

THE HIDDEN RULE OF WOMEN

THE HIDDEN RULE OF WOMEN  
A STUDY OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU'S  
UNDERSTANDING OF WOMEN

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis is a response to the contemporary controversy concerning whether Rousseau's view of women is chauvinistic or radical in nature. These critiques remain inadequate guides to a clarification of his view since they disregard the tensions which permeate his perspective and they concentrate, instead, on assessing his treatment of women on the basis of preestablished frameworks of thought. Rousseau presents two arguments: first, he describes women as being powerless and suitable only for a home life; and secondly, he argues that better education should be extended to women because this would benefit society. If Rousseau's view is chauvinistic, why would he advocate measures to improve the situation of women and how would this benefit society? Alternatively, if his theory is radical, why would he argue that women be deprived of social power? This thesis will clarify Rousseau's view of women and show that the tension existing in his perspective is caused by his attempt to conceal a special role for women; one which makes them active social participants.

This analysis, then, will examine his perspective on women in relation to his views on men and society. Proceeding in this manner is beneficial because: it provides a theoretical framework within which his treatment of women can be better understood; and it reveals Rousseau's account of male psychology, and his view of women cannot be understood without this; and it facilitates the comparison of the situation of women and social

practices. This comparison is quite significant since it reveals the similarities between the role of women and that of the Legislator, and since it is from these similarities that Rousseau reveals his assertion that women are the actual, albeit covert, rulers of society. Rousseau, however, is not entirely radical; his view of women is radical in its aim, but it remains essentially chauvinistic.

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## INTRODUCTION

The political and social theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau has become the object of much analysis by contemporary theorists, who are specifically concerned with ascertaining the precise nature, and the implications, of his view of women and their role in society. From this study, most feminist theorists have concluded that Rousseau's view of women must be categorized as a traditionally male chauvinistic perspective. The basis for this assertion is founded in a number of Rousseau's propositions: first, since there are biological differences between men and women, women's functions must lie solely in child-bearing and -rearing activities; secondly, because these types of distinctions exist, women must be confined to the private sphere and as such, they are to be denied access to direct political/social institutions; thirdly, women are considered to be the private chattels of men; and lastly, due to their lesser physical abilities, women become the objects of the males' desire for power. In short, the egalitarian principles which are evident in the relations between men in Rousseau's theory of social relations are not applicable to the relations between women and men, nor to the relationship between women and their society.

Despite the pervasiveness of this feminist perspective,



there are a few theorists who claim that Rousseau's view of the relations between men and women are evidence of how nonexploitative associations between the sexes can be achieved. In short, the interdependence created by human sexuality within the family generates the possibility of establishing an egalitarian society. The basis for this assertion can be found in a number of Rousseau's postulates: first, women, by virtue of the biological differences between the sexes, perform an essential and humanly necessary function which is as important as economic production; secondly, despite the confinement of women to the home, they are not deprived of influence in society; thirdly, although there are natural differences between men and women, they share a basic human equality; and lastly, both men and women can cooperate with each other without exploiting one another.

According to these two very different perspectives, Rousseau can be designated as either a male chauvinist or as a radical theorist. Rousseau's theory can be used to substantiate both of these diverse claims. For example, on the one hand, Rousseau asserts that women, who should be passive and weak, must be confined to the home and only men should participate in the public sphere. On the other hand, he defends the extension of better education to women since this would become socially beneficial. Although Rousseau is most often considered to be a male chauvinist who advocates a traditional patriarchal society, it is unusual that he would defend the extension of education to women. If Rousseau's view is

chauvinistic, why would he advocate measures which would invariably improve the lot of women and how would this be socially beneficial? Alternatively, if Rousseau's theory is radical in its aim, why was it necessary to confine women to the home? At first sight, it is uncertain whether the divergence evident between these two interpretations is due to an inconsistency within Rousseau's theory itself, or whether it is caused by the inadequacy of these categories when applied to his theory, or whether the inconsistencies are the result of Rousseau's attempt to conceal a hidden role or concern for women.

In this study, two hypotheses will be developed in order to reach a more adequate understanding of Rousseau's view of women and to determine whether he was a radical or a chauvinist or a bit of both. The first hypothesis will show that Rousseau believed that the interdependence created by human sexuality generates the possibility for attaining a type of nonexploitative society. This assertion can be substantiated by examining the general characteristics of man and woman from the state of nature, to the transition to society, and the consequences this progression has for both sexes, and to the degeneration of both social and personal relations. The evidence, pursued in this manner, will determine that the nonexploitative relations existing between the sexes is based on the interdependent status of male-female unions. The interdependence of the sexes could then be used to show that the completely dependent condition of women is

misleading. In short, the interdependent status of each sex will be shown to have a more concrete foundation in Rousseau's view rather than merely isolating the dependent condition of women.

The second hypothesis will show that the interdependence, engendered by human sexuality and which creates the possibility for establishing a nonexploitative society, necessitates the influence of women in society. In this way, Rousseau meant to communicate a hidden role which women must perform within social relations. Thus, it will be shown that Rousseau understood women as the driving force behind society and, in essence, the covert rulers of society. In order to substantiate this assertion, it is necessary to examine the way in which Rousseau develops the uniqueness of women from the state of nature, to the establishment of permanent relations between the sexes, and to the degeneration of the conjugal and familial unions. Finally, the significance of women will be revealed in a comparison of their role to that of the legislator. The analysis, proceeding in this way, will shed light on the indirect rule of women and it will lead to an understanding of the exact nature and significance of that rule.

In order to develop these two hypotheses, the examination will proceed in the following manner. Chapter One will provide a critique of the contemporary interpretations of Rousseau's view of women and in this way, the weaknesses of these critiques will reveal the controversial or problematical areas in Rousseau's theory. The second chapter will analyze

Rousseau's view of the general characteristics of human beings in the state of nature and the applicability of these features to the condition of women, in that state, in particular. This examination will establish the similarities between the sexes and how women develop in a unique way which sets them apart from men. Chapter Three will be devoted to an examination of the relations between men and those between men and women in both the "Golden Era" and in the ideal republic. This analysis will show, first, that the conceptual knowledge developed in women in the state of nature allow them to initiate social relations; and secondly, it will reveal, in part, the relationship between the family and society, and that the factor which connects these two institutions is the role of women. The fourth chapter will concentrate on examining the parallel developments between the corruption of social and personal relations. The aim of this chapter will be to, first, establish the relationship between the familial and social units, and secondly, to reveal that women have a great deal of power or influence in the degeneration of both conjugal and civil societies. Chapter Five will examine the inadequacies of the sexual division of labour, postulated by Rousseau, with particular concern for the consequences of that division for the situation of women. This analysis, in turn, will establish the exact nature of the influence of women and the significance of this influence in the operation of society. The last section of this study will be set aside for concluding remarks on the radical or chauvinistic nature of Rousseau's perspective.

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUES

Generally, there are three types of critiques which attempt to explain Rousseau's understanding of women. The first two critiques shall be called "Psychologism" and "Fragmentary Theoretical Analysis". The remaining critique does not fit into either of these two categories and in fact, it is difficult to find an adequate title to convey the exact nature of the problems that this type of critique involves. Since the last commentary refers solely to the recent interpretation of Rousseau's view of human sexuality, written by Joel Schwartz, it may be useful to simply call it the Joel Schwartz critique. It is necessary to examine these commentaries not merely because these are the current interpretations of Rousseau's understanding of women, but also because these critiques do not fully explicate the theoretical bases for his view or in the attempt to explain the theoretical bases, a number of interpretive problems are created. The first view does not attempt to render a theoretical analysis at all, and the second perspective isolates only certain aspects of Rousseau's theory, often without adequate explanation. In fact, the second view emphasizes solely one of his theoretical bases, his theory of social relations, thereby disregarding his theory of nature. Further, only certain

manifestations of his social theory are considered, and these pertain to the dependent condition of women. These manifestations are examined in isolation of other situations of dependence in Rousseau's theory of society, those which refer to the dependent condition of men and children. Instead of isolating the situation of women in order to determine the degree of their dependency, their condition can be better assessed in relation to the dependency of men and children. In short, these critiques lack an adequate theoretical analysis of Rousseau's understanding of women, as it is manifested both in his theory of nature and in his theory of social relations. Although the last perspective, Joel Schwartz's critique, does render a complete theoretical analysis, the interpretation evident in this view is often problematical since the implications of Rousseau's view are not examined to their fullest and since the conclusions reached in this perspective are sometimes contradictory to Rousseau's basic postulates. In order to explore these weaknesses, these perspectives must be considered in greater detail.

The view called "psychologism" attempts to assess Rousseau's understanding of women on the basis of his own personal relationships with women. In this way, some critics have examined his autobiographical works in order to assert that Rousseau's need to subordinate women, evident in his account of the transition from the state of nature to the state of society, is based on his own unsuccessful physical and emotional involvements with women. Victor G. Wexler states:

It is hardly surprising that the unifying pattern of Rousseau's adult relationships with women was his refusal to be totally committed to them, to love and to esteem the woman concerned. He would, in general, either fall desperately in love but isolate himself from a sexual experience or give into his sexual compulsions, regarding the woman as a non-entity. Rousseau needed to escape from any total engagement of the passions. Using a variety of excuses, he managed to avoid the very relationship he feared would have killed him.<sup>1</sup>

He concludes that Rousseau's own inability to have a successful relationship with a woman made him fear all women, and this fear caused Rousseau to advocate the subordination of women in his theory of social relations. Hence, Wexler writes:

Rousseau's adventures or misadventures with the women he loved, or tried to love, illuminate his personal fear of women- which helps to explain why his theory of education slights women and how his fictional treatment of female nature exaggerates their emotional influence on men.<sup>2</sup>

Since Wexler asserts that the influence women have over men is merely a manifestation of Rousseau's own fear of women, he shows that he does not seriously consider Rousseau's assertion that women can be powerful. Not only does Wexler conclude that Rousseau's understanding of women is a consequence of his own inadequacies with women, he also manages to dismiss the importance of women in Rousseau's theory.

Susan Moller Okin views Rousseau's personal experiences in much the same light as does Wexler. Okin claims that Rousseau's writings reveal that women aroused sexual feelings in him, thereby making him feel afraid and guilty, and

also creating a threat to his independence and self-sufficiency.<sup>3</sup> Again, this view emphasizes Rousseau's own inadequacies in handling an emotional and sexual relationship with a woman. However, Okin would not agree with Wexler's assertion, based on his own understanding of Rousseau's perspective, that women do not have an influence over men. She concludes, on the basis of Rousseau's interaction with women, that since he believed women to be powerful, they must be subordinated in order to retain male superiority.<sup>4</sup>

Although Wexler and Okin reach different conclusions, their evidence is based on psychological inferences about the inadequacies Rousseau felt in his relationships with women. However, there are some problems with this type of perspective. First, the Wexler-Okin outlook is too general in application. Hence, it might make more sense to argue that Rousseau's inadequacies with women could have been caused by his motherless youth which would make women strange to him. In this way, his own relationships with women and their failures could have been the result of Rousseau's need to find a mother image. The fact that he referred to Madame de Warens as "Mama" would substantiate this interpretation. However, this objection aside, the Okin-Wexler perspective may explain, in part at least, some of Rousseau's relationships, but it is not applicable to the most important relationship that he experienced; that is, his relationship with Madame de Warens. Concerning the intimacy he shared with Madame de Warens, Rousseau wrote:



My soul, whose most precious faculties my organs had not developed, still had no fixed form. It awaited, with a sort of impatience, the moment which would give it that form. This moment, accelerated by our encounter, did not, however, come at once. And due to the simplicity of manners which education had given me, I saw this delicious but fleeting state, in which love and innocence inhabit the same heart prolonged in me for a long time. She had sent me away. Everything called me back to her. Ah! if I had sufficed for her heart as she sufficed for mine, what peaceful and delightful days we might have spent together! We did pass such days but how short and fleeting they were, and what a destiny followed them.<sup>5</sup>

In this paragraph, Rousseau reveals the depths of his love for Madame de Warens. Although he does admit that he could not satisfy her as she satisfied him, he does not convey an overwhelming impression of fear or guilt in his "lack of success" in this relationship. Further, he says nothing to indicate that this union would have prospered had he been able to subjugate or subordinate her will to his. Instead, he indicates, in the passage immediately following the above, that this relationship allowed him to be himself and that he desired to elevate and emulate Madame de Warens, not to subjugate her will. Thus, Rousseau writes:

No day passes but what I recall with joy and tenderness this unique and brief time of my life when I was myself, fully, without admixture and without obstacle, and when I can truly say that I lived. ...Without this short but precious time, I would perhaps have remained uncertain about myself. For, weak and without resistance all the rest of my life, I have been so troubled, tossed about, plagued

by the passions of others that almost, passive in such a stormy life, I would have difficulty in unravelling what there is of my own conduct. To such an extent hard necessity has unremittingly borne down upon me. But during those years, loved by a woman full of desire to please and of gentleness, I did what I wanted to do, I was what I wanted to be; and through the use I made of my leisure, aided by her lessons and example, I was able to give my still simple and new soul the form which better suited it and which it has always kept.<sup>6</sup>

According to Rousseau, this relationship, although unsuccessful, in that it did not result in a permanent coupling, was beneficial to his personal development; he was able to be his natural self with a woman. Further, Madame de Warens served as an example for him to follow, and this factor enabled him not only to develop, but also to exercise his freedom and individuality. Thus, Rousseau acknowledges the influence a woman had on his life without being fearful of that influence and endangering his natural self. On these bases, Rousseau considers this relationship as a personal success despite the fact that it did not result in a permanent union.

The limited applicability of the "psychologism" critique will become more evident in Rousseau's assertion of the factors which are necessary for him to have a successful or fulfilling relationship with a woman:

Fondness for solitude and contemplation arose in my heart along with the expansive and tender feelings made to be its nutriment. Tumult and noise constrict and stifle them; calm and peace restore and exalt them. I need to collect myself in order to love. I induced "Mama" [Madame de Warens] to

live in the country. An isolated house on the slope of a valley was our refuge; and there, for a period of four or five years, I enjoyed a century of life and a pure and full happiness which covers with its charm everything dreadful in my present lot. I needed a friend suited to my heart; I possessed her. I had longed for the country; I obtained it. I could not bear subjection; I was perfectly free and better than free, for bound only by my affections, I did only what I wanted to do. All my time was filled with loving concerns or rustic occupations. I desired nothing but the continuation of such an enjoyable situation. My only worry was the fear it might not last for long; and this fear, born of the instability of our situation, was not without foundation.

Thus, the factors contributing to Rousseau's successful relationship with Madame de Warens were peaceful and isolated surroundings, which expand and intensify emotive capacities; a woman with a nature suitable to his own; freedom and independence; and security, in this case financial stability.<sup>8</sup> For Rousseau to be content in a relationship, these factors must be present. The Okin-Wexler perspective does not consider factors other than fear or guilt in assessing Rousseau's understanding of women, on the basis of his own personal experience, and as such, this perspective is limited in applicability.

Apart from the limited applicability of this type of critique, the second problem consists in the inability of Wexler and Okin to realize that Rousseau's own personal relationships may not automatically be reflected in his theoretical concepts that relate to women (as, perhaps, the above statements by Rousseau illustrate). However, if Rousseau did feel

inadequate and feared women, this would not automatically merit the conclusion that his views are weak or unsophisticated.

Instead, the concepts which Rousseau uses to support his view of women should be considered in order to adequately assess his perspective. By not examining the theoretical bases of his view, this type of critique detracts from Rousseau's credibility as a political theorist.

The second type of critique, "fragmentary theoretical analysis", is based on the examination of only one of Rousseau's theoretical constructs, his theory of social relations, and this analysis is used to establish a theoretical framework to explicate the manifestations of social relations. One main interpretation of the reasons why Rousseau advocates the subordination of women, concentrates on the maternal role and its importance. This type of perspective examines the confinement of women to the home and attempts to explain why he does so. Ron Christenson suggests that Rousseau advocates the confinement of women to the home so that men may participate in social activities. Underlying this proposition is Christenson's belief that Rousseau had no other alternative but to confine women to the home in order to ensure that women would take care of the private sphere, while men provide for the public sphere.<sup>9</sup> In reaching this conclusion, Christenson assumes that Rousseau's sexual division of labour is absolute, having no overlapping functions. It is not sufficiently clear whether the sexual division of spheres, according to Rousseau, is this stringent. In fact, Rousseau may not have attempted to make

this division as absolute as Christenson believes.

In depriving women of political power, Christenson believes that Rousseau meant to emphasize three considerations. First, he asserts that Rousseau establishes the inability of women to rule and as such, they must be ruled.<sup>10</sup> Secondly, Christenson justifies this assertion on the basis of Rousseau's statement that women have private-regarding motives, while men alone are capable of having public-regarding intentions.<sup>11</sup> Lastly, he asserts that Rousseau believes that the inequality of women is not based on laws created by men, but on reason.<sup>12</sup>

However, there are problems with these assertions. First, Christenson does not explain why Rousseau ostensibly thought that women are incapable of ruling, and why, therefore, they must be ruled. As such, this leaves unexplained how Rousseau could treat women as capable of self-governance in the state of nature. In order to obtain a full understanding of the inability of women to rule, which Christenson emphasizes, the apparent discrepancy between this and Rousseau's view of women in the state of nature must be explored. Secondly, Christenson does not explicate why women are capable only of private-regarding motives and why, thus, they must be confined to the private sphere. This assertion is directly contrary, first, to Rousseau's belief that women are more subjected to the natural sentiment of pity, an other-regarding inclination, than are men.<sup>13</sup> Also, Christenson's view that women are incapable of ruling would not be well-founded if Rousseau's description of the independent status of natural

woman is applicable to women in society as well. Further, Christenson's interpretation relies on the complete separation of the private and public spheres. This type of absolutist separation may not be achievable given the nature of human beings, and Rousseau may have recognized this impossibility when he considered the influence that women can have on men and hence, on society.<sup>14</sup> Lastly, Christenson's statement that the inequality of women is based on reason and not on laws made by men is not well-founded. In making this assertion, Christenson suggests that man did not try to subjugate women; but rather, that this subjection is based on reason and this is, in some respect, the result of a natural phenomena. Christenson's perspective contradicts Rousseau's assertion of the equality between men and women, and the independence of women in the state of nature. Subordination was not a natural condition in the state of nature,<sup>15</sup> and it is doubtful that Rousseau meant to establish this in society. Further, Rousseau maintains that rape, one form of subjection, is contrary to both nature and reason.<sup>16</sup>

In general, Christenson examines the dependent condition of women in society and attempts to explicate the theoretical bases that sustain these conclusions. However, his view is not adequate because his conclusions are often contradictory to Rousseau's description of the condition of women in the state of nature. In examining only the dependent condition of women in society, Christenson's view lacks analysis of some of the guiding principles that Rousseau postulates for social

relations and of Rousseau's theory of nature. As such, the power of Rousseau's argument is not recognized and his strength as a political theorist is not fully appreciated.

Lynda Lange, like Christenson, also concentrates on the maternal role and its significance, and the confinement of women to the home in order to explicate why Rousseau believes that women should be subordinate. Lange argues that Rousseau stresses a woman's place in the home on the grounds that the family is the only suitable refuge for social beings:

Indeed, the little society of the family is the only bulwark against the larger society, the only thing that gives him any hope of a humanly satisfying life removed from the larger society. But Rousseau argues for this to succeed the sexes cannot be equal.<sup>17</sup>

Lange suggests that Rousseau views the family as a means through which, people can escape from the pressures of social interaction, and as such, it can serve only as a vehicle which provides personal satisfaction.

Rousseau's view of the harmonious interaction among members of the household may indicate that the family unit has greater social importance than Lange's suggestion attributes to it. According to Rousseau, the family facilitates the learning and the practice of those responsibilities which are also necessary for peaceful coexistence and cooperation in civil society:

A small number of good-natured people, united by their mutual wants and reciprocal benevolence, concur by their different employments in promoting the same end; every one finding in his situation all that is requisite to content-

ment, and not desiring to change it, applies himself as if he thought to stay there all his life; the only ambition among them being that of properly discharging their respective duties. There is so much moderation in those who command, and so much zeal in those who obey, that equals might agree to distribute the same employments among them, without any one having reason to complain of his lot. No one envies that of another; no one thinks of augmenting his fortune, but by adding to the common good; the master and mistress estimating their own happiness by that of their domestics and the people about them.<sup>18</sup>

According to this passage, all members within the household are exposed to the practice of those social responsibilities necessary for the operation of society and the interaction of its citizens. Further, Rousseau maintains that the parents are obliged to teach their children "...those ideas which are relative to the state and condition of humanity, and those which relate to their duty... ." <sup>19</sup> For this reason, the family in Rousseau's theory may be considered an intimate unit in which the socialization of family members begins.<sup>20</sup> This is not to say that the family cannot be used as, and that Rousseau did not mean it to be, a refuge; but rather, to assert that perhaps the family has greater social importance than Lange's interpretation suggests. Rousseau may have meant the family to be a smaller, more intimate unit which would facilitate the learning of social duties. This would make the socialization process much easier to bear and much more easily acceptable because everyone learns in an environment of mutual affection and common aspirations. This view is founded on



Rousseau's belief that the family is the first social grouping, and its foundations can be traced initially to the state of nature.<sup>21</sup> Perhaps the family unit is, in part, the concept which unites the theory of nature with the theory of social relations.

Lange's view diminishes the importance that Rousseau asserts women have within the family unit. This significance, however, is recognized by other commentators on Rousseau's perspective of familial life. Merle Perkins suggests that women, according to Rousseau, provide the incentive for self-sacrifice among family members and as such, they furnish an example which could teach the children that self-interest will not sustain harmonious interaction. Perkins writes:

Julie, the feminine principle of pitié, is the nucleus of this group. In her and in all true women, according to Rousseau, amour de soi, the faculty to struggle, survive and resist is not dominant. Rather, ego expresses itself in the form of love, an instinct hard to distinguish from the pitié which is their essential feminine trait.<sup>22</sup>

Since women, according to Perkin's understanding of Rousseau's view, are characterized by love and pity, they provide an example of self-sacrifice which may become important for the sustenance of the harmonious relations among family members. Lange's suggestion that the family's importance lies in people's desires to escape rules out any significant contributions women may make for the sustenance of the family. The sustaining role of women becomes even more important the more the family unit resembles the social unit, or the more that

familial practices parallel social customs.<sup>23</sup> In short, Lange's view denies any influence the family may have on the social structure and instead, treats it as a refuge devoid of any real social significance. In denying the significance of the role of the family, as well as the importance of women in fulfilling that role, Lange's view suggests a complete separation of family or private life from social existence, a conclusion which is contradictory to the theoretical bases by which Rousseau unites the family and society.

Further, Lange states that the view of the family espoused by Rousseau, considered as a refuge, necessitates an inequality between the sexes. However, the protective function of the family unit need not be responsible for the inequality between the sexes. Lange's perspective does not consider Rousseau's premise of natural inequalities which differentiate between men, men and women, the old and the young, the sick and the healthy.<sup>24</sup> Rousseau's view implies that no matter what role the family fulfills, there will be inequalities among the sexes. The protective role of the family may enhance these inequalities, but the differences between men and women exist outside of this type of concern. Lange's perspective does not examine the natural bases for inequalities and the emergence of the family, but considers only one of the social outcomes of Rousseau's view- sexual differentiation within the family and the dependence of women on men. In this way, her perspective is limited in scope and application.

Some believe that Rousseau advocates the subordination

of women on the basis that men are sexually dependent on them. This implies a vindictive side to Rousseau's view of the male-female relationship. For example, Susan Moller Okin writes:

...if men were going to be sexually dependent on women, he wanted to make sure that there were all kinds of ways in which women were dependent on men.<sup>25</sup>

However, this view is, in some respects, narrow for it attempts to assess Rousseau's motives, and these are never clearly revealed by him. Further, Okin considers only the dependence of women on men as being of any great significance, and she does not attempt to reconcile this with other important manifestations of dependency relations in society. In particular, she does not recognize the mutual dependence that the advent of the family could create. As Schwartz points out,

the family puts an end to their freedom. Within its confines human beings come to depend on one another sexually.<sup>26</sup>

Okin's view dismisses the possibility of attaining a mutual form of dependence within the family. Further, what is missing in her view is an analysis of the dependent condition of women as compared to the dependent situation of men on women and of people in general in relation to society. Without attempting to understand the affects of dependency relations for men and for human beings in society, the dependence of women becomes exaggerated. If the dependent situation of women is isolated from other manifestations of dependence, as Okin's perspective requires, a distorted impression of Rousseau's theory of social relations is created.

Another explanation for the confinement of women to the home is based on the consequences that the sexual union has for women. Lange writes:

Rousseau says for example, that women are naturally more timid and cautious about sex than men because from a strictly biological point of view, the consequences for them are greater. But in the next passage he quickly descends to the expression of what sounds like a primitive fear of woman's sexuality.<sup>27</sup>

Lange may be correct in assuming that the consequences of the sexual union are greater for women- men cannot become pregnant. However, it is not entirely certain whether Rousseau actually believed that women "are naturally more timid and cautious about sex". Lange's view does not take into account the sexual practices of women and men in the state of nature. In the natural condition, Rousseau does not describe women as naturally "more timid and cautious about sex". Although women are not depicted as unlimited seekers of sexual satisfaction, they engage in sexual activities rarely and only when the need arises.<sup>28</sup> If Rousseau's theory of social relations follows consistently from his theory of natural relations between the sexes, there is no reason to conclude, as does Lange, that women are timid and cautious about their sexuality. Although it may be argued that women in the natural condition are not aware of the biological consequences of sex which could make them more cautious and timid, it is also conceivable that women, with the development of their memories and imaginative capacities, may become capable of understanding the consequences of sexual activity.<sup>29</sup> If this suggestion has a basis in Rousseau's

theory, then Lange's argument would not be applicable to his view of women.

In general, the main shortcoming of those perspectives, which are based on the maternal role and its importance and subsequently the confinement of women to the home, is their limited theoretical analysis. Primarily, these views examine only one aspect of Rousseau's theoretical bases, the dependence of women in the male-female union, and they attempt to give to these manifestations of Rousseau's theory of social relations explanations which prove to be incompatible with his basic postulates and specifically, his theory of mankind in the natural state. By considering only particular manifestations of his theory of social relations, a distorted perspective of Rousseau's writing is established.

The last type of critique consists of the interpretation of Rousseau's view(s) of human sexuality by Joel Schwartz. Although my study depends, to some degree, on Schwartz's perspective, it also departs significantly from his argument. The divergence from his analysis is due to a difference in interpretations of human sexuality in the state of nature and the principles which underly this phenomenon, and a difference in the understanding of the implications of sexual relations between men and women. Schwartz postulates two sexual teachings based on Rousseau's view(s) of human sexuality. The first teaching, Schwartz maintains, involves the heightening of the distinctions between the sexes, and their mutual dependence, which could be utilized for the political betterment of

mankind<sup>30</sup>, since

...we can achieve freedom through sexuality, or that sexual energy, directing us toward one another physically, can be manipulated so as to enable us to depend upon one another politically as well; from sexuality we can learn to cooperate with one another without exploiting one another.<sup>31</sup>

Although this hypothesis is common to this study as well, Schwartz does not always successfully reconcile this view with some of Rousseau's other statements concerning the sexual relations between the sexes. For example, Rousseau refers to women as the possessions of men,<sup>32</sup> and he indicates that men view the sexual coupling as a conquest or a victory.<sup>33</sup>

Rousseau's statements imply that nonexploitative relations between the sexes are impossible without changing these male attitudes toward sexuality. Schwartz's conclusion, that a nonexploitative society could be established on the principles which guide sexual relations, is not fully convincing because his assertion is contradictory to Rousseau's understanding of women as possessions and as objects for men to conquer.

Schwartz suggests that Rousseau offers a second sexual teaching, which is based on his view that Rousseau criticizes sexual differentiation because it makes society necessary and unavoidable.<sup>34</sup> The second teaching, Schwartz maintains, is founded on

...a vision of a radically individualist autonomy and independence of others, to which Rousseau believed (a few) men but no women could reasonably aspire. The second teaching is thus a critique of

society and of sexuality, both of which lead Rousseau to a critique of femininity.<sup>35</sup>

Rousseau's criticism of women need not suggest, as Schwartz argues, that men, and their lives, should be completely independent of or separate from that of women. This is to say, the criticism of women need not indicate, merely, the necessity for establishing a "radically individualist autonomy and independence of others" as Schwartz claims; but rather, Rousseau could indicate the necessity for measures to harmonize the tensions, existing in men, which impell them to strive for independence and yet to engage in permanent unions with women. In essence, Schwartz asserts that the sexual relations prevalent in the state of nature could lead man to the "good life". Rousseau denies vehemently that the primitive condition and the radical independence of others can become the "good life" for man:

What! must we destroy societies, annihilate thine and mine, and go back to live in forests with bears? A conclusion in the manner of my adversaries, which I prefer to anticipate rather than leave them the shame of drawing it.<sup>36</sup>

This study, contrary to Schwartz's second sexual teaching, proposes that the "Golden Era" is meant to show mankind the way to achieve the "good life".

In order to arrive at these two sexual teachings, Schwartz treats natural independence, which exists in the state of nature, and human interdependence, evident in the "Golden Era", as mutually exclusive terms. This contradicts Rousseau's assertion that some forms of interdependence are beneficial for

the lives of human beings; he does not argue that all forms of interdependence are detrimental to independence.<sup>37</sup> Although Schwartz suggests that sexual relations in the state of nature do not infringe upon the natural independence of the two participants,<sup>38</sup> this can be possible only if natural independence is equivalent to indifference; since indifference would inhibit contact between individuals entirely. Further, since Rousseau views human sexuality in the state of nature as a force which unites the sexes,<sup>39</sup> Schwartz's perspective is not well-founded.

Schwartz's failure either to fully extend the implications of Rousseau's view of sexuality or to understand the indications of some of Rousseau's statements about women in postulating the possibility of attaining nonexploitative relations, and the ill-founded division of Rousseau's perspective of human sexual relations, constitute the major points of divergence, from his assessment, for this study. However, some aspects of his interpretation will be criticized in subsequent arguments, and some facets will be used to support some of the ensuing postulates in this analysis of Rousseau's view of women.

In conclusion, all three critiques are somewhat limited guides to Rousseau's understanding of women. The "psychologism" view does not render a theoretical analysis in order to explain the reasons for Rousseau's perspective on women, but relies, instead, on the unsure foundation of his own inadequacies with women. The "fragmentary theoretical analysis" perspective does not examine either Rousseau's view of women



in nature or the position of men and human beings, in general, in their dependency on women and society. As such, most views indicate that there is a discrepancy between his theory of nature and his theory of society, and thus, they dismiss his view of the natural state without examination. Rousseau more than likely meant his theory of nature seriously and it must be viewed in this light, so that an adequate understanding of his view may be achieved. Further, in isolating the question of the status of women from other manifestations of his theory of social relations, a distorted impression of the entirety of Rousseau's theory is created. The distortion arises when the negative side of women's role in society is emphasized and its positive aspects are not considered. In stressing the positive sides of women's function, it can be determined whether women undergo as radically negative a transformation as do men, and as human beings in society do in general. A comparison of these facets will facilitate a more adequate understanding of Rousseau's view of women. Lastly, in diverging from Schwartz's perspective, it is hoped that the full implications of Rousseau's view of women will become more evident and the apparent inconsistencies within Rousseau's theory will be more easily accounted for. At this point, however, it is necessary to examine Rousseau's theory of the natural relations between the sexes and the condition of women within this state.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE UNIQUENESS OF WOMEN AND HUMAN SEXUALITY IN THE STATE OF NATURE

This chapter will be devoted to an examination of Rousseau's conception of the original state of nature, prior to those developments which make social relations between men and between men and women necessary. The general characteristics that Rousseau describes human beings as having will be analyzed, with particular emphasis on whether these features are applicable to women in this state as well. This will be followed by an examination of that which distinguishes natural woman and her existence from that of natural man. The similarities between the modes of existence of the two sexes, and the principles which underly them may, then, be assessed. This analysis is necessary in order to reach an understanding of the natural basis for the uniqueness of women, which allows Rousseau to treat women differently than men in society. Further, this investigation will help to explicate how consistent the transition from the state of nature to the state of society is.

Natural man's environment was one of abundance.<sup>1</sup> As such, provision for his physical needs was readily available, without one man's subsistence coming into competition with that of others. In this way, natural man was self-sufficient,

depending only on himself, and nature, for his physical subsistence and, hence, he was able to live an independent and solitary existence.<sup>2</sup> Since man did not need to fight with others for the necessities of life, within an environment of scarcity, Rousseau concludes that man in the state of nature can live peaceably with his fellows. Further, the prospect of a peaceable life is assisted by the operation of the natural sentiment of pity<sup>3</sup> and the futility of dominating others in this state.<sup>4</sup>

Further, Rousseau asserts that men, in the original state of nature, are equal. The basis for equality in the natural condition is rooted in the equal subjection of each to the environment, the basic and natural needs which apply to all, and the equal freedom from subjection to the will of others.<sup>5</sup> Hence, Rousseau writes:

Now if one compares the prodigious diversity of educations and types of life that prevails in the different orders of the civil state with the simplicity and uniformity of animal and savage life, in which all nourish themselves on the same foods, live in the same manner, and do exactly the same things, it will be understood how much less the difference between one man and another must be in the state of nature than in society, and how much natural inequality must increase in the human species through instituted inequality.

Rousseau distinguishes between two forms of inequality here. The first, natural inequality, is established by nature and accounts for the differences of ages, bodily strengths, and qualities of mind or soul.<sup>7</sup> Instituted or contrived inequality

arises from a convention which is authorized by the consent of men and it distinguishes between the wealth, honour and power of men.<sup>8</sup> With the presence of natural inequalities in their environment, primitive men share the same type of needs and way of life with others in their surroundings, and in this way, men share an equality of needs and satiation levels. If men are equal on this basis, then they are equally exposed to the environmental conditions, from which they procure the satisfaction of their needs. Given this, men would be equally subjected to the advantages and disadvantages of natural circumstances. The environment itself does not bestow preferences on some individuals, in allocating access to foodstuffs or other resources necessary for self-preservation.<sup>9</sup> Hence, although natural inequalities between men exist, these are, more or less, accidental rather than a part of a predetermined plan or pattern which gives an advantage to some to the detriment of others.

Man in the natural condition lives harmoniously within his environment. Primitive man's needs are limited to those necessary for his survival- food, rest and sex,<sup>10</sup>-and thus, these needs have an instinctual basis. Instinctual needs are those toward which man is urged by a dictate of the body, according to what is necessary for it to continue operating properly. This form of need is directly opposed to the unlimited needs which men in corrupt society pursue. Thus, Rousseau states that corrupt social man first attempts to satisfy the basic needs; then the superfluous; next, the

delights; then he acquires wealth and subjects; and lastly, he tries to obtain slaves.<sup>11</sup> Whereas the needs of natural man are determined by the dictates of self-preservation, the needs of social man are dependent on his whims and social opinion.<sup>12</sup> Natural man's needs are so completely connected to the requirements of his self-preservation, that even his mental faculties are dependent on his needs for development. Thus, natural man's faculties progress only according to needs and environmental circumstances:

...progress of the mind has been precisely proportioned to the needs that peoples had received from nature or to those which circumstances had subjected them, and consequently to the passions which inclined them to provide for those needs.<sup>13</sup>

The interdependence between man and nature is completed with the dependence of mental progression on needs and environmental circumstances.

It is necessary to examine the ways in which man may transcend nature, thereby leaving a state of equality and interdependence between man and his environment. To understand how man surpasses the limitations imposed by nature, the characteristics of man in the natural condition must be considered. Rousseau maintains that the foremost sentiment with which natural man is imbued is love of oneself:

The love of oneself is always good and always in conformity with order. Since each man is specially entrusted with his own preservation, the first and most important of his cares is and ought to be to watch over it constantly. And how could he watch over it if he did not take the greatest interest in it.<sup>17</sup>

The love of oneself is indicative of the inner consistency with which nature imbues man, in that man's needs, actions and mental capacities are interdependent, and it demonstrates man's ability to realize this internal order within the external environment. In this way, man's internal consistency is restricted to the dictates of his external environment. Thus, man's inner or spiritual growth is dependent on changes in the environment. Internal growth is, therefore, relative to the ability to manifest this within the external environment when the environment can sustain such a development. This explains why Rousseau maintains that natural passions, such as sex, love of oneself and pity are limited, in the sense that they are instinctual, and as such, they tend to preserve man and his freedom.<sup>18</sup> In natural man's more constrained environment, his passions and hence, his mental progress, are restricted solely to that which is necessary for his self-preservation. In this way, man's knowledge consists of that which affects him immediately. If man is limited by physical needs and if mental faculties are connected with needs,<sup>19</sup> then the capacities of the mind can develop progressively only if the satisfaction of instinctual needs is threatened; that is, when environmental circumstances conflict with the satisfaction of needs, man is forced outside of himself through the development of love of oneself. Once man's needs become difficult to fulfill, when, for example, the human population expands or when natural disasters make food scarce, he must learn new ways to obtain what is desired, or

face extinction.

Instinctually, man's first care is his preservation and this requires the satisfaction of basic desires- hunger, thirst, rest and sex- all of which are established within his constitution. However, man is able to choose whether to resist or follow nature's commands, and for this reason, Rousseau maintains that man is a free agent.<sup>20</sup> Man's freedom then is based on a recognition that he can choose which path to follow. It is important to understand that man's status as a free agent is established by the consciousness of his self. Man, in the state of nature, although not originally so, becomes a free agent once his consciousness of himself is revealed in his ability to differentiate between himself and animals:

But savage man, living dispersed among the animals and early finding himself in a position to measure himself against them, soon makes the comparison; and seeing that he surpasses them in skill more than they surpass him in strength, he learns not to fear them any more.<sup>21</sup>

Man's consciousness of himself as a being distinct from the animals is also evidence of his recognition that he is a free agent. Man, then, need not necessarily remain restricted by nature's confines. This form of consciousness also is present in the sentiment of feeling alive or of experiencing the sentiments of his existence. Thus, Rousseau writes:

His [natural man's] soul, agitated by nothing, is given over to the sole sentiment of its present existence without any idea of the future, however near it may be, and his projects, as limited as his views, barely extend to

the end of the day.<sup>22</sup>

Man's awareness of himself is manifested in the sentiment of his present existence, which, in essence, is a recognition of a feeling of freedom.

Natural man could have remained limited and undeveloped if he was not independent, in part, of nature. Hence, progression is possible due to the awareness of the self as a free being. Rousseau argues that man's recognition that he is a free being gives rise to the progression of his faculties;<sup>23</sup> an advancement made possible by an innate propensity, self-perfection. Rousseau describes self-perfection as "...a faculty which, with the aid of circumstances successively develops all the others, and resides among us as much as in the species as in the individual."<sup>24</sup> The faculty of self-perfection enables man's capacities to develop beyond their natural limitations, once the circumstances necessary for its advancement have been satisfied.

Natural man also possesses a natural sentiment of pity which guides his perceptions of and his actions towards others. Rousseau maintains that this sentiment operates to achieve two ends; first, it tempers the severity of man's self-preservative instinct and the love of oneself; and secondly, it functions as a means of identification with his fellows, although he does not have extensive contact with others. Rousseau writes:

It is very certain, therefore, that pity is a natural sentiment which, moderating in each individual the activity of love of



oneself, contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species. It carries us without reflection to the aid of those whom we see suffer; in the state of nature, it takes the place of laws, morals and virtues, with the advantage that no one is tempted to disobey its gentle voice.<sup>25</sup>

The natural sentiment of pity hinders man from becoming self-absorbed and individualistic, and thus, it reinforces the perfectibility of man which is directed toward the preservation and the development of the human species as a whole. Without postulating man's propensity to pity, it is doubtful whether the state of nature would have entailed peaceful co-existence, since isolation, limited needs and abundance would not necessarily prevent those who are physically stronger from capitalizing on the disadvantaged condition of the weak. Thus, Rousseau states that pity "...will dissuade every robust savage from robbing a weak child or an infirm old man of his hard-won subsistence if he himself hopes to find his own elsewhere."<sup>26</sup> Thus, the operation of pity ensures that the stronger will not attempt to benefit themselves by taking advantage of those who are weak and not in a position to fight back. Abundance in the environment does not preclude the possibility that natural man will try to procure his subsistence in the simplest way- by capitalizing on the weakness of others. In short, the sentiment of pity prevents one man from benefitting from the disadvantaged condition of another.

The operation of the natural sentiment of pity is stimulated by man's sensitivity; a receptivity which is

directed inward at first and which is transformed later to include others in the external environment, once man's imaginative capacity is developed.<sup>27</sup> Unless man is considered to be a sensitive being, pity would not be universally applicable:

It seems, in effect, that if I am obliged to do no harm to my fellow man, it is less because he is a reasonable being than because he is a sensitive being; a quality that, being common to beast and man, ought at least to give the one the right not to be uselessly mistreated by the other.<sup>28</sup>

Rousseau suggests that man's rationality would not provide an adequate basis of identification with others. The inadequacy of reason to promote bonds between people is based on the inequalities of mental capacities found in different individuals.<sup>29</sup>

Rousseau believes that the most sufficient means of identifying with others can be found in man's sensitivity, or his ability to empathize with the weaknesses or vulnerable condition of others which cause them to experience pain, since this sensibility is universal. Rousseau argues that pity serves as a basis for unification, since all are vulnerable and the recognition of this susceptibility produces emotional bonds:

It follows from this that we are attached to our fellows less by the sentiment of their pleasures than by the sentiment of their pains, for we see far better in the latter the identity of our natures with theirs and the guarantees of their attachment to us. If our common needs unite us by interest, our common miseries unite us by affection.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, the ability of each to recognize his vulnerability to pain forms a greater bond between human beings. Further,

Rousseau argues that this sensibility "guarantees" the bonds that one forms with others. The reason why Rousseau asserts that human beings are guaranteed of the security of their attachments on the basis of this sensitivity is that each is able to affirm his own vulnerability in the observation of the weaknesses of others. This assertion implies that emotional attachments may initially be formed by a recognition of one's own weaknesses. However, since Rousseau argues that man is a free agent, it is conceivable that he could either choose to follow or resist<sup>32</sup> the dictates of natural pity, thereby disregarding the natural order. At this point, then, it is necessary to analyze the natural order which may either be sustained or destroyed by the general features of human-kind.

The natural order, according to Rousseau, has two functions: first, it separates each species from the others and it maintains each species' distinctiveness. For this reason, Rousseau advocates that each species "...has only its own proper instinct... ." <sup>33</sup> Each species is separated by nature according to its instinct or inclination, and this instinct is directed toward the self-preservation of that species. Rousseau maintains that animals cannot deviate from the instincts given to them by nature and thus, "...a pigeon would die of hunger near a basin filled with the best meats, and a cat upon heaps of fruit or grain, although each could very well nourish itself on the food it disdains if it made up its mind to try some." <sup>34</sup> The natural order, then,

establishes the place of each species in the environment, as well as its equal entitlement to existence.<sup>35</sup> Rousseau states:

In every animal I see only an ingenious machine to which nature has given senses in order to revitalize itself and guarantee itself, up to a certain point, from all that tends to destroy or upset it.<sup>36</sup>

Each species, to some degree, is ensured of its preservation within the order of nature, which also gives to each species the instincts that will lead it to this end. Hence, each species is set apart from all the others by virtue of its distinctive instincts.<sup>37</sup> Secondly, the natural order unites all members of a species according to common drives, and it allows for the coexistence of diverse beings, all of whom attempt to "revitalize and guarantee" themselves or whom attempt to preserve themselves.<sup>38</sup> For this reason, Rousseau describes the state of nature as a condition which incorporates

...the simplicity and uniformity of animal and savage life, in which all nourish themselves on the same foods, live in the same manner, and do exactly the same things...<sup>39</sup>

The overall unity evident in the order of nature, an organization which can never be disrupted, provides for the coexistence of all species. In this way, the species are united by the dictates of nature and by their relation to nature, as concerns the attainment of a common goal- the preservation of each individual of the species and the perpetuation of that species. Concerning the order of nature, Rousseau writes:

The insurmountable barrier that nature sets between the various species, so that they would not be confounded, shows its intentions with the utmost clarity. It was not satisfied with establishing order. It took certain measures so that nothing could disturb that order.<sup>40</sup>

Each species is meant to endure on the basis of the behavioural patterns or instincts peculiar to that species. That is, each species member follows a mode of behaviour specifically designed for it, which would take it to its end—the preservation of the individual member and the propagation of the entire species. As such, each species lives and develops itself on the basis of the natural instincts inherent in its constitution.<sup>41</sup> In this respect, however, man's constitution differs from the fixed composition of other species, and thus, Rousseau writes:

...while each species has only its proper instinct, man...appropriates them all to himself, feeds himself equally well with most of the diverse foods which other animals share, and consequently finds his subsistence more easily than any of them can.<sup>42</sup>

Of all the species, man alone can diversify his actions thereby enabling him to preserve himself more easily. The ability to diversify his behaviour indicates that man is not necessarily confined to one goal (self-preservation) and hence, one direction to achieve this goal; but rather, man's diversity indicates Rousseau's belief that he need not remain restricted by the dictates of nature. This is not to say, however, that man's existence is entirely independent of natural dictates. Man is born weak and needs guidance, and he appropriates both strength

and direction by imitation. Man observes the self-preservative instincts of the other inhabitants in his environment, and transforms these instincts thereby establishing a human framework within a natural order. The ability to transcend natural dictates is evidence of man's undefined nature and purpose. The indeterminate essence and goals of man become clearer in the contrast between the developmental processes of animals and of man. Rousseau writes:

By contrast an animal is at the end of a few months what it will be all its life; and its species is at the end of a thousand years what it was the first year of that thousand. Why is man alone subject to becoming an imbecile? Is it not that he thereby returns to his primitive state; and that- while the beast, which has acquired nothing and which has, moreover, nothing to lose, always retains its instinct- man, losing again by old age or other accidents all that his perfectibility had made him acquire, thus falls back lower than the beast itself? It would be sad for us to be forced to agree that this distinctive and almost unlimited faculty is the source of all man's misfortunes... .<sup>43</sup>

Although man, from the hands of nature, is a limited being unaware of his potential, he is endowed with capacities which enable him to create his own purpose and framework.

[From the discussion pertaining to the general characteristics of mankind and the natural order, it becomes evident that man is both part of a larger whole, the natural order, and that he is a whole unto himself, in the sense that he is completely self-sufficient.] Of the general characteristics described earlier in this chapter,<sup>44</sup> some will sustain the

natural order, while some may destroy this order. In this way, natural inequalities and the uniformity of life and needs among men maintain the natural order, since these two factors allow for the coexistence of men who are dissimilar according to age, health, strength and qualities of mind or soul;<sup>45</sup> natural pity sustains the natural order since it contributes to the "...mutual preservation of the entire species;<sup>46</sup> the faculty of perfectibility may perpetuate the order of nature, since this capacity would allow the species as a whole to progress or develop itself;<sup>47</sup> and the love of oneself may sustain this order, when it is directed by reason and tempered by pity.<sup>48</sup> However, these same faculties could equally well destroy the order of nature. Specifically, perfectibility which is designed to benefit the individual to the detriment of the species,<sup>49</sup> will destroy the order of nature; also, when natural inequalities are combined with contrived inequalities, which differentiate between the circumstances of men, some being considered superior and others base;<sup>50</sup> and when the love of oneself becomes vanity, which causes men to harm one another in order to obtain benefit for themselves.<sup>51</sup>

In summary, natural man's existence is both dependent on and independent of nature. He is dependent on nature and its order, since his physical existence relies on the environment and its provisions; and he is independent of nature, since he is endowed with capacities which set him apart from all other species and which allow him to either improve upon or destroy nature. The natural order may be defined, specifically, as

...a principle which involves the progressive unfolding and development of man's possibilities within the framework of the 'universal system' and yet allows him to express his uniquely human characteristics of perfectibility and freedom.<sup>52</sup>

Further, the natural order is a unity which can be dissolved by individual perfectibility. Thus, the order of nature is "...a preestablished harmony that unites our needs, our style of life and the earth, which is not yet blemished by our errors."<sup>53</sup> The natural order unites all members of the human race on the basis of habit or natural customs, and establishes an equality on these bases between all its members. However, this unity exists only when the perfection and freedom of the individual and that of the entire species coexists. At this point, though, it is necessary to examine the applicability of the general characteristics of humanity to natural woman and to determine her role within the order of nature.

In Rousseau's original state of nature, there would appear to be little differentiation between the way of life of the male and female sexes. This is to say, both are equally exposed to environmental changes; both equally undergo the impulses of nature and live according to natural need; both lead a self-sufficient and isolated existence; and both appear to develop in roughly the same manner. For these reasons, the existence of man and woman may be similar at this stage in human development. Rousseau asserts the similarity of the way of life for natural man and woman when he criticizes those philosophers who endow the state of nature with



social attributes:

...those who, reasoning about the state of nature, carry over to it ideas taken from society, and always see the family gathered in the same habitation and its members maintaining among themselves an union as intimate and permanent as among us, where so many common interests unite them. Instead, in the primitive state, having neither houses, nor huts, nor property of any kind, everyone took up his lodging by chance and often for only one night. Males and females united fortuitously, depending on encounter, occasion, and desire, without speech being a very necessary interpreter of the things they had to say to each other; they left each other with the same ease.<sup>54</sup>

In the absence of permanent unions between men, women and children and permanent habitations, Rousseau argues that the female members of the species live freely, self-sufficiently, and independently; they are considered equal in respect to their male counterparts, to each other and the environment; and they are guided by the same inclinations of nature. There is no reason to believe that Rousseau understood women to be anything but equal, at least initially, to men in the original state of nature. However, before this conclusion can be considered an adequate representation of Rousseau's postulates, the relations between men and women, and the effects of these associations for women in the state of nature must be examined in greater detail.

The only significant contact sustained between males and females in their naturally isolated condition is engendered solely by sexual necessity. Hence, Rousseau writes:

...there was one blind appetite that

invited him to perpetuate his species; and this blind inclination, devoid of any sentiment of the heart, produced only a physical act. This need satisfied, the two no longer recognized each other, and even the child no longer meant anything to his mother as soon as he could do without her.<sup>55</sup>

However, being by nature solitary and indifferent, unions between the two sexes occur infrequently and cease when both participants have been sexually gratified.<sup>56</sup> Thus, sexual satisfaction does not automatically become a natural basis for permanent associations between the sexes. In fact, Rousseau argues that the absence of lasting unions is ensured by the natural necessity of physical impulses and the impeded development of mental faculties:

...for this kind of memory, by which one individual gives preference to another for the act of procreation, requires...more progress or corruption in human understanding than can be supposed in man in the state of animality in question here.<sup>57</sup>

In essence, there is nothing in the nature or in the mental capabilities of men and women at this stage, that would compel them to live together or even to associate on a regular basis. Instead, women and men appear concerned solely with the satisfaction of their physical needs. Rousseau writes:

And if in the state of nature the woman no longer feels the passion of love after the conception of the child, the obstacle to her society with the man thereby becomes greater still, since then she no longer needs either the man who impregnated her or any other. Therefore there is not for the man any reason to seek the same woman, nor for the woman, any reason to seek the same man.<sup>58</sup>

After the completion of the sexual union, both male and female return to their original independent existence. The absence of a sense of obligation of each sex to the other, either before or after the completion of the sexual act, inhibits the emergence of lasting relationships. This is to say, the sexual union cannot be evaluated according to moral criteria; moral in the sense that the male is not obliged to care for the female and their offspring as a consequence of sexual satisfaction.<sup>59</sup> This assertion becomes clearer in Rousseau's main criticism of John Locke's view of relations between men and women in the state of nature:

I shall observe first that moral proofs do not have great force in the matters of physics, and that they serve rather to give a reason for existing facts than to prove the real existence of those facts. Now such is the kind of proof Mr. Locke uses... .<sup>60</sup>

Rousseau continues:

Mr. Locke evidently supposes what is in question; for it is not a matter of knowing why the man will remain attached to the woman after delivery, but why he will become attached to her after conception. His appetite satisfied, the man no longer needs a given woman, nor the woman a given man. The man has not the least concern nor perhaps the least idea of the consequences of his action. One goes off in one direction, the other in another... .<sup>61</sup>

Rousseau argues that sexuality in the state of nature should not be evaluated on the basis of moral criteria, since it does not produce an obligation between the sexes and since the sexual coupling is an act which is natural, or based on a

natural impulsion; thus, what is defined as natural, need not be explained on the basis of moral standards. Although Rousseau describes the sexual union as being a means to obtain physical gratification, the exact nature of the physical basis of sexuality remains ambiguous. It is necessary then to examine and clarify the nature of this ambiguity.

The ambiguity concerning Rousseau's use of physical to describe the sexual act creates a difficulty in understanding the nature of these relations, and the impulses which give rise to them, since he also refers to it as an activity which produces pleasure and he indicates that it has a biological or reproductive purpose. Although these three different terms need not be mutually exclusive in reference to sexual activities it is important to establish which of these terms (physical/instinctive, pleasurable and biological) best expresses his understanding of the relations between the sexes, particularly since he indicates that human sexuality becomes a socializing agent. By the use of the term physical to describe the sexual union, Rousseau could mean that the sexual coupling is an activity which would gratify a natural instinct. Viewing the sexual coupling in this way denies the application of moral criteria to this act, according to Rousseau, which would justify the establishment of permanent associations between the female and the male on the basis of obligation.<sup>62</sup>

Rousseau maintains that the sexual union is devoid of either moral or emotional considerations primarily because human beings had not yet developed those mental faculties conducive

to the identification and experience of morality. Thus,

Rousseau states:

Imagination which causes so much havoc among us, does not speak to savage hearts. Everyone peaceably waits for the impulsion of nature, yields to it without choice with more pleasure than frenzy; and the need satisfied, all desire is extinguished.<sup>63</sup>

Since the imaginative capacity had not yet developed among natural man and woman, they are drawn together by physical impetus, or as Rousseau states, by the "...general desire which inclines one sex to unite with the other."<sup>64</sup> The physical aspect of sexual relations is directly opposed to the moral component which Rousseau defines as "...that which determines this desire [physical desire or impulse] and fixes it exclusively on a single object, or which at least gives it a greater degree of energy for this preferred object."<sup>65</sup> The distinction between Rousseau's view of what is physical and what is moral in sexual relations leads Susan Moller Okin to conclude that sexuality in the state of nature is a purely physical act, having an instinctual basis:

In the state of nature, sexuality was a simple animal appetite, analogous to hunger and the need for rest, an instinct designed to ensure the perpetuation of the species, and readily satisfied by any willing member of the opposite sex who chance to pass by. What savage man experienced was just the physical part of the feeling of love, as opposed to the moral part, which attaches itself to one preferred object...<sup>66</sup>

Although Okin defines sexual relations as the satisfaction of

physical impulses, on the basis of Rousseau's view, this perspective may not be consistent with other descriptions of sexuality by Rousseau.

The sexual impulse is unique among the other impulses since it directs man to seek out others for its satisfaction. The sexual instinct, in essence, draws man outside of himself in order to satiate this desire. Although it is possible to assert that men and women could gratify this urge without assistance, Rousseau's view does not include this possibility. Sexuality, then, as a natural impulse, ensures that man and woman will cooperate to satisfy their desires. Thus, sexuality in the state of nature may indicate that women and men were not meant to live a solitary and isolated existence. In fact, Rousseau may have meant sexuality to serve as a natural agent of sociability which unites women and men on the basis of their desires. Viewing the sexual impulse as an appetite which draws man and woman together is entirely consistent with Rousseau's statement that sexuality is a general desire which causes the sexes to unite.<sup>67</sup> In this way, if sexuality forms the basis for the union of natural man and woman, it may not be analogous to other "animal appetites" as Okin argues, since these other instincts do not operate to encourage unions.

Since Rousseau asserts that sexual relations between human beings are merely events necessary for the gratification of an impelling urge, he also argues that natural woman and man "...yield to it without choice... ." <sup>68</sup> Why would Rousseau maintain that sexuality is not associated with choice, parti-

cularly when he describes man as a free agent who can acquiesce in or resist natural dictates?<sup>69</sup> If Rousseau argues that man can transcend natural limitations, why should the sexual impulse not be included as an activity that man and woman can choose to follow or resist? One possible explanation for this discrepancy in Rousseau's assertions could be accounted for by the necessity of ensuring that men and women are drawn together by sexual desire. If women and men could choose not to have sexual relations, it could be possible that they would never unite for the gratification of this need. This assertion becomes more plausible with Rousseau's statement, made in reference to the social relations between the sexes, that female desire is stronger than male desire.<sup>70</sup> With Rousseau's belief in the weakness of male sexual desire, it is conceivable that men may not necessarily be as readily inclined to unite, on the basis of sexual desire, as would women. If Rousseau meant sexuality as an agent of sociability, then it is possible that the lack of choice, initially, may have been intended to ensure that the sexes would unite, at least temporarily.

It may also be possible that Rousseau asserts that, the absence of choice in sexual encounters may have been necessary in the initial contacts between the sexes, but it would no longer be essential following repeated experience. Natural woman and man would, then, no longer be limited to pursuing sexual unions for bare preservation alone, but would become aware of the pleasurable sensations produced in this union and/or the consequences of the sexual act- pregnancy.<sup>71</sup>

Rousseau also views sexuality as a mechanism which produces pleasurable sensations,<sup>72</sup> which leads Joel Schwartz to conclude that sexuality, pursued for the delectation of each, contributes to the individual's comfortable, as opposed to bare, existence.<sup>73</sup> If sexuality is an activity which produces pleasure, it may not be entirely sound to describe it as a purely physical instinct. If natural woman and man pursue sex for their delectation, it may be that they have surpassed the physical limitations imposed by instinctual actions; in fact, viewed in this light, sexuality may lose some of its purely physical character. Schwartz argues that if sexuality is considered pleasurable by natural woman and man, then it may not be sought by blind physical urges, but by choice.<sup>74</sup> Once sexual relations are considered pleasurable, then it is conceivable that satisfaction will be pursued for the pleasurable sensations that sex would bring, instead of being pursued merely for the physical release of an impelling urge. In short, if people seek to satisfy their sexual desires for the delectation they will receive, instead of seeking satisfaction for its own sake, then gratification is sought for a purpose other than sexual release. This could indicate, as Schwartz points out, that the sexual instinct becomes more closely associated with human choice and as such, natural man and woman have developed control over a previously blind instinct.<sup>75</sup>

However, Schwartz's perspective, that the sexual union identified as a source of pleasure, becomes closer to an area



relegated to human choice, may not be entirely well-founded.

Rousseau argues that natural man initially will function in much the same way as animals do, on the basis of instinct.<sup>76</sup>

Thus, Rousseau writes:

To perceive and feel will be his first state, which he will have in common with all animals. To will and not will, to desire and fear will be the first and almost the only operations of his soul until new circumstances cause new developments in it.<sup>77</sup>

The perceptions and feelings, of which natural man is capable, are instinctual. In much the same way, Rousseau indicates that the identification of pleasure and pain also may be instinctual;

His [natural man's] desires do not exceed his physical goods, the only goods he knows in the universe are nourishment, a female, and repose; the only evil he fears are pain and hunger.<sup>78</sup>

The ability to feel pain and hunger, both of which are forms of deprivations, implies that natural man would be able to experience the opposite of these, pleasure and satisfaction. Although the pleasurable sensations of sexual encounters may be aided by memory of those sensations,<sup>79</sup> the sexual union may still be associated with instinct and it may not become more of a product of choice, as Schwartz claims.<sup>80</sup> In short, although the pleasurable sentiments produced by the sexual union are enhanced by memory, this does not conclusively substantiate the claim that sex may be pursued by choice, rather than by instinct; Rousseau's view of sexuality implies that pleasure can be identified by instinctual knowledge, and not merely by enlight-

ened knowledge, and therefore, pleasurable sensations of the sexual act need not, as Schwartz claims, become an area assigned to human choice.<sup>81</sup> Further, Schwartz justifies this conclusion on the basis that Rousseau does not refer to the sexual union as a need essential for the preservation of the species.<sup>82</sup> However, Rousseau does indicate that sexuality is designed to guarantee the preservation of the entire species.<sup>83</sup>

Inherent in Rousseau's view of sexuality is a biological necessity, which is, somewhat, consistent with his description of the physical aspect of love, that it is a general desire which impels the sexes to unite,<sup>84</sup> but it is not entirely consistent with that definition. The inconsistency between sexuality as a biological need designed to preserve the race and Rousseau's description of the physical aspect of love, becomes more evident with an analysis of the applicability of choice to the biological basis. In affirming that sexuality may be biologically based, it is necessary that the sexual coupling occurs because of the biological need in both females and males, or at least in one of the two, to propagate the race. The biological aspect differs from the physical since the latter refers to the purely physical release of a blind instinct over which one has no control; whereas the former relates to the reproductive bodily processes, which, potentially may be controlled. In short, a purely physical release could never be recognized as more than just a release; but, once the outcomes of the sexual union can be discerned, child-birth, then a biological impetus can be more easily recognized and

controlled, as a visible effect of a bodily urge. In essence, the difference between the physical and the reproductive amounts to a distinction in aims. The reproductive or biological is directed toward the preservation of the human species; while the physical is directed toward the release of a physical impulse, over which the individual has no control, which would satisfy the individual's needs. It will be argued that Rousseau meant to emphasize the biological basis of sexual relations, although this does not exclude either the physical or pleasurable views, and that women would come to understand the consequences of sex before men would, and this recognition would be facilitated by a biological view of sexual relations, as it is based on the possibility of recognizing the results of sexual relations and of controlling this process.

The biological basis of sexuality can be inferred from Rousseau's statement that the sexual coupling occurs infrequently; that is, sexual gratification in the natural state is sought only during certain times;

The continual cohabitation of husband and wife provides such an immediate opportunity to be exposed to a new pregnancy that it is very hard to believe that chance encounter or the impulsion of temperament alone produced such frequent effects in the pure state of nature as in the state of conjugal society.<sup>85</sup>

Although Rousseau asserts that sexual unions between men and women are infrequent in the natural condition, he is careful to distinguish between human sexual practices and animal

sexual activities, which are governed by the female animal's periods of heat and exclusion.<sup>86</sup> This indicates that human sexuality may not be purely instinctual (physical), but instead may become regulated by choice, at least in the sense that the female's sexuality is not regulated by periods of heat and exclusion. Thus, the biological nature of the sexual union is significantly different from the biological impetus inherent in the sexual practices of animals. However, the exact nature of human sexual relations, as they differ from those experienced by animals, necessitates further examination.

Rousseau, throughout the entire Second Discourse, discusses the sexual union, in a specific manner, only in conjunction with pregnancy.<sup>87</sup> In this way, Rousseau does not emphasize the physical gratification sustained by sexual encounters; but rather, he stresses the reproductive goal of the sexual union. In emphasizing the reproductive goal of human sexuality, Rousseau may be stressing the biological basis of the union between male and female. Concerning the reproductive end of sexuality, Rousseau writes:

Among the passions that agitates the heart of man, there is an ardent, impetuous one that makes one sex necessary to the other; a terrible passion which braves all dangers, overcomes all obstacles, and which, in its fury, seems fitted to destroy the human race it is destined to preserve.<sup>88</sup>

If Rousseau meant to emphasize the biological basis of human sexuality, as his reference to sex as a means of preserving the species may indicate, it is then possible to argue that sexual relations, described in this manner, would eventually be

governed by choice, more so than if sexual encounters were described as purely physical or purely pleasurable. However, it would be necessary to show that a biological impetus could be controlled, eventually, by human choice. If sexuality has a biological basis, then, in conjunction with the physical impetus, it is easier to understand why man and woman were originally inclined to unite, prior to their comprehension of the pleasure that the coupling would produce. The biological impetus would facilitate comprehending why isolated and self-sufficient women and men would engage in sexual activities and the pleasurable sensations produced by the coupling would ensure that future unions would be pursued. In this way, the desire for pleasure would reinforce the biological basis and the desires of the individual for pleasure would operate consistently with the need to propagate the human race. This is to say, the pleasure of the individual need not be sacrificed to a human necessity, reproduction, but can coexist with it. Further, the view of sex as a purely physical instinct would also reinforce the biological perspective as well, since it forces unions between the sexes for the sake of bodily satisfaction.

As stated previously, it is plausible that in postulating a biological basis for sexuality, that sexual encounters may become governed by choice, rather than remaining instinctual. In order to substantiate this claim, it is necessary to determine whether the sexual relations between natural woman and man do operate on the basis of choice. One means of showing

the presence of choice in sexual encounters is to consider whether both partners must be willing to cooperate or whether sexual satisfaction must be mutual. Rousseau writes:

Limited solely to that which is physical in love, and fortunate enough to be ignorant of those preferences that irritate its sentiment and augment its difficulties, men must feel the ardors of their temperament less frequently and less vividly, and consequently, have fewer and less cruel disputes among themselves. ... Everyone peaceably waits for the impulsion of nature, yields to it without choice with more pleasure than frenzy; and the need satisfied, all desire is extinguished. It is therefore incontestable that love itself, like all the passions, has acquired only in society that impetus ardor which so often makes it fatal for men; and it is all the more ridiculous to portray savages continually murdering each other to satisfy their brutality as this opinion is directly contrary to experience, and as the Caribs, that of all existing peoples which until now has departed least from the state of nature, are precisely the most peaceful in their loves and the least subject to jealousy... .<sup>89</sup>

This description shows that sexual encounters between women and men are not violent and as such, it is not evident that men attempt to force women into submission for sexual satisfaction. If there is no force in sexual encounters, then this implies that both men and women choose to submit to their desires. The absence of coercion indicates a recognition of the sovereignty of each individual over his body, and sovereignty requires control over admitting access to others. The absence of force in sexual unions is reinforced by the abundance of females in the environment.<sup>90</sup> Rousseau implies that if one female is unwilling to partake in sexual gratification, the male

can more easily find an agreeable female rather than force an unwilling one into submission.<sup>91</sup> The absence of coercion in the sexual relations of natural woman and man indicates that some form of choice is evident in submitting to sexual desire. It will be argued that human sexual relations become governed by choice once the biological consequences of sexual intercourse are recognized. It is necessary, then, to examine specifically the life of natural woman and the effects that the consequences of sexuality imposes on her.

Although the sexual union produced consequences for the female sex alone, women did not need to enlist the aid of their male partners in the nurturing of their children. In fact, the contribution by males would not have been an option for them since they were able to resume their self-sufficient way of life by independently caring for their children.<sup>92</sup> Natural woman was able to care for her child for two reasons: first, because of dietary habits, and secondly, because of her physical constitution. In respect to dietary habits and constitution, Rousseau maintains that human beings were by nature frugivorous:

...if the help of the male were necessary to the female to preserve her young, it would be above all in the species that live only on grass, because the mother needs a very long time to graze, and during that entire period she is forced to neglect her brood; whereas the prey of a female bear or wolf is devoured in an instant, and she has more time, without suffering from hunger, to nurse her young. This reasoning is confirmed by an observation upon the relative number of teats and young which distinguishes

the carnivorous from the frugivorous... .  
 If this observation is correct and general,  
 as woman has only two teats and rarely  
 produces more than one child at a time,  
 there is one more strong reason to doubt  
 that the human species is naturally  
 carnivorous.<sup>93</sup>

If human beings were frugivorous initially, as Rousseau claims, it would be much easier for females to procure their subsistence, since it is readily available without much effort, than could the carnivorous species.<sup>94</sup> Further, human females can carry their young with them while they seek food; while female carnivores must leave their young, find food and return with it,<sup>95</sup> and in species which need to graze, the females must neglect their young while feeding.<sup>96</sup> In short, human females are better equipped to look after their children even while seeking their subsistence. Thus, Rousseau states:

Perhaps their children walk late and with difficulty, but mothers carry them with ease: an advantage lacking in other species in which the mother being pursued, finds herself forced to abandon her young or to regulate her speed by theirs.<sup>97</sup>

Hence, the constitution of female human beings and the facility of finding foodstuffs, allow the female to be self-sufficient, thereby alleviating the necessity of male assistance. Despite the fact that natural woman must care for a child, her self-sufficiency and independence are not threatened.

Initially, an emotional bond between a mother and the child to which she had given birth did not exist, and thus, Rousseau argues that she depended on instinct in order to nurture him:



The mother nursed her child at first for her own need; then, habit having endeared them to her, she nourished them afterward for their need. As soon as they had the strength to seek their food, they did not delay in leaving the mother herself; and as there was practically no other way to find one another again than not to lose sight of each other, they were soon at a point of <sup>98</sup> not even recognizing one another.

The cohabitation of a mother and her child gave rise to emotional bonds, which develop from a need unique to women; that is, the need for women to nurse the children which they bear. This observation allowed Rousseau to conclude that maternal love is a natural phenomenon which arises from a situation of dependence, albeit a temporary one. The union of mother and child does not engender more than a temporary dependence. This is a curious statement by Rousseau since he argues that an emotional bond is formed between the mother and the child. Although he does not specify why the child leaves the mother as soon as he can fend for himself, it may be that the mother loses her emotional attachment with the child as soon as he can provide for himself, because the mother realizes that the child should be and is capable of being independent. Thus, the mother could recognize the independent status that her child achieves, and willingly lets the child leave due to respect for that self-sufficiency. Or perhaps, the emotional attachment between the two, arising from the child's weakness or vulnerability, is dissolved once this weakness is overcome. Thus, the emotional bond between the two would be sustained only for as long as

the child continues to be vulnerable and dependent on the mother. This second possibility does not preclude the first, which would become effective once the child is no longer weak.

In order for females to have an emotional bond with their children, a change in the sentiment of love of oneself was necessary.<sup>99</sup> Initially, the mother responded instinctually to a new situation which she did not understand. It is possible that the love of oneself prevented her from immediately developing an emotional attachment, and for this reason, Rousseau states that at first the mother nurtured her child for her own need, instead of for the child's need. After a period of adjustment, she was able to develop an emotional bond with her child. However, this is not likely to occur until the mother can identify with her child, and this development necessitated a transformation in the mother's sentiment of love of oneself. Rousseau describes the love of oneself as

...a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to watch over its own preservation, and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue.<sup>100</sup>

The mother, accustomed to watching over only her preservation, had to become habituated to watching over the subsistence of her child. In short, it was necessary for the mother's sentiment of love of oneself to expand in order to incorporate her child's existence. Specifically, the self-preservative instinct, which follows from the sentiment of love of oneself, is extended to include the preservation of the child, who, through the mother's experience of childbirth, comes to represent an extension of

the mother's self. This development, then, might stimulate the female's faculty of self-perfection in order to transcend the limitations imposed by the love of oneself. It is necessary that the sentiment of love of oneself, and its inherent limitations, be extended since the mother must develop in order to fulfill the needs of her child.

Although Rousseau's view of the relations between a mother and her child necessitates the stimulation of the faculty of self-perfection, in order for her to form an emotional bond with the child, it is important to understand the processes which facilitate this development. Rousseau maintains that the progression of a passion which is other-regarding, such as that shared by a mother and her child, is preceded by the development of the imagination.<sup>101</sup> The stimulation of the imaginative capacity is necessary since it would allow an individual to identify with the needs and feelings of others.<sup>102</sup> This is to say, the imagination allows the individual to place himself in the situation of another in order to understand what the other needs or feels, and thus the mother's sentiment of love of oneself must be extended in order for her to develop an attachment with her child. Lacking an extension of this sentiment, the mother would not be able to identify the needs or feelings of her child. With this initial development in women, they may begin to progress in many different ways.

Rousseau argues that the activity of the passions perfect reason; that passions originate from needs; and that passions progress from knowledge or experience.<sup>103</sup> If passions

develop from knowledge or experience, then this may be responsible for the attachment that arises from the contact between a mother and her child. This is to say, the passions that a mother experiences in the presence of her new-born child could be responsible for stimulating her faculty of self-perfection, which would then develop the mother's passions and reasoning faculties. However, since Rousseau states that passions originate from needs, and this development, in turn, perfects reason, and if the emotional bond arising from the interaction between a mother and her child is based on the mother's experience during the child-bearing and -rearing process, then it is possible that this development of the mother's passions is based on her need to nurse her child.<sup>104</sup> The need to nurse her child and the development of her passions may stimulate the mother's faculty of self-perfection. This discussion gives rise to two significant questions. First, if the mother's faculties of love of oneself and perfectibility developed from her union with the child, do these progressions give rise to subsequent developments? Secondly, if the mother's faculties develop, is it possible that she could eventually come to understand the consequences of sexual relations, which would, then, become governed by choice? These questions must now be considered.

It may be sound to argue that these first developments occurred among the first generation of women in the society of their children, before arising among men. For example, the development and use of language corresponds to the advancement

of mental capacities and close society with others. Hence, Rousseau has grounds to believe that the rudiments of language emerged from the association of a mother and her child:

Note also that the child having all his needs to explain and consequently more things to say to the mother than the mother to the child, it is the child who must make the greatest efforts of invention, and that the languages he uses must be in great part his own work, which multiplies languages as many times as there are individuals to speak them. A wandering and vagabond life contributes further to this, since it does not give any idiom the time to gain consistency. For to say that the mother teaches the child the words he ought to use to ask her for a particular thing shows well how one teaches already formed languages but it does not teach us how they are formed.<sup>105</sup>

Thus, language, and prior to its development, the faculties necessary for its formation, emerged initially from within the relations between a mother and her child. The child's imagination is developed from this interaction and it may be sustained in part when the dependence ceases. The female's understanding and imagination would evolve from the necessity to comprehend and to fulfill her child's needs. Given these assertions, it may be possible to conclude that the rational development among the first generation of adult males occurs much later than first generation females and their children. Thus, in the original state of nature, the female plays an integral role in initiating social relations and practices.

The same logic may be applied to the propensity toward the natural sentiment of pity. This is to say, the temporary

union of a mother and her child may develop and/ or fortify the operation of pity. As noted previously, pity serves to temper the severity of love of oneself and to provide a means of identifying with the weaknesses or vulnerability of others.<sup>106</sup> To experience this sentiment, the development of one's imaginative capacity<sup>107</sup> and subsequently, sensitivity,<sup>108</sup> is required. The natural sentiment of pity may have been experienced in a significant or repeated way within the closely-knit existence shared by a mother and her child. In caring for her child, without male assistance, the female must satisfy the helpless child's needs and ensure his survival. When natural woman, after giving birth, becomes aware of her child's weaknesses or vulnerability to pain, she must become capable of recognizing the needs of her child. However, in order to ascertain her child's needs, so that she can satisfy them, she must first be able to transport herself beyond her own needs. In this way, imagination allows the mother to develop and/or fortify her sentiment of pity, which, in turn, allows her to extend her love of herself to include the existence of the child. It is logical that the interaction among women and their children would facilitate and enhance the development of these natural faculties, thereby creating emotional bonds between them; this assertion is plausible especially when contrasted with the solitary existence experienced by males in the original state of nature.

Many of the characteristics utilized by Rousseau to describe the constitution of man and his way of life are

applicable as well to women in the original state of nature. Natural woman and man are independent and self-sufficient; they both are capable of transcending natural limitations, developing in the process, their uniquely human capacities; and they are equal to each other and they are equally subjected to the environmental circumstances. What differentiates between the modes of existence of the sexes is the female's ability to become pregnant. After becoming pregnant and giving birth, the woman could consider and care for her child. The way that she lives does not change in any drastic manner; the only difference consists of having to temporarily take responsibility for the nurturing of the child. The female's ability to have children, however, may be responsible for the unique way in which she subsequently develops. In fact, the uniqueness of female development could lead to her recognition of the consequences of sexuality. This development, and its implications, may become clearer in the analysis of the consequences of the temporary mother-child union for the female and her child.

Both the mother and child are developed from the intimacy that they share. If, as Rousseau maintains, passions progress from knowledge or experience and originate from needs,<sup>109</sup> then it is not clear whether the female's ability to experience pity is diminished after her child leaves her. In much the same way, it is not evident that the maternal sentiment may not be recalled to her after the child leaves, when, perhaps, she encounters other females with their children or when she sees other children. It may be this recollection of the maternal

sentiment which would eventually lead the female to develop in a significantly different way than her child and to understand the consequences of the sexual union.

Within the temporary union of the mother and the child, both develop their imaginative capacities, both develop the rudiments of language which enables them to understand each other, and it is likely that both these advancements are caused by the awakening of the faculty of perfectibility. However, the mother and the child differ in their experiences of love. The child loves his mother because of the care that she provides and the example she furnishes him with, which teaches the child all that is necessary to survive. The mother, however, experiences a more complicated form of love, the maternal love which comes from taking responsibility for the survival of another and a sharing of life with another. It is this more profound experience of love or sharing which allows the females to develop their mental faculties prior to both first and second generation males.

Assume that a first generation female gives birth to a male child. As has already been established, the female is more likely to develop a profound sentiment within this union and by virtue of its depth, it may be more easily recalled to her when this union ceases. Although the male child also develops from the union with his mother, he leaves this association to assume an independent and self-sufficient existence. In this way, the male child would not have the opportunity of uniting with his mother again; but the mother



could conceivably have more children. This is to say, the form of love experienced by the male child for his mother could never be repeated; whereas the maternal sentiment could be experience repeatedly by the female. Further, if the female is capable of recalling the maternal sentiment, then she may be able to recollect the birth of her child as well. The male child, although perhaps capable of recalling the love he had for his mother, would not be aware of the intimacy he shared with his mother at the moment of birth; or, stated differently, he would not be aware that he had emerged from her body. Lacking both this knowledge and experience, and himself living an isolated existence wherein he unites sporadically with other women for sexual satisfaction, he could never be really aware of the exact nature of the intimacy shared between himself and his mother. If the female gave birth to a female child, it is even more conceivable that the female child could recognize the consequences of sexuality after both experiencing childbirth herself and recollecting the love she felt for her mother. Since the existence of males and their inability to give birth themselves may indicate that they would remain ignorant of the consequences of sexual relations longer than would the first generation female or the second generation female child. In this way, it is conceivable that the first generation female and second generation females develop conceptual ideas before either first or second generation males.

Rousseau alludes to the development of the mental

faculties of females prior to males, when he states:

The man has not the least concern nor perhaps the least idea of the consequences of his action. One goes off in one direction, the other in another, and there is no likelihood that at the end of nine months they have any memory of having known each other: for this kind of memory, by which one individual gives preference to another for the act of procreation, requires, as I prove in the text, more progress or corruption in human understanding than can be supposed in man in the state of animality in question here.<sup>110</sup>

Rousseau, in this quotation, makes a number of curious assertions that have important implications for the situation of women and their development. First, Rousseau states that the ability to discern the consequences of sexual relations requires greater understanding than is evident in the original state of nature. Natural man and woman, at this stage, are considered "animals" until their distinctly human nature is developed. The distinction between man and the animals is based on the human faculty of self-perfection and the consciousness of their free agent status.<sup>111</sup> Although the ability to recognize one's free agent status has not yet been considered, in that sexuality becomes a matter of choice, the faculty of self-perfection in both women and their children began to operate after childbirth. In this way, the perfectibility of the mother's and the child's faculties may effectively remove them from the "state of animality" to which Rousseau refers.

Secondly, Rousseau specifies that the man may not understand the consequences of the sexual union. It is curious

that he suggests that "the man" may not comprehend the consequences of his actions. This is strange because Rousseau does not use the expression "the man" to refer to both man and woman, as the use of "man", in the sentence immediately following this one, is meant to include both man and woman. This omission becomes more significant when the context in which it is made is understood. Immediately prior to this statement, Rousseau refutes John Locke's assertion that an obligation for the male to take care of the female and their children is created by the sexual union.<sup>112</sup> In this way, the reference to "the man" which follows, more concretely establishes that Rousseau meant to isolate the male's inability to understand the consequences of sexual relations. This implies that the female could be capable, at some point, of recognizing the consequences of the sexual union.

Thirdly, Rousseau argues that man and woman are not capable of that form of memory which could allow them to give preference to one member of the opposite sex for sexual relations. However, dismissing one of the manifestations of memory does not rule out the existence of other forms of memory. It is possible that the female could recall that she engaged in a sexual encounter, without necessarily remembering the specific male involved, and that she had a child sometime afterwards. This possibility is reinforced by Rousseau's assertion that the female is unlikely to be impelled by desire and to engage in sexual activities while she is pregnant,<sup>113</sup> and this could facilitate the female's memory of the events

which led to her becoming pregnant. Further, if the female recollects or experiences the maternal sentiment after the child leaves her, then this could enable her to connect childbirth and maternal love with sexual relations. This assertion becomes more plausible since women's faculties were developed from their experiences as mothers, and it is not clear that these faculties regress after their children leave them. For these reasons, it is possible to claim that females could comprehend the consequences of their sexuality, and pregnancy could become a matter of choice for women.

However, it is necessary to stipulate that this evolution in the existence of the female is the consequence of a situation characterized by dependence; a condition unique to women who alone recognize their children's dependence upon them for existence. Thus, it is possible to assert that this dependence gave rise to the progression of the female's mental faculties. Although this may not constitute the first recognition of relations of dependence, since the sexual act also may involve the realization of dependence on others external to oneself. Since the propensity to engage in sexual relations is the only need which requires the cooperation of another for its satisfaction, this may necessitate a recognition of temporary dependence on another. In the absence of this recognition, neither the male nor the female could satisfy their sexual urges. Rousseau seems to ensure that the sexes realize their dependence upon each other by suggesting that sexuality is founded on a biological need to propagate the human race.<sup>114</sup>

Although Rousseau states that human sexuality is a physical impetus,<sup>115</sup> he also understands it as an activity pursued for pleasure,<sup>116</sup> and as an activity based on a biological need to propagate the human race.<sup>117</sup> However, only with the assertion of a biological impetus, being directed toward a specific goal- the continued existence of the human race- can Rousseau use sexuality as an agent of social relations. Since sexuality described as either a physical impulse or a pleasurable sensation, by themselves, do not necessarily give rise to choice, which would prove to be inconsistent with Rousseau's assertion that man is a free agent, then it may be assumed that sexual relations viewed as a biological necessity, would bring people closer to obtaining choice over their sexual urges. The biological basis of sexuality would facilitate comprehension of sexual encounters, because it relies on the comprehension of bodily processes and this basis is the most immediate and the easiest means for natural man and woman, as Rousseau describes them, to come to understand the outcomes of sex. Further, the biological view can accommodate both the descriptions of sexuality as a physical impulse and as a means to obtain pleasure. The physical impetus, where sexual relations are indicative of the desire to satisfy bodily appetites, could describe the sexual union before natural woman, and eventually man, becomes aware of the consequences of sexuality. Further, sexual relations can be associated with pleasurable sensations only before natural woman and man realize the outcome of their sexuality. However, it may be possible to

assert that Rousseau meant to emphasize the biological aspect of sexual relations merely because, first, it is aimed at ensuring the survival of the species as a whole; secondly, it is possible to eventually obtain control over the reproductive processes by becoming aware of the consequences and this would prove to be consistent with his other basic postulates in the state of nature- freedom and perfectibility; and thirdly, because the physical impetus and pleasurable sensations involved in sexual relations need not be directed toward anything more than satisfaction, which itself can be identified by instinct alone, these would not necessarily allow man and woman to acknowledge their differences from the animals and to exercise their uniquely human faculties.

In conclusion, many of the general characteristics of human beings in the original state of nature are applicable to women equally. In this way, the lives of both natural man and woman are isolated and self-sufficient; both are imbued with the sentiment of love of oneself and the self-preservative instinct which comes from it; and both are characterized by the faculty of perfectibility and by the natural sentiment of pity. Perhaps the only difference in the applicability of these is one of degree. If the analysis of the exact nature of sexuality and of the relations between a mother and her child are sound, then women, due to their unique biological construction, may develop conceptual knowledge sooner than would men. In this way, women develop in a significantly different and unique manner. The unique development of women could lead them to an

understanding of the consequences of sexuality and, at least, women may choose whether to become pregnant or not. This progression of women's faculties depends on the repeated experience of maternal love, a sentiment unknown to men. With both the development of women's faculties in the union with her child and the contributions they invest into this union, directly influencing the development of their children, and the realization of the consequences of sexual relations, both pregnancy and dependence, may affirm that human sexuality, according to Rousseau, is an agent of social relations and that women are the guardians of sociability. However, in order to determine whether this proposition is sound, it is necessary to analyze the role of women in initiating social relations, and this will, in part, be the subject of the next chapter.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE ROLE OF WOMEN AND THE TRANSITION TO SOCIAL RELATIONS

In this chapter, a parallel progression, evident between the factors which give rise to and sustain the transition to social relations and those components which cause and uphold the permanent family unit, will be analyzed. The examination of the parallels between these two developments will facilitate an understanding of the progression of human beings according to the general characteristics outlined in Chapter Two, which, in turn, will show that Rousseau's theory of nature is followed consistently by his theory of social relations. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, it will be shown that those developments which give rise to the conceptual knowledge of women, thereby enabling them to ascertain the consequences of sexuality, also make them responsible for initiating social relations. Secondly, this chapter will reveal, in part, the intricate relationship between the familial and social units, and to show that the basis for the connection between these two institutions is the role of women. However, before these conclusions can be reached, it is necessary to discuss those factors which give rise to the transition to social relations.

In the pure state of nature, the needs of human beings



were easily satisfied. However, Rousseau argues that this situation was not meant to endure. He states that natural obstacles began to threaten the preservation of both woman and man, and, as such, they had to learn to overcome these changes:

The height of trees, which prevented him from reaching their fruits, the competition of animals that sought to nourish themselves with these fruits, the ferocity of those animals that wanted to take his very life, all obliged him to apply himself to bodily exercises. It was necessary to become agile, fleet in running, vigorous in combat. Natural arms ... were soon discovered at hand. He learned to surmount nature's obstacles, combat other animals when necessary, fight for his subsistence even with men, or make up for what had to be yielded to the stronger.<sup>1</sup>

Natural man, and more specifically his needs, began to come into conflict with his environment and the needs of his fellow inhabitants, and he had to learn to adapt to new circumstances. A previously abundant environment, which sustained peaceful relations among human beings, had been lost and was replaced by an environment in which foodstuffs were somewhat scarcer. It is possible that these conflicts appeared due to an increase in the human population and the resulting lesser availability of easily obtained goods; more competition between men and the animals for foodstuffs, perhaps caused by environmental changes which give rise to scarcity; and the potential tyranny exercised by the stronger members over foodstuffs in the environment. In short, these conflicts indicate a growing need

for social relations and man's efforts to establish himself within this framework.

Obstacles in the environment necessitated a transformation in the way of life of human beings in order that they could adapt to surroundings in which social relations were becoming inevitable. This transformation appears in conjunction with a development in man's mental faculties. Thus, Rousseau writes:

This repeated utilization of beings in relation to himself, and of some beings in relation to others, must naturally have engendered in man's mind perceptions of certain relations. Those relationships that we express by the words large, small, strong, weak, fast, slow, fearful, bold, and other similar ideas, compared when necessary and almost without thinking about it, finally produced in him some sort of reflection, or rather a mechanical prudence that indicated to him the precautions most necessary for his safety.<sup>2</sup>

From these initial reflections, man was able to recognize his superiority over animals, thereby allowing him to establish his supremacy within the natural order.<sup>3</sup> Rousseau maintains that this development gave man the ability to perceive conformities:

The conformities that time could make him perceive among them, his female, and himself led him to judge of those which he did not perceive; and seeing that they all behaved as he would have done under similar circumstances, he concluded that their way of thinking and feeling conformed entirely to his own. And this important truth, established in his mind, made him follow a premonition as sure as dialectic and more prompt, the best

rules of conduct that it was suitable to observe toward them for his advantage and safety.<sup>4</sup>

Man's mental faculties had progressed to a point whereby he became capable of perceiving and evaluating the external behaviour and the internal predisposition of others. This progression indicates that man no longer was completely self-sufficient since his existence was not centred within himself; but rather, he began to view his existence in light of the lives and sentiments of others. The development, which allows man to understand and relate to others, shows that his faculty of self-perfection and imagination had begun to operate. In this way, man was able to transcend the limitations of love of oneself which, initially, had kept both his existence and his distinctiveness within himself.<sup>5</sup>

In judging his life in relation to others, man was able to determine the resemblances between himself and others, and this knowledge enabled him to predict the motives underlying the actions of others. The ability to "read" other people and to assess their motives facilitated his capacity for discerning when cooperation and competition were useful and when they would be detrimental.<sup>6</sup> The ability to easily identify the motivations behind the thoughts and actions of others could establish the basis for honest and nonexploitative relations between men and between men and women. In understanding themselves and in viewing the same or similar thoughts and feelings within others, men and women could interact in an authentic manner because they were themselves

and because they acted as themselves.<sup>7</sup> In short, the feelings, private thoughts and actions of each were consistent and thus, each person became capable of that internal consistency which could be transposed onto the external world. This is to say, people could relate to each other, in the external realm, on the basis of the internal order of each. Thus, the thoughts or feelings and actions of each individual were consistent, and this facilitated honest and nonexploitative relations because each person could be who he was, without feeling that he had to change for the benefit of others.

Rousseau argues that once industry became perfected, man's faculties developed correspondingly.<sup>8</sup> Thus, from the improvements made in industry, further changes in the environment followed:

This was the epoch of the first revolution, which produced the establishment and differentiation of families, and which introduced a sort of property—from which perhaps many quarrels and fights already arose. However, as the stronger were probably the first to make themselves lodgings they felt capable of defending, it is to be presumed that the weak found it quicker and safer to imitate them than to try to dislodge them; and as for those who already had huts, each man must seldom have sought to appropriate his neighbor's less because it did not belong to him than because it was of no use to him, and because he could not seize it without exposing himself to a lively fight with the family occupying it.<sup>9</sup>

This transition is based on a number of important factors which show how little the life of man had changed, with the establish-

ment of the family unit and property holdings, from his previous form of existence in the natural condition. First, Rousseau argues that property holdings were more than likely established by innovators in the environment and these initiators were the stronger members of the species who made for themselves permanent lodgings. The remaining group, the imitators, recognized that it was easier to copy the advancements made by the innovators, thereby averting the potential for violent conflicts. Hence, even those less advantaged by nature could survive equally well as the innovators, simply by following their example. Although natural inequalities give rise to distinctions between the strong/innovators and the weak/imitators, these were not used to disadvantage the weak. This could imply that the natural sentiment of pity hampered the strong's sentiment of love of oneself, which, without pity, could have prompted them to benefit at the expense of the weak.<sup>10</sup> Pity, then, could operate at this stage to ensure the mutual preservation of the species.<sup>11</sup> Secondly, the self-sufficiency of the weak was guaranteed by imitation and thus, their preservation was not endangered by the new self-sufficient status, based on the advent of permanent lodgings, of the stronger. Thirdly, property holdings were restricted by natural need since it was not necessary to acquire more than one place of residence, and as such, needs and ways of life remained on an equal footing.<sup>12</sup> Lastly, man's status as a free agent, established in the state of nature,<sup>13</sup> is maintained with the recognition and respect for property holdings in the

absence of a political authority. Although human existence was transformed by factors external to the immediate self of each, Rousseau does not indicate that these changes necessitated a complete metamorphosis in the general features which had characterized human life in the original state of nature.

Even with the advent of property holdings, the lives of women and men remained simple and solitary, without increasing their needs.<sup>14</sup> Further, man became accustomed to the use of implements which would facilitate the satisfaction of his needs, and as such, he increased his leisure time.<sup>15</sup> Rousseau then argues that leisure time was used to procure commodities, which both weakened man's constitution and developed into basic needs:

For, besides their continuing thus to soften body and mind, as these commodities had lost almost all their pleasantness through habit, and as they had at the same time degenerated into true needs, being deprived of them became more cruel than possessing them was sweet; and people were unhappy to lose them without being happy to possess them.<sup>16</sup>

At this point in man's development, commodities had become needs; things that were necessary to allow him to live according to the style to which he had become accustomed. In short, man was habituated to a certain manner of living and he valued all that was necessary to achieve this end. The greater value placed on possessions indicates that man's self-sufficiency was decreased further by his attachment to external goods.

Rousseau argues that the advent of permanent dwellings

prompted a unification of families in one area:

A permanent proximity cannot fail to engender at length some contact between different families. Young people of different sexes live in neighboring huts; the passing intercourse demanded by nature soon leads to another kind no less sweet and permanent through mutual frequentation.<sup>17</sup>

Rousseau indicates, here, that human sexuality established contact between neighboring families and this development eventually stimulates further identification with others. Thus, Rousseau suggests that this initial form of identification with others gives rise to bonds between families and from these attachments a community develops, and subsequently, a nation emerges, "...unified by customs and character, not by regulations and laws but by the same kind of life and foods and by the common influence of climate."<sup>18</sup>

With these changes becoming evident in the environment, people also experience an increase in passions. With the increase in interaction, sustained by the advent of communities, an increase in comparisons among individuals developed. Hence, Rousseau argues that from a mutual preference shared by a male and female love grew, and from love, jealousy emerged.<sup>19</sup> Also, from the public display of talents came self-esteem, and from the latter, the desire for public esteem.<sup>20</sup> From the desire for public esteem, Rousseau advocates that men claimed the right to consideration, which, in turn, created the duties of civility:

From this came the first duties of civility, even among savages; and from

this any voluntary wrong became an outrage, because along with the harm that resulted from the injury, the offended man saw in it contempt for his person which was often more unbearable than the harm itself. Thus, everyone punishing the contempt shown him by another in a manner proportionate to the importance he accorded himself, vengeance became terrible, and men bloodthirsty and cruel.<sup>21</sup>

With the rise of self-esteem or dignity, people sought to be respected for what they were and of what they were capable. This is to say, amidst a relatively uniform existence within this "Golden Era", the second stage of the state of nature, people demanded that their individuality be respected. Rousseau's view indicates that by offending a person's character, one in fact was insulting this person's right to show that he is a distinct human being. Rousseau maintains that if an individual desires to be respected as a distinct human being, he must inspire this awareness in others:

We must pay due respect to ourselves,  
if we expect to receive it from others;  
for how can we flatter ourselves, that  
others will pay to us what we have not  
for ourselves?<sup>22</sup>

Inherent in this development is a form of consent among individuals to the right of the individual self-determination of each. Since each person is responsible for himself, he must act in a manner which would allow others to recognize his own personal merits. In this way, the desire for public esteem is manifested along with the advent of self-esteem. The right of self-determination is reinforced by the person's right to reparation, practised when that person was harmed voluntarily by another.<sup>23</sup>



Although this advancement in the lives of human beings appears to arise in society without a natural basis established for it by Rousseau, this development does arise from a natural foundation.

The advent of the desire to distinguish oneself accompanies the development of self-esteem and the desire for public esteem. Man's self-esteem develops with the realization of his merits, which are revealed to him through comparisons with those around him.<sup>24</sup> From the recognition of his merits, man demanded that these qualities be respected by his fellows.<sup>25</sup> Underlying the demand for public esteem is man's desire to distinguish himself. Although Rousseau does not explain the genesis of this sentiment directly, it is possible to trace its development through conjecture.

The desire to distinguish oneself may be rooted in the natural sentiment of love of oneself and the care which inclines man to watch over his preservation.<sup>26</sup> It is the sentiment of love of oneself which allows woman and man to be sufficient unto themselves and which may, eventually, make them aware of their qualities and talents. In short, the sentiment of love of oneself is likely to be the equivalent of self-consciousness. Man's consciousness of himself is heightened by comparisons with others. Natural man, Rousseau indicates, becomes more conscious of himself when he compares himself to the animals.<sup>27</sup> This comparison would produce a realization of the distinctions prevailing between himself and animals, and from these comparisons, man was able to recognize his distinc-

tiveness. In this way, natural man could realize that he has a distinctive identity which accounts for the differences between himself and the other living inhabitants in the environment, and it is this recognition which allows him to establish his superiority over animals.<sup>28</sup> Further, the consciousness of the self is heightened by comparisons with other human beings. Man's consciousness of himself as a being endowed with certain qualities becomes evident the more he comes into contact with other human beings.<sup>29</sup> At first, man's comparisons with others are limited to contrasting the obvious physical qualities (large, small, strong, weak) and the manifestations of these features (fast, slow, bold, fearful).<sup>30</sup> In this way, man could judge that he was faster than one person, but slower than another, for example, and as such, he could value his qualities and realize his shortcomings. With these developments, man then was able to realize the conformities and dissimilarities between himself and others in their ways of thinking and feeling.<sup>31</sup> This development would allow man to view his thoughts and feelings as distinctive, or relative to himself alone, or as similar to the thoughts and feelings of others. The transition to the complete consciousness of the self occurred with the comparisons of man's talents to those possessed by others in the community.<sup>32</sup>

However, man's consciousness of himself in comparison to others could not arise without being accompanied by the development of the imagination, since the imaginative capacity would enable man to transport himself beyond the immediate

limits imposed by the self and to identify with others.<sup>33</sup> Thus, man's imagination aids him in developing as a distinct being.<sup>34</sup> However, the ability to distinguish the self also is given impetus by the faculty of self-perfection, which develops all of man's faculties and is evident both in the individual and in the species.<sup>35</sup> In this way, the perfectibility of the individual would correspond to the development of the individual's self as a distinct entity. Although Rousseau asserts that individuals desire to be recognized by their fellows, it is not entirely clear why he stresses the importance of this desire.

The desire to distinguish oneself may indicate Rousseau's concern for the maintenance of individuality within a social environment.<sup>36</sup> For this reason, the desire for distinction may also necessitate authentic relations between human beings. Rousseau was concerned that man be self-reliant, in the sense that he need not be anything but himself, or stated differently, that man's actions and thoughts are united.<sup>37</sup> On this basis, men could interact honestly and the motives for their actions would be known to all.<sup>38</sup> Further, man is aware of his distinctiveness simply because there are other human beings to whom he can compare himself and who, in essence, make him aware of himself as a distinct being. Therefore, authentic relations are necessary in order that each can reaffirm himself through comparisons with others. If the individual can fully understand the intentions of others, then he is more or less guaranteed of never being exploited or abused because of who he is, and

people could coexist and cooperate peacefully. Unless the distinctiveness of each is recognized, then the contact between individuals may be based on qualities alien or foreign to each. When interaction is based on external considerations, individuals give an ascendancy to things unrelated to themselves which are not indicative of their motivations and character. If the values which guide the actions of each are alien, in the sense of external, to each, then no one can identify with and control the influence of these externalities. In this way, insincerity would govern the relations among people and individuality would be subsumed by inauthenticity or by standards which are alien to each and every individual.<sup>39</sup> Further, with the advent of insincerity and alien standards, people do not relate to each other as distinct human beings; but rather, social interaction is characterized by standards which are not representative of human qualities.<sup>40</sup> If human qualities are taken from the interaction between human beings, then people alienate themselves from others and they are left free to use or exploit others, thereby fostering disharmonious relations.<sup>41</sup> Thus, Rousseau may have argued that the desire to distinguish oneself must operate in conjunction with the need for authenticity in the relations among men in order to ensure that human qualities are retained in interaction. In this way, individuality and perfectibility of each individual would give rise to the perfection and preservation of the entire species. Thus, Rousseau may have used the desire for distinction and the need for authentic relations in order to ensure the maintenance of

individuality within a situation of human interdependence in society.

In conjunction with self-sufficiency, the desire to distinguish oneself and the need for authenticity, Rousseau argues that men and women should find happiness within themselves:

But if there is a state in which the soul finds a solid enough base to rest itself on entirely and to gather its whole being into, without needing to recall the past or encroach upon the future; in which time is nothing for it; in which the present lasts forever without, however, making its duration noticed and without any trace of time's passage; without any other sentiment of deprivation or of enjoyment, pleasure or pain, desire or fear, except that of our existence, and having this sentiment alone fill it completely; as long as this state lasts, he who finds himself in it can call himself happy, not with an imperfect, poor and relative happiness such as one finds in the pleasures of life, but with a sufficient, perfect, and full happiness which leaves the soul no emptiness it might feel a need to fill.<sup>42</sup>

In this way, Rousseau maintains that the possibility for happiness lies within the individual and all that is necessary to attain satisfaction is for the individual to understand himself.

Rousseau states:

But it seems to me that what takes place outside of us can only offer passing distractions which let us fall back into this world impotent; and it is when we savor what is within ourselves and again find our soul in order, that we can draw forth sure enjoyment and savor a continuous happiness.<sup>43</sup>

For this reason, Rousseau stresses that each individual should know himself and find happiness with his qualities and limitations. Thus, external considerations and events would not prove to be as devastating to one who attains self-sufficiency through this form of happiness. Upon attaining this level of happiness, Rousseau argues that the individual can transform the environment to conform to his self:

The heart must be at peace and no passion come to disturb its calm. The one who experiences them must be favorable to them, as must be the conjunction of the surrounding objects. What is needed is neither absolute rest nor too much agitation, but a uniform and moderated movement having neither jolts nor lapses.<sup>44</sup>

Since the individual lives in society, he cannot find happiness in himself alone. Instead, the individual must learn to accommodate the presence of other people and include them in his happiness. Further, Rousseau recognizes that interdependence could be destructive to individuality and thus, urging each to know and find himself, individuality may be sustained in social relations. Women, by merit of having children and of instantly forming a close attachment to them, may be able to accomplish this much easier and more "naturally" than would men. Nonetheless, men must also find happiness in others.

When the individual realizes his qualities and can be satisfied with himself, he is then better able to participate and contribute to society. This is to say, after realizing one's potentials and limitations, the individual is more capable of finding his place within the natural order. For Rousseau

believes that everyone has a place and that each must know himself well enough to adapt employment to suit his qualities.

Rousseau writes:

Everything, says he [Wolmar] , tends to the common good in the universal system of nature. Every man has his place assigned in the best order and arrangement of things; the business is to find out that place and not to disturb such order.<sup>45</sup>

Although happiness is found within one's self, social beings must learn to find contentedness with familial and social relations as well. This is to say, social beings must make those around them a part of their happiness, if they are to find satisfaction within their external environment. For this reason, Rousseau concludes that for two people to render each other's lives happy is the most endearing and pleasing duty of humanity.<sup>46</sup> In short, if men and women can find happiness within themselves and project this happiness onto their environment, not only will they become attached to their environment but they will also be able to find happiness although they are dependent (on their spouse, their family, social relations, and society itself). To this end, Rousseau argues that citizens must be inspired by patriotism, since it would facilitate setting aside one's private interest to work for the common good when one has emotional attachments to his fellows:

Patriotism is the most effective, for as I have already said, each man is virtuous when his private will conforms on all matters with the general will, and we willingly want what is wanted by the people we love.<sup>47</sup>

The dependence engendered by men with the advent of social relations need not be exploitative as long as each learns to find happiness within himself and within others. In fact, Rousseau's perspective implies that men in society are much better off than they were in the natural condition because of the external attachments that they form.<sup>48</sup>

From the principles that Rousseau establishes in the "Golden Era", the ideal republic can be instituted. Thus, Rousseau argues that a political society arises from the need to

find a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.<sup>49</sup>

Men unite with each other on the basis of a social contract and this agreement, based on consent, ensures that men continue to be free and never subjected to the will of one man or group of men. Since one person or group of persons can never command power over another, Rousseau argues that each person can retain independence despite the advent of interdependence among men:

As each gives himself to all, he gives himself to no one; and since there is no associate over whom one does not acquire the same right one grants him over oneself, one gains the equivalent of everything one loses, and more force to preserve what one has.<sup>50</sup>

In fact, Rousseau maintains that the association of men produces a larger whole of which each is merely a part:

Instantly, in place of the private person of each contracting party, this



act of association produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will.<sup>51</sup>

The union of men produces a moral collectivity and thus, a higher order of which each is an essential part. In this way, Rousseau argues that political society elevates man:

This passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his behavior and giving his actions the morality they previously lacked. Only then, when the voice of duty replaces appetite, does man, who until that time only considered himself, find himself forced to act upon other principles and to consult his reason before heeding his inclinations. Although in this state he deprives himself of several advantages given him by nature, he gains such great ones, his faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas broadened, his feelings ennobled, and his whole soul elevated to such a point that if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him beneath the condition he left, he ought ceaselessly to bless the happy moment that tore him away from it forever, and that changed him from a stupid, limited animal into an intelligent being and a man.<sup>52</sup>

The interdependence among men in political society allows each to develop his uniquely human attributes of freedom and perfectibility. In this way, the interaction among men actually develops each person and despite this situation of interdependence, men remain "...as free as before".<sup>53</sup>

To ensure that the interdependent status of men in

political society does not become a means to exploit each other, Rousseau introduces the general will. Rousseau states that the general will is the expression of that which is shared by the citizens, since

...if the opposition of private interests made the establishment of societies necessary, it is the agreement of these same interests that made it possible. It is what these different interests have in common that forms the social bond, and if there were not some point at which all interests are in agreement, no society could exist. Now it is uniquely on the basis of this common interest that society ought to be governed.<sup>54</sup>

The general will is indicative of those common interests which unite men and thus, interdependence may not become exploitative since all are united by a common bond. Further, the general will is not exploitative not only because it represents the common desires of all, but also since it applies equally to each. Thus, Rousseau writes:

The engagements that bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual, and their nature is such that in fulfilling them one cannot work for someone else without also working for oneself. Why is the general will always right and why do all constantly want the happiness of each, if not because there is no one who does not apply this word each to himself, and does not think of himself as he votes for all? Which proves that the equality of right, and the concept of justice it produces, are derived from each man's preference for himself and consequently from the nature of man; that the general will, to be truly such, should be general in its object as well as in its essence; that it should come from all to apply to all; and that it loses its natural rectitude when it is

toward any individual, determinate object. Because then, judging what is foreign to us, we have no principle of equity to guide us.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, Rousseau argues that the general will applies to each person and is formed by each person, and in this way, it is equally applicable to all. No one is more obliged than another and further, the freedom of each is preserved. The general will, then, preserves freedom and equity, and these ensure against exploitation in political society. In short, Rousseau argues that when political society is governed by the general will, the dependence on other men and their personal wills is not possible. Thus, men are dependent on each other and no one is personally or more dependent on another, for "...as each gives himself to all, he gives himself to no one... ." <sup>56</sup> The general will ensures against private dependence, and thus, Rousseau writes:

How can it be that they obey and no one commands, that they serve and have no master, and are all the freer, in fact, because under what appears as subjugation, no one loses any of his freedom except what would harm the freedom of another. These marvels are the work of law. It is to law alone that men owe justice and freedom. It is this healthy instrument of the will of all that reestablishes, as a right, the natural equality among men. It is this celestial voice that tells each citizen the precepts of public reason, and teaches him to act according to the maxims of his own judgement and not to be in contradiction with himself.<sup>57</sup>

The general will establishes the freedom of each, the equality of all and in so doing, no one can be exploited for the benefit

of another. Further, Rousseau argues that, through following the general will, each retains his authenticity; this is to say, each judges on the basis of his internal maxims and through decision-making, each projects this consistency into his relations with others, and thus, man is free from internal contradiction.

However, in order to remain free from contradiction, men must follow the general will, which is "...a pure act of understanding, which reasons in the silence of the passions about what a man can demand of his fellow man and what his fellow man has the right to demand of him."<sup>58</sup> In order to follow the general will, men must be able to constrain their passions and consider the greatest good in all decisions. For this reason, Rousseau maintains that men must be virtuous:

Everything that is seen to contribute to this greatest good, but that laws do not specify, constitutes acts of civility, of goodwill; and the habit that disposes us to practice these acts even to our own disadvantage is what is called force or virtue.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, the general will and virtuous conduct would also ensure against exploitation in social relations.

Rousseau also argues that a natural order exists within social relations which, having natural inequalities between men as its basis, ensures the importance of the contributions of each to society. Thus, Rousseau writes:

Everything, says he [Wolmar], tends to the common good in the universal system of nature. Every man has his place assigned in the best order and arrangement of things; the business is to find

out that place and not to disturb such order.<sup>60</sup>

Rousseau suggests that, by nature, each man is suited to perform certain functions and these must be both included in and respected in the social order. Thus, Rousseau states:

Man, said she [Eloisa] is too noble a being to be made a mere tool for the use of others; he ought not to be employed in what he is fit for, without consulting how far such employment is fit for him; for we are not made for our stations, but our stations for us. In the right distribution of things, therefore, we should not adapt men to circumstances, but circumstances to men; we should not seek that employment for which man is best adapted, but that which is best adapted to make him virtuous and happy. For it can never be right to destroy one human soul for the temporal advantage of others, nor to make any man a villain for the use of honest people.<sup>61</sup>

Nonexploitative relations can be avoided if the abilities of each are included and honoured in the social order.

The transition to social relations, as I have shown in Chapter Two, shows the development of the general characteristics of mankind. Environmental obstacles stimulated the individual's mental faculties and from this, people began to compare themselves with others. From these comparisons, an individual was able to recognize similarities and dissimilarities with others. At this point, people needed others in order to reaffirm their own individuality, and thus, they become less self-reliant. The advancements in mental faculties began to perfect industry and in this way, property holdings were established and commodities were invented. These two developments meant, first,

men were governed by natural need; secondly, men retained and affirmed their status as self-governors; thirdly, natural inequalities became more evident, but were not used to disadvantage those who were not as capable as others; fourthly, despite advancements made by individuals, the entire species was preserved (and not just these individuals); and lastly, individuals moved further away from their former complete self-sufficiency. Also the transition to social relations gives evidence of greater interaction among individuals. The increase in interaction created an evolution of the passions and self-esteem. From self-esteem came the desire to distinguish oneself. The desire for distinction, supplemented by authentic relations, became the means of preserving individuality within a framework of interdependency. In this way, although people were no longer completely self-sufficient and depended on others to reaffirm their individuality, they still were able to maintain their authenticity within a sphere of interdependence.

From the general principles which operate in the "Golden Era", Rousseau's ideal political society could develop. Thus, the interdependence between men in the "Golden Era" could develop into the complete interdependence evident in the ideal republic. The republican system espoused by Rousseau would protect the equality and freedom of each. Further, Rousseau argues that from the association of men, each individual becomes a part of a larger whole, whereas before he was sufficient unto himself. In order to ensure that the interdependent status of men does not become a means of exploitation, Rousseau introduces

the general will which unites men on the basis of their common interest. The general will, not only sustains equality and freedom, but, it also ensures against dependence on the wills of others. In so doing, men retain their ability to be themselves, despite interdependence, and to channel their inner unity through the political union. In short, no one must change himself drastically to accommodate the presence of others. However, in order to retain their authenticity, men must find happiness within themselves and to discover that for which they are best-suited to perform. Thus, the natural order operates in society and establishes a place for each within society. All of these factors are conducive to nonexploitative relations. At this point, it remains to be determined whether these developments are parallel to those among women and men living in permanent associations.

Although Rousseau indicates that permanent familial unions coincided with the advent of property holdings,<sup>62</sup> his view indicates that the family existed prior to property, which merely "...produced the establishment and differentiation of families... ." <sup>63</sup> Further, he maintains that the environmental difficulties which stimulated the development of natural man's mental faculties<sup>64</sup> and allowed him to perceive conformities among other people and also, the similarities which existed between himself and "his female".<sup>65</sup> Rousseau's view, then, may indicate that something resembling a permanent union between male and female existed when environmental difficulties arose, if not before. This assertion could also signify that natural

man was involved in a somewhat permanent union before his mental faculties had completely developed. If this suggestion can be inferred from Rousseau's view of women, in general, and the state of nature, it may then be possible to argue that women could have been instrumental in initiating social relations in the form of a permanent familial unit.

Rousseau establishes that human beings were frugivorous, due to the shape of their teeth and the conformation of the intestines,<sup>66</sup> and this allowed the human race to live among themselves in continual peace.<sup>67</sup> He then argues that this assertion can be reinforced by the fact that the frugivorous female species members have only two teats and therefore, they were not meant to bear more than two children at a time.<sup>68</sup> He maintains that frugivorous species were designed to have so few children at one time, as compared to carnivorous species, because of their dietary habits:

The reason that can be given for this difference is that animals that live only on grasses and plants, remaining almost the entire day at pasture and being forced to spend much time nourishing themselves, could not be adequate to the nursing of several young; whereas voracious ones, having their meal almost in an instant, can more easily and more frequently return to their young and their hunting, and compensate for the dissipation of such a large quantity of milk.<sup>69</sup>

Thus, since frugivorous species must devote a great deal of time to feed themselves, nature restricts them to bearing a maximum of two children at one time.

Rousseau establishes that human beings are naturally



frugivorous, not carnivorous.<sup>70</sup> Further, he argues that the family is a natural institution only among frugivorous species.<sup>71</sup> In this way, the human family may become a natural unit only if human beings were not originally carnivorous and since the family unit is natural in frugivorous species, the human family may become a natural association on the basis of its ties to the frugivorous species. This assertion may be inferred from Rousseau's critique of John Locke, where he argues that

...if the help of the male were necessary to the female to preserve her young, it would be above all in the species that live only on grass, because the mother needs a very long time to graze, and during that entire period she is forced to neglect her brood; whereas the prey of a female bear or wolf is devoured in an instant, and she has more time, without suffering from hunger, to nurse her young. This reasoning is reaffirmed by an observation upon the relative number of teats and young which distinguishes the carnivorous species from the frugivorous... .<sup>72</sup>

If the frugivorous family is natural, then it is possible to argue that the human family would be natural insofar as human beings are frugivorous.<sup>73</sup> This is to say, the family could become a natural unit, although it was not natural originally, if the human species is frugivorous. This becomes a more plausible assertion if either environmental difficulties necessitated the male's aid or if the number of pregnancies increased among the female members of the species. Although Rousseau does not specify concretely that established relations between the sexes arise from either scarcity or an increase in pregnancies or both, it may be inferred that an increase in the

number of pregnancies contributed to scarcity or coexisted with it, and this would necessitate the assistance of males to ensure the preservation of the species.

In Chapter Two, it was suggested that the repeated experience of maternal love combined with the developments of their mental faculties (imagination, extension of love of oneself, perfectibility, language, and pity) may have allowed women to progress to an understanding of the consequences of the sexual union.<sup>74</sup> If females develop conceptual knowledge before males are capable of this, then women, aware of the consequences of sexual relations, would choose to become pregnant. Further, once females understand the consequences of their sexuality, they could become pregnant more often. If females become pregnant more often, their self-sufficient status may no longer be maintained. In essence, self-reliance for women in the state of nature might only be possible if they have only one child to care for at any given time. This could be substantiated by Rousseau's assertion that in the frugivorous species the male's assistance is necessary for the preservation of the female and her young, more than in the carnivorous species.<sup>75</sup> If women become less self-sufficient when they have more children, then, according to Joel Schwartz, they could either become carnivorous or they could seek the assistance of males.<sup>76</sup> If females (and males) were to become omnivorous, this would create a number of problems for them. First, it would take time for females to learn to stalk or trap and kill animals, and during this time, her children would be exposed to attacks

from other animals, and starvation. Secondly, the female would be competing with other carnivorous animals and as such, she would expose herself to attacks from these animals, and to starvation if she could not quickly adapt. And lastly, if a female has more than one child to care for at any given time, her physical constitution may weaken and her children may not develop as quickly. The female's constitution would weaken because she must expend more time and greater effort to fend for herself and for her children. This, in turn, could imply that her children would develop less quickly, because their mother must fend for more than one child and because she could not give each child the same amount of attention to teach them to fend for themselves. As such, her children would become more dependent upon her. Thus, the increasing demands of the children on their mother and the increase in both time and effort to provide for their subsistence, could diminish the strength of the female's constitution, and this could impede her success in killing and combatting animals. For these three reasons, it may be more likely to assume that women opted to enlist the assistance of males in guaranteeing the subsistence of their children. In fact, Rousseau's description of the transition to permanent associations among women and men implies that females enlisted the aid of males.

Rousseau implies that males and females were united before the advent of environmental difficulties and before the complete development of man's mental faculties. He also argues that,

The continual cohabitation of husband and wife provides such an immediate opportunity to be exposed to a new pregnancy that it is very hard to believe that chance encounter of the impulsion of temperament alone produced such frequent effects in the pure state of nature as in the state of conjugal society.<sup>78</sup>

As Schwartz points out, Rousseau may suggest, in the above passage, that conjugal society arises as a cause of the increase in women's pregnancies and not as an effect of this increase.<sup>79</sup> Thus, the increase in pregnancies necessitates the assistance of the males. Further, Rousseau argues that emotional attachments and familial bonds arise from permanent associations:

The first developments of the heart were the effect of a new situation, which united husbands and wives, fathers and children in a common habitation. The habit of living together gave rise to the sweetest sentiments known to men: conjugal love and paternal love.<sup>80</sup>

Rousseau maintains that conjugal love and paternal love can only be experienced when men become habituated to living with their mates and children. Since Rousseau does not suggest that the habit of living together, at this point, gave rise to maternal love and conjugal love, it could indicate that Rousseau believes that both the maternal and conjugal sentiments existed in women prior to the establishment of permanent associations. This interpretation depends on Rousseau's use of "men" to refer only to the male members of the species. This interpretation is the most logical since, within the remainder of the passage quoted above, Rousseau specifically differentiates between his use of

"men" and "women", according to the sentiments and occupations he assigns to them.<sup>81</sup> It is not plausible to assume that Rousseau used "men", in reference to conjugal love and paternal love, to refer to both men and women. Thus, since Rousseau does not make any mention of a development of these types of emotions in women, at this point, it implies that maternal love is a more natural sentiment than is paternal love,<sup>82</sup> and that women were capable of conjugal love, or a sentiment resembling it, prior to its emergence in men in conjugal society. If conjugal society arises as a cause of more frequent pregnancies and if women experience both maternal and conjugal sentiments prior to the establishment of permanent associations between the sexes, then it is more likely to assume that women enlisted the aid of men to ensure their preservation and that of their children. Further, if it can be shown that the conjugal sentiment may have existed in women prior to permanent associations, women's role as the initiators of social relations would then become more concrete.

Rousseau argues that the family was united on the basis of mutual affection and freedom.<sup>83</sup> In some respects, it is difficult to understand, particularly for men, how previously solitary and self-reliant human beings could suddenly become emotive. Rousseau states that initially the development of emotions and emotional attachments is engendered by the sentiment of love of oneself:

In seeking to be loved, one comes to love; love is an inevitable outcome of self-interest: and from this mutual

affection- the result of equality-  
spring without effort all the virtue  
which our constant homilies fail to  
secure... .<sup>84</sup>

Emotional attachments arise from the love of oneself, which awakens in man or woman the desire to be loved. It could be argued that since the woman's love of herself is developed and extended to her children within the union of mother and child,<sup>85</sup> it is more likely that she would be more capable of forming an emotional attachment to a man, before the man was able to do so. Further, with the development of her sentiment of love of oneself and an awareness of the consequences of sexuality, both these factors would enable women to form a conjugal sentiment on the basis of their conceptual knowledge. If women desire to have children, it is conceivable that they could form an emotional bond with the men who are willing to impregnate them. Thus, a woman could appreciate the male's sexual desire, forming perhaps an attachment to him on this basis, insofar as he will satisfy her desire to have another child.

Further, Rousseau maintains that the family is united by freedom; that is, the woman and the man have freely given each other preference, and for this reason, they begin to live together on a permanent basis. However, Rousseau indicates that only women make a choice of mates:

...in species in which one male is united with one female, in which mating produces a sort of moral bond- a sort of marriage- the female belongs by her own choice to the male to whom she has given herself, and commonly resists all others.<sup>86</sup>

Rousseau's assertion may indicate that the female chooses the

male to whom she will give herself and that the male need not make a choice of mates at all, but merely accepts or rejects the female. This difference is significant because the choice made by the male is more passive, whereas the female's choice is active; the female seeks to choose a mate, the male does not search for one. The importance of this distinction consists in its application to the emotional sentiments arising from love of oneself. If women are capable of a sentiment resembling conjugal love prior to the establishment of permanent relations, then it may be logical to argue that females chose their mates; while their mates were not capable of making a choice, but merely could confirm or deny an advance of this nature by the female. In short, women, being capable of making choices, if they could discern the consequences of sexual relations,<sup>87</sup> could be the aggressors in initiating unions of a permanent nature. This could also explain why Rousseau states that, prior to permanent associations, the female belonged to the male, since those faculties necessary to enable him to make an active choice had not yet developed. Women could only be the males' possessions because they did not actively seek to choose a woman as a mate. Men only become capable of actively choosing a mate after the establishment of permanent associations and their experience of conjugal love, both of which then would unite the family on the basis of "...reciprocal affection and freedom... ."89

In short, the developments which occur from within the union of a mother and her child, allow women to progress in a

unique way. The repeated experience and memory of the maternal sentiment could have allowed women to develop conceptual knowledge before men did. This advancement, in turn, may have caused an increase in the number of pregnancies for women, which did not enable them to sustain their self-sufficient status. The loss of their self-reliance may have directed women to actively seeking males' assistance in order to provide for the subsistence of their children and themselves. Their choice of mates was facilitated by the sentiment of love of oneself, developed and extended within the union of a mother and child, and their ability to make choices, based on the conceptual knowledge which arises when the female discerns the consequences of sexuality. Taken together, these factors indicate that women may have been the initiators of permanent sexual and familial relations.

Just as in the transition to social relations, the environmental factors which caused relations among men to become more necessary, the inability of women to care for more than one child at a time, made the permanent conjugal and familial unions necessary.<sup>90</sup> Both of these developments are initiated by an awakening of mental faculties, and both are dependent on the conceptual knowledge which led to permanent associations.<sup>91</sup> Further, both progressions create the establishment of permanent associations and from this sense of stability, emotional bonds arise. Thus, in social relations, human sexuality gives rise to community bonds and from these, a nation emerges;<sup>92</sup> and in the personal relations between the sexes, human sexuality gives



rise to the conjugal union, and the conjugal union gives rise to the family unit, and from these, conjugal love and paternal love develop.<sup>93</sup> In this way, the developments in social and personal relations are parallel.

The advent of the family was responsible for a division of labour between the sexes, heretofore unknown in their separate existences. Rousseau concludes that women became sedentary and began to care for their home and their children on a regular basis, while men went to seek their common subsistence.<sup>94</sup> As Susan Moller Okin argues, this development occurred suddenly and with no apparent explanation for its emergence:

Suddenly, in a single paragraph, and virtually without explanation, he postulates 'a first revolution', in which, together with rudimentary tools and the first huts, which together constituted 'a sort of property', appears the very first cohabitation, in the form of the monogamous nuclear family. Suddenly, also without justification, he introduces a complete division of labour between the sexes. Whereas previously the way of life of the two sexes had been identical, now 'women became more sedentary and grew accustomed to tend the hut and the children, while the man went to seek their common subsistence.' This division of labour, of course, meant that the entire female half of the species was no longer self-sufficient, and since it had been this very self-sufficiency which had been the guarantee of the freedom and equality that characterized the original state of nature, one might expect, though one will not find, some commentary on the inequality which had thus been established.<sup>95</sup>

Although Okin claims that Rousseau does not give any explanation for the implementation of a sexual division of labour, he does

assert why this becomes necessary. As the human race had begun to progress, people were able to live and to procure their subsistence more easily. However, this more "luxurious" existence caused men and women to become less robust. Rousseau writes:

The two sexes also began, by their slightly softer life, to lose something of their ferocity and vigour. But if each one separately became less suited to combat savage beasts, on the contrary, it was easier to assemble in order to resist them jointly.<sup>96</sup>

As men and women developed mentally and emotionally, thereby assembling into permanent unions, the physical constitution of both sexes began to deteriorate. However, the constitution of the female may have weakened more than that of the male since pregnancies occurred more often,<sup>97</sup> and since children became more dependent on their mothers. Thus, the support of the father became necessary in the "Golden Era" since children, like their mothers and fathers, also lost some of their vigour. Concerning the differences between children in the natural state and those in permanent associations, Rousseau writes:

With regard to children, there are many reasons to believe that their strength and their organs develop later among us than they did in the primitive state of which I speak. The original weaknesses they derive from the constitution of their parents, the cares taken to wrap and restrain all their limbs, the softness in which they are raised, perhaps the use of milk other than their mother's, everything oppresses and retards in them the first progress of nature. The concentration they were obliged to give to a thousand things on which their attention is continually fixed, while no exercise is given to

their bodily strength, may also bring about considerable diversion in their growth; so that if instead of first overburdening and tiring their minds in a thousand ways, their bodies were left to be exercised by the continual movements that nature seems to demand of them, it is to be presumed that they would much sooner be capable of walking, acting, and providing for their needs themselves.<sup>98</sup>

Since children had become more dependent on their mothers, before permanent associations,<sup>99</sup> it is conceivable that their physical constitutions began to develop more slowly than they would have when women bore only one child at a time. Further, since children in the "Golden Era" do not need to provide for themselves, their fathers provide subsistence for all family members, it is not necessary that they develop as quickly as would children in the original state of nature. Children, then, become more dependent on their parents for their subsistence and as such, their physical constitutions develop less quickly. The softening of the constitutions of men, women, and children necessitated joint efforts in order to provide sufficient resistance to life-threatening situations. This implies that preservation, in general, requires joint efforts, and as such, complete self-reliance is no longer possible for the sexes to maintain. Instead, their mutual preservation required interdependence, and the division of labour, introduced within the family unit, indicates a need for the sexes to rely on each other. The necessity for interdependence also reinforces the assertion that women initiated the family unit because their preservation and that of their children were endangered.<sup>100</sup>

A second contributing factor to explain the reasons why Rousseau instituted a division of labour, refers to the facility of providing mutual preservation once new implements were designed:

In this new state, with a simple and solitary life, very limited needs, and the implements they had invented to provide for them, since men enjoyed very great leisure, they used it to procure many kinds of commodities unknown to their fathers... .<sup>101</sup>

Rousseau indicates that the invention of new implements made the procuring of food and other necessities less difficult and less time-consuming. Also, since people lived according to naturally limited needs, it was not necessary that both male and female seek food; that is, because needs were limited, the provision of necessities would not require more effort and time than one person could expend without any loss or burden. Further, Rousseau suggests that people, at this stage, more than likely practiced a primitive form of horticulture:

Once they became industrious, it is credible that, with sharp stones and pointed sticks, they began by cultivating a few vegetables or roots around their huts long before they knew how to prepare wheat and had the implements necessary for large-scale cultivation.<sup>102</sup>

Thus, horticulture would also facilitate the provision of basic needs. The facility with which foodstuffs could be procured and the use of implements, designed specifically for this task, simplified the man's ability to provide the necessities for his family. Since ensuring the subsistence of one's family neither required a great deal of time nor effort, the necessary labour

for the preservation of the family unit was divided between the sexes. Rousseau's view implies that the males hunted and gathered food because of their physical supremacy and the females cared for their children and tended the hut because it was necessary for them to remain close to their children in order to nurture the youngest ones, who were the most dependent. The weakened condition of women, children and men necessitated a division of labour since they could no longer be self-sufficient. Thus, the loss of self-reliance necessitates interdependence.

Just as the advent of property holdings, in the form of permanent lodgings, gave evidence of a distinction between the stronger and the weak,<sup>103</sup> the division of labour also distinguishes between the stronger (males) and the weak (females and children). Also, the inequalities that exist between stronger and weak men are not used to disadvantage the weak, hampered by pity perhaps.<sup>104</sup> In much the same way, the inequalities between men and both women and children indicate that these inequalities need not engender exploitation; but rather, they can be conducive to interdependence and mutual benefit. Also, men would not use their strength to exploit women and children because of emotional developments- conjugal love and paternal love. Further, just as property holdings were restricted by natural need,<sup>105</sup> the division of labour was determined by that labour which was necessary for the family's preservation. Also, in the transition to social relations, man's status as a free agent is maintained with the recognition and respect for

property holdings in the absence of political authority.<sup>106</sup>

In much the same way, men and women unite in conjugal unions without contracts, and work in different spheres without problems arising between them. The lives of women and men were no longer independent, as they had been in the state of nature. However, women appear to become more dependent than do men with the advent of the division of labour. At this point, it is necessary to examine further the inequality, based on differences of physical strength, between women and men.

Rousseau differentiates between that which is species related and that which is gender related. The former accounts for the characteristics common to both sexes, while the latter serves to distinguish between the sexes. Thus, Rousseau writes:

The only thing we know with certainty is that everything that men and women have in common belongs to the species, and that everything which distinguishes them belongs to the sex. From this double perspective, we find them related in so many ways and opposed in so many other ways that it is perhaps one of the marvels of nature to have been able to construct two such similar beings who are constructed so differently.<sup>107</sup>

Hence, on one plane, men and women are considered equals in as much as they are members of the human species, and as such, they share some common characteristics and inclinations. On a second plane, women and men are unequal by virtue of sexually distinct characteristics and inclinations. Rousseau, however, maintains that gender based inequalities are not substantial:

In everything not connected with sex, woman is man. She has the same organs, the same needs, the same faculties. The machine is constructed in the same

way; its parts are the same; the one functions as does the other; the form is similar; and in whatever respect one considers them, the difference is only one of more or less.<sup>108</sup>

Although Rousseau argues that the differences between man and woman are based on gender, he indicates that these are not terribly significant. However, he then argues that the gender distinctions between the sexes are responsible for the attributes of masculinity and femininity.

Gender based distinctions are resolved into physical differences, primarily in strength and stature. Rousseau makes it clear that a woman is made to please a man because of his physical supremacy, thereby indicating that the woman is disadvantaged in this respect:

...woman is made to specially please man. If man ought to please her in turn, it is due to a less direct necessity. His merit is in his power, he pleases by the sole fact of his strength. This is not the law of love, I agree. But it is that of nature, prior to love itself.<sup>109</sup>

Although this view of nature and the relations between men and women in the state of nature is not concretely specified in the Second Discourse, a basis for this perspective can be inferred from Rousseau's deliberations on the state of nature. It may be possible to assume that the male's physical strength became a factor in the female's choice to give one male preference.<sup>110</sup> If the female could no longer retain her self-sufficient status, with more than one child to fend for, she may have sought a mate who, by virtue of his physical strength, could best adapt

himself to the new circumstances and who could provide and protect the female and her offspring. In short, if women became concerned for their preservation and that of their children, they may have given greater preference to those males who, by merit of their physical strength, are most capable of enduring and surpassing hardships. Physical strength, then, becomes a desired quality only with the advent of hardships for women.

A complete equality between the sexes cannot be established due to the superiority of the male's physical strength. In fact, Rousseau argues that the inferior physical abilities of women allowed them to be conquered:

To what end are they given a heart more sensitive to pity, in running less speed, a body less robust, a shorter stature, more delicate muscles, if nature had not let themselves be vanquished? Subjected to the indispositions of pregnancy and the pains of childbirth, should such an increase in labour exact a diminution of strength? But, to be reduced to this hard estate, they had to be strong enough to succumb only when they want to and feeble enough to always have a pretext for submitting. This is exactly the point at which nature has placed them.<sup>111</sup>

Rousseau's perspective implies that the physical inferiority of women was part of nature's plan which would allow them to be conquered. This may be substantiated by the female's inability to maintain her self-sufficiency by having more than one child at a time.<sup>112</sup> The female's inferior physical capacities would then be responsible for her own defeat. This assertion could imply that males believed that they had conquered women, when, in fact, women actually chose their mates. This is to say, if



the male was not able to understand that the female was choosing a mate and would merely consider the female as a possession,<sup>113</sup> he may believe that he had conquered her in some way or that her choice was actually a form of submission to his physical strength. This proposition becomes more plausible since, prior to the reference to the female as the male's possession, Rousseau argues that man was able to distinguish between the strengths and weaknesses of others, in comparison to his own abilities,<sup>114</sup> and that upon his ability to judge the capabilities of others against his own, nascent man felt "...the first stirring of pride... ." <sup>115</sup> The ability to distinguish between his strengths and those of others, and the first feeling of pride could indicate that men came to believe that they conquered women. However, the supremacy of physical strength becomes most evident in sexual relations. The sexual union becomes a means through which the male is assured of his physical supremacy and consequently, for the female to admit her vulnerability and her inferiority to the physical prowess of the male. This is to say, the female is vulnerable to the physical power of the male, as she would have difficulty resisting a direct physical attack on her by her partner, if he is so inclined. In this way, the sexual coupling seems to symbolize the right of the stronger, since the male's physical power is established, as is access to what is his.

Although Rousseau maintains that the physical differences between men and women are not substantial, he suggests that moral distinctions result from the physical differences between the

sexes:

In the union of the two sexes each contributes equally to the common aim, but not in the same way. From this diversity arises the first assignable differences in the moral relations of the two sexes. One ought to be active and strong, the other passive and weak. One must necessarily will and be able; it suffices that the other put up little resistance.<sup>116</sup>

The physical distinctions between women and men give them a diversity of capabilities which emerge in the moral relations of the two sexes. Rousseau concludes that one partner ought to be passive and weak, the other active and strong. This statement could imply that these distinctions are not always easy to maintain, if they are attainable at all, and as such, it becomes merely a prescription, as is evidenced by the use of "ought", for the sexes to follow. However, Rousseau argues that the sexes should strive to maintain these distinctions:

All the faculties common to the two sexes are not equally distributed between them, but taken together, they balance out. Woman is worth more as woman and less as man. Whenever she makes use of her rights, she has the advantage. Whenever she wants to usurp ours, she remains beneath us.<sup>117</sup>

The importance of Rousseau's argument consists in his assertion that despite the physical inferiority of women, they are compensated with "rights", unrelated to physical prowess, which they can use to their advantage. Thus, the maintenance of the natural distinctions or inequalities will not disadvantage the female despite her physical inferiority. This is directly parallel to Rousseau's assertion that the innovations made by the stronger

members of the human species will not disadvantage the weaker members,<sup>118</sup> as long as the stronger do what they do best (innovate) and the weaker adhere to their capabilities (imitating). From this proposition, one could infer a moral difference in the relations between the stronger and the weak: one ought to be passive and weak, and thus, imitate; the other ought to be active and strong, and thus, innovate; and in this way, the preservation of the entire species will be assured.

Another important component of Rousseau's insistence of maintaining the distinctions between the sexes, consists in an acknowledgement of the significant contributions of each sex. Rousseau's view implies that each sex maintains a sphere of importance which complements the other's abilities, and as such, a woman's importance consists in retaining those inclinations peculiar to her gender and not in attempting to be like men.<sup>119</sup> This is to say, women and men, being endowed with different inclinations which are based on the physical distinctions between the two, are capable of different occupations, both of which are necessary to achieve their common objectives. In this way, women retain a sphere of importance, through which their unique contributions to the common good are channelled, just as men add to the common good in a way which women cannot. The survival of the family unit depends on the unique, but different contributions of each sex toward that aim. The separate spheres of each sex supplement the sustenance of and provision for the family. This assertion is parallel to the unique, but different contributions of the innovators and the imitators which allow

for the mutual preservation of the species, and to those special contributions made by each man to the common good.<sup>120</sup>

In accordance with the confinement of women to the home, women's talents are related to that which is common and practical. Men's talents, however, lie in the moral realm; that is, men's capabilities can best be exercised in that realm which is part of a higher order in the scheme of things. Rousseau describes the moral order as that sphere in which men display their capacity to overcome their physical characteristics and the limits that these impose on men. This distinction between the sexes can be shown by Rousseau's account of their sexual differences:

While giving man inclinations without limit, He gives him at the same time the law which regulates them, in order that he may be free and in command of himself. While abandoning man to immoderate passions, He joins reason to these passions in order to govern them. While abandoning women to unlimited desires, He joins modesty to those desires in order to constrain them. In addition, He adds yet another real recompense for the good use of one's faculties- the taste we acquire for decent things where we<sup>121</sup> make them the rule of our actions.

Although both men and women are governed by physical inclinations and characteristics, men alone can transcend their bodies' dictates through reason; while women remain associated with their bodies, despite the constraints imposed by modesty. In short, men can surpass the limitations demanded by their bodies, but women, although modesty allows them to transcend their (potentially) unlimited sexual desires, remain governed by their bodies.

At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between two terms that Rousseau utilizes to differentiate between the sexes- passions and desires.

Within the context of the above quotation, immoderate passions may refer to either strong feelings, in the sense of deep sensitivity, while unlimited desires refer to the potentially limitless craving for sexual satisfaction. What both have in common consists in the fact that both arise or originate from needs. Needs, initially, are the dictates of the body which require satisfaction- nourishment, repose, and sex. Rousseau maintains that passions originate from needs and progress from knowledge.<sup>122</sup> In this way, passions may be an internal sensitivity to external objects which will increase through habitual exposure of knowledge. For example, the need for sexual relations with a female eventually, after permanent unions have been established, gives rise to conjugal love; and sexual relations with one female give rise to paternal love through habitual exposure and the knowledge of the consequences of sex. Passions, then, are active and consist of an internal sensitivity to external objects. Desires, however, may also be based on needs; or at least some desires are founded on needs. Desires are a wish or desire for something toward which a person is impelled. Thus, sexual desires are based on a need for sexual satisfaction. As long as desires correspond to limited needs, for example, the needs of the body, desires need not create turmoil.<sup>123</sup> However, when knowledge progresses desires need not be restricted to the physical dictates of the

body, but rather, they can be associated with the realization that something is lacking. As such, desires can be a longing for something not presently within reach but which may be attained in the future. Rousseau writes:

With the sole exception of the physically necessary, which nature itself demands, all our other needs are such only by habit, having previously not been needs, or by our desires; and one does not desire that which he is not capable of knowing. From which it follows that savage man, desiring only those things the possession of which is in his power or easily acquired, nothing should be so tranquil as his soul and nothing so limited as his needs.<sup>124</sup>

Perhaps the most interesting dissimilarity between passions and desires is that the former, depending upon an internal sensitivity directed outwards, is likely to arise from habit or experience; while the latter, understood as a wish for something, is more likely to be associated with the imagination. Thus, men, as passionate creatures, needed habitual exposure to women and children in order to form emotional attachments through which their passions are channelled. Women, however, only need their imagination or conceptual knowledge to discern the consequences of sexuality and thus, to initiate permanent family relations. The distinctions between passions and desires becomes significant since they determine the sphere and abilities of each sex.

Rousseau argues that even the intellectual abilities of women are associated with their physical inclinations:

Women, in general, do not like any art, know nothing about any, have no genius.

They can succeed in little works which require only quick wit, taste, grace, and sometimes even a bit of philosophy and reasoning. They can acquire science, condition, talents, and everything which is acquired by dint of work. But that celestial flame which warms and sets fire to the soul, that burning eloquence, those sublime transports which carry their raptures to the depths of hearts, will always lack in the writings of women; their works are all cold and pretty as they are; they may contain as much wit as you please, never a soul; they are a hundred more times sensible than passionate.<sup>125</sup>

Although Rousseau here addresses the distinctions between men and women, these differences may also apply to the stronger and the weak. In this way, the stronger may refer to the males who have surpassed the physical limitations of their bodies, which would allow them to make innovations; while the weak are hampered by their inability to transcend their constitution. Like women, the weak could acquire sensible things, but they could never be capable of sufficient genius to innovate. This perspective is evident in Rousseau's message for the common man:

As for us, common men not endowed by heaven with such great talents and not destined for so much glory, let us remain in our obscurity. Let us not chase after a reputation which would escape us... . . . Let us leave to others the care of informing people of their duties, and limit ourselves to fulfilling well our own. We do not need to know more than this.<sup>126</sup>

Rousseau establishes guidelines for the happiness of the common man by urging him to be content with his lot and let others provide innovations and guidance.

Rousseau establishes that men, and not women, are passionate creatures which implies that men are dependent on women for the fulfillment of their passions. Further, they may also be dependent on women for the maintenance of everyday concerns. The contrast in the abilities of women and men may become more evident in the following:

Consult the taste of women in physical things connected with the judgement of the senses, but consult the taste of men in moral things that depend more on the understanding.<sup>127</sup>

Perhaps the main reason why women operate within a sphere concerned with only what is "physical", is that their existence is bound more closely with what is natural to their sex; that is, they are associated with the bearing and nurturing of children. In this way, women are considered to be hampered by their bodies, due to pregnancy and unlimited sexual desires.

The discussion of the physical differences between the sexes, which become evident when women are no longer capable of being completely self-reliant, has been shown to be parallel to the distinctions which differentiate between the stronger or the innovators and the weak or the imitators. The importance of this parallel lies in its applicability to men and not just between men and women. This is to say, there does exist the same type of natural distinctions between men, as between the sexes. Thus, women are not the only ones who appear more disadvantaged by the physical superiority of men, since the weak also appear disadvantaged by the stronger. Rousseau argues, however, that these distinctions are not



disadvantageous to either the weak or to women since both perform necessary and useful functions. He also indicates that the weak and women should learn to be satisfied with who and what they are, in order to retain their importance which is manifested in their unique forms of contributions. If these distinctions are maintained, the common good of the stronger and the weak, and of men and women can be achieved. The natural inequalities between women and men are similar to those which exist between men. As such, it may be implied that within the natural order, each sex is imbued with qualities that direct it to fulfill a function which contributes to the common good. In this situation, the common good may be the preservation of the entire species. Thus, the distinctions which apply to each sex are similar to those which relate to men in social relations, and through the maintenance of these differences, the common good of both is achieved.<sup>128</sup>

Apart from caring for the children and the home, the sustenance of the family requires that women be concerned with virtuous behaviour. Virtue is defined as the habit by which one is inclined to contribute to the greatest good, even when it may be disadvantageous to do so.<sup>129</sup> With the distinctions between the sexes, each sex contributes to the common good in different ways. Rousseau writes:

The kind of life, says she [Eloisa], which would delight the one, would be insupportable to the other; the inclinations which nature has given them, are as different as the occupations she has assigned them: they differ in their amusements as much as

in their duties. In a word, each contributes to the common good by different ways, and the proper distribution of their several cares and employments, is the strongest tie that cements their union.<sup>130</sup>

Of all the virtues, chastity is foremost in ensuring the continuity of a harmonious family life. However, the emphasis on being chaste is directed mainly toward women: "I [Eloisa] will be faithful because it is the chief duty which unites private families and society in general. I will be chaste because it is the parent virtue which nourishes all the rest."<sup>131</sup> In short, women must be concerned with fidelity and chastity, and she is accountable to both her family and society for her virtue. Rousseau states:

It is important then, not only that a woman be faithful, but that she be judged to be faithful by her husband, by those near her, by everyone. It is important that she be modest, attentive, reserved, and that she gives evidence of her virtue to the eyes of others as well as to her own conscience. If it is important that a father love his children, it is important that he esteem the mother. These are the reasons which put even appearances among the duties of women, and make honor and reputation no less indispensable to them than chastity. There follows from these principles, along with the moral difference of the sexes, a new motive of duty and propriety which prescribes especially to women the scrupulous attention to their conduct, their manners, and their bearing.<sup>132</sup>

The insistence on women's chastity is consistent with what Rousseau calls the moral difference between the sexes, which establish that women should be consulted in matters relating to the

judgement of the senses and that men should be consulted in matters which depend on the understanding.<sup>133</sup> In essence, women should be concerned mainly with what is physical, since their existences, and perhaps, their importance are based on their biological construction; while the contributions of men should be connected with the moral order, since the preservation of the family depends on his ability to act in society and to coexist with other men. However, the reasons why Rousseau asserts that women must pay close attention to their chastity must now be considered.

Rousseau demands that women appear to be chaste beyond all doubt and he indicates that there are three reasons why this must be the woman's responsibility. First, women must be chaste because the sexual act has greater consequences for them than it does for men. Chastity for women is stressed because of their ability to become pregnant. Rousseau states:

'Why', they ask, 'should what is not shameful for a man be so for a woman? Why should one of the sexes make a crime for itself out of what the other believes itself permitted?' As if the consequences were the same on both sides!<sup>134</sup>

Rousseau asserts, in this quotation, that women are capable of becoming pregnant and for this reason, they should not partake in extramarital affairs. This reason may not be an adequate indication of Rousseau's meaning simply because it reveals no more than women's ability to become pregnant; however, this assertion becomes more significant when it is associated with the second and third reasons, offered by Rousseau, for

emphasizing a woman's chastity.

Secondly, Rousseau argues that women need to be more concerned with chastity, although this does not mean that men need not be concerned at all, since he believes that they have potentially unlimited desires and since they can easily entice men, who prove to be extremely vulnerable to their charms.<sup>135</sup> If women are ruled by (potentially) unlimited sexual desires and since men, who are ruled by immoderate passions, are easily enticed by women, women must guard their chastity closely within the familial setting in order to sustain the moral fibre of the family and hence, society.<sup>136</sup> Women's potentially unlimited desires must be constrained for the benefit of male security and conceivably, for the benefit of peaceful coexistence among men in society. The need for men to feel secure becomes clearer with the third reason that Rousseau advances for the emphasis of female chastity.

Thirdly, women must be concerned with their chastity because mothers provide the link between fathers and their children. Rousseau argues that a father would not be likely to love any child which he believes is not his own. In this way, the father's love is insecure and he needs a guarantee that a child is his before he could develop a paternal sentiment. According to Rousseau, a woman's infidelity dissolves this link:

It is up to the sex that nature has charged with the bearing of children to be responsible for them to the other sex. Doubtless it is not permitted to anyone to violate his faith;

and every unfaithful husband who deprives his wife of the only reward of the austere duties of her sex is an unjust and barbarous man. But the unfaithful woman does much more; she dissolves the family and breaks all the bonds of nature. In giving the man children which are not his, she betrays both.<sup>137</sup>

When the woman becomes pregnant and enlists the aid of the male, as in the developing state of nature, social relations evolve and a number of different roles come into being: women become wives and mothers, and men become husbands and fathers. In short, the woman's pregnancy and her inability to sustain her self-reliance generates a whole social framework to which men become habituated and attached. The social framework is not as alien to women as it is to men, because Rousseau argues that the maternal sentiment is natural and also, it is a sentiment which is experienced more intimately by women because of the actual childbirth and nurturing process. Men do not have as intimate an experience with the paternal sentiment and the reason for this may be that they are effectively alienated from experiencing both childbirth and nurturing because of their own reproductive processes. Although the mother can be absolutely certain of her biological tie to the child,<sup>138</sup> the father has no such certainty. If the woman is unfaithful, then the tie between the father and their children becomes more uncertain, and thus, Rousseau argues that the family bonds are destroyed.

With the abolition of both conjugal love and paternal love, Rousseau believes that familial relations are dissolved.

From Rousseau's emphasis on the chastity of women, two considerations arise which may explicate his concern. First, the emphasis on fidelity for women may indicate an underlying notion of property, in the possession of women and children. This view is based on statements made by Rousseau such as the following: "the female belongs by her own choice to the male" and that the "guarantee of her fidelity" makes the male "less anxious at the sight of other males and lives more peacefully with them", and that the female's fidelity "repays the father for the attachment he has for his children."<sup>139</sup> Further, Rousseau maintains that men should command in the family since they must oversee the conduct of their wives, in order to ensure that their children are legitimate; and since the children, after the father has provided for their needs, must, when adults, provide for their father.<sup>140</sup> These statements could lead to the conclusion that Rousseau included a conception of male ownership of his wife and children within the family unit. However, although there may be a conception of property underlying Rousseau's view of the family, he also indicates that such a conception cannot apply to the familial unit, and this gives rise to a different interpretation of these statements which will be emphasized in this thesis. Rousseau argues that possession must be reciprocal within a marriage: "Possession which is not mutual is nothing. It is at most possession of the sexual organ, not of the individual."<sup>141</sup> This assertion is entirely contradictory in light of the statements, concerning women as the property of men, made above.

The view which holds that women cannot be the property of their husbands could be substantiated by Rousseau's arguments against slavery, and one-sided possession would indicate a form of servitude, wherein he acknowledges that children cannot be enslaved by their fathers,<sup>142</sup> and that in renouncing one's freedom, one relinquishes one's status as a human being.<sup>143</sup> This implies that neither women nor men can relinquish their freedom. Due to these inconsistencies, it is not entirely clear whether Rousseau meant to convey a notion of property in his view of the family or whether his emphasis on women's fidelity is designed to reveal another type of concern.

The second consideration arising from Rousseau's concern that women be faithful to their husbands may be the necessity for men to live securely. This assertion becomes more plausible when examined in conjunction with the desire for distinction and the need to be authentic. The desire for distinction arises with man's need to be recognized for his real merits by others.<sup>144</sup> This desire necessitates authentic relations among men; or stated another way, men need to relate to each other and to women honestly and openly.<sup>145</sup> Concerning the need to be authentic, Rousseau writes:

To be something, to be oneself and always one, a man must act as he speaks; he must always be decisive in making his choice, make it in a lofty style, and always stick to it.<sup>146</sup>

Thus, man needs to be at one with himself; that is, his thoughts or feelings and actions must be united according to the order of his soul and he must make choices which correspond to his

inclinations. In short, he must be united from within and he must transpose this unity onto the external world through his actions. When a man marries, Rousseau's view indicates, that he must ensure that his wife's inclinations suit his own and that the children that they produce also are raised to complement the design of his inner unity.<sup>147</sup> This is to say, a man must be able to relate to the objects of his love openly and honestly. Woman must also be authentic and be able to relate to her husband and her children. For this reason, Rousseau advises the women of Geneva to always be what they are.<sup>148</sup> From the authentic bases in the conjugal union, Rousseau describes the union of Julie and Wolmar as complementary and as such, their association forms one soul;<sup>149</sup> and he describes the conjugal union as the union of the will and understanding which forms a moral person.<sup>150</sup>

Rousseau may emphasize authentic relations between the sexes because dishonesty and insincerity would cause one sex, or the other, to abuse and exploit their partner; the conjugal union would then become an outlet for power, instead of an intimacy which produces happiness and security.<sup>151</sup> Rousseau argues that the conjugal union is established upon the greatest degree of intimacy that can subsist between two people and is guided by very special sentiments:

I am convinced it was not good for man to be alone. Human minds must be united to exert their greatest strength; and the united force of friendly souls, like that of the collateral bars of an artificial magnet, is incomparably greater than the sum of their separate



forces. This is thy triumph, celestial friendship! but what is even friendship compared to that perfect union of souls which connects the most perfect, the most harmonious amity, with ties an hundred more sacred? where are the men whose ideas, gross as their appetites, represent the passion of love only as a fever of the blood, the effect of brutal instinct? ... .<sup>152</sup>

The union between a male and a female does not merely follow from a sexual attraction shared by both; but rather, the union is based on the incompleteness of two parts becoming one whole. Thus, a man by himself is only an insufficient and incomplete part; however, when he unites with a woman who has qualities to make up for those of his own which are insufficient and incomplete, the two share one perfect and whole soul. By themselves they are incomplete, and together they are whole.

The conjugal union, viewed in this light, becomes a means for each partner to reaffirm his authenticity. This association allows each individual to see who he really is and to affirm this perspective in the eyes of the other; but this process of self-affirmation necessitates the greatest of intimacy and trust because the individual places himself in a completely vulnerable position.<sup>153</sup> Since the woman's pregnancy creates a social framework based on sentiments not directly experienced by the man, maternal love and childbearing and nurturing, the man must trust the female's chastity if his self and her self are to be reaffirmed within the child. Thus, just as conjugal love represents self-affirmation, paternal love becomes an avenue for the assertion of the self. Since the

woman's tie to the child is biologically certain, her ability to reaffirm herself in the child follows automatically. However, because the child is conceived, develops, receives its subsistence from, and is born from the woman's body, the affirmation of the man's self is less direct and less obvious to him. Thus, since the male's reproductive process denies him this more intimate and more intense means of affirming his self, he must rely on the guarantee of his wife's fidelity in order to confirm his self in their children. Although it can be argued that the demand for the fidelity of women may indicate a hidden notion of property in the family, this assertion may not be well-founded if Rousseau's view of the family can be interpreted as a means of individual self-affirmation. The perspective of the family as a means of the individual reaffirmation of each will be used for the purpose of this study.

At this point, it may be noted that the desire for distinction and the need for authentic relations are also necessary for the reaffirmation of the self in society.<sup>154</sup> This is to say, when social relations are authentic, the individual can affirm himself in comparison to others, and this makes each aware of his distinctiveness and that of others. This assertion is directly parallel to the view of the family as a means of the reaffirmation of the self, which necessitates authentic relations between the sexes and is based on the affirmation of one's individuality or the desire for distinction. Further, the view of the conjugal union in which two incomplete parts join together to form one soul or a whole, is analogous to the

creation of political society wherein formerly self-reliant men become the parts which form the larger moral collectivity.<sup>155</sup> Thus, both the conjugal union and society make up for the insufficiency or incompleteness of separate individuals and elevate their existences to a higher realm. Also, just as virtuous conduct, manifested by means of the general will, is necessary for the harmonious interaction between men,<sup>156</sup> so virtue for both men and women (although Rousseau emphasizes women's virtue here) sustain cordial interdependence among family members. In these respects, the familial and conjugal unions are parallel to his ideal republican social unit.

Isolated in the home, on the basis of her ability to become pregnant, her ability to entice men, and her capability of linking the father to their children, a woman's life is concerned with the maintenance of the harmony of familial life. If a woman conducts herself virtuously, she is able to please man. In fact, Rousseau argues that the existence and rights of the woman depends on her ability to please the man:

Show them in their very duties the source of their pleasures and the foundation of their rights. Is it so hard to love in order to be loved, to make oneself lovable in order to be happy, to make oneself estimable in order to be obeyed, to honor oneself in order to be honoured? How fine these rights are! How respectable they are! How dear they are to the heart of men when women knows how to turn them to account! To enjoy them she does not have to await the passage of years or the coming of old age. Her empire begins with virtues.<sup>157</sup>

The harmony of family life, and the authenticity which sustains

it, will be assured when a woman seeks to please her husband through virtuous behaviour. Rousseau does not view this as an unreasonable request, since the woman depends on the man to provide her with a family life and with children; lacking a family, she would have difficulty surviving in society on her own. Since a woman's virtuous conduct pleases man, it is not just for her benefit that she behave in this manner; for, once the man is assured of his wife's virtue, he may become more secure in their relationship and more trusting of her as an authority within the home. A woman can secure this trust, thereby easing the insecurity of her partner, by recognizing her obligations to her husband and to her children, and as such, willingly performing her duties.<sup>158</sup> With the acceptance of her duties, the woman endeavours to fulfill the needs of others in order that others fulfill her needs in return and to establish herself as an authority within the household.<sup>159</sup>

While the duties performed by women are directed toward the sustenance of the family unit, the duties of the father are directed toward the provision for and the protection of his wife and children. Rousseau argues that a father is obliged to contribute to the upbringing of his children:

A father, when he engenders and feeds his children does with that only a third of his task. He owes to his species men; he owes to society sociable men; he owes to the state citizens. Every man who can pay this triple debt and does not is culpable, and more culpable perhaps when he pays it halfway. He who cannot fulfill the duties of a father has no right to become one. Neither poverty

nor labors, nor concern for public opinion exempts him from feeding his children and from raising them himself.<sup>160</sup>

Thus, a father must work to feed his children and to raise them himself to live in a socially acceptable manner. In short, he must ensure that his children will grow up to be beneficial to society, so that they will not prove destructive to social cohesion. Viewed in this light, the father becomes the provider for society since he helps to furnish it with competent and cooperative children. Further, he is charged with the raising of his children, and as such, he must take on his responsibility to contribute to their education. In short, fathers cannot be the passive observers of familial life; but rather, they must be active participants in the edification of their children. Thus, the father must assist directly in the socialization of his children. Further, in contributing to the education of his children, the father reaffirms and perpetuates his self, as well as society and social relations.

In the home, Rousseau maintains that paternal authority should reign due to the male's physical supremacy; a consistent proposition if the male is viewed as the provider for and the protector of the family. This proposition is consistent since, as the provider and protector, the male is considered to be the strongest member and the most capable of willing.<sup>161</sup> Rousseau thus establishes the male as the supreme authority within the family unit:

For several reasons derived from the nature of things, the father should command in the family. First, the

authority of the father and mother should not be equal; rather there must be a single government, and when opinions are divided, there must be a dominant voice that decides. Secondly, however slight the incapacities peculiar to the wife are thought to be, since they are always an inactive period for her, this is sufficient reason to exclude her from primacy, because when the balance is equal, the smallest thing is enough to tip it. Furthermore, the husband should oversee his wife's conduct because it is important to him that the children he is forced to recognize do not belong to anyone other than himself. The wife, who has no such thing to fear, does not have the same right over her husband. Third, children should obey their father, at first through necessity, later through gratitude. After having their needs met by him for half their lives, they should devote the other half to attending his needs.<sup>162</sup>

The reasons that Rousseau establishes for the dominance of male authority within the family are based on the natural inequalities which exist between the male and his wife and their children, and on the necessity for guaranteeing the woman's fidelity. Further, the father must both reaffirm himself and his values in his children, and thus, perpetuate society.

The division of labour between the sexes is analogous to the distinctions between the contributions of each man to the common good of society.<sup>163</sup> Since both these parallel developments have natural inequalities as a common basis, Rousseau's view implies that just as each man contributes differently, the sexes provide different functions which are meant to ensure the preservation of the family. Thus, although Rousseau argues that women must be concerned with virtuous behaviour, men must

also be responsible or virtuous in order to perform and recognize their duties which are necessary for the provision of the family. Further, since each sex is assigned a separate sphere of contribution, it is possible to assert that Rousseau meant to suggest that the desire to distinguish oneself could, in part, be channelled through this sphere. In this way, independent contributions may become a means of retaining individuality amidst a sphere characterized by interdependence. This assertion is analogous to Rousseau's concern that individuality would not be lost with the advent of interdependent relations among men.<sup>164</sup> For these reasons, Rousseau's description of the conjugal and familial unions are parallel to his account of the social relations between men.

The advent of the family unit may have been caused by the advanced conceptual development of women in the natural condition. However, in becoming aware of the consequences of sexual relations, women began to lose their self-sufficiency and with this loss, the assistance of males became necessary. From the assistance of males, permanent associations arose, the family unit emerged and this engendered emotional attachments for males; Rousseau's view implies that the females were capable of these sentiments prior to habituation. These developments were found to be parallel to similar advancements made in the transition to social relations. In this latter situation, environmental obstacles gave rise to the development of mental faculties. With the progression in mental faculties man became capable of judging the physical and emotional similarities

between himself and others. From this advancement, man began to lose his self-sufficiency since others were necessary to reaffirm his individuality. The development of mental faculties also created extensive emotional attachments in social relations, after property holdings were established. Due to the weakened condition of women, men and children, a division of labour was established between men and women, based on the necessity for ensuring the preservation of the family unit. This division created a situation of interdependence among the sexes, and it emphasized the natural limits of necessary familial labour; the self-sufficiency, in a limited sense, of men and women in their separate, but important, occupations; the natural inequalities operating between the sexes, based on physical and moral differences coming from gender which were not exploitative, but beneficial for the preservation of the family. These developments correspond to those which arise after the advent of property holdings in the transition to social relations. Thus, men were differentiated by their physical capabilities and superior or inferior innovative abilities; the relative self-sufficiency of the weak; and property was limited to natural need. Further, the natural inequalities among men were used to ensure the preservation of the entire species. Both social and personal relations were based on authenticity and the desire to distinguish oneself, and thus, people needed to relate to others, reaffirm themselves in others, and yet maintain their individuality. In these ways, the natural order operated on the basis of the perfectibility of the species,



without disadvantaging the individual, and the human species coexisted without exploiting each other. Hence, even within an interdependent social setting men and women lived a peaceful and harmonious existence.

In analyzing the parallel developments which give rise to and sustain both social and personal relations it becomes clearer that women, with the progression of their conceptual knowledge and their unique biological construction, are responsible for the initiation of permanent associations between the sexes. With the advent of permanent relations between women and men, the existence of men becomes ennobled, through the experience of conjugal love and paternal love. Since women introduce men to familial relations and the sentiments which accompany this development, they are responsible for enhancing the lives of men and for this reason, Rousseau describes the emotional bonds that men experience as "...the sweetest sentiments known to men... ." <sup>165</sup> Further, Rousseau maintains that the conjugal union brings together two individuals who, by themselves are incomplete, become part of a larger whole which creates one soul <sup>166</sup> and one moral person. <sup>167</sup> This description of those factors which create permanent associations are parallel to those which establish the social relations among men. In this way, the distinctions between the stronger and weak men are responsible for the establishment of permanent lodgings and also, this development reveals the basis for Rousseau's assertion that each man has a place in the natural order of society. With the advent of permanent lodgings,

greater interaction between families is sustained by human sexuality which, then, gives rise to community bonds. With the assertion that the ideal republic can be established on those factors evident in the "Golden Era", the existence of men, within a situation of interdependence is ennobled and enhanced both by patriotism and by the operation of the general will. Further, Rousseau argues that the union of men in society, who by themselves are incomplete, become the parts which form a larger whole, described by Rousseau as a moral and collective body receiving from its members its common self.<sup>168</sup>

Further, Rousseau's description of both the family and society shows that they operate on the same principles- natural inequalities, the natural order, the desire for distinction, authentic relations, virtue, interdependence, individuality, and the harmony created by nonexploitative relations. It is curious how two such seemingly disparate institutions can be unified by the same principles and the effects of these for the lives of men. In essence, it must be concluded that Rousseau meant the family and society to resemble each other and operate similarly. Further, since women are considered the initiators of the primary social relationships in the family, it is possible to postulate that the role of women and their unique development are responsible initially for the impetus leading to the creation of social relations among men. In short, there is an intimate connection between the family and society, and the factor which connects these two institutions is the role of women. Although the position of women in the family does not directly reveal the

significance of women entirely, due to the dependent and, almost weak, situation, the importance of their function may become clearer with an analysis of the degeneration of both social and personal relations.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### WOMEN AND THE DEGENERATION OF CONJUGAL AND CIVIL SOCIETIES

This chapter will concentrate on examining the parallel developments between the degeneration of social and personal relations. The analysis of these two developments will show how the general characteristics of human beings, discussed in Chapter Two, are corrupted and the consequence of this advancement for both sexes. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, the relationship between the familial and social units will be revealed and the role of women, which connects these two institutions will become clearer. Secondly, the degeneration of the conjugal union will establish the significance of the influence of women in society. Rousseau, here, suggests that women have a great deal of power; a factor which is implicit in his perspective, but which, in the corruption of personal relations, becomes more explicit. After the analysis of these two parallel developments has been completed, the significance of establishing the relation between both personal and social theories, either in a corrupt or ideal form, will be discussed.

Although the "Golden Era", the second stage of the state of nature directly following the original natural condition, represents a balance between the principles established in Rousseau's natural theory and his social theory, (the sentiment

of pity operates, the entire species is preserved within the natural order through the "proper" operation of perfectibility, freedom and equality are preserved, individuality and authenticity are maintained), the stages which follow, in the Second Discourse, are degenerative and as such, they represent the antithesis of this epoch. The stages succeeding the "Golden Era" illustrate the progression of corrupt forces in social relations; both human nature and the environment degenerate from the equilibrium attained in the prior era. In short, whereas the "Golden Era" represents a point of perfection from which Rousseau's ideal political society can emerge, the degenerative stages illustrate the corruption of the ideal society and the principles which underly it. At this point, society's decay must be examined in order to determine the consequences of the abuse of the principles evident in Rousseau's description of the "Golden Era".

In the social relations among men, the progression towards social interdependence began with an extension of the division of labour beyond that which was instituted between the sexes.<sup>1</sup> The division of labour was necessitated by the invention of metallurgy and agriculture which created a situation of interdependence among men.<sup>2</sup> Rousseau writes:

As soon as some men were needed to smelt and forge iron, other men were needed to feed them. The more the number of workers was multiplied, the fewer hands were engaged in furnishing the common subsistence, without there being fewer mouths to consume it; and since some needed foodstuffs in exchange for their iron, the others

found the secret of using iron to multiply foodstuffs.<sup>3</sup>

The invention of metal implements became something valuable not only to the inventors but also to others since these would facilitate the provision of foodstuffs. The inventors, Rousseau indicates, may have used the demand for iron in order to accrue benefits to themselves. This is to say, the demand for iron implements allowed the inventors to exchange these goods for more foodstuffs than the implements were worth. The exchange value between iron and food became unequal and thus, the inventors of iron learned the secret of profit.

With the cultivation of the land, Rousseau argues that the division of the land followed, based on the right to appropriate the products of one's own labour. Further, from labour, Rousseau maintains that permanent property holdings in land were established:

It is labor alone which, giving the cultivator a right to the product of the land he has tilled, gives him a right to the soil as a consequence, at least until the harvest, and thus from year to year; which creating continuous possession, is easily transformed into property.<sup>4</sup>

The establishment of property holdings, based on labour, need not have had detrimental effects, except that both the capacity to labour was unequal and the equilibrium between iron and foodstuffs was disrupted. Rousseau writes:

Things in this state could have remained equal if talents had been equal, and if, for example, the use of iron and the consumption of foodstuffs had always been exactly bal-

anced. But this proportion, which nothing maintained was soon broken; the stronger did more work [thus acquiring more to himself]; the clever turned his to better advantage [perhaps by allowing others to do the work for him but still retaining the profits]; the more ingenious found ways to shorten his labour [by technological developments]; the farmer had greater need of wheat; and working equally, the one earned a great deal while the other barely had enough to live.<sup>5</sup>

The inequality between both labouring capacities and mental faculties disturbed the balance between use and consumption, and created an inequality of dependence among men.

The disproportion between use and consumption and the inequality of dependence gave rise to contrived inequality.

Rousseau argues that contrived inequality

...consists in the different privileges that some men enjoy to the prejudice of others, such as to be richer, more honored, more powerful than they, or even to make themselves be obeyed by them.<sup>6</sup>

Rousseau maintains that contrived inequality began to manifest itself along with natural inequality, which consists of differences of "...ages, health, bodily strengths, and qualities of mind or soul..."<sup>7</sup> Natural qualities and talents alone no longer served to differentiate between men; differences were also established by circumstances (for example, social position, the type of labour performed, how much value the labor produced).<sup>8</sup>

It is conceivable that contrived inequality need not arise among a people all of whom perform labour necessary for society. If all labour at that which is needed for the operation of society,

and, thus, the preservation of all, then the type of work that each performs need not become a measure of equality or inequality in that society. However, with the division of labour, Rousseau's view implies that people became associated with different types of labour. The type of labour and perhaps the importance of this type of activity for society or the amount of goods that the labour would allow an individual to accumulate became a means for distinguishing between people. With the recognition and the institution of contrived inequality, Rousseau argues that men began to move away from their ties with nature, where differences are determined solely by natural inequalities, and began to identify themselves more with those qualities necessary in society which would allow them to succeed.<sup>9</sup> Thus, men began to live outside of themselves, relinquishing their formerly self-contained existence, thereby losing the self-sufficiency, and they became obsessed with external goods, thereby losing their ability to live within the bounds of natural need. Once external goods were considered to be valuable, people began to associate their value and the value of others on the basis of these goods. In essence, the self-esteem of each individual became dependent on labour and property, and since external goods become necessary for the esteem of each, men no longer could be self-reliant.

With social dependence becoming more prevalent, the natural order had begun to deteriorate, spurred on initially by the loss of self-sufficiency. The natural order continued to degenerate when unequal possessions were established by the division of the land; which division was never explicitly



instituted although private property existed prior to this development. That is, in the "Golden Era" private property existed and was respected by customs or conventions; people did not need the formal institution and division.<sup>10</sup> Concerning the unnecessary formal institution of property holdings, Rousseau writes:

The first person who, having fenced off a plot of ground, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him, is the true founder of civil society.<sup>11</sup>

The formal establishment of property holdings diminished the individual's ability to respect the property of others. In the "Golden Era", formalized property holdings were unnecessary because man was able or responsible enough to respect and follow guidelines, based on customs, of his own accord.<sup>12</sup> In this epoch, individuals order their own actions based on their needs and their freely given choices, within a realm lacking a political authority. Hence, in the absence of definite consensual relations, people follow conventions which have never been explicitly agreed upon or formulated. For this reason, Rousseau maintains that a number of communities eventually came together to form a particular nation which is "...unified by customs and character, not by regulation and laws but by the same kind of life and foods and by the common influence of climate."<sup>13</sup> The formal establishment of property holdings represents a departure from the conventions or customs of the "Golden Era", and this creates a situation in which men are no longer self-reliant;

but rather, they must learn to live according to external maxims which are not representative of their internal cogitations nor the customs by which they had previously been bound.

With the division of the land, greed and ambition began to take root.<sup>14</sup> Greed and ambition caused men to stray from virtue,<sup>15</sup> to disregard the natural order, and to lose concern for the well-being of their fellows. For this reason, Rousseau maintains that natural pity had been stifled completely<sup>16</sup> and as such, the preservation of the entire species was no longer guaranteed. The lack of concern for one's fellows becomes evident in the conflict between the right of the stronger (the rich) and the right of first occupant (the poor), which shows that property holdings could be expanded only at the expense of other's well-being.<sup>17</sup> Thus, Rousseau writes:

Thus, as the most powerful or most miserable made of their force or their needs a sort of right to the goods of others, equivalent to according to them the right of property, the destruction of equality was followed by the most frightful disorder; thus the usurpations of the rich, the brigandage of the poor, the unbridled passions of all, stifling natural pity and the as yet weak voice of justice, made man avaricious, ambitious, and evil. Between the right of the stronger and the right of first occupant there arose a perpetual conflict which ended only in fights and murders.<sup>18</sup>

The advent of property holdings and the value that men placed on property itself, created distinctions among them. From the distinctions caused by property holdings, two classes were created, the rich and the poor, on the basis of violent con-

flicts over possessions. This development, similar to the advent of permanent housing which distinguished between the innovators and the imitators,<sup>19</sup> did not ensure the mutual preservation of each; but rather, Rousseau argues that the human race became subjected to disunity and decadence:

Such was, or must have been, the origin of society and laws, which gave new fetters to the weak and new forces to the rich, destroyed natural freedom for all time, established forever the law of property and inequality, changed a clever usurpation into an irrevocable right, and for the profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjected the whole human race to work, servitude, and misery.<sup>20</sup>

However, Rousseau does not clearly show how "a few ambitious men" could subject the entire human race to servitude and misery, and thus, it is necessary to determine the basis for this occurrence.

The enslavement of the poor by the rich may have been attained by the unequal operation of the faculty of self-perfection. In describing the inequality in perfectibility, Rousseau states:

It is easy to see that one must seek in these successive changes of the human constitution the first origin of the differences distinguishing men- who, by common avowal, are naturally as equal among themselves as were the animals of each species before various physical causes had introduced into certain species the varieties we notice. In effect, it is not conceivable that these first changes, by whatever means they occurred, altered all at once and in the same way all the individuals of the species; but some, being perfected

or deteriorated and having diverse qualities, good or bad, which were not inherent in their nature, the others remained longer in their original state. And such was the first source of inequality among men... .<sup>21</sup>

The unequal operation of the faculty of self-perfection is one of the natural inequalities which differentiate men; Rousseau refers to this type of inequality as differences in "...qualities of mind or soul... ." <sup>22</sup> Perhaps the earliest occurrence of this inequality is revealed in the unequal mental developments between natural woman and man. <sup>23</sup> Rousseau also discusses this form of inequality in relation to the perfection of industry. <sup>24</sup> The perfection of industry resulted from greater mental awareness and, in reference to the construction of more permanent forms of lodgings, the stronger members of the human species. <sup>25</sup> Rousseau's description of the stronger and the weak, implies that the former became the innovators and the latter became the imitators. <sup>26</sup> The unequal operation of the faculty of self-perfection may have accompanied the physical distinctions between the strong and the weak. Rousseau's view may be taken to imply that there were innovators, who had superior mental and physical capabilities, and there were imitators, who possessed inferior mental and physical faculties; however, the imitators were not disadvantaged by these inequalities and they lived equally as well as the innovators merely by imitating their example.

The distinction between those who innovate and those who imitate is evident also in the stages describing the decay

of society, which degenerates because of the continued unequal operation of the faculty of self-perfection. Hence, those who claimed property rights and who, subsequently, conceived of political institutions may have developed their mental faculties more quickly than had their fellows, thereby enabling them to devise a scheme through which they could profit while simultaneously suppressing any opposition.<sup>27</sup> The rich, described also as the stronger members of the species, used their physical prowess to forcibly acquire the goods of the poor.<sup>28</sup> The superior reasoning powers and physical prowess of the rich, which may justify calling them the innovators, is implicit in Rousseau's descriptions of the conflicts between the rich and the poor:

It is not possible that men should not at least have reflected upon such a miserable situation [the state of war between the rich and the poor] and upon the calamities overwhelming them. The rich above all must have soon felt how disadvantageous to them was a perpetual war in which they paid all the costs, and in which the risk of life was common to all while the risk of goods was theirs alone. Moreover, whatever pretext they might give for their usurpations, they were well aware that these were established on a precarious and abusive right, and that having been acquired only by force, force could take them away without their having grounds for complaint. ...Destitute of valid reasons to justify himself and of sufficient forces to defend himself; easily crushing an individual, but himself crushed by groups of bandits, alone against all, and unable because of enemies united by the common hope of plunder, the rich, pressed by necessity, finally conceived the most

deliberate project that ever entered  
the human mind.<sup>29</sup>

Rousseau describes the rich as being physically capable of easily "crushing an individual" and of usurping the possessions of the poor<sup>30</sup> and this may coincide with the physical abilities of the strong who create permanent, defensible lodgings.<sup>31</sup> Further, spurred on by the threat of losing all that they acquired, the rich used their superior mental faculties to enslave the poor by means of establishing political institutions; a scheme which Rousseau calls "...the most deliberate project that ever entered the human mind."<sup>32</sup>

In contrast to the rich, Rousseau implies that the poor possess inferior mental and physical capabilities. This may become evident in Rousseau's description of the reaction of the poor to the proposed establishment of political institutions:

Far less than the equivalent of this discourse [the one in which the rich proposed their scheme] was necessary to win over crude, easily seduced men, who in addition had too many disputes to straighten out among themselves to be able to do without arbiters, and too much avarice and ambition to be able to do without masters for long. All ran to meet their chains thinking they secured their freedom, for although they had enough reason to feel the advantages of a political establishment, they did not have enough experience to foresee its dangers. Those most capable of anticipating the abuses were precisely those who counted on profiting from them.<sup>33</sup>

The poor, described by Rousseau as "crude, easily seduced men", were not capable of foreseeing the dangers of the political institutions proposed by the rich, and in their ignorance, they

merely "ran to meet their chains". The distinctions between the rich and the poor, similar to those which subsist between the strong and the weak in the natural condition, merit designating the rich as the innovators in a corrupt society and the poor as the imitators. Having no rule of their own to follow, the imitators modelled the corrupt example of the innovators and took on the corrupt values of the latter. Rousseau describes the imitators as having "too much avarice and ambition", since

...citizens let themselves be oppressed only insofar as they are carried away by blind ambition; and looking more below them than above them, domination becomes dearer to them than independence, and they consent to wear chains in order to give them to others in turn.<sup>34</sup>

The less capable or perfected, unable to guide their own conduct by their own maxims, were dependent on the innovators for an example to follow which would allow them to live as well as, or according to similar standards as, the innovators. Instead of providing an enlightened example to follow, the innovators used the dependent situation of the imitators in order to enslave them. Thus, the dependent situation of one group became a tool for the benefit of another group.

To summarize, the extension of the division of labour which became necessary with the advent of agriculture and metallurgy, created a situation of interdependence among men. This occurrence, combined with the division of the land and the necessity of social relations, effectively made self-reliance unattainable. The division of the land gave rise to private

property which, because of social interdependence and contrived inequality, became a necessary determinant in ascertaining the worth of each man. As such, men were ruled by greed and ambition. With greed and ambition, men became more concerned with acquiring property, in order to increase their worth in the opinions of others. Since these changes caused great interest in the acquisition of property, private possessions became the measure of the importance and power of each. The significance of property is epitomized in the conflict which arises between the stronger and the first occupant. Within this conflict, violence became the title to property holdings and the possessions of the stronger were enlarged at the expense of the weak. The stronger were able to capitalize on the less capable or weak members of the species by virtue of their superior cunning and physical prowess. For this reason, Rousseau argues that the initiation of social relations established the status of rich and poor.<sup>35</sup>

It is evident, from the establishment of the status of the rich and poor and the changes that facilitated this occurrence, that the principles which operated both prior to the "Golden Era" disappeared completely. Men no longer were governed by natural need, which constrained men to obtain only those things necessary for sustenance, but by unlimited needs or desires. This is to say, there no longer were natural limitations on that which is deemed necessary to sustain life. Instead, it became important to acquire as much as was possible. Rousseau's view, then, indicates that men no longer gave value



to those inner qualities which made each person distinct and significant; but rather, everyone aspired to obtain those external goods which would make each important in the eyes of others. Men were not content with being themselves nor with the limitations that being themselves imposed. In place of contentedness with themselves, men desired to be something different. These changes gave rise to the destruction of the natural order.

The natural order is the overall framework of both animal and human existence, and it is the whole of which man is a part. The progression of man within the natural order is based on the development of his uniquely human characteristics of perfectibility and freedom. In short, the natural order provides a framework for human development.<sup>36</sup> The decay of man, as evidenced in the establishment of complete social dependence, involves a departure from human development and in its stead, the initiation of individual perfectibility and servitude. As such, the initiation of social relations on the basis of the exploitation of the weak by the stronger members of the species represents an attempt by the stronger to develop themselves at the expense of the weak. In short, the faculty of self-perfection is developed in the individual to the detriment of the species.<sup>37</sup>

The emphasis placed on the perfectibility of the individual to the detriment of the species disrupts the harmony that unites men according to the natural order.<sup>38</sup> Further, the principles which ensure the development of the species, natural pity and later, virtue, no longer guide the actions of men.

Virtue,<sup>39</sup> which predisposes man to act according to considerations for the needs of others, even when it is not advantageous for him to do so, no longer inspires unity among men. Instead, the establishment of social relations is divisive and as such, it creates a disharmony among men. In short, the good of each is pursued to the detriment of the good of all.

The divisiveness caused by perfectibility is enhanced by the corruption of the desire to distinguish oneself. Within a degenerating society, the desire to distinguish oneself becomes manifested in the acquisition or possession of external goods or qualities and as such, it becomes a corrupt tool for individual perfectibility. Thus, Rousseau writes:

I would point out how much that universal desire for reputation, honors, and preferences, which devours us all, trains and compares talents and strengths; how much it stimulates and multiplies passions; and making all men competitors, rivals, or rather enemies, how many reverses, successes, and catastrophes of all kinds it causes daily by making so many contenders race the same course. I would show that to this ardor to be talked about, to this furor to distinguish oneself, which nearly always keeps us outside of ourselves we owe what is best and worst among men... .<sup>40</sup>

The desire to distinguish oneself, with the advent of degenerative social relations, became corrupt itself since it is directed toward the attainment of status (honours, reputations and preferences) and thus, its influence makes men live in the opinions of others, or outside of themselves.<sup>41</sup> Further, instead of operating as a force which would unite men, the desire for distinction encourages hatred and distrust in making men enemies.<sup>42</sup> Also,

since the desire for distinction makes "...so many contenders race the same course...",<sup>43</sup> it proves to be destructive to individuality because all pursue the same goals, all desire to have the same qualities and goods, and all use the same means, dishonesty and trickery, to subvert their rivals.

When the violence engendered by the right of property and the usurpations of the rich did not subside, the rich devised a scheme to create political institutions in order to obtain profits while simultaneously suppressing any opposition.<sup>44</sup> Thus, Rousseau argues that political institutions were established and governors selected, on the basis of wealth, merit, or age,<sup>45</sup> to maintain the state's constitution.<sup>46</sup> The elected governor obliged himself to guarantee the possession of each man's property within a peaceful environment and to follow the public utility at the expense of his private interest.<sup>47</sup> Rousseau maintains that the power granted to the magistrate was accompanied by honours, "...which make the laws and their ministers respectable" and priveleges, "...which compensates them for the difficult labours that good administration requires."<sup>48</sup>

Although the institution of the magistracy was not beneficial to the interests of the poor, primarily because it established and enforced the status of powerful and weak,<sup>49</sup> Rousseau sustains that the poor consented to this development because they had become accustomed to material goods and as such, they became incapable of living freely. Thus, Rousseau argues that the poor, governed by avarice and ambition, sub-

jected themselves, in the belief that they had secured their freedom.<sup>50</sup> Rousseau, then, indicates that the distinctions between the poor and the wealthy created a popular desire for the attainment of power, reputation and wealth;

...it is very difficult to reduce to obedience one who does not seek to command; and the most adroit politician would never succeed in subjecting men who wanted only to be free. But inequality spreads without difficulty among ambitious and cowardly souls, always ready to run the risk of fortune, and to dominate or serve almost indifferently, according to whether it becomes favorable or adverse to them.<sup>51</sup>

This distinction between the people and their governors becomes evident<sup>52</sup> and in so doing, the governed desire to obtain those goods which are the source of the differences between the two.

Thus, Rousseau writes:

...I would easily explain how...inequality of credit and authority becomes inevitable between individuals as soon as, united in the same society, they are forced to make comparisons between themselves and to take into account differences they find in the continual use they make of one another. These differences are of several kinds; but in general wealth, nobility or rank, power, and personal merit are the principal distinctions by which men are measured in society...<sup>53</sup>

Upon understanding the factors which distinguish between the governors and the governed, the poor enslave themselves, perhaps unknowingly, in order to attempt to eradicate these differences. The divisiveness that is engendered by the distinctions attained by the stronger, or the governors, is utilized to further subju-

gate the poor.

Rousseau's description of the institution of the magistracy implies that the desires of the stronger or the innovators were directed to obtaining greater power and distinctions.<sup>54</sup> In this way, the innovators, cognizant of the dissatisfaction of the poor, may have exploited the poor's dependence on material goods, which now represent the unlimited nature of man's needs. This is to say, since material goods became necessary for the satisfaction of the self-esteem of each, the innovators may have capitalized on this form of dependence to more firmly establish their superiority. Thus, Rousseau argues:

From the extreme inequality of conditions and fortunes, from the diversity of passions and talents, from useless arts, from pernicious arts, from frivolous sciences would come scores of prejudices equally contrary to reason, happiness, and virtue. One would see chiefs foment all that can weaken assembled men by disuniting them; all that can give society an air of apparent concord while spreading a seed of real division; all that can inspire defiance and mutual hatred in different orders through the opposition of their rights and interests, and consequently fortify the power that constrains them all.<sup>55</sup>

The governors or innovators instigate social divisions in order to augment their own power and this form of exploitation is facilitated by the desire of the governed or imitators to attain the same status that their governors have reached. The influence of the governors on the governed is revealed in Rousseau's description of the life of an ambitious citizen:

...the citizen, always active, sweats, agitates himself, torments himself

incessantly in order to seek still more laborious occupations; he works to death, he even rushes to it in order to get in condition to live, or renounces life in order to acquire immortality. He pays concert to the great whom he hates, and to the rich whom he scorns. He spares nothing in order to obtain the honor of serving them; he proudly boasts of his baseness and their protection, and proud of his slavery, he speaks with disdain of those who do not have the honor of sharing it.<sup>56</sup>

Rousseau's description of the citizen indicates that corrupt social man, although he dislikes the great and the rich, nonetheless attempts to raise himself to a similar status by serving them. This situation is indicative of the degree to which people sought to eradicate the differences between themselves and those who had attained power and wealth- a position that the imitators could never obtain and which only enslaved them further.

In summary, the institution of the magistracy enhanced and advanced the problems created by the establishment of social relations. Men had become accustomed to evaluating themselves on the basis of wealth and position, and with the institution of the magistracy, wealth became an avenue for the attainment of political power. The inequalities evident between the powerful and the powerless became a tool used by the governors or the stronger to further subjugate the governed or the weak. This, in turn, caused the governed to follow the corrupted example of their governors, in an attempt to procure the same honours and wealth for themselves. However, the weak could not succeed because their ambition merely strengthened the power

held by the governors, who utilized the desires of the weak to create more divisions and conflicts among them. The use of the governed for the benefit of the governors is indicative of the rise of individual perfectibility, which is pursued to the detriment of the perfection of the species and this causes the destruction of the natural order. Further, virtuous conduct does not constrain the desires of the governors, thereby showing their disdain for the well-being of others.<sup>57</sup> The governors are concerned only with maintaining and fortifying the distinctions between themselves and the governed, while the citizens attempt to eradicate these distinctions. The renouncing of virtue and the natural order, through the enslavement of the poor, shows the consequences of electing representatives of the citizens' wills. In investing public authority in private persons, the citizens may find that their wills may not be represented properly.

While the governors attempted to secure their power by disuniting the governed,<sup>58</sup> they took advantage of the disorder that this caused within society to augment their power over the governed. From this basis, Rousseau argues that elections eventually created social disorders which, in turn, gave rise to a transformation in the nature of governmental rule:

The more elections fell to men advanced in age, the more frequent elections became and the more their difficulties were felt. Intrigues became introduced, factions were formed, parties grew bitter, civil wars broke out; finally the blood of citizens was sacrificed to the so-called happiness of the State, and men were at the point of falling

back into the anarchy of earlier times. The ambition of leading personages profited from these circumstances to perpetuate their posts in their families; the people already accustomed to dependence, repose, and the conveniencies of life, and already incapable of breaking their chains, consented to let their servitude increase in order to assure their tranquility. Thus the chiefs, having become hereditary, grew accustomed to consider their magistracy as a family possession, to regard themselves as proprietors of the State, of which they were at first only the officers, to call their fellow citizens their slaves, count them like cattle in the number of things that belonged to them, and call themselves equals of the gods and kings of kings.<sup>59</sup>

When the magistrates became hereditary, the status of master and slave was created, and this final degree of inequality among men is completed with the changing of legitimate power into arbitrary rule.<sup>60</sup> With the rise of tyranny, laws are eradicated and people are reduced to a level of helplessness wherein their only recourse is blind obedience.<sup>61</sup>

The establishment of tyranny indicates the absolute impotence of men who have become enslaved by the will and the passions of a master. Rousseau indicates that the tyrant was able to usurp power and subjugate men because men, in electing governors, were essentially relinquishing their own responsibility for governing themselves. Rousseau's view substantiates this assertion when he advocates that a man who relinquishes his freedom, in order to enslave himself, acts contrary to nature:

...the goods I alienate become something altogether foreign to me, the abuse of



which is indifferent to me; but it matters to me that my freedom is not abused, and I cannot, without making myself guilty of the evil I shall be forced to do, risk becoming instruments of crimes. Moreover, as the right of property is only conventional and of human institution, every man can dispose at will of what he possesses. But it is not the same for the essential gifts of nature, such as life and freedom, which everyone is permitted to enjoy and of which it is at least doubtful that one has the right to divest himself: by giving up the one, one degrades his being, by giving up the other one destroys it insofar as he can; and as no temporal goods can compensate for the one or the other, it would offend both nature and reason to renounce them whatever the price.<sup>62</sup>

Rousseau's view here implies that in transferring responsibility for man's self-governance to another, he effectively alienates his freedom and exposes himself to the danger of misrepresentation and servitude.

In essence, Rousseau's description of the degeneration from the institution of the magistracy to tyranny implies that the governors of society had become dissatisfied with their former level of power and thus, they attempted to obtain an even greater level of power, perpetual rule. Further, Rousseau's account of the establishment of tyrannical rule also implies that the rulers became dissatisfied with one form of power, which would enhance the distinctions between the governors and their subjects, and instead, they desired to acquire an absolute power, which would give them the power over life and death.<sup>63</sup> The absolute power of life and death represents the most corrupt form of unlimited needs, since human beings are treated

as simple material goods and exist for the pleasure of the tyrant. In this way, the tyrant forcibly acquires human lives in order to enhance his own reputation as the strongest and most powerful. Rousseau argues that the rule of the tyrant coincides with the rise of the passions and their supremacy over both reason and virtue;

It is from the bottom of this disorder and these revolutions [ie., the divisiveness inspired by corrupt magistrates] that despotism, by degrees raising its hideous head and devouring all it had seen to be good and healthy in all parts of the State, would finally succeed in trampling under foot the laws and the people, and in establishing itself upon the ruins of the Republic. The times that would precede this last change would be times of troubles and calamities, but in the end everything would be engulfed by the monster, and peoples would no longer have chiefs or laws but only tyrants. From that moment also morals and virtues would cease to be in question; for wherever despotism reigns...it tolerates no other master. As soon as it speaks, there is neither probity nor duty to consult, and the blindest obedience is the sole virtue which remains for slaves.<sup>64</sup>

Rousseau's view implies that the rise of the tyrant's passions of self-interest revokes the influence of morals and virtues, since the lives of others have no meaning for him. In short, the tyrant has no concern for others, except insofar as he can use others for the satisfaction of his own desires. The absolute rule of the tyrant is the epitome of individual perfectibility, in its most severe and corrupt form, and its result, the most absolute means of distinguishing between

individuals.

Rousseau argues that men no longer had the capacity to enjoy freedom, for they were enslaved by their desire for more and more material goods and the resulting power that their possession would entail. In short, men, previously governed by natural limited needs, were enslaved by their material desires or passions. The desire for wealth, reputation and power, and the social and political advantages that these would bring, gave rise to the subjection of men to a master. Thus, Rousseau writes:

Here is the ultimate stage of inequality, and the extreme point which closes the circle and touches the point from which we started. Here all individuals become equals again because they are nothing; and subjects no longer having any law except the will of the master, nor the master of any rule except his passions, the notions of good and the principles of justice vanish once again. Here everything is brought back to the sole law of the stronger, and consequently to a new state of nature, different from the one with which we began, in that the one was the state of nature in its purity, and this last is the fruit of an excess of corruption.<sup>65</sup>

Rousseau asserts that this new state of nature differs from the original condition, since the latter was one of purity and the former was developed by an excess of corruption.<sup>66</sup> The distinction made here by Rousseau could be interpreted as implying that the law of the stronger, in its purity, could serve a useful purpose. Since, in the transition to the "Golden Era", the stronger were responsible for the innovations made within that condition, while the weak imitated these,<sup>67</sup> it could be inferred that the stronger indirectly rule by virtue of their

example. The tyrant, then, would represent the antithesis of the rule of the innovators in the state of nature, since he rules directly; since he is not so much concerned with providing an example to follow, as he is with enslaving others; and since he is not concerned with securing life, through the mutual preservation of the species, but with making others his means of life. If this assertion can be taken from Rousseau's view of natural man and his relations with others, then the rule of the tyrant is not only opposed to reason and virtue, but also to the natural order since the role of the stronger members of the species within this order is not to rule, but merely to guide the weaker members. In short, Rousseau's description of the rule of the tyrant reveals the most extreme form of individual perfectibility and self-interest which destroys the human race for the benefit of one individual.

The stages of societal corruption reveal the degeneration of human nature caused by the abuse of a number of significant principles that Rousseau had established (for example, authenticity and perfectibility of the entire species, not merely of some individuals; freedom and social interdependence; natural inequalities; virtue). For example, the interdependence among men need not cause degeneration; but rather, it could be used beneficially, to create an harmonious and nonexploitative society, as in the "Golden Era".<sup>68</sup> In the progression of corrupting forces, interdependence became a degenerative cause when it is combined with other different factors: contrived inequality; the loss of self-reliance and thus, men beginning

to live outside of themselves or in the realm of social opinion; the advent of unlimited needs which caused men to become attached to external goods and to judge the merit or value of each on the basis of these goods; the desire to distinguish oneself became associated with these external goods; and the advent of property and the division of labour created a class system which increased the dependence of some on others for their lives and all that was necessary for the preservation of their lives. Further, the self-governance of each was lost through the civil enforcement of property holdings and laws, and through the transfer of the authority of each to political agents; the unequal operation of self-perfection was not contained by virtue or pity and as such, this faculty was used to enslave others; and the rise of self-interest or acquisitive passions caused men to stray from virtue and any concern for the well-being of others. All these factors combine to destroy the natural order, which occurs when men no longer consider distinctions or natural inequalities important, but seek to remove all differences in order to strive for the same goals and relinquish individuality because they were no longer satisfied with who they are and what they are best-suited to perform. In short, the order of nature is destroyed when the relations between men become inauthentic and when individual perfectibility is pursued to the detriment of the perfection of the species or, stated differently, when the individual places himself above everyone and everything else. Rousseau's description of the degeneration of human society indicates that the

dependent situation of men became a source of discontent. This dissatisfaction caused men to revolt against all that they had cherished (freedom, self-reliance, authentic relations) at one point, in order to obtain those material distinctions which would lead to social recognition. In essence, the human race bowed to individual inclination in order to transgress the limits that nature had imposed on the human race for its happiness and comfortable existence.<sup>69</sup> Having examined the results of social degeneration, it is necessary to consider Rousseau's account of the corruption of the male-female relationship, in order to determine whether the decay of personal relations is caused by the abuse of the same principles and to discern the effect of this development on women and their role.

The sustenance of the family unit requires the cooperation of the male and the female, both of whom, by the interests and the inclinations peculiar to each, work together for the survival and benefit of all family members. In this way, the family depends on virtuous conduct, whereby each contributes to the good of all.<sup>70</sup> Males contribute to the common good on the basis of those inclinations peculiar to them; thus, men should be active and strong and they must will and be able.<sup>71</sup> Females, however, should be passive and weak, and put up little resistance.<sup>72</sup> From this distinction, Rousseau asserts that women should be consulted in things which relate to the judgement of the senses, while men are associated with the moral realm which depends on the understanding.<sup>73</sup> The physical and moral distinctions between the sexes, established by Rousseau, indicate

that individual inclination gives way to virtue in order to ensure that the duties or responsibilities, necessary to fulfill the common aim, are executed.<sup>74</sup> If individual inclination is not suppressed, or properly channelled, Rousseau argues that the family, and the principles which sustain this unit, will deteriorate.<sup>75</sup> The corruption of the family is an important phenomenon since it may become the model for the larger social unit.<sup>76</sup> In order to discern the significance of the family, it is necessary to examine the family's degeneration in greater detail.

It can be inferred from Rousseau's view that the division of labour, operating properly, need not have created turmoil within the familial setting.<sup>77</sup> However, with the advent of corrupt forces, this division and its resulting interdependence are important contributors to the decay of the family. In the stages of degeneration, the sexual division of labour becomes responsible for an increase in dependence between the sexes, which gives rise to the suppression of natural inclinations.<sup>78</sup> In this way, Rousseau maintains that men begin to devote more time to pleasing women:

If this effort to oppose Nature is hurtful to the body, it is even more so to the mind. Imagine what can be the temper of the soul of a man who is uniquely occupied with the important business of amusing women, and who spends his entire life doing for them what they ought to do for us, when exhausted by the labors of which they are incapable, our minds have need of relaxation. Given to these puerile habits, to what that is great could we ever raise ourselves.<sup>79</sup>

When men devote their time to pleasing women, they do not

exercise their physical and mental faculties, and thus, their constitution softens. Rousseau indicates that men at this stage are beginning to lose their self-reliance by becoming more dependent on the opinions and desires of women. As such, men begin to live outside of themselves by taking on both qualities and inclinations to which they are not naturally disposed, but which are desirable from the perspective of women. In essence, Rousseau argues that women, unable to become like men, attempt to transform man's nature to their liking:

Let us follow the inclinations of nature, let us consult the good of society; we shall find that the two sexes ought to come together sometimes and to live separated ordinarily. I said it before concerning women, I say it now concerning men. They are affected as much as, and more than, women by a commerce that is too intimate; they lose not only their morals [manners], but we lose our morals [manners] and our constitution; for this weaker sex, not in the position to take on our way of life, which is too hard for it, forces us to take on its way, too soft for us; and no longer wishing to tolerate separation, unable to make themselves into men, the women make us into men.<sup>80</sup>

Rousseau suggests that men, preoccupied with entertaining women, not only lose their mores, but also their physical constitution and moral will, and as such, they are inviting mediocrity and stagnation.<sup>81</sup>

This aspect of the degeneration of the male-female union resembles the stage in social corruption, wherein social relations and property holdings were created, for both of these



occurrences result in an increase in dependence and subsequently, a loss of self-sufficiency.<sup>82</sup> In the conjugal union, Rousseau indicates that the increase in the dependence of men upon women, and the loss of self-reliance, becomes evident when both partners are preoccupied with their emotional attachments:

The intent of matrimony is not for man and wife to be always taken up with each other, but jointly to discharge the duties of civil society, to govern their family with prudence, and educate their children with discretion. Lovers attend to nothing but each other, and all that they regard, is how to show their mutual affection. But this is not enough for a married pair, who have so many other objects to engage their attention. There is no passion whatever which exposes us to such delusion as that of love. We take its violence for a symptom of its duration; the heart, over-burdened with such an agreeable sensation, extends itself to futurity; and while the heat of love continues, we flatter ourselves that it will never cool. But, on the contrary, it is consumed by its own ardour; it glows in youth, it glows faint with decaying beauty, it is utterly extinguished by the frost of age; and since the beginning of the world, there never was an instance of two lover who sighed for each other when they became grey-headed.<sup>83</sup>

Rousseau suggests that the way in which love is manifested has been changed; that is, conjugal love is replaced by romantic love. Romantic love causes the two partners to retreat into each other and into their romantic attachment and to stray from the duties necessary for the sustenance of both the conjugal and familial unions. Rousseau's perspective signifies that romantic love is a direct consequence of the increase in contact and

dependence between women and men, and it directly contributes to leading both partners away from their duties.<sup>84</sup> Thus, the sustenance of both the family and society is endangered.

A further consequence of romantic love is that it creates a substantial increase in dependence, that sustained by men becomes more significant since Rousseau argues that love is the realm of women and that women attain power over men through the use of love:

Love is the realm of women. It is they who necessarily give the law in it, because according to the order of nature, resistance belongs to them, and men can conquer this resistance only at the expense of their liberty. Hence, a natural effect of this sort of play [i.e. one in which the love interest is emphasized] is to extend the empire of the fair sex, to make women and girls the preceptors of the public, and to give them the same power over the audience that they have over their lover. Do you think, Sir, that this order is without difficulties; and that, in taking so much effort to increase the ascendancy of women, men will be the better for it?<sup>85</sup>

It is possible, then, to assert that women were initially responsible for the creation and the nurturing of romantic love, in order to gain greater power over men by making them more dependent upon the objects of their love. This may not be an implausible assertion since Rousseau claims that men are passionate creatures and as such, they are susceptible to the enticements of women.<sup>86</sup> This susceptibility becomes more significant when considered in conjunction with the greater amount of time men spend in pleasing women, since the physical and mental capacities of men are weakened as well. Also, with the rise of

romantic love, women become more evident in the public sphere; that is, the power of romantic love is manifested in the public activities of the married pair. In short, romantic love may draw women outside of their seclusion in the private sphere and into the public realm. If this proposition of the public ascendancy of women is plausible, then this occurrence could have a number of detrimental effects for men. Men could sustain a loss in their self-esteem since they are persuaded by women to disregard their natural inclinations and to substitute those qualities which women desire men to have. Further, the esteem of men could be lessened since natural inequalities no longer differentiate between the sexes, but rather, contrived inequality takes its place. Contrived inequality,<sup>87</sup> is established from these new circumstances among men and women, becomes evident when men submit to the wills of women and change their impulses in order to win the favour of women. In this situation, women have become the dominant force to which men subject themselves in order to receive their benefaction. The institution of contrived inequality in the relations between the sexes, may have been made possible by women's awareness of the weaknesses of men which they then use to enslave men, by means of romantic love. Women, then, may have used their faculty of self-perfection in order to develop those talents to which men are vulnerable, so that they could subjugate men to their desires. Thus, the faculty of self-perfection is used to develop women and enhance their position to the detriment of men and the human race as a whole.

Rousseau suggests that the increased contact between men and women not only stifles genius, but it also suppresses love itself. Rousseau argues that love is stifled by the habitual attention paid to women by men, and the romantic love that develops under these circumstances which, because of its excess, loses the sincerity that it would have in more moderate situations:

It would not be hard to show that instead of gaining by these practices, the women lose. They are flattered without being loved; they are surrounded by agreeable persons but they no longer have lovers; and the worst is that the former, without having the sentiments of the latter usurp nonetheless all their rights. The society of the two sexes, having become too usual and too easy has produced these two effects, and it is thus that the general spirit of gallantry stifles both genius and love.<sup>88</sup>

With the advent of insincerity, Rousseau argues that men become more concerned with their own interests:

The honest feelings of humanity, the plain and affecting openness of a frank heart, are expressed in a different manner from those false appearances of politeness, and that external flattery, which the customs of the world require...; and when I see men, lost in dissipation pretend to take so tender a part in the concerns of every one, I readily presume they are interested for nobody but themselves.<sup>89</sup>

Romantic love or the spirit of gallantry is the expression of mere flattery; it is not indicative of love. Men no longer care about the duties that love inspires and for which they are responsible; but instead, they concentrate on satisfying

the whims of women in order to better serve their own interests. Rousseau's perspective implies that men may have submitted to romantic love, and hence, the desires of women in order to both satisfy or appease women and, in the process, obtain some benefit for themselves. This situation resembles the stage in society's degeneration wherein the rich devise a scheme of political authority to appease the poor and to obtain more benefits in an harmonious environment.<sup>90</sup> Like the poor, who succumb to the desires of the rich, men submit to women's desires since they had become accustomed to the "rule" of women and since they hoped to alleviate the disparities between themselves and women. Thus, Rousseau writes: "...they [men] prefer their rank to their sex, and imitate women of pleasure that they themselves may be above imitation."<sup>91</sup> By appeasing the whims of women, Rousseau argues that men aspire to become like women, insofar as they desire to achieve the same status or power that women have over men. This transition illustrates that the unrestrained rise of of man's corrupt or misguided passions, through romantic love, leads inevitably to self-interest and the decay of responsibility or virtue.

As previously mentioned, Rousseau maintains that women do not benefit from the establishment of romantic love. Although women attempt to supplement their power by instituting romantic love, they may do so only if they can change the natural inclinations of men. In transforming natural inclinations, Rousseau argues that women inevitably institute contrived inequality:

In France, where the men have submitted to live after the fashion of women, and to be continually shut up in a room with them, you may perceive from their involuntary motions that they are under confinement. While the ladies sit quietly, or loll upon the couch, you may perceive men get up, go, come, and sit down again, perpetually restless, as if a kind of mechanical instinct continually counteracted the restraint they suffered, and prompted them, in their own despite to that active and laborious life for which nature intended them.<sup>92</sup>

As a consequence of romantic love, Rousseau indicates that the natural inequalities which differentiate between women and men, according to strength and weakness, active and passive, are replaced by contrived inequality. As such, the new strength or ascendancy of women prevails over the weakness of men. Thus, the power women hold over men becomes greater the further men stray from their natural circumstances and realm. In order to establish contrived inequality, women influenced a change in male nature. This is to say, women persuaded men to constrain their natural inclinations, thereby governing the physical supremacy which was men's previous claim to ascendancy. In this sense, it is possible that women had taken advantage of men's emotional dependence and had utilized it, by implementing romantic love to which men, as passionate beings, proved susceptible, in order to augment their power. Through the use of the disadvantaged position of men, women attain greater social power. By suppressing natural inclinations, women stray from virtue in order to satisfy their desires for overt power in society. Thus, romantic love, similar to the greed and ambition

which cause the rich to seek power over the poor,<sup>93</sup> affects both men and women compelling them to enter into a struggle for power.

The natural order<sup>94</sup> becomes distorted by the suppression of natural inclinations. This distortion is worsened by a synthesis of the inclinations of the sexes. This is to say, contrived inequalities, manifested through romantic love, displace the natural inequalities of strength and will, which formerly distinguished between the sexes and their roles. Concerning the suppression of natural dictates, Rousseau, in one of Julie's speeches, writes:

The soul of a perfect woman and a perfect man ought to be no more alike than their faces. All our vain imitations of your sex are absurd; they expose us to the ridicule of sensible men, and discourage the tender passions we are made to inspire. In short, unless we are near six foot high, have a base voice, and a beard upon our chins, we have no business to pretend to be men.<sup>95</sup>

With the loss of distinctions between the sexes, women take on the characteristics of men and attempt to enter the spheres allotted to men according to the natural order. Thus, Rousseau asserts that women "...take on the masculine and firm assurance of the man... ." <sup>96</sup> Women, then, attempt to become less passive and weak by asserting their rule over men; they conduct themselves with an immodest bearing, and they are no longer concerned with the consequences of this type of conduct;<sup>97</sup> they no longer seclude themselves in the private sphere, but rather, they display themselves and their power over men publically;<sup>98</sup>

and they relinquish their obligations to both their husbands and their families.<sup>99</sup>

In summary, these factors in the changing relations between women and men are similar to those transformations described by Rousseau in the degeneration of society. The institution of the sexual division of labour produces similar consequences for men and for women, as that created for men with the extension of the division of labour in society. Both divisions of labour gave rise to greater interdependence; a loss of self-reliance, in that men begin to determine their personal merits on the basis of external goods and values; and both diminish the strength, physical and moral, of men. In short, men attempt to possess women in much the same way as they attempt to acquire property, and this situation is exactly what women desire because men seek to possess women by pleasing them; but women, in reality, possess men and manipulate them to satisfy their desires. This is comparable to the situation of the poor, where the rich lead them to believe that they are better off when, in reality, the rich create divisions among them in order to fortify the power of the governors. Further, just as property holdings serve to differentiate between men and their status in society, romantic love distinguishes the power and status of women and men. Thus, women become more powerful and a greater authority in society the more they can weaken men, thereby eliminating inequalities of gender, and the more they can entice men into trying to satisfy their desires. Analogous to property holdings in the degenerative society,



romantic love becomes women's entitlement to power over men. Further, it may be logical to conclude that women, in weakening and transforming the natural inclinations of men, possess a greater faculty of self-perfection. In this way, women can easily identify the weaknesses of men and their aspirations, and turn these to their advantage in order to enslave men. This is comparable to the rich who enslave the poor by utilizing the poor's desires for wealth and status to subjugate them further. Similar to the rich, women, in their attempts to enslave men, are predisposed to individual perfectibility, to the detriment of the perfection of the species as a whole, and the harmony previously subsisting between men and women,<sup>100</sup> is replaced by exploitative relations.

The increased contact between women and men, sustained when women force men to become more passive, and their casual relations, increase the opportunity for infidelity. The rise of infidelity follows directly from greater contact and dependence, and romantic love. Both these factors cause sentiments to become more common and more dishonest.<sup>101</sup> Rousseau's view implies that the more common and the less sincere that love becomes, the less powerful its hold on people is. Thus, Rousseau argues that the weakening of pure love causes the bond between a couple to dissolve.<sup>102</sup> Men and women become discontent with their relationships, love no longer is exclusive, and hence, the occurrences of infidelity grow. With the rise in occurrences of infidelity, Rousseau argues that the marriage contract becomes meaningless:

...they [Parisians] call it [marriage] a sacrament, and yet it has not half the power of a common contract. It appears to be nothing more than an agreement between two persons to live together, to bear the same name, and acknowledge the same children; but who, in other respects, have no authority one over the other.<sup>103</sup>

Rousseau maintains that the marriage contract has become simply a private agreement between two people to live basically separate lives; there no longer is anything to bind the couple since there are no emotional attachments. With the lack of emotional bonds within the marriage, Rousseau states that satisfaction is sought outside of the conjugal union. Further, in this situation, Rousseau argues there can be no intimacy between a husband and a wife:

As soon as there is no more intimacy between the parents, as soon as the society of the family no longer constitutes the sweetness of life, it is of course necessary to turn to bad morals to find a substitute. When is the man stupid enough not to see the chain formed by all these links.<sup>104</sup>

Romantic love and the casual relations between the sexes causes insincerity and general dissatisfaction within the conjugal union. In this way, infidelity may represent the rise of bodily passions. This is to say, when pure love, as Rousseau defines it, becomes insignificant, women and men turn to "bad morals" in order to satiate their bodily desires. This situation is comparable to the stage of society's degeneration, where acquisitive desires, or the passion of self-interest, manifests itself in society and begins to rule all men, thereby enslaving

everyone.<sup>105</sup> In fact, the triumph of self-interest in the conjugal union has similar consequences for personal relations as it had in the corruption of society.

The opportunity for infidelity is not sought only by men, but Rousseau implies that women also desire to have affairs.<sup>106</sup> In this way, when women wish to have extramarital affairs, the distinctions between the sexes disappear entirely. With the opportunity for women to engage in affairs, women relinquish their ties with social convention, which Rousseau seems to indicate become natural, renouncing chastity or modesty. Chastity was necessary to contain the unlimited sexual desires of women, in order to prevent the bearing of illegitimate children. By moving away from chastity, women refuse to recognize their obligations to their husbands to produce legitimate children. When women no longer feel obliged to contain their sexual desires, they become more like men, since men, who are incapable of becoming pregnant themselves, need not restrain themselves from engaging in extramarital affairs.<sup>107</sup> Women, in pursuing affairs, become bold (as opposed to modest) and as such, they are not concerned with the consequences of their actions; this circumstance is similar to the male's lack of concern for biological consequences when he engages in extramarital affairs. In essence, women become inauthentic since they are willing to disregard their marital vows of fidelity, and to deny those qualities which are part of their female nature (childbearing and nurturing). Thus, Rousseau argues that infidelity becomes a way of life for the sexes, to a

point wherein fidelity or virtue is criticized:

Adultery is considered as no crime, and conveys no indecency in the idea: their [Parisians] romances, which are universally read for instruction, are full of it; and there appears nothing shocking in its consequences, provided the lovers do not render themselves contemptible by their fidelity. O Eloisa! there are many women in this city who have defiled their marriage beds a hundred times, yet would slander an union like ours, that is yet unsullied with infidelity.<sup>108</sup>

Infidelity had become romanticized, and as such, the model for all to follow.

One significant consequence of infidelity is that the nature and the role of women have changed. Rousseau argues that women's ability to bear children, requires that they be identified with this capacity for as long as they are able to become pregnant.<sup>109</sup> This type of sexual differentiation produces a distinct natural end for women,<sup>110</sup> and this, in turn, makes it necessary for women to concentrate their lives within the child-bearing and nurturing sphere. In this way, the private sphere becomes the realm of women and it is within this sphere that their virtue is established. Concerning private virtues, Rousseau writes:

Private virtues are often the more sublime, as they less aspire to public approbation, but have their end in the testimony of a good conscience.<sup>111</sup>

Women, governed by private virtues, are not virtuous because they will receive public approbation; but rather, they follow the dictates of virtue for the satisfaction of having a good

conscience. However, women who renounce virtue in favour of infidelity, may seek public commendation for their actions.

In arguing that women should be modest and passive, Rousseau maintains that women should not become sexually aggressive:

Who could think that nature has indiscriminately prescribed the same advances to both men and women, and that the first to form desires should also be the first to show them? What a strange depravity of judgement! Since the undertaking has such different consequences for the two sexes, is it natural that they should have the same audacity in abandoning themselves to it?<sup>112</sup>

When women actively pursue affairs, they are, in essence, becoming the aggressors in sexual relations. Further, when women are no longer modest, they live for social opinion and as such, they take on appearances. Rousseau maintains that once women become more concerned with appearances, their inner sentiment is lost:

...opinion without sentiment will only make them false and dishonest women who put appearance in the place of virtue.<sup>113</sup>

Thus, when women concentrate on the opinions of others for their own self-esteem, they become less natural or false, since they are more concerned with how others perceive them than with having a good conscience or being virtuous. In essence, women, in becoming more involved with their appearances, begin to live in the eyes of others and show no regard for being themselves. Women, then, become inauthentic since they move away from their ties with nature; those ties which give women a feminine air

are replaced with qualities which draw attention to themselves within society. According to Rousseau, women cease being women and become merely a spirit representing social values;

The first inconveniency of great cities is, that mankind are generally disguised, and that in society they appear different from what they really are. This is particularly true in Paris with regard to the ladies, who derive from the observation of others the only existence about which they are solicitous. When you meet a lady in public, instead of seeing a Parisian, as you imagine, you behold only a phantom of the fashion. 114

Although Rousseau argues that women may not entirely stray from their natural ties, they maintain a public facade and thrive on what he refers to as "the observations of others". In this way, all that women are concerned with is being noticed, which is nothing more than an egotistical self-satisfaction. This implies that the sphere of women is no longer private; but rather, they have become public creatures who are capable, in this situation, of ruling men overtly.

Once women have become public creatures, or when they depend upon others' opinions as the sole source of their importance, they rule men overtly on the basis of their sexual desires and subsequently, their ability to attract men by means of these desires. Rousseau argues that with the public display of women's sexual desires, society becomes unrefined. This perspective is evident in Rousseau's description of the degeneration of ancient societies, in which women, at one time, were secluded from public view:

Everything is changed. Since then,

hordes of barbarians, dragging their women with them in their armies, have inundated Europe; the licentiousness of camps, combined with the natural coldness of northern climates, which makes reserve less necessary, introduced another way of life which was encouraged by the books of chivalry, in which beautiful ladies spent their lives in getting themselves honorably kidnapped by men. Since these books were the schools of gallantry of the time, the libertine ideas that they inspire were introduced, especially at the courts and in the big cities where people pride themselves rather more on their refinement; by the very progress of this refinement, it had to degenerate finally into coarseness. It is thus that the modesty natural to women has little by little disappeared and that the manners [morals] of сутlers have been transmitted to women of quality.<sup>115</sup>

With the direct rule of the sexual desires of women in society, women become evident in the public sphere. This assertion is shown by Rousseau's claim that women, no longer satisfied with remaining private creatures and unable to take on the male's way of life in the public sphere, force men to take on their way of life.<sup>116</sup> In short, women compel men to become more dependent on them, so that men must constantly associate with women and try to please their whims, and thus, women obtain their power over men by means of their sexual desires. Hence, the sexual desires of women and the satisfaction of these, once their influence becomes evident in the public sphere, become unrestrained. In essence, women attract many men who, becoming dependent upon their sexual servitude to women, seek only to satisfy women's unlimited sexual desires. Thus, men become

more dependent on women and subjected to their sexual power, in an attempt to satisfy their sexual desires and to eventually achieve some form of equality with the female sex. Since the sexual desires of women have become unlimited, there may be little chance that men could succeed in satisfying them. In this sense, women directly rule men by promises of sexual satisfaction while aware that satiation is not likely.

In summary, romantic love, being similar to the greed and ambition which afflict the poor and compel them to support the institution of the magistracy, gives rise to both the sexual superiority of women and to men's desires for sexual equality, if not superiority, over women. Just as the poor desire to acquire those material goods which will allow them to obtain an equal or more powerful status than the rich possess, men desire to obtain an equal or more powerful status than women have.<sup>117</sup> In degenerating society, the competition among men for the attainment of wealth and status fortified the power of the rich, since this competition divided them amongst themselves.<sup>118</sup> In much the same way, romantic love could inspire competition among men for the preference of women and this, in turn, augments the power of women who, having unlimited desires, compel men to try harder to satisfy them. It is conceivable that women could subjugate more men and much more easily because of this divisiveness and competition. Similarly, as the poor resolve themselves to follow the example of the rich,<sup>119</sup> men resolve themselves to conform to the example of women and in this way, romantic love gives rise to infidelity. Infidelity



creates a disharmony among men and women, just as competition for material goods creates discord among the poor. With the advent of infidelity, the natural distinctions between the sexes disappear, and this development is analogous to the eradication of the distinctions between men with the establishment of the desire for acquisition. Further, infidelity represents the destruction of authentic relations between the sexes, since the two are not inclined by love but merely by sexual exploitation. This development is similar to the exploitation of the poor's dependence on material goods by the rich.<sup>120</sup> Further, the degeneration of personal relations show that the sexes desire to distinguish themselves on the basis of their sexuality and this is also analogous to the desire of men in social relations to make themselves distinct by acquiring material goods and status.<sup>121</sup>

The influence of infidelity is revealed in the habituation of men to the sexual rule of women which caused them to dispose of their freedom by becoming more attached to their own desires. Infidelity, then, represents the unlimited nature of the sexual needs of men and especially of women. Infidelity arose, initially, because men subjected their sexual desires to the rule of women; just as unlimited acquisition resulted from the poor's subjection of their desires to those of the rich.<sup>122</sup> The practice of infidelity shows that women were concerned with satisfying their sexual desires for power over men, to the detriment of conjugal love, modesty, and the sustenance of the family unit and its social relations. In short, women desired

power over men above all else.

When women become prominent in the public sphere, Rousseau argues that they, then, stray from their duties:

A home whose mistress is absent is a body without a soul which soon falls into corruption; a woman outside of her home loses her greatest lustre, and despoiled of her real ornaments, she displays herself indecently. If she has a husband, what is she seeking among men? If she does not, how can she expose herself to putting off, by an immodest bearing, he who might be tempted to become her husband? Whatever she may do, one feels that in public she is not in her place; and her very beauty, which pleases without attracting, is only one more fault for which her heart reproaches her. Whether this impression comes to us from nature or education, it is common to all the peoples of the world; everywhere, women are esteemed in proportion to their modesty; everywhere, it is seen that when they take the masculine and firm assurance of the man and turn it into effrontery, they abase themselves by this odious imitation and dishonor both their sex and ours.<sup>123</sup>

According to Rousseau, when women enter the public sphere, they relinquish their ties with nature and become corrupt.

Rousseau's perspective on women's sexuality is similar to the view he expounds in the final degenerative stage of society. The final corrupt stage is indicative of the overt rule of self-interest or bodily passions.<sup>124</sup> All men are enslaved by these desires, under the direct rule of one man's arbitrary passion. Analogously, when women stray from modesty and virtue, they no longer are concerned with hiding their unlimited sexual desires, nor with limiting these desires, by

means of modesty, to promote the harmony necessary in the conjugal union. This perspective implies that women became less desirous of covert rule, enticing one man with their sexual desires,<sup>125</sup> and as such, they manifest their rule directly in social relations. If, as Rousseau maintains, women rule men or have power over them indirectly as a cause of their sexuality, then the overt rule of women would mean the use of sexuality to rule in the public sphere. In this way, women would utilize their unlimited sexual desires, upon which men are dependent for their own sexual satisfaction, in order to rule men. This assertion could be substantiated by the advent of romantic love, and both the discontent and the infidelity which are its results.

Like the final stage in society's decay, the triumph of bodily appetites in the corruption of the male-female relationship results in the destruction of personal relations. When men relinquish their concern for the well-being of others, the social order becomes corrupt;<sup>126</sup> Rousseau indicates that this disorder becomes more pervasive once women have been led astray of their duties. Rousseau argues that women are responsible for the sustenance of the family unit.<sup>127</sup> If women refrain from these duties, enticed away by "masculine" pursuits and interests, the security of both family life and the primary social relations that it sustains are threatened.<sup>128</sup> Women alone are responsible for the survival of the family unit, since they are capable of bearing children, which according to Rousseau makes them more naturally sociable,<sup>129</sup> and since women alone can ensure the bond between a father and his children.<sup>130</sup> When

women's rule is manifested in society, they become incapable of living a virtuous life. The connection between these two factors become clearer in Rousseau's description of the contrasts between the life-style of women in Paris and that of Julie:

Her uniform and retired manner of living would be to them insupportable; they would think the noise of children insufferable; they would be fatigued to death with the care of their family; they would not be able to bear the country; the esteem and prudence of a husband, not over tender, would hardly recompence them for his indifference and age; his preference, and even his regard for them, would be burthensome. They would either find means to send him abroad, that they might live more at their liberty; or would leave him to himself, despising the peaceful pleasures of their situation, seeing more dangerous is elsewhere, they would never be at ease in their own house, unless they came as visitors. It requires a sound mind to be able to enjoy the pleasures of retirement; the virtuous only being capable of amusing themselves with their family concerns, and of voluntarily secluding themselves from the world: if there be on earth any such thing as happiness, they undoubtedly enjoy it in such a state. But the means of happiness are nothing to those who know not how to make use of them; and we never know in what true happiness consists, till we have acquired a taste for its enjoyment.<sup>131</sup>

If women are not capable of living the virtuous life of Julie, then it becomes evident that material passion or self-interest has begun to affect their lives. That is, like men in the degeneration of society,<sup>132</sup> women seek greater freedom through the unlimited satisfaction of their passions. Ultimately, this indicates that women become discontent with their husbands

and families since these alone do not any longer satisfy the increasing demands of their passions; and the dissatisfaction evident with women's lives, causes men to become discontent as well. In short, women are no longer bound by natural need.

As in the state of society, the degeneration of the conjugal union ends with the triumph of self-interest, as it is manifested in the desire to satiate one's own passions, which causes both men and women to lose concern for others and instead, to use each other to satisfy themselves. Consistent with their role as innovators,<sup>133</sup> Rousseau maintains that women must return to their roles as mothers if society is to be rescued from corruption:

Do you wish to bring everyone back to his first duties? Begin with mothers. You will be surprised by the changes you will produce. Everything follows successively from this first depravity. The whole moral order degenerates; naturalness is extinguished in all hearts; home life takes on a less lively aspect; the touching spectacle of a family aborning no longer attaches husbands, no longer imposes respect on outsiders; the mothers whose children one does not see is less respected. One does not reside in one's family, habit does not strengthen blood ties. There are no longer fathers, mothers, children, brothers, and sisters. They all hardly know each other. How could they love each other? Each thinks only of himself. When home is only a sad solitude, one must surely go elsewhere for gaiety.<sup>134</sup>

This quotation illustrates all the principles which, taken together, cause the degeneration of personal relations: women relinquish their responsibilities for sustaining the family unit and the relations necessary to this form of association; there

are no emotional bonds between human beings who share an intimate relationship and as such, there is no authenticity since no one can be themselves and since no one relates to others honestly; there is no means of identifying oneself in relation to others, or no means of reaffirming one's self, because there are no emotional bonds to identify relationships; women disregard their ties with nature by not adhering to feminine traits and inclinations; there are no longer distinctions between the sexes, and hence, no roles through which individuals can reaffirm themselves and their relations to others; each sex tries to distinguish itself through sexuality; and finally, lacking distinctions, all become self-interested and sexual appetites rule the actions of all. Due to their influence on the moral order of society, Rousseau establishes that the role of women is not merely confined to the private sphere, but that their role can influence the social order as well. Further, Rousseau's view suggests that women are responsible for retaining natural ties. If women are led away from nature, men also depart from natural ties. In this way, women also affect social relations; for they could either preserve the influence of natural principles in society, thereby encouraging nonexploitative relations (as in the "Golden Era" and the ideal republic<sup>135</sup>), or they can cause unnatural principles to be established, thereby allowing society to degenerate. The influence of women described here, seems inconsistent to the dependent condition of women discussed previously.<sup>136</sup> At this point in the analysis of Rousseau's view of women, it is implied that women have more

power and significance than the previous analysis, in Chapter Three, of women in conjugal society indicated.

In exploring the degeneration of society and the corruption of the relations between the sexes, Rousseau actually examines those types of inequalities based on material possessions and political power which produce discontent, and in much the same way, the degeneration of personal relations is based on those inequalities of sexual satisfaction and power over the opposite sex which also give rise to dissatisfaction. In this way, discontent arises from a situation of dependence; from the individual's desire to perfect himself to the detriment of the development of his fellows; from the triumph of self-interest or appetite; from the desire to eliminate natural distinctions; and from the desire to distinguish one's self by disadvantaging others, and by using inauthentic relations to exploit others. In both forms of corruption, people no longer can be satisfied with who and what they are, what they are best qualified to do, and with whom they are coupled or attached. Among both corrupt women and men, all that is significant is power through self-satisfaction, possession and enslavement.

The manifestations of discontent creates the destruction of the natural order and the principle which sustains that order, virtue. Discontent causes both women and men to desire that which they do not have and which, perhaps, is impossible for them to obtain. The bitterness and envy caused by discontent compels them to concentrate on their deprivations and to attempt to overcome the sources of their dissatisfaction

regardless of the consequences of their actions. It follows that these feelings produce the destruction of the natural order and virtue since women and men lose concern for the needs and well-being of others. In short, since both the natural order and virtue provide for the well-being of each and every member of the species, the influence of these principles is destroyed necessarily with the triumph of self-interest and the perfection of the individual. Rousseau's perspective may indicate that the satisfaction of certain kinds of desires may not lead to greater freedom for the individual; but rather, the rise of self-satisfaction and self-importance will cause the enslavement of all. For this reason, Rousseau urges women and men to find happiness within themselves and with the natural distinctions which exist between women and men. Both of these factors will benefit the individual as well as the human race as a whole, by securing individuality within a situation of interdependence.

The significance of examining the parallels between the the institution of social relations of men and of permanent family unions, and between the corruption of both social and personal relations is two-fold. First, this analysis shows what principles Rousseau believes are necessary for the establishment of nonexploitative relations. In order to achieve nonexploitative relations based on interdependence, Rousseau asserts the necessity of following the natural order; the maintenance of natural inequalities or distinctions; adherence to virtue, to ensure the preservation of the species; the retention



of independence, individuality and self-reliance, to confirm the individual's existence and importance despite interdependence; and the sustenance of authentic relations, to avoid exploitation. Secondly, both parallel developments show that there is a connection between social and familial relations. This is to say, the factors which operate within the family are directly parallel to those evident in society. This indicates that there is an intimate relationship between the family and society, wherein it may be possible to assert that the family unit influences the social unit. Rousseau indicates that the basis for this connection consists in the qualities and role of women. The importance of women is suggested in both parallel developments. In fact, the transition to permanent relations show the significance of women in society. Thus, Rousseau's argument is based on an assertion that women's fidelity ensures authentic relations, and authenticity establishes women as the sustainers of the family; and conversely, women's infidelity gives rise to inauthentic relations, and inauthenticity or dishonesty creates the destruction of the family and social relations. This perspective is also evident in social relations among men wherein Rousseau argues that when men respect the well-being of the entire human race authentic relations between men are possible and authenticity allows for the mutual preservation of all members of the species; and conversely, disregard for human beings sustain inauthentic relations, and inauthenticity or dishonesty brings about the destruction of the human species and social harmony. If women inspire authentic relations

within the familial unit, and Rousseau suggests that this is indeed what happens, then women may also stimulate authenticity in society. This proposition becomes more plausible when Rousseau's emphasis on the role of women in the family's degeneration is considered, since his description of the corruption process suggests that women have a great deal of power over men. Thus, it is necessary now to examine whether there is a concrete foundation for the power of women and its significance of this for society can be discerned in Rousseau's view of women. This will be the subject of the following chapter.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### WOMEN AS THE EARTHLY EQUIVALENTS OF THE GREAT LEGISLATOR

This chapter will be concerned with determining whether there is a foundation in Rousseau's understanding of women which would allow women to be socially significant, other than as the sustainers of the family unit. To this end, it is necessary to discuss whether Rousseau, in establishing a sexual division of labour, meant to create a regimented society in which the private and public spheres remained completely separated. This, in turn, will show that women become the sustainers of, not only the family unit, but also, the social unit. From their role as the sustainers of social relations, a curious parallel arises between women's role and that of the great legislator. The parallel between these two functions will clarify the exact nature of the influence of women in society. However, it is necessary, at this point, to discuss the sexual division of labour in order to ascertain whether Rousseau meant to create a well-ordered society dependent upon a complete division of spheres for men and women.

In confining women to the home and men to the civil sphere, it appears that Rousseau attempts to establish a regimented society. However, this does not seem to be his intention, strictly speaking. What he may be concerned with is

dividing up socially necessary labour on the basis of generalizations which specify what each sex is best-suited to perform within two spheres. As it has already been established, this division resulted from the transition to permanent associations between the sexes.<sup>1</sup> It is curious, though, why Rousseau maintains that men should be associated with the civil sphere, since he also argues that society is more alien to men than to women, and yet, by virtue of his physical strength, men become responsible for providing for their families' subsistence,<sup>2</sup> and as such, they gradually become more involved with society and social relations.<sup>3</sup> Thus, it is conceivable that men begin to identify themselves more closely with this type of sphere. This assertion implies that man, although not naturally a social being, becomes more dependent on society. It would also indicate that women retain their natural, albeit slightly altered, dependence on the family.<sup>4</sup> Rousseau's theory of the distinctiveness of the sexes leads him to seek a unity of opposites, or the harmonious interaction and cooperation of differently inclined human beings.<sup>5</sup> However, if Rousseau did mean to create two spheres of contributions, it is doubtful that these could remain distinct according to his own theoretical postulates.

The differentiation of spheres, and hence, duties, would seem to establish the place of each sex either within society or within the home. This view necessitates asserting that these distinctions must apply to each sex absolutely and that the duties of each must never impinge upon the duties and sphere of the other. Lynda Lange writes:

Rousseau makes an explicit philosophical distinction between the family, and other aspects of private life, and citizenship, or public life. The latter is associated with the sphere of generality, that is, of discourse and judgement about what are considered the loftiest of intentional objects and moral sentiment. The dualism of mind and body which underlies this distinction has played a very important role in the history of political theory, where it is used as a part of the philosophical foundation of the justification of hierarchical structures. It is argued in that context that those who best exercise the functions of mind are the ones who ought to rule those dominated by appetite or sentiment. The problem is that reduced to one of identifying these individuals. Since the material needs of society, along with the will and passions of its individual members may never be literally dispensed with, however much they may be controlled or denigrated, the dualist must assign these activities to some segment of the society.<sup>6</sup>

Lange suggests that Rousseau believes that men, capable of suppressing their passions, should rule over women, who are dominated by their bodily attributes. These factors, Lange believes, lead to the establishment of private-public dualisms.<sup>7</sup> However, the construction of Lange's argument depends on whether Rousseau believed this type of division could exist, without the functions of each sex encroaching upon those of the opposite sex. Rousseau indicates that this division cannot be absolute and thus, the exclusion of spheres is not entirely possible. For example, Rousseau argues that the mother is not the only family member charged with caring for the children.<sup>8</sup> As previously noted,<sup>9</sup> the father must take part in the education of his children. Further, Rousseau explicitly states that males

must share in the upbringing of his children: "In these species the male shares the care of the little ones... ." <sup>10</sup> Thus, Rousseau maintains that men must take responsibility for certain aspects of the nurturing of their children; for example, the father must provide his children with the necessities of life, he must tend to their edification, he must prepare them for society and social relations, and he must ready them for active participation as citizens. <sup>11</sup> Also, he specifies, contrary to Lange's statement, that men are passionate beings. <sup>12</sup> Rousseau does not argue that women are ruled by their passions and in fact, he states that women "...are a hundred times more sensible than passionate." <sup>13</sup> This distinction suggests that men can identify more easily with their passions, than can women. Further, Rousseau believes that man is characterized by his physical strength <sup>14</sup> and hence, men, and not merely women, are also tied to their bodies. The above considerations indicate that the division of labour may not be as absolute as Lange believes. The ambiguity of the restrictions imposed by the division of labour becomes a more significant factor when it is applied to the situation of women.

In the description of the degeneration of personal relations, Rousseau indicates that women have a great deal of influence over men, which is powerful enough to change the constitution of men, <sup>15</sup> to enslave men by romantic love, <sup>16</sup> to remove the influence of natural inequalities between the sexes, <sup>17</sup> and to directly rule men on the basis of their sexual desires. <sup>18</sup> All of these assertions indicate that Rousseau recognizes that

women can affect the lives of men in a significant manner. In fact, Rousseau argues that women possess power or talents which are designed to compensate them for their lack of physical prowess:

...nature wants them to think, to judge, to love, to know, to cultivate their minds as well as their looks. These are the weapons nature gives them to take the place of the strength they lack and to direct ours.<sup>19</sup>

In order to compensate women for their inferior physical capabilities, Rousseau asserts that nature bestows them with talents (thinking, judging, knowing, loving, cultivating their minds) which they use to direct male strength. In this way, Rousseau argues that women better their position through manipulation:

"She must have the art to make us want to do everything which her sex cannot do by itself and which is necessary or agreeable to it."<sup>20</sup> Women, then, guide the strength of men by manipulation. This statement gives rise to three important considerations: Why do women have this power? Why would men, who are described as possessing greater physical strength and rational capacities, be willing to accept this direction? For what purposes can this power be used (that is, is the exercise of this power confined to the home or can it be extended to operate in the social setting as well)? Although the assertion of the power of women seems to indicate an underlying inconsistency in Rousseau's understanding of women, it may be possible that the affirmation of the influence of women is indicative of a hidden role that he meant to communicate. Before this can be

concretely concluded, it is necessary, first, to address those questions underlying Rousseau's assertion of the power of women.

The reason why women possess this ability and, in part, men submit to this power willingly is revealed in Rousseau's assertion of women's ascendancy:

I am far from thinking that this ascendancy of women is in itself an evil. It is a gift given them by nature for the happiness of the human race. Better directed, it could produce as much good as today it does harm. We do not adequately suspect the advantages that would result for society if better education were given to that half of the human race that governs the other. Men will always be what is pleasing to women; therefore, if you want to become great and virtuous, teach women what greatness of soul and virtue are.<sup>21</sup>

This establishes, first, that the ascendancy of women is a gift from nature which can be used for many good purposes, but that this power is susceptible to harmful usage as well. The harm which results from the abuse of this power is evident in the degeneration of the conjugal union. Secondly, Rousseau argues that the abuses of this power may be averted if women were better educated, and he maintains that this would be socially beneficial. Thirdly, Rousseau indicates that women are the "natural" governors of men and this reveals why he believed that women have this power. Further, it reveals, in part, why men accept the rule of women; that is, since the ascendancy of women is established by nature, its natural basis is something to which men may have become accustomed. Perhaps most importantly, the principles evident in this passage are contradictory



to Rousseau's other postulates concerning the condition of women. For example, Rousseau maintains that nature allowed women to be vanquished by giving them less physical strength.<sup>22</sup> The ascendancy of women asserted in this passage is directly contrary to the domination of women by men on the basis of physical strength, unless Rousseau meant to convey that just as nature gave women talents or powers to oppose any attempts by males to completely dominate them,<sup>23</sup> men were given reason and physical strength by nature to counter the attempts of women to completely dominate them, by capitalizing on their passionate nature. Although Rousseau never explicitly states this possibility, it may be inferred from his view that each sex was provided with special talents to ensure against domination by the other. Further, the power given to women contradicts Rousseau's insistence that women should be "passive and weak", and put up "little resistance".<sup>24</sup> If women are ascendant, then they may not be passive and weak, nor need they put up little resistance. It may be more likely that Rousseau meant to advocate that women should appear to be passive and weak and to appear to put up little resistance. In this way, Rousseau can be interpreted as advising women to keep their ascendancy, and the talents accompanying it, hidden and to allow men to believe that they are "active and strong" and that they can "necessarily will and be able".<sup>25</sup> However, the necessity for keeping the power of women hidden is still not clear and will be examined later in this chapter. Further, the assertion of women's ascendance may contradict Rousseau's

statement that women are knowledgeable in physical things that depend on the judgement of the senses, while men comprehend moral things that depend on the understanding.<sup>26</sup> If women teach men what greatness of soul and virtue are,<sup>27</sup> then they must be knowledgeable in "moral things that depend more on the understanding."<sup>28</sup> In order to teach men to be great and virtuous, women are necessarily involved in moral things, and they must understand what it means to be great and virtuous, how to make men great and virtuous and of what these are comprised; all these assertions indicate that women must have knowledge in moral things. Just as Rousseau cautions women to keep their power hidden, he may advocate that women conceal their knowledge of moral things, for a reason which as yet remains unclear. However, Rousseau's assertion of the natural ascendancy of women does not adequately explain why men accept their guidance, nor does it reveal the purposes for which this power is to be used, nor does it clarify what it is about women which enables them to teach virtue. These questions will be put into a clearer perspective by examining the nature of dependency relations and of male authority, respectively.

With the establishment of the family it appears that the woman's independence is limited more severely than that of her male partner, and that which she enjoyed in the state of nature. In fact, the idea of being confined to the home indicates a total loss of independence. Previously self-reliant, Rousseau implies that women become more dependent upon men than men upon women:

Woman and man are made for one another, but their mutual dependence is not equal. Men depend on women because of their desires; women depend on men because of both their desires and their needs. We could survive more easily without them than they would without us. For them to have what is necessary to their station, they depend on us to give it to them, to want to give it to them, to esteem them worthy of it.<sup>29</sup>

Rousseau, here, distinguishes between desires and needs,<sup>30</sup> and from this distinction, he measures the degree of dependence that these sustain for both men and women. He argues that women depend on men solely on the basis of their desires and their needs, while men depend on women only for their desires. However, it is not clear that Rousseau's theory can sustain the distinction between desires and needs, as they apply to men, and as such, it is necessary to determine whether men also depend on women for their needs. This examination can be facilitated by analyzing those things which are distinguished as needs, according to Rousseau, as they apply to men and women.

In stating that women depend on men for their needs, Rousseau could refer to, first, women's inability to have children without male assistance. Thus, women depend on men in order to have children. Although men also depend on women for the reproduction of children, it is not sufficiently clear whether Rousseau believes that men consider children a need. Secondly, women depend on men for the satisfaction of their sexual desires. However, since Rousseau indicates that sexual gratification is something which is common to both men and women, the dependence sustained by this situation is both mutual and natural.

As such, sexual dependence, for the satisfaction of a mutual desire, does not place women in an inferior position to men.

As a consequence of familial life, women are not able to provide for their own needs, or for their preservation, and for this reason, they must depend on their husbands. In short, Rousseau argues that women, who are no longer completely self-sufficient, depend on men's willingness to provide for their subsistence and comfort:

There is no parity between the two sexes in regard to the consequences of sex. The male is male only at certain moments. The female is female her whole life or at least during her whole youth. Everything recalls her sex to her; and to fulfill its functions well, she needs a constitution which corresponds to it. She needs care during her pregnancy; she needs rest at the time of childbirth; she needs a soft and sedentary life to suckle her children; she needs patience and gentleness, a zeal which nothing can rebuff in order to raise her children. She serves as the link between them and their father; she alone makes him love them and gives him the confidence to call them his own. How much tenderness and care is required to maintain the union of the whole family.<sup>31</sup>

Rousseau indicates that women, as long as they are capable of having children, are identified with the biological functions of their gender, while men are distinguished by the function of their gender only when engaged in the sexual union. Thus, the sexual union, and its consequences, is responsible for the distinctions between the sexes, according to what is masculine and what is feminine. In accordance to what is considered

feminine, Rousseau argues that women need a "soft and sedentary" existence, in order to fulfill their role as wives and mothers. The foundation for this view is based on the changes sustained by the transition from the original condition; that is, the previously uncontrollable biological need which produces pregnancy became a matter of choice for natural women,<sup>32</sup> and upon the transition to permanent social relations, pregnancy became a socialized need.<sup>33</sup> For this reason, Rousseau asserts that in society pregnancies occur more frequently.<sup>34</sup> Further, he argues that women must be confined to the home in order that their husbands may be assured of the paternity of their children.<sup>35</sup> Thus, women appear to have voluntarily forsaken independence in favour of familial life, and subsequently, for the attainment of their most prominent need- to have children. This conception of dependence is not entirely foreign to women, since in the state of nature, women could have relinquished their self-sufficiency in order to have more children and to more easily provide for their subsistence with the assistance of men.<sup>36</sup> In essence, the dependent condition of women, prior to the establishment of permanent relations between the sexes and in the temporary union of mother and child in the natural condition, has merely been carried over to social and personal relations.

The conception of pregnancy as a need may indicate that women are dependent on men, while men retain a greater semblance of their natural independence. However, this would hold true only if Rousseau claimed that women and children did

not become needs for men. Rousseau argues that the natural independence of men is lost in the transition to permanent social relations,<sup>37</sup> and it is replaced by emotional dependence within the familial environment.<sup>38</sup> This is to say, a man becomes more attached to his wife and children with the development of conjugal love and paternal love. The rise of emotional attachments may be a more extensive development for men than Rousseau's view indicates. With the experience of these new emotional attachments, man became more interested in and formed more intimate bonds with others. Rousseau states:

In proportion as ideas and sentiments follow upon one another and as mind and heart are trained, the human race continues to be tamed, contacts spread, and bonds are tightened. . . .  
As soon as men had begun to appreciate one another and the idea of consideration was formed in their minds, each one claimed a right to it, and it was no longer possible to be disrespectful toward anyone with impunity.<sup>39</sup>

Rousseau indicates that the awareness of others gave rise to greater contact, more interest in others, and emotional bonds. Hence, it does not seem possible to assume that this emotional progression has little significance for men. In fact, the retention of natural (and perhaps even extensive social) independence is no longer possible for men, since natural independence requires not only self-reliance, but also indifference to others or no emotional ties. Within a permanent cohabitation, Rousseau argues that a man is not indifferent to his wife and children, nor is he disinterested in men outside of the conjugal union, as the advent of emotional attachments demonstrates.

Further, these emotional attachments change the nature and inclinations of men. In this way, men become habituated to being depended upon and, in turn, they learn to depend on the emotional attachments that they have formed. For example, Rousseau suggests that the love shared by a man and a woman, which is based on mutual preference, after the transition to society, gives rise to jealousy.<sup>40</sup> This could indicate that the object of a man's love became a need, and therefore, anyone who attempted to encroach upon that object, either in reality or in his imagination, was considered a threat to the man and a root cause of jealousy. The advent of jealousy in man's emotional attachments may be indicative of the degree to which he had become dependent upon the objects of his love. In fact, a man may become jealous because the encroachment of another endangers his ability to reaffirm himself in his wife, and he regards this type of infringement as a threat to his distinctiveness and his self-sufficiency, sustained in the spiritual nature of the conjugal union.<sup>41</sup> Viewing his wife as an intimate part of his self indicates that a man begins to depend on love and his wife as basic needs. Further, it may be logical to conclude that men become dependent upon the products of conjugal love, their children. Thus, Rousseau states:

Though fortune spoils him [the father] of his wealth, she can never rob him of those affections which are attached to him; she cannot deprive a father of his children; all the difference is, that he maintained them yesterday, and they will support him tomorrow. It is thus that we may learn the true enjoyment of our riches, of our family, and of our-

selves; it is thus that the minutiae of a family become agreeable to a worthy man who knows the value of them; it is thus far from considering these little duties as troublesome, he makes them a part of his happiness, and derives the glory and pleasure of human nature from these noble and affecting offices.<sup>42</sup>

In this passage, Rousseau indicates that children are a part of the father's happiness and they are an avenue through which men derive distinction and pleasure. If this is so, children would have greater significance in the lives of men than Rousseau admitted. Further, the significance of children to their fathers is evident in the emphasis Rousseau places on women's chastity. In essence, this concern reveals more about the insecurity of men than about the nature of women. This is to say, men needed guarantees from women that they are the fathers of the children reproduced in the conjugal union and these guarantees would facilitate authentic relations within the family unit and the males' ability to reaffirm themselves in the children.<sup>43</sup> As the insecurity of men indicates, children had become intimately connected with their fathers' selves and, as such, a need. Since men needed assurances that the products of their love were truly a part of their selves and that no one had encroached upon the objects of their love, men, then, might become more dependent on women for the satisfaction of their needs (conjugal love and paternal love), as well as their sexual desires, as much as women become dependent upon men for the same. If men are dependent upon women for both their needs and desires, then this would explain why they might accept direction from women.



Hence, just as women realized that they desired to have children with one man, thereby initiating the transformation to social relations, and voluntarily accepted their dependence on men for the satisfaction of their needs,<sup>44</sup> so men may come to desire and to need both conjugal love and paternal love after having experienced them. In this way, men become husbands/fathers and social beings, capable of being governed by the general will, after voluntarily recognizing their dependence on women for the fulfillment of their needs and desires.

However, there may be another reason why men would accept the guidance of women. Rousseau argues that women's judgement develops prior to that of men:

Women's judgement is formed earlier than men's. Since almost from infancy women are on the defensive and entrusted with a treasure that is difficult to protect, good and evil are necessarily known to them.<sup>45</sup>

Rousseau's statement implies that women are able to naturally distinguish between good and evil. This point would appear to be relatively insignificant unless it is understood within Rousseau's social context. The advent of interdependence among men gave rise to commonly accepted standards of excellence.<sup>46</sup> Rousseau argues that certain qualities became necessary to possess, and men, relying on appearances, began to live outside of themselves:

Behold all the natural qualities put into action, the rank and fate of each man established, not only upon the quantity of goods and the power to serve or harm, but also upon the mind, beauty, strength, or skill, upon merits

or talents. And these qualities being the only ones which could attract consideration, it was soon necessary to have them or affect them; for one's own advantage, it was necessary to appear to be other than what one in fact was. To be and to seem to be became two altogether different things; and from this distinction came conspicuous ostentation, deceptive cunning, and all the vices that follow from them.<sup>47</sup>

With the advent of social relations, men began to evaluate themselves based on comparisons with others and this process, maintained by authentic relations, allowed each to be himself without needing to be anything different and to be aware of himself as a distinct human being.<sup>48</sup> However, when social relations are inauthentic, Rousseau maintains that people attach themselves to external goods and evaluate themselves on this basis.<sup>49</sup> When men become inauthentic, they seek to benefit and distinguish themselves by exploiting others.<sup>50</sup> Men may be exposed more to the dangers of inauthenticity simply because they must provide for the family's subsistence and this takes them away from the home, and because they must cooperate politically with other men in society. Women, however, being confined to the dictates of private life, may not be as adversely affected by inauthentic relations than are men, since Rousseau argues that insincerity makes women lose their mores, while men lose both their mores and their physical constitution.<sup>51</sup> Women, in being confined to the home, are more distant from the immediate affects of inauthentic relations, and by virtue of their seclusion, Rousseau indicates that women devote more time to developing their mores:

From their [men's and women's] relation

in this country [England] we can draw a conclusion about the others. The whole difference consists in the fact that the life of women is a continual development of their morals [manners], whereas, since those of men disappear in the uniformity of business, one must wait to see them in their pleasures to judge them. Do you want to know men? Study women.<sup>52</sup>

Women remain at a greater distance from the uniformity and conformity that social interaction sustains for men, and as such, the true nature of men is dependent upon women; or, stated differently, women, being more occupied with the mores of human society, determine the mores of men. For this reason, Rousseau maintains that women are responsible for determining the morality of human society: "It is for women to discover experimental morality, so to speak, and for us to reduce it to a system."<sup>53</sup> In reality, women determine the mores prevalent in society, although in an indirect fashion. Men may then respect the guidance of women since they retain their natural character and are removed from the pressures to conform to specific socially necessary practices, outside of a home life.<sup>54</sup> Thus, Rousseau maintains that women determine social practices and men merely execute these procedures:

Women's reason is practical and makes them very skillful at finding means for getting to a known end, but not at finding that end itself. The social relationship of the sexes is an admirable thing. This partnership produces a moral person of which the woman is the eye and the man is the arm, but they have such a dependence on one another that the woman learns from the man what must be seen [ie., what the end is] and the man learns from the

woman what must be done [ie., what the means are to that end]. If woman could ascend to general principles as well as man can, and if man had as good a mind for details as woman does, they would always be independent of one another, they would live in external discord, and their partnership could not exist. But in the harmony which reigns between them, everything tends to the common end; they do not know who contributes more. Each follows the prompting of the other; each obeys, and both are masters.<sup>55</sup>

Since women are excluded from active participation, Rousseau indicates that women are unable to find what the necessary end is by themselves and hence, they must wait until men tell them what the desired goal is, then women may guide men to that end on the basis of their knowledge of good and evil.<sup>56</sup> Although Rousseau acknowledges that women are instrumental in guiding social practices, it remains to determine how substantial the power of women is for society and social relations. The significance of the social influence of women can be shown by examining the nature of male authority.

As noted previously, male authority within the family unit is superior to the female's authority.<sup>57</sup> However, this assertion may be directly contrary to Rousseau's insistence that both the male and the female obey and are masters.<sup>58</sup> The inconsistencies evident in Rousseau's understanding of authority within the family could be explained by the necessity for keeping the authority of women indirect; women must not, according to Rousseau, rule directly in the household.<sup>59</sup> Women are considered to be subservient to male authority since Rousseau believes them to be considerably weaker physically.<sup>60</sup> However,

the inequality evident in these power relations is ambiguous since Rousseau maintains that, in reality, the stronger depends on the weaker:

...the stronger appears to be master but actually depends on the weaker. This is due not to a frivolous practice of gallantry or to the proud generosity of a protector, but to an invariable law of nature which gives woman more facility to excite the desires than man to satisfy them. This causes the latter, whether he likes it or not, to depend on the former's wish and constrains him to seek to please her in turn, so that she will consent to let him be the stronger. Then what is sweetest for man in his victory is the doubt whether it is weakness which yields to strength or the will which surrenders.<sup>61</sup>

Rousseau asserts that nature gives women the ability to have (potentially) unlimited sexual desires,<sup>62</sup> while men have weaker and uncertain sexual desires.<sup>63</sup> The uncertainty of male sexual desire makes him dependent on the assistance of the female to ensure the successful completion of the sexual union.<sup>64</sup> The male, despite his physical supremacy, does not possess stronger or more certain sexual desires. The male may consider himself as the stronger partner only if the female allows him to assume this role. This is to say, the female gives the male a psychological boost necessary for the completion of the sexual coupling, since the uncertainty of the male's desires makes him feel weak and thus, dependent. In short, women exercise both sexual and authoritative control over men, by virtue of modesty and their strong sexual desires, and hence, Rousseau

writes:

If the two sexes had equally made and received the [sexual] advances, vain importunity would have never been preserved; the passions, ever languishing in a boring freedom, would have never been excited; the sweetest of all the sentiments would hardly have touched the human heart, and its object would have been badly fulfilled. The apparent obstacle, which seems to keep this object at a distance, is in reality what brings it nearer. The desires, veiled by shame, become only the more seductive; in hindering them, chasteness inflames them. Its fears, its tricks, its reserves, its timid avowals, its tender and naive delicacy, say better what chasteness thinks to hide than passion could have said it without chasteness. It is chasteness which lends value to favors granted and sweetness to rejection. True love possesses really what chasteness alone contests with it; that mixture of weakness and modesty renders it more touching and tenderer; the less it obtains, the more the value of what it does obtain increases, and it is thus that it enjoys both its privations and its pleasures.<sup>65</sup>

Rousseau argues that the repression of women's sexual desires enables them to force men to overcome the uncertainty of their desires, thereby giving women control, in part, over the sexual relations between men and women. Through the use of their power, women are compensated for their lack of physical strength and men are satisfied despite the weakness of their sexual desires. Thus, in sexual relations, a balance is struck between each person's weaknesses and his desire to rule. Rousseau writes:

In relation to the chasteness of women in particular, what gentler arm could this same nature have given to the one

it destined to resist? The desires are equal. What does that mean? Are there on both sides the same faculties for their satisfaction? What would become of the human species if the order of attack and defense were changed? The assailant would choose by chance times when victory would be impossible; the assailed would be left in peace when he needs to be vanquished, and pursued without interruption when he is too weak to succumb; in a word, since the power and will, always in dissaccord, would never permit the desires to be mutually shared, love would no longer be the support of nature but its destroyer and plague.<sup>66</sup>

In sexual relations, the male desires to rule the female on the basis of his greater physical strength and for this reason, Rousseau speaks of the sexual encounter as a victory<sup>67</sup> and in terms of attack and defense. The female desires to rule the male on the basis of her greater desire and in this way, Rousseau urges women to be modest because if she is not, the sexual union would be deprived of excitement and that the desires would languish in a boring freedom.<sup>69</sup> With both partners striving to rule, the success of the sexual coupling depends on the equilibrium sustained by both sexes' strengths.<sup>70</sup> Thus, the woman consents to allow the man to feel physically superior since his sexual desire requires this psychological boost. Interestingly, however, Rousseau does not suggest that men consent to the superiority of women. If, as Rousseau maintains, the woman is characterized by unlimited desires, the physical supremacy of the man would not necessarily affect her sexual performance, in the same way that the modesty of the woman influences her partner's conduct or response. Although Schwartz

suggests that the sexual union expresses "...the alternating rule of each sex... ."70, if the woman is not influenced by the male's physical superiority, then the sexual union is ruled by the constant authority of modesty. Despite the necessity for the man's willingness to participate, the woman's functioning does not depend on any psychological boosts administered by the male. As Schwartz, himself, points out,

The male believes that he triumphs over the female (as is evidenced in the male understanding of the sexual union as a 'conquest' or a 'possession'); but in fact, to a considerable extent the male deceives himself. He thinks that he rules his partner directly; in reality, she manipulates him indirectly.<sup>71</sup>

Schwartz recognizes the constant rule of women, but yet he insists that sexual relations comprise the alternating rule of each sex. In fact, since modesty rules the sexual relations of women and men, women rule consistently; men do not rule in sexual encounters, women merely allow them to believe that they rule. This argument indicates that men, psychologically, need to believe that they rule in the conjugal union. If women allow men to assume that they rule personal relations, then it may be possible to conclude that this deception is manifested in the social/political realm as well. This is to say, the rule of men in society may conceal the discreet rule of women within the same realm. The influence of women in social relations will become evident in the analysis of the parallels between their role as the sustainers of the family and of morality, and that of the legislator.



According to Schwartz's interpretation of Rousseau's understanding of women, women have a distinct political influence:

It is women who ultimately control the mores and opinions of male citizens. ... Rousseau realizes that political authority is not wholly manifest and direct, and associates covert and indirect authority with the rule of women. Because this is so, what is true with regard to sexuality is also true with regard to politics: the reality of feminine power is greater than its appearance.<sup>73</sup>

However, this proposal is incomplete. Although Schwartz maintains that women are concerned with the mores and opinions of men in society and as such, they manipulate men indirectly, and he suggests that this influence becomes manifested in the larger society,<sup>73</sup> he does not recognize that the role of women is more concretely connected with social practice than Rousseau's view suggests. Rousseau's emphasis on the importance of women in social practice and his ambiguity concerning the exact role of women becomes more evident through a detailed examination of the parallels between the roles of women and the legislator.

The first parallel between the role of women and that of the legislator can be found in the reason why Rousseau suggests that a legislator is necessary in society. Rousseau maintains that the legislator is needed to provide citizens with the enlightened guidance that they lack, thereby uniting society on the bases of understanding and will:

How will a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wants because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry

out by itself an undertaking as vast and as difficult as a system of legislation? By itself, the people always wants the good, but by itself it does not always see it. The general will is always right, but the judgement that guides it is not always enlightened. It must be made to see objects as they are, or sometimes as they should appear to be; shown the good path it seeks; safeguarded against the seduction of private wills; shown how to assimilate considerations of time and place; taught to weigh the attraction of present, tangible advantages against the danger of remote, hidden ills. Private individuals see the good they reject; the public wants the good it does not see. All are equally in need of guides. The former must be obligated to make their wills conform to their reason. The latter must be taught to know what it wants. Then public enlightenment results in the union of understanding and will in the social body; hence the complete cooperation of the parts, and finally the greatest force of the whole. From this arises the necessity for a legislator.<sup>74</sup>

The legislator will be responsible for discovering good laws which would unite the understanding and will, resulting in public enlightenment. The necessity for an enlightened understanding within society, in order to unite the parts of the whole, is similar to the understanding required within the conjugal union and to achieve this union, the capacities of women become significant.

Rousseau maintains that women's judgement, based on the knowledge of good and evil, is formed prior to that of men.<sup>75</sup> This knowledge is socially beneficial since women are not as directly affected by the uniformity and the conformity that social interaction sustains for men. Rousseau writes:

They [men] are affected as much as, and more than, women by a commerce that is too intimate; they lose not only their morals [manners], but we lose our morals [manners] and our constitution.<sup>76</sup>

Although this passage appears as a reason for the lives of men to be separate from the lives of women at times, it could be equally applicable to the relations between women and men, and social interaction. Rousseau argues that the intimate relation between men and business cause their mores to disappear:

...the life of women is a continual development of their morals [manners], whereas, since those of men disappear in the uniformity of business, one must wait to see them in their pleasures to judge of them. Do you want to know men? Study women.<sup>77</sup>

The intimate relation sustained by business practices necessitates that men separate themselves from the requirements of business when engaging in their recreational activities. It is conceivable that Rousseau implies that the constitution of men could deteriorate if they were not different in their pleasures. However, although they are indirectly affected by business practices, women may be less likely to be changed by this when they remain isolated in the home and distanced from any immediate consequences. The importance of establishing the distance of women from the immediate effects of the business world becomes clearer when this factor is compared to the distance of the legislator from man's nature. Thus, Rousseau writes:

The discovery of the best rules of society suited to nations would require a superior intelligence who saw all of men's passions yet experienced none of them; who had no

relationship at all to our nature yet  
 knew it thoroughly; whose happiness  
 was independent of us, yet who was  
 nevertheless willing to attend to ours... .<sup>78</sup>

Since women are removed from the immediate effects of the world of business and since they are not passionate, but sensible, women may be distant enough from uncorrupted character to complement the legislator's function.

Since women are removed from the immediate influences on male behaviour and since they are capable of distinguishing between good and evil, women may unify the relations between the sexes according to will and understanding. In fact, the description of the necessity to produce public enlightenment by unifying the will and the understanding of citizens is similar to Rousseau's account of the conjugal union, united by the same means:

Women's reason is practical and makes them very skillful at finding the means for getting to a known end, but not at finding that end itself. The social relationship of the sexes is an admirable thing. This partnership produces a moral person of which the woman is the eye and the man is the arm, but they have such a dependence on one another that the woman learns from the man what must be seen and the man learns from the woman what must be done.<sup>79</sup>

Just as the legislator is responsible for discovering good laws which would result in the union of the understanding and the will, and thus in public enlightenment, the male-female relationship creates a "moral person", unified by the will and understanding, for "the woman is the eye and the man is the

arm... ."80 In essence, the male, by himself, would remain incomplete, as would an unmarried female.<sup>81</sup> However, if women initiate social relations, by virtue of their ability to become pregnant, and being aware of the consequences of the sexual coupling when men are not,<sup>82</sup> then, by manipulating the males to live in a permanent union, females actively promote the union of the will and understanding. In much the same way as the legislator is necessary to harmonize the citizens in the state, women reconcile the disparate inclinations of the sexes to form the complete whole which, in turn, operates for the benefit of society. In short, just as the legislator and citizens complement each other, so do women and men.

Another parallel between women and the legislator concerns how the influence of both is manifested in society. Rousseau argues that the legislator does not act directly in the political sphere, and his role is in no way connected with the desire for human domination:

The legislator is an extraordinary man in the State in all ways. If he should be so by his talents, he is no less by his function. It is not magistracy; it is not sovereignty. This function which constitutes the republic, does not enter into its constitution. In a way, it is a particular and almost divine activity that has nothing in common with human domination. For if one who has authority over men should not have authority over laws, one who has authority over laws should not have authority over men. Otherwise his laws being made to serve his passions, would often only perpetuate his injustices, and he could never avoid having private views alter the sanctity of his work.<sup>83</sup>

The legislator must not have any direct authority over men. Instead, the legislator's role, like that of women, is manifested indirectly. Rousseau advocates that this separation of powers is necessary because the legislator, obtaining authority over men, would use the laws to serve his self-interest. This is analogous to what happened when women began to rule men directly, in the degeneration of the conjugal union.<sup>84</sup> When women began to rule directly, they were enticed away from their duties in order to fulfill their unlimited sexual desires, and thus, the degeneration of personal relations ended in the triumph of bodily appetites.

However, the legislator, due to his superior capacity for understanding, will have difficulty in making himself understood by the people.<sup>85</sup> As such, Rousseau argues that he must have recourse to another authority:

Each individual appreciating no other aspect of government than the one that relates to his private interest, has difficulty perceiving the advantages he should obtain from the continual deprivations imposed by good laws. In order for an emerging people to appreciate the healthy maxims of politics, and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit which should be the result of the institution, would have to preside over the founding of the institution itself; and men would have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of laws. Since the legislator is therefore unable to use either force or reasoning, he must necessarily have recourse to another authority, which can win over without violence and persuade without convincing.<sup>86</sup>

Since the nature of men must be conducive to the ends manifested in social institutions, Rousseau maintains that men must be, prior to the establishment of civil society, what they will be after society has been erected. In order to complete this seemingly impossible task, since he cannot use coercion, the legislator must resort to another authority which can "win over without violence and persuade without convincing." Women also utilize this same type of authority. According to Rousseau, women win men over without violence, due to their lesser physical abilities, by using feelings or emotional attachments, and as such, women are described as being manipulative.<sup>87</sup> By virtue of being manipulative, women can merely "persuade without convincing"; that is, since their rule is indirect, it can never convince men or force them to obey. As the degeneration of the conjugal union illustrates, if the rule of women was direct, man could not retain even an appearance of superiority.<sup>88</sup> Further, since both the legislator and women rule by indirect means, both rule by means of manipulation. In this way, both entice their subjects; that is, both depend upon a form of seduction in order to lead men to "the good". The legislator lures citizens to accept the deprivation necessitated by good laws and in so doing, he changes the nature of men; while women entice men into depending upon them and their guidance, and in this way, they transform men's nature. In short, both entice their subjects into following the guidelines of each.

The above establishes that the legislator's influence is manifested in social relations, as is that of women. This

assertion leads to another parallel between the legislator and women, and this is evident in the functions that the legislator must perform in order to unite society completely. In order to enlighten citizens and to regulate their behaviour accordingly, Rousseau suggests that the legislator is obliged to transform human nature:

One who dares to undertake the founding of a people should feel that he is capable of changing human nature, so to speak; of transforming each individual, who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into part of the larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being; of altering man's constitution in order to strengthen it; of substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence we received from nature. He must, in short, take away man's own forces in order to give him forces that are foreign to him and that he cannot make use of without the help of others.<sup>89</sup>

In essence, women, as initiators of social relations, perform this function as well. Through their actions, women initiate the family, thereby transforming the solitary existence of men to one which is based on mutual affection and freedom.<sup>90</sup> Men begin to depend on the sentiments of conjugal love and paternal love, as well as upon the objects of these feelings. Men do not merely reciprocate this affection, but also recognize their obligations to their families and thus they become the providers for the family unit.<sup>92</sup> By recognizing his dependence on the objects of his love, the life of man takes on a partial and moral existence.<sup>93</sup> Men no longer can be completely self-reliant as they were in the state of nature, and by himself, he is not



complete or whole. In this way, man's existence is a partial one since he needs to rely on the cooperation of others in order to be assured that the totality, the state, survives. Thus, Rousseau writes:

...if each citizen is nothing and can do nothing except with all the others, and if the force acquired by the whole is equal or superior to the sum of the natural forces of all the individuals, it may be said that legislation has reached its highest point of perfection.<sup>93</sup>

Within the state, each citizen must act in concert with the others and in this way, the existence and contributions of each is dependent on that of others. Since society requires the interdependence of its members, in order that the individual is willing to sacrifice his private interest to the general will, each citizen depends on his fellows for his own existence.<sup>94</sup>

The interdependent status of men in society resembles that which exists between women and men in Rousseau's description of the family:

The two sexes also began, by their slightly softer life, to lose something of their ferocity and vigour. But if each one separately became less suited to combat savage beasts, on the contrary it was easier to assemble in order to resist them jointly.<sup>95</sup>

Women and men, no longer self-sufficient, must rely on each other in order to fight against those dangers which threaten the family's preservation. Further, Rousseau indicates that the attainment of the family's common good necessitates the interdependence of its members.<sup>96</sup> The institution of the family

gives evidence of the end of the independence of men and signifies the beginning of men's existence as a part of a larger whole. For Rousseau, the relations between men and women become a social relationship, which produces a moral person.<sup>97</sup> In short, women have transformed men's nature into that which facilitates the establishment of social relations and the responsibilities necessary for their maintenance. Without this change in man, Rousseau argues that he could never have developed the higher capabilities with which he is endowed:

Even had this perfect independence and unregulated freedom remained joined to ancient innocence, it would always have had an essential vice, harmful to the development of our most excellent faculties, namely the lack of that liaison between the parts which constitutes the whole.<sup>98</sup>

If women did not initiate social relations, men would never have developed their "most excellent faculties", but rather, they would have remained in the natural condition where Rousseau maintains that men could never be anything but indifferent and limited:

...should we suppose his [natural man's] mind to have as much intelligence and enlightenment as he must and is in fact found to have dullness and stupidity...? What progress could the human race make, scattered in the woods among the animals? and to what point could men mutually perfect and enlighten one another, who, having neither fixed domicile nor any need of one another, would perhaps meet hardly twice in their lives, without knowing and talking to each other.<sup>99</sup>

By making fixed domiciles necessary and by allowing men to come to need relations with others, women give impetus to men's

development of their "most excellent faculties". For these reasons, both women and the legislator transform men's nature to facilitate interdependence amidst the social grouping.

Further, the legislator must keep the general will intact. Thus, Rousseau argues that he must make private wills into public virtues, and this can be accomplished by modifying each individual's internal maxims:

If it is good to know how to use men as they are, it is better still to make them what one needs them to be. The most absolute authority is that which penetrates to the inner man and is exerted no less on his will than on his actions. It is certain that people are in the long run what the government makes them. ... Train men, therefore, if you want to command men. If you want the laws obeyed make them beloved, so that for men to do what they should, they need only think they ought to do it.<sup>100</sup>

In order to maintain the general will, men must be made to love the laws, then the authority of the laws will penetrate into the hearts of men, where it will be exerted upon their wills. In initiating social relations, women exert their influence on men by instilling in them the sentiment of love. Concerning the moral aspect of love, Rousseau writes:

...the moral element of love [that which determines and fixes physical desire exclusively on a single object] is an artificial sentiment born of the usage of society, and extolled with much skill and care by women in order to establish their ascendancy and make dominant the sex that ought to obey.<sup>101</sup>

Women will be obeyed when love penetrates into the hearts of men and when it is exerted upon their wills. In this way,

women have also made men what they need them to be. Rousseau states: "She must have the art to make us want to do everything which her sex cannot do by itself and which is necessary or agreeable to it."<sup>102</sup> As the legislator transforms human nature, women also change certain aspects of male nature.

It may also be possible to argue that women, like the legislator, strive to keep the general will intact. This becomes evident in both the role that women play in the family and the use of the family to socialize its members. Within the family unit, Rousseau suggests that women provide an example for all to follow:

Heaven seems to have sent her [Eloisa] upon earth, to serve as an example of excellence of which human nature is capable, and of that happiness it may enjoy in the obscurity of private life, without having recourse either to those public virtues which sometimes raise humanity above itself, or to those honours with which the breath of popular applause rewards them.<sup>103</sup>

Julie, indicative of all women, is meant to inspire in others the benefits of self-sacrifice. In sacrificing her own happiness, by constraining her talents to use in the private sphere only, Julie inspires virtue and happiness in those around her. Thus, Rousseau writes:

The pleasure Mrs. Wolmar takes in discharging the noblest duties, in making all who approach her virtuous and happy, communicates itself to all those who are the objects of her care, to her husband, her children, her guests, her domestics. No tumultuous scenes of noisy mirth, no loud peals of laughter, are heard in this peaceful mansion; but, in their stead, you always meet with contented

hearts and cheerful countenances. If at any time you see a tear, it is the tear of susceptibility and joy. Troubles, cares and sorrows intrude not here, any more than vice and remorse, of which they are the fruits.<sup>104</sup>

The woman's propensity to self-sacrifice creates a familial environment in which children, and all other members of the household, learn to practice those responsibilities which are also necessary for the peaceful existence and cooperation of all in civil society. It may be for this reason that Rousseau believes that the family is the prototype of society.<sup>105</sup> Thus, he suggests that Julie's example motivates all of the members of the household to willingly contribute to the common good:

...the prospect of this house with the uniform and simple life of its inhabitants, diffuse over the mind of the spectator a secret pleasure, which is perpetually increasing. A small number of good-natured people, united by their mutual wants and reciprocal benevolence, concur by their different employments in promoting the same end; every one finding in his situation all that is requisite to contentment, and not desiring to change it, applies himself as if he thought to stay here all his life; the only ambition among them being that of properly discharging their respective duties. There is so much moderation in those who command, and so much zeal in those who obey, that equals might agree to distribute the same employments among them, without having reason to complain of his lot. No one envies that of another; no one thinks of augmenting his fortune, but by adding to the common good; the master and mistress estimating their own happiness by that of their domestics and the people about them.<sup>106</sup>

Everyone in the household subordinates himself to the common good and finds within his situation the means of contentment, by

following the example of Julie and discharging their duties with pleasure. According to Rousseau, the family is an intimate unit in which the socialization of its members begins.<sup>107</sup> That is, the family provides its members with exposure to the practice of the social responsibilities which are necessary for the operation of society and the interaction of its citizens.<sup>108</sup> Thus, women in the family unit also strive to keep the general will intact.

The primary connection between the role of the legislator and that of women concerns the force of habit, as opposed to the force of authority. Rousseau maintains that within the political realm men are guided by three types of laws: political laws, which determine the organization of the state; civil laws, which regulate the relations between the members of the state; and criminal laws, which direct the relations between men and the laws of the state.<sup>109</sup> However, there is a fourth type of law which Rousseau suggests is more important and more effective than the three forms mentioned above:

To these three types of law is added a fourth, the most important of all; which is not engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of the citizens; which is the true constitution of the State; which gains fresh force each day; which, when other laws die out, revives or replaces them, preserves a people in the spirit of its institution, and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for that of authority. I am speaking of mores, customs, and especially of opinion- a part of the laws unknown to our political theorists, but on which the success of all the others depends; a part to which the great legislator attends in secret while appearing to limit himself to the

particular regulations that are merely the sides of the arch of which mores, slower to arise, form at last the unshakable keystone.<sup>110</sup>

Within the political/social sphere, there are written rules which serve to guide man's actions and are, thus, indicative of impersonal authority. Rousseau indicates that written laws are not always adequate guarantees for obedience, since their basis is weaker and less permanent, and as such, they must be supplemented by unwritten laws.<sup>112</sup> Unwritten laws or customs tend to be effective guarantees for action and behavioural restrictions since they appeal directly to emotions and since they have a more permanent basis, habit. This is directly relevant to the role of women in society since their rule is also manifested in informal relations. In the Second Discourse, a part of the dedication section is addressed to the women of Geneva, and here Rousseau reveals the influence of women in the mores or the moral foundation of society:

Could I forget that precious half of the Republic which creates the happiness of the other and whose gentleness and wisdom maintain peace and good morals? Amiable and virtuous countrywomen, the fate of your sex will always be to govern ours. It is fortunate when your chaste power, exercised solely in the conjugal union, makes itself felt only for the glory of the State and the public happiness!... What barbarous man could resist the voice of honor and reason in the mouth of a tender wife? ... It is for you to maintain always, by your insinuating wit, love of laws in the State and concord among citizens: to reunite, by happy marriages, divided families; and above all to correct, by the persuasive sweetness of your lessons and by the

modest graces of your conversation, the extravagances our young people adopt in other countries... . Therefore always be what you are, the chaste guardians of morals and the gentle bonds of peace; and to continue to exploit on every occasion the rights of the heart and of nature for the benefit of duty and virtue.<sup>112</sup>

The authority of women is indicated in the personal and informal rule within the conjugal union and the familial unit. In this respect, women are free to appeal to the emotions of their husbands, or their passionate nature,<sup>113</sup> in order to encourage men to continue to support the happiness of the state. It is for this reason that Rousseau argues that women "...must have the art to make us want to do everything which her sex cannot do by itself and which is necessary or agreeable to it."<sup>114</sup> The manipulation of men by women is a covert activity designed to influence male behaviour and since women rule indirectly, men are not aware of their function. Thus, the rule of women is not direct and as such, men believe that they rule women directly, when in fact women rule men: "...the stronger [men] appears to be master but actually depends on the weaker [women]."<sup>115</sup> Like the legislator, women rule secretly to influence and direct the mores of society. Further, both the power of women and the legislator depends on controlling habit. This parallel becomes more significant for women because their sphere lies in that which relates specifically to habit. Thus, when Rousseau states that permanent relations between the sexes gives rise to conjugal love and paternal love<sup>116</sup> and the need for both virtue and modesty,<sup>117</sup> he acknowledges the role that women play in



asserting control over men's habits; this is one more reason to support the view that women are the initiators of society and social relations.<sup>118</sup> Further, the reasons for his assertion that men should have the supreme authority in the household, and yet, at the same time he describes the cooperation of the husband and wife in terms of both obeying and both being masters,<sup>119</sup> becomes clearer. Rousseau maintains that men's authority is direct and overt, but the authority of women is manifested in their control over their husbands' habits and is, then, indirect and covert. In this way, both are masters and both obey, although the male may not recognize that he is being obedient and that women share the authority in the home. This is directly parallel to both the direct (or the particular regulations) and the indirect (or the mores) roles of the legislator.<sup>120</sup>

Although Rousseau implies that it is impossible to have a legislator on earth, since he must closely resemble a god,<sup>121</sup> he may indicate that it is possible to find a substitute for him. Hence, women could become the earthly substitutes for the legislator. In this way, women become responsible for the moral framework of society and its social relations. After all, a woman's empire "...begins with virtues."<sup>122</sup> The role of women in society is more concrete than is usually expected in Rousseau's social theory. In fact, without the role of women, men would have remained in the state of nature, lacking any impetus to effect the transition of solitary men, governed by appetite, into social men governed by both reason and passions. The covert influence of the legislator in determining the moral foundation

of society is directly parallel to the discreet rule of women as the guardians of morals. In this way, the influence of women in determining the moral fabric of society must predominate, as should that of the legislator. In essence, just as Rousseau maintains that the legislator is necessary for the ideal operation of the state, the activity and the influence of women is required for the establishment and the sustenance of those moral precepts which guide the ideal social relations. In this way, the role of women is not merely parallel to the role of the legislator, but also, women could be the authority to which the legislator appeals.<sup>123</sup> If this assertion is plausible, then women are the complements of the legislator's function.

In conclusion, although the advent of the family created a situation of greater dependence for women, it also augmented the dependence of men upon both women and their families. Further, the advent of social relations gave rise to interdependence among men. Thus, although the dependence of women on men and their families increases, so does that of men. In short, the transition to society sustains an increase in dependence for both men and women. Although the dependence of women on men has increased, this is merely the result of the progression to society and the dependence of men increases proportionately as well. Thus, the situation of women has not changed drastically from their status in the natural condition.

Despite their dependent situation in the family, women retain an independent sphere through which their influence is

channelled. By retaining a sphere of influence of their own, women are furnished with an area within which men cannot interfere. This may satisfy Susan Moller Okin's criticism of Rousseau's view of women:

Rousseau's ideal republic of free and equal heads of patriarchal families is necessarily built on the political exclusion, total confinement, and repression of women.<sup>124</sup>

From this assertion, Okin concludes that the ascendancy of men over women is deemed natural and requires no institutional compensation, as the social contract and civil equality counteract the natural inequalities which exist among men.<sup>125</sup> In being charged with sustaining the moral foundation of society, women do have an institutionalized form of compensation for the inequalities established in the relations of men and women. Thus, women retain part of their previous independence, just as men, through social action, preserve part of their former independence as well. As women became the initiators of society, they become the sustainers of the family and of society itself. Although they are confined to the home, women are the complements of the legislator and as such, they indirectly guide social progression.

The sole problem with the indirect rule of women is that they are deprived of recognition for their talents and as such, men appear to retain their superiority. Rousseau offers three explanations for keeping the rule of women indirect. First, as women become directly active in society, they may become more like men, as in the degeneration of the conjugal union, and in

this way, their actions and understanding are transformed.<sup>126</sup> This, in turn, would corrupt the moral foundation of society, since preservation of social mores depends on women remaining exactly what they are, and all would suffer. Secondly, Rousseau maintains that the covert rule of women is more effective because men, spurred on by their individual wills, may rebel against direct authority.<sup>127</sup> Thus, women must remain in the home, concealed under a veil of a wife, mother and homemaker, and a veil of helplessness or weakness, in order to convince men of their physical inferiority. Thirdly, men need to feel that they rule, by virtue of their physical strength, in the home and in relation to sustaining social relations.<sup>128</sup> As such, men's self-esteem requires that they be in command, or, at least, that they appear to dominate. In short, the psychological construction of men rebels against any feeling of dependence, even though they are dependent in reality, or any situation in which they do not appear to be in control. Although men may recognize their dependence on their wives and children, they could not accept any situation in which they did not feel superior- man's physical strength would allow him to feel dominant at least in the familial setting. In order to sustain society, men need to believe that they dominate women, and women must be willing to allow them to believe that they command, since the sustenance of social relations is important for the maintenance of their power.

## CONCLUSION

### ROUSSEAU: RADICAL OR CHAUVINIST?

From this study, two assertions can be made. First, it has been argued that the interdependence which exists in both social and personal relations in Rousseau's theory can be used to establish a nonexploitative society. To this end, the general characteristics of human beings in the state of nature and the effects of these on the development and the degeneration of men and women were examined. From this analysis, it was shown that the interdependence engendered by human sexuality generates the possibility of attaining a non-exploitative society. Examined in this way, it was shown that the dependent condition of women has been somewhat exaggerated. This is not to say that women are not dependent, but rather, to assert that Rousseau shows that men are dependent on women, that children are dependent on their parents, and that all are dependent on each other and on society. Further, viewed in a positive light, the dependence of both sexes and of each on society, need not be exploitative. Thus, if virtue, the natural order, natural inequalities, the desire for distinction, authentic relations, freedom, individuality, and self-reliance are maintained, then society will be nonexploitative, according to Rousseau. However, Rousseau's perspective remains exploitative in part, and it should not be considered fully nonexploitative,

as will be shown in the argument which will follow.

Apart from establishing those principles which could lead to a nonexploitative society, it was shown how the role of women is necessary to achieve this end. For this reason, the unique development of women from the state of nature to the establishment and degeneration of the conjugal union and social relations were examined. It was shown that Rousseau's view of women was somewhat inconsistent through each period of human development. Thus, women in the state of nature may have developed conceptual knowledge prior to men, used this knowledge to create permanent conjugal and familial unions once their preservation and that of their children were endangered, and finally, they used this knowledge to sustain both the familial and social units in civil society. From the unique development of women, it was shown that their role and capabilities complement that of the legislator. Thus, Rousseau had a hidden concern for the social significance of women in his theoretical postulates, and in this way, his understanding of women takes on a more radical character, in the sense that he acknowledges that women are the actual governors of society. However, the nature of his perspective is not entirely radical, and this will become more evident in the discussion which follows.

The divergence in the contemporary controversy, examined in the introductory section of this study, concerning whether Rousseau may be called a male chauvinist or a radical theorist, is not caused by an inconsistency in his theory itself. As it

has been shown, Rousseau's understanding of women is somewhat consistent from the natural condition to women's role in civil society. The evidence examined conveys that Rousseau did have a hidden concern for the role and significance of women, and this consists in the complementary relation between the functions of women and that of the legislator. This aspect of Rousseau's thought is, indeed, radical since most interpretations of his view do not recognize the exact nature of the power he asserts women have. In fact, most interpretations of his view conclude that Rousseau was content to deny women any power or influence in society at all. However, it is not entirely clear whether the terms male chauvinist or radical theorist can be adequately applied to his understanding of women. In order to completely understand the difficulties involved in using these terms, it is necessary to show how Rousseau's view of the relations between the sexes is consistent with some feminist concerns and why it does so, and to show that although Rousseau's view of the relations between the sexes is somewhat nonexploitative, it is not entirely so.

Rousseau argues that there are definite natural distinctions between what would constitute a male member of the species and a female member of the race. These dissimilarities have an anatomical basis: the biological differences in reproductive systems, and difference in strength and stature.<sup>1</sup> These means of differentiation, based on Rousseau's natural theory, are innocuous and nonexploitative by themselves. In fact, it could be argued that anything which is natural is nonexploitative

precisely because natural inequalities would not amount to much unless they were given a general basis which would allow these to become a form of power. In short, the inequalities between women and men need not become a means of exploitation as long as one sex neither attains power over nor be able to oppress the other.

Rousseau argues that the equality of the sexes may be attained by respecting those capabilities which differentiate between the sexes primarily because each sex contributes their unique abilities, in different ways, to society. Men become the providers for the family and society, while women are considered the sustainers of these two units. In short, despite their differences, men and women are both considered to be important social contributors. Although Rousseau advocates the significance of both sexes, his theory in no way suggests that women be granted equal opportunities. As Lorenne M.G. Clark and Lynda Lange point out, "...an adequate political theory [if it is to be considered non-sexist] must allow the same rights, duties, privileges, and liabilities."<sup>2</sup> Rousseau's theory in no way advocates this type of equality since he argues that women must be confined to the home, although he considers women to be a significant force in society. The confinement of women to the home shows that Rousseau did not mean to grant them the same opportunities as he does grant men.

However, Rousseau's view of the natural distinctions between the sexes does have a positive side as well. With the presence of natural inequalities, neither women nor men need to



be more than what they are in order to be accepted. That is to say, the sexes need not compete with each other to gain acceptance; each sex is important precisely because it differs from the other. This is an important factor in respect to contemporary feminist theory since some advocate that women should not have children naturally; but rather, they urge that technological means should be used in order to transcend the differences in the reproductive processes between women and men.<sup>3</sup> Thus, some argue that those factors which serve to distinguish between men and women be eradicated, and this treats women's ability to have children as something which is not unique or special. In essence, then, women must transform themselves and relinquish a part of their uniqueness in order to be considered equal to men and to be important contributors to society. Whether or not the ability to have children affects the identity of women naturally or whether it is a culturally imposed phenomenon really makes little difference at all. The important point to consider is that women are the only segment of the human population that can give birth, and this is something that makes women very special indeed. Instead of relinquishing this capability, in favour of access to technological means of reproduction, women, and men, should respect this ability. The only times when the ability to have children becomes oppressive is when women are forced to have children they do not want; or when women are forced to remain in the home, without their consent, in order to have and care for children; or when they are persuaded that their place is in the home only. In short, the ability to bear

children becomes a means for the exploitation of women only when this capacity is used by men to control women.

Although Rousseau argues that women should be confined to the home, he does not do so specifically for the purpose of controlling them. He argues that women are a significant force in society, on the basis of that which makes them special- they can be mothers and they can be prudent governors. In essence, Rousseau advocates the maintenance of the natural distinctions between the sexes because they allow each sex to attain a special status and importance. For women, Rousseau argues, their status as governors is based on natural dictates:

...the sweetest laws of love are born little by little from the coarse union of the sexes. Women possess their empire not because men wanted it that way, but because nature wants it that way. It belonged to women before they appeared to have it.<sup>4</sup>

If the differences are not maintained, as is evidenced in the degeneration of the relations between the sexes, Rousseau argues that that which distinguishes between them and gives them their special status is lost, and subsequently, each sex is exploited. Hence, if the differences between men and women, whether they have a natural basis or even a cultural basis, could be respected, the relations between the sexes could become more mutually agreeable and rewarding.

Rousseau's insistence on the maintenance of natural distinctions, in turn, ensures that each sex has a position in the order of nature and within the social order as well. In human society, the order of nature provides each member of the species

with a function based on its dictates and ensures that all roles are important for the harmonious coexistence of the human species and the individual satisfaction of each. Rousseau's view of the natural order is significant to the reproductive issue in feminist theory.

In contemporary feminist theory, there is a concern that the reproductive labour of women, the bearing and nurturing of children, be recognized as a socially important activity.

Lynda Lange writes:

...there are two activities essential for the existence of any human society: production and reproduction. That production is a uniquely human activity essential for society is denied by no one. Reproduction, broadly defined to include the labour of nurture and socialization, must be seen to have a place beside production as a primary essential activity, and not merely a 'natural', pre-social, albeit necessary, activity. As such, its mode is a determinant, along with the mode of production, of the form of the whole society.<sup>5</sup>

Lange criticizes democratic theory because it does not recognize the social significance of the reproductive labour of women.

Further, Lorene M. G. Clark maintains that reproductive labour must come to be viewed as a necessary process that must be fully shared; that is, it must be seen as having human value and that it may not necessarily lie outside of the public sphere.<sup>6</sup>

Interestingly, Rousseau's view of women and the importance of their reproductive capacity is consistent with both Lange's and Clark's views.

In Rousseau's theory, reproduction and motherhood are

given a prestigious place within society. For this reason, Rousseau argues that men are the providers and women are the sustainers of the family and society. Although he believes that motherhood is a natural and pre-social activity, a view which Lange criticizes, he also maintains that it is an essential activity. First, he indicates that reproduction and the maternal sentiment become responsible for the institution of social relations, then he states that women become the sustainers of the family, and lastly, he asserts that women become the guardians of social mores. Secondly, he indicates that mothers should be given both more respect and authority in society through laws.<sup>7</sup> Lastly, the qualities, which Rousseau argues women have as mothers, are those which allow them to become the sustainers of society's moral foundation.<sup>8</sup> Rousseau's view is entirely consistent with Lange's statement that reproduction must have a place beside production as an essential activity, and as such, the two modes of labour together would determine the form of society.<sup>9</sup>

Further, Rousseau's perspective is consistent with Lorenne M. G. Clark's assertion that reproduction must be viewed as having human value.<sup>10</sup> That Rousseau considers reproduction as having human value can be shown by his assertion that, "We are, so to speak, born twice: once to exist and once to live; once for our species and once for our sex."<sup>11</sup> Although it appears that Rousseau here differentiates between human value and the value arising from sexual distinctions, this may not be his only intention. When he states that people are born

twice, to exist and to live, he could be taken to imply that people, as members of the human species, merely exist; while sexual distinctions and thus, the different contributions of each sex, adds value to human existence and creates life, both literally and figuratively. Rousseau may, then, be viewed as advocating that women's ability to have children creates greater human value by merely adding to existence. This perspective can be substantiated by the rise of conjugal love and paternal love, which Rousseau describes as being the "sweetest sentiments known to men."<sup>12</sup> Without the contributions of women to sustain the family unit, these sentiments would disappear and all emotional attachments would be dissolved. Thus, the contributions of women add value to human existence.

Rousseau's theory has been shown to be consistent with the contemporary feminist concern that reproduction must be viewed as a human activity which is as essential to society as is production. Further, this perspective requires that reproduction must be shared by women and men. Rousseau also advocates that men must also give assistance in the nurturing and the socialization process.<sup>14</sup> He argues that fathers must not only provide for the subsistence of his children, but also, they must raise their sons to meet the requirements involved with being men, sociable men, and citizens.<sup>15</sup> In short, his view of familial responsibility necessitates that fathers share in the nurturing, education and socialization needs of the reproductive process. Although he does not argue that these must be shared equally, he does maintain that these responsi-

bilities must be shared, for "...he who cannot fulfill the duties of a father has no right to become one."<sup>16</sup>

Rousseau's view of love is one which is not necessarily exploitative, in a traditional sense. Love, according to Rousseau, is not the only thing with which a married couple must be concerned.<sup>17</sup> This is to say, love is important but it is not the only significant thing which makes the conjugal union operate effectively. The two individuals must be responsible for jointly discharging the duties of the family and of society as well.<sup>18</sup> Rousseau, thus, discredits romantic love and all the turmoil associated with this form of love; women, according to Rousseau, should not be placed on a pedestal, but should be respected as a partner; they need not be worshipped, but esteemed for what and who they are. In short, love should not be romanticized and made into something it is not. In fact, Rousseau argues that when love becomes idealized, there exists the danger that each partner's identity will be subsumed by false sentiments and flattery. The loss of individuality is one of Rousseau's main concerns, since he believes that it is too easy for men and women to lose themselves in another person and this causes the relinquishing of natural distinctions, the loss of sincere attachments, the corruption of both conjugal and familial unions, and as in the decay of the relations between the sexes, the opportunity to gain power over others. When love is viewed as a partnership, neither men nor women gain their worth solely from a love relationship because, although they are bound by emotional ties, they are not inextricably limited

by these bonds, and also, they each retain a separate sphere of importance.

The danger in forming an identity solely on the basis of the emotional bonds that one person shares with another is not only that one's individuality may be threatened, but also, that one loses touch with all that occurs outside of this sphere. In essence, in retreating into one private sphere, a person, in effect, relinquishes concern for anything which occurs outside of that sphere. Although the conjugal union and the family unit are important, the larger social unit must also be sustained if marriage and the family are to retain their uniqueness. For this reason, Rousseau describes men who are preoccupied with women as being incapable of raising themselves to anything great,<sup>19</sup> and he argues that women should not be occupied solely with their husbands and children. If the family unit is to maintain its character, society must also share the same character in order that both prosper.

Since Rousseau does not argue that love should be romanticized, his view is significant for the relations between the sexes and the family. Rousseau's view implies that no one should seek to isolate himself from society entirely. Further, by virtue of living in society, all are social beings and, as such, have a responsibility for the sustenance of their environment; lacking this direct form of participation, the environment may become something foreign or alien to its inhabitants. Traditionally, women, moreso than men, seek to isolate, or are forced to isolate, themselves from the larger society. In

retreating into homelife, not only do women lose their identity, but also they remove themselves from social involvement. In so doing, women cannot be respected for their unique contributions to society; in fact, they relinquish all responsibility for social development, and they are effectively alienated from their environment. If society becomes an alien entity, Rousseau argues that both men and women can only be self-interested beings; they cannot benefit from the advantages that living in society sustains; the socially significant contributions of each would not be realized, and in fact, each would deny his responsibility and distinctiveness by not participating in society; they could never have anything apart from themselves and they could never have a say in how society could operate for the benefit of all, and in this way, each actually relinquishes his right of self-governance. Due to natural distinctions and virtue, Rousseau argues that each sex is unique and that each can effectively realize himself as a significant contributor to society.

Rousseau's view of dependence appears to be nonexploitative on the surface; however, it is not entirely nonexploitative, as will be discussed later. Rousseau's perspective of social and personal relations are based on his attempt to combine both independence and dependence, which, in turn, is a response against those relations of dependence that are based on the desire to acquire power.<sup>20</sup> The relations between the sexes in the degeneration of the conjugal union show that relations of dependence have been utilized to oppress a segment of the



population. In essence, the progression of corrupt forces show the misuse of dependence. In order to stave off the abuse of dependence, both in society and in personal relations, Rousseau strives to find an equilibrium between dependence and independence. With the attainment of this balance, women and men are still dependent upon each other and yet, each, as either a provider or a sustainer, retain a portion of their independence to the exclusion of the other.

In order to attain an equilibrium between independence and dependence, it is necessary that no one person is more dependent than another.<sup>21</sup> In this way, since all, by virtue of living in society and social relations, no one citizen may be more dependent upon society than the other.<sup>22</sup> Also, within the conjugal union, one partner should not be more dependent than the other.<sup>23</sup> Although an attempt to assess the degree of dependence of each person would present insurmountable difficulties, Rousseau's perspective need not be taken so literally. Rousseau merely suggests that dependence, in either personal or social relations, must be mutual.<sup>24</sup> If dependence is mutual, it is not necessarily exploitative since no one can obtain power over another. Further, the mutuality of dependence, which distinguishes Rousseau's perspective from some feminist theorists, is conducive to the view that marriage is considered a partnership.<sup>25</sup> Rousseau's view of marriage provides a significant contrast to what some authors, in this case Elizabeth Rapaport, consider to be the radical feminist view of love. In conveying the views of Ti-Grace Atkinson and Shulamith Firestone,

Rapaport concludes that,

...women's love is pictured as a destructive dependency upon men; men are pictured as neither harmed by nor dependent upon the women they love, if they love at all. Love is not seen as a structurally symmetrical relationship in which men and women love each other in the same way and have a similar or identical experience of love.<sup>26</sup>

In the radical feminist view, the dependent situation engendered by love affects women only; women alone are the victims of love. Contrarily, Rousseau portrays both men and women as dependent within the conjugal union and as such, this mutuality creates the possibility for creating an equality in personal relations. Further, Rousseau describes men, more so than women, as the victims of love and the dependence it engenders.<sup>27</sup> However, if men believe that women are more dependent, although they are not, then men can accept their position and responsibilities with greater ease. In short, the significance of Rousseau's perspective consists in his illustrations of dependence and its abuse within social relations, and how this abuse affects everyone. In fact, he asserts that an excess of dependence can be used to oppress the segment or group that is most dependent. To avoid the abuse of dependence, Rousseau advocates that if some are going to be dependent, then all must be dependent. If all are dependent, the opportunity for abuse may be lessened because all are in a similar or the same position. Perhaps the most significant aspect of dependence, is his account of how men respond to being in such a position.

Rousseau's view implies that one reason why women must be confined to the home is related to the inability of men to overtly recognize their dependence on women and women's inability to govern men overtly. As such, women must be confined to the home under a veil of helplessness. Men, by virtue of their physical superiority, are unable to accept the rule of women, who are physically weaker. However, Rousseau argues that men deceive themselves because they are, in actuality, dependent upon women.<sup>28</sup> Men are not superior to women and do not rule them in sexual relations. On the contrary, women rule men, both sexually and socially, through manipulation.<sup>29</sup> In this way, women allow men to believe that they are stronger in order to ensure that men will satisfy their needs and desires. In essence, the women rule discretely so that men, although misguided, can feel superior.<sup>30</sup> However, by confining women to the home, because men need to feel dominant, Rousseau treats men as being incapable of accepting the contributions and value of women, and in this way, men are not considered responsible enough to deal with the true situation. This implies that women must take care of men and protect them from those situations and truths of which men are incapable of handling. This, in turn, implies that women are capable of the responsibility necessary for dealing with situations that men cannot, but Rousseau does not give them credit for their abilities; he argues instead that they must be confined in the home and pretend to be helpless in order for men to feel that they are in control. Not only does Rousseau burden women and make them

responsible for men's shortcomings; but he also treats men unfairly in stating that they could not accept their limitations and their "inferiority" to women, in some respects.

Further, apart from advocating mutual relations of dependence, Rousseau argues that each sex must retain a separate sphere, in which the other cannot interfere, and through which the independence of each sex is manifested. Thus, women directly contribute to society through the sustenance of the moral foundation and as the guardians of morality. In investing their energies in this way, women may achieve personal satisfaction and they would also have a source of power. In allocating to women a source of power, Rousseau maintains that women must be satisfied with this level, and they must not strive to augment their power, since society would degenerate. For this reason, Rousseau stresses that women be virtuous in order to prevent the abuse of their power over men, as manifested in this independent sphere. In a similar context, men, dependent on their wives and families, must be free to act socially and to exercise their say in determining the direction of society, within the limits posed by the moral order. Since the social actions of men are limited by the moral foundation, as established by women, the decision-making sphere is not independent in the same or similar way as is the moral sphere of women. However, being unaware of the exact influence of women, men believe themselves to be independent within this sphere. The independence of men, then, is manifested concretely in labouring for the sustenance of their families. This is

the only area in which men are truly independent, and even in this sphere, they are not merely serving their own interests or enhancing their own talents or qualities; but rather, they are serving the interests of others and in fact, they are allowing women to remain in the home and to develop their talents/perform their functions by alleviating the necessity for women to provide for their own subsistence. In fact, if women initiate permanent familial and conjugal unions because they are no longer able to provide for their subsistence and that of their children, then by providing for the preservation of the entire family, men are merely acting in the interests and needs of women. Rousseau argues that men, easily influenced by women, must retain some separate pleasures, since the increase in interaction between the sexes ultimately leads to degeneration.<sup>31</sup> Further, men, being more susceptible to the manipulation of women, must associate with men, in order that the distinctions between the sexes may be retained, and so that men, partaking in pleasures together, become accustomed to depending on other men.<sup>32</sup> However, if women regulate the mores of society, they also influence the mores of men, and this influence could affect how men conduct themselves in their pleasures as well.

Rousseau's view that men and women retain an independent sphere is significant when applied to those who retreat into a family unit. Those who seclude themselves in this manner become dependent on the family unit to the exclusion of all else, and they cut off access to other means of independ-

ence. In essence, Rousseau suggests that while social relations engender dependence, they also create the possibility to sustain, if not develop, avenues of independence. Further, these independent activities are open to both women and men. In striving for independence, a person's dependent situation would be much easier to accept and it would make a person feel more secure with dependence, knowing that there is a separate sphere for him as well; that is, that person who knows his value and his importance is not limited to one sphere only. In this way, neither the man nor the woman are valuable only on the basis that he or she is married, but also, the individuality and uniqueness of each is guaranteed through the retention of independent spheres of contributions and activities.

In short, relations of dependence need not be considered a means of exploitation, either within society or within the relations between women and men. Rousseau's main criticism of exploitative relations is that a situation of dependence becomes viewed as oppressive and as such, it creates discontent. He advocates, first, a responsible management of dependency relations, and the retention of natural distinctions, wherein no one is concerned with taking advantage of others but merely living securely and harmoniously with all; and secondly, that each sex retain an individual sphere through which their unique character and energies can be channelled. With these guidelines serving as restraints, Rousseau indicates that women and men can be content with what they are and with what they have to contribute to the good of all, and dependence

need not become a source of discontent. Further, everyone is assured of a place within society and is a contributor to the operation of that society- no one is left out, no one is ridiculed, and each is respected. Each member of society is important because each is a singular individual. Dependence, in short, could animate both social and personal relations; it need not be a divisive and destructive element in society.

With the assertion of the significance of women in the operation of society, Rousseau's view of women is not as chauvinistic as some contemporary feminists argue. In fact, his theory has some concerns which are similar to those in feminist theory. However, Rousseau's understanding of women is not entirely free from exploitative implications. First, Rousseau's view may be nonexploitative if one agrees with the distinctions he makes between women and men, by postulating what is masculine and feminine. Although there may be differences between women and men, the most evident being that between reproductive systems, in a truly egalitarian society, these need not become as significant as they are in Rousseau's theory. There will always be differences between women and men, women and women, and men and men; however, these are not sufficient cause to determine the activities of each. By virtue of postulating such differences, one limits the possibilities of each individual; each person is limited by these types of categories. Although Rousseau stressed the equality of the sexes, despite the distinctions between them, he limited the achievements of women by asserting that they must remain in the home. Arguing that

women contribute in a significant way does not make up for their confinement to the home.

Secondly, since the rule of women is covert, Rousseau deprives them of recognition for their contributions. The reason for this deprivation consists in the inability of men to cope with the power of women. In essence, women are not acknowledged for their uniqueness by men. This situation leaves women responsible for bearing the burden of their knowledge. In this respect, Rousseau treats men unjustly since he considers them incapable of acknowledging, accepting and respecting the contributions of women. Women, also, are treated unjustly since their abilities must go unacknowledged and since they must protect men from the knowledge of their capacities, and as such, they must continue to perpetuate a "Noble Lie".

Thirdly, although Rousseau stresses that men and women must relate to each other openly and honestly, they cannot do so because women may not reveal the secret of their rule. If women and men must be who they are, then women should not rule indirectly nor should they feign helplessness or weakness. In pretending to be weak or helpless, women are, in essence, being inauthentic.

For these reasons, Rousseau's theory is both exploitative and nonexploitative. His theory contains elements of both these characteristics. As such, his theory is both radical and chauvinistic. In determining whether Rousseau is either a radical or a male chauvinist, it must be concluded that he is a little of both of these. The problem with applying either of



these terms to Rousseau's theory, is that they seem to be inadequate to describe the exact nature of his view of women.

## ENDNOTES

### CHAPTER ONE

<sup>1</sup>Victor G. Wexler, "'Made For Man's Delight': Rousseau As Antifeminist", American Historical Review (1976) 81:281.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 100.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, trans. and ed. Charles E. Butterworth (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1979), p. 100.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 141.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 141-142.

<sup>8</sup>See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, trans. Peter France (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1979), pp. 154-155. In this edition, the instability to which Rousseau refers is specified as financial insecurity. Charles E. Butterworth's edition of The Reveries implies this as well; see p. 142.

<sup>9</sup>Ron Christenson, "Political Theory of Male Chauvinism: Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Paradigm", Midwest Quarterly xiii:3 (Spring 1972), p. 291.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 298.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 299.

<sup>13</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: Rousseau's Letter to d'Alembert, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 86.

<sup>14</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 89.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 139.

<sup>16</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1979), p. 359. See also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 85.

<sup>17</sup>Lynda Lange, in CBC, "Ideas", 3-24 January 1983, "Rousseau and Modern Society", p. 14.

<sup>18</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., trans. William Kenrick (London: Tulley's Head, in the Strand, 1769), 3:238-239. For Rousseau's view of the socialization process in the family, see also Joel Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 50.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 3:287.

<sup>20</sup>Joel Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 50.

<sup>21</sup>See Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", pp. 146-147 and p. 121 for a discussion of the temporary union of a mother and her child.

<sup>22</sup>Merle L. Perkins, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: On the Individual and Society (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1974), pp. 191-192.

<sup>23</sup>For a detailed discussion of this matter, see Chapter Two 56-70 and Chapter Three pp. 96-104 below.

<sup>24</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 101.

<sup>25</sup>Susan Moller Okin, in CBC, "Ideas", p. 23.

<sup>26</sup>Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 3.

<sup>27</sup>Op. Cit., p. 22.

<sup>28</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", pp. 120-121 and p. 142.

<sup>29</sup>Lange, in CBC, "Ideas", p. 22.

<sup>30</sup>Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 3.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>For examples of Rousseau's references to women as the possessions of men, see Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and

Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 144; Rousseau, Emile, p. 361 and pp. 429-430; and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Geneva Manuscript", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 170.

<sup>33</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 360.

<sup>34</sup>Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 6.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 201.

<sup>37</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 68.

<sup>38</sup>Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 11.

<sup>39</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 116 and p. 142.

## CHAPTER TWO

<sup>1</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 142.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 137.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 132-133.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 139.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 138-139.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 138.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 138-139.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 199.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>15</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1979), pp. 212-213.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 213.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>19</sup>Op. Cit., pp. 115-116.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 132-133.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>27</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 223.

<sup>28</sup>Op. Cit., p. 96.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>30</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 221.

<sup>31</sup>For the sake of simplicity, the use of his or her and him- or herself will be omitted and replaced with the use of him or himself. It is to be understood that wherever the masculine form is used in relation to something which depicts human characteristics or situations, both male and female sexes are implied.

<sup>32</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 113.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 113-114.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., pp. 113.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 138.

<sup>40</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 276.

<sup>41</sup>Op. Cit., p. 106.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., pp. 114-115.

<sup>44</sup>For a more detailed discussion of those general characteristics of human beings, in reference to the natural order, see pp. 36-40 above.

<sup>45</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 101.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., pp. 132-133.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>52</sup>Ronald Grimsley, "Rousseau and the Problem of Happiness", in Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays, M. Cranston and R. S. Peters, eds. (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), p. 234.

<sup>53</sup>Leon Emery, "Rousseau and the Foundations of Human Regeneration", in Yale French Studies xxvii (Fall-Winter), p. 9.

<sup>54</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", pp. 120-121.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp. 214-215.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., pp. 215-216.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., pp. 218-219.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 135.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 109.

<sup>67</sup>Op. Cit., p. 134.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 135.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>70</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 360 and p. 358.

<sup>71</sup>Joel Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 15.

<sup>72</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 135.

<sup>73</sup>Op. Cit., p. 16.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 115.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>80</sup>Op. Cit., p. 15.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>84</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 134.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 121, p. 142 and pp. 216-217.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., pp. 135-136.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 216.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 188. See also p. 108.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., pp. 108-109.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p. 216.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 112.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>99</sup>For a detailed examination of the sentiment of love of oneself, see the discussion in this chapter pp. 30-32 above.

<sup>100</sup>Op. Cit., p. 222.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>102</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 223.

<sup>103</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 116.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid.

<sup>106</sup>For a detailed discussion of the natural sentiment of pity, refer to pp. 33-36 above.



<sup>107</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 223.

<sup>108</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 96.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., pp. 218-219.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., p. 135.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

### CHAPTER THREE

<sup>1</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 142-143.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 143-144.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>For a detailed discussion of the sentiment of love of oneself, see pp. 26-29 above.

<sup>6</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 144.

<sup>7</sup>Marshall Berman, The Politics of Authenticity (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 181-182.

<sup>8</sup>Op. Cit., p. 146.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>For a more extensive discussion of the natural sentiment of pity and its relation to the sentiment of love of oneself, see pp. 33-36 above.

<sup>11</sup>For a more detailed examination of how pity ensures the preservation of the species, see pp. 33-36 above.

<sup>12</sup>For a discussion of natural need in relation to property, refer to pp. 77-79 above.

<sup>13</sup>For a more extensive examination of the free agent status of natural woman and man, see pp. 32-33 above.

<sup>14</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 147.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 148.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 149.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 149-150.

<sup>22</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., trans. William Kenrick (London: Tully's Head, in the Strand, 1769), 4:74.

<sup>23</sup>Op. Cit., pp. 149-150.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 149.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the love of oneself, refer to pp. 30-32.

<sup>27</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 107 and p. 144.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 143-144.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 149.

<sup>33</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 223.

<sup>34</sup>Marshall Berman, in The Politics of Authenticity, isolates the imaginative capacity as the factor which allows women and men to develop as distinct beings. Berman states:

It was only through the growth of the imagination that the self could emerge as a distinct and vital power, organizing the individual's life activity and dynamically from within, propelling him beyond whatever social roles and realities he might be 'given'. At the same time, however, this inward dynamism propelled man beyond some of the profoundest experiences and the most intense forms of happiness he had ever known.

<sup>35</sup>For a detailed examination of the faculty of self-perfection, refer to the discussion on p. 33 above.

<sup>36</sup>See Berman, The Politics of Authenticity, pp. 129-130 for a discussion of Rousseau's insistence on maintaining individuality in an environment of social interdependence.

<sup>37</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 40.

<sup>38</sup>For an examination of authenticity, see the discussion on pp. 76-77 above.

<sup>39</sup>Refer to Berman, The Politics of Authenticity, p. 144 for a discussion of the consequences of inauthentic relations, which are created by the advent of judging others according to alien standards or non-human standards.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>42</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1979), pp. 68-69.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 121. This quotation appears in a footnote by Butterworth; it was crossed out by Rousseau in the original manuscript.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>45</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4vols., 3:261.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 247.

<sup>47</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on Political Economy", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 218.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>49</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 53.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>57</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on Political Economy", p. 214.

<sup>58</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Geneva Manuscript", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 161.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 191.

<sup>60</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:261.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., pp. 220-221.

<sup>62</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 146.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 142-144.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 187-188.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., pp. 191-192.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 192.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Joel Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 23.

<sup>72</sup>Op. Cit., p. 216.

<sup>73</sup>Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 23.

<sup>74</sup>For a detailed analysis of the advanced conceptual development of natural woman's mental faculties, see the discussion on pp. 57-69 above.

<sup>75</sup>For an understanding of the differences that Rousseau establishes between the frugivorous and carnivorous species, refer to the analysis on pp. 56-57 and 97-100 above.

<sup>76</sup>Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pp. 24-25.

<sup>77</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 144.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

<sup>79</sup>Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 24.

<sup>80</sup>Op. Cit., pp. 146-147.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>For a more extensive examination of the maternal sentiment in natural woman, refer to the analysis on pp. 57-61 above.

<sup>83</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", pp. 146-147.

<sup>84</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise, in Emile, Julie and Other Writings, ed. R. L. Archer (New York: Barron's Educational Services, Inc., 1964), p. 39.

<sup>85</sup>For a more detailed examination of the love of oneself, in reference to its development within the temporary union of mother and child in the natural state, see the discussion on pp. 57-69 above.

<sup>86</sup>Rousseau, Emile, pp. 429-430.

<sup>87</sup>For a more comprehensive study of natural woman's ability to discern the consequences of human sexuality, refer to pp. 61-70 above.

<sup>88</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 144.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., pp. 146-147.

<sup>90</sup>Refer to pp. 97-100 above for a more detailed discussion of this matter.

<sup>91</sup>For an examination of the awakening of natural man's mental faculties, see pp. 74-82 above.

<sup>92</sup>For a study of these developments, see pp. 79-82 above.

<sup>93</sup>For a better understanding of the emergence of conjugal love and paternal love, refer to pp. 101-103 above.

<sup>94</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 147.

<sup>95</sup>Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 112-113.

<sup>96</sup>Op. Cit., p. 147.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 218.

<sup>99</sup>For an analysis of the dependence of children on their mothers, see the discussion in Chapter Two pp. 57-59 and in Chapter Three pp. 97-100 above.

<sup>100</sup>For a more extensive analysis of the role of women in initiating permanent family relations, see pp. 95-105 above.

<sup>101</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 147.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

<sup>103</sup>For an examination of the distinctions between the strong and the weak, refer to pp. 77-79 above.

<sup>104</sup>See pp. 77-79 above for a discussion of the relations between the stronger and the weak.

<sup>105</sup>For an analysis of the natural need in relation to property holdings, refer to pp. 77-79 above.

<sup>106</sup>Refer to pp. 77-79 above for a discussion of man's free agent status, in respect to property holdings.

<sup>107</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 358.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 357.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>For an examination of the preference that a woman gives to a man, see the discussion on pp. 102-105 above.

<sup>111</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: Rousseau's Letter to d'Alembert, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 86.

<sup>112</sup>For a more detailed discussion of this matter, refer to pp. 97-100 above.

<sup>113</sup>For a more detailed analysis of this topic, see pp. 102-105 above.

<sup>114</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 143.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>116</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 358.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., pp. 363-364.

<sup>118</sup>Concerning the relations between the stronger and the weak, refer to pp. 77-79 above.

<sup>119</sup>For a more extensive examination of the attempts made by women to become more like men, see the discussion on pp. 174-185.

<sup>120</sup>Concerning the roles of the innovators (the stronger) and the imitators (the weak), and the mutual preservation of each, see pp. 77-79 above.

<sup>121</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 359.

<sup>122</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 116.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., p. 213.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid.

- <sup>126</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts", in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 64.
- <sup>127</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 341.
- <sup>128</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:85.
- <sup>129</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Geneva Manuscript", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 191.
- <sup>130</sup>Op. Cit., pp. 220-221.
- <sup>131</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>132</sup>Rousseau, Emile, pp. 361-362.
- <sup>133</sup>Ibid., p. 341.
- <sup>134</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 85.
- <sup>135</sup>Op. Cit., p. 359.
- <sup>136</sup>Ibid. . . .
- <sup>137</sup>Ibid., p. 361.
- <sup>138</sup>Ibid., p. 37.
- <sup>139</sup>Ibid., pp. 429-430.
- <sup>140</sup>Ibid., p. 361. See also Rousseau, "The Geneva Manuscript", p. 170.
- <sup>141</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 2:16-17.
- <sup>142</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 49.
- <sup>143</sup>Ibid., p. 50.
- <sup>144</sup>For a more extensive analysis of the desire to distinguish oneself, see pp. 82-86 above.
- <sup>145</sup>See also Marshall Berman, The Politics of Authenticity, p. 178, pp. 181-182 and p. 195.
- <sup>146</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 40.
- <sup>147</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:110-11.



<sup>148</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 89.

<sup>149</sup>Op. Cit., 2:248.

<sup>150</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 377.

<sup>151</sup>For a more detailed examination of this matter, refer to pp. 174-185 below.

<sup>152</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 2:21-2.

<sup>153</sup>Berman argues that the security and intimacy of the conjugal union is responsible for the emergence of the individual's distinctiveness. Berman states:

Rousseau believed that the self, every individual's self, bor infinite, inexhaustible riches within it. Only by being together alone could men and women create the climate of mutual trust and intimacy that the self needed before it would give up its buried treasure.

See Berman, The Politics of Authenticity, p. 195.

<sup>154</sup>See pp. 82-86 above for a more detailed examination of this matter.

<sup>155</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the moral body produced by the union of men in society, see pp. 89-90 above.

<sup>156</sup>For a more extensive analysis of the general will and virtue, see pp. 89-93 above.

<sup>157</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 390.

<sup>158</sup>Ibid., p. 382.

<sup>159</sup>Ibid., p. 390.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>161</sup>Concerning the supremacy of male authority in the family, refer to pp. 97-100 above.

<sup>162</sup>Rousseau, "The Geneva Manuscript", p. 170.

<sup>163</sup>For a more extensive analysis of this matter, see pp. 93-94 above.

<sup>164</sup>For a more detailed examination of the necessity of ensuring individuality within a situation of interdependence, refer to pp. 90-94 above.

<sup>165</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", pp. 146-147.

<sup>166</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 2:248.

<sup>167</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 377.

<sup>168</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", p. 53.

#### CHAPTER FOUR

<sup>1</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 153.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 152.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 154.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 154-155.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 155-156.

<sup>10</sup>For a more detailed discussion of this matter, refer to pp. 74-79 above.

<sup>11</sup>Op. Cit., p. 141.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 148.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 156.

<sup>15</sup>For a more extensive analysis of this subject, see pp. 89-93 and pp. 122-133 above.

<sup>16</sup>Op. Cit., p. 157.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 156-157.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 157.

<sup>19</sup>For the distinctions between the innovators and the imitators, see the discussion on pp. 77-79 above.

<sup>20</sup>Op. Cit., p. 160.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>23</sup>For a more detailed study of the unequal mental developments of women and men, refer to pp. 56-70 and pp. 96-104 above.

<sup>24</sup>Op. Cit., p. 146.

<sup>25</sup>For a more extensive study of this topic, see pp. 77-9 above.

<sup>26</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 116.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 157.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 158-159.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 157.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 146.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 158-159.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 159-160.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>36</sup>For a more detailed examination and definition of the natural order, refer to pp. 36-41 above.

<sup>37</sup>Op. Cit., p. 114.

<sup>38</sup>For a more extensive discussion of how the faculty of self-perfection could disrupt the harmony of the natural order, see pp. 39-41 above.

<sup>39</sup>See pp. 89-93 and pp. 122-133 above for a more detailed examination of virtue.

<sup>40</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 175.

<sup>41</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 1:77-8. cf. Berman, The Politics of Authenticity, p. 116.

<sup>42</sup>See Berman's analysis in The Politics of Authenticity, p. 140.

<sup>43</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 175.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 169.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 159.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 174.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., pp. 173-174.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 176.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>57</sup>For a more detailed discussion of virtue, see pp. 89-93 and pp. 122-133 above.

<sup>58</sup>Op. Cit., p. 176.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp. 171-172.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., pp. 167-168. cf. Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 50.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 176-177.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>67</sup>See pp. 77-79 above for a more detailed study of the relations between the stronger/innovators and the weak/imitators.

<sup>68</sup>For a discussion on the ideal republic, as it is established on the foundations of the "Golden Era", refer to pp. 89-94. above.

<sup>69</sup>For a more extensive examination of Rousseau's view of happiness, see pp. 86-89 above.

<sup>70</sup>Concerning a definition of virtue, see p. 93 above.

<sup>71</sup>See pp. 112-122 above for a specification of the natural distinctions or inequalities between the sexes.

<sup>72</sup>Refer to pp. 114-122 above for a specification of the moral differences between the sexes.

<sup>73</sup>For an examination of the differences in the spheres and talents of the sexes, see pp. 106-112 and pp. 112-122 above.

<sup>74</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:238-9.

<sup>75</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 88.

<sup>76</sup>See Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 50, for his assertion that the family becomes a model for the larger society.

<sup>77</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:85.

<sup>78</sup>For an analysis of the natural inclinations of the sexes, refer to pp. 114-116 above.

<sup>79</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 103.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 103.

<sup>82</sup>See pp. 143-148 above for a discussion of the loss of self-reliance with the advent of property holdings.

<sup>83</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 2:245-6.

<sup>84</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, pp. 100-104.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>86</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 43.

<sup>87</sup>For a discussion of contrived inequality, see pp. 143-145 above.

<sup>88</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 104.

<sup>89</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 2:158-9.

<sup>90</sup>For a more detailed examination of this matter, refer to pp. 147-149 above.

<sup>91</sup>Op. Cit., p. 84.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., 3:85-86.

<sup>93</sup>For a discussion of the effects of greed and ambition on men in society, see pp. 147-148 above.

<sup>94</sup>For a specification of Rousseau's view of the natural order, refer to pp. 36-41 above.

<sup>95</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 1:152.

<sup>96</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 85.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid.

<sup>100</sup>Concerning the harmony that Rousseau argues could subsist between a married couple, see pp. 128-132 above.

<sup>101</sup>Op. Cit., p. 104. cf. Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 2:26-27.

<sup>102</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 49.

<sup>103</sup>Op. Cit., p. 89.

<sup>104</sup>Op. Cit., p. 49.

<sup>105</sup>For a more extensive discussion of the effects of self-interest on men in society, refer to pp. 155-159 above.

<sup>106</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 2:89.

<sup>107</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 85.

<sup>108</sup>Op. Cit., p. 89.

<sup>109</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 361.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., p. 358.

<sup>111</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 2:15.

<sup>112</sup>Rousseau, Emile, pp. 358-359.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., p. 382.

<sup>114</sup>Op. Cit., pp. 92-93.

<sup>115</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, pp. 89-90.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>117</sup>For a more extensive examination of the ambition of the poor, who aspire to achieve the same status as the rich, refer to pp. 155-159 above.

<sup>118</sup>Refer to pp. 158-159 above for an examination of how the rich create competition among the poor in order to fortify their power.

<sup>119</sup>For a more detailed examination of how the poor follow the corrupt example of the rich, see pp. 148-154 above.

<sup>120</sup>For a discussion of the rich's exploitation of the poor, refer to pp. 155-159 above.

<sup>121</sup>For a more extensive discussion on this subject, see pp. 155-158 above.

<sup>122</sup>See the discussion on unlimited acquisition, pp. 155-8 above.

<sup>123</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 88.

<sup>124</sup>For a specification of the triumph of self-interest in the degeneration of social relations, refer to pp. 160-165 above.

<sup>125</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 359.

<sup>126</sup>For a more extensive discussion of the disregard for others in a degenerating society, see pp. 147-152 above.

<sup>127</sup>For an understanding of why Rousseau considers women to be the sustainers of the family unit, refer to pp. 112-122 above.

<sup>128</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 46 and p. 359. See also, Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 88.

<sup>129</sup>For the reasons why Rousseau believes women are more naturally social than are men, see the discussions which establish women as the initiators of society, on pp. 56-70 and pp. 96-104.

<sup>130</sup>For Rousseau's argument that women link fathers to their children, refer to pp. 112-122 above.

<sup>131</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:206-7.

<sup>132</sup>Refer to pp. 155-158 above for a more detailed examination of how men seek greater freedom through the satisfaction of their passions.

<sup>133</sup>See pp. 56-70 and pp. 96-104 above for a specification of the innovative function of women.

<sup>134</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 46.

<sup>135</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the nonexploitative relations in the "Golden Era" and the ideal republic, refer to pp. 79-86 and pp. 89-95 above.

<sup>136</sup>Refer to pp. 106-110 above for a more extensive analysis of the dependent condition of women.

## CHAPTER FIVE

<sup>1</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the division of labour which Rousseau argues results from the transition to permanent relations between the sexes, refer to pp. 106-110 above.

<sup>2</sup>See pp. 133-135 above for an examination of the reasons why Rousseau justifies the supremacy of male authority in the household.

<sup>3</sup>For a more extensive analysis of the involvement of men in society, refer to pp. 89-95 above.



<sup>4</sup>For an understanding of the natural dependent condition of women, see pp. 106-110 above.

<sup>5</sup>For an analysis of the unity or harmony which is created in the conjugal union, see pp. 124-132 above.

<sup>6</sup>Lynda Lange, "Women and the General Will", in Trent Rousseau Papers, eds., Jim MacAdam, Michael Newmann and Guy LaFrance (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980), pp. 115-6.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 157.

<sup>8</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1979), p. 49.

<sup>9</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the duties the father must perform for the provision for and the socialization of his children, refer to pp. 133-135 above.

<sup>10</sup>Op. Cit., p. 430.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 49. cf. pp. 133-135 above.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 359.

<sup>13</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: Rousseau's Letter to d'Alembert, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 103.

<sup>14</sup>Op. Cit., p. 358.

<sup>15</sup>Op. Cit., p. 100. See also pp. 168-173 above.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 47. See also pp. 168-173 above.

<sup>17</sup>For a more detailed examination of the natural inequalities between the sexes, refer to pp. 168-173 above.

<sup>18</sup>For an analysis of how women rule men on the basis of their unlimited sexual desires, see pp. 180-185 above.

<sup>19</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 364.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 387.

<sup>21</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts", in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 52-53.

<sup>22</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 86.

<sup>23</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 364.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 358.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 341.

<sup>27</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts", pp. 52-53.

<sup>28</sup>Op. Cit., p. 341.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 364.

<sup>30</sup>For the distinction between Rousseau's usage of desires and needs, refer to the discussion on pp. 118-119 above.

<sup>31</sup>Op. Cit., p. 361.

<sup>32</sup>For a more detailed examination of how pregnancy becomes associated with choice, see pp. 56-70 and pp. 96-104 above.

<sup>33</sup>See pp. 96-104 above for a discussion of how pregnancy becomes a socialized need.

<sup>34</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 217.

<sup>35</sup>Rousseau, Emile, pp. 429-430. See also pp. 122-133 above.

<sup>36</sup>For a more detailed discussion of why the assistance of men was necessitated by the loss of women's self-reliance, refer to the discussion on pp. 96-104 above.

<sup>37</sup>For a more extensive analysis of the loss of natural independence, see pp. 89-95, pp. 96-104 and pp. 168-173 above.

<sup>38</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", pp. 146-147.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 149.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., pp. 148-149.

<sup>41</sup>See pp. 124-133 above for a more detailed examination of the spiritual tie between a married couple and the distinctiveness of each in the conjugal union.

<sup>42</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:111-2.

<sup>43</sup>For a more extensive analysis of the male's need to reaffirm himself in his children, refer to pp. 128-132 above.

<sup>44</sup>For women's acceptance of their dependence on men for the satisfaction of their needs, see pp. 96-104 above.

<sup>45</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 397.

<sup>46</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 149.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., pp. 155-156.

<sup>48</sup>For a specification of authentic relations and the desire for distinction, see pp. 82-86 above.

<sup>49</sup>See pp. 143-148 above for a more detailed examination of men's attachment to external goods and values.

<sup>50</sup>For the results of inauthentic relations see pp. 147-153 and pp. 173-177 above.

<sup>51</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 100.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., pp. 82-83.

<sup>53</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 387.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 386. See also p. 390 and p. 393.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 377.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 397.

<sup>57</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on Political Economy", in On The Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 210.

<sup>58</sup>Op. Cit., p. 377.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 408.

<sup>60</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on Political Economy", p. 210.

<sup>61</sup>Op. Cit., p. 360.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 359.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 360.

<sup>64</sup>See Schwartz's analysis in The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 35.

<sup>65</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, pp. 84-85. cf. Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pp. 36-7.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 84. cf. Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 37.

<sup>67</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 360.

<sup>68</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, pp. 84-85.

<sup>69</sup>See Schwartz's argument in The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 37.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 43. cf. Rousseau, Emile, p. 360.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 67.

<sup>75</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 397.

<sup>76</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 100.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., pp. 82-83.

<sup>78</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", p. 67.

<sup>79</sup>Op. Cit., pp. 82-83.

<sup>80</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 377.

<sup>81</sup>For Rousseau's assertion of the incompleteness of each individual prior to his union in conjugal society, see pp. 128-132 above.

<sup>82</sup>For a more detailed analysis of how women discern the consequences of sexuality, refer to pp. 56-70 above.

<sup>83</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Geneva Manuscript", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 180.

<sup>84</sup>For the direct rule of women on the basis of self-interest, see pp. 158-164 above.

<sup>85</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", p. 69.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 360. cf. Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 43.

<sup>88</sup>For a more extensive analysis of the direct rule of women over men and the results of this development, see the discussion on pp. 180-185 above.

<sup>89</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", p. 68.

<sup>90</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", pp. 146-147.

<sup>91</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 49.

<sup>92</sup>For a more detailed examination of the emotive development of men, stimulated by dependence, refer to pp. 206-210 above.

<sup>93</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", p. 68.

<sup>94</sup>For a more extensive analysis of the general will, see pp. 89-94 above.

<sup>95</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 147.

<sup>96</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:238-9.

<sup>97</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 377.

<sup>98</sup>Rousseau, "The Geneva Manuscript", p. 159.

<sup>99</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 119.

<sup>100</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on Political Economy", pp. 216-7.

<sup>101</sup>Op. Cit., pp. 134-135.

<sup>102</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 387.

<sup>103</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:213-4.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., p. 206. cf. Merle L. Perkins, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: On the Individual and Society (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1974), pp. 191-192.

<sup>105</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", pp. 76-77.

<sup>106</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., 3:238-9. cf. Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 50.

<sup>107</sup>Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 50.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", pp. 76-77.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

<sup>112</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 89. cf. Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 45.

<sup>113</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 359.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., p. 371.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 360.

<sup>116</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", p. 147.

<sup>117</sup>Op. Cit., pp. 361-362.

<sup>118</sup>For a more detailed examination of why women can be considered the initiators of society, refer to pp. 56-70 and pp. 96-104.

<sup>119</sup>For a more extensive analysis of the equality existing in the authority of the household, see pp. 213-218 above.

<sup>120</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", p. 77.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>122</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 390.

<sup>123</sup>Op. Cit., p. 69. cf. pp. 218-222 above.

<sup>124</sup>Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 144.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid.

<sup>126</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 88.

<sup>127</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", p. 69.

<sup>128</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 360. cf. Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 43.

## CONCLUSION

<sup>1</sup>Rousseau, Emile, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 358. See also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: Rousseau's Letter to d'Alembert, p. 86.

<sup>2</sup>Lorenne M. G. Clark and Lynda Lange, in the introduction to The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. viii.

<sup>3</sup>Elizabeth Rapaport, "On the Future of Love: Rousseau and the Radical Feminists", in The Philosophic Forum (1973-4) 5:188-189.

<sup>4</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 360.

<sup>5</sup>Lynda Lange, "Reproduction and Democratic Theory", in Contemporary Issues in Political Philosophy, eds. W. Shea and J. King-Farlow (New York: Science History Publications, 1976), p. 136.

<sup>6</sup>Lorenne M. G. Clark, "The Rights of Women: The Theory and Practice of the Ideology of Male Supremacy", in Contemporary Issues in Political Philosophy, eds. W. Shea and J. King-Farlow (New York: Science History Publications, 1976), p. 50.

<sup>7</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 37.

<sup>8</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 89.

<sup>9</sup>Lange, "Reproduction in Democratic Theory", p. 136.

<sup>10</sup>Clark, "The Rights of Women: Theory and Practice of the Ideology of Male Supremacy", p. 54.

<sup>11</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 211.

<sup>12</sup>Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men", pp. 146-147.

<sup>13</sup>Clark, "The Rights of Women: The Theory and Practice of the Ideology of Male Supremacy", p. 54.

<sup>14</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 49.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Rousseau, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise 4 vols., trans. William Kenrick (London: Tully's Head, in the Strand, 1769), 2:245-246.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 103.

<sup>20</sup>See Chapter Four for a discussion of those degenerative stages which represent the desire for the acquisition of power over others.

<sup>21</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", in On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 53. See also Rousseau, Emile, p. 377.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>23</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 377.

<sup>24</sup>Rousseau, "On the Social Contract", p. 53. See also Rousseau, Emile, p. 377.

<sup>25</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 377.

<sup>26</sup>Rapaport, "On the Future of Love: Rousseau and the Radical Feminists", p. 186.

<sup>27</sup>See pp. 168-185 above for a discussion of romantic love and infidelity, in relation to how these show that men are the victims of love.

<sup>28</sup>Rousseau, Emile, p. 360.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 387.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 360.

<sup>31</sup>Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, p. 100.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 40.



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