

CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY

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By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of morality from the ontological point of view. I take as my main clue Heidegger's criticism of the moral interpretation of conscience in his *Being and Time*. This criticism enlightened me with the thought that conscience is associated with authentic existence, while morality is associated with inauthentic existence. Therefore, in this thesis morality is investigated in light of its connection to conscience.

My main argument is that conscience is the center of the existence of the Self, while morality is based on the misunderstanding of the Self that speaks silently in conscience. Therefore, my central claim is that *the movement from conscience to morality coincides with the transition from authentic to inauthentic existence*. Furthermore, I show that this movement happens twice. The first movement coincides with the transition from the original existence of the Self to human existence. The second movement coincides with the transition from authentic to inauthentic (everyday) human existence.

Although Heidegger emphasizes the importance of the call of conscience in authentic Being-one's-Self, he does not really put conscience in the center of human existence, because the principle of his ontology is the concept of Being rather than the concept of the Self. Therefore, in this thesis I reinterpret his ontology in terms of the Self and base my study of morality on this reinterpretation.

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“When people lose sight of the Tao,
the idea of the morally good and just is created.”

—Tao Te Ching: Chapter 18

“You must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,
for when you eat of it you will surely die.”

—Genesis 2: 17

“You must yet become as a child and without shame.”

—Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Second
Part, “The Stillest Hour”

INTRODUCTION

§1. Ontology and Ethics

Soon after Heidegger published his ontological work *Being and Time*, a young friend asked him, “When are you going to write an ethics?”¹ The overtone of the question is that ethics is a natural outcome of ontology, because *what we are* determines *what we ought to do*. Heidegger, however, did not go on to write such an ethics. His major concern in *Being and Time* is the meaning of Being. Although the main content of the book is the ontological investigation of Dasein (human being), such investigation only serves as an approach to the meaning of Being. In his later work, Heidegger became even more absorbed in *Being as such* (*Sein als solchen*) and therefore paid less attention to Dasein. So it is not surprising that although in *Being and Time* he had provided us with an excellent ontological investigation of Dasein, he did not go on to study morality on the foundation of this ontology.

By ontology Heidegger means the study of *the meaning of Being* or *what it means to be*. According to Heidegger, traditional philosophy has forgotten the question of Being that was once the focus of early Greek thinking. What takes over the concept of Being (*das Sein*) is the concept of entity (*das Seiende*). Hence he carefully distinguishes between an inquiry about Being (*ontological inquiry*) and an inquiry about entities (*ontical inquiry*). As Being is always the Being of an entity, an ontological inquiry is concerned with the *Being* of entities that enables them *to be* themselves and therefore directed towards the *general structure* or *ground* of these entities. An ontical inquiry (such as science), on the other hand, is concerned with the “*what*” of entities and therefore directed towards the *particular facts* about them. This distinction between ontological and ontical inquiry is in a certain way parallel to Kant’s distinction between transcendental and empirical knowledge.² Heidegger thinks that it is impossible to understand the meaning of Being through ontical inquiry, but it is also impossible to do so without inquiring into entities with reference to their Being. Since Dasein is a special entity to whose Being *an understanding of Being* always belongs, ontology should take the investigation of Dasein (in terms of its Being) as an approach to the meaning of Being in general. As he says more clearly in a later work, “The unveiling of the constitution of the Being of Dasein is ontology.”³

Therefore, although Heidegger does not take morality as a theme of study for ontology, his concept of ontology does not exclude the study of morality either, for morality is a way *to be* ourselves. As a specific form of human existence, morality has subsisted for thousands of years, which means that it must be deeply rooted in the general structure of Dasein. Thus the ontology of Dasein will remain incomplete if it does not include the study of morality. Accordingly, if we define ethics as the (ontological) study of morality, we do have reason to expect Heidegger to have written an ethics based on *Being and Time*. But this does not mean that Heidegger should have set up some moral

rules for us to follow. The study of morality need not be a part of morality (just as the study of law need not be a part of law). On the contrary, only when we strictly distinguish ethics from morality can we have a true ethics in the sense we just defined, as only when we keep a distance from a picture can we see clearly what it is.

§2. Conscience and Morality

There is yet another reason why Heidegger does not make morality a theme of study. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger gives us an existential interpretation of conscience, and claims that conscience is the existential condition “for morality in general.”⁴ What he really means is that morality comes from conscience by way of a *misinterpretation* of the latter. According to Heidegger, the everyday existence of Dasein is essentially inauthentic, because in its everyday existence Dasein does not live as itself but rather as the One or the “they” (*das Man*), which is everybody and nobody. When Dasein loses itself in the “they,” “it fails to hear its own Self in listening to the they-self.”⁵ Hence Dasein simply follows what “they” say and lives as “one of them.” The call of conscience that says “guilty!” is a call from Dasein’s true Self that calls Dasein back from its falling into the “they.” So conscience is in essence purely a self-relation. Moreover, according to Heidegger, the nullity indicated by the meaning “guilty!” is simply an *a priori* characteristic of Dasein’s existence and has nothing to do with its actual action. Therefore, the ordinary (moral) interpretation of guilt as a judgment indicating the breach of some moral requirement that applies to one’s Being with others is a misinterpretation of conscience.

Since moral judgment is a misinterpretation of conscience, it is inauthentic in essence. Therefore, it seems quite reasonable for Heidegger not to waste time on the study of morality. His analysis of moral judgment in *Being and Time* is only a part of his interpretation of conscience, which again only serves as a step towards the complete grasp of the Being of Dasein. Therefore, it is understandable that his analysis of moral judgment in *Being and Time* only occupies several pages under the title “the Way Conscience is Ordinarily Interpreted.”⁶

But here we have an important clue for our study of morality. If moral judgment is a misinterpretation of conscience, and if morality is an inauthentic mode of human existence based on this misinterpretation, then we have reason to believe that the movement from *conscience* to *moral judgment* coincides with the transition from *authentic* to *inauthentic* (everyday) human existence. In fact, Heidegger does associate moral judgment with everyday existence when he says: “The common sense of the ‘they’ knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them.”⁷ He also links conscience with authentic human existence (in contrast to the above association) when he continues to say: “It [Dasein] has slunk away from its ownmost Being-guilty so as to be able to talk more loudly about making ‘mistakes’. But in the appeal, the they-self gets called to the ownmost Being-guilty of the Self.”⁸ Thus it is quite possible that the movement from conscience to moral judgment coincides with the transition from authentic to inauthentic (everyday) human existence.

If this is true, then the study of conscience and morality should be a central part of ontology. However, this is not the view of Heidegger. Although he emphasizes the importance of conscience in calling Dasein back from its falling, he never really puts conscience in the center of human existence. For Heidegger, human existence is essentially *Being-there (Da-sein)*. What fundamentally constitute the “there” (disclosedness) of Dasein are state of mind and understanding. Though Heidegger treats conscience as a mode of disclosedness, he does so only by taking it as a mode of (silent) discourse, and not at the same time taking it as a state of mind. But conscience as the *feeling of guilt* is without any doubt a state of mind. Moreover, because the call of conscience comes from the true Self of Dasein, conscience must be *the primary state of mind* in which the Self of Dasein primarily dwells. So it must be the center of human existence.

Consequently, we have to reinterpret Heidegger’s ontology and give conscience a central role in human existence. If this central role can become clear to us, we will be able to prove that the movement from conscience to moral judgment coincides with the transition from authentic to inauthentic (everyday) human existence. Furthermore, since conscience is a *feeling (of guilt)*, the movement from conscience to moral judgment can happen only if conscience has already been submitted to a *moral feeling*, while so-called *moral action* is nothing but a form of action based on *moral feeling* and *moral judgment*. This kind of action is essentially inauthentic, because in it the center of human existence has shifted from conscience to moral feeling and judgment. *Moral feeling, judgment* and *action* together constitute what we usually call *morality*. We can thus expand our previous thesis and say that the movement from conscience to *morality* coincides with the transition from authentic to inauthentic (everyday) human existence.

According to Heidegger, authentic human existence has the characteristic of *Being-guilty*. It is easy to see why this is so because, for Heidegger, to become authentic means first of all to accept the call of conscience that comes from the true Self of Dasein and says “guilty!” silently to it. Nonetheless, the meaning “guilty!” also indicates to us that human existence is *not* the *original* existence of the Self, but is instead a modification of it. Although Heidegger tries to show that “guilty!” does not mean that the nullity of human existence has “the character of a privation,” his argument is not very convincing, as I shall show.⁹ The negative judgment “guilty!” on human beings indicates that human existence must come from the original existence of the Self due to a *loss* of the original authenticity (guilt means “I am not totally who I am” and therefore signifies a privation of authenticity). But since guilt has become the *a priori* characteristic of human existence, we must *totally accept* it in order to live authentically as human beings. If we turn away from our *human* conscience (the feeling of guilt) to *human* morality, our existence will become *inauthentic Being-guilty*, namely inauthentic (everyday) human existence. Therefore, the transition from authentic to inauthentic (everyday) human existence is not the *first* but rather the *second* transition from authentic to inauthentic existence. Accordingly, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the first transition from *authentic* to *inauthentic* existence (from original to human existence) also coincides with a movement from (original) *conscience* to (original) *morality*. We can thus sum up

and say that *the movement from conscience to morality coincides with the transition from authentic to inauthentic existence*. This, then, will be the claim of this thesis.

The transition from original to human existence is not a theme of study for Heidegger. His investigation in *Being and Time* is completely limited to human existence. However, we do find a support in a pre-ontological literature, namely the Bible, which not only provides us (in the Old Testament) with an account of how man became mortal in the first place due to his “original sin” (an *a priori* guilt that comes from the possession of the knowledge of good and evil), but also claims (in the New Testament) that such “original sin” has been overcome by Jesus Christ when he died at the cross for the “sins” of all human beings. Accordingly, in this thesis I compare our ontological account of the transition from original to human existence with the biblical account of it. I also give a preliminary discussion (in the conclusion of Chapter Three) regarding the ontological possibility of overcoming “original sin.”

§3. The Self and its Being

As mentioned above, to study morality on the foundation of Heidegger’s ontology, we must reinterpret his ontology and give conscience a central role in human existence. How are we going to justify this reinterpretation? We have to proceed according to a *principle* that is in accordance with his ontology and yet allows us to put conscience at the center of human existence. We cannot simply accept the principle of his ontology and only modify the part where he investigates conscience (and moral judgment), because the neglect of the central role of conscience in human existence is not an accidental characteristic of his ontology. Given that conscience is where the Self primarily dwells in human existence, this neglect of the central role of conscience in human existence signifies a more fundamental neglect, namely the neglect of *the concept of the Self*.

The goal of Heidegger’s ontology is to understand *the meaning of Being* or *what it means to be*. Thus the principle of this ontology, if we are allowed to say that there is such a principle, is *the concept of Being*. As Being is always the Being of an entity, ontology cannot investigate the meaning of Being in an abstract way, but must always do so by investigating *entities* with reference to their Being. Heidegger not only realizes this, but also realizes that to understand the meaning of Being, ontology must take the investigation of Dasein (in terms of its Being) as an approach to the meaning of Being in general, for Dasein is the entity to whose Being an *understanding of Being* always belongs. Because Dasein is in each case *mine*, Heidegger takes the *selfhood* of Dasein as a way to grasp this entity as a whole. However, since he understands ontology (narrowly) as the study of the meaning of Being, he does not treat the concept of the Self as a fundamental concept of ontology. For him the Being of Dasein is not based on its Self. On the contrary, selfhood is only a characteristic of Dasein’s Being; that is, “a way of existing.”¹⁰

Existence is a peculiar kind of Being that belongs only to Dasein. As Dasein, we always have a pre-ontological understanding of our own Being. This understanding is essentially a *projection*, because Dasein always takes its own Being as an issue. Therefore, for Dasein, *to be* means *to comport itself with the understanding of its own Being*. This kind of Being is called “existence” (*Existenz*) by Heidegger. Hence existence is what distinguishes Dasein’s Being from the Being of other entities. A hammer, for example, *is* something I can use to perform a task. It thus possesses the kind of Being called *readiness-to-hand* (*Zuhandenheit*) by Heidegger. But it does not possess *existence*, for it does not *comport itself with the understanding of its own Being*. In Heidegger’s language, a hammer does not *exist*, though it *is* something rather than *nothing*. As Barry Allen points out, “He [Heidegger] reserves the term *Existenz* (existence) exclusively for the being of an entity which is in each case ‘mine’ — the being of Dasein. In his language it is terminological stipulation that only Dasein exists.”¹¹ Because Heidegger uses the term “existence” in such a special way, to avoid any confusion, in this thesis I will also use this term exclusively to the kind of Being Dasein possesses.

What does it mean for Heidegger to say that selfhood is “a way of existing”? It means that the Self of Dasein is not a substance or a subject in the sense of traditional philosophy. Dasein *is* only in terms of its Being. Therefore, to say that Dasein has a Self is the same as to say that Dasein possesses a mode of Being called Being-one’s-Self (*Selbstsein*). Since Dasein’s Being is existence, its Self or Being-one’s-Self is only a way of existing for Heidegger. This interpretation of the Self of Dasein lays ontology firmly on the ground of the concept of Being. However, it also at the same time covers up the fundamental importance of the concept of the Self. It is true that an entity *is* only in terms of its Being. Therefore, Dasein *is* its Self only in terms of its Being-one’s-Self. But if we look more closely, Being-one’s-Self means *to be one’s Self*. Only when we presuppose *the concept of the Self* can we make sense of this *to be one’s Self*. According to Heidegger, in everyday existence Dasein *is not* its true Self, but it can *choose to be its true Self* through *resoluteness* (*Entschlossenheit*), which is Heidegger’s term for *authentic Being-one’s-Self*. However, unless the true Self of Dasein *is* something that Dasein *has to be*, it will be meaningless to say that its authentic existence is achieved by *choosing to be its true Self*. Therefore, the true Self that Dasein *has to be* is not constituted by Dasein’s Being-one’s-Self. It is rather the ontological condition for the latter.

Here, we must distinguish strictly between the Self as the ontological condition of Dasein’s Being-one’s-Self and the Self that *exists* in terms of such Being-one’s-Self. Unlike the second form of the Self, the first form of the Self *is* but does not *exist*. That is to say, the first form of the Self possesses its own kind of *Being* that is not in the form of *existence*. Because it is the ontological condition for every Dasein’s Being-one’s-Self, it can be properly called *the Self as such*, while the second form of the Self, namely the Self that *exists* through Dasein’s Being-one’s-Self can be properly called *the existing Self*. Correspondingly, the *Being of the Self as such* (which is not in the form of existence and is yet to be determined) can be properly called *Being as such*. Just as *the Self as such* is the ontological condition for *the existing Self*, its *Being as such* is the ontological

condition for *the Being of the existing Self*, namely *existence*. We can therefore give the name “transcendental Self” to *the Self as such* and “transcendental Being” to its *Being as such*. By using the term “transcendental” we also want to emphasize that *the Self as such* and its *Being as such* goes beyond the realm of experience, for experience is but the *disclosed content of our existence*.

Heidegger never distinguishes between *the Self as such* and *the existing Self*, though he does make a distinction between *Being as such* and *the Being of a specific entity*. When he asks the question of Being, the Being he has in mind is Being in general or as such, rather than the Being of a specific entity. However, as he takes the investigation of the Being of Dasein as an approach to the meaning of Being (as such), he seems to have the difficulty to make the jump from the Being of a specific entity (Dasein) to *Being as such*. He is aware of the fact that *Being and Time* does not sufficiently answer the question of Being (as such). In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, which was published two years after *Being and Time*, Heidegger admitted that “With the question concerning Being as such, we are poised on the brink of complete obscurity.”¹² In his later works he thought that the failure of moving from the Being of Dasein to *Being as such* in his early works was due to the subjectivistic language of these works, and therefore tried to approach *Being as such* in a new way with the idea of Ereignis (Logos or Tao), which basically refers to the self-governing activity of nature, but it also means that man is appropriated for the cosmic play to be revealed through man.¹³ Consequently, in his later philosophy he moved away from the subjectivism of Dasein and towards the *Being as such* associated with *nature*.

It will go beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the complicated later philosophy of Heidegger. But his later philosophy does give us a clue for what *the Self as such* really is. The Self as such *is* itself through its *Being as such* associated with *nature*. Therefore, nature is in a certain way the ontological ground for Dasein’s Being. This will explain why Dasein’s Being is *Being-in-the-world*, which is the basic state of Dasein’s existence according to Heidegger. Dasein as the existing Self possesses Being-in-the-world as its basic state of existence because the Being of *the Self as such* is associated with *nature*, through which (and the body as a part of it) the existing Self is able to live in the world by moving and using things within the world. This will also enable us to understand better Dasein’s thrownness. By thrownness Heidegger means that Dasein does not create itself from ground up but rather always finds itself in the world alongside things within the world: it *has been thrown* into the world. However, looking more closely, it is not exactly Dasein that has been thrown into the world, for what can be thrown into the world must be something that is not in the world. Because *the Self as such* is the ontological (transcendental) condition for the existing Self, it is more appropriate to say that it is *the Self as such* that *has been thrown* into the world and becomes the existing Self (Dasein), which corresponds to the fact that its *Being as such* associated with *nature* becomes *Being-in-the-world* after it *has been thrown* into its *existence*. To sum up, *the Self as such* already *is* itself through its *Being as such* associated with *nature* before it is thrown into the world and exists as Dasein (the existing Self), which therefore *has to be the Self that it has been* through its *Being-the-*

Self. Here we use the term “Being-the-Self” rather than “Being-one’s-Self,” because *the Self as such* is the same in every Dasein.

Our concept of *the Self as such* seems to draw Heidegger’s concept of *Being as such* back to the subjectivism of Dasein. But it is not really so if we realize that *the Self as such* is not a *subject*, for it becomes a Self (the existing Self) that *lives* in the world only after it has been thrown into its existence. By distinguishing between *the Self as such* and the existing Self, we thereby obtain a better understanding of the relation between *Being as such* and the Being of the existing Self (existence). Insofar as the Being of the existing Self is the actualization of *Being as such* that is associated with *nature*, it has the form of *Being-in-the-world*. But insofar as the existing Self is *the Self as such* that *has been thrown* into its existence, the Being of the existing Self has the form of *to be the Self as such that it has been* or what we have called *Being-the-Self*. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s investigation of Dasein’s Being starts with the basic state of its Being (Being-in-the-world) and ends with the meaning of its Being (temporality). Temporality means that Dasein comes towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back to what it has been. If we replace the term “itself” with “the Self as such,” then temporality is the same as what we have called *Being-the-Self*, namely *to be the Self as such that it has been*. Therefore, by distinguishing between *the Self as such* and the existing Self, we can understand better the *transcendental* character of temporality, which is designated by Heidegger with the term “ecstasies,” meaning *standing outside of itself*.

The concept of the Self (as such) we introduced will make the central role of conscience in human existence clear. The existing Self is the Self that has been thrown into its existence. It is therefore by definition the *existential representative* of the Self. So the Self manifests itself primarily through its *judgment* upon the existing Self. Since conscience is where the Self discloses this judgment, it is where the Self primarily dwells in its existence. Moreover, the Being-the-Self of the existing Self has the form of temporality, which is a *movement* of the existing Self towards the Self that it has been. Accordingly, temporality must be reinterpreted as an *action* of the existing Self (we have chosen the word “resolving” to designate this *action*). Because conscience is where the Self primarily dwells in its existence, it is the core of all resolving. Therefore, conscience is in essence the center of human existence.

Thus the principle of our reinterpretation is *the concept of the Self*. This does not mean that the concept of Being can simply be put aside, because the Self as such *is* itself only through its *Being as such* associated with *nature*, while the existing Self *is* its true Self only through its *Being-the-Self*. So whenever we talk about *the Self as such* or the existing Self, we must do it with reference to *Being as such* or *Being-the-Self* (respectively). The Self and its Being are *interdependent*. Insofar as Heidegger views the Self as nothing more than a characteristic of Dasein’s Being, his ontology does not explain clearly why Dasein can *call itself back* from its lostness in the “they” and why it can actually *choose to be its true Self* when it hears the call of its conscience. Therefore, we must reinterpret his ontology *in terms of the Self* in order to understand the essence of morality in relation to conscience, which also means that we must redefine ontology as the study of the Self and its Being rather than the study of Being alone. In accordance

with this definition, existence must be redefined as *comporting oneself with the understanding of one's own Self and its Being*. Given that both the understanding of one's own Self and that of one's own Being belong to one's own self-understanding, we can also define existence simply as *comporting oneself with self-understanding*.

This reinterpretation will inevitably restore the concept of self-consciousness, a concept that Heidegger deliberately avoided, due to his understanding of the Self as a mode of Dasein's Being, and his criticism of the traditional concept of self-consciousness. But the concept of self-consciousness is indispensable for any investigation of the existence of the Self. Only on the foundation of self-consciousness can Dasein's Being as Being-the-Self become possible. The best thing we can do is to avoid the error of traditional concept of self-consciousness while we try to investigate self-consciousness from the ontological point of view. Accordingly, in this thesis self-consciousness and Being-in-the-world are treated as two basic states of human existence that are equally primordial and interdependent, while human existence as a whole is grasped by the concept of Being-the-Self (temporality).

This reinterpretation will also shed a new light on the concept of the Other. According to Heidegger, Being-with-others essentially belongs to Dasein's Being. Since everyday Being-with-others is inauthentic because Dasein has lost itself in the One or the "they," authentic Being-one's-Self can only be achieved when Dasein is called back from its lostness in the "they" by conscience. However, although Heidegger discusses in detail how authentic Being-one's-Self is achieved in *resoluteness* when Dasein is thus called back by conscience, he never makes it clear how Dasein achieves its authentic Being-with-others. He seems to suggest that when Dasein achieves authentic Being-one's-Self, its authentic Being-with-others is at the same time achieved. Given his claim that conscience is purely a self-relation, it is unclear how authentic Being-with-others is achieved through authentic Being-one's-Self. He gives us the following brief explanation: "Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates."¹⁴ What he means by "leaps forth" is to help others realize and become their own true Selves, rather than to do things for the Other (to *leap in* for the Other), which he thinks will only take away the Other's responsibility for himself or herself.¹⁵ This explanation of authentic Being-with-others, however, is too narrow in essence. According to this explanation, the Other is related to me only as *a problem* (it is not its own true Self) that I can help to fix. So it seems that the Other will have nothing to do with me if it is already its own true Self. This explanation of authentic Being-with-others does not offer any insight into the unique Other that can only be discovered as an Other *by me*. At bottom it understands nothing more than one's own true Self.

The inadequacy of Heidegger's account of the Other has been criticized by many authors. The most eminent among them seems to be Emmanuel Levinas, whose notion of the *asymmetry* between the I and the Other is extremely helpful for understanding the uniqueness of the Other. However, his attempt to submit ontology to morality is something that I don't want to follow. To understand the essence of morality, which

essentially concerns the Other, we must understand the Other from the purely ontological point of view. As the Self primarily dwells in conscience, we have to scrutinize how conscience is related to the Other. In this thesis, it will be shown that *the feeling of Love* is an extension of conscience with reference to the Other. Although *logically speaking the Self as such* is the same in every Dasein, it is only through *Love* that we *existentially* identify the *same Self* in the Other. Hence authentic Being-with-others is achieved in Love rather than resoluteness, though Love and resoluteness are closely related in terms of the Self. More importantly, we will show that the connection between the Self that dwells in conscience and the *same* Self discovered in the Other naturally gives rise to the confusion between the silent judgment of conscience and the speech of the Other. This confusion is what makes morality possible in the first place, because moral feeling is nothing but the feeling that the speech of the Other is a judgment on me. Therefore, *the concept of the Self* is crucial for the ontological study of morality.

§4. An Overview of *Being and Time*

Many readers of *Being and Time* have complained about the difficulty of its language and style, which seem strange to people whose training is mainly in the field of traditional philosophy. Although many phenomena discussed in this book, such as anxiety, death and guilt, are things every one of us is more or less familiar with, it is not very clear why they appear as themes of study in a philosophical work that claims to be a study of the meaning of Being. It thus seems necessary to give a brief overview of *Being and Time* before we reinterpret its ontology. For this purpose we do not need to look at all the content of this book. Instead, we will focus on Heidegger's methodology and the difference between his ontology and our reinterpretation of it. This overview is therefore not a complete one. Nor is it intended to be a general introduction to *Being and Time*, because our point of view is limited by the purpose of this thesis.

I want to argue that Heidegger can be excused from the accusation that his study of the meaning of Being does not use the same kind of language as traditional philosophy. According to Heidegger, the problem with traditional philosophy is that it has forgotten the question of Being. As a result, it understands entities in terms of ontic categories (nouns) rather than their be-ing or their "to be" (verbs). All entities are treated as having the same kind of Being, namely *presence-at-hand* (*Vorhandenheit*), which is the way an entity is taken out of the context of real life and appears as merely something to be contemplated or simply looked at. When all entities are treated as something merely *present-at-hand*, the difference between their modes of Being disappears. This provides an easy way for traditional philosophy to grasp everything by using concepts constituted in a purely theoretical manner. Thus words such as "substance," "identity," "difference," "cause" and "effect" seem to be more "philosophical" than words such as "anxiety," "guilt" or "death," not to mention "ready-to-hand," "present-at-hand" or "Being-ahead-of-itself." Even concepts such as "man," "life" and "universe" in traditional philosophy only refer to something *present-at-hand*, because this perspective only directs us to the

facts (properties) associated with the entities without clarifying their modes of *Being*. Accordingly, to grasp entities in terms of their modes of *Being* we must use new language. This new language may sound strange to a reader who is accustomed to understanding philosophical concepts only in the context of thinking rather than in the context of existence. But language is only a means to an end. Our attention should be directed to what is talked about (in real life) rather than the words we use. If we look at *our own life* to find out what the “strange” terms Heidegger uses really refer to, these terms will no longer appear to be “strange” but rather normal. This way of reading a philosophical work is difficult, because it requires more than pure thinking: it requires us to observe the *phenomena* of our own life in order to understand its ontological structure. But it is the proper way to understand *our own Being*.

The problem with traditional philosophy has its root in our everyday existence. We do not come to understand Being for the first time in philosophy. On the contrary, we always already understand Being in a pre-ontological manner before we try to think about it philosophically. The understanding of Being is something that essentially belongs to our own Being, because to exist is to comport ourselves with an understanding of our own Being. Ontology is therefore nothing other than the thematic development of this pre-ontological understanding of Being. That is why Heidegger takes the investigation of *Dasein* (in terms of its Being) as a clue for the meaning of Being in general. However, in everyday existence we misunderstand ourselves, so the investigation of our own Being must first overcome this self-misunderstanding. Ontology thus becomes a process of enlightenment. This again makes reading *Being and Time* more difficult than reading a traditional philosophy work, though it also provides us a way to overcome the defects of traditional philosophy.

The way Heidegger proceeds in *Being and Time* seems to confirm our assertion that ontology is a process of enlightenment. Let us take this standpoint and try to understand the development of his investigation. Because in everyday existence we are usually attached to the things we use and understand ourselves in terms of them, Heidegger’s investigation of *Dasein* starts with things within the world and proceeds to the world itself, which is not the sum of things within the world but rather a constitutive item of *Dasein*’s Being: the world is *for the sake of* *Dasein*. This *significance* of the world (worldhood) understood by *Dasein* is the ontological condition for things to possess *readiness-to-hand* (or its deficient mode *presence-at-hand*) as their mode of Being. Therefore, by moving from things within the world to the world itself, Heidegger has made a first step towards the *Being* of *Dasein*, namely its *Being-in-the-world*. To live in the world is to go beyond things within the world in terms of the world itself that is a constitutive item of *Dasein*’s Being. This concept of Being-in-the-world moves our understanding away from the ordinary thinking that we are just entities among other entities within the world. It also shows to us that *Dasein* is not in the first place an isolated subject and then happens to possess something like a world (as an object). On the contrary, *Dasein* is only insofar as it has a world and lives in the world by using things within the world for its own sake. But Heidegger’s concept of Being-in-the-world does not take into account the body (the embodiment of the Self) that makes Being-in-the-

world possible. Accordingly, in this thesis Being-in-the-world will be reinterpreted as Being-in-the-world-through-the-body.

From the world Heidegger moves to others that live in the same world with Dasein. In everyday existence, Dasein not only tends to lose itself in things within the world, but also in others from which it does not distinguish itself in a genuine way. The “who” of everyday existence is the One or the “they,” which is at the same time everybody and nobody. So everyday Dasein lives like an actor who always acts according to the public “script” of what one is supposed to do and therefore loses sight of the real situation and makes no genuine resolution. He seems to suggest that because Dasein encounters others environmentally through things within the world (which are *shared* by *everyone*), it inevitably takes itself as *merely one of others* and therefore lives as the inauthentic *they-self* (*das Man-selbst*). Hence the authentic Self of Dasein can only come as a modification of its inauthentic they-self. Insofar as his investigation proceeds from inauthentic to authentic existence (corresponding to a process of enlightenment), this explanation seems natural. But to view the inauthentic they-self as ontologically prior to the authentic Self is problematic, for only when the Self has been authentically disclosed can Dasein misunderstand it as something else and therefore become inauthentic. Moreover, when the ontological priority is given to the inauthentic they-self, how Dasein first comes to realize itself as “I” and the Other as “You,” “He” or “She” remains a mystery.¹⁶ Accordingly, in this thesis we are going to interpret the inauthentic they-self as a modification of the authentic Self of Dasein. We are going to show how the Self is primarily disclosed in conscience, how it comes to realize the three meanings of the Self and how the inauthentic they-self originates from the confusion between the Self disclosed in conscience and the Self discovered in the Other.

From the “who” of everyday Being-in-the-world, Heidegger moves to the *self-consciousness* of this entity, though he does not use this term. Since he understands the Self of Dasein as a mode of its Being, he takes the self-consciousness of Dasein as a constitutive item of Being-in-the-world, namely as *Being-in as such* or *Being-there* (in the world). The term “there” is not only used to designate the spatiality of Being-in-the-world, but more importantly its disclosedness. To be “there” is to disclose and to be disclosed. “*Dasein is its disclosedness.*”¹⁷ This disclosedness is constituted by *state of mind*, *understanding* and *discourse*. Dasein always finds itself in its state of mind as something that has been *thrown* into its disclosedness. State of mind always possesses understanding as its *sight*, which is essentially a (non-conceptual) *projection*. What is understood in such a (non-conceptual) self-projection is then articulated by *discourse*. Heidegger thus bases meaning on the (non-conceptual) understanding of things we always already possess in our dealing with them. This is an important step towards the overcoming of traditional philosophy that tends to get lost in the sea of concepts and forget their origin in real life. Moreover, Heidegger shows to us that the disclosedness that belongs to everyday existence is characterized by *idle talk*, *curiosity* and *ambiguity*, in a word, by the One’s groundless and uprooted floating. Therefore, the kind of Being that belongs to everyday existence is called the “falling” of Dasein, in the sense that Dasein in its everyday existence has lost itself in the “they” and is absorbed in things

within the world that have been publicly interpreted by the “they.” Here the inauthenticity of everyday existence is defined more precisely and we are prepared to move towards authentic existence.

But this account of disclosedness (self-consciousness) is incomplete in several senses. First of all, it does not show us *how* the Self is disclosed in state of mind. Secondly, it does not show *how* the Self comes to possess understanding as *its own* sight. Thirdly, it does not show *how* discourse is made possible by the discovery of the Other. Heidegger need not answer these questions, because he moves from what we already are (in everyday existence) to what we can be (in authentic existence). But we have to answer them in terms of the Self. In this thesis, it will be shown that conscience, as where the Self primarily discloses itself, is *the primary state of mind* that grounds state of mind in general, and that the understanding of the Being of the existing Self is the *primary understanding* that grounds understanding in general, which again grounds all forms of disclosure. We will also show how discourse is based on the discovery of the *same* Self in the Other. For this purpose the concept of *silent speech* is introduced, a concept that is implicit in Heidegger’s thinking but never explicitly formed. Moreover, Heidegger’s discussion of falling only shows us the kind of *understanding* and *discourse* (*idle talk, curiosity* and *ambiguity*) that constitute the falling of Dasein, without clarifying the kind of *state of mind* that dominates falling. Therefore, this account of the disclosedness of everyday existence is incomplete. In our investigation of falling we are going to show that it is *moral feeling* in the form of *shame* that dominates falling.

From falling Heidegger moves to anxiety. What he means by anxiety is a state of mind that discloses the *insignificance of things within the world* and thus brings Dasein back from its absorption in them to its possibility of authentic Being-in-the-world. Because Dasein in its Being-in-the-world always *projects* itself upon *possibilities*, anxiety discloses Dasein as *Being-possible*. When Dasein is brought back from its absorption in things within the world, the way things publicly interpreted by the “they” collapses. That is why Heidegger thinks that anxiety “individualizes” Dasein and discloses to Dasein the possibility of “choosing itself and taking hold of itself.”¹⁸ This is the first step towards authentic existence. But this movement is incomplete, because anxiety discloses to Dasein the possibility of *authentic existence* only with reference to its *Being-in-the-world*. Dasein is yet to discover its *true Self*.

Heidegger calls anxiety “basic state of mind.” However, what he means by anxiety is not a state of mind that we always possess, but rather a state of mind that can (when it happens) awaken us from our absorption in things within the world. It is therefore what we shall term “the call of anxiety.” Though he thinks that anxiety is always “latent” in Being-in-the-world, how this is so remains unclear. In this thesis, we are going to show that the “latent” anxiety is the *basic state of mind* associated with the *primary understanding* of Being. We will reserve the term “anxiety” for this *basic state of mind* and distinguish it from the *call of anxiety* that comes from it but happens only when Dasein has lost itself deeply in the “world” of its concern.

Heidegger thinks that (the call of) anxiety discloses Dasein’s Being as *care*. Care means that Dasein is not an entity that *is* itself in the sense of a *simple selfsameness*, but

rather in the sense that it *has been thrown* into the world (facticity), *being-alongside* things within the world (falling) and is *ahead of itself* by *projecting the possibilities of its own Being* (existentiality). This threefold structure of Dasein's Being is disclosed because Dasein is anxious about its own Being. Heidegger is close to saying that anxiety (as basic state of mind) is always associated with the (primary) understanding of Being, though he never makes this move. Inasmuch as he arrives at the concept of care from the analysis of (the call of) anxiety, the kind of care he introduces here is not yet the authentic Being of Dasein, though the threefold structure of Dasein's Being has come to view.

From Dasein's Being as *care* Heidegger moves to its Being as *Being-towards-death*. This development is at the same time a transition from the first to the second division of *Being and Time*. Roughly speaking, the first division investigates Dasein's inauthentic (everyday) mode of Being, while the second tries to grasp its authentic mode of Being (in terms of temporality). To arrive at authentic existence Dasein must move from the possibility of authentic *Being-in-the-world* to the possibility of authentic *Being-one's-Self*, which means that this *entity* must be grasped *as a whole* in terms of its Being. Heidegger sees this *whole* in Dasein's death, because death is the end that completes Dasein's *Being-in-the-world* (by denying its possibility). However, since Dasein's Being is *existence*, death must be understood as the way Dasein *comports* itself towards its end, namely as *Being-towards-death*, rather than an event that is yet to come someday but not right now, as "they" always say. The public interpretation of death also covers up the fact that death as my ownmost possibility can only be taken over by me. Therefore, the *anticipation of death* that understands the *non-relational* character of death *individualizes* Dasein down to itself (as anxiety does). But Heidegger does not show us how to arrive at this authentic understanding of death. In this thesis we will try to describe the kind of experience that enables us to do so and term it "the call of death."

In its *Being-towards-death* Dasein grasps itself *as a whole* in terms of its Being. But to achieve complete authentic existence Dasein must discover its *true Self* and return to it. This final step towards authentic existence starts with the call of conscience that calls Dasein back to its true Self. This call is therefore purely a self-relation. According to Heidegger, what the call gives Dasein to understand, namely the meaning "guilty!" is only an indication of the *a priori* nullity of Dasein's existence rather than a judgment of what it has done wrong. He thus criticizes the ordinary (moral) interpretation of conscience as a misinterpretation. By "wanting to have a conscience," Dasein achieves authentic *Being-guilty* (authentic *Being-one's-Self*) in *resoluteness*, which discloses *the situation* authentically in *the moment of vision*. Furthermore, Heidegger brings authentic *Being-towards-death* and authentic *Being-guilty* together and reaches the concept of authentic *Being-a-whole* in *anticipatory resoluteness*, which is the complete form of Dasein's authentic existence, but is nothing other than resoluteness in its most authentic sense, namely *resoluteness with the understanding of one's own Being as a whole*, an understanding that is in the form of *anticipation of death* and associated with *anxiety*.

It is understandable that Heidegger takes the meaning "guilty!" as an indication of the nullity of human existence rather than a negative judgment on the human existing Self, because for Heidegger the Self is merely a way of existing. However, it is more

reasonable to interpret the meaning “guilty!” as an indication of the nullity of the human existing Self rather than the nullity of human existence, which is indicated by *anxiety* rather than *the feeling of guilt*. Only when we take the meaning “guilty!” as a *judgment* from *the Self as such* on the human existing Self, can we understand why it has been misinterpreted as a moral *judgment* on the latter. Moreover, since Heidegger does not have a clear concept of *resolving*, the “who” of authentic existence remains somewhat unclear. In this thesis, it will be shown that conscience (and state of mind in general) is what *resolves* with the *sight* of understanding, and that *resoluteness* is only one of the modes of resolving.

Finally, Heidegger moves from Dasein’s authentic *Being-a-whole* (*anticipatory resoluteness*) to the *meaning* of its Being, which means that what has been tacitly *understood* and *projected upon* (namely Dasein’s Being) in Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole must now be grasped in a conceptual form. The projection upon Dasein’s Being in authentic Being-a-whole is possible only because Dasein’s Being is already understood as having a threefold structure (*having been, the present and the future*). This (primary) understanding of Dasein’s Being as *temporality* is what enables Dasein to exist by *taking care* of its own Being. Therefore, temporality is the meaning of Dasein’s Being (the meaning of *care*). Because Dasein understands its own Being as *temporality*, it also understands the Being of other entities it encounters according to its *temporal* projection. It thus makes sense to take temporality as the clue for the meaning of Being in general. Here the role of the (primary) understanding of Being as what grounds understanding in general becomes quite obvious, though Heidegger does not make it clear.

Since Heidegger understands the Self as a mode of Being, he views temporality as something *self-generated*. But his insistence on the distinction between temporality and ordinary concept of time (which is a “leveling down” of temporality) means that he still thinks of temporality in terms of its *transcendental* character (namely its *ecstasies* or “standing outside of itself”), though not of *the transcendental Self*. However, without the concept of *the transcendental Self*, the reason why temporality must “stand outside of itself” and why it can still take hold of itself when it thus “stands outside of itself” will remain a mystery to us. So in this thesis temporality will be reinterpreted in terms of the (transcendental) Self, which means that it has to be reinterpreted as the *comporting* of the existing Self towards the (transcendental) Self, namely as the *resolving* of the existing Self *to be the Self as such that it has been*, rather than a mysterious structure that can “temporalize itself.”

After defining temporality as the meaning of Dasein’s Being, Heidegger tries to grasp Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole in a more complete sense in its *historizing*, which means that in Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole between birth and death through anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein grasps its *having been* existentially as a *possibility* that can be *repeated in the future*. Thus he emphasizes the importance of *heritage* and *fate* with reference to Dasein’s *anticipatory resoluteness*. This understanding liberates the study of history from the investigation of dead facts and restores to history its *existential* significance based on Dasein’s Being as temporality. Furthermore, because Dasein is essentially Being-with-others, its *historizing* is a *co-historizing* that makes up the *destiny*

of a people. However, since for Heidegger everyday Being-with-others is inauthentic, while he does not explain clearly how authentic Being-with-others is achieved, the concept of co-historizing does not seem to go beyond the historizing of individual Dasein, though he insists that history is not the sum of individual acts. What we are going to do in our reinterpretation is to base the concept of history on the concept of *the Self as such* that exists temporally in the *community* through its activities, which are carried out through the acts of *individualized Selves* but at the same time *transcend* these individual acts.

§5. The Structure of this Thesis

The structure of this thesis is relatively simple. What we want to do is to study morality in its relation to conscience, based on a reinterpretation of Heidegger's ontology. The first thing is to reinterpret Heidegger's ontology in terms of the Self. Since human existence is a modification of the original existence of the Self, our reinterpretation will be done with reference to original existence, rather than human existence. In the second part we investigate the movement from conscience to morality. We will show why and how this movement happens in original existence, and why and how it happens again in human existence. Since inauthentic existence is based on self-misunderstanding, we can never really understand authentic existence if we never try to overcome self-misunderstanding and return to our authentic existence. Therefore, in the third part we investigate the counter-movement from morality to conscience, which is at the same time a transition from inauthentic to authentic existence.

Accordingly, the thesis consists of three chapters:

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|---------------|------------------------------------|
| Chapter One | The Original Existence of the Self |
| Chapter Two | From Conscience to Morality |
| Chapter Three | From Morality to Conscience |

CHAPTER ONE

THE ORIGINAL EXISTENCE OF THE SELF

My thesis is that the movement from conscience to morality coincides with the transition from the authentic existence of the Self to the inauthentic. Our main argument is that morality is a mode of existence based on the misunderstanding of the Self that judges silently in conscience. Since to exist is to comport oneself with self-understanding, the movement from conscience to morality is simultaneously a transition from authentic to inauthentic existence. To show that this argument is ontologically sound, we have first of all to investigate the structure of the existence of the Self, and focus on the role of conscience and understanding in that structure.

Our investigation will be based on Heidegger's investigation of human existence in *Being and Time*. However, there are two important differences. First of all, as stated in the introduction, to understand the ontological essence of morality in its relation to conscience, we must reinterpret Heidegger's ontology in terms of the Self. Secondly, to understand the transition from authentic to inauthentic existence, we must start our investigation with the *most authentic* existence of the Self, namely the *original existence of the Self*, rather than human existence. As Heidegger's investigation in *Being and Time* is limited to human existence, the results of our investigation in this chapter will not be the same as Heidegger's. However, his results remain the most helpful guide for our investigation, because human existence is an ontological modification of the original existence of the Self, as we shall show in the next chapter.

What we mean by the original existence of the Self is not a mode of existence that has been actually lived by the Self. It is rather the mode of existence the Self would live if it lives without self-misunderstanding. Ontologically this mode of existence is the closest to the Self, while other modes of existence can be viewed as its modification by virtue of a "falling." Since the Self is predestined to misunderstand itself when it *first* comes to self-reflection, as we are going to show in the next chapter, the original existence of the Self is bound to become inauthentic. The best thing the Self can do is to achieve a better self-understanding and try to move back to its authentic existence with true self-understanding. Therefore, whether the original existence of the Self has been actually lived is not very important from the ontological point of view.

The investigation of the original existence of the Self is in a certain sense more difficult than that of human existence, because we only have the experience of human existence. However, it is also in a certain sense easier, because we only need to investigate how the Self would live if it lives without self-misunderstanding, which means that we can infer *logically* what original existence is like without the need to tackle the complicated issue of self-misunderstanding.

§1. Self-Consciousness

The fundamental characteristic of the existence of the Self is what Heidegger has called disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*), which means that the Self does not exist *blindly*, but always exists in a certain kind of openness, in which it finds itself and things within the world that can be manipulated for its own sake. The Self must be completely closed to itself (having no self-consciousness whatsoever) before it is thus disclosed to itself. Accordingly, it is not by its own decision that the Self comes to its disclosed existence in the first place. Rather, it *has been thrown* into such existence. *The Self as such* already is itself through its *Being as such* associated with nature before it *has been thrown* into its disclosed existence and *has become* the existing Self. Therefore, the existence of the Self as a whole or the Being of the existing Self is actually *to be the Self (as such) that it has been* or what we have called *Being-the-Self*.

Since *the Self as such* is totally closed to itself, it is something *transcendental* for the existing Self. Here by “transcendental” we mean “beyond disclosedness” or “surpassing disclosedness.” For the existing Self, *to be the Self that it has been* is the same as *to be the transcendental Self*. Accordingly, to exist not only means to enter disclosedness, but also means to *transcend* disclosedness. Therefore, *disclosedness* only characterizes the *foreground* of the existence of the Self, while its *background* is characterized by *transcendence*. For this reason, the existence of the Self as a whole (Being-the-Self) is both disclosive and transcendental. However, disclosedness is what makes the existence of the Self possible in the first place. Thus before we go on to discuss the existence of the Self as a whole (Being-the-Self), we must first of all understand its disclosedness.

As disclosedness is the disclosure of the Self to itself, it can be grasped as a whole *in terms of the Self*. Such a whole can be properly called the *self-consciousness of the Self*. But disclosedness also makes Being-in-the-world possible by opening up a world for the Self to live in. Thus self-consciousness and Being-in-the-world are two basic states of the existence of the Self, insofar as disclosedness is concerned. In this section we are going to investigate disclosedness in more detail, in order to grasp it as a whole as the *self-consciousness* of the Self. The investigation of *Being-in-the-world* will be left to Section Two. The existence of the Self as a whole (Being-the-Self) will be grasped as *temporality* in Section Three.

According to Heidegger, disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, discourse and falling.¹⁹ But sometimes he only mentions the first three constituents.²⁰ There is a reason why falling is sometimes excluded. Falling is not really a constituent of disclosedness, but only a specific mode of disclosedness that belongs to inauthentic (everyday) existence. Furthermore, sometimes he even only mentions the first two as what constitutes disclosedness.²¹ The reason is also obvious. Discourse is possible only on the foundation of state of mind and understanding. Therefore, we are going to take the first three as what constitute disclosedness, and the first two as its fundamental constituents.

However, disclosedness is not the sum of these constituents but a single whole. The center of this whole is conscience. It is conscience as the primary disclosure of the Self that unites the three constituents of the disclosedness of the Self. This is something Heidegger never fully realizes. Although he has discovered the important role of conscience in the calling back of Dasein from falling to authentic Being-one's-self, he does not fully realize that conscience can do this only because conscience is where the Self primarily discloses itself, and therefore is the center of disclosedness and the existence of the Self. This defect of his ontology is due to the fact that he views the Self as merely a way of existing. The fact is, *the Self as such* already *is* itself through its *Being as such* associated with nature before it *has been thrown* into its disclosed existence and *has become* the existing Self. For the existing Self, to exist simply means *to be the Self (as such) that it has been*. So existence must be understood in terms of the Self and not vice versa. Therefore, in the following discussions we are going to reinterpret Heidegger's concept of disclosedness in terms of the Self, starting with the connection between the Self and conscience.

(1) The Self and Conscience

Conscience is the feeling that I am under the silent judgment of my true Self. This feeling has three features that distinguish it from other feelings. Firstly, conscience is a feeling of being judged. In every form of feeling something is judged. For example, in the feeling of beauty an object is judged, in the feeling of pain the body is judged, while in conscience it is *I myself* that is judged. Secondly, conscience is a feeling of being judged by nobody else but by *my true Self*. Thirdly, the feeling that I am judged by my true Self is at the same time the feeling that my true Self *transcends* me, because in conscience I do not feel that I am judging but rather that I am judged, and yet what judges me is not somebody else. Only if I as the existing Self *represent* the transcendental Self that judges me in conscience, will I be able to feel that what judges me in conscience is not somebody else. Therefore, in conscience I discover the Self that I *represent* in a *transcendental* manner. Nowhere else can I discover my true Self in a way more original than in conscience, because it is the *only place* where my true Self, as something that totally *transcends* me, judges me *directly* with a silent voice.

Since conscience is where the Self primarily discloses itself to itself, it is where the Self primarily dwells in its existence. So I as the existing Self am nothing but conscience, which as the primary disclosure of the Self is by its very essence the *existential representative* of the Self. Here we must demystify the meaning "I" by tracing it back to conscience. Conscience is the foundation for the meaning "I" and not vice versa, though conscience comes to the understanding of this meaning only when it discovers the *same* Self in the Other, as we are going to show in (5).

In conscience I hear the silent judgment of the Self upon me. The judgment is silent because conscience is a feeling. What does this silent judgment "say"? It "says" nothing else than "I am who I am," for conscience *is the existential representative* of the Self. So *I am who I am* does not mean that *I am me*, but rather that *I am my Self*. This

silent judgment is, of course, not in the form of words. It is rather a *meaning* associated with a feeling. Therefore, conscience (of original existence) is a feeling that has the meaning of *I am who I am*, a feeling of *absolute self-affirmation*, a purely *godlike* feeling.

This *meaning* of conscience can be properly called its *content*, in contrast to its *form* as a *feeling*. A feeling exists in such a way that it lets something *matter* to it. As the primary disclosure of the Self to itself, what *matters* to conscience is nothing but *the Self as such*. By letting the Self as such *matter to it through and through*, it *hears* the silent speech of the Self. The phrase “through and through” simply means that conscience lets the Self matter to it as *the Self as such*. But conscience does not exist in the first place and then *by extra* let the Self *matter* to it, because conscience as a *self-feeling* is made possible precisely by this “*letting the Self as such matter to it through and through*.” This kind of *self-mattering* that has the meaning of *I am who I am* directly shows *how the Self is* in its existence, and it does so in a primary way, for what primarily *matters* to the existing Self is its true Self, namely *the Self as such*.

(2) Conscience and State of Mind

Conscience is a self-feeling that shows *how the Self is* in its existence by *letting the Self as such matter to it through and through*. However, *the Self as such* is not the only thing disclosed. The disclosure of the Self has many other aspects, each of which determines *how the Self is* in its existence, and therefore *matters* to conscience (the existing Self) in its own specific way. Since conscience already lets *the Self as such matter to it through and through*, each of these aspects of the disclosure of the Self can only matter to conscience by *giving rise to* a new mode of self-feeling as a specific *extension* of conscience. Every such new mode of self-feeling shows *how the Self is* in its existence in a specific way, and is what is usually called a *mood* or a *state of mind*. As Heidegger points out, “A mood makes manifest ‘how one is, and how one is faring’.”²² For example, when I have worry over losing my job, I let my job matter to my feeling of anxiety, but what I am really anxious about is my state of Being-in-the-world (without a job I would not be able to obtain the things that can support my living in the world). So this worry shows to me that I am not doing well regarding my state of Being-in-the-world. However, Being-in-the-world matters to my feeling of anxiety not because it is a form of *Being*, but because it is a form of *my Being*. I do not, for example, have worry over the Being of a stone. If I have worry over my wife’s sickness, hypothetically speaking, that is because I love her as *myself*. So it is obvious that what a state of mind shows is *how the Self is* in its existence. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that only when we go further than Heidegger and distinguish between the existing Self and *the Self as such*, can we make sense of this *how the Self is* (in its existence), which does not mean how the existing Self *is itself*, for such “is” simply means self-sameness, but rather how the existing Self *is the Self as such that has been thrown* into its existence (for the existing Self, *to be* simply means *to be the Self as such that it has been*). That is why a state of mind is nothing but an extension of conscience.

Since any state of mind is a specific extension of conscience, conscience is what grounds states of mind in general and can be properly called *primary state of mind*. This relationship between conscience and state of mind in general is never fully realized by Heidegger, though he has come close to this realization. Regarding state of mind he says: “In a state of mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has.”²³ In his interpretation of conscience he says that the call of conscience comes from Dasein itself and summons it to the Self, implying that conscience is where Dasein finds its true Self.²⁴ Therefore, he is close to the realization that conscience is *the primary state of mind* that grounds state of mind in general. But he never takes this important step. Therefore, the central role of conscience in disclosedness remains unclear in his thinking.

Since conscience is the primary state of mind that gives rise to other states of mind as its extensions, state of mind as a whole can be viewed as the completion of conscience, which shows in a complete way *how the Self is* in its existence. Therefore, state of mind as a whole is the *complete existential representative* of the Self, and it is so by virtue of conscience. But the judgment of the Self upon conscience does not for that reason extend to other states of mind. It is precisely because conscience has let the Self matter to it *through and through* by virtue of the *judgment* of the Self that other aspects of the disclosure of the Self can only *matter* to it by giving rise to other states of mind. That is why only in conscience can I hear the silent judgment of the Self.

Because conscience is the *existential representative* of the Self, it becomes the *center* or the *heart* of the existence of the Self. Since state of mind as a whole is the completion of conscience, it is the *center* or the *heart* of the existence of the Self in a complete sense, while conscience can be properly called the *ground* or the *bottom* of this *heart*. The word “heart” in English not only means the organ that resides in the (left of) center of the body, or the center of anything, but also means a place where state of mind as a whole resides (therefore, in the following discussions we will no longer distinguish between “state of mind as a whole” and “the heart”). This use of the word “heart” in English suggests that the character of state of mind as the *center* of existence has been implicitly realized by pre-ontological understanding. Moreover, when people want to express sincerity, they use the phrase “from the bottom of my heart.” From the ontological point of view, to be sincere simply means to be *truly my Self* when I do or say something to others. So the fact that conscience is the *ground* or the *bottom* of the heart has also been implicitly realized by pre-ontological understanding, so much so that when you “search your heart” you actually “search your conscience.” The Chinese language, which is so different from English, also uses the word “Xin” (heart) in the same way as the word “heart” is used in English. More interestingly, the Chinese word for conscience is “Liang Xin.” The word “Liang” means “inborn.” So “Liang Xin” literally means “inborn heart.”²⁵ Thus it is evident that the character of conscience as *the primary state of mind* that is totally *inborn* has been realized by the Chinese pre-ontological understanding.

The *inborn* or *a priori* character of conscience means that although conscience is a *positive* feeling, it is not yet a *happy* feeling. A feeling is either positive or negative, depending on the meaning associated with it. But conscience as an *inborn* or *a priori* feeling has nothing to do with the *empirical* status of the Self, while a *happy* feeling always indicates that a specific aspect of the *empirical* status of the Self is in a positive state. Therefore, conscience is a *positive* feeling but is neither a *happy* feeling nor an *unhappy* one. However, the fact that conscience is a *positive* feeling implies that state of mind in general is a *happy* feeling, because when *I am who I am*, there is nothing that can deny the status of the Self in my existence.

(3) State of Mind and Understanding

In state of mind the Self is disclosed to itself by showing *how the Self is* in its existence. Therefore, the content of state of mind is always associated with a mode of understanding, which understands the existing Self *as* the Self in its existence. Such understanding is what gives state of mind its *content* (its *meaning*) in the first place. But even the *form* of state of mind as a *feeling* has also been understood in terms of its *possibility*. This latter understanding is what allows state of mind to be *formed* as a *feeling* in the first place. In a word, understanding is what grounds the disclosedness of state of mind by understanding the *content* (*meaning*) and *form* (*possibility*) of such a disclosure.

Yet understanding is not only what grounds the disclosedness of state of mind, but also what grounds disclosedness in general. Like state of mind, other forms of disclosure (such as bodily feeling, seeing, hearing, moving, etc.) also have *content* and *form*, and understanding is what grounds their *content* by associating them with certain *meaning*, which is always the understanding of certain aspects of the Self, and what grounds their *form* by understanding the *possibility* of their form. Such grounding is essentially *a priori*. That is to say, the connection between understanding and all forms of disclosure is not something the Self learns from its actual living, but rather something *inborn*, because without the understanding of the *possibility* and *meaning* of all forms of disclosure, the Self would not even be able to live in the first place. Therefore, understanding is involved in all forms of disclosure in a *non-reflective* manner. However, understanding itself is also a form of disclosure (a special one that grounds all forms of disclosure). Thus like other forms of disclosure it is subject to change through actual living, especially through reflection. For example, when I open the glass door of a building, I usually hold it for a second until the next person gets it. The understanding involved in this kind of action is non-reflective, because this way of opening a glass door has become my habit. However, this habit was formed by my previous reflection, since before I learnt to do this I only understood opening a door as opening a door and no more. Therefore, it is evident that the non-reflective understanding involved in all forms of disclosure can be reshaped by reflection. That is why we prefer to call it *non-reflective* rather than *pre-reflective*. The reshaping of our non-reflective understanding through reflection makes the development

of understanding possible, but it also makes the misunderstanding of the Self possible, because reflection can always go wrong.

The understanding associated with state of mind is only one example of how understanding grounds the disclosedness of a form of disclosure. However, state of mind has a special feature that no other forms of disclosure have, namely its character as *the existential representative of the Self*. This character enables state of mind to possess understanding as its own *sight*, for *all understanding is a part of the self-understanding of the Self* (even when understanding understands things within the world, for example, it still understands them with reference to the Self, namely as something *for the sake of the Self*). Here we must carefully pay attention to the distinction between an understanding associated with a state of mind and an understanding possessed by it, a distinction that is never explicitly made by Heidegger. An understanding associated with a state of mind grounds the state of mind by understanding its *meaning* and *possibility* and is therefore the *most proper sight* of the state of mind. However, a state of mind (as the existential representative of the Self) can possess *any* understanding as its *sight* and not just the understanding associated with it. On the other hand, only when an understanding is possessed by the existential representative of the Self, can it become truly the *self-understanding of the Self*. So state of mind is also what makes understanding what it is supposed to be. In a word, state of mind and understanding are equally primordial constituents of disclosedness, and neither can be without the other. We can thus understand better why Heidegger says “A state-of-mind always has its understanding” and “Understanding always has its mood.”²⁶

It is very important to understand that the Self in its existence *dwells* in state of mind and *possesses* understanding as its *sight*, which means that state of mind and understanding should always be thought of as *one single whole*. Therefore, whenever we talk about state of mind, understanding is *already included* as its *sight*. Thus the word “heart” should mean more than just a feeling. Instead, it should mean the unity of state of mind and understanding by state of mind itself. In English we sometimes use the word “heart” in this way, for example, when we say “I knew it in my heart.” It is interesting to note that this kind of usage is rather usual in the Chinese language. In Chinese the word “Xin” (heart) not only means *state of mind* in general, but also what *understands* everything. So the meaning of the word “Xin” embraces both the meaning of the English word “heart” and that of “mind.” The Chinese people do not seem to have any problem with this kind of “mixture.” On the contrary, it reflects their tendency to view state of mind and understanding as a single whole. It is obvious that in this language, the fact that state of mind *possesses* understanding as its *sight* has already been understood in a pre-ontological way.

Let us look more closely at the way understanding grounds disclosedness in general. To *disclose* something is to bring it into *presence*. Accordingly, everything disclosed is disclosed in *the present*, which is nothing but the *complete form* of disclosedness (this point is not clear in Heidegger’s thinking). So understanding as what grounds disclosedness in general is not a *process* but a momentary *sight* possessed by *state of mind* (the existing Self), which is at the center of disclosedness, namely the center

of *the present*. However, for the existing Self, to exist is *to be the Self that it has been*, or more exactly, *to return to the Self that has been thrown into the present*. This “having been thrown” and “returning to” are two components of existence that go beyond *the present*. Therefore, the existing Self always understands its own Being as *temporality*, though it does so only in a *non-reflective* way. This understanding can be properly called *primary understanding* because it understands the existence of the Self *as a whole* and therefore (by doing so) *grounds* all understanding or understanding in general. We have mentioned above that understanding is a special form of disclosure that grounds all forms of disclosure, which means that it also grounds itself. We now see that the understanding that grounds understanding in general is nothing but the primary understanding of one’s own Being (as temporality). By possessing this *primary understanding*, the existing Self is able to transcend *the present* in its *Being-the-Self*, namely in its *temporality* (see §3).

Therefore, the meaning of disclosedness as a whole (*the present*) is that it is a component of Being-the-Self (*temporality*). Yet primary understanding should not only determine the *meaning* but also the *possibility* of disclosedness as a whole. Therefore, primary understanding views *all the possibilities of the present* (such as *the possibility of moving, touching, seeing, hearing, feeling, imaging, ...*) as belonging to *the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*. So Being-the-Self is not only *temporality* (insofar as its *meaning* is concerned) but also *Being-possible* (insofar as its *possibility* is concerned). This means that the existing Self not only understands its Being as *to be the Self it has been*, but also as *to be able to be my Self*. Since *the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* is actually constituted by *all the possibilities of the present*, what the existing Self *is able to do* is always something *concrete* regarding *the present*. But no matter what possibility of *the present* it has chosen, what the existing Self does always belongs to its Being-the-Self, for *all the possibilities of the present* have been united by primary understanding as the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*. For example, when I eat a meal or sing a song or talk to somebody, what I do is simply a way to be my Self. Here it is worth noticing that although Heidegger views the Being of Dasein as *Being-possible*, he does not inquire into the *concrete form* of possibility. Therefore, he does not make it clear that every possibility belongs to the *possibility of disclosedness*, neither does he have the notion that *all the possibilities of the present* have been held together by primary understanding as my ultimate possibility of *Being-the-Self*. He rather tends to take Being-one’s-Self as only one of the possibilities of Being-possible.

What primary understanding understands is a fundamental aspect of the Self, namely the Being-the-Self of the existing Self. Therefore, primary understanding is associated with a state of mind that shows *how the Self is* in its existence regarding its *Being-the-Self*. This state of mind is the *basic state of mind* that underlies all states of mind, because it is associated with the primary understanding that grounds all understanding. Though like other states of mind it is also an extension of conscience, it is as fundamental as the latter, because while conscience lets *the Self of the existing Self* matter to it, basic state of mind lets *the Being of the existing Self* matter to it. Thus conscience and basic state of mind are equally primordial and interdependent. Moreover, because primary understanding unites *all the possibilities of the present* as the *ultimate*

possibility of Being-the-Self, basic state of mind is a feeling that *everything in the present is for my existence*. Therefore, it can be properly called *the feeling of playfulness*, which is in harmony with the *purely godlike feeling* of conscience, for a *godlike* being is always its true Self and therefore does not need to *care* about what it does but simply *plays* with all the possibilities of the present. This characteristic of original existence had been understood pre-ontologically in many ancient myths, which usually described the gods and goddesses as living playfully without the need to care about anything.

The last important thing about understanding is that *in everything disclosed* understanding always *gives a meaning* for the Self to understand, which is the way it grounds the *content* of all forms of disclosure. This means that *in everything disclosed* understanding always “*says*” something to the Self. In this sense every disclosure is a *silent speech* (except a word, which is a verbal speech). To *listen* to a *silent speech* simply means to *accept* its meaning. For example, if I listen to the *silent speech* of the feeling of hunger in my stomach, I will try to find something to eat. If I listen to the *silent speech* of a red light I will stop my car at the intersection. In a word, listening to the silent speech of everything disclosed is the fundamental way to understand everything. This kind of listening can be properly called *primary listening*, because it is what makes listening to verbal speech possible in the first place.

Yet not all the things disclosed speak silently in the same way. In everything disclosed, there is always a meaning that is silently said *to the existing Self*, but not necessarily *from the Self*. As a matter of fact, only in conscience does the silent speech come *directly from the Self as such*. This is what is special about conscience. However, it does not mean that the existing Self needs to have a special kind of listening regarding conscience. The existing Self listens to the silent speech of conscience simply by *accepting* its meaning, and it does so without paying attention, because conscience as the core of the existing Self is what *pays attention* (to the things the existing Self does) rather than what *needs attention* (from the existing Self). In a word, the existing Self can simply live *as* conscience. The fact that in everyday existence Dasein *is forced to* pay attention to *the call of conscience* means that in such existence the existing Self already turns away from conscience, no longer accepting what it silently says (its meaning). For only when the existing Self turns away from conscience will conscience become an unhappy feeling that calls the existing self back to its true Self. Accordingly, we must distinguish carefully between *conscience* and *the call of conscience*, a distinction that is never made by Heidegger. Since the call of conscience happens only occasionally, his confusion between the call of conscience and conscience means that the central role of conscience in the existence of the Self has escaped his otherwise penetrating insight.

(4) Conscience and the Other

In conscience I find that the Self speaks silently and directly to me. This is the *primary* way the Self discloses itself to its existing Self. However, it is not the only way the Self does so. In the Other the *same* Self also speaks silently to me. The silent speech of the Other is associated with *the image of the Other*, which is something I discover

within the world. Though everything within the world speaks silently to me, only *the image of the Other* speaks silently to me *as* the Self. However, I can understand this silent speech of the Self in the Other, only because I already understand the silent speech of the Self in conscience. Therefore, while in conscience the Self speaks *directly* and *internally* to me, in the Other it speaks *indirectly* and *externally* to me. It is the *internal Self* that dwells in my conscience that discovers its *external existence* in the Other. The fact that conscience discovers the *same* Self in the Other means that conscience *accepts* the silent speech of the Other *as* the silent speech of the Self, which again means that as a feeling, conscience discovers the *same* Self in the Other by *letting the Other matter to it through and through*.

However, conscience already lets the internal Self matter to it through and through. So the discovery of the *same* Self in the Other is actually accomplished by a state of mind, which is an extension of conscience with reference to the Other. Since this state of mind is a feeling that *the Other is the external existence of my internal Self*, it can be properly called *the feeling of Love* in the most *primary* sense. This *primary feeling of Love* is not a blind one. On the contrary, it possesses the most primary understanding of the Other. It discovers the Other in the most primary way by listening to (accepting) the silent speech of the Self in the Other, and letting the Other matter to it through and through.²⁷ It should be noted that the Self always discovers everything within the world by listening to (accepting) its silent speech, and letting it matter to its state of mind in a certain way. But only in conscience and the Other does the Self *let something matter to it through and through* (as the internal and external Self, respectively).

There is always an *asymmetry* between the I and the Other, as Levinas has insightfully pointed out, for I always find my Self *internally* in my conscience and the Self in the Other *externally* within the world.²⁸ It is because of this asymmetry that the way I primarily discover the Other can be called Love. Love means that the Self that exists internally has found the *same* Self in the Other by *letting the Other matter to it through and through*. It is thus a unity of the internal and external Self, not by putting them together, but by the internal Self's *recognition* of the external Self as the *same* Self. Therefore, the principle of Love is nothing but *the unity of asymmetrical Selves*. Because of this *asymmetry*, the internal Self can only discover the external Self as the *same* Self by *recognition* rather than *comparison*. I do not step outside of myself to view myself in the way I view the Other, and then discover the Other as the *same* Self, for not only can I not do it, but even if I could do it, when I thus "step outside of myself" there would no longer be any internal Self, and therefore no longer any "I" or "Other" at all. So Love is the *identity* of the internal and external Self, not in the sense of comparing two things and then coming to the conclusion that they are identical, but in the sense that the internal Self *identifies* the external Self as the *same* Self. In a word, Love is the existential *self-identity* of the Self in its most proper sense.

However, the Love in which I discover the Other in the most primary way should be strictly distinguished from other modes of Love, such as family Love, friendship or the Love of community. The Self that speaks silently in conscience does not have any specific character. The content of conscience says nothing about my empirical existence.

The judgment “I am who I am” is a *true judgment a priori*. So when I discover the *same* Self in the Other in the most primary way, I do not do this because of some special characters of the Other. The Love in which I discover the Other in the most primary way is totally empty. It understands nothing about the Other except the fact that the *same* Self exists externally in the Other. Such Love is a positive feeling, because it is directly based on conscience, which is a totally positive feeling. But like conscience, it is not yet a happy feeling, because it understands only the *a priori* characteristic of the Other. Other modes of Love understand the Other as more than just the external Self, because they involve the *concrete* understanding of the Other. Therefore, we call the Love in which I discover the Other in the most primary way *Primary Love* and other modes of Love *Concrete Love*. All Concrete Love is based on Primary Love, but unlike the latter, which is a positive but empty feeling, the former is always a happy feeling, because it always affirms the *empirical existence* of the Self through *self-identity*.

The most original Concrete Love is the Love of male and female. It is the most original because it is the *embodiment* of the *principle of Love*, namely *the unity of asymmetrical Selves*. The male is the natural embodiment of the internal Self, while the female is the natural embodiment of the external Self. The internal Self is associated with *resolving*, as we are going to show in our discussions about temporality, while the external Self is associated with its *image*. Thus nature, through its association with the *Being as such* of the Self, has given rise to the male and female body in such a way that the former reflects the *power* of the internal Self to *resolve*, while the latter reflects the *beauty* of the *image* of the external Self (in this sense Levinas’ claim²⁹ that the feminine is otherness itself can be justified). This asymmetry between male and female is a relative one, because both male and female are internal Self, and both discover the opposite sex as its external Self through Primary Love. However, on the foundation of this Primary Love, the relative asymmetry of male and female gives rise to the Love of male and female as the most original Concrete Love. Thus it is only natural for the male and female to have sexual intercourse, because sexual intercourse is nothing but the *self-identity* of the male and female body. Through this *embodied self-identity*, the Self is able to reproduce its existence. There is no surprise that the child is conceived in the female body, because what is only *implicit* in the male body (a new life) can become *explicit* only in the female body. Since children come from the self-identity of father and mother, they still belong to the Love of male and female. Therefore, the most original Concrete Love sees its completion in Family Love.

According to Heidegger, conscience is purely a self-relation. His interpretation of conscience thus lacks a bridge through which I as conscience can reach the Other. As we have shown above, this bridge is nothing but Primary Love. It is this state of mind as the extension of conscience with reference to the Other that discovers the Other in the most primary way, by letting the Other matter to it through and through as the *same* Self. This state of mind, however, is no longer conscience as such. It has nothing to do with the judgment of the Self on the existing Self. The same thing can also be said of all Concrete Love based on it. Therefore, conscience (as such) remains the only place in which I find my own true Self in the most primary way.

(5) The Other and Discourse

In the Other the Self speaks silently to me just as it does in my conscience. But what does the Self in the Other “say” to me silently? Since conscience recognizes the *same* Self in the image of the Other, the silent speech of the Self in the Other has the meaning of *self-identity of the Self*, which when understood as something the Self says to itself has the meaning “I.” The meaning “I” is the meaning of the Self understood by the Self, insofar as it is something *self-identical*. But the internal Self can never come to the understanding of this meaning “I” by itself, because the meaning of *self-identity* of the Self can only be discovered when the internal Self recognizes the *same* Self in the Other. The existing Self *is* its true Self through *existence*. Therefore, the self-identity of the Self is not the same as the self-identity of a thing with itself that takes the superficial form “A=A.” The Self can realize its own *self-identity* in its existence *only by the existential act of identifying itself as itself*, which is done when the internal Self *identifies* the external Self in the Other as the *same* Self. Accordingly, the meaning “I” (the meaning of *self-identity*) can only be realized *through the Other*.

Here it may be helpful to discuss what Levinas has called *the face*. According to Levinas, vision always has a power over its object. Seeing is already possessing and denying. But the face of the Other surpasses the power of my vision.³⁰ The vision of the face is no longer vision but hearing and speech: “the ‘thou shalt not murder’ is inscribed on the face and constitutes its very otherness.”³¹ What Levinas discovers is the peculiarity of the image of the Other regarding its silent speech. However, this silent speech does not give a command but simply says “I,” meaning *self-identity* and nothing else. How this meaning of *self-identity* gives rise to the meaning “You” or “Thou” will be discussed next.

Since the Self says “I” silently in the image of the Other, I can hear this silent speech only if I understand (refer to) the Other as “I.” This is the understanding associated with the image of the Other. However, because “I” is the meaning based on my discovery of the *same* Self in the Other, I can take the Other as “I” only if I at the same time take myself as “I.” Therefore, the discovery of “I” in the Other is at the same time a discovery of “I” in me. In this way the Self comes to the understanding that both the internal and external Self are self-identical. But I primarily discover the Self in conscience, and it is conscience that discovers the Self in the Other *as* its external existence. So the Self discovered in conscience becomes the “I” in a primary sense, while the *same* Self discovered in the Other becomes the “I” in a secondary sense, namely “You,” which simply means “the I in the Other.” Consequently, “I” becomes the *first meaning* of the Self, while “You” becomes its *second meaning*.

Furthermore, as the meaning of the Self is discovered through my listening to the silent speech of the Other, and is discovered *both* in the Other and I, it makes me understand that the Other *also* listens to the silent speech of me. This enables me to try to speak something to the Other, for I will never speak to the Other if I do not understand in the first place that the Other is listening. Thus when the silent meaning “I” and “You” are

articulated and become words in my actual speech, “I” means the speaker and “You” means the listener. But I can speak to You because I always already listen to the silent speech of You and therefore understand that You too are listening to my silent speech. So discourse is founded on *listening*. More specifically, it is founded on listening to the silent speech of conscience and the silent speech of the Other. As Heidegger points out: “Listening to...is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it.”³²

It is in discourse that I *first* try to transcend the *asymmetry* between I and the Other. Therefore, in discourse there arises a new meaning of the Self that transcends the first and second meaning of the Self and understands the I and the Other both as “a self.” This understanding of the Self as “a self” is based on the understanding of the Self as “I” and “You,” but it has become a new self-understanding of the Self in which the Self abstracts from the uniqueness of “I” and “You,” and understands itself as something *universal*. This universal meaning of the Self refers to both I and You as *a universal self*. It thus gives rise to the meaning “we.” However, only in others (other than I and You) can we totally put aside the asymmetry between I and You and understand the *pure form* of this universal meaning of the Self, namely as “they,” or in a single other as “he” or “she.” This *third* meaning of the Self is based on the *first* and *second* ones, and is impossible without them.

Discourse is a derivative mode of disclosedness based on the disclosedness of state of mind and understanding. It is founded upon the silent speech of everything disclosed. Without this silent but meaningful background all words lose their meanings, because although the meaning of a word is associated with a sound or a picture, what this meaning understands is usually not this sound or picture but something that has been silently understood in other forms of disclosure. Nonetheless, with the development of discourse everything is understood in a new light. In discourse the Self comes to the understanding of itself not only in the first and second senses, but also in the third sense, namely as *a universal self*. This understanding of the *universality* of the Self makes the silent speech of everything *to the Self* also become a *universal* meaning. It therefore sheds a new light on the whole sphere of disclosedness by giving it *intelligibility*. Here by “intelligibility” we do not mean “rationality” but simply the *silently disclosed logical connections between the universal meanings* of all the silent speeches. Even when discourse is not going on, I still exist differently than an animal, because at every moment the silent speech of everything is not only *understandable* but also *intelligible* for me. The difference between *understandability* and *intelligibility* is that although everything disclosed is disclosed with the *understanding* of its meaning (for the Self) and its possibility, only when the meanings of all disclosures become *universal* through discourse, can the *logical connections* between these meanings be disclosed (silently) to the Self and therefore become *intelligible* for the Self. The key point is that meaning is in essence universal, but the meaning of a disclosure is bound to the disclosure. It can become a truly universal meaning only after the Self understands its own universality and

therefore frees the meaning of a disclosure (as a meaning for the Self) by separating it from what it is associated with (the disclosure) and turning it into a word. Therefore, through discourse, the logical connections between *words* (their universal meanings) disclose the logical connections between *things* to the Self. These logical connections between things remain disclosed to the Self after the discourse, because the Self's non-reflective understanding of these things has been reshaped by the discourse.

Moreover, because in discourse I speak to the Other with the understanding of myself as "the Other for the Other," I also understand the possibility of speaking to myself by taking myself as an *abstract Other*. As a result, discourse naturally develops into *thinking*, in the sense of speaking with an inner voice to myself. The intelligibility of disclosedness also allows me to develop *reasoning*, which does nothing other than *making sense* of the *logical connections* between all forms of silent speech. Reasoning need not be *purely rational*. The essence of rationality lies in universality. Only when I take myself and the Other as *purely a universal self*, can I *totally abstract* from the different ways I discover my Self and the Other, and therefore reason in a *purely rational* way. For example, when Adam Smith suggests that sympathy can become the foundation of moral philosophy, because it is through sympathy that we know how other people feel, his reasoning is not purely rational, because it is backed up by the experience of sympathy towards the Other. On the other hand, when Kant thinks that we should always act with a maxim that can be willed as a universal law, because the essence of a human being lies in its rationality, his reasoning is totally based on the abstract concept of a (universal) human being and is therefore purely rational. But the *third* meaning of the Self is based on the *first* and *second* meanings of it. So the concept of a universal self is meaningful only when it is based on the way I discover my Self in conscience and the Other in Primary Love. From this point of view, Kant's "categorical imperative" is not as "categorical" as he thinks, for this kind of *purely rational thinking* has lost sight of the *origin* of the universal meaning of the Self.

Discourse as communication makes the existence of the Self a true whole in the form of *community*. A community is in the first place the community of I and You, but it is also a community of *a universal self*. This latter meaning of the Self makes everyone a *member* of a community. In community as a whole I find that *the Self as such* exists in a *complete form* in its numerous *activities*, such as politics, economy, art, philosophy, science and technology. However, I can understand such a thing as community only because the Self exists first of all in I, secondly in You, and thirdly in everyone else of the community. So a genuine community is always founded on Primary Love.

(6) Self-Consciousness

Our discussion so far has made it possible to grasp disclosedness as a whole in terms of the Self, namely as the self-disclosure of the Self. Such a whole can be properly called the *self-consciousness* of the Self. The *primary self-consciousness* of the Self includes the two fundamental constituents of disclosedness, namely state of mind and understanding. On the foundation of this primary self-consciousness, *discourse* is

developed as the third constituent of disclosedness, because it makes disclosedness intelligible. But discourse is based on the discovery of the *same* Self in the Other in Primary Love, which is the *self-identity* of the Self achieved through the Other. Therefore, Primary Love can be properly called *self-consciousness through the Other*. Based on Primary Love, other modes of Love, such as friendship and family Love become the *concrete* ways I identify the *same* Self in the Other. Accordingly, they also belong to *self-consciousness through the Other*. The highest form of self-consciousness is achieved in the Love of community, in which I *identify* community as a whole as the external existence of my internal Self. So the Love of community can be properly called *self-consciousness through the Absolute Other*. We can thus divide the development of self-consciousness into the following four stages:

A. Primary Self-consciousness

The core of any self-consciousness is the unity of state of mind and understanding, or what we have called *the heart*. In this primary self-consciousness, state of mind is the *existential representative* of the Self and possesses understanding as its *sight*. The understanding associated with *conscience* understands the *Self* of the existing Self, while the *primary understanding* associated with *basic state of mind* (the feeling of playfulness) understands the *Being* of the existing Self and unites *all the possibilities of the present* as the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*. Thus the Self is able to *exist* with *self-understanding*. Nevertheless, at this stage the Self has not yet realized its own self-identity. So the self-consciousness at this stage is not self-consciousness proper but only the germ of self-consciousness.

B. Self-Consciousness through the Other

The discovery of the *same* Self in the Other enables the Self to realize its own *self-identity* through the Other, and therefore starts the second stage of self-consciousness in Primary Love. At this second stage, both the internal and external Self are understood in terms of the *self-identity* of the Self. So it is at this stage that the Self comes to its first proper self-consciousness, in which the meaning of the Self has been understood in its first and second sense. This self-consciousness is directly based on primary self-consciousness. The only difference is that the Self now has realized its own self-identity. Therefore, the self-consciousness at this stage can be called the *self-realization* of the Self.

This stage also includes the *concrete* ways I identify the *same* Self in the Other, namely *friendship* and *family Love*. Friendship is a direct development of Primary Love in terms of the specific character of the Other (or the specific way I know the Other). It is in friendship that the Other comes out of its abstract and empty form in Primary Love and becomes my external existence in a concrete way. It is also through friendship that I come to a genuine realization of my own specific character that makes me what I am. However, while Primary Love and friendship are based on the principle of Love, namely the unity of the asymmetrical Selves (the internal and external Self), it is the Love of male and female (the Love of the opposite sex) that becomes the *natural embodiment* of this principle. Thus the Love of the opposite sex enables me to identify the concrete Other in the most original way. It is therefore the ultimate way to become one with the

Other. This Love sees its complete form in family Love, which includes not only the love of father and mother but also the love of parents, the love of children and the love of brothers and sisters. The love of father and mother remains at the center of family Love because it is what provides the whole family its self-identity. It has been observed that in a family where the love of the father and mother is strong, the children tend to have a stable self-esteem, and it is not without reason that this is so.

C. Discourse

In discourse, the third and universal meaning of the Self is developed, along with the universal meaning of everything disclosed. Therefore, discourse makes the whole sphere of disclosedness intelligible, and it remains so even when discourse is not going on. The Self thus achieves its third stage of self-consciousness through the development of discourse. This radical transformation of disclosedness in terms of intelligibility enables the Self to be self-aware all the time. Accordingly, the self-consciousness at this stage can be properly called the *self-awareness* of the Self.

Although before the development of discourse (such as in animals and babies) there could be some premature forms of “friendship” and “family Love,” they can become mature only after the development of discourse, because these Loves involve the *concrete meanings* of the Other that can only become *intelligible* through the development of discourse. However, this does not change the fact that these Concrete Loves belong to the way we achieve self-identify through the Other, as Primary Love does. That is why we have put them in the previous stage together with Primary Love, regardless of the fact that they can become mature only after the development of discourse.

D. Self-Consciousness through the Absolute Other

Discourse has made possible the existence of community. In community the self-consciousness of the Self becomes complete. Community is founded on the way we discover the *same* Self in the Other. So it is not only founded on Primary Love but also on friendship and family Love. But community also gives rise to a new form of Concrete Love peculiar to it, namely the Love of Community, in which I identify myself with community as a whole by *letting it matter to me through and through*. This mode of Love is associated with the understanding that the complete existence of the Self can only be achieved in community as a whole. In this kind of Love I find the external existence of my Self in *the Self as such* that exists in community as a whole through its activities. But all Love is based on the asymmetry of internal and external Self. Therefore, I can identify myself with community as a whole only if I take it as the external existence of my internal Self, namely as *the Absolute Other*, which is at the same time *the Absolute Self*. Consequently, in community as a whole the Self reaches its highest form of self-consciousness through the Love of community. The self-consciousness at this last stage of development can be properly called the *self-accomplishment* of the Self.

Therefore, unlike the traditional concept of self-consciousness, the self-consciousness of the Self is not in the form of an isolated subject who thinks rationally about itself. To think about one’s self rationally requires the existing Self to “step outside” of itself and look at itself from the perspective of a spectator (a third person). In

such rational thinking the Self has lost sight of what the third meaning of the Self is based on, namely the first and second meanings of the Self developed in discourse. Therefore, to start with an isolated subject who thinks rationally about itself and then goes on to understand the I, the Other and discourse puts things totally upside down. Any study of self-consciousness that proceeds in this way has from the very beginning overlooked the foundation of rational thinking in the discourse between I and the Other, and can never go back to it in a genuine way. However, the fact that the traditional concept of self-consciousness is problematic does not mean that we should abandon the concept of self-consciousness altogether (as Heidegger tends to do). The defect of the traditional concept of self-consciousness can be avoided if we base the concept of self-consciousness on the concept of disclosedness, a concept that originally comes from Heidegger himself.

§2. Being-in-the-world

Our analysis of the existence of the Self in section one is essentially incomplete, because we assumed that the Self has been thrown into its existence but never asked *how* this “throwing” becomes possible in the first place. It is true that the Self has been thrown into its disclosedness, dwelling in a state of mind that possesses understanding as its sight. But this “throwing” can happen only because another equiprimordial “throwing” has happened together with it, namely the *throwing of the Self into the world through the body*. The body is the *natural embodiment* of the Self through the *Being as such* of the Self associated with *nature*. So the body is not a thing within the world that the existing Self happens to possess. On the contrary, it is only through the body that the Self can be thrown into the world and become the existing Self. By moving the body the Self is able to use things within the world for its living. Therefore, the worldhood (essential structure) of the world is not only constituted by the *significance of the world*, as Heidegger maintains, but also by the *possibility of moving the body*. The body is also what enables us to live in the same world with the Other. In a world, *Being-in-the-world* is essentially *Being-in-the-world-through-the-body*.

However, only when the Self has disclosed itself in a state of mind that possesses understanding as its *sight*, can it understand the significance of the world and the possibility of moving within the world, and therefore be able to use things within the world for its own sake. So primary self-consciousness is not only the “who” of Being-in-the-world, but also what determines the essential structure of the world. It follows that when primary self-consciousness develops, the Self will also live in a different world. Therefore, self-consciousness and Being-in-the-world as two basic states of the existence of the Self are *equally primordial* and *interdependent*: to exist is to live in the world through self-consciousness. Consequently, corresponding to the four stages of self-consciousness, the development of Being-in-the-world also has four stages. Since Heidegger does not investigate this correspondence between self-consciousness and Being-in-the-world, it is necessary for us to make it clear.

(1) Being-in-the-private-world

The primary form of self-consciousness is a state of mind that possesses understanding as its sight. Before the discovery of the Other, this primary self-consciousness has made possible a private world that is totally *my own*. Here “my own” does not mean that I have come to the realization of myself as “I,” but that the Self as a state of mind that possesses understanding as its sight is able to move its body and use things within the world *for its own sake*. Because the Self hasn’t realized its own self-identity, the three meanings of the Self remain undiscovered. The logical connections between things within the world are also hidden from the Self. Such a private world is for the most part unintelligible. The Self who lives in this kind of world cannot do anything other than simply survive. So it takes everything it discovers within the world basically as food. A baby that is just born is living in such a private world until it can recognize the Other.

(2) Being-in-the-same-world-with-the-Other

The disclosure of the world not only makes Being-in-the-private-world possible, but also makes it possible to encounter the body of the Other, which is discovered primarily as something within the world. However, I can discover the Other in this body only when this body *matters to me* in a way that is essentially different from things within the world. Therefore, in Primary Love, the Self discovers the Other in its body by letting this body *matter to it* as the *embodiment of the Self*, which also means that it *lets the Other embodied in this body matter to it through and through*. For a baby, the Other that is discovered in such a way is usually the mother, or anyone who is close to it. In such Primary Love, the Other is discovered as the external existence of the internal Self that dwells in a state of mind and possesses understanding as its sight. When the Other is discovered (in Primary Love), the world becomes a common world, in which the private world does not disappear; it has just been opened (in my understanding) to the Other, and therefore is no longer a purely private world. I still use things within the world for my own sake, but with the understanding that they are also things that the Other can use for their own sake. The common world is therefore a *shared* world. When a baby hides a toy behind its back and does not want the Other to take it, its understanding of the world as the *same* world *shared* by itself and the Other has become evident. The understanding of this *same* world also helps the existing Self to understand the Other as the *same* Self (in terms of Being-in-the-world), and therefore helps the development of self-consciousness. The existence of the Self at this stage is *Being-in-the-same-world-with-the-Other*.

At this stage the Self has begun to realize its own self-identity through the Other. Therefore, the *first* and *second* meanings of the Self become understandable, but only in the form of silent understanding associated with its own *state of mind* and *the image of the Other*. They have not been articulated into words, not until discourse is developed. The third meaning of the Self remains undiscovered, and the world is still for the most part unintelligible. However, the understanding that the world now is the *same* world for

me and the Other becomes a foundation for discourse to develop, for although the Self already understands the silent speech of things within the world and that of the Other, it can understand a sound or a gesture from the Other as signifying something within the world only if it already understands the world as the *same* world for itself and the Other.

Friendship and family Love are directly founded on Being-in-the-same-world-with-the-other. They also at the same time greatly enrich the latter, not in the sense that the world has more contents because of Concrete Love, but in the sense that the same world obtains a new identity because of the self-identity I achieve through the Other *in a concrete way*. This is most evident when people say to their loved one: “You mean the whole world for me,” or as Levinas puts it: “To love is to exist as if the lover and the loved one were alone in the world.”³³ Although the mature form of friendship and family Love can only be achieved after the development of discourse, the fact that the world has a new identity because of Concrete Love is true even in some animals. For example, an animal mother (such as a hen) may try to look for food for her newborns and protect them when they are under attack. Though we do not know how she feels, it is still apparent that she understands the world not only as her own world but also as a world for her children, and does so in a concrete way.

(3) Being-in-the-intelligible-world

When discourse develops, the universal meaning of the Self is discovered, so is the universal meaning of everything within the world. The logical connections among all the silent speeches of things within the world become intelligible on the foundation of the universal meanings of these silent speeches. Therefore, the world becomes an intelligible world, and the existence of the Self becomes *Being-in-the-intelligible-world*. But it is worth pointing out that the intelligible world is not another world different from the private world or the shared world. It is only the private world and the shared world *made intelligible* through the development of discourse. This world remains intelligible even when discourse is not going on. Therefore, I do not simply live in a world of “materials,” but rather in a world that always bears some “worldview” on it. Thus people who grow up in the same world tend to have a similar “worldview.” This is not due to the same “materials” we shared, but the same way we interpret things within the world through discourse.

(4) Being-in-the-public-world

Since Being-in-the-world is always Being-in-the-world-through-the-body, the people who live (move) in the same land naturally form a community through discourse, and therefore have a public world. The public world is nothing but the shared and intelligible world. However, it is not only open for I and the Other, but also for a community to perform its activities. The foundation of this public world is the public property possessed by community as a whole, such as government buildings, market places, sports grounds, squares and theatres. In the public world I not only live as a

unique (internal) Self, but also as a universal self (a member of the community). Moreover, though the activities of a community are actually carried out by individualized Selves, these activities require a basic level of the Love of community in order to be properly carried out *as* the activity of the community. Therefore, the Love of community goes along with *Being-in-the-public-world*.

§3. Temporality

The above two sections have made it clear that the existence of the Self has two basic states, namely self-consciousness and Being-in-the-world, which are equally primordial and interdependent: to exist is to live in the world through self-consciousness. However, existence is a true whole only when we view it in terms of the Self. To grasp existence as a whole in terms of the Self, we must find out the structure of existence as a whole that embraces self-consciousness and Being-in-the-world. What do these two basic states of existence have in common? They are both based on *disclosedness*. It is the disclosure of the Self and the world that make possible self-consciousness and Being-in-the-world. Therefore, it is disclosedness as a whole, namely *the present* that embrace both self-consciousness and Being-in-the-world. However, everything in *the present* constantly changes in *time*. The ordinary concept of time tells us that the structure of time consists of *the past*, *the present* and *the future*. It is not a static moment but *a flowing of the present* from the past to the future. Therefore, it seems natural to take time as the structure of existence as a whole—it is obvious that everything in our self-consciousness is constantly changing, and that the dealing with things within the world is carried out in time. But this ordinary concept of time fails to understand the essence of time *in terms of the Self*. If the existence of the Self as a whole or the Being of the existing Self is only *a flowing of the present*, it will not be essentially different from the Being of things within the world. Therefore, the ordinary concept of time does not catch the peculiarity of the existence of the Self.

However, nobody can deny that we do everything in time. The existence of the Self is certainly *temporal*. But its *temporality* needs to be understood *in terms of the Self* and distinguished from the time of things within the world. Since the Self is transcendental, its temporality must also have transcendental dimensions. These transcendental dimensions, of course, do not include *the present*, because what the Self transcends is exactly *the present* or disclosedness as a whole. Therefore, it is natural to think that *the past* and *the future* are two *transcendental* dimensions determined by the *transcendental* character of *the Self as such*. They must in a certain way give rise to *the present*, which is the place for the existing Self. In the following discussion we are going to show that this is really the case. Our analysis of temporality is not the same as Heidegger's, because we directly base it on the concept of the Self. However, the understanding of temporality as the threefold structure of *having been*, *the present* and *the future* is the same. Note that since Heidegger reserves the term "past" for the ordinary

concept of time and replaces it with “having been” when he analyzes temporality, we are going to do the same thing.

The *transcendental* Self *has been thrown* into its *disclosedness (the present)* and becomes the existing Self. Therefore, for the existing Self, *to be its Self* means *to be the Self that it has been*, or more exactly, *to return to the Self that has been thrown into the present*. This *having been thrown* and *returning to* are two components of existence that *transcend* its *disclosed* component, namely *the present*. Therefore, the existence of the Self as a whole, or the Being of the existing Self consists of three components, namely *having been thrown*, *the present* and *returning to*. Ontologically speaking, the *having been thrown* is prior to the existence of the Self in *the present*, which is again prior to the *returning to* of the existing Self. However, only if the Self that exists in the present *returns to* the Self that it has been, can it be *truly* the Self that it *represents*. Therefore, the third component, namely the *returning to* is not only the *logical result* of the first two components, but also what holds the three components together as a true whole by *logical necessity*.

Let us look more closely at what the three components mean. First, the *having been thrown* is what *the past* really means for the existing Self, though we must follow Heidegger in reserving the term “past” for the ordinary concept of time, because this term implies something that “has gone” rather than “has been,” and is therefore inappropriate for the understanding of time in terms of the Self. Secondly, *the present* means basically the same thing as it does in the ordinary concept of time, but we must understand it *in terms of the Self* as the *presence of the Self*, in the sense that the Self dwells in a state of mind that possesses understanding as its sight, which is what grounds disclosedness as a whole. Lastly, for the existing Self, *to return to the Self* means *to comport itself towards the Self*. Thus “*returning to*” is nothing but what *future* really means for the existing Self. In a word, the existence of the Self as a whole, as *to be the Self that it has been* or *Being-the-Self*, is nothing but *temporality*.

Temporality is essentially a transcendental movement, both in the sense of *having been thrown* and *returning to*. What this movement transcends is disclosedness as a whole or *the present*. But it is the Self that exists in *the present* that transcends *the present* by its own movement *towards the Self that it has been*. Therefore, this transcendental movement includes *the present* as what it transcends. So both self-consciousness and Being-in-the-world are *temporal* in nature. However, since it is the existing Self that transcends *the present* in its temporal movement, temporality as Being-the-Self can only be carried out through the *self-consciousness* of the Self, and for this reason must be understood with reference to the latter.

(1) Temporality and Primary Self-Consciousness: Resolving

In primary self-consciousness, the Self dwells in a state of mind that possesses understanding as its sight. By possessing primary understanding, the existing Self is able to understand its own Being as *to be the Self that it has been*, or more exactly, as *to return to the Self that has been thrown into the present*. Therefore, though everything

disclosed is disclosed in *the present*, the primary understanding possessed by the existing Self enables it to understand the meaning of *transcending the present*, and do so in a purely *non-reflective* manner. Since the existing Self (as a state of mind) is the existential representative of the Self, and always *returns to the Self* that it *has been* with a *sight* that understands the *meaning* of this returning, what *returns* always coincides with what *has been thrown*. Therefore, temporality as the Being-the-Self of the existing Self is actually *Being-eternal*.

However, for the existing Self to comport itself towards the Self that it has been, it must not only understand the *meaning* of such comporting but also the *possibility* of doing so. That is to say, it must understand its *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*. But its ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self is actually constituted by *all the possibilities of the present* held together by primary understanding, as we have shown in Section One. Thus comporting towards the Self is actually done with reference to *all the possibilities of the present (that have been disclosed)*. The movement in which the existing Self comports itself towards the Self (that it has been) with reference to *all the possibilities of the present*, is called *resolving*. Resolving is therefore the actual form of temporality, insofar as temporality is possible only through self-consciousness.

The Self who resolves is primarily the Self that dwells in conscience. In its resolving conscience always brings itself (the “I am”) back to its true Self (the “who I am”). Therefore, it is always the true existential representative of the Self. As other states of mind are extensions of conscience, they can also resolve with their own specific sight, based on the resolving of conscience. Accordingly, conscience is by definition the core of all resolving. Nevertheless, primary understanding is always associated with basic state of mind (the feeling of playfulness). It is actually *basic state of mind* that sees *all the possibilities of the present* and holds them together as *the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*. Because resolving is always done with reference to *all the possibilities of the present*, all resolving is based on the resolving of *basic state of mind*. Accordingly, it is actually *the unity of conscience and basic state of mind* that is the core of all resolving. Since conscience is a *purely godlike feeling*, while basic state of mind is a *feeling of playfulness*, resolving has the characteristics of *Being-godlike* and *Being-playful*. Moreover, as mentioned above, temporality is actually *Being-eternal*. Therefore, the original existence of the Self is characterized by *Being-godlike*, *Being-playful* and *Being-eternal*. This is in accordance with the pre-ontological understanding of original existence by many ancient myths. Despite the fact that they call beings that possess perfect existence “gods” or “goddesses,” the *Being* of these perfect beings is quite similar to what we have called the original existence of the Self.

Let us look more closely at the *temporal* character of resolving. To resolve is to bring the Self that exists in the present to the Self that it has been (the Self as such), and to do so with reference to *all the possibilities of the present*. Since the existence of the Self in *the present* is *made possible* ontologically by the *having been thrown* of the Self, to bring the Self that exists in the present back to the Self that it has been and to do so with reference to *all the possibilities of the present*, is at the same time to *throw the Self again into the present according to the possibility of doing so*. Therefore, resolving

always results in *a new presence of the Self*. It is a free movement of the Self that forms a circle, because its *agent* and *what it moves* are one and the same thing, namely the Self that exists in the present (primary self-consciousness). However, resolving should not be understood narrowly as a totally *voluntary* act. The third component of temporality, namely the *returning to* is a *logical result* of the first two components. Therefore, one always resolves by *logical necessity*. What can be chosen *voluntarily* is only *this* or *that* possibility of *the present*, rather than the possibility of *returning to* or *not returning to* the Self. No matter what possibilities of *the present* have been chosen or not chosen, one always returns to the Self through resolving by *logical necessity*, even when one has no desire to do anything, which is only a mode of resolving that lets everything in the present go its own way.

Because *the future* is what constantly gives rise to *the present* in view of its *having been thrown*, temporality is essentially *futural* (that is why we have defined existence as *comporting oneself* with self-understanding). For this reason *the present* must be understood in terms of *the future*, which means that understanding as what grounds disclosedness as a whole (*the present*) must be understood as essentially a *projection*, which according to Heidegger is the most important feature of understanding. It also means that *all the possibilities of the present*, as my ultimate possibility of *Being-the-Self*, must be understood (in the terms of Heidegger) as *what I am capable of* in the sense of *projection*, rather than as mere *logical possibilities of the present*.

Given that *the future* is what constantly gives rise to *the present* in view of its *having been thrown*, temporality can also be called *time*, if by time we mean a structure that constantly gives rise to *the present*. But temporality as the time of the existing Self is not the flowing of *the present* from one moment to the next—such time moves only within the realm of *the present* and is therefore essentially different from the *transcendental* time that belongs to the existing Self, though it can be said that things within the world possess this kind of time. For the existing Self, time is nothing but the way it comports itself towards the transcendental Self that it has been. Therefore, its *future* is not a process of *the present* that is yet to come, and its *having been thrown* is not a process of *the present* that extended from time immemorial to the *now*. The time the existing Self lives in can be properly called *the moment*, which has the threefold structure of *having been thrown*, *the present* and *comporting towards*. The moment is essentially *transcendental*. However, because resolving is always done with reference to *all the possibilities of the present*, the Self always makes use of *the present* as the base for its Being-the-Self, and resolves freely according to whatever possibility of Being-the-Self that has been disclosed to it in *the present*. To do so it does not need to look for such possibility, because the primary understanding it possesses always holds *all the possibilities of the present* together as *the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* and does so in a *non-reflective* manner.

(2) Temporality and Love

In Love I discover the Other as my Self in its external existence, and therefore identify myself with the Other, which is not only true for Primary Love, but also for Concrete Love. Thus temporality as Being-the-Self is not only the resolving of primary self-consciousness, but also the resolving of Love, insofar as the self-identity of the Self is realized through the Other. The resolving of Love is done by the feeling of Love as a state of mind that possesses the understanding of the Other and my Being-in-the-same-world-with-the-Other. It is still the resolving of primary self-consciousness, but has become more developed, in the sense that the Self now resolves as a self-identical Self.

Because the Self realizes its self-identity through the Other, its resolving always involves the Other in one way or another. This does not mean that the Self has to “take the Other into account” when it resolves, for the Other has always already been taken into account whenever the resolving is done by *a feeling of Love* that lets the Other *matter to it through and through*. Thus the structure of temporality does not take a new form in the resolving of Love. What is new is only the agent of resolving, which is now a self-identical Self who realizes its self-identity through the Other, and therefore always already takes the Other into account in its resolving. Therefore, the resolving of Love is as free as the resolving of primary self-consciousness.

(3) Temporality and Discourse

The development of discourse makes the whole sphere of disclosedness intelligible. Therefore, the existing Self becomes self-aware all the time. Such a self-aware Self always understands itself and the world in light of intelligibility and resolves with such intelligible sight. Discourse discloses the logical connections among *all the possibilities of the present* and therefore greatly enriches these possibilities. The logical connection between temporality and the time of things within the world also becomes intelligible through discourse, especially thinking. Therefore, the existing Self now can make a decision regarding something that is going to happen many years later, with the knowledge about what had happened a long time ago. This enables it to utilize the time of things within the world for its own time (its own Being-the-Self) to its best capacity. Decision-making is a form of resolving that is done with *the sight of thinking (the understanding associated with words)*, which not only discloses the logical connection between the time of things within the world and my own time, but also many other logical connections among things. Thinking allows the Self to see a broader context of everything when it makes a decision. However, as a self-aware Self, I always have an *intelligible sight* of my situation, even when I am not thinking (though this *intelligible sight* has been shaped by previous thinking). In many situations, the attachment to thinking can only make me listen less to the silent speech of the situation, and therefore act less effectively. Moreover, thinking could sometimes go wrong and misunderstand the Self or its situation. Therefore, decision-making as a form of resolving is not always desirable.

(4) Temporality and Community

Temporality as the Being-the-Self of the existing Self can be viewed as the *actualization* of the *Being as such* of the Self. This actualization is at the same time *individualization*, insofar as it always throws *the Self as such* into its *unique* existence in *conscience*. However, the Self not only exists as an individualized Self (the I), and its external existence (the Other), but also as *a universal Self* that exists in a community. Community is not the sum of individualized Selves. It is rather *the Self as such* that exists *through* individualized Selves in its numerous activities. Thus the temporal existence of the Self in a community becomes the *complete* actualization of the *Being as such* of the Self. It is not the same as the temporality of an individualized Self, but is directly based on the latter. This temporal existence of the Self in a community means that the Self that has been thrown into a community always brings itself back to *the Self as such* by its numerous activities carried out *through* individualized Selves. Because the temporality of an individualized Self has the characteristic of *Being-eternal*, the temporal existence of the Self in a community can be said to have the characteristic of *eternity*.

CHAPTER TWO FROM CONSCIENCE TO MORALITY

In the last chapter we have tried to understand the original existence of the Self, which is a mode of existence the Self would live if it lived without self-misunderstanding. This original existence of the Self is apparently not our human existence, as evidenced by the fact that the human conscience is a feeling of guilt rather than a feeling of absolute self-affirmation. Accordingly, human existence must be an ontological modification of the original existence of the Self, and it must come from the latter as the result of a self-misunderstanding. Here arises an intriguing question: how does the Self come to its self-misunderstanding *in the first place*? This *first self-misunderstanding* of the Self must be a direct modification of the *original self-understanding* of the Self, for only when the true Self has already been disclosed to the existing Self, can the existing Self *misunderstand* its true Self. Given that conscience is where the Self primarily and directly discloses itself to its existing Self, the *first self-misunderstanding* of the Self must be a misunderstanding of conscience by taking something else as its *substitute*. Insofar as conscience is a feeling of self-judgment, we have reason to suspect that the substitute for conscience must be a moral feeling that possesses moral thinking as the sight of resolving. Therefore, the *first self-misunderstanding* must result in a *movement from conscience to morality*, which is at the same time *a transition from authentic to inauthentic existence*, because turning away from conscience is simultaneously turning away from *the Self as such*.

In this chapter we are going to investigate why and how the first self-misunderstanding happens, and in so doing determine the ontological essence of morality. Next we are going to investigate the consequence of the movement from conscience to morality. This movement results in a *transcendental denial* of the existing Self, and therefore changes conscience from a *godlike* feeling to a feeling of *guilt*. The *transcendental denial* of the existing Self is accompanied by a *transcendental denial* of the *Being* of the existing Self, which not only brings *death* to the existence of the Self, but also changes basic state of mind from a feeling of *playfulness* to a feeling of *anxiousness*; that is, *anxiety*. Consequently, the original existence of the Self is transformed into a new mode of existence characterized by *guilt*, *death* and *anxiety*, which is nothing but *human existence*. Human existence is relatively inauthentic in comparison with the original existence of the Self, but is authentic in comparison with its everyday (inauthentic) modification. The transition from original to human existence has been called “The Fall of Man” in the Bible.³⁴ But this original “falling” is not the falling Heidegger investigates in *Being and Time*. What he investigates there is the transition from authentic human existence to the inauthentic one (everyday existence), though his investigation actually moves in a reverse direction. We are going to show that the falling from authentic human existence to the inauthentic one (everyday existence) is also a movement from conscience to morality. Therefore, the movement from conscience to

morality consists of two stages, each of which corresponds to a transition from authentic to inauthentic existence.

§1. The Origin of Morality

(1) Moral Feeling

Let us start with the original existence of the Self and try to understand *why* and *how* the movement from conscience to morality happens. Conscience is the positive feeling that *I am who I am*, which simply means that I am truly the Self that I represent. I understand this meaning by listening to (accepting) the silent judgment of the Self upon me in conscience. Because conscience is associated with the understanding that *I am who I am* or *I am my Self*, it *does not understand* the possibility of *not being its Self*. Therefore, it is impossible for conscience to misunderstand the Self that dwells in it. However, the Self can also be discovered externally in the Other. When conscience discovers the *same* Self in the Other in the most primary way by letting the Other matter to it through and through, it gives rise to a state of mind called the primary feeling of Love. The understanding associated with the primary feeling of Love is directly based on that associated with conscience, and links the latter to the understanding of the Other. Accordingly, the primary feeling of Love *does not understand* the possibility of understanding the Other in any other way than *as the Self*. Therefore, it is also impossible for the primary feeling of Love to misunderstand the Self discovered in the Other.

Nevertheless, the connection between the self-understanding associated with conscience and that associated with the primary feeling of Love can give rise to a new form of self-understanding. In the former self-understanding, I understand the Self by listening to (accepting) its silent *speech* as a *judgment* upon me. In the latter self-understanding, I understand the Self by recognizing the Other as the *same* Self. Therefore, when I first start to *reflect* on the Self (in me and in the Other), the connection between these two forms of self-understanding naturally gives rise to the understanding that *the speech of the Other is a judgment upon me*. This understanding is a new way to understand the Self in the Other, in terms of its speech and its connection to conscience. Thus this new form of *self-understanding* gives rise to a new mode of state of mind that lets the *speech* of the Other matter to it as a *judgment* upon itself. This new mode of state of mind arises out of conscience and the primary feeling of Love, but is different from both, because it comes from the *conjunction* of their two forms of self-understanding in *reflection*. This new mode of state of mind becomes a new part of my selfhood. As it is a feeling that lets the speech of the Other matter to me as a judgment upon me, it can be properly called *moral feeling*, for it is the part of me that always listens to moral judgment.

It is very important to understand the difference between moral feeling and the two modes of state of mind it bases itself on, namely conscience and the primary feeling of Love. Moral feeling always misunderstands the Self that discloses itself in conscience,

because when it takes the speech of the Other as a judgment upon me, it already gives the exclusive authority of the Self that judges me silently in conscience to the Self in the Other. Moral feeling also misunderstands the Self in the Other discovered by the primary feeling of Love, because the Self in the Other is what matters to me through and through by virtue of self-identity rather than its judgment upon me. Therefore, while the self-understanding associated with conscience and that associated with the primary feeling of Love are the true self-understanding of the Self, the self-understanding associated with moral feeling is not, though the latter comes from the conjunction of the former two in reflection.

The understanding that gives rise to and always associates itself with moral feeling is what we have called the *first self-misunderstanding* of the Self. It comes *naturally* from the *connection* between the self-understanding associated with conscience and that with the primary feeling of Love, when the existing Self *first* tries to *reflect* on the Self (in itself and in the Other). It also comes *inevitably* because when the existing Self *first* tries to reflect on the Self, it possesses *no other sight* of the Self than the self-understanding associated with conscience and that with the primary feeling of Love; so the connection between these two forms of self-understanding is the *only* connection (regarding the Self) that can be made intelligible through reflection. To understand this connection correctly, the existing Self needs to understand more than just this connection; it needs to understand other connections between the Self in itself and the Self in the Other that are not directly disclosed in its original self-understanding but can become intelligible through the development of its self-knowledge. Therefore, when the Self *first* tries to reflect on itself in its existence, self-misunderstanding comes naturally and inevitably (the Self has no self-consciousness whatsoever before it has been thrown into its existence). This is the first step of the Self towards its self-knowledge. Thus it is not an accidental mistake that it can avoid, but rather a natural development of its original self-understanding.

(2) Moral Thinking

In moral feeling I understand that the speech of the Other is a judgment upon me. Though this is the first step towards self-knowledge, it is still not a proper self-knowledge, because it is only an understanding associated with a feeling. To develop self-knowledge, I must think about the Self. Thinking is a form of discourse in which I take myself as an abstract Other and listen to the speech of this abstract Other. As moral feeling, I not only think about the Self, but also take such thinking as *a judgment of the Self upon me*. Therefore, the thinking of moral feeling becomes *moral thinking*. Since I as moral feeling can take moral thinking as the judgment of the Self upon me only because I already understand what *judgment* means in conscience, the first and natural content of moral thinking is a translation of the silent judgment of the Self in conscience into words, as “I am who I am” or “I am my Self” or any other words that have a similar meaning.

However, this first self-knowledge is incomplete, because in my primary understanding I always understand my Being-the-Self, namely my temporality; so if I

reflect further on my own *Being*, I will be able to understand that I *have been* my Self, I *am* still my Self, but is truly my Self *only if I comport myself towards my Self*. So there arises the thinking that *I ought to be my Self*. The meaning “*ought to be*” comes directly from my understanding of the *logical necessity* to comport myself towards the Self through *resolving* (see Chapter One, §3). It refers directly to my *future*. This kind of thinking in terms of the meaning “*ought to be*” is a self-knowledge of the Self that follows from the first self-knowledge, but has gone further to understand the Self with reference to my *Being-the-Self*.

Thus the complete first self-knowledge of the Self understands not only that *I am who I am* or *I am my Self*, but also that *I ought to be who I am* or *I ought to be my Self*. As in thinking I understand the Self not only from my own point of view, but also from the point of view of *a universal self*, the self-knowledge of the Self also has an objective form, which thinks that *man is good* and that *man ought to be good*. Here “to be good” means nothing else than “to be what one is supposed to be,” though the concrete content of what a man is supposed to be varies in the moral thinking of different people. Only when I thus view myself objectively as a universal self can I abstract from the meaning “I” and view the silent judgment of the Self in my conscience as *a judgment of quality*, namely as a judgment that says “*good*.” When I apply this objective knowledge to myself, it means that *I am good* and that *I ought to be good*. I can also apply it to the Other and understand that *You are good* and that *You ought to be good*.

(3) Moral Action

The abovementioned self-knowledge is not a self-misunderstanding if I take it as merely a form of *knowledge*. However, moral feeling always takes such self-knowledge as a *judgment* from the Self, and therefore transforms this self-knowledge into moral thinking. Moral feeling always listens to its moral thinking with the understanding that it is listening to the voice of conscience. In so doing it has mistaken *itself* as conscience, which means that it has taken the “Self” that “judges” in moral thinking as its *true Self*. Accordingly, in its resolving moral feeling always comports itself towards the “Self” that “judges” in moral thinking. Who is the “Self” that “judges” in moral thinking? It is not the true Self that speaks to me silently in my conscience. However, it has been understood *as* this true Self. Since moral thinking is actually done by moral feeling, the “Self” that “judges” in moral thinking is nobody else but *I myself as moral feeling*. So in its resolving, moral feeling always comports itself towards *itself*, by taking itself *as* the true Self that judges in conscience. Such resolving of moral feeling can be properly called *moral action*.

By “moral action” we do not mean a specific pattern of action, but simply the resolving of moral feeling. It is distinguished from other forms of resolving by its *agent* rather than its *content*. However, since resolving is always done with the understanding of *Being-the-Self*, moral action can also be distinguished from other forms of resolving by the characteristic of its *temporality*. Since moral feeling takes *itself* as the true Self, it understands the *having been thrown* of the Self as *having been myself*, and the

comporting towards the Self as *comporting towards myself*. Because moral feeling *itself* is a *state of mind* disclosed in *the present*, it therefore understands the *having been thrown* of the Self as *having been in the present*, and the *comporting towards the Self* as *will be in the present*. Therefore, the temporality of moral feeling is a *leveling down* of Being-the-Self or temporality from the *transcendental* level to the level of *mere disclosedness*. For moral feeling, the future is nothing other than a process of *the present* that is yet to come; the past is nothing other than a process of *the present* that extended from time immemorial until *now*; in a word, I am nothing but a self that moves in the process of *the present*.

Therefore, when moral feeling resolves according to moral thinking, it not only comports itself with the general understanding that *I ought to be my Self*, but more specifically with the understanding that *I ought to be such and such a self*. Here, the term “*such and such*” simply means the *concrete possibilities of the present*. Since moral feeling understands *different possibilities of the present* as *different possibilities of the Self*, the understanding it resolves with becomes *I ought to make such and such choice*. Therefore, moral action has the form of *making a moral choice*, insofar as it is done according to moral thinking. In “*making a moral choice*” moral feeling has become blind to the fact that since *all the possibilities of the present* have been held together by primary understanding as my ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self, *I am always my true Self* no matter what *specific possibilities of the present* I have chosen to actualize. When rightly understood, the self-knowledge that says *I ought to be my Self* simply indicates a *logical necessity that is always the case* in my resolving, and therefore is not a matter of choice. However, since moral feeling has mistaken itself as the true Self and therefore misunderstands the true Self as something that *merely* exists in *the present*, it is bound to make this logical “*ought to*” a matter of choice.

To sum up, morality is a mode of existence that comes naturally and inevitably when the Self first develops its self-knowledge. It is constituted by a *state of mind* (moral feeling) that *resolves* (taking moral action) with a special *sight* (moral thinking). All of these three constituents of morality can be understood as the *turning away of the existing Self from conscience*: moral feeling is a turning away from conscience as the state of mind in which the Self primarily dwells; moral thinking is a turning away from conscience as the silent judgment of the Self; moral action is a turning away from conscience as the core of all resolving. However, these three aspects of the movement from conscience to morality are all based on the confusion between conscience and moral feeling on the part of the latter. Thus morality turns away from conscience by taking over the role of conscience in the existence of the Self. Therefore, morality itself is a movement from conscience to itself. Since this turning away from conscience radically changes the Being-the-Self of the existing Self, it inevitably results in the transition of the original existence of the Self to a new form of existence.

§2. The Birth of Human Existence

(1) Being-guilty

Morality as a mode of existence is essentially inauthentic. Since moral feeling mistakes *itself* as the true Self, it always comports towards *itself* rather than the true Self, which means that it always takes the Self as existing *merely in the present* and therefore turns the self-knowledge *I ought to be my Self* into the moral thinking that *I ought to make such and such choice*. Because moral feeling always *resolves* with such *misunderstanding* of the Self and Being-the-Self, its resolving always *fails* to bring the existing Self back to *the Self as such*.

However, moral feeling does not resolve alone. The resolving of moral feeling is based on the resolving of conscience, which always brings the existing Self back to *the Self as such*. Therefore, even the resolving of moral feeling does not fail altogether to bring the existing Self back to its Self, insofar as conscience is the core of all resolving. It is precisely because the resolving of moral feeling still brings the existing Self back to its Self (insofar as its ground in conscience is concerned) that its *failure* to bring the existing Self back to its Self (insofar as its misunderstanding of the Self and Being-the-Self is concerned) makes the Being-the-Self of the existing Self as a whole *inauthentic*. Thus the existing Self as a whole also becomes *inauthentic* existential representative of the Self because of its *inauthentic* Being-the-Self. Here, “inauthentic” does not mean “totally false” but rather “not totally true.” Nothing can be its Self in a manner that is totally false, because then *it would not be this Self at all* and therefore its *not being this Self* does not involve any falsehood.

Thus the existing Self as a whole is no longer the *totally true* existential representative of the Self. This change of the representing character of the existing Self logically results in the corresponding change of the judgment of the Self upon the existing Self. This judgment now is no longer “I am who I am” or “I am my Self,” but “I am not totally who I am” or “I am not totally my Self.” When the silent judgment of the Self in my conscience has been thus changed, conscience is no longer a totally positive feeling. Accordingly, it is no longer a feeling of absolute self-affirmation or a purely Godlike feeling, but instead it has become a *feeling of guilt*, which is the feeling that *I am not totally who I am* or *I am not totally my Self*. The silent judgment “guilty!” in conscience comes directly from *the Self as such* and signifies the denial of the existing Self by *the Self as such*. Since *the Self as such* and its *Being as such* are totally *transcendental*, the denial of the existing Self by *the Self as such*, due to the inauthentic Being-the-Self of the existing Self, is a totally *transcendental change*, which does not belong to my Being-the-Self, but rather to the *Being as such* of the Self, and the silent judgment “guilty!” I hear in my conscience is only its manifestation in my Being-the-Self. As the *Being as such* of the Self has gone through a totally *transcendental change*, the fact that *I am not totally my Self* is a totally *transcendental* truth that can never be changed by my own Being-the-Self. It has therefore become the *a priori* characteristic of the existence of the Self.

This new mode of existence characterized by an *a priori* guilt can be properly called *human existence*. Here, the term “human” is used with reference to a conscience that feels the *a priori* guilt, rather than to a species among many species. As a human being, I am always guilty no matter what I do, because the silent judgment “guilty!” in my conscience is a purely *a priori* judgment rather than an *empirical* one; it tells me nothing else than the *transcendental* truth that *I am not totally my Self*. Since conscience has been changed from a purely *godlike feeling* to a *feeling of guilt*, the resolving of conscience has also been changed from *Being-godlike* (of original existence) to *Being-guilty* (of human existence), which simply means that as a human being I always comport myself towards the Self that *I not totally am*. Because all resolving is based on the resolving of conscience, human existence as a whole has become essentially *Being-guilty*.

Our above interpretation of guilt is not totally the same as Heidegger’s interpretation of it. Though he recognizes the *a priori* characteristic of guilt, and views human existence as essentially *Being-guilty*, he does not interpret what the silent judgment “guilty!” means in the way we have done. For Heidegger, the negative element in the feeling of guilt, namely its “notness,” comes from the fact I have been thrown into the world *not* by my own accord, and that choosing one possibility always means *not* choosing other possibilities.³⁵ Thus there is essentially a *nullity* in Dasein’s thrownness and projection. It follows that “*Dasein as such is guilty*.”³⁶ This interpretation implies that the existing Self is essentially *guilty* because it is *not* the Self as such, which *is* itself by its own accord, and has no need to choose between possibilities disclosed in *the present*, because it is totally *transcendental*. However, this interpretation says nothing other than that the existing Self exists in the way *it is supposed to exist*. Nothing should be *guilty* because it exists in the way *it is supposed to exist*. Besides, we can always find out some “notness” in everything we can think of. For example, the Self as such is *not* disclosed to itself. Does it become *guilty* because of this “notness”? Since Heidegger does not distinguish between *the Self as such* and the existing Self, his interpretation of guilt only shows us some “notness” of the existence of the Self and yet fails to explain why such “notness” should have the meaning “guilty!” that we actually understand in our conscience as a meaning that suggests a *denial* of the existing Self. This interpretation overlooks the fact that it is precisely *the Self as such* that has been thrown into its *own* existence and exists *as* itself in conscience; so conscience as the judgment of the Self upon its *own* existential representative should be a *totally positive* feeling, namely in the form of “I am my Self,” if the existence of the Self is *totally authentic*. Only when the existing Self has become *inauthentic* due to its inauthentic *Being-the-Self*, could the silent judgment of the Self upon its *own* existential representative become *negative*, namely in the form of “I am not totally my Self” or “guilty!”

The human conscience as the primary state of mind of a human being is a *negative* feeling, but it is not yet an *unhappy* feeling, because it indicates the *a priori* characteristic of human existence and has nothing to do with its *empirical* content. Only when I as a human being have turned away from this negative feeling does it become an unhappy feeling that calls me back. Therefore, we must distinguish between *conscience* and *the call of conscience*. The latter will be discussed in Chapter Three.

(2) Being-towards-death

Human existence is essentially Being-guilty. The feeling of guilt in my conscience has come from the transcendental denial of the existing Self by *the Self as such*. Since the transcendental denial was caused by the failure of the existing Self to bring itself back to *the Self as such* through its Being-the-Self (resolving), the denial is not only a denial of the existing Self, as manifested in the feeling of guilt, but also a denial of the *Being-the-Self* of the existing Self. This aspect of the transcendental denial manifests itself in the change of *primary understanding*, which understands the *Being-the-Self* of the existing Self. In original existence, primary understanding understands that *I have been the Self, I am still the Self* and that *I always bring myself back to the Self that I have been and still am*. This original primary understanding goes along with the original conscience that says silently “I am who I am” or “I am my Self.” However, since in human existence the understanding associated with conscience has been changed to “I am not totally who I am” or “I am not totally my Self,” primary understanding correspondingly changes to the understanding that *I have been the Self, I am not totally the Self*, and that *I always bring myself back to the Self that I have been but not totally am*.

Looking more closely, this new form of primary understanding means that *I can never totally return to my Self through my own existence, or I can totally return to my Self only if I no longer exist, or my comporting towards my Self is a comporting towards the ultimate impossibility of my existence*. This new form of primary understanding can be properly called (using the term of Heidegger) *anticipation of death*, because it understands the ultimate impossibility of my existence (which is what death means) as something I always comport myself towards. Since resolving is always done according to the primary understanding that understands the *Being-the-Self* of the existing Self, the resolving of human existence becomes *Being-towards-death*. Death in its most original sense is the *transcendental denial* of my *Being-the-Self*. Being-towards-death is simply its manifestation in my *Being-the-Self*.

Death as the *transcendental denial* of the *Being-the-Self* of the existing Self also manifests itself in another form. Because the *Being as such* of the Self is associated with *nature*, the *transcendental denial* (of *Being-the-Self*) that belongs to *Being as such* results in a denial of *Being-in-the-world* regarding its relation to *nature*. Since *Being-in-the-world* is possible only as *Being-in-the-world-through-the-body*, while the body is a part of nature and the embodiment of the Self, the body is always dying (as can be seen from all its sickness and its final decease). Therefore, both *Being-towards-death* and the dying of the body are the manifestation of the *transcendental denial* of the *Being-the-Self* of the existing Self. The final decease of the body is at the same time the end of *Being-in-the-world*. It therefore signifies the ultimate denial of the possibility of my existence. However, even when I am still living, *at every moment* my ultimate possibility of *Being-the-Self* has already been denied as *impossibility* (because I can never totally return to my Self through my *Being-the-Self*). Thus as Heidegger insists, the decease of the body as an event that is going to happen someday should never be confused with the way I comport

myself towards the ultimate impossibility of my existence, namely my *Being-towards-death*.

Being-towards-death means that I always bring myself back to the Self that I have been but not totally am. The “not totally am” signifies that I am not totally the Self that I represent. So in my temporality what returns never totally coincides with what has been thrown. That is why the *Being-eternal* of original existence has become the *Being-towards-death* of human existence. Consequently, human existence is always a growth, a development, and a movement towards its final end. This is the mode of existence that is suitable for the Self that first comes to its existence, for when the Self first comes it is totally ignorant of itself and therefore does not deserve a perfect existence (*Being-eternal*). As a result, the temporal existence of the Self in a community also loses the characteristic of *eternity* and becomes what we call *history*. Like individualized human existence, history is also a growth, a development, and a movement towards its final end. The final end of history is nothing but the total self-realization and self-accomplishment of the Self by virtue of all of its activities carried out through individualized Selves from generation to generation.

(3) Being-anxious

In primary understanding I understand that my *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* is at the same time *impossibility*, because I can never totally return to my Self through my Being-the-Self. This negative essence of my *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* is the *a priori* characteristic of my existence and has nothing to do with its *empirical* content. Since primary understanding understands my *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* negatively in an *a priori* manner, the *basic state of mind* associated with it is no longer *the feeling of playfulness*, as in original existence, but has become a negative feeling called *the feeling of anxiousness*, or simply *anxiety*. Therefore, in human existence, anxiety is the basic state of mind that underlies all states of mind. Just as the feeling of playfulness is in harmony with the purely godlike feeling in original existence, anxiety is in harmony with the feeling of guilt in human existence. What anxiety is anxious about is my *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*, which is at the same time *impossibility*. So anxiety is the feeling of *not being able to return to my true Self*. It is the feeling of death in the most primary sense.

Furthermore, since *all the possibilities of the present* have been held together by primary understanding as *the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*, they too have been denied in a *general and a priori* manner. Thus anxiety discloses to me the *a priori nullity* of my *Being-possible*. I am always anxious no matter what specific possibilities have been disclosed to me in a real situation. But it is precisely in light of this *ultimate emptiness of all the possibilities of the present* that the real meaning of these possibilities for my Being-the-Self is disclosed to me in a genuine manner, because the ultimate emptiness is the *a priori* characteristic of these possibilities, due to the fact that my *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* is at the same time *impossibility*. However, although this feeling of anxiousness is a *negative* feeling, it is not yet an *unhappy* feeling, because

it discloses to me something that is true *a priori*, and therefore has nothing to do with the *empirical content* of my existence. Only when I have turned away from this authentic feeling of anxiousness do I sometimes feel a strong unhappy feeling of anxiousness that tries to call me back to the authentic anxiety. Since what Heidegger calls “anxiety” is a feeling of anxiousness that *awakens* Dasein from its falling, it is actually *the call of anxiety*, which will be discussed in Chapter Three.

Because anxiety lets the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self *matter* to it *negatively* as *impossibility*, it always *cares* about this ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self, which also means that it *cares* about *all the possibilities of the present*, insofar as they belong to the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self. Anxiety always discovers *all the possibilities of the present* as the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* in light of their *ultimate emptiness*, about which it is always *anxious*. Given that resolving is always done with reference to *all the possibilities of the present*, human existence as Being-possible is essentially *Being-anxious*.

This characteristic of human existence has been expressed by Heidegger using the term “care” (*Sorge*). For Heidegger, the Being of Dasein as a whole is care. By “care” he means “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside entities encountered within-the-world.”³⁷ The “ahead-of-itself” means that Dasein always *projects* the *possibilities* of its own Being. The “already” signifies that Dasein *has been thrown* into the world, while the “Being-alongside” implies that it always *takes care of* entities within the world that have been disclosed to it in *the present*. Therefore, taking all of these meanings as a whole, what “care” really means is nothing but the *temporality of anxiety*. That is why in the second division of *Being and Time* he goes on to clarify temporality as the meaning of care. However, since he does not inquire into the *agent* of temporality, he does not have a clear concept of *resolving*, though what he calls “resoluteness” is actually a special form of resolving, as we shall show in Chapter Three. Accordingly, though he has come to the concept of care through his analysis of anxiety, the role anxiety plays in his concept of care lies mainly in the fact that anxiety is associated with the understanding of Dasein’s Being, rather than that it always *resolves* with such understanding. Despite this difference, what he calls “care” is basically the same as what we call *Being-anxious*.

By introducing *Being-guilty*, *Being-towards-death* and *Being-anxious*, we have shown the basic characteristics of human existence, in contrast to the *Being-godlike*, *Being-eternal* and *Being-playful* of the original existence of the Self. If we look more closely, these three forms of human existence are at bottom one and the same thing. *Being-towards death* is the same as *Being-guilty*, because *comporting towards the ultimate impossibility of my existence* is the same as *comporting towards the Self that I can never totally be through my existence*. Moreover, as resolving is always done according to the primary understanding of Being-the-Self associated with anxiety, *Being-towards-death* and *Being-guilty* are the same as *Being-anxious*. These three forms of Being are simply three ways to express the same thing, namely the basic characteristic of human Being-the-Self, with *Being-towards-death* emphasizing the *sight* of all resolving, namely *primary understanding* in the form of *anticipation of death*, *Being-guilty*

emphasizing the human conscience, which is at the *core* of all resolving, and *Being-anxious* emphasizing the *basic state of mind* that sees *all the possibilities of the present* in light of their *ultimate emptiness*.

(4) The Human Other

The human existence we have discussed so far only concerns the internal Self, namely the Self that judges silently in conscience. But as we have shown in Chapter One, the Self also exists externally in the Other. Since conscience is a feeling, the Other is discovered in the most primary way in Primary Love, and in other more developed ways in Concrete Love. However, with the change of conscience from a positive feeling to a negative feeling (the feeling of guilt), Love has taken a new form in human existence, which means that the Other is discovered in a new way than in original existence.

Because in conscience I understand that *I am not totally my Self*, when I discover the *same* Self in the Other through my primary feeling of Love, I have the understanding that the Other is the external existence of the Self that *I cannot totally be*. Thus on the one hand, I still identify the *same* Self in the Other by letting the Other *matter to me through and through*, which means that I still open my heart and accept the Other as a part of my life. On the other hand, I also feel that the Self that exists in the Other is the Self that *I cannot totally be*, which means that the Other is always discovered with *uncertainty*. This *uncertainty* of the Other is the *a priori* characteristic of the human Other, and has nothing to do with the specific character of the Other. Insofar as I recognize the *same* Self in the Other in my primary feeling of Love, this feeling is positive. However, insofar as the Other is always discovered with *uncertainty*, it is also a negative feeling. Therefore, the primary feeling of Love is both positive and negative. However, it is neither a happy feeling nor an unhappy one, because it discloses only the *a priori* characteristic of the Other.

This *a priori* uncertainty of the Other means that the discovery of the *same* Self in the Other could turn to its *opposite* regarding the *empirical* existence of the Other. That is to say, although in Primary Love I always discover the *same* Self in the Other in an *a priori* manner (otherwise I could not even recognize the Other as the Other), the “sameness” may turn out to be *false* regarding the *empirical* existence of the Other. Therefore, while I always let the Other *matter to me through and through* regardless of its empirical existence, its empirical existence may turn this “mattering through and through” in an opposite direction, which means that the Other may *matter to me through and through* as the *false* Self. In this case the primary feeling of Love will be modified *empirically* and become *the feeling of dislike*, which can take many different forms, such as spite, anger and hate. It is precisely because I always recognize the *same* Self in the Other in an *a priori* manner (by letting it matter to me through and through) that when the Other in its empirical existence turns out to be the *false* Self it arouses *the feeling of dislike* in me. So only when I open my heart to the Other can a genuine feeling of dislike become possible, though it may not be desirable, for it is an unhappy feeling that hurts not the Other but me.

The primary feeling of Love can also be modified in another way. Since I always discover the Other as the *same* Self in my primary feeling of Love in an *a priori* manner, while in my conscience I always understand that I am not totally my Self, I can also understand that the Other *too* is *not totally* his or her own Self. This understanding modifies the primary feeling of Love and turns it into a feeling of *compassion*. Here we must distinguish between the understanding that *the Other is not the same Self as my Self*, and that *the Other is not totally his or her own Self*. The former modifies the primary feeling of Love by turning it into its *opposite* and makes it *the feeling of dislike*, while the latter modifies the same feeling by adding more understanding of the Other to it and turns it into *compassion*. The former does not go beyond the understanding of the Other associated with the primary feeling of Love, but simply denies the “sameness” of the Other, while the latter totally accepts the “sameness” and goes further to understand the Other according to my own self-understanding associated with conscience. So the latter is possible only if I already understand the universal meaning of the Self developed through discourse. That is why an animal does not have any compassion for other animals, though it can become angry with them. Since I am not the Self that judges the Other in its conscience, compassion does not understand the Other as the Self in its *guilty* existence but rather as the Self that has been *abandoned* to its *imperfect* existence, as can be seen by me from the suffering, misfortune and the final death of the Other.

Concrete Love remains a happy feeling in human existence, because in it I discover the *same* Self in the Other in a *concrete* and therefore *empirical* manner. However, since Concrete Love is based on Primary Love in which I always discover the Other with *uncertainty*, Concrete Love can always become broken. When this happens, the feeling of Love disappears or turns into the feeling of dislike. The more I loved originally, the more I hate when the one I love turns out to be the *false* Self (betraying my love). Concrete Love can also become “broken” in another way, namely when the one I love dies. This event turns the feeling of Love into extreme sadness, which is still a positive feeling insofar as it is the feeling of Love, but it is also extremely unhappy, because the *same* Self that I identify with in a *concrete* and therefore *empirical* manner has been deprived of actual existence.

§3. The Biblical Account of “Original Sin”

Our investigation in this chapter has shown that when the Self first comes to develop its self-knowledge in the form of moral thinking, it has moved away from conscience to morality and as a result, its original authentic existence has been transformed into a human existence, which is essentially *Being-guilty*, *Being-towards-death* and *Being-anxious*. This investigation is purely ontological, and is based on the reinterpretation of Heidegger’s Ontology given in Chapter One. However, it seems quite strange to think of morality as the source of *guilt*, *death* and *anxiety*. We do not find any support from Heidegger himself. Though he is quite critical of morality, he never really takes morality as a theme of study. However, we do find some support from a pre-

ontological source, namely the Bible. The account of “Original Sin” given in Genesis under the title “The Fall of Man” is quite similar to the account of the transition from the original existence of the Self to human existence as given in this chapter. Thus a comparison between these two accounts can help us to understand better our own results.

Since the biblical story of “The Fall of Man” was written in a religious language, we must first of all interpret the meaning of the word “God” from the ontological point of view before we compare the two accounts. In the Bible, the word “God” primarily means a being who created man and woman in *its own image*, which suggests that “God” is actually what we have called *the Self as such*, because the existing Self has come from *the Self as such* as its *existential representative*. Moreover, because the *Being as such* of the Self is associated with *nature*, it is not surprising that “God” is also taken as the one who created heaven and earth. The Bible also describes “God” as the one who *judges* every man and woman created in its own image, which agrees with the fact that *the Self as such* is what *judges* every existing Self in conscience. Moreover, “God” said to Moses that his name is “I am who I am,”³⁸ which is precisely what *the Self as such* says silently to the existing Self in original conscience. Thus we can assume that the meaning of the word “God” in the Bible came from the pre-ontological understanding of *the Self as such*, though it is at the same time a misunderstanding, because *the Self as such* is nothing but *my* transcendental Self. Nonetheless, let us put aside this difference and see whether we can make sense of the biblical story of “The Fall of Man” by interpreting “God” as *the Self as such*.

The story³⁹ says that after “God” created the first man, Adam, he put him in a garden called Eden. Here, Eden symbolizes the perfect world before “The Fall of Man.” In the middle of the garden were *the tree of life* and *the tree of the knowledge of good and evil*. Apparently, these two “trees” are not real trees but symbols. *The tree of life* symbolizes *eternal life*, while *the tree of the knowledge of good and evil* symbolizes the knowledge that enables us to make moral judgment, namely self-knowledge in the form of *moral thinking*. Before Adam made his first speech, he already listened to “God,” namely *the Self as such* that judges in conscience, and “God” warned him: “you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will surely die.” This warning means that moral thinking will lead man to death. Since it is a “warning” from the Self that speaks silently in conscience, it also implies that turning away from conscience to morality is the cause of death.

The story continues to say that “God” created a woman from the rib he had taken *out of* the man. This is a metaphor that understands man as the natural embodiment of the *internal* Self and woman as the natural embodiment of the *external* Self. When “God” brought Eve (the Other, the Self in its external existence) to Adam, Adam uttered his first speech: “This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh.” This speech shows that he understood Eve as the external existence of his own internal Self. This is the understanding of Love, both in the sense of Primary Love, in which I discover the Other in the most primary way, and the most original Concrete Love, namely the Love of male and female. The speech also shows that the man started to understand the meaning “I,” implying that he had realized his *self-identity* through the Other.

This first speech seems to symbolize the origin of discourse (in the Other). The story tells us that discourse continues to develop between a serpent and the woman. The serpent symbolizes the wisdom of man. The fact that the discourse is carried out between the serpent and the woman (the Other) symbolizes that the first thinking is carried out between man and his (abstract) Other. It also symbolizes that the first thinking is stimulated by the reflection on the Other. The serpent says to the woman: “when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” That is to say, having self-knowledge in the form of moral thinking will enable the existing Self to judge as *the Self as such* does in conscience. The story says that the woman took the forbidden fruit, ate it and also gave some to the man. Here is a pre-ontological understanding of the role of the Other in moral thinking. Not only is moral thinking between me and the (abstract) Other, it also *comes from* my first reflection on the Other. If I never reflected on the Other, I would never be able to engage in moral thinking. That is why the story says that the woman took and ate the forbidden fruit and gave some to the man. This, however, should not be taken as a negative aspect of the Other, because without the Other I would not be able to realize my own *self-identity* in the first place, not to mention that moral thinking comes from my own *misunderstanding* of the Other.

By creating moral thinking, man had turned away from “God” (the Self that judges in conscience), and the judgment from “God” is:

Cursed is the ground because of you;
through painful toil you will eat of it
all the days of your life.
It will produce thorns and thistles for you,
And you will eat the plants of the field.
By the sweat of your brow
you will eat your food
until you return to the ground,
since from it you were taken;
for dust you are
and to dust you will return.

This judgment implies that man’s *Being-in-the-world* had been denied in terms of its relation to *nature*, which no longer supports its existence. Now man had to *take care of* his own Being-in-the-world through labor. Since he came into the world through the body, the body would die and return to nature again. In a word, man’s existence now is characterized by *care* and *death*. At the end of the story, “God” also judged that the man “must not be allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat, and live forever.” It means that after man created morality, his existence was no longer *Being-eternal* but rather *Being-towards-death*. Because man had been *judged* by “God” *negatively*, his existence became a *guilty* existence. Here, the idea of guilt is implied but not yet put in explicit words. It becomes further developed in the New Testament, where it is interpreted as “original sin,” namely the original guilt that came from the first man but has become an *a priori* guilt for all his children.⁴⁰

One may want to object that since the Bible consists of many moral teachings, it does not seem plausible to interpret “the knowledge of good and evil” as *moral thinking*. Many believers in the Bible have tried to disregard the phrase “of good and evil” and to interpret “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil” as a symbol of human knowledge (wisdom) in general. But if we look more closely at the moral teachings of the Bible, we can find that these teachings all come from “God” in one way or another. The spirit of the Bible is that man is not entitled to judge himself, and only “God” can judge man. “Original Sin” is nothing but the attempt to judge as “God” judges, namely to turn away from the judgment of “God” towards one’s own moral judgment. So the Bible discourages man from judging other people by his own moral thinking, or listening to the moral judgments of others, unless these judgments are said to come from “God” in a certain way. For example, when Abram (or Abraham as he was later called) answered to “God” and tried to kill his only son as a sacrifice to “God,” he was acting “immorally” but righteously, because “God” is the only one who has authority to judge.⁴¹ In the New Testament there are also many words from Jesus and his disciples telling people not to judge.⁴² However, since the Bible understands the transcendental Self of human being as “God,” it actually makes us listen to an “Absolute Other” who judges with words. So it too misunderstands *the Self as such* as moral thinking does, though it has the merit of turning us away from making moral judgments on others or listening to the moral judgments of others, and therefore is not very far from returning us to our conscience.

The biblical story was written in a way that seems to suggest that “The Fall of Man” was a historical event that actually happened at the beginning of human history (or pre-history). But if we interpret “The Fall of Man” as a turning away from conscience to morality, it can also be understood as an ontological movement. Whether such an event actually happened at the beginning of human history (or pre-history) is not something that we can investigate ontologically. What we tried to understand in Chapter One is the original existence of the Self as the way it is supposed to be (if it exists without any self-misunderstanding), rather than a mode of existence that has actually been lived. Our results in this chapter further show that this original existence of the Self, even if it had been lived at the beginning of human history (or pre-history), would naturally and inevitably change into human existence. The reason is that when the Self *first* developed its self-knowledge, this *first* self-knowledge could *only* come from the *original* understanding of the Self associated with conscience, and the *original* understanding of the Other based on conscience (in the primary feeling of Love). So the Self is predestined to misunderstand itself when it first develops its self-knowledge. It therefore naturally lives a guilty existence when it first comes to exist. It is only through continual trial and error that the Self can develop a better self-knowledge. Therefore, the so-called “original sin” should not be taken as “sin” at all. It is actually the first step towards self-development rather than a fall from a perfect state.

However, it cannot be denied that the movement from conscience to morality is simultaneously a transition from authentic to inauthentic existence. This is not only true for the transition from the original existence of the Self to human existence, but also true

for the transition from authentic human existence to inauthentic human existence, which will be discussed next.

§4. Falling into Everyday Existence

Human existence is essentially *Being-guilty*, *Being-towards-death* and *Being-anxious*. It is a transformation of the original existence of the Self. After the transition from original existence to human existence happens, the Self still has a chance to live in authentic human existence. First of all, all resolving is based on the resolving of conscience. The silent judgment “guilty!” in my conscience is a *true* judgment that comes *directly* from my *true* Self. In this sense, the resolving of my conscience is still authentic. The resolving of anxiety and that of the feeling of Love are also authentic, because these two feelings are in agreement with conscience. Therefore, if I *totally accept* my conscience and do not allow moral feeling to develop, my existence can still be authentic, not in an absolute sense but in a relative sense, because it is not as authentic as original existence (for what I bring back to the Self has already been judged *a priori* as “not totally my Self”), but it is the most authentic existence that a human being can achieve through *its own Being-the-Self*.

However, before the Self develops a better self-knowledge, it still has a natural tendency to move away from conscience to morality, because such movement is directly based on the conjunction of the two forms of original self-understanding in reflection (see §1). This movement from the human conscience (the feeling of guilt) to morality is the true *falling* that modifies human existence in an *inauthentic* way. It does not result in any *transcendental* change of *the Self as such* or its *Being as such*, because the human existing Self has already been judged *a priori* as *not totally its Self*. But it does make human existence in general (or on average) become (for the most part) inauthentic. This general or average human existence is what Heidegger has called “everyday existence.”

In this section we are going to investigate the falling from authentic human existence into everyday existence by following the movement from human conscience to morality. This investigation is directly indebted to Heidegger’s investigation of falling in *Being and Time*. However, our method is not the same as his, because his investigation of falling is not based on the concept of moral feeling (it therefore tends to *describe* rather than *explain* falling). To understand the movement from conscience to morality in human existence, we have first of all to determine the *form* moral feeling takes in human existence, because moral feeling is directly based on conscience, while conscience has become a negative feeling in human existence.

(1) Shame

Moral feeling is the feeling that the speech of the Other is a judgment on me. Since the silent judgment of the Self in human conscience is a *negative* judgment (“guilty!”), while moral feeling comes from the misunderstanding of the Other as the Self that judges me (as the Self in my conscience does), moral feeling has also become a

negative feeling in human existence, namely *the feeling of shame*. Shame is the feeling that *the Other is judging me negatively*. Moral feeling always feels shame in front of the Other, even when the Other is not actually speaking a negative judgment on me, because moral feeling always takes the look of the Other (a form of silent speech) as a *negative silent judgment* on itself, which resembles the *negative silent judgment* of conscience even more closely than spoken judgment does.

The biblical story says that before “The Fall of Man,” “The man and his wife were both naked, and they felt no shame,”⁴³ but after they ate from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, “the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized they were naked; so they sewed fig leaves together and made coverings for themselves.”⁴⁴ This means that they began to feel shame in front of each other, especially from the look of the other one. When they heard the sound of “God” they hid from him among the trees of the garden. Then “God” called to the man, “where are you?” The man answered: “I heard you in the garden, and I was afraid because I was naked; so I hid.” Here, “God” appeared as a *voice* that *called* the man to *judgment*, a voice the man tried to hide himself from, because he felt *shame* about himself and was afraid of his *guilt*. Therefore, the story reveals to us that the creation of moral thinking is the cause of shame, and shame is a turning away from guilt. In our previous analysis of the biblical account of “Original Sin,” we deliberately left out this part of the story, because shame is not the turning away from original conscience, but the turning away from human conscience (guilt); so it belongs to the true falling that happens after the original “Fall of Man.”

Shame is the strongest when there are many others looking at me. The reason is that when there are many others (especially when they are all strangers), the Self in the others loses its *specific* characteristics of existence and appears to be a “common Self” that is quite close to *the Self as such* that judges me silently in my conscience. This is why one often feels nervous, uneasy or even frightened when one has to do something in the public eye. Nervousness, uneasiness and fright are all modifications of shame. Though sometimes we can be very brave in front of many others, we can be so only because we have repressed our shame and even made it temporarily disappear, for the fact that we need “to be brave” in front of many others already indicates that shame has become a basic feeling of our everyday life.

But the others are not the only Other, because I am also an abstract Other to myself. In moral thinking I always listen to the moral speech of this abstract Other. So I also feel shame when I think morally, for only when I feel shame about myself will I take my own self-knowledge as a judgment on myself. Since moral feeling is a negative feeling, moral thinking has the form of “I am bad” and “I ought not to be bad.” Even when moral thinking says something positive, such as “I should be nice to the Other,” it still assumes the possibility of doing otherwise and understands that *I ought not to do otherwise*. Accordingly, for human moral feeling, every “ought to be good” is at bottom “ought not to be bad.” Shame is always there whenever I think morally.

It must be pointed out that moral thinking has many different forms. What moral thinking takes as “good” or “bad” can be very different in different people. Therefore, we

shall not understand the term “moral thinking” narrowly according to the ordinary usage of this term. Even when I think that “I ought to be selfish in order to make myself happy,” I am still thinking morally, though this thinking appears to be “immoral” to many people. A moral judgment is still a moral judgment when you turn it upside down. What makes it moral is the feeling of shame that always attaches to a certain form of “ought not to,” though one can also engage in moral thinking mainly for rational reasons.

(2) Inauthentic Being-guilty

Shame as a moral feeling has turned away from conscience towards the moral speech of others and the moral thinking of its own. Thus the silent speech of the Self in conscience becomes quite strange for shame, because this speech does not come from others, and is not in the form of moral judgment. Accordingly, in most cases shame deals with this strangeness of conscience by turning the silent judgment of conscience into words, making it its own moral judgment, and therefore reinforces itself from the side of conscience. By doing so it has successfully submitted conscience to itself and therefore makes conscience a “moral conscience.” This is the ordinary way moral feeling interprets conscience. This kind of moral feeling can be properly called *ordinary moral feeling*.

A special way ordinary moral feeling deals with the strangeness of conscience is to direct the judgment of conscience at the Other. Ordinary moral feeling always misunderstands that the Other is the Self that judges me. If it turns this misunderstanding the other way around, it will take itself as the Self that judges the Other. To deal with the strangeness of its own conscience, it may try to take *the Other* as what the silent judgment “guilty!” it hears in its own conscience really *aims at*. In so doing moral feeling deceives itself that it is totally innocent, and that all the guilt shall be put on the Other. It thus successfully dismisses the strangeness of conscience by directing its judgment at the Other. This special way of dealing with the strangeness of conscience can therefore be called *guilt shifting*. In the biblical story of “The Fall of Man,” “God” asked the man (Adam): “Have you eaten from the tree that I commanded you not to eat from?” The man said, “The woman that you put here with me—she gave me some fruit from the tree, and I ate it.” Apparently the man tried to shift his guilt to the woman (Eve), while the woman also tried to shift her guilt to the serpent when she said: “The serpent deceived me, and I ate.”⁴⁵ The story of “Cain and Abel,” which comes right after the story of “The Fall of Man,” gives us another example of guilt shifting. The Story says that Adam and Eve had two sons, Cain and Abel. Because “God” looked with favor on Abel’s offering taken from his flock, while he did not look with favor on Cain’s offering taken from his soil, Cain became very angry and killed Abel.⁴⁶ This is guilt shifting in the form of murder. When the habit of guilt shifting is developed to its extreme, one will treat others as if they are fundamentally blameworthy, to the extent that one may take killing others as the best way to justify one’s own conscience. This seems to be the hidden motivation for the behavior of some serial killers who know no better joy than killing others. However, it must be noticed that guilt shifting is only a special way ordinary moral feeling deals with

the strangeness of conscience. A more basic way to dealing with it is to turn the silent judgment of conscience into a moral judgment upon oneself rather than the Other.

Moral feeling can also deal with the strangeness of conscience in a way totally different from ordinary moral feeling. If moral feeling pays attention to the silent judgment of conscience, it may be able to see that the silent judgment in conscience does not come from itself but from a different source. So it may try to interpret the silent judgment of the Self in conscience as coming from *an Other* that is not a specific Other in the world (because the judgment comes internally). In doing so moral feeling creates the image of an “Absolute Other” and understands that this “Absolute Other” is the only one who can judge it. Therefore, it naturally submits itself to this “Absolute Other,” which thus becomes the figure of “God” in religion. Moreover, since moral feeling always listens to itself as an abstract Other in its moral thinking, it has the tendency to mistake its own moral thinking as coming from the “Absolute Other” that judges internally. When this actually happens, it will listen to its own inner voice as if it is listening to the “Absolute Other,” or try to speak to this “Absolute Other” in prayer. When this happens, moral feeling again misunderstands the *silent* judgment of conscience, though it has done so in favor of conscience (it tries to come back to conscience but in a wrong way). By interpreting conscience in such a way moral feeling has turned itself into a *religious moral feeling*.

To sum up, by interpreting the silent judgment of conscience as its own moral judgment or the judgment from “God,” moral feeling is able to accept conscience in an *inauthentic* way. Accordingly, when we say moral feeling is a “turning away from conscience,” we do not mean that it totally *rejects* conscience, but rather that it *misinterprets* conscience when it *accepts* it. Only by *accepting* conscience in such an *inauthentic* way can shame continue to exist, because it is directly based on guilt. Since it mistakes the Self that speaks silently in conscience as itself or “God,” it either comports itself towards itself or “God.” In both cases it fails to bring the existing Self to the true Self that speaks silently in conscience. Therefore, the resolving of shame is an *inauthentic Being-guilty*.

(3) Inauthentic Being-towards-death

In our discussion of moral action in §1, (3), we showed the basic characteristic of the temporality of moral feeling. Moral feeling always comports itself towards the “Self” that “judges” me in moral thinking. This “Self” that “judges” me in moral thinking is nothing else than moral feeling itself. Thus moral feeling always mistakes itself as the true Self. Accordingly, it understands the *having been thrown* of the Self as *having been in the present*, and the *comporting towards the Self* as *will be in the present*, which means that it understands the future as a process of *the present* that is yet to come, and the past as a process of *the present* that extended from time immemorial until *now*. In a word, moral feeling understands the existing Self as moving in the process of *the present*. Such understanding is a *leveling down* of the Self and the Being-the-Self of the existing Self from the *transcendental* level to the level of *mere disclosedness*.

This previous analysis was carried out with reference to the original moral feeling that is directly based on original conscience. It can also be applied to *ordinary moral feeling* in human existence, but not to *religious moral feeling*, because when religious moral feeling interprets the Self as “God,” it does not misunderstand the Self as itself, namely as something existing merely in *the present*, but rather as something essentially *transcendental*. The Bible thinks that “God” is “over all and through all and in all,”⁴⁷ and that we have come from “God” (being created in his own image) and must return to “God” by following his commands. Therefore, religious moral feeling does not understand the Self and Being-the-Self in the same way as ordinary moral feelings does. Its understanding of the Self and Being-the-Self is not really a “leveling down” of them (though still a misunderstanding of them). Accordingly, in the succeeding investigations of falling we are going to focus on *ordinary moral feeling*.

Since the resolving of conscience in human existence has changed from *Being-eternal* to *Being-towards-death*, while all resolving is based on the resolving of conscience, the resolving of ordinary moral feeling also has the characteristic of *Being-towards-death*, but in an *inauthentic* way. Because ordinary moral feeling understands the Self as moving in the process of *the present*, it does not understand the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self as a possibility of returning to the *transcendental* Self, but merely as a possibility to be in *the present*. So death loses its *transcendental* characteristic and is understood merely as an event that is going to happen *someday*. Thus *anticipation of death* becomes *expectation of death*: death will happen *someday* but not *right now*. Such an understanding of death is a distortion of primary understanding that understands my ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self as having been denied in an *a priori* manner. It thus covers up the fact that death is possible *at every single moment*. Therefore, the *Being-towards-death* of ordinary moral feeling is essentially *inauthentic*. Such *inauthentic Being-towards-death* goes along with the moral thinking that *I ought to make such and such choice*, because both come from the misunderstanding of the Self by ordinary moral feeling as something existing merely in a process of *the present*. However, ordinary moral feeling always distorts primary understanding, even when moral thinking is not involved (moral feeling does not always think). Therefore, the *Being-towards-death* of ordinary moral feeling is always *inauthentic*, even when no moral choice is made according to moral thinking. Consequently, *inauthentic Being-towards-death* has become an *ordinary* characteristic of our *everyday* existence.

(4) Inauthentic Being-anxious

As we have shown in §2, (3), primary understanding is always associated with anxiety. What anxiety is anxious about is the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self that is at the same time *impossibility*. It is a negative feeling but is not yet an unhappy one, because the negative characteristic of the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self is something *a priori* rather than *empirical*. By accepting this *negative* but *a priori* characteristic of the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self, anxiety sees *all the possibilities of the present* clearly in light of their *ultimate emptiness*. By doing so it does

not turn them into “dust” but rather discloses them in the most genuine way, because only when they are disclosed as belonging to my ultimate possibilities of Being-the-Self that is at the same time *impossibility* can I hold them as possibilities available for my *Being-the-Self*. Accordingly, anxiety does not grasp *all the possibilities of the present* by attaching to them. On the contrary, it grasps them in the best way by seeing them clearly in light of their ultimate emptiness.

However, this is the case only when ordinary moral feeling is not operative. When ordinary moral feeling takes itself as the true Self it has misunderstood the Self as something existing *merely* in a process of *the present*. Therefore, although *all the possibilities of the present* are held together by primary understanding as belonging to the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self, ordinary moral feeling distorts this primary understanding by taking the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self as merely “to be in the present in such and such a way.” Here the “such and such a way” signifies some concrete possibilities of the present. Since ordinary moral feeling submits *all the possibilities of the present* to its “such and such a way,” it makes anxiety anxious about *all the possibilities of the present* with no insight into its *ultimate emptiness* that belongs to the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*, which means that it *has leveled down* the authentic anxiousness about the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self from the *transcendental* level to the level of *the present*. It thus turns anxiety into the *concern* over some *possibilities of the present* that it takes to belong to its “such and such a way.” Concern (*Besorgen*) is an inauthentic mode of anxiety.⁴⁸ No matter how concern chooses its “such and such a way,” it is always anxious about some *possibilities of the present* rather than the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*. Because the *sight* of anxiety has been leveled down by ordinary moral feeling, the resolving of anxiety becomes *inauthentic Being-anxious*, so does all the resolving based on it.

As ordinary moral feeling submits conscience to itself, it also submits anxiety to itself. Since the possibility of moving and using things within the world belongs to *the possibilities of the present*, ordinary moral feeling has the tendency to *concern* itself with things within the world through its inauthentic anxiety. It thus has the tendency to fall into the “world” of its concern and become fascinated by things within the world. In doing this it has tacitly understood itself in terms of things within the world, because when it loses sight of its *transcendental* Self, it can only interpret itself in terms of what it has in *the present*.

Ordinary moral feeling can also choose other possibilities of the present (other than using things within the world) as what the Self *ought to be*. Its “such and such a way” can have many different varieties. But no matter how ordinary moral feeling conceives its “such and such a way,” its inauthentic anxiety has lost sight of the *ultimate emptiness* of *all the possibilities of the present* and therefore no longer understands them in a genuine way, namely, as belonging to the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*, which is at the same time *impossibility*. By covering up the *ultimate emptiness* of *all the possibilities of the present*, its inauthentic anxiety becomes “less anxious” and even totally “comfortable.” However, this inauthentic anxiety can also become extremely *worried* when *all the possibilities of the present* do not fit into its “such and such a way.”

When this happens it sees no hope and falls into *despair*. In a word, because the inauthentic anxiety of ordinary moral feeling no longer has insight into the authentic future that belongs to the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self that is at the same time *impossibility*, it no longer sees the possibility of holding its existence *as a true whole*. Accordingly, it feels helpless in the “course of time” and lets itself be dragged away by the things it attaches to.

(5) The Inauthentic I and the Inauthentic Other: The One or the “They”

In authentic human existence, there is always an *asymmetry* between the I and the Other. I discover my true Self internally as the Self that judges me silently in conscience, but the Self I discover in the Other is always associated with the image of the Other, which exists externally and does not judge me at all. This *asymmetry* between the internal and external Self makes the *self-identity of the Self* an act of *identification* on my part. Since my internal Self dwells in my heart, I can discover the *same* Self in the Other only by *opening my heart to the Other and letting the Other matter to me through and through*. This is how I discover the Other in the most primary way. As human conscience is a negative feeling, the Other discovered in this way is always associated with *uncertainty*. In a word, in authentic human existence, I always discover the Other by *opening my heart to the Other and letting the Other matter to me through and through with uncertainty*.

But this is not the way ordinary moral feeling discovers the Other. Ordinary moral feeling is a feeling that the speech of the Other is a judgment on me. This feeling is based on the confusion between the internal Self that judges me silently in conscience and the external Self that I *identify with* whenever I discover the Other (as the *same* Self). That is why it takes the speech of the Other as a judgment upon itself. When it interprets the silent judgment of conscience in terms of its moral judgment, it has totally lost sight of the *asymmetry* between the internal Self and the external Self (insofar as the judgment on me is concerned). Therefore, ordinary moral feeling understands both “I” and “You” in terms of “a self”: I and You are nothing but two actual examples of “a self.” Such understanding turns things totally upside down, because the truth is that “a self” is possible only as the abstraction of “I” and “You.” Therefore, ordinary moral feeling no longer understands the *uniqueness* of the I and the Other. Everyone is *merely* an example of *a universal self*. Everyone becomes *the One* or *das Man*, which is the (German) term Heidegger chooses to designate the “who” of everyday Dasein. In John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson’s translation of *Being and Time*, “das Man” has been translated as “they,” which is also a mode of the third meaning of the Self, as we have shown in Chapter One, Section 5. So the Self of everyday existence is the they-self (*das Man-selbst*).

Consequently, ordinary moral feeling always misunderstands I and the Other. It misunderstands I because it no longer understands the *uniqueness* of my internal Self (the Self that judges me silently in conscience). It also misunderstands the Other, because it discovers the *same* Self in the Other in the sense that both I and the Other are nothing but

examples of “a self,” and that both I and the Other are capable of judging me. Since ordinary moral feeling discovers the *same* Self in a *merely* derivative way, it has lost sight of the way I discover the Other in the most primary way, namely, by *opening my heart to the Other and letting the Other matter to me through and through*. Thus the Other that *matters to me through and through* becomes the Other that *matters to me by virtue of its speech as a judgment on me*. Through this misinterpretation of the Other discovered in the most primary way by the primary feeling of Love, ordinary moral feeling has successfully submitted primary feeling of Love to itself. Accordingly, when ordinary moral feeling dominates my heart, I no longer open my heart to the Other. Instead, I open my heart only to the speech of the Other, with special attention to its character as a *judgment on me*.

Since ordinary moral feeling does not really understand the asymmetry between I and the Other, the fact that it pays special attention to the (judging) character of the Other’s speech means that it also pays the same kind of attention to the (judging) character of its own speech to the Other. In a word, because what really matters to ordinary moral feeling is the (judging) character of one’s speech, it takes care not to go into the heart of conversation in its everyday *Being-with-others*, which has actually become *Being-the-One-with-other-Ones*. Therefore, in its everyday conversation the One remains on the surface of everything where everyone can agree with everyone. This kind of everyday conversation is what Heidegger calls “idle talk” and views as one of the constituents of falling. What makes everyday conversation “idle talk” is not that the subject of such conversation is trivial. On the contrary, “idle talk” can handle all the important subjects without any difficulty, because in this kind of conversation nobody really cares what is talked about; the only thing that matters is *to confirm* and *to be confirmed*. Thus the One speaks and listens without genuine understanding. As Nietzsche observes, “down there everyone talks and no one listens”; “Everyone among them talks; no one knows how to understand any more. Everything falls into the water, nothing falls into deep wells any longer.”⁴⁹

This kind of attitude towards others is not only characteristic of the One’s speech, but also characteristic of its action (resolving), because unlike the feeling of Love that always already takes the Other into account in its resolving, the One must deliberately take others into account when it resolves, in order to avoid the possible negative judgment from the Other. So it always takes care to be “nice” and “polite” to others, without a genuine intention to welcome the Other into its life, because when it lets the judgment of the others matter to it in this way it already *closes its heart to the Other* and no longer lets the Other *matter to it through and through* as a genuine part of its own life. Just as in “idle talk” it takes care not to enter into the heart of conversation, in its everyday *Being-with-others* it takes care not to enter the heart of others’ lives, or to let others enter the heart of its own life. It is precisely when the One focuses on “being nice” and “being polite” in such a way it is farthest away from the authentic Other. Discovering the Other in such a superficial way brings a sense of security to the One, because to discover the Other in the most primary way means to open the realm of *uncertainty*, while the One is afraid of such uncertainty, for it is afraid of the possible negative

judgment from the Other. Nonetheless, only when I totally accept the uncertainty of the Other can I appreciate the great deeds of the Other (even when they shock or go against me) and also allow myself to follow my heart in my deeds (even when they shock or go against the Other). Therefore, for the most part the One's action does not bear the characteristic of a genuine greatness.

To live as the One makes life easier, because for one thing it causes the least trouble from others; for another it reduces the need to go into the heart of everything. It is therefore not surprising that the One has become the dominating "who" of everyday life. Along with the One, the *inauthentic Being-guilty*, *inauthentic Being-towards-death* and *the inauthentic Being-anxious* of ordinary moral feeling naturally become the dominating modes of Being-the-Self in everyday existence. Moreover, since ordinary moral feeling understands the *first* and *second* meanings of the Self in terms of the *third* one, the community of the One becomes a community in which everyone is *merely* a member. This is especially true in the modern (liberal) society, in which community is no longer based on Primary Love and Concrete Love (family Love, friendship and the Love of community). Everyone is equal; everyone is the same; everyone is the One. Nobody really cares how the Other lives its life: what you do is your business and what I do is my business; you can do anything as long as you don't hurt others. As the One does not really *opens its heart to the Other* and *lets the Other matter to it through and through*, great characters remain unnoticed, great deeds remain unseen, greatness has been replaced by popularity: there is no longer a *hero* but only an *idol*. It is unlikely that this kind of community can give rise to great cultures, such as the one we find in ancient Greece.

The problem with the One is not that it is *a universal self*. The third and universal meaning of the Self is an important aspect of our self-understanding. Without it the world would not be an intelligible world for us, and we would live like animals. This understanding of the Self from the perspective of *universality* is not only what enables us to develop knowledge (science), but also what enables us to develop law. The foundation of law is nothing but the human conscience that says "guilty!" silently. The silent judgment "guilty!" or "I am not totally my Self" shows to me that I have been denied *transcendentally* by *the Self as such*. This is the *a priori* characteristic of my existence. Because I understand myself as *a universal self*, I also understand that other universal selves have also been denied by *the Self as such* in a *transcendental* manner. If I understand *the Self as such* correctly, I will know that it is not up to a universal self to judge another universal self. The only authority that can judge a universal self is *the Self as such*, insofar as it exists in a community through its activities. Therefore, I understand that *only the community as a whole* can put a judgment on a universal self and say that it is "guilty!" This, then, becomes the origin of law.

But community as a whole is not really *the Self as such* that speaks silently in conscience. It is rather *the Self as such* that exists in all of its activities carried out through individualized Selves. Law (or more generally, politics) is one of these activities, because the judgment of law is carried out through individualized Selves that represent the community as a whole. Accordingly, the judgment of law on a universal self is not

that “this universal self is not totally *its* Self,” but rather that “this universal self is not totally the Self that exists through every member of the community,” or simply “this universal self is not truly universal.” Such judgment is not an *a priori* judgment but rather an *empirical* one, for it is true only if “this universal self is not truly universal,” which can only be determined *empirically*. As a result, the judgment of law says “guilty!” to any universal self that disgraces its *universality* and punishes such a universal self—since the *universality* of the existing Self only shows up in its relation to *other* existing Selves, the law says “guilty!” to and punishes anyone who hurts *other people’s freedom* to be a universal self. Hence unlike morality, law is not a misinterpretation of conscience, because community as a whole can act as *the Self as such* and put a judgment on the existing Self.

Therefore, to be a universal self does not mean to be inauthentic. The problem with the One is not that it is a universal self, but rather that it is *merely* a universal self. When I (as the One) understand myself and the Other *merely* as two examples of a universal self, I have lost sight of the uniqueness of I and the Other. Accordingly, the One is neither an authentic I nor an authentic Other. On the other hand, although law by its very essence relies on the universal meaning of the Self, its interpretation of human beings (as a universal self) can still be authentic, if we do not take this interpretation as the primary or only way to understand ourselves. However, in our modern (liberal) society, law has the tendency to become the most important thing in a community. So its interpretation of human beings has the tendency to become the primary and even only way to understand ourselves. This is mainly due to the fact that the One has become the dominating “who” of our everyday existence, but it can also reinforce the dominating power of the One in our everyday existence.

This dominating force of law goes hand in hand with the dominating force of science in the modern age. Since the time of the Enlightenment, human life has become more and more “scientific” everyday. Science as an activity of the Self in community does not have any problem within itself. But like law, science (its rational way of thinking) is founded on the universal meaning of the Self. Today almost every aspect of human life has been put under the study of science. Everyday more and more “scientific data” of human life (such as those from biology and psychology) enter the popular understanding of what a human being is. The problem with these data is not that they are *scientific*, but that they are used to support the understanding of a human being from the *merely* universal point of view. When law and science become the secular “God” we tacitly worship everyday, the understanding of the Self as *merely* a universal self also becomes overwhelmingly dominating in our everyday life.

Since the problem with the One lies in its being *merely* a universal self, to overcome this problem does not mean to stop being a universal self, but rather to bring it back to its origin by rediscovering the authentic Self and the authentic Other. As the One lies at the very bottom of falling, we can never fall to a lower level than the One (though we can fall more deeply into the One). So when we become almost nothing but the One, it would be a proper time for us to try to move up.

CHAPTER THREE FROM MORALITY TO CONSCIENCE

In the last chapter we have shown that the movement from conscience to morality consists of two stages. The first stage corresponds to the transition from the original existence of the Self to human existence. The second stage corresponds to the transition from authentic to inauthentic (everyday) human existence. Only the second stage can be called falling, because the first one is only a necessary first step of the Self towards its self-knowledge. The first stage involves a totally *transcendental* change of *Being as such* that cannot be reversed by our own Being-the-Self, while the second stage is reversible in principle, because the change it involves is purely *empirical*. Therefore, it is always possible for us to move towards authentic human existence by rediscovering the authentic Self and the authentic Other.

§1. Rediscovery of the Authentic Self

(1) The Call of Conscience

In our everyday existence, for the most part we do not live as our own true Self, but rather as the One. Even when I say “I,” I still (tacitly) mean the One who feels shame (or tries to be brave) in front of many others, the One who is afraid of hearing negative judgments, the One who speaks and listens with the intention to confirm and to be confirmed, the One who thinks in terms of “ought” and “ought not,” the One who acts in the way “one is supposed to.” In a word, in everyday existence, I have for the most part forgotten *who* I really am.

But this everyday way of living is broken when conscience calls. The call of conscience can happen when I am comfortably living on the surface of everything, fleeing from one moment to the next without actually living them, or “wasting my time” in meaningless “idle talk.” In these cases I have fallen too deeply into the One and allowed myself to go too far away from my unique Self that judges me silently in conscience. When ordinary moral feeling turns too far away from conscience, it can no longer successfully submit the latter to itself. Its inauthentic character (being a false Self) becomes conspicuous for conscience (for it can no longer cover up conscience by mistaking itself as the latter). Thus the *a priori* judgment “I am not totally my Self” in my conscience becomes *empirically* realized with reference to ordinary moral feeling, which means that conscience has become an *unhappy* feeling. Since ordinary moral feeling is directly grounded on conscience (by taking over the role of the latter), this unhappy feeling becomes a “call” that summons the One back from its falling into the they-self to the true Self that says “guilty!” silently in conscience.

When the call happens, the One feels that it has been denied as a false Self. This unhappy feeling is usually subtle but unmistakable. Usually the One still goes on with

what it is doing when it hears the call, but it has been compelled to pay attention to the call by the authoritative and silent voice of conscience. All the noise of “idle talk,” though it can still be heard becomes a remote background. The One is forced to become quiet and listen to what the silent voice of the call says to it. But the source of this silent voice (the Self) is totally *transcendental* and goes beyond everything the One is familiar with. The call thus makes the *uniqueness* of the internal Self so clear to the One that the One can no longer exist as “everybody and nobody”: in hearing the call clearly, the One collapses.

Since the call brings the existing Self back from its lostness in “everybody and nobody,” it can be said to have the function of “individualizing” the Self.⁵⁰ But this “individualizing” does not create individuality for the first time. The call does nothing other than bring the existing Self back to the true Self that judges silently in conscience. As conscience is where the Self primarily dwells in its existence, it is the primary individualization of the Self, the very origin of my individuality—I am an *individualized* Self in terms of conscience. However, we must keep in mind that the word “individualized” is used in contrast to “as such,” rather than to “universal.” To individualize the Self simply means to throw it into its existence. The Self (as such) does not relate itself to its existence as (a Platonic) “idea” to its example. Rather, the Self exists *as* its own representative in conscience. This “as” is primarily constituted by a silent judgment of the Self on me and completed by my *Being-the-Self*, namely my temporality. So my true Self is always *unique* rather than *universal*.

On the foundation of my conscience, I can identify the Other as the *same* Self in Primary Love. This too, is not the same as to discover “another example” of a universal self, for Primary Love as the *self-identity* of the Self is directly based on the *asymmetry* between the internal and external Self. It is on the foundation of this *self-identity* (of *asymmetrical* Selves) that I first come to understand that both I and the Other are “a universal self.” This understanding becomes the foundation of knowledge (science) and law. But if I view myself and the Other as *merely* two examples of a universal self, then I have put things totally upside down and forget what my true Self really is. I will then view my individuality as merely a *specific* example of a *universal self*, and thus lose sight of its origin in my conscience. Hence the call of conscience does not create my individuality for the first time. It simply brings the individualized Self that has forgotten its origin of individuality to stand on its own feet again.

The fact that in hearing the call clearly the One collapses does not mean that ordinary moral feeling has totally disappeared. The One or the “they” is only the *everyday* form of ordinary moral feeling. When this feeling hears the call of conscience clearly, it is drawn back from the One or the “they” by the call. But it is still a moral feeling (shame). Its inauthentic character remains conspicuous to conscience and still makes the latter unhappy. Accordingly, when I hear the voice of my true Self in conscience, I will want to be totally conscience and nothing else. This “wanting to have a conscience,” as it is so called by Heidegger, is actually a *resolving* of conscience *to be totally itself*, which means that I *resolve* to *totally accept* my *a priori* guilt. Only when conscience thus resolves can it win itself back from ordinary moral feeling and make the

latter disappear. When this happens, conscience will no longer be an unhappy feeling (as a call to its substitute), but simply a negative feeling that has been totally accepted without misunderstanding. Now nothing takes over the role of conscience in my existence, which therefore becomes authentic. Accordingly, to return to authentic human existence simply means to become *authentically guilty* (in an *a priori* manner).

The call of conscience can also happen in another way. In everyday existence we often feel guilty after we have done something that we think we “should not have done.” This kind of calling is familiar to most of us. For example, if I forget to turn off an electric stove after I have used it for cooking, I could cause a fire in the kitchen. If this happens and if the house belongs to my landlord, I will probably have a strong feeling of guilt (a very unhappy one) for causing the fire. This call of conscience is related to what I have done to others. The meaning of this call consists of three aspects, corresponding to the three meanings of the Self. First of all, the call suggests that in my everyday existence I have turned away from my true Self that speaks silently in conscience. That is why conscience calls me back to my true Self when the accident happens. The conscience will never call me if I have not turned away from it. Therefore, the call is in the first place a calling back to my true Self.

But the call is occasioned by the accident. What is the connection between my conscience and the accident? The accident belongs to a part of my everyday existence, in which for the most part I do not live as my true Self but rather as the One. But why does the call happen *precisely* when I cause a fire in my landlord’s house? When I live as the One, I only pay attention to being “nice” and “polite,” and do not really let the Other’s life matter to me, for it is conscience that lets the Other matter to it and in so doing gives rise to primary feeling of Love, while ordinary moral feeling only lets the Other’s speech matter to it as a judgment on itself. Consequently, when my action causes harm to the Other, the fact that for the most part I fail to live as conscience becomes conspicuous to conscience itself and therefore results in a call. Yet even if I live totally as my conscience I could still cause the fire. When the One attaches to popular moral teachings it will tend to be over-considerate when it deals with others. Hence it may have less chance to cause trouble. But the point is, if I live totally as my conscience, I always already accept the fact that I cannot totally be the Self (so I could hurt the *same* Self in the Other). Thus I do not need the call of conscience (a strong unhappy feeling) to remind me of what I always already understand, though this kind of authentic Being-guilty is very rare.

When the call of conscience happens in relation to the Other, I can still resolve to be totally my conscience, namely to *totally accept* my *a priori* guilt and bring myself back to my true Self. Since in this case the feeling of guilt is related to the Other, this kind of resolving will at the same time open my heart to the Other. It will make me pay less attention to being “nice” and “polite” and more attention to the Other’s life itself. If conscience can successfully win itself back from ordinary moral feeling by its resolving, the feeling of guilt will no longer be a strong unhappy feeling, but simply a negative feeling that has been totally accepted without misunderstanding.

Furthermore, because I not only understand myself and the Other as the internal and external Self, but also as *a universal self*, I realize that what I have done to the

landlord's house is a denial of universal freedom, for the landlord *too* is a universal self and the house belongs to its freedom (to use things within the world for its own sake). This denial of universal freedom is what we usually call "injustice." To make this injustice disappear, I will probably offer some money to the landlord as compensation. If the damage caused by the fire is grave and the landlord sues me for it, then I will be willing to accept the judgment of the court, because this judgment comes from *the Self as such* that exists in the community I belong to through its activities.

But all of these reactions may happen in a different way if I misinterpret the meaning of the call. When ordinary moral feeling is dominating in my everyday existence, my first reaction to the accident may be a strong feeling of shame. I become nervous about how to tell this to the landlord. I may try to find excuses to avoid hearing negative judgments from the landlord, but I may also think "I should not lie to other people." When I am tortured by these thoughts, I may still be able to hear the call of conscience. However, since shame is already a misunderstanding of conscience, it may interpret the call of conscience with its own moral thinking: "Oh! I should not have done this. How could I do such a bad thing! I used to think that I am a good man, but look what I have done to others!" When I interpret the call of conscience in terms of this kind of moral thinking, I have lost the chance to listen *quietly* to the *silent* speech of my conscience and withdraw from my everyday way of living by the *resolving* of my conscience (to be totally itself). So when I face the landlord, uneasiness will catch my heart. But if the landlord forgives me, I will feel a great relief: I am still a good man. When I pay my debt to the landlord, I will also feel that I am doing a *good* thing that can compensate for a *bad* thing that has been done by me.

The above discussion hasn't taken into account the fact that in modern society the One focuses more on popular thinking and less on the feeling of shame (partly due to the decline of traditional morality and development of civil society in the modern age). As the One who lives in modern society, I may focus more on the fact that the landlord and I are both a universal self and less on my feeling of shame. So when I hear the call of conscience, I will understand the call as *merely* concerning the injustice I have done to the landlord. I will focus on the calculation of debt and the negotiation with the landlord. After I pay off my debt I will be released from the call of conscience. If I still feel guilty, I may try to talk to others about my unhappy feeling and see what "they" think. "They" will, of course, tell me that everything is OK, because I have done what one is supposed to do in this situation ("they" will try to console me as if "they" know me better than me, which actually is true, for at bottom I am not my true Self but merely "one of them"). Thus I will be confirmed by "they" and able to live as the One again. In this kind of reaction I also lose the chance to listen *quietly* to the *silent* speech of my conscience and withdraw from my everyday way of living by the *resolving* of my conscience (to be totally itself).

Heidegger's criticism of the everyday interpretation of conscience focuses on the last form of reaction we just mentioned. He thinks that the main error of the everyday interpretation of the call of conscience is the misunderstanding of Dasein as a *present-at-hand* entity with which one might *concern* oneself. This kind of misunderstanding views

the call of conscience as telling us something *practical* about our deeds and calling us to reckon up “guilt” and “innocence.” “This would be as if Dasein were a ‘household’ whose indebtednesses simply need to be balanced off in an orderly manner so that the Self may stand ‘by’ as a disinterested spectator while these Experiences run their course.”⁵¹ But “The call discloses nothing which could be either positive or negative as something with which we can concern ourselves.”⁵² For Heidegger, indebtedness is only the occasion for the call of conscience. The fact that the call happens *after* the deed has been done is not essential, because the call is basically a calling-forth rather than a reminder of what we have done. “The voice does call back, but it calls beyond the deed which has happened, and back to the Being-guilty into which one has been thrown, which is ‘earlier’ than any indebtedness.”⁵³ The ultimate meaning of the call of conscience is that it “summons Dasein to existence, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.”⁵⁴

This criticism of the everyday interpretation of the call of conscience is basically in line with our above analysis. As we have shown, since the One understands itself *merely* as a universal self, it has the tendency to view the call of conscience as *merely* a matter of injustice and focuses only on “balancing off” its indebtedness; in doing so it has lost the chance to listen *quietly* to the *silent* speech of conscience and return to its true Self by the resolving of conscience (to be totally itself). However, justice is not something inauthentic in essence, as Heidegger seems to imply. To understand that I owe something to the Other, I need not understand myself and the Other as *present-at-hand* entities with which we might *concern* ourselves. The only thing I need to understand is what my conscience tells me silently (“I am not totally my Self”) and what this means regarding the *universality* of the Self that exists in a community. Hence justice, as the judgment of the Self that exists in a community through its activities, is more profound than the calculation of present-at-hand things or a “household” business. Nevertheless, the concept of justice is based on conscience and not vice versa. So if I attach to the concept of justice and forget its source in my conscience, I will view myself as *merely* a person who lives under law, i.e., *merely* a universal self (the One), and therefore lose sight of the uniqueness of my true Self in conscience. From this point of view, Heidegger’s criticism remains meaningful to us.

(2) The Call of Anxiety

When the One turns away from conscience, it has at the same time turned away from anxiety, because conscience and anxiety are equally primordial and interdependent. By turning away from anxiety towards inauthentic anxiety, which is always *concerned* with some *possibilities of the present* (especially the possibility of using things within the world), the One covers up the *ultimate emptiness of all the possibilities of the present*. It can therefore live with comfort and tranquility. Though sometimes its concern becomes *worry*, the One still attaches to the things it concerns itself with, and hopes that it could finally get rid of this worry by obtaining the things it attaches to. Even when its worry becomes *despair*, the One can still turn to other things it attaches to and hopes that it will be luckier with those things. Therefore, although worry and despair are unhappy feelings,

they do not serve as a call that calls the One back from its falling into the “world” of its concern.

But when the One attaches too much to the things it concerns itself with, it has totally lost sight of the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* that is at the same time *impossibility*, which goes along with the understanding *I am not totally my Self*. So the discord between its inauthentic anxiety and conscience becomes conspicuous to the latter. The tension between them thus becomes a call that calls inauthentic anxiety to return to its authentic state that goes along with conscience. This call is at the same time a calling back of the One from its attachment to some *possibilities of the present* to its *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* (especially from its absorption in *things within the world* to its authentic *Being-in-the-world*). As ordinary moral feeling has submitted authentic anxiety to itself and makes the latter inauthentic, the call can only exist as a modification of inauthentic anxiety. The result of this modification is something between inauthentic and authentic anxiety: *the call of anxiety* exists as a strong *unhappy* feeling that is *anxious* about the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* which is at the same time *impossibility*. This call of anxiety is close to authentic anxiety, because it is anxious about the same thing as the latter. But at the same time it is still controlled by ordinary moral feeling and is thus an *unhappy* feeling. Hence the call of anxiety is also different from authentic anxiety (which is a *negative* but not an *unhappy* feeling). Therefore, the call denies *all the possibilities of the present* insofar as their *ultimate emptiness* has been covered up when the One attaches to them. It therefore shows to the One the *meaninglessness* of these possibilities when they are no longer understood as belonging to the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self* that is at the same time *impossibility*. This is the way anxiety calls the One back from its falling into the “world” of its concern. That is why Heidegger emphasizes that (the call of) anxiety discloses to Dasein the “insignificance” of things within the world and the possibility of authentic Being-in-the-world, although his analysis (unlike ours) is not based on the distinction between authentic and inauthentic anxiety.⁵⁵

When the call of anxiety happens, the world becomes somewhat strange (uncanny) for the One, because all the things it used to be attached to now appear to be totally meaningless, which makes the One feel that it has been pulled out from its root and becomes totally homeless in the world. In *Faust*, Goethe describes this kind of experience as the phenomenon of “care”:

Care. Once I make a man my own,
 nothing in this world can help him;
 everlasting darkness falls,
 suns no longer rise or set—
 though no outward sense has failed,
 all is darkness in his heart,
 and however great his treasures,
 there's no joy in their possession.
 Good and bad luck both depress him,
 he is starving though there's plenty;

source of joy or spot of trouble,
it's postponed until the morrow—
caring only for the future,
he gets nothing done at all.⁵⁶

What Goethe calls “care” is precisely the call of anxiety. As the combination of authentic and inauthentic anxiety, the call discloses both authentic and inauthentic *Being-anxious* as the possibilities of *Being-the-Self*. So long as I remain in this combination of authentic and inauthentic anxiety, I will always feel unhappy and have no desire to do anything. To make this unhappy feeling disappear, I have to release anxiety from the control of ordinary moral feeling, which means that I have to *totally accept* the *ultimate emptiness of all the possibilities of the present* that has been disclosed to me by the call. This total acceptance is at the same time a *detachment* from everything I am attached to. I have to realize that *all the possibilities of the present* have been *denied* in an *a priori* manner. Thus there is no point in attachment to anything. Only when I am no longer attached to anything can I see everything in the most genuine way as belonging to my ultimate possibility of *Being-the-Self*. By giving up attachment, I can win back the *meaning* of the world at a higher and more genuine level. If I succeed, the strong unhappy feeling will disappear. Inauthentic anxiety will be brought back from ordinary moral feeling and becomes authentic. So by totally accepting authentic anxiety I will find a real joy in everything I do, because there is nothing now that can worry me.

But this kind of enlightenment rarely happens. In most cases, when the One feels the call of anxiety, its only wish is to get rid of this unhappy feeling and go back to the everyday way of living it is familiar with. Hence the One will tend to view the call as an unwelcome “disturbance,” though it can hardly do anything to get rid of this “disturbance,” because the call is not about some specific thing that it concerns itself with, but rather about the *ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self*. However, the One can still try to analyze the cause of this call and attribute it to (the lack of) something it concerns itself with. By doing this the One loses the chance to understand genuinely the *ultimate emptiness of all the possibilities of the present*, and therefore also loses the chance to return to authentic anxiety. But it has successfully transformed the call of anxiety into the *worry* over something that it *concerns* itself with. This worry will become less when things start to “become better,” or when the One finally gives up this specific “something” and chooses another to concern itself with. At the end, the call of anxiety will disappear, and the One will be able to go back to its everyday way of living, in which it always finds comfort and tranquility.

(3) The Call of Death

The One understands death *merely* as an event that is going to happen *someday* but not *right now*. Therefore, although the One knows that *someday* it is going to *die*, it is glad that *right now* it is still *alive*. Sometimes the One does have worry over death, because death means that all the things it attaches to will disappear together with its own existence. This will be the ultimate denial of everything that the One attaches to *right*

now, for at the end there is nothing left. However, the One is smart enough not to let this thought disturb it. So it attaches more to the things it concerns itself with and totally loses itself in them. By doing this, the One is able to forget the terrible thing that is going to happen *someday*, and continues its *everyday* existence in comfort and tranquility.

However, the One could suddenly face death when something in its everyday existence goes wrong, for example, when it is diagnosed as having a fatal disease, or is hit by a car and almost gets killed, or robbed by someone with a gun. When this kind of thing suddenly happens to the One, it shocks the One from the ground of its existence. It is as if in the middle of its everyday existence the One suddenly hears thunder that almost deafens its ears: “**What are you doing? You the One who is always dying?**” This becomes a call of death for the One. What calls the One is not a kind of *feeling* but a kind of *understanding*, namely the primary understanding that has been distorted by ordinary moral feeling but is restored when the One suddenly faces death, because the fact that *at every moment my existence has been denied* in an *a priori* manner suddenly becomes intelligible. All the things the One used to be attached to suddenly reveal their ultimate emptiness. The One is thus brought back to face the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self that is at the same time *impossibility*. In the face of this ultimate denial of *my own* existence, all the “idle talk” about death fails. Therefore, when I realize the uniqueness of *my own death* with reference to *my* ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self, the One collapses. I can therefore live a life that is genuinely *my own* with the *anticipation of my own death*, which means that I *totally accept* the fact that *my own existence has been denied* in an *a priori* manner — *death is possible at every single moment*.

The call of death has happened to many people. Some of them totally change their view of life after they have a so-called near-death experience (they now want to live every single moment of their life rather than flee from one moment to the next). However, the call of death does not always draw the One back from its falling into everyday existence. Since the One always listens to the “public” interpretation of death, which is based on the understanding of death as *merely* an event that is going to happen *someday* but not *right now*, even if the One has been shocked by the sudden disclosure of death, it may still try to understand the experience as “they” do. It therefore feels the need to ease its heart by “idle talk.” When the One focuses on telling others how lucky it is to survive the accident, it may arouse curiosity in them, and “they” may also come up with some other cases of “accidents.” Finally everyone is happy with the feeling that *I am the lucky one*. So the One is confirmed by others about what death means and able to go back to its everyday way of living. Death has called, but nobody listens. The only thing the One learns from the whole incident is that “next time I will be more careful.” By focusing on the “facts” about death, the One has lost the chance to realize its ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self that is at the same time *impossibility*, and therefore also loses the chance to return to authentic *Being-towards-death*.

In his interpretation of *Being-towards-death*, Heidegger pays special attention to the *non-relational* character of death. According to Heidegger, “Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”⁵⁷ Nobody can take away my death or

represent me in death. Death is always *my own* and therefore totally *non-relational*. Accordingly, Heidegger thinks that the experience of the death of others is not a genuine experience of death, and therefore does not really help us with the understanding of our own death. This highlighting of the *non-relational* character of death is indeed very helpful for our understanding of death, for if we always understand death with reference to the “actual” examples of death we observe in other people, we will fail to understand the genuine meaning of death as the characteristic of our own Being, namely as our own *Being-towards-death*.

This, however, does not mean that the experience of the death of the Other is not a genuine experience of death. In fact, the call of death can also happen when the Other dies or is dying. Since in Love I identify the Other as the *same* Self and achieve my *self-identity* through the Other, the death of the Other is even more shocking than the experience of my own dying. The death of the Other I love (or the news that the Other I love is dying soon) could suddenly happen to me when I am enjoying the comfort and tranquility of everyday existence. It is also like the thunder that almost deafens my ears: “**What are you doing? The one you love is dead (dying)!**” It can draw me out of my everyday way of living and make me feel that all the things I used to be attached to have become meaningless. Like my own death, the death of the Other I love is also an ultimate denial of my own existence. I may therefore understand better my own death when I contemplate the death of the Other, though this has become less important when the Other I love dies, because the death of the Other I love has made my own existence becomes less important.

(4) Resoluteness and the Moment of Vision

So far we have discussed three ways the One is called back to authentic existence. These three forms of calling are closely related. The call of conscience brings the One back to its true Self through the resolving of conscience to be totally itself. The call of death restores the primary understanding that has been distorted by ordinary moral feeling, and thus enables the One to see clearly its ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self that is at the same time *impossibility*. So what the call of death discloses is actually the *sight* needed for the resolving of conscience in the call of conscience. But this *sight* remains *abstract* if it does not simultaneously understand the ultimate possibility of Being-the-Self in terms of *all the possibilities of the present*. Therefore, the call of anxiety that discloses *all the possibilities of the present* in light of their *ultimate emptiness* is precisely what completes this *sight* by giving it concrete content. With the authentic disclosures achieved by the call of death and the call of anxiety as its *sight*, conscience can thus resolve *to be* totally itself and win itself back from ordinary moral feeling. The authentic *Being-guilty* thus achieved, which is at the same time authentic *Being-towards-death* and authentic *Being-anxious*, is nothing but what Heidegger has called (*anticipatory*) *resoluteness* or authentic *Being-a-whole*.

Though all the three forms of calling are related to resoluteness, it does not mean that the movement from morality to conscience can only be fulfilled when all the three

forms of calling happen at the same time. One may achieve authentic *disclosure* bit by bit. As long as the authentic disclosure (the *sight*) needed for the resolving of conscience has been achieved, the call of conscience alone may be able to bring the One back to its true Self. Moreover, when one resolves to accept *death* or *anxiety*, one may also at the same time resolve to accept *guilt*, if one understands the relation between the three. Returning to authentic existence is a complicated process, and different people may achieve it by different means. But it is not something mysterious. Even everyday existence is not totally inauthentic. Most of us have more or less accepted guilt, death and anxiety, though we seldom achieve pure and complete resoluteness. It is the (tacit) acceptance of our guilt that enables us to accept law. It is the (tacit) acceptance of our death that enables us to live without complaint, for *what could be worse than death?* It is also the (tacit) acceptance of anxiety that enables us to overcome worry and despair. Thus the acceptance of guilt, death and anxiety is not an act of pessimism, but what enables me to be optimistic in an *authentic* sense.

Resoluteness not only brings me back to my true Self, but at the same time brings me back to my authentic *Being-the-Self*, namely my authentic *temporality*. When resolute, I suddenly find myself in a situation that is totally proper *for me*, as if a fish captured in a tank is suddenly thrown back into the sea. Everything disclosed in *the present* is disclosed *authentically*, which means that it is disclosed as *the presence of my Self* that I give rise to from the true Self that I have been. I thus have the feeling of *being totally free in the present*. This kind of authentic present has been called *the moment of vision (Augenblick)* by Heidegger.⁵⁸ In *the moment of vision*, my eyes are suddenly open and see for the first time the *real situation for my own Being-the-Self*. Everything I do becomes so meaningful that I find myself acting in a way I always wanted to but very seldom have a chance to achieve. It is not because my environment has prevented me from acting in this way, but rather I myself was not equal to this kind of action in my everyday existence, in which for the most part I do not live as my true Self but rather as the One. When I live as the One, *all the possibilities of the present* have been interpreted *beforehand* for me by “they.” I accept the situation disclosed in this way without realizing that the disclosure is neither the sight of my conscience nor the sight of my authentic anxiety, but rather the sight of my ordinary moral feeling and its inauthentic anxiety (concern). Since I myself *am* this ordinary moral feeling in my everyday existence, I do not object to the usual way I discover a situation. I am actually right about this, because I am the One who sees what it is supposed to see.

(5) The Difficulty of this Rediscovery

The rediscovery of the authentic Self is difficult. First of all, the three forms of calling do not always happen. Even if they do happen sometimes, they may not be taken as a chance to return to authentic existence. Even if they are taken as such a chance, the inertia of self-misunderstanding may limit the rediscovery. Even if I suddenly achieve resoluteness and experience the moment of vision, it may last only for hours or days, and I may gradually go back to my old way of living. Moral feeling is very hard to get rid of

because every state of mind is a part of my self rather than an object that I can handle in any way I want. Hence morality is like gravity: it is always easier to fall than to stand up. To rediscover the authentic Self, I not only need to catch those chances that allow me to do so; I also need will power in order to overcome the inertia and stubbornness of morality. Whenever moral thinking comes to my mind or moral feeling (shame) catches my heart I need to get rid of it with a firm resolution. To do this not only will power is needed, courage too is necessary. Nobody knows this better than Nietzsche. His *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* remains one of the bravest books that was ever written, one that never fails to give us the power and courage we need for the overcoming of morality, because it not only summons us to self-overcoming but also does so in a poetic style that directly appeals to our heart.

However, to be authentic is more than to be firm and brave. The rediscovery of the authentic Self is a process of enlightenment. It requires a radical change in our self-understanding. We can never succeed if we are not willing to change our self-misunderstanding, which, however, is the most elusive thing in the world. Very often when we try to overcome self-misunderstanding we simply create another one to replace it. For example, when the One tries to “overcome morality,” either because it hears from others or reads in some book “morality is not a good thing,” it may again misunderstand what “morality” means, and therefore avoid doing those things that are deemed “moral” by people. It may also misunderstand the *uniqueness* of its own true Self, and take this uniqueness as “to act differently from the crowd.” But to be the true Self does not mean to act according to a certain *pattern*. What is at issue here is not *what* I do but rather *who* is doing it. If I understand my Self truly, I will no longer care about how to act, because I have become totally free in my heart and see every situation as a genuine situation for *my own Being-the-Self*. Accordingly, what happens in authentic action is hard to predict. Many great deeds have come about as accidents. It does not matter whether my action is the same as that of the “crowd,” for what is most important is to *follow my heart* and then everything I do will be truly *my* action.

To be authentic is nothing more than to follow the heart. Here, of course, we have to exclude moral feeling (shame) and its inauthentic anxiety (concern) from the genuine content of the heart, for these feelings are at bottom false. Since the genuine content of the heart is nothing other than a genuine extension of conscience, to follow the heart is the same as to follow conscience. But to follow the heart does not mean to live blindly according to feeling only, because at every moment the heart always possesses the *sight* of the real situation, including the *sight* achieved through *thinking*. It is not thinking in general but rather *moral thinking* that draws us away from the genuine content of the heart, because moral thinking is a substitute for the silent judgment of the Self at the core of our heart. However, it also seems true that the attachment to *purely rational thinking* tends to draw us away from the heart as the internal Self, because this kind of thinking requires us to think in a way as if we are nothing but *a universal self*.

The One may also have the misunderstanding that it has to “rebel” against the tradition or culture of its community in order truly to become its Self. But as Heidegger points out, “The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current

factual possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them *in terms of the heritage*, which that resoluteness, as thrown, *takes over*.”⁵⁹ It means that since Dasein is always something *thrown*, it never creates itself *from the ground up*; therefore, its *authentic possibility* is always based on what it *has been*. So to disregard our heritage will only narrow down or even cover up the true possibilities of authentic existence. In addition to this argument from Heidegger, we can also understand the importance of tradition or culture from the viewpoint of community. Though (individual) everyday existence is inauthentic, that does not mean that one’s tradition or culture is essentially inauthentic. The activity of *the Self as such* in a community is not the result of individual actions, not even the sum of them, because it is the activity of *the Self as such* through individualized Selves, and sometimes it is even hard to say who has been involved and who hasn’t. There is always some wisdom and beauty in any historical tradition or culture. It is not wrong but rather foolish to disregard this wisdom and beauty, which has come from hundreds or thousands of years of development.

§2. Rediscovery of the Authentic Other

There is always an asymmetry between the authentic Self and Other. Thus the authentic Other is not rediscovered in resoluteness but in Love, though these two kinds of rediscovery are complimentary to each other, because the Self I is discovered both in me and the Other. Since Love is the extension of conscience with reference to the Other, the rediscovery of the authentic Other is also a movement from morality to conscience.

(1) Primary Love

In everyday existence I discover the Other primarily in a feeling of *indifference*, because the Other is just *another* example of *a universal self*. I may be very “nice” and “polite” to the Other, but for the most part I do not really *open my heart to the Other and let it matter to me through and through*, because most of the time I care about how the Other judges me (and how I judge the Other) rather than the Other itself. This kind of indifference is a deficient mode of Primary Love, because in this kind of feeling I let the Other matter to me in such a way that at bottom it does not really matter. Moreover, when I live *merely* as a universal self, I tend to view *rules, norms, laws* and *rights* as more important than the Other that can be discovered authentically as *the Other* only by *me*.

What really prevents me from discovering the authentic Other in the most primary way is either my moral feeling or thinking. When I feel shame in front of many others and am afraid of their negative judgments on me, “they” have become an obstacle to my freedom (not externally, but internally). When my heart feels the (imaginary) pressures on my action from “they,” I no longer recognize the Other as a *real part* of my life but rather as an intruder (I feel more comfortable when there are no others around me). Therefore, to rediscover the authentic Other I only need to do the opposite: *totally open my heart to the Other as a part of my life*. This “opening” is actually the *resolving* of my

primary feeling of Love towards the Other to become totally itself, because it has been made deficient by my ordinary moral feeling.

If I can resolve in this way, I will find that the Other is not someone who judges me with its look or its words but rather a part of *my* life, without which I do not really have a life. The Other is therefore no longer an intruder upon my life, even when it treats me badly or tries to kill me — an enemy is as real a part of my life as a friend. With my heart open to the Other, my life becomes to a certain extent uncertain, because I may not know exactly what I would do to the Other. This uncertainty is precisely what is lacking when I simply live as the One. It could lead me to great deeds. It could also lead to trouble. However, for human being this is the only way to discover the authentic Other in the most primary way. To find out what the sea is you have to jump into it and face the danger of drowning, though it would be wise to improve your skill at swimming and learn how to avoid this danger.

(2) Friendship

Since the authentic Other is not *merely* a universal self, the way I treat *this* Other need not be totally the same as the way I treat *that* Other, depending on who the Other is. Some may become my friends and others may not. Real friendship is a form of Love that directly comes from Primary Love by making the latter concrete. In friendship I identify the *same* Self in the Other either because I discover some special characters of the Other that attract me, or because something happens to the I and the Other that from that moment links us together. Since I identify the *same* Self in a friend in a *concrete* way, a friend is not only a part of my life, but also an important part of my life. The more I know my friend, the more I want to spend time with him (or her) and share our lives together. But if I view the Other *merely* as another example of *a universal self*, I will not understand this kind of friendship. I may know someone for ten years and still treat him or her in the same way I treat everyone else, for in my mind everyone is the same and no one is special. I may thus live a life in which everyone is my friend but no one is my real friend.

To rediscover the authentic Other in a concrete way, I must not only open my heart to the Other as a part of my life, but also open my eyes and see the *uniqueness* of every Other. This uniqueness is not necessarily the unique character of the Other, though that is often what makes a great friendship — the uniqueness can also be the unique way we know each other. Although I can understand in my mind that there are billions of people living all over the world, I do not meet every one of them. Of those I do meet I may not know them well. Therefore, those I do know well become a real part of my life rather than just “another one.” In the Chinese language, there is a special word for this kind of connection, namely “Yuan.” When the Chinese say that two people have “Yuan,” they mean that the two people have some *predestined connection* between them that brings them together, while those who do not have “Yuan” between them will never have a chance to know each other, even if they live across the street for their whole life. Whether there is this kind of predestined connection between people is not something we

need to investigate in this thesis. But at least we can say that if we treat people we know well in exactly the same way we treat everyone else, we are not going to have real friends, and the authentic Other will remain something abstract rather than concrete.

(3) Family Love

In the opposite sex I discover the concrete Other in the most original way, because the asymmetry between sexes is nothing but the embodiment of the principle of Love, namely the principle of the asymmetry between the internal and external Self. So the opposite sex is the Other in the most original and concrete sense. When I fall in love with someone of the opposite sex, I achieve a self-identity that is so original that it can totally change my life. When I am in love, the sky is bluer than ever, the world seems to have a new meaning. I may suddenly realize that my life before this moment was a life in vain. In love I understand perfectly what it is like to follow my heart. In love my action becomes unpredictable. In love I no longer care about the judgment of others. Love draws me out of my everyday way of living — “My life will never be the same.” Accordingly, love remains the most powerful force from the Other that can release me from everyday existence. Furthermore, in love the concrete uniqueness of the I and the Other are mutually confirmed (nobody can replace my wife or my husband). On the foundation of love, family also becomes a place where concrete uniqueness is recognized and respected (nobody can replace my father, my mother, my brother, my sister or my children). In a word, family Love is the most powerful force from the Other that can keep me away from the “everybody and nobody.”

However, in modern (liberal) society the One has become so popular that even family Love has been modified by the One’s all-penetrating power. When everyone lives merely as *a universal self*, love is understood as merely a “relationship” between *two universal selves*. Therefore, the *asymmetry* between man and woman that lies at the very heart of love becomes more and more insignificant. In accordance with this, today’s law has a stronger and stronger tendency to “redefine” marriage as a union of *two universal selves*, whether the two in union are of the opposite sex seems to be merely “a matter of personal choice.” One may want to argue that if I follow my heart then my “personal choice” is always authentic. But as we have mentioned many times now, the heart always possesses *understanding* as its *sight*, while to view love and marriage as *merely* a “relationship” between *two universal selves* is a *misunderstanding* of the Other that is discovered in the most original and concrete way in the love of man and woman. When love and marriage is misunderstood in this way, the essence of the love of man and woman as the natural embodiment of the principle of Love is covered up. The Other discovered in the most original and concrete way has been treated in the same way as other forms of the Other, and therefore loses its specific authenticity.

To rediscover the authentic Other in the most original and concrete way, we need to rediscover the meaning of being a man and the meaning of being a woman, and the meaning of love. To do this we need to stop listening to the noise of the “public” that knows nothing more than the fact that everyone is a universal self and that a universal

self has the right to do anything as long as it does not hurt other universal selves. If we keep falling into this “*merely* a universal self,” one day we will no longer understand what love is, though people will still talk about it in terms of “relationship.”

(4) The Love of Community

In a community I discover *the Self as such* in its complete existence. But I can identify myself with a community only by taking it as the external existence of my internal Self, namely as the *Absolute Other*, to which I devote myself as I do to my loved ones. Therefore, the Love of community is not the same as being a good member of a community, which simply means to be a good example of a universal self, while in the Love of community I transcend my individuality and raise myself to the same level as the community as a whole. It is in this kind of Love that I become authentically my Self in an ultimate way. Thus it is not surprising that many great persons in history have achieved their greatness through the love of mankind as a whole.

However, in modern (liberal) society, the love of mankind as a whole seems to be confused with the love of everyone as a human being. Thus we tend to care more about human rights than the destiny of mankind. Today, if one still cares about mankind as a whole, it is because everyone has the equal right to pursue happiness, and there are still many people in the world who cannot enjoy this right. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe also proves that the love of mankind cannot replace the liberal concept of human rights. However, it does not follow that the liberal concept of human rights can replace the love of mankind. In the love of mankind I identify myself with mankind as a whole by devoting myself to its activities, while in the liberal concept of human rights it is the state that identifies itself with each of its members by securing the individual rights of the latter. These two forms of self-identity should never be confused, and it is the love of mankind that enables me to become my true Self in an ultimate way.

(5) The Difficulty of this Rediscovery

The rediscovery of the authentic Other is difficult, because the (inauthentic) Other is what morality basically concerns itself with. The One thus has a tendency to confuse Love with morality. It may misunderstand Love as something it “ought to do” regarding the Other. But Love never speaks the language of “ought.” Love is not an obligation. Love is not a responsibility. Love is not even a virtue. Love is rather the way I discover the *same* Self in the Other. It is therefore the way I achieve *self-identity* through the Other. I do not create Love but am created by Love. Love is not in the power of my control: it comes when it comes and goes when it goes. This again makes the rediscovery of the authentic Other difficult.

The One may also misunderstand Love as a form of “altruism.” Is there anything more “altruistic” than Love? But the concept of “altruism” is based on the misunderstanding that the Other is *totally different* from myself, and that I should not care only about myself. But the authentic Other is precisely the external existence of *my*

internal Self. Only by identifying the Other as the *same* Self can I discover the authentic Other in Love. Therefore, to draw an absolute line between the I and the Other is precisely the opposite of what Love does, namely to remove such a line and unite one with the Other. Since Love is something higher than my individual existence, my action in Love often looks like “altruistic behavior” from the perspective of a spectator, and it is rightly so. Yet the essence of Love lies in *self-identity* rather than *self-denial*. Hence understanding Love as a form of “altruism” covers up its essence. The Love of man and woman, for example, is regarded by some people (with moral thinking) as lower than other forms of love, because for one thing it involves beauty and sex that *bring pleasure to oneself*; for another it is limited to *one specific Other* and therefore too narrow in its essence. What they fail to see is that this form of Love brings *pleasure through the body* precisely because it is the *embodiment of the principle of Love*, and that it excludes a third party precisely because it is *limited by the principle of Love it embodies*.

The One may also misunderstand Love as *being good* to the Other. But the authentic Other is discovered in Primary Love with *uncertainty*. So Love could always turn to its opposite and become *the feeling of dislike*, such as spite, anger and hate. Although these unhappy feelings are harmful to myself and therefore it is not wise to maintain them, they are still the (negative) modifications of Love and in this sense still more authentic than the feeling of indifference. However, this is the case only when the feeling of dislike is caused by the action of the Other against me (or my loved ones) rather than my own habit of guilt shifting.

§3. Conclusion

In the preceding two sections we have shown how authentic human existence can be achieved by rediscovering the authentic Self and Other through resoluteness and Love (respectively). We have also shown the difficulty of this transition from inauthentic to authentic human existence, which is simultaneously a movement from morality to conscience. It is difficult because we can only start from where we are, namely from everyday existence in which, for the most part, we have already lost sight of the true Self. Thus the transition is bound to be an adventure that sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails. The situation is made worse by the fact that the transition from inauthentic to authentic human existence is always a reversible process, for it is a change that happens to the *empirical* content of human existence rather than to its *a priori* characteristic. One may even wonder whether such a struggle towards authentic human existence is worth undertaking. After all, authenticity is not *everything* and no one is obliged to achieve it.

Nevertheless, the transition from inauthentic to authentic human existence is significant for *the Self as such* that exists in mankind as a whole through its activities carried out by individual human beings. One of the things the Self struggles towards in human history is a better self-understanding. In this thesis it has been shown that morality originates from the misunderstanding of the Self that judges silently in conscience, which means that the transition from inauthentic to authentic human existence, which is at the

same time a movement from morality to conscience, constitutes a decisive development of the Self insofar as its self-understanding is concerned. Accordingly, the fact that nobody has the obligation to achieve authentic human existence does not mean that authentic human existence is insignificant for the Self, just as the fact that nobody has the obligation to engage in philosophy or art does not mean that philosophy or art is insignificant for mankind.

It follows that the transition from inauthentic to authentic human existence should be viewed as the enterprise of mankind rather than merely the affair of an individual human being. Although authenticity is a characteristic of individual human existence, history has shown us that the people of the same age living in the same nation tend to share an idea regarding the authenticity of their existence, which is due mainly to the fact that the development of the self-understanding of the Self is preserved in the language, education, social organization and other constituents of a community. The ancient Greeks, for instance, seemed to care more about how to live a beautiful life than what was right and wrong, as evidenced by the fact that they seemed to feel very little shame in exposing the beauty of their naked body to others (such as in sport and art). In comparison with the ancient Greeks, we are today less innocent in action and more sophisticated in our moral consideration. Though the modern age witnessed a decline in traditional morality, partly due to the decline of the traditional religion associated with it, it did not eliminate moral thinking but rather developed it in a more rational and sophisticated form. Today almost every kind of action has been analyzed from the moral point of view using the language of “rights” and “responsibilities,” a language that is nearly as technical as that of science. Thus contrary to the ancient Greeks, we tend to care more about whether we have the right or responsibility to do something than whether it is a beautiful thing to do. When the legal aspect (the universal legitimacy) of our action becomes the major concern, the esthetic *sight* of our action is blurred. Although it is true that the modern age has made a tremendous advance in many areas of human activity, such as in science, technology, politics (law) and economy, we have at the same time lost the simplicity that characterizes the ancient Greeks, a simplicity that tends to disappear when our heart is occupied by our rational and sophisticated moral consideration.

Yet it would be unfair to view rational morality as the invention of the moderns. In the writings of Plato, we find that in the classical period of ancient Greek history, the Greeks (especially their philosophers) were preoccupied with the need to examine the rightness of their life by rational thinking. Socrates expressed this best when he declared that the unexamined life is not worth living. While we have to admire the great contributions of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to the development of traditional philosophy, we cannot avoid noticing that their attempt to rationalize human life was the first move away from a life of simplicity towards a life of complexity. This tradition of rationalizing human life reached its peak in the moral philosophy of Kant. His famous categorical imperative, which asks us to always act with a maxim that can be willed as a universal law, turns human life into a matter of merely following rational rules, which denies the importance of the heart in human life. The absurdity of this moral philosophy

becomes evident when he says that the absolute command to tell the truth must be obeyed in all situations, even when a murderer asks me the whereabouts of his intended victim.⁶⁰

Today very few people will consider seriously the categorical imperative. The philosophy of our age (the postmodern age) tends to demolish everything built up by traditional philosophy, which in a broad sense includes all the development from ancient Greek philosophy to German idealism. It thus gives the movement from morality to conscience a free space to expand itself. However, although the philosophy of our age is very good at destroying old things, it does not seem to exhibit an equal ability to build new things. Consequently, when the idol of traditional philosophy is taken down, what takes over is the idol of public (popular) thinking. The fact is that philosophy is not only one of the activities of the Self; it is also a *sight* of the Self that gives directions to other activities, in a sense quite similar to what understanding does to the disclosedness of human existence. Though we do not expect philosophy to prescribe what we should or should not do in a moral sense, we *do* want to have a better self-understanding through philosophy. Self-ignorance is the *empirical* component of the “original sin” of the Self when it first comes to its existence. Therefore, the development of self-understanding through philosophy is actually a part of the overcoming of “original sin.” Although the philosophy of our age tends to aim at the destruction of traditional philosophy, the rational core of the latter becomes more accessible to us when its error is revealed. We thus have reason to expect that philosophy will continue to develop itself and continue to contribute to the overcoming of our ignorance.

However, ignorance is only the *empirical* component of our “original sin.” The transition from inauthentic to authentic human existence, which is accompanied by the overcoming of our self-misunderstanding, does not change the fact that *the Self as such* has judged every one of us as “guilty!” in an *a priori* manner. This *a priori* judgment “guilty!” means that *I am not totally my Self*. Therefore, it indicates a privation of authenticity in human existence, not in the sense that human existence cannot become authentic, but in the sense that it has moved away from the original existence of the Self and results in a *transcendental denial* of the existing Self. This *transcendental denial* not only denies the existing Self, as manifested in the feeling of guilt, but also denies the Being of the existing Self, as manifested in death. Therefore, it is the *transcendental* component of our “original sin.” While the fall from authentic to inauthentic (everyday) human existence is *reversible*, the “fall” from the original existence of the Self to human existence is *irreversible*, insofar as our own Being-the-Self is concerned, for our own Being-the-Self can only change the *empirical* content of our existence. Therefore, it seems that the overcoming of “original sin” (its *transcendental* component) is something that goes beyond human capacity.

Although this conclusion is true, it does not exclude the possibility that the *transcendental* component of “original sin” could be overcome by a *transcendental change of Being as such* that offsets the *transcendental denial* of the existing Self and its Being. However, given that the *transcendental denial* is a denial of the existing Self and its Being, the *transcendental change* that is supposed to offset this *transcendental denial* must accompany a corresponding change of human existence regarding the effects of the

transcendental denial on such existence, namely the *guilt* and *death* of human beings. Because human beings cannot do anything about the *transcendental* component of “original sin” except by totally accepting its effects, the overcoming of “original sin” must happen simultaneously to *Being as such* in a *transcendental* manner, and to human beings in the manner of *a total acceptance of guilt and death for the sake of overcoming our “original sin.”* This total acceptance of the *guilt* and *death* of human beings need not involve all human beings, because every human being is the representative of *the Self as such*. Accordingly, the change in human beings can happen in *one single human being* and be shared by others through him who represents *the Self as such* in this overcoming, as long as he is willing to *totally accept* the *a priori* *guilt* of mankind as his own *guilt* and to be *put to death* by the law of mankind.

From this point of view, what the Bible (New Testament) tells us about the overcoming of “original sin” through Jesus Christ seems to be a possible solution for our “original sin.” Nevertheless, to investigate the ontological truth of such a solution requires us to have a more complete ontology than the one Heidegger has given us. We need to understand better the *inner logic* of human history, which again requires us to understand better how *Being as such* is determined by *Logos* (the self-governing activity of nature). This kind of inquiry goes totally beyond the scope of this thesis. What we want to show is only that the movement from conscience to morality coincides with the transition from authentic to inauthentic existence. We have tried to prove this by showing how morality originates from the confusion between the silent judgment of conscience and the speech of the Other, a confusion that naturally comes from the connection between the Self that dwells in conscience and the same Self discovered in the Other. It is also helpful to discuss the counter-movement from morality to conscience, and we have done so regarding the transition from inauthentic to authentic human existence. As to the transition from human existence to a mode of existence in which our “original sin” has been overcome, we cannot say anything here more than the comment that it is possible from the ontological point of view.

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NOTES

¹ Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 255.

² Sherover, 28-32.

³ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 163 [232-233].

⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 332 [*Sein und Zeit*, 286].

⁵ *Ibid.* 315 [271].

⁶ *Ibid.* 335-341 [289-295].

⁷ *Ibid.* 334 [288].

⁸ *Ibid.* 334 [288].

⁹ *Ibid.* 331 [285].

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 312 [267].

¹¹ Allen, 78.

¹² Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 159 [226-228].

¹³ See Zimmerman, *Eclipse of the Self*, 233.

¹⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 344 [298].

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 158 [122].

¹⁶ Heidegger does not take the distinction between "I" and "thou" as a theme of study in *Being and Time*. In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, he introduces the concept of the "neutrality" of Dasein (136-140 [170-177]) and denies the ontological importance of the distinction between "I" and "thou" (187-188 [240-243]).

¹⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 171 [133].

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 232 [187-188].

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 314 [269].

²⁰ *Ibid.* 263 [220].

²¹ *Ibid.* 304 [260].

²² *Ibid.* 173 [134].

²³ *Ibid.* 173 [134].

²⁴ *Ibid.* 320, 318 [275, 273].

²⁵ Some writers use a different system of spelling, in which the Chinese word for "heart" is spelled as "Hsin" and the Chinese word for "conscience" or "inborn heart" is spelled as "Liang-chih."

²⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 182 [142-143].

²⁷ Heidegger's claim "in concerned solicitude the Other is proximally disclosed" (*Being and Time*, 161 [124]) seems to come close to our claim that the Other is discovered in the most primary way in Primary Love. However, he continues to say in the same page: "the explicit disclosure of the Other in solicitude grows only out of one's primarily Being with him in each case." It is apparent that he takes Being with the Other (in terms of things within the world) as more primordial than our feeling towards the Other. The fact is that our dealing with the Other would not have the meaning of "Being with the Other" if it did not involve a primary understanding of the Other as the Other (as the *same* Self). Since understanding always has its mood, as Heidegger insists (182 [143]), our primary understanding of the Other is always associated with a feeling towards the Other that lets the Other matter to us in a way different from things within the world. This feeling is nothing but what we have termed "the primary feeling of Love."

²⁸ Levinas, 105, 168.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 113.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 9-11.

³¹ *Ibid.* 35.

³² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 206 [163].

³³ Levinas, 20.

³⁴ Chapter Three of Genesis tells us how Adam and Eve became mortal after they ate of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The chapter is entitled “The Fall of Man.” See *The Holy Bible*, 2.

³⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 329-331 [283-285].

³⁶ *Ibid.* 331 [285].

³⁷ *Ibid.* 237 [192].

³⁸ *The Holy Bible*, Exodus 3:14, 42.

³⁹ *Ibid.* Genesis 2-3, 2-3.

⁴⁰ For example, Romans 5:12 says: “Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all men, because all sinned.” See *The Holy Bible*, 798.

⁴¹ The story comes from Genesis 22 (see *The Holy Bible*, 14-15). When “God” called Abram to sacrifice his only son Isaac as a burnt offering, he listened to and obeyed the words of “God” with absolute faith. But when he took a knife to slay his son, “God” stopped him and promised him: “through your offspring all nations on earth will be blessed, because you have obeyed me.” So when he became old “God” said to him: “No longer will you be called Abram; your name will be Abraham [meaning ‘the father of many’], for I have made you a father of many nations.” (Genesis 17:5, 11.) Today, Abraham is recognized as the father of faith for all who believe in “God.”

⁴² See, for example, Luke 6:37 (729), John 8:3-11(757), Corinthians 4:3 (808).

⁴³ *The Holy Bible*, Genesis 2:25, 2.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Genesis 3:7, 2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Genesis 3:11-13, 2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* Genesis 4:1-15, 3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Ephesians 4:6, 828.

⁴⁸ Heidegger uses this term to designate everyday mode of *care*, without specifically relating it to inauthentic anxiety as we do.

⁴⁹ Nietzsche, “The Returning Home,” 296.

⁵⁰ Heidegger thinks that it is mainly anxiety and death that individualizes Dasein (see §40 and §53). This thinking reflects his understanding that the Self is a mode of Being (anxiety possesses the understanding of Being in the form of anticipation of death). But I want to argue that the call of conscience individualizes Dasein in a more fundamental way, for conscience is where the Self primarily dwells in its existence.

⁵¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 340 [293].

⁵² *Ibid.* 340-341 [294].

⁵³ *Ibid.* 337 [291].

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 340[294].

⁵⁵ Heidegger does not have the concept of inauthentic anxiety. What he means by anxiety is a mode of state of mind in which Dasein is brought back from its falling into the “world” of its concern to its authentic Being-in-the-world. But he also claims that falling is grounded in anxiety (230 [186]). We can make sense of this claim only if we base falling on the inauthentic modification of (authentic) anxiety.

⁵⁶ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust I & II*. Edited and translated by Stuart Atkins (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 289 [11,450-11,465].

⁵⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 294 [250].

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 376, 387-388 [328, 338].

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 435 [383].

⁶⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* (with “On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns”), translated by James W. Ellington (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993), 65 [427].