

AESTHETICS IN THE AGE OF REASON

AESTHETICS IN THE AGE OF REASON

By

LOUIS ROCHON, B.A.

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

(c) Louis Rochon, May, 1989

MASTER OF ARTS
(Philosophy)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Aesthetics in the Age of Reason

AUTHOR: Louis Rochon, B.A. (Ottawa)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. Evan Simpson

NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 119

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the societal forces which have helped shape the present-day form of the institutionalization, criticism, and appreciation of art. Specifically, it examines the influence of modern thought on our present understanding of art. First, we examine how modernists have typically looked at art. Both the enlightening aspects as well as the deficiencies of modernist aesthetics are uncovered. Also, with the help of Jürgen Habermas, we examine a modernist societal approach to aesthetics. Second, the fundamental philosophical presuppositions of modernity are uncovered so that the societal forces that have helped to make art an autonomous institutionalized field of expertise can be examined. In passing, we discuss the concept of "lifeworld". We then examine the explanatory powers of considering the arts as forms of language. Third, as Habermas's social theory indicates, an excursion into the theory of argumentation provides indications of the mechanisms involved in the understanding of art. We consider the rhetorical, dialectical, and logical aspects of both non-verbal and linguistic argumentation. This provides us with a forum for discussing Habermas's notion of an ideal speech situation, Gadamer's concept of the various modes of

experiencing tradition and its parallel with the experiencing of art, and Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation and what it implies for non-verbal forms of art. Fourth, we examine the implications and explanatory powers of Habermas's three-world distinction, which is, in turn, derived from the modernist presupposition of the distinction between subject and object. With these distinctions, we can see that the existence of a highly specialized field of expertise surrounding art and notions such as "art for art's sake" are not accidental. To conclude, we examine emotional life and its implications for modern notions of art.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Evan Simpson for his careful, patient, and detailed comments on this thesis, and Dr. Gary Madison for his suggestions on how to improve the overall structure. Both of these philosophers have provided me with many enlightening insights which have greatly improved this work.

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Raymond and Carmel, who have supported me in many ways over the years.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE
MODERNISTS LOOK AT ART. 8

CHAPTER TWO
REFLECTIONS ON ART, RATIONALITY,
LIFEWORLD, AND LANGUAGE27

CHAPTER THREE
ART AND THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION:
THE ROLE OF RHETORIC, DIALECTIC, AND LOGIC.49

CHAPTER FOUR
ART AND THE THREE-WORLD DISTINCTION74

CONCLUSION98

REFERENCES 110

BIBLIOGRAPHY 118

Introduction

Philosophers have traditionally taken on the task of trying to understand the creation, meaning, and use of works of art. In the Twentieth Century, we seem no closer to understanding these aspects of art than was Plato over 2000 years ago. This is a peculiar situation when one thinks of it, since there were times in the history of Western culture when people seemed to have understood these aspects of art. For example, in Medieval times, the Orthodox Church used art as a method of teaching dogma to illiterate followers. The early Russian icon painters represented a particular dogma in pictorial form by following a rather strict style book called a "Podlinniki."¹ This style book amounts to an aesthetic theory because it encompasses a philosophy of representation. Icon painters presented scenes in accordance with the Podlinniki, and the Church followers could easily decipher the meaning of an icon given the constancy of the means of representation.

Today, the situation is not as simple. We do not think of the creation of art as simply a craft, but rather, we seem to think that there is an elusive aspect to the creation of art: an aspect that we sometimes represent by troublesome expressions such as "the artist's imagination".

The meaning of art cannot be construed from its use, as it was for the Russian icon. Rather, we construe the use of art extremely vaguely: self-justificatory notions of art such as "art for art's sake" seem to be contradicted by indications of the great worth of art, such as the existence of prized national museums and the seemingly outrageous prices paid for art by dead masters. Also, some current trends of thought, such as the notion that "form follows function," point towards the uselessness of the merely decorative--gargoyles are very rarely found in contemporary architecture--while we sometimes think of the merely functional as being splendidly decorative--halogen desk lamps have become the rage of late, but their form simply follows the function of lighting a specific area.

A quick glance at the present-day situation can give the impression that the art world is, at least partially, in a state of chaos. This is simply an illusion. There are forces which give and have given the art world its present form. Uncovering these forces is one of the main tasks of this thesis. That is, what we think art is has been shaped by a set of presuppositions that forms a system of thought that can be called "modernity". Once the idea of modernity is better understood, we can have a clearer notion of the situation of art.

What is modernity? This is a difficult question. The word "modern" in the expressions "modern art," "modern

philosophy," "modern science" has different connotations. To avoid complications, I will consider the word "modern" only in connection with philosophy, and I will define "post-modern" negatively by calling it what is subsequent to, and not, "modern". For the purposes of this thesis, I will define as "modern" those philosophies which implicitly or explicitly presuppose and deploy both a radical distinction between subject and object and the possibility of apodictic truth. René Descartes, with his spiritual soul that knows of its existence with certainty, and with his corporeal world whose existence can only be proven with the help of a non-deceptive God, is certainly a modern philosopher. Modern philosophy has a long and great tradition which has certainly left deep impressions on the form and how our thinking of society, culture, and art. Even to this day, there are many modernist philosophers. As we will see, Jürgen Habermas goes one step further with the subject/object distinction by positing a subject/object/social distinction. As a modernist, Habermas radically maintains this distinction since, as David Ingram writes,

In Habermas's opinion, the foundation of fundamental ontology, the authentic self, is ultimately revealed as none other than the pure spontaneity, or freedom, of the transcendental ego.²

Habermas also believes in the truth-finding powers of rationality. According to Seyla Benhabib,

Habermas stresses that the destruction of the unity of reason does not mean a general

loss of rationality. Even if, as regards the substantive content of ideologies and world-views, the loss of meaning is irreversible, the unity of reason can be preserved via those communication processes through which validity claims can be redeemed. The new paradigm of rationality is not *substantive* but *discursive*.³

The very modernism of Habermas can be, and is, criticized. However, there is a point where the criticism is questionable. Because of the scope and depth of his work, Habermas is able to reveal how modernist thought influenced the structures, and our thoughts concerning the structures, of society, culture, and art. Habermas accomplishes this, not in spite of, but because of, his modernist presuppositions. Therefore, a close examination of Habermas's thoughts will enable us to better understand present-day institutionalization and our notions of art. Our world is one that has been formed in part by modernism. It is by studying a modernist that we can best understand the result of modernist thought.

Despite all this, there is a point where suspending criticism of the presuppositions of modernism is not useful. If we are to study art and try to formulate an aesthetic theory, holding on to unexamined and unquestioned presuppositions does not seem appropriate. Hence, we must confront philosophical questions concerning art and aesthetics directly.

Perhaps the most appropriate philosophical question we can pose at this point is "How do we understand art?".

This one question has three others imbedded within it: namely, "What is understanding?", "What is art?", and "Who are we?". The first of these three questions is philosophical since it has to do with epistemology. The second question, "What is art?", as been answered usually from within philosophical systems, or from within specialized aesthetic theories that do not directly deal with, but generally do not seek to contradict, larger philosophical systems. "Who are we?" may also be answered philosophically, since it may involve the problematic notions of intersubjectivity, culture, society, and community.

Of course, there are answers to the question "How do we understand art?" within the modernist tradition. By examining modernist thought, we can get hold of modern aesthetic presuppositions, which gives us an opportunity to surpass the aspects of modern aesthetics that we deem incorrect. In short, by making our task to be an examination of modern thought, we can shed light on the present conditions of art and aesthetics, and, if deemed necessary, we can try to see beyond these conditions. The work of Jürgen Habermas is particularly well suited for this task, given its scope, depth, and modernist presuppositions.

This thesis will approach the task outlined above in the following manner. In Chapter One, we will examine how modernists look at art. Of course, there is no simple way of examining all modernist aesthetic theories, but we can, with

the help of Morris Weitz, examine their role. Then, with the help of Emily Carr, I will show how ideas of aesthetics and of art depend on social and cultural conditions. Finally, I will examine Habermas's notions of art as they are presented in his article "Modernity versus Postmodernity".

Chapter Two will be reflections on the role of modernist social and cultural theory in understanding art and aesthetics. With the help of Habermas's *Theory of Communicative Action*, some of the fundamental philosophical presuppositions of modernity will be uncovered. Such notions as rationality, grounding, validity claims, and lifeworld will be examined insofar as they can bridge the gap between social theory and aesthetics. Finally, I will argue that the concept of language can effectively bridge this gap.

In Chapter Three, I will look at what can be learned from considering art as language by exploring Habermas's theory of argumentation. This will amount to an examination of the rhetoric, dialectic, and logic of art. As we will see, the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer is very useful in this connection.

Finally, in Chapter Four, I will examine various versions of the three-fold distinction between the objective, subjective, and social worlds. Habermas's own three-fold distinction will be examined closely, since with it I will be able to explain some of the societal effects of modernist thinking on the creation, meaning, and use of

works of art. As I hope to show, it is no accident that in contemporary Western society art can be construed as superfluous, almost useless, and merely the subjective expression of individuals. I will end this chapter and conclude this thesis by introducing some notions concerning how we can surpass the present condition of art.

1. Modernists Look at Art

Since the beginning of modern era, many theories of aesthetics have been written, and then forgotten. Except for a few notable exceptions, contemporary studies in aesthetics tend to ignore the work of aestheticians of the past. Thus, the aesthetic writings of otherwise great authors, such as Edmund Burke, Samuel Coleridge, and Leo Tolstoy, are either ignored or examined as historical curiosities. Why is this? Not infrequently, once we examine any of these past theories of art, we find that they are simply no longer applicable: they fail to make an intelligible interpretation of a work of art created after the theory was written. For example, Tolstoy's theory of Emotionalism fails to enlighten us concerning some contemporary works of art. The phenomenon refutes the theory, as it were. If this is so, what are we to make of these theories?

The first task of this Chapter is to examine one answer to this question: namely, Morris Weitz's "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics". The second task is to pick up where Weitz leaves off. I hope to show, through an examination of Emily Carr's *Klee Wyck*, how in fact ideas of aesthetics depend on cultural and social conditions. Finally, the third task is to examine Jürgen Habermas's article "Modernity

versus Postmodernity". This, I hope, will set the stage for an exploration into the conditions and presuppositions of aesthetics in the age of modernity.

In "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," Weitz critically examines theories of art, such as Formalism, Emotionalism, Intellectualism, and Organicism, from the point of view of the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. Weitz recognizes the importance of aesthetic theories, and for this reason he does not wish to undermine them. Rather Weitz wants to criticize art theorists who attempt to provide necessary and sufficient defining properties of art.¹ Despite the fact that Weitz proves to his satisfaction that discovering such defining features is impossible, he nevertheless writes that "aesthetic theory...is important not only in itself but for the foundations of both appreciation and criticism."²

Now, for Weitz, a definition of art is impossible since the logic of the concept of art shows that it has no set of necessary and sufficient properties. To uncover the true logic of the concept art, he adopts the method Wittgenstein uses in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein recommends that we "...don't think, but look!"³ For him, this means that one should not assume that there is an essence to, say, games. Rather, one should look and see if there is anything in common to all games. Upon examining particular games, such as chess, baseball, card games and so

on, one finds nothing in common to all of them, no necessary and sufficient set of properties which can constitute a definition. As a result of looking at the actual use of the word "game," writes Wittgenstein, one finds "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing...."⁴

Weitz shows that there can be no definition of art, insofar as any such definition attempts to provide a set of necessary and sufficient properties, by simply plugging in the word "art" where Wittgenstein uses the word "game". According to Weitz, no one set of common properties belong to the set of objects that we call "art". Thus, the properties which belong to the objects we call "art" are merely "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing...."⁵

From within the framework of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, Weitz introduces the distinction between open and closed concepts. According to Weitz, "a concept is open if its condition of application are emendable and corrigible...."⁶ Art, he claims, is an open concept. To illustrate his point, Weitz demonstrates the openness of one of the sub-concepts of art, namely "novels," by posing the question "Is Joyce's *Finnegan's Wake* a novel?". Weitz writes that many of the typical elements of a novel are not found in Joyce's book, and that Joyce himself introduced elements never previously found in novels. But if *Finnegan's Wake* is found to be a novel, "the concept [of the novel] is extended

and a new phase of the novel is engendered."⁷ Thus, one can see why Weitz considers "art" to be an open concept, just as its sub-concepts of "novels," "comedy," "tragedy" and so on, are open concepts. Of course, there are exceptions, according to Weitz: the Greek Tragedy for instance, because of its theory, definition, and outlined common properties, proves to be a closed sub-concept of art. Art itself is an open concept, for just as the sub-concept "novel" may have to accommodate *Finnegan's Wake*, so "art" itself should be emendable in order to allow us to call objects such as Marcel Duchamp's *The Fountain* (a.k.a. *The Urinal*) works of art. There is no way of determining beforehand what objects can, and will, be appreciated aesthetically or even end up in a museum.

I am not sure that Wittgenstein would have appreciated Weitz's distinction between open and closed concepts. The idea of a closed concept seems dangerously close to the idea of atoms of propositions that Wittgenstein seeks to avoid in his later work. There may be no such thing as a totally closed concept. Weitz writes that

[Concepts are closed] only in logic or mathematics where concepts are constructed and completely defined. It cannot occur with empirically-descriptive and normative concepts unless we arbitrarily close them by stipulating the ranges of their uses.⁸

But perhaps even mathematics and logic do not have closed concepts. As Wittgenstein asks, "why do we call something a 'number'?"⁹ As he says, the concept "number" spins a thread:

...a thread we twist fibre on fibre. and the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.¹⁰

Mathematics, the "thread," uses many conceptions of "number," the "fibres," all having family resemblances. Even if we gave the concept of "number" rigid limits, there would still in fact be a variety, although a restricted one, of different uses, and hence concepts, of "number". Also, if we take into consideration W.V. Quine's critique of the distinction between analytic and synthetic,¹¹ we can see that Weitz's distinction between open and closed concepts cannot be feasible. Hence, aesthetic theories that presuppose the possibility of closed concepts are mistaken. However, this does not prevent these theories from helping us understand certain types of art. The mistake comes when the authors of such theories attempt to define the necessary and sufficient properties of *all* art. After all, we can hardly think of the concepts of art as being more rigid than those of logic.

All this leads to the conclusion that all concepts are, in one way or another, open. But this does not mean that mathematics is open to political or moral dictates, for example. Each concept is open immediately to some possibilities, and more indirectly to others. For example, the concept "game" incorporates "Monopoly" immediately within itself, but it assimilates "war games" somewhat indirectly and only via an imaginative metaphor. I will be arguing in

Chapter Three that there are reasons why certain concepts are open to some emendations and not to others.

Weitz himself believes that there are two ways in which the concept "art" is open. The concept can be in need of correction and emendation either because a) there is a new object that we wish to include as art which normally does not fall within that sphere of objects, or b) there is an object that we agree is art, but it requires new criteria for its evaluation and appreciation. This corresponds to what Weitz describes as the logic of a) "X is a work of art" as criterion of recognition, and b) "X is a work of art" as criterion of evaluation.¹² Thus, for Weitz, art is an open concept insofar as a) one can recognize Duchamp's *The Fountain* as a work of art, and b) one can judge Picasso's *Guernica* in terms other than those used to evaluate paintings that use natural perspectives.

Note here that Weitz makes a clear-cut distinction between the recognition of art and its evaluation. According to him, some aesthetic theorists confuse the descriptive and evaluative use of the word "art". In the evaluative sense, he writes that "X is a work of art" means, as in the case of the Formalists for example, either (1) "X is a successful harmonization" or (2) X is a work of art "on the basis of its successful harmonization."¹³ In essence, Weitz complains that the theorists evaluate how praiseworthy art is using (2), and then turn around and formulate a definition, and

hence criteria of recognition, on the basis of (1). Weitz then tries to show the circular nature of the theorists' procedure by positing the existence of a bad work of art. Given that a bad work of art is not a proper basis for the evaluation of "praiseworthiness" (on the basis of successful harmonization, for the Formalists), then the bad work of art would have few of the features by which we call something art (successful harmonization). Therefore, the bad work of art is not art, since it has few or none of the necessary features.¹⁴ In other words, Weitz believes that some of the theorists' procedures lead to the assumption that there is only one way of judging something to be art, which might consequently lead to a judgment of a generally recognized work of art that it is not art at all.

Insofar as art theorists do what Weitz suggests they do, his analysis seems quite correct. It seems to work in the case of Tolstoy and his theory of aesthetic emotions, for example, and also for Clive Bell's and Northrop Frye's theories of significant form. John Cage's piece for piano entitled "4'33" is an example of an art work with neither much form nor emotional content.*

*Of course, whether or not "4'33" is a work of art is debatable and raises many questions. On one interpretation, it could be said that the art lies in the fact that Cage, a prominent musician, offers this as a work of art. In this case, the effects on society of "4'33" are themselves the work of art--a concept that, as we shall see in Chapter Four, Jürgen Habermas will declare to be non-rationalizable.

Weitz's distinction between descriptive and evaluative criteria in the logic of "X is a work of art" is perhaps too radical. If one describes something as a work of art, then perhaps one is already making an evaluative judgment, even if such an evaluation is formed on the basis of unreflective preconceptions. Although paint-by-numbers are not found in art museums (yet), they are nevertheless looked at as aesthetic objects.

As criteria by which one describes something as art evoke evaluative criteria, the reverse situation can also be true. That is, criteria by which one judges something to have aesthetic value can become the criteria by which one judges something to be art. This is in fact what Weitz accuses some aesthetic theorists of doing. In a peculiar way, it seems that the theorists' confused logic can result in rather brilliant and original art. Andy Warhol's *Three Boxes of Brillo*, for example, seems to be a case where objects which are usually considered as having no aesthetic value are evaluated as having positive aesthetic qualities, and are thereby rendered, or defined, as art objects. Warhol forces the viewer to evaluate the boxes of brillo using the same criteria which determine the aesthetic qualities of other contemporaneous objects clearly regarded as art.

Despite its shortcomings, Weitz's article does provide us with prolegomena to aesthetic theories. As Weitz sees it, attempts to generate a set of universal defining

features and evaluative standards for art have failed. And, given the "open" nature of the concept of art, such attempts are bound to fail. Nevertheless, such theories have an important role to play with respect to certain types of art, since, as Weitz says, they are the foundations for criticism and appreciation.

Why are some theories favoured rather than others? Why do aesthetic theories, which are used to both produce and evaluate art, seem to come in and out of fashion? Certainly each theory has its inner logic, but is there a logic by which these theories are evaluated vis-à-vis each other?

Emily Carr's *Klee Wyck* may provide some clues on how to answer these questions. In *Klee Wyck*, Carr writes of her experiences with Canadian West Coast Indians. According to Carr, the art of these Indians was fully integrated with other aspects of life: the totem poles, for example, were used as door holes and funeral casket holders. The Indians drew no distinctions, as we do, between art, daily life, and nature. "Houses and people were alike. Wind, rain, forest and sea had done the same to both--both were soaked through and through with sunshine."¹⁵ Carr describes how the Indians disliked having their pictures drawn, since they believed that part of their spirit would be trapped in the image after they were dead.¹⁶ Images and totem poles were not created only for aesthetic gratification. Rather, they were

expressions of the Indians' spiritual life. A man's totem pole told who the Indian was, and who he could marry:

You know also by the totem what sort of man he was or at least what he should be because men tried to be like the creature of their crest, fierce, or brave, or wise, or strong.¹⁷

The Indian explicitly identifies himself with the creatures of nature he has represented in his totem pole. The Indian is to become part of nature, and the union is signified in the art of the totem.

Klee Wyck indicates how art functions in society, and in particular, Indian society. Carr's message seems to be that we cannot fully understand Indian art until we are at least partially immersed in Indian culture. Surely, the expressions of Carr's own paintings would not have been possible without her trips to the forests of the Queen Charlotte Islands.* Carr's book suggests to the reader that we must go one step further than what Weitz suggests in a quest to conceive how we understand art: theories of art cannot in principle uncover the essential properties of art, but the same theories express social assumptions and presuppositions by which we criticize and evaluate art. This, in turn, raises questions concerning the role of aesthetics in society. In the Western world, theories of aesthetics come in and out of fashion because of forces, yet unknown, in

* Carr's painting *Blunden Harbour* is able to convey to us the intense spirituality the totems poles have for the Indians.

society. As the *Klee Wyck* example indicates, if we better understand the role of aesthetics in society, we can better understand what is expected in terms of theories of art. We do not treat art the same way the Haida Indians treat their totem poles. Therefore, it is with a discussion of the societal role of aesthetics that I wish to begin my analysis of art. In the article "Modernity versus Postmodernity," Jürgen Habermas provides a brief analysis of the societal role of aesthetics. This article can perhaps direct us to a starting point for our investigation.

According to Habermas, aesthetic modernity first assumed a clear contour in the works of Baudelaire, and then evolved into the various avant-garde movements, and finally reached a climax in Dadaism and Surrealism.¹⁸ As Habermas writes, "Aesthetic modernity is characterized by attitudes which find a common focus in a changed consciousness of time."¹⁹ The avant-garde artists, who exemplify the consciousness of modernity, struggle towards the undefined future and thereby exalt the present. "Modernity revolts against the normalizing functions of tradition...."²⁰ Avant-gardism is a play against the false normativity of history. We might characterize aesthetic modernism, as Habermas seems to do, as a cult of the "new". But everything new is eventually outmoded, and modernism focuses its attention on the novelty of the next style.²¹

Habermas seems to be correct on these points: there is an element in the ideology of modernity which dictates that we ought to usurp and surpass past accomplishments in any given field. The predominance of the idea of progress in Western society seems to coincide with modernity. But I'm not quite sure that "We observe the anarchistic intention of blowing up the continuum of history...."²² It seems to me that we ought to analyze aesthetic modernity in more depth than Habermas does if we are to permit ourselves such a blanket statement. Besides this point, it seems to me that changes in the aesthetic consciousness of the artists of Western society are caused not only by the introduction of a superstructural ideology such as modernity, but the change of consciousness is also affected by changes in the technological infrastructure involved in the production of art. That is, the introduction of photography, for example, adds a new dimension to the set of raw materials by which artists exercise their expertise. With the introduction of photography comes a decrease in demand for the representational family portrait style of paintings. In order to survive, artists have to adjust to this new situation. To say that the Dadaists and Surrealists are simply reacting to the introduction of photography would obviously be an oversimplification of the matter, but we cannot ignore changes in the aesthetic infrastructure, and we must

consequently take them into account in an analysis of the role of aesthetics in society.

Next, Habermas discusses the decline and fall of aesthetic modernism. The avant-garde artist, who sought to break with tradition, himself developed a tradition throughout the twentieth century. "Post-avant-garde" art, writes Habermas, is the term "...chosen to indicate the failure of the Surrealist rebellion."²³ He argues against Daniel Bell's position that "...the crises of the developed societies of the West are to be traced back to the split between culture and society."²⁴ Bell's view is that aesthetic modernism gives the individual of this culture a temperament characterized by hedonistic motives which conflict with and contradict the principles of societal modernity. The latter demands of the individual "...the moral basis of a purposive rational conduct of life."²⁵ Modernist culture, which has infected the lifeworld, conflicts with modern society.

As Habermas points out, the discontentment which people have with what Bell calls "society"--the politico-economic segments of life--is

...rooted in deep seated reactions against the process of *societal* modernization. Under the pressures of the dynamics of economic growth and the organized accomplishments of the state, this social modernization penetrates deeper and deeper into previous forms of human existence. I would describe this subordination of the lifeworlds under system's imperative as a matter of disturbing the communicative infrastructure of everyday life.²⁶

What had been the task of culture was taken over by modern societal structures. The task of passing on cultural tradition, of social integration, and of socialization have been taken over by those who deploy economic and administrative rationality--a rationality, Habermas is quick to point out, which is itself dependent upon communicative rationality.²⁷ For Habermas, all types of rationality ultimately have communicative rationality as their foundation. Given his analysis of societal modernization, it is therefore reasonable for him to say that only when "...we dispense with the usual concentration upon art..." the "project of modernity" comes into focus.²⁸

Habermas responds to Bell by saying that his

...neoconservative doctrine blurs the relationship between the welcomed process of societal modernization on the one hand, and the lamented cultural development on the other. The neoconservative does not uncover the economic and social causes for the altered attitude towards work, consumption, achievement, and leisure.²⁹

In other words, Habermas believes that it is not modern culture which conflicts with modern society, but rather modern society conflicts with itself, via internal contradictions caused by the deployment of a societal economic and administrative rationality. Those who deploy this rationality do not realize its dependence on communicative rationality. This in turn, may give rise to a conflict between culture and society. As it stands, Habermas's analysis seems to me to be quite correct, for it appears to be more likely

that any sustained dissatisfaction with a particular organization in society must come from reflections on that organization itself, although the discontentment can be initiated from outside. That is, the hedonistic individual may well criticize life based on the morals of purposive rationality, but his criticisms will fall on deaf ears since he criticizes purposive rational conduct from outside, rather than from inside, that rationality. The outside view does not seem to permit constructive criticism as does the inside view. Sustained criticism is possible only from the inside since the criticism relies on the self-contradictory nature of modern society. Both Habermas's and Bell's analyses presuppose that there is a deep division between culture and society, between the aesthetic-hedonistic life and the politico-economic life. We must see why Habermas believes there is this division. As we will see, it is by this division that Habermas explains the position of aesthetics in modern society.

Along with Alfred Schutz, Habermas sees

...the lifeworld as the unthematically given horizon within which participants in communication move in common when they refer thematically to something in the world.³⁰

Participants in communication can problematize segments of the lifeworld itself by adopting a reflective attitude. They cannot objectify the whole of the lifeworld, however, but only segments of it, and even this occurs against a background of unquestioned lifeworld presuppositions.

As the communicative interactions between members of a community become more complex, what might be called a "division of communicative labour" appears. Societies which evolve into a situation where there exists political stratification of classes first exhibit such a division, according to Habermas.³¹ In a stratified society, power is monopolized by certain members, and they, in turn, legitimize their exercise of power via ideology. Those in power, in exercising their power over the whole of the population, form what Habermas calls "system".³² In sum, select members of a society assume control of certain types of communicative interaction that occurs in the lifeworld and impose the systematic consequences of their specialized dialogues upon the whole of society. The notion of "lifeworld" will be more closely examined in Chapter Two of this thesis.

Habermas, following Max Weber, tells of how, during cultural modernity, "substantive reason" has separated into the three autonomous spheres of science, morality, and art.³³ From modernity on, everyday questions and problems concerning the world fall under three specific aspects of validity: truth, normative rightness, and authenticity. People have acquired special expertise and institutions have formed around the discourses concerning each of the three types of validity claims.

This professionalised treatment of the cultural tradition brings to the fore the intrinsic structures of each of the three dimensions of culture. There appear the

structures of cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and of aesthetic-expressive rationality, each of these under the control of specialists who seem more adept at being logical in these particular ways than other people. As a result, the distance has grown between the culture of experts and the larger public.³⁴

Needless to say, the implications of this passage are vast. As far as aesthetics is concerned, Habermas believes that, in general terms, he has managed to characterize its role in society. The role of aesthetics in society is itself a vast field of enquiry: just as aesthetic-expressive rationality is institutionalized in the form of professional production and criticism of art, its two counterparts--cognitive-instrumental and moral-practical--are institutionalized via scientific discourse and theories of morality and jurisprudence respectively. The latter two types of institutions are vast and take years of training in order for one to be able to function as a professional within them. By implication, the same may be true for art. A further investigation of Habermas's reasons for positing the three types of institutions and rationality will be necessary if we are to discover his theory of the role of aesthetics in society. For now, let me just say that there seems to be problems with the differentiation of rationality into the three types of validity claims, especially when one considers this separation vis-à-vis his distinction between lifeworld and system. Ideas in art sometimes get de-institutionalized even if they originated in an institution. For

example, many of the ideas which originate in the specialized fashion industry eventually find themselves expressed in the dress of the common person.

Now, as we have seen, along with the emergence of modernity came the creation of an aesthetics where art is an autonomous field, according to Habermas. "Art for art's sake" expressed this autonomy during the late nineteenth century. But unfortunately, the more the modernist transformation was realized, "...the more art alienated itself from life and withdrew into the untouchableness of complete autonomy."³⁵ The Surrealists tried to counter this tendency by bringing art to everyday praxis. This was supposed to have the effect of illuminating and revolutionizing life. But the Surrealists' revolt failed. Habermas's main explanation of this failure is that the Surrealists tried to break open only one cultural sphere, namely art. Art could only fall back upon itself because the other two fields remained intact.

A reified everyday praxis [such as art] can only be cured by creating unconstrained interaction of the cognitive with the moral-practical and the aesthetic-expressive elements. Reification cannot be overcome by forcing just one of those highly stylized cultural spheres to open up and become accessible.³⁶

As Martin Jay rightly notes, a situation where there is "unconstrained interaction" is highly improbable in this society.³⁷ Not only that, but it seems to me that the reification of everyday praxis is "cured" by other means than

those Habermas suggests. Many elements and ideas which result from such praxis find themselves in the normal everyday interactions of the members of society.

The diagnosis of the condition of modern aesthetics that Habermas offers seems largely correct. However, the insights which he gains are at the expense of committing himself to the project of modernity. But it is in fact this commitment which allows him to express his view, for he assumes many of the same philosophical presuppositions as those he studies. He is able to reveal many of the thoughts that have helped, through the course of several centuries, to structure our society. Despite the fact that sometimes these thoughts and presuppositions do not escape criticism, it is nevertheless worthwhile examining them, through Habermas's *Theory of Communicative Action*, to see why our understanding of art as taken the present form.

2. Reflections on Art, Rationality, Lifeworld, and Language

Art is obviously not an isolated phenomenon. Among other things, Carr's *Klee Wyck* shows that there is a social and cultural context within which art appears. How are we to construe the relationship between art on the one hand, and society and culture on the other? In this chapter, we will look at some of the answers to this question by examining some of the philosophical presuppositions of modernity as they are displayed in Habermas's *Theory of Communicative Action*. The goal we ought to try to achieve is to be able to explain the role and meaning of objects of art for the people of modern Western society. This chapter consists in some reflections on this goal. We will examine the problems of rationality and grounding, the notion of lifeworld and the forms of argumentation found within it, and the use of considering art as forms of language. From here, we can then examine more specific problems concerning our understanding of art. For now, we best keep in mind the example of the art of the West Coast Indians as it is portrayed in Carr's *Klee Wyck* and use this to measure the extent to which any theories we uncover can be deemed universal.

To begin with, Habermas specifies that rationality has to do with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and

use knowledge. One can either express knowledge by engaging in communicative activity, or use it for goal-directed interventions in the world.¹ An example of the former case is telling someone how to modify states of affairs, while an example of the latter is an intervention in the world by physical means to bring about a state of affairs. Thus, both persons and symbolic expressions can be rational.

Habermas considers two paradigmatic cases: a person can criticize the truth of an assertion made by another, and a person can dispute the effectiveness of a teleological action made by another. Thus, along with other types of claims I will describe below, truth and effectiveness can, under the proper circumstances, be called rational, given that the validity of both types of claims may be questioned. In the former case, the truth of the communicated expression is questioned; in the latter case, doubts are raised concerning the effectiveness of a particular teleological action. In the process of criticizing and arguing for a particular validity claim, it is grounded.² For Habermas, the notion of grounding a validity claim forms part of his concept of communicative rationality:

This concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rational conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld.³

A validity claim loses its status as controversial if participants in communication are able, by argumentative speech and rational convictions, to agree on whether or not that claim has legitimate support from other claims that have been already established as true or correct. By pointing to already established claims, participants "...assure themselves both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld."⁴

Note that, at this point, Habermas has only spoken of two types of validity claims: claims of truth and of effectiveness. There are also claims concerning the rightness of norms of actions, the adequacy of standards of value, the truthfulness or sincerity of expressions, and claims concerning the comprehensibility or well-formedness of symbolic constructs. As we can see, the concept of rationality goes beyond determining what is true or false, effective or ineffective. We will further examine the various types of validity claims before the end of this chapter.

Now, it is the communication concerning actions which is grounded, and not the actions themselves. Of course, the same is true of teleological actions: for example, it is not kicking the ball, but rather, it is either saying or implicitly knowing that one kicks the ball to score a goal which is rational. This is an important distinction because it changes the point at which validity

claims are grounded. They are not grounded in the nature of things, but rather, validity claims are grounded in propositions which have at least the potential to express the nature of things. Nothing in the ball itself demands that someone kicks it. To kick it to score a goal while playing soccer is rational to us. People like the Azande might not think that the obsessive kicking of balls is rational on any grounds. In short, validity claims concerning teleological actions are not grounded, at least directly, in the nature of things in themselves. Even seemingly universal validity claims such as "Everybody must eat to live" are not grounded in the nature of things, but rather in the propositions used to express the nature of things. Our concepts of life and of how human beings use food to survive are surely different from those of the Azande. We need not look far for differences in these respects: what items are considered acceptable as food varies even within our culture.

For Habermas, the fact that there is grounding is universal to all cultures, while the types of grounding are not. That is, a West Coast Indian can explain to another Indian what sort of spirituality he seeks for himself via the signifiers illustrated in the totem pole. A person from industrialized Western culture might explain why he wants to put a satellite in orbit. Both explanations may be grounded, but the European man may not think the Indian's actions are

rational, and vice-versa (given limited intercultural contact). Thus, when Habermas writes,

If we start from a noncommunicative employment of knowledge in teleological action, we make a prior decision for the concept of *cognitive-instrumental rationality* that has, through empiricism, deeply marked the self-understanding of the modern era⁵

we can see that there are grounds for an argument for possible intercultural incommensurability. But, given that being rational is the giving of grounds for any controversial validity claim, it follows that, for any culture, communication is that which can be rational. Thus, communicative rationality is universal. This indicates a certain universality to human nature and yet points towards the fact that, to understand another culture, one must be immersed in it: an Indian would have to take part in modern Western culture in order to acquire cognitive-instrumental rationality which, in turn, would permit him to understand why we would want to put a satellite in orbit.

Note that Habermas uses the idea of unconstrained speech as a basis for communicative rationality. The idea of unconstrained speech is in turn formulated in conjunction with the notion of an ideal speech situation. A question one may legitimately ask at this point is what are unconstrained speech and ideal speech? Could one give examples of unconstrained speech and of an ideal speech situation? Where, in the praxis of communicative acts, do participants in communication assure themselves of both the unity of the object-

ive world, and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld? For example, a Haida Indian might agree with me when I declare a certain totem pole to be great, but I can still believe that the totem pole is merely a carved up piece of wood, while the Indian sees it as endowed with, for the lack of better words, something spiritual. Despite the fact that our assessments coincide, we may not see the same things in the totem pole. As far as the lifeworld is concerned, I cannot even begin to imagine what presuppositions are involved in the Indian's assessment of the totem pole: for example, I may think that Roy Lichtenstein's *Whamm!* is also great, but the Indian may not. I may be looking for the aesthetic; he may be looking for the spiritual. I have not assured myself of the intersubjectivity of our lifeworlds. It seems unnecessary to posit an ideal speech situation to explain the coordination of action. I will take up this matter again in Chapter Three.

Despite the dubiousness of the necessity for the notion of an ideal speech situation, there is something which seems correct about Habermas's notion of the unifying properties of communication. For example, upon hearing "Watch out for the falling stones!," one reaffirms the belief in stones and the belief that others know of stones. Habermas writes that "The world gains objectivity only through counting as one and the same world for a community of speaking and acting subjects."⁶ The world, as an abstract

concept, is affirmed through speaking, as is the totality of presupposed interpretations of the world. The lifeworld is "...the totality of interpretations presupposed by the members [of a community] as background knowledge."⁷ The lifeworld, as background knowledge, cannot be turned over and examined in its totality. It contains presupposed specifications of the relations between the experiences had by individuals in a community. The relations may be characterized as either consistent or contradictory. Contradictory presuppositions can coexist at peace within the lifeworld, unless they are thematized in the context of an argument. Disagreements present a challenge to lifeworld presuppositions. When the conflict is resolved, the result falls back into the lifeworld. That is to say, the result regains the status of a communally accepted unquestioned presupposition, and thus we can say that something has been learned.

The lifeworld can be regarded as a sort of communal subconscious which can in part become conscious via argumentation. It is a reservoir of presuppositions everybody in a given culture "knows," but no one bothers to talk about. Obviously, no rational North American, for example, is going to stick his tongue into an electrical outlet. One might even go as far as saying that this sort of action is a societal prohibition since it is completely unacceptable behaviour, although there is a rational basis for not doing such things. The point is that the prohibition concerning

electrical outlets remains unconscious and unquestioned, unless one sees someone trying to break the prohibition or hears of someone's intentions of breaking it. Of course, particular prohibitions need never exist at all. It would be ludicrous to say that Stone Age people had presuppositions concerning electrical outlets. Hence, I shall specify that all lifeworld presuppositions must have the potential of being questioned. Otherwise, we would have to endow the lifeworld with undiscoverable metaphysical and psychological propositions: undiscoverable because no actions on the part of the participants in communication could lead to a situation where these types of lifeworld presuppositions are thematized. No matter what a Stone Age person did, he could never have discovered presuppositions concerning not sticking his tongue in electrical outlets. Hence, one can only say that, initially, lifeworld presuppositions are created, and can, at a later date, be discovered.

At this point, I would like to introduce depth as a dimension in the lifeworld. Roughly speaking, depth is the degree to which a presupposition or a tightly-knit group of presuppositions is intertwined with the rest of the lifeworld. The deeper a presupposition is, the more difficult it is to uncover it, and the more other presuppositions depend on it for support. Let me demonstrate: my presuppositions concerning totem poles have very little depth. That is, if I had never heard or read about totem poles, my present life

would not be very different. An indication of the shallowness of my knowledge of totem poles is the fact that I could not provide very good reasons or grounds for their having been made, nor could I provide reasons why a particular totem pole has significance for a particular Indian. Conversely, my knowledge of electrical outlets has considerable depth: much of my daily activity presupposes electrical outlets and their supporting mechanisms. Life without knowledge of electricity would be very different.

Despite my use of the first person singular pronoun in the last paragraph, it is society as a whole, through persons and texts, which shapes itself in accordance to the lifeworld. That is, although I know of and use electricity, it is society as a whole--which is of course composed of people--which knows of and deploys knowledge of electricity. No one person knows all about electricity. No one person knows all the physics, or every building that is plugged in. This fact will become important when I discuss the idea of expertise.

Note that a set of presuppositions can still have a shallow depth even if the notion of lifeworld is considered an attribute of a whole society. The notion of totem poles, for example, still has little depth in Western industrialized society even with the extended notion of the lifeworld. The feature of the lifeworld that I would like to point out here is that of depth stratification. Take, for example,

presuppositions concerning the mini-skirt: they have shallow depth, since their existence makes little difference to the daily life of the people in our society. However, ideas concerning the mini-skirt are dependent upon a set of presuppositions concerning fashion or dress; the latter set of presuppositions have much more depth than the former. Notions of dress form a bedrock which notions of mini-skirts rest upon. In short, notions of mini-skirts have a dependent and stratified relationship with the notions of dress.

Habermas posits the lifeworld as a structure universal to cultures and societies. It seems to me that depth, as a structural characteristic of the lifeworld, can be thought of as universal. It is difficult to imagine a society where all the lifeworld presuppositions are equally deeply grounded. We can legitimately expect varying degrees of depth prior to an investigation of lifeworld presuppositions alien to our own. In practical terms, an anthropologist could easily change some of the presuppositions that the people he is investigating hold, but other presuppositions could not be changed without inculcating the subjects under study with a large set of presuppositions alien to them. In the same way, one can expect stratification to occur in all lifeworlds. Notions of electrical outlets, for example, can legitimately invoke images both of word processors and of Benjamin Franklin flying a kite in a thunderstorm. Thus, we can see that the associative paths between lifeworld presup-

positions are extremely subtle and complex. The "logic" by which lifeworld presuppositions are interconnected is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to characterize generally. This serves to caution us against rashly attributing universal characteristics to all lifeworlds. As I have stated above, we can legitimately expect to find the features of depth and stratification in all lifeworlds, but we ought not be surprised to find a society which does not have one or either of these lifeworld features.

We of industrialized Western society may affirm and hold as a presupposition the distinction between speech and teleological action--between "talking" and "doing"--but we must not think of this distinction as a feature universal to all lifeworlds. The practice of incantations and prayers in societies alien to ours indicates a belief in some sort of magical relation between objects and their names. Of course, / we have speech acts which "do" things too. We can do such things as promise, confess, name, warn, assert, request, bet, and even wed by merely speaking. All these action situations are social and the actions themselves are normally oriented towards reaching an understanding with other people. For Habermas, this constitutes communicative action. We can also lie or otherwise deceive others: this constitutes strategic actions since it is the misuse of other people in order to reach our own ends. Actions taken on the physical world are always oriented towards success.

These actions constitute instrumental actions.⁸ What we do not often find in Western society are actions oriented towards reaching an understanding with the physical world. For example, we do not usually discuss the possibility of Platonic forms with stones and chairs. This constitutes the "category mistake" of orienting communicative action towards something with which we believe we cannot reach an understanding. To the secular man, praying for rain is an act of desperation. Likewise, the same man would say that the "savage" mind confuses speech and the world. Habermas writes,

to be sure, the confusion of nature and culture by no means signifies only a conceptual blending of the objective and social worlds, but also a--by our lights--deficient differentiation between language and world; that is, between speech as a medium of communication and that about which understanding can be reached in linguistic communication.⁹

Conversely, the belief that words by themselves do not "do" things in the "physical world" is natural to us. To believe otherwise would be a challenge to lifeworld presuppositions. We could, of course, try to recreate "savage" thinking within the context of the distinction between speech and teleological acts. This course of action could not amount to a recreation of "savage" thinking because the subtleties in the meaning of "savage" words would be lost, given that the words are tainted with what we would call "category mistakes."

It is also possible to have incompatible types of thinking within one culture, and even within one person. For example, it is possible that a person capable of a scientific frame of mind is also capable of prayer. The two sets of presuppositions involving science and religion in this case could very well be inconsistent, but there is no reason why the two cannot coexist in the lifeworld, so long as one set does not challenge the presuppositions of the other. The debates concerning the Theory of Evolution present such a challenge. These debates can be resolved either by devaluing some tenets of science or by dropping the religious dogmas concerning the origins of man and beasts. Without a doubt, the theological thinking which posits Adam and Eve as the beginning of mankind encompasses some sort of rationality. But I think that we can go along with Habermas when he writes that it is the concept of cognitive-instrumental (teleological) rationality which marks the modern era.¹⁰

Now, as we have already seen, the term "rational" applies to expressions which can be true or false, effective or ineffective. These expressions embody, respectively, truth claims and success claims; they are forms of argumentation which Habermas calls "theoretical discourse."¹¹ According to Habermas, there are other types of discourse which can be called rational: practical discourse, aesthetic criticism, therapeutic critique, and explicative discourse are all rational and they all have their particular type of

validity claim. For example, theoretical discourse makes claims of either the truth of propositions or efficacy of teleological actions. The types of claims the other types of discourses make are indicated in Figure One. Each type of claim can be embodied in corresponding expressions. If the validity claim is controversial, the corresponding expression is considered problematic. Following Habermas, I have charted the forms of argumentation and the corresponding problematic expressions and controversial validity claims in Figure One. Again, I would like to recall the fact that the distinctions in the forms of argumentation as they are presented here apply only to Western industrialized society.

Let us recall that when the lifeworld presuppositions are thematized by participants in communication they become controversial validity claims. Whether we assent or not to these validity claims depends on the grounds provided. As Habermas writes, there are five forms of argumentation and five types of controversial validity claims. But this does not mean that the whole of the modern lifeworld is itself divided into five segments.

In the division of the forms of argumentation, Habermas provides a place for aesthetic criticism. Note that this is aesthetic criticism, and not art itself. That is, the division actually represents talk about art, and not necessarily art itself. What Habermas wants to point out is that aesthetic criticism can be rational, like truth and

Figure One¹²

Forms of Argumentation

Reference Dimensions Forms of Argumentation	Problematic Expressions	Controversial Validity Claims *
Theoretical Discourse	Cognitive-instrumental	Truth of proposition; efficacy of teleological actions
Practical Discourse	Moral-Practical	Rightness of norms of actions
Aesthetic Criticism	Evaluative	Adequacy of standards of value
Therapeutic Critique	Expressive	Truthfulness or sincerity of expression
Explicative discourse	-----	Comprehensibility or well-formedness of symbolic constructs

success claims, insofar as good grounds can be provided. An aesthetic criticism is considered grounded when members of a lifeworld community can recognize in a statement about art a typical, or standard, reaction to an art object. Habermas quotes Richard Norman to illustrate his point:

To want simply a saucer of mud is irrational, because some further reason is needed for wanting it. To want a saucer of mud

* Note that claims of truth or efficacy have to do with the objective world, claims of rightness and claims of adequacy of standards of value with the social world, and claims of truthfulness, sincerity, and comprehensibility with the subjective world. It is by no means a coincidence that each type of validity claim makes reference to one of the three worlds. The reasons for this are covered in Chapter Four.

because one wants to enjoy the rich river-smell is rational. No further reason is needed for wanting to enjoy the rich river-smell, for to characterize what is wanted as "to enjoy the rich river-smell" is itself to give an acceptable reason for wanting it, and therefore this is rational.¹³

Here, the idea is that members of a community (modern Western society in this case) can easily imagine what it would be like to enjoy the rich river-smell, and therefore these members can understand someone's wanting a saucer of mud. Habermas contrasts the person who provides rational grounds for liking the mud to an irrational person "...who explains his panicked reaction to open spaces by their 'crippling,' 'leaden,' 'sucking' emptiness...."¹⁴ According to Habermas, such a reaction to open spaces will scarcely be understood by members of our community, especially in an everyday context. To say that open spaces are "sucking" could not be explained or rendered plausible by appeals to standards of evaluation found in our community.¹⁵ In sum, Habermas tells us that aesthetic claims, as well as truth or success claims, normative claims, and truthfulness and sincerity claims, can be meaningful and rational expressions.

The rationality inherent in [communicative] practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively achieved agreement must be based *in the end* on reasons. And the rationality of those who participate in this communicative practice is determined by whether, if necessary, they could, *under suitable circumstances*, provide reasons for their expressions.¹⁶

At first, Habermas's outline of aesthetic criticism seems plausible since, within the context of a general theory of rationality, he provides a way by which aesthetic statements can be said to be rational. But, as I will try to illustrate, which aesthetic statements are rational and which are not cannot be as easily determined as Habermas leads us to believe. For example, if one can empathize with a traumatized soldier such as John Rambo of *Rambo: First Blood* fame, then one can easily imagine a book or a film where one is required to empathize with a character who finds open spaces "sucking". Likewise the protagonist Marian in Margaret Atwood's *The Edible Woman* is reduced, through a peculiar brand of "logic," to eating only a few types of vegetables:

She was watching her own hands and the peeler and the curl of crisp orange skin. She became aware of the carrot. It's a root, she thought, it grows in the ground and sends up leaves. Then they come along and dig it up, maybe it makes a sound, a scream too low for us to hear, but it doesn't die right away, it keeps on living, right now it's still alive....

She thought she felt it twist in her hands. She dropped it on the table. "Oh no," she said, almost crying. "Not this too."¹⁷

Of course, this quote when read in the context of the book makes Marian's rejection of carrots seem more understandable and rational. If we take Rambo and Marian as making statements about being a traumatized soldier and a hater of carrots respectively, there does not seem to be any point at

which a statement can be deemed irrational, even in the context of a single lifeworld community.

Conversely, Habermas points out that the Surrealist revolt against art as a reified praxis failed.¹⁸ That is, the Surrealists attempted to bring their art to the people, to install their art in the lifeworld of the community. Instead, Surrealist art fell into the hands of those we might call the bourgeois of the art world. "Ordinary people," as it were, rejected Surrealist art. It seems to me that people did not reject these art works because of the meaning of the art, but rather, because they failed to understand the form of Surrealist artworks, and thereby never had access to its meaning. It takes a trained eye to see Dali's *Geopoliticus Child Watching the Birth of a New Man* as a commentary on the American involvement in World War II. Simply put, one cannot expect the work of Salvador Dali to have mass appeal. It requires work and study in order to have a meaningful interpretation of Dali's work. The masses may simply not have had the incentive to do this study.

It appears that there is an ambiguity in Habermas's position concerning the rationality of aesthetic criticism: there is, on the one hand, the potential rationalization through empathy of what would, in circumstances other than attempts at aesthetic appreciation, be called personal idiosyncracies. For example, the reader of Atwood's *The Edible Woman* is prompted to understand the logic of not

eating carrots. On the other hand, there is the failure of the masses to understand and to see the rationality behind highly stylized works of art. The viewer of the Dali painting must be taught how to interpret the colours and shades. Both of these situations exhibit a concern with reaching a new understanding: both the idiosyncracies and the highly stylized works of art show a pattern of having to be grounded before they are understood. As Habermas writes, "The concept of *grounding* is interwoven with that of *learning*."¹⁹ Thus, the masses may readily understand a natural perspective image such as those produced by Robert Bateman, but in this case, as far as aesthetic appreciation is concerned, nothing is learned.

What is it exactly that can be learned from art? In general, there are two types of things learned: first, we learn a new form of expression and thereby we learn of a new way of seeing the world. That is, we acquire a way by which we can form the world. Second, once we have learned the new way of forming the world, we have access to a new meaning. The style of Picasso's art is unique in being able to express its particular meaning. The meaning of *Guernica* could not be accessed without knowing its form. The painting could not be translated into a verbal equivalent, and a written or verbal report of the bombing could not be translated into a non-verbal form. Likewise, the work of Dali uses a particular form to express a particular meaning.

Both form and meaning may have "aesthetic value." If one is expected to know English to understand the subtleties of Keats's poetry, then one has to know the form of Dali's art in order to understand its meaning. So there seems to be a particular code of interpretation required in order to make Dali's painting understandable and rational. These codes are not, at present, part of the lifeworld of the masses. The codes, although they may be particular to Western society, are as foreign to the masses of Western society as the Haida language of the West coast Indians.

If we find ourselves in a situation where we can read Dali's paintings, we can say that we have learned to understand that form of art. And so we have gone full circle: we can once again ask the question "How do we understand art?". Understanding is intertwined with learning: we must learn to read Dali's work; we must learn the form of novels to understand Marian's motivations. Once we have learned to read Dali, we can learn what he has to say about the world. Learning is being exposed to forms of argumentation, so that we may in turn practice them. Given that we can learn to read and understand non-verbal art the same way we learn to read and understand language, we must suppose that art is not a *form* of argumentation, but rather, it is a *medium* of argumentation. That is, it is not just languages that can take on the forms of argumentation which Habermas mentions, but painting, photography, film, music, and

sculpture also embody these forms. The forms of art which do not use language can tell a truth about the world, can demonstrate the rightness of a norm, can criticize other art forms, can be sincere or insincere, and can explain how to read symbolic constructs. In short, non-verbal forms of art can take on all the forms of argumentation that language does. Hence, I am going to express this fact by technically specifying that non-verbal forms of art are forms of language, although the former may greatly differ from the latter on semiotic terms.*

There seems to be a problem here: exactly what is language? If we say that language is what we speak and what we write using an alphabet, then the non-verbal arts are definitely not languages. But if we understand language as that which carries claims in the form of expressions, then we can say that the non-verbal arts are languages. Whether or not the non-verbal arts are languages is, as Wittgenstein says,²⁰ simply a matter of where we draw boundaries. For my part, considering languages as systems of organized complexes of meaning seems ultimately more important than considering languages as merely the marks and spoken

* One school of thought holds the semiotics of language as the paradigm, and thus the key, to interpreting the non-verbal arts. For example, Boris Uspensky was able to provide a very useful system for interpreting Medieval Russian icons using concepts borrowed from the study of language. See Uspensky, *The Semiotics of the Russian Icon*, (Lisse, Belgium: The Peter the Ridder Press, 1976).

equivalents of what is found in dictionaries. Hence, non-verbal forms of art are forms of language.

Understanding art as a type of language is a possibility which Habermas overlooks. The problem with him lies in the fact that he categorizes symbolic expressions as having either the form of speech acts or the form of goal-directed acts. Non-verbal art is not speech, and to describe it as a type of goal-directed act does not seem quite right. Perhaps because of his own sometimes convoluted expression, Habermas reduces symbolic expressions to either talking or hammering.

If we are to consider art as language, then a venture into Habermas's theory of argumentation would be useful for determining some of the aspects of art as they are construed by modernity. Of course, it is entirely possible that Habermas's theory of argumentation does not accommodate any media of argumentation other than speech and writing. Then, to further elaborate on the theory of argumentation, I will take up Habermas's discussion of Popper's three-world distinction, which I hope will explain the modernist view of the societal function of art.

3. Art and Theory of Argumentation: The Role of Rhetoric, Dialectic, and Logic

According to Habermas, an excursion into the theory of argumentation could provide us with the following results: an exposition of both the legitimate forms of argumentation and the forms universal to all types of argumentation, a theory of reasoning that is applicable both to itself and to language, and a theory of discursive persuasion.¹ Of course, effectively covering all aspects of this topic is a tall order--one that I cannot claim to do in any great depth, and also one which proves to be, as we will see, somewhat problematic for Habermas. However, this excursion will prove to be very helpful in pointing out what kinds of questions need to be answered if we are to have a notion of the understanding of art. Theory of argumentation may provide the key to answering the following questions: what are the conditions necessary for the understanding of art? What possible social functions could art have, if any? Is there a right attitude towards art? How does art carry convictions, if it does? And how does society affect our understanding of art?

In the first part of this chapter I will attempt to find the keys to answering these questions by considering Habermas's three aspects of argumentation: namely, process,

procedure, and product. Accordingly, I have sub-divided the first part of the chapter by using the more familiar but parallel three-fold distinction between rhetoric, dialectic, and logic. Note that these three *aspects* of argumentation are not to be confused with the five *forms* of argumentation that we have seen in Chapter Two. Rather, each form of argumentation has all three aspects. For example, theoretical discourse has aspects of rhetoric, dialectic, and logic.

As Habermas writes, the separation of the three aspects of argumentation cannot be maintained.² As we will see, there are good reasons for agreeing with Habermas on this particular point. Nevertheless, considering the three aspects will provide us with a forum for discussing certain topics. By considering rhetoric, we will examine the failure of Habermas's notions of an ideal speech situation and of symmetry conditions. Hans-Georg Gadamer's notion of "openness" will prove to be a much better representative of the aspect of rhetoric than what Habermas has offered. Given that Habermas's account of the dialectic aspect of argumentation is also lacking, we will again turn to Gadamer for answers. Specifically, we will examine Gadamer's notion of the experience of the 'Thou' and the parallel between this experience and the experience of art. To end the first part of this chapter, we will examine the aspect of logic in argumentation and the reasons that Habermas gives for the collapse of the distinction between the three aspects of

argumentation. This collapse introduces the topic of the second part of this chapter: the grounds for distinguishing between the five forms of argumentation. As we will see, Steven Toulmin makes this distinction on logical grounds. According to Habermas, this is unacceptable given the collapse of the three aspects. We will also see that Habermas attempts to provide empirical grounds for the five-fold distinction: grounds which make the distinction inapplicable to non-verbal forms of art.

1.1 *Rhetoric*

Following Toulmin, Habermas distinguishes between three aspects of argumentative speech. For our purposes, "argumentative speech" will be changed to "argumentation" so that we can include non-verbal art forms. Now, the first of these aspects is *process*. According to Habermas, rhetoric is concerned specifically with this aspect. He writes that the idea of an ideal speech situation, that of unconstrained speech, is what characterizes optimum argumentation as process.³ He recognizes the dissatisfaction his critics have with the positing of this ideal, and consequently replaces it with the vague notion of "general symmetry conditions" which must be presupposed by participants in argumentation.⁴ According to Habermas, these participants

...have to presuppose in general that the structure of their communication, by virtue of features that can be described in purely formal terms, exclude all force...except the force of the better argument.⁵

Participants in communication achieve the general symmetry conditions when their only motive for arguing is "...a cooperative search for the truth."⁶ Argumentation is "...a *reflective continuation...of action oriented to reaching an understanding.*"⁷

Exactly what does Habermas expect by imposing "symmetry conditions" on the idea of reaching an understanding? Should we say that participants in communication must not deceive, or have any other bad intentions, if understanding is to be reached? This is completely untenable. In general, there is no way of testing for deception. We may only suspect deception when someone tells us an inconsistent story. Jorge Luis Borges makes this point well: in a short story, he describes someone who discovers in an old encyclopedia an entry for a country called "Uqbar". The entry describes the economy, weather conditions, location, and the character of the people of that country.⁸ According to the story, no other encyclopedia mentions the country, but this was shrugged off as an oversight. To get back to our so-called reality, we might ask a questions such as "Why do we believe that Antarctica exists?". Given that only a chosen few have actually stepped on that continent, most of us have no means of verifying its existence first hand. Our existence does not depend on its existence. Stories told to us about Antarctica have a certain consistency, and perhaps

that is the only reason why we believe in the existence of a frozen continent at the south pole of the earth.

Does deception necessarily exclude reaching an understanding? The experience of politicians, for example, demonstrates that the condition of non-deception does not necessarily have to be met in order for an understanding to be reached. Of course, deception on a massive scale does not lead to understanding, but is a little deception not sometimes helpful to understanding? Imagine this situation: a candidate is being interviewed for a position in a company. When he sits down, the candidate accidentally pricks himself very deeply in his thigh with a needle he inadvertantly left in his pants which he had sewn the night before. The candidate is in great pain. One of the interviewers asks him if there is anything he would like to say at that point in time. The candidate should perhaps say that he is in pain, or even perhaps scream. Instead, he says some drivel about how he would be very valuable for the company.⁹ The candidate may actually believe his own drivel, but that is not the point: he hides his own pain in order to convey an impression. The candidate might have taken some sleep-inducing drugs to combat a nasty virus. However, the candidate fakes a happy and enthusiastic predisposition. Could it not be said that the candidate is deceiving in order to communicate, and thereby make understood, his aptitude during his more normal states?

To deepen the problem, one could ask what the use of an ideal speech situation is. What does Habermas want to achieve with this notion? Could he be seeking to better our lives by pointing to the best possible set of rules for language? Would that not amount to changing languages themselves? Consider what Wittgenstein writes concerning using logic as the model for the ideal language:

...the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages [of logic] were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician to shew people at last what a proper sentence looks like.¹⁰

Is Habermas really qualified to tell us what an ideal speech situation looks like? As Wittgenstein says, "...the most that can be said is that we *construct* ideal languages."¹¹ If deceit is included in our speech situations, then so be it.

Let us consider some examples from art. Are novels deceitful? Not necessarily: most readers of novels suspend the normal criteria by which they measure factuality. The same could be said of abstract art: if someone went to Spain, he would not expect people and things to look the way they do in Picasso's *Guernica*. However, the level of deceitfulness in other types of art is sometimes difficult to evaluate. The photo-journalist can always find a vagrant in the richest of cities. The television cameraman can take shots of an uprising in a foreign country. The uprising may have involved only 500 people or so, but the camera ignores the thousands of other people who go about their daily

business as usual. Could it not be said that the cameraman is deceiving us by using the uprising to portray the mood of an entire country? Perhaps. But it could not be said that we do not have at least some understanding of what is going on in that country.

Art may act as a "therapeutic critique," as a systematic deception whereby members of a society are "demythified" and told the truth concerning societal structures. Sigmund Freud's notion of "transference" helps explain how art may have therapeutic effects: in a psychoanalytic situation, the unconscious impulses and fantasies of the patient are aroused so that their object is no longer a person from the patient's past, but rather, their object is the physician himself. The unconscious impulses and fantasies demonstrate their full force in the presence of the physician. The physician then makes the impulses and fantasies conscious for the patient in the course of analysis. This has the double effect of resolving the unconscious complexes which gave rise to the impulses and destroying the transference which permitted the resolution in the first place.¹² Much the same way, we may transfer our unconscious impulses and fantasies on a character of a play, for example. Our unconscious complexes are resolved, perhaps not for the better, in the way which the character of the play (or the author) sees fit.

Habermas recommends what might be called "societal psychoanalysis," whereby false consciousness is eradicated by deceptive means.¹³ Note that here Habermas presupposes a distinction between "true" and "false" consciousness and that all which is unconscious can, in one way or the other, be rendered conscious. In Freudian terms, a person without an unconscious is unimaginable and, by implication, so is a society without a collective unconscious. Habermas implies an image of a utopia where the work of societal psychoanalysis would be done, and deception, in whatever form, would not be necessary, even though we have gotten to the utopia by deceptive means. "Unrealistic" portraits of the world, given their deceptive character, would seem to be no longer necessary. All in all, the notion of an ideal speech situation seems impossible given that the unconscious, collective or otherwise, will always introduce an element of distortion.

Now, let us consider what the object of our understanding is. The temptation which Habermas perhaps felt is to say that we understand other people. This clearly cannot be, for unconscious forces systematically distort what people say. The mind is not clear to itself, as Descartes thought. We can never fully know why someone says something. Hence, it is more correct to say that the object of our understanding is what people say. We understand expressions, and different expressions, even if they have more or less

the same meaning, can differ in their affects. As Habermas would have it, the particular expression we choose is a consideration of process. Certainly, when we think of rhetoric, we think of it as having that aspect Habermas calls "process". But is that all rhetoric is? It does not seem so, since when we think of rhetoric, not only do we think of the conditions which allow for agreement, but we also think of the agreement, or of the conviction, itself. Hence, if we wish to understand the process of argumentation, we must also consider the procedure and the product of argumentation.

Nevertheless, we can characterize the process aspect of argumentation as presupposing openness on the part of participants. Unlike Habermas, who points towards the transcendental ideal speech situation to measure the appropriateness of the context of argumentation, Hans-Georg Gadamer uses the more plausible notion of openness to describe the process aspect of the preconditions of reaching an understanding. Being open to an argument means listening to it, entertaining it, and being open to the possibility of changing one's mind because of it. As I have described before, process is associated with rhetoric. Given that rhetoric cannot convince anybody of anything if it falls on deaf ears, it makes sense to say that openness is a precondition of reaching an understanding.

1.2 *Dialectic*

Now, according to Habermas, "...as soon as one considers argumentation as *procedure*, we have to do with a form of interaction *subject to special rules*."¹⁴ By considering argumentation from the aspect of procedure, he believes he can describe how participants in communication can thematize validity claims, how they can take on a hypothetical attitude and test ideas, and how, through the testing of reasons and grounding, the better argument can gain assent. Procedure may also involve the cooperative division of communicative labour. As Habermas considers process to be the rhetorical aspect of argumentation, procedure is considered the dialectical.

Art is in a peculiar position vis-à-vis procedure. Art, and even written texts for that matter, are not usually considered participants in communication. Obviously, we can and do learn and reach understanding from reading texts and viewing art. Somehow, the experience of art counts for more than the simple experience of objects. We can experience art in much the same way Gadamer suggests we experience tradition:

Tradition is not simply a process that we learn to know and to be in command of through experience; it is language, ie it expresses itself like a 'Thou'. A 'Thou' is not an object, but stands in relation with us. It would be wrong to think that this meant that what is experienced in tradition is to be taken as the meaning of another person, who is a 'Thou'. Rather, we consider that the understanding of tradition does not

take the text as an expression of life of a 'Thou,' but as a meaningful content detached from all bounds of the meaning of the individual, of an 'I' or a 'Thou'.... Tradition is a genuine partner in communication, with which we have a fellowship as does the 'I' with a 'Thou'.¹⁵

/ The procedure for understanding works of art necessarily involves letting the art speak to you. To understand a work of art, one must be open to what it has to say. The procedure involves having the right attitude towards art. Habermas's idea of procedure describes the division of communicative labour, how participants can thematize validity claims, and the hypothetical attitude, but Habermas does not consider how we choose what validity claims are to be examined. Habermas's idea of procedure does not tell us how we should approach art. Conversely, Gadamer suggests that there are three modes by which we can experience the 'Thou'. As we will see, only the third of these modes is appropriate for the experience. I will examine these three modes while exploring the parallels between the 'Thou' and art.

/ As Gadamer writes, the first of the inappropriate modes of experiencing the 'Thou' is when we make the 'Thou' an object of scientific study. The person who apprehends tradition in this mode detaches himself from the continuing action of history, of the historical reality to which he is himself part.¹⁶ Likewise, the first mode of the experience of art is the situation in which artworks are objectified,

where all subjective elements which give the art its life are excluded systematically. In the case of visual arts, for example, the picture amounts to juxtaposed colours, textures, and forms. Art, as an object, becomes a mere representation of something else, much like a blueprint. If there is any enjoyment in the experience of art in this mode, it comes from what the art represents, and not from the art itself. We might enjoy a Bateman painting because it reminds us of a youthful walk through the woods, but we do not enjoy the art itself. In this mode, we cannot enjoy the art itself because we do not allow the art to speak; we only allow it to represent. Thus, the actions of the artwork on the subject and the subject's part in the artwork are not considered.

Gadamer describes the second of the inappropriate modes of experiencing the 'Thou' as a form of self-relatedness. The person claims to know the 'Thou'; he knows the otherness of the 'Thou,' and even the fact that it belongs in our history and tradition: its "historicality". But the person's self-awareness consists in withdrawing from the dialectical reciprocity with the 'Thou'.¹⁷ While he claims to transcend his being conditioned by his knowing of the other, the 'Thou' has become unreachable to that person. As Gadamer writes, "In the hermeneutical sphere the parallel to this experience of the 'Thou' is what we generally call historical consciousness."¹⁸ With this consciousness, a

person imagines himself free of prejudice and as having an objective procedure to the understanding of the 'Thou'.¹⁹

If we consider the 'Thou' to be a work of art, we can call the person who experiences art in Gadamer's second mode an "unsympathetic informed viewer". This person recognizes the historical and aesthetic lineage of a particular work of art. He can recognize techniques of craftsmanship, historical precedents, the touch of the artist, and he thereby claims to understand the artwork. The viewer may be said to have "aesthetic consciousness". But in the end, via what might be described as a Husserlian *epoché*, the viewer of the art has made a conscious effort not to let the art reach him. In terms of argumentation, this viewer's understanding of the artwork reaches no further than the aesthetic criticism and the explicative discourse that he is able to produce concerning the art.

According to Gadamer, the third and the only appropriate mode of the experience of the 'Thou,' which he describes as the highest, is one in which a person takes into account his own historicity when he experiences the 'Thou' of tradition. "To stand within a tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible."²⁰ We must experience the 'Thou' truly as the 'Thou'; we must listen to what it has to say to us. Openness to the other is necessary. We must allow for the otherness of tradition to make a claim; we must allow it to say something to us.

Gadamer describes this mode of experience as encompassing effective-historical consciousness.²¹

Parallel to this mode of experience when it comes to art is a viewer who is not only able to read the art, but who is also predisposed to listen to it. That is, knowing how to read art, knowing how to interpret the interactions of its symbolic constructs and knowing the history of such interactions, are not enough to understand the artwork. Likewise, knowing how to read English is not enough for knowing Marian's motives in *The Edible Woman*. Possessing aesthetic consciousness is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the understanding of art. As opposed to aesthetic consciousness, a person can be said to have effective-aesthetic consciousness when he perceives

...that the work of art is not an object that stands over and against a subject for itself. Instead the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience changing the person experiencing it. The 'subject' of the experience of art, that which remains and endures, is not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it, but the work itself.²²

The person who has an effective-aesthetic consciousness has truly learned from the work of art; he has reached an understanding; he has let the work of art question his lifeworld presuppositions; he is truly open to what it has to say.

As we have seen, the second aspect of argumentation, procedure, involves the methods by which validity claims can be raised and tested. There are several types of procedures

by which we can approach an artwork, but as I hope to have shown via the work of Gadamer, the only proper procedure is one which assumes art as a partner in communication. That is, the process, that of assuming openness, must take place for both art and people to be understood. As I argued before, it is the expressions of other people, and not the people themselves, that are understood. If by argumentation we say that we partake in the subjectivity of other people, then, by analogy, we can say that when we view art appropriately, we partake in the subjectivity of the artwork. Note that the subjectivity of people participating in communication can change, but, as Gadamer writes, the subjectivity of an artwork remains and endures.²³

1.3 *Logic*

According to Habermas, the third aspect of argumentation is *product*. As process and procedure are concerned with the rhetoric and dialectic of argumentation respectively, so product is concerned with logic. Logic describes the intrinsic properties by which validity claims are redeemed or rejected. With logic one can specify the general properties of cogent arguments: with logic, we can take a position concerning a validity claim (conclusion) by considering the reasons for establishing the claim (the grounds) and the rules of inference (the warrants). If need be, we can restrict the scope of the claim (modifiers).²⁴

What are we to make of art vis-à-vis this aspect of argumentation? Works of art seem to have a content that is over and above the content found in formal syllogisms: obviously, a message such as "Civil war is wrong" is more rhetorically effective in Picasso's *Guernica* than it is when stated as a major premise. Indeed, as I have shown in Chapter Two, *Guernica's* and the syllogism's message cannot be the same. That is, given that translating the content of one medium into another may not be possible, positing some sort of universal logic, or product, of argumentation may be difficult. As we will see, Habermas argues that separate consideration of the three aspects of argumentation cannot be maintained. If this is true, then unique forms of rhetoric and dialectic as are displayed by certain art forms seem to imply unique types of logic of argumentation: while syllogistic logic is one appropriate way of evaluating spoken and written language, it may be inappropriate, perhaps even incapable, of evaluating the non-verbal arts. For example, while it makes sense from a logical point of view to say "yes" or "no" to a verbal statement such as "The dog is dead," the same does not seem to apply to non-verbal forms of art: it does not seem to make sense to say "no" to Georges Seurat's *The Circus*. There will be more about this later on in this chapter. For now, we will investigate Habermas's reasons for positing the collapse of the three aspects of argumentation to see if they can enlighten us

concerning the possibility of unique forms of media-bound logics.

Habermas examines Wolfgang Klein's attempt to study argumentation only as process. According to Habermas, Klein opens himself up to the sense of an argument while maintaining a strictly descriptivist attitude.²⁵ That is, Klein wants to describe arguments without having an objective evaluation of the arguments employed. Klein describes argumentation as

...an attempt to transform something collectively problematic into something collectively valid by drawing upon what is already collectively valid.²⁶

Klein understands "collectively valid" as "...those views that are actually shared by specific groups at specific times."²⁷ As Habermas sees it, the problem with Klein's approach is that

...he screens out all internal relations between what is *de facto* accepted as valid and what should have validity in the sense of a claim transcending local, temporal, and social limitations....²⁸

Habermas believes that Klein attempts to neutralize the standards by which the rationality of reasons are evaluated. That is, Klein will follow parts of an argument and the flow between arguments without considering the validity of the conclusions, grounds, warrants and modifiers. In short, Klein purposefully neglects the reasons for conclusions. Hence, "...reasons are conceived...as opaque incentives for changing attitudes."²⁹ In short, Klein's approach does not

allow for an internal perspective on the part of the examiner of the argument. Klein's external perspective cannot uncover the implicit grounds, warrants, and modifiers of a conclusion. The concept of validity is replaced by that of acceptance.

Habermas argues that since Klein examines arguments exclusively from the perspective of process (rhetoric), he is obliged to neglect the product (the logic) of the same arguments.³⁰ That is, there is no way of mediating what they (the group under investigation) find rational and what we (the examiners) find rational. Since Klein's approach of abstracting process from argumentation systematically disregards the validity of conclusions, grounds, warrants and modifiers, it also disregards the logic by which participants in communication reach an understanding. This leads Habermas to conclude that the distinction between process, procedure, and product aspects of argumentation cannot hold true if we are to thoroughly understand the reaching of understanding. Despite Klein's own statement to the contrary, I am inclined to follow Habermas when he writes that Klein's approach leads to relativism. However, relativism, which carries bad connotations for a modernist like Habermas, ought not scare us off. W.V.O. Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation³¹ applies here: there may be no way of comparing the logic of two languages. We

simply cannot presuppose that the Azande ground their claims using the same aspects of argumentation we use.

Given this situation, it seems impossible to compare the logic of art with the logic of language. The category of "logic" may not even apply to art at all. Given that a work of art may use systems of semiotics and semantics other than those used in spoken language, there may be no way of discovering if art has logic. Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation also applies here: two somewhat plausible but contradictory translations of a visual artwork into verbal language can imply two different "arguments" in the artwork. Hence, it is impossible to determine the nature of the logic in non-verbal art, if there is any.

Given that the logic of spoken language may be inapplicable to non-verbal art, it is impossible to determine whether or not the distinction between the five forms of argumentation, as it is portrayed in Figure One, holds true for all media. Habermas accuses Toulmin of positing the five-fold distinction on the basis of logic alone. According to Habermas, Toulmin then posits the institutional differentiation of the forms of argumentation via a "...historical-reconstructive investigation of concept and paradigm changes...."³² Given Habermas's critique of Klein's attempt to study argumentation only from the aspect of process, we can see that Habermas cannot accept Toulmin's basis of using the aspect of logic alone to posit the

differentiation. Much like Klein's method, Toulmin's method systematically omits an analysis of the observer. That is, Toulmin must consider the observer as having an "impartial standpoint of rational judgment."³³ In sum, if the distinction between the five forms of argumentation is to hold true while accounting for the observer, Habermas must find a new foundation for it.

2. Grounds for the Distinction between Forms of Argumentation

Habermas provides this foundation by introducing a theory of argumentation which can specify a system of validity claims. He can then find the forms of argumentation which correspond to the types of validity claims specified. Concerning the theory of argumentation, Habermas writes that

...it does not have to provide a derivation for such a system [of validity claims] in the sense of a transcendental deduction; a reliable procedure for testing corresponding reconstructive hypotheses suffices.³⁴

According to Habermas, when a speaker implicitly or explicitly raises a validity claim, the hearer can take a "yes" or "no" position, or he can abstain. By taking a "yes" or a "no" position the hearer agrees or disagrees, in the light of reasons or grounds, with the validity claim raised by the speaker. For Habermas, "...such positions are the expression of insight or understanding."³⁵ In short, understanding an utterance is knowing what it means to take a yes/no position vis-à-vis that utterance.

According to Habermas, in Western industrialized society, there are five basic types of validity claims that can be raised by utterances: truth, rightness, adequacy of standards of value, sincerity, and comprehensibility. When we analyze any particular utterance, we should seek to find what type of validity claims it raises. This in turn can only be discovered by knowing what it would mean to take a "yes" or a "no" position concerning that particular utterance. And further, "what *grounding* means, can be explained only in connection with the conditions for discursively redeeming validity claims."³⁶ For example, a descriptive statement is grounded by establishing the states of affairs. All other types of statements can be grounded similarly. In our society, and perhaps in others, aesthetic statements are grounded when the preferability of values has been established.

In effect, Habermas believes that his positing of five distinct forms of argumentation and validity claims is grounded in empirical observations of our particular society. Indeed, it seems difficult to see the need for types of validity claims other than those mentioned. It seems that if one knows the meaning of an utterance, one must know what it means to agree or to disagree with that utterance. For example, I may not personally be decided as to whether or not there should be abortion on demand, but I know what it means to agree or disagree with that proposi-

tion. Conversely, I cannot agree or disagree with a Haida Indian's account of the spiritual character of a particular totem pole. The question here is, how much of the Haida culture would one have to learn in order to understand the Indian's statement?

I will answer this question by pointing out the society-specific character of Habermas's distinction between the types of validity claims. Since Habermas does not base this distinction on a transcendental deduction, but rather, on empirical observation, there is no reason to believe that the distinction holds true for all societies. Habermas himself points out that the "savage" mind does not differentiate between the object domains of nature, culture, and the self.³⁷ This means that, for example, objects of nature can have human characteristics. Consequently, the Indian's account of the spirituality of the totem pole may be raising a claim concerning the sincerity of the object under question: we, of Western industrialized society, cannot understand the Indian's statement since we would necessarily see it as containing a category mistake. We never question the sincerity of, say, a telephone pole.

Among the presuppositions of the lifeworld of Western industrialized society is the distinction between the five types of validity claims. This presupposition must have great depth in our lifeworld, since it acts as a principle by which we categorize validity claims, which in turn

act as the system by which we ground utterances. If the Haida Indians can make a statement which, on a regular basis, breach our categories of validity claims, then we can safely assume that the Indians' lifeworld does not contain the presupposition concerning the five types of validity claims. Hence, being able to understand the meaning of taking a "yes" or a "no" position concerning a Haida statement--which, according to Habermas, is at least a prerequisite to understanding the statement--involves learning a lifeworld which is somewhat alien to our own. For example, an anthropologist who is learning the "savage" language from scratch has to learn when "yes" or "no" is the appropriate position to take when the native says "gavagai". But again, it seems that Habermas unjustifiably imposes the same type of rationality on all languages. For example, do the Azande themselves implicitly take a "yes" or a "no" position when one of their members says something? This is difficult to determine without studying the Azande directly. Nevertheless, it seems that Habermas is missing some point or other when he makes the taking of a position as a prerequisite to understanding.

In our Western culture, it is easy enough to take a "yes" or "no" position concerning a spoken or written expression. When we talk of black holes, the rightness of abortion, the beauty of Warhol's art, the sincerity of George Bush, or even the comprehensibility of Hegel's

Phenomenology of Spirit, taking a "yes" or "no" position, or knowing what it means to take such a position, makes sense as a precondition for understanding an expression. The question is, does it make sense to take a "yes" or "no" position towards a non-verbal expression? For example, what would it mean to say "no" to Picasso's *Guernica*, Michelangelo's *David*, or even saying "no" to a post-card? We can barely say "no" to a television news report because of its visual component. It is also difficult to say "no" to written works of art. We cannot say "no" to Marian's hating of carrots: "insane" perhaps, but not "no". It seems, then, that taking a "yes" or "no" position is *not* a precondition for understanding non-verbal, and perhaps non-Western, utterances. At most, we can say that taking a position is a precondition for understanding verbal Western expressions.

Perhaps the people of Western societies realized this implicitly. Since saying "no" to visual works of art makes no sense, the work of art is, in respect to argument-
✓ ation, released from a dependence on verbal language. Verbal language is a common denominator in a community. It is the universal way in which we express ourselves and receive expressions from others. The non-verbal arts, however, require a certain amount of expertise to be able to both express ourselves using them, and to read them. Given this situation of limited access, the non-verbal arts can be

misconstrued as being merely an individual, idiosyncratic, expression. Habermas's attitude is typically modern:

The type of validity claims attached to cultural [aesthetic] values does not transcend local boundaries in the same way as truth and rightness claims. Cultural values do not count as universal; they are, as the name indicates, located within the horizon of the lifeworld of a specific group or culture³⁸

Societal forces have caused non-verbal art to be regarded as merely a subjective expression: an expression which has been justified by "art for art's sake". As will see, an institution was formed around this idiosyncratic form of expression. Among its other tasks, this institution takes on the specialization of aesthetic criticism: the explaining of the proper codes, one might call them, for the reception of non-verbal art. As Habermas writes, in aesthetic criticism

...the peculiar role of arguments...is to open the eyes of participants, that is, to lead them to an authenticating aesthetic experience.³⁹

Aesthetic criticism amounts to the giving of a set of instructions or to the teaching of the codes of reception proper to a particular type of art. In part, the subject of the next chapter is the form of institutions, including the institution of art, during the age of reason.

4. Art and the Three-World Distinction

It is difficult to imagine what people of decades and centuries past thought when they performed certain actions. For example, how could an eighteenth-century European man of medicine have thought that a woman's hysterical condition was caused by a wandering uterus? It seems evident that the European worldview has changed radically during the last few centuries, and that this transformation continues to this day. In fact, the transformation of our worldview seems to have quickened its pace to the point that we sometimes do not understand the actions of people who lived a mere thirty years ago. For example, what thoughts could have possibly crossed the minds of the CIA agents and medical personnel who performed brainwashing experiments using LSD on innocent victims? How could a pre-frontal lobotomy be thought of as a cure for schizophrenia? Such lobotomies might be presently thought of as primitive and cruel, but the surgeons who performed these operations during the 1940s and 50s probably did not think of them as such.

Despite all the seemingly radical changes in the European worldview, there are elements of commonality. Take, for example, written and spoken language: it seems

surprising that we can read, without requiring a translation, texts that are sometimes more than five hundred years old. Likewise, we have no difficulties in understanding the art of such masters as da Vinci and Dürer. Hence, there must be an underlying sameness which resided and resides in the European worldview throughout its history. Otherwise, reading relatively old texts and art would require a conscious invocation of translation and hermeneutics. Without this underlying sameness, the meaning of our own medieval and early modern texts and art would be as obscure to us as that of the totem poles of the Haida Indians.

Indeed, the elements which we seem to have in common with our ancestors--especially the elements of spoken and written language--can lead us to believe that we have much more in common with them than we actually do. For example, the fact that the linear perspective* was not commonly employed in the visual arts before the late Middle Ages seems surprising to those who have little or no knowledge of the history of art. Of course, there were experiments with depth in ancient and medieval times, but for the most part,

*In a linear perspective, the three-dimensionality of what is seen is projected on a two-dimensional plane--the canvas, for example--in such a way that the geometry of what is pictured seems to be faithfully represented. Thus, what is twice as far away in the "world" will appear twice as small in the image. Most photographic images use linear perspectives. Also, other types of perspectives are possible. For example, when an artist uses a semantic perspective, the importance of the object dictates its size on the canvas.

the art of those periods, such as Egyptian stone engravings, medieval Russian icons, and the stain-glass windows of the churches, did not employ a linear perspective. For us, the linear perspective seems--and hence acquired the name--"natural". All else is deemed "abstract," "romantic," or even "primitive" art, which can seem confusing, senseless, even meaningless, given the lack of a linear perspective which would normally act as a basis for reading a work of art. Conversely, reading art which uses a linear perspective seems easy and meaningful; the language of such artwork seems natural because of the belief that nature actually reveals itself to us in that perspective. In the face of this, how can we possibly justify wanting to portray objects and bodies while using anything other than a linear perspective?

As Gadamer writes,

It was during the Renaissance, a time of a vigorous upsurge of enthusiasm for all scientific and mathematical construction, that the linear perspective became the norm for painting as one of the great wonders of artistic and scientific progress.¹

These scientific and mathematical constructions were originally devised to explain and interpret such things as the movements of the heavenly bodies. But because of the objectivating attitude which accompanies scientific research, these constructions began to appear real, and thus a mere intellectual device acquired an ontological status.

Mathematical space and time seemed to have just as much reality as God.

Scientific explanations eventually enchanted the world of fine art. Works of art started using the methods of scientific explanation as methods of representation. Artists, at one time, were keenly aware of the developments in science. Da Vinci's repertoire of activities, for example, proves this point. However, over the last one hundred and fifty years or so, artists have become disinterested in science, mainly because it proved to be particularly weak in its powers to show anything about "human nature".

Of course, this last point remains to be proven. We are at a point in history where the physical sciences and the so-called human sciences seem to have very little in common. Yet, there are elements of commonality within Western culture which allow for both the possibility of understanding between people who take part in a variety of contemporary societal institutions, and, as I have mentioned before, the possibility of understanding what our ancestors have communicated in the form of language.

In this part of the thesis, I will attempt to provide a model which will serve as a basis for understanding how the various institutionalized disciplines have come to be, and what their interrelations are. In keeping with the theme of this thesis, I will naturally concentrate

on the place of art and aesthetics. Finally, I will attempt to extrapolate aspects of an overall theory of aesthetics which are implied by my schematization.

To begin with, the model that I am proposing is based upon Habermas's examination of Karl Popper's three-world distinction. I will presently sketch out an outline of this analysis.

Popper proposes that, for the purpose of sociological analysis,

We may distinguish the following three worlds or universes: first the world of physical objects or physical states; secondly, the world of states of consciousness, or of mental states, or perhaps of behavioral dispositions to act; and thirdly, the world of objective contents of thought, especially of scientific and poetic thoughts of works of art.²

In short, Popper distinguishes between the physical world, the mental world, and, to put it in Hegelian terms, the world of objective spirit. Popper describes the third world as containing "the products of the human mind."³

Popper's proposal is certainly intriguing, but it does have its problems. As Habermas points out, Popper conceives the three worlds in ontological terms, which means that entities which belong to their respective world have "...a specific mode of being: physical objects and events, mental states and episodes, and semantic contents of symbolic formations."⁴ For Popper, the first and second worlds are in immediate interchange, as are the second and

third. Conversely, the first and third worlds can only interact through the mediation of the second. Habermas agrees with Popper's conception of the interaction between worlds, but a problem with the scheme remains: Popper casts the relation between the mind and objective spirit in cognitive-instrumental terms, which leads to a conception of the third world as having the primary function of encompassing and expanding technically-utilizable knowledge.⁵ That is, Popper conceives the third world as containing nothing but different types of instrumental rationalities, which can be thought of as methods by which human beings deal with the first world, and which, I presume, could be described as more or less efficient vis-à-vis each other.

For Habermas, the major strength of Popper's model is that the mediation between the first and second worlds occurs via the third world of objective spirit. This means, first, that entities of the third world cannot be reduced to entities in the second. This prevents a "...psychologistic conception of the objective mind [spirit]...."⁶ And second, the causal model which explains the relation between entities within the first world cannot act exclusively as the model which explains the relations between the first and second world. Thus Popper bars the way to a physicalist conception of mind.⁷

The view that entities of the third world cannot be reduced to entities in the second implies that symbolic

formations--elements of the third world--belong to all human beings, and yet cannot be reduced to the thoughts of a single person. Thus the works of artists and writers go far beyond them, even though they are the products of their individual, creative, minds. To put it in practical terms, the meaning found in the various symbolic formations of *Guernica* cannot be reduced to Picasso's thoughts of the work. What Gadamer writes of literature applies to all symbolic systems: "...a written tradition can detach itself from the mere continuance of the fragments left over from the life of the past...."⁸ Literature and other symbolic formations have acquired their "...own simultaneity with every present."⁹ For all practical purposes, we can never read what Homer, Dürer, or Jane Austin themselves wanted to say, but rather, we read their texts and art works. As Gadamer writes, the reader of a work of art gives it "...a life of its own."¹⁰ Habermas also observes the same phenomenon:

Symbolic formations are, it is true, generated by the productive mind; but though they are themselves products, they confront subjective mind with the objectivity of a problematic, uncomprehended complex of meaning that can be opened up only through intellectual labor. The *products* of the human mind immediately turn against it as *problems*.¹¹

The works of the great men and women of the past can take "residence" in the objective spirit in the form of culturally and sociologically communicated symbolic forma-

tions. It could be said that we actually "think" of, and through, their work. Objective spirit, as the world of semantic content and symbolic formations, can be added to and modified by intellectual labour. For example, the work of Newton is expressed not only in his written work, but also by how we, in our everyday life, describe and symbolize the movements of objects. The source of these descriptive and symbolizing systems can be forgotten. If this is the case, the product of intellectual labour can turn against us as a problem. The "uncomprehended complex of meaning" which has been handed down to us can, as Habermas writes, only be unravelled by intellectual labour.

The ones who take on this intellectual labour can be described as explorers, in the most literal sense, of the third world of semantic content and symbolic formations. How the exploration of the third world can take place can be well understood by way of I.C. Jarvie's phenomenological sociology of knowledge:

People living in a society have to find their way around it, both to accomplish what they want and to avoid what they do not want. We might say that to do this they construct in their minds a conceptual map of the society and its features, of their own location among them, of the possible paths which will lead them to their goals, and of the hazards along each path.¹²

According to Jarvie, we, as individuals, attempt to map out the third world so that we can better find our ways around in it. But the fact that we live "...in an unmanageably

large and changing society permits neither perfect mapping, nor perfect coordination of maps."¹³

Jarvie's analysis is illuminating given that it points to the finitude of the human individual by comparing the exploration of all possible points on Earth with the complete exploration of objective spirit: both are, in practice, impossible. However, Jarvie's analysis does not take into account what Habermas call the "hypothetical-reflective attitude."¹⁴ That is, we may indeed study and map out the terrain of objective spirit, but we may also reflect upon, and perhaps change, that very terrain. Jarvie takes an objectivating attitude towards objective spirit, which consequently leads him to ignore the possibility of reflection within that spirit. As Habermas points out, the same objectivating attitude also leads Jarvie to neglect the possibility that propositions may admit of things other than truth.¹⁵ As we have seen, for Habermas, propositions also allow for claims to rightness, sincerity, and value. Habermas also criticizes Jarvie's proposal for not permitting a distinction between cultural values and institutionally embodied values. For Habermas, it is the coercive character of established institutionalized norms which distinguishes societal formations from cultural formations. The former have an obligatory character, while the latter are "free-floating."¹⁶

Now, given the criticisms of Popper's and Jarvie's respective three-world theories, Habermas proposes three modifications in order to form his own theory:

(A) Habermas distinguishes the concept of "world" from that of "lifeworld". Accordingly, he writes that "sociated subjects, when participating in cooperative processes of interpretation, themselves employ the concept of world in an implicit way."¹⁷ It is those elements in the world which are thematized by participants in communication. According to the theory of argumentation, the validity of the thematized element are rendered problematic, thus allowing for the possibility of reflection within the particular worlds. Conversely, "the cultural tradition shared by a community is constitutive of the lifeworld which the individual member finds already interpreted."¹⁸ The lifeworld acts as the "unthematically given horizon"¹⁹ common to participants in communication thereby allowing them to refer to something in the world.

At this point, I would like to add to Habermas's distinction between "world" and "lifeworld". First, lifeworld presuppositions can, and often do, become thematized, and are thereby brought within the realm of the "world". For example, the existence of causality in nature was for the most part assumed until David Hume questioned it. The converse of this first criticism is also possible: an element in the world can lose its status of being a

"thematized problem". This type of element is by no means forgotten, but rather, it is drawn into the lifeworld. The results of the great problems of the past are now our presuppositions. Second, the lifeworld cannot be reduced to the world, and vice-versa. The former reduction is impossible since there must always remain in the lifeworld a presupposition that there is a world. The latter reduction is impossible for it would necessitate a form of communication where lifeworld presuppositions are never thematized: a form of communication that does not allow for either doubts or questions concerning any possible expression.

We now find ourselves in a position where we can at least partially understand and explain some of the problems which I raised at the beginning of this chapter. For example: the problem of why we can understand old texts and art. Throughout the history of Western culture, many problems have been thematized, and then drawn into the lifeworld. But what has been thematized is only superficial, for the lifeworld, as I have described it, is stratified, which means that some presuppositions are based on deeper ones, the latter ones having been set in the most ancient of times. The presence of fundamental lifeworld presuppositions, such as the ones concerning the existence of the world and of human beings, can be found in cultures that existed more than 2000 years ago. Such elements of

commonality allow us to understand ancient authors such as Plato.

Sometimes we find ourselves in a situation where we do not understand a text or a work of art, or at least ask ourselves "How could anybody have thought this?" These texts and works of art can be described as the losers of past battles to find solutions to thematized problems. Although these texts might still be with us, their solutions have either never taken a place in our lifeworld, or have been usurped and replaced by more contemporary solutions. Thus, many of Herbert Spencer's ideas strike us as unusual, Newton's notion of "ether" does not enjoy the popularity it once did, and the art of the Cubists is presently met with bewildered gazes.

(B) Habermas proposes to take the concept of objective spirit further than Popper by allowing claims and propositions to admit of relations other than truth. That is, Habermas differentiates within the objective spirit spheres of validity in accordance with different types of validity claims.²⁰ There are three spheres of value: science and technology, law and morality, and art and criticism. These three spheres are, respectively, the cognitive-instrumental, the evaluative, and the expressive components of culture. Habermas claims that spheres of value and components of culture can be treated as autonomous problem domains. This claim seems to be somehow intuitively true,

since we are not apt to treat strictly technological problems using normative or expressive claims. But I believe that the distinction between the three spheres of value is an artificial one that cannot be maintained upon close scrutiny. Later in this chapter, I will attempt to show how and why this distinction is faulty by demonstrating that art does not fall neatly into the rubric implied by this distinction.

It seems that Habermas suffers the symptoms of Cartesian Anxiety--not so much by wanting apodicticity, but rather by alienating the subject of experience from what he experiences. That is, Habermas distinguishes between the physical world, the mental world, and the world of objective spirit. To reflect this distinction, the last of these worlds is in turn subdivided into the objective, subjective, and social aspects. This second three-fold division can be regarded as a formation within objective spirit. As the "category mistakes" of the Haida Indians indicate, objective spirit does not have to take on that type of formation. However, the first three-fold division is fundamental for Habermas. Although he refuses to derive the first three-fold distinction ontologically, he does derive it phenomenologically by finding the worlds that correspond to the three-fold distinction within objective spirit. The result is an image of a subject who is opposed to, and confronted by, something completely "other," namely, the external

world. We can confront this alienation, and we can thereby confront the radical distinction between the three worlds. However, this point is somewhat moot, for the distinction is characteristic of modern thought.

Because Habermas himself posits this distinction within the objective spirit, he is able to classify forms of argumentation in terms of the spheres of validity, or worlds, that they correspond to. The five forms of argumentation that we have seen in Chapter Two are grounded in their respective world as follows:

Figure 2
Division within Objective Spirit
& Forms of Argumentation*

Objective	Social	Subjective	
Theoretical Discourse	Practical Discourse	Aesthetic Criticism	Therapeutic Critique

One must keep in mind that Figure Two represents a three-fold distinction within objective spirit. There are also the physical and mental worlds which stand outside objective spirit. As stated before, objective spirit contains semantic contents and symbolic formations, which, in turn, refer to one of the three worlds. In other words, within objective spirit, there is discourse concerning the physical world, the mental world, and discourse concerning objective spirit itself. In the Habermasian scheme of things, the three-world

*There is also Explicative Discourse, which refers to itself as a world.

distinction within objective spirit echoes a generalized ontological three-world distinction.

(C) This last point leads to Habermas's third and final modification of Popper's theory. As David Ingram describes it, "...each world is defined as the intentional correlate of a certain attitude...."²¹ The physical, mental, and objective spirit worlds correlate to the objectivating, expressive, and valuating attitudes respectively. An agent can apply any one of the three basic attitudes to whatever world he wishes. For example, one could take on an objectivating attitude towards the world of objective spirit: in this situation, one would attempt to describe the laws and morality of a society without adopting them. For Habermas, this does not constitute a type of category mistake, but rather this provides him with, as Ingram writes, "...the reference points required to construct a nonselective model of social rationalization."²²

Now, given that any of the worlds can be thematized from the perspective of any one of the three attitudes, Habermas deduces nine possible formal-pragmatic relations: "pragmatic" because they serve to guide the actions of agents, "formal" because the relations depend on a three-world distinction, that is, a "formulation".²³ Some of the nine formal-pragmatic relations are, as Habermas writes, "...suitable for the accumulation of knowledge."²⁴ As Habermas writes, each basic attitude circumscribes its own

type of rationality. Specifically, the objectivating, norm-conformative, and expressive attitudes circumscribe cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-practical rationality respectively.²⁵ Thus, the formal-pragmatic relations which share a basic attitude have the same type of rationality. For example, art and eroticism share aesthetic-practical rationality--a rationality

...within which the production of knowledge can take the form of authentic interpretation of needs, interpretations that have to be renewed in each historically changed circumstance.²⁶

Given that art and eroticism share the same type of rationality, any accumulation of knowledge in art affects the state of knowledge concerning eroticism, and vice-versa.

In a modern society, a stable and systematic accumulation of knowledge can occur only if societal institutions are organized (rationalized) in such a way that the labour necessary for the acquisition of knowledge is divided along the lines of the formal-pragmatic relations. For example, institutions where people typically take an objectivating attitude towards the physical world are considered stable. Conversely, a group of people who mix-and-match all three basic attitudes towards the objective world does not constitute a stable societal institution. For example, there are some religious sects that step outside their institutionalized sphere of morality by denying the validity of theories that belongs to the sphere of science and

technology. In particular, some American Fundamentalist sects have taken upon themselves the task of rewriting the Theory of Evolution so that it will accord with a literal reading of the Bible. If we follow Habermas's criteria, we would have to regard these sects as unstable institutions.

In short, Habermas believes that society is rationalized into specialized institutions, and that this rationalization echoes the formal-pragmatic relations. The resulting rationalization complexes are illustrated in Figure 3:

Figure 3
Rationalization Complexes²⁷

Worlds Basic Attitudes	Objective	Social	Subjective
Objectivat- ing	Science/ Technology	Social Technologies	X
Norm- Conformative	X	Law	Morality
Expressive	Art	X	Eroticism

This Figure shows a somewhat idealized pattern of societal rationalization. A nonselective pattern--a pattern where the rationality which corresponds to one attitude does not dominate the others--is preferable. According to Habermas, three necessary conditions have to be met in order that this pattern remains nonselective: first, the production and transmission of knowledge specialized according to

validity claims must be secured; second, the specialized knowledge created by the various cultures of experts must be passed on to "...the communicative practice of everyday life...";²⁸ and third,

...the cultural value spheres have to be institutionalized in such a balanced way that the life-orders corresponding to them are sufficiently autonomous to avoid being subordinated to laws intrinsic to heterogeneous orders of life.²⁹

The normative implications of Habermas's rationalization complexes are somewhat disturbing. First of all, there is a tension between wanting a society of experts on the one hand, and a society of people who partake, at least to some extent, in the knowledge of everyday life on the other. How is the individual to decide the balance between the life of an expert and the life of--how should I describe it?--a human being? On the one hand, neglecting the life of an expert presents problems for the individual in a society that demands specialization, and on the other, neglecting common everyday life in favour of expertise seems to make the individual an automaton. Second, assuring the autonomy of the various fields of expertise seems reasonable enough, but this too presents problems. On the one hand, situations where the institution of law imposes itself on another institution, such as art or science, are not usually considered legitimate. Some artists and scientists dislike having their work criticized by those from juridical or political institutions. On the other hand, the people within the

institution of art frequently take it upon themselves to criticize other institutions. In the context of present day Western society, a work of art such as Picasso's *Guernica* can be quickly declared to be legitimate social criticism. All in all, the relations between the various fields of expertise which have been delineated by the rationalization complexes are not as simple as Habermas makes them out to be.

Another point of criticism against Habermas's rationalization complexes is the existence of relations, indicated in Figure 3 by an "X," which cannot be rationalized. For example, the rubric representing an objectivating attitude towards the subjective world is empty because, as Habermas writes, "...[it] stands for the assumption that nothing can be learned in an objectivating attitude about inner nature qua subjectivity."³⁰ As David Ingram writes,

...[this] puts empirical psychology and utilitarian ethics beyond the realm of rationalizable undertakings. The idea of a hedonistic calculus has long been held suspect by philosophers, but the success of experimental psychology and psychopharmacology can hardly be doubted.³¹

In general, Ingram thinks that it is unclear why Habermas includes within the rationalization complexes three rubrics which cannot be rationalized. This exclusion has been most severely criticized by Thomas McCarthy,³² but we need not examine the details here.

What is important here is that the distinctions within the rationalization complexes are weakened by the non-rationalizable rubrics. According to Habermas, the fact that the rubric indicating an expressive attitude towards the social world is empty

...signals that expressively determined forms of interaction (for example, counter-cultural forms of life) do not form structures that are rationalizable in and of themselves, but are parasitic in that they remain dependent on innovations in the other spheres of value.³³

The key word here is "parasitic": I would like to suggest that, to one extent or the other, all the individual rubrics within the rationalization complexes are "parasitic" on all the others. Hence, because of the connotations of the word "parasitic," I will replace it with "dependent".

Now, if we take the example of art, we can see that it is dependent on science and technology, since the former at times borrows the idea of the linear perspective from the latter. This example is just the tip of the iceberg, for, without a doubt, each field of expertise is dependent on others. Habermas himself provides the evidence:

Autonomous art has just as little structure-forming effect on society as a whole as do the shifting, unstable countercultures that form around this subsystem.³⁴

He further characterizes the institution of art as having a sphere of value which focuses upon a "...hedonistic lifestyle directed to innerworldly salvation...:"³⁵ a life-

style, according to him, which is a reaction against the pressures of theoretical and practical rationality.³⁶

Apart from the fact that it is difficult to imagine Van Gogh as a hedonist, I cannot understand why Habermas characterizes the institution of art as being more unstable than, and a simple reaction to, the other rationalized institutions. He seems to be saying that people take on a distasteful duty when they work as scientist, lawyer, or social worker, but once they get home, people suddenly adopt an expressive attitude and indulge in art and eroticism, by watching television, presumably. Immanuel Kant uses the formula "purposiveness without a purpose"³⁷ to distinguish aesthetic experience from practical and moral experience. Unfortunately, Habermas lays too much emphasis on the last three words of the formula.

Habermas's attitude towards art is not untypical in contemporary society. The question "What is art good for?" is difficult to answer: we are presently in a situation where the finest works of art are hidden in museums, a situation where art is relegated to the status of the superfluous, of the indulgent, and of the merely sensuous. Perhaps the biggest fault with modernist aesthetics is its failure to find the value of art.

Signs and systems of signs, if I may regard art that way, are not useless, but are, on the contrary, primordial. As Jean Baudrillard writes,

Chaque groupe ou individu, avant même d'assurer sa survie, est dans l'urgence vitale d'avoir à se produire comme sens dans un système d'échanges et de relations. Simultanément à la production de biens, il y a urgence à produire des significations, du sens, à faire que l'un-pour-l'autre existe avant que l'un existe pour soi.³⁸

Language is essential for human kind, and art is the frontier of language. Like the great sea explorers of yesteryear, the artist plunges into the great unknown of new worlds. Art works with language: it changes it, researches it, and develops it so that there may be new forms of expression. As Gadamer writes, "Language is not just one of man's possession in the world, but on it depends the fact that man has a world at all."³⁹ Art, by developing new forms of expression, has the potential to reveal, or rather to create, new worlds.

Habermas's own position concerning the scope of language is ambiguous. On the one hand, he seems to realize the primordially of language:

with the concept of communicative action there comes into play the additional presupposition of a *linguistic medium* that reflects the actor's world-relations as such.⁴⁰

For him, understanding in language is the "mechanism" for coordinating actions.⁴¹ Language can coordinate actions in terms of means and ends (cognitive-instrumental rationality), it can coordinate actions in terms of normative agreements (moral-practical rationality), and it can also coordinate in terms of interpretations of needs (aesthetic-

practical rationality). The medium for all these action coordinations is language. As such, language cannot be contained by making it one of the objects of study of one type of rationality, but rather, language must be presupposed and dealt with by all types of rationality. On the other hand, Habermas ignores the primordially of language by describing the research and development of new forms of expression as being contained by the formal-pragmatic relations of art and eroticism. Whatever worlds art reveals are systematically contained within specific institutionalized fields of expertise. Art seems to have nothing to do with science, law, and morality, despite evidence to the contrary.

A question then remains: has modernist aesthetics missed out on the fundamental primordially of language and art? The short answer is no, but perhaps modern philosophers and aestheticians would not have posed the question in quite that fashion. Modernists think of art as somehow fundamentally subjective: Habermas, for example, describes the institution of art as one that was and is formed around the expressive (subjective) attitude towards the physical world. As such, art constitutes one set of themes and problems for one specific field of expertise. Given that language is the medium that reflects world-relations, its themes and problems have to do with all fields of expertise. Because of this situation, Habermas cannot entertain the possibility

that the problems of art are problems of language. However, as a modernist, Habermas is a representative of a long tradition of great thinkers. As such, an exploration into aesthetics with the help of his work, as I hope to have shown, is extremely enlightening.

Conclusion

As Chapter Four indicates, there is something wrong with the modernist conception of art. It seems that art is not merely the subjective expression of the individual or merely an institutionalized embodiment of specialized knowledge. All in all, much of what modernists have to say about art seems counter-intuitive. Why is this? To conclude this thesis, I will examine this question closely, since doing so provides us both with an interesting way of summarizing the major points we have made in this work and with some pointers on how to avoid the traps of modernism when it comes to the evaluation and appreciation of art.

The counter-intuitiveness of the modernist conception of art can be traced back to the fundamental philosophical presuppositions of modernity. As we have seen in the Introduction, these presuppositions involve both a radical distinction between subject and object and the positing of the possibility of an apodictic truth. In epistemological terms, these presuppositions imply a subject which knows, an object which is known, and, in the case of Descartes, a subject that can know of its existence apodictically. Jürgen Habermas improves on this scheme by positing a third realm he call "the social" which, in the course of the thesis, I

have described as "objective spirit". This third realm bridges the gap between individual subjects by providing them with a commonality which allows for an intersubjective grounding of knowledge via communication. However, despite the fact that the two or three-fold distinction has been most thoroughly explored in terms of implications, there is still something essential missing in the modernist analysis of art. I would like to suggest that what is missing is the inclusion of emotional life.

One could ask "What does emotional life have to do with art?", but this question presupposes that life may not have anything to do with art. One of the many consequences of modernist presuppositions is the distinction between reason and emotions. The distinction is useful, but does not represent the human condition. Emotions are necessarily involved in our rational processes, and rationality guides our emotions. Modernist aesthetics seeks to abstract reason away from the living human being, and then tries to use this reason as a means of evaluating, appreciating, and categorizing art.

One could also ask "What is emotional life?". This question is extremely difficult to answer abstractly. A living human being experiences, responds to what he experiences, and even changes the way he experiences, thereby also changing what is experienced. Even this is an unsatisfactory

explanation of emotional life. To see life, one must live, and, if we are lucky, we can sometimes see life in art.

And he seemed verily to be re-born. Now life came into him! He had been gradually dying ... in the isolated private life of the artist and the conscious being.¹

Despite the efforts of the modernist, life was never completely abstracted from art. One can never completely hide life behind rationality. Now, I will reexamine some of the major arguments in this thesis in the light of the idea of life.

In Chapter One, we examine Weitz's criticism of aesthetic theories such as Formalism, Emotionalism, Intellectualism, and Organicism. All of these theories were found to be inadequate since they failed to recognize something as art, or failed to provide a framework to properly evaluate certain types of art. Each individual theory can be useful, insofar as it helps us understand and appreciate certain types of art. Weitz, however, posits the distinction between recognizing and evaluating art, which is, as we have seen, unhelpful. This distinction does not hold true in many circumstances. As Emily Carr shows, the Haida Indians integrate their art, their totem poles, with other aspects of life. From the Indian's point of view, a totem pole is not simply an object to be gazed at and isolated in a museum. We of Western society also integrate art with other aspects of life. For example, we can appreciate the aesthetics of a room and its furniture in terms of the forms, colours, and textures. Office chairs often act as

symbols of rank within a company, and can yet be aesthetic objects. These examples make it difficult to decide what is art. However, the circumstances of modernism require that we remain within the bounds of institutionalized art.

Habermas, in the article "Modernity versus Postmodernity," says that because of the reification of the praxis of everyday life, certain practices have been taken over by a culture of experts. The experts, in turn, create practices that are so specialized that the common person has no understanding of the them. Habermas's analysis seems to be largely correct, insofar as it applies to his examples of Surrealist and Dadaist art. However, there may be forces at work here which are not within the circle of explanation formed by Habermas's theory of institutionalization. For the contemporary Western individual, Dadaism and Surrealism are still on the margin of things understood. Dadaism and Surrealism use systems of signs, or languages, which are not commonly found in the everyday life of the public. A Surrealist like Dali, for example, used oil and canvas as a medium--a medium which, by its very nature, allows for only one object to qualify as the work of art. How is the person supposed to integrate the work of Dali with his life if he is forced to view this art in a museum? If the Dadaist and the Surrealist wanted to make their work accessible to the public, then they should have chosen a medium which can easily be integrated into the lives of the public. Oil

painting are, by their very nature, elitist: the can never be integrated into the lifeworld. The public is not unwilling when it comes to learning how to read new forms of art. Television pictures, for example, often use the rather complex system of having shots sequenced for semantic narrative continuity, instead of having shots juxtaposed for spatial and temporal continuity. The matter of having an art form accepted by the public may simply be a matter of aesthetic infrastructure.

As we saw in Chapter Two, Habermas's *Theory of Communicative Action* is very useful for uncovering the philosophical presuppositions of modernity which have helped define the present notions of the meaning and societal role of art. By considering the rationality of speaking and acting subjects, Habermas examines the grounding of expressions. In turn, expressions are problematic when the validity claims they raise are controversial. A validity claim is either assented to or rejected depending on whether or not participants in communication agree that the claim can be rationally grounded in lifeworld presuppositions.

As we saw, there are many problems with Habermas's reflections on rationality. However, some useful ideas emerged in these reflections. For example, the concept of "lifeworld" as the set of presuppositions that everybody in a given culture "knows" but does not talk about is very enlightening. The concept of "lifeworld" can help explain

how aesthetic criticism is grounded. It is with this concept that a statement such as "I want a saucer of mud because I enjoy its rich river-smell" can be seen as rational, or at least reasonable. However, the concept of "lifeworld" implies much more than Habermas uncovers. In Chapter Two, I explained how styles of art are best understood as forms of language. This notion works hand-in-hand with a notion I would like to present here: the key to finding the individual subject is not, in the Cartesian manner, through having thought immediately reflecting upon itself--this method systematically leaves out the experiences of the individual out of consideration. Rather, the key to finding the living subject, the individual, is by examining the lifeworld.

I would like to expand on Habermas's concept of "lifeworld" by including the idea of life. Now, the lifeworld for Habermas is a group of unquestioned presuppositions that every member of a culture "knows". However, each individual has his own experiences, and he thereby learns the lifeworld in his individual way. The presuppositions may be the same, but they may be intertwined differently. Simply put, there are many ways that people can arrive at the same conclusion. The life of the individual dictates how the lifeworld presuppositions are intertwined. For example, both the religious fanatic and the physicist may believe that God exists, but for very different reasons. If we include the idea of life in the concept of "life-

world," then we should no longer speak of the lifeworld as being a collective unconscious, but rather we should speak of many individual lifeworlds which have, in a particular culture, family resemblances. Habermas's way of characterizing the lifeworld does not seem quite correct since it takes life out of the structures of the lifeworld by construing these structures in rational terms. Life is emotional and sometimes irrational. We sometimes agree or disagree with a statement on simply emotional grounds. For example, the word "love" is as common as any other, but there are many different notions of what it means.

As was previously discussed, different presuppositions have different depth. The deeper the presuppositions are, the more likely are they to be intertwined more or less the same way in the individuals of a community. Ideas of chairs, tables, and the Sun have great depth, since members of a culture are not apt to use these ideas very differently. Love has less depth since it can mean anything from a great respect for another to pure sexual lust. Idiosyncracies can be described as having the least amount of depth: an individual who finds open spaces to be "sucking" has lifeworld presuppositions that are not shared with others.

This idea of the lifeworld can help make sense of the experience of art. By viewing or reading a work of art, we learn a new set of presuppositions and how they are intertwined. For example, it is only by reading *The Edible*

Woman that one can learn the reasons for Marian's aversion to carrots. From *Rambo* we can learn what motivates a traumatized soldier. In general, there is a dialectical relationship between lifeworld presuppositions and their intertwining: the former dictates the character of the latter, and vice-versa. Each presupposition defines itself in terms of others. Any particular element within a work of art is defined in terms of other elements. The work of art is in part a self-referring system of signs--a language, in short. The system of signs defines the content, and vice-versa. The individual reader of the work of art learns both the content and the system of signs: he duplicates within himself a certain set of intertwined lifeworld presuppositions. It is the life of the individual that allows for this duplication, and he, in turn, starts to experience the world and himself in terms of the newly learned lifeworld presuppositions.

As we saw in Chapter Three, Habermas believes that the theory of argumentation is the key to understanding changes in the lifeworld. It is within this context that he posits the notion of an ideal speech situation, and, as we saw, this transcendental notion is unhelpful in understanding our understanding of art. And, as we saw in Wittgenstein, we need not examine ideal languages that have been abstracted from everyday life to answer the question of how speech can change lifeworld presuppositions.

By examining Gadamer's notion of how we experience tradition, we found how speech and non-verbal expressions can change lifeworld presuppositions. From Gadamer, we concluded that we must be predisposed to listen to works of art. We must be open to and entertain what they have to say. We must be ready to absorb within ourselves their presented lifeworld presuppositions. We can thereby experience the world the way works of art require us to experience them. A work of art captures a portion of the lifeworld of the artist. Thus, a portion of the subjectivity of the artist is found in the artwork: a portion which embodies both an experience and the language needed to capture the experience. Hence, the work of art has subjectivity, but one, as Gadamer describes, that remains and endures.

In general, we can say that when someone views non-verbal art in the proper way, he learns new language games. However, describing the logic internal to these language games is very difficult. As we have seen, Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation implies that the meaning of non-verbal works of art cannot be translated into a verbal equivalent. The senselessness of saying "no" to a non-verbal work of art is an indication that the logic found in non-verbal forms of art, if there is any, also cannot be translated into a verbal equivalent. Non-verbal forms of art may have a form of logic where the individual elements within the art are grounded in lifeworld presuppositions differ-

ently than are verbal and written argumentation. While we can ground a verbal premise with a "yes" or "no," grounding the meaning of a work of art may be more an emotional, rather than a rational, exercise. Again, the viewer of the art must be predisposed to listen to it.

The living individual learns from art, and art has a tradition. The lifeworld which is imbedded in the individual also goes beyond him. The lifeworld is, among other things, a set of codes on how to live. These codes may exist for centuries, given that they can be passed on. One form of codes by which we can approach life is embodied in the thoughts of modernism. There is, as Habermas writes, an "uncomprehended complex of meaning"² which has been handed down to us by our various languages and media, and the complex can only be uncovered by intellectual labour. It is as human beings that we embody the complexes of meaning which permits us to experience and interact with the world.

As we saw in Chapter Four, modernity furnishes us with one type of complex of meaning. As such, modernity lets us experience and interact with the world in a particular way--a way that requires us to see art as a subjective expression. According to modernist presuppositions, rationalization requires that art be regarded as a specialized field of expertise. Art has been institutionalized and specialized to conform with these presuppositions. In Habermas's view,

...art's becoming autonomous means that the inner logic of the aesthetic value sphere is set free, making possible a rationalization of art and, therewith, a cultivation of experiences in dealing with inner nature, that is, the methodological-expressive interpretation of a subjectivity freed from everyday conventions of knowledge and action.³

Here, Habermas's modernist presuppositions show clearly. There is present a transcendental subjectivity which can, it is presupposed, set itself apart from everyday knowledge and action. However, since experience can change how an individual experiences, it seems impossible to separate the subject from everyday life. Habermas also presupposes that autonomy, of art in this case, means freedom. However, could one not say that artists, or anyone else for that matter, can realize their dependence, assent to it, and still be free? Habermas's autonomy does not create freedom, but rather, it makes art autonomous from everyday life. Thus, making art autonomous, for a modernist, means that good art is to be revered like icons of a specialized sphere of expertise, and put in the best museums. As a consequence, good art is found only in places that are out of the way of normal everyday life. However, it is only within this type of life that art can gain its full meaning.

Museums, for these reasons, seem almost self-contradictory: they try to bring art to as many people as possible, but because of the context they provide, no one, except for a few curators and security guards, can include

in his interpretation what the art has to say in an everyday context. The artists themselves have, perhaps unwillingly, contributed to this situation by creating works of art that can have only one physical object count as the original.

Despite the elitism involved in the high arts, there are important lessons that we can learn from them. For example, we have learned through the course of this thesis that the non-verbal arts embody languages. Art sometimes requires that we learn a new language: a new way of symbolizing the world and thereby changing the world. How are we to construe the various media in general in the light of this? For example, does television merely present bits and pieces of the world, or does it embody a language that is able to create a world? That is, does television report on the political status quo, for example, or does it lend a hand, along with other media, in creating a world of the political status quo? Of course, the same sorts of questions could be asked of all media. Answers, however, will have to wait for future projects.

References

Notes For Introduction

¹Boris Uspensky, *The Semiotics of the Russian Icon*. (Lisse, Belgium: The Peter the Ridder Press, 1976), p. 9.

²David Ingram, *Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 88.

³Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm and Utopia*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 262.

Notes for Chapter One

¹Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", in *Philosophy Looks at Art*, 2nd edition, J. Margolis ed., (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), p. 121.

²Weitz, p. 121.

³Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), § 66.

⁴Wittgenstein, § 66.

⁵Wittgenstein, § 66.

⁶Weitz, p. 126.

⁷Weitz, p. 127.

⁸Weitz, p. 126.

⁹Wittgenstein, § 67.

¹⁰Wittgenstein, § 67.

¹¹V.W.O. Quine, *Word and Object*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), p. 126.

¹²Weitz, pp. 128-9.

- ¹³Weitz, p. 129.
- ¹⁴Weitz, pp. 129-30.
- ¹⁵Emily Carr, *Klee Wyck*, (Toronto: Irving Publishing, 1986), p. 6.
- ¹⁶Carr, p. 8.
- ¹⁷Carr, p. 52.
- ¹⁸Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," trans. Seyla Benhabib, *New German Critique*, 22 (Winter, 1981), p. 4.
- ¹⁹Habermas, p. 4.
- ²⁰Habermas, p. 4.
- ²¹Habermas, p. 4.
- ²²Habermas, p. 5.
- ²³Habermas, p. 6.
- ²⁴Habermas, p. 6.
- ²⁵Habermas, p. 6.
- ²⁶Habermas, p. 7.
- ²⁷Habermas, p. 8.
- ²⁸Habermas, p. 8.
- ²⁹Habermas, p. 7.
- ³⁰Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), p. 82.
- ³¹David Ingram, *Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 126-7.
- ³²Ingram, p. 127.
- ³³Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," p. 8.
- ³⁴Habermas, p. 8.
- ³⁵Habermas, p. 10.

³⁶Habermas, p. 11.

³⁷Martin Jay, "Habermas and Modernism" in *Habermas and Modernity*, ed. Richard Bernstein, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), p. 133.

Notes for Chapter Two

¹Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), p. 8. Further references to this book will be indicated by "ThCA:1".

²Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 10.

³Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 10.

⁴Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 10.

⁵Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 10.

⁶Habermas, ThCA:1, pp. 12-3.

⁷Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 7.

⁸Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 285.

⁹Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 49.

¹⁰Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 10.

¹¹Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 23.

¹²Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 23.

¹³Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 16. From Richard Norman, *Reasons for Actions*, (New York: 1971), pp. 63-4.

¹⁴Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 17.

¹⁵Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 17.

¹⁶Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 17.

¹⁷Margaret Atwood, *The Edible Woman*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart-Bantam Ltd., 1969), pp. 183-4.

¹⁸Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," p. 11.

¹⁹Habermas, ThCA:1, p. 18.

²⁰Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), § 68.

Notes for Chapter Three

¹Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), p. 23. Further references to this book will be indicated by "ThCA:1".

²Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 26.

³Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 25.

⁴Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 25.

⁵Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 25.

⁶Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 25.

⁷Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 25.

⁸Jorge Luis Borges, "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" in *Ficciones*, trans. Alastair Reid, (New York: Grover Press Inc., 1962), op. cit.

⁹Some of the ideas presented in this passage are tangently related to a portion of the following work: Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), §§ 244-50.

¹⁰Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, § 81.

¹¹Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, § 81.

¹²Sigmund Freud, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" in *Case Histories I: "Dora" and "Little Hans,"* trans. Alix & James Strachey, (Great Britain: The Pelican Freud Library, vol. 8, 1977), pp. 157-9.

¹³Jürgen Habermas, "Psychoanalysis and Social Theory" in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977).

¹⁴Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 25.

¹⁵Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Garrett Borden & John Cumming, (New York: Crossroads Publishing Co., 1975), p. 321.

- ¹⁶Gadamer, p. 322.
- ¹⁷Gadamer, p. 323.
- ¹⁸Gadamer, p. 323.
- ¹⁹Gadamer, p. 323.
- ²⁰Gadamer, p. 324.
- ²¹Gadamer, p. 324.
- ²²Gadamer, p. 92.
- ²³Gadamer, p. 92.
- ²⁴Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 26.
- ²⁵Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 27.
- ²⁶Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 27. From Wolfgang Klein, "Argumentation und Argument" in *Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft* 38/29 (1980), p. 19.
- ²⁷Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 28.
- ²⁸Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 28.
- ²⁹Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 28.
- ³⁰Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 30.
- ³¹W.V.O. Quine, *Word and Object*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), p. 73f.
- ³²Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 33.
- ³³Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 34.
- ³⁴Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 38.
- ³⁵Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 38.
- ³⁶Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 39.
- ³⁷Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 48.
- ³⁸Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 42.
- ³⁹Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 42.

Notes for Chapter Four

¹Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Relevance of the Beautiful" in *The Relevance of the Beautiful and other Essays*, trans. Nicholas Walker, (Cambridge: The Univ. Press, 1986), p. 8.

²K.R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, (Oxford: the University Press, 1972), p. 106. Quoted from Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), p. 76. Further references to this book will be indicated by "ThCA:1".

³K.R. Popper & J.C. Eccles, *The Self and its Brain*, (New York, 1977), p. 38. Quoted from Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 76.

⁴Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 77.

⁵Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 79.

⁶Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 78.

⁷Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 78.

⁸Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 353.

⁹Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 353.

¹⁰Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 353.

¹¹Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 77.

¹²I.C. Jarvie, *Concepts and Society*, (London, 1977), p. 161. Quoted from Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 80.

¹³Jarvie, p. 165. Quoted from Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 79.

¹⁴Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 80.

¹⁵Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 81.

¹⁶Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 81.

¹⁷Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 82.

¹⁸Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 82.

¹⁹Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 82.

²⁰Habermas, *ThCA:1*, p. 83.

²¹David Ingram, *Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason*, (New York: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 30.

²²Ingram, p.55.

²³Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 236.

²⁴Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 237.

²⁵Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 238.

²⁶Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 238.

²⁷This chart is adapted from Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 238.

²⁸Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 240.

²⁹Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 240.

³⁰Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 237.

³¹Ingram, p. 56.

³²Thomas McCarthy, "Reflections on Rationalization" in *Habermas and Modernity*, Richard Bernstein ed. According to McCarthy,

Habermas argues that the discontents of modernity are rooted not in rationalization as such but in the failure to develop and institutionalize in a balanced way all the different dimensions of reason opened up by the modern understanding of the world (p. 176).

McCarthy contrasts Habermas's view of rationalization with Max Weber's:

Max Weber viewed the process of societal rationalization as a growing hegemony of *Zweckrationalität*, of technique and calculation, of organization and administration. The triumph of Reason brought with it not a Realm of Freedom but the dominion of impersonal economic forces and bureaucratically organized administrations, not of God on Earth but an "iron cage" in which we are henceforth condemned to live (p. 176).

³³Habermas, *ThCA*:1, pp. 338-9.

³⁴Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 240.

³⁵Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 240.

³⁶Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 240.

³⁷Munroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. Inc., 1958), p. 558.

³⁸Jean Baudrillard, *Pour une critique de l'Economie politique du Signe*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), p.76.

³⁹Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 401.

⁴⁰Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 94.

⁴¹Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 94.

Notes for Conclusion

¹D.H. Lawrence, *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, (London: Penguin Books, 1928), p. 113.

²Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), p. 11. Further references to this book will be indicated by "*ThCA*:1".

³Habermas, *ThCA*:1, p. 161.

Bibliography

- Baudrillard, Jean. "La fin de la modernité ou l'ère de la simulation" in *Supplément à l'Encyclopédie Universalis*.
- Baudrillard, Jean. *Pour une critique de l'Economie politique du Signe*. Paris: Les Essais, Gallimard, 1972.
- Baudrillard, Jean. *Simulacres et simulation*. Paris: Editions Galilée, 1981.
- Beardsley, Munroe C. *Aesthetics: from Classical Greece to the Present*. Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1966.
- Beardsley, Munroe C. *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981.
- Benhabib, Seyla. *Critique, Norm and Utopia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Bernstein, Richard. ed. *Habermas and Modernity*. Cambridge: MIT press, 1985.
- Bernstein, Richard. *Philosophical Profiles*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1986.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. "Disposition Esthétique et Compétence Artistique" in *Les Temps Moderne*, vol. 26.
- Carr, Emily. *Klee Wyck*. Toronto: Irving Publishing, 1986.
- Eisenstein, Sergei. *Film Form*. Trans. Jay Leyda. New York: HBJ Books, 1949.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *The Relevance of the Beautiful and other Essays*. Trans. Nicholas Walker. Cambridge: The University Press, 1986.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. Trans. Garrett Borden & John Cumming. New York: Crossroads Publishing Co., 1975.

- Habermas, Jürgen. *Communication and the Evolution of Society*. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1979.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Trans. Jeremy Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Legitimation Crisis*. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.
- Habermas, Jürgen. "Modernity versus Postmodernity" in *New German Critique*. 22 (Winter, 1981). Trans. Seyla Benhabib.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Philosophical-Political Profiles*. Trans. Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1987.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Vol. 1. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1983.
- Ingram, David. *Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
- Jay, Martin. "Habermas and Modernism" in *Habermas and Modernity*. Ed. Richard Berstein.
- Piché, Claude. "Communication et Esthétique chez Habermas". Montréal: Claude Piché, 1986.
- Putnam, Hilary. *Reason, Truth, and History*. Cambridge: The University Press, 1981.
- Quine, V.W.O. *Word and Object*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960.
- Uspensky, Boris. *The Semiotics of the Russian Icon*. Lisse, Belgium: The Peter the Ridder Press, 1976.
- Weitz, Morris. "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", in *Philosophy Looks at Art*. Ed. J. Margolis. 2nd edition. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *The Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.