DEVELOPMENT AND RESISTANCE:
RURAL RESISTANCE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES
IN WESTERN SAMOA
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PRACTICES IN WESTERN
SAMOA

By
EUDENE LUTHER, M.A.

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AUTHOR:  Eudene O. Luther, B.A. (University of Lethbridge)
          M.A. (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. William Rodman

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I show that contemporary development practices in Western Samoa are the product of a historical encounter between two social, political, and cultural worlds; the Samoan world characterized by a kin-ordered mode of production and the world of global capitalism. That encounter culminated in the incorporation of the Independent State of Western Samoa created and defined by members of a Samoan political élite in collaboration with members of the New Zealand colonial élite.

Since the incorporation of the Independent State of Western Samoa, successive government élites in collaboration with aid donors have attempted to implement a state-centred model of and for development directed toward the goals of national self-reliance and a condition of improved economic well-being for all Samoans. Government strategies have focused on the development of relations with patron states that provide aid in the form of grants, loans, technology, and technicians for investment, for the most part, in large state-owned commercial ventures and infrastructural projects.

Unfortunately, government strategies have failed to achieve either a movement toward national self-reliance or enhanced economic well-being for the majority of Samoans. The Government development practices have not effectively mobilized and utilized rural resources, specifically, the rural institutions of land and labour, as tools for raising productivity in the rural sector of the economy. Instead the production of export crops has stagnated or declined, and government attempts to utilize land for forestry or infrastructural projects have been met, more often than not, with resistance from people living in the rural areas. Furthermore,
young Samoans continue to migrate out of the rural areas leaving their families short of labour and struggling to produce a surplus in addition to their subsistence requirements.
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Also, I would like to thank the development practitioners from the various donor countries who openly shared their perceptions of development with me and gave me some valuable insights into what it might be like to be in their shoes.

I am deeply grateful and indebted to the chiefs and Orators of the village that hosted my research. They treated my son and me as friends and honoured guests and taught us how to participate in village life. Li'o and Fa'aiu took us in as members of their family and taught us about the enduring power of love and generosity.

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This thesis is founded on the research and writings of many other scholars concerned with the history and development of the South Pacific region in general, and Western Samoa in particular. Of special importance are the works of Paul Shankman, Sharon Tiffany, John Tim O'Meara and Cluny Macpherson. In addition, Paul Shankman, Sharon Tiffany and Tim O'Meara generously shared with me their
knowledge of the peculiarities of doing fieldwork in Western Samoa. Consequently, I was far better prepared than I otherwise would have been. Without the devotion and writings of these scholars and the other scholars mentioned herein, this dissertation would not be possible.

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For my son, Justin
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INTRODUCTION

The stagnation and decline of Western Samoa's agricultural exports is conceptualized by scholars, aid donors and indigenous elites alike as a problem of economic development. In the literature on Samoa, there is an ongoing debate around the topic. Fox and Cumberland (1962), Pirie (1970), Lockwood (1971), Shankman (1972), Fairbairn (1972, 1975, 1985) and Yusuf and Peters (1985) link the problem to the persistence of Samoa's traditional institutions while Pitt (1970), Tiffany (1975a), Leung Wai (1978), Kallen (1982), Macpherson (1988) and O'Meara (1990) argue Samoa's traditional institutions, far from hindering development, allow successful participation in the cash economy and provide adequate incentives to raise the production of agricultural exports. The latter link declining production to a combination of economic factors such as unpredictable prices for imported food and agricultural inputs, inappropriate development policies, and the drain of Samoan labour out of the rural areas through migration.

Regardless of their views these scholars have based their analyses on their observations of the overt practices of Samoan farmers living in rural villages, and on how those practices have impacted the productive capabilities of the nation state of Western Samoa. They have paid far less attention to the impact of national and international development policy and practices on the behaviour of rural Samoan farmers and even less to the historical basis of economic and political processes that occur in Western Samoa today.

The present study departs from those mentioned above because
its central premise is that the problem of development in Western Samoa can only be understood by situating the analysis within the wider historical context of the expansion of global capitalism -- a process culminating in the colonization of Western Samoa, the incorporation of Western Samoa as an independent state and, finally, its growing dependence on foreign capital and international aid. This situating of local problems of development in the context of national and international events helps to provide answers to some questions that remain unanswered in the literature. For example: Why don't farmers plant crops that yield a higher monetary return? What is the role of the government in perpetuating the decline and stagnation of the production of export crops? In what ways do aid donors perpetuate the underdevelopment of the rural sector? These questions, while raised in the context of Western Samoa, could be asked of many new Pacific nations.

Western Samoa's political élite have expressed a strong commitment to economic growth reflected in the growth of per capita income as a means of improving the welfare of the Samoan people. Each development plan has emphasized that economic growth must occur through higher productivity and diversification of export crops. Moreover, except for the first plan, all plans state that economic growth "must not be realized at the expense of basic changes in Samoa's social institutions" (G.W.S. 1975b:2). Instead, the plans articulate a commitment to improving the productivity of village land by utilizing Samoa's indigenous institutions. This commitment to the preservation of indigenous institutions is synonymous with the commitment to preserve Samoan culture, not as a "static entity", but "as a dynamic force necessary for the spiritual and emotional health of the Samoan people" (G.W.S. 1980:85-86). Finally, the government of Western Samoa links economic growth to the realization of national, political and economic independence and self-reliance.
My data suggest that Western Samoa’s development policy has not been matched by either appropriate development strategies or performance of the economy. State development strategies have focused disproportionately on the commercial sector of the economy. The government has invested miniscule amounts of money in increasing the productive capacity of rural farmers and government development projects circumvent indigenous rural organizations rendering them redundant as facilitators of the development process.

Government development policy and practice in Western Samoa is the product of conscious strategizing of and collaboration between groups of people situated in their respective social formations: indigenous Samoan élites on the one hand, and aid donors and foreign businessmen/women on the other - diverse groups that have little in common except their claim to promote Samoan development. Furthermore, the historical and contemporary practices of these foreign and indigenous élites are motivated by their desire to remain in power by ensuring the maintenance, reproduction and, sometimes, the transformation of their respective social, political, and cultural institutions. However, this collaboration between élites has not gone unresisted. Government supported development projects are often thwarted by resistance from rural areas. This resistance is almost always organized against the use of village land by the government or foreign business interests.

In this thesis I show that contemporary development practices in Western Samoa are the product of a historical encounter between two social, political, and cultural worlds; the Samoan world characterized by a kin-ordered mode of production and the world of global capitalism. That encounter culminated in the incorporation of the Independent State of Western Samoa created and defined by members of a Samoan political élite in collaboration with members of the New Zealand colonial élite.
Since the incorporation of the Independent State of Western Samoa, successive government elites in collaboration with aid donors have attempted to implement a state-centred model of and for development directed toward the goals of national self-reliance and a condition of improved economic well-being for all Samoans. Government strategies have focused on the development of relations with patron states that provide aid in the form of grants, loans, technology, and technicians for investment, for the most part, in large state-owned commercial ventures and infrastructural projects.

Unfortunately, government strategies have failed to achieve either a movement toward national self-reliance or enhanced economic well-being for the majority of Samoans. Government development practices have not effectively mobilized and utilized rural resources, specifically, the rural institutions of land and labour, as tools for raising productivity in the rural sector of the economy. Instead the production of export crops has stagnated or declined, and government attempts to utilize land for forestry or infrastructural projects have been met, more often than not, with resistance from people living in the rural areas. Furthermore, young Samoans continue to migrate out of the rural areas leaving their families short of labour and struggling to produce a surplus in addition to their subsistence requirements. This failure on the part of governments combined with the resistance from rural farmers calls into question the suitability of a state-centred model of and for development in the Western Samoan context.

**CONTRADICTIONS AND AMBIGUITIES: A Review of the Literature**

Western Samoa is situated 172° W and 14° S 1,900 miles north of New Zealand and just east of the International Date Line. Its seven islands amount to 1,093 square miles almost all of which are accounted for by the two main islands of Upolu and Savai’i. Only two
of the five smaller islands are inhabited; Apolima and Manono.

The country has been independent since 1962, following forty-eight years of New Zealand administration and trusteeship and prior to that, fifteen years of German colonization. The last census (G.W.S. 1984a) taken in 1981 estimated the population to be 160,000 of which twenty-two percent live in the urban area, Apia.

The culture is distinctively Samoan. Traditional authority is vested in 17,900 chiefs (G.W.S. 1987a). Each extended family has at least one chief who is appointed by consensus by all adults in the family. Ownership of approximately eighty percent of Samoan land is legally vested in the chiefs who direct and manage the economic, social, and political affairs of their villages and families. Until recently, only chiefs could vote or run for office in national elections except for two seats reserved for non-Samoan voters.

On October 29, 1990, the people of Western Samoa voted in a referendum to extend voting rights to all citizens over the age of twenty-one. Subsequently, legislation was passed extending voting privileges to all adult Western Samoan citizens in February of 1991. While some sixty thousand adults are now eligible to vote, only Samoan matai (chiefs) can run for office.

There are 362 villages with an average population of 200 to 500 people. Each village is governed by a Council of Chiefs that can fine or otherwise punish offenders of village rules. Besides the village council, each village has women's committees responsible for village health, various agricultural programmes, and fund-raising for village projects. Village chiefs, untitled men and women's organizations and committees together provide the labour and financing for building schools, village roads, churches and health clinics. Projects are financed partially through fund-raising activities and partially by negotiating loans with commercial banks.

Subsistence agriculture and cash cropping is the principle
economic activity in Western Samoa absorbing seventy percent of the labour force and contributing nearly fifty percent (inclusive of subsistence income) of the Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.). A surplus is produced for local sale consisting of root crops, fish, and a variety of fruits and vegetables. Coconut oil, cocoa, and taro are major export items (ibid.:46). Over the last thirty years, the production of copra has stagnated and the production of cocoa has declined. Each of Western Samoa's development plans have expressed alarm at this situation and a number of scholars have tried to determine the causes.

As I mentioned above, a debate has developed in Samoan literature around the topic of the stagnation of rural production. Some scholars link problems of development with Samoa's traditional institutions. Fox and Cumberland (1962) conclude one of the earliest studies on Western Samoan agriculture by stating that the most serious constraint on commercial production for export markets "is the absence of provision for the individual use of land" (ibid.:322). Furthermore, fragmentation and dispersal of land holdings is a deterrent to "improved cultivation practices and a daily waste of time and energy" (ibid:323). They suggest that villages should consolidate garden plots into "economic plantation sizes" under the guidance of the government.

Lockwood (1971) studied the use of land and labour by Samoan farmers. He observes that the production of food and cash crops is well below that which Samoan farmers could achieve if they fully exploited their available land and labour. This observation is based on his 1966 study of the daily work activities of men. According to Lockwood, underproduction of crops for export is caused by the lack of security in land tenure, and the gift-exchange system (see Chapter II), both of which act as a disincentive to Samoans wishing to accumulate wealth (ibid.:208). Lockwood concludes that "the real
objective of Samoan work" is to achieve political influence within the Samoan political system and, hence, their "interest in the outside world in general and the market in particular is limited" (ibid.).

We should note that when Lockwood collected his data, he did not consider women’s labour, and he considered only the time (between 26 hours and 33 hours per week) spent on subsistence and cash crop activities. Labour spent on fishing, community development (building and maintaining village schools, roads, clinics, water systems etc.), or social reproduction (marriages, funerals, matai installation ceremonies, etc.) was not included in Lockwood’s time study.

Pirie (1970) compares early development in American Samoa with development in Western Samoa. In 1962, American aid poured into American Samoa. The money was used to build schools, waterworks, telecommunication systems, and fish canneries, and to expand the tourist industry (ibid.:498-499). By 1970, at least ninety percent of the Samoan male population had paid employment. Agriculture was no longer a significant component of the economy (ibid.:500). The rate of development, Pirie observes, should be viewed "as a demonstration of the inherent power of capital investment and government spending to overwhelm traditional social, political and economic barriers" (ibid:506). Western Samoa is a "striking contrast" to American Samoa, says Pirie (ibid). The country is still predominantly agricultural and development will require "radical new technologies, intensive commercial agriculture, and modifications to the land tenure system" (ibid.).

Holmes (1970; 1980) also links problems of development to Samoa’s traditional institutions. He argues that any untitled Samoan man can theoretically attain chiefly status. Thus there is no incentive for them to seek wider participation in European goods,
power and prestige, either by changing their behaviour or changing
their allegiance from their chiefs to the State.

In 1975, Fairbairn notes that while a modest proportion of
total potential labour time is actually devoted to economic tasks,
the government’s willingness to accept technical, human, and capital
aid from the international community has "laid the foundation"
(ibid.:192) for economic development. Development, Fairbairn
asserts, depends on, among other things, a more flexible land tenure
system to encourage commercial production for the international
market.

By 1984, some of Fairbairn’s optimism begins to wane. In
papers he co-authored with Tisdell, based on data from a number of
Pacific Islands, he cautions Pacific governments against relying on
the export of non-subsistence goods, and non-renewable resources.
Commercial production, he argues, leaves people with less land for
subsistence agriculture, and may be unsustainable in the long run if
markets collapse (Fairbairn and Tisdell 1984; 1985). Then, in an
article co-authored with his wife (Fairbairn and Fairbairn 1985),
Fairbairn appears to be less concerned with the potentiality of
unsustainable development. He and his co-author (ibid.:305) suggest
that the social system tends to blunt incentive and innovation. The
Fairbairns’ argue that chiefly ownership and control over land
prevents non-Samoans and Samoans short of land who wish to increase
their agricultural productivity from acquiring surplus village land.
Furthermore, the land tenure system limits the amount of land
available for commercial plantations (ibid.:307).

Yusuf and Peters (1985) also argue that declining production
in Western Samoa is the result of the land tenure system;
"...productivity, improvements, diversifications of crops, gains in
marketing, a commercial orientation to farming activities have all
been handicapped by communal management of nearly eighty-percent of
the land" (ibid.:4). They note however, that low prices for copra are equal in importance to communal management as a disincentive to farmers who may otherwise produce more crops (ibid.:6). They also acknowledge that the heavy migration of young people out of the rural areas is the result of low returns on agricultural labour as compared to wage labour (ibid.). They observe that for the family and community, to maximize returns by way of remittances, "conservation of village and social relations, loyalties and identity is the most rewarding investment so long as other possibilities cannot be developed" (ibid.:14). They suggest that the government should direct resources to village institutions (ibid.:20-21). Village corporations and the church will provide, according to Yusuf and Peters, the "entrepreneurial impulse" and "managerial scaffolding" to draw skilled Samoan man-power abroad back to the country and induce overseas Samoans to invest in productive local ventures. However, since chiefly management of land is to blame for declining production, a "redefinition of property rights and rewiring of the power structure" will also be required (ibid.:22).

This group of authors view Samoa's land-tenure system as a major constraint on commercial production and thus, as the primary cause of declining production for export markets. Shankman (1976) changes the focus from production of export crops to migration. He states that migration is both symptomatic of and perpetuates underdevelopment in Western Samoa (ibid.:23). He argues that although migration and remittances offer short term consumption benefits for individuals and families, substantive development requires increased production relative to consumption. However, in Western Samoa, remittances have increased consumption, but not production. As a result, migration inhibits national self-reliance. Shankman notes that between 1956 and 1972, per capita production of
agricultural exports declined to levels below those of the turn of the century, while consumption of imported goods increased steadily, causing trade and balance-of-payments deficits (ibid.). Remittances provided the surplus for increased consumption (ibid.:28-29).

Shankman suggests that migration is a Samoan adaptation (or perhaps, a rational economic response) to the decline of cash available from export earnings. He suggests that,

The stability of the initial Samoan adaptation to the wider world has given the relatively recent social situation an "aura" of tradition... but a closer look at faʻasamoa reveals that it is more an ideology of tradition.... The conservative faʻasamoa ethos can be viewed as a product of underdevelopment, and it might be expected that, as development occurs, the conscious model of faʻasamoa will disappear. (ibid.:25)

Shankman further suggests that the "ideology of tradition" persists because the Western Samoan economic elite encourages it. Here he disagrees with Holmes and Lockwood concerning the Samoans' attachment to their indigenous institutions. He argues instead, that if Samoans had the opportunity to participate fully in the market economy, their institutions would become redundant and disappear. He asserts that the indigenous institutions persist because the Europeans and part-Samoan business elites discriminate against Samoans who try to enter their circle. Instead, the business elite encourages Samoans to consume and seek status in their own political systems. This situation, he suggests, is exacerbated by the customary system of land tenure which further limits Samoans' economic opportunities.

Like the scholars whose works I discussed above, Shankman comes back to the land tenure system as a major, if not primary, cause of declining production of export crops in Western Samoa. Shankman implies that a change in the land tenure system might provide economic opportunities for Samoans and help to reduce the flow of labour out of the rural areas. This group of scholars then,
regards Samoa's indigenous institutions, particularly the land tenure system as a major impediment to commercializing agricultural production and, concomitantly, a major obstacle to national autonomy and self-reliance.

On the other side of the debate, Pitt (1979:7) argues that Samoa's traditional institutions, far from hindering economic development, allow successful participation in the cash economy and provide an efficient framework for production and exchange as well as adequate production incentives (ibid.:263). With respect to the latter, both Pitt (ibid.) and Kallen (1982:36) argue, contrary to Holmes, that education and economic ability in the cash economy are the most important criteria for obtaining chiefly titles and prestige. In his book The Social Dynamics of Development, Pitt (1976) cites a variety of data from the works of anthropologists and sociologists to support the argument that so-called traditional societies are flexible enough to achieve development (ibid.:85-107). He asserts that development (building roads, schools, clinics, etc.) has been taking place in the villages of Western Samoa but that this development has gone unrecognized by development agencies (ibid.:138). Pitt concludes that the "social distance" between aid donors along with government officials and the Samoan people explains the general failure of development policies. In a later article he notes that only five percent of the population in Western Samoa have ever benefitted from aid (1979:68). Declining production in agricultural exports is the result of: low world prices and high prices for imported agricultural inputs, both of which operate as a disincentive to rural producers; high consumer prices for imported food stuffs that encourage villages to consume rather than export what they grow (ibid.:68-69); and the mismanagement of development by "new élites" who owe their wealth to government positions (ibid.:78). He suggests that development agencies must find ways to
control new élites and establish a more "genuine communication" with the villages (ibid.). Note, however, that the data I present below (Chapter VII) suggest that development agencies are willing collaborators with the new élites and are, therefore, in no position to control them.

Tiffany and Macpherson also doubt that indigenous institutions in Western Samoa blunt innovations and agricultural productivity. Tiffany (1975) presents a case study of an enterprising chief who successfully uses kinship and political networks to advance his economic and political goals. Macpherson (1988) provides examples of entrepreneurial individuals who have used new technologies and strategies to increase the productivity and profitability of village agriculture. Macpherson argues that indigenous institutions are neutral with respect to economic innovations (ibid.:6). He found that even when an individual’s innovations generated new wealth which had the potential to change the existing distribution of local power, those in power made no attempt to limit or constrain the activities of entrepreneurs. Instead, entrepreneurs were rewarded with titles and positions or authority within their respective kin groups, villages, or both.

Macpherson suggests that neither the village nor the family has any reason to constrain production when those who create wealth invest in the village. By bestowing matai titles on such people, "they lock them and the resources they control into patterns of rights and obligations" (ibid.:19). Thus both the village and family benefit from increased production.

Macpherson concludes that the decline and stagnation of export crops is due to the flow of labour out of the rural areas as young people migrate to Apia or overseas (ibid.:21). He suggests that the government should tap the potential production in rural areas by harnessing rather than eliminating indigenous structures.
"The challenge for planners is to persuade rural farmers that increasing agricultural production is a rational use of labour" (ibid.). The data I collected in the village (Chapter II) support Macpherson's conclusion.

Sam Leung Wai (1978), a top level bureaucrat who works closely with rural farmers in Western Samoa, also lays the blame for declining productivity in the export sector on labour moving out of the rural economy into the urban economy. He argues that because of crop pests and disease, and unpredictable world prices, the productivity of farm labour is declining relative to wage labour. As a result, labour is leaving the rural sector. Consequently, farm families producing all their subsistence requirements and participating in family and community activities are finding it difficult to produce a surplus for export (cf Chapter II).

Recently, O'Meara (1986,1990) makes the following observation about those who argue that the decline and stagnation of export crops is due to Samoan institutions:

People assume that economic incentives are already adequate for greater output so that development will proceed only when villagers are persuaded to abandon their inhibiting traditions. If this is wrong, however, then the social explanation is itself incorrect and development programs based on it cannot hope to succeed (1986:2).

O'Meara (ibid.:1986,1990) presents evidence which strongly contradicts the explanation that socio-cultural institutions inhibit the economic incentives of villagers. He conducted a year-long survey of household labour-use, production, and income in a Western Samoan village to show that the villagers' decisions to invest labour in non-agricultural activities are rational when economic returns from agriculture are very low compared to returns from other sources of income. He concludes that the economic incentives of the market place are not adequate to inspire greater production (see Chapter II). Under these circumstances, rural farmers invest in
their children's education and send them into wage-labour overseas or in Apia. Moreover, contrary to the myth of Samoan conservatism, he shows that traditional institutions have not remained unchanged. Rather, villagers have adapted them to accommodate their involvement in the cash economy (see Chapter VI).

Despite the fact that O'Meara does not blame Samoan institutions for the decline in export production, he agrees with Shankman regarding the Samoans' attachment to their institutions. He speculates that the villagers' "emphasis on sharing and gift-giving" is more an adaptation to poverty than the cause of it (1990:193-215). The ceremonial exchange system endures, he suggests, because Samoans have adapted it to their needs. Villagers exchange subsistence goods and matai titles for purchased goods and cash from wealthier urban and overseas relatives who attend ceremonial exchanges (weddings, funerals, chiefly installation ceremonies, church dedications, etc.). Few Samoans, he continues, can afford to withdraw from the mutual support and security provided by the family, especially since there is no national social security system to take its place.

O'Meara seems to suggest that Samoans engage in ceremonial exchange purely for financial reasons and would give up their indigenous institutions if they were more financially secure. He tends to undervalue the role played by ceremonial exchange, first in reproducing the village power structure; second, in legitimizing the political and social identities of the individuals involved; and third, in constructing the aspirations in the first place of those who exploit wage labour as an economic option. This may be an overzealous attempt by O'Meara to establish the rationality of Samoan decision-making behaviour vis-à-vis their choices to leave farming and become involved in wage labour. However, to say that Samoans are rational is not the same thing as saying their
aspirations are not culturally constructed. To do so is to forget an old anthropological truism. Most Samoans will continue to support their indigenous institutions whether they are financially rewarding or not, precisely because it is those very institutions that construct and legitimize their identities and thus their aspirations in the first place.

Although O'Meara is to be commended for dispelling the myth of Samoan conservatism, we are still left with only a partial explanation of the productivity problem: i.e., low returns to rural farmers on cash crops. Important questions are still left unanswered. For example, why don't farmers switch to planting higher return crops? What is the role of government and aid donors in perpetuating rural stagnation? The scholars mentioned above have limited their ability to answer such questions by basing their analysis on the decision-making behaviour (whether to produce for export or migrate) of Samoan farmers and on how these decisions have impacted the nation's productive capabilities and thus national economic self-reliance. They have all but ignored national and international development policies and practices, as well as the concept of development which underwrites the same, an investigation of which may go a long way in answering these questions.

The above review of the literature indicates the importance of the problem of stagnating or declining production of export crops in Western Samoa. However, scholars contradict one another when they attempt to isolate causes, and their remedial policy suggestions are sometimes ambiguous. Some of the contradiction and ambiguity might be avoided if scholars would disclose how they conceptualize development. For example, Fox and Cumberland, Lockwood, Pirie, Holmes, Fairbairn and Shankman appear to define development in terms of the advancement of national autonomy and self-reliance best achieved by means of commercializing the production of export crops.
through the efficient use of land and labour, and utilizing the principles of economies of scale and comparative advantage. Accordingly, land and labour should be "free" to respond to the dictates of the market. Given this view of development, it makes sense to see Samoan institutions, especially the land tenure system, as an obstacle. Indeed, most of the land and labour in Western Samoa is controlled by a hierarchy of chiefs. Moreover, many plots of land are too small to be commercially viable units and any given individual's land holdings may be small, scattered and far away from home. So, as Fox and Cumberland (1962) remark, much time is "wasted" walking to and from scattered plots. In addition, given this view of development, time and resources spent by villagers on ceremonial, social and political activities that reproduce their indigenous institutions, is "wasted" and might otherwise be spent on production of cash crops.

By contrast to the above authors, Pitt, Tiffany, Macpherson, Leung Wai and O'Meara seem more concerned with development defined as village autonomy and self-sufficiency than with development defined as national autonomy and self-sufficiency. Consequently, they argue that Samoan institutions are flexible enough to achieve higher production of crops. These scholars argue that a combination of the unpredictability of world prices, out-migration from villages to urban and overseas areas, inflationary consumer prices for food and agricultural inputs, and inappropriate development policy are responsible for declining and stagnating production of exports. This analysis implies that development planners must persuade rural farmers that increasing the production of export crops is the most rational use of labour. Furthermore, the government should "harness the farmer's potential for production" by "supporting rather than eliminating" indigenous political and economic structures (Macpherson, 1988:21). Ambiguities in the literature, then, are
resolved by examining the conceptions of development that underpin these different points of view.

WESTERN SAMOA IN THE PACIFIC CONTEXT

Western Samoa is one of the nine independent states in the Pacific region. The other eight are Nauru, Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, The Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Vanuatu. These nine states are theoretically free to make their own decisions about development policy and practice. There are a number of works on island development which indicate that Western Samoa is not unique in the Pacific region. The Asian Development Bank (1980) has published a survey of agricultural constraints and choices in Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Western Samoa. Young and Gunasekara (1984) have studied agricultural policy and projects in the Solomon Islands, Western Samoa and Fiji. Browne and Scott (1989) have looked at economic development in Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, The Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. Bertram and Watters (1985) and Ogden (1989) have examined the economic viability of microstates including Tuvalu and Kiribati. Recently, John Connell (1990) edited a book on migration and development in the South Pacific. Finally, Fisk (1986) has written a short and concise overview of the difficulties facing the agricultural sector in Western Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands.

Authors who have contributed to these works note that in all Pacific states, agriculture is the main export sector (Ward 1980:480; Fisk 1986:2; Browne and Scott 1989:4; Young and Gunasekara 1984:1; Ogden 1989:362). Money, especially from the sale of copra, provides the cash for rural producers. In all countries, upwards of eighty percent of the land is under the control of local kin groups; i.e. the land is held under customary rules of land tenure (Ward and

In almost all Pacific island countries, most people (between seventy five and eighty five percent) are engaged in mixed subsistence and cash-crop farming on land held according to customary rules (Fisk 1986:11-12). Only in Fiji is the commercialized sector of major importance. In all other South Pacific countries, the mixed subsistence and cash-crop farming sector produces the greatest amount of exports, supplies the majority of people with food, and is the main source of productive employment, even though workers are not paid a wage (ibid.:14). As Fisk (1986) emphasizes, this sector is the most stable and "its immense share of productive capital and other improvements, is socially, politically and economically almost impossible to move and reallocate" (ibid:14-15). In other words, development planners and politicians have no choice but to take account of this sector.

The national development plan of all nine independent states identify rural development as a major concern (Ward and Proctor 1980:39; Browne and Scott 1989:5; Ogden 1989:364). Most plans "echo the Western Samoan statement" (Ward and Proctor 1980:39) that growth must not occur at the expense of indigenous institutions (Browne and Scott 1989:5; Ogden 1989:361). However, in every case, government expenditures do not reflect the fact that rural development is a government priority (Ward and Proctor 1980:144; Young and Gunasekara 1984:4-5; Browne and Scott 1989:5-6; Ogden 1989:364). As Young and Gunasekara (1984:5) point out, many Pacific island nations put less emphasis on rural small-holder projects than on large state-owned commercial ventures managed by foreign experts, and on infrastructure (Fisk 1986:5; Browne and Scott 1989:6). Furthermore, rising incomes and wage levels in island countries as a result of government expenditures "do not stimulate foreign earnings or import
replacements" and attract labour out of agriculture into highly paid but "non-self-supporting industries" (Fisk 1986:5-6).

Rural resistance to development projects, especially forestry and infrastructure development (hydro-electric dams, airports, etc.) is common in island countries (Hau’ofa and Ward 1980:68; Watt 1980:311; Browne and Scott 1989:8). For example, customary landowners, worried about the effects of logging and mining on their subsistence/cash-crop strategies, come into conflict with national governments interested in income from forestry and mining. Such conflicts generate acts of rural resistance against government projects and are a significant political problem in the Solomon Islands (World Bank 1980:18-19), Fiji, Western Samoa, Tonga (Watt 1980:293-313) and Papua New Guinea (World Bank 1981).1

While all Pacific island countries have legally entrenched the protection of customary land, Pacific lawmakers have paid little attention to the link between local government (responsible for administering customary rules of tenure) and the state (Powles 1982:349-350). Consequently, Pacific governments do not deal well with disputes over their use of customary land for development and, according to one scholar, they "appear reluctant to use what legal powers they do have" (Thomas 1983:3).

Migration of people out of rural areas to local urban areas or overseas is a common phenomenon in Pacific island states. Some scholars view migration as a problem for the development of national self-sufficiency and autonomy because it reduces the labour force and therefore the production of export crops in the rural areas while creating political dependencies in Pacific island states on labour-receiving countries like Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A. (Ward and Proctor 1980:138-139; Watt 1980:398-399; Munro 1990:41). Other scholars view migration as a positive force which contributes to both a favorable balance of payments (remittances
contributed to foreign exchange) and a higher standard of living in Pacific island communities (Browne and Scott 1989:13-14; Bertram and Watters 1985; Ogden 1989; Boyd 1990).

We need to be clear, however, that if indigenous elites conceptualize the stagnation and decline of export crops as a problem of economic development, and national development plans identify rural development as a major concern (see above), then migration is a problem that must be addressed. Any development projects or strategies aimed at raising production in the rural sector of Pacific economies are necessarily dependent on adequate pools of labour. With respect to Samoa, many scholars (Shankman 1972, Leung Wai 1978, Macpherson 1985, Fisk 1986) view the shortage of labour in rural areas as one reason for the decline and stagnation of export crops. My own data also suggest that there is a shortage of labour in terms of raising agricultural production in the village where I stayed (See chapter II).

At the same time, Macpherson (1985) points out there is ample evidence among Samoans residing in New Zealand of continuing commitment to and identification with families and villages in Western Samoa (ibid.:242). Migrants mobilize their capital and energy in order to contribute to projects sponsored by their families and villages. In fact, migrant participation in such projects is critical to their success (ibid.:244). Every member of a village, whether a resident or a migrant, is levied and arrangements made for regular collection until a target sum of money is reached for a particular project (ibid.). Macpherson observes further, that the most significant family matters to migrants are the disposition of lands and titles (ibid). Migrants travel back and forth to Samoa to participate in family debates concerning these matters. Macpherson concludes that migrants leave Western Samoa to provide greater support to the families they leave behind and to
improve the economic prospects of their children through higher education abroad (ibid.:248).

If migrants believe their financial prospects and therefore their ability to support their families left behind in the rural areas of Samoa are better overseas or in Apia (the urban centre of Western Samoa) then any rural development initiative needs to convince potential migrants that they are just as well off at home. Or as Macpherson (1988:21) puts it: ‘The challenge for planners is to persuade rural farmers that increasing agricultural production is a rational use of labour.’

Besides the constraints discussed above, agriculture, like any other industry in the Pacific, is disadvantaged by smallness of scale, remoteness from world markets, and serious weather problems (Fisk 1986:1-2). All products produced by Pacific island economies are available to world markets from large countries in Asia, Africa and tropical America. The cost of collecting and transporting small cargoes from dispersed islands reduces the economic return to Pacific island farmers. In addition, the cost of agricultural inputs are high. Furthermore, foreign buyers of Pacific products demand root crops, fruits and vegetables that are uniform in size and shape (Yen 1979:96). Rural farmers with small land holdings cannot produce large enough quantities to ensure a sizeable selection of uniform produce for export. A national commitment to efficient commercial production would require dispossessing farmers with small land holdings so as to consolidate land into commercially viable plots. This would diminish the subsistence food supplies such that foreign exchange gains made by commercial production would have to be used to subsidize imported food (ibid.:103). In short, it is more advantageous for both the nation and rural farmers to produce subsistence goods than to produce strictly for the world market (ibid.:3). Yen and Fisk’s argument is a serious challenge to those
who would argue that a commitment to efficient commercial production for the world market is the only route to national self-reliance and autonomy. Fisk (1986) concludes that national agricultural development planning should concentrate on the mixed subsistence and cash crop subsector. While such a conclusion appears to be commonsensical, many scholars and aid agencies (Hau‘ofa and Ward 1980:77; Hau‘ofa 1980:486; Watt 1980:6-8; World Bank 1980; Young and Gunasekara 1984:27; Browne and Scott 1989:6-8) regard commercial production as more efficient than mixed subsistence and cash-crop production despite the diseconomies of Pacific agriculture pointed out by Yen (1980) and Fisk (ibid.).

Despite these commonalities between all Pacific island countries, there are significant differences between them as well. Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu have indigenous populations which are linguistically and culturally diverse. In Papua New Guinea, conflicts between groups of people who are traditional rivals interfere with national unity (World Bank 1981:1). National unity is also a problem in Fiji where fifty-five percent of the population is of Asian descent and the rest are Melanesian. By contrast, the populations of the independent states of Polynesia (Western Samoa and Tonga) and Micronesia (Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Nauru) are homogeneous in terms of culture and language (Powles 1980:45). In these countries, hierarchical chiefly political organizations and nation-wide kinship groups are conducive to the formation of broad bases of power useful in national politics (ibid.). While chiefs and other local leaders have varying degrees of local control in Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Kiribati, in Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga, chiefs play a crucial role in national decision-making (ibid.:46). In Nauru, the indigenous socio-political organization has been destroyed by successive colonial and military occupations (Powles 1982:346).
Although the country of Western Samoa has most in common politically with post-colonial Fiji and Tonga, it is unique with respect to the strength and persistence of its indigenous political institutions. With the help of the British, Tonga’s chiefly hierarchy was highly centralized in the last century with the constitution of 1875. This constitution entrenched the powers of a monarch and thirty-three nobles to control the state and gave six hereditary chiefs control over most of the land (Powles 1980:47). Today, the land tenure system operates to benefit the monarch, the thirty-three nobles and the six hereditary chiefs (ibid.). Village chiefs have been supplanted by elected, government-paid town officers in the administration of village affairs (ibid.:48).

In Fiji, the colonial administration modified Fijian land rights, ostensibly to protect Fijian landowners against encroachment by the white planter and settler community (Rutz 1987:533). In 1874, the Great Council of Chiefs was formed to advise the colonial administration on customary rules of land tenure. But the chiefs could not agree amongst themselves and "proclaimed great diversity of property concepts and much ambiguity in Fijian relations toward land" (ibid.:537). In the end, threatened with the possibility of land alienation by the Europeans, the chiefs declared the "true" and "real" ownership of land was vested in the mataqali (ibid.:538) despite the fact that this particular subdivision of the maximal lineage into descent groups lacked consistency and permanency (Powles 1980:49-50). In this way, eighty-four percent of Fijian land was placed under the control of lineage chiefs and rendered inalienable (Rutz 1987:539).

In 1940, the "Fijian Native Land Trust Ordinance" removed effective rights from lineage chiefs and placed them in the hands of the newly constituted Native Land Trust Board (NLTB). The colonial government entrusted the NLTB with the task of administering all
native land "for the benefit of Fijian owners" (ibid.:539). The Board became the sole agent for leasing native land and granting economic concessions. For landless Indians, the Board became the agent for the land market. For chiefs, the Board turned them into land-owners able to collect rents from occupants (ibid.).

In 1974, the independent state of Fiji created the Native Land Development Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of the NLTB. Its stated purpose was "to help Fijians develop and grow in business" (ibid.:541). Today, in Suva, the main industrial, commercial and administrative centre of Fiji, landowning chiefs can extract rents and ignore their own obligations to occupants of land (ibid.:549), thereby allowing them to accumulate capital for further investment (Ward and Proctor 1979:146).

By contrast to Fiji and Tonga, colonial regimes in Samoa were unable to change the land tenure system substantially. The basic unit of Samoan politics is still the village. Village Councils of Chiefs regard themselves as autonomous in relation to the national government (Powles 1980:49). The constitution of Western Samoa does not attempt to modify the system of land tenure and chiefly titles. Instead, the constitution states that land and titles will be "held in accordance with Samoan custom and usage" (G.W.S. 1962). Land in Western Samoa may not be sold, mortgaged or transferred. Leases are possible only after any objections are dealt with by the village councils or the Lands and Titles Court (Powles 1980:52). Very little Samoan customary land is registered by the government of Western Samoa. In short, Western Samoa is unique in the Polynesian context due to the strength and persistence of its indigenous political institutions.
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS: DEVELOPMENT and RESISTANCE

Defining Development

The stagnation of rural production in Western Samoa is conceptualized by Samoan scholars, aid donors and indigenous élites alike as a problem of economic development.² In theoretical discourse, there are a number of different meanings assigned to development. But as I suggest in the Samoan literature review above, scholars have not explicitly disclosed or elaborated their views on the subject. Consequently, they have not adequately thought through the implications of their definition for development policy and practice. Furthermore, these scholars have paid little attention to how different groups of Samoans conceptualize development and how these concepts inform the development practices of these groups.

Definitions of development have been offered by two distinct communities: the academic community and the community of development practitioners who work for aid donor agencies in Third World countries. Some of the academic contributions to the definition of development may be summarized as follows. First, development may be understood in orthodox economic terms as growth in G.N.P. (Gross National Product) (Chinchilla and Deitz 1981:142). In the literature on Pacific island economies, this understanding of development is sometimes referred to as the "modernization and growth model" (Ogden 1989:364) because it stresses that the state should increase monetary income by stimulating growth in goods and services and especially exports which earn overseas exchange. Development strategists typically emphasize investment in infrastructure and commercial enterprises that support an export oriented economy.

Second, development is used to refer to an undefined ideal state identified with a condition of economic well-being and autonomy for the nation state, while underdevelopment is associated
with economic stagnation and political dependency of the state on the industrial world (see Frank 1967; 1974). This view of development is espoused by Pacific island leaders (Bertram and Watters 1985:516; Ogden 1989:361; Rodman 1989:5). For Pacific island nations as for other Third World nations, the idea of development as national self-reliance has a number of goals: devising poverty-reducing development strategies; decreasing dependence on the world economy; and pressuring wealthier industrialized states to redistribute global resources (Tickner 1986:461). As a result, local political and bureaucratic élites equate development with state building and management of relations with patron states (Marcus 1981:50) that provide aid in the form of grants, loans, technology and technicians. Note that in dependency theory discourse, the implication for action that emerges from the definition of development as national self-reliance and autonomy, is for Third World governments to break away from global economic and political structures (Seth 1987:159). In practice, while espousing the rhetoric of national self-reliance and autonomy, Pacific island leaders are following a "modernization and growth" model of development by investing aid money in both large state-owned commercial ventures run by foreign experts and infrastructure (Fisk 1986:5; Browne and Scott 1989:6). Both the first and second model of development discussed above are state-centred in the sense that the state is viewed as the primary decision-making body regarding development and as the only institution capable of designing and implementing development policies and strategies.

Third, development is equated with the replacement of non-capitalist relations of production by capitalist relations of production (see Cardoso and Falleto 1979). This view of development is found in the literature of Latin America (ibid.) and Africa (Hyden 1980), but not in the Pacific literature, possibly because
customary land tenure is legally enforced. Fourth, development is defined more specifically as an increase in the capacity of a people to influence their own future with respect to production and distribution of resources (Bryant and White 1982). This latter definition focuses on the political dimensions of development, and is based on a distinction between growth and development (ibid.:9-11). While growth is equated with the actual production of greater output, development is equated with people’s capacity for producing a greater output, and involves structural change directed toward empowering people to acquire the services and resources necessary for the task. According to this view of development, the central problem is to increase the capacity of poor people to take political action on their own behalf, because only when people have political power can they acquire the goods and benefits associated with development projects. This view of development appears in the Pacific literature under the rubric of community self-reliance and autonomy, as opposed to national self-reliance and autonomy (Ogden 1989:365). Ogden (ibid.:364) refers to this view of development as ‘village based’ in the Pacific islands, having as its goals: local self-reliance exemplified by basic needs satisfaction, and community access to services such as health, education, transportation, electricity, etc.; decentralization of decision-making processes related to development; financial support for village-based modes of production; and dissemination of appropriate technology (see Chapter II).

Ogden bases this distinction between the village-based and the national view of development in Pacific Island states on Tickner’s (1986) distinction between community as opposed to national self-reliance and autonomy. Proponents of the communitarian approach advocate that political participation in the development process should be as widespread as possible (ibid.:463). They
believe that decentralizing political decision-making processes from the state to the community is crucial. They express strong reservations about whether the nation state is the best instrument for implementing a development strategy aimed at improving the well-being of the rural poor. Conversely, proponents of the state-centred view (ibid.) advocate strengthening the nation state since it is the only institution capable of implementing a successful self-reliance strategy given a powerful dominating international political order. They advocate building a modern industrialized sector behind tariff barriers along with selective use of foreign investment. They urge Third World nations to join together in order to be more effective in international economic decision-making and to press for global redistribution of resources (ibid.). Statists are not interested in decentralizing power, a strategy they believe would threaten the existing élites. If the communitarian view of development is "village based", (Ogden 1989) the state-centred view of development is government based.

In the 1970s, the International Labor Office (ILO), a prominent United Nations organization, rejected the orthodox meaning of development expressed exclusively in terms of an increase in GNP, and attempted to endow the concept of development with new meaning (Friedman 1979:607-613). The goal of growth was expanded to include objectives of employment opportunities and income distribution. Concepts such as "distribution equity", "rural development" and "appropriate technology" entered development discourse. Similarly, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (1985:3) and the World Bank (1989:1) rejected their earlier strategy of industrial export-oriented growth in favour of "balanced development" between the rural sector and the urban industrial sector.

By 1975, the ILO began to develop two new strategies; the export distribution strategy and the strategy of redistribution with
growth (ibid.). Friedman points out that, examined at close range, neither strategy was new. The principle objective of both was still the satisfaction of markets in industrialized countries. Whereas development practitioners had once thought Third World countries were efficient primarily as producers of raw materials, this new strategy was aimed at taking advantage of cheap and supposedly "inexhaustible" supplies of labour. Thus, the new doctrine of the ILO emphasized the location of manufacturing in the Third World. Meanwhile, development practitioners at the FAO and World Bank began to focus on rural development. In 1973, the World Bank President announced a special emphasis on rural development loans (World Bank 1988:1-2). The search began for a development strategy that would improve the productivity of rural farmers. At the same time, the "green revolution" technology based on high yielding varieties of seed became available. The FAO, World Bank and ILO now envisaged a production-led rural development strategy which could be used by millions of farmers on small holdings and which would meet the new aims of economic growth and equity between rural and industrial sectors (Friedman 1979:607-613; World Bank 1988:2; FAO 1985:3-4). The development practitioners' efforts were directed toward corporate methods of agricultural production involving massive application of fertilizers, high yield seed varieties and intensive irrigation (ibid.). While this latter strategy brought spectacular results in terms of yields per hectare, development practitioners soon became aware that human costs were greater than expected. In many places, landlessness increased. Commercial production displaced production for local consumption, causing a decline in levels of nutrition, because the wages of landless urban workers were too low to buy an adequate diet. Land resources deteriorated as farmers who were able to hold on to land over-worked it in order to keep up with rising costs of agricultural inputs. In sum, this development
strategy worsened the majority of people's living standards (Friedman 1969:612-613).

In light of this finding, the ILO redefined development again, equating it with the basic needs of the poor, and making these needs the object of state policy (ibid.). However, basic needs were equated with consumption, not production. A minimum income or poverty line was determined. Then, state policy was directed toward bringing as many people as possible above the poverty line, either by forms of direct distribution of resources, or expansion of job opportunities. Because this view of development was equated with consumption, and not production, social justice and equity were seen as a trade-off with economic growth. In this sense, it was an adjunct to mainstream growth strategies, since the amount transferred to ensure a minimal social justice could not jeopardize the overall growth of the economy (ibid.:608-609).

By the early eighties, development practitioners began to realize that problems with production-led rural development were due to the inadequate formulation of projects and programmes, institutional weaknesses affecting extension services to rural farmers, (especially market research and credit), and the lack of farmer's participation in solving their own development problems (FAO 1985:2; World Bank 1988:2).

Many rural development projects provided single-crop technical packages which farmers were reluctant to adopt; lacked profitable and reliable technologies suitable for diffusion to farmers with small land-holdings; failed to consider that low producer prices for project crops were a disincentive to farmers resulting in low rates of farmer participation, high out-migration of labour and a shortage of labour for crop maintenance and harvesting; and failed to take into account marketing arrangements for both agricultural inputs and maintenance of capital items, as
well as the transfer of agricultural crops to export or domestic outlets (World Bank 1988:29-41).

A new consciousness appears to be emerging among development practitioners to the effect that farmers must participate in solving their development problems (FAO 1985:2; World Bank 1988:2). Development practitioners are beginning to realize that development requires structural change directed toward empowering people to acquire the services and resources necessary for producing a greater output. This realization is expressed in terms of multi-level planning (ibid.). In recognition of the realization that agricultural projects must be tailored to the needs and priorities of local recipients, in a recent report, the FAO (1985:8) urges Third World national governments to delegate decision-making responsibilities to rural people and to promote those peoples' organizations so as to strengthen the participation of the rural poor in decision-making, implementation, and evaluation of rural development programmes. In other words, development practitioners seem to be advocating a move away from a state-centred model of development toward a community-centred model.

In this thesis, I show that successive government élites in collaboration with aid donors have attempted to implement a state-centred model of and for development directed toward the goals of national self-reliance and a condition of improved economic well-being for all Samoans. Second, I indicate that government strategies have focused on the development of relations with patron states that provide aid in the form of grants, loans, technology, and technicians for investment, for the most part, in large state-owned commercial ventures and infrastructural projects. Third, I point out that government development strategies have failed to achieve a movement toward the goals of either national self-reliance or enhanced economic well-being for the majority of Samoans in part,
due to their inability to effectively mobilize and utilize rural resources, specifically, indigenous institutions, land and labour, as tools for raising productivity in the rural sector of the economy. On the contrary, government attempts to utilize land for forestry or infrastructural projects have been met with resistance from people living in the rural areas. Furthermore, young Samoans continue to migrate out of the rural areas leaving their families short of labour and struggling to produce a surplus in addition to their subsistence requirements.

**Defining Resistance**

As many authors I cite above (p. 25) have pointed out, rural resistance to development projects, especially forestry and infrastructure development, is common in island countries. Customary land owners, worried about the effects of logging and mining on their subsistence cash-crop strategies, come into conflict with national governments interested in generating an income from forestry and mining. Such conflicts generate acts of rural resistance against government projects and are a significant political problem in Western Samoa as in other island countries.

In Western Samoa, resistance against élite practices has been a pervasive dynamic in its pre-colonial, colonial, and contemporary history. A major premise of this thesis is that contemporary problems of development can neither be adequately analyzed nor solutions considered without attempting to understand the basis of this resistance.

Some of the most spectacular forms of Samoan resistance have been against the imposition of an essentially alien institution -- the State. Theorizing about the specificity of the colonial and post-colonial state became a major debate in Marxist scholarship (Alavi 1972; Leys 1976; Shivji 1976; Von Freyhold 1977; Mortimer 1977). Alavi (1972:60-62), for example, argues that the
specificity of the colonial and post-colonial state is the result of the fact that, unlike the situation in the industrial world, it was not the creation of indigenous classes designed to provide a framework of law essential for the development of capitalist relations. Rather, in colonial societies, the state apparatus was developed by external metropolitan interest groups for the purpose of exercising control over all indigenous classes. The governing élites in post-colonial states identify development with the transfer of capital and technology from metropolitan countries and often undertake some kind of state monopoly capitalism in which the state develops institutionalized ties with foreign capital, thereby taking more control over the economy so as to facilitate the inflow of even more foreign capital (Van Freyhold 1977:75-77). Foreign businessmen/women may also develop an intricate network of relations with indigenous business interests, thus becoming a part of the local power bloc. Alternatively, the State may merely take on the role of preparing the infrastructure and economic conditions conducive to foreign investment. Whatever the role assumed by the post-colonial state in encouraging foreign investment or negotiating aid, one of the pervasive characteristics of post-colonial social formations in Africa, Asia and Oceania has been the struggle between rural farmers and the State (Leys 1976; Mouzelis 1978; Mortimer 1979; Samoff 1980; Cliffe 1982; Alavi 1982; Shanin 1982; May 1982; see also Chapters II, V). As Cliffe (1982:277) remarks, the conflicts between the whole rural class and the State may be more critical than those between classes of rich, middle or poor rural farmers. Resistance, then, becomes a major consideration when analyzing the context of development in Third World formations.

What sets rural farmers in both Africa (Hyden 1980) and the South Pacific (Fisk 1986) apart from others is that they simultaneously provide for their own subsistence and engage with a
cash economy in which they work for wages, sell their agricultural surplus and operate small-scale business enterprises. By straddling the cash economy and the rural economy, farmers gain a measure of security and freedom from market forces, as well as from the government. For example, if a crop fails or prices are low they can work for wages. Their subsistence gardens will always protect them from starvation. Whereas the state is interested in higher production of cash crops, rural farmers are interested in their subsistence needs and such things as schools, dispensaries, electricity, and clean water. In other words, rural farmers can withdraw from or remain indifferent to state projects aimed at higher production because they can secure their own means of production and reproduction through their own non-capitalist economy. For example, local leaders enhance their power and prestige by organizing self-help projects to provide schools, water facilities, electricity, etc. Thus, while the state is dependent on the rural farmers to raise their production, the rural farmer is not dependent on the state and remains, in Hyden's (1980) words, "uncaptured".

This ability of rural farmers in Western Samoa and elsewhere in the Third World to defy laws and refuse to participate in development projects has been the despair of intellectuals and policy makers of both political persuasions. Marxists view peasant resistance to capitalism as a barrier to the course of social evolution leading to socialism. They are, therefore, prone to accuse rural farmers of being incapable of asserting their class interests due to false consciousness. Bourgeois commentators and officials respond by calling rural farmers tradition-bound, conservative and irrational. Nevertheless, there is more and more reason to believe that the peasant economies in the world are the only ray of optimism in an otherwise bleak future. In a conference paper, Tim Shaw
(1988:24), for example, has presented a convincing argument to suggest that peasant communities will take a leading role in Africa's future development as disindustrialization undermines the role of the state, labour and the embryonic bourgeoisie:

Most regimes in Africa continue to contract and be characterized by essentially decentralized states in which the regime's writ only occasionally affects local patterns of production, accumulation, reproduction, and welfare. In short, "civil society" is in a period of revival throughout Africa as the informal sectors, cooperative organizations, religious associations, ethnic communities, NGO's and aid agencies come to fill the gaps vacated by the state in a period of contraction. This vacated space widens the possibilities of authentic forms of democracy: new forms of articulation, participation, and resolution.

The time has come to view the behaviour of rural farmers in the Third World, not as a barrier to social evolution, nor as tradition-bound, conservative and irrational, but as creative acts of resistance and accommodation to a new mode of production - global capitalism.

To ignore resistance is to deny the colonized recognition as subjects of history. As the historical analysis of Samoan resistance reveals (Chapter IV), Samoa's kin-ordered mode of production supports social, political, and cultural institutions which have been mobilized by Samoans to both resist the advances of foreigners and the spread of capitalist productive relations, and shape the structure of the colonial and post-colonial state. Samoan resistance, on occasion, has taken the form of well-organized campaigns of violence and civil disobedience. At other times, resistance has been unorganized, subtle and beyond the explicit domain of political action. For the purpose of this thesis, I define resistance broadly to include both of these categories.

Scott (1985) defines everyday forms of resistance as distinct from revolutionary acts designed to overthrow the existing social order, as acts performed by relatively powerless segments of
a population "intended to mitigate or deny claims made by superordinate classes or to advance claims vis-à-vis those superordinate classes" (ibid.: 32). He illustrates the import of everyday forms of resistance by drawing attention to some Third World examples relevant to Western Samoa. Flight and evasion of taxes in Western Samoa, as in other parts of the colonial world, have curbed the ambition of colonial and post-colonial states, forcing them to impose levies on exports.

Also, in Western Samoa, state development projects are often thwarted by resistance from the rural areas. This resistance is almost always organized around issues of State use of rural land. Rural resistance to development projects introduced by outside agents is not a new phenomena in Western Samoa. In fact, as I discuss in Chapter IV, it has been a pervasive dynamic element in the pre-colonial, colonial and contemporary history of Western Samoa. Moreover, continued rural resistance to State development initiatives, if not redressed, threatens to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the government in future (see Chapter V).

Finally, public invasion of State property that openly challenges property relations, as well as the destruction of privately owned plantation land, has sometimes forced the State into recognizing the demands of rural farmers (see Chapter II).

In these ways the relatively powerless rural farmers have made their political presence felt. While the foes of subordinated groups -- employers, state officials, etc. -- lump together all forms of such defiance as crimes, the relatively powerless segments of society may view them as "perfectly justifiable -- even honourable acts of social protest" (Guha 1983:89). In fact, this reinterpretation of a crime as an honourable act is most dramatic in acts of violence against collaborators with foreigners. The collaborator is viewed as a "carrier of corrupt consciousness" (Guha
Rebel violence functions therefore as a defense of class consciousness against its perversion, as a necessary act of spiritual fratricide in which a brother must be sacrificed for the sake of solidarity (ibid.).

Examples of this latter form of violence can be found in the historical and contemporary record of Samoan resistance (see Chapters IV, V).

Another form of everyday resistance may be called symbolic appropriation. This involves appropriation of dominant symbols of the colonizers by the colonized, that are then imbued with indigenous meaning. For example, in Samoa, money earned from wage labour or from the sale of crops, is the dominant symbol of global capitalism. But money has entered the indigenous gift exchange system. When this happens, money ceases to function as a quantitative measure as it does when it functions as an instrument of commodity exchange (Gregory 1982). Rather, as an instrument of gift-exchange, money becomes a qualitative measure. Thus the practice of giving inverts the usual role of money. By identifying the giver with the cash gift, the giver personally appropriates its inherent power. In contributing to the community through participation in ceremonial exchange (Chapter II), rural Samoans, like their counterparts in other areas of the world, seek self-fulfillment and prestige, thus reversing the loss of self associated with the sale of crops or wage labour (Comaroff 1985:236). In Samoa, this seeking to re-tool the dominant symbols is done, not just by appropriating money as gift, but also through the Samoanization of State and Church. This symbolic resistance represents the structure of the conjuncture (Sahlins 1985:xiv) between global capitalism and the Samoan world (see Chapter III). While symbolic resistance may not confront the forces of political domination, it does defy the penetration of capitalist values and practices into the structures
of the Samoan world.

Unlike every-day forms of resistance, well organized campaigns of violence and civil disobedience in Western Samoa have confronted the forces of domination and shaped them in significant respects. The success of these confrontations will be evaluated in the chapters to follow.

For the purpose of this dissertation, then, resistance, following Scott (1985:32), is any act intended to mitigate or deny claims or to advance claims made on a superordinate group vis-à-vis a subordinate group. Such acts may include both dramatic organized acts of resistance prevalent in pre-colonial and colonial times, as well as forms of everyday resistance. In Western Samoa, dramatic acts of resistance have included armed rebellions and massive campaigns of civil disobedience and non-cooperation. Everyday forms of resistance include such acts as crimes directed against foreign businesspeople, would-be Samoan collaborators, and state property as well as the appropriation by Samoans of symbols normally associated with European and North American culture such as money, church and state.

In the chapters that follow, I show that rural resistance against government development projects calls into question the suitability of a state-centred model of and for development in the Western Samoan context. Rural landowners in Western Samoa are committed to a mixed subsistence and cash-crop farming strategy. Government development projects which encroach on village land threaten the capacity of villages to attain, maintain and perpetuate their political autonomy and self-reliance. Furthermore, I will try to show that, by rendering village institutions redundant in the development process, the government may be ignoring its most valuable structural resource for implementing policies and strategies. At the moment the government is primarily interested in
income-generating and foreign-exchange-earning infrastructural developments (i.e. airports, hydro-electric dams) and commercial ventures (i.e. forestry and tourism) which have the potential to promote national self-reliance and autonomy.

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation is based in part, on field research I conducted from September 1985 to August 1986 in Western Samoa. I spent seven months in Apia, the urban centre and the remaining five months in a rural village on Opolu.

The way in which I defined the research problem determined my methodology. In Western Samoa, as in most Third World Countries, the state identifies development with the transfer of capital and technology from donor countries either in the form of international aid or foreign investments. Thus, rural development occurs within a national and international context. So, a thorough-going examination of development practices in Western Samoa requires a macro-level analysis of international structures and their impact on micro-level structures and practices at both the national and village level. The way I approach the analysis of development practices owes much to anthropologists like Eric Wolf (1982) and Peter Worsley (1985), both of whom ground their analysis in the history of contact between micro-populations and the global economy. In addition, my methodology is heavily influenced by Marshall Sahlins (1981, 1985) who brings to our attention the cultural richness and complexities of contact situations between two or more sets of actors grounded in very distinct sets of material conditions (see Chapter III).

Methodologically, the thesis is grounded as much in historical documentation and Samoan literature as it is in cultural observation. As such, the thesis is unconventional in that it is informed by participant observation but not reliant on it.

My task in the field was twofold. I sought to discover how
international aid donors, foreign investors and the State of Western Samoa collaborate to choose development policy, projects, and strategies. Second, I examined the activities and discourses of rural farmers to get an idea of their conceptions of development, their perceptions of available resources, especially investment capital and labour, and their perceptions of the government and its projects and practices.

In Apia, I began by conducting structured interviews with eight resident representatives of aid donor countries and international agencies; two from New Zealand, two from Australia, one from Japan, one from the European Community, one from the United Nations’ Development Programme, and one from the World Bank. The representative for the Asian Development Bank was not available for an interview.

I prepared a set of questions designed to elicit: information on the structures and processes related to aid disbursements and allocations; the donor countries’ motivations for giving aid to Western Samoa; the aid donor representatives’ conceptions of development; his/her analysis of Western Samoa’s problems with the production of export crops, and proposed solutions. I also studied available documents published by aid donors regarding their policies and activities.

I conducted structured interviews with politicians closely associated with rural development. My prepared questions elicited information about: processes of development planning and institutions the government utilized to implement its development objectives in rural areas; the politicians’ conceptions of development, development problems and proposed solutions. All of the politicians I interviewed, except for one, were fluent in English. The minister who was not comfortable with English arranged for his secretary to act as interpreter.
Finally, I conducted structured interviews with fourteen top-level bureaucrats in the government departments and agencies closely related to rural development. I prepared a set of questions designed to elicit their views on the reasons for the stagnation and decline in production of important export crops in rural areas. All the bureaucrats I interviewed were fluent in English.

In order to provide maximum comfort and anonymity for the people I interviewed, I did not use a tape-recorder. Instead, I recorded interviews by hand, verbatim, or as close to verbatim as possible. Dialogue which appears in this thesis is reconstructed from my hand-written records.

During the research I made a careful study of government documents in order to assess perceptions of development that inform government policy and performance and problems with rural development. Of particular importance to this study are the following: Development Plans dating back to independence in 1962; the Constitutional Debates wherein the meaning and role of the state vis-à-vis the traditional political institutions were hammered out; and the available reports of both the Department of Agriculture, Forestries and Fisheries and the Department of Economic Development.

After completing my work in Apia, I went to live in the village of Talie (fictional name). I spent the first few weeks absorbing the rhythms of village life and establishing a rapport with my Samoan family. Toward the end of the second month, I asked my Samoan father to present me to the chiefs of the village so I could explain my presence there and present them with a monetary gift. I had been advised by one of my Samoan friends in Apia that, since I did not possess any traditional wealth (finemats, pigs, kava, or tapa), a gift of money would be both appropriate and appreciated. My Samoan mother accompanied my Samoan father and me to the council house in the village. We sat on the seaward side of the
meeting house next to my Samoan father and the other orator chiefs of the village. The untitled men sat on the landward side of the house, where one of them was making kava. I was introduced as the "daughter" of the high chief. One of the orators called the chiefs' names in order of rank, serving kava to each in turn. I was served last. After drinking kava, the meeting began with a discussion of planting targets for taro in the following week. When all the village business had been attended to, my Samoan father presented my gift, dividing it equally amongst the twenty-five chiefs in attendance. Each made a speech of welcome and appreciation for the gift, and the meeting was over.

That evening, my Samoan mother suggested I make a comparable gift to the Women's Committee who were presently engaged in raising funds to build a clinic. I consented and the next day my Samoan mother, who was president of the group, presented the women with my gift. My gifts to the chiefs and their wives established my status and role in the village. I was invited to all the Women's Committee meetings, work parties, and fund-raising events, as well as to a chief's installation ceremony and a wedding. I had long informal discussions with prominent men and women concerning their dreams and hopes for their families and village, and the problems they experienced trying to realize them.

Finally, on the basis of these discussions, I constructed a questionnaire to be administered to members of each of the major status groups in the village: the chiefs, the chiefs' wives, the daughters of the village and the untitled men. I allowed two weeks for the respondents to answer the questionnaire. During the first week I met with a group of respondents from each status group during their respective weekly meetings. I explained that I wanted them to answer the questions to help me write a book about their problems and what they thought should be done about them. In the introductory
paragraph I stressed the anonymity of the respondents' responses, urged them to answer the questions truthfully, and told them they would be paid five tala (Samoan dollar) when they returned the questionnaire:

You are not required to put your name on this questionnaire. This is to make sure you are free to answer the questions honestly. The author of this questionnaire is interested in your true feelings so she is able to write the truth. She can only write the truth if you tell the truth.

She is deeply grateful for your help with her research and will pay you $5.00 when you return the questionnaire.

I went through the questionnaire with the respondents present at the meetings and instructed them to help those not present should the need arise. There is a high rate of literacy among the elderly in Samoa. However, it is quite probable that some respondents received help in writing answers from other members of their families.

The number of questionnaires I administered was influenced by both research and budgetary concerns. I had been unable to acquire a sufficient command of the Samoan language to either write the questionnaire or translate the answers. I paid for these services. At the same time, I wanted to give a small monetary gift to the respondents both as compensation for their efforts and to ensure all questionnaires were returned to me. I decided one hundred questionnaires - twenty-five to each status group - would both ensure an adequate distribution among the fifty households in the village and be within my budgetary constraints. I hoped my Samoan family would provide me with lists of names from each status group to enable me to devise a random sample for each group. However, both my Samoan mother and father perceived the monetary gift attached to the questionnaire as too valuable a resource to be distributed in a random fashion. My Samoan parents explained to me that they would distribute and collect the questionnaires, and that each household in the village would receive at least one. On the evening designated
by my Samoan father, my Samoan mother and I sat in the back of the family’s pick-up truck and drove through the village, picking up the questionnaires from the respondents who streamed out of their fales to meet us. My Samoan mother checked off each respondent’s name, peeling off five tala notes from the five hundred tala roll as she went. All questionnaires were returned that night. The questionnaires designated for the chiefs and their wives (twenty-five questionnaires each) covered half of all members of these two status groups in the village. Approximately one quarter of both the untitled men and daughters of the village were included in the sample.

The major purpose of the questionnaire was to discover the prevalence and variation across particular status groups of attitudes and perceptions the villagers had expressed in their informal conversations with me. For example, part of the District of Talie is designated by the government as production forest, and many of the villagers I spoke with expressed a negative attitude toward logging village lands. Consequently, one of my questions elicited respondents’ opinions regarding logging and their reasons for the same. Also, my village informants perceived development in terms of improving village life. They complained about their lack of resources to make desired improvements and the government’s lack of assistance. Other questions were designed to do the following: elicit the respondents’ perceptions of their member of parliament and government activities; discover what village improvements the respondent desired and their ideas of how to achieve them; assess the respondents’ perceptions of their access to resources such as cash income, loans, labour, land and transportation; discover how respondents spent cash incomes. None of the respondents kept records of what they spent, how much they earned from the sale of produce or of monies received from relatives working in Apia or overseas.
Respondents relied on their memories. I was unable to use information in these categories.

I used the traditional technique of participant observation during each stage of the research. In the urban centre, Apia, I was invited to attend diplomatic gatherings, parliamentary sessions, and conferences. In the village, I was adopted into the family of the highest ranking chief. I accompanied the women to their committee meetings and to the plantations. Accompanied by my Samoan mother, I observed the men at several council meetings. I attended many traditional ceremonial exchanges in the village where I lived, and in villages elsewhere in the Islands. I became intimately acquainted with both urban and village life and my many friends, both male and female, constantly supplied me with information unobtainable by any other means. With their help, I gained valuable insights into how Samoans manage their daily lives, as well as how they perceive the world of the papalagi (whiteman), and their relationship to it.

Upon returning from the field, I thoroughly examined the historical accounts of Samoa, the available Samoan literature and newspaper reports I had saved in the field. In this thesis I use these documents to show how contemporary Samoan culture and development problems are the historical product of struggles between culturally situated actors engaged in creative acts of resistance and accommodation to contact with global capitalism, the imposition of the colonial state and the subsequent incorporation of the Independent State of Western Samoa. Consequently, this thesis owes as much to my interpretations of the observations of historians, other anthropologists, and other trained observers of Samoan affairs as is does to my interpretations of my own observations in the field.
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

I have asserted that the problems of economic development in Western Samoa can be understood only by situating the analysis within the wider historical context of the expansion of global capitalism. Accordingly, Chapter II draws on the Samoan literature to ground the reader in a detailed description and analysis of the social and political structure of a Samoan village and its relationship with the village economy and the global market place. In this Chapter, I describe the village of Talie, the village’s response to a government reforestation project and analyze the results of the questionnaire I administered in the village so as to ground the reader in development issues as they are experienced by rural Samoan farmers. Because the thesis is meant for a general audience as well as Samoan politicians and bureaucrats, in Chapter III, I discuss theoretical approaches to development, and evaluate them in light of the Western Samoan experience. I distinguish my theoretical approach to development from other development theorists and practitioners by viewing development and underdevelopment as the social product of the conscious actions of people and conceiving of contemporary Samoan culture as originating in the process of resistance and accommodation to Samoan contact with the global economy. In Chapter IV, I analyze the historical background to contemporary problems of development. The analysis focuses on the dynamics of the Samoan response to the forces of global capitalism, the imposition of the colonial state and the subsequent incorporation of the Independent State of Western Samoa.

In Chapter V, I explicate the major issues discussed in the Constitutional Debates (G.W.S. 1960), and how they were resolved. Further, I discuss the contemporary state institutions closely associated with post-colonial development practices as well as the government’s first attempt to institute a rural development
In the last three chapters I am most concerned with showing how contemporary Samoan culture is the product of on-going struggles between culturally situated actors engaged in acts of resistance and accommodation to global capitalism. I try to show how Samoans have used their cultural categories to structure the conjuncture between their own world and that of global capitalism; and how, in so doing, Samoans have influenced the course of events and transformed their culture at the same time. In Chapter VI, I discuss how the state and electoral politics are transforming Samoan cultural practices and affecting contemporary economic development processes occurring today. In Chapter VII, I describe and analyze post-colonial international relationships in the South Pacific at the time of my research and the structures of power and resistance within which development must take place. I also examine the health of the Samoan economy, the performance of major aid donors in terms of resource allocations, and the way in which aid donors conceptualize development as well as the decline and stagnation of export production and the solutions they propose. In addition, I examine the processes of development planning and implementation as well as government expenditures. Finally, I explicate the ways in which politicians and bureaucrats conceptualize development and development problems, and the solutions they propose. I conclude the dissertation by restating the multidimensional context of development in Western Samoa and the way in which the actions of foreign agents of global capitalism and powerful state officials and politicians have intentionally or unintentionally contributed to the stagnation of rural production in Western Samoa. I explore possible strategies for raising rural productivity and suggest avenues for further research.
NOTES


2. The subject of this thesis is economic development. Everywhere I use the word development, I mean economic development as opposed to political, cultural, aesthetic or any other kind of development.

3. I use a fictional home for the village to ensure, as far as possible, the privacy of my informants.

4. Literacy is virtually universal (G.W.S. 1984:35).

5. See Appendix I for village questionnaire.
CHAPTER II
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL SAMOA

INTRODUCTION

I have stated that the problem of economic development in Western Samoa can only be understood by situating the analysis within the wider historical context of the expansion of global capitalism. In this chapter I draw on the literature concerning Samoa to ground the reader in a detailed description of the history of the social and political structure of a rural village and its relationship to the village economy, the state of Western Samoa and global market place. In addition, I describe the particular village of Talie and the village’s response to a government reforestation project. I also present and analyze the results of the questionnaire I administered in the village so as to ground the reader in development issues as they are perceived and experienced by rural farmers. I administered the questionnaire to one hundred villagers (25 chiefs, 25 wives, 25 untitled men, and 25 daughters of the village). The responses to the questionnaire give us some insight into how villagers perceive development and experience development issues. I was particularly interested in how many farmers exported crops, their perceptions of resources available to increase their production of export crops, and their perceptions of government development practices.

I caution the reader, however, that the ethnographic evidence I present concerning villagers’ perceptions regarding development is modest. Any claims I make, therefore, are suggestive rather than conclusive. However, such claims, though highly suggestive, are useful in pointing to areas where further research
needs to be done.

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE VILLAGE


Socially, the village community is made up of extended families called 'aiga which are part of larger geographically dispersed corporate groups organized on the principle of cognatic descent (Tiffany 1975c;1978). The cognatic descent principle allows an individual to claim membership in a descent group by tracing descent to a group's founder through either male or female links (ibid.:430). The cognatic descent group ('aiga) is the most genealogically inclusive corporate group in Samoa.

All 'aiga are identified by the titles, and land attached to the same, of their founding ancestors. Such titles are referred to as senior titles (ibid.:434; Shore 1982:85). All other titles belonging to an 'aiga are called junior titles and are ranked in relation to the senior title. Lands owned by senior titles are named estates in particular villages where the 'aiga are believed to have been established by their founders (Tiffany 1975c:43). The localized residential core of an 'aiga lives on and farms the estate. Geographically dispersed members of the group live in different villages and farm estates belonging to different 'aiga. 'Aiga members become dispersed through ties of marriage and adoption. Nonetheless, each family has a home village where the senior chief
resides, and where its agricultural land is located.

The incumbent chief (matai) of a family is selected by a consensus reached by all interested members of the 'aiga referred to as the 'aiga potopoto (relatives who gather together) (ibid.). The consensus is validated by an installation ceremony (saofa'i).

Either men or women can hold chiefly titles. Once a senior chief is selected, he or she becomes the administrator of the 'aiga's estate and the protector of the family's dignity and welfare. The senior chief allocates lands to family members for cultivation; designates house-sites; arbitrates and mediates intra- and inter-'aiga disputes; mobilizes goods and labour for 'aiga participation in ceremonial exchanges (see below) and village sponsored projects (building roads, schools clinics, etc.); represents the 'aiga on the village council; and maintains the 'aiga's corporate property (ibid.:435).

Senior chiefs often delegate their administrative responsibilities to junior chiefs, referred to as tautua matai (literally, service chiefs), under their authority especially when they are elderly or residing elsewhere (i.e., Apia or overseas). Junior chiefs are appointed by senior chiefs. Once appointed, the 'aiga potopoto sponsors an installation ceremony for the junior chief as a way of validating the senior title-holder’s choice.

Senior title holders are the basis of the political structure of the village (Shore 1982:85). Title holders are entitled to a place on the village council (fono). Socially and politically, each village is identified by its fa'alupega, a highly formalized greeting of its senior chiefs. This greeting indicates the relative rank of each senior title holder within the village as well as their rank and relationship to other senior title holders throughout Samoa. As Shore (1982:78) remarks, the structure of a village fono is linked to all others throughout the Samoan archipelago allowing
any Samoan chief to participate in a fono anywhere in the islands.

A village’s possession of a fa’alupega is a demonstration of its autonomy (Davidson 1967:17). Every council meeting within a village and every important exchange between members of different villages begins with the recitation of each village’s fa’alupega (Freeman 1984:122). Such recitations not only reflect the rank of village chiefs but are also a public acknowledgement by each village of the political integrity of the other. The fa’alupega also records shifts in power and prestige of ‘aiga within the village and thereby provides a “conventionalized record of village history” (Davidson 1967:717) in terms of its families’ political and social status in Samoa. It is the duty of Samoa’s orator chiefs to know the fa’alupega for all villages in Samoa (ibid.).

The village council (fono) cross-cuts and unifies families within the village (Davidson 1967:18; Gilson 1970:19; Shore 1982:99). All village title holders, junior or senior, have the right to sit in the village fono. All title holders are referred to as chiefs, (matai). The degree of a chief’s authority and influence is relative to the seniority of his/her position in the village hierarchy as recorded in the fa’alupega (Gilson 1970:21; Shore 1982:85). Junior title holders in particular ‘aiga will defer to the authority of their senior title holder. Consequently, owners of junior titles have little say in village affairs (Shore 1982:85-86). Nonetheless, as Gilson (1970:20) and Shankman (1983:210-211) point out, village government is seldom “an autocracy of one” (Gilson 1970:20) because most villages have several matai of senior rank and decisions must always be reached by consensus.

The village fono has ultimate authority in village affairs and represents the village in inter-village and district (see below) matters (Shore 1982:99-100). Village councils promulgate and enforce village law and act as a judicial body in handling disputes and
transgressions of village law. They have jurisdiction over all village affairs: the conscription of labour for village projects; the distribution of food at village ceremonials; the settlement of disputes between families; the imposition of fines and punishments; the regulation of inter-village affairs; and the alienation of village land. The ultimate sanction open to the council against those who disobey is banishment from the village (see Shore 1982 for recent events involving banishment; and this Thesis, Chapter VI).

Today, the village council is also an important institution for improving the village. Chiefs form committees to organize and execute specific projects (i.e., building and maintaining schools, roads, clinics, water works, etc.) chosen by the council as a whole. For example, the village Development Committee decides how much money is required and how the money is to be raised for village improvements; the Agricultural Committee inspects village plantations and gives advice to farmers on what to plant and how to control diseases and pests; the School Committee maintains school buildings, collects school fees, and raises money for school supplies; the Village Committee organizes the labour to keep the village clean and beautiful; the Curfew Committee patrols the village during evening prayer to keep it quiet; and so on. If the government of Western Samoa is involved in a project with village farmers, the village councils also act on the government’s advice, when it is given, communicated by the village mayor (pulenu’u), regarding detailed planting targets for food and export crops (while I was in Talie there were no such government projects in progress). Finally, village councils must approve the use of all unused village lands by both village inhabitants as well as persons and institutions from outside the village such as the government or foreign investors. In Talie, the chief’s council meets every Monday morning to take care of village affairs (see also Shore 1982:100).
Other village organizations cut across village descent groups. In addition to the village council, each village has an association for untitled men ('aumaga) who work together in communal projects. The 'aumaga have always undertaken the heavy work of the village like clearing paths and land, and making roads. They also fish as a group for village ceremonies. The 'aumaga is known in Samoa as 'the strength of the village'. The untitled men form a pool of labour ready to implement the development projects identified by the village council. Through their membership in the 'aumaga the untitled men serve the chiefs in all their endeavours. The power structure of the village council is repeated in the 'aumaga as it is in all other village organizations. The 'aumaga is led by the sons of senior chiefs. These leaders have the power to fine members for missed work parties or failure to meet planting quotas. In addition to development tasks, the 'aumaga is an institution for socializing young men in political and oratorical skills necessary for becoming chiefs. The 'aumaga in Talie meets regularly to set planting targets, especially for taro, to arrange work parties, and to cook food for matai meetings (see also Shore 1982:101-102).

Women's Committees are also a major organizational resource in the development of the rural areas. Women are divided into two groups on the basis of status: the wives of the chiefs of the village (Faletua ma Tausi) and the daughters of the village ('aualuma). The wives of the chiefs organize themselves into various committees designed to improve village life. For example, Health Committees monitor the cleanliness of the water supply, the health of infants, and the cleanliness of village houses and toilets; Development Committees inspect plantations of products for making tapa (bark cloth), house mats and fine mats, as well as organize mat-weaving sessions. Also, villages have Women's Committees which include the wives of untitled men who marry into the village, as
well as chiefs’ wives and members of the ‘aualuma. These committees produce and sell handicrafts, vegetables, pigs, eggs and cattle, in order to raise funds for village schools, clinics, and other projects. Women are an important labour pool for building schools, clinics and churches, and for feeding the pastor, teachers and nurses in the village. Women’s Committees are led by the wives of the highest-ranking chiefs in the village. Like their husbands, these women are expected to provide village-wide leadership. While I was in Talie, The Women’s Committees were busy raising funds and collecting materials to build a clinic in the village.

The ‘aualuma (organization of village daughters) is comprised of women born and raised in the village. Women in this group may be unmarried, widowed, divorced, or married to men from other villages who have come to live with them. Even women who move away to live with their husbands in other villages remain daughters of their natal village, and retain their rights to participate in ‘aualuma activities. The ‘aualuma is led by senior chiefs’ daughters, who supervise the members in growing products for making mats, weaving mats, and serving the wives of the chiefs. These women are often engaged in small fund-raising projects such as vegetable gardens and craft-making. The ‘aualuma is also an organization for socializing young women into their roles of being wives of chiefs. The ‘aualuma in Talie was involved in numerous fund-raising events while I was there and maintained a communal vegetable garden.

VILLAGE AND DISTRICT ORGANIZATION

Historically Samoa has been divided into districts associated with three founding families (Keesing and Keesing, 1959:22). Two of these founding families are based in what is now Western Samoa: Samalietoa and Satapua. The family of Tuimanua is based in what is now American Samoa. These districts have
boundaries, are named, and have recognized ceremonial centers (Davidson 1967:25). Districts are associated with what the Europeans glossed as "royal" titles (Keesing and Kessing 1959:ibid.). The four districts on Upolu are: Atua associated with the Tuiatua title; Tuamasaga associated with the Malietoa, Gatoaitele, and Tamasoali'i titles; A'ana associated with the Tuia'ana title; and a district known as Aiga-i-le-tai (family of the sea) comprising Mulifunua (on the coast of Upolu) Fa'asaleleaga (On the eastern coast of Savaii) and the islands of Monono and Apolima. The district of Aiga-i-le-tai is associated with the Malietoa title. The rest of Savaii is divided into two districts, Itu-o-Tane and Itu-o-Fafine. No one lineage and thus no one title holder dominates in Savaii (Gilson 1970:52).

Historical district and subdistrict organization in Samoa has always had significant administrative limits (Gilson 1970:53-62; Davidson 1967:19-28; see Chapter V this thesis). There are no formal administrative institutions at the subdistrict and district levels as there are in the villages. Subdistricts have their origins in a single village which, with population growth and lineage segmentation, split into a number of contiguous villages. Unity among the villages depends on the leadership of senior title holders in politically dominant cognatic descent groups. At the district level, councils consist of all senior title holders from the various village councils. However, any issue concerning the whole district can only be decided by consensus. No senior title holder can force their opinion on any other.

In the past, a chief gained ascendancy in a district by his/her own efforts rather than by the power or authority inherited in his/her title or titles (ibid.). Chiefly efforts at the district level were concerned with the formation of political alliances, warfare, and the accumulation of wealth through marriages of first-born to spouses of equally senior descent.²
Sometimes the district chiefs could form a national council through their own personal attempts to unify all the districts (Gilson 1970:58). The Satupua and Samalietoa are headed by an organization of leaders known collectively as the Tumua and Pule. The alliances within the Tumua and Pule are subject to historical shifts in power. In the past, when the Tumua and Pule got together to form a council they could bestow the four titles called papa titles (Tuiatua, Gatoaitele, Tamasoali’i and Tuia’ana) on one person. Whoever held the four papa titles simultaneously attained the title of Tafa’ifa, meaning literally "supported by the four" (Gilson 1970:50) but sometimes glossed as "king" (see Chapter IV).

The Samoan polity did not limit succession to the Tafa’ifa title to any one cognatic descent group. The personal qualities of contenders for the title were equally important as close genealogical links to former title holders, especially qualities such as leadership in war and the ability to form political alliances through marriage and adoption (ibid.). According to Samoan legend, a woman, Salamasina, was the first to attain the title of Tafa’ifa as a result of warfare, ties of adoption, and marriage (ibid.).

Since European contact in 1830 when Malietoa acquired the four papa titles, all disputes over the Tafa’ifa title have involved the Samalietoa and Satupua. These disputes were often settled by warfare (see Chapter IV). When a Tafa’ifa died, the four papa titles and any other he/she held were scattered amongst the families again (ibid.:60-61). No single district had the authority to confer papa titles. So until the senior title holders could unite, titles would lie vacant or be disputed by warfare.

When a Tafa’ifa was chosen, it was because political alliances between powerful chiefs united the districts throughout Samoa. Such a political alliance was called a malo and represented
an alliance between the Tumua and Pule. The malo would then be in position to control the bestowal of the papa titles, and the distribution of goods and finemats such bestowals entailed.

Significantly for Samoa, a malo was not an executive nor judicial body. Its members had no legal right to interfere in one another’s local affairs. To do so would threaten the alliance and risk its dissolution (ibid.:62). In fact, alliances between groups comprising the malo were continually shifting. So when colonial authorities tried to build a stable European-style kingship and a central Samoan government on Malietoa’s succession to the Tafa’ifa title in 1830, their efforts were in vain (see Chapter IV). Nonetheless the two colonial governments and, today, the State of Western Samoa have used old district boundaries as the basis for administrative divisions. Today, each traditional district is divided into a number of electoral districts that continue to reflect the importance of historical political boundaries and alliances between the Samalietao and Satupua in contemporary politics.

Under the German colonial administration, the title of Tafa’ifa ceased to be an important factor in Samoan politics. A number of senior title holders from Upolu told me that district councils have not met since colonial times, but that subdistrict alliances are still important in contemporary politics.

THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION AND THE VILLAGE ECONOMY

The basic economic production unit in Samoan society is the domestic household (Mead 1939:39; Davidson 1967:17; Gilson 1970:15-16; Tiffany 1975b:267-286). Almost all households are headed by matai (either junior or senior) and consist of co-residents who share the proceeds of their agriculture and/or wage labour, an earth oven, and a cooking house. Household members may occupy several
dwellings for living and sleeping. Samoan households consist of at least the nuclear family, and often include cognates, especially, for example, some of the couple's married children and their offspring. Variation in numbers of households associated with each descent group in a village reflects differences in relative sizes of residential cores. For example, according to one knowledgeable chief I spoke with, the residential cores of five discrete descent groups live in the village of Talie. The descent group of my Samoan family owned the highest ranking title in the district and had thirty Talie households (almost one half of the sixty-six households in the village) attached to it. The other four descent groups had between three and ten households attached to them.

As soon as a senior matai is selected, he or she becomes the administrator of the estate belonging to the title (Tiffany 1975b). The chief allocates lands and housesites to 'aiga members residing on the estate. Junior matai are allocated parcels of the estate to manage for the senior matai. In return for the right to use the land, resident members give gifts of labour, produce and cash to the chief. A chief may extend the estate attached to his/her title by using family labour to break virgin land belonging to the village in which he or she resides. Virgin land belongs to the 'aiga whose members first clear and plant it. The land accrues to the estate of the title holder under whose authority the members work. In this way, chiefs appropriate the labour of resident cognates and affines who live on the estate attached to their titles.

If chiefly authority confers the right to the labour and services of family, it also confers the "onerous burden" of supporting those over whom he or she rules (Shore 1982:65). Chiefs must endure continual requests from family members for moral and economic support. The chief is responsible for making sure, first, that his/her household is self-supporting in terms of subsistence,
and, second, that the household can generate a surplus for distribution in island-wide ceremonial exchanges. Furthermore, a chief who is cruel, unscrupulous or incompetent may, theoretically, be removed from his/her position by a consensus reached by the 'aiga potopoto. Such a removal, Samoans told me, was rare. More commonly, family members who are disgruntled with a chief’s performance will change their allegiance to another chief of a related 'aiga by moving to the latter’s land. It is never in the best interest of a chief to shirk his/her responsibilities for looking after the family since loss of a member represents a decline in the productive capabilities of the family.

In addition to taking care of each family member’s welfare, a chief must continue to validate and enhance the rank of his/her title by contributions to island-wide ceremonial distribution as well as to village and church affairs. The rank and status of a chief’s title depends on a chief’s ability to generate and attract surplus for such events. Enterprising chiefs seek always to extend their household’s productive land holdings, their stock holdings and the size of their work group so as to generate a surplus for ceremonial redistribution and village or church affairs. Over time, a particularly distinguished title holder may raise the rank of a junior title to the point where it is no longer a subordinate title (ibid:86). Shifts in relative rank between titles are recorded in the fa’alupega.

THE VILLAGE OF TALIE

I spent five months in the rural coastal village on Upolu. To protect the identity of my hosts and friends, I call the village by a fictitious name -- Talie -- and the electoral district within which it is situated by the same name.

The village of Talie is at the juncture of a cross-island
road and the main road which runs around the island. It is about one hour, by truck, from the island’s marketplace in Apia. At the juncture of the roads is a small trade store -- a favourite meeting place for young people from Talie and the other three contiguous coastal sub-villages in the district. The shopkeeper, a prominent district chief’s wife, sells eggs, bread, biscuits, canned fish, cold beer, cold pop, kerosene, matches and cigarettes to villagers who run out of these items before their next trip into Apia. The main road runs close to the mountain slope. The coastal plain is narrow -- no more than three quarters of a mile wide. Most of the village’s houses, its two churches and its school, are nestled amongst multicoloured flowering bushes on land situated between the coast and the main, round-island road. A rough village road loops down from the cross-island road to the coast, along the coast, and back up again to the main road. The area along the coast is the heart of village activity. The main meeting house, the churches, and the school face onto the village green (malae), and out to sea. Within and around the village are each family’s house-sites groves and gardens of subsistence foods and products (coconut, banana and bread-fruit trees, root crops and vegetables, mat-making plants, etc.) and their small animals (chickens and pigs). Horses, used for transporting produce from distant plantations, are kept tethered to bread fruit trees in front of their owners’ houses. There are also houses built on either side of the main road and the cross-island road. Most of the village’s large farms and unbroken lands are on the mountain slope, covering an area which runs about a mile and a half wide, and ten miles up to the mountain ridge. Many families have built their homes on either side of the cross-island road closer to their plantations. Three of the families along this road have built copra-drying sheds. Another family runs a large herd of cattle on their land. Many of the children living along this road
rise at the crack of dawn each morning to make the long trek to school.

The village is without electricity. Each family lights its Coleman lamps at six o'clock for evening prayer. The lamps burn through the evening and into the night. Both of the pastors' families have a generator which provides electrical light for village and church meetings.

I chose Talie as my research site because the village was involved in a long-standing dispute with the government over a reforestation project on land associated with its senior title. My interest in this dispute introduced me to some local history contained in the records of the Land and Survey Department and provided me, or so I thought, with an opportunity to observe first hand a group of villagers' response to government development practices. The dispute was brought to my attention by the Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The dispute involves some 3,000 acres of land used by the government to establish plantations of fast-growing hard wood trees with funding from New Zealand and the Asian Development Bank. Since 1980, young men, armed with machetes, from Talie and a neighbouring village, have been interrupting work on the plantation for up to two months at a time, by threatening to use force if the government did not call a halt to the project. The Minister made a cabinet submission based on consultations with the Minister of Lands and the villagers, which articulated the following options: (i) the government release approximately 1,000 acres of other lands for village use in return for a guarantee by the village that it not interfere again with the project; (ii) the government lease land now under reforestation; (iii) the government take the matter to court, upon which a final approach could be decided. The Minister noted that the Lands and Survey Department had confirmed that the area under dispute was
government land, but that the villagers claimed the land belonged to them and were prepared to use force if the government refused to acknowledge their claim. The Minister further noted that the whole project could be lost to weeds and that the aid donors were likely to discontinue their assistance if the dispute was not resolved.

The Lands and Survey Department houses the court records which trace the alienation of the land from the original title holders. The records date back to 1870 and end in 1894. This period in Samoan history was characterized by indigenous wars, land alienation, and colonial intervention (see Chapter V). In 1889, the Germans called a conference in Berlin which brought together the three imperial powers involved in Samoa; Britain, the United States and Germany. The conference culminated in the Berlin Act, which, among other things, brought Samoa under tripartite control by the three powers, named Malietoa Laupepa as King, and set up the Samoan Land Commission to settle disputes between foreigners and Samoan chiefs.

The Act stated that any claims on land which had not been acquired in a customary manner would not be recognized. Under customary law, land could not be alienated unless agreement was reached between the family owning the chiefly title to the land and the village council where the land was located. The Samoan Land Commission consisted of nominees of each of the foreign powers, assisted by the Native Advocate, also a foreigner.

The court records concerning land in the district of Talie indicate that Samoan chiefs who objected to foreign claims based their cases on the fact that it was they who were the rightful owners to the land, and that the foreign titles were invalid under the Berlin Act because the original sales had not been made by the rightful owners. However, the records show no indication that the Land Commission took the question of Samoan title seriously. The
land now under dispute in the district of Talie is covered by three separate Court Grants made in 1896 and 1897 declaring a German and an American firm sole proprietors. The records of one of the Court Grants, involving 2,000 acres of land, merely states that "the land is sufficiently identified ... by the claimant Dr. Herman Stockfleth..." Another Court Grant involving 23,600 acres was settled by a Compromise Agreement, whereby thirty-seven claims were rejected in favour of Samoan chiefs, and twenty-six claims were confirmed in favour of the foreign claimants. The Compromise Agreement does not state on what basis these decisions were reached. It merely states that the claimant's (Dr. Stockfleth) representative and the Native Advocate made a decision which the Samoan Land Commission approved. The record of the third Court Grant, involving some 4,000 acres and three Samoan objectors, shows that disputes were settled in favour of the claimant (the American firm) because the objectors failed to appear in court. However, subsequent to the Court Grants, chiefs who had lost their land in the District of Talie lodged formal objections with the Native Advocate and applied for rehearings. Before the court could rehear the cases, however, the Native Advocate left Apia with some of the court records, including the Compromise Agreement. His letter of September 16, 1923, now a part of the court's records, states that his failure both to lodge one such application for a rehearing and to return the Agreement to the court registrar, was due to the "disturbances which culminated in the division of the Islands". The point is that rehearings, applied for in 1896 and 1897, subsequent to the Court Grants, were never heard due to violent Samoan resistance to foreign interference with their choice of King, culminating in the partitioning of the Samoan Islands in 1899 (see Chapter IV). The institution of German Colonial Rule superceded the Berlin Act. In 1907, the American firm sold its land to a German and, in 1921,
under the Samoan Crown Estates order of 1920, all lands were transferred to the Government of New Zealand. The land in the District of Talie was never used or occupied by persons outside the District until the Government of Samoa began using it for a reforestation project in 1980. As far as I know, the dispute remains unresolved.

The title to the land under dispute is the District of Talie's highest title. The title belongs to the village of Talie, and is held jointly by the District's Member of Parliament and the mayor (pulenu'u) of the village of Talie. I was adopted into the family of the village mayor as the chief's daughter. Unfortunately, due to my low rank in Samoa's political hierarchy, it was bad manners for me to discuss the dispute with my Samoan father. However, the chief's son told me the title holders were well aware of the court records, and the government knew his father's title held authority over the land being used for reforestation. I was unable to discuss the dispute beyond this brief discussion with the chief's son. He told me that it was not only impolite but also dangerous to openly discuss issues surrounding land under dispute. "Putting foot" on the land was even more dangerous, he said. So I never saw the land, nor the young men with machetes who supposedly guarded it. Nonetheless, the dispute was an indication that the residents of Talie were willing to actively resist government development practices which encroached on their land, and alerted me to disputes happening elsewhere in the islands.

PRODUCTION IN TALIE

Subsistence agriculture and cash-cropping are the most important village occupations. The farmers of Talie grow tree crops, root crops, fruits and vegetables. Household surpluses are sold in the market or exported. One of my questions asked respondents: How
much of your crop do you sell in the market? How much of your crop do you export? Do you prefer to sell your crops in the market or export them? I suspected from my discussions with villagers that people did not keep records of market transactions. Sure enough, answers to the first two questions were vague and not comparable. Some respondents named the crops in answer to "How much...?" without giving amounts. Other respondents gave proportions that did not add up (i.e., 1/2 in market, 3/4 overseas). A number of respondents gave rough estimates in sacks and cases (i.e., "more than twenty cases"; "plenty of sacks"; etc.). Four of the respondents did not give any amounts and three respondents reminded me they "didn't write it down".

The villagers' lack of concern regarding records of sales of produce stands in stark contrast to the meticulous records chiefs keep during ceremonial exchanges (see below). On a number of occasions, I witnessed my Samoan father recording transactions during ceremonial exchanges. Also, I was allowed to peruse his record books, and noticed that he had recorded exact amounts of cash as well as finemats, "cases" of fish and "boxes" of biscuits. This meticulous record keeping during ceremonial exchanges has been reported in the literature (Tiffany and Tiffany 1978:369; Shore 1982:207). The contrast in record keeping reflects, I believe, the villagers' commitment to their ceremonial exchange networks and their view of market exchange, not as a profit making venture, nor as an end itself, but as a way to enhance their performance in ceremonial exchange and village life.

Villagers took great pains to impress upon me that they did not "look for money" for personal gain but for cash to buy items they could not produce themselves (cloth, lamps, bedding, rice, bread, etc.) or for Fa'alavelaves. Fa'alavelaves are any events requiring villagers to make cash contributions such as funerals,
weddings, births, building dedication ceremonies (churches and schools) church contributions and contributions to village projects (for building supplies or payment of loans). However, further research needs to be done to determine how Samoan households construct their trade relations and how these latter impact on their cash-crop and subsistence decision-making activities. For example, do rural producers calculate market exchange in terms of past monetary costs and profits or, alternatively, in terms of present and future household and ceremonial needs, and how much they can save for future needs? More to the point, is it possible for rural producers of subsistence and cash crops to keep records of expenditures and returns? After all, a profit statement is an accounting of income and costs of a production unit (e.g. a single crop) during one production cycle (usually one year). But in fact, no domestic crop is a costing unit. Cash crop harvest yields next years seed, subsistence food for the household, consumption costs of labourers who also work on other crops, food for ceremonial exchanges, feed for animals, food for visitors, food for the village pastors, teachers and the nurse. The surplus that reaches the market is what is left over after both the reproduction costs of the household and village, and the family’s status maintenance and enhancement costs have been met. So, if it is not possible for villagers to calculate in terms of profit, how do they make decisions of what and how much to plant? Answers to such questions would be illuminating to those interested in raising the productive capacity of the rural sector of the Samoan economy.

The respondents’ answers to the following question is tabulated below: Do you prefer to sell your crops in the market or to export them?
### Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surplus Produce</th>
<th>Chiefs</th>
<th>Chiefs’ Wives</th>
<th>Untitled Men</th>
<th>Village Daughters</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surplus Produce</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export &amp; Market</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Only</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Only</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sold Cocoa &amp; Coconuts</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer Market</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer Export</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Preference</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eighty-two percent of the respondents to the questionnaire sell some surplus. Fewer chiefs’ wives than any other status group sell a surplus. Chiefs’ wives have less of a surplus for sale probably because they grow all the mat-weaving and tapa-making materials for the village. Mat-weaving materials include both plants for household mats and finemats used in ceremonial exchanges. Of the eighty-two percent who produce a surplus, seventy-five percent (61 respondents) export some of their produce. Only slightly more than half of this group (31) sell cocoa or coconuts, twenty-two of whom are chiefs. Chiefs also export some of their surplus taro, bananas, pineapples, kava and a variety of root crops. The rest they sell in the market along with a variety of fruits, vegetables and spices. Only two chiefs’ wives sell any cocoa or coconuts. All chiefs’ wives grow plants for weaving mats. These women export some of their surplus cabbages, pumpkins, passion fruit, pawpaws, taro, pineapples, flowers, tapa and mats. They sell the rest of the
surplus in the market except for the flowers which are exported. Untitled men sell predominantly root crops (taro, yams, kava) and bananas. Only five of these men sell cocoa or coconuts. Village daughters sell the same range of surplus produce as that of the untitled men. Only five untitled men and five village daughters sell cocoa or coconuts. All status groups appear to export and/or market the more lucrative crop, taro. This data may lend some support to the argument that the stagnation and decline of Western Samoa's major export crops (cocoa and coconuts or coconut oil) is due to low prices (see Pitt 1979; Macpherson 1988) compared to taro which is a much more lucrative crop.

Thirty-one of the eighty-two respondents said they prefer to export crops because they can get "more money". Slightly more than half (43) of the respondents who sell a surplus said they prefer to sell their crops in the market. Sixty-five percent (28) of this group said they prefer to sell in the market because they get "quick money" for family affairs such as ceremonial exchanges. This finding indicates that the government's practice of delaying payment for exports until crops have been sold overseas may be a disincentive to more than one third of the people who sell surplus produce in Talie. Only eight respondents said they prefer the market because they do not produce enough surplus to fill crates supplied by the Produce Marketing Division, or sacks provided by the Agricultural Store. Finally, eight people said they prefer the market because they can "control" their own prices whereas overseas prices are "controlled by outsiders".

Everyone in the village, except the very young and very old, spends some time working on plantations. Twelve people in Talie also work for wages or have a business. The highest-paying salaried job belongs to the Member of Parliament who earns a yearly wage of WS$11,500 (about US$5,750 in 1986). The next highest-paying salaried
job belongs to a young untitled man who earns WS$3,484 per annum driving a tour bus around the island. The Mayor of Talie earns WS$2,000 per annum; three school teachers make a yearly salary of WS$1,800; a senior government typist earns a yearly salary of WS$800; the store owner and the tattooist earn yearly incomes of WS$1,000 each; and two women who make and sell handicrafts earn yearly incomes of WS$500 and WS$1,000 respectively.

**CEREMONIAL EXCHANGE AND COGNATIC DESCENT**

The basis of contemporary Samoan social organization is the cognatic descent group or 'aiga. Members of cognatic descent groups can validate their status in a number of ways. First, a member must trace descent from an ancestral founder through males or females, or through adoptive links. These descent or adoptive links represent a person's potential 'aiga membership (Tiffany 1975c:432). The number of any person's 'potential' 'aiga memberships is far greater than the number of their 'actual' 'aiga memberships. In order for a person's genealogical or adoptive link with a particular 'aiga to be recognized by the senior title holder, that person must actively participate in the family's affairs. A person's failure to participate may result in eventual omission of his/her genealogical link to the 'aiga's founder over time (ibid.). A person can participate in an aiga's affairs in a number of ways: residence on and cultivation of land belonging to the 'aiga; and political and economic support (food, cash, fine-mats) for 'aiga ceremonial redistributions (at weddings, funerals, births, title bestowals) called fa'alavelaves.

A person's primary membership is in the 'aiga on whose land he or she resides and whose senior chief he or she serves, (Tiffany and Tiffany 1978:368). Members who reside on the senior title holder's estate participate in family affairs everyday by
contributing daily to the chief’s needs. Respondents to the questionnaire I administered in the village of Talie express the ways in which they serve their chief in answers to the questions: How much of your time is spent serving the chief? In what ways do you serve? Here is a sample of their responses:

Money for village affairs, money for district affairs, food such as taro, chicken, pigs, fish for family occasions [ceremonial exchanges] (an untitled man).

I work in the plantation to earn money to serve the chief especially in church and village matters...all the time, everyday (an untitled man).

All the time everyday I serve the chief in all ways - serve with money, clothes, church donations and village donations (a ‘daughter of the village’).

Everyday, food, money...anything, taro, coconuts, fine-mats, food contributions to village and church (a ‘daughter of the village’).

People may activate secondary ‘aiga memberships on whose estates they do not reside by contributing to the senior title holder’s ceremonial redistributions (fa’alavelaves). Individuals vary according to the number of active ‘aiga memberships they are able to maintain. A person’s actual ‘aiga memberships are limited by geographic distance as well as economic, political and psychological resources required to maintain active memberships (Tiffany 1975c:432). Tiffany points out that the numbers of memberships maintained are highest among senior chiefs and “upwardly mobile persons” who recognize the political and economic importance of maintaining ties among various ‘aiga as a base of support for current and future projects (ibid.).

The Tiffanys (1978) refer to this exercise of choice by individuals with respect to ‘aiga memberships as the principle of ‘optation’. An individual publicly maintains, strengthens and validates his/her ‘aiga memberships by participating in ceremonial exchanges sponsored by senior title holders. Also, networks of ‘aiga memberships extend beyond cognates to include affines, political
allies and friends. Many different relationships are publicly demonstrated during ceremonial exchanges. As the Tiffanys (ibid.:385) assert, many individuals seek to enhance their social, economic, and political positions by opting to meet contribution obligations to high status groups that control desirable land, titles, economic resources, offices, and political influence.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CEREMONIAL EXCHANGE

Chiefly control over land, labour and ceremonial exchange is the basis of chiefly power in Samoa. Before and during ceremonial exchanges, senior title holders mobilize their cognatic descent group's manpower and resources, accumulate and redistribute wealth. It is at these events that we see the principle of 'optation' at work: "...redistributions involve persons who are eligible to establish their entitlement to 'aiga membership and who choose to do so by actually contributing to the event..." (Tiffany and Tiffany 1978:368). A ceremonial distribution may be sponsored by one 'aiga or all 'aiga in the village or district.

A senior-ranking chief's most important responsibility is to maintain and enhance the dignity of his/her descent group, either by making generous contributions to ceremonial exchanges sponsored by other descent groups, or by sponsoring ceremonial exchanges himself/herself (Tiffany 1975b:271). Junior-ranking chiefs channel goods to their senior-ranking chiefs during these events. Chiefs recognize many ceremonial relationships based on cognatic descent and kinship, affinity, friendship and bonds established between titles and villages, based on historical and political circumstances. Contributions to ceremonial exchanges constitute a public validation of social, economic and political bonds between descent groups, friends, titles and villages. A chief depends on personal influence, reputation and rank, rather than on direct
requests for help outside the family in sponsoring ceremonial exchanges. However, in the case of village-sponsored projects, village chiefs make direct requests for labour and goods. Ceremonial occasions are announced in advance over the local radio, and supporters come forward with their contributions. Relatives living overseas are notified by telephone or letter.

Senior and junior chiefs receive goods and money from their supporters who in turn, mobilize household personnel and request assistance from 'aiga members and affines. Goods are then stockpiled by the senior ranking chief in preparation for the public ceremony. This stockpiling constitutes phase one of a ceremonial exchange (ibid.:282-283). Phase two involves the senior chiefs in a public redistribution of goods. An orator chief, representing the senior chiefs, is in charge, noting in his/her record book all the contributors from affines, political allies and friends who attend the event (Tiffany and Tiffany 1978:369). Meanwhile orator chiefs determine the allocation of accumulated goods and untitled men deliver goods to kin, guests and village residents. Phase three consists of subsequent redistributions (Tiffany 1975b:ibid.). People who receive goods during phase two return to their villages and redistribute wealth to those who initially assisted in the event while keeping some items for themselves.

Phase two of the ceremony is the most important phase. The redistribution may continue for hours, sometimes into the night and following day. If imbalances in the exchange occur, it is equalized in subsequent exchanges. Chiefs keep meticulous records of what they give and to whom, and what they receive and from whom (Tiffany 1975b:ibid.; Shore 1982:207). Reciprocal presentations comprise three types of goods: money, food and fine mats. The prestige and political astuteness of participating chiefs are put on the line in these formal redistributions (Shore 1977:151). Reciprocal
presentations by host chiefs are meticulously calculated according to the quality and quantity of goods received; the rank and prestige of the receiver; and the closeness of the relationship of the receiver to the host’s descent group. Ideally, the higher the status of the person, the larger the gifts they give and receive. Also, the closer the kin relations between giver and receiver, the better the quality of gifts given and received.

Both the Tiffanys (1978) and O’Meara note that non-resident kin are important contributors to ceremonial exchanges. They, especially those who have jobs overseas, often contribute more than resident kin. Kin who live overseas make cash contributions to ceremonial exchanges to maintain group memberships. Samoan rural dwellers exchange their subsistence goods and traditional wealth (fine-mats, tapa, pigs) for cash and purchased goods from relatives living overseas (O’Meara 1990:201-206). In addition, some local families give titles to overseas relatives. In return, relatives provide more money and goods. By sponsoring ceremonial exchanges, "cash hungry villagers" gain a share of the resources of relatives working overseas. Senior title holders exchange fine-mats, tapa, pigs and matai titles for cash and purchased goods from wage-earning relatives (ibid.).

Giving and receiving gifts at ceremonial exchanges constitutes the fabric of social, economic and political life in Samoan villages. Ceremonial exchanges are both a public display of an untitled individual’s actual choices with respect to which social and political ties he/she wishes to activate or maintain and a validation of chiefly rank and prestige. Moreover, ceremonial gift exchange constitutes an economy which is fundamentally different from the capitalist economy. Building on Marx’s analysis of capitalist society, C.A. Gregory, in Gifts and Commodities (1982) distinguishes between capitalist and non-capitalist economies on the
basis of the objects exchanged. In a capitalist economy, objects of exchange assume the alienated form of a commodity, while objects exchanged in a society structured on principles of kinship and descent assume the non-alienated form of a gift. This distinction between gifts and commodities reflects a difference in the social status of both transactors and objects (ibid.:42). In an exchange of commodities, transactors are in a state of reciprocal independence; i.e., the transactors are strangers or aliens with respect to the exchange and objects exchanged. In a non-capitalist economy, transactors engaged in exchanges are politically and socially related to one another and, thus, involved in reciprocal rights and obligations; i.e., they are in a state of reciprocal dependence with respect to themselves and the objects transacted:

Commodities are alienable objects transacted by aliens; gifts are inalienable objects transacted by non-aliens...

One of the social consequences of the inalienable relation between a thing-gift and its producer is the phenomenon of personification: things are anthromorphised in a gift economy...

In a commodity exchange, the reciprocal independence of transactors, and the alienability of the objects transacted, means that the exchange relation established is between objects rather than subjects. Thus, commodity exchanges objectify social relations between people and they appear as a quantitative relation between the objects exchanged.

Furthermore, the motivation of the gift transactor and the commodity transactor is different (ibid.:51-55). The commodity transactor is trying to maximize profit, while the gift transactor is trying to maximize social and political relationships. Finally, objects, land, and labour assume a commodity form in a capitalist economy because one of the preconditions for its existence is a propertyless working class who, in order to provide for their subsistence and reproduction, offer their labour-power for sale. By contrast, in a society organized on principles of kinship and descent, products, land and labour assume the form of a gift precisely because of the
unity of the producer with the means of production (ibid.:100). In the Samoan example, titles owned by descent groups are inalienably attached to pieces of land. Everyone belongs to a number of descent groups and, therefore, has an inalienable right to land, the products of their labour on the land, and thus the means of their subsistence and reproduction.

CEREMONIAL EXCHANGE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

The first contact of Samoans with the global economy in 1830 occurred with the manufacture of coconut oil (see Chapter V). By 1850, Apia had become a key port for German trade in coconut products. Samoans perceived cash-cropping as another economic resource, and success in cash-cropping quickly became a primary qualification for acquisition of titles (Pitt 1970; Kallen 1982). German plantation managers, however, worked within the constraints imposed by Samoan cultural practices. Germans were able to trade with Samoans, but unable to make labour contracts with them. Germans found Samoan chiefs difficult to control, probably because if chiefs had tried to institute an unpopular practice such as labour conscription, they would have run the risk of losing their own labour force, their titles and, maybe, their lives. Thus, German plantation owners depended on imported labour from New Guinea or China. Consequently, Samoan labour did not become a commodity until the Second World War, when American forces arrived in the territory. In 1942, employment became available to Samoans in construction, loading and unloading ships, domestic services, and as interpreters (Davidson 1967:157). Today, in addition to cash-cropping, Samoans use education, success in business, and well-paying jobs in Apia or overseas to demonstrate their political and economic competence, and thereby maintain or enhance their status within the indigenous political system. They do this, first, by transforming gifts into
commodities and, second, by transforming income and the commodities income can buy into gifts. On the one hand, Samoans sell crops and their labour (both of which operate as gifts in indigenous ceremonial exchanges) to earn money. Then, money is used either as a gift or to buy commodities which are used as gifts in ceremonial exchanges. Commodities which are used as gifts include things which are purchased in trade stores, like cartons of canned fish, cans of corned beef, rice, and cartons of crackers. On the other hand, Samoans sometimes buy fine mats and pigs (traditional gifts transformed into commodities by putting them up for sale in the market) only to transform them back into gifts again in a ceremonial exchange. In this way, money, a dominant symbol of global capitalism, ceases to function as a quantitative measure of commodity exchange (ibid.). Rather, when it functions as a gift, it becomes a qualitative measure. By identifying the giver with the cash gift or commodity, the giver personally appropriates its inherent power (Comaroff 1985:236). In contributing to the community, the donor seeks self-fulfillment and prestige, thus reversing the loss of self associated with selling one's labour and the products of one's labour. Significantly, in Western Samoa land cannot be transformed into a commodity by constitutional decree. This appropriation of global symbols is done, not only with money, but also with the state and the church as I discuss in Chapters IV and V. This symbolic resistance is a pervasive characteristic of the articulation of Samoa's indigenous economy with global capitalism, and though it may not confront directly the forces of global domination, it defies the penetration of capitalist hegemony into the structures of village life in Western Samoa.

The wish to improve village life by acquiring goods produced in the global market motivates villagers to sell the products of their labour (especially cash crops) and to seek wage labour. As
Norton (1984:107) observes, all families regard money as essential in their efforts to maintain social ties and status. Much of the wealth needed for gift-giving is produced by relatives working overseas. Relatives send cash surpluses to parents and siblings living in Samoa "to keep their names good" (ibid.). Pressures to fund their relatives' participation in social functions are a constant drain on the income of planters, businessmen/women, salary earners and remittance receivers residing in Western Samoa. Macpherson (1988:242) notes further that migrants mobilize capital and energy to contribute to village projects such as schools, clinics and churches. So migrants link rural Samoa inextricably to the global market place.

The Samoan emphasis on collective welfare over personal gain does not preclude each person's desire for achievement. Under the present land tenure system (see Chapter V), the descent group collectively owns land, but the produce of newly-cleared land belongs to the person who plants it (O'Meara 1990). Each constituent household of the descent group supplies the labour for its own gardens and plantations. When labour is shared, even among kin, households expect the gift to be reciprocated. The only time labour, produce and funds are pooled by the community is when the village council organizes village projects. Thus, neither labour nor the product of one's labour are the communal property of the descent group. The household rather than the descent group is the unit of production, and each productive member of the household is motivated by his/her personal desire to develop his/her social identity by contributing to household subsistence and ceremonial activities of the chief.

Cognatic descent groups have important structural implications for Samoan social organization (ibid.:270). Individuals change residences whenever they feel it is economically or
politically advantageous to do so. For example, an individual may choose to reside with relatives in a village close to Apia in order to work or seek employment there. Or, an individual may choose to live with a household where he/she feels his/her candidacy for a chiefly title would be strongly considered by the descent group constituents. Finally, an individual may choose to live in the household of a descent group which owns the title to an abundance of unused land. Thus, disproportions in kin group size to available land can be overcome by affiliation to a group where land is plentiful; i.e., the principles of cognatic descent allocate land to those who are willing to cultivate it.

In sum, ceremonial exchange in Western Samoa reproduces the village power structure, legitimizes the political and social identities of individuals involved, and constructs the aspirations of those Samoans involved in wage-labour and business ventures.

**A DISCOURSE APART**

To enter into a discourse with villagers is to enter a discourse apart from that which one finds in the development literature. Economic metaphors for development -- increased production of foreign exchange-earning goods, favourable balance of payments, economic diversification, import-substitution etc. -- are absent in the language of villagers. What I equated with village development (roads, electricity, clinics, schools), the people in the village referred to as improvement of village life. In village discourse, improvements were those things which make people healthier and their lives easier and more pleasant. Significantly, the villagers articulated their dreams and wishes regarding village improvements, not in personal or individualistic terms, but in terms of their whole village. Concomitantly, the size of village churches, the school and meeting houses, the wealth of the village’s senior-
ranking title holders, and the size of the pastors' houses are a source of pride and prestige for all village residents. These latter reflect the Samoan conception of personhood or self, less in egocentric terms, than in terms of social and political identities.

A person's name reflects his or her relationship to persons, localities and parcels of land. At birth, a Samoan child is given a personal name. Children may be named after any relative or event. They may be given a name from the Bible, or one borrowed from English or German. In addition to personal names, Samoans are known by the chiefly titles they hold (ibid. 1982:145-146). Men and women can hold as many titles as they can secure through selection by the descent group(s) that own(s) them. Also, titles may be shared by two or more individuals, created or split by authorization of a descent group's senior-ranking chiefs (see Chapter V). The constraints on the number of titles any one person can hold are the genealogical links one can trace to title-owning group(s), one's personal ability to devote time, energy and wealth to fulfilling obligations to members of their title-owning group(s), and one's possession of sufficient prestige to make a desirable title-holder to the title-owning group. Given these constraints, most chiefs hold a single title, while those holding multiple titles own no more than two or three. In addition to being identified by a personal name and title names, Samoans also use the name of their mother's or father's title (ibid.:146). Throughout their lives, then, Samoans add name segments, thereby enriching their social and political identities. Kinship and territorial affiliations through their own and/or parents' titles, constitute the potential "sides" or identities for Samoan persons. These "sides" or identities are activated in social and political settings.

Shore (1977:212-220; 1982:144-148) suggests that the Samoan naming system is an excellent paradigm for the Samoan conception of
self. He uses the gem metaphor to explicate the Samoan concept of self. The more "sides" a Samoan is able to socially activate, the more brilliant he or she becomes in form. For a Samoan, to know a person is to know the many "sides" a person has manifested, or is likely to manifest, in different social circumstances. Samoans negotiate and acquire "sides" or identities by participating in ceremonial exchanges of goods. What Shore calls "sides", Tiffany (1975c) refers to as "consanguinal links". A person makes himself/herself "brilliant" by acquiring and maintaining many "consanguinal links" through participation in ceremonial exchange.

VILLAGER'S ACCESS TO RESOURCES

One of the questions designed to assess the villagers' access to resources asked the respondents to answer the following question: The government of Western Samoa wants the people to grow more crops. Do you agree? Give the reason for your answer. Only five respondents said they disagreed with planting more crops, because there were no markets for them (cf. quotes pp.330-331, 337).

Respondents expressed this view as follows:

It's good to have plenty of food but the trouble is there's no market to sell it. I don't support the government as the government has no markets for crops (a chief);

No, [I don't agree I should enlarge my plantation]. Crops go rotten, no market overseas. Prices have dropped down...no instructions on how to plant food crops (a chief's wife);

No, [I don't agree I should enlarge my plantation]. Not enough markets overseas and low prices for produce (a village daughter).

These answers suggest that the villagers' lack of knowledge about overseas markets, and low crop prices are a disincentive to raising their production of export crops.

Ninety-three percent of the respondents, however, agreed they should plant more crops. They expressed their agreement, not in
terms of reducing the trade deficit or accumulating capital, but in terms of avoiding food shortages, making money to take care of family and village responsibilities, and having enough food and money to contribute to ceremonial gift exchanges. All of these respondents said they could not extend their plantations because they lacked capital and labour. The following excerpts from respondents' written responses expressed this lack of essential resources (cf. quotes: p.331).

I support the planting for a better tomorrow. I agree as it will help to feed me and my family. Money is needed to develop plantation—money to pay people—strong boys (a chief);

[I need] a loan to pay workers, and buy weedkillers, bush knives and so on. The reason for having no money and pigs for my family [is] I know what to plant but I have no money (a chief);

I wish to enlarge my plantation because it is useful for the family. [I need] a loan from the government, also machines and labourers. I'm sick of trying. It's hard work (a chief's wife);

Yes [I agree I should enlarge my plantation] because many times food is needed for fa'alavelaves [ceremonial exchanges]. I need help through a loan (an untitled man);

Yes [I agree I should enlarge my plantation] so we will not go hungry or steal from other people's plantations—also [I] will get money. [I need] chemicals (fertilizers, weedkillers, etc.) bush knives, digging sticks to plant taro, taamu and other useful things for my family (an untitled man);

Yes, [I agree I should enlarge my plantation] so [there] will be no food shortages and [I] get money for selling in the market. [I need] a loan for money to buy weedkiller and help... Not enough money to buy weedkiller and pay workers (a village daughter);

Yes, I have started to increase my garden...[but] not enough time and not enough help and no money (a village daughter).

These answers indicate that shortages of labour and capital are equally important disincentives as low prices and lack of marketing information for villagers wishing to increase their production of surplus produce.
In addition to expressing a need for capital, twelve respondents (all chiefs) indicated they did not have land because the government had taken it:

I should try to enlarge my plantation. [I need money...to pay workers -- not enough money, not enough land. The government has taken all the land (a chief);

Yes, I agree [to plant more crops]. No money and no land (a chief's wife);

Yes, I agree to enlarge the plantation [but] need people to help plant taro...not enough land and short of money (a village daughter).

None of the untitled men said they were short of land. Finally, thirteen respondents said they lacked knowledge of what to plant:

I must ask someone...who knows about instructions to plant things...[there's] not enough money and I don't understand what to plant (a chief);

No [I will not enlarge my plantation]. Crops go rotten, no markets overseas, prices dropped down...no instructions on how to plant food crops (a chief's wife);

Yes [I agree to enlarge my plantation] so we do not have a repeat of food shortages which have happened six times in the past...[I need] advice on correct things to plant and correct way to plant them (an untitled man).

None of the village daughters said they didn't know what to plant.

Households can depend only on the labour of their children. But, almost half the respondents (forty-eight percent) had no children working on their plantations. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents had between one and three children working on their plantations, and only six respondents could depend on the help of more than three children. Respondents to the questionnaire reported having a total of five hundred and one children. Approximately thirteen percent of the children were under school age. Almost forty-two percent of the children attended school. About twenty percent of the children worked on their parent's plantations, three percent of whom also attended school. Eight percent of the children of Talie had jobs in Western Samoa and sixteen percent of the
children worked overseas. Nearly four percent of the children neither worked nor attended school. They simply "hung about" as one of my Samoan friends put it. In other words, fifty-five percent of the children were dependents. Of a potential labour force of forty-five percent, twenty-four percent had jobs elsewhere. This figure is a little higher than the twenty percent O'Meara (1190:32) reports have left Vaega village on Savaii. Many of the villagers I spoke with expressed the opinion that at least some of their children who had left would have stayed in the village if agricultural work had been more lucrative. This data lend some support to the argument of some authors (Leung Wai 1978; Pitt 1979; Macpherson 1988; O'Meara 1990) that the decline in production of export crops is caused by the movement of labour out of the rural areas due to the decline in productivity of farm labour relative to wage labour either in Samoa or overseas.

An overwhelming number of villagers in Talie perceive that raising their production of export crops requires the government's cooperation and assistance in terms of capital requirements (both for hiring labourers and buying tools and agricultural inputs) marketing arrangements and agricultural knowledge. With respect to capital requirements for hiring labour, however, it is unclear from the respondents' answers where this potential work force would come from given the high rate of migration out of rural villages. However, some villagers believe that if the government would invest in rural production, some of their children presently engaged in wage-labour would stay home and work in productive agricultural activities.

VILLAGERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT

One section of the questionnaire was designed to elicit respondents' perceptions of their Member of Parliament and
government activities. In order to elicit these perceptions, I asked the following questions: What has the government done for your village? Have you talked to your Member of Parliament about the things you want for your village? Has the Member of Parliament done anything for you? Sixty-three percent of the respondents, distributed evenly between the status groups, said the government had never done anything for the village. The rest of the respondents said that the government helped the village by providing them with roads, piped water, and a loan for the school. Fifty-four percent of the respondents said they had talked to their Member of Parliament about improving village life. Topics the villagers most frequently discussed with their Member of Parliament were plantation development (access roads, what to grow, transportation of crops, and loans) electricity for the village, a medical clinic and a preschool. This fifty-four percent, however, was distributed unevenly across the status groups (23 chiefs, 16 chiefs' wives, 8 untitled men, 17 daughters of the village). Chiefs, therefore, are far more likely to talk to their Member of Parliament than any other status group, while untitled men are the least likely to approach their Member of Parliament.

Forty-three percent of the respondents said their Member of Parliament had never done anything for them. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents said their Member of Parliament had helped them improve their lives. Again, these respondents were distributed unevenly across status groups (25 chiefs, 14 chiefs' wives, 9 untitled men, 9 daughters of the village). All of these respondents mentioned that the Member of Parliament had improved the village by getting the government to provide piped water for the village and a loan for the village school. Fourteen of the respondents said the Member of Parliament had helped them by donating to their ceremonial gift exchanges and giving them money when they were poor. Nine
respondents said the Member of Parliament had given them advice on plantation development, four respondents said he was negotiating with the government for the return of their land, and four respondents said he had guaranteed loans for them.

Respondents' answers to the above questions indicate that a negative attitude toward the government is widespread in Talie. Slightly less than half the respondents also expressed a negative attitude toward their Member of Parliament, although all these respondents were untitled members of the village.

Negative attitudes toward the government were also expressed in the respondents' answers to two other questions: The government of Western Samoa receives aid from overseas. Do you know how the government spends the aid money? Do you agree with how the government spends the money? And: How is Western Samoa changing, and what do you think about it?

Six people did not answer the questions about aid. Fifty-one respondents said they did not know where the government spent aid monies. Almost all of these respondents (forty-five) said they did not agree (supposedly because they did not know) with how the government spent aid and offered suggestions on how the government should spend the money. All these respondents suggested the money should be spent in the villages for things like electricity, schools, clinics, churches and plantations. Here is a sample of their responses:

No [I don't know]. The old hands in parliament know....They should spread it [aid money] around each district to use for plantations, schools, and churches (a chief);

No, I don't understand where the money [aid] goes....I think the money should be distributed among M.P.s to give to the villages (a chief);

I don't know. [The government] should use [aid] to bring electricity to places where there is none (a chief's wife);

We don't know. Only M.P.s and cabinet ministers
should look after families, the village, the children (a village daughter).

Forty-five respondents said they thought they knew how the government spent aid money, fifteen of whom did not agree. They felt the government was ignoring village needs:

Yes [I know], [the government] puts it [aid] in the bank and gets interest on it. The interest is used by those in power. [Aid should be used] for the maintenance of schools and the family and children (a chief’s wife);

Yes [I know], some money for the development bank. No [I don’t agree], it should be distributed among farmers and used by the agricultural department to provide cheap agricultural chemicals to ease the work on plantations (an untitled man);

Yes, [I know], to improve airports and other things of the government. No [I don’t agree]. The government] should distribute the money amongst the back villages because these are the ones supplying the country’s food, especially as not enough things to work plantations (a village daughter).

Sixty of the ninety-four respondents to this question disagreed with how the government was spending aid money. Thirty-four respondents agreed with how aid money was being spent. However, all the respondents in the latter group thought that at least some aid money was being spent in the villages, on schools, hospitals, plantations and access roads. In other words, this group did not differ from the first group with respect to how they thought aid monies should be
spent. The difference between the groups depended on how the respondents thought aid money was being spent rather than a substantive difference in opinion as to how aid money should be spent.

Many respondents expressed discontent with government practices in their responses to the questions: How is Western Samoa changing? What do they think of the changes? Twenty-one respondents to the questionnaire did not answer this question and two chiefs' wives thought there had been no change. Fifty seven respondents (about seventy-two percent of those that answered the question) said they thought Western Samoa had changed for the worse. This group of respondents blamed poverty, the high cost of living and the erosion of traditional values on their politicians. Here is a sample of the sixteen chiefs' responses:

Many changes, some good some bad. Life is faster and Samoa is going downhill. [Things will improve] only when the leaders of government are patriotic, of good character and not only talk, are true to their words, live serving and working to improve the situation. It is no good just being educated overseas. All they know is how to play politics and are not concerned with the people. Their outlook is palaqí [white]. They don't know if they are Samoan or afakasi [half-caste]. Samoa's blessings come from the mountains. If the one on top is good, all the people will be fortunate (a chief);

Higher cost of living which was cheap -- Overseas ideas coming in -- results in poverty....Remember, Samoa is founded on God. [The government] should lower the cost of living and leaders should be honest and help weaker people (a chief);

The only people benefitting [from the changes] are the Prime Minister and the cabinet. [Changes] caused by the political situation and division into political parties as well as not caring about people because if they [the government] were concerned for people [they] would reduce the cost of goods (a chief).

Of the sixteen chiefs who thought that Western Samoa had changed for the worse, six blamed the introduction of party-politics to Western Samoa (see Chapter VIII). As one chief put it party politics causes each side to be "jealous of the other" and to try to "feather their
own nests". Three chiefs also made reference to the preamble to the "Constitution" which states that "Samoa is founded on God". One chief is quite explicit about what this should mean:

Overseas influences result in poverty. Samoa is founded on God. Therefore the leaders should be of good character and also generous to the poor (a chief).

Nine wives of chiefs also complained about the high cost of living and party-politics in Western Samoa (cf quote: 319):

Samoa has changed as the government keeps changing. This is not good. It divides the people who can’t agree on politics (a chief’s wife);

[The changes are] not satisfactory. The only people who benefit are those in power and of no use to people who support the government (a chief’s wife);

[Changes are] not good. The cost of living is high, goods in shops have increased in price. This is fine for the wealthy, but no good for the majority of Samoans (a chief’s wife);

Samoa’s change for the worse is caused by disagreement of country’s leaders. They have gone from the original foundation of the government; ‘Samoa is founded on God’ (a chief’s wife);

Eighteen untitled men echoed the sentiments of the chiefs and their wives:

[The people] should remove business people from position of Members of Parliament as they only try to improve their businesses (an untitled man);

Samoa can be changed if the people are of one mind. If the MPs work together. If party-system continues, the country will fall apart. Some MPs think only of themselves and their own future (an untitled man);

Changes have to be made. The money from copra should be increased and cost of living should be reduced (an untitled man);

Much change -- cost of living high. Government should consider this and do something about it as the people are suffering (an untitled man).

Thirteen daughters of the village complained about how Samoa is changing. They talked almost exclusively about the cost of living and prices of export crops (cf quotes: pp. 320, 328–29).

The cost of living is up. Increase the price of
copra and cocoa, reduce the cost of goods in shops! Samoa has much deficit overseas. Government relies on the sweat of the people of Samoa to pay its debts owing overseas (a daughter of the village);

[Western Samoa has] changed for the worse. I think the country's leaders should look to the country's poverty and increase the price of copra, because that is the main export crop. They [the leaders] are only looking out for their families and forgetting the whole of the country who are poor (a daughter of the village);

Government should make a gift to the people by reducing the cost of living and raising the price of copra and other plantation crops (a daughter of the village).

Two of these women mentioned politics. One said:

Samoan custom is being lost in favour of influences from overseas, especially politics....(a daughter of the village).

The other woman remarked:

I don't know the kind of government that rules Western Samoa. I don't know what to think except the government of Samoa is very bad.

It is clear from this group of respondents that a significant number of people in Talie believe that the government is shirking what they consider to be its moral responsibility; that is, to look after the people in the villages, especially the poor. Most of the respondents point to the high cost of living as proof that the government is shirking its responsibility. Some respondents, especially from amongst the untitled men and the 'daughters of the village' point to the low prices for export crops as evidence of the uncaring attitude of the government. Almost one quarter of the group of respondents who said that Western Samoa had changed for the worst thought that the introduction of party politics was responsible for the politicians’ lack of concern. This group of respondents thought that their leaders were so busy arguing and competing for power amongst themselves, they had no time to address the problems of farmers in the villages. Other respondents questioned the moral character of their leaders, accusing them of acting only in their own self-
interest.

A smaller number of respondents (twenty or about twenty-five percent of those who answered the question) felt that Western Samoa had changed for the better. Among these respondents were four chiefs, eight chiefs’ wives, five untitled men and six daughters of the village. Respondents in this group emphasized infrastructural developments in the country like the airport, the roads and ferry services between the islands and some respondents thought that people were better off materially and financially; that there were more factories and thus more jobs for children; and that their children’s opportunities for a good education were better. Two respondents, a chief and a chief’s wife, mentioned that Western Samoa was better off because it was now an independent country. However, four of these respondents added cautionary notes to their statements. Here are a sample of responses from those who thought Western Samoa was better off:

Yes, we are an independent country. We are no longer ruled by the outside....Samoans are running the government. They should rule with fairness not for his or her family but look after the whole country. In this way Samoa will be successful (a chief);

The new airport and ships to travel to Tutuila and Savaii and for tourists. If Samoa is founded on God it will prosper (a chief);

Business, airports, coconut oil mill, hotels good for money. Many people are overseas and send money to build the new houses and buy many things and make businesses, cars. I feel sad if they all gone overseas...no-one to cultivate the land...[I]find more land but no-one to cultivate it.[I] got nine children. Six are in New Zealand...Three in Samoa (a chief’s wife);

Airport, good roads, aircraft. I think Samoa is in good shape (a chief’s wife);

Many new things that have been established are good ideas for the country for income (an untitled man);

Just change little bit about the cost of living (an untitled man);

Plenty of jobs for school-leavers, cost of goods is
reasonable, the future is getting better for children in education and working for large companies. Samoa is well off at this time if only can keep it up (a daughter of the village);

...I think Samoa’s life is good because Europeans came and built factories for the Samoan people to work and make good lives (daughter of the village).

Despite these positive responses to change in Western Samoa, however, most respondents felt that Samoa had changed for the worse.

One section of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate what their village needed to improve it. The most frequently mentioned items were electricity, access roads to plantations, clean drinking water, water tanks to store water during the dry season, a clinic and a chemist in that order. At the time I was living in Talie, the residents were raising funds to build a clinic. As one chief and his wife told me, people in the village had died because they could not get to the hospital in Apia on time. The chiefs of the village were already taxing themselves heavily to pay off the government loan (WS$75,000) for the school the villagers had built in 1984. Each chief was expected to pay fifteen tala (WS dollars) to the school committee each month for this purpose. A number of senior chiefs in the village complained about the difficulty they had in coming up with their payment since prices for their export crops had dropped and the interest on the loan had gone up. Since the chiefs were still struggling to pay off the loan, the women were raising the money to build the clinic by increasing their production of cash crops and handicrafts; organizing walkathons, bingos and raffles; and putting on dance performances in Apia and other villages. A dance I attended in Apia earned WS$500 after expenses.

Seventy-eight percent of the respondents felt they could raise more money for village improvements if the government would make loans available for village businesses. On the questionnaire, I asked: If your village could get a loan to start a business to
make money for things your village needs, what kind of business do you think you should start? Do you think your village could cooperate in a business venture? Fifteen respondents did not answer these questions. One person thought the village didn’t need anything. Sixty-nine of the eighty-three people who answered the question had ideas for businesses. Thirty-one respondents suggested a cooperative agricultural venture (dairy, poultry, or cattle farm, plantation, market garden). Fifteen respondents mentioned a village store. Eight respondents thought the village should invest in a fishing boat with an outboard motor and start a business selling fish. Three people thought the village should have a cooperative copra drying business. And three people thought the village should have a hotel. Other individuals suggested a cinema, boxing ring, pharmacy, pub, handicraft shop, sewing shop, a bus and a bingo hall. Responses to this part of the questionnaire indicate that residents of Talie not only possess a development consciousness but also ideas about how to achieve their objectives.

Seventy respondents out of the eighty-four who answered the question on a village business believed that it was possible for them to set up a cooperative business. This group had some idea of how to set it up. Twenty-two respondents (six chiefs, four chiefs’ wives, one untitled man, eleven daughters of the village) thought the business should be managed by their own group although two of the chiefs thought the untitled men should work for them. Only five people (two chiefs and three chiefs’ wives) had any idea how to organize a business beyond groups of people taking turns to work. This group of respondents suggested that the business would have to have a president, a treasurer and an accountant.

Fifteen respondents (six chiefs, five chiefs’ wives, four untitled men) felt that the village could not run a cooperative business, either because people would not be able to agree or
because people were dishonest. Respondents expressed their opinions as follows:

[The village] should not make a cooperative because some people are dishonest. It is preferable for individuals to make their own business (a chief);

[A business] is not easy to organize because people can't agree (a chief);

No, [the village cannot cooperate]. Impossible to work together because Samoans are very suspicious of each other. The business will go broke, some are honest, others are dishonest (a chief's wife);

[The village] should not start [a business] because plenty of money will go to those who control the business (an untitled man);

No, [the village cannot cooperate], the matais will take the money and run (an untitled man).

The 'Daughters of the village' were the only group who did not doubt that they could run a cooperative business. More than half of the respondents (eleven out of twenty) from this group felt the business should be exclusively a group business run by the 'aualuma (organization of village daughters).

Answers to this section of the questionnaire indicate that, whereas most people of Talie have good business ideas, they may have little knowledge of how to run a successful business. Nonetheless, many respondents (eighty-one percent) appeared willing to borrow money to start a business. By contrast, in answer to the questions: Have you ever applied for a loan? seventy-seven of the one hundred respondents had never applied for a loan. Only one person had applied for a loan and been turned down by the bank. Chiefs were the most likely (fourteen out of twenty-five), and chiefs' wives (one out of twenty-five) were the least likely to borrow money. Five out of twenty-five daughters of the village and three out of twenty-five untitled men had borrowed money. Most loans (fourteen out of twenty-three) were for plantation development. All of these loans, except for one, ranged from three hundred to seven hundred dollars. One loan for fifteen hundred dollars was to a chief who claimed to have
made fourteen thousand dollars on his market garden the previous year. Five loans ranging from two thousand to five thousand dollars, were for vehicles; two loans (WS$500 and WS$1,500) were for cattle; one loan (WS$5,000) was for a European house; and one loan of WS$100 was for personal reasons.

Most farmers who apply for loans do so to develop their plantations. This makes sense since ninety-three percent of the respondents to the questionnaire said they lacked the capital to extend their plantations. But why do so few farmers apply for loans? Many of the villagers I spoke with said the Development Bank (the only bank that lends money to farmers) did not give loans large enough to cover the cost of enlarging a plantation (cf quote below:327). According to these farmers, WS$ 500 is barely enough to clear a half-acre of land by the time they pay the labourers, buy the tools (machetes, etc.) and agricultural products like weed-killer. Five respondents said they did not want to borrow because the return on their produce would not be enough to repay the loan. Of the twenty-three people who applied for loans, five of them were having trouble paying them back. Their reasons were as follows:

Army worms [taro pests] got the plantation. Also I have no strength to work (a chief);

If I can’t [pay] it’s because the price of copra has dropped. [I have] not enough taro and no cocoa (a chief);

No, [I have not paid back the loan] because only a small sum is gained from my plantation (an untitled man);

Not enough taro and too many fa’alavelave [ceremonial exchange which require both taro and money] (an untitled man);

Price of passion fruit dropped (a daughter of the village).

These responses indicate that farm operations are undercapitalized and that both farmers and the Development Bank lack long-term information on crop prices. Consequently, returns on investments are
often inadequate to pay back loans. Furthermore, residents of Talie have not applied for loans to set up small businesses despite the fact that they have expressed ideas for enterprises should loans be available. The villagers of Talie I spoke with told me they could not get loans for business because they had no collateral—"nothing to put up except our sweat" as one villager put it. As we shall see in the following chapters, customary land cannot be used as collateral for loans. This is a problem for those who wish to start businesses in the rural areas of Western Samoa. It is also a partial explanation for why most farmers are undercapitalized.

The government of Western Samoa has emphasized the development of forestry as complementary to the use of land for agriculture—development which necessitates the leasing of customary land, either for logging or reforestation. The government has designated approximately one third of the customary land area of the district of Talie as production forest (ADB 1985:293). Although the government did not begin any logging operations in the district while I was in the islands, there is a possibility that sometime in the future the government will want to log the area. I asked the following question to elicit the respondents' attitudes toward leasing customary land: A government company (Samoa Forest Products) as well as private foreign companies are interested in leasing customary land so they can cut and export timber, and make more money for Western Samoa. Do you agree? Do you agree with replanting trees? Give the reasons for your answers. Six people did not answer this question. A small number of respondents (thirteen people) thought that leasing land to logging companies was a good idea, because it would create employment for young people and generate an income from unused land. However, eighty-six percent of the respondents to the question were opposed to the idea of both leasing village land as well as cutting down and replanting trees. They were
opposed for three reasons: leasing land is equated with land alienation; cutting down trees destroys the environment; and foreign companies will benefit at the expense of the Samoan people.

Respondents expressed their concerns as follows:

No [I don’t agree]. If forests [are] cut down there will be nothing to shade the soil... The land is God’s gift to the country to live off and not to leave to outsiders (a chief);

No, the company [logging company] will reap the benefit of the country. Samoa is a small country with not enough forest. The trees are very useful for people’s lives, rivers will dry up because no trees to shade and hold the water (a chief);

No, I don’t agree with it. Waste to cut down [trees] and no use to the life of the people. Water supply dry up... Outsiders will take the land of Samoa (a chief);

...I am against cutting the forests because the life of Samoa depends on the soil (a chief);

No...the ruthless cutting of forests will result in damage to the land [soil] and the water supplies, and Samoa will become like those countries where nothing will grow properly (a chief’s wife);

No, [cutting down trees] is a quick way to ruin the land of the country and also ruin the water supply, which is the life-blood of the people (a chief’s wife);

No, our government will get little financial return. Most [money] will go to overseas companies who are leasing the land (a chief’s wife);

No,...if all Samoa is leased to companies, what about the true people of Samoa? (a chief’s wife);

I don’t agree because trees are a standby (like an insurance) for the generations to come (an untitled man);

No, I should not [lease land]. It will mean the owners of the land will no longer have a say in his own land - and companies will gain [financially] (an untitled man);

It is not good to lease Samoan land for many reasons. [cutting down trees will] affect the water supply, lose the top soil. There is a saying in Samoa, days go and days come - sometime in the future the outsiders will come and claim as theirs the land they planted (an untitled man);

No, the right hand of Samoa or the development of Samoa is the soil. If the trees are cut down, crops
cannot grow properly and the ground will became water logged (an untitled man);

No, I am very much against this [leasing land] because it's easy to get money, too hard to get land (a daughter of the village);

No I don't agree to lease land to people from outside and don't want the useful trees cut down. I disagree with cutting trees because it will kill off the crops planted in their shade. No, the earth is our body and the rivers are our blood. No, I believe in leaving alone the land of Samoa with its trees to continue growing (a daughter of the village);

No good in this way [to lease land] - takes land from villages, land on which village depends...company gets plenty of money - little money for village (a daughter of the village);

No, because it [cutting down trees] will spoil the forest, lands, and spoil the water supply and [there] won't be any more birds...Company [logging] gets lot of money, Samoa little (a daughter of the village).

In sum, the majority of the people from the village of Talie view the government's plan to develop forestry as a threat to their survival. Respondents equate the leasing of customary land for logging or reforestation as land alienation. Furthermore, they perceive logging as a grave threat to the environment and, thus, the Samoan way of life. Finally, they understand that relationships with logging companies are potentially exploitative wherein companies stand to make a large profit while villagers gain little or nothing at all.

CONCLUSIONS

The basic unit of Samoan politics, today as in the past, is the village. Village councils of chiefs consider themselves to be autonomous in relation to the national government (Powles 1980:49; 1986:193). The village is also a self-reliant economic unit that exercises daily control over its land, labour and resources. Through cash-cropping and wage labour, villages are linked to the global market place. Through ceremonial exchange, villagers reproduce their
social, political and economic institutions and transform the cash and commodities they acquire in the market place, back into gifts. As I discuss above, both the Tiffanys (1978) and O’Meara (1990) note that migrants are important contributors to ceremonial exchange. Also, Norton (1984:107) observes all Samoan families regard money as essential to their efforts to maintain their social ties and status through their contributions to ceremonial exchange and village projects. Much of the villagers’ wealth comes from relatives living overseas. Relatives send cash surpluses to parents and siblings back in the rural areas to ‘keep their names good’ (ibid.). Macpherson (1988:242) points out that migrants mobilize capital and energy to contribute to village projects. In these ways the village economy is inextricably bound to the global market place. Although, as I discuss above, further research needs to be done on how rural producers construct their relations to the market place and how these relations affect the producers decisions regarding ‘what’ and ‘how much’ to plant. When government planners articulate a commitment to Samoa’s indigenous institutions (see Chapter VI), they refer to the social political and economic institutions described in this chapter -- institutions which are indivisible and comprise that complex whole sometimes referred to as fa’a-Samoan (the Samoan way) or Samoan culture.

According to the respondents to my questionnaire, residents of Talie not only expect help from the government, but consider it the government’s moral responsibility. The village sector of Western Samoa’s economy is already equipped with institutions engaged in development tasks. Village institutions raise money and provide labour to build roads, schools, clinics and churches. In addition, village institutions maintain law and order among village residents. There are no state sponsored law enforcement agents in Samoan villages.
The village council is an important institution for improving the village. Chiefs form committees to execute specific projects chosen by the council as a whole. In Talie, the chiefs' major project at the time of my research was to pay off the loan for the village school. The association of untitled men (aumaga) form a pool of labour ready to implement development projects chosen by the village council, or women's committees. Women's Committees produce and sell handicrafts, pigs, eggs and cattle in order to raise funds for village projects. In Talie, at the time of my research, the Women's Committees were busy raising funds to build a clinic. Women are an important pool of labour for building schools, clinics, churches, and feeding and housing the pastors, teachers, and nurses in the villages.

While I was in Talie, the Government was not making use of these village institutions in any meaningful way. By rendering village institutions redundant in the development process, the government may be ignoring its most valuable structural resource for implementing policies and strategies.

The village of Talie is presently involved in a long-standing dispute involving 3,000 acres of land the government is using for reforestation. The villagers claim the land belongs to them. They have invaded the property, threatening the aid-donor's investments and openly challenging the government to recognize their rights to the land. Court records dating back to 1870 trace the alienation of the land and indicate that the original owners were never given a fair hearing, due to the political turmoil of the times. The lands under dispute were never occupied by outsiders until the government began using them for a reforestation project in 1980.

Residents of Talie have a conception of land which is opposed to that of the would-be developers of Western Samoa. Land
and the products of the land are not conceived of as alienable resources to be turned into a profit in the international market. Rather, those who depend on land for their livelihood conceive of it as "God's gift to the country", and access to its products as a "God-given" right. For the residents of Talie, land and its products are, in Marx's words, inalienable; the title holder's rights to the land are non-negotiable; to negotiate a lease with the government or some foreign company is to risk the alienation of customary land by transforming that which is "God's gift" into a commodity. Moreover, to alienate land is to erode chiefly power and thus to threaten the foundation of the Samoan way of life. Resistance, organized by the District of Talie's Member of Parliament, and supported by the residents of Talie, against the government's reforestation project, is a manifestation of chiefly power, and, quite possibly, of their desire to maintain and reproduce Samoan institutions and culture.

Residents of Talie made it quite clear by their responses that they would view commercial logging on their land as a threat to their subsistence/cash cropping style of life. They equated leasing of land with land alienation. They perceived logging as a threat to the environment. "Cutting down trees" would "ruin the water supply", the "life-blood of the people", and the soil "the right hand" of Samoan development. Residents of Talie strongly suspect that foreign companies would benefit at the expense of Samoan people; that the companies get "plenty of money" and "little money for the village". The respondents' answers suggest that residents of Talie do not view development in terms of increased production for export, "balance of payments" or "national self-sufficiency"; although all of these may be unintended consequences. Instead, villagers appear to be more interested in development conceived as improving the quality of their lives in the village. They desire to increase the production of their crops to avoid food shortages and fulfill their social
obligations by means of ceremonial exchange. For most Samoans, engagement in wage labour and cash cropping is a means to attain, maintain and enhance their power and prestige within the Samoan moral universe, rather than an end in itself. Moreover, the villagers expect the government to help them achieve their development goals by using foreign aid to "spread around to each district to use for plantations, schools and churches"; to improve the "water supply and access roads"; and "to provide cheap agricultural chemicals to ease the work on plantations". The villagers think the government should "make a gift to the people" and "increase the price of copra and other plantation crops" and "reduce the cost of goods in the shops". The villagers' request for government help reflects their perceptions that they lack the resources to further develop their community by themselves.

In short, in the discourse of the respondents, village development or improvement is a village-centred endeavour. In saying that the villagers' discourse about development is village-centred, however, I do not wish to suggest that villagers are disinterested in pursuing individual or family business activities. As Macpherson (1988) points out this is clearly not the case. He gives three examples of successful enterprises run by individuals or families (a family who buys a freezer and sells freezer space to other villagers; an untitled man who grows vegetables to sell at a local market; an untitled man who receives a gift of a chain saw from relatives working overseas and sets up a small timber mill). As Macpherson (ibid.) articulates, as long as those who create wealth invest in village projects their activities are not constrained by others. In fact, their families bestow matai titles on successful entrepreneurs thereby locking them and their resources they control into patterns of rights and obligations within the family and village. In chapter seven, I document two
enterprising chiefs’ explanations of how they manage successful businesses — businesses sanctioned by the village — precisely because the chiefs in question take good care of family and village obligations. The point I wish to emphasize is that even though villagers view the individual household as the suitable production unit, this does not preclude a view of the village community as the appropriate focus of concern. Vice-versa, a view of the village community as the appropriate focus of concern does not preclude a view of the household or individual as an appropriate production unit.

At the same time, I wish to caution the reader that my conclusions regarding the village-centeredness of the respondents’ discourse regarding development comes from one village in rural Samoa. More research needs to be done to determine how widespread this view is in the general population. The respondents themselves accuse some politicians of acting in their own self-interest. In this thesis (pp. 226-7) I recount the story of a chief who is banished from his village when he tries to assert his private business interests against the wishes of the village council (see also p.88). Thus, though a village-centred view of development may be prevalent, it does not go unchallenged in Western Samoa.

It is clear from the responses to the questionnaire that villagers are primarily engaged in subsistence production. Surpluses are exported or sold in the market. The responses indicate that the farmers’ levels of production for export are affected by prices. Also, the responses suggest that the levels of production for export may increase if the government invested more money in low-interest loans for farmers, market research and rural infrastructure, and subsidies for agricultural inputs. However, any substantial increase in production for export also depends on keeping labour in the rural areas.
Though the villagers may lack the capital to improve their communities beyond what they have been able to accomplish so far, they do not lack vision. Respondents to the questionnaire elaborated their ideas for small village industries suitable for raising money to improve village life. In the event that the government opens a dialogue with rural Samoans, they will not be short of ideas for suitable projects designed to develop the rural areas although they may need information on how to manage projects of their choice.

If we were to define development as raising the capacity of people to accomplish production tasks set by themselves, either by strengthening the institutions they value or providing resources to build new ones, then residents of rural Samoa are already engaged in development (building, schools, clinics, churches, etc.) by means of production tasks set by themselves for themselves, and they have at least some of the institutions necessary to reach their goals. However, they may have reached the limit of their resources, both in terms of labour and capital. In order to raise the production of foreign-exchange earning goods, the data I collected in the village suggest that the government needs to invest money in market research, crop substitution and possibly village industries. Such an investment may make village agriculture more lucrative and stem the flow of young people out of the villages. In addition, if indeed a village-centred view of development is as prevalent in the wider rural population as it appears to be in the discourse of the villagers from Talie, then the Government may do well to consider a community-centred model of and for development aimed at legitimating and supporting community self-reliance and autonomy and having as its goals basic needs satisfaction; community access to services such as health education, transportation, electricity etc.; decentralization of decision-making processes related to development from the state to the
village; and dissemination of appropriate technology. Such a strategy may attract some young people back to the village and make village life more attractive to those who are thinking of leaving in the future.

Finally, the respondents' discourse indicates that a substantial number of residents of Talie do not believe that their economic well-being has been enhanced by government development practices. In fact, the only government development project in existence during the period of my research - the reforestation project - has been met with resistance from the villagers. Moreover, children of Talie continue to migrate out of the village to take jobs that are more lucrative than cash-cropping, leaving their families short of labour and struggling to produce a surplus beyond their subsistence requirements.
Cognatic descent is the term preferred by Leach (1960), Freeman (1957), and Tiffany (1974 f.n., p.35) to denote descent groups based on non-unilinear principles for determining membership.

In pre-contact Samoa, two great families managed to gain ascendancy: The Samalietoa and the Satupua. In the past, the Samalietoa dominated alliances in the district of Tuamasaga. However, the subdistricts of Tuamasaga had important political ties with the Satupua family who dominated political alliances in the district of A'ana and Atua. Both great families had branches of their cognatic descent groups dispersed throughout the districts of Upolu. Nonetheless, since before the time of European contact, the districts of Upolu were so dominated by a single cognatic descent group (either the Samalietoa or the Satupua) that senior title holders resembled district chiefs (Gilson 1970:52). The Satupua dominated in the districts of Atua and A'ana and owned the powerful titles, Tamasese, Mata'afa, and Tuimalealii'ifano as well as the "royal" titles Tuia'ana and Tuiatua. The Samalietoa dominated in the Tuamasaga district of Upolu as well as in powerful districts of Savaii and owned the powerful titles Malietao, Gatoaitele and Tamasoali'i.
CHAPTER III
ANALYZING DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT
IN WESTERN SAMOA

INTRODUCTION
Because this thesis is meant for a general audience including interested Samoan readers, in this chapter I discuss macro-theoretical approaches to development and evaluate them in terms of the Western Samoan experience. My approach to development is distinct from others because I view development and underdevelopment as the product of the conscious actions of indigenous and foreign élites and contemporary Samoan culture as originating in the process of resistance, collaboration and accommodation to contact with the outside world. This approach necessitates a theoretical framework which gives analytical import to both the historically and culturally situated practices of foreign and indigenous élites as well as the resistance these practices invoke from those adversely affected by them.

REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY
An academic interest in development came into its own in the 1970s and 1980s as a response to the proliferation of independent states, especially in Africa. An awareness of significant differences in strategies for development followed by these newly independent states resulted in a proliferation of academic writing on the topic. This scholarship reflects the outstanding social relevance of the problem. In the preface of his book, Introduction to the Sociology of ‘Developing Societies’ (Alavi and Shanin 1982) Teodor Shanin discusses the importance of discovering reasons for and finding solutions to the problems of poverty facing Third World
The question of so-called 'developing societies' lies at the very heart of the political, economic and moral crisis of contemporary global society. It is central to relations of power, diplomacy and war in the world we live in. It is decisive where the material well being of humanity is concerned ... (ibid.: xi).

In the fifties, development theorists argued that poor countries (usually referred to as backward societies) would follow the same evolutionary stages of development experienced by 19th century Europe once they were integrated into the world capitalist economy. Sooner or later, theorists hypothesized, the diffusion of Western capital, technology and values would close the gap between the rich and the poor countries. These so-called modernization theorists assumed the world was divided into traditional and modern sectors and that the modern sector would eventually transform the traditional sector into itself. Foreign investment and foreign aid were believed to be the benevolent mechanisms which would bring about this transformation.

When it became obvious that the gap between the rich and the poor countries was not closing but widening, theories of dependence and underdevelopment began to proliferate. According to these theorists, poor countries today are following a course radically different from nineteenth century Western Europe. The term backward societies, popular in modernization discourse, gave way to a new term -- underdeveloped societies -- to reflect this change in thinking. Dependency theorists reject the dualistic conception of the world which underlies modernization theory. They abandon the notion of a modern, partly industrialized sector, transforming a backward, traditional peasant sector into itself, in favour of a view of the world as exploitative chains of metropolis-satellite relations stretching from foreign powers down to the Third World rural peasant (Frank 1967).
Frank argues that the root cause of underdevelopment is the expropriation by the metropolitan countries of a potentially investable surplus in peripheral satellite countries. Foreign investment and foreign aid, far from being benevolent contributions as modernization theorists argue, are, in fact, the cause of underdevelopment (Frank 1974). Satellites are underdeveloped precisely because they lack access to their own surplus -- a surplus which is expropriated through the mechanisms of foreign investment and foreign aid. This surplus is then used in the development of capitalism in the metropolis. Furthermore, this exploitative relationship between the metropoles and satellites is recreated within indigenous non-capitalist social systems, destroying them in the process.

In his book, *Lumpenbourgeoisie Lumpendevolution: Dependence, Class and Politics in Latin America*, Frank (1974) argues that class structure in satellite countries is created by metropolitan capital. Surplus value is drawn out of the satellites by a local ruling class, who, as agents of metropolitan capital, owe their privileged positions and their very existence to élites situated in the capitalist economy of advanced industrialized countries. Thus, the bourgeoisie in dependent satellite countries cannot be expected to formulate a genuine policy of development because its own vested interests would be jeopardized (Ibid. 135-136). Rather, since the causes of underdevelopment lie in the capitalist system itself, "the only remedy against the causes, as well as the symptoms of underdevelopment, is the revolutionary destruction of bourgeoisie capitalism and its replacement by socialist development" (ibid.). Frank's analysis points to the limits of development controlled by foreign élites. He emphasizes the subordinate position of these societies in the capitalist world system and the determination of their fate by external actors.
While dependency theory has been important in developing a critique of modernization theories, the paradigm has come under strong attack by other scholars. In his article "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America", Laclau (1971) criticized Frank for giving analytical priority to exchange over production, thereby ignoring the persistence of non-capitalist modes of production. Furthermore, as other critics of dependency theorists have pointed out, this neglect of the non-capitalist modes of production in the Third World makes it difficult to incorporate detailed (especially anthropological) studies of developing countries into Frank's global scheme of metropolis/satellite relations (Samoff 1980; Ruccio and Simon 1986). If one examines an attempt to uncritically apply dependency theory to problems faced by Pacific Island countries, this latter difficulty becomes obvious. For example, in their book about South Pacific economies, Howard, Plange, Durutals and Witton (1983) assert that

Such economies are converted from serving the interests and needs of local populations to serving the profit based motives of international capital and the class interests of the industrialized nations (ibid.:253).

But what of Fisk's (1986:14-15) findings that in almost all Pacific island countries, most people are engaged in mixed subsistence and cash-crop farming, serving their own needs, on land held according to customary rules? Only in Fiji is the commercialized sector of major importance. In their book, Development and Dependence: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea (1979), Amarshi, Good, and Mortimer present a view of Papua New Guinea as a country in which government leaders and administrators have been beneficiaries of foreign investment and aid, while the mass of people have been losers suffering from rising inequalities, intense exploitation, misgovernment, social disruption and blighted opportunity (ibid.:x-xi):
This we agree is no accident, but the direct consequence of operations of a world system that feeds upon the weak, the vulnerable and the dependent (ibid.:xi).

This view, however, is hard to reconcile with the perspective of P.S. May (1982:422-434) (a leader of a group of writers on micronationalist movements in Papua New Guinea) who shows that local resistance to State hegemony has contributed to a shift in development resources and initiatives from the state to the village. This inability of dependency theory to focus on the local setting of underdevelopment is largely responsible for its treatment of the Third World as passive victims of world capitalism (Trimberger 1979:128). Much of the recorded history of Samoa [see Chapter V] denies such a view. Dependency theorists deny Third World élites their role as both collaborators and protagonists in an ever-intensifying struggle with international actors.

Finally, dependency theory hinges on a particular definition of underdevelopment and, by extension, development. For Frank (1967:1974) underdevelopment refers to economic stagnation, poverty and the inability of Third World people to control their own destiny. Presumably, then, development entails economic growth, a condition of well-being and autonomy for Third World nations. This equation of underdevelopment and stagnation, however, could not be maintained by dependency theorists once many poor nations began to show sustained signs of economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. Cardoso and Faletto (1979) introduce the notion of dependent development to describe this new situation. This concept rests on a specific definition of development which foresees the destruction of non-capitalist forms:

Development in this context means the progress of productive forces mainly through the import of technology, capital accumulation, penetration of local economies by foreign enterprises, increasing numbers of wage earning groups and intensification of social division of labor (ibid.:xxiv).
They are careful to state that by development they mean neither "the achievement of a more egalitarian or more 'just' society" (ibid.:xxiii). In fact, they point out that dependent development produces both wealth and poverty, accumulation and shortage of capital, employment for some and unemployment for others. In the end, the authors argue, development is distorted, and what has to be discussed is not the consolidation of the state and the fulfillment of autonomous capitalism but how to supersede them. The important question is how to construct paths toward socialism (ibid.).

Significantly, dependency theorists locate the source of Third World poverty in the workings of the capitalist system. The centre of action for socialist reform and development is the Third World State. Development entails national self-sufficiency and autonomy. The state is the only relevant agency to carry out reform and the ruling élites are the only relevant actors to bring about development. But, as Colin Leys (1977:94-95) remarks, to explain how underdevelopment comes about does not disclose what development should be, or what practical political position we should take. In short then, dependency theory is not adequate for my analysis because: it treats Third World actors, not as conscious strategizers, collaborators and protagonists but as passive victims of capital; and it ignores the vitality and persistence of non-capitalist modes of production.

The articulation of modes of production approach, developed within the French Structural Marxist school, has resolved some of the weaknesses in dependency discourse. Specifically, the modes of production model is a response to the tendency of dependency theorists to ignore the persistence of non-capitalist relations of production in many areas of the world. The concepts, "mode of production" and "surplus labour", developed within Marxist scholarship, are vital to this new approach. Marx himself was
imprecise about the meaning of social formation. However, scholars such as John Taylor (1979), Nicos Mouzelis (1978) and Samir Amin (1976) have used the concept to refer to the social, political and cultural formations that exist in contemporary Third World countries. Taylor, for example, states that the contemporary reality of underdevelopment in Third World countries must be analyzed as a social formation dominated by an articulation of at least two modes of production (Taylor 1979:101-102). Social formation is a descriptive concept denoting an actual specific geographically bounded and historically given entity (in this case, Samoa), consisting in "historical legacies from the past and potentialities for the future" (Alavi 1982:178).

By contrast, mode of production is an analytical concept based on the structure of social relations of production. Unlike his definition of social formation, Marx's concept of mode of production is quite precise and elaborate. For Marx (1968:67-88), the first historical act of humans was providing for their own subsistence. Furthermore, human history is defined in terms of a succession of modes of production brought about by a conflict between the forces of production (the mode of appropriation of Nature: land, tools, labour) and the existing relations of production (the mode of appropriation of surplus labour and the form of distribution of the means of production) (ibid.:67-88). Modes of production are distinguished one from the other on the basis of their relations of production: i.e., their respective form of extraction of surplus labour (ibid.:112).4

The concept "surplus labour" can be applied to the analysis of non-capitalist modes of production. Here, surplus labour is extracted by lords, elders or chiefs in the form of ground-rent, prestations of food and money, or "corvée" labour respectively. Unlike workers in a capitalist mode of production, workers in a non-
capitalist mode of production remain in possession of their means of subsistence and production. Meillassoux (1972), Terray (1972), Rey (1975, 1979) and Dupré and Rey (1973) use the concepts "mode of production" and "surplus labour" to analyze non-capitalist modes of production. They elucidate how relations of kinship function as relations of production and reproduction in societies where political and economic authority is vested in lineage chiefs, as it is in Samoa. They show how essential units of production are based on "real" (biological) or fictive (adoptive) kinship, and how the marriage system is the central means by which social relations of production are reproduced.  

We cannot talk about the concept "mode of production" without talking about social classes and the appropriation of surplus labour. Terray (1975:88-87) follows Lenin in defining classes as groups of people who differ from one another by the place they occupy in a system of production. Further, due to the place that they occupy, one class appropriates the labour of the others. Dupré and Rey (1973), in an example drawn from the African Congo (Zaire), show how in lineage societies, alliances are formed between elders (chiefs) of neighbouring groups for the mutual preservation of their authority. Holding élite goods is the collective base of their power, which they exercise in exchanges of these goods, particularly in matrimonial exchanges. These exchanges guarantee the reproduction of lineages as productive units, as well as the relations of dependence of junior men and women on elders. This is because a junior, in order to emancipate himself from an elder by becoming an elder himself, must marry, and only elders can transfer élite goods required in matrimonial exchange. Thus, elders control the emancipation of juniors by controlling the latter’s access to élite goods and, ultimately, their access to marriage, female labour and wealth. Women, as well as men, help produce élite goods, either
by feeding the elders who make them or by directly contributing labour to their production. Thus elders extract surplus labour from juniors and women to produce a product (élite goods) which is then used to reproduce the conditions of their dependence.

Terray (1975) makes a distinction between "a class in itself" and "a class for itself". Relations of exploitation in a lineage mode of production create social categories based on age and sex. These categories are a form of horizontal solidarity between elders, on one hand, and junior women and men on the other. But there is also vertical solidarity between an elder and wives and junior men under his control. These two types of solidarity are in contradiction, so that the triumph of horizontal solidarity would mean the destruction of vertical solidarity. For Terray the question is: When does a "class in itself" (junior men and women) become conscious of itself as a "class for itself", capable of collective action, of taking historical initiative, and changing the course of events?

The mode of production concept can be applied to contemporary Samoan society [see Chapter II]. For the purpose of this thesis, I use the concept "mode of production" in the same way as Wolf (1982) uses it. That is, to inquire into what happens in encounters between societies "predicated upon different modes of production", (ibid.:77) in this case, Samoan society and European and American societies. The concept allows me to reveal the political-economic relationships that "underlie, orient and constrain" (ibid.) interaction within the Samoan social formation. Like the African Congo that Dupré and Rey (1978) describe, Samoa has a lineage (Dupré and Rey, 1978) or kin-ordered (Wolf 1982) mode of production. According to Wolf, a kin-ordered mode of production is one in which kinship nomenclature is used to legitimize persons’ access to titles and land as well as their capacity to mobilize
labour and political support (ibid.:88-100). This use of kinship leads to the internal ranking of descent lines based on the degree of success of leaders in managing alliances, people, resources, and warfare. Leaders who are most effective in contracting politically strategic marriages and the judicious redistribution of goods to followers gain at the expense of their less apt contenders.

As I show in Chapter II, cognatic descent groups form the basis of Samoan social organization. Samoan chiefs, as a group, constitute a "class in itself". Titleholders, as a "class for itself" express their interests in the village councils, and, in recent history, in state institutions [see Chapter V]. Control over land, labour and élite goods is the collective base of their power, which they validate publicly in ceremonial redistributions of élite goods at all political and social ceremonies, including births, deaths, marriages and, most significantly, chiefly installation ceremonies (Saofa'i). As in Dupré and Rey's (1978) African Congo example, these ceremonial exchanges of food and élite goods guarantee the reproduction of families as reproductive units, as well as the relations of dependence of untitled men and women on their chiefs. In contrast to the Congo, however, it is the chiefly installation ceremony, not the marriage ceremony, that emancipates untitled Samoan persons from their chiefs by becoming chiefs themselves. Only chiefs can transfer the élite goods required in the saofa'i. The absence of one senior title holder at a saofa'i can invalidate the whole ceremony, and the title in question cannot be bestowed on the would-be incumbent. Thus, matai, as a "class for itself" control the emancipation of the untitled by controlling the distribution of élite goods in their name and, ultimately, their access to land, labour, and wealth. The untitled members of a chief's family produce élite goods, some of which they must present to the chief they serve. In addition, untitled men, women and
children are expected to contribute some of their labour to their chief's political and economic ventures. In this way, chiefs extract surplus labour from untitled men, women and children, which is used to produce elite goods which are then used to reproduce the conditions of their dependence.

Today, because of the articulation of the Samoan kin-ordered mode of production with global capitalism by way of the production of cash crops, chiefly extraction of surplus labour sometimes generates tensions and conflicts between chiefs and the untitled men and women. It is the working out of this conflict that constitutes one of the historical dynamics of the Samoan kin-ordered mode of production. As I discuss in Chapter V, conflicts between chiefs and untitled men and women are partially mediated today by a modified land tenure system. In sum then, the concept, mode of production, may be usefully applied to an analysis of the Samoan economic and political system.

The central problematic of this thesis is to explain contemporary development practices in Western Samoa in terms of the historical articulation of the kin-ordered mode of production with global capitalism. As I discuss in Chapter IV, in Samoa, in the first phase of the articulation of the indigenous mode of production with the capitalist mode of production, indigenous élites both collaborated with foreign élites in order to enhance their power and successfully resisted some of the activities of foreign powers. Neither the German nor the New Zealand colonial regime were successful in their attempts to install puppet chiefs, or institute a system of forced labour [see Chapter IV]. Thus, foreign merchants, investors and plantation owners were unable to rely on Samoans as a cheap labour force. In fact, the conditions necessary for the establishment of the dominance of the capitalist mode of production do not exist in Samoa, even today.
For Rey the motor of history is the necessary global expansion of capitalist relations of production. Though Rey attempts to construct a model to demonstrate the autonomous nature of non-capitalist modes of production, in the end the latter inevitably succumb to the pressures of foreign capital, hence the label pre-capitalist. This is because Rey assumes a historical succession of modes of production such that a peasant mode of production based on small-holder agriculture, hand implements and indigenous exchanges of wealth is inevitably succeeded by capitalism dominated by a bourgeoisie, and based on industrial technology. Samoa, as a case study, runs counter to this assumption as do other Third World Countries.

As Alavi (1982:192) points out, another danger of the mode of production concept is a narrow reading of the social relations of production as relations which exist between two sets of individuals or classes, independently of the cultural and political matrix within which they are embedded. The dominance of the capitalist mode of production over the non-capitalist mode of production is not a process that unfolds purely at the economic level (ibid.; Mouzelis 1978; Amin 1978; Taylor 1979). Rather, it is a process which can only be accomplished by political action. For example, Mouzelis (1978:64-84) argues that if we wish to account for the way in which the indigenous mode of production develops in comparison to the capitalist mode of production, we must pay less attention to the economic logic of the capitalist mode of production and more to the class structure of the social formation under consideration. The overall lack of development must be understood, not in terms of some inherent tendency in the capitalist mode of production but, rather, in terms of the activities of dominant groups (both foreign and indigenous) whose interests are opposed to the type of resource allocation that could bring about balanced growth between the
agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy.

What is at issue here is the whole concept of articulation. In order to understand contemporary structures of Third World social formations, we must understand how the capitalist mode of production articulates with the persisting non-capitalist modes of production. Articulation implies more than mere linkage. It means the intervention of the practices of actors entrenched in one mode of production within the practices of those entrenched in the other. This conceptualization of the articulation of modes of production allows the analyst to move from an analysis of structure to an analysis in terms of actors. As Mouzelis (1981:367) points out, the danger is that analysts transform structures into "mysterious omniscient entities whose needs regulate everything and everybody on the social scene". Structures and reproductive requirements are abstractions, not actors. As such, they cannot 'cause' anything. Whereas structures may indeed limit and facilitate action, the explanation for the emergence, persistence and transformation of social phenomena must be sought in the strategies, projects and struggles of collective actors. Any attempt to perceive collective actors or classes as mere effects of structural dynamics, or as constraints, leads to teleological explanations. As Mouzelis (ibid.:368) asserts, it is legitimate to argue that the persistence of noncapitalist modes of production benefits imperialism, but to argue that the persistence of non-capitalist modes of production are effects of the world capitalist mode of production is to argue that whatever happens to the Third World is because imperialism needs it. The persistence of non-capitalist modes of production must be analyzed, not as a functional necessity for capitalism but, rather, as the result of struggles between agents acting within the constraints of different modes of production.

Mouzelis (1981:3699) takes his critique of modes of
production theorizing one step further and asks why we should not establish the fact of imperialist expansion by theorizing the dynamics of the political sphere, in the same way as most theorists theorize the dynamics of the economic sphere. Why is the economic dynamic given privileged status in the explanation of capitalist expansion, when a political dynamic such as competition between nation states is relegated to a residual category? A conceptual framework which gives primacy to the economic dynamic excludes the possibility of asking whether certain forms of global capitalist expansion might be based on a predominantly political, rather than an economic, dynamic.

For example, the early history of Samoa [see Chapter V] is as much a consequence of political competition between Germany, Britain and the U.S. as it is the consequence of the economic practices of business men who sought to protect their commercial investments. Furthermore, Samoan history was never merely a consequence of the political and economic ambitions of foreigners. Samoan chiefs of "royal" rank collaborated with European missions, merchants and Kings in order to gain access to arms and valuables outside the indigenous mode of production in their attempts to install themselves as "king" at the expense of their contenders. The fact that Samoan chiefs rise to prominence by successfully managing alliances, labour and resources constitutes a major political dynamic within Samoan history.

Further, Mouzelis (ibid.:531-536) suggests, if the relative autonomy of the political and cultural spheres are to be taken into consideration, the appropriate conceptual tools must be constructed for their investigation in exactly the same manner as mode of production theorists have conceptualized economic structures and tendencies. Just as the economic possibility of imperialist expansion and penetration is assessed, there should be an attempt to
theorize the political possibility or impossibility of such an expansion, given a certain level of military technology and statecraft, both within the non-capitalism formation and the capitalist formation in question. Political and military structures may limit economic expansion at a given historical moment. This is borne out by the historical conjuncture of the Samoan world with global capitalism, as is demonstrated in the chapters to follow. In the absence of Marxist tools for the analysis of political and cultural phenomena, I borrow concepts from non-Marxist conceptual frameworks which I explicate below.

Finally, articulation of modes of production theorizing in the French tradition not only evicts human agency from history, but tends to ignore culture as a historical dynamic in its own right. Godelier (1978) makes some attempt to take account of culture when he includes "ideal" realities (a complex body of representations, ideas, patterns, etc.) within the category of productive forces. Clearly then, in practice, Marx's distinction between infrastructure and superstructure dissolves. This "ideal" element (culture) is not merely a reflection of social relations, but a condition for their production and reproduction. Indeed, Godelier argues, ideas which legitimize dominance and dependence play a decisive role in the reproduction of productive relations. However, he does not elaborate on how an analysis of culture's influence can be worked into an analysis of the articulation between capitalism and non-capitalist economic orders.

In Islands of History (1985), Sahlins also attempts to take account of culture in analyzing a period of contact:

On the one hand, people organize their projects and give significance to their objects from the existing understandings of cultural order. To that extent, the culture is historically reproduced in action... On the other hand ... as the contingent circumstances of action need not conform to the significance some groups might assign them, people are known to creatively reconsider their con-
ventional schemes. And to that extent, the culture is historically altered in action (ibid.:vii).

Further, Sahlins (ibid.:viii) disagrees with historical materialists who argue that because non-capitalist societies are radically transformed by Western Capitalist expansion, we must deduce that these societies have no autonomous social movement of their own. As he argues, such a view leaves us unable to account for the diversity of local responses to the world system -- persisting moreover in its wake. World-system theory itself allows for the preservation of satellite cultures, as the means of reproduction of capital in the dominant European order. But, if so ... European wealth is harnessed for the reproduction and even creative transformation of their own cultural order (ibid.:viii).

Sahlins refers to the coming together of two radically different cultural orders as a "conjuncture" rather than an "articulation". He argues that the "conjuncture" is structured in terms of the actor's cultural categories (Sahlins 1981), by showing us in one of his examples how Hawaiians, interpreting the events of European contact through their own cultural forms, recreated the distinctions of Hawaiian status.9 This use of cultural categories to make sense of a period of contact puts the cultural system at risk because "people cease to be slaves of their concepts and become masters" (Salhins 1985:x). This making sense of a period of contact -- this synthesis of cultural structures and event -- constitutes the "structure of the conjuncture", by which Sahlins means

the practical realization of cultural categories in a specific historical context as expressed in the interested action of the historic agents, including the social structuring of their interaction (ibid.:xiv).

By focusing on the "structure of the conjuncture" between global capitalism and non-capitalist formations, Sahlins introduces both culture and the practical strategizing of conscious creative human actors into a model for the analysis of European contact with non-western cultures. Social classes and agents, rather than being
seen as effects of the structural modification of relations of production, are viewed as the authors of the modifications. Or, to put it another way, collective actors and classes are not viewed as passive products of structure. Rather, structures are viewed as the product of collective action.

In a similar vein to Sahlins' theorizing, Worsley (1985:3-4) argues that underdevelopment is the social product of the conscious action of people. Each colony -- and, by extension, each Third World social formation -- was the product of a dialectic in which social institutions and cultural values of the conquerors was one term and the culture and social institutions of the conquered were the other term. The dialectic was played out through the collaboration between the actors situated in their respective cultures (ibid.:4).

What Sahlins and Worsley are arguing, then, is that when Europe came into contact with the non-European world, an articulation or conjuncture occurred, not merely between modes of production but between social, political and cultural institutions, by way of agents embedded in them. Thus, underdevelopment in Third World social formations today can be understood only as a result of the historical and contemporary strategizing and collaborations between actors situated in their respective institutions. To take seriously the role of historically situated actors is not to argue that some abstract structure such as the capitalist mode of production, powered by its own abstract force, penetrated indigenous economies, thereby creating an indigenous class whose interests coincided with the capitalist class. Rather, it is to give full analytical import to the historically-situated practices of, for example, indigenous leaders, whose primary interest was to maintain themselves in power. As a result, the strategies of some leaders included collaboration with European economic and political élites, but this does not mean the former were created by the latter.
Furthermore, elites resisted some of the practices of European economic and political elites every bit as much as they accommodated others. Finally, Samoan elites are not the only actors who have had an impact on the articulation between the Samoan and European and American worlds. In contemporary Samoa, rural farmers are successfully challenging the "elite's" development practices. The land dispute I describe in Chapter II is only one such example. An emphasis on political actors embedded in their respective polities requires an elaboration of concepts to investigate their cultural and political spheres of action. In the next section, I elaborate the conceptual tools to be used in the analysis of underdevelopment in Western Samoa.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING CONTEMPORARY UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN SAMOA

Underdevelopment in Western Samoa is the product of an historical encounter between two social, political and cultural worlds: one, the Samoan world, characterized by a kin-ordered mode of production (Wolf 1982: 88-100), and the other the Euro-American world, characterized by the capitalist mode of production. This encounter took place within a global order in which the Samoans and the Europeans and Americans wielded unequal powers. For example, European missionaries and European and American merchants entered Samoa with Euro-American technical resources and the military and political backing of their respective nations. Christian missions became a new source of power and influence for certain prominent Samoan chiefs. They were a source of guns, tools and education. In other respects, however, the activities of foreign merchants and missions stood in direct opposition to the political and economic self determination of Samoan people. Thus, the Samoan response to foreign power has been, more often than not, one of active organized resistance. Significantly then, the encounter between European and
Americans and Samoans has been characterized by domination, accommodation, collaboration and resistance.

The notion of "articulation" has been most consistently used in the context of the modes of production debate, where it denotes the interplay between separate modes of production characterized in terms of their distinctive forms of extraction of surplus labour. This approach, however, simplifies a complex reality by disengaging forces and relations of production from their embeddedness in other wider cultural orders (Comaroff 1985:154). The concept of articulation used in this thesis implies more than mere linkage. It means the intervention of the practices of collective actors entrenched in Samoan institutions within the practices of those situated in global capitalist institutions, and vice-versa. Furthermore, the socio-economic and political formation that has emerged in Western Samoa today is as much the product of the conscious intentions of actors embedded in very different orders of meaning, as it is the product of unexpected consequences of the same, as we shall see below. Moreover, the process of articulation was set in motion by "a contingent overlap between the two worlds" (ibid.:155), a recognition of shared interests and strategic practice between the two sets of actors.

Development and underdevelopment in Western Samoa today is the social product of the conscious actions of people, and contemporary Samoan culture originates in the processes of human resistance, collaboration and accommodation to the conjuncture of these two worlds.

In this thesis, I use the Marxist concepts of modes of production and articulation as a conceptual framework "to map out a problem area" (Mouzelis 1988:109) - in this case, underdevelopment in Western Samoa - and "to prepare the ground" for its empirical investigation (ibid.). I do not use Marxist concepts as a
substantive theory; i.e. to provide "a set of verifiable and knowledge producing statements" (ibid.). I use the framework as a way of studying both agency and institutional structure and as a way of acknowledging that, although agents do not operate in a social vacuum, neither are they puppets.¹⁰

I acknowledge however, that a Marxist conceptual framework is unable to deal with cultural spheres of action successfully. Eric Wolf’s book *Europe and the People Without History* (1982) illustrates the problems of reconciling political economy with cultural analysis (Marcus and Fisher 1986:85). While the book is an excellent survey of "subjects of ethnography" placed in the context of "the history of capitalism", Wolf tends to treat culture as that which pre-dates colonialism (ibid.). As Marcus and Fisher remark, the cultural construction of meaning and symbols is of interest to political economists. Culture is not only that which pre-dates capitalism. It originates "in processes of resistance and accommodation to historically momentous trends of institution building" (Marcus 1986:178).

In *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities* (1981), Marshall Sahlins views Hawaiian culture as originating in the events of early Hawaiian-European contact. Sahlins shows how Hawaiians used their cultural categories to structure the conjuncture between their own world and that of the Europeans. In so doing, the Hawaiians influenced the course of events and transformed their culture at the same time. Sahlins’ work presents a radical alternative to simple historical narration (Marcus and Fisher 1986:102-103). Sahlins views culture as a product of struggles between culturally situated actors so that what may appear to some scholars as cultural conservatism on the part of the Hawaiians, is viewed instead as creative acts of resistance and accommodation to a new mode of production. Similarly, in the history of Samoan/Euro-American contact, I show that Samoans
structured the conjuncture of the two worlds in terms of their own cultural categories putting their culture at risk as well as transforming it in the process.

Dominant cultural symbols, normally associated with the Euro-American world (such as the nation state, the church, and money) were appropriated by the Samoans and retooled, giving them a decidedly Samoan gloss. Today, the result is a unique socio-political formation, neither capitalist nor traditional, which developed in the colonial arena and persisted through to its independence as the State of Western Samoa, despite increasing domination by world forces. Since independence, lines of resistance, accommodation and domination have existed, not only between the State and international order, but also between rural Samoa and the Independent State of Western Samoa.

Until recently, Marx's conceptual framework provided the only critical edge to social analysis (Ulin 1991:74). Today, "post-modern anthropologists", notably Marcus and Fisher, promote the "small narratives of ethnographic inquiry" as the basis for cultural critique (ibid.). Marcus asserts that "the most powerful and novel criticism of capitalist society lie embedded in the everyday conditions and talk of ethnographic subjects" (Marcus 1986:180). In the pages that follow, I attempt to do justice to the critical projects of both the political economists and the post-modernists."
NOTES

1. W.E. Moore (1963:89), for example, defined the process of modernization as the total transformation of traditional societies into advanced or modern ones.

2. "Underdevelopment", Frank (1967:3) argues, "is not an original or traditional state of affairs". Rather it is a product of 'Capitalism'. He uses the concept of economic surplus and its utilization to explain underdevelopment in dependency discourse:

   ... the historical development of the capitalist system ... generated underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surplus was expropriated, while generating economic development in the metropolitan centres which appropriate that surplus ... (ibid.).

3. Frank (1974) expresses the exploitative relationship between the metropoles and satellites in the following way: The monopoly capitalist structure and surplus expropriation/appropriation contradiction runs through the entire Chilean economy, past and present. Indeed, it is this exploitative relation which in chain-like fashion extends the capitalist link between the capitalist world and national metropoles to the regional centres (part of whose surplus they appropriate) and from these to local centres, and so on to large landowners or merchants who expropriate surplus from small peasants or tenants, and sometimes even from these latter to landless laborers exploited by them in turn (ibid.:7).

4. Frank (1974) expresses the role of the State as follows: Using government cabinets and other instruments of state, the bourgeoisie produces a policy of under-development in the economic, social and political life of the "nation" ... (ibid.:13).

5. For example, in the capitalist mode of production, all people are divided into two classes; capitalist producers and free labourers (ibid.:142-148). The capitalist producers set the free labourers to work on the means of production (land and machinery). The capitalist purchases the workers' labour power in exchange for a monetary wage with which the workers buy commodities to ensure their own and their families' subsistence. Within this labour process, there is a difference between the value of labour (the wage) and the value of the saleable commodity produced. The difference between the wage paid and the price of the commodity sold represents the surplus labour that the capitalist is able to extract from the free labourer because he/she owns and controls the means of production.

6. Terray (1972:137-146) warns us, however, that an analysis of the economic base cannot be abandoned for an analysis of kinship, because in societies
where relations of production are modelled on kinship relations, the latter may be modified for political and economic reasons. Thus, the so-called "real" kinship relations observed by ethnologists may be a compromise between genealogical relations and a complex interplay of juridicio-political and ideological structures.

7. For example, Christopher Leo, in his recent book, makes the following observation about Kenya: One of the most obvious facts about Kenyan society ... is that the peasant and capitalist modes of production are not succeeding phases, one retreating while the other advances. Rather, they are flourishing in tandem and mutually reinforcing (1984:7).

Colin Ley (1971:307-37) goes further than Leo and shows that in post-independence Kenya, the peasant mode of production was displacing capitalism. Kenya's new government implemented a settlement programme devoted to the purchase of European estates and their resale to African small-holders. These estates were bought by African partnerships and co-operatives, and then subdivided into small-holdings by informal arrangements. This multiplication of small-holdings, rather than their consolidation into larger forms, hinges on an existence of a frontier of underutilized or unutilized land. As long as such a frontier exists, enterprising people wishing to expand their land holdings move into the frontier rather than displace their neighbours. The Kenyan example, then, has relevance for many islands of the Pacific, and other places where land shortage is not a development problem. This expansion of a non-capitalist mode of production in Western Samoa, as in Kenya, is strengthened by the fact that even the urban elites supplement their incomes or provide themselves with additional security by acquiring or maintaining chiefly titles to small land-holdings in the rural areas. As long as this state of affairs persists, the displacement of a non-capitalist mode of production by capitalism is not inevitable, at least, not in the foreseeable future.

8. For example, John Taylor's (1979) explanation, of "transitional" economics in the Third World, focuses on the articulation of the capitalist mode of production and the non-capitalist mode of production. But the articulation is viewed as being determined by the reproductive requirements of the former, and the degree of persistence of the latter.

9. The commercial use of the chiefly tabu on sandalwood trade meant that, for commoner people, the sacred restrictions which had once promised divine benefit, were now used against their general welfare. In these unusual circumstances, Hawaiian
men and women did not hesitate to violate tabus in defiance of their chiefs -- collective action which culminated in the abolition of the tabu system. Thus, the history of Hawaiian society is a political history explained in terms of the opposition of class interests. The chiefs, as intelligent intentional subjects, used existing cultural categories in ways that invited resistance and eventual abolition. Cultural categories were put at risk in action.

10. The mode of production, as a key concept, allows the analyst to move back and forth between problems of institutional analysis and strategic conduct. As Mouzelis (1988:112) argues, "it requires no mental acrobatics to move from an analysis of how the technical and social division of labour allocates agents into different locations/positions within the sphere of production, to an investigation of the types of practices and struggles to which such structural positions lead or fail to lead". Also, as Roseberry (1988:168) argues, the strength of the mode of production approaches in the hands of anthropologists like Wolf is the "placement of anthropological subjects within the larger historical, political and economic movements, in the attempt to understand the impact of structures of power upon them".

11. By combining a marxist framework with Sahlin's cultural framework for the analysis of Samoa's contact with global capitalism, I hope to show how the analysis of social relations of production in non-capitalist production systems are important for grasping the political and social constraints to which symbolic exchanges are subject. I agree with Ulin (1991:81) that decentering the authority of the anthropologist by allowing a multiplicity of different perspectives to emerge is not a substitute for reconstructing the socio-historical process to which they owe their origins. As Polier and Roseberry (1989:252) remind us, ethnographic discourses are not self-referential. "They are constructed within social fields of force, power and privilege" (ibid.).
CHAPTER IV
SAMOA'S ENCOUNTER WITH GLOBAL CAPITALISM

INTRODUCTION

In the next three chapters (IV, V, VI) I am most concerned with showing how contemporary Samoan culture is the product of on-going struggles between culturally situated actors engaged in creative acts of resistance and accommodation in the global economic order. I show how Samoans have used their cultural categories to structure the conjuncture between their own world and that of the Europeans and Americans; and how, in so doing, Samoans have influenced the course of events and transformed their culture at the same time.

In this chapter, I interpret historical accounts to show how contemporary problems with development in Western Samoa are the product of an historical encounter between two social, political and cultural worlds: the Samoan world characterized by a kin-ordered mode of production (Wolf 1982:88-100) and the European-American formation characterized by global capitalism. The encounter took place by way of agents embedded in their respective cultural formations -- agents whose primary interests were to maintain themselves in power. The historical processes that ensued were characterized by domination, collaboration and resistance. Foreigners entered Samoa with technical resources, as well as the military and political backing of their respective nations. Certain prominent Samoan chiefs saw the foreigners as both new sources of power and as a threat to the political, economic and cultural self-determination of the Samoan people. Samoa’s chiefly elite used indigenous cultural categories to make sense of their interaction
with the foreigners. By doing so, they put their culture at risk and transformed it. This "making sense" of a period of contact is what Sahlins (1985:xiv) calls the "structure of the conjuncture"—"The practical realization of cultural categories in a specific historical context as expressed in the interested actions of historic agents including the social structuring of their interaction" (ibid.).

In this chapter, I focus on the dynamics of the Samoan response to the forces of global capitalism and the imposition of the colonial state up to the time of the incorporation of the Independent State of Western Samoa. The historical data are divided into three periods: the pre-colonial period; Samoa under German rule; and Western Samoa under New Zealand rule and the subsequent incorporation of the Independent State of Western Samoa.

THE SAMOAN SOCIAL WORLD AND ITS KIN-ORDERED MODE OF PRODUCTION

The Samoan world is characterized by a kin-ordered mode of production in which kinship ties, either biologically or socially determined (the latter allows for incidents of adoption and manipulation of biologically based genealogies), are used to legitimate people's access to the forces of production (land, labour, and tools) and existing relations of production (the social and jural-political relationships between producers). When kinship ties are utilized in these ways, marriage, for example, ceases to be merely a relationship between a bride and groom and may become, instead, a tie of political alliance between groups. As Wolf (ibid.:92) puts it:

The extension of kinship therefore, is not the same as kinship on the level of filiation and marriage: it is concerned with jural allocation of rights and claims and hence with political relations between people.

In addition, kinship nomenclature is used to convey information
about the differential capacities of groups to mobilize labour and political support. This use of kinship leads to internal ranking of descent lines (ibid.:94). Hierarchical ordering of descent lines, their rise and decline, are based on successful or unsuccessful management of alliances, people and resources as well as on success and failures in wars. In Wolf’s words:

Leaders effective in contracting politically strategic marriages or in the judicious redistribution of luxury goods to followers gain at the expense of less apt contenders. With the passage of time such gains are translated into genealogical claims and modified to exhibit change (ibid.:94).

Wolf argues that the fact that chiefs rise to prominence in this way constitutes one of the major points of stress in the kin-ordered mode of production. In fact, it may constitute its central dynamic. Because a chief’s resources ultimately depend upon his/her kinsmen and allies, he/she has no independent source of resources with which to establish dominance and power. In order to break through this limitation, a chief has to gain access to independent, reliable and renewable resources of his or her own. Wolf (ibid.:96) states this is why chiefs have proved to be notorious collaborators with Europeans. Connections with Europeans offered chiefs access to arms and valuables outside of the kin-ordered mode of production. In addition to the structural limitations on a chief’s power, kin-based mechanisms and institutions are limited in their capacity to deal with conflict. Conflict between descent lines often results in group fission or war.

Wolf’s statement regarding the structural limitations on a chief’s power, and his/her consequent collaboration with Europeans, is supported by the historical information on Samoa I present below. Also, the data support his statement concerning the inability of kin-based institutions to deal with conflict between descent lines. Moreover, a more serious structural limitation was the lack of
adequate institutions to deal with conflicts which arose between prominent Samoan chiefs and European and American agents -- a limitation which had unexpected and serious consequences for Samoa's political autonomy.

Happily, however, some of the Samoans' cultural practices proved to be advantageous in their dealings with the foreigners. Historically, in practice, Samoans did not alienate land in a manner corresponding to the European or American practice of sale or fixed-term lease. Today, as in the past, Samoans look upon the land as nurturer, provider and mother. This metaphor of land as mother is reflected in the word *fanua*, which means both land and placenta.

Samoans first made land available to European missions to secure their power and services. In the process, they devised a set of customary rules governing land transfers: i.e., the land in question could not be transferred unless it was agreed to by the family whose land it was, and the village council where the land was located (Gilson 1970:163; Davidson 1967:45). When a decision was made in this way, the tenants enjoyed undisputed tenure and some land passed to Europeans in this way. However, as will be discussed below, unscrupulous chiefs broke these rules and alienated large amounts of Samoan land which did not belong to them. Nevertheless, the rules were there to exercise in a settlement of land claims by European powers in 1894 (Kennedy 1974:101) -- a settlement which ultimately left Samoans in control of eighty-six percent of their lands, thereby modifying the expansion of capitalist relations of production.

Other cultural practices also helped the Samoans resist foreign domination (see Chapter II). The combination of both the provision in Samoan practices for allowing individuals a choice of where to live and to whom to give economic and political support, as well as the practice of bestowal and deposition of chiefly titles
according to a consensus of family members operated as a check on chiefly power. These practices made Samoan chiefs difficult to control by merchants, missionaries, consuls, or state officials, because chiefs who attempted to implement an unpopular rule at the bidding of these foreigners ran the risk of losing their chiefly title, labour force, political following, and possibly their life.

The missionary John Williams (1984:238-239) commented on the constraints on chiefly power;

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\text{Indeed I have heard that it is no infrequent occurrence that if the chief renders himself obnoxious to his tribe by oppression that they the tribe will hold a ... meeting have a regular consultation or trial on the subject and condemn him to death.}
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Moreover, because access to land is granted on the basis of bilateral kin ties, an individual has a choice of where to work and to whom he/she gives economic and political support. Thus, it is not difficult for people to switch their allegiances from one chief to another. Also, at the level of a national council, (see Chapter II), a king could be stripped of his title for not acting in accordance with the wishes of the people. This inability of kings and chiefs to collaborate unopposed with foreigners modified the effects of Western domination on the Samoan social formation.

Finally, the organizational mechanism for uniting all of Samoa, known as the Tumua and Pule, though ineffective in politically uniting all of Samoa under a king and, thus, preserving their political autonomy, was an effective mechanism for collectively organizing Samoan resistance to undesirable State laws and, ultimately, for organizing Samoa's independence movement.
THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD

The Missionaries

Historians have established the time of the first contact between Samoans and Europeans as being in 1791 when a French navigator, La Perouse, ventured into the principal harbour of Tutuila, Pago Pago, whereupon twelve of his crew-men were killed by the Samoans due to a quarrel that arose over the French punishing a thief (Stair 1983:27-28). John Stair reports that the first European visitors did not land but remained sailing around at some distance from the shore. The Samoans believed the visitors had come from the spirit world, so offerings of food to these sailing gods were left on the beach (ibid.:23). After a time, some Samoans more courageous than others made contact with the vessels in their canoes, and found that the visitors were living men, white in colour, and speaking an unknown language. These visitors were called papalagi (sky bursters), because the Samoans thought they had either burst through the sky with their ships, or lifted it up and sailed underneath (ibid.:24).

It was not until 1830 that the first missionaries came. This encounter between Europeans and Samoans is characterized by both collaboration and resistance. The chiefs, for whom religious leadership in the household was one among many duties, regarded missionaries as a new source of prestige, and a new avenue for attaining political eminence and exercising political authority. Moreover, the church, under the auspices of John Williams of the London Missionary Society, appreciated the benefit of gaining the support of chiefs of royal rank. In fact, Williams’ standard practice was to win the support of the highest ranking chiefs in order to encourage mass conversion in a short time.

In 1830, the first missionaries anchored off the island of Savai’i near the home of Samalietoa. Coincidentally a powerful
chief, Malietoa Vai‘inupo was on the verge of gaining the status of tafa‘ifa and saw in the missionaries an opportunity for strengthening his position. John Williams promised members of the Samalietoa their acceptance of Christianity would bring lasting peace and an abundance of goods. John Williams’ first visit lasted one week. He left a small contingent of teachers under the protection of Malietoa. In exchange for chiefly protection of the mission houses and the missionaries, Williams gave Malietoa axes, hammers, chisels, hatchets, cloth, beads, and a gun. Chief Malietoa returned a gift of pigs and vegetables to Williams (Williams 1984:75). By the time Williams returned in 1832, the Samalietoa had become willing converts of Christianity and, Malietoa Vai‘inupo had emerged victorious in war and obtained the coveted title of tafa‘ifa (Gilson 1970:70-76). Other important chiefs convinced village councils to punish or banish villagers who refused to become Christian in return for goods from the mission (Davidson 1967:34). Consequently, by 1845, the majority of Samoans were nominally Christian.

Tiffany (1978:429) and Holmes (1980:476) suggest that the nature of the Samoans’ religious organizations and their desire for Western goods contributed to their acceptance of Christianity. After a careful examination of early missionary reports, Holmes (ibid.) concludes that before contact with Christianity, Samoans worshipped a single high god, Tagaloa, while lesser gods were connected to important families. Family and village priests interpreted the will of locally honoured deities, but no single religious leader spoke for Samoans as a whole. At the time of contact, "there was tremendous village and district autonomy in both religion and government" (ibid.). So the absence of a priestly hierarchy and the localization of village and household deities allowed Williams and his teachers to encourage individual chiefs to convert to
Christianity. Williams (1884:236) describes this general state of affairs as follows:

Christianity has not been embraced by the Samoans in general in a hasty and inconsiderate manner. The chiefs of the different settlements held meeting after meeting to consult upon the propriety of changing the religion of their ancestors...

The chiefs' desire for status advancement and acquisition of material wealth also encouraged them to accept the new religion.

Williams goes on to say that:

On one of these occasions, a chief of superior rank stated his wish that Christianity should be embraced saying only look at the English people. They have noble ships where we have only canoes. They have strong beautiful clothes of various colours while we have only ti leaves. They have iron axes while we use stones. They have scissors while we have sharks' teeth....I therefore think the God who gave them all these things must be good and that his religion must be superior to ours. If we receive and worship Him, He will in time give us all these things (ibid.:237).

John Williams (ibid.:150) encouraged the Samoan chiefs to make this connection between Christianity and wealth by making presents of axes, scissors and beads to those chiefs who had converted to Christianity.

If Samoans collaborated with European missions, they also resisted their control. A Marist priest reported in 1850 that the Samoans' resistance to mission control made the islands a refuge for other Polynesians, especially Tongans, who wished to escape oppressive mission laws (Gilson 1970:127). Missionaries and teachers depended on individual chiefs for protection. Mission stations were located in political centres where powerful Samoan chiefs conducted their district affairs. So the administrative level of the mission coincided with traditional district organization (Tiffany 1978:432). In Samoa, missionaries were unable to consolidate congregations of Samoans under one teacher. Instead, chiefs jealously guarded their teachers and fragmented the mission's administrative efforts;

Thus, the established tradition of village
autonomy, combined with the teacher’s dependence on chiefly goodwill, supported the development of locally autonomous congregations led by teachers willing to modify formal mission policies to meet local political circumstances (ibid.).

Tiffany stresses that this pattern of local congregational affiliation is evident in contemporary Samoa. Today, denominational affiliation correlates with descent group membership and political relations based on chiefly alliances (ibid.:433). Samoan villages take care of all their pastor’s material needs and contribute food and money for church construction programmes and other church projects. Pastoral support is contingent upon the assistance of chiefs who also hold administrative offices in subdistrict, district and national church institutions (ibid.:445). Church memberships and changes in denominational affiliations are manifestations of shifting political alignments. The result is "an indigenized church" incorporated into descent group activities administered and supervised by chiefly title-holders (ibid.:453). Status rivalries are reflected in the construction of larger and more magnificent churches as well as chiefly efforts to providelavishly for their pastor (ibid.:451). Felix Keesing reports a missionary as saying;

Instead of accepting Christianity and allowing it to remodel their lives to its own form the Samoans have taken the religious practices taught to them and fitted them inside Samoan custom, making them part of native culture....Christianity, instead of bursting the bonds of the old life, has been eaten up by it (Keesing, in Holmes 1980:486).

The Merchants and the Adventurers

The contact between Samoans and agents of global capitalism, however, placed their cultural practices at far greater risk than their contact with the Western church. Contact between the elite class of Samoan chiefs and European and American merchants, supported by their respective national governments, is characterized by a political dynamic set in motion by the strategic interests of European States and the United States in the Pacific region, on the
one hand, and the aspiration of Samoan chiefs to maintain their political autonomy, on the other. In the end however, Samoan institutions were unable to unify Samoans at the national level and Samoa's political autonomy was lost.

The South Pacific was one of the last regions to be incorporated into global capitalism. Its geographic remoteness made it impossible for small ships to carry sufficient quantities of food, water and fuel to make the trip. Furthermore, the islands had almost none of the natural resources -- precious metals, spices, silks -- to attract the interest of European merchants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, little deliberate contact was made in the Pacific until the eighteenth century.

The roots of expansion into the Pacific in the last decade of the eighteenth century lay in the desire of powerful nations to acquire trading posts and maritime bases for expanding their foreign commerce, and controlling the ocean shipping routes. The development of British settler colonialism in Australia and New Zealand resulted in the establishment of trading routes between the South Pacific and the rest of the world (Amarshi 1979:4). These nations acquired their Pacific shipping routes and maritime bases to support: the English and American whaling industry (ibid.; Ryden 1975:12); the rise of the fur industry in England, Russia and America; and U.S. interest in trade with China. The Chinese traded their silk, teas and porcelain for Pacific sandalwood, sea slugs, pearls, tortoise shell, mother of pearl and arrowroot. For a long time, Samoa, as a maritime base was bypassed for Tahiti, Hawaii and New Zealand. But as early as 1839, an American exploring expedition singled out a Samoan harbour for whalers in the South Pacific (Ryden 1975:16). Meanwhile, in New Zealand, even before it became a British Colony in 1849, "writers, politicians, and propagandists" asserted that New Zealand had "an imperial destiny" in the South Seas (Ross 1969:1-4). The so-
called optimists argued variously that since the Maoris were Polynesians, all Polynesians should be brought under one British government; that a great trade would develop between New Zealand and Pacific Islands; and that foreign occupation of an island could pose a serious danger to New Zealand.

Before 1855, the commercial value of Samoa lay in supplying the natives with articles of European manufacture by way of the missionaries (Masterman 1934:57-59). Europeans exchanged agricultural tools, cotton and European clothing for Samoan pigs, fruit, pearl, tortoise shell and later, coconut oil. The production of the latter was encouraged by missionaries who taught them to construct presses for the purpose. In the last decade of the eighteenth century, commercial expansion into the Pacific was initiated by the European demand for oil used to manufacture soap and candles (ibid.). German merchants began to build a trade network to satisfy the demand. Samoa was in the most advantageous position for trade between Pacific Islands and Europe. Prior to the use of coconut oil, spermaceti was used and the Pacific sperm whaling industry had profited. In Samoa, the first export of coconut oil in 1842 was by the son of the missionary, John Williams. Williams Junior also served as U.S. Consul until 1850 (Ryden 1975:19-20). His main task was to meet with Samoan chiefs to get their consent to code rules and regulations for the protection and provisioning of whalers while in Samoan ports. Chiefs at main ports also met with British naval officers to discuss harbour dues, services to ship companies, and the conduct of seamen (Davidson 1967:39-40).

At first, the Samoan chiefs transferred small amounts of unused land to missions and consuls but refused land to whalers and those interested in plantation agriculture (ibid.:45; Gilson 1970:162-163). John Williams Jr. became the first major land owner (Gilson 1970:164-166). He traded in Samoan-produced coconut oil and
introduced the Samoans to the advantages of shore-based trading and the money economy. Merchants visiting Samoa paid port fees to high-ranking chiefs in the Apia area. By 1850, the port of Apia had become a major trading centre in the Pacific. A German firm, Godeffroy and Son, dominated the trading houses. Until 1850, foreign interest in Samoa had focused on its strategic importance in opening and protecting trade routes. From 1850 onwards, Samoans were also influenced by Europe's demand for raw materials.

The discovery of gold in America, New Zealand and Australia produced an increase in Pacific trade and communication. The opening of the Pacific Coast of North America began with the gold rush of 1849 in California. By 1869, the American trans-continental railway was completed, transforming America into a Pacific power (Masterman 1934:83). Gold was discovered in Australia and New Zealand in the early 1850's. Gold enhanced the wealth of these countries and they began to look west to Japan and China. Samoa was on the main route between North America, Asia and the Orient. America had had trade treaties with Borneo, Siam, China and Japan since 1832. By 1852, America had made treaties with Korea (ibid.:106). These pan-Pacific affairs had resulted in America's acquisition of Guam and the Philippines. American ships called at Honolulu, Tonga, Fiji and Samoa. Finally, the growth of trans-Pacific trade in the 1850's combined with much discussion about building a central American canal (the future Panama Canal) prompted Australian, New Zealand and American adventurers to explore the islands hoping to make a fortune on future land sales and profitable tropical products (ibid.: 111).

Between 1870 and 1890, American naval reports expressed a concern for American trade rights with respect to bases in Hawaii and Samoa in connection with the proposed Panama Canal (Ryden 1975:43). Service to the Pacific from the East coast of the United States would be faster by two weeks through the proposed Panama
Canal, than via the Cape of Good Hope or the Suez (ibid.:45-46). Webb, a New York ship-builder interested in establishing a Pacific steam-ship line, sent an agent to Samoa in 1871, only to find that German plantation ships occupied the harbour of Apia (ibid.:51). The U.S. agent there, Jonas M. Coe, informed the U.S. Department of State that Germany intended to lay claim to Samoa (ibid.:52-53).

Following the U.S. Congress' lack of enthusiasm for subsidizing Webb's shipping line, the government of New Zealand, concerned with the rumours that Germany might lay claim to Samoa and absorb all new trade in the Pacific, agreed to subsidize the steam line (ibid.:76). Webb established his line in 1871 and began making regular stops at another Samoan harbour, Pago Pago. However, the British showed no enthusiasm for acquiring territory in the Pacific, and, according to Ryden (ibid.:78) tried to discourage New Zealand's imperial interests as early as 1872.

Along with Webb, a group of land speculators from California were also interested in the Samoan islands. They had established the Polynesian Land Company (ibid.:83-84) and planned to set up a plantation products company. They were interested in U.S. protection for their business ventures and petitioned President Grant in 1872 to make Samoa an American protectorship. President Grant appointed a friend, A.B. Steinberger, also a friend of the ship-builder Webb, as a special agent of the United States (ibid.:86) Steinberger's mandate was to "investigate the Samoan islands" and "to caution chiefs against making grants of land to foreigners" (ibid.:88). However, the U.S., like Great Britain, was not interested in annexing Pacific territory at that time (ibid.:119-120).

Nonetheless, by 1875, the United States had concluded a reciprocity treaty with Hawaii, and Great Britain had annexed Fiji. By 1879, German warships had concluded treaties with Tonga and Samoa (Masterman 1934:62; Ryden 1965:137). These foreign dramas of
annexation were intimately interwoven with Samoan dramas involving land and kings.

European and American contact with Samoa, then, was motivated primarily by foreign businessmen interested in expanding their foreign commerce in the Pacific region, controlling ocean shipping routes and acquiring Pacific products.

The King-Makers

The death of Malietoa Vai'inupo in 1841 plunged Samoa into years of civil war, as a new struggle began for titular supremacy (Davidson 1967:42-43). Warfare continued sporadically until 1873. "In normal circumstances", Samoans did not part with their land (Field 1984:23). But Malietoa factions were warring and their desire for arms overwhelmed them. Between 1870 and 1872 extensive land alienation had occurred, a fact that horrified many Samoan chiefs and affirmed their interest in establishing strong national administrative institutions to deal with foreigners (ibid.:146). Land alienation had occurred for the following reasons: first, Europeans and Americans had begun to see Samoa's future in terms of large-scale plantations, particularly with respect to copra and cotton production: second, a confederation of chiefs were attempting to overthrow Malietoa Laupepa, the half brother of Malietoa Vai'inupo and, on both sides, unscrupulous chiefs were willing to trade land over which they had no authority, and without consultation with village councils, for firearms and ammunition (Kennedy 1974:11). For example, Theodore Weber, the German consul and manager of the German firm Godeffroy and Sons, bought an estimated 25,000 acres, while the Polynesian Land Company claimed to have bought 300,000 acres (nearly half of Samoa) in this way (ibid.). By 1873, commercial interests in Samoa began to be perceived by Samoan chiefs as a serious threat, and revealed the
inadequacy of Samoan political institutions for dealing with European firms.

Samoan resistance to European encroachment on their lands took two forms: on the one hand, low-ranking chiefs and untitled men converged on the sites of German wrongdoers, stealing and destroying plantation property. On the other hand, in 1873, seven high ranking chiefs formed a *Malo* (an alliance between the *Tumua* and *Pule*) and established a provisional government known as *Ta‘imua*. This cartel of high ranking chiefs was vested with authority by the chiefs’ followers to draft a constitution and code of laws (Davidson 1967:47-48). "Royal" chiefs were mandated to conduct relations with foreign powers, maintain law and order in association with village councils and consuls, and appoint district officials. They appointed Steinberger as an advisor. Upon his arrival in Samoa, Steinberger met with the chiefs to inform them that President Grant advised them not to sell their land (Ryden 1975:94). Steinberger reported to the President that from that day on, he had gained the confidence of the Samoan Chiefs, and that:

The chieftains would seek me, asking advice, and detailing their plans for creation of a government and establishment of laws (quoted in Ryden, ibid.).

With the advice of Steinberger, the Samoan chiefs created a council of *Faipule* (district representatives) which gave the districts and villages a voice in the government. The *Ta‘imua* (consisting of high ranking chiefs of the *Tumua* and *Pule*) and the *Faipule* became the new government of Samoa. The chiefs resolved the problem of the *tafa‘ifa* title by making the king a constitutional figure-head. To minimize conflict, the holder of the *tafa‘ifa* title was to be chosen alternatively from the Sa Malietoa (of the *Pule*) and the Sa Tupua (of the *Tumua*). By informal agreement, it was decided that Malietoa Laupepa should be the first king. The new constitution was promulgated on May 18, 1873, and Malietoa Laupepa was installed as
One of the first tasks the new government set for itself was the settlement of land disputes. However, before this could be done, the new government realized that to have credibility it needed the friendly protection of one of the great powers (the U.S. or England) from the German consul, Weber (also manager of the German plantations), who continued to alienate their land. The new government and the King, therefore, sent a petition with Steinberger, asking the president of the U.S. for his protection (Davidson 1967:52; Ryden 1975:111). The U.S. denied the request (ibid.). Nonetheless, Steinberger returned to the Samoan Islands and in 1875, Malietoa named Steinberger Premier of Samoa (Ryden 1975:124). A new constitution provided that no act of the king was valid without the signature of the Premier (ibid.). Britain had annexed Fiji in that year, and the British Consul in Fiji opposed Steinberger’s government. In December of 1875, a British warship arrived in Apia with one hundred armed sailors and coerced King Malietoa into signing a deportation order for Steinberger (ibid.:141). The government reacted immediately by disposing of Malietoa who had not, as far as it was concerned, acted in its best interest (Davidson 1967:57-58; Ryden ibid.). "He is no longer our king and never will be again," wrote the Ta’imua to President Grant (Ryden ibid.).

Thus began two decades of a fluctuating struggle for the right to control Samoa’s economic and political future. The consular representatives competed in attempts to establish a centralized Samoan government which would ensure stability, and advance their separate interests. The Samoan district factions encouraged this competition of interests by collaborating with consuls to install their own candidate as king. An opposition movement grew around the
Samalietoa as a consequence of Malietoa Laupepa's deposition and reinstated him as king. Laupepa signed a treaty of friendship with the U.S., and granted the Americans the right to build a coal-yard and a naval base at Pago Pago as well as exclusive rights to the harbours (Kennedy 1974:14-15). The U.S. signed the treaty allegedly out of fear that the British Governor of Fiji would annex the Samoan Islands as a British colonial possession (Ryden 1975:199). Weber waited for the arrival of a German warship, which came in 1879, seized the two harbours on Upolu, and forced the pro-American Malietoa Laupepa to sign a treaty of friendship with Germany (Kennedy 1974:15). Malietoa Laupepa suffered a loss of prestige over the Samoan-German treaty, while the power of the Samalietoa, who began to act separately from the government, rose. The Malietoans selected Tavalou, Laupepa's uncle, as their leader and signed an Anglo-Samoan treaty of friendship following a secret request for British protection by Tavalou (ibid.:19).

In an attempt to recreate the central government in Samoa, the Ta'imua installed Tavalou as king at the end of 1879. Upon his death in 1880, Malietoa Laupepa was installed as king, and his rival Tapua Tamasese was installed as vice-king. However, an unsettled political situation within the Ta'imua prevented the Samoan government from strengthening its position and settling the land question. Willful damage and thefts against German plantations continued to anger Weber, whose profits were declining.

In an attempt to protect German commercial interests in 1884, a new German consul, Stuebel, waited for a German warship to enter Apia Harbour and, at gun point, co-opted Malietoa Laupepa into signing a treaty which placed Samoan political affairs firmly under German control (ibid.:34-35; Ryden 1975:277-278). Correspondence between the American, British and German consuls in Apia contained enquiries about German plans. The U.S. Consul
received a statement from Malietoa that he had signed the treaty under duress (Ryder 1975:279). When the chief ignored the treaty, Stuebel used it as a pretext to drive him from the seat of Samoan government. He declared war on Malietoa, brought ashore seven hundred marines, and raised the flag of the German Empire (ibid.:372). Malietoa Laupepa was deported on a German warship. In his place, the Germans installed Malietoa's rival Tamasese Tupua of the Satupua lineage, who accepted the coalition as an effective means of checking the aspirations of a new contender, Mata'afa Josefo, also of the Samalietoa lineage (Hempenstall 1978:28). He then installed an ex-company employee, Brandeis, as president of his new regime (ibid.; Ryden 1975:322-323; Field 1984:24). The German-Tamasese regime attempted to levy a capitation tax, and threatened to mortgage the lands of those who did not pay (Kennedy 1974:74). The response of some Samoans was one of non-cooperation and civil disobedience. Chiefs who refused to pay taxes were deported or put in jail, and the government passed a law forbidding public assemblies. German warships remained in the harbour ready to put down any rebellions.

However, the threat of a large-scale intervention by German warships could not prevent Samoan retaliation (ibid.:74-75). A rumour circulated that the Germans were encouraging Tamasese to claim the title of Tafa'ifa. The chiefs who opposed Tamasese and supported Mata'afa installed Mata'afa as king on September 11, 1888 (Ryden 1975:414). The powerful chief Mata'afa, joined Samoan rebels who were already in the bush. The opposing forces met in a battle after the Tamasese men had fired the first shot (ibid.). In the fighting that followed between German-trained followers of Tamasese and followers of Mata'afa, the Mata'afans emerged victorious and set to plundering German plantations (Kennedy 1974:75; Ryden 1975:415). The German-Tamasese regime called for more forces from Germany and,
a month later, prepared to disarm the Mata'afans. But, the Mata'afans killed or wounded fifty German sailors. (Kennedy 1977:91; 1974:75; Ryden 1975:418). The victory represented the first serious defeat of an advanced Western power in the Pacific and the first time that a group of Samoans had directly attacked the Germans.

Abroad, the Germans were against sending further vessels because the British and the U.S. were both against it, so they appealed to Britain for help in solving what they referred to as "the Samoan problem". The U.S. dispatched a squadron to protect American property and lives (Kennedy 1974:78-81). In 1889, interested Europeans and Americans called a conference in Berlin, and, without consulting the Samoans, the participants brought Samoa under the tripartite control of Britain, Germany and the United States (ibid.:93; Ryden 1975:422-504). The first article of the Berlin Act was "a declaration respecting the independence and neutrality of the islands of Samoa" (Kennedy 1977:92). The Berlin Act was intended as an act of recognition by the three powers of Samoa "as an independent native kingdom" (Hempenstall 1984:23). The Act was also an assurance that the powers would "maintain equality" between themselves in relation to the Samoan Islands (Ryden 1975:429).

During the Berlin Conference, Germany proposed that the Conference should take no action in the question of a government "acceptable to the native," but should provide "a solid base for protection of life, property and trade for the foreigners leaving the natives to govern themselves in their own way" (Ryden 1975:458). Britain and the United States accepted this position (ibid.:455-456). At the conference, the Powers decided to levy a capitation tax of one dollar upon every adult Samoan; to place a ban on the importation of arms to Samoans but not to Europeans; and to install Malietoa Laupepa as king. In addition, they decided that Malietoa's
successors should be elected and a chief justice should be installed to settle the land question (ibid.:523; Kennedy 1974:93). Under the auspices of a Swedish judge, land disputes were heard and settled. With respect to land disputes, the three Western powers decided only land that had been acquired in a regular and "customary" manner before 1879 was to be recognized.

A synopsis of a review of land claims examined by the Commission shows that of 134,419 acres of land claimed by German subjects, 75,000 acres or about fifty-six percent were confirmed by the Commission (Ryden 1975:523). Of the 303,746 acres claimed by American citizens, 21,000 acres or about seven percent were confirmed, almost all to the San Francisco stockholders of the Polynesian Land Company (ibid.:536). Of the 1,250,270 acres claimed by the British, 36,000 acres or about three percent were confirmed (ibid.:523). Although Samoans were left in control of eighty-six percent of their land, the contemporary history of Western Samoa discussed below and in Chapter II reveals that the land question is far from settled. Today, the State of Western Samoa is still faced with land disputes dating back to this time.

In addition to representing the final loss of political autonomy for Samoa, the Berlin Act represented an attempt by the three Western Powers to restore peace among themselves -- a peace which had been disrupted by their mutual suspicions that one or the other of the powers would annex the islands (ibid.:429). Neither Britain nor the U.S. were interested in assuming the cost of annexing Samoa, but both recognized the value of its strategic position on the Pacific trade route for cargo ships, gold-carrying ships and warships, following the opening of the Panama Canal (Masterman 1934:83). For this reason, both Britain and the U.S. were opposed to Samoa’s annexation by Germany, whose expansionist policies in the Pacific were perceived as an economic and military
threat to them both (ibid.:155). Germany, on the other hand, was unwilling to go to war over Samoa and was willing to negotiate (Kennedy 1974:84). Tripartite control seemed to be the only peaceful solution to the problem. The inclusion in the Berlin Act of a prohibition on further land sales, and the provision for the installation of a chief justice to settle land disputes was probably done, in part, to bring internal peace to the islands. However, given the fact that Germany was the only country with substantial commercial interests in the land, it is also likely that the U.S. and Britain were attempting to curtail Germany's commercial expansion in the Pacific.

As for the Samoans, despite the fact that their indigenous political institutions did not provide a basis for an effective central government, the political organization embodied in the Tumua and pule (groups of powerful orator chiefs) allowed Samoans to collectively resist the alienation of their land with enough strength to force the Great Powers to agree to a land settlement. Also, Samoa had recognizable customary land rules to apply in the settlement (ibid.:101). Finally, the constraints on chiefly power at the top made it difficult for the Germans to control Samoan Kings. As soon as Germans coerced a Samoan king into doing their will, powerful alliances of Samoan chiefs responded by deposing of the king. The lack of administrative power at the top of the indigenous political hierarchy prevented the Germans from controlling Samoans indirectly through their chiefs.

The peace that tripartite control was expected to bring to the islands was never realized. The Samoans' resistance to tripartite control by the powers continued to take the form of civil disobedience, non-cooperation and violence. The Samoans resented the fact that the Germans had imposed a king of their own choosing (ibid.:97). Mata'afa, who had a considerable following because of
his victory against the Germans, had been deported and his son was at war with the Malietoa groups. Continuous unrest caused a decline in trade and planting, and the Samoans continued to ignore payment of the head tax (ibid.:100-107). The German plantation company was also beset with labour difficulties because Melanesian labour was unavailable, and Samoans had always been unwilling to work for them. Malietoa died in 1889, and the war between the Malietoans and Mata’afans continued. Germany, in a defensive bid to arrest the decline of its interest in the group, threw its support behind Mata’afa Josefo. Americans led operations on behalf of Malietoa Tanumafili I (Hempenstall 1978:30-31). When the Americans fired on Mata’afa Josefo’s villages, Mata’afa retaliated by killing three American sailors and ambushing a party of troops who tried to follow them into the bush. A major confrontation between the United States and Germany was avoided when a hurricane drove three German warships onto the reefs of Apia and the prospects of a German military victory in Samoa were arrested. The realization that the warships lost were worth more than the financial prospects of the island group itself forced the German government into another round of negotiation with Britain and the United States.

Finally, in 1899, a three power commission was dispatched to Samoa (Ryden 1975:56; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:23). The three powers negotiated with the powerful Samoan élites and, subsequently, a cease-fire was agreed to by Mata’afa Josefo and Malietoa Tanumafili I. The commission reached a decision in favour of Malietoa Tanu as king but the German Consul, unable to abide by the decision, issued a proclamation abolishing the position of king (Ryden ibid.). Following lengthy deliberations, the Samoan Islands were partitioned, with Germany taking Western Samoa, the U.S. taking Eastern Samoa, and Britain gaining Tonga. Nevertheless, the degree of sovereignty to be assumed by the Samoan government and the German
colonial regime was never clearly defined. This provided the Samoan leaders with the opportunity to challenge the structures of colonial administration "stage by stage", thus ensuring the continuity of Samoan political protest (Hempenstall and Rutherford:23-24).

If the historical record of the pre-colonial encounter between the Samoans and foreigners tells the story of the eventual loss of political autonomy for the Samoans, it also suggests that the Germans were unable to gain absolute control over Samoan politics -- as its colonial rule will attest. The history of Samoan politics is the history of Samoan élitists. The Germans clearly needed cooperation of such men to gain control over the islands. But to call these chiefs simply collaborators would be misleading. They made no permanent choice to serve or resist, but moved between cooperation and opposition according to pressures on them from their supporters, and their own political and economic objectives. By the same token, Samoan resistance was never a case of irreconcilable opposition to American and European interests. Samoan élites tried to accommodate European and American needs in their quest for mutual coexistence and profit. The Samoan response to first contact with Europeans may be viewed as an example of creative transformation of their institutions in an endeavour to imbue new structures with old meanings. Samoans resisted European hegemony, in part, by appropriating the church and the State, both symbols of European culture, and restructuring them in terms of their own indigenous institutions.

Today, denominational affiliation correlates with descent group membership and political relations based on chiefly alliances. Changing denominational affiliations are manifestations of shifting political alignments. The result is an indigenized church, incorporated into descent group activities supervised by chiefs. Samoans chiefs tried to construct an indigenized state as well. They
attempted to resist foreign encroachment on their lands by forming a national government based on indigenous institutions at both the village and district levels. Under German colonial rule, the Samoan state institutions, the Ta'imua (the council of orator chiefs representing the Tumua and pule) and the Faipule (the council of district chiefs) remained in existence.

This first encounter between the Samoans and foreign interests is not only illustrative of creative transformations but also of the weaknesses of a kin-ordered mode of production. In order to attain and maintain his position as tafa‘ifa, Malietoa collaborated with mission houses to acquire arms and valuables outside his network of kin and allies. After Malietoa died, unscrupulous supporters of the contenders for his position traded land for firearms. These wars over the supreme title reflect the limitations of kin-based mechanisms and institutions in dealing with conflicts over supremacy between descent lines. Another weakness of kin-based mechanisms became apparent when the newly constituted Samoan government, which was supposed to guarantee internal political autonomy, could not settle the land question with foreign encroachers without the military backing of one of the powerful nations. In the end, would-be kings "manoeuvred the Great Powers" (Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:21) behind their competitions by entering into treaties with all of them, sacrificing their political autonomy in the process. These transformative processes and limitations continued to influence Western Samoa’s colonial history.

WESTERN SAMOA UNDER GERMAN COLONIAL RULE

The character of German colonial rule in Samoa was affected externally by Germany’s stance with respect to her Pacific colonies. The isolation of the island colonies, one from the other, and from the mother country, their insignificance in the larger German
empire, and the relatively moderate level of investment at stake, all resulted in a minimum of supervision from Germany and more freedom of action for the local administration (Hempenstall 1978:22-23). Regimes in the Pacific were not supported by large military forces. None of the colonies had a special colonial troop. In Samoa, a police force of thirty young Samoans was the only means of State control. In an island empire the size of the German Pacific, land-based security forces were too expensive and inefficient to maintain so colonial administrators were forced to rely on the German navy for support. In 1914, when war was declared, none of the colonies could count on naval protection, so Samoa fell into allied hands without resistance.

Internally, although Mataˈafa Josefo was grateful to Germany for its support in the recent civil war, he expected Germany to recognize him as king of Western Samoa, and his chosen Faipules (district chiefs) as the government of Samoa (Hempenstall 1978:31-32). Thus, before the German flag was raised, Mataˈafaˈs government proceeded to collect taxes and issue regulations concerning Europeans and Samoans alike. Moreover, there was little Germany could do, since Mataˈafaˈs party still represented the strongest military force in Samoa, 2500 armed men. The Germans, by contrast, possessed a small cruiser which occasionally visited the islands, and thirty Samoan police. Thus, Germany was faced with establishing a colonial relationship with a people who never accepted the premise of subordination as Europeans conceived of it. The "king-makers", the Tumua and Pule representing "the confederation of districts" supported Mataˈafa and expected Germany to guarantee his party's supremacy in Samoan affairs (Hempenstall 1977:211). In other words, the Samoan élite expected Germany to act as an agent in reconstituting the transformed indigenous political system in favour of Mataˈafa.
The first governor of Samoa, Wilhelm Solf, named the Kaiser monarch of Samoa and Mata'afa his Paramount Chief (Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:25). Solf made the Ta'imu'a (consisting of the main contenders for paramountcy) part of the colonial bureaucracy as a way of undermining the dominance of Mata'afa (ibid.). He appointed a paid native bureaucracy (the Fono of Faipule) of district representatives to sit with Mata'afa at the district centre of political power in the village of Mulinu'u. Mata'afa advised Governor Solf on the appointment of village mayors (pulenu'u), district judges, police, and plantation inspectors (ibid.).

The governor added the office of pulenu'u (village mayor) to facilitate the collection of a poll tax levied on each adult male. This head tax was collected with Mata'afa's party's consent, and on the agreement that the money be used only to support the Samoan administration, and not for the white community. In addition, with the cooperation of district chiefs, Solf supervised road building and coconut planting. Meanwhile, in the white community, settlers were disillusioned by the lack of land for growing coconuts and cocoa and the shortage of labour for European plantations (Hempenstall 1978:38-40). One of their leaders, a planter from Germany, proposed a solution to replace Solf's regime with a military one and compel Samoans to work for Europeans. Solf, however, declared that Germany was more interested in the Samoans as trading partners than as a labour force (ibid.:40-41). The Samoan chiefs reminded Solf that it was Samoan custom that no one perform servile labour. In any case, as I point out above, the Samoan practice of ousting unscrupulous Samoan chiefs would have made it impossible for chiefs to compel their families to work for German plantation owners.

On top of this threat to the stability of the colonial regime, a slump in the world market price of copra threatened the
Samoan’s economic prospects (ibid.:43). Copra that Samoans produced was the backbone of the German export trade, and provided Samoans with the money for European consumer goods, church contributions and the administration’s head tax. The Samoan villages produced well over half the copra exported, and the drop in their income produced widespread discontent. Mata’afa’s party made an application to Solf that the price of copra be stabilized at its original price. Solf rejected this application, thereby posing a direct challenge to Mata’afa’s power and setting the stage for a major challenge to the white community’s control over the price and marketing of copra.

That challenge came from a powerful orator chief, Lauaki Namulan’ahu Mamoe, who conceived of the idea of a copra marketing board run by the Samoans themselves (ibid.:44; Hempenstall 1977:217; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:24). According to the historical record, Lauaki was the son of a German customs officer and the daughter of a Samoan high chief (Hempenstall 1978:44); a powerful Samoan orator who had "made and broken high chiefs" (Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:24); and a "master of history and legend" (Field 1984:29). The Samoan Malo (government) ordered each Samoan male to contribute to the compani (company), launching it as a patriotic venture that would emancipate the Samoans from their "slavery" to white copra traders. The company, however, was a direct assault on one of the basic tenets of colonization -- white trader and European monopoly of commerce (ibid.:44). The "kingmakers of Samoa" (Tumua and Pule) were asserting their mandate to carry out affairs of state under the direction of Mata’afa Josefo by institutionalizing their power in the co-operative copra marketing board.

Solf forbade payments to the cooperative, and two leaders were imprisoned when no-one obeyed (Hempenstall 1978:44). In the end, the scheme failed because non-Mata’afan supporters were reluctant to sponsor a scheme which would further entrench the
Mata’afans in power (Hempenstall 1977:218). Solf used the lack of unity among the Tumua and Pule to deport the ring-leaders in the operation of the company, and to abolish the Ta’imua (the council of orator chiefs) by legislating against any references to names and privileges of the Tumua and Pule in the formal salutations of Samoa (Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:26-27). At least in the colonial administration’s mind, Solf had abolished the Tumua and Pule (Hempenstall 1977:215). In its place, he created a new salaried council of Faipule to consist of twenty-seven deputies who would assemble twice a year. These Faipule represented a new assembly and administration composed of chiefs who did not hold power within the indigenous political structures in the districts (ibid.:216). All appointments were made by the Governor, and the Faipule were responsible for conveying his orders to the villages. Once again, the inability of kin-based mechanisms to resolve dissension between factions of Samoan élites and to unify them against the colonial regime resulted in the Tumua and Pule’s loss of power at the national level.

The next confrontation between the Samoan élites and the German administration took three years to emerge (Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:27-28). In 1908, Mata’afa Josefo was in his seventysixth year. The time had come to designate a successor. There were four candidates, two from each royal lineage. The powerful chief from Savai’i, Lauaki, threw his support behind Malietoa Tanu (ibid.). He attempted to create an alliance between the Tumua and Pule based on support for his proposed reforms. He proposed a permanent re-establishment of the Ta’imua (comprised of orator chiefs of the Tumua and Pule) and the return of Faipule supported by the districts to Mulinu’u. These proposed reforms reflected an attempt by Lauaki to reassert the power of the Tumua and Pule over Solf’s self-appointed council of Faipule. By proclaiming the end of
the orator groups in 1905, and by awarding new eminence to previously less distinguished families, Solf had attempted to ignore the scale of status and prestige in the indigenous political system. Lauaki also proposed a lowered head tax (ibid.).

Solf responded to Lauaki by exploiting the fragility of the alliance between the Tumua and Pule (Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:28; Hempenstall 1978:55-64). He toured the districts of Lauaki’s rivals in the Tumua and persuaded them Lauaki’s plans did not include them in the final victory. The most powerful chiefs of A’ana and Atua deserted the alliance. Lauaki came with his army from Savai’i, ready to make war. The Tumua chiefs asked Solf to supply them with weapons to capture Lauaki, but the prospect of war, the plunder of plantations, and the possible ruin of the cash-cropping industry did not appeal to Solf. He telegraphed Berlin for military support. Germany sent 680 sailors and marines to Samoa; Lauaki surrendered and was deported.

Solf used his victory in the Lauaki affair to declare the end of the kingship after Mata’afa Josefo’s death and the appointment of two advisors, one from each lineage, to the Governor (ibid.). At Mata’afa Josefo’s death, the Parliament was abolished and Malietoa and Tamasese were appointed as the Governor’s joint advisors in the shadow of the German navy. For all intent and purposes, the domination of Samoan politics by the Tumua and Pule was at an end. Their acquiescence suggests that violence as a response to the actions of authorities was no longer appropriate under a colonial regime with the military backing of the mother country (Hempenstall 1978:ibid.).

Although the Tumua and Pule had been undermined during German rule, innovations were taking place in response to changing economic opportunities at the level of the village where chiefs had control of daily affairs. Committees of chiefs had been appointed by
the village councils to work with the government appointed village mayor in supervising the planting of crops, imposing fines for failure in plantation work, and punishing those who were guilty of offenses (Davidson 1967:88). This committee system has survived to become an important part of modern-day village administration. At the end of German rule, Samoan plantations covered three times the area of German plantations, and supplied three-fifths of the exported copra (Hempenstall 1978:69-70; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1978:29). Villagers used the money they earned from cash cropping to buy European consumption goods, maintain their churches and pay the administration’s head tax.

In 1914, German rule came to an end with the outbreak of the First World War. Western Samoa came under the control of New Zealand, at the request of Great Britain, with a military regime.

**WESTERN SAMOA UNDER NEW ZEALAND RULE**

If the historical record suggests that the German governor was successful in exploiting the inability of Samoan kin-based mechanisms to unify powerful Samoan chiefs at the national level of political organization, it also suggests that the colonial regime was dependent on collaboration with powerful chiefs. Under New Zealand colonial rule, violence occurred when the colonial administration attempted to move away from such collaboration.

New Zealand’s interest in Samoa began with British settlement of the Pacific (Corner 1962:130-136). Many settlers believed they were creating a New World which would be a Pacific Centre. As early as 1848, New Zealand was advocating a policy of imperial expansion in the Pacific, based on strategic and commercial interests. The value of New Zealand’s trade with the islands doubled between 1870 and 1890. The British government, however, ignored New Zealand’s demands, particularly as the latter was unable to pay for this proposed expansionism and bargained away Samoa to Germany and
the United States.

At the onset of her colonial rule, then, New Zealand, only a half-emancipated colony itself, lacked both an institutionalized colonial administering staff and a tradition for governing colonies (ibid.:142-43). Felise Va’a (1976) calls Western Samoa "an experimental station" for New Zealand’s expansionist policies in the Pacific. New Zealand’s inexperience with colonial administration was evident immediately. Her economic measures, especially the imposition of export duties and repatriation of most of the indentured labour, offended commercial and planting interests (ibid.; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:32-33; Field 1984:33). Repatriation of Chinese labourers forced many British planters into bankruptcy (Field ibid.). In the Samoan community, the expropriation of German-owned business firms created opportunities for Samoans, and particularly for part-Samoans like O.F. Nelson. Merchants such as the latter gained some businesses that Germans lost, thereby gaining control of the copra trade. It was not until the war was nearly over that the New Zealand administration encountered its first real disaster, and Samoans began to frame their political objectives and build organizations for their attainment.

The crisis came for New Zealand in the form of an influenza epidemic in 1919 which killed twenty-two percent of the population (Corner 1962:138; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:32-33; Field 1984:34-51). There was an unusually high death rate among members of the *Fono* of Faipule (council of district chiefs), many of them German-trained officials, and older chiefs in general. Hempenstall and Rutherford (ibid.) point out that the epidemic "accelerated the transition from the Samoan élite associated with the German colonial period to new élites associated with later political rebellion against colonial rule". The epidemic was directly attributable to the neglect of New Zealand officials who, having been notified that
a boat carrying diseased people was on its way to Samoa, allowed the passengers to disembark, and failed to notify the authorities. The epidemic killed over 8,500 persons out of a total population of 32,000. It was two decades before suitable appointments were made to titles left vacant by the deaths (Corner 1962:138). The epidemic brought New Zealand’s military regime to an end. New Zealand became a member of the League of Nations, and was given a mandate to rule over Samoa.

In 1920, a Samoan constitutional order vested power in an administrator and legislative council (Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:33-34; Field 1984:54-58; Boyd 1969:131-133). The New Zealand Governor Tate gave legal recognition to the council of Faipule (Boyd 1969:133). German appointed Faipule who had not died in the ‘flu epidemic remained on the council and new ones were appointed by the new colonial regime. The Faipule’s role was to advise the legislative council. New Zealand, however, reserved the right to legislate on a wide range of subjects (Davidson 1967:100-101). The legislative council was composed of New Zealand officials and three representatives from Samoa’s European community.

Samoan resistance to the New Zealand administration began almost immediately. When the administration increased import duties on European goods, the council of Faipules organized a boycott on traders throughout Upolu (Field 1984:56). When a deputation of Faipules visited Governor Tate to protest the tax, he threatened to exile them to one of New Zealand’s "many small islands" (ibid.). In 1921, twenty-eight of the thirty-one Faipules petitioned the King of England for self-government protesting government taxes and their lack of voice in the government (ibid.:58). In 1922, Tate enacted the Samoan Offenders Ordinance based on the Samoan custom of banishment (see Chapter II, V), whereby persons found guilty of threatening village peace could be banished from the village. With
this ordinance, Tate took banishment powers for the colonial administration (ibid.).

Tate's new government concentrated on developing agriculture and protecting Samoans. This "patronizing attitude" was expressed in the following statement:

The natives themselves have not sufficient training or education to enable them to appreciate or understand the principles for which the Allies are fighting, or vote intelligently upon such an important question as the destiny of Samoa (quoted in Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:33).

In 1923, Richardson became the new administrator. In his personal diary, Richardson expressed his determination to increase Samoan production by making them produce more and better cocoa, copra and bananas, and by diversifying village agriculture (Boyd 1969:134). In Richardson's opinion, the customary land tenure system and the local traders were impediments to increased production (ibid.). Richardson proposed a scheme for allotting five acres of land to every Samoan taxpayer to be inherited by his wife and children (ibid.:135; Field 1984:62; Davidson 1967:100-101). The allocation was to be a life-time lease-hold at one shilling per acre per annum, to be paid to a district fund for land development (Boyd 1969:135). Richardson also proposed a scheme to bypass the village trader by having Samoans market copra through the government. He attempted to control Samoan ceremonial exchanges (see Chapter II) at marriages, funerals and chiefly installation ceremonies (ibid.:138; Field 1984:62) on the grounds that they were "a waste of time and resources" (Field ibid.). Richardson used the Samoan Offenders Ordinance to remove chiefly titles and banish chiefs to remote parts of the Islands for failure to comply with his wishes (Field 1984:64; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:35). Samoans responded to Richardson by ignoring edicts concerning titles.

The first public sign of opposition to Richardson was a meeting in Apia in October of 1926 (Boyd 1969:141-146). This meeting
represents the beginning of Western Samoa’s movement towards independence called the Mau (Davidson 1967:115-116; Boyd 1969:145-146; Field 1984:56; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1985:37). Samoan resistance to Richardson’s administration took the form of civil disobedience, non-cooperation and peaceful demonstration. O.F. Nelson, a wealthy part-Samoan, and holder of an important Satupua title, led the movement. Two meetings took place in 1926 attended by three hundred Europeans and Samoans. The Mau Committee consisted of six wealthy European residents and six high-ranking Samoan chiefs. Moreover, the Fautua (the Head of the Satupua and the Samalietoa) sent messages of support to the committee (Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:37). Samoan traders, like O.F. Nelson, opposed Richardson’s government marketing scheme. (Boyd 1969:146; Field 1984:71). Nelson urged the Samoans to look to the Mau Committee as an alternative to government (Boyd ibid.). He began by holding a meeting in order to draft a full statement of complaints and requests to be presented to the government. Samoans responded from all over the country, and began to meet in Apia regularly to help with the work. Richardson ordered Samoans not to leave their places of residence. His orders were ignored. Richardson was powerless to take action against the local Europeans who kept all activities within the law, but he denied passports to Samoans who wished to go to New Zealand to present their case to the government (Boyd ibid.:149). The activities of the Samoans were organized by high-ranking chiefs of the Tumua and Pule (Davidson 1967:115-116).

The movement, known as the Mau, was given formal shape in 1927 with a declaration of their political objective (ibid.:119):

We declare and believe that ... it is the inherited privilege of a person living under the British flag ... to assist the members of a subject race in advancement towards ... government of people in accordance with the will of the people.

The Mau, which had been provided with badges and uniforms by Nelson,
showed up at a public gathering in Apia celebrating the British King’s birthday (ibid.:120). Their presence convinced Richardson that the movement was not insignificant, and he responded by issuing a proclamation for the Mau to disband and threatened to punish those who disobeyed. The Samoan leaders refused to disband, and Richardson retaliated by banishing two high-ranking chiefs and depriving others of their titles.

Boyd (1969:152) suggests that by 1927, "the country" was divided into two factions. Those who had "declared their allegiance to the Mau" and those who were "for the Malo" (colonial government). The Mau instructed their supporters to stop paying taxes and to stop sending their children to government schools (ibid.). Richardson used the Samoan Offenders Ordinance to banish Samoan leaders of the Mau from their districts and deprive them of their titles (ibid.:152). The New Zealand government passed legislation to empower Richardson to deport European and part-Samoan leaders.

In 1927, New Zealand sent a Royal Commission to hear evidence from the Mau (Boyd 1969:153; Field 1984:101-106; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:37). The Commission’s mandate was to discover if the Mau had reasonable cause for complaint. The commission heard evidence from three hundred witnesses. The Samoans drafted a list of complaints as follows: they disliked the high salaries enjoyed by expatriate officials; they opposed land reforms and the practice of giving government loans to Samoans for developing land because they feared land would be lost if loans could not be repaid; they disliked the high medical tax because it was a drain on their private resources, and because most of them lived at a distance from the hospital and dispensaries; they opposed the Samoan ordinance of 1922 which allowed the government to banish any Samoan and deprive chiefs of their titles; they opposed the government appointment of matai to the Fono of Faipule and
considered Faipule as salaried government officials dependent on
government patronage, and not their properly accredited
representatives; they complained that ordinances requiring the
payment of new taxes and planting new crops had imposed burdensome
obligations; finally, recognizing that the Fono of Faipule was only
an advisory council, they requested equal representation in the
legislature (Davidson 1967:122-129). The conclusion of the
government-appointed commission was that the Mau’s complaints were
without foundation (ibid.: Boyd 1969:153; Hempenstall and Rutherford

Richardson deported O.F. Nelson and other European leaders
(Boyd 1969:154; Field 1984:107-109). The government passed a bill
forbidding the wearing of Mau uniforms and banning the raising of
funds by Samoan political organizations (Davidson 1967:13; Field
1984:111-120). Following the deportation of Nelson, the Mau
organized a boycott on merchants who sold imported goods, told their
supporters to stop making copra and to continue in their refusal to
pay taxes. The Mau began appearing regularly in Apia wearing a new
Mau uniform.

In 1928, Richardson sent for three warships from New Zealand
(Field ibid.). Landing parties of marines and naval officers
arrested four hundred Mau supporters and put them in a quickly
prepared detention camp. Within the camp a change in the leadership
of the Mau occurred. Until that time, none of the four Tama-a-Aiga
("royal" sons - Tapua Tamasese, Malietoa, Mata‘afa, Tuimaleali‘ifano) had taken the leadership of the movement. Within
the camp, Tapua Tamasese emerged as the new leader of the movement.
The leader’s objective was the withdrawal of New Zealand from
Western Samoa. New Zealand ordered the marines to avoid violence
(ibid.:117). The Mau prisoners came and went from the make-shift
detention camp as they wished. They visited "Apia in the evening"
and returned to the camp before morning for "the free breakfast" (ibid.). Richardson was forced to admit defeat and remit sentences for all four hundred prisoners.

With the emergence of Tapua Tamasese as leader of the Mau, the orators of the Tumua and Pule began to reassert their authority (Davidson 1967:130,133,135). The orators of Pule encouraged their people to pilfer European property and sing anti-government songs in Apia. The orators of the Tumua and Pule used their influence to draw even more people into the movement.

Tamasese discouraged practices harmful to Samoans, such as the ban on copra making and the refusal to allow children to go to school. Instead, he encouraged the Mau to concentrate on building up its own administrative structures in villages and districts as well as at the centre. The Mau continued to hold meetings and demonstrations in open defiance of the law and continued to default on taxes. They also prepared a petition to the League of Nations stating Samoan grievances, to which were appended the names of 8,000 Samoan men of tax-paying age out of a total of approximately 9,300 (Davidson 1967:133). The figures suggest that, in 1928, eighty-five percent of the people belonged to the Mau (ibid). The New Zealand government retained the support of Malietoa Tanumafili, although most Malietoa "families" were in the Mau (Boyd 1969:157; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:39), and the government appointed Faipule and other Samoan officials who "valued their status and pay" (Boyd 1969:158).

The New Zealand government recalled Richardson and appointed Allen as Colonial Administrator of Western Samoa. Allen informed the Minister of External Affairs in New Zealand that the time had come to break the Mau (ibid.:159).

Allen's response to the Mau campaign of civil disobedience and non-cooperation came on the day known as "Black Saturday"
(Davidson 1967:138; Boyd 1969:163; Field 1984:147-159). Allen ordered the police to arrest several Mau men who had ignored their court summons to appear on charges of non-payment of taxes (Field ibid.). At a peaceful mass celebration in Apia to welcome back a leader who had completed his two years in exile, the police moved into the crowd and attempted to arrest men who owed the government taxes. The crowd stoned the police who opened fire, killing eleven Samoans, nearly all holding important titles, including the leader of the Mau, Tamasese (ibid.). Subsequently, the government declared the Mau a seditious organization, and New Zealand dispatched a cruiser to Samoa. The Mau fled to the bush. Allen launched a "campaign of terror" against the Mau (ibid.:164). The police raided homes, smashed furniture and destroyed finemats. The police tried to prevent people from feeding members of the Mau. The Royal marines of New Zealand went into the bush in an attempt to capture Mau men. The men remained in the bush until the marines left. When they returned to their villages, the Mau men worked quietly to strengthen their organization at the village level (Davidson 1967:141-144). The women’s Mau, however, worked openly (ibid.:193) and represented about four fifths of the female population (Boyd 1969:155). It consisted of wives and daughters of the men in the Mau and was a protest movement against the terror of night raids. The Mau remained a political force until the end of Allen’s term in 1931 (Boyd 1969:166).

Hart replaced Allen in 1931. In 1933, Nelson returned from years in exile. Leaders of the Tumua and Pule, with the help of Nelson, began work on establishing an alternative government to the New Zealand government. The leaders of the Mau prepared a constitution and set out to visit all the villages for the purpose of ratifying the constitution, establishing new village organizations and collecting taxes. However, Nelson was discovered
with incriminating documents in his house, and sentenced to eight months in prison and ten years in exile (Davidson 1967:146; Boyd 1969:173; Field 1984:207-208; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:141).

Some relief came for Samoans when New Zealand elected a Labour party in 1935 that was more sympathetic to the Samoans (Boyd 1969:175; Field 1984:214; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:42). The new government revoked the declaration proclaiming the Mau a seditious organization; wrote off arrears in Samoan taxes; repealed the Samoan Banishment Ordinance; and sent O.F. Nelson home. The Mau was consulted about the boundaries and number of Faipule constituencies, with the result that Mau members stood for election and won thirty-three out of the thirty-nine seats in the new Fono of Faipule (Davidson 1967:150; Boyd 1969:175-176; Hempenstall and Rutherford 1984:42). The Faipule Election Ordinance of 1939 required each Faipule district to submit to the administrator a nomination signed by more than one half of the chiefs of the constituency. The chiefs were free to adopt a method of reaching an agreement on the nomination (Davidson 1967:150 f.n.). The Ordinance increased the number of Faipule constituencies from thirty-nine to forty-one (ibid.). The functions of the Fono were to nominate members to the Legislative Council and appoint three Samoan judges to sit in the High Court. However, the New Zealand policy in Samoa fell far short of self-government.

Turnbull became the new administrator under the Labour government (Boyd 1969:182). In 1939, Turnbull put forward a proposal for legal recognition of the powers of the Ali‘i and Faipule (the leadership of the village; see Chapter VI) so as to build an administrative structure upon the local autonomy of the villages (ibid.). The Secretary of External Affairs objected on the grounds that it involved "legal recognition of undemocratic, traditional chiefly authority" (ibid.:183-184). The New Zealand government later
observed in its official statement to parliament that "to formulate native custom and social discrimination into law might retard heavily evolution towards more completely democratic principles" (ibid.).

The Second World War brought ten thousand American troops to Samoa. Twenty-six hundred Samoans were put on the payroll (ibid.:185). During the war, Samoans ceased overt activity aimed at self-government. Then in 1945, Tupua Tamasese called for a National Council of all Samoa (Davidson 1967:165; Boyd 1969:192). The Council reached a decision to petition the United Nations for self-government under a trusteeship agreement with New Zealand. In 1946, the United Nations approved the trusteeship agreement. Shortly after, a National Council, comprised of the leaders of the Tumua and Pule, met to decide upon the Samoan members of the new Legislative Assembly and signified their willingness to work with New Zealand toward self-government in stages (Boyd 1967:197).

During New Zealand's colonial rule, the colonial administration tried to break away from the colonial practice of collaboration with powerful Samoan chiefs established by the Germans. The refusal of colonial administrators to collaborate with powerful Samoan chiefs posed a direct challenge to the leadership embodied in the Tumua and Pule. The success of the Mau reflects the Samoan élite's submergence of traditional rivalries between the Tumua and Pule in favour of a united opposition to New Zealand colonial rule. Furthermore, the Mau had successfully maintained and strengthened the political autonomy of the villages. The Samoan élite's insistence on an elected Fono of Faipule during Germany's and New Zealand's colonial rules represents the Samoan leaders' determination to preserve indigenous forms of government at the village level of political organization. The Fono of Faipule, since 1939, continually asked for legal recognition of the authority of
the Ali'i and Faipule (Boyd 1969:250). This request has remained unfulfilled to this day.

Although Samoans accepted the need for a central government their commitment to a system of district and village councils never diminished. Villagers did not build up a strong dependency on the government for things like hospitals, schools and water supplies. For these purposes, villagers were willing to tax themselves heavily, whereas they regarded as oppressive any attempt by central government to raise similar sums by direct taxation (Davidson 1967:263). The latter part of the Mau movement was aimed at strengthening village and district organizations and, in some parts of Samoa, that occurred. Individual chiefs also encouraged their families to develop prosperous plantations. At the district level, especially where villages held high ranking titles, extensive economic and institutional innovation had occurred (ibid.:291). Some districts organized health, agriculture and education committees. Fund raising for projects took place on a district-wide level to build hospitals and water works. Some district councils instituted rules binding on the villagers, setting minimum areas to be planted by each family in principal food and cash crops (ibid.:289-293). None of these innovations were a result of legal enactments. They were the result of strong leadership and voluntary participation. Economic development was taking place within the indigenous system of land and labour control. If Samoans were successful in preserving the political and economic autonomy of their villages, they also continued to transform their institutions. For example, some chiefs began to modify land tenure rules by subdividing un-cleared village land between branches of their families (Boyd 1969:218). These lands were then passed on to descendants within the branches of the family. I discuss this modified land tenure system in the next Chapter.
During the period from 1945 to 1947, Samoa experienced a large increase in its export earnings, due to favourable world prices. The value of imports was well below the value of exports, leaving a considerable surplus to be invested in education, roads and medical services (ibid.:235-236). The per capita income of Samoans was higher than in most of Asia and Africa. Large reserves of uncultivated land made it possible for enterprising chiefs to develop land and accumulate capital. However, since neither land nor crops could be used as collateral for loans to buy trucks, build a road or a copra drier, most successful Samoan planters were also traders. This gave them financial standing with the firms they sold copra to, enabling them to acquire credit when necessary. In sum, an indigenous Samoan élite began to emerge which had close ties with foreign firms and investors (ibid.).

Between 1945 and 1955, Samoan producers raised their share of total exports from fifty-five percent to sixty-six percent. Many Samoans began trading on their own account. In 1957 assets from the New Zealand Reparation Estates were transferred to Western Samoa Trust Estates Corporation. Its profits were to be transferred to the Samoan government. This was a substantial political step towards New Zealand’s withdrawal from the country. However, rural credit was still not available to small Samoan planters or would-be indigenous entrepreneurs. Considerable Samoan capital, in fact, was being invested abroad (ibid.:259).

**THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE**

From 1945 to 1962, political thought and action amongst the Samoan élite was dominated by the reorganization of the structure and mode of operation of the institutions of an independent central government. In 1950, the New Zealand administration appointed a commission composed of six Samoan leaders and headed by J.W.
Davidson, a Pacific historian from New Zealand (Boyd 1969:209-211). The report of the commission recommended legal recognition of the power of the Ali’i and Faipule (village chiefs) as a way of linking village and district councils to the central government. The New Zealand High Commissioner consulted anthropologist Felix Keesing about the possibility of legal recognition of the village leadership embodied in the Ali’i and Faipule. Keesing replied that:

To give so much modern style government authority to the matai group would not only invite abuses but also put a straight jacket upon Samoan society just at the time it needs maneuvering room for development and change (Keesing, quoted in Boyd 1969:211).

This unsupported assumption was shared by the United Nations Mission that visited and met with Davidson in 1950 (ibid.; Davidson 1967:231-232).

The constitutional committee also embarked upon the task of constitution-making (Davidson 1967:353-357). After the constitution had been drawn up, a constitutional convention, consisting of the constitutional committee and members representative of the villages and districts, as well as representatives of the European community, was assembled to examine and adopt the constitution (ibid.:358). The amended constitution was then distributed to all Samoans and ratified by a nation-wide plebiscite in 1962. The Samoans endorsed the constitution by an overwhelming majority, and in December, 1962, Western Samoa became an independent state. In this way the constitution of Western Samoa was prepared and enacted in advance of New Zealand’s withdrawal (ibid.:352).

The central government of Western Samoa is not a typical Western democratic multi-party system. Instead, its nature incorporates elements of the indigenous political system as I elaborate in Chapter V. The constitution restricts eligibility for election of the Head of State and a three person Council of Deputies to members of the Tama-a’Aiga, i.e., to the “royal” sons of Samoa.
(The Constitution of the Independent State of Western Samoa 1962:8-12). Acceptance of these positions precludes the holders from participating in active politics, so that any person who wishes to follow a political career can decline the position. The Constitution provides that restrictions on the eligibility for election to Head of State or the Council of Deputies might be changed by the legislative assembly in power, so the way is left open for widening the eligibility for these offices, should Samoan opinion change. The functions of the Head of State and Council of Deputies are to appoint a Prime Minister who commands the confidence of the majority of members of parliament, and eight ministers, on the advice of the Prime Minister, and to approve all legislation. Tapua Tamasese Mea‘ole and Malietoa Tanumafili II jointly held the office of Head of State at Independence. Since 1962, the former has died and the latter carries on as sole Head of State. Below the Head of State and Council of Deputies is the Cabinet, consisting of a Prime Minister (elected on the nomination of the Legislative Assembly), and eight other ministers, chosen by the Prime Minister. The legislative assembly is elected on the basis of domestic status. Europeans have the right to vote in elections on the basis of universal suffrage, but until 1991, Samoan franchise extended only to chiefs (see Chapter VI). The constitution further provides for the protection against the alienation of land. Matai titles can only be held according to Samoan custom; and second, all disputes in relation to matai titles or land are settled in the Lands and Titles Court according to customary law. These rules, however, do not unduly prohibit Europeans from access to customary land, since any citizen related, in accordance with custom by bilateral kin ties, marriage, or adoption is eligible to become a matai and to exercise all the privileges of the position (Davidson 1967:380).

Although Samoans accepted the need for a central government,
their commitment to their indigenous system of village and district councils continued undiminished during New Zealand Colonial rule. Local development took the form of competitive building of churches, hospitals, schools and water supplies. Upon this indigenous structure, new leaders built a state.

Although Samoan resistance to foreign domination has helped to avoid some of its most exploitative forms, such as separation of producers from their land and the imposition of forced labour, more subtle forms of exploitation took place. For example, during colonial times European traders regularly underweighed the copra of Samoan copra producers thirty to fifty pounds in each hundred pounds, and gave them inferior goods for higher prices than they charged Europeans (Firth 1977:11). Even when Samoans became actively involved in trading, monopolistic firms in Apia, which controlled the buying and selling of goods, sold to Samoan traders on the most severe credit terms and paid low prices for crops (Pitt 1970:259-261). After independence, the village copra producer received a very small proportion of the overseas price of his cash crops. Pitt (ibid.:59) states that in 1964 most copra producers and banana growers received twenty-five percent of the price paid overseas merchants. Fluctuation in import/export prices, tariffs and duties were also handed down to the village trader and producers by these monopolistic foreign firms (ibid.:260). This monopoly by European import/export firms was perpetuated by the discriminating practices of the trading bank and European-based credit institutions. Pitt (ibid.:209-211) states that the trading bank was the only source of credit in the early days after independence, besides the large foreign firms. The bank would give credit only to persons who could offer free-hold land or regular high paying jobs as security. Thus, Samoan planters, working on customary land, were unable to get loans from the bank. They were forced into paying high interest rates to
non-Samoan money lenders or traders who, in 1964, borrowed money at six percent, and lent it to Samoans at interest rates of between fifteen and eighty percent. Both the unequal exchange of goods between the Samoan producer and trader and the foreign-owned monopolistic firms in Apia, as well as the credit situation, represent forms of foreign exploitation which impeded Samoan capital formation and, thus, the emergence of Samoan-owned import/export firms.

These forms of economic exploitation reflect the growing dependency of Samoans on European goods and services. By the early 1960s, European goods and services such as tinned foods, clothing, building materials, agricultural and fishing equipment, household utensils, Western education and medicine were all perceived by Samoans as necessary goods and services. Not only were they perceived as being more useful than their Samoan counterparts, they were also viewed as conferring and reflecting chiefly status (ibid.:128-133). Furthermore, Western education had come to be one of the main criteria for achieving chiefly rank (ibid.:46). Thus, the need for European goods and services is a powerful incentive for Samoan engagement in the world market by way of cash-cropping and wage-labour.

CONCLUSION

The above discussion of the historical record of the articulation (conjuncture) of the Samoan world and the global order suggests that it occurred by means of the intervention of practices of actors entrenched in one mode of production (either the kin-ordered or capitalist) within the practices of those entrenched in the other. Furthermore, the persistence of Samoa’s kin-ordered mode of production and the chiefly power structure it supports is the result of struggles between Samoa’s chiefly élite and a foreign
élite both of which were acting within the constraints of different modes of production. Also, the early history of Samoa is as much the consequence of political competition between Germany, Britain and the U.S. as it is the consequence of the economic practices of businessmen/women who sought to protect their own investments. Furthermore, Samoan history was never merely the consequence of the political and economic ambitions of foreigners.

Historically Samoans both collaborated with outsiders and resisted their actions. Between 1873 and 1899, every Samoan king attempted to enhance his military power and prestige by signing treaties of friendship with the United States, Britain and Germany. By incorporating the arrival of missionaries and merchants into their indigenous political and social exchange networks, the Samoan élite ensured both the persistence and transformation of their political and economic structures. These competitive acts of collaboration by members of the Samoan élite prevented Samoans from unifying at the national level and caused dissension between the foreign powers who eventually made peace among themselves by dividing the Samoan islands between Germany and the United States. The loss of political autonomy for Samoa reflects the limitations of Tumua and Pule to resolve conflicts which occurred internally between descent lines. Consequently, the Samoan élite was unable to unify at the national level of political organization. Lack of unity rendered the élite ineffectual in resolving conflicts with foreigners. Germany became the colonial ruler of Western Samoa until the beginning of World War I when New Zealand took over as the colonial administrator. Samoan resistance against their colonizers continued to maintain and transform their indigenous political and economic institutions, prevented the separation of producers from their land and the imposition of forced labour. Moreover, the independence movement, led by the Tumua and Pule, culminated in
Western Samoa's incorporation as an independent state in 1962.

Finally, by the time Samoa gained its independence, the Samoans' dependence on European goods and services and their involvement in the world market had been well entrenched by a century of collaboration and resistance between Samoan and foreign élites. While collaboration produced a Samoan élite which is well educated and successful in the European world of trade and commerce, resistance modified the form of European hegemony so that contemporary Samoa may be described as a mutual, albeit uneasy, coexistence of two worlds: the Samoan world in its transformed state, supported by a kin-ordered mode of production, and the global world supported by the capitalist mode of production. In short, the history of the people of Western Samoa is one of creative acts of resistance and accommodation to the practices of the agents of global capitalism. In Chapter V, I show how the Independent State of Western Samoa was created by members of the Samoan élite in collaboration with members of the New Zealand colonial élite and second, how the Samoan élite, has used the State to mediate these two worlds and how that mediation incites resistance from rural Samoans. Also, I illustrate how contemporary Samoan culture is the product of ongoing struggles between culturally situated actors engaged in creative acts of resistance and accommodation to the global economic and political order.
NOTES

1. The Samoans' willingness to pay taxes to Mata'afa's government contrasts with their refusal to pay a head-tax to the German consul. The Samoans' change in attitude toward taxes undoubtedly reflects the legitimate authority of their own leaders to tax them and, conversely, the German consul's lack of legitimacy.
CHAPTER V

THE HEART OF POWER: THE POST-COLONIAL SAMOAN STATE

INTRODUCTION

The Western Samoan formation may be described as a mutual coexistence of two modes of production; the kin-ordered mode of production and the capitalist mode of production. Samoans mediate these two worlds by including economic and political competence in dealing with the global economy as qualifications for Samoan status and rank (Kallen 1982:36). In this way, criteria such as education, professional status and income are incorporated into the Samoan political system. For example, Samoans perceived the missionaries’ introduction of cash-cropping as another economic resource, and success in farming quickly became a primary qualification for acquisition of chiefly titles. Today, in addition to cash-cropping, Samoans use education, success in business, and well-paying jobs in Apia or overseas to demonstrate their economic and political competence in dealing with the global system. In other words, Samoans today use modern status criteria to gain access to chiefly titles as well as to maintain or enhance their rank within the Samoan political system. This strategy has given rise to a new Samoan élite with roots in the historical interactions between old Samoan élites and foreign élites. As I discuss in Chapter IV, in the early 1800’s, high-ranking chiefs used missionaries and the church to broaden their political prestige based on their new roles as teachers of the new religion and deacons in the church. In addition, European traders and missionaries provided high-ranking chiefs with trade goods, and tools, used as élite goods in indigenous exchanges, and as a means of increasing village agricultural production.
respectively. Furthermore, chiefs used money from the sale of cash crops as an élite good in indigenous exchanges and as gifts to the church. In this way, chiefs used money to pursue their political ambitions within their indigenous political system, and thereby resisted the establishment of European hegemony within indigenous institutions.

Second, besides appropriating dominant symbols associated with Euro-American culture, such as the church and money, some Samoans intermarried with Europeans and Americans, thus creating a community of afa-kasi (part-Samoans). Samoan chiefs of high rank married their daughters to respected, well-to-do settlers. The offspring of stable marriages were raised to respect both their Samoan and European heritage. This group was always in opposition to the colonial regime. Together with dissident chiefs, they opposed administrative control over business and organized the Mau (see Chapter IV). Part-Samoan Mau leaders like O.F. Nelson acquired Samoan titles (Pitt 1976:59). Since independence, part-Samoans have sought and been granted Samoan titles so they could enter Parliament (ibid.). In short, many of the descendants of mixed marriages have become respected business people and political leaders in contemporary Samoa.

Third, some Samoans who availed themselves of education provided by the missions quickly raised their status within the Samoan and European communities by becoming pastors. Although Samoans opted to exclude pastors from participation in the Samoan political system, many descendants of pastor’s families have become either high-ranking chiefs or their spouses. By the end of the nineteenth century, high-ranking Samoans had achieved prominence in commerce by successfully synthesizing Western knowledge and techniques with Samoan knowledge and values. Their wealth, knowledge, power and prestige have been passed on to their
descendants.

This new Samoan élite, composed of full-blooded Samoans and afa-kasi established itself in the post-World War II years as leaders in the Mau. The identification of this post-war generation of Samoan political leaders with Samoan institutions had a decisive impact on the process of formal decolonization. For example, Tapua Tamasese Mea’ole gained undisputed leadership over the Mau because of his ability to blend fa’a-Samoa (the Samoan way) and fa’a-papalagi (the Euro-American way). Other key leadership roles were played by wealthy Samoan and part-Samoan traders who held high-ranking titles in the indigenous political system. In other words, rendering good service to Samoan political, cultural and economic institutions is the established strategy for attaining authority and political influence in contemporary Samoa. At the same time, secondary and tertiary education abroad, a working knowledge of English, practical experience in Western business and politics, as well as an income from trading and planting or business, enhance a chief’s effectiveness in rendering service to Samoan society.

In this Chapter, I show how the Samoan élite, in collaboration with the Government of New Zealand, influenced the nature of the contemporary Samoan state and its relationship with the indigenous political structure. I discuss the constitutional debates to show how collaboration and resistance occurred among particular groups of participants and how, in the process, Samoan culture has been transformed.

FORMATION OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE: PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS

The Government of New Zealand and the United Nations dictated the termination of Western Samoa’s dependency on New Zealand. The Samoan élite had prepared and ratified the Constitution in advance, so the United Nations could be told how the State of Western Samoa proposed to control its affairs (Davidson 1967:352).
In 1959, New Zealand called for a general election to elect forty-one Samoan representatives. Following the election, Samoan leaders established a cabinet government and Fiame Mata’afa Mulenu’u was sworn in as Prime Minister. Mata’afa embodied in his person the dignity of Samoa’s cultural institutions as well as education and experience in the Western World (Boyd 1969:247). Likewise, his wife Fetaui was the daughter of a Samoan chief and the grand daughter of a pastor. Mata’afa and Fetaui, equally at ease with Europeans and Samoans, embodied the characteristics and ideals of the contemporary Samoan élite.

The new Executive Council of Western Samoa established the Working Committee on Self-Government to draft a constitution. Comprised of seven members of Western Samoa’s indigenous élite, the Committee was chaired by two of Samoa’s “royal sons”, Tapua Tamasese and Fiame Mata’afa (Davidson 1967:353-359). A New Zealand-appointed professor of constitutional law, C.C. Aikman, provided the Working Committee with legal advice. In addition, the Working Committee appointed another advisor, J.W. Davidson, a prominent Pacific historian, who since 1947 had advised the New Zealand government on Western Samoa’s programme of development towards self-government. The Working Committee was heavily dependent on the advice of these two men (ibid.: 357). As constitutional advisers, Aikman and Davidson worked from the premise that the Constitution of the Independent State of Western Samoa should create the institutions of government, imbue them with power and delimit the scope within which they would operate.

In 1960, a Constitutional Convention was held between August 16 and October 10 to ratify the Draft Constitution produced by the Working Committee. The Constitutional Convention was governed by procedures dictated by the constitutional advisors, Davidson and Aikman (ibid.: 385-401). The convention, chaired by the two “royal
sons”, included three representatives from each of the forty-one Samoan constituencies, ten representatives from the European community and all the members of the current legislative assembly (ibid.:382). Davidson and Aikman sat on either side of the joint chairmen, who took turns chairing the convention. Davidson admits to playing an advocacy role in support of the Draft Constitution and to meeting frequently with the Working Committee throughout the convention to discuss likely opposition and tactics to overcome it:

Members [of the Working Committee] were thus able to intervene in debates, at the most effective times and on agreed to lines, without appearing to seek a dominant role (ibid:387).

In addition, members of the Constitutional Convention felt a customary deference toward the "royal sons", who not only chaired the debates but had also chaired the Working Committee responsible for the Draft Constitution. Thus many participants in the Constitutional Debates were reluctant to vote against proposals they believed the chairmen supported. Consequently the Draft Constitution was ratified unchanged despite constant vigorous debates over motions from the floor over whether to include references to the indigenous political institutions excluded by the Draft Constitution. In 1961, the Samoan people endorsed the Constitution in a plebiscite and Western Samoa became an independent state.

In sum, the procedures followed to end Western Samoa’s political dependency on New Zealand favoured collaboration between Samoa’s indigenous political élite and New Zealand’s political élite. As I discuss below, the most controversial subjects discussed were: the relationship of the Tama-’aiga (holders of any one of the four royal titles) to the office of the Head of State; the lack of legal recognition of the Tumua and Pule (the highest dignitaries of the eleven traditional political districts and recognized as ‘king-makers’); the lack of legal recognition of the Ali’i and Faipule
(the collective power holders in the village and district political structures) and indigenous law; the status of government land, including the Western Samoan Trust Estates; and the proposed changes to the indigenous land tenure system. The final outcome was a Constitution which formally defined the State as the ultimate decision-making institution. In effect, the Constitution permanently shifts the control of political decision-making from the indigenous political system to a foreign-derived institution -- the "state". In other words, the "state" is, legally, the "heart of power" in modern Samoa. Today, the survival of the indigenous political system hinges on two contingencies: first, the participants in the constitutional convention retained the clause in the Draft Constitution restricting those who can vote and run for parliamentary office to chiefs. Second, the Samoans' strong attachment and commitment in lived practice to their institutions, or what I call the "power of the heart" (see Chapter VI).

DEFINING THE STATE: "HEART OF POWER"

The first issue discussed in the constitutional debates was whether or not the traditional authority of the village and district leaders, known collectively as the Ali'i and Faipule, should be given constitutional recognition in the definition of the state. A participant introduced a motion to change the draft constitution's definition of state from:

The State includes the Head of State, Cabinet, Parliament and all local and other authorities established by or under any law.

to

The State includes the Head of State, Cabinet, Parliament, and all local authorities established by or under any law by the Ali'i and Faipule.

Those who spoke in favour of the motion argued that constitutional recognition should be given to the village and district leaders, because it is they who organize and execute village development projects, and they who have the legitimate
authority to implement government development programmes (ibid.:77-102).\(^1\) Therefore, laws made by the Ali‘i and Faipule ought to be recognized by the state. Those who spoke against the motion, including the constitutional advisor, Davidson, argued that the relationship between the law of the state and the authority of the Ali‘i and Faipule should be worked out by the state legislature. Furthermore, Davidson argued, the Ali‘i and Faipule did not derive their power from the constitution, but from Samoan custom and, therefore, should not be given constitutional recognition (ibid.:74,76).\(^2\) The latter argument was not an argument at all, since that was precisely the issue: whether or not the Constitution should, in principle, recognize the authority of the Ali‘i and Faipule thereby give it legal force. Finally, the chairman closed the debate by suggesting a resolution be passed making appropriate recommendation to the legislative assembly to draft legislation to ensure that the authority of the Ali‘i and Faipule be given legal recognition.\(^3\)

One of the participants who spoke in favour of tabling the above resolution in the house the following day was the then Prime Minister of Samoa, the Hon. Fiame Mata‘afa Mulenu‘u, who spoke in support of those participants who voiced their fear that the authority of the Ali‘i and Faipule would be contradicted by the authority of the state. Mata‘afa used the example of banishment, a customary punishment, which, on the face of it, contradicts a person’s constitutional right to "move freely in Western Samoa and reside in any part thereof" unless the state legislates otherwise or a public order detains undesirable persons (The Constitution of Western Samoa part 13, Clause (1), subclause (d); Clause (4):12-13). Banishment from the village is an act of last resort, used to punish titled or untitled persons who do not submit to the authority of the Ali‘i and Faipule. Mata‘afa spoke as follows:
we all understand that at the present time the existing laws are somewhat conflicting to a certain extent with the authority of the Ali’i and Faipule. For example there were certain cases where some people authorized under the authority of the Ali’i and Faipule...approached the Government and the Government directs them according to existing laws that they may continue residing on their own property...it is therefore essential for the matter to be given the attention of members of the legislative assembly to discuss and find out what is best to solve the problem (ibid.:104).

Despite the overwhelming support for tabling the above resolution, the government is no closer today to defining the relationship between Samoan customary authority and law, and state authority and law than it was in 1960. The latter is defined by the constitution while the former is not. The right of village councils to banish trouble-makers from the village is an ongoing debate among certain members of the Samoan polity. Ala’ilima and Ala’ilima (1966) report an incident in which a chief was banished by his village council for challenging a higher-ranking chief in a national election. The banished chief filed a complaint with the Supreme Court of Samoa. After hearing the case, the Attorney General ruled the Ali’i and Faipule had committed no offence since their actions were "in line" with Samoan customs and traditions and the Constitution (ibid.:250). Powles (1982:351) observes that judicial restraint in interpreting the constitutional Bill of Rights has prevented conflict from "crystallizing" in Western Samoa. Eighteen years elapsed before an expatriate judge stated publicly that, in his opinion, the common practice of banishment from the village was inconsistent with Article 13 of the Constitution. Nonetheless, cases challenging banishment suggest that attempts by judges of the Supreme Court to do away with the practice as an ultimate village sanction against village law-breakers have not been effective (Powles 1986:206).

The most serious conflict between participants in the constitutional debates arose over the provision for the election of
Head of State. Article 17 of the Draft Constitution stated that on Independence Day, the heads of the leading "royal" families, Tupua Tamasese Mea’ole and Malietoa Tanumafili II would assume jointly the office of Head of State and, upon the death of one, the survivor should continue to hold office. However, on the death, resignation or removal from office of both persons, this article would cease to be in force. Instead, under Article 18, the Head of State thereafter shall be elected by the legislative assembly. Furthermore, the legislative assembly is responsible for stating the qualifications a person must possess to be eligible for Head of State. However, the working committee for the Draft Constitution recommended eligibility be restricted to the Tama-a’Aiga (holders of any one of the four royal titles). The constitutional advisor - Davidson - urged this stipulation not be included in the Constitution, because the dignity of the Tama-a’Aiga derives from Samoan custom, and not law. However, the participants in the constitutional debates argued that, in the future, the Head of State should be chosen, not by the legislative assembly, but by the Tumua and Pule since, traditionally, they had chosen the supreme ruler (ibid.:286). Moreover, as another participant pointed out, historically the Tumua and Pule had unified Samoans during crises, thereby restoring peace. Thus, this important institution should be given constitutional recognition as the only legitimate authority to choose the Head of State. Davidson spoke against the motion that the Tumua and Pule choose the Head of State, and argued that, historically, the Tumua and Pule had difficulty choosing those who should hold high titles. Since the Head of State had important legal powers such as the approval of all laws and all decisions of cabinet, a legal procedure such as a majority vote in the legislature, had to be provided for appointing the Head of State so that there would be doubt about this person’s right to exercise
power (ibid.:242). In the end, the chairman closed the lengthy, emotional debate by reminding the participants that "in our very hearts" the authority of the Pule and Tumua is the traditional authority, but "we are now dealing with the task of an Independent State" (ibid.:300). The chairman implies that the very independence of Western Samoa depends upon constitutional recognition of the supersession of state power with respect to the traditional power of the Tumua and Pule. In traditional Samoan fashion, participants in the debate deferred to the authority of the chairman, a "royal son" of Samoa, and the motion was put and lost. Today, the constitution merely recommends that the eligibility for election to the Head of State be restricted to the Tama-a’Aiga.

The next issue to be debated was a motion in favour of universal suffrage for all those over 21 years of age. The Draft Constitution restricted those who could run for parliamentary office and vote to chiefs. This was to ensure that traditional leaders chosen in the customary way would also choose the leaders of the Independent State. Those who voted against the motion in favour of universal suffrage for all persons over 21 stressed the intimate link between the traditional land tenure system and traditional leadership and power. In their speeches they suggest that giving the vote to all persons over twenty-one years old would threaten traditional leadership and power, and, thus, Samoan culture itself. The motion was lost in the vote. Today, suffrage has been extended to all Samoans 21 years of age or over. But only chiefs can run for or hold political office. The latter is the only legal provision that links traditional power to state institutions.

Since one of the most important assets a country has, in terms of development, is its land, the debate regarding its status is an important issue with respect to Western Samoa’s economic and political well-being. All land in Western Samoa belongs to one of
three categories: (i) customary land held in accordance with Samoan custom; (ii) freehold land held for an estate in fee simple; and (iii) public land vested in the state, free from customary title and fee simple. The foundation of a chief’s power is his/her control over land attached to his/her title. That power is protected by Part IX of the Constitution, which forbids both alienation of customary land, either by sale or mortgage, and its use as assets for payment of debts. However, the Constitution states that the legislative assembly may make laws with respect to three matters: (i) how Samoan custom is to be interpreted through the Lands and Titles Court in disputes; (ii) the conditions under which leases or licenses over customary land may be granted for purposes of store sites, churches, or any other purposes for which a law is passed to grant a licence or lease; (iii) how the government may take land for roads, schools, hospitals or other public activity. Further, the Constitution states that two-thirds of all chiefs in Western Samoa must agree to any changes made in this part of the Constitution (G.W.S. 1960:43-44). The first land debate arose over state land. Under the provision of the Berlin Act of 1889, all lands judged to have been acquired in a customary manner were given in Court Grants to the respective foreign proprietors. After World War I, these lands passed to the New Zealand colonial government, as war compensations. In 1947, the leaders of Samoa, in a meeting with a United Nations delegation, expressed their wish that these lands be returned to the original owners of the land (Davidson 1967:180). However, the government of New Zealand declared that it would grant the Crown Estates only to the Independent State of Western Samoa, but not to the Samoan people as a whole, nor to any original land owner. So, in 1953, the land was handed over to the State of Western Samoa. The reasons behind the refusal to give land back to the original owners is not discussed in the literature. We can only
surmise the motivation for New Zealand’s refusal to return state land to the original Samoan titles. Maybe New Zealand politicians and officials believed a return of state land to its original titles would have involved New Zealand in a multitude of costly court cases. This is unlikely, however, given that the state has a complete set of records of the original titles. Also, New Zealand had already returned 4,300 acres to some 15 villages by way of a Crown Grant in 1934 (G.W.S. 1875:64). Alternatively, maybe New Zealand thought it best to leave the Independent State of Western Samoa with an income-generating land base. Finally, it is possible that New Zealand politicians thought that returning alienated land to the original owners would set a dangerous precedent in their own country considering their reservation system for New Zealand’s indigenous population, the Maori. Whatever the motivation, the land is still State Land, and many participants at the constitutional debates questioned the validity of its original sale. The chairman, however, reminded participants that public lands were Court Grants under the Berlin Act, and could not be changed (ibid:677). Debate on the status of public lands was closed, and another debate opened over the right of the Lands and Titles Court, a state institution, to settle disputes over customary lands and titles.

At present, all disputes over customary lands and titles that cannot be settled locally are settled by the Lands and Titles Court. Disputants settle their differences without the aid of legal counsel, since Samoan customary law is without legal footing. Samoan court judges hear evidence from disputants and their respective supporters and then make a judgement. Before the creation of the Lands and Titles Court, all disputes were settled by the Ali‘i and Faipule (village authorities) in consultation with the Tumua and Pule (the highest-ranking dignitaries of the eleven traditional political districts). Today, most disputes are still settled locally.
(Tiffany 1974; 1980; 1985). Most disputes over titles are settled within the aiga potopoto (ibid.:1974:42). The descent group is the minimal level of conflict management (ibid.:1980:184-185). Disputes that are not settled by the family are taken to the village fono where the Ali‘i and Faipule attempt to resolve the disputes. Disagreement over village or district boundaries are managed by joint fono assemblies of the communities concerned. Disputes could be taken directly to the Lands and Titles Court. But, as Tiffany (ibid.:186) remarks, villagers regard local settlement as the most desirable way to resolve conflicts. The Ali‘i and Faipule prefer to avoid the shame of airing grievances in a public court. Villagers who submit petitions to the court are considered troublemakers and threaten their future relationships with chiefs. The court will not hear a case unless the registrar is satisfied that the issue cannot be resolved locally (ibid.:186).

Many of those who spoke to Part IX of the Draft Constitution regarding lands and titles expressed their wish that this customary power of the Ali‘i and Faipule be given constitutional recognition:

The Land and Titles Court ought to recognize the pule of the Ali‘i and Faipule. With the present practice ... people who are not closely related to the title, if they are smart enough to convince the court that they are heirs the true heir gets nothing. But the Ali‘i and Faipule have experience and ... know the boundaries of the land and all the titles belonging to certain families...in their legislation they should include some reference concerning the pule of the Ali‘i and Faipule to be consulted before the other steps are taken (G.W.S. 1960:690-691).

The chairman attempted to close this debate with the following speech:

It must be known that the Ali‘i and Faipule should do their work before the matter is brought into the Lands and Titles Court and it must be remembered that only as a last resort would it be referred to the Lands and Titles Court (G.W.S. 1960:694).

Although another participant suggested that a recommendation be made
to the Legislative Assembly to include, in future laws, some reference to the fact that the Ali’i and Faipule must be consulted before the Lands and Titles Court, no motion was put forward, and the debate on the issue was closed.

Finally, a debate occurred over the issue of land tenure specifically with respect to the development of agriculture. The Committee of the Draft Constitution recommended that conditions be included in the Constitution to enable all Samoan planters, whether chiefs or untitled persons, to obtain more secure tenure to the land they cultivate (ibid.:712). The Committee recognized that the improvement in the quantity and quality of agricultural production required an assurance to the progressive planter that he would not lose, without good cause, his plantation, and the ability to obtain credit on adequate security, when heavy expenditures for development have to be met over a short period of time (ibid.). The Committee considered that the above conditions could be met by granting a lease or occupational licence to individual planters according to the following stipulations: Leases could be granted to chiefs or untitled persons. Leases should be registered by the Minister of Lands who should not register any leases until: a) he had the written consent of the chief holding authority over the land and the Ali’i and Faipule of the village. When virgin bush is to be used, over which no chief has authority, then consent should be obtained from the chief to whom the untitled person rendered service and from the Ali’i and Faipule; b) he had satisfied himself that granting such a lease would not endanger the interests of the family or the village (ibid.:712-713). Also, leases should be renewable, boundaries of the land in question defined and passed on to widows and children. Leases should be cancelled if: a) the holder of the lease failed to render service ordinarily required by Samoan custom; b) if the holder of the lease failed to make effective use of land
as stated in the lease; c) application to cancel the lease would be
made by the Ali‘i and Faipule of the village (ibid.: 713). The
Committee believed the introduction of this system of leases would
provide additional security of tenure and the prerequisite for
obtaining credit, while, at the same time, protecting, traditional
Samoan authority over land. But the participants in the
constitutional debates believed differently. They were most
concerned with the system’s effect on both the relationship between
chief and untitled men and women and land distribution:

...the matai has full control of his family
affairs and if we approve this recommendation it
may mean that the Taule‘ale’a (untitled man) would
go and make negotiations on his own accord
(ibid.: 717).

and:

It is the normal custom of our people that if an
untitled person serves and renders service to his
matai in Upolu and at a later time he wishes to
visit and live with other relatives in Savai‘i, he
may freely do so without any hindrance whatever,
but if we are to institute this leasehold system,
it will then appear as if my own relatives will not
be my own people, but will be regarded as people
unrelated to me...what will be the position for the
people who will grow up within this family within
the next ten years? They will have no land because
I will have leased out all the available family
lands to the people living in the family at the
present time (ibid.: 725).

One of the participants addressed his remarks to Davidson:

...I can also say now, with due respect to the
Honourable Professor’s experience and knowledge, I
think there are a number of things which might
prove quite complicated to his understanding in
matters of Samoan custom .... This is one of the
highest relationships that can be observed by both
the village and the people outside. That is, the
relationship between a father and son or a matai
and an untitled person. In the truest sense ...
this relationship ... can be compared to a Godly or
Heavenly inheritance ... whatever good thing that
an untitled person can obtain through his efforts,
that should always be handed over or reserved for
use by the matai. With the introduction of this
contemplated procedure whereby the father would
lease land to his own son ... it is something that
has never occurred in the so-called relationship ...
if we were to introduce that word ‘lease’ into
our family circle, I am sure it would break it up
because the younger people will lose respect for their parents...(ibid.:734).

Those who spoke in favour of a system of leases stressed its importance to the development of crop production, especially with respect to its ability to secure loans required for such development. However, in the end, the motion was lost.

The traditional authority of Ali'i and Faipule (village and district leaders) to make laws governing the Samoan people is not recognized in the constitutional definition of the state. Further definition of the relationship between the state and the traditional matai system was left to the legislative assembly of the Independent State of Western Samoa. Second, neither the traditional authority of the Tumua and Pule to choose the highest office-holder -- the Head of State -- nor the dignity of the Tama-a'Aiga was given constitutional recognition. In other words, the Constitution ensures the legal supersession of state power with respect to the indigenous political structure. During this debate, the chairman implied that the very independence of Samoa depended on this matter, and participants deferred to his authority as a Tama-a'Aiga. Third, the motion in favour of universal suffrage of all persons over twenty-one years old was lost. Until recently only chiefs could vote or run for political office in Western Samoa. Since 1991, suffrage has been extended to all Samoans twenty-one years of age or over. However, only chiefs can hold political office. This provision represents the only legal link between the authority and power vested in the traditional political system and the power of the state. Fourth, the chief’s power and authority over customary land attached to his/her title is given full constitutional recognition. However, the chairman of the constitutional debates refused to recognize claims made by original title holders to customary land alienated under dubious circumstances during the period of first contact. Instead, the status of this land, first given in Court
Grants to the respective foreign proprietors, then to New Zealand as war compensation, and, finally, turned over to the Independent State of Western Samoa, remains public land. Again, the debate over the status of public land was closed by the chairman, who argued that its status could not be changed except by a law passed by the legislative assembly and, again, participants deferred to his authority. Fifth, there is no constitutional recognition of either Ali'i and Faipule on the Tumua or Pule's knowledge of custom and, thus, their right to settle disputes over land and titles in the district and village councils. Instead, a state institution, the Lands and Titles Court, and state-appointed judges have the legal authority to settle disputes. Again the chairman closed the debate by arguing that it was up to the Ali'i and Faipule to exercise their authority and power to settle disputes before disputes went to court. Finally, a motion to include provisions whereby chiefs or untitled persons could lease customary land was lost. Today, the Government of Western Samoa is the centre of action and uses the following structures to implement development policies and practice.

THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHERIES

The Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) was created in 1959 to promote and encourage all agricultural and pastoral industries in Western Samoa; to maintain and improve both the quality and quantity of agricultural produce; to promote the conservation, production and development of all natural resources, especially soil, water, forests and fish (ADB 1985:117). DAFF's ordinance makes no provision for it to directly manage production on Western Samoa's customary land. However, the Department's first annual report (DAFF 1964:54) articulates a strong commitment to protecting traditional institutions as the basis of the subsistence farming, so that people in Western Samoa never go hungry due to
price fluctuations in the export market. For this reason, the
Department has adapted its advisory services to Samoan institutions,
and given careful consideration to recommending new agricultural or
management methods.

DAFF is managed by a Director, Deputy Director and
controlling officers of the various technical divisions for crops,
livestock, forestry, fisheries, extension work, produce inspection
and the Produce Marketing Division (ADB 1985:118). The Department
has no research division. Research is carried out within individual
development projects managed by aid-donor personnel (ibid.: 126).
Direct contact with rural farmers is managed through the Agriculture
Extension Division (ibid.:129). The Division consists of two senior
Agricultural Officers, one for Upolu and one for Savai‘i. Both
islands are divided into regions, each of which are administered by
an Agricultural Officer and served by District Field Officers and
their assistants. Apart from agricultural extension work, the
Agricultural Extension Division is responsible for implementing any
micro-projects funded by the Rural Development Programme (see pp.
202-3). Before the introduction of the Rural Development Programme
in 1975, extension workers provided services for producers in the
form of inputs and labour (e.g., weeding, supplying seeds and
fertilizers, inspection and spraying of banana plantations, and
sometimes harvesting coconuts). After the implementation of the
Rural Development Programme, the extension workers began to design
development projects and to collaborate with the Development Bank in
writing up loan applications for funding them (DAFF 1976:11;
1977:25). This changed the extension workers’ role from a labourer
to an advisor and teacher. Extension workers were made responsible
for assessing, implementing and supervising loans. Since 1979,
extension workers are no longer responsible for rural projects.
Their primary responsibility is to provide education and information
to interested producers. In 1984, the Department adopted the "train and visit" system of extension to keep farmers and researchers in touch (DAFF 1984:32-33). Extension workers attend technical training sessions every month at the National Training Centre. In addition, the Extension Division conducts farmers' training and field days where they disseminate information about pests, disease control, pesticides, farm management, crop cultivation, poultry husbandry, banana development and livestock husbandry.

Dissemination of information to extension workers is mainly the responsibility of the Department’s Communication and Information Service (ADB 1985:131). Information dissemination to policy makers is achieved through quarterly meetings of Division Heads where information is channelled up through the Director to the Minister and then taken to Cabinet. The Director’s Reports facilitate this process.

Reports are not available for each year. However, they articulate the Department’s concerns. For example, the Director and Division Heads, through the Reports have consistently asked government to allocate more resources to rural development, especially to replanting programmes for replacement of old coconut and cocoa trees, disease control, research, and improved marketing arrangements (DAFF 1964:54; 1971:48; 1982:21; 1984:67). In addition, the Forestry Division has drawn attention to the critical depletion of forest resources and notes its disagreement with the Government’s policy allowing the export of hardwoods (DAFF 1976b:20; 1975:30; 1977:6; 1982:10; 1984:64). Besides DAFF, other government institutions are closely related to the government’s rural development efforts: the Agricultural Store Corporation; the Development Bank of Western Samoa (DBWS); the Copra board and the Cocoa Board; the Rural Development Programme; and the Office of the Pulenu’u (village mayor).
In 1984 the Asian Development Bank funded a mission to "identify the constraints that have inhibited growth" (ADB 1985: v-vi) in Western Samoa's agricultural sector. The Mission's evaluations are contained in volume two of its report: *Western Samoa Agriculture Sector Study: Background and Sector Review*. Some of the bureaucrats I interviewed drew my attention to this study and corroborated some of Mission's evaluations in Western Samoa. The points of agreement between the Asian Development Bank's Study (ibid.) and the bureaucrats I interviewed are cited below.

**THE AGRICULTURAL STORE CORPORATION**

The Agricultural Store Corporation was established in 1975 as a national agency for importing and distributing all agricultural inputs (ADB 1985:132). The store is managed by a board chaired by the Minister of Agriculture, and is operated as a non-profit organization. The government uses the Corporation to implement its policies on subsidies for selected agricultural inputs, and to ensure supplies to farmers (ibid.:42). In recent years, the Corporation has experienced severe management and financial problems. It is unable to supply the needs of farmers, since it frequently runs out of fertilizer, herbicides, and insecticides. As there are no alternative sources of supply, the failure of the Corporation to perform efficiently jeopardizes production in the rural areas (cf quote: p.328).

**THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF WESTERN SAMOA**

In 1960, the government, recognizing that a lack of credit was an obstacle to increasing agricultural productivity and rural incomes, established a modest Development Fund administered by the Bank of Western Samoa (Leung Wai 1984). In 1974, the Fund was upgraded to a Development Bank, aided by technical assistance from
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The government's share capital in the Development Bank of Western Samoa (DBWS) is sustained by grants from Australia, New Zealand, ADB and the European Community. DBWS is required to operate as a viable operation, but is not expected to make an excessive profit. In recent years, the need for credit by village small-holders has increased, along with their use of fertilizer, chemicals, improved livestock breeds, new crop varieties and the need to control crop diseases (ibid.:7). The government uses DBWS to supply credit to the rural areas as well as to large-scale commercial agricultural operations, and to industry.

In particular, the Bank administers the government’s Cocoa Suspensory Loan scheme, designed to provide an incentive for farmers to grow one of its major export earners. A suspensory loan is contingent on the farmer’s success in carrying out technical requirements, and conditions specified by the government, whereupon 75 percent of the loan converts to a grant, and 25 percent is repayable according to lending criteria. DBWS assesses the credit worthiness of those applying for suspensory loans. In addition the Bank: does market studies on crops favoured by farmers -- like taro and passion fruit; acts as the government’s agent in identifying new business opportunities and becoming partners in joint ventures with overseas entrepreneurs thereby making optimal use of joint venture equity schemes funded by New Zealand, Australia and the European Community; stimulates and facilitates the building of credit unions in the rural area to undertake small lending to rural farmers; and lends to village councils and village sub-groups (women’s committees, informal cooperatives, extended families) for building schools and clinics, as well as group agricultural handicraft and fishing projects. In reality, however, very little of the Bank’s resources are allocated to rural development (see: p.32).

The Bank notes that repayment for group loans have been
satisfactory, while small loans to individual farmers have been costly, due to large numbers of appraisals required and the follow-up care involved. For this reason, DBWS is trying to revive credit unions which pre-date the Bank. The Bank believes credit unions are more suitable for administering small loans because members are well-known to union officials and disclosures of borrowing by members is allowed, enabling officials to use social pressure to ensure loan payment (ibid.:12).

THE COPRA AND COCOA BOARD

The Copra Board was established in 1948 and is composed of the Minister of Agriculture and six other members appointed by the Head of State (ADB 1985:162-163). The Board’s functions are to: fix the price of copra paid to producers; secure the most favourable arrangements for the purchase, export and marketing of copra; establish a reserve fund for price stabilization to protect the copra producers from the vagaries of the market; licence copra buyers, copra exporters, manufacturers of coconut oil and other coconut products. Prior to 1948, export and sale of the country’s copra was handled by commercial trading organizations. Now the Board fulfills this role by acting as the final buyer of copra which, before 1983, it exported and presently sells to the coconut-oil mill. The Copra Act of 1981 updated existing legislation to empower the Board to set minimum and maximum prices for copra for each year. Producer prices are derived from FOB (free on board) prices to international buyers. Floor and ceiling prices are based on a five-year moving average of the last four years of actual export value and the expected value for the current year. The floor price is 95 percent of this moving average, and the ceiling price is 110 percent. The floor price becomes the guaranteed minimum for the year. If the actual FOB price is lower than the floor price, the
Copra Fund makes up the difference in value. When the FOB price is higher than the minimum price, the difference in value, up to the ceiling price, is subject to a 20 percent levy. If the FOB price exceeds the ceiling price, the excess is subject to a 50 percent levy. These levies are paid to the Copra Fund. Finally, the Board levies a 15 percent charge for administrative expenses.

The Cocoa Board was established in 1972 and controls the export of cocoa. The organization of the Cocoa Board is identical to the organization of the Copra Board. It uses the same staff and management and shares the same premises. Prior to 1972, the export and sale of the country's cocoa was handled by licensed commercial trading organizations. The Board procures cocoa and sets prices using the same formula used for determining the price of copra. The quality of beans procured from farmers is not monitored, providing no incentive to ferment cocoa beans properly, so the quality is poor.

The Cocoa Board and Copra Board administer the Stabex Fund provided by the European Community. The Fund is to stabilize the farmers' earnings from copra and cocoa. However, the Boards were poorly managed until 1986 by a Secretary who had been associated with them since their inception. The Boards are composed of members of the Secretary's families. The Boards' stated FOB price was consistently lower than prices quoted in international publications (ibid.:166-170). Also, the 15 percent charge levied for administration expenses is excessively high and inappropriate, since the Boards' actual administration costs are not related to FOB prices. Finally, since the Copra Board sells to the coconut-oil mill and no longer exports cocoa, a pricing system based on its FOB price is no longer appropriate. In sum these two Boards, that control two-thirds of Samoa's exports and are poorly managed, resulting in low returns to farmers (cf quotes: 90-91; 330-331).
THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

In mid 1977 the Government of Western Samoa instituted a programme to "increase the output" of productive resources from the village sector of the economy and to "improve the quality of life in villages without unduly destroying the basic village structure" (GWS 1980:98). *Western Samoa's Fourth Five Year Development Plan* (DP4) lays out the rationale for the Rural Development Programme (RDP):

Since the country's principle resource is agriculture and with 80% of the land under the control of villages in accordance with the customary land tenure system, any major increase in production will necessarily need the involvement of the village sector (ibid.).

DP4 outlines the main objectives of the RDP "to increase the output of the village" and to foster a procedure of "planning from below" (ibid.). DP4 emphasizes the importance of "planning from below given the political peculiarities of Western Samoa's rural sector:

"planning from below" is probably a far more important factor than is the case in other countries and is probably a necessary condition for any village development programme. The fierce autonomy with which villages conduct their own affairs make it well nigh to impossible for centrally-imposed planning programmes to succeed without their direct participation (ibid.).

The assertion contained in the quote above regarding the "autonomy" of Samoan villages is a familiar theme in the historical literature on Western Samoa as I point out above (see Chapter II and Chapter IV).

According to a number of reports on the RDP (ADB 1985; Andres and Morris n.d.; Fleming n.d.), Western Samoa's first attempt to institute a rural development programme failed, in part, due to a major contradiction contained in the quote above: that "planning from below" can work in conjunction with "centrally-imposed planning programmes" (ibid.). E. M. Fleming, a technical expert from the University of the South Pacific, elaborates this contradiction. He reminds us that "traditional forms of village development"
originated in the village and were based on decisions made by village leaders according to perceived needs of the villagers and their leaders (Fleming n.d.:23; cf p. 32%; end note 1, this chapter). By contrast, decision-makers for the RDP were "participants of the national political system and the international funding agencies" (ibid.:3). The RDP, then, was consistent with central planning and a state-centred model of and for development. Projects were designed and implemented outside the village and controlled by the pulenu’u whose role it was to provide a working relationship between the village and the national government (ibid.:10). As Fleming asserts, this arrangement caused a "dilution of planning from below" (ibid.:f.n.:3).

Despite the villagers' lack of control over the design and implementation of projects at the national level, they exerted some control over the selection of projects and modified the ones they chose to comply with village and family needs. The designers of the RDP assumed that because the village was an autonomous political unit, it would also make an effective production unit (ibid.:17; ADB 1985:134). However, an examination of how villagers modified projects is instructive. Fencing materials, originally intended for use in building communal pig pens to encourage improved building practices, were distributed by local pulenu’u to individual families who used them to fence their gardens so as to ensure staple foods and crops were not damaged by free-ranging pigs (Fleming n.d.:17; ADB 1985:134). Traditionally, individual families rather than whole villages have owned pigs. By contrast, cattle have not been a part of the traditional subsistence strategy so cattle projects under the RDP were run, either by a whole village, or a village committee (Andres and Morris n.d.:3; ADB 1985:134). But even cattle projects were modified to suit village and individual needs. Cattle were slaughtered for use in ceremonial exchanges rather than sold on the
market as was the original intent of project designers (Andres and Morris n.d.:3). The most successful projects under the RDP were poultry projects run by village women’s committees (ibid.). Some women’s committees later expanded into new activities including handicrafts, small scale vegetable gardens, piggeries and cattle-raising (ADB 1985:136).

On examination of available projects that villagers did not apply for is also instructive in terms of the communal bias built into Samoa’s first attempt at rural development. Villagers did not choose to apply for village-run enterprises, in transport, product collection and storage, and handicrafts (Fleming, n.d.:17). However, many villagers, according to Fleming (ibid.), requested funding for a transport business run by an individual. The RDP turned down such requests because of their non-communal nature (ibid.). The assumption that the village is an effective unit for running enterprises goes against local practice. Traditionally, small village enterprises, such as product collection, transport, storage, handicrafts, shops, etc., are carried on by individuals. In the village of Talie, handicrafts, vegetables, and bananas, are produced for the market by individuals. A family runs the local shop as a private enterprise (see chapter II). There are several copra driers who run family operations. Cluny Macpherson (1988) gives examples of successful enterprises run by individuals or families (see chapter II). Sharon Tiffany (1975) gives an example of an enterprising chief who runs a commercial cocoa plantation, a product transport and processing business, and a store. In chapter VII (p. 323) of this thesis, I record an interview with a chief who runs a successful commercial plantation and cattle business. One lesson, to be learned from the Government’s first attempt at rural development, then, is that, because the village is an autonomous political unit does not mean it is necessarily an effective
production unit.

Besides the problems caused by design and implementation of projects at the national level rather than the village level, authors of the reports cited above suggest that the RDP had other difficulties not attributable to the actions and motivations of villagers. Rather, problems arose from the design and/or faulty implementation of the projects themselves. First, the RDP ignored the villagers' needs for technical skills and for spare parts needed to repair and maintain boats, chainsaws, and spraying and misting equipment (Fleming n.d.:20; Andres and Morris n.d.:9). Second, villagers were ill-equipped to seek out market opportunities (ADB 1985:135). Whereas the Produce Marketing Division of the Department of Agriculture (PDM) was well linked to large commercial traders, it was not well linked to the village producers (Andres and Morris n.d.:6). The PDM did not make containers available to small producers and the collection of produce was haphazard. Some villagers disliked selling their produce to the PDM because: they were paid less than the commercial traders for their produce; they were made to wait for their cash payments (c.f. Chapter II: p. 68); and they often had to transport their own produce (Andres and Morris n.d.:6). Third, the RDP neglected to provide a specialized staff to help villagers with the projects (ADB 1985:135; Andres and Morris n.d.:9). Fourth, projects were approved by the RDP before necessary inputs were available (Andres and Morris n.d.:12). Fifth, lack of infrastructure was a problem for some projects (e.g. access roads, cold storage and electricity) (ibid.:13). Sixth, some project proposals were incompletely researched so that unsuitable land was selected for development of particular crops (ibid.:8). Seventh, decisions taken at the national level conflicted with the marketing needs of the village producers (ibid.:8). For example, the Government allowed large quantities of eggs to be imported from New
Zealand which created a surplus and a reduction in the price of locally produced eggs (ibid.). Also, the Government continued to import cheap canned tuna from Japan and made it impossible for local fishermen to compete (ibid.). Eighth, the lack of coordination and cooperation between various ministries responsible for implementing the RDP was detrimental to the success of the project (ADB 1985:135; ibid.).

The 1983 Rural Development Act states that the Rural Development Programme is responsible for: formulating policies for social and economic development in the rural areas; authorizing requests for development projects from village leaders and women’s committees; and organizing competitions between villages to encourage productivity (ibid.:133-135). The stated objective of the Programme is to improve village incomes without jeopardizing the country’s traditional institutions. Villagers are to determine their needs, draw up project proposals, and execute them. The government is to provide technical expertise. A Rural Development Division in the Prime Minister’s department, assesses and funds projects. The central criteria for project selection is that they be communal to ensure widespread participation in the development process. This emphasis may be unwise, as I discuss above, because the village is predominantly an institution for local government, rather than a production unit (see also Chapter II above). While the Programme organizers acknowledge the crucial importance of involving village councils in formulating projects, as the authors of the Asian Development Bank’s report (ADB 1985:134) suggest, the execution of projects should be delegated to individual chiefs and their families. The authors go on to say that any projects involving the permanent or semi-permanent use of land are particularly difficult to implement (ibid.). The most successful projects are fishing ventures that follow the traditional pattern of specialist fishermen.
and their crews provisioning fish for the village (ibid.). By 1986, according to the Director of the Rural Development Programme, Australia had cut their aid because a commissioned follow-up study concluded that projects were unsuccessful.

**OFFICE OF THE PULENU’U**

Pulenu’us are part-time village mayors, elected by village chiefs to serve a three-year term as the liaison officer with government (ibid.:132-133). Their power derives from their position in the village hierarchy of chiefs and not from their affiliation with the central government (Shankman 1983:209). The election of a pulenu’u is one way for a village to ensure it is recognized by the central government as a legal entity (ibid.:212). Both Shankman (ibid.:212) and Keesing and Keesing (1956:95-96) observe that villages select low-ranking title holders to fill the office of village mayor so as to ensure the incumbent will comply with the consensus of council rather than the administrative directives of the central government. My experience in the field suggests this may have changed. My Samoan father is the pulenu’u of Talie and shares the highest-ranking title in the village with his cousin who is the district’s member of parliament. I spoke to four other pulenu’us while I was in the field, all of whom held the highest ranking titles in their villages. Shore (1977:106) also found that the two highest ranking chiefs in the village of Sala’ilua alternate as mayor. However, as Shore observes, the pulenu’u pays little attention to his job and is accorded little prestige due to this office.

Shore’s (ibid.) observation that the mayor of Sala’ilua paid little attention to his job is also true of the mayor of Talie. My Samoan father submitted a record of new titles as well as births and deaths for registration by the central government. However, he had little else to do since the central government was not directing any
of their development efforts toward rural villages at the time of my field work. The remuneration the mayor received for his job did allow him to co-sign loans for local farmers who wished to develop their plantation. In this way, my Samoan father gained extra prestige in the village as a result of his job. In 1976, the central government attempted to use the village mayor as a conduit for planning information and funds (Shankman 1983:225-226). In 1977, the government increased the salary of the village mayor. The salary and the potential rewards of the office probably began to attract high title holders. According to reports cited above, the government’s efforts to develop the rural area failed because programmes were not well organized and, in some cases, inappropriate. The pulenu'u were expected to implement rural development projects without any government training or information themselves (ADB 1985:135) or in some instances, the necessary leadership skills (Fleming n.d.:8).

The Office of the Pulenu'u is supported by a secretariat within the Prime Minister’s department which pays the pulenu'us’ wages and expenses. Pulenu’us meet once a month as a council in the pulenu’us’ fale (a large traditional Samoan house) to receive instructions from the government, when there are any, usually in the form of precise planting targets for crops. To the extent that village mayors are now high-ranking respected chiefs, the Pulenu’us’ Council has the potential to be an important body for development planning and implementation in the rural area, should the government open a productive dialogue with the villages regarding appropriate projects.
CONCLUSION

The historical encounter between the Samoan world characterized by a kin-ordered mode of production and global capitalism culminated in the Independent State of Western Samoa. This State was created and defined by the Samoan élite led by two of Samoa's "royal sons", Tapua Tamasese and Fiame Mata'afa, in collaboration with New Zealand's colonial élite represented by a prominent historian, and advisor to the New Zealand Government, J.W. Davidson, and C.C. Aikman, a New Zealand professor of constitutional law.

The chairmen of the Constitutional Debates in 1960 -- on the advice of and in collaboration with, New Zealand's constitutional advisors -- resisted giving constitutional recognition to the complete Samoanization of the Independent State of Western Samoa. Complete Samoanization of the State could have been accomplished only by legal recognition of the indigenous power structures embodied in the institutions of the Ali'i and Faipule and Tumua and Pule. Partial Samoanization of the State was accomplished, however, by restricting suffrage (until recently) and the right to hold political office to chiefs. Nevertheless, the foundation of chiefly power -- i.e., the control over land attached to title, -- was given legal recognition. However, the power of Samoan institutions is not solely dependent on the Samoanization of the State through legal means. The Samoans' strong attachment and commitment in lived practice to their indigenous institutions and ultimately their active resistance to State power is a dynamic force in contemporary Samoan society. I refer to this power as the "power of the heart", the subject of the next Chapter.

Nonetheless, the centre of action for government-funded development in Western Samoa today is the State. The political and bureaucratic elites are the only actors engaged in government funded
development planning and implementation. Significantly, the reports cited above echo the concerns of the farmers in Talie (see chapter II above). DAFF’s Annual Reports consistently contain requests to government to allocate more resources to rural development, especially for crop production, appropriate research in disease control and technology, and improved marketing arrangements. Likewise, the forestry division has drawn attention to the critical depletion of forestry resources and notes its disagreement with the government’s policy of continuing to allow the export of hardwoods. Other reports cited above indicate that the agricultural store is unable to ensure a reliable supply of agricultural inputs to farmers; the Development Bank is unable to supply an adequate amount of credit to rural small-holders; the Copra and Cocoa Board has been unable to ensure a fair price to the producers for their product; the Rural Development Programme is underfunded and, in the past, projects have been organizationally, technically and financially unsound; and the office of the Pulenu’a is underutilized by government planners.

Finally, according to reports cited above, the Government’s first attempt to institute a Rural Development Programme was unsuccessful in its’ bid to effectively utilize rural resources, especially land and labour, as tools for raising the productivity of the rural areas. The major reasons for this failure appears to have been that projects were based on the following erroneous assumptions: that “planning from below” could work in conjunction with state-imposed planning programmes; and that because the village is an autonomous political unit it is necessarily an effective production unit.
NOTES

1. The following excerpt from the debate (G.W.S. 1969:77) captures this sentiment: "I beg to point out that all these major projects, such as school buildings and hospital buildings and so forth are relied, to a large extent, on the authority which is vested in the hands of the Ali'i and Faipule. Without their support nothing will ever come about".

2. Mr. Davidson: "We do not have to include a reference to the pule of the Ali'i and Faipule because that pule does not derive from the constitution that we are now considering but from the Samoan custom ... The leaving out of any reference at this point to the Ali'i and Faipule does not in any way affect the power that the Ali'i and Faipule have and will continue to exercise" (G.W.S. 1960:76).

3. The resolution, which was duly passed, is as follows:

In conformity with the preamble of the Draft Constitution, where it is stated that Western Samoa shall be an "Independent State based on Christian Principles and Samoan custom and tradition" the constitutional convention affirms its conviction that the well-being of the country in the future, as in the past, is dependent upon proper support and protection given to the pule of the Ali'i and Faipule. The convention further believes that the relationship between the central government and the Ali'i and Faipule of the districts and villages must be placed upon a formal constitutional basis. It notes that this subject was fully discussed in 1950 by the Commission of Inquiry into and report upon the Organization of District and Village Government with the Hon. Fautua, the Ali'i and Faipule of every district and every village, and with representatives of Government departments and that, following such discussion, detailed recommendations were made. It further notes that although the legislative assembly endorsed the commission's recommendations in the same year, little has yet been done to give effect to them. The convention therefore recommends: 1. That the Legislative Assembly should as soon as possible study the recommendations of the 1950 Commission and all relevant evidence; and 2. that after such study, legislation should be prepared and enacted to ensure that the authority of the Ali'i and Faipule is properly protected in the interest and well-being of Western Samoa and its people (ibid.:99).

4. 

"... I do not support the proposal that the Head of State is to be elected by the 41 constituencies because that was not a God-given thing to Western Samoa. In the past, the representatives of the eleven political districts assembled to decide on
who should be Head of State ... we must stick fast to old customs and traditions ... Our new independent State should be guided along these lines" (G.W.S. 1960:286).

5. "... The contention that the Tumua and Pule are already embraced in the ruling and operations of the Samoan government is something I disagree with, because in my own thinking the present situation of the Tumua and Pule is only external to the government ... it was the Tumua and Pule who united the people thus restoring peace ... (ibid:288).

6. Speeches against universal suffrage: "Let us look at European life as compared to Samoan custom .... The parents would look after their children from birth right up until they are 21. On reaching age 21, a boy would be let out in the wide world; he has no more ties with his family. He does not consider what is going to happen to his parents and does not consider going back to see about the land and to get the land prepared for himself in case any trouble occurs in the family. The land may be there but it is his father's property ... But with regard to the Samoan boy, it is just the opposite. When a Samoan boy goes out into the world he has to keep his ties with home, and as long as there is a matai in the family, he is more or less the caretaker of the family property, of everyone attached or interested in the family ... and that property is handed down from generation to generation ... We have inherited from our parents and they from their parents, and we look forward to passing it on to our children ... if a matai has some sort of trouble ... he has to write to all other members of family, in Pago Pago, Fiji, Honolulu, New Zealand or America ... They all have to contribute money because ... they still have an attachment [to the land] which is their family heritage" (ibid.:495-497) and; "Those who are 21 years of age and even younger boys and girls ... have a voice ... Before a matai is elected ... everyone in the family regardless of age has a voice ... before the chief is appointed to sit with the Ali'i and Faipule the blessing of God must be sought and also the good wishes of the chiefs with whom he is to sit ... If we give the right to vote to 21 year old we never know in future, the people might change their minds and vote an ordinary matai Head of State and supreme leader of the country" (ibid.:495).

7. A speech questioning the original sale of State land: "I wish to ask ... as to whether this land cold be referred back to the original owners making them Samoan customary land, because I do contend that these lands were likely sold by one person of the village ... without prior consent of the rest of the village (ibid.:575-577).

8. Speeches expressing the concern that power of traditional authorities to settle disputes over
customary lands and titles be given constitutional recognition: "The Lands and Titles Court has been responsible for deciding a lot of differences which may happen in family circles .. and as we know for a fact that this position is most disappointing and a very unsatisfactory one as far as the Samoan social life is concerned .. I would like, therefore to recommend that the Ali‘i and Faipule ought to be given a legal standing in trying to solve the differences between two parties in the villages ... The decision of the Ali‘i and Faipule ought to be given first priority or consideration by the Lands and Titles Court before the statements of both parties are considered" (ibid:580); "The people of Samoa hold regard towards the Kings of the Country ... There is again the question of the eleven political districts formed up by the Tumua and Pule .... they rule and have matters brought to them because they are the sole authority as far as customs are concerned. Furthermore, these eleven political districts are called the eleven Faipule of the country ... I would ask the question ... whether this government should be ruled by matais or whether it should be ruled by the Ali‘i and Faipule? As we are progressing now to attain our full independence is it our wish that we adopt foreign procedures in order to guide and control our new Independent State? I think it would be advisable if we would first of all set down a certain footing with regard to our own set up, that is, our social structure in the community" (ibid:682).

9. During the last nine months of 1980 an evaluation of the RDP was undertaken by a team of technical experts from the University of the South Pacific. The technical experts based their evaluations, first on visits to a sample of villages on Upolu and Savai‘i where they observed projects and interviewed participants; and, second, on interviews and discussions with people outside the villages who were involved with implementing projects and providing advisor and technical services to project participants. I use the reports of E.M. Fleming, P.M. Andres and D.E. Morris in my discussion of the RDP.
CHAPTER VI

POWER OF THE HEART: SAMOAN RESISTANCE TO STATE CONTROL

INTRODUCTION

In the last Chapter, I discussed the formation of the post-colonial state. In this Chapter, I discuss how the state and electoral politics are transforming Samoan cultural practices and affecting economic development processes to show that contemporary Samoan culture is the product of ongoing struggles between culturally situated actors engaged in creative acts of resistance and accommodation to the global economic and political order.

The colonial state in Western Samoa, like all other colonial states, was an administrative state -- a political dependency -- first under Germany, and then New Zealand. By contrast, the post-colonial state is the creation of the Samoan elite, which, in collaboration with foreign constitutional advisors, created a state that would protect their interests -- interests that lie in both the Samoan world and the global economy. It is this praxis -- this straddling of two worlds by Western Samoa's elite -- that gives the post-colonial Samoan polity its specific dynamic character. That praxis may be conceptualized as a conjuncture structured by Samoan cultural categories. During the constitutional debates, Samoan participants made use of their cultural categories to work out a definition of the post-colonial state. In so doing, their cultural practices have been put at risk by alien customs and institutions. At the same time, Samoan politicians have given these alien customs and institutions a decidedly Samoan gloss. This political praxis has often been the despair of foreign aid donors, Western-educated
Samoan bureaucrats, expatriate bureaucrats and foreign intellectuals alike. More often than not, the political practices of the Samoan elite have invited resistance -- sometimes violent -- from rural farmers. I attempt to describe that praxis -- to show how it is motivated more by the power of the Samoan heart than by the desire for profit which informs the praxis of aid donors and other would-be developers of the Samoan world.

I use the metaphor "power of the heart" in recognition of a speech made by one of the chairmen during the constitutional debates:

When the question is put and whatever the result will be, do not think that is the way we think in our very hearts because it is not. Pule and Tumua is our own traditional authority, we all understand it. It is just like broad daylight. We understand it and we accept it but, on the other hand, we are now dealing with this task of an independent State (G.W.S. 1960:300).

Many of my Samoan friends referred to the Samoan "heart" as an explanation for their commitment to their Samoan institutions in defiance of foreign notions of power and authority embodied in "the state". As I discuss below, the sheer strength of indigenous institutions in Samoa is a counter-hegemonic force which, more often than not, renders the contemporary State ineffectual in implementing rulings and practices that run counter to customary practice. Many of my informants describe Samoans who lack the proper respect for indigenous institutions as possessing palangi (non-Samoan) hearts while those who respect Samoan customs and values, even if they are palangi, are described as having Samoan hearts.

I recall a conversation I had with a number of old Samoan chiefs, sitting on mats in one of their Fales (houses), in a village somewhere on the North-West coast of Upolu. They told me that "these days some people in government had lost their Samoan hearts". When I questioned them about how a man could "lose his heart", one old chief explained that to be wise one had to "know
with the heart". If a Samoan man no longer "knows with his heart", he has lost his Samoan heart because he no longer respects his Samoan customs and values. For these old Samoan chiefs, then, the source of knowledge and wisdom was not the brain but the heart.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PRACTICES

Government Reports

I begin my discussion of contemporary political practices in Western Samoa by examining the document published by the Government of Western Samoa in 1975 entitled Report on Matai Titles, Customary Land and Land and Titles Court (G.W.S:1975a). Also, I use my field notes, to convey, as much as possible, the richness and drama of a Third World polity trying to adapt to the contemporary world.

The Report (ibid.) is the product of a committee appointed by the Government of Western Samoa to review legislation governing the Land and Titles Court, and to make recommendations to the cabinet regarding the same. The report, however, goes far beyond its original mandate, and is a critique of the Samoan polity after twelve years of independence. The committee was composed of a foreign advisor (a former New Zealand barrister and magistrate in Western Samoa), a Samoan chief, a Samoan broadcaster, a Samoan principal of Teachers’ Training College, a past Prime Minister of Samoa, and a Samoan judge of the Land and Titles Court. This committee reviewed all relevant statutes and interviewed judges and staff of the Land and Titles Court, heads of government departments, lawyers, and doctors (ibid.:6). The Samoan public was consulted by way of public hearings, both in Samoa and in the large Samoan migrant community in New Zealand. Further, the committee studied problems of customary law in American Samoa, Nigeria, Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea, and subsequently they decided Western Samoa
had special features such that the situation in other countries was of little help.

The committee's recommendations to the Samoan parliament fell into three broad categories: matai titles and the authority of the Ali'i and Faipule vis-à-vis the Land and Titles Court; the customary land tenure system as the basis of the dignity and power of chiefs as well as their traditional right to 'banish' troublemakers; the legislation and practice of the Lands and Titles Court, established under the German Colonial State in 1903. I turn, now, to a discussion of that report.

**Matai Polota: Election Chiefs**

Chiefs have participated in the selection of representatives since the Faipule Election Ordinance of 1939 No. 1 (Powles 1986:201). The Ordinance stated that chiefs were free to choose their Faipule "in such a manner as they think fit" (ibid.). Until independence, dominant political factions secured a candidate by consensus, thus avoiding the ballot required by the administration in case of a deadlock. Today, the creation of new voters introduced by the proliferation of new titles has all but destroyed the old method of selecting government representatives by consensus.

Ala'ilima and Ala'ilima (1966) elaborate on the difference between the consensus method of selecting government representatives and the ballot. Samoan consensus meetings begin with the "sitting of chiefs at significant house posts" and the "presenting of kava" (ibid.:250). These ceremonies "visualize and verbalize" the accepted "deference weighting" of participant chiefs (ibid.). The problem for decision is announced by the highest ranking chief. Participants who wish to express their opinion speak in "deference order". During a second round of speeches, chiefs put pressure on each other to take one side of the argument or the other. The highest-ranking chief
says nothing during these rounds of speeches. He/she weights arguments according to the rank of the speakers. The highest ranking chief speaks only when he/she can offer a resolution at which time deference due his/her rank ensures unanimous consent (ibid.). In consensus decision-making, participants agree on two things: the traditional ranking order of titles and the obligation to abide by consent once given. A person who participates in consensus decision-making and later breaks the agreement may be banished from the village. If a candidate is chosen by consensus politics, no other chief can file as a candidate without breaking the consensus and courting banishment (ibid.:242).

In electoral politics, people universally agree beforehand to abide by the majority vote upheld by police enforcement, if necessary (ibid.:251-252). The social status of voters is irrelevant since every voter is an equal participant. Furthermore, voters are polled about candidate choice but not about their willingness to conform to the choice. Ala’ilima and Ala’ilima (1966) suggest that the ballot box is unreliable as an assurance of harmony within the district.

The Report on Matai Titles, Customary Land and Land Titles Court notes that over a twelve-year period, from 1960 to 1972, the annual rate of increase in matai titles was more than twice the annual rate of increase in the population. Some constituencies doubled the number of matai titles, others tripled the number, while others showed a reasonable increase of only seventeen percent. Tiffany (1975a:85-106) describes the election campaign of a wealthy planter who used the strategy of splitting customary titles successfully. Ala’ilima and Ala’ilima (1966) note that soon after independence, chiefs recognized the advantage of increasing the number of title holders in their families. More recently, Powles (1986:202) observes that splitting and creating titles "to
manufacture" votes has been criticized by traditional leaders as "contrary to custom". The Report (G.W.S. 195a:15-16) states that Samoans view matai polota (creation of matai for the purpose of voting) as a threat to the matai system, and as a consequence of introducing the electoral system into the Samoan polity, combined with the restriction of suffrage to matai. Complaints about the appointment of matai titles for voting purposes were made as far back as the first election after independence in 1964 (ibid.:15-16). As a result, in 1969 the legislative assembly passed the Lands and Titles Protection Amendment Act, that enabled the registrar to clear two thousand names off the matai register of those who had been appointed contrary to Samoan custom. (The registrar for matai was introduced in 1957 as a necessary preparation for voting in general elections). The Lands and Titles Amendment Act allows a three-month period during which time any Samoan can make an objection to a matai appointment, and the registrar can determine that the appointment is in accordance with Samoan custom before it is registered. However, the amendment has not proven effective in preventing the rapid increase in matai titles. The electoral officer for Western Samoa has recorded a nineteen percent increase in matai titles between 1979 and the elections of 1982, and a twenty-four percent increase between 1982 and 1985. The official estimate for the numbers of registered matai in 1987 is 17,900, an 80 percent increase over the 9,930 matai in 1979 (G.W.S. 1987:x). During this same period, the population of Western Samoa rose from approximately 152,000 to 161,039 (ibid.) -- an increase of only 5.9 percent.

Traditionally, it was unusual to create new titles, or to split existing ones (G.W.S. 1975a:19-22; Tiffany 1985b). New titles, were only created on a special occasion: when a person of high title wanted to honour a particular person for a particular accomplishment, or for rendering him/her some special service. These
new titles were known as matai tautua, or titles serving the matai who created them (GWS 1975a:19-22). Matai tautua often used the same land as the matai they served. Today, for election purposes, many titles are created by matai who have no authority or special purpose for doing so except to gain a vote at election time. The registrar records titles created for election purposes as long as a traditional ceremony of appointment is carried out. However, the registrar is not entitled to enquire whether the matai creating the new title has the customary authority to do so or not (ibid.). People who participated in public hearings condemned the creation of new titles for election purposes (ibid.).

Splitting and joint-holding of titles is another way to increase the numbers of matai for voting purposes. Like the creation of new titles, traditionally, splitting and joint-holding of titles was very rare (ibid.). By 1948, the Secretary of Samoan Affairs noted the growing numbers of incidents in which titles were held jointly or split. Joint-holding means a full sharing of a title and its authority for the lifetime of the holders. Unlike splitting, when one or more persons hold a title jointly, the branches of the family and their lands are not permanently divided into separate groups with separate land-holdings. In cases of title-splitting that reached the Lands and Titles Court, judges consented to splitting titles if they were convinced by the testimony of the disputants that such actions would restore harmony within the family (Tiffany 1974:46).

Samoans who took part in the public hearings to discuss matai polota felt that the creation, splitting and joint-holding of titles was desirable where an increase in the number of chiefs was necessary, either to meet the needs of branches of families that were growing in size, or to meet the aspirations of energetic people wishing to be recognized for service to their chiefs (G.W.S.
1975a:19-22). However, the public felt that the creation of titles for election purposes without regard for family needs results in titles being conferred on people who have neither lands to administer nor family to serve. These matai polota are recognized by Samoans as being inferior chiefs. However, the Ali'i and Faipule (the recognized chiefs of the village) have no authority to keep matai polota out of the village council. Furthermore, recognized chiefs representing their titles at the village council are sometimes unable to implement council decisions because co-holders of their titles, who are not present at council meetings, refuse to comply with its decisions (ibid.). Another problem was brought to my attention by several of the Samoan chiefs. Some chiefs attempt to switch plots of land with each other so as to consolidate scattered land holdings into one large parcel more suitable for development. For example, one of my Samoan friends was in the process of trading with other chiefs in her village for pieces of land along the coast next to her house-site in order to develop a tourist spot and, thereby, enhance the income of her village. However, she explained, when as many as ten or even twenty chiefs hold the title to a piece of land, it is hard for them to agree on what to do. Thus, development initiatives of individual chiefs may be discouraged by those who hold their titles jointly merely for voting purposes.

Two solutions have been proposed to solve the problem of matai polota. Stricter regulation of matai titles and universal suffrage. An examination of this problem gives us some insight into the way in which the introduction of electoral politics to the indigenous polity of Western Samoa has put their cultural categories and practices at risk.

The government committee appointed to review the Land and Titles Ordinance of 1934 advanced the following as a solution to the problem of matai polota: the regulation of the appointment of matai
by the Lands and Titles Court based on the following principles; 
tautua titles (junior title-holders serving a senior chief) should
only be created by senior chiefs in recognition of customary
service; every title must have a form of address and a right to
speak in the Council; all new chiefs must have a family and lands to
administer; and all new chiefs must be recognized by the Council in
the village where their title is held. Furthermore, the regulation
of chiefly titles should be carried out by the Lands and Titles
Court (G.W.S. 1975a). The latter poses another serious problem for
the Western Samoan polity, due to the Court’s constitutional status.
In practice, Samoa has two systems of law.

The Lands and Titles Court

In 1889, the Berlin Act set up a court to settle land
disputes between Samoans and foreigners. After 1900, the Samoan
leaders and German administration decided that a court was needed to
peacefully settle disputes between Samoans over chiefly titles and
customary land. The Land and Titles Commission was set up in 1903,
and renamed the Land and Titles Court in 1937. According to the Land
and Titles Ordinance of 1934, the court has jurisdiction in all
matters relating to Samoan names and titles, and in all claims and
disputes between Samoans relating to Samoan land. Thus jurisdiction
is exclusive, which means no other court can deal with these
matters, and there is no appeal to a higher court. Since there is no
State legislation pertaining to the indigenous political system,
either for local and district government or for holding customary
land and chiefly titles, the only court that can apply customary law
in resolving disputes is the Land and Titles Court (Tiffany 1974;
1985; Powles 1986; Anesi 1988).

In effect, then, there are two systems of law operating side
by side in the Samoan social formation (Powles 1986). State law,
based on the principles of British Common Law and legislation, governs legal marriages, business transactions, criminal offenses and the activities of government while Samoan custom and usage governs Samoan political, economic and cultural practices. Each system of law has its own courts. The Supreme Court and Magistrate's Court have jurisdiction over State law and legislation, and the Lands and Titles Court has jurisdiction over customary law and usage.

Customary law and usage is not defined by the constitution, nor by any statute. The committee's Report defines it as law applied in family and village life "to preserve peace and harmonious relations in Samoan society" (G.W.S.:91). In addition to customary law and usage, local customs are also recognized by the Lands and Titles Court. Local custom relating to particular chiefly titles may differ from usual custom and from one place to another. The custom and usage applied by the Lands and Titles Court is "what the people of Western Samoa want at the present time", and includes "the principles which have been applied by the Lands and Titles Court over the last seventy years, and local custom, that may have only particular application" (ibid.:94).

The only reference to the Lands and Titles Court is in Article 103 of the constitution and states that the court shall have such composition and jurisdiction in relation to chiefly titles and customary land as may be set out by the Lands and Protection Ordinance of 1934. By comparison, the Supreme Court and Magistrates Court are established in the constitution itself. The committee concludes in its Report that, since ninety-eight percent of the people living in Western Samoa do so under a chief, and since the Lands and Titles Court rules on cases involving the highest titles in Samoa -- cases that have widespread social and political consequences -- it should be accorded appropriate constitutional
recognition and retain its distinctive Samoan style and character. That distinctive character comprises an emphasis on "mediation, settlement, proper kava ceremonies for members of the Court, the exchange of written statements by the disputants on the day of the hearing, and the absence of lawyers and cross-examination of witnesses (ibid.:101).

A Samoan judge, Taulapapa Anesi (1988) and a Samoan lawyer, Aeau Semi Epati (1988) refer to the Lands and Titles Court as the most important court in Samoa. The Court has the responsibility and authority to determine "Samoan custom and usage" (Epati 1988:168). In making and recording decisions, the Court is giving "custom and usage" the force of law (ibid.). Epati asserts "Our identity as a people lies in maintaining these [land and title] aspects of social structure" (ibid.:170-171).

Furthermore, the committee recommends that provisions should be made for the Ali‘i and Faipule of the villages in which the disputes arise, to make representation to the Court hearings (G.W.S. 175a:103). This recommendation was meant to enhance the legitimacy of the Court decisions. Many Samoan chiefs impressed upon me that only the Ali‘i and Faipule were competent to resolve disputes since they alone were authorities in Samoan custom pertaining to their villages and districts. Both their representation at Court hearings and their acceptance and implementation of Court decisions is mandatory if the dignity and integrity of the Court is to be maintained. At present, there are no procedures to enforce Court decisions which run counter to the decisions reached by the Ali‘i and Faipule in any given dispute. The Lands and Titles Court is not a criminal court, so according to a Court official, the police are often unwilling to interfere when persons fail to comply with decisions of the Court. Unfortunately, the Court does not keep records on non-compliance with court decisions. However, one Court
official believed non-compliance was wide-spread in cases where the village council did not agree with the Court's decision. Moreover, Western Samoa's police force is small and unarmed. For the most part, peace and harmony is maintained in Samoa by Ali'i and Faipule, thus a large armed police force is considered unnecessary by the government and most of the Samoans with whom I spoke.

The problem of constitutional recognition of the Lands and Titles Court and the legitimation and implementation of its decisions is a problem of "linkage" between local government and the state. Powles (1982:350) asserts that Pacific constitutions have paid little attention to links between local government and the state. As a result, Pacific governments do not deal effectively with local government or land tenure issues (ibid.). Tiffany (1985:4) observes that decisions by Pacific courts do not resolve disputes. Rather, a court decision provides an "additional round" in a "continual sequence of compromise and negotiation" that is characteristic of relations in Pacific island polities. Court decisions mobilize "losers" to improve their positions relative to "winners" by redeploying local mechanisms of conflict resolution for negotiating unacceptable consequences of a court decision (ibid.:15).

Taulapapa Anesi (1988:108), a judge with the Samoan Lands and Titles Court, observes that some of the increased workload of the Court is due to land development involving boundary disputes and ownership disputes of plantation, village and district land. In these cases, the Court cannot enforce its own decisions (ibid.). The problem of the legitimacy and implementation of the Land and Titles Court decisions which run counter to the decisions of the Ali’i and Faipule is illustrated by the following case. On January 17, 1986, the SAMOAN TIMES carried the following story under the headline Village Burns Timber Company:
Fire yesterday completely destroyed six houses, heavy equipment valued at some two million, and other property of Pacific Development Company Limited at Salelologa...The owner of the land leased by the logging company, Pauli Koki Wong Kee, was injured during the fire which allegedly was deliberately started by Salelologa villagers...

Yesterday's drastic event was reportedly sparked off by a letter to Salelologa village from the Land and Titles Court Office that the village stop interfering with the company's operations.

Instead of heeding the office's instructions, the village decided to take matters into their own hands to highlight their claims to the land.

Back in 1984 when...the Minister of Lands...issued a license to Pacific Development to cut and export logs for twenty years at a fee of 10 sene per cubic foot of timber the village strongly objected to the license granted at Pauli's request.

According to them the land rightly belonged to the village despite a court ruling that the land belonged to Pauli Koki's family (Samoan Times, Vol XVIII No. 3, Jan. 17, 1986).

Then, when the police tried to take the villagers into custody, the village matai threatened the government with "war":

Travelling overseas is being denied villagers of Salelologa...The Police's move came after a squad they sent to Salelologa last week...was challenged by village matai and others that there would be "war" if the police started arresting people.

It is understood that no arrest has yet been made, but at one point the villagers themselves threatened to burn down all government properties at Salelologa and Tuasivi.

But the police were cautioned to remain calm...over the wireless informing them that the Prime Minister did not ever consider "war" of any kind.

Meantime, village matai have banned from the village the man whose house they burned, Pauli Koki Wong Kee, and his whole family (The Samoan Observe, Vol. III No. 4, Jan. 29 1986).

According to an official at the Lands and Survey Department, the dispute between the matai, Pauli, a part-Samoan and the rest of the Ali'í and Faipule of Salelologa had been going on for two years. Pauli was claiming authority over some two thousand acres of bush land. The village fono maintained that the land was village land.
Pauli took the dispute to the Land and Titles Court, where a court decision ran counter to the wishes of the Ali‘i and Faipule, and granted him authority over the land. The official told me that it is very unlikely that a chief would have authority over 2,000 acres of bush land because according to Samoan custom, uncultivated bush land is village land. However, the Court appears to have decided it came under the authority of a chief. There is also a problem of interpretation of the court’s decision. An official at the Lands and Survey Department suggested to me that the Court had only granted the chief authority over 100 acres, but the chief had interpreted the Court’s description of the land as referring to 2,000 acres. Nevertheless, the Court’s decision and action ran counter to the wishes of the village council, and, possibly, to Samoan custom. The Court, therefore, was unable to implement its decision. In fact, the recalcitrant chief was given the punishment in the last resort by the Ali‘i and Faipule. He and his family and all their descendants were banished from the village:

Salelologa village banished Pauli Koki Wong Kee and his family from the village forever last week, and have promised death to him and anyone else who sets foot again on the disputed land...

Graves of Pauli’s parents were dug up and the remains burnt when the village invoked long-dormant powers to impose a solution on the long-standing dispute over the land (Samoan Times, Vol. XVIII No. 4, Jan. 24, 1986).

Banishment from the village is one of the most controversial of village sanctions. Banishment is an order by the Ali‘i and Faipule to a person and his/her family to leave the village for an indefinite period of time -- sometimes forever. Today, the Ali‘i and Faipule consider the power of banishment the ultimate and most important sanction vested in the village council (G.W.S. 1975a:83). It is used only after all other methods of settling disputes (discussion, mediation, fines, ostracism from village affairs) have failed. This sanction is the major reason why state police services
are almost never required in the villages. Despite this fact, there is no legislation authorizing village councils either to resolve disputes, conduct village affairs or to punish offenders of village law. Moreover, the act of banishment violates Article 13 of the constitution, which provides for freedom of anyone to reside in any part of Western Samoa unless reasonable restrictions are imposed by the legislative assembly. If banishment continues to be used by the villages, the legislative assembly is bound by the constitution to pass some statutory provisions to deal with it. The Lands and Titles Court presently makes or rejects banishment orders by village councils, and may be acting unconstitutionally. This constitutional problem arises with all punishments handed out by village councils. So far, the people of Western Samoa tolerate the existence of unconstitutional village courts administering customary justice, while the police and established courts apply the written law. This signifies the Samoan people's attachment and commitment in lived practice to the authority of village councils and possibly their alienation from the State Judicial System. Nevertheless, unless legislation is introduced to legalize the entire framework of local government, the whole structure of the indigenous political system could, theoretically, at least, be undermined by cases brought against it in future, in the Supreme Court of Western Samoa regarding its constitutionality.

"Unofficial courts", similar to village councils in Western Samoa exist throughout the Pacific. Pacific scholars who have observed "unofficial courts" (Rodman 1982:69-95; Westermack 1986; Scaglion 1990:17-33) conclude that they are a necessary adjunct of the legal system to ensure "social control" (Rodman 1982:94); that they strengthen the position of traditional leaders and contribute to peacemaking (Scaglion 1990:29); and that imposed law does not necessarily extinguish local autonomy (Westermack 1986:133).
studies suggest that it is not in the interest of either the state or the people to undermine these indigenous political structures, either in Western Samoa or in other Pacific states where unofficial courts exist. However, this may be an overly optimistic view, especially in cases where disputes involve state versus local control of resources. For example, the dispute between the Lands and Titles Court and the village council of Salelologa that I discuss above involves a disagreement between the village council and the government regarding the authority of the government, supported by a Court ruling, to licence a logging company to develop village land. The government, in this case, was unable to assert its authority because it lacked an armed enforcement agency to counteract the villagers' threats to resist arrest by using force if necessary. However, it is not inconceivable that sometime in the future, the government will decide both to arm its police force in order to enforce Court rulings that support state control over village resources and to declare unconstitutional the village council's authority to banish would-be collaborators with state authorities. At the moment, the power inherent in village councils depends on, not just the villagers' support and commitment to their indigenous institutions, but also the good graces of the government in power at any given time.

Absentee Chiefs and the Practice of "Treating"

Since independence, Western Samoa's indigenous political system has been put at risk by other problems arising from its struggle to adapt to Samoa's participation in the global economy. Migration from the rural areas to Apia or overseas has brought about changes in the Samoan polity and economic system (Macpherson 1990; Kallen 1982; Shankman 1976; 1990). The combination of fluctuations in world market prices for cash crops and job opportunities in Apia and overseas have attracted young, educated Samoans from the rural
villages and away from a career in agriculture. In the post-World War II period, the expansion of urban industries in New Zealand, the United States and Australia provided opportunities for unskilled Samoans. Consequently, during this period, emigration of Western Samoans to New Zealand, in particular, became a mass migration (ibid.:20). After independence in 1952, a "friendship treaty" between New Zealand and Western Samoa ratified the continuation of economic and political ties between them, and thus favoured continued Samoan migration to New Zealand.

Today, migration is an aspect of what Kallen (ibid.:30) calls the "new ethnicity", whereby Samoans have incorporated what were formerly viewed as criteria for European status (education, success in business, well-paying jobs in Apia and overseas) into their traditional political system. In fact, Kallen found that migration out of the rural area is considered a "rite of passage" by most young Samoans. Thus, many Samoans interested in chiefly titles migrate to Apia or overseas to attain high-paying jobs or an education. Furthermore, many chiefs consider high-paying jobs a necessity if they are to maintain the dignity of their titles and look after their families to the best of their ability. As a result many chiefs are now living away from the villages where they hold their titles. In the district where I did my research, for example, out of the 559 title holders, 317 (fifty-six percent) lived in Apia, overseas, or elsewhere in Samoa. Chiefs in the district where I did my research considered this a problem, because absentee chiefs vote in elections but do not carry out their responsibilities in the village, especially with respect to village development projects such as the building of schools, clinics, churches and roads. This fact was confirmed by some of the chiefs I spoke with who admitted that they avoided going back to their village so as to escape demands on their resources.
Migrants living overseas send millions of dollars every year to their Samoan families. In 1986, for example, Samoans sent back W.S.$63.5 million dollars (G.W.S. 1987:9). This is 63.5 million dollars in foreign exchange, as compared to W.S.$23.49 million earned by exports, and W.S.$35.09 million acquired in grants and loans from aid agencies (ibid.:242). Is it any wonder, then, that many Samoans say "our young people are our most valuable export"? Furthermore, most remittance money finds its way either into the indigenous exchange networks or is spent on imports for agricultural development, houses, education and on church contributions (Shankman 1990:13). In addition, as Macpherson (1985) remarks, migrants mobilize their capital and energy to contribute to village projects. More specifically, villagers collect and use migrants’ remittance monies to create, extend and renew capital assets such as meeting houses, churches, schools, and plantation access roads, or, in other words, to ‘develop’ their villages. In an election year much of this remittance money is redistributed in the rural areas by those running for office. The most successful candidates are those who are best able to tap the resources of relatives overseas. The latter is defined by some Samoans as another serious problem created by the electoral system and is referred to as the problem of "treating".

The use of remittances from relatives living overseas by local élites is a common phenomenon in Pacific island politics. Marcus (1981:50) observes that local élites in Pacific nations conceive of their resource base as "dispersed family networks with anchors in different places abroad". Members of the Samoan élite, no less so than members of the Tongan élite, can be viewed collectively as "accumulators and redistributors of resources" through "family networks" and "through positions that they control within government and the church" (ibid.:53). Migration has resulted in what Marcus (ibid.) calls "transnational corporations of kin
which resemble transnational corporations in their allocations of resources and transfer of income between branches of the family group.

When the Constitutional Convention of 1960 restricted political office and suffrage to chiefs, they separated economic power from political power. Economic control was in the hands of members of an urban part-Samoan elite with European status whose political power was minimized by giving them only two out of the forty-seven seats in Parliament. Political control was placed in the hands of matai who derived their power from the indigenous system of rank and authority (Thomas 1984:40). High-ranking chiefs recognized the attainment of political office as a new opportunity for status rivalry within the indigenous hierarchy (Powles 1986:197). They used their rank to secure political office (Powles 1982:355) and moved to the urban town of Apia.

Simultaneously with the urbanization of the Samoan elite, part-Samoans of European status activated links with their Samoan families and accepted matai titles (Powles 1982:355; Thomas 1984:140). Bestowing titles on the economically influential part-Samoans benefited the ‘aiga because it gained access to the recipients’ material wealth (Thomas ibid.). As a result, political and economic power is now in the hands of an urban elite comprised of a disproportionately large number of part-Samoans (Thomas 1984:140).

Most successful candidates in Samoan elections are prosperous farmers, businessmen, or civil servants (Norton 1982:101). Inequalities within the village are reflected in the existence of Samoan fales (thatched houses made out of local materials) along with expensive European style bungalows. The most prosperous families have established branches of their families abroad and thereby have access to remittances (ibid. 106-107).
Political competitions encourage the circulation of wealth in the form of credit at village stores, and gifts of cash and food during elections.

Wealth and titular rank do not always go together in rural villages (ibid.:107). Some of the most prosperous families with numerous kin abroad and large plantations do not possess the highest titles. Likewise, chiefs of highest rank do not always win elections since the introduction of the ballot box. As Ala’ilima and Ala’ilima (1966:242) point out, the secret ballot allows chiefs to express their personal opinion rather than their deference position. Nonetheless, today, losers in an election campaign can undermine the process by filing election petitions alleging "treating" and bribery in an attempt to have the results reversed (Va’a 1983:70-71).

In 1976, Cabinet appointed a committee chaired by the Head of State, Tapua Tamasese Lealofi IV. The Cabinet directed the committee as follows:

To consider and report on all cases or incidences of election offenses, abuses or corrupt practices found or determined by the Courts since Independence; and to report on and recommend necessary measures to remedy or eliminate them (G.W.S. 1979:2).

As the committee reported,

The Committee [was] faced with a very heavy and onerous task in trying to draw the attention of the people to come forward and present their views and recommendations on this important issue ... The work of the committee was very difficult, due to the lack of support by the people (ibid.:3).

The committee interviewed 84 persons in Apia, 54 of whom were chiefs, and 780 people in the rural areas, 774 of whom were chiefs. Although the committee strongly encouraged untitled people to come forward and give their opinion especially on matai suffrage, few did so. The committee believes this was due to their indifference, or reluctance to speak on any matter which is presumed to be within chiefly authority (ibid.:4). According to Samoan custom, specific
chiefs are authorized to speak for the village or district. So, at
the meetings held by the committee in the rural areas, the
spokesperson for the district presented a view that is presumed to
be unanimous. The committee concluded:

The opinion of the country was very firm that the
right to vote should be limited to only the matais
because there is a belief to act otherwise might
tend to affect the matai system as well as the
Samoan customs (ibid.:4).

Moreover,

Most matais who gave evidence ... had indicated
their full support of the revival of the old system
of election of representatives in the past that was
to elect in the customary way on a unanimous
agreement of a district or constituency (ibid.).

According to the Report, most chiefs are suggesting that the
electoral system be abolished, and that Samoa return to the old
system of elected faipule (M.P.s) by unanimous consent. A candidate
chosen by this method is usually a widely respected high-ranking
chief in the district (Va’a 1983:80). The traditional leaders argue
that the return to this practice would stop the abuse of appointed
matai polota (election matai) as well as the bribery of matai by
candidates, under the electoral system. The committee rejected this
solution because the number of members who had been elected in the
customary way had decreased (G.W.S. 1975a:23). In 1961, twenty-one
or half of the Members of Parliament were elected in the customary
way. By 1976, this number had decreased to six (fourteen percent).
The committee argued:

It is crystal clear, from these figures, the
failure of the country to abide with its customs
and traditions for the election of members to these
important offices at the present time.

The committee therefore recommended that the vote be extended to all
persons 21 years old and over for matai representatives. The
committee argued that universal suffrage would stop both the
creation and splitting of matai titles for voting purposes, as well
as the bribery of matai at election time. However, the report stated
that while universal suffrage may stop matai polota, it is unlikely that it would stop what some Samoans are calling bribery or "treating". Instead, more people would be open to more bribery. Furthermore, untitled people could be persuaded to vote against the wishes of their chiefs, which may mean a "contest of untitled against titled people" (G.S.W. 1975a:25), and a substantial decrease in family harmony and discipline. A Samoan family thinks of itself as a body "with the chief as its head and the members as its arms and legs" (Ala'ilima and Ala'ilima 1966:252). Samoans who are apprehensive about universal suffrage worry about what might happen to the dignity of the family, "if its own arms and legs were free to operate independently of its head" (ibid.).

The committee felt that the Electoral Act of 1952 was inadequate to deal with the problem of bribery. The act provides as follows:

Every person commits the offence of bribery who, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf gives any money or procures any office to or for any elector or voter, or to or for any other person on behalf of any elector or voter, or to or for any elector or voter to vote or refrain from voting...

The major problem in making charges of bribery is to distinguish it from Samoan custom. In Western Samoa it is the custom that, if a person calls on another -- whether invited or not, whether for a specific purpose or not, and whether it is on a day of a special occasion (e.g., election day) or not -- it is the practice of the Samoan host to offer to his visitor food, drink and, on many occasions, money -- euphemistically called "fares". The money is a reciprocal "gift" to the visitor in return for his/her trouble and cost of travel. Also, money is used as an "élite good" in indigenous exchange networks. So, on occasions such as weddings, matai installation ceremonies, funerals, and births, all of which may occur during an election period, political candidates may contribute
money as well as traditional goods to these exchanges.

Before 1979, Chief Justices gave defendants in cases of bribery or treating, the benefit of the doubt (Va’a 1983:86). But in 1979, the Chief Justice returned four guilty verdicts based on the following criteria: 1) gifts of money and food are permissible provided that they express long established custom; 2) a gift, to be an offence, must be motivated by self-interest rather than duty; 3) traditional activities by the matai candidate during the final weeks of the election should be curtailed, as they may be exploited to bribe voters under the guise of duty. In 1984, the Electoral Amendment Act outlawed, for a three month period during an election, all traditional ceremonies where money, food, drink and fine mats are exchanged, except for funerals. Despite this amendment, my Samoan friends tell me that "treating", at election time continues unabated. Some of my informants felt that this was a corruption of the electoral system. A bureaucrat expresses his sentiment as follows:

Voters usually back a candidate who shows he has enough to give them. Then, after he has been voted in, the candidate becomes nothing more than an occupier of the seat for the next three years. At the end of three years, someone else would be there who has enough to give the voters, and he is voted in ... As a result, neither the voters or the candidates genuinely believe in contributing to the country ... Figures from the last two elections in 1979 and 1982 indicate 60 percent of M.P.s have not been returned to parliament, and this trend will continue.

A matai who works a large plantation in the rural area expressed the same sentiment:

I need many dollars to run for election ... maybe 10,000 ... you have to pay the matai -- get food -- many money

-- you need many connections overseas ... Here in Samoa you agree with the ideas of the person who gives you money ... That’s Samoan custom.

Others were totally unconcerned by the practice of "treating", which they acknowledged is, now, "a secret":

It is very important for a **Faipule** to be successful and generous ... How is he supposed to show us he is so? ... It is the custom of Samoa.

and

At election time rich people from Apia or overseas share their money around. This is a good thing about elections. You can see them [the candidates] with their briefcases full of money in the market place ... it is good.

In other words, just as the **matais** legitimize their right to hold titles by demonstrating their economic and political competence by "giving" to the family, candidates legitimize their right to hold office in the same way. In this manner, "treating", like "giving" is a good way to redistribute wealth from the rich to the not-so-rich. Thus, many Samoans have interpreted the electoral system in terms of their own cultural categories. Most of my Samoan friends do not view "treating" as a serious problem, because it does not put their cultural practices and categories at risk. On the other hand, the electoral system has become another avenue for status rivalry, and, in the process, has transformed indigenous politics. Most Samoans view **matai polota** as a serious problem, precisely because it does put their cultural categories and practices at risk. Put simply, **matai polota** dilutes the dignity and authority of the **matai** system by spreading it around to too many people. Decisions are difficult to make and implement because too many people have the right to take part in the decision-making process.

**"Treating" and Party Politics**

Status rivalry among incumbents for the position of Prime Minister has resulted in the formation of political parties. In the 1979 elections, Chief A retained his position as Prime Minister by one vote in the legislative assembly. His opponent, Chief B, formed a political party, the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP). In 1982, the party selected its own candidates to run for election in the districts. According to Va’a (1983:97), party politics has
caused the number of candidates to decline, indicating that a candidate supported by a political party is at an advantage. By 1982;

Loyalty to a political party was emerging more clearly as a virtue in itself, one more important than loyalty to the traditional hierarchical system with its ethics and mores (ibid.:99).

Chief A’s supporters filed twelve petitions against HRPP members and HRPP members filed ten petitions against Chief A’s supporters. All petitions were based on complaints of treating and bribery. Most petitions were dismissed for lack of evidence but, remarkably, the Prime Minister, Chief B, leader of the HRPP, lost his seat on grounds of impersonation (voting in the names of dead or absentee voters) and Chief A was sworn in as Prime Minister (ibid.:99-100).

In 1991, suffrage was extended to all Samoans over the age of twenty-one. On April 5, 1991, Western Samoa had its first election based on universal suffrage (Malifa 1991a:5; Robinson 1991:14). The custom of "treating" during elections has now been extended to women and untitled men (Malifa 1991b:14). Because the political élite uses the electoral system as a forum for status rivalry, political parties have formed, encouraging Samoans to develop loyalties to a party. Va’a (ibid.) suggests party loyalties may be undermining his people’s loyalty to the indigenous hierarchical system. The 1991 elections may support Va’a’s suggestion. Tui’atua, who was a former Prime Minister under his other title Tupuola, and is now Tama-a-‘Aiga ("royal" son) in his district, and leader of the newly formed Samoa National Development Party (SNDP), was defeated in his electoral district by a lower ranking chief. Furthermore, Tofilau, the Prime Minister of Samoa, is not a Tama-a-‘Aiga. During elections, at least, party politics take precedence over status and rank in the minds of voters. One Samoan journalist, Malifa (1991a:5), suggests that, in the last election, untitled men and women rewarded the HRPP for extending suffrage to
Development of Customary Land

The state's desire to develop land has invited the strongest expressions of Samoan resistance to the imposition of state power precisely because Western notions of development threaten the Samoan customs most directly by undermining the power of traditional leaders. Customary land is land held in accordance with Samoan custom and usage, and comprises eighty percent of the land surface of Western Samoa. All customary land has a relationship either to chiefly title or village councils. Samoans value their land tenure system because it is fundamental to Samoan society and provides life-long security to all Samoans (G.W.S. 1975a). Article 102 of the constitution protects customary land against alienation, except when the State needs it for "public purposes". The Taking of Land Act of 1964 allows the government to take land for such things as airports, schools, parks, forestry, erosion control, water catchments, and so on. The act states that those who have authority over the land must be compensated. The Taking of Land Amendment Act of 1970 explicates the compensation procedure as follows: the Minister of Lands, in consultation with persons with authority over the land, must reach an agreement on the compensation. If an agreement cannot be reached, the Supreme Court determines compensation. In 1967, the Alienation of Customary Land Act of 1965 was amended to "make better provision for leasing or licensing for forestry", either by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, or by some interested businessperson. In either case, the Minister of Lands meets with the customary owners of the lands in question, and, on the advice of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, decides upon the provision of the lease. The provisions of the lease are then published in the Savali (the government newspaper), and a three-
month period is allowed, during which "any interested Samoan" may lodge a written objection with the Registrar of the Land and Titles Court. If objections are lodged, the Land and Titles Court hears and disposes of the objections.

In practice, the logistics of leasing or licensing customary land can be formidable despite legal provisions. For example, the only suitable place for a hydro dam is on the site of five villages engaged in a dispute over their boundaries. The dispute will probably have to go to court, and could seriously delay work on the project. Moreover, as early as 1971, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) reported that it was involved in a struggle with customary land holders (DAFF 1971:24). The government was involved in two joint ventures with foreign timber companies wishing to lease land for logging and reforestation. But, by 1972, it was obvious that while customary landowners were interested in having some of their land logged and cleared for cultivation, none were interested in leasing land for reforestation. The government, therefore, has had to resort to the use of State land for reforestation. Then, in 1982, the Chief Forestry Officer drew attention to the serious loss of forest resources due to the disputes between the villages and the government over the status of State Land used for reforestation. ¹ The use of customary land, either for logging or reforestation, has caused conflict between customary land holders and the government.

Significantly, the major impetus for change in land tenure comes not from the State's development efforts but from within the kin-ordered mode of production itself as Samoans try to accommodate cash-cropping. In pre-contact time, land could not be alienated in a manner corresponding to the Euro-American practice of sale or lease. During the post-contact era, Samoans made land available to European missions in order to secure the use of their power and
services. In the process, rules were devised to cover the alienation of land; i.e., a land transfer had to be agreed to by both the family wishing to transfer the land, and by the village council where the land was located (see Chapter IV). The Alienation of Customary Land Act and its amendments acknowledge these old rules. However all untitled Samoans are prohibited from obtaining licenses or leases to customary land. The Report on Matai Titles, Customary Land, and the Land and Titles Court (G.W.S. 1975a) notes that there is much public concern over the lack of protection untitled persons, especially untitled men, have for their interest in land. As early as 1960 the Constitutional Committee recommended that leases be granted to untitled men as long as they continued to render service to their chief and make effective use of land. The Constitutional Convention, however, turned down the recommendation. Then in 1963 a Select Committee on Leasing of Customary Land, having recommended against leasing land to untitled men, said:

The committee believes it should be obligatory for matai to leave taule’ale’a [untitled man] free to use any bush-land he is developing, so long as he renders proper service.

The practice of bestowing titles on younger, educated, employed and urban based people is also causing concern among chiefs regarding security of land tenure. High-ranking absentee chiefs delegate responsibility for managing family land and labour to junior chiefs. Junior chiefs may be reluctant to plant lands extensively with crops that take a long time to mature in case absentee chiefs return home and claim the product of the junior chiefs’ labour (Lameta 1991:58). The Committee (G.W.S. 1975a) discussed insecurity of land tenure with respect to untitled men but not junior matai.

The Samoan desire for a more secure tenure in land used for cash-cropping is occasioned by the fact that many young people invest not only their labour, but also their own cash, to buy
agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, weed sprayers and herbicide. But, since only senior chiefs have authority over land and its produce, junior chiefs, untitled men and women have little security for their investment. This lack of security of land tenure for many Samoans that has prompted some critics to attack the Samoan Land Tenure system as being the main obstacle to economic progress and development. These critics assume that untitled people and junior chiefs will lack the incentive to develop unused customary land unless they can be sure that their senior chiefs will allow them to stay on land until their crop is harvested, and will not demand too much of the fruits of their labour.

The Committee (ibid.), however, argued that this was an unfair criticism of the customary land tenure system, because development of the country depends as much on the stability of the traditional social and political structures as it does on increasing agricultural production. Nonetheless, the Committee acknowledged that the interests of untitled Samoans should be protected and recommended that the matai register include all tautua (service) interests under each matai title, including the interests of widows, widowers and children of former title holders, as well as the tautua interests of taule'ale'g. The committee saw this as an advantage, both for protecting the untitled's interests to land, and for acquiring credit. If all untitled persons had their names under the names of their respective matai, the registrar could issue a certificate describing the land and its location, which could then be used to satisfy the bank issuing credit. Also, widows, widowers, and children of former titleholders would have protection as long as they served the matai. The Committee argued further that the registration of tautua interests was better than a lease or license, which may be used to stop a chief from coming onto the land to discipline trouble-makers or implement a family or village decision.
By contrast to leases or licenses, tautua interests are, in accordance with custom, subject to the authority of the chief, and do not constitute the alienation of customary land. Despite the committee’s recommendations, however, a system of tautua interest has never been implemented, and untitled producers and junior chiefs are still dependent on the good graces and good sense of their senior chiefs. However, according to my untitled and titled friends, it is not advantageous for senior chiefs to alienate junior chiefs or untitled men and women through unfair treatment, since senior chiefs are dependent on the labour of their subordinates to enhance their prestige. For example, junior chiefs and untitled persons contribute to ceremonial exchanges sponsored by senior chiefs and cultivate unbroken bush land, thereby extending the landholdings of senior title holders.

Public concern over tautua interests, especially those of taule'ale'a, illuminates a classic Marxian dynamic within Samoa’s kin-ordered mode of production (See more general description above, Chapter III). The introduction of cash-cropping has given rise to a contradiction between the “forces of production” (the investment of labour and capital into cash-cropping) and the ‘relations of production” (the traditional authority of the matai over labour, land and produce). In an attempt to resolve conflict between chiefs and untitled persons arising from this contradiction, rural Samoans over the last four decades, have made their own modifications to their customary land tenure system (O’Meara 1986:113-159; 1990:137-147). These modifications were first reported in the literature by O’Meara (ibid.), and are confirmed by my own informants. First of all, in the traditional land tenure system, matai titles are attached to house sites and agricultural lands. Control over land is gained by acquiring a specific matai title which has authority over specific house sites and agricultural plots. Also, access to the
matai titles is gained by a combination of descent from, and exceptional service to, the present title holder. The most significant feature of the traditional land tenure system is that family lands descend, not to the heir of a title holder’s body, but to the successor of his or her title (ibid. 1986:116). This is because the ‘aiga potopoto (maximally extended family) that selects the matai includes both resident and non-resident members. Thus, there are many potential candidates supported by different branches of the ‘aiga potopoto, and succession to a title is almost always a contest. Whoever accedes to the family title moves into the house site, if he or she does not already live there, and immediately takes control of the family and lands to which the title is attached. It is this possibility -- that a person who is not the biological heir of a former title holder may take control of the plantation and house-site -- which causes the greatest insecurity of tenure. I do not know whether this insecurity is widespread. A court official told me that people who accede to senior titles are just as likely to be siblings of the former title-holder as off-spring. In cases where siblings accede to a title, the former title-holders wife and children are required by law to move from the house-site and relinquish all rights to plantation lands. I have personal knowledge of one case in which a previous incumbent’s daughter lost her bid for her father’s title to her father’s brother. Following a court case, mother and daughter were required to leave the house where the latter had been born. The uncle and his family now occupy the house. The uncle manages the plantation lands attached to his title. Mother and daughter rent a bungalow in the urban area where they run their own business. The court official assured me that the descendants of senior title-holders still have to relinquish their rights to house-sites and lands should someone other than a direct descendant accede to the title.
O'Meara states that to understand the difference between the modified system and the traditional system of land tenure requires an understanding of how Samoans distinguish between potential rights and actual rights, under the traditional system of land tenure (ibid.:117; 1990:139). Any heir of an extended family has potential rights to the use of family land, but this potential cannot be realized unless he/she lives with the family and serves the chief. If he/she lives with the family, and serves the chief, he/she has unquestionable actual rights to the land and the chief merely directs where and how his/her labour is expended. However, heirs do not always live with their families. A young man or woman may move to the family lands of his/her respective spouse, and serve the chief of the spouse’s family, either permanently or temporarily. If a person moves away, he/she may not maintain active membership in his/her family. Active membership in a family is maintained by making contributions to family affairs (see chapter II). However, neither contributions nor birthright can give a non-resident heir a right to family lands. They merely maintain a potential right.

If a non-resident heir with potential rights to family land wishes to use family land, he/she must first request the chief’s permission, which is almost always granted (ibid.). By contrast, a resident heir does not have to request permission of the chief. Thus, while any heir has a potential claim to family lands based on descent, activation of that claim requires both residence and service to the chief having authority over the lands. At the same time, under the traditional system of land tenure, any heir has a potential claim to the chiefly authority over family land, but this potential is only activated if and when an heir is elected to the specific title having authority over the land.

Alongside this traditional system of land tenure, O'Meara (1986:123-136; 1990:143-151) found a different land tenure system
operating, referred to as the ‘modified system’. Villages clearly distinguish between lands held according to tradition and those held under the modified system. According to the modified land tenure system, which began operating at least as early as the 1930’s, a plot of land may be legitimately inherited by individuals directly from the person who first cleared and planted it, regardless of matai title. This is in direct contrast to the traditional system, whereby particular matai titles are attached to land, and authority over land is gained only by first acquiring the title.

O’Meara (ibid.) reports that the villagers themselves are quite explicit about the reasons for the change in land tenure. Their primary motivation is their desire for more control over income from cash-cropping. As I discuss above, the modified system of land tenure resolves conflict between untitled farmers and their chiefs with respect to both the security of land tenure and control over the fruits of their labour. Furthermore, most modern houses in rural villages are built by chiefs with remittances from their children living overseas. Chiefs secure their investments by building their houses on house sites claimed as individuals under the modified system of land tenure, rather than under the traditional system. Under the traditional system, virgin forest could be cleared by anyone in the village. The authority over the newly-cleared plot went to the senior title owned by the family which cleared and planted the land. Under the traditional system, the planting of tree crops is the ultimate way for a family to extend its land holdings. Under the modified system, newly-cleared land may be claimed by the individual, his or her spouse, and their children. "Some of these plots have now been held and inherited by individuals for up to three generations" (ibid. 1986:132). Significantly, however, the person who clears and works land cannot hold authority over that land until he/she acquires a matai title.
But, it can be any matai title. Until then, the land remains under the authority the matai he/she serves.

The availability of new land is an important facilitator of this modified land tenure system (ibid. 1986:136; 1990:145). Lands which have been cleared under the old system of land tenure cannot be alienated from the senior title attached to it. Also, a Samoan must still be given a junior title by the senior matai he/she serves to acquire, legitimate, and protect individual rights to newly-cleared cash crop land and house-sites. So, as O’Meara (ibid. 1986:136) points out, the desire of many Samoans to protect individual rights to newly cleared land and house-sites led to the proliferation of titles long before the creation of new matai for election purposes. Also, since potential conflict and tension between untitled men and their chiefs can be resolved by adhering to the modified system of land tenure, O’Meara (ibid. 1990:148) suggests the incentive of untitled men to develop land is no longer blunted by the land tenure rules, as some scholars suggest (see Chapter I). Furthermore, since ambitious untitled men are able to acquire chiefly titles with relative ease, there is little reason for introducing a system of leases, or “tautua interests”, as the Report of Matai Titles, Customary Land, and the Land and Titles Court (G.W.S. 1975a) suggests.

In fact, O’Meara (1990:141-142) argues, it is not the Samoan land tenure system, per se, that creates a problem with development in Samoa, as much as it is administrative procedures of the Land and Titles Court itself. The Samoan Land and Titles Protection Ordinance 1934 (now amended as the Land and Titles Act 1981) requires that the registrar accept and act upon a petition, oral or written by “any interested Samoan” when either the government or a chief announces an intention to develop land. The registrar has interpreted “any interested Samoan” to mean anyone who claims to be an heir to the
present title holder, or previous title holders, whether or not they have actual rights (i.e. resident heirs serving the senior matai with pule over the land), or potential rights to do so (ibid.). O’Meara suggests, this procedure designed during New Zealand’s colonial rule, was devised to lessen the power of matai. The practical effect of the court’s petition procedure is to blur the traditional distinction between potential and actual rights, thereby giving non-resident heirs a legal right to contest a chief’s authority over land when, in fact, they have no traditional right to do so. Furthermore, the court does not legally recognize the modified tenure system, even though court judges are fully aware of its prevalence, and villages accept it and base their court claims on it (ibid. 1986:156; 1990:145-147). Villagers have modified the traditional land tenure system to restrict land claims to those who first cleared the land and their direct descendants, thereby making land tenure more secure, and providing adequate incentive to develop the land. So, it may be the courts’ petition procedures, not the land tenure rules per se, that are undermining the incentive of ambitious enterprising individuals who wish to develop land in the rural area. A number of Samoan matai I talked to complained that distant relatives were interfering with their desire to develop land by bringing court petitions against them.

**Development of Government Land**

The government of Western Samoa owns sixteen percent (G.W.S. 1987:31) of the total land base of Western Samoa. In Chapter IV, we saw that a conference was called in Berlin in 1889. The Berlin Act specified in Article IV that a land commission be formed to hear and settle land disputes between foreigners and Samoan chiefs. The Act specified that only land that had been alienated in a customary manner (i.e. with the consent of both the chiefs having title to the land and the council of the village where the land was located)
would be recognized as being under foreign ownership. As a result of the Samoan Land Commission hearings, foreigners acquired legal rights of ownership to about twenty percent of the land of Western Samoa. Legal ownership of these lands passed to the government of New Zealand by the Samoan Crown Estates Order of 1921, and became known as the New Zealand Reparation Estates. The Estates consisted of 113,560 acres of which 18,000 acres had been cultivated by the Germans (Thomas 1984:134-136). Later, the New Zealand administration sold or leased many cocoa plantations to European residents and new European settlers (ibid.). The administration also gave back large tracts of land to land-short villages around the Apia urban centre (ibid.:137).

In 1951, 31,600 acres of the New Zealand Reparation Estates became a Samoan government-owned corporation, called the Western Samoan Trust Estates Corporation (hereafter referred to as WSTEC). The remaining 78,360 acres of the New Zealand Reparation Estates were turned over to the Independent State of Western Samoa in 1962. Following independence, the government corporation WSTEC continued to make land available for residential and agricultural purposes (Thomas 1984:137-138). Small areas of land were either granted or sold to village chiefs. Most land was sold for urban development. By 1981, WSTEC was in debt. Continual changes in national governments resulted in changes in management. The corporation was involved in court cases concerning misappropriation and misuse of funds and assets. In 1983, the corporation sold 250 acres of peri-urban land to cover its debt (ibid.:138). The land was sold for between WS$5,000 and WS$13,000 per quarter acre. Thomas (ibid.) argues that the government’s policy of allowing WSTEC to sell land has contributed to unequal distribution of land along ethnic lines because neither the average wage-earner (earning WS$1,000 and WS$3,000 per annum) nor rural Samoans (reliant on low market prices
for copra and taro) could afford to buy the land. Only urban-based matali, part-Samoans and Europeans, who already controlled commercial enterprises or free-hold land they could mortgage, were able to obtain sufficient credit to buy the land. Thus, the government’s practice of selling crown land gives urban-based chiefs (Samoan or part-Samoan) an opportunity to accumulate capital, and thereby contribute to the formation of an urban-based Samoan elite (ibid.:143). At the time of my research, WSTEC and government land comprised sixteen percent of the Samoan land base while four percent was privately owned, and eighty percent was under customary ownership (G.W.S. 1987:31).

Since 1971, all of Western Samoa’s development plans have identified government owned land as a major vehicle for industrial and commercial development in Western Samoa. However, development of government land has been an extremely controversial affair since many Samoans do not accept the legitimacy of the Samoan Land Commission’s land grants. As I discuss above, Samoan leaders, in a meeting with a United Nations delegation in 1947, expressed their wish that these lands be returned to the original owners of the land. However, the government of New Zealand declared that it would grant the land only to the Independent State of Western Samoa. The validity of the original sale of customary land was again questioned during the Constitutional Debates of 1960. The chairman, however, closed the debate by reminding the participants that public lands are Court Grants under the Berlin Act, and could not be changed. The records of these court cases and grants are available for public examination at the Lands and Survey Department. Chiefs involved in disputes with the government concerning the use of so-called government land are very familiar with the contents of these records.

Each time the government attempts to develop government
land, government officials must sit down with the villagers and negotiate compensation. This is despite the fact that the land is on record in the Official Register of Lands as belonging to the government or to WSTEC. The government’s recently completed extension of the national airport at Faleolo is the most controversial development of public land today, and events surrounding its construction are a good illustration of both the government’s commitment to traditional rights to land as well as village resistance to the government use of lands (without fair compensation) which they believe were forcibly taken from their forefathers.

On December 4th, 1985, on the eve of the opening of the new runway, The Samoan Observer carried the following story with the headline "Village Still Planning Disruptive Action":

Despite assurances from the Minister of Lands ... that the village of Satuimalufilufi has accepted a land swap offered by his Government, the village is still "gearing up to stop the opening".

A source told the Observer Monday that ... the village had not agreed as a whole to the government’s offer. The sources, who did not wish to be named, said a delegation from the village, who had earlier stopped work on the airport extension, was to advise the Department of Lands not to send a survey team. "The surveyors would be risking their lives", he said.

According to the source, the village is seeking more compensation from Government for their lands (The Samoa Observer Dec. 4, 1985).

Despite this threat, Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana opened the runway without incident the following week. However, Tofilau Eti Alesana’s government fell from power in the New Year, and was replaced by the government of Va’ai Kolone. When negotiations between Satuimalufilufi village and the new government broke down, villagers occupied land which had originally been promised to them but was later declared a reserve area for future expansion of the airport. The following excerpts from articles carried by local newspapers explain the dispute:
Police arrested ten people Tuesday for allegedly stealing and damaging WSTEC property by Faleolo Airport.

The ten people are believed to be members of the extended family of Saipate Olomanu of Satuimalufilufi Village.

Saipate is claiming $4 million compensation for lands which he claims were forcibly taken from his forefathers. He also claims that because the airport is on part of that land, he and his family are entitled to a share of the landing fees collected by the Airport Authority (The Samoan Observer, April 11, 1986).

and

The stretch of land along the inward side of the main road facing the new Faleolo air strip is now occupied by Satuimalufilufi villagers ... Informed sources disclosed that part of the land occupied now was originally promised to Satuimalufilufi village but the decision was later changed last year when it was realized that the area may be needed in the future for airport expansion and related facilities.

Negotiations with the Minister of Lands resulted in an agreement with the villagers that they would be relocated on an area just past the Mulifanua Wharf. This would ensure a sea frontage and ready access for the sea, which indeed provides a traditionally valued privilege.

Reliable sources revealed that the district’s Member of Parliament was influential in pushing the Satuimalufilufi villagers to stay on the “renewed” areas.

... The land in question belongs to WSTEC. But the government has the power to take any lands required for public purposes. And there have been a number of land transactions between government and WSTEC involving land needed for Faleolo Airport development.

... The claim by the Satuimalufilufi has the sympathy of their Member of Parliament who is also the Minister of Civil Aviation (The Samoan Weekly, April 4, 1986).

On May 7, 1986, The Samoan Observer reported that Magistrate’s Court had ordered the release of fifty-two squatters from Satuimalufilufi village after they had spent the night in prison:

... Satuimalufilufi village and the government have been engaged in an on-going dispute over lands the villagers claimed were theirs but were now owned by WSTEC.
The latest confrontation took place during the building of the extension of the airport at Faleolo but a compromise was reached when WSTEC lands elsewhere had been released to the village...

The lands now under dispute are not covered in that exchange. They are separate lands which the arrested squatters have been building on and using as their own...

The squatters had claimed these were their lands which WSTEC had taken from them.

The dispute reached a climax but not a resolution in July of 1986, when donkeys on the airport strip, caused damage to a Polynesian Airline Boeing 707. On July 16, 1986, The Samoan Observer carried the following story:

Slack airport security at Faleolo Airport is being blamed for a near-tragic incident at Faleolo Airport... involving Polynesian Airline Boeing 707 and a pack of donkeys roaming the runway... the aircraft smashed into the herd of six donkeys, killing two, one of which was sucked inside one of the plane's engines, damaging it. Donkey meat was pried out of the engine later.

None on board the plane was injured in the incident, but the plane was declared not airworthy and a replacement engine had to be flown in from Australia.

In Apia, a rumour circulated that the villages of Satuimalufilufi had placed the donkeys, allegedly belonging to the government, on the airport strip. There was much speculation as to who would pay for the damages to the plane. On the same day, the newspaper reported that security guards at Faleolo Airport shot donkeys found wandering on the runway Monday morning in their bid to tighten security. The same newspaper carried a cartoon which lent some humour to an otherwise explosive situation, detailing a damaged plane whose pilot was saying, "Sorry for the delay, ladies and gentlemen, but by a stroke of good luck we'll be dining on 'Donkey Deluxe', served in our own aviation sauce". That week in parliament, the leader of the opposition, Tofilau Eti Alesana, brought up the issue in the House, calling for an end to the killing of donkeys and
other animals by the security guards at Faleolo Airport. He went on to say that killing the animals would not solve the security problems at the airport, and asked the Minister of Aviation, the M.P. for Satuimalufilufi village, to remove his people from WSTEC land east of the airport. At the time I left the field in August, 1986, this dispute remained unresolved.

This detailed account serves two purposes: first, it is an illustration of how the Samoan political élite attempts to straddle two worlds -- the Samoan world and the global world; second, it is an obvious example of village resistance to the political activities of the Samoan élite. With respect to the former, the airport extension funded by New Zealand aid reflects the political élite’s commitment to developing the tourist industry, some of whom have substantial business interests in its development. In addition, New Zealand is hoping that the expansion of the tourist industry will improve Western Samoa’s balance of payments situation by earning foreign exchange, and thereby enhancing its ability to trade with New Zealand. On this level, the interests of the New Zealand government as aid donors and some members of the Samoan political élite coincide, so the government has provided the land for the airport expansion. At the same time, the political élite is aware that most Samoans do not think the government’s ownership of public land is legitimate. Thus, despite the fact that WSTEC has legal ownership of the land at the airport, politicians have attempted to negotiate an exchange of land with the land-poor village of Satuimalufilufi. Some land has been exchanged, but my sources tell me that the village also wants a cash settlement in exchange for the land promised but not transferred.

This puts the government in a very awkward position, because WSTEC has been operating at a loss since 1971 and, despite large capital investments financed by foreign loans, its debt had risen to
at least $12 million by 1986 (Samoan Times: July 4, 1986). Consequently, its major foreign financiers, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, suspended disbursement of funds as of July 1, 1986. The World Bank recommended that the government sell some more of its lands in an attempt to save WSTEC.

An article published in The Samoan Times on July 25, 1985, adds an ironic twist to WSTEC’s situation, and brings history full circle. The headline of the article, “Treaty May Save WSTEC”, makes reference to the Berlin Treaty which ended Samoa’s political autonomy and set up the Samoan Land Commission whose court grants left the Independent State of Western Samoa in control of 16 percent of the land area of Western Samoa. The article is as follows:

The marking of the 100 years of the Treaty of Berlin may also mark the resurrection of WSTEC if the West German Government heeds the appeal by the Deputy Prime Minister Tupuola Efi.

While in Bonn recently.. The Deputy Prime Minister ... discussed plans for the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty by the governments of Germany, Britain, and the United States in Berlin on 14 June 1889 that guaranteed the independence and autonomy of Samoa (my emphasis added).

In his preliminary talks with German officials the Deputy Prime Minister said he stressed that by far the most important legacy of the German times here is the Western Samoa Trust Estates Corporation (WSTEC).

The German response, he said, was positive and very receptive to his plea that Bonn could do nothing more worthwhile for Samoa then ensuring the WSTEC will continue as a permanent productive legacy into the next century of the Berlin Treaty (The Samoan Times, July 26, 1986; my emphasis added).

Thus, in a spectacular show of mutual interest with the Germans, the direct descendant of Tamasese, the then Deputy Prime Minister Tupuola Efi, reinterprets the Treaty of Berlin as a guarantee of the independence and autonomy of Samoa in a desperate plea to save WSTEC. I say "reinterprets" the Berlin Treaty because it was
Tamasese who joined forces with the German regime against Mata‘afa forces in the war of 1889, and whose defeat prompted Germany to ask Britain and the United States to a conference which culminated in the Berlin Treaty ending Samoan Political autonomy.

The detailed account of the dispute between Satuimalufilufi village and the government not only illustrates how the Samoan political elite attempts to straddle two worlds, it is also a good example of village resistance to their interests. In a classic case of what Scott (1986:6-7) calls "everyday forms of resistance", Satuimalufilufi villagers invaded State property in Western Samoa and openly challenged these property relations. At the time of my leaving Samoa, they were still living on WSTEC land, helping themselves to the fruits of WSTEC plantations, growing their garden vegetables, and allowing their animals to forage for food. In short, they were carrying on their everyday lives in open defiance of the law. So-called "stealing" of WSTEC property is, in the villagers' eyes, and in Guha's (1983:89) words, "perfectly justifiable --even honourable acts of social protest".

CONCLUSION

The continuation of the illegal practice of 'treating' at election time; the refusal by Samoans to allow the Lands and Titles Court to be the final arbiter in village land disputes; the refusal of rural land owners to allow the government to alienate customary land for public use or develop State land without compensating the original owners together with the government's tolerance of these events despite the legal power to repel them -- all these events are manifestations of the Samoan polity's continuing commitment to the maintenance and reproduction of Samoan institutions -- a praxis that substantiates the power of the Samoan heart. This power of the heart has successfully curtailed State power through 25 years of State
rule largely directed to imposing a state-centred model of and for development upon the Samoan people. In short, Samoan culture has operated as a counter-hegemonic force to the extension of State authority and control over village resources and thus, the development process itself.

Nevertheless, the very presence of foreign-derived institutions like the State and electoral politics as well as the rise of a group of Samoans who perceive their futures and fortunes as being partially dependent on success in the global economy puts Samoan cultural categories and practices at risk. For example, it is not inconceivable that absentee chiefs (who are a majority in the district where I did my fieldwork) would someday vote for a government interested in changing the land tenure system by allowing the sale of customary land they no longer need or want. Such a change could threaten the reproduction of the Samoan political system by eroding its land base. Secondly, the lack of constitutional recognition of the local power structures paves the way for some future political élite to declare village laws unconstitutional thereby undermining the power and autonomy of the village councils to control their land resources. Finally, the formation of political parties may encourage Samoans to identify with a political party and undermine their loyalties to the indigenous political hierarchy of titles. While none of these postulated outcomes may be inherently effective in the face of lived practice, they are worthy of consideration by Western Samoa’s planners and visionaries.
NOTES

1. One such dispute over the reforestation project at Togi Togiga reached a crisis in 1986 and is covered in detail in Chapter II.

2. It is common practice for the government to send out surveyors to survey any land which is to be developed so that it can be recorded in the Official Register of Lands. It is just as common practice for villagers who disagree with the development to threaten the surveyors with death. Officials at the Lands and Surveys Department told me surveyors consider working on lands which are under dispute to be too dangerous, and will not go on the land.
CHAPTER VII

DEVELOPMENT OR DEPENDENCE: CONTRADICTIONS AND DISJUNCTURES

In the first part of this Chapter, I describe the changing complexion of post-colonial international relationships in the South Pacific in order to elaborate the stage upon which foreign agents (aid donors and investors) work through their relationships with Samoan élites (state politicians and officials). Furthermore, I describe the structures of power and resistance in order to explicate the multidimensional context within which development must take place. Then I examine the processes of development planning in Western Samoa, and look at government expenditures and involvement in projects in order to assess the government’s performance in terms of rural development. Also, I examine the Samoan economy’s health and productivity in order to assess the performance of major aid donors in terms of resource allocations and their effectiveness in developing the economy. Finally, I discuss the ways in which aid donors, politicians and bureaucrats conceptualize development as well as the stagnation and decline of production and the solutions they propose for enhancing the productive capacity of the Samoan people.

THE POST COLONIAL PACIFIC: NUCLEAR BUILD-UP OR NUCLEAR FREE

Since decolonization began in the South Pacific with Western Samoa’s independence in 1962, eight more island groups have become fully independent -- Nauru, Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, the Soloman Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Vanautu. This means nine independent states are free to make their own foreign policy
decisions, forcing the United States, Australia and New Zealand to devise new policies to maintain their predominant influence there (Fry 1981:455). Since the 1970's the former Soviet Union, Japan and China have expressed interest in the South Pacific. They have offered the newly independent states an alternative source of economic assistance, trade, and diplomatic links outside their former colonial links in the region.

The abundance of fish in the South Pacific has enhanced the commercial value of the region, attracting Japanese, Russian and U.S. fishing vessels. These distant fishing nations have had to make agreements with new Pacific States, giving them a leverage in international politics they might not otherwise have.

In addition to its commercial fishing value, today, as in the past, the Pacific is of immense strategic value (Fry 1981:459; McDonald 1986:124; Buszynski 1988:213-234; Knapman 1986:139; Hau’ofa 1987:10). In particular, French Polynesia is a French Nuclear testing site, New Caledonia is a potential site for a French Nuclear base, and the Micronesian Territories and Guam are important sites for U.S. military and communications bases. Through the ANZUS security pact, Australia, New Zealand and the United States developed a joint initiative with respect to strategic interests in the area. In 1976, the former Soviet Union established diplomatic links with Tonga, Fiji and Western Samoa. Australia and New Zealand responded by dramatically increasing their economic aid and diplomatic links with the South Pacific states (Fry 1981:460). In the mid-eighties, Soviet interests intensified in the Pacific because of the roles played by China and Japan in contemporary international politics (Buszynski 1988:213-234). The United States made a crucial alliance with Japan to impede the projection of Soviet naval power into the Pacific and to challenge the Soviet base in the Sea of Okhotsk just to the north of Japan. Japan’s role
was to assist in the imposition of a blockade in time of conflict, to co-operate in anti-submarine warfare and to intercept Soviet bombers. This U.S.-Japanese union posed a threat to the Soviet Union's second strike capacity and was viewed by the Soviet Union as an attempt to enhance the United States' first strike capabilities.

The Soviet Union responded to the American-Japanese strategic cooperation in several ways. Emphasis given to internal economic reform under Gorbachev reflected the Soviet Union's recognition that it did not have the resources to support an arms build-up against the combined forces of the U.S. and Japan (Buszynski 1988:214). Also, in an attempt to compensate for strategic vulnerability, the Soviet Union began to encourage efforts of South Pacific States to declare a nuclear free zone, thereby reducing Pacific perceptions of a Soviet threat. The major thrust of Gorbachev's Pacific policy was towards improving Soviet relations with Japan and China and undermining U.S. relations with them as a way of ensuring a more favourable balance of power in the region (ibid.:223). To this end, Gorbachev agreed to remove Soviet missiles in the Pacific, and to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, and began negotiations to reduce troops along the Sino-Soviet border (ibid.:223-228).

Before the break up of the Soviet Union, its relations with China improved steadily due to a significant increase in trade arranged largely in barter terms (Alagappa 1990:329; Ziegler 1990:437). Soviet relations with Japan did not progress as well. While the Soviets sought to attract Japanese capital, technology and management assistance in developing their economy, the Japanese had few incentives to cooperate because the Soviets did not have the foreign currency to pay for sizeable imports of Japanese goods and technology (Ziegler, ibid.).

The Japanese-U.S. alliance appears to be strong, based on
a division of labour for maintaining the status quo in the Pacific. Japan is concentrating on economic development of the region by means of aid, trade and investment while the United States is handling military defence in the region as a whole (Khamchoo 1991:15). In 1986, Japan announced its intention to increase its aid allocations to Pacific island countries by more than ten percent annually (Keith Reid 1987:13).

Although Gorbachev's leadership greatly reduced the threatening image of the former Soviet Union in countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (Corning 1990:468), the non-communist East-Asian countries and Japan wanted the U.S. to maintain its military presence in the region (Alagappas 1990:343). Southeast Asia is a source of eventual raw materials for Japan, a sizeable market for Japanese goods, and a site for substantial Japanese investment (Khamchoo 1991:7). Until recently, the Japanese viewed the U.S. military presence as essential for protecting their trade interests against Soviet expansionism. The Southeast Asian countries viewed the U.S. military presence as a restraint on both Soviet and Japanese powers (ibid.:19).

Furthermore, the objectives of the American Pacific strategy continue to be to maintain both maritime superiority, with deployed forces prepared to fight across the full spectrum of warfare, and a network of alliances and close friends (Corning 1990:7-8). It is impossible for anyone to predict what effect the break up of the Soviet Union will have on U.S. and Japanese strategies in the Pacific, but it is likely that the Pacific will continue to be of immense strategic value for some time to come.

In 1971, the New Pacific States of Western Samoa, Fiji and the Cook Islands took the initiative to create their own organization -- the South Pacific Forum -- in an attempt to shape and control the influence of metropolitan countries (Fry 1981:461-
466). They asked Australia and New Zealand to join them but excluded the other metropolitan countries. The Forum established the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) as its research arm. Australia and New Zealand each contribute one third of the budget, with the remainder contributed by the Pacific State members. The Forum has since negotiated access to the Australian and the European Community's (EC) markets, as well as access to the Asian Development Bank. In addition, the South Pacific Forum countries set up the Forum Fishing Agency to regulate the activities of North Pacific fishing nations, especially the now defunct Soviet Union, the United States, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Negotiations through the 1970's on the Law of the Sea served to notify these distant-water fishing nations that they now had to deal with independent countries before fishing in their waters. At first, the United States refused to ratify the Law of the Sea, and thereby refused to accept the 200 mile exclusive economic zones of Pacific Island States (Power 1986:469). The United States maintained that highly migratory species, such as tuna, should not come within the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal states, a position designed to protect the interests of their powerful commercial fishing lobby (Waugh 1988). Some Pacific Island states responded by arresting U.S. fishing vessels.

Finally, in 1987, after two and a half years of negotiations between Forum countries and the U.S., they signed a treaty giving Forum countries about $US60 million over a five year period, in return for U.S. fishing rights (ibid.). Most Pacific scholars viewed the treaty as inevitable due to the American concern at that time over Soviet fishing, and other Soviet diplomatic advances in the Pacific (Power 1986:469; MacDonald 1986:123).

Besides attempting to control the fishing activities of North Pacific fishing nations, Pacific Island States have used the
South Pacific Forum to speak with a united voice against other
distasteful activities by metropolitan countries in their region. For
example, they have spoken out strongly against French nuclear
testing beneath Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia. This long-term
criticism of French nuclear testing is combined with forum support
for independence movements in French territories, particularly in
New Caledonia, where nationalism is strongest (Power 1986:466). In
1985, strong protest from the South Pacific Forum persuaded Japan to
delay dumping nuclear waste in the North Pacific. Between 1984 and
1985, a working group of the South Pacific Forum, chaired by
Australia, drafted what became the Rarotonga Treaty. The treaty
bans regional states from developing, manufacturing, testing and
acquiring, owning or using nuclear explosive devices (Power
1986:455-475). Further, the treaty recognizes the right of each
Forum state to make decisions about port-visits of ships carrying
nuclear weapons.

As Epeli Hau'ofa (1987) remarks, economic development trends
over the last couple of decades have been toward economic,
political and social integration of the islands with New Zealand and
Australia precisely because Pacific States are such an integral part
of the overall regional alignments. Also, in 1986, the flow of
Japanese aid to the Pacific Forum countries increased to $A55
million, reflecting the fact that the U.S. has urged Japan to
shoulder more of the regional defense burden by providing
development resources for Pacific States. In other words, the
donors view economic aid as fundamental to the stability of their
political alignments in the Pacific -- a stability which serves the
economic and political interests of the donors. Consequently, as
Hau'ofa (ibid.:9) argues, it is unlikely that economically powerful
nations will allow Pacific economies any measure of independence in
the foreseeable future. This fact is reflected in the conversations
I had with aid donor officials cited below.

The newly independent states of the South Pacific are confronted with a rapidly changing global order. Before decolonization, international relations were determined by the United States in conjunction with Australia, New Zealand and the European powers. However, since independent states have become political actors in their own right, the North Pacific powers -- Japan and the former Soviet Union in particular -- have made international relations more complicated. The widespread perception of a Soviet threat to the United States' strategic interests in the area has increased the flow of economic aid to the new Pacific nations -- aid that was unlikely to promote growth in small island economies limited by their size, remoteness and natural resource poverty (Knapman 1986:139-152). To this extent, aid has been a way for metropolitan countries to create economically dependent states that will, in time, become more like them and come to share the same economic and political philosophies.

In an effort to resist the unwanted activities of metropolitan countries, the new Pacific States created the South Pacific forum. However, their success in controlling the activities of commercial fishermen and strategic maneuvers has been limited. With respect to the former, the total area of the Pacific nations' exclusive economic zones exceeds 30 million kilometers, and distant fishing nations take eighty percent of the tuna taken these waters (Bergin 1988:48-49). Unfortunately, Pacific Island States do not have the massive amount of capital required either for surveillance or to develop their own fishing fleets and canneries. Those that do exist in the Pacific are either wholly owned, or almost wholly owned, by corporations in Japan or the United States.

Pacific Forum countries have been even less successful in controlling foreign military actions in the area. The Rarotonga
Treaty is deliberately restricted to the South Pacific, so as not to jeopardize U.S. strategic assets in the North Pacific, and the United States has done nothing to encourage France to limit its military activities in New Caledonia or French Polynesia.

However, despite their limited success in controlling the activities of metropolitan countries, Pacific Forum countries have had great success in forging a regional identity based on both the rejection of the continuing political, cultural and economic domination by powerful Pacific rim countries and the assertion of a Pacific cultural identity and autonomy (Fry 1981:468). For example, Epeli Hau'ofa (1987) suggests that "the privileged groups" (ibid.:1) of the South Pacific Island states form a single dominant culture, i.e. a "regional society" that emerged during the process of colonization. Members of this élite, who have forged intimate links through governmental, professional, educational, and other connections including migration and marriage, have a great deal more in common with each other than with less privileged members of their own societies (ibid.:1-3). Regional élites decide on the needs of their communities and the direction of development. Highly trained Pacific Islanders who have become consultants in the region, combine their specialist expertise with their "insider insights" and become "effective advocates" for "capitalist development" (ibid.7). Hau'ofa remarks that many of the region's resources, including aid money, go toward supporting this élite group and suggests that the region's underprivileged people are poor because they cannot tap these resources. The data I present below support Hau'ofa's claims. In 1980, an edited volume entitled The Pacific Way (Tupounuia, Crocombe and Slater, eds. 1980) expressed the concerns of Islanders about development planning and its impact on their respective cultures and identity. Many of the contributors to the volume express concerns that the development process benefits only a small
urban élite composed of foreigners and Islanders working in close association with foreign interests and values (Rokotuivuna 1980:6-8; Sevele 1980:99-100). One Islander expresses the goal of development planning as 'capitalist materialism' and views it as a threat to Island economies based on kinship (Rika 1980:29). Some of the Islanders (Rokotuivuna 1980:ibid.; Sevele 1980:ibid.; Ratuvili 1980:91) urge development planners to consult the people about their goals and objectives and the kind of society they want.

A considerable number of regional conferences are held every year involving large numbers of government bureaucrats, politicians and community leaders (Fry 1981:469). During my fieldwork, one of my Samoan friends gave me a copy of resolutions passed by one such conference: The Pacific People’s Solidarity Conference for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific, Suva, Fiji August 5-8, 1986. Conference participants call for immediate demilitarization and denuclearization of the Pacific. They identify themselves with all indigenous people of the world, describing themselves as "living as one with the elements". The colonists, on the other hand, are described as being "responsible for the destruction of mankind and the wholesale rape of our mother earth". Their proposed solution to this wholesale destruction is for the indigenous people to reclaim their land and thereby their rights as indigenous people of the world.

This, then, is the backdrop to the stage upon which the aid donors work out their relationship with Samoan state officials and politicians -- a scenario which prompts one to ask: Are aid donor interests in Western Samoa fuelled more by a concern to maintain and enhance their collective strategic advantage in the Pacific than by a concern to promote development in this small island nation, and, to what extent are the Samoan élites collaborating with the aid donors?
GOVERNMENT PLANS AND THE PLANNING PROCESS

The government of Western Samoa began formalized indicative development planning in 1965 with the country's First Five-Year Plan, 1966-1970. Western Samoa's Sixth Development Plan 1988-1990 was completed in December of 1987. In October 1965, the Economic Development Act was passed establishing a Department of Economic Development and providing for a Minister of Economic Development who was named as Chairman of the Economic Development Board. The Board consists of five Cabinet Ministers, and is chaired by the Minister of Economic Development (GWS 1966:6-8). The same year, the government established the Enterprises Incentives Board to recommend to Cabinet the granting of incentives to enterprises in manufacturing, processing, tourism, fisheries and forestry development and research (ibid.). Multi-year indicative plans -- either five or three years -- state the government's development objectives, strategies for achieving them, and programmes and projects to be implemented during the plan period.

The first step in plan preparations is a request to all departments to identify projects stating objectives, cost, and sources of funds. Department submissions are reviewed by the Treasury and the Department of Economic Development. Projects are studied formally by the Ad Hoc Planning Committee comprising representatives from major departments and chaired by the Director of Economic Development. The plan is then drafted by the Department of Economic Planning. The draft plan is submitted, discussed and finalized at the ministerial level by the Economic Development Board, consisting of the Ministers of Works, Agriculture, Lands, Finance and Economic Affairs, and then submitted to Cabinet. Finally, the Aid Coordinating Committee, a section of the Prime Minister's department, with a membership of Ministers and senior government officials, examines and screens all aid-funded projects.
The Committee submits its recommendations and decisions directly to cabinet for tabling in the Legislative Assembly. In short, the political and bureaucratic élite are responsible for economic planning in Western Samoa.

Western Samoa’s political and bureaucratic élite have expressed a strong commitment to economic growth reflected in growth of per capita income as a means of improving the welfare of Samoan people (GWS 1966:xiii; 1970:3; 1975b:2; 1980:4; 1984b:12; 1987:Preface). At the same time, each Development Plan has emphasized that economic growth must occur through higher productivity and diversification of export crops in the rural sector. This emphasis is based on the recognition that about 80 percent of the country’s total marketed agricultural products, 75 percent of the value of agricultural exports and 15 percent of public revenue derived from export taxes, originates in the rural or village sector of Western Samoa’s economy (Fairbairn 1985:336). Moreover, except for the first Plan, all Plans state that economic growth ‘must not be realized at the expense of basic changes in Samoa’s social institutions’ (GWS 1975b:2). Instead, development strategies seek to improve the productivity of village land by utilizing Western Samoa’s political, social and cultural institutions (GWS 1970:Introduction; 1975b:2; 1980:1; 1984:12; 1987:Preface). For example, in the Preface of Western Samoa’s Fourth Five-Year Development Plan 1980-1984 (GWS 1980), the Director of Economic Development stated that:

it is imperative to meet the basic needs of all citizens, to retain Samoa as a predominantly rural village society, to utilize natural resources as the basis of economic development, and to draw more heavily upon traditional organizations and institutions in development (ibid.:Preface).

In Western Samoa’s Sixth Development Plan, the Minister of Economic Affairs praises Western Samoa’s development, saying that:

We have every reason to be satisfied with our
achievements ... Since Independence in 1962, successive governments have demonstrated full commitments to the socio-economic development of Western Samoa as a positive means of improving the well being of the Samoan people. At the same time the traditional forms of organization, Cultural belief and value systems of Samoan life have been able to stay outside of the vicious circle of hunger and poverty that plague most under-developed countries. Happily for Samoans, if all else fails there is always the village economy to sustain life (GWS 1987:Preface).

This commitment to the preservation of traditional institutions by Western Samoa’s economic planners is closely related to their commitment to the preservation of Samoan culture, not as a static entity, but as a dynamic force necessary for the spiritual and emotional health of the Samoan people:

Like a tree, culture is forever growing new foliage and roots. Samoan culture was changing even in pre-papalagi [pre-contact] times through inter-island contact and endeavours of exceptional individuals and groups who manipulated politics, religion, and other people. No culture is sacred or perfect. Individual dissent is essential to the healthy survival, development and sanity of any nation; without it our culture will stagnate and drown in self-love. No culture is ever static ... there is no state of cultural purity ... usage determines authenticity ... Cultural identity and its development is now recognized as the most basic ingredient of building a nation. Without it, so-called modern economic development may occur at the expense of our spiritual and emotional health as a people and as Samoans (GWS 1980:85-86).

Economic growth and the well-being of Samoans is linked to increased production of export crops as a way of both improving Western Samoa’s balance of payments and decreasing its dependence on foreign aid. For example, in the Introduction to the Third Development Plan (GWS 1975b) the Minister of Finance and Economic Development states that:

The main thrust of the Plan is to increase our country’s basic capacity for agricultural production, particularly of crops that can readily be exported, to earn foreign exchange required to continue the development of our economy and enable us to obtain the imported consumer goods we need (ibid.:Introduction).

At first, foreign aid in the form of loans and grants was viewed by
politicians and bureaucrats as a necessary means of bridging the foreign exchange gap by providing foreign capital to invest in development aimed at sustained economic growth (GWS 1966:17; 1970:22). By 1975, however, Samoan planners were worried about whether or not project aid was accomplishing this task. For example, the Third Development Plan states that:

The country is now facing ... constraints on the availability of three key resources: foreign exchange savings in the public sector; and managerial and technical manpower .... Foreign assistance, of course can help bridge all three resource gaps .... Indeed the Third Plan relies heavily on foreign aid .... for balance of payments support and domestic expenditures ... (GWS 1975b:3-5).

But the planners caution:

project choices, even if financed by foreign aid, including grants, still must measure up to hard economic criteria. Favourite projects of aid donors are not necessarily in the best interest of Western Samoa ... they can divert the country's scarce managerial resources and domestic funds from more important tasks (ibid.:6).

By the Fifth Economic Development Plan (GWS 1984b) economic planners began to express a great deal of concern about Western Samoa's dependence on foreign aid. In fact, economic independence and self-reliance became a major development objective:

True economic independence and self-reliance is desired to maintain national integrity and self-reliance. This is not possible as long as Samoa continues to be heavily dependent on foreign aid, technical manpower, fuel and food .... A major pre-condition for greater economic independence is effective self-reliance at the rural village level (ibid.:12).

In addition to stating a commitment to increased production, economic independence and self-reliance, all development plans have articulated a commitment to providing greater opportunities for all Western Samoans to participate more actively in the development process (GWS 1966:xiii; 1970: Introduction; 1975b:12; 1980:98; 1984b:12; 1986:25). The strongest commitment to wide-spread participation in the development process ("planning from below") is
the Village Development Programme will seek to establish a process of "planning from below" in village society. This approach will be based upon the ability of traditional institutions -- fono, matais, pulenu'u, the Women's Committees, youth groups and others -- to determine appropriate village level development goals, and to design and execute the productive activities which will make the achievement of these goals possible (GWS 1975:12).

Other Plans have expressed the commitment more generally:

to ensure equitable distribution of socio-economic opportunities according every Samoan citizen a rightful place to participate and share in the fruits of development (GWS 1987:25).

The political élite's concern with "planning from below" is linked to their concern with the preservation of culture. In the first quote above, for example, the author assigns an active role to "traditional" institutions, specifically, the village council (fono), chiefs (matais), the village mayor (pulenu'a), women's committees and youth groups. Note, however, that the office of the village mayor and women's committees, both of which were created during the German colonial era, are glossed as "traditional" institutions. A Samoan writer, Malama Maleisea (1980) views the dual goals of economic growth and preservation of culture as problematic because they necessitate a choice, not only of what aspects of tradition to preserve, but also of what tradition constitutes in the first place.²

Finally, the last two Development Plans have included a commitment to:

conserve and protect the environment, maintain the ecological balance, improve the habitat and physical development of Western Samoa (ibid.).

Unfortunately, the development objectives of Western Samoa's senior bureaucrats and politicians have not been matched by either development strategies and resource allocations or performance of the economy. As I discuss below, since 1974, GDP per capita has
declined, the trade deficit has escalated rapidly, Western Samoa’s
dependence on foreign aid and remittances from Samoans working
overseas has increased significantly, an ever-increasing percentage
of exports has been required to service the foreign debt, and the
production of major export crops has either stagnated or declined.
Moreover, government development expenditures indicate a decreasing
monetary commitment to agriculture. The First Development Plan
allocated 62 percent of development expenditures to agriculture and
21 percent to infrastructure (GWS 1966:93). The actual outcome,
however, was a complete reversal of intentions, with infrastructure
receiving 64 percent (ADB 1985:31). Government expenditures during
the Second, Third and Fourth Development Plans indicate that
agriculture received 22 percent, 24 percent and 32 percent
respectively, while expenditures on infrastructures continued to be in
excess of 50 percent. During the Fifth Development Plan period,
out of a total expenditure of WS$228.5 million, agriculture received
30 percent and infrastructure 56 percent (GWS 1987:259).

Government strategies aimed at achieving economic growth
have not been directed exclusively at the agriculture sector, nor
have all or even most of agricultural expenditures reached the rural
sector of the economy. In fact, the rural sector is believed to
require a lot of government support in terms of technical advice and
other services, but little capital expenditure (GWS 1975b:10;
1980:100-106). Out of a total development expenditure of WS$91.9
million between 1974 and 1979 (GWS 1980:238) only WS$1.1 million, or
1.3 percent (ibid.:104) was spent on rural development projects.
Although there are no comprehensive figures for rural development
expenditures, records of loan approvals at the Development Bank of
Western Samoa (DBWS) gives some idea of capital investment (the Bank
is the major credit institution for rural small-holders). DBWS
lends to rural people for village projects such as schools, clinics,
and roads as well as for plantation development. Between 1980 and 1983, the government’s total development expenditure was WS$117.9 million (GWS 1984b:172). During that same period, DBWS approved loans to small agriculture and village projects totalling WS$3.6 million (ibid.:92) or 3 percent of the government’s total development expenditure. Unfortunately, in the government’s Sixth Development Plan (GWS 1987:250), the table on DBWS loan operations does not distinguish between lending to large commercial agricultural operations and small-holders in the village sector. However, the government’s Capital Expenditure Programme for 1988 to 1990 (ibid.:218-233) does give details of proposed expenditures which indicate that only slightly more than three percent of total government spending was allocated for programmes in village agriculture: the Cocoa Suspensory Loan Programme (WS$1.32 million); the Coconut Planting and Replanting Programme; the Community Forestry Programme and Artisanal Fisheries Development. However, another 2.8 percent of total government expenditure will be allocated to village infrastructure projects including village water supplies, plantation access roads and village electrification. So a total of 5.8 percent of proposed government expenditures was set aside for the rural sector.

The Apia hospital project financed by New Zealand aid is an early example of the government’s neglect of rural development. In the early 1970’s, the New Zealand government agreed to upgrade Apia hospital on the condition that the government of Western Samoa upgrade district hospitals and rural health services (Hoadley 1980:443-455). In 1976, New Zealand terminated the project because, apparently, the Western Samoan government was not carrying out its end of the bargain. District hospitals are built and maintained by rural people. Rural people perform all routine patient care and provide food and housing for resident medical staff. As Hoadley
(ibid.:449) remarks, the Apia hospital absorbs a disproportionate quantity of government resources relative to the proportion of patients it treats. Concentrating medical and health resources in Apia discourages the self-help efforts of the villages and imposes the extra costs of travel on sick persons and their families.

A more recent example of how government development programmes by-pass the rural farmers is the history of passion fruit production (O'Meara 1990:21-22). In an attempt to diversify village agriculture, the Department of Agriculture started a passion fruit programme in the late 1970's on quarter acre village plots. The programme ran into problems almost immediately because trellis posts deteriorated rapidly, causing the mature vines to collapse. Also, the participant farmers had to pollinate the flowers by hand. The government put the programme under the management of an expatriate who doubled the selling price of the fruit; signed contracts with commercial growers, almost all of whom were Samoans who owned freehold land near Apia; replaced untreated trellis posts with chemically treated ones; and set up commercial beehives to eliminate the need for hand pollination. The manager did not accept any growers who did not contract for the entire expensive package. Village farmers had neither the cash nor the ability to secure loans for the initial costs of production. The expatriate manager favoured Samoans with concentrated land holdings of ten acres or more. After three years of spectacular harvests, the scheme collapsed due to huge unsold surpluses.

Most of the government's agricultural spending has been allotted either to productive projects at WSTEC, the government's agricultural corporation (the largest commercial operation in Western Samoa), or to largely aid-funded, service-oriented development and research projects which utilize government land and foreign technicians and managers. Such projects include the Cocoa
Rehabilitation Project (Australia), Plant Protection Project (West Germany), Livestock Development (FAO/IFAD), Animal Health and Production (UNDP) and so on (ADB 1985:70-75). As early as the government's Second Development Plan (GWS 1970:33-35) Western Samoa's planners draw attention to the need to investigate the development potential of WSTEC and other government land holdings which together account for 15.8 percent of Western Samoa's land base. The Third Development Plan articulates a commitment to developing commercial agriculture:

While acknowledging the substantial importance of village agriculture, it would be a mistake to neglect the significance of the Western Samoa Trust Estates Corporation (WSTEC) and its control over some 20,000 acres of prime land, or the existence of certain additional public and private farm units .... These include government livestock units .... (GWS 1975b:87).

The Fourth Development Plan reiterated this commitment and singled out WSTEC as the largest beneficiary because of its potential role both as a model for commercial agricultural production based on modern management practices and as a means to develop agro-industries (GWS 1980:113-118). At the same time, government viewed WSTEC as the main means by which agricultural exports could be strengthened. In order to prepare WSTEC for this role, government negotiated some 20 million dollars worth of loans to both improve WSTEC's management and rehabilitate its plantations (ibid.:117). By 1984, however, the government was expressing concern and disappointment over WSTEC's performance:

WSTEC has been accorded a key role in the government's strategy to develop agriculture, especially in fostering the concept of commercial agricultural production based on modern management practices ... but WSTEC's performance so far has been disappointing. During DP4 substantial funds were channelled into WSTEC for development by the ADB, the World Bank, UNDP and bilateral donors. The purpose was to rehabilitate existing plantations by upgrading management, to execute a vigorous replanting programme and to develop new agricultural areas. However, due to large operating losses ... WSTEC's financial structure
has become increasingly weak, which caused delays in the implementation of its plantation development programme (GWS 1984:54-55).

By 1986, major aid donors were threatening to cut their funding to WSTEC unless the corporation tightened up its financial control (The Observer August 8, 1986; The Samoan Times June 27, 1986). For some time WSTEC was run by a six-man board, including the Prime Minister, all of whom were political appointments, and some of whom were cabinet ministers. In 1986, however, the government was engaged in depoliticizing WSTEC’s board. Nonetheless, when WSTEC’s financial situation became public knowledge, scandals involving misappropriation of funds by politicians were recalled:

With 30,000 acres of prime land at its disposal WSTEC has the potential to become the country’s main foreign exchange earner. However, because of misuse of its assets for political purposes the corporation has never been allowed to realize anywhere near its full potential. In the last general election for instance, WSTEC lost thousands through the illegal use of cattle and funds to back certain candidates ... As an example we cite the case of one Board where a certain MP took goods on credit nearly five years ago and has never repaid the debt. That very MP is now Chairman of the Board (The Samoan Times May 2, 1986).

Also, various WSTEC scandals were the subject of bitter debates in Parliament during August of 1986. One newspaper reported that:

Opposition leader Tofilau Eti led the critics’ assault on the poor performance of the corporation (WSTEC) ... Tofilau accused the Minister of being responsible for the loss of some $250,000 alone while he was general manager of WSTEC (The Samoan Times August 15, 1986).

The Opposition Leader alleged the accused Minister had ordered 200 tons of rice for some businessmen for which he had been paid a commission. The rice, he said, had to be dumped when bugs and insects made it unfit for eating (ibid.).

Development Plan Six acknowledges WSTEC’s inability to play a leadership role meant to "demonstrate the virtues and values of commercial plantation management and organization" (GWS 1987:66-67). The Plan advocates a programme to restructure WSTEC’s management
practices and complete planting programmes agreed upon with the funding agencies. Nevertheless, despite the fact that WSTEC has not been able to demonstrate the value of commercial plantation management to Western Samoan farmers, development planners are presently suggesting that government encourage the formation of large-scale commercial development in the village sector by supporting worthwhile joint ventures between local villagers and outside parties, either local or foreign, in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, or agro-processing (GWS 1984:13-14). Furthermore, the Sixth Development Plan (GWS 1987:33) proposes that serious consideration be given to a land tax as part of a comprehensive plan to restructure land use in Western Samoa:

It is recognized that the use of customary land which accounts for about 81 percent of total land area exerts a major influence on the pattern of land use and prospects of agricultural development .... The major agricultural development thrust must therefore be directed towards the village sector with projects designed not only to produce the maximum net benefit to the country in terms of land capability and productivity but to be compatible with the social and land tenure systems. It is here proposed that as a measure for improving productivity on customary land, serious consideration should be given to imposing a land tax preceded necessarily by a comprehensive land-use survey. Land would then be taxed on its potential productivity according to its approximate size and fertility (ibid.:34).

Also, the Plan emphasizes the development of forestry as complementary to the use of land for agriculture:

forestry plays an important ‘multiple role’ as a supplier of raw materials for various industries, and in its environmental protection role in stabilizing watersheds and maintaining water yields. Forestry is thus complementary to agricultural land use in preventing erosion and flooding and therefore maintaining the productivity of land. While forestry comes second to agriculture in terms of economic use of land, it will be a challenge...for government to regard this natural resource...as an essential and profitable alternative to maximizing productivity of land...(ibid.).

The Plan points out the importance of physical planning:
Physical planning will be a matter of priority during DP6 and it behooves the Government to carefully look into the effective development of areas of land for settlement, industrial and commercial, and agricultural purposes so as to realize optimum land utilization.... To this end a comprehensive land use survey for the whole country...will be conducted (ibid.:35).

There is a curious disjuncture in plan dialogue surrounding the issue of rationalizing land-use in the rural area. On the one hand, the planners emphasize that agricultural development should be compatible with the social and land tenure systems. On the other hand, they are suggesting allocating land to alternative uses (settlement, industrial, commercial and agriculture) based on a government land-use survey - a consideration which totally ignores the fundamental political and social realities of Western Samoa's land tenure system: that is, that customary land allocation is the exclusive domain of chiefs and village councils. Also, the government's proposal to institute a land tax on the potential productivity of land assumes that rural farmers possess the capital and labour necessary to develop the land. So far, the government has been unwilling to provide farmers with very much capital and my data on the village (Chapter II) shows they are experiencing a serious shortage of both labour and capital. Furthermore, as O'Meara (1990:124) observes, the purpose of the proposed land-tax is to force local farmers to produce and market more cash crops. But, the proposal assumes all land could and should be valued solely for its potential for producing cash crops. This assumption is absurd in a small Pacific island country, where at least half the land is used for subsistence production. The tax would force village planters to produce cash crops when it is not economically advantageous to do so. O'Meara's (ibid.) observation supports the positions of Yen (1980) and Fisk (1986) which I discuss in Chapter 1. Such a tax may diminish subsistence food supplies to the point where foreign exchange gains made by export production would have to
be used to buy imported food consumed by the rural farmers. As Yen
(ibid.) argues, it is more advantageous for both the nation and the
rural farmer to produce subsistence goods than to produce strictly
for export.

The Government’s Sixth Development Plan is not the first to
discuss forestry as an alternative use of customary land. In fact,
the First Development Plan (GWS 1962:32) emphasizes that:

One of the biggest immediate potentials for
diversification in Western Samoa is in timber
harvesting, tree farming and sawmilling.

A forestry study done in 1962 concluded that large-scale milling and
logging operations in Western Samoa would not be feasible (Shankman
1978:389). Then, in 1963, a United Nation’s study came to the
opposite conclusion. This study concluded that large-scale
sustained yield tree farming was feasible. In 1965, an American
firm, Potlatch, visited the island of Samoa and conducted a survey
of twenty-six varieties of hardwoods (Shankman 1978:390). In 1966,
the government of Western Samoa received a proposal from Potlatch to
establish a large commercial timber operation at Asau on the Island
of Savai’i. The Forestry Act of 1967 introduced the institutional
framework for development in Western Samoa (GWS 1970:43). By 1968,
New Samoa Industries Ltd. (NSIL) had begun lumber production on
Upolu and Potlatch Samoa had established itself on Savai’i
(ibid.:151). The monetary rewards from Potlatch fell far short of
what Samoans expected. The average yearly per capita income for
farmers who leased their land to the company was a little under
eleven Samoan dollars (Shankman 1978:393). The royalties Potlatch
paid on cut timbers were also small -- four cents per cubic foot,
part of which went to the government for reforestation (ibid.).
Finally, repayment on loans used to cover the building of harbour
and wharf facilities for the operation of Potlatch Samoa cost far
more than the government expected. By 1970, the government realized
Potlatch's contribution to the country's balance of payments was small (ibid.:394).

In 1977, the government of Samoa and an Australian firm bought out Potlatch with the government retaining eighty percent of the shares (GWS 1978:9). This new company is known as Samoa Forest Products. By 1974, domestic production of timber almost displaced imports (GWS 1975b:153) and by 1984, timber had become a valuable export (GWS 1984b:66).

Forests occupy about 50 percent of the total land area in Western Samoa and ninety-five percent of it is under customary ownership. The Alienation of Customary Lands Act provides for the negotiation of the lease of customary land for twenty years. However, leases have been difficult to negotiate. In fact, the first five Development Plans observe that the Samoa land tenure structure is a major threat to the development of the forest industry (GWS 1966:24; GWS 1975b:156; GWS 1980:129; GWS 1984b:66).

The Forestry Act of 1967 states that the government must maintain and establish necessary forests to protect the climate and soil and provide the forest produce requirements for both local consumption and the export trade, on a sustained yield basis (GWS 1970:45). In order to meet these requirements, the government has designated large areas of forests as protection forests, national parks and reserves (ADB 2985:84-85). Furthermore, in conjunction with bilateral aid donors, the government has been engaged in reforestation and research since 1974. In 1980, Western Samoa's Fourth Development Plan (GWS 1980:129) stated that forestry development was an important economic priority:

As one of the few hardwood exporting nations engaged in a significant level of hardwood replanting, Western Samoa may expect increasing sales from sawn timber ...

Furthermore, the Fourth Plan noted that the forests were an important cultural consideration:
Samoa’s culture encourages Samoans to regard themselves as an integral part of their environment. Forests are a source of building supplies, medicine, dyes, decoration, and forests protect water supplies and replenish the soil’s fertility (ibid.:65).

Despite this acknowledgment of the cultural importance of forests, however, by 1984 replanting was behind annual targets and planners were predicting indigenous forests would be depleted by 1995 at the current rate of removal (GWS 1984:b:66). Government planners blamed their plight on Samoa’s traditional land tenure system which “constrained development” by necessitating “difficult and prolonged negotiations with Government” for approval for infrastructure as well as reforestation (GWS 1984b:16; 1987:32). In fact, as early as 1980, planners complained about the lack of village cooperation in land acquisitions for government development projects. Whenever land is needed for development projects, the Lands and Surveys department is required to survey the boundaries of the land in question so that negotiations between villages and the government can proceed. However, “survey work of this nature is often made impossible as people become hostile and survey teams have been thrown off the land more than once” (GWS 1980:138).

Moreover, forestry development has involved some high-ranking politicians in heavy competition which brought about the downfall of the government in 1985. A company from American-Samoan-Pacific Development Company (PDC), and a Hong Kong interest, Superlandford, had both proposed to export Samoan hardwood. In the early months of 1985, Superlandford supposedly entered into some fourteen agreements with various villages and persons in Savai’i for the purposes of using their lands for logging. Joseph Lai, a representative of Superlandford, signed an agreement with a district in China to buy Samoan logs based on an alleged agreement he had with the government of Samoa (The Samoan Times March 21, 1986). The government at the time was formed by the Human Rights Protection
Party under the leadership of Tofilau Eti. In response to a report of his alleged approval of Superlandford and its agreement with a district in China, Tofilau Eti declared Joseph Lai an undesirable visitor to Western Samoa, and placed a ban on the export of logs. The other company, PDC, opted for a saw-milling operation and was granted hefty incentives, including a ten-year tax holiday, and ten million dollars worth of duty-free imports. Meanwhile, some members of HRPP led by Superlandford’s so-called business consultant, began a movement to oust Tofilau Eti as Prime Minister. These members joined the opposition party (The Christian Democratic Party), called themselves the Coalition, and chose Va’ai Kolone as their leader. By December, the Coalition had established itself as a majority in the house and voted against the government budget as an expression of their solidarity (The Samoan Times, Dec. 20, 1985). On December 30, 1985, Va’ai Kolone was sworn in by the Head of State as Prime Minister, in recognition of his ability to command the confidence of the majority of Members of Parliament.

Immediately after the Coalition Government came into power, Joseph Lai of Superlandford returned to Western Samoa. Ministers supportive of Superlandford began pressing the new Prime Minister to remove the ban on the export of logs imposed by the former Prime Minister:

Tremendous pressure on Prime Minister Va’ai Kolone to grant the logging company Superlandford $10 million in import incentives plus a tax holiday is undermining the solidarity of the Coalition Government.... The pressure created by Superlandford followed the disclosure by the company’s so-called principal stockholder here, Joseph Lai of Hong-Kong, that he had the means to inject into the country $8 million for forestry and agriculture development. Joseph Lai had reportedly threatened to divert this investment to the Solomon islands if the government would not have it (The Samoan Observer, March 26, 1986).

By May 30th 1986, cabinet had granted Superlandford WS$10.5 million duty-free imports and a ten-year tax holiday. The Chief Forestry
Officer advised Superlandford that the so-called agreements with certain villagers they already held were unlawful and therefore not acceptable, and that they should disregard them and lodge a fresh application for licences which must be negotiated between villages, the government, and the interested party. When I left the field in 1986, Superlandford had still not been issued a licence to cut and export logs. The Pacific Development Company had been burned down by the villagers of Salelologa (see Chapter VI), and told by the Coalition that the incentives and licence issued it by the deposed Tofilau regime were not valid. The discouraged owner was preparing to leave the country.

Government planners in Western Samoa have a long-standing commitment to diversifying the Samoan economy (GWS 1966:26; GWS 1970:3-4; GWS 1975b:1; GWS 1980:6; GWS 1984b:73; GWS 1987:27, 78) in order to both earn and save foreign exchange. To this end, the government has consistently encouraged the development of: small manufacturing industries that make use of forest and agricultural products; the tourist industry; and indigenous energy, including hydro-electric and wood-fuelled power stations so as to save the foreign exchange required for importing diesel fuel. Specifically, the government has encouraged foreign and local investment in manufacturing and tourism by: providing government equity participation financed through foreign aid; granting tax and import incentives under the Enterprises Incentives Act 1965 and its amendments; free repatriation of profits; and providing infrastructure such as an improved land, water and air-transport system, improved telecommunications network and the Apia water and sewage system. In the energy sector, the government has become almost self-sufficient in energy for electricity generation during the wet season, and intends to become self-sufficient during the dry season by establishing a wood-fuel system (GWS 1984:140-141).
The Government of Western Samoa is heavily involved in industrial development (GWS 1987:77). By 1984 it was involved in 20 enterprises, including WSTEC, the single most productive enterprise in the country, as well as agricultural stores, produce marketing, the coconut oil mill, animal feed, timber milling, power generation, insurance, shipping and handicraft marketing. The government, therefore, has a strong interest in developing infrastructure to enhance its investments. Furthermore, some politicians are involved in a number of private concerns of their own, as the discussion above on forest development suggests. In this respect, the government of Western Samoa is not unlike the governments of other South Pacific states. As I discussed in Chapter 1, many Pacific island nations put less emphasis on rural small-holder projects than on large state-owned commercial ventures and infrastructure (Young and Gunasekara 1984:5; Fisk 1986:5; Browne and Scott 1989:6).

In sum, the successive government elites of Western Samoa in collaboration with aid donors have attempted to implement a state-centred model of and for development aimed at achieving national self-reliance and a condition of improved economic well-being for all Samoans. These goals are linked to economic growth through the increased production of export crops and the development of commercial timber operations, agro-industry and tourism.

Government elites view foreign aid as a necessary means of bridging the foreign exchange gap by providing capital to invest in commercial enterprises and the necessary infrastructure. On the one hand, government planners encourage private investment in tourism, forestry and manufacturing by: providing investors with equity participation funded through foreign aid; providing infrastructure such as an improved land-water-, and air-transport system, improved telecommunications network and the Apia water and sewage system also financed by foreign aid; granting tax and import incentives and
allowing free repatriation of profits to investors.

On the other hand, successive governments have used foreign aid to invest in state-owned commercial enterprises like WSTEC and PDC. Most of government’s agricultural spending is allocated to state-owned and managed agricultural corporations. Rural producers and village institutions are by-passed as facilitators of national development because the bulk of development resources are allocated to projects that do not use them. This latter sets up a strange tension in Plan dialogue between the apparent commitment to village institutions and development strategies that render these institutions redundant. Finally, Development Plan dialogue records the lack of village cooperation in the governments’ acquisition of land for forestry and infrastructural development.

A PORTRAIT OF A STAGNATING AND DECLINING ECONOMY

Aid donors and indigenous élites conceptualize the stagnation and decline of Western Samoa’s agricultural exports as a problem of development. National income or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the total value of goods and services produced by a country during a given year. It is used by Western Samoa’s economic planners as a per capita measure of the economy’s productivity as well as an indication of the country’s standard of living. National income accounting is in its elementary stages in Western Samoa as it is in South Pacific Islands in general (Fairbairn 1985:27). Western Samoa began reporting highly tentative figures on national income in 1980 (GWS 1980:8) as a part of their development plans. Based on a highly tentative figure of WS$200 per capita in 1972, estimates show that between 1972 and 1978, GDP expressed in 1972 figures at an average of 2.5 percent per year, then declined (in constant 1980 prices) from WS$708 in 1979 to WS$590 in 1983 (GWS 1984b:5). In 1987, Western Samoa’s Sixth Development Plan reported an estimated
growth in real GDP between 1984 and 1987 of 1.5 percent (GWS 1987:203). However, during the same period, the contribution of the primary sector (agriculture, forestry and fisheries) to the Gross Domestic Product declined by about 2.8 percent. In constant 1984 prices GDP in 1986 was WS$211,868,000 (ibid.:2). Based on an estimated population of 161,039 (ibid.:x), GDP per capita for 1986 was WS$1330 or WS$633 per capita in constant 1984 prices. Since 1979 then, GDP per capita declined from WS$708 to WS$633 in 1986.5

Besides GDP per capita, another important indicator of a country’s economic health and productivity is its balance of trade. Since 1965, Western Samoa has shown a trade deficit. In 1965, total imports were 3,290,348 British pounds; total exports were 2,083,417 pounds—leaving a trade deficit of 206,931 pounds. To put it another way, in 1965 exports financed 63.3 percent of the imports. By 1976 the trade deficit had risen to WS$18.2 million and exports financed only 22.9 percent of imports (ADB 1985:203). By 1986, the trade deficit was WS$81.9 million and exports financed only 22.3 percent of the imports (GWS 1987:238).

The critical role of agriculture in the achievement of economic growth in Western Samoa has been acknowledged by all six of Western Samoa’s development plans and by a major study conducted by the Asian Development Bank. Western Samoa’s Sixth Development Plan (ibid.) states that the agricultural sector accounts for 50 percent of the GDP and all but a small share of export earnings, while as much as 70 percent of the population depends on it for their livelihood. Furthermore, the plan states:

the growth of the economy of Western Samoa is a function of the agricultural sector because of the heavy reliance of export earnings, local food supply, manufacturing raw materials, employment and overall income on this sector ... (ibid.:1);

and after growing at an estimated average annual rate of 2.5 percent during the 1970s the country entered a period of negative growth with real GDP declining
at an average rate of 5.3 percent per annum during the 1980-82 period which coincided with the decline in the performance of the major export crops of Western Samoa (ibid.).

In 1965, major agricultural export products (copra, cocoa and bananas) made up 91 percent of the value of all Samoan exports (GWS 1966:60). In 1975, major agricultural products (copra, cocoa, bananas, taro and timber) accounted for 82 percent of the value of total exports. In 1986, major agricultural products (coconut oil, cocoa, copra meal, taro and timber) accounted for 70 percent of the total value of exports. Productivity in the agricultural sector, then, is of major significance to planners of the Western Samoan economy. Over the years, copra and cocoa have remained leading export crops, while taro has replaced bananas as a leading export crop. Also, since 1983, with the establishment of Western Samoa's coconut oil mill, coconut oil has replaced copra as the country's leading export.

Each of Western Samoa's development plans have expressed alarm over the stagnation or decline in the volume of these major products produced for export. Even when export prices have been high, production in terms of volume has been static (GWS 1984:29). For example, in 1956, Western Samoa exported .14 long tons of copra per capita (GWS 1970:Appendix). By 1966, this volume had dropped to .11 long tons per capita (ibid.). In 1976, production of copra for export hit an all-time low at .09 long tons per capita, and rose back to its 1956 level in 1985 and 1986 at .14 long tons per capita (ADB 1985:243; GWS 1985:13; GWS:1987:235). Cocoa production has shown a more radical decline than copra production. In 1956, Samoans produced .034 long tons of cocoa per capita (GWS 1970:Appendix). By 1966, this volume had declined to .021 long tons per capita (ibid.). In 1976, the volume of cocoa exported was only .012 long tons per capita (ADB 1985:247) and by 1986, this volume had dropped to .005 long tons per capita. Unlike the production of
copra and cocoa, the production of taro per capita has increased over the last ten years and has replaced bananas as a leading export crop. In 1976, Samoans produced .44 cases of taro per capita for export (ADB 1985:251). By 1986, the volume had almost tripled to 1.2 cases per capita (GWS 1987:235).

The growth, stagnation or decline in production of Samoa’s major agricultural products is a reflection of the Western Samoan economy in general and -- except for the production of taro -- over the last thirty years, production of Western Samoa’s major agricultural products for export has either declined (in the case of cocoa) or stagnated (in the case of copra). In addition to national income, balance of trade and production of major exports, a country’s balance of payments also indicates a country’s economic well-being. Samoa’s balance of payments record shows an increasing dependency on foreign aid and remittances. During 1966 to 1970, the trade deficit was financed by the government’s overseas accounts, private remittances from migrants working overseas, and internal borrowing. By 1966, the government had borrowed 325,000 New Zealand pounds for harbour development and plantation restoration. All grants from bilateral or multilateral sources were for emergency purposes following a hurricane in late January of 1966.

Between 1970 and 1980, however, only part of the trade deficit could be covered by overseas accounts, private remittances, tourism and internal borrowing. Furthermore, government surpluses were far below the requirements necessary to fund their development plans. Thus, over the Third Plan period (1975-1979), Western Samoa’s dependence on overseas resources in the form of project grants, soft-term loans and commercial loans increased significantly (GWS 1980:238).
As one can see from Table I, above, between 1974 and 1977 the trade deficit rose from WS$8.2 million to WS$20.6 million. Over the same period foreign aid (including grants and loans) more than tripled from WS$1.9 million (30 percent of a total government expenditure of WS$6.2 million) to WS$51.9 million (39 percent of a total government expenditure of WS$15.6 million) (GWS 1980:238-9). During the same period, remittances from overseas migrants almost doubled from approximately WS$5.6 million in 1974 to WS$10.8 million in 1977 (ibid.).

By 1983, Western Samoa’s trade deficit had risen from WS$20.6 million in 1977 to WS$52.9 million. In the same time period, foreign aid increased from WS$5.8 million in 1977 to WS$23.8 million in 1983 (GWS 1984:165) i.e., 63 percent of a total government expenditure of WS$37.9 million for that year (GWS 1987:259). Furthermore, remittances more than tripled from WS$10.8 million in 1977 to WS$30.5 million in 1983 (GWS 1984:165).
Western Samoa's balance of payments became a major concern of government planners and aid donors in 1980 (ADB 1985:14-20). Large balance of payment deficits were primarily the result of three factors: the world wide recession from 1979 to 1981 resulted in a decline in the export price of copra; at the same time, imports of transport equipment, industrial supplies, fuels and lubricants rose substantially in response to national development requirements; also, government earnings from services were static. By the end of 1982, arrears on external payments were in excess of export revenue. By 1983, Samoa's external debt (consisting mainly of concessional or soft loans from multilateral and bilateral aid donors) was estimated at WS$93 million. Servicing this debt is a burden, and in 1983 it absorbed 12.7 percent of the value of exports, and amounted to 25 percent of the government's recurrent expenditures. In 1974, debt servicing was about WS$1 million, only 7 percent of total recurrent expenditures, and about 13 percent of the value of exports, which totalled WS$7.6 million (GWS 1980:240, 233).

In 1983, the government of Western Samoa embarked on a stabilization programme supported by a standby credit of 3.375 million SDR from IMF and a rescheduling of external debt (ibid.:14). In March, 1983, the government: devalued the Samoan dollar (tala) by 17.5 percent against the New Zealand dollar (GWS 1983:10); introduced import control through foreign exchange allocation; attempted to raise government revenues by placing import duties on materials required for foreign-aided projects, and raising duties on all other imports except food; reduced government borrowing and spending; increased efforts to contain income tax evasion; and increased interest rates on term deposits to encourage domestic saving (GWS 1983:10).

By 1986, Western Samoa's balance of payments showed a surplus of WS$24.64 million. However, the trade deficit was high at
WS$81.7 million, financed by remittances from overseas migrants which had doubled since 1983 to WS$63.5 million, and foreign aid, which increased to WS$30.6 million (72 percent of total development expenditures) from WS$23.8 million in 1983 (GWS 1988:256). Debt servicing, in 1986, had risen to WS$4.6 million, or 20 percent of exports (GWS 1987:242). Moreover, due to a dramatic decline in world prices for coconut oil and cocoa in 1985 and 1986, and a subsequent decline in production of these export crops, export earnings fell from WS$27.4 million in 1983 to WS$23.4 million in 1986 (ibid.). Western Samoa has become increasingly dependent upon foreign aid and migrant remittances to finance its import bill.

This is a portrait of Western Samoa’s stagnating and declining economy. Since 1972, Western Samoa’s GDP per capita has declined by about 1 percent, and its balance of trade has deteriorated. In 1965, Western Samoa’s exports financed 63.3 percent of its imports. But, by 1986, exports financed only 23.3 percent of Western Samoa’s imports. In the thirty years between 1966 and 1986, production of copra stagnated at .14 long tons per capita. Cocoa production declined from .021 long tons per capita to .005 long tons per capita, and bananas were replaced by taro as a major export crop. Finally, Western Samoa’s balance of payment record shows an increasing dependence on foreign aid as well as on remittances from Samoa migrants working overseas. In 1974, Western Samoa received WS$1.9 million in foreign aid and WS$5.6 million in migrant remittances. These two sources of foreign exchange almost covered the trade deficit of WS$8.2 million. By 1983, foreign aid and migrant remittances rose to WS$23.8 million and WS$30.5 million respectively, which more than covered the trade deficit of WS$52.9 million that same year. In 1986, Western Samoa’s trade deficit was WS$81.7 million which, once again, was covered by foreign aid and migrant remittances of WS$30.6 million and WS$63.3 million.
respectively. However, much of Western Samoa's foreign aid comes in the form of loans. On the one hand, in 1974, debt servicing represented about 13 percent of the value of exports. By 1986, debt servicing represented 20 percent of Western Samoa's exports. On the other hand, migrant remittances finances 35.2 percent of imports in 1974, while foreign aid financed 23.2 percent of imports in the same year. By 1986, migrant remittances were financing 60.3 percent of Western Samoa's import bill, while foreign aid financed 29 percent of it. In short, the macro-economic indicators used by Western Samoa's economic planners the economic health of the country is worse in 1986 than it was in 1974, even though foreign aid and migrant remittances have escalated rapidly over the intervening years. Moreover, remittances sent by Samoans living and working overseas to their relatives in Western Samoa have always financed far more of Western Samoa's export bill than foreign aid has financed. As Shankman (1976) argues, migration is, itself, symptomatic of "underdevelopment" in Western Samoa. In 1966, the net out-migration of Samoans from Western Samoa was 474 persons (GWS 1966:12). In 1976, 5807 persons left Western Samoa to work overseas. There are no reliable figures for migration since 1979. However, the government's Sixth Development Plan (GWS 1987:18) suggests out-migration is still "alarmingly high", and roughly estimated it at 1.8 percent of the population (about 3,000 persons per year). Shankman (1990:13) concludes that migration is a better investment than cash-cropping. The injection of foreign aid into the economy has failed to overcome the preferences of most Samoans for migration or reliance on remittances. In short, government strategies based on a state-centred, economic growth model of and for development have failed to achieve a movement toward the goals of either national self-reliance or improved economic well-being for the majority of Samoans. Moreover, the governments have failed to
mobilize indigenous institutions or to effectively utilize rural land and labour as tools for raising the productivity of the rural sector of the economy. In fact, for most Samoans, migration is a better investment than cash cropping.

The stagnation and decline of Western Samoa's economy in spite of the fact that foreign aid has increased from just over WS$2 million in 1973 to WS$30.6 million in 1986 (ADB 1985:32) raises the question of where aid is actually spent. Each of Western Samoa's six development plans has articulated a strong commitment to raising the production of export crops, particularly in the rural sector where 70 percent of the population resides on 80.6 percent of the land, and where between 80 and 90 percent of the export crops are grown, and 80 percent of the copra used for making coconut oil is produced (GWS 1966:9; GWS 1970:5; GWS 1975b:56; GWS 1980:98; GWS 1984b:46; GWS 1987:59). Foreign resource allocation has not matched this commitment. Although there are no comprehensive statistics on actual foreign aid allocations in Western Samoa, in 1984 the Office of the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) put together a report on the nature and amount of external assistance in the form of project aid given to Western Samoa, as well as to other island groups (UNDP 1984). This report gives us some idea of where aid is spent. Out of a total expenditure of US$22,134,828 in project aid in 1984, US $17,582,683 (79.4 percent) was spent on salaries for foreign experts and consultants involved in projects unrelated to rural development; US$3,954,056 (17.9 percent) was spent on equipment, training and fellowships for Western Samoans; and a meager US$598,089 (2.7 percent) was spent on rural development.?

Apart from the UNDP Report cited above, individual aid donors gave me some of their own reports. For example, the Asian Development Bank has been a major source of loan financing. Between
1978 and 1984, ADB disbursed an estimated WS$28.7 million to Western Samoa (ADB 1985:33). Of this amount, WS$12.8 million (45 percent) went to the Development Bank of Western Samoa -- the bank which provides 90 percent of the credit for rural producers (ibid.:142). However, of this WS$12.8 million, only WS$4.0 million (32 percent) was lent to rural producers (ibid.:151). In other words, only 14 percent of ADB's total disbursements reached the rural producers. The rest of ADB's loans went either to infrastructure, plantation or cattle development projects on the government's commercial estates called WSTEC (Western Samoa's Trust Estates Corporation), or to the government's forestry development programmes (ibid.:57.70,83,91,105). The World Bank also approved a loan for WS$8.0 million to WSTEC for replanting, importing planting materials, and the establishment of nurseries with additional co-financing from Australia (US$5.4 million), UNDP (US$1.7 million), Japan (US$1.4 million) and the EC (US$0.3 million). Along with ADB's share, amounting to US$4.5 million, the total disbursement of loans to WSTEC was US $20.5 million between 1977 and 1980 (ibid.:57).

New Zealand has the longest established bilateral aid programme in Western Samoa, almost exclusively in the form of grants (ibid.:33). Between 1973 and 1983 New Zealand's aid to Western Samoa totalled NZ$38 million. In the agricultural field, New Zealand's total aid budget has financed large infrastructure projects such as: a hospital and large concrete water reservoir in the urban centre of Western Samoa, Apia; the extension of the runway at Faleolo Airport to take large-bodied jets; and the new coconut oil mill. New Zealand has contributed to Western Samoa's rural development by improving the village water supply by means of a well-drilling programme and by improving radio reception in the villages. In 1984, seven percent of New Zealand's aid went to rural
development for ground water drilling (UNDP 1984). Australia has the largest bilateral grant programme, which amounted to WSS$268 million between 1980 and 1983 largely for the development of agriculture and infrastructure, including the airport (ADB 1985:33). Australia’s agricultural projects have contributed to WSTEC’s development and to the establishment of a research station devoted largely to cocoa rehabilitation. In 1984, out of a total of US$2.5 million in aid to Western Samoa, Australia contributed nothing to rural development (UNDP 1984). Japan has contributed a substantial amount of project aid to Western Samoa, mainly for large infrastructural projects such as airport and wharf facilities, a fisheries complex and market, and a fishing vessel. In 1984, out of a total expenditure of US $3.7 million, all but US$31,400 was spent on salaries for volunteer technicians, teachers and professionals, and none was spent on rural development. The European Community (EC), between 1975 and 1984, gave Western Samoa 25 million ECUs, or approximately US $18.7 million (CEC 1984). Funds committed directly to rural development were for emergency aid after a village fire and for small village projects such as roads, electricity, banana plants, fertilizer, weed killer, fishing boats, outboard engines and tackle. Village emergency aid, together with the small projects, cost a total of US$585,750, or thirty-one percent of the total project aid. Most of European Community’s project aid went to finance a hydro electric scheme, an earth satellite station, telephone facilities and Stabex transfers paid into the government treasury.

Western Samoa’s major aid donors (New Zealand, Australia, Japan, EC, World Bank and Asian Development Bank) allocate most of their monies either to large infrastructural projects or to the government’s commercial agricultural endeavours. Very little reaches the rural producers who form a large percentage of Western
Samoa's population, and who produce most of the export crops, as well as the copra used for making Western Samoa's leading export since 1983 -- coconut oil.

As early as 1976, Pitt (1976:43-48) argued that development policies in Western Samoa fail because of the "social distance" between aid donors and the local people. In 1964, a Development Secretariat supported and staffed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began surveying the Island's resources, determining planning priorities, and producing five-year development programmes (Shankman 1978:389). UNDP officials used New Zealand expertise to formulate their plans (Pitt 1976:43-44). They adopted the assumption of former New Zealand officers that the chiefly system in Samoa based on communal land tenure was an obstacle to development and began to forward plans to develop tourism, commercial logging, and agriculture. Pitt describes the UNDP officials in Samoa as "socially distant" from both the Samoan élite and the rural Samoans. Their daily "rounds" and "rituals" took place in "élite places" (their homes or offices).

Their wives exchanged tea parties or coffee mornings and gossip with the spouses of .... diplomats, businessmen and the odd missionary wife. Most of the children went overseas to school .... There was relatively little contact, even with the part-Samoan community and practically none with the Samoans themselves, apart from the ubiquitous Samoan servants, gardeners, etc .... As a consequence of this separation many international officials had very little knowledge about Samoan society and culture generally, or the needs of specific areas (ibid.:46).

Pitt's description of resident UN officials in Samoa fifteen years prior to my own research differs very little from my own observations of the aid representatives with whom I played bridge, shared the occasional dinner and attended a number of diplomatic gatherings. When I asked them how much they knew about the rural areas, they admitted they had never seen a village except from the vantage point of a few beaches where they sometimes bathed or
picnicked. Although they occasionally played golf with the local political élite, they did not count the latter among their "friends". They viewed me as an exotic friend who sometimes lived in the village, a feat they viewed with awe, and, occasionally, suspicion. A few "experts" questioned me about the rural Samoans as though they were "aliens" and made continual remarks about how "dirty" they looked at the market. Is it any wonder, then, that some of my rural friends referred to foreign aid as "jobs for slobs"?

THE AID DONORS: "JOBS FOR SLOBS"

During my visit to Western Samoa, I was able to interview eight resident representatives of aid donor countries and international agencies: two from New Zealand, two from Australia, one from Japan, one from the European Community, one from UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), and one from the World Bank. I was interested, primarily, in the structures and processes related to aid disbursements and allocations; the representatives' impressions of donor countries' motivations for giving aid to Western Samoa; the aid-donor representative's conception of development, their analysis of Western Samoa's problems with the production of export crops, and proposed solutions. All excerpts from conversations reproduced below are reconstructions from notes I took during interviews.

CONVERSATIONS WITH AID DONORS

Australia: Aid and Trade

Australian aid for the South Pacific is planned on the basis of an indicative planning figure for the region as a whole. The amount was A$300 million for 1983-1988. This budget is given to the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) within the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. The Bureau decides how to spend it. About A$5.5 million is allotted to Western Samoa each year.

Australia allocates aid to Western Samoa through their staff at the Australian High Commission in Apia, Western Samoa. The staff is expected to identify development projects through negotiations with Western Samoa's Aid-Co-ordinating Committee, composed of ministers and senior government officials. The Aid Co-ordinating Committee submits a formal request to the Australian High Commission and projects are approved or not by the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs or his/her delegate. Furthermore, approved Australian projects must be managed by an Australian appointed by the Australian government. The Australian minister of Foreign Affairs gives careful consideration to the availability of goods and services from Australia in project selection. The Australian government actively promotes the involvement of Australia's private sector in its aid programme (ADAD 1985:1-3). The director of aid projects at the Australian High Commission said:

Aid is good for Australian Business. Eighty-five percent of the goods and services for projects come from Australia. Aid generates economic activity there. Also, Australian businessmen are interested in business opportunities here. Our Joint Venture Programme provides our own entrepreneurs with capital to do feasibility studies and training, etcetera -- and provides the recipient country with capital. So, for example, the government of Western Samoa have shares [with Australians] in the Tusitala Hotel and the Veneer mill. It's good for them, it's good for us.

This Australian official was quite clear about Australia's motivations for giving aid to the Pacific Region:

... to protect political stability in the Pacific region. We do most of our trade in this area. The Pacific Islands are a large market for Australia. Political stability ensures the protection of that market.

He defined development in economic terms as the enhancement of Western Samoa's "buying power" in the international market:

we fund projects like the airport and WSTEC and the
research station mainly to help [Western Samoa] with foreign exchange.

He blamed Western Samoa’s development problems on the government’s lack of vision:

one of the big problems with the government here is that it doesn’t have a good idea of what sorts of development projects it wants ... Politicians have no vision of what they want Western Samoa to look like in twenty years. Some of our projects are a waste of money because they are inappropriate, but we have to spend the money, so we do. Politicians need to come up with more suitable development projects.

The official’s last comments prompted me to visit the Australian research project devoted largely to cocoa rehabilitation. The expressed goal of the project is to increase village incomes and foreign exchange earnings by increasing cocoa quality and production. Australian aid to the project has been in the form of technical assistance, funding for the establishment of the research station, training of local assistants and funding for a portion of the local costs to Western Samoa. The Government of Western Samoa has provided personnel, land, seeds, and some of the recurrent operating costs.

A Director of Research at the research station cited lack of political support and failed experiments as reasons for the failure of the project:

We work with contact farmers through extension workers who visit them. We want them to plant Amelonado cocoa instead of Samoan cocoa [Trinitario] because the trees grow faster and the yield is better on well-watered sites although Samoan cocoa is more drought resistant. The government introduced a Cocoa Suspensory Loan Scheme to get Samoans to plant Amelonado. If the farmer adheres to good plantation management the loan is converted to a grant after six years. But, the farmers still get the money even if they plant Samoan cocoa, so Hell!

His last statement was said in a dejected tone of voice. He explained to me that he had spent much of his time building a large cocoa fermenter designed to produce a better quality cocoa bean than
the traditional method of drying cocoa in coconut baskets placed in the sun. The large fermenter consists of eight wooden boxes (about 4' by 4' by 1' deep) with holes in the bottom. A hot air blower circulates air under the bins to prevent the beans from going mouldy. The bins hold a larger quantity of wet beans than coconut baskets, and the larger the quantity of beans the larger the amount of heat they generate and the better the quality of cocoa produced.

The idea was that we would buy cocoa pods from the farmer, bring them here for fermenting and sorting so we could export a better quality bean ... but the politicians didn’t like the idea of us buying from the farmers instead of the Cocoa Board .... As it is there’s no incentive for the grower to produce a better quality bean. Prices paid at the Cocoa Board are low compared to world prices and it doesn’t matter about the quality of beans. The farmer gets the same price for rubbish as he gets for a good quality bean.

This last statement reflects the political dynamics of "aid giving".

The Australian government insists that the Australian project manager maintain control of the project which includes control over the fermenter. In order to make the best use of the fermenter, the project manager would have to buy cocoa pods from the farmer, thereby transferring power to set price and quality control from the local government’s Cocoa Board to the aid donor’s agent -- the project manager. This latter scenario is politically unacceptable to local politicians. Thus, a project which is worthwhile, on the face of it, becomes a waste of time, money and effort because it is unacceptable to local politicians.

Besides being politically unacceptable, the cocoa rehabilitation project is, for the most part, a scientific failure. The Director and I went to look at the experimental plots of cocoa and he commented as follows:

Experiments for growing Amelonado cocoa concern spacing and shade. Trees are optimally spaced to keep down weeds and shade trees are planted every three trees on each row. But our shade trees got infected with aphids and they actually cause a weed problem .... You can see how it would be hard to
convince farmers to listen to us. The scientist tells the extension workers to tell the farmers to plant one kind of shade tree -- then they tell them to pull it out -- and the plot looks disgusting. The truth is the farmers have no faith in science. Why should they? There's also a problem with pink disease in Amelonado -- it has to be pruned out .... The experiment is still young. Who knows what will happen in twenty years.

Thus, even from a scientific point of view, the project has not convinced Samoan farmers that they should switch from planting Trinitario ("Samoan") cocoa to planting Amelonado cocoa, nor has the Development Bank insisted that farmers do so in order to qualify for the Cocoa Suspensory Loan initiated by the government in 1984.10

Allocation of Australian foreign aid in Western Samoa, then, is a product of élite collaboration and negotiation between the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Australian High Commission in Western Samoa and local Samoan Ministers and high ranking bureaucrats. The Australian political élite and their delegates maintain control of the aid-giving process by making final decisions on the projects funded, based on whether or not the project promotes the involvement of the Australian private sector. Furthermore, all projects are under the control of an Australian manager. One such project, the Cocoa Rehabilitation and Development Project, was -- at the time of my research -- both politically and scientifically unsound and its goal to increase village incomes and foreign exchange earnings by increasing the quality and quantity of cocoa produced by Samoan farmers had not been fulfilled.

The Director at the Australian High Commission said that Australia's primary motive for giving aid to Western Samoa was to protect political stability in the area and, secondarily, to promote economic activity in Australia. He defined development as enhancement of Western Samoa's buying power in the international market place. Finally, according to the Australian Director, Western Samoa's development problem is the result of a lack of
vision by the Government of Western Samoa with respect to how it wants Western Samoa to develop. The solution lay with the government’s formulation of such a vision.

New Zealand: Our Nearest and Dearest

The government of New Zealand decides upon the amount of money to be given to its primary area of aid concentration -- the South Pacific. The money is then given to New Zealand’s External Aid Division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for disbursement to each Pacific Nation. New Zealand allocates about NZ$4.0 million to Western Samoa each year. After these monetary decisions are made, a New Zealand aid Mission comes to Western Samoa and asks the Aid Coordinating Committee how it wishes to spend the money. The Samoan government’s priorities are considered but, ultimately, as the High Commissioner put it, projects must “fit with the New Zealand’s priorities”:

New Zealand is quite flexible; it is interested in infrastructural programmes and projects that generate income. When an agreement is reached, New Zealand puts the project out to tender in New Zealand. Samoan labour is used wherever possible. At the moment, New Zealand funds scholarships for Samoans, the Apia water system, a civil aviation technician, ground water drilling and reforestation -- that’s the systematic planting of trees. But, you know, the Chinese, Koreans and Taiwanese are interested in Samoan hardwood which threatens our reforestation programme. We are also involved in a number of joint ventures with the Government of Western Samoa and New Zealand businessmen in corned beef, Rothman cigarettes and soft drinks.

New Zealand’s motivations for giving aid to Western Samoa are similar to those of Australia:

We give aid to Western Samoa for strategic purposes. The strategic position of the islands is important to New Zealand -- it’s right in our backyard. And we don’t want just anybody playing there, do we? All of New Zealand’s life-lines run through and over the Pacific -- shipping and airways. We do thirty million dollars worth of trade with Samoa each year. Eighty percent of New Zealand’s aid comes to the Pacific. We are really interested in markets for New Zealand products.
Aside from that, we have humanitarian considerations. We'll support Samoa no matter what. She is our nearest and dearest.

The High Commissioner defined development as an enhancement of Western Samoa's ability to export:

New Zealand is interested in projects which will enhance Samoa's capacity to export and thereby earn the country income to buy goods and services, which will raise their standard of living.

He blamed Western Samoa's development problems on both their paucity of planning skills and corruption:

Look, Samoans never have to plan, do they? There's no shortage of food. Their houses are low maintenance, so they don't have to save for repairs. On top of that, salaries are low and corruption is high. New Zealand pays for scholarships but Samoans don't return because wages are too low and everybody in the government looks after their own families instead of the country as a whole.

I went to see another staff member of the New Zealand High Commission to get another perspective on Western Samoa's development problem. This woman told me that:

We need well planned projects. All the Western Samoans talk about is rural agriculture, but we end up doing a Visitor's Bureau because we have no well planned projects for rural development. What we really need is a central planning committee so all the aid donors and Samoans can coordinate their efforts and activities and come up with well planned projects.

She conceived of development as:

raised production, so that self sufficiency results and aid isn't necessary.

She went on to complain about one of New Zealand's forestation projects on land in the district where I did my field research. Recently, residents of the district, after being paid a wage by New Zealand to plant trees on virtually barren volcanic rock, armed themselves with machetes and prevented project managers and workers from tending the WS$2 million dollars worth of fledgling seedlings. The staff member explained that:

This is a good example of a poorly planned project.
The Samoan government thought the land was settled. But, in fact, the land was never "Gazetted". The government usually announces its intentions to use land for forestation in the Gazette, and waits for all people with claims to come forward and hash out an agreement. But, the government didn't do that, so now two million dollars are going down the drain because of bad management.

For this staff worker, a poorly planned project is one which incites resistance from rural people, resulting in a wasted investment.

Allocation of New Zealand's foreign aid, then, is a collaborative effort between the political élites of Western Samoa and New Zealand. New Zealand, however, reserves the right to make final decisions with respect to projects it funds. According to the High Commissioner, New Zealand gives aid to Western Samoa to protect its trade networks in the Pacific. He defined development as the enhancement of Western Samoa's ability to export and thereby earn the country income to buy goods and services on the international market. He believes development for Samoans is difficult due to both their lack of planning skills and government corruption. The staff worker, however, conceived of development as self-sufficiency in production, and saw the absence of well-planned projects for rural development as the reason for the lack of development in Western Samoa. This reason is especially germane, given the fact that New Zealand's forestation and reforestation projects (aimed at enhancing and sustaining Western Samoa's export market in hardwood as well as its production of wood for domestic consumption) are being threatened, both by foreign business interests in Samoan hardwoods and resistance by rural farmers.

Japan: Aid and Emigrate

Japan's International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is mandated to extend technical cooperation to overseas governments who are friendly to Japan, in the hopes that such cooperation will have a favourable effect on Japanese emigrants (JICA 1985:2-5).
JICA's mandate for technical cooperation with Third World countries includes programmes to train middle and high-level managers in business management practices and distribution and marketing techniques. In addition, JICA dispatches Japanese experts and equipment to Third World countries who ask for assistance in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and medicine. Furthermore, Japanese training centers are established by JICA in recipient countries to train local people in the use of Japanese technology, management, marketing and distribution techniques. Japan believes the acquisition of its knowledge by Third World participants not only contributes to development of Third World countries, but also introduces its culture and develops friendly relations between Third World countries and Japan (ibid.:6-9). Finally, JICA sends volunteers to work with local people in self-help endeavors in the Third World because Japan believes young people play a unique role in consolidating mutual understanding in these countries. There were about twelve Japanese volunteers working in Samoa in 1985-1986.

As JICA's representative in Western Samoa told me:

Western Samoa can get funding for almost any development project by negotiating directly with the Japanese Government. But, Japanese aid comes in a complete package: technicians, machinery, capital -- all provided by Japan and all made in Japan. Japan built both of Samoa's wharves and has committed .45 million to building the new airport terminal. There is a Japanese company here that imports all Japanese products. Also, Japanese businessmen are interested in joint ventures here. A Japanese businessman has a 50 percent interest in a logging mill with the government of Western Samoa.

JICA's representative conceives of development in economic terms:

Development requires infrastructure and technology. Samoa is undeveloped because it has had little time to adapt to the modern world and not much incentive to do so. Samoa is not in a crisis situation. Everyone has food so there is no real incentive to develop. Japan has a population problem which we have had to adapt to and we have always had well established industries and education system. Samoa has none of these incentives or advantages.
Allocation of Japanese aid then is carried out on the basis of negotiations between the government of Japan and the government of Western Samoa. Because Japanese aid comes in a complete package, it is only suitable for large infrastructure projects or technical assignments which require little or no collaboration between local inhabitants and project personnel. Development is conceived of strictly in terms of infrastructure and technology. According to JICA’s mandate, Japan’s motivations for giving aid are inseparable from its desire to create friendly relationships with countries in which Japanese emigrants can someday live and invest. In the talks I had with JICA’s representative, there was no hint of a wider political motive behind Japan’s aid to Western Samoa. Finally, according to JICA’s representative, Western Samoa is undeveloped both because it has little incentive to produce more than it does, and because it has had little time to adapt to the modern world.

The European Community: Aid and Grassroots Development

The European Community (EC) allocates aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries on the basis of a signed contract known as the Lomé Convention. The Lomé Convention is a five-year contract negotiated between ACP countries and the EC, that provides a range of instruments for economic cooperation. For example, almost all ACP exports are allowed to enter EC markets duty free and in unlimited quantities. Furthermore, when ACP governments experience revenue losses when the prices of their major exports fall, they may apply for compensation from the Stabex Fund.

Eight independent Pacific States, including Western Samoa, became members of the Lomé Convention in 1975. Western Samoa’s signature on the Lomé agreement entitles Western Samoa to aid from the European Development Fund and preferential trade arrangements with the EC. The EC maintains a resident advisor in Western Samoa.
After countries sign the Lomé Convention, a programme Mission comes from Brussels to negotiate with the government’s aid-coordinating bodies to work out development projects. Then the amount given to each ACP country is decided in Brussels, and projects are chosen for funding. Funds are then transferred to the treasury of each country and the account is managed by the treasury and the EC’s resident advisor and staff. Projects are tendered in EC and ACP member countries.

The EC is a political as well as an economic alliance between Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The signing of the third Lomé Convention links the EC with sixty-five countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. These seventy-five ACP and EC states represent half the membership of the United Nations. This fact prompted the EC resident advisor in Western Samoa to remark:

The EC is a political body, so naturally our interests in the Pacific are political. We are interested in political stability here. Nonetheless, we are also interested in investment opportunities for European businessmen here. Our business "antenna" is the manager of the Development Bank. He keeps his eyes and ears open for potential investment — especially joint-ventures with local business people and the government.

My informant told me that, although project selection criteria are never revealed by the EC, basic principles guiding project design and selection were written down, for the first time, in the text of the Third Lomé Convention following more than a year of negotiations between EC and ACP countries. Article 10 of the Third Lomé Convention states that:

Co-operation shall be aimed at supporting development in the ACP states, a process centred on man himself and rooted in each people’s culture. It shall back up the policies and measures adopted by those States to enhance their human resources, increase their own creative capacities, and promote their cultural identities. Co-operation shall also encourage participation by the population in design and execution of development operations (The
Dieter Frisch, Director General for Development Negotiations for the Community, referred to this focus on "man as the centre of development" as a realization of priorities:

...concentration is on grassroots development, integrated in its cultural and social environment with the peasant of the world taking first place and with emphasis on food security (The Courier 1985:19-20).

This new concentration by the EC on the grassroots is a result of the growing awareness of EC representatives of Africa's situation as a result of development which has "essentially been an economic and commercial relationship": (ibid.:7). Jason Thorn, President of the Commission of European Communities, expressed this awareness as follows:

...Local food production must be boosted; rural communities must be provided with necessary inputs, techniques must be taught, poor harvest losses must be prevented. In short, overall food strategies must be devised ... starting from an overall view of food security based first and foremost on development of domestic production (ibid.:19-20).

On the one hand, the forum for negotiations which preceded the signing of the Third Lomé Convention is a unique and positive model with respect to international resource allocations because sixty-five ACP States, representing almost half of the Third World Countries in the U.N., were able to negotiate the principles of development with a major aid donor -- the European Community. No other aid donor provides such a forum whereby their Third World aid recipients can consolidate their bargaining power and define the nature of the development they want and experience. On the other hand, a policy is impotent unless it can be translated into successful projects. This means that policy must somehow raise the awareness and inform the actions of those who design and implement development projects; i.e. the resident representatives of the aid donors and the government representatives on aid-coordinating bodies
in the recipient countries. Unfortunately, the EC resident advisor in Western Samoa appeared to be unaware of the principles contained in the Third Lomé Convention. He defined development simply in terms of increased economic production and preferred to attribute the demise of Western Samoa’s economy to internal factors rather than to the nature of development projects:

I suspect there is a great deal of mismanagement of the economy by politicians and that’s why development is not progressing as it should. However, I’m new here and I don’t know much about Samoan politics or the people. I’m still learning.

Nonetheless, EC’s investment in Western Samoa’s rural sector has improved in recent years. Between 1981 and 1983 the EC invested only 3.1 percent of its aid package in the rural economy (C.E.C. 1984). However, in 1984, the EC invested 53 percent in rural development.

Although final decisions on aid allocations are made by the Commission of the European Communities in Brussels, negotiations which precede the disbursement of funds provide a forum for ACP countries, including Western Samoa, to define the nature of development they want. The Third Lomé Convention focusses on grassroots development of domestic production, which is integrated into the social and cultural environment of rural communities.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Aid and Wellbeing

The United Nations allocates aid to recipient countries through its Social and Economic Council. Each country is given an indicative planning figure. For Western Samoa, it’s about two or three million dollars for each five year cycle. A country like Western Samoa appoints a person in their government to be the liaison between United Nations’ agencies like the UNDP and the government. The government liaison together with resident representatives, work out proposals that the agency (in this case
the UNDP) then submits to the U.N.'s Social and Economic Council for acceptance or rejection.

The resident representative at the UNDP office in Western Samoa told me that:

Usually the government [of Western Samoa] and myself decide on projects based on the priorities of government and UNDP priorities. UNDP favours micro-projects, especially ones that may raise agricultural production and incomes.

Unfortunately, at the moment we are funding a lot of technicians and consultants for government departments. This is because we have no good proposals for rural development. We need good projects. We are thinking of getting into joint business ventures with rural Samoans, but the government has no strong sense of how it wants to develop the rural areas. I end up writing up project proposals that are acceptable, but they are based on limited information about rural Samoa ....

We need to start rethinking what we mean by "development". At the moment UNDP is motivated by its moral responsibility for the well-being of the Third World. But what does "well-being" mean and how do we bring it about?

She further cautioned me that development is a political consideration for large aid donors like the United States:

The U.S. donates the largest amount of aid and wields its political power by withdrawing or giving aid according to the actions of agencies in the Third World. That means if agencies wanted to institute a project that ran counter to U.S. interests, it wouldn't stand a chance because the funds wouldn't be there.

The structures and processes of aid allocation by the United Nations are the same for all United Nations' agencies working in Western Samoa. Although project proposals are worked out by the resident representative and government liaison, the final decision about funding projects is made by the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations. The UNDP conceptualizes development in terms of 'well-being'. However, the resident representative was neither sure how a developing country like Western Samoa conceived of well being, nor how they could achieve or enhance it. Nonetheless, she was in favour of raising rural incomes by means of micro-projects. She
viewed Western Samoa’s development problems in terms of an absence of good government proposals for rural development. Her solution was to re-think development and design and implement proposals to accomplish it.

**The World Bank: Aid and Commerce**

The function of the World Bank, according to its resident representative in Apia, is to help a Third World Country develop by financing commercially viable operations. Western Samoa’s largest commercial agricultural operation is WSTEC (Western Samoa’s Trust Estate Corporation), a government corporation. Since 1976, the World Bank, among others (ADB, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, EC and UNDP) has financed the Corporation’s operations. In 1979, the World Bank approved a loan to WSTEC for US$8.0 million, disbursed over a 10 year period, to be used for a planting project on three WSTEC plantations. In 1985, the World Bank sent a Mission to Western Samoa to review and report on progress being made on the plantations. In June 1986, the World Bank Mission Report recommended suspension of disbursements of their loan, due to WSTEC’s financial problems and the uncertainty of its future. One newspaper (Samoan Times: July 4, 1986) reported WSTEC’s total indebtedness as at least WS$12.0 million.

The Director of the Mission gave me a copy of a preliminary report on WSTEC plantations on Upolu. Under his direction, one of his staff had checked every plantation and summarized his observations as follows: All plantations are infected with weeds; many old palms remain, so new replantings are competing for sunlight and are nutrient deficient; theft occurs on all plantations along boundaries facing villages; copra production dropped by 500 tons in both 1984 and 1985; coffee yields on two plantations were only half the potential yield; seedlings in the nurseries are scorched when transplanted; cocoa is poorly fermented; WSTEC sells higher grade
cocoa to London for less than the Cocoa Board pays for low-grade cocoa.\(^1\)

When I asked the Director of the World Bank Mission why he thought WSTEC was "in the red", he blamed bad management:

First, over the last 10 years, only 5.6 percent of the old trees have been replanted -- 30 percent should have been replanted. Then, the politicians are reluctant to adopt new ideas. They think it's good for the plantation to have cattle in it -- to keep down weeds -- but it's not. Rutting cattle damage the roots of trees, and weeds are bad for the cattle. Good pasture can't be grown where coconuts grow. The people who have been making decisions for WSTEC are not good managers -- they are politicians. They install a soap factory, a gas station, a general store, piggeries, a wood production factory. Then, in order to enhance their political prestige, they give these operations to their families to run. You can't run a commercial operation that way.

Then you have the plantation managers. They are matai. We contract out to matai because they have access to family labour. But, Samoans are not good workers -- they have no incentive to work -- they have adequate food and shelter.

Wages are low. A plantation manager gets about 5 to 6 thousand a year -- a worker 4.80 a day. So, everybody steals. And wages can't be raised, because, if they were, they couldn't compete with mechanized operations around the world. Samoa can't mechanize because of the lava rock. Nuts have to be collected manually or with donkeys. It's a "catch twenty-two".

The Director defined development in terms of corporate profit. He blamed Western Samoa's development problems on theft, bad management decisions by politicians, the Samoan managers' and the labourers' lack of incentive to work. His solution was to depoliticize the Board of WSTEC and introduce a system of merit pay for plantation managers and labourers.

**POLITICAL DEPENDENCE, ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OR DEVELOPMENT?**

It is clear from the above interviews and discussion that, although the allocation of aid to 'development' projects in Western Samoa is the product of élite collaboration between the aid donor
representatives and the politicians and bureaucrats of Western Samoa, the aid donor countries, through their respective organizations make the final decisions. Furthermore, all aid donor representatives except the UNDP, restrict their definitions of development to economic considerations. Specifically, development is conceived of as either the production of foreign exchange-earning goods and services in the case of Australia, New Zealand, the EC and the World Bank or the acquisition of infrastructure and technology in the case of Japan. For the aid donor representatives development involves: helping Samoa with "foreign exchange" and "raised production" so "self sufficiency results and aid isn't necessary"; "investment opportunities" and "corporate profit" for government organizations. Such statements reflect a state-centred view of development, in so far as the objective of development is to strengthen the self-sufficiency and autonomy of the state. There is nothing in the representatives statements to indicate a concern for community-focused development in the village. None of the representatives mention decentralizing the decision-making process or financial support for village-based modes of production. The concerns of the representatives are far removed from the concerns of the villagers. In fact, two of the officials (Japan's and New Zealand's) feel that rural Samoans have adequate food and housing and this community self-sufficiency dampens the farmers' motivation to cooperate with development projects. Their attitude, I believe, reflects their ignorance. As I show in Chapter II, villagers are concerned with improving the quality of life in their communities. They believe foreign aid should be "spread around the districts" to improve plantations, schools, water supplies, access roads and churches. All villagers I spoke with wanted to earn more money. Exporting more produce is one way they can do this but villagers are concerned about the price of copra, markets for their produce and
inflation. Donors seem shamefully unaware of such concerns. I suggest that adequate food and housing does not dampen the farmers' motivations to increase production per se as much as it dampens their enthusiasm to exploit themselves further by producing more low-return crops, (for which there may be no markets), for the sake of national self-sufficiency and autonomy. In short, the aid donor representatives espouse a state-centred, "modernization and growth model" of development that stresses growth in exports that earn overseas exchange, and investment in infrastructure to support an export oriented economy (Ogden 1989:364). Shankman refers to such aid as a "global potlatch" in the interest of economic "take-off" in under-developed countries supported by the generosity of developed countries (Shankman 1978:375).

Motives for aid vary. According to their representatives, Australia, New Zealand and the EC, who collectively donated 80 percent of Western Samoa's project aid between 1982 and 1987 (GWS 1987:260), are motivated primarily by the desire to maintain "political stability" in the Pacific. Aid is a way of maintaining their collective political domination in the region -- a political domination they feel is necessary for the protection of their Pacific trade routes. These three powers are interested, secondarily, in stimulating economic activity at home either by exporting their human resources and technologies, or by identifying investment opportunities for their respective citizens. By contrast, Japan's primary motive for giving aid, according to JICA's mandate, is to create friendly relationships with countries in which Japanese emigrants can live and/or invest. Finally, the UNDP is motivated by their moral responsibility for the well-being of Third World peoples.

All of the representatives thought that Samoans themselves were responsible for the stagnation and decline of their economy.
In their opinion, either Samoans, in general, lack the incentive to produce more than they already do, or their politicians lack the vision to design well-planned development projects. Despite the fact that the economy has deteriorated since the flow of aid to the region has increased, no-one questioned the relevance or appropriateness of the development models or projects to date, except for the UNDP resident representative, who thought that the whole notion of development should be redefined. The only bright spot in an otherwise bleak scenario are the principles written down in the EC's Third Lomé Convention, which express the idea of "grassroots development" of "domestic production", integrated into the social and cultural environment of rural communities. Unfortunately, the EC is a minor aid donor to Western Samoa. Any significant change in development practices would require a change in the focus of the development model and projects of the three major donors - Australia, New Zealand and Japan - based on a working knowledge of rural Samoa's mode of production and culture.

A mere desire for political domination on the part of New Zealand, Australia and the EC, however, is not equivalent to actual domination. Western Samoa is not obliged to accept aid from these donors or from any other. However, by accepting aid, the government of Western Samoa renders itself politically dependent on these aid donors, because the donors make the final decisions as to what projects are funded. Similarly, to the extent that politicians perceive aid as a necessary means of legitimating or supporting their positions, they are also economically dependent on aid donors in general, which brings me to my conversations with Samoa's political élite.

**Conversations with Politicians**

I interviewed politicians from both the Coalition Government
and HRPP to discover how they perceived development and the government's development problems. I was able to interview, in depth, three ministers and three recently deposed ministers, and two members of parliament. I also listened to parliamentary debates on the radio, to access a wide range of political opinion. Conversations reproduced below are reconstructions of notes I took during my interviews.

I began my interviews by asking the politicians to explain to me the main purpose of the government. Everybody agreed the government's main function was to develop the Samoan economy in order to make a better life for Samoans. One member of parliament, in a speech to the members, described the government as based on Samoan custom but essentially "autocratic" with respect to its authority to allocate resources, "a dangerous weapon" which "must be used with care":

The Government is a dangerous weapon, therefore we must use it with care. Its powers are provided for by the Constitution. But, there are other powers outside the Government. The Public Service Union, the business sector, non-governmental organizations. Some of the groups believe they too can improve the human element ... The Government should not allocate resources to one sector and deprive another. To do it is to disrupt the peace and harmony of the country. And, there's the power of our customs. The Government of Samoa is based on the authority of the chiefs and orators of the country. This authority is still evident in the fact that the parliament is comprised of matai and that most of the land is customary land which comes under the power of the matai. The power of the administration of parliament depends on our custom which especially seeks to maintain peace.

A government minister emphasized the distinctively Samoan character of the state which is antithetical to a party system:

In Western Samoa we can't have a party system. When you are picked as a Faipule (Member of Parliament) you are a representative of the Ali'i and Faipule (collective authority) of the district. You are a Chief, in your own right of your family and district, and no imposed structure such as the State can take that away. So each representative in the House is a representative of one of the Faipule districts with their own distinctive
autonomous group. When you are selected by them, you are carrying their dignity. Each Faipule is loyal to a district and loyal to a family. So, Party go to hell! Until you understand there are 41 faipules and 41 distinctive groups you can't understand Samoan politics if other representatives of other districts come together with me then I can make a proposition, but, in Western Samoa, development must take place within the Matai system. Any capitalism will be swallowed up by the matai system. That’s why I’m not afraid to use capitalism.

A former minister, however, felt there should be a proper party system in Western Samoa to stop Members of Parliament switching their allegiance from one leader to another:

The Constitution makes no provision for a party system in Western Samoa. Elected representatives of each Faipule district make up the house. Those members elect the Prime Minister in an open vote. Within seven days, the Prime Minister chooses his Cabinet and the Prime Minister and Cabinet are sworn in for a three-year term. The HRPP was formed in 1979 when the Tupuola administration used the Public Service to sack top bureaucrats. These people criticized Prime Minister Tupuola. He couldn’t take it as an analytical objective critique of his policy. He saw it as personal opposition and criticism of his family. The members of HRPP saw the sacking as an infringement on workers’ rights. So the party was called the Human Rights Protection Party. A lot of these people were competent educated people with knowledge of the law and political astuteness. But, over the years, the party has attracted a lot of no-gooders. The ideals of HRPP have begun to take second place to private interests. It would be far better to emulate the party-system proper. This would stop the giving out of favours and switching parties. Some people joined the Coalition because they weren’t given portfolios. And some walked because they had personal interests in logging and thought Va’ai would be easier to manipulate than Tofilau.

Another Minister believed political manipulation was an inevitable consequence of matai suffrage:

The simplest way of putting it is if you don’t agree with me you go with someone else and defeat me. This development of parties is a new idea which comes from abroad through tourists and students who go away to school and come back.

Nonetheless, constant shifts of power were viewed by all the politicians as disruptive to the development process. As one of the
politicians remarked:

Six political changes have occurred between 1980 and 1986. Development consciousness depends on leadership, both in the village and Parliament. Changes in leadership disrupt development efforts because too much time, effort and money is spent on trying to get power. We need a leader everyone can trust and respect. This is not easy for such a young country (cf quotes p. 89).

The politician's conceptions of development were fairly consistent with Plan statements, at least in principle. They all articulated a commitment to developing the rural areas, both by raising the production of export crops and encouraging rural-based industries. However, they had different ideas as to how development should take place. One of the recently deposed ministers supported the allocation of development funds to infrastructure, and criticized both the government's marketing arrangements and the way in which rural development funds had been allocated for political purposes in the past:

We need to spend more money on rural production, but first we have to get the produce to markets on roads, planes and ships. These things have been provided by aid. Also we need access roads to village plantations. And we need to dismantle the central control by Government over the marketing of copra and cocoa. Prices are set at the Board in an arbitrary manner and it's a disincentive for the farmer to have to bring copra and cocoa to Apia for sale. Whenever the Government spends money in the rural area, there is an intrusion of politics and favouritism to the politicians' villages. This is an improper and distorted allocation of resources. Parliament should allocate resources, not just a particular minister. This would make the development of rural production more rational and more attractive to aid donors (cf quotes p. 89).

A minister of the government, however, was less concerned with how aid funds were allocated and more concerned with developing commercial operations in the rural area. On the topic of agricultural productivity he argued that:

One problem is our own organization. If we went to increase production we must create large commercial
operations on land that is not being used. Concentrating on small farmers is political thinking. They can produce a livelihood but not enough to export. What we need is a much larger fund for development. One way for villagers to acquire capital is to make deals with loggers. In return for hardwood, the logging company could plant agricultural produce or replant the same species. Something like Superlandford was trying to do. Alternatively, government could lease unused land from villagers and give land to good farmers who have the know-how but not enough land.

When I suggested that rural farmers may resist interference with control of their land, either by foreigners or the government, this particular minister replied that villagers needed to acquire a "development consciousness" -- that resistance to development was "a matter of jealousy". One of the members of parliament strongly disagreed with this line of reasoning, and argued that rural resistance to development projects reflected both a contradiction between private or public enterprise and the Samoan land tenure system, and a lack of government consultation with villagers:

The government wants private enterprise but there is a contradiction with Fa’a Samoa (Samoan culture) that needs to be worked out. The Ali‘i and Faipule of the village are responsible for their people and their land. They are the ones who must take responsibility for any decisions. The government doesn’t take responsibility. At the moment, politicians are paying lip service to rural development as a strategy for getting votes. Ministers are not willing to sit down with people in villages and work out different formats to be used as models for commercial ventures that would be satisfactory to all concerned. The Government talks about "planning from below", but in actual fact they never ask people what they want. That’s why people resist their ideas. Villages conduct their affairs with fierce autonomy. So it’s impossible for Government to impose a plan without direct participation of the village.

Several times, during Parliamentary debates, Faipules (Members of Parliament) accused Government of being interested only in "big projects", and of neglecting to consult the village before implementing them. On February 18, 1986, one Faipule suggested that the "Salelologa burning" was the result of the government’s failure to consult with the village before issuing a licence to P.D.C. (the
logging company). This same Faipule referred to disputes between the government and rural villages concerning Faleolo Airport and hydro-electric projects, and called on the Ministers to fully explain to villages concerned, the procedures and implication of infrastructural projects. On March 10, 1986, a faipule whose district suffers from a lack of water asked government to explain their policy on the distribution of aid, specifically, of water tanks. The remarks of these particular faipules indicate that the government has failed to communicate adequately both their plans for development and their policy for distributing aid to rural areas.

The problem of distributing income from development projects financed by foreign investors was thought to be a major problem by several of the politicians. As one minister put it:

The ban on logging was not a rational decision. It was based on politicking over the issue of who was going to control the rich man, Joseph Lai, and his wealth.

In fact, this minister was far more interested in using his political position to make private deals than to influence the way in which government aid was allocated:

The land in our village is not good for cash cropping so I negotiated with a film company to use our beach and the village for a movie. We also sent a group of villagers to Japan to build a model Samoan village. This year we paid W$18,000 to the church. We are now seen as a rich village. I am now negotiating loans to put up a hotel. This has nothing to do with Government. These are private deals. Being a politician is a good way for me to have access to knowledge of where to get money and for me to make sure my children have a better life.

A member of parliament commented on this use of government to enhance the incumbent’s private interests:

Samoa has a small population. This means that those who are competent and qualified enough to hold bureaucratic or political positions are also the same people who are aware enough to take advantage of economic opportunities. This means there is a great deal of manipulation of one’s bureaucratic and political positions for economic advantage. With no law forcing people to resign their economic positions which may conflict with
their political or bureaucratic roles, the way is open for individuals to use their government positions as a means of enhancing their own private interest. Joint-ventures with foreign investors are a perfect example. People in government hear of them first, and are often the only ones who know how to take advantage of them. Most rural Samoans wouldn’t hear about them or know how to get access to capital.

This politician impressed on me that although the matai system is a naturally redistributive system, it does not inhibit the accumulation of capital:

In rural exchanges, people came out about even. But business is considered separate from rural exchanges. If you make a lot of money you can save and invest. It’s just a management problem palangis don’t have. This doesn’t mean people don’t ask you for money but you don’t have to give it. It’s perfectly legitimate to keep business funds separate. Cash cropping is hard work and export prices are low, so it makes sense for ambitious matai with large families to get into business. However, business is always a special management problem for Samoans, especially if customary land is involved. It can’t be just for personal gain. A matai must always share the fruits of his or her labour with the family and village. The enterprise must always be sanctioned by the village.

A successful farmer and prominent politician explained to me how he managed his enterprise and his obligations to his family and village:

Once you get a matai title you are entitled to work land. In some villages, the matai have divided unused land amongst themselves. But in my village, once you get a matai title you can work as much land as you want to or are able to work. The matai divides the land among untitled people. It is the duty of untitled men to work on my plantation without cash payment. If I want work done quickly, I will pay outside workers to do it for me. A matai allocates part of his plantation for fa’alavelaves [family ceremonies such as births, deaths, weddings]. The matai has sole authority over everything in his family. If a tautua [he who serves] can’t afford a fa’alavelave the matai provides the money to keep up the good reputation of the family. The matai’s job is to take care of the land and those who serve. If those who serve me are good workers, I can go to the Development Bank and guarantee a loan for them to make their own plantation. The value of my crops and animals is used as security for loans. I have 1,000 cattle and 500 developed acres of land. I have a good
name at the bank. I can secure a loan for WSS200,000. I can help the people of my village. I earn respect through hard work.

The statements of these politicians suggest that rural business enterprises which are sanctioned by village inhabitants are very successful and not antithetical to Samoan cultural institutions. By contrast, government and foreign enterprises which encroach on village land without the approval of village councils invite strong resistance from village inhabitants. Furthermore, the government has failed to develop a satisfactory dialogue with rural villages regarding both implementation of projects and allocation of resources. Finally, the government’s failure to consult rural inhabitants about development in the rural areas has made it impossible to generate suitable, worthwhile, fundable projects. The governments’ failure to establish a dialogue with villagers regarding suitable development projects is linked to their failure either to mobilize indigenous institutions or to effectively utilize rural land and labour as tools for raising the productivity of the rural sector of the economy.

All of the politicians I interviewed thought that foreign aid and investment was absolutely necessary if they were to increase their country’s productivity. They referred to aid donors as “our friends”, and believed the task of coming up with suitable development priorities and strategies was the government’s responsibility. They did not feel that aid donors distorted their priorities or forced a programme of development they did not want. Only one of my informants questioned whether or not aid donors were sincere in developing the economy of Western Samoa. He said that:

Aid donors would support us if they didn’t have to give us aid in ten years. Of course, if we do become self-sufficient, we will have political autonomy to vote as we like in the United Nations. Right now we vote with our aid donors in the West, because they are our friends. But, if aid donors are sincere, they should help us with self-sufficiency. I don’t know if they would support
rural projects like hotels and things. We'll have to see.

The government's major objective expressed both in its Development Plans and the statements of politicians is to raise productivity in the rural sector by utilizing village political and social structures, either to raise the production of export crops or establish village industries. However, the government's development strategy has been to deprive the rural area of capital and to allocate most of its resources to commercial and infrastructure projects, which do not utilize village structures, thereby rendering them redundant as facilitators of the development process. Moreover, the government has failed to attain its objective of widespread participation of Samoans in the development process. Instead, government and foreign-financed projects that encroach on village land have precipitated strong resistance from the rural farmers. Finally, by failing to utilize foreign and domestic resources in such a way as to decrease its dependence on foreign aid, the government has not achieved its objective of moving toward national self-reliance and political autonomy. In practice, the politicians of Western Samoa follow a state-centred model of development to the extent that they attempt to strengthen the self-sufficiency and autonomy of the state and view the state as the only institution capable of implementing a successful development strategy. Moreover, large inflows of aid reinforce the political élites illusion that the government is the source of development. The politics and diplomacy of international aid encourage Samoan politicians to establish links with outside donors and potential investors -- links which may weaken their commitment to both their electorate in the villages and the village mode of production. Along with the aid donors, the political élite of Western Samoa, through their development practices, follow a modernization and growth model of development stressing growth in exports and
Nonetheless, the politicians I interviewed are reflective about their seemingly contradictory roles as developers of the economy and as chiefs. As chiefs, they carry the dignity of their districts and are bound to safeguard and promote district interests, even at the expense of government interests. As members of government, they are expected to make rational objective decisions about the economy as a whole, based on maximizing the productivity of the country's natural resources. Many politicians have a strong interest in developing infrastructure in order to maintain and enhance the government's investment opportunities in industrial development. Other politicians use government enterprises to satisfy district responsibilities, leaving themselves open to public criticism and charges of corruption. In some cases, this practice of using government resources to enhance district interests is motivated more by the Samoan heart (see Chapter VI below) -- i.e., by a politician's commitment to the maintenance and reproduction of the Samoan world -- than by a desire for a personal profit. These conflicting priorities reflect what Ogden (1989) calls the "paradox" of Pacific development, i.e., the constant process of reconciling communitarian village-based views of self-reliance and autonomy with the statist perspective of self-reliance and autonomy. However, insofar as Samoan politicians identify the transfer of capital and technology from aid donor countries with the development of Western Samoa, they are likely to continue to attempt to guarantee expected returns on foreign investments by: trying to keep Western Samoa's village producers under control; instituting state industries using commercial management techniques; and developing networks of relations with foreign business interests. The interests and activities of Samoan politicians and aid donors have, so far, opposed the type of resource allocation and institution building in...
the rural areas that would bring about growth in that sector of the Samoan economy. Moreover, Samoan politicians have attempted to make sense of their encounter with aid donors by regarding Western Samoa's natural resources as commodities and a source of profit. Thus, development projects have been aimed at maximizing resource productivity in terms of the profit to be made in international trade. Finally, the government of Western Samoa is likely to persist with its rhetoric and goal of national self-reliance and autonomy as long as politicians believe it will enhance the government's ability to manipulate aid donor countries into redistributing global resources.

**The Bureaucrats: Grassroots Development**

I conducted in-depth interviews with fourteen top-level bureaucrats in the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), the Rural Development Programme, the Development Bank of Western Samoa (DBWS), the Agricultural Store Corporation, the Department of Economic Development, the Lands and Surveys Department, the Lands and Titles Court and the aid Coordinating Committee. We discussed issues relating to Western Samoa's development problems in general, and rural development in particular. Conversations reproduced below are reconstructed from my interview notes.

I asked all the bureaucrats I interviewed for their views on the reasons for the stagnation and decline of production in the rural areas. Their reasons fell into four major categories: lack of government commitment to rural development; lack of aid-donor commitment to developing the Samoan economy; the use of development funds for political purposes; and corrupt practices by politicians and bureaucrats. Half of the bureaucrats I interviewed thought the solution to Western Samoa's economic problems lay in building
development structures in the rural area, both to identify their production requirements and to put pressure on the government to provide the necessary resources.

CONVERSATIONS WITH THE BUREAUCRATS

Government Commitment to Rural Development

Nine of the fourteen bureaucrats I interviewed felt that the government lacked commitment to rural development (defined in terms of increasing both the production of export crops and rural incomes) evidenced by the government’s failure to: involve rural people in the development process; allocate sufficient resources to rural infrastructure and market research directed toward identifying export crops which yield higher returns than coconuts and cocoa; provide sufficient credit and inputs for rural small-holders who wish to expand their plantations; identify economically-sound development projects compatible with traditional institutions and devise some satisfactory method to fix the boundaries of customary land. The bureaucrats expressed their views as follows:

There is no money in export crops. The government isn’t really committed to finding alternative crops with markets. They just talk about rural development but don’t do much (cf. quotes:81-2);

The government defines development as short-term, fast buck deals. To them development is hydro-electric dams, airports and luxury items -- TVs, videos, fancy clothes. They don’t have a good idea of how to develop;

The government is still concentrating their efforts on traditional low-return crops when they should be diversifying. The grassroots is not involved in planning. The rural people don’t even know what the government’s plans are. There is a shortage of inputs -- fertilizer and pesticide -- the treasury hasn’t been paying the subsidies to the Agriculture Store, so they can’t get any more credit from overseas suppliers;

There is no unified, consistent effort toward development. The government doesn’t know what it wants. They lack knowledge about the economy so Parliament makes ad hoc decisions;
The production of export crops is stagnating because prices are low, and you can get a better price in the local market. There's also a shortage of labour in the rural area. Young school-leavers live off their relatives in town. They don't want to work the plantations for nothing. The government should make agriculture more lucrative to keep the young people on the plantations (cf quotes p. 81);

Farmers are always complaining about the lack of access roads to their plantations and the Development Bank won't give them enough credit to expand their plantations. The Bank discriminates against small holders. Industry is given a three year grace period before paying back loans. Not the small holders. We only have a suspensory loan for cocoa. It doesn't cover anything else (cf quote: pp. 86-7);

The government talks about joint commercial ventures between foreign or local entrepreneurs with capital and technical knowledge, and customary landowners in the rural area. But, it won't work. No businessman is going to invest in customary land. Land tenure is too insecure and besides, transportation and roads are not available. The government should talk to rural people instead of thinking up ideas by themselves;

Development requires firm boundaries. Many disputes arise between the government and villagers about whether land is customary land or government land. Customary land interferes with the government's development projects. Also, foreign investors want surveys done and we can't do them because villagers cut our tapes and pull out markers. They even beat us up;

What I am trying to say is that the government must consult the villagers about development. They don't, so villagers get angry. If the people in the village want to exchange land with each other to consolidate larger plots to develop, they will do it. They just need some help with registering the agreement. At the moment, it's a moral agreement. And they need knowledge about good projects.

Aid Donors' Commitment to Development

Seven of the fourteen bureaucrats I interviewed thought aid donors lacked commitment to rural development evidenced by their: lack of interest in funding rural development projects; insistence on managing projects and supplying their own equipment and technicians; and lack of cooperation with the government's
development initiatives. They expressed these opinions in the following ways:

The aid donors tell us what projects they are interested in funding. Departments put forward proposals for which they know aid is available. Thus development occurs according to the objectives of the aid donors, not the government. Government priorities are distorted by the aid donors. Aid donors give aid so our country will buy their products and hire their technicians. Aid stimulates their economies, not ours.

Japanese give aid because our balance of trade with Japan is very lopsided. We import much more from Japan than we export to them -- especially cars, trucks and fertilizer. Also, we borrow from the Asian Development Bank, which is heavily financed by Japan. So Japan may be interested in markets for their products. We buy equipment for projects at inflated prices, and Japan benefits, not us;

Rural development came into the language of aid donors in the sixties, but they are not very interested in it. Look at the implementation of the cocoa project. They are all expatriates. They try to link up with the rural people by hiring a local counterpart. But they pick them up [the rural counterparts] and put them in the back of the truck. The experts have houses, telephones and vehicles. But the local counterpart has none of these things. So the local counterpart loses heart, and has no commitment to the project. Aid donors think that development can occur within project and task-force programmes under their management. This has resulted in quasi-governmental entities like WSTEC, which completely by-pass DAFF and thus have no linkages with the rural people;

Aid is given to achieve the purposes of the donors. So donors dictate what it is used for. Donor governments are interested in investments and markets. The Government Aid Committee knows what the donors want to fund. So the government formulates projects they [aid donors] like. But, it's up to the government to be more aggressive about what it wants, especially with respect to rural development. Aid donors aren't interested in that;

Donors employ their own technicians and buy their own products. Little gets left behind -- machines can be a problem because maintenance costs are high, and there's no spare parts. Then there's the water tanks funded by UNDP. The design was not suitable for weather conditions in Western Samoa. Finally, after three years and a lot of money, the engineer was fired. Now a local engineer builds them for very little pay;
We have a trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand -- SPARTECA [South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Corporation Agreement]. But the trade agreement doesn’t always work to our advantage. For example, there may be duty free entry on goods, but there are non-tariff barriers like quarantines and packaging requirements. Sometimes an exporter requires five different certificates. This is a disincentive. Another example: presently the government is interested in import substitution. We would like to start a flour mill. The U.N. did a feasibility study and we have a local entrepreneur interested in financing it. But, we buy 95 percent of our flour from Australia. We would like to buy wheat for the flour mill, but Australia said no and, for political reasons, the government won’t buy it from the EC [European Community] because they are afraid Australia will cut down its aid;

The Rural Development Programme was set up in 1977, at which time we received 200,000 Australian. This amount was increased to 300,000 in 1980. But in January of 1986 I am still waiting for money. Australia cut our funds when a man hired to do a follow-up study reported the rural development programmes were unsuccessful. Instead of working on new programmes, Australia just cut our funds. Villagers apply for three to four thousand projects each year. Only one percent get funded. Aid donors don’t care about rural development.

Development Funds and Policies

Five of my informants argued that indigenous politics interfered with the development process either because it interfered with economic efficiency, or because it offended aid donors:

It is common for Ministers to originate projects and direct the aid committee to look for funds. After the funds have been acquired, politics influences where projects go. For example, the Minister of Health decides where doctors, nurses and medical equipment go; the Minister of Education decides where school supplies and funds go; the Minister of Public Works decides where hydro projects and roads go. Politicians have a short life-span. They use aid as political currency. Aid donors don’t like this;

Politicians use aid to enhance their political prestige. The Rural Development Programme was set up to develop the rural areas. The Prime Minister had final say over how funds were given out. The fund was abused because the Prime Minister gave out money for political reasons. The aid donors stopped funding the programme;

Fa’a Samoa [Samoan custom] is an effective
instrument to affect a greater sharing of goods and services. Fa' a Samoa redistributes the national wealth and economic efficiency takes second place. Fa'a Samoa is the way you ensure your social well-being and welfare, so why worry about efficiency? If your family or district is in need of help, you don’t worry about efficiency, you give it. What is efficiency anyway? Aid donors don’t explain what criteria they use to determine efficiency.

Bureaucratic Corruption

Three of my informants mentioned corruption as a problem. At the time I was doing the interviews, the Copra and Cocoa Board was the object of a scandal involving mismanagement of funds. The Copra and Cocoa Board’s secretary was asked to retire after twenty-eight years of service, when an audit revealed WSS$2,000,000 had been misappropriated in one year alone (The Samoan Observer Dec. 23, 1985). Apparently members of the secretary’s family had been paid grossly inflated wages, while certain copra producers were overpaid for their product. One of my informants commented as follows:

The Board should be more responsible to the growers. They should publicize prices and how they are set. Operating costs should not be tied to world prices. This practice generates a large surplus which can be misappropriated. It’s not only the Copra and Cocoa Board either. We have a problem with misappropriation of funds in the bureaucracy. Just look at the auditor’s reports in Hansard. Very little is done about it.

Grassroots Involvement in the Development Process

Seven of the fourteen bureaucrats I interviewed suggested that the participation of rural people in the development process would resolve many of Western Samoa’s development problems. One of the bureaucrats expressed his ideas in a Master’s thesis (Fasavalu:1985). He argues that the development process should be an exercise in problem solving involving aid donors, the government, and rural farmers. Researchers should converse with farmers to ensure that foreign technology is perceived as appropriate by the farmers themselves (ibid.:50). Furthermore, researchers should make
use of indigenous knowledge as a complement to their own:

Localized knowledge may provide useful shortcuts for researchers in their search for effective solutions to the farmers’ problems. Also an idea borrowed from the people, elaborated by the government and returned to the people is much more likely to be adopted than something alien to them ... This means extension workers, researchers and planners must learn from the farmers ... [also] the credibility of the extension worker depends on reasonable access to credit and marketing facilities (ibid.55-65).

Fasavalu advocates organizing farmers into groups, first, to identify problems they cannot resolve themselves, and then to put pressure on government and development agencies to provide things like appropriate research, credit, market information and infrastructure. Another bureaucrat expressed a similar sentiment:

At the moment government tells us what they are interested in funding; we tell the growers and they apply for funds. But villages are politically autonomous. They don’t need government. The government has to persuade them that development is in their interest .... At present I have been trying to encourage rural people to put pressure on the government for more funds to raise production and develop markets for their products.

One of the bureaucrats thought that economic viability should take second place to building development structures in the rural area:

Rural people don’t see the connection between growing more taro and an airport. People think government aid is free, so why pay back Development Bank loans. Faipules are beginning to ask the government for aid. Also, the Pulenu’u is part of the structure of government. He can ask government for things like roads. In light of this developing awareness in the rural areas, economic viability of projects should take second place to building structures in the rural areas to take care of development needs.

Three of the seven remaining bureaucrats I interviewed believed the solution to stagnating production in the rural areas depended on a change of attitude among politicians. They argued that politicians should be less interested in the development agendas of aid donors and or business people and more interested in the needs of their constituents. One official expressed this view
as follows:

In the western world, politicians are wealthy or middle class. In Samoa, politicians are neither wealthy nor well educated. Politicians don't have much money so they are easily bought by foreign investors and easily influenced by aid donors ... They should start listening to what their people are saying. Then ask the aid donors for money.

One top official in the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries said he thought that Samoans should be persuaded to invest in production:

*Fa’alavelaves* are the greatest obstacle to raising rural production. *Fa’alavelaves* prevent accumulation of profit. People are obligated to give what they make to ceremonial exchange. Even if politicians can be persuaded to invest more in rural production, the farmers would still have to be persuaded to reinvest profits to replenish stock or buy more planting materials.

Two senior officials involved with the Development Programme felt that market development was the solution:

The government is not aggressive enough in finding markets. If growers knew how many cases were available for their produce they would grow more. The Produce Marketing Division controls the allocation of cases according to market demand. They should be involved in finding new markets for products (cf quote p.81).

Finally, one bureaucrat connected with the Rural Development Bank thought that the government should privatize all state-owned enterprises and allow "market forces" to prevail even in the rural sector:

Maybe the time has come to privatize government ventures and to allow market forces to operate in the rural sector rather than subsidizing low-return crops.

**CONCLUSION**

As I discuss in Chapter VI, DAFF's Annual Reports consistently contain requests to government to allocate more resources to rural development, especially for crop production, appropriate research in disease control and technology, as well as for improved marketing arrangements. In addition, the Forestry
Division has drawn attention to the critical depletion of forestry resources and notes its disagreement with the government's policy that continues to allow the export of hardwoods. Other reports cited above (Chapter VI) indicate that the Agricultural Store is unable to ensure a reliable supply of agricultural inputs to farmers; the Development Bank is unable to supply an adequate amount of credit to rural small-holders; the Copra and Cocoa Board has been unable to ensure a fair price to the producers for their product; and the Rural Development Programme is underfunded. Bureaucrats identified four major reasons for this situation: the lack of government commitment to rural development; the use of development funds for political purposes; and corrupt practices of some politicians and bureaucrats. Half of the bureaucrats I interviewed believe the solution lies in organizing rural people to pressure the government into responding to their needs. Some felt that the government ought to design projects which are both economically feasible and politically acceptable to rural people, and then pressure aid donors into funding them. Of course, this particular plan of action requires the cooperation of the aid donors themselves -- an eventuality which is impossible to predict on the basis of my research. It is significant, however, that all three groups -- aid donors, politicians and bureaucrats -- identified the lack of suitable projects for developing the rural sector of the economy as a major reason for the stagnation and decline of its productivity. Furthermore, both the politicians and bureaucrats recognize the fact that aid donors resent politicians appropriating international wealth to enhance their own political positions. In fact, aid donors who use their resources to accomplish their own political ends may have a vested interest in maintaining Western Samoa in a state of political and economic dependency. The State of Western Samoa lacks autonomy, in that it depends on foreign investment and
international aid to fulfill its primary function -- i.e., developing the economy. Furthermore, Western Samoa's aid donors may be more concerned with maintaining their collective strategic advantage in the Pacific, and thus with keeping Western Samoa dependent, than with developing Western Samoa’s economy. Finally, by accepting the aid donors model with respect to economic development (modernization and growth; national autonomy and self-sufficiency), politicians place themselves in the role of collaborators in the development process and incite resistance from the rural people.

In sum, since the incorporation of the Independent State of Western Samoa, successive government elites in collaboration with aid donors have attempted to implement a state-centred model of and for development directed toward the goals of national self-reliance and a condition of economic well-being for all Samoans. Government strategies have focused on the development of relations with patron states that provide aid in the form of grants, loans, technology and technicians for investment, for the most part, in large state-owned commercial ventures and infrastructural projects.

Unfortunately, government strategies have failed to achieve a movement toward the goals of either national self-reliance or enhanced economic well-being for the majority of Samoans. The governments' failure is due, in part, to their inability to mobilize rural resources, especially indigenous institutions, land and labour.

More often than not, government attempts to utilize land for forestry or infrastructural projects have been met with resistance from people living in the rural area. Governments have bypassed rural producers and indigenous institutions as facilitators of national development because the bulk of development resources are allocated to commercial and infrastructural projects that do not use
them. For most Samoans, migration is a better investment than cash-cropping so young Samoans continue to migrate out of the villages, leaving their families short of labour (see chapter II).

This failure on the part of the governments combines with the resistance from rural farmers calls into question the suitability of a state-centred model of and for development in the Western Samoan context.
Regional conferences, including those sponsored by the South Pacific Forum, have played an important role in forging a regional identity based on both the rejection of the continuing political, cultural and economic domination by powerful Pacific rim countries and the assertion of a Pacific cultural identity. The Pacific nuclear-free zone issue is a major rallying point for these assertions. Conference participants who drafted the resolutions are angry about French and U.S. strategic advances into the North and South Pacific. Their anger is shaped by a deep concern for the health of their people. Also the conference participants view the Euro-American and Japanese perception of a Soviet threat in the Pacific as a myth perpetuated by the U.S. administration and, as one of my informants said, "We Pacific Islanders are not going to continue to sacrifice the well-being of ourselves and our children because of Russian paranoia".

Missionaries considered many aspects of Samoan culture -- warfare, polygamy, certain forms of dancing and singing, traditional hair styles and clothing and, until this day for some Samoans, tattooing -- "bad" and belonging to the 'time of darkness' before conversion to Christianity (Maleisea 1980). Most nineteenth and twentieth century ethnographers offer only one version of a number of oral traditions concerning creation, chiefly titles, district boundaries, and other political and religious institutions. The versions of oral traditions recorded in ethnographies reflect a bias towards the Samoan faction with which the ethnographers happened to be aligned (ibid. 26-27). The Lands and Titles Court has also established certain versions of tradition at the expense of others by recording those which the judges have deemed the most convincing and using them in all subsequent contests over the lands and titles to which they pertain (ibid.). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss different versions of Samoan tradition and culture. However, it should be noted that what constitutes tradition and culture is not unproblematic.

I discuss the 'Salelologa burning' in detail in Chapter IV. In January, 1986, the people of the Salelologa village burned down equipment belonging to a logging company in defiance of a court order to stop interfering with the company's operations.

Figures for GDP include subsistence production. However, none of the government development plans indicate how subsistence production is calculated. In Western Samoa's Fifth Development Plan (GWS 1984:4), the authors state that subsistence income is the 'leading category' of National Income. They go on to caution that estimates of subsistence income are probably understated. The authors of a World Bank Report (Yusuf and Peters 1985:18) state
simply that 'the largest component of production is the subsistence sector, primarily agriculture, for which statistics are non-existent'. The Asian Development Bank’s (1985:15) agricultural sector study reports that ‘In 1981, the net value added of the subsistence sector was estimated at WS$33.5 million while the census recorded 20,000 people engaged in subsistence activities, indicating an average income of WS$1,660 per head.’

The authors of Western Samoa’s Fourth Development Plan note that although estimates related to ‘non-market production’ are ‘hazardous’ it is not unreasonable to assume that this category of production keeps pace with population change (GWS 1980:13). My guess is that 1981 estimates of subsistence production per capita are used and adjusted for population growth and inflation.

5. Western Samoa experiences a high inflation rate as well as periodic devaluation of the tala. To make figures for GDP comparable, they are reported either in constant 1980 prices (GWS 1984:5) or constant 1984 prices (GWS 1987:2). The government also calculates this inflation rate using 1980 as a base year (GWS 1987:244): 1980=100. Inflation in December 1986 was 213.5. In order to compare per capita income between 1979 (reported in 1980 constant prices) and 1986, I converted per capita income for 1986 into constant 1980 prices by dividing by 2.

6. Conversion of coconut oil to dry copra is based on a 60 percent extraction rate (GWS 1987:235).

7. The project breakdown for the US$598,089 spent on rural development was as follows: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) $10,000 - consultant in rural technology; and $6,000 - training farmers in the use of donkeys; UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) - $115,000 rural water supply; $6,500 -- vaccines for children; $3,020 -- preschool teacher training; $17,659 -- refrigerators and mid-wifery kits; $830 -- educational manuals and posters; New Zealand -- $76,700 -- rural water supplies; $14,750 -- small rural projects (unspecified); European Community -- $111,120 -- rural development projects (unspecified); The Federal Republic of Germany -- $5,000 -- rural primary school upgrading; U.S. Peace Corps -- $231,000 -- eleven teachers for manual arts and home economics in rural schools.

8. Details of these projects can be found in Development published by External Aid Division, Ministry of External Affairs, New Zealand.

9. Stabex is the European Community’s scheme to moderate the effects of instability in the price of exports of member states by transferring money to make up the difference between a fixed price and actual price when prices are low. Member states
pay back the fund when prices are high in an amount equal to the differences between a fixed price and the actual price.

10. In an effort to encourage cocoa planting, the Cocoa Suspensory Loan Scheme was initiated to plant 600 ha. of cocoa in 1984. The scheme provides a cost of WSS2,717 per ha. for the first four years. Twenty percent of this cost is the farmer's contribution in the form of his labour; 20 percent is a loan from the Development Bank; and 60 percent is a suspensory loan that can be converted to a grant if the farmer's performance is satisfactory in terms of management and planting techniques.

11. I discuss this project in detail from the district's perspective in Chapter II.

12. Specifically, JICA facilitates emigration of Japanese to friendly countries by: providing extensive services to potential emigrants, which includes collection and dissemination of information on laws and the political, economic and cultural situations in countries which are preferred destinations; handling emigration procedures; facilitating agreements between emigrants and future employers in the country of destination; providing emigrants with training courses on the condition and language of accepting countries; and by providing welfare services (schools, teachers, clinics, physicians, public halls, etc.) for emigrants which supplement the services of the accepting country when those services are deficient or absent. JICA also buys land in the accepting countries for emigrants who wish to farm and extends loans to those who wish to set up businesses (ibid.:9-10). Furthermore, Japanese loans are available to companies in the accepting countries which either employ Japanese emigrants or buy the products of Japanese farmers. At the time of my research, there were no Japanese with landed emigrant status in Samoa.

13. It is interesting to note that the World Bank report on Western Samoa entitled Western Samoa: The Experiences of Slow Growth and Resources Imbalance (Yusuf and Peters 1985) makes no mention of WSTEC. Instead, the authors stress the need for development of agro-based industries and diversification of agricultural exports in the rural sector of the economy.
CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study has been to show that the decline & stagnation of the rural sector of the economy in Western Samoa can only be understood by situating the analysis within the historical context of the expansion of American and European capitalism. By situating the analysis of Western Samoa’s development problems within the context of national and international events, I have shown that the stagnation and decline of the production of export crops is not the result of cultural conservatism as many scholars (Fox and Cumberland 1962; Lockwood 1971; Pirie 1970; Fairbairn and Fairbairn 1985; Yusuf and Peters 1985; Shankman 1972) have suggested. On the contrary, the historical and contemporary evidence suggests that Samoans have continuously and consciously transformed their institutions in an effort to control and shape events. The scholars I mention above misinterpret Samoan resistance to particular foreign interventions as conservative, essentially passive and negative. They view Samoan resistance to changes in their land tenure system as responsible for blunting incentive and innovation, and limiting agricultural productivity and economic opportunities. Shankman (ibid.) perceives the persistence of Samoan custom as ideology and as a product of underdevelopment. This is neither a useful nor accurate interpretation of Samoan resistance.

During the period of first contact, powerful chiefs gained access to missionary trade goods in order to strengthen their positions against their contenders. At various times, one or the other of the heads of royal lineages, attempted to protect their position as King of Samoa by signing treaties with one or the other
of the Great Powers (United States, England, Germany) and inextricably involved them in a political struggle amongst themselves -- a struggle the Powers resolved by annexing the islands. Nevertheless, colonial administrators, who did not have the advantage of military forces based in Samoa, needed the cooperation of the Samoan political élite to rule the islands. Foreign administrators inherited state structures designed by the Samoan chiefs themselves. From the beginning of contact with foreign merchants, high-ranking Samoan chiefs were willing participants in cash-cropping, business and the European education system. Members of this élite established themselves as leaders of Western Samoa's independence movement and as authors of the Constitution of the Independent State of Western Samoa. Today, some Samoan chiefs are prosperous entrepreneurs, others are graduates of some of the world's most prestigious universities and most are shrewd and innovative politicians. In short, a century and a half of Samoan collaboration with foreign élites has produced a Samoan élite which is both well educated and successful in the global economy and an active force in the transformation of Samoan culture. At the same time, Samoan resistance has successfully curtailed some of the most exploitative forms of foreign domination. Chiefs refused to make labour contracts with foreign plantation owners. Samoans burned and trampled German plantations thereby forcing the administrators to acknowledge their land claims. Chiefly campaigns of violence thwarted the German administration's attempts to interfere with their choice of King and obliged the foreigners to acknowledge indigenous political institutions and chiefly status and power. During New Zealand's rule, the administration's attempts to institute land reform incited the indigenous élite to organize mass campaigns of civil disobedience, non-cooperation and peaceful demonstrations, all of which culminated
in Western Samoa's independence in 1962. Against the will of
foreign advisors, the authors of Samoa's Constitution gave
constitutional protection to the further alienation of customary
land thereby protecting the base of chiefly power. Today, rural
Samoans, led by their village councils, continue to resist the
alienation of village land by thwarting attempts of government
planners and foreign investors to develop it commercially.

In addition to preventing both the separation of Samoan
producers from their land and the institution of forced labour,
Samoan chiefs creatively restructured foreign institutions in terms
of their own culture system thereby resisting the establishment of
Western cultural values within the Samoan polity. For example, the
church is perceived by chiefs as an avenue for exercising political
authority. In the period of first contact, missionaries and
teachers depended on individual chiefs for protection (Tiffany
1978). Mission stations were located in political centres where
powerful Samoan chiefs conducted their district affairs. The
administrative levels of the mission coincided with traditional
district and subdistrict levels of political organization (ibid.).
By the end of the nineteenth century, Samoan teachers and pastors
controlled local churches, and to this day, church contributions
feed upon a system of competitive status enhancement. Each Sunday,
the pastor publicly identifies the donors with their monetary gifts.
Today, denominational affiliation corresponds with descent group
membership and political relations based on chiefly alliance
(ibid.). In short, the church has been assimilated into the
political structures of Samoan society.

Money has also been assimilated into the structures of
Samoan society. Money which Samoans earn from cash-cropping or wage
labour is transformed into gifts in both the indigenous gift-
exchange economy and the church. In these ways, money is used by
Samoans to seek self-fulfillment and prestige within their indigenous culture thus reversing the loss of self associated with wage-labour and cash-cropping. Today, some Samoan politicians attempt to resist the hegemony of foreign aid donors by appropriating the power of foreign wealth and using it to enhance their own political and social interest.

As well as assimilating the church and the use of money, Samoans have also assimilated the state and electoral politics into their own political structures. Rendering good service to Samoan political, economic and cultural institutions is still the established strategy for attaining authority and political influence in state institutions. The authors of Western Samoa's Constitution restricted eligibility to vote (until recently) and to hold political office to chiefs thereby ensuring the maintenance and enhancement of indigenous political institutions. The successful candidates for political office are those who can best tap the resources, especially money, of their families and redistribute them among rural voters.

In sum, Samoan resistance has prevented extensive foreign encroachment on their land, the institution of forced labour and the establishment of commercial values and practices within the Samoan polity. What some scholars have interpreted as cultural conservatism may be viewed more usefully as creative acts of resistance to global capitalism and the commercial values upon which it is based.

I have tried to establish that development and underdevelopment in Western Samoa are the result of the conscious actions of people and that contemporary Samoan culture originates in the processes of human resistance, collaboration and accommodation to contact between the Samoan world and global capitalism. It is more useful to view contemporary Samoan custom as a by-product of
these processes. To view contemporary Samoan custom as ideology and a product of underdevelopment is to deny custom its full import and dynamism as lived practice.

Contemporary development practices in Western Samoa are the product of a historical encounter between the Samoan world and the world of global capitalism. This encounter culminated in the Independent State of Western Samoa created and defined by members of the Samoan élite in collaboration with members of the New Zealand élite. Partial Samoanization of the State was accomplished by restricting suffrage (until recently) and the right to hold political office to chiefs. Also, the foundation of chiefly power, i.e. the control over land attached to title, was given legal recognition. Further, Samoanization of the State was prevented, however, because the indigenous élite, on the advice of the New Zealand's colonial advisors, failed to give constitutional recognition to the indigenous power structures embodies in the village and district institutions known as the Ali’i and Faipule and the Tumua and Pule respectively. However, the power of village and district institutions is not solely dependent on the constitutional recognition of the same. The Samoans’ strong attachment and commitment in lived practice to their indigenous institutions and ultimately their active resistance to State power is a dynamic force in contemporary Samoan society. Nonetheless, Samoan politicians and top level bureaucrats conceptualize development as a state-centred task aimed at national self-reliance and autonomy. In an attempt to achieve this goal, Samoa’s political élite channel national and international resources into state-owned commercial ventures as well as the infrastructure necessary to attract foreign business interests willing to develop local resources.

Development policy and practices are the product of the contemporary strategizing of two sets of actors; the Samoan élite
(politicians and high-level bureaucrats) and the foreign élite (aid donors and foreign businessmen/women). Practices of both élites are motivated by their desire to maintain themselves in power. With respect to foreign élites, beginning in 1975, aid donor countries dramatically increased their aid to Pacific island states, including Western Samoa, so as to maintain them as economic and political dependencies in the Pacific. Foreign aid has not contributed to the health of the Samoan economy. Instead, GDP per capita has declined, the trade deficit has escalated and the production of major crops has either declined or stagnated. Less than five percent of foreign aid has been allocated to the rural areas.

Low world prices for most of Samoa's traditional export crops force young skilled workers and educated Samoans out of farming and into wage-labour in Apia and overseas. Commercial development funded by foreign aid has weakened the Samoan economy and contributed to the rising cost of living for all Samoans. Commercial development, then, has hardly been a panacea for the majority of Samoans and resistance to it should not be interpreted as either negative or passive.

The allocation of foreign resources to the various sectors of the economy in Western Samoa is the result of élite collaboration between Samoan politicians and top level bureaucrats and the representatives of aid donor countries and institutions. The Samoan élite identifies the transfer of foreign capital and technology from aid donor countries with development of Western Samoa and as a necessary means of legitimating their government positions. In order to guarantee expected returns to foreign donors, they have tried to institute state industries using commercial management techniques, develop networks of relations with foreign businessmen/women, and prepare the infrastructure necessary to attract foreign investment. As mediators of the world of global
capitalism and the Samoan world, the Samoan élite, in order to make sense of their interaction with foreign aid donors and businesspeople, conceive of Western Samoa's natural resources as exploitable resources capable of being turned into profit through international trade. The government has emphasized, for example, the development of forestry -- development which necessitates the leasing of customary land, either by the government or foreign businesspeople, for the purpose of logging and reforestation. However, the Samoan political and bureaucratic élite have failed to develop a satisfactory dialogue with rural villagers regarding either the implementation of these projects or the allocation of resources. This failure to communicate with rural people has incited their resistance both to government projects (i.e., the airport, hydroelectric dam, WSTEC, reforestation) and to private business ventures (the Saleleloga burning).

Moreover, because government politicians are chiefs, and therefore dependent on their rural constituents for their positions, they are unable to guarantee aid donors that projects will either be implemented or produce expected results. Take the example of WSTEC, the country's largest commercial agricultural operation funded by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The managers of WSTEC are chiefs. Some managers have used WSTEC resources to install commercial operations run by family members and to finance political campaigns. WSTEC plantations are all managed by chiefs because only they have access to enough labour to work the plantations. Chiefs and their families routinely help themselves to WSTEC produce. Most of my Samoan friends do not consider these chiefly activities to be morally wrong. In fact, they are envious of those chiefs who seize the opportunity to enhance their families' resources and prestige. WSTEC was at least twelve million Western Samoan dollars in debt in 1986.
The government is unable to control any form of resistance to foreign-financed projects. This situation has led members of the Samoan élite, especially bureaucrats, to suggest that the solution to underdevelopment in the rural sector lies in organizing rural people to pressure the government into responding to their development priorities. In short, rural resistance to projects supported by the Samoan élite has presented the government with a serious challenge, and made known the political presence of the relatively powerless rural farmer.

Organizing rural people to pressure the government into responding to their development priorities will take an initiative outside the indigenous structures of power. Samoan political institutions encourage vertical solidarity between untitled people and their chiefs. In addition, horizontal solidarity between chiefs of a village can be accomplished through decisions arrived at by village councils. This kind of solidarity makes possible rural resistance to government projects at the village level. However, beyond the village, the solidarity necessary for effective pressure on government is not possible using the indigenous power structures. Pressure would have to come from a new country-wide initiative and possibly from the government itself. The recent extension of suffrage to untitled men and women may provide that political initiative.

In short, Government strategies have failed to achieve a movement toward the goals of either national self-reliance or enhanced economic well-being for the majority of Samoans. The governments' failure, in part to their inability to mobilize and utilize rural resources, specifically, indigenous institutions, land and labour, as tools for raising the productivity of the rural sector of the economy.

More often than not, government attempts to utilize land for
reforestation, forestry or infrastructural projects have met with resistance from rural residents. Young Samoans continue to migrate out of the villages to jobs that are more lucrative than cash-cropping, leaving their families short of labour and struggling to produce a surplus beyond their subsistence requirements. This failure on the part of governments, combined with the resistance from rural farmers calls into question the suitability of a state-centred model of and for development in the Western Samoan context.

A 'village-based' (Ogden 1989:365) model of and for development may well be more appropriate and effective in Western Samoa. As I state, in the Introduction, 'village-based' development focuses on community self-reliance and autonomy rather than national self-reliance and autonomy. This model of and for development has as its goals: local self-reliance exemplified by basic needs satisfaction, and community access to services such as health, education, transportation, electricity etc.; decentralization of decision-making processes related to development; financial support for village-based modes of production; and dissemination of appropriate technology.

A village-based model of and for development may be more appropriate in the Western Samoan context than a state-centred model for several reasons. First, rural villages in Western Samoa are self-sustaining economic and political units. Village councils of chiefs consider themselves autonomous in relation to the National government. Moreover, village committees are already engaged in village-centred development such as building schools, clinics, roads and churches. Villagers also house and feed pastors, teachers and nurses. In other words, rural Samoans presently possess some of the organizational resources necessary to design and implement projects. A village-based model of and for development, then, is able to acknowledge and legitimate the political autonomy of village
councils as well as mobilize, utilize and build upon the valuable institutional resources that already exist in rural Samoa.

Second, a village-based model of and for development is capable of acknowledging and legitimating the indigenous mode of production and the values upon which it is based. Projects based on such a model may incite less resistance from rural producers. Through cash-cropping and wage-labour villagers are linked to the global market place. Through ceremonial exchange, villages transform cash and commodities they acquire in the market place into 'gifts' and thereby reproduce their social, political and economic institutions. Migrants are also important contributors to ceremonial exchange. Relatives living overseas mobilize capital and energy to contribute to village projects by sending cash surpluses to parents and siblings living in the rural areas. As a number of scholars (Macpherson 1988; Norton 1984) have pointed out, Samoans engage in wage-labour and cash-cropping as a means to attain, maintain, and enhance their power and prestige within the Samoan moral universe rather than as an end in itself.

Furthermore, the discourse of respondents from Talie suggests that most rural producers do not conceive of land and its products as alienable resources to be turned into a profit in the international market. Rather, most respondents conceive of land as "God's gift to the country" and access to its products as a "God given right". Respondents also indicate they do not keep records of market transactions. These observations raise the question of how rural producers construct their relationship with the market and how that relationship affects their decisions on 'what' and 'how much' to plant. Further research is required to answer these questions. Village-based projects aimed at raising rural productivity should be informed by such knowledge. Nevertheless, development strategies designed to implement a village-based model of and for development
may be more supportive of the indigenous mode of production and incite less resistance from rural producers.

The villagers of Talie say they have reached the limit of their resources in terms of capital and labour. This may be true of many rural producers in Western Samoa. Furthermore, the respondents to the questionnaire indicate that their levels of export production are affected by prices and that their production may increase if the Government invested in low-interest loans, subsidies for agricultural inputs, market research aimed at identifying new high value/low volume crops with good storage properties, and communication and transport infrastructure as well as entertainment centers. A major challenge for the government is to persuade young people to stay in the village both by convincing them that agriculture is a rational use of their labour and that the village is an attractive place to live. What is lacking is both a national leadership committed in practice to eliciting from the less powerful rural chiefs a creative and critical formulation of their hopes and needs as well as foreign and national development agencies whose structures and norms are designed for a development strategy based a village-based model of and for development that has, as its goal, community self-reliance and autonomy.

The major reason for my focus on rural resistance to development in Western Samoa has been to both assess the potential for kin-ordered Pacific societies to reassert their autonomy and to inform efforts to enhance community involvement in their own development. Western Samoa represents but one of these societies. Types of resistance and forms of symbolic mediation characteristic of Pacific societies are complex. Moreover rural modes of production and social formations as expressed in given historical cases may be profoundly different from the case I present here. Nonetheless, an understanding of the range of resistance movements
throughout the Pacific is crucial if we, whether we are development theorists, consultants or practitioners, are to adequately inform the development practices of aid donors and Pacific politicians.
APPENDIX I

QUESTIONNAIRE

You are not required to put your name on this questionnaire. This is to make sure that you are free to answer the questions honestly. The author of the questionnaire is interested in your true feelings so that she is able to write the truth. She can only write the truth if you tell the truth. She is deeply grateful for your help with her research and will pay $5.00 when you return it.

ACCESS TO RESOURCES

For all respondents:

I. a). How old are you?
   b). Are you married?
   c). How many children do you have?
   d). How many of your children are:
      (i) Less than school age?
      (ii) Attend school?
      (iii) Work on the plantation?
      (iv) Have a job in Western Samoa?
      (v) Have a job overseas?
      (vi) Are neither working nor going to school?
   e). How much money did you receive from your working children in the last twelve months?
   f). How much money did you spend in the last month on?
      (i) Church donations?
      (ii) Fa‘alavelaves?
      (iii) Household expenses?
      (iv) Plantation development?
      (v) School fees:

For Untitled People:

   (vi) Services to your matai

   g). How much of your time is spent serving your matai
   h). In what ways do you serve?

For All Respondents:

II. a). Do you have a plantation?

For Matai’s Wives:

III. a). Do you have a plantation separate from your husband’s?
      b). How large is your plantation?
      c). What crops do you grow?
d). How much money did you make from the sale of your crops in the last twelve months?

e). How much of your crops do you export?

f). How much of your crops do you sell in the market?

g). Do you prefer to sell your crops in the market or export them? Give the reason for your answer.

h). Do you have a business or a job besides your plantation? What kind of business or job? How much did you earn from your business or your job in the last twelve months?

i). Do you have a truck?

PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT

I. a). What has the Government of Samoa done for your village?

b). What village committees do you belong to?

c). What does your committee do for the village?

d). What sorts of things does your village need to improve village life?

e). How does your village raise money for the things your village needs?

f). (i) Has your village ever applied for a loan for a village project?

(ii) When?

(iii) From whom?

(iv) How much?

(v) For what?

(vi) Did you pay it back?

II. a). Have you ever gone to talk to your Member of Parliament about the things your village needs?

b). What did you talk about?

c). What did your Member of Parliament do for you?

III. a). (i) Have you ever applied for a loan?

(ii) When?

(iii) Did you get one?

(iv) From whom?

(v) How much?

(vi) What for?

(vii) Did you pay it back?

IV. a). The government of Western Samoa wants the people to grow more crops. Do you agree?

b). Give the reason for your answer.

c). Are you going to make your plantation bigger?

d). Do you need help to make your plantation bigger?

e). Are you going to ask someone for help? Who?

V. A government company (Samoan Forest Products) as well as private foreign companies are interested in leasing customary land so they can cut and export timber and make more money for
Western Samoa. Do you agree? Do you agree with replanting trees? Give reasons for your answers.

VI. If your village could get a loan to start a business to make money for your village needs, what kind of business do you think you would start? Do you think your village could cooperate in a village venture? How do you think you should organize yourself to run a business?

VII. The government of Western Samoa receives aid from overseas. Do you know how the government spends its aid money? Do you agree with how the government spends its aid money? Give reasons for your answer.

VIII. How is Western Samoa changing? What do you think about the change?

Note: Spaces were left on the Questionnaire for all answers.
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