THE UNIFYING PROJECT IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY
"THAT WHICH IS SHOWN"

AS THE UNIFYING PROJECT

IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY

By

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ABSTRACT

The distinction between that which can be said with a language and that which must be shown by a language is central to Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The theme of "saying and showing" has at least three distinct but related connotations in that work. First, the theme constitutes the core of the Tractarian view of the logic of language and, with this, the core of its view of metaphysics. The logical form of a proposition must show itself thereby allowing the proposition to picture a possible state of affairs in the world and, consequently, allowing a language-user to claim that that state of affairs is actually the case in the world. Second, the theme of saying and showing is apparent in Wittgenstein's view of the elucidating activity that is philosophy, as the philosopher brings one to see that which shows itself and thereby brings one to see the world aright. Third, the theme of saying and showing accounts for Wittgenstein's remarks on the ineffability of the mystical/ethical: why one must remain silent concerning that which is "higher" and what this silence means.

The implications of the third connotation of the theme of saying and showing, however, make possible a critique of and a development within the first connotation of that theme. This third sense of the theme, therefore, makes possible a changed view of language, logic and the world. Exactly such a view is developed in the *Philosophical Investigations* and other later writings of Wittgenstein. The theme of
saying and showing can thus be traced into Wittgenstein's later writings. Further, having found the theme in the later writings as well as in the earlier work and having linked the theme with Wittgenstein's views on the mystical/ethical, it becomes reasonable to postulate a unified ethical project of showing the limitations of language as underlying the entire corpus of Wittgenstein's work.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1919, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote a letter to Bertrand Russell in which he discussed the philosophical views presented in his own 

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. He there stated:

Now I'm afraid you haven't really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole business of logical propositions is only a corollary. The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions—i.e. by language—(and, which comes to the same, what can be thought) and what can not be expressed by propositions, but can only be shown (gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.

Although Wittgenstein here refers to the theme of "saying and showing" as the "main contention" of his work and as "the cardinal problem in philosophy", very little prolonged or detailed study of that theme in Wittgenstein's writings has been carried out. Examining Wittgenstein's Tractatus in terms of that theme should at least place the work in the perspective in which its author considered it. As will be discovered in the following chapters, however, the theme of saying and showing is much richer than many Wittgensteinian commentators have suggested and, in its various connected but distinct connotations, the theme provides an accounting, not simply of logic and language, but, therewith, of man, the world, philosophy and ethics.

Having discovered the richness of the theme in the Tractatus, it is possible to find the theme in Wittgenstein's later writings as well. This, in turn, justifies the postulation of a unified ethical project underlying the entirety of Wittgenstein's life and work and
allows an understanding of the well-known changes in Wittgenstein’s views while yet significantly challenging the common understanding that there are "two Wittgensteins". Taking Wittgenstein at his word when he speaks of his "main contention", will, therefore, prove quite fruitful.

The first and best known version of the theme of "saying and showing", the one that originally defines that distinction and sets the tone for discussion of its other connotations, concerns that which is shown as the basis of language and the world. The connotations of the distinction for philosophy and for ethics and the possibility of a unified Wittgensteinian project will follow step by step after this original discussion of the theme in its centrality to the view of logic, language and the world presented in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.
CHAPTER ONE

THAT WHICH IS SHOWN AS THE BASIS OF LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD

1. That Which is Shown as the Basis of Language

In a well-known passage of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein wrote "Language disguises thought" (4.002). Our everyday language, he suggests, serves us perfectly well for speaking about and acting in the world even though we normally have no idea of how the language so functions. We generally have no difficulty with immediately combining and re-combining terms into new meaningful expressions nor, conversely, with immediately comprehending the meaning of new combinations of terms. Moreover, we can often recognize sounds or marks as language even without comprehending what is there said. Wittgenstein compares our easy unreflecting use of language to the way in which people speak "without knowing how the individual sounds are produced" (4.002). Just as there are those who, for various important reasons, attempt to discover how those individual sounds are produced, however, so will Wittgenstein, for reasons which will later become apparent, attempt to discover the actual "inner workings" of language beneath its disguise of everyday familiarity and complexity. He will attempt, then, to lay bare "the logic of language" (4.002) which shall involve the proper analysis of the apparent paradigm of meaningful thought and language: the proposition. The question concerning the "inner nature" of language, or, to continue the opening metaphor, the question of the "form of the
thought" beneath the "outward form of the clothing" of language (4.002),
becomes, therefore, the question of how the various terms in a
proposition combine and recombine and of how the proposition "connects"
with the world.

A proposition, in turn, is considered by Wittgenstein to be
simply a special case of representation in general. To understand how
this can be so and then to understand how a proposition functions, it is
first necessary to consider Wittgenstein's account of representation in
general. The question now is: how does anything (a photograph, a
schematic drawing, a scale model, etc.) function as a representation of
something else? The answer lies in the notion of "modeling": one thing
is able to model and thus to serve as a "picture" of the other.

An important feature of any model (anything being used to model
something else) is that it itself is a fact (2.141), that is, it is
itself an actually occurring "event" or state of affairs in the world
(2). It is the nature of all facts, whether functioning as models or
not, to consist of certain elements in a certain relationship.
Conversely, it is the nature of any such "object" to have relationships
with other "objects", or, in other words, to be a constituent or element
of a state of affairs (2.01, 2.011). Thus, in modeling, one fact (a
complex of elements in a determinate relationship) models another fact
(another distinct complex of elements in some determinate relationship).

The definitive characteristic of the fact as model is that, in
some manner it "places before us"3 or "suggests" some other state of
affairs (2.11). It is able to do this because the elements composing the
model are taken as representatives of the objects composing the
"suggested" state of affairs. Wittgenstein finds that the elements of
the model are able to become such representatives exactly because they
"are related to one another in a determinate way" (2.14), that is, due to
their fixed internal structure.

Since the elements of the model have this structure, the
possibility of the structure obviously is real and, therefore, the
possibility that other things are related in the same manner is also real
(2.151). The structure of the model's elements consequently "suggests"
to us that some other items are structured or internally related as some
other state of affairs in the same way (2.15). Wittgenstein refers to
the possibility of that structure as the picture's "pictorial form"
(2.15). The pictorial form, then, is the structure of a particular fact
as able to "suggest" or, more correctly, to picture or model the
structure of some other state of affairs. It is what actually makes a
particular fact a picture or model since it is that which allows the
"pictorial relationship" to be set up, that is, the correlation of
elements of one fact (the "picture") with other similarly structured
items (2.1514). The pictorial form, therefore, is the means by which a
picture is able to "reach out" beyond itself to represent some other
state of affairs (2.1511, 2.1512).

Wittgenstein also introduces the notion of "representational
form" calling it the picture's "standpoint" "outside" the subject it
represents (2.173). This is quite distinct from "pictorial form".4
Representational form regards the picture (that is, the fact having
pictorial form) insofar as it is a fact distinct from yet related (via
picturing) to the pictured state of affairs. Thus, rather than simply
being used unreflectively to picture another state of affairs, the picture itself becomes the object of attention and the physical elements in their particular configuration are considered as "having" or "manifesting" pictorial form. The representational form of a picture, therefore, refers to the picture as "standing apart from so as to re-present" the state of affairs whose pictorial form it shares. So considered, the relation between the picture-as-fact and the pictured state of affairs is external while the relation between the picture-as-such and the pictured state of affairs, that is, the relation of the pictorial form, is internal.

For instance, a painting and a photograph of a landscape will constitute different forms of representation in that, even while neglecting all the possible variations in style or method, each picture will represent the scene in a uniquely identifiable manner due to the medium in which it is executed. Each picture, in its own manner, must stand outside the landscape it represents so as to "re-present" it pictorially. Each picture, moreover, will have its own internal structure, that is, each will be constituted by the elements of its medium related together in a definite manner determined by or within the limits of the medium. Even several pictures executed in the same medium (for instance, more than one copy of the "same" photograph) will, therefore, consist of distinct particular elements each with its own internal structure—that we normally consider them to be copies of the same picture is, in this connection, incidental. The structure of the painting, of the photograph and of the actual landscape, however, each manifest the possibility of a relation between various items which can be
and, in this case, is found in some other state of affairs as well. Thus, the painting, the photograph and the actual landscape are also internally related by having an identical pictorial form: each "suggests" or represents the same state of affairs as the other.

Although, as will be discussed later, a picture requires an intention while straightforward perception, apparently, does not, still, as can be seen in the above example, given the possibility of a picturing relationship between two facts, which fact is the picture and which is the pictured is a matter of convention or human artifice. The painting can be said to model the photograph and the actual landscape; the photograph can be said to model the painting and the actual landscape; the actual landscape can be said to model the painting and the photograph. All can be perceived as facts and, once the internal relation between them is established, any of the three can be used intentionally to "suggest" or represent the others.

A picture, then, must have a pictorial form "in common with reality" (that is, with states of affairs other than or "outside of" the picture) (2.17). Erik Stenius refers to this relation as "isomorphic representation" and such a picture as an "isomorphic picture". This isomorphism is established by what he terms a "key of interpretation" which establishes the fixed correspondence between the elements of the picture and what is depicted. A key of interpretation can be established in many ways, thus, the same picture can be isomorphic or not with a great number of different facts. "A picture", Wittgenstein says, "can depict any reality whose form it has" (2.171). For instance, a spatial arrangement of dots could, in principle, represent any spatial
arrangement of items—its particular interpretation will depend upon the "key" of correlations established.

The mere existence of a key of interpretation does not guarantee that the picture shall be isomorphic. The picture may fail to represent any fact or, what amounts to the same thing, a picture may not accurately represent the fact it was "supposed" to represent. Such a non-isomorphic picture will still be a picture (in Stenius' technical phraseology, it still does have a key of interpretation) but it will be a false picture. As Stenius puts it, "isomorphism is a criterion for the truth of the picture": if the key of correlations is established and the relation between the internal structures of representation and represented is isomorphic, then the picture is true; if the correlations cannot in practice be established, or if they can but the ensuing relation between the internal structures of those correlated items is not isomorphic, then the picture is false.

In regards to the impossibility of establishing correlations between picture and pictured, I think it is necessary to distinguish between "impossible in practice" and "impossible in principle". By "impossible in practice", I mean an a posteriori impossibility which is ultimately a contingent matter, amounting to "not (yet) having been able to". For instance, one might establish a key of interpretation for the sculpture "Man Releasing Eagles" which makes it impossible to have found or to expect to find any correlated elements in the world: one (contingently) cannot find a man who looks precisely like that releasing birds which look precisely like those in the sculpture. By "impossible in principle", on the other hand, I mean an a priori impossibility,
amounting to a logical contradiction in the key of interpretation. An
instance of this would be the production of a purported "representation"
containing elements which one insisted must be correlated with items in
reality but which one refused, by definition, to ever correlate with any
such discoverable items. While the former could reasonably be called a
false representation of a man releasing eagles, the latter would
reasonably not be called a "representation" at all.

An ambiguity in our notion of modeling is, therefore, clarified
by Wittgenstein's analysis. Apart from the false picture, there is the
purported "picture" that is not genuinely a picture at all. It has no
coherent key of interpretation and is thus incapable of "application" or
"projection" (3.11) in the world. It is, then, not capable of being
judged true or false and, as a picture, is meaningless.

One particular instance of a purported "picture" that logically
could not be what it purports to be, is a picture which attempts to
represent its own form of representation. The key of interpretation for
any fact supposed to constitute such a picture would be necessarily
incoherent, thereby distinguishing this "impossible picture" from others.
With the aforementioned pictures, the key of interpretation had to be
examined to see if it was possible in principle to establish those
correlations or not. With this "impossible picture", however, one can
decide a priori that no such correlations, no such key, could be
established. This is because the picturing relationship itself here
reaches its "peculiar limit".

A picture cannot stand apart from itself so as to "re-present"

itself (2.174): it is itself and can only represent what it is not, thus,
it cannot be a picture of itself being a picture of something else. The deeper reason for its inability to enter into an external relation with itself, is the picture's inability to enter into an internal relation with itself, thus, it cannot be a picture of "how" it is a picture of something. In other words, not only can the form of representation not be represented, but the pictorial form cannot be depicted (2.172).

"A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it" (2.172). Thus is the theme of "that which is shown", which shall emerge as central to the Tractatus, first introduced. Not only can the form of representation not be represented nor the pictorial form depicted, but these need not be represented or depicted. The form of representation is right there "in" the model before us. Similarly, the pictorial form is right there "in" the picture and "in" the depicted state of affairs: to see the internal relationship between these is to see the pictorial form. The pictorial form simply "emerges" self-evidently within that fact which is the picture-to-be and allows it to stand for something else (that is, to become a picture). Since the pictorial form is that which makes modeling possible, and since it cannot itself be modeled but must simply display itself and be seen to do so, the self-evident pictorial form is the limit of the modeling relation. The pictorial form is, as Robert Cavalier writes, "a self-limiting, imposed upon models by their very nature, i.e., from within".

If there were some minimal formal "feature" that any pictorial form must have in order to be a pictorial form, then Wittgenstein's "inside" analysis of the picturing relationship would have reached its outermost limit. Wittgenstein finds that there is such a minimal formal
feature and calls it "logical form" (2.182). Just as every picture and every other state of affairs must have a structure in order to be that picture and that state of affairs, every structure, whether as present in a picture or in any other state of affairs, in order to be structure, must have an order of some kind. For instance, whether a picture's pictorial form is spatial, its internal spatial structure and a key of interpretation then making it possible for the picture to represent any other spatially structured state of affairs, or whether its pictorial form is temporal, its own particular internal temporal structure and a key of interpretation then making it possible for the picture to represent any temporally structured state of affairs, or whether a picture's pictorial form is colour, and so on: the picture must in every case have some logical order which allows it to share a pictorial form with the pictured state of affairs. The pictured state of affairs must also, in every case, have a logical order to its own structure which allows it to share a pictorial form with the picture and, thereby, be pictured.

The logical form is, then, simply, but crucially, the ability of the elements of a model to combine in some way without regard to the limits of any particular pictorial form (that is, without regard to the peculiarities of spatiality, temporality, colouredness, and so on) such that only their basic logical order is considered and, thus, the possibility of other items combined with a similar logical order is "suggested". Logical form, therefore, is more basic than pictorial form and, ultimately, makes pictorial form possible. Logical form requires no more in common between picture and pictured than that a similar logical
order be discoverable within the structure of each. Further, since logical form is the minimal formal structure which any and every state of affairs, whether actual or not, must have in order to be a state of affairs, Wittgenstein refers to logical form as "the form of reality" (2.18)\textsuperscript{13}.

Logical form makes it possible for a model to represent some other "part" of reality while holding nothing in common with it except logical structure. For example, it is logical form which allows a spatial model to represent a temporal state of affairs, as occurs when a written musical score represents a series of sounds. Logical form, therefore, also makes possible a type of "abstract" model which is purely logical in character, its physical elements only being considered as to their logical relations, but which can, nonetheless, depict reality. Wittgenstein refers to these as "logical pictures" (2.18). Such logical pictures, whose pictorial form is logical form, must thus be able to depict any possible state of affairs because they will be able to share the logical form of any aspect of reality. Put conversely: whatever such logical pictures can depict must constitute the possible states of affairs, since all reality must have the logical form which the structure of logical pictures makes manifest. Logical pictures, therefore, can depict all the actual states of affairs and allow us to affirm them as true and depict all the non-actual states of affairs and allow us to deny them as false. In short, by displaying their essential form and by allowing us to assert the truth or falsity of a picture of every possible state of affairs, logical pictures can, quite simply, depict the world as it is (2.19)\textsuperscript{14}. 


\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
Robert Fogel in states that "the doctrine of logical form (=form of reality) seems quite inevitable" only if we first accept three theses:

i. there is such a thing as a perfectly general theory of representation;
ii. representation always involves the notion of a form shared by the representation and the thing represented;
iii. there is no single material feature that is exploited by all forms of representation.

Fogel feels that only the third thesis "seems obviously true".

If the account that I have given of Wittgenstein’s "picture theory" is correct, however, Fogel’s criticism seems misplaced. The first thesis is not an assumption antecedent to the postulation of logical form but rather a conclusion following therefrom: it is with the "discovery" of logical form and, thus, the possibility of logical pictures, that the analysis of representation becomes "perfectly general". The second thesis is indeed antecedent to the notion of logical form but is not so much an assumption as it is a matter of "definition": form is taken to be that which allows one structured set of elements to stand in for another distinctly separate structured set of elements—which "standing in for" is directly observed to happen in reality. When it comes to logical form, the notion of "form" has become so expanded as to mean the ability of any "ordered elements" to stand in for any other "ordered items" in some determinate way.

This final point, however, opens a more serious criticism, to be discussed more fully later. With the postulation of pictorial form as that which representation and represented must share in order to enter the picturing relation which so obviously does hold between them, and with the entailed corollary that this pictorial form is displayed, not
depicted, Wittgenstein has assumed that this display is unambiguously self-evident, that is, that we can simply see the pictorial form and immediately recognize it for what it is: the single determinate pictorial form. It is upon this assumption that the "doctrine of logical form" ultimately rests. In other words, while that which allows one fact to represent another in the least "iconic", most abstract manner (which representing is taken as experientially obvious) may well enough be defined as "logical form", Wittgenstein has not yet informed us as to how the same logical form is present in the two disparate facts. Instead, he has uncritically taken the latter to be simply displayed univocally to any "logical experiencer". This uncritical assumption will later be strongly questioned by Wittgenstein himself. If we may postpone further judgement upon this assumption, however, we may return to the important notion of "logical form".

Since, as has been said above, a logical picture can depict any possible state of affairs, logical pictures become co-extensive with what we normally call thought. Wittgenstein, indeed, collapses the two: "A logical picture of facts is a thought" (3), thus embellishing upon the earlier aphorism, "We picture facts to ourselves" (2.1). What is important to the present discussion is that Wittgenstein goes on to say, "In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses" (3.1): finally the link between the foregoing general account of representation and the subsequent particular analysis of language is established.17

A linguistic utterance is barely, if at all, iconic: it bears little or no spatial, temporal or other overtly pictorial resemblance to
any reality beyond other linguistic utterances. With the explicitly pictorial features having been made redundant by the introduction of logical form, however, a linguistic utterance could still be a logical picture of non-linguistic reality. Or, again conversely, continuing the analysis of the possibility of purely logical, non-iconic pictures leads to the postulation of a form of representation, a sign system, which develops into that which we otherwise call "linguistic expression".

If a linguistic expression in its simplest, clearest, most straightforward form, that is, the form of the proposition, is a logical picture, then all the features ascribed to representations in general may be expected to recur with propositions. The proposition will be a fact standing for another possible state of affairs due to shared logical form and the establishment of correlations between elements of the proposition and items within the represented state of affairs. Further, the logical form of the proposition will not be representable by the proposition but will have to display itself in the proposition. How in detail is this done and what is the importance of it?

In a sentence, a thought is expressed through a series of perceptible signs which together are called by Wittgenstein "a propositional sign" (3.12). The propositional sign is a fact in the world (3.14), as is any other model. The propositional sign becomes a proposition by means of its "projective relation to the world" (3.12), that is, by our recognition that the logical form manifest in its elements is also manifest in some other possible state of affairs, the propositional sign thereby becoming a logical picture of that state of affairs. So conceived, however, a proposition is still purely universal
in character while in actual use the sense of a proposition is quite particular: "A proposition [logical picture] includes all that the projection [logical form as present in and "projecting" from the logical picture] includes, but not what is projected [the particular intended sense]" (3.13). To further clarify: "A proposition, therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it" (3.13). The particularity of the proposition's sense, also called its "content" (to complement the logical "form" of the propositional sign), is supplied by the act of thinking. The intentionality of thought, that is, establishes the particular key of interpretation with the particular intended experiential material (which material it also supplies)\(^1\)\(^\text{18}\).

In the propositional sign itself, the principle elements (that is, the words) must stand to one another in some "determinate relation" (3.14). Only such determinately related items, not a mere "blend of words" (3.141) or "set of names" (3.142) can display a logical form and, thereby, represent another state of affairs. To use Wittgenstein's example, it is the physical occurrence of the perceptible element "\(a\)" in a determinate relation to the perceptible element "\(b\)" in the propositional sign "\(aRb\)" that projects another possible state of affairs: \(aRb \ (3.1432)\)\(^1\)\(^\text{19}\). Thus, a particular sign represents (or, to introduce a new term, "symbolizes") a particular item in reality, while a particular relation between signs represents (or symbolizes) a particular relation between other items. As Stenius says, therefore, "the symbols in a sentence are not always linguistic objects like words or letters"\(^1\)\(^\text{20}\); the relation between those "linguistic objects" also symbolizes. This,
then, is the demand that a proposition's "symbols be of the same ontological category as the entities in reality they correspond to according to the key". Elsewhere, Stenius refers to this as the common "categorical structure" of the picture and the pictured.

Wittgenstein claims that a proposition is "completely analyzed" (3.201) when the "elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought" (3.2). Henry Finch clarifies this notion:

a proposition is completely analysed when its sense is made clear—not when we have reached "factual" absolutes [that is, ontological "objects"], but when we have reached the simples that are necessary in order to make that particular sense determinate [that is, "the objects of thought"].

The simples in a completely analyzed proposition, therefore, need not be "ontological simples" of any kind. Rather, they can be whatever correspond to the "simple signs", that is, to the elements of a completely analyzed proposition (3.201). While, ultimately, this "whatever" may, in turn, be analyzed and, in some other context, may require such analysis, the sense of the original proposition will be clarified when the intentional thought to which it gives expression is clarified and this does not, of itself, necessitate complete ontological specification of all that might be implied by the proposition. In use in an actual proposition, the simple sign is a "name" (3.202), whose meaning is the object with which it is correlated (3.203).

Essentially, therefore, a proposition consists of names so determinately related to one another so as to quite literally depict the possibility of the named items standing in the same determinate relation. The determinate relation of the names can simply be seen in the propositional sign. That this determinate relation "possesses" or
"constitutes" or "manifests" logical form also "possessed" or "constituted" or "manifested" by the corresponding named items, must also be seen. Wittgenstein, therefore, writes: "A proposition shows its sense" (4.022); "Propositions show the logical form of reality" (4.121).

The problem mentioned earlier concerning Wittgenstein's uncritical belief in the unequivocal obviousness of form in general and logical form in particular is here again apparent. While one can perceive the physical propositional sign, whether through sight, sound or touch, and can, perhaps, be said to thereby perceive a determinate relation between its elements, it is not clear that one can thereby perceive the presence of a logical form, especially when that very same logical form is also present in the quite different determinate structure of the proposed state of affairs. It seems, therefore, that "seeing" and "showing" are used literally of the physical propositional sign but only metaphorically of the logical form: our understanding of the propositional sign as "possessing", "constituting", "manifesting" a logical form which permits it to represent some other state of affairs is "like" or "akin to" seeing something that is shown to us. That "a proposition shows its sense" may, then, well be true if "shows" is used metaphorically, but we do not thereby understand how this "seeing" or "showing" is accomplished. Wittgenstein has extended the uses of "seeing" and "showing" into the metaphorical while taking the metaphorical references to be as straightforward and obvious as the literal ones.

Wittgenstein introduces the notion of a "rule of projection" which
constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways (4.0141).

Although the notion of rule-governed interpretation and translation of the "logical syntax" of disparate facts (3.343, 3.344) is a recognition that seeing (understanding) the logical form of a fact, such as that of a propositional sign, involves something different from seeing (perceiving) the fact itself, still this only complicates, without clarifying, how logical form shows itself. The rule will now have to be as obvious and unequivocal as the perceived fact from which the ruled projection is made—"the rules of logical syntax must go without saying, once we know how each individual sign signifies" (3.334)—and if this is so, the projected logical form of the fact will again be displayed with equal unequivocal obviousness. Thus, we are, effectively, no further ahead in understanding how logical form shows itself, plus, we must now understand how a rule that "goes without saying" can "govern" (5.512) our seeing.

Wittgenstein writes: "a proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand" (4.022--Wittgenstein's emphasis); this exposes the limits of the proposition. A proposition cannot explicitly show itself showing how things stand (a picture cannot represent its form of representation) and a proposition cannot explicitly show how it shows how things stand (a picture cannot depict its pictorial form). "Saying" is simply claiming that "the explicitly shown" is the case—it is simply the act of communicating by constructing propositions that can show how things stand. There is, then, no "saying" apart from a "showing with a proposition"—no "saying", no act of proposition construction, which can result in anything but a showing of how things
stand. What can be said by a proposition is, therefore, limited to what can be explicitly shown with a proposition and what can be explicitly shown with a proposition is limited to how things might stand. Put negatively, what can be said cannot include what cannot be shown by being made the "subject" of a proposition and what can be shown by being made the "subject" of a proposition cannot include a proposition showing how things stand or how a proposition shows how things stand. What can be said, therefore, cannot include a proposition showing how things stand nor how a proposition shows how things stand. In other words, what is implicit in a proposition, allowing it to have sense, cannot be made the explicit "subject" of a proposition and, therefore, cannot be expressed in an act of saying. "What can be shown [that is, what shows itself implicitly within a proposition, ultimately, its logical form], cannot be said [that is, cannot be made the explicit "subject" of a proposition and claimed to be the case]" (4.1212).

Stenius feels that there is an inconsistency between the use of "show" at 4.022 and its use at 4.1212 and that, consequently, there must be two kinds of "showing" involved here: "in one sense of 'show' sentences say what they show [in reference to 4.022], and in another they cannot say what they 'show' [in reference to 4.1212]"25. The first type of showing, it is claimed, is done by the "external structure" of the picture (or the proposition) and its key of interpretation. In this way, a picture "presents" or "depicts" a state of affairs26. The second type of showing is supposed to be done by the "internal structure" of the elements of the picture. In this manner, a picture "exhibits" the "internal structure of the elements of the prototype"27.
Although Stenius does go on to use "show" as equivalent to "exhibit", his account seems confused. If, as argued earlier, Stenius' "fictitious pictures" are a cross-category and redundant to Wittgenstein's analysis, and if, consequently, his notion of "real prototype" collapses into "a possible state of affairs", then a picture simply "exhibits" the internal structure of the state of affairs it "depicts" and "depicts" the state of affairs whose internal structure it "exhibits". The exhibition (of logical form) only and always takes place within the depiction of a particular state of affairs and within that state of affairs (if it actually obtains). The exhibition allows the depiction to occur as intentional thought adds the particular content to the exhibited form of the proposition. The proposition, thus, can "show how things stand if it is true" (that is, have sense, depict) only insofar as a logical form shows (that is, exhibits) itself. There are not, then, two different "kinds" of showing: only "exhibiting" (of logical form) is true "showing" but "depicting" (having sense) cannot occur except for "exhibiting" and "exhibiting" is always present in "depicting", therefore, the term "showing" is easily and naturally extended to "depicting" as well.

Also, as Donald Harward has pointed out, 4.022 need not be interpreted to mean that what is shown is also said: "it is not the nature of a proposition to truly say". Rather, a "language-user" asserts (says) a proposition while a proposition "shows itself". Thus, again Stenius' "two kinds of showing" are undercut.

Wittgenstein's account of what a picture shows and what we can, therefore, say with it, allows for meaningful communication with
propositions and, at the same time, "discovers" an inherent limit to the use of propositions. Propositions limit us to saying "how things are" (3.221), that is, limit us to depicting how possible situations may be structured.

Every proposition represents a possible state of affairs which actually does obtain or actually does not obtain: the proposition is either true or false. Wittgenstein describes this using the metaphor of space and place: a proposition determines one precise "place" in the "logical space" of all possibilities (3.4, 3.41). The proposition's manifest logical form, taken together with the meanings of its simple signs, depicts one precise possible state of affairs; they depict precisely what must be the case for the proposition to be true. In other words, the proposition specifies its "truth-conditions".

The "place and space" metaphor allows Wittgenstein to draw out another consequence of his view of the proposition as a logical picture. "A proposition can determine only one place in logical space; nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it" (3.42). Max Black paraphrases this as:

although a proposition expresses a single state of affairs, the conventions determining its sense also provide for the senses of all the complex propositions in which it is a truth-functional component.

Because a particular proposition, while still displaying the same internal logical form, can be negated or can be conjoined or disjoined with other propositions, that original proposition must "give" or "imply" or "set limits to" what is possible for any and every other proposition. Every possible proposition must be capable of negation, conjunction and
disjunction just as this one is; every other possible proposition must be capable of conjunction and disjunction with this proposition; the truth or falsity of the newly generated "complex" proposition must, in part, be a function of the truth or falsity of the original proposition; and so on. If this were not so, then the propositional sign would become ambiguous, the interpretation of its symbols inconsistent because the symbols would mean and imply one thing in one application and something different in another application—tantamount to the symbols being intrinsically meaningless and, thus, unable to specify any precise place in logical space.

Wittgenstein also uses the metaphor of a "logical scaffolding" which "surrounds" a picture and "determines logical space" (3.42): that a particular place in logical space can be determined by a proposition, means that a "logical scaffolding" must make that place possible, which, in turn, means that an entire logical space of other possible places must be entailed by that scaffolding.

A proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding, so that one can actually see from the proposition how everything stands logically if it is true. One can draw inferences from a false proposition (4.023).

The phrase "actually see" in the above quotation is very important. The same logical form that one must "actually see" within the propositional sign, allowing it to become a logical picture of a particular state of affairs capable of being true or false, now can also be "actually seen" as implying the logical "parameters" of an entire "world" in which that logical picture would be true and, thus, the necessary parameters for the logical form of other propositions true in
that "world".

In this way the view that a proposition is a model of reality opens out into a general account of logical necessity. While any logical picture of a state of affairs "automatically" sets logical parameters for other compatible logical pictures of states of affairs, there are yet other "logical pictures" which, due to their logical form, are compatible with any other logical pictures and others again which are compatible with no other logical pictures. The former are tautologies, the latter contradictions. A tautology, as it were, does not determine a place in logical space and, therefore, leaves the space entirely undetermined. A contradiction's "place", on the other hand, is "all" of logical space, leaving no "other" places open for determination (4.463). Neither a tautology nor a contradiction can actually depict reality. Neither is, then, a genuine picture or a genuine proposition (4.462). Tautologies and contradictions can, however, be conceived of as constituting the two extremes between which genuine propositions operate: "a tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's impossible" (4.464); "the truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open to the facts" (4.463) and this "range" is delimited by tautology on the one extreme and contradiction on the other.

To re-introduce the "showing" and "saying" terminology, tautologies and contradictions cannot be used to say anything since they have no sense. They, however, can show that they have no sense and, thus, "show that they say nothing" (4.461). The importance of this odd ability shall soon become apparent.

A valid deductive argument, that is, a set of propositions
whose truth necessarily entails the truth of some other proposition, takes the form of a tautology. Wittgenstein will take all necessary truths to be "propositions of logic" and all of the latter to be tautologies. As various commentators have pointed out, and as Wittgenstein himself came to realize, however, it is not at all obvious that this is the case for all necessary truths. With colour terms, as Robert Fogelin for instance, puts it: "if a patch is coloured brown, this excludes the possibility of its being coloured blue. Furthermore, the exclusion is not contingent or accidental." That something is brown necessarily entails that it is not blue, yet, this is not a formal proposition of logic, in the Tractarian sense, since the "exclusion" is due to the meanings, the intentional content, of the terms "brown" and "blue" and is not a purely formal contradiction applying universally to every proposition in logical space. For the same reason, the necessary truth, "if brown, then not blue", cannot be a tautology in the Tractarian sense.

Fogelin also attempts a refutation of Wittgenstein's answer to Kant's problem concerning the inability of the right hand and the left hand to coincide. Wittgenstein holds that a "right-hand glove could be put on the left-hand, if it could be turned around in four-dimensional space". This "solution" is judged "just awful" by Fogelin: "it is surely obvious that Kant's central point is that a right-hand glove and a left-hand glove cannot be made to coincide in three-dimensional space."

This counter-example, however, is crucially different from the previous one and, I think, serves to clarify what Wittgenstein
understands by "logical necessity". The previous counter-example was true due to the meaning of the symbols alone, yet was consequently able to determine logical space in some manner. The present case, on the other hand, requires an antecedent determination of logical space as three-dimensional physical space, that is, an antecedent limitation of the possible to the possible-within-three-spatial-dimensions. The "necessity" involved in the inability of the right-hand and the left-hand gloves to coincide, therefore, requires the preceding postulation of three-dimensional space which is itself only one of the possibilities within logical space. Such postulation and the consequent "necessity" may be actually called for a posteriori but cannot be established a priori within logical space as such through the meaning of symbols themselves without antecedent restrictions, that is, it is only "conditionally necessary". Thus, the "necessity" Fogelin here speaks of is not an "absolute" or "unconditional" necessity due to the logical possibility of four-dimensional space and Wittgenstein restricts necessity to such "absolute" necessity.

Although the previous counter-example indicates that logical necessity cannot, in turn, be easily restricted to tautology as defined in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein's discussion of logical propositions as tautologies may now be re-entered.

"That a tautology is yielded by this particular way of connecting its constituents characterizes the logic of its constituents" (6.12). That this particular combination of propositions does not determine logical space in any way, demonstrates that that which they depict together is no more than that which they depict separately and
this, in turn, demonstrates that this particular "connectedness" must itself have been already implicit in them. Thus, that this particular combination of propositions yields a tautology is said to "demonstrate the logical properties" of those propositions (6.121). It is exactly because we do not say anything new when asserting propositions in this combination, that is, exactly because this combination "says nothing", that allows this combination to show what can, then, only be the logical properties of the constituent propositions (6.12, 6.121). Thus, in showing themselves as senseless, the propositions of logic show the "inherent contours" of logical space and since all genuine propositions are necessarily located in that space, the propositions of logic must again indicate the limits of meaningful expression.

Here the common root of the proposition as hitherto analyzed and of the foundation of logic, as conceived by Wittgenstein, becomes apparent. The proposition is a picture constituted of names in a determinate relation. In this determinate relation, a logical form having certain logical properties shows itself. These logical properties themselves are shown explicitly in the tautologies that are the "propositions" of logic. Picking up a previous metaphor, while a particular proposition was made possible by a logical scaffolding which it, therefore, implied, "the propositions of logic describe [that is, take the "shape" of--show] the scaffolding of the world" (6.124, my emphasis)40. The particular logical forms of particular propositions require (that is, are made possible by and have properties "described" by) the tautological "propositions" of logic--the tautological "propositions" of logic require (that is, describe the properties of and
are, therefore, determined as non-arbitrary by the particular logical forms of particular propositions. Particular propositions "result" from the application of logic (5.557)—logic "results" from the logical form of particular propositions.

Logic per se is purely formal, lacking the particular content of intentional thought and experience. Consequently, logic per se is a priori and cannot anticipate what particular senses can be projected with propositional signs, since this requires intentional thought, and, therefore, it cannot anticipate what particular propositions with sense might be proposed. Consequently, all logical questions can be decided a priori (5.551): in Wittgenstein’s famous words, "logic must look after itself" (5.473). At the same time, however, logic is not arbitrary or "free-floating": "logic has to be in contact with its application" (5.557). This point of contact is logical form, the form of reality. Something must be if logical form is to be and, thus, if the "propositions" of logic are to be. "Logic is prior to every experience—that something is so. It is prior to the question 'How?’, not prior to the question 'What?"' (5.552).

How propositions and logic are interconnected with the world through that which is shown but not said is made more explicit by another of Wittgenstein’s metaphors.

How can logic—all-embracing logic, which mirrors the world—use such peculiar crotchets and contrivances [in its sign-language]? Only because they are all connected with one another in an infinitely fine network, the great mirror (5.511). Logical form, which is the form of reality, is the connection between logic as a rigorous sign-language and that which is the case in reality,
the world. Logic, as such, however, is not equivalent to any sign-language, no matter how rigorous that sign-language might be. Logic is that which is non-arbitrary in a logical symbol: in logic "the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself" (6.124, my emphasis). Any sign-language, therefore, is only a "mirror" of logical form, though logical form is known solely as "mirrored" in some way. The world must also have logical form (for reasons discussed earlier) and could also be said to "mirror" it (though that means extending the "mirror" metaphor in a slightly different direction than did Wittgenstein). Logic as a rigorous sign-language and the world would, then, each mirror logical form and, consequently, mirror each other.

If all propositions must possess logical form, which logical form can only be shown and cannot be "said", and if the sign-system of logic is the working out of the logical properties of those propositions, which properties also can only be shown and cannot be "said", then logic must show forth the schema for the system of all propositions which schema cannot be "said". The mirror has the potential to reflect anything that can be reflected, yet it is not itself reflectable. That which can be reflected is known as reflected; logic is "a mirror-image of the world" (6.13) since logical form is the form of reality (2.18). Thus, on Wittgenstein's view logic must "pervade" the world (5.61) while never being an object in it. In short, "logic is transcendental" (6.13).

If, in addition to the assumptions mentioned earlier, we now assume that the proposition is the quintessential linguistic form, then Wittgenstein's analysis has finally laid bare the logic of language itself. He has thereby shown the transcendental limits of language and
has done so without self-defeatingly placing himself beyond those limits: the limits have simply shown themselves as limits. The status of Wittgenstein's own statements in bringing us to see the transcendental bounds of language and the importance of our seeing this are the subjects of subsequent chapters.

The distinction between that which can be said because it is shown as a logical picture and that which cannot be said because it allows something to be shown with a logical picture, that is, the distinction between that which can be said and that which must be seen to show itself is central to Wittgenstein's analysis and, thus, is crucial to the accomplishment of his task. That which shows itself and cannot be said is made to carry much weight, yet rests on several assumptions. Were Wittgenstein to have become more critical in his account of how something comes to be seen, his account of "that which is shown" as the basis of language would perforce change and the accomplishment of his task be significantly altered. That this did occur will also be argued subsequently.

II. The Metaphysical Basis of That Which is Shown in Language

An aspect of showing running through the foregoing discussion must now be dealt with explicitly. It was there said that a model of any sort (including, therefore, a proposition) was first of all a fact, an actually occurring "event" or state of affairs, in the world. Moreover, the logical form uniting a picture with the pictured, that is, that which allows some fact to become a picture with sense, was also necessarily the form of reality. Finally, then, logic was described as the "mirror"
of the world. In laying bare the "logic of language", therefore, Wittgenstein's analysis has at the same time laid bare the "logic of the world". What must now be made explicit is that the world, too, "shows itself" in the sign-system of logic and in propositions. The "self-showing" of the world runs throughout and is the basis of the "self-showing" of language already discussed. 

In order to see the logical form within a proposition, we must first see the "linguistic objects" (the names in a completely analyzed proposition) which constitute the propositional sign by standing in the requisite relationship. Thus, the simple apprehensibility of the propositional sign testifies to an original "self-showing" of that which constitutes the sign—an original "self-showing" of the world. 

It is in its application in the world that the propositional sign shows its nature clearly: the determinate relation shows a logical form and the related simple signs show that they are names (3.262), when intentional thought creates a specific key of interpretation by projecting the concatenated simple signs into the world. But for the names to show that they are names, they must show that they mean those particular items in the world with which they have been correlated. This, in turn, requires that those items "be shown/show themselves": the name shows the item by meaning it but the item can only be meant because it shows itself. Thus, after the name first shows itself as an item in the world, it becomes a name by being used to intend some other item which thereby shows itself in the world. 

Although logic can and must "take care of itself", the logical properties it shows are the logical properties of the world (6.12).
because the propositions with which it deals "show the logical form of reality" (4.121) and, therefore, of the world (6.124). As Wittgenstein said, logic "is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What?'" (5.552). The question "What?" is answered with "the nature of the actual items in the world".

The items to which we refer in our ordinary statements about the world and even the more clarified and specific "objects of thought" which are named by the simple signs of a completely analyzed proposition do not constitute some ultimate ontology of the world. Such items, in most cases at least, could themselves be shown to consist of still other structured items. If this regress were infinite, however, the world could not have any ultimate form and logic and propositions with a sense determined by logical form could not occur. Since this consequent is apparently false, so must the antecedent be. If the regress is finite, then there must be ultimate simples which are the substance of the world (2.021, 2.0211, 2.0212), that is, which constitute the "what" that makes logic and language possible. The propositions naming such ultimately simple objects are termed "elementary propositions" (4.21).

Irving Copi gives four "pieces" of evidence indicating that Wittgenstein considered "substantial objects"42 to be "bare particulars", that is, to possess "formal but no material properties [that is, no qualities]"43. First of all, at 2.0232, Wittgenstein claims outright that "in a manner of speaking, objects are colourless" which, in the context of 2.0231 where the discussion was of "material properties", can only be a denial of the attribution of any such material properties to substantial objects. Secondly, if substantial objects did possess
material properties, then they would become describable states of affairs contrary to Wittgenstein's claim at 3.221 that "[substantial] objects can only be named". Thirdly, every proposition must be "logically articulated" (4.032) and, therefore, every corresponding state of affairs must have some composition. States of affairs are composed of objects, however, and must, therefore, always consist of more than one object. If substantial objects had material properties, on the other hand, then they would each constitute a state of affairs consisting of a single object—contrary to the foregoing. Finally, Copi cites Wittgenstein's statement in the Philosophical Investigations that "my 'objects' (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements [as spoken of in Plato's Theaetetus which could be named only]" and, therefore, were bare particulars.

Despite having no material properties, the substantial objects must possess formal properties. These properties will concern the possible states of affairs in which the object can occur (2.0123). Moreover, these properties will be internal and external (2.01231). The internal properties are those which "it is unthinkable that its object should not possess" (4.123), while its external properties need not be known "to know an object" (2.01231).

Leonard Goddard and Brenda Judge have argued effectively that a substantial object's internal properties simply are the possible states of affairs into which the object can enter. Firstly, Wittgenstein's previously cited remark at 2.01231 makes it seem "that getting to know the nature of Objects [substantial objects] just is getting to know the possible combinations in which they stand". Secondly, the notion that
the internal properties are distinct from but result in the possible states of affairs into which a substantial object can enter, treats such non-material properties as though they were simple material properties. Items of the non-substantial sort can be said to have internal properties which result in the different relations in which the objects stand. For example, "Sophia and Amos can stand in the relation of hating just because they are two humans with emotions."\(^48\). Substantial objects, however, by definition, are simple and, therefore, cannot be divided into ordinary categories, lack the ordinary properties associated with those categories and cannot, then, stand in such ordinary relations. Rather, "the relation which holds between Objects [substantial objects] is always the same and is always the featureless 'combination' or 'configuration'."\(^49\). Consequently, there is no criterion for differentiation into categories of substantial objects or for postulation or inference of an internal property distinct from and resulting in a relation\(^50\). The substantial object, then, is only identifiable or definable by the very combinations with other objects into which it can enter: those are its internal properties. Analysis shows that these must be but they exist only in combination and there is no more to them than that they combine as they do.

Substantial objects, which essentially are the possible states of affairs into which they can enter, are, therefore, the "unalterable form" of the world (2.026). The actual configurations which substantial objects assume are accidental to them and constitute their external properties. The ordinary objects thus constituted may then manifest material properties\(^51\). The actual configurations of substantial objects,
that is, that which from those objects' "points of view" are their external properties, are "what is changing and unstable" in the world (2.0271).

Since, "the possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an [substantial] object" (2.0141) and since, then, "every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the [substantial] object" (2.0123), it follows that "if all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given" (2.0124). The unalterable form of the world, therefore, makes it possible to picture all possible states of affairs and to determine them as true or false, despite the constant change and instability of the actual world. Also, the unalterable form of the world makes it possible to study the logic of all possible states of affairs and, therefore, of the actual world, despite its changeability. Thus, the nature of the substantial object showing itself, quite independent of any language-user, makes possible all that was discussed in Part I of this chapter and, ultimately, is the subject of discussion there.

Another manner in which the "self-showing" of substantial objects is implicit in the foregoing discussion is through what can now be considered their external properties, that is, the states of affairs which actually obtain and determine the actual truth or falsity of particular propositions. The bare particulars required by the preceding analysis, of course, can never occur independently but must always be a component of some actual configuration. Wittgenstein uses the term "subsist" of substantial objects (2.027, 2.024) since it is states of affairs that "exist" (2). Elementary propositions, which name those
ultimately simple objects, will, thereby, picture the most elementary configurations of objects. If true, elementary propositions will show what actually exists—if true, they will describe the world completely and objectively (4.26). Non-elementary propositions, then, will picture select complexes of those most basic configurations of substantial objects. They will, thus, be capable of truth or falsity, since they can depict an aspect of the world, but they will not be capable of describing the world completely or objectively because they depict selectively and without maximum detail. A non-elementary proposition, therefore, must be logically equivalent to some concatenation of elementary propositions which will objectively and articulately show the configuration of substantial objects shown without complete clarity by the non-elementary proposition.

For Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, language and the world are isomorphic. Although we can only know the logic of the world through the logic of language, there can only be a language and a logic due to the existence of the world with its logic. Tractarian metaphysics is, therefore, inseparable from the Tractarian analysis of language and stands or falls with it. The problems mentioned in Part I of this chapter are, then, no less problems for the subject of Part II. The most immediate of these concerns the status of the propositions contained in the Tractatus itself and, consequently, the place of philosophy in the world.
CHAPTER TWO

THAT WHICH IS SHOWN BY THE PHILOSOPHER

Language has a logic which is often lost to our consciousness due to the "enormously complicated" conventions of everyday usage (4.002). When we come to see this logic, however, we come to see the inherent limit of language because we come to know the only possible forms which the logic of language will allow language to assume. Although this logic "shows itself" and the limit of language then "shows itself", too, it is Wittgenstein's analysis, his philosophical work, which has enabled us to see "that which shows itself". Thus, because "language disguises thought" (4.002), we must clarify the true nature of thought and language—we must discover that which "shows itself".

Unclarified language, that is, use of language without an awareness of its limit, can easily lead to the construction of purported "propositions" that picture no possible state of affairs but which yet have the same "appearance" as genuine pictures of possible states of affairs. Such constructions must be essentially meaningless, on the previous view of language, and philosophy, in clarifying the logic of language, will reveal that these purported "propositions" are not genuine propositions. Philosophy will bring us to see that these constructions attempt to reach "beyond" the inherent limit of language and, thus, show themselves as meaningless.
Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language (4.003).

This radical conclusion raises many questions: how can some of the most highly respected works by some of the most respected minds in history be merely "nonsense"? How does Wittgenstein propose to "point out" their nonsensicality? What of Wittgenstein's own statements in the Tractatus: must they not also then be nonsensical? What is the difference and the relationship between sensible genuine propositions, senseless "propositions" of logic and nonsensical "pseudo-propositions"?

As explicated in chapter one, a proposition shows a logical form which it holds in common with reality and, thus, is able to "show" a sense (4.022). Its sense is the reality pictured by the proposition (4.021), that is, the possible situation with which the proposition is "essentially connected" (4.03) via a "mirrored" logical form.

Wittgenstein writes: "in a proposition a situation is, as it were, constructed by way of experiment" (4.031). A sensible proposition, therefore, must depict a possible state of affairs, a situation that could be ascertained to be true or false in reality. The ability to be ascertained as true or false is not here the defining characteristic of sense but is, nonetheless, a necessary consequence of having sense. It therefore becomes a test or criterion for having sense while not of itself being sufficient for the determination of sense. Thus, tautologies and contradictions are ascertainable as true and false respectively, yet do not have sense.
Tautologies and contradictions "show that they say nothing" (4.461), that is, they lack sense. Tautologies and contradictions "do not stand in any representational relation to reality" because "the former admit all possible situations, and the latter none" (4.462). The truth-conditions of tautologies and contradictions are independent of the facts (4.463). Thus, the truth-conditions for the conjunction of a tautology and a proposition are identical to the truth-conditions for that latter proposition (4.465). Although they lack sense, tautologies and contradictions are not nonsensical since "they are part of the symbolism" (4.461). Tautologies and contradictions, that is, constitute the limits of meaningful symbolization (4.460) and, consequently, "describe" the logical "parameters" or the logical "scaffolding" in which all sensible propositions are located. These "propositions" of logic constitute the limit of language (the limit of sensible expression) so must themselves be senseless, though not yet "beyond" the limits of sensible expression.

Statements that do not show the limits of language and also do not picture possible states of affairs can be neither merely senseless nor sensible. They neither overtly show that they say nothing nor show a "sayable" sense. The truth or falsity of such statements cannot be established a priori or a posteriori because there are no ascertainable truth-conditions. Such statements, then, are of the same form as those pictures discussed in chapter one whose keys of interpretation cannot be established in principle; they must determine some "place" in logical "space", if they are to be propositions (which they do purport to be), yet must determine no such "place", if they are not to be construed as
ordinary factual claims (which they are not supposed to be). Such statements, therefore, are nonsensical "pseudo-propositions".

Since "a proposition is a picture of reality", the totality of true propositions must constitute a complete picture of the world. Obtaining a complete picture of the world can be considered the traditional goal of the combined natural sciences. Wittgenstein therefore deduces that "the totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science" (4.11). It is true, of course, as Max Black points out, that "science [as actually practiced] is more than a thesaurus of contingent truths"\textsuperscript{2}, but Wittgenstein’s point seems valid: science as practised is made possible by the facts that are the world and which would be fully described by the "totality of true propositions". The totality of true propositions, then, could replace (in the sense of "cover the same territory" as and allow all the practical consequences of) the corpus of the natural sciences. Thus, in essence, the totality of true propositions and the whole of natural science are identical. Obviously, however, we do not possess the totality of true propositions and the actual practice of science is neither purely descriptive nor absolutely comprehensive of all that is the case. Introducing natural science into the discussion serves to underline that to which a genuine proposition will be akin, namely, scientifically discovered statements about the "natural" world.

If philosophy is that activity which analyzes true propositions and if natural science is the totality of true propositions, then philosophy \textit{per se} cannot itself be a natural science (4.111). Philosophy works with scientific propositions and, when its task is completed, the
result is still merely those same propositions of natural science, albeit, in analyzed form. The task of analysis of genuine propositions is, nonetheless, important for it clarifies the manner in which such propositions model states of affairs. It, therefore, makes clear how the propositions "connect" with the world. Through analysis we thus discover the precise sense of the proposition: precisely what it means and what it implies—what items it names and what logical form it shows. Through analysis, then, we discover the nature of language in general and of the world. In an earlier metaphor, analysis reveals the "form of the thought" beneath the "outward form of the clothing" of language (4.002).

Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries (4.112).

Thoughts are given "sharp boundaries" in two closely related ways. First, the particular truth-conditions of every particular proposition analyzed will be made manifest, as discussed above. Second, language and thought in general will have shown themselves as limited to what can be pictured and, thus, what can have truth-conditions. Philosophy, then, clarifies the sense of particular propositions and also clarifies what can and cannot be a member of the totality of true propositions, that is, discovers the limits of natural science as a whole (4.113).

This elucidating activity of philosophy (4.112), however, must have yet another aspect. It is through analysis that a statement may be exposed as not picturing any possible state of affairs. The logical form which a picture must possess may not show itself and, thus, through attempting to clarify its sense, analysis may reveal that the purported
"proposition" fails to have sense. In other words, it is philosophy as sense clarification which, subsequently, forces some utterances to show themselves to be nonsensical.

Nonsensical "pseudo-propositions" include not only the grander statements of traditional metaphysics but even many more humble statements involving, what Wittgenstein terms, "formal concepts" such as "object", "complex", "fact", "function", "number", and so on (4.1272). Formal concepts are correctly symbolized with variables (4.1271) because, strictly speaking, formal concepts are variables. "Object", for instance, does not mean any particular item or combination of items in the world nor does it then mean some other, more mysterious, item: "so one cannot say, for example, 'There are objects', as one might say, 'There are books'" (4.1272). "There are objects" would be symbolized by $(\exists x)$; while "There are books" would be symbolized as $(\exists x)Bx$, where $Bx$ means "$x$ is a book". The latter is a genuine proposition using the propositional function $Bx$ to mean the "proper" concept "book" by containing the variable $x$ (the formal concept, "object"); the former is a pseudo-proposition misconceiving the formal concept to be a proper concept of some peculiar sort. Due to the difference between a formal and a proper concept and the misconceptions which the non-recognition of this difference can give rise to, Wittgenstein also calls the formal concept a "pseudo-concept" (4.1272), though, as Black points out, this designation is not pejorative: "'pseudo-' here stresses the contrast with 'proper'". A formal concept is properly given by giving the particular instances which are its "values" (4.12721). Black's paraphrase of 4.12721 is especially lucid:
A formal concept is defined by explaining the use of a certain variable, which in turn calls for a specification of the possible values of that variable. So in defining the formal concept we necessarily identify its instances.\(^4\)

To utter, "There are objects" is, therefore, to speak nonsense and not to truly say anything. To say, "That book is an object" is not to say any more than either "That is a book" or the tautology "All book-objects (of which that is an instance) are objects". It follows, then, that questions treating formal concepts as though they were proper concepts are also nonsensical, "for no proposition can be the answer to such a question" (4.1274). For instance, the apparent metaphysical question "Do objects really exist?" can have no answer because the question is misconceived: strictly speaking, it must be asking "Does a formal concept of the particular sort such that that book is one of its values (assuming that a book is an object) really exist?" Formal concepts, of course, do not exist apart from their values and that we know at least one value of that formal concept means that we must already know the meaning of that formal concept. Conversely, if we did not know any of its values, we would not have any reason to possess that concept and could not raise questions about it. Analyzed in this way, the question as asked is revealed to be nonsensical, that is, to have no possible answer because formal concepts are not existing items. The question is thereby not so much answered as made to disappear as a question.

Analyzed "downward" to clarify its sense, some sentence may thus be exposed, not to be senseless, as the propositions of logic are manifestly and harmlessly senseless, but to have failed to make coherent
sense. The proponent of such a sentence may attempt a defense of his statement by insisting that it must be analyzed "upward" to clarify his intention in producing it. For instance, in asking the question "Do objects really exist?", he may have intended to raise a question of the form "What does really exist?" As a specific question about the world, however, this latter is even emptier of factual content than the first. The validity of the question might again be defended as a necessary "response" to "the mystery of Being" or some such feeling. If something such as this was the intention, then it becomes clear the "question" was not asked as an ordinary serious question to which an answer could be given: no "answer" could be required or expected—no suggested proposition could be acceptable as a "solution" because nothing actually wants solving. Also, even if something such as this was the motivation behind that expression, Wittgenstein's analytical revelation of it as nonsense when asked as a normal question clarifies that that was the motivation and that such expressions must not be confused with questions about specific states of affairs.

Not all nonsense results from misunderstanding a formal concept. Wittgenstein gives other examples as well: for instance, "the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful" (4.003) or the statements "2 + 2 at 3 o'clock equals 4" (4.1272) or "Socrates is identical" (5.4733). In each case, philosophical analysis reveals that the utterance does not have a coherent sense because, in some manner, it fails to "connect" with the world. Although its proponent may again have intended something "higher" by his utterance, he must come to realize that what he has said is, literally, nonsense.
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give meaning to certain signs in his propositions (6.53).

As here stated, this project might at first appear identical to the logical positivists' project of simply doing away with metaphysics. That Wittgenstein's view of philosophy cannot be so simple, however, is already implicit in the above quotation: how does one "demonstrate" to the metaphysician that "certain signs in his propositions" are without meaning, if one is allowed "to say nothing except what can be said"?

This seems to call into question the statements of the *Tractatus* itself, which are certainly not propositions of natural science. Would we be as well, then, never to have created the pseudo-propositions which philosophy must expose to be nonsense? This seems to call into question the ultimate worth of "the correct method in philosophy": if there were no nonsense, then only the propositions of natural science would ever be uttered and no expose of meaningless signs required. Does Wittgenstein's "correct method in philosophy" amount to no more than the erasing of pointless "scribbles" which finally must result in the erasure of his *Tractatus* itself?

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world arighit (6.54).

Thus, the statements of the *Tractatus* are indeed pseudo-propositions—they are nonsense and must be discarded. At the
same time, however, it is not a matter of simply "erasing" or ignoring them, but rather one of, somehow, "transcending" them--discarding them "eventually", after learning from them in some way. Pseudo-propositions are, then, apparently required, at least to point out the nonsensicality of other pseudo-propositions, even when employing "the only strictly correct" (6.53) method in philosophy.

Richard Bernstein concludes that "at least three languages are distinguished in the Tractatus: the perspicuous language, ordinary language, and the ladder language". According to Bernstein, Wittgenstein uses the "ladder" language "as a type of meta-language" and only mentions the "perspicuous" and "ordinary" languages. The perspicuous language consists of configurations of names deliberately constructed so as to clarify "how any ['ordinary'] language works . . . to make true and false statements". With perspicuous language, "the point is to show how radically different naming and saying really are; to elucidate the nature of predication" which finally allows us to "lay bare the structure of reality". Bernstein's conception of a perspicuous language, therefore, roughly corresponds to the rigorous sign-language of logic discussed in chapter one.

According to Bernstein, "ladder" language, on the other hand, being a "type of meta-language", can say that which perspicuous language can only show because it utilizes formal concepts. For instance, "in the ladder language we can say that relations and properties are represented though not named". Only the ladder language can "elucidate" picturing.

That Bernstein's account must be wrong becomes apparent first
of all in his ambiguous use of the terms "show" and "say". While, as the above quotations testify, he maintains that the perspicuous language "shows" the nature of ordinary language and that the ladder language can "say" that which the perspicuous language can only "show". Bernstein also says quite explicitly: "the ladder language only elucidates or shows, while the perspicuous language describes or says". Even though he here equates "elucidate" with "show" and with the function of ladder language, Bernstein also implies that the perspicuous language "elucidates" by "showing" and that ladder language "elucidates" by saying, which again is confused.

A further indication that Bernstein's account of Wittgenstein must be mistaken, is his claim that "only propositions in the perspicuous language picture reality": "sentences in ordinary language can be said to picture only in so far as they can be translated into this [perspicuous] language". As was discussed in chapter one, it was Wittgenstein's intent to lay bare the logic of language per se which led to the "picture theory" of the proposition. If "picturing" did not account for ordinary language, then the theory would have lost its point. Ordinary language, therefore, must picture reality to work at all and the perspicuous language can only be the "distilled essence" of ordinary language, vividly showing forth the logical form present in, though disguised by, ordinary language.

Dan Nesher has neatly summed up both the truth of and the problem with Bernstein's view of the relationship between the "ordinary" and the "perspicuous" languages: it is perfectly correct to consider Wittgenstein's
Tractatus as a search for the deep-structure of a language, a sort of abstract skeleton of the object language, but only metaphorically can one name this deep-structure a language.

From the Tractarian perspective, there are also problems with the notion of treating the propositions of the Tractatus as written in a meta-language. Since the "object" language of which it would speak is language per se, its analysis must account for any supposed "meta-language" as well. Thus, the Tractarian propositions must either be speaking about themselves, in which case they are not a meta-language, or they must "stand outside" of all language, in which case they are not a meta-language. It will not do, then, to consider the Tractarian propositions as meaningful in a meta-language: they must be pseudo-propositions and, technically, meaningless. If Bernstein's claim that the "ladder language" of the Tractatus is a "type of meta-language" is not to be abandoned totally, then much emphasis must be placed upon the qualification "a type of".

More recently, Robert Fogelin has taken a similar view of the propositions of the Tractatus: "in effect, Wittgenstein presents a metalanguage specifying the truth conditions for a set of propositions that make up an object language." Again, much emphasis must be placed upon the qualification "in effect", since, as Fogelin himself goes on to say, "the propositions of the object language are able to make known, without saying, what these metapropositions attempt to say.

Unfortunately, Fogelin does not place proper emphasis here, for he goes on to claim that "any metalanguage that is incompatible with the object language it defines can invoke this strategy." As argued above, Wittgenstein's "metalanguage" cannot truly "define" his "object language"
since the object of his analysis is language *per se* and his "metalanguage", then, at best, "attempts" to say what, technically, cannot be truly "said" in any language.

Max Black suggests that "a great many" of the propositions of the *Tractatus*, that is, those employing formal concepts, are akin to tautologies in that they "are *a priori* but involve no violations of the rules of logical syntax". Thus, to use his example, the statement "A proposition is not a complex name", works to "draw attention" to the grammar of our language. Black says that this "is as reputable an activity as mathematics".

Black's account of this, however, cannot be correct either. Tautologies and mathematical equations simply show forth "the logic of the world" (6.22) but say nothing (5.43). On the other hand, statements utilizing formal concepts, such as Black's sample statement, draw our attention to grammar, not by showing it forth, but by apparently saying what the grammar is. According to the "picture theory" of the proposition, there would, therefore, have to be items in the world corresponding to "proposition" and "complex name". As was discussed earlier, however, formal concepts do not function in this manner, that is, do not correspond with the world and, thus, the Tractarian propositions "do violate the rules of logical syntax". To put it more simply, according to the Tractarian analysis, only tautologies can be true *a priori* and statements concerning the grammar of our language, though apparent *a priori* truths, are not tautologies.

Nesher finds the clue to understanding how those pseudo-propositions containing formal concepts can function, despite
their nonsensicality, in aphorism 3.263 of the *Tractatus*:

Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs [that is, the names in the language]. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known (3.263).

Nesher maintains that such elucidations mention but do not truly use names and that they can only effectively do so if we already know that the mentioned sign is a name and know what it names. For example, when Wittgenstein writes (elucidates): "the reason why 'Socrates is identical' says nothing is that we have not given any adjectival meaning to the word 'identical'" (5.4733), we understand the elucidation "only because we already know the referential meaning of the name 'Socrates'" and, consequently, can understand that "identical" would have to be an adjective if that proposition were to have meaning.

Similarly, we would have to already know the meaning of the mentioned term "identical" to understand that it is not an adjective.

Unfortunately, Nesher does not clarify how this explanation of the understanding of pseudo-propositions elucidating names can be extrapolated to include the more common pseudo-propositions elucidating formal concepts. Rather, he simply generalizes his finding to conclude: "the 'meta-semantical language' of philosophy in the *Tractatus* is not a descriptive object language of the second order, but is rather a totally different language-game". This broad conclusion has not been established. Formal concepts, as Nesher himself states, "have no referential meaning" and, therefore, have not yet been explained. Even if the implication is that a philosophical pseudo-proposition, such as "A relation is not an object", mentions but does not use the formal concept
"relation", that is, the subject of the elucidation, still it must actually use the formal concept "object" in predication if the statement is to say anything about the subject. Further, it seems that all elucidations, including those mentioning primitive signs, must use some formal concepts. For instance, in Nesher's example, the Tractarian proposition uses the formal concept "adjectival meaning" without giving it some particular "value". Again, Nesher himself states that "formal concepts' are the concepts which philosophical analysis uses in performing its function". Thus, Nesher's analysis is valuable for its indication that elucidations "can begin only when a full-fledged language already exists" and, consequently, that at least some terms in some pseudo-propositions can be understood as "mentioned" terms whose meaning we already know. Also, he is quite correct in stating that philosophical elucidation must be a totally different "game" played with language. Nonetheless, he has ultimately failed to account for the comprehensibility of the elucidations he is discussing. He has not established a way, consistent with the Tractatus, in which that "nonsense turns out to be a kind of sense" and, thus, he has not clarified the nature of the "totally different language-game" of elucidation.

There is still another problem with the accounts so far given by Bernstein, Black and Nesher of the Tractarian philosophical pseudo-propositions. Not all of the "propositions" of the Tractatus can be construed as grammatical elucidations of any kind since not all of them contain formal concepts. For instance, "world" is neither a name nor a formal concept with particular values, yet many of Wittgenstein's
remarks refer to the world. When Wittgenstein writes: "the world is all that is the case" (1), he is not simply mentioning the term "world" and making the grammatical observation that it is substitutable for the phrase "all that is the case", if for no other reason than that there is no legitimate use for the latter phrase--the "totality of facts" (1.1) is not pictureable. Also, it must be remembered that for Wittgenstein the ultimate purpose of the Tractatus, and hence of philosophy, is to bring us "to see the world aright" (6.54, my emphasis), not just to set grammar aright for its own sake. Such statements, then, are not merely "metaphysical-sounding" elucidations of grammar. Rather, they are overt metaphysical claims whose grammatically demonstrable nonsensicality must elucidate in some other manner.

Black agrees that not all of the Tractarian propositions are "formal statements" of "philosophical grammar". The other, as yet unaccounted for, Tractarian propositions, he deems "exercises" in "revisionary metaphysics". With these latter pseudo-propositions, the philosopher "proceeds by analogy and metaphor" in an attempt to enlarge and extend the given concepts of science and ordinary life in a way which will allow him to arrive at a more extensive, a more penetrating, and in some way more fundamental, view of the universe.

For Black, Wittgenstein's statement that the propositions of the Tractatus must finally be understood to be nonsensical (6.54) is an admission that his "metaphysical innovation" finally must "be abandoned as abortive". The enterprise, however, is still valuable because those engaged in it have, at least, learned what is not the case and have, therefore, gained greater conceptual clarity: "for clarity arrives at the
end of a conceptual investigation, not at its beginning. On Black's interpretation, then, the *Tractatus* is simply one metaphysical study among others and, since at least large portions of it constitute an abortive metaphysical study, these should now be abandoned and others, yet untried, be pursued.

There are several problems with this interpretation. First, it is not at all clear that this radical move was what Wittgenstein intended with his comment at 6.54. Wittgenstein does not advise that we should "abandon" those Tractarian propositions as abortive but that we should "climb up beyond them"; "we must transcend these propositions" (6.54). Second, Wittgenstein seems to intend something more positive by his conclusion than Black suggests: upon realizing that those Tractarian propositions are nonsensical, we should "see the world aright" (6.54); in his "Preface" to the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein writes:

> the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems.

Third, the view that those Tractarian propositions are nonsensical follows from the entire analysis of language contained in the *Tractatus*: to abandon those propositions that are not "formal statements" of "philosophical grammar", we must accept those that are the latter. If we accept the latter, however, as Black must since he has introduced this distinction, then no alternative metaphysical studies are possible: no "more penetrating" or "more fundamental view of the universe" can be reached because the logic of language and of the world has already been laid bare. If, on the other hand, we reject that analysis of language in
the *Tractatus*, then the very reason for abandoning that "revisionary metaphysics" is undercut and, again, Black's interpretation fails. It seems, then, that if one accepts the Tractarian analysis of language, one must either abandon all metaphysics or one must follow Wittgenstein and attain to some other "ineffable" metaphysical orientation.

A different approach to pseudo-propositions is taken by P. M. S. Hacker. Hacker finds that within the realm of covert philosophical nonsense, we must distinguish between "misleading" nonsense and "illuminating" nonsense. Misleading nonsense will consist of pseudo-propositions that are not recognized to be such and are, thus, employed as though they were genuine propositions. Those employing these pseudo-propositions will, then, think themselves to be saying something when in actuality they are not. Illuminating nonsense will consist of pseudo-propositions that are recognized to be such but are nonetheless employed to achieve some particular effect. Although Hacker does not expand upon what makes the difference between misleading and illuminating nonsense, it seems that the difference must simply lie in the different effects which the nonsensical can have. Thus, it is possible to agree with K. T. Fann when he writes that Wittgenstein "could not have said, 'My propositions are illuminating (or elucidating) nonsense' and still subscribe to the view that nonsense can be misleading or it can be illuminating, depending upon how it is used and understood. There are no "special" pseudo-propositions whose nonsensicality guarantees "illumination"--all are equally nonsensical and liable to mislead.

Context is the key to proper understanding.
Illuminating nonsense will guide the attentive hearer or reader to apprehend what is shown by other propositions which do not purport to be philosophical; moreover it will intimate, to those who grasp what is meant, its own illegitimacy.

As Nesher pointed out above, a pseudo-proposition elucidating with a formal concept can do so because it occurs in the context of a language which already shows the correct use of that formal concept. Since we speak that language, we must implicitly already know its logic and must, therefore, implicitly already know that which shows itself. Once this logic has been thematized by the perspicuous "language" of philosophical analysis, that which shows itself has been laid bare and is merely "waiting" for explicit awareness to be focused upon it. In this context, a skillfully phrased and carefully used pseudo-proposition can "turn" our awareness to that which is there "waiting" to be seen. Thus, this deliberate nonsense will have led us to see that which shows itself—it will have performed the task of elucidation and have, thereby, become "illuminating" nonsense. It is not here a matter of "meta-linguistic" analysis but rather one of "intra-linguistic" performance.

As discussed in chapter one, when we have correctly seen that which shows itself, we will not only have understood our language but, moreover, have seen the world correctly. Thus, even those apparent "grammatical" elucidations are also "metaphysical" elucidations. Those Tractarian remarks which are overtly metaphysical in character are, then, not a special type of pseudo-proposition. Rather, they function within the context of other Tractarian pseudo-propositions and, though they might become misleading nonsense outside of it, within that context they "turn" our attention toward the deeper significance of that which shows
itself in language, the deeper "vision" of that which is shown, namely, the world and man's relationship with it.

Although Wittgenstein does not spell out his view of philosophy in great detail, I believe that a consideration of his remarks, especially at *Tractatus* 4.112, 6.53 and 6.54, indicates that for him philosophy proceeds as follows. A statement having been made, the philosopher produces an analysis which clarifies or elucidates its sense by allowing it to be clearly seen as a picture of some state of affairs, that is, by bringing us to clearly see the statement's logical form and the items it names. In order to do this, and more particularly if the the analyzed statement fails to have a coherent sense, the philosopher may have to produce a pseudo-proposition (generally one misemploying a formal concept) in order to bring his interlocutor to "see" that which shows itself. For instance, if someone stated "Socrates is identical", the philosopher might respond with "There is no property called 'identical'" (*5.473*). This response must be a pseudo-proposition because it employs the formal concept "property" as a noun, that is, it suggests that there are objects named "properties". Despite its own nonsensical character, however, the response may bring the author of the original statement to see that he is misusing the word "identical" because his implicit knowledge of that which shows itself and the context of the pseudo-proposition may allow him to grasp the intention or the point of the philosopher's remark and to see explicitly that which shows itself. The philosopher's response, then, has a "performative" value: it is appropriate if it brings the interlocutor to "see" his mistake and then, more importantly, to see the world and his relationship to it correctly.
Moreover, both the philosopher and his interlocutor may then be driven to see some other, improperly expressed, intention "behind" that original remark concerning Socrates. When that intention is correctly understood, interlocutor and philosopher will either know how to properly express it in language or they will know why it is inexpressible and, again, they will have been brought to a deeper vision of the world and man's relationship with it. Even the original metaphysical pseudo-proposition, now exposed as nonsense, can, therefore, be valuable once we are no longer misled by it. It, too, may disguise a "higher" intention concerning man and his world and it, too, is a necessary rung in the ladder of dialectical interaction between philosopher and interlocutor which we must climb to "see the world aright". Still, in all this, only sense clarification is the "strictly correct" method on philosophy, since the pseudo-proposition is nonetheless nonsensical and the dialectical interaction between philosopher and interlocutor is, at best, a hoped for result of that analytical sense clarification. Also, if we all maintained our vision of that which shows itself and attained to the ineffable metaphysical orientation it carries, then only sense clarification would ever be required.

It is, of course, difficult to discuss such a view of philosophy without being misleading. For instance, it will be impossible to state positively what one sees when one properly sees the world and his relationship to it. Similar to defining health as the absence of disease, the correct "vision" can be defined negatively as the absence of misconceptions. Nonetheless, as with health, there is a positive reality to the "vision": if misconceptions were removed, we would yet continue
conceiving of the world, but it would now be done correctly; we would still have an awareness of why metaphysics fails and, thus, of the way the world actually is. Moreover, for Wittgenstein, "seeing the world aright" has a definite and positive effect upon the living of one's life. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

There are, then, two senses behind Wittgenstein's claim that "a philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations" (4.112). First, philosophy "elucidates" in the sense that it clarifies the logic and meaning of propositions, giving "sharp boundaries" to thoughts. Second, philosophy "elucidates" in the sense of utilizing pseudo-propositions, that at least "sound" metaphysical, to dialectically arrive at some correct "vision" of man and the world (6.54). The first requires activity on the part of the philosopher only to lay bare that which must show itself in logic and language. The second requires that which must show itself in logic and language only as an aspect (albeit, a necessary aspect) of an activity on the part of the philosopher. The dialectical purpose of this activity must be caught on to by the philosopher's interlocutor--it must be "seen" and cannot be "said" because it necessarily occurs outside the bounds of picturing and only that which can be pictured can be claimed to be the case (that is, "said").

The second type of elucidation, then, involves a second type of "showing", in addition to "that which shows itself". This new type of showing is done by the philosopher in active dialectical engagement within a particular context. It utilizes that which shows itself in sense clarification, pseudo-propositions which show themselves as nonsensical and the particular parameters of the particular context of
discussion in order to "re-orient" the participants in the discussion and thus "show" them the "nature" of the world and man's place in it.

Donald Harward correctly distinguishes, what he terms, "demonstrative" showing and "reflexive" showing 49. By "reflexive" showing, he means that which has the form "a shows characteristic b" or "the b of a shows itself", namely, "that which shows itself" 50. By "demonstrative" showing, Harward means that which has the form "x shows something to y" or "x shows y how to do something" or "x shows y that something" 51. In other words, by demonstrative showing, Harward means that activity of "showing" done by the philosopher. Harward goes on to say that there is a use of showing which prohibits being said—the 'show itself' uses in the Tractatus. But there are other uses of 'show', the demonstrative uses, which can be said 52.

Despite the correctness of the distinction between "reflexive" and "demonstrative", this next distinction, between "shown and not said" and "shown and said", cannot be correct. The demonstrative showing done by a philosopher, first of all, is an activity which is successful or not as a performance, thus, it need have nothing to do with "saying", although it may occur within the context of "saying". In Wittgenstein's words: "philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity" (4.112). Secondly, and more crucially, the demonstrative showing done by a philosopher, even in so far as it involves utterances, either involves analyses, which per se are reflexive, not demonstrative, showing, or it involves uttering nonsense. Nonsense is precisely that which cannot be said because it shows itself to be an illogical picture, therefore to be one without possible sense, and therefore one that cannot be claimed to
be the case (that is, "said"). Unlike tautologies and contradictions which show forth logical form, though they are senseless and, therefore, do not say how anything stands in the world, demonstrative philosophical showing does not even show the form of how things stand, let alone say how anything is. It is successful or not in its task of "illumination" only as an action in a context.

To repeat once again, the goal of this second type of showing is to "see the world aright", that is, to see the nature of the world and man's relationship to it, that is, to see that which "underlies" the mere "how" of particular states of affairs and to see that which one attempts to address with questions concerning "what" and "why" (5.552, 6.44).

Thus it concerns a "matter" that cannot be said nor show itself. Yet, it does concern some "matter". When Wittgenstein writes: "it [philosophy] must set limits to what can be thought; and in doing so, to what cannot be thought" (4.114) or, again, "it [philosophy] will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said" (4.115), he seems to be giving a clear indication that some positive, objective reality is present and can be signified, even though it cannot be explicitly thought or said. This becomes even clearer when he writes:

there are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words [that is, cannot be shown by logic nor said with language]. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical. (6.522)

Erik Stenius, therefore, is clearly wrong in his view that "what is inexpressible is just nonsense and nothing else"53, that "this is not reverence for the ineffable"54. If philosophy is the dialectical transcendence of metaphysical pseudo-propositions, then maintaining a metaphysical silence (7) would be the inevitable positive fulfillment of
seeing that which is "manifest" and not merely "the expression of a way of escape". Of course, this is not to say that such silence is nonetheless necessary before this "mystical"—Wittgenstein's entire account has been an attempt to show why these "truths" are necessarily ineffable—but only to say that this "mystical" is positive for human consciousness.

David Pears brings a more important criticism to bear against the Tractarian account of philosophy. Pears holds that some metaphysical pseudo-propositions are actually "deep tautologies" that have simply been given "the wrong kind of expression". For instance, "the valid point" made by a solipsist is that "What is reflected in the mirror of language is reflected in the mirror of language", although he misstates this truth to make it appear as a "substantial necessary truth" (which it is not). Wittgenstein's "theories" concerning logic and ontology, on the other hand, must be "genuine substantial necessary truths of a Kantian kind", that is, they must be taken as genuine a priori claims about "the character of what does exist". If "transformed" into tautologies, they would only amount to "Language works as it does" and "Reality has the character that it has", which are not what Wittgenstein wants to claim.

Thus, Wittgenstein's own metaphysical statements, unlike the metaphysical statements of others, are not "deep tautologies" and are not explicable as "showing". Pears concludes, therefore, that Wittgenstein's "doctrine of showing" is not applicable to philosophy.

In the terms of the Tractatus, however, Pears' account contains several confusions. First, Wittgenstein's accounts of language and ontology are not proposed as "theories", but rather are supposed to
follow from a descriptive analysis of language leading necessarily to
what must be the case for the analyzed phenomenon to occur. Thus,
Stenius is perhaps not far wrong in referring to these accounts as
"transcendental deductions"61. Second, a tautology is not true because
of what it says but purely because of the formal properties it shows. If
a metaphysical pseudo-proposition is transformed into a tautology,
therefore, it can no longer say anything: the truth that "emerges" cannot
be the "deep" intention of the metaphysician for it is simply the
universal logical truth that if p, then p. Moreover, on Pears account,
all metaphysicians must actually be attempting to make the same "valid
point": that if p, then p. Third, as is clear from the foregoing, Pears
does not take proper account of the crucial difference between
senselessness and nonsense. This, in turn, leads to a fourth point:
Pears does not take proper account of the equally crucial difference
between "shown" by a senseless tautology and "shown" with nonsense. That
these two distinctions are present in and necessary for the understanding
of the Tractatus has been argued above. Thus, contrary to Pears,
metaphysical pseudo-propositions that make a "valid point" cannot be
"deep tautologies" and the Tractarian pseudo-propositions do not have a
different status than other pseudo-propositions. The metaphysician's
"valid point" must always be made in some non-sensical manner and,
consequently, can neither be said nor show itself.

Internally consistent as the Tractatus account may be in
treating philosophy as the activity of "discovering" that which shows
itself and, thereby, "showing" something ineffably "more", still a
certain "inner tension" remains. The term "mystical", for instance, has
many connotations: why has Wittgenstein used it here? What is gained by this correct "holistic" vision of the world: how does it differ from scientific knowledge of particular facts, if, despite this vision, it remains that "the world is all that is the case" (1)? Further, if what is nonsense can yet be illuminating, how much "pressure"\textsuperscript{62} does this place upon the Tractarian account of sense? Finally, considering the unresolved questions raised in chapter one concerning the extension of the term "shown" in the phrase "shown of itself" from a more or less straightforward to a metaphorical use, how might this new use of "shown" in the phrase "shown by the activity of a philosopher" complicate or clarify the manner in which "showing" is the basis of language? I shall deal with these questions in the following chapters.
CHAPTER THREE

THAT WHICH IS SHOWN BY THE ETHICAL LIFE

The tension in Wittgenstein's attitude toward that which does not lie within the bounds of sensible language, that is, his attitude that that which is nonsensical can yet be "illuminating", is manifest most clearly in his remarks concerning ethics. For instance:

Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.¹

This remark is made just after the very strong statement:

I see now that these nonsensical expressions [of ethics] were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was of their very essence. For all I wanted to do with this was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language.²

These remarks raise three related questions. First, there is the question of what more precisely Wittgenstein means by the "ethical". Second, it must be made more explicit why ethics, the search for value and meaning in life, does not lie within the bounds of sensible language. Third, given that ethics is not expressible but is nonetheless to be deeply respected, what is the status of statements made concerning the value and meaning of life? The third question can be rephrased to ask what we are to do in regards to ethics, considering that it is admittedly respectable yet is not properly expressible in language. As might be
expected from the discussion in chapter two, the answer to the third question will again lie in the distinction between showing and saying. It will become evident later in this chapter, however, that showing, when applied to ethics, yields an important insight which will, in turn, help answer some of the questions still outstanding since chapter one and make possible a different view of language.

In "A Lecture on Ethics", Wittgenstein states that when he wants "to fix his mind" on what he means by the ethical, "it always happens that the idea of one particular experience presents itself". This experience is one of wondering at the existence of the world. Wittgenstein goes on to add the experiences "of feeling absolutely safe" and "of feeling guilty" and says that he "could have added others". The first such experience helping him fix his mind upon the ethical, called the experience par excellence, is plainly that realization which in the Tractatus is termed "the mystical": "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists" (6.44). This is, in that work, embellished further with the comment: "Feeling the world as a limited whole--it is this that is mystical" (6.45). Thus, for Wittgenstein, the ethical is related to the mystical and the mystical is involved with such concerns as the existence of the world as a whole. Moreover, these ethical/mystical concerns are at least partly experiential.

Wittgenstein links these experiences to religious terminology. Wondering at the existence of the world, for instance, is said to be that which is referred to by talk of the world having been created by God. Feeling absolutely safe is said to be what is meant by feeling "safe in
the hands of God." Feeling guilty is what is meant with the words "God disapproves of our conduct." Such religious terminology begins to make apparent why these "mystical experiences" are considered as meaningful or valuable and, hence, as ethical. These experiences as described in religious terms all seem to indicate something of ultimate importance which is felt to be other than a part of the world yet which bears upon some individual's attitude toward and behavior in the world. As Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebooks several years before "A Lecture on Ethics": we discover something "problematic" about the world, calling this "its meaning" and "to believe in God means to see that life has a meaning." ("Life" here does not, of course, refer to physiological life or psychological life but rather to the world.) In his Notebooks, Wittgenstein gives an account of how the concept of God arises which is obviously linked to the first experience mentioned in "A Lecture on Ethics" and to Tractatus 6.44. An individual is there said to encounter the world about him as though it were "given" to him, that is, as though he were "entering into" it from "outside." The individual, therefore, experiences a sense of dependence upon something outside of him which "something" is felt as an "alien will." That which is thus independent of us but upon which we feel dependent, Wittgenstein calls God. Thus, for Wittgenstein, God is, at one and the same time, "how things stand" and "fate" which, when taken together, give life, the world as a whole, some sense not had by the individual "facts of the world." Eddy Zemach coins the term "factuality" to explain Wittgenstein's remarks about the mystical and God. Factuality is said to be "the form of all facts" and, thus, not itself a fact. The
factuality of a fact is said to be "the 'fact' that it [the fact] is a fact"\textsuperscript{24}. As discussed in chapter one, the form of a proposition allows the proposition to have sense, although the proposition does not contain that sense. On Zemach's account, the form of all facts, since it can have no key of interpretation, must either have no sense or its sense must be identical with its form. Zemach, without argument, adopts the latter interpretation of factuality\textsuperscript{25}. Factuality is, nonetheless, said to be "higher" than the world because it is the sense of the world and "every Sinn [sense] is 'higher' than the fact that represents it"\textsuperscript{26}. On Zemach's account, therefore, factuality is God\textsuperscript{27}. He takes his analysis one step further to identify Wittgenstein's "general form of a proposition", \([\tilde{p}, \tilde{\xi}, N(\tilde{\xi})] \langle 6 \rangle\), that is, the most general logical form of any actual proposition, with the "pseudo-concept" God\textsuperscript{28} because this general propositional form shows the form which any factual proposition must have\textsuperscript{29} and so displays factuality.

There are several things wrong with Zemach's account. First of all, it is not certain whether greater clarity is gained or lost by referring to "the 'fact' that a fact is a fact". More importantly, Zemach does not support his claim that we should identify the form of factuality with its sense rather than merely find that factuality is senseless—which he does recognize as an alternative\textsuperscript{30}. Wittgenstein nowhere claims that every sense is higher than the fact that represents it. Indeed, the implication of 6.42—"propositions can express nothing that is higher"—would seem to be that the sense of a proposition is not higher than the fact that represents it, since propositions do express a sense. If this is so, then factuality, even if it could be identified
with its own sense, would not be "higher" than the world of facts while God is said to be "higher" than the world (6.432) and thus the identification of God and factuality would be broken. Third, as discussed in chapter two, a "pseudo--" or formal concept is a variable that has no meaning apart from the various values it assumes. Wittgenstein's general propositional form, then, is, as such, an empty formalism with no sense and when it is given particular values, thereby assuming a particular sense, a particular proposition with that form is created. The concept of God, on the other hand, even as Wittgenstein employs it, already has a particular sense and has no range of values to be "plugged" into it. God, therefore, is not a pseudo-concept--or at least not one of the type discussed in the Tractatus. Finally, and this may be the source of the above three confusions, that a fact is a fact is not a formal concern, while the form of all facts would not of itself refer to the "being" of facts. Zemach's use of the term "factuality" is, therefore, ambiguous.

While Zemach's ambiguous notion of factuality may help to bring out an aspect of Wittgenstein's notion of the mystical, it cannot be completely correct because it cannot account for the notion of the "higher", that is, the notion that "life has meaning". Nothing in Zemach's discussion of factuality can account for the sense of wonder, security or guilt that leads Wittgenstein to postulate God and the mystical. Thus, while for Wittgenstein factuality may be mystical, the mystical cannot be factuality.

It seems that the three experiences of which Wittgenstein speaks change in some manner one's comprehension of or his relationship
with factuality. Such experiences, then, would alter one's entire comprehension of and relationship with the world of one's experience:

The world must, so to speak, wax or wane as a whole. As if by accession or loss of meaning32.

This waxing and waning of the world as a whole, moreover, necessitates coining expressions, such as "God", that must function differently than the expressions of the language used to make particular claims about what is or is not the case in the world. This is, first of all, because attempting to speak of the world as a whole must be different from speaking about particular items in the world and, second, because attempting to speak of variations in one's relationship to the world as a whole, that is, attempting to speak of the world as meaningful or not, important or not, valuable or not, and so on, must again be different from making non-value-laden claims about the state of particular items in the world.

Thus, a dichotomy is formed between what, in Wittgenstein's later terminology, could be called two "language-games" but without that terminology, can roughly be called factual claims and evaluative claims or simply matters of fact and matters of value. Perhaps Wittgenstein's clearest expression of the source of this dichotomy was given as late as 1950:

If someone who believes in God looks around and asks "Where does all this come from?", he is not craving for a (causal) explanation; and his question gets its point from being the expression of a certain craving. He is, namely, expressing an attitude to all explanations.—But how is this manifested in his life?33

The closing question, I think, indicates the connection Wittgenstein saw between mystical experience, religious terminology and ethical behavior
and, as well, indicates why this complex is distinct from the factual. A certain way of experiencing the world, a certain craving regarding our knowledge of the world, requires certain peculiar non-descriptive expressions and certain manifestations of behavior. This, of course, is not a "one-way" connection: the mode of expression also requires a certain manner of experiencing and certain behavior while certain behavior requires a peculiar terminology and a certain manner of experiencing. It is thus that Wittgenstein can so easily collapse the mystical, the religious and the ethical, moving smoothly from a discussion of certain of his experiences to a discussion of values, and it is thus that he must consider this as real and definite but non-factual. As he wrote in 1929:

What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics. Only something supernatural can express the Supernatural.34

In "A Lecture on Ethics", Wittgenstein draws out the connection between the mystical and the ethical and the distinction between factual claims and evaluative claims by introducing a distinction between the absolute and the relative senses of value terms. Terms such as "good" and "right", for instance, can be used to compare something to some given determinate standard or goal.35 Such "judgements of relative value" are, therefore, said to be "mere statement[s] of facts" and replaceable by propositions not containing the value term.36 For instance, "This is the right way to Granchester" means merely "this is the way to reach Granchester in the shortest time."37 Value terms, however, can also be used, according to Wittgenstein, in a manner that refuses replacement by non-value statements. Such a "judgement of absolute value" is ethical in
nature. Wittgenstein goes on to say that it is with the aforementioned three mystical experiences that he finds himself compelled to use value terms in their absolute sense: something about the experience of wondering at the existence of the world, feeling absolutely safe and feeling guilty inclines him to judge these experiences as absolutely good and right. Thus, the "supernatural" character of truly ethical judgements is again underlined: they are intended to be absolute and, thus, intended to be distinct from judgements of ("natural") fact. Such ethical or absolute judgements, however, are not arbitrary, as certain experiences or a certain comprehension of the world elicit these judgements while other occasions do not.

For Wittgenstein, then, ethics affects one's entire relationship with the world and is quite distinct from the making of factual claims about the world while remaining as definite and non-arbitrary as the experience of the mystical which is its source. For instance, in dealing with a murder, Wittgenstein asserts that we could describe the deed completely, including even a description of "the pain or rage caused by this murder in other people" without making an ethical judgement. Theodore Redpath argues that "it seems reasonable enough to say 'Well, the act [murder] was either atrocious or it was not, and surely to say either is to make a statement of fact'" thus objecting that the opposite of Wittgenstein's view is just as reasonable as Wittgenstein's own view. This objection, however, misses Wittgenstein's point. First, we can report the fact that someone had that emotional response to that event but that will not be an ethical judgement. More importantly, however, Wittgenstein is not arguing that
we cannot absolutely judge the murder to be atrocious ethically: quite
the contrary, for, I believe, he has chosen the extreme example of murder
exactly expecting that his audience will judge such a deed to be
unethical—he wants only to indicate that this judgement is quite
different than the simple description of events. If one wants to call
the former judgement a "fact" as well, then he must introduce two
varieties of facts: sensually perceivable, valueless facts and sensually
imperceptible facts of value which, for Wittgenstein, require a change in
the world of facts as a whole and, thus, must be facts about the facts.
It is precisely this equivocation on the term "fact" that Wittgenstein is
systematically trying to avoid in his discussion of ethics and so he
cannot call the atrociousness of a murder, albeit undeniable, a fact.

This same point is again made when Wittgenstein discusses why
the concept of an absolutely good particular state of affairs is a
"chimera". An absolutely good state of affairs, such as "the absolutely
ger" right road", would have to be one upon "which everybody on seeing it
would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not
going". Redpath agrees that there is no state of affairs that fulfills
this criterion but objects that this is not the proper criterion for
ethics since "human conscience" does not "operate by logical
necessity". According to Redpath, Wittgenstein

has substituted for an ethical definition of
absolute good a definition depending on logical necessity, and has
also, by implication, excluded a definition of absolute good
depending upon people's actual desires and inclinations.

Again, however, the objection misses Wittgenstein's point.
Wittgenstein is merely arguing that if the absolute good were simply
discoverable in or as some state of affairs within the world, then, that state of affairs would have to draw us by some type of logical necessity in order to have the requisite authority so as to be properly describable as the absolute good. It is exactly because this is not how such absolute judgements are made that Wittgenstein rejects the notion that absolute value is simply found and described in the world. Even Redpath is forced to mention "human conscience" and "people's actual desires and inclinations": it is precisely because Wittgenstein, too, recognizes that, somehow, the source of ethical valuation must lie within these that he denies that it is found within the world. Thus, even if, as Redpath suggests, there were some state of affairs that was judged "so much better than any other... that everybody ought positively to try to bring about that state of affairs"47, still this need not contradict Wittgenstein's main contention: it is we who would judge that state "better than any other" and we who would judge that we "ought to try" to bring it into existence—that it is valued has not been shown to lie within the favored state as such.

Given this dichotomy between factual claims and evaluative claims and the association of evaluative claims with the mystical and the religious, in terms of the Tractarian analysis of language, the ethical must lie beyond sensible linguistic expression. The sense of a proposition was discovered to be the state of affairs whose logical form the proposition shows and whose objects its simple signs name. Consequently, a sentence that is not strictly descriptive of some state of affairs, as a value judgement is not, and requires some relation to the world as a whole, as a value judgement does, cannot have sense.
Further, it is plain that value judgements are not propositions of logic and are, therefore, not merely senseless. On the Tractarian analysis of language, then, sentences expressing ethical judgements must be nonsensical: "it is clear that ethics cannot be put into words" (6.421).

Similarly, in "A Lecture on Ethics", Wittgenstein writes that "a certain characteristic misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expressions" and, though he there refers to this as "right in an ethical sense", he still writes that "what we mean, is not right in its [the expression's] trivial sense": in the *Tractatus*, the latter can be the expression's only correct sense, thus what the "Lecture" calls misuse is equivalent to what the *Tractatus* calls nonsense.

If ethics is unsayable and yet is the inquiry "into what is really important"\(^{49}\), Wittgenstein must account for its genuine origin and clarify what is to be done in its pursuit. In the *Tractatus* an attempt to accomplish this leads to Wittgenstein's analysis of the will. Wittgenstein's conception of the will is, in turn, caught up with his conception of the "philosophical self", the "metaphysical subject" (5.641). Thus, the latter concept, although not directly involved with ethics, must be briefly discussed first.

If I wrote a book called *The World as I found it*, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book (5.631).

Thus, after all that can be said has been said, it is shown that the metaphysical subject is not found as an entity of any sort in the world because it is never mentioned: it is "not the human being, not the human
body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals" (5.641).

Nonetheless, the world (including the human being, body and mind) is experienced: it is conceptualized, pictured, mirrored with language; and, moreover, there is a sense of unity to these conceptualizations, pictures, reflections. In short, "the world is my world" (5.62) because there is some sense of "I" in which I am the one who speaks the language. As discussed in chapter one, it is the intentionality of thought that adds specific content to the formal structure of language and allows particular propositions with sense to be said. The I is that which adds this intentional content. Henry Finch sums this up neatly:

The world is the world whose form and structure is mirrored in pictures and propositions; my world is the direct qualitatively experienced content.

Thus, "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (5.6) just as the limits of language per se mean to limits if the world per se, as was discussed in chapter one. Consequently, the metaphysical subject, that is, the I which intentionally experiences the world through the formal structure of language thereby allowing language to become more than empty, formal structure, is, as well, "a limit of the world" (5.632).

It might seem, at first, that the metaphysical subject is purely the limit of my world, that, since I speak the language, it is my language only and that Wittgenstein should not mention the language or the world. This solipsistic objection, however, fails as "what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest" (5.62). First of all, the metaphysical self was shown not to exist in the world but only "transcendently deduced" by the
sense of the world as mine. Although language and world are indeed mine in this transcendental sense, this is precisely nothing in the world but purely a sense had by the world as a whole. The metaphysical subject is not, then, some discrete entity claiming the world or creating a world; rather it is nothing other than the world having no content of its own other than the world of its experience. Thus, when Wittgenstein announces "I am my world" (5.63) and confirms the insight of solipsism, his statement is as much the radical objectivization of the self as it is the radical subjectivization of the world: "the self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it" (5.64). There is, therefore, nothing positive that can be said about the metaphysical I. It rather shows itself implicitly within our use of language and experience of the world, while all that we can positively say will speak non-subjectively of the world.

There is a second related reason for our inability to speak in solipsistic terms of my language and my world. Although the metaphysical subject must supply the specific content that enables the formal structure of language to assume specific senses thus making language and the world mine, all that can be said with language must be expressed in that formal structure. The specific intentional content is necessarily supplied only by the metaphysical subject in projection of the sense and is never pictureable as such. Thus, while what will be meant will always be meant by a metaphysical subject, what will always be expressed will be only expressed in the impersonal formal structure, that is, in the language and shall, therefore, be of the world.

The conclusions that Wittgenstein draws from the foregoing
considerations are that "what brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'" (5.641) and that "the philosophical self is . . . the limit of the world--not a part of it" (5.641). These conclusions, following largely from the view of language and the world discussed in chapter one, are relevant to the present chapter only insofar as they clarify Wittgenstein's notion of the will. Further discussion of this latter, however, may clarify some of the problems with the concept of the metaphysical subject.

While the metaphysical subject is the sense of the world as mine, resulting from language as used by me, for Wittgenstein, this sense of mine and me is made possible by the will. Conversely, the actuality of the sense of mine and me necessitates a will to make that sense possible: "if the will did not exist, neither would there be that center of the world, which we call the I, and which is the bearer of ethics"53. Wittgenstein, therefore, contends that nothing in or about the world requires this "center", this sense of being mine, in order for it to be. This relates back to the feeling that a person has of entering the world as though from the outside54. The world, however, does have this sense of being mine, resulting, as mentioned above, from the intentionality of thought. The intentionality of thought, in turn, requires a will to project significance upon or through the formal structure of language:

Things acquire "significance" only through their relation to my will. For "Everything is what it is and not another thing"55.

Wittgenstein also implies the connection between the will and intentional thought when he writes:
But can we conceive a being that isn't capable of Will at all, but only of Idea (of seeing for example)? In some sense this seems impossible.56

Thus, the metaphysical subject is the sense of the world as mine and the willing subject is the reason or ground for the possibility of the metaphysical subject.

In the first quotation cited in the above paragraph, the Will is referred to as "the bearer of ethics". Wittgenstein writes: "I will call 'will' first and foremost the bearer of good and evil"57. While earlier a distinction between fact and value was discussed as arising out of Wittgenstein’s views on the mystical, here a link is made between the will and value. There are, of course, historical reasons for connecting the will with ethics58 but the connection also comes out of Wittgenstein’s own analysis. In the following discussion, I will attempt only to delineate Wittgenstein’s view of the will as Wittgenstein presents it. Although some of Wittgenstein’s terminology is reminiscent of nineteenth century philosophy—particularly of Kant and Schopenhauer—Wittgenstein’s philosophy has its own internal needs and uses for this terminology and it is only with the explication of these that I am here concerned. The first step in achieving this is to distinguish the will from the facts of the world.

Since it was shown that the metaphysical subject does "not belong to the world" (5.632), that it is "not a part of it [the world]" (5.641) but rather that it is the "limit of the world" (5.632, 5.641), the willing subject, as ground of the metaphysical subject, must also be "not part of the world, but a boundary of the world"59. Wittgenstein writes: "the world is independent of my will" (6.373). It was said at
Tractatus 5.631, however, that the human body is a part of the world and at 5.641 that "the human soul [that is, mind]" is dealt with by the science of psychology, meaning that it, too, must be part of the world. At Tractatus 6.423, Wittgenstein goes still further and writes that "the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology". As Jeremy Walker comments on 6.423:

By "the will as phenomenon", i.e., the phenomenal will, Wittgenstein can mean only those phenomena, facts, which we are ordinarily referring to in speaking of "the will" or willing. This will, then, stands for the empirical facts of wanting, wishing, and hoping, of voluntary and deliberate action, and of happiness and unhappiness, and so forth.

The metaphysical and the willing subjects, therefore, in not being part of the world, are distinguished, not only from the human body and mind, but also from the phenomenal will. Thus, the non-phenomenal will is radically distinct from everything factual and can only be taken as transcendental. The transcendental will, therefore, in constituting a limit of the world, is correctly "situated" so as to be able to affect that waxing and waning of the world as a whole (6.43) which was said to happen with the ethical but, at the same time, exactly in being so radically distinct from the world, becomes problematic as to its ability to affect anything.

Wittgenstein's analysis has revealed: that value, affecting the world as a whole, is distinct from the facts of the world and, consequently, is unsayable; that the transcendental will is a limit of, not a fact within, the world and, therefore, could conceivably affect the world as a whole. The will is, then, a possible candidate to explain the value in and the meaning of the world as a whole and the ethical is a
possible candidate to demonstrate how the will might change the limits of
the world as a whole without affecting the specific facts of the world.
In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein accepts this explanation: the will is the
source of value in the world—the world waxes or wanes with value as the
will operates (6.43). It is now natural for Wittgenstein to conclude:

It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental. (6.421)

Thus the distinction between factual claims and evaluative claims is
transformed into a distinction between matters of fact and matters of the
transcendental will—facts *per se* have no value, thus, the world *per se*
has no value and value *per se* is not a matter of facts, thus, value *per
se* is "outside" the world.

In the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein speaks of "two godheads: the
world and my independent I"61. Using these terms, it is the second
godhead that discovers the first, thereby, bringing value into its life.
Thus, the ethical requires both godheads, but it is only the second that
lives specifically in terms of the ethical and, therefore, only the
second for whom the ethical is as such.

The first godhead cannot be compelled in any manner by the
second godhead, that is, "the world is independent of my will" (6.373)
and "even if all that I could wish for were to happen, still this would
only be a favor granted by fate, so to speak" (6.374)62. The will, then,
can only be in or out of agreement with what actually occurs in the
world. Phrasing this in the more suggestive terminology of religion: I
can either do (will) the will of God or not and, if I would be at peace
with what shall in any case occur, I must will as God wills. In other
In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that is what "being happy" means.

Thus, Wittgenstein sketches one way in which the transcendental will, while independent of the world and unable to affect what is the case, can yet will in regards to the world and thereby bring value into the world. Wittgenstein here also gives a more specific example of how the world can wax or wane as a whole, since "the world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man" (6.43). Finally, in this account can be seen how the transcendental will might be used to explain those mystical experiences which compel Wittgenstein to use value terms in their absolute sense. Both the experience of wonder and of absolute security may now be considered as the transcendental will in perfect accord with what is—the complete transcendental willing, without reservation, that what is, be—in other words, such perfect accord of the second godhead with the first that no discrepancy or distance between the two is felt. The experience of guilt, on the other hand, may now be considered as resulting from not transcendentally willing what is, or, at least, from realizing that one has not transcendentally willed what is, or, in other words, as the second godhead having become distant from the first.

Wittgenstein emphasizes the connection between the happiness won by transcendentally willing that which is and the notion of absolute value when he writes:

I keep on coming back to this! simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad. And if I now ask myself: But why should I live happily, then this of itsel seems to me a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems
that it is the only right life\textsuperscript{64}.

Thus, one simply must come to see why such happiness is crucial and absolute by living it. To justify living happily, one would need to explain or explicate the difference between living happily or not living happily. Such an explanation, cannot be given, however, because the will involved is transcendental and the change involved regards the entire character of the world as a whole. As discussed above, the transcendental will and the world as a whole are necessarily inexpressible because they are necessarily unpicturable.

What is the objective mark of the happy harmonious life? Here it is again clear that there cannot be any such mark that can be described. This mark cannot be a physical one but only a metaphysical one, a transcendental one\textsuperscript{65}.

There is, then, a "mark" of the happy or the good or the right (that is, the ethical) life despite its being inexpressible. It will be manifest throughout the ethical person's life in a different attitude toward or relationship with the entire range of the phenomenal, including, therefore, but not limited to, the ethical person's body and mind, his actions and thoughts. "The will [that is, the transcendental or ethical will] is an attitude of the subject [that is, the transcendental or willing subject] to the world\textsuperscript{66}. Thus, while, as was concluded above, "ethics cannot be put into words" (6.421), it nonetheless shows itself in a person's entire attitude toward the world, that is, it shows itself in the very nature, character or style of a person's living.

Peter Winch, in his article "Wittgenstein's Treatment of the Will", finds that some of Wittgenstein's remarks of Notebooks 4.11.16
concerning the will simply "contradict" other more prevalent remarks and, because they are inconsistent with the Tractarian view of language, are merely ignored in the Tractatus. Thus, Wittgenstein’s comment, "The fact that I will an action consists in my performing the action, not in my doing something else which causes the action" is said to be rejected by him a few lines later when he writes, "For the consideration of willing makes it look as if one part of the world were closer to me than another (which would be intolerable)." The latter remark, however, need not be interpreted as a rejection of the first but rather as a rejection of the view that "I cannot will everything" and, thus, as a development of the view that "The will is an attitude of the subject to the world." The first quotation from Notebooks 4.11.16 can be understood as simply another development of that same view concerning the will as an attitude of the subject toward the world. This contention, in turn, is still present in the Tractatus as the view that

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world... The world of the happy man is a different one from the world of the unhappy man (6.43).

The transcendental will can accompany any event in the world as a consequence of being an attitude toward the entire world. This means that it can also accompany all that is affected by the phenomenal will. I can transcendently will that the sun rise or not, just as I can transcendently will that my hand perform such and such an action or not. As Finch puts it:

The consideration that I am able to move my own body, whereas I am not, for example, able to move the sun, simply means for Wittgenstein that the factual situations are different in the two cases and this can be brought out in the description of the
two cases as something we can represent. We cannot will without acting, but this does not mean that what we try to do we can always do; it merely means that it makes no sense to talk about “trying to will.”

I can transcendentally will that the sun not rise tomorrow morning and if I am phenomenally unable to prevent that happening, I have not failed to will, although, transcendentally, I am less happy for having opposed what is. I can, on the other hand, transcendentally will that the sun should rise tomorrow and, if it does, then, transcendentally, I shall be living happily.

The deeper problem which, I believe, Winch feels lies within Wittgenstein’s account of the transcendental will is that the latter must be somehow connected with the phenomenal will:

It seems that a condition of having the [transcendental] attitude of a happy man is deciding to do certain things rather than others; and, failing an alternative account of action, this seems to reintroduce the will qua phenomenon.

This problem can be drawn out in two ways. First, there are some willed events for which I am held responsible and others for which I am not: if I will that it should rain tomorrow and it does, then I am still not held responsible, whereas, if I will that I should commit a murder and my body performs the actions leading to the death of another, then I am held responsible. Second, if I am to be content with whatever comes to pass by transcendentally willing it, then, if I do so, I shall be ethical no matter what I do phenomenally: if my body performs actions leading to the death of another and I will that it be so without feelings of guilt, then I have done nothing unethical—I shall be guilty only when and because I feel guilty.
Such criticisms, however, are misplaced. As B. F. McGuinness points out, although "ethical criticism of an action without regard to its motive will be meaningless for him [the ethical man]"76 and although "the happy man must be indifferent to the success or failure of his efforts"77, still some motives are a priori impossible for him78. For instance, Wittgenstein himself wrote: "whoever realizes this [that the "philosophical I" is not in the world] will not want to procure a pre-eminent place for his own body or for the human body79. Selfishness or ego-centricity, then, and anything following from these are simply not possible for the person who would live happily--they cannot be willed transcendentally. We are, then, indeed responsible for anything and everything that we transcendentally will and not for what actually occurs in the world but if we would have peace, there are certain things that we must and others that we cannot will. If phenomenally I perform an action that I cannot will transcendentally, for example, a murder, or do not perform an action that I must will transcendentally, for example, attempting to save a life when it is within my power to do so, then I shall have done something wrong and the wrongness shall be of my transcendental will even though the action was purely phenomenal and the willing, or lack of it, purely transcendental. Why we should strive for transcendental peace and what more precisely willing ethically means in particular circumstances, however, are inexpressible but can and must show themselves to and in the ethical person.

The ethical can, first of all, be shown by the analysis Wittgenstein gives in the Tractatus. By showing the limits of language from within, one shows what is not a sensible expression of language.
Yet by "climbing" the dialectical "ladder" that leaves one silent upon reaching the top, one sees that that about which one is silent is not nothing. In a letter to Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein wrote concerning the Tractatus that

the book is ethical . . . [and] consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and I'm convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way. In brief, I think: All that of which many are babbling today, I have defined in my book by remaining silent about it.\(^7\)

Again, however, the statements concerning ethics in the Tractatus must themselves be nonsense, albeit nonsense leading to illumination of the true ineffable nature of ethics. Accepting the view of ethics as being a matter of the transcendental will and of ethical pronouncements as being, at best, illuminating nonsense, allows a new understanding of the Tractatus as a work. It now must be seen as an effect of the transcendental will as manifested in the life of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The philosophical activity performed in that book, culminating as it does in showing the ineffable nature of ethics, must be taken as itself an example of a transcendental ethical attitude toward the world: it is itself an example of ethical action. Again, the ladder metaphor seems appropriate: first, as discussed in chapter one, we must see that which shows itself as the basis of language and the world; then, as discussed in chapter two, we realize that a philosopher had to bring us to see that which shows itself; finally, as discussed above, we see that in having been brought to see that which shows itself, an ethical action has been performed and that all along the ethical has been showing itself. The view expressed by Paul Engelmann about the Tractarian
analysis of ethics can, therefore, be applied to the *Tractatus* itself:

The view of the *Tractatus* in this respect can be summed up briefly by saying: ethical propositions do not exist; ethical action does exist.\(^1\)

The echo of this view is unmistakable when, in 1937, Wittgenstein quotes Goethe with approval: "in the beginning was the deed."\(^2\)

It is possible now to see the fallacy involved in Stenius's interpretation of Wittgenstein's closing statement in the *Tractatus*—"what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (7)—that is, that

this in not a reverence for the ineffable. It could rather be characterized as the expression of a way of escape. When Wittgenstein determined to be silent he turned away from philosophy and tried to enter an active life.\(^3\)

That Wittgenstein does feel a "reverence for the ineffable" has been defended throughout the above chapters. More importantly, for Wittgenstein, philosophy proper is an activity manifesting the ethical and, thus, is not opposed to an active life but is simply one way of acting ethically. With such a view of philosophy and of ethics one would, moreover, expect Wittgenstein to manifest the ethical in other ways in his life—this would not be "turning away from" but, to the contrary, the fulfillment of the views expressed in the *Tractatus*\(^4\).

It is in living one's life, then, that the ethical is primarily shown. Due to the relation of the will to the world as a whole, the entire quality of one's life/world must take on a special character. One's specific actions are, then, ethical because they are, as it were, "products" of this ethical living. Still, one might come to understand some particular action as ethical and, thereby, come to appreciate the
quality, the particular relation of the will to the world, that characterizes the life incorporating the action. The writing of the \textit{Tractatus} would be one such action but there could be others.

Issuing a command to perform one action rather than another might bring one to see the ethical. Such an "ethical law" cannot, of course, be justified, for reasons discussed above. As Wittgenstein puts it: "when an ethical law of the form, 'Thou shalt ..., ' is laid down, one's first thought is, 'And what if I do not do it?" (6.422). No sensible answer could be given to the latter question. Nonetheless, one might come to see the changed relation of the will to the world that entails such a "law" and, thus, learn to see the ethical. In the \textit{Notebooks}, for instance, Wittgenstein commands, "Live happily!" after a dialectical discussion of ethics: to ask here, "And what if I do not?", would not be answerable but would be an indication that one has not yet come to see the view of life emerging in the discussion and manifesting as that command.

Ethics can also be shown by example. Besides the example, of course, provided by one's own life, art can produce illustrations of the ethical--although the principle regarding examples from life and from art is the same. Examples can show the ethical due to the direct connection Wittgenstein finds between art, life and ethics. In the \textit{Notebooks} Wittgenstein writes:

\begin{quote}
The work of art is the object seen \textit{sub specie aeternitatis}; and the good life is the world seen \textit{sub specie aeternitatis}. This is the connexion between art and ethics.\end{quote}

In the \textit{Tractatus}, Wittgenstein writes that "to view the world \textit{sub specie aeterni} is to view it as a whole--a limited whole" and, as mentioned
earlier, the latter is said to be mystical (6.45). The particular aesthetic "object" viewed *sub specie aeternitatis* can be a particular item, action or set of actions. Seen in this fashion, however, the particular item, action or actions are seen with their "whole world as background" (67). When the whole world is seen implicitly as background, the possibility of thematizing and, thus, explicitly seeing it, too, *sub specie aeternitatis* is created. Thus, seeing a particular item, action or set of actions "in light of eternity", that is, as an aesthetic object, allows seeing the entire world of which that object is a part "in light of eternity", that is, as mystical. An illustration of ethical action can, therefore, be persuasive because of the entire attitude and world view which the illustration can spawn. In this connection, Engelmann reports that Wittgenstein felt unreserved admiration and respect for Tolstoy, at least when I knew him. Among Tolstoy's writings he had an especially high regard for *The Gospel In Brief* and the Folk Tales.88

The connection between art and ethics, however, allows for a still more immediate communication of the ethical than just the illustration of ethical action. It can also directly communicate a sense of the mystical and, therefore, of ethical life. This manner of showing the ethical is expressed in Wittgenstein's reaction to the poem "Graf Eberhards Weissdorn" by Ludwig Uhland:

The poem by Uhland is really magnificent. And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be--unutterably--*contained* in what has been uttered! 89

Here what is said does not merely illustrate but "contains" the ethical.
The suggestion, too, is that only "really magnificent" art can do this. Engelmann feels that "the poem as a whole gives in 28 lines the picture of a life" and testifies that Wittgenstein "shared my reaction". Such art seems to make such a smooth transition from viewing an object or action sub specie aeternitatis to viewing a life sub specie aeternitatis that the transition from art to ethics is inescapable: if one appreciates the art work, then the mystical and, hence, the ethical shall be seen. Such art must be very economical in style, so as not to attract more attention to itself than to its point, yet must be skillfully executed with its point clearly in the artist's mind. A "truly magnificent" work of art, therefore, will be akin to Wittgenstein's own Tractatus, having such a deliberate transparency toward the ethical that its very composition can be recognized as an example of ethical action even if, as such, it contains no explicit example of ethical action.

The ethical, then, is shown primarily in the living of one's life and, consequently, in the actions that are produced by that life. Actions can be deliberately carried out so as to show the ethical to another. Such self-conscious exemplary activity can take the direct form of the performance of some deed, such as, perhaps, a rich man's son giving away his inheritance and becoming a school teacher, or it can manifest in the creation of some "work" which shows the ethical. The work may be philosophical, bringing an interlocutor to see what ethics is not and, therefore, guiding the latter to see what ethics must be, or the work may be the postulation of ethical commands, the following of which might bring the interlocutor to see why the commanded action is necessary, or the work may be artistic, presenting objects in such a
manner that, when understood correctly, they allow the ethical to be seen with varying degrees of directness and intensity. If language is used in this activity of showing, however, it produces what is literally nonsense. Even if a genuine proposition appears, moreover, it, as such, does not show the ethical. Rather, it is only the activity or work as a whole, of which that proposition is a part, that shows the ethical. For instance, it is the poem as a whole which shows the ethical, not one of its lines which incidentally is meaningful as a proposition. The ethical point of the activity or work is not *per se* expressible but must be seen or caught on to within the activity or work which exemplifies it.

Catching on to the point of an example, however, is a form of showing that is related to the showing itself of logical form, that is, the showing that is the basis of the picture theory of the proposition, only through the philosophical activity of showing and in that no manner of showing can be said. The picture theory of the proposition, in placing value "outside" of the world, together with Wittgenstein's mystical certainty concerning the reality of value, has, thereby, forced the postulation of a new concept of showing of that which cannot be said. It was already implicated in the nature of philosophical elucidation which utilized that which shows itself as the basis of language and pseudo-propositions to bring an interlocutor to "see the world aright". With the showing of the ethical, a concept of showing has fully emerged that is detachable from, though compatible with, the concept of showing that is the basis of the Tractarian analysis of language. New possibilities are, thus, created.

The notion that, because it is somehow real, value must be
transcendental was forced by the only interpretation of the fact/value distinction which the Tractarian analysis of language would allow. Consequently, the concept that ethics is transcendental, that it is a matter of the transcendental will, does not emerge from Wittgenstein's sense of the ethical, as such, but only from the latter in light of his analysis of language. Further, neither the fact/value distinction as such nor the showing of the ethical require the notion of the transcendental. Thus, on the one hand, all talk of the transcendental must be considered nonsensical, due to the Tractarian analysis of language, and, on the other hand, no talk of the transcendental is necessary for showing or seeing the ethical. As early as January 1, 1918, before the publication of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein, in a letter to Engelmann in which he discusses his own ethical state, writes:

I shall either remain a swine or else I shall improve, and that's that! Only let's cut out the transcendental twaddle when the whole thing is as plain as a sock on the jaw.  

This, at least implicit, recognition that the concept of the transcendental adds nothing to the lived reality of the ethical, that it can, therefore, be "cut out" of the discussion and the matter will remain as plain as before, again opens new possibilities.

One of the new possibilities is that, with a concept of showing that is separable from the picture theory of meaning and with the possibility of "bracketing" the transcendental in regards to ethics, it should be possible to draw out the implications of Wittgenstein's mysticism, that is, to analyze the distinction between factual claims and evaluative claims and, thereby, account for the ethico-religious, without mention of the transcendental will. In some of Wittgenstein's later
writings this is precisely what occurs. This means not only that there is a definite continuity within Wittgenstein's views on the ethical but that one formulation of the distinction between showing and saying, namely, ineffably showing the ethical in one's life acts and works, survives from the earliest to the latest of Wittgenstein's writings and is central to their being properly understood.

In 1950, the year before Wittgenstein's death, he wrote what is clearly a more mature statement of the same views expressed in the *Notebooks* of 1916 and "A Lecture on Ethics" of 1930 concerning how the concept of God arises. It is, thus, an expression of that which in the *Tractatus* was called "the mystical".

Life can educate one to a belief in God. And experiences too are what bring this about; but I don't mean visions and other forms of sense experience which show us the "existence of this being", but, e.g., sufferings of various sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows us an object, nor do they give rise to conjectures about him. Experiences, thoughts,--life can force this concept on us. Other experiences forcing this concept upon us could as well be the feelings of wonder, of absolute security and of guilt. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein suggests that we might feel "astonishment at the fact that we agreed [in some calculation]" and adds that "we might give thanks to the Deity for our agreement". Whatever the experience that becomes important for us, the essential thing, as before, is that our experience of the world forces us to use a terminology that is not descriptive of specific "sense impressions", that is, a terminology in which we try to speak of the world as a whole as having some sense or some value. Moreover, there is something immediate and non-speculative about this sense of value and, therefore, about our
use of this terminology.

In a passage cited earlier and also written in 1950,

Wittgenstein discusses the belief in God as "a certain craving" and as "expressing an attitude to all [causal] explanations".97

Someone may for instance say it's a very grave
matter that such and such a man should have died before he could complete a certain piece of work; and yet, in another sense, this is not what matters. At this point one uses the words "in a deeper sense".98

Thus, still there is a dichotomy between "causal explanations", that is, what would earlier have been called statements of fact, and expressions of an "attitude" of "craving" which is distinct from, though related to, such causal explanations, that is, expressions of value.

The distinction between ethico-religious expressions and scientific propositions is also made in the 1938 "Lectures on Religious Belief". Wittgenstein writes that even if, for instance, someone could make definite and certain statements describing the future and so could forecast "some sort of a Judgement Day", still accepting such statements as true would not of itself be religious belief. To the religious attitude, "the best scientific evidence is just nothing".99 Religious belief is not a matter of opinion, hypothesis, probability or knowing100, thus, it is quite different than science.

There is now, however, a manner in which statements of religious belief or, more generally, any statements concerning a deeper sense to the world, any expression of value, can be recognized as distinct from science without either abandoning them or explaining them in terms of the transcendental. They can be directly explained in terms of showing the ethical in the living of one's life.
Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a Last Judgement? But I couldn't say "Yes" or "No" to the statement that there will be such a thing. Nor "Perhaps", nor "I'm not sure". It is a statement which may not allow of any such answer.

As Wittgenstein wrote several years later, in 1950: "the words you utter or what you think as you utter them are not what matters, so much as the difference they make at various points in your life." As in the earlier writings, though words may be used when expressing the ethical, they are merely part of the activity of living in a certain manner and it is the particular character of the overall life that truly matters.

The important question regarding expression of religious belief and, hence, of value is: "how is this manifested in his [the believer's] life?" The year before his death Wittgenstein is, therefore, expressing the same thought regarding the ethico-religious as was expressed twenty years earlier in a 1930 conversation with Friedrich Waismann:

Is speech essential for religion? I can quite well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrines, and hence nothing is said. Obviously the essence of religion can have nothing to do with the fact that speech occurs--or rather: if speech does occur, this itself is a component of religious behavior and not a theory.

That the meaning of life, the reality of value in the world, in short, the ethical, is not essentially a matter of language, that insofar as language is used in its expression it is used quite differently than in the scientific reporting of facts, and that, therefore, expressing the ethical can never be a science, does mean that the essence of ethics is inexpressible in scientific propositions but this now does not, in turn, mean that the essence of ethics is transcendentally "outside" the world.
The ineffability of ethics can now be understood in a manner that avoids all philosophical problems regarding the postulation of a transcendental will and the relation of the latter to action within the world. Ethics is ineffable in that it is essentially a matter of action, of living one's life in a certain way, and in that, even when language is used, that language must be understood as an action and as an aspect of a certain way of living. Ethics is ineffable in that it is not essentially a matter of description or theory and, consequently, is distinct from science where these linguistic practices are essential. Finally, then, ethics is ineffable in that it is essentially non-scientific—it cannot be done as or replaced by a scientific description or theory of the ethical, despite its reality and centrality to human life.

Placing emphasis upon the act of showing the ethical in one's life and understanding the ineffability of ethics in those terms has another important consequence. It becomes apparent that even the mystical attitude, allowing an individual to find meaning in life and to live ethically, becomes inseparable from its manifestation in that person's life and actions. Although "experiences" can teach one to believe in God, that is, can make one's life as a whole wax with meaning, and although "sound [religious] doctrines are all useless," that is, linguistic expressions of religion are not essential to it, still that one has learnt to believe in God, that one's life has waxed with meaning, requires that one manifest this in his or her life: "you have to change your life (Or the direction of your life)." This underlines, I believe, the crucial point available with the advent of the
notion of showing the ethical in one's life and actions. It is not simply that the ethical can be shown in one's life, but that it must be shown in one's life. Further, the ethical must be shown not merely because this is the only manner in which the transcendental ethical will can manifest itself. Rather, the ethical must be shown because of its "existential" urgency and reality: if the ethical does not show itself in one's life, then one is simply not ethical. Thus the notion of the transcendental will not only can be bracketed because the ethical can be shown and always is shown but it can be bracketed because the ethical must be shown. The transcendental will is not only unnecessary but it is insufficient while the act of showing is not only sufficient, it is necessary for ethics. The "subject's inward (ethical) attitude towards the world which receives its expression in praxis"108 is only important insofar as it does receive "expression in praxis". The showing of the ethical in one's life becomes more important than and becomes the criterion for identifying the presence of the "subject's inward attitude" rather than vice versa.

This understanding of the importance of showing the ethical in one's life makes problematic the understanding of another early observed phenomenon, namely, that which "A Lecture on Ethics" considered "a certain characteristic misuse of our language" in regards to "all ethical and religious expressions"109 and which the Tractatus considered to be nonsense. Exactly because there are "certain characteristic" expressions of language embedded in and recognizable as a part of a certain characteristic way of living, it is no longer clear why they should be labeled a "misuse" of language or "nonsense". If one can catch on to the
point of a certain example, action, command or work of art, and can come to understand the life that requires that example, act, command or work of art that is, the sense or meaning of the latter, one seems called to recognize that one also catches on to the point of those "certain characteristic" linguistic expressions of the ethico-religious life. Though they are part of a certain form of life, they can be understood in terms of the living enactment of that life. Though they are not scientific propositions, they need not claim to be such and it becomes less important to judge them against the latter. That a religious utterance, for example, makes no sense as a scientific proposition or hypothesis and is not intended to be taken as such, does not of itself mean that the utterance is nonsense, for one may be able to catch on to the point of the remark in the context of a religious life.

It [religion] gesticulates with words, as one might say, because it wants to say something and does not know how to express it. Practice gives the words their sense.

Thus, the "pressure" mentioned in chapter two, which was placed upon the Tractarian concept of sense by the notion of illuminating nonsense, becomes critical with the postulation of showing the ethical via particular actions exemplifying and manifesting a way of living. While the showing itself of logical form, the basis of the notion of sense as analyzed in the Tractatus, is that which first suggested, made possible and, for Wittgenstein, necessitated the type of showing discussed in the present chapter, the latter contains the seeds of an idea that can grow to rival the very analysis that gave it birth. As will be discussed in the following chapter, however, this latter notion
of showing need not so much replace its older rival as lead to a new understanding of it. The latter notion of showing can take the former up into itself and arrive at a deeper understanding of that which shows itself as the basis of language.
CHAPTER FOUR

THAT WHICH IS SHOWN IN A FORM OF LIFE

The mystical must make itself manifest (6.522) yet the mystical is not an object (or objects) and is not a logical form (or forms). The mystical shows itself in a manner quite distinct from the manner in which the world and logic show themselves. The mystical, which is the source of the ethical and the religious, shows itself in the being of the world as "a limited whole" (6.44 and 6.45). The ethico-religious, therefore, shows itself in the life of the "mystically happy" person as the world for him waxes with meaning (6.43). As a consequence, something inexpressible can be shown by the activity of philosophy, by commands, by examples and by "magnificent" works of art. That which is nonsense on the analysis of language given in the Tractatus is able to show that which is most important. Moreover, it can do so without recourse to the transcendental. Thus, if the naive notion of a transcendental logic simply showing itself as the basis of sense and the paradoxical notion that that which is nonsense can yet be illuminating together form a major challenge to the Tractarian account of sense, the Tractarian implication that the ethical can be shown in one's life and action already implicitly contains a response to that challenge.

First, therefore, it is necessary to sketch in general the type of response to that challenge which can be drawn out of the latter account of showing. Second, Wittgenstein's later writings on language
must be examined in order to compare the analysis of language therein with the former "sketch", that is, in order to find traces of a showing of that which cannot be said as the basis of language. Finally, then, it will be concluded that, in Wittgenstein's later writings, language is indeed made possible by that which is shown, that this account of showing is identical with the last discussed Tractarian account of showing and that, therefore, the later analysis of that which is shown as the basis of language is a critical development within, but not a conceptual break with, the earlier analysis of that which is shown as the basis of language.

The response to the aforementioned challenge to the Tractarian analysis made available with the concept of showing discussed in chapter three concerns a new way of understanding how that which is shown as a propositional sign can become meaningful and, thus, be used to say something. This response has two aspects. First, the latest concept of showing makes a new understanding of language possible. Second, the latest Tractarian concept of showing forces a re-evaluation of the earliest concept of showing and, thus, in itself poses the very challenge to the Tractarian analysis of language raised above. The response now available to the above mentioned challenge is, therefore, both to make a new understanding of language possible and to make one necessary.

If nonsensical pseudo-propositions, illustrative examples and activities that are not at all linguistic can show that which is of most importance, then language and, a fortiori, the internal structure of linguistic utterances is not, of itself, the essence or source of our ability to communicate a point. That linguistic signs in general are
able to communicate a point can, therefore, be accounted for without considering their internal structure. The detailed analysis of the propositional sign as picture which Wittgenstein carried out in the Tractatus, consequently, becomes redundant. All that is of the essence of the ability to communicate is that the interlocutors understand the point of each other's actions—each seeing that which the other sees. Thus, this concept of showing allows the meaningfulness of linguistic signs to be accounted for by their having a point which others can catch on to in a particular context, if they would live and relate to the world in the same manner as the one issuing the linguistic sign. The one issuing the linguistic sign, of course, if he would have the sign make a point, that is, become meaningful, must issue it with at least tacit awareness of the particular context and of the manner in which those with whom he would communicate live and relate to the world. Effective communication, therefore, can serve as the paradigm for saying something and, thus, for making sense: the proposition need no longer be considered the quintessential linguistic form. Moreover, a proposition itself will make sense when, given the appropriate context of action and circumstances (besides, of course, the context of other similarly sensible propositions), it can be used to communicate, that is, used to say something to another. A sense must be shown by the proposition having made some point, served some purpose or so on in the lives of the interlocutors.

The concept of showing which grows out of Wittgenstein's view of ethics, however, does more than simply provide the basis for an alternative to the analysis of language developed in the Tractatus.
Rather, it provides the basis for a critique of that analysis, forcing it to develop toward a deepened understanding of that which shows itself. This deepened understanding of that which shows itself, moreover, dovetails nicely with the above mentioned "alternative" analysis of language.

As discussed in chapter one, the Tractarian analysis of language ultimately rests on the assumption that logical form, the form of reality, can simply display itself unequivocally to any "logical experiencer", that a single determinate logical form can be seen in the structure of the propositional sign and in the structure of the depicted state of affairs. Also as discussed in chapter one, this assumption requires extending the concepts of "showing" and "seeing" from the literal, straightforward sense in which a propositional sign is perceptible and, therefore, is "seen" to "show itself", to the metaphorical sense in which a propositional sign is understood as having a logical form and, therefore, that logical form is "seen" to "show itself". How exactly a single determinate logical form shows itself in a propositional sign and in some quite distinct state of affairs is not accounted for by Wittgenstein's introduction of "rules of projection".

The concept of showing emerging from the discussion of ethics allows an accounting of the showing itself of logical form in terms of being able to catch on to that which human beings do with the perceived facts, such as the perceived propositional signs. The very notion of logical form as the self-showing internal structure of a proposition which allows it to have sense thus ceases to have an explanatory value and need no longer be postulated. It is not that the sign in itself is
essentially univocal nor that an essentially univocal rule of projection obviates the potential ambiguities of the sign and makes an inherent logical form manifest. Rather, the human community using the signs to communicate some aspect of its life uses the signs with a regularity recognizable by them. The resulting syntax of the signs will be describable by the community as being rule governed, should the community attempt to give voice to the regularity they find in their use of the signs. To that community, then, the logic of their propositional signs and the logic of the states of affairs of which they speak will show itself in a more or less straightforward, unequivocal fashion but only because of the deeper showing itself of the point of the regularity of those signs in their lives. The latter showing will be made possible first of all because the members of the community will be educated in the use of the signs but ultimately because of the common humanity of the community members which places them in implicit agreement and common understanding.

Paradoxically, this account lends justification to extending the senses of "seeing" and "showing" from the literal to the metaphorical. In whatever manner perception and perceptible actually occur in the "literal" sense, the "metaphorical" seeing and showing of the logic of language and the world must, for initiated members of the community, be exactly similar—just as unequivocal and obvious—as their perception of the propositional sign and of the state of affairs of which they speak using the propositional sign. The concept of showing emerging from the discussion of ethics emphasized the importance of metaphor in showing through examples and works of art. That the very concept of
showing is now understood as itself metaphorical for an otherwise more elusive notion is not, then, an objection.

This view of the showing itself of logic, however, requires a different understanding of the relationship between a proposition and the world than the "picture theory" of the Tractatus provides. Since the showing itself of logic to a linguistic community is made possible by the activity of that community, the key of interpretation for an individual proposition will not now be a matter of associating its names with objects and its internal relations with the internal relations of the pictured state of affairs. Instead, the key of interpretation will ultimately be embodied in the entire life and linguistic habits of the community using the individual propositions and allowing them to understand the point of its being issued in some particular context. If a picture of the world is created, it will be created primarily by the totality of action and linguistic habit in which the particular proposition appears and only secondarily supported by and reflected in the particular proposition. Consequently, the "substantial objects" discussed in the second part of chapter one are not necessitated by language per se, as it is not each proposition taken individually which must be isomorphic with the world and as the sense of the proposition is embedded in the activity of the community using it, not directly in the natural world.

The above-mentioned alternative, to the analysis of language given in the Tractatus here coalesces with the deepened understanding of how that which in the Tractatus is said to show itself does indeed come to show itself. Thus, a critical development within the Tractarian
analysis is made possible by the concept of showing made available with Wittgenstein's views on the ethical, which latter views are implicit within that original Tractarian analysis. That that which was already available in the early writings was realized in Wittgenstein's later writings can be demonstrated by examining the central concepts of that view of language in terms of the distinction between showing and saying.

In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein is again concerned with revealing the manner in which language functions. At one point, he employs the same metaphor which he had employed in the *Tractatus* to clarify the problem we encounter with language: the reason that "we remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity" of language uses and, thus, oblivious to the actuality of language is that "the clothing of our language makes everything alike". Consequently, we must not be deceived by the "outward form of the clothing" into misunderstanding the actual movements of the living body inside its familiar guise.

Wittgenstein, therefore, distinguishes the surface grammar from the depth grammar of our language: to reveal the actual operation of language is to reveal its depth grammar.

Wittgenstein here searches for the depth grammar in a different manner than in the *Tractatus*. Rather than beginning with the apparent paradigm of language, that is, the proposition, and then attempting to deduce what must be the case in order for that paradigm to work, he will begin with actual instances of language and simply observe what is the case as it works. As Wittgenstein contrasts the two approaches:

The more narrowly we observe actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it an our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of
investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty.--We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk; so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!3

The "rough ground", of course, consists of actual instances of language use. The question for investigation becomes: how do we ordinarily use language meaningfully?

For an investigation of the "rough ground" of language, the above question contains its own answer. The key is that ordinarily we use language and gauge its meaningfulness by its usefulness. If someone goes to a grocery store and orders five red apples, then the words "five red apples" will have proved meaningful when and if the transaction with the grocer is successful--if, that is, the grocer knows what to do upon perceiving those particular signs and his actions result in that which the customer wanted accomplished by using those words.4 That the words in the statement mention, respectively, a number, a quality and physical objects is, of course, essential for the meaning of the statement but only because the customer and the grocer require those particular words of one another in order to understand how precisely they are to accomplish a task. Analyzing the statement into its components will not explain what the statement means to its users. On the contrary, only understanding what the statement means to its users will explain what the components of the statement are. If the grocer does not know how to use the word "five", then even if he is able to categorize it as a number, others, such as his customer, will not say he knows the meaning of the word. If, however, he does know how to use the word in a transaction,
then, even if it does not occur to him to categorize it as a number, others, such as his customer, will be satisfied that he knows the meaning of "five". No matter what images, thoughts or feelings one may have upon perceiving an utterance, the key to understanding it as a meaningful statement is understanding it as a useful statement. Wittgenstein concludes:

For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

The question now becomes: how is the use of a linguistic utterance circumscribed so that it might be both universal enough for the utterance to apply in very different situations and specific enough for the utterance to be exactly applied in some particular situation? How, then, does someone know and understand the use of a linguistic expression? The definition of meaning as use has not yet revealed the depth grammar of language but it continues to point the direction for inquiry.

Wittgenstein introduces the concept of a "language-game" to emphasize the dynamic, interactive and human character of language implied by the insight that meaning is use. Language is learnt as though one were learning a game and words are used in ordinary situations much as they are used as part of a game. Thus, the term "language-game" refers to primitive, child-like languages from which we can learn much concerning actual everyday language and refers, as well, to the dynamic aspect of language appropriation. Finally, then, "language-game" refers to "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven". A particular linguistic expression, therefore, is coined as part of an entire language-game: it is learnt and used along with and as
part of a larger context of human activity. The meaning of a linguistic expression is caught up with and inseparable from an entire body of purposeful human activity that circumscribes it. Understanding the use of a linguistic expression entails understanding the language-game of which it is a part. Revealing the depth grammar of language will, therefore, require revealing how a language-game is "played".

It might seem that the obvious characteristic of a language-game is that it is played according to rules which govern the syntax, semantics and even pragmatics of the language. The language user, then, will know how to use a term when he understands the rules governing it. These various rules for the various uses of different linguistic expressions, consequently, constitute the depth grammar of a language. The surface grammar of a language will, then, be the apparent rule for the use of a term which, due to the variety of possible rules, may or may not be the actual rule for the normal use of the term and, thus, may or may not result in linguistic confusion. While, on the one hand, this observation concerning the rule-governed nature of language games seems undeniable for most of language, on the other hand, even disregarding the large number of exceptions to linguistic rules which yet offer a language-user little or no trouble in practice, the very notion of "following a rule" is problematic. How does one correctly follow a rule in his use of language?

A field which is completely rule governed, where there are no exceptions to the rules, would appear to be the field of mathematics. A simple example of the ruled use of an expression from mathematics, then, should be able to reveal what it means to follow a rule or to fail to
follow one. Wittgenstein, therefore, discusses how one continues a number series. His method is to consider one possible account of the "ruled-ness" of the continuation, find problems with that account, consider another and so on until, by understanding what is not the case in following a rule, we understand what is the case. Saul Kripke, in discussing this, uses the complementary method of introducing a radical sceptic who attacks and attempts to undermine every account of ruled behavior, thereby creating a dilemma which he finally proceeds to resolve.

Simply copying signs, for example, "1", "2", "3", "4" and such is not what is meant by "knowing" or "understanding" a number series. Further, even continuing the series on one's own to any given point is not, of itself, what is meant by understanding the series. Rather, as Wittgenstein says, we have some sense that any particular copy of the series is only an instantiation, a product, of our understanding; somehow "the understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use". The question, then, becomes: what can this "understanding" or "knowledge" consist in so as to function as a "source"?

One possible answer is that understanding a number series and knowing how to continue it is a mental disposition. In the past, one has only described finite portions of a number series a finite number of times. In one's mind, however, might be a particular disposition that allows one to take up the series anew and continue it indefinitely at any time.

Several considerations argue against the dispositional theory. First, how could such a disposition include numbers too large for a human
being to comprehend or a length of the number series too long for one to
complete in a lifetime? Such numbers and such a length of the series is
consistent with, even entailed by, the series as meant yet is beyond the
capability of our mental dispositions. Kripke's sceptic will simply
claim that we cannot know that the series should be continued one way
rather than another given numbers sufficiently large and a series segment
sufficiently long.

It also will not do to say that we could continue the series
if our lifetime and brain capacity were increased infinitely. This is an
argument from ignorance (we do not know what would happen if this
impossible condition were filled) and begs the question (the sceptic is
exactly claiming that "continuing the series" for such numbers and at
such lengths might mean something different than for smaller numbers and
segments)\(^10\).

Another problem for the dispositional theory lies in its
inability to account for the difference between a systematically
committed error in and the correct continuation of the number series. If
we have a disposition to continue the series in a particular fashion,
then that fashion should (by definition) be the correct one. This,
however, is not actually the case. It is, of course, circular to say
that one must be disposed to continue the series \textbf{correctly}, in the
fashion \textbf{originally meant}, since it is the very concepts "correctly" and
"originally meant" that were to be explained via dispositions\(^11\).

Finally, then, the real mistake of the dispositional account is
clarified: it misses the point which Wittgenstein seeks to understand and
which Kripke's sceptic challenges as unjustified. It is not a question
of whether and how we are disposed to continue the series in actuality but rather why we should continue the series in precisely one particular manner—the correct manner.

Another possible explanation of how understanding might function as the source for the generation of a number series is that we might understand and, thereby, possess a formula from which the series results.

Again, however, the attempted explanation fails. We might indeed derive a formula characterizing the series but in order to do so we must first know the series meant. Not only will different formulas result in different series, but one and the same set of signs, said to be "the formula", may be systematically interpreted in different ways resulting in different series. Thus, to have the formula, we must first have the meant series to derive it from (not vice versa) and, further, we must know how the formula is to be meant so as to correspond to the meant series. The question remains: why is that, and only that, the correct continuation of the series and why are those signs to be taken to mean that, and only that, series?

As Kripke points out, considerations of theoretical simplicity are not relevant either. Simplicity can be appealed to in choosing one theory over another in order to explain some given fact in the "neatest" way possible. With the continuation of a number series, however, either there is no given fact whatsoever to be explained or it is the characterization of the "fact" itself which is in dispute. The Kripkean sceptic is not simply saying that we do not know how to continue the series in the proper way, but rather that there is no proper way.
could, he challenges, continue the series in any manner and, post factum, make that the "proper" way.

A final common explanation as to how our understanding is the source of a number series, one implicit within the preceding appeal to simplicity, is the appeal to intuition or inner experience as providing the certainty, the indisputable fact, underlying the series. On this account, one is guided in continuing the number series by a direct experience of knowing that which comes next: one intuits that 4 goes after 3, that 5 goes after 4, and so on and, therefore, writes "4" after "3", "5" after "4", etcetera.

Again, there are problems. Wittgenstein observes that it is only after we have completed the action that we speak of an experience of "having been guided" through the act. Retrospectively, we think that we must have been guided by some "ethereal" intuition but in performing the act, we do not actually refer to a preceding experience which tells us what to do--we simply act, albeit in a "guided fashion". The question of how we act in a "guided fashion" without a prior experience that guides us is, then, still open.

Kripke adds that even if there were some introspective experience accompanying the act, it would necessarily be inefficacious: we would require yet another experience revealing how the first is to be interpreted so as to guide us; then, a third to empower the second to guide us with the first; ad infinitum. To put it another way, if we did have some intuition, why would we call it, for instance, the intuition of 4--what would justify connecting that experience with future acts of properly writing "4" under certain circumstances and not under
others? Something else again would have to guide us in the interpretation and use of those intuitions.

The basic mistake of the experientialist is like that of the dispositionalist: even if his claims were true, his argument would not answer the crucial question. The experiences which we actually do have may not be the experiences which we should have—the manner in which we actually do understand the experiences we have may not be the manner in which we should understand them.

Wittgenstein’s “negative” analysis, telling us what is not the case, has now had at least one positive result: it has clarified the point that to understand the use of a term means to understand how one ought to use it, not simply how one does use it or “feels inclined” to use it or such. Understanding a term, then, means filling some normative requirement. For an individual speaker, use is normative, prescriptive, and only consequently descriptive.

A further example from Wittgenstein clarifies the point that expectational requirements must be met for a term to have meaning and demonstrates that this is accomplished by fulfilling public criteria. What conditions must be filled for it to be properly said that a person is reading (out loud)?

As Wittgenstein comments:

we are tempted to say: the one real criterion for anybody reading is the conscious act of reading.

Two counter-examples suggest, however, that consciousness is not a necessary or a sufficient condition here. First, if a person follows the printed words on a page with his eyes and makes the "proper"
intelligible sounds, then we would say that he is reading even if, for some reason, his own sensation were that "of saying something he has learnt by heart" (that is, consciousness is not necessary). Second, if a person looked at a series of arbitrary marks on paper and accompanied this with particular sounds, we would likely not say that he was genuinely reading even though he had the sensation of reading those sounds "off of" the marks (that is, consciousness is not sufficient). Thus, somehow it is the behavior itself, not the individual's conscious states, that constitute reading--any conscious states must themselves be judged as belonging to actual acts of reading or not and, therefore, they cannot be the criteria by which those acts themselves are judged.

Genuine reading might also be characterized as occurring when the sound is "derived from" the writing. If this sense of derivation is construed causally--if, that is, we feel that the physical letters somehow draw the sounds from us, and even if the caused-sound is taken as simultaneous with the cause-letter--then, an empirical claim is made that is simply not true: we do not feel the sound as an effect of the read letter when engaged in an act of reading. Further, since any physical sign could be used to correspond with any physical sound, even if the relation of cause and effect were seen as applicable, then we would still need to know how this particular sign came to cause this particular sound--which is the real point in question here.

The notion of derivation as such, however, is important and revealing. To describe the act of reading, it seems we are forced to say such things as: the words "come of themselves," the letters and sounds, the words, are "familiar" to us, we make particular sounds
"automatically" upon seeing certain signs, the eye scans the page "with a particular ease" and "involuntary speech goes on in the imagination". Again, there is the sense of having been guided but, as already argued, the final criteria for judging that the reader actually was guided and his having of that "sense" actually justified, are his overt, essentially public action—not his inner, essentially private dispositions or experiences. "Derivation", therefore, must itself be an essentially public activity—one justified by, redeemed as meaningful by, essentially public standards or expectations.

I say "essentially public" and not simply "public" so as to include cases of reading where there is no actual audience. In such cases, an audience could have been present and, ultimately, it is the possibility that such an audience could have been appealed to which determines that reading was actually being done in solitude. The case is still more complicated, however, since a person could, and normally does, function as his own "audience" when he is alone. The individual as audience, though, will need to judge himself as "performer" in precisely the same way, with reference to the same overt criteria, which any other would use to judge him or which he would use to judge any other.

This is the key difference between Wittgenstein's account and the previous views: while those assumed that the individual's self-understanding was obviously primary and were thrown into conundrums when attempting to understand that self-understanding, Wittgenstein finds, upon analyzing their puzzles, that the criteria for understanding are necessarily public, the human "agreement" must, therefore, be primary and that individual self-understanding is, then, a non-puzzling particular
instance of public agreement. The solution to what Kripke has called "the Wittgensteinian Paradox"—"no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action could be made to accord with the rule"—lies, therefore, in the public agreement aspect of following a rule. People behave in a certain manner and prescribe and reinforce that behavior for one another. Thus, in retrospect, a rule can be discovered but this rule can only exist and have unequivocal meaning for those concerned because they first know and agree on how they ought to behave.

A language-game, then, even insofar as it can be described in terms of rules is not explained by them. That the potential equivocality of a rule, when considered on its own, is not realized due to the disambiguating primacy of communal activity demonstrates that it is the fulfillment of normative criteria which ultimately circumscribes use. The actuality of communal behavioral criteria constitutes a rule and, in a search for the depth grammar of a language-game, the rule serves to indicate the primacy of those criteria and, therefore, of communal activity. Above, a language-game was said to be played as an inseparable part of the larger drama of purposeful human activity. Now it becomes clear that the depth grammar of a language-game, the meaning (that is, use) of the expressions in a language-game, must finally be explicated in terms of publically available criteria, the establishment, promulgation and fulfillment of which are purposeful human acts and, therefore, woven into the entire fabric of human life.

Understanding the depth grammar of a statement means understanding the use of the statement which, in turn, means, among other
things, understanding the criteria for use of the statement. The linguistic thematization of the use of language according to criteria constitutes depth grammatical rules for the language. Hence, the source of confusion over language being bounded by rules: practice is primary and rules grow from it, yet the rules are the formulation of the practice and, thus, appear constitutive of the language; although the rules are, in effect, descriptive of practice, the practice itself has norms, thus, the rules appear prescriptive. What, then, is the true status of remarks concerning criteria?

John Canfield has argued convincingly that criteria are definitive of, rather than evidence for, that of which they are the criteria, that is, the actualization of the criteria is logically decisive in determining that an expression has been correctly used. For instance, if a person performs the activity we consider "correctly continuing a number series", then, by definition, it is correct to say of him that he "understands the series" and, by definition, he "knows (at least for that context) the meaning of the signs involved". If a person fulfills the behavioral criteria for reading, then, by definition, it is correct to say of him that he is "reading", by definition, he "knows how to read". As Wittgenstein puts it: "grammar tells what kind of object anything is".

This does not mean simply identifying that of which something is the criterion with some one specific criterion. In Canfield's words:

One of the main points of Wittgenstein's discussion is to show that there is not one thing and, in particular, not one mental event that we would call "expecting B to tea." There is rather a vast family of sets of activities and events, any of which would, correctly, be called "expecting B to tea".
Any specific member of the criteria family is sufficient and at least one is necessary in order to define the presence of that "object" for which the family serves as criteria. The criteria are nonetheless definitive, however, since when one criterion is met, it is logically true that that "object" is present.

Moreover, a definition can be amended with extra stipulations so that what had been a criterion no longer is one. As Canfield points out, this is in keeping with Wittgenstein's observation that a criterion can become a mere symptom of that for which it had been a criterion, since, when the old unamended criterion is met, it might still suggest, albeit inconclusively, that that of which it had been a criterion could be present.34

Grammatical remarks, therefore, describe that which makes the language what it is for those who use it. Thus, like the propositions of logic in the *Tractatus*, they describe the logic of the language of which they are the grammar. Similar to the "scaffolding" of language shown by the propositions of logic, the agreement described by grammatical rules is referred to as "part of the framework on which the working of our language is based".35 Grammatical remarks, then, in a certain manner also "show" the structure of our language. There is, however, a crucial difference: grammatical remarks cannot be *a priori* and the logic they describe is not purely formal. Like the tautological propositions of logic in the *Tractatus*, statements of the depth grammar of a language will appear obvious and incontestable to the users of the language but only because the latter already are "users of the language". Unlike the tautological propositions of logic, statements of depth grammar do not
show forth "pure" logical form incidentally displayed by some particular sign system and necessitated by all sign systems. Rather, they merely make explicit that which the users of a particular language are already doing and are incomprehensible apart from the activity. Ultimately, then, statements of depth grammar merely make the use of a language explicit for the users of the language.

Statements of depth grammar, however, do not represent the actual employment of language in some language-game and are quite distinct from statements so employed in that they merely thematize the parameters within which such meaningfully employed statements are issued. Thus, although with the abandonment of the concept of the self-showing of logical form, the surface grammar of sentences giving the logic of a language must be different than in the Tractatus, still, as an examination of their own depth grammar reveals, such sentences serve an explicative function for the logic of a language quite distinct from the actual employment of language to make claims about or to perform transactions and so on within the world. If one insists that such sentences "say" what the logic of a language is, then one will have to distinguish two distinct types of "saying": the "saying" of the logic of the language and the "saying" that one can do having accepted the logic of the language. The distinction here is not between two language-games but between two types of remarks concerning any language-game.

In the Tractatus, "saying" is a technical term meaning not simply the uttering of a remark but the claiming that that which is shown by the propositional sign is the case. With the abandonment of the concept of a logical form which shows itself within a proposition and
thereby allows it to have sense in favour of a concept of meaning as use, the concept of saying must also develop. Saying, however, need not now collapse into the mere making of an utterance. Rather, it will now mean the actual useful employment of language to accomplish something in a language-game. Saying will thus encompass such linguistic practices as making claims, reporting, explaining, justifying, reasoning to a particular conclusion and so on. Although this is certainly a critical development within the concept of saying, it is, nonetheless, exactly in line with the implications of that concept within the Tractatus. It is there accepted that "if all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world" (4.26) and that "the totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science" (4.11).

Thus, the whole of natural science can, in principle, say all that is sayable and thereby give a complete description of the world ("all that is the case" [1]). According to the Tractatus, therefore, if all that can be said was said, then nothing in the world would require further inquiry. Consequently, saying takes the place of reporting, explaining, justifying, reasoning to a particular conclusion and so on. It is completely consistent, therefore, to refer to these latter activities as saying when they are discussed in Wittgenstein's later writings.

If, as Wittgenstein writes, grammar "only describes and in no way explains the use of signs" and, consequently,

grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings;

then, because grammar in no way controls or governs language, the question of how language becomes that useful enterprise in which we are
engaged is still open. How do we acquire that specific use of those specific signs as described by the depth grammar of the language? How are those "parameters" explicated by depth grammar and which make it possible for us to say anything established? The answer is simple and, therefore, difficult: we are shown.

I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things.

The showing involved is a training which prescribes and instills the requisite behavior mentioned earlier. A child is born into a community which already lives in a certain manner, performs certain activities and, as an integral aspect of this life activity, uses signs in some particular manner. Consequently,

the children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so and to react in this way to the words of others.

Wittgenstein emphasizes: "the teaching of language is not explanation, but training". Explanation is impossible, not only because the child has yet no language in which the explanation can be given, but because there is no explanation that could be given: there is nothing that wants explaining. At this level of language, it is simply a matter of performing the required act—performing as the community performs.

Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?

These last questions, again posing the "Wittgensteinian Paradox", only appear to pose a problem for the instillation of
grammar by training. The questions are, however, exactly parallel to the response, "And what if I do not do it?", given to "an ethical law of the form, 'Thou shalt . . .'", as discussed in the *Tractatus*. The response shows a misunderstanding of the point of the command. The ethical command was not to be taken as an ordinary command given by one individual or group to another but rather must be obeyed for its own sake and one must and can see the point of it. A human being who genuinely did not see the point of living in accordance with ethical law would be, at least to the extent of his incomprehension of ethics, excluded from the human community. Similarly, following a rule correctly by being trained to act in a certain way is not to be taken as simply obeying a rule laid down by one individual or group for another. Rather, it is acting in a particular manner because one is already a human being and a member of that community and one can, must and will catch on to the point of the training, thereby, obeying the rule. A human being who genuinely could not do so would be, at least to the extent of his incomprehension of linguistic training, excluded from the human community. One can, of course, misunderstand a particular activity and can make a particular mistake, just as one can perform an ethical misdeed, but a human being cannot misunderstand all human activity and be totally mistaken, any more than he can choose not to be an ethical being. If, *per impossible*, we could not see the point of an ethical command, then there would be no ethics because there would be no ethical being and if we could not see the point of our linguistic training, then there would be no language because there would be no linguistic being. In the *Tractatus*, however, there is an ethical will which *does* catch on to the point of the ethical
law and, in the Investigations, there is the human being who does catch on to the point of the linguistic training. Language, like ethics, is possible because it is not begun ex nihilo but rather from that which a human being already is.

The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.

The common behavior of mankind makes training possible or, conversely, training gives explicit specification to the implicit common behavior of mankind. There are several related ideas in this: an individual is trainable because he is a human being submerged in a human community; an individual is trained into the concrete realization of his humanity; and, the act of training is simply the natural, inevitable promulgation of a community’s concrete specification of human behavior performed as part of and in the act of living out that concrete embodiment of human life. A particular activity is taught and learned as one of the specifics woven into a form of human life. Thus, an individual is trained in an entire form of human life along with and even in the act of being trained in some particular activity. Training, therefore, is nothing less than the showing itself of a form of life to one who sees the point of specific actions.

Training itself will be accomplished by any and all of the specific activities that constitute that form of life. It can also be accomplished deliberately. For instance, as Wittgenstein writes:

if a person has not yet got the concepts [of "regular", "uniform" or "same" (any particular concept)], I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice.

As suggested by its general character, training may also require issuing
specific commands which order someone to simply perform some act without question.

The training which shows how language functions by instilling that language and by showing an entire form of life while instilling that form of life and which is made possible because those so trained are human beings, operates, then, in precisely the same manner as the "showing of the ethical life", discussed in chapter three: by catching on to the point of a life, an action, an example or a command. The notion of criteria now clarifies what "catching on to the point" means, namely, no more nor less than "proceeding to live and act in the requisite way". The showing of the ethical life, however, as every version of showing emerging from the Tractatus, could not be said and had to be shown. Is the showing of a form of life and the consequent showing of the basis of language similarly unsayable? I think that it is clear that this is the case.

After writing that it is possible to teach concepts to another "by means of examples and practice", Wittgenstein goes on to say that "when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself". Again, the point of the examples and practice is that one must act in a certain way because that, by definition, is the right way. Only in action can the Wittgensteinian Paradox be avoided.

One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. --I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I--for some reason--was unable to express; but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not an indirect means of explaining--in default of a better.

That the examples possess some "common thing" is only true in retrospect,
by definition: their common feature is that we act in a certain manner in regards to them. Ultimately, there is no justification or explanation for the action:

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do".

As Wittgenstein states in *Zettel*, once justifications and explanations have been exhausted,

[we] will answer nothing, or at any rate, nothing relevant, not even: "Well because we all do it like that"; that will not be the reason.

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein also emphasizes:

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;--but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of [literal or intellectual] seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

Again, the centrality of acting and of instilling certain actions by training are underlined: acting and, thus, training, not explanation or justification, are necessary because our practices are finally not explicable or justifiable--our practices are finally not explicable or justifiable because they are a matter of action and result from training, not explanation or justification.

Looking again at the actual manner in which one learns, for instance, to continue a number series, it becomes apparent why that which we learn is, *per se*, unjustifiable.

At first perhaps we guide his hand in writing out the series 0 to 9; but then the possibility of getting him to understand will depend on his going on to write it down independently.

That the student understands the series exactly is his ability to write
it down on his own and his ability to write "it" down on his own exactly is his independently doing as the teacher had done.

How can he [the student] know how to continue a pattern by himself—whatever instruction you give him?—Well, how do I know?—If that means "Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons shall soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.

With the words "This number is the right continuation of this series" I may bring it about that for the future someone calls such-and-such the "right continuation".

I cannot give reasons for the action called "continuing the number series in the proper manner" because there is no reason for it—it is simply done, perhaps creatively, as an aspect of human life. The number series, however, might serve as a reason in some other transaction: if, for example, I want five red apples from a grocer and he counts them out as, "One, two, three, five", then I will justifiably insist that he owes me one more apple by explaining, "The proper series is 'one, two, three, four, five'".

Wittgenstein refers to the human activity that reveals and promulgates itself in training as the "substratum for the meaning" of the rules of the language. Acting is the bedrock of meaning and, hence, of reasoning, explanation and justification. Consequently, it cannot itself be reasonable or unreasonable and cannot itself be explained or justified. "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life". Saying, "This is simply what I do" or "We all do it like that" are not justifications or explanations. In the context of giving justifications or explanations, such remarks are not meaningful claims at all: they are simply the recognition of the given, the seeing of that which shows itself but is not meaningfully sayable because it
makes all meaningful saying possible. The ineffable human act is not appealed to as a ground but rather is simply recognized as inevitably present within and as all meaningful communication, that is, as the grounding for all groundable statements.

It [a language-game] is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).

It is there—like our life54.

Garth Hallett cites a passage from an unpublished Wittgenstein manuscript:

Language is unique, so cannot be explained. It must show itself55.

As Jerry Gill has put it:

the character of epistemological bedrock can only be displayed or allowed to show itself; every attempt to doubt or justify it becomes entangled in self-stultifying confusion56.

Thus, in Wittgenstein's later analysis, language is still based upon a showing that makes all sensible saying possible and which itself is unsayable.

Earlier in this chapter, the grammatical remarks of Wittgenstein's later analysis were compared and contrasted with the senseless self-showing tautological propositions of logic discussed in the Tractatus. A further development in that comparison now appears. Just as attempts to say something about that which must show itself in those Tractarian propositions of logic is misconceived and must result in nonsense, so misconceptions concerning grammatical remarks can lead to "self-stultifying" attempts to say that which must be shown. Grammatical remarks are simply observations of activity which cannot and need not be explained or justified. If a grammatical remark is not recognized as
such, then it might seem to constitute a saying of that which is actually shown and, thus, to be a "special" type of statement with some "special" epistemological status or "special" metaphysical insight or it might just seem philosophically peculiar and puzzling. Here again that the logic of a language-game is substantive, not purely formal, wreaks a change in understanding where such nonsense has gone wrong, that is, how the discovered "limits" of language actually delimit and what the metaphysical implications of language are.

Since, in learning a language-game, we are trained in an entire form of human life and since the rules of the grammar of that language-game simply describe the ungroundable activity of that form of life, we, in effect, learn the whole "system" of activities describable in a system of rules together: "a totality of judgements is made plausible to us"; "when we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions"; "it is not a single axiom that strikes me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support". Further, since these ungrounded beliefs, premises and consequences, describable as the grammar of the language-game, are substantive, they together form a "picture of the world". Thus, a language-game is necessarily played within the parameters of an ungrounded world-picture.

I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No; it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning.
This inexpressible background picture of the world, in which all that can be meaningfully expressed is grounded, is also said to "be part of a kind of mythology" and to be "the element in which arguments have their life."

If the substantive background suppositions of this mythology are ever thematized, they will necessarily be "exempt" from doubt within the language-game they support as it is then played. Wittgenstein compares such statements which must "stand fast" with "the axis around which a body rotates":

This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

Thus, the "immobile", the "fixed", the "indubitable though unjustifiable", that is, the linguistic thematization of the inexpressible, though its thematization may come as a discovery to the users of a language, is precisely nothing in itself, is only the linguistic reflection of their own activity. Mythology in itself has no epistemological or metaphysical status and is no more or less puzzling than human behavior.

Whereas language as analyzed in the *Tractatus* necessitated the formal outlines of an "atomistic" metaphysics, the metaphysical entailments of the present analysis are so broad as to be empty. There must be human beings who live and act in a community and, therefore, who must possess some "common behavior". There must be a world for that human community to live within and act upon. Thus, in language it is truly man and the world that are shown but they are only shown exactly as in the activity that is the language. While man does show himself in
language, he only there shows himself as the activity within the world that is the basis of the language. While the world, too, does show itself in language, it, too, only there shows itself as the possibility of man's performance of the activity which is the basis of the language. There is, then, still an original metaphysical "self-showing" in language but it amounts to no more than the language itself.

Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a "proto-phenomenon". That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played.

I think that this broad remark must be taken as no more or less metaphysically trivial than the parallel remark in the Tractatus: "The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand" (4.5).

The suggestion made by Goddard and Judge that the ontology of the Tractatus might be "consistent with" the Investigations is not wrong but misguided. It is not that Wittgenstein simply "turned from" his former "metaphysical interests", but that with the new account of that which is shown as the basis of language, subsisting, propertyless objects are no longer necessitated as had formerly been presumed. Though that ontology may, then, be consistent with the later account, there is no longer any reason to propose it. Moreover, a broad "metaphysical interest" is still there to be seen in the Investigations.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote: "if the world had no substance, then whether a proposition has sense would depend on whether another proposition was true" (2.0211). In the later analysis, Wittgenstein has discovered a means of re-interpreting and, thereby, accepting the latter alternative without creating an infinite regress and, thus, he can avoid discussing the nature of the substance of the
world. That a particular proposition already has a sense which is affirmed in an act of saying, does not mean that that sense does not itself result from a previous affirmation of a different type.

Really "The statement is either true or false" only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.

An explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another—unless we require it to prevent a misunderstanding.

One lives and acts according to an implicit and unjustifiable though explicable mythology. The sense of any claim within a language-game is grounded in this shared mythology. The truth or falsity of these claims is, in turn, only available to those who genuinely understand their sense and, further, is not of itself problematic for those who do share the mythology. "Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement"; "I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say 'can trust something')".

Because the mythology, despite its groundlessness and lack of special epistemological or metaphysical status, yet does constitute a "metaphysical self-showing" of the reality of man and the world in and as activity, it is not "free-floating" and answerable to nothing; in practice, that which we trusted may prove untrustworthy or we may simply find it preferable to trust in something else. This is not to say that the mythology must, after all, "agree with reality, with the facts", since that would mean merely "going round in a circle"—"agreeing with reality" is made possible and defined by the mythology. Neither, though, does this mean "that human agreement decides what is true and what is false"—true and false are determinable with a mythology due to the
reality of human activity within the world and the reality of the world as revealed by human activity.

It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. Form of life, language, mythology are not opinions though they make opinions with a determinable truth value possible. While the new account of showing has moved Wittgenstein's analysis out of a naive realism, it has not moved it into an equally naive relativism.

I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago and therefore believed this. We might instruct him: the earth has long . . . etc.—We should be trying to give him our picture of the world.

This would happen through a kind of persuasion. Persuasion, not reasoning, would be necessary because reasoning can only take place within a shared picture of the world while the persuasion Wittgenstein here speaks of is a matter of changing that very world picture. Persuasion, however, can be carried out. It might be accomplished by appealing to the simplicity or symmetry of a view or by its internal coherence or its variety of applications or consistency with other already shared "myths" or other such methods. Persuasion is possible due once again to the "common behavior of mankind."

Mythologies, according to Wittgenstein, are of our own "animal" nature and, thus, though not a matter for justification, are not arbitrary not totally alien to any human being. Conversions, therefore, are neither impossible nor arbitrary. Gill says that "there is a kind of 'reasoning' which characterizes persuasion that distinguishes it from coercion or conditioning. While this distinction is valid, the use of
the term "reasoning" to describe that which Wittgenstein has deliberately
called "persuasion" to distinguish it from reasoning is highly misleading
and constitutes another attempt to treat that which must be shown as
though it were sayable. Persuasion, like training, is the activity of
showing and is distinguishable from reasoning as well as from coercion
and conditioning exactly because it is constituted by human beings
respectively demonstrating and catching on to the point of an activity
and an entire way of living in the world. Unlike training, however,
persuasion results not in the instillation of a world picture but in
seeing the preferability (that is, the greater simplicity, symmetry,
internal coherence, usefulness and so on) of one world picture over
another.

It is this notion of an unsayable showing made possible by the
definiteness of a human response to the reality of human activity which
contains the resolution of the debate between the advocates and the
opponents of what has been termed "Wittgensteinian Fideism"\(^2\). The
latter view, as characterized by Kai Nielsen in his article of that
title, is roughly a construal of Wittgenstein's analysis as a
relativistic in its implications, with the consequence that religion, as
a case in point of a particular form of life with its own particular
mythology and language-game, is immune to criticism simply because it is
practiced. As Nielsen sums up the view:

> it is this very form of life, this very form of
discourse itself, that sets its own criteria of coherence,
intelligibility or rationality\(^3\).

The purpose of philosophy is not criticism but description: "it
[philosophy] can only display for us the workings, the style of
functioning, of religious discourse. Nielsen brings various arguments to bear against such an anti-critical, relativistic viewpoint,

concluding that:

perhaps God-talk is not as incoherent and irrational as witch-talk; perhaps there is an intelligible concept of the reality of God, and perhaps there is a God, but the fact that there is a form of life in which God-talk is embedded does not preclude our asking these questions or our giving, quite intelligibly, though perhaps mistakenly, the same negative answer we gave to witch-talk.

That Wittgenstein was not a "fideist" follows from the previous discussion in light of the discussion in chapter three. It is not the case that every form of life is sacrosanct and must be tolerated simply because it is there. We can persuade by showing and be persuaded by seeing the preferability of one form of human life over another. The second part of this conjunction is needed because, if some human beings can be persuasive, then other human beings must be persuaded. Put in this general way, however, it becomes clear that, in Wittgenstein's account, all human beings must consider themselves as persuadeable as well as persuasive and consider other human beings as persuasive as well as persuadeable. The account, then, is not a recipe for intolerance or complacency. Such persuasion is neither coercion, as the fideist might understand it, nor reasoning, as Nielsen might consider it. Forms of life are the given in that they are the element in which our arguments function. A form of life cannot be criticized from some imagined "absolute" standpoint outside of all forms of life, since such does not exist, nor from a distinctly separate form of life, since the arguments and the counter-arguments would, by definition, be at cross-purposes. A form of life can only be criticized from within, as Nielsen, too,
admits. All human forms of life, however, are outgrowths of human beings living in the world. As alien as one human form of life may seem to another, therefore, it cannot be absolutely alien—the gulf between believers and non-believers cannot be unbridgeable. Thus, any human being can, in principle, become an insider to any human form of life and, consequently, can criticize it, trying to persuade his fellows to another view accessible from that form of life.

D. Z. Phillips writes:

Just as various events and activities in human life [such as harvesting or sowing] can be celebrated in ritual or brought before God under the aspect of prayer, may not the aspects of rituals and prayers themselves be changed by these various events and activities? And if this is admitted, may not their aspect change for the worse, sometimes, may not confusion and distortion set in? May they not cease to be distinctive language-games? These questions must be answered in the affirmative, but there is no reason to think that Wittgenstein cannot allow for such an answer.

As discussed in chapter three, for Wittgenstein the ethico-religious way of living and its necessitated language-game does result from some definite, essentially ineffable, human response to life. For Wittgenstein, a form of life with its mythology and language-game, as exemplified in the ethico-religious life, is not completely autonomous or "free-floating" and is not, therefore, immune to criticism and persuasion. It must, however, be genuinely understood and appreciated— one must catch on to the point of it—for criticism to be sensible, useful, and for either the original point of the game to be clarified or for persuasion, by the seeing of another point, to be possible. While the doctrine of showing requires a non-relativistic view of man and the world, it also requires a subtle appreciation for the
richness of human life and the plurality of human expression.

In Wittgenstein's later writings, the final limit of sense is no longer logical form which shows itself within the proposition as its internal structure but rather a form of life which shows itself within a language-game as its grammar and picture of the world. The limit of language no longer demarcates the transcendental which circumscribes the factual but rather the human way of being in the world which circumscribes the world in which a human being is. The isomorphism of language and world is now better understood as a symbiosis of language and world. That which shows itself in language and the world can no longer be decided *a priori* and described with crystalline perfection. That which is shown cannot be said, not because it is unpictureable, but rather because, if thematized, it is both indubitable and unjustifiable. It is merely a description of that which people do and, therefore, of that which they implicitly trust and promulgate in their action.

Misunderstanding that which must show itself, due to putting it into words with the same surface form as genuine meaningful statements, leads to philosophical, often metaphysical, nonsense. Seeing that which must show itself and, therefore, correctly understanding those apparent "philosophical propositions" no longer leads to considering them of heuristic value only and, ultimately, to be transcended as superfluous, but rather to appreciating them as myth and metaphor. That a metaphor can show that which cannot be said (as, in the Tractatus, the metaphors of logical space, logical scaffolding, the great mirror and the ladder helped show what could not be said) is no longer the reliance upon a second concept of showing beyond, though necessary for, that which shows
itself as the basis of language and the world. Rather, metaphor is now understandable with the same concept of showing as is required to understand the basis of language and the world.2

The concept of showing which emerges from Wittgenstein's later writings is, then, that concept of showing with metaphor, example, command, action and life required and, thus, made available by the Tractatus so that that work might bring us to "see the world aright" and show the ethical. The implications of the latter concept of showing have, of course, been drawn out in greater detail in the later writings but the family resemblance is unmistakable since here the resemblance is not between two distinct family members, but between a family member as a youth and the same family member grown in maturity. Still, in all this, as before, it is the philosopher and his work that brings us to see explicitly, clearly and finally that which shows itself. The philosopher's activity of showing and its point or purpose must be considered in light of the developments within Wittgenstein's analysis of language.
CHAPTER FIVE

THAT WHICH IS SHOWN BY PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION

"God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of everyone's eyes". Wittgenstein wrote this remark in 1947. The preceding year he wrote: "I am showing my pupils details of an immense landscape which they cannot possibly know their way around." With their suggestive phrasing, these remarks, written late in their author's life, sum up Wittgenstein's later view of philosophy, as already implicit within the discussion of chapter four. The philosopher must "see into" what is simply there before all human beings and must bring others to see that which shows itself. Philosophy, then, in some manner, still clarifies sense and brings us to "see the world aright".

Given what has been said in the previous two chapters, it is not surprising that Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as an enterprise has remained unchanged from the Tractatus to the later writings. Indeed, the understanding of the development in Wittgenstein's analysis of language argued for in the preceding chapters implies that Wittgenstein's own philosophical project did not change per se and that, therefore, Wittgenstein's view of what constitutes a proper philosophical project should not have changed. Further, if the same concept of showing as was necessitated for showing the ethical in the Tractatus is, in the later writings, necessitated not only for ethics but also for the analysis of language, then one would expect that the concept of showing,
as necessitated for that which is shown by the philosopher in the *Tractatus*, would have had no reason to be altered in the later writings, since this latter concept of showing, though involving the self-showing of logical form, also already involved showing as an activity. With the deepened understanding of that which shows itself as the basis of language and the world as that which shows itself in a form of human life, that which is shown by the philosopher should, however, become less paradoxical because it is no longer based upon a distinct, though related, concept of showing. Thus, the showing done by the philosopher in the *Tractatus* ought still to be present, though in developed form, in the later writings. Conversely, the view of philosophy emerging from the later writings involves a concept of showing very similar to that involved with the view of philosophy in the *Tractatus*.

Continuity in Wittgenstein's views on philosophy has been observed before, but because the centrality of the concept of showing was not recognized, neither the full continuity itself nor the significance of this continuity was completely appreciated. In order to demonstrate the continuity in Wittgenstein's views on philosophy in light of the concept of showing that which cannot be said and in order to appreciate the significance of this continuity, it is first necessary to discuss why we do not see "what is before everyone's eyes", why we do not know our way around our landscape and, thus, must be shown.

The aspects of things which are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations for his enquiry do not strike a man at all.

Ordinarily we simply use language unreflectingly in the course of our
daily activities. Moreover, we are ordinarily immersed in those daily activities and do not raise or consider philosophical problems concerning the nature of our lives and the world. If we begin to reflect on the latter without reflecting on the former, that is, if we do not understand the functioning of language but try to understand the nature of man and the world, then we will not thoroughly understand the nature of our questioning itself. In the previous chapter, it was noted that depth grammatical observations, when formulated in language, appear in the same linguistic form as the claims, orders and arguments of our ordinary daily transactions, despite their crucial difference from the latter. Consequently, that which is actually a question or an observation about the depth grammar of a language-game appears, superficially, to be a question or claim concerning metaphysics. Conversely, questions or claims concerning metaphysics will appear to be of the same status as questions or claims made in our ordinary transactions. For example,


It is, therefore, because we tend to misunderstand depth grammar that we become lost: either our very misunderstanding leads to a confusing reflection upon the nature of man and the world or a reflection upon man and the world becomes confused because we misunderstand depth grammar. In short, our intelligence becomes "bewitched" by language.

Due to our familiarity with that which shows itself in language but our lack of understanding concerning the distinction between what can be said and what can and must be shown, we do not know the limits of
language and think that we are asking a question or making a claim when we are actually showing our form of life or we expect an explanation or justification when there is only a form of life to be seen.

The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery. 7.

As in the Tractatus, therefore, philosophy must show the limits of language by elucidating its actual functioning.

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in "seeing connexions. 8.

Wittgenstein emphasizes:

The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. 9.

Since the goal of philosophy is the uncovering of nonsense and confusion due to misunderstanding language and since its method is "perspicuous representation", that is, elucidation, of the manner in which language actually works, philosophy will be descriptive only—it will not theorize or justify claims as the sciences do—exactly as outlined at Tractatus 4.111 and 4.112 10. As was also the case for philosophy in the Tractatus, when the elucidating activity of philosophy is completed, the result is only the same linguistic utterances with which one began, albeit, in analyzed and clarified form:

Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language 11;

It [philosophy] leaves everything as it is 12;

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains
nor deduces anything; If anyone tried to advance these in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them. 

Given that philosophy is still to be conceived of as the activity of clarifying the sense of meaningful statements by bringing our attention to that which must show itself as the basis of language, Hacker's introduction of a second sense of "explain" to account for Wittgenstein's own philosophical activity is, at best, needless and, at worst, an obfuscation. Hacker writes:

Revealing conceptual connections, which were not hitherto explicit or articulated even though they are an integral part of our linguistic practice, seems as legitimate a sense of "explain" as any. . . . He [Wittgenstein] also explains, in great detail and profundity, the multifarious sources and processes which generate philosophical illusion.

This use of "explain", however, obscures both the distinction which Wittgenstein tried so hard to make between that which can and that which cannot (need not) be explained and the connection this distinction has with the distinction between that which can and that which cannot (need not) be said. Hacker's additional sense of "explain", then, is better described as "show" and its introduction is merely one more attempt to say that which must show itself.

Sense clarification by elucidating that which shows itself will have to be accomplished in a different fashion than in the Tractatus, however, since sense can no longer be accounted for in terms of a logical form which shows itself within the individual proposition. It will not, then, be a matter of logical dissection of a proposition and of correlation of its components with the world but rather a matter of finding the place of an utterance in a language-game and, therefore, of
describing the depth grammar and world-picture of the relevant portion of the language-game. In other words, it will be a matter of seeing how a human form of life shows itself in that utterance. Moreover, since there is no longer an a priori "crystalline" logic underlying all language and which logical analysis brings to the surface, but rather since the logic of a language-game "lies open to view"\(^{16}\), there is less reason to carry out an analysis except for the exposure of error. Thus, the emphasis in philosophy shifts from sense clarification which also exposes nonsense to exposés of nonsense which also clarify sense. As Wittgenstein puts it:

> our investigation does not try to find the real exact meaning of words; though we do often give words exact meanings in the course of an investigation\(^{17}\);

> the philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness\(^{18}\).

Again due to the diversity of language-games and of possible errors there cannot be simply one or any set number of methods and resolutions of problems:

> Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem. There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies\(^{19}\).

The goal of any method will ultimately be the same, however: to understand the point of an utterance in a language-game. It would, then, be misleading to emphasize too much the difference between the notion of "the correct method of philosophy" contained in the Tractatus and the notion of "methods, like different therapies" contained in the Investigations. Gill seems guilty of such an exaggeration when he writes that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein "[does] away with all philosophical problems in one fell swoop" whereas in the Investigations he "is content
to take up specific problems and deal with them one by one." The only "correct method of philosophy" of the Tractatus is very broad, still requiring specific engagement of the specific individual who wishes "to say something metaphysical" so as to "demonstrate to him that he has failed to give meaning to certain signs in his propositions" (6.53--my emphasis). The "methods, like different therapies" of the Investigations are still all aimed at regaining philosophical health and proceed according to the view of language, man and the world discussed in chapter four.

In both the Tractatus and the Investigations, since philosophy proper is descriptive and elucidates specific philosophical confusions by drawing our attention to the actual basis of language which must show itself in language, philosophical problems are not solved by philosophy proper but are made to disappear as problems21. Thus, as Jonathan Lear has indicated, there are "two strands" in Wittgenstein's view of philosophy22. On the one hand, philosophy is the source of error and health consists in making the issues of philosophy vanish, while, on the other hand, philosophy is necessary and is the therapy which restores conceptual health. This, of course, is no contradiction. We produce philosophical problems by "running up against the limits of language" in the course of reflecting upon man and the world--our intelligence constantly becomes bewitched by language. Wittgenstein is not attempting to put an end to such reflections upon man and the world per se--he is not attempting to thwart our intelligence. As he said in "A Lecture on Ethics" in 1931: he "cannot help respecting deeply" and would not ridicule that "tendency in the human mind" to run against the limits of
language. In a 1929 conversation with Friedrich Waismann, he also said:

Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language. Think for example of the astonishment that anything at all exists.

Wittgenstein would, however, have us become aware that we have reached the limits of language and of what this means for our use of linguistic expressions at this point—he would liberate our intelligence from its bewitchment. Thus, that act of philosophical reflection that results in confusion and philosophical problems must be performed so as to avoid that confusion and make those problems vanish. A part of what it is to be human is to be that being for whom philosophical health is problematic. Philosophy, then, is that tendency towards illness but we could not and would not want to put an end to the tendency as that would entail putting an end to part of what it is to be human. We can, however, avoid succumbing to illness and can strive to live in good philosophical health.

Philosophy unties knots in our thinking; hence its result must be simple, but philosophizing has to be as complicated as the knots it unties.

In short, then, with all elucidating philosophical "therapies" which cause the disappearance of philosophical problems, "the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity." They aim at that which Hacker has called a "surview" of a language-game and a form of life. As Hacker puts it:

The complete surview of all sources of unclarity by means of an account of all the application, illustrations, conceptions of a segment of language ... will produce an understanding of logical connections which will dissolve confusion.
Hacker also points out that this result "is the heir to the 'correct logical point of view' of the Tractatus". Hacker does not point out, however, that just as the "correct logical point of view" allows the one who attains it to "see the world aright", so such a surview allows us to see aright a human form of life, that is, the actuality of man and the world as manifest in language. A surview allows us, in Wittgenstein's words, "to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most remarkable". Thus, just as the notion of sense clarification is present in the later writings as the notion of therapy, so the notion of "seeing the world aright" is yet present as the notion of attaining a complete clarity in which we see what is most remarkable.

How, then, are philosophical elucidations, perspicuous representations, produced so as to clarify sense, act as therapy, achieve complete clarity and make the correct vision of man and the world attainable? "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use", that is, we study language in general and specific linguistic expressions in terms of the discussion of chapter four, namely, in terms of meaning as use, language-games, criteria, mythologies and forms of life. It will mean looking at particular examples, either of particular confusions which have actually occurred or of cases analogous to our actual use but simplified so as to emphasize some particular aspect of language. As Wittgenstein suggests: "A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example". A properly balanced diet of examples is, then, crucial to philosophical health, as indicated in chapter four by the centrality of examples in learning and demonstrating
knowledge of a language-game and its mythology. An example in philosophy will show how some linguistic expression actually does work, what its status and point in a language-game are, how it can become confusing and how such confusion can be avoided. These examples will often consist in the creation of primitive language-games, such as that discussed in chapter four, concerning the customer who orders five red apples in a grocery store, which obviate a particular point, such as the circumstances in which a grocer "knows the meaning" of an order. The examples will, as well, consist very often in the minute re-creation of the origin of a concept, such as that of a number series. Also, the creation of fantastic world-pictures, such as the suggestion of a man who believes that the world has only existed for fifty years, will often serve to bring our attention to some aspect of language, for instance, the difference between the reasoning within and the changing of a world-picture. Again, the actual specific perspicuous representation will depend upon the point that needs to be made. "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose". 

Even more than was already suggested in the Tractatus, philosophy shall, in the later writings, depend upon an interlocutor who responds appropriately to the work of the philosopher. First, an interlocutor is necessary in order to manifest a philosophical problem. Second, the response of the philosopher will only be elucidating, the representation he gives will only be perspicuous, if the interlocutor catches on to the point of it and this will often require a dialogical context of proper mutual responses.

Wittgenstein's later writings are intensely dialectical—
frequent interplay of two voices, of question and answer, response and co-response. Using Wittgenstein's *Investigations* as an example of correct philosophizing, it becomes apparent that due to its dialectical nature, elucidation need not consist only of a variety of types of examples. Within the proper dialogical context, an elucidation can be provided with a command; for example:

Don’t say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"—but look and see whether there is anything common to all.\(^3^4\)

In addition, within the proper dialogical context, a rhetorical question or other rhetorical remark may be elucidating, if the interlocutor can catch on to the point of it; for instance:

How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself—whatever instruction you give him? Well, how do I know?\(^3^5\)

If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory [of the departure time of a train]? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.)\(^3^6\)

Viggo Rossvaer refers to this activity as an "indirect communication" depending upon an element of irony: "the irony lies in this, that those remarks pretend to agree with our position, while at the same time mercilessly exposing it to laughter.\(^3^7\) This reciprocal exposing and being exposed to laughter has a deliberate and precise effect (thus, it is communication) but the effect is an altered understanding and manner of acting on the part of the interlocutor (thus, it constitutes a showing and is "indirect").

Such indirect, dialectical communication requires performative skill on the part of the philosopher—Rossvaer refers to philosophy as an
"art form" as well as sensitivity and, finally, changed behavior on the part of the interlocutor. Only the changed understanding of the interlocutor, as manifest in his changed behavior, proves the success of the dialectical encounter and, thus, makes the philosopher's remarks elucidating. I think that it is to the necessity of the dialogical context and a successful performance therein that Wittgenstein is referring in his remark of 1931 that

the solution of philosophical problems can be compared with a gift in a fairy tale: in the magic castle it appears enchanted and if you look at it outside in daylight it is nothing but an ordinary bit of iron (or something of the sort).39

With the developed analysis of language, discussed in chapter four, this characteristic of that which appeared enchanted in one context to not appear so in another is not paradoxical: it is no longer to be considered as a genuine bit of iron which, oddly, can sometimes appear as though enchanted, but rather as treated by its users as "an ordinary bit of iron" in one context and treated by its users as "an enchanted gift" in another context. In less colourful words: it is not that that which is literally nonsense can, paradoxically, be illuminating—as was the case with the metaphysical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus—but rather that that which is nonsense in one language-game and in one context can be meaningful in another language-game and/or in another context.

This is not, of course, to say that no utterances can ever be condemned as nonsense: Wittgenstein, at one point, describes his very aim in philosophy to be "to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense."40
stopped feeling sympathetic to that which he condemns as nonsense: "in a
certain sense one cannot take too much care in handling philosophical
mistakes, they contain so much truth". An utterance can be nonsensical
either because it has no use in the language-game played or because its
deep grammatical status or role has not been understood and,
consequently, the utterance is misused (both are a posteriori
discoveries). The latter type of "philosopher's nonsense" does, then,
contain an important insight, albeit, confusedly. Moreover, there is yet
something "most remarkable" which can "strike" us and which the confused
philosopher may have wrongly thought that he was stating with his
nonsense. Wittgenstein's own philosophical statements do not fall into
this class. That his remarks require a dialogical context and are
nonsensical outside that context and that they make their point due to
use of example, metaphor, command, rhetoric and other linguistic
performances does not make them pseudo-propositions. In the course of a
dialogue Wittgenstein may even deliberately create nonsense which is able
to show something to his interlocutor, but, as Lear points out, it is
employed only because we do come to recognize it as absurd and thus are
brought to see that which actually is the case with the meaningfulness of
language. Lear writes:

> when we are freed from the need to construct
> spurious justifications for our practices, we are at last able to
> say, "that's simply what we do". For Wittgenstein this is the
> beginning of self-consciousness about the way we see the world.

Unlike the statements of the *Tractatus*, therefore, the
statements of the *Investigations* and of the other later writings need not
per se be recognized as nonsensical. While they do not, then,
constitute a ladder which must be transcended, their function is still to
turn our attention to the human form of life which shows itself as the
basis of language and such an act of showing requires us to learn
something from the remarks made: something ineffable concerning human
life and thinking. Wittgenstein asks, "What is your aim in philosophy?",
and answers, "To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle". This is
not simply knowing how to go on making other philosophical remarks but,
to the contrary, knowing how to go on peacefully with our lives without
the need for further remarks concerning a philosophical problem because
the problem has disappeared.

Here we come up against a remarkable and
characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the
difficulty--I might say--is not of finding the solution but rather
that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it
were only a preliminary to it. "We have already said
everything.--Not anything that follows from this, no, this itself is
the solution!"

Anthony Kenny has asked the question: "in what way--according
to Wittgenstein--is the philosopher better off than an ordinary
non-philosopher?". Kenny's own answer to this important question is
good but incomplete. He quotes from an unpublished Wittgenstein
manuscript: "philosophy is a tool which is useful only against
philosophers and against the philosopher in us". As mentioned earlier,
philosophy results from a natural human tendency and Wittgenstein's task
is not to end this tendency but to draw our attention to it and to avoid
going into problems with it. As Kenny aptly puts it:

Wittgenstein thinks that the task of philosophy is
not to enlighten the intellect, or not directly, but to work upon
the will, to strengthen one to resist certain temptations.

Thus, because we are all philosophers to some extent and liable to become
bad philosophers, we are all in need of such a discipline as Wittgenstein's work gives. Kenny further points out three danger areas for someone undisciplined by philosophy: at the mythical level (that is, we become trapped by our own picture of the world), at the hypermythical or theological level, and at the scientific level (that is, we become victimized by scientific mythology). Kenny also suggests practical consequences of these dangers: for instance, trapped by our own world picture, we may kill an animal to mythically relieve our own guilt or, theologically, we may believe that thoughts are in the spirit not in the physical person or, scientistically, we may subscribe to a faulty psychological doctrine concerning the teaching of children. Despite agreeing with Kenny's account, in so far as it goes, I believe that he has missed the deeper and more immediate urgency for disciplining the "will to philosophize".

Stanley Cavell, while not attempting to answer Kenny's question nor drawing the conclusion I want to draw, has commented on the confessional style of the *Investigations*:

Inaccessible to the dogmatics of philosophical criticism, Wittgenstein chose confession and recast his dialogue. It contains what serious confessions must: the full acknowledgement of temptation ("I want to say . . . "; "I feel like saying . . . "; "Here the urge is strong . . . ") and a willingness to correct them and give them up ("In the everyday use . . . "; "I impose a requirement which does not meet my real need"). (The voice of temptation and the voice of correctness are the antagonists in Wittgenstein's dialogues.) In confessing you do not explain or justify, but describe how it is with you. And confession, unlike dogma, is not to be believed but tested, and accepted or rejected. Nor is it the occasion for accusation, except of yourself, and by implication those who find themselves in you.

Cavell goes on to draw a parallel between the work of Wittgenstein and that of Freud regarding "unmasking the defeat of our real need in the face of self-impositions which we have not assessed." Although I do
not dispute this parallel, I think it again misses the more important implication of the confession: it is an ethical deed.

Wittgenstein said that the point of the Tractatus was an ethical one, that it showed the limits of the ethical from within exactly by showing the limits of language and, thus, it showed the necessity of silence regarding the ethical. As discussed in chapter three, the view that ethics is transcendent was an attempt to explain the felt difference between fact and value and the different role of language in regards to each (that is, necessary and adequate to the realization of the former, unnecessary and inadequate to the realization of the latter). Consequently, Wittgenstein's substantive views on ethics survived the developments in his views on language and the bracketing of "the transcendental". The ethico-religious remains a matter of changed attitude toward the world and life as a whole. It is inspired by astonishment and is manifest in action. Linguistic expression, therefore, remains unnecessary and inadequate for the ethico-religious and if linguistic expression occurs, it is still to be taken differently than in what is called "reporting facts".

By turning our attention toward that which shows itself as the basis of language, that is, by making manifest the manner in which actual language becomes meaningful, Wittgenstein has again shown the limitations of language. He has again shown the relationship of language to the ethico-religious and has again indicated why "saying", that is, description, theory, justification, explanation and so on, cannot capture that which is essential to the ethico-religious: the living of a human life according to certain humanly recognizable norms is, ultimately, not
explicable or justifiable and descriptions and theories concerning such a
life are, finally, unnecessary and unsatisfying. Thus, on the one hand,
the ethico-religious life does not require language use and in so far as
it uses language, it uses it in a very different fashion than, for
instance, does science. On the other hand, every form of life is a given
and its basis is not a matter for explanation or justification. With the
ethico-religious, moreover, even a description of the practices and
actions that constitute this form of life and a description of the
grammar of any language-game it may involve will not be able to capture
the felt need or urgency that compels those who live in this way, while
it is this very felt need that is most crucial for understanding this
form of life. To put it crudely: the ethico-religious does not of itself
need saying and saying cannot capture the essence of the
ethico-religious.

Due to the developments in Wittgenstein’s analysis of language,
however, inexplicable and unjustifiable human action in accordance with
humanly recognizable norms is also that which ultimately constitutes
language. Since language is, therefore, rooted in human action and the
ethical form of human life is such that it is compelled to in-form all
human action, language itself is of ethical concern. Not to recognize
that language use is embedded in a language-game and, therefore, in some
form of human life, means that one does not fully recognize that language
is a human activity. Consequently, one will not recognize the human
limitations and human possibilities inherent in language and, to that
extent, becomes a less genuine or "authentic" human being. Such
practical dangers as Kenny mentions, then, are incidental consequences of
bad philosophy but are not its most urgent ethical condemnation: bad
philosophizing is itself unethical action. The philosophical temptations
which we must resist are not merely analogous to moral temptations but
are, finally, a "species" of the latter. As Erich Heller writes of
Wittgenstein:

He could not but have contempt for philosophers who
"did" philosophy and, having done it, thought of other things:
money, lists of publications, academic advancements, university
intrigues, love affairs, or the Athenaeum—and thought of these
things in a manner which showed even more clearly than the products
of their philosophical thought that they had philosophized with less
than their whole person. Wittgenstein had no difficulty detecting
in their style of thinking, debating, or writing the corruption of
the divided life, the painless jugglery with words and meanings, the
shallow flirtation with depth, and the ear deaf to the command of
authenticity. Thinking for him was as much a moral as an
intellectual concern.

The Investigations, therefore, not only delimit the ethico-religious but
demonstrate and promulgate ethical action. Even more overtly than the
Tractatus and without the paradox of the ladder metaphor, the
confessional style of the Investigations constitutes a self-conscious
showing of the ethical: "a confession has to be part of your new life."

Wittgenstein chose a quotation from Nestroy as his motto for
the Philosophical Investigations:

There are so many means of extirpating and
eradicating, and nevertheless, so little evil has been extirpated,
so little wickedness eradicated from this world, that one clearly
sees that people invent a lot of things, but not the right one. And
yet we live in the era of progress, don't we? I s'pose progress is
likely a newly discovered land; a flourishing colonial system on the
coast, the interior still wilderness, steppe, prairie. It is in the
nature of all progress that it looks much greater than it really
is.

G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker state that the intention behind this
choice of motto "remains, however, unclear" but, in light of what has
been said above, the motto is quite clear. Nestroy's remark is ironic: even though we consider ourselves to be living in an age of progress, no progress has been made and none is expected concerning that which is most important. Hence, we must cease our pre-occupation with progress and with those matters wherein progress can be made and renew our lives as ethical beings. With the motto, then, Wittgenstein is clearly indicating his prime concern in the book, namely, to personally extirpate and to show us why and how to extirpate evils. The motto indicates that the point of the *Investigations*, no less than that of the *Tractatus*, is an ethical one.

The deepest answer to Kenny's question concerning the value of philosophy, therefore, lies in its ethical point: as human beings we will do philosophy and as ethical beings we must do it correctly. As with the *Tractatus*, the role of correct philosophy in the later writings is to bring our attention to that which shows itself as the basis of language, to distinguish that which can be said from that which cannot and need not be said but must show itself, to expose misunderstanding and nonsense and, thus, to bring us to see the world and man aright. Even more than with the *Tractatus*, the analyses and the elucidations which the philosopher uses, according to the later writings, are dialectical and largely dependent for their style and usefulness upon the responses of an interlocutor. Finally, again as with the *Tractatus*, but now more directly and, therefore, more silently, the point of the dialectical, elucidating activity of the true philosopher is self-consciously ethical. The dialectic, however, is not a ladder by means of which one reaches that which is ineffably higher but rather a confession, personal and
communal, by means of which one reaches that which is ineffably deeper. In the remark with which this chapter began, then, Wittgenstein was not merely employing a figure of speech when he invoked God to grant insight to the philosopher.
CONCLUSION

"THAT WHICH IS SHOWN" AS THE UNIFYING PROJECT IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY

The theme of saying and showing lies at the heart of Wittgenstein's philosophy. It forms the basis of his views on language, the world, philosophy and ethics and is found in his major writings upon these his major concerns. As originally explicated in the Tractatus, the theme holds different, but related, connotations for each of these concerns. The best known, though still often misunderstood, version of the saying and showing theme is that of the showing of logical form which, in the Tractatus, makes saying possible but cannot itself be said. The other connotations of saying and showing, in the Tractatus, and how they relate to this "best known" version are rarely amplified and discussed. The dearth of understanding concerning the full significance of saying and showing in the Tractatus, together with the obvious changes in Wittgenstein's views on language, as presented in his later writings, has led to an almost total neglect of that theme as it appears in his later writings. This, in turn, is largely responsible for the almost universal tendency among commentators to "split" Wittgenstein into two philosophers--"early Wittgenstein" and "late Wittgenstein"--and has led to a de-emphasizing of that which was most important in Wittgenstein's life and work, namely, showing the ethical. Even those few commentators who have suggested the presence of the saying and showing theme in the later writings or who have argued against "splitting" Wittgenstein into
two or who have emphasized Wittgenstein's central concern with the ethical have never, it seems, "pooled" their insights, have never learnt from one another, so as to draw out the Wittgensteinian project and, again, I believe this to be due to missing the full significance, the distinct but related connotations, of the saying and showing theme.

Donald Harward has detected the presence of the theme of saying and showing throughout Wittgenstein's writings. Unfortunately, his discussion is very brief and centers only upon the theme in regards to Wittgenstein's views on language--Harward does not discuss the theme in regards to Wittgenstein's views on the nature of the world, of philosophy and of ethics. Consequently, his brief discussion is not only incomplete but the very justification for consistently referring to that which appears in Wittgenstein's changed views on language as "the theme of saying and showing" is lost. As it stands, Harward's analysis could not escape the charge of equivocation regarding his use of the terms "saying" and "showing".

Garth Hallett, too, has traced the "say--show distinction" into Wittgenstein's later writings. Though his discussion is even more brief than that of Harward, his suggestive remarks imply an awareness that, in the Tractatus, the distinction appears in more than one fashion and that the reply to the charge of equivocation in applying that distinction to the later writings is to be found in its other Tractarian connotations. Hallett writes: "its [the Tractatus'] sentences might be nonsensical, in the technical Tractatus sense, but they served a purpose". Hallett, however, says no more than this and does not even suggest the importance of the distinction in regards to the views on
ethics expressed in the *Tractatus*, while it is in the latter that the justification for consistently applying the distinction to the later writings is most clearly found.

Also, Hallett believes that in Wittgenstein's later writings, depth grammar cannot be said but must be shown with examples because saying it would be making a generalization about it, and a generalization is quite likely to mislead... If someone has taken to philosophy and is suffering from the philosophical worries brought on by blindness to grammar, the only thing to do is to give him examples, cases—lots of them and as varied as possible.

As discussed in chapter four above, Wittgenstein's later view on the necessity of showing grammar is stronger than this:

I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice. And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself; my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.

In other words, showing with examples is not done in lieu of saying with a generalization; the latter is simply not possible because a "generalization" would actually be only a post factum description of an activity and, thus, could not explain anything. As with the *Tractatus*, making a claim about that which shows itself is not merely a pedagogical improbability, it is a conceptual impossibility.

Peter Winch is perhaps the best known commentator who has argued for the "unity of Wittgenstein's philosophy". His discussion centers on Wittgenstein's unchanged concern with "the problem about the nature of logic" while insisting that the *Philosophical Investigations* challenge some of the very presuppositions of the *Tractatus*, that is, that after the *Investigations*, it is not possible to "just accept the
Tractatus as perfectly sound considered as an account of one particular sub-section of language"9. In this connection, Winch mentions

[Wittgenstein’s] distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown and the way in which this distinction persists, in transmuted form, from the Tractatus through to the last writings10.

For Winch, the key to this is the concept of "the 'dimensions' in which what is said has sense"11: the concept of the dimensions of sense links the concept of "logical space" from the Tractatus with the concept of "grammar" in the later writings without the misleading geometrical picture implied by the former concept. Winch, however, does not expand further on this. For instance, he does not discuss what it is that is "shown" and how this showing can give determinate dimensions to sense without the concept of logical space. Further, he does not discuss the theme of showing and saying in regards to philosophy or ethics. He does not realize that the answers to the previous crucial questions regarding what is shown and how it might determine sense in the absence of the picture theory were already available in the Tractatus and the Notebooks, 1914-1916. Thus, Winch not only misses the justification for unequivocally applying the terms "saying" and "showing" to the later changed views on logic and language but misses, as well, the even stronger unity of Wittgenstein's views regarding philosophy and ethics. Consequently, the "unity" Winch finds in Wittgenstein is more of a "developmental continuity" than a "conceptual identity" of any sort. While the former is present in Wittgenstein's work and the recognition of it is extremely important, it is only understandable in terms of the latter.
Similarly, David Pears writes:

in spite of the differences between his
(Wittgenstein's) early work and his later work, what he was trying
to do was still the same kind of thing, . . . the change in method
was not a sharp break with the past, but a gradual transformation of
the ideas of the Tractatus which preserved what was good in them.12

Unlike Winch, however, Pears is aware of "other kinds of discourse
["religious, moral and aesthetic"] besides the factual13 and of the
"pressure exerted by those other kinds of discourse" upon the Tractarian
concept of sense.14 Pears, therefore, has the ingredients for drawing
out the "conceptual identity" within Wittgenstein's theme of saying and
showing and, thus, within Wittgenstein's philosophy. Unfortunately, he
does not do so: he does not explicate the theme of saying and showing in
this connection; he does not discuss Wittgenstein's later writings as the
outcome of exerting pressure upon the Tractarian analysis of sense; and,
finally, he does not discuss the lack of substantial change in
Wittgenstein's views on the religious, the moral and the aesthetic.

As discussed in chapter five above, Anthony Kenny and P. M. S.
Hacker note the lack of substantial change in Wittgenstein's views on
philosophy but, again due to not understanding the full significance of
the distinction between showing and saying, they do not appreciate the
full significance of this lack of substantial change for the entire
philosophy of Wittgenstein: the developmental continuity of
Wittgenstein's views on language in light of the conceptual identity of
showing with activity. Consequently, Kenny and Hacker, as well as
Harward, Hallett, Winch and Pears, miss the deepest most important
unifying point in Wittgenstein's work: it shows the ethical.

Robert Cavalier has emphasized the ethical dimension of the
Tractatus but his discussion is limited to that work. Viggo Rossvaer, on the other hand, has written of the Philosophical Investigations:

The feeling that Wittgenstein lacks a theory is the effect of a too simple approach to the philosophical problems. The problem is not that the examples are too few to give a clear picture, but that Wittgenstein’s technique has an ethical aspect. Complete clarity is born out of an existential crisis, where your Weltanschauung may suffer a total reorientation, from an attack that comes from within.

Rossvaer, however, does not expand any further upon this and does not attempt to link this ethical view either with the ethical view of the Tractatus or with the view of language of the Investigations. Further, the ethical, as present in Wittgenstein’s later work, is more than merely an "aspect" of his technique. Rather, the ethical lies behind the entire manner of philosophizing, the entire style of the work: the ethical is the raison d’être of the later work just as it had been of the Tractatus.

I do not mean this to be a thesis concerning the psycho-biography of the man Ludwig Wittgenstein. I, of course, do not pretend to know the order in which ideas arose in his mind nor even if he was personally aware of the various connotations of and connections between the concepts he employed. A close examination of his concepts, however, reveals that the theme of showing that which cannot be said, lying at the center of the Tractatus, has in that work at least three interconnected uses: that which shows itself as the basis of language and world, that which is shown by the philosopher and that which is shown by the ethical life—the second acting as a bridge between, by being an amalgam of, the first and the third. In light of the theme of saying and showing, Wittgenstein’s views regarding the ethico-religious did not change substantially throughout his writings. More importantly, the
concept of the third type of showing in the Tractatus can, ultimately, explain the first, doing what the first should do but without the problems encountered by that first concept of showing. Thus, the concept of showing by living an ethical life makes available a concept that could lead to a critical development within the view of language and the world presented in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein's later writings on language, man and the world exactly fit the implied schema.

There is, then, a conceptual unity, amounting to a unified Wittgensteinian project, throughout Wittgenstein's philosophy and which can only be understood by examining the theme of saying and showing: that which it makes sense to say is made possible by, and, thus, operates within the limits of, an ineffable showing and becoming aware of this distinction with regards to our lives of thought and action is an ethical task. The common view that there are "two Wittgensteins" is, therefore, a highly misleading picture concerning Wittgenstein's life and work. It is only after recognizing the aforementioned unity, the unified Wittgensteinian project, however, that the changes in Wittgenstein's views can be properly understood in their developmental continuity and the insights of such Wittgensteinian commentators as Harward, Hallett, Winch, Pears, Rossvaer, Kenny and Hacker concerning unaltered or developmentally continuous aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy cease to appear either anomolous or of only psycho-biographical interest in regard to Wittgenstein.

The deep and far-reaching importance of that unified ethical project manifest in Wittgenstein's entire life and work is elegantly stated by Wittgenstein in a deceptively simple remark of 1937: "Let us be human"17.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER ONE


2The nature of these objects is discussed in some detail in Part II of the present chapter.


4Some commentators, such as Erik Stenius and Robert Cavalier often seem to use representational form as equivalent to pictorial form. Cf. Erik Stenius, Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought” (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), pp. 99-100; Cavalier, Tractatus: A Transcendental Critique, p. 111. This, however, is uncritical and untrue to the Tractatus; cf. 2.17 (pictorial form is that which a picture has “in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it”) and 2.173 (representational form is a picture’s “position outside” its subject). Thus, I agree with Anthony Kenny’s reading of this: cf. Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1973), p. 57.


6“Key of interpretation” is, in Stenius’ phraseology, a special type of “key of isomorphism”; the latter can be established between any facts that can be analyzed into systems of elements that can, in turn, be made to correspond symmetrically and transitively (Ibid., pp. 93-94); the former “key” refers to the establishment of such an isomorphism when one of the facts is considered to be a picture of the other (Ibid., p. 95).

7Ibid., p. 97.

8By George Wallace; located at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.
The distinction between impossible in practice and impossible in principle undermines, I believe, a distinction which Stenius attempts to set up. Stenius holds that a picture represents its "prototype" and, thereby, presents or depicts a possible state of affairs. If that state of affairs actually obtains, then the picture also presents or depicts its prototype (Stenius, *Tractatus: A Critical Exposition*, p. 98). The notion of "prototype", then, is held to be distinct from the notion of "picture", as it is what a picture represents, and also distinct from the possible state of affairs a picture depicts, as the prototype is only depicted if the state of affairs is actual. The notion was introduced to distinguish pictures that are "genuine representations" from those that are "fictitious" (Ibid., p. 89). Stenius, in this regard, distinguishes a sculpture of Venus from a bust of Shelley; the former has no real prototype and is, therefore, fictitious while the latter has a real prototype and is, therefore, a genuine representation, capable of being isomorphic or not (that is, capable of being true or false) (Ibid., p. 89).

The category of "fictitious picture" and, with it, the notion of "prototype" is, however, redundant. Although it may be impossible in practice to correlate the sculpture of Venus with the particular fact which must obtain for the model to be true (for instance, no one living on Mount Olympus is found to have the same appearance as that sculpture), still, it was not impossible that that fact could have been discovered or, for that matter, that that fact might yet be discovered. The "fictitious" is, then, simply a possible state of affairs that does not obtain—it is merely false. If, on the other hand, one interprets the sculpture so that no possible state of affairs could be correlated with it as the pictured fact (for instance, if one maintained that a goddess is not any particular fact in the world, is not like any ordinary state of affairs and, therefore, that her sculpture in principle cannot be correlated with any state of affairs), then the sculpture is indeed not a genuine representation because it lacks a coherent key of interpretation: it is said to be a "model of" a goddess yet is denied a priori the possibility of any correlation with the world. The "fictitious" is, then, merely self-contradictory—it is the logically impossible.

With either view of the "fictitious", the notion of "real prototype" collapses into "a possible state of affairs". The further distinction which Stenius makes between the prototype represented by a picture and the possible state of affairs depicted by a picture then also collapses. Technically, every picture, by definition of "picture", genuinely represents (or depicts) a possible state of affairs and may be true or false. If that possible state of affairs actually obtains, then the picture represents (or depicts) an actual state of affairs: it is isomorphic, true. There are no pictures that do not have "real prototypes" and are not "genuine representations" because, technically, a "fictitious picture" is either a contradiction in terms or denotes a picture of a non-actual, but possible, state of affairs.

That a picture is false or that some artifact does not succeed in being a picture at all does not, of course, mean that it serves no purpose apart from picturing. For instance, a child's toy "car" may not be able to picture any known or even any possible automobile, yet the
child may still enjoy playing with it; a "sculpture of" Venus may not represent any known or even any possible being, yet it may play a key role in a religious rite, and so on. It is also not inconsistent with Wittgenstein’s analysis that one might form a picture of some fact which latter is also on occasion used to picture still other facts. Thus, one might, for example, create a sculpture in imitation of other sculptures: if one attempted to correlate such a model with the subject of the original, the model might well seem "incomplete" (to use Stenius’ term) but this would merely be because one was not then correlating it with the correct state of affairs. I believe that this and the aforementioned ulterior uses for what is nonetheless strictly speaking a false picture or a non-picturing fact account for Stenius’ other two examples of "fictitious pictures" (for which see, Ibid., p. 110).

10Cavalier, Tractatus: A Transcendental Critique, p. 112.

11The quoted aphorism is the first hint of "showing" in the actual text of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This theme is, of course, mentioned earlier in the "Preface" to that work.

12Cavalier, Tractatus: A Transcendental Critique, p. 113.


14Henry Finch attempts to take 2.19 much further asserting that "ordinary pictures cannot depict the world, but can only depict reality" (Henry LeRoy Finch, Wittgenstein—The Early Philosophy: An Exposition of the "Tractatus" [New York: Humanities Press, 1971], p. 63) because "the correspondence of their elements with objects is given at the start; the objects do not have to be meant" (Ibid., p. 62). While Wittgenstein does make a distinction between world and reality (2.04, 2.06, 2.063), it cannot be as sharp as Finch claims nor for the reason he gives. Wittgenstein writes: "Every picture is at the same time a logical one" (2.182, Wittgenstein’s emphasis) and refers to logical form (that which characterizes a logical picture) as "the form of reality" (2.18, my emphasis), not as "the form of the world". The passages of the Tractatus which Finch cites in supporting his view (2.13, 2.131) state only that a picture’s elements do correspond with other objects—they do not reveal how this correspondence is carried out. It seems that intentional thought would always be required to turn one fact into a picture of some other state of affairs: "we picture facts to ourselves" (2.1, my emphasis). Contrary to Finch, therefore, I deny that any picture has "intrinsic referentiality" (Ibid., p. 58).

I take "world" to include only "positive" facts as true, so that any representation of a non-actual state of affairs is simply false (4.26). For example, in regards to the world, one can only state that it is false that unicorns exist. As Wittgenstein wrote to Russell: "Of course no elementary proposition[s] [those describing the world] are negative" (Wittgenstein, Letters to Russell, p. 73). Reality, on the
other hand, I take as including "positive" and "negative" facts, so that one can make true statements about the non-actual without ontological confusion as to what is in the world (2.06). For example, in regards to reality, one can say that it is true that unicorns do not exist.

This reading, then, is still consistent with Finch’s interpretation of 2.063 ("the sum-total of reality is the world"): non-actual states of affairs add nothing to the "total", since "what does not exist is not a different reality, but the same reality as what does exist" (Finch, *Wittgenstein--Early Philosophy*, p. 60).

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16Ibid., p. 21.

17Fogel says of aphorism 3.1: "we must notice that this remark is descriptive, not definitional, for there are many different ways in which a thought can find expression perceivable by the senses" (Ibid., p. 24); Kenny concurs on this: "presumably a proposition is not the only perceptible form of expression of a thought" (Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, p. 58). Although nothing important to the present discussion hinges on this, I do not think that it need be taken as obvious that paintings, sculptures or even musical scores, to use Kenny’s examples, could not be propositions in the technical sense of that term. Certainly linguistic expressions of a particular type (that is, sentences) are the paradigm case of propositions and are what Wittgenstein goes on to discuss, but I do not think it would be inconsistent or even counter-intuitive to also include other expressions of thought as, technically, propositional. G. E. M. Anscombe refers to a line drawing of two men fencing as a "picture become proposition" (G. E. M. Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus* [London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967], p. 71) saying, "certainly a picture whose ‘sense’ is ‘thought’ one way or the other, as I have described, is a propositional sign" (Ibid., p. 70; her emphasis).

This is related to, though distinct from, the argument of Finch discussed above regarding the intentionality of picturing: to deny that a picture need be meant is to deny that it can be a proposition but to affirm that it needs to be meant is not yet to affirm that it is a proposition per se.

Black would translate 3.1 as: "in a sentence the thought expresses itself perceptibly" (Black, *Companion*, p. 99), which translation, however, would require Fogel’s and Kenny’s qualification.

18Cf. Finch, *Wittgenstein--Early Philosophy*, p. 59. Cavalier implies that it is perceptual experience which adds the "content" to the proposition’s logical form ("for instance, the actual desk standing to the right of the chair" [Cavalier, *Tractatus: A Transcendental Critique*, p. 125]) but this seems insufficient: in that case a false proposition (that is, one not agreeing with perceptual experience) or one not yet known to be true or false (that is, one for which the relevant perceptual experience has not yet obtained) would have no content and, therefore,
become senseless, which is contrary to Wittgenstein's earlier remarks at 2.22, 2.221, 2.222.

Finch holds that the form/content distinction "does not show up on the level of ["ordinary"] pictures (Finch, Wittgenstein--Early Philosophy, p. 58): this is incorrect or, at least, misleading. Although the term "content" was not used in this regard earlier, a picture, nonetheless, is always distinct from that which is pictured (that was the point of discussing the picture as a form of representation), thought is always required in order to establish one fact as picture of another and pictorial form per se would always be universal (otherwise it could not be held in common by picture and pictured [2.151]) requiring a particularization in application by intentional thought.


Thus, Irving Copi was certainly correct in his debate with Daitz and Evans concerning what counts as an element in the proposition "aRb" and in the fact aRb (Irving Copi, "Objects, Properties, and Relations in the 'Tractatus'," in Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard, eds., Essays on Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" [New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966], pp. 175-181). Only two genuine elements have been mentioned in either: the letters "a" and "b" in the proposition and the corresponding items a and b in the state of affairs--in an "adequate notation", "R" would not appear just as the relation of a and b is not some third item "between" a and b (Ibid., p. 107). Even if, as Anscombe objects, there may ultimately be more than two items involved in the sense of "aRb" (G. E. M. Anscombe, "Mr. Copi on Objects, Properties, and Relations in the 'Tractatus'", in Copi and Beard, eds., Essays, p. 187), these other items will not be relations.


21 Ibid., p. 117.


23 There are, I think, difficulties with Finch's stated interpretation of 3.2; for instance, 3.21, which does seem to speak of objects in a technical ontological sense. But Finch's reading is not impossible and has the great advantage of, temporarily at least, averting the problems with Wittgenstein's view that every proposition "is a truth-function of elementary propositions" (5), which seems the only alternate interpretation of the notion of a "completely analyzed proposition".
24 That the "literal references" of "seeing" and "showing" are "straightforward and obvious" is, of course, an assumption as well.


26 Ibid., p. 179.

27 Ibid., p. 179.

28 Donald W. Harward, Wittgenstein’s Saying and Showing Themes (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1976), pp. 16-17.

29 Ibid., p. 16. This is the reading of 4.022 which I have followed above.

30 Ibid., p. 17.


32 "Wittgenstein’s ‘logical space’ is similar to a coordinate system in theoretical physics. Any one set of coordinates presupposes the whole system" (Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973], p. 185).


34 Fogelin, Wittgenstein, p. 82.

35 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Some Remarks on Logical Form", in Copi and Beard, eds., Essays, p. 35: "the mutual exclusion of unanalysable statements of degree contradicts an opinion which was published by me several years ago and which necessitated that atomic propositions could not exclude one another. I here deliberately say ‘exclude’ and not ‘contradict’, for there is a difference between these two notions, and atomic propositions, although they cannot contradict, may exclude one another”. Thus, Wittgenstein here introduces a new formal feature which propositions (such as those possessing colour terms) may manifest: exclusion. The logical product of two propositions which exclude one another is not a contradiction but neither is it a possibility—the logical product simply cannot be sensibly considered (ibid., pp. 36-37).

36 Fogelin, Wittgenstein, pp. 81-82.

37 Ibid., p. 82.

38 Pears, Wittgenstein, p. 85.

39 Ibid., p. 85.
That "describe" must here be taken as equivalent to "show" rather than "say" is clear from comparing 6.124 ("the propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world") with 6.11 ("the propositions of logic say nothing"). Also compare 6.22: "[the logic of the world] is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic."

It might at first appear that the more natural interpretation of 5.511 is that logic (as a sign-language) mirrors the world because of a shared logical form. This interpretation, however, makes the mirror-metaphor at 5.511 inconsistent with the mirror-metaphor at 4.121. Wittgenstein there says that "propositions cannot represent logical form; it is mirrored in them" when, on the preceding interpretation, one would have expected him to say that propositions cannot mirror logical form: it is present in them and allows them to mirror reality. The above interpretation avoids this inconsistency.

Finch uses this term to distinguish such objects from "objects of thought" and "objects of a picture [that is, objects in the widest sense: any depictable item]" (Finch, Wittgenstein—Early Philosophy, pp. 37-39).

Copi, "Objects, Properties, and Relations", in Copi and Beard, eds., Essays, p. 184.


Copi, "Objects, Properties, and Relations", in Copi and Beard, eds., Essays, pp. 184-185.


Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., pp. 8-9.

Ibid., pp. 10-11.

As Goddard and Judge point out, this creates a "three-tiered ontological system arranged thus in descending order: 1. Ordinary objects and facts 2. Atomic facts [that is, the existing, objective most basic configurations of substantial objects] 3. Objects [that is, subsisting substantial objects"] (Ibid., pp. 13-14).
CHAPTER TWO

Cf. K. T. Fann, *Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 24-25. Fann's diagram is useful but also misleading in that it appears to simply contrast saying and showing whereas showing underlies saying and makes it possible. Sense, senselessness and nonsense are indeed "what is said" but only because of "that which shows itself". Thus, Fann's statement "'sense', 'senselessness' and 'nonsense' are terms applicable solely to 'saying'--i.e. propositions" (ibid., p. 25) is not necessarily incorrect but is at least over-simplistic and misleading in its implications (see chapter one above).


5 Richard J. Bernstein, "Wittgenstein's Three Languages", in Copi and Beard, eds., *Essays*, p. 236.

6 Ibid., p. 236.

7 Ibid., p. 238.

8 Ibid., p. 235.

9 Ibid., p. 238.

10 Ibid., p. 242.

11 Ibid., p. 239.

12 Ibid., p. 243.

13 Ibid., p. 239.

14 Ibid., p.243.

15 Ibid., p. 238.

16 Ibid., p. 239.

17 Ibid., p. 236. The use of "describe" here as equivalent to "say" is, of course, not true to the *Tractatus* use of that term. See above: Chapter One, note 40.

18 Ibid., p. 238.
19Ibid., p. 243.
20Ibid., p. 243.
21Ibid., pp. 242-243.


23Fogelin, Wittgenstein, p. 92.
24Ibid., p. 92 (my emphasis).
25Ibid., p. 92.
26Black, Companion, p. 381.
27Ibid., p. 381.


30Ibid., p. 145.
31Ibid., p. 144.
32Ibid., p. 144 (my emphasis).
33Ibid., p. 145.
34Ibid., p. 145.

35Erik Stenius feels that there are three sources of need for a "non-depicting language" which in the context of the present discussion would mean three different uses for philosophical pseudo-propositions: "(i) To make statements as to how language works (ii) To make statements on the internal structure of reality and language . . . (iii) To make statements on what can be neither ‘shown’ nor ‘said’" (Stenius, Tractatus: A Critical Exposition, p. 208). I do not see a relevant distinction between (i) and (ii): if one makes a statement "as to how language works", then he has made a statement "on the internal structure of language" and vice versa. Also, it seems confused to say that "type-iii" statements "are nonsensical to
remarkable degree" (Ibid., p. 208) while, presumably, types "i"
and "ii" are nonsensical to a lesser degree: a statement is
either nonsensical or it is not and all statements here mentioned
are nonsensical. Further, as discussed above all nonsensical
statements must include something that neither shows itself nor
can be said, otherwise they would not be nonsensical. The only
distinction of possible relevance in Stenius' account is the
distinction between pseudo-propositions concerning the internal
structure of language and those concerning the internal structure
of reality—and even these must be closely linked.

37 Black, Companion, p. 381.
36 Ibid., p. 386.
38 Ibid., p. 386.
39 Ibid., p. 386.
40 Ibid., p. 386.

41 Cf.: "The Tractatus has so rigorously established its
case that it has arrived at the point of its own ‘overcoming’." (Cavalier, Tractatus: A Transcendental Critique, p. 204.

42 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, trans. Pears and McGuinness,
p. 4.

43 Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 18. Covert
philosophical nonsense is itself distinguishable from overt
nonsense: "for example, Chomskian sentences such as ‘Ideas
furiously green sleep’ are intuitively recognizable [overt] nonse" and would not be mistaken for genuine
propositions—unlike covert philosophical nonsense (Ibid., p.
18).

44 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

46 Fann, Wittgenstein’s Conception, p. 35. Hacker, of
course, also admits "to be sure, Wittgenstein does not use the
phrase ‘illuminating nonsense’" (Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p.
29).

47 Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 18.
48 Cf. Ibid., p. 29.
49 Harward, Saying and Showing, pp. 6-7.
CHAPTER THREE


2 Ibid., p. 11.

3 Ibid., p. 8.

4 Ibid., p. 8.

5 Ibid., p. 8.

6 Ibid., p. 10.

7 Ibid., p. 10.

8 Ibid., p. 8.

9 That such use of the term "mystical" is legitimate and traditional was shown by B. F. McGuinness in "The Mysticism of the Tractatus", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 75 (1966), pp. 320-328.
Bertrand Russell, in a letter of December 20, 1919, testifies that Wittgenstein's mysticism was serious and was an overwhelming influence in the latter's life: "I had felt in his book a flavour of mysticism, but was astonished when I found that he has become a complete mystic. He reads people like Kierkegaard and Angelus Silesius, and he seriously contemplates becoming a monk... He went on [military] duty to the town of Tarnow in Galicia, and happened to come upon a bookshop... he went inside and found that it contained just one book: Tolstoy on the Gospels. He bought it merely because there was no other. He read it and re-read it, and thenceforth had it always with him, under fire and at all times" (Bertrand Russell, in Wittgenstein, Letters to Russell, p. 82).


11 Ibid., p. 10.

12 Ibid., p. 10.


14 Ibid., 8.7.16, p. 74e.

15 Ibid., 24.7.16, p. 77e.

16 Ibid., 8.7.16, p. 74e.

17 Ibid., 8.7.16, p. 74e.

18 Ibid., 8.7.16, p. 74e.

19 Ibid., 1.8.16, p. 79e. That God is here claimed to be "how things stand" while at Tractatus 6.44 the mystical was said to be "not how things stand in the world... but that it exists" does not mean that "God" and "the mystical" do not refer to the same experience of the world. At Tractatus 6.44, Wittgenstein is referring to how particular states of affairs stand in the world while in the Notebooks entry of 1.8.16 he is referring to how the totality of states of affairs stand, that is, to the world viewed as "a limited whole", which at Tractatus 6.45 is also referred to as "the mystical".

20 Ibid., 8.7.16, p. 70e.

21 Ibid., 8.7.16, p. 74e.

22 Eddy Zemach, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of the Mystical" in Copi and Beard, eds., Essays, p. 361.

23 Ibid., p. 362.
24Ibid., p. 363.
25Ibid., p. 363.
26Ibid., p. 364.
27Ibid., p. 361.
28Ibid., p. 366.
29Ibid., p. 365.
30Ibid., p. 363.
31Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 8.7.16, p. 74e.
32Ibid., 5.7.16, p. 73e.
34Ibid., p. 3e.
36Ibid., pp. 5-6.
37Ibid., p. 6. Contrary to Theodore Redpath ("Wittgenstein and Ethics", in Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz, eds., Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972)), I do not think that it properly can be called an "objection" that the "right way to Granchester" could also mean "the way that yields the most pleasant walk" since, presumably, "the most pleasant walk" could also, on Wittgenstein's account, be systematically replaced by factual reports.
39Ibid., pp. 7-8.
40Ibid., p. 8.
41Ibid., pp. 6-7.
...
subject is demonstrated by the first sentence of this same notebook entry: "Good and evil only enter through the subject"; and the sentence immediately following this entry: "It is not the world of Idea that is either good or evil; but the willing subject".


61 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 8.7.16, p. 74e.

62 Wittgenstein here speaks of "wishing" rather than of "willing" when it seems that wishing must be of the phenomenal rather than of the transcendental will and only the latter is a godhead. Whether this is equivocation or merely speaking in a "popular sense", I think the point of the passage is clear: even if I am happy with what is the case, still my will did not bring about what is the case and my happiness is a fortunate coincidence.

63 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 8.7.16, p. 75e.

64 Ibid., 30.7.16, p. 78e.

65 Ibid., 30.7.16, p. 78e.

66 Ibid., 4.11.16, p. 87e.


68 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 4.11.16, p. 88e.


70 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 4.11.16, p. 88e.

71 Ibid., 4.11.16, p. 87e.

72 Finch, Wittgenstein--Early Philosophy, p. 162.

73 Ibid., p. 163.

74 As Jeremy Walker points out, it is not clear if for Wittgenstein willing requires an actual or merely a potential "object in the world" (Walker, "Early Theory of the Will", Idealistic Studies, p. 200), that is, it is not certain that I have willed at all if I will that which does not occur. It is not, however, important, to the present discussion whether or not, for instance, it is genuinely possible for me to have willed that the sun not rise given that it did rise and that I did not will that it should occur.
75Winch, "Wittgenstein's Treatment", *Ratio*, p. 46.


79Wittgenstein, *Notebooks*, 2.9.16, p. 82e.


82Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, p. 31e. The quotation is reported by the editors as from "Goethe, Faust, Part I (In the Study)" (*Ibid.*, p. 31e, n. 1).


84William Warren Bartley III has pursued such an interpretation of Wittgenstein's life as a school teacher after completion of the *Tractatus*: "... an attempt to put something like the Sermon on the Mount, as rendered by Tolstoy, into practice is to show rather than say something. That Wittgenstein was, either consciously or unconsciously, for better or for worse, engaging in an imitation of Christ is a possibility that cannot lightly be dismissed when one attempts to comprehend his extraordinary life in Trattenbach, Puchberg, and Otterthal between 1920 and 1926" (William Warren Bartley III, *Wittgenstein* [London: Quartet Books, 1977], p. 54). Bartley gives an intriguing account of Wittgenstein's life in that period and, I believe, presents a convincing case for such an interpretation. See especially, *Ibid.*, chapter 3, pp. 53-96.

Also, Berthold P. Reisterer has put the point nicely: "Yet granted the meaning of life can't be said, still it, as most other meanings, can be shown. Accordingly, at this point, we have to look at W.'s own life to see what it shows. There we find renunciation. After completing the *Tractatus*, W. gave away a considerable inherited fortune, withdrew from sophisticated cultural and academic life of Vienna and Cambridge and attempted to devote himself completely to the service of his fellow men. For him this meant teaching primary school in remote Austrian villages and working as a gardener for a monastery in a suburb of Vienna" (Berthold P. Reisterer, "Wittgenstein's Ethics", in Leinfellner, Leinfellner, Berghel, Hübner, eds., *Wittgenstein and His Impact*, p. 485).
See also: Dina Magnanini, "Tolstoy and Wittgenstein as 'Imitators of Christ'", in Leinfellner, Leinfellner, Berghel, Hübner, eds., 
Wittgenstein and His Impact, though this account draws largely upon that 
of Bartley mentioned above.

85Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 8.7.16, p. 75e.
86Ibid., 7.10.16, p. 83e.
87Ibid., 7.10.16, p. 83e.
88Engelmann, Letters, pp. 79-80.
89Wittgenstein, quoted in Ibid., p. 7.
90Engelmann, Letters, p. 85.
81Cf. Zemach, "Philosophy of the Mystical", in Copi and Beard, 
eds., Essays, pp. 373-374.
82Cf. "Once when questioned by a villager about his religion, Wittgenstein replied that although he was not a Christian, he was an 
'evangelist'" (Bartley, Wittgenstein, p. 71).
83Wittgenstein, quoted in Engelmann, Letters, p. 11.
84After having climbed the Tractarian ladder, one can, not only 
throw the ladder away, but see that the ladder itself was not essential. 
Several years after the publication of the Tractatus, in the same year as 
"A Lecture on Ethics", Wittgenstein wrote: "I might say: if the place I 
want to get to could only be reached by way of a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place I really have to get to is a place I must already be at now" (Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 1931, p. 7e). Paradoxically, this important realization can come for Wittgenstein only after having climbed the ladder.
85Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 86e.
86Wittgenstein, Investigations, I, 234, p. 87e.
87Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 85e.
88Ibid., p. 85e.
89Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, 
Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Basil 
100Ibid., p. 57.
101Ibid., p. 58.
The following remark by Finch is, therefore, exaggerated and misleading: "The gap between the Lecture on Ethics (1929 or 1930) and the Lectures on Religious Belief (1938) is shown by the difference between regarding religious belief as a seeming simile which is really nonsense and regarding it as the 'culmination of a form of life'" (Finch, Wittgenstein--Early Philosophy, p. 179). First, only the statement of religious belief, not the transcendental attitude of believing, was held to be nonsensical and that not necessarily in a pejorative sense. Further, Wittgenstein's view of religious belief in 1930 and as early as the Notebooks, 1914-1916 is of religion as essentially a way of living, that is, of "behavior" in the widest of senses. His view on religious language in 1938 and as late as 1950 is that it is important only insofar as it is a part of that way of living. Thus, religious belief, for Wittgenstein, was always related to the way one lives and statements of religious belief were always considered a useful but inessential aspect of living in a particular way.

Cavalier, Tractatus: A Transcendental Critique, p. 183.


CHAPTER FOUR


Ibid., 1, 664, p. 168e.

Ibid., 1, 107, p. 46e. The need to get "back to the rough ground" of actual instances of everyday language in order to escape the "intolerable" "requirement" of "crystalline" logic is, I believe, a direct parallel to Wittgenstein's much earlier remark to Engelmann that his actual ethical condition is "as plain as a sock on the jaw" and, thus, they need to "cut out" "the transcendental twaddle" (Wittgenstein, in Engelmann, Letters, p. 11).


Cf. Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 8. Kripke uses a different example from mathematics: "how do I know that '68 plus 57', as I meant 'plus' in the past, should denote 125?" (*Ibid.*, p. 12); that is, although I now mean "addition" by "plus" and, therefore, now mean that sum to denote 125, how do I know that in the past I did not mean something which I might now call "quaddition", in which case, to be consistent ("ruled") in my use of "plus", I should now also mean "quaddition" and, thus, mean that same sum to denote 5 (by definition of "quaddition", where "68 plus 57" denotes 5) (*Ibid.*, pp. 12ff.) The question, of course, does not regard the possibility of memory loss or some such but rather regards a challenge to how we know what we mean and, thus, how we can claim to consistently mean the same thing.


*Kripke, Wittgenstein*, pp. 22-32.


*Ibid.*, I, 190, p. 77e.


*Kripke, Wittgenstein*, pp. 42-43.


Ibid., I, 160, p. 64e.

Ibid., I, 160, p. 64e.

Ibid., I, 169-170, p. 64e.

Ibid., I, 165, p. 66e.

Ibid., I, 166 and 167, pp. 67e-68e.

Ibid., I, 166, p. 67e.

Ibid., I, 168, p. 68e.


29 John Canfield correctly points out that criteria are not the only considerations in determining meaning. He lists four other considerations: 1. "General facts about the way things are form the background for the use" (John V. Canfield, *Wittgenstein: Language and World* [Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1981], p. 72); 2. "Circumstances. One can distinguish the background conditions in which a language game is played from the circumstances in which it is played" (Ibid., p. 73); 3. "Another feature of use relevant to meaning is the role of an expression in a language game (that is, the social practices that give an expression a particular import in a particular society: for instance, "He is in pain" has a different role in a society that does not practice medicine than in one that does)" (Ibid., p. 74); 4. "Finally, there is the question of the (full) depth grammar of a criterially governed expression" (Ibid., p. 74). By the last consideration, Canfield intends the various other depth grammatical remarks clustered around criterial statements. For instance, "No criterion governs the use of 'I am in pain'" (Ibid., p. 75) is a non-criterial depth grammatical remark; or, someone having said, "I am in pain", it is possible (that is, sensible, meaningful, useful) for another to verify this by testifying "He is in pain" (Ibid., p. 75); Canfield gives three other examples (Ibid., p. 75). Due to these considerations, it is not simply the case either that "if the criterion changes, the meaning changes" (Ibid., p. 70) nor that "if the criterion remains the same, the meaning remains the same" (Ibid., p. 70).

I do not wish to dispute these considerations, *per se*, but I think that it is clear that they are of peripheral interest both to a discussion of Wittgenstein's texts and to a discussion of the implications of meaning as use. Also, they are conceptually secondary to criteria in that they can only come into consideration due to and in terms of criteria. Thus, I discuss the concepts of meaning as use and of depth grammar in terms of criteria alone.
For instance, when continuing the above mentioned number series, a person will say that the series is generated by starting with 1 and continually adding 1 and will insist that this is the right and proper rule to follow. This is, of course, true but misses the deeper point.

Canfield, Wittgenstein, pp. 42-51 and 79-95.


Canfield, Wittgenstein, p. 46.


Ibid., I, 496, p. 138e.

Ibid., I, 144, p. 57e.

Ibid., I, 6, p. 4e.

Ibid., I, 5, p. 4e.

Ibid., I, 206, p. 82e.

Jonathan Lear speaks of this in terms of "mindedness": when we attempt to imagine genuinely "other-minded" beings "we verge on incoherence and nonsense", thus, the only "minded" beings we can at all imagine or conceive of are "like-minded" (Jonathan Lear, "Leaving the World Alone", Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79 [1982], p. 336).

Wittgenstein Investigations, I, 206, p 82e.

Ibid., I, 208, pp. 82e-83e.

Ibid., I, 208, p. 83e.

Ibid., I, 71, 34e.

Ibid., I, 217, p. 85e.


Wittgenstein, Investigations, I, 143, p. 56e.
50 Ibid., I, 211, p. 84e.


52 Ibid., 300, p. 55e.


54 Wittgenstein, *Certainty*, 559, p. 73e.


57 Wittgenstein, *Certainty*, 140, p. 21e.

58 Ibid., 141, p. 21e.

59 Ibid., 142, p. 21e.

60 Ibid., 93-94, pp. 14e-15e.

61 Ibid., 94, p. 15e.

62 Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 1931, p. 16e.

63 Wittgenstein, *Certainty*, 95, p. 15e.

64 Ibid., 105, p. 16e.

65 Ibid., 88, p. 13e.

66 Ibid., 152, p. 22e.


68 Goddard and Judge, *Metaphysics of "Tractatus"*, p. 69.

69 Ibid., p. 69.

70 Wittgenstein, *Certainty*, 200, p. 27e.


73 Ibid., 509, 66e.

74 Ibid., 191, p. 27e.

76Ibid., I, 241, p. 88e.

77Wittgenstein, *Certainty*, 262, p. 34e.

78Ibid., 92, p. 14e.

79Ibid., 359, p. 47e.


83Ibid., p. 99.

84Ibid., p. 99.

85For which see: Ibid., pp. 100-114.

86Ibid., p. 114.

87Ibid., p. 99.


90Cf. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 1950, p. 86e: "Life can educate one to believe in God".

91Cf. Gill, *Wittgenstein and Metaphor*, p. 101, where Gill stresses the "symbiotic" character of the "dynamic relation between it [language] and the world" and also, p. 145: "in a way Wittgenstein has come full circle: in the *Tractatus* he sought to explain the natural world on the basis of logical thought, in the *Investigations* he sought to explain logical thought on the basis of social activity, and in *On Certainty* he seeks to explain social activity on the basis of the natural world".

92Jerry Gill has done a detailed analysis of the metaphors in
Wittgenstein's best known works (cf. Gill, *Wittgenstein and Metaphor*, pp. 73-147). While I do not take exception to Gill's general thesis that Wittgenstein's metaphors develop from the static to the animate and that this reflects the change in his views on language nor to the general thesis that the metaphors are necessary to Wittgenstein's exegesis of language, still I think that the distinction which Gill draws between the *Tractatus* and the later writings is too sharp, based on too narrow a view of the concept of showing. Gill, for instance, writes: "His early work arose out of a rarified academic environment in which mathematics and logic played an important role. His later work, on the other hand, arose out of a fifteen year period away from philosophy..." (*Ibid*, p. 122).

Firstly, the early work was not written purely in an academic environment but also on the battlefields of World War One. More importantly, as argued in chapter three, the "fifteen year period away from philosophy" is more accurately described as a fifteen year period away from the academic environment due to Wittgenstein's views on showing the ethical in one's life, as outlined in his philosophy.

The exaggerated contrast which Gill draws, due to lack of sensitivity to the full meaning of "showing" in the *Tractatus*, is continued when he writes: "in form the two books [*Tractatus* and *Investigations*] are similar in the sense that they both rely heavily on metaphorical expression and understanding. They differ in that the content of the one [*Tractatus*] leaves no room for such expressions and understandings, while that of the other not only makes room for them, but places them at the heart of language" (*Ibid.*, p. 159).

The *Tractatus* leaves no room for metaphorical expressions as literally sensible but it does entail a doctrine of showing with nonsense and, therefore, of showing with metaphor—this is the point of the ladder metaphor at the end of the *Tractatus*. Given the broader view of showing, there was no reason for Wittgenstein to "show the slightest tendency toward being embarrassed about his frequent, indeed pivotal, use of metaphor" (*Ibid.*, p. 159) in the *Tractatus* any more than to feel such of its use in the *Investigations*. Thus, although there is, as Gill says, "tension" in the *Tractatus* (*Ibid.*, p. 162), this need not be seen as due to the contradiction of an "official" reductionist view by an "unofficial" metaphorical view, but rather as the paradox inherent in any consideration of the ineffable.

**CHAPTER FIVE**

1Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, p. 63e.


Hacker suggests that there are at least five sources of error implicit in language use, emphasizing that his classification "has no pretensions to completeness or exclusiveness" (Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, p. 128). Illusion can result from "(1) superficial analogies in the surface grammar of language, (2) the phenomenology of the use of language [that is, experiences had by a language user while using language], (3) pictures or archetypes embedded in language, (4) the model or presentation and solution of problems in the natural sciences, (5) natural cravings and dispositions of reason" (ibid., pp. 128-129). These five can, I believe, be reduced to one: misunderstanding depth grammar in terms of surface grammar. Thus, in a sense, Hacker's points (2) through (4) are merely special cases of his point (1). The language user's experience of the "meaningfulness of words" becomes misleading when, after attempting to formulate this experience in words, the sentence so formed has the same surface grammar as any sentence describing any experience of the world: the superficial analogy leads the language user to misunderstand "the phenomenology of the use of language" (cf. ibid., pp. 130-131). Similarly, the pictures "embedded" in language use become misleading because they are not recognized as part of the mythology of language due to their "superficial analogy" with surface grammatical pictures of the world (cf. ibid., pp. 131-133). Scientific models can become particular instances of misleading pictures: we do not recognize them as mythological presuppositions of certain language-games and, thus, superficially, take them to constitute an observation concerning the nature of reality (cf. ibid., pp. 133-134). Finally, Hacker's point (5) is an observation of that which lies behind all language use, correct or nonsensical: per se, it need not result in error and if it does so, then it will again be due to our having misunderstood the depth grammar in terms of surface grammar (cf. ibid., pp. 134-135).


Ibid., I, 122, p. 49e.

Both Kenny and Hacker point out the continuity of Wittgenstein's view that philosophy must be descriptive and is not a natural science (cf. Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, pp. 229-230; Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, pp. 116-119) but neither mention the connection that this has with elucidation and, thus, with the philosopher's showing of that which cannot be said. Consequently, both Kenny and Hacker miss the true import of the continuity they point out.

12Ibid., I, 124, p. 49e.
13Ibid., I, 126, p. 50e.
14Ibid., I, 128, p. 50e.
16Ibid., p. 122.
17Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, 467, p. 83e.
19Ibid., I, 133, p. 51e.
27Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, p. 113, n. 3.
28Ibid., p. 115.
31Ibid., I, 116, p. 48e.
32Ibid., I, 593, p. 155e.
33Ibid., I, 127, p. 50e.
34Ibid., I, 66, p. 31e.
35Ibid., I, 211, p. 84e.
36Ibid., I, 265, p. 94e.


38Ibid., pp. 29-30.

39Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 11e.


41Wittgenstein, Zettel, 460. p. 82e.


44Ibid., p. 401.


46Wittgenstein, Zettel, 314, p. 58e.


50Ibid., p. 19.

51Ibid., pp. 18-19.


53Ibid., p. 184.


Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 1931, p. 18e.


Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein, p. 16.

CONCLUSION

1Harward, Saying and Showing.
2Hallett, Meaning as Use, p. 87.
3Ibid., p. 87.
4Ibid., p. 88.
5Wittgenstein, Investigations, I, 208, p. 83e.
6Ibid., I, 211, p. 84e.

8Ibid., p. 2.
9Ibid., p. 17.
11Ibid., p. 15.
12Pears, Wittgenstein, p. 95.
13Ibid., p. 96.
14Ibid., p. 97
15Cavalier, Tractatus: A Transcendental Critique.
16Rossvaer, "Philosophy as an Art Form", Johannessens and Nordenstam, eds., Wittgenstein, p. 30 (my emphasis).
17Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 30e.
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