramifications have been gathered together there is little option but, once again, to postpone further discussion. We have, that is to say, an enormous amount of ground to cover from the point at which, in _The Interpretation of Dreams_, Freud reveals his own reluctance to engage in 'lengthy discussions of the psychology of unconscious thinking' (SE v 493).

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There is at this point, however, a less-fraught issue which connects up with the discussion so far. For if the idea of secondary revision in the dream has led us to the idea of daydreaming, or conscious day-time phantasy, then there is a further, natural reference in Freud's writings. I have in mind perhaps the best-known, and _prima facie_ the most direct of all Freud's contributions to the understanding of art: the essay on 'Creative Writers and Daydreaming'.

It must be said, however, that the title of Freud's essay promises a good deal more than it delivers. And one very curious reason for this is that Freud chooses to concern himself not with writers of any critical stature but rather with the 'less pretentious' authors of popular
romances and high adventures: the kind of literature, Freud suggests, in which characteristically

If, at the end of one chapter of my story, I leave the hero unconscious and bleeding from severe wounds, I am sure to find him at the beginning of the next being carefully nursed and on the way to recovery. (SE IX 149)

It is, in other words, the kind of literature to which one is hardly inclined to turn any aesthetic attention at all, and far less could it be thought to epitomise literary art. Freud's judgement that it constitutes a model which, via 'an uninterrupted series of transitional cases', accommodates all literature is just eccentric.

The point which Freud's peculiar concern here enables him to make is that 'the protection of a special Providence' under which the heroes of such literature are placed has an affinity with the hallucinatory, wish-fulfilling quality of the daydream. That is to say, the daydream, like the night-dream, is predicated upon, and finds its driving force in wishes which, if they remain unsatisfied in reality, nevertheless find glorious fulfilment in the course of the dream. The hero of the romances and adventures is indeed, Freud argues, no other than the hero of the daydream or night-dream - that figure of boundless privilege and prerogative - 'His Majesty the Ego' (SE IX 150).

There is very little to dispute in Freud's point here, except, perhaps, that there is not an analogical relation
between such literature and the daydream so much as an ins-
stantial one: these romances and adventures just are (ins-
cribed) daydreams. And insofar as Freud wants to add that
daydreams, in virtue of their majestic egotism, 'repel us 
or at least leave us cold' (SE IX 153), then this would 
precisely explain why what might be called 'daydream litera-
ture' commands no critical esteem.

But if there is little which is aesthetically illumina-
ting in connection with this aspect of the common ground 
of daydreams or phantasies and (a dubious kind of) litera-
ture, and nothing which further serves to locate the role 
of phantasy in art, Freud nevertheless does go on to make 
a striking point, though it is also, for my purposes, all 
too depressingly familiar. For he suggests — despite 
his earlier insistence on the continuity of daydream lit-
erature with its critically distinguished counterparts — 
that it is 'the essential ars poetica' to 'soften' the 
egotistical character of phantasy. And he adds that the 
technique of the true artist here is to bribe us 'by the 
purely formal — that is, aesthetic — yield of pleasure 
which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies' 
(SE IX 153). But though the point about the aesthetic 
bribe is interestingly suggestive — and I mean to come 
back to it in the following chapter in another connection. 
— Freud is content simply to say that the true artist's
formal technique is his 'innermost secret' (SE IX 153). Once again, the discussion is inhibited by Freud's reluctance to say anything about the formal features of art.

Though Freud's primary attempt in 'Creative Writers and Daydreaming' to elaborate on the connection of phantasy and art takes us no further forward, it is, I think, worth mentioning two, almost incidental points which occur in the essay. The first draws attention to the temporal mode of phantasy; and the second introduces an aspect of phantasy which leads into Freud's theory of the joke and its relevance to the understanding of art.

For the first, Freud discusses at some length the way in which phantasy 'hovers, as it were, between three times - the three moments of time which our ideation involves' (SE IX 147). He has in mind that, first, some present impression releases a preconscious or unconscious wish in the subject; second, phantasy then carries the wish back through a memory of a childhood experience in which such a wish had found fulfilment; and third, the wish is then projected forward into the future and represented in phantasy as once more fulfilled. And it is this threading of present, past and future which suggests to Freud a formula which might describe the writer. Thus,
A strong experience in the present awakens in the
creative writer a memory of an earlier experience
(usually belonging to his childhood) from which
there now proceeds a wish which finds its fulfilment
in the creative work. The work itself exhibits
elements of the recent provoking occasion as well
as of the old memory. (SE IX 151)

We have, in fact, already seen how some such formula is
applied in Freud's discussion of Leonardo: some present
circumstance — Freud suggested the smile of the sitter
for the Mona Lisa — recalls for Leonardo the infantile
experience of his mother's highly charged affections, which
experience Leonardo then projects forward as a wish which
is fulfilled in the same enigmatic smiles of the androgyn-
ous figures of the last paintings. But we need not only
point here to a Freudian illustration of the Freudian for-
mula. An even more direct illustration can be found, for
example, in Proust's _À la Recherche du Temps Perdu_. Most
obviously, of course, illustration lies in the celebrated
flavour of a madeleine; but, startlingly, Proust himself
reflects on his own art at one point in almost the precise
terms of Freud's formula:

> Il fallait...faire sortir de la pénombre ce que j'avais
sentir, de la renconterer en un équivalent spirituel.
Or ce moyen qui me paraissait le seul, qu'était-ce
autre chose que de créer une œuvre d'art? (10)

The second point which emerges in 'Creative Writers and
Daydreaming' is Freud's suggestive connection of phantasy
with play. And the point of course will have immediate reference to the long employment of the idea of play in aesthetic discussion.

Freud argues that we might well look to children's play to detect 'the first traces of imaginative activity' (SE IX 143). It is, one need hardly say, a suggestion which has been centrally incorporated in post-Freudian psychoanalysis: for instance in Anna Freud's work, and in Melanie Klein's. But, Freud goes on to comment, we should resist thinking of the child's play as whimsical or unserious: on the contrary, the child 'takes his play very seriously and he expends large amounts of emotion on it' (SE IX 144). For Freud, the contrast with 'play' is not 'serious occupation', but, rather, 'reality'. But this is not to say that the child's playing constitutes a failure to discriminate, or an evasion of, reality:

Freud writes,

In spite of all the emotion with which he cathects his world of play, the child distinguishes it quite well from reality; and he likes to link his imagined objects and situations to the tangible and visible things of the real world. (SL IX 144)

And it is in this respect, Freud claims, that 'The creative writer does the same as the child at play' (SE IX 144). (It is interesting here, though not a point which Freud seems to have in mind, that, through the connection of phantasy and play, and in virtue of the fact that playing neither
necessarily involves a failure to discriminate reality
nor an evasion of it, the artist's use of phantasy in his
art need not commit him to the painfully unreal world of
the neurotic.)

To elaborate: the child's play must, with approaching
adulthood, give way to imaginative activity whose pleasures
can be indulged without the shame of appearing just child-
ish. And one very obvious substitute for play in this
respect is phantasy: it may be thought a continuation of
play which, though it retains the pleasures of play -
and Freud comments that 'hardly anything is harder for a
man than to give up a pleasure which he has once experienc-
ed' (SE IX 145) - nevertheless conceals those pleasures
from others. But then any reproach which residually
attaches to the continuation of play in phantasy will not
be directed upon the artist to the degree that he inter-
weaves phantasy in such a highly-regarded activity as art.
Art might be said to be, in this respect, the most powerful
vindication of play.

Freud inclines to go further here and to say that the
pleasure which the artist provides is in the nature of an
'incentive bonus' or a 'forepleasure' - and this of course
is connected with the idea of the artist's aesthetic bribe.
He writes,

In my opinion, all the aesthetic pleasure which a
creative writer affords us has the character of a
of a forepleasure...and our actual enjoyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our minds. It may even be that not a little of this effect is due to the writer's enabling us thenceforward to enjoy our daydreams without self-reproach or shame. (SE IX.153)

As Freud then adds, 'This brings us to the threshold of new, interesting and complicated enquiries'; but though he immediately goes on 'but also, at least for the moment, to the end of our enquiries', the stage, I think, is now quite well set to consider his theory of the joke. For, it turns out, alongside phantasy, one of our adult substitutes for childish play is the activity of making jokes: joking as we shall see is, for Freud, a form of developed play. And it is in the course of Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious that we shall find Freud elaborating on a good number of the suggestive points I have here considered. Indeed, Freud himself wanted to claim that 'The first example of an application of the analytic mode of thought to the problem of aesthetics was contained in my book on jokes' (SE XIV 37).

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Consideration of the dream has eventually led to the reintroduction of the idea of phantasy in relation to art, and in turn, through the essay on 'Creative Writers and
Daydreaming this has led to the suggestion that we might look to Freud's theory of the joke in seeking a psychoanalytic approach to art. But there is a considerably more important reason for now turning to *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*. For, in connection with both the theory of neurosis and the theory of dream it has been a specific and crucial theoretical problem, where the unconscious inner world can be thought relevant to art, to determine how it is possible for the artist to manipulate his phantasy in artistic form - how he can exploit unconscious processes in the direct service of his art. It is in *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* that we first begin to see this kind of manipulation and exploitation advanced as a general theoretical possibility.
The inner worlds of neurosis and dream, I have argued, serve as no secure foundation in aesthetic discussion. But there is, perhaps, one evident respect in which this might have been foreseen. The formulation is crude, but mental phenomena such as neuroses and dreams are more naturally construed as events or reflexes within the psychic domain than as acts or undertakings. If we turn now to Freud's theory of the joke this particular drawback is not so apparent. As it is said, we make jokes; neuroses and dreams simply happen to us. In this respect, at least, there is a prima facie more plausible connection between art and the joke, for the work of art, whatever else it is, is the object of intentional and purposive activity, both the artist's and the spectator's.

But before I address the sometimes intimidating complexity of Freud's account of the joke in those respects in which it is clearly different from such formations as neurosis or the dream, it will no doubt be useful to establish some degree of continuity with the discussion so far.

In the course of reading the proofs of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud's colleague, Wilhelm Fliess, was led to
remark that many of the dream interpretations seemed excessively amusing (vide SE IV 297n; SE VIII 173n). Freud, though, was very ready to acknowledge this peculiarity: only, he insisted, it was not the dream-interpreter who should be held responsible for this impression, but rather the dreamer himself. The interpretation of a dream seeks only to uncover the dream-work which modifies the dream-thoughts, and if the interpretation itself seemed to be 'in the nature of a joke', then this, Freud claimed, could only be because, in the end, 'the dream-work operates by the same methods as the joke' (SE VIII 173).

It was, then, natural for Freud to follow his study of the dream with a study of the joke, and proper that his first concern, in the most extended section of Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, should be to confirm the suggestion of an affinity between the dream-work and the methods of the joke, or, as he came to call it, 'the joke-work'. And indeed, through a careful survey of a prodigious number of jokes, Freud is led to conclude that 'the joke-work and the dream-work must, at least in some essential respect, be identical' (SE VIII 165). That is to say, it appears that the same unconscious processes of condensation, displacement and representation are as much manifest in jokes as they are in dreams. (I shall here spare myself the solemn labour of a recitation of
jokes in order to support Freud's conclusion (1).)

Alongside this view of the essential identity of the joke-work and dream-work, Freud presents another which is of greater immediate interest. And that is that, not only are the processes of condensation, displacement and representation apparent in jokes, they are, moreover, essential to any joke's being one. To demonstrate this, Freud conceived of the operation of 'reduction', as he called it, an operation which roughly parallels the aim in interpreting a dream. That is, just as it was the aim of the dream-interpretation to 'undo' the dream-work and thus to expose the dream-thought, so, too, the reduction of a joke consisted in undoing the joke-work, thus exposing the fully elaborated joke-thought. But invariably, Freud found, once the joke had been reduced in this way, it no longer seemed funny. To illustrate: Heine's delightful character, Hirsch-Hyacinth, reported that he had been received 'famillionairely' by the wealthy Baron Rothschild; but in this case, once the work of condensation has been undone, what is exposed is the perfectly indifferent thought that the poor lottery agent had been received 'familiarly' by the 'millionaire' Baron (vide SE VIII 12-13; 16-21).

As soon as it is clear that the work of the unconscious processes is no merely adventitious feature of the joke, then,
Freud suggests, it is not unnatural to suppose that the joke might be formed on rough analogy with the formation of a dream. That is, where, in the case of a dream, a dream-thought is given over to unconscious revision, then if we were to think of a joke-thought as similarly given over to unconscious revision this would 'present the same outcome that we can observe in jokes' (SE VIII 166). It is out of this suggestion, with a number of appropriate adjustments, that the famous Freudian formula for the joke emerges: namely, that in the joke 'a preconscious thought is given over for a moment to unconscious revision, and the outcome of this is at once grasped by conscious perception' (SE VIII 166).

This summary account is intended only, as I said, to establish some degree of continuity with the preceding discussion. It constitutes little more than a preface to what I take to be the principal source of interest in Freud's theory of the joke — the interest which, I think, will enable us to further the aesthetic discussion. For if it so far seems that the joke is a psychic phenomenon which largely resembles the dream, it quickly becomes apparent how radically unlike the dream, or a neurotic symptom, it really is. And it is to the lack of resemblance that I now want to turn.

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The general plan of the argument from this point will be to characterise the exact nature of the joke's attachment to and use of the unconscious processes of the mind. But it will not be possible, I fear, to set out the argument in any apparently systematic or continuous manner, for often where it is convenient to focus on one or another feature of Freud's theory, a proper articulation of that feature turns out to depend upon a recognition of the shifting perspectives which Freud tends to employ. If this range of perspectives serves to enrich the theory of the joke, then it also makes it seem excessively dense. So it will be useful here to outline the principal junctions of the argument I intend.

First, I shall try to show, though it is true that unconscious revision in the case of both the joke and the dream serves to effect a distortion of the thoughts which underlie them, the distortion in the case of the joke cannot be so far-reaching as in the dream, for the joke, as an essentially social phenomenon is bound, in a way which the dream is not, to respect the condition of its sociality. But this point immediately leads to a useful parallel between the joke and art with respect to what I have frequently referred to as the social and institutional character of art.

Second, the fact that the joke is not, as it were,
as socially irreverent as the dream must suggest a very general difference of purpose in each case. As Freud was to put it, 'Dreams serve predominantly for the avoidance of unpleasure, jokes for the attainment of pleasure' (SE VIII 179). And here again a parallel with art presents itself, for art too is directed towards the attainment of pleasure and not the avoidance of unpleasure. Indeed, we shall see, it is in the course of trying to secure a characterisation of this feature of the joke that Freud himself introduces the aesthetic parallel.

Freud's reference to aesthetic theory here, however, adds a new complexity to the discussion, in two respects. In the first place, his claims tend to drive us too quickly and too deeply into the domain which it is my purpose to establish as common to the joke and art, and, moreover, at a point which is itself difficult of access. Here, then, I shall seek some retrenchment in drawing upon my favoured association of Kant and Freud in order to identify the central issues more clearly. In the second place, once Freud has suggested construing our pleasure in the joke in terms which are more or less inherited from aesthetic theory, he begins to retrace his account of the joke in a new perspective. That is, he now produces a further classification of jokes, not now with respect to the different techniques of the joke-work, but with respect to the variety of ways
in which the element of play manifests itself in jokes.

At this point, the new perspective enables us to advance the aesthetic discussion a little further in two interesting respects, each connected with the two principles which Freud regarded as operative in joking. The first he calls 'the principle of the confusion of sources of pleasure', and the second, 'the principle of forepleasure'. Each of these is directly connected with the matter of the artist's aesthetic bribe, to which I drew attention in the discussion of 'Creative Writers and Daydreaming'.

Finally, though it will, I hope, be apparent how fecund Freud's theory of the joke is from the aesthetic point of view, certain theoretical difficulties remain. For though it is clear that in the joke there must be a good deal of exchange between conscious and unconscious processes, it continues to be problematic as to how, in theory, this might come about. I shall conclude then with a further discussion of this issue which has, in a number of ways, constituted a principal difficulty in securing a solid foundation for the understanding of art within Freud's early theory of the mind.

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The dream, we have seen, is 'a completely asocial mental product'. The joke, on the other hand, is 'the most social
of all the mental functions which aim at a yield of pleasure' (SE VIII 179). What Freud has in mind here is, first, the evident fact that we tell jokes to others. But it is not, he urges us to think, merely a contingent fact that we do. There is a further fact to which he draws our attention: namely, the fact that we cannot laugh at our own jokes, or at least that we cannot until others have started to laugh (though I think one has to add a further qualification here to the effect that we cannot laugh at our own jokes unless we anticipate the laughter of others). These two facts Freud brings together in the claim that 'We are compelled to tell our jokes to someone else because we are unable to laugh at it ourselves' (SE VIII 156). In other words, Freud argues, the joke is incompletely realised as a joke (for the joker) until, in telling it to others and in occasioning their laughter, the joker himself can laugh. The joker's laughter at his own joke is, as Freud liked to put it, quoting Dugas, really a laughter 'par ricochet', and in this respect the joker depends upon a social context if he is to realise the pleasure for the sake of which he makes the joke.

There are a number of issues which Freud's thesis here introduces: for instance, why is the laughter of the joker's audience in some sense causally efficacious
in the realisation of the joker's own pleasure? And why is it, in the first place, that the joker is in need of such prompting? But I think these issues need not immediately concern us. For the first, Freud does indeed supply highly elaborate terms in which to construe the causal efficacy of the audience's laughter, but these terms tend to derive from his earlier theories concerning the absolute economy of energy within the mental apparatus; and these theories, in connection with the activity of joking rather than with the largely mechanistic accounts of neurosis or the dream, give rise to certain distracting anxieties (2). For the second, it will only become apparent why the joker is unable to laugh at his own joke when, a little later, we come to consider the kind of pleasures which are embodied in joking.

For the moment what is of the first importance is that to the degree that the joker depends upon a social context, then it follows that he cannot allow his joke to be more than minimally distorted by the unconscious processes of the joke-work. Obviously if he is to secure the co-operation of his audience then he must make concessions to intelligibility. As Freud puts it,

The condition of intelligibility is...binding upon [the joke]; it may only make use of a possible distortion in the unconscious through condensation and displacement to the point at which this can be set straight by the third person's understanding. (SE VIII 179)
Clearly this points to a radical difference between the joke and the dream. For, to recall,

not only does [the dream] not need to set any store by intelligibility, it must actually avoid being understood, for otherwise it would be destroyed.  

(SE VIII 179)

The issue here conveniently allows the re-introduction of the vital aesthetic consideration concerning the sociality and institutionality of art. That is, one aspect of the difficulty of taking either neurosis or the dream as a model for art was that in each case the contributions of the unconscious processes remain quite untutored by demands imposed externally, from outside the domain of the repressed wish which stands behind either neurosis or the dream. But such demands, it appears, are intrinsic to the successful joke.

Perhaps the most revealing way in which to consider the parallel in this respect between the joke and art is in reference to a remark Freud once made in a letter to his friend, the artist Stefan Zweig. Freud wrote,

as a critic, one might still be entitled to say that the concept of art resisted an extension beyond the point where the quantitative proportion between unconscious material and preconscious elaboration is not kept within a certain limit. (3)

To put it in the terms I employed earlier, the artist, we want to say, exhibits a greater command and mastery over his material than the models of neurosis or dream allow: for in each case, the dominance of unconscious material
over what can intelligibly be made of it is particularly forceful. But with the joke, the quantitative proportion between unconscious material (the contributions of the joke-work) and the preconscious elaboration (the expression of the joke under the condition of intelligibility) is kept within that limit which, Freud suggests, is appropriate with respect to the concept of art.

At this point the parallel between the joke and art can help us to see something of deeper significance. For if it has sometimes seemed that the argument concerning the sociality and institutionality of art is enforced by very general considerations about the use of the concept of art, and makes no special contribution to the understanding of the artistic process itself, then this can now, to some extent, be rectified. For, in the case of the joke, we can see much more readily what it is that is involved in the joker's accommodation of his joke to a social context. The distortion in the joke must be such that it can be 'set straight' by the joke's audience: but that this can occur is importantly a function of how far the distortion in the joke already respects the medium of its expression. For it is with respect to the exigencies of the (linguistic) medium itself that condensation or displacement is readily reversible. To illustrate — and I borrow here from Ernst's Gombrich's essay on 'Freud's
Aesthetics', in which he argues a similar point - we might consider Hilaire Belloc's witty little rhyme,

When I am dead, I hope it may be said,
His sins were scarlet but his books were read.(4)

The point is that it is the nature of the linguistic medium - here, the fact of the homophony of 'read' and 'red' - which permits the fusion of two trains of thought in an amusing and readily intelligible manner. (We should contrast this, for instance, with a made-up word like 'Auto-didasker'.) As Gombrich puts it,

Puns are not made: they are discovered in the language, and what the primary process does in Freud's account of the joke is really to facilitate this discovery by its rapid shuttling of associations. (5)

In other words, what the model of the joke provides here is not only a means of seeing in what respects the artist might be thought to be in command of his material, but also how this at the same time constitutes a mastery of the medium in which it is expressed. And this is crucial: for it is a perpetual temptation in the search for a psycho-analytic aesthetic - and not only here - for the medium of expression in art to become quite transparent and evanescent, as if it were perfectly indifferent whether the artist chooses to express himself in paint or in stone or in words. I drew attention to the aesthetic absurdity of this temptation in the Prologue, and I indicated there how, when we come to consider the work of Adrian Stokes
the temptation never arises, and how consideration of the medium of art is itself a central part of his psychoanalytic aesthetic. I shall, then, return to the point at much greater length later.

There is a further general connection which might be made with respect to this point. I have talked a good deal about the way in which Freud's contributions to the understanding of art are inhibited by his own reluctance to say much about the formal aspects of art. But the theory of the joke seems to release us to some degree from those inhibitions. For the aspects of the joke which I have been discussing suggest, as again Gombrich has put it, that 'What the joke owes to the unconscious is not so much its content as its form' (6). The joke, as it were, wrenches from the unconscious what, we have seen, merely saturates neurosis or the dream, and it does so in order to secure a particularly attractive form for the joke-thought. In this the joke appears to constitute a promising model for art insofar as, for the first time, we seem to have some theoretical resource for talking of the contributions of unconscious processes to formal technique, though of course we have yet to see whether in fact Freud's theory of the joke clearly makes out, in terms of the theory of mind, the possibility of this kind of manipulation.

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To the degree that the joke is significantly less socially irreverent than the dream, this quickly suggests a deep-lying difference of respective purposes. To put it crudely, while distortion in the joke must permit intelligibility, distortion in the dream must prevent it.

The asymmetry here is readily understandable if we recall for a moment the psychogenesis of the dream (and much the same may be said about the psychogenesis of the neurotic symptom). The dream, that is, occurs as the (hallucinatory) fulfilment of a (repressed) desire. But since the repressing forces are not wholly inactive even in the state of dreaming, the desire finds expression only in disguised form. And we can add here that if the desire could not find even so attentuated an expression (or if the disguise were not sufficiently effective) then something malignant might (for instance, the distress in being awoken by a bad dream which penetrates defences too forcefully). In this sense, then, 'dreams serve predominantly for the avoidance of unpleasure' (SE VIII 179)

On the other hand, the joke occurs, as it were, quite gratuitously. It is not, for example, the expression of a repressed desire (though, as we shall see with respect to what Freud called 'tendentious jokes' it might express a thought which would otherwise be suppressed or repressed). Indeed, far from seeking to avoid some possibly malignant
condition, the joke actually serves to bring about a ben-
ign one. In this sense, jokes 'serve predominantly for
the attainment of pleasure' (SE VIII 179)

Once this fundamental difference of purpose between
the joke and the dream (or a neurotic symptom) is made
clear, an obvious aesthetic parallel suggests itself.
For it is natural to think of art itself as gratuitous
in the same way as the joke: art too is, as I said, di-
rected towards the attainment of pleasure and not to the
avoidance of unpleasure. Such a general affinity of
course does not take us very far. But, it becomes appar-
et, there are highly specific points of comparison bet-
ween art and the joke which emerge here. And it is Freud
himself who is at this point led to draw upon the resources
of aesthetic theory in order to characterise the pleasures
embodied in joking. What he has in mind is that the joke
stands under the general condition which, he suspects,'governs all aesthetic ideation': namely, that

If we do not require our mental apparatus at the
moment for supplying one of our indispensable satis-
factions, we allow it itself to work in the direction
of pleasure and we seek to derive pleasure from
its own operation. (SE VIII 95-6)

Evidently what lies behind Freud's suspicion here is an
established aesthetic tradition. And it is, I think as
evidently, the Kantian aesthetic tradition. It might, then,
be useful to elaborate Freud's claims about the joke with
reference to the tradition. (In this, specific confirmation may be found for the claim discussed in the Prologue that ideas developed with particular clarity in the Kantian aesthetic tradition are seen by Freud to characterise the procedures of mental life more generally.)

It was the principal aim of the Kantian aesthetic tradition, to recall my remarks in the Prologue, to explore the condition of the mind in our experience of art. And Kant himself was particularly concerned to explain in these terms the pleasure which is expressed in an aesthetic judgement ('the judgement of taste'). Thus, for Kant,

\[\text{The quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity such as belongs to cognition generally, is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgement of taste. (CJ 60)}\]

It will be convenient to examine the view with respect to two separable claims which it embodies.

First, Kant wants to say that the mental state in a pure aesthetic judgement is one in which, with respect to the representation of the object, the powers of representation (that is, the imagination and the understanding) are felt to be engaged in 'free play' (\textit{Ibid} CJ 39, 58, 88, 107). That is to say, the mind is not here directed either by a conceptual rule (as, for example, in a cognitive judge-
ment) or by the will (as, for example, in a moral judge-
ment). The aesthetic judgement is, to use the famous
locution, 'disinterested'; or, in my terms, 'gratuitous'.

Second, Kant goes on, our particular pleasure in
this mental state arises from the way in which, though
the imagination and the understanding are undirected and
engaged in an 'indefinite' activity, they are nevertheless
felt to be in harmony. Our pleasure, then, consists in
our feeling that our mental faculties are in fundamental
mutual accord.

To return now, in parallel, to Freud's view of the
joke: first, Freud argues that while dreams 'retain their
connection with the major interests in life' — in virtue,
one supposes, of the continuity of the desires which prompt
the dream in life generally — jokes, on the other hand
do not: rather, they are predicated upon 'the mere activ-
ity, untrammelled by needs, of our mental apparatus' (SE VIII
179). In other words, our pleasure in the joke is, for
Freud, disinterested — or gratuitous — in much the same
way as aesthetic pleasure is for Kant. Second, Freud has
it, our pleasure in the joke arises from the mere undirect-
ed or disinterested activity of our mental apparatus — from
the free play of the mind, as Kant would put it.

What is interesting here, I think, is the way in which
Freud's claim about the origin of our pleasure in the joke
is much simpler, more direct and more accessible than the corresponding Kantian claim. That is, for Freud, our pleasure arises directly out of the mere free-play activity of the mind, and not, as for Kant, mediately, through the way in which this free-play activity makes us aware of the 'harmony of our faculties'. This is extremely convenient of course, for the Kantian idea of there being a harmony of our mental faculties which harmony we come to be aware of as a specific feeling of pleasure is notoriously obscure: it is a dizzying kind of self-awareness which takes as its object, not any particular content in the mind, but rather the faculties of the mind itself; and it is not at all obvious that this awareness should in itself be felt as particularly pleasurable. (Actually there is, I think, something overdetermined about Kant's thesis in this respect. For at two points in the Critique of Judgement he suggests that the free play activity of the mind is in itself a direct source of pleasure (vide CJ 164; 197).)

It is not yet of course clear why Freud thinks that the free play activity of the mind is a direct source of pleasure in the joke. But then his answer has already been intimated in the discussion in the previous chapter of the essay on 'Creative Writers and Daydreaming'. It is just that this free play activity of the mind in joking restores the liberties of an abandoned childhood activity:
the activity of play itself. Joking is, for Freud, like phantasy, a form of 'developed play' (SE VIII 179), and as such its particular savour lies in the way in which an intense childhood pleasure is allowed to re-assert itself in acceptable form, without the shame of appearing simply to revert to childhood activity.

Before I go on to consider Freud's views of the nature and role of play in joking, and how far these views may be brought to bear on the understanding of art, I should make clear that my concern, in parallel with Freud's, is with the way in which the idea of play might be useful in characterising the pleasures of art. It is no part of my concern to maintain that art itself can be construed as a form of play. Indeed this is a thesis which has had some currency in aesthetic theory, but, at least in one of its forms, it is quite unacceptable. That is, it is sometimes maintained that artistic activity is 'free' in the sense that it is unstructured, and that in this respect it resembles play. But this at once misrepresents both the idea of art and the idea of play. In the first place it misrepresents art insofar as, I have repeatedly argued, the artist is constrained by the conventions and expectations which constellate in the social and institut-
ional character of art. In the second place it misrepresents play, at least as the term is employed in psychoanalytic theory. For example, it will be recalled, the contrast Freud intended with the idea of play was not with 'serious occupation' — that is, some highly specific, structured activity — but rather with 'reality', conceived of as that which engages our fundamental interests in the efficient conduct of our lives. The point is crucial, for if the idea of play were thought of as the idea of an entirely free and unstructured activity, then of course it is inconceivable how it could come to be regarded as exhibiting 'the first traces of imaginative activity', as Freud suggested, or how it could come to have a central role in post-Freudian analysis of children: it is in virtue of the structure of the child's play that the analyst is alone able to identify the structure of the child's inner world. The point is that if play contrasts with reality it is not because play is unstructured and reality is, but because play has a different structure from reality. Similarly, the free play activity of the mind in art contrasts with the normal operation of the understanding not because it is unstructured, but because it has a different structure.

We might in fact return to Kant for a final word on the matter. For though of course Kant was very much exer-
cised by the idea of freedom in art, he was clear in insisting that this freedom should not be regarded as an absolute, unstructured freedom - as 'mere play'. He writes,

    It is not amiss, however, to remind the reader of this: that in all the free arts something of a compulsory character is still required, or, as it is called, a mechanism, without which the soul, which in art must be free, and which alone gives life to the work, would be bodyless and evanescent (e.g. in the poetic art there must be correctness and wealth of language, likewise prosody and metre). For not a few leaders of a newer school believe that the best way to promote a free art is to sweep away all restraint, and convert it from labour into mere play. (CJ 164)

The freedom of the soul in art - and this is one way in which to identify my object in talking of art and the representation of mind - is not, for Kant, a freedom which evades the 'compulsory character' of art - roughly, I take it, those exigencies to which I have drawn attention in terms of the social and institutional structure of art. And this is no less the case when that freedom is given articulation in the idea of play in the psychoanalytic sense.

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Once Freud has noted the importance of the role of play in the joke, he attempts an interesting account of the genesis of the activity of joking. Thus,

    If we now survey the course of development of the
joke, we may say that from its beginning to its perfecting it remains true to its essential nature. It begins as play, in order to derive pleasure from the free use of words and thoughts. As soon as the strengthening of reason puts an end to this play with words as being senseless, and with thoughts as being nonsensical, it changes into a jest, in order that it may retain those sources of pleasures and be able to achieve fresh pleasure from the liberation of nonsense. Next, as a joke proper, but still a non-tendentious one, it gives assistance to thoughts and strengthens them against the challenge of critical judgement, a process in which the 'principle of confusion of sources of pleasure' is of use to it. And finally it comes to the help of major purposes which are combating suppression in order to lift their internal inhibitions by the 'principle of foropleasure'. Reason, critical judgement, suppression - these are the forces against which it fights in succession. (SE VIII 137-3)

Embodied in this account of the genesis of joking there is a new kind of classification of jokes themselves, not now in terms of the techniques which they employ, but rather in terms of the variety of ways in which the element of play manifests itself in different kinds of jokes. Let us look at this in detail.

There are, essentially, three levels of joking, each of which involves some modification of the original role of play. First, at the lowest level, is the jest or pun. Here, all that is required to satisfy the proscriptions of a developed sense of reason is that the play with words should not be mere childish babble but should at least express a moderately coherent thought. For example, Freud cites Rokitansky's jest about the occupation of his sons, two of whom were doctors and two singers: 'Two heilen
(= heal)', Rokitansky is alleged to have said, 'and two

heußen (= howl)' (SE VIII 130). The pleasure here lies in the similar sound of the two words, and it is of much the same order as the pleasure the child gets from his arbitrary association of words because he finds them aurally satisfying. But there is also a moderately coherent thought in Rokitansky's jest which supports the playfulness against objections of reason.

At a slightly more sophisticated level is the innocent joke, which still operates more or less directly in terms of the pleasure to be derived from play, but which seeks further to solemnise or sanction the play in presenting a thought which is itself of some degree of interest: that is, which is more than merely a coherent thought. For example, Freud cites the politician's remark concerning the solidarity of his ministerial cabinet: 'How can we einsteh-

en (= stand up) for one another when we can't ausstehen (= stand) one another' (SE VIII 131). Again there is an obvious pleasure in the playful association of similar-sound-words, but there is also here a thought of substance: namely, about the possibility of mutual support where there is no mutual sympathy. Interestingly, however, there is some confusion here about how far our pleasure lies in the playful quality of the joke, and how far in the thought itself. As Freud puts it, the joke makes a 'total impression of en-
joyment' on us in such a way that we cannot readily identify the source of our pleasure. And in this respect, the joke-thought evades the solemn tests of critical reason.

Third, and at the most sophisticated level is the tendentious joke. But here there is what amounts to a reversal of the role of play as it operates in both the jest and the innocent joke. For in this case inhibitions are raised not only by the playful element in the joke itself but also by the thought which it expresses: characteristically, for Freud, a thought which is of a hostile or obscene nature. And here the element of play is used to disguise, or to divert attention from, the hostility or obscenity. The element of play, as Freud puts it, constitutes a kind of forepleasure which assists the emergence of the thought and thus liberates a further pleasure in the expression of what might otherwise be proscribed. And here, once again, there is that same total impression of enjoyment which leaves us confused about the exact source of our pleasure. So, for example, while there is a strong element of hostility in Dylan Thomas's description of the fat man who 'wears three double chins at the back of his neck', the playfulness of the description assists the hostility, and the real source of our pleasure is sufficiently unclear for us to feel no scruple.

If we now recall a matter which I mentioned earlier,
it will perhaps be clearer what it is that constrains the joker in not laughing at his own joke — at least until others have laughed. For in the case of each of the three levels of joking which Freud identifies, the impulse to make the joke stands under certain kinds of general inhibition: inhibitions of reason, inhibitions of critical sense, or stronger inhibitions of moral sense. The joker thus uses his audience's laughter at his joke to overcome those inhibitions and to sanction his own laughter. The embarrassment at making a joke which no-one finds funny, we might then say, is not so much the embarrassment of lacking a skill, but rather of appearing silly (in making a nonsensical pun), or of appearing pointless (in elaborating a joke around and uninteresting thought), or of appearing offensive (in making a particularly cruel or a grossly obscene joke).

The role of play in the joke, then, is a complex matter, and of course its complexity is increased when we recognise that Freud's identification of the three levels of joking is, and I think is intended as, rather artificially systematic. Clearly the separation of the jest from the innocent joke is vague in terms of some such notion as 'critical interest', and critical interest itself may well embody a tendentious purpose. Indeed, I should say, we find those jokes most satisfying which combine a clever
play on words with both a pointed thought and a more or less tendentious purpose. (Oscar Wilde was a master of the mode.)

The same kind of complexity, it seems to me, attends the role of play in art. And perhaps the most useful way to introduce this is in reference to the two principles, the principle of confusion of sources of pleasure and the principle of forepleasure, which Freud regards as operative in joking.

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What I want to suggest is that what Freud sees as the essential confusion and equivocality upon which the joke depends parallels that condition of the mind which renders the articulation of our aesthetic experience so difficult. To return to a theme of the Prologue, we cannot expect 'the lucidity that is rightly demanded elsewhere, where the subject is cognition by concepts', as Kant was to put it (CJ 7). And Freud's point about joking can perhaps lead us to see why this might be so.

Illustration is available, I think, if we consider two not uncommon forms of aesthetic complaint which are sometimes registered against certain works of modernist art. For the complaints seem to bear witness to our attachment to
something like the principle of the confusion of sources of pleasure with respect to art.

It is sometimes objected that, for example, Claes Oldenburg's 'soft' works of art (his Soft Tub (1966), say — a bathtub fashioned in vinyl and kapok), or Roy Lichtenstein's 'comic strip' art, are too frivolous, too playful to count as art. On the other hand — and this is perhaps just the obverse side of the first objection — it is said that such art is too vigorously divorced from its artistic motive: it ends up as a mere gestural illustration of a theoretical point, not as the artistic embodiment of the point. This last, I take it, is part of the drive of Tom Wolfe's recent essay, 'The Painted Word', in which he complains that 'frankly, these days, without a theory to go with it I can't see a painting' (7).

The objections, so far, are more indignant than persuasive. That is, we are offered no clear reason why playfulness in itself is aesthetically unacceptable, nor why illustrative reference to a theory is. But perhaps one way in which to construe the motive of the objections is to think of them as equally dependent upon the aesthetic assumption that no work of art should so readily resolve itself either in terms of playfulness or in terms of a supporting theory. In other words, we might think of the aesthetic assumption as an analogue of the expectation that a joke should
make a 'total impression of enjoyment' such that we remain unclear about the exact source of our pleasure. And the reason for this assumption is perhaps indicated by Freud's analysis of the joke. For as much as we object to a joke on the grounds that its playfulness offends mature reason, so too we might object to playful art — there appears to be nothing to sanction the play. On the other hand, as much as we object to a joke on the grounds that its playfulness fails to disguise a non-joking purpose, so too we might object to art which too obviously refers us to a theory — there appears to be nothing to sanction that purpose. In each case, in other words, aesthetic resistance arises in virtue of a lack of confusion or equivocality in our experience of the art. And this kind of resistance is by no means raised only by modernist art. It is, I think, what we have in mind when we say that a work of art is trite, or banal, or superficial: it embarrasses us like a poor joke — and this embarrassment, I suggested, is not necessarily an embarrassment at a lack of skill.

Obviously it is not enough simply to say that we rely on something like the principle of the confusion of sources of pleasure in our experience of art. That would be like suggesting that we remain content with the idea that our experience of art is just an inarticulate form of experience.
What is further required here is an explanation of the exact aesthetic function of this kind of confusion. But if we now turn to the second of Freud's principles, the principle of forepleasure, an explanation presents itself.

In fact an interesting example of the aesthetic function of confusion or equivocality occurs in Freud's brief but intriguing essay, 'Psychopathic Characters on the Stage'. Here Freud argues that it is not only that our understanding of art may not be very explicit - and he reminds us that 'After all the conflict in Hamlet is so effectively concealed that it was left to me to unearth it' (SE VII 310) - but that in certain cases (like Hamlet) the dramatist must actually ensure that we are to some extent confused about the source of our pleasure. That is, in what Freud calls 'psychopathological drama' the dramatic conflict is essentially between a conscious impulse and a repressed one, and where the play is so magisterial and widely engaging as Hamlet then it is likely that the audience will share the repressed impulse with the stage-character. If this indeed is the case, then the more explicit our recognition of the repressed impulse the more likely it is to provoke a resistance or an aversion which will effectively undermine our pleasure.

It is, then, Freud argues, the dramatist's problem in presenting an abnormal or neurotic character on the stage
- a character of course who is not simply psychotic, but rather who touches off the springs of neurosis in all of us - to find ways in which to avoid the resistance or aversion. And the solution which Freud proposes here roughly parallels what he has said with respect to the disturbing thoughts embodied in the tendentious joke: for here, too, it is a question of deriving pleasure from a thought which in itself encounters resistance or aversion. The point is that to the degree that we are unable to make out with any clarity the various sources of pleasure in the psychopathological drama (or the tendentious joke), our attention to the disturbing thought is the more readily diverted by the manifest pleasures of play. The repressed material is then, as Freud puts it, able to find liberation through the operation of a kind of 'incentive bonus' or forepleasure provided by the play, and thus, 'with the assistance of the offer of a small amount of pleasure a much greater one, which would otherwise have been hard to achieve, has been gained' (SE VIII 137)

At this point we are returned to the thesis embodied in 'Creative Writer's and Daydreaming': namely, Freud's suggestion that all aesthetic pleasure is in the nature of a forepleasure which opens up the way for a greater pleasure emanating from a deeper psychic source - to the idea of the aesthetic bribe, as I called it. And we see particul-
arly clearly with respect to a play like Hamlet why it is that the dramatist is compelled to offer us the bribe, and in what the bribe consists. Parricidal and incestuous phantasies are of course for Freud the common, repressed burden of the human condition, and in this respect we would resist a Hamlet who too explicitly represents them for us. But by precipitating us headlong into the play-action through the formal techniques which give us the sense of vitality and drama, Shakespeare diverts our attention from the nature of Hamlet's phantasies. We are bribed, but too immersed in the play to be able to take note.

It might be said that Freud's view of the aesthetic bribe is not so strikingly novel: it is simply a form of the familiar belief in the cathartic value of art: the belief that art, or at least some art, prompts in us the release of otherwise restrained feeling. Doubtless there is an affinity here, but it seems to me the real value of Freud's discussion lies in his identification of the particular mechanisms by which the cathartic release is effected. For it is often left unclear exactly how this could come about. For instance, it is the least satisfying aspect of the cathartic thesis that it is too often assumed that it is our distance — the fact that we willingly, and knowingly, suspend our disbelief — from the dramatic representation which permits the release of feeling, as if the distan-
ce were our security. The trouble with this assumption of our security from the hero's dangers is that it too easily collapses either into a failure to apprehend his tragedy, or into an apprehension of his failure to be tragic: the hero appears too alien from our own immediate concerns for it to be comprehensible how we can be prompted to feel anything at all. But on Freud's account, it is exactly part of the point that it is in our being immersed in the activation of the hero's tragedy while yet being unable to 'take stock of what is happening' (SE VII 309) that we are offered that forepleasure which assists the liberation - the cathartic release - of what our psychic energies otherwise try to hold in check. We are, on Freud's account, wholly engaged with the hero, and as much as the hero is blindly impelled into his tragedy to discover it too late, so too are we. And that, surely, is the point of tragedy. At the same time, however, it explains how we can take pleasure in it - just as we laugh at jokes whose purpose might otherwise offend us.

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At the start, I pointed out one obvious respect in which the joke, more readily than either a neurotic symptom or a dream, seemed to recommend itself as a significant aesthetic model:
the respect, that is, in which the joke is more naturally brought under the concept of action than event. As I indicated, we think of ourselves as making jokes, not of jokes simply happening to us, as a neurotic symptom or a dream happens to us. And indeed, it has turned out, much that has made itself available to the aesthetic discussion stands on just this point: for example, with respect to the controlled manipulation of unconscious processes in the formation of the joke; or with respect to the pleasurable intentions upon which the joke is predicated; or with respect to the experience of confusion and ambiguity in the hearer of a joke (in contrast with the confused experience of a neurotic symptom or a dream).

But what cannot be neglected is the fact that the idea of our making a joke turns out to be, in the terms which Freud proposes, somewhat problematic. Once again, we encounter traces of the same difficulty which arose in the discussion of both neurosis and the dream in relation to art: namely, the difficulty of whether the theory of mind on which Freud's discussions rest clearly permits the view that unconscious processes can be employed in the service of an activity like art. And at this point the difficulty becomes all the more urgent: for I have written as if — as I believe in fact it is true — the theory of the joke sanctions just such a possibility. That is to
say, while the specific transformations effected by the unconscious processes of the joke-work are not under our control, what is is that they can come to have their influence in the first place. What, as it were, stands between the joke-thought and the joke-work is an intention: the intention to make a joke. And this, as we have seen, is quite different from what can be said of the neurotic symptom or the dream. For here a repressed desire finds its way into the unconscious, through phantasy, not as a result of any intention on our part, but because of its intrinsically forceful need to find fulfilment.

But what seems obvious enough here is peculiarly confused when Freud begins to discuss the sense in which we can be said to make a joke. He writes,

We speak, it is true, of 'making' a joke: but we are aware that when we do so our behaviour is different from what it is when we make a judgement or make an objection. A joke has quite outstandingly the characteristic of being a 'notion that occurs to us involuntarily'. What happens is not that we know a moment beforehand what joke we are going to make, and that all it then needs is to be clothed in words. We have an indefinable feeling, rather, which I can best compare with an absence, a sudden release of intellectual tension, and then all at once the joke is there. (SE VIII 167)

And this characteristic, Freud goes on, 'fits satisfyingly into the view of the joke-work which we have derived from dreams' (SE VIII 167)

The passage here is, I find, peculiar in a number
of respects: most obviously, perhaps, in Freud's sudden reversion to the relation of jokes and dreams when one considers that so much of his concern has been with the differences between the two phenomena. But alongside this, there is an uncharacteristic degree of equivocation in his argument.

In the first place, it is a dubious assumption that knowing beforehand what one is going to do or say is the criterion for the voluntariness of the doing or saying: the criterion, that is, of its being an action rather than, say, a reflex. Foreknowing is largely irrelevant: for example, I may know beforehand that I am going to sneeze, but that does not make my sneezing a voluntary act. Presumably what Freud has in mind is not the involuntariness of a joke, but its spontaneity. And this of course is quite proper: one does not work at producing a joke in the same way that one works at producing a judgement or an objection; or at least if one does the joke appears appropriately laboured. But if this is what Freud has in mind, then there is no reason to qualify the sense in which we make a joke or to associate it with the occurrence of a dream: for example, making a sympathetic gesture may be a considered act, or it may be spontaneous; but in the latter case we do not think of it as an act which occurs involuntarily, as a gesture which there is any reason to
doubt that in fact we make.

In the second place, if I am right in construing Freud as really talking about the spontaneity of the joke, not its involuntariness, he further equivocates upon exactly what it is about the joke which is spontaneous. That is, he asserts that we do not know beforehand what joke we are going to make, not that we do not know beforehand that we are going to make one. But this has little to do with the spontaneity of the joke: what, for example, is spontaneous about making a sympathetic gesture is that I do not know beforehand that I shall make it, not what it will be (though it follows that if I do not know that I shall make it then I do not either know what it will be).

A further view of the point at issue here - and one which neatly draws us back to the aesthetic discussion - is offered by Richard Wollheim in an essay on 'Freud and the Interpretation of Art'. He writes

We do not, Freud claimed, make a joke in the sense in which we make a judgement or an objection. But if all that amounts to is that we cannot make a joke simply in consequence of deciding to, even if favourable conditions are present, something similar is true in the case of many undoubted activities: including, significantly enough, the activities of art. Shelley pointed out that "a man cannot say "I will compose poetry"'. Or, more accurately, if he does nothing can ensure that he will succeed. But from this Shelley did not draw the unwarranted conclusion that no-one ever composes poetry, that it simply happens. As a dream simply happens. (8)

When I said earlier that what, as it were, stands between
a joke-thought and the joke-work is an intention — in 
Wollheim's terms, a decision — to make a joke, this of 
course is perfectly compatible with the possibility that 
a joke may not emerge — no more than, as Wollheim points 
out, an intention to create art would ensure that it was 
art one created.

There is a good reason to make so much of the issue 
here. Some time ago, it might be recalled, I claimed that 
too often the interpretation of Freud's views on art has 
been influenced by the Romantic tendency to obscure the 
ideas of artistic inspiration and activity. And this tend-

cy, I tried to show, was hostile to much that Freud in 
fact said. But here it begins to look as if Freud himself 
is influenced by a similar tendency in talking of an 'indef-

inable feeling' which precedes the involuntary eruption of 
a joke. I have said, I hope, enough to indicate the deg-
ree of Freud's confusion in the matter. But what import-

antly remains now is the question of how such a confusion could 
have come about.

A moment ago I said that Freud's reversion to the relation 
of jokes and dreams was peculiar in view of his general em-
phasis upon the difference between jokes and dreams. One 
way in which to represent the peculiarity of this is in 
connection with the fact that a joke is predicated upon a
pleasure-directed intention. For, interestingly, Freud himself is aware of the appearance of contradiction which his remarks about the 'involuntariness' of jokes gives rise to in this respect. He writes,

...we inferred that the original intention of jokes was to obtain a yield of pleasure.... We have now adopted the hypothesis that condensations of this [pleasure-giving] kind, such as serve the techniques of jokes, arise automatically, without any particular intention, during thought-processes in the unconscious. Have we not here two different views of the same fact which seem incompatible with each other? (SE VIII 169)

Freud answers his own question without hesitation,

I do not think so. It is true that there are two different views, and that they need to be brought into harmony with each other, but they are not contradictory. One of them is merely foreign to the other; and when we have established a connection between them, we shall probably have made some advance in knowledge. The fact that such condensations are sources for a yield of pleasure is far from incompatible with the hypothesis that conditions for their production are easily found in the unconscious. We can, on the contrary, see a reason for the plunge into the unconscious in the circumstance that the pleasure-yielding condensations of which jokes are in need arise there easily. (SE VIII 169)

There is no conviction in the answer. Patently the resolution of the two views, insofar as this would comprise an 'advance in knowledge', cannot be so inconsequential as Freud would have us suppose. And it is of no value at all to say that 'we can see a reason for the plunge into the unconscious'. With the joke, and with art too, the reason is evident enough. What is not, and what has been so much at issue during the entire discussion is how the 'plunge'
is effected. By what mechanism can the rational and conscious activities of the mind, the secondary process, come to exploit the unconscious processes of the mind, the primary process? To this, in the terms set by the theory of the mind which he had available at the time of writing *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*, Freud had no real answer. The original conception of the unconscious as the hidden, renegade part of the mind does not readily permit its compromise with what appears to lie, as it were, at the surface of the mind. We must wait upon the 'advance in knowledge' to which Freud casually referred in order to find a resolution of the issues. And the task seems worthwhile: for if the theories of neurosis, dream and the joke do not, as has sometimes been thought, provide any secure foundation in the understanding of art, they have nevertheless been immensely suggestive. One suggestion in particular serves to identify my themes in Part Two. Freud's study of Leonardo led him to suggest that the artist had found ways in which to bind the unconscious energies of his phantasy life in the service of his art. And this, in turn, led Freud to suggest that Leonardo's art had a profound therapeutic value for Leonardo: it was as if the art had restored a resilience to an ego weakened by conflict - precisely the therapeutic restoration which analysis itself would seek to effect. It is, then, the
ideas of the unconscious, of phantasy, and of the ego on which I shall concentrate in Part Two, in connection with Freud's revisions of his earlier theory of mind and his suggestions towards a much broader picture of the inner world.
PART TWO

THE PICTURE OF THE INNER WORLD

Introduction

1

Freud's Theory of Mind

2

Melanie Klein's Theory of Mind
INTRODUCTION

Three aspects of inner life have so far been considered in relation to the understanding of our experience of art, and I have argued that shortcomings and difficulties in the aesthetic application of the models of neurosis, dream and the joke frequently derive from lacunae in Freud's early views of the mind. In particular, we have seen, further investigation of the nature and role of the ego and of the nature and function of phantasy is required if the aesthetic project is to find fulfilment.

Though, as I have indicated, Freud's later work (from about the onset of the First World War) addresses itself to what have appeared as the theoretical lacunae in the earlier work, the picture still remains to some extent incomplete and unresolved. Thus, in the second chapter of Part Two, I shall also want to consider the continuation and development of Freud's work in the psychoanalytic studies of Melanie Klein and her followers.

What is at issue here is complex. It is not simply a matter of redirecting attention to another aspect of inner life. For it quickly becomes apparent that it is a broad psychoanalytic theory of the mind itself which is at stake. That is to say, Freud's later work turns out to involve a
wide reorganisation and redistribution of earlier insights, along with momentous new discoveries about the structure of mind. And Kleinian theory, though a direct heir to Freudian, itself seeks to attach different emphases to the inherited insights in virtue of equally momentous discoveries. For this reason it will not be possible to continue the somewhat ad hoc procedures of Part One. My object is a broad picture of the inner world which seems to me to offer the greatest resource in coming to understand the inner structure of our experience of art.

But while the discussion here follows directly upon Part One, if with a wider focus, it also anticipates Part Three and the examination of the psychoanalytic aesthetic constructed in the work of Adrian Stokes. For Stokes's work depends substantially, though often implicitly, upon the picture of the inner world which is my concern here. If I can make the background to Stokes's writings more explicit than he himself tended to, then this will not only meet a condition of their understanding but will also afford a convenience in their presentation. It would, I feel, be an irritation constantly to have to interpolate into that presentation a series of essays in articulation of the precepts on which Stokes relies.

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An introductory comment is perhaps required in connection with the appeal I shall make to the psychoanalytic work of Melanie Klein. For there is the possibility here of losing the sympathies of the Freudian, and little hope of holding the attention of those unsympathetic to psychoanalysis in general.

While Klein was always to insist that her contribution 'is in every respect based on the body of knowledge transmitted to us by Freud', and that her theoretical conclusions 'contain a full confirmation of the knowledge Freud has gained from the analysis of adults, and are an endeavour to extend that knowledge in one or two directions' (PC 7), this is not always apparent. And one reason for this is that, unlike Freud, Klein was to draw her theoretical conclusions mainly from her analyses of small children. That is to say, while Freud's studies of the adult mind led him back to the mind of the child and to its influence in subsequent development, Klein tended to work in the reverse direction — or rather the direction which follows the actual course of human development.

So far this will seem a natural and proper complement to Freud's work. But if there is any resistance to the idea that the workings of the adult mind are in certain respects dependent upon and expressions of unconscious mechanisms and
structures, then such resistance is likely to be fortified where the same thing is asserted of the child. That is, while most of us would be prepared to accept that within the enormous range of expressive possibilities open to the adult there are discontinuities and disruptions which are illuminatingly accounted for in terms of the unconscious workings of the mind, the child's expressive possibilities are so restricted, particularly at the earliest stage where there is the most meagre capacity for verbalisation and conceptualisation, that it can sometimes seem bizarre and ludicrous to read its behaviour in terms of the drama of the unconscious.

Melanie Klein was well aware of this. For instance, in a passage in which she discusses her view — which at the time ran strongly counter to psychiatric orthodoxy — that schizophrenia not only may manifest itself in early childhood but is indeed not so uncommon, she characterises some of the symptoms as they might appear to the untutored eye. Severance from reality, a lack of emotional rapport, an incapacity to concentrate, silly behaviour and nonsense-talk — all these are not nearly so remarkable in the child as in the adult. Or again, automatic behaviour is likely to be thought mere docility, or even extreme 'goodness' in the child; and negative behaviour might be put down to a
marked 'naughtiness' (vide CP 247-8).

The point is, however, if so severe a disturbance as schizophrenia can pass unnoticed in the small child, then clearly the detection of allegedly normal phases of unconscious development will seem to some extremely tenuous, or tendentious. And when we find Klein, writing of the phase of infancy she terms 'maximal sadism', attributing to the infant of a few months a sadistic desire 'to destroy its mother...with its teeth, nails, excreta and with the whole of its body, transformed in imagination into all kinds of weapons' (PC 187), the picture seems so grotesque as to exceed the bounds of credibility — perhaps even the bounds of moral tolerability.

Such, I would suppose, are the thoughts which might occur in those unfavourable to the enterprise of psychoanalysis, and even to those who claim acquaintance with Freud's works. But the thoughts are misplaced. Two illustrative considerations should suffice to show why.

In the Prologue, I indicated my intention to oppose a variety of regrettably common beliefs which flourish in the name of what I called 'Freudianism'. And a good many of these beliefs have grown up in virtue of a failure to recognise that the psychoanalytic investigation of unconscious imaginative activity is not the investigation of some atten-
uated form of the conceptual processes of the mind. (That it is not, to return to a theme discussed in the Prologue, is of course a principal reason for discovering an aesthetically in psychoanalytic theory.) Thus, for example, it is sometimes asserted that Freud's claims about the sexualisation of thought are unacceptable, for it is no part of our discrimination of objects in the world that we think of, say, elongated objects under the concept 'phallus'. Of course it is not. But the objection is irrelevant. The process of conceptual discrimination (as, for instance, Kant sought to show) is inextricably bound up with consciousness, and however far one is prepared to accept Freud's claims about the way in which our apprehension of the world extends beyond the conscious and into the unconscious, it does not follow that the process of conceptualisation has the same extension. Our conceptual discrimination of objects in the world is not in any sense touched by the fact that objects which we recognise under the concepts 'umbrella', or 'cigar' or 'tower' may also, unconsciously, be apprehended as sexual symbols (1).

Once this is clearly understood, then the source of one possible objection to Kleinian theory — and it might be thought more forceful here with respect to the mind of the infant — is cut away. For where it is thought incredible and repugnant to suppose that the infant's inner
world is inhabited with terrifying images of persecuting and persecuted genitalia, say, the thought would often be defended on the grounds that infant simply does not have the conceptual capacity to discriminate very much at all, far less monstrous representations of a breast or penis. But this turns out to be no objection at all. Klein is talking about unconscious imaginative activity: the world of unconscious phantasy, not the conceptually-ordered world.

A second illustrative consideration takes us to the heart of the Kleinian extension to classic Freudian theory. And, once again, it might be introduced in reference to a common and mistaken belief which has grown up around Freud's work: this time in connection with Freud's insights into that most dramatic and profound turning point in psychic development, the Oedipus complex and the setting up of the super-ego.

It is frequently assumed that Freud's seminal discussion of the Oedipus complex warrants the idea that the dimensions of our character are determined by early, harsh or benign, parental attitudes. The assumption, however, is only vaguely related to Freud's views. For, though it is true that Freud was at first unsure what emphasis should
be given to actual childhood treatment, he was always clear that the way in which the child himself experiences parental attitudes is a critical factor. And in his later work the role of actual childhood treatment recedes in significance. What is notable here is Freud's acknowledgement of his debt to Melanie Klein for the realisation that the severity of the super-ego which emerges in the Oedipal phase in fact rarely corresponds to the actual severity of the child's upbringing (vide SE XXI 130 and note). For in this Freud can be said to recognise what was to become a central principle of Kleinian theory: namely, that it is the role of phantasised constructions of actual experience which is the significant determinant in this crucial phase of development: in other words, that it is the representation of the parental figures in phantasy which is critical in the structuring of character. And it is from here only a short way to the most momentous discovery of Kleinian theory. For while Freud had regarded the super-ego as, roughly, an inner object anthropomorphically modelled on the father, Klein found that it is, much earlier, an inner object which derives from the child's phantasy-representations of those parts of the parental figures of which it is first aware before it comes to recognise the parents as whole individuals. And first amongst these, of course, is the mother's breast. Thus, For Klein, the drama of the inner world is played out
in terms of, as I put it earlier, terrifying (phantasy) images of persecuting and persecuted genitalia.

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So much by way of necessary introduction. If in the course of Part Two I can establish a picture of the inner world, particularly in respect of the nature and role of the ego and the nature and function of phantasy, then what will have been achieved is the resource dictated by the discussions in Part One which should enable us to further the understanding of the inner structure of our experience of art.
FREUD'S THEORY OF MIND

It is to Freud that we owe the idea that what appear as discontinuities, disruptions and disturbances in our conscious life may often be referred to the workings of the unconscious. Indeed, as Freud was to put it,

The division of the psychical into what is conscious and what is unconscious is the fundamental premiss of psychoanalysis. (SE XIX 13)

It has not been, nor is it, my intention widely to justify the psychoanalytic premiss with respect to the general, or even metaphysical, hostilities which it sometimes engenders. But that is not to say that I take the idea of the unconscious to be established by fiat. On the contrary two important demands might be made of the descriptive division of our mental life into conscious and unconscious components. The first concerns the general possibility of raising what is identified as unconscious to consciousness. The second concerns the continuity of what is identified as unconscious with what is conscious in a fully integrated theory of the mind. And very roughly, I want to suggest, these two demands might be thought to characterise the respective aims of the distinction I make between Freud's early work, until about 1914, and the later.

For the first, the idea of the unconscious appears in Freud's early work almost exclusively in connection with the.
idea of repression. That is, Freud argues that certain of the contents of the mind are unconscious to the extent that a psychical mechanism, repression, opposes their entry to consciousness. In other words, the idea of the unconscious is originally equated with that which is repressed, and it is in virtue of the therapeutic possibility of raising what is repressed to consciousness that psychoanalysis claims its authority for the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious. As Freud asserts,

The fact that in the technique of psychoanalysis a means has been found by which the opposing force can be removed and the ideas made conscious renders the theory irrefutable. (SE XIX 14)

As Freud's work progressed, however, more and more is brought into the orbit of the unconscious. It is not only that the unconscious is thought to have a particular content, namely, repressed ideas; gradually the concept broadens into the idea of a particular kind of mental mechanism, the primary process, with its own peculiar mode of operation. Still, however, it remains the case that the operation of the primary process is predicated on the need to prevent unacceptable ideas and impulses from becoming conscious. Classically, for example, the unconscious processes of the dream-work aim to disguise a repressed wish from conscious awareness.

A pivotal point in the progress is reached, however,
when Freud came to consider jokes and their relation to the unconscious. For here, dramatically, it is apparent that the operation of the primary process is not just predicated on the need to prevent unacceptable ideas and impulses from becoming conscious: unconscious processes which had hitherto appeared to work exclusively in the service of defence appeared also to make themselves available in the service of conscious purpose, namely, making a joke. But now this rapprochement of the primary and secondary (or conscious) processes of the mind gives rise to an enormous theoretical complication: for it now looks as if the distinction between what is unconscious and what is conscious is more blurred than had originally been supposed. As Freud himself was later to see,

Hitherto the only guide we have had in our investigations has been the distinguishing mark of being conscious and unconscious: we have finally come to see how ambiguous this can be. (SE XIX 19)

It is to this point of ambiguity that I sought to bring the discussion of Freud's early work in Part One.

It might now be more readily understood what force and relevance the second of the two demands I suggested might be made of the idea of the unconscious comes to have. For if Freud was at first content to attend simply to the operation of the unconscious in a variety of its manifestations in our inner life, gradually the scope and nature
of its operation began to infringe upon any straightforward division of the unconscious and conscious. And the more this became apparent, the more urgent a problem it became to set the gathered insights within a systematic account of the structure of the mind. The detailed psychological maps which Freud had drawn had now to be fitted together to form a broader picture of the inner world generally. And it is this 'metapsychological' enterprise, as Freud was to call it, which forms a central motif in the later work.

As the new phase begins to emerge, Freud's concern with the division of the unconscious and the conscious begins to recede. In 1915 we find Freud writing

The more we seek to win our way to a metapsychological view of mental life, the more we must emancipate ourselves from the symptom of 'being conscious'.

(SE XIV 193)

And in 1923, in his last major theoretical work, the classic The Ego and the Id, Freud announces that 'The characteristic of being unconscious begins to lose significance for us'

(SE XIX 18).

What, we must ask, permits Freud this loosened attachment to what, after all, he himself had regarded as the 'fundamental premiss' of psychoanalysis, the division of the unconscious and the conscious?

The answer is that, increasingly, Freud concerned him-
self with an account of the agencies of the mind: with the ego, with what was to be called the id, and with what had originally appeared as a modification of the ego, the ego-ideal or the super-ego. It is to the modes of operation of these three agencies of the mind that the properties of being unconscious or conscious are now attached. And it is in terms of the three agencies that the so-called structural theory of the mind is articulated.

An objection is likely to occur here. For though the terms 'id' and 'super-ego' made no appearance in Freud's work before 1923, the term 'ego' had a long history. Indeed, for many years it seemed to have been equated precisely with the conscious part of the mind. Thus, it might be said, Freud's declared dwindling interest in the division of the unconscious and the conscious is rather arch: the original division is retained in his continuing to use the term 'ego'. The opposition of the id and the ego, it will be said, is just another way of expressing the opposition of the unconscious and the conscious.

The objection is understandable, but it is mistaken: it is false that the ego had ever exclusively been equated with the conscious part of the mind - though this had been to some extent obscured in Freud's early work - and false that the opposition of the id and the ego expresses the opposition of the unconscious and conscious - though
this is commonly enough assumed in popular accounts of Freudian theory.

First, in at least one of its activities, the activity of repression itself, Freud had actually long regarded the ego as unconscious. This, it is true, was somewhat obscured in the early work - often to Freud himself - because until about 1914 Freud's principal concern had been with the repressed contents of the mind, not with the repressing agency. But by 1923 the situation had altered radically. Pressures to confront the matter of the nature of the ego and its activities had been building up from several directions over the previous nine years - notably, we shall see, in connection with ideas which had been rehearsed in Freud's essays 'On Narcissism' (1914) and 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917). At last Freud felt ready to turn from his earlier concerns. 'Pathological research', he wrote briskly, 'has directed our interest too exclusively to the repressed. We should like to learn more about the ego' (SE XIX 19). And with this remark we are precipitated into the accelerated theoretical machinery of The Ego and the Id.

Second, though it is true that the idea of the id stands in direct ancestral line from the original equation of the unconscious with the repressed, I have already indicated how this characterisation gradually broadened to include specific unconscious processes of the mind.
We may now add to this the further expansion of the idea of the unconscious as a complete system of mental activity, to which Freud had begun to refer, in the essay on 'The Unconscious' (1915), as 'the system Ucs' (vide SE XIV 166-215). And it is in the system Ucs that Freud primarily wanted to locate the id.

However, it turns out that the id is not the sole occupant of the system Ucs. For by 1923 Freud had come to see that

A part of the ego, too — and Heaven knows how important a part — may be Ucs, undoubtedly is Ucs

(SE XIX 18)

In a moment I shall try to retrace the route by which Freud was led to the crucial revisions of the theory of mind in the light of new discoveries. But it is perhaps worth anticipating how the revised theory of mind comes to bear upon the theoretical difficulties inherent, I argued, in Freud's theory of the joke — the same difficulties which impeded the securing of a proper aesthetic foundation in early Freudian theory. That is to say, the idea of the joker's (or the artist's) temporarily giving over his material to unconscious revision begins to seem less fraught with those difficulties which derived from the assumption that the ego's activities stand in stark opposition to the unconscious. The revised theory of mind seems, as it were, to open up a path into the unconscious for the ego. And it
was of course this possibility, I argued, upon which the account of the joke crucially depended, despite Freud's ultimate vacillations. In fact in this respect if we turn the point around, we might say, as Richard Wollheim puts it in his book on Freud,

...Freud's treatment of the joke becomes in many ways the prototype for what he says about the processes and activities of the ego, as they come to be defined. ¹

And in this thought we might find reason to restore the original belief that Freud's theory of the joke had greater aesthetic bearing than either the theory of neurosis or the theory of the dream.

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Early in the discussion of the theory of neurosis, I drew attention to the fact that the theory restrictedly concerned the transference neuroses, and that Freud had at first conceded his inability, both in practice and in theory, to deal adequately with the narcissistic neuroses. This inability, I suggested, had its source in the obscurity of the role of the ego, and in a lack of clarity about the course of the development of the ego. It is in the essay 'On Narcissism' that Freud first confronts some of these issues.
At first the term 'narcissism' had been employed to denote a specific perversion in which a subject came to treat his own body as a sexual object. But clinical experience with neurotics began to reveal that the narcissistic attitude was both wider in scope, and more general in its manifestation than the idea of its constituting a perversion could comfortably accommodate. And Freud was to go even further. 'Finally', he was to declare,

it seemed probable that an allocation of the libido such as deserved to be described as narcissism might be present far more extensively, and that it might claim a place in the regular course of human sexual development.... Narcissism in this sense would not be a perversion, but the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instincts of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature. (SE XIV 73-4)

Thus, Freud was led to postulate what he called 'primary narcissism' as a phase in the normal course of sexual development — and to which, in the familiar manner, there was the possibility of regression, and hence the narcissistic perversion or neurosis.

The implications of the postulation of a primary narcissism are profound. The ego has now come to be thought, as Freud put it in a favoured analogy, somewhat like an amoeba: that is, it appears that originally the ego is itself invested with libidinal energies, and it is only subsequently that some of this energy is directed towards other objects, much as the viscous substance
within the body of the amoeba is subsequently projected in pseudopodia. This is striking, for hitherto the ego had seemed to stand outside the course of libidinal development. Now there appeared to be both the familiar object-seeking libido and an ego-directed libido. What had at first been thought of as the non-sexual ego-instincts, the instincts of self-preservation, were, it now appeared, infused with sexuality from the beginning.

Freud was well aware of the problem to which this new insight gave rise. In particular it occurred to him that he had fallen prey to one or another of two enemies with whom he resisted associating: on the one hand, those critics who had accused psychoanalysis of trying to explain everything in terms of sexuality; and on the other, Jung, who had long insisted that the term 'libido' denoted all forms of instinctual energy.

The problem is quickly and boldly resolved. Freud immediately conceded the instincts of self-preservation to the libido. And if this is revolutionary, it is not, perhaps, so unnatural. For Freud's original view of instinctual conflict as a conflict between instincts of love and instincts of nourishment and protection is not entirely persuasive. With the attribution to libido of the self-preservation instincts, along with the sexual, the view is appr-
opriately undermined: henceforth libido is regarded in
general as expressing the 'life-instinct'.

Of course a new problem arises here. For once the
opposition between instincts of love and instincts of self-
preservation disappears, how are we to characterise inner
conflict? The answer which Freud proposed takes us
deep into the complexity of his later work. For, he sugg-
ested, in opposition to the life-instinct stands the death-
instinct: in opposition to love, hate.

At this point I shall not attempt to articulate Freud's
earliest conception of the nature of the death-instinct:
not only is it a complex issue in itself, but subsequently
it undergoes such modification as to render its present dis-
cussion redundant. Instead, I want to turn to another of the
routes which was ultimately to lead to the theory of mind
developed in The Ego and the Id: namely, Freud's conception
of the 'ego-ideal' — the origin of the later idea of the
super-ego. And in following this route, in postponing a
discussion of aspects of the death-instinct, the transition
will turn out to be not so abrupt. For the idea of hate and
aggression is very closely bound up with the idea of the
super-ego.

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In speculating on the place of primary narcissism in ego-development, Freud writes that

The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state. This departure is brought about by means of the displacement of libido on to an ego-ideal imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about from fulfilling this ideal.

(SE XIV 100)

What Freud has in mind here with the notion of the ego-ideal is the phenomenon which might variously be characterised as 'conscience' or 'self-regard'. At any rate, the ego-ideal is an object which is thought to constitute a special standard against which the ego is measured, and as a result of which measuring we are alternately pleased with ourselves or displeased. In exaggerated form, the ego-ideal is manifest in the paranoid's delusions of being watched; but, Freud writes,

A power of this kind, watching, discovering and criticising all our intentions does really exist. Indeed it exists in every one of us in normal life.

(SE XIV 95)

Freud adds, the ego-ideal appears to be the result of an identification with the critical influences which the child encounters in his environment, most obviously through his parents. And it is in virtue of a failure to satisfy the demands of the ego-ideal that there arises the peculiar condition of an 'unconscious sense of guilt'.

It is these thoughts which Freud begins to develop in
a more rigorous way in the essay on 'Mourning and Melancholia'. For, it is Freud's view, the dramatic manifestation of an unconscious sense of guilt in the state of melancholia - what would nowadays be called 'depression' or 'manic-depression' - suggests that what is involved is a sense of failure at not having satisfied the demands of the ego-ideal.

The similar symptomatic conditions of the states of mourning and melancholia lead Freud to suppose that they share a common prompting cause: namely, the loss of a loved object. But if the same kind of painful dejection and inhibition upon interest and activity is apparent in each case, then there is also, in the melancholic state, a very striking diminution of self-regard. The melancholic characteristically expresses himself in self-recrimination, self-accusation and self-reproach. It is as if, Freud puts it, 'In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself' (SE XIV 246). But how, we must ask, might this come about?

It becomes apparent in the clinical situation that the melancholic's railings against himself are in fact curiously inapplicable to himself. But, Freud writes, 'with insignificant modifications they do fit someone else, someone whom the patient loves, or has loved, or should love' (SE XIV 248) - someone, that is to say,
with whom the subject has established a peculiarly forceful and close relation which amounts not so much to an object-choice, a desire to have such an object, but to an identification, a desire to be such an object. In other words, the situation recalls the departure from primary narcissism in which the libido is displaced on to an ego-ideal.

There is, however, a complicating factor in the subject's identification with his ego-ideal: namely, an ambivalence, a conflict of loving and hating attitudes, which proceeds - Freud was at first a little undecided on the point - either from some constitutional characteristic in the subject, or from his experience of real slights in his attachment to the ego-ideal. In any case the ambivalence arises out of what is experienced as a threat of losing the ideal object.

Now, Freud goes on, 'the loss of a love-object is an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make itself effective and come out in the open' (SE XIV 251). And of course this is a point which fits naturally into our common view of such things: for instance, in the case of the jilted lover who turns ferociously against his former intimate. But if we now attach the point to Freud's construal of both mourning and melancholia as involving the loss of a loved object, we begin to see what it is that might be going on.
Commonly, in the kind of mourning which verges on the pathological, the subject's ambivalence towards his lost loved object is expressed 'in the form of self-reproaches to the effect that the mourner himself is to blame for the loss of the loved object, i.e. that he has willed it' (SE XIV 251). The mourner, in other words, experiences a guilt in the loss of his loved object which proceeds not from anything he has done actually to bring about that loss — though this is how the pathological mourner will represent the situation — but rather from what he takes himself to have done in virtue of the ambivalence of his love.

The case of the melancholic can now be articulated along roughly similar lines. Thus, it is a guilt which proceeds from his ambivalent feelings towards his putative lost loved object which finds its characteristic expression in self-reproach and self-accusation. But here the recrimination and accusation is more pointed than in the case of the mourner, to the degree that the melancholic has identified with his object. The recrimination and accusation really is self-reproach or self-accusation: the loss of the loved object in this case amounts to a loss of a part of the ego, an ego-ideal.

There is, then, this difference between the mourner and the melancholic; but there is another of greater
significance. For the mourner is, in the end, more easily able to withdraw his libidinal attachment to his loved object: that is, his sense of reality in finally coming to reconcile himself to the death of his loved object serves to diminish the force of the libidinal attachment. But the melancholic encounters a resistance to the withdrawal of libidinal attachment, for it is not an attachment of which he is consciously aware: his love and his hate are unconscious, and hence so too is the sense of guilt at the loss of his loved object which issues in self-reproach.

The array of insights, if yet quite unsynthesised, is rich and exciting. And there is something further to add: for in 'Mourning and Melancholia' Freud was to some extent able to elaborate upon the idea of identification as this had occurred in 'On Narcissism' in connection with the setting up of the ego-ideal. First, Freud came to think, if identification is to take place, there must have been a 'strong fixation' to the loved object, and little power of resistance to it (SE XIV 249). And this point serves to confirm the belief that the ego-ideal constitutes an inheritance of the parents' critical influence. Second, insofar as identification is thought in the case of the melancholic to be 'a regression of one type of object-choice to original narcissism', there is the suggestion
that identification in the first instance constitutes, as
Freud had intimated in 'On Narcissism', a preliminary to
object-choice proper. And third, the early occurrence of
identification suggests its association with the oral phase
of libidinal development: indeed, Freud speculates, the
mechanism of identification might be thought 'introjection'
or 'incorporation' in which the subject has not only, as it
were, taken his loved object inside himself, but feels that
he has swallowed it up and devoured it. This in turn sugg-
ests a specific occasion for his sense of guilt with respect
to his ambivalent attitude towards the object: that is,
he feels that he has brutalised and cannibalised his own
loved object.

These are thoughts, in any case, around which the theory
of the mind of The Ego and the Id is woven. And if the im-
pression has formed of a lively but unsystematic flux of ideas,
then this is, I think, properly to represent the situation
immediately prior to, and also to some extent continued in,
The Ego and the Id. For Freud himself regarded the work as
'more in the nature of a synthesis', and he admitted that it
'does not go beyond the roughest outline' (SE XIX 12).

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The ego, Freud had come to believe by 1923, acted unconsc-
iously not only in the service of defence - that is, as the agent of repression - but also with respect to extremely high-ranking mental functions - notably, as we have seen, the function of self-criticism. And what comes to be of the first importance in this recognition is the role of these unconscious activities in the building-up of the ego - in the formation of character and personality. We should, then, look to Freud's new thoughts about the development of the ego.

It is Freud's first claim - and it has obvious affinity with the earlier apparent belief that the ego was the agency of consciousness which was regarded as 'the surface of the mental apparatus' - that the origins of the ego are to be traced to the activity of perception, to the 'perceiving surface' of the organism, Freud called it (SE XIX 19).

It is through perception, Freud argues, that an awareness is developed, on the one hand, of the external world, and on the other, of the ego itself. This dual awareness comes about not through the perception of two different kinds of objects - to say that of course would be to beg the question - but rather through a distinction between two kinds of perception: external perception and internal perception. Freud holds, reasonably enough, that external perception - perception which is closely dependent on bodily disposition, as in seeing - can readily be distinguished from internal
perception - perception which is not so dependent and which, for example, cannot be removed by a change in bodily disposition, as in the perception of pain.

As the infant's range of perceptions, both internal and external, increases, so too, then, does his awareness of the external world and his awareness of himself, of his own ego. And what follows from this - it is an inestimably critical point - is that the earliest awareness of the ego is intrinsically bound up with an awareness of the perceptual and motor capacities of the body. 'The Ego', Freud writes, 'is first and foremost a bodily Ego' (SE XIX 26): that is to say, the ego is first conceived under the sway of heavily corporeal imagery.

In this thought we immediately see how Freud's account of the development of the ego comes into association with his account of libidinal development - and I noted earlier how, for a long time, the development of the ego had been thought to lie outside the course of libidinal development. For it had of course long been a tenet of Freudian theory that libidinal development is successively marked by and conceived of in relation to particular bodily activities in the oral, anal, phallic and genital phases of infantile development. Now the suggestion is that it is not only sexuality which has corporeal structure, but the ego too. And it is natural to suppose that the corporeal structure
of the ego will coincide along the same oral, anal, phallic and genital scale, and thus, as Freud's claims about ego-libido in 'On Narcissism' had implied, that the ego is from the start infused with sexuality. Specifically, for example, where sexuality is equated with a particular bodily activity, and where some activity of the ego — say some intellectual activity — is equated with that same bodily activity, then there will be a strong tendency for the intellectual activity itself to become, as it were, tinged with sexuality. In other words, we encounter here the source of the most central of Freudian precepts about the sexualisation of thought and mental activity.

At this point we may appropriately bring under consideration the way in which the developing ego seeks to invest objects with libidinal cathexes. At first, insofar as objects in the external world are largely undifferentiated from the ego, the ego itself will naturally be the focus of libidinal cathexes: we recognise, in other words, the phase of primary narcissism which Freud had discussed in 'On Narcissism'. Subsequently, as the objects of the external world come to be recognised as independent of the ego, the ego attempts libidinally to retain those objects in itself. That is to say, it forms a strong identification with those objects in order to protect itself from threats of losing the objects: we
recognise, in other words, the theme of Freud's discussion in 'Mourning and Melancholia'.

However, in the six years which intervened between 'Mourning and Melancholia' and The Ego and the Id, Freud had been led to revise his views of the relative importance of the process of identification. Referring to the earlier work, Freud writes that 'We did not appreciate the full significance of this process and did not know how common and typical it is' (SE XIX 28). Its significance, he now wants to say, lies far beyond the contribution it makes in defence against threats of losing a loved object:

...we have come to understand that this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes an essential contribution towards building up what is called its 'character' (SE XIX 28)

But now, with the resource of the new insight into the corporeal structuring of the ego, a greater precision can be brought to the idea of identification. And this, in turn, will permit an extension of the original view of the ego-ideal as a modification of the ego into the more fully developed concept of the super-ego.

In discussing Freud's papers of 1914 and 1917 I drew attention to the way in which Freud suggested an association of the process of identification with the mechanism of introjection or incorporation, and how the association seemed to depend on the first occurrence of the process of identific-
cation in the oral phase of development. But now we may say, insofar as identification is an early activity of the ego it will be conceived in connection with a particular bodily activity. In other words, there is now a much stronger reason to suppose that the mechanism of identification is, as Freud had speculated, introjection or incorporation. To put it another way, it is now natural to suppose that identification will be attended by specifically oral phantasies of having swallowed up and devoured an object.

Further to this point, it is now easier to see how it is that the idea of introjection or incorporation permits the re-introduction of the idea of ambivalence with respect to an object with which the ego identifies. For in virtue of the orally-imbued phantasies which attend identification the objects will themselves take on the special characteristics of the oral phase of libidinal development: in particular, they will be infected by the sadistic aspects of the oral phase, expressed in the activity of biting.

It is now only one step further in the reorganisation of the earlier insights which leads us to the Freudian conception of the super-ego. Freud had suggested that the parents will figure importantly as the voice of conscience embodied in the ego-ideal, and thus as a source of a sense of guilt, but it is now clear exactly how this comes about. The super-ego, as it is now called, just is the critical
agency formed out of successively introjected objects which will be characteristically ambivalent between love and hate. And of course first amongst the introjected objects, as the infant begins to discriminate objects in the external world, will be the mother and the father. And as the super-ego begins critically to govern the child's activities, his character begins to take on specific form in reference to the way in which the mother and father have been introjected. We become, to use Freud's famous phrase, the 'precipitates' of our identifications (vide SE XIX 29; 34). And thus it is that the unconscious activities of the ego come to have a highly significant role to play in the course of human development.

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The account I offer of the ideas leading to Freud's conception of the super-ego is of course abrupt; but to anyone familiar with The Ego and the Id it will probably also seem tendentious in a peculiar way. For the idea of the super-ego has made its appearance in the account without reference to that revolutionary point of childhood development, the Oedipus complex. This, it will be objected, is to misrepresent Freud, for not only is it the case that his principal elaboration of the idea of the super-ego occurs in connection with
the Oedipus complex, but Freud himself clearly maintained that the super-ego is 'the heir of the Oedipus complex' (SE XIX 36).

There are three reasons for having introduced the idea of the super-ego without reference to the Oedipus complex. The first is just that what I have said, I believe, substantially anticipates what Freud provides in connection with the Oedipus complex. The second is that it is quite unclear why, given Freud's view of the formation of the super-ego in terms of the process of identification and introjection, the formation of the super-ego is dated so late as the onset of the Oedipus complex, which occurs in the last, genital phase of libidinal development. As we have seen, Freud was unhesitant in associating the first occurrence of identification and introjection with the earlier, oral phase of development.

The third reason, which is largely procedural, follows from the second. For in leaving it open for the moment at what exact point the super-ego begins to be formed, and in implying the discrepancy in Freud's views between the orally-founded process of identification and introjection and the formation of the super-ego in the genital phase, I mean to create a place for what I shall introduce in the following chapter: namely, the modifications of classic Freudian theory effected in the work of Melanie Klein. The most strik-
ing of these is Klein's recognition of the very much earlier formation of the super-ego: in fact in Klein's view, it is formed in the first year of life, in the dominantly oral phase, and not, as for Freud, between the ages of three and five, in the dominantly genital phase.

Still, there is perhaps some advantage in Freud's discussion of the formation of the super-ego in connection with the Oedipus complex, for this, it might be said, permits a more readily graspable representation of the role of ambivalence. That is to say, it might be thought more natural to construe ambivalence as attaching to a developed awareness of personal relationships, which is of course what, for the first time in the child's life, the Oedipus complex amounts to. To anticipate a distinction made in Kleinian theory, it is perhaps easier to think of loving and hating attitudes embodied in a relationship to a 'whole object' - for instance, to the mother conceived of as a whole, independent person - than in a relationship to a 'part object' - for instance, to the mother only partially conceived of as a feeding breast.

In Freud's view, the complete Oedipus complex has both a 'positive' and a 'negative' component. That is, in the case of the male child, not only is there an affectionate, sexual attachment to the mother which complicates an identification
with the father, but also an affectionate, sexual attachment to the father which complicates an identification with the mother. (Similarly, mutatis mutandis, in the case of the female child.) The complications here are that the father and mother respectively come to be regarded as obstacles to the sexual impulses directed towards the other parent, and thus the identifications take on what Freud called 'a hostile colouring' (SE XIX 32). The super-ego, in other words, formed as a result of these identifications, has a similarly hostile aspect. That is to say, the super-ego does not only consist in an imperative to be like the father or mother, it also consists in a forceful prohibition that the child be like the father or mother: the father and mother have prerogatives which the child himself must not exercise. And now, as a result of these prohibitions, the child is increasingly forced to repress the original identifications. Thus, Freud has it,

The child's parents, and especially the father, were perceived as the obstacles to a realisation of his Oedipus wishes; so his infantile ego fortifies itself for carrying out the repression by erecting this same obstacle within itself. It borrowed strength to do this, so to speak, from the father, and this loan was an extraordinarily momentous act. The super-ego retains the character of the father, while the more powerful the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence of authority, religious training, schooling and reading), the stricter will be the domination of the super-ego later on - in the form of conscience or perhaps of an unconscious sense of guilt. (SE XIX 34-5)
To put Freud's point another way, the 'obstacle' which is set up within the ego to countermand the sexual desires directed towards the mother or father is what is experienced by the child as the hostility of — particularly the father's — authority. But, as I indicated in the Introduction, it was under the influence of Melanie Klein that Freud came to recognise that this hostility is not just 'the aggressiveness that has returned from the external world which is bound by the super-ego': more significantly, a part of it is the aggressiveness which 'is carrying on its mute and uncanny activity as a free destructive instinct in the ego and the id' (SE XXII 109). Thus we see how widely important the idea of ambivalence, which Freud had first thought pathological in the melancholic, has become: in fact it is constitutional in us all. Moreover we now see the full significance of the fact that ambivalence is constitutional in us all with respect to Freud's change of mind in regarding instinctual conflict as a conflict of love and hate rather than a conflict of love and self-preservation. (To return to the point at which I left off the discussion of love-hate conflict in connection with the essay 'On Narcissism' it will perhaps now be clearer why I wanted to avoid consideration of the death-instinct alone. As I predicted, the conflict of love and hate is very closely bound up with the articul-
ation of the idea of the super-ego.)

It is at the height of the Oedipus complex that the child feels the deepest conflict between love and hate: between the love he feels for, and feels he owes to, his parents, and, on the other hand, the hatred he feels at the frustration of his Cedipal desires. And what occurs at this point, according to Freud, is that the child seeks to overcome the internal conflict by projecting his own hatred onto his parents, thus dramatising their severity. Thus, when the parental figures are introjected as the super-ego, the severity of the super-ego will be correspondingly dramatic, and quite out of proportion to any real severity in the child's upbringing. In other words, Freud puts it,

...the super-ego seems to have made a one-sided choice and to have picked out only the parents' strictures and severity, their prohibitive and punitive function, whereas their loving care seems not to have been taken over and retained. (SE XXII 62)

And this, of course, is exactly why, for Freud, the voice of conscience, the 'unconscious sense of guilt' can be so powerful - pathogenically so in the case of the melancholic.

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It might now be appropriate to set Freud's views on the formation and nature of the super-ego in the wider context
of the revised theory of the mind developed in *The Ego and the Id*.

The super-ego, as Freud thought of putting it at one point, constitutes an 'ideal model' of the fundamental aim of the ego to reconcile the inner world with the outer. That is to say, with the formation of the super-ego, the ego has discovered an extremely powerful agent to countermand the impulses of the id, momentarily represented through the Oedipal desires. Ideally the ego can make use of the power of the super-ego to reconcile the impulses of the id with reality. But the model is ideal. The price the ego has to pay for the service of the super-ego may be exorbitant. For at worst, as Freud dramatised the situation,

> Helpless in both directions, the ego defends itself vainly against the instigations of the murderous id and against the reproaches of the punishing conscience. (SE XIX 54)

And this, of course, in addition to the ego's function in trying to cope with the demands of the external world as well.

It is with respect to this picture that Freud finally has the resource to specify the exact costs that may be exacted from the ego. For, as he was to represent it in the 1924 paper on 'Neurosis and Psychosis', transference neurosis results from a conflict of the ego and the id, narcissistic neurosis from a conflict of the ego and the
super-ego, and psychosis from a conflict of the ego with the external world (vide SE XIX 149-53).

There is, however, a further point which ought to be made with respect to this view of the various kinds of conflict. It is that, though the peculiar phenomenon of the unconscious sense of guilt will be most apparent in narcissistic neurosis — in the conflict, that is, between the ego and the super-ego — it is not, as indeed one must suppose from Freud's view of the ubiquitousness of the narcissistic attitude, unique to such neurosis. In fact, in The Ego and the Id, Freud is prepared to claim that 'in a lesser measure this factor has to be reckoned with in very many cases; perhaps in all comparatively severe cases of neurosis'. And he immediately goes on,

In fact it may be precisely this element in the situation, the attitude of the ego-ideal, that determines the severity of a neurotic illness. (SE XIX 50)

This, in turn, leads to the more forceful assertion in 'Neurosis and Psychosis' that

The attitude of the super-ego should be taken into account — which has not hitherto been done — in every form of psychical illness. (SE XIX 152)

And of course, we may add in virtue of Freud's insistence upon the continuity of psychical illness and health, if the attitude of the super-ego is to be taken into account in every form of illness, then it must also be taken into account in the most general picture of the inner world.
It is with these final, though I think it must be said rather bold, remarks of Freud's that we can see just how far the theory of mind has been modified. For if, in the earlier period of his work, the primary emphasis had been upon the relation between the conscious and the unconscious, the picture has now become much more subtle. As Freud puts it in this final phase of his thinking, 

Conflicts between the ego and the ideal will, as we are now prepared to find, ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is psychical, between the external world and the internal world. (SE XIX 36)

A few pages later Freud adds

The struggle which once raged in the deepest strata of the mind, and which was not brought to an end by rapid sublimation and identification, is now continued in a higher region, like the Battle of the Huns in Kaulbach's painting. (SE XIX 39)

The image is fecund. In one respect it stands as a monument to the way in which Freud's genius has created a more extensive picture of the inner world than first thoughts about neurosis and dreams and jokes might have suggested to a lesser mind. In another, it indicates just how much Freud has brought to his account of the inner, unconscious workings of the mind: 'not only what is lowest but also what is highest' (SE XIX 27). And third, in connection with this last point, it is for my purposes a happy accident that Freud should chose to represent his thought in reference to a painting. For if Freud's final picture of the inner world does
not entirely resolve the difficulties of finding a proper aesthetic foundation in the earlier approaches, and though Freud himself was never to consider its aesthetic application, it does in many ways serve to circumscribe the area in which resolution of those difficulties might ultimately be discovered.

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What was found inhibiting in the discussions of Part One was the matter of precisely how the 'plunge into the unconscious' could come about - in particular, how the artist could come to make use of the unconscious processes of the mind in creating art. But, it turns out, part of the difficulty here lay in the conception of the mind with which Freud had at first worked. For where the mind is regarded as divided more or less strictly into the domains of the conscious and the unconscious, then the facility of purposive passage between the two domains is not clearly made out. Now, however, with Freud's revised theory of mind, the particular difficulty slips away, along with Freud's receding interest in the strict demarcation of the conscious and the unconscious. For, as we have seen, in his discussion of the role of the ego - the agency of mental activity - Freud has not only been able to specify
the ego's activities in binding unconscious energies, but also — and precisely in virtue of these activities — to reveal the way in which the character of the ego is itself built up. In other words, insofar as these activities are intrinsic to the functioning of the ego and critical in its development, it is no longer appropriate to suppose a theoretical difficulty in the thought of the ego's making use of unconscious processes: the ego, it turns out, is itself already unconscious in respect of a number of the indubitably 'higher' activities of the mind.

Of course, if the earlier difficulties have slipped away — if, as I put it earlier, the revised theory opens up a path into the unconscious for the ego — then this serves only to sanction the limited aesthetic insights gathered in Part One in respect of the workings of the mind on the models of neurosis, dream and, especially, the joke. If we are to extend understanding here what is now required is to bring the new resources to bear upon wider aesthetic matters. And although I think we shall have to call upon Melanie Klein's more detailed theoretical elaborations in order to do this successfully, the resources there now are interestingly invite a return to perhaps the most intriguing of Freud's own earlier contributions to aesthetic understanding, the essay on Leonardo. For Freud's discussions of the manner in which unconscious mental mechanisms operate in the
building-up and development of the ego suggest a more confident reading of the way in which Leonardo could be regarded, as having discovered in his art the means of restoring an ego which had long been threatened by conflict — as having discovered in his art 'a path back to reality'.

Leonardo, we might now say, represents a case in which the normal course of the Oedipal phase of development was fairly seriously disrupted. In the first place, in view of Leonardo's early years in the exclusive company of his natural mother, we may imagine a peculiarly intense libidinal attachment to his mother insofar as his Oedipal desires were not, at that stage, obstructed by the presence of his father. But when, later, Leonardo was taken into his father's household and thus belatedly confronted with the classic Oedipal conflict, we may imagine an extremely severe repression of his precocious Oedipal desires for his mother, for of course by then those desires were likely to have been very deeply established.

It would be natural to say at this point that the only effective means by which Leonardo could cope with his excessively strong desires for his mother lay in an equally strong identification with her, through repeated introjection. And it is relevant here, I think, to consider that the vulture phantasy which Freud regarded as expressing Leonardo's lib-
Idinal attachment to his mother should have been projected upon the dominantly oral phase of Leonardo's development— that is, to that phase in which identification through introjection or incorporation first occurs. And of course it is in virtue of the excessively strong identification with his mother that we have an explanation of Leonardo's putative (idealised) homosexuality: henceforth his sexual desires are projected upon boys in his own image whom he would seek to love as his mother had loved him.

The disturbed course of the Oedipal phase of his development and its final resolution, however, would likely have left Leonardo a burden of conflict which derived from the intensity of his desires for his mother and the consequent severity of their repression. That is to say, we imagine Leonardo's case to represent the possibility which Freud had dramatised as the ego's vainly defending itself against the instigations of the murderous id and against the reproaches of the punishing conscience.

We saw, however, that Freud refused to think of Leonardo as neurotic, as debilitated by his burden of conflict. The fact was, as Freud supposed, that though Leonardo did at some points in his adult life find himself suffering as a result of the original conflict—in the period of his life in which his creative abilities were seriously inhibited, Freud suggests, by virtue of the severity of the origin-
al repression of his Oedipal desires – he was not con-
demned permanently to repeat the original conflict. In
Freud's famous phrase, the neurotic 'repeats instead of
remembering' (SE XII 151), but, Freud had speculated, it
appears that in the last years of his life Leonardo was
able to remember the original conflict through his art.
The Giaconda smile recalls for Leonardo the love he had
felt towards his mother and which had for so long stood
under the shadow cast by repression. And in recalling the
love he finds release from his creative inhibitions.

The successive regressions which, Freud supposed, en-
able Leonardo to overcome the conflict of his early years
might be called, I suggested earlier, borrowing an expres-
sion from the ego-psychologists, 'regressions in the service
of the ego'. This suggestion might now make more sense
in the light of Freud's later work. It is as if, through
his art, Leonardo restored in phantasy what he had
for many years been unable to acknowledge. And just as,
much earlier, the phantasy introjection of his mother had
strengthened and secured Leonardo's ego against conflict –
though at the cost of unhappiness in his sexual life – so
the re-restoration in phantasy of his relations to his mother
as this can be taken to have been expressed in his late art,
once again strengthens and secures the ego against conflict
– only this time, Freud suggested, through the denial of
unhappiness in his sexual life. As we saw, Freud speculated that in the late androgynous figure-paintings,

It is possible that in these figures Leonardo had denied the unhappiness of his erotic life and has triumphed over it in his art, by representing the wishes of the boy, infatuated with his mother, as fulfilled in this blissful union of the male and female natures. (SE XI 117-8)

It is thus, in the terms which are now available, that Leonardo's art might be thought to have been truly therapeutic. For it is, as it were, in the re-building-up and strengthening of the ego by means of those processes which Freud had come to see were critically involved in the original development of the ego, that Leonardo can be thought to have achieved the end which psychotherapy itself seeks: namely, the strengthening of an ego which, as a result of some flaw or inadequacy in the original course of its development, is weak or disabled.

There are two matters on which Freud did not pronounce in his revised picture of the inner world, and each is critical if the re-reading I have offered of the Leonardo essay is to be sustained. The first is the idea of phantasy, and in this we once again recall the incomplete theme of the earlier chapters on Freud. But there is a new and significant clue to the articulation of the idea of phantasy which can be found in Freud's later writings. That is that Freud wanted to think of the mechanism of introjection
specifically in relation to oral phantasies of incorporation. But, we should remember, introjection is an unconscious mechanism of the ego, and this immediately suggests a radical new departure in Freud's thought. For now, it appears, phantasy is not just the vehicle of wishes and desires, as it had previously been construed: phantasy is also the vehicle of the ego-mechanisms — the ego-mechanisms themselves find representation in phantasy.

The second matter concerns, one might say, the malleability of phantasy. For we need to know precisely how phantasy can come to be employed in the reparative process putatively attributed to Leonardo, and, moreover, we need to know what it is that in the first place initiates the reparative process and on what energies it can be said to draw.

Each of these two matters, however, lie at the heart of Kleinian theory, to which it will now be appropriate to turn.
In the previous chapter, I implied a discrepancy in Freud's thought between, on the one hand, his articulation of the mechanism of introjection in relation to the oral phase of libidinal development, and, on the other, his dating of the first introjection of the parental figures and the forming of the super-ego much later than the oral phase. If introjection first occurs in the oral phase then might we not expect to find traces of the super-ego, and, correspondingly, evidence of Oedipal desires, much earlier than Freud had supposed? I added at the time that the question would naturally introduce Melanie Klein's work. For in fact Klein's view on the matter forms the core of her theoretical modifications of Freudian theory. Thus, she writes that her analyses of children demonstrate that the oral frustrations which children undergo release the Oedipus impulses in them and that the super-ego begins to be formed at the same time. The genital impulses remain out of sight at first since they do not as a rule assert themselves against the pregenital impulses until the third year of life. At that period they begin to emerge into clear view and the child enters a phase in which its early sexual life comes to a climax and its Oedipus conflict attains full development. (PC 179)

My reading of Kleinian theory then may be construed as the elaboration of the view that there is a connection between the oral phase of development and the emergence of the super-
ego. And in order to secure this reading to the account of Freud's later work, I shall concentrate primarily on the notions of ambivalence, the unconscious sense of guilt, and the process of identification and the related mechanisms of introjection and projection.

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It is a generally observed fact of infancy that the baby's pleasure in sucking gives way after a time to a pleasure in biting (1). In recognition of this, Klein suggests a division of the oral phase of development into the oral-sucking stage and the oral biting stage. In turn this division is presented as a polarity between instincts of love and hate. Thus,

...we may regard the force of the child's fixation at the oral-sucking level as an expression of the force of its libido, and, similarly, the early and powerful emergence of its oral sadism as a sign of the ascendancy of its destructive instinctual components. (PC 180)

To put it simply, the infant's sucking is the means by which it gains the nourishment it instinctually needs to survive, while its biting, though doubtless also instinctual, seems to have just the reverse tendency. The question now is, Why this oral sadism? And how is it to be understood?

The infant quickly learns that his mother, or more precisely his mother's breast (and much the same may be said, mutatis mutandis, of the breast-substitute in the bottle-fed
infant), not only satisfies his instinctual need for nourishment, but also, as it were, withholds that satisfaction: the mother's breast, that is, is not always there to satisfy the need. In fact the situation constitutes the classic occasion of anxiety where, as Freud had put it in another connection, the ego is helpless in the face of a constantly increasing instinctual demand — the earliest and original determinant of anxiety. (SE XX 144)

It is at this point, according to Klein, that the infant projects his own response to the instinctual danger outwards on to the breast itself, which comes to be experienced as threatening and hateful — as the source of anxiety. And in order to retain the nourishing, good aspect of the breast, and at the same time to destroy the threatening, bad aspect, the infant introjects the breast. But now, of course, the destructive impulses which are directed in phantasy against the introjected breast are in themselves also the occasion of anxiety: the infant now feels that he himself, insofar as he has identified with the breast, will be destroyed by those same destructive impulses. In this, however, we find a parallel to the situation which Freud had taken to arise in connection with the Oedipus conflict. In this respect then, Melanie Klein believes,

The Oedipus conflict and the super-ego set in... under the supremacy of the pre-genital impulses, and the objects which have been introjected in the oral-sadistic phase — the firsts object-cathexes and identifications — form the beginning of the
early super-ego. Moreover, what originates the formation of the super-ego and governs its earliest stages are the destructive impulses and the anxiety they arouse. In thus regarding the impulses of the individual as the fundamental factor in the formation of his super-ego we do not deny the importance of the objects themselves for this process, but we view it in a different light. The earliest identifications of the child reflect its objects in an unreal and distorted way. (PC 195)

We should pause to consider in greater detail this rapid revision of Freudian views.

First, and most generally important, Klein's position on a crucial matter is, from the start, declared quite unequivocally. As I pointed out in the Introduction and in the discussion of Freud, there was at first some unclarity in Freud's account of the formation of the super-ego about what emphasis was to be attached to the connection between the severity of the super-ego and the actual severity of the parents and the emphasis to be attached to the connection between the severity of the super-ego and instinctual aggression. And, as I indicated, it was in fact under the influence of Melanie Klein that Freud later came to attach the greater emphasis to the latter view. For it is Klein's claim that the severity of the super-ego is a function, not of the actual nature of the introjected objects, but of the infant's phantasies about those objects - objects represented, that is, 'in an unreal and distorted way'. And the kind of distortion at this stage is clear: for the phantasies
which predominate at the time of the earliest identifications in this oral-sadistic stage are peculiarly destructive phantasies.

Though I want to postpone full consideration of the Kleinian concept of phantasy until the core precepts of her theory have been properly established, that the introjected objects are represented in phantasy, not as they really are, as destroying and destroyed is significant in a respect which I have already mentioned. That is, the objects which are introjected at the oral-sadistic stage are not 'whole objects' not, as I articulated this notion in the previous chapter, the persons of the mother or father but rather 'part objects' parts of the persons of the mother or father: specifically, different bodily organs, and of course first amongst these at the oral phase is the mother's breast. The point; that it is in destructive phantasy that the introjected objects are represented, to some extent overcomes a difficulty I anticipated in the understanding of Klein's theories in comparison with Freud. For the ambivalence of the introjected object for Freud was, so to speak, anthropomorphised in his regarding the persons of the mother or father as the first introjected objects. And this anthropomorphic tendency stands upon what I have just discussed: namely, the fact that Freud was at first unclear about whether the introjected object represents, at least to some degree, a real
and doubtless actually ambivalent — object in the child's world.

It follows clearly enough from Klein's views that the first objects are introjected at a particularly sadistic stage of development that the super-ego, or the early traces of the super-ego, which is thus formed will be correspondingly cruel and severe. That is, the terrifyingness of the objects, and the force of the destructive impulses which are employed in overcoming their terrifyingness, will exaggerate the authority of the super-ego. But this must seem to suggest the bizarre picture of the infant as suffering not only fierce anxieties and brutal impulses, but also the reproaches of an especially punitive conscience. One begins to wonder quite how the infant's immature ego could possibly cope with the situation: the most robust ego, we must imagine, would be hard-pressed in such dire circumstances. In fact, however — and this is both an interesting and important feature of Kleinian theory — the apparent crisis turns out to be a sort of salvation. The force of the early destructive impulses in fact requires the opposition of an equally forceful authority. Thus the ego, which is still weak, mobilises the cruelty of the early super-ego in defence against the destructive impulses which are themselves the occasion of anxiety. As Klein puts it,
...as soon as the process of incorporation has begun the incorporated object becomes the vehicle of defence against the destructive impulses within the organism.  

(PC 184)

In other words, the cruelty of the early super-ego comes to the defence of the ego against instinct, though at this stage primarily destructive, not sexual, instinct. And of course in this Klein's views are entirely consonant with Freud's insofar as the super-ego is regarded as the agency from which instinctual inhibition proceeds.

One further aspect of Klein's views of the formation of the early super-ego will, I hope, suffice to conclude this rather summary account of her theory, specifically in relation to the discussion of Freud.

We have already seen how Freud came to associate the workings of the super-ego with the unconscious sense of guilt. But Freud's limited discussion of this notion must, I think, leave us a little uncertain about what answer he wanted to offer to a question he himself had asked: namely, How is it that the super-ego manifests itself essentially as a sense of guilt...and moreover develops such extraordinary harshness and severity towards the ego?  (SE XIX 53)

It seems to me that the answer offered here by Kleinian theory is particularly compelling. The harshness and severity of the super-ego, we have just seen, is a function of the fact that the first objects are introjected in a
dominantly sadistic phase of development. And insofar as the destructive phantasies are so intense at this period we may suppose that later, once the super-ego has been released from service in defence against the destructive impulses, the unconscious sense of guilt in which it finds expression will not only itself be strong but also as generally widespread as, we saw, Freud had speculated it might be. For of course insofar as the sense of guilt is made to stand in connection with an entirely normal, not pathological, phase of development — the oral-sadistic stage — then the more plausible it is to assume that we are all subject to the same burden, if not the same intensity, of guilt. Moreover, it is particularly clear in Kleinian theory to what, in the first instance, this sense of guilt attaches, and why it should be experienced specifically as a sense of guilt. It attaches, that is to say, to the damage (in phantasy) which the destructive impulses have wreaked on the infant's first objects. And it is in the course of arguing this that Klein draws attention to the benign, reparative use to which the sense of guilt is subsequently put. She writes,

...when the excessive severity of the super-ego has become somewhat diminished, its visitations upon the ego on account of those imaginary attacks [upon the introjected objects] induce feelings of guilt which arouse strong tendencies in the child to make good the imaginary damage it has done to its objects. And now the individual content and details of its
destructive phantasies help to determine the development of its sublimations, which indirectly serve its restitutive tendencies... *(CP 274)*

There is, I am aware, a good deal which will seem unclear in this cursory account of what lies at the centre of Klein's view of the early development of the child. But perhaps the bare form of this has been sufficiently adduced to permit taking a broader view of its significance for the Kleinian theory of mind. And once this is done, I mean to take up the ideas of phantasy and reparation as these occur in Kleinian theory, for each turns out to be crucially relevant to the aesthetic discussion.

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What dominated Freud's account of the development of the individual, at least until the very last phase, was his identification of the sequence of libidinal phases through which the child passes. Melanie Klein, however, from the start, gave much greater emphasis to the emerging structure of the ego and to the ego's characteristic activities. But within this emphasis, it is possible to find a very rough parallel to the successive phases of libidinal development in Klein's idea that the infant adopts two distinguishable 'positions' in the course of its development. These two positions, which
are identified with respect to characteristic constellations of the ego's mechanisms of defence, Klein calls, respectively, the 'paranoid-schizoid' position, and the 'depressive' position. To understand what she has in mind, we should once again take up consideration of the mechanisms of introjection and projection as they are employed for purposes of defence.

The infant at first projects his feelings of love and hate outwards, on to the primary external object, the breast. Consequently, the breast comes to be regarded as having both a 'good' aspect and a 'bad' one. And when, subsequently, the breast is introjected, it is correspondingly introjected both under its good and bad aspects. (In my earlier discussion of this I might have appeared to imply that the breast was primarily introjected as a bad object. But while this emphasis served the purpose of identifying the force and influence of the destructive impulses it should not be regarded as an accurate picture. For though in the oral-sadistic stage destructive impulses predominate over loving impulses they do not obliterate them. And when the breast is introjected, it is introjected as much in order internally to retain its good aspects as to fight off its bad ones.)

The infant now tries to keep apart the good object, apprehended as life-giving and nourishing, and the bad
object, apprehended as threatening and persecutory. In other words, the infant tries to 'split off' the projective residues of the introjected object - his own love and hate. His anxiety at this stage - a paranoid anxiety - is that the bad object will overwhelm and destroy the good, and hence at the same time, in view of his identification with the objects, overwhelm and destroy himself. And his defence against this anxiety - a schizoid defence - is to split off the good and bad objects, and hence at the same time, in view of his identification with the objects, the good and bad aspects of himself. Thus the term 'paranoid-schizoid' to describe this stage of development.

As the infant develops further, as he becomes aware of a broader range of objects in the world, these same processes of projection and introjection are repeated in much the same manner as his first projective and introjective identifications with the breast. But, in the normal course of development, as his adaptation to reality increases, the infant begins to recognise that the split-off good objects, and hence his own loving impulses, are stronger than the bad objects, and hence than his hating impulses. And as he becomes more securely possessed of the good objects, or - what is theoretically the same thing - as his ego becomes stronger, his paranoid anxieties diminish: there is a decreasing need to project his hating, destructive
impulses outwards on to external objects, hence an increased integration of formerly split-off introjected objects, and hence also an increased integration of the ego.

It is at this point that the depressive position begins to set in. The infant comes to recognise his mother as a person, as a whole object, and no longer as a configuration of part-objects which are split-off into good and bad components. At the same time, the introjection of the mother as a whole object promotes a further integration of the ego: the infant realises that his loves and hates are not split off at all, but that he himself has directed them to one and the same object. And this leads to a new anxiety which is depressive in character. The mother, apprehended now as a whole object, is recognised to be independent. There is a sense of loss at this recognition of independence which leads to an intensification of the introjective activities as the infant tries to retain his good object inside himself. But alongside this is his feeling that he himself has been responsible for the loss and independence of the good object: his own impulses have destroyed and still threaten to destroy the good object. The sense of loss, and the sense of guilt which accompanies the loss — and we might here recall how significant these two factors were in Freud's account of melancholia (depression) — now come to be infant's predominating feelings. And thus the
term 'depressive' to describe this stage of development.

To look more generally at Klein's account here, two points ought to be made clear. The first is that the way in which each position is designated is not meant to indicate that they are in themselves in the nature of psychotic conditions. For Klein they constitute stages in the normal course of development. On the other hand, we should not be surprised to learn, bearing Freudian theory in mind, that they are importantly connected with neurotic and psychotic disturbance in later life. That is to say, just as for Freud there could be regression to the various phases of libidinal development, so too for Klein there could be regression to the depressive and to the paranoid-schizoid positions.

This brings us quickly to the second point, which goes some way to explain Klein's use of the term 'position' and not 'stage' or 'phase'. For the two positions are not bound together, as the phases of libidinal development, in a strict temporal sequence. The primary reference is to the characteristic mechanisms of defence which are employed against particular kinds of anxiety, and it is in virtue of the predominating anxieties that the positions alternate across the entire range of infantile development. Thus, there is nothing internal to the positions which prevents a return from the depressive position to the paranoid-schizoid, and though in the normal course of development the in-
fant overcomes the depressive position, there is nothing to prevent a return to it. Thus the possibility and facility of regression to either position in later life is, as it were, built into the concept of a position from the first. And this of course contrasts with Freud's views to the degree that, just as the original phases of libidinal development are strictly temporally fixed, the course of regression is correspondingly fixed.

The core of the fully-developed personality of the adult lies, according to the Kleinian view, in the nature of the integration of object-relations which is achieved in the depressive position, but the complexity of individual variation also depends upon the force and subsequent influence of the object-relations established in the paranoid-schizoid position, and in the later modifications and sublimations of depressive anxiety. As Hanna Segal, one of Klein's followers, has put it,

Some paranoid and depressive anxieties always remain active within the personality, but when the ego is sufficiently integrated and has established a secure relationship to reality during the working-through of the depressive position, neurotic mechanisms gradually take over from psychotic ones. Thus, in Melanie Klein's view, infantile neurosis is a defence against underlying paranoid and depressive anxieties and a way of binding and working through them. As integrative processes initiated in the depressive position continue, anxiety lessens and reparation, sublimation and creativity tend to replace both psychotic and neurotic mechanisms of defence.

(Re: ix-x)
As the tail of Segal's remark suggests, we are at last close to the point at which the picture of the inner world towards which Kleinian theory has worked begins to have a particular import for the aesthetic project. But it will be useful, first, to provide a general review, paying special attention to the concepts of phantasy and reparation.

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The concept of phantasy, we saw in the course of the discussions of Part One, underwent a variety of modifications and extensions. At first, Freud used the term primarily to designate the activity of day-dreaming, or conscious imaginative activity generally, and in its usual orthographic form in common parlance — 'fantasy' — this remains its designation. Such activity, Freud claimed, was predicated upon a wish, and hence phantasy could be regarded — much like a dream — as the (hallucinatory) fulfilment of a wish. Freud, however, soon came to see that phantasies were much more closely like a dream in that they too might be predicated upon an unconscious wish. Thus phantasies themselves could be unconscious. Still, Freud's use of the term 'unconscious phantasy' was restricted, and this we can now say was partly for the reason to which I drew attention at the start of the previous chapter: namely, that the
unconscious was for a long time generally equated with the repressed. In other words, unconscious phantasy appeared to have been nothing more for Freud than repressed conscious phantasy.

At the same time, however, Freud had turned his attention in 'Creative Writers and Daydreaming' to the role of phantasy in art. And there a new dimension in the understanding of phantasy was revealed: namely, its function as a continuation of play. In view of this, it then seemed natural to consider the joke, for joking too was thought by Freud to be a continuation of play. But what emerged in the discussion of the joke was that the unconscious activities of the mind appeared - though there was some difficulty in finding the theoretical specification of this possibility - not to operate exclusively in the service of defence against libidinal desire. Thus, in respect of the connection between joking and phantasy-forming, it appeared possible that phantasy itself was not wholly predicated upon a wish, whether conscious or unconscious.

In the later investigation of the nature and activities of the ego, it became clear that it was indeed not only the contents of the id which were represented in phantasy, but also the activities of the ego itself. Specifically, we saw, the mechanism of introjection was attached to, and seemed quite closely dependent upon, phantasies of incorpor-
ating an object orally. Thus, it now seems, there is considerably more to the idea of unconscious phantasy than is represented in the idea of repressed conscious phantasy.

The line of thought pursued by Melanie Klein importantly stems from the possibility of the representation of the ego's activities in phantasy. That is to say, once the theoretical aim of uncovering the nature of the ego had come to dominate psychoanalytic work, the focal point of the enquiry came to be the precise nature of phantasy. Indeed, it can be said, the entire interpretative foundation of Kleinian theory rests upon the idea of unconscious phantasy and its representation of the ego's activities. And of course, along with the elevation of the importance of the idea, comes a new and much richer elaboration of its nature. (Henceforth, in discussing this matter, I shall follow the conventions of Kleinian psychoanalysts and use the terms 'phantasy' and 'unconscious phantasy' interchangeably: 'phantasy' now means 'unconscious phantasy', unless there is a specific note to the contrary. The stipulation is important in avoiding confusion, for I mean to draw on the work of two of Klein's followers, Susan Isaacs and Hanna Segal, and each of them uses 'phantasy' and 'unconscious phantasy' interchangeably.)

It was, generally speaking, Freud's view that all mental
processes originate from instinctual needs, or in response to external stimuli as they came to affect those needs. And, in Freud's view, it is through the id, which he always took to be directly in contact with somatic processes, that the instinctual needs find mental representation. The view acquires greater specificity in Kleinian theory. For what is now regarded as the mental representative of instinctual need is unconscious phantasy. As Susan Isaacs puts it in an essay on 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', 'Phantasy is (in the first instance) the mental corollary, the psychic representation of instinct' (DP 83). But what is dramatic about this specificity is that phantasy is a mental representation of instinct which is formed through the medium of the ego, not, as for Freud, the id. That is, a central precept of Kleinian theory is, as Hanna Segal writes, that 'Phantasy-forming is a function of the ego' (IK 20).

The role of phantasy, however, is by no means exhausted in the rudimentary representation of instinctual need. Once again, Susan Isaacs:

The relation between phantasy and wish-fulfilment has always been emphasized: but our experience has shown that most phantasies also serve other purposes as well as wish-fulfilment: e.g. denial, reassurance, omnipotent control, reparation etc. . . . (DP 83)

In other words, phantasy takes on the dual role both of conveying instinctual impulses and of defending the ego
against anxieties which derive from the frustration of those instinctual impulses.

But, again, the role of phantasy is not exhausted in the representation of instinct and in defence of the ego. For the mechanisms of defence which find representation in phantasy - and here we return to the late Freudian claim - also play a crucial part in the building-up of the ego, in establishing its character. And this of course is why, for the Kleininan, unconscious phantasy is such a potent therapeutic instrument. For, as Segal has put it, it is the fact that the character of the ego is intimately related to unconscious phantasy which makes it possible to influence the structure of the ego and the super-ego through analysis. It is by analysing the ego's relations with objects, external and internal, and altering the phantasies about these objects, that we can materially affect the ego's more permanent structure. (IK 20)

Finally, and this is a point which will significantly lend itself to the aesthetic discussion, unconscious phantasy is further regarded by the Kleininan as standing behind the possibility and the quality of extremely highly-developed and sophisticated functions such as thought and creativity. That is, where, for Freud, thinking develops from the interplay of instinctual impulses and the process of reality-testing, for the Kleininan, for whom phantasy represents those instinctual impulses, thought is regarded as developing from the testing of phantasy against reality. Thus,
Hanna Segal:

Thinking could be viewed as a modification of unconscious phantasy, a modification brought about by reality-testing. The richness, depth and accuracy of a person's thinking will depend on the quality and malleability of his unconscious phantasy life and his capacity to subject it to reality-testing. (IK 23)

The remark quickly recalls several of the themes of Part One in connection with the discussion of the artist's inner world. Thus, it was frequently a matter of trying to determine the quality of the phantasies putatively brought to art (of whether they were simply the consequence of a wish); or of determining the malleability of the phantasies (of whether the artist could be said to manipulate his phantasy in the interests of art); or of determining the artist's capacity to subject phantasy to reality-testing (of whether, unlike the neurotic, the artist's use of phantasy led him on the path back to reality). The Kleinian theory of mind, in other words, in elevating the idea of unconscious phantasy to such a crucial place in the account of the human mind, seems to offer much greater theoretical resource in such matters. Quite what resolution is available, however, importantly depends upon what is made of the idea of reparation: for, as it has already been intimated, the capacity to make reparation appears to be closely bound up with the possibility of creative activity.
Reparation occurs, in the first instance, as a mechanism of defence against depressive anxiety. As Klein usefully sums up the position we have reached,

The basis of depressive anxiety is... the process by which the ego synthesizes destructive impulses and feelings of love towards one object. The feeling that the harm done to the loved object is caused by the subject's aggressive impulses I take to be the essence of guilt.... The urge to undo or repair this harm results from the feeling that the subject has caused it, i.e. from guilt. The reparative tendency can therefore be considered as a consequence of guilt. (DP 284)

At the same time, the reparative process contributes substantially to the integration of the ego. To put it simply: the introjected object becomes, as we have seen, a part of the self, and so in his grief at the loss and independence of the object, and in his sense of guilt at having damaged it in phantasy, the infant's grieving and guilt are ultimately directed upon the (imagined) loss of a part of himself and upon the damage he has done himself. In trying to restore and repair the good object, the infant then is trying to restore and repair himself. And insofar as he is successful in restoring and repairing the good object internally, his ego is increasingly strengthened as the good object is more and more securely assimilated. (The re-restoration of the good object is of course what the Kleinian therapist tries to achieve in his patient; and thus, more precisely, we might now say that it was perhaps in this that the real therapeutic value of Leonardo's art
essentially lay: in his later art he restores and repairs the good object of his early childhood.) In turn, this strengthening and integration of the ego gives rise to an increasing confidence that reparative capacities can set things right not only in the inner world, but also in the world of external, real objects. Frustration and deprivation in the real world gradually cease to elicit the hatred which had earlier threatened to overwhelm the ego, and the hatred itself becomes less terrifying as the belief develops in the capacity to make good what hatred has destroyed. The reconciliation in the inner world becomes the source of strength in dealing with the outer.

It should be recalled at this point that the Kleinian view of the development of the individual is a theory of infantile development, largely concerned with the first months of life. But it is now, with the idea of reparation, that a bridge is created from the infant's early and highly restricted world of inner objects to the child's increasing range of activities and interests in the external world. For instance, it is to the reparative process in its early manifestation that Kleinian theory would attribute that characteristic desire in early childhood that things should be done in the 'right' way. And doubtless every parent will testify to the assiduity with which his child will seek to correct any deviation from what he regards as the
'proper' form of his activities: for example, to the ferocity which attends the child's complaints that a game is not being played right, that it is being 'spoiled'.

But there is, so far as my account has gone, something of a lacuna in this transition from the inner world to the outer. For if the idea of reparation has been introduced in connection with, and theoretically depends upon, the infant's feelings towards his first objects, how does it come about that these feelings and consequent anxieties and attempts to overcome those anxieties are, as it were, transmitted from the inner objects to objects in the real world. Earlier I alluded briefly to the way in which the processes of projection and introjection are repeated across an ever-expanding range of objects in the external world, but I have not yet attempted to say quite why this repetition should occur, and why, hence, the process of reparation should have a widely general role.

In her central paper, 'The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego' (CP 236-50), Melanie Klein presents her view of what is, in large measure, the most crucial issue in every psychoanalytic theory: namely, the way in which the unconscious world comes to colour the activities and interests of conscious life. For Freud, of course, this derives from the child's earlier libidinal
interests as a result of which he seeks to rediscover in every object his own bodily organs and their functioning; and this process of rediscovery is facilitated by the ease of transition through a constantly-expanding realisation of pleasures. In Klein's view, it is the child's symbol-forming capacities which, directly, give rise to the libidinal colouring of objects, activities and interests; and these symbol-forming capacities themselves develop directly out of anxiety, through identification and the processes of projection and introjection. That is, the child forms his first crude symbols by projecting parts of himself on to outer objects, and by identifying, through introjection, parts of the object with parts of himself: for instance, the breast is projectively characterised as 'bad', and when introjected it comes to stand for the 'bad' parts of himself. Thus, Melanie Klein writes,

Since the child desires to destroy the organs (penis, vagina, breast) which stand for the objects, he conceives a dread of the latter. This anxiety contributes to make him equate the organs in question with other things: owing to this equation these in turn become objects of anxiety, and so he is impelled constantly to make other and new equations, which form the basis of his interests in the new objects and of symbolism.

Thus, not only does symbolism come to be the foundation of all phantasy and sublimation, but, more than that, upon it is built up the subject's relation to the outside world and to reality in general. (CP 238)

In her short lay account of her theory, the essay on 'Love, Guilt and Reparation', Klein puts her point more simply:
In this symbolic way, any round object may, in the child's unconscious mind, come to stand for his mother's breast. By a gradual process, anything that is felt to give out goodness and beauty, and that calls forth pleasures and satisfaction, in the physical or in the wider sense, can in the unconscious mind take the place of this ever-bountiful breast, and of the whole mother. (LR 106)

If we now attach the idea of reparation to the continuing interplay of projection and introversion, and to the transmission through symbolism of feelings and phantasies, then clearly reparative activity can manifest itself with respect to any new symbolic equation. But then, as we have seen, as anxieties diminish the mechanisms of projection and introversion take on a wider role than in defence of the early ego, and come to be influential in establishing characteristic configurations of object-relations and interests. And now we are extremely close to the ideas of creativity and art. For, it might be said, it is in art, paradigmatically, that an interest in symbol-forming activity itself has reached its peak, and the desire to make things (artistically) right and whole has reached its highest intensity. 

Pregnantly, Klein asserts,

...the sculptor who puts life into his object of art, whether or not it represents a person, is unconsciously restoring and recreating the early loved people, who he has in phantasy destroyed. (LR 106)

But not only the artist. For Klein also wants to say - and the remark recalls a theme of the Prologue about the need to take into account both the artistic and spectatorial point of
view:

The desire to rediscover the mother of the early days, whom one has lost actually or in one's feelings is...of the greatest importance in creating art and in the ways people enjoy and appreciate it. (LR 105)

These at least are the thoughts to which the Kleinian theory of the mind has led, and though of course they can hardly be represented at this point as convincing, nor even indeed very illuminating, they are thoughts out of which a good deal might be made aesthetically. In particular, we shall see in Part Three, they are thoughts around which Adrian Stokes elaborates a rich and compelling aesthetic.

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With the exception of the essay on 'Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and the Creative Impulse' (CP 227-35), Melanie Klein herself did not address her theory to matters of art and aesthetics. And even this brief essay, it should be said, has extremely limited concerns.

Klein's first subject in the essay is Colette's libretto for Ravel's opera, L'Enfant et les Sorilèges, and her aim is to reveal characteristic anxiety-situations represented in the child's successive dramatic activities. Thus, she identifies a primary sadism represented in the
child's destructive rage which has been prompted by his mother's punishing him for failing to do his homework; the hostility and destruction turned back on the child represented in the way the objects and animals which he has tortured in his rage come to life and begin to threaten him; and finally, the restoration of a good internal world and the overcoming of the destructive impulses represented in the child's pity and care for an injured squirrel - the hostility of the animals diminishes as, in the finale, they sing 'That's a good child, a very well-behaved child'.

The approach here does not take us far in the understanding of art - though it does, I think, rather like Freud's essay on Leonardo, have a usefully illustrative purpose in understanding Kleinian views of anxiety. And the reason it does not take us far is that, like Freud's own attempts to consider works of art, it focuses on the content of a work of art, rather than the form. To employ a locution I used in connection with Freud's work, Klein offers us here a new set of psychoanalytic images in the content of art.

In the second part of her essay, Klein offers a (highly speculative) psychoanalytic account of the development of creative impulse in the painter, Ruth Kjar. As it was represented by the painter's friend, Karen Michaelis, Kjar, who as a young woman had suffered severe fits of depression in
which she felt there was a vast 'empty space' inside her, was one day confronted with what she felt to be the external embodiment of that empty space when a painting which had long hung in her house was removed, leaving a blank space on the wall. Apparently the space on the wall became neurotically intolerable to Kjar who immediately, and though she had never in her life painted, set to work with oils and brushes and filled the blank space with an extraordinarily accomplished painting. In Klein's view, the situation rather neatly represented her theoretical claims about the relation of creativity and reparation: namely, that it is in virtue of the experience of loss, of internal emptiness, at the vanishing of a good object which creates guilt-anxieties. The symbolic transitions from the good object to other objects in the world then carry with them the same guilt-anxieties, and there is an intense desire to make good the original loss and symbolically to restore the good object. (And in this context, Klein goes on to suggest how, in terms of content, Kjar's paintings might be considered explicit attempts at the restoration of a lost good object.)

Again, however, this does not take us very far. The artist is not of course psychologically unique in his reparative desires (though it may in fact be true that he experiences reparative desires with a particular intensity).
What the artist is unique in is that the course of his symbolic transitions leads him to express his reparative desires in artistic form. And the central aesthetic issue here concerns the respects in which art may be thought particularly suited as the vehicle of the reparative desires — that is, the respects in which a work of art might be said formally, and not as a matter of content, to be apt for the process of reparation.

If 'Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and the Creative Impulse' offered the sole contribution that Kleinian theory could be thought to make to the understanding of our experience of art, then no significant advance would have been made over Freud. But, happily, this is by no means the case. For several of Klein's followers have taken up the aesthetic discussion in a number of interesting ways. And though, as I intimated, we must wait upon the discussion of Adrian Stokes's work to discover any very confident aesthetic use of Kleinian theory, it is, I think, worth looking briefly at the work of one of Klein's psychoanalyst colleagues, Hanna Segal, in this respect. I shall do so with reference to three aesthetic themes which were discussed in the Prologue, and to which I have frequently recurred: first, the idea of form in art; second, the relations between artist and spectator; and third, the matter of what I have called
the 'objecthood' of art.

It is on the assumption that in his work the artist is once more working through the depressive position, making reparation for a lost inner object and restoring his inner world that Segal has, in a pair of overlapping essays on 'A Psychoanalytic Approach to Aesthetics' (2) and on 'Art and the Inner World' (3), suggested a psychoanalytic construal of a specifically formal issue in aesthetics.

The salient psychological point for Segal is that the process of reparation is successful only to the degree that there is a proper acknowledgement of the original loss and destruction. Otherwise, for example, allegedly reparative activity would only constitute a form of denial. But Segal brings this point interestingly into connection with the aesthetic relations of beauty and ugliness, first quoting Rodin's views on the matter. Rodin apparently wrote,

'We call ugly that which is formless, unhealthy, which suggests illness, suffering, destruction, which is contrary to regularity - the sign of health. We also call ugly the immoral, the vicious, the criminal and all abnormality which brings evil - the soul of the parricide, the traitor, the self-seeker. But let a great artist get hold of this ugliness; immediately he transfigures it - with a touch of his magic wand he makes it into beauty.' (4)

What Segal wants to make of this is that it is in his acknowledging the ugly - in the overcoming of ugliness, not in its denial or evasion - that the artist reveals himself.
And in this his art parallels the working-through of depressive anxiety and successful reparation. But this immediately suggests an important point in the understanding of art: in crude form, that the ugly is not that, as it is sometimes thought, which lies outside art, in contrast with art, but is that which the work of art can resolve and transform. The ugly, we might say, is as much an aesthetic aspect of art as beauty (which view, if we look at a Goya etching, or Cuernica, seems to me more readily comprehensible than the belief in the synonymy of art and beauty). As Segal puts it, 'A work of art devoid of the elements we might call ugly would not be beautiful but merely pretty' (5).

The point might be made in a slightly different way if we consider the relation between representations of beauty and the beautiful itself. Manifestly, of course, a photograph of a beautiful woman is not thereby a beautiful photograph. And where, in indubitably classic works of art — say, Botticelli's The Birth of Venus — there is a more or less simple representation of beauty, this again is not in itself the reason that such works are classically beautiful, no more than it is the case that a work of art which represents suffering and destruction and ugliness is thereby ugly. What, I think, is interestingly at issue here is the degree of perfection which a work of art might admit without degenerating into emptiness or 'prettiness'. And it is an issue
which perhaps suggests that indubitably classical works of art are somewhat problematic paradigms — that is to say, that it is in virtue of entirely unobvious aesthetic properties that they commend themselves as paradigms of art. Segal in fact tries to draw classical art into her thesis here, but not, it seems to me, very convincingly. Taking a cue from Rilke's remark that 'Beauty is nothing but the beginning of terror that we are still just able to bear' — a remark which seems more appropriately to define the idea of the sublime — she wants to claim that the classical perfection of the Parthenon or the Discobolus, despite their lack of elements of the ugly, still embody 'the terrifying experience of depression and death' (6). As we shall see, however, the matter is one on which Adrian Stokes has to pronounce in much greater depth, and with greater penetration.

Segal's thesis about the reparative parallel in art usefully leads to another concerning the relation of artist and spectator with respect to the work of art. For if the reparative process is in some sense evident in the formal structure of the work of art, then it is natural enough to suppose that our aesthetic experience of the artist's work stands upon an implicit recognition of reparative success (or failure) and the resolution of anxiety (or lack of resolution). Importantly, this is not to assume a speci-
fic awareness of the artist's own inner world and its vicissitudes -- we do not depend here either explicitly or covertly upon some pathographic understanding of the artist himself -- but it is to suggest that the needs and desires which occur in relation to the promptings of the artist's inner world are in general recognisable as our own. So far as the artist is a man like ourselves (and not, for example, psychotic) -- so far as he shares our common neurotic burdens, Freud might have said -- then so far his art can seem to us the resolution of a widely-shared anxiety.

As Segal represents our experience of his art, the artist has, in his hatred destroyed all his loved objects just as I have done, and like me he felt death and desolation inside him. Yet he can face it and he can make me face it, and despite the ruin and devastation we and the world around us survive. What is more, his objects, which have become evil and were destroyed have been made to come alive again and have become immortal by his art. Out of all the chaos and destruction he has created a world which is whole, complete and unified. (7)

One further point drawn from Segal's essays will conveniently bring us to the matter of the 'objecthood' of art, and, at the same time, naturally introduce Adrian Stokes.

It is, for Kleinian theory, an important part of successfully working through depressive anxieties and making reparation that the inner object is recognised and restored as independent and separate: that is, as a whole object of which the subject no longer seeks to retain the
good aspects and to split off the bad. And of course this theoretical point carries over in the symbolic transitions effected upon the original object, and hence, ultimately, to the work of art. And in this the vital consideration emerges. Segal writes,

...if I am correct in my assumption that the artist when creating is working through again his infantile depressive position, then he too has not only to recreate something in his inner world corresponding to the recreation of his internal objects, but also has to externalise the completed object and allow it to become separate from himself, giving it independent life in the external world.... This aspect of the artist's creativity — the work of art being felt as part of his internal world and yet constituting an independent external object at the same time — was elaborated by Adrian Stokes in his book, *The Invitation in Art.* (8)

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Consideration of Freud's later work and of Melanie Klein's theories has provided a picture of the inner world which at last permits the general possibility of mapping out a properly-construed view of the inner structure of our experience of art. And it is to such a view that I now turn in discussing the aesthetic of Adrian Stokes in Part Three. But if the theoretical resources are now available, it also seems to me a matter of singular importance that the discussion so far of what may be called the subjective background to our experience of art should, at this point, naturally have led us back to the objective aspects of art. And
it is indeed appropriate that this should have introduced the name of Adrian Stokes. For, in particular in his earlier writings, Stokes insistently recalls us to an awareness of the work of art as an object hewed in the solidity of stone, or worked in the redolent stuff of oil paint on the surface of a stretched expanse of canvas.

Consideration of such works as The Quattro Cento, Stones of Rimini and Colour and Form — works written before Stokes explicitly came to employ the insights of psychoanalytic theory — will serve to restore the imbalances which have perhaps been created by the emphasis upon the inner structure of our subjectivity. As Stokes reminds us in his first psychoanalytically informed work,

The work of art is esteemed for its otherness, as a self-sufficient object, no less than as an ego-figure. (GC 50)
PART THREE

THE AESTHETIC OF ADRIAN STOKES

Introduction

1
The Objecthood of Art

2
Art and the Representation of Mind
INTRODUCTION

Adrian Stokes's writing career covered almost half a century, from the bold and youthful The Thread of Ariadne in 1925 to A Game That Must Be Lost, published in 1973 some months after Stokes's death on December 15, 1972. In all there are twenty-two volumes of his work, a number of uncollected essays and some poetry. A selection of his writings, The Image in Form, appeared in 1972, and a collected edition of his writings on art is currently in hand.

There are no extended critical works on Adrian Stokes. Indeed, with the exception of some reviews (1), the only guides are Richard Wollheim's preface to The Invitation in Art, his introductory essay to The Image in Form, and Eric Rhode's few, largely biographical, pages of introduction to A Game That Must Be Lost. Stokes remains a figure widely known but generally unread, celebrated by friends and aficionados but not publicly reported.

In the following pages I concern myself with thirteen of his works. Four of these, written in the 1930s and 1940s, I shall somewhat arbitrarily declare to belong to a first period, of which I write in the first chapter. There are two transitional works, and the remaining seven belong to a second, more or less explicitly psychoanalytic
period of which I write in the second chapter.

In discussing the earlier work under the title 'The Objecthood of Art', another form of selectivity will be apparent. For it is not only that I concentrate on those themes of Stokes's earlier work which are, I believe, importantly elaborated in, and hence crucial to the understanding of, the work which is informed with the insights of psychoanalytic theory. As well, I select those themes which seem to me to create a proper balance in writing of the inner structure of our experience of art. For, as I pointed out in the Prologue, it is sometimes the case that in the tradition which stands behind my project the work of art becomes a sort of courtesy object: more of an occasion than a palpable object.

Stokes, I shall say, particularly in the earlier writings, is concerned to explore what I am calling the 'objecthood' of art. And it is not here simply that one is never in doubt about Stokes's awareness of the implacably sensible dimensions of the work of art. Stokes further wants to make something very specific of the 'externality' of art, of its bodily presence to us — of the apparently uninteresting fact that, as it is put somewhat later, the painter (the 'artist par excellence' for Stokes) wields his brush 'at arm's length'. What sense these images have I hope to make clear in examining the dominant theme of Stokes's
early work - his distinction between 'carving' and 'modelling' modes of art. As we shall see, that these are modes of the objecthood of a work of art is significantly related to the first derivation of the terms: that is, the ideas of carving and modelling originally refer to something like the artist's physical confrontation with his object. There is, it quickly becomes clear, a great deal more to the ideas than just this, however, and it is my purpose in the first chapter to try to draw out exactly what this is.

Once a proper sense of the objecthood of art has been restored to my general enterprise, I mean to collect together themes which have interwoven themselves throughout my discussion so far and, in the final chapter, to offer an account of 'Art and the Representation of Mind'. Here I shall consider Stokes's writings from the early 1950s on, and the penetration of Stokes's earlier aesthetic as it is enriched by a psychoanalytic understanding of the inner structure of our experience of art.

A final introductory point might be made. Intrinsic to all of Stokes's writings on art is a belief about how such an enterprise ought to be conducted. He writes, that is to say, of those aspects of art in which 'the co-ordination of art and life are implicit', and he insists that these
are 'the only aspects that are fit subject for literature' (QC 127). These aspects are designated the 'emblematic' quality of art, and the idea of the emblematic lies at the heart of Stokes's thinking.

Unfortunately, however, Stokes's use of the idea of emblem is never clearly explained — indeed, the term 'emblematic' largely disappears in his later work (giving way, first, to the ugly term 'emblematic-cultural' and, in the end, to 'cultural' tout court — but its sense is persistent. And it is especially in this matter that one becomes most aware of a feature of Stokes's writing generally: the fact that Stokes makes almost no concession to discursive plainness. Of course, in view of my remarks in the Prologue and elsewhere about the absurdity of trying to talk of our experience of art as plainly as one would of pigs, I see no grounds for complaint. But it causes difficulties for the commentator. The idea of the emblematic, for instance, first occurs quite cursorily articulated in a footnote, and one suspects that the footnote was included more or less as an afterthought, perhaps prompted by a publisher's reader. For in Stokes's writings one has the sense of a mind utterly absorbed in its objects and determined to announce those objects in no other form than that in which they had first impinged upon the mind. When Richard Wollheim wrote in his introductory essay on Stokes that
'for anything even approximating to the subtlety and ingenuity of Stokes's criticism there is no alternative to a return to the writings themselves' (2), it was no lame gesture about his own review of Stokes's ideas, but rather, I think, a serious claim about any review of them. It is perhaps in the end understandable that Stokes has found no platoon of apologists: the initial act of presumption compels, or should compel, hesitancy.
THE OBJECTHOOD OF ART

Art, it is Adrian Stokes's earliest contention, is either of a predominantly carving mode or of a predominantly modelling mode. Such contentions usually have greater audacity than accuracy, but the first troublesome difficulty in trying to render what Stokes has in mind with the ideas of carving and modelling is that the audacity is deliberate. Stokes's attitudes to carving and modelling modes of art are at first — and indeed for a number of years — highly dramatised. Art of the carving mode, in particular Stokes's beloved 'Quattro Cento' art, as he called it, is patently favoured in his earlier works, and art of the modelling mode is frequently scorned. This preferential bias, then, will often seem to interfere with the claims I shall make on behalf of the distinction — primarily that it is an aesthetic distinction concerning the nature of art generally and not one concerning Stokes's private estimation of the merits of one kind of art over another. And the reason that the bias should not be permitted to interfere with the account of the distinction is that Stokes in fact confessed to a 'partisan purpose' which is quite independent of the aesthetic which evolves. That is, it was his first motive in The Quattro Cento and Stones of Rimini to rescue works of art which had long remained in the shadow of critical neglect.
and indifference. One might ignore the trends of critical partisanship - including Stokes's - were they not so insidiously engaged in Stokes's very personal manner of writing, but there is a further complication. It is that the critical trends constitute for Stokes the surface manifestations of deeper issues concerning the proper approach to the understanding of art. Importantly, critical attachment to, for example, the obvious vitality of Florentine art of the sixteenth century - an art of a predominantly modelling mode - too easily diverts attention from the 'emblematic' foundation of art - of all art, but most clearly of Quattro Cento art. Thus, in favouring the carved art of the Quattro Cento, Stokes at the same time subtly advances his emblematic approach. And it is a discussion of this approach which, I think, best serves to introduce the ideas of carving and modelling and the nature of the aesthetic distinction which their relation embodies.

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'So direct an emblematic art', Stokes writes in the first pages of The Quattro Cento, introducing his favoured art, could develop only in a Southern climate, in that part of the South where light induces even a Northerner to contemplate things in their positional or spatial aspect, as symbols of objective realisation. (QC 16)
The introduction is striking: we are not accustomed to think in this way of the significance of light in connection with the formal relations of the objects of our seeing - of the way in which a Southern light will seem to 'spread out' objects in space in equal display, to force them out, as it were, from the chiaroscuro of Northern light.

Stone, Stokes adds in Stones of Rimini (and for the present I treat The Quattro Cento and Stones of Rimini as strictly continuous), conspires with light in this same respect: 'For the essence of stone is its power to symbolize objectivity' (SR 128); and 'Northerners have never loved stone deep down; and no other material directs the fantasy to pure non-rhythmic space' (SR 144). Unlike the more highly reflective materials - bronze, for instance, or terra cotta - light falling upon stone is even and undramatic: the solidity of the stone is presented full-face.

Water, too, enters the conspiracy: exemplarily in Venice,

The water never palls against the stone: the radiant causeway swarms. Water and builted stone vivify the one the other; they are at peace. The certainty of man-placed stones contracts the ocean's awfulness. In the port, it is as if the seas had been sifted and winnowed: upon the tall mole we can admit and gaze at their depth. Nothing is kinder to the ephemeral reflections, refractions and shadows of water than the even-lighted masonry; no material less stalwart would provide such vivid opportunities to the water's reflective tricks.

Amid the hurly-burly of the port there exists
the wideness of all space in miniature, the Mediterranean spaciousness or distinctness. (SR 21)

It is in this conspiracy of light, stone and water that Stokes urges us first to contemplate the art of the Quattro Cento, for it is the Mediterranean life which offers the primary resource for the true Quattro Cento artist: not only in the light which inspires objective realisation and equal display; not only in the stone, the inspiration of objectivity and outwardness; not only in the water's enhancing the show of objectivity in the stone. For, Stokes writes,

If we would understand a visual art, we ourselves must cherish some fantasy of the material that stimulated the artist, and ourselves feel some emotional reason why his imagination chose, when choice was not altogether impelled by practical, technical and social considerations, to employ one material rather than another. Poets alone are trustworthy interpreters. They alone possess the insight with which to re-create subjectively the unconscious fantasies that are general. (SR 20)

Poets - or, as we shall come to see, the artistically sensitive psychoanalytic commentator.

It is thus that we are first introduced to the idea of the emblematic. Quattro Cento art - 'so direct an emblematic art' - we are urged to see, presents the knit fabric of life, a constellation of feelings and phantasies which have as a source of inspiration and sustenance the natural elements - light, stone, water. Nowhere is this plainer than in what was, for Stokes, the pinnacle of Quattro Cento
achievement: Luciano Laurana's ducal palace at Urbino, of which Stokes writes,

To turn subject into object palpable as death the perfect object, to turn time into space without eradicating time as does the incident of death, to show living under the form of the complete, the manifested, was the highest exploit: since it was the final expression of the universal aim, strongest in that time, to show, to objectify; in other words, it alone entirely reflects the process of living carried to conclusion, of object charged with subject. It is an expression as vital as the dance to which it is the opposite, the complement and the end. All the rest of art lies between. (QC 160)

Art and life are seen to be at one in the veritable objecthood of the palace at Urbino. Our subjectivity is seen objectified in the work of art: quite literally, and without pejorative overtone, it is petrified. And it is to this ideal of objectification that Stokes refers the idea of the emblematic.

In his introductory essay to Adrian Stokes, Richard Wollheim makes a more specific, if less poetic, approach to the idea of emblem by considering its relation to what is often called an 'iconic' sign or symbol - a sign or symbol, that is, which readily renders up its artistic sense. Wollheim claims that, for Stokes, an emblem seems to be an iconic symbol which makes wide connections with the process of symbolic creation itself. That is, an emblem might be thought to stand as a direct expression of the artistic process generally and, Wollheim adds, it is the artistic process itself which
'perhaps...is the only source of meaning in the arts, and the signs or symbols in which it issues acquire their meaning derivatively from it' (1).

What, I take it, Wollheim has in mind here might be rendered in Stokes's remark in The Quattro Cento that 'the act of artistic creation was itself the specific symbol of release that men were feeling or desiring' (QC 17); and it is in virtue of this that Quattro Cento art can be thought of such high emblematic value: it is, Stokes immediately adds in a favoured phrase, an 'art twice over' — once, that is, simply as symbolic creation, and once again in terms of the special significance which attaches to the externalisation and objectification of symbol in the work of art.

This duality of symbolic expression is perhaps best grasped if we recall the originally heraldic sense of the term 'emblem'. Thus, as the Oxford English Dictionary would have it, an emblem is 'a figured object used with symbolic meaning as the distinctive badge of a person, family, nation ...'. For example we might take the emblem of the elephant adopted by Sigismondo which is everywhere evident in the Tempio Malatestiano, described by Stokes at length in Stones of Rimini, and which Sigismondo had had built as a personal monument. The elephant, or more precisely, the representation of the elephant symbolises, let us say, imperious
power and strength. But employed as an emblem, as Sigismondo's 'distinctive badge', it may further be said to stand in symbolic relation to Sigismondo's life and military exploits. In this sense, the represented elephant comes to be doubly symbolic, and it is this sort of sense which Stokes wants for the idea of emblematic art — an 'art twice over'.

A more pertinent illustration of the point, however, is available if we look to Stokes's incidental discussion of French classical painting at the stage in The Quattrocento in which the idea of emblematic quality is first introduced. He wants to say that French classical painting is emblematically 'mean': its 'morbid, staccato classicism' merely abstracts the 'spatial value which a southern climate induces' (QC 14). And though such painting has a certain perfection in virtue of the 'relentless stress of making pictorial ends meet', there is a sense — commonly enough engendered by classical art — that the life of the spatial value has been lost, that the symbols have been uprooted from the life in which they originally flourish. In other words, the symbols fail to be emblematic — and it is at this point, in a footnote, that Stokes cursorily defines 'emblems' as 'symbols of living' (QC 14). It is, one might say, as if a scholar Sigismondo, not the soldier Sigismondo, had adopted the symbol of the elephant as his 'distinctive
badge': the elephant remains to symbolise power and strength, but - unless the scholar is content to regard his scholarship as elephantine and lumbering - the symbol fails to represent the life.

If we draw further on the example which French classical painting provides, then the greater import of Stokes's attachment to the idea of emblem in art quickly becomes apparent. For, it is clear, when Stokes characterises French classical painting as emblematically 'mean', he does not thereby intend to dispute its commonly agreed virtues. It is a risky sort of illustration, but I think Stokes employs it merely as a convenient way in which to identify that aspect of art which most concerns him. Moreover, it is not that emblematic quality in art is some quite localised quality, apparent in Quattro Cento art but not, for example, in French classicism. For in fact, Stokes goes on to suggest, emblematic quality is so fundamental an aspect of art - of any art - that one might, indeed, substitute the term 'emblem' for 'art' itself. Stokes writes,

...if one needed to find another word for 'art' it would be 'emblem'. Preoccupation with aesthetic values tends to blind us to this fact. Perhaps it is as well, since our own art lacks emblematic tension. This is no fault of artists. They are bound to reflect our lack of corporate emotion by lifting the structure of their art to a feasible distance. On the other hand,
I do not claim for the majority of Quattro Cento works the highest aesthetic value, nor even always the highest aesthetic value among works of their own age. I have dragged from obscurity several works confounded there by critics. A Quattro Cento masterpiece, however, eludes the traps of aesthetic appraisal. (OC 17)

And in his footnote to the phrase 'aesthetic values' Stokes elaborates:

*By 'aesthetic' values I mean those values in relation to a work of art which can be discussed - at any rate for a time - without referring to the connections of art and its period. (OC 17)

In other words, Stokes's reference to the emblematic inferiority of French classical painting is independent of any judgement of its 'aesthetic' value, as at least Stokes conceives the term. And this conception is not so very eccentric, for of course what would be agreed upon is the way in which French classical painting - like every form of classicism - embodies the kind of 'timelessness' and independence of period which Stokes takes the aesthetic approach to espouse.

But now if this point becomes clear, it must suggest that Stokes's emblematic enterprise is quite remote from any aesthetic tradition. At best, perhaps, it could be thought an iconographical enterprise - the tracing of artistic symbols to the cultural life in which any work of art is located: rather more an historical and social enterprise than a strictly aesthetic one.

Indeed, I think it may be said, Stokes's enterprise is 'iconográfical' - but in a sense which is very much
broader than is orthodox — for instance in the Warburgian manner of iconographical study. For the cultural life with respect to which Stokes seeks to identify artistic emblem is considered not so much from an historical or social point of view as from a psychological: the emblems manifest in art are thought to give expression to general psychological attitudes rather than historical or social preoccupations. And now, we may say, it is insofar as these general psychological attitudes are continuous across the whole range of cultural life — no matter what the specific aesthetic values espoused — that we are taken to the heart of Stokes's thinking. For in considering Quattro Cento art from the emblematic point of view, Stokes seeks to exemplify what, in the very first pages of The Quattro Cento, he declares as a general principle — a principle, I shall want to say, upon which his entire work is predicated. He writes,

The process of living is an externalisation, a turning outward into definite form of inner ferment. Hence the mirror to living which art is, hence the significance of art... (QC. 15)

It would be difficult to conceive of a more exact rendering of (what I take to be) the most fundamental precept of the aesthetic which the study of Quattro Cento art initiates. And it is just this precept which is later to be brought, quite naturally, under the sway of psychoanalytic theory: for in fact it is the 'inner ferment' the psychoanalytic
account of which has been my principal object in the discussions of Parts One and Two.

It will be almost twenty years before psychoanalytic theory makes any explicit appearance in Stokes's work, and when it does I shall return to the point of its connection with the idea of emblematic quality in art. Here I simply draw attention to what seems to me of the first importance in Stokes's approach. Manifestly there are difficulties which require further discussion — in particular, I should say, the relation of emblematic and aesthetic values — but in order to carry out the discussion we should first consider in detail exactly what it was that Stokes had in mind under the general title 'Quattro Cento art'. And this title, we shall see, very soon gives way to the idea of what Stokes comes to call a 'carving' mode of art.

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In fact it is early in The Quattro Cento that Stokes hesitantly introduces the ideas of carving and modelling. He writes,

The distinction I am making is laborious. I might have simplified it into a distinction between carving and modelling, between the use of stone and of bronze, were it not for the fact that bronze can well convey
an emotion primarily imputed to the stone, while, on the other hand, stone can be carved, as it was by Lombard sculptors, to perpetuate a conception not only founded upon the model but inspired by modelling technique. (QC 28)

But Stokes's scruples here — in fact they drop away in Stones of Rimini — usefully serve to identify a principal feature of Quattro Cento effect. (To avoid any abrupt transition between the terms of The Quattro Cento and Stones of Rimini, I shall talk here of 'Quattro Cento carving', and draw indifferently upon the insights of both works.)

Stone obviously demands a different kind of artistic technique from clay or bronze or wood — the preferred media of the modeller. That is, while stone demands to be rubbed and thinned, clay or bronze demands to be moulded and gouged, and wood chipped and split. Of course the difference of technique does not take us very far here, for, as Stokes points out, it is possible to work stone to much the same effect as, say, bronze. When this occurs, however, it is natural to think of the artist's having used or exploited the stone, of his having forced a desired effect out of the stone. And it is the possibility of different kinds of artistic attitude towards a chosen medium, rather more than a distinction of technique, which comes to underlie the characterisation of the ideas of carving and modelling. To use Stokes's favoured phrase, the true Quattro Cento carver manifests a 'love of stone'.
What Stokes has in mind here is not so much the special appeal which stone as mere stuff holds out for the carver (though this may well be implicit in his attitude), but rather the respect in which the carver holds stone as a medium. The stone is felt to have 'rights', it might be said — a life of its own with respect to which the carver harmoniously projects his aim. On the other hand, the modeller will incline to ignore the rights of his medium, and we find in his art that 'the material with which, or from which, a figure has been made appears as so much suitable stuff for this creation' (SR 110); that 'the modelled shape is not uncovered but created' (SR 118).

To elaborate further: where the carver's love of stone is manifest, 'one feels that not the figure, but the stone through the medium of the figure, has come to life' (SR 110); that there is 'an articulation of something that already exists in the block' and that the carved figure is 'never... entirely freed from its matrix' (SR 114). The carver, so to speak, is in direct 'communion' with his material, and, Stokes wants to say, it is

...the profundity of such communion, rather than those plastic values that might roughly be realised by any material, which provides the distinctive source of interest and pleasure in carved objects. (SR 110)

This 'love of stone' brings us to bear directly on the high emblematic value of Quattro Cento carving, for the artist's attitude is such that he determines only to
disclose what is already implicit in the block - to coax it, as Stokes liked to put it, into 'bloom': 'The stone is carved to flower, to bear infants, to give the fruit of land and sea' (QC 15), and the images here deliberately evoke the 'co-ordination' of art and life. The stone itself is regarded as 'the repository of humanistic fantasies, particularly those symbolizing southern compulsion to throw life outward, to objectify' (QC 7).

To describe Quattro Cento carving in such generalised and metaphorical terms does not so far secure it a very definite identity. But if we now turn to Stokes's extensive discussion of the spatial values characteristically employed in Quattro Cento carving - and, contrastingly, those employed in modelling modes of art - it quickly becomes apparent to what observed effect on the face of the stone Stokes means to refer.

Quattro Cento carving, Stokes argues, embodies spatial values which make basic appeal to the eye alone, rather than those spatial values whose apprehension depends upon the operation, or surrogate operation, of tactile and kinaesthetic sense. For the moment I shall ignore the complex issues which attach to this contrast set out in terms of the alleged difference in modes of spatial awareness, and concentrate, rather, on its symptomatic manifestation. For it is importantly part
of what Stokes has in mind that an exclusively visual awareness of space — and hence the spatial values which are its object — is immediate and non-temporal. And it is evident that an awareness of space which further depends on tactile and kinaesthetic sense, on bodily movement and the possibility of bodily movement — and hence the spatial values which are its object — is cumulative and temporally successive.

Quattro Cento carving, it is Stokes's point, literally petrifies any element of the temporal. 'The highest achievement in architecture', Stokes writes, characteristically dramatising his favoured art, 'was a mass-effect in which every temporal or flux element was transformed into a spatial steadiness' (QC 15). And this important idea of 'mass-effect' is elaborated in terms of immediate and non-temporal visual synthesis. Thus,

An undecorated wall...may give a strong impression of mass, but only when there are variations in its surface, mostly of colour and tone, that the eye with one flash discovers coherent, so that perceptions of succession belonging to any estimate of length or height or density, retire in favour of a feeling that here you witness a concatenation, simultaneity, that the object is exposed to you, all of it at once. (QC 156)

On the other hand, what Stokes calls 'massive-effect', or 'monumentality' is principally conveyed cumulatively and successively. Thus,

Mere size, on which monumental aim is nearly always intent, in itself entails rhythm, since when magnitude is too great for immediate perception, the eye must continually follow up and down and along the
structure, and will then synthetize in terms of rhythm. (QC 172n)

It is not the essence of Stokes's point that it is in virtue simply of size that some objects will make themselves available to non-temporal visual awareness and that some are too large to occupy the visual field in a single glance. Rather, he draws attention to the analogue of monumentality in those vital, accelerating architectural lines which draw the eye successively along, forestalling immediacy of apprehension.

Nowhere is mass-effect so evident for Stokes than, once again, in that pinnacle of Quattro Cento achievement, the ducal palace at Urbino; and nowhere less evident than, for instance in Brunelleschi's Ospedale degli Innocenti (reproduced respectively as plates XXXIII and XII in The Quattro Cento). In Luciano Laurana's work,

The stone...lies on the brick in low relief, yet stands out simple, distinct, a white magic, nitidezza. The impassable space between window frame and pilaster along the storey, or the exact framing of a window that lies back on the wall - for the colonnade below is broad - give so supreme an individuality to each stone shape, (though every pilaster, for example, is the same as the next), that one appears to witness a miraculous concurrence of masterpieces of sculpture, each designed to show the beauties of his neighbour as unique. There is no other traffic between them. Their positions are untraversable, and no hand shall dare to touch two stone forms at a time. They flower from the brick, a Whole made up of Ones each as single as the Whole. What could be more different from Brunellesquish running lines, than this sublime fixture of the manifest? (QC 155)

Inevitably such description throws us back on the idea of the emblematic, for this 'sublime fixture of the manifest'
is, Stokes writes, an 'expression far less divorced from the processes of living' (OC 159-60) than the elaborate academic genius of Brunelleschi's architecture - an architecture which, to use the familiar contrast, if high in aesthetic values, is yet low in emblematic content.

To return to the point about the relations between purely visual awareness and an awareness which further depends on the operation, or surrogate operation, of tactile and kinesthetic sense, there is, I think, very little which this kind of distinction can in fact add to the distinction of mass-effect and massive-effect articulated more simply in terms of immediate and successive visual synthesis respectively. And this is surely to the good. For any sharp distinction between purely visual awareness of space and a tactile and kinesthetic influence in the visual awareness of space must seem highly artificial. Indeed, I would suggest, when Stokes talks of mass-effect in relation to his example of an undecorated wall and refers to the 'strong impression of mass' which the wall offers, it is plain that this impression - however it is apprehended, whether the visual synthesis is immediate or cumulative - already elicits tactile or kinesthetic sense. And in fact Stokes himself is well aware of this. For in the end where the contrast of mass-effect and massive-effect is made too heavily
to depend upon a sharp distinction between purely visual awareness of space and awareness of space further influenced by tactile and kinaesthetic sense, Stokes is forced only to a qualification. Thus he admits that

...architecture and painting, as well as sculpture, in fact all visual art must make some appeal to tactile sense. The question is solely one of degree, or precedence. I consider that in painting and architecture, and even in sculpture, the appeal should be first and primarily to the eye; that is to say, the appeal should be such that the eye, with the assistance of previous tactile experience in materials and textures, would be able largely to synthetize the successive elements in the tactile part of the appeal, and cause it to be something immediate as vision itself. (OC 28n)

There is still a great deal more to say about the variant spatial values which Stokes has in mind. For so far all that is apparent is that, in terms of an immediacy of visual synthesis, Quattro Cento carving will cleave to an homogeneity of surface effect uninterrupted by a strongly rhythmic and progressive linearity. But rather than pursuing the matter with respect to the architecture which is Stokes's concern in The Quattro Cento, I turn to his discussion of low-relief sculpture in Stones of Rimini. This will be convenient for two reasons. In the first place, the flattened and compressed figures of low-relief will seem the most natural occasion for the homogeneity of surface effect, and hence when Stokes undertakes to show how there is a clear and dramatic distinction between the low-reliefs of Agostino di Duccio and Donatello, his point will
seem all the more penetrating. In the second place, as I intimated, when Stokes came to write Stones of Rimini he was more confident about articulating his views in terms of the distinction between carving and modelling values. And one of the benefits of this is that the residually historical sense of the term 'Quattro Cento' disappears; for although Stokes insisted from the first that he intended no specific historical reference, it is a little difficult to accommodate this not only to his continuing to use an expression which diverges so little from the orthodox historical designation 'Quattrocento', but also to his choice of, for example, the Quattrocento Luciano Laurana to illustrate his thinking.

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An oblique approach to the qualities of low-relief sculpture may be the most serviceable in the first instance.

In Stones of Rimini, Stokes apologises for the fact that the photographs which illustrate his text do not well convey carving values: 'Photographs', he writes, 'transmit plastic values exceedingly well, carving values hardly at all' (SR 108). But this seems paradoxical, What better, one might think, to convey the under-emphatic homogeneity of surface-effect in carving art than the photo-
graph's under-emphatic two-dimensional representation of three-dimensionality? Is it not more likely that the stronger, more rhythmic values of modelling art will fail to be conveyed by a photograph?

In fact, I interpret, photographic reproduction of modelled relief, precisely because a photograph is under-emphatic, tends to mitigate the stronger rhythms while not losing them altogether (because they are of such strength in the original), and hence they will appear not quite so striking as they might, as it were, face to face. On the other hand a photograph will precisely tend to diminish the already under-emphatic face of carved relief to the point where the surface will begin to seem quite blandly undifferentiated. This, I think, describes what occurs in the photographic exemplars of carving and modelling art which Stokes employs: respectively, of Agostino di Duccio's Madonna and Child with Angels (SR Plate 8), and of Donatello's Pieta (SR Plate 7), which has the more obvious appeal. To recall a characteristic of carving conception — that the carved form is never entirely freed from its matrix — it looks from the photograph as if the Pieta makes closer approach to the characteristic: for instance, where the wings of the angels who support Christ seem to merge with the background stone, as also do Christ's left shoulder and breast, and the robes and right leg of the angel on the right.
The strong definition of the figures is disguised in the photograph: they seem not to stand out and away from the background stone, the matrix, as one suspects they would seen directly. In contrast, Agostino's figures seem never to have emerged at all from the matrix. The subtlety of transformation from plane to plane, and the delicate transitions from extremely low to slightly higher relief tend to be lost, as if the figures were really etched in one plane.

Assuredly the photographic first appearance is deceptive. A closer study reveals the deep shadows across the surface of the Pieta, while in the Madonna there is a general homogeneity of surface lighting. And of course what we read off from the shadows is a strong impression of recession and projection in the Pieta. The deeply shadowed profile of the angel who supports Christ's shoulder indicates the way in which the figure is given definition by advancing it much further out from the plane which the Christ figure occupies. And similarly the shadowing at the back and shoulder of the second angel indicates the way in which that figure obliquely traverses planes. Clearly there is a perspectival coherence to the relief surface, but it is quite unlike the coherence of surface in the Madonna. As Stokes puts it, 'One obtains from the Donatello none of the sense of surface making surface to flower' (SR 145);
In the *Madonna*, by contrast, there is what Stokes calls an 'undulation' in the stone, a smooth, unemphatic transition from plane to plane. The Child's curving shoulder in Agostino's relief is 'juxtaposed upon the face of an angel behind, from which the shoulder's roundness graduates. Face and shoulder give each other shape' (SR 145).

If reference to perspectival consideration does not already suggest as much, Stokes has no hesitation in reminding us of the affinity of Agostino's sculptural technique with Piero della Francesca's mastery in paint. Quite naturally, reflection upon carving values in low-relief sculpture leads to the idea that analogous values may be found in painting. I shall take this up in a moment. But for the present it would be useful to provide a summation of what so far emerges as the distinctive quality of carving art in reference to architecture and low-relief sculpture. Thus, Stokes:

The essence of the carving, and of truly spatial, non-rhythmic approach in general, is the juxtaposition of similar tones, of related contours, of intrinsically related forms. Every part is on some equality with every other part, an organisation that is foreign to the come-and-go of rhythm. Work of this intensely spatial kind recalls a panorama contemplated in an equal light by which objects of different dimensions and textures, of different beauty and of different emotional appeal are seen with more or less the same distinctness, so that one senses the uniform dominion of an uninterrupted space. The intervals between objects have assumed a markedly irreversible aspect: there it all is, so completely set out in space that one cannot entertain a single afterthought. In visual art, the idea of forms however different, as answering
to some cogent, common, continuous, dominion that
enforces bonds between those forms in spite of their
manifold contrasts, gives rise to the distinctive
non-plastic aim: and this idea was inspired, above
all by the equality of light on stone, an equality,
that dramatizes every tonal value. In Piero della
Francesca's painting, by the religious reverence for
spatial intervals, by tonal and perspectival organi-
zation, all feeling, all movement, all rhythm, all
plasticity itself, was translated equally into pan-
orama terms. (SR 144-5)

In the idea of a 'cogent, common, continuous, dominion
that enforces bonds between those forms in spite of their
manifold contrasts', we are introduced to a line of thought
which becomes increasingly evident in Stokes's discussion
of carving modes of painting, signalled by Stokes's use
of such terms as 'equal emphasis' and 'equal insistence'.
Light, stone and the love of stone, purely visual space
all conspire to achieve the panoramic effect - that
sublime fixture of the manifest, the pinnacle of Quattro
Cento, and of carving, achievement. But, we shall see,
the example of Piero's work adds more to the conspiracy:
a love of perspective, and a love of colour.

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Stimulated by the equal showing and fraternal relation-
ship of Quattro Cento architecture, strong without the
help of hieratic formula, yet observing closely, dis-
covering, in time with his poetic aim, the broad sweep
of tone, Giorgione sought to contain the passage of
time, a man's life, in the forms of simultaneity. (AS 43)

Thus, in a claim frequently adduced by Stokes, might archite
ecture be thought 'Mother of the Arts'. And the maternal providence of Quattro Cento architecture is, Stokes likes to think, enormously wide. It is apparent not only in Piero's work, but in Giorgione's too (that is, in High Renaissance art); and, with spectacular imaginative leaps, Stokes finds it in Vermeer's work, in Chardin's — even in Cézanne's. Thus, we find Stokes writing of Piero,

If there is an emphasis it is upon the homogeneity of space ignored by the medieval mind, an emphasis previously unknown in painting.... Piero, as did Cézanne whose sense of colour was equally dominant in his sense of form, preserved the two-dimensional character of the picture space — a certain archaic flatness, then, of forms — in conjunction with a great depth and a great volume. (AS 31-2) Or again,

Piero's colour exploits the affinity to which we have referred in terms of shape and tone.... It is the réaliser of Cézanne. Such demonstration of intellect and feeling was the crown of the Quattro Cento compulsion to make manifest. (AS 35) It is, then, in terms of pictorial representation of space and of use of colour that we are urged to recognise the carver's ambition in painting. I shall consider each in turn.

The spatial effect of Quattro Cento stone art, the purely visual spatial steadiness, finds clear expression in the degree to which buildings and even sculptural reliefs themselves employ three-dimensional space, so to speak: their carving values are revealed in space. On the other
hand, putatively similar values in painting are more complex: the painter creates the space in which they are manifest: they are revealed in represented space. To put it crudely, the Quattro Cento spatial effect in painting is not achieved through, nor is it discriminable in terms of, 'undulations' in the surface of the canvas, and it is not to be contrasted with the spatial effect of strong projections and recessions in the surface of the canvas.

In a painting, evidently, three-dimensional space is represented two-dimensionally, and the most obvious means of such representation is perspectival technique. And just as Stokes had earlier attributed to the stone-carver a 'love of stone', so, in an analogous way, he attributes to the painter of carving proclivity a 'love of perspective'. In contrast with this 'love of perspective', we might then suppose a more vigorous, exploitative, modelling attitude towards perspectival representation.

The point Stokes makes is not readily perspicuous, and one reason for this is that he talks of perspective, not as is perhaps most natural as an element in the content of a painting, but rather in terms of its formal significance. This, I noted in the Prologue, is evidence of the general tendency apparent in Stokes's work over the years, and though I merely mention it here it is worth noting as an important aspect of the discussion of perspective and, as we shall see
in a moment, of the discussion of colour.

What Stokes has in mind might be introduced in connection with the idea of an emblematic approach to art (though Stokes himself does not explicitly make this connection). In writing of Piero's love of perspective, Stokes asserts that

Space, to a less degree the perennial subject of all painting, was Piero's rigid concept, whereas conceptual art substitutes a convention for mathematical space. (AS 32)

What, I think, is suggested by the term 'conceptual art' is that art which, however rich in what Stokes called 'aesthetic values', is nevertheless emblematically 'mean'. For instance, French classical painting, in which, we might recall, Stokes found an abstraction of spatial values in the 'relentless stress of making pictorial ends meet'. One of the ways, I would suggest, in which this abstraction and stress can make itself felt is in the forceful use of a perspectival convention. And this perhaps is best illustrated in the paintings of a master of French classicism, Poussin: for instance, in paintings such as La Mort de Saphire where space is rigidly enclosed within a press of buildings. Though it is an odd association, a comparison of Poussin's use of perspective with Piero's might reveal Stokes's point.

The aim of perspectival representation in general is to create an illusion of third-dimensional depth in a two-dimensional surface. But though it is clear enough that
perspectival illusion in this sense denies two-dimensionality, it is important to specify the object of its denial. For, crudely, the denial can occur in one of two ways: it may be that what is denied is the two-dimensionality of the represented scene; or it may be that there is a more vigorous denial not only of the two-dimensionality of the represented scene but also, as it were, of the representational medium - of the two-dimensionality of the picture plane or the canvas. In other words, in the first case, the denial of two-dimensionality of the represented scene is, at the same time, contained within a clear acknowledgement of the two-dimensionality of the picture-plane or canvas: and, in the second case, there is a denial of both. This second case, I think, is illustrated by Poussin: the projections and recessions in perspective are extremely strong to the degree that it is as if the picture plane itself is projectively and recessively pulled out of two-dimensional alignment. With Piero this is never the case: the projections and recessions are under-emphatic and never strain against the two-dimensionality of the picture plane. It is a subtle effect - indeed it can sometimes seem that without stronger projections and recessions re-aligning the two-dimensionality of the picture plane Piero's work has a tendency to lose the third dimension of the represented scene as well. There is, as Stokes put it, an 'archaic flatness', and indeed for the
modern eye it would not be an uncommon first response to, say, *The Nativity* that there seems to be a perspectival defect — a judgement which would not be made of Poussin's work.

In these terms, then, what I think Stokes means in talking of Picro's love of perspective is Picro's special respect for two-dimensional representation of three-dimensionality: that is, it is not so much a love of perspective itself — and it is difficult to see what that could amount to — as a love of the perspectival medium, the two-dimensional picture plane or canvas. And this comfortably fits the analogue I suggested, the love of stone. For, I argued, the love of stone is to be understood as the love of stone as a medium, and a respect for the 'rights' of the stone. Thus, love of perspective is a love of the perspectival medium, and a respect for the rights of that medium, namely, its two-dimensionality.

The painter draws on further resources in the aim of homogenous space, resources which are of no representational concern to the architect or stone-sculptor — primarily colour. But it is useful to introduce Stokes's discussion of colour with a point that might be made about the painter's intimately connected use of light. We saw how, for Stokes, the 'equal lighting of the South' is thought to promote phantasies in
the Quattro Cento artist which he projects in the spatial
effect of his art. But the painter has of course directly
to represent this equally emphatic light if he is to achieve
the panoramic effect in his picture. And in fact when I
noted Stokes's reference to Piero in connection with the
Agostino relief discussed earlier, it is part of Stokes's
point that the spatial effect in Agostino's Madonna is
captured in Piero's use of lighting. He writes of The
Flagellation,

This is the painting that presumes light, a more or
less equal light, another word for space as homogene-
ous medium, in which all things are set out. Piero
could turn transition and movement into the finality
of such space. Lights, on the other hand, lighting
effects, or an emphasis on chiaroscuro, these are to
be connected with rhythm or poise, not primarily with
stone.  (SR 146)

The remark signifies the extraordinary coherence of Stokes's
emerging aesthetic. Light and stone were invoked to ident-
ify the virtues of true Quattro Cento effect. Stone and
the love of stone are now thought to have analogues in the
carving painter's love of perspective; and light, too, the
use of lighting in Piero's art, becomes part of the analogy.
And from talk of light it is but a short way to talk of col-
our.

In introducing Colour and Form, Stokes writes,

I have sought to isolate that kind of manifestation
in which inner ferment has suffered conversion into
the most specific state of outwardness or fixture.... I now consider the same phenomenon in painting: I do so from the angle of colour, because the visual epitome of externalisation and the forms which embody it, are dependent on our colour vision. (CF 22)

Once again, we are immediately struck by Stokes's easy, and confident assimilation of what would generally be thought the colour-content of a painting to colour-form - to the formal modes of externalisation in art. But his premiss might at first seem peculiar: how is colour 'the visual epitome of externalisation'?

Most obviously, colour is the visual epitome of externalisation simply because, while certain aspects of our awareness of externality are dependent upon a collusion of senses (for instance, the physical location of an object would authoritatively be determined by a collusion of visual, tactile and perhaps also aural sense), there can be no collusion of senses with respect to the colour-properties of something external to us: colour-perception is exclusively visual perception. Colour, then, really would be the most significant resource on which Stokes might draw in characterising the purely visual synthesis on which, we saw, Quattro Cento effect was argued to depend.

Moreover, unlike sense of touch, sense of colour is not, to use a once fashionable term, 'bi-polar' - or, in the terms which Freud employed in his discussion of the development of the ego, colour-perception is exclusively an 'extern-
al perception' and not also an 'internal perception' (2). The clearest example here is perhaps that when I claim to be hot, I may be taken either to refer to the external temperature or to my own (feverish) bodily temperature. By contrast there can be no such systematic equivocation when I claim, say, to see yellow: ceteris paribus, I just do refer to something external. (The qualification is, I think uninterestingly, necessary in that in certain circumstances, suffering jaundice, or having an after-image, I may in fact not refer to something external. But these are deviant cases which lie outside, and indeed depend for their recognition upon, a systematic account of colour-perception. The trouble, one might add, with such philosophical theories as the reduction of the external world to 'sense-data' is that they are precisely raised on a diet of such deviant cases while failing to note what they deviate from.)

A third feature, however, of Stokes's thesis here is that of all visual perception, colour-perception is the epitome of externalisation. What, we might ask, of the visual perception of shape and volume: what is external to us must have some shape and some volume, but is it so clear that it must also be seen to have some colour? The answer is obviously that it must. The visual perception of both shape and volume in an object is determined by its chromatic distinction from and definition in a background.
If colour-perception is not possible (where the object is the same colour as its background, with no shadowed definition, or where the object is colourless) then neither is the visual perception of shape and volume.

Once the significance of colour-perception in this respect is recognised, then Stokes is in a position to introduce a conception analogous to that of love of stone or love of perspective — namely, 'love of colour'. Thus, Stokes writes,

The true colourist, then, is recreating by his use of colour, the 'other', 'out-there' vitality he attributes to the surface of the canvas, just as a carver reveals the potential life of the stone.... (CF 29)

That is to say, just as the stone is thought to have rights of its own, so too is the surface of the canvas. The carving painter will respect those rights, and will paint in a manner analogous to the stone-carver's working his stone, preserving the matrix, allowing figures and forms to be revealed and not imposed, adjusting his conception constantly to the demands of his medium. We have just seen how Piero may be thought to have achieved this through his love of perspective and his respect for the two-dimensionality of the surface of the canvas: now we are urged to recognise how a love of colour makes a similar contribution.

There are, Stokes reminds us in Colour and Form, three prin-
cipal chromatic dimensions. There is, first, variation in hue: that is, there are reds, greens, blues and so on. Second, there is tonal variation in any given hue, a variation in range of lightness between black and white: that is, there are light blues and dark blues. Third, there is variation in intensity of any given hue, a variation in range of saturation from neutral grey: that is, there are pale greens and deep greens. And of course we have to add to these principal chromatic dimensions the variations in admixtures of hues, and the variations in tone and intensity of these admixtures.

The painter's palette, then, has an extremely complex structure. How is the true colourist alleged to govern his effect in working within the complex structure?

In the first place, Stokes wants to say, the true colourist, like the true carver, will disdain heavy and dramatic accents and rhythms: he resists bright illumination in juxtaposition with dark shadowing. In a favoured phrase, his colours are 'self-lit': in other words, they do not fluctuate with respect to pictorially internal illumination. Stokes writes,

The tendency of the true colourists is to discount the separateness of illumination, to identify it with the colour of objects so that these objects appear to be self-lit in virtue of their colour, as if breathing. Whatever be the specific illumination represented, light, in the form of living colour, also seems pre-eminently to come from behind, from the back, from the canvas. (CP 31)
It is clear what Stokes has in mind here, for if we contrast a Rembrandt, say, with a Cézanne, the chiaroscuro rhythms of the former will suggest recession in the surface of the canvas, where in the Cézanne, in its 'all-over' colour-effect, its chromatically unretiring appearance, we find that 'equal insistence' which is essential to the preservation of the two-dimensional surface. (To put the point more dramatically, one would never find a painted shadow in any Impressionist work. True colourists, a painted shadow for the Impressionists would represent, as it were, a hole in the canvas.)

A second technique of the true colourist consists in his respect for the complementarity and near-complementarity of colour. (Crudely, the complementary of a colour is that colour which appears as its after-image. Thus, the complementary of leaf green is violet, of yellow, blue, of orange, turquoise, of red, sea green, and, obviously, vice versa. And if we imagine these colours ranged in that order in a circle with diameters joining complementaries, then it is easy to see which colours are near-complementaries: for instance, colours within the range turquoise-sea green-leaf green constitute the complementarity range of red; violently non-complementary to red would be violet or orange.) It is in virtue of his respect for the complementarity range of his colours in fact that the painter creates analogues of
the way in which, as Stokes put it in his discussion of the
Agostino relief, one shape 'causes' another - or, more
generally, of that 'cogent, common, continuous, dominion'
which enforces bonds between forms and 'gives rise to the
distinctive non-plastic aim'.

Third, and connected with this last point, the true
colourist will try to reveal the constituent elements in
his admixtures of hues by ensuring there is no jarring
juxtaposition of non-complementary elements. Again to
take Piero as an example, we see in The Nativity the cons-
stituent elements of the blue of the gown worn by the central
figure of the group behind the Infant picked out in the
burgundy yoke of the gown worn by the figure to his right,
in the more intense blue of the Virgin's gown, with its
similar burgundy yoke, in her deeper blue cloak, and in the
pink of the gown worn by the seated King.

Stokes liked to refer to this intense regard for
chromatic relations in the work of the great carving paint-
ers as a feeling for 'identity-in-difference', a phrase he
took over from the philosopher F.H. Bradley. But the phrase
in fact indicates nothing more than the homogeneity of
what he had earlier characterised as Quattro Cento effect.
The colour-elements in true carving painting, though in
themselves contrasted, will seem to stand to each other
in formal relations which have the effect of preserving
the surface unity of the canvas, and will not, as it were, break up the surface in making strong individual claims to attention. 'Each part sustains its brother', Stokes writes in a frequently employed image; the carving painter 'works difference and hostility into an ideal amity' (CF 101)

Carving values, it was earlier alleged, are primarily to be discovered in art which relies upon purely visual synthesis, and as we saw in connection with the idea of 'mass-effect' what Stokes had in mind was a synthesis which required none of the temporal progression of movement. In painting, the possibility is nicely illustrated in an anecdote concerning Giorgione which Stokes borrows from Vasari's Lives of the Painters. Apparently, Verrocchio's bronze horse, the famous Collèoni sculpture, led Giorgione into a dispute with a group of sculptors. The sculptors claimed that their art was superior on the grounds that it was possible to discover a sculpture's manifold aspects in being able to walk around it. Giorgione argued, on the contrary, that it was precisely the possibility of taking in a painting in 'una sola occhiata', in a single glance, which proved the superiority of painting. To demonstrate, Giorgione painted a figure which showed all its aspects at once: a nude with its back to the viewer where front of the body was reflected in a stream at the feet of
the nude, the left side in a highly polished corset and the right in a mirror. Clearly it was a painting of considerable ingenuity if nothing else, but the point which Giorgione sought to make has deeper significance for Stokes. He writes,

...Piero della Francesca and Giorgione crystallized for una sola occniata, in wider relation, those primarily architectural displays which had appeared on the surface of stone with such tension of outwardness. Their inspired emphasis upon simultaneity entailed a lack of emphasis in any particular, but a much-heightened accent upon brotherhood, upon a conception of form stemming from the ceaseless inter-communication of textures and surface colours; yet, unlike decorative treatment, expressing deep emotional content; subsuming, also, in terms of simultaneity or immediacy, the tugging and less immediate sensations of rhythm and balance and opposition that are the first objects of tactile awareness. (AS 42)

Such thoughts are attached more explicitly by Stokes to the idea of carving and modelling modes of art:

The painter of modelling proclivity manifestly recharges a landscape with patent flourish. The painter of a carving proclivity is manifestly at pains to show that the forms there each have a face which he discloses.... There is...a greater temporal suggestion in [the modeller's] work, that will be absent from the work of one who rejoices in the conception of absolute disclosure in concrete or simultaneous form... [the modeller] accumulates force and direction; he does not reveal an accumulation, an augmentation upon the surface, a mere outwards

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My concern so far has been to present a detailed review of Stokes's earliest writings on art, from The Quattro Cento
(1932) to *Art and Science* (1949), with the purpose of identifying aspects of Stokes's thought which seem to me central to an understanding of the distinction between carving and modelling modes of art. But, however central such ideas as 'emblem', 'Quattro Cento', 'love of stone', 'mass-effect', 'love of perspective' and 'love of colour' are to the articulation of what Stokes had in mind, there remain more general difficulties about what, precisely, a distinction between carving and modelling modes of art can contribute to the understanding of art.

The difficulty which is perhaps most apparent -- and the one to which I drew attention at the outset -- is that carving and modelling play very unequal roles in Stokes's discussion. What is said about modelling is said incidentally, and often disdainfully, while Stokes's focus is concentrated on his patently favoured carving art. The difficulty is troublesome, as I suggested earlier, because it carries a strong suggestion that Stokes is not so much describing two different modes of art, but rather using carving values as a kind of undeclared touchstone of aesthetic appraisal. But if we now consider in more detail Stokes's admitted 'partisan purpose' in favouring carving art, we shall see that this is not in fact so. And at the same time I think this will permit a clear understanding of the nature of an emblematic approach to the understand-
ing of art specifically in connection with Stokes's puzzling attitude toward 'aesthetic values'.

At a late point in The Quattro Cento, following his account of Donatello, Stokes admits that he finds it a matter of 'dismay' that he has not considered Donatello's work 'from the angle of pure aesthetic value' (QC 127). But, he goes on, to have done so would have been irrelevant to his purpose. And his purpose, he reveals - 'for we have learned the anti-Ruskin lesson well' - is 'to re-estimate the spirit of the Renaissance, to attempt anew the co-ordination of the spirit of western man with his art' (QC 127).

He adds, however,

...in the long run, a more psychological approach is not at variance with a more purely aesthetic approach. On the contrary, the former should be indispensable to the latter, and vice versa. I have by no means attempted their separation, since neither exists as a pure entity and since only for a partisan purpose does their division seem to exist. But I, too, redress a balance in the appreciation of Italian art. My concern with Donatello is solely in his relation to the Quattro Cento spirit. Indeed the theme of Donatello as artist, as artist in isolation, the theme of the inventiveness of his power to transmute the Quattro Cento stimulus into various forms of art, would be one slightly dangerous to my own. For while admitting its necessity to the Quattro Cento, I decry the Florentine power to translate emotions painstakingly into forms of art - of which Donatello's art is the supreme outcome - in favour of an anonymous spirit whose servants are more nearly children of their age, in favour of artists inspired by a patron's personality, whence springs the art entirely emblematic, the art 'twice over', miraculous to us who lack emblem. The Florentine attitude was indispensable to the Quattro Cento, and vice versa; their relation mirrors that in art criticism between the more psycho-
logical and the more aesthetic approach; and in
decrying Florence in favour of the rest of Italy,
I seek to redress exactly that same balance as I do
in favouring a more psychological approach. (QC 127-8)

In other words, Stokes has sought to give a proper emphasis,
within a wider context, to the values which Quattro Cento
art most clearly espouses. And this, at the same time, is
to give a proper emphasis to the emblematic, psychological
approach. To say that one kind of art — and Stokes, as
we saw, admitted as much of certain Quattro Cento works —
that it is lacking in the highest aesthetic value, or to
say of another that it is emblematically 'mean', is not
at all to pronounce on their place in the pantheon of val-
ued art, but simply to draw attention to the particular
kind of artistic values to which, respectively, they give
most weight. And now, we can say, insofar as the two kinds
of artistic values are not irredeemably hostile, and insofar
as the two approaches are not so starkly opposed, then this
indicates the proper perspective on the distinction between
carving and modelling modes of art. For it is not so much
that the distinction refers to some more or less unsubtle
separation of one kind of art from another, but rather to
two kinds of themes which are manifest in all art. Just as
Quattro Cento values are intermingled with Florentine, and
just as the emblematic approach is complementary to the
aesthetic, so too are carving and modelling themes inter-
weaved. For, Stokes writes, "let me admit at once that in
no part of the world has there existed a sustained figure-
carving in which modelling did not influence, and so extend
the carver's aim' (SR 122); and, moreover, 'I would remind
the reader that the carving aim can reach its height of
achievement only as a reduction of the plastic aim' (CF 181).

It is still not clear quite how modelling themes in
art might be associated with considerations of 'aesthetic
value', and this is in part because Stokes has said so
little about them. But, we shall see in the following
chapter, once carving and modelling themes are given psycho-
analytical construal, this, along with the claim about the
complementarity of carving and modelling themes, will become
more readily apparent.

There is, however, a final point which ought to be made
before introducing Stokes's attempt at a psychoanalytic
construal of his aesthetic as it has so far emerged. For
to what degree can Stokes's early work be said to invite,
even implicitly, an association with psychoanalytic theory?
Prima facie, Stokes's attitude towards art so far is, if
unique in detail, very much the attitude of the art critic
- even the art scholar. For instance, the distinction
between carving and modelling themes might look to be a
variant upon the kind of stylistic distinction familiar
in, say, Wolfflin's conception of the 'linear' and the
'painterly' (3). And in this sense it may look as if the association with psychoanalytic theory is, at best, of more or less analogical or illustrative appeal rather than, as I believe, an attempt to give internal elaboration to the ideas of carving and modelling.

The point I have in mind here might best be made by returning to the title under which I have wanted to review Stokes's early work: that is, as a discussion of what I have called the 'objecthood' of art. The sense of this title is now, I hope, sufficiently clear in virtue of the way in which the ideas of carving and modelling themes in art constitute a resource in articulating the spatial values manifest in the object which is the work of art. But it is perhaps necessary at this point to re-affirm the way in which Stokes would regard objective forms of art as giving expression to aspects of our subjectivity.

In offering a reading of Stokes's conception of the emblematic in art, it might be recalled, I attached special significance to Stokes's remark that

The process of living is an externalisation, a turning outward into definite form of inner ferment. Hence the mirror to living which art is, hence the significance of art... (QC 15)

To turn the same point around with respect to the subsequent discussion, we might say, as Stokes puts it in Colbur and Form,
Visual art projects in the guise of objective forms in space, the subjective forms that the spirit harbours in fantasy. (CP 97)

And of course it is precisely in virtue of Stokes's emblematic and psychological approach to carving and modelling values that he can at once talk of objective and subjective aspects of art. Art is thought to particularise in objective form phantasies which crowd together in inner ferment, and that it does, for Stokes, is not at all a process which is, as it were, detached from, or super-imposed upon the media, the actual stuff of art. Indeed, Stokes has wanted to say, the actual stuff of art, notably stone, or colour, are already themselves the occasion of externalisation - or, to use psychoanalytic phraseology, of the projection of the inner world: they are themselves, Stokes wrote, 'the stocks for deeper fantasies'. And it is in this sense that art, in the use it makes of its materials, can be thought to mirror the externalising, projective process of living:

Art is the face of mankind, the symbol of living, of the creating that turns emotion's multiplicity into concrete and particular individual acts. (CP 48)

We may now add to this that, insofar as carving and modelling are forms of objectification in art, then they might further be thought to exemplify very general forms of psychological projection. To speak of the carved and modelled forms of the objecthood of art is, at the same time, to speak of forms of subjecthood in the externalising process of living
which art mirrors. And though at this point such claims are not made with any psychoanalytic authority in Stokes's work, it is perhaps already clear what forms of subjecthood might be brought into association with carving and modelling themes in art. For example, art with predominantly carving themes will naturally cleave to phantasies of serene, acknowledged 'out-thereness'. It is the image in Luciano's courtyard at Urbino ('the sublime fixture of the manifest'); an image which is ubiquitous in Piero's art, in spatial effect, in lighting, in colour-forms - even in the figures Piero paints: in the Tempio Malatestiano fresco portrait of Sigismondo (no gentle subject, we must believe), or in the fresco, Constantine's Dream (that cataclysmic vision), the faces are unshadowed with inner associations. As Stokes puts it,

The deep life does not course in the men and women of Piero's frescoes. Their deep life stands revealed as if they were pools, millions of drops run together in a still shape. (CF 42)

By contrast, art with predominantly modelling themes will naturally cleave to phantasies of potent and consuming vitality, drawing us in with their strong rhythms - to phantasies of 'envelopment', Stokes was later to say. It is the image in the swift running lines of Brunelleschi's architecture, in the dramatic surface transitions of Donatello's Pieta relief, in Florentine art generally, in the
paintings of Verrocchio or Pollaiuolo. Or the image in the condottieri bust in the Bargello, attributed to Desiderio da Settignano — how unlike the figures of Piero, we think:

These ambitious contortions intimate a rich brutality, every nerve tremor of a once skulking soul passed into terms of vein and bounding muscle. (QC 144)

The theme, Stokes at one point suggests, is an inheritance from Etruscan art: there is ...an anguish, hardness, which provides a core for good modelling, and, in the form of sadistic outbursts as felt in Etruscan art but still more in Etruscan character, explains a reactive emphasis, an old guilty-conscious emphasis on what is calm and on what is sweet. (QC 105)

The images seem too richly weaved, too rich in their own poetic associations. In Kantian terms, if Stokes's writing here gets 'on level terms' with the aesthetic idea then perhaps we are not yet ready for this. But the ground is prepared to some extent: to talk in this way of art is, in a very specific sense, to suggest 'how the images in carved or modelled form might be thought 'the face of mankind'. The image in the carver's 'love' or the modeller's 'brutality' really are images for the face of mankind. It is, for instance, a specific face for our ambivalence.

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The last point invites a comment on the way in which Stokes's
early work affords the background for the development of a psychoanalytic aesthetic. For, though I wanted to argue in the Prologue that the aesthetician must seek a unitary understanding of art which embraces the point of view of the spectator and artist alike, there is perhaps some unclarity about how that embrace is achieved in Stokes's early work. Indeed, insofar as the original sense of the ideas of carving and modelling in art derives from specific artistic technique and attitude, it must look as if it is the artist's point of view which has dominantly prevailed. But, if it has, then this is not, I think, the occasion for any anxiety about what, psychoanalytically, might be made out of the frame of the early aesthetic. For there is a clear sense in which the artist's techniques and attitudes simply exemplify techniques and attitudes by which we conduct life. To return by a different route to Stokes's claim that art is the face of mankind, to say that the artist is engaged in a 'creating which turns emotion's multiplicity into concrete and particular individual acts' may be to draw attention to the particular individual acts in which the artist engages, but this is not to set him apart from that non-artistic form of creating, living itself, which also consists in turning emotion's multiplicity into concrete and particular, though not artistic, individual acts. Art in this sense does mirror the process of
living; but in this sense the processes of living also mirror the processes of art. In his practical form of activity the artist differs from the man who is not an artist; but in what meaning that activity can be said to have he is a man like any other. Hence what meaning the fruit of that activity, the work of art, can be said to have is indifferent between the artist's form of (creative) activity and the spectator's form of (observational) activity. If Stokes has talked more often about the artist than about the spectator then this is, as it were, fortuitous: for the point of view he adopts turns out to have an internal flexibility which embraces both. This, it seems to me, is the peculiar merit of Stokes's aesthetic: it is, if not explicitly, an attempt at the unitary understanding of art on which I have wanted to insist. And when that understanding is given psychoanalytic construal it has a further merit. For at the very beginning I argued that if psychoanalytic theory can contribute in any significant way to the understanding of art, it is not - and it was not for Freud - because the artist is in essence psychically remote from anyone else. It is insofar as psychoanalytic theory provides a picture of an inner world common to humanity - an inner world shared by artist and spectator alike - that to talk in psychoanalytic terms of the representation of mind in art need not be
thought to bifurcate into talk of the artist's mind on the one hand, or the spectator's on the other. It does not, I suggest, in the implicitly psychoanalytic terms of Stokes's earlier aesthetic; and it will not, I hope to show in the following chapter, when Stokes makes his invocation of psychoanalytic thinking quite explicit.
We have paused for one moment to wonder whether psychoanalytic metapsychological theory has allowed sufficient weight to the perennial challenge of the wide open world of the senses.... (CM 3)

Thus Stokes concludes the brief essay, 'Concerning Art and Metapsychology', written in 1945, and the first of his essays explicitly to address psychoanalytic theory on aesthetic questions. And perhaps the concluding remark serves also to render the fundamental theme of the writings on art to this point: the objecthood of art, as I have called it - the palpably sensible dimensions of the object which is the work of art.

What prompts 'Concerning Art and Metapsychology' is Stokes's reflection on Freud's speculation - which I have discussed at some length - that the artist finds in his art 'a path back to reality'. But while Freud's principal concern seemed to be with the way in which art might be of therapeutic value, encouraging the artist to work his way out of the oppressive and potentially pathogenic world of phantasy, Stokes gives a slightly different emphasis to the issue. For he wants to argue that, however far it may be shown that the inner world of phantasy is centrally implicated in the experience of art,
the work of art itself is an object firmly implanted in
the outer world. Stokes writes,

The generating relations of a work of art have an
air of a set-out finality, of a diverse expression
that is single, of a phantasy that has become detach-
ed from its originator to become an object, as if he
were able to make of his mind a stone which yet dis-
plays and manifests the content of his mind...

The work of art, then, is primarily distinguish-
ed from the daydream, with its smaller claim to
shapeliness, by a seeming outwardness, a seeming
otherness, by an appearance of reality. (CM 3)

The provenance of the thought here, and the significance
of the image of the stone will, I hope, be clear from
the discussion in the preceding chapter. Now, we see,
the earlier work suggests a natural transition to psycho-
analytic theory: from the outer world of the work of art
to the inner world of the mind. And it is in the course
of the next twenty or so years that Stokes reviews some
of his earlier contributions and begins to raise them to
full-blown psychoanalytic articulation.

In this chapter I mean to consider Stokes's view of
the representation of mind — the account of the inner
world set out by Freud, and by Melanie Klein — in art;
of the way in which this provides new resource in charact-
erising carving and modelling themes in art; and of the
conception of form in art to which Stokes is led. But,
first, I want to return to the idea of the emblematic —
the idea, I suggested, which was never far beneath the
surface in the entire span of Stokes's thinking and which
is crucial to the understanding of Stokes's general purpose in writing of art.

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In 1947 and 1951, Stokes produced two intensely personal volumes, Inside Out and Smooth and Rough. In each, it might be said, we find Stokes gradually working through his own experience in analysis with Melanie Klein, and adjusting and re-articulating his own vision of the world. During this period it was not art which was the dominant concern in his writing so much as life itself, life as it was experienced by Stokes in Italy and in his beloved London - a life which had come to be refulgent with psychoanalytic imagery. For instance, in describing a period spent in Rapallo, Stokes reflects,

Nature spreads and mounts before me, fixed and growing, changeless in the clearness of its cycle. I have here the means of action, a demonstration, not of the purpose of life but of the power of life to be manifest; not of one thing but of the calm relationship of many things, concrete things, each bound to each by an outwardness that allows no afterthought to the spectator: an outward showing goes within him. An answering life wells to the surface, and he feels - hence the great beauty of Mediterranean landscape - that the process of a man's existence is outward, giving shape, precise contour to the few things that lie deepest; whatever the distortion they mutually endow, making the expenditure in terms of a surface we call expression, be it in action, art or thought. (IO 32)
A little later Stokes adds,

I found a period which expressed the Rapallo aesthetic of life, the rush to make inside things manifest as superlative space. When examining early Renaissance architecture and sculpture I at once recognised this passionate aim. I formed an aesthetic devolving from this art: bit by bit I was reconstructing the good mother amid continuous ruins. (IO 33)

It is now, for Stokes, only a short way from the psychoanalytically-imbued personal recall to the aesthetic itself, in particular to what he had termed the emblematic quality of art. To repeat, what had struck Stokes was the way in which art seemed to mirror the externalising process of living. Now, in *Inside Out*, the point acquires greater specificity in connection with psychoanalytic theory:

Not only is a work of art, as a datum of a sense or senses, an object in the literal meaning, but that object expresses the universal desire to translate life into an outward attachment. The libido, according to one aspect of Freud's metapsychological thought, is primarily object-seeking. (IO 69)

Thus, we might say, are first thoughts on the relation of art and psychoanalysis in 'Concerning Art and Metapsychology' turned upon the Quattro Cento aesthetic. Henceforth, the language of psychoanalysis becomes an ally in the conception of the emblematic quality of art.

The transition is not without its difficulties. In the first place, as I pointed out earlier, Stokes's conception of the emblematic is too unique, too novel - above all so wide - to sustain itself without constant reitera-
tion and reformulation. In the second place, it is not entirely clear that the language of psychoanalysis is in fact an appropriate ally.

For the first point, we might look to Stokes's consideration of the emblematic quality in art in both the first of his volumes in psychoanalytic aesthetics, *Michelangelo* (1955), and to a late essay on 'The Future and Art', in the posthumous collection, *A Game That Must Be Lost*.

In introducing *Michelangelo*, Stokes reflects on what distinguishes his emblematic approach from the more systematic iconographical approach. Art scholarship, he says, has become absorbed 'in fixing the derivations (if easily handled) for each plastic form and iconographic theme' (MA 20). But this absorption, Stokes feels, is too narrow and tends to be conducted 'at the expense of general appreciation': the study of art 'cannot be secluded in every case from a present understanding of human needs', and it is his aim in writing of Michelangelo 'to discover certain fantasies that are common ground in the projection of Form' (MA 21).

In 'The Future and Art' Stokes returns to the point with slightly different emphasis. It is true, he writes, that, for instance, the Byzantine icons and mosaics 'were subject to religious pattern books which determined not only the attributes but the very cast of looks appropriate for each apostle' (GL 146). But it is not some analogue of
religious pattern books which concerns Stokes. Rather,
he goes on,

...far more general than such rules and the beliefs
they serve, though equally tenacious, there are usu-
ally in my belief, composite images that often settle
for striking concrete mise-en-scènes, sometimes archi-
tectural, that tend to symbolise, even to epitomise,
a wider, cultural condition.... For the artist all
current feeling and thinking, his own and the think-
ing of those who influence him occur in the view of
these concrete surroundings which are taken to impinge
on the circumstances, and even to point the path, of
our culture. (GL 146-7)

We know the kind of mise-en-scènes, the concrete surround-
ings, which for Stokes had been so influential in Quattro
Cento art - as concrete as stone itself. But, as I indicat-
ed earlier, all art is thought by Stokes to attach to simi-
lar, emblematic mise-en-scènes. And in fact, though remarks
in The Quattro Cento seemed to suggest that Stokes believed
art of the modern age to lack emblem, one of the most intrigu-
ing themes in the later work is Stokes's attempt to specify
the emblems of modern art - the mise-en-scène of the
'Machine Age', as he sometimes called it. I shall not be
much concerned with this aspect of Stokes's work, but it is
perhaps worth noting how closely it follows the pattern of
his general purposes. In Smooth and Rough, for example,
Stokes wrote poignantly of a matter which much distressed
him: the ravages and destruction wrought upon the London
of his childhood. And once he had found ways in which to
articulate his distress in psychoanalytic terms, it became
a general aim to discover in the horrific *mise-en-scene* and the cultural condition which it epitomised for Stokes the touchstones of modernist art. It was not, it should be said, that Stokes found modernist art contemptible in itself — indeed he greatly admired the work of many modern artists (Anthony Caro, for one, whom Stokes was amongst the first to support) — but he saw in its products the deep hopelessness of a society which had become obsessive and compulsive.

To turn to my second point about the appropriateness of the language of psychoanalysis for Stokes's purpose, there are, I think, two separate aspects to the issue. The first is the more easily grasped, and indeed I have to some extent already discussed it. That is, it might be recalled, I opened my discussion of Freud by insisting that Freud's theory generally is meant to show the continuity of the normal and the pathological. In other words, all human activity falls within the embrace of the psychoanalytic theory of mind. At the same time, however — and this is the other aspect of the issue — it might be said that what the language of psychoanalysis tends to lack is, as it were, a 'transcendental' anchorage. This, at least, is the way in which Stokes wants to consider the matter in a late, and extremely complex, essay on 'Psychoanalysis and Our Culture'. Is there, Stokes asks, alongside the analytic
quality of psychoanalytic thinking, a 'constructive' quality, a 'gigantic imagery' - the kind of imagery, Stokes says (with distrust), to be found in the 'poetic elements of the psychology of religion': for instance, in such thoughts of the human condition as 'a vale of tears'? Do we discover that transcendental concern which Stokes describes as 'that large and more varied part of ourselves with aims common to all other people'? - to which he adds,

Psychologically speaking, a transcendental preoccupation as I conceive it in non-escapist terms, expresses a projection of identity, that is to say, of that part of identity held in common which possesses for a complexity of reasons a value that we need to explore and to contemplate. (GL 135)

In fact Stokes expresses doubts about evidence of such transcendental concern in psychoanalysis, but the argument of his essay is that we might presume upon the possibility of one day being able 'to magnify, in a just and dignified manner of feeling, the elements, the transcendental elements, common to a thousand individual analyses'; and he suggests the idea of a 'perfected fable' as the vehicle of such magnification (GL 139). (In fact, as I understand it, Stokes attempted to fashion just such a fable in an extraordinary piece entitled 'Face and Anti-Face: A Fable'. He writes a disturbing narrative set in a society in which, as a result of mass-innoculations which ensure health, the people start to grow unshaveable, barbed, porcupine-like quills from their faces. The psycho-
analytic reference here is to the way in which the quills interfere with orally-dominated attitudes, particularly the oral roots of aggression.

It is not relevant to my purpose here to consider the argument of 'Psychoanalysis and Our Culture' in any great detail, nor to discuss Stokes's admitted 'visionary' suggestion about how psychoanalytic thinking might come to have a transcendental content. But what, I think, the essay points to is the way in which Stokes's ideas about art find a place in the train of thought. As Stokes says, 'The only worthy symbols for all that is held in common, as well as for every variation in inner life, are the projections wrought by art' (GL 136) - once more, the emblematic quality of art. In other words, I would suggest, it is in regarding art as symbolic of the variations of inner life, and at the same time in regarding it as a symbol for all that is held in common, that Stokes's work can be thought at once to show the potency of psychoanalytic thinking in the understanding of the more immediate impact of art, and at the same time to provide a transcendental tone for that thinking. In extending our understanding of art through the resources of psychoanalytic thought, Stokes also extends our understanding, and the significance, of psychoanalytic thought.

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The multiplicity of themes, and the manifold variations upon those themes, in Adrian Stokes's explicitly psychoanalytic work from 1955 make it difficult to present a general view of his project. A chronological account would not do either, for often a theme is anticipated almost incidentally in one work to be confidently resumed in another. Hence what appearance of system there might be in the matters I now propose to discuss is more or less forcefully projected upon Stokes. There will, I hope, be some advantages for clarity in this, but I should declare unambiguously that I offer just one reading of Stokes, one route through his fecund work. That the themes I shall consider are central is not the point on which I hesitate, but they are not the only themes. And it is not only their centrality in Stokes's work which prompts me to include them: there are themes of my own, announced in the Prologue, which influence the selection.

While Stokes had boldly introduced a psychoanalytic perspective on art and the artist in the first of the group of writings with which I am now concerned, the volume on Michelangelo, to start here will perhaps create a misleading emphasis. It might seem, that is to say, that the study of Michelangelo offers a rough parallel to Freud's pathographic study of Leonardo. Stokes, however, as I have
already intimated, was never more than incidentally concerned with the artist himself to the exclusion of the spectator. (This is an issue to which I shall return towards the end of the chapter.) And it is notable, for instance, that despite the fact that it is Michelangelo the artist who is the ostensible subject of the work, Stokes subtitles it 'A Study in the Nature of Art'.

There will be more to say about specific points raised in *Michelangelo* in a moment. For the present, it will be useful to start with the second work in the psychoanalytic grouping, *Greek Culture and the Ego*, for, again despite its ostensible subject — Greek culture — the work constitutes Stokes's most sustained, if not his most mature, attempt to reveal the psychoanalytic resources on which he draws in his aesthetic. And the work has, for my purposes, an additional convenience in that it further serves to illustrate Stokes's attachment to an emblematic approach to art.

As I indicated earlier, the term 'emblematic' goes underground, as it were, in Stokes's later writings. There is, however, one significant occurrence, interestingly in the unwieldy compound 'emblematic-cultural' which I take to be a transitional form lying between the idea of the emblematic in the early work and the wide conception of the cultural in the later. In any case, Stokes uses the
term in the eponymous essay in *Painting and the Inner World* in remarking the way in which art 'provides a converse to comfort distributed by keepsakes and knick-knacks, by the preference for at least one kind of vulgarity...'. He goes on,

A Sung Bowl renders no doggy acquiescence: we must come to terms: it does not live up to us and has lost in our eyes, or largely lost, the emblematic-cultural qualities from which it will have been fashioned. Yet the necessity remains to found art in common experience and the artist in common man. (Pi 3)

It is something like this necessity which Stokes, I think, confronts in writing of the roots of Greek art in the Greek cultural condition. But the subject is chosen not so much for its intrinsic interest, but rather because, as Stokes argues, Greek culture can be thought to manifest an attachment to the psychoanalytic ideal of an integrated ego. And once this argument is secured, Stokes goes on to show that not only is Hellenic art to be seen under the aegis of an image of the integrated ego, but that indeed all art can be seen in this way. In fact, if there is one dominant theme in Stokes's later work, it might be said to consist in the demonstration that the idea of form in art is no less than the idea that a work of art offers an image of ego-integration.

That there was in Greek culture a special reverence for the ideal of integration — where this has no psycho-
analytic specificity - is evident enough: for instance, in the Platonic conception of the good man and the good life. As Maurice Bowra has put it,

If the complete force of a man's nature works as a single power, he is a full man, and no Greek of the great days would have denied that this was the right and natural way to behave. (1)

But in this, Stokes claims (though also across a wide range of Greek manners, mores, myths and scientific endeavour - I select the most obvious instance), there is an affinity with the Freudian view of Eros, the life-instinct, as the 'libidinal and integrating principle' (GC 8). More specifically, Stokes argues that Greek achievement can be seen as the cultural expression of that benign psychic mode, familiar from the discussion of Kleinian theory, in which a good object, introjected as the good aspect of the super-ego, comes to be the source of strength and protection for the ego - where its benign power serves the ego in such a manner that the ego is no longer compelled to reject and split off the bad objects which it encounters. Thus, the ego achieves a measure of integration which it lacks where its sole defence lies in the mechanisms characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position: an increasingly diverse range of objects are internally reconciled as the ego begins to take on its particular character. If the theory is here shifted to the cultural level - transcendentally magnified,
so to speak — then it might be said that it is the benign power of a 'cultural super-ego' in Greek civilisation which stands behind the harmonious fecundity of achievement in art, in polity, in science. Stokes writes,

I think the best way to summarize Greek achievement is to assert that the Greeks were able to acknowledge as such the most diverse objects and the most diverse psychical phenomena. It is one reason why many of our terms derive from theirs. Aspects of psychical reality more nearly reach accommodation...more nearly congregate, under a notable form of stability, that is, under an image of ego-integration. I shall contend that art in all times has shown this to be so. (GC 11)

The Greek achievement, in other words, can be thought a cultural parallel to the psychoanalyst's restoration of an integrated ego in his patient. (As we shall see, once this thesis is rendered in terms of art, the restorative and therapeutic implications come to have particular significance.)

But, it will be objected, it is all very well to talk in this way of 'the image of ego-integration' — just so long as one postpones ascribing any specific dimension and texture to the image. That is, it will be thought a nice but insubstantial means to construe Greek achievement. Moreover, insofar as it is an insubstantial construal, perhaps just tolerable in the context of wide-ranging abstractions about culture, it can hardly serve any account which gives detailed emphasis to the concrete, physical objecthood of a work of art, as Stokes's earlier account of course does.
How are we supposed to read an image of ego-integration in
the carved block of stone, or in the paint-loaded surface
of a canvas?

The answer here is that there is nothing which is less
specific to the putative image of ego-integration in the
block of stone or the canvas than there is to any other
image of ego-integration. Indeed, there is something which
is very much more specific about the image here. For the
image of ego-integration finds its expression in corporeal,
physical structures: the image of ego-integration is, or
is an attenuation of, the image of the whole body. In
this, in the very physicality of its medium, the work of
art may very well be thought the paradigmatic expression of
the image of ego-integration. And to support the claim
we need only recall the picture of the inner world drawn
by Freud and Melanie Klein.

Freud, it will be remembered, argued that the ego is
'first and foremost a bodily Ego', and it was in this connec-
tion that I endeavoured to explicate the fundamental psycho-
analytic position concerning the corporealisation, and hence,
in virtue of the succeeding corporeal phases of libidinal
development, also the sexualisation, of thought and mental
activity generally. This, we then saw, was a theme which
Kleinian theory worked out in detail with respect to the
child's development through his symbolic projections of his
first inner objects - the bodily organs and subsequently the whole bodies of his parents - on to an increasing range of objects in the outer world. In other words, the states and activities of the ego are, according to psychoanalytic theory, permanently imbued with, and represented in, corporeal imagery. Thus, in the early, immature ego-states, unconscious phantasy life will be replete with part object imagery - images of bits of the body. With matur- ation and the increasing integration of the ego, unconscious phantasy life will organise itself in terms of whole object imagery - images of the whole body. It is at this point that Stokes takes up the argument of Greek Culture and the Ego. Thus, he writes,

In order to view ourselves not merely as continuous but as integrated we need, I submit, probably as one among several parallel ego-symposia, a constant intimation of wholeness, a figure that condenses not only sensations and perceptions but principal 'good' introjections and object-relationships, a body-ego projection of its own wholeness, an awareness founded on synthesis of previous body-egos belonging to other periods of psychic growth, an empathic awareness of a corporeal figure with a generalised reference that is likely to make itself felt, according to the perceptual context, by such qualities, contributing to wholeness, as balance, rhythm, movement, texture; a figure then, that comes best before us in the act of receiving objects, regarded as independent, which, by their structure and concreteness and exact limit bring with them the sense of our composite selves. (GC 19)

With this in mind, then, we may return, not just to the matter of the expression of the image of ego-integration in art, but, more widely, to the expression of the image in
culture itself. For one point which is relevant to Stokes's finding an image of ego-integration in Greek culture - a projection of the 'ego-figure' as he often called it - is the remarkable Hellenic reverence for the ideal of a human body. Indeed, for the Greeks, the true perfection of man consisted not simply in an ideal of the integrated mind but further in its harmonious relation to an ideal of the healthy, well-formed body. And of course if we look to Greek art, we find the natural exemplification of the cultural ideals in the marble and bronze figures embodying the spiritual virtues.

That art should be thought to provide paradigmatic images of ego-integration in virtue of its projection of a body-image does not of course depend upon the manifest representation of the body in works of art - though, it might well be argued, where a culture manifests an ideal state of ego-integration, notably Greek and Renaissance culture, this is likely to be signalled by a wealth of artistic representation of the perfected body. Stokes writes of the manifest representations of the body in art that

...they are no more representative than many other themes and I do not base my argument on the mere fact of figuration. Indeed, what impresses me more is the prevalence, the dominance, of the theme of texture in all the arts, of bone and flesh, as it were, of rough and smooth, a wider consideration than the expression of mood and subject. (GC.43)
It is just this theme, of course, which has run throughout the early writings. And it is in virtue of the sensible texture, the very concrete manifestation, in the object-hood of art, rather than in any content which it represents, that we find a paradigm of the body-image and hence a paradigm of the image of ego-integration.

A point which might be disputed in Stokes's view, however, is that the body-image as an expression of the states of ego-integration must surely be less evident in cultures in which, unlike Greek or Renaissance culture, there is something less than an ideal state of ego-integration. In other words, is it not the case that less noble and stable cultures — our own, for example — will betray not the body-image of ego-integration, but rather, as the Kleinian might put it, a part body-image of an unintegrated ego? Stokes argues not. As he sees it,

Culture mirrors contrasting ego-states. Where one is stressed it is likely to be at some sacrifice of others, if only because of influence upon the character of the ego-ideal. But even in the instance of a palpably regressive ideal, we must suppose that the integrated ego organizes the symbols and rituals of that ideal. (GC 21)

To turn this claim back into the mode of individual psychology, the emphasis in a subject, say, upon the part object phantasies and relations of the paranoid-schizoid position ('a palpably regressive ideal'), while it will determine the character of the subject, it will generally be an em-
phasis maintained under the aegis of an ego which is integrated, if less than in an ideal way, then nevertheless to some degree. Where it is not, where the conflicts which the paranoid-schizoid emphasis gives rise to are especially potent, then we are inclined to say that the ego has disintegrated in psychosis — for example, in paranoia or schizophrenia — to the point where it no longer makes much sense to talk of the subject as having a specific character. The parallel in wider terms then, I would suggest, is not that of a culture which expresses itself under the aegis of a disintegrated ego in this sense, but rather of no culture at all — nothing, at least, which is recognisable as a specific culture. The appropriate example, perhaps, would be something like Hobbes's state of nature rather than even the most perilously regressive culture like Hitler's Germany, for even there the symbols and rituals of the paranoid ideals were organised under the aegis of a body-image of ego-integration — figured in the picture of the lantern-jawed, blond Aryan superman.

Thus, with respect to art, what Stokes maintains is that the body-image in art is not that which is represented in the content of art, but rather that which organises what is represented. Form, in other words. And in fact, to talk of the body-image in art is, for Stokes, to talk of the image in the form of art — the image for which we have waited
so long in the discussion of the aesthetic application of psychoanalytic theory. Though I shall have a great deal more to say about this a little later, it is perhaps here worth saying that this is no bizarre conception of form in art which Stokes advances. To recall what I quoted a moment ago concerning the projection of the body-image of ego-integration, Stokes wrote that we come to be aware of 'a corporeal figure with a generalised reference that is likely to make itself felt, according to the perceptual context, by such qualities, contributing to wholeness, as balance, rhythm, movement, texture' — in other words just those general qualities which have always been regarded as aesthetically formal.

Undoubtedly, there remain urgent issues concerning the account I have wanted to give of Stokes's position in Greek Culture and the Ego. First, we need considerably more precise an articulation of the projection of the body-image in art. Second, we need to know what wider significance might attach to this projection. And third, we need to know what, specifically, is organised in the work of art under the aegis of the body-image.

For the first point, I have already briefly indicated what connection is made in thoughts about the body-image in art with the general concerns of Stokes's earlier writ-
ings: namely, that it is in the corporeal expression
of the structure of the ego in the body-image — psycho-
analytically speaking the sole means by which the structure
of the ego finds expression — that we find a parallel to
Stokes's discussion of the objecthood of art. Stokes him-
self sums it up:

Art, truly seen, is never ghostly; and art, truly
seen, does not so much educate us about animation,
about the mind or spirit, about the intentions of
others good or bad in which we find a source of per-
secutory feelings or of trust, as about the resulting
body-person, about the embodiment that is much more
than an embodiment because bodily attributes have
always been identified with those intentions....
There is a sense in which all art is of the body,
particularly so in the eyes of those who accept that
the painted surface and other media of art represent
as a general form, which their employment particularises,
the actualities of the hidden psychic structure made
up of evaluations and plantasies with corporeal con-
tent. (RN 40)

An exceedingly important point may be drawn out here. It
is that where we want to discover the mind's representation
in art, it is not as if the work of art immediately gives
out, or resonates with, mental representation or reflection;
as in psychoanalytic theory itself, inner life is projected
through the medium of the body, through corporeal phantasy.
In the emphasis which Stokes now gives to the body-image in
art, then, he manages to preserve what, in the early work,
he explicitly sought to articulate as the expressive power
of the medium of art and the use of the medium, rather than
as an expressive power which is attributed directly to the
artist himself, almost in despite of his medium. This point stands in close connection with another, to which I repeatedly drew attention to in earlier chapters as the unacceptable temptation to ignore the structured or institutional character of art - the 'compulsory character' of art, Kant called it. That is, it too often seemed that psychoanalytically-inclined writers were too quick to find in art mere symptoms of the artist's inner life, not sublimations - where the idea of sublimation is rendered as the fulfilment of inner desires in socially - in this case, in aesthetically - acceptable form. In remarking on the idea of form to which the body-image attaches, Stokes wittily comments on the point:

Though the emotion aroused may seem infinite, the variation of form is restricted: there is no merit in two heads or three legs. The forms that embrace what is most desirable and most rejected partake of an extreme limitation, like the picture within its frame, like the meagre repertory of forms that are available to the artist. (RN 40)

If at this point we consider the way in which Stokes wants to summarize his position, then I think this will naturally introduce the second issue I mentioned a moment ago: concerning, namely, what wider significance might attach to the projection of the body-image in art. Stokes writes,

...whatever aesthetic object we contemplate, it serves only as a symbol for an aspect, or for many aspects, of our accumulated feelings and projections and projections in regard to the body to which in our own
selves and in the case of others we are tied to not only indissolubly but without solution, without an integration continuous and stable: that is to say, incompletely when compared with a work of art perhaps whose medium is always broadly of its fabric. (RN 41)

What Stokes had earlier called the 'out-thereness' or 'otherness' of the work of art can now be seen to have a very particular kind of psychological reverberation: in its wholeness and self-sufficiency it readily invites the symbolic projection of the whole mother's body: its body-image is the image of the whole mother. But, we saw in the discussion of Kleinian theory, it is the recognition of the whole mother, and the accompanying sense of loss and guilt characteristic of the depressive position, which brings in its wake the urge to make reparation, to reconstitute in phantasy the whole object which is imagined destroyed. The work of art, then, in terms of its whole body-image, is, or can be, the most pre-eminently suitable occasion for the reparative act: as Stokes puts it, the work of art provides, or can provide, 'the model for repairing and esteeming others, in terms of a body-structure to be mended or treasured' (GC 27)

And this, Stokes adds, writing in Michelangelo,

is the practical idealism of all art which says 'in order to live we must somehow thrive'. The artist is compelled to overcome depressive fantasies by making amend (often, as in the Renaissance, by presenting with an air of ease the surprising and the difficult), the amend that articulates together an all-embracing physical entity with bodily separateness, reconstructions of internalised good objects, threatened by the bad.... The artist has recognised our common sense of loss in a deep layer of his mind. (HA 67)
The idea of the reparative function of art — and I shall want to come back to this in greater detail in connection with the idea of form in art, with which it may now, in virtue of the idea of the body-image, be seen to stand in intimate relation — very quickly brings us to the third of the three issues I mentioned: concerning, namely, what it is that is organised in the work of art under the aegis of the body-image.

Obviously, to talk of reparation in the Kleinian sense is to talk in a doubly general way: first, about an unconscious aim whose particular fulfilment, if such there should be, is not theoretically specifiable; and again, about an aim which is common to us all — at least outside extreme forms of psychosis. In other words, the particular manifestation of the reparative act, and no less so when the reparative act finds expression in the creating of art, varies as a function of the respects in which the damaged inner object is imagined to stand in need of repair. Simplistically: that there is a loss which demands restoration and reparation is common, but what restoration and reparation is required is individual. Hence, to talk of reparation with respect to the work of art is to talk only of its general form, not its particular content. If this so far seems too general an aesthetic point, then we may yet appeal to the further resources of Kleinian theory, to the account of universally
prevalent phantasies, to assist in the characterisation of what it is that is organised in the work of art under the aegis of the body-image: in particular, of course, to the phantasies respectively associated with the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position. And perhaps it is now time to say that the contrasting kinds of phantasies can readily be brought into connection with what Stokes has already identified as the contrasting themes of art: respectively, modelling themes and carving themes. It is to that connection that I now want to turn.

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In the study of Michelangelo, Stokes writes,

Now, if we are to allot pre-eminence in aesthetic form to an underlying image of the body, we must distinguish two aspects of that image, or, rather, two images which are joined in a work of art. There is the aspect which leads us to experience from art a feeling of oneness with the world, perhaps not dissimilar from the experience of mystics, of infants at the breast and of everyone at the deepest points of sleep.... We experience it to some extent also from passion, manic states, intoxication, and perhaps during a rare moment in which we have truly accepted death; above all, from states of physical exaltation and catharsis whose rhythm has once again transcribed the world for our possession and for its possessiveness of us; but only in contemplating works of art, as well as nature, will all our faculties have full play, will we discover this kind of contemplation in company with the counterpart that eases the manic trend. I refer to the measured impact of sense-data that distinguishes the communicating of aesthetic experience from the
messages of ecstatic or dreamy states: I refer to the otherness in the full perceptions by which art is made known. (MA 65-6)

It is easy to see that these two images have primitive roots: respectively in, as Stokes puts it, 'the positive rhythmic experience of the infant at the breast and the subsequent appreciation of the whole mother's separate existence' (MA 66). In other words, their roots are in the consuming nature of the infant's seeking instinctual satisfaction at the breast, and in his later realisation that the source of his instinctual satisfactions, recognised in the person of his mother, is separate from him and independent of his desires.

The images - Stokes designates them respectively images of 'envelopment' and images of 'otherness' or 'separateness' - are regarded as forming a complex network of connections and associations in infant and adult life generally, so that their manifestation in art is simply a specific instance. Thus, I shall focus successively on different parts of the network and try to show the interconnections.

It will now be a familiar claim of Kleinian theory that the immature ego - the ego in the paranoid-schizoid position - is characterised by its dominating (projective and introjective) identifications with (good and bad) part objects.
And an important aspect of the force (and partiality) of these identifications is that there is very little differentiation of the ego from what lies outside. It is as if the world is swallowed up in, or enveloped by, the ego, or it is a matter of indifference here - as if the ego were swallowed up in, or enveloped by, the world.

First amongst the unconscious phantasies of envelopment are those generated in the infant's experience at the breast. (Freud, incidentally, referred to the infant's experience at the breast, along with the experience of sleep, in an obviously connected way here as the source of the 'oceanic feeling' (2).) Satisfaction and nourishment at the breast, at this early point of minimal differentiation of subject and object, is, then, represented in phantasies of being at one with the world - the satisfaction and nourishment is not apprehended, as it were, as a bounty granted by the world outside. And it is this experience which leads to the introjection of the enveloping, life-enhancing breast as the primary good object; though of course it is also the case that as the infant becomes aware that satisfaction and nourishment at the breast is, as I put it, a bounty granted by the world outside - because it is sometimes a bounty which is withheld - the breast is also introjected as the primary bad, frustrating and hated object.
Later, as the paranoid-schizoid position is overcome, the infant begins to recognise his mother as a whole object, not just as an arbitrary configuration of part objects, good and bad. And what it is that is recognised— with depressive force—is the lack of continuity between the ego and the world outside. The mother is felt to be other than, separate from, the ego and no longer an aspect of the one undifferentiated world of subject and objects. Hence the sense of loss; hence the sense of guilt as the infant imagines himself responsible for the loss in virtue of having damaged his good object; hence the urge to reparation, to set up the whole mother internally again and again.

These two primary aspects of infantile inner life are, in later life, projected upon an increasing range of objects and activities. And in the struggle for ego-integration—or, what is the same thing, the restoration of the whole mother internally—it is the success with which the individual can work through phantasies of envelopment and otherness which will determine how closely he approaches to the ideal state of ego-integration.

Now, it is Stokes's aesthetic extrapolation upon these psychoanalytic themes that the primary phantasies are projected with particular vividness in the experience of art, to be displayed in the body of the work of art in a rich variety of tensions and resolutions, of conflict and coordin-
ation.

'For the purposes of art', Stokes writes, announcing the programme of his aesthetic account, 'the degree to which self-subsistent object-nature...can be admitted, may not always be very great' (GC 24): no greater, one might say, than the degree to which the admission might be made from individual to individual. And he refers us here to the vital rhythms and emphatic swiftness which draw us in, envelop us, in the work, for example, of Michelangelo. In Michelangelo's art the image of envelopment is very much stronger than, say, in Piero's art which, we saw Stokes wanted to say, reveals the unemphatic, 'brotherly' interplay of forms which gives the sense of 'out-thereness', of the separateness of the world in a Piero painting.

'Yet', Stokes goes on,

upon the pursuit, often the manifest pursuit, of part objects and upon the oceanic states to which they lend themselves there supervenes in art, it appears to me, an impress of equilibrium deriving from the composition of whole objects. (GC 24)

In other words, what tensions are apparent in the work of art between part and whole object forms - even in works in which part object forms compulsively dominate - are ultimately bound within an image of otherness, the body-image which, Stokes has argued, all art makes manifest.

The general point which Stokes wants to make in this matter
is perhaps most vividly illustrated if we consider not the artistic projection of those benign, affirmative enveloping states which associate with phantasies of the good, ever-bountiful breast, but rather their negative, greedy and envious counterparts, states of enveloping aggression which associate with phantasies of the bad, frustrating breast. For here, it might be said, the alleged alliance in the work of art of images of envelopment and otherness or separateness is much harder of, and hence a much more dramatic, achievement. (Without resort to psychoanalytic language, or to aesthetic intuition, it is generally true that a consuming (enveloping) rage leaves less of the world untouched (separate and independent) than a contrasting intoxication of love — unless one has the faith of a saint, or of a pantheistical Wordsworthian.) This is particularly true — and as I have said it becomes a frequent theme in Stokes's later work — of the art of our own culture. As Stokes puts it, 'many appreciators today seem to find it more exciting if formal values can be observed barely to survive a monstrous expression of, say, greed' (PI 9). Of course that it should, even so barely, so perilously, survive is a condition of its being recognisable art. To return to Stokes's theme of the body-image in art, the body has limits of deformity which are tolerated in the name of humanity (to have two heads and
three legs would be inhuman) and also in the name of art
(Othello cannot be 'the green-eyed monster which doth mock/
The meat it feeds on' — or else his tragedy is untragic.)
'What is entirely negative or chaotic, or merely unfeeling',
Stokes asserts, 'can never be art...'(PI 9), but of course
it is the bravura, or bragadoccio, of modernist art to
flirt with such themes. And the risks are not without
reward. That is, it seems to me, the more dramatic the
aggression (or regression), the more striking the reforma-
tion (or integration) in the form of a work of art —
though one must inevitably be less sure of the resolve.
For example, the Cubist's attack upon whole objects and
his artistic appropriation of parts is perhaps the most
aesthetically notable example of the compulsive, aggres-
sive trend in modernist art. But perhaps this is in no
small measure a function of the fact that the most notable
Cubists (Picasso, for example, and Braque) also strongly
espoused the more serene, traditional values: there is,
one might say for instance, a deeper, less anxious respect
in their work for the limitations of form in the two-dimen-
sional, rectangular canvas than is evident, say, in the
work of Robert Rauschenberg (in his projections off the
face of the canvas) or of Frank Stella (in his use of non-
rectangular canvases). Stokes, I think, has some such
point in mind when he writes,
The framework, the indispensable carrier of this passionate process...is the idea of construction itself, seen as identical with the ego-figure: hence our feelings of well-being, of health before the successful painting in spite of the often considerable aggression that has gone into. (GC 49-50)

The hazards, but also of course the deep interest, of much modernist art can perhaps be said to lie in the sense that the manic trend constantly threatens to overspill the artistic framework — indeed deliberately so in the case of the Minimal artist's ambition to achieve 'the condition of non-art'.

To return here to the theme of Stokes's emblematic approach to art, what trends recognisable art will contain will depend upon the temper of the culture — on the transcendentalised psychology of the culture, that is. Doubtless Piero's art, or Milo's Venus were propitious for the ideals of ego-integration, but, Stokes puts it,

...for modern urban life our eyes and other senses no longer receive nor as easily construct the broader symbolic impressions of whole objects in terms of that environment: there appears to the contemplative mind a drag upon many individual things as such, a partial dissolution of a self-sufficiency that depends from the imaginative angle upon the notion of a wide organisation, as well as upon the frequency, of valued things. Modern art shows that we must search for mere fragments of an organisation and that we have an entire impatience with cultural symbolic systems: they would lack impetus. They cannot be applied now to the order or, rather, to the lack of order, of things. (RN 29)

Collage, perhaps, is most propitious for the cultural ego-state dominated by part object relations.
But it would be wrong to imply that the envelopment factor and manic, compulsive trends in art are evident only in modernist art. For perhaps the finest example of the envelopment factor employed to magnificent aesthetic effect is the art of Turner. In comparison with the serenity of a Pico, say, Turner's canvases are ablaze or awash - indeed it is remarkable (and very much to the psychoanalytic point) how frequently, particularly in Turner's late work, the themes of fire and flood recur, threatening to consume and envelop the figured objects. In an ambitious essay, 'The Art of Turner (1775-1851)', Stokes offers us an intriguing glimpse into the obsessional traits in Turner's art.

There are two remarks, one Turner's, one Hazlitt's on Turner, each quoted at different points in Stokes's essay, which, I think, can significantly be set together. 'Indistinctness is my forte', Turner is reported to have said in response to the frequent critical complaints about the lack of definition and finish in his work (vide PI 50). And Hazlitt, so often dogged in his critical mindlessness, protested that Turner 'delights to go back to the first chaos of the world' (vide PI 72). The remarks together rather nicely illustrate the enveloping quality of the artist's work. For the first, indistinctness and lack of definition is of course precisely what characterises the enveloping states associated with early part object identi-
fications: there is, we saw, little differentiation of the ego from its objects. And, for the second, it is of course precisely the earliest part object relations which constitute the first chaos of the (inner) world, and to which there is always the possibility of regression — of, like Hazlitt's Turner, 'going back'.

The power and ferocity of Turner's vision, however, was no compulsion by which he was unrestrainedly ridden. A craftsman, closely nurtured in artistic tradition, there is no sense in which it can be said that Turner's artistic form is infected by the chaos he could represent. The fire and flood threaten to consume only the figured objects, not the framework, 'the indispensable carrier of this passionate process'. There is no arbitrary exercise of power — and it is perhaps the sense of arbitrariness which most offends in Rauschenberg's work or Stella's. Or perhaps a more appropriate modernist contrast with Turner's art lies in action painting. Here paint seems to drench the canvas in no more controlled a way than, in its making, the paint drenches the surround of the surface on which the canvas is laid — where that the canvas lay where it was, and not six inches to the left, ceases to be of moment. In conventional painting of course the parallel is not the location of the canvas while it is being worked, but the location of subject on the canvas. And it is, for example, what we recog-
nise as the artist's awareness of the location of subject in the picture plane which eliminates any sense of an arbitrary exercise of power. This, exemplarily, with Turner. As Stokes points out in describing the contrasting movements and vigorous rhythms in *The Wreck Buoy*,

The meeting of these movements occurs near the centre of the canvas, from where one has the sense of extracting the heart of so vertiginous, so desert, yet so various a scene, in terms of the red-rose jib on the nearer sailing boat: at either side verticals incline outwards and thereby stress that centre. (PI 76)

Stokes adds, significantly enough, 'Awareness of a centre in great space will favour a *rencontre* of contrary factors in whatever sense'. And one sense here is that the *rencontre*, the integration in the structure of the picture, suggests the model for the acknowledgement and resolution of conflict and tension under the aegis of the whole body-image - the centre, as it were, of the integrated ego.

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What has been under discussion in terms of images of envelopment and otherness in art, it should be apparent, closely parallels what Stokes had earlier identified as, respectively, modelling and carving themes in art - except of course that this time round there seems to be a much greater emphasis upon envelopment/modelling themes than on otherness/
carving themes. But it is, so far, just a parallel: again the vigour of Stokes's thinking demands reassurance in smaller matters of detail. First, I want to consider the perceptual ramifications of images of envelopment and otherness, just as, in the previous chapter, I discussed the perceptual ramifications of carving and modelling themes.

Smells and tastes, no one would dispute, have, paradigmatically, the capacity to envelop. One talks, for example, of an 'overpowering' smell or taste, but not of an overpowering texture, and not usually of an overpowering sight or sound (and where one does, I suspect, what is meant is that the sight blinds or that the sound deafens - whereas an overpowering smell or taste, however unpleasant, is not thought sensibly injurious). That this should be so accommodates itself naturally to psychoanalytic thinking, for of course the sense of smell and taste predominate at the primitive, oral phase of development precisely in terms of enveloping part object identifications. 'Smell', Stokes writes, 'has the primitive character of a mode of recognition, of incorporation, that dogs us' (GL 28): that is, a smell will not leave us alone, and as a primitive mode of recognition the sense of smell makes dogs of us. (Anyone may observe in a dog that it is not only a smell which first attracts its attention - and often a particularly malodor-
ous object which it takes in its mouth - but a smell, above all, which envelops its every purpose, obliterating the most firmly tutored habits.

It is, however, an elementary fact that a work of art has neither smell nor taste. Indeed, Stokes writes,

> A statue doused in perfume would be aesthetically most offensive, except that our imaginative faculties would not even then treat statue and perfume together, save in regard to wetness which would be of significance as texture. (GC 23)

One might say, the dab of perfume on the beautiful woman does (and is doubtless intended to) dog us, but we do not want such intimations of closeness from a statue - which is presumably why a dog does not appreciate the statue. What, aesthetically, we want is that self-sufficiency, that independence, that whole object otherness. And that is why, for Stokes, 'art presupposes visual (i.e. from a distance) apprehension of the object' (GC 23); and why, he writes elsewhere,

We have no difficulty in speaking of the painter as the artist par excellence, of painting as the representative of art in general. I think that this is because of the instrument, the brush, tipped with the creative material, and because the canvas is worked at arm's length, with the result that the very act of painting as well as the preoccupation with the representation of space, symbolize not only the restitutive process but a settled distance of the ego from its objects. The distance from us of our world varies continuously: the artist brings all into view, into focus, at arm's length, as it were. (TP 9)

This, clearly enough, is the view which dominates Stokes's early work - and not surprisingly since it is
his primary concern in the early work to articulate the sense of 'out-thereness' or otherness in art with predominantly carving themes: art created and viewed at arm's length exemplarily.

Aside from the unique manner of expression, and the context in which it works, however, Stokes's point has the familiarity of an orthodox aesthetic precept first introduced by Kant: namely, that in aesthetic contemplation there must be a high degree of 'detachment' or 'disinterestedness'. Schopenhauer, for example, used to complain of what he called that 'low species' of Dutch still-life painting which endeavours to depict edible objects so realistically that they excite the appetite and stimulate the will: thus, for Schopenhauer, 'purely aesthetic contemplation is at once abolished, and the purpose of art thus defeated' (3).

At the same time, though — and this is a recognition which is beginning to emerge in Stokes's work in his increasing insistence upon the need for interplay between images of envelopment and otherness — while the emphasis upon the detached and contemplative character of aesthetic experience is proper, and often salutary in the discrimination of the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic (in saying what offends us in the perfumed statue and draws us to the perfumed woman), it can sometimes lend itself to protests about the lifelessness of art and the remote, unworldly quality of aesth-
etic experience. As Stokes puts it, 'it is understandable to mistake or to resist the point of art, to find in its scentless flowers no suggestion but of their deadness' (PI 8).

It is not, of course, in terms of the paradigms of smell and taste as enveloping sensations through which Stokes now seeks to assert the need of envelopment imagery in the work of art. (Or rather, it is not directly in such terms: Stokes does maintain the thesis — with which I shall not be concerned — that works of art do, or can, have a strong oral component, for instance, in the sense of aesthetic nourishment which they provide.) In fact, he argues, it is through tactile and kinaesthetic sense, through the rhythms and movement in a work of art, that envelopment imagery is most apparent. And of course, we saw, it was in terms particularly of rhythm and movement that Stokes had earlier articulated the idea of modelling themes in art.

That works of art provide tactile and kinaesthetic sensations, but not sensations of smell or taste, has its own psychological significance. If we recall Freud's distinction between external and internal perceptions, and the importance of their interplay in the developing awareness of the ego as separate from its objects, then it is clear that tactile sensation has a critical role: for, unlike other senses, the sense of touch yields both an extern-
al perception of an object and, at the same time, an intern-
al perception of the body as the organ of touch. And much
the same may be said here about kinaesthetic sensation. For
instance, while the kinaesthetic rhythms of suckling at the
mother's breast give rise to the 'oceanic feeling' of the
oneness of the ego and the world, they acquire a pointed
significance once it is recognised that the means of suck,
the breast, is an object in the outer world - thus, one
supposes, thumb-sucking in later childhood as a form of
anxiety-behaviour, or, in adulthood, the anodynal effect
of cigarette-smoking. In other words, it is principally
in terms of tactile and kinaesthetic sensation that, at the
earliest stage, the infant's discrimination of the ego from
its objects is likely to be enacted. (Again, to refer to
a dog-eared issue, we perhaps resist ascribing self-consc-
iousness to the dog - an awareness of itself as distinct
from its objects - on the grounds of the enveloping qual-
ity of its primarily olfactory mode of perception.)

We have seen so far the way in which, for Stokes, the
work of art projects and restores the body-image. But now,
with respect to the matter of tactile and kinaesthetic sens-
ation, there is a suggestion about what perceptual factors
might be instrumental for the fulfilment of that aim. For,
Stokes wants to argue,

The work of art, often called dynamic, vital, organic,
provides a figure not only of the aim but of the process.
The work of art, that is, functions as a kind of symbolic model not only of the restorative aim, but also as a symbol for the phantasies which must be worked through if the aim is to be fulfilled.

At this point, we might return to what I remarked as the curious aspect of Stokes's articulation of the idea of mass-effect. What was curious was the way in which Stokes wanted to insist upon the purely visual synthesis which mass-effect elicits, while the impression of mass is evidently supported by tactile experience. I think it may now be said that the purely visual synthesis on which Stokes wanted to insist anticipates the idea of the work of art's projection of the whole body-image. But while visuality - 'arm's length distance' - is still thought to epitomise the experience of art and its making, Stokes is now very much better prepared to admit the role of non-visual effect - as it were, under the aegis of visuality, under the aegis of the whole object otherness of the work of art.

The point brings us naturally to what Stokes now wants to make of the earlier distinction of carving and modelling themes. For the subtler relations of images of envelopment and otherness allow us to see more clearly the balance and intimacy between carving and modelling themes than Stokes's earlier 'partisan purpose' had permitted. For now Stokes
feels much more confident, and more articulate, in identifying the place in aesthetic experience, alongside images of otherness - the 'out-there-ness' of carving effect - of images of envelopment - the to-and-fro rhythms of modelling effect. Indeed Stokes is prepared to argue the necessity and significance of an 'enveloping pull' in all art - the 'invitation' in art of which he writes in the volume with that title.

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We should recall that Stokes had in fact admitted in *Stones of Rimini* that 'in no part of the world has there existed a sustained figure-carving in which modelling did not influence and so extend the carver's aim'; and, in *Colour and Form*, that 'the carving aim can reach its height of achievement only as a reduction of the plastic aim' (4). But it was only once he was convinced that aesthetic justice had been done to carving themes in art that he felt ready to turn to art in which there is a clear alliance of carving and modelling themes. For instance, Michelangelo's art. Indeed, for Stokes, Michelangelo's art provides a paradigm of the alliance, for though the art creates ready associations with the carving virtues of Classical sculpture, Stokes points out that
If the definition fails to enclose even Michelangelo's recurrent adaptations of classical themes, it is not because he is not found there, but because he extends beyond. We shall often have met with conflict conveyed in art with equal or even greater intensity, but we shall not find a parallel for his idealization that electrifies without disrupting a classical embodiment.

(MA 62)

It is not, however, until ten years later, with *The Invitation in Art* (1965) that Stokes is finally ready to focus in any detail on the aesthetic role of modelling values in art. And, doubtless aware of his own exaggerating tendencies in the studies of Quattro Cento art, Stokes feels obliged to qualify his new interest. He writes in the introduction to *The Invitation in Art*:

> If in this book I attempt to trace the permeating role of a plastic, enveloping element, my preoccupation is not at all exercised at the expense of those other values, the equal emphasis, the flowering radiant compactness, that evoke re-creation of the whole independent object, the utter demonstration of its brotherly yet differing parts, none of which is overborne. (I A 9)

Under this qualification, then, let us look at what Stokes has in mind.

Art, it has been Stokes's view, is the notable occasion for the symbolic projection of inner states in outward form; and our concern with the form of a work of art is a projection of our concern with the structure of the inner world. But if art can instil and sustain this habitual concern, it does so, for Stokes, only because...

...in every instance of art we receive a persuasive
invitation...to participate more closely. In this situation we experience fully a correlation between the inner and the outer world which is manifestly structured (the artist insists). (IA 14)

The envelopment factor in art draws us into the whirlpool of part objects and part object-relations - the 'first chaos' of the inner world, so to speak - but in the work of art's focus at arm's length, in the otherness of the whole body-image which its form projects, we are made to see what was partial and in bits now integrated. As Stokes puts it,

In a combination that art offers, we find a record of predominant modes of relationships, to part objects as well as to whole objects. (IA 21)

And it is in virtue of the projected record of part object-and whole object-relations that Stokes now wants to say, modifying his earlier emphasis on the contemplative distance of visuality, 'As well as to observe, Form induces us to partake' (TP 17)

Perhaps the best way in which to reconstruct Stokes's thinking here is to consider the sense of aesthetic 'lifelessness' - to recall the term I used earlier - which might be created by art which neglects the envelopment factor, which issues no invitation for us to partake as well as for us to observe. There are two points to consider here, I think. The first - and I discussed this briefly at the end of the chapter on Klein in connection
with Hanna Segal's essays in aesthetics — is the role of negative values such as the ugly or squalid in aesthetic experience: that is, the role of the harsher projections of part object-relations. The second, and more general, is the nature of the partaking which the envelopment factor in art can induce. And this point, I think, opens up a natural route back to Stokes's earlier discussion of the relations of carving and modelling values.

For the first, Stokes was to write in *Greek Culture and the Ego*,

> From the point of view of a strong aesthetic sense in regard to human constructions, ugliness, 'ladness' as such, is not most feared, but emptiness; that is to say, lack of identity, lack of focus, promoting a feeling of unreality as may be transmitted, for instance, by an ill-proportioned flashy apartment yet designed, it seems, to banish space and time and so the sense of any function to be performed there. A crack in the plaster would be a relief. The squalid, the ugly, do not necessarily lend themselves to this numbing sense of unreality, deeply feared as proclaiming lack of relation, disintegration, the undoing of the ego-figure. (CC 52)

In fact, for instance in earlier allusions to modernist art, I have wanted to give greater emphasis than Stokes does to these negative values, to the cracks in the plaster. In part, this was because, as I said, there is often a greater sense of satisfaction (I find) in the hard-won success of integrating such values in aesthetic form. (As Stokes put it, 'many appreciators today seem to find it more exciting if formal
values can be observed barely to survive a monstrous expression of, say, greed — a form of excitement, Stokes also suggests, valued only by the victims of our chaotic culture.) But since there is always the danger of obsessional perversity in seeking out the chaotic in order to get the satisfaction of finding it tidied up, as it were, it is useful to have the support of Stokes's view about why negative values in art can be internally significant. To say, as Segal put it, that in the absence of negative values a work of art might end up simply being 'pretty' is, so far as it goes, correct, but one wants to know here why prettiness might be so disturbing. And Stokes suggests that the merely pretty, or the bland apartment with no crack in the plaster, do not so much fail directly to engage aesthetic sense as in fact threaten the condition of aesthetic sense: namely, an awareness of reality. The vacuous and the bland are disturbing in their unreality. Anyone knows that who has vainly sought reassurance in a large international airport or in the colour-coordinated corridors of a modern hospital. In wanting to scream at the ubiquitous hum of piped music, I would suggest, the desire is more to create a crack in the unreal facade in which to insert one's aesthetic sense than to make an aesthetic protest. Architects of public buildings nowadays seem to flatter themselves that they eliminate protest by being scrupulously inoffensive. But at what cost?
At least one felt secure enough to have aesthetic opinions about Gothic railway stations.

To turn to the second point, about the nature of the aesthetic partaking of which the envelopment factor in art can induce, it will be useful to recall a matter raised in connection with the discussion of carving themes in painting. The carving-painter, we saw, works lovingly to preserve the two-dimensionality of his medium, but of course it is an exceptionally subtle enterprise: two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional scene, for example, demands that there be at least some degree of illusional depth in the picture. Indeed, Stokes suggests, it is this illusional depth in representational painting which perhaps first engages aesthetic attention. He writes,

More clearly in naturalistic painting, the first test of its merit is the degree to which we become attached to the turn of the contours, the degree to which we are compelled to feel our way into spaces, whether populated or whether empty of shapes. This matter is at the heart of painting on a flat surface, distinguishing its appreciation from an apprehension of landscape itself which the eye constructs and contemplates without ado as a three-dimensional datum. (IA 27)

We see in this, perhaps, just why Stokes had been so resolutely concerned to find ways in which to articulate and to affirm the neglected merits of carving art — and why there is a tendency to neglect its merits. Modelling art meets this 'first test' with notable ease, while the invitation in, say, a Piero just is so unassertive in this respect that it
is likely to pass unnoticed. (Significantly enough, there is a room in the National Gallery in London which exhibits both Piero's The Baptism and Pollaiuolo's The Martyrdom of St Sebastian: inevitably one's eye is first drawn to the vibrant flourish and rhythms of the Pollaiuolo.)

To take the issue further here, there is a kind of painting, not in itself unskilful or incompetent, which is commonly enough found above the homely fireplace – Stokes refers to 'a gay bit of painting of a Mediterranean harbour that I saw in a café' (IA 27) – and which can fail to meet the 'first test'. It is not so much because there is no sense in which the figured objects stand in front of or behind one another, but rather because it is as if the artist had simply referred us to the spatial depth without traversing the spatial interstices. The spectator, Stokes writes,

\[\text{wants to be induced to feel his way over the stones of the quay, bit by bit. Again, he is not interested in the stones of the quay: he is interested in the breadth to the water's edge, and then in the breadth of the water between quay and boat; he wants to swim, as it were, in the empty air above them, yet again he won't mind if that which he contemplates does evocative service for, but hardly looks like, the width of the quay. ...we demand to be drawn in among these volumes, almost as if they were extensions of ourselves, and we do not tire of this process, the incantatory process at work. It is at work only because the canvas face is, in fact, flat. (IA'28)}\]

But put in this way, and if we recall Stokes's characterisation of mass-effect in contrast with massive-effect or monumentality (where the eye is successively drawn by the
rhythmic traversing of space), we begin to see just how narrow a file carving art really does occupy between modelling art and gay bits of painting of Mediterranean harbours hung in cafés. The idea of carving values in art crucially depends upon the sensitivity of Stokes's vision in detecting the unemphatic 'undulation' and 'blossoming' on, for example, the stone reliefs of an Agostino — and of course also on Stokes's capacity to articulate that vision at such plausible length. When I made the point about the inadequacy of photographic representation to convey the carving values of Agostino's Madonna and Child with Angels, what suggestion there might have been about the crudeness of the photographic medium is in fact an instance of the more general point about the difficulty of conveying those values in any medium — including a literary one. On the other hand, what secret assurance there was in thinking that Donatello's Pieta is obviously the more engaging relief of the two now finds support in Stokes's claim it is the first test of merit in art to find oneself attached to the turn of contours. And of course it is just this point which finally allows us to see what it was Stokes had in mind in separating emblematic values from purely aesthetic ones — those values, he had admitted, epitomised by Donatello and by Florentine art generally. It is, one might in the end say, the for-
wardness of 'invitation', the strength of the 'enveloping pull', which serve to distinguish the exemplars of carved and modelled art. Indeed, it is perhaps in virtue of this thought that one sees how the critical preferences of which Stokes had talked in his early discussions might in fact be erected within the understanding of art which Stokes offers: some of us just are more readily engaged by the polite, reticent invitation, some of us by the warmer, more intimately hospitable invitation. And that, in terms of the psychoanalytic background to Stokes's aesthetic, is of course very much to the point.

What began for Stokes as a sometimes quite personal, sometimes apparently eccentric aesthetic distinction has reached maturity. The re-consideration of the significance of modelling values has restored the balance of the distinction, and in this we are offered a potent tool in the understanding of art. In the account of the manifold relations of carving and modelling aims we have a means to grasp the prolific, and often contrasting configurations inscribed in the face of art. (And it is worth saying here, all art, not just visual art, as it might have seemed in virtue of Stokes's examples: it is clear now that the emphasis on visuality is an emphasis on a paradigm — that the painter is, as Stokes put it, 'the artist par excellence'.) That
this should have been achieved without the notable dangers in aesthetic theory of too abstract a generality, or of tendentious 'evaluative' assumption, is a rare accomplishment. But there is a greater achievement than this. For Stokes's method of informing his aesthetic with the insights of psychoanalysis shows us both the homelessness of art and its centrality to the human condition. The emblematic approach to art permits us to see that its projections, of so profuse a variety, really do cleave to that universality which art constantly seeks to embody. Stokes felicitously intimates the double achievement in two short sentences from *The Invitation in Art*:

> Art, we have seen, is mastery within the mode of certain emphases upon reconstruction. Whatever else it makes known, art transmits an enticing eloquence in regard to the varied attachment to objects, and in regard to the co-ordination of the self. (In 29)

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Throughout earlier chapters, I argued that it is only in the articulation of the formal qualities of art that any distinctive contribution is made to our understanding of art. I want now to consider more directly this aspect of Stokes's work — how far the idea of a psychoanalytic aesthetic has been rescued from the tendency simply to read a latent meaning in the manifest content of a work of
art.

When Bell and Fry sought to provide a theory of 'Significant Form' they made, I think, no less — but not much more — than this obvious point that our distinctively aesthetic interest lies in the form and not the content of a work of art. As they liked to put it, Significant Form is the vehicle of the 'aesthetic emotion'. And it is a point which is always worth making, for there is always a curious temptation to drift into a discussion of the content of a particular work though one supposes oneself to be talking of its specific aesthetic virtues. It is a temptation, for example, especially noticeable for some reason in discussing films, where a frequent issue of recent years is expressed as the question of whether a film with erotic or violent content can commend itself aesthetically — as if the content determined its aesthetic status. Of course one may find erotic content discomfiting — in art as much as in polite conversation — or one may disapprove of violence — in art as much as in the streets — but this is no more a significant aesthetic attitude than it would be to say that one avoided Tolstoy's stories because one found Russian peasantry lugubrious — in art as much as in a bar. In any case, however generally widespread the temptation to focus on the content and not the form of a work of art, it is, I have argued, a common
tendency in what passes for psychoanalytic aesthetics.

At the same time, however, to insist that a distinctively aesthetic interest is directed upon the formal qualities of a work of art is only of introductory value—which is why I suggest that Bell and Fry made little more than the obvious point (5). I do not mean here only that the insistence is of introductory value unless one can specify with some precision what formal qualities are. Indeed, much academic aesthetics and criticism (particularly literary criticism) occupies itself with such specification. But whatever one may in the end want to specify as the formal qualities of art, one is ultimately only forced back to the original claim that aesthetic interest lies in just these formal qualities. Only this time it is no answer to say that the interest lies here because it does not lie with content. One wants to know why the interest lies here, what is significant in form. One requires, I want to say, a specific image to attach to form which shows why our interest lies here. To put it another way, one requires a generalised content for the form—a meaning, perhaps latent, in the form.

It will, I trust, be evident what relevance such remarks have to the discussion of Adrian Stokes, in particular to his view, which I intimated in the Prologue, that there is an 'image in the form of art'.
The idea of form in the preceding pages on Stokes's work has never in fact been very far from the surface. Indeed, as I pointed out at the time, it is in the view that the work of art projects a body-image that we find what is at the heart of Stokes's conception of form, and also, of course, what image he believes form constructs. But in his late lecture, 'The Image in Form', Stokes argues his position in a manner which, at least prima facie, does not draw so explicitly on the resources of psychoanalytic theory. 'There is a sense', Stokes writes,

in which every object of the outside world is expressive since we tend to endow natural things, any piece of the environment, with our associations to it, thereby constructing an identity additional to the one generally recognised. At heightened moments anything can gain the aura of a personage. (P. 48)

There will be few who would demur from such a claim about so common and ubiquitous an aspect of human experience — what might be called 'the-man-in-the-moon' syndrome. On the other hand, there are few who want to make much of it. And this is the reason I said that Stokes's argument only prima facie does not draw on psychoanalytic theory. For of course the vanguard amongst the few who attach importance to the-man-in-the-moon syndrome is formed by the psychoanalytically-inclined. Indeed, without the assumption of the importance of the syndrome, and of the way in which the inner world is projected on to the outer, psychoanalysis
could make no headway at all, either theoretically or in therapeutic work with patients.

Stokes, however, goes on to indicate the limitations on the possibility of projection and association with respect to art. He writes,

In art it should not be we who do all the imaginative work in this way. The better we understand art the less of the content we impose, the more becomes communicated. In adopting an aesthetic viewpoint - this, indeed, is a necessary contribution on our part - which we have learned from studying many works of art, we discover that to a considerable extent our attention is confined to the relationship of formal attributes and their image-creating relevance to the subject-matter. The work of art should be to some extent a strait-jacket in regard to the eventual images that it is most likely to induce. (RN 48)

This much is fairly obvious - in fact it is a point which I made much earlier in discussing the lack of congruence between associations to a dream and some putative parallel with associations to a work of art (6). But what is not so obvious, and the point which Stokes wants to make, is that it is in virtue of the image which form itself creates, that projections and associations are bound. Thus, he writes,

Obviously any mode of feeling can be communicated by art, perhaps even by abstract art. Nevertheless the personification of that message in terms of aesthetic form constructs a simulacrum, a presence that qualifies the image of the paramount feeling. That feeling takes to itself as a crowning attribute more general images of experience. Form, then, ultimately constructs an image or figure of which, in art, the expression of particular feeling avails itself. (RN 48)

To illustrate: the reiterated motif in the second movement
of Schubert's posthumous piano sonata in A Major — a particularly poignant phrase — binds us to an image which is quite unlike that which would be induced by setting that same motif in, say, a concerto or a symphony. The paramount feeling in the sonata is, let us say, of tautness and fragility, whereas in a concerto or a symphony it would be likely to occur to us as reassuring and faithful. But this is so in virtue of the particular formal constraints of the sonata which, in bodying forth the poignant motif, offer us an image which allow us to make wider connections in our experience of the world. What comes to us as poignant comes to us in a variety of ways: it may be felt as taut and fragile, as a sudden sharp glimpse into our sensitivity which is too easily lost; or it may be felt as reassuring and faithful, as a reminder of the condition of our sensitivity. The form of the work constructs an image for these possibilities.

To take another, quite different example, Stokes's:

A simple instance lies with Bonnard, with the shape of hats in his time that approximated to the shape of the head and indeed of the breast. He seems to co-ordinate experience largely through an unenvious and loving attitude to this form. (RN/48)

In other words, this particular form in Bonnard's painting, in the particular way in which it is reaffirmed, provides, again, an image which allows us to make wider connections in our experience of the world: in this case it is the
image which the psychoanalyst construes in unconscious phantasy as a prevailing, benign attitude in the infant's introjective identification with his first object, the breast.

I set the two illustrations together deliberately. I suppose it has to be said that the particular example Stokes chooses does not at all indicate that his aesthetic here depends upon the possibility of detecting breast-shaped configurations on the canvas. One writer, Jack J. Spector, in his frequently eccentric work on The Aesthetics of Freud, refers in a mismanaged way to Stokes's aesthetic as 'a theory of the breast' — whatever that might mean — and wonders how plausible it is in application to a painter who produces phallic configurations on his canvas (7). The misunderstanding is of the same order as that which has Freud declaring that any elongated object is a phallic symbol and any round one a breast symbol. Stokes's point is that the recurrence of the Bonnardian form — which happens to be the shape of the breast — and its reaffirmation in a particular manner offers an image, the image of the good breast, under which wide experience is unconsciously co-ordinated. Of course the same breast-shaped form might have manifested itself in an image of the bad breast — an image for the unconscious co-ordination of experience in a dominantly aggressive, plundering manner. But this is just
not how the form is worked in Bonnard's painting. To go back to my own example, which has nothing to do with breast-shaped configurations, the poignancy of the Schubertian motif might well be articulated with greater specificity as inducing the image in sonata form which might manifest itself in unconscious phantasy as the depressive awareness of the imminent danger of losing the good breast and as the acknowledgement of guilt in its loss — the acknowledgement of ambivalence in our sensitivity, and of the way in which our sensitivity can be lost. To work out the example in some such way as this is to provide a greater specificity in appealing to the first symbol which is projected unconsciously on to the outer world — a concrete bodily image for a universal mode of experience.

There are, it seems to me, two notable successes won in Stokes's conception of form. First, while no less formal, the conception is specifically attached to the structure of the inner world, and this as no faint resonance but rather as a peculiarly dense image which is, in its embodiment in the work of art, the only kind of image appropriate to the expression of inner states. The expressiveness of the work of art is thus not at all cut adrift of the actual objecthood of the work, and this so often happens in theories of expression — where, for example, an expressive desire is
imputed to the artist in such a way that the desire appears quite external to the medium in which he works.

The second success is more absolute than relative to competing theories. As I noted in the Prologue, there is a degree of artificiality about a distinction between form and content — a rigidity which can be too restrictive and often too remote from our actual experience of art. It is the peculiar virtue of Stokes's conception of form to circumvent this. As we have seen, throughout his work there is a tendency to embrace more and more of what would more often be thought aspects of the content or contentual image in a work of art and to bring it under the concept of form: the tendency was particularly striking with respect to Stokes's discussion of perspective and colour. And in this the concept of form is already unusually rich. But now, in virtue of the idea that form too constructs an image, we see how form and formal qualities can themselves be thought to associate with feelings and phantasies. And perhaps that feelings and phantasies are more commonly associated with the particular content of art and not the form is most clearly illustrated if we look back to the point of departure in Freud's work: to the idea, as I called it, of a psychoanalytic image in the content of art.

To put Stokes's view in summary, he claims that alongside
specific images which we obtain from the content or subject of art, there is a more generalised imagery to be obtained from the form: namely, a body-image, in whatever particular way this might be reconstructed. But since the body-image is the image of the general structure of the mind, it is in this way that the work of art can be thought so significant a projection of the human condition: namely, as a projection of the vicissitudes of the mind. In the first pages of my discussion of Stokes's conception of the emblematic foundation of art I noted a remark which, I suggested, constitutes the principle on which Stokes's entire work is predicated. That the suggestion was proper is, I hope, apparent in the naturalness of saying once more, with forty years of Stokes's work between, and with the full force of psychoanalytic thought as an ally, that, indeed,

The process of living is an externalisation, a turning outward into definite form of inner ferment. Hence the mirror to living which art is, hence the significance of art... (QC 15)

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There is one further, and final, aesthetic matter to which I should like to return, and it will perhaps serve to knit together the multiple themes, not only in Stokes's work,
but also in the aesthetic enterprise of writing of the inner structure of our experience of art and of the representation of mind in art.

As I remarked in the Prologue, a primary difficulty for the aesthetcian seems to me to lie in the need to construct a unitary point of view out of three quite fundamental concerns: first, a concern with the artist's experience of his work; second, a concern with the spectator's experience of his work; and third, a concern with the objecthood of the work of art. And, as I pointed out, in talking of the inner structure of our experience of art — in talking of our subjectivity with respect to art — it is the concerns with the artist and spectator which tend to prevail. But despite the emphasis in what has been discussed on the subjective inner world — and indeed that part of the inner world which lies beyond the grasp of consciousness — the tendency to evade proper acknowledgement of the objecthood of art has been diverted.

In the first place, the psychoanalytic picture of the inner world which has figured in the discussion is one which, I have often pointed out, gives supreme weight to the corporeality of the inner world — to the projection of inner states in corporeally-saturated phantasy. And in the second place, Stokes's work might well be construed as a
natural complement to the psychoanalytic picture. For, from the first, and before the invocation of psychoanalytic insight, Stokes had precisely been concerned to show that all art has the externality and objecthood of a body.

But if the concerns with artist and spectator are thus secured without the price that is aesthetically paid for idealism, then what remains is the question, which I discussed briefly at the end of the previous chapter, of how far the concern with the artist is secured without the cost of neglecting the concern with the spectator, or vice versa.

In my earlier remarks on the issue, I wanted to suggest that Stokes's contrast of carving and modelling themes in art could be viewed in the end indifferently through the eyes of the artist or the spectator, though it is true that the contrast was originally rooted in contrasting techniques and attitudes of the artist. The contrast had a flexibility which accommodated both points of view, that is to say, in virtue of the artist's and spectator's sharing a commonly structured inner world which is projected in a variety of ways in the work of art. The suggestion might now, I think, be reaffirmed more confidently.

Art, it has been argued, projects an image of ego-integration, a (bodily) image for the co-ordination of exper-
ience. But it would, at this point, be inane to ask whose ego, artist's or spectator's, is integrated in the projected image. No less than the spectator is imaginatively bound by the form which the artist creates, the artist is bound by what Stokes had called his 'meagre repertory' of forms — by the institutional character of art, as I argued earlier. The spectator does not freely project himself on to the work of art, and neither does the artist: or else he is no spectator of art, and no artist. What each confronts is an image for the co-ordination of widely-shared experience within the general human condition: of love and hate, of reassurance and persecution, of atonement with the world and separateness from it, of loss and restoration — of temps perdu and temps retrouvé as Proust put it in that most penetrating of explorations in the underworld of the imagination. The image has a face all right, but it is, as Stokes had put it much earlier, 'the face of mankind'.

'Of course', Stokes rightly points out, 'there would be nothing to art could it be exercised in despite of temperament' (PI 6). That is in part why, I think, we can come to regard certain works of art as flawed in their very perfection (sometimes a feeling engendered by the anonymity of classical art); as vacuous in their very stylishness (sometimes a feeling engendered by contemporary fiction);
what we have in mind in accusing an artist of having 'sold out' (often an accusation levelled at playwrights and film-directors, for whom box-office riches seem so irresistible a temptation). Stokes adds,

Not even the framework ordained by culture can be used to contrive for aesthetic expression a rule of thumb; though his working in a settled style will cloak it thickly, the artist has needed his temperament. (PI 6)

We, too, have needed the artist's temperament, not, as it were, naked, but rather as the distinctive couture for his embodied art. And above all, for the very fact of his art: for the springs of his compulsion to create lie in his temperament.

The thought here catches at one last theme: the reparative, restorative aspect of art and aesthetic experience. But if it is true of the artist that temperamentally he stands under a stronger compulsion than most to make reparation, again and again to restore a whole object which was felt as lost and damaged, this does not mean to say that the whole object restoration of his work is efficacious for the artist alone. For we all share in his need to make reparation for loss and destruction (unless we be unremittingly psychotic). The work of art comes to be the occasion of vicarious reparation, so to speak: in this lies our feeling of the permanent encouragement of art, of its beneficence and palliation. (It is perhaps worth saying that
to feel art as persecutory is to be mad or maddened: the destruction of art rightly induces a sense of horror which is no effete delicacy: witness the world's response to the maniac's shattering Michelangelo's _Pieta_ with a hammer, or to another's gashing Rembrandt's _Night Watch_ with a knife, or to the savaging of art in wars and revolutions.)

But, one needs to add, if we find in great art the occasion of vicarious reparation, it is also painfully evident that for most of us the acknowledgement of loss and destruction and ugliness - the condition of reparation - is too rarely something we achieve with the punctillious courage and astuteness of the great artist. We are not, regrettably, Leonardo's. But to aspire to his condition is no less to aspire to the perfectibility of the human than to aspire to the perfectibility of art.

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Adrian Stokes was himself both a painter and a poet of distinction. It is just, then, that a poem, 'Private View'(8), should serve as an eminently fit conclusion.

These faces known
Some spoken into
Over forty years.

Thereby ageing them a little more
Paintings look back
Add customary weight
Of new experience.

The clear-cut artist
Or is he here? — it makes no difference —
Speaks more candidly
Than we have done to one another
Whose voices will not cease to grope
Or flourish an impertinence.
We ourselves don't work as valued art.
So each year gaps occur upon the wall of time
Thefts calmly viewed as if by sharp custodians.
NOTES

Complete description of the works cited will be found in the Bibliography. Notes are arranged by chapter.

PROLOGUE


(3) Oscar Wilde, 'The Portrait of Mr W.H.' in The Artist As Critic, Critical Writings of Oscar Wilde (1968), ed Richard Ellman, p 209.

(4) As Michael Podro puts it in his study of the Kantian aesthetic tradition, The Manifold in Perception, ideas developed in that tradition are more often discussed 'in literature stemming from psychoanalytic thought rather than academic philosophy' (1972, p 124n). Those works in contemporary aesthetics which I have found most illuminating are Richard Wollheim's Art and Its Objects (1968) and On Art and the Mind (1973), and Stanley Cavell's Must We Mean What We Say? (1969) and The World Viewed (1971).


(6) vide Michael Fried, 'Art and Objecthood' in Minimal Art (1968), ed Gregory Battcock, p 136n. It is from Fried's essay that I borrow the term 'objecthood', though I mean something more general than Fried.

(7) I am not maintaining here that a work of art is a physical object, only that it is an object with sensible dimensions. Clearly Schubert's Der Tod und das Mädchen is not a physical object, but it is an object with sensible dimensions: we identify it as the object which it is in virtue of its aural configurations.
(7) (Cont) Once this distinction is clear, the source of one objection to the claim that all art has a specific form of objecthood is cut away. There remains the difficulty - a general one - of determining the exact nature of the objecthood of a literary work of art in particular. Each of the sensible dimensions of a literary work might appear to be parasitic upon the physical objecthood of the copy, and, notoriously, the work of art which is, say, Proust's novel is not identical with my copy of the work (since I can destroy my copy without destroying the work of art). The argument cuts both ways, however. Assuming Maugham's dictum that a short story has a beginning, a middle and an end, for example, clearly if I tear out the first pages of 'Rain' the story does not thereby cease to have a beginning. The question is, where is the beginning? Certainly not 'in Maugham's mind'; certainly not 'in the readers' minds'. I want to say that it is a function of the object which the story is, but that of course still leaves the question of what kind of object the story is.

The issue is perplexing and distracting, and I shall generally not refer to examples of literary art in the course of the essay for reasons of economy. My own inclination is to argue that a literary work reconstructs a sensible world, and that its objecthood is a function of the visual, tactile and aural dimensions of that world. In other words, a literary work creates, as it were, an 'artistic space' which is the analogue of the three-dimensional space created in a two-dimensional painting.


I 1 ART AND NEUROSIS

(1) vide Richard Wollheim, Freud (1971), pp 140-150.


(4) Trilling (1950), p 169.


(7) Richard Wollheim has suggested that Freud thought of himself a belonging 'in a pantheon of the human race' along with such figures as Leonardo, and that 'he wrote about Leonardo in much the same spirit as later, at one of the dark moments of European civilisation, he wrote to Einstein' (Richard Wollheim, 'Freud and the Understanding of Art' in Wollheim, On Art and the Mind (1973), p 205. Jack J. Spector argues that Freud wrote about Leonardo because 'he identifies with the problems of Leonardo' (Spector, The Aesthetics of Freud (1973), p 35).

(8) vide I 2 'Art and Dream', pp 65-71.


I 2 ART AND DREAM

(1) Ernest Jones (1955), Volume III, p 251. The occasion of Freud's remark was a letter to Zweig thanking him for an introduction to Salvador Dali, of whom Freud made an exception in his general opinion of the Surrealists.
I 3 ART AND THE JOKE

There are two points here. First, Freud was aware that his inductive procedures in reviewing a large number of jokes gave no final authority to his conclusion about the identity of the joke-work and dream-work. He claimed merely to have found "the commonest, most important and most characteristic methods of joking" (SE VIII 167), and confirmation, or disconfirmation, of that conclusion would require as extensive a review of jokes as Freud's. Second, that such a review would be a solemn labour is a peculiar fact about theoretical studies of the joke: there is no better way to represent a joke as quite unfunny, and that rather destroys the point of the exercise.
Although Freud wrote at one point that Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious was conceived 'only from the economic point of view' (SE XXI 161), this is thoroughly misleading. In the first place, Freud was no longer concerned with the original idea of there being an absolute economy in the mental apparatus (vide SE VIII 156); and he is aware that the relative economies brought about in joking are in themselves minimal and are, moreover, relative to a sense of expected and customary expenditure of energy (vide SE VIII 157).

Second, and more generally, the distracting issue for my purposes is that the earlier economic theory, while it is plausible enough in connection with instinctual energies, is unsuited to an account of the non-instinctual activities of the ego, and I am arguing that it is such an account which (proleptically) emerges in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious.

Freud to Stefan Zweig, 20 July 1938. The letter is translated by Ernst Gombrich and quoted in his essay on 'Freud's Aesthetics' in Encounter (January 1966), pp 34-35.

Gombrich (1966), p 36.

Gombrich (1966), p 35.

Gombrich (1966), p 35.


Richard Wollheim (1975), ms p 16.

II INTRODUCTION

vide I 2 'Art and Dream', pp 68-69.
II 1 FREUD'S THEORY OF MIND


II 2 MELANIE KLEIN'S THEORY OF MIND

(1) Note that what is at issue is the baby's pleasure in sucking or biting, not the activities themselves.


(4) Segal (1952), p 401. Segal does not identify the source of her quotation.

(5) Segal (1975), p 801.

(6) Segal (1952), p 404.

(7) Segal (1952), p 399-400.

(8) Segal (1975), p 800.

III INTRODUCTION


(2) Richard Wollheim, 'Adrian Stokes' in Wollheim (1973), p 331. The essay is originally the introduction to The Image in Form (1972), ed Wollheim, but my practice is always to quote from Wollheim (1973).
III 1 THE OBJECTHOOD OF ART


(2) vide II 1 'Freud's Theory of Mind', pp 167-168.

(3) vide Heinrich Wölfflin, Principles of Art History (1950), passim.

III 2 ART AND THE REPRESENTATION OF MIND

(1) Maurice Bowra, The Greek Experience (London 1957); quoted by Stokes at GC 8.

(2) vide Freud, SE XXI 64-5, 72.


(4) vide III 1 'The Objecthood of Art', pp 269-270.

(5) Doubtless Bell and Fry were influential in drawing attention to the importance of form in art, and though Stokes had little respect for either, clearly he would have felt their influence as his immediate predecessors in the English aesthetic tradition. What is more to the point is that, in my view, it was only when the tradition moved up the road to Hampstead from Bloomsbury that there was any advance upon what Fry had at one point referred to as 'this vague adumbration of the nature of significant form' (Roger Fry, 'Retrospect' in Vision and Design (1961), p 236).

(6) vide I 2 'Art and Dream', pp 63-64.


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