THE THEORY OF ITEMS:
ITEMS, NONEXISTENCE, AND CONTEXTS
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By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is divided into two parts: the Theory of Items, and the Theory of Contexts. The latter is a further elaboration of the former.

In the first chapter I argue against the classical doctrine of ontological-referential theory. This classical position may be represented by Russell’s and by Quine’s position on nonexistent objects.

The first position that I propose to reject is the view that in order to say anything true about an object its name or description must have an actual reference. This view is represented by Russell’s proposition *14.21:

\[ \vdash \forall x(\phi x) \rightarrow \exists x(\phi x) \]

on which Russell writes: "This proposition shows that if any true statement can be made about \((\exists x)(\phi x)\), then \((\exists x)(\phi x)\) must exist". (Principia Mathematica)

The Theory of Items rejects this view and states that whether a statement about a certain object is true or is false does not depend on the ontic status of that object. Thus, consequently, a true statement about nonexistent objects can be made (without making a distinction between a secondary and a primary occurrence as Russell did).
The second position that is to be rejected is the view that nonexistent objects are mere nothings. This is represented by one of Quine’s theorems that nonexistent objects are simply empty sets.

\[ *_{197} \vdash \Gamma \neg (E \beta)(\alpha)(\alpha = \beta \iff \phi) \rightarrow (\forall \alpha) \phi = \emptyset \]

(*Mathematical Logic*).

For the Theory of Items, nonexistent objects are not nothings; they are somethings for they can be said to have any property whatsoever. Thus if we may have a set that contains existent objects, then we may also have a set that contains nonexistent objects. Nonexistent objects are just as much ‘items’ as existent ones; this is the reason why I call the theory being proposed here the ‘Theory of Items’ and not the Theory of Objects. The word ‘item’ is used instead of ‘objects’ to indicate the ontic neutrality of the matter that we are talking about.

In the second chapter I will present various examples of the classical view and I will try to reply to their arguments in the light of the Theory of Items explained previously.

In the third chapter I will discuss the Theory of Contexts. I will argue that semantical features (truth and falsity) should be assigned to various statements about various items (existent or nonexistent). I maintain that the assignment of a truth value is very much context-dependent. The characteristics of contexts and various rules that
govern them will be discussed. More attention will be given to the fictional items and fictional contexts for no doubt they present some peculiar problems. For example if a fictional item x in a story C1 has a feature that -p, and the same item in a different story C2 has a feature that -~p, then can we validly conclude that the fictional item x is both p and ~p? My argument is based on the analysis of contexts. Only by presenting a satisfactory theory of contexts can that problem (and many other paradoxes) be solved.

This thesis is far from being complete. There are some important topics that I do not discuss (due to page and time limitation). For example the problems of: significance and nonsignificance; whether we should take a three value logic (by incorporating significance as the third value) instead of the classical two value system; consistencies; and a possible formal theory for the Theory of Contexts. The last two of these problems are stated very briefly in the Appendix.

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v.
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Kevin Halion, for making me realize that there are serious problems in any attempt to provide a recursive definition of a context.

***
"I see nobody on the road", said Alice. "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked in a fretful tone. "To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too! Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people, by this light!"

(Alice, Through the Looking Glass)
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viii.
LOGICAL SYMBOLS

The following abbreviations are used:

$\exists$, for the existential quantifier: $\exists$

$\forall$, for the universal quantifier: $\forall$

$\Rightarrow$, for a material implication: $\Rightarrow$

$\emptyset$, for an empty-set symbol: $\emptyset$, $\neg$
CHAPTER ONE

THE THEORY OF ITEMS

[1]. Introduction.


It is simply natural to start our investigation of the Theory of Items by examining Meinong's theory of objects, since Meinong -without doubt- is the father of the modern theory of objects. This does not mean, however, that the theory of items I propose to develop in this thesis is strictly Meinongian. The Theory of Items (to be introduced in 1.2.) accepts some of the fundamental theses of Meinong's theory, but it also rejects several other postulates which are crucial within Meinong's own theory. Those that we take are: the rejection of a classical belief that only actual and real things can be the proper objects of knowledge; the denial of the empiricists' view that only existent objects can truly be characterised; and the rejection of the traditional philosophical prejudice against any things that do not exist (e.g. that nonexistdent objects are mere nothings). We also agree with Meinong's conception of an object which is basically -in Meinong's word- 'daseinfrei',
or 'free of any existential assumption'. What we reject is what seems to be a fundamental notion in Meinong's system, that is the concept of 'being' or 'subsistence'.

This section is divided into two parts. In the first part I shall discuss Meinong's theory of objects as it is presented in his articles "The Theory of Objects" (1904) and "Zur Gegenstandstheorie" (1920)¹. Only those parts which are significant and relevant for the development and discussion of the Theory of Items will be presented. The first subsection is intended to be an historical background for the Theory of Items itself. In the second part of this section, the fundamental ideas and conceptions of the Theory of Items will be given. And finally the philosophical significance of the Theory of Items will be presented. A further elaboration of the theory itself, however, will be given in the next four sections.

Meinong argues that actual and real objects are not the only objects that can be objects of knowledge. There are many objects other than existent ones that can legitimately be objects of knowledge. Mathematics, for instance, deals with numbers, connections and relations which obviously do not exist. Literature deals most of the time with nonexistent fictional characters; impossible objects such as a round-square; as well as possible and impossible
narratives\textsuperscript{2} such as H.G. Wells' \textit{Time Machine}. The nonexistent objects in dreams are the main topic of discussions and speculations for the psychoanalysts. Modern theoretical physics more and more talks about theoretical entities which very often are empirically unverified and may not even exist. Endless examples can be given. The objects of knowledge—in short—include many nonexistent items as well as the existent ones. Meinong says,

\begin{quote}
[T]he totality of what exists, including what has existed and will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of the Objects of knowledge. (Meinong 1960:79)
\end{quote}

The reason why we do not realize this fact is—according to Meinong—simply a prejudice; a prejudice which he calls the prejudice in favour of the existent. Meinong says,

\begin{quote}
This fact [that the totality of what exists is very small in comparison with the totality of the objects of knowledge] easily goes unnoticed, probably because the lively interest in reality which is part of our nature tends to favour that exaggeration which finds the non-real a mere nothing—or, more precisely, which finds the non-real to be something for which science has no application at all or at least no application of any worth. (Meinong 1963:79)
\end{quote}

Thus, now we can summarize Meinong's position as follows:

\begin{quote}
(M1). There are objects that do not exist.

(M2). Everything whatsoever—whether it is impossible,
or possible, existent or nonexistent— is an object.

(M3). Nonexistent objects are not nothing; they are something. This is simply to say that they have certain properties. Thus, an object is anything that can have properties.

(M4). Thus, nonexistent objects can be thought about, speculated on, assumed, as well as being objects of knowledge. Everything whatsoever, Meinong argues, can be objects of knowledge: "even unreal things with being, things without being, possibilities, and even impossibilities can be objects of knowledge." (Meinong 1974:224) This leads to the conclusion that a special kind of science is needed in order to deal with all objects whatsoever. Metaphysics cannot be this science since metaphysics is limited to what is real and actual: "metaphysics has to do [only] with everything that exists." (Meinong 1963:79) The science of objects comprehends all items without restriction "especially ...to the special case of existence, so that it can be called existence-free [daseinfrei]." (Meinong 1974:224) This science about items as such is the Theory of Objects. Meinong further adds,

In this respect, it is a kind of a companion piece to metaphysics which tries to comprehend the totality of reality, while the theory of entities, because of its freedom from existence,
tries to encompass also everything that is not real. (Meinong 1974:225)

The doctrine that everything is an object should not be confused with philosophers' accusation that Meinong is a 'super-ontologist', 'super-Platonist', or an 'entity-multiplier'. Findlay, for example, -despite his sympathetic treatment of Meinong's theory- sees Meinong as the introducer of unnecessary entities and as having "a world perhaps too rich in forms of intentionality and over-populated by objects." (Findlay 1963:326. Cf. also Routley 1979a:490) It is clear that for Meinong not all objects exist, he maintains the opposite: many objects do not exist. Nonexistent objects, as Routley says, do not belong to the population of the world. Therefore, "the world may be overpopulated, but it is not 'overpopulated' by nonexistent people." (Routley 1979a:490) And, since many items do not exist, they cannot be removed by Occam's razor. Occam's razor applies only to existent entities.

Lycan's description of Lewis' realism as a "brand of Meinongianism" (Lycan 1979:287) is also misdirected for obviously Lewis is far from being a Meinongian. Lewis' realism maintains that everything exists, if not in the actual world, in a possible world. (Lewis 1979:182) It is Lewis who is the entity-multiplier and not Meinong, for Meinong holds that not everything exists.
Meinong divides objects into those that have being (Sein) and those that do not have being (Nichtsein). Furthermore, objects that have being either exist or subsist. Tables and chairs, for instance, are said to exist; whereas numbers, and relations, for example, do not exist but subsist. There is a third class of objects which neither exist nor subsist (nevertheless they are not mere nothings). These objects lack any form of being therefore they stand beyond the realm of being—they are Aussersein in Meinong’s phrase. These are for example, impossible objects such as the round-square, and fictional objects such as Pegasus and unicorns. In his article "The Theory of Objects" (1904), Meinong indicates that originally he held that there was a form of being which is possessed by all objects whatsoever. This stemmed from Meinong’s doctrine of the logical priority of the object. According to Meinong the object is a prius for the apprehension. That is: the object is already there for the apprehending. Heanue says:

To apprehend is always actively to get at what there already is or "is".
(Meinong 1983:xxix)

And Meinong himself says,

"A must be "given" to me in some way or other if I am to grasp its non-being." (Meinong 1960:85)

This form of being that must be possessed by all objects
whatevsoever is what Meinong called "Quasisein" (quasi-being). Findlay explains,

This sort of being... pertained to everything; it was distinguished from other varieties of being by the fact that it had no contrary. For if it had a contrary, the entities which lacked Quasisein would have to possess Quasisein of a higher order, since they would certainly not be nothing. And so we should be drawn into an infinite series of orders of Quasisein:... Quasisein had therefore no contrary, but belong to all entities whether they existed or not. (Findlay 1963:47)

Meinong eventually abandoned this doctrine on the ground that a form of being (i.e., Quasisein) which belongs to every entity and of which it is inconceivable that some entity may not have it is really not a form of being at all. (Findlay 1963:47)

The doctrine of Aussersein leads to the doctrine that the so-being (Sosein) of an object is independent from its being (Sein). An object is such and such, or has certain characteristics, independently of whether it has being at all. In other words, an object may have certain characteristics regardless of its ontic status. Pegasus, for example, can have the characteristic of being a winged horse regardless of its nonexistence. Chisholm explains,

[5]ince we can think about these objects and say various true things about them, then they have certain characteristics even though they cannot be said to be. They have Sosein even though they haven’t any Sein. This
is Meinong's doctrine of *Aussersein*: certain objects which are such that there are no such objects have certain definite characteristics. Or, more briefly, from the fact that an object is *something* it does not follow that the object is. (Chisholm 1973:209-210)

Now, we can conclude,

(M5) Every object has the characteristics it has regardless of whether it exists or not. The Golden mountain is both golden and a mountain; a round square is both round and square.

Not all predicates, however, are characterising predicates. Meinong makes a distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties. A nuclear property is understood as a constitutive property of an object; and an extra-nuclear property is understood as a property which is not a constitutive part of any object. It is a property "which is 'founded on' the notion of the object". (Findlay 1963:176) Meinong gives an obvious example of an extra nuclear property: the property of simplicity. Suppose there is an object that may be regarded as simple, e.g., a certain specific shade of red. If we treat this simplicity as a constitutive part of that object, then we are involved in a contradiction. The object will have the property of being simple as well as being red. Now, since the object has two properties (being simple as well as being red), then the object is complex. But, this is absurd since the object is simple! In order to avoid this contradiction, Meinong holds that the property of simplicity
cannot be the constitutive part of any object. And, thus, it is an extra-nuclear property.

A more relevant example for our purposes is the notion of 'being': 'being', according to Meinong, is not part of any object. This is because if 'being' were a constitutive part of any object, then we would be involved in a contradiction. A red Pegasus is both a Pegasus and is red, but an existing Pegasus is not both a Pegasus and existent for Pegasus does not exist. Existence, then, is not an ordinary predicate like 'is red'; it is not a constitutive part of any object. And, therefore, existence is an extra-nuclear property. "[T]hus predicates ascribing ontological status cannot form part of characterisation of any item." (Griffin 1979:30)

(M6) Existence is not a characterising property of an object, nor are: 'is determined', 'is simple', and 'is complete'. They are not part of any object, they are extra-nuclear properties.

1.2. The Theory of Items.

The Theory of Items I propose to develop is similar in many ways to the Theory of Objects already developed by Meinong. Most of the basic assumptions that have been made by Meinong are regarded as fundamental theses for the Theory of Items. However, this does not mean that the Theory of Items is Meinong's theory. The Theory of Items being developed here can neither be regarded
as merely Meinong's theory revised nor an extension of it. There are at least two reasons why this is so. First, the Theory of Items rejects some of the theses that are fundamental in Meinong's theory. Second the Theory of Items is going to be developed far beyond Meinong's own intention in developing the Theory of Objects. In Chapter III a significant development for the Theory of Items is proposed. This development is the attempt to incorporate the Theory of Context—in its very simple form—in the heart of the Theory of Items. If this project is successful, then, it is hoped that many problems concerning nonexistent items, and problems of intensionality in general can be solved satisfactorily.4

As it may be recalled Meinong makes a distinction between objects that have being and those that do not have being. Furthermore, objects that have being are divided into two categories: they either exist or subsist. The Theory of Items differs from Meinong's Theory of Objects in the following respect. The Theory of Items accepts that there is a legitimate distinction to be made between items that have being and those that do not. However, for the Theory of Items there is only one kind of item that has being; those are existent items. The Theory of Items rejects subsistence as a second mode of being. Thus, an item either exists or it does not have any form of being whatsoever. There are no subsistent items. This issue will
be discussed in sec.5 of this chapter.

It seems to me that once we have a valid argument for accepting items that have no being whatsoever into our theory as legitimate items, then the second mode of being (subsistence) will become obsolete. Those items which subsist according to Meinong can now be classified among those that have no form of being whatsoever. The introduction of the second mode of being of course provides Meinong with a way out from his hesitation to attribute existence to a certain class of items on one hand, and his unwillingness to attribute nonexistence to those items on the other. This, however, is unnecessary if we have accepted items with no form of being whatsoever fully into our theory.

Thus, whereas in Meinong's theory nonexistent objects may include those that subsist as well as those that have no form of being whatsoever; in the Theory of Items by 'nonexistent items' it is intended to mean only those items that have no form of being whatsoever.

It does not mean, however, that Meinong's theses (M1) to (M6) are to be neglected. On the contrary, the Theory of Items (or [TI], for short) is based on those theses-with slight alterations.

The first of Meinong's theses that is taken over by the Theory of Items is the postulate that there are items that do not exist:

[TI]1. There are items that do not exist. (cf. (M1)).
Two things need to be said regarding this first postulate. Firstly, to say that 'there are items' does not mean to imply that those items have some kind of being. When I say 'there are items' I do not make any ontological claim about those items. This seems straightforwardly true since if 'there are items' were to imply there are items that have being, then the above postulate would be a contradictory claim. For as I have maintained above items that do not exist do not have any form of being at all. And therefore, secondly, there is a legitimate distinction to be made between 'there is x', or 'there are x-es', and 'there exists x'. In saying 'there is(are) x(es)' I am not making any ontological claim about x(es); but in saying 'there exists x' I am in fact making an ontological claim about x(es). Thus, the claim 'there are items that do not exist' is not a contradictory claim, and the claim 'there are items that exist' is not a tautologous claim.

Likewise, to say that there is no x is not the same as to claim that x does not exist for something that does not exist can still be talked about. What I am claiming when I say 'there is x' is that x may have certain properties. I will discuss this shortly.

Now, since we can say that there are items that do not exist as well as there are items that exist, consequently those items that exist and those that do not have any form of being at all are items. Thus our second
The word 'item' is used to indicate the ontic-neutrality of the term. Thus, regardless of ontic status everything thinkable, assumable\textsuperscript{5}, or dreamable is an item: whether something is existent or nonexistent, real or fictional, complete or incomplete\textsuperscript{6}, it is an item. It has been argued that the term 'item' is preferable to the term 'object' since the latter always carries the connotation of being real or existent. Furthermore, the term 'object' fails to capture the whole realm of items. Routley, for example, argues,

There are some unfortunate features involved in the use of the word 'object'. The word has obtained bad press in some quarters because of its linkage with object of consumption... In other places the term 'object' has been taken to represent something that is cold, neutral, without value, as in the phrase 'mere object'... All these associations are wrong for what object-theory was intended to be about. Objects -or items as it is preferable to say- may be objects of consumption or (mostly) not, they may be valuable or not. They are not divided sharply from subjects or persons, but include them. Further, processes, occasions, events and so forth, are all items, though not material ones... Still, the term 'object' undoubtedly has some restriction upon it in more ordinary use; for instance it is something "out there", it is separable, more or less, etc. 'Thing' is even more limited. The term 'item', though it has a tendency to slide to the linguistic, avoids these problems. (Routley 1986:1-2)
Even though I agree that the term 'item' is somehow more ontically neutral than 'object'; I will be more flexible in using these two terms. Concerning the ontological connotation of each term, I will be using 'item' and 'object' interchangeably throughout this thesis. That is to say that 'object' is to be understood in an ontically neutral way just as 'item' is understood. However, regardless of the ontological connotation of either terms, the term 'item' is used to indicate the generality of the term. Thus 'item' is used to talk about both particular things (such as tables and chairs) and also states of affairs such as possible and impossible narratives. Whereas the term 'object' is used only to refer to a particular thing. So, 'The Theory of Items' is a theory which includes both objects (things) and state of affairs (or, in Meinong's terms: objectives). It deals with possible and impossible objects as well as possible and impossible discourses; it discusses existent and nonexistent objects as well as existent and nonexistent narratives.

The term 'entity' is reserved specially to denote an existent item. This is consistent with how 'entity' is defined in *Oxford English Dictionary*: "something that exists as a separate thing."

The third thesis of [TI] is the
rejection of the belief that those items which do not exist are mere nothings.

[TI]3. Nonexistent items are something and not mere nothings. (cf. M3))

Consider this: we go to the movie to see Superman and not to see nothing; a psychoanalyst analyses his patient's dream objects, and is not analysing nothing. Superman and the dream objects are something if only because we know that Superman differs from the dream objects. If they are mere nothings, then a comparison between the two is not possible.

Thus the fourth thesis is:

[TI]4. Nonexistent items can be thought about, speculated on, assumed, as well as being objects of knowledge. (cf.(M4))

The fact that an item does not exist, does not mean that it is less important or less valuable than an item that exists. There are many existent items that are trivial, and there are many nonexistent items that are absolutely crucial for our lives. For example the concept of relations. Theses [TI]3 and [TI]4 lead to the conclusion that not only existent items may be objects of knowledge, nonexistent items can as well become objects of knowledge. Just because nonexistent items do not exist, it does not mean that they cannot become objects of knowledge.

The fifth thesis is:

[TI]5. An item may have the features used to
characterize it regardless of its ontic status. (cf. (M5))

The assertion that a Pegasus is a winged horse, for example, does not involve the assumption that there exists an entity called Pegasus. Pegasus can be characterized as a winged horse, regardless of whether Pegasus exists or not. If every assertion about nonexistent items always involves the assumption that the item exists, then all fictional works are false; psychoanalysts, and mathematicians most of the time talk falsely. However, it seems simply true to assert that—say—a Pegasus is not a unicorn, or that Superman is not Sherlock Holmes, or to discuss in an academic environment an impossible narrative. In making these assertions, or engaging on these discussions, we are not making any assumptions about the existence of the objects of which we are speaking. A novelist knows perfectly well that her characters do not and never did exist, a psychoanalyst realizes that objects in dreams do not exist, nor does he pretend that those objects exist; and yet he can talk about them, --those objects are something. Nor does it need to be concluded that fictional objects—even though they don't exist—exist in a different sense: in stories, or in possible worlds. The reason is because existence unlike most other properties is not a
characterising property of any item. And thus, even though we may say that there is a red fictional item (e.g., a red Pegasus) in some possible worlds, we may not say that there is an existent fictional items (e.g., an existent Pegasus) in some possible worlds, for fictional items does not and never did exist. Thus, our next principle is:

[TI]6. Existence is not a characterising property of any items. (cf. (M6)).

Not all of the features that an item may be thought to have, are characterising features. 'Existence' for example, even though it is a feature of an item, it is not a characterising feature. Only characterising features can characterise an item. The distinction between characterising and non characterising features is parallel to the distinction made by Mally - which was taken over by Meinong - between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties (already explained above). The motivation in insisting on making the distinction in both cases is obviously the same, that is: to keep the theory consistent (see Meinong's examples presented above).

Consider a theory $A$ which treats all features as characterising features; -that is $A$ does not make any distinction between characterising and non-characterising features. By $A$ we can conclude that "the existing golden-mountain exists" is a true proposition; but "the existing
golden-mountain exists" is obviously not true since a golden mountain does not exist! Thus the theory A is inconsistent (with the facts).

What is the philosophical significance of the Theory of Items? First, the Theory of Items solves many problems of intensionality which are "impregnable to empiricists and to classical assaults." (Routley 1979a:8) Why is intensionality important? It is important because most scientific and everyday discourse is intensional. Routley argues,

The overwhelming part of everyday, and also of extraordinary, of scientific and of technical discourse is intensional. Even superficial surveys of the published and spoken word will confirm this claim: work through a few columns of newspaper and magazine or a literary or a scientific journal, or even through a paper or two of our extensional friends, and see for yourself. (Routley 1979a:8)

As I said before, mathematical, literary, and scientific discourse deals with many items which do not exist.

Second, the Theory of Items provides an alternative view to classical logic especially in dealing with non-existent objects such as fictional items. The Theory of Items, for example, rejects the following claims which are usually held by the classical view:

(1) if there is something which is P, then this 'something' must exist.

(2) 'there is' can be read 'there exists'.
(1) is no other than the Russellian classical Ontological Assumption:

(3) \( \vdash \psi (\forall x)(\phi x) \rightarrow E!(\forall x)(\phi) \) *14.21 Principia.

which says: if any true statement can be made about \( (\forall x)(\phi x) \), then \( (\forall x)(\phi x) \) exists. By [TI]4 the Theory of Items rejects the above principle. (2) is not true since the distinction between 'there is' and 'there exist' needs to be explicated (as I have showed earlier on). Classical logic, of course, fails to see this point since for the classical logic 'there is' and 'there exists' are both to be translated as \((E\exists)x\ldots x\ldots\) in the formal language.

The third philosophical significance of [TI] is concerned with the fact that there are many important nonexistent items in everyday life that cannot be disregarded. To exclude nonexistent items is simply to disregard too many items that definitely play a significant role in our life.


2.1. Meinong's Über Annahmen.

Meinong's Über Annahmen (1983)7 starts with a classical distinction between a representation (Vorstellung)8 and a judgment (Urteil). Meinong's concept of an assumption is based on this distinction. He maintains that there is a mental phenomena which is stronger than a mere representation but weaker
than a judgment. This 'intermediate' phenomenon which stands between a representation and a judgment he calls an assumption. In order to understand how Meinong arrives at such a position the classical distinction between a representation and a judgment needs to be explained.

(i). In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, for example, a representation is seen as the epistemological condition for anything at all to be known as an object. By *representations* Kant means objects which are given to us through our sensibility (intuitions) and objects which are presented to us through understanding (concepts). In short we know anything at all as an object only because the object is represented to us either by means of our sensibility or by means of our understanding.

Furthermore, Kant maintains that no concept can relate to its object directly (B93). Something else is needed to mediate between objects and concepts. This is Kant's concept of a *judgment*. Kant states: "Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object..." (B93). Since to understand something one needs to be able to relate concepts and objects together, this leads to the conclusion that understanding is the faculty of judgment (B94). For example: I can understand the concept of a book because I can relate the concept of a book with the book as
an object of an intuition given through my sensibility. A judgment, thus, is something by which we can tie up together both concepts and intuitions.

(ii). According to Brentano—who was Meinong’s teacher from 1875-1877 (Meinong 1983:ix)—there are three main mental acts: a presentation (Vorstellung), a judgment (Urteil), and the phenomena of love and hate. The first two parts of this threefold division are the most important for our purpose. A presentation and a judgment are two ways of being conscious of an object, for Brentano says that an object enters into our consciousness in two ways: either as an object of presentation or as an object of affirmation or denial. Brentano argues:

When we say that presentation (Vorstellung) and judgment (Urteil) are distinct basic classes of mental phenomena, what we mean by this, according to what has been remarked before, is that they are two entirely different ways of being conscious of an object. By this we do not mean to deny that every judgment presupposes a presentation. We maintain, rather, that every object of judgment enters into consciousness in two ways, as an object of presentation, and as an object of affirmation or denial. (Brentano 1960b: 62)

Findlay explains Brentano’s concept of presentation:

Whenever anything stands before consciousness, whenever we see a colour or hear a tone, construct an image in our fancy, or understand the
meaning of a word, we are living through a Vorstellung in Brentano’s sense. (Findlay 1963:4)

For Brentano all judgement is either affirmative ("This book is red") or negative ("This book is not red"). Findlay explains:

A judgment distinguishes itself from a Vorstellung in that, when we judge, we accept something as true [affirmative] or reject something as false [negative]; such judgments are present even in simple cases of perception and memory where we trust our experiences too implicitly to express such trust in words. (Findlay 1963:4)

Brentano, it seems to me, gives Kant’s concept of a representation a psychological flavour. In Kant’s theory the dichotomy between a representation and a judgment is a matter of epistemology, in Brentano’s it is a matter of psychology.

A presentation is the logical condition for all types of experience to be possible at all; a judgment is built on a presentation. (Findlay 1963:5) This does not mean, however, that judgments are reducible to mere presentations (Grossmann 1974:79). The difference between a presentation and a judgment is that the former is passive because the object is presented to us, it is given to us; while the latter is active because we make the judgment. Whereas in a mere presentation we merely receive objects as they are given to us, in a
judgment we relate and combine concepts and objects in order to make understanding and apprehension of an object possible.

(iii). Meinong agrees both with Kant and Brentano in maintaining that a representation is a passive state and a judgment is an active state of the mind.

The Vorstellung in itself is a wholly passive experience, to which we surrender ourselves without endeavouring to make anything out of it ... If someone were to look at a coloured pattern in a wholly passive frame of mind, he would presumably live through or enjoy certain mental modifications or Vorstellungen, but he would only be aware of the pattern and its properties if he abandoned this passivity. (Findlay 1963:5-6)

According to Findlay, however, Meinong holds that Vorstellung "only provides the necessary basis for such an explicit apprehension" (1963:5), and it is not actually setting an object before the mind. This is obviously another way of restating Kant's point that in order to know anything as an object, a presentation in itself is not adequate. A presentation must be accompanied by a process of realization, i.e., a judgment; that is: the object must be realized by way of compounding object and concept. (cf. Kant: B141 and A51) Thus, for Meinong -as for Kant- representation alone is not adequate for an apprehension of something. "A mere Vorstellung is a passive experience, in which the reference to an object
is only potential, not actual." (Findlay 1963:171)

The potential direction to an object which we find in the Vorstellung becomes a complete and explicit apprehension of something when the active experience of judgment or assumption supervenes, the presence of an object is acknowledged or its nature is recognized. (Findlay 1963:6)

Nevertheless Meinong does not deny the role of a presentation as a logical prius of anything whatsoever to be thought and apprehended. He says in the opening sentence of his Über Annahmen:

Representation has long been recognized as the prerequisite of anything that occurs in the realm of thought. Unless a thought occurrence is itself a representation, it presupposes a representation. (Meinong 1983:9)

Meinong also shares Brentano’s view that what makes a judgment distinct from a mere representation is that a mere representation lacks conviction and also it is not something that can be affirmed or denied. This is because to affirm or to deny something is to judge that such-and-such is the case or not the case. A person who makes a judgment that the book that he sees is red, is also convinced that the book is in fact red. And this judgment is either affirmative: "Yes, the book is red", or negative: "No, the book is not red!". In a mere presentation the object is presented to us; no more than that, it neither carries conviction nor an affirmation or negation. Meinong argues:
There are, namely, two things which, in my opinion, anyone will grant as being present in judgment, but lacking in representation. A person who judges believes something, or is convinced of something; it is only by a quite obvious extension of verbal usage that we can speak of judgments in which the subject leaves his conviction in _suspensu_. Furthermore, every judgment, by its very nature, occupies a definite position within the antithesis of yes and no, of affirmation and negation. (Meinong 1983:10)

Meinong also holds that there are two kinds of representations: a perception representation and a production representation. A perception representation is a representation which is given to us through our sensory perception. We experience, for instance, what blue or red is. (Meinong 1983:15) A production representation is a representation "by which we apprehend similarity or difference quite as we apprehend blue or red by means of sensation." (Meinong 1983:15) We experience that blue cars differ from red cars, or that dark-blue is relatively similar to light-blue; this apprehension of the difference or the similarity -not just the apprehension of the colours- is what Meinong calls 'production representation'. However, both kinds of representation carry no conviction and they are not something that can be affirmed or denied. Meinong, thus, dismisses clearly the claim that there is such a thing as a 'negative representation',

[N]egation is _never_ a matter of
representing, ... Negation lies beyond representation... Can the apprehending of our negativum N somehow be charged to a perceptual representation and thus, in some way or another, be reduced to perception? The evident nature of perception permits no doubt that the question is to be answered only in the negative... We can probably now regard it [the negative representation] as settled that these things are not representation at all. (Meinong 1983:14,15,&20)

Now, Meinong introduces a new kind of mental phenomena: this is a mental phenomena which can take the form of an affirmative or negative statement and yet lack any conviction. Since Meinong has made clear that negative representation must be rejected, this kind of mental phenomena cannot possibly belong to representations. But it cannot belong to judgements either since it lacks conviction. Meinong accepts that every conviction must either be affirmative or negative. This leaves it open to the speculation whether or not there is a 'convictionless affirmation and negation'. Meinong maintains that in fact there is such a thing. (Meinong 1983:11) Since this 'convictionless affirmation and negation' is stronger than a mere representation, and it is also weaker than a judgment, it must occupy the intermediate domain between a representation and a judgment. Meinong proposes to call the member of this intermediate domain an
'assumption':

In what follow the word "assumption" will be used as a technical term for all those experiences which, as I hope to show, belong to the previously mentioned intermediate domain, the domain between representation and judgment. (Meinong 1983:12)

Thus, an assumption is a judgment with no conviction. Both an assumption and a judgment "[are] always a doing as opposed to an undergoing, i.e., as opposed to the passive attitude we meet within say, feeling -but in representation, too, strictly speaking. .... [A]ssuming as well as judging is a doing." (Meinong 1983:243)

According to Findlay, Meinong's notion of an assumption is quite different from our ordinary use of the word 'assumptions' which sometimes are understood as 'surmises' or 'judgments'. (Findlay 1963:11) Findlay argues that "Meinong restricts the application of the word 'assumption' to those experiences in which we 'take' something to be the case, quite regardless as to whether there are grounds for believing it to be the case or not." (Findlay 1963:64) The example that Meinong himself gives is an assumption that the Boers won the war in 1899-1902. (Meinong 1983:11) We can assume this to be so even though we know that it is contrary to the fact.

Even though it is true that an assumption is completely lacking in conviction, it nevertheless differs from a representation which is merely passive act of the
mind. Definitely in making an assumption that the Boers won the war, I am active. The supposition that the Boers won the war is not merely presented to us, but rather we make it. And also, in making the above assumption I am making a positive assumption that the Boers won the war and I am making a negative assumption that the Boers lost the war.

The similarity and the difference between judgments and assumptions can also be explained in terms of objectives. Suppose I judge that the Boers lost the war. According to Meinong the object of my judgment is the Boers, and its objective is 'that the Boers lost the war'. Obviously we may make a false judgment as well as a correct one. To judge that the Boers lost the war is to make a correct judgment, and to judge that the Boers won the war is to make a false judgment. Meinong argues that in both judgments 'that the Boers lost the war' and 'that the Boers won the war' are objectives.

Now Meinong points out that in assumptions too we have objectives. Thus, we can assume that the Boers lost or that the Boers won the war. In both cases, 'that the Boers lost the war' and 'that the Boers won the war' are objectives. We can conclude, then, that an objective is an entity "which can be judged and assumed, and which are in some cases facts". (Findlay 1963:67) Thus, Meinong concludes,

[T]here is generally no difference between a judgment and an assumption as regards the objective;... Thus
there are assumptions of being and assumptions of non-being; assumptions of being and those of so-being, assumptions of existence and those of subsistence. (Meinong 1983:243)

and,

The assumption is a sort of limit-case of the judgment, characterized by the zero-value of the strength of conviction. (Meinong 1983:245)

The next task that Meinong has to do is to provide arguments for the existence of assumptions both in scientific discourse and in everyday life. The first argument for the existence of assumptions is in a mathematical discourse. It is not hard to find that many mathematical explanations start from certain assumptions. Thus, for example:

The locution "Let there be a right triangle, one of whose sides is half the length of the other", is one that can only be understood as the expression of an assumption... The reader of the above example of the right triangle has surely already thought of how frequently mathematical explanations make use of similar locutions, only then to attach affirmations that no longer partake of the nature of "mere assumptions" (Meinong 1983:81)

In the theory of argumentation and philosophy in general the notion of an assumption is manifested in the form of "hypothetical discussion of concepts" or "hypothetical situations". (Meinong 1983:81-2) Philosophical inquiry, especially, is a matter of testing an assumption introduced for the solution of a
problem, testing it by developing its consequences and by comparing the consequences with what is given or acknowledged." (Meinong 1983:82)

Assumptions can also be found in the arts especially literature. Fictional narratives are based solely on various assumptions. We assume that Superman is real even though we realize that he is merely a fictional character, we assume certain impossible narratives to be possible in order for us to be able to follow the whole story. We do think of certain actors as certain fictional characters. The task of an actor in this case is to copy the external aspect of the behaviour of the person to be portrayed. (Meinong 1983:85) In reading a novel we assume that the story is real so that we can enjoy the novel. Meinong expresses these phenomenon as follows:

But, he [the reader] generally doesn't take a novel that he is reading to be a "true story", either, and yet he will perhaps concede without any special reluctance that during the reading of it he does maintain an attitude to the action and the individual persons which is very much as though they were real. Thus, the notion that in the reading of the novel something more than mere representation is going on will have impressed many a person as something obvious, and many a one will then find that it does not require too great a step to conjecture, further, that what he is reading is something that he believes, i.e., judges -not lastingly, to be sure, but
Two examples of the existence of assumptions in everyday life can be presented as follows. The first example is the intellectual attitude of children when they are playing. It is simply natural that children assume many things when they are playing in order to amuse themselves. When they are playing with tables and chairs they assume that they are playing with an airplane, or a horse and carriage. Children also assume that, for example, Santa Claus is real, not a mere fictional character. They want to talk to him, and even write letters to him. Meinong argues,

I have in mind the attempt to make out that the child at play really is in a state of delusion during its play, i.e., that a chair that it has harnessed to the table as a horse to a wagon really is taken by the child to be a horse and that the table really is taken to be a wagon. (Meinong 1983:83)

Another case of assumptions is a case of deception. The man who deceives knows two things: he knows the truth and also realizes that what he says is not the truth. If this man tries to deceive others, he will try to convince other people that he is not aware of the truth, therefore he pretends to have a different opinion "and he consequently does not himself make the judgment that he wants to bring about in the other person. The liar does not himself believe what he assumes the appearance
of believing". (Meinong 1983:87)

Meinong also maintains that assumptions can be found in questions. He argues that "it is clear that a person who asks a question wants to know something, and that by means of his question he is giving notice of what it is that the desired knowledge is supposed to concern." (Meinong 1983:90. my underlinings) For example:

When someone asks who owns the lake-fishery, he is presupposing by his question that there is a fishery on the lake that he has in mind. (Meinong 1983:90)

According to Meinong judgments are justified by evidence. If I make a judgment that Scott is the author of Waverley, the judgment will most probably be true if the evidence says that Scott is in fact the author of Waverley, and false otherwise. This is what Meinong calls "judgment-evidence". Concerning assumptions, one may ask whether there is anything like "judgment-evidence", whether there is such thing as "assumption-evidence". Meinong dismisses such a possibility. It is true that assumptions can be associated with either true or false judgments, evident or evidenceless judgments "[b]ut the fact that judgment "A is B" is evidently true or is evidently false is entirely different from the question as to whether the assumption "A is B" has evidence or not." (Meinong 1983:246) Evidence cannot belong to assumptions for "[e]ven in the most favourable evidential state assumptions are never
suited for the apprehending of factuality as such, in the way that evident judgments are." (Meinong 1983:251)

Now, since evidence does not bind assumptions as it binds judgments (this is to say that evidence is relevant to judgments, but not to assumptions), assumptions are left absolutely free from the standpoint of any evidential requirement. This is Meinong's postulation of the absolutely free assumption thesis:

We are altogether incapable of specifying any assumption-experience that could possibly be said to have, all by itself, anything like evidence or which, just by itself, would have some sort of advantage in evidence over its opposite... Bearing this in mind, we can then say: There is no assumption which, considered just by itself, could exhibit any evidential advantage over other assumptions; nor is there any assumption which, considered just by itself, would warrant objection from the standpoint of any evidential requirement. To that extent our assuming does not have any sort of evidential bound set for it: the situation is one of unlimited freedom of assumption. (Meinong 1983:246. my underlining)

The unlimited freedom of assumption principle simply states that we can assume anything whatsoever. There is no restriction to imagining the impossible, or to thinking the possible, to assume fictional objects as factual entities, etc. In short,

[In accordance with the principle of unlimited freedom of assumption, I can assume of any given negativum that is positive, of a factual objective that is merely possible, and so on, just as long as I have first make the modal
properties in question intellectually accessible, so to speak, by means of appropriate conceptualization. (Meinong 1983:253)

2.2. Freedom of Assumption Postulate [FA].

The next principle of the Theory of Items is the unlimited freedom of assumption thesis imported directly from Meinong’s theory. The freedom of assumption thesis can be formulated in the following way:

[FA] Everything whatsoever can be assumed, imagined, speculated on, thought about, with no restriction.

The clause "with no restriction" should be added to indicate that [FA] is absolutely free. Routley says: "There is no restriction on what is imaginable (even the unimaginable is imaginable). One can imagine what one likes, of any sort, abstract or particular, bottom or higher order, no matter how bizarre or whether inconsistent, incomplete, paradoxical or absurd. ... [TI] imposes no restriction on freedom of assumption: assumption is absolutely free". (Routley 1979a:599,864)

On the basis of [FA] we can now define what we mean by an "item" and therefore determine the scope of our inquiry. The following is the definition of an item:

[I] An item is anything whatsoever which is imaginable, thinkable, assumable, with no restriction.

The above definition states, first, that an item is anything which falls under [FA]; anything which is legitimate under [FA] -so to speak- is an item. Thus we have the dogma: anything that is thinkable is an item. In other words,
anything which can have properties is a 'something'; therefore it is an item. Second, this definition of an item also allows us to speak about any objects whatsoever indiscriminately of their ontic status. And this conforms to what the Theory of Items intends to achieve, that is: to include all items without any form of prejudice. Superman is an item just as President Reagan is an item, since Superman is surely a something and not a mere nothing. Likewise a round-square is an item just as well as a round thing is an item since even though a round-square is an impossible entity it nevertheless is something and not nothing. Superman, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, a round-square, a golden mountain, things in my dream last night, etc. are items because they are imaginable, assumable, thinkable (thus, they are something).

An unlimited freedom of assumption also means an unlimited freedom to assign by means of assumptions any features whatsoever to an item. Thus, we are not only free to imagine, think about, speculate on, make assumptions about Pegasus and Superman, but also free to assign any kinds of features to Pegasus and Superman. I can imagine that President Reagan is in fact a logician, and since according to the definition [I] above Reagan as well as Pegasus is an item, I must also be able to
imagine that Pegasus is -say- a president of the U.S. It should be noted that [FA] is absolutely unlimited. Hesitation should not arise regarding the fact that by [FA] we can state: "Pegasus is assumed to exist", as well as "Pegasus is assumed to be a flying pig"; or "A round-square thing is assumed to be possible" as well as "A round-square is assumed not to exist". 'Existence', 'nonexistence', 'possibility', 'impossibility', '__is fictional', '__is factual', '__is real', '__is thought by', '__is imagined by', '__is dreamt by', etc.; as well as: '__is red', '__is blue', '__is the president of the U.S.', '__is flying', '__is famous', '__is smart', etc., all are features that can be legitimately assigned to any items whatsoever under principle [FA] above.

According to Routley in Meinong's later work -that is in his Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit (1915)- Meinong restricts the unlimited freedom of assumption postulated in Über Annahmen. In Über Möglichkeit assumption is prohibited where the modal moment\(^1\) is present (cf. Routley 1979\(^2\) 864, and Über Möglichkeit p.283 ff.). Thus, Findlay, for example, says:

But the freedom of our assumption is limited in one important respect: we cannot by any mental feat lift out of Aussensein a fact that squares are round, or a possibility that two straight lines should enclose a space, in which the modal moment is present.
The most fantastic and insane assumptions can present genuine objects, but the attempt to assume the presence of modal moment where it is not present is necessarily abortive, and apprehends no objects whatever. (1963:107)

Here is where one of the differences between the Theory of Items and the later Meinong rests. The Theory of Items insists that no limitation and restriction should be applied to the principle [FA].

However, whereas it is correct to say that I can imagine that Pegasus exists, or that I can imagine a round-square thing is possible (since this is guaranteed by [FA]), it is absolutely incorrect to conclude that Pegasus exists or that a round-square thing is possible. The reason is because whereas it is true that 'existence' is a feature, it is not the case that 'existence' is a characterising feature. Further explanation is given in the next two sections.

[3]. Independence Thesis. [IT]

[a]. One of the major claims of the Ontological Assumption [OA] is that nonexistent items are featureless, only what exists can truly have properties. This thesis that what does not exist has no properties is apparent in, for example, Russell and Strawson’s writings. Russell argues (in On Denoting) that the present King of France is bald is a false proposition because the present King of France does
not exist. Whereas Strawson argues that the same proposition is neither true nor false because -again- there is no present King of France. Thus, according to [OA], whether an item can be said truly to have some properties is very much dependent on the ontic status of that item.

The Independence Thesis [IT] is a direct rejection of the above claim for [IT] says that an item may have any property without assuming first that the item exists; thus, nonexistent items may have some properties. Quite obviously this claim is taken from Meinong doctrine of the independence of Sosein from Sein. That is: an object is such-and-such (or has a Sosein) regardless of whether or not that object has any being (Sein). Routley concludes:

What the Independence Thesis does claim is that the having of properties is not affected by existence, or alternatively, that the nonexistence of an item does not guarantee (and cannot be defined as) the failure to possess properties. In view of it we can correctly attribute some properties to nonentities. (Routley 1979a:25)

[b]. The claim that nonexistent items can be said truly to have some properties is undeniable. Countless examples can be given. For example, in mathematics and in theoretical sciences: "[a]ll of pure mathematics and much of theoretical science lie beyond the boundaries of the actual". (Routley 1979a:28-29) In fictional worlds we do talk about Mr.Pickwick as being a fat man, or Holmes as
being a detective. Further more we do maintain that some propositions about nonexistent items are true or false. For instance, that Pegasus is a superman is a false proposition; and that Pegasus is a winged horse is a true proposition regardless of the ontic status of Pegasus. In all of these examples some properties can be attributed to items that do not exist.

[4]. Characterisation Postulate. [CP]

[a]. The Independence Thesis claims that nonexistent items can be said to have some properties (features). What features, then, do nonexistent items have? Obviously nonexistent items have features which characterise them as such. In order for us to say that Pegasus differs from Holmes, for instance, Pegasus must have some features that characterise it as Pegasus; and Holmes must also have some features that characterise it as Holmes. Those features that are used to characterise an item as such are the characterising-features (chfs). Now, the Characterisation Postulate [CP] says that any item has the features used to characterise it regardless the item's ontic status (cf. (M5) and [TI]5).

[b]. There are two versions of [CP]: the Unrestricted Characterisation Postulate [UCP], and the Restricted Characterisation Postulate [RCP]. The [UCP] claims that any feature whatsoever can be used to characterise any item. In other words, any feature is a
characterising feature. This position is, however, not defensible for it leads to inconsistency. Take as examples the feature of simplicity and the feature of existence.

Let's take as an item a certain specific shade of red which can be regarded as simple. But if we were to treat the feature of simplicity as a feature that characterises the shade of red, then we will be involved in a contradiction. For the item now is no longer simple but complex: it is red as well as it is simple. In order to avoid this undesirable conclusion, we must maintain that the feature of simplicity --unlike the feature of being red-- is not a feature that can characterise any item. That is to say that the feature of simplicity is not a constitutive part of any object.\(^{13}\)

Likewise the feature of existence is not a characterising feature of any item because if it were then we would be forced to accept an inconsistent result. Consider this: it is true that the Golden mountain is both a mountain and golden; but it is obviously not true that an existent Golden mountain exists. If existence is a characterising feature of an item, then we must accept the latter statement. But it is absurd. Therefore existence can not be a characterising feature of any item.

What can be concluded from the above examples is that at least the feature of simplicity and the feature of existence are not characterising features of any items. That
is to say that even though they can be features of an item, they certainly are not characterising features. This proves that there are non-characterising features (non-chfs).

Once we have recognized that there is a legitimate distinction to be made between chfs and non-chfs, the [UCP] must be restricted. The Restricted [CP] claims that not all features are characterising features. Only chfs can be used to characterise an item. Routley concludes:

[CP] enables us to decide the ontological status of any item that pleases us. Suppose, for example, someone wants a philosopher's stone which exists. Then consider such a philosopher's stone; by [UCP] this exists. In a similar way [UCP] sanctions ontological proofs of all sorts. ... Sometimes it is disastrous, and sometimes it leads to unwanted contradictions, as in the case of an existent round square. ... An unqualified [CP] thus disastrously overdetermines truth values, and in particular ontological states. ... The only viable course open is the expected and intuitive course: to restrict the Characterisation Postulate. (Routley 1979a:255-6)

[c]. Now the distinction between chfs and non-chfs must be elaborated since:

the Characterisation [Postulate] which [is] central to the theory of items, depend upon the distinction of one place predicates into characterising or not, it is important, especially for philosophical applications, and for assessment and criticism of the theory, to elaborate the distinction and to try to make it good. (Routley 1979:264)
What do constitutes characterising features and what do constitutes non characterising features, then? How can we decide which predicates are characterising and which are not? Parsons argues that the decision procedure is based on, first, philosophers' consensus throughout the history of philosophy, and, second, human intuition. Parsons argues,

[1]. Our historical situation yields a very rough kind of decision procedure for telling whether a predicate is nuclear or extranuclear. It is this: if everyone agrees that the predicate stands for an ordinary property of individuals, then it is a nuclear predicate and it stands for a nuclear property. On the other hand if everyone agrees that it doesn't stand for an ordinary property of individuals (for whatever reason), or if there is a history of controversy about whether it stands for a property of individuals, then it is an extranuclear predicate, and it does not stand for a nuclear property. ... [2]. I find that I have such an intuitive ability, and that other people pick it up quite readily; even those who are sceptical about the viability of the distinction seem to agree about what predicates are supposed to be which... (Parsons 1980:24)

Routley defines characterising and non characterising features in term of their paradigms. Thus, the paradigm of characterising features are simple descriptive predicates; and the paradigm of non characterising features are ontic predicates. These are some of the examples: (Routley 1979a:265)

Characterising features:
(1) Descriptive predicates:

(a). auxiliary verb to be + predicative adjectives. E.g., '___is dry', '___is dusty'.

(b). auxiliary verbs to be + indefinite descriptives. E.g., '___is a horse', '___is a man'.

(c). Intransitive verbs, states, descriptive actions, etc. E.g., '___runs', '___sleeps'.

(d). predicate negations of the predicates of the foregoing classes

(2) Compounds of characterising features.

(2) Non Characterising features.

(1) Ontic predicates: '___exists', '___is contingent'.

(2) Evaluative predicates: '___is good', '___is beautiful'.

(3) Theoretical predicates: '___is determined', '___is complete'.

(4) Logical predicates: identity determinates.

(5) Intensional predicates: 'is thought about by'.

[5]. Existence and Nonexistence.

5.1. Is Existence a Predicate?

[1]. One of the dogmas of classical logic is "existence is not a predicate". Here, by 'predicate' it is meant a logical predicate and not a grammatical predicate. A logical predicate is understood as 'what is affirmed or denied of the subject', and to predicate is "logically to assert (a thing) about a subject." (Oxford English Dictionary).

In this section, first, I will present the
classical logicians' arguments that existence is not a (logical) predicate. And then, second, I shall argue that their arguments are based on the ontological assumption that is to be rejected. And therefore, I will conclude, that once we abandon the ontological assumption, the argument that existence is not a logical predicate will collapse. And finally I will establish that existence is a logical predicate (as well as a grammatical one).

[2]. Russell in his "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" 1918 (PLA) argues that existence is not a property that can be attributed to any entity. Essentially, existence is a property of a propositional function. (PLA:232)

According to Russell, to say that a such-and-such exists is simply to assert that there is at least one value of the proposition function "x is a such-and-such" which is true. He says,

When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning of 'existence'. You may express it by saying that there is at least one value of x for which that propositional function is true. Take 'x is a man', there is at least one value of x for which this is true. That is what one means by saying that 'There are men', or that 'Men exist'. (PLA:232)

Thus, if we say 'Unicorns exist' or 'Unicorns do not
exist', we are not asserting or denying the existence of any individual unicorn for "it is [only] of propositional functions that you can assert or deny existence." (PLA:233) Therefore, to say that 'Unicorns exist' is to assert that "There is at least one value of 'x is a unicorn' that is true". And to say that 'Unicorns do not exist' is to say that "It is not the case that there is at least one value of 'x is a unicorn' that is true".17

By using a logical formulation this argument can be made clearer. Russell rejects 'E!a' -where a is a logically proper name- as a meaningful proposition. However, Russell does not reject 'E!(\(\forall\) x)(\(\phi\)x)' as a meaningful proposition since 'E!(\(\forall\) x)(\(\phi\)x)' is simply defined as '(Eb):\(\phi\)x\(\equiv\)x.x=b' which is read: "There exist an x which uniquely satisfies \(\phi\)x" with \(\phi\)x for any propositional function (Principia *14.02). In 'E!a' we treat existence as a property of an entity, whereas in 'E!(\(\forall\) x)(\(\phi\)x)' existence is simply the property of the function \(\phi\)x. The question is why did Russell refuse to treat existence as a property of an item?

One possible answer is the following. It seems to me that his argument is rooted in his doctrine of names and descriptions. Russell argues that "a name cannot occur significantly in a proposition unless there is something that it names." (Russell 1959:64) Now, if we were to treat existence as a property that can be
attributed to any entity (say \( a \)), then we would treat \( a \) as a logically proper name that must refer to something existent. This means that in order for \( E!a \) to be significant at all there must be something (existent) to which the name \( a \) refers. "[T]hus the sentence \( 'a \) exists' will be meaningless if \( a \) does not exist. So, too, will be \( 'a \) does not exist'. (Russell 1919:178-9 and cf. Griffin 1985b:8)

Another possible answer to the above question is that "if \( a \) is immediately presented, its existence is obvious and thus not worth asserting. Similarly, to deny that \( a \) exists will be false. Thus \( E!a \) will be trivial, while \( \neg E!a \) will be contextually self refuting." (Griffin 1985b:6). Even though -as Griffin has pointed out- this cannot be all what Russell meant, nevertheless Russell did indicate that this is so (cf. PLA:211).

There is no doubt that Russell's argument that existence is not a property attributed to any entity is based entirely on the doctrine of names and descriptions above. That is the doctrine that a name must refer to something existent in order for the proposition in which that name occurs to be meaningful at all. Once we have abandoned this doctrine there is no reason at all to hold that existence in \( E!a \) is not a property that can be attributed to an item \( a \). The Theory of Items says that we can 'refer to' (in a sense of 'talk about') existent as well as nonexistent entities.
[3]. In "Is Existence a Predicate?" (1966) Moore holds that

1) 'Some tame tigers growl' means

2) 'There are some tame tigers that growl'.

Likewise

3) 'Some tame tigers do not growl' means

4) 'There are some tame tigers that do not growl'.

It is obvious that 'growl' is a predicate, there is no problem regarding this. But, let us examine the use of 'exists' which is assumed to be treated as a predicate just as 'growl' is. Thus we have,

1a) 'Some tame tigers exist' will mean

2a) 'There are some tame tigers that exist'. (1965:86)

Moore regards this statement as 'queer' since the word 'some' implies that it is part of a whole. 'Some of x...' implies that there are other x-es which are not... . The obvious problem is apparent if we try to negate (1a) and (2a):

3a) 'Some tame tigers do not exist' which means

4a) 'There are some tame tigers that do not exist'.

For Moore (4a) is unacceptable since it is merely a contradiction in terms: 'there exist some things that do not exist'!

Is it possible there should be any tame tigers which do not exist? I think the answer, is that, if in the sentence 'some tame tigers do not exist' you are using 'exist' with the same meaning as in 'some tame tigers exist', then the former sentence as a
whole has no meaning at all - it is pure nonsense. (Moore 1966:86)

Notice that Moore's argument is based on the prejudice in favour of the existent. His mistake rests on his existentially loaded notion of 'there are' or 'there are some'. He fails to make a distinction between 'there is' and 'there exists'. In order to see this, (4a) needs to be translated into formal language:

\[(4a_1) \forall x \neg \exists x\]

with \(x\) for tame tigers, and \(E\) for the predicate existence.\(^{18}\) It is easily seen that \((4a_1)\) is to be rejected since it is obviously a contradictory statement. Moore is right in saying that \((4a_1)\) is a contradictory statement. However, a closer examination suggests that the reason why \((4a_1)\) is a contradictory statement is not because we treat existence as a logical predicate, but rather because we translate 'there are' as 'there exist'; or in other words: existence is already assumed in the existential quantifier \((\exists)\). Once this ontological assumption is rejected, we will be able to treat existence as a logical predicate. For example by adopting an ontically neutral quantifier \((\Sigma)\).

In the second part of the article, Moore suggested that existence may be taken as a property that can be attributed to an entity. His modal argument is as
follows:

\[(\alpha)\] It is a simple truth that 'this might not have existed' is significant for "in the case of every sense-datum which anyone ever perceives, the person in question could always say with truth of the sense-datum in question 'This might not have existed'. (1966:93)

\[(\beta)\] 'This might not have existed' is significant iff 'This might have existed' is also significant.

\[(\delta)\] 'This might have existed' is significant iff 'This exists' is significant.

\[(\Gamma)\] Thus, if 'This exists' is significant, then "why should we not say that 'exists' here 'stands for an attribute'?" (1966:94)

I think the argument is valid and acceptable as far as the Theory of Items is concerned. However, for the Theory of Items, a modal argument is not needed in order to show that existence is a property of an object. From [FA], [CP], and [IT] alone, we can argue that existence is a property of an object (even though it is not an ordinary property; this point will be taken up later on) without going into a modal argument.

[4]. D.F.Pears has formulated the classical dogma as follows: existence is not a (logical) predicate because if it were then we are committed to:

(a) referential tautologies, and

(b) referential contradictions. (Pears 1967:98)

(a). Referential Tautology Argument.

Pears argues that existence cannot be a predicate just as 'is red' or 'is big' are. When one asserts 'This book is red' or 'This book is big', we say something about the
book: the book is said to be red or big (thus, in this sense both 'is red' and 'is big' are logical predicates).

Now, Pears argues that if we treat existence as we treat 'is red' and 'is big', we will make a mere tautologous statement. Let us assume that existence is a predicate just as 'is red' and 'is big' are. Then, to say 'This book exists', is to say something about the book. But since the word 'this' is a referential-word (that is, 'this' is used to refer to something existent), thus the sentence 'this x is F' already implies the existence of x. Since in 'this x is F' the existence of x is already implied, if we substitute F for 'exists' and say 'this x exists', we are simply uttering a mere tautologous statement. But, obviously we don't since the assertion 'this x exists' may be very informative indeed. Thus, the conclusion is that existence cannot be a (logical) predicate.

(b). Pears' referential contradiction argument is exactly the same as Moore's argument in the first part of his article already explained above.

Notice that Pears' argument (a) presupposes that the referential-word 'this' must refer to something existent. This is the reason why 'This book exists' is a tautology. Pears' mistake is to assume that 'This book' is existentially loaded. The reason for that is that Pears believes that we cannot refer to something which does
not exist. When we refer to something by using the word 'this', the object we indicate by 'this' must exist. The Theory of Items, on the other hand, rejects the Reference Theory. For the Theory of Items we can refer to (in a sense of 'talk about') nonexistent objects because they are items. Once the Reference Theory has been abandoned, there is no reason any more to assume that 'This book' in 'This book exists' is asserting (or, implying) the existence of the object referred by 'this'. 'This exists', thus, is not a tautology since the item indicated by 'this' may or may not exist. If we are talking about Pegasus, for instance, 'This exists' will be a false statement since Pegasus does not exist. But if we talk about Nixon, then 'This exists' will be a true statement (but not a tautology) since Nixon does exist.

[5]. Thomson in his article "Is Existence a Predicate?"\textsuperscript{20} tries to present another argument for the dogma that existence is not a (logical) predicate. Thomson's argument for this is the following: in logic --even though we do use a word such as 'exists' which occurs as a grammatical predicate,-- there is no need to use 'exists' as a logical predicate: the occurrence of 'exists' as a logical predicate in a formal logic can be avoided. For example:

(5) 'A round square exists'
is to be translated into:
(5a) \((\exists x)(x \text{ is a round square})\), and

(6) 'A round square does not exist'

is to be translated as

(6a) \(~(\exists x)(x \text{ is a round square})\).

Notice that even though 'exists' occurs as grammatical predicates in both (5) and (6), in both (5a) and (6a) 'exists' does not occur as a logical predicate at all. Thus, Thomson concludes, existence is not a logical predicate.

The failure to distinguish between 'there is' and 'there exists' is also apparent from Thomson's treatment of the problem. Thomson's reason why 'exist' need not occur as a logical predicate in any logical formulations of '...exists' is because Thomson treats all existential statements by means of an existentially loaded quantifier \((\exists)\) which is read 'there exists...'.

For the Theory of Items the distinction between 'there is' and 'there exists' must be made first before we decide whether existence is a predicate or not. In order to distinguish 'there is' from 'there exists', the Theory of Items adopts a neutral logic with an ontically neutral quantifier \((\Sigma)\). Thus 'For some x, Fx' is to be symbolized as:

(7) \((\Sigma x)Fx\)

to distinguish it from 'There exists x, Fx' which is classically symbolized as:

(8) \((\exists x)Fx\).
The Theory of Items holds that 'there is x' does not imply that x exists whereas the classical existential quantifier ($\exists$) implies that such and such exists. Solely because of the existential loading of the classical quantifiers Moore et.al., argue that existence cannot be a logical predicate. Now, since ($\Sigma x)Fx$ does not imply ($\Sigma x)Fx$, we can assert that existence is in fact a (logical) predicate! 'There are some things that exist' is not a tautologous statement because it is translated as:

(9) ($\Sigma x)Ex$

and 'There are some things that do not exist' is not a contradiction because it is symbolized as:

(10) ($\Sigma x)\neg Ex$.

(9) is not a tautology because the neutral quantifier ($\Sigma$) does not imply already the existence of x, therefore Ex adds something new to the x. And (10) is not a contradiction for similar reasons. In Chapter III sec.7 the nature of the neutral logic will be investigated in more detail. Now since the foundation of the case against treating existence as a logical predicate, which is based entirely upon the ontological assumption, has been proven to be inconsistent with [TI] and therefore is to be rejected, there is no reason any more to maintain that existence is not a logical predicate. The classical dogma "existence is not a predicate" collapses with the refutation of the Reference Theory
and the Ontological Assumption.

Thus, finally we can postulate the following principle:

(α) Existence is a logical predicate.

[6] If existence is a logical predicate, is it the same kind of predicate as 'is red' and 'is big' which are also logical predicates? It appears that it is not.

On the Theory of Items:

(i) A golden-mountain is both a mountain and golden.

is true by the Characterisation-Postulate, but

(ii) The existing golden-mountain exists.

is not. This suggests that existence must be different from 'is golden' or 'is a mountain'.

In the previous sections I have claimed that there is a difference between characterising and non-characterising features. And that existence is not a characterising feature (even though it is a feature). Now this distinction becomes clearer in light of the suggestion that even though existence is a logical predicate, nevertheless it differs from other ordinary predicates such as 'is red' and 'is a winged horse'. Our previous statement that existence is not a characterising feature simply means that existence is not assumable. This, however, does not suggest that our principle (α) above should be rejected. What it suggests is that our principle (α) needs to be modified. The new modified principle will retain that existence is a
logical predicate but it is not an ordinary logical predicate, or in other words:

(β) Existence is a feature but it is not a characterising feature.

or:

(β1) Existence is a logical predicate but it is not a characterising logical predicate.

5.2. What items do exist?

The position I propose to defend is the following: even though there are many items, only some of the items exist. There are many items that do not exist. The number of items that exist is very small in comparison to those that do not exist (cf., Meinong's "Theory of Objects"). As I have insisted throughout this chapter, those that don't exist are not mere nothings. They are something -they are items that are capable of having certain properties. Now, the appropriate answer to the question "What items do exist?" is "Some items exist". These items that exist are non fictional particular items.

In analysing what sort of items do and do not exist I will follow the classical philosophical distinction between two realms of "things": universals and particulars. The debate is between the realist and the nominalist. A realist such as Plato holds that both universals and particulars exist, even though universals have a different type of existence nevertheless
universals (e.g., Forms) are said to be real (even according to Plato, Forms are more real than particular things). A nominalist maintains that only particulars exist, and that there are no universals.

The Theory of Items rejects realism since clearly not everything exists, there are many things that do not exist. The hesitation to accept what does not exist is simply a result of the prejudice in favour of the existent that is to be rejected.

The Theory of Items’ view toward what exists and what doesn’t exist is similar to that of nominalism. (c.f., Routley’s nonnominalism or noneist-nominalism, in 1979a:731). [TI] agrees with the nominalist that to exist is to occupy the domain of empirical reality. What is rejected in nominalism, however, is the conclusion that universals, classes, and abstractions are mere nothings thus they must be excluded from the theory. [TI] neither regards those that do not exist as mere nothings nor intends to exclude them from our theory.

This does not mean however that all particular things exist, obviously possible and impossible fictional particular things do not exist. Thus, we can conclude that only nonfictional particular things exist!

In this section, first I will present philosophical principles regarding what exists and doesn’t exist. And then criteria for existence will be given, and finally the argument that universals, abstractions, and
fictional particular things do not exist will be discussed. This will leave us with non-fictional particular things as the only items which exist.

[1]. For [TI] an item either exists or does not exist (that is: it has no form of being whatsoever), there are no subsistent items. Within the system of [TI] abstractions such as numbers and relations are said neither to exist nor to subsist. [TI] believes that the notion of subsistence is quite unnecessary. If we can accept that nonexistent items such as Pegasus can have certain features just as existent items can, then there should not be any hesitation in accepting that numbers and relations too are nonexistent items. Thus the first principle is:

(1) An item either exists or does not have any form of being whatsoever.

The next principle states that an item exists if, and only if it occupies the domain of empirical reality. (cf., Routley 1979a:700-701) This means that an item is said to exist if it is empirically verifiable: we can kick it, we can touch it, there is an empirical possibility that it can be discovered, it can be seen, it occupies space and time, etc. An item that is empirically verifiable in the above ways is a nonfictional particular. Thus the following are our principles:

(2) To exist is to occupy the domain of empirical reality.

Therefore, only nonfictional particulars can be said to
exist since they alone can occupy the domain of empirical reality.

(3) Only nonfictional particulars exist.

[2]. The following are the criteria for existence. An item exists if, and only if, the item fulfills the following criteria. An item must fulfill all criteria in order to be able to be considered as an existent item.

(a) **Locatability in space.** An item must occupy real empirical space: "Whatever exists has a spatial neigbourhood." (Routley 1979:732)

(b) **Time dependency.** An item can start and cease to exist. Aristotle existed, but he does not exist. Quine exists, but some day he will cease to exist.

(c) **Capable of acting physically on other entities.** An existent item can be kicked, touched; it can also be used to hit and cause physical harm to a human being. (c.f., Routley 1979:733)

(d) **Consistency.** An existent item is always a consistent item. Impossible items do not exist.

(e) **Completeness.** An existent item is a complete item.
A complete item is an item that is determined in terms of its features. If we take f for any feature, then, a complete item is an item that has either f or ~f. (see note #6)

These criteria are to be taken as a whole to determine whether an item exist or not. In other words an item exists iff. it fulfills all the above criteria.

[3]. Early on we divided the realm of "things" into universals and particulars. Let us examine whether universals exist. Universals do not exist because they do not fulfill the criteria of existence explained above. Universals are not to be found in my table, it cannot be kicked, neither can it be said to cease to exist now, and to start to exist today: thus at least it does not fulfill conditions (a), (b), and (c).

Abstractions such as relations, concepts, numbers, etc. do not exist. They are not the sort of things that can be kicked around, or to be found in some empirical space. Thus they fail to fulfill conditions (a) and (c).

[4]. Since I have shown that universal and abstractions do not exist, the set of remaining items is narrowed down. Now we only have particular items to be considered as existent items. Particular items are divided into two kinds: Pegasus, Holmes, unicorns, etc. are one kind of particulars, and Quine, the table I am writing on now, etc. belong to another.
The former are fictional items, and the latter are nonfictional items. Fictional particular items do not exist, even though they can have certain features. Surely, all fictional items are incomplete and indeterminate items (some of them are even impossible), thus they fail to fulfill conditions (d) and (e).

This leaves us with non-fictional particular items. Thus, only these items exist!

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ENDNOTES


"Zur Gegenstandstheorie" is to be found in Meinong by Grossmann (1974)(pp. 224-229). Translated as "Meinong's Ontology".

2. The term 'narrative' is used to mean fictional-story. Thus, by impossible and possible narratives I simply mean a narrative that involves impossible or possible situations. Thus, Alice's Adventures and Wells' Time-Machine may be categorized as impossible narratives.

3. It is difficult to define what Sosein really means. But roughly to say that an item has Sosein is to assert that an item has certain characteristics (cf. Chisholm 1973:209). Thus, Meinong says, [Sosein] is either what-being (The horse is a mammal') or how-being ('Snow is white'). (Meinong 1983:228)

4. However, I must confess that this theory is far from perfect nor is complete, because this thesis is intended to provide only a philosophical footing for the Theory of Items. And I believe that a complete theory should also present the formal semantical foundation of a Context Logic. Unfortunately the latter is not the main part of the present thesis.

5. The word 'assumable' is used to mean something about which assumptions can be made.

6. By 'complete objects' I mean: for any property, the object either has that property or it has its negation. Nixon is a complete object because it is true that for any property he either has that property or its negation. 'Incomplete objects' are objects which are not determined in terms of some of their properties. Thus for example, Holmes is an incomplete object because he is not determined in terms of some properties such as having a mole on his back.

8. There is no precise translation for 'Vorstellung', roughly it is translated as 'representation', 'presentation', or 'idea'. Thus Kemp-Smith used 'representation' for Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; J. Heanue used 'representation' in his translation of Über Annahmen; and D.B. Terrell et.al. used 'presentation' for their translation of Brentano's works.

9. Norman Kemp-Smith's translation will be used.

10. From this third phenomena we know that Brentano is not offering an epistemological argument for the possibility of knowledge, but rather a psychological argument since the psychological states of pleasure and displeasure are here introduced.

11. Let's take (1) Pegasus is assumed to exist; and (2) Nixon exists. According to Meinong, (1) is a case of a watered-down factuality and (2) is a case of a full-strength factuality (cf. Findlay 1963:103-105). The difference between (1) and (2) rests on the notion of a modal-moment. Meinong holds that the modal-moment is something that differentiate statements such as (1) from (2). (2) differs from (1) because the modal-moment is present in (2) but not in (1). Thus (1) lacks the modal-moment. Meinong also states that watered-down factuality (e.g., (1)) plus the modal-moment yields full-strength factuality, and full-strength factuality minus the modal moment yields watered-down factuality. (cf. Findlay 1963:103-4).

12. It may be argued further on the basis of this that essence precedes existence. For, first, nonexistent items may have more or less determinate characters and natures even though they do not exist. And second, in order to determine whether a thing exists or not, to seek it out or look for it, we commonly need to know what it is: essence is, in this respect, epistemologically prior to existence. (Routley 1979a:51)

13. The reader may recall that this is Meinong's own example already stated previously. Meinong concludes that the property of simplicity is not a nuclear property of any object; it is an extra-nuclear property. That is to say that the property of simplicity is not a constitutive part of any object. I take it then that Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties is roughly parallel to Routley's distinction which is taken in this thesis between characterising and non-
characterising features.

14. It can be concluded that whereas [FA] is left absolutely free, and restriction is not intended; [UCP] needs to be restricted. A restriction on [UCP], however, does not mean a restriction on [FA]. This seems to be the aspect that Meinong fails to see when he insists in his later works (e.g. Über Möglichkeit) that assumption is prohibited where the modal moment is present.


16. A propositional function is defined as "any expression containing an undetermined constituent; or several undetermined constituents, and becoming a proposition as soon as the undetermined constituents are determined." (PLA:230) An example of a propositional function would be "x is a man" or "n is a number". By substituting the undetermined constituent x in "x is a man" the name "Socrates", we obtain a proposition with a determined constituent "Socrates is a man".

17. In order to see this point clearly we need to examine an analogy to the above problem. 'Numerous' like existence, is not a property attributed to an entity. So, in 'Men are numerous' it is not asserted that numerous is a property attributed to men. What it says is that there are several values of x that will satisfy the propositional function 'x is numerous'. Russell argues, If x, y, and z all satisfy a propositional function, you may say that that proposition is numerous, but x, y, and z severally are not numerous. Exactly the same applies to existence, ... (PLA:233)

18. It should be noted that the quantifier here must be an existential quantifier and not universal quantifier for Moore clearly says that 'Tame tigers exist' must mean 'Some tame tigers exist' and not 'All tame tigers exist'.


20 "Is Existence a Predicate?" part II a reply to Pears, in Strawson (1967).

21. By 'empirical verifiability' I do not mean it in the Logical Positivist's sense. I am not proposing a
verification principle. To say that in order to know whether an item exists or not is to verify it empirically (or at least empirical verifiability is possible in principle), is just to say that in order to know whether an item exist or not we must use some empirical means to check its existence (we must see it, touch it, hear it, etc.).

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CHAPTER TWO

THE THEORY OF ITEMS AND ITS RIVALS

[1]. Introduction.

In the previous chapter we concluded that the Theory of Items makes no existential assumptions concerning the items that we talk about. Nonexistent as well as existent items, fictional as well as real items, and impossible as well as possible items can be accepted without any hesitation. The Independence Thesis states that any item can be said truly to have properties regardless of that item's ontic status. And from the Characterisation Postulate we can say, for instance, that Pegasus can be characterised truly to be a winged horse.

In this chapter we are going to examine the Theory of Items' main rivals, they are various forms of the Reference Theory which is based on the Ontological Assumption. In general these theories hold what the Theory of Items rejects, such as: (i.) only existent and actual items can be characterised truly as having certain properties; (ii.) nonexistent items are not really items -- there are no nonexistent items. We will examine shortly Frege's Sense and Reference theory; Russell's theory of descriptions; Strawson's alternative theory to Russell's theory of descriptions; Quine's ontological commitment;
and various Modal Realism arguments (Lewis and Plantinga).

In sec. 3 I will examine another rival to the Theory of Items, that is the Reductionist Theory. This theory holds that nonexistent items are to be reduced to some other entities which are more 'real' such as concepts, logical entities, or ideas.

Reference Theory (or [RT] for short) is based on the Ontological Assumption thesis (or [OA]): in order to say anything true about an item to which a name refers that item must be actual (or existent). It can easily be observed that [OA] is a direct rejection of the Independence Thesis explained previously.

[RT] may be presented as a theory of meaning or it can also be presented as a way of deciding the truth value of a statement about a certain item. As a theory of meaning, [RT] claims that the meaning of a singular term (a description or a proper-name) is the entity it refers to. (By 'entity' is meant an actual existent item.) As a theory of truth value determination, [RT] claims that a true statement about a certain item can be made if, and only if, the item is actual. Thus "'Fx' is true" presupposes the actuality of x.

It should be noted here that the term 'reference' can be understood in two ways: first as existentially loaded reference, and second as ontically neutral reference. The existentially loaded sense of reference demands that the reference is actual. This is
the sense used by the [RT] mentioned above.

Concerning the second sense of reference, Routley has suggested to use the word 'about' instead of 'reference'. To say that \( x \) is about \( y \) is to assert that no existential assumption is attached to \( y \): \( y \) need not exist. Routley says,

So we shall say that 'a' has a reference only where a exists; otherwise 'a' is about, signifies, or designates, a, though a need not exist or be appropriately shorn down to have only transparent features. (Routley 1979a:53)

Whereas Routley introduces the concept of aboutness and still retains the old conception of existentially loaded sense of reference, I suggest that we dismantle altogether any ontological prejudice in the notion of reference itself. Thus, 'reference' should be understood in term of 'aboutness'. Routley wants to retain both the old conception of reference and at the same time also retain the aboutness theory. Where \( x \) is an actual item, we say "\( y \) refers to \( x \)"; and where \( x \) is a nonexistent item, we assert "\( y \) is about \( x \)". To keep the distinction between aboutness and reference is important, according to Routley, for the basic mistake of [RT] is "the identification of aboutness and reference". (Routley 1979a:53). Thus, for example, Devitt (1984:87) says: "[a]boutness is nothing but reference, and truth is to be explained in terms of reference." The suggestion to regard 'reference' in term of 'aboutness' is the opposite
of the above [RT]'s claim.

As far as the Theory of Items is concerned I do not see the point of still maintaining the old conception of reference on one hand while holding the notion of aboutness on the other. My suggestion to broaden the notion of reference to include both Routley's 'reference' and 'aboutness' seems to be more consistent with the common usage of the word 'reference'. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, mentions that 'refers to' can be understood as 'about something'.


2.1. Frege's 'Meaning and Sense'.

2.1.1. Frege's 'Meaning'.

Frege's version of the referential theory claims that the meaning of a proper name is the object which that proper name refers to. Thus, for example, he says: "the meaning of 'evening star' would be the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense" (Frege 1980:57) for both the name 'evening star' and the name 'morning star' refer to the same object. This referential theory is clearly stated in his article "On Sense and Meaning" (Frege 1980),

A logically perfect language should satisfy the condition that every expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name out of signs already introduced shall in fact designate an object, and that no signs shall be introduced as a proper name.
without being secured a reference. (Frege 1980:70)

And Dummett, on Frege’s philosophy, states:

If such an expression is properly formed, it must be a proper name, since it passes the immediate test for belonging to that type. Either, therefore, it is properly formed, and stands for an object, or it is not properly formed, ... in which case it has no correct use and does not stand for anything, but should be banished from our speech. (Dummett 1981:240-1)

Similarly the meaning of a declarative sentence for Frege is the object which that declarative sentence refers to. This object is the circumstance that is either true or false. This Frege calls: the True and the False (for Frege the True and the False are objects, cf., Frege:1980:63). This, it seems to me, means that a declarative sentence is either true or false if, and only if, that sentence has meaning. Now, Frege also holds that a declarative sentence has meaning if its parts also have meanings (Frege 1980:62-63). A question immediately arises: what about a declarative sentence the subject of which refers to a nonactual object, such as 'Pegasus is a winged horse'? Unfortunately it is not clear to me (at least from my reading of 'On Sense and Meaning') what Frege’s exact position is regarding this kind of declarative sentence. Two possible positions may be taken: first Frege may regard 'Pegasus' as a non-proper name, and thus it need not refer to an actual item. It is not clear whether Frege takes this line of argument. The second
position is to regard 'Pegasus' as a proper name. And since 'Pegasus' will have no actual reference, it has no meaning. Consequently the above sentence will also have no meaning. And thus it is neither true nor false.

What is clear in Frege's writings is that (i.) Frege accepts that there are declarative sentences which have no meanings, even though they do express thoughts. For example: 'Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep' (Frege 1980:62) (ii.) However, Frege also says that if we want to know the truth value of that sentence, then the meaning of that sentence is required. Thus, unless we want to know its truth value, the sentence 'Pegasus is a winged horse' will have no meaning (even though undoubtedly it does express thought).

2.1.2. Frege's 'Sense'.

Frege's initial motivation in introducing the notion of sense besides his notion of reference is to be able to deal with a puzzle about identity ('='). This is stated in his "On Sense and Meaning": if 'a=b' is true then 'a=b' should mean the same thing as 'a=a'. For if 'a=b' is true, then 'a' and 'b' are two names for the same object, and thus 'a=b' tells us no more than 'a=a'. But in fact this is not the case for even though it is true that 'morning star'='evening star', 'morning star=evening star' definitely has more cognitive value than 'morning star=morning star'.

In order to solve this puzzle Frege introduces the
notion of sense. Thus he maintains that two names may have the same reference but yet they differ in sense. The sense of a sign contains the mode of presentation whereby the sign gives us its reference.

Let $a$, $b$, $c$ be the lines connecting the vertices of a triangle with the midpoints of the opposite sides. The point of intersection of $a$ and $b$ is then the same as the point of intersection of $b$ and $c$. So we have different designations for the same point, and these names... likewise indicate the mode of presentation; and hence the statement contains actual knowledge (Frege 1980:57)

Thus, even though 'morning star' and 'evening star' have the same meaning (that is: they have the same reference), nevertheless the sense of 'morning star' may differ from that of 'evening star'; and thus the thought which is expressed in 'morning star=evening star' differs from that of 'morning star=morning star'.

There is another motivation in introducing the notion of sense which I think is more relevant for our discussion on the Theory of Items. Without the notion of sense, Frege's referential theory will commit him to the following undesirable positions:

(i.) Proper names/singular terms which refer to nonexistent objects will have no meanings. And

(ii.) Declarative sentences which have singular terms refering to nonexistent objects, have no meanings.

These are undesirable conclusions for obviously we do
understand the declarative sentence 'Pegasus is a winged horse', or 'Odysseus was set ashore', despite the fact that 'Pegasus' and 'Odysseus' do not refer to actual objects. Now, in order to avoid these undesirable results, the notion of sense is called to the rescue. We do understand declarative sentences like 'Pegasus is a winged horse' or 'Odysseus was set ashore' as 'significant' sentences because they do nevertheless express thoughts. And the thought which is expressed by a (declarative) sentence is the sense of that sentence. Thus, besides reference, proper names/singular terms and declarative sentences have sense.

2.1.3. Criticisms.

(i.) It may be argued by the defenders of Frege that Frege's notion of sense (Sinn) proves that Frege's theory is not entirely referential. This defence, however, fails especially if we realize that the notion of sense is referential in disguise. Routley argues that "the subject expression refers, not to the expected reference, but to the emergency reference, the concept. The basic mechanism is still referential, because once the new references, the concepts, are introduced, every subject again occurs referentially in its context". (Routley 1979:64) Then, it turns out that Frege's theory is a form of double reference theory with the concept or sense providing the supplementary reference. So, finally Routley concludes:
The main line is essentially referential: the (OA) is satisfied, since all concepts are said to exist. (Routley 1979:64)

On this ground, therefore, Frege's theory of reference must be rejected. What is right about Frege's introduction of the notion of sense is the realization that "a further factor is needed to account for non referential uses of subjects". (Routley 1979a:63)

(ii.) Since Frege holds that every proper name/singular term and every expression refer either to objects or to concepts, how does Frege's referential theory deal with nonexistent objects such as a golden mountain and Superman? Let's assume first that Superman is a proper name. According to Frege, then, it must refer to an object superman. Unfortunately there is no such thing as superman, since superman does not exist. Dummett will probably argue that while it is true that superman does not exist, nevertheless the name Superman must refer to an object, i.e., an abstract object (see the next section). However, this argument does not clarify the problem at all since according to Dummett an abstract object is an object that has no role in causal interactions and cannot become the subject of change (see part 2.1.4. of this section). Obviously this is not true, since Superman does have a role in causal interactions. When Superman breaks the window, for example, he causes the
window to shatter. And also Superman can become the subject of change since he grows up and grows older. etc. Thus Superman cannot be categorized under Dummett's abstract object.

The second strategy is to argue that 'Superman' refers to the concept of superman. The problem with this view is obviously Superman is not the same thing as the concept of superman. Superman is a flying-man, but the concept of superman is clearly not a flying-man. Superman lives in New York City, but the concept of superman can not live anywhere. I go to see Superman in a movie theater and not to see a concept of superman. Thus, the Reference Theory not only holds the ontological assumption that should be rejected by the Theory of Items, but also it fails completely to deal with nonexistent items especially the fictional ones.

2.1.4. Dummett on Abstract Objects.

This section is devoted to the discussion on Dummett's interpretation of Frege's notion of objects. Dummett basically argues that Frege is committed to the realist view of abstract objects. This claim will be compared to the the basic claim of the Theory of Items made earlier.

Very briefly Dummett claims (in Frege's Philosophy of Language, 1973, Chapter 14) that concepts are in fact objects: they are abstract objects. Early on I have stated
that part of the problem with Frege's theory is to determine whether 'Pegasus', or 'Odysseus' refer to objects at all. There is no doubt that they may have sense; that is they may express thoughts. But whether they also have reference is not quite clear in Frege's writings. This problem can now be made clear. Since thoughts are abstract objects for Dummett, therefore we may conclude that 'Pegasus' and 'Odysseus' do in fact have reference for they refer to objects, i.e.: abstract objects. (Likewise, 'morning star' will refer to a concrete object.)

Since Dummett introduces the notion of abstract objects, does this mean that Dummett's theory will be compatible with the Theory of Items? (It should be noted that the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is not Frege's, it is Dummett's interpretation of Frege's philosophy.) A closer examination, however, proves otherwise.

The first argument which will show that Dummett's theory is a rival rather than a 'companion' to the Theory of Items, is the argument that Dummett's theory no doubt still excludes many items even though it admits abstract objects. This is apparent from his definition of concrete and abstract objects. Concrete objects according to Dummett are objects that can be perceived, and can take part in causal interaction, as well as become the subject of change. Dummett argues,

[A necessary and sufficient condition
for something to be a concrete object is] that the object be perceptible to some conceivable sensory faculty... the presence of the object could be detected by some instruments or apparatus... the object is one which can be the cause of change. More generally, a concrete object can take part in causal interactions: an abstract object can neither be the cause nor the subject of change. (Dummett 1973:491)

And by abstract objects, Dummett means,

Our criterion for objects of certain kind being abstract rather than concrete was that there should be some functional expression such that it was essential for the understanding of any name of an object of that kind, that the referent of the name be recognized as lying within the range of that functional expression. (Dummett 1973:486&494)

For example, 'shape' is an abstract object for Dummett since it falls within the range of functional expression 'the shape of__'. So are colours and points, they both fall within the range of functional expressions 'the colour of__', and 'the point of__'. The point is that it is necessary that abstract objects are to be understood only within the functional expression. They cannot be understood apart from the context of a functional expression. The concept of colour, for example, can only be understood in the context 'the colour of something'. This differs from concrete objects such as 'Washington', or 'Ottawa'. 'Washington' can be understood independently from its functional expression 'the capital of' since it refers to a concrete object.
Now, notice that according to these definitions of abstract and concrete objects, many nonexistent items such as fictional items and impossible items are still being excluded from Dummett's theory. Fictional items for example finds no place either in the domain of concrete or abstract objects. Surely fictional items cannot be included in the domain of concrete objects since fictional items are not perceptible (they are not the sort of things that can be touched, kicked, like tables and chairs: they don't exist!). But they are not abstract objects either since no doubt fictional items can take part in causal interactions and become the subject of change. For instance, Sherlock Holmes can kill or be killed by Moriarty, or Holmes can cause Moriarty to think twice before committing another crime.

There is no doubt that the fact that Dummett's notion of objects excludes many other nonexistent items is motivated by his prejudice in favour of what is real. Dummett's realism states that abstract objects, as well as concrete ones, are real. The realm of reference - Dummett maintains - is reality. (Dummett 1981:431,432) Dummett further argues that for Frege the referents of an expression are "things in the real world... And the real world contains no incompletely specified thing". (Dummett 1981:170) And concepts "belong to the 'realm
of reference', that is, are as much part of the real world as are objects". (Dummett 1981:174) And finally Dummett concludes,

The fundamental thesis of realism, ..., is that we really do succeed in referring to external objects, existing independently of our knowledge of them, and that the statements we make about them carry a meaning of such a kind that they are rendered true or false by an objective reality the constitution of which is, again, independent of our knowledge. (Dummett 1981:446)

From these statements alone we know that incomplete items (nonexistent items are incomplete items) as well as items in a possible world, and unreal objects are being excluded. If the real world where the referents reside consists only of 'completely specified things', then where are incomplete and unspecified items to be found?

Dummett's theory seems to be loaded with the ontological assumption. Dummett regards objects as falling within the range of individual variables, and these individual variables are bound by quantifiers which no doubt are existentially loaded. Objects are required to "compose the domain of quantifiers". (Dummett 1973:474) For Dummett abstract objects "are just as much objects as concrete ones, and may just as legitimately be taken as the referents of proper names or as belonging to the domain of first order quantification." (Dummett 1973:480, my underlining) And, quantifiers (both universal and existential) are existentially loaded for he says that a statement with a
universal quantifier "has existential import just as much as does one of the form 'Ex(Ax)'." (Dummett 1973:476)

2.2. Russell.
2.2.1. Russell’s Theory of Descriptions.

It is not my intention in this section to examine Russell’s theory of descriptions in great detail. My purpose is simply to show that Russell’s theory of descriptions is a rival to the Theory of Items.

Russell’s theory of descriptions was first presented in his celebrated paper "On Denoting" 1905 (Russell 1984). As Sainsbury (Sainsbury 1979) has argued the theory of descriptions has two aspects, one informal and the other formal. The informal aspect "offers an analysis of descriptions in ordinary English" (Sainsbury 1979:95). Whereas the formal aspect "consists of definitions of the non-primitive PM-symbols ‘’ [‘the’]... A full account of the scope of descriptions in English is to be obtained only through the formal aspect of the theory." (Sainsbury 1979:95) I will be concerned mostly with the informal aspect of the theory of descriptions.

In general the theory of descriptions is this:

(1.) ‘The F is G’ is to be analysed as: 'There is one and only one entity which is F, and whatever is F is G'. For example: 'The King of France is bald' is to be analysed as: 'There is one and only one entity which is King of
France, and this entity is bald'. ("On Denoting": 53)

(2.) 'The F exists', or 'There is such thing as the F', is to be analysed as: 'There is one and only one entity which is F'. (cf. Sainsbury 1979:95)

For example: 'The King of France exists' is to be analysed as: 'There is one and only one entity which is King of France'.

2.2.2. Criticisms.

Here are some undesirable consequences of the theory of descriptions:

(i.) Nonexistent items cannot be said truly to have properties.

This is a direct consequence of the clause (1.) above. According to the theory of descriptions 'The horse owned by Belorphon is a winged horse' is to be analysed into:

(a.) 'There is one and only one entity which is a horse and owned by Belorphon, and whatever is a horse and owned by Belorphon is a winged horse'.

(a.) is false because there is no such entity: the horse owned by Belorphon is a nonexistent item. In Principia this is clearly stated by the well-known proposition *14.21 (with \((\gamma x)(\phi x)\) is to be read: 'the x such that x is \(\phi\)').

\(\vdash \psi (\gamma x)(\phi x) \rightarrow E!(\gamma x)(\phi x)\).

and then Russell wrote: "This proposition shows that if any true statement can be made about \((\gamma x)(\phi x)\), then \((\gamma x)(\phi x))
must exist." (Whitehead&Russell 1980:181-182) Thus, all propositions about nonexistent items having certain properties are false.

It should be noted that the above conclusion is not inconsistent with Russell's insistence that some propositions about nonexistent items may be true. Let's take the following example: 'The horse owned by Belorphon is not a winged horse'. According to the theory of descriptions this can be analysed either as:

(b.) 'There is one and only one entity which is a horse and owned by Belorphon, and whatever is a horse and owned by Belorphon is not a winged horse'.

or, as:

(c.) 'It is not the case that there is one and only one entity which is a horse and owned by Belorphon, and whatever is a horse and owned by Belorphon is a winged horse'.

Russell states that in (b.) 'the horse owned by Belorphon' has a primary occurrence, and in (c.) it has a secondary occurrence. Russell will maintain that (b.) is false and (c.) is true. (c.) is true because what is denied is the existence of an entity which is a horse and owned by Belorphon; whereas (b.) is false since there is no such entity. Notice that Russell's claim that some propositions about nonexistent items may be true does not mean that nonexistent items can be said truly to have
characterising properties. This claim is still denied by Russell. Thus, in other words, (c.) is true because it denies the existence of such an entity (i.e. Pegasus), and not because whether the entity which is a horse and owned by Belorphon has or does not have the characterising feature of being a winged horse.

(ii.) There will not be any significant difference between one proposition about a certain nonexistent item and other proposition about other nonexistent item. This is because all propositions about nonexistent items are assigned value false. Thus, for example, the proposition that "Holmes is not a unicorn" will be just as false as "Holmes is a unicorn." Even identity statement about nonexistent objects such as "Holmes is Holmes" as well as "Holmes is not Holmes" will be assigned the same value false. It seems that intuitively this is incorrect. We do want to say that, for instance, "Holmes is a unicorn" is a false proposition since Holmes is not a horse with a horn in its head. And that "Holmes is a detective" is a true proposition. However, to say that "Holmes is a unicorn" is false, and that "Holmes is a detective" is true, is to accept that nonexistent items (e.g., Holmes) do have characterising features that characterise them as such. Holmes is characterised as a detective and not as a unicorn, etc. Russell's theory of descriptions
not only rejects that nonexistent items can have characterising properties, but, as a consequence, it also becomes insensitive to the difference between one proposition (about nonexistent items having certain characterising properties) and another proposition (about another nonexistent item having another kind of characterising property).

(iii.) Since nonexistent items cannot be said truly to have characterising properties which characterise them as such, then there will not be any significant difference between one nonexistent item with another.

Again this sounds undesirable since it is obvious that Sherlock Holmes—who is a detective—differs from a unicorn—which is a fictional horse. The present King of France, even though it is indeterminate in term of its baldness, it nevertheless is a different item from the present King of Australia. In short we are able to make a distinction between one nonexistent item with another. We are able to do this simply because nonexistent items do have characterising features that characterise them as such.

2.3. Strawson's Truth Value gaps.

Contrary to Russell's position, Strawson argues that assertions about nonexistent objects are neither true
The truth or falsity of such assertions does not arise: there is a truth value gap. The sentence is meaningful, but it can neither express a true nor a false assertion. Strawson maintains,

The sentence, 'The king of France is wise', is certainly significant; but this does not mean that any particular use of it is true or false. (Strawson 1978:72)

It must be noted that Strawson's notion of truth value gaps differs from the Theory of Items' notion of indeterminateness. The difference rests on the fact that Strawson's theory is still referential. He maintain that the question of truth or falsity does not arise because the item we refer to does not exist. He says,

Now suppose someone were in fact to say to you with a perfectly serious air: 'The king of France is wise'. Would you say, 'That's untrue'? I think it's quite certain that you wouldn't. But suppose he went on to ask you whether you thought that what he had just said was true, or was false; whether you agreed or disagreed with what he had just said. I think you would be inclined, with some hesitation, to say that you didn't do either; that the question of whether his statement was true or false simply didn't arise, because there was no such person as the king of France. (Strawson 1978:71) (my underlining)

Strawson's Referential Theory and Ontological Assumption is apparent from his insistence that only sentences which have actual references can express true or false assertions. He says,

We use it [a sentence] truly or
falsely when we use it to talk about some one; when, in using the expression, 'The king of France', we are in fact mentioning some one. (Strawson 1978:72)(my underlining)

The Theory of Items accepts the third value, i.e., the value 'indeterminate'. For example, we do not want to assign either the value true or false to the assertion that Holmes has moles on his back because whether Holmes has moles on his back or not is simply not determined. So, instead, we say that the assertion that Holmes has moles on his back is indeterminate. But, unlike Strawson's truth value gaps, the Theory of Items believes that whether an assertion is true, false or indeterminate does not depend on whether there is any actual item to be referred. We state that Holmes is a detective is a true assertion, and that Holmes has moles on his back is an indeterminate assertion. Obviously we assign the value true or indeterminate not because of Holmes' ontic status, but rather on whether Holmes is characterised as such or not.

2.4. Ryle's 'Fido'-Fido Theory of Meaning.

Ryle claims that Meinong holds the theory that for every meaningful subject term 'a' there is a reference to which that meaningful subject term refers, just like Fido answers to the name 'Fido'. Thus, by 'Fido'-Fido theory of meaning Ryle means: a theory which states that "any
subject 'a' has a denotation if it has a meaning and this denotation a determines the meaning of 'a'.

(Routley 1979a:60) Ryle's mistaken claim is that the object we refer to is actual and 'exists' in some sense (e.g., Pegasus exists in a fictional world). Thus Ryle says,

> So not only Fido and London, but also centaurs, round squares, the present King of France, the class of albino Cypriots, the first moment of time, and the non-existence of a first moment of time must all be credited with some sort of reality. They must be, else we could not say true or false things of them. (Ryle 1957:251) (my underlining)

This is obviously not the principle of the Theory of Items, let alone that of Meinong. For Meinong is far from maintaining that any items we refer to must have some form of being in order that we can talk about them truly. There are many unreal objects that we can say something true or false about.

2.5. Quine’s Criterion of Ontological Commitment.

[1]. Quine’s ontological commitment is manifested in his well-known dogma that to be is to be the value of a (bound) variable. According to him we are committed to the existence of an item if that item is the value of x in '(Ex)(x__)' . This is his criterion of ontological commitment which is a kind of "a test of what kinds of thing a theory says there are". (Haack 1985:43)
It is a test of what a theory says there is, and not what there is. What there is, for Quine, is what a true theory says there is. I will show that this criterion of ontological commitment is designed at the very beginning in such a way that it excludes all nonexistent items. The criterion of ontological commitment asks what kinds of entity are required if a theorem beginning with \((\exists x)\) is to be true. (Haack 1985:45) If a theory takes \((\exists x)(9 > x > 5)\) to be true, then that theory is committed to the existence of numbers. Quine argues,

In general, entities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if some of them must be counted among the values of the variables in order that the statements affirmed in the theory be true. (Quine 1980:103)

and,

[T]o say that a given existential quantification presupposes objects of a given kind is to say simply that the open sentence which follows the quantifier is true of some objects of that kind and none not of that kind. (Quine 1980:131)

Quine's argument can be summarized as follows:

(1). Entities that are assumed in a given theory must be able to be counted as the values of a variable \(x\) in a form \((\exists x)(\ldots x\ldots)\).

(2). Thus, a theory that takes \(y\) as the value of a variable \(x\) in \((\exists x)(\ldots x\ldots)\), is committed to the existence of \(y\).

Notice that according to (1) no theory can deal with
nonexistent objects since Quine's criterion of ontological commitment excludes all nonexistent objects. Thus, a theory that tries to include nonexistent objects into its system, can never make a true statement about nonexistent objects since nonexistent objects cannot "be counted among the values of the variables". In other words, if we take y to represent all nonexistent objects, y cannot be the value of variable x in $(\exists x)(\ldots x\ldots)$ since $(\exists y)(\ldots y\ldots)$ will always turn out to be a false statement. Thus, a theory that intends to make a statement about nonexistent objects must start by treating all its nonexistent objects as values of a bound variable. The theory will, of course, break down at this first test since the entities which the theory is proposed to deal with do not exist. Therefore, Quine's philosophy deliberately excludes nonexistent objects from the very beginning.

[2]. Quine argues in his *Methods of Logics* (1950):

To say that *something* does not exist, or that there is something which is *not*, is clearly a contradiction in terms; hence '$(x)(x \text{ exists})$' must be true. (Quine 1951:150)

The reason why '$(x)(x \text{ exists})$' must be true and that '$(x)(x \text{ does not exist})$' is a contradiction in terms is because his theory is existentially loaded. For Quine '$(x)(x \text{ exists})$' implies $(\exists x)(x \text{ exists}).$ If his quantifier were neutral
and not existential one, \((x)(x \text{ exists})\) need not be an analytic truth, and \((x)(x \text{ does not exist})\) need not be a contradiction in terms. By using neutral logic, for example, we can take \(\Sigma\) as a neutral quantifier, then we can formulate 'something does not exists' as \((\Sigma x)x^\sim E. \ (\Sigma x)x^\sim E\), unlike \((\exists x)(x \text{ does not exist}), \) is not a contradiction in terms since \((\Sigma a)\Phi\) does not imply that \(a\) exists (whereas \((\exists a)\Phi\) implies that \(a\) exists).

[3]. Concerning singular terms that fail to designate, Quine maintains that names should be converted into general terms. This move is taken to avoid the problem that if singular terms such as Pegasus are taken to be in a purely referential position, then Pegasus must exist. Quine argues that if 'Pegasus exists' is to be taken to imply \((\exists x)(x \text{ exists}), \) then 'Pegasus exists' is always true since \((\exists a)\Phi\) already implies that \(a\) exists. Thus, this suggestion is to be rejected. The second suggestion is to treat 'Pegasus exists' as \((\exists y)(y=\text{Pegasus}). \) This suggestion is to be rejected as well since it still implies that Pegasus has a purely referential position; thus, 'Pegasus exists' will turn out to be true. The third suggestion is to argue that 'Pegasus exists' is neither true nor false. Quine rejects this suggestion too. He argues that the notion of truth value gaps
is not preferable on the ground that "they cannot be systematically spotted by notational form" and that "they remain an irksome complication, as complications are that promise no gain in understanding." (Quine 1960:177) Quine's own suggestion is to convert names which fail to refer to some definite entities into general terms. Thus, ‘Pegasus’ becomes ‘...is-Pegasus’, or ‘something which pegasusizes’. (c.f., Quine 1980:8) Thus the function of ‘Pegasus’ is not like ‘a’ in Fa, but rather like ‘F’. Thus, (Ex)(x is Pegasus) is to be reparsed: ‘there exists something which pegasusizes’. Now, we can assign the value false to what is to be read (Ex)(x Pegasusizes) since there is no such entity: something which pegasusizes does not exist.

[4]. Quine’s identification of items which do not exist with the null class leads to a serious problem.

1. Something which does not exist is identical to the null-class: ∅,

\[ \Gamma \vdash \neg\exists \beta (\alpha = \beta \iff \phi) \rightarrow (\gamma \exists \phi = \emptyset) \]  (*1977)

2. Something which pegasusizes does not exist, thus it is identical to the null-class ∅.

Next, we can prove that the null class exists (Quine’s existential quantifier may range over the null class). Since items which do not exist are identical with the null class, and the null class exists, then items which do not exist exist! (cf., Routley 1979a:134)
[5]. One of Quine's metatheorems states that a property can be owned only by an existent thing:

$$\phi \equiv (Ex)\phi \quad (*137)$$

Consequently, nonexistent items such as Pegasus cannot have any features at all. Thus, "Pegasus is a winged horse" has to be false. Nonexistent items, since they are nothing, cannot have any features.

2.6. Set Theory and Nonexistent Items.

[1]. Let me first start by making a claim that set theory should not concern itself with the ontic status of the members of a given set. Intuitively this sounds correct since to say that $x$ is a set of all prime-numbers is simply to say that $x$ is a collection of a certain kind of numbers. If we can have a collection of a certain items -whether existent or not-, we can surely have a set of those items. Thus, for example, Suppes says that by set it is meant "a collection of entities of any sort". (Suppes 1972:1) Georg Cantor's own definition of a set as "any collection of definite distinguishable objects of our intuition or of our intellect to be conceived as a whole" (Stoll 1979:2) does not make any ontological claim as to the status of the items that can be the member of a given set either. This is indicated by the phrase "objects of our intuition or of our intellect" which -as Stoll himself says- "gives complete liberty so far as the nature of the objects
comprising a set is concerned." (Stoll 1979:3) The ontic status of a given item in a given set, therefore, is not the task of a set theory to determine.

Now, classical logicians have regarded the above Cantorian "naive" set theory as inadequate for several reasons (however I am not concerned with this issue here). This paper will look at the very basic argument of the classical logicians' reconstructed set theory namely the classical logicians' definition of a set. My argument is as follows. Even though classical logicians may deny that a set theory's business is to deal with the ontological status of a given item in a given set, their definition of a set commits them to that view.

I will try to point out in the next part that there are some unacceptable consequences of the classical logicians' definition of a set. And finally in the last part I will, very briefly, offer a modified version of the classical definition of a set.

[2]. Usually in the classical logic a set is defined as:

\[(dfl) \ (x)(x \text{ is a set} \equiv [(Ey)(y \in x \lor x = \emptyset)])\]

(Suppes 1972:19)

which is read: x is a set iff. either x has members or x has no members at all, i.e., x is empty. The problem rests of course in the existential-quantifier \((E)\) which no doubt is existentially loaded. What they overlook is the fact that the quantifier \((E)\) requires y to be an existent item. Thus
(df1) should be read more precisely as: "x is a set iff. either x has existent members or x has no members at all". Reconstructed in this way, consequently (df1) excludes the nonexistent items: (df1) make it impossible for nonexistent items to be members of a set!

Another line of argument is to take nonexistent items as identical with null-class. Thus, nonexistent items are empty sets. This, for example, is Quine's position. Quine claims:

\[(E\beta)(\alpha=\beta.\equiv\varnothing)\rightarrow(\gamma\alpha)\neq\varnothing.\]

(Mathematical Logic: 148)

However, this is unacceptable since it will lead to a very serious problem namely that nonexistent items can be proved to exist! (see Routley 1979a:134) This second line of argument, thus, must be rejected.

This leaves us with the first alternative, namely that a set cannot have nonexistent items as its members. By this argument we cannot have a set which its members are Holmes, Watson, and Moriarty. Intuitively it seems to me, however, that we can have a set x, such that x={Holmes, Watson, Moriarty}. Nor can we have by (df1) above a set x such that x={Plato, Socrates, Aristotle} since (even though they existed) they do not exist! Obviously the classical definition of a set is incompatible with Cantor's own formulation. Whereas Cantor's formulation puts no restrictions on the nature of the items comprising a set, the classical logicians's formulation clearly restricts that freedom.
As a result of the definition (df1) above, classical logicians are committed to the view that set-theory must deal with the ontological status of the items in a given set.

Classical logics may avoid this problem by claiming that everything whatsoever exists. Thus, since everything exists, everything can comprise a set. However, this is simply false since not everything exists. We don't want to say, for instance, that items such as Pegasus or unicorns exist.

Another possible way out is to reject my claim that the definition of a set given above makes any ontological claim at all. As a matter of fact this is the only apparent possible reply that I can think of. They would claim that the existential quantifier (E) does not state that something bound by that quantifier must exist. But, if this is what they really intend to say, then why use the existential quantifier at all? For traditionally existential quantifier (E) has always been interpreted as 'there exists at least one' -(thus, Quine for example has his famous dogma: 'to be is to be the value of a bound variable'). They could use, for example, a neutral quantifier (Σ) to express what they really want to say. This suggests that the problem with the above definition (df1) has something to do with the existential quantifier (E).

[3]. Since the central problem of (df1) rests on its existentially-loaded existential quantifier (E), to modify
(df1) is to change the quantifier into a more ontically neutral one (this project has been done, for example, by Routley:1966). Let's take (Σα) as a neutral quantifier read: for at least one item α, with no assumption about the ontic status of α (thus α can be an existent or nonexistent; a possible or impossible item). Thus (df1) can be modified as follows:

(df2) (x)(x is a set ≡ [(Σy)y∈x ∨ x=∅])

(df2) does not exclude nonexistent items since y need not exist; thus now we can have a set with nonexistent or existent items as its member. The most important thing is that (df2) is consistent with my earlier claim that set theory should not concern itself with the ontic status of the items of a given set. After all Cantor's understanding of a set is not only limited to those items which exist.

2.7. Lewis' Extreme Modal Realism.

Lewis' modal realism clearly asserts that everything exists. Lewis' modal realism states that there is a plurality of worlds: the possible and the actual; and that these worlds (both the possible and the actual) do exist! Let us examine what Lewis can possibly mean by 'everything exists'. What does it mean to say that possible worlds exist?

There are two notions to be clarified here, first what 'possible world' means, and second, what 'exists' means. Lewis maintains that possible worlds are simply
"ways things could have been". (Lewis 1973:84) This position in itself does not commit Lewis to the view that a possible world exists in a literal sense. It is quite commonsensical to say that I could have been a soldier. This is no more than saying that it is possible that I am a soldier (say, if I went to a military college instead of to a university, etc.). There need not be another world, --which is similar to the actual one with me as a soldier in it,-- which exists (just as this world, these tables and chairs exist). However, Lewis' next step in defining what he means by existence, is surprising. He says that by 'existence' he means it in a literal sense of existence, just as 'this table exists', or 'that chair exists'. Thus, when he is arguing that many possible worlds other than ours exist, he means it in a literal sense of existence. Possible worlds exist just like our actual world exists. The difference is that possible worlds are unactualized existent items, whereas our world is an actualized existent item.

Lewis, obviously is not Meinongian in any sense at all. His extreme realism is not consistent with the Theory of Items either, since, no doubt, it presupposes ontological prejudice. For the Theory of Items not all item exists, and not all item need to exist. Possible worlds do not exist, only our actual world exists. It does not mean however that there are no possible worlds. To accept that
there are possible worlds is one thing, and to assert that those possible worlds exist is quite another thing. The former may not be inconsistent with the Theory of Items but the latter cannot be accepted by the Theory of Items.

2.8. Plantinga's nonexistent and fictional objects.

David Lewis's extreme realism gains full support from Alvin Plantinga. In the introduction of his book *The Nature of Necessity* (1978) Plantinga clearly states that we cannot conclude that there are nonexistent objects and therefore we cannot talk about them. He says,

> [M]ust we conclude that there are some things that do not exist? Can we think and talk about what does not exist? The answer is we must not and cannot. (Plantinga 1978:v)

**Nonexistent objects.**

Following Lewis, Plantinga holds that nonexistent objects exist in some possible worlds. Even though they do not exist in this actual world, nevertheless they do exist in other possible worlds. It seems that his argument is based on the premiss that if nonexistent objects are possible (that is: if nonexistent objects can possibly exist in the actual world), then they must exist in some possible worlds. Thus nonexistent objects are unactualized possible objects. He argues,

> [T]hey [nonexistent objects] exist all right, but they just are not actual... This is not to say, however, that it [Plantinga's example of a nonexistent
object] does not exist...; what is meant is that it does indeed exist, but happens not to be actual. (1978:131)

And then he concludes,

So a possible but unactual state of affairs is not a nonexistent state of affairs; it exists just as serenely as your most solidly actual state of affairs. (1978:132)

Finally, Plantinga argues that we cannot conclude that there are nonexistent objects, for this conclusion according to him means: there is a possible world W "where there exists an object that does not exist in this [possible world]" (1978:132) Plantinga is right to say that the above conclusion "seems totally unwarranted". (1978:132) Plantinga's mistake is obviously not in his concluding remark, but rather in his other premises. Plantinga argues:

(1). "x might have been existed" is equivalent to "x exists in some possible worlds".

(2). Nonexistent objects might have existed; thus even though nonexistent objects do not exist in the actual world, nevertheless they do exist in the possible world W.

(3). If nonexistent objects exist in the possible world W, then to say that there are nonexistent objects is to say that there is a possible world W where there exist objects that do not exist in it.

(4). (3) is absurd therefore: (i) we cannot think and talk about nonexistent objects. (ii) We must not conclude that there are some things that do not exist. (1978:v)

Plantinga is right in concluding that (3) is absurd, and therefore (4) follows. But, notice that (3) is absurd
precisely because they way Plantinga analyses nonexistent objects in (1) and (2). The truth of (3) presupposes the truth of (1) and (2). However, are (1) and (2) acceptable? I will argue that they are not. First, regarding (1). The assertion that x might have been existed is not equivalent to the assertion that x exists in some possible worlds. In Chapter-One I have stated that for the Theory of Items there is only one way for an object to exist, that is: to exist in the actual world. If the Theory of Items accepts that there are possible worlds, then the Theory of Items may also accept that there are objects in those possible worlds. But, it does not mean that those objects exist in the possible worlds. If there are objects in some possible worlds (not the actual one), then those objects do not exist in there. Thus, the Theory of Items rejects the idea that there are objects which exist in other than the actual world.

Second, it seems to me that Plantinga does not differentiate between the predicate existence and other predicates such as 'red', 'tall', etc. Thus, whereas it is true that from:

(a). x might have been red,
we can conclude:

(b). x is red in some possible worlds.

it is obviously not acceptable that from:

(c). x might have been existed
we conclude:

(d). x exists in some possible world.
The Theory of Items clearly distinguishes between characterising and noncharacterising predicates. Existence, even though it is a predicate like 'is red' or 'is tall', nevertheless it is not a characterising predicate. Thus, while (a)-(b) is valid, (c)-(d) is not. Plantinga treats existence as if it were a characterising predicate just as 'is red' is. Thus argument (1) must be rejected since it is based on the above confusion.

Third, regarding (2). Since (1) has been rejected, then (2) must also be rejected. (i) Nonexistent objects do not exist in the actual world, they do not exist anywhere. (ii) Whereas it can be true that from the nonexistent object that I am thinking of (e.g., Pegasus) is red, one may conclude that in some possible world Pegasus is red. It is certainly not true to conclude from nonexistent objects might have been existed that nonexistent objects exist in some possible worlds.

Fourth, since nonexistent objects do not exist anywhere, (3) does not stand. And, thus, (4) does not hold either.

Fifth, it seems to me that the reason why Plantinga (and perhaps other possible-worlds theorists as well) holds (1) above is because of the Ontological Argument [OA] explained previously. That is: we cannot talk about things which do not exist. The argument is as follows:

(e). We cannot talk about things that do not exist.

(f). Say that P is a nonexistent object.
(g). But obviously we can talk about it, i.e., we can say that \( P \) \textit{might have been existed}.

(h). Since (g) and (e), then it must exist in some other ways.

(i). Let's create a world (other than the actual one) in which \( P \) exist so that we can talk about it.

(j). Thus, to say that \( P \) might have been existed is to say that that \( P \) exists in other world than the actual one.

The centre of the argument is of course (e) and (h) which are forms of [OA].

Sixth, Plantinga (and also Lewis) does not attempt to deal with fictional impossible items at all. This is because Plantinga’s framework is the possible worlds theory. Possible worlds theorists cannot accept that there can be any impossible or inconsistent possible world. An impossible item such as a round-square item cannot be found in one of Plantinga’s possible worlds because it \textit{is not} a possible item. Thus, impossible and inconsistent items are being excluded.

\textbf{Fictional Objects.}

Plantinga argues (in 1978:153):

(5). Fictional objects do not exist.

(6). It is possible that fictional objects could have existed.

(7). Therefore, fictional objects exist in possible
Again, I fail to see how from the fact that it is possible that fictional objects could have existed, it follows that fictional objects exist in possible worlds. The same argument underlies the above reasoning. (7) presupposes the acceptance of (1) above. If (1) is to be rejected, then, there is no reason at all to conclude (7) from (6). The Theory of Items may accept (6) and also maintains that fictional objects do not exist in anywhere.

2.9. Free Logic.

From our discussion so far we can conclude that classical referential logic with its ontological assumption is incompatible with the Theory of Items I propose to develop, this is because:

1. classical logic's inability to express quantificational claims about what does not exist. I.e., nonexistent objects are to be avoided as much as possible.

2. classical logic's inability to express the truth about nonexistent objects. I.e., either statements concerning nonexistent objects are always false, or no truth values are assigned.

The Theory of Items, therefore must take the form of nonclassical logics. Two alternatives remain, either the Theory of Items adopts Free Logic or takes the form of
Neutral Logic. It will be shown that the Theory of Items takes Neutral Logic and not Free logic for its form. This section is devoted to the discussion of why Free Logic is not good enough for the Theory of Items.

Free Logic—as stated by van Fraasen and Lambert—deserves a special attention because Free Logic goes beyond what classical logic assumes. That is: Free Logic does not make any assumption that an item must exist in order for a true statement about that item can be made. In this sense Free Logic is closer to what the Theory of Items holds. However, Free Logic cannot be adopted for the Theory of Items because Free Logic basically does not deal with items themselves and as a result some of its postulations are incompatible with the Theory of Items.

Lambert (1983) formulates Free Logic as a logic which is free of existence assumptions in respect to its singular and general terms. (p.104) This is to say that in order for a statement to be true, its singular or general terms need not be assumed to refer to something existent. Thus, Lambert states that Free Logic is:

- a logic in which quantificational phrases have existential import and there are no statements such that they are logically true only if it is true that G exists for all general terms G or it is true that s exists for all singular terms s. (Lambert 1983:105)

The Theory of Items disagrees with Lambert's formulation of Free Logic as a logic in which quantificational phrases have existential import. This formulation shows that Free Logic
is not essentially free from any ontological presumption. This can be further shown by examining the following claims that Free Logic makes regarding the status of items in its theory:

(a). Free Logic -[FL] for short- regards nonexistent items as second-class citizens. Nonexistent items are not fully objects; they are 'virtual objects' "who are clearly recognizable as such but who do not enjoy the rights of complete personhood."

(b). For [FL] nonexistent objects are not to be quantified over because they are not really entities. Nonexistent objects cannot become the value of bound variables because they "cannot aspire to full objecthood", thus, "no free logician quantifies over beingless objects." (Lambert 1983:98)

The Theory of Items, on the other hand, clearly states that nonexistent items are as much items as existent ones. Nonexistent items are neither second-class citizens, nor somewhat inferior than existent items.

For the Theory of Items nonexistent items can be quantified over because nonexistent items are seen as items just as existent items are items and can be quantified over. [FL] rejects quantification over nonexistent objects, because its quantifier is still existentially loaded. Whereas, [TI]'s quantifier is ontically neutral. [TI] can quantify over nonexistent objects without assuming that they exist. Thus, for example, instead of ordinary existential quantifier (E), [TI] has a neutral quantifier (Σ).11

(c). The motivation of [FL] is not trying to include all items with no ontological prejudice into its system, but rather to provide a safe way of talking about something which we are not sure of its actual
The idea is that the methods of logic ought to apply to reasoning containing expressions that one may not be sure refer to any existing objects... (Lambert 1983:100)

The basic motivation of [TI] from the very beginning, however, is to try to provide a system by which we can deal with all items regardless their ontic status, including things that we know do not exist. A system that can analyse nonexistent and fictional objects critically as well as it can discuss existent and actual objects philosophically.

(d). Lambert argues that [FL] is irreferential in a sense that singular and general terms do not stand for anything. Especially concerning nonexistent items: [FL] is irreferential because nonexistent objects are not objects, they are nothing, thus one cannot refer to nothing. (Lambert 1983:97-8&112)

[TI] is referential in the sense that we can refer to nonexistent objects, since nonexistent objects are items in a full sense. But also, [TI] is nonreferential in a sense that the referents do not need to exist or to be actual. I have mentioned in previous Chapter that 'refers to' is to be understood as 'talks about'.

(e). [FL] excludes nonexistent objects. [FL] is not committed to the realm of items that do not exist. "In our development, talk about non-existent objects is just that- "talk" is what is stressed. "Non-existent" object, for us, is just a picturesque way of speaking devoid of any ontological commitment. In this regard our own development is motivated by what Russell called "a robust sense of reality". (van Fraassen 1972:200)

[TI], on the other hand, is committed to the realm of nonexistent objects (and all items), since that is what the basic understanding of [TI]. [TI] does not regard
nonexistent objects as merely a picturesque way of speaking about something that lacks actual reference, [TI] regards nonexistent objects as irreducible items that need to be treated as the same as any other items. van Fraasen's statement suggests that [FL] is still not free from the ontological assumption. The admission of nonexistent objects is against our "robust sense of reality" if, and only if we regard nonexistent objects as having some kind of being. For us, nonexistent objects do not exist, they have no form of being whatsoever, that is the end of the matter!

(f). van Fraasen's postulation of [FL] suggests that [FL] is basically still referential. "How can we find out whether "Pegasus flies" is true in M if "Pegasus" does not designate anything in M? The answer to this question is: we cannot find out. Since Pegasus does not exist, there are no facts to be discovered about him. What we can do is arbitrarily assign that sentence a value." (van Fraasen 1972:180)

[TI] believes that even though Pegasus does not exist, we do not assign arbitrarily a sentence about it a value. The assignment of a value is very much determined by the context in which that sentence is uttered. Given a standard context (of Greek mythology) we do not assign arbitrarily a value true to a sentence "Pegasus is a flying horse". Likewise we do not assign "arbitrarily" a value false to a sentence "Pegasus is a flying pig". In Greek mythology it is true that Pegasus is a flying horse and not a flying pig, there is nothing "arbitrary" about it. van Fraasen also suggests that truth is the function of a reference: we
don't know the value of "Pegasus flies" because there is nothing to refer to. In our discourse I have stated that referential theory must be rejected as incompatible with the Theory of Items. We know that Pegasus has such and such features from its context. If we take fictional world of Greek mythology as the context, then we know that Pegasus is a winged horse.

(g). The notion of entities for [FL] is existent entities. Non existent items are not to be regarded as items at all! (van Fraasen 1972:203) For [FL] the ranges of bound variables are taken intact from the classical logics: "thus individual bound variables have as designation-ranges just [existent] (individual) entities." (Routley 1979:76)

(h). Since [FL] is not concerned with items, therefore it cannot talk about variety of items as well. Thus, it is inadequate for the Theory of Items.

[3]. The Reductionist Theories.

The next rival to the Theory of Items is a theory that intends to reduce nonexistent entities to something that really exists. The motivation of this theory, therefore, is ontological reduction. The theory regards nonexistent entities as mere nothing, thus they must be interpreted in such a way so that they become something. Routley argues,

The reason is that because most reductionists arise from ontological worries and are intended to be ontological reductions, to show that the thing eliminated does not really exist, at least not independently, but only as or through something else to which it reduces. (Routley 1979:887-8)
The problem, again, starts from the reductionists' belief that since nonexistent objects are mere nothings we cannot talk about nothing. But we do talk about something when we discuss God, for instance. Thus, they conclude that this something cannot be the nonexistent object itself, but rather something else which clearly exists (e.g., the meaning, or concept, or idea of God). The reduction theory takes several forms:

Nonexistent objects are to be reduced to:

1. **Concepts**: e.g., God is a mere concept-word 'God'. When we talk about God, we talk about the concept 'God' and not about God himself (as an item).

2. **Logical entities**: e.g., possible worlds are logical structures: they are what truth is relative to. Stalnaker, for example, refuses to say that he is making an ontological claim about possible worlds. This is because they do not exist, and it is hard to hold a position concerning items that do not exist. Stalnaker says,

   Possible worlds are primitive notions of the theory, not because of their ontological status, but because it is useful to theorize at a certain level of abstraction... The concept [of possible worlds] is a formal or functional notion, like the notion of an individual presupposed by the semantics for extensional quantification theory... A possible
world is what truth is relative to... To believe in possible worlds is to believe only that those activities have a certain structure, the structure which possible worlds theory helps to bring out. (Stalnaker 1984:57)

For [TI] the matter is quite straightforward, possible worlds are nonexistent items! It does not mean however that [TI] rejects Stalnaker's proposal to treat possible worlds as logical items, it simply states that one must accept that possible worlds as nonexistent items first before one says something more about it.

[TI] holds that items -existent or nonexistent, real or not real- are irreducible to anything else. Items are objects in themselves!

3. Reduction to mental objects: Believing in mediatorial entities is a form of reductionism. Nonexistent items are reduced to mental objects which are more 'real' (and therefore more 'acceptable') than the nonexistent items themselves. Thus, e.g.:

Pegasus is not an object in a full sense of object (since it does not exist), it is merely an idea of Pegasus.

This theory states that there are two objects, the one the immediate object (the idea, the species, the form), and the mediate or external object. Only the former objects are accepted. "[T]he immediate object of the philosopher -the idea- is said to exist, and to be perceived in all
these operations." (Reid 1863:369) According to Reid, this theory believes that,

Though there may be a remote object which does not exist, there must be an immediate object which really exists; for which is not, cannot be an object of thought. The idea must be perceived by the mind, and if it does not exist there, there can be no perception of it, no operation of the mind about it. (1863:369)

There is a shift from object to the intermediate object. The shift is motivated by the ontological assumption. The object itself is reduced to ideas, concepts, and meanings which are said to exist. For example, there is no doubt that an intermediate object such as meaning or sense is needed in cases of empty reference and in cases of reference in opaque frames. (Routley 1979:890) Without reference theory and ontological assumption, intermediate objects are not needed. Routley concludes,

Intermediaries and middlemen do not exist, and as objects they are otiose. (Routley 1979:890)

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ENDNOTES

1. The German word 'bedeutung' which was translated as 'reference', now is translated as 'meaning', this is to be consistent with Geach and Black's recent translation of Frege's works in *Translation from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*. (1980) edited by Geach and Black. Thus, 'Sinn und Bedeutung' is translated as 'Sense and Meaning' and not 'Sense and Reference'.

2. Many have argued that Dummett misinterprets Frege's doctrine of concepts and objects, especially concerning Dummett's own claim on the distinction between concrete and abstract objects. Hans Sluga in his article "Frege and the Rise of Analytical Philosophy" (1975) for instance, argues that Frege's doctrine of objects is not to be interpreted ontologically. Frege, Sluga maintains, does not make any ontological claim when he states for example that the concept of horse is not a concept but an object. Here Frege simply makes a logical claim that the concept of horse is an object because "the concept of horse" functions as an object. Dummett, on the other hand, claims in his book *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy* (1981) that Frege's philosophy is to be interpreted ontologically. Dummett says,

   I am here affirming that Frege's doctrine are intended to be understood ontologically... any attempt to interpret him otherwise must pervert his entire philosophy. (430)

3. For Strawson it does not make any sense to say that a sentence is either true or false. A sentence can be either significant or nonsignificant. And it can be used to make a true or a false assertion.

   [We cannot talk of the sentence being true or false, but only of its being used to make a true or false assertion, or (if this is preferred) to express a true or false proposition.

   (Strawson 10978:67)

   Also, for Strawson only assertions are about something. "we cannot talk of the sentence being about a particular person." (Strawson 1978:67)

4. See his "Description and Existence" *Journal of Philosophy* (36) 1939.

5. \( *149: \vdash \neg(\alpha)(\phi \rightarrow \gamma) \vdash (\exists \alpha) \phi \rightarrow (\exists \alpha) \gamma \) (Mathematical
6. Quine states:
We have indeed never been worried that open sentences lack truth values, but open sentences are notationally recognizable. A special awkwardness of the truth-value gaps here under consideration is that they cannot be systematically spotted by notational form. (Quine 1960:177)

7. All the theorems (start with +#) and metatheorems (start with *#) are from Mathematical Logic (1955).


9. Lycan argues that Lewis' realism is a "brand of Meinongianism", see Lycan: "The Trouble with Possible Worlds" (p.287) in The Possible and the Actual ed. by M.J.Loux (1979).


11. Neutral-logic will be explained in the next Chapter III, sec. 6.

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CHAPTER THREE
THE THEORY OF CONTEXTS AND FICTIONAL ITEMS

[1]. Introduction.

What we have postulated in Chapter One is that the Theory of Items permits any item to be assumed to have any property whatsoever. The Theory of Items, furthermore, asserts that whether an item can be said truly or falsely to have certain properties does not depend on the ontic status of that item. In other words, the Theory of Items has shown that existent or nonexistent items can be said truly to have certain properties.

However, how we propose to assign semantical values (truth, falsity, significance, meaningfulness, etc.) to statements about those (existent or nonexistent) items has not been discussed in the previous chapter. From Chapter One we only have established the position that, for example, Pegasus may be said truly to be a winged horse regardless of its ontic status. But obviously not every statement in which Pegasus is characterised as a winged horse is true. There are circumstances in which the statement that Pegasus is a winged horse is false. For instance if Pegasus in a non standard context (in my novel about Pegasus) is a winged pig instead of a
winged horse. The point that I made in Chapter One is that whether a statement that Pegasus is a winged horse is true or false, the ontic status of that item has nothing to do with it. Something other than the ontic status of an item is needed to determine the semantical value of the statement about that item.

What has been suggested in the above paragraph is that a statement about a certain item may be true or false depending on what context a given token sentence is used to express that true or false statement. Thus, a certain token sentence with respect to Collins' novel can be used to yield a true statement that Holmes met Wittgenstein in Cambridge; but with respect to Doyle's works it will not necessarily yield a true statement. This is the position that I propose to defend in this chapter. The theory I am advocating is called the Theory of Contexts (or [TC] for short). Thus it is my argument that the assignment of the semantical features to any statement about any item is basically context-dependent.

It should be noted that I intend to base [TC] on [TI]. [TC] presupposes [TI], that is: the Theory of Contexts I am advocating here is possible because there are many basic arguments that have been made possible already by the Theory of Items. It seems clear to me that if one intends to hold the Theory of Contexts, then one must also
hold the Theory of Items. Otherwise, how can one argue that a token sentence in a certain context (in the actual world) can be used to yield a true statement about nonexistent items? In other words: if one holds —say—Russell's dogma that x must exist if a true statement about x is to be made (Principia 1980:182); then it becomes impossible to argue that a given token sentence can be used at all in a context to express a true statement about nonexistent items. Those who hold Russell’s dogma, or its variations, must either adopt the theory of descriptions, or otherwise they must argue that nonexistent items exist in some other worlds (possible worlds). However, both of these claims have already been rejected by [TI].

Thus, for example, I am justified in asserting that a particular token sentence with respect to a Greek myth is used to express a true statement that Pegasus is a winged horse, and when it is used with respect to my novel, it expresses a false statement, because I have argued that even though Pegasus is a nonexistent item nevertheless we may assert true or false things about it (which is [TI]'s claim).

In this chapter I will only discuss one kind of item, namely: fictional items. I will show, thus, how the Theory of Contexts will deal with them.

In order to show how the Theory of Contexts works for fictional items, in sec.2 I will present some puzzles
which are based on the confusion either between one fictional context and another fictional context, or between factual and fictional contexts. And then in secs. 3 to 7 I will present some alternative theories which have some potential in resolving the puzzles. In sec. 8 I will present a fuller discussion of the Theory of Contexts. I will examine first how a statement about fictional items may be analysed properly. And then various concepts—such as: token-type sentences, use-mention, contexts, and statements—will be explained. In the third part of sec. 8 some relevant rules regarding the relations between contexts will be given. Finally in sec. 9 I will try to solve the fictional puzzles stated in sec. 2 by using the Theory of Contexts.

[2]. Some of the problems in fictional discourse.

2.1. Multiplication of narratives or multiplication of objects.

Consider a fictional character, Frankenstein (Fr.). According to the original novel by Mary Shelley, Frankenstein is pictured as a mean, rude and frightening monster. So:

(1) 'Fr. is a frightening monster'

is true according to Shelley's version of Frankenstein. However, apparently there is a movie called "Abbot and Costello meet Frankenstein", in which Frankenstein is depicted as a 'benign monster' who is involved in
hilarious situations (of course Fr. in Shelley’s version is no laughing matter). Thus,

(2) ‘Fr. is an amusing monster (but not frightening) is true in Abbot-Costello’s story. But, obviously (1) is incompatible with (2). What is frightening is of course not amusing. How do we reconcile these? In regard to this problem two possible positions may be taken. The first one is that (1) and (2) are cases of fictional entity (character) multiplication. Thus, Frankenstein in (2) is an entirely different fictional entity from Frankenstein in (1). The subscriber to this theory is ready to admit that we have two Frankensteins: the amusing one, and the frightening one. If this position is taken then there will be no problem of reconciling the two versions since the first and the second are not contradictory: they are talking about two different characters (different fictional objects), just as Sherlock Holmes who is the cleverest detective, differs from Moriarty who is the most famous criminal.

The second position is that (1) and (2) are cases of multiplication of fictional narratives. According to this position there is only one Frankenstein who involved in two different fictional narratives. I will maintain that this position is more desirable than the first one.

My strategy is first to grant that there is a genuine puzzle regarding (1) and (2) (henceforth this puzzle will be called ‘the problem of narrative multiplication’),
and then, second, I will introduce the notion of context and argue that this problem of narrative multiplication may be clarified by contextual theory.

Now, if we take the first alternative position, (1) and (2) will not be a puzzle at all. But we do, prima-facie, regard (1) and (2) as a puzzle. (1) and (2) is a puzzle precisely because we regard Abbot-Costello’s Frankenstein as basically Shelley’s Frankenstein. Thus, we regard (1) and (2) as a puzzle because we think that the latter version of Frankenstein is based on Shelley’s Frankenstein. (Consider this: Abbot-Costello’s movie is funny because the Frankenstein in their movie is in fact Shelley’s Frankenstein. If their Frankenstein is not Shelley’s Frankenstein, then their movie will not be as successful as they wanted it to be.) Thus, the first alternative is undesirable.

The above puzzle is not a case of fictional item multiplication but rather a case of narrative multiplication. There is only one Frankenstein, that is, Shelley’s; Abbot-Costello’s Frankenstein is in fact Shelley’s Frankenstein with different characteristics. The fact that the same item may have different (even contradictory) characteristics in two different narratives is permitted by the principle that any item may have any character whatsoever [FA]. We need not conclude that there are two different (fictional) items from the fact that this item is described
differently in a different context.3

However, there is a certain case in which we could regard a situation similar to the above problem of narrative multiplication as a case of fictional items multiplication. Suppose a sixteenth-century Persian author wrote a never-published novel about a character called Frankenstein who made a living by selling and renting camels somewhere in the Arabian desert. Shelley knew nothing about this Frankenstein since the only person who knew the story is the author himself. Then, it is quite obvious that this Arabian Frankenstein (who mysteriously got his very un-Arabic name) is an entirely different fictional item from that of Shelley. And clearly no puzzle arises even though we assert that "Frankenstein lived in Arabian desert" is true, and that "Frankenstein never went to any desert" is also true. Very easily we can point out that the Arabian Frankenstein is not the same fictional item as the German Frankenstein. This last hypothesis, however, is not the same as the above puzzle that we intend to discuss. To be able to recognize the difference is quite crucial for determining whether the problem of narrative multiplication is a matter of fictional items multiplication or fictional narratives multiplication. It is clear that in (1) and (2) there is only one Frankenstein, and that Abbot-Costello's Frankenstein is Shelley's; whereas in the second example there are two
Frankensteins: the Arab one and the German one.

Since my position is to regard (1) and (2) as a case of multiplication of narratives rather than multiplication of fictional objects, then a problem immediately arises: whereas

(1). 'Fr. is a frightening monster'
is true in Shelley's version, it is false in Abbot-Costello's version, and whereas

(2). 'Fr. is an amusing monster'
is true in Abbot-Costello's version it is false in Shelley's novel (notice that (1) implies the negation of (2), and (2) implies the negation of (1)).

This position approaches the problem by asserting that there is one Frankenstein who appears in at least two different versions. I am not concerned only with the fictional item Frankenstein itself, or with the Frankenstein-version on its own, but rather I am concerned with both the item (Frankenstein) and the narratives (Shelley's and Abbot-Costello's).

2.2. Mixed modes of being.

This problem is presented by Woods (1974:41): a fictional entity is capable of entering into all sorts of quite ordinary relations with other items (including actual objects). For example:

(3). 'Holmes had tea with Watson'
which is true in Doyle's stories. And:
(4). 'Holmes had tea with Gladstone'
which is the case -say- in Mr X's books. Both (3) and (4) are in the form of 'x had tea with y'. The difference is that in the case of (3), both x and y are fictional objects, thus no difficulty arises concerning the relation between the two objects. But in the case of (4), whereas x is a fictional object, y is an actual object. 'x had tea with y' implies that 'y had tea with x', just as 'x kicked y' implies that 'y was kicked by x'. How can an actual entity such as Gladstone have tea with, or be kicked by a fictional item such as Holmes? Woods says:

Prime Minister Gladstone, it seems, could hardly have kicked, congratulated, had tea with or spoken to Holmes. without Holmes being real... (1974:41).

Thus whereas it is true that "Holmes had tea with Watson" implies that "Watson had tea with Holmes", it does not seem true that "Holmes had tea with Gladstone" implies that "Gladstone had tea with Holmes".

2.3. Relational Puzzle (factual and fictional truths).

The third problem is the problem between fictional statements and factual states of affairs. That is between;

(5). 'Holmes lived in London',
which is true in the fictional stories of Doyle's, and

(6). 'London is not inhabited by Holmes'.
The two sentences are apparently both true (since it is the case that Holmes lived in London according to Doyle's
novels), and also false "for Holmes did not live in London as empirical scanning would have revealed; a stake out on Baker street would have obtained no trace of Holmes... Holmes was not, that is, an historical figure..." (Routley, 1979a:563)

2.4. Fictional Paradox.

The fourth problem can be formulated as the following (Routley 1979a:588-9):

(7). A(a) Aeneus defended Troy, a high and windy city.
(8). a=b Troy is a low city and airless village in Asia Minor.
(9). A(b) Aeneus defended a low and airless city.
(10). but ~A(b), since A(a).

or:

(11). agb Holmes did not live in any brewery, he lived in 221B Baker St.
(12). b=c 221B Baker St = Bigshott Brewery.
(13) agc Holmes lived in Bigshott Brewery.
(14). but ~agc, since agb.4

I intend to solve all of these problems by using the Theory of Contexts. But before I do so, I shall examine several possible answers that have been proposed by Woods, and by Parsons. My conclusion is that both Woods' and Parsons' theories are inadequate to solve the problems concerning fictional discourse. Therefore the development of a new logic for fictional items is needed.

[3]. Parsons' Theory.

The problems with fictional discourse stated above suggest that the solution must be concerned with the
specification of the fictional contexts. For example, this is hinted in the way we treat the first puzzle: as a multiplication of versions. Thus, it has something to do with 'versions', or 'contexts'. However, Parsons' theory (manifested in his system of language \( \Theta \)) does not include the notion of contexts at all. We must see whether his theory still may contribute something important to the solution of our problems.

What is nonclassical in Parsons' language \( \Theta \), however, is the inclusion of the distinction between characterising predicates (or as Parsons prefers to call them 'nuclear predicates') and noncharacterising predicates (or what Parsons calls 'extra nuclear predicates') in the axiomatic system of his language \( \Theta \). (1980:72-74) As I have stated in the previous chapter, the distinction between these two kinds of predicates is crucial for a satisfactory and a consistent Theory of Items.

From the point of view of the Theory of Items, some of Parsons' postulations are undesirable. Among those are:

1. Parsons' theory does not deny that fictional items exist in fiction.

It seems that Parsons operates with two notions of existence: 'exists' and 'exists in fiction'. He argues that to say that such and such exists does not mean that such and such 'exists in fiction' --and vice-versa. He says,

[Let me emphasize that although the theory under discussion denies that (many) fictional characters exist, it
does not deny that they exist in fiction. Existing in fiction and existing are quite different things, and one may do the former without doing the latter, just as one may commit adultery in the heart without thereby committing adultery. (Parsons 1980:50-51)

This is contrary to the claim that the Theory of Items made earlier regarding what does and does not exist. According to [TI] only one kind of item exists, that is nonfictional particular concrete things. Thus [TI] maintains not only that many fictional characters do not exist, but more over for [TI] all fictional characters do not exist. There is also no need to have two kinds of existence. To exist is to exist in the real empirical world; fictional items do not exist anywhere, not in fiction, not in the real empirical world. Parsons' hesitation to accept that fictional items do not exist anywhere, and that there is only one kind of existence I presume is based on [OA] which states that even though fictional items do not exist (in the actual world), they must in some other way exist.

2. Parsons' "plugging-up" relation leads to a serious trouble.

Let's use n to stand for Nixon, c to stand for Carter, and M to stand for the relation of meeting. Thus, we can express: 'Nixon has the property of meeting Carter' by n[Mc], and 'Carter has the property
of meeting Nixon' by [nM]c. Parsons holds the position that x bears the relation R to y is true if, and only if, both x[R]y and [xR]y is true. (1980:60) Now, according to Parsons' position "Nixon meets Carter" is true if, and only if n[Mc] & [nM]c. Parsons's theory works only if the items under consideration are existent real items, but it certainly won't work for fictional items. Parsons accepts this consequence. He says,

[I] am going to suppose that there are relational properties [among fictional items], and also that the equivalence mentioned above does not always hold. Of course, if both terms of a relational statement are real objects, then the equivalence of 'x[Ry]' and '[xR]y' will hold. (Parsons 1980:60 my underlinings)

Furthermore he argues,

[I]t will be a principle that if both x and y exist, then x[R]y iff [xR]y... x bears R to y... is true if and only if both x[R]y and [xR]y. For real objects [this principle is applied] but for unreal objects [it is] not. (Parsons 1980:60. my underlinings)

Thus, finally Parsons concludes that real objects can never bear relations to unreal ones: "no real object ever has a relational property that is obtained by plugging up one end of a nuclear relation with an unreal object". (Parsons 1980:60)

Parsons' conclusion obviously stands against the Theory of Items' argument that any item whatsoever may be characterised as having certain properties. From this argument it follows that any existent item can bear
relations to any nonexistent item. In one of Doyle's stories it may be true that Gladstone is characterised as having the property of meeting Holmes. We certainly don't want to deny this. And yet by Parsons' conclusion it seems that we must reject it. The problem rests on the fact that Parsons does not take into account the importance of contexts. We must, for example, make a distinction between factual and fictional contexts. Parsons' conclusion is true only with regard to the factual context. But to conclude that it is true that in the factual context existent items can never bear any relation to nonexistent items, is not the same as to maintain that existent item can never bear relations to nonexistent items in other contexts. For obviously in a fictional context an existent item may be characterised as having a certain relation to a nonexistent item.

In other words Parsons' conclusion is justified if and only if he does not take contexts seriously. For if he had taken contexts into account, then there won't be any reason at all to conclude that existent items can never bear relations to nonexistent items.

The Theory of Contexts will agree with Parsons' in so far as the distinction between characterising and noncharacterising predicates needs to be specified in our formal logic. But by no means is Parsons' language adequate to handle fictional objects - and therefore eventually all items.
[4]. Woods' Elliptical Theory.

The problems with fictional discourse stated above indicate that the truth and falsity of a statement about fictional items must be examined contextually. We cannot say, for example, that "Frankenstein is a frightening monster" is true in all works of fiction. What we are entitled to assert is that "Frankenstein is a frightening monster" is true in a specific context namely Shelley's version. This is apparent from the fact that "Frankenstein is a frightening monster" may not be true in another context, e.g., in Abbot-Costello's movie. Further, it appears that there is no consistency in the assignment of truth values to fictional items: according to one standard, A is true, but according to another standard, A is not true. For Woods and other elliptical theorists this apparent inconsistency is undesirable. So, for example Woods says,

In general the predicate schema 'true-in-θ', where θ is a theory, can be expected to pick out the theorems of θ. Now, unless θ is a sound theory its theorems will not all be true. And if it is sound and complete, its theorems will all be true. In the latter case 'true-in-θ' is no alternative to "true", for they come to the same thing; and in the latter case, 'true-in-θ' is an undesirable alternative to "true", for it defeats the intuition that the favourable evaluated sentences of θ all be true. (1974:34)

Woods regards the sentence:
(φ) "Frankenstein is a frightening monster"
as ambiguous and confusing since it can be true or false
depending on the standard we are working with. To avoid
this ambiguity Woods' strategy is to replace sentence φ
of the English language E with a sentence Y in the formal
language L. Woods says,

\[ F \]ictional sentences, φ, ... are
supposed untrue and are replaced by a
true sentence, Y, with which the
original [i.e.: φ] is said to be
confused. ... [For example] "Holmes
lived in London" [i.e.: φ] is an
ellipsis for, means the same as, some
sentence [i.e.: Y] recording the
origin or locale of the former.

The formation of sentence Y is done by using the
Olim-operator O(φ) which is read "once upon a time". Any
sentence φ in the English language about fictional
entities is to be translated into O(φ) in the formal
language L. So, in a way, Woods makes the following
distinction:

(φ). The sentence (about fictional items) S of the
English language E: "Frankenstein is a frightening
monster", and

(Y) The sentence O(φ) of works-of-fiction in the
formal language L, which is the translation of
sentence S above: O(Frankenstein is a frightening
monster).

Woods argues,

To this end it is supposed, for the
time being, that what is semantically
distinctive of fictional sentences is that they are modified by a sentence operator. We, denote this operator by 'O' after the Latin *olim* for 'once upon a time'. In general we surmise that a fictional sentence $S$ of $E$ is to be represented in $L$ by a sentence $O(\phi)$. (1974:39).

There is no question that the introduction of the O-operator is a form of the elliptical theory of fiction. In the elliptical theory, Routley argues,

assertions of fiction, apparently about fictional objects, are shorthand for statements characteristically obtained by introducing covering operators which isolate problematic subject terms - statements not about fictional objects at all. (1979:559)

With Woods' operator some of the problems with fictional discourse can be solved, but by no means all of them. The problem of fictional/factual ambiguity, for example, has been handled quite well by covering the fictional sentence $S$ with an O-operator, and therefore translating it into $O(S)$ in order to distinguish it from sentences about factual things which are not supposed to be ambiguous. Thus, we can assert:

$V(O(\text{'Holmes lived in London'})$ is true; that is in Doyle's works. And:

$V(\text{'Holmes lived in London'})$ is false; that is in the real London.

What remains a question to me is how do we distinguish between two (or more) works of fiction at which
the sentence s holds? For instance, in handling the multiplication problem (1) and (2) above, obviously (1) will be translated into:

\[(1)\). O(Fr. is a frightening monster),\]
and (2) into:

\[(2)\). O(Fr. is an amusing character).\]

Clearly we want to be able to maintain that (1) is a true sentence in one context, and that (2) is true in another context. However, since we only have one kind of O-operator, the fact that (1) implies the negation of (2) in the first context (e.g., in Shelley's story), and that (2) implies the negation of (1) in the second context (e.g., in Abott-Costello's movie) is not apparent. That is, (1) and (2) are given the same truth-value true despite the fact that (1) \(\rightarrow\)\(\sim\)(2) in one context, and (2) \(\rightarrow\)\(\sim\)(1) in another context. If we want also to hold that the difference between (1) and (2) is not trivial, then our theory should be able to tell that \{(1) \(\rightarrow\)\(\sim\)(2)\} in one context (Shelley's) and \{(2) \(\rightarrow\)\(\sim\)(1)\} in another context (Abott's). Woods' single O-operator fails exactly in this respect. The only logical way out is to specify what context the O-operator is working on, for example by distinguishing O₁(\(\phi\)) from O₂(\(\phi\)). So (1) becomes:

\[(1\_a)\). O₁(Fr. is a frightening monster) is true; and\]

\[(2\_a)\). O₂(Fr. is an amusing monster) is true.\]

However, here the O-operator begins to lose its explanatory
force, or else it becomes a version of the Theory of Context I am about to propose.

Another criticism of the elliptical theory is this: there is no reason to distinguish between the sentence $S$ of the English language $E$, and its translation $O(\phi)$ of $L$. The ostensible reason for making a distinction is because sentence $S$ always appears to be ambiguous and unclear in terms of truth value assignments, that is: it may be true if one standard and false if another standard is used. But, is $S$ nontrivially ambiguous?

Here we need to make a distinction between logical ambiguity and ambiguity in meaning. Woods clearly asserts that $S$ is not logically ambiguous, for $O(S)$ has the same logical structure as $S$ (thus if $O(S)$ is not logically ambiguous, $S$ cannot possibly be logically ambiguous either). Woods maintains:

The represented sentence is assumed to have the logical structure of the representing sentence... (1974:39)

Thus, $S$ is ambiguous not in logical structure but rather in meaning. But, if this is correct, it appears trivial since "Holmes lived in London" is just as 'ambiguous' as "I am hot" is between "I am hot" (uttered by me), and "I am hot" (uttered by somebody else), or as 'London' is between London (Ontario) and London (England). It does not mean, however, that Woods is proposing a theory of fiction because of the ambiguity of fictional sentences, but
it seems very clear to me that the only reason for introducing the O-operator is because fictional sentences are ambiguous. The distinction between S and its translation O(S), thus, is unnecessary. It turns out that contextual theory will capture this problem better. Consider this: in a certain definite context, no ambiguity arises. Suppose we are in a literary class, where we are discussing Doyle's novels. In this context hardly any ambiguity (in meaning) arises concerning the sentence "Holmes lived in London".

Another problem with Woods' theory is concerned with Woods' axioms, namely axiom (A3), that is: logical truths are fictional truths.

(A3) ($\neg\Box\neg\phi$) $\rightarrow$ O($\phi$)  (p.141)

This is too strong a principle to be adopted. Consider the following counter argument (presented by Routley on p.549): suppose in fictional work N, e.g.: science-fiction, $C \lor \neg C$ is denied, thus in N, $C \lor \neg C$ is false. But $C \lor \neg C$ is a logical truth. Thus by (A3) we must accept the truth in fiction of $C \lor \neg C$ (since it is logical truth). And since (A3) states that logical truth is fictional truth we will have:

(A3). $\boxdot (C \lor \neg C) \rightarrow O(C \lor \neg C)$

but this is obviously inconsistent with N itself which asserts that $(C \lor \neg C)$ is false (thus it doesn't follow from the logical truth $C\lor\neg C)$.

Thus, it seems to me that the O-operator is not an
adequate apparatus to deal with fictional items, for what the O-operator actually does is simply to distinguish fictional statements from factual statements. But it does not really deal with fictional statements themselves. This is easily seen from the fact that the O-operator is insensitive to various kinds of fictional items. (As examples (11) and (21) have already shown). Fictional discourses not only contain factual and fictional statements, but moreover they also are rich with varieties of fictional statements; and certainly we want to deal with them as well.

Woods' O-operator solves only a small part of the problem with fictional items, but there are many other problems which the O-operator is not sensitive to. Therefore Woods' operator is inadequate to handle the complexity of fictional discourses.

[5]. Devitt's 'Pretence Theory of Fiction'.

Devitt (in Designation 1981) holds the following positions:

(A) Sentences in fictional works (novels, stories, etc.) do not express statements. This is because the 'storyteller' (by this he means the author of a fictional work) talks about something which does not really exist.

(B) Thus, since sentences in fictional works fail to express statements, then, they are neither true nor false. "His [the storyteller's] sentences have no truth value and
do not claim to have any truth value." (Devitt 1981:171)

(C) However, the storyteller (and the audience too) does 'pretend' that he/she talks about something real (existent). "[A] storyteller pretends that a world of a certain sort containing entities of a certain sort exists..." (Devitt 1981:171) Thus, in this act of pretending the storyteller's sentences do express statements and have truth value.

Similar to Woods, Devitt makes a distinction between the storyteller's actual sentences in his/her works (novels, stories, etc.), and those sentences which are preceded by a phrase such as 'Let us assume that', or 'It is imagined that'. The former is to be represented by the storyteller-operator $S$, and the latter by the fictional story-operator $F$. Let's say that we have the following sentence which occurs in one of Doyle's novels:

(1) 'Holmes is a detective'

Since (1) is the actual sentence which is used by the storyteller (in this case is C. Doyle), and which is to be found in one of his novels, then according to Devitt (1) is paraphrasable by:

(2) $S$(Holmes is a detective)

(2) is neither true nor false because it does not express any statement (by args. (A) and (B)). But if I say: 'Let us assume or imagine that Holmes is a detective', which is paraphrasable by:

(3) $F$(Holmes is a detective)

then (3) will express a statement and it is either true or
false. (Devitt 1981:172)

Criticisms:

[1]. Devitt's arguments (A) and (B) are obviously inconsistent with the Theory of Items. As it can be easily observed, they are the [RT].

[2]. The Theory of Items maintains that whether the statement that Holmes is a detective is true or is false depends on whether Holmes is characterised as a detective or not. However, Devitt maintains that (1) is true or false iff it is interpreted as 'It is imagined that Holmes is a detective'. Now, of course the affirmation or the denial of 'It is imagined that Holmes is a detective' is not quite the same as the affirmation or the denial of the statement that Holmes is a detective. According to the Theory of Items what is affirmed or denied is the characterisation of Holmes as a detective, and surely not the imagining of Holmes as a detective. As it may be recalled [FA] states that any item may be assumed to have any property whatsoever, and [CP] (on the basis of [IT]) says that an item has the features that are used to characterised it (regardless its ontic status). Devitt's pretence-theory may be consistent with [FA], but certainly not with [CP].

[3]. It is doubted that the author (and the audience too) 'pretends' that Holmes is a detective, or that Holmes killed Moriarty. According to Doyle it is true that Holmes is a detective; there is no pretence here: Holmes is in fact
a detective. When Doyle wrote his novels, he did not pretend that Holmes is a detective! Similarly, when I discuss Doyle's novels in a seminar, I do not pretend that Holmes is a detective. We take it to be true that Holmes is a detective.

[6]. Pragmatic Theory.

The Theory of Contexts for fictional object that I propose to develop is somewhat similar to the pragmatic theory already developed by Dana Scott⁷, Montague⁸, David Lewis⁹, and Cresswell¹⁰ (to some extent). The similarity rests in the recognition of the significance of context for understanding the meaning of a statement. It will become apparent that my treatment of fictional objects is only possible by introducing and clarifying the notion of a context. I shall delay this particular discussion until later, and now I shall discuss the possible contribution of pragmatic theory to the logic of fiction.

Very briefly, the pragmatic theory argues that the meaning/ truth value of a sentence depends on the context in which that sentence is uttered. So, for example, the sentence "I am the President of the U.S" will have a different meaning depending on where, when, and by whom the sentence itself is uttered. If it is uttered by Reagan in 1986, say, then the above sentence is true, but if it is uttered by the Queen, then it
will have the value false. Likewise if it is uttered by Reagan in 1945, then it will be a false sentence. Thus, without the specification of the context, a sentence has no fixed truth-value. Dana Scott, for example, says,

Thus even if we know that the meaning of the predicate $P$, we cannot say whether $(\forall x)P(x)$ is true or false. However, if we specify an $i\in I$, then relative to this index the sentence assumes a truth value: namely it is true if $P(a)$ is true for all $a\in A_i$. Until we specify the $i\in I$, the range of the quantified variable is not known. (1970: 149)

Take as an example the previous sentence:

(1). "I am the President."

(2). Let $i$ be indices or points of reference. The members of $i$ may be varied, say $i=\{t, pl, s\}$, with $t=$ time, $pl=$ place, and $s=$ the speaker. Thus $i$ may be $i=\{1986, \text{U.S, Reagan}\}$, or $\{1945, \text{U.S, Reagan}\}$, etc. Now, even if we know the meaning of (1), we cannot assign a truth value to it alone, unless the points of reference (context) are specified. So, let’s say that $i=\{1986, \text{U.S, Reagan}\}$, then (1) is true iff. ‘I’ refers to Ron Reagan; it is uttered in 1986; and in 1986 Ron Reagan is the president of U.S; and false otherwise.

This recognition of the importance of the context in which a sentence is uttered in determining the truth value of that sentence is the aspect of the pragmatic theory which will be taken over by the Theory of Contexts.
David Lewis in his "General Semantics" (1972) discusses this problem further. Instead of 'points of reference' or 'indices', Lewis has 'coordinates' which function exactly like Scott's 'points of reference' explained above. 'Possible worlds', 'time', 'place', and 'audiences', for example, are coordinates. The truth value of a sentence is determined by appealing to these coordinates. So, for instance, sentence (1) above is true if the 'speaker coordinate' is Reagan; the 'time coordinate' is 1986; and the world is the actual world. Furthermore, the meaning of a sentence, according to Lewis, is:

something that determines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false. It determines the truth value of the sentence in various possible states of affairs, at various times, at various places, for various speakers, and so on. (1972:173)

This 'something' is a function from indices to truth values (Lewis 1972:174). Context, thus, is relevant for deciding the truth value of a sentence.

This view is shared as well by Cresswell in his Logic and Languages (1973) where he says that "the value of [a] sentence will be the set of complete contexts in which [that sentence] is true [or false]." (1973:110, my underlining) However, Cresswell disagrees with Lewis' multiplication of coordinates. He argues:

The trouble with the 'coordinate' approach to contextual
dependence is that it seems to require that we give in advance a finite list of contextual features to be taken into account when evaluating a sentence. (1973:111)

For Cresswell context is a property of a sentence. To know the truth value of a sentence such as (1), for instance, is to know what properties it has, e.g., these properties are: 'uttered by Reagan', 'uttered in 1986', and so on. Thus the meaning of a sentence is a function from properties to propositions. Cresswell concludes:

All this suggests that the meaning of (1) should be a function from properties into propositions ... [It will be something like the following: $V((1))$ is that function $\theta$ from properties into propositions such that if $w$ is a property which specifies an utterance $a$, utterance time $t$ and indicated institution $i$, then $\theta(w)$ is the proposition that $a$ is [President of the U.S] at time $t$...
(1973:112)

The most important point is made by Montague. Montague attempts to incorporate contextual aspect into a formal language. Thus, he says,

In interpreting pragmatic language $L$ we shall have to take into account the possible contexts of use. It is not necessary to consider them in their full complexity; we may instead confine our attention to those among their features which are relevant to the discourse in question. Thus it will suffice to specify the set of all complexes of relevant aspects of the intended possible contexts of use. (1974:98, my underlining)

Montague's contribution is his insistence that in formal
languages (not just in natural language) the context of use must be taken into account and be specified.\textsuperscript{11} So, 

\begin{quote}
we must determine the set of all possible contexts of use - or rather, of all complexes of relevant aspects of possible contexts of use... For example if the only indexical features of \( L \) were the presence of these operators and the first person pronoun 'I', then a point of reference might be an ordered pair consisting of a person and a real number understood respectively as the utterer and the moment of utterance. (1974: 121-122)
\end{quote}

The Theory of Contexts agrees with Montague's as far as the kind of context is to be made specific in formal language. We should keep this in mind when discussing [TC].

[7]. Neutral Logic.

One direct consequence of the Theory of Items postulated in the previous chapters is that we need a system of logic which does not exclude nonexistent items, and thus, which does not make any existential assumptions. If we intend to have a satisfactory logic that can deal with fictional objects (as this chapter intends to do), then classical logic is the main obstacle since by its existential assumption nonexistent items are excluded. Our logic, therefore, must be quite different from the classical one. It must be, first of all, neutral in terms of the ontic status of any item. This is to say, our logic must not be based on any existential
presumptions. And second, our logic must also take contexts into account. This second form will be discussed in the Appendix. In short, our system of logic must remain consistent with all the principles and postulates of the Theory of Items.

Classical logic does not distinguish between:

(a). there are ghosts, and

(b). ghosts exist.

Classically both (a) and (b) are to be translated as

(c). (Ex)(Gx).

Neutral logic, on the contrary, makes a distinction between 'some items are ghosts' and 'ghosts exist'. Even though ghosts may not exist, nevertheless ghosts are items. Thus, there are items that do not exist. Only by distinguishing (a) from (b) can we say that

(d). Some things do not exist.

Obviously, (d) will imply a contradiction if it is translated into a classical formal language:

(e). (Ex)(Vy)(y\neq x)!

The ability to formulate sentences such as (d) is very important for any formal theory of [TC], since a fictional discourse basically deals with items that do not in fact exist: we talk about Pegasus even though Pegasus doesn't exist; we argue whether Sherlock Holmes is really the most famous detective even though we know that Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist; we enjoy joking about Superman even though
Superman never did exist. Thus, this is the reason for taking neutral logic as the basis for fictional logic.

Routley's neutral logic takes the following form:

1. **Neutral quantifier ∃**: is read 'for all items' with no existential presupposition.

2. **Neutral quantifier ∨**: is read 'for at least one item' with no existential presupposition.

3. **Existential quantifier E**: is read 'there exists at least one'.

4. **Universal quantifier V**: is read 'for all existing'

5. E is read '___exists' treated as a logical as well as a grammatical predicate.

The following definitions hold:

6. \((∃x)A \equiv \neg (∀x)\neg A\)

7. \((∃x)A \equiv \neg (∀x)(A(x)\&E(x))\)

8. \((∀x)A \equiv \neg (∃x)\neg A(x)\)

Both the following formulas are satisfiable:

9. \((∃x)\neg E(x)\) 'some things do not exist'

10. \((∃x)E(x)\) 'some things exist'

(9) and (10) do not imply any contradiction since the quantifiers are ontically free. Now, fictional objects can be admitted without any hesitation:

11. 'Pegasus exists'

   \((∃x)(E(x)\&(x=P))\), or simply \(E(p)\)

(11) states that Pegasus is an item (therefore it is something and not a mere nothing, in spite of its
nonexistence): there is an item \( x \), this item exists, and this existent item is Pegasus.

(12). 'Pegasus does not exist'

\[
(\exists x)(\neg E(x) \& (x=P))
\]

or simply \( \neg E(p) \)

(12) states that there is a nonexistent item \( x \), and this nonexistent item \( x \) is Pegasus: Pegasus, even though it does not exist, is an item. Thus, Pegasus (a nonexistent item) does not exist.

(13). 'Nixon is a president'

\[
(\exists x)((x=N) \& Pr(x))
\]

with \( Pr \) for 'president',

(14). 'Nixon is not a president'

\[
(\exists x)((x=N) \& \neg Pr(x))
\]

(15). 'Pegasus is a winged horse but it does not exist'

\[
(\exists x)(H(x) \& \neg E(x) \& (x=P))
\]

with \( H \) for 'is a winged horse'.

What neutral logic does is to admit nonexistent objects within its own system of logic. However, by no means is it in itself adequate for the logic of fiction, since fictional discourse is constructed not only out of fictional objects such as Pegasus, Holmes, and Frankenstein, but also those objects are bounded by a certain context, story, or narrative. When we are talking about fictional discourse we are talking not only about Pegasus but also Pegasus in a certain story. Thus the logic for fictional objects must be adequate also to include both fictional objects and the story (context) wherein those objects are narrated. It appears, then, that neutral logic is only the first step toward the general logic of fiction. The fictional logic
must take into account the significance of context as well as the characters themselves.

[8]. The Theory of Contexts.

If we intend to solve the fictional puzzles presented earlier, we must be able to assign semantical features to various expressions about fictional items. For example, we should be able to say that 'Frankenstein is a monster' is true, or is false, or is significant, etc. I will argue that such semantical features are features of the use of token sentences which successfully express statements in a particular context. Thus, for example, we want to be able to say things like these:

(i.) a token sentence 'Holmes est un detective' is used significantly in one of Doyle's novels iff that token sentence with respect to the above context successfully yields a statement.

(ii.) a token sentence 'Holmes est un detective' is used truly by Doyle in one of his novels iff that token sentence with respect to the above context expresses the true statement that Holmes is a detective.

(iii.) a token sentence 'Frankenstein est un detective' is used falsely by Abbot-Costello in one of their movies iff that token sentence with respect to the above context expresses the false statement that Frankenstein is a detective.

In order to be able to assert statements such as (i.)-(iii.), first, we need to examine the general form (F):

(F). a sentence $s$ is used in a context $c$ to express the statement that $s$.

Our ability to solve fictional puzzles, then, will depend on
our ability to express (F) properly. However, before we are able to do this, what we mean by tokens, statements, and contexts must be made clear. We will explain these notions in the next three sub-sections.

8.1. Token and type sentences.

Since we want to argue that the semantical features of an expression such as 'Frankenstein is a monster'; or 'Frankenstein is an amusing character', are the features of the use of token sentences in particular contexts, the distinction between token and type sentences should be made clear. This distinction will be crucial for our later purposes for we also want to say that the token sentence which we mention in our analysis in the form (F) must be of the same type as the actual token sentence which occurs in the actual texts even though they are undoubtedly two different tokens. Yet, the standard view regarding the distinction between types and tokens is far from being conclusive and satisfactory. I will examine various problems concerning the classical distinction between types and tokens, and then an alternative view will be presented.

The inadequacy of the standard-view.

Generally it is accepted that the following two expressions:

(1). detective
and

(2). detective

are two different tokens; nevertheless they are of the same type. (1) and (2) are two different tokens because they are located at two different places, and they are of the same type because they have a similar structure (this claim is to be disputed later on). Whereas if we have,

(3). Holmes

(2) and (3) are two different tokens and two different types.

However, in the standard account what types and tokens are, and what the relation between types and tokens is, have never been made clear. It is simply accepted, for example, that whereas token sentences exist (or may exist), types do not (they are abstract entities), but, many questions are still left unanswered. Such as: is the distinction between tokens and types, the distinction between two entities? Can we talk about type sentences apart from token sentences? Is it type or token sentences which are used to make statements? Do we assign truth-values to token or types sentences? etc.\textsuperscript{15}

Secondly, what counts as a type remains a problem: what are the determining factors such that two different tokens can be said to be of the same type?

The first possible answer is that two different tokens can be said to be of the same type if and only if they have the same structure\textsuperscript{16}. This can be either physical
similarity (orthographic or auditory), or syntactic similarity. Thus,

(1). detective and

(2). detective are two tokens of the same type because they have the same physical structure and/or they have the same syntactic structure. But, if this is correct, then, the following pair of words cannot be of the same type:

(4). detective; DETECTIVE because they have a different physical structure [Probably they are typed by using two different type-writers; the former has small-letters and the latter has capital-letters.] However

(5). detective; detective are two tokens of the same type since they 'sound' similar (cf. Haack's criterion of auditory similarity) even though the former is in English and the latter is in French.

The second possible answer is that two different tokens can be said of the same type if and only if they have the same semantical structure, that is if they have the same meaning. There are two objections to this view, first, if this position is right, then

(6). bark (dog) and

(7). bark (tree)
are two tokens not of the same type. Whereas,

(8). police

and

(9). flat-foot

are tokens of the same type (since (8) and (9) mean the same thing). It becomes unclear whether tokens or types have meanings. Since types do not really exist, then, probably it will be maintained that tokens have meanings. But, if this view is held consistently, then, it must presuppose that the meaning of a word is basically context-independent. That is: in order to be able to say that some tokens are of the same type in virtue of their meanings, meanings must be the features of the tokens. This generates my second objection, for later on I will argue that meanings are not the features of the tokens but rather the features of the use of those tokens in various contexts\textsuperscript{17}.

What may be concluded from our discussions so far is that the standard account of the distinction between token and type sentences is generally quite ignorant to all of the problems I have presented above. As a consequence the above problems have not been addressed properly. For them the distinction seems clear and needs no further explanations. But as I have argued it turns out that the distinction between tokens and type which is taken for granted generates many serious problems. A more critical account of types and tokens, thus, is needed.
The alternative view.

(i.) We will start by discussing the nature of tokens and types and their relations to each other. Let me emphasize that the distinction between tokens and types should not be seen as a distinction between two entities: tokens on one hand and types on the other. My claim is that the distinction between a token and a type is a distinction between an individual and various ways of classifying the features of that individual. We cannot, then, talk about types apart from tokens.

I will use the following analogy to explain more clearly the distinction between type and token sentences (the analogy is from Goddard and Routley (1966), with some adjustments). Suppose I have a Ford car and John also has a Ford. I keep my Ford in my garage and John keeps his in his garage. There are two individual cars: mine and John's, if you don't believe it you may count them and soon you will discover that my Ford differs from John's Ford.

Now, my Ford has certain features: it has a scratch in its bumper; it is blue; and it is used as a taxi. John's Ford also has several features: it has no scratch; it is red; and it is used privately, never as a taxi.

Now, how do we explain that types are simply ways of classifying various features of the individual (i.e., the car Ford) rather than another sort of individual? I can say that the individual in my garage and the
individual in John's garage are of the same type: they are cars (Fords). Obviously to conclude that mine and John's are of the same type, i.e., cars, is to appeal to the various common features of both individuals. E.g., the thing in my garage has the characteristics of what people call 'being a car'; and so does the thing in John's garage. Now, with respect to these characteristics we may say that my car and John's are of the same type. That is: with respect to a particularly given feature of them (i.e., their functions) we can classify them as of the same type. But regarding its colour, they are not of the same type since mine is blue and his is red. Suppose there is a third Ford—a blue Ford—owned by Jack. Regarding the colour of the cars, my Ford and Jack's are of the same type: they are both blue (i.e., blue Fords). However, to say that my car and John's are of the same type (i.e., they are cars), and that mine and Jack's are of the same type as well (i.e., they are blue cars) is not to assert that I have two cars: my car, and my blue car. I still have one car in my garage with many characteristics that can be classified accordingly.

The distinction between token and type sentences is similar to the distinction between a Ford and various possible ways of classifying the features of it. It is thus misleading to speak of token and type sentences as if there are two separate entities. The distinction is,
rather, between a token and various possible ways of classifying the features of that token sentence. Thus,

[t]hat two individual words which have been written by different hands and have markedly different physical characteristics are nevertheless classed as tokens of the same type means that the physical difference which could be used as the basis of different type classifications... or as tokens-features, are evaluated within certain limits of tolerance defined by reference to certain interests. (Goddard-Routley 1966:8. my underlinings)

(ii.) The question remains: what are these features such that two different tokens can be said of the same type? We have suggested that these features can not be physical similarities alone, neither can they be similarities of meaning alone. I claim, then, that among these features are the various possible ways of using that token sentence in a given context to express the same statement. Just as my Ford can be used in various ways (as a taxi or privately), so can a token sentence be used to express various statements. For example, the token sentence:

'There is a bull'

may be used to issue a warning or simply to inform someone that the animal inside that cage is called a bull (e.g., in front of a cage in a zoo). Even though this is a necessary condition, nevertheless it is not a sufficient condition, for there must also be
syntactic similarities. Thus, a token sentence $s_1$ and a token sentence $s_2$ are two tokens of the same type if and only if: (i.) $s_1$ and $s_2$ may be used in a particular context to express the same statement (semantic-similarities); and (ii.) they have a similar syntactic structure.\footnote{18}

Now, it can be concluded that, first, since tokens are the actual physical inscriptions, the same token cannot be used twice (except if that token is cut out and then placed it in some other place; or (arguably) if it is recorded and then played back). Second, only token sentences can be used to make statements. Third, to describe a type as a class of tokens, is to describe that token's various possible uses in various contexts. Thus, fourth, types are what the tokens may exemplify.

What we know so far is that by the sentence $s$ we
mean the token-sentence $s$. Thus (F) will be modified into:

(F). the token-sentence $s$ is used in a context $c$ to express the statement that-$s$.

In the next sub-section I will examine how, in (F), the token sentence $s$ is to be used properly. This will take us to the discussion on the distinction between use and mention. The role of types will appear again after I have introduced how we can mention token sentences properly.

8.2. Use and mention.

The classical account.

Consider the following examples:

(1). Holmes is a detective.

(2). Holmes is a six letter word.

(1) is true since Holmes may be characterised as a detective; here Holmes is used to refer to a man who is the central character in Doyle's stories. However, it is certainly not true that he is a word --let alone a six letter-word. Thus, (2) cannot be true.

However, it is possible that when we say (2) what we actually intend to say is that the word 'Holmes' is a six letter-word, i.e.:

(3). 'Holmes' is a six letter word.

If what we want to assert is about the name 'Holmes', then certainly it is true that the word 'Holmes' (not Mr.
Sherlock Holmes) is a six letter word.

In (1) 'Holmes' is being used, whereas in (3) the name 'Holmes' is being mentioned. Quine has argued that the confusion between use and mention is the confusion between an object and its name -- that is: between the object Sherlock Holmes and its name 'Holmes'. (Cf. Quine 1955:23) Thus, following Quine, quote marks are used when the name of an object is being mentioned, and no quote marks will be used if we talk about the object itself. For example:

(4). Holmes is a 5 ft-tall,
(5). Holmes killed Moriarty,
are about the character in Doyle's stories. And,
(6). 'Holmes' is used 500 times on Doyle's books,
(7). 'Holmes' is a name of Holmes,
are about the name of the character Holmes, and not about the character Holmes himself.

The problems with the classical account.

I will present two instances in which quote marks are usually used:

(a). choose a six letter word: 'Holmes', 'Johnson', 'Hamilton'.

(b). translate 'Le chat est noir'.

We may agree that in both (a) and (b) whatever is quoted is being mentioned and not used. However, there are two major differences between them. First, in (a) we need not read
what is inside the quote, whereas in ($\beta$) to read what is inside the quote is necessary. Thus, I need not know who or what Holmes is, and yet I can understand perfectly well that only 'Holmes' is a six letter-word in ($\alpha$). However, in order for me to translate the sentence 'Le chat est noir' successfully, I need to read inside the quote marks in order to know what that sentence means. If I change the sentence in quote marks to 'Die katze ist schwarz', I will have a different task to perform. But if I change 'Holmes' in ($\alpha$) to 'Watson', I can as well perform the task with no difficulty.

The second difference between ($\alpha$) and ($\beta$) is that what are quoted in ($\alpha$) are names of some items, i.e., Mr Sherlock Holmes; President Johnson; and Gen. Hamilton. Whereas in the latter case what is quoted is not supposed to be a name for anything.

Now, the fact that the same quote marks are used indifferently in two different cases, suggests that there are problems with quote marks. First, the classical quote marks are supposed to be name-forming, but actually not all that we intend to mention is a name, e.g., ($\beta$)-examples. Therefore, Quine's argument that the confusion between use and mention is the confusion between an object and its name does not apply in general. Second, if whatever appears between quote marks is a name, we need not read inside the quote marks. But, there are cases -such as ($\beta$)- in which to read inside the quote marks is necessary.
Another device, thus, need to be used other than the conventional quote marks. This device will be used to indicate that a given sentence is being mentioned and not used; yet it is not a name and therefore it is necessary to read whatever appears between quote marks. This is important if we want to be able to state formula (F) successfully. Such as:

(8). Karen used 'Le chat est noir' to make a statement that the cat is black.

(8) is similar to the (β)-examples for, first, we want to mention the sentence 'Le chat est noir' and not to use it. Second, 'Le chat est noir' is not supposed to be a name for anything. Third, it is important that we read inside the quote marks for if we change what appears between the quote marks in (8) to 'Le monde est rond', then (8) will probably be false since 'Le monde est rond' does not yield the statement that the cat is black. Obviously the conventional quote marks (i.e., Quine's) cannot be used here, since they are appropriate only for cases such as (α).

Instead of using the conventional quote marks I will use Spanish-quotes <--- to handle cases such as (β) and (8). Thus, (β) will be written as:

(8). translate <Le chat est noir>, and (8) as:

(9). Karen used <Le chat est noir> to make a statement that the cat is black.

It should be noted again that what appears between the
Spanish-quotes is a token (word or sentence).

Now, we are a step further in being able to express (F) more properly:

(F). a token sentence <s> is used to express the statement that-§.

---

In dealing with expressions concerning fictional items (or, about fictional items) such as,

(10). Doyle used <Holmes est un détective>, in the French version of Sherlock Holmes, to make the statement that Holmes is a detective,

two cautionary remarks must be made: first, since, as I have stated earlier, the same token sentence cannot be used twice (except if it is removed and placed somewhere else), the token sentence <Holmes est un détective> which occurs in (10) cannot be the same token sentence as that which actually appears in that particular book of Doyle's. Yet, second, we want to assign semantical values to the use of that token sentence which actually occurs in Doyle's book by saying that the token sentence <Holmes est un détective> in (10) is used truly, or falsely, etc. In order to do this we must maintain that even though it must be accepted that the token sentence which occurs in (10) is a different token sentence from the one which
actually occurs in the Doyle's book, nevertheless they are of the same type. It does not mean, however, that we will then assign the semantical values to a type sentence in (10). We cannot assign truth values to a type sentence because a type sentence is just what may be exemplified by a token sentence. What we can do is to assign the semantical features to the use of a token sentence of a type exemplified by <Holmes est un détective>. Thus, (10) will be:

(11). Doyle used a token sentence of a type exemplified by <Holmes est un détective> to make a statement that Holmes is a detective.

And,

(F). a token sentence of a type exemplified by <s> is used in a context \( Q \) to express a statement that \( s \).

What we obtain from formulating (F) in the above way is that: (i.) we remain consistent with the argument that the semantical features are features of the use of token sentences in a context. And (ii.) we also recognize that even though the token sentence which occurs in (F) is not the same token sentence as the one which actually occurs in the actual texts, nevertheless they are of the same type. Therefore, (iii.) it is possible to analyse expressions about fictional items via (F).

8.3. Sentences and statements.

It has been stated that by sentences I mean
token sentences. A statement, then, is what is expressed by a token sentence in a certain context.

The main difference between a sentence and a statement is that whereas a sentence can be used with respect to a certain context to express a statement, a statement is not the sort of thing that can be 'used' with respect to a certain context to express anything. Thus, whereas it is proper to say that a sentence <s> is used truly, or falsely, with respect to a given context c; it is improper to assert that a statement that-<s> is true, or is false if that statement is 'used' truly or falsely with respect to a given context c. This is because a true, or a false, statement is just what is expressed by a token sentence <s> which is used truly, or falsely, in a certain context. To put it differently: to say that a token sentence <s> is used truly, or falsely, is just to say that a token sentence <s> is used in a particular context to express a true, or a false, statement. Thus, the relation between a sentence and its context is what I will call the 'relation of use', whereas the relation between a statement and its context is the 'relation of correspondence'. To say that a sentence is context-sensitive is to say that two different token sentences of the same type may express various statements when it is used with respect to various contexts. Thus, a sentence is context-sensitive in virtue of its relation (i.e., 'relation of use') with its context. A statement is also context-sensitive but for a different
reason. (They have a different kind of context-sensitivity.) To say that a statement is context-sensitive is to say that whether that statement is true or false depends on whether that statement corresponds or fails to correspond to its context. (This will be explained later.) Thus, a statement is context-sensitive in virtue of its relation (i.e., 'relation of correspondence') with its context.

The second difference between a sentence and a statement is: if we have any statement, e.g., that-$q_1$, then the token sentence $<s_1>$ --the token sentence which is used to express the above statement in an appropriate context-- must be used significantly. This is simply because to say that $<s_1>$ is significant with respect to a certain context is just to assert that $<s_1>$ is used successfully to yield a statement that-$q_1$ in that given context. However, if we have any token sentence of a certain type, e.g., $<s_2>$, then it is not necessary that $<s_2>$ is significant, for it is possible that when $<s_2>$ is used in a particular context it fails to yield any statement whatsoever.

On the basis of the above consideration, I will maintain that truth and falsity are not features of the use of any token sentence, but rather they are features of the use of a token sentence which successfully yields a statement in a given context. For a token sentence which fails to yield a statement when it is used in a given context, is neither true nor false. It should be noted that
whether a token sentence will successfully yield a statement or not depends entirely on the context in which that token sentence is used. Thus, whether a token sentence is significant or not depends on the context.

Since a token sentence which is used successfully to yield a certain statement in a given context is always a significant sentence, then truth and falsity are features of a significant sentence. Now, if truth and falsity are features of significant sentences, and if significant sentences always express statements; then, to say that a significant sentence is used truly or falsely is just to say that that significant sentence is used to make a true or a false statement. This view is supported by Goddard-Routley:

"It is however appropriate to describe some token sentences, namely those which are used to make statements in a specified context, as true or false. For if a token sentence, which is a unique individual, is used to make a true statement in a particular occasion, we may say that it was used truly. We may then transfer this description of the use to the vehicle used. For since the token is unique and the context of its utterance is specified, to say that it is true is simply an abbreviated way of saying that it was used truly, i.e., to make a true statement, on that occasion. (Goddard-Routley 1973:27)"

I will discuss this problem in more detail later on after the notion of a context has been explained.

To distinguish between sentences and statements, I will use square-brackets for statements. Thus, if s is any
sentence, \(<s>\) is the mentioning of that sentence, then, \([s]\) is the statement which is expressed by \(<s>\) in a context. Usually \([s]\) can be read: that-\(~s\). So:

(12). Doyle used a token sentence of a type exemplified by \(<\text{Holmes est un détective}>\) to express \([\text{Holmes is a detective}]\).

And,

(F). a token sentence of a type exemplified by \(<s>\) is used in a context \(g\) to express the statement \([s]\).

Now, we are left with the problem of what we mean by a context. In the next section I will discuss this notion. Only after we have made clear what we mean by a context, can we proceed with the claim made earlier that the semantical features of an expression are the features of the use of token sentences which successfully yield statements in a given context.

8.4. Contexts.

It should be noted once again that a true or a false statement is just what is expressed by a token sentence which is used truly or falsely in a given context (cf. Goddard-Routley 1973:27; and also see note #20). In terms of the use of a token sentence which successfully yields a statement in a given context, then, it is easily argued that the truth and falsity of the use of that token sentence is context-dependent. A token sentence is used truly or falsely always with respect to a particular given context. For example, even though a token sentence \(<\text{Mary}
is happy> can be used truly when 'Mary' is used to talk about Jack's wife, it does not mean that the same type sentence can be used truly as well when 'Mary' is used to talk about other things, e.g., to name my cow which does not look happy at all. The example suggests that on one occasion a token sentence of a certain type may be used truly (that is to express a true statement), but in another occasion the same type sentence (of a different token, of course) may be used falsely (that is to express a false statement). It shows, thus, that the truth and falsity of the use of a token sentence of a certain type which successfully expresses a statement is indeed context-dependent (that is it depends on a certain occasion). We are still in the dark though since what I mean by a context has not been made clear. We will discuss this shortly.

Since contexts will determine what kind of statements will be expressed by a certain token sentence, then we must be able to make a distinction between two different statements which are expressed by two different token sentences of the same type in two different contexts. Thus, if I use the token sentence <Churchill was a cabinet minister>, and I talk about the history of England, then the token sentence <Churchill was a cabinet minister> with respect to the history of England will express the statement [Winston S. Churchill was a cabinet minister].
But if in uttering the same type sentence, I am talking about my neighbour Bob Churchill, then the token sentence <Churchill was a cabinet minister> with respect to a certain facts about my neighbour, will express the statement [Bob Churchill was a cabinet minister], which apparently is a false statement. Thus, we may distinguish one statement from another in virtue of the context in which that statement is expressed by a certain token sentence.

My argument is based on a version of Tarski's Convention (T): a statement is true iff there is a fact which corresponds to it, and false otherwise. Secondly, I will also argue that a context is just a set of (non-linguistic) facts (or states of affairs). Thus, finally my position will take the following form:

(T). <s> is used in a context (c) to yield [s], and [s] is true iff it corresponds to (c).

8.4.1. How contexts should be understood.

Firstly, it should be acknowledged that there are difficulties in any attempt to provide a recursive definition of a context. This is because a context can be anything: what can be regarded as a context may vary from one situation to another, and from one interest to another. Once an adequately precise definition of a context (if there is
any such thing) has been given, there will always be a way to create another context which is not included within that definition.

Another reason for being sceptical about providing a rigorous definition of a context is that, as is generally accepted, there are no general properties such that whatever can be regarded as a context must have them. Thus, context is boundless in two senses. First, any given context is open to further descriptions. There is no limit in principle to what might be included in a given context, to what might be shown to be relevant to the performance of a particular speech act. ... Context is also unmasterable in a second sense: any attempt to codify context can always be grafted [(transplanted)] onto the context it sought to describe, yielding a new context which escapes the previous formulation. (J. Culler 1982:123-4)

The explanation of the notion of a context to be given shortly is not meant to be a recursive definition. The reason will be made clearer later.

Secondly, there is a need to distinguish at least between a set of fictional matters and a set of factual matters. The adequacy of any theory about fictional objects (that is any theory which is concerned with fictional objects) depends entirely on its ability to draw the line between fictional and factual matters. A theory about fictional objects must be able to state with
clarity that a certain assertion holds in a fictional and not a factual context, and vice versa. Otherwise confusions will result.

The notion of a context will next be explained in terms of facts, or states of affairs.

A context is to be understood as a set of facts or states of affairs. That is, it is a set of non-linguistic entities since obviously 'facts' are not linguistic items. Goddard-Routley gives the following example:

For example, the specification of a context for a particular utterance may take the following form: The time is 4 p.m. on Wednesday 17 January 1968. The place is the public bar of the Cross Keys Hotel, St Andrews. The speaker is Joe Bloggs. The name 'Bill' in the sentence he just uttered was used to refer to Bill Todd; etc. (Goddard-Routley 1973:49)

I will use the term 'facts' to mean anything that is the case in this actual world. That Churchill was once the prime minister of Britain, or that Churchill was the man whose son's name is Randolph Churchill, for instance, are facts. The term 'fictional states of affairs' will be used to mean anything that is the case according to a certain author in a certain story. It simply means anything that is the case in -say- Doyle's novels, or Hardy's stories. That Holmes is a detective, or that Jude died in misery
are fictional states of affairs since it is the case that, according to Doyle's novel, Holmes is indeed a detective, and that according to one of Hardy's stories Jude did indeed die in misery. That Holmes was a crook in Doyle's novels, however, is not a fictional state of affairs since it is not the case that in Doyle's novels Holmes is a crook.

One major difference between a fact and a fictional state of affairs (and this marks the demarcation between the fictional and the factual worlds) is that whereas if a fact is true, then it is true everywhere (in this actual world of course), if a fictional state of affairs is true according to one author in one story, it may not necessarily be true according to a different author in a different story. Thus a fictional state of affairs is anything that is the case in the fictional world of a certain author.

The main point that I am defending here is that neither facts nor fictional states of affairs are linguistic items at all. The fact that Churchill was once a prime minister, or that he was once a cabinet minister, are not linguistic items at all -- they are facts. Likewise, that Holmes is a detective, or that Holmes' best friend is Watson, in Doyle's novels, are not linguistic items at all. They are what is the case in a fictional world: fictional states of affairs.

A set of facts will be called a factual context and
a set of fictional states of affairs will be called a fictional context.

Of course it is inevitable that, in explaining and discussing the nature of facts or fictional states of affairs we must represent them by means of language (via sentences which describe facts or fictional states of affairs). But that does not mean that contexts themselves are nothing but linguistic items. It is important to emphasize that facts and fictional states of affairs can not be linguistic items if my version of Tarski's Convention (T) is to be maintained. For, firstly, I hold that what can be true or false are only linguistic items, i.e., statements. Facts and fictional states of affairs cannot therefore be true or false since they are not linguistic items. And secondly, I also hold that whether a statement is true or false depends upon what is the case. Obviously whatever is the case cannot be a linguistic item as well.

Now, I need to explain the distinction between unactualized and actualized (factual or fictional) contexts. There are many facts and there are many fictional states of affairs. But not all of those facts and not all of those fictional states of affairs will be regarded as contexts. Relative to certain interests, only some of the totality of all that is the case (facts or fictional states of affairs) will be regarded as a context. Since contexts are understood as sets of facts or
fictional states of affairs, then contexts are various possible ways of forming sets out of that totality of everything that is the case. To be regarded as a (actualized) context, a set of facts or a set of fictional states of affairs must fulfill the following two conditions: it must be relevant to and it must be sufficient in determining the truth value of a particularly given statement. What will be regarded as relevant and sufficient conditions will be relative to the interests of the speaker.

Sets of facts or fictional states of affairs which are not relevant and sufficient in determining the truth value of a given statement are nevertheless potential contexts. That is to say that they can be regarded as contexts if a different statement is given. These sets of facts or fictional states of affairs which are potential contexts are called: the unactualized contexts (for they may be actualized if we have a different sentence).

Given a particular statement, a set of facts or fictional states of affairs which is relevant and sufficient in determining the truth value of that statement, is called the actualized context (it may be left unactualized if we have a different statement).

In order to distinguish between statements
and facts, or fictional states of affairs (non-linguistic items), in mentioning facts, or fictional states of affairs I will use capital letters, and they will be bold-faced and underlined. Thus, \([s]\) is a statement, and \(S\) is a fact or a fictional state of affairs.

It is usually accepted that a statement \([s]\) is true if and only if there is a fact, or a fictional state of affairs which corresponds to it, and that it is false if there is no fact, or if there is no fictional state of affairs which corresponds to it. I will take this line of argument. Thus, for example, the statement \([\text{Churchill was once a cabinet minister}]\) is true iff in fact Churchill was once a cabinet minister, and false otherwise. Thus, we will have a version of Tarski's Convention (T):

\[(T). \ [s] \text{ is true iff } S.\]

And,

\([\text{Churchill was once a cabinet minister}]\) is true iff \(\text{CHURCHILL WAS A CABINET MINISTER.}\)

8.4.2. Factual Contexts.

There are many facts in the actual world, for example:

- a. \(\text{WINSTON S. CHURCHILL WAS THE PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN.}\)
- b. \(\text{WINSTON S. CHURCHILL WAS A CABINET MINISTER.}\)
- c. \(\text{REAGAN WAS A MOVIE ACTOR.}\)
- d. \(\text{REAGAN IS THE PRESIDENT OF U.S.}\)
- e. \(\text{BOB CHURCHILL, MY NEIGHBOUR, IS A FARMER.}\)
- f. \(\text{BOB CHURCHILL, MY NEIGHBOUR, ISN'T A CABINET MINISTER.}\)

There are also various possible ways of forming a set out of
those six facts. Thus, according to set theory from (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) there are 6³ possible sets that can be formed (given that there won't be any null-context), i.e., {a}, {b}, {c}, {d}, {a,b}, {a,c}, {a,d}... etc. Since a context is understood as a way of forming a set, then there are 6³ possible contexts -that is: there are 6³ unactualized-contexts. (Here we only assume that there are 6 facts). But what we are interested in is not just any set of descriptions, but rather we are interested in a set of descriptions which is relevant and sufficient in determining the truth and falsity of a given statement.

Now, to say that I use the token sentence <Churchill was a cabinet minister> in a certain context to express the statement [Churchill was a cabinet minister], is just to say that I use the token sentence <Churchill was a cabinet minister> with respect to a certain set of facts to express the statement [Churchill was a cabinet minister]. Let's assume two possible contexts that may be taken. If I take as a context a set of facts {a,b}, then I will use the token sentence <Churchill was a cabinet minister> with respect to {a,b} to express a statement [Winston S. Churchill was a cabinet minister]. We may say that the statement [Winston S. Churchill was a cabinet minister] is a true statement because it corresponds to the set of facts that is assumed, i.e., it corresponds to {a,b}.
But if I take as a context a set of facts \( \{e,f\} \), then I will use the token sentence "Churchill was a cabinet minister" with respect to \( \{e,f\} \) to express a statement \([\text{Bob Churchill was a cabinet minister}]\). We may say, then, that the statement \([\text{Bob Churchill was a cabinet minister}]\) is a false statement because the statement \([\text{Bob Churchill was a cabinet minister}]\) does not correspond to the set of facts \( \{e,f\} \). That is: according to that set of facts, my neighbour isn't a cabinet minister.

Two things may be stated: firstly, whether I regard the set of facts \( \{a,b\} \) as the actualized context or regard the set of facts \( \{e,f\} \) as the actualized context, depends entirely on my interest at the moment. If I intend to talk about English history, for example, then I may choose \( \{a,b\} \) as a context. But if I intend to talk about my neighbour, then I may pick up \( \{e,f\} \) instead. (This is the reason why the explanation of the nature of a context is not meant to be a recursive definition of a context since almost anything can be regarded as a context).

Secondly, in the above example the first context, i.e., the set of facts \( \{a,b\} \) can be regarded as an actualized context because it is relevant and sufficient in determining the truth value of the use of the token sentence "Churchill was a cabinet minister" which successfully yields a certain statement. But if we have a statement \([\text{Churchill lost the election}]\), then the first context, even
though it is relevant, will not be sufficient since more facts are needed than \{a, b\}. Whereas if we take as a context a set of facts \{c, d\}, then this context will neither be relevant nor sufficient in determining the truth value of the above statement. Thus the context \{c, d\} will remain unactualized. But it is possible, that if I have a statement [Reagan is the president of US], then the set of facts \{c, d\} will be regarded as a context because it is relevant and sufficient in determining the truth or falsity of the given statement.

8.4.3. Fictional Contexts.

One of the most distinctive characteristics of the factual context is that it is a set of facts about actual items (existent items). What these actual items are need not be explained here since they have already been discussed in Chapter One. Thus, the most distinctive characteristic of the fictional context is that it is a set of fictional states of affairs. Again what we mean by fictional items has already been discussed in the previous chapter.

Thus, the statement \[s\] is true iff there is a fictional state of affairs to which that statement corresponds, and it is false otherwise. However, unlike factual contexts, fictional contexts are basically incomplete. This is because there are many 'states of
affairs' which are not determined and stated by the author. Thus if in factual contexts a statement can be either true or false (true iff there is a fact corresponding to it, and false iff there is no fact corresponding to it), in the fictional contexts a statement is not always either true or false. Here, falsity must be distinguished from incompleteness. We may, of course, treat incompleteness in terms of falsity, and then retain the two value system. This strategy, however, is undesirable for it seems to me that there is a legitimate distinction between -say- [Holmes is not a detective] and [Holmes has moles on his back]. Whereas we can easily assign the value false to the former, the latter cannot simply be regarded as false. The point is that we don't know whether Holmes has or does not have moles on his back. That particular case is just not determined by the author. Thus, if there is a legitimate distinction to be made between the above two statements, then there must also be a legitimate distinction between falsity and incompleteness.

Therefore, within fictional contexts, it will not be appropriate to define falsity in terms of the absence of fictional states of affairs since incompleteness is also the absence of fictional states of affairs. Falsity, then, will be understood as the denial of whatever is the case; and incompleteness will be regarded as neither the
denial nor the affirmation of any fictional state of affairs since there are no such fictional states of affairs. So, for example, [Holmes is not a detective] is a false statement because it denies the fictional state of affairs \textit{HOLMES IS A DETECTIVE}. And [Holmes has moles on his back] is incomplete because neither \textit{HOLMES HAS MOLES ON HIS BACK} nor \textit{HOLMES DOESN'T HAVE MOLES ON HIS BACK} is determined (i.e., they are not fictional states of affair).

Let's take the following examples. There are many fictional states of affairs, e.g.:

(a). \textit{HOLMES IS A DETECTIVE}. (in Doyle's novels)
(b). \textit{HOLMES'S FRIEND IS WATSON}. (in Doyle's novels)
(c). \textit{JUDE LIVES IN LONDON}. (in Hardy's novels)
(d). \textit{JUDE DIED}. (in Hardy's novels)

Given that there are only 4 fictional states of affairs, according to the set theory there are 15 possible sets that can be formed from them (again, given that there won't be any null-context), i.e., \{a\}, \{b\}, \{c\}, \{d\}, \{a,b\},... etc. In terms of the theory of contexts this means that there are 15 possible contexts, or 15 unactualized contexts. We are not, however, interested in just any set of fictional states of affairs; rather we are interested only in those which are relevant and sufficient in determining the truth or falsity of a particular given statement. Those which fulfill the above conditions will be regarded as our actualized context; this is the context that we are interested in.
Thus, for example, to say that I use the token sentence <Holmes est un détective> to talk about Doyle’s Holmes and to yield the statement [Holmes is a detective], is to assert that I use the token sentence <Holmes est un détective> with respect to a certain set of fictional states of affairs to yield the statement [Holmes is a detective]; such that this set of fictional states of affairs is both relevant and sufficient in determining the truth or falsity of the above statement in that context. Three possible contexts may be taken. Firstly, if we take as our actualized context the set of fictional states of affairs \{a,b\}, then I will use the token sentence <Holmes est un détective> with respect to \{a,b\} to yield the statement [Holmes -in Doyle’s novels- is a detective]. We may then assert that the statement [Holmes -in Doyle’s novels- is a detective] is a true statement because [Holmes -in Doyle’s novels- is a detective] conforms to \{a,b\}. In this case \{a,b\} is both relevant and sufficient in determining the truth or falsity of the above statement.

But if I use the token sentence <Holmes killed Watson> to talk about Doyle’s Holmes to express the statement [Holmes -in Doyle’s novels- killed Watson], our set of fictional states of affairs \{a,b\} may not be sufficient (even though probably it is relevant) in determining the truth and the falsity of the statement [Holmes -in Doyle’s novels- killed Watson]. Obviously
more fictional states of affairs are needed other than \{a, b\}.

Thirdly, if we take as our context the set of fictional states of affairs \{c, d\}, then this set of fictional states of affairs will neither be relevant nor sufficient in determining the truth or falsity of the above statement.

At this stage we may conclude that whichever set of fictional states of affairs intended to be regarded as the actualized context is very much relative to our interest at that moment. Thus, to say that I intend to use a particular token sentence to express a particular statement is just to say that in using that particular token sentence and in making that particular statement I choose a certain set of fictional states of affairs which is relevant and sufficient in determining the truth or the falsity of my intended statement. For example, to say that I intend to use a token sentence "Holmes est un détective" to mean [Holmes is a detective], is just to say that I choose an appropriate set of fictional states of affairs (among many other sets of fictional states of affairs) which will help me in determining the truth value of my statement.

8.4.4. Rules for fictional and factual contexts.

RULE 1: FICTIONAL-FACTUAL CONTEXTS.

(a). In a given argument all of its premises and
conclusion must be considered with respect to the same context: either all of them are in the same factual context, or all of them are in the same fictional context.

(β). We may not create a context such that one of its members is a fictional context and the other is a factual context.

Since a factual context has already been understood as a set of facts which is relevant and sufficient in determining the truth and falsity of a statement, and a fictional context has already been understood as a set of fictional states of affairs which is relevant and sufficient in determining the truth or falsity of a statement, then there cannot be any confusion between factual on one hand and fictional contexts on the other. This is because matters of fact are not matters of fictional states of affairs, and matters of fictional states of affairs are not matters of fact. Thus, we may set down the following rule: if we have an argument then all of its premises and conclusion must be in the same fictional context, or in the same factual context.

For example, if we have a statement [Holmes lived in 221B Baker St, and it is not a Brewery], and if we have statement [221B Baker St is a Brewery], then we may not conclude [Holmes lived in a Brewery] since, whereas the first premise and the conclusion are matters of fiction (that is: they are true or false with respect to a set of fictional states of affairs), the second premise is a factual matter (that is: it
is true or false with respect to a set of facts).

This rule also applies in the case of implication, thus: we may conclude that \([a]\) implies \([b]\) only if \([a]\) and \([b]\) are in the same factual, or fictional contexts.

This does not mean, however, that we may not have mixed characters within one context. Thus, fictional characters may be involved in a factual context (e.g., Churchill worshipped Holmes), and factual characters may also be involved in a fictional context (e.g., Holmes met Wittgenstein and Russell -- in Collins' book). But, this does not mean that there are mixed contexts: factual and fictional. Thus, fictional characters and factual characters may overlap, but fictional contexts and factual contexts may not overlap. Thus, we may not have a set which has facts and fictional states of affairs as its members. The reason is because fictional matters exclude factual matters, and vice versa.

RULE 2: MIXED FICTIONAL CONTEXTS, AND MIXED FACTUAL CONTEXTS

One fictional context may be combined with another fictional context to make a new fictional context. Likewise, one factual context may be combined with another factual context to make a new factual context.

A mixed factual-fictional context must be distinguished from a mixed fictional context or a mixed factual context. The former is not permissible, but the latter is permissible. This is easily understood if we
remember that a factual context is just a set of facts, thus to say that we may mix one factual context with another (factual context) is just to assert that we may combine some facts into one set such that a given statement is true or false with respect to it. Also, since a fictional context is just a set of fictional states of affairs, then to say that we may have a mixed fictional context is just to assert that we may combine several fictional states of affairs to form a set such that a given statement will be true or false with respect to it.

However, concerning fictional contexts, Rule 2(6) needs to be restricted since certainly not any mixed fictional context is acceptable. We do not want, for instance, to have Doyle's *The Naval Treaty* and JRR Tolkien's *The Lord of The Rings* to become one context for obviously they have nothing in common with each other. But on the other hand we do also want to be able to maintain that all of Doyle's novels about Sherlock Holmes may be combined together to create a new (and larger) context.

The following restriction on Rule 2(6) will allow two (or more) different fictional contexts to be combined and to create a new context.

(∈). Two (or more) different fictional contexts may be mixed to create a new context if, and only if, either: those fictional contexts are created (written or spoken) by the same author, and that they are intended by that author to be a series. Or, else:

(Γ). if those fictional contexts are not created by the same author, then at least they are meant to be a series by one or both of the authors.
Here by a 'series' it is meant:

(1.) the story is continued in the next episode (book, film, story, etc) with possibly a different title. Or, a story which is the continuation of the previous story (with possibly a different title).

For example Dallas Episode-I may be combined with Dallas Episode-II to create a new context since Dallas Episode-II is the continuation of Dallas Episode-I (even though probably it has a different title).

(2.) Character(s)-consistency, that is: the author usually intends to keep the character(s) in one of his stories consistent with (the same) character in another story (of his).

For example Doyle's The Naval Treaty may be combined with other Doyle's novels about Sherlock Holmes to create a new context: 'The Adventure of Sherlock Holmes', because clearly the author tries to keep his main characters (Holmes, Watson, Moriarty) consistent in all of his novels. Thus, for instance, if in The Naval Treaty the author states that Holmes is a detective and Watson is his friend, then in the next novel (e.g., The Return of Holmes) the author will try to be consistent with what he has said previously. That is: in The Return of Holmes Holmes is a detective and Watson is his friend. If, for some reasons, there is a change of characters (e.g., that Holmes is no longer a detective), then the author will try to explain in such a way that it will remain consistent with what he has stated previously.

(3.) Narratives-consistency, that is: the author usually intends to be consistent with his narratives.

Thus, if two fictional contexts are to be combined, then
those two fictional contexts must have some consistencies. If it is stated in the first fictional context that \(-p\), then in the second context it must be recognized that in the first context he/she already has said that \(-p\). Doyle's *The Final Problem* and *The Return of S.Holmes* can be taken as an example. Those two stories may be combined together to create a new context because in *The Return of S.Holmes* there is an attempt on the part of the author to keep consistent with what has happened in *The Final Problem*.

Thus, Rule 2(\(\varepsilon\)) will allow us to combine all of Doyle's works on Holmes and create a new context: 'The Adventure of S.Holmes'. Rule 2(\(\Gamma\)) allows us to combine David Day's book *A Tolkien Bestiary* with JRR Tolkien's novels since Day's novel is meant to be the continuation of Tolkien's *The History of Middle-Earth*.

However, concerning factual contexts, we do not encounter the same problems as those that we have with the fictional contexts. This is because every factual context is a consistent context. Since all the characters are factual, therefore, they are also consistent items. Two (or more) factual contexts, then, may be combined to create a new context with no restriction. As a matter of fact it is quite common that two factual contexts overlap with each other. For example, the history of England may very well be overlaped with the history of France.

The following notations will be used henceforth:
Factual contexts: \((ca1), (ca2), (ca3), \ldots\)
Fictional contexts: \((c\beta1), (c\beta2), (c\beta3), \ldots\)

The subscripts will be used to distinguish between one fictional context (or, one factual context) and another fictional context (or, another factual context).

\(Y\) will be read '(a sentence) yields (a statement)'

For example: \(<s1>(ca1) Y [s]\), will be read 'a sentence \(<s1>\) is used with respect to a factual context \((ca1)\) to yield a statement \([s]\)'.

8.4.5. Conclusions:

(i.) In general a context is a set of facts (a factual context), or a set of fictional states of affairs (a fictional context).

(ii.) In particular a factual context is a set of facts which is both relevant and sufficient in determining the truth or falsity of a given statement. Likewise, a fictional context is a set of fictional states of affairs which is both relevant and sufficient in determining the truth or falsity of a given statement.

(iii.) \(<s>\) is used truly with respect to a context \((c)\) iff \(<s>\) with respect to \((c)\) yields a true statement \([s]\).

(iv.) And, a statement \([s]\) is true in a given context iff it corresponds to a certain set of facts. Or, a statement \([s]\) is true in a given context iff it conforms to a certain set of fictional states of affairs. Thus, \([s]\) is true iff it corresponds/conforms to \((c)\).

[9]. Resolving some of the problems.

The main difference between the Theory of Contexts
I proposed in the previous section, and Routley-Goddard's views (both in Routley 1979a and in Goddard-Routley 1973) is that the assumption of truth values to statements (both about fictional and factual matters) in the Theory of Contexts is very much context-dependent; whereas in Goddard-Routley's views this is not the case. This will become apparent in the last part of this section.

My main argument in this section is the following: first, depending on the context, two token sentences of the same type may express various different statements. Second, if a token sentence $<s_1>$ is used in a certain context to yield a true statement $[s_1]$, it does not mean that $<s_1>$ will necessarily yield a true statement in a different context. Third, if $<s_1>$ is used to yield a true statement in a particular context, and if $<s_1>$ is used to express a true statement but in a different context, then it does not mean that the true statement which is expressed by the token sentence $<s_1>$ with respect to the former context, is equivalent to the true statement which is expressed by the token sentence $<s_1>$ with respect to the latter context.

9.1. The problem of multiple versions.

This is the problem between:

(1). 'Fr. is a frightening monster'
which is true in the context of Shelley's novel. And

(2). 'Fr. is an amusing monster'
which is true in another context namely Abbot-Costello's.
We have agreed that this is not to be resolved by fictional entity multiplication. The above problem is the problem of the multiplication of versions. The elliptical theory which is based on translating fictional sentence $S$ in English language into sentence $O(s)$ also has to be abandoned since the $s$-$O(s)$ distinction is unnecessary. As I have indicated in section [4], contextual theory will capture this problem better since ambiguity can be avoided once the context is determined and specified.

In order to analyse (1) and (2), they need to be translated into our formula (F). Thus,

(1). a token sentence of a type exemplified by

<$\text{Frankenstein is a frightening monster}$> is used with respect to a fictional context $(C_1)$ to yield

$[\text{Frankenstein is a frightening monster}]$.

and

(2). a token sentence of a type exemplified by

<$\text{Frankenstein is an amusing monster}$> is used with respect to a fictional context $(C_2)$ to yield

$[\text{Frankenstein is an amusing character; he is not frightening}]$

with $(C_1)$ and $(C_2)$ for Shelley's story and Abbot-Costello's film respectively.

There is no inconsistency involved between (1) and (2) since they are in two different fictional contexts. Inconsistency arises only if from (1) and (2) we conclude:

(3). token sentences of types exemplified by
<Frankenstein is a frightening monster> which is used in (c_p1) and <Frankenstein is an amusing monster> which is used in (c_p2); are together used to yield [Frankenstein is both amusing and frightening].

We may formulate (3) into an argument in order to see that (3) is not permissible under Rule 1 above:

where <s_1> stands for <Fr. is a frightening monster>;
<s_2> stands for <Fr. is an amusing monster>;
[s_1] stands for [Fr. in Shelley's novel is a frightening monster];
[s_2] stands for [Fr. in Abott-Costello's movie is an amusing monster].

(3a). If, <s_1>(c_p1) Y [s_1], and if <s_2>(c_p2) Y [s_2];
then <s_1>(c_p1) & <s_2>(c_p2) Y [s_1 & s_2].

Since truth and falsity are the features of the use of token sentences in various contexts, then, if a particular token sentence is used truly, or falsely, in one context, it may not necessarily be used truly, or falsely, in another context. Thus, if in (c_p1) the token sentence <Frankenstein is a frightening monster> yields a true statement, it does not necessarily mean that it will also yield a true statement in (c_p2).

This can be made clearer by using my version of Tarski's Convention (T):

(1). [Fr. is a frightening monster] is true iff that statement conforms to the set of fictional states of affairs of Shelley's stories.

And,

(2). [Fr. is an amusing character] is true iff that statement conforms to the set of fictional states of affairs of Abbott-Costello's film.

In (1) [Fr is a frightening monster] is a true statement
because it conforms to Shelley's stories; whereas in (2) 
[Fr. is an amusing character] is a true statement because it 
conforms to Abbott-Costello's film. If the token sentence 
<Fr. is a frightening monster> is used with respect to (cβ2) 
to express the statement [Fr. is a frightening monster], 
then the statement [Fr. is a frightening monster] will be a 
false statement because it denies what is the case in 
Abbott-Costello's film. Similarly, if the token sentence 
<Fr. is an amusing character> is used with respect to (cρ1) 
to yield the statement [Fr. is an amusing character]; then 
the statement [Fr. is an amusing character] will be a false 
statement because it denies what is the case in Shelley's 
story. It is obvious, then, that the statement [Fr. is an 
amusing character] is not inconsistent with the statement 
[Fr. is a frightening monster] since they are true or false 
in two different sets of fictional states of affairs.

More importantly, the combination of two different 
contexts as in (3) is prohibited by Rule 2(ε)(Γ). Abbot-
Costello's version of Frankenstein obviously is not meant to 
be the continuation of Shelley's story about Frankenstein. 
In the movie Abbot-Costello meet Frankenstein the character 
Frankenstein is -so to speak- 'borrowed' by Abbot and 
Costello. Therefore, Abbot and Costello are not obligated to 
keep the character Frankenstein necessarily consistent with 
Shelley's Frankenstein.

9.2. The problem of mixed modes of being.
This is a perplexity between:

(4). 'Holmes had tea with Gladstone'

and our hesitation to accept that

(41). 'Gladstone had tea with Holmes'

for how can an actual entity have tea with a fictional object? Both Parsons' and Woods' theories have been shown to be unsatisfactory in dealing with the relation between fictional and actual items. Using contextual theory, however, the problem can be clarified.

(41) can be analysed in two ways:

(41a). a token sentence of a type exemplified by
<Gladstone had tea with Holmes> is used with respect to a factual context (ca) to yield [Gladstone did have tea with the fictional character Holmes].

or:

(41b). a token sentence of a type exemplified by
<Gladstone had tea with Holmes> is used with respect to a fictional context (cp3) to yield [Gladstone did have tea with the fictional character Holmes].

with (ca) for -say- the history of England; and (cp3) for one of Doyle's novels.

(41a). The statement [Gladstone, as a matter of fact, did have tea with Holmes] is a false statement since the statement [Gladstone, as a matter of fact, did have tea with Holmes] does not conform to the set of facts (of -say- the history of England).

(41b). The statement [Gladstone, in a fic.story, did have tea with Holmes] is a true statement because it
conforms to the set of fictional states of affairs of Doyle’s stories.

(4) may also be analysed in two ways:

(4a). a token sentence of a type exemplified by <Holmes had tea with Gladstone> is used in a factual context (ca) to yield [Holmes had tea with Gladstone].

or,

(4b). a token sentence of a type exemplified by <Holmes had tea with Gladstone> is used in a fictional context (cpa) to yield [Holmes had tea with Gladstone].

(4a). The statement [Holmes, as a matter of fact, had tea with Gladstone] is a false statement because it fails to correspond to the set of facts.

(4b). The statement [Holmes, in a fic.story, had tea with Gladstone] is a true statement because it conforms to the set of fictional states of affairs of Doyle’s stories.

Two things need to be said. First, hesitation should not arise here regarding the fact that the fictional object Holmes relates to the factual object Gladstone, since in the fictional world (cp) if Holmes could relate to Watson, why can not he relate as well to Gladstone? The freedom of assumption thesis [FA] tells us that this is possible. Second, does (4) imply (41) and (41) imply (4)? The answer to this question can be given only after the contexts of (4) and of (41) are known. Since we know that (41a) and (4a) are in the factual context; and since (41b) and (4b) are in the fictional context, we may
say then that the statement [Holmes, as a matter of fact, had tea with Gladstone] implies the statement that [Gladstone, as a matter of fact, had tea with Holmes] and vice-versa; likewise the statement that [Holmes, in a fic. story, had tea with Gladstone] implies the statement that [Gladstone, in a fic. story, had tea with Holmes] and vice-versa. But certainly, neither the statement that [Holmes, in a fic. story, had tea with Gladstone] can be said to imply the statement that [Gladstone, as a matter of fact, had tea with Holmes] nor the statement that [Gladstone, as a matter of fact, had tea with Holmes] can be said to imply the statement that [Holmes, in a fic. story, had tea with Gladstone]; and neither the statement that [Holmes, as a matter of fact, had tea with Gladstone] can be said to imply the statement that [Gladstone, in a fic. story, had tea with Holmes] nor the statement that [Gladstone, in a fic. story, had tea with Holmes] can be said to imply the statement that [Holmes, as a matter of fact, had tea with Gladstone]. The explanation can easily be given by RULE 1(a).

9.3. Relational Puzzle.

This is a problem between statements:

(5). [Holmes blew up London], which implies that

(5a). [London was blown up by Holmes], and factual statement that

(6). [London was not blown up by Holmes].
It would be a mistake to conclude that this puzzle shows that there is something wrong with nonentities. (Routley, 1979a:577) By using contextual theory the above problem can be clarified; (5a) does not contradict (6) since they involve two different contexts. The source of confusion is the failure to distinguish between a fictional context on one hand, and a factual context on the other. First we may analyse (5) and (5a) in the following way:

(5). a token sentence of a type exemplified by <Holmes blew up London> is used in a fictional context (cψ3) to yield [Holmes blew up London].

and,

(5a). a token sentence of a type exemplified by <London was blown up by Holmes> is used in a fictional context (cψ3) to yield [London was destroyed by Holmes].

By RULE 1(α) we are justified in saying that the statement [Holmes blew up London] implies the statement [London was destroyed by Holmes]. The question is whether the statement [London was destroyed by Holmes] contradicts the statement [London was not destroyed by Holmes] in (6). Since (6) is a factual matter, i.e.:

(6). a token sentence of a type exemplified by <London was not blown up by Holmes> is used in a factual context to yield [the city of London was not destroyed by Holmes].

and since (5a) is a fictional matter, then we cannot say that what is stated in (5a) contradicts what is stated in (6). To say that what is stated in (5a) contradicts what is
stated in (6) is to confuse a fictional matter with a factual matter in one argument. This is not allowed by RULE 1(α).

However we may also analyse (5) and (5a) as follows:

(5). a token sentence of a type exemplified by <Holmes blew up London> is used in a factual context (c<3>) to yield [Holmes blew up London].

and,

(5a). a token sentence of a type exemplified by <London was blown up by Holmes> is used in a factual context (c<3>) to yield [London was destroyed by Holmes].

The statement [Holmes blew up London] implies the statement [London was destroyed by Holmes]. And since the statements in (5a) and in (6) are in the same factual contexts, then, by RULE 1(α), the statement in (5a) does contradict the statement in (6). This is to say that [London was destroyed by Holmes] and [London was not destroyed by Holmes] both correspond to the set of facts of —say— the history of London.

9.4. Fictional paradox.

(7). (A)a Aeneus defended Troy, a high and windy city.
(8). a=b Troy is a low and airless village in Asia Minor.
(9). (A)b Aeneus defended Troy, a low and airless village.
(10). but ~(A)b, since (A)a.

Routley’s solution is based on the argument that the above paradox involves a confusion between intensional/extensional statements. He argues that
(9) is illegitimate \(\text{from} (7) \) and (8) since (7) is an intensional statement, and (8) is an extensional statement - thus (9) is "intersubstituting extensional identicals \( [(8)] \) in intensional places\([(7)]\)." (Routley, 1979a:588)

However, this intensional/extensional distinction in his theory of fictional objects is strikingly similar to Frege's secondary reference that has been refuted by Routley himself. Routley argued that Frege's notion of sense is an "emergency reference" which is needed in case Frege has to deal with nonreferential statements (c.f., 1979a:64) Frege's notion of sense is "simply providing an auxiliary reference for oblique contexts." (1979a:62–63) Once the Reference Theory has been rejected Frege's distinction between sense and reference is not needed at all.

This seems to be the case with Routley's extensional/intensional distinction. His notion of intensional statement is simply to provide a "way out" in case he has to deal with problematic statements such as the fictional paradox. This is apparent from the argument presented above: when Routley faces a problem of paradoxical consequences, he quickly turns some of the statements into intensional statements so that substitution is blocked, and his theory is saved from being inconsistent. However -- just like Frege's sense/reference -- Routley's extensional-intensional distinction is not needed if we have an
adequate theory of context\textsuperscript{24}.

My proposed solution for the above paradox is based on the contextual theory. The specification of context is sufficient to clarify the paradox of fictional items above, therefore the intensional/extensional distinction may be ignored.

Thus, by RULE 1(α), (9) is an illegitimate conclusion that is derived from (7) and (8) since (7) and (8) are from two different contexts: one from the factual context and the other from the fictional context. By RULE 1(α) (15) is an illegitimate conclusion from (12) and (14) as well for the same reason. Thus, by asserting that (7) and (8) are in two different contexts, and by asserting that (12) and (14) are in two different contexts, it is enough to solve the fictional paradox without going into the intension/extension distinction à la Routley.

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ENDNOTES


2. Basically there are only two problems here stated in 2.1 and 2.2. Problems stated in 2.3 and 2.4 are the variations of problem 2.2. with different examples.

3. Let us take $x$ as an item (fictional item) and $p$ and $\neg p$ as two possible features of it in two different stories: $s_1$ and $s_2$. Multiplication of fictional narratives theory says that there is only one item $x$ which involves in two different stories $s_1$ and $s_2$: in $s_1$ $x$ is $p$, and in $s_2$ $x$ is $\neg p$. It does not necessarily follow, however, that $x$ is both $p$ and $\neg p$. For to say that $x$ is both $p$ and $\neg p$ is to attribute some features to a certain item without determining the context. This can’t be done as it will become clearer in sec. 8. However, ‘$x$ is both $p$ and $\neg p$’ can be true iff there is another story (e.g., $s_3$) in which $x$ is determined to be both $p$ and $\neg p$.

4. The inference to (9) and (13) involves a substitution rule based on indiscernibility of identicals (or Leibniz’s Identity). However, according to Routley, Leibniz’s Identity itself must be rejected since it is based on the Reference Theory. See Routley 1979a:95.

5. C.f. Devine 1974. Devine argues quite similarly:
   ‘Richard III killed the princes’ is ambiguous: it may be taken as a statement of historical fact (in which case it has been doubted) or a statement of what goes on in Shakespeare’s play (in which case it cannot be)... [because] it is true according to another standard of truth, fidelity to Shakespeare’s play ‘Richard III’

6. “London is a nice city” may be ambiguous in meaning. That is: it may mean differently depending on the context of utterance. It may mean London England or London Ontario. But from its logical structure there is no ambiguity at all: ‘London’ is a singular term and ‘is a nice city’ is a one place-predicate’... etc.


10. Logics and Languages. (1973)

11. A classical definition of truth (e.g., Tarski), for instance, asserts that "Snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white. It is always assumed without question that the context of utterance is the standard world where we exist and snow is in fact white. But it seems that there is no need that this specification of world is made. Another example is: almost all logicians agree that (A&B) is true iff. both A and B are true. Again it is taken for granted that the standard world is used, and the attempt to specify in what context/world (A&B) is uttered/used is not specified in the syntax. Montague's grammar, however, made specific the context of utterance in the syntax.


13. The formal theory for the Theory of Contexts will be discussed in the Appendix of this thesis.

14. I will take Susan Haack's Philosophy of Logics (1985) as a representation of this standard view. Also see Goddard-Routley's (1968) discussion on the standard-view.

15. cf. Haack (1985). These questions are not discussed at all in her book.

16. This seems to be Haack's position. She states:
   I shall need to distinguish between sentence types and sentence tokens....
The question of what to take as criteria of identity for sentence types is disputed; some would argue typographical and auditory similarity... Others would require sameness of meaning. I shall stick to the former criterion,... (1985:75).

17. This is apparent in Haack's writings (1985). See the above quotation.

18. The meaning of a sentence is what that sentence expresses in a particular given context. Now, since a token sentence may be used to express various statements in various contexts, then, the meaning of a sentence is also context dependent.

19. By a sentence I mean an indicative, or directive, sentence.

20. Thus:
(i.) a token sentence \( \langle \sigma \rangle \) is used in a given context \( \Theta \) significantly iff it yields a statement.
\[ \text{sig} \langle \sigma \rangle(\Theta) = \text{df} (Ea)(\sigma)(\Theta)Ya. \]

(ii.) a token sentence \( \langle \sigma \rangle \) is used truly in a given context \( \Theta \) iff it yields a true statement.
\[ \text{tru} \langle \sigma \rangle(\Theta) = \text{df} (Ea)(\sigma)(\Theta)Ya&Ta. \]

(iii.) a token sentence \( \langle \sigma \rangle \) is used falsely in a given context \( \Theta \) iff it yields a false statement.
\[ \text{fal} \langle \sigma \rangle(\Theta) = \text{df} (Ea)(\sigma)(\Theta)Ya&Fa. \]

The notations are Goddard-Routley (1973) with a minor adjustment: \( \langle \sigma \rangle \) for qu(\pi).

21. It may be the case that the author is unknown, for example, in the case of legends. Since originally a legend is told rather than written, the 'author' of that legend may have never been discovered. In this case, then, a fictional states of affairs will be a fictional states of affairs according to the tradition and culture in which that legend is told or believed. For example, if in a certain tribe there is a legend that there are Dragons running around the forest, then, that there are dragons running around the forest is the fictional states of affairs according to that tribe. (Here by 'legends' I do not mean it in a religious sense; it is simply a story that has been told from one generation to another).
22. Of course the fictional state of affair that Holmes is a detective is to be represented by linguistic means (sentences). But it does not mean that what is the case in Doyle’s novels is a linguistic item. What I want to deny is that there is no distinction between a statement [Holmes is a detective], and what is the case in Doyle’s novels, i.e., **HOLMES IS A DETECTIVE.** The difference is that the former is true or false (or incomplete) with respect to the latter.

23. Consider what JRR Tolkien wrote in his foreword to his trilogy *The Lord of The Rings*:

> The Lord of the Rings is now issued in a new edition, and the opportunity has been taken of revising it. A number of errors and inconsistencies that still remained in the text have been corrected... (my underlinings. JRR Tolkien *The Fellowship of the Ring* first part of *The Lord of the Rings*. Methuen, Toronto: 1971, p.5)

However, if the story is meant to be inconsistent by the author -say- if in a particular story it is stated that p&¬p, then p&¬p will have to be true in that context. An inconsistency arises if it is denied that p&¬p in that story.

It should be noted that an intended inconsistency must be distinguished from an unintended inconsistency. If I write a book which is based on my dreams, then most of my stories will be inconsistent. Thus, say that I accept (p&¬p) to be true in my book. If this is the case then we must accept that (p&¬p) is true at least with respect to my book. This, however, is not the same as inconsistencies in Émile Zola’s novels (e.g., *La Bête Humaine* Penguin ed. 1986). In that novel Zola stated that in 1869 Jacques was 26 years old, and Zola also stated that Jacques was born in 1844 (so in 1869, Jacques should had been 25). We may not say, however, that Zola is committed to an inconsistent story for it is not Zola’s intention to be inconsistent. The translator of the above novel (Leonard Tancock) said that this is Zola’s mistake. To say that it is Zola’s mistake is to say that Zola did not intend his story to be a contradictory one. Thus, here, (p&¬p) --i.e., Jacques was both 26 and not 26 years of age in 1869-- must be regarded as false. Perhaps it will be helpful to state my version of the principle of charity:

as far as possible interpret an author’s works as consistent ones. If it isn’t possible then it must be accepted that any inconsistency in that works is true.
24. Prof Nick. Griffin pointed out this problem.

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APPENDIX

In this Appendix I intend to discuss very briefly two problems that the Theory of Items and the Theory of Contexts must deal with, but unfortunately they have not been discussed in this thesis due to page and time limitation.

The first problem is the problem with the formal theory of the Theory of Contexts. The Context Logic itself has been developed by Goddard and Routley in (1973). But their Context Logic differs from the Theory of Contexts in one important aspect, that is: the context-dependent truth values. This is understandable for their Context Logic is not developed for its own sake, but rather for a further development of their Significance-Logic.

However it cannot be denied that if we want a formal theory for the Theory of Contexts, then, at least we must adopt Goddard-Routley's Context Logic especially on their treatments on token sentences and statements. And then we must add formation rules for contexts, and some formal rules that may govern the relation between one context with another. Secondly, we must also adopt the Neutral Logic already explained in sec.7 of Chapter-III since we want also to deal with all sort of items (fictional-factual, existence...
or nonexistence). Thirdly, Parsons' contributions to the axiomatization of characterising and noncharacterising predicates can not be ignored.

The second crucial problem that we must deal with is the problem of consistency. It seems clear to me that if we want to have a satisfactory theory of fictional items, then our theory must be in some ways paraconsistent. That is to say that we must accept some inconsistencies as legitimate and non-trivial (but by no means all inconsistencies).

One significant conclusion that may be drawn from Chapter-III is that what is true or false with respect to one particular context may not necessarily be true or false with respect to a different context. Now, if we accept this conclusion, then, we must also accept that there are some inconsistencies which are true, or important. Consider this: if \( p \& \neg p \) is rejected in one context -say- in the factual context), then \( p \& \neg p \) will be false in that context. But it does not mean that it will necessarily be false in another context. For it is possible that in a fictional context (e.g., Alice in Wonderland) \( p \& \neg p \) is accepted, and thus it is true. But to say that \( p \& \neg p \) is accepted in Alice's stories is just to say that there is at least one contradiction which is true.

The problem becomes very complex once we have realized that accepting some inconsistencies as true has a
far reaching effect upon the presentation of our formal theory of the Theory of Contexts. Now, our formal theory not only must take Neutral Logic, but it also must take Paraconsistent Logic.

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