REVEALING POSITIONS:
THE ROLE OF POINT OF VIEW IN
THE UNDERSTANDING OF UTTERANCES

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REVEALING POSITIONS
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Abstract

Explanations of how we understand some types of utterances often involve appeals to either speaker meaning or context. I suggest that these devices are inadequate for explaining how we understand utterances using the word ‘I’, metaphorical statements, and statements in and about works of fiction. Instead, I argue that in order to explain our understanding of such utterances, we need to appeal to point of view.

I deal with each type of utterance separately, in each case building on a philosopher’s previous work of explaining how we understand that type of utterance: Gareth Evans on utterances using the word ‘I’, Max Black’s interaction theory of metaphor, and Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe for fictional statements. I note that in each case the relevant theory is not comprehensive enough. Gareth Evans accounts for how each of us thinks of ourselves as a self, but neglects to account for how each of us thinks of ourselves as an individual self. Max Black’s theory accounts for most of our intuitions about metaphor, but his theory cannot explain our emotional response to metaphorical phrases. Kendall Walton’s theory accounts for statements made in works of fiction and most statements made about works of fiction. However, his theory of make-believe is inadequate for explaining how we understand critical statements about works of fiction. I argue that all three theories can provide the required explanatory force if each is supplemented by an appeal to point of view.
Before characterizing point of view, I show that context is inadequate for explaining metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction. Any contextual theory for these statements would be inadequate unless it allowed for multiple contexts for a single sentence. I concentrate on François Recanati’s multiple domain theory in order to show that theories positing such multiple contexts are inadequate because they lack ways of differentiating and accessing such contexts.

Appealing to point of view, in conjunction with the three theories I favour, explains how we understand the utterances in question. Self-conscious self-reference using the word ‘I’ is possible because we assume an imaginative stance for viewing what we take to be our ‘inner life.’ Metaphorical statements are understood through a pattern that includes the self. When making statements about fictional characters mentioned in works of fiction, we make-believe that the names refer to actual people. However, when we make critical statements using such names, we believe that they are the names of fictional characters.
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INTRODUCTION

As competent users of our language, we are able to understand both prosaic and fanciful utterances. If a speaker says, 'I think Cinderella married the prince because her society did not allow a woman to paddle her own canoe,' we may disagree but we can nonetheless understand what the speaker is saying. Yet explaining how and what we understand when we understand such an utterance involves us in several contentious issues. This utterance involves explaining how we understand the word 'I', metaphorical phrases, and the proper names of fictional characters.

At first glance, utterances using the word 'I', using metaphor or using statements in and about works of fiction would seem to have little in common. Nonetheless, there is a certain affinity between them. Each kind of utterance has an uneasy relationship with the world in that there is a gap between the determinate sense of a sentence using any one of these phrases and that sentence's determinate truth value. Given David Hume's inability to discover a self apart from his changing perceptions, controversy unsurprisingly arises over whether or not the word 'I' is a referring expression and, if it is, what the word is referring to. In spite of this controversy, we understand what a speaker is saying if she says, 'I am hungry' and even if she says, 'I could not live with myself if I broke my promise'. Just as contentious are statements in and about works of fiction. The names of fictional characters occurring in statements in and about works of
fiction are superficially indistinguishable from the proper names of actual persons. Yet the names of fictional characters are empty in that, unlike proper names, they apparently refer to what does not exist. In spite of this lack of referents, some statements containing empty proper names would seem to be, in some sense, true. At least, if a statement like ‘Gretel is Hansel’s sister’ is false, its falsity strikes us differently from the falsity of a statement like ‘Gretel is not Hansel’s sister’, even though no fact of the matter distinguishes them. Utterances containing metaphors do not refer, of course, yet they apparently describe states of affairs that, literally speaking, we know do not exist. We might agree that mankind can learn much from the ‘Book of Nature’ even while knowing that nature is not a book. Consequently, in spite of their being literally nonsensical or false, we still consider metaphors as conveying information. These three types of utterances, then, are similar in that each seems to hover uncertainly between a descriptive or referential use and a creative use of the language.

Several philosophers have attempted to overcome the difficulty posed by such sentences by evoking either context or speaker meaning. For example, Richard Routley (1980) sees context as a role, its features being whatever is needed to determine a sentence’s deviant sense, use, and aboutness. John Searle (1979) argues that the meanings of many sentences rely, at least partially, on what speakers intend those sentences to mean. Yet each device generates its own difficulties. There is no universal agreement over what constitutes context nor is it clear that context alone can supply determinate meaning for every problematic
sentence without itself becoming an unworkable concept. In order to supply everything that is lacking, the notion becomes so broad that it ends by being nothing more than a convenient label for whatever is needed to explain our understanding of a particular utterance. Speaker meaning, on the other hand, has encountered strong criticism because of its reliance on speaker intention. First, there is the problem attendant on recognizing the difference between following a rule and intending to follow a rule. More crucially, we can ask whether our understanding of what a speaker says depends on our knowing what she intends or whether we know what a speaker intends because we understand what she says. Neither context nor speaker meaning, then, is adequate for explaining how we understand the utterances in question. While both context and speaker meaning have their place, these notions cannot be evoked for every problematic utterance.

My main thesis is that we need to appeal to the concept of point of view in explaining the meaning of these three types of utterance. I begin by examining previous and current attempts at explaining these utterances and supplement those explanations that appear most successful. I discuss the contentious issues involved in explaining how we use the word ‘I’ by examining various theories explaining our use of this word. Although Gareth Evans’ theory appears most promising, I argue that he cannot account for how we conceive of ourselves as individual selves. When considering metaphorical utterances, I rehearse the difficulty in providing a theory of metaphor that might cover any and all
instances. Max Black's interaction theory of metaphor is the most comprehensive but falls short by failing to account for our personal involvement with many individual metaphors. When discussing how we might explain our understanding of statements made in and about works of fiction, I argue that Kendall Walton's theory of make-believe satisfactorily explains statements made in works of fiction and many statements made about works of fiction. However, his theory is less satisfactory in explaining how we understand critical statements about works of fiction. In each case, I suggest that the perceived problem with the most promising theory on offer for each type of utterance can be overcome by appealing to the notion of point of view.

I then question our easy reliance on context. There are contextual theories explaining how we understand utterances using the word 'I', metaphorical statements, and statements in and about works of fiction. In connection with metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction, I argue that an appeal to context is useful only if there is a way of providing multiple contexts for a single utterance. Otherwise, utterances like 'my sister is more resourceful than Gretel' or 'she thinks her argument can be defended' would remain unaccounted for. In each utterance, the context needed to evaluate phrases such as 'my sister' and 'she' is not the context needed to evaluate the empty proper name or the metaphor. François Recanati has provided a theory of multiple contexts. However, an examination of his multiple domain theory reveals that such a scheme falters because there is no coherent way of delineating or accessing such
contexts. We need a further device because context is only explanatory if it is interactive.

Finally, I consider the notion of point of view. We frequently encounter the term 'point of view' yet our understanding of this notion has most often been taken for granted. Philosophical treatments of this notion have tended to concentrate on its usefulness for explaining perceptions or beliefs. Literary studies of this notion widen its scope of application by noting its usefulness for explaining certain aspects of discourse. However, their focus has fixed on how this notion aids in the delineation of different narrative voices within works of fiction. Depending on the sentences occurring within a particular work of fiction, we can identify the narrator as omniscient, privileged, effaced, and so on. I believe that the usefulness of this notion can be extended even further. Occurring within a work of fiction or not, utterances often reveal points of view that can be inferred from what is said. If a speaker says, 'It looks like it is going to rain,' her observation is dependent on a particular time and location. Although taking account of this implied point of view is unnecessary for understanding every sentence, an appeal to point of view is crucial for explaining utterances using the word 'I', metaphorical statements, and statements in and about works of fiction. Consequently, after exploring the notion of point of view, I give a fuller account of how attention to the notion of point of view can help explain our understanding of the utterances in question.
I do not want to make extensive claims for the explanatory powers of point of view. Like the notion of context, the notion of point of view has limits. However, appealing to the notion of point of view can explain how we understand utterances using 'I', metaphorical statements, and statements in and about works of fiction.
CHAPTER 1

HOW WE USE THE WORD ‘I’

Two men become embroiled in an argument that reduces itself to each man declaring ‘I am right and you are wrong.’ Both men make their point by using the same sentence, yet they are disagreeing. The difference between the two utterances of this sentence hinges on the various referents of the indexicals ‘I’ and ‘you’. The word ‘I’ is an indexical and, like all indexicals, what it denotes is relative to the speaker. No one denies that the word ‘I’ is intimately related to the speaker of ‘I’ in a particular context of use. If we hear a statement with ‘I’ as the subject, we must discover whose statement it is before we can know of whom the predicate holds if the statement is true. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say how ‘I’ might refer.

Philosophers working in the philosophy of language find the case of ‘I’ problematic because, although ‘I’ appears to be a referring expression, there is a gap between meaning and reference. Each of us can use this word to refer to himself or herself even though its lexical meaning remains unchanged. Accounts of ‘I’ are controversial because there are several available possibilities as to what aids lexical meaning in determining reference, just as there is debate over whether the word works like a demonstrative or a proper name. A connected difficulty arises when we try to identify what ‘I’ refers to or stands for. Earlier philosophers had little difficulty with the referent of ‘I’ because they were comfortable seeing
the mind or the self as an object distinct from the body. ‘I’ could thus be a proper name standing for this object or a demonstrative pointing to the object.

Contemporary philosophers, rejecting such characterisations of the self, are bereft of this handy object as the referent of ‘I’.

Theories denying that ‘I’ refers argue that there are crucial differences between ‘I’ and referring terms. Although I believe that ‘I’ is a referring term, I also believe that these theories nevertheless note features of ‘I’ that must be considered by any theory contending that ‘I’ is a referring term. Many reference theories of ‘I’ fall short because they suppress or ignore the features peculiar to ‘I’. Gareth Evans’ theory is most successful in taking account of these features while still showing how ‘I’ is a referring term. Yet his model of self-knowledge leaves us with a diminished account of the ‘inner life’ and hence of self-reflection. I attempt to extend Evans’ theory by arguing that much of our ‘inner life’ depends on the comparisons we make with others and that accounts of our ‘inner life’ are metaphorically pictured.

The Particularities of ‘I’

In this section, I wish to establish that the word ‘I’ has features not possessed by other referring terms. Briefly, in her article “The First Person” (1975), G.E.M. Anscombe sets out the thesis that the word ‘I’ is not a referring term. This thesis has been rejected by many, including me, but her article remains important because she broaches at least two of the features peculiar to the word ‘I’ that must be explained—or explained away—by theories which hold that the word ‘I’ is a
referring term. Her article’s most important contribution to the discussion of ‘I’ is her recognition that if we consider what we must know in order to use ‘I’ as a referring term, we come to the insight that we associate ‘I’ with first-person self-conscious self-reference.

A sketchy outline of the other two features, to be filled in later, might be in order here. These features will be explained more fully when I discuss the writings on ‘I’ by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Sydney Shoemaker. In The Blue Book (1975), Wittgenstein contends that the word ‘I’ can be used either as subject or as object. Shoemaker, in his article “Self-reference and Self-awareness” (1968), expands on his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s distinction and argues that when ‘I’ is used as subject, we never mistake its referent, but when ‘I’ is used as object, the referent of ‘I’ can be misidentified. The word ‘I’, then, has two other unusual features: ‘I’ can be used both as subject and as object; and in its subject use, one can never mistake the referent of ‘I’ or, as Shoemaker puts it, sentences in which ‘I’ is used as subject are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. When laying out the arguments contained in these texts, I note places where I think their arguments have gone awry, but I have no quarrel with their identification of the peculiar features of ‘I’.

In her article “The First Person,” G.E.M. Anscombe rests her argument that ‘I’ is not a referring term on a feature peculiar to the word ‘I’: unlike other referring terms, the referent of ‘I’ is always guaranteed. For example, ‘Santa Claus’ may appear to be a proper name, but it is actually an empty term because
there is no existent item to which the term 'Santa Claus' might refer. A similar
failure can occur when a speaker attempts to draw your attention to a particular
object by using the demonstrative 'this' and pointing. If, without the speaker's
knowledge, the object has been moved, the demonstrative will not have a present
object to which it can refer. Unlike these cases, the use of the word 'I' guarantees
both the existence and the presence of its referent. A speaker can never use the
word 'I' without its referent both existing and being present in the context in
which the sentence containing the 'I' occurs. A secondary aspect of this feature of
having a guaranteed referent which Anscombe mentions but does not develop is
that we are assured of not getting hold of the wrong object when we use the word
'I'.

Looking for the basis of this feature of having a guaranteed referent leads her
to the rule that 'I' is the word that each one uses in speaking of oneself. If 'I' is a
word of self-reference and we have a speaker using this word, then we also have
the existence and the presence of a referent. Moreover, in relation to the
secondary aspect of this feature, one would never be in danger of getting hold of
the wrong object if one referred to oneself as 'I'. Having arrived at this rule, the
rule that 'I' is the word that each one uses in speaking of oneself, she concedes its
initial plausibility and acknowledges its ability to explain why the referent of 'I'
is guaranteed, but she nevertheless provides several challenges to this rendering
of 'I', with the crucial problem being how we are to understand 'oneself'
('herself', 'himself'), the self to whom the 'I' supposedly refers.
Anscombe approaches the problem of how ‘I’ refers by examining what it is that someone must know in order to refer by using the word ‘I’. If ‘I’ is a word of self-reference, then one needs an awareness of self in order to refer to it. She wants an account of first-person self-conscious self-reference, but mistakenly argues that no account can be forthcoming because there is no object (self) of which we can be aware. Traditionally, what we refer to as ‘I’ has been accepted as non-identical to the body: the referent of ‘I’ is not identical to the body because if I were put into a deprivation tank which ensured that I would receive no information from my bodily senses, I could still use ‘I’ to refer to myself. Anscombe argues that the rule (that ‘I’ is the word each one uses in speaking of oneself) is unable to account for self-conscious self-reference in order to emphasize that this referent is also non-identical with the narrative facts about oneself. As Anscombe’s example puts it, it is possible that “when John Smith spoke of John Horatio Auberon Smith (named in a will perhaps) he was speaking of himself but he did not know this” (22). In other words, Smith has referred to Smith without his realizing that Smith is himself. We thus have self-reference but not first-person self-conscious self-reference. The proposed rule about ‘I’ cannot explain ‘I’ as a referring expression because it allows that one can refer to oneself without knowing that the object one is referring to is oneself. To interpret Smith’s statement ‘I am hungry’ as ‘Smith is hungry’ is inadequate because, according to Anscombe, the sense of ‘Smith’ is just some collection of narrative facts about Smith. We could not save the situation by altering the rule to read “‘I’ is a word
each one of us uses when knowingly and intentionally speaking of oneself. Because, as Anscombe contends, Smith is knowingly and intentionally speaking of Smith, that is, himself. However, her example shows only that Smith is speaking of himself in the referentially transparent sense, and consequently does not show that he knowingly and intentionally speaks of himself. Nevertheless, the rule for ‘I’ fails because it is insufficient for indicating the way in which the object is presented to the speaker. Invoking Frege, she argues that knowing the referent of ‘I’ cannot give us the way the object is presented to, and thereby determines how the extension of the term is grasped by, the speaker. Here, not just any sort of self-consciousness will do. Because she is considering what someone must know in order to refer by using the word ‘I’, Anscombe is looking for an account of first-person self-consciousness. In order to get at what Smith fails to realise, ‘I’ has to be explained in terms of the first person. However, to explain ‘I’ by explaining it in terms of ‘I’ is to make the rule circular, and consequently, non-explanatory.

Here, we might concede that Anscombe’s argument is correct yet reject her overall thesis by suggesting that ‘I’ is a primitive which is not non-circularly explainable in any other vocabulary. I reject this route, however, because, as I will argue in later sections, I believe that Anscombe is wrong, and that a non-circular account of first-person self-conscious self-reference can be provided.

Smith knows a narrative fact about John Horatio Auberon Smith, that he is named in a will, and by using the name, he refers to himself. Anscombe suggests
that we might assume that if he refers to himself, then he is conscious of himself, that is, self-conscious. Yet she argues that this assumption would be wrong. When we speak of self-consciousness, we do not mean something like Smith’s situation. On the other hand, if we see self-consciousness as consciousness of a self, we run into a different set of problems because not only must we discover what this self is, but we must also characterise our way of referring to it.

For Anscombe, the nature of ‘I’ as an expression is closely connected to what is taken to be the exact referent of ‘I’. Anscombe rejects the possibility that ‘I’ might be either an abbreviation for a definite description or the proper name of a self because both explanations are inadequate. ‘I’ cannot be a proper name because the self is not an object one can point to. Nor can it be an abbreviation for a definite description because, according to Anscombe, the only candidate for this account is ‘the sayer of this’ where ‘sayer’ implies ‘thinker’. Because the referent of ‘I’ is always guaranteed, this account is faced with the problem of identifying the same referent in different ‘I’-thoughts. On each occasion that Speaker A uses the word ‘I’, she would have a concept in mind that uniquely fit her. If it did not fit uniquely, then she could not be sure of getting the right concept. This concept would have to be different from the concepts other speakers use since this concept fits Speaker A rather than other speakers. Added to this difficulty is the possibility that the concept Speaker A uses to refer to herself is not necessarily the same each time she uses the word. Anscombe concludes that reference could only be guaranteed if the referent of ‘I’ were
newly defined with each use of ‘I’ yet remained in view only so long as
something was taken to be I. Having exhausted what she perceives as all the
possibilities, Anscombe concludes that ‘I’ is not a referring term.

While she is correct that ‘I’ is not a proper name or a definite description, she
is mistaken when she argues that ‘I’ cannot be a demonstrative. She bases her
argument on the fact that the referent of a demonstrative such as ‘this’ is not
guaranteed and her belief that the self is not an object. She argues that if we see
‘I’ as a word similar to the word ‘this’, we are still entitled to ask “this what?” ‘I
is not like a demonstrative because demonstratives refer to objects, and,
according to Anscombe, the self is not an object. She contends that identifying
something means that it should be possible to misidentify that thing, yet a mistake
is not possible here. Demonstratives can fail to refer, but ‘I’ cannot. The use of
the word guarantees both the existence and the presence of the referent. In other
words, any use of ‘I’ guarantees a referent because if, in a context, one is referring
to oneself, then the referent of that ‘I’ must exist and be present in the context.

I disagree that ‘I’ does not work like a demonstrative because demonstratives
refer to objects and the self is not an object. There are candidates other than the
self—such as the person or the speaker—that could stand as the object
demonstratively referred to by a token of ‘I’. Anscombe makes no allowance for
the possibility that our previous view of what constitutes a demonstrative
reference might be too narrow.
In spite of her mistaken refusal to see the word ‘I’ as demonstratively referring or, indeed, to see it as a referring term at all, her article is nevertheless important because it notes features of ‘I’ which should be considered by any theory of this term. She establishes that, as a referring term, the referent of ‘I’ is guaranteed (in the sense that its use guarantees both the existence and the presence of its referent). Moreover, given this feature of a guaranteed referent, any consideration of what we must know in order to use the word ‘I’ to refer cannot ignore the importance of giving an account of first-person self-conscious self-reference.

Anscombe ignores a peculiar feature of ‘I’ noted by Ludwig Wittgenstein. In *The Blue Book* (1975), Wittgenstein contends that “misunderstandings about the word ‘I’ arise because there are two different cases in the use of the word ‘I’ (or ‘my’) which I [Wittgenstein] might call ‘the use as object’ and ‘the use as subject’” (66). In the statement ‘I have grown six inches,’ ‘I’ is used as object. In such cases, ‘I’ is a referring expression because it involves the recognition of a particular person, “and there is in these cases the possibility of an error, or as I [Wittgenstein] should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been provided for” (67). In other words, identifying the referent of ‘I’ involves taking a third person perspective on oneself (as object), and so there is the possibility of misidentifying the referent. On the other hand, if I make a statement like “I have toothache” or ‘I like carrots’, ‘I’ is being used as subject. In such cases, it is
impossible for me to mistake someone other than myself as the referent of ‘I’ because no identification is necessary.

Sydney Shoemaker, in his essay “Self-reference and Self-awareness” (1968), urges that Wittgenstein is claiming that cases involving use of ‘I’ as subject are not immune to errors of any sort, but they are immune to a particular kind of error, that is, about who is being referred to. One can never mistake the referent of ‘I’ if ‘I’ is a tool of self-reference. Statements containing ‘I’ used as subject are “immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns” (556). On the other hand, the statement ‘a is φ’ is not immune from such error if it is possible that “the speaker knows some particular thing to be φ, but makes the mistake of asserting ‘a is φ’ because, and only because, he mistakenly thinks that the thing he knows to be φ is what ‘a’ refers to” (557). Given this distinction between the two uses of ‘I’, a statement such as ‘I scored the winning goal’ is open to such error because in making this statement, I may mistake another for myself. In the heat of the moment, amid a flurry of players and sticks, confused as to which stick is held by which arm, I may mistakenly assume that I am the player who scored the winning goal. That I certainly moved my stick in order to hit the puck and that someone’s stick did hit the puck gives me the belief that I scored the winning goal. Because someone scored the winning goal, if the property (of scoring the winning goal) is not mine, then it has to be instantiated in someone else. According to Shoemaker, in cases like this, the predicate is used to identify
the subject and thereby takes precedence over the subject term so that the subject is the person who satisfies the description. If the word ‘I’ does not refer to this person, then the reference of ‘I’ has failed. An ‘I’ used as object is not immune from error due to misidentification because by misascribing the predicate, the speaker misidentifies the subject. I know someone scored the winning goal, and I mistakenly assert that ‘I scored the winning goal’ because I believe that the player who scored the winning goal will be referred to by using ‘I.’ That ‘I’ is being used as object can be easily seen by using the passive voice. That is, ‘x scored the winning goal’ becomes ‘the winning goal was scored by x’, where ‘x’ can be replaced by either ‘I’ or the name of someone else in the context. ‘I’ is an object in which predicates are instantiated.

Not every false predicational statement involves a misidentification of the subject. If I say that my friend Smith was Saskatchewan Snow Queen in 1995, whereas in fact it was 1996, I have not misidentified Smith. In this case, I was speaking of Smith. However, if I am speaking of the Saskatchewan Snow Queen in 1995 and I identify this woman as Smith, I have misidentified Smith as the relevant Snow Queen. Similarly, in a crowded swimming pool, I may look down and see that someone’s foot is bleeding. I might assume that the bleeding foot is mine and report this belief by saying, ‘I am bleeding’. I am speaking of the object whose foot is bleeding, and I believe that I can identify this object by using the word ‘I’. If someone else is bleeding and that foot is not mine, then my token of ‘I’ is a misidentification.
As noted earlier, not all cases of ‘I’ are open to this error. When I say that ‘I think I scored the winning goal’, the ‘I’ used as the grammatical subject of the verb ‘think’ is immune to error through misidentification even though the second use of ‘I’ is not. According to Shoemaker, when ‘I’ is used as subject, it is used in connection with predicates describing mental activities. In this latter case, misidentification is not possible because, as Wittgenstein notes, “there is no question of recognising a person when I say I have toothache” (67). When using ‘I’ as subject, misidentification is not possible because the question of identification does not even arise. In such cases, sentences using ‘I’ as subject are expressive rather than descriptive or assertive. Consequently, Wittgenstein concludes that ‘I’ is not always a referring expression.

However, Wittgenstein’s conclusion is hasty and false. His conclusion cannot follow without some principle like ‘when a sentence ‘…a…’ is used in such a way that it is impossible for it to misidentify-a, then ‘a’ is not in that use a referring expression’. Yet this principle is unworkable for what is a, which cannot be misidentified, but the referent of ‘a’?

Moreover, Shoemaker’s account of the difference between ‘I’ used as subject and ‘I’ used as object is not without its difficulties. While his distinguishing between the two uses is valid, his resting this distinction on the kind of predicate involved is less convincing. According to Shoemaker, ‘I’ is used as subject in sentences asserting mental predicates whereas ‘I’ is used as object in sentences asserting physical predicates. He is mistaken because his ground of the difference
between the two uses forces him to make a further distinction. In order to avoid
the consequence that every false predicational statement involving a physical
predicate signals a misidentification of the subject, he must distinguish those
occasions on which the predicate is used to identify the subject from those on
which the predicate is not used in this way. However, he is unable to explain why
and on which occasions we would decide to use the predicate to identify the
subject.

I reject the conclusion that ‘I’ is not a referring term just as I reject that the
difference between ‘I’ used as object and ‘I’ used as subject is a matter of the
kind of predicates involved. In spite of my resistance to these arguments, I accept
that there are two uses of ‘I’ and that a sentence using ‘I’ as subject is immune to
error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. However,
this immunity does not rest on the belief that, in one case, no reference takes
place.

I agree with Gareth Evans when, in Varieties of Reference (1983), he
distinguishes between ‘I’ used as subject and ‘I’ used as object by offering a new
account of how these two uses are distinguished:

Our ‘I’-ideas are such that judgements controlled by certain
ways of gaining knowledge of ourselves as physical and
spatial beings are immune to error through misidentification:
that the bearing of the relevant information on ‘I’-thoughts
rests upon no argument, or identification, but is simply
constitutive of our having an ‘I’-idea. (220, his emphasis)
He construes a use of 'I' in an atomic sentence of the form 'I am doing (feeling) x' as immune to error through misidentification if it does not make sense to say 'someone is doing (feeling) x, but is it I who am doing (feeling) x?' He denies, however, that distinguishing the two uses of 'I' is a matter of differentiating the kinds of predicates involved. Rather, it involves how one comes to know that the predicate is instantiated.

The referencing of 'I' is self-conscious because the subject's idea of the object depends on her ways of gaining knowledge about it. Since we must know which object it is in order to refer to it, all uses of 'I' are self-conscious. Sometimes, the self-consciousness is third-person; other times, it is first-person. In a case of identification-dependent reference, I might misidentify the object that is bleeding as myself and attempt to refer to that object (in which the property is instantiated) by using the word 'I'. There is a gap between knowing that the property is instantiated and knowing that it is instantiated in myself ('a is F' and 'a=b'). Of course, a mistake has been made because the word 'I' cannot refer to that object. We might assume that we have here a case of unselfconscious referring using the word 'I'. That the speaker is unselfconscious is evidenced by her misidentifying another object as herself. However, this assumption is unwarranted. The word 'I' in such a case is being used improperly. 'I' is a word of self-reference, and the speaker has tried to use the word to refer to something other than herself.
On Evans’ rendering, some bodily self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification. For example, if I say, ‘I am hot and sticky’, and my statement expresses knowledge gained in the appropriate way, it makes no sense to ask ‘someone is hot and sticky, but is it I who am hot and sticky?’ There are ways of knowing that the property of being hot and sticky is instantiated such that, if the first part of the sentence (that is, ‘someone is hot and sticky…’) expresses knowledge gained in this way, then the actual question will not make sense. He denies that there is a gap between my having information in the appropriate way that the predicate ‘hot and sticky’ is instantiated and my having information that it is I who am hot and sticky. That is, there is no gap between knowing that a predicate is instantiated and knowing that it is instantiated in oneself. Perception-based judgements about our position and our relation to other things in the world, about certain bodily states if perceived in appropriate ways, and about our mental states are identification-free in the sense that there is no identification component of ‘I am F’ based on ‘b is F’ and ‘I am b’ (someone scored the winning goal and I am that someone). Sentences using ‘I’ as object do not have immunity to error through misidentification because they are identification-dependent. More succinctly, the difference between ‘I’ used as subject and ‘I’ used as object is based on our ways of gaining knowledge about the object rather than on the kind of predicate involved.

Many philosophers resist Anscombe’s startling conclusion that ‘I’ is not a referring term. Some philosophers, for instance, Saul Kripke, argue that some
singular terms do not have descriptive senses specifying the conditions needed to identify those terms' referents. This claim supports direct reference theories which hold that the semantic value of a sentence containing a singular term is exhausted by its referential truth-conditions. For example, the semantic value assigned will be the same for both ‘Superman is identical to Superman’ and ‘Superman is identical to Clark Kent’ because both have the same referential truth conditions (Superman being identical to himself). As Anscombe, in Fregean terms, discusses it, the relativity of ‘I’ to a speaker causes difficulty for theories of sentence meaning which hold that sense leads to reference or intension to extension. If we reject the assumption that a descriptive sense is needed to determine reference, then much of Anscombe’s difficulty of seeing ‘I’ as a referring expression disappears. Nevertheless, a question remains even for direct reference theories of language. Because each of us can use the word ‘I’ to refer to herself or himself, the lexical meaning of ‘I’ cannot, by itself, identify one referent rather than another in any particular use of ‘I’. Something else over and above lexical meaning must aid in determining reference. What facts about the situation of utterance, then, are relevant to an understanding of any particular use of ‘I’?

The Linguistic Rule for ‘I’

Many contemporary theories of how ‘I’ refers do away with the rule that includes the problematic term ‘oneself’. They shift attention away from the person using ‘I’ to refer by concentrating on what one understands when one
hears someone using the word ‘I’. On this approach, our understanding of the
word ‘I’ is roughly governed by the rule that any particular token of ‘I’ refers to
the speaker of that particular token. This rule, however, cannot by itself identify
one referent rather than another. The actual act of uttering this word is
insufficient to identify the referent if only because a speaker’s reciting and
therefore physically uttering the word ‘I’ from a written text would not make the
speaker the referent of that token of ‘I’. Another device is needed to close the gap
between meaning and reference.

One possible explanatory device is speaker intention. The speaker is the
referent of ‘I’ in any given situation of utterance where the speaker had herself in
mind when uttering the word and thereby intended to communicate something
about herself. We can replace ‘I’ by the name of the speaker in third-person
reports by taking speaker intention into account.

While this solution is initially plausible, it cannot be explanatory unless we
can clearly identify what it means for a person to have herself in mind. When
Howard K. Wettstein criticizes the explanatory force of intention in his article
“How to Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference” (1984), he does not
clarify the notion of ‘having-in-mind,’ but he does allow that it is not a matter of
thinking actively about or concentrating on the referent when uttering the
referring term. He summarises an account that might be put forward by an
intentional theorist and then indicates the weakness of any such account by
showing that even if we take the notion ‘having-in-mind’ for granted, a speaker
using the word ‘I’ refers to himself even when he has someone other than himself in mind. Wettstein conceives of Ahern, a historian who thinks he is de Gaulle. Giving a lecture on de Gaulle’s accomplishments, he says to the audience, ‘and then I marched triumphantly into Paris.’ As he makes this remark, Ahern has de Gaulle rather than himself in mind. Strictly speaking, Ahern’s remark is false because while de Gaulle marched into Paris, Ahern did not. According to Wettstein, this example indicates that the intentional theorist’s case has failed in two ways. Having something in mind is not a sufficient condition for reference because Ahern fails to refer to de Gaulle even though he had de Gaulle in mind and thereby intended to refer to him. Further, having oneself in mind is not necessary for reference because Ahern referred to himself even though he did not have himself in mind.

Wettstein allows that there is a sense in which Ahern refers to de Gaulle in that if Ahern succeeds in communicating about de Gaulle, then he must have in some sense referred to him. However, Wettstein insists that in another sense, “a preferred sense,” Ahern referred only to himself when he uttered the word ‘I’ (note 17). He briefly considers more complicated accounts of having someone in mind. He suggests two possibilities:

First, the intentional theorist could argue that Ahern, because he believes that he is de Gaulle, does have himself in mind when he uses ‘I’. Ahern’s use of ‘I’ thus rests on his intention because he intended ‘I’ to refer to himself and the reference did not fail. Wettstein argues that this account will not improve matters
because it conflicts with linguistic convention. He compares the Ahern example to a third-person case. A speaker may confuse two people by mistakenly calling the man Smith by the name ‘Jones’. The speaker has failed to refer, Wettstein contends, because Smith is not Jones. Similarly, when Ahern confuses himself with de Gaulle, his use of ‘I’ ought to fail because, in this situation, de Gaulle is not the referent of ‘I’ whereas Ahern is. However, a reference failure does not occur, thereby indicating that intention cannot fix reference.

Secondly, the intentional theorist could argue that Ahern had two individuals in mind, himself and de Gaulle. Because Ahern is conveying information about de Gaulle rather than about himself, de Gaulle is primarily in mind and so is the referent of ‘I’. Wettstein agrees that Ahern might have had both himself and de Gaulle in mind, and had them in mind unequally. Ahern’s intention to convey information about himself is a subsidiary intention. Wettstein allows this subsidiary intention because “when a speaker refers by using ‘I’, since he knows that ‘I’ always refers to the utterer, he will surely have himself in mind at least in the subsidiary sense” (69). However, while this subsidiary intention may accompany reference, it is insufficient for fixing it. Moreover, de Gaulle may be primarily in mind but, given that Ahern fails to refer to de Gaulle, primary intention is also insufficient for fixing reference.

Of special interest is Wettstein’s claim that Ahern has in some sense succeeded in referring to de Gaulle if he has been able to communicate something about de Gaulle. This allowance leads us to question his argument concerning
third-person accounts of reference. A speaker could call the woman Smith by the name ‘Jones’, yet her audience might nevertheless understand that the speaker is speaking of Smith. This audience understanding might suggest that the speaker has succeeded in referring to Smith in spite of her use of an alternate name. Although not in the sense Wettstein prefers, he acknowledges that such reference is possible. However, he may be mistaken in allowing that reference does take place, or at least, in allowing that reference takes place through use of a referring expression. Audience understanding of faulty referents can be explained by recognizing that sometimes the predicate of the sentence takes precedence over its subject; that is, the predicate is used to identify the subject. The predicate is used in this way only when a reference failure occurs and some strategy is necessary for understanding what is said. If I see Smith raking leaves and mistakenly say ‘Jones is working hard,’ you may understand that I actually want to make this remark about Smith. This understanding does not rest on your recognizing my intention or your assumption that in some contexts a proper name can refer to other than its direct referent. Your understanding is possible because you recognize that I am speaking of the woman who ‘is working hard,’ and this woman happens to be Smith rather than Jones. However, hearers do not always follow this order of precedence. If Smith is raking leaves and Jones is watching, I might say, ‘Jones is working hard.’ Two readings of this sentence are possible. You might privilege the predicate and conclude that I have misidentified the
woman raking leaves. Alternatively, you might privilege the subject and conclude that I am speaking ironically.

My taking a position different from Wettstein’s on this matter is not meant to suggest that I am supporting the intentional theorist. How an audience reads the sentence ‘Jones is working hard’, literally or ironically, will not depend on the intention of the speaker. Rather, it will depend on the perspective of the audience, their decision to emphasise the subject or the predicate. The speaker intends to refer by using a referring expression. That is, the speaker intends a certain word or expression to refer, but this reference did not take place.

Wettstein argues that the crucial component for fixing reference is context: “The linguistic rule that governs ‘I’ specifies its reference in terms of a simple, noncausal, nonintentional property of the context” (69). ‘I’ is directly referential in that reference is not determined by any kind of conceptual content. We need not consciously think of the rule on any occasion on which we use ‘I’ because “it is a rule of our language, internalised by every competent speaker, that ‘I’ refers to the agent of the context” (67). The distinction between the speaker as utterer of the word ‘I’ and the speaker as the agent of the context comes from David Kaplan. In his article “Thoughts on Demonstratives,” Kaplan (1990) argues that there are two kinds of sense: content and character. The content of a sentence is what is said (a proposition). If the sentence contains a demonstrative, then the content will depend on the context. My statement, ‘I am hungry’, will have a different content than your statement, ‘I am hungry’. The content is a function
from a possible world to an extension. In other words, content is the referential part of sense that holds for tokens of the type expression. Character, on the other hand, determines how the content of an expression is determined by the context. That is, character is the semantic part of sense that holds for the type expression. The character of ‘I’ is the rule “which assigns to each context that content which is represented by the constant function from possible worlds to the agent of the context” (37). The character of ‘I’, then, is represented by a rule from contexts to individual concepts, not from contexts to individuals. According to Kaplan, ‘I’ refers directly but it need do so only in the introducing context. In other contexts, the proposition in which it occurs can carry a representation of the original referent. This scheme allows that ‘I’ refers not to the utterer of the token of ‘I’ but to the agent of the context. Wettstein adopts this scheme and thereby argues that I am the referent of an appropriate utterance of ‘I’ not because I am the utterer of that token of ‘I’, but because, as the agent of the context, I uttered that token of ‘I’. Thus, a publicly available fact about the context—who is the agent of the context—bridges the gap between meaning and reference in the case of the indexical ‘I’. The rule determines the linguistic meaning of ‘I’ while a fact about the context, specifically, who is its agent, determines the particular referent. ‘I’ always refers to the agent of the context, whoever that agent might be. This regularity does not mean that ‘the agent of the context’ is a synonym for ‘I’. Rather, it is a description in the meta-language used to systematically fix references of utterances of ‘I’.
The claim that ‘I’ refers to the speaker as the agent of the context depends on how this referent is identified. An attractive feature of the intentional theorist’s account is that it allows us to differentiate easily between producers, that is, between a machine producing the word ‘I’ and a person doing so. The reference is self-conscious because a token of ‘I’ refers to the speaker who intentionally uses that token of the word. Yet Wettstein’s contextual account also has this feature because Wettstein classifies the referent of ‘I’ as the agent of the context rather than as the speaker of the token. Thus, if Smith is reading aloud from an autobiography written by Jones, and Smith reads the line, ‘I was soon satisfied,’ the ‘I’ refers to Jones rather than to Smith because although Smith is the speaker, Jones is the agent of the context. Moreover, the self-reflexive feature of ‘I’ is preserved in that if ‘I’ refers to the speaker (characterised as the agent of the context) and the speaker uses this word, then the speaker has referred to herself.

**Difficulties with the Contextual Account**

The importance of context would seem to be correct, as far as it goes. For instance, if a speaker says, ‘I am hungry,’ a hearer repeating to a third party that ‘the speaker is hungry’ will have captured both the meaning and the reference of the original statement. However, there is some question about whether this is all the hearer will have understood.

Although Wettstein’s argument is plausible, his Ahern example does not fully address the attractiveness of the intentional explanation of ‘I’. The intentional account is able to capture the nuances we discover in various uses of the word ‘I’.
Because of the close connections between ‘I’, personal experience, and reports of the self, the view that ‘I’ is simply a reference to the speaker (as agent of the context) appears incomplete, sketchy or stunted. Wettstein’s account opens up a question that needs to be examined: when we read fictional texts, we are able to distinguish between the ‘I’ of the narrator or persona and the ‘I’ of the intrusive author. Wettstein’s contextual account might have difficulty separating these various strands because of the perennial problem of deciding where a context begins and ends. In other words, the agent of a context is not always obvious because the limits of a context are not always apparent.

Wettstein’s account cannot explain why the reference of ‘I’ is sometimes immune to error through misidentification. The linguistic rule does not change between the uses of ‘I’ as subject and ‘I’ as object. His Ahern example relies on this guaranteed reference, but it cannot be part of the linguistic rule. It is also a linguistic rule that proper names refer to individuals yet, as Wettstein notes, the referents of proper names are not guaranteed and mistakes can be made. That is, a mistake has been made when Smith is referred to by the name ‘Jones’. However, in spite of Ahern’s confusing himself with de Gaulle, the only individual to whom his ‘I’ can refer is Ahern, because Ahern, as the agent of the context, is the speaker of that particular token of ‘I’. Moreover, nothing in the context can provide this guarantee because Wettstein dismisses the explanatory force of the intentional and causal properties of the context.
Finally, Wettstein's account has difficulty distinguishing between first and third-person perspectives. It cannot, for instance, deal with John Perry's argument about the essential indexical. Unlike the cases of mistaking another for oneself, many of John Perry's examples centre on the possibility of mistaking the narrative facts about oneself as being facts about someone other than oneself. One such example concerns an amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, who is lost in Stanford Library. Lingens would like to find his way out of the library, but he does not know who he is or where he is. While aimlessly wandering, he reads two books: a biography of himself and a detailed account of the library. This wealth of information, however, will not help him because although he now knows many facts about himself and where he is, he does not know them in the right way. No matter how uniquely this information identifies him or the library, he only knows it from a third-person perspective. He can know many facts about Rudolf Lingens and Stanford Library, but he will still not know who he is or where he is. In other words, any information he learns about Lingens will be considered facts about Lingens rather than about himself because he has mistaken Lingens for someone other than himself. According to Perry, human action and belief depend not only on what is thought, but also on the way it is thought. We need to think of ourselves and objects indexically. In order for human action to occur, place and time must become 'here' and 'now', and objects must be thought of in relation to a 'me'.
Perry thus distinguishes between what we think and the way in which we think it. We can have the same object of belief but we apprehend this object in different ways. Perry, however, does not see this distinction as affecting the information conveyed by the sentence containing the word ‘I’. Perry quarrels with Wettstein in that he sees ‘I’ as a demonstrative, but he agrees with Wettstein about what we understand when we use or hear the word “I”. However, instead of lexical meaning and context, he conceives of a different division. Perry argues that words such as ‘I’ can be divided into information (what we think) and role (the way we think). A case of believing involves believing a thought (as information) by apprehending a sense (as role) in a certain context. The sense of an indexical is its role, a constant function from context of utterance to a value (the object to which the referring term takes us in a given context). More specifically, the role of ‘I’ is the common meaning that this word has for all and, by apprehending this role, we are able to pick out the referent of a particular token of ‘I’. We can easily see this separation in the case of sentences using indexicals. If Smith says ‘I like oranges’ and Jones says ‘I like oranges’, they are in the same belief state and ‘I’ plays the same role, but they are apprehending different thoughts (as information), that is, Smith’s liking of oranges and Jones’ liking of oranges. On the other hand, if Smith says ‘I like oranges’ and Jones says ‘Smith likes oranges’, then they are apprehending the same information (Smith’s liking of oranges), but they are doing so in different ways. This account is quite distinct from Wettstein’s, but they agree on the same meaning for the word ‘I’.
because Perry denies that the way we understand a thought is a part of the
information contained by the thought. Consequently, he finds no difficulty in
asserting that any particular token of ‘I’ simply refers to the speaker of that
particular token.

Colin McGinn’s account comes to much the same conclusion. McGinn, in
The Subjective View (1983), is interested in indexical thoughts rather than
indexical expressions, but he does contend that “indexical words... serve... to
express a subjective perspective on the world,” this subjective perspective being
the indexical mode of presentation (22). He argues that in thinking of items under
‘I’, each of us applies a single constant concept—the concept of oneself: “The
naïve view suggested by indexical word meaning is thus that in thinking of items
under ‘I’, ‘now’, ‘here’ one applies a single constant concept—the concept of
oneself, of the present, and of the spatial vicinity—and not occasion-relative
concepts” (65). He conceives of the logic of indexicals as expressing the truth of
subjective modes of presentation. This logic tells us how any subject must
represent the world from a certain structured perspective, the truths of which turn
solely upon the essential properties of indexical modes of presentation. He
defines the self as “that which has a certain subjective perspective on the world”
so that each perspective constitutes a single self (16-7).

According to McGinn, when a speaker uses ‘I’, she uses the concept of
herself, but this concept does not determine the reference of ‘I’ on any particular
occasion. Although each person is presented to herself, each of us thinks of
ourselves in the same way when we use ‘I’. Smith cannot be presented to Jones in
the same way that she is presented to herself; however, Smith is presented to
herself in the same way that Jones is presented to herself. His account of how ‘I
refers makes use of a combination of linguistic meaning and context. When
different thinkers use indexical concepts, they associate different information
with their indexically identified objects of thought. However, while this
information may vary, the indexical concept used is itself unvarying between my
use and your use. Although this mode of presentation is not the linguistic meaning
of ‘I’, it is congruent with it. Roughly, in thinking of items under ‘I’, one applies
the concept of oneself rather than applying particular information about one’s
individual self.

At this point, McGinn appears to encounter Anscombe’s objection that in
order for a speaker to identify the same referent in different ‘I’ thoughts, she
would need to have a concept that uniquely fit her. Otherwise, she could not be
assured of getting the right referent, and the use of ‘I’ would no longer be
guaranteed. McGinn, however, evades this problem because, while the indexical
mode of presentation is part of any ‘I’-thought, it does not lead to reference: “the
context of thought or utterance is what ties the indexical mode of presentation
down to particular things, not the concepts in the mind of the thinker” (67). The
conceptual content of an indexical does not depend on its referent, but a complete
indexical thought, as a truth-evaluative proposition, is so dependent.
McGinn accepts the distinction between the as-subject and as-object uses of ‘I’ and argues that ‘I’ as-subject is immune to misidentification because such identification does not go beyond what is subjectively given. In his words, “‘I’ is used as subject only in judgments asserted on the basis of incorrigible self-ascription of subjective states” (52). He accounts for as-object uses on another basis. McGinn presses on Wittgenstein’s view that ‘I’ and ‘my’ have a similar use in the language. McGinn sees ‘I’ used as object as involving identifying oneself as the owner of a body that is itself identified by perceptual means. Consequently, ‘I’ used as object is always replaceable by the words ‘my body’. Having two uses for the word ‘I’ does not disturb this picture because ‘I’ used as an object is a derivative use of ‘I’, parasitic on the primary use of ‘I’. He argues that ‘I’ used as object is always replaceable by ‘my body’, a replacement which thereby indicates that the object of reference is distinct from the self, and thus mistakes can be made. McGinn thus avoids some of the difficulties encountered by Shoemaker’s account of the distinction between the two uses of ‘I’, but his account is vulnerable to other challenges.

McGinn argues that ‘I’ used as subject and ‘I’ used as object are different because uses of ‘I’ as object can be replaced by the phrase ‘my body’ whereas uses of ‘I’ as subject cannot. Smith, after playing an exhausting game of hockey, tells Jones, ‘I scored the winning goal but I am in pain.’ Jones, upon hearing this utterance, understands the two uses of ‘I’ in different ways in that she can say ‘Smith’s body scored the winning goal but Smith is in pain.’ McGinn would have
to explain the awkwardness of this translation as being the result of convention rather than error. That uses of 'I' as object are always replaceable by the phrase 'my body' indicates that the object of reference thus mistaken is distinct from the self. Moreover, to say 'my' in 'my body' is to use 'I' as subject. However, McGinn's willingness to substitute the phrase 'my body' for 'I' in sentences using 'I' as object suggests that he is differentiating the two uses by the type of predicate involved. According to McGinn, 'I' used as subject is based on the incorrigible self-ascription of subjective states. 'I' used as object, because it is parasitic on the primary use of 'I', is also ultimately based on the incorrigible self-ascription of subjective states. What, then, is the difference between the two uses? McGinn may be concentrating too exclusively on Shoemaker's examples concerning a body part, the owner of which is open to question. However, less physical examples are possible. Smith reads a biography of himself written by a biographer who has access to letters Smith does not even remember writing. Smith, after reading the quoted letters, might say, 'I had some strange ideas then'. The possibility of error through misidentification has been provided for in that the biographer may have misidentified the author of the letters, and consequently, Smith, by assuming that the author of the letters can be referred to by her using 'I', has committed an error through misidentification. Because this token of 'I' does not possess the feature of being immune from error through misidentification, it is being used as object. Nevertheless, Smith, when he says, 'I had some strange ideas then', does not mean 'my body had some strange ideas
then'. By introducing the metaphor of ownership of the body, McGinn mistakenly suggests that third-person self-consciousness can be reduced to first-person self-consciousness. Such a reduction is misleading because one's way of being conscious of oneself is different in the two cases.

**First-person Self-conscious Self-reference**

Although all three philosophers favour direct reference accounts, I shall argue that Perry and McGinn can apparently counter the difficulties Anscombe raises whereas Wettstein cannot. Anscombe claims that we associate uses of 'I' with first-person self-conscious self-reference. There is a difference between, for instance,

(1) Smith, realising she is Agatha’s niece, saying, ‘Agatha’s niece is very rich’ and

(2) Smith, not realising that she is Agatha’s niece, saying, ‘Agatha’s niece is very rich.’

In both cases, Smith has made a self-reference but in (1), this reference is self-conscious whereas in (2), it is not. We cannot capture the difference by saying that self-conscious self-reference is made knowingly and intentionally because in both cases, Smith knowingly and intentionally refers to Agatha’s niece. Instead, we would say that Smith must knowingly refer in the right way, but this way can only be explained in terms of the first person. When ‘I’ is used as object, self-conscious self-reference is unproblematic. If I say, ‘I scored the winning goal,’ my reference differentiates me from all those in the context who might have
scored that goal. I am self-conscious in that I am identifying myself as the one, among possible others, who scored the winning goal. On the other hand, if I say ‘I am in pain,’ I am not differentiating myself from all others in the context who might have pain by identifying myself as being the one in pain. In this case, I appear to lack the self-consciousness necessary for reference. It seems that if ‘I’ refers in this latter case, it does so because the speaker is aware of herself in a first-person way. If ‘I’ does refer, then Anscombe’s difficulty in finding a non-circular explanation of self-conscious self-reference remains. We would then have to regard first-person self-consciousness as puzzling and perhaps as inexplicable in other terms.

If ‘I’ used as subject does not refer, then some other account of its use in the language must be forthcoming. According to Wittgenstein, this use of ‘I’ is expressive rather than referential. Anscombe argues that the status of ‘I’ is grammatical, that ‘I’ used in a statement is no more referential than the ‘it’ in the sentence ‘it is raining’. There is a third possibility. One of the puzzles about ‘I’ concerns the way in which it appears in sentences containing a distinction between the subject and the self. This distinction appears in its most sustained form in autobiography. The project of autobiography would seem to be the self-conscious questioning or describing by an author of himself or herself. Yet within particular autobiographies, the ‘I’ has a curious status in that it appears to denote both the subject or self who writes and the object or self who is written about. This feature could be characterised as self-reference except that a difficulty
arises. Depending on the accuracy of the account and the kinds of descriptions used, this subject and object can come apart in various ways. For example, the ‘death of the author’ thesis argues that the text, rather than having an author, has instead only an author function. Rather than having an actual author who can be referred to from within the text, the text itself gives rise to a number of subjects and selves, none of which are identical to the (putative) unique author. Because of this difficulty, some critics of the genre (for example, Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes) contend that, unique self-presence being impossible, ‘I’ does not refer. Autobiographical discourse creates rather than reflects or describes a self. Because the notion of the author is itself a fictional construct, the ‘I’ of autobiography is fictive.

The various possibilities of how ‘I’ used as subject might be other than referential are not equally compelling. Nevertheless, all possess the virtue of not needing an account of first-person self-conscious self-reference. However, their acceptance comes at the cost of disturbing our intuition that ‘I’ does refer. They would be less plausible if an adequate account of first-person self-conscious self-reference could be found.

Lucy F. O’Brien (1995), in her essay “The Problem of Self-Identification,” does not distinguish between as-subject and as-object uses of the word ‘I’. Nonetheless, she nicely sums up the major ways in which we might be thought to refer to ourselves. First, there is de facto reflexive reference; A refers to B when A=B. Next, in systematically reflexive reference, A refers to A. Finally, there is
full self-conscious self-reference in which A refers self-consciously to A (243). If we consider Wettstein’s account of how ‘I’ refers in light of these categories, we can see that his account does not capture first-person self-conscious self-reference. On his account, when I use ‘I’, I am referring to the agent of the context. My use is a self-reference because I happen to be the agent of the context (A refers to B if A=B). That is, the speaker is referring to herself only because she is the agent of the context, not because she is aware that she is the agent of the context. His account thus recognises no difference between cases like (2) Smith, not realising she is Agatha’s niece, saying, ‘Agatha’s niece is very rich’ and cases like (1) Smith, realising she is Agatha’s niece, saying, ‘Agatha’s niece is very rich.’ Wettstein’s account goes no further because he is uninterested in what the agent is aware of when using a token of ‘I’. His account is not incompatible with self-conscious self-reference if we assume that an agent is aware when she is the agent of the context. Nevertheless, problems remain. His account appears to lack the immediacy of our use of ‘I’. I do not derivatively understand that I am the referent of my token of ‘I’, that I am ‘I’ because ‘I’ refers to the agent of the context and I am the agent in this context. Also, he would seem to need some device, other than context, for explaining our assumption that the speaker knows when she is the agent of the context.

Perry and McGinn initially appear to have found non-circular accounts of how ‘I’ refers. Although Perry concentrates on difference in behaviour as signalling differences in belief, his solution allows us to get closer to how we
actually use ‘I’ in that it favours systematically reflexive reference. First-person utterances involve having attitudes conforming to the self-reference rule. Colin McGinn provides a similar solution. Our use of ‘I’ cannot be automatic or completely unreflective. The conceptual ingredient that accompanies any particular use of ‘I’ just is our knowledge congruent with the linguistic rule governing the use of ‘I’.

Perry and McGinn’s schemes offer slightly different solutions to the phenomenon of first-person self-conscious self-reference. Perry begins with the rule that ‘I’ refers to the speaker and accommodates first-person self-consciousness by introducing the way we think in addition to what we think. In *The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays* (1993), Perry summarises his account as follows:

> We need nothing in our theory of meaning except the meaning of ‘I’ on specific occasions of use. The former would be the same for everyone, and correspond to the same psychological role for everyone. It would therefore not be what determines reference, since it would no more refer to one person than another. But it would not *need* to determine reference, since ‘I’ designates without sense—but not without meaning. (114, his emphasis)

According to Perry, when I think ‘I have to work today’, the thought is about me because of the meaning of ‘I’ and the context of the thought, that is, that I am doing the thinking. He argues that acceptance of a sentence is a relation a person has to a sentence at a time. It is a three-place relation between the sentence, the person who accepts, and the time she does the accepting. Believing to be true is
more complex because sentences are true or false as uttered by some person at some time. Believing-true is thus a five-place relation because a person and a time come in twice. Consequently, belief is a system of relations between a subject and a sentence, and I stand in the relation, believing to have to work today, to myself. This belief state is classified by the sentence containing the indexical:

We can accept that there is no thought only Hume can apprehend. Yet only he can know he is Hume. It must not be just the thought that he thinks, but the way that he thinks it, that sets him apart from the rest of us. Only Hume can think a true thought, by saying to himself, I am Hume. Self-locating knowledge, then, requires not just the grasping of certain thoughts, but the grasping of them via the senses of certain sentences containing demonstratives. (Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives”, 66).

McGinn, on the other hand, begins with the rule that ‘I’ refers to oneself. Self-consciousness is introduced at the beginning in that “we can say that to think of something indexically is to think of it in relation to me, as I am presented to myself in self-consciousness” (17). An awareness of the self is thus built into the very content of an indexical thought. Although McGinn’s way of putting the matter is misleading, his point is, I think, apt. If I think of an object in relation to me, I have an awareness of myself as one aspect of that relation.

Yet these accounts are not satisfactory. Perry is not entirely persuasive when he contends that the way we think something forms no part of the information it conveys. We can know the same object in many different ways, depending on our
point of view. Seeing Venus as the Morning Star rather than as the Evening Star depends on our perspective, that is, on when we are seeing it. Even so, when I learn that the Morning Star is the Evening Star, I am learning more than a different way of viewing Venus. Similarly, if Lingens learns that the person he has been mistaking for another is actually himself, then it seems that he has learned something substantive. At the very least he can now think, as he could not before, that ‘the events that happened to Lingens happened to me’ and ‘Lingens’ possessions are my possessions.’

Lingens comes to know of a relation that holds between himself and the Lingens of the autobiography, namely that he is Lingens. Whatever has happened or will happen to Lingens has happened and will happen to him. This information adds a point of involvement that was previously missing. He was unaware of this relation when suffering from amnesia. This relation holds whether or not Lingens knows it, but this circumstance does not make his knowledge of it irrelevant.

McGinn’s account has the virtue of recognising both uses of ‘I’ and explaining why some uses are guaranteed; it does not suggest that one needs to know the linguistic meaning of ‘I’ in order to think of oneself; and it clearly distinguishes between first and third person but allows for the essential indexical by holding that first-person accounts cannot be reduced to third-person accounts.

Nevertheless, how McGinn’s account can handle the difficulty of self-conscious self-reference is not entirely clear. When used as subject, ‘I’ directly refers whereas when it is used as object, ‘I’ does not. As-object uses of ‘I’ are not
direct because such uses involve perceptually identifying a body and then identifying oneself as the owner of that body. For McGinn, indexical modes of presentation enter most directly into as-subject uses of ‘I’, yet he acknowledges that his claim, the claim that “all indexical modes of presentation go back to, are anchored in, conscious presentation of the subject of the indexical thought in question,” is stronger than he needs (17, n. 17). However, if McGinn is willing to give up his notion of conscious presentation, then he has difficulty accounting for self-conscious self-reference.

**The Difficulties associated with Self-conscious self-reference**

There is some question about whether or not Perry’s explanation can actually account for first-person self-conscious self-reference. As an amnesiac, Lingens may come to know that Lingens is in the library. He could inform someone that (a) ‘Lingens is in the library,’ but his reference to Lingens will not constitute self-conscious self-reference because he does not know that he is Lingens. Later, Lingens may come to realise that he is Lingens. He can then say, (b) ‘Lingens is in the library, and I am Lingens’. The difference between Lingens saying (a) and his saying the first part of (b), that is, ‘Lingens is in the library…’, is not a difference in what is thought but in the way in which Lingens thinks this thought. Both parts of his statement (b) ‘Lingens is in the library, and I am Lingens’ appear to contain a self-conscious self-reference because of Lingens knowing, in the right way, of the relation which holds between himself and Lingens, namely, that he is Lingens.
On my reading of Perry’s account, how we should analyse the first part of this sentence and how Lingens understands it is as follows:

a. Lingens says, ‘Lingens is in the library…’.

b. The proper name ‘Lingens’ directly refers.

c. Lingens’ belief, that he is Lingens, is a relation that he bears to Lingens.

d. Because of this relation, his self-reference is self-conscious.

Perry’s account would break down the second part of the sentence and how Lingens understands it in the following way:

e. Lingens says ‘…and I am Lingens’.

f. His token of ‘I’ directly refers to the user of this token of ‘I’.

g. The belief of the user of this token of ‘I’, that he is the user of this token, is a relation that the user of ‘I’ bears to the user of ‘I’. This relation is the role of ‘I’, the way he is thinking.

h. His way of thinking constitutes self-conscious self-reference because he believes that he, himself, is the user of the token of ‘I’.

What should be noted is that, in both cases, there are two relations rather than one. In the first case, we have (1) the relation between the referent of ‘Lingens’ and Lingens, the relation that makes his reference a self-reference [see b] and (2) Lingens’ belief that he is Lingens, the relation that makes the reference self-conscious [see c]. In the second case, we have (1) the relation between Lingens and the user of this token of ‘I’ [see f], a relation that holds whether or not
Lingens is aware of it so holding and (2) Lingens’ belief that he (Lingens) is the speaker of this token of ‘I’ [see h].

This distinction becomes clear if we imagine that Jones, another amnesiac, comes to believe that he is Lingens. In a grandiloquent manner, he could suddenly announce, ‘Lingens is in the library.’ Believing that he is Lingens, Jones would then hold the second relation, but this relation would be insufficient for self-conscious self-reference [see c]. We might think that Jones has attained self-consciousness if not self-reference [see d], but this assumption would not be correct. In order for there to be an indication of self-consciousness, we also need self-reference. Similarly, it would seem that in order for a user of ‘I’ to make a self-conscious self-reference, she must be aware that she is the user of this particular token of ‘I’. However, this awareness would apparently have to rest on a prior identification of herself.

Moreover, this identification cannot be derivative. Knowing in the right way is important because we see first-person self-consciousness as immediate. For instance, Lingens, still suffering from amnesia, might meet someone whom he instinctively trusted. His new acquaintance might tell Lingens that he (Lingens) is Lingens, and Lingens, because he trusted this person, would come to believe that he is Lingens. When he repeats, ‘I am Lingens’, he would have both of Perry’s relations. His statement is both self-referential and self-conscious. Yet we can see a difference between, for example, Hume sitting in his study idly thinking, ‘I am Hume’ and Lingens, on the word of a trusted stranger, coming to
believe ‘I am Lingens’. Although both are thinking a true thought, the kind of evidence on which their beliefs rest is very different. Hume bases his judgement on information gained in the normal way, that is, on past memories of having others address him as ‘Hume’ and of telling others that he is called ‘Hume’. It would make no sense for Hume to ask ‘someone has been addressed as ‘Hume’ by others numerous times and has told others that his name is ‘Hume’ numerous times, but is it I who have been so addressed and who has told others that his name is ‘Hume’?’ In other words, his memory-based judgement is not identification-dependent. The case with Lingens is otherwise. He lacks any memory of being called or calling himself ‘Lingens’, even though, after reading the biography, he accepts that someone is Lingens. In his case, it would make sense for him to ask, ‘someone has been addressed as ‘Lingens’ by others numerous times and has told others that his name is ‘Lingens’ numerous times, but is it I who have been so addressed and who has told others that his name is ‘Lingens’?’ Perry, however, does not distinguish between ‘I’ used as subject and ‘I’ used as object, and so he does not recognise a distinction between the two cases. Consequently, his account cannot capture our intuition that Lingens’ belief here is not the right sort of belief. Lingens’ reference is self-conscious, but it does not reflect first-person self-consciousness.

In his essay “Understanding Demonstratives” (1990) Gareth Evans suggests that Perry’s scheme cannot account for first-person self-conscious self-reference. He worries about Perry’s claim that thoughts concerning self-locating knowledge
must be grasped “via the senses of certain sentences containing demonstratives”. According to Evans, this claim might mean that Perry sees ‘I’ as ‘the person who utters x and x is a token of ‘I’’. Evans’ point here is that on Perry’s account the common meaning of ‘I’ entertained by different people, an incomplete Fregean sense, is perhaps like a description containing a free variable. If so, then he wonders how this understanding could relate to a person’s capacity to think self-consciously. He argues that

no one can give an account of the constant meaning (role) of a demonstrative without mentioning some relational property (relating an object to an occasion of utterance) which an object must satisfy if it is to be the referent of the demonstrative in that context of utterance, but the idea of this property plays no part in an explanation of what makes a subject’s thought about himself, or the place he occupies, or the current time. (95, his emphasis).

In order to relate an object to an occasion of utterance, Perry might be analyzing sentences like “I am Hume” as mental utterances so that “self-conscious thought depends upon the interior exploitation of the conventional meaning of certain public linguistic devices, which is surely neither necessary nor sufficient for it” (Evans, 95). Consequently, Perry’s account needs something further.

In order to understand fully what is involved in a speaker self-consciously referring to herself when using ‘I’ as subject, we need an account of how the speaker is aware of herself in a first-person way. McGinn’s identification of the first-person perspective could be useful to such a project, but only if this
identification were cognitively available to the speaker. Even then, that we apply a concept of ourselves each time we use the word ‘I’ is, to say the least, unlikely.

**Evans’ Solution**

Gareth Evans, in *Varieties of Reference* (1983), recognises the need for explaining first-person self-conscious self-reference. He adheres to what he calls Russell’s Principle, the principle that in order to refer to an object one must know which object it is. A use of ‘I’ cannot be a self-reference, then, unless it is self-conscious. Evans treats ‘I’ as a word which demonstratively refers to a person, and “a fundamental identification of a person involves a consideration of him as the person occupying such-and-such a spatial-temporal location” (211). He argues that self-conscious thought rests on the various ways we have of gaining knowledge, or are disposed to gain knowledge, about ourselves as physical things. To think of the world as objectively existing, that is, as apart from the subject, is to have the idea of the subject as being in the world, and to think of oneself as ‘I’, one must have the capacity to identify oneself fundamentally, to be able to locate the object that is oneself. We form cognitive maps of our surroundings in that we know our “position, orientation, and relation to other objects in the world upon the basis of our perceptions of the world” (222). We are also able to perceive our bodies through “our proprioceptive sense, our sense of balance, of heat and cold, and of pressure” (220). This knowledge distinguishes me as an object in the world distinct from all others, and thus allows me to self-refer. First-person thought is thus not independent of information gleaned from the environment. We are aware
not just of the object but also of how that object is presented to us in that our awareness of this object depends on our awareness of its relation to other objects in the world.

Evans, because of his explanation of the basis for uses of 'I' and his distinction between the two uses of 'I', is able to account for first-person self-conscious self-reference as being identification-free. There is no gap between knowing that the predicate is instantiated and knowing that it is instantiated in me. Self-conscious self-reference is difficult to pin down because it seems that it is possible for one to be aware of oneself in both a first-person and a third-person way. Third-person self-consciousness occurs when, for instance, one catches sight of oneself in a mirror. First-person self-consciousness rests on the belief that each of us experiences ourselves in a way in which we do not experience others and in which no others experience us. Both can be distinguished from experiences in which self-consciousness appears to play no part, as when one suddenly realizes that one has arrived at one’s destination with no recollection of how one got there. While the realization is self-conscious, the experience on which one bases this realization is not. These two types of self-consciousness do not involve awareness of different objects, the body and the mind. The only object of awareness is a single, whole person with both physical and psychological attributes; thus the difference must rest on the way we are aware, the evidence for this self we choose to foreground.
Third-person self-consciousness is relatively unproblematic. One becomes aware of oneself in a third-person way when one experiences oneself as an object. Third-person self-consciousness is often identified with feelings of shame or embarrassment. Shame or embarrassment occurs when I become conscious not just of how I appear from a third-person perspective, but of how I might be judged from that perspective. Although the actual experience of shame or embarrassment would be reported using ‘I’ as subject, the experience which gave rise to such feelings, in any one of the three ways in which the two uses of ‘I’ are distinguished, would be reported using ‘I’ as object—in Evans’ terms, it would be appropriate to ask ‘someone spilled coffee at lunch, but is it I who spilled coffee at lunch?’

Self-consciousness must also be involved when one identifies one’s emotional states or judges one’s own personal tastes. An examination of my emotional state, perhaps an attempt to understand exactly which emotion I am feeling, typically involves self-consciousness from a first-person perspective. Identifying my emotional state is not the same as examining my appearance in a mirror. Having gained knowledge about my emotional state in the normal way, it would make no sense for me to say ‘Someone is feeling an as yet unidentified emotion, but is it I who am feeling an as yet unidentified emotion?’ Such awareness, then, does not appear to involve third-person self-consciousness. Certainly, this experience would be reported using ‘I’ as subject, and such a report would be immune to error through misidentification. If I am aware, in the
normal way, that the attribute, for example, of being angry is instantiated, then it would make no sense to ask 'someone is feeling angry, but is it I who am feeling angry?' Yet the concept of first-person self-consciousness is more controversial than that of third-person self-consciousness. Evans’ account can provide us with a solid base, but more remains to be said. On Evans’ account, statements such as ‘I feel angry’ cannot be fully separated from bodily self-ascriptions: no use of ‘I’ is possible unless we are able to locate the object that is oneself. His point is apt because if I am pondering what emotion I am feeling, I could at least partially assess my emotional state by evaluating physical clues. I could check to see whether, for instance, my heart rate was increased or my muscles were tightened. These physical signs would not be definitive, but they would form part of the evidence leading to a judgement about my emotional state.

Yet Evans goes further by modelling all self-knowledge (introspection) on how we know what we believe and perceptually experience. His model is meant to reinforce that self-knowledge is not a form of “inner” perception. He argues that when a subject makes a self-ascriptiion of belief, her eyes are directed outward, toward the world. She does not apply a procedure for determining beliefs to something, herself, that she has previously identified or will subsequently identify. Rather, “whenever you are in a position to assert that p, you are ipso facto in a position to assert ‘I believe that p’” (225-6). He notes, however, that there is a difference between ‘p’ and ‘I believe that p’.

Understanding this last judgement will also involve firstly, the subject’s
possessing the capacity to identify herself as an object of a certain kind occupying a certain space-time location, and secondly, her being willing to recognise that others also have this capacity. The self-ascription of perceptual experiences is slightly different. A perceptual experience is an informational state of the subject, a state representing the world in a certain way that can be classified as true or false. This informational state can have a motive force on the subject’s actions, though “concept-exercising and reasoning organisms” can resist this motive force (227). To check the veracity of her judgement, the subject looks at the world rather than her experience (her internal state). To gain knowledge of her internal informational state, she would re-use “precisely those skills of conceptualisation that [s]he uses to make judgements about the world” but would bracket out extraneous knowledge (227). That is, she would ignore her judgement of the state’s truth or lack thereof. She can express her knowledge of this internal state by prefacing her remark with ‘It seems to me as though…’. Nevertheless, she is not perceiving her internal state because “there is no informational state which stands to the internal state as that internal state stands to the state of the world” (228).

Evans claims that “the informational states which a subject acquires through perception are non-conceptual, or non-conceptualised” (227, his emphasis). He may simply mean that this state is prior to a belief state, that first we experience and then we judge whether what we experienced is real. I am not sure what else he can mean because his representation of the content of such an informational
state, like a photograph, is “Red (x) & Ball (x) & Yellow (y) & Square (y) & On Top Of (x,y)” (125). Concepts are certainly involved here. However, that the representation of the content of an informational state uses concepts does not imply that the state itself is conceptual or conceptualised. On the other hand, Evans wants to distinguish the content of an informational state from sense data, and he speaks of the informational state of tracking an object. He may simply mean that concepts are not built into perception. If he rejects even the concept involved in ‘object’, he will have difficulty, I think, when he comes to bracketing out extraneous detail. An infant may experience the world in this primitive way, but once she learns the concepts, it would seem impossible for her to go back. There is no reason to suppose that we regularly and consistently encounter objects in the world and then apply concepts to them. And if we do not, then the bracketing out is not a removal of abstraction but simply a further level of it.

**The Limits of Evans’ Solution**

Unfortunately, Evans’ theory leaves us with an impoverished notion of the inner life we apparently capture through introspection. While I agree with what Evans says about perception and belief, I quarrel with his claim that the ways we have of knowing what we believe and what we experience will give us “a good model of self-knowledge (or introspection) to follow in other cases” (225). In order to recognize what we are aware of when we are self-conscious, we need a more flexible model than the one he has provided. Evans acknowledges that he has not presented, nor has he tried to, the full picture of self-consciousness.
Nevertheless, without an expanded view, his model is misleading. His model indicates our awareness of what it is to be a self, but our notion of self-reflection goes beyond this. We want to know not just what it is to be a self (person) but what it is to be this self (person). Our model needs to find this common denominator (what it is to be this self) for all such cases of knowledge rather than for any particular or unique self.

I have no quarrel with his insight that an examination of our mental states does not require an inner gaze, but I would argue that something is missing from his picture because his subject is too passive. Other persons are needed for a fuller account of self-consciousness. We compare our perceptions of things to the reports others give of their perceptions of these same things. If such comparisons did not occur, then it would be difficult for occasions to arise on which one could distinguish between, for example, ‘I see a bird’ and ‘I seem to see a bird’. Without a history of such comparisons, it would be as likely for the perceiver to say ‘I saw a bird, but it flew away so quickly that I did not even see it go.’ Our willingness to doubt what we perceive comes from past experience of such occasions. As Evans notes, “understanding of the content of [a] judgement [of either belief or perception] must involve possession of the psychological concept expressed by ‘§ believes that p’, which the subject must conceive as capable of being instantiated otherwise than by himself” (226). Nevertheless, his model ignores the active nature of the perceiving subject. When he speaks of perception, his informational states rest on the difference between, for example, ‘I see a bird’
and ‘I think I see a bird.’ One can have the informational state reported by ‘I think I see a bird’ even if there is no bird. When he explores the self-ascription of perceptual experience, he speaks as though the variety of informational states is exhausted by one true informational state and myriad false ones. Yet Evans’ point would be as strong even if the subject were seen as playing a more active role. On his view, conscious experience requires only “that the subject exercise some concepts—have some thoughts—and that the content of those thoughts should systematically depend upon the information properties of the input” (159). This requirement does not limit the possible combinations of informational states experienced by various perceivers of the same object. Two subjects could experience different informational states from looking at the same object without either being classified as false. For example, if you and I look at the same painting, and you are an art expert, you will be aware of the significance of details that I will also see but do not mark. The difference in what we notice when each looks at the art object would exist even if you were an amnesiac and so unaware that you were an art expert. If we were asked to reproduce our informational states, our reproductions would no doubt be very different, even though we were perceiving, and correctly perceiving, the same object. Although our individual states have different content, this different content does not consist in my informational state being a false representation of the world and yours being a true representation. Rather, the difference between our states would depend on how we were looking at the object. The difference between us as persons is not
exhausted by the fact that we are different bodies in the world. The differences between what you see and what I see when we look at the same scene form part of what makes you different from me. Our self-reflection could capture these differences. In other words, self-consciousness can involve understanding not just what you are seeing and what I am seeing, but also why what you notice is different from what I notice.

Consequently, Evans' model is less illuminating when we look at cases other than belief or perception. In the case of a subject's attempting to identify the emotion she is feeling, her self-reflection need not follow the model of reproducing her informational state by considering the event in the world which caused that emotion. It could be argued that emotions do not always have objects and that, even when they do, the identification of these objects is not always forthcoming. Consider, for example, the times when it is difficult to differentiate between looking for the source of one's anger and finding a legitimate reason to express that anger. The persons or incidents so identified become excuses rather than reasons for one's anger. Much of the literature about emotions concerns the problem of deciding on a definition of an object of emotion. There must be a relation between a particular emotion and the object of that emotion, but how can there be any relation if the object of that emotion has no ontological status? If I fear the monster hiding in my closet, what is the relation between my fear and the non-existent monster? Moreover, I may have emotions seemingly related to objects that I know do not exist. I may, for instance, experience emotion while
reading about the trials and tribulations of fictional characters. I may pleasurably anticipate having a new car even though the having of that new car is not a current state of affairs and may never come to pass.

Pondering the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an emotion suggests that objects of emotion are causally linked to or constitutive of that emotion. However, characterizing this relation is not easy. Smith is angry because Jones is late for their appointment. We assume that Smith’s anger is caused by Jones’ tardiness. However, Smith is mistaken about the time set for their meeting, and so Jones is not late. The object of Smith’s anger (Jones’ tardiness) is thus non-existent even though Smith is angry. How can we characterize the relation between the emotion and its object given that the object is non-existent? If we shift the focus by arguing that Smith’s anger is caused not by Jones’ tardiness but by Smith’s belief in Jones’ tardiness, a different problem emerges. If Smith is aware of the true object of emotion (her belief in Jones’ tardiness), then she cannot be angry with Jones even if Jones is tardy because her anger is not caused by Jones’ tardiness.

Even if we see emotion as always arising from or being directed toward an object, such a reproduction may not supply the subject with what she wants to know. Self-reflection would lead her to ask further questions such as why this incident produced this feeling rather than another or why this incident produced this feeling in her whereas it produced a more easily recognizable feeling in someone else. Often, our self-reflection does not end when we discover what we
believe or how things seem to us. We also want to know why we believe what we do and why things appear to be a certain way to us. These further questions will not be answered by only looking outward, toward the world. We also need to recognize our process of comparison. As Evans rightly notes, self-consciousness needs an awareness of type, that is, of being a type of experiencer having a type of experience. However, first-person self-consciousness also rests in the differences, in how the individual deviates from the type. If a doctor asks me to describe my pain, first-person self-consciousness is required in order to clarify my mental self-ascription. I would explore the particularity of the pain through a process of comparison—to how I felt previously, to other pains I might have had, to the current state of my body and those parts which do not feel painful. I need a realization of pain as a type, but I also need to isolate my pain rather than seeing my experience as general pain.

Because Evans neglects the particularity associated with ‘I’, his model has difficulty handling cases like emotion. He insists that one’s internal state can never become an object. A subject’s “internal state cannot in any sense become an object to him. (He is in it)” (227, his emphasis). His statement is perhaps too strong in that it leaves no way of accounting for much of what we deem inner experience. Evans comes to this conclusion because he does not consider that what you notice can be different from what I notice when we both look at the same object without either of us incorrectly perceiving that object. He denies that we need or have an internal gaze because the internal state is our informational
state and there is no informational state that stands to the internal state as that internal state (informational state) stands to the world. While I agree that an internal gaze is unnecessary, the differences between what each of us notices can form the content of the informational state which stands to the internal state as that internal state stands to the state of the world. Our internal state (informational state) contains not just what we are perceiving (the state of the world) but also how we are perceiving, what we notice when we perceive that state of the world. In other words, our ‘inner life’ also depends on others in that it contains not just what is perceived but also how the subject is perceiving, and an awareness of how she is perceiving depends on the way in which her way differs from how others are perceiving the same object. Such differences discovered between ourselves and these others can become the object of our attention.

Moreover, just as McGinn was forced to introduce the metaphor of owning the body, Evans’ account, in order to give us an adequate account of self-consciousness, must also be supplemented by metaphor. Contrary to Evans’ conclusion, one’s internal state can become an object to the person who is in it, but because she is in it, she views that internal state as if it were a separate object. Evans is being too rigid when he contends that our internal state cannot become an object to us “in any sense.” Sometimes, we look, for instance, at our emotional state as if, in a metaphorical sense, it were a self apart from the subject (‘I’). In other words, we distance ourselves from an aspect of ourselves, thereby seeing ourselves as if we were an object distinct from the subject, as others would see us
if they were, metaphorically speaking, in our position. I am not arguing that each person has a metaphor unique to her. Because metaphors of the self are culturally constructed and mediated, they are neither idiosyncratic nor eccentric. 'I' does refer, but such reference includes the way in which the object is presented to us. More precisely, the word 'I' has sense as well as reference.

The difference between sentences using 'I' as subject and those using 'I' as object rests on the kind of self-consciousness involved, and identifying the type of self-consciousness involved rests, in turn, on "thinking in ways that are liable to be informed by certain kinds of evidence or information about oneself which one is capable of acquiring" (212). In other words, when we use 'I' as subject, we are aware of ourselves through first-person self-consciousness whereas when we use 'I' as object, we are aware of ourselves through third-person self-consciousness. In uses of 'I' as object, the subject distinguishes herself by identification. She identifies herself as the one among possible others in the context of whom (among possible others in the context) the predicate holds. In uses of 'I' as subject, such identification does not take place. In mental self-ascriptions, the subject reports on her knowledge of her beliefs, perceptions, emotions, and so on. This knowledge comes not just from her object of perception but also from comparing her current experience to earlier, similar experiences she might have had and from comparing her responses to the responses of others or possible others. Exploring why she responds to an object in the world as she does while
others do not allows her to understand more about herself as well as the object in question.

How we distinguish ‘I’ used as object from ‘I’ used as subject, then, rests on the different ways we have of gaining knowledge about ourselves. If, for instance, someone hears Smith say, ‘I scored the winning goal,’ she understands the statement in an observational way. That is, she can capture the meaning of the statement by saying, ‘the speaker scored the winning goal,’ her evidence being her observation of who scored the winning goal and who uttered the statement. On the other hand, if someone hears Smith say, ‘I have a pain,’ she cannot evaluate the statement in the same way because she lacks an observational way of gaining that knowledge. Smith could be lying, but she could not be honestly mistaken about being in pain. She does not question in the same way the truth of Smith’s second statement because she assumes that the statement rests on some way of gaining knowledge, even if this way is not available to her. What is available to her, however, is the way she uses when she ascribes pain to herself. She assumes that she and Smith are relying on the same way. That is, we fancifully posit a special awareness, ‘from the inside’ as it were. We assume self-consciousness because we imaginatively put ourselves in the speaker’s place. Not all self-ascriptions receive this treatment. A subject might say, for instance, ‘I am a brave person.’ Here, because she is basing her judgement on memories of how she has behaved in the past, she is using ‘I’ as subject for it makes no sense to say ‘Someone is brave, but is it I who am brave?’ if the judgement contained in the
first component is based on information obtained in the normal way and does not rest on an identification of one among many in a context. There is no gap between her believing that the predicate is instantiated and knowing that it is instantiated in herself. Her statement is immune to error through misidentification but, unlike the statement ‘I am feeling pain,’ it is not accepted in the same way. The difference lies in our ways of gaining knowledge about ourselves and others. If the subject does not know whether or not she is the one in pain, then no one does. On the other hand, we could quarrel with the subject about whether or not she is a brave person because there is more than one way of gaining this knowledge.

I believe that Evans’ account, suitably supplemented, can capture all our intuitions about the ways in which ‘I’ is used. While self-reference is at the heart of self-consciousness, there is more than one way of distinguishing oneself—that is, of how one comes to know that the predicate is instantiated—and thus, more than one type of self-consciousness. Immunity to error through misidentification in relation to first-person pronouns rests on the kind of self-consciousness involved. Uses of ‘I’ as object are not immune to error through misidentification because, in such cases, one is self-aware through identification, that is, through differentiating oneself from possible others in the context. On the other hand, uses of ‘I’ as subject are immune to error through misidentification because this use is based on one’s being self-aware without an identification of one among many possible others in a context. This first-person self-consciousness arises from ‘fundamental identification’, an awareness of one’s own body, one’s position in
the world, one’s place as an element in the objective order. This position cannot be mistaken because if it is, then we cannot be said to know anything.

Given that in order to refer to an object one must know which object it is, a use of ‘I’ does not refer unless some self-consciousness is involved in its use. Other things, such as mechanical toys or parrots, can utter tokens of ‘I,’ but on this account, the uttering of these tokens of ‘I’ do not refer. When, after its button is pushed, a doll says, ‘I am hungry’, we might assume that the doll has referred to itself. However, we do not understand the words in the same way as we would if, for instance, a child said them. We would not respond, rushing to find food for the doll. We withhold this response not because dolls do not eat or because the doll does not understand what it is saying, but because we do not allow that it has referred simply by uttering a token of ‘I’. A child, playing with the toy, might imagine that the doll has referred but the child’s willingness to understand the token as a reference does not make the doll (an inanimate object) the agent of the context, even one who does not know just when it is speaking. Here, the child is involved in a game of pretend and the ‘I’ uttered by the doll is fictive, and most children understand it as such. On the other hand, if a parrot says, ‘I want a cracker’, we would not be amiss in finding it food. We might be inclined to argue that the parrot is referring because it is both the utterer of a token of ‘I’ and it might know just when it is speaking. We assume that the parrot in some sense understands what it is saying (and is perhaps using the word ‘I’), but even so, its utterance of ‘I’ does not refer. Even though the parrot may realise that the group
of sounds 'I-want-a-cracker' is often followed by the appearance of crackers, this realisation is a far cry from our notion of what it is for 'I' to be a referring term (or what it is to use 'I' in order to refer).

As the example of the doll indicates, not all uses of 'I' are literal. In sentences like 'I never reveal myself to strangers', 'I didn't like my old self', 'I am not myself today', 'I am creating a whole new me', the subject-self distinction can only be made in a metaphorical sense. These expressions are metaphorical whereas expressions like 'I groom myself' or 'I talk to myself' are not. If we paraphrased these expressions, substituting another expression for 'myself', we would get very mixed results. For example, we could paraphrase 'I groom myself' as 'I groom my body', but a paraphrase of 'I never reveal myself to strangers' would be 'I never reveal my thoughts and feelings to strangers'. Further, we could substitute the name of another person in place of 'myself' in these sentences but, in the metaphorical cases, the substitution would be odd and misleading whereas in the literal cases, it would not. The pair of 'I talk to myself' and 'I talk to Jane' is not misleading, but the pair 'I am not myself today' and 'I am not Jane today' (or even the pair 'I am not myself today' and 'Jane is not Jane today') is. Such metaphors indicate that while 'I' refers to the speaker as an element of the objective order, talk of the self involves the various ways we have of picturing our inner life, our awareness of ourselves. Acknowledging that the way we know (think) forms part of what we know (think) allows us to understand how readers distinguish between various tokens of 'I' in written texts. Rather than referring
directly, how the object (the referent of ‘I’) is presented to us comes into play when differentiating between, for example, a persona and an autobiographical voice. One is fictive and the other is not, though the difference does not rest solely on context. We could easily assume that only context was in play if we were, for example, differentiating between the ‘I’ of *Tristram Shandy* and the ‘I’ of Rousseau’s *Confessions*. However, all cases are not this clear. Where, for instance, do we place the ‘I’ of Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey”? Since the scene described in the poem exists, it can be assumed that reference occurs; but it is not entirely clear that the ‘I’ of the poem refers to Wordsworth. These difficult cases indicate that simply relying on context or intention is not enough for understanding. Most often, ‘I’ does refer to the speaker, but we could only argue that such is the rule for ‘I’ if we fail to recognize there are many kinds of individual cases using ‘I’, and that the ways in which ‘I’ refers depends on the kind and degree of self-consciousness we assign to the use of each token.

In the preceding discussion, understanding how ‘I’ might refer has taken two routes. If we approach the problem by examining what it is for someone to use the word ‘I’, we come to the claim that ‘I’ is the word each one uses in speaking of herself. If we concentrate on what one understands when one hears a speaker using the word ‘I’, we come to the rule that any particular token of ‘I’ refers to the speaker of that particular token, if the speaker is also the agent of the context. Each approach adds to our understanding of this word. As users of ‘I’, we are aware of the self-consciousness involved in the use of this word. As hearers of
‘I’, we are aware that the word does refer. Unfortunately, the use of two routes seems to place us in the position of trying to understand a word in which what we know when we are using it is different from what we know when we are hearing it used. The solution is to gather together the insights gleaned by both approaches. I argue that Evans is successful in doing this. On his account, ‘I’ refers but it does so by retaining the self-consciousness of self-reference. Nevertheless, his account is incomplete in that it leaves out much of what we, through self-reflection, regard as the ‘inner’ life. His view can be supplemented by making the subject more active, creating as well as responding to her environment. Further, we must recognize that not every use of ‘I’ is a literal one, and that, just as ‘I’ has a way of being presented to us as well as being a referent, it can be understood in a metaphorical way.
CHAPTER 2

EXPLAINING METAPHORICAL STATEMENTS

My exploration of metaphor begins with a delineation of the major stumbling blocks to articulating a definition of metaphor. Although we can recognize instances of metaphor, any account of how we do so is problematic. Attempting to understand how we recognize metaphor, then, can only partially help us develop a characterization of metaphor. This difficulty stems from there being many different kinds of metaphor, and controversy can arise over whether boundary cases should be classed as literal, metaphorical, or otherwise figurative.

We seem unable to isolate the one feature (or group of features) that all instances of metaphor might share. I argue that, of the theories on offer, Max Black's interaction theory explains most of our intuitions about metaphor. However, his theory should be supplemented by Michael Polanyi's version of the interaction theory. Further, I take Polanyi's insight about the importance of focus for understanding metaphor and suggest that the difference in focus is the difference between language used literally and language used metaphorically. Metaphor creates a pattern that includes the self. Literal statements commit the speaker to articulating how things are. Metaphorical statements commit one to articulating how things feel or seem to be to us. I finish my exploration by considering some possible objections to this characterization of metaphor.
Any discussion of metaphor encounters the problem of giving an initial characterization of metaphor that might fix the boundaries of the object in question. This task is difficult because it would appear impossible to find a characterization that is both adequate for the purpose yet non-question begging. In his Fifth Edition of *A Glossary of Literary Terms* (1988), M.H. Abrams, within his entry on figurative language, opines that "in a metaphor, a word or expression which in literal usage denotes one kind of thing or action is applied to a distinctly different kind of thing or action, without asserting a comparison." While this characterization goes far beyond our easy definition of metaphor as an elliptical simile, it falls short of being adequate because it does not distinguish metaphor from false statements. For example, the statement 'the whale is a fish' uses a word ('fish') which denotes one kind of thing yet applies it to a distinctly different kind of thing ('whale') without asserting a comparison. Although fitting his characterization of metaphor, on the face of it the statement 'the whale is a fish' is simply a false literal statement rather than a metaphor. In his Seventh Edition (1999), Abrams gives a separate entry for metaphor, neglects to give a terse initial characterization, and confesses that "after twenty-five centuries of attention to metaphors by rhetoricians, grammarians, and literary critics—in which during the last half-century they have been joined by many philosophers—there is no general agreement about the way we identify metaphors, how we are able to understand them, and what (if anything) they serve to tell us." It is hardly surprising, then, that in his Fifth Edition, Abrams quickly follows his short
characterization by giving several examples of metaphor. Philosophers fare no better. Max Black, in his 1962 essay “Metaphor,” begins with a list of “unmistakable instances of metaphor” rather than with a characterization of metaphor (26, his emphasis). John Searle (1978, 1993), in his essay “Metaphor,” asks what a metaphor is but opts for discussing how it works and why some work better than others because, according to Searle, the question of what a metaphor is cannot be answered until these other questions have been sorted out. Thus, they begin not with the assumption that we all possess a knowledge of what metaphor is but with the assumption that, in practice, those faced with an instance of metaphor will be able to recognize it as such.

An examination of particular instances of metaphor arguably shows that phrases can have metaphorical meanings as well as literal meanings and that we can recognize the difference. For instance, John Donne’s “Sonnet XIV” would appear to exploit the tension between the two. This sonnet, structured on a puzzling series of opposites, begins with the line, “Batter my heart, three person’d God,” and ends with a couplet containing two paradoxes:

    Except you enthrall mee, never shall be free,
    Nor ever chast, except you ravish mee. (13,14)

In the intervening lines, the persona begs God to save him from sin because he lacks the ability to save himself. Throughout the poem, Donne uses words associated with the body to discuss the spirit, and the concluding lines are understandable only if we recognize them as metaphorical. Literary critical works
like Anthony Low’s “The Holy Ghost is Amorous in his Metaphors” (1994),
William Kerrigan’s “The Fearful Accommodations of John Donne” (1974) and
James Winny’s *A Preface to Donne: Revised Edition* (1981) may disagree over
the details of how these lines should be paraphrased, but all identify them as
metaphorical. If these lines are taken literally, the reader is left with no clear
understanding of how the persona’s demand for enslavement can lead to freedom
or how his desire for sexual violation can lead to sexual purity. The point of this
poem depends on the reader’s ability to make sense of the seeming paradoxes
contained in the couplet. If the reader can resolve these paradoxes, then she must
also consider that there is also a way of resolving the paradox of a three-personed
God. The poem’s cleverness rests on the knowledge that these two cases are not
the same; indeed, the disparity between them would appear to hinge on the
difference between literal and metaphorical meaning.

**Recognizing Metaphor**

Acknowledging that we can recognize an instance of metaphor when
encountered is very different from characterizing what metaphor is. An account of
how we recognize metaphor might bring us closer to our goal. Unfortunately,
although language users regularly and consistently use, recognize, and understand
metaphorical statements, philosophical agreement on how these feats are
accomplished has thus far been lacking. Traditionally, metaphor has been
considered a matter of words rather than thought, and a metaphorical expression
is viewed as a departure from literal language. This departure is special in that,
rather than making one's sentence nonsensical or merely false, it instead allows us to understand the sentence metaphorically, thereby creating a tension between what a sentence literally means and the meaning which the speaker implies or the hearer understands. Seeing metaphor as a departure from literal language is initially plausible. We recognize such a departure by choosing to interpret a sentence metaphorically because of its obvious literal falsity, a falsity most often involving the attribution to a subject of an improper category or property. For example, in the sentence 'Sally is a pig', if Sally is actually a human being, then this sentence, by claiming that Sally is a member of the category 'pig', signals its metaphorical status. Similarly, the sentence 'the ship ploughed the sea' is obviously false because it attributes to the ship in question the property of being able to plough, a property that ships do not actually possess.

Yet the attempt to locate this obvious falsity in all metaphorical expressions has shown its limitations as a device of recognition. The explanation is inadequate because the diversity of metaphor ensures that only some metaphors appear amenable to such identification while others are less accommodating. If we consider a metaphor like John Donne's 'no man is an island', we see that it is not false for it makes no category mistake nor does it attribute to the subject an improper property. We might even characterize this statement as obviously true. Moreover, it is a well-formed sentence, neither syntactically nor semantically deviant.
Some might disagree that the statement, ‘no man is an island’ is both literally true and a metaphor. First, some might argue that this statement is not a metaphor. Rather, it is an example of meiosis—specifically, litotes—an instance of intentionally saying something weaker than what one intended to say, by using a negative. Meiosis, however, misses the mark. An example of meiosis would have a speaker saying ‘Jane is not a graceful dancer’ when she actually means something like ‘Jane is a graceless dancer’. If we consider ‘no man is an island’ in this regard, we are left with something like ‘every man is a peninsula’. Suggesting that Donne’s remark is an example of meiosis does not affect its status as a metaphor.

Secondly, others might argue that just as the statement, ‘man is an island’ makes a category mistake, so, too, does the statement, ‘no man is an island’. Following Leonard Goddard and Richard Routley’s discussion of nonsignificance and falsification in The Logic of Significance and Context (1973), how we understand these statements depends on how we read the negation (8-15). If we understand the statement ‘man is an island’ as a significant but false statement, then its negation, ‘no man is an island’ would be true. Here, we are regarding the statement, ‘man is an island’ as we might regard a statement like ‘the whale is a fish’. While we might initially assume that the whale is a fish, further investigation would reveal our mistake. Similarly, we might come to discover that no man is an island. On the other hand, we might understand the statement, ‘man is an island’ as nonsignificant and therefore nonsensical because man is not the
kind of thing that can be mistaken for an island. We could then treat the statement’s negation in one of two ways. We could hold that nonsignificant statements are necessarily false. Then, if we read the statement, ‘no man is an island’ as a shortened version of ‘man is not the kind of thing that could be mistaken for an island.’ we would see it as significant and true. However, if we assume extended classical logic, then neither ‘man is an island’ nor its negation, ‘no man is an island’ has a truth value. Both are simply nonsensical or meaningless. If we see the matter in this way, then we would equally see that statements like ‘the ship ploughed the sea’ are not false. We could no longer hold that metaphor is signalled by its obvious falsity. Rather, metaphor would be signalled by lack of significance. My intention, however, was merely to show that a statement could be both literally true and a metaphor. A less elegant but less controversial example might be the statement, ‘Harry is a clown’. If understood literally, the statement identifies Harry’s occupation. If understood metaphorically, Harry is dismissed as absurd and consequently as irrelevant and best disregarded. We can thus conclude that while some metaphors are obviously false when viewed literally, others may signal their presence by their obvious truthfulness.

Alternative tests are only partially successful. Though it is frequently the case that a metaphor is jarringly false when understood literally, such falsity is not necessary for metaphor. Because some metaphors are semantically well-formed and even true when interpreted literally, this test is too narrow to capture all
instances of metaphor. Philosophers have accounted for these odd instances by rejecting the notion of obvious literal falsity in favour of literal inappropriateness. Literal inappropriateness is a wider notion in that while it encompasses obvious falsity, it also accounts for banality and pointlessness. We interpret Donne’s phrase metaphorically because we question why someone would tell us that no man is an island. Similarly, the literal information conveyed by ‘tomorrow is another day’, by its sheer irrelevancy, would have the hearer looking for an implied further meaning. Still, if one encounters e.e. cumming’s sentence ‘life is not a paragraph and death I think is no parenthesis’, it would strike one as curious rather than banal. Besides, judgements of banality or pointlessness would appear to bring in contextual considerations.

The most plausible test involves the use of context, but even this is not entirely satisfactory. Many sentences, when encountered out of context, will not signal their metaphorical status, even though their status is obvious in the context of utterance. For example, if Disraeli is at a political meeting and he says, ‘I have climbed to the top of the greasy pole,’ then we might be forgiven for understanding that his remark is metaphorical. On the other hand, if Disraeli makes this statement while he is in the vicinity of a greasy pole, then his claim is not obviously a metaphor. Consequently, some philosophers such as John Searle (1993) argue that an adequate account of metaphor can only be given at the level of utterance by taking into account contextual features. That is, the test for the metaphorical status of a sentence is an incompatibility between a literal reading
of the sentence and its context. Yet even this test encounters problematic cases. Given that both occur within the same sonnet (context), why does the phrase 'except you enthrall mee, never shall be free' appear to demand a metaphorical reading whereas the phrase 'three person'd God' does not? The only answer can be Christian theology's insistence that the latter be taken literally, and it would be difficult to see this insistence as part of the context.

The difficulty of finding an adequate yet all-encompassing test for recognizing metaphor leads Max Black (1994), in his essay "More About Metaphor," to contend that the best we can do is accept that recognition of a statement as metaphorical depends on two things: our general knowledge of what it is to be a metaphor and our judgement that a metaphorical reading of a statement is preferable to a literal reading (34). However, while such guides to interpretation seem general enough to cover all cases, there is some question about their adequacy because our general knowledge of what it is to be a metaphor often fails us. The following list of phrases and statements, variously gleaned from philosophical writings on the topic of metaphor, gives some hint of the problem. There can be debate not only over how we might recognize these metaphors but even whether all are metaphors:

1. Sally is a pig; Richard is a lion; Nancy is a robot; Bob is a sponge; Sally is a block of ice.

2. Fred is a giant; Mary is a dragon; our product is a Fountain of Youth.

3. No man is an island; life is not a paragraph.
4. Tomorrow is another day; he is a man; he is a clown.

5. He feels down today; she is blue.

6. The ship ploughed the sea; death cast its net.

7. Disraeli climbed to the top of the greasy pole.

8. He nickel-and-dimes everyone he meets.

9. She comes from common folk—poor when honest.

10. Spendthrift crocus; chaste moon.

11. Book of Nature; the World is a Stage; up is good.

12. Moscow is cold; Hemingway lost in Africa.

13. A road runs through my property.

Controversy over the identification of phrases as metaphorical often occurs because there appear to be many different kinds of metaphor. Attempts to systematise our understanding of metaphor by concentrating on kinds of metaphor have met with only limited success. The broadest division made is between dead and living (vital, novel) metaphors. A dead metaphor is a metaphorical term or phrase so common that its meaning has become conventionalised. The class of dead metaphors contains metaphorical phrases that are on their way to being considered literal in that their once metaphorical meaning can now be considered the primary or secondary use of the expression. We must struggle to revive the metaphorical beginnings of phrases such as ‘the mouth of the river’, ‘in an argument, one must defend one’s position’, ‘bottleneck’, ‘pinpoint’ or ‘tail-light’. Other metaphors of this class are more obviously metaphorical but the connection
between the two parts of the metaphor has been lost. We can, for example, speak
of a ‘table leg’ or of ‘the heart of the matter’ without being aware that we are
speaking metaphorically. However, if the metaphorical status of such expressions
is pointed out to us, we can recognize and understand it.

Similarly, living metaphors also contain a range of different metaphorical
instances. At one extreme, there are phrases that are easily recognized as
metaphorical yet the metaphorical relation between the words which comprise
them no longer forms part of how we understand them. If others tease me, I know
that they are ‘pulling my leg’, yet why this idiom has this meaning eludes me.
George Orwell, in his essay “Politics and the English Language,” cites such an
instance when he notes that writers who intend to use the metaphor ‘toe the line’
sometimes write it as ‘tow the line’. Such a writer could not explain why the
metaphor ‘toe the line’ has the conventional meaning of ‘to follow the rules
closely’ or ‘to do as one is told’ but, if she hears this phrase, she understands its
meaning as such. This category of living metaphors also contains trite metaphors
such as ‘x is a pig’ as well as more original and novel metaphors like ‘Disraeli
climbed to the top of the greasy pole.’ At the other extreme are instances of poetic
metaphor which are often not understood immediately and, even then, can only be
paraphrased with difficulty. For example, we know that, literally speaking, life is
not a paragraph, but why, metaphorically speaking, this is so has to be puzzled
out.
While dead metaphors encounter controversy over whether or not a boundary phrase is metaphorical or literal, poetic metaphors involve boundary cases about whether a particular phrase is best classed as a metaphor or as some other, different figurative trope. The following line by Pope, “Or stain her honour, or her new brocade,” appears to be a metaphor as well as being a clear case of zeugma. That is, the single word ‘stain’ stands in the same grammatical relation to both ‘her honour’ and ‘her new brocade’ but there is an obvious shift in its significance. We must consider whether a metaphor can be an instance of both or whether a metaphor cannot employ or be characterized as any other figure of language. Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu (1994), in their essay “Metaphor and Other Kinds of Non-literal Meaning,” for example, see such distinctions as important. They contend that “one of the acid test[s] of any putative theory of metaphor is whether it can account for the differences between metaphor and other types of nonliteral lexical meaning, such as metonymy” (159). However, such an accounting is of concern only if instances of metaphor can never be classed as some other kind of figurative trope. In metonymy, the literal term for one thing is applied to another with which it has become closely associated because of a recurrent relationship in common experience. Abrams cites the examples of ‘the crown’ standing for a king and ‘Hollywood’ standing for the film industry. Metonymy has sometimes been classified as a species of metaphor, and insisting that they are entirely different tropes might involve us in a misleading distinction. Such a distinction could lead us to a narrow, premature,
and reductive characterization of metaphor which will be trivial because ultimately useless for the project of differentiating between literal and metaphorical language. Even if we acknowledge that a phrase like ‘I enjoy reading Shakespeare’ is not a metaphor, difficulties remain. Is the phrase ‘she is blue’ an instance of metaphor or metonymy? Neither comparison nor continuity seems to fit such a case.

According to one of the examples cited in the essay by Hintikka and Sandu, the phrase ‘the mountain sat upon the plain in his eternal chair’ is a metaphor (163). Their example points to the problem of sharply delimiting metaphor from other types of figurative language. The phrase ‘the mountain sat upon the plain in his eternal chair’ is not an instance of metonymy, but it is an instance of personification. Cases of personification such as ‘the sky wept’ or ‘don’t slam the door in the face of opportunity’ do seem to be instances of metaphor. Similarly, phrases such as ‘the spendthrift crocus’ appear to be metaphors, even though they are also cases of pathetic fallacy. John Searle uses the phrases ‘Sally is a block of ice’ and ‘Sally is a pig’ as instances of metaphor. These phrases do not fall under any other figurative term, yet their status as metaphors seems almost accidental. The metaphors ‘Sally is a block of ice’ and ‘Sam is a gorilla’ can be seen as the opposite of personification, though they are opposite in different ways. In the first case, instead of an inanimate object being endowed with human attributes, a human subject is endowed with inanimate attributes. In the second case, rather than attributing human actions and feelings to a natural object, the phrase
attributes natural capacities to a human subject. These instances suggest that the
category of metaphor overlaps with other categories of figurative language.

The challenge is to isolate instances of metaphor without relying on a
particular theory of metaphor to do it. Any definition of metaphor seems to imply
a theory of how it works and vice versa; that is, each theory has a class of
metaphors for which the theory appears to work very well. Objectors to any
particular theory of metaphor often do so by introducing another kind of metaphor
for which the theory holds less well or not at all. Rejecting a theory, then, often
involves either rejecting that theory's definition of metaphor or, at least,
broadening or narrowing the category of what can be included as a metaphor.
Very roughly speaking, we can argue that metaphor has something to do with
similarity, but how similarity might be involved is controversial.

The diversity of instances of metaphor suggests that while we do not want to
limit, by definition, those instances that might be deemed metaphors, we
nevertheless do not want to broaden the category of metaphorical language to the
extent of making it synonymous with figurative language. A theory of metaphor
should explain those examples that generate little controversy while leaving open
the possibility that more controversial cases, unless otherwise adequately
categorized as some other trope, could be seen as instances of metaphor.

Theories that unduly limit instances of metaphor are ultimately disappointing
because they either leave us wondering what the fuss was about or neglect the
issues that led us to examine the subject in the first place. Black holds that
recognizing an expression as metaphorical depends on our general knowledge of what it is to be a metaphor and our judgement that a metaphorical reading of an expression is preferable to a literal reading. Black’s guidelines for recognition of an instance of metaphor are too broad to be of more than limited usefulness. Nonetheless, we should perhaps conclude not that Black is wrong but that inquiring how we recognise metaphor can only sketch the outline of our subject matter. The question of how we recognize metaphor is problematic only if we allow that metaphor is a strictly semantic phenomenon. If we allow that metaphor is only partially semantic in that it is a habit of thought as well as a matter of language, then a statement is metaphorical to the extent that it can support a metaphorical reading.

**Conflicting Theories of Metaphor**

Not everyone allows that sentences have metaphorical meanings. John Searle, in his essay “Metaphor,” denies that there is metaphorical sentence meaning because he takes metaphor as an instance of speaker meaning rather than of sentence meaning. In his essay “What Metaphors Mean,” Donald Davidson (1978) denies that there are two kinds of semantic meaning—literal and metaphorical. He contends that “metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more” (30). Distinguishing between what words mean and what they are used to do, he argues that metaphor depends on the gap between what is said and what is intimated by the hearer of the statement. The difference between the literal and the metaphorical is not a difference in
meaning but a difference in the force with which they are used. A metaphor has
the effect of making us think deep thoughts and of noticing that which we might
not otherwise have noticed. His theory diverges from other pragmatic theories of
metaphor such as John Searle’s in that, according to Davidson, the effect of a
metaphor arises from what the competent hearer notices rather than from what the
speaker means.

The denial of metaphorical meaning is not without its critics. Savas L.
Tsohatzidis (1994), in his essay “Speaker meaning, sentence meaning and
metaphor,” takes Searle to task for his assumption that metaphorical meaning is
not sentence-based. He believes that Searle’s approach is representative of most
other pragmatic approaches to metaphor, including Davidson’s. I take it that he
includes Davidson’s approach because Davidson sharply divides meaning from
use. According to Davidson, what others call metaphorical meaning is actually
intimation, the effect a metaphor has on its hearers. While this intimation is not
Searle’s speaker meaning, both are firmly embedded in the domain of use.
Tsohatzidis notes that the Gricean framework, Grice’s theory of conversational
implicature, provides a cancellability test which helps us decide whether a
conveyed meaning is speaker-based (domain of use) or sentence-based (sentence
meaning). He argues that applying this test to metaphorical utterances yields
surprising results: the meanings of many metaphorical utterances, particularly
those involving the recognition of a category mistake, are not speaker-based.
The cancellability test holds that if a speaker cannot without oddity deny that, in uttering a given sentence $s$, she means $p$, then her meaning $p$ by uttering $s$ can legitimately be taken as just a function of what $s$ itself means; alternatively, if a speaker can without oddity deny that, in uttering a given sentence $s$, she means $p$, then her meaning $p$ by uttering $s$ cannot legitimately be taken as a function of what $s$ itself means. For example, the oddity of ‘the box is empty’—but I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing in the box’ shows that if a speaker who says ‘the box is empty’ is interpreted as meaning there is nothing in the box, then the legitimacy of that interpretation can be conclusively established by appealing to what the sentence she uttered itself means. On the other hand, the non-oddity of ‘you are standing on my foot—but I do not mean to suggest that you should move; I just want to inform you of where you are standing’ shows that if a speaker’s saying that ‘you are standing on my foot’ is interpreted as meaning that she is asking you to move, then the legitimacy of that interpretation cannot be conclusively established by appealing to what the sentence she uttered itself means. The cancellability test is thus able to confirm cases in which a speaker’s meaning diverges from a sentence meaning.

Tsohatzidis holds that when this test is applied to metaphorical utterances, the results indicate that metaphorical meanings are a function of sentence meanings. According to the test, it is sentence meanings rather than speakers’ meanings that cannot be denied without oddity. A speaker might say, ‘My sister Sally is a bull in a china shop’ and be interpreted as meaning metaphorically that
her sister is clumsy. If this (or any other) metaphorical meaning is not part of the sentence meaning, then the speaker should be able to cancel without oddity all interpretations except the one identical to its literal meaning. She could attempt to block this metaphorical interpretation (or any other) by speaking as if Sally were literally a bull in a china shop. She could, for instance, say, ‘My sister Sally is a bull in a china shop—I should move her into a field with a fence before she breaks the dishes’. Tsohatzidis contends that such an utterance would be either rejected as odd (semantically anomalous) or accepted as semantically well formed only if the hearer interprets the speaker as speaking metaphorically throughout (and so the metaphor has not been cancelled). That is, unless the hearer takes the speaker to be still speaking metaphorically when she talks of taking Sally to the field, the sentence will be rejected as semantically anomalous. Unless the sentence is interpreted metaphorically, it cannot be interpreted. Thus the attempt to cancel without oddity all possible metaphorical interpretations cannot succeed. As far as the cancellability test is concerned, metaphorical interpretations of utterances must be just functions of what the sentences themselves mean rather than functions of some device (like speaker meaning) in the domain of use.

If a speaker says, ‘My sister Sally is a bull in a china shop, but I do not mean to say that she is clumsy’, then the speaker ought to be able to go on to say what she does mean. If her actual meaning is not similarly metaphorical, then the sentence will be rejected as odd. This test produces equally odd results if we...
consider metaphors like ‘it’s raining cats and dogs,’ ‘their marriage is on the rocks’ or ‘the plot thickens’. We might be able to think of contexts in which this literal statement would seem less odd: Sally might be wearing the costume of a bull or she might be acting the role of a bull in a play. Even then, strictly speaking, Sally is not a bull but is dressed like a bull or acting as a bull. Moreover, such reaching for what might constitute plausible details suggests that the metaphorical utterance is context free in a way in which the literal utterance is not. Moreover, the metaphor will signal certain cancellations: ‘My sister Sally is a bull in a china shop, but I do not mean to say she is a quadruped with horns’.

For those who allow the possibility of metaphorical sentence meaning, there is some agreement on metaphor. Most philosophers allow that metaphor has something to do with similarity and, consequently, that there are at least two parts to a metaphor. Sometimes, the terms ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ have been used to label these two parts. This terminology comes from I.A. Richards (1936). According to him, ‘tenor’ is the original idea or principal subject, the subject to which the metaphorical word is applied, whereas ‘vehicle’ is the metaphorical word that evokes the borrowed idea or what the subject resembles. In the metaphor ‘Richard is a lion’, Richard would be the tenor, the subject that the sentence is about, and ‘lion’ would be the vehicle, the metaphorical word that evokes what the subject resembles. Many philosophers prefer their own terminology because Richards’ labels work less well for implicit metaphors. In an implicit metaphor, the vehicle is not predicated of the tenor. For example, identifying the tenor and
vehicle in the metaphorical phrase ‘Disraeli climbed to the top of the greasy pole’ is less than straightforward. Moreover, Max Black (1962) quarrels with Richards’ labels because Richards’ own use of them is inconsistent (47, n.23). Nonetheless, his labels are handy if applied carefully and sparingly. Current theories of metaphor tend to position themselves in relation to the theory of substitution or comparison and the theory of interaction. The first tends to see metaphor as an unimportant rhetorical device whereas the second tends to see it as a crucial tool for discovering the world.

The substitution theory, attributable to Aristotle (The Poetics, 21.1457b6-33), nicely explains how metaphorical expressions can devolve into literal expressions. This theory sees metaphor as a deviance from literal use of language in that metaphor involves giving a name to a thing that properly belongs to another kind of thing. The focus is on the word rather than the sentence for, in metaphor, a word gains an extended meaning. On this theory, a nominative metaphor (A is B) is an indirect way of saying A is C. A modern variation of this theory is the category view: metaphors are class-inclusion statements in which the tenor of the metaphor is assigned to a category referred to by the vehicle of the metaphor. The vehicle becomes both the name of the category and the prototypical member of it. (‘Richard is a lion’ becomes Richard is a member of the category of entities that are brave, a category designated by the word ‘lion,’ and whose prototypical example is the lion).
The comparison theory is, according to Max Black (1962), a sub-class of the substitution theory and shares with it the contention that the meaning of a metaphorical statement is actually the literal meaning of a different statement. As on the first theory, metaphor is nothing more than a rhetorical device. In other words, a metaphor has emotive force but no cognitive value. A nominative metaphor (A is B) is a compressed way of saying A is like B. Modern versions of this view are more complicated: A is to B as C is to D (Richard is to human bravery as a lion is to animal bravery).

These related theories work most clearly with nominative metaphors. Jane tells Sally, ‘Richard is a lion.’ Because Richard is their biological brother and therefore a human being rather than a lion, this statement, if taken literally, is obviously false and therefore deviant. This deviance indicates to Sally that Jane’s statement is a metaphor. Having recognized the statement as a metaphor, Sally must now go through a reasoning process in order to understand it. If the substitution theory is correct, Sally quickly considers the many properties possessed by lions in search of one that might also apply to her brother. She hits on the property of bravery. The word ‘lion’ receives an extended meaning so that the metaphor literally means ‘Richard is brave.’ If the comparison theory is correct, Sally reasons that the metaphor is actually a compressed simile. She translates ‘Richard is a lion’ into ‘Richard is like a lion’ and then tries to find matches between the properties of Richard and the properties of lions.
Although similarity appears to play a part in most metaphors, the substitution theory and related comparison theory tend to trivialise metaphor. In relation to the substitution theory, we can argue that only the most commonplace metaphors are incapable of sustaining more than one shared natural interpretation. Those who hear the statement ‘Richard is a lion’ may understand from it that Richard is brave. Yet those who hear ‘Richard is a pig’ may be left wondering whether Richard is messy or greedy or both. Moreover, the substitution theory, by contending that the word acting as the vehicle in the metaphor receives an extended meaning, leads us to wonder about the purpose of metaphors. If ‘Richard is a lion’ simply means that ‘Richard is brave’, there seems to be no reason for a speaker to use a metaphor when its literal equivalent would do as well or, being clearer, better. The comparison theory explains metaphor by explaining it away. If we are forced to translate a metaphor into an equivalent simile, then we are left to wonder why the speaker did not use the simile instead of the metaphor.

Both the substitution theory and the comparison theory are mistaken because, in their almost exclusive reliance on similarity, they fail to distinguish between one thing being like another and one thing being seen as like another. Both Max Black (1962) and John Searle (1993) consider the comparison theory hopelessly vague because any two objects are similar in some respect, and this theory does not provide for how we are able to pick out the relevant similarities. John Searle (1993) is especially forthcoming in his criticism of the comparison theory, but his
most interesting criticism is his insight that, in many instances, there is no
similarity between the objects mentioned in a metaphor. He further contends that
those metaphors which do involve similarity are wrongly characterized by the
theory in that it assumes that because comparison often plays a role in our
comprehension of metaphor, the similarity at work in a particular metaphor is that
metaphor’s meaning. We might be tempted to object to Searle’s criticism by
noting that his criticism is only telling if similarity is construed narrowly as
restricted to similarities in properties. For example, in the metaphor ‘Sally is a
block of ice,’ listing the properties of Sally and the properties of a block of ice
would not seem to get us any closer to understanding the metaphor. If, like Keith
Holyoak and Paul Thagard in their book Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative
Thought, we recognize that similarity can encompass similarity in properties,
relations, and structures, then we appear to have discovered the necessary
similarity. More specifically, there is a relational similarity between Sally and a
block of ice in that just as a block of ice is chilly for everything around it, so Sally
is chilly to those around her. Unfortunately, this solution is inadequate because
we are still left with a metaphorical shift. Even though the relation appears to be
similar, the word ‘chilly’ is metaphorical in the second occurrence. Examples
such as this lead George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), in Metaphors We Live
By, to contend that metaphors structure our experience. They would argue that we
are understanding one kind of conceptual domain (in this case, emotional
influence and reaction) in terms of a different conceptual domain (physical
influence and reaction). Part of the conceptual structure of the source domain (physical) is mapped onto the conceptual structure of the target domain (emotional). Their point is that we do not have two pre-existing conceptual structures that happen to be similar; rather, the structure of the conceptual domain of the source (emotional) does not exist unless it is perceived in this way. Although Searle’s theory of metaphor is very different from Lakoff and Johnson’s, they nonetheless agree on this shortcoming of the comparison theory.

The difficulty of seeing literal similarity as exhausting the meaning of metaphor is also shown by Andrew Ortony (1993) in his essay “Similarity in similes and metaphors.” Ortony notes that literal statements of similarity act very differently from metaphorical statements that imply a similarity. He argues that although similarity in literal statements is seen as symmetric, if the terms in a metaphor are reversed, then the meaning of the metaphor is either lost or changed (344-346). For example, in the literal statement ‘blackberries are like strawberries’, blackberries are like strawberries to the same degree that strawberries are like blackberries. On the other hand, in the metaphorical statement ‘billboards are warts’, billboards are more like warts than warts are like billboards. Ortony argues that similarity plays a central role in metaphor, but not the role envisaged by proponents of a simple comparison model.

More promising is the interactive theory. Initially set out by Max Black in his essay “Metaphor” (1962), this theory has become a major alternative to the substitution theory. In Black’s initial rendering of his theory, a metaphor involves
a focus (the incongruent element in the statement) in relation to its frame (the remaining elements of the statement surrounding it). For example, in the metaphor ‘Richard is a lion,’ the word ‘lion’ would be the focus whereas the other words in the sentence used literally would be the frame. In a metaphor, the word that is the focus receives new meaning that is not quite its meaning in literal uses. In a nominative metaphor (A is B), A interacts with B in that B, because it is standing as the focus, evokes a “system of associated commonplaces” associated with the word (as distinct from a list of actual properties of the object) to produce a novel metaphorical meaning (40). A (the tenor or primary subject) limits which associated commonplaces are relevant while the system of B (the vehicle or secondary subject) is used to organize our conception of A. What emerges is a new conceptual organization of or perspective on some object or topic. In the case of ‘Richard is a lion’, Richard is the primary subject and lion is the secondary subject. We understand this metaphor by recognizing that the word ‘lion’ evokes a system of associated commonplaces, some of which will be relevant for our contemplation of Richard. Metaphors are creative in that they allow us to see some aspects of reality that they themselves help constitute.

In his later essay “More About Metaphors” (1993), Black more forcefully argues for the view that metaphors are “cognitive instruments indispensable for perceiving connections that, once perceived, are then truly present” (37, his emphasis). He makes what he considers as minor improvements to his original theory. First, he is more forthcoming about what constitutes a metaphorical
statement. Such a statement is identified "by quoting a whole sentence, or a set of sentences, together with as much of the relevant verbal context, or the non-verbal setting, as may be needed" for a competent hearer to grasp the metaphorical meaning (24). This expansion allows him to encompass metaphors that might otherwise pose a problem for his theory. For example, the metaphorical meaning of the phrase ‘I have climbed to the top of the greasy pole’ remains puzzling until we take into account that Disraeli is the speaker.

Secondly, his system of associated commonplaces is replaced by an implicative complex arising from the interaction between the primary and secondary subjects. The primary subject evokes a selection of the secondary subject’s properties, thereby allowing the construction of a parallel implication complex that fits the primary subject and reciprocally inducing parallel changes in the secondary subject (28). The metaphorical statement ‘Sally is a block of ice’ can be shown to involve the creation of an implicative complex. Here, Sally is the primary subject and block of ice is the secondary subject:

SS: a block of ice is cold.

SS: things that are physically cold are numb or unfeeling.

SS: people that are numb are less apt to react to physical stimuli.

PS: people who are unemotional are less apt to react to emotional stimuli.

PS: such people are, metaphorically speaking, cold because their emotions are numb, and numbness is associated with coldness.

PS: Sally is emotionally cold.
Alternatively,

SS: a block of ice is cold.

SS: cold things cause a chill in things around them.

PS: Sally causes, metaphorically speaking, a chill in people around her.

PS: Sally is cold.

There is no one-to-one correspondence or sharing of a salient feature in that, strictly speaking, a block of ice is not unfeeling or numb in the same way that Sally is unfeeling or numb nor do they cause the same kind of chill. In the statement ‘Sally is a block of ice’, unless we understand that we are identifying emotional rather than physical properties, we will have hyperbole instead of metaphor. The success of this metaphor does not lie in the similarity between the primary and secondary subjects. Often, a metaphor’s success stems from the disparity between the two. For instance, it is uninteresting to say that sparrows are like robins because their similarities tend to outweigh their differences. A comparison between the two would concentrate on their similarity. However, to say ‘a robin is a sparrow’ is to focus on the difference between the two in that our first thought would be that a robin is not a sparrow. The statement ‘a robin is a sparrow’ would be understood as a mistake rather than a metaphor unless we recognize that the basis of the sentence equally supports their difference as well as their similarity. Black (1993) acknowledges that every metaphor may be said to mediate an analogy. However, the interaction view is more than an extension of the comparison view because “implication is not the same as covert identity:
Looking at a scene through blue spectacles is different from comparing that scene with something else” (30, his emphasis).

The interaction theory has not escaped criticism. According to John Searle (1993), the interaction theory holds that metaphorical meaning arises from the interaction between an expression used metaphorically and an expression used literally. He then denies that there are cases in which the connection between a metaphorical statement and what that statement calls to mind is created by the juxtaposition of the metaphorical expression and the rest of the metaphorical statement in which the expression appears. First, he argues that some metaphorical statements do not have both a focus and a frame (93). Second, he contends that metaphorical statements containing a proper name are resistant to such interaction because a proper name is not the same as other words (94).

In order to clarify his claim that not every metaphor has a focus and a frame, Searle uses the example of a mixed metaphor. Instead of saying ‘Sally is a block of ice’, we can refer to Sally as ‘the bad news’ in order to create the mixed metaphor ‘the bad news is a block of ice’. Because this mixed metaphor has no words used literally, it has no frame. Nonetheless, just as we can understand the metaphorical statements ‘Sally is a block of ice’ and ‘Sally is bad news,’ so we can understand the metaphorical statement ‘The bad news is a block of ice’. He concludes that having a literal frame is not logically necessary for metaphor.

Searle’s first objection misses its mark. Black’s notion of a metaphorical statement extends beyond a single sentence to possibly encompass a set of
sentences, the verbal context, and the non-verbal setting. If I am at a banquet and
am served a plate of roast beef while my companion receives a substitute meal of
a tuna fish sandwich, his comment ‘Chalk and cheese’ can be understood as a
metaphor even though he has not fully articulated his thought. He could have said,
‘Comparing these two meals is comparing chalk to cheese’. In other words, the
literal frame can be contextually implied as well as stated. Searle’s example of
‘the bad news is a block of ice’ is nonsensical rather than metaphorical unless we
have some understanding that this sentence forms part of a wider metaphorical
statement. Searle appears to collapse I.A. Richards’ ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ into
Black’s ‘focus’ and ‘frame’. These pairings are not the same. While Black (1993)
contends that “the duality of reference [in a metaphor] is marked by the contrast
between the metaphorical statement’s focus (the word or words used non-
literally) and the surrounding literal frame,” he construes Richards’ ‘tenor’ and
‘vehicle’ as ‘primary subject’ and ‘secondary subject’ (25). Instead of saying
‘Richard is a lion’, I might instead say ‘Richard is one of those beasts’ while
pointing at a lion. I have used two different focuses but my secondary subject has
remained the same. Of course, this example is only meant to suggest that the
secondary subject can be signalled in different ways. Black’s secondary subject is
not a single thing or entity but a system of relationships. Contrary to Searle’s
characterization, metaphorical meaning arises because of interaction between the
primary subject and the secondary subject.
Searle believes that his second objection is more serious. Contrary to what he takes as the central tenet of the interaction theory, he argues that metaphor is not a result of any interaction among the elements of the sentence. He notes that “Sally’ is a proper name; it does not have a meaning in quite the same way in which ‘block of ice’ has a meaning” (94). The meaning of some noun phrases, specifically, proper names and indexicals, is exhausted by their referring function so that there is nothing left over to interact with the secondary subject. Hence, the sentences ‘Sally is a block of ice’, ‘Miss Jones is a block of ice’, and ‘That girl over there in the corner is a block of ice’ have the same metaphorical (utterance) meaning even though different words are being used.

While this objection initially seems telling, Searle does not place enough emphasis on Black’s claim (1993) that “the duality of reference [that is, the presence of the primary and secondary subjects] is marked by the contrast between” the focus and the frame (27). The contrast between the focus and the frame only marks the presence of the primary and secondary subjects. The interaction taking place in a metaphor occurs between the primary and secondary subjects. Evaluating one of Searle’s own examples suggests the difference between the two sets. Searle’s example of Disraeli saying ‘I have climbed to the top of the greasy pole’ does not make sense as a metaphor unless we understand that while the word ‘Disraeli’ forms part of the frame, it is not the primary subject. However, because ‘Disraeli’ is part of the frame, we can identify the primary subject ‘politics’ which interacts with the secondary subject ‘climbing to
the top of the greasy pole'. While context can give us the information that there
is no greasy pole in the vicinity (and so the statement is metaphorical) and that the
pronoun 'I' refers to Disraeli, it does not give us the information that Disraeli was
Prime Minister or that this position is conceptualised as being at the top of a
political hierarchy. If we choose 'I' or 'Disraeli' as the tenor of the metaphor, we
discover that not just any definite description of him will do. We must hit on the
right description in order for the metaphor to make sense. Part of what we know
about Disraeli is his political position and this, in turn, marks the primary subject
that interacts with the secondary subject. Similarly, 'Sally is a pig', 'Miss Jones is
a pig', and 'Fred is a pig' function as metaphors not so much because of the
meanings of the words 'Sally', 'Miss Jones', and 'Fred' but because, in
appropriate contexts, these proper names mark primary subjects that are human
rather than porcine.

Another basic criticism of the interaction theory is that Black never managed
to show that there was any literal interaction between words in a sentence. This
criticism is telling only if it is apt, and Black is difficult to pin down on the
question of whether or not he considers it a virtue that the interaction be strictly
literal. When Black (1993) considers an actual instance of metaphor, 'marriage is
a zero-sum game,' he first constructs the implication-complex involved. He lists
the associated commonplaces evoked by the word 'game', then uses them to
construct a corresponding implication-complex for marriage. The resulting
propositions about marriage "can be taken literally—or almost so" (29). He
allows for some hesitation in strictly matching statements about one with statements about the other and confesses that at least one word "must surely have an extended sense" (29). He classifies the relations between the meanings of the corresponding key words of the two implication-complexes as identity, extension, similarity, analogy, and metaphorical coupling (the original metaphor implicates subordinate metaphors). We must remember, however, that Black was quarrelling with views which held that the complexity of metaphor could be made literal by either substituting or comparing. His 'interaction' is meant to counter this simplicity by indicating that more than one operation is involved. He further wants his interaction theory to account for the fact that the same metaphor can generate several different equally valid interpretations. His inability to reduce 'interaction' to literal interaction between words in a sentence is a problem only if such a reduction is Black's intent. His including a section on the importance of metaphorical thought and his belief that the secondary subject's implication-complex creates a screen through or a perspective by which one views the implication-complex of the primary subject suggest otherwise.

Variations on the Interaction View

Michael Polanyi (1975), in Meaning, finds difficulties with at least Black's earlier version of the interaction theory: Black does not adequately explain how the hearer connects the two systems (later, implicative-complexes) present in a metaphor; his view cannot explain why many metaphors have the capacity to move us emotionally; and, even though he acknowledges that metaphors
communicate a cognitive content, because he holds that ambiguity is a necessary
by-product of metaphor, he dismisses the notion that a literal paraphrase can
exhaust this content. Despite these difficulties, Polanyi, in the main, adopts
Black's account of metaphor, and his aim is to modify rather than reject the
interaction theory. Polanyi's variation involves several concepts central to his
thought: tacit awareness, personal knowing, and intrinsic interest. While these
concepts are convincing in the examples he uses, I find them less applicable to
semantic meaning.

According to Polanyi, our experience of the world is a jumble of sense
perceptions until we bring organizing principles to it. Meaning is achieved when
persons in a community perform an integration thereby giving rise to a focally
intended whole or unity. Particulars can be noticed in different ways; we can be
aware of them in themselves or we can understand them in their participation in a
comprehensive entity. When we are aware of them in themselves, particulars can
be identified because they are the object of our focal awareness. They capture our
intrinsic interest. When we are aware of them in their participation in a
comprehensive entity, they are the objects of our subsidiary or tacit awareness
and, consequently, these particulars are less clear than their relation to the whole.
For example, a blind man using a stick to navigate will initially focus his attention
on the hand holding the stick. Later, this awareness will become tacit as he
focuses his awareness on the tip of the stick as it encounters other physical
objects. Similarly, how we recognize a particular face relies on particular features
of which we are only tacitly aware. We attend from the subsidiaries (the particulars of which one is only tacitly aware) to the focal act, and the subsidiaries have meaning only insofar as they bear on our focal awareness:

"when something is seen as subsidiary to a whole, this implies that it participates in sustaining the whole, and we may now regard this function as its meaning within the whole" (Personal Knowledge 58). Understanding both literal and metaphorical phrases involves tacit items; however, the way in which these items are involved to create meaning is unique to each enterprise. The difference involves our degree of personal involvement.

Coupled with tacit awareness is Polanyi’s belief that all knowledge has a personal base. In Personal Knowledge (1962), he contends that “the arts of doing and knowing, the valuation and understanding of meanings, are… only different aspects of the act of extending our person into the subsidiary awareness of particulars which compose a whole” (65). There is no case in which we can look at the world as it is apart from our means of construing it. Yet some patterns are better than others, and we constantly modify our anticipatory framework in order to achieve closer contact with reality. Polanyi (1962) contends that the personal is distinct from both the subjective and the objective:

I think we may distinguish between the personal in us, which actively enters into our commitments, and our subjective states, in which we merely endure our feelings. This distinction establishes the conception of the personal, which is neither subjective nor objective. In so far as the personal submits to the requirements acknowledged by itself independent of itself, it is not subjective; but in so far as it is
an action guided by individual passions, it is not objective either. It transcends the disjunction between the subjective and the objective. (300)

That the personal submits to requirements independent of itself suggests the social dimension of the personal. Nonetheless, our personal involvement varies according to the acts we are performing. Understanding a literal statement involves minimal personal involvement. On the other hand, a higher degree of personal involvement is required for understanding a metaphorical statement.

Polanyi (1975) argues that there are at least three kinds of semantic meaning: literal, symbolic, and metaphoric. Understanding literal statements relies on indication. The name of an object is like a finger pointing to an object. Just as the finger is subsidiary in that we attend to it only by following its direction to the object, so we are aware of the word only insofar as it directs our attention towards its referent. The literal use of language is a from-to relation in that the integration of tacit items into a focal whole is made from the self as centre to the object of our attention. In the case of symbolic meaning, the subsidiary items, as well as the focal object, are of intrinsic interest to us. A symbol such as a flag is of more interest than the reality it denotes because the tacit items involved in that reality become embodied in the symbol. A flag, if seen focally, is only a piece of coloured material, and as such, it has little interest for us unless we take into account our awareness or our society’s awareness of membership in a nation, the nation’s existence and history, and our memories of it. If we lacked such
awareness, either of our own or of our society’s, then we would not recognize the piece of coloured material as a symbol. Symbolization is self-giving in that the symbol is partially established by surrendering memories and experiences of the self into the focal object.

A further example might make this difference clearer: if clues in a context suggest a symbolic rather than a literal reading of the word ‘moon’ (if, for instance, it were part of the phrase ‘chaste moon’), then our intrinsic interest would not be captured by the focal meaning of the word ‘moon’. That is, our interest would not be in the moon’s shape, size, colour, distance from the earth, or even its status as an object. Instead, our intrinsic interest would rest on subsidiary clues such as the many ways this word has been used before and the place this word has in our culture. Its proximity to the word ‘chaste’ might suggest that it is symbolic of the goddess Diana. In the case of symbolism, the subsidiary clues (ideas, concepts, feelings about Diana) are more important than the reality to which the word points (the moon). The difference between indication and symbolization lies in the relation of the self (in a personal rather than a subjective way) to the process. In indication, the from-to relation ensures that the clues project away from the self as centre. In symbolization, the self (as conditioned by culture), because of the shift in intrinsic interest, becomes part of the meaning, and awareness of the object includes awareness of self.

The metaphorical is distinct from both the literal and the symbolic, though it contains elements of both. Being able to connect the diverse matters in a
metaphor into a whole is an instance of our ability to integrate clues into a focal
whole. In Meaning, Polanyi contends that “when a symbol embodying a
significant matter has a significance of its own and this is akin to the matter that it
embodies, the result is a metaphor” (78). This terse characterization of metaphor
is not entirely clear. From his earlier remarks, I take it that in a metaphor, both the
primary and the secondary subjects allow for simultaneous literal and symbolic
readings and that, together, the primary and secondary subjects create a joint
meaning that exceeds these two parts. The initial focal object (the secondary
subject) returns back to the subsidiary element (the primary subject) and enhances
its meaning so that the subsidiary element bears on and becomes embodied in the
focal object. Further, the subsidiary clues (the experiences in our lives that are
related to the two parts of a metaphor) are integrated into the joint meaning of the
primary and secondary subjects so that the metaphor embodies us in itself and
thereby emotionally affects us. What is literally absurd very often becomes,
through our determination to find coherent sense and our emotional investment,
powerful and moving.

Polanyi’s account deals nicely with the objections he raises to Black’s
account. He gives a more detailed explanation of how the two parts of metaphor
interact and he explains the emotive force of metaphor. Finally, Black (1993)
contends that a literal paraphrase cannot fully capture the meaning of a metaphor
because ambiguity is a necessary by-product of a metaphor’s suggestiveness.
Polanyi would disagree. A literal paraphrase can capture a metaphor’s meaning.
However, because a metaphor relies on hearers integrating disparate matters into a novel meaning, any metaphor will lose its force when paraphrased because the integration will be destroyed. This loss of force leaves us disappointed in the paraphrase.

Although Polanyi’s account of literal language as a kind of naming is less than persuasive, his characterization of metaphor as an integration of disparate matters into a focal whole captures how we understand particular instances of metaphor. He is surely correct in seeing metaphor as a coincidence between cognitive and emotive utterance. True, not all metaphors are emotive. Some, for example, are simply bits of technical language (for instance, ‘software’). Yet the many risqué comments about floppies and hard drives have shown us that the meanings of metaphors are highly unstable. Understanding a particular instance of metaphor involves a number of disparate matters, including reference, implication, association, allusion, connotation, nuance, and the discovery of pattern. In a metaphor, because the terms symbolize as well as refer, the objects do not have to be seen under their true descriptions (‘Sam is a gorilla’) nor do they have to exist (‘Sam is a dragon’). How we think of these objects is as important as what properties they actually possess. In William Shakespeare’s play A Midsummer Night’s Dream, the character of Oberon makes a veiled reference to Elizabeth I by suggesting that she is immune to the emotion of love:

But I might see young Cupid’s fiery shaft
Quenched in the chaste beams of the wat’ry moon,
And the imperial vot’ress passèd on,
In maiden meditation, fancy-free. (II.i.161-4)

Metaphors abound in this passage, but all seem to centre on the word ‘moon’.

Elizabeth I is the (implied) tenor and the moon is the vehicle. The word ‘moon’ is used symbolically to stand for Diana, the virgin goddess. The mention of the moon’s “chaste beams” suggests this symbolic reading. Yet the symbol is also metaphorical in that, as a metaphor, it alludes to Elizabeth’s reputation as the Virgin Queen for she is the “imperial vot’ress” who worships not the moon, but Diana. The figure is even more complicated in that love, symbolized as a fiery arrow shot from Cupid’s bow, is thwarted by the seemingly physical nature of the moon. The figure relies on the way in which water quenches fire, though the way in which the moon is “wat’ry” is not clearly stated. This adjective, if taken literally, means that the moon is composed of water. Metaphorically, however, the moon is “wat’ry” either because the moon appears to be watery or because the moon influences tides and inundation generally. If the latter, this adjective further flatters Elizabeth because England is a maritime nation, and Elizabeth, as its ruler, governs the seas. The meaning of this metaphor thus relies on an interaction between the primary and secondary subjects, and our understanding of it depends on immediate knowledge like the physical properties of the moon and such (less) immediate knowledge as that of the flattering of queens.

Polanyi is also persuasive when he presses on the importance of focus in understanding the workings of metaphor. The crucial role of focus can be clarified if we consider the difference between using language literally and using
it metaphorically. Although seeing metaphor as a deviance from literal language is controversial, we nevertheless need to make some distinction between metaphorical and literal language. Even if we contend that all language is metaphorical—at least in origin—we nevertheless need to hold apart those dead metaphors from the phrases we might currently consider metaphorical. Metaphorical and literal language permeate each other in two ways: our ordinary speech is a mixture of both and statements can be deemed one or the other depending on what we take to be literally true.

In his short article “A Postscript on Metaphor,” W.V. Quine (1978) notes that there are two ways in which a metaphorical term or phrase can become a literal term or phrase. First, repeated and consistent use of a metaphorical phrase renders it open to re-analysis; we re-evaluate our use of it. The phrase becomes a dead metaphor, and if this phrase is used because an equivalent literal phrase is lacking or unwieldy, it becomes the basis for a newly literal term. Here, we might think of a term like ‘tail-light’. This term might have its origin in metaphor, but we now literally assert that cars have tail-lights. Secondly, Quine argues that factual information can change our relation to metaphorical statements. Quine notes that the molecular theory of gases was once considered a metaphor. However, this insight lost its metaphorical status when it was discovered that gas literally is composed of particles. Quine concludes that while metaphor (or something like it) governs the growth of language, “what comes as a subsequent refinement is rather cognitive discourse itself, at its most dryly literal” (160).
Quine’s remarks paint only a partial picture of the movement of language between literal and metaphorical. There are also instances of literal language becoming metaphorical. The statements of discredited metaphysical theories have retained their usefulness by becoming metaphorical. Such metaphors recur in unlikely places, as when John Searle (1993) mentions the metaphor ‘she is bitter’. He contends that this metaphor and those like it point to the arbitrary basis of many metaphors. Contra Searle, this metaphor comes from the once widely held theory of humours. Statements once regarded as explanations of events are now seen as fanciful or poetic descriptions of those events. Moreover, if Lakoff and Johnson are even partially correct, then making the distinction between the metaphorical and the literal is at least as difficult as explaining it. According to them, many metaphors are difficult to identify because some metaphors structure our experience instead of describing or explaining it. Nevertheless, even they differentiate between the two in that concepts not comprehended through conceptual metaphor are literal. We can accept such a division even if we disagree with Lakoff (1993) that literal concepts are limited to concrete physical experience.

While these views are persuasive, the difficulty of definitively distinguishing between metaphorical and literal language can be explained otherwise. No one knowingly uses a metaphor to accurately and precisely describe the world. If I say ‘Sally is a pig’, I am saying something about her but I am not identifying her as a member of the category ‘pig’. In metaphor, we yoke two disparate matters that do
not commonly belong together. The challenge of understanding a given metaphor is to match this imaginative structure to the world. However, the interaction view is misleading in that it contends that metaphor gives us a new conceptual organization or perspective on some object. Rather, metaphor gives us a pattern of attention that includes the self, in the sense of involving the personal rather than the subjective. Any particular instance of metaphor directs our focus by shifting from an object in the world to the relation between the speaker of the metaphor and that object. When we use a literal statement, we are trying to capture how things are. If our literal statement is mistaken, we have nevertheless tried to capture how things seem to be even if we have not captured how things are. However, when we use a metaphorical statement, we are trying to capture how things seem to us in the sense of how they feel to us rather than how things are or how things seem to be. Making a metaphor is not a commitment to how the world is. Rather, it is a commitment to how the world feels to us. Holding these two apart is difficult, hence the difficulty of separating metaphorical and literal language.

Speaking of how something feels to us is to speak vaguely because the word ‘feel’ can variously mean exploring by touch, being emotionally affected, experiencing pleasurable or painful consciousness of an external fact or one’s own condition, being conscious or perceiving, or even expressing a belief or judgement. My use of this term is meant to indicate an awareness of things which involves our reference to things to a lesser extent than to how those things effect
us. Here, I use the term ‘feel’ in a quasi-passive sense in that something is felt to produce a certain impression on the senses or the sensibilities. Instances of something feeling to have a specified property are consequently tentative. For example, in the statement, ‘her hand feels rough,’ the emphasis is on how her hand feels rather than how the hand is. Such observations slide into simile or metaphor when how something feels to us is known to be different from how it actually is. If one knows that one is feeling a hand rather than anything else, one might nonetheless say, ‘her hand feels like leather’ or ‘her hand is leather’. One is aware of the metaphor because, no matter how it feels, one knows that it is a hand. To say how something seems to be to us, then, concerns affect rather than appearance.

My previous claim, that a metaphor directs our focus to a relationship between the object mentioned in the metaphor and the metaphor’s speaker, should be qualified. Metaphorical language directs our attention to a relation between the self and the world rather than to a relation between humans and their world—always remembering, of course, that the ‘self’ spoken of belongs to the category of the personal rather than the category of the subjective. In this sense, the self is not entirely singular in that metaphor is more than subjective or idiosyncratic. While the speaker is often taken into account, a metaphorical phrase that is too subjective will not be understood. For example, if someone abruptly says, ‘the letter E is yellow,’ we might assume (though we need not) that the speaker is using a metaphor but our understanding will go no further.
Consequently, it would be more correct to say that metaphor focuses our attention on a relationship between ourselves and a particular aspect of the world.

If metaphor results in a shift of focus, then we can see why many metaphors are self-revealing. Because the speaker is one pole of this relationship, her emotions and personal tastes cannot be left out of the account. Often, a metaphor can tell us more about the attitude of the speaker than it can about the referent being spoken of. For instance, if my friend Tom has just opened a string of soup kitchens, I might say to the reporter assigned to cover the opening that ‘he is a Mother Theresa’ or even that ‘he is Mother Theresa’. My comment would be admiring if I consider Mother Theresa to be emblematic of selfless sacrifice. Just as easily, though, my remark could be critical if, like Christopher Hitchens, I think that Mother Theresa is a tireless self-promoter. This metaphorical statement reveals little about its subject. However, it does reveal an emotional attitude that I, as the speaker, have toward Mother Theresa.

Metaphors are not idiosyncratic or purely subjective because they do not convey the discovery of new things so much as they convey knowledge of things we already know. While particular instances of metaphor can be startling, they nevertheless involve symbols that are publicly constructed and accessible. For example, in a large class of metaphors, humans are compared to animals. This practice is possible because of our previous practice of explaining animal behaviour in terms of human behaviour. Only later, as our stance toward the animal world changed, did we regard the statements arising from this initial
practice as unwarranted. Aesop’s Fables, for example, strictly relies on this practice. Later, we created metaphors asserting that humans were particular animals but did so only because we had earlier characterised animals as having these human characteristics. Consequently, current metaphors assert identity between the two in that humans are animals only insofar as animals are considered to have human characteristics. Lakoff and Johnson also note that our culture contains myriad metaphors that they see as conceptual mappings. These mappings spawn many different linguistic expressions that, according to them, nonetheless express the same metaphor. For example, the conceptual mapping LOVE IS A JOURNEY will generate linguistic expressions like ‘spinning our wheels’, ‘off the track’, and ‘on the rocks’. While we might quarrel with the centrality and extent they claim for these metaphors, such conceptual mappings can be identified. Although Searle’s theory of metaphor is very different, even he notes that there appear to be metaphorical groupings such as temperature metaphors (‘she is a warm person’, ‘Sally is cold’, ‘their relationship is lukewarm’). Our understanding of many metaphorical expressions relies on their relationship to such systems.

Even if we are struck by a metaphor’s novelty, its freshness does not stem from its conveying new information about the world. Rather, metaphor allows us to put together in a new way information that we already possess. If, for example, you say, ‘I live beside a pig,’ context might be needed in that I will not recognize your statement as metaphorical if you live next to a pig barn. However, context
can only help me so far. In order to understand your metaphor, I will also need to
know that your neighbour’s yard is a mess or that your neighbour insists on
erecting her fence inside your property line or that you have very strict notions
about cleanliness or what is someone’s due. I must already have some clue about
which facts will bear on your remark. If I do not already have such information
about you or your neighbour, I will be unable to limit the symbolic connotations
of ‘pig’. In this sense, a fresh metaphor can only be understood if it tells us what
we already know. Nonetheless, there is a difference between saying that
metaphors give no new knowledge and claiming that they convey no knowledge.

Emphasizing the focus of metaphorical statements allows us to recognize the
diversity of metaphor. Dead metaphors are dead because our experience of an
object and how that object is are now considered to be the same. Novel metaphors
allow us to look at an object in a new way whereas a dead metaphor does not.
Consequently, novel metaphors still retain the difference between the two.
Conceptual metaphors govern our way of seeing something to such an extent that
we can only with difficulty (or perhaps not at all) separate how we are seeing the
object from what it is. To say that statements once considered literal are now seen
to be metaphorical is to miss the point. A statement of the molecular theory of
gases was not once wrongly considered to be a metaphor. Rather, it was once a
metaphor in that it captured how gases seemed to be to us. Now, that same
statement is literal because it captures how gases are.
Possible Objections

One might assume that it follows from this theory that any sincere statement which is literally false is a metaphor, but this assumption would be wrong. While it is true that many metaphors are false when taken literally, not all metaphors are of this type. Moreover, many literally false statements are not metaphorical. Rather, they are erroneous attempts to describe how some aspect of the world is. Metaphors also describe how some aspect of the world is, but the description focuses only on how that aspect is in relation to us. The focus is on the relation rather than on the aspect of the world. When I claim that ‘Sally is a dragon’, I am not claiming that dragons exist and that Sally is such a creature. I am implying, however, that how I think of dragons is how I think (and perhaps how you ought to think) about Sally.

Moreover, not every sincere, enthusiastically affirmed nominative characterization is metaphorical. The statement, ‘Brenda is greedy’ is not metaphorical even though the statement, ‘Brenda is a pig’ is. The difference is that the first statement focuses on Brenda whereas the second statement focuses on a relation that includes the self. We can obviously say,

1. Brenda is greedy though she never appeared so to me.
2. Brenda is greedy though she always hid it in my presence.
3. Brenda is greedy though it took me a long time to realize it.

Moreover, these remarks are no odder or less easily understood if we replace ‘greedy’ by ‘pig’.
(4) Brenda is a pig though she never appeared so to me.

(5) Brenda is a pig though she always hid it in my presence.

(6) Brenda is a pig though it took me a long time to realise it.

In spite of our easy understanding, these statements are not synonymous. Apparently, Brenda would possess the property of being greedy whether or not anyone recognized her as having this property. On the other hand, her being a pig, metaphorically speaking, depends on how we regard pigs and our choosing to regard Brenda in the same way. Yet the focus does not thereby shift from Brenda to the speaker. For example, given that a metaphor expresses how the world seems or feels, the statement, ‘To me [as in ‘to my way of thinking’ or ‘in my opinion’], Brenda is a pig’ might strike us as redundant. However, that this statement and others like it are not redundant supports rather than undermines this explanation of metaphor. Such a statement involves the self in two ways rather than one. The metaphor, ‘Brenda is a pig’ involves the self in a personal way. Adding to this metaphor the phrase, ‘to me...’ involves the self once more but, this time, in a subjective way.

One could perhaps agree that metaphor provides a pattern of attention yet resist the further claim that such a pattern includes the self. Such resistance is understandable if one concentrates on certain kinds of metaphors. Dead metaphors, for example, lack a first-person quality. However, the absence of a felt quality does not mean that the self is no longer part of the pattern. The personal is not the subjective. Metaphorical phrases focus on an experience, a relation
between us and an object (or aspect of the world) rather than on the object itself. If I tell you that 'the neck of the bottle' is too narrow for my purpose, I might not recognize this shift of focus. Similarly, I might not recognize that I have used a metaphor. In spite of my lack of recognition, I have used a metaphor and a shift of focus has occurred. Those who recognize the phrase as metaphorical focus not on the bottle but on how the bottle's shape reminds them of the shape of a human body.

Some of the consequences of this theory might appear untenable. The first consequence involves the question of metaphorical truth. If a metaphor is never a commitment to how the world is, then it seems that one could never object to a metaphorical statement on the grounds of factual error. For example, I might say, 'Sally is a pig'. You might say that this statement is untrue because Sally is a human being. However, this objection only concerns the literal truth of my statement. You might equally question the truth of my statement by pointing out Sally's many unselfish acts of kindness. It would seem that on the present account of metaphor, I could easily reply that I am not commenting on how Sally is but only on how she seems or feels to me. Yet such a view would shift the focus to the speaker instead of keeping it on the relation between the primary subject, the secondary subject, and the self. Consequently, this reply would not end the matter. Your recourse to factual information—that Sally has been the author of many instances of kindness and consideration—is more than a statement about Sally. Because it is a reply to my metaphorical remark, it is also a questioning of
my view of Sally. How I view Sally is a part of how the world is. My metaphor is not straightforwardly untrue so much as it is inapt. If, for example, I explain that Sally does not even own a broom, then my metaphor is apt in spite of her kindness. If, however, my metaphor was a comment on her selfishness, then unless I can produce my own litany of Sally's many unkind acts, your objection would stand and the aptness of metaphor would be deemed questionable.

Another consequence concerns the difficulty of paraphrasing metaphors. Donald Davidson, in his essay "What Metaphors Mean," asks why, "if a metaphor has a special cognitive content, [...] it should] be so difficult or impossible to set it out" (42). Davidson's question introduces the notorious open-ended quality of metaphor, our unwillingness to accept that the full meaning of a living metaphor can be captured in any one paraphrase. Black explains this difficulty by contending that all metaphors are ambiguous. Polanyi argues that the integration of the parts to the whole is necessarily lost when a metaphor is paraphrased. I would agree with Polanyi in that our disappointment in the paraphrasing of metaphor is hardly surprising if we allow that metaphor directs our attention to our relation with an object instead of to the object itself. Often, the difference between a metaphor and its paraphrase hinges on the focus of our attention. For example, if we paraphrase the metaphor 'man is a wolf' by saying that the literal phrase 'man is vicious' captures its meaning, we can see that while the paraphrase asserts something about man, namely, that he is vicious, it says nothing about where we stand in relation to man and wolves. The focus of the paraphrase is
simply different from the focus of the metaphor. Nonetheless, this difference of focus does not mean that paraphrase is impossible. A closer paraphrase could capture the focus of a metaphor by including the process whereby we arrived at the conclusion that ‘man is a wolf’ could be paraphrased by saying that man is vicious. Such a paraphrase would thus articulate where we stand, our point-of-view. Even then, this expanded paraphrase might not entirely capture our position vis-à-vis the object. Given that metaphorical language focuses on the relation between the self and the world, an exact paraphrase might sometimes have to capture what might be impossible—the first-person quality of metaphors. In spite of the shared cognitive content, there is a felt difference between my reporting my pain by saying ‘I am in pain’ and you reporting my pain by saying ‘she is in pain’.

Here, one might object that both statements, ‘man is vicious’ and ‘man is a wolf’, express the speaker’s point of view in relation to man. In one sense, this objection is valid in that both statements reflect the speaker’s belief. However, this objection is not telling in that the literal statement is a commitment to voicing (rightly or wrongly) how the world is whereas such is not the case with the statement ‘man is a wolf’ because, literally speaking, we know that man is not a wolf. This metaphorical statement relies on how we think of wolves as much as it relies on what we think of man. Depending on our changing cultural assumptions about wolves, this metaphor could as easily mean that man acts in a group or that man is a mixture of predatory and familial impulses. If we choose to privilege the mythic dimension of wolves, this phrase could even mean that man is a sexual
predator, though this last might limit the meaning of the word ‘man’. The
speaker’s point of view is involved in that the rich associations suggested by the
metaphor arise from the relation rather than from the object itself. Man is not
literally a wolf but we sometimes regard man in the same way that we regard
wolves.

The personal, however, sits uneasily between the subjective and the
objective. Different people could understand in different ways the same metaphor
used on a particular occasion of utterance. For example, two people may hear
about a guilty verdict in a court case. The person who agrees with the verdict may
say ‘justice is blind’ and thereby imply the impartiality of the justice system. The
other person, disagreeing with the verdict, may agree that ‘justice is blind’ but
thereby imply that dispensing justice is an impossible task. This second rendering
is not an example of irony because the speaker does not mean that justice is not
blind or that justice is not impartial. Rather, she means what she says, that is, that
those who are blind are unable to see clearly and so are unable to see the truth.
Even if two people agree on the same rough paraphrase for a metaphor, they may
reach this paraphrase by different methods. For example, the metaphor ‘Sally is a
block of ice’ has been analyzed in two different ways though the resultant
paraphrase, that Sally is emotionally cold, is roughly the same.

Conclusion

Although there is great variety in metaphor, common features can be
disclosed. Metaphor may make us attend to a likeness between two or more
things, but metaphor is more discursive than comparison. It provides us with a pattern of attention instead of a description, and this pattern includes the self. When we use a metaphorical statement, we commit ourselves to capturing how things feel or seem to us rather than how things are or how things seem to be. Involvement of the self is evidenced in several ways: many metaphors have an emotive or evaluative force; the same metaphor used on the same occasion of utterance can be understood in different ways; even if the same metaphor used on the same occasion of utterance receives the same rough paraphrase, how people arrive at that paraphrase may vary; finally, many metaphors are self-revealing. While the self is also involved in literal statements, the focus of our attention is different. Literal statements try to capture how things are when seen from no particular point of view. Metaphorical statements focus on the relation between the self and some aspect of the world. Metaphors thus have both cognitive and emotive value. This focus reveals aspects of the self and aspects of the world as they are in relation to each other.

Renford Bambrough, while arguing in *Reason, Truth, and God* that we know more than we can say, uses the example of a man who spends his life studying information about the Rocky Mountains. When he finally sees these mountains, he may “find that he has nothing to say about them that has not been said a hundred times before, even if he now sees much that he had not seen when those words were said to him” (120). Bambrough suggests that the man would be unable to articulate his new knowledge. Yet we need not acquiesce in
Bambrough's acceptance of defeat. Such knowledge is more than his emotional reaction to the scene now presented to him. The mountains have not changed but his relation to them has; accordingly, the pattern in which and by which he perceives the mountains is now different. It is possible that the man could communicate some of this knowledge by using a metaphor. Metaphors allow us to articulate a different perspective from which we perceive novel patterns and connections between well-known facts and circumstances. Consequently, although our ordinary speech is replete with metaphors, we do not consciously use a metaphorical expression when we think a literal one will do as well.
CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING STATEMENTS IN AND ABOUT FICTION

Just as the concept of point of view has a place in the understanding of metaphor, so, I shall argue, this concept is useful for explaining how we understand statements in and about works of fiction. Because Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe, as set out in *Mimesis as Make-Believe* (1990), is both comprehensive and convincing, I use his theory as the basis for my account of how we understand statements in and about fictional works. Although his theory is not free of problems, I argue that such problems as do exist can be countered by introducing the concept of point of view into his theory of make-believe.

**The Problem**

How we understand statements in and about works of fiction is problematic because questions arise concerning reference and existence. The use of a singular subject expression in true or false simple statements is ordinarily its referential use, and the statement’s truth or falsity can usually be accounted for, semantically, in terms of reference to entities in the actual world. That is, a statement is true if the referent of the subject expression exists and if the predicate holds of that subject. Fictional characters, however, do not exist. If they do not exist, then they are nothing. Nothing, as nothing, has no properties—at least, no such properties as those we attribute to fictional characters. Yet in statements in and about fictional works we speak as if the subjects do have...
properties, and we seem able to make true and false statements about them. If I say ‘Gretel has a brother’, I seem to have said something true. By using the proper name ‘Gretel’ and adding to it the predicate ‘has a brother’, I have appeared to refer to Gretel and attributed to her a property. I can differentiate her from other fictional characters (‘Gretel has a brother whereas Rapunzel is an only child’) or apparently say false things about her (‘Gretel was eaten by the witch’). Even if we hold that all statements that contain the proper names of fictional characters are false, we must explain why the falsity of ‘Gretel was eaten by the witch’ strikes us differently from the falsity of ‘Gretel is Hansel’s sister’. The felt differences between these statements would seem to negate Gareth Evans’ rendering of the Russell Principle, that it is not possible to make a judgment about an object without knowing what object you are making a judgment about (Varieties of Reference 65). We do seem able to discuss Gretel even though there is no actual person that we might have in mind. Because Gretel does not actually exist, we need an account of how we understand statements that discuss her apparent properties and thereby express true and false statements about her.

Given that sentences occurring in fictional works or sentences about fictional characters share the same lexical components and grammatical constructions as ordinary literal statements, distinguishing such sentences from ordinary ones has led philosophers to argue either that a fictional character is an object of some kind (as in Meinongian-type theories) or that such sentences can be logically paraphrased in a way that would isolate or otherwise eliminate the problematic
reference. Theories that attempt to eliminate problematic referring terms must explain why the same sentence can apparently behave in very different ways. We must consider what is meant, for instance, by the sentence ‘Emma Woodhouse... had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world’ occurring in Jane Austen’s novel *Emma*. We might see this occurrence of the sentence as unproblematic because Jane Austen is the author. Consequently, we see her as creating rather than as describing this fictional personage. The statement is false (or lacks a truth value) because ‘Emma Woodhouse’ lacks a referent. This failure to refer does not disturb us, however, because we do not regard Austen as intending to refer. On the other hand, if a critic writing about *Emma* says that ‘Emma Woodhouse... had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world’, the sentence appears to behave differently. If we are tempted to think that the critic’s utterance of this sentence is the same as Austen’s, we need only compare this sentence to the sentence, ‘Emma Woodhouse is introduced in the first line of the novel’. The critic’s utterance of the sentence ‘Emma Woodhouse had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world’ apparently has a status different from Austen’s because the statement ‘Emma Woodhouse is a character in Jane Austen’s novel *Emma*’ is true, and the critic is simply and accurately describing this character. In other words, the critic is presumably describing an independent reality whereas Austen is not. Consequently, we are less comfortable accepting that statements like the critic’s are false or lack a truth value.
Given that the two instances of the sentence ‘Emma Woodhouse...had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world’ occur in two different contexts, we might be tempted to assume that a term like ‘Emma Woodhouse’ functions differently in different contexts. Within the context of the novel, the author uses the term ‘Emma Woodhouse’ to create rather than to refer, but in another context the term refers to the fictional character Emma. While this explanation is plausible, it is not a solution because fictional contexts are permeable. The same fictional character can appear in different works by the same author or even in different works by different authors. A context limited to a particular work or even to the works of a particular author will thus be inadequate. Moreover, we can compare fictional characters to actual people as when I say, ‘My neighbor is as forgiving as Desdemona’. Sometimes, as in Truman Capote’s Côte Basque, actual events are reported, though the actual people involved in these events are given fictional names. Other times, as in historical novels, actual historical figures are introduced into the novel. If we assume that sentences occurring within a work of fiction behave in such a way that reference of singular subject terms is suspended, then we have difficulty accounting for apparent reference to actual persons, objects, and events.

**Kendall Walton’s Theory**

Accounting for how we understand statements in and about works of fiction is the central task of Kendall L. Walton’s *Mimesis as Make-Believe*. Walton’s theory is the most persuasive of those that have emerged because it recognizes
that even though the sentences comprising literary works of fiction are not true, and we know that they are not true, they nonetheless influence how we see ourselves and others. Walton’s position is in opposition to the two most influential trends of how to account for statements in and about works of fiction. Meinongian-type theories that hold that there are non-actual objects satisfactorily explain our responses to works of fiction, for instance, why we are moved by Othello’s despair or Desdemona’s plight. Yet such theories are ultimately unconvincing because they involve unnecessary reification. Insisting that we cannot be moved unless there is some kind of object which might move us leaves little room for the role of the imagination in understanding works of fiction. Accounts stemming from theories of language, particularly those based on speech-act theory, are also inadequate. While they allow for the pretence involved in understanding statements in works of fiction, by itself pretence is not enough because not all pretending to assert produces fiction. Moreover, seeing fiction as the result of suspending the ordinary commitments associated with illocutionary acts suggests that these theories ultimately see fictional uses of language as aberrant from and parasitic on prosaic or serious uses of language. They tend to imply that serious language is central to our lives whereas fictional uses produce unnecessary ornaments. Walton’s theory of fiction is attractive because it avoids these unpleasant consequences.

According to Kendall Walton’s *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, a game of make-believe (that is, an exercise of the imagination involving props) has rules
requiring its participants to imagine that certain matters are true. Props are objects
that prompt imaginings, are the objects of imaginings, and, most importantly, they
"are generators of fictional truths, things which, by virtue of their nature or
existence, make propositions fictional" (37). An object is a prop in a game of
make-believe, then, if it plays a central role in bringing about that particular
imaginings are mandated for players of the game. The agreements participants
make about what to imagine are rules prescribing certain imaginings (39). If a
participant later forgets or refuses to imagine what was agreed upon, then she is
breaking the rule, playing the game improperly. Rules can be both categorical and
conditional (if certain circumstances obtain, then certain things are to be
imagined). Props generate fictional truths in such games. For example, if children
are playing a game in which they imagine that tree stumps are bears, then certain
rules obtain. It is a (conditional) rule that if a stump occupies a certain spot, then
one must imagine that a bear occupies that spot. The stumps, as props, generate
fictional truths in that the positions of the bears depend on the positions of the
stumps: "the fictionality of the proposition that there is a bear at a certain place
consists in the fact that imagining is prescribed by a rule of the game" (40). If
there are four stumps in the yard, then there are four bears in the yard. If, halfway
through the game, a fifth stump is discovered in a clump of bushes and one of the
children says, 'A fifth bear is lurking in the bushes', then her statement will be
fictionally true.
Walton extends these observations to works of fiction. The proper response to a work of fiction is to imagine rather than to believe, and so a work of fiction is a prop in a game of make-believe. The work—as prop—generates fictional truths because it mandates the imagining of propositions and “a fictional truth consists in there being a prescription or mandate in some context to imagine something” (39). Fiction is best understood in terms of function in that a work is a fiction if it serves as a prop in a game of make-believe. Instead of eliciting belief, the propositions generated by a work of fiction prescribe that we are to make-believe that there are such objects as are referred to and described by the words of the work. We can, of course, use a work however we like. We could, for example, read only the first five paragraphs of every chapter. Still, in an authorized game, there are rules or conventions about how a work is to be used in that appreciators of a work (that is, those who appreciate the function of the work) are subject to prescriptions, deriving from the rules of the game and the nature of the work, to imagine the propositions that are fictional in that work (60). A work’s function is to serve in authorized games of make-believe, and a game is authorized if the principles whereby fictional works are generated are accepted ones for that work. Appreciators of the work become participants in a game authorized by the work and thereby act within the scope of the game. Because Emma is a prop in a game of make-believe, appreciators become participants in the game by making believe that ‘Emma Woodhouse’ is a genuine proper name referring to a woman who has particular properties and is involved in certain events. When an appreciator
comments on some detail in the work, she is not making a comment about a fictional world. Rather, she is making believe that she is commenting on the real world (394). In other words, she is pretending that the fictional characters are real people and that the fictional events related actually occurred.

According to Walton, each work has a fictional world, a world associated with the statements that compose the text and propositions inferred from them according to principles of generation. For example, because *Emma* contains a scene in which Emma attends a picnic, it can be inferred (unless otherwise stated) that Emma has a mouth, can use eating utensils, and so on. That Emma and her fellow characters always use carriages or ride on horses indicates that cars are not part of the world of the work. To speak of the fictional world of the novel *Emma* is to use a shorthand to refer to the class of propositions that are *Emma*-fictional. A proposition is fictional if it is true in a fictional world. A proposition is *Emma*-fictional if it is true in the world of *Emma*. The novel generates fictional truths independently of what anyone does or does not imagine because of the words constituting the work. Walton warns against identifying fictional worlds with the possible worlds of logic. Unlike possible worlds, fictional worlds are sometimes impossible and usually incomplete. As Gareth Evans (1982) notes in *Varieties of Reference*, there is a further difference, for in possible worlds the information we receive is not illusory, whereas "the initial supposition generating the game of make-believe within which we make conniving use of empty singular terms is that certain information, which is in fact deceptive, is information from actual
objects and events” (355). In other words, we suppose that the information is instantiated rather than being possible or conditional.

Just as works have fictional worlds, so do games of make-believe using those works as props. Walton distinguishes the two kinds of worlds in that the propositions fictional in an appreciator’s game will not be exactly the same as those fictional in the world of the work. Appreciators participate in games authorized by works of fiction. For example, it will be fictional in an appreciator’s game that the appreciator imagines Emma falling in love with Mr. Knightley. However, the reader is not among the characters of the novel and this fictional truth will thus not be part of the world of the work. Consequently, the two worlds are distinct (59). Walton contends that if a particular work is used as a prop in a game of make-believe, then the world of the work and the world of the game will share many of the same fictional truths: “the propositions fictional in the world of a game are those whose fictionality is generated by virtue of the principles and props of the game—the propositions which, because of the principles in force and the nature of the props, are to be imagined by the participants in the game” (59). A proposition is fictional if it is true in a fictional world. What is fictional in a work is accounted for by what is fictional in games using the work as a prop: “what is fictional in La Grande Jatte is what is (or would be) fictional in any game in which it is the function of the painting to serve as a prop, and whose fictionality in such games is generated by the painting alone” (60). One can play a game authorized by a work of fiction but one does not
thereby enter a fictional world. Such worlds are not "real" nor is there a "space" in which one might discover such a world. Nonetheless, by participating in the game, the appreciator belongs to the world of the game though she does not belong to the world of the work of fiction. Just as the fictional truths generated by a work can be compatible with the fictional truths generated by a game of make-believe authorized for that work, so what is fictional can also be true. It is both William Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*-fictional and true that Caesar was assassinated. However, it is not this occasional congruence which give fictional worlds whatever objectivity they possess. Rather, the props themselves give fictional worlds a kind of objectivity by making them independent of individual imaginers.

Walton's theory of make-believe finds a place for the imagination in the appreciation of works of fiction and ensures that the notion of fiction is different from rather than parasitic on serious discourse. More specifically, his theory accounts for both sentences occurring in works of fiction and statements made about works of fiction. Austen's statement "Emma Woodhouse...had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world" could be explained by holding that Austen is making believe that she has knowledge of a woman named Emma and the events in which this woman is involved. Gareth Evans (1982) toys with this view, but Walton rejects it as unnecessary. The status of a work as fiction does not depend on the intention or attitude of its author: "a thing may be said to have the function of serving a certain purpose, regardless of the intentions of its maker, if things of
that kind are typically or normally meant by their makers to serve that purpose.” (52). The correctness of Walton’s view can be seen by recognizing that some works of fiction lack such an intention on the part of the author. Geoffrey Chaucer’s incomplete work The Legend of Good Women relates the lives of several women, a group including the mythical Ariadne as well as the historical Cleopatra. In his Prologue, he testifies to the truth of his poem by invoking authority:

```
Than mote we to bokes° that we fynde,
Thurgh whiche that olde thinges ben in mynde,
And to the doctrine of these olde wyse,
Yeve° credence, in every skylful wise,
That tellen of these olde approved stories
Of holynesse, of regnes, of victories,
Of love, of hate, of other sondry thynges,
Of whiche I may not maken rehersynge.
And yf that olde bokes were awey,
Yloren° were of remembrance the key.
Wel ought us thanne honouren and beleve
These bokes, there we han noon other preve. (17—28)
```

These verses suggest that he sees the name ‘Ariadne’ as having the same status as ‘Cleopatra’ in that both proper names refer to personages who once existed. On the other hand, that Chaucer feels compelled to justify his use of these “bokes” indicates that his contemporaries are beginning to question whether, as we might put it, these proper names are empty or genuine. Regardless of whether or not he intends his contemporaries to understand the statements made in his poem as a matter of belief rather than as a prescription to imagine, the poem’s value lies in
its status as fiction. Make-believe is located in the attitudes of readers, attitudes formed by tradition and common practice, rather than in the attitudes of writers. Walton explains statements made about works of fiction by showing how each type involves make-believe:

1. sentences apparently referring to fictional characters. Appreciators are expected to play games of kinds authorized for the works they appreciate and, when they participate verbally, to make it fictional of themselves that they speak truths. The critic, by saying ‘Emma Woodhouse has lived nearly twenty-one years in the world’, is claiming that to pretend as she does is to make it fictional of herself, in a game authorized by Emma, that she speaks truly. Walton conceives of the following principle: “when a participant in a game of make-believe authorized by a given representation [work] fictionally asserts something by uttering an ordinary statement and in so doing makes a genuine assertion, what she genuinely asserts is true if and only if it is fictional in the game that she speaks truly” (399). Given that it is fictional in the participant’s authorized game that she speaks truly, what she asserts is true.

2. sentences involving comparisons of fictional characters from different works. If the critic says ‘Emma Woodhouse is more willful than Elizabeth Bennett’, she is involved in a game of make-believe, albeit an unofficial game. That is, the game is unofficial in that it is authorized by a combination of works of fiction. Walton would paraphrase this statement as ‘there are degrees of
willfulness p and q, where p > q, such that it is fictional in Emma that Emma Woodhouse is willful to degree p and it is fictional in Pride and Prejudice that Elizabeth Bennett is willful to degree q’ (413).

3. sentences containing genuine proper names occurring in fictional works or games of make-believe. If a critic says, in a game authorized by the Holmes stories, that ‘Holmes lives in London’, ‘Holmes’ does not refer but ‘London’ is referential and takes its actual reference. ‘London has Holmes as one of its residents’ expresses a fictional truth about London (105, 115).

4. sentences which betray the fiction. If a speaker says, ‘In Austen’s novel Emma, Emma is the youngest daughter’, in using the name ‘Emma’, she is, while betraying the pretense, pretending to refer to something or alluding to a kind of pretending-to-refer. She is asserting that in a game authorized by Emma, so pretending is fictionally to refer successfully. On the other hand, if a critic says, ‘Emma is a fictional character’, her statement is not fictional in a game authorized by Emma because in games authorized by Emma, it is fictional that ‘Emma’ refers to an actual person. He suggests that there may be an unofficial game in which there are two kinds of people—real people and fictional characters (423). An unofficial game arises by devising one on our own or by modifying an authorized one by altering the principles whereby works contribute to the generation of fictional truths (406). When a critic says, ‘Emma is a fictional character’, she fictionally refers and attributes a
pretend property, that of being a character. By engaging in this pretense, she
betrays the pretense that in an authorized game, she is referring.

A Problem with Walton's Theory

Some might argue that making believe is different from imagining. While
children engage in both, adults (generally) only engage in the latter. The two
activities are phenomenologically different. While this criticism is correct in
pointing out that imagining and making believe are distinct activities, Walton
argues not that the two are phenomenologically different but that making believe
is a particular kind of imagining. Imagining is a versatile activity: on one occasion
one can determine what to imagine whereas on another, what one imagines comes
unbidden; one can imagine in isolation or in concert with others; imaginations
can be sustained or momentary; and one can imagine with or without props. On
the other hand, make-believe, as Walton uses this term, always relies on props.
Consequently, it is less flexible than imagining. One is not free to imagine just
anything because props generate rules about what can be imagined. Moreover, the
prop, as an actual object, makes the narrower imagining of make-believe social
rather than solitary in that anyone playing a game authorized for the prop will
imagine much the same thing. As long as one is playing the game, the make-
believe is sustained. A game of make-believe is not a daydream or a reverie, but
all are particular cases of imagining.

Still others might balk at the notion that a work of fiction is a prop in a game
of make-believe. If a child picks up a stick and makes believe that it is a gun, her
game is open to myriad variations in that she can make up the rules as she goes along. Such is not the case with a work of fiction because the rules are more rigidly prescribed. Walton addresses this worry by arguing that props such as the child’s stick are used for a single game of make-believe on a particular occasion whereas other props are not (51-3). For example, although a stick can on occasion be a prop, a Barbie doll has the function of being a prop whereas the stick does not. Function arises from rules about how things are to be used. These rules stem from tradition, common practice or convention and are society relative. In this society, dolls have a make-believe function but in other societies, they may not. Unlike the stick, the Barbie doll is meant to be a prop in certain kinds of games, games that generate certain fictional truths such as the doll being regarded as a person. The Barbie doll is not designed for any particular, individual game; rather, it serves as a prop in any game authorized for it. It is the Barbie doll’s function to serve as such a prop even if the doll is never played with and instead only forms part of someone’s collection. Walton contends that a work of fiction is more like a Barbie doll than a stick.

At first glance, there seems little resemblance between activities involving sticks, Barbie dolls, and works of fiction. What we do, for example, when we are reading a novel seems very different from what we might do if we were playing with a stick or a doll. Certainly, the physical aspects of such activities are very different. Emotionally or imaginatively, however, crucial differences are less easy to detect. Although childhood games are sometimes deemed mere amusement,
they are often played with a seriousness that belies this label. The difference between games involving a stick, a Barbie doll, and a work of fiction is the degree of freedom allowed by the prop. A stick can be used in a game of make-believe, but no games are authorized for it. Consequently, anything about the stick might be imagined in any game we care to play with it. The Barbie doll has games authorized for it. In any authorized game, Barbie is imagined as a beautiful female. It may be the case that if the participants lack a Ken doll, they could imagine that the Barbie doll is Ken. However, such freedom of imagination exceeds the rules of the games authorized for the doll. Finally, games involving works of fiction allow for even less freedom of imagination because in games authorized for works of fiction, the rules are strictly prescribed. Such rules can be overridden, but if done, the game becomes unauthorized. The constraints imposed by a work of fiction make for a more sophisticated game than could be played with a doll or a stick. Because it is understood that certain objects function as props in certain kinds of games, the rules of the game do not have to be established each time it is played. The relevant principles of generation are already in place. Creators of props can thus predict how their creations will be used and “insofar as it is the object’s recognized function to be a prop in certain kinds of games, the principles are likely to seem natural, to be accepted automatically, to be internalized, and the prescribed imaginings are likely to occur spontaneously” (53).
One might also argue that the role of a prop in a game of make-believe and the role of a work of fiction in one’s imaginative appropriation of it is, at best, only analogous. The two roles are distinct in that, for example, a reader does not typically pause in the middle of reading a work of fiction to imagine other doings and sayings of the characters than those described in the work. A work of fiction is like an elaborately constructed object that one observes but does not play with. Rather, one imaginatively enters into the world of the work.

While this view is persuasive, it does not fully account for how one interacts with a work of fiction. While one may not imagine in detail undocumented doings and sayings of the characters, one’s assumption while reading a work of fiction is that such doings and sayings occur. When a character is said to leave the room, one assumes that the character leaves by the usual method unless otherwise specified. Moreover, a consideration of what is usual indicates the active role played by a reader of a work of fiction. Different interpretations of the same work of fiction arise based on what individual readers deem as being usual.

For example, different interpretations of Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein arise because of controversy over whether or not Victor Frankenstein loves his foster-sister, Elizabeth. Victor frequently professes his great love for Elizabeth and his passionate desire to marry her. Yet these statements are being evaluated by a reader who has beliefs about how men behave when they are in love. Readers expect a character professing love to conform to—or at least, not to violate—these beliefs. Consequently, in spite of the character’s sayings, the
reader notes that Victor neglects to write to Elizabeth for several years. When Elizabeth’s letter to Victor concludes with gossip about the several marriages of her friends, Victor finds the relevant passage unremarkable. Although Victor repeatedly insists on Elizabeth’s centrality in his life, he does not discuss marriage with her until his father urges him to do so. Immediately after proposing to Elizabeth, Victor leaves for several months. While away, he half-creates and then destroys a mate for the Creature. In response, the Creature vows to be with Victor on his wedding night. Victor immediately interprets the Creature’s remark as a threat against his life. He marries Elizabeth without telling her about what he believes will occur on their wedding night. He does not realize the actual threat conveyed by the Creature’s remark until the moment of Elizabeth’s death.

These events are related in the novel, but it is up to the reader to interpret them. One might see this pattern of events as suggesting that Victor does not love Elizabeth. One might consequently conclude that because the Creature is Victor’s creation and they share a life force, he is Victor’s creature. That is, he is the instrument of Victor’s darkest unconscious desires. His murder of Elizabeth fulfills Victor’s desire to have Elizabeth removed from his life. On the other hand, one might simply accept Victor’s claims about loving Elizabeth and conclude that her death is just one more instance of the Creature’s malevolence. One may consider a reader as entering into the world of the work, but in this case, the world of the work may or may not be one in which Victor loves Elizabeth. Characterizing our engagement with a work of fiction as entering into the world
of the work suppresses or ignores all that the individual reader brings to a reading of that work. We are able to re-read works of fiction with interest and enjoyment because there is not one correct interpretation of a work of fiction. Walton's contention that our engagement with a work of fiction is a game captures the reader's active role whereas seeing this engagement as entering into the world of the work renders the reader passive.

While Walton might convince us of the role of make-believe and the nature of props, his theory falters in one major area. Although Walton's theory appears to explain most kinds of sentences involving proper names of fictional characters, difficulties arise in cases where it seems implausible that pretense is involved. When we are engaged with a work of fiction, we do play a game of make-believe. We pity Othello and fear for Desdemona even though we know that what we are watching are only actors on a stage and that the actress will not actually die. At other times, however, we feel ourselves observing and describing instead of participating, and it is at those times that Walton's explanation falters. Two questions arise about Walton's treatment of remarks like 'Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character'. First, I question whether a critic who is making this remark is pretending or playing a game of make-believe. Secondly, whether or not a critic is so pretending, I question whether the property of being a fictional character is itself a pretend property.

The details of Walton's theory become less convincing as he moves from considering an appreciative reading of a fictional work to considering a critical
analysis of it. Walton is most convincing when he argues that appreciators of a fictional work participate in a game of make-believe authorized by that work. As Evans (1982) notes, such developments could easily occur in children’s games of make-believe. In a mud pie game, if a dispute arises over how many pies each child has, their fathers might become involved. One father might say to the other, ‘Your boy started out with three pies, right out of the oven. Then he gave one to Mary, and ate one—he should only have one left’ (364). The fathers, being appreciators of the game, exploit the pretense and are therefore participants in the game. Similarly, a reader who says (1) ‘Emma Woodhouse has a sister’ is exploiting the pretense in a game authorized by Emma. However, not all talk about what goes on in the novel exploits pretense in the same way. Walton acknowledges that a critic who says, for instance, (2) ‘Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character’ is not playing a game authorized by the novel because in games authorized by the novel, Emma is a person rather than a character. Walton deals with (2) by contending that when a speaker says ‘Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character’, the speaker is participating in an unofficial game in which it is fictional that there are “real” people and fictional characters. However, his contention that such remarks are still fictional because part of an unauthorized game is not convincing.

While the comment ‘Emma Woodhouse has a sister’ informs us about a detail in the novel, the comment ‘Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character’ would appear to provide us with a detail about the fictional status of the novel or
at least of some set of sentences within it. The difference is not difficult to
discern. The cultural critic Elaine Showalter, in her essay “Representing Ophelia:
Women, Madness, and the Responsibilities of Feminist Criticism,” notes that
many feminist critics believe Ophelia’s ‘story’ should be told, that is, that her
behaviour and subsequent madness should be explained by exploring her betrayal
at the hands of her father, brother, lover, court or society. Showalter, on the other
hand, argues that the ‘story’ of Ophelia that could more fruitfully be told would
be the history of her representation evident in painting, photography, psychiatry,
literature, and theatrical production. These two versions of what constitutes
Ophelia’s ‘story’ mirror the focus evidenced by comments (1) and (2) about
Emma Woodhouse. In the first version, feminist critics are participants in a game
authorized by Shakespeare’s Hamlet. In Showalter’s version, I would argue that
no game is being played.

Equally implausibly, Walton further contends that the speaker who says
‘Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character’ not only fictionally refers to
something by means of the name ‘Emma Woodhouse’, but that she also pretends
a property is being specified by the predicate ‘is a fictional character’, even
though there is no such property as that of being a fictional character (423). The
speaker is only pretending that the words ‘is a fictional character’ pick out a
property. Yet Walton gives no reason for declaring that being a fictional character
is a pretend property other than his desire to paraphrase away all possible
references of empty proper names. According to Walton, to assert ‘Gregor Samsa
is a fictional character’ is to play a game while betraying the pretense. We can abandon the pretense by saying ‘there is no such thing (or person) as Gregor Samsa’ or ‘‘Gregor Samsa” does not denote anything’ (423). Walton resists the claim that the difference between genuine proper names and empty proper names hinges on the question of existence. Yet while his rendering of how one might abandon the pretense is not the same as a paraphrase of ‘Gregor Samsa is a fictional character’, he has left us no other way of distinguishing between “real” people and fictional characters because the predicate ‘is a fictional character’ does not specify an actual property. Here, then, he appears to see the difference between “real” people and fictional characters as strictly one of ontological status, as if they were the same except for existence or lack thereof.

Franz Brentano (1911, 1960), in his essay “Presentation and Judgment Form Two Distinct Fundamental Classes,” argues that propositions like ‘the centaur is a poetic fiction’ cannot be reduced to existential propositions. He agrees that the proposition ‘a centaur is a poetic fiction’ requires that a centaur should not exist. However, in order to be true, the proposition requires that something else exist, namely a poetic fiction which prescribes one to imagine an object combining the upper parts of a human with the body and legs of a horse. The proposition can be paraphrased as ‘there is a centaur imaginatively created by poets’. He argues that predicates, like adjectives, can modify as well as enrich their subjects. The difference between ‘a man is learned’ and ‘a man is dead’ is that the second does not presuppose, in order to be true, the existence of a man. All that is needed is
the existence of a dead man. The proposition, ‘a centaur is a fiction’, if true, does not demand that there should be a centaur but it does demand that there should be an imagined centaur. What holds for a poetic fiction holds for a fictional character. Fictional characters are imagined individuals inhabiting fictional worlds; at least they inhabit the fictional world of the work. That is, a fictional character is what can be imagined if one plays a game authorized by a work of fiction in which such a fictional character occurs. When I say that a fictional character inhabits a fictional world, I mean that what can be imagined as that fictional character is governed by the rules of generation and the class of propositions that are fictional for that work. When a critic says, for example, ‘there can be no plot without character’, she is not pretending nor is she imagining a pretend property, that of being a character. Of course, Walton would argue that the comment ‘Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character’ is not true but, at most, fictionally true. Yet there is a difference between Emma Woodhouse being an imagined individual inhabiting a fictional world and, as Walton would have it, imagining that Emma Woodhouse is an imagined individual inhabiting a fictional world.

**Fictional Characters**

Yet talk of characters can lead to difficulties, the most puzzling perhaps being how we are to explain the migration of characters to other works of fiction. We are faced with explaining how we can know when we are being presented with the same character. Is Sherlock Holmes the same character in all of Arthur
Conan Doyle’s Holmes stories? Given that each story has the same author, we might be inclined to say yes. More problematically, is Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes the same character as Basil Rathbone’s Sherlock Holmes? There is no actual object to which various authors refer with the proper name or on which different authors report or create adventures. On the other hand, regarding ‘Sherlock Holmes’ as a set of properties is difficult because sentences like ‘Sherlock Holmes is a friend to Dr. Watson’ would be uninformative if this property were one already signaled by the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Descriptively, the two figures are not the same because Rathbone’s Holmes fights Nazis (for example, in the movie Sherlock Holmes and the Voice of Terror (1942)) whereas Doyle’s Holmes does not and indeed would be too old to take an active part in the Second World War. Walton’s solution to this puzzle does not employ a concept of character: it might be a rule that to hold that Holmes is the same man in each of the Holmes stories is fictionally true given that Holmes the detective is involved in more than one case. Games authorized by episodes involving Rathbone’s Sherlock Holmes perhaps borrow the rule that Holmes has been involved in many cases, and extend it to a later case in which Holmes battles the Nazis.

That Walton’s proposed solution is less felicitous in other cases suggests that we cannot avoid taking seriously talk of fictional characters. When characters migrate to other works, they do so in different ways and to different effect. It hardly matters whether we identify Rathbone’s Holmes with Doyle’s Holmes. There could be participants in a game authorized by episodes involving
Rathbone's Holmes who have never read one of the Holmes stories or even realized that Doyle originally created the Sherlock Holmes character. Something similar cannot be said for games authorized by Woody Allen's "The Kugelmass Episode." In Allen's short story, Kugelmass, a professor of humanities living in New York, succeeds in bringing Emma Bovary from the novel, Madame Bovary, into his world. Once there, Emma shops, orders room service, and enrolls in acting classes. Unlike appreciators of works involving Sherlock Holmes penned by authors other than Doyle, if participants do not recognize Emma Bovary's status as a character from the novel, the point of the work will be lost. Much of our understanding of the short story is based on our remembering the fictional truths about Emma established by Madame Bovary and recognizing how Allen interprets these truths to establish how Emma might behave in Kugelmass' world. The humour arises from the appreciator's recognition that the second set of fictional truths is fictional in a different way (but what way?) from the original set.

Walton might counter that at least one of the fictional worlds in the short story is only a reflexive representation. Yet the presentation of fictional worlds in this short story is not the same as when a work contains a reflexive representation, when one fictional world is embedded in another. Of a case like the play-within-a-play in Hamlet, Walton (1990) contends "if p is fictional we imagine it to be true, whereas if it is merely fictional that p is fictional we imagine only that p is imagined to be true" (284). In "The Kugelmass Episode," such embedding does
not occur. Just as Emma enters his world, so Kugelmass enters the world of the novel and thereby astonishes readers in his world who are confused by sudden introductions of this sporadically appearing character Kugelmass. Moreover, Kugelmass’ adventure ends badly when he becomes trapped in a textbook and is there hunted by an irregular Spanish verb. We are not meant to imagine only that the meetings between Kugelmass and Emma are imagined to be true.

Walton never directly discusses such a case, but he comes close when he considers Voltaire’s Candide. Walton argues that fictional truths about Pangloss are not fictional of Leibniz. Pangloss is Voltaire’s device for referring to Leibniz, but the referring is done in order to comment on him rather than to establish fictional truths about him (113). Of course, this case is different because, unlike the name ‘Emma Bovary’, ‘Leibniz’ is not an empty name. We are not then prescribed to compare the actual truths about one (Leibniz) with the fictional truths about another (Pangloss). Rather, we are prescribed to compare fictional truths about Emma with other fictional truths about Emma.

Peter Lamarque (1996), in Fictional Points of View, grapples with the problem of what constitutes a character. Because he relies on speech act theory, much of his explanation is disappointing. However, his contention that we can adopt different points of view toward fictional characters can be used to resolve the problem plaguing Walton’s theory of make-believe. Unlike Walton, Lamarque holds that the fictionality of a work is determined by the author’s intention. The author stipulates rather than describes a state of affairs, and proper names
occurring in her sentences have content (sense) but not reference because her sentences are not actually asserted. The author appears to perform nonfictional illocutionary acts but, because of the conventions of storytelling, she takes on none of the commitments associated with these illocutionary acts (27). Her sentences thus have propositional content but none of the commitments (especially reference) associated with assertive or non-fictional illocutionary acts. Because the author does not assert, her sentences are neither true nor false in the author’s use (30).

On the other hand, sentences about works of fiction are asserted and so are either true or false. Lamarque notes that Gottlob Frege held that when we read fiction, we concentrate on the thoughts (propositions) expressed rather than on the reference or truth-value of what is expressed. The sense of sentences containing empty proper names in an author’s or informed reader’s use is just what it would be in non-fictional contexts but the standard referential intentions associated with these names are suspended. In an informed reader’s use, the reference of such a proper name is indirect in that reference shifts from the object itself to the sense of the name. This sense then stands in the subject position of statements about that fictional character. The sense of a fictional proper name is the means by which a person in a fictional world is presented and identified in a particular work of fiction. This sense is stipulated by the author’s sayso, her descriptions of the character presented in the work. In other words, a fictional character is a description, a set of properties. Sentences about works of fiction are elliptical for
wider sentences that include a fictional operator like 'in [a particular] novel, story, poem, and so on...'. Sentences used to comment on the work of fiction which contain the proper names of fictional characters are true or false for, in such cases, these proper names refer to actual components of the work, that is, to fictional characters.

This explanation leaves Lamarque with the problem of how and why a reader would respond to a character. We might pity Othello as a tragic hero but it is dubious that we would pity a set of properties even if this set fits the criteria of a tragic hero. Lamarque deals with this problem by arguing that when we read a work of fiction, we do so from both an external and an internal perspective. This dual perspective allows us to recognize that the reference of proper names of fictional characters is also dual. Within a work of fiction, characters use proper names to refer to each other. Such reference is internal in that, within the work of fiction, such characters are imaginatively regarded as ordinary people and their names function as ordinary proper names. Internal reference is only possible for a speaker within the work. Readers can only make-believe or imagine that such names actually refer. The internal perspective is the view of participants within the fictional world and readers adopting this perspective through imagination are able to involve themselves emotionally with the characters. On the other hand, the external perspective takes account of the fact that such a world is fictional. When the name of a fictional character appears in the context of an author’s use or reader’s use, "the internal references of the names (to the ordinary people in the
world of fiction) get transformed into indirect references (to the senses of the names themselves)” (33). The description of a character presented in a work of fiction identifies the character from the internal perspective and defines the character from the external perspective. Most often both views are held simultaneously, with the external perspective guiding and constraining the internal perspective.

Lamarque’s reliance on authorial intention is problematic and his theory has difficulty explaining transfictive contexts. The nature of his fictional operator remains vague so that we are unsure about exactly what fictional operator might be in place in elliptical sentences such as ‘Emma Woodhouse is more willful than Elizabeth Bennett’ or ‘my neighbour Susan is as forgiving as Desdemona’. Gareth Evans (1982) rejects the usefulness of fictional operators by noting that if a sentence is not properly intelligible on its own, the same will hold of any more complex sentence in which it is embedded. If the sentence ‘that man is bald’ fails to be properly intelligible when there is nothing to which the term ‘that man’ refers, then one cannot then proceed as though the sentence ‘it is fictional that that man is bald’ were intelligible. Nonetheless, Lamarque’s reliance on different perspectives is intriguing and can be usefully incorporated within Walton’s theory of make-believe.

The predicate ‘is a fictional character’ does not specify a pretend property. In spite of the game Walton claims we play when we speak of characters, the difference between ‘real’ people and fictional characters is not simply their
difference in ontological status. To say ‘Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character’ is not the same as saying ‘there is no such person as Emma Woodhouse’. Stephen R.L. Clark (1990), in his essay “On Wishing There Were Unicorns,” urges us to adopt an ontology of fictional objects. Although his solution is ultimately unappealing, he nicely encapsulates why we are attracted by such theories in that being fictional is very different from being merely non-existent. Clark argues that when we wish for unicorns to exist, we are not wishing that one of the things that exist were called a unicorn or that it were a unicorn instead of what it is. Nor are we wishing there to be something else than what already is. We want neither a transformation of a presently existing thing nor the emergence of a natural kind with all or most of the imagined properties. A unicorn that exists would not satisfy our longing because if there were a unicorn, it would only be one more natural species among many others. If a unicorn existed, whatever we find marvelous about the idea of a unicorn would be lost. He concludes that “it is the non-existent that we wish were real, but real, if that were possible, in its very non-existence” (251). While his analysis does not inevitably lead us to the conclusion that existence is a kind of property, his remarks are apt in that being a fictional character is not the same as being merely non-existent. Speaking of unicorns is not the same as, for example, speaking of the next generation. Neither happens to exist, but unicorns are fictional characters whereas members of the next generation are not. When we evoke ‘the next generation’, we are not usually regarding the next generation as inhabiting a
fictional world, although if we wish to imagine the future as a fictional world, we are free to do so and, in so doing, members of the next generation would be fictional characters. However, we must keep in mind that fiction is not a copy of reality but an illusion of it. We do not usually play a game of make-believe in which the next generation exists. Rather, just as we were once the next generation, so we anticipate by believing—not making-believe—that another generation will exist.

Walton ignores his earlier insight that the implications following from propositions about characters are different from those that follow from propositions about “real” people. Propositions involving the names of fictional characters can support symbolic or metaphorical interpretations that would be inappropriate for sentences involving genuine proper names. For example, if my friend Tom relates to me his experience of entering an office and seeing a woman dressed in black with a cat sleeping at her feet, even if he further adds that she has a wart on her face and is knitting with black wool, I would be unlikely to regard her as a sinister person. However, when this character is presented in Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, I can immediately recognize the symbolic implications of her qualities and understand them as supporting her role as the keeper of the door to darkness. It might happen to be the case that Tom’s woman is sinister. However, that she is sinister could not be concluded from her appearance. On the other hand, Conrad’s description of this character is adequate evidence for so concluding that this figure is meant to be seen as sinister. Such
symbolic implications are not restricted to modern works of fiction. All sentences involving the names of fictional characters have the potential for such symbolic interpretations. Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* is a case in point. When it was first published, many readers regarded the novel as an autobiography and read the sentences of the work literally. Other readers, recognizing that the work is fiction, also recognize its potential, often realized, for being interpreted symbolically. Philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum who see works of fiction as aids in moral education often go awry because they ignore the symbolic interpretations of the sentences in the work which might complicate or undermine the surface narrative.

Given that being a fictional character is not a pretend property, we need a way of determining when speakers making comments involving fictional names are making believe and when they are not. While Lamarque’s introduction of points of view is apt, this concept would be more usefully employed in differentiating the fictionally true from the true. Relying on internal and indirect reference leaves Lamarque no way of distinguishing between comments like (1) ‘Othello succumbs to Iago’s machinations’ and (2) ‘Othello has fewer lines of dialogue than does Iago’. Yet there appears to be a shift in point of view here. In (1), the speaker is a participant in a game of make-believe authorized by the play, and so what she says is fictionally true. In (2), the speaker is an appreciator without being a participant. She is not pretending that the character Iago is given more lines than the character Othello, and what she says is true. In (1), the speaker only pretends to refer. Othello can succumb but a fictional character
cannot. In (2), the speaker is referring. Fictional characters have lines of dialogue whereas persons do not. Walton toys with the idea of point of view and thereby differentiating between appreciation and criticism of works of fiction (393-5). The appreciator plays the game whereas the critic “considers the work and the games to be played with it from without, from an onlooker’s point of view, describing matter-of-factly what fictional truths it generates” (393). He ultimately rejects the notion that two points of view are involved because an appreciator can only play the game if she recognizes that the world of the game is fictional and a critic will not get very far without also being an appreciator. Although Walton acknowledges that we can hold two points of view simultaneously, he sees nothing following from this insight because even if the critic is not pretending to assert in Walton’s sense, make-believe comes into the picture somewhere, even if it is only lurking in the background (395-6). He thus concludes that sentences “appearing to denote purely fictional entities are not expressing propositions at all” (396). Yet the items which make up two points of view need not be mutually exclusive in order for each to be clearly identifiable. If two people are looking at the same scene, they are not engaging in quite the same activity if one is looking at the flowers by the tree and the other is looking at the tree by the flowers. Just as looking at the flowers involves having the tree in the background, so one can observe a fictional game even though make-believe is lurking in the background. Our tacit assumption when reading a novel is that, apart from those of actual personages, the proper names used in the novel refer to fictional characters rather
than persons, even though our enjoyment of the novel will be lessened if we focus
on this assumption. Our tacit assumption when we are doing a critical analysis of
the novel is that the descriptions of the fictional characters are matters for make-
believe rather than belief.

The two points of view can also be noted in children’s games of make-
believe. Gareth Evans (1982) is correct in comparing the father’s remark about
how many pies the child has to a comment like ‘Emma Woodhouse has a sister’.
However, the father’s remark is not comparable to a comment like ‘Emma
Woodhouse is a fictional character’. In the mud pie game, the children might
complicate the action by pretending that pinecones are tarts as well as pretending
that lumps of mud are pies. Mary, slow to catch on, may begin decorating her
mud pie with pinecones. When the other children protest, the father might attempt
to settle the squabble by explaining to Mary that ‘the pinecones are tarts, not
meringue or decoration’. Because the father has identified the objects (the
pinecones) as both pinecones and tarts, Walton would argue that the father is
either still participating in the game but betraying the pretense or playing a
different, unofficial game. However, Walton’s analysis would be comparable to
suggesting that someone who is only explaining how to play chess is actually at
the same time either playing chess or perhaps playing some other game. The
father’s explanation to Mary is neither part of the mud pie game nor part of an
unofficial game that only the father is playing. Rather, the father is setting up or
explaining to Mary the rules of the mud pie game. That Emma Woodhouse is a
fictional character is a categorical rule rather than a move (or a conditional rule) in the game authorized by the novel *Emma*. If we are only imagining that Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character inhabiting a fictional world then we are only imagining that we are playing a game authorized by the novel *Emma*.

Although Evans (1982) allows that discourse about works of fiction often involves talk of fictional characters, he raises three objections to invoking an ontology of abstract objects, that is, fictional characters:

> It fails to make it a requirement for understanding these remarks [remarks in and about works of fiction] that the hearer possess and invoke information (or misinformation) in a way which mimics the understanding of remarks involving ordinary singular terms. Secondly, it fails to recognize the undeniable element of pretense present in this kind of discourse. Thirdly, such an ontology is excessively sophisticated for the needs of this discourse, in which a general conception of the identity-conditions of these abstract objects, *characters*, is not presupposed. (367, his emphasis)

His objections are well taken but have less force if we introduce the concept of point of view. With the concept of point of view in place, we can see that the comment ‘Othello succumbs to Iago’s machinations’ requires the hearer to possess information in a way that mimics the understanding of remarks involving ordinary singular terms. Such a comment indicates that the speaker is adopting a particular point of view by participating in a game of make-believe authorized by Shakespeare’s *Othello*. Moreover, the element of pretense necessary for adoption of this point of view is recognized. Yet we must also recognize that pretense is unnecessary for both speaker and hearer with a comment such as ‘Othello has
fewer lines of dialogue than does Iago'. Finally, as Evans notes, we do not need a sophisticated ontology with identity-conditions for characters to understand sentences discussing what goes on in the novel. Of course, neither do we need such knowledge for understanding ordinary remarks about actual people. Nevertheless, while ordinary appreciation of a fictional work does not require such sophistication, we must still acknowledge that discourse about what goes on in the novel can become a complicated affair and that any participation requires some understanding of the rules of the game. As we move toward critical analysis of the novel, our point of view shifts in order to encompass more than simply understanding that a character is an imagined individual inhabiting a fictional world. We focus on the rules themselves rather than on the imagining prescribed by those rules.

Strictly speaking, fictional characters belong to theories of characterization rather than to works of fiction. Fictional characters can be divided into flat or round, major or minor, static or dynamic. Whatever nuances we add to the concept of fictional character, we understand that a fictional character is an imagined individual who inhabits a fictional world. The same fictional character might be imagined as inhabiting one fictional world or several, as does the gingerbread man who inhabits both the fairy tale and the movie *Shrek*. Quarrels can develop over whether or not a proper name actually refers to a fictional character. For example, critics can disagree about whether or not Lady Macbeth’s children, Godot or General Gabler qualify as fictional characters. The criteria for
including or excluding these names as being the names of fictional characters
rests on the degree and kind of characterization deemed appropriate by different
theories of characterization. Lady Macbeth’s children can hardly be imagined
since we do not even know how many she has. Yet without them, we would be
unable to regard her as a mother or to see the full extent of the womanly nature
that she is forced to overcome. Godot has no properties nor does he interact with
the fictional characters in the play. Consequently, we have no firm way of
deciding whether this name denotes a representation or a reflexive representation.
If character is a function of plot, then we can also consider the fictional characters
who ought to be there but are not. For example, it says something about the plot
of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein that apart from Caroline Frankenstein, whose
death apparently motivates her son to animate a creature, only one other family in
the novel has a mother. I do not mean to suggest that a fictional character is
whatever is defined by a theory of characterization so that what is a fictional
class character depends on what theory one adopts. Consequently, the progress of these
critical debates is unimportant to this discussion The proper name of a fictional
class character refers to an imagined individual inhabiting a fictional world, but how
that character is to be imagined involves make-believe, a game involving a prop.
A fictional character is what can be imagined if one plays a game authorized by a
work of fiction. Although we view fictional characters from two perspectives,
where we draw the line between observing and participating can be difficult. The
comment that ‘Emma Woodhouse is a good character’ can mean (1) that an
appreciator is pretending that Emma is morally sound or (2) that a critic approves of the characterization involved in creating the character. Although a firm demarcation between the two views may not be possible, numerous instances of each are ready to hand.
CHAPTER 4

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CONTEXT

Context is often used as an explanatory tool for our understanding of a variety of sentences and utterances. This use of context becomes more contentious the further it moves away from sentences containing ambiguous or indexical elements. Even if this difficulty were absent, not all sentences are amenable to a straightforward evoking of context. I have suggested that context alone cannot account for our understanding of certain utterances by indicating that this concept is insufficient for explaining how we understand metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction. More specifically, the major shortcoming of context in regard to such sentences is that this notion is too barren unless one adopts a theory of overlapping contexts. For example, theories which hold that a metaphorical word or phrase gains an extraordinary meaning that can be taken literally in the right context have difficulty accounting for mixed metaphors. Utterances such as John Searle’s ‘the bad news is a block of ice’ would seem to require two contexts in order for us to understand it. Moreover, a metaphorical phrase often occurs within an otherwise literal sentence. Consequently, a special context is needed for the metaphorical phrase that is not needed for the other parts of the sentence. If a critic says, ‘Only a sly fox could have conceived of the subtlety of this’, the context of the situation of utterance can help us evaluate the demonstrative ‘this’ but a further context will be needed.
if the phrase 'sly fox' is to be understood yet not taken literally. If statements about fictional characters are true (in a context), then statements such as 'My neighbor is as forgiving as Desdemona' would require more than one context—both that of the actual world and that of the fictional world or the world of the play. Such theories face the difficulty of laying out what constitutes a context and explaining how a single utterance can be understood or evaluated according to two or more contexts.

In this chapter, I examine critically an initially persuasive theory of how a single utterance can be simultaneously evaluated by multiple contexts. Although François Recanati develops this theory for definite descriptions, it also applies to metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction. The problems facing Recanati's theory are those which face any theory of overlapping contexts. By making context carry the full explanatory load, theories of overlapping contexts or domains neglect the point of view needed for allowing participants in a discourse to interact with a context. I begin by describing when philosophers of language appeal to context in explaining sentence meaning, and how these various appeals have resulted in the discovery of many different kinds of context, some of which are more helpful than others for explaining utterance meaning. I then set out François Recanati's contextual theory together with the reasons for his thinking that his theory is superior to other theories using context. I point out difficulties with this contextual theory and argue that unlike contexts that fix the content of indexicals and ambiguous terms, his use of domains
provides a context to which hearers and speakers may have no access. Finally, I explore the implications of these difficulties successively for metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction.

Types of Context

A unified account of context would have great explanatory force in that the context for any utterance sensitive to it would be structured by the same type and number of features. We could then select beforehand which features would be relevant to the understanding of any such utterance and thereby clearly indicate the role played by context. Unfortunately, giving a unified account of context is difficult. It is also difficult to explain how context manages to do what various semantic and pragmatic theories claim it does. In both cases, the reason for the difficulty is that the features of context apparently shift according to the particular problem that context is called upon to solve. Which utterances are deemed context-sensitive is less interesting than the features of context said to be needed to interpret those utterances. Philosophers have variously posited as contexts the sentence, the situation of utterance, domains of discourse, propositions, and the external situation. Perhaps the least controversial invocation of context is its use in connection with ambiguous words. In his The Foundations of Arithmetic, Gottlob Frege discusses the meaning of a word. How we should understand his Context Principle, the principle that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence, is much debated. Nonetheless, we can at least see how this principle might be used to determine the meanings of certain kinds of ambiguous terms.
For example, the meaning of the word ‘bank’ in the sentence, ‘Tom went to the bank to deposit his cheque’ is different from the meaning of the word ‘bank’ in the sentence, ‘Tom went to the bank to fish.’ In the context of the first, the word ‘bank’ means a financial institution whereas in the second, the word ‘bank’ means the ground bordering on a river or stream. If this use of context to determine meaning is the only use sanctioned, then context is linguistic and works at the level of the sentence.

If we choose to evaluate utterances rather than sentences, then we must take into account the context of utterance. This context contains situational elements that are considered together as the situation of utterance. The situation of utterance allows us to evaluate utterances containing indexicals of time, place, and person. Although an indexical such as ‘I’ makes the same semantic contribution in any sentence in which it is uttered, its content (or value) is context-relative in that, in any given situation of utterance, ‘I’ refers to the agent of that context. The truth value of the utterance varies according to features of the context. Utterances like ‘I am hungry,’ ‘the meeting begins now,’ and ‘the building is here’ cannot be evaluated unless we consider features of the context such as who is speaking, when the utterance occurs, and where it is uttered. This context is also useful in the case of demonstratives. Evaluating the utterances ‘this is white’ and ‘that is black’ depends on what is being referred to, and such references can change depending on the situation of utterance. The context of
situation of utterance is extra-linguistic but nonetheless limited by regular features governed by the linguistic roles of indexicals and demonstratives.

A further type of context is the domain of discourse. François Recanati (1987), in “Contextual Dependence and Definite Descriptions,” views the domain of discourse as “that with respect to which the speaker presents his or her utterance as true” (62). This context is internal to the discourse in that it is the situation talked about rather than the external context of utterance. The situation talked about is the content of ongoing speech, “what is being talked about (the topic of conversation), what has been said so far” (60). Considering the situation in which utterances containing quantified noun phrases are made can supply restrictions that are not explicitly stated. For instance, Mary might describe the condition of her recently purchased bottles by saying, ‘every bottle is empty.’ This utterance would not be true in a standard context but would be true if evaluated with respect to the contextually determined domain of its situation of utterance. This kind of context is more contentious than the kind used in evaluating indexicals because it relies less on the regular linguistic features of words and expressions.

Some uses of this context rely on the linguistic features of types of words in order to exploit the intuitive appeal of this context. Recanati (1987), for example, has argued that proper names also depend on a contextually determined domain. The linguistic rule may be that a proper name refers to its bearer, but because proper names act like indexicals, who is the bearer of the name in question is
extra-linguistic and context-relative. If I say, ‘Aristotle is a philosopher,’ you would be wrong in assuming that I am referring to the ancient Greek thinker if, in the situation of utterance, we are watching my cat Aristotle contemplate a ball of dust with a puzzled expression on his face. Recanati’s position here becomes persuasive because he partially relies on regular linguistic features. The word itself (‘Aristotle’) may lack a particular linguistic role but the kind of word it is (proper name) does have this regular feature. If a word could be categorized as being the kind of word that had such a role, then it could be seen to act like an indexical.

Utterances containing incomplete definite descriptions like ‘the man,’ ‘the senator,’ or ‘the side of the house’ can also be considered semantically ambiguous in that we must rely on context to supply which man, which senator, and which side of which house. In his essay “Are Contexts Semantic Determinants?” Philip P. Hanson (1980), in the course of arguing for a negative answer to this question, notes that the rules of use for incomplete definite descriptions are contextually vague. The rule for the indexical ‘I’ is that the referent of ‘I’ is the speaker in the context of utterance, whereas the dubious rule for ‘the senator’ is the senator, if any, “in question in the utterance, where, in the absence of an explicit act of demonstration or the like, what is ‘in question’ hinges on the utterer’s intentions, rational expectations, and background beliefs” (174, his emphasis). While Hanson is perhaps too hasty in rejecting the efficacy of context, he nonetheless notes that the use of context would be considerably strengthened if it could be said to
include speaker intention. Yet this inclusion, though sometimes done, is
contentious and, as I later argue, stretches the features of context too far.

Some philosophers argue not so much for a special context as for
emphasizing particular features of context. A.W. Moore (1997, 2000), in Points of
View, highlights the historical and cultural context which changes or modifies the
meanings of words or phrases. He notes that in many cases predication may
require a context. The meanings of some predicative expressions are not
definitions determining their condition of application. Moore entertains the notion
that the meaning of a word is nothing apart from its continued usage.
Consequently, words have histories, and the use of a word can be seen as a
process. We cannot understand a use of a word apart from its occurring at a
particular stage in the word’s development. He uses, as an example, the sentence,
‘Earshot of somebody is the distance within which his or her voice can be heard.’
While this was once roughly definitional, some utterances of it would now be
false, especially if we take into account such things as the use of the telephone
(97-8). Recanati (1994), on the other hand, suggests that the context can be
modified by the speaker’s motive in using certain words. He mentions Austin’s
example, ‘France is hexagonal.’ The sentence will be considered true or false
depending on the standard of precision deemed relevant to the context of
utterance.

Other utterances said to be context-relative are less easily codified to regular
features of the situation of utterance like speaker, time, place, and person. For
example, in the utterance, ‘Mary is more diligent’, context would be useful for its evaluation. The utterance may mean that Mary is more diligent than, perhaps, creative or it may mean that Mary is more diligent than someone else. The identification of speaker, time, place, and persons is not the identification needed for evaluating this utterance. Consequently, in order to deal with these utterances, Christopher Gauker (1998), in his essay “What is a Context of Utterance?”, proposes a set of features in the context that he calls the propositional context. This context is useful in evaluating utterances containing expressions like ‘yet,’ ‘only,’ ‘even,’ and ‘too.’ Gauker contends that the evaluation of such utterances involves elements of the context that are propositional in character. For instance, evaluating the utterance ‘Jane is late, too’ may depend on the context containing something like ‘Tom is late.’ Gauker sees this context as also helping in the evaluation of factive verbs such as ‘to know.’ Evaluating the utterance ‘Matt knows that his paper is late’ depends on whether or not the context includes ‘Matt’s paper is late.’ He extends the usefulness of this context to cover possessive noun phrases so that, for example, evaluating the utterance ‘Tom’s horse lost’ will depend on whether the context includes ‘Tom owns a horse’ or ‘Tom bet on a horse.’ Gauker is not alone in seeing these phrases as context dependent. Stephen Neale (2000), in his essay “On Being Explicit,” identifies possessive noun phrases as genitive descriptions and, as such, holds that they are similar to incomplete definite descriptions because “in both cases contextual information is needed to effect interpretation” (290). Neale’s comment may be
too strong. While we may not know in what way the horse might be said to be
‘Tom’s horse’, we can still understand what it means to have this horse lose.

In a more recent article, “Situated Inference versus Conversational
Implicature,” Gauker (2001) posits a context of external situation, a context he
distinguishes from the context of utterance, in order to argue that the utterances
Grice takes as relying on conversational implicature actually rely on what the
speaker said and features of the external situation. Because of conversational
implicature, a speaker may utter p (what is said) but implicate q (the proposition
conversationally implicated). Grice holds that there exists in the speaker the
thought q and, in order for conversational implicature to be successful, the hearer
must understand that the speaker thinks q and intends to conversationally
implicate that q. In one of Grice’s examples, A is standing by an immobilized car
and is approached by B. A says, “I am out of gasoline;” B replies, “There is a gas
station around the corner.” Grice uses the notion of conversational implicature to
explain how A is able to conclude from what B explicitly says (p) that he can get
gasoline from the gas station around the corner (that q). Gauker argues that if the
external situation includes the circumstances that A and B are near a busy
intersection in a heavily populated part of town during the middle of the day, then
in order for A to conclude that the station is open and has gasoline, A need not
recognize that the speaker is thinking that q. If the external situation is different in
that it includes the circumstances that A and B are on a remote country road in the
middle of the night, A will probably not conclude that the station is open and has
gasoline. In either case, A's concluding or not that q rests on what is said and the external situation. A need not concern himself with B's intention.

Although I have not considered special cases like metaphorical statements or statements in and about works of fiction, I trust that this host of examples nonetheless roughly indicates the variety of utterances said to be sensitive to context. In order to accommodate such a varied list of utterances, several different kinds of context must be evoked. Philosophers have introduced us to the context of the sentence, the context of utterance, the domain of discourse, the propositional context, and the context of external situation. In addition, we are urged to think of the meanings of words in light of their historical and cultural context and to consider the motive of the speaker. Context apparently includes several features: time, place, persons, domain of discourse, speaker intention, information gleaned by observation, ordinary beliefs and assumptions, background beliefs, and rational expectations. Daniel Andler (1993), in his essay "Is Context a Problem?", opines that "resistant to subtraction, context is forever open to addition" (239). Given the breadth claimed for context, we should not be surprised if a formulation of context remains vague. In The Logic of Significance and Context, Leonard Goddard and Richard Routley (1973) attempt to evade this vagueness by moving from features of context to the role it plays in specific instances. Nonetheless, they contend that context can be represented by a set of sentences, namely those which specify the context. Such sentences might typically include information such as the topic of conversation, the domain,
special assumptions and presuppositions in terms of which non-standard senses can be determined, ambiguities removed, and indefinite uses made definite:

"what is important in the specification of a context is that all information is given which is relevant to the determination of the actual sense, use and aboutness of the sentences which are uttered, insofar as these deviate from, or are not given by, the semantic dictionary of the background language [that is, the standard or typical use of the vocabulary of a language]" (40-1). However, if context is defined so broadly that it presumably includes anything other than the compositional sentence meaning relevant to determining what an utterance means, then the problem becomes sorting out what is not part of the context.

If context is deemed whatever is needed for understanding a sentence, then the concept becomes too baggy, a catch-all label rather than an explanatory tool. We cannot, for example, simply assume that speaker intention is part of context. Seeing speaker intention as part of context is not simply another addition to context. Exactly whom the word ‘I’ (when used in an utterance) refers to depends on the context. The time, although part of the context, is irrelevant to this reference because the time at which the utterance takes place does not conflict with who made the utterance. Consequently, the same context can supply both time and agent of the context without a conflict arising. The case is different for speaker intention. In a case in which the speaker, thinking she is Napoleon, says, ‘I am hungry,’ the reference of ‘I’ to the agent of the context is in conflict with the speaker’s intention of referring to Napoleon.
Making speaker intention part of context misconceives the relationship between the two. The utterance, ‘it is cold in here’ can receive various interpretations depending on the context by which it is evaluated. If the utterance occurs while the speaker is standing in a walk-in freezer, it will be understood as a descriptive statement. If it is said while the speaker is seated at a dining table underneath an open window, it may be understood as a request that the window be closed. What a speaker intends to convey by her words is what she can be reasonably be understood, in the context, to be conveying. Context thus constrains speaker intention. If speaker intention is seen as part of the context, then this constraint is removed and nothing can help us identify speaker intention. Moreover, as Kent Bach (2000), in “Quantification, Qualification, and Context” contends, speaker intention cannot be part of the context: “if the context is to play the explanatory role claimed of it, it must be something that is the same for the speaker as it is for his audience, and obviously the role of speaker’s intention is not the same for both” (272, n.16).

**How Context Does What It Does**

Although many philosophers agree on which kinds of utterances are sensitive to context, they often disagree about the way in which context contributes to determining what has been said. In his essay “Referential/Attributive: A Contextualist Proposal,” Recanati (1989) notes that there are several competing approaches when considering the context sensitivity of expressions containing quantifiers. The sentence ‘Everybody’s going to die tomorrow’ expresses
different propositions in different contexts even if the reference of ‘tomorrow’ is fixed. In one context, ‘everybody’ means everybody in the world whereas in another context, ‘everybody’ means everybody in this group. If one adheres to the Ambiguity Theory, then we have a single but structurally ambiguous surface sentence while at a deeper level we have two distinct sentences: ‘everybody is going to die tomorrow’ and ‘everybody in this group is going to die tomorrow.’ If the surface sentence corresponds to the first, then it is a complete sentence. If it corresponds to the second, then it is an elliptical sentence. On the Implicature Theory, the speaker literally says that everybody (that is, everybody in the world) is going to die tomorrow, but the context makes it obvious that the speaker cannot have meant to communicate this proposition. The context thus leads the audience to consider the speaker’s intention. On Recanati’s Contextual Theory, all quantification is relative to either an explicit or implicit domain. When the domain is implicit, context is required. If a speaker uses the sentence, ‘everybody is going to die tomorrow’ to express that everyone in the room is going to die tomorrow, the utterance means that everybody in some domain \( x \) is going to die tomorrow, and “context is required to instantiate the domain-variable \( x \) in the same way as it is required to fix the reference of ‘tomorrow’” (230).

Kent Bach (2000) argues that we need to specify whether a context is pragmatic or semantic. Differentiating between the two involves making several distinctions. In a pragmatic context, content is determined relative to a context (varies from context to context); that is, the features of a context for a particular
utterance are just those needed to determine its content. Secondly, what is being determined by context is ascertained on the basis of contextual information (epistemic determination). Bach describes this feature as the context including "any mutually and readily accessible information that speakers can count on each other to count on in figuring out what they mean when they say what they say" (272). Finally, context determines the most plausible interpretation. In other words, clues in the context may not always make clear what the speaker means so that what is understood by her hearers may not be what she means. In a semantic context, content is determined by context (is a function of context); for example, recognizing who is the agent of the context always determines the content of the word 'I' used in an utterance. Secondly, what is being determined is fixed by contextual features (constitutive determination). Content is determined by context because of the regular linguistic features of the words themselves. For example, the time at which an utterance containing the word 'now' is made fixes the content of that word. Finally, context determines the actual interpretation. In other words, we do not have to ascertain what the speaker means.

His distinctions are solid if, for example, we contrast a situation of utterance with a context of external situation. The content of the word 'I' in a sentence uttered in a situation of utterance is determined by context in the sense that its content is fixed by features of the context. Context thus determines the actual interpretation of the token. Bach notes that the semantic context (the situation of utterance) is restricted to indexicals and tense. This determination is independent
of the speaker’s intentions and beliefs in that, for example, if Tom says, ‘I am hungry,’ the hearer, knowing the speaker is Tom, interprets the utterance as ‘Tom is hungry’ even if Tom thinks he is Napoleon. On the other hand, utterances sensitive to a context of external situation have their contents determined relative to a context, and what is determined is ascertained on the basis of contextual information. This context determines only the most plausible interpretation. For example, if, while helping myself to a second bowl of ice cream, my partner remarks, ‘ice cream has a high fat content’, do I conclude from what my partner says (p) that he may mean I am in danger of becoming overweight (that q)? Bach argues that context helps us assess what the speaker means. Gauker would disagree with this added qualification in that he does not see the context as being limited by conversational relevance. In all other ways, though, the context of external situation fits Bach’s sketch of a pragmatic context. Nonetheless, Bach’s division is not entirely successful. Given the varied cases in which context is said to play a part, we cannot always expect these distinctions to be equally clear.

In a semantic context, content is fixed by context because of regular linguistic features of the words themselves. Some words have more than one meaning (are ambiguous), and we need the context of that word being used in a sentence in order to understand which meaning is the relevant one. There is a limit to the number of meanings an ambiguous term has. If the sentence in which the word has been used is too cryptic (for example, ‘Goebbels is fair’), then we are unable to disambiguate the sentence (that is, Goebbels may be just or blond).
Consequently, nothing determinate has been said. Although the referent of an
indexical may be any person, time, or place on any occasion of use, an indexical’s
content is fixed by the context. A token of ‘I’, used rather than mentioned, refers
to the agent of the context, usually the speaker, but never to the hearers of that
particular token. Even if the speaker intends her token to refer to someone other
than herself, she will be unsuccessful. The difficulty with the semantic context is
that its usefulness is exhausted by certain kinds of words. However, as the
example of ‘Mary is more diligent’ shows, the meanings of some utterances seem
to change according to the contexts in which they are uttered, even though these
utterances contain neither indexicals nor ambiguous words.

On the other hand, in a pragmatic context, the content of an utterance varies
from context to context but does so without relying on the regular linguistic
features of the words. In some utterances, speaker meaning and sentence meaning
diverge. Context gives us information about what the speaker intended or meant.
Nonetheless, other utterances apparently rely on contextual information that does
not lead to speaker meaning. If Paul says, ‘Tom’s horse won the race,’ context is
needed in order for us to understand whether ‘Tom’s horse’ is the horse Tom
owns, bet on, or rode. The phrase ‘Tom’s horse’ is neither indexical nor
ambiguous. Moreover, if hearers have not already understood from the context in
what way Tom’s horse is ‘Tom’s horse’, then guessing the speaker’s intention
will be purely a matter of luck. Although some philosophers may see the need for
a propositional context or something like it, no regular linguistic feature, rule, or
convention can help us access such a context. In such cases context merely labels what must be there, but it ceases to be explanatory.

Recanati notes that his notion of context includes beliefs and intentions as well as parameters such as time, place, speaker and hearer. Thus, although he sees it as a pragmatic conception, his notion of context cannot be neatly fit into Bach’s categories of pragmatic and semantic contexts. Bach (2000) complains that many philosophers ignore the distinctions he notes, but perhaps they are ignored because his delineation makes the semantic context too gaunt whereas the pragmatic context is so all-encompassing that it becomes unwieldy (273).

The Contextual Theory

The usefulness of context for understanding certain sentences is limited if a single utterance is determined or evaluated by a single context. Such a context is not rich enough to account for statements containing metaphors or for statements in and about works of fiction. Some enthusiastic proponents of the explanatory efficacy of context thus argue that a single utterance can involve more than one context. For example, the utterance, ‘my neighbor is more loving than Becky Sharp but less loving than Desdemona’ would have either two contexts (the actual world and the fictional world) or three (the actual world, the fictional world according to the novel, and the fictional world according to the play). François Recanati’s domain of discourse theory holds that a single utterance can be interpreted according to multiple domains. His theory is of interest because his view of context is one which would be needed to explain how context alone could

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explain our understanding of metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction. However, I argue in later sections of this chapter that a reliance strictly on context will not achieve the desired results. Recanati’s theory encounters the difficulty of explaining how all contexts can be equal and how an utterance modifies or connects to a context.

What role context plays in the understanding of incomplete definite descriptions is much debated. One can agree with Recanati (1989) that definite descriptions express either singular propositions or general propositions depending on the context of utterance. Recanati (1987) cites three possible explanations of the role of context in the understanding of incomplete definite descriptions: the elliptical theory, the direct reference theory, and the contextual or domain of discourse theory. On the elliptical theory, context provides for an identification of the complete definite description. Incomplete descriptions or sentences containing incomplete descriptions are abbreviations for longer descriptions or sentences. The abbreviated or elliptical sentence is ambiguous because it could potentially abbreviate many different sentences. For example, the incomplete definite description, ‘the senator,’ could be elliptical for ‘the first female senator ever appointed’ or ‘the oldest living senator.’ Context disambiguates an elliptical sentence by making manifest the more specific sentence of which it is an abbreviation. However, Recanati protests that context is inadequate for such a task. Both Howard Wettstein (1981) and Recanati (1987) argue that even when context is taken into account, there remain several definite
descriptions that could fit the intended reference of the incomplete description.
The incomplete definite description, ‘the senator’, could be ‘the first female senator ever appointed’ or ‘the only senator born in Red Deer, Alberta’ where both descriptions describe the same person. Which complete description is correct remains undecidable because nothing in the context of utterance, including speaker intention, is helpful.

On the direct reference theory, which Wettstein (1981) favours, context provides an identification of the reference. A sentence containing an incomplete definite description is a singular proposition consisting of an object referred to and a concept expressed by the predicate of the sentence. Instead of indicating a complete definite description, the context reveals which item is being referred to. Yet Recanati quarrels with this theory because a singular proposition requires a directly referential term and definite descriptions are not directly referential terms even though they sometimes have a directly referential use. The direct reference theory accommodates the referential use while failing to capture the attributive use of definite descriptions.

Recanati’s (1987) domain of discourse theory contends that context provides for an identification of the domain of discourse. His definition is different from the regular, logical definition of a domain of discourse. According to Recanati, a domain of discourse is that with respect to which the speaker presents her utterance as true. A domain of discourse, that is, the situation talked about, can be seen as a mini-world, a fragment of the world. The situation talked about includes
the topic of conversation, the content of ongoing speech in the sense of propositions made rather than words uttered (60). Such content is part of the context with respect to which any utterance forming part of that discourse must be interpreted. Reference of incomplete definite descriptions depends not on the situation of utterance but on the situation talked about which very often happens to be identical with the situation of utterance (61). An incomplete definite description is not ambiguous, but it is semantically underdetermined. The existence and uniqueness condition is not satisfied in incomplete definite descriptions like ‘the senator.’ However, this condition is satisfied in the mini-world under consideration: “incomplete definite descriptions, then, are to be interpreted with respect to some mini-world—not necessarily the same mini-world for all incomplete descriptions in a given sentence” (61). In the sentence, ‘he went up to the attic and opened the window,’ ‘the attic’ is interpreted with respect to a mini-world (the attic of a particular house) and ‘the window’ is interpreted with respect to another mini-world (the window of the attic rather than the window of the house). The domain of discourse can be the actual world rather than a mini-world. Further, it can be a person’s belief-world or a fictional world rather than the actual world (62).

**Difficulties With the Contextual Theory**

The domain of discourse theory is attractive, but the role context plays in fixing the existence and uniqueness condition of an incomplete definite description is problematic. While context might allow the incomplete definite
description, 'the senator', to mean at least one person is a senator and at most one person is a senator, other cases are more contentious. In turn, this difficulty points out the larger problem that arises if one extends too far one's claims for the explanatory role of context. First, that mini-worlds can be other than rather than a part of the actual world is worrying because it is difficult to see how such a context could allow any incomplete definite description to satisfy the existence condition. The utterance, 'the woman who found her cupboard bare had wanted to get her poor dog a bone' would not be true simply because it is being evaluated according to a fictional domain, even if that domain is limited to the world of the nursery rhyme. Some other theory of fictional objects would also have to be in play. More generally, the theory does not satisfactorily explain how a change of domain is signaled or even occurs nor does it indicate how the different domains by which a single utterance is interpreted overlap or interact with one another. The theory's attempt to deal with these issues drives it into relying on something other than context.

Recanati argues that all definite descriptions (both complete and incomplete) are domain dependent because even complete definite descriptions are relative to a domain of discourse, that of the actual world. He attempts to show the universality of domains through his discussion of utterances that contain explicit domain-indicators. In the utterance, 'John thinks that p', the expression, 'John thinks that...' will be interpreted according to a domain of discourse, possibly though not invariably that of the actual world. The actual world is always the
default case. According to the domain of the actual world, the speaker is mentioning an actual thought of John’s. However, the expression, ‘John thinks that...’ is also a domain indicator. Consequently, ‘p’ will be interpreted according to the domain of John’s belief world so that the expression, ‘John thinks that p’ says that ‘p’ is true in the world of John’s beliefs. A different domain arises in the utterance, ‘according to Paul, John thinks that p’. Here, we begin with Paul’s belief world. That is, the expression, ‘...p’ is interpreted according to John’s belief world whereas the expression, ‘...John thinks that p’ is interpreted according to the domain of John’s-beliefs-according-to-Paul. He represents domain indeterminacy at the level of sentence meaning “by means of variables ranging over domains of discourse” (70). He contends that for a definite description, rather than having the sentence, ‘the F is G’, we instead have “The F(i) is G(j), where i and j are domain-variables, to be contextually instantiated” (70). Knowing the truth conditions of the utterance involves knowing how many domains are involved. If only one domain of discourse is involved (i=j), then the utterance is true if there is a unique object F in world W and F is G. If two domains are involved (i ≠ j), then the conditions to be satisfied are those that must be satisfied in a pair of worlds for the utterance to be true with respect to this pair of worlds. Then, the utterance is true if there is a unique F in the first world and its counterpart is G in the second world. Such a scheme is handy for statements about fictional worlds. For example, if a critic notes that ‘Emma Woodhouse lives in England’, there will be a shift between subject and predicate in that the domain
of discourse for ‘Emma Woodhouse’ is a fictional context but the predicate ‘lives in England’ would need only the domain of the actual world. We would not want this property to be somehow different in kind than it is in the actual world.

However, while this indeterminacy can be represented, how context allows for multiple domains in the same situation of utterance is problematic. Recanati contends that “at the level of sentence-meaning, the domains of discourse are not fixed: it is the context of utterance which determines the domain of discourse” (69). For example, when Mary says, ‘Every bottle is empty,’ the actual sentence she utters does not indicate that she is talking about every bottle she bought.

Nonetheless, according to Recanati, the domain of discourse depends on the topic of conversation, what has been said so far. The meaning unit enlarges to the conversation, but the conversation is itself composed of the smaller meaning units of sentences. The domain of discourse is part of the content of speech.

Consequently, aspects of sentence meaning should be capable of being accessed in order to explain how a change of domain of discourse occurs. Yet Recanati notes that even an explicitly stated domain-indicator can only imply the domain under consideration and that “such semantic additions cannot fix the domain of discourse, which ultimately remains a pragmatic, contextual matter” (64). Because domains cannot be fixed at the level of sentence meaning, something else must explain why, for example, in the utterance, ‘He went up to the attic and opened the window,’ we understand that the attic is the attic of the house while also understanding the window as being of the attic rather than of the house.
 Somehow, the topic of conversation (domain of discourse) has changed mid-sentence but Recanati has not explained how this change has come about given that, on his theory, no indication of domain on the level of sentence meaning helps us decide when this change has occurred. It cannot be the word ‘window’ because if this word helps us identify the domain of discourse, then it would also help us identify which window, and so the intermediate step of identifying the domain of discourse would not be needed. The words ‘he went up to the attic’ are a likelier candidate, but they occur at the level of sentence meaning.

Robert Stalnaker, in his essay “On the Representation of Context,” also adopts a possible world model for representing a discourse context. While there are differences (for example, Recanati’s mini-worlds are only like possible worlds), I assume that, in the main, Recanati would not strenuously quarrel with this model. Stalnaker sees context as both the object on which speech-acts act and that by which speech acts are interpreted. Context is a body of information presumed to be common to the participants in a discourse, information that can be represented by a set of possible worlds he calls a context set. What is presupposed in the context is what all these possible worlds have in common. Recanati’s theory differs here in that a context is information that is available rather than being confined to presupposition. However, at this point, nothing hinges on this difference. This model holds even if we substitute available information for presupposed information. According to Stalnaker, a speech act or assertion is, in part, a proposal to alter the context either by adding information to the context or
by eliminating some possible worlds from the context set (6). The context is thereby constantly changing as things are said (8). The way a speech act changes the context depends on its content. The hearer’s interpretation of the assertion is done in the prior context and its content added to the context. The prior context is the context changed by the fact that the assertion is made but prior to acceptance or rejection of the speech act. A successful speech act changes the context in two ways: that the statement is made is information added to the context and the content of the statement is added to the context.

Stalnaker’s model thus supports Recanati’s theory in that this model appears to allow speech acts to change the domain of discourse by providing a way for an utterance to contribute to a context which would then determine the domain of discourse. Yet Stalnaker also notes an objection made by Hans Kamp. Kamp rejects a possible worlds model for discourse context because such a model does not allow for the distinctions needed to account for some linguistic phenomena. Stalnaker uses two pairs of sentences to illustrate Kamp’s hesitation in accepting the model:

1. (a) Exactly one of the ten balls is not in the bag.
   
(b) It is under the sofa; and

2. (a) Exactly nine of the ten balls are in the bag.

(b) It is under the sofa.

This example is intractable because there is controversy over how pronouns work and because the pronoun and its co-referring term occur in two different
sentences. A pronoun is used anaphorically if it repeats the reference of some other referring expression in the sentence. For example, in the sentence, ‘Mary realized she was late’, the pronoun ‘she’ is the antecedent of the referring expression ‘Mary’. There are two possible descriptions of how a pronoun works anaphorically. One possibility is that the antecedent is a placeholder for some other referring expression in the sentence. The pronoun refers in the same way that the noun would have done in its stead. However, as Jaakko Hintikka and Jack Kulas (1985) note in Anaphora and Definite Descriptions, this view of pronouns is limited because many instances cannot be described in this way. For example, in the sentence, ‘Every man loves his mother’, replacing ‘his’ by ‘every man’s’ as in ‘every man loves every man’s mother’ gives us a different meaning from the original sentence (79). The other possibility is that the antecedent repeats the reference. In the sentence, ‘Mary realized she was late’, the pronoun ‘she’ does not refer to Mary. Rather, it refers to the already established reference. The relations of co-reference are seen as holding between different noun phrases in a single sentence. Yet this approach also encounters difficulties. Kent Bach (1987), in Thought and Reference, argues that pronouns refer indexically (contextually). In the sentence, ‘Mary realized she was late’, context establishes whether ‘she’ refers to Mary or to some other female. Even if a relation of co-reference could be established, it would only hold for different referring expressions in a single sentence. If a pronoun appears in a sentence other than the one containing the
referring expression, then the pronoun is used indexically. If pronouns refer indexically, then Stalnaker’s example is problematic.

The problem remains even if pronouns are used anaphorically. We could perhaps try to extend anaphora from the sentence to discourse by relying on the convention that a pronoun refers to the object picked out by the immediately preceding expression uniquely referring to an object. This approach is persuasive because, very often, we can combine two sentences to form one; the sentences, ‘Mary has a comb’ and ‘It is in her purse’ can be combined to form the single sentence, ‘Mary has a comb, and it is in her purse’. Yet such a rule has severe limitations. The following pairs of sentences indicate that the proximity of the referring expression to the pronoun is often irrelevant:

a) 1. Othello trusts Iago.

2. He is unworthy of this trust.

b) 1. Othello trusts Iago.

2. He is foolish to do so.

Of course, we have more than one uniquely referring expression in the first sentence of each pair. Other examples, however, indicate that a pronoun occurring in a sentence without a referring expression can refer to something in the context or to an implication drawn from the first sentence:

c) 1. The ball is under the sofa.

2. I warn you—it needs to be vacuumed.
Here, the pronoun 'it' refers to something in the context, specifically, the area under the sofa. Other examples offer themselves:

d) 1. The ball is missing.
   2. It often happens.

Here, the word 'it' is not an impersonal pronoun as in the sentence, 'it is raining'. Rather, the word 'it' refers to the state of affairs of the ball being missing.

Stalnaker recognizes the challenge posed by the two pairs of sentences:

1.(a) Exactly one of the ten balls is not in the bag.
   (b) It is under the sofa; and

2.(a) Exactly nine of the ten balls are in the bag.
   (b) It is under the sofa.

In each pair of sentences, assertion (a) changes the context and assertion (b) is made in the changed context. That the pronoun 'it' in 2(b) is used to co-refer with 'the bag' cannot be a matter of sentence grammar because the two terms occur in different sentences. The natural conclusion is that the pronoun 'it' in each sentence is being used indexically and that its interpretation depends on the context of discourse. Because 1(a) and 2(a) are truth conditionally equivalent, the resulting context of each should be the same. Yet the contexts in which 1(b) and 2(b) take place must be different because although 1(b) and 2(b) are composed of the same words in the same order, they cannot receive the same interpretation.

The word 'it' in 1(b) refers to the missing ball, whereas the word 'it' in 2(b) refers
to the bag. Kamp concludes that the representation of context needs something beyond the device of possible worlds.

Stalnaker acknowledges that his model does not provide a solution for the problem raised by Kamp, but he argues that this problem does not touch the adequacy of the possible worlds model and therefore his model can provide a framework for clearly formulating the problem. According to Stalnaker, Kamp ignores the first way in which a speech act changes the context:

Since it is a manifestly observable fact that, in each case, a certain sentence was uttered, this fact, together with any additional information that follows from that fact, conjoined with standing background information about linguistic and speech conventions, is available to distinguish the two posterior contexts, the contexts to which [1(b)] and [2(b)] are interpreted. (11).

The pronoun 'it' requires a salient unique individual. Of relevance are facts about the words used to express certain propositions in the discourse. Consequently, these facts are reflected in each of the possible worlds that are members of the relevant context set.

Stalnaker’s conclusion, even if accepted, does not strengthen Recanati’s case for the identification of domains. At best, his theory only provides the framework for clarifying the problem. Stalnaker once again insists on the limits of his argument:

I want to emphasize that I am not suggesting that [this] example does not pose a real problem: the problem of explaining just what the relevant difference is between [1(a)] and [2(a)], the difference that is responsible for the fact that [1(a)] makes a certain individual available for pronominal
reference, while the truth conditionally equivalent [2(a)] does not. Discourse representation theory and dynamic predicate logic each have something to say about what the mechanisms that explain the difference might be. But whatever the explanation, it will appeal to facts about English, or about the practice of speaking English, that can be presumed to be available to competent English speakers, and so they will be facts that distinguish the possible worlds that define the different contexts. (12)

Stalnaker’s solution is not entirely satisfactory because our interpretation of ‘it’ need not rest on the first way an utterance contributes to the context. More specifically, given that there are a possible ten balls, what follows from the content of 2(a) is that of ten balls, only nine are in the bag. By implication, the tenth ball is not in the bag. The content of the utterance and what follows from it thus provides the context with two salient unique individuals—the missing tenth ball and the bag. If two possibilities are provided, then the referent becomes vague. Consider the following pair of sentences:

3. (a) The puppy destroyed your slipper.
3. (b) It is under the sofa.

Does the pronoun ‘it’ in 3(b) refer to the puppy or your slipper? Neither ‘the puppy’ nor ‘your slipper’ is a clear antecedent of the pronoun. Moreover, there is no appreciable difference between 1(a) and 3(a) in that both would appear to provide two salient unique individuals. The actual words being used are thus less crucial than Stalnaker allows. If you and I are discussing Othello and you call its author Shakespeare while I insist on calling him The Bard, our words are not
evaluated by two different contexts. Two contexts are unnecessary even if I call the author Francis Bacon.

While the appeal to facts about language (English) and the practice of speaking language (English) casts a wide net, Stalnaker is perhaps too sanguine about their use in distinguishing possible worlds. I am not suggesting that the pronoun ‘it’ in 2(b) co-refers with the ball not identified by ‘exactly nine of the ten balls’ as Henry Rider Haggard’s She is referred to by ‘She who must not be named’. I am arguing that in each case, the context—the same context—provides two possible salient unique individuals but provides them in a different way. What changes between 1(a) and 2(a) is not the context but what is deemed of interest in the context. That which is of interest in the context has shifted from one aspect to another while leaving 1(a) and 2(a) truth conditionally equivalent.

Positing a plurality of domains within the same sentence negates the usefulness of the concept of context. While explaining how a change of domain can induce a shift in reference, Recanati (1987) introduces the following example:

Peter wrongly believes that Ann is your sister, Ann is coming over and I say to you, ironically: ‘Hey, “your sister” is coming over.’ Although the utterance as a whole is about the actual world, the description ‘your sister’ is to be interpreted with respect to Peter’s belief world. In this context, the description refers to Ann, whereas in another context it would refer to Nicole, your actual sister. (63)

Recanati later argues that he does not contradict himself if he says both “‘your sister” is coming (about your alleged sister)’ and ‘your sister is not coming (about
your sister).’ On the level of sentence meaning, nothing determinate is said.
Rather, “the domain of discourse involved is a determinant of what is said” (69).

In spite of the speaker’s tone of voice, that his remark is ironic is dubious.
There are many different kinds of irony, but none seem to fit Recanati’s example.
Some kinds can be eliminated immediately. His example is not an instance of
Socratic irony, dramatic irony, tragic irony, cosmic irony or romantic irony. The
most likely possibility is that his example is a case of either situational irony or
verbal irony. In situational irony, an element of or event in the situation subverts
the apparent situation or reverses the expected outcome. The fire hall burning
down would be an example of situational irony. Sometimes, the reversal is less
obvious. If Jean Chrétien, while accepting a humanitarian award, utters a threat
against Iraq, his remark is ironic. The irony does not depend on Chrétien’s
intending to speak ironically or even realizing that his remark is ironic. Nor does
the irony depend on Chrétien invoking a different domain of discourse. His
remark is ironic because the situation and his remark are incongruent to the extent
that his remark undermines or contradicts the grounds on which one receives such
an award.

Unlike situational irony, verbal irony requires that the speaker intend to
speak ironically. Here, what the speaker intends to be understood by her audience
is opposite to what she says. M.H. Abrams (1999), in A Glossary of Literary
Terms, defines verbal irony less emphatically: “the ironic statement usually
involves the explicit expression of one attitude or evaluation, out with indications
in the overall speech-situation that the speaker intends a very different, and often opposite, attitude or evaluation” (135). For example, when Antony, in his speech to the Roman mob, calls Brutus an honourable man, he means the opposite of what he says. He is ostensibly attributing to Brutus a quality (honour) but does so in such a way that his actual meaning is evident.

If we examine Recanati’s example in the light of these two kinds of irony, we can see that the closest fit is with verbal irony. The speaker in Recanati’s example intends to speak ironically, and verbal irony requires such an intention on the part of the speaker. However, in spite of this similarity, the example cannot be an instance of verbal irony. When the speaker tells you that ‘your sister is coming over’ because Ann is coming over and Peter thinks that Ann is your sister, he is not making an ironic statement no matter what his tone of voice. An ironic statement depends on an explicit statement in a context with indications that the speaker intends a very different, opposite, meaning or attitude. If the remark were ironic, we should be able to locate the source of the irony. Our making the statement, ‘It is ironic that Peter thinks Ann is your sister’ does not locate such a source. If it did, then the remark ought to be equally ironic if Peter had said, ‘your sister is coming over,’ though in Peter’s case, the irony would be situational rather than verbal. Recanati’s speaker is not saying what he does mean, but not every instance of speaker meaning diverging from sentence meaning is a case of irony.
Even if we allow that the remark is ironic, Recanati’s example would still be problematic in that it is difficult to see how the speaker can be both speaking ironically and intending Peter’s belief world to be that with respect to which he presents his utterance as true. If he is presenting his utterance as straightforwardly true by using Peter’s belief as a domain, then he is not speaking ironically because, according to Peter’s belief world, Ann is your sister. If he is speaking ironically, then he is not presenting his statement as true by using Peter’s belief world as a domain because his statement is only ironic according to the actual world.

It might be the case that only the use of the description ‘your sister’ is ironical, not the whole statement. The speaker presents the statement as true but ironically uses a description of Ann that is not in fact true of her but which Peter thinks is true of her. The description, along with the context of Peter’s belief world, nestles within the entire utterance so that it is presented as true according to the actual world. If so, the difficulty remains. Recanati’s theory relies on multiple domains to defuse and reconcile incongruities and conflicts. In his example, ‘your sister is coming over’, the statement is true even though Ann is not your sister because the statement is being evaluated according to two different contexts. The falsity of his description of Ann is thereby defused because his description is true according to Peter’s belief world. However, the very reconciliation that makes the utterance true also makes irony impossible. Given that the overall speech-situation is composed of two domains, the tension between
the remark and the situation necessary for irony is lacking. If Recanati chooses another example, possibly ‘Ponce de Leon sought the fountain of youth,’ the use of multiple domains for a single utterance is still problematic. The statement is true according to the domain of the actual world (of a certain time), but the statement does not thereby become true if it is also presented as true according to the domain of fiction. According to the domain of fiction, it is not true that the fountain of youth has the property of being sought by Ponce de Leon.

In spite of Recanati’s analysis, the actual world is not merely the default case and interpreting an utterance according to the actual world is not just another case of interpreting an utterance according to a domain of discourse. In the utterance, ‘John thinks that p’, the speaker mentions an actual belief of John’s. In the utterance, ‘according to Paul, John thinks that p’, contra Recanati, we do not start with the world of Paul’s beliefs. Rather, we begin with an actual belief of Paul’s. Recanati appears to see multiple domains in two ways. In some cases, domains nest within each other like Russian dolls. In others, the domains are multiple but do not appear to overlap. That is, they do not overlap unless one sees them as once again being bound by the domain of the actual world. Rather than being one more domain of discourse among others, the actual world is that by which all other domains are evaluated or interpreted. Consequently, Recanati’s scheme of representation is disingenuous. His scheme needs all domains to be equal and contextually instantiated. Given that the actual world is not just one domain among others, then his scheme has needlessly complicated matters.
When Recanati speaks of context as "a determinant," he does not mean that context is needed to understand what is said. His example of 'your sister is coming' does not involve your knowledge or lack thereof. If you are unaware of Peter's mistaken belief, then although you might later be surprised by Nicole's failure to arrive, you will have nonetheless understood the statement as straightforwardly literal rather than as ironic. If you have more than one sister, you may not expect Nicole to arrive, but you will expect either Nicole or one of your other sisters to arrive. On the other hand, Peter will show no surprise when Ann appears and Nicole does not. Believing Ann is your sister, he, too, will have interpreted the sentence as straightforwardly literal rather than as ironic. Even if you are aware of Peter's mistaken belief, you might not consider it relevant to understanding the statement. A shift in the domain of discourse has nonetheless occurred because a domain is that with respect to which the speaker presents his utterance as true. However, in this case, a shift in domain of discourse will be useless because it will not help the hearers understand what is said. Although the speaker (supposedly) spoke ironically, he did so perhaps because he intended to do so, even if his intention remained unrecognized. Recognition of his irony thus depends not on the domain of discourse but on speaker intention or something like it.

Recanati apparently avoids this pitfall by arguing that context, even when the domain of discourse is made explicit, makes it the case that what is said is said, rather than merely allowing hearers to understand what is said. Sentence-meaning
plus context (the domain of discourse) determines what is said (the linguistic meaning that involves truth conditions) (69). He argues that this context dependency holds for both the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions. His ironical utterance, ‘your sister is coming’ thus might be paraphrased as ‘your sister (according to Peter’s belief world) is coming (according to the actual world).’ On the other hand, if Peter says, ‘your sister is coming,’ although he is basing his utterance on his belief that Ann is your sister, there is only one domain of discourse because it is with respect to the actual world that Peter presents his utterance as true.

Because a mini-world (domain) arises from the situation talked about, a single situation of utterance could produce proliferating domains. Yet a single utterance involving more than one domain leads to the difficulty of distinguishing these mini-worlds. We lack a systematic way of setting boundaries for what constitutes the situation talked about. For example, Dick asks Tom if Peter has been through a particular house, and Tom replies, ‘Yes, Peter went up to the attic and closed the window’. According to Recanati, ‘the attic’ is interpreted with respect to one mini-world (the attic of a particular house) and ‘the window’ is interpreted with respect to another (the window of the attic). Yet if it is the case both that only one window of the house was left open the previous day and that the attic has only one window, then the context provides for there being one domain of discourse or two domains of discourse—the domain ‘of the house’ or the domains ‘of the
house’ and ‘of the attic’—but does not provide anything else for helping us
decide whether the utterance is determined by one mini-world or two.

If a determination of what is said depends on available rather than relevant
information provided by the context, a move Recanati appears to favour, then the
context contains too much information. However, while it may be the case that
the context is too rich for Dick to determine what is said, it cannot be the case
that nothing determinate is said. According to Recanati, a determination of what
is said does not depend on the hearer’s knowledge or lack thereof. The utterance
does not lack a determinate meaning simply because the hearer is unable to
determine what is said. What is determinately said depends on “that with respect
to which the speaker presents his or her utterance as true” (62). Yet if the window
talked about is actually the attic window, Tom’s statement can be evaluated as
true according to both the domain ‘of the attic’ and ‘of the house’. The emphasis
must therefore fall on what the speaker deems as the appropriate mini-world.
Recanati’s definition of domain does not preclude that speaker intention rather
than context is crucial for distinguishing a domain. The mini-world ‘of the attic’
applies because Tom intends that it should do so. At least in contexts that are too
informative, determinacy of utterance appears to hinge on speaker intention rather
than on context or domain of discourse.

On the other hand, although it may be the case that there is both a single open
window and a single attic window, both bits of information might not be available
in the context. While the existence of both windows might be equally known by
both Tom and Dick, perhaps their previous conversation has included a
discussion of only one of them. While it seems unlikely that the two men would
have been discussing the scarcity of windows in the attic, Dick may have earlier
inquired whether or not the open window had been closed. This previous mention
might lead Dick to conclude that the window mentioned by Tom is the window of
the house rather than the window of the attic. Notwithstanding Dick’s
assumption, it could as likely be the case that Tom is introducing a new topic, a
topic that introduces the domain ‘of the attic’. Once again, what determines what
Tom said is not the context but his intention.

Indexicality and Ambiguity

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, context is least contentious when
used to explain our understanding of ambiguous terms and indexicals. If Recanati
could show how our understanding of underdetermined sentences relies on either
ambiguity or indexicality, then his case for contextual efficacy would be
strengthened. Recanati (1987) acknowledges that semantically underdetermined
sentences are neither indexical nor ambiguous. Nonetheless, he slips into
discussing these sentences as if they were ambiguous. Although semantically
underdetermined sentences are not ambiguous, Recanati uses Quine’s test for
ambiguity when he notes that one can truly say both that ‘your sister is coming’
and ‘your sister is not coming’. Just as ambiguous words have no meaning unless
they are understood in context, so semantically underdetermined sentences have
no definite meaning unless they are understood in context. Semantically
underdetermined sentences are treated on a larger scale in that the word becomes
a sentence and the context of a proposition becomes the context of a discourse.
Yet this parallelism is misleading because Recanati is right when he says that
sentences like ‘your sister is coming’ are not ambiguous. He is not discussing the
difference between sentences like (1) ‘Tom stepped out of the boat onto the bank’
and (2) ‘Tom is the manager of the bank’ and a sentence like (3) ‘Tom finally
reached the bank’. In (1) and (2), the word ‘bank’ is disambiguated by the
sentence in which it occurs. In (3), the ambiguity remains, and the wider context
of a discourse is needed in order to disambiguate the sentence. Rather, Recanati is
arguing that even sentences like ‘the present king of France is bald’, ‘all men are
mortal’, and ‘a triangle is a geometric figure with three sides’ need context in
order to have determinate meaning. By arguing that the actual world is only one
domain among others and that the domains of discourse are not fixed at the level
of sentence meaning, Recanati is contending that all sentences are semantically
underdetermined. But this cannot be right. If I meet you in the hallway and
abruptly say, ‘Tom says the meeting will take place tomorrow’, you might ask me
who Tom is or which meeting he is referring to, but it would seem to be a
pointless digression for you to ask me to explain the context in which the remark
originally arose. You attempt to establish identification rather than domain. Given
the abruptness of my announcement, no context has been established yet you have
at least some understanding of what I have said. Even allowing that utterances
can be more informative than sentences and that utterances always occur in some
context does not make it the case that the topic of discourse determines what is said.

Recanati also argues that the context dependency of definite descriptions does not rest on indexicality. Nonetheless, a comparison to indexicality suggests the difficulty of using context in this regard. An indexical like ‘I’ is in one sense immune to context in that ‘I’ makes the same semantic contribution in any sentence in which it is uttered, regardless of the context in which the sentence is uttered. When encountering a sentence using ‘I’, we do not always understand who is the speaker (as agent) in the context, but we do understand that ‘I’ refers to the speaker of the token (as agent) no matter what the context. The context allows us to pick out the value of ‘I’ but it does not aid us in deciding the domain of items being referred to, that domain including only the speaker of the utterance. The value of ‘I’ depends on the situation of utterance in that, even if Tom thinks he is Napoleon, his use of ‘I’ will refer to himself rather than Napoleon. The case is far different for incomplete definite descriptions.

Evaluating cases of incomplete definite descriptions in light of the indexical ‘I’ may be unfair to Recanati’s theory. Perhaps cases of definite descriptions used referentially might be more usefully compared to the indexical ‘here’. Philip Hanson (1980) notes “that our implied contrast between indexical and non-indexical cases is over-stated. The truth of sentences, insofar as they contain indexicals, is at best only relatively independent of intentions, etc.” (177). He uses as an example the utterance ‘I am here now’. He contends that unlike ‘I’, ‘here’ is
a "vague indexical," and he asks, "by 'here', do I mean 'in Vancouver' or 'in the room'?" (177). On the surface, at least, the two cases appear to be analogous. In Mary's utterance, 'Every bottle is empty,' the phrase 'every bottle' may refer to every bottle in the world, every bottle she bought, or every bottle in some other domain of discourse determined by the context. In Hanson's utterance, 'I am here now', 'here' may indicate 'in Vancouver', 'in this room', or some other place determined by the context. Yet the similarity between the two cases is superficial, and Hanson is too hasty in calling 'here' a vague indexical. That is, Hanson is mistaken that in the utterance, 'I am here now', the meaning of 'here' is affected by speaker intention.

Gareth Evans (1982) argues that even though 'p=here' is the same thought as 'I am at p', we do not identify 'here' as 'where I am' (153). We cannot first identify which material object in the world we are and then conceive of what it is for us to be located at a particular place. He persuasively argues that here-thoughts are part of an egocentric mode of thought by which we think about spatial position within a framework centring on the subject's body. I can be mistaken about where I am, but as long as there is a possibility of receiving some information from the place, I can never be mistaken about my being here. Like our use of 'I', our use of 'here' is independent of our intention when used in an utterance.

Evans' analysis of 'here' indicates a major difference between indexical and non-indexical cases. According to him, information specifying a position in
egocentric space is not information about a special kind of space but a special kind of information about a space—"information whose content is specifiable in an egocentric spatial vocabulary" (157). Although its terms refer to points in a public three-dimensional space, their sense relies on a particular framework. Recanati's analysis of definite descriptions is different in that it provides information for a special domain rather than a special kind of information about a domain. Evans' invoking of a framework, a standard from which or by which we understand certain terms, arguably suggests that point of view is at least as crucial as context to indexicality. Recanati's analysis falls short because he allows no similar room for point of view in cases of definite descriptions.

Recanati (1987) contends "that indexicality (or 'egocentricity') and context dependence are two different things, and that the reference of a definite description is always context-dependent even though not all descriptions are indexical" (64). Yet his separation of the two leads to the much debated problem of how one ought to characterize context. Context can be characterized as a subset of the actual world. Context is thus objective and has the virtue of connecting language to the world. Yet this characterization raises the difficult question of how, if context is separate from us, it can influence our behaviour and understanding. On the other hand, we can characterize context as subjective by seeing it as a psychological concept. Our behaviour and understanding are influenced not by what is the case but by what we assume is the case. This characterization might explain how we can be influenced by false beliefs about
what is our actual situation. For example, we can understand that calling someone ‘a gorilla’ is accusing that person of being aggressive even though gorillas are not aggressive. Unfortunately, we have no way of relating this subjective context to the objective world. In his essay, “What is Context?”, Benny Shanon notes that these gaps can be overcome by an interactional characterization of context. He identifies Barwise and Perry’s situational semantics as employing this characterization of context, but such a characterization is equally employed by most theories of indexicality. Consequently, we are not surprised that discussions of the context-sensitivity of utterances often focus on indexicality. Recanati wishes to retain the interactional characterization of context, but he ignores the concept of point of view which is crucial for it.

**Metaphorical Statements and Statements in and about Works of Fiction**

I have gone the long way round to a consideration of the use of context in explaining metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction. Yet I trust that my circuitous route indicates that those who see context alone as an explanation for our understanding of these statements still have a great deal of explaining to do. Metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction are not semantically underdetermined sentences. However, like them, these statements are neither indexical nor typically ambiguous. Presumably, a comprehensive contextual explanation of these statements requires the use of multiple domains or contexts for a single sentence. However, the resistance to
contextual explanation of these statements rests on the recognition that context itself is permeable.

Context has a role to play in the recognition of metaphor but fails as an explanation of it. I am not here suggesting that Recanati’s theory gives or even attempts to give an account of metaphor. His theory cannot accommodate metaphor because a domain of discourse is usually defined as a set of individuals with respect to which predicates have extensions, and although Recanati’s definition of a domain is different, he is concerned with reference rather than sense. I am concerned here not with domains of discourse but with interpreting a single utterance according to multiple contexts. That said, that such a contextual theory would fail to explain metaphor is prefigured in Recanati’s treatment of ironic utterance. Recanati’s contextual explanation of the ironic utterance, ‘your sister is coming’ is inadequate because the domain in which the utterance would be ironic is not the domain in which it is understood. This same difficulty occurs if we substitute a metaphorical expression for the ironic one. If the metaphor is interpreted literally in one context because in that context one of the meanings of the phrase is extended, then we no longer have a metaphor. The metaphor is a metaphor only if we interpret it according to a context in which it does not have this meaning. More specifically, ‘Richard is a lion’ might be true in a domain or context in which one of the extraordinary senses of the word ‘lion’ is ‘a brave man’. Yet in such a context the phrase is literal rather than metaphorical.
Similarly, a theory of overlapping contexts has difficulty accounting for the open-ended quality of many metaphors. The metaphor ‘man is a wolf’, on a particular occasion of use, may be paraphrased as ‘man is vicious’ but it could also mean much more than this paraphrase captures. To compensate for simultaneous multiple interpretations, such a theory would have to see context as similarly open-ended. For example, Ben Jonson’s poem “Epitaph on Elizabeth, L.H.” begins with the question, “Wouldst thou hear what man can say / In a little?” This question has two meanings, both metaphorical, and both crucial for understanding the question being asked. First, the persona is asking if the reader (‘thou’) would like to read (‘hear’) what a man (‘man’), specifically, the persona, can say in a few words (‘a little’). Secondly, the persona is asking if the reader (‘thou’) would like to know (‘hear’) what mankind (‘man’), specifically, Elizabeth, can accomplish or produce (‘say’) in a short lifetime (‘a little’).

Although references of words change, overlapping contexts cannot entirely explain the changes. The words ‘a little’ in one paraphrase refer to a few words whereas in the other, they refer to a short life. Two mini-worlds perhaps enter here—an average number of words as opposed to an average span of life. Yet how context signals these two mini-worlds is unclear. Perhaps they are signaled by the changing reference of ‘man’. This word signals both the persona and Elizabeth. However, both Elizabeth and the persona can be seen as part of the same context. Thus, the reference of ‘man’ has changed but has not done so because of a change in contexts or mini-worlds.
The case of statements in and about works of fiction faces its own difficulties. When viewed in isolation from one another, the statements arising from fiction and those arising from non-fiction might appear to be understood according to different domains or contexts. The statement, ‘Becky Sharp is calculating’ is not true according to the actual world (because Becky Sharp is an empty proper name) but is true according to the world of W.M. Thackeray’s novel *Vanity Fair*. Since we have one statement that appears to be both true and false, we can conclude either that we understand this statement in two different ways or that we are evaluating the statement according to different contexts. If we reject the theory of make-believe, given that the statement is unambiguous, we seem to be left with the explanatory tool of a contextual theory.

However, if we have a single utterance that encompasses both fictional and non-fictional elements, as in the utterance, ‘My friend Jane is more calculating than Becky Sharp’, the contextual theory loses its explanatory force. We face the difficulty of accounting for how these two domains arise and interact. Because domains are not fixed on the level of sentence meaning, the domains do not arise from or interact on the level of the sentence itself (69). Having domains fixed contextually strikes us as correct because we would not want to say that the meaning of the phrase ‘Becky Sharp’ somehow involves its being the name of a fictional character in Thackeray’s novel. Yet the situation talked about is equally unhelpful. If the conversation concerns Jane and her relationships with others, the discourse context is unlikely to provide a previous mention of *Vanity Fair* or its
fictional characters. Neither course is needed because, according to Recanati, a domain is that with respect to which the speaker presents her utterance as true. The speaker presents her utterance as true with respect to both the actual world (of which her friend Jane is a member) and the fictional world of 

*Vanity Fair* (from which arises Becky Sharp). The two domains are made available because the speaker intends them to be so available. However, given that speaker intention is not part of the context, these domains are not, as Recanati (1987) would have it, “contextually instantiated” (70). Bereft of the possibility of contextual instantiation of domains, we are left with a situation in which the proper name ‘Becky Sharp’ refers because the speaker intends it to refer. Moreover, nothing in the context restrains speaker intention so that, other than guessing, we have no way of knowing the speaker’s intention and consequently the number and kind of domains instantiated. Speaker error would not be possible because every intention would be actualized.

Context is not always the most useful concept for explaining how we understand certain utterances. Disagreements about how we should understand certain fictional works are commonplace. For example, Anton Chekhov’s *The Three Sisters* has sometimes been presented on stage as a comedy whereas at other times it has been presented as a serious drama. Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* has been the focus of an ongoing debate about whether or not the novel is racist. We might consider the case of two literary critics who disagree over how to read a certain sentence in a fictional work. One critic claims that the sentence
is ironic (or symbolic or allusive) whereas the other does not. Given that the
debate is sustained and ongoing, there is no reason to suppose that each critic is
unaware of the position held by the other. Since these critics are examining the
same sentence in the same work, it is tempting to assume that their disagreement
stems from something else, namely, the context by which each is understanding
the sentence. There should be, apart from the two interpretations themselves, a
way of distinguishing these two contexts. Yet if each critic produces a set of
sentences that constitutes the context according to which the sentence is being
understood, we could not automatically assume that these sets of sentences would
be different. If the sets were compared, we might discover that they were similar,
perhaps identical (something perhaps like ‘sentence s is said by the fictional
character Marlow to the Accountant at the Outer Station after Marlow has seen
the shackled men, in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, a fictional work
published in England not long after the conquest of the Congo’). What such sets
miss is the weight given and the connections made between the various items.
When we read a work like Shakespeare’s Othello for a second time, we do not
expect to understand it in exactly the same way nor do we. The differences
between our first and second readings of the same text are not based on our
suddenly noticing hitherto unread phrases or sentences. Nor are we taking into
account new information by using a different context. Different readings occur
not because the work or its context has changed, but because we have. A new
reading produces a different interpretation because we give some words and sentences different emphasis and connect them in new patterns.

Although many utterances are amenable to contextual explanation, context is not thereby equally useful for explaining how we understand any and all utterances. Metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction initially seem to lend themselves to contextual explanation. Yet an examination of how we might relate to the domains or contexts needed suggests that the contextual theory used in such cases is not as useful as we had initially supposed. Again, I am not arguing that context has no explanatory role to play in our understanding of some metaphorical statements and statements in and about works of fiction. However, in order to play this limited role, context must be seen as interactional, and such a characterization of context cannot occur without the concept of point of view.
CHAPTER 5

THE CHARACTERIZATION AND APPLICATION

OF POINT OF VIEW

Exploration of point of view has traditionally taken place within literary studies. An essay by Norman Friedman (1955), “Point of View in Fiction: The Development of a Critical Concept,” initially pointed out the importance of point of view for understanding narrative structure. Following Friedman, Seymour Chatman (1978), in Story and Discourse, noted that ordinary usage of the term is three-fold: perceptual, conceptual, and from the point of someone’s interest. According to Chatman, these three uses are separate only in some narrative structures. Wallace Martin (1986), in Recent Theories of Narrative, defined ‘point of view’ as

a general term referring to all aspects of the narrator’s relation to the story. It includes distance (variations in the amount of detail and consciousness presented, in the range between intimacy and remoteness), perspective or focus (whose eyes we see through—the angle of vision), and what the French call voice (identity, position of the narrator). (124, Martin’s emphasis)

Much of what literary critics have had to say about point of view is irrelevant for the purpose of this chapter. Ordinary conversation lacks the mannered and artful structure of literary texts. Nonetheless, we should not ignore that many utterances used in ordinary discourse reveal points of view.
In order to explain how we use utterances containing the word ‘I’, metaphorical statements, and statements in and about works of fiction, we need something further than an understanding of the context in which these utterances occur. An appeal to the points of view from which utterances take place has explanatory force for our understanding of utterances involving reference to the self, metaphorical utterances, and utterances in and about works of fiction. However, in order for us to fully appreciate this force, the notion of a point of view must itself be made clearer.

Characterizing Point of View

A viewpoint is the position or point in space from which a viewer looks at an object or objects in her visual field. This position lies outside the viewer’s own visual field but if the viewer provides an accurate description or representation of what she sees (perhaps a photograph), this position can be established by others through their understanding of what is or is not in the viewer’s visual field. Objects in the visual field can be related to this viewpoint. For example, if only the tops of houses can be seen in the visual field, then the viewer is viewing the houses from above and her position is likewise elevated. When used outside discussions of visual perception, the term ‘point of view’ is a metaphor. We have three different, albeit overlapping, ways of characterizing this notion: perspectival, conceptual, and utilitarian.

The perspectival characterization of point of view is central to the metaphor because it lies closest to a literal use of the term. When we see an object from a
particular point of view, only some of its features will be apparent to us. If we are looking at a stationary cube, for example, we will only see the sides or corners facing us. As we change position, other sides and corners of the cube become apparent to us, but we can never see all sides and corners simultaneously. This view is thus partial, and moreover, it often relies on how things look rather than how things are. If a speaker says, ‘the sun and the moon look similar in size’, her observation is position dependent, a dependence that can be articulated if she adds the phrase ‘from here’. Although an indexical phrase will make manifest her point of view, her utterance is not subjective. Anyone occupying the same position as the speaker could, all things being equal, make the same claim. The utterance is consequently objective even though it is partial.

Both Antti Hautamäki (1986) and A.W. Moore (1997, 2000) note that this characterization of point of view can be extended in that, rather than only perceiving a part or aspect of a particular object, often we only attend to or acknowledge an aspect or part. In other words, we choose the aspects on which we focus according to our point of involvement (Moore 8-9). Hautamäki uses a scheme of determinables to characterize a point of view. A determinable is a term (such as colour or shape) having several determinates (such as red, blue, and so on or round, square, and so on). Every physical object can be completely characterized by specifying its determinates under all applicable determinables. Hautamäki defines point of view as a selected finite set of determinables. Depending on our focus of attention, we decide which features we will
foreground. Even when two people are viewing the same object, one can, without displaying either irrelevancy or redundancy, ask what the other is looking at. The questioner wants to know what her fellow viewer is noticing, what is of interest to her, her point of involvement with the object. For example, a speaker could make a series of utterances describing two objects and thereby indicate the aspect that is currently of interest. While observing two cats side by side, she might say, (1) ‘one cat is larger than the other’, (2) ‘one cat is standing whereas the other is sitting’, and (3) ‘one cat is black whereas the other is white’. Here, she is describing the objects from the perspective of attending to (1) size, (2) posture, and (3) colour. These utterances indicate the ways in which appearance begins to merge with concepts. We can further extend this perspective by seeing an object as a whole consisting of parts (as when two viewers see the duck/rabbit picture with one seeing it as a duck whereas the other sees it as a rabbit), as a kind in contrast with other kinds (as when we differentiate between two cars by calling one a Ford and the other a GM), as having a certain function (as when we characterize iron bars on a window either as protection or as an obstacle to freedom), and from the point of view of its origins (as when we differentiate between art and found art).

The perspectival characterization of point of view cannot be extended too far. Eventually, it lapses fully into the category of the conceptual characterization of point of view. Two viewers may see the same object and even the same aspects of
that object, but nonetheless do so differently. In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s ‘Golden Bough’ (1979), he remarks that

We might say “every view has its charm” but this would be wrong. What is true is that every view is significant for him who sees it so (but that does not mean “sees it as something other than it is”). And in this sense every view is equally significant. (11)

While this example involves perception, what comprises a particular point of view on the conceptual characterization is not so much focus, what is being seen, but how it is being viewed. The example suggests that two viewers looking at the same scene need not find that scene equally significant, even though neither is seeing things other than they are. We can thus have two viewers each of whom sees the same object but does so differently. Here, we encounter more fully the adopting of different frames of reference. How something appears to us depends on a background of beliefs and experiences that we bring and relate to the thing we are regarding. The conceptual characterization of point of view is evoked when, for instance, we speak of the moral point of view or the woman’s point of view. On this characterization, point of view is a set of attitudes, beliefs, and personal concerns that constitute a person’s stance in relation to things and events. Kurt Baier (1960) argues that adopting a point of view in this sense might be adopting its defining principle. Evaluating an action from a Kantian point of view would be much different from seeing it according to an Aristotelian standpoint. Nonetheless this limited sense of the basis for adopting a point of view cannot account for what we are identifying when we evoke a woman’s point
of view. To be a woman and thereby have a woman’s point of view on some issue is not to possess a defining principle. This consideration leads Jon Moline (1968) to argue that adopting a point of view involves viewing things or events by means of identifying with certain experiences. Here, point of view relies on the adoption of a frame of reference rather than a point of involvement.

Although Moline does not discuss the possibility, there may be unexamined limits here. For example, crises in the feminist movement have led to quarrels over whether or not the movement can reflect differences between women based on race, class, sexual orientation and so on. As the divisions multiply, the case may develop in which one may believe one has understood and even adopted the point of view of a woman about a particular subject, yet any particular woman may feel that her point of view has not been so captured. Protestations of one’s understanding may be met with resistance. Here, she may be relying on her belief that an objective understanding can never equal her subjective knowledge of this—her—position. Moline’s analysis raises the question of whether or not, on this characterization, point of view is inherently subjective so that adopting someone else’s point of view involves one in an exercise of empathy.

Yet the major difference between the perceptual and conceptual characterizations of point of view only apparently hinges on how one is able to adopt the point of view of another. These two characterizations are part of a continuum rather than being exclusionary categories. Because one never appears within one’s perspectival field, one must always infer one’s own point of view. If
a viewer is looking out her window at the street, she sees the road, cars, other houses, streetlights, and so on, but she never sees herself looking at this scene. Even when a viewer is looking in a mirror, she sees her image rather than herself.
The same is true on the conceptual characterization. There is a painting that depicts a tea table set with three places, and behind the table, two jackasses are sitting and apparently drinking tea. Their faces are full frontal, and their eyes gaze out at the viewer. This scene, then, forms the perspectival/conceptual field with the viewer standing outside of it. Yet this field is not stable because the painting is entitled *We Three*. Because of this title, the conceptual field enlarges, seemingly to encompass the viewer. However, as the viewer in one sense becomes part of the conceptual field, she does so from an imaginative vantage-point which once again places her outside that field.

When characterized as either perceptual or conceptual, a point of view is held by an idealized observer. To see what someone else sees, we do not try to imaginatively become them, to see through their eyes. Rather, we try to assume their position. If two women are hiking in the woods and trying to find the highway, both will be searching through the trees for some visual sign. One spots a stretch of highway through the trees and shouts, 'There is the highway!' The other cannot see the highway from where she is standing. In order to see the highway, she must return to her companion's position and, as it were, look over the other's shoulder. If she still cannot see what the other sees, the other may use a gesture, a pointing finger to guide her. Similarly, to understand a conceptual
point of view, one must understand the conceptual position of the other, using one’s own understanding of the other’s beliefs, goals, and restrictions on considerations in order to do so.

We could suppose that adopting a point of view on either characterization encompasses the notion of seeing through someone else’s eyes. Yet this way of putting the matter obfuscates by gesturing toward empathy. Instead, what is shared is a vantage ground—anyone standing in the same position has the potential for seeing what the first viewer sees. If, as Moline has it, adopting a point of view means identifying with certain experiences, we need not be led immediately to understanding this identification as empathy. Rather, such a point of view can be understood by understanding historical and cultural perspectives and the assumptions and presuppositions that are at work.

The utilitarian characterization of point of view further indicates that a reliance on empathy is unnecessary for understanding how one adopts the point of view of another. On this characterization, point of view rests on someone’s interest. The viewer may be unaware of her own interest even though others might have this knowledge about her. We might say, for instance, ‘Although Jane does not yet realize it, giving up the house was a mistake from her point of view’. Jane has a particular point of view whether or not she realizes it. Here, point of view is characterized as someone’s advantage, welfare or well being. To adopt a point of view on this characterization precludes empathy because the first viewer does not have full knowledge of her own situation. This characterization can also
be extended in that sometimes we are unaware of our interest or point of involvement. An obvious example is poor Lingens who reads his own biography without realizing that he is Lingens. There are also examples closer to home. A viewer of the painting *We Three* might look at the painting and simply wonder why it has such an odd title. She is nonetheless part of this enlarged conceptual field whether or not she recognizes her position. Although she remains unaware of her position in the conceptual field, her companions will recognize her new position even if she does not. Her companions have a point of view outside this conceptual field, and it is the viewer’s failure to adopt this point of view that causes her to remain unaware of her position within the conceptual field. Nonetheless, she may come to realize her position. There is no first-person perspective on this characterization of point of view.

Taken together, the three characterizations indicate the features of a point of view and our ability to understand and even adopt other points of view. A point of view is partial but it need not be subjective. A viewer does not appear in his or her perceptual or conceptual field, but the point of view of the viewer can be inferred from what is contained in the perceptual/conceptual field. In other words, we infer a point of view from a representation created by that point of view. We are not always aware of our point of view. We rarely think of our having a particular point of view because our focus is on the scene before us. We are interested in the world rather than in examining our position in relation to it. Our point of view becomes noticeable only when we realize that it differs from
someone else’s. Then, by recognizing the partiality of theirs, we recognize the partiality of our own. Moreover, our point of view is constantly shifting and changing as we perceive different things and relate these things to different frameworks.

Point of View and Utterances

Understanding the point of view from which an utterance is made depends on what is said rather than the attitude or intention of the speaker. In connection with utterances, often a point of view is inferred from recognizing either voice or focus. Voice is signaled by the structure of the sentence whereas focus is revealed by its content. However, it is important to note that point of view is implied rather than stated.

In Points of View, A.W. Moore (1997) argues that points of view include “points in space, points in time, frames of reference, historical and cultural contexts, different roles in personal relationships, points of involvement of other kinds, and the sensory apparatuses of different species” (6). He makes a further distinction between type and content of representations, arguing that point of view can cut across both:

1. An astronaut says, “The moon is less than fifty miles away.”
2. Someone else, referring to the astronaut, says, “He is within fifty miles of the moon.”
3. A man on earth says, “The moon is less than fifty miles away.”
Representations (1) and (2) share the same content. That is, they share how things must be if (1) and (2) are true. Although sharing the same content, (1) and (2) are of different types. Moore defines the type of a representation as the role it must play in the psychology of its producer if it expresses a belief of its producer. His definition of ‘type’ can perhaps be clarified by citing an example used by John Perry (1990) in his article “Frege on Demonstratives.” Perry’s example is meant to show that self-locating beliefs individuate psychological states in explaining and predicting action. While you and I are hiking in the woods, I am threatened by a bear. I apprehend the thought ‘I am being threatened by a bear.’ You apprehend the thought ‘she is being threatened by a bear.’ While the content of our thought is the same (‘R.A. is being threatened by a bear’), that the type is different is indicated by my reaction of curling in a ball whereas you react by running for help. Essential to action is time and place becoming ‘here’ and ‘now’ and understanding that what is happening is happening ‘to me’. The role the representation plays in the psychology of its producer is thus different and serves to explain our different reactions.

On the other hand, representations (1) and (3) are of the same type but have different contents. The content of the representations is different in that they do not share how things must be if (1) and (3) are true. The astronaut’s representation is true whereas the representation provided by the man on earth is false. (1) and (3) are of the same type in that both, in order to make a clearly self-
conscious statement, would have to say, ‘the moon is less than fifty miles away from me.’ Point of view thus affects both the content and type of representation.

Most (perhaps all) utterances imply a point of view. If someone says, “The sun is approximately ninety-three million miles away,” we automatically understand that she is making this observation from a terrestrial point of view. Yet as Moore (1987) notes, “The representation itself, importantly, does not involve reference to the earth. At most it involves an oblique reference to the earth, through an implicit use of the indexical phrase ‘from here’” (2). Even explicitly mentioning one’s point of view will not stop a further implication. If a manager says, “In my official capacity, I deplore union organizing,” the point of view from which the utterance is made is not thereby stated. The utterance implies that the speaker’s point of view vis-à-vis her utterance encompasses more than the one identified by her ‘official capacity’. As a point of view always lies outside its perspectival/conceptual field, so an utterance’s point of view can never be stated in the utterance.

Sentences involving shifts between first and third person or direct and indirect discourse signal a point of view. If an astronaut says, “The moon is fifty miles away,” we automatically understand that she is making this observation in relation to herself. A fully self-conscious statement would require her saying, ‘the moon is fifty miles away from me’ or ‘the moon is fifty miles away from here’. We can report her observation to a third party in one of two ways. We can use direct discourse by telling a third party, ‘she said, “The moon is fifty miles
away”. Alternatively, we can use indirect discourse by saying something like ‘she said the moon was fifty miles away from her’ or ‘she said that she is fifty miles away from the moon’. When we use direct discourse, we are mimicking, as far as possible, the first person point of view of the astronaut. When using indirect discourse, we are shifting her first person observation to the third person point of view. The propositional content remains the same even though the point of view does not.

One may argue that when we understand an utterance we are not thereby recognizing a point of view. Rather, we are simply understanding the meanings of the words used. Yet consider reporting the astronaut’s speech to an obtuse listener. The sentence, ‘she said that the moon was fifty miles away’ would not be understood if taken at face value. Your listener would object that the moon is not fifty miles away and therefore the astronaut is mistaken. You would have to counter by explaining that the moon is fifty miles away from her. The controversy arose because your listener had not taken the implied point of view of the utterance into account.

Focus is crucial in understanding point of view. The expressions used in an utterance signal a speaker’s focus and hence her point of view. In relation to fictional texts, Susan Ehrlich (1990) notes that sentences with the same propositional content can differ according to point of view. If Jane is Dick’s only sibling, the sentences, (1) Dick loves Jane, (2) Dick loves his sister, and (3) Jane’s brother loves her, indicate a shifting point of view—respectively, (1) neutral, (2)
Dick’s point of view, and (3) Jane’s point of view. Here, we have not the point of view of the speaker of these sentences so much as the point of view she is focusing on in these sentences. Just as a viewer might choose to concentrate on an object’s colour rather than its size or shape, so the speaker is concentrating on one element by seeing the other elements in the sentence in relation to it.

We can even understand sentences that lack a consistent point of view because we are able to supply the regularity that is lacking. Although the move involves a grammatical mistake, we often report the utterances of others in a mix of first and third person. For example, we might say ‘Jane said she would be late and please do not leave’ or ‘my mother asked was I ever going to get a job’. Our oral communications are often grammatically incorrect. These sentences are understandable even though they are grammatically incorrect. We understand them because we can easily identify the relevant shift in point of view.

While points of view can be inferred from utterances, the task of acknowledging the point of view implied by a particular utterance is often irrelevant to understanding how that utterance is used. Yet this dismissal of point of view is not always possible. Explanations of utterances using the word ‘I’, metaphorical statements, and statements in and about works of fiction need such an acknowledgment.

Self-Reference and Point of View: The First-Person Perspective

In a previous chapter, I argued that a comprehensive account of the word ‘I’ needs to recognize first-person self-conscious self-reference without
impoverishing our notion of what it is to be a self. Such an account crucially
depends on recognizing that we can adopt different points of view even when we
are perceiving ourselves. An appeal to point of view provides for how we know
rather than what we know.

When Thomas Nagel (1979), in Mortal Questions, wonders what it is like to
be a bat, he concludes that the question cannot be answered satisfactorily unless
we take into account the subjective character of experience. Because there are
radical differences between the sensory apparatuses of bats and humans, bats and
humans experience the world in different ways. Although we could objectively
describe how a bat might experience the world, such a description would fall
short of answering the question. He argues that "every subjective phenomenon is
essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an
objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view" (167). Consequently,
even to form a conception of what it is like to be a bat, one must take up the point
of view of a bat. Similarly, secondary qualities such as colour or taste can only be
experienced by those having the relevant sensory apparatus. In other words,
secondary qualities are subjective in that they are only accessible from a
particular, experiential point of view. Moreover, we cannot be wrong about these
experiences because they are as they appear to us. For example, an object may
appear red to me because I see it under a red light. When informed of the
particular circumstances under which I viewed the object, I could conclude that I
am wrong about the object being red, but I cannot be wrong about it looking red to me.

The shift from an objective to a subjective point of view is shown by the use of an indexical. It is possible to think of an object or an aspect thereof in many ways. However, to think of an object indexically is to think of it in relation to oneself (that is, in relation ‘to me’). Indexicals thereby serve to express a subjective perspective or point of view on the world. Colin McGinn (1983), in The Subjective View, notes that ‘I am here now’, if describing one’s first-person position rather than objective coordinates, characterizes what it is to have a first person point of view (42). This statement in such a case is never wrong. For example, one can be wrong about what time it is, but one can never be wrong about the time being ‘now’.

The shift between first and third person points of view has implications for the meaning of the word ‘I’. The word ‘I’ demonstratively refers to a person, an element of the objective spatial order. While ‘I’ refers to the speaker of that particular token in the situation of utterance (if the speaker is also the agent of that context), the meaning of the word is not thereby exhausted. Our awareness of an object depends on its relations to other objects in the world. Yet to think of the world as objectively existing apart from the subject, we have to have an idea of the subject as being in the world, of being one element among others. To think of oneself as ‘I’, one must have the capacity to identify oneself, to locate that object that is oneself. We do so through a cognitive map of our surroundings, our
knowing our orientation, position, and relation to other objects in the world based on our perception of the world.

Self-reference can be done either from the first-person (subjective) or the third-person (objective) point of view. In both cases, self-consciousness can be involved. However, when self-reference is subjective, it is self-conscious in a first-person way and cannot be mistaken. When self-reference becomes self-conscious in a first-person way, a point of involvement is added, a new relation is recognized which was previously missing. There is a difference between noticing a woman wearing a hat (perhaps in a mirror) and knowing that the woman wearing the hat is me. The way we see something is a point of involvement. What we learn is knowledge of a relation that holds between me as object and me as subject. First-person thought is not independent of information gleaned from the environment. However, such thought is egocentric and subjective when it is self-conscious. Each one of us can view ourselves from this point of view though we cannot have this point of view on others. When we self-consciously refer to ourselves, we are aware not just of the object that is me but also how this object is presented to me in that my awareness of this object depends on its relation to other objects in the world.

Colin McGinn (1983) and Gareth Evans (1982) contend that the constancy of linguistic meaning from occasion to occasion indicates that there is a single, common mode of presentation in indexicals. While agreeing, I have argued in a previous chapter that this mode of presentation is only the basis for ‘I’ thoughts.
Evans’ model allows us an awareness of selfhood but does not deal with our awareness of what it is to be this individual self. Although Evans is right to note that an examination of our mental states does not and could not require an inner gaze, our notion of self-reflection is richer than Evans allows. This additional awareness of self arises from the point of view we adopt when self-reflecting. Self-reflection proceeds by a process of comparing our perception of things to the reports others give of their perceptions of these same things. If you find a particular landscape significant whereas I do not, this difference says something about you and me rather than about the landscape. Such differences become the object of our attention during self-reflection. From this object we can further infer our point of view in that this comparison is done from a point outside the conceptual field. If we could capture this point of view in a conceptual field, we would do so from only from a different point of view that is once again outside this field. Even in self-reflection we are seeing ourselves from an imaginative standpoint outside of ourselves. Because self-reflection relies on multiple comparisons in different situations, we do not have a stable conception of the self. Given that we are unable to fully capture this individual self, how we think of the self is subject to a variety of different metaphors. We do not each possess a separate metaphor of the self. Rather, these metaphors are produced by our culture. This variety occurs because we never appear in our own visual/conceptual field. The mode of presentation is common to all persons yet
particular 'I' thoughts can be culturally mediated through metaphorical conceptions of the self.

Point of View and Metaphor

As I have argued in a previous chapter, metaphorical statements are most fully explained by Max Black's interaction theory (1993). On Black's theory, the interaction forming the basis of a metaphor results in seeing one thing through the lens or framework of another. I part company with Black by arguing that metaphor is best understood as providing a pattern of attention that includes the self. When making or understanding a metaphor, our point of view changes in that our interest or involvement shifts from the thing (world) to our relation with the thing (world). A metaphor provides a different conceptual field from the one involved in a literal description.

The interaction that takes place between the primary and secondary subjects of a metaphor arises from the relation between these elements as well as from the elements themselves. Consequently, the interaction is threefold, holding between the primary subject, the secondary subject, and the self. When understanding or making a metaphor, we focus both on what the terms literally mean and on their tacit or symbolic meaning. The words used in a metaphor thus partially gain their meaning from the roles they play in the larger whole of the metaphor.

A change in point of view often relies on a shift in focus. I could look at an apple first from the point of view of size and then from the point of view of
colour. In other words, my interest or involvement is not always the same even though the object has not itself changed. In metaphor, my point of view of the primary subject shifts in that I see it according to the framework of the secondary subject. However, point of view enters into metaphor in a second way.

Sometimes, we have two points of view on an object in that what we know to be true of an object conflicts with how that object appears to us or how we experience that object. Objectively, I may know that the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are equal, yet I perceive or experience them as being unequal. It may be that I find a particular type of apple sweet. On one occasion, I may taste such an apple after eating something else and find that the apple tastes sour to me. I can conclude not that the apple is sour but that what I had previously eaten made it taste sour to me. The conflict between what I know a thing to be and how I experience that thing rests on the difference between points of view. While these cases are not metaphorical, something very like this shift in point of view occurs in metaphor. Such a shift is not sufficient for metaphor, but it is necessary. A metaphor relies on an experiential point of view in that a metaphor captures how a thing (the primary subject) seems or feels to us even while we are understanding that how the primary subject feels to us is not how it is. When I use a metaphor, I am describing the primary subject, but my focus is slightly shifted in that I am expressing my point of involvement with it, how I feel about the primary subject. Thus, I may use the metaphor, ‘Sally is a pig’ even as I know that, literally speaking, Sally is not a pig.
The felt quality associated with metaphor is most easily seen with poetic metaphors. We often find a poetic metaphor powerful because it expresses what we have often felt yet never felt capable of articulating ourselves. Two people might paraphrase a particular poetic metaphor in slightly different ways because they are relating that metaphor to their own experience. When Lawrence Ferlinghetti, in his poem “Constantly Risking Absurdity” that contains an extended metaphor of the poet as an acrobat, claims that beauty is “spread-eagled in the empty air of existence,” particular understandings of this metaphorical phrase would no doubt contain differences. Similarly, if someone says, “Sally’s prose has the sparkle of a new pair of rubber boots,” possible literal paraphrases of what this metaphor means in relation to Sally’s prose will vary. However, many metaphors are more prosaic. Sometimes, we can use metaphors without even realizing that our phrases are metaphorical. Yet we need not conclude from the diversity of metaphors that they lack a stable point of view.

Our speech is regularly a mix of metaphor and literal statement. A speaker can often use a metaphor without realizing it. This situation would appear to negate the claim that metaphor provides a pattern of attention that includes the self. However, such a speaker has nonetheless used a metaphor even though she lacks the experiential perspective. We are often unaware of our own point of view even though others can recognize it. The structure of a metaphor creates a particular kind of conceptual field, a field that is created whether or not a maker
or hearer of a metaphor recognizes that field by adopting the appropriate point of view.

The most difficult metaphors to explain are those that are neither poetic nor unrecognized. Prosaic metaphors like 'the ship of state' are easily recognized as metaphors yet there seems to be no involvement of the self. As metaphors more comfortably and conventionally come to express certain experiences, their felt quality is lost. Here, we might consider Michael Polanyi's (1962) distinction between tacit and focal awareness. When a blind man initially learns to use a cane, he is conscious of his hand manipulating the cane. As he becomes more comfortable, his focus shifts to the tip of the cane as it comes into contact with objects. Although he is no longer focally aware of his hand manipulating the cane, his tacit awareness of it nevertheless has meaning insofar as it bears on his focal awareness. While all parts of a poetic metaphor receive equal attention, a prosaic metaphor allows us to focus our attention on the metaphor's singular, conventional meaning. If, according to our standards, we think Sally is messy, we can use the metaphor 'Sally is a pig' to express our feeling even though we no longer consider why calling someone a pig is calling them messy. If asked, we should be able to give an account of the metaphor's meaning but only after reflection. Even though we are no longer focally aware of the relation, our tacit awareness nonetheless bears on our focal awareness of the metaphor. These tacit elements are necessary to the structure of the metaphor even if we no longer focus our attention on them. I suggest that familiarity has made us so comfortable with
the conceptual fields of some metaphors that we no longer self-consciously appreciate them. Nonetheless, that any particular speaker may use the metaphor without any sense of personal involvement does not diminish the inclusion of the personal that is part of the conceptual field of the metaphor.

**Point of View and Statements In and About Works of Fiction**

Kendall Walton's theory of make-believe adequately explains statements made in fiction and most statements made about fiction. His theory is least satisfactory when dealing with critical statements about fiction. A statement like 'Emma Woodhouse is motherless' is subject to make-believe rather than belief. A statement like 'Emma is central to each chapter of the novel' is less amenable to this explanation. In order to accommodate both kinds of statements, Walton argues that critics who make comments of the second kind are only playing a different kind of game of make-believe and that being a fictional character is itself a fictional property. Alternatively, Walton could claim (as he did in personal conversation), that in a statement like 'Tom Sawyer does not exist', 'Tom Sawyer' signals a kind of failure to refer. In a statement like 'Tom Sawyer is a fictional character', 'Tom Sawyer' once again signals a failure to refer. The rest of the statement, '... is a fictional character', indicates why the proper name ('Tom Sawyer') fails to refer. The proper name fails to refer because it arises from a prop in a game of make-believe.

Neither explanation is entirely satisfactory. In an earlier chapter, I argue that critics are not making believe, for example, that Emma Woodhouse is a fictional
character. Walton's second explanation does not entirely explain how a proper name can refer in some sentential contexts but not in others. At first glance, proper names would not seem to be ambiguous terms.

The difficulty stems from our recognizing that the names of fictional characters can be used in statements that can accommodate two different kinds of predicates. We often see these predicates as reflecting two different kinds of properties. However, this way of seeing the matter does not bring out what we find odd in statements that confuse the two. If we collapse our two initial examples into one statement, we notice the oddity: 'Emma Woodhouse is motherless and is central to each chapter in the novel'. Similarly, while we find unremarkable the statement, 'Emma does not realize that she loves Knightley until she thinks he is interested in Harriet', we recognize the apparent oddity of the statement, 'Emma does not realize that she loves Knightley until Chapter Thirteen'. Although the statement, 'The estrangement between Jane and Rochester lasts for many weeks', is acceptable, the statement, 'The estrangement between Jane and Rochester lasts for one chapter', is less so. The oddity rests on the speaker initially treating the names as if they were the names of real persons yet finishing her statement by noting that the names are the names of fictional characters. Walton, I assume, would say that the oddity arises from there being two different games of make-believe at play in one statement. However, if both games are make-believe, then the oddity would not arise.
The oddity of a statement such as this stems not from a confusion of two different kinds of properties, but from a shift in point of view. The shift in these statements is reminiscent of the shift in point of view that occurs in the grammatical error of shift of discourse (e.g., 'my mother said was I ever going to get a job'). The statement has shifted from being a statement in a game and thereby subject to make-believe to a statement commenting on such a game and subject to belief. In the first, one is playing a game and thereby assuming a point of view from within that game. In the second, one is assuming a point of view from outside the game. The work of fiction is central to both but the conceptual field arising from each point of view is different. In the first, one plays a game authorized by a work of fiction and thereby imagines that the proper names refer to actual people. In the second, one is commenting on a fictional character, that is, what could be imagined if one plays a game authorized by a work of fiction. From a point of view within the game, 'Emma' refers to an actual person. From a point of view outside of the game (or any game of make-believe), 'Emma' is the name of a fictional character constituted by the sentences of Jane Austen's *Emma* and the implications arising there from.
CONCLUSION

Appealing to point of view is crucial for explaining how we understand the utterance ‘I think Cinderella married the prince because her society did not allow a woman to paddle her own canoe’ and others like it. However, the explanatory power of point of view should not be over-extended. The limits to applying this notion show themselves in two ways. First, appealing to point of view is irrelevant for explaining our understanding of many utterances. If a speaker says, ‘a triangle is a figure having three angles and three sides,’ our understanding comes from the meanings of the words used and not from our recognition that the speaker is using the conceptual framework of geometry. Secondly, the notion of point of view cannot of itself explain our understanding of problematic utterances. For example, although a metaphor is a metaphor whether or not it is recognized as such, we must also allow that context is often needed to recognize a metaphor.

Yet acknowledging the limitations of an appeal to point of view allows us to clarify the usefulness of this notion as an explanatory tool.

Taking account of point of view involves distinguishing it from context and speaker meaning. Context and point of view sometimes overlap. We can speak of the context of a certain time and place or we can consider a representation as being seen from the point of view of a certain time and place. While in this instance either characterization of time and place will do, other cases—such as the case of statements in and about works of fiction—require a
specific appeal to point of view rather than context. Moreover, we sometimes evoke point of view without acknowledging or even recognizing our appeal. For example, if a speaker says, ‘King Charles was martyred,’ we would assume that the speaker disapproved of Parliament’s trial and execution of King Charles. If the speaker disavows this attitude by saying that she did not intend to express disapproval, we might say, ‘that may not be what you meant, but that is what you said.’ Of course, the speaker did not actually express her disapproval. Rather, the point of view implicit in the utterance is one of disapproval. Consequently, recognizing the explanatory role of appealing to point of view has the additional benefit of curtailing and thereby clarifying the explanatory force of speaker meaning and context.

Utterances take place in a context and, most often, when someone utters a sentence, she intends to convey some meaning by that utterance. Yet the presence of these elements in a speech situation should not blind us to other elements needed to explain how we understand certain utterances. In order to explain how we understand utterances using the word ‘I’, metaphor, and statements in and about works of fiction, we need to appeal to point of view.
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