PROFESSOR MOU TSUNG-SAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF PRAJNA

AN EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR MOU TSUNG-SAN'S UNDERSTANDING

OF PRAJNA

IN THE LIGHT OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF DOCTRINES

By

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A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

August 1986

MASTER OF ARTS (1986) McMASTER UNIVERSITY
(Religious Studies) Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: An Examination of Professor Mou Tsung-san's Understanding
of Prajñā in the Light of the Classification of Doctrines

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NUMBER OF PAGES: v, 122

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my advisory committee, Dr. Yün-hua Jan, Dr. Koichi Shinohara, and Dr. Graeme MacQueen, for their assistance in the preparation of this thesis. Their criticism, guidance and encouragement have been invaluable.

I would like to thank my fellow graduate students for their assistance and advice, especially Yu-kwan Ng with whom I have had scores of interesting and fruitful discussion. I would also like to thank my friends, Dr. John Berthrong, who kindly provided the copies of some of his articles on Prof. Mou Tsung-san, and Diane Carpenter, who polished my English.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Sau-fung, who stood by me and encouraged me.

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INTRODUCTION

Professor Mou Tsung-san 牟宗三 is one of the leading con-
temporary Chinese philosophers. Although his works are still largely
unknown to the West,[1] they have attracted much attention from scholars
in Hong Kong and Taiwan.[2] He wrote a two-volume work on Chinese Buddhism,
the title of which is Fo-hsing yü pan-jo 佛性與般若(Buddha-nature
and Prajñā). This work deserves our attention for at least three reasons.
Firstly, it is an ambitious enterprise in terms of coverage, depth, and
design.[3] Secondly, as a Confucian, Mou has criticized Buddhism,[4] but in
this work he tries to be objective. This attempt is an encouraging sign
for a renewed Buddho-Confucian dialogue. Thirdly, in this work as well
as his other writings,[5] Mou shows a great appreciation for Buddhism
because he thinks that it is more philosophical than Confucianism and
Taoism.[6] He uses Buddhism as a bridge to connect Chinese philosophy and
the philosophy of Kant[7] which, in Mou's opinion, is the pivot of Western
philosophy. He even claims that he finds the limitation of Kant's
philosophical system and that Chinese thinking helps break this limitation
and thus promotes Kant's philosophy. To prove or disprove this ambitious
claim depends on a careful and thorough examination both of Mou's
understandings of Kant's philosophy and of Buddhism.

In spite of being a Confucian, Mou claims that an objective and
comprehensive understanding of Buddhism is necessary to a complete

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understanding of the history of Chinese philosophy.[8] But Fo-hsing yü

pan-jo is not a typical work in the field of history of philosophy.

Since he thinks that the development of Buddhist philosophy in China is

mainly a continuous struggle to solve the contradictions among sūtras

and śāstras, and that the peak of this struggle is the Classification

of Doctrines (pan-chiao 判教), the work concentrates only on the key

points which show the differences among doctrines. It neglects whatever

materials he thinks as unimportant to or unrelated to the Classification

of Doctrines. It is due to this emphasis that the work ignores such

important figures as Seng-chao 僧肇 (A.D. 374-414) and Chi-tsang 吉藏

(A.D. 549-623), both of whom should certainly be included in a typical

work in the field.

There are many systems of the Classification of Doctrines in

Chinese Buddhism, among which Mou considers that of the T'ien-t'ai School

天台宗 the best. His evaluation of Buddhist doctrines is largely

based on his understanding of T'ien-t'ai's philosophy, though he does

not hesitate to make some modifications based on his own interpretation

of some sūtras and śāstras. Mou's preference for T'ien-t'ai is signifi-

cant in itself since it is a departure from the majority of scholars in

modern China who prefer the Wei-shih School 唯識宗 (Conciousness

Only) or the Hua-yen School 華嚴宗 to the T'ien-t'ai School.[9]

Whether Mou's understanding of T'ien-t'ai's philosophy and his inter-

pretation of sūtras and śāstras are accurate needs examining; so does

the contribution of his modified system. But a thorough examination of

T'ien-t'ai's system of the Classification of Doctrines and Mou's modified

system is a very complex task beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, we

only concentrate on Mou's understanding and evaluation of prajñā.

Prajñā, the Buddhist concept of wisdom, is a very important concept in Buddhism. Along with the monastic discipline and meditation, it is a part of the triple foundation of Buddhist teachings. Without the attainment of prajñā, salvation would be impossible. All the Chinese philosophers of the Classification of Doctrines are aware of its importance; they classify all those sūtras and śāstras which preach prajñā and its related concept emptiness (śunyatā) into one group and consider this group to be one of several doctrines in their systems. For example, the T'ien-t'ai School gave the name Shared Doctrine (t'ung-chiao 通教) to the doctrine which relates emptiness with conditioned-origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and preaches prajñā by which Buddhists have an insight into emptiness. In T'ien-t'ai's Classification of Doctrines, the Shared Doctrine is only one of the Four Doctrines of Conversion. Basically, Mou follows this fourfold scheme; but he thinks that prajñā and Buddha-nature are the two leading concepts for the understanding of the different doctrines of conversion.[10] According to Mou, the doctrine of prajñā is a common doctrine shared by all four doctrines of conversion, whereas Buddha-nature is the key concept used to distinguish different doctrines, for different doctrines of conversion have different conceptions of Buddha-nature.[11] This view of Mou's clearly indicates that prajñā is more important in Mou's modified system than in T'ien-t'ai's system of the Classification of Doctrines.[12] What is T'ien-t'ai's conception of prajñā? What does T'ien-t'ai mean by the term Shared Doctrine? In what way is Mou's understanding of prajñā and the Shared Doctrine different from that of T'ien-t'ai's? What are the textual sources for his new

interpretation? What are his arguments? What problems might be involved in relation to prajñā in Mou's modified system of the Classification of Doctrines? All these questions are the concerns of this thesis.

In order to answer the questions mentioned above, this thesis will be divided into the following parts. The first chapter will be an introduction to Mou's life and his works.[13] This will provide a brief picture of Mou's scholarship as a whole and his position towards Buddhism in particular. The second chapter will be a study of T'ien-t'ai's conception of prajñā and the Shared Doctrine in the framework of the Classification of Doctrines, as shown in the writings of Chih-i 智 顗 (A.D. 538-597) and Ti-kwan 諦 觀 (A.D. ? -971).[14] The third chapter will concentrate on Mou's understanding and evaluation of prajñā and the Shared Doctrine as presented in his book Fo-hsing yü pan-jo.[15] The fourth chapter will be a discussion of the problems arise in Mou's conception of prajñā in the framework of the Classification of Doctrines. Reference to recent work on the subject will be brought into the discussion or compared with Mou's understanding whenever it is necessary.[16]

NOTES

[1]The existing Western scholarship on Mou's works includes: Wei-ming Tu, "Review of Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i," Journal of Asian Studies, 30(1971):642-647; John Berthrong, "Mou Tsung-san's New Confucianism as Religious Doctrine," a paper presented at the California Regional Seminar for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, January 21, 1977; John Berthrong, "Suddenly Deluded Thoughts Arise," SSCR Bulletin, No. 8, Fall 1980, pp. 32-55; John Berthrong, "The problem of the Mind: Mou Tsung-san's Critique of Chu Hsi," Journal of Chinese Religion, No. 10, 1982, pp. 39-52; Whalen Lai, "Review of Fo-hsing yü pan-jo," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, VII (1984): 281-292.

[2]This fact can be reflected in a 1983 publication, Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh tzu-tien ta-chüan 中國哲學辭典大全 (Dictionary of Chinese Philosophy) in which various authors quote Mou's work or list them in their bibliographies.

[3]Whalen Lai, op. cit., p. 281.

[4]His criticism of Buddhism appears in many of his works. But the clearest and most systematic presentation can be found in the appendix to Vol. I of Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i 心體與性體(Mind and Human Nature).

[5]Chih te chih-chüeh yü Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh 智的直覺與中國哲學 (Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy). Hsien-hsiang yü wu-tzu-shen 現象與物自身(Phenomena and Things-in-themselves).

[6]Mou, Fo-hsing yu pan-jo, p. 1023.

[7]This fact is especially clear in Hsien-hsiang yü wu-tzu-shen, which is devoted to a synthesis of Chinese philosophy and Kant's philosophy. In this work, Mou relies more on Buddhist terminology than those of Confucianism and Taoism. In Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, though not a work devoted to that synthesis, he often shows how some Buddhist concepts can be related to those of Kant's.

[8]Mou, Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, Preface, p. 6.

[9]Whalen Lai, op. cit., p. 282.

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[10]This is the reason why Mou uses these two concepts as the title of his work, which is mainly a study of Buddhist doctrines of conversion.

[11]Mou, Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, Preface, p. 3.

[12]The concept prajñā is not only important in Mou's modified Classification of Buddhist Doctrines, but also important in Mou's own philosophical project, in which Mou justifies his claim that human beings can possess intellectual intuition by identifying prajnā with it. For an understanding of Mou's conception of prajnā as intellectual intuition, one can consult Chih te chih-chüeh yü Chung-kuo che-hsüeh, p. 211 ff. (Cf. p. 13 of this thesis).

[13]About Mou's life and works, this thesis mainly relies on the biography in Mou Tsung-san hsien-sheng ti che-hsüeh yü chu-tso 牟宗三 先生 的 哲學 與 著作 (The Philosophy and Writings of Mr. Mou Tsung-san), pp. 5-96. This biography was written by Tsai Jen-hou 蔡仁厚 , one of Mou's disciples since 1950's. Mou says, in Sheng-ming te hsüeh-wen 生命 的 學問 (The Living Learnings), p. 132, that he has written an autobiography, but the work as a whole has not been published yet.

[14]Chih-i, though the third patriarch, was the real founder of the school. T'ien-t'ai's Classification of Doctrines was formulated by him. After him, Chan-jan 湛然 (A.D. 711-782) and Chih-li (A.D. 960-1028) contributed significantly to T'ien-t'ai's philosophy, but their main concerns were on the Complete Doctrine (yüan-chiao 圓教) and the concept of Buddha-nature rather than on the Shared Doctrine and prajñā. Thus, the second chapter of this thesis concentrates on Chi-i's writings and ignores the writings of Chan-jan and Chih-li. Ti-kuan wrote a treatise, T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i 天台四教儀 (The Fourfold Doctrines of T'ien-t'ai), which has been considered to be the most concise and reliable summary of T'ien-t'ai Classification of Doctrines. Mou's interpretation of the Shared Doctrine relies heavily on Ti-kuan's summary. (See Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 628-629). However, the eminent Japanese scholar, Sekiguchi, has challenged the validity of the outline offered by Ti-kuan as a summary of the ideas of Chih-i. Thus, a summary of Chih-i's conception of the Shared Doctrine in the framework of the Classification of Doctrines is very crucial to the examination of Mou's understanding of the Shared Doctrine. This thesis therefore concentrates more on Chih-i's writings than on Ti-kuan's writings.

[15]Other than Fo-hsing yü pan-jo , Mou's understanding of Buddhist philosophy can also be found in Hsin-t'i yu hsing-t'i, Vol. 1, pp. 571-657; Chih te chih-chüeh yü Chung-kuo che-hsüeh, pp. 211-345; Hsien-hsiang yü wu-tzu-shen, pp. 369-429; and Chung-kuo che-hsueh shih-chiu chiang 中國 哲學 十九 講 (Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy), pp. 253-387. The first three above-mentioned works are publications

earlier than Fo-hsing yü pan-jo; they contain few main points which are not included in Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, Mou's mature and voluminous work on Chinese Buddhism. The last work was the latest publication; although it does not present any new ideas, it elaborates on some points mentioned in Fo-hsing yü pan-jo. This thesis will take this latest work as a supplement to Fo-hsing yü pan-jo.

[16]The Classification of Doctrines is very important in the development of Buddhist philosophy in China, but Western scholars have paid little attention to it. Concerning T'ien-t'ai system, Leon Hurvitz, Chih-i (538-597), pp. 229-331, is the only comprehensive introduction to the subject. David Chappell, T'ien-t'ai Buddhism: An Outline of the Fourfold Teachings, is an translation of Ti-kuan's T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i, the only translation of a complete T'ien-t'ai's treatise in English. However, prajña and emptiness are popular topics among Western scholars. Th. Stcherbatsky, D.T. Suzuki, Edward Conze, T.R.V. Murti, Richard Robinson, Frederick Streng, etc. have contributed a great deal to the subject. Although they don't deal with the problem of the Classification of Doctrines, their understanding of prajña can be compared with Mou's understanding of the concept. This comparison provides us with a perspective to re-evaluate Mou's evaluation of prajña in his modified system of the Classification of Doctrines.

CHAPTER 1

MOU'S LIFE AND WORKS

Mou Tsung-san was born at Chi-hsia 棲霞 of Shantung Province 山東 , China on April 25, 1909. He grew up with many brothers and sisters in a poor farmer's family.[1]

In 1927, Mou went to Peking, in order to attend pre-college courses in Peking University. Two years later, he was admitted into the Department of Philosophy, where he met a professor, Hsiung Shih-li 熊十力 (1885-1968) of whom Mou soon became a devoted disciple.[2] Hsiung was one of the greatest philosophers in modern China.[3] Hsiung's masterpiece, Hsin wei-shih-lun 新唯識論 (A New Philosophy of Conciousness Only), contributed a great deal to the concurrent revival of Buddhist philosophy.[4] Mou must have learned something about Buddhism from Hsiung in his early life. But Hsiung's philosophy is a part of Buddhist thought only in a negative sense, for it turns away from Buddhism. Hsiung was in fact a modern Confucian who criticized Buddhist epistemology and then constructed a Confucian epistemology by borrowing Buddhist terminology. This borrowing seems to imply that Hsiung appreciated Buddhist terminology very much. Mou has followed his master's step and has remained a devout Confucian through his life. Mou also shows a great appreciation for Buddhist terminology.

After Mou graduated from the university in 1933, he first became a journal editor and then a high school teacher. In the early years of

the Sino-Japanese war which began in 1937, he was unemployed and

destitute.[5] From 1942 to 1949 he taught in several universities in China,

mainly on logic and Western philosophy. Then he went to Taiwan, con-

tinuing his career as a philosophy professor. In 1960, he began teaching

at Hong Kong University. Eight years later, he transferred to the Chinese

University of Hong Kong. From 1974 on, he has been partly retired and

has been teaching in New Asia Institute of Advanced Chinese Studies, Hong

Kong. During those years in Taiwan and Hong Kong, Mou lectured mainly

on Chinese philosophy, and occasionally on epistemology and Kant's

philosophy. The trend of his teaching, as well as that of his writings,

reflects the development of his philosophical activities: a journey from

logic and epistemology of Western philosophy to ethics of Chinese

philosophy which culminated in his exposition of the moral philosophy of

Confucianism.

As a philosophy professor, Mou's life has been simple. Among the

most important events in his life have been the writing and publication

of his philosophical works. The following is a list of his works:[6]

1. Ts'ung Chou-i fang-mien yen-chiu Chung-kuo chih hsüan-hsüeh
   yü tao-te chê-hsüeh 從周易方面研究中國之玄學與道德哲學
   (A Study of the Book of Changes in Relation to Chinese
   Metaphysic and Moral Philosophy). (1935).

2. Lo-chi tien-fan 邏輯典範 (Exemplar of Logic). (1941).

3. Li-shih chê-hsüeh 歷史哲學 (The Philosophy of History).
   (1955).

4. Li-tsê-hsüeh 理則學 (Logic). (1955).

5. Jên-shih-hsin chih p'i-p'an 認識心之批判
   (Critique of Epistemological Mind), two volumes. (Published
   in 1956, but finished eight years earlier).

6. Tao-te te li-hsiang chu-i 道德的理想主義
   (Moral Idealism). (1959. A collection of essays published
   in journals between 1949 and 1954).

7. Chêng-tao yü chih-tao 政道與治道(The Way of Political
   Rights and the Way of Governing). (1961).

8. Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh te t'e-chih 中國哲學的特質
   (Special Characteristics of Chinese Philosophy). (1963).

9. Ts'ai-hsing yü hsuan-li 才性與玄理 (Material Nature and
   the Dark Learning). (1963).

10. Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i 心體與性體(Mind and Human Nature),
    3 volumes. (1968-1969).

11. Shêng-ming te hsüeh-wên 生命的學問 (The Living Learnings).
    (1970. A collection of essays mainly published in journals
    between 1949 and 1957).

12. Chih te chih-chüeh yü Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh 智的直覺與中國
    哲學(Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy). (1971).

13. Hsien-hsiang yü wu-tzu-shen 現象與物自身 (Phenomena
    and Things-in-themselves). (1975).

14. Fo-hsing yü pan-jo 佛性與般若(Buddha-nature and Prajna),
    2 volumes. (1977).

15. Ts'ung Lu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Ch'i-shan 從陸象山到劉蕺山
    (From Lu Hsiang-shan to Liu Ch'i-shan). (1979. This is the
    fourth volume of Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i).

16. Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang 中國哲學十九講

   (Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy). (1983).

17. Shih-tai yü kan-shou 時代與感受 (The Times and Feelings).

   (1984. A collection of speeches delivered mainly between

   1978 and 1983).

For the sake of convenience, we can divide Mou's writings listed

above into four groups according to their different concerns. Group I

includes numbers 2, 4 and 5, the works on logic and epistemology; Group

II includes numbers 3, 6, 7, 11 and 18, the works mainly on philosophy of

history and politics; Group III includes numbers 1, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16

and 17, the works on Chinese philosophy; Group IV includes numbers 12

and 13, the works of Mou's own philosophical project. All of them can

be seen as a personal response to the challenge that modern China has

faced in confrontation with the Western culture in the twentieth century.

Mou's earliest work (number 1 in the above list) indicates that

Mou began his writing career as a convinced Confucian. Confucianism has

been the foundation upon which he conciliated Chinese tradition with

Western philosophy. To make his conciliation comprehensive, Mou devoted

the early years of his career to the studies of the core area of Western

philosophy, namely logic and epistemology, and wrote those works com-

prising Group I.

The confrontation between modern China and the Western culture

has had a direct influence upon the country's political development.

Marxism from the West has conquered China. Because of Mou's disgust

with the political development rendered by the Communist takeover of

Mainland China in 1949, he wrote the works of Group II. In book number

three in this category, Mou shows that there were spiritual principles which governed the development of Chinese history. The existence of these principles, in Mou's opinion, is a refutation of the view of the Communists who see nothing but darkness in Chinese history. In book number seven, Mou advocates that it is only the Western democracy that can meet the needs of China. The books numbers 6, 11 and 17 are the collections of the essays, in which Mou criticizes Marxian ideology from the viewpoint of Confucian tradition. This tradition is characterized by Mou as consisting of moral idealism and the living learnings.

Being confronted with the Western culture, many Chinese have found fault with Chinese tradition. In Mou's opinion, some of their attacks against the tradition are due to misunderstandings of Chinese philosophy. To set a good example of understanding, Mou has devoted most of his life to the studies of different traditions in Chinese philosophy and written the works of Group III. The books numbers 1, 8 and 16 are mainly studies of Confucianism in the Pre-Chin Period. The book number nine mainly covers the Neo-taoism in the Wei-Chin Dynasties. The book number 14 covers Chinese Buddhism. The books number 10 and 15 are studies of Neo-Confucianism in the Sung and Ming Dynasties. The book number 16 is a series of lectures covering almost all schools in all periods. To what extent Mou's understanding of different philosophical traditions is influenced by his conviction in Confucianism, is a question subject to the examination of scholars; Mou at least tries to be objective, i.e., not to see through the lenses of Confucianism, by going to the key scrip-tures and the classic passages in those traditions.[7] However, Mou never writes only as a historian of philosophy; he is also an independent thinker,

ready to pass his own judgement on the passages (not necessarily from the standpoint of Confucianism), and articulate enough to translate archaic formula into his philosophic languages.

Mou's philosophic languages are largely borrowed from Western philosophy. There are at least two reasons for this borrowing: firstly, he appreciates that most of Western philosophical terms have precise definitions; secondly, he is eager to conciliate Chinese philosophy with Western philosophy. Mou's studies of Western logic and epistemology led him to regard Kant's philosophy as the highest achievement in Western philosophy. But he also claims that Kant's system cannot be used to fully accomplish his own insight about intellectual intuition and things-in-themselves. In other words, Kant's system, in Mou's opinion, is an incomplete one. To complete this system, Mou argues, in the works of Group IV (books numbers 12 and 13), that not only divine beings but also human beings can possess intellectual intuition, and that because of this possession, things-in-themselves can be represented to human faculties. Mou also argues that this acknowledgement is a common insight in the traditions of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.

This synthesis of Kant's philosophy and Chinese tradition is the final goal of Mou's own philosophical project. Being a Confucian all his life, Mou naturally builds his project with Confucian insights as corner-stones. But when he deals with the concept of intellectual intuition, Mou prefers to use the Buddhist concept, prajña, which in Mou's opinion, has a richer philosophical connotation than the equivalent concept in Confucianism.[8] In the book number 13, we can find that Mou also borrows other Buddhist terms. When Mou wrote the works numbers 12 and 13, he was working on Fo-hsing yü pan-jo. With this goal of synthesis in mind, Mou

often makes comparative studies between Kant's philosophy and Buddhism in Fo-hsing yü pan-jo. One of the prominent examples is that Mou devotes a whole chapter to comparing Nagarjuna's conception of number and time with Kant's philosophy.[9] If one ignores Mou's philosophical project as a whole, one cannot appreciate this comparison, which is unrelated to the scheme of the work: a study of Chinese Buddhism in the light of the Classification of Doctrines.

Due to the complex nature of Mou's philosophical project, it is a very difficult task to examine his understandings of Kant's philosophy, Confucianism and Chinese Buddhism, and it is even more difficult to evaluate to what extent his understandings of Kant's philosophy and Confucianism influence his interpretation of Chinese Buddhism. Mou, in the Preface of Fo-hsing yü pan jo, cofesses that he has criticized Buddhism before, but claims that he is objective in wriring this work.[10] He claims that his interpretation follows the main structure of Chih-i's Classification of Doctrines. While the question how Mou's conviction as a Confucian influences his interpretation of Chinese Buddhism, is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to point out that some scholars think that Mou's preference for the T'ien-t'ai School reflects his standpoint of a Confucian who emphasizes moral practice.[11]

[1] Mou, Shêng-ming te hsüeh-wên, p. 3.

[2] In an essay, "Master Hsiung Shih-li and I", Ibid., pp. 132-156, Mou tells us how Hsiung influenced his life and his destiny as a Confucian.

[3] For a short account of Hsiung's life and works, see Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and comp., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963):736-772.

[4] There are at least two Ph.D. dissertations on Hsiung's understanding of Buddhism. One is Benjamin Chan's The Development of Neo-Buddhist Thought in Modern China as Represented in the Philosophy of Hsiung Shih-li: The Identification of Reality and Function(Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University, 1968); another is Edward F. Connelly's Xiong Shili and His Critique of Yogacara Buddhism (Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University, 1979).

[5] Mou, Shêng-ming te hsüeh-wên, pp. 139-149.

[6] Other than his own writings, Mou has translated works of Thomas Aquinas, G.W.F. Hegel, Bertrand Russell, Alfred Whitehead and articles on Existentialism, Vedanta, etc. But the most important are the annotated translations of Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral, Critique of Pure Reason, and Critique of Practical Reason, which were published in 1982. These translations of Kant's works are of great significance to Mou, for Mou's own philosophical system begins with the problems which Kant left unsolved.

[7] Compared with the practice of those Neo-Confucians of the Sung Dynasty who criticized Buddhism without making the effort to understand objectively Buddhist basic concepts, this effort of Mou's is an encouraging sign for Buddho-Confucian dialogue. One example of the misunderstandings of Neo-Confucians, as mentioned on Mou's Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i, p. 571, is that Chang Tsai 張 載 mistook Buddhist concept śūnyata (Emptiness) for his own concept t'ai-hsü 太 虛 (Great Vacuity).

[8] In Chih te chih-chüeh yü Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh, pp. 212-213, Mou has pointed out that vijñāna and prajñā can be compared with sensible intuition and intellectual intuition, and that dharmas as conditional

existence and dharmas as such can be compared with phenomena and things-in-themselves. In Kant's philosophy, the key terms such as sensible intuition, intellectual intuition, phenomenon, and thing-in-itself are all as well-defined and well interreconnected as in any good theoretical system; so are Buddhist conceptions of vijñāna, prajñā, conditioned-origination and suchness. This systematic character of Buddhist philosophy indicates that, the concept prajñā has a more precise meaning and is in a better position for being compared with Kant's conception of intellectual intuition than the equivalent concept in Confucianism.

[9]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 121-175.

[10]Ibid., Preface, p. 5.

[11]Whalen Lai, "Review of Fo-hsing yü pan-jo," p. 287: "Mou's appreciation of T'ien-t'ai Chih-i and final judgement on the achievement of the Buddhist path in light of Mou's own Neo-Confucian philosophizing is best seen in the chapter on the meaning behind the traditional classification of Master Chih-i in the 'fifth rank.' .... Here we witness the personal passion of Mou the philosopher and his advocation of the means and end to man's moral existence. Here we may also see perhaps the reasons for his predispositions for T'ien-t'ai." John Berthrong, "Suddenly Deluded Thoughts Arise," p. 50: "... T'ang Chun-i comments that the T'ien-t'ai School placed a great deal of emphasis on the act of cultivating this potentially good mind. It should by now be obvious that this is the kind of Buddhism most congenial to Mou Tsung-san." These scholars might be justified to say so. However, the reason why Mou follows the main structure of Chih-i's Classification of Doctrines in his interpretation of Chinese Buddhism is much more straightforward. Mou himself sees the Classification of Doctrines as the peak of the development of Chinese Buddhism (Cf. p. 2) and he always emphasizes that T'ien-t'ai Classification of Doctrines is the most satisfactory, as shown in his often-repeated comparison between T'ien-t'ai's and Hua-yen's systems of the Classification of Doctrines.

CHAPTER 2

T'IEN-T'AI'S CONCEPTION OF PRAJÑĀ AND THE SHARED DOCTRINE

IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF DOCTRINES

I. THE ORIGIN OF THE PRACTICE OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF DOCTRINES

The Classification of Doctrines is one of the distinctive features
of Chinese Buddhism. The schools such as T'ien-t'ai and the Hua-yen have
considered their Classification of Doctrines to be the core of their
teachings. These schools generally assumed that all sūtras transmitted
into China were the words of the Buddha, and that any contradictions and
discrepancies they found in the sūtras must be apparent, not real. By
classifying the seemingly inconsistent doctrines in different sūtras,
each of these schools stressed the doctrine it followed and had elaborated
upon, as the highest truth that the Buddha had ever preached, and regarded
all the other doctrines as the expedients of the Buddha. The religious
purpose of this practice is understandable, but the assumption that all
sūtras were preached by the Buddha himself is a problematic one, which,
though formulated in India, should not be taken too literally as done by
many of Chinese Buddhists.

As a living religion, Buddhist teachings naturally developed
after the death of its founder. Out of the respect to the founder, the
Buddhists would regard the words of the Buddha as sūtras and the later
elaborations as śāstras. The elaborations finally ramified into at least

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eighteen schools. Around the beginning of the Christian era, these

schools were challenged by a new form of Buddhism which produced volumi-

nous scriptures of its own. This new sect called itself Mahāyāna and

the older schools Hīnayāna. The Mahāyānists generally looked down on

the Hīnayānists; the Hīnayānists indicted the Mahāyāna scriptures as

not being the teachings of the Buddha. Facing this indictment, some

Mahayanists defended themselves by claiming their scriptures to be sutras,

i.e. the actual words of the Buddha.[1] In no position to dispute the

orthodoxy of the Hīnayāna cannon, the Mahāyāna resorted to stating that

the latter, though preached by the Buddha, was a tentative truth rather

than the ultimate one. This was the germination of practice of the

Classification of Doctrines, implicit in the Mahāyāna's defence of itself

as the good coin of Buddhism.[2]

Without realizing the historical conditions under which the

Mahāyāna arose, early Chinese Buddhists generally accepted Mahāyāna's

claim that all sutras were preached by the Buddha himself.[3] However, they

found contradictions and discrepancies not only between Hīnayāna and

Mahāyāna, but also within Mahāyāna itself. Since the Buddha, as one who

had realized the truth, could not contradict himself, it was necessary

to resort to a device of the Classification of Doctrines by which one

sees the inconsistencies as results of a progression, in which the Buddha

first preached to the persons with dull capacities and then to the persons

with sharper capacities.

It is not known just when the practice of the Classification of

Doctrines began in China;[4] but by the second half of the fifth century,

it had become quite popular. Most of the authors of the early Classifications

Doctrines left no writings of their own, and now we can only find the fragments of their ideas in the accounts of later Buddhist masters, notably those of Chi-tsang,[5] Chih-i[6] and Fa-tsang 法藏 (A.D. 643-672).[7] From those accounts, we can see that these early masters approached the problem of the Classification of Doctrines either in terms of when the Buddha taught (time), or how he taught (method), or what he taught (content). All of these three perspectives were later included in T'ien-t'ai's Classification of Doctrines.

II. T'IEN-T'AI'S CLASSIFICATION OF DOCTRINES

T'ien-t'ai's Classification of Doctrines was formulated by Chih-i, the real founder of the school, and it was later characterized by Ti-kuan as the Five Periods and the Eight Teachings (wu-shih pa-chiao 五時八教).[8] The Five Periods refers to a chronological division of the Buddha's teaching career. The Eight Teachings is further subdivided into two groups, the Four Methods of Conversion (hua-i ssu-chiao 化儀四教) and the Four Doctrines of Conversion (hua-fa ssu-chiao 化法四教).

A. The Five Periods

In Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsuan-i,[9] Chih-i gives a chronological division of the sūtras assumed to be preached by the Buddha in the following order: (1) the Avataṅsaka Sūtra (華嚴); (2) four Āgamas (四阿含); (3) the Vaipulya Sūtras (諸方等); (4) the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (般若); (5) the Lotus Sūtra (法華) and the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra (涅槃).

Chih-i also gives the reasons that the Buddha preached in that order. He explains that immediately after the Buddha had attained

enlightenment, he preached the content of his enlightenment, namely, the oneness of all existence. This is the teaching contained in the Avataṅsaka Sūtra. However, only the bodhisattvas with the sharpest capacities were able to understand the meaning of this profound teaching; the audience with lower capacities behaved as if they were deaf and dumb and went away discouraged. For the benefit of this audience, the Buddha decided to preach a simpler teaching, i.e. the teaching in the Āgamas of the Hīnayāna. This is the second period. Since the Āgamas were designed to attract the listeners, this period is called the period of inducement.[10]

Having taught the teaching in Āgamas which the Hīnayānists understood, the Buddha felt that they were ready for a more profound teaching. He then preached that the Āgamas did not contain the ultimate truth, and that there exist higher truths in the Mahāyāna sūtras. This is the third period, that of the Vaipulya. However, in this period, the Buddha did not preach the Mahāyāna truths in their fullness; he was mainly interested in comparing the Hīnayāna with the Mahāyāna. In order to destroy the pride and self-satisfaction of those who believed in the Hīnayāna teaching, the Buddha reminded them persistently and indefatigably of the superiority of the Mahāyāna teaching, and told them that they must be ashamed of the Small Vehicle and aspire to the Great Vehicle. Since in this period the Buddha rebuked the Hīnayānists for their wrong views, it is called the period of rebuke.

The Buddha then preached the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras. The doctrine taught during this fourth period was that of the universal truth of emptiness. Whereas during the preceding period the Buddha emphasized the distinction between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna, now in this period

he emphasized the unity underlying both. Because of this, the period is also called the period of integrating all the teachings so far.

After the fourth period, the Buddha felt that the time was ripe for him to preach the highest truth. He then preached the Lotus Sutra. In this Sutra, the vehicles for śravakas and pratyekabuddhas of the Hinayana, and for bodhisattvas of the Mahayana, are said to be only temporary; they are all united in the one vehicle. This implies that all of Buddha's listeners are destined for Buddhahood. However, this last period also included the Mahaparinirvana Sutra, which was assumed by Chih-i's contemporaries to be the Buddha's last sermon before he entered Nirvana. For most masters of early Classification of Doctrines, it was also regarded as the Buddha's ultimate doctrine. Chih-i accepted the assumption that the sutra was the Buddha's final sermon, but he didn't see it as superior to the Lotus Sutra. In order to reconcile this assumption and his conviction that the Lotus Sutra represented the highest truth, Chih-i designated a special function to the Mahaparinirvana Sutra. The ultimate message was contained in the Lotus Sutra, while the Mahaparinirvana served merely to pick up like fallen grains, those on whom the preaching of the Lotus Sutra had failed to have the desired effect.

B. The Four Methods of Conversion[11]

The first of the Four Methods is the Sudden Method (tun-chiao 頓教). It consisted of a direct exposition by the Buddha of the content of his perception exactly as he had perceived it. This method is suitable for the audience with the sharpest capacities. This was the method adapted in teaching the Avatansaka Sutra.

The second method is the Gradual Method (chien chiao 漸教).
In this method the audience is led step by step, from the simple to the
profound doctrines. This method included the Āgama, Vaipulya, and
Prajñāpāramitā periods.

The third method is the Secret Method (pi mi chiao 秘密教).
This is the method used by the Buddha when he preached in such a way
that his several listeners, unaware of one another's presence, each
thought that he alone was being taught by the Buddha.

The fourth method is the Variable Method (pu ting chiao 不定教 .
In this method the listeners are aware of one another's presence, but
they hear and understand differently what the Buddha is teaching.

According to Ti-kuan, the last two methods were present through-
out the first four of the Five Periods.[12]

C. The Four Doctrines of Conversion

The Four Doctrines of Conversion are the Tripitaka Doctrine
(tsang chiao 藏教), Shared Doctrine (t'ung chiao 通教), Distinctive
Doctrine (pieh chiao 別教), and Complete Doctrine (yüan chiao 圓教).[13]
By this scheme Chih-i tried to set forth, in terms of ideological content,
the entire range of what he supposed to be the Buddha's teachings. This
is the most important part of Chih-i's Classification of Doctrines, and
is repeated, usually in a fragmentary manner, here and there in Chih-i's
writings. The most systematic presentation of this scheme can be found
in his Ssu-chiao-i,[14] upon which the summary in this section is mainly
based.

1. The _Tripitaka_ Doctrine

Chih-i called Hīnayāna doctrine _tsang chiao_, which is a short title of _san tsang chiao_ 三藏教. _San tsang_ is a translation of _tripitaka_.

According to Chih-i, the _sūtras_ which the Buddha preached in the _Tripitaka_ Doctrine are the Āgamas.[15] It is well-known that the most important teachings in the Āgamas are the Four Noble Truths. However, Chih-i felt that the Four Noble Truths also applied to the other doctrines of conversion. The Four Noble Truths in the _Tripitaka_ Doctrine, as different from those in the other doctrines, are the Four Truths of Origination and Extinction (_sheng-mieh ssu-ti_ 生滅四諦). By this term, Chih-i meant that each of the Four Noble Truths in the _Tripitaka_ Doctrine has substantiality (_shen shih pu hsü_ 審實不虛).[16]

While Chih-i believed that each of the Four Noble Truths in the _Tripitaka_ Doctrine had substantiality, he didn't imply that the Hīnayānists saw substantiality in every phenomenon. It is common knowledge that they denied substantiality at least to such a phenomenon as the self; that means, they had their own view of emptiness (_śūnyatā_). But this view, in Chih-i's opinion, as different from that of Mahāyānists', is to understand emptiness only through analyzing phenomena (_hsi fa k'ung_ 析法空).[17]

The Hīnayānists are also generally called the Two Vehicles, which consist of the _Śrāvaka_ Vehicle and _Pratyekabuddha_ Vehicle. Following the traditional view, which has been accepted by the Hīnayāna, that Shākyamuni had been a bodhisattva before he became a Buddha, Chih-i added a third vehicle, i.e. the Bodhisattva Vehicle, to the _Tripitaka_ Doctrine.[18]

Although the attainments which are realized through practice by the individuals in the Three Vehicles are different, the highest attainment to which they can aspire is the extinction of body and mind (hui-tuan chih kuo 灰斷之果).[19] That is to say, in the Tripiṭaka Doctrine the Buddha did not preach the Permanency of Buddha-nature (fo-hsing chiang chu 佛性常住).[20] The Permanency of Buddha-nature is a very important concept in Chih-i's Classification of Doctrines which is used to distin-guish the Tripiṭaka and Share Doctrines from the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines. In the latter two doctrines, the Buddha is said to preach the Buddha-nature, which is permanent and not empty (pu-k'ung 不空).[21] According to Chih-i, in the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines the Buddha preached both emptiness and non-emptiness, i.e. a Middle Way (chung tao 中道);[22] in the Tripiṭaka and Shared Doctrines he preached only empti-ness, i.e. a Partial Truth (p'ien chên chih li 偏真之理).[23]

Another main point by which Chih-i distinguished the Tripiṭaka and Shared Doctrines from the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines, is that the former are doctrines which are limited to the [Three] Realms (chieh nei 界內), whereas the latter are doctrines which go beyond the [Three] Realms (chieh-wai 界外).[24] Although Chih-i often used this pair of con-cepts, it seems that he never defined chieh nei or chieh wai. However, it is clear that this pair of concepts is related to delusions.[25] According to Chih-i himself, the delusions limited to the [Three] Realms includes the False Views and Wrong Attitudes (chien ssu huo 見思惑),[26] and the Innumer-able Delusions (ch'en sha huo 塵沙惑);[27] the delusions beyond the [Three] Realms include the False Views and Wrong Attitudes,[28] the Innumerable Delusions,[29] and the Fundamental Ignorance.[30] The followers of the Tripiṭaka and Shared Doctrines can only eliminate the delusions limited

to the [Three] Realms, whereas the followers of the Distinctive and

Complete Doctrines can eliminate the delusions both limited to and beyond

the [Three] Realms. Since one usually acquires merits as the results of

eliminating delusions, the followers of the Distinctive and Complete

Doctrines thus acquire more merits than the followers of the Tripitaka

and Shared Doctrines. Being inferior to the followers of other doctrines,

the followers of the Tripitaka Doctrine acquire less merits, for they can

only eliminate the False Views and Wrong Attitudes which are limited to

the [Three] Realms.[31]

In summary, in the Tripitaka Doctrine the Buddha preached the

concepts of the Four Truths of Origination and Extinction, and "the

understanding of emptiness only through the analysis of phenomena" (hsi

fa k'ung). The highest attainment to which the followers of this doctrine

can aspire, is the extinction of body and mind. The other characteristics

concerning their attainment can be best summarized in Ti-kuan's words:

> Although the attainments which are realized by
> the practices of people in the Three [Vehicles] are
> different, still they are the same [a] in cutting
> off False Views and Wrong Attitudes, [b] in
> transcending the Three Realms,[32] and [c] in realizing
> the Partial Truth.[33]

2. The Shared Doctrine

Chih-i defines the Shared Doctrine clearly in the Ssu-chiao-i:

> The meaning of "Shared" is "the same".
> The Three Vehicles accept the same [doctrine],
> therefore, the name "Shared" is used. This
> doctrine explains that because of conditioned-
> origination [all dharmas are] empty; [that means,
> in this doctrine the Buddha preached] the Four
> Truths of Non-origination (wu-sheng ssu-ti 無生
> 四諦). It is the elementary teaching of the
> Mahayana which is taught mainly to the bodhisattvas

but also shared by the Two Vehicles. Therefore,
the Mahāprajnāpāramitā Sutra says, 'He who wants to
learn the Śrāvaka Vehicle should learn prajñā. He
who wants to learn the Pratyekabuddha Vehicle should
learn prajñā. He who wants to learn the Bodhisattva
Vehicle should learn prajñā.'[34] The Three Vehicles
accept the same doctrine and realize paramārtha,
therefore, this doctrine is called Shared Doctrine.
The so-called Shared Doctrine can be understood in
several ways, as summarized in eight points: 1. The
teaching is shared. 2. The truth is shared. 3. The
wisdom is shared. 4. The eliminations are shared.
5. The practices are shared. 6. The stages are
shared. 7. The causes are shared. 8. The attain-
ments are shared. The teaching is shared, for the
Three Vehicles accept the same teaching that because
of conditioned-origination [all dharmas are] empty.
The truth is shared, for [the Three Vehicles] have insight
into the same Partial Truth. The wisdom is shared,
for [the Three Vehicles] gain the same skillful All-
inclusive Wisdom. The eliminations are shared, for
[the Three Vehicles] eliminate the same delusions limited
to the [Three] Realms. The practices are shared, for
[the Three Vehicles] perform the same practices of
pure views and pure attitudes. The stages are shared,
for [the Three Vehicles] achieve the same stages from
the Stage of Dry Wisdom to the Stage of the Pratyekabuddha.
The causes are shared, for [the Three Vehicles] share the
same causes of the Nine Non-hindrance. The attainments
are shared, for [the Three Vehicles] realize the same
attainments of the Nine Deliverances, the Nirvāṇa with
Remainder and the Nirvāṇa without Remainder. Because
of these eight points, the doctrine is called the
Shared Doctrine. If we don't follow this Shared
Doctrine, then [we can] not know the Shared Truth, nor
can we realize these Shared attainments. Therefore,
in the Vaipulya Sūtras of the Mahāyāna and the
Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, there are Two Vehicles who all
accept this doctrines and thus attain enlightenment.
[Some people may] ask: Why is it not called the
Common Doctrine (kung-chiao 共教)? The answer is:
the name "Common" only applied to the near, i.e. the
Two Vehicles, and cannot apply to the far; the name
"Shared" can apply conveniently to both the near and
the far. [By] saying that it can apply conveniently
to the far, [we mean that the doctrine] shares [itself]
either with the Distinctive Doctrine or with the
Complete Doctrine.[35]

In the above quotation, the Shared Doctrine has two different connotations.

Firstly, it can be understood to be a doctrine, the followers of which,
i.e. the Three Vehicles, can share the same characteristics as mentioned
in the above eight points. Secondly, the Shared Doctrine can be under-
stood to be a doctrine, which is also shared by the followers of the
Tripitaka Doctrine and by the followers of the Distrinctive and Complete
Doctrines.

What does Chih-i mean by saying that the Shared Doctrine can be
shared by the followers of other three doctrines of conversion? What
do they share with the followers of the Shared Doctrine? Certainly they
don't share all those characteristics as mentioned in the above eight
points. Otherwise, we cannot distinguish the followers of the Shared
Doctrine from those of the other three doctrines.[36] Also, why does Chih-
i object to the use of the name "Common Doctrine" for the doctrine which
the Three Vehicles accept in common? The answer to these questions can
be found in Chih-i's conception of prajñā. Following a suggestion of
the Ta-chih-tu-lun 大智度論,[37] Chih-i divides prajñā into two kinds:
the Common Prajñā (kung pan-jo 共般若) and the Non-common[38] Prajñā
(pu-kung pan-jo 不共般若),[39] the meaning of which is made clear in
the quotation below:

> There are two kinds of prajñā. 1. [The prajñā
> which the Buddha] preached to the Two Vehicles
> in common [i.e. the Common Prajñā]. 2. The
> prajñā which the Buddha didn't preach to the Two
> Vehicles in common [i.e. the Non-common Prajñā].
> Based on this [division of prajñā], the Ultimate
> Reality (實相) can also be divided into the
> two kinds: 1. the common; 2. the non-common.
> In that of the common, [we can] see only emptiness
> and [we can] not see non-emptiness; we can not
> liminate the Fundamental Ignorance but [can]
> only eliminate the False Views and Wrong Attitudes.
> This is the Ultimate Reality of the Partial Truth.

That of the non-common is called the Ultimate
Reality of the Middle Way.[40]

Thus, the Two Vehicles, i.e. the followers of Tripitaka Doctrine, share

the Common Prajñā, in which the Buddha preached only emptiness, with the

followers of the Shared Doctrine; the followers of the Distinctive and

Complete Doctrines, share the Non-common Prajñā. in which the Buddha

preached both emptiness and non-emptiness, with the followers of the

Shared Doctrine. It is due to this preconception of the term Non-common

that Chih-i objects to the use of the name "Common Doctrine" for the

Shared Doctrine, which may wrongly lead us to exclude Non-common Prajñā

from the Shared Doctrine. (This is what Chih-i means by saying that the

name "Common" only applied to the near but not to the far.)

From the above quotations and analysis, we may now easily identify

Prajñā as the main content of the Shared Doctrine. As preached in the

Prajñāparamitā Sūtras, prajñā is a kind of wisdom by which we can see

emptiness in all dharmas. It is commonly acknowledged that Nāgārjuna

and the school he founded, i.e. the Mādhyamika, have made the best

systematic exposition of the concept of emptiness as developed first in

the Prajñāparamitā Sūtras. In his Mādhyamaka-kārikās, Nāgārjuna argues

that since all dharmas are conditionedly originated, they are empty.

Based on this understanding, Nāgārjuna, as contrasted with some Hīnayānists,

rejected any doctrine of origination which might be taken as origination

with substantiality. Following Nāgārjuna's view, Chih-i said that in the

Tripitaka Doctrine the Buddha preached the Four Truths of Origination

and Extinction, whereas in the Shared Doctrine he preached the Four Truths

of Non-origination. Along with prajñā, the doctrine that all dharmas

are empty because of conditioned-origination, and the Four Truths of Non-

origination are the main contents of the Shared Doctrine.

As mentioned in the section on the Tripitaka Doctrine, although some Hīnayānists see substantiality in some phenomena, they have their own view of emptiness. According to Chih-i, this view is that of hsi fa k'ung, i.e. understanding emptiness through analyzing phenomena. The view of emptiness held by the followers of the Shared Doctrine is quite different. In order to see emptiness in phenomena, they don't have to go through the process of analyzing phenomena; they see emptiness directly in every phenomenon by understanding the principle of conditioned-origination. Because of conditioned-origination, every phenomenon as such is empty. This view of emptiness is called ti fa k'ung 體法空.[41] In Chih-i's opinion, the view of hsi fa k'ung is awkward (拙), whereas the view of ti fa k'ung is skillful (巧).[42]

As mentioned in one of the above eight characteristics, the Truth into which the followers of the Shared Doctrine have insight is a Partial Truth. This means that they understand only emptiness. Chih-i also calls this kind of understanding the Mere Emptiness (tan k'ung 但空).[43] The followers of the Partial Truth cannot understand non-emptiness, i.e. they cannot understand the Buddha-nature which is replete with Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges.[44] This limitation implies that in the Shared Doctrine the Buddha did not preach the Permanency of Buddha-nature, and that the highest attainment to which the followers of the Shared Doctrine can aspire, is the extinction of body and mind.[45]

According to Chih-i, the Shared Doctrine is also a doctrine limited to the [Three] Realms, and its followers, i.e. the Three Vehicles, also eliminate all the False Views and Wrong Attitudes.[46]

In summary, in the Shared Doctrine the Buddha preached prajñā,
the teaching that all dharmas are empty because of conditioned-origination,
the Four Truths of Non-origination, and "to see that dharmas as such are
empty" (ti fa k'ung). Recognizing these ideas as the main contents of
the Shared Doctrine, one can easily identify this doctrine with the
Mādhyamika philosophic system or even with the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras.[47]
Chih-i regarded the Shared Doctrine as the elementary teaching of the
Mahāyāna.[48] But like the Hīnayānists of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, the
highest attainment to which the followers of the Shared Doctrine can
aspire, is also the extinction of body and mind. The other characteristics
concerning their attainment are also similar to those concerning Hīnayānists'
attainment, as summarized by Ti-kuan:

> Although the attainments which are realized are
> different, they are the same [a] in cutting off
> False Views and Wrong Attitudes, [b] in trans-
> cending the limitation of life [in the Three Realms],
> and [c] in realizing the Partial Truth.[49]

These similarities between the attainments as preached by the
Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Shared Doctrine [50] raise the problem of how
one can justify the former as the Hīnayāna and the latter as the Mahāyāna,
and even the problem of the distinction between the two doctrines. This
distinction is also a problem if one considers Chih-i's own definition
of the term "Shared": the doctrine is called Shared Doctrine because the
Three Vehicles in this doctrine share the same characteristics in eight
categories;[51] if so, since there are also Three Vehicles in Chih-i's
conception of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, can we thus call it Shared Doctrine
instead of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine because the Three Vehicles of this
doctrine share the same characteristics?[52]

Ti-kuan is keenly aware of these problems, as shown in the following passage:

> Question: Since these two doctrines, the Tripitaka
> and the Shared, are the same [a] in having three
> vehicles, [b] in cutting off the four levels of
> attachment, thus transcending only the Three Realms,
> [c] in realizing a Partial Truth [of emptiness], and
> [d] in having walked 300 yojanas, thus entering the
> Magic City [of Nirvāṇa], then why are they differentiated
> into two? Answer: It is just as you have said. However,
> they are the same and yet not the same. Even though
> what they realize is the same, there is an enduring
> difference between "great" and "small", between "skillful"
> and awkward". These two doctrines are limited to the
> [Three] Realms. Yet the Tripitaka Doctrine is "small"
> and "awkward" within the [Three] Realms. It is "small"
> because it does not share anything with the "great".
> It is "awkward" because it understands emptiness only
> through analyzing phenomena 析 色 入 空 .... But
> the Shared Doctrine is "great" and "skillful" within
> the [Three] Realms. It is "great" because it is the
> first entrance to the Great Vehicle [Mahāyāna].
> It is "skillful" because it understands emptiness by
> directly experiencing phenomena 體 色 入 空 .[53]

In the above quotation, the reason why Ti-kuan regards the Tripitaka

Doctrine as "small", i.e. as Hīnayāna, and the Shared Doctrine as "great",

i.e. as Mahāyāna, is not so convincing. However, he makes it clear that

the key point to distinguish the Tripitaka Doctrine from the Shared

Doctrine is that in the former the Buddha preached hsi fa k'ung, whereas

in the latter the Buddha preached ti fa k'ung. This position of Ti-kuan

is actually what he inherited from Chih-i. In the Mo-ho chih-kuan,

Chih-i says:

> [The Shared Doctrine] is mainly preached for
> bodhisattvas. [In it the Buddha preaches] the
> understanding of emptiness by directly experienc-
> ing phenomena; although there are Hīnayānists,
> [i.e. sravākas and pratyekabuddhas, in the Shared
> Doctrine,] it is nothing but Mahāyāna. Just like
> the Tripitaka Doctrine [in which the Buddha preaches]
> the understanding of emptiness through the analysis
> of phenomena, although there are buddhas and

bodhisattvas [in the Tripitaka Doctrine], it is
nothing but Hinayana. 54

This passage suggests that Chih-i is also aware that the Tripitaka

Doctrine and the Shared Doctrine are the same in having Three Vehicles.

Although he doesn't hereby raise the question about the distinction

between the two doctrines as clearly as Ti-kuan does by pointing out

several similarities between them, he does sense the distinction problem

and the problem of the status of the Shared Doctrine as a Mahayanist

doctrine. For Chih-i, hsi fa k'ung is awkward and ti fa k'ung is skillful.

This pair of terms is the key point Chih-i uses to distinguish between

the Tripitaka Doctrine and the Shared Doctrine and also to explain why

the former is Hinayana and the latter Mahayana.

3. The Distinctive Doctrine

In the Ssu-chiao-i, Chih-i also gives a summary of the Distinctive

Doctrine:

> The meaning of "Distinctive" is "non-common" (pu kung
> 不 共). This doctrine is not shared by the Two Vehicles
> in common with bodhisattvas, thus, it is called the
> Distinctive Doctrine. The doctrine explains directly
> that the conditionedly-originated [dharmas are] pro-
> visional existences. [In this doctrine the Buddha
> preached] the Four Truths of Immeasurability (wu-liang
> ssu-ti 無 量 四 諦). This teaching is solely for
> bodhisattvas, and not for the Two Vehicles, and this is
> why śrāvakas were present [as an audience of the Buddha
> but acted] as [if they were] deaf and dumb.... The so-
> called Distinctive Doctrine can be understood in different
> ways, as summarized in eight points. 1. The teaching is
> distinct. 2. The truth is distinct. 3. The wisdom
> is distinct. 4. The eliminations are distinct. 5. The
> practices are distinct. 6. The stages are distinct.
> 7. The cause is distinct. 8. The attainment is
> distinct. What makes the teaching [of the Distinctive
> Doctrine] distinct [from the teaching for the Two
> Vehicles] is that the Buddha preached the Buddha-dharmas
> as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges; this teaching
> is distinct for bodhisattvas and is not shared by the

Two Vehicles. What makes its truth distinct is that
the Buddha preached ālayavijñāna, [a concept by which
the Buddha explained] the conventional truths as
numerous as the sands of the Ganges. What makes its
wisdom distinct is that [the followers of the Distinctive
Doctrine will finally gain] the Wisdom of Knowing the
Different Ways Suited to Different Individuals. What
makes its eliminations distinct is that [its followers
will] eliminate the Innumerable Delusions, the False Views
and Wrong Attitudes beyond the [Three] Realms, and the
Fundamental Ignorance. What makes its practices distinct
is that [its followers will] undertake throughout innumer-
able kalpas, to do the practices of various pāramitās
and the practices which help carry oneself or other
through the ocean of suffering. What makes its stages
distinct is that the thirty minds, [i.e. the thirty
stages,] [the best among which can] control the Funda-
mental Ignorance, are the stages of the wise, and that
the Ten Bhūmis, in which the true nature [of the followers]
manifests itself and [the followers] eliminate the
Fundamental Ignorance. [The Ten Bhūmis] are the stages
of sages. What makes its causes distinct is the cause
of the Non-hindrance Daimond. What makes its attainment
distinct from the attainment of the Two Vehicles is
that the Nirvāna, which its followers may enter, con-
sists of the Four Characteristics. Because of these
eight points, it is called the Distinctive Doctrine.[55]

In the above quotation, we see that Chih-i emphasizes the distinction

between the Distinctive Doctrine, which the Buddha preached solely for

bodhisattvas, and the doctrine which the Buddha preached for the Two

Vehicles; by the latter Chih-i clearly implies the Tripitaka Doctrine.

Furthermore, if we compare the eight points mentioned above with the

eight characteristics shared by the followers of the Shared Doctrine, we

will find the distinction between the Distinctive Doctrine and the

Shared Doctrine. Being aware of these differences, Ti-kuan says:

This teaching [i.e. the Distinctive Doctrine] explains
the doctrine that transcends the [Three] Realms and
belongs to the bodhisattvas alone [as outline by the
following eight categories]: teaching; truth; wisdom;
eliminations; practices; stages; causes; attainments.
This is distinct from the two previous doctrines
[Tripitaka and Shared], and is distinct from the

> Complete Doctrine which follows: Therefore it is
> called Distinctive. The Nirvāna Sutra says: "The
> causes and the conditions of the Four Noble Truths
> have innumerable forms which are not understood
> by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas." 56

The reason why Ti-kuan calls this doctrine Distinctive is not justified.

Any one of the four doctrines must be distinct from the other three

doctrines, otherwise, it can't be taken as a separate doctrine. However,

Ti-kuan is rightly aware of those eight points which can be used to

distinguish the Distinctive Doctrine from the Tripitaka and Shared

Doctrines. Following Chih-i's leads, Ti-kuan regards the Distinctive

Doctrine as a doctrine which goes beyond the [Three] Realms, as contrasted

with the Tripitaka and Shared Doctrines which are limited to the [Three]

Realms. Quoting the Nirvāna Sutra as the authority, Ti-kuan also sees

that Buddha preached in the Distinctive Doctrine, innumerable forms of

the causes and conditions of the Four Noble Truths. This can be taken

as Ti-kuan's explanation of what Chih-i calls the Four Truths of

Immeasurability.

Chih-i's term Four Truths of immeasurability should be under-

stood in the context of his conception of the Buddha-dharmas as Numerous

as the Sands of the Ganges, which might be related to his conception of

the delusions beyond the [Three] Realms. Although Chih-i never defines

chieh-nei and chieh-wai, as followers of a doctrine beyond the [Three]

Realms, the followers of the Distinctive Doctrine must practice more

Buddha-dharmas than those of the Tripitaka and Shared Doctrines in order

to eliminate the delusions which lie beyond the [Three] Realms. The

delusions are so numerous that the Buddha-dharmas must be as numerous

as the sands of the Ganges, which will be undertaken by the followers of

of the Distinctive Doctrine throughout innumerable kalpas. After such

a great effort, these followers may enter the Nirvāna which consists of

the Four Characteristics. This conception of Nirvāna is related to the

Mahāyānists' conception of Buddha-nature, which in turn is related to,

in Chih-i's opinion, non-emptiness. For Chih-i, the Buddha preached in

the Distinctive Doctrine a Middle Way instead of the Partial Truth, i.e.

preaching both emptiness and non-emptiness. The non-emptiness is identi-

fied with Buddha-nature in the sense that the Tathāgatagarbha Replete

with the Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges.[57]

Chih-i mentions the concept ālayavijñāna as a part of the

Distinctive Doctrine. In so doing, he actually identifies the Yogācāra

school with the Distinctive Doctrine.[58] But what he has in mind is the

Yogācāra philosophy as developed by the Ti-lun masters 地 論 師 and

the She-lun masters 攝 論 師, which historians have named as the "old

Yogācāra tradition", as distinct from the "new Yogācāra tradition"

developed much later by Hsüan-tsang 玄 奘 (A.D. 596-664).[59]

4. The Complete Doctrine

The last the Four Doctrines of Conversion Chih-i designated by

the name Complete Doctrine. According to Chih-i, in this doctrine the

Buddha preached the highest truth to his followers with the sharpest

capacities. In the Ssu-chiao-i, Chih-i also gives a summary of this

doctrine:

> The meaning of complete is impartiality. This doctrine
> explains inconceivable conditioned-origination. In
> this doctrine the Buddha preached the Two Truths in
> the light of the Middle Way, which is replete with
> the noumenal and the phenomenal. [The Middle Way
> implies that this doctrine is] neither partial nor

distinctive. It is only for the followers with
the sharpest capacities. Because of this, it is
called the Complete Doctrine. The Avatansaka Sutra
says, "The Buddha manifests his all-powerful ability
in order to preach the complete sutra. [He declares
that] innumerable sentient beings are destined to
gain enlightenment."[60] This sutra [61] says, "All
sentient beings are the Mahanirvana, which can never
be extinguished." The chapter of the Mahaprajnaparamita
Sutra on repleteness says, "Although all dharmas are
empty, the one mind is replete with thousands of
practices." The Lotus Sutra says, "[People] put two
palms together to show [their] respect. [They] want
to learn the way of repleteness."[62] The Nirvana
Sutra says, "The Daimond Treasury lacks nothing."
Therefore, it is called the Complete Doctrine. The
so-called Complete Doctrine can be understood in
different ways, as summarized in eight points. 1. The
teaching is complete. 2. The truth is complete.
3. The wisdom is complete. 4. The eliminations are
complete. 5. The practices are complete. 6. The
stages are complete. 7. The causes are complete.
8. The attainment is complete. What makes the
teaching of the Complete Doctrine complete is that
[in this doctrine the Buddha] taught directly a Middle
Way which implies impartiality. What makes its truth
complete is that [by preaching] the Middle Way [the
Buddha] saw impartiality in all principles. What
makes its wisdom complete is that, the Wisdom of
Knowing All Forms is complete. What makes its elimin-
ations complete is that, [the Buddha] cuts off the
Fundamental Ignorance without cutting off [any dharmas].
What makes its practices complete is that, when any
practice is performed, all practices are involved
[at the same time]. [Any practice performed by the
followers of this doctrine is based on] the complete
cause of the Mahayana and [is aimed at] the complete
attainment of the Nirvana. Because of [this] cause
and [this] attainment, all [practices] are involved
[when any practice is performed]. This is what it
means by saying that when any practice is performed,
all practices are involved. What makes its stages
complete is that from the first Bhumi onwards, [every
Bhumi is] replete with all the merits belonging to
various Bhumis. What makes its cause complete is
that the cause illustrates both the Two Truths
and naturally leads to [the Wisdom of Knowing All
Forms].[63] What makes its attainment complete is
that [the attainment of] the Supreme Enlightenment is
inconceivable, and that the Three Attainments, [i.e.
Dharmakaya, Prajna, and Moksa] are neither [arranged]

longitudinally nor transversely. Because of
these eight points, it is calledthe Complete
Doctrine.[64]

This summary, unlike the summaries of the Shared and Distinctive Doctrines,

which we have quoted before, provides us with few concrete details of

the Complete Doctrine; in it Chih-i tries mainly to define the term

"complete". The meaning of complete is crucial to the understanding of

Chih-i's Classification of Doctrines, for the term is implicitly used

as a criterion in assigning the four doctrines to their respective posi-

tions in his scheme of the Four Doctrines of Conversion. To Chih-i,

the Complete Doctrine isthe highest truth the Buddha has ever preached,

the position of each of the other three doctrines is determined by its

closeness to the Complete Doctrine. Thus, we find that in his writing,

Chih-i never tires of comparing the other three doctrines with the Com-

plete Doctrine.

Chih-i has not stated the criterion explicitly, and he has never

felt it necessary to provide a systematic presentation for the Complete

Doctrine. The contents of the Complete Doctrine, as well as those of the

other doctrines, can be found, in a fragmentary nature, throughout his

writings. The most important ideological contents of the Complete Doctrine

are the key concepts, such as the Contemplation of Three Truths in One

Mind (i-hsin san-kuan 一心三觀) and the Trischiliocosm in a Moment

of Consciousness (i-nien san-chien 一念三千). Unlike the Tripitaka,

the Shared, and the Distinctive Doctrines, which can be identified with

the Hinayāna, Mādhyamika, and Yogācāra respectively, the Complete Doctrine

cannot be identified with any definite school developed in India. It is

a doctrine developed by Chih-i himself and based on his own interpretation

of some passages from various sūtras and śāstras.[65] Thus a reconstruc-

tion of Chih-i's conception of the Complete Doctrine with reference to

the key concepts, is necessary to a comprehensive understanding of his

Classification of Doctrines in general and to the Complete Doctrine in

particular. However, this is a difficult task which has been undertaken

by Mou in the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo. Without the intention of reconstructing

Chih-i's conception of the Complete Doctrine ourselves, or of giving a

summary of Mou's reconstruction,[66] we shall only concentrate on analyzing

some similarities and differences between the Complete Doctrine and the

other three doctrines. A discussion of the meaning of the term complete,

as implied by the above quotation from the Ssu-chiao-i, contributes a

great deal to this analysis.

In that quotation, Chih-i first defines complete as impartiality,

and then supplements it with repleteness. The meaning of repleteness is

even more crucial than the meaning of impartiality to the understanding

of the Complete Doctrine. To show the importance of this meaning of

repleteness, Chih-i quotes the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, Lotus Sūtra,

and Nirvāna Sūtra as his authorities. This is understandable, for the

meaning of impartiality itself cannot distinguish the Complete Doctrine

from the Distinctive Doctrine.

As mentioned already, the Tripitaka and Shared Doctrines are the

doctrines in which the Buddha preached a Partial Truth, i.e. Mere Empti-

ness; the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines are the doctrines in which

the Buddha preached both emptiness and non-emptiness, which can be

regarded as an impartial truth, or a Middle Way. Non-emptiness is referred

to by Chih-i as Tathāgatagarbha; that means, in the Distinctive and

Complete Doctrines the Buddha preached the Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as

the Sands of the Ganges. Based on this reference, Chih-i also regards

the Four Truths preached in the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines as

immeasurable (wu-liang 無量), and regards those preached in the

Tripitaka and Shared Doctrines as measurable (yu-liang 有量). Thus, by

failing to meet the criterion of impartiality, the Tripitaka and Shared

Doctrine are different from the Complete Doctrine and by failing to meet

the criterion of repleteness, they are far away from the all-inclusiveness

of the Complete Doctrine. By the criterion of impartiality only, the

Distinctive Doctrine is the same as the Complete Doctrine, for in both

of them the Buddha preached an impartial truth, i.e. non-emptiness in

the sense that Tathāgatagarbha is replete with the Buddha-dharmas as

Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges. However, in Chih-i's opinion, the

followers of the Distinctive Doctrine cannot be said to be as replete

with all dharmas as the followers of the Complete Doctrine. Thus, a

question naturally arises: why did Chih-i say that the followers of

the Distinctive Doctrine are not replete with all dharmas, even though

the Buddha did preach in this doctrine the Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as

the Sands of the Ganges? The answer to this question can be found in

Chih-i's concept, Non-action (wu-tso 無作). The Four Truths preached

in the Distinctive Doctrine are, though immeasurable, not of the Non-

action; therefore, its followers cannot be said to be replete with all

dharmas.

In the Ssu-chiao-i, Chih-i designates the Four Truths of

Immeasurability and the Four Truths of Non-action (wu-tso ssu-ti 無作四諦)

to the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines respectively.[67] But these

two terms are simplified, and thus not very accurate. What Chih-i really

means is: the Four Truths of the Distinctive Doctrine are immeasurable

and are described by the idea of Action (yu-tso 有作), whereas the Four

Truths of the Complete Doctrine are immeasurable and are described by

the idea of Non-action. Thus, although the Four Truths in both the

Distinctive and Complete Doctrines are immeasurable, the key charac-

teristic which distinguishes them lies in the concept of Action or Non-

action. In the Ssu-chiao-i, Chih-i does not give a clear definition for

the term Non-action,[68] but he provides a very important point which can

be used to distinguish the Four Truths of Immeasurability from the Four

Truths of Non-action: the former are referred to as related with the con-

cept Fundamental Ignorance, whereas the latter are referred to as related

with the concept Dharmatā.[69] In Buddhist teachings, the Fundamental

Ignorance is characterized as the root of all conditionedly-originated

actions; Dharmatā is characterized as something outside the category of

conditioned-origination. Chih-i's reference to the Four Truth of

Immeasurability as related with the Fundamental Ignorance implies that

the immeasurable dharmas as merits, are acquired by the followers of the

Distrinctive Doctrine through practice; merits "acquired" in the sense

that, these dharmas can only be understood ultimately in a doctrine of

conditioned-origination. The reference to the Four Truths of Non-action

as related with Dharmatā also reminds us of the concept Nature-repleteness

(hsing-chü 性具),[70] which implies that the immeasurable dharmas as

merits, acquired by the followers of the Complete Doctrine through practice,

are paradoxically "not acquired" in the sense that the followers are

replete with all these dharmas in the followers' own nature. In other

words, the followers are replete with them in principle prior to any actual action of practice (i.e. Non-action). This interpretation of Chih-i's reference to the Fundamental Ignorance and Dharmatā as related to the Conditioned-origination and Nature-repleteness respectively, can also gain support from what Chih-i says in a passage of the miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i about the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines. According to Chih-i, what the followers of the Distinctive Doctrine understand as non-emptiness is only a principle, the principle only to be realized through conditionedly-originated practices.[71] This dependence upon conditioned-origination impliesthat there is no guarantee for the followers of the Distinctive Doctrine to become replete with all dharmas. But when the followers of the Complete Doctrine learn the principle of non-emptiness, they immediately know that they are in principle replete with all dharmas prior to any actual action of practice.[72]

The above is a summary of the Four Doctrines of Conversion. In Chih-i's Classification of Doctrines, the Four Doctrines of Conversion are correlated with specific sutras located in the Five Periods.[73] In the first period, the Buddha preached the Avataṅsaka Sūtra, which contains the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines. In the second period, the Buddha preached four Āgamas, which contain only the Tripiṭaka Doctrine. In the Vaipulya Sūtras of the third period, the Buddha explained all of four doctrines. In the Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtras of the fourth period, the Buddha explained the Shared, Distinctive and Complete Doctrines. In the fifth period, the Buddha taught the Lotus Sūtra and Mahāparinirvāna Sūtra; the former contains only the Complete Doctrine, whereas the latter contains all four doctrines.

NOTES

[1]The Hīnayānists generally followed a closed tradition, i.e.
they regarded only the words of the Buddha, and those words of others
which had been certified by the Buddha, as revelatory (thus authorita-
tive). Some Mahāyānists complied with this tradition and claimed
that Mahāyāna sūtras were actually preached by the historical Buddha
himself and had been kept in secret places. However, some Mahāyānists
adopted a radical view of revelation. Although they still considered
the certification of the Buddha to be essential, they explained the
presence of the Buddha in a new way and didn't confuse the fictional
events with historical reality. For a detailed discussion of this issue,
one can consult Graeme MacQueen's article, "Inspired Speech in Early
Mahayana Buddhism" Religion, 11 (1981):303-319; 12 (1982):49-65.

[2]There are also explicit statements of the Classification of
Doctrines in a number of Mahāyāna texts, such as the Lotus Sūtra, the
Mahāparinirvāna Sūtra, the Laṅkavatāra Sūtra and the Samdhinirmocana Sūtra.
For the details in the former three sūtras, consult Hurvitz, Chih-i,
p. 183, 215-217; for the details in the last sūtra, see Taishō shinshū
daizōkyō 大正新修大藏經 (henceforth abbreviated to T), Vol. 16,
697a-b.

[3]As MacQueen, op. cit., p. 51, points out, '... when the early
Mahāyānists defend their sūtras as buddhavacana they do not mean this
that these texts are the speech of the "historical Buddha"'. However,
when some Chinese Mahāyānists accepted the assumption that all sūtras
were preached by the Buddha, they seemed to take the assumption literally.
For example, Chih-i classified all sūtras in his scheme of the Five
Periods, which suggests that all sūtras were originated from the historical
Buddha.

[4]An attempt to trace the beginnings of the Classification of
Doctrines in China as early as Kumārajīva (A.D. 350-409) and his dis-
ciples, Seng-jui 僧叡 (A.D. 352-436), Chu Tao-sheng 竺道生 (A.D.
355-434) and Hui-kuan 慧觀 (A.D. 355-426), can be found in Enichi Ocho's
"The Beginnings of Buddhist Tenet Classification in China," Eastern
Buddhist, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 71-94.

[5]San-lun hsüan-i 三論玄義, T.45, 5b.

[6]The most important material for the study of early history of
the Classification of Doctrines is found in Chih-i's Miao-fa lien-hua
ching hsüan-i 妙法蓮華經玄義. T.33, 801a-b. An English study of
it can be found in Hurvitz, op. cit., pp. 217-229.

[7] Hua-yen wu-chiao chang 華嚴五教章 , T.45, 480b-c.

[8] T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i, T.46, 774c.

[9] T.33, 800a-b; 807a-808a.

[10] In Mia-fa lien-hua ching wen-chü 妙法蓮華經文句 , T.34, 840b, 3; 90b, 8; 87c, 11; Chih-i uses 誘引 (inducement), 彈訶 (rebuke), and 融通 (integrate) to describe the second, third, and fourth periods respectively. The last of these terms is a key term in T'ien-t'ai's conception of prajñā.

[11] Since the Method of Conversion is unrelated to the themes of this thesis, we provide only a very simple summary of them.

[12] T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i, T.46, 775b; David Chappell, op. cit., p. 61.

[13] This thesis follows David Chappell's translations for the four doctrines of conversion.

[14] T.46, 721a-769a.

[15] Ibid., 721b, 29.

[16] Ibid., 725c, 19; 21; 23; 25. Chih-i's term "Four Truths of Origination and Extinction" should be understood in contrast with the term "Four Truths of Non-origination", which, according to Chih-i, was preached by the Buddha in the Shared Doctrine. By the word non-origination, Chih-i didn't mean that the Buddha rejected all doctrines of origination, for Chih-i himself regarded the principle of conditioned-origination as the core teaching of the Buddha in the Shared Doctrine; Chih-i only meant that the Buddha rejected any doctrine of origination which might be taken as origination with substantiality. In other words, in the Shared Doctrine the Buddha preached against any idea of substantiality as might be related to the Four Truths, i.e. there is in the absolute sense no suffering, no arising, no cessation, no path either. In contrast with these Four Truths of the Shared Doctrine, the Four Truths of the Tripitaka Doctrine, in Chih-i's opinion, can be understood as somethings with substantiality.

[17] Hsi fa k'ung has been a generally accepted term. In Chih-i's words, it is 析假入空 (Ibid., 724a, 7); in Ti-kuan's words, it is 析色入空 (T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i, T.46, 778a, 15-16).

[18] Ssu-chiao-i, T.46, 732c, 29ff.

[19]Ibid., 728a, 7. The English translation of 灭 体智 follows Soothill and Hodous' Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, p. 383. The extinction of body and mind is the state that, according to the Hīnayāna, the Buddha enters at his death. Although the Nirvāṇa in this nihilistic sense, as D.T. Suzuki points out in Outline of Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 331, is not so much the object of the religious life of Hīnayānists as the recognition of the Four Noble Truths, or the practice of the Eight Rightful Paths, this conception of Nirvāṇa has been selected as one of the main points of the Hinayāna upon which the Mahāyāna criticizes. Chinese Mahāyānists even call this state the extinction of wisdom (mieh chih 灭 智).

[20]In the Ssu-chiao-i, T.46, 728a, 8, Chih-i sees the concept "Permanency of Buddha-nature" as opposite to the concept "extinction of body and mind", a position which Chih-i adopts from the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra. The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra has made it clear that the Buddha preached the Permanency of Buddha-nature so as to avoid a disbelief as might be resulted from the Hīnayāna conception of Nirvāna. For if one understands Nirvāṇa in its nihilistic sense as the extinction of body and mind, one might easily conclude that even the Buddha himself is impermanent and thus throw doubt upon the meaning of Buddha's existence. According to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, impermanency, suffering, selfless and impurity are the four characteristics related to Hinayana conception of Nirvāna,whereas permanency, joy, self and purity are the four characteristics related to Mahāyāna conception of Buddha-nature. The term Permanency of Buddha-nature, as suggested by the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, has the connotation of joy, self and purity as well as that of permanency. (See T.12, 523b, 11-19; 523c, 13-15).

[21]Chih-i often quotes the Mahāparinirvāna Sūtra (Cf. T.12, 523b, 13ff.) and says that the Two Vehicles see only emptiness whereas bodhisattvas see both emptiness and non-emptiness. Non-emptiness indicates Mahānirvāna (Mo-ho chih-kuan, T.46, 28a, 8), Buddha-nature (Wei-mo ching hsüan-su, T.38, 555c, 11; Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i, T.33, 700c, 3), and Tathāgatagarbha (Ibid., 703a, 22-23). That is, non-emptiness means that Buddha-nature is not empty in the sense that Tathāgatagarbha is replete with Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges (heng-sha fo-fa 恒沙诸佛法).

[22]As mentioned already, non-emptiness indicates Buddha-nature. Chih-i also says that to see both emptiness and non-emptiness means to see a Middle Way (Mo-ho chih-kuan, T.46, 90b, 29 - c, 1). In the Ssu-chiao-i, T.46, 730a, 28 - b, 1, Chih-i asserts that both of the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines preach a Middle way and have an insight into Buddha-nature.

[23]Ssu-chiao-i, T.46, 730a, 17-18.

[24]Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i, T. 33, 688a, 21 - b, 2;
710c, 18-27; 737b, 17-19.

[25]Mo-ho chih-kuan, T. 46, 30a, 24-25; 60c, 8.

[26]Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 760b, 26; Wei-mo ching hsüan-su, T. 38,
551a, 14. 見 思 惑 indicates two kinds of delusions. Following David
Chappell's example, this thesis uses "False Views" and "Wrong Attitudes"
as the translations for 見 惑, and 思 惑, . (See T'ien-t'ai Buddhism:
An Outline of the Fourfold Teachings, p. 90.)

[27]Mo-ho chih-kuan, T. 46, 7a, 12-13.

[28]Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 760b, 26-27; Wei-mo ching hsüan-su, T. 38,
551a, 15.

[29]Mo-ho chih-kuan, T. 46, 7a, 13.

[30]Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 760b, 27: Wei-mo ching hsüan-su, T. 38,
540b, 23; 551a, 15.

[31]Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i, T. 33, 737a, 14.

[32]"Transcending the Three Realms" should be understood as
transcending, i.e. eliminating, those delusions within the [Three]
Realms. (界 内 惑,). It should not be understood as reaching
beyond the [Three] Realms, for only the followers of the Distinctive
and Complete Doctrines can reach beyond the [Three] Realms.

[33]Translation from David Chappell, op. cit., p. 107.
Compare it with T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 777c, 5-6.

[34]This quotation is very important to the understanding of
Chih-i's conception of the Shared Doctrine. It comes from T. 8, 234a,
15-19.

[35]Translated from the Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 721c, 23 - 722a, 17.

[36]The followers of the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines, as we
will see, share very few of those eight characteristics with the followers
of the Shared Doctrine. But the followers of the Tripitaka Doctrine share
many of those eight characteristics with the followers of the Shared
Doctrine. Thus, a question arises as to whether or how we can distinguish
the Tripitaka Doctrine from the Shared Doctrine. This question will be
discussed later in the section (Cf. pp. 30-32).

[37] T. 25, 310c, 13-14; 357c, 13-15; 564a, 21-22; 754b, 23-24.

[38] According to dictionaries, the antonym of "common" is "uncommon". However, "common" at least has two meanings: ordinary and shared. "Uncommon" seems only to be the antonym of the former. For Chih-i, pu-kung pan-jo means the prajñā which the followers of the Shared Doctrine don't share with the followers of the Tripitaka Doctrine. Thus, this thesis coins a new word "Non-common" for the translation of pu-kung.

[39] Chih-i often mentions this pair of concepts or one of the pair in his writings, e.g. Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i, T. 33, 738a, 9; 801c, 28; 805b, 26-27; 811c, 13-15; 812a, 9; Miao-fa lien-hua ching wen-chu, T. 34, 30a, 4; Kuan-yin i-su 觀音義疏㲉 , T. 34, 885c, 23; Mo-ho chih-kuan, T. 46, 31c, 14; 74c, 23; Ssu-chiao-i , T. 46, 722b, 6-7; 723c, 6.

[40] 若經疏 Translated from the Jen-wang hu-kuo po-jo ching su 仁王護國般 T. 33, 254c, 26-255a, 1.

[41] Ti-fa-k'ung has been a generally accepted term. In Chih-i's words, it is 體假入空 (Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 724a, 8); in Ti-kuan's words, it is 體色入空 (T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 778a, 18).

[42] Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 766b, 17-18.

[43] Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 723a, 10; Mo-ho chih-kuan, T. 46, 28a, 6-14.

[44] See note 21 of this chapter.

[45] Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 728a, 7-9.

[46] This point has been mentioned in one of the eight characteristics shared by the followers of the Shared Doctrine. Also in the Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 747c, 13-14, Chih-i says that the Three Vehicles are the same to eliminating the False Views and Wrong Attitudes. However, in a detailed analysis of the Ten Stages of the Shared Doctrine, we find that in the seventh Stage the followers eliminate completely all the False Views and Wrong Attitudes, and that from the eighth Stage onwards they can further overcome (侵) or even eliminate (臨行) all the Recurring Delusions (習氣). (See the Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 750b, 4-14; Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i, T. 33, 737a, 19-20). This elimination of the Recurring Delusion can be taken as one of the characteristics which make the Shared Doctrine superior to the Tripitaka Doctrine.

[47]In the Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 768a - b, Chih-i identifies four doctrines of conversion with various sutras and śastras, but he does not mention the Middle Treatise there. (From now on, following R.R. Robinson's example, this thesis will use the name Middle Treatise as the translation of 中論 , the Chinese version of Madhyamaka-kārikās.) It seems that he never identifies the Shared Doctrine with the Mādhyamika philosophy. The reason for this might be that Chih-i drew his doctrine of the Three Truths, an important content of the Complete Doctrine, from the Middle Treatise. However, scholars like Hurvitz (See his Chih-i, p. 260) are justified in doing so, for the teaching that all dharmas are empty because of conditioned-origination is the central theme of the Middle Treatise. Also in the Ssu-chiao-i, Chih-i repeats his statement that the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras contain the Shared, Distinctive and Complete Doctrines. Whether the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras contain the Distinctive and Complete Doctrine is a question we will discuss later.

[48]This does not mean that Chih-i knew the historical fact that the thought of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and the Mādhyamika philosophy were the early development of the Mahāyāna. For him the Shared Doctrine is the elementary teaching of the Mahayāna, in the sense that it helps to promote followers from the Hīnāyāna and enables them to go further into the Distinctive or Complete Doctrine of the Mahāyāna.

[49]T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 777c, 29-778a, 1. English translation from David Chappell, op. cit., p. 122, with an alternation of "Partial Truth" for "one-sided Truth". On p. 107, Chappell translates 隨情實 as the Partial Truth.

[50]Compare the above quotation with the quotation from Ti-kuan on p. 25.

[51]For these characteristics, see the eight points mentioned in the quotation on p. 26.

[52]In the Ssu-chiao-i, Chih-i lists eight "shared" characteristics for the Shared Doctrine, eight "distinctive" characteristics for the Distinctive Doctrine (Cf. the quotation on p.32), and eight "complete" characteristics for the Complete Doctrine (Cf. the quotation on p.36). Although he does not do so for the Tripitaka Doctrine, the Tripitaka Doctrine certainly has its own characteristics; otherwise, it cannot be distinguished from other doctrines.

[53]Translation from David Chappell, op. cit., pp. 124-125 with a few alternations. Compare it with the T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 778a, 11-19.

[54]Translated from T. 46, 32b, 25-26.

[55] Translated from T. 46, 722a, 18 - b, 15.

[56] Translation from David Chappell, op. cit., p. 129 with a few alternations. Compare it with T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 778a, 24-27.

[57] For the identification of non-emptiness with Buddha-nature, see note 21 of this chapter. 也是來藏性 三千 佛法佛性 is an important concept in understanding the distinction between the Tripitaka and Shared Doctrines and the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines. Following Whalen Lai's example, this thesis translates it into the Tathagatagarbha [Replete with] Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges [Alias] Buddha-nature. (See "Review of Fo-hsing yü pan-jo" Journal of Chinese Philosophy, VII (1984): 284.).

[58] Also see the Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i, T. 33, 742a, 23 - b, 27.

[59] For the details of these traditions, consult Ming-wood Liu's "The P'an-chiao System of the Hua-yen School in Chinese Buddhism," T'oung-Pao, Vol. 67 (1981): 13-14; also consult Diana Paul's Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1984.

[60] Avatansaka Sutra, T. 9, 750b, 6-7.

[61] This is the Wei-mo ching. For the Ssu-chiao-i is originally a part of the Wei-mo ching hsüan-su (A Commentary on the Wei-mo ching).

[62] Lotus Sutra, T. 9, 6c, 6.

[63] The addition of this phrase as the object of the sentense is based on the Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 728a, 12-13.

[64] Translated from T. 46, 722b, 10-29.

[65] The most important sutra on which Chih-i established the Complete Doctrine is the Lotus Sutra. According to Chan-jan, other important scriptures are the Ta-chih-tu lun, Mahanirvana Sutra, and Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra. (See Chih-kuan i-li 止觀義例), T. 46, 452c, 28-29).

[66] Even a summary of Mou's reconstruction is not an easy task and may not make the matter simpler. Firstly, Mou's reconstruction takes 449 pages (Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 575-1023). Secondly, whether Mou's understanding of the Complete Doctrine is accurate is an open question. Thirdly, Mou often uses his own terminology which needs further articulation.

[67] T. 46, 726 a-b.

[68] In the Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 726b, 5-7, Chih-i says that in the Nirvāna Sūtra the Buddha preaches one Real Truth (Cf. T. 12, 6851, 23ff). The Four Truth of the Complete Doctrine, in Chih-i's opinion, can be reduced into one Real Truth. Due to this reduction, the Four Truths cannot be really counted as four (四實不作四); therefore, the Four Truths of the Complete Doctrine is called wu-tso ssu-ti. This is the only definition which Chih-i gives to the term wu-tso in the Ssu-chiao-i. But this seems to be a play on words rather than a clear definition. In Chinese, the word tso can be understood as "counted" in the context that the Four Truths cannot be really counted as four. The reduction of the Four Truths into one Real Truth may have its important implication in the Complete Doctrine, (Cf. Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsuan-i, T. 33, 781b, 7ff), but this definition of wu-tso as "not counted" cannot be fit into the usual usage of the term. Wu-tso is generally used to describe something which is not the result of any action originated conditionedly (因緣造作). This rendering of wu-tso as the Non-action can also be seen in Chih-i's own writings: Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsuan-i, T. 33, 701b, 8.

[69] T. 46, 726b, 20-24.

[70] Mou took hsing-chü and hsing-chi 性起 (Nature-origination) as the concepts crucial to the understanding of the Complete Doctrine and Distinctive Doctrine respectively. Andō Toshion 安藤俊雄 a famous Japanese scholar, also regarded hsing-chü as the most important concept of the Complete Doctrine, and used it in the title of one of his books on T'ien-t'ai School: Tendai shōgu shisō ron 天台性具思想論 . It seems that Chih-i never used this term. We find that Chan-jan mentioned it in his Fa-hua hsüan-i shih-chien 法華玄義釋籤 , T. 33, 919c, 20. It is probable that Chih-li first coined the term hsing-chu san-chien 性具三千 (Nature-repleteness with the Trischiliocosm), which is a further articulation of Chih-i's concept i-nien san-ch'ien. In the Kuan-yin hsuan-i chih 觀音玄義記 , T. 34, 905b, 8 and also in the Shih pu-erh men chih-yao chao 十不二門指要鈔 T. 46, 713a, 9-10, Chih-li explains the Non-action in the sense of hsing-chü.

[71] T. 33, 703b, 17-18.

[72] Ibid., 19-20.

[73] See the Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 725a, 21-25.

CHAPTER 3

MOU'S CONCEPTION OF PRAJÑĀ AND THE SHARED DOCTRINE IN THE

FRAMEWORK OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF DOCTRINES

I. MOU'S CONCEPTION OF PRAJÑĀ

A. Prajñā as the Common Doctrine

Fo-hsing yü pan-jo is a work which concentrates on the classi-
fication of doctrines. The specific classification which Mou took as
the guideline is the Four Doctrines of Conversion of the T'ien-t'ai
system.[1] Mou accepted not only the basic structure of this fourfold
scheme, but also T'ien-t'ai ideal of the Complete Doctrine. However,
there are some modifications in Mou's own system, amongst which his
conception of prajñā is the most important. In Chih-i's system, prajñā
is a main content of the Shared Doctrine. It is shared by all followers
of the four doctrines in common. But Chih-i didn't allow the name Common
Doctrine for the teaching of prajñā, for he had a preconceived conception
of the Common Prajñā and Non-common Prajñā.[2] Mou disagreed with Chih-i
on the distinction between types of prajñā.[3] Following Chih-i's own
assumption that all the Three Vehicles share prajñā in common,[4] Mou
called it the Common Doctrine.

According to Chih-i, the Common Prajñā is the teaching in which
the Buddha preached only emptiness to the Two Vehicles of the Shared
Doctrine and the followers of the Tripitaka Doctrine, whereas the Non-
common Prajñā is the teaching in which the Buddha preached both emptiness

and non-emptiness to the bodhisattvas of the Shared Doctrine and the followers of the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines. Chih-i claimed that he had the Ta-chih-tu lun as the authority for this dividion of prajñā.[5] Due to his conception of the Non-common Prajñā, Chih-i also claimed that the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the Ta-chih-tu lun contained the Shared, the Distinctive, and the Complete Doctrines.[6] Mou rejected Chih-i's conception of the Non-common Prajñā. Although Mou didn't go directly to the Ta-chih-tu lun to discredit Chih-i's conception of the Non-common Prajñā,[7] he did throw doubt on the fact that the Mahāprajñā-pāramitā Sūtra contained the concept non-emptiness in the sense of the Tathāgatagarbha [Replete with] Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges [Alias] Buddha-nature.[8] In order to support his own conception of prajñā as the Common Doctrine, a major deviation from Chih-i's system, Mou analyzed the concept of prajñā, which is based on his own interpretation of some important scriptures. These scriptures are Kumārajīva's translations of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, Ta-chih-tu lun and Middle Treatise.[9] In this analysis, Mou emphasized the skillful function of prajñā, prajñā as a non-controversial (wu ch'eng 無諍) and "non-analytical" teaching (fei fen-chiai ti shuo 非分解地說),[10] and prajñā as a teaching of the Functional Repleteness (tso-yung ti yuan-chu 作用的圓具). All these emphases threw light on the under-standing of the concept prajñā itself, but also on the understanding of Mou's own modified system as a whole.

In his modified system, Mou also regarded ti fa k'ung, another main content of the Shared Doctrine, as the Common Doctrine. The exclusion of its two crucial concepts, may raise a problem concerning the existence of the Shared Doctrine itself.[11] However, Mou didn't

cancel the Shared Doctrine; he redefined it. Therefore, there are five

doctrines in Mou's modified system: the <u>Tripiṭaka</u>, the Shared, the Dis-

tinctive, the Complete, and the Common Doctrines. The former four doctrines

are the Doctrines of Ontological Systems (<u>hsi-t'ung chih chiao</u> 系統之教),[12]

and the last one is the Doctrine of Contemplating Dharmas (<u>kuan-fa chih</u>

<u>chiao</u> 觀法之教).[13] That means, the former four are the ontological

theories concerning the existence of <u>dharmas</u>; the last one is only a

teaching of seeing into the ultimate reality of <u>dharmas</u>.[14] The former four

systems differ in their theories concerning the existence of <u>dharmas</u>, based

on their different conception of Buddha-nature;[15] however, they are the

same in accepting emptiness as the ultimate reality of <u>dharmas</u> - an insight

of <u>prajñā</u>. Buddha-nature and <u>prajñā</u> are two leading concepts in Mou's

modified system, a fact also reflected in the title of <u>Fo-hsing yü pan-jo</u>

The four chapters of the first part of <u>Fo-hsing yü pan-jo</u> are

devoted to an analysis of the two leading concepts: three on <u>prajñā</u> and

one on Buddha-nature. The chapters on <u>prajñā</u> are: Chapter 1. On the

<u>Ta-chih-tu lun</u> and <u>Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra</u>; Chapter 2. The Contemplation

of <u>Dharmas</u> and the Eight Negations in the <u>Middle Treatise</u>; Chapter 3.

Nāgārjuna's Dialectics on Number and Time. Although Chapter 3 is important

to a larger project in which Mou tried to conciliate Kant's philosophy

and Chinese philosophy, it is unrelated to the Classification of Doctrines.

Thus, this thesis concentrates only on the first two chapters.[16]

B. <u>The Skillful Function of Prajñā</u>

In the beginning of the first chapter, Mou characterizes the

<u>Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra</u> as a <u>sūtra</u> in which the Buddha mainly preached

the skillful function of <u>prajñā</u>. The function of <u>prajñā</u> is to eradicate

all kinds of determination so that one is free from clinging to them

(tang-hsiang ch'ien-chih 蕩相遣執).[17] This function can be applied to

all dharmas without exception, since every dharma as such, as pointed out

in one of Mou's quotations from the sūtra,[18]

> neither gathers nor scatters, is devoid of colour,
> devoid of form; the absolute reality [of it] is devoid
> of all kinds of relativity (無對一相);[19] this implies
> the indeterminate nature of all dharmas (無相).[20]

In Mou's opinion, this sūtra has been preached in order to illustrate

this function of prajñā.[21] It is due to this intention that the sūtra

mentions many dharmas. The sutra mentions each of these dharmas so as to

show that every dharma as such is devoid of all kinds of determination,

which are relative; in other words, so as to show that the function of

prajñā can be applied to all dharmas. In this way, the Māhaprajñāpāra-

mitā Sūtra is different from any other sūtra or śāstra which was written

in order to elaborate on a specific ontological system. Such an elabora-

tion usually requires the author to analyze the existence into dharmas,

to see how dharmas are actually originated; the dharmas should be as well-

defined and interrelated as in any good theoretical system. This kind of

elaboration is called by Mou, "analytical" teaching (fen-chiai ti shuo

分解地說). The teaching of the Mahāprajñāpāramita Sūtra is not

"analytical". Although the sūtra mentions many dharmas, it does nothing

to explain, in an "analytical" way, any dharmas. The dharmas which it

mentions have already been explained "analytically" in the previous sūtras

and śāstras. This teaching of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra is called by

Mou, "non-analytical" teaching (fe fen-chial ti shuo).[22]

In Mou's terminology, we may say that those teachings of Shākyamuni's such as the Four Noble Truths, the Five Aggregates, and the Eight Rightful Paths, are "analytical" teachings.[23] These teachings are the early development of an ontological system. The later development of the Hīnayāna is mainly a scholastic elaboration on dharmas. Although different sects of the Hīnayāna had different analyses of dharmas, they all preached "analytical" teachings. The teachings of all Hīnayāna sects, together with the teachings of Shākyamuni's, were regarded by Chih-i as one doctrine (i.e. the Tripitaka Doctrine); in Mou's terminology, they all formed a single ontological system. It is on this basis of the analysis of dharmas developed by the Sarvāstivādins of the Hīnayāna, that the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra develops its own teaching.[24] However, the teaching of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra itself is not an ontological system, for the sūtra does not accept the Sarvāstivādin theory of dharmas, which, as an ontological theory, deals with the problem of existence. The concern of the sūtra is not with the existence of dharmas at all, i.e. it does not deal with the problem how dharmas are actually originated; the concern of the sūtra is only with the ultimate reality of dharmas. The sūtra mentions the dharmas of the Sarvāstivāda School in order to show that the ultimate reality of every dharma is emptiness. Emptiness as the ultimate reality can only be understood through seeing that every dharma is devoid of all kinds of relativity, i.e. seeing the indeterminate nature of every dharma. This practice is described elegantly by the sūtra itself as "explaining the ultimate reality of dharmas without destruction of their provisional existences." (不壞假名而說諸法實相).[25]

Being provisional existences, all dharmas are determinates, but the ultimate reality of them is emptiness.

The Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra mentions dharmas in order to show that the function of prajñā can be applied to all dharmas without exception. This attitude of the sūtra towards dharmas, in Mou's opinion, is one of the most important characteristics of the sūtra.[26] In order to make this point clear, Mou quotes from the sūtra a long list of what all dharmas consist of.[27] Here, we see that the sūtra does not mention dharmas for the sake of introducing any ontological theory on the existence of dharmas; the long list is only a Buddha's answer to the inquiry as to what dharmas consist of. The Buddha recommended that bodhisattvas and mahāsattvas should learn and understand the unimpeded nature (無礙相)[28] in every dharma of the list. Having given the list of all dharmas, the Buddha recommended once again that bodhisattvas and mahāsattvas should not cling to all dharmas, which are empty of self-character (自相空),[29] and that bodhisattvas should understand the non-dual nature (不二相) of all dharmas.[30]

From the above selections of what Mou has quoted from the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, we see that the sūtra preaches the doctrine of emptiness, using the following different but synonymous phrases: "the absolute reality" (一相), "the indeterminate nature" (無相), "the ultimate reality of dharmas" (諸法實相), "the unimpeded nature" (無礙相), and "the non-dual nature" (不二相). According to Mou, the reason that the sūtra mentions all those dharmas one by one is to show that all dharmas without exception are empty, as implied by the above-mentioned phrases.[31] Mou even claims that all the ninety chapters of the

sūtra were written in order to preached the emptiness of all dharmas.[32]

If we have an insight into this truth of emptiness, we shall not cling

to any dharmas. This is what Mou means by tang-hsiang chien-chih, which

is the skillful function of prajñā.

The reason why Mou regards the function of prajñā as skillful is

also revealed by the above analysis. With prajñā we shall not cling to

any dharmas (不著), but at the same time, with prajñā we shall not

abandon any dharmas (不捨).[33] Although this function of non-clinging

yet non-abandonment sounds paradoxical, it is necessary for one to gain

enlightenment; therefore, it can be described as skillful. The warning

against abandonment of any dharmas is implied in the Buddha's claim that

he explained the ultimate reality of dharmas without destruction of their

provisional existences (不壞假名).

In order to illustrate this skillfulness of prajñā, Mou has quoted

long passages from the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra,[34] amongst which the

following can best illustrate the point:

> Bodhisattvas and mahāsattvas should understand [dharmas]
> in the following context: all dharmas are but provisional
> existences. [They] should learn prajñāpāramitā in this
> manner. Kauśikah! [If] bodhisattvas and mahāsattvas
> learn [rūpa (matter)] in such a way, [then they] don't
> learn [substantiality from] rūpa; [in the same manner,
> they] don't learn [substantiality from] vedanā (sensations),
> sañña (perceptions), samkhāra (mental formations) and
> viññāna (consciousness). Why [do they not learn substan--
> tiality from these five aggregates]? [They do not learn
> it because they] can't find [any other] rūpa [than pro-
> visional existence] to be learned; [they do not learn it
> because they] can't find [any other] vedenā, samkhāra,
> and viññāna [than provisional existences] to be learned.
> [If] bodhisattvas and mahāsattvas learn [dānapāramitā
> (generosity)] in such a way, [then they] don't learn
> [substantiality from] dānapāramitā. Why [do they do not
> learn substantiality from dānapāramitā]? [They do not
> it because they] can't find [any other] dānapāramitā

> [than provisional existence] to be learned. [By the
> same argument, we can] even [say that bodhisattvas
> and mahāsattvas] don't learn [substantiality from]
> prajñāpāramitā [itself]. Why [do they not learn sub-
> stantiality from prajñāpāramitā]? [They do not learn
> it because they] can't find [any other] prajñāpāramitā
> [than provisional existence] to be learned. [35]

This passage makes it clear that to learn prajñāpāramitā, is to understand

that all dharmas are but provisional existences, i.e. to underatnd that

all dharmas are empty. Therefore, we don't learn substantiality from

dharmas; we can't find any other dharmas than provisional existences to

be learned. Even prajñāpāramitā itself is but another provisional

existence; we can't find any other prajñāpāramitā than provisional

existence to be learned. In other words, the sūtra recommends that

bodhisattvas and mahāsattvas should learn prajñāpāramitā in such a way

that they don't learn substantiality from it. Mou describes this way of

learning in an elegant, paradoxical expression: to learn without learning

is the real learning (以 不學學, 是之為學). [36] This paradox also

illustrates the skillfulness of prajña. If we don't learn substantiality

from any dharmas, we shall not cling to any dharmas. However, the learn-

ing itself is necessary for one to gain enlightenment; this means that

one must not abandon dharmas. All those dharmas which one learn do him

no harm so far as he understands them as provisional existences.

In summary, Mou sees the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra as a sūtra

which preaches the skillful function of prajña. Prajña functions in such

a way so as to give an insight into the emptiness of dharmas and thus

enables one to be free from clinging to dharmas. The function is skillful

in that one need not abandon any dharma, even though one does not cling

to it. In order to show that this skillful function of prajña can be

applied to all dharmas without exception, the sūtra mentions all dharmas

one by one. The sūtra mentions those dharmas not for the sake of

establishing any ontological system, thus it does nothing to explain, in

an "analytical" way, any dharmas. The sūtra just mentions those dharmas

which have been explained "analytically" in the previous sūtras and

sastras, in orderto show that the ultimate reality of all dharmas is

emptiness. This kind of teaching which mentions dharmas without any

"analytical" explanation, is called by Mou "non-analytical" teaching.

Since the concern of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra is not with the existence

of dharmas but with the ultimate reality of dharmas, the sūtra can use

any dharmas available, any dharmas having been explained "analytically"

in an ontological system, to show that the ultimate reality of these

dharmas is emptiness. Historically, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras began to

develop at thetime when the Sarvāstivāda School was popular. The Mahā-

prajñāpāramitā Sūtra thus mentions mainly the dharmas in the ontological

system of the Sarvāstivāda School. It does not mean that the sūtra

accepts this ontological system as such, and that the sūtra agress with

the specific analysis of dharmas as established in this ontological system.

The sūtra only shows that the skillful function of prajñā can be applied

to all the dharmas in this ontological system. If any ontological system

other than that of the Sarvāstivāda School exists, it may also show that

the skillful function of prajñā can be applied to all dharmas of this

other ontological system. In this sense, the teaching of prajñā is the

Common Doctrine. Becauseof this attitude of the sūtra towards an on-

tological system (in the present case, towards the ontological system of

the Sarvāstivāda School), the sūtra does not identify itself with any

ontological system, and the sūtra can thus not by itself distinguish

one ontological system from another.[37]

Mou disagrees with Chih-i's distinction between the Common

Prajñā and the Non-common Prajñā. Chih-i saw the Common Prajñā as the

prajñā which the Two Vehicles of the Shared Doctrine share with the

followers of Tripitaka Doctrine, and the Non-common Prajñā as the prajñā

which the bodhisattvas of the Shared Doctrine share with the followers

of the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines. However, this distinction,

in Mou's opinion, cannot be justified. The teaching of prajñā does not

identify itself with any ontological system. In other words, there is no

Non-common Prajñā, as conceived by Chih-i, which can be identified with

an ontological system as the Distinctive Doctrine or as the Complete

Doctrine. There is no Non-common Prajñā which advances an ontological

theory on the existence of dharmas as the concept Tathāgatagarbha

[Replete with] Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges [Alias]

Buddha-nature, does.[38] There is also no Common Prajñā, as conceived by

Chih-i, which can be identified with an ontological system as the Tripitaka

Doctrine. The Common Prajñā can only be regarded as a prajñā whose skill-

ful function is to be applied to the Tripitaka Doctrine. The Non-common

Prajñā can only be regarded as a prajñā whose skillful function is to

be applied to the Shared, Distinctive and Complete Doctrines. This uni-

versality of the skillful function of prajñā allows the application of

prajñā to all ontological systems, and clearly suggests that the teaching

of prajñā is only a common doctrine.

C. Prajñā as a Non-controversial and "Non-analytical" Teaching

Non-controversial character is an implication of any common

doctrine. If people raise controversies about a doctrine, they will not

accept it unanimously. In order to maintain his thesis on prajñā as a

common doctrine, Mou argues that the teaching of prajñā is a teaching

of non-controversy. The non-controversial character of prajñā has been

pointed out by Chih-i, who quoted statements in the Ta-chih-tu lun which

were against the Tripitaka Doctrine, "The other sūtras preach controversial

teaching; the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras preach non-controversial teaching."[39]

However, Chih-i also followed the opinion of the Ta-chih-tu lun and said

that the Buddha had never preached any controversial teaching, and that

the controversies about any teaching of the Buddha's were raised by those

sentient beings who misunderstood the teaching and clung to it.[40] If that

is the case, how can we distinguish the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras from the

other sūtras? Upon what grounds can we say that the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras

preach non-controversial teaching and the other sūtras preach controversial

teaching? Can sentient beings also misunderstand Buddha's teaching of

prajñā and therefore cling to prajñā? As mentioned already, the

Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra is fully aware that sentient beings may cling to

prajñāpāramitā, and thus gives a warning that they cannot find any other

prajñāpāramitā than provisional existence to be learned. Then why don't

we call the teaching of prajñā a controversial teaching? These questions

indicate that we cannot distinguish between controversial and non-

controversial teachings only by the criterion of whether or not sentient

beings misunderstand them and cling to them. The real criterion must lie

in the objective teachings themselves; it must not lie in the subjective

attitude of sentient beings. Although he was not fully aware of this pro-

blem of criterion, the author of the Ta-chih-tu lun pointed out,

> This [teaching of] prajñāpāramitā is non-
> controversial, because [it preaches that] dharmas

> are ultimately empty. If the Ultimate Emptiness
> (pi-ching k'ung 畢竟空) is attainable and
> controversial, it cannot be called the Ultimate
> Emptiness 41

The Ultimate Emptiness is one of the eighteen ways of describing emptiness.

It emphasizes the idea of all dharmas being absolutely empty, including

the emptiness itself.[42] In this way, the author of the Ta-chih-tu lun

seemed to argue that the teaching of prajñaparamita was non-controversial

because its teaching on emptiness itself had implied a warning against

clinging to any dharmas as the source of controversies. It seems that

Chih-i agreed with this argument. Chih-i said that in the Tripitaka

Doctrine the Buddha preached only the simple teaching, whereas in the

Shared Doctrine he preached that all dharmas are but provisional existences,

i.e. all dharmas are without substantiality. The teaching, as preached

in the Tripitaka Doctrine, is easily misunderstood by sentient beings,

whereas the teaching of emptiness is less liable to be misunderstood.[43]

This argument seems to suggest that the teaching of prajña warns that

even emptiness itself is but a provisional existence, and that because

of this warning against clinging to any dharmas as the source of controver-

sies implied in the teaching of prajña itself, the teaching is thus non-

controversial. Following this argument, we may say that the Tripitaka

Doctrine would have become less controversial if the Buddha had given

a warning against any possible clinging of dharmas. This inference con-

cerning the Tripitaka Doctrine in a conditional statement raises no problem.

However, if we apply this argument to the Distinctive Doctrine, we will

find a serious problem. For example, the Yogacara School has integrated

the teaching of emptiness, as developed by the early Mahayana, into its

doctrine.[44] Can we thus say that the Distinctive Doctrine is non-

controversial? If so, on what ground can we think that the non-

controversial Distinctive Doctrine is inferior to any other doctrines

such as the Complete Doctrine.

Mou is fully aware of the problem of the criterion which distin-

guishes non-controversial teachings from controversial teachings. He

argues that controversies are inherent in any sutras which the Buddha

preached in an "analytical" way, and that the Prajñāpāramitā Sutras

which were preached in a "non-analytical" way are non-controversial.

This distinction between an "analytical" teaching (fen-chiai ti shuo)

and a "non-analytical" teaching (fei fen-chiai ti shuo) is very important

to the understanding of Mou's modified system of the Classification of

Doctrines. Mou considers both of the Common and Complete Doctrines to

be "non-analytical" teachings and thus non-controversial, while he con-

siders the other Doctrines in his modified system to be "analytical"

teachings and thus controversial. Mou's conception of the "non-analytical"

teaching is inspired by the Ta-chih-tu lun. Before we examine Mou's

conception of "non-analytical" teaching, we should examine a passage

which Mou quotes from the Ta-chih-tu lun:

> ... Also, in the other sutras [the Buddha] often preaches
> by various three-entrances, [e.g.] the so called the
> good entrance, evil entrance, and morally neutral
> entrance. Now, [the Buddha] wants to preach that the
> [ultimate] reality of dharmas belongs to neither the good
> entrance, nor the evil entrance, nor the morally neutral
> entrance, [i.e. all the determinates of these three
> entrances are conceptual constructions],[45] therefore [he]
> preaches the Mahaprajñāpāramitā Sutra. The dharmas of
> learning, the dharmas of beyond learning, the dharmas
> of neither learning nor beyond learning; the dharmas
> of eliminating false views, the dharmas of eliminating
> wrong attitudes, the dharmas of non-elimination; visible
> and perceptible [dharmas], invisible and perceptible
> [dharmas], invisible and imperceptible [dharmas];
> upper dharmas, middle dharmas, lower dharmas; small

dharms, large dharmas, innumerous dharmas; etc.; all these three-entrances of dharmas are [preached in] the same [way in the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra which considers them to be conceptual constructions]. Also, in the other sutras [the Buddha] preaches to śravakas about the four types of meditation which eliminate false views. According to this [teaching], monks contemplate the thirty-six constituents of the inner body, and overcome weaknesses such as desire and greed. In the same way [they] contemplate the outer body, and the inner-and-outer body. Now, [the Buddha] wants to preach the four types of meditation which eliminate false views in a dissimilar entrance of dharmas, therefore [he] preaches the [Maha]prajñaparamita Sutra. [In this sutra the Buddha] preaches that bodhisattvas contemplate the inner body [in such a way that they] gain no contemplation of the body, [and that there is] no attainment of the body, because there is nothing [substantial] to be attained. In the same way [that bodhisattvas] contemplate the outer body, and the inner-and-outer body, [they] gain no contemplation of the body, [and they] don't attain the body, because there is nothing [substantial] to be attained. It is difficult for the [bodhisattvas] to gain no contemplation of the body during meditation on the body. [What we have said about meditation on the body can] also be applied to the other three types of meditation which eliminate false views. The four right efforts, the four bases of supernatural power, the four meditations, the four noble truths, etc., all these four-entrances of dharmas are [preached in] the same [way in the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra, which considers them to be conceptual constructions]. Also, in the other sutras the Buddha preaches that the five aggregates are impermanent, sorrowful, empty, and non-substantial. Now, [the Buddha] wants to preach the five aggregates in a dissimilar entrance of dharmas, therefore [he] preaches [Maha]prajñaparamita Sutra. For instance, the Buddha tells Subhuti, "If bodhisattvas contemplate that matter is impermanent, [they will] not get prajñaparamita. [If they contemplate that] sensations, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness are impermanent, [they will] not get prajñaparamita. [If they contemplate that] matter is impermanent, [they will] not get prajñaparamita. [If they contemplate that] sensations, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness are impermanent, [they will] not get prajñaparamita." The five sensations, five worlds of sentient beings, etc., all of these five-entrances of dharmas are [preached in] the same [way in the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra, which considers them to be thought-constructions]. The other six [-entrances], seven[-entrances], eight[-entrances], and even the innumerous-entrances, etc., are [preached in] the same [way in the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra which considers them to be conceptual constructions].46

In the above quotation, the author of the Ta-chih-tu lun clearly points

out that the teachings in the other sūtras are preached in such a way

that the dharmas are grouped into three-entrances, four-entrances, five-

entrances, six-entrances, seven-entrances, eight-entrances, or even

innumerous-entrances, and that the teaching of prajñā in the Mahāprajñā-

pāramitā Sutrā is preached in a dissimilar entrance of dharmas (i fa-men

異法門). Mou calls the method by which the dharmas are grouped into

numerous entrances, the "analytical" method,[47] and the dissimilar entrance

of dharmas, i.e. the method which is dissimilar to this "analytical"

method, the "non-analytical" method.[48] Mou argues that controversies

are inherent in whatever teaching which is preached in an "analytical"

way, because all analyses have limitations and the alternative analyses

always exist. Since we can always find alternatives to an analysis, none

of the analyses are necessarily true; therefore, we can always raise con-

troversies about those analyses.[49] Mou thus points out that the real

criterion, by which we distinguish a controversial teaching from a non-

controversial teaching, does not lie in the subjective clinging of sentient

beings to dharmas, but lies in the objective teachings themselves, whether

there are "analytical" or "non-analytical". If a teaching is "analytical",

it is controversial in principle. The clinging to dharmas as if they were

substantial only makes the controversies more sticky.[50]

In order to clarify his points about the "analytical" teaching

and "non-analytical" teaching, Mou comments on what the Ta-chih-tu lun

says about the "dissimilar entrance of dharmas":

> In the case [where the Buddha] preaches [in the
> other sūtras] about three-entrances, [he] explains
> "analytically" good dharmas, evil dharmas, and morally

neutral dharmas, [he] tells us how dharmas are
good, how dharmas are evil, and how dharmas
are morally neutral. All of these are expedient
teachings, which cannot be taken to be ultimately
true. Now, [in] the [Maha]prajñaparamita Sutra
[the Buddha] does not preach in this way; [in] it
[the Buddha] only mentions those dharmas which have
been "analytically" explained [in the other sutras]
and points out the ultimate reality of them. The
ultimate reality is neither good, nor evil, nor
morally neutral. [In] this sutra [the Buddha] wants
to preach "the ultimate reality of dharmas, which
belongs to neither the good entrance, nor the evil
entrance; nor the morally neutral entrance."
"Neither the good entrance" implies that there is no
[substantial] dharma in the good entrance to be
attained. "Nor the evil entrance" implies that
there is no [substantial] dharma in the evil entrance
to be attained. "Nor the morally neutral entrance"
implies that there is no [substantial] dharma in the
morally neutral entrance to be attained. Unattain-
ability, non-possession, and ultimate emptiness are
descriptions of the ultimate reality of dharmas.
The ultimate reality [of dharmas] is not a determinate;
this [indeterminate nature of dharmas] is its quiescent
nature. This is what [the Buddha in] the [Maha]prajna-
paramita Sutra wants to preach, and it is preached in
a "dissimilar entrance of dharmas." Also in the case
[where the Buddha] preaches in the other sutras about
the four types of meditation which eliminate false
views, [he] tells us in an "analytical" way how to con-
template the consciousness, and how to contemplate
dharmas. Now, [in] the [Maha]prajñaparamita Sutra
[the Buddha] does not preach in this way. [In] this
sutra [the Buddha] preaches the four types of meditation
which eliminate false views, in order to make it clear
that the body is unattainable, that sensations are
unattainable, that consciousness is unattainable, and
that dharmas are unattainable. The prupose of this is to
preach the four types of meditation at a higher level,
i.e. to be preached in a "dissimilar entrance of dharmas."
Also in the case [where the Buddha] preaches in the other
sutras in an "analytical" way, that five aggregates
are impermanent, sorrowful, empty, and non-substantial,
[he] explains directly the meanings of [these] dharmas.
Now, [in] the [Maha]prajñaparamita Sutra [the Buddha]
does not preach in this way. [In] this sutra [the Buddha]
preaches five aggregates, in order to make it clear that
both permanence and impermanence are unattainable, that
both sorrow and non-sorrow are unattainable, that both
emptiness and non-emptiness are unattainable, and that

both substantiality and non-substantiality are
unattainable. If [one sees that] either aspect
is attainable, while insisting that five aggregates
are either permanent or impermanent, [one] does not
get prajñaparamita. This is also a way to preach
five aggregates at a higher level, i.e. [they are]
preached in a "dissimilar entrance of dharmas."
In the other casss [where the Buddha] preaches in
six-entrances, seven-entrances, eight-entrances,
[he] preaches the other sutras in an "analytical"
way, and the [Maha]prajñaparamita Sutra in a
"dissimilar entrance of dharmas." 51

In the above comment, Mou emphasizes that the "dissimilar entrance of

dharmas" of the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra (i.e. a "non-analytical"

teaching) is at a higher level than the three-, four-, five-entrances,

etc. of the other sutras (i.e. an "analytical" teaching). What he means

by "a higher level", in the terminology of logic, is that the teaching

of the other sutras is a teaching of the first order, and that the

teaching of prajña is a teaching of the second order.[52] By Mou's own

analogy, we may say that the former is like a process of eating and the

latter a process of digesting.[53] This analogy suggests two important

points. First, without eating there is no digesting; this suggests that

a "non-analytical" teaching must take some dharmas, which have been ex-

plained as definite concepts in an "analytical" teaching, as raw food to

digest. Second, food must be digested before it can contribute to our

health; this suggests that the dharmas of an "analytical" teaching must

be seen as non-substantial before they can contribute to our enlighten-

ment. This second point is well illustrated by the example of the four

types of meditation which eliminate false views. The concern of the

Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra is not to explain how to contemplate the body,

the sensations, the consciousness, and dharmas, but to point out that

there is nothing substantial in either the body, the sensations, the consciousness, or dharmas to be attained. One of the main themes of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra is to point out that the ultimate reality of all dharmas, which have been explained in an "analytical" teaching, is emptiness.

In order to point out that the ultimate reality of all dharmas is emptiness, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra usually expresses this truth in paradoxes, which Mou considers to be a main feature of a "non-analytical" teaching.[54] When the Buddha instructs bodhisattvas to contemplate the body is such a way that they gain no contemplation of the body, a paradox is implied in this instruction. As we have seen from a quotation in the last section, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra recommends that bodhisattvas learn prajñāpāramitā in such a way that they don't learn substantiality from any dharmas including prajñāpāramitā itself. Mou describes this way of learning in a paradox: to learn without learning is the real learning. Another paradox in the sūtra which has the same meaning is: to abide with prajñāpāramitā without abiding with any dharmas [including prajñāpāramitā itself].[55] This view of non-abiding reminds us of the Daimond Sūtra which is full of paradoxes.[56] The Daimond Sūtra also says, "What the Buddha preaches as prajñāpāramitā is not prajñāpāramitā."[57] All these paradoxes must be understood in the context that the teaching of prajñā mentions dharmas in order to show that they are unattainable and empty.

D. Prajñā as a Teaching of the Functional Repleteness

In Mou's evaluation of the teaching of prajñā, a very important
and original point is that Mou finds a new usage for the term yüan
(complete) when he uses it to describe the teaching of prajñā. Being
a non-controversial teaching, the doctrine of prajñā can be regarded as
a common doctrine; the skillful function of prajñā can be applied to all
dharmas without exception. This universal application suggests the
meaning of all-inclusiveness, which is generally regarded as a meaning
of the Chinese word "yüan". Chih-i defined yüan in the meaning of re-
pleteness, which has developed into the concept "nature-repleteness" as
the main content of the Complete Doctrine.[58] Repleteness is a synonym
for all-inclusiveness. Therefore, Mou also sees repleteness as a
characteristic of the teaching of prajñā. However, since Mou thinks that
the teaching of prajñā and the Complete Doctrine have different concerns,
the former is concerned with the ultimate reality of dharmas whereas the
latter is concerned with the existence of dharmas, he makes a distinction
between the repleteness of prajñā and the Nature-repleteness by coining
two terms "Functional Repleteness" (tso-yung ti yüan-chü 作用的圓具)
and "Ontological Repleteness" (tsun-yu-lun ti yüan-chü 存有論的圓具)
for them respectively.[59]

To see repleteness as a characteristic of the teaching of prajñā
is not an innovation of Mou's. In the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, the fifth
section of the first chapter of the first part entitled "Prajñā Replete
with All Dharmas" begins with a quotation from the Mahāprajñāpāramitā
Sūtra:

> The Buddha told Śāriputra, "Bodhisattvas and mahāsattvas
> abide with prajñāpāramitā without abiding with any dharmas.

> [However, they] don't abandon any dharmas. [They
> should] be replete with dānaparamitā (generosity),
> because neither the giver, nor the receiver, nor
> the charity is attainable. Because neither evilness
> nor non-evilness is attainable, [they] should be
> replete with śilaparamitā (moral conduct). Because
> the mind is unmoved, they should be replete with
> ksāntiparamitā (patience). Because the body and
> mind never get tired and lazy, [bodhisattvas] should
> be replete with vīryaparamitā (energy). Because
> [the mind] is neither wandering nor making distinction
> among the objects of contemplation,[60] [they should be
> replete with dhyānaparamitā (meditation). Because
> [they] cling to no dharmas, [they] should be replete with
> prajñaparamitā. Bodhisattvas and mahāsattvas abide
> with prajñaparamitā without abiding with any dharmas.
> Because [they] don't [see that dharmas] originate [as
> something with substantiality], [they] should be replete
> with the four types of meditation which eliminate false
> views, with the four right efforts, with the four bases
> of supernatural power, with the five sense-organs, with
> the five moral powers, with the seven characteristics of
> enlightenment, with the eight noble paths, ... 61.

The above passage continues with a list of dharmas. Although the list

may not be complete, the passage clearly indicates that to be replete

with all dharmas is a function of prajñā. Based on the authority of the

Mahāprajñāparamitā Sūtra, Mou uses the term yüan with its connotation of

repleteness to describe the teaching of prajñā. This passage also indi-

cates the character of the repleteness of prajñā, which we can easily

tell is different from that of the Nature-repleteness. The Nature-

repleteness is a theory of the T'ien-t'ai School, which explains the

existence of all dharmas. This repleteness is a repleteness in the

ontological sense. However, the repleteness of prajñā only means that

with prajñā one does not abandon any dharmas, nor does one abide with

any dharmas. This non-abandonment and non-abiding of any dharmas is

only a subjective attitude which one has towards dharmas, and it has

nothing to do with any objective ontological theory on dharmas. The

function of prajñā is to show that the ultimate reality of all dharmas without exception is emptiness. This all-inclusiveness implies a meaning of repleteness. Based on this difference between the repleteness of prajñā and the Nature-repleteness, Mou coins the terms "Functional Repleteness" and "Ontological Repleteness".

Mou understands the repleteness of prajñā not only in its quantitative meaning as all-inclusiveness, but also in its qualitative meaning as accomplishment (ch'eng chiu 成就).[62] That means, prajñā not only points out the emptiness of ALL dharmas, but also functions in a way that with prajñā one can ACCOMPLISH every dharma. The qualitative meaning of repleteness as accomplishment, as implied in the above-quoted passage, is even more important than the quantitative meaning of repleteness as all-inclusiveness. In the above passage, the Buddha tried to include all dharmas, and this suggests that he saw all-inclusiveness as a meaning of repleteness, but he didn't list these dharmas only for the sake of showing the all-inclusiveness of prajñā. The main reason why the Buddha listed these dharmas such as dānapāramitā, śilapāramitā, kṣāntipāramitā, etc. one by one, is to show that if one abides with prajñāpāramitā without abiding with each of these dharmas, he will be replete with each of these dharmas. This repleteness with each dharma, in Mou's opinion, is the accomplishment of each dharma due to the function of prajñā. Thus, the repleteness with dānapāramitā means the accomplishment of dānapāramitā; the repleteness with śilapāramitā means the accomplishment of śilapāramitā; the repleteness with kṣāntipāramitā means the accomplishment of kṣāntipāramitā, etc.

What does Mou mean by saying that with prajñā one can accomplish dharmas? To put the question more specifically: In what way does prajñā function so that with it one accomplish dharmas? And what does the

accomplishment of a dharma mean? The answer would be that prajñā

functions in such a way that with it one neither cling to any dharmas

nor does one abandon any dharmas. Although non-clinging is generally

regarded as the principal function of prajñā, the idea of non-abandonment

is also crucial to the understanding of the accomplishment of a dharma.

To accomplish a dharma actually means that the dharma help one to gain

enlightenment. Since all dharmas, as we   will see, can be helpful for

one to gain enlightenment, one need not abandon any dharmas.

However, the above-quoted passage seems to emphasize the idea

of non-abiding or non-clinging more than the idea of non-abandonment,

which is mentioned only once. This emphasis is clearly seen in the

corresponding commentary in the Ta-chih-tu lun. In the corresponding

passage,[63] the Ta-chih-tu lun only makes comments on the former idea, but

not on the latter idea. However, Mou sees both of these ideas as equally

important to the understanding of the repleteness of prajñā.[64] In order

to make his view clear, Mou quotes another passage from the Ta-chih-tu

lun:

> The reason why [one does] not abandon [any dharmas]
> is that all dharmas can help [one to gain enlightenment].
> [The reason why one does] not accept [any dharmas]
> is that the ultimate reality of all dharmas is emptiness;
> [there is] no [dharma] to be attained, therefore one
> does not accept any dharmas. Also, [even] all [dharmas
> as] defilements and kleśa are upside down and illusive;
> [still one does] not abandon [dharmas], only because
> [one] understands that all dharmas are as such, and
> that the indeterminate nature [of all dharmas] is [their]
> ultimate reality, and that none [of the dharmas] are
> memorable. This is called bodhisattva's pāramitā of
> non-acceptance and non-abandonment, and [this is also]
> called prajñāpāramitā.... 65

The non-acceptance (pu-sou 不受) in this passage denotes the same idea

as non-abiding and non-clinging. The last statement clearly characterizes prajñaparamita as a wisdom with which one neither clings to any dharmas, nor abandons any dharmas. Both non-abandonment and non-clinging are equally important to the function of prajña with which one can gain enlightenment. Although the combination of non-abandonment and non-clinging sounds paradoxical, these two ideas supplement each other and this combination fully explains how one can accomplish any dharmas with prajñaparamita.

At first sight, the teaching of prajña emphasizes the idea of non-clinging. Throughout the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra the Buddha instructed his followers to understand that all dharmas are empty. This understanding enables one to be free from clinging to any dharmas, which is a necessary condition for the gaining of enlightenment. However, the idea of non-abandonment, though it is not emphasized as much as the idea of non-clinging, is also important to the understanding of the function of prajña. Its importance lies in the fact that it can supplement the idea of non-clinging by giving a warning against the misunderstanding of the idea of non-clinging. People might misunderstand the idea of non-clinging and thus consider moral nihilism to be a teaching as implied in the doctrine of emptiness. In order to warn against this moral nihilism, the teaching of prajña sometimes also emphasizes the idea of non-abandonment. That means, morality cannot come from nowhere, and it must begin through the practice of some dharmas. In order to gain enlightenment, one has to practice some dharmas such as six paramitas, i.e. one cannot abandon all dharmas. Furthermore, one need not abandon any dharmas, for none of the dharmas do one any harm so long as one understands them

as provisional existences. This shows that the idea of non-clinging also supplements the idea of non-abandonment. As pointed out by the above quotation from the Ta-chih-tu lun, all dharmas can help one to gain enlightenment. It is in the sense that a dharma enables one to gain enlightenment that the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra says that one is replete with this dharma. But a dharma can only be helpful to one who is trying to gain enlightenment, so long as one sees it as a provisional existence and thus does not cling to it. To accomplish a dharma means that one understands the ultimate reality of the dharma, i.e. without denying its status as provisional existence which can be helpful for one to gain enlightenment.[66]

II. MOU'S CONCEPTION OF THE SHARED DOCTRINE

According to Chih-i, Prajña and ti fa k'ung are the main contents of the Shared Doctrine. However, Mou sees both of them as the contents of what he calls the Common Doctrine. In the last section, we have seen the reasons why Mou sees prajña as a common doctrine. In this section, we will discuss Mou's conception of ti fa k'ung and his new definition of the Shared Doctrine.

A. Ti Fa K'ung as Preached in the Middle Treatise

Chih-i considered ti fa k'ung to be a main content of the Shared Doctrine. He also said that in the Shared Doctrine the Buddha preached that, because of conditioned-origination, all dharmas as such are empty.[67] That means, ti fa k'ung is a view in which one sees emptiness directly in every phenomena by understanding the principle of conditioned-origination.

Thus, we can see ti fa k'ung as a teaching which is preached in Nāgārjuna's

Middle Treatise. In the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, Mou devotes the second

chapter of the first part to the analysis of this view of emptiness in

the Middle Treatise.

A study of the Middle Treatise will show that the way Nāgārjuna

expounded the idea of emptiness was very different from the method used

in hsi fa k'ung, by which the Hīnayānists understood emptiness through

the analysis of dharmas. The trick of hsi fa k'ung is to analyze a

dharma into its component dharmas, and to show that since this dharma is

conditioned by its component dharmas, it is a dharma without substantiality.

In order to get rid of the idea of substantiality at this level, some

Hīnayānists further analyzed a component dharma into its own sub-component

dharmas. This process of analysis can continue for a while, but must

stop eventually. Without fully understanding the aim of getting rid of

any idea of substantiality, some Hīnayānists mistook the component dharmas

in the last analysis for something ultimate, for something with substantiality.[68]

This is the reason why Chih-i said that the Four Truths as preached in the

Tripitaka Doctrine have substantiality.[69] The early Mahāyānists strongly

objected to this view of substantiality and expressed their objection

clearly in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras in which they preached that all

dharmas without exception were empty, and that even prajñā itself was

empty. Following this tradition of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, Nāgārjuna

wrote the Middle Treatise. In order to destroy the idea of substantiality

completely, Nāgārjuna no longer employed the same analysis as used by

the Hīnayānists. He tried to show that one could see emptiness directly

in every phenomenon by understanding the principle of conditioned-

origination. That means, the principle of conditioned-origination

implies the idea of emptiness. If one understands emptiness in this way,

one need not analyze dharmas in order to see how dharmas are actually

conditionedly-originated.

If one wants to see how dharmas are actually conditionedly-

originated and thus analyzes dharmas, one must describe dharmas as

phenomena by such concepts as origination, extinction, permanence, de-

struction, identity, differentiation, coming [into being], and going [out

of being].[70] However, these concepts may be misunderstood as the concepts

with substantiality. Nāgārjuna saw that all these concepts were nothing

but conceptual constructions, i.e. all of them were empty.[71] Therefore, in

the beginning of the Middle Treatise, he preached the Eight Negations: non-

origination, non-extinction, non-permanence, non-destruction, non-identity,

non-differentiation, non-coming [into being], and no-going [out of being].[72]

By this eight negations, Nāgārjuna tried to destroy the method of analysis,

and its possible connection with the idea of substantiality at its root.

A question concerning this idea of non-origination arises:

Nāgārjuna always emphasized the idea of conditioned-origination, but he

also preached the idea of non-origination; how could he integrate two

opposite ideas into his doctrine? Was this integration a contradiction

of which Nāgārjuna was not aware? According to Mou, this is not a con-

tradiction, for the denotations of the term origination in these two ideas

are different; actually, the idea of conditioned-origination implies non-

origination.[73] Nāgārjuna's idea of conditioned-origination, in Mou's

opinion, is identical with the idea of emptiness, i.e. the relationship

between these two ideas is analytical, not synthetical.[74] In other words,

the proposition that all conditionedly-originated dharmas are empty is

a tautology. This tautological proposition implies that there is no

dharma which is originated in the way that a thing with substantiality

is supposed to be originated,[75] for the thing with substantiality cannot

be originated at all. Non-origination means that there is no origination

whatever which can be understood in an ultimate, substantial sense, and

that all originations are conditioned-originations.

Mou feels that the identical relationship between conditioned-

origination and emptiness is a key to the understanding of the Middle

Treatise.[76] If one follows Mou's argument, one may say that the main

contribution of the Middle Treatise was to point out this identical

relationship, which had been ignored by some Hīnayānists.[77] Since the

identical relationship between existence (dharmas) and conditioned-

origination was a common knowledge among Buddhists, by pointing out the

identical relationship between conditioned-origination and emptiness,

Nāgārjuna arrived at a very convincing conclusion that all dharmas were

empty. In this way, Nāgārjuna gave a logical structure to the doctrine

of emptiness as developed in the tradition of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras.

The identical relationship between conditioned-origination and

emptiness, in Mou's opinion, is suggested in the following statement of

the Middle Treatise:

> Certainly there is no self-existence of existing
> things in conditioning causes 78

This statement clearly indicates that conditioned-origination implies

emptiness. This implication is also shown in another statement of the

Middle Treatise:

.... Since there is no _dharma_ whatever originating
independently, no _dharma_ whatever exists which is
not empty. 79

However, both of the above-quoted statements only indicate that condi-
tioned-origination implies emptiness; none of them indicate that emptiness
also implies conditioned-origination.[80] That conditioned-origination is
an implication of emptiness seems to be suggested by the following
statements:

When emptiness "works", then everything in
existence "works". If emptiness does not
"work", then all existence does not "work".[81]

Since Buddhists take existence to be identical with conditioned-
origination, we can thus rewrite these statements into: When emptiness
"works", then all conditionedly-originated existence "works". If
emptiness does not "work", then all conditionedly-originated existence
does not "work". In these two rewritten statements, it seems that the
latter indicates that conditioned-origination implies emptiness, where-
as the former indicates that emptiness implies conditioned-origination.[82]

If one understands the general principle that conditioned-
origination and emptiness are identical, one can see emptiness directly
in every _dharma_. One need not see how _dharmas_ are actually conditionedly-
originated in a specific analysis in order to understand the emptiness
of these _dharmas_. For example, one need not analyze the life of sentient
beings into the Twelvefold Conditions of Dependent Origination so as to
understand that there is not substantiality in the life of sentient beings.
Certainly no Buddhists could have objected to the analysis of the Twelve-
fold Conditions of Dependent Origination, for it was one of the basic
teachings preached by Shākyamuni himself. However, the significance of

this analysis lay in the general principle of conditioned-origination
implied in the analysis, not in the specific analysis itself. As a
specific analysis, it might be found unsatisfactory to explain many
phenomena and thus would need further elaboration. In the Hīnayāna,
many elaborations were advanced. All of these analyses should have been
aimed at illustrating the general principle of conditioned-origination,
a principle of getting rid of any idea of substantiality. But some
Hīnayānists, such as the Sarvāstivādins, ignored the principle itself and
mistook some dharmas in a specific elaboration for something with sub-
stantiality. It was under the influence of a new Mahāyānist movement,
which protested against this theory of substantiality, that Nāgārjuna
wrote the Middle Treatise. Nāgārjuna no longer employed the "analytical"
method but instead tried to show that one could see emptiness directly
in every dharmas by understanding the principle of conditioned-origination.
Since some Hīnayānists mistook dharmas in the process of analysis for
something with substantiality, Nāgārjuna set out to destroy any idea of
substantiality as related to these dharmas. In the Middle Treatise,
he thus disconnected the idea of substantiality from the dharmas such as
the six sense organs, the five aggregates, the six realms, etc. The
special method he used for this purpose was simple: he presupposed the
identical relationship between emptiness and conditioned-origination, i.e.
he presupposed that emptiness was an implication in the principle of
conditioned-origination. Form the premise that all dharmas are condi-
tionedly-originated, one draws the necessary conclusion that all dharmas
are empty.[83] Since this premise is a common teaching which has been
accepted by all Buddhists, no Buddhist can reject the conclusion if they

recognize the identical relationship between emptiness and conditioned-origination. The acceptance of the conclusion resulted from an application of ti fa k'ung to dharmas. By this application, Nāgārjuna's doctrine of emptiness became, in Mou's words, "a universal principle, a generalization of Shākyamuni's teachings including the Twelvefold Conditions of Dependent Origination, the impermanence of samkhāra, and the non-substantiality of dharmas."[84]

B. Ti Fa K'ung as the Common Doctrine

According to Mou, the Middle Treatise is mainly an application of ti fa k'ung to different dharmas.[85] Although the dharmas mentioned by Nāgārjuna are very limited, one has no reason for setting a limit for the application of ti fa k'ung to dharmas. In other words, ti fa k'ung as a view of emptiness can be applied to all dharmas. One can thus see it as a common method.[86]

In his modified Classification of Doctrines, Mou considers ti fa k'ung, together with prajñā, to be part of the Common Doctrine, which is different from the four doctrines of ontological systems in that it has a different concern. The concern of the Common Doctrine is not with the existence of dharmas, but with the ultimate reality of dharmas. With prajñā or ti fa k'ung, one can understand that the ultimate reality of dharmas is emptiness. In order to show that all dharmas are empty, one may apply the function of prajñā or the view of ti fa k'ung to every dharma. As a demonstration of ti fa k'ung, the Middle Treatise thus contains many dharmas. According to Mou, Nāgārjuna does not mention dharmas so as to advance an ontological theory concerning the existence of dharmas. The

reason why he mentions such dharmas as the six sense organs, the five

aggregates, and the six realms, etc. is that he wants to disconnect

these dharmas from any idea of substantiality. Therefore, Nāgārjuna's

concern is the ultimate reality; concerning the existence of dharmas,

he only says that they exist because they are conditionedly-originated.

This explanation is only a general Buddhist principle, which tells

nothing about how dharmas are actually originated.[87] This principle

of conditioned-origination as preached in the Middle Treatise is very

different from the theory of conditioned-origination as advanced by the

Yogācāra School, which analyzed the eightfold consciousness in order to

show how all dharmas are conditionedly-originated by ālayavijñāna.[88]

Nāgārjuna doesn't put forward any analysis of his own; in order to point

out all dharmas without exception are empty, he just uses the dharmas

in an analysis available to him. He does not accept any specific analysis.

One cannot identify Nāgārjuna's doctrine of emptiness, ti fa k'ung,

with any ontological system. But ti fa k'ung can be applied to every

ontological systems so as to show that all dharmas in this system are

empty. Because of this universal application, ti fa k'ung can be regarded

as a common doctrine. Also because of Nāgārjuna's use of dharmas without

the acceptance of any specific analysis, ti fa k'ung can be seen as a

"non-analytical" and non-controversial teaching.

As a common doctrine, the view of ti fa k'ung, in Mou's opinion,

has been integrated into several schools and ontological systems. Two

of the Three Characters of the Yogācāra School are correspondent to the

view that all dharmas are conditionedly-originated and thus empty: "the

character of dependence upon others (i-t'a-ch'i hsing 依他起性)"

illustrates the point of conditioned-origination, whereas "the character

of ultimate reality (yüan-ch'êng-shih hsing 圓成實性)" illustrates

the point of emptiness.[89] The doctrine of the Harmonious Mergence of

the Six Forms (liu-hsing yüan-yung 六相圓融), which was advanced by

Fa-tsang of the Hua-yen School, is also all illustration of ti fa k'ung.[90]

The Three Truths of the T'ien-t'ai School is an implication of ti fa

k'ung too.[91]

When Mou says that ti fa k'ung is a common doctrine, he does not

mean that it was actually accepted by all the ontological systems. What

he means is that it can be applied in principle to all the ontological

systems. For example, the Tripitaka Doctrine preaches hsi fa k'ung which

is different from ti fa k'ung. In Mou's opinion, however, ti fa k'ung

is only a development of hsi fa k'ung.[92] Although the methods of these two

views of emptiness are different, one "non-analytical" another "analytical,"

their aims are the same: to see emptiness in conditionedly-originated

dharmas. Ti fa k'ung is a view which makes conditioned-origination a

principle, the principle of getting rid of any idea of substantiality.

However, the followers of the Tripitaka Doctrine were not fully aware

of this principle, although the principle had been implied from the

beginning in Shakyamuni's teaching of the Twelvefold Conditions of

Dependent Origination, in his teaching of the impermanence of samkhara,

and in his teaching of the non-substantiality of dharmas. In the process

of analysis, they might mistake some dharmas for something with sub-

stantiality. They could not see emptiness as a necessary implication of

conditioned-origination and thus could not conclude that all dharmas

without exception were empty. In order to destroy the idea of

substantiality which had been held by some followers of the Tripitaka

Doctrine, the advocates of ti fa k'ung, such as Nāgārjuna, made the

implication of conditioned-origination explicit. Nāgārjuna added

nothing new to this implication. Therefore, we can regarded ti fa k'ung

as a development of hsi fa k'ung, although their methods are quite

different Since ti fa k'ung can fulfill the aim of hsi fa k'ung but is

free from the drawback of hsi fa k'ung, Mou thus follows Chih-i's view

and sees ti fa k'ung as skillful and hsi fa k'ung as awkward. According

to Mou, if the followers of the Tripitaka Doctrine understand the skill-

fulness of ti fa k'ung, they will give up hsi fa k'ung and will integrate

ti fa k'ung into their own ontological system.[93]

C. Mou's Definition of the Shared Doctrine

   According to Chih-i, prajñā and ti fa k'ung are the main contents

of the Shared Doctrine. Now, Mou regards them as the Common Doctrine.

If one agrees with Mou on his conception of the Common Doctrine, can one

then replace the Shared Doctrine with the Common Doctrine? To put the

question more specifically: Can one thus cancel the Shared Doctrine which

might be taken to be an ontological system, as different from the other

ontological systems? Can one thus advance a modified Classification of

Doctrines, in which there are, in Mou's terminology, one Doctrine of

Contemplating Dharmas, i.e. the Common Doctrine, and three Doctrines of

Ontological Systems, i.e. the Tripitaka, the Distinctive, and the Complete

Doctrines?[94]

   This problem of the existence of the Shared Doctrine as a separate

ontological system from other ontological systems, e.g. the Tripitaka

Doctrine, will become clearer to us if we consider the problem of the distinction between the Tripiṭaka Doctrineand the Shared Doctrine, which has come to the notice of Chih-i and Ti-kuan.[95] Ti-kuan is keenly aware of this distinction problem and points out that the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Shared Doctrine are the same in transcending only the Three Realms, and in realizing a Partial Truth of emptiness, etc. These similarities also raise the problem of the status of the Shared Doctrine as a Mahāyānist doctrine. Chih-i, as well as Ti-kuan, sees hsi fa k'ung and ti fa k'ung as the key to distinguishing between the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Shared Doctrine. For them, hsi fa k'ung is awkward and ti fa k'ung is skillful; this difference of the skillfulness in the views of emptiness explains why the Tripiṭaka Doctrine is Hīnayāna and the Shared Doctrine Mahāyāna. Now, if one considers ti fa k'ung to be the Common Doctrine, can one still insist on a Shared Doctrine as an ontological system? If so, how can one make distinction between this Shared Doctrine and the Tripiṭaka Doctrine? How can one justify this Shared Doctrine as a Mahāyānist doctrine?

Before discussing Mou's position concerning the three questions in the last paragraph, we can now, from Mou's viewpoint, easily explain why there are so many similarities between the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Shared Doctrine, as pointed out by Ti-kuan. As mentioned already, the Shared Doctrine as conceived by Chih-i can be identified with the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and the Mādhyamika philosophic system.[96] Mou's analysis has shown that both the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the Middle Treatise mention the dharmas which have been analyzed in the Hīnayāna, i.e. the Tripiṭaka Doctrine. However, the sūtra and the treatise mention these dharmas not for the sake of establishing any ontological

system, but for the sake of preaching emptiness. The main objective of the two texts is to destroy any idea of substantiality, thus they protest against those Hīnayānists who consider dharmas in a specific analysis to be something ultimate. In order to show that all dharmas without exception are empty, the texts examine the dharmas, which have been analyzed in the Hīnayāna, one by one. Because of this examination, the two texts, although they don't analyze dharmas, contain dharmas which have been analyzed. Although the main concern of the two texts is not with the existence of the dharmas, it seems that they contain views concerning the existence of dharmas. Only with the knowledge of the Hīnayānist analyses, the authors of both texts are not aware of the existence of the dharmas beyond the [Three] Realms; they are not aware of the concept of non-emptiness. This limitation of their knowledge explains why the two texts preach mainly the dharmas limited to the [Three] Realms and a Partial Truth.

Although Mou regards prajñā and ti fa k'ung, two of the main contents of the Shared Doctrine, as the Common Doctrine, he does not cancel the Shared Doctrine. He still sees the remaining contents, such as the views concerning the dharmas which are limited to the [Three] Realms as parts of the Shared Doctrine which, along with the Tripitaka, the Distinctive, and the Complete Doctrines, is one of the four ontological systems.[97]

Mou claims that the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra only contains the Common Doctrine, whereas the Middle Treatise contains both the Common Doctrine and the Shared Doctrine.[98] The reasons why he considers the Shared Doctrine to be a content of the Middle Treatise are that the treatise contains only dharmas which are limited to the [Three] Realms,

and that it doesn't contain the concepts of non-emptiness and the Permanency of Buddha-nature.[99] Mou doesn't explain explicitly why he doesn't consider the Shared Doctrine to be a content of the Mahāprajñā-pāramitā Sūtra. Maybe the reason is that in the Mahāprajñāparamitā Sūtra there are the concepts of permanency, joy, self, and purity,[100] four characteristics related to the concept of the Permanency of Buddha-nature.

Since Mou considers ti fa k'ung to be the Common Doctrine and still insists on a Shared Doctrine as an ontological system, people like Ti-kuan may ask Mou two questions, namely, how can he make distinction between the Shared Doctrine and the Tripitaka Doctrine? And how can he justify this Shared Doctrine as a Mahāyānist doctrine? To the first question, Mou has no answer.[101] To the second question, Mou answers in a partly negative way: although he does not deny the teaching of the Middle Treatise as a doctrine of the Mahāyāna, he does not grant it a full status either.[102]

Mou does not think that hsi fa k'ung and ti fa k'ung can be the basis on which one distinguishes between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. For Mou, the reason why some Buddhists are called Hīnayānists is that they don't have great compassion, and that they don't care much about the salvation of others. Therefore, Mou considers only the teachings which are related to the depth of compassion to be the key point used to distinguish the Mahāyāna from the Hīnayāna.[103] According to Mou, if a doctrine preaches only the dharmas limited to the [Three] Realms, the merits which the followers of this doctrine can acquire are also limited to the [Three] Realms, and are thus very limited. This limitation of

merits cannot meet the demand of a bodhisattva who has great compassion.
It is due to this limitation that Mou doesn't allow a full status of
the Mahāyāna to the Shared Doctrine.

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MOU'S CONCEPTION OF PRAJÑĀ IN HIS MODIFIED
      CLASSIFICATION OF DOCTRINES

In his analysis of prajñā as the Common Doctrine, Mou points out
that prajñā is a non-controversial, "non-analytical" teaching, and that
it is a teaching of the Functional Repleteness. These two characteristics
of prajñā are not only important to the understanding of Mou's conception
of prajñā, but also important to the understanding of Mou's modified
system of the Classification of Doctrines in general and his ideal of the
Complete Doctrine in particular.

In Mou's modified system, there are five doctrines: the Common,
the Tripiṭaka, the Shared, the Distinctive, and the Complete Doctrines.
In this list, the first one is the Doctrine of Contemplating Dharmas,
which is very different from the latter four Doctrines of Ontological
Systems.[104] The concern of the Doctrines of Ontological Systems is with
the existence of dharmas, whereas the concern of the Doctrine of Con-
templating Dharmas is with the ultimate reality of dharmas.

According to Mou, the four doctrines of ontological systems
differ in their theories concerning the existence of dharmas based on
their different conceptions of Buddha-nature. The Complete Doctrine is
also different from other three doctrines mainly in that it is "non-
analytical"[105] whereas the other three are "analytical". Concerning the
concept of Buddha-nature, the followers of the Tripiṭake and Shared

Doctrines have not been aware of its connotation as the Tathāgatagarbha

[Replete with] Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges.

The Distinctive and Complete Doctrines preach the teaching of the

Tathāgatagarbha [Replete with] Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of

the Ganges [Alias] Buddha-nature; however, they are different in that

the Distinctive Doctrine preaches the teaching via an "analytical"

method whereas the Complete Doctrine preaches the teaching via a "non-

analytical" method.[106] The Tripitaka, the Shared and the Distinctive

Doctrines are all "analytical" teachings and thus are controversial. The

Complete Doctrine is a "non-analytical" teaching and thus is non-controversial.

Mou's conception of "non-analytical" and non-controversial teaching, as

we have discussed it in this chapter, comes from his understanding of

what the Ta-chih-tu lun says about the teaching of prajñā.

In Mou's opinion, both the Common Doctrine and the Complete

Doctrine are "non-analytical" and non-controversial teachings. Both of

them can be described as yüan (complete) in its connotation of repleteness.

However, Mou considers the Common Doctrine to be a teaching of Functional

Repleteness and the Complete Doctrine to be mainly a teaching of Ontolo-

gical Repleteness. Perhaps it is due to this non-controversial nature

and repleteness that some people regard the Common Doctrine as an ultimate

and perfect teaching.[107] But Mou doesn't consider the Common Doctrine as

really ultimate and perfect teaching, for he finds a limitation in it.

From the viewpoint of the ultimate reality of dharmas, this doctrine may

be taken as an ultimate and perfect teaching; however, this doctrine tells

one nothing about the existence of dharmas, an important concern of

Buddhism.[108]   According to Mou, only the T'ien-t'ai's Complete Doctrine

is the ultimate and perfect teaching, for it combines the Ontological

Repleteness with the Functional Repleteness: the Nature-repleteness is

a teaching of Ontological Repleteness, whereas the Threefold Contemplation

is a teaching of Functional Repleteness.[109]

NOTES

[1]Mou paid little attention to the Five Periods and the Four Methods of Conversion.

[2]Cf. pp. 27-28.

[3]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 11, 9ff. (From now on, the number of line will often be given after the number of page in our references to the works of Mou's.)

[4]Cf. note 34 of Chapter 2.

[5]Ssu-chiao-i, T. 46, 722b, 6.

[6]See Ibid., 768b, 13-14.

[7]The Ta-chih-tu lun mentions at least four times (Cf. note 37 of Chapter 2) that there are two kinds of prajñā: one is the prajñā which the Buddha preached to śrāvakas and the bodhisattvas of lower stages in common, and another is the prajñā which the Buddha preached only to the bodhisattvas of the Tenth Stage. The emphasis is on the capacities of the audience. Except for this difference in the capacities, we cannot find any other significant differences in the teaching itself, not to mention a Non-common Prajñā with the connotation of non-emptiness. If the difference in the capacities of the audience can be taken as a basis for differentiating prajñā, one may argue that there are more than two kinds of prajñā, since these capacities can be divided into more than two kinds. Complying with this argument, the Ta-chih-tu lun, T. 25, 754b, 23-26, says: "There are two kinds of prajñā. 1. The prajñā which the Buddha preached to [the bodhisattvas of the lower stages] and śrāvakas in common. 2. The prajñā which the Buddha preached to the bodhisattvas of the Tenth Stage; this is the prajñā which even the bodhisattvas of the Ninth Stage did not hear, let alone the bodhisattvas who just developed the bodhicitta. Moreover, the bodhisattvas from the First Stage to the Ninth Stage were all different in the level of the understanding of prajñā. The general aspect of prajñā is the same but prajñā can be differentiated in terms of depth." This passage clearly indicates that the Common Prajñā and the Non-common Prajñā are only two indefinite, indeterminate concepts in the Ta-chih-tu lun. Moreover, one cannot find non-emptiness in the sense of the Tathāgatagarbha [Replete With] Buddha-dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges [Alias] Buddha-nature in the Ta-chih-tu lun. Therefore, when Chih-i

claimed that he used the Ta-chih-tu lun as the authority for his own conception of the Non-common Prajñā, actually he read the connotation of emptiness into the text.

[8]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 11, 17-18; p. 180, 3ff.

[9]One may add many other Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and the śāstras of the Mādhyamika, to the list of the important texts which deal with the teachings of prajñā and emptiness. However, these three scriptures have been generally recognized as among the most important ones. As pointed out by Chan-jan, Chih-i's system is also partly based on the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the Ta-chih-tu lun (See Chih-kuan i-li, T. 46, 452c, 28-29). Unless we find passages in other texts which can much better support or can invalidate his arguments, we have no reason to object to Mou's dependence on these three texts only.

[10]As we will see in the next two sections, the "analytical" teaching and the "non-analytical" teaching are Mou's own terminology. For Mou, "analytical" teaching is controversial whereas the "non-analytical" teaching in non-controversial. However, for those who are familiar with the Western philosophy, the term analytical reminds them of analytical proposition which is necessarily true and thus non-controversial. In order to avoid the possible confusion, this thesis will use quotation marks for Mou's terms analytical and non-analytical.

[11]For Ti-kuan, as discussed on pp. 31-32, the Tripitaka and Shared Doctrines have many similarities, whereas the main point to distinguish them is hsi fa k'ung and ti fa k'ung. If Mou takes ti fa k'ung out of the Shared Doctrine, the problem of the existence of the Shared Doctrine as a separate doctrine from the Tripitaka Doctrine arises.

[12]According to Mario Bunge, Ontology I: The Furniture of the World,(Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 3-6, ontology can be defined in ten ways, among which are as the discourse on Being (or Absolute) and the discourse on being (or existence). If understood in the former sense, ontological system is not allowed in Buddhism, for Buddhism rejects any idea of Absolute. However, Mou uses the term only in the latter sense, which is also used and clearly defined in another work of Mou's. (See Chih te chih-chueh yü chung-kuo che-hsueh, p. 3).

[13]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 636, 11-12.

[14]In the Ibid., pp. 16-17, Mou points out that "the existence of dharmas" (法 之 存 在) and "the ultimate reality of dharmas" (諸 法 實 相) are two totally different concerns. The ultimate reality of all dharmas is emptiness, which though indicates that all dharmas are originated conditionedly (an implication of ti fa k'ung), tells us

nothing about how dharmas are actually originated, whether by ālayavijñāna or something else. That is to say, emptiness and its related concept prajñā are not ontological terms which can be used to explain the existence of dharmas.

[15]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, Preface,pp. 3, 10-11. Also see, p. 17, 6-8.

[16]However, there are still many sections in these two chapters which will not be discussed here, for they are unrelated directly to the themes of this thesis. For example, Section Two of the First Chapter is a section on the meaning of the Three Wisdoms, which originated from the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sutra and is important in Chih-i's conception of the Complete Doctrine. But the concept of Three Wisdoms as analyzed by Mou, is not much related to the themes of this thesis.

[17]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 3, 12. The term laksana 相 can be understood in either a positive or negative sense, depending on the context. In its positive sense, such as in the context of tathatālaksana 如相 , it is a non-dual and absolute reality which the Tathāgata realizes. (See K. Venkata Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy, p. 269). In its negative sense, such as in the context of laksana-grāha 即相 , it is something one should be rid of. In the Ibid., pp. 17-78, Ramanan translates "laksana-graha" as "to seize the determinate". By determination, Ramanan means the specification by abstraction, a process of conceptual construction through which an existent entity is divided, thus resulting in duality and relativity. Following Ramanan's example, this thesis will sometimes use the term "determination" for the translation of laksana 相 .

[18]See Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 3, 12-13. It is quoted from T.8, 242c, 2-4.

[19]We understand the Chinese word "相" as "相對" (relative) and " _ 相 " as "唯一之相 " (absolute reality).

[20]Following Ramanan's example, we use "indeterminate" for the translation of Chinese term "歷相 " (See op. cit., p. 87). This translation is consistent with Ramanan's conception that all determinates are relative (Cf. note 17 of this chapter).

[21]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 3, 13 and 10, 15-16.

[22]Ibid., pp. 3, 13-pp4,3. Fen-chiai ti shuo and fei fen-chiai ti shuo, also called fen-pieh shuo 分別說 and fei fen-pieh shou 非分別說 , are a pair of concepts which are widely used by Mou throughout the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo. For a better understanding of these concepts, one can consult the Appendix of the book (pp. 1187-1214) and the Chung-kuo chê-hsueh shih-chiu chiang, pp. 331-366.

[23]Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 346, 2.

[24]This fact has been pointed out by Edward Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books, p. 85. He says, "At some time or another most Buddhist schools drew up a list of factors which they regarded as 'dharmas'. In essentials all these lists agree. The Prajñāpāramitā texts work with the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins, who counted seventy-five ultimates."

[25]Ibid., p. 8, 1. It is quoted from T. 8, 227b, 5-6.

[26]This is the reason why Mou titled the First Section of the First Chapter of the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, "The Characteristics of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra and its Dharmas."

[27]See the quotation in Ibid., pp. 5-7, which is quoted from T. 8, 242c, 5-243b, 8.

[28]T. 8, 242c, 6-7. We understand " 無礙相 " as " 無礙之相 " (unimpeded nature). The term laksana 相 in this context is to be understood in its positive sense, i.e. the absolute reality which will not be an impediment to the enlightenment.

[29]T. 8, 243b, 6-7. " 自相空 " is one of the eighteen ways of describing emptiness. D.T. Suzuki, On Indian Mahayana Buddhism, p. 48, translates it as "emptiness of self-aspect or self-character".

[30]T.8, 243b, 7-8.

[31]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 7, 17- 8, 2.

[32]Ibid., pp. 10, 15.

[33]Ibid., pp. 10, 11.

[34]Ibid., pp. 8-10. They are quoted from T. 8, 277b, 4-278b, 1.

[35]Translated from T. 8, 277b, 24-277c, 3.

[36]That means, to learn a dharma without learning substantiality from the dharma is the real learning, which one gains with prajñā. For this paradoxical expression, consult the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 10, 12.

[37]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 11, 7.

[38] Ibid., pp. 11, 17-18.

[39] Mo-ho chih-kuan, T. 46, 74c, 20-21. It is quoted from T. 25, 62b, 6-8.

[40] See Mo-ho chih-kuan, T. 46, 74c, 13 and the Ta-chih-tu lun, T. 25, 10-14.

[41] T. 25, 62b, 15-16.

[42] Ta-chih-tu lun, T. 25, 290a, 4-5.

[43] Mo-ho chih-kuan, T. 46, 74c, 13-14 and 18-19.

[44] In Vasubandhu's Mahdāntavibhaga Śāstras (Pien-chung-pien lun 辯中邊論), there are sixteen ways of describing emptiness, including the Ultimate Emptiness. See T. 31, 466a, 3-6.

[45] For the usage of the terms "determinate" and "conceptual construction", see Note 17 of this chapter.

[46] See the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 12-13 and the Ta-chih-tu lun, T. 25, 62b, 18-c, 11.

[47] Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 14, 3-4.

[48] Ibid., p. 15, 2.

[49] Ibid., p. 14, 4-5.

[50] Ibid., p. 14, 5-6.

[51] Translated from the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 14, 8-, p. 15, 1.

[52] Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 357, 1-2.

[53] Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 15, 3.

[54] Ibid., p. 15, 4.

[55] T. 8, 218c, 21-22.

[56] For a discussion on the paradoxes in the Daimond Sutra, one can consult Yu-kwan Ng, "The Meaning of Emptiness and It's Logical Structures in the Prajñaparamita Sutras," 般若經的空義及其表現邏輯, Hua-kang fo-hsüeh hsüeh-pao 華岡佛學學報, October, 1985, pp. 245-246.

[57] T. 8, 750a, 14-15.

[58] Cf. p. 38 ff.

[59] Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 83, 4-5.

[60] The Chinese 味 originally means taste. In this context, we guess that 味 means making distinction as one usually does to tastes.

[61] See Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 69 and T. 8, 218c, 21ff.

[62] See Ibid., p. 78, 5. Also see the Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 327.

[63] T. 25, 139a, 26-140a, 20.

[64] In the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 71, 18-19, Mou uses the phrases 不離不捨不壞 and 不受不著不可得 to represent the ideas of the non-abandonment and non-clinging respectively, and sees both of them as necessary for the repleteness of all dharmas.

[65] See Ibid., p. 72, 2-4. It is quoted from T. 25, 369b, 7-11.

[66] See the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 78, 8. Mou's idea that a dharmas is accomplished through the function of prajna, which points out the ultimate reality of the dharma, is very close to the idea advanced by D.T. Suzuki in his On Indian Mahayana Buddhism, pp. 33-34. Suzuki sees prajna as the directing principle of the other five paramitas. (i.e. prajña directs five paramitas like a guide dog does to a blind.)

[67] See the quotation on p. 25.

[68] In his Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahā-prajñā-paramitā-Sastra, p. 323, K. Venkata Ramanan puts it rightly that the component dharmas in the last analysis can be taken as the ultimate of analysis, but not as the ultimate of reality. However, some Hinayanists mistook the ultimate of reality for the ultimate of analysis. For example, the Sarvastivadins took the seventy-five dharmas in their analysis as something with substantiality. (See Ibid., pp. 57-58).

[69]See Note 16 of Chapter 2.

[70]According to Mou, the concepts such as these eight, like Kant's categories, are necessary for the understanding of phenomena (Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 92, 10-14; Hsien-hsiang yü wu-tzu-shen, p. 369, 5ff.).

[71]Mou, Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 265, 11-12; Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 90, 9-10.

[72]T. 30, 1b, 11-12.

[73]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 90, 6.

[74]Ibid., p. 89, 11-13. The term "analytical" which is used here is different from the term "analytical" which Mou uses to distinguish a teaching from "non-analytical" teaching (See Ibid., p. 1210, 14-15). In order to avoid confusion, this thesis will use "tautological" or "identical" instead of "analytical" to describe a proposition or logical relationship which is not synthetical. (Cf. note 10 of Chapter 2).

[75]Ibid., p. 90, 6-7.

[76]This is the reason why Mou often emphasizes this logical relationship between conditioned-origination and emptiness. See Ibid., p. 89, 11-13; p. 90, 6; p. 93, 3-4; p. 95, 13; p. 112, 15-17. Also see the Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 255, 7; p. 266, 8-11.

[77]This contribution will become clear when we discuss later Mou's opinion that Nāgārjuna's view of emptiness is a generalization of Shākyamun's teaching of the Twelvefold Conditions of Dependent Origination.

[78]This quotation can be found in T. 30, 2b, 18. English translation is from Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness, p. 183 (1:3). For Mou's comment on this statement, see the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 93, 2-4.

[79]T. 30, 33b, 13-14. English translation is from Streng, op. cit., p. 213 (24:19).

[80]Mou quotes the first statement as a major example which illustrates the identical relationship between conditioned-origination and emptiness. However, in pointing out one implication while neglecting the other, Mou jumps too quickly to concluding that the relationship between emptiness and conditioned-origination is identical.

The following passage of this thesis tries to find out the reverse implication in the <u>Middle Treatise</u> so as to support Mou's view of the identical relationship.

[81]T. 30, 33a, 22-23. English translation is from Streng, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 213 (24:14).

[82]We can only say that it seems that these statements indicate an identical relationship between emptiness and conditioned-origination, depending of course upon how one explains the word "works" in these statements. The meaning of Streng translation "works" is ambiguous. In his Nāgārjuna: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, p. 147. Kenneth K. Inada translates these two statements as follows: "Whatever is in correspondence with śūnyatā, all is in correspondence (i.e. possible). Again, whatever is not in correspondence with śūnyatā, all is not in correspondence." The meaning of the word correspondence is also not clear. The Chinese translation of these two statements is: 以有空義故 , 一切法得成 , 若無空義者 , 一切則不成. In Chung-kuan lun-sung chiang-chi 中觀論頌講記, p. 464, Yin-shun 印順 explains this Chinese translation in a way that it supports Mou's view of identical relationship.

[83]If one can see emptiness as the implication of conditioned-origination, one need not go through the process of analyzing phenomena so as to reject the idea of substantiality (i.e. the method of <u>hsi fa k'ung</u>). In other words, one can see emptiness directly <u>in every phenomenon itself</u>. This seems to be the reason why the method of understanding emptiness as preached in the Shared Doctrine is called 體法空 (<u>ti fa k'ung</u>), in which "體" is understood as "當體" (in itself).

[84]Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 254, 4-5. J.W. De Jong holds the same opinion when he says, "The Madhyamikas have carried the Buddhist concept of the transitoriness of everything to its ultimate conclusion." ("Emptiness", in the <u>Journal of Indian Philosophy</u>, 2(1972): 14.).

[85]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 113, 2.

[86]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 113, 3-4.

[87]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 112, 10.

[88]Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 267, 13-16.

[89]Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 266, 4-6. The English translations of 依他起性 and 圓成實性 are from Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 94.

[90] Hsien-hsiang yü wu-tzu-shen, p. 381, 1ff.

[91] Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 97, 6.

[92] Ibid., p. 112, 15- p. 113, 1.

[93] Ibid., p. 113, 5-6.

[94] For the usage of Mou's terminology, consult p. 52.

[95] Cf. pp. 31-32.

[96] Cf. note 47 of Chapter 2.

[97] See Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 113, 10ff. Mou also calls the Common Doctrine the "Shared Doctrine in an unlimited sense" (無限定的通教), and the remaining contents the "Shared Doctrine in a limited sense" (有限定的通教). The reason why Mou still uses the term "Shared Doctrine" for the Common Doctrine may be that the teachings of prajñā and ti fa k'ung are originally parts of Chih-i's Shared Doctrine, and that the word "shared" has almost the same meaning as the word "common". As the Common Doctrine, this "Shared Doctrine is not limited in its application to any specific ontological systems, thus the name "Shared Doctrine in an unlimited sense". The remaining contents of Chih-i's Shared Doctrine, after excluding prajñā and ti fa k'ung, are not common doctrines. They are limited in the sense that they can only be taken as a specific ontological system, thus the name "Shared Doctrine in a limited sense". This thesis avoid these rather confused terms, and only uses the term "Common Doctrine" for the former, and the term "Shared Doctrine" or more specifically "Mou's Shared Doctrine for the latter.

[98] Ibid., p. 115, 13.

[99] Ibid., p. 113, 10- p. 114, 10.

[100] T. 8, 333a, 23-26. Also see Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 180, 3-5.

[101] It seems that Mou is not aware of this question. However, this unawareness, as we will see in the second section of the next chapter, is a part of the confusion inherent in Mou's conception of the Shared Doctrine.

[102] In Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 113, 12, Mou considers the teaching of the Middle Treatise to be a "limited" Mahāyana (有限定的大乘).

[103]Ibid., p. 113, 4-9.

[104]Basically, Mou's four Doctrines of Ontological systems follow Chih-i's scheme of the four Doctrines of Conversion. The only deviation is that Mou, inspired by the Classification of Doctrines of the Hua-yen School, divided the Distinctive Doctrine into the Elementary Distinctive Doctrine (shih pieh chiao 始別教) and the Final Distinctive Doctrine (chung pieh chiao 終別教). Mou identified the former with Hsuan-tsang's Yogācāra School and the latter with the Awakening of the Faith and the Hua-yen School. (See Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, pp. 638-640).

[105]Mou argues that the teaching of the Lotus Sūtra is "non-analytical" (See Ibid., p. 586, 12- p. 587, 1). Mou also argues that the basic insights of the T'ien-t'ai's Complete Doctrine can be expressed in dialectical, "non-analytical" statements (See Ibid., p. 615, 9-11). Mou's arguments about the "non-analytical" nature of the Complete Doctrine are very complex and beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis only intends to point out that Mou's conception of the "non-analytical" teaching is very crucial to the understanding of his conception of the Complete Doctrine, and that his conception of "non-analytical" teaching comes from his interpretation of the term "dissimilar entrance of dharmas" in the Ta'chih-tu lun.

[106]Ibid., p. 17, 6-8.

[107]A modern Buddhist mond Scholar, Yi-shun, considers the teaching of prajñā and ti fa k'ung (in his terminology, i.e. hsing-k'ung wei-ming lun 性空唯名論) to be the most perfect among all Buddhist teachings. See Yin-shun's Wu-cheng chih pien 無諍之辯, p. 137 and also his Chung-kuan lun-sung chiang-chi, pp. 12-16.

[108]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 17, 3-4, p. 79, 1-2; p. 115, 14-15; p. 635, 3-4.

[109]Ibid., p. 17, 13-16; p. 755, 10ff. According to Mou, in the T'ien-t'ai's Complete Doctrine, the Ontological Repleteness is primary (存有), and the Functional Repleteness is secondary (作用).

CHAPTER 4

SOME PROBLEMS IN MOU'S CONCEPTION OF PRAJÑĀ

I. IS THE COMMON DOCTRINE REALLY A NON-CONTROVERSIAL TEACHING?

In order to support his thesis that the teaching of prajñā and
ti fa k'ung are the Common Doctrine, Mou argues that the teachings are
non-controversial. This argument is necessary, for if people raise con-
troversies about the teachings, they will not accept them as the common
doctrine.

According to Mou, the teachings of prajñā and ti fa k'ung are
non-controversial because they are "non-analytical". By describing the
teachings as "non-analytical", Mou means that they don't analyze existence
into dharmas, i.e. that they don't make any assertion about the existence
of dharmas. The teachings only mention the dharmas which have been
analyzed in the previous ontological theories, in order to show that the
ultimate reality of all dharmas is emptiness.

A question arises: Why is a "non-analytical" teaching necessarily
non-controversial. Mou has made it clear that any specific analysis as
an ontological theory makes assertions about the existence of dharmas,
and that the alternative analyses based on different assertions always
exist, such that controversies are inherent in all ontological systems.
However, Mou has never made it clear why a "non-analytical" teaching is
necessarily non-controversial. The teachings of prajñā and ti fa k'ung

don't make any assertion about the existence of dharmas, and one thus cannot raise controversies from the viewpoint of specific ontological system. But is the assertion that all dharmas are empty a controversial one? Mou has never given a systematic presentation of the logical structure of the "non-analytical" teachings as shown in the Prajñaparamita Sutras and the Middle Treatise. He only emphasizes that many statements in these texts are paradoxical[1] and that the logical structure of these texts is mainly a dialectical.[2] Is it this dialectical logic which makes the teachings non-controversial?

In The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, T.R.V. Murti gives a detailed and systematic presentation of the structure of the Madhyamika dialectic.[3] He sees the Madhyamika dialectic mainly as a series of reductio ad absurdum arguments (prasangapadanam).[4] According to Murti, the Madhyamika teaching of emptiness is not a theory,[5] i.e. it makes no assertion, it advances no thesis. The chief Madhyamika teachers only disprove the theses of their opponents by the method of reductio ad absurdum, and they never advance any thesis of their own as a counter-thesis.[6] This method "accepts a particular thesis hypothetically, and by eliciting its implication shows up the inner contradiction which has escaped the notice of the opponent."[7] In this way, the Madhyamika teaching of emptiness criticizes all theories, but it is not another theory for it advance no thesis of its own. This opinion of Murti's supports Mou's argument that the teachings of prajña and ti fa k'ung are non-controversial.

Many modern scholars share the same opinion with Murti.[8] Actually, this is not a modern opinion, for the Madhyamika masters Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, and Cadrakirti already stated it very clearly.

In his <u>Vigrahavyāvartanī</u>, Nāgārjuna says:

> If I would make any proposition whatever, then
> by that I would have a logical error. But I do
> not make a proposition, therefore I am not in
> error.9

Similarly, Aryadeva in his <u>Catuhsataka</u> points out that his philosophy can not be refuted even if one tries hard to refute it inasmuch as it has no thesis of its own.[10] Candrakirti in the course of his commentary on <u>Mūlamādhyamakakārikās</u> states that:

> The only result of our deduction is to repudiate
> the theory of our opponent. Our acceptance of
> the converse theory is not at all therewith implied.
> Our master, Nāgārjuna, when combating opposed
> opinions, has very often had recourse just to a
> deduction <u>ad absurdum,</u> without ever admitting positive
> counterpart. 11

An early Chinese Mādhyamika, Seng-jui 僧叡 also considers emptiness as the expeller of views which in its turn must not be held as a view.[12]

If it is true, as is claimed by the Mādhyamika masters and the modern scholars, that the Mādhyamika makes no proposition, advances no theory, and holds no view, and that he employes only the method of <u>reductio ad absurdum</u>, then the only thing he can say is that in so far as his method is applied to those theories of different schools, either Buddhist or non-Buddhist, none of them can be sustained. How can he assert that all <u>dharmas</u> are empty? If he is successful in applying the method of <u>reductio ad absurdum</u> to all the theoreis which are based on the idea of substantiality, then he can only say that none of those theories can be sustained: or more specifically, he can say that none of the <u>dharmas</u>, which are contained in the theories to which the method has applied, are substantial. If he thus concludes that all <u>dharmas</u> without

exception are empty, he goes beyond reductio ad absurdum. Murti himself

makes it clear that, "Prassanga is not to be understood as an apagogic

proof in which we prove an assertion indirectly by disproving the

opposite."[13] If it is true that the Madhyamika employes only the method

of reductio ad absurdum, then he can only use his opponent's axioms for

the sake of argument, and he cannot use any axiom which is not accepted

by his opponent. Does the Mādhyamika succeed in refuting all views with-

out making any assumptions that are not accepted by the opponents under

attack?

In his article "Did Nāgārjuna really refute all philosophical

views?" Richard H. Robinson points out six axioms which Nāgārjuna

assumes but are not accepted by his opponents.[14] Some of these axioms

such as the two kinds of truth are not even conceded by a Hīnayānist.

Thus, the Hīnayānist will certainly raise controversies about these

presuppositions in the teaching of ti fa k'ung. When Mou says that this

teaching is non-controversial, he seems not to be aware of these axioms

of the Mādhyāmika School. By describing the teachings of prajñā and

ti fa k'ung as "non-analytical", Mou only means that they don't put forward

any analysis of their own, i.e. they don't make any assertion about the

existence of dharmas. Or more precisely put, the teachings don't explicitly

make assertions, but they have some implicit presuppositions, which can

be refuted by the opponent. As "non-analytical" teachings, they don't

make assertion explicitly, but this does not mean that they are necessarily

non-controversial.

One of the Mādhyamika axioms which Robinson points out is that the

perception of arising and ceasing is illusory. This is a presupposition

accepted by all Mahāyānists. However, this is also one of the major

Buddhist tenets which were attacked by the Confucianists of the Sung

Dynasty. As a Confucianist, Mou has criticized Buddhist doctrine of

illusion and empty.[15] Thus, when Mou says that the teachings of prajñā

and ti fa k'ung are non-controversial, even he himself is aware that the

teachings are not non-controversial absolutely. This shows that even

though the teachings are regarded by Mou as "non-analytical", they are

not necessarily non-controversial.

Mou says that the teachings of prajñā and ti fa k'ung are the

Common Doctrine, which is "non-analytical". Mou also says that because

the doctrine is "non-analytical", it is non-controversial. Now, we have

shown that the Common Doctrine has its own presuppositions and thus is

not non-controversial. This indicates that either a "non-analytical"

teaching is not necessarily non-controversial, or the Common Doctrine is

not truly "analytical" in Mou's sense. Whatever the case, this is a

problem of which Mou is not aware.

II. IS THE SHARED DOCTRINE AN ONTOLOGICAL SYSTEM?

As already discussed, the Shared Doctrine as conceived by Chih-i

is very close to the Tripitaka Doctrine: both of them realize only a

Partial Truth; both of them only preach the dharmas limited to the [Three]

Realms. These similarities raise two problems: The problem of the

distinction between the two doctrines, and the problem of the status of

the Shared Doctrine as a Mahāyānist doctrine. Chih-i and Ti-kuan are

aware of these problems. They see hsi fa k'ung and ti fa k'ung as the

key points used to distinguish between the two doctrines. Hsi fa k'ung

of the Tripitaka Doctrine is awkward, and this makes the doctrine Hinayāna;

ti fa k'ung of the Shared Doctrine is skillful, and this makes the doctrine

Mahāyāna.[16]

Mou doesn't think that the skillfulness of the ti fa k'ung can

justify the Shared Doctrine as a Mahāyānist doctrine. He considers only

the teaching which is related to the depth of compassion to be a key

point used to distinguish the Mahāyāna from the Hīnayāna. In Mou's

opinion, only the doctrine which preaches the dharmas beyond the [Three]

Realms has full status as doctrine of the Mahāyāna. Because of this

preconception, Mou doesn't even grant the Middle Treatise full status

as a teaching of the Mahāyāna.[17]

However, this status problem seems to be meaningless if one reviews

the whole thing from the historical viewpoint. Historically, the term

"Mahāyāna" is used to name a new movement of Buddhism which protested

against the Hīnayāna. From the very beginning, the ideal of bodhisattvas,

the emphasis on prajñā, and the new conception of emptiness were the main

drive for the development of the Mahāyāna. The early Mahāyānists, such

as the authors of the Prajñāparamitā Sūtras and the Mādhyamika masters,

devoted themselves mainly to the development of the doctrine of prajñā

and emptiness. Like all the other Mahāyānists, these early Mahāyānists also

greatly emphasized the ideal of bodhisattvas, even though they contributed

very little to the development of the concepts such as non-emptiness, the

Permanency of Buddha-nature, the Tathāgatagarbha [Replete with] the Buddha-

dharmas as Numerous as the Sands of the Ganges, ālayavijñāna, etc., all of

which are related to the dharmas beyond the [Three] Realms. The fact that these

early Mahāyānists said little or nothing about[18] the dharmas beyond the [Three]

Realms and thus provided no theoretical foundation for the great compassion of

bodhisattvas, doesn't deprive them any status as Mahāyānists. Like many

other great religious movements in human history, the Mahāyāna happened

to have many grand masters who contributed a great deal to its development.
Some early masters paid a great deal of attention to the doctrine of
prajñā and emptiness, whereas some later masters paid a great deal of
attention to the doctrine of Buddha-nature. They were all important to
the development of the Mahāyāna. No disagreement should exist with regard
to the status of these masters as Mahāyānists, unless the master under ques-
tion preached something contradictory to the spirit of the Mahāyāna. The
status problem only arose when Chih-i completely ignored the history of
Indian Buddhism, and advanced the theory that from the very beginning
Shākyamuni himself had known all Buddhist doctrines and that it was only
out of his consideration for his audience's capacities that Shākyamuni
preached different doctrines on different periods. If what Chih-i claimed
is true, Shākyamuni should have preached the dharmas beyond the [Three]
Realms in a Mahāyānist doctrine such as the Shared Doctrine. Therefore,
the problem of the Shared Doctrine's status as a Mahāyānist doctrine only
arises in Chih-i's Classification of Doctrines. As a modern scholar, Mou
certainly knows more about the history of Indian Buddhism than Chih-i did,
but he still doesn't grant the Middle Treatise full status as a teaching of
the Mahāyāna; this may sound ridiculous to many scholars. The status pro-
blem as raised by Mou seems to indicate that Mou still take Chih-i's legacy
too seriously and regards some contents of the Middle Treatise as an onto-
logical system which has definite views on the existence of dharmas. Mou
defined these definite views of the Middle Treatise as the Shared Doctrine
in his modified Classification of Doctrines. If the Middle Treatise really
has definite views of its own on the existence of dharmas and these dharmas
are limited to the [Three] Realms, Mou may be justified in his own system

of the Classification of Doctrines in challenging the full status of the

Middle Treatise as a teaching of the Mahāyāna. However, one can ask a

question: Does the Middle Treatise really contain definite views of

its own on the existence of dharmas? More specifically, is the Shared

Doctrine which Mou identifies in the Middle Treatise an ontological system

accepted by Nāgārjuna himself?

Through his discussion about the teachings of prajñā and ti fa

k'ung, Mou has made it clear why the Shared Doctrine as conceived by

Chih-i is so close to the Tripitaka Doctrine. The views concerning the

existence of dharmas in both doctrines are confined to an analysis of

the dharmas which are limited to the [Three] Realms. This analysis is

a specific ontological system, different from other later-developed

"analytical" teachings of ontological systems such as the Dictinctive

Doctrine. According to Mou, the dharmas of this ontological system have

been analyzed in the sūtras and śāstras of the Tripitake Doctrine. However,

some followers of the Tripitaka Doctrine go astray during the process of

analysis by advancing some idea of substantiality. In order to destroy

this heresy, the authors of the Prajñāpāramitā Sutras and Nāgārjuna men-

tion those dharmas which have been analyzed in the Tripitaka Doctrine.

In Mou's opinion, the authors of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and Nāgārjuna

themselves have never put forward any analysis of dharmas for their own

purpose, they just use those dharmas which are available; they don't even

accept the analysis of the Tripitaka Doctrine, but only mention the dharmas

in this analysis, one by one in order to show that all dharmas without

exception are empty. If dharmas belonging to a doctrine other than the

Tripitaka Doctrine such as the Distinctive Doctrine happen to come to

their notice, they will not hesitate to point out that these dharmas too
are empty. For example, the author of the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra
says that permanency, joy, self, and purity, four characteristics
related to the concept of the Permanancy of Buddha-nature, are all un-
attainable. Even though Nagarjuna fails to point out that these four
characteristics are empty too, the manner in which he uses and mentions
dharmas is not in the least different from the manner of the authors of
the Prajñaparamita Sutras. This manner clearly indicates that Nagarjuna,
as well as the authors of the Prajñaparamita Sutras, never accepts a
specific analysis on the existence of dharmas as his own views concerning
the existence of dharmas. In other words, the Middle Treatise, as well as
the Prajñaparamita Sutras, does not have an ontological system of its
own.[19] How can Mou regard the views concerning the existence of dharmas
in the Middle Treatise as constituting the Shared Doctrine, which remains
as one of the four ontological doctrines in Mou's modified Classification
of Doctrines?

Throughout Mou's discussion about prajña and ti fa k'ung as the
Common Doctrine, we cannot detect any difference between the manner in
which the author of the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra mentions dharmas and
the manner in which Nagarjuna does. It seems that Mou is inconsistent
in identifying the Shared Doctrine in the Middle Treatise[20] and not
identifying the Shared Doctrine in the Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra. At
least, he is not free from the charge of being ambiguous, for he never
makes it clear what differences between the Middle Treatise and the
Mahaprajñaparamita Sutra he sees, which make him believe that one text
contains the Shared Doctrine while another does not. One difference may

be that the concepts of permanency, joy, self, and purity are contained
in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, but not contained in the Middle Treatise.
However, we instead see this occurrence of the four characteristics in the
sūtra as an incidental fact rather than as a doctrinal difference between
the two texts. The reason that Mou includes the Shared Doctrine in the
Middle Treatise, but not in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra may be that,
although strange as it might appear, a philosopher and non-Buddhist like
Mou has a greater respect for sūtras than for śāstras.[21] For Mou, prajñā
and ti fa k'ung provide the key which enables one to be replete with
dharmas, it thus becomes a common doctrine accepted by the followers of
the Distinctive and Complete Doctrines; the Shared Doctrine as an ontologi-
cal system expresses only narrow views on the existence of dharmas by
ignoring the dharmas beyond the [Three] Realms. Mou regards the Common
Doctrine to be of greater importance than the Shared Doctrine, and it is
not unreasonable to say that he respects the former more than the latter.
Perhaps it is due to his great respect for sūtras that he only identifies
the Common Doctrine in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra and that he identifies
both the Common Doctrine and the Shared Doctrine in the Middle Treatise.
Whatever reasons there may be, we somehow find that Mou is not very con-
sistent in his view about the manner in which the Middle Treatise and
the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra mention dharmas. From the manner in which
they just use the dharmas as analyzed in the previous ontological system
without necessarily accepting the analysis, as suggested by Mou himself,
we can only conclude that neither the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra nor the
Middle Treatise contains an ontological system of its own. Therefore,
Mou's Shared Doctrine as identified in the Middle Treatise never exists.

One may ask a question: Why does Mou not just cancel the

Shared Doctrine? If he did this, there would be only three Doctrines

of Ontological Systems, i.e. the Tripitaka Doctrine, the Distinctive

Doctrine, and the Complete Doctrine, and one Doctrine of Contemplating

Dharmas, i.e. the Complete Doctrine, in Mou's modified Classification

of Doctrines. It seems that the cancellation of the Shared Doctrine does

not influence in any way Mou's theses about the other three ontological

systems, and that the cancellation is harmonious with his theses about

the Common Doctrine. But Mou insists on the existence of the Shared

Doctrine in the Middle Treatise and gives an explanation for his in-

sistence: this view can be harmonious with the opinions of the T'ien-

t'ai School and the Hua-yen School, the former of which sees the Śūnyavāda

School as the Shared Doctrine, while the latter sees the Śūnyavāda School

as the Elementary Doctrine.[22]

NOTES

¹Cf. p. 67.

²Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 356, 8-16.

³Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 121-208.

⁴Ibid., p. 131.

⁵Ibid., p. 160.

⁶Murti is aware of the existence of a sub-school of the Mādhyamika, i.e. the Svatantra Mādhyamika, which believed in advancing counter-theses. But Murti doesn't see it as the main stream of the Mādhyamika. See Ibid., p. 132.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Kenneth K. Inada, Nāgārjuna: Mūlamādhyamakakārikā, pp. 24-25; Jacques May, "On Madhyamika Philosophy", Journal of Indian Philosophy, 6(1978): 238; G. C. Nayak, "The Madhyamika Attack on Essentialism: A Critical Appraisal", Philosophy of East and West, 29 (1979): 478; Jaidev Singh, Introduction to Madhyamika Philosophy, p. 17.

⁹English translation is from Frederick Streng, Emptiness, 224, II(29).

¹⁰See Nayak, op. cit., p. 478.

¹¹It is quoted in Ibid.

¹²See Richard H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China, p. 121.

¹³Murti, op. cit., p. 131. Candrakirti also makes this point clear, see the quotation on the preceding page.

[14]Richard H. Robinson, "Did Nagarjuna really refute all philosophical views", Philosophy East and West, 22(1972):327-331. Many other scholars also point out the presuppositions of the Mādhyamika School. See Ryotai Fukuhara, "On Svabhavavada", in R. Pandeya ed., Buddhist Studies in India, pp. 88-89; Raymond Panikkar, "The 'Crisis' of Mādhyamika and Indian Philosophy Today", Philosophy East and West, 16(1966): 121-122; Frederick Streng op. cit., pp. 36-40.

[15]Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i, Vol. 1, pp. 647-657.

[16]Cf. pp.31-32.

[17]Cf. pp. 85-86.

[18]Mou notices that the Mahāprajñāparamita Sūtra contains the concepts of permanency, joy, self, and pruity, four characteristics related to the concept of the Permanency of Buddha-nature. The Middle Treatise, on the other hand, doesn't contain these concept. (Cf. Notes 99 and 100 of Chapter 3).

[19]Although the Prajñāparamitā Sūtras and the Middle Treatise have their own presuppositions (Cf. p. 102), these presuppositions are also accepted by other Mahāyanists, such as the followers of the Distinctive and the Complete Doctrines. These presuppositions themselves cannot be considered to be an ontological system as separate from the other ontological systems, such as the Distinctive and the Complete Doctrines.

[20]In the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 634, 1-6, Mou almost denying the existence of the Shared Doctrine in the Middle Treatise.

[21]In Chung-kuo chê-hsüeh shih-chiu chiang, p. 287, 1-288, 10, Mou shows that he has greater respect for sūtras than śāstras. For Mou, Buddhist sūtras, as well as the Analects of Confucians and the Gospel contain much more wisdom and many more insights than the philosophical elaborations present in Buddhist śāstras or any philosophical system.

[22]Fo-hsing yü pan-jo, p. 635, 4-7.

CONCLUSIONS

Fo-hsing yü pan-jo is a work written in order to evaluate the

various doctrines in Chinese Buddhism. Mou claims that his evaluation

of Buddhist doctrines is largely based on his understanding of T'ien-

t'ai's Classification of Doctrines, though he makes modifications based

on his own interpretation of some sūtras and śāstras. One of the major

modifications is that Mou sees the teaching of prajñā as the Common

Doctrine. Prajñā, together with Buddha-nature, is the main concept in

the Fo-hsing yü pan-jo. However, judged from its scope and Mou's intent,

the concept of Buddha-nature is much more important than the concept of

prajñā to the understanding of Mou's modified Classification of Doctrines.

Therefore, to what extent Mou's understanding of the T'ien-t'ai philosophy

is accurate, to what extent Mou's modifications are effective in over-

coming whatever weaknesses he finds in the T'ien-t'ai's Classification

of Doctrines, and what contributions Mou makes to the studies of Chinese

Buddhism, are the questions which will remain largely unanswered without

any serious, comprehensive examination of Mou's understanding of Buddha-

nature being undertaken. However, while concentrating on Mou's under-

standing of prajñā in this thesis, we have observed some interesting

points:

(1) For Chih-i, prajñā is a very important concept: the followers

of the Tripitaka Doctrine share the Common Prajñā with the Two Vehicles

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of the Shared Doctrine, whereas the followers of the Distinctive and

Complete Doctrines share the Non-common Prajñā with the bodhisattvas

of the Shared Doctrine. However, Chih-i doesn't discuss much about the

teaching of prajñā. For example, Chih-i says that the Period of

Prajñāpāramitā is a period of integration for all the teachings preached

before this period, and that the teaching of prajñā is non-controversial,

but he doesn't elaborate on these points. As contrasted with Chih-i,

Mou is very concerned with the characteristics of prajñā. The reason

for Mou's elaboration of these characteristics may be that his conception

of prajñā is a major deviation from Chih-i's Classification of Doctrines,

and that his conception of prajñā is also very important to the under-

standing of Mou's system as a whole.

(2) As a major deviation from Chih-i's system, Mou's conception

of prajñā can no longer be based on Chih-i's understanding of the term.

Being aware of the confusion of Chih-i's conception of the Non-common

Prajñā, Mou goes directly into the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, the Ta-chih-

tu lun, and the Middle Treatise, and advances his theses which are based

on his own interpretation of some passages in these texts. As pointed out

by Chan-jan, the Mahaprajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the Ta-chih-tu lun are

among the several scriptures upon which the T'ien-t'ai system is based.

The Middle Treatise is also important to the T'ien-t'ai School, for

Chih-i's concept of the Three Truths is derived from his own interpreta-

tion of a key passage in the treatise. In other words, the sources for

Mou's new conception of prajñā are still the scriptures which the T'ien-

t'ai School takes to be the most important ones.

(3) Mou's basic insights about prajñā as a common doctrine seem to be mainly inspired by Chih-i himself. Chih-i says that all Three Vehicles are in need of the same learning prajñā. This view of Chih-i's actually comes from the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, and Mou might have been either inspired directly by the sūtra, or by Chih-i's emphasis on it.[1]

(4) By mentioning the Śrāvaka Vehicle, the Pratyekabuddha Vehicle, and the Bodhisattva Vehicle, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra seems to suggest that all Buddhists are in need of the same learning prajñā. However, Chih-i interpretes these Three Vehicles as three kinds of followers of the Shared Doctrine, and then he plays on the word "share", because the followers of this doctrine share the same prajñā, the doctrine is called "Shared Doctrine". Chih-i prohibits the use of the name "Common Doctrine", for he has preconceived a distinction between the Common Prajñā and the Non-common Prajñā, the conception of which he claims originates from the Ta-chih-tu lun. Mou objects to this distinction. Although Mou doesn't go directly to the Ta-chih-tu lun to discredit Chih-i's conception of the Non-common Prajñā, Mou does throw doubt on Chih-i's opinion that the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra contains the concept of non-emptiness. Our examination of all occurrences of Non-common Prajñā in the Ta-chih-tu lun supports Mou's view by indicating that Chih-i reads his own conception of prajñā into the scripture for his own purpose.

(5) If one follows Mou's arguments about the characteristics of prajñā, one will understand why in the Shared Doctrine there are views concerning the existence of dharmas, which are so close to the Tripitaka Doctrine. These similarities raise the problem of the distinction between two doctrines, and also the problem of the Shared Doctrine's status as

a Mahāyānist doctrine. Chih-i is fully aware of these problems, and

he sees ti fa k'ung as the key element which can be used to distinguish

the Shared Doctrine from the Tripitaka Doctrine, and which makes the

Shared Doctrine a Mahāyānist doctrine. Mou rejects this view of Chih-

i's. Mou takes the method of ti fa k'ung out of the Shared Doctrine,

and sees it as a part of the Common Doctrine. Mou also points out that

the key element which distinguishes the Mahāyāna from the Hīnayāna

should be the concept of Buddha-nature, which is related to the depth of

bodhisattvas' compassion. Although Buddha-nature is also a very important

concept in Chih-i's system, Chih-i seems to neglect the importance of

this concept in distinguishing between the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna.

(6) Although Mou is rightly aware of the confusion of Chih-i's

conception of prajñā and takes prajñā and ti fa k'ung out of the Shared

Doctrine, he doesn't cancel the Shared Doctrine. He still identifies

the Shared Doctrines as an ontological system in the Middle Treatise.

In so doing, he seems to be inconsistent. The reason for this, as Mou

himself says, is that he doesn't want to deviate too far from Chih-i's

view of the Shared Doctrine. It is strange for a philosopher like Mou,

who has criticized Buddhism and many other traditions of philosophy, to

say something like this. Perhaps it is out of respect for Chih-i.

(7) The Śūnyavāda School was a very important school of the

Mahāyāna, both in India and in China. By considering the Śūnyavāda

School to be the Shared Doctrine, Chih-i seems to downplay the importance

of it. Modern Western scholars generally have a great interest in the

Mādhyamika and regard Nāgārjuna as one of the greatest philosophers in

Indian philosophy. Murti even considers the Mādhyamika philosophy to be the central philosophy of Buddhism. In China, there has recently been a revival of the Śūnyavāda philosophy. One of the most learned monks, Yin-shun, regards the Śūnyavāda philosophy as the ultimate and perfect teaching of Buddhism. These modern scholars, both Western and Chinese, probably will not be satisfied with Chih-i's devaluation of the Śūnyavāda School. Mou takes the teachings of prajñā and ti fa k'ung out of Chih-i's Shared Doctrine and sees them as the Common Doctrine. In Mou's opinion, all other Buddhist doctrines should accept this common doctrine and integrate it into their own systems. Mou also uses the term yüan (complete) to describe this doctrine, for with prajñā one can be replete with all dharmas. In this way, Mou echoes the modern consensus on the importance of the Śūnyavāda School.

(8) Mou doesn't consider the Śūnyavāda philosophy to be the ultimate teaching of Buddhism. He makes a distinction between the Functional Repleteness and the Ontological Repleteness. According to Mou, the teaching of prajñā is only a teaching of the Functional Repleteness, which cannot answer the most important question of Buddhism, the question of becoming a Buddha (ch'eng-fo 成佛). In Mou's opinion, the perfect answer to this question is found only in the T'ien-t'ai's system of the Nature-repleteness. The theory of Nature-repleteness is the most satisfactory ontological interpretation of the existence of all dharmas, which are the merits one has to acquire in order to become a Buddha. Mou sees these two kinds of repleteness as key points to be used to distinguish between the Śūnyavāda School and the T'ien-t'ai School.

The Common Doctrine, which is contained the Śūnyavāda philosophy, is only the teaching of the Functional Repleteness. The Complete Doctrine as preached by the T'ien-t'ai school combines the Functional Repleteness (i.e. the Threefold Contemplation) and the Ontological Repleteness (i.e. the Nature-repleteness). In contrast to some scholars, Mou considers the concept of Nature-repleteness to be more important than the concept of the Threefold Contemplation to the understanding of the T'ien-t'ai philosophy, for he takes the Ontological Repleteness to be primary and the Functional Repleteness to be secondary in the Complete Doctrine.

NOTE

[1]Yin-shun also sees the teaching of prajñā as a common doctrine, and he clearly explains that he gets this view directly from the passage of Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, which indicates that all Three Vehicles are in need of the same learning prajñā. See the Chung-kuan lun-sung chiang-chi, p. 28.

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