IS ECCE HOMO NIETZSCHE'S APOLOGY?
IS ECCE HOMO NIETZSCHE'S APOLOGY?
"A YES, A NO, A STRAIGHT LINE, A GOAL..."

By

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TITLE: Is Ecce Homo Nietzsche's Apology?  
"a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal..."

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ABSTRACT

Socrates abounds in Nietzsche's writings. From beginning to end, in major works and throughout notes and other materials, Nietzsche attempts to fathom the problem of Socrates.

One's interpretation of Nietzsche's Socrates bears on one's reading of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche's final original, last to be published (posthumously), and perhaps most widely misunderstood work.

This thesis contributes to Nietzsche studies by casting some light on the text in terms of this problem.

According to Nietzsche's sequential and systematic formula of "a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal...", three separate preliminary studies of literature addressing the problem and question prepare a subsequent connecting commentary and investigation of the evidence of the texts.

The results of the inquiry indicate that beyond even the majestic Heraclitus, none other than Socrates is Nietzsche's first and last philosopher. The underlying theme is that Nietzsche constructed his life and literature, art and philosophy, upon the "parable and parallel" of Socrates.

Thus it is suggested that one read Nietzsche in light of the dialogues. In this light, Nietzsche's last work forms an ironic commentary on the Apology and problem of Socrates, the subsequent all too sudden collapse into the abyss of madness the tragic irony.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am happy to thank Howard Aster, Professor of Political Science, Thesis Supervisor. I would also like to thank Zdravko Planinc, Professor of Religious Studies, the other member of my Committee. Both men had confidence in me and provided strong support for the successful fulfilment of this enterprise.

Anticipated in the writing of my 1988-89 Political Science 426 Honours Essay, April 4, 1989 (Supervised by Professor Thomas J. Lewis, Second Reader, Professor John W. Seaman); the first working steps taken at the beginning of my graduate studies, in the fall of 1989; a proposal presented to the Supervisory Committee at the end of January, 1990; the thesis, this work would become epic. Over eight years to create and complete, it became a case of The Joyous Science, Book IV, aphorism 339, "Vita femina"; BGE, Pt. 2, sec. 41-44.

When my post-secondary studies began at McMaster in September, 1981, I was lucky, or it was destiny to have the dynamic Dr. Aster teach my section of Political Science 1A6. The first (and now, the last) paper I prepared was for this course—a theory essay on the subject of political obligation, with reference to Socrates and Plato's Apology and Crito.

For my second semester in graduate school, January to April, 1990, I was fortunate to participate in Professor Planinc's seminar on Gadamer, Truth and Method. Reviewing the 426 essay, hearing my ideas for a thesis on Nietzsche, Socrates and Ecce Homo, in January he presented to me Leon Craig's essays. Plato's Political Philosophy appeared in 1991.

I must also make a special acknowledgement of the late Ben F. Meyer, Professor of Religious Studies. A vision of this task, and the goals beyond, began to emerge in Professor Meyer's Theories of Interpretation course, the fall of 1989, Monday mornings, 8:30 a.m., University Hall 122.

"Out of Life's School of War:" The original Supervisor, Marshall N. Goldstein, professor emeritus (under whom I studied Hegel and political economy), remained to read the complete draft and take part in the Oral Defence, held on Tuesday, November 25, 1997, 10:00 a.m., Department of Political Science, Kenneth Taylor Hall, 5th floor.

My mother, Mary Viola, died April 6, 1994. This thesis is dedicated to our family and the memory of her.

Amor fati!
ABBREVIATIONS, TEXT AND TRANSLATIONS

Apart from the headings in the Table of Contents and for Chapters 1-3, as well as for the first mention in the Introduction and Endnotes, and also in the Bibliography, the full titles of the following three pieces of scholarly literature the thesis takes as its critical points of departure appear in the text this once only: Walter Kaufmann's Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, (Princeton, 1950; fourth edition, pp. i-xvii, 1-532, 1974) Nietzsche's View of Socrates, by Werner J. Dannhauser (Cornell, 1974, pp. 1-283), and "NIETZSCHE'S 'APOLOGY': On Reading Ecce Homo," a paper prepared and presented to the Canadian Political Science Association by Professor Leon Harold Craig, (Ottawa, 1982, pp. ii, 1-61). Each piece is hereafter noted in abbreviated forms of Nietzsche, Nietzsche's View, or "Nietzsche's 'Apology.'"

For the initial reference to each piece in the Introduction, relevant source information is recorded in the Endnotes to the Introduction. For subsequent citations, page numbers are in parentheses in the body of the thesis (four digit numbers in parentheses indicate dates; ellipses in brackets [...] are those to be found in the text quoted).

* * *

References to Ecce Homo refer to R. J. Hollingdale's English rendering of the original German text, one of at least two standard translations available in the last two decades. First published in 1979, with an Introduction, Chronology of Nietzsche's Life, and Notes (Erratum: p. 119), the 1992 edition contains revisions to the text and translation, as well as a new Introduction by Michael Tanner.

In the final fifth part of his Introduction, entitled "Text" (pp. 16-17), Hollingdale notes that he chose to base his translation on the German text printed in Karl Schlecht's three volume edition of Nietzsche's works, Werke in drei Bänden (Munich, 1955; 3rd ed., Index: Vol., 1965). Schlecht's, writes Hollingdale, derives from that printed for the Gesamtausgabe in Grossoktav (XV Band, Leipzig, 1911), which in turn derives from the original, limited edition, privately published by Insel-Verlag in 1908, on the authority and under the general supervision of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, the sister, edited, with a postscript, by Dr. Raoul Richter.
For the first reference to *Ecce Homo* in the Introduction, relevant information on the text and translations is recorded in the second Introduction Endnote. Subsequently, notations are in parentheses in the text, abbreviated as follows: capitalized Roman numerals I, II, III, and IV denote the major chapter divisions "Why I Am So Wise," "Why I Am So Clever," "Why I Write Such Good Books," and "Why I Am A Destiny"; Arabic figures signify internal sections.

III includes Nietzsche's retrospective comments on his ten books to the date of *Ecce Homo* (excluding *The Antichrist*), one by one, in order, beginning with *The Birth of Tragedy*, his first book, published in 1872, through to *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Case of Wagner*—though Nietzsche inverts the actual order of the last two: the latter, first in the final series of five books written in 1888, was published in August, the former was completed by fall and published as scheduled, at the end of January, 1889 (the last book Nietzsche himself would prepare the proofs for printing and publication).

Eight of the ten self-commentaries in III are themselves subdivided by Nietzsche into numbered internal sections, (*The Joyous Science* and *On the Genealogy of Morals* being single sections each). In these cases, included in the parentheses following the Roman character is an abbreviation of the title of the particular work in question, based on its English form, as transposed by Kaufmann or Hollingdale—except for the *Unfashionable Observations* and *The Joyous Science*. For the eight of ten cases, additional Arabic numbers now denote subsections.

***


This volume provides separate introductions and indices, as well as detailed footnotes to each translation. It also includes some other valuable translations and supplementary material. Including all those to which Nietzsche himself refers in *Genealogy*, to elucidate the text and the art of reading well, Kaufmann provides a sampling of seventy-five aphorisms representing the early-middle, post-Basel period series of five aphoristic works, composed and
published from 1878 to 1882, prior to the creation in 1883 of the Prologue and First Part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Supplemental to *The Case of Wagner*, selections from the 1888 correspondence concerning the work are translated.

The Kaufmann version of *Ecce Homo* is also available as it originally appeared, in a paperback volume, together with the seventy-five aphorisms and joint Kaufmann and Hollingdale translation of *Genealogy*, third in the series of three volumes issued separately, leading to the collected edition, for which the translations were ultimately intended (see his "Note on this Edition," p. vii, as well as his Bibliography to *Nietzsche*, 4th. ed., Part V, sections B and C, pp. 492-93).

*Basic Writings* reproduces the pagination of each of the five translations and separate commentaries, apparatus and editorial matter. As pertaining to *Ecce Homo* (pp. 655-800; 199-344), which was left for last and receives more detail than any of the other works (Vintage, pp. viii-ix), these are in the forms of an "Editor's Introduction" (pp. 657-65; 201-09), "A Note on the Publication of Ecce Homo" (pp. 666-70; 210-14), copious footnotes, an "Appendix" of previously untranslated "Variants from Nietzsche's Drafts" (pp. 793-800; 337-44), and a comprehensive Index (pp. 835-45; 357-67).

Examples decode the parenthetical abbreviations. Quoting a sentence in section nine of "Why I am so Clever" is noted as (II, 9, pp. 709-10); citing phrases from "Why I Write such Good Books," section two, convert into (III, 2, pp. 718-19); and references to Nietzsche's comments on *The Joyous Science* in "Why I Write such Good Books," and to sections one to nine of "Why I am a Destiny," are, respectively, (III, JS, pp. 747-48) and (IV, 1-9, pp. 782-91).

For further biographical, historical, and philological data and debate as to the composition, completion, editing, posthumous publication, editions, and status of *Ecce Homo*, including the roles played by Nietzsche's sister, Richter and Heinrich Koselitz, alias Maestro Pietro, alias Peter Gast, Hollingdale recommends that one consult Schlecta's "Philologische Nachbericht" to his edition of Nietzsche's works, as well as the "Erganzung" in the index volume; Erich Podach's controversial *Friedrich Nietzsche's Werke der Zusammenbruchs* (Heidelberg, 1961); Kaufmann's *Nietzsche*,


Also see the last chapter of Gary Shapiro's hermeneutical account of Nietzschean Narratives (Indiana, 1990, pp. 142-67), "How One Becomes What One Is Not (Ecce Homo”).

* * *

All of Nietzsche's major works, i.e., the books he himself published, or completed and prepared for publication, were translated into English before the outbreak of WWI.


We are indebted to Dr. Levy's devotion to scholarship in collecting and editing this first and only "authorized" English edition of Nietzsche's "complete works." However, it is widely recognized that most of these old translations, none of which are by Levy himself, are rather unreliable. Some are entirely unacceptable as the philological foundation for Nietzsche studies in English. All translations in the Levy Edition have been superceded.

As with Ecce Homo, for Nietzsche's other main works the thesis refers to the de facto standard Kaufmann and Hollingdale translations. A collection of the various volumes and editions containing the individual and joint Kaufmann and Hollingdale translations constitutes an ad hoc complete set of Nietzsche's books that is suitable for scholarly purposes.

Hollingdale was enlisted by Kaufmann to collaborate in the translation of *Genealogy*, and in the special case of the non-book *The Will to Power*. He has also translated four of the same later works already included among Kaufmann's translations, as well as *Ecce Homo*. By 1986 he had succeeded in completing translations of the three early works Kaufmann left undone.

***

Nietzsche's books are generally cited according to chapter and section numbers, which remain the same in all editions in any language. Section number abbreviations will depend on the titles and structures of the particular book. But *Zarathustra*, *Twilight*, and *Nietzsche contra Wagner* are not composed of consecutively numbered sections. Kaufmann assembled them together, along with *The Antichrist*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, the first critical edition of selected Nietzsche translations he issued (Viking, 1954; errata: p. 115; cf. pp. 191, 260, 344).

*The Portable Nietzsche* made available these four later works, complete and unabridged, in much needed new English versions. This volume also contains over sixty pages of additional selections from Nietzsche's other books, from his fragments and notes, and from his letters, all arranged in chronological order, translated and edited, including a general Introduction, Prefaces, Notes, and other scholarly material. For *Zarathustra*, the bulk and core of the contents, Kaufmann offers a miniature commentary on every chapter.

Thus, in addition to *Ecce Homo*, translations of eight of Nietzsche's twelve other major works, complete, are conveniently available in Kaufmann's two large volumes, *The Portable Nietzsche* and *Basic Writings*. The four early "out of fashion" essays (translated by Hollingdale), and the subsequent series of aphoristic books (*Human, All Too Human* and *Daybreak* translated by Hollingdale, *The Joyous Science* translated by Kaufmann) are available in individual volumes.

The same method of parenthetical notation is maintained with reference to Nietzsche's other major books. References to publications of the lesser writings are acknowledged in Endnotes, with the exception of subsequent references to *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (translated and with an Introduction by Marian Cowan, Regnery, 1962), for which is applied the pattern already noted (PTA).
The following key to title abbreviations lists Nietzsche's other major works, in order of publication:

The Birth of Tragedy .............................................. BT
Unfashionable Observations .............................. UC
Human, All Too Human .................................. HH
Assorted Opinions and Maxims .......................... ACM
The Wanderer and His Shadow ........................... WS
Daybreak ......................................................... Dawn
The Joyous Science ........................................... JS
Thus Spoke Zarathustra .................................... Z
Beyond Good and Evil ........................................ BGE
On the Genealogy of Morals .............................. GM
The Case of Wagner ............................................ CW
Twilight of the Idols .......................................... TI
The Antichrist .................................................. A
Nietzsche contra Wagner ................................... NCW

For further historical and philological information on these works, standard collected German editions, and English translations, consult the commentaries in Kaufmann's volumes already noted, in his edition of The Will to Power, and in his Nietzsche, fourth edition; also refer to the bibliographies, chronologies, indices, introductions and notes which accompany Hollingdale's set of translations, as well as his biographical study of Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy (Louisiana, 1965) and volume on Nietzsche in the Routledge Author Guides series (Routledge, 1973).

Also see the valuable volume Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's, edited and translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by Daniel Breazeale (with a Foreword by Walter Kaufmann, Humanities Press, 1979; slightly revised paperback, 1990).

* * *

The source of the *Apology* is Hugh Tredennick's translation in *The Last Days of Socrates* (1954; revised translation by Harold Tarrant, with new Introduction and Notes, 1993). The text for Plato is *Collected Dialogues* (Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, with Introduction and Prefatory Notes, Princeton, 1961; erratum: *Phaedrus* 276c, p. 522). The first of the twenty-six dialogues collected (plus the Letters and the *Epinomis* and *Greater Hippias*) is Tredennick's original version, under the title *Socrates' Defense* (*Apology*).

For the first reference to the *Apology* in the Introduction, bibliographical data for the text and translation is recorded in the third Introduction Endnote. Thereafter, incorporated parenthetically is a short form of the standard Stephanus notation (whereby "references to the text are given by means of the marginal sigla derived from the pagination and page subdivisions of the 1578 edition of Plato by Henri Estienne (Stephanus), which is conventionally used for references to the text of Plato" [p. 1609]).

Parentheses containing only line number sections refer to the *Apology*. For other dialogues noted, also included are titles, or their abbreviated forms.
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INTRODUCTION

"Formula of my happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal..."¹

The question of the first line of the title—Is Ecce Homo² Nietzsche's Apology?³—indicates the subject of the thesis: the case of Ecce Homo, with reference to the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates.

The strategy of the thesis is suggested by the second line. A propos the crypto-aphoristic formula of the forty-fourth and last of the "Maxims and Arrows" opening Twilight of the Idols ("Formula of my happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal..." [TI, I, 44]; reshaped to end the first of the sixty-two parts of The Antichrist: "Formula of our happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal..."⁴), the first three chapters are decisive preliminary studies (III, GM, p. 769), sequentially and systematically examining three selections of literature that deal with Nietzsche's Socrates and Ecce Homo.

Chapter One studies in detail Walter Kaufmann's Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Chapter 13, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward Socrates." Examining selected evidence in order, supplying critical commentary demonstrating Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates, Kaufmann revalues the prevalent image of Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates. In
the concluding Section III, he delivers a brief case to defend 'a Yes' proposal "that Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's Apology."\(^5\)

Chapter Two is an exegesis of 'a No' contra Kaufmann, presented by Werner J. Dannhauser in his *Nietzsche's View of Socrates*.\(^6\)

Kaufmann's *Nietzsche*, 13, III is the foil for Dannhauser. Reviewing the same body of evidence, Dannhauser finds that Nietzsche's attitude is more of a problematic contest with Socrates. On these grounds, overruling Kaufmann's optimistic interpretation, Dannhauser's brief comments on the question of the text cancel Kaufmann's 'Yes' case that "Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's Apology."

Chapter Three summarizes Professor Leon Craig's CPSA paper "NIETZSCHE'S 'APOLOGY': On Reading Ecce Homo."\(^7\)

Dannhauser contra Kaufmann is the point of departure for this paper. Picking up the argument where Dannhauser refutes Kaufmann, Professor Craig compares and contrasts both opposites and likenesses between the two texts and philosophers. In sequential and dialectical relation to Nietzsche and Nietzsche's View, this 'straight line' of inquiry goes beyond a surface reading of Ecce Homo and the Apology to synthesize the 'Yes' and 'No' perspectives.

The dialectical interplay of the three decisive inquiries prepares the ascent to 'a goal...'
Chapter Four first recapitulates the argument and evidence introduced by the preliminary cases.

Select material evidence for the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates is then re-examined. Nietzsche contests Socrates, however, in this he honours him. Socrates remains a singularity in Nietzsche's rank order of historical figures. It is resolved that "The Problem of Socrates" is a central theme of Nietzsche's life and thought.

In this context, the question of the thesis is re-evaluated by considering the circumstances and contents of Ecce Homo itself. To what extent does Nietzsche consciously strike a real relation with the Apology?

The contents can be read in support of the classical interpretation that Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's Apology. The chapter headings ironically identify with Plato's Socrates, and the text seems to be written with continuous dialectical reference to Socrates, the man, and the Apology, the writing.8

The biographical chain of events in 1888 and 1889 complements this evidence. With Nietzsche's collapse into madness, Ecce Homo becomes his Apology. Thus, it is recommended that the text is best read as the Nietzschean equivalent.
CHAPTER ONE:
Walter Kaufmann,

This beginning is remarkable beyond all measure. I had discovered the only parable and parallel to my own innermost experience which history possesses—I had therewith become the first to comprehend the wonderful phenomenon of the Dionysian. By recognizing Socrates as a decadent I likewise offered a quite unambiguous proof of how little the certainty of my psychological grasp stood in danger of influence from any kind of moral idiosyncrasy—seeing morality itself as a symptom of decadence is an innovation, a unique event in the history of knowledge. How high above and far beyond the wretched shallow-pated chatter about optimism contra pessimism I had leapt with these two insights!—I was the first to see the real antithesis—the degenerating instinct which turns against life with subterranean revengefulness (Christianity, the philosophy of Schopenhauer, in a certain sense already the philosophy of Plato, and the whole of idealism as typical forms) versus a formula for the highest affirmation, born out of fullness, of superfluity, a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering, even to guilt, an affirmation even of all that is strange and questionable in existence [...]. This ultimate, joyfullest, boundlessly exuberant Yes to life is not only the highest insight, it is also the profoundest, the insight most strictly confirmed and born out by truth and science. Nothing can be subtracted, nothing is dispensable—those aspects of existence which Christians and other nihilists repudiate are actually on an infinitely higher level in the order of rank among values than that which the decadence instinct could approve of and call good. To comprehend this requires courage and, as a condition of this, a superfluity of strength: for precisely as far as courage may dare to venture forward, precisely by this measure of strength does one approach truth. Recognition, affirmation of reality is for the strong man as great a necessity as the 'ideal' is for the weak, under the inspiration of weakness, cowardice and flight in the face of reality [...]. They are not at liberty to know: decadents need the lie—it is one of the conditions of their preservation.—He who not only understands the word "Dionysian" but understands himself in the word "Dionysian" needs no refutation of Plato or of Christianity or of Schopenhauer—he smells the decomposition [...] (III, BT, 2, pp. 727-29).
The aim of Chapter One is to retrieve from the text the case Kaufmann states defending his proposed 'Yes' thesis "that Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's Apology" (408).

Kaufmann's thesis and case are advanced and developed in the brief concluding Section III of Chapter 13, for the wider context of a treatment of the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates. Sections I and II present selected evidence for the problem, in true order, from The Birth of Tragedy, through to Twilight of the Idols, with interpretive commentary.

Together with the preamble, the first two sections cover over four times more text than Section III, which is limited to comments on Nietzsche's final few references to Socrates in Ecce Homo.

As such, the first task will be to articulate Kaufmann's chronological treatment of Nietzsche's Socrates in Chapter 13, Sections I and II. This task leads naturally into a study of Section III, retrieving the case he delivers to defend his 'Yes.'
I: Articulation of Context: Chapter 13, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward Socrates"

In the Preface to the first edition of Nietzsche (1950), Kaufmann declares that "the present book aims at a comprehensive reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought... Nietzsche is here assigned a place in the grand tradition of Western thought and envisaged against the background of Socrates and Plato, Luther and Rousseau, Kant and Hegel" (x).

Prefacing the third edition (1968), Kaufmann points out some key differences between his and most other studies of Nietzsche. One key difference is his emphasis on "the development, the context, and the interrelations of Nietzsche's views" (vii). The purpose of Nietzsche is to lead the way "to do him full justice...to show that he was a great thinker...it is not a study of 'Nietzsche and X' or a study of 'Nietzsche as Y' but an attempt to do justice to Nietzsche's thought as a whole... [and] to do justice to the man no less than the thinker" (viii-ix).

Introduced by way of a Prologue, sub-titled "The Nietzsche Legend" (pp. 3-18), postscripted with an Epilogue, "Nietzsche's Heritage" (pp. 412-423), the main body of the book is organized into four major parts: Background (pp. 19-118), The Development of Nietzsche's Thought (pp. 119-207), Nietzsche's Philosophy of Power (pp. 209-333), and Synopsis
(pp. 335-411). Parts I-III, sub-divided into eleven chapters, introduce and examine the historical and philosophical background of Nietzsche's life, and reconstruct in some detail intricacies of his developing and mature thought, as embodied in his writings.²

Part IV--Chapters 12 and 13--offers a "'Synopsis' of Nietzsche's thought in the dual perspective of his repudiation of Christ and his admiration for Socrates" (xv).

Kaufmann thinks that the origins and development of Nietzsche's thought cannot be fully understood apart from the complex interrelationship of his conception of Jerusalem, Jesus, and Judaeo-Christianity on the one hand, and his attitude toward Athens, Socrates, and Hellenism on the other (321). Repeated expression of these themes is characteristic of Nietzsche's body of writings, and for Kaufmann, they belong closely connected in an exposition and interpretation of his philosophy (390).³

Kaufmann had already produced an article in 1948, entitled "Nietzsche's Admiration for Socrates,"⁴ reviewing and commenting on all passages in which Nietzsche deals with Socrates, including the primary evidence of works published or completed and prepared for publication, as well as the relevant notes and other posthumously published material.⁵
A revised version superceding this article was incorporated in the first edition of *Nietzsche* as Chapter 13. The title of the original piece was retained, remaining so for the paperback (1956) and third editions. 6

The title indicates Kaufmann's absolute judgement on the matter of Nietzsche's Socrates. His examination of the evidence and reconstruction of the problem lead him to conclude that Nietzsche admires Socrates.

According to Kaufmann, however, some writers are misled by the title, apparently assuming that the method of his study is to address only those Nietzsche passages clearly expressing esteem and admiration for Socrates. 7 Thus, for the final fourth form (1974) the title is phrased differently:

The old title of Chapter 13 seems to have led some writers to suppose that the chapter deals only with "Nietzsche's Admiration for Socrates," while ignoring the passages that are sharply critical of Socrates. Those who have read the chapter will have found that it takes note of all passages in which Socrates is discussed as well as some in which he is not named outright. To avoid misunderstanding, the title has been changed to "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward Socrates" (iv).

The new title for the moment suspends judgement on the matter, portraying more precisely the basic theme and purpose of the research: to determine, on the basis of all relevant passages, what is Nietzsche's fundamental predisposition toward Socrates, what is his attitude toward Socrates. 8
Pertaining to scholarship on this question in the first half-century after the death of Nietzsche—"at one time it was widely claimed that Nietzsche hated Socrates, and the evidence was simply not examined carefully"—Kaufmann's research, incorporated as Chapter 13, fashioned and carried out a major "revaluation of all values," to adopt Nietzsche's notion.

Kaufmann's "revaluation" is double-edged. At once affirmative and refutative, the literary configuration of Chapter 13 is in tune with the classical balance of Apollo and Dionysus, as to The Birth—or, as in Ecce Homo, strikes the mean between "Yes-saying" and "No-doing."

First of all, based upon an extensive assemblage of evidence in the texts necessary to determine Nietzsche's attitude, presented in chronological sequence, together with critical and interpretive commentary, Kaufmann carefully constructs an elaborate scholarly case purporting to positively, sufficiently, demonstrate Nietzsche's clear respect and admiration for Socrates.

However, this "Yes-saying" Apollinian context of affirmation, order and reconstruction is predicated on Kaufmann's "No-doing," Dionysian tendency, the assignment of which is to expose, skirmish, and categorically refute the
assumption that Nietzsche hates Socrates.

Kaufmann's remarks in the preamble to Chapter 13 (p. 391) issue report as to the unsatisfactory state of the discipline and literature on the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates. His remarks also announce his agenda and program of dual "Yes-saying" and "No-doing" commentary to follow.

To begin, affirming in both tone and substance, Kaufmann asserts that "Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates is a focal point of his thought and reflects his views of reason and morality as well as the image of man he envisaged" (391).

However, the second and third sentences are accusatory, critical and sharply reproving: Nietzsche's critics and interpreters have been persistently preoccupied with his critique of Socrates, and it has become a dogma, unquestioned and unexamined, that Nietzsche repudiated Socrates. At best it is admitted that his attitude was "ambiguous" (391).

Echoing his point on truth and method in his Preface, Kaufmann suggests that what is missing in the literature "is an examination of all passages in which Nietzsche discusses Socrates as well as some in which Socrates is not named outright" (391). Recommending such a comprehensive and systematic study, he predicts that such a study leads to a new understanding of The Birth of Tragedy and of Ecce Homo, and it throws new light on Nietzsche's entire philosophy, from his first book to his last. It gives a concrete illustration, sadly lacking in the voluminous Nietzsche literature, of his dialectic; it brings to light the unequaled impact on his mind of the irony and
ceaseless questioning of Socrates; and it shows how Nietzsche, for whom Socrates was allegedly "a villain," modeled his conception of his own task largely after Socrates' apology (391).

These predictions actually sketch an abstract prefiguring and qualifying "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward Socrates." Although Chapter 13 is by no means a comprehensive monograph on the subject, in the twenty pages of material that follows, Kaufmann does in fact attempt to throw new light on the development and final positions of Nietzsche's entire philosophy; concretely illustrate a most striking example of Nietzsche's dialectic; forcibly bring to light the unequaled impact Socrates has on Nietzsche's mind; and, demonstrate how Nietzsche models his conception of philosophy and his own task largely after the paradigm of the Platonic Socrates.
i) "No-doing": Refuting the Dogma Nietzsche Hates Socrates

Kaufmann points out in the third Preface that he deals extensively and critically with "apparently negative evidence and rival interpretations" (vii) of Nietzsche. This also distinguishes his study from many others. Nietzsche is about Nietzsche, but it is also a guide to much of the Nietzsche literature. If one is not content to offer just another view of him, there is no alternative. Sound method requires that we do not merely marshal the evidence for our own views: we must go out of our way also to confront evidence that on the face of it contradicts our views (in the present case, passages in Nietzsche that do not seem to fit our image) and alternative constructions (those proposed by other writers on the subject)...no other study of Nietzsche deals so thoroughly with rival interpretations, demonstrating why they are so untenable (vi).

Parallel to his positive treatment of the problem, Kaufmann includes in Chapter 13 a sharp line of refutative rhetoric, a chorus of caustic polemic, and utterly ruthless scholarly criticism, calculated to negate any dogmatic notion that Nietzsche repudiates Socrates. A string of pointed comments throughout, and copious footnotes, dealing with alternative constructions, negative evidence, and rival interpretations proposed in works by Bertram, Brinton, Hildebrandt, Jaspers, Knight, Newman, Morgan, Podach, and Oehler, approximates a critical review of extant literature addressing the problem.13
Kaufmann executes his refutation of the dogma as to Nietzsche's attitude in chronological stages, demonstrating its untenability over the course of Chapter 13, progressively revealing a number of "negative" arguments and reasons, based on the evidence of the text, many times in direct counterpoint to one or more of the noted authors' positions.\(^{14}\)

Section I opens with an extended reading of Nietzsche's attitude in *The Birth* (pp. 391-395). The very first sentence, identifying and attacking the roots of the dogma, begins to execute the "No-doing" program: "The prevalent impression of Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates depends partly on a misconstruction of his first book" (391).

As Kaufmann understands it, Nietzsche's first book is thoroughly dialectical in its conception (392; cf. 192, 329). Kaufmann describes the nature and logic of Nietzsche's dialectic, with respect to the detailed discussion of Socrates from Section 12 to Section 15, in that "though Nietzsche's uneven style brings out the negative and critical note most strongly, he was not primarily 'for' or 'against': he tried to comprehend. In a general way his dialectic appears in his attitude toward his heroes" (392).

The assumption that Nietzsche hated Socrates emerged in part because many critics and commentators misunderstood or
ignored the dialectic of Nietzsche's thought in *The Birth*. This helped lead to "the established notion that Nietzsche's attitude was hateful" (393).

In his "Translator's Introduction" to his translation of the text (1967), Kaufmann exposes the extreme case of Richard Oehler, whose early work (1904) was widely read. Oehler, Kaufmann informs us, "understood *The Birth* as a manifesto against Socrates and Socratism." On Oehler's view, it is alleged and assumed that Nietzsche hates and attacks from his very first book; Nietzsche sees Socrates as nothing less than the arch "villain" of world-history. Oehler's image of Nietzsche's repudiation of Socrates in *The Birth* was accepted and repeated uncritically by commentators as unquestioned dogma:

For over forty years the ridiculous claims of Richard Oehler, in *Friedrich Nietzsche und die Vorsokratiker* (1904), were repeated by one interpreter after another— even after Oehler had thoroughly discredited himself with one of the most unscrupulous books ever to have come from a writer with some scholarly pretensions, *Friedrich Nietzsche und die Deutsche Zukunft* (1935), an attempt to identify Nietzsche with the aspirations of the Nazis, who had come to power in 1933... Neither Oehler nor his early book would deserve mention here if that book had not been used and echoed uncritically by A. H. J. Knight in the only English full-length study of Nietzsche's relation to the Greeks, and if Knight had not been relied on uncritically by Ernst Newman, Crane Brinton, and Erich Podach.
Kaufmann re-formulates his counterpoint to Oehler's view in terms of Nietzsche's dialectical approach toward the problem of Socrates:

In fact, Nietzsche is no more against (or for) Socrates than he is against (or for) Apollo or Dionysus. His whole way of thinking is far removed from such crudities...Socrates is introduced in The Birth with the reverence befitting a god, the equal of Apollo and Dionysus. Of course, Nietzsche's critical powers do not spare even gods, and he finds Socrates deeply problematic. He always approached Socrates in this manner, stressing now his admiration, now his objections, and sometimes, as here, both at once.\textsuperscript{17}

In Chapter 13, against the background of Nietzsche's deliberate renunciation of his other early idols, Schopenhauer and Wagner, each the ostensible occasion of Unfashionable Observations, Kaufmann observes that in the case of Socrates, one will not find Nietzsche suffering the same fundamental break: the fatal Shakespearean "Brutus crisis" (393). On this basis, he criticizes Crane Brinton's perpetuation of the dogma (1941), whose "category 'What Nietzsche Hated' is thus inadequate...the inclusion of Socrates in it is quite untenable" (392).\textsuperscript{18}

Kaufmann does admit that Nietzsche critiques Socrates. However, he is careful to note that if scholars are to begin to understand Nietzsche's critique, beginning with his first book, they should postulate some formal distinction between Socrates the person, whom Nietzsche holds in esteem to the
end, and "Socratism," the doctrine and epigoni toward which Nietzsche's attitude remains sharply critical. Kaufmann reasons that the truth-value of any such legitimate distinction depends upon one's definition of the latter (393).

He draws the distinction, and defines its content, with respect to the problem in *The Birth*, noting for his critical review and refutation that

The view that Nietzsche merely admired the man Socrates while hating the outlook he embodied is untenable. Even a cursory inspection of 15 of *The Birth of Tragedy* shows this quite conclusively... Nevertheless, interpreters have almost invariably ignored 15—and on this depends not only Brinton's construction but also Morgan's (393-394).

Kaufmann points out that the original version of *The Birth* actually ends with section 15. Section 15 "marks the climax and conclusion of Nietzsche's long dialectical analysis of the problem of Socrates" (394):

Nietzsche has propounded his thesis of the origin of Greek tragedy out of the "Dionysian" and the "Apollinian"...the antithesis of the Dionysian and the Apollinian; and their synthesis is found in tragic art. Then Socrates is introduced as the antithesis of tragic art. The antagonism is not one which "may not be necessary." Rather, Nietzsche persistently concerned himself with what he accepted as necessary; and because Socratism seemed necessary to him—he affirmed it. Like Hegel, Nietzsche sought to comprehend phenomena in their necessary sequence; that is part of the significance of his *amor fati* (392-394).

Nietzsche's probing dialectical analysis in *The Birth* implicitly *affirms* and comprehends Socrates and the rationalistic tendency of the Greeks as necessary. Therefore,
his complex attitude toward Socrates is beyond being simply pro or contra. Nietzsche's first encounter with the problem of Socrates is more an expression of what he will later label his amor fati. Thus, for Kaufmann, The Birth constitutes neither a personal attack on Socrates, nor an unqualified repudiation of Socratic thought. Indeed, the two sections (14 and 15) in which the discussion of the death of tragedy reaches its climax--the second great highpoint of the book--suggest that but for Socrates Greek culture might have perished altogether; also that "the influence of Socrates necessitates ever again the regeneration of art"; and finally even that we need an "artistic Socrates" . . . Apollo and Dionysus reached a synthesis in tragedy; this synthesis was negated by Socrates; and now another synthesis is wanted, an artistic Socrates.

"In Nietzsche's first book, as in his last, Socrates is criticized but still aufgehoben in--still part of--the type Nietzsche most admires" (395).

Section I goes on to review posthumously published classical philological materials of Nietzsche's Basel period, such as his lectures devoted to the study of Plato's dialogues, and the work toward the unfinished "Philosopher's Book," including the essay fragment Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (pp. 396-398).

Socrates is paramount throughout the material of this period. Kaufmann maintains that in the domain of classical philology Nietzsche was not "concerned with the pre-Socratic only" (397, fn. 10). Furthermore, he argues, "Nietzsche's
love of the Pre-Socratics need not entail hatred and condemnation of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics" (402, fr. 14). In this light, he makes connected points for his refutation and commentary:

The prevalent view of Nietzsche's repudiation of Socrates ignores these lectures completely; yet the fragments of that period reiterate the same profound admiration (397).

Section II covers the evidence from Unfashionable Observations through Twilight (pp. 398-407). At the outset, Kaufmann again considers whether Nietzsche's passionate admiration for Socrates should have been shaken by a "Brutus crisis"--a deliberate attempt to maintain "independence of soul" by turning against the idolized Socrates (398).

He recalls his earlier admission and negative qualification, to the effect

That some distinction must indeed be made between Nietzsche's attitudes toward Socrates and Socratism, although it is false to say that Nietzsche abominated Socratism, if the latter is taken to mean the outlook Socrates embodied (398).

With this in mind, Kaufmann points out that, quite generally, Nietzsche distinguishes between a) men whom he admires, b) the ideas for which they stand, and c) their followers. Only in terms of some such categories can one understand Nietzsche's complex attitude toward Jesus, Christianity, and Christendom...Schopenhauer...Wagner (398-99).

From this point of view, "Nietzsche's fight against Socrates thus takes two forms: denunciation of his epigoni and respectful criticisms of his own doctrines" (399).
Kaufmann emphasises the continuity, development, interrelations, and unity of Nietzsche's thought (vi-x, i4, 72-95). He therefore dismisses as unfounded the idea of a "new positivistic and pro-Socratic period in which Nietzsche gives up his previous conceptions" (399):

The notion that Nietzsche repudiated his earlier view of Socrates as the "theoretical man," when he now described his philosophy as "practical," rests on a basic misunderstanding. Throughout, Socrates is admired for his integration of the theoretical and practical: in the earliest writings he is both the "theoretical man" and the Lebensphilosoph; now he is "theoretical man" who "would rather die than become old and feeble in spirit" (399).

Section II presents selected evidence in order, with comments on important passages from Unfashionable Observations (III, "Schopenhauer as Educator," sec. 6), Human, All Too Human ("The Wanderer and His Shadow," aph. 86, "Socrates"), Daybreak (aph. 116, "The unknown world of the subject"), and The Joyous Science (aph. 340, "The dying Socrates").

Executing the refutation with respect to the aphorism "Socrates," Kaufmann bluntly asserts that "such passages seem to render absurd any claim that Nietzsche hated Socrates" (400). Of Daybreak, he claims that it is

The first of Nietzsche's books in which a respectful critique of Socratic doctrines can be found. Socrates and Plato ...shared that "deepest error that 'right knowledge must be followed by right action!'" (401; Dawn, 116; cf. HH, 102).

And as for "The dying Socrates," Kaufmann writes that it is
plain Nietzsche is affirming Socrates, nevertheless,
This affirmation, though unqualified, is not blind—and the very same aphorism ends with the words: "we must overcome even the Greeks." As a dialectical thinker, Nietzsche affirms as necessary and admires even what must be overcome. His admiration does not arrest his thinking, and his critique does not detract from his admiration (401).

To conclude the articulation of the "No-doing" element of Chapter 13, one will note that Kaufmann vigorously objects to Oehler's weak argument that Nietzsche's mention of Socrates' unseemly appearance and plebeian descent is proof-positive of his hatred (397, fn. 8). Kaufmann insists that Nietzsche's remarks on Socrates' infamous ugliness and descent are spirited, the emphasis is on the ironic, and his tone surely is of "Joke, Cunning, and Revenge" (JS, Prelude).

In a lecture, Nietzsche reflects on Alcibiades' Symposium speech, mentioning said peculiarities (Symp. 214e-222b). As Kaufmann reads it,

His admiration for Socrates, however, prevented him no more than the Platonic Alcibiades from stressing the physical ugliness of Socrates no less than his plebeian descent. His flat nose and thick lips, and his alleged admission that nature had endowed him with the fiercest of passions, are all emphasised on the page preceding the praise of the Lebensphilosoph (397).

Apart from all question of appearances (35b), clearly Alcibiades himself "admires" and "praises" Socrates. Oehler, vulgar Nazi, seems to have no fingers for either's irony.
ii) "Yes-saying": Select Evidence, with Commentary
Demonstrating Nietzsche's Admiration for Socrates

Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates simply is not hateful, according to Kaufmann. Far from the "villain," it is suggested, Nietzsche thinks Socrates a hero, and he reveres his life and death. In short, Nietzsche admires Socrates.

Only in section 12, in highly dramatic fashion, Nietzsche introduces Socrates in The Birth "as a demigod, the equal of Dionysus and Apollo, man and myth at once" (392). Kaufmann recognizes that Nietzsche's thought in his first book is dialectical, and he understands that "Socrates is pictured, in the following pages, as the embodiment of that rationalism which superceded tragedy" (393). Nevertheless, Kaufmann points out, Socrates' "superhuman dignity is emphasised throughout" (393). He demonstrates Nietzsche's clear respect and admiration for Socrates in The Birth:

Reverently, Nietzsche speaks of the "logical urge" of Socrates "in its unbridled flood it displays a natural power such as we encounter to our awed amazement only in the very greatest of instinctive forces." He speaks of sensing "even a breath of that divine naivete and assurance of the Socratic direction of life" and of the "dignified seriousness with which he everywhere emphasized his divine calling, even before his judges." Nor have there been many since Plato who have described Socrates' death with more loving poetry (393).

"Nietzsche's conception of Socrates was decisively shaped by Plato's Symposium and Apology, and Socrates became little less than an idol for him" (393).
In the Preface to the fourth edition, Kaufmann discloses that "on 395 a couple of sentences have been inserted to call attention to two images in which I have long recognized self-portraits of Nietzsche: 'an artistic Socrates' and 'the Socrates who practices music'" (iv). In admiring Socrates, Kaufmann argues, Nietzsche strives to emulate him:

In the picture of the "theoretical man" who dedicates his life to the pursuit of truth, Nietzsche pays homage to the "dignity" of Socrates. At the same time his own features mingle with those of his ideal. Socratism is the antithesis of tragedy, but Nietzsche asks "whether the birth of an 'artistic Socrates' is altogether a contradiction in terms," and nobody has ever found a better characterization of Nietzsche himself. At the end of section 15 we find another self-portrait: "the Socrates who practices music" (395).

With respect to Nietzsche's attitude in the Basel period following The Birth, Kaufmann presents for his demonstration one significant point apparently ignored by previous commentators: Nietzsche revised the orthodox, traditional "Pre-Socratic" distinction in his lectures and Philosophy in the Tragic Age, instead writing of the group of "Pre-Platonic" philosophers, from Thales to Socrates. For his own purposes, Nietzsche pointedly includes Socrates as the last in a Schopenhauerian "Republic of Creative Minds" (PTA, I, p. 32; II, p. 34). According to Kaufmann, clearly such evidence suggests Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates. Nietzsche classifies three of these pure types of Greek sages—Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Socrates—as inventors of
universal archetypes of philosophy, true for all possible philosophy (PTA, I, p. 31). Pythagoras is equated with "the sage as religious reformer" (396); Heraclitus becomes "the proud and lonely truth finder" (396); and who is Nietzsche's Socrates?—"The sage as the eternally and everywhere seeking one" (396). Kaufmann remarks that "one may suspect that Nietzsche must have felt a special kinship to the ever seeking Socrates. In any case, the lecture on Socrates leaves little doubt about this self-identification" (396).

To substantiate his argument as to Nietzsche's attitude, Kaufmann also points out that in the lectures Nietzsche celebrates Socrates as the first philosopher of life [Lebensphilosoph]. Admiration for "The Philosopher as Cultural Physician," and affirmation of philosophy and theoretical knowledge as being useful in the practical service of culture, of life, are key motifs of Nietzsche's developing and mature thought. In Kaufmann's view, "Socrates influenced Nietzsche's conception of the ideal philosopher" (396; cf. 8).

Anticipating and preparing his 'Yes' reading of Ecce Homo in Section III, now Kaufmann quotes Nietzsche's own description of the Apology in one of the lectures as "a masterpiece of the highest rank": "Plato seems to have received the decisive thought as to how a philosopher ought to behave toward men from the Apology of Socrates: as their
physician, as a gadfly on the neck of man" (399). This quote also stands as the motto to Chapter 13 itself (391; cf. 145).

The lecture draws heavily on the Apology: wisdom consists in seeing the limitations of one's own knowledge; Socrates, living in poverty, considered it his mission to be a gadfly on the neck of man; "life without such inquiries is no life." The irony of Socrates receives special emphasis...Apparently, Nietzsche himself derived his picture of the ideal philosopher from the Apology, and Socrates became his model (397-398).

"Socrates, while definitely a decisive 'turning point' in history, is the very embodiment of Nietzsche's highest ideal" (399).

The continuity of Nietzsche's admiration is reflected in Human, All Too Human, "where Socrates is often referred to with unqualified approval and the notions of the gadfly and the divine calling are still prominent" (400).

"In The [Joyous] Science Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates reaches its apotheosis" (401). In the first sentence of aphorism 340, "The dying Socrates," Nietzsche goes so far as to write that "I admire the courage and wisdom of Socrates in all he did, said--and did not say" (JS, 340).

Next, Kaufmann cites Beyond Good and Evil as further evidence for his argument that Nietzsche admires Socrates. He adduces the substance of the "Preface" to the work, in which Nietzsche qualifies Christianity as "Platonism for the people": "We are told that the influence of Socrates, though
it may have been a corruption, was a necessary and fruitful ingredient in the development of Western man: 'let us not be ungrateful..." (403).

Rather hastily glossing over the direct evidence of the back-to-back sections 190-191, which on the surface of it might seem to support strong arguments that contradict his judgement, Kaufmann goes on to assert that section 212 shows conclusively that Nietzsche has not really changed his mind about Socrates: he is still the ideal philosopher. Short of the value-creating philosopher of the future who has never yet existed--and does not live today--there is none greater than Socrates (403-404).

He quotes 212 at length (p. 404).

Kaufmann continues tracing Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates up to "the five books Nietzsche wrote during his last productive year, 1888," which in his opinion "present a crescendo without equal in prose."25

Nietzsche refers to Socrates in almost all of his works after The Birth was first published in 1872. However, a comparable systematic or sustained analysis of Socrates is not included in any work until Twilight. The second in this final series of five books, completed and prepared for publication in 1888, Twilight is an overture and epitome of his thought. The second of the book's ten parts Nietzsche entitles "The Problem of Socrates."
In this second extended study of the case of Socrates, according to Kaufmann, Nietzsche develops his "conception of the decadent philosopher who cannot cure his own decadence but yet struggles against it" (406). Nietzsche writes of Socrates that he "understood that all the world had need of him--his expedient, his cure, his personal art of self-preservation" (TI, II, 9). Kaufmann notes the significance of the fact that in Twilight, "just as in Nietzsche's first book, Socratism is considered dialectically as something necessary--in fact, as the very force that saved Western civilization from an otherwise inescapable destruction" (406).
II: Exposition of Argument: "Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's Apology"

In the context of the concluding Section III of Chapter 13, Kaufmann advances the proposition that "Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's Apology" (408), and he delivers a brief case in order to defend and develop this 'Yes' interpretation.

Expressing the dual perspective reflected by the "Synopsis," Kaufmann opens Section III:

Ecce Homo was Nietzsche's last work, and in many ways the culmination of his philosophy. Much of it can be understood only in terms of a juxtaposition which we have previously encountered: Christ versus Socrates" (407).

Nietzsche's philosophy culminates with Ecce Homo, but not simply sequentially. More importantly, it unfolds toward its final vision in terms of this encompassing dual image.\(^\text{26}\)

To throw Nietzsche's positive attitude toward Socrates into bold relief against his decisive break with Christianity in Ecce Homo, Kaufmann poses the juxtaposition in relation to Kierkegaard's decision, recorded in his Fragments, to choose Revelation, and Jesus, Saviour, over Socrates, the Teacher:

As Nietzsche assures us in the Antichrist, he reveres the life and death of Jesus--but instead of interpreting it as a promise of another world and another life, and instead of conceding the divinity of Jesus, Nietzsche insists: Ecce Homo! Man can live and die in a grand style, working out his own salvation instead of relying on the sacrifice of another... Nietzsche, as ever, prefers Socrates: man's salvation is in himself, if anywhere (407).

Kaufmann maintains that the text "does not involve any departure from Nietzsche's 'middle' period" (407).\(^\text{27}\) He
illustrates the continuity of Nietzsche's thought briefly, arguing that Voltaire's impassioned Ecrasez l'infâme! reinforces the "middle" view of the Enlightenment. Thus we are told "this vehement Voltairian polemic is not incompatible with the amor fati Nietzsche stressed in Ecce Homo" (407).

Although the dialectical conception of history behind Nietzsche's amor fati, his "formula for greatness in human beings"—"that one wants nothing to be other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not in all eternity" (II, 10, p. 714)—is not markedly different from Hegel's, for Kaufmann, Nietzsche's attitude toward Christianity certainly is. Yet both men define their own historical significance in terms of their relation to Christianity...each considers himself, in Nietzsche's words, a destiny...Nietzsche answered his own question, "why I am a destiny," by claiming that he was the first to have "uncovered" Christian morality (408; cf. 81-95, 235-246).

Kaufmann then states that "all of this shows the essential continuity of Nietzsche's thought, no less than does his reiteration in the first chapter that he, as well as Socrates, is decadent" (408). He notes that in Nietzsche's discussion of Zarathustra in the text, Nietzsche "ascribes to the overman that 'omnipresence of sarcasm [Bosheit] and frolics' which he evidently associated with Socrates" (408); and the continuity of Nietzsche self-identifying with Socrates is evident in the comments on The Case of Wagner, in that he "emphasizes his own love of irony" (408).
Now, Kaufmann propounds the key thesis statement, to the effect that "Yet not one of these points is as important as the fact that Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's Apology" (408).

This stated, the point is at hand where he delivers his brief case in defence of his proposed 'Yes.'

In summary, by means of a comparative approach to the two works in question, his case is based on the evidence and argument that Nietzsche's chapter titles and corresponding text--"Why I Am So Wise," "Why I Am So Clever," "Why I Write Such Good Books," and "Why I Am A Destiny"--purposely recall the lietmotifs of Socrates in the Apology.

True to the method and detailed execution of the thesis strategy, this exposition includes the four paragraphs, following the key statement, containing Kaufmann's 'Yes' case Brinton remarks incidentally--though, in conformity with almost the entire literature, he fails to discuss Ecce Homo--that it "is not apologetic." This, of course, is the basis of our comparison with the Apology—that masterpiece for whose sake one studies antiquity. The heading of the first chapter, "why I am so wise," recalls the lietmotif of the Apology. Socrates, after claiming that he was the wisest of men, had interpreted his wisdom in terms of the foolishness of his contemporaries, who thought they knew what they really did not know, and in terms of his own calling. Nietzsche answers his own provocative question in terms of "the disparity between the greatness of my task and the smallness of my contemporaries." His wisdom, he claims, consists in his opposition to his time—and we have seen that he felt close to Socrates in this respect.

The second question, "why I am so clever," is similarly answered: "I have never pondered questions that are none." Again one recalls the Apology, where Socrates scorns far-flung speculations; he confined his inquiries to a few
basic questions of morality.

The third question, "why I write such good books," receives a more startling reply: "There is altogether no prouder nor, at the same time, more subtle kind of book: here and there they attain the ultimate that can be attained on earth--cynicism." We are reminded of that Socratic "wisdom full of pranks which constitutes the best state of the soul of man," and of the "sarcastic assurance" of the "great ironist" who vivisected the virtues of his age. Nietzsche concedes that a cynic may be no more than an "indiscreet billy goat and ape," but even so he considers "cynicism the only form in which mean souls touch honesty." His position depends, as it often does, on the conviction that superficially similar forms of behaviour may be expressions of profoundly different states of mind: "In sarcasm [Bosheit] the frolicker and the weaklings meet"; it may be an expression of ressentiment or of greatness of soul. Thus Nietzsche expressly associates cynicism with the "new barbarians" who combine "spiritual superiority with well-being and excess of strength." And in a letter to Brandes, on November 20, 1888, he says: "I have now written an account of myself with a cynicism that will become world-historical. The book is called *Ecce Homo* [...]."

In the *Götzen-Dämmerung*, Socrates had been called a buffoon: Now "buffoon" and "satyr" (a term the Platonic Alcibiades had used to picture Socrates) become idealized conceptions. Nietzsche, too, would be a satyr; he praises Heine's "divine sarcasm without which I cannot imagine perfection" and calls him a satyr; and on the same page he says of Shakespeare: "what must a man have suffered to find it so very necessary to be a buffoon." In the end, Nietzsche says of himself: "I do not want to be a saint, rather a buffoon. Perhaps I am a buffoon" (408-410).

It is constructive to balance these key passages from *Nietzsche*, 13, III with the summary-exposition provided by Dannhauser in the "Introduction" to his book *Nietzsche's View*:

Kaufmann's book devotes much of the chapter's final section to *Ecce Homo*, a book he tends to see as the culmination of Nietzsche's philosophy. In opposition to Kierkegaard, who chose Christ and revelation over Socrates the Teacher, Nietzsche prefers Socrates. *Ecce Homo* is Nietzsche's *Apology.* The first chapter, "Why I am so Wise" recalls the Socratic speculation about his own wisdom; Nietzsche feels
close to Socrates because Nietzsche's wisdom, like that of Socrates, consists in opposition to one's time. Nietzsche's explanations of "Why I am so Clever" also recall the Apology: Nietzsche, like Socrates, scorned "far-flung speculations." Nietzsche's self-admitted cynicism is close to Socratic sarcasm, irony, and prankish wisdom. In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche calls Socrates a buffoon; in the Symposium Alcibiades calls Socrates a satyr; in Ecce Homo "buffoon" and "satyr" become idealized conceptions. Nietzsche would rather be a buffoon than a saint, and he writes, "Perhaps I am a buffoon" (37).

Professor Craig notes that "Kaufmann makes almost the same point in his 'Editor's Introduction' to his translation of the work, although there his defence of the claim is even briefer, confined to less than two paragraphs" (58, en. 8).

In his first book Nietzsche had traced the "birth of tragedy" to the creative fusion of the Apollinian and the Dionysian, and the death of tragedy to the imperious rationalism for which he found the most impressive symbol in Socrates. Then he found a rebirth of tragedy in Wagner's work and had looked forward to the advent of an "artistic Socrates"--Nietzsche himself...Ecce Homo is the Apology of this "artistic Socrates."

Plato's Socrates had claimed in his Apology that he was the wisest of men, not because he was so wise but because his fellow men were so stupid, especially those who were considered the wisest--for they thought they knew what in fact they did not know. And Socrates, accused of impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, argued that he was actually the city's greatest benefactor and deserving of the highest honours. Thus, Ecce Homo could have been entitled "Variations on a Theme by Socrates." 28

Returning to Nietzsche, 13, III, Kaufmann now concludes his reading of the evidence in Ecce Homo, completing his treatment of Nietzsche's Socrates. He considers the second to last aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil (295), the
"genius of the heart" passage, wherein Nietzsche refers to "the Pied Piper," and "Dionysus" is said to be a philosopher. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche quotes this passage, claiming that he is describing "Dionysus." However, formulated as a riddle at which the reader may only guess, not deduce, Nietzsche cryptically conceals who he really means. Kaufmann is wise enough to divine that "indeed this is a picture of him whom Nietzsche has in mind when he writes, in the last line of his last book: 'Has one understood me?—Dionysus versus the Crucified.--'" (410). Kaufmann asks "Who is Nietzsche's 'Dionysus'?" (410; cf. 32-33 fn. 9, 108-114).

Kaufmann is fully aware Nietzsche celebrated the art and wisdom of Goethe as Dionysian (JS, 103, 357, 370; BGE, 209, 256; TI, IX, 48-51). He doubts, however, Nietzsche is thinking only of Goethe. Consulting the "Editor's Introduction" once again, Kaufmann writes:

Looking for a pre-Christian, Greek symbol that he might oppose to "the Crucified," Nietzsche found Dionysus. His "Dionysus" is neither the god of the ancient Dionysian festivals nor the god Nietzsche played off against Apollo in The Birth of Tragedy, although he does, of course, bear some of the features of both.

Kaufmann also knows that "in the later notes, Nietzsche presents himself as Dionysus" (33). Nevertheless, his comments in the footnote to the passage in his translation of Beyond Good and Evil (1966) point toward his answer:
Some of the features of this portrait bring to mind Socrates. In this connection section 212 might be reread; also the beginning of section 340 of The [Joyous] Science...The image of the pied piper recurs in the first sentence of the present section--and the Preface to Twilight...Finally, the section on the genius of the heart should be compared with the words of the Platonic Socrates, on the last page of the Theaetetus.35

So according to Kaufmann, unless it is the signature of Nietzsche himself, the proper name "Dionysus" is a thinly veiled, coded semiotic sign, signifying continual reference to none other than Socrates.33

Completing the positive demonstration of Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates, Kaufmann quotes 295 at length, and then cites a part of the intoxicated Alcibiades' Symposium speech--in Kaufmann's words, an "epitaph for Nietzsche [coupling] his hymn on the genius of the heart with the words of the Platonic Alcibiades" (411).

Dannhauser's summary has also captured this conclusion and remainder of Chapter 13:

In Beyond Good and Evil (Aphorism 295), Nietzsche had sketched a glorious picture of man at his highest, the "genius of the heart"; there he had referred to Dionysus as a philosopher. In Ecce Homo he quotes from this passage, forbidding conjecture as to whom he is describing. According to Kaufmann, however, there is no need to conjecture. In the passage in question the genius of the heart is called a Pied Piper. In The [Joyous] Science, Nietzsche calls Socrates a Pied Piper. Therefore, though the passage may also refer to Nietzsche himself, it certainly refers to Socrates (37).
CHAPTER TWO:
Werner Dannhauser,
Nietzsche's View of Socrates

The extent to which I therewith discovered the concept "tragic," the knowledge at long last attained of what the psychology of tragedy is, I have explained most recently in the Twilight of the Idols. "Affirmation of life even in its strangest and sternest problems; the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility even in the sacrifice of its highest types—that is what I called Dionysian, that is what I recognized as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet. Not so as to get rid of pity and terror, not so as to purify oneself of a dangerous affect through its vehement discharge—Aristotle misunderstood it that way: but, beyond pity and terror, to realize in oneself the eternal joy of becoming—the joy which also encompasses joy in destruction [...]." In this sense I have the right to understand myself as the first tragic philosopher—that is to say, the extremest opposite and antipodes of a pessimistic philosopher. Before me this transposition of the Dionysian into philosophical pathos did not exist: tragic wisdom was lacking—I have sought in vain for signs of it even among the great Greeks in philosophy, those of the two centuries before Socrates. I retained a doubt in the case of Heraclitus, in whose vicinity in general I feel warmer and more well than anywhere else. Affirmation of transitoriness and destruction, the decisive element in a Dionysian philosophy, affirmation of antithesis and war, becoming with a radical rejection even of the very concept "being"—in this I must in any event recognize what is most closely related to me of anything that has been thought to date. The doctrine of "eternal recurrence," that is, of the unconditional and endlessly repeated circular course of all things—this doctrine of Zarathustra might in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus. At least the Stoics show traces of it, and the Stoics inherited almost all their principal ideas from Heraclitus.—(III, BT, 3, pp. 729-30).
Dannhauser's *Nietzsche's View* was also published in 1974. The title, agenda of "Contents" (pp. 7-8), and first sentence-paragraph beginning the programmatic "Introduction" (pp. 13-41) indicate that, as to the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates, Dannhauser's work is quite comprehensive: "My main objective in this book is to contribute to the understanding of Nietzsche by examining as carefully as possible one central concern of his: Socrates" (13).

For scholars exploring Nietzsche via the gateway of his image of Socrates, close inspection of the structure and substance of *Nietzsche's View* will confirm that this book is required reading and a veritable vademecum (*JS, Prelude*, 7).

The main objective in Chapter Two of the thesis is to present an exegesis of one central aspect of *Nietzsche's View*: Dannhauser's quarrel with Kaufmann's "Socratic" reading of *Ecce Homo*. 
I: Foregrounding: The Programmatic "Introduction"

The text is in fact direct and decisive action on Kaufmann's prescriptions and recommendations in the prefaces to Nietzsche, and the preamble to Chapter 13, as to what direction and form further research in this area should take.

Reviewing all the pertinent passages where Socrates is named, as well as other relevant materials, sequentially and systematically, together with connecting critical and interpretative commentary, Dannhauser certainly fulfills Kaufmann's call for a methodologically correct and comprehensive reconstruction of Nietzsche's Socrates.

However, in treating the same problem, on the basis of the same body of evidence in Nietzsche's texts, Dannhauser proposes an alternative interpretation which challenges and rivals Kaufmann's "Socratic" approach (35).

Dannhauser argues that Nietzsche's references to Socrates are riddled with ambiguity and contrary attitudes. Nietzsche's view is complex, changes, and evolves. However, from first to last Nietzsche strongly opposes and openly attacks Socrates. If continuity or unity does obtain in Nietzsche's view, then this does not consist of Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates, but rather reflects his perpetual contest and quarrel with him.
It is Dannhauser's sound method, as Kaufmann has put it, that before re-reading all the evidence and producing his account of the same problem, he first goes out of his way in the "Introduction" to address Kaufmann's influence.

Acknowledging the legitimacy of Kaufmann's leading authority in North American Nietzsche studies (p. 26); noting some of his major and minor contributions to the field (pp. 26-27); reviewing the assumptions, intentions, structure and substance of the third edition of *Nietzsche* (pp. 27-29); and before a more detailed summary of the contents of Chapter 13 itself (pp. 29-35), Dannhauser pauses for perspective, and queries:

What kind of Nietzsche has emerged from Kaufmann's book up to this point? That question can be answered without too much distortion, but perhaps somewhat surprisingly: a Socratic Nietzsche. Repeated references to Socrates have in a way prepared the reader for the title of the last chapter, which is "Nietzsche's Admiration for Socrates" (35).

Presenting three general criticisms of Kaufmann's view of Nietzsche (p. 38), Dannhauser outlines three further criticisms specific to Kaufmann's view of Nietzsche's Socrates in Chapter 13 (pp. 39-41).

Along with Kaufmann, I believe in "constructive refutation," and hope that the following chapters will substantiate my contentions about the "true" Nietzsche. The chapters will also attempt to buttress the following three criticisms which address themselves specifically to Kaufmann's understanding of Nietzsche's image of Socrates (39).
The second criticism directly contests the contents of Kaufmann's case for his 'Yes' in Nietzsche, 13, III.

Dannhauser contends that "Kaufmann's interpretation of Ecce Homo is unconvincing" (40). He grants to Kaufmann that "the Apology and Ecce Homo do, of course, have things in common, and by choosing to overlook the fact that the Apology was not written by Socrates himself, one can consider them both as autobiographies of great philosophers" (40). However, skeptical of the range and even efficacy of such a comparison, he denies that because one may find formal similarities between the two autobiographical works of the great philosophers, literary and artistic, one ought therefore to overlook even greater contrasts in actual content, factual or philosophical: "But surely, in a comparison of the two works an appreciation of the formal similarities must be attended by an appreciation of the immense substantive differences" (40). To bring to light the sharp contrast in the texts between Socrates and Nietzsche, which Kaufmann tends to overlook in Chapter 13, Dannhauser immediately identifies for the reader three pairs of these "immense substantive differences":

Socrates presents himself as deeply rooted in an Athens he has never left voluntarily; Nietzsche presents himself as a rootless traveller. Socrates protests his piety; Nietzsche flaunts his atheism. Socrates makes himself appear more humble than he is; Nietzsche makes himself appear more arrogant than he is (40).
Dannhauser ascertains that "Such contrasts could be multiplied" (40).

Dannhauser's critique of Kaufmann's interpretation of *Ecce Homo* winds up in concurrence with Karl Löwith's ear for the tone of sheer madness in the text, concluding with a rhetorical question, asking whether, yet really positing and persuading that, the tone of the Platonic text is the very opposite: "Finally, the whole tone of *Ecce Homo* has been characterized correctly by Karl Löwith as one of 'desperate buffoonery.' Is not the tone of the *Apology* the exact opposite?" (40).⁷

Arraigned on alleged capital crimes (*Euthyphro*); standing trial, convicted, and sentenced to death (*Apology*); imprisoned in his last days that followed (*Crito*); even up to the point of freely administering the deadly hemlock to himself, and speaking out his last words to his old friend Crito, the very moment before his death (*Phaedo*); on one hand, the pious and wise old Socrates remains calm and rational, the magnanimous man, inscrutable, diplomatic.⁸

On the other, megalomaniacal, Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, escalates into a mad conceit, and descends into hysterical self-apotheosistic rants, complete with prophecy and revelation.⁹
II: Exegesis: "The View of Socrates in Nietzsche's Final Period"

Adopting Kaufmann's method of examining the evidence for Nietzsche's view in order, with commentary, Dannhauser explicates Nietzsche's last references to Socrates, those in Ecce Homo, only much later, in the fourth chapter, "The View of Socrates in Nietzsche's Final Period" (pp. 175-239).

Precisely in this context, fully 195 pages after initially expounding the criticism of Kaufmann's 'Yes' interpretation of Ecce Homo, Dannhauser recalls his major points contra, and effectively resolves his 'No' antithesis.

He opens his seven paragraph, three page review of the text along biographical, historical and philological lines:

Ecce Homo, Wie man wird, was man ist (Ecce Homo, How One Becomes What One Is) was not published until 1908. There is evidence to suggest that the manuscript left by Nietzsche was in a state of disarray and that his disciple Peter Gast's role in preparing it for publication was somewhat greater than is usually characterized by the word "editor" (234).10

The second paragraph begins directly examining the evidence in the text we have. "Nietzsche refers to Socrates in the first aphorism of the first section, which is entitled 'Warum ich so weise bin' (Why I Am So Wise)" (234).11 He reports the import of this initial reference to Socrates in the text: Nietzsche "calls 'the case of Socrates' the most famous example of dialectics as a symptom of decadence" (234). Nietzsche, Dannhauser continues, "recalls that at the time he
wrote *The Dawn of Day* he himself possessed 'a dialectician-clarity par excellence'" (234). He "not only admits but asserts that he has been, and to some extent still is, a decadent, but he also insists that he is its very opposite" (234). Dannhauser explains Nietzsche's admissions and assertions, with reference to Socrates and himself, and to decadence, dialectics and doubleness: "being both sick and healthy, he is capable of both the insights due to sickness and the insights due to health" (234). From this, Dannhauser adduces yet another outstanding difference that becomes apparent in contrasting *Ecce Homo* and the *Apology*:

The clear implication is that he knows all that Socrates could possibly have known—and more. Socrates explained his wisdom as knowledge of ignorance. Nietzsche claims he is wise because he has attained the highest and final perspective, a claim that suggests not ignorance but absolute and comprehensive knowledge (235).

The third paragraph of the review informs the reader that "*Ecce Homo* contains few further references to Socrates, but it contains much additional information on the decadence to which Nietzsche links Socrates at the outset" (235). This is especially true of the final section of the book—"*Warum ich ein Schicksal bin*" (Why I Am a Destiny)—in which Nietzsche proudly proclaims his opposition to morality and optimism, both of which he understands as forms of decadence; morality is the "idiosyncrasy of decadents" (235).

Dannhauser concludes paragraph three: "Thus he casts more light on his quarrel with Socrates as articulated in
Twilight of the Idols" (235).14

Opening the fourth paragraph, Dannhauser reminds the reader that previously he had "attempted to show that, although Nietzsche quarrels with Socrates, he is not devoid of admiration for him" (235; 64, 156-67, 174-75, 186). Now, somewhat obliquely, he enters the claim that "Nietzsche's aphorism on his 'practice of waging war' in *Ecce Homo* provides further evidence for my contention" (235; I, 7, pp. 687-89).

Nietzsche asserts that he measures his own strength by the greatness of his opponents, and that he seeks opponents whose cause has been victorious. He also claims that, when he attacks, it is proof of his benevolence and even of his gratitude; he honours opponents by attacking them (235).

Thus concluding this paragraph, he opens the fifth: "By noting the element of admiration in Nietzsche's treatment of Socrates, I am brought back to Kaufmann's suggestion that *Ecce Homo* is Nietzsche's *Apology*" (235).

Before completing the exegesis of Dannhauser's review of the text, including his resolution of the quarrel with Kaufmann's 'Yes' case, it is prudent to review his counter-argument, as well as to bring to light certain implications. Dannhauser alludes to his "Introduction" and the summary and indictment of Kaufmann's view of the problem. Here he pointed out that "What in this study is considered to be one problematic aspect of Nietzsche's image of Socrates—his admiration for Socrates—is taken by Kaufmann to be the very
core of the image" (27). He charges that Kaufmann's view "distorts—or at least oversimplifies—Nietzsche by making him seem at once less ambiguous than he really is" (32).

Noting Nietzsche's admiration, Dannhauser also alludes to the first of only two direct remarks on Kaufmann after the "Introduction," which occurs in a passage early in the complicated, detailed second chapter, "Socrates in The Birth of Tragedy and in Nietzsche's Early Writings on the Greeks":

I have spoken of Nietzsche's attack on Socrates. Although my view differs with that of Kaufmann I do not wish to suggest the formal opposite of his view that Nietzsche simply, maliciously, and unforgiveably slanders Socrates. Crane Brinton surely oversimplifies Nietzsche's image of Socrates when he discusses it in a chapter whose title is "What Nietzsche Hated." The above exposition of The Birth of Tragedy has pointed to numerous passages in the book that should make one beware of such oversimplifications (86).

In his comments that follow, Dannhauser goes on to consider Nietzsche's Homeric "contest" with Socrates, indirectly illuminating the nature of his quarrel with Kaufmann's understanding of Nietzsche's image of Socrates:

According to Nietzsche, Plato in his dialogues continually engages in a contest with the poets; indeed, the dialogue as a genre arises to contest tragedy. This essay suggests that Nietzsche's relation to Socrates is in part that of one contestant to another. A meaningful contest demands a worthy opponent. To say that Socrates is the turning point of history is to suggest that Socrates effected a revaluation of all values. Nietzsche's own efforts in this direction are made necessary by the persisting and pernicious influence of that revaluation; Nietzsche must, therefore, engage in a contest with Socrates. To continue the metaphor: during his fight with Socrates, Nietzsche discovers that a true victory could not mean simply a return to the pre-Socratic; it would
mean the advent of something post-Socratic which would include Socratic elements. For Nietzsche, therefore, the most desirable outcome of the contest is to transcend Socrates rather than to defeat him (86-87).

In view of the agenda of Nietzsche's View, the programmatic criticisms of Kaufmann set down in the "Introduction," the above passages in the text, as well as the "aphorism" from Ecce Homo which Dannhauser now invokes, what one is given to understand is that Dannhauser has transposed the tenets of Nietzsche's teaching on the poetics and politics of philosophy to apply to his book-length case contra Kaufmann's influential views in Nietzsche, Chapter 13.16

By transposition, one may infer the following: Dannhauser deems Kaufmann a worthy dialectical foil; he measures the merit and worth of his Nietzsche scholarship by the standard of Kaufmann's excellence; he considers the "Socratic" readings of Nietzsche and Ecce Homo as victorious "causes"; and his quarrel with Kaufmann is actually proof that he is honouring him, showing him gratitude, and being benevolent toward him. Furthermore, the outcome Dannhauser seeks in his "contest" with Kaufmann is not to retreat to dogmatic assumptions or oversimplifications prevalent in the pre-Kaufmann era. The aims of his "constructive refutation" are to build upon and go beyond Kaufmann's "revaluation."

I return to the exegesis. Dannhauser proceeds in the
fifth paragraph to recapitulate and resolve his 'No' criticism of Kaufmann's 'Yes' case. He repeats his observation that Nietzsche was the author of *Ecce Homo* whereas Socrates was not the author of the *Apology*" (235). Augmenting the contrapuntal theme, he attends to still other substantive differences between the philosophers and the composition and content of their works:

Socrates may not have been humble--one must not overlook the immense difference between humility and Socratic irony--but he never attempted to make a legend out of himself in the way that Nietzsche does in *Ecce Homo*. Plato idealized Socrates in the *Apology*, but in *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche idealizes himself, attempting, as it were, to be at once both Socrates and Plato (235-236; cf. 212).

He also recalls his earlier admission concerning comparisons, from the point of view of both works being autobiographies of great philosophers. Again, Dannhauser grants to Kaufmann that "to the extent that Nietzsche presents himself as a philosopher in *Ecce Homo*, there are, of course, similarities between him and Socrates" (236).

However, to resolve his final critical counterpoint, Dannhauser insists that, unlike the measured *tone* of Plato's Socrates in the *Apology*, Nietzsche's *tone* in *Ecce Homo* does not remain calm: "When his tone is calm, he is capable of sounding 'Socratic,' as when he distinguishes himself from fanatics and religious founders. Unfortunately, however, he is either unwilling or unable to maintain a calm tone" (236).
Concluding his brief review of *Ecce Homo*, Dannhauser appraises some of Nietzsche's more questionable and suspect claims in the text, implicitly in light of the subsequent sudden collapse and total breakdown.\(^\text{17}\)

As described above, the text's tone is at times in striking contrast to the *Apology*. It appears to Dannhauser that Nietzsche is already a touch mad, so that one is forced to suspect that he considers himself not something less than a founder but something more. He certainly considers himself something more than a "mere" philosopher; it is not as a mere philosopher that Nietzsche acknowledges his responsibility for all millennia after him, and that he proclaims his greatest book to be a work of inspiration and revelation (236).

In this light, Dannhauser describes Nietzsche's outrageous self-cast role in world-history: "a 'destiny' who will end the division of Europe into petty states and introduce the great politics of the future"; Nietzsche's "task is to mold man into that which is more than man--he himself is not a man but dynamite" (236).\(^\text{18}\)

Such is the apocalyptic, power political, world-historic vision of *Ecce Homo*.\(^\text{19}\) However, illustrating further fundamental differences between Nietzsche and Socrates, and *Ecce Homo* and the *Apology*, Nietzsche's delusions of himself are not at all in harmony with the image of the contemplative "Socratic" philosopher of the Platonic Academy or the Epicurean Garden:
Traditionally the philosopher may have presented himself as the perfection of man, but in *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche presents himself as more than a man; the very title of the book suggests as much. He understands himself as the "destiny" who appears at the moment in man's history when man can become super-human. It is, then, finally Nietzsche and not Socrates who represents the true vortex and turning point of world history (236-237).
CHAPTER THREE:
Leon Craig,
"NIETZSCHE'S 'APOLOGY': On Reading Ecce Homo"

A tremendous hope speaks out of this essay. I have in the end no reason whatever to renounce the hope for a Dionysian future of music. Let us look ahead a century, let us suppose that my attentat on two millennia of anti-nature and desecration of man were to succeed. That new party of life which would tackle the greatest of all tasks, the attempt to raise man higher, including the relentless destruction of everything that was degenerating and parasitical, would again make possible that superfluity of life on earth from which the Dionysian state, too, would have to awaken. I promise a tragic age: the supreme art in saying Yes to life, tragedy, will be reborn when humanity has weathered the consciousness of the harshest but most necessary wars without suffering from it [...] A psychologist might add that what in my youthful years I heard in Wagnerian music had nothing at all to do with Wagner; that when I described Dionysian music I described that which I had heard—that instinctively I had to transpose and transfigure everything into the new spirit that I carried in me. The proof of that, as strong as any proof can be is my essay "Wagner in Bayreuth"...The pathos of the first few pages is world-historical...Wagner, Bayreuth, the whole petty German wretchedness, is a cloud in which an infinite fata morgana of the future is reflected...the close proximity of the brightest and the most fateful forces, the will to power as no man ever possessed it, the ruthless courage in matters of the spirit, the unlimited power to learn without damage to the will to action. Everything in this essay points to the future: the impending return of the Greek spirit, the necessity of counter Alexanders who will retie the Gordian knot of Greek culture after it had been untied [...] Listen to the world-historical accent with which the concept of the "tragic attitude" is introduced at the end of section 4: this essay is full of world-historical accents. This is the strangest "objectivity" possible: the absolute certainty about what I am projected itself on to any reality that chanced to appear—the truth about me spoke from some dreadful depth. On pages 174-5, at the beginning of section 9, the style of Zarathustra is described with incisive certainty and anticipated; and no more magnificent expression could be found for the Zarathustra event, the act of a tremendous purification and consecration of humanity than as can be found on pages 144-147, section 6 (III, BT, 4, pp. 730-731).
The first two chapters detail the dialectical case of Dannhauser contra Kaufmann. In Nietzsche's View, Dannhauser presents a strong 'No' criticism and counter-argument directly contesting, undermining and ultimately collapsing the defences for Kaufmann's 'Yes' in Nietzsche.

Chapter Three summarizes a third study, entitled "Nietzsche's 'Apology,'" by Professor Leon Craig.

Professor Craig attempts in his essay "to show that Ecce Homo is best read with constant reference to the Platonic Socrates, especially as portrayed in the Apology" (3). He ventures "so far as to suggest that Ecce Homo is the Nietzschean equivalent, Nietzsche's 'apology'" (3).

Bearing on the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates, with the Dannhauser contra Kaufmann case being a specific point of reference, in relation to the question of the thesis, this essay may be read as 'a straight line' analysis of Ecce Homo.
Comparing the general character of the two works, Professor Craig notes that on the surface "Nietzsche's portrayal of himself in Ecce Homo diametrically opposes Plato's portrayal of Socrates, especially in the Apology, but throughout the rest of the Platonic corpus as well" (4). Indeed, Nietzsche does criticize, openly oppose, and, in a word, "attack" Socrates (5). Initiated with the critical analysis in the The Birth (sec. 12-15), carried out in many comments in books leading up to Twilight, "The Problem of Socrates," Ecce Homo is the culmination of Nietzsche's sustained campaign against Socrates (5).

As anyone familiar with Nietzsche's writings will know, from the very beginning, to abrupt end, Socrates occupies a certain prominence throughout (7). Since in a number of respects Nietzsche casts himself "as the antithesis of Socrates" (7), according to Professor Craig, to begin to read and understand Ecce Homo, it is useful to first systematically contrast it to the Apology (5).

However, documenting Nietzsche's overt opposition to Socrates, as well as examining some of the dramatic contrasts between the two works, will illustrate only the first part of his case (4-5). Subsequently, he explores in some detail an even more impressive number of likenesses and similarities,
connecting *Ecce Homo* with Plato's portrayal of Socrates.

The more one thinks about it, the more one discerns strange similarities between Nietzsche's portrayal of himself and Plato's portrayal of Socrates, accumulating to the point of their being profoundly indistinguishable [...] or so it seems to me (5).

The "opposites" and "likenesses," collected and divided, put in proper perspective, show that *Ecce Homo* is purposely composed to point to the Platonic Socrates. Standing in constant comparison with, and dialectical reference to, the Platonic text, *Ecce Homo* is Nietzsche's equivalent, the Nietzschean "apology" (3).

More evidence and arguments for this interpretation are presented in the final section of the essay, which comments on how to read Nietzsche's answers to the four questions of the titles which govern and structure *Ecce Homo*. Professor Craig notes the concept of irony as central to his contention (5). He suggests that the chapter headings and answers consciously develop thematic ironies in relation with Plato's Socrates, particularly the parallel to the *Apology*:

That Socrates is a master ironist needs no defence; he is justly credited with originating this especially supple, subtle mode of speech. "O enigmatic ironist" is how Nietzsche personally addresses Socrates. But Nietzsche, also, is a master ironist. He acknowledges his "love of irony, even world-historical irony" (III, *CW*, 4, p. 780). *Ecce Homo*, like the *Apology*, puts its author's command of irony to the supreme test (6).
II: OPPOSITES (pp. 8-20)

Professor Craig observes that, "Despite Nietzsche's suggesting that the belief in opposites [Gegensatze] may be a mere prejudice of philosophers (BGE, 2), the term 'opposite' certainly occurs often enough in his writings, including Ecce Homo" (8).

In many cases, Nietzsche defines himself in terms of his "opposition" (8): he is "the last anti-political German" (I, 3, p. 681); he is an antithesis to an idealist (III, 1, p. 717); he knows himself to stand "in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia" (IV, 1, p. 782); he contradicts "as has never been contradicted and...nonetheless the opposite of a No-saying spirit" (IV, 1, p. 783); he is "the first immoralist" (IV, 2, p. 783); and, he is, "in Greek, and not only in Greek, the Antichrist" (III, 2, p. 719).

Professor Craig will explore the one all-encompassing opposition in Nietzsche's life and thought: "Nietzsche's self-styled opposition to the Platonic Socrates" (9, 18-19).

He now proceeds to illustrate Nietzsche's opposition with a series of examples from the texts, "especially as this is manifested in the contrasts between Ecce Homo and the Apology" (9), beginning with the first fundamental contrast:

The titles of the four main sections of Ecce Homo provocatively remind even a casual reader--indeed, even a browser--of the contrast between Nietzsche and Socrates. Why
I Am So Wise"...as opposed to Socrates, who insists he remains, after seventy years of inquiry, profoundly ignorant; his very first sentence acknowledges one more thing of which he is ignorant (17a; notice 19c, 21d, 22c-d, 20b-c, 29a, 37b, 42a). "Why I Am So Clever"...as opposed to Socrates, who is quick to deny he is clever [deinos]; the claim that he is a clever speaker is the most amazing of the many falsehoods related by his accusers (17b). "Why I Write Such Good Books"...as opposed to Socrates, who never wrote anything, who referred only to the writings of others (19c, 26d, 22b), and who professed certain reservations about the written word (cf., e.g., Phaedrus 274b-275e). "Why I Am a Destiny"...as opposed to Socrates, who likened himself to an annoying insect, such as could be easily eliminated and forgotten (30e-31a) (9-10).

Beyond the overt contrast between the works and philosophers evident in the chapter titles of Ecce Homo, the first opposition Professor Craig discovers is that Socrates, "on trial for not believing in the established religion and for encouraging such disbelief among the youth, takes pains to create the appearance of conventional piety" (10). Nietzsche, however, "relentlessly attacks the established religion in the most disrespectful of terms [...] such as could only appeal, perhaps, to rebellious youths" (10).

He notes that Nietzsche's opposition "is enhanced by the fact that Nietzsche is himself explicitly the author of his own praise, whereas the Apology of Socrates was written by another" (9). Furthermore, the dramatic setting of the Apology is the most public of all the dialogues. By contrast, Ecce Homo "is private to the point of intimate" (10). In addition, the Apology embodies a typically Platonic triadic
character, whereas *Ecce Homo* is four-fold in nature, typically Nietzschean (10).  

Professor Craig now turns from general observations on the most obvious "opposites" in order to contrast, in his words, "certain details of the two works. Some of these 'oppositions' are as flagrant as the section titles; others are exceedingly subtle--sometimes mere nuances--and may cause one to see the Platonic Socrates in a new light" (10).

Before proceeding with an exposition of this series of "opposites," a clarification is necessary. Here, as for the summary of the "likenesses" segment of the essay which follows, not all of Professor Craig's discoveries are presented. An extensive selection will be sufficient.

Socrates may presume that "he is familiar to his audience--they know how he speaks (17c), and what about (19d, 31c); he has an established reputation" (11). In fact, as Professor Craig notes, Socrates understands that "it is his long-standing notoriety that is really responsible for his being brought to trial (18a-e, 23d-e)" (11). Conversely, Nietzsche begins *Ecce Homo* emphasising his virtual obscurity:

Seeing that I must shortly approach mankind with the heaviest demand that has ever been made on it, it seems to me indispensable to me to say who I am. This ought really to be known already: for I have not left myself "without testimony." But the disproportion between the greatness of my task and the smallness of my contemporaries has found expression in the fact that I have been neither heard nor even so much as seen.
I live on my own credit; it is perhaps merely a prejudice that I am alive at all? (Foreword, I, p. 673; cf. III, CW, 773-81).

Socrates speaks of his parents to the jury, but only to mention that they were human. Quoting Homer, he says that he was not sprung "'from an oak or from a rock!'" (34d). Nietzsche discusses both his mother and father, as well as his ancestry (I, 1, p. 678; 2, 3, pp. 680-82) (11).

In his defence, Socrates refers repeatedly to his poverty (23c, 31c, 36d, 38b; cf. 30b). It is the consequence, Socrates contends, of fulfilling the duties of his mission in obedience to the Delphic oracle (28e, 33c). Nietzsche, notes Professor Craig, "claims that a certain 'instinct' forbade him 'a philosophy of poverty' (I, 2, p. 680)" (11).

Socrates does not presume to be a teacher (33a). Virtue is not geometric and cannot be taught per se (19d-20c). Nietzsche, however, writes that he is "the teacher par excellence about 'ascent and descent'" (I, 1, p. 678). He reads his "Schopenhauer as Educator" as "Nietzsche as Educator" (III, UO, 3, p. 737) (12).

Socrates describes himself as a gadfly, and actually God's gift to the polis (30d-e). Nietzsche states that with his Zarathustra he has "given mankind the greatest gift that has ever been made to it so far" (Foreword, 3, p. 675) (12).

Cross-examining Meletus, Socrates tactfully raises--
but evades answering—the question of his atheism (24b-28b). Nietzsche admits his atheism "is a matter of course...from instinct" (II, 1, p. 692).

Socrates sought to improve his fellow Athenians, in Professor Craig's words, "constantly exhorting them to pursue virtue and care first for their souls (29d, 30a, 30e, 38a, 31b, 35a-d, 36c); indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that he has been their greatest benefactor (30a, 30d, 36d)" (12). Nietzsche writes that "The last thing I should promise would be to 'improve' mankind" (Foreword, 2, p. 673).

To his consternation, Socrates saw how his mission in obedience to the God was all too easily arousing resentment, unpopularity, and "the slander and jealousy of a very large section of the people" (28a; 18d, 19a, 21b, 21c, 21e, 22e-23a, 23e, 24a, 32b-c, 37c-d; cf. Meno 90a-95a; Symp. 219c, 220b) (13). Nietzsche states that he has "never understood the art of predisposing people against [him]," and that few have "felt ill will toward [him]—but perhaps rather too many traces of good will (I, 4, p. 683; III, 1, pp. 715-18).

"And whereas Socrates avows ignorance of the future of his soul (29b, 42a), Nietzsche flatly announces: 'I know my fate' (IV, 1, p. 782)" (13).

Socrates' mission compelled him to live a philosophic life (28e), every day seeking out others to examine and
discuss wisdom and virtue (38a). Nietzsche emphasises "the solitude of the philosophic life" (14). He writes that "Philosophy, as I have hitherto understood and lived it, is a voluntary living among ice and high mountains" (Foreword, 3, p. 674). He chooses to live in "absolute isolation" (I, 2, p. 680); solitude is for him a requirement (I, 8, p. 689). Zarathustra "is a dithyramb on solitude" (I, 8, p. 690).

And whereas Socrates defends his beloved Athens and fellow Hellenes, Nietzsche rejects his people and fatherland (14); Socrates never left his city, yet Nietzsche became a solitary "wanderer." Socrates reminds his jury that he fought for the city three times (28e)...[He] reminds them they are citizens of "the city that is greatest and best reputed for wisdom and strength" (29d); he exhorts them to care for the city (36c; cf. 38c); and he rejects exile, or a life of wandering from city to city, insisting he would be less at home and less welcome anywhere else than Athens (37c-e; cf. Crito 52e-53a) (14).

Nietzsche, on the other hand, denounces virtually everything German: cuisine (II, 1, p. 694), climate (II, 2, p. 696), towns and cities (II, 8, p. 709), education (II, 1, p. 693). He identifies the German with the mediocre (II, 2, p. 696). Germans are "oxen" (III, 3, p. 720), "incapable of any conception of greatness" (II, 4, p. 701) or of artistic ambition (II, 5, p. 704), or of knowing what music is (II, 7, p. 707). His writings are more welcome everywhere else than Germany (III, 2, p. 718). German culture is beneath contempt (II, 3, p. 699), and "as far as Germany extends it ruins culture" (II, 3, p. 700; II, 5, p. 704). Germany is the "shallows of Europe" (III, 2, p. 718); indeed, Germans "aren't even shallow," but entirely lacking in depth (III, CW, 3, p. 778). He is a pessimist concerning the very concept 'German' (II, 5, p. 703). It is part of his ambition to be "considered a despiser par excellence of the Germans"
(III, CW, 4, pp. 778-79): "to think German, to feel German—I can do everything, but not that" (III, 2, p. 719). It seems he has been only "externally sprinkled with what is German" (I, 3, p. 681), and he is "a stranger in [his] deepest instincts to everything German, so that the mere proximity of a German hinders [his] digestion" (II, 5, p. 703) (14-15).

Part of the charge against Socrates is not recognizing the gods of the city and introducing new divinities (24b). Nietzsche notes that "I erect no new idols...To overthrow idols...that rather is my business" (Foreword, 2, pp. 673-74).

After the second vote, Socrates' final remarks to his jury are reconciliatory, and he concludes that the time for him to go and to die is at hand (38c, 39b, 40b, 42a). Nietzsche looks beyond the moment, writing that "My time has not yet come, some are born posthumously" (III, 1, p. 715).

Whereas the Apology may be read, in Professor Craig's judgement, "as a sustained exhortation to the virtue of human being and citizen, [the] entire line of defence implicitly refuting the charge that [Socrates] is a corrupter of the young" (15), Nietzsche boasts in Ecce Homo of having "chosen the word immoralist as a symbol and badge of honour for myself; I am proud of having this word which distinguishes me from the whole of humanity" (IV, 6, p. 787).

In order to adduce other oppositions between Socrates and Nietzsche's portrayal of himself in Ecce Homo, Professor Craig examines aspects of Socrates' character as portrayed
elsewhere in the dialogues (16).

Apparently Socrates usually had "a rather scruffy appearance, such that his being freshly bathed was reason for comment (e.g., Symp. 174a; cf. Protag. 335d)" (16). Nietzsche acknowledges his "instinct for cleanliness": "I constantly swim and bathe and splash, as it were, in water—in some perfectly transparent and resplendent element" (I, 8, p. 689; cf. Foreword, 3, p. 674; III, CW, 3, p. 778; IV, 7, p. 788; IV, 8, p. 790).

It is written that Socrates was hardy and robust, proving himself able to tolerate all kinds of "food, weather, climate, season" (e.g., Symp. 220a-b, Repub. 404a-b)" (16). It is also well-known that Nietzsche was prone to frailty and sickness (e.g., I, 1, pp. 678-79; I, 6, p. 685; III, HH, 4, p. 743; III, Z, 1, p. 753).

When necessary, Socrates was also able to withstand consumption of large quantities of alcohol. Nietzsche states that "alcoholic drinks are no good for me; a single glass of wine or beer a day is quite enough to make life for me a 'Vale of Tears'" (II, 1, p. 694). He "cannot advise all more spiritual natures too seriously to abstain from alcohol absolutely" (II, 1, p. 695).

Socrates distinguished himself in actual combat. However, as Professor Craig notes, "it was usually in losing
causes, and while on the defensive and in the course of retreating (Laches 181b, Charm. 153a, Symp. 221a-b, Apol. 26e; cf. Repub. 422b, 474a-c, 528a)" (17). For Nietzsche: "War is another thing. I am by nature warlike. To attack is among my instincts" (I, 7, p. 687-89). He describes his four Unfashionable Observations as "altogether warlike" (III, UO, 1, p. 732), and as "attentats" that were largely successful (III, UO, 2, p. 733).

Throughout the dialogues (though not in the Apology), Socrates is usually sitting (e.g., Symp. 175d, Phaedrus 229b, Phaedo 60a). Nietzsche advises the opposite: "Sit as little as possible; credit no thought not born in the open air and while moving freely about" (II, 1, pp. 695-96).

Socrates is known to laugh in the dialogues, but not to cry. Nietzsche confesses that when he reads Zarathustra he suffers "unbearable fits of sobbing" (II, 4, p. 702).

Finally, Socrates is not reported being sick, and in the dialogues he is portrayed as a picture of health. His last words, however, could be interpreted to mean that he saw his whole life, or life itself, as a sickness (18; Phaedo 118a). Nietzsche documents his protracted illnesses, yet he insists that at bottom he is fundamentally healthy (18). He tells how and why he "made out of [his] will to health, to life, [his] philosophy" (I, 2, p. 680).
This series of examples illustrating Nietzsche's self-styled opposition to Plato's Socrates establishes the basic point: "Ecce Homo was written with conscious regard for the contrast to be drawn between the two philosophers" (18-19).

However, Professor Craig notes, Nietzsche also claims that, in his case, opposites co-exist (19). Co-existant opposites Nietzsche speaks of in Ecce Homo include his "twofold origin, as it were from both the highest and lowest rung on the ladder of life" (I, 1, p. 678), his "twofold succession of experiences" (I, 3, p. 681); he is "at once decadent and beginning" (I, 2, p. 680); and of Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes that "he contradicts with every word, this most Yes-saying of spirits; in him all opposites are bound together into a new unity" (III, Z, 6, p. 761). Nietzsche tells us that because of his dual nature and experience he has the ability to reverse perspectives (I, 1, p. 679; cf. III, Z, 6, pp. 761-62). This ability is a key precondition for his self-prescribed task of a "revaluation of all values"--in itself a harmony of various contrary capacities and energies (19-20). Thus Nietzsche writes:

For the task of a revaluation of all values more capacities perhaps were required than have ever dwelt together in one individual, above all even contrary capacities that had to be kept from disturbing, destroying one another...a tremendous multiplicity which is nevertheless the opposite of chaos (II, 9, p. 710).
What is more, it is noted, Nietzsche's acute diagnoses of his sickness and health, and the prescription of his task, seem to echo the discussion of medical matters in the Republic (19-20). Nietzsche's clinical standpoint as "cultural physician," and his affirmative philosophy of "the great health" (III, Z, 2, pp. 754-55; JS, Pre.; V, 382) reminds one of Socrates' position that physicians first need experience in both sickness and health if they are to successfully practice the art of healing (Repub. 404e-408e).  

With these observations the reader is directed to the striking, and even strange similarity between Nietzsche's portrayal of himself in Ecce Homo and Plato's portrayal of Socrates in the dialogues. Indeed, the "psychological problem" of harmonizing opposites within a single soul is not exactly without precedent (e.g., Repub. 375b-e, 473c-d, 503b-d) (20).
III: LIKENESSES (pp. 20-31)

Now with an eye for matching "significant likenesses between the portraits of the two philosophers" (20), Professor Craig turns to compare *Ecce Homo* and the *Apology*.

In defence of himself and philosophy, Socrates makes an issue out of truthfulness. Undermining the credibility of his accusers, who according to Athenian legal customs would have addressed the jury first, Socrates retorts that "scarcely a word of what they said was true" (17a; cf. 18b, 23d, 34c, 39b). Socrates assures the jurors that from him they will hear "the truth," "the whole truth" (17b, 20d, 24a, 33b-c, 36d, 38a, 41c). He takes it as his duty to tell the truth, even if the truth is shameful (22b), or if the consequences are anger, ill-will, or slander (24a, 31d-e, 34c) (20).

Nietzsche also is concerned with truth: "The truth speaks out of me...I know myself to stand in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia" (IV, 1, p. 782). According to him, Zarathustra "is more truthful than any other thinker. His teaching, and his alone, upholds truthfulness as the supreme virtue" (IV, 3, p. 784; cf. III, Z, 6, pp. 760-61). Nietzsche warns that his truth is "terrible" (IV, 1, p. 782): "How much truth can a spirit bear, how much truth can a spirit dare? More and more that became for me the real measure of value" (Foreword, 3, p. 674).
Socrates explains why he did not seek public office. He claims that, being steadfastly opposed to ignorance and injustice, long before he would have endangered and lost his life, helping neither himself nor anyone else (31c). Though he was not involved in the institutions governing the polis, as an active citizen he did not ignore his obligations and responsibilities to the State and its Laws. He recounts two instances of fulfilling formal political duties of an Athenian citizen, once in the Democracy, once under the Thirty. Underlining the danger and futility of one just person seeking to change corrupt political regimes, in both cases it so happened that Socrates stood alone opposing the perpetration of flagrant injustices (31c-32e).

As for Nietzsche, he labels himself "the last anti-political German" (I, 3, p. 681). And he claims to be involved only in causes that leave him with no allies (21): "I stand alone--where I compromise only myself [...] I have never taken a step in public which was not compromising: that is my criterion of right action" (I, 7, p. 688).

The dictum "the unexamined life is not worth living" (38a) is a key to Socrates (22). Nietzsche's signature is his "Revaluation of all values: this is my formula for an act of supreme self-examination on the part of mankind, become flesh and genius in me" (IV, 1, p. 782).
For all the forensic strategy, rhetorical tactics, artful silence, and traditional piety of Socrates' "apology," the defence speech proper, to say nothing of his counter-penalty proposal, remains rather "offensive." Nietzsche, even with his first book, and particularly so in Ecce Homo, is controversial, deliberately provocative, and shocking (22).

Plato's Socrates insists he has no students, nor did he become anyone's teacher; he "never promised or imparted any teaching to anybody" (19d, 33a-b; cf. 23c, 30c, 31b). Concluding his "Foreword", Nietzsche quotes Zarathustra, who counsels his "disciples" to seek themselves and not remain mere "believers": "One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil" (Z, 1, 22, p. 190; Foreword, 4, p. 676).

Socrates reproves his fellow Athenians with a message urging them not to neglect "attention or thought to truth and understanding," and "to make [their] chief concern not for [their] bodies or possessions, but for the highest welfare of [their] souls" (30a, 28e). Nietzsche remarks "But that is how I have always lived. I had no wishes. A man over forty-four who can say that he has never striven after honours, after women, for money!" (II, 9, p. 711).

One line of Socrates' defence is to distinguish himself from certain others in the jurors' minds. Socrates should not be confused with Sophists (19d-20c), Anaxagoras
Nietzsche exclaims to his readers: "Listen to me! For I am such and such. Do not, above all, confound me with what I am not!" (Foreword, 1, p. 673). "I don't want to be confounded with others—not even by myself" (III, 1, p. 715).

Socrates was the God's gadfly, stinging the lazy stallion of Athens to rouse it to its excellence and virtue (30e-31a). "Nietzsche's stinging criticisms of things German can be similarly interpreted" (27).

Finally, Professor Craig notes that "Socrates doesn't merely refer to the inspiration that animates poets and diviners (22b), he delivers an oracle himself (39c; cf. 33c)" (28). In his commentary on Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes his conception of inspiration (III, Z, 3, pp. 756-57), concluding that "This is my experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back thousands of years in order to find anyone who could say to me 'it is mine also'" (III, Z, 3, p. 757). Nietzsche also delivers prophecies (28). He promises the rebirth of a tragic age (III, BT, 4, p. 730), and "the return of the Greek spirit" (III, BT, 4, p. 731; UO, II, 10; JS, 343).

Compared to the profound similarities they perhaps purposely cloak and veil, the oppositions and contrasts between Plato's Socrates and Nietzsche's Nietzsche tend to be
"exoteric" (20; BGE, 30). Few, if any, turn out to not be so. If one reflects further on the various "oppositions" between Nietzsche and the Platonic Socrates, such as those noted earlier, one finds many of them to be superficial. The contrasting exterior Nietzsche has so carefully crafted, so craftily crafted, will not bear close and sustained inspection [...] nor is it meant to (28).

For one example, reading the augenblick11 commencing Ecce Homo, apparently penned by Nietzsche on October 15, 1888, celebrating and consecrating his forty-fourth birthday, one might suppose that, when compared to the classic Platonic text, with Socrates on trial, defending philosophy, destined to a martyr's death, Nietzsche's strange "autobiography" is only some narcissistic soliloquy composed to amuse himself (10, 28). However, in the "Foreword" immediately preceding the augenblick, and throughout, it is clear Ecce Homo is addressed to a contemporary audience of readers, and is also "posthumous"--to be received in the future (IV, 1, p. 782).

Professor Craig notes other examples in the text in which an apparent contrast to Socrates may be comprehended in light of the dialectical comparison between Nietzsche's portrait of himself and Plato's Socrates: despite claiming to not understand "the art of predisposing people against [him]," Nietzsche actually gives evidence for having done just this (I, 5, p. 685; III, 1, pp. 715-18; III, UC, 1, 2, pp. 732-36) (29). As for his aversion to suffering the effects of
spirits: "I almost become a sailor when it is a matter of strong doses" (II, 1, p. 694) (29). And it seems that Nietzsche, also, has experience in a kind of "extreme poverty" (I, 1, p. 678) (29). Furthermore,

Concerning his strangely belaboured sicknesses, he treats them as effects, not causes, of a decline in spiritual vitality, something to be cured by force of will (I, 2, p. 680); but was it not Socrates who first suggested that it is not "a sound body that by its virtue makes the soul good, but the opposite: a good soul provides the body with its own virtue so as to make it as good as it can be" (Rep. 403d)? (29).

Professor Craig also recommends that one invert one's perspective as to the irony masking the Apology, as well, if one is to truly distinguish and appreciate the profound likenesses and similarities between the two works and philosophers. He suggests "Perhaps the relationship between these works is best exemplified by the equivocal status of the titles Nietzsche chose for the parts of his 'apology'" (29).

At first, the four titles appear to trumpet the dramatic contrast and overt opposition between the general characters of the philosophers and works (8-10, 29). However, one should realize that Nietzsche ironically points to a common identity with Socrates (29).

Reading the Apology from this subtle, reverse point of view, first, is it not true that Socrates, too, though he always protests his ignorance, explains why he is so wise, indeed, the wisest of humans (23a-b)? Second, who that has
read Plato doubts Socrates is clever, an exceptionally skilful speaker, if and when he so chooses quite able to make a weak argument refute the stronger (29)? Third, though he usually denies he is a teacher, in fact is Socrates not remembered in the tradition, after all, as the teacher par excellence (29)?

According to Professor Craig, "There are so many striking similarities between Plato's portrayal of Socrates and Nietzsche's portrayal of himself that it is hard to avoid regarding them as two images of the same idea" (30).

As further evidence for his case, he raises still more parallels between Ecce Homo and Socrates in the dialogues:

When Nietzsche claims, "I tame every bear, I make even buffoons mind their manners" (I, 4, p. 683), is the reader not permitted--indeed, invited--to recall Socrates' taming of Thrasymachus (Repub. 350d, 354a, 450a, 498c-d) and his encounter with Aristophanes (Symp. 223c-d)? Or when Nietzsche claims to be an expert at tuning "the instrument 'man'" (I, 4, p. 683), who is not reminded of the most elaborate use of that metaphor (Repub. 410c-412a; cf. 350a and Phaedo 91c-94e)? Or when Nietzsche admits he would prefer being "a satyr rather than a saint" (Foreword, 2, p. 673), is the reader not reminded of Alcibiades' praise of Socrates employing that [very] image (Symp. 215a ff.), just as Nietzsche's claim concerning the unique quality of his books (III, 3, p. 719) echoes Alcibiades' description of Socrates' speeches (Symp. 215c-e)? If all these common, sometimes trivial, details were collected, I suspect their sum would be considerable (30).

He cites one further compelling likeness: at the outset of Ecce Homo Nietzsche speaks of being "the teacher par excellence" regarding "ascent and descent" (I, 1, p. 678). According to Professor Craig, it is likely that Nietzsche is
thinking and writing in terms of the ideas and images of the Cave simile (31). Notice that immediately following his claims about "ascent and descent," Nietzsche writes that at the age of thirty-six, his life sank to its lowest point:

I still lived, but without being able to see three paces in front of me...lived through the summer like a shadow...and the following winter, the most sunless of my life, as a shadow...
This was my minimum: The Wanderer and His Shadow originated during this time. I undoubtedly knew all about shadows in those days [...] (I, 1, p. 678; cf. BT, 14; JS, 108; BGE, 26).
IV: IDENTITY (pp. 32-55)

Professor Craig concludes "Nietzsche's 'Apology'" with separate commentaries on Nietzsche's answers under each of the four questions—titles which give Ecce Homo its form and ruling intentions (32). For, as he writes, "as anyone who has read this strange book knows, the connections between the titles and their respective texts are by no means obvious" (32).

It is his suggestion that Nietzsche answers in the spirit and letter of the Platonic Socrates: "If I have understood him correctly, those answers reveal a deep identification with the Platonic Socrates—so much so that it would not be misleading to suggest the spirit of Plato and Socrates is re-incarnated in Nietzsche" (32).

The final section of "Nietzsche's 'Apology'" occupies over a third of the essay's space and is scholarship teeming with suggestive insight. In the following brief review only a few of the more obvious "identity" arguments are presented.

Why I Am So Wise (pp. 32-40)

Why is Socrates so wise? Socrates knows his own ignorance (20d-23b). Socrates knows all human knowledge is worth little or nothing compared to divine wisdom (23a). And Socrates doesn't fear death (28b-29b). As Socrates explains it to his jury, since humans are utterly lacking knowledge
about what follows death, there can be no rational ground for thinking it is either something inherently bad, or the greatest blessing; certainly this is that which all should know they do not know. He remarks that "perhaps I am distinguished from the many human beings in this, and if I were to declare myself wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this: that not possessing any real knowledge of what comes after death, I am also conscious that I do not possess it" (29a-b). Professor Craig comments that, "Needless to say, even with perfect knowledge, evaluating death would be bound up with evaluating life" (32).

To explain why he is so wise, Nietzsche first writes that "The luck of my existence, its uniqueness perhaps, lies in its fatality..." (I, 1, p. 678). He expresses this thought "in the form of a riddle" (I, 1, p. 678), which is regarding his "dual descent," and this is what "perhaps distinguishes" him (33): "this if anything explains that neutrality, that freedom from all partiality in relation to the total problem of life which perhaps distinguishes me" (I, 1, p. 678).

Professor Craig draws the clear and distinct parallel: Socrates is "perhaps distinguished" by his impartiality with respect to death; Nietzsche is "perhaps distinguished" by his impartiality with respect to life--are these not two sides of the same coin, of the same wisdom? And is this impartiality regarding both life and death not what Nietzsche's riddle points to: "as my father I have already died, as my mother I still live and grow old?" (I, 1, p. 678) (33).
The "Why I Am So Wise" section of Nietzsche's "autobiography" proceeds to discuss his family, his chronic illnesses and struggles to recover, his notion of ressentiment, and two other "traits of [his] nature" (I, 8, p. 689): "by nature warlike" (I, 7, p. 687) and an "instinct for cleanliness" (I, 8, p. 689). Professor Craig argues that Nietzsche's discussion of his wisdom is meant to reveal the essential facets of his own natural nobility: his natural sense of piety, of gratitude for everything that contributed to his existence, beginning with his parents but in principle encompassing the entire history of the world; his comprehensive natural health, of body and soul; his naturally warlike, aggressive, victory-loving spirit; his natural taste for solitude and self-sufficiency (34).

However, according to Professor Craig, the central problem of "Why I Am So Wise" is ressentiment. Nietzsche's natural nobility is in being enlightened about it, and free from it (33, 36). "Being sick is itself a kind of ressentiment" (I, 6, p. 686). Nietzsche apparently is "healthy at bottom" (I, 2, p. 680). He has overcome his sicknesses (I, 6, pp. 686-87). Ecce Homo, expressing his amor fati, also embodies his "great health" (III, Z, 2, pp. 754-55; JS, 383), as Professor Craig notes, "the 'physiological presupposition' of his comprehensive excellence" (35).

In all of this, Nietzsche is akin to Socrates. In the dialogues Socrates is the very "picture of robust health" (35). Furthermore, Socrates maintains that justice is the
complex unity of human virtue (35); he teaches that virtue is "a certain health, beauty, and good condition of the soul" (Repub. 444a), and "that a good soul makes for a good body (Repub. 403d; cf. 410b-c)" (35).

For both philosophers, "health" and "sickness" mean more than usually thought (35). Professor Craig elaborates:

In fact, ressentiment is the universal human sickness, a deep disharmony of the soul we all suffer from. It is a division in the spirit, as revealed in one's equivocal attitude towards excellence: the noble, high, great, generous— in short, healthy— side of one's nature admires excellence, and is drawn to emulate it; the base, low, small, mean— in short, sick— side envies excellence, resents it, and is moved to deny, suppress, even annihilate it in order to escape the pain of shame (39d, Phaedrus 246a-256e, especially 253c-e) (35-36).

Insofar as he is a warlike philosopher, Nietzsche is also metaphorically akin to Socrates, who was, when necessary, the soldier's soldier (28b-29b). And one should be well aware that "martial images pervade Plato's Republic from beginning to end" (37).14

**Why I Am So Clever (pp. 41-46)**

Since he chose not to remain silent, how does Socrates defend against the accusations and charges he is clever and a skilful speaker? Socrates denies he is a skilful speaker, and he casts aspersions on the credibility of the prosecution's truthfulness (17a). Yet, ironically, in his sophisticated forensic demonstration of his honest, plain speaking (17d), he
more or less proves the point—to his old and new accusers, to the jurors, and to the readers—that here "'is a clever man called Socrates who has theories about the heavens and has investigated everything below the earth, and can make the weaker argument defeat the stronger!'" (17d). 15

Professor Craig points out that in the Greek, Socrates is making an ironic play on the word deinos (41). The root meaning is "fearsome," or "terrible," but when applied literally to speech the meaning becomes "dangerously clever" (41). As Professor Craig notices, at the end of "Why I Am So Clever" Nietzsche remarks that he knows "no other way of dealing with great tasks than that of play" (II, 10, p. 714). Like Socrates, then, Nietzsche's cleverness is in connection with his playful irony (41).

Professor Craig observes that the section does begin ironically: Nietzsche queries "Why do I know a few more things? Why am I altogether so clever?" (II, 1, p. 692). And Professor Craig observes this: "What immediately follows is a litany of things he doesn't know, and of his important mistakes" (41-42). Nietzsche doesn't know from personal experience "actual religious difficulties," "a pang of conscience," or even the concept of atheism (he is atheistic by instinct) (II, 1, p. 692). He does not know about "striving," "willing," "having taken any trouble," or
"struggling" (II, 9, p. 711). He does "not know how to distinguish between tears and music. [He does] not know how to think of happiness...without a shudder of timidity" (II, 7, p. 708). Above all, he did not know himself while he was becoming himself: "To become what one is presupposes that one does not have the remotest idea what one is" (II, 9, p. 710).

As for "the blunders" of his life (II, 9, p. 710), until a "very mature age [he] always ate badly" (II, 1, p. 693); most of his time "was spent nowhere but in the wrong places" (II, 2, p. 697); his "entire spiritual diet, the division of the day included, was a completely senseless abuse of extraordinary resources, without any kind of provision for covering this consumption, without even reflection on consumption and replenishment" (II, 2, p. 697).

Professor Craig comments that "it is not immediately clear what 'few things more' he does know. But as to why he is so clever--he became clever, from 'experience' working in conjunction with his 'instincts'" (42).

The first half of "Why I Am So Clever" discusses basic concerns of the corporeal body: questions of food and nutrition, climate and metabolism. Nietzsche tells us he learned from his own worst experiences that assiduity, "the sedentary life...[is] the real sin against the holy spirit" (II, 1, p. 696). Sickness, however, forced him "to reason, to
reflect on reason in reality" (II, 2, p. 697).

The last half of the section attends to matters of the spirit. Nietzsche discusses "selectivity in one's own kind of recreation" (II, 3, p. 698), among his favourite recreations being reading: "In my case all reading is among my recreations ... It is precisely reading which helps me to recover from my seriousness" (II, 3, p. 698; Phaedrus, 257b-279c).

Such small concerns of the body and spirit, Nietzsche writes, "according to the traditional judgement are matters of complete indifference" (II, 10, p. 712). However, he teaches, These small things -- nutrition, place, climate, recreation, the whole casuistry of selfishness -- are inconceivably more important than anything that has been considered important so far. It is precisely here that one must begin to relearn (II, 10, p. 712).

How did Nietzsche become so clever? He has finally learned to appreciate the importance of such small concerns, and therefore he now knows a few more things (IV, 8, p. 790).

Those things which mankind has hitherto pondered seriously are not even realities, merely imaginings, more strictly speaking lies from the bad instincts of sick, in the profoundest sense injurious natures -- all the concepts "God," "soul," "virtue," "sin," "the Beyond," "truth," "eternal life" [...]. But the greatness of human nature, its "divinity," was sought in them [...]. All the questions of politics, the problems of the ordering of society, and of education have been falsified down to their foundations because the most injurious men have been taken for great men -- because contempt has been taught for the "little" things, which is to say for the fundamental affairs of life itself [...]. (II, 10, p. 712).

All of this is, again, close to Socrates. Cicero has
said somewhere supposedly Socrates first brought philosophy down from the clouds, into the cities, in terms of such
metaphors as "nutrition" and "cleanliness." 16 Professor Craig
draws one example from the Republic, where it is written that
Concerning every seed or thing that grows, whether from the
earth or animals, we know that the more vigorous it is, the
more it is deficient in its own properties when it doesn't get
food, climate, or place suitable to it (Repul. 491c-d; cf.
433a).
Set at the occasion of an evening symposium, after the action
of Book I, "Socrates describes the sampling of arguments about
justice... as a banquet (Repul. 354a-b)'" (46).

Why I Write Such Good Books (pp. 46-52)

Professor Craig observes that Nietzsche begins this
section with "a general discussion of why he writes such good
books" (46), followed by self-commentaries on his previous
works, one by one. As to the general introduction,
"presumably, it somehow reveals why he writes, as well as
explains why the books are so good. And one might also
presume that whatever he says is meant to apply reflexively to
Ecce Homo" (46). As for the reviews, "collectively, these
invaluable commentaries implicitly provide another kind of
account of how he became what he is" (46).

Nietzsche does explain why he thinks his books are so
excellent, in both style and substance, yet he does not
directly address the question of why he writes (46-47). Instead, he discusses real, hypothetical and future readers, and being understood or not (47). Professor Craig supposes that "The two facets of the question are suggested in the first line: 'I am one thing, my writings are another'" (47).

Nietzsche tells us he is a master psychologist (BGE, 23). He tells us this explains why his books are so good and so hard--and why they demand such good and hard readers. "That out of my writings there speaks a psychologist is perhaps the first insight reached by a good reader--a reader such as I deserve, who reads me the way good old philologists read their Horace" (III, 5, p. 722). According to Professor Craig, "The evidence for his mastery of psychology is as apt to be found in the form, or style, of his books--in his choice of rhetoric--as it is in their content" (47).

Because of their enigmatic, ironical style, his books teach, or at least assist the reader to learn, to teach himself if he is so inclined...That his books are subtle, and allusive including self-allusive to the point of being labyrinthine, is not likely to be disputed. As such they could only be expected to appeal to a certain kind of reader (48).

As Nietzsche explains,

One can simply no longer endure other books, philosophical ones least of all. To enter this noble and delicate world is an incomparable distinction--to do so one absolutely must not be a German; it is in the end a distinction one must have earned. But whoever is related to me through loftiness of will experiences when he reads me veritable ecstacies of learning... (III, 3, p. 719).
According to Professor Craig, the self-commentaries, which occupy the centre of Ecce Homo, emphasize Nietzsche's psychological acumen (49). To illustrate his power in this respect, Nietzsche concludes the general introduction with his "genius of the heart" passage from Beyond Good and Evil. As noted above, in quoting this passage in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche fuels speculation as to who it is describing. Professor Craig would guess that the "genius of the heart" could only be either Socrates or Nietzsche himself.

Why I Am a Destiny (pp. 52-55)

The final section of Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's answer explaining why he is "a destiny, a fate, a great event, ein Schicksal" (52). The rhetorical style and tone of this section is most striking: "Any trace of equivocation has disappeared, replaced by the tone of the Absolute. Everything seems exaggerated, and coloured in black or white, Yes or No, truth or lie, good or evil. Only slightly less noticeable is the preoccupation with religion and morality" (52).

The style and content of Ecce Homo are interconnected (52-53). Playing "the teacher and advance proclaimer of this monstrous logic of terror, the prophet of a gloom and an eclipse of the sun whose like has probably never yet occurred on earth" (JS, 343), "last disciple and initiate of the god
Dionysus" (BGE, 295), "teacher of the eternal recurrence" (TI, X, 5), "in Greek, and not only in Greek, the Antichrist" (III, 2, p. 719), Nietzsche mimics a Biblical prophet. He believes he is "a destiny" because he thinks he exposes the psychology of Christian morality as its "feet of clay" (Foreword, 2, p. 674). Bringing Ecce Homo to its crescendo, he thunders:

The unmasking of Christian morality is an event without parallel, a real catastrophe. He who exposes it is a force majeure, a destiny--he breaks the history of mankind in two. One lives before him, or one lives after him [...] The lightning-bolt of truth struck precisely that which stood highest: he who grasps what was then destroyed had better see whether he has anything at all left in his hands (IV, 8, pp. 789-790).

As Professor Craig points out, Socrates, too, was relentless and destructive in his questioning of "the established religion and its morality" (53)--the gods of Homer and the conventional Homeric morality and virtue founded upon this tradition (54).¹⁷

Socrates' offensive and subversive activities continued over many years, helping him to acquire notoriety among many Athenians. In his own words, the affidavit in the legal action brought against him by his accusers and prosecutors read "something like this: 'Socrates is guilty of corrupting the minds of the young, and of believing in deities of his own invention instead of the gods recognized by the State'" (24b).¹⁸
CHAPTER FOUR:

"a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal..."

But how can he achieve so strange a goal?...And how can we attain that goal? you will ask. At the beginning of a journey towards that goal, the god of Delphi cries to you his oracle: "Know yourself." It is a hard saying: for that god "conceals nothing and says nothing, but only indicates," as Heraclitus has said. What does he indicate to you? (UC, II, 10; cf. I-IV, passim; PTA, 8).

*End and goal.*—Not every end is a goal. The end of a melody is not its goal; but nonetheless, if the melody had not reached its end it would not have reached its goal either. A parable. (WS, 204; cf. 87, 275; HH, 33, 56, 107, 145, 155-58, 208, 270-72, 29C, 475-76, 494; AOM, 179, 378).

The many forces that now have to come together in the thinker.—To abstract oneself from sensory perception, to exalt oneself to contemplation of abstractions—that was at one time actually felt as exaltation; we can no longer quite enter into this feeling. To revel in pallid images of words and things, to sport with such invisible, inaudible, impalpable beings...It is not the content of these sportings of spirituality, it is they themselves which constituted "the higher life" in the prehistoric ages of science. Hence, Plato's admiration for dialectics and his enthusiastic belief that dialectics necessarily pertained to the good, unsensory man. It is not only knowledge which has been discovered gradually and piece by piece, the means of knowing as such, the conditions and operations which precede knowledge in man, have been discovered gradually and piece by piece too. And each time the newly discovered operation or the novel condition seemed to be, not a means to knowledge, but in itself the content, goal and sum total of all that was worth knowing. The thinker needs imagination, self-uplifting, abstraction, desensualization, invention, presentiment, induction, dialectics, deduction, the critical faculty, the assemblage of material, the impersonal mode of thinking, contemplativeness and comprehensiveness, and not least justice and love for all that exists—but all these means to knowledge once counted individually in the history of the vita contemplativa as goals, and final goals, and bestowed on their inventors that feeling of happiness which appears in the human soul when it catches sight of a final goal. (Dawn, 43; cf. 44-45, 106-10, 114, 119, 127, 130, 164, 530, 537-41, 544, 547-50; JS, 258, 360, 382; BGE, Pre., 207; GM, II, 16, 24).
I: Recapitulation and Critical Commentary

i) Kaufmann, Nietzsche: 'a Yes'

In Kaufmann's translation of the fourth last aphorism in the original edition of *The Joyous Science*, "Vita femina," the first part reads as follows:

For seeing the ultimate beauties of a work, no knowledge or good will is sufficient; this requires the luckiest of accidents: The clouds that veil these peaks have to lift for once so that we see them glowing in the sun. Not only do we have to stand in precisely the right spot in order to see this, but the unveiling must have been accomplished by our own soul because it needed some external expression and parable, as if it were a matter of having something to hold on to and retain control of itself. But it is so rare for all of this to coincide that I am inclined to believe that the highest pinnacles of everything good, whether it be a work, a deed, humanity, or nature, have so far remained concealed and veiled from the great majority and even from the best human beings. But what does unveil itself for us, unveils itself for us once only (JS, 339; cf. 108-12, 258; UO, II, 2; HH, 586; Dawn, 458; TI, Pre.; Foreword, pp. 673-76; III, 3, pp. 719-20).

I am inclined to believe that Kaufmann's complete work on Nietzsche--many lesser contributions ("what could only be means, entr'acte, and minor works" [III, UO, 3, p. 738]), eleven translations of all but three of Nietzsche's books, edited, with commentaries, and Nietzsche--is just such a rare Nietzschean revelation, revealing itself for us only once. The Kaufmann translations superceded previous attempts and provide a fairly reliable philological foundation for Nietzsche studies. So far as this is not impossible ("Untranslatable.--It is neither the best nor the worst of a book that is untranslatable" [HH, 184; cf. WS, 132; JS,
Kaufmann unveils for the English reader the language of Nietzsche's literary genius and art of style—Nietzsche's "many stylistic possibilities—the most multifarious art of style that has ever been at the disposal of one man...the art of the great rhythm, the great style of long periods to express a tremendous up and down of sublime, of superhuman passion...a thousand miles beyond what was called poetry hitherto" (III, 4, pp. 721-22), "the infinite and the impossible...all of his own masks and multiplicities" (BGE, 190), "the greatest strength any philosopher so far has had at his disposal" (BGE, 191; cf. 28, 247).

Nietzsche is a recognized "classic" in the field, in any language, and has underwritten most, if not all, subsequent Anglo-European and North American Nietzsche studies. First published in 1950, and over two decades after the final fourth edition appeared in 1974, in many ways Kaufmann's work will remain very useful for scholars.5

Kaufmann discovered the prime value of Socrates in the study of Nietzsche.6 A "Socratic" view of Nietzsche and 'a Yes' interpretation of Ecce Homo are dominant ideas that define the context and parameters of Kaufmann's comprehensive reconstruction of the man and his writings.

What argument and evidence supports these judgements? One is first alerted in Nietzsche to the Socratic theme and
'Yes' thesis in the four prefaces. In the first, Kaufmann presumes Nietzsche is decisively influenced by and closely related to Socrates. Socrates is posted head of the tradition, Nietzsche is taught as an heir and herald (JS, 344; BGE, 212). Kaufmann suggests that "Nietzsche's greatest value may well lie in the fact that he embodied the true philosophic spirit of 'searching into myself and other men'--to cite the Apology of Socrates" (xvi), Kaufmann himself now citing, as the embodiment of Nietzsche's true philosophic spirit, 29c-d, and writing of Nietzsche, "and few men could have reiterated the words of the great Greek with more conviction" (xvi).

In the short preface to the adumbrated paperback edition, Kaufmann wishes Nietzsche to "stand as an invitation to read Nietzsche and, above all, to think. Its message is essentially the motto which Socrates in his Apology inscribed over all subsequent philosophy: 'The unexamined life is not worth living!'" (xii).

Clearly, Kaufmann derives the dual perspective of Part IV, the "Synopsis," from the final vision of Ecce Homo--"Has one understood me?--Dionysus versus the Crucified.--" (IV, 9, p. 791). Indeed, these last words of Nietzsche stand as the motto for Part IV (335; cf. xv; I, 1-3, pp. 678-82; III, BT, 1, pp. 726-27; III, Z, 6, pp. 760-62; IV, 1, pp. 782-83).

"Nietzsche's Attitude Toward Socrates," Chapter 13, is
the second half of the "Synopsis"; thus, by Kaufmann's design, it is the penultimate chapter. This seems to suggest that Kaufmann wished to bestow extra weight to this special subject in his reconstruction of Nietzsche. It may be placed at the end because Kaufmann "considered it a particularly fitting coda and testament,"8 "one great Cyclops eye of Socrates" (BT, 14), so to speak. In any case, Kaufmann intends Nietzsche, especially the contents of Chapter 13, to express with all possible force the profound impact of Socrates on Nietzsche.

Examining the research-design and contents of Nietzsche further, while Nietzsche's life and thought is presented in chronology, note that it is only in this chapter where the commentary on a specific issue-area strictly adheres to the actual sequence of Nietzsche's publications.

As was learned, examining select evidence, in order, with "No-doing" and "Yes-saying" commentary, including critical assessment of literature extant, Kaufmann aims Chapter 13 to "revalue" or "invert" the standard image of Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates.

"No-doing," then, Chapter 13 is written to object to and overrule any view that Nietzsche hated Socrates the individual--composed to be the most extreme repudiation of any belief Nietzsche portrays Socrates as a "villain" of world-history, whether it be the ever-elusive historical man, the
ironic Plato's Socrates, or Nietzsche's own idiosyncratic conception (321). For Kaufmann, the presumption that Nietzsche hates Socrates is almost "truth stood on its head" (III, 1, p. 717). Chapter 13 is intended to be the measured antithesis, also, of any dogmatic belief that Nietzsche was ambivalent toward Socrates (321; cf. 17).

As "Yes-saying," Kaufmann accounts for Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates in terms of admiration and affirmation. From first to last, as far possible from the arch "villain," Nietzsche admires Socrates as an heroic world-historic individual (391). This affirmation of Socrates decisively shaped Nietzsche's life (393): "Apparently, Nietzsche himself derived his picture of the ideal philosopher from the Apology, and Socrates became his model" (398). "Nietzsche emulates Socrates, the model philosopher" (406).

Kaufmann's conception of Ecce Homo as portal to the Nietzschean oeuvre is in symbiosis with his treatment of Nietzsche's Socrates in Chapter 13.

The final Section III contains a four page reading of the problem in Ecce Homo, of which the last two are given over to discussing Beyond Good and Evil, 295, as noted, cryptically quoted by Nietzsche in the text (III, 6, pp. 724-25).

Pre-established by Kaufmann's design, the key 'Yes' proposition, "that Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's Apology," is
stated only now, at the apex finally emerging in full view like an "idea of ideas, the key of keys, the light of lights" (*Dawn*, 68), "this question in each and every thing...this ultimate eternal seal and confirmation" (*JS*, 341).

Consistent with the program of dual commentary, the 'Yes' interpretation of *Ecce Homo* forges yet "another link between Socrates and Nietzsche" (384). Kaufmann concludes the demonstration of Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates by underlining how and why Nietzsche's final account of himself, his last original work, is the culmination of this attitude.

Considering Nietzsche's background, Kaufmann points out in his "Introduction" to his edition, it is not surprising to find the text has "classical inspirations...Aristotle's portrait of the great-souled man in the *Nichomachean Ethics*...was probably inspired in part by Socrates' *Apology*. In any case, both left their mark on *Ecce Homo.*"³

Clearly, then, Kaufmann's classical "Socratic" reading of Nietzsche and the 'Yes' thesis govern his Nietzsche.

Interesting, too, is that Chapter 13 in relation to the text as a writing echoes how Socrates' *Symposium* discourse on love stands in relation to those preceding his. Kaufmann does end Chapter 13, Section III citing a certain selection from Alcibiades' words, coupling this with the "hymn on the genius of the heart" as "an epitaph for Nietzsche" (411).
However interesting or true all of this may be for Walter Kaufmann and his *Nietzsche*, the fundamental problems and questions persist: first, probed by a critical "hammer," does Kaufmann's account of the problem in Chapter 13, as the necessary condition for a "Socratic" reading of Nietzsche, ring sound and true? Second, is the sufficient foundation for a classical interpretation of *Ecce Homo* in the text itself? Kaufmann's *Nietzsche* was pivotal, a seminal work in Nietzsche studies. It will stand out as "monumental" history (UO, II). The text properly points the way toward *Ecce Homo* and the Greeks. Perhaps none other than Walter Kaufmann is Nietzsche's "genius of the heart...who guesses the concealed treasure...the divining rod for every grain of gold that has long lain buried under much muck and sand" (BGE, 295).^{10}

From another, less flattering perspective, however, the selective handling of evidence and rather polemical argumentation in Chapter 13 tends to misrepresent the true nature of Nietzsche's Socrates, is deliberately misleading, and could be construed as irresponsible sophistry.^{11}

Presuming obviously detailed knowledge of all evidence at hand, as well as rationality and conscious intentionality, it would appear that a hidden agenda of Kaufmann's text is to orchestrate the victory of his weaker argument that Nietzsche admires Socrates.
In the preface to the final fourth edition, responding to unnamed allegations that his account deals only with "Nietzsche's Admiration for Socrates," Kaufmann rejoins that he changed the title, and revised Chapter 13, to avoid any such misunderstanding on the part of critics and commentators. "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward Socrates," he assures the reader, does in fact consider all passages where Nietzsche is, in Kaufmann's words, "sharply critical" of Socrates (iv).

Despite Kaufmann's reassurances, should one carefully scrutinize the comments of Chapter 13, line by line, as well as all relevant footnotes and commentaries in his critical editions of translations, checking this against the actual content of the evidence presented—and certain other passages not presented, and left without commentary—it appears as if Kaufmann does avoid important passages which, on the face of it, might contradict the argument Nietzsche admires Socrates.

Ex parte, Kaufmann's account does not do justice to Nietzsche's critique of Socrates, while overestimating admiration as the very core of Nietzsche's view. Many passages where Nietzsche criticizes Socrates, and other references that may suggest ambiguity toward him, are either avoided or dismissed in terms of unmitigated admiration.

Then again, allowing the benefit of the doubt, Kaufmann means to defend Nietzsche and the truth. Given the
exceptional circumstances of Nietzsche's madness, his sister's actions, the Will to Power non-book, the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche, and the fate of Nietzsche's post-WWII reception in North America, in Chapter 13 Kaufmann purposely propagates a "necessary lie" (UO, II, 10). Therefore, he is guilty only of overreacting to countermand the key part of the "Nietzsche Legend" that Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates is hateful.

Regardless of aims and motivations, the difficulty now is that Kaufmann's image of Nietzsche's Socrates is as partial as the one it is intended to revalue. Conceptualizing Nietzsche's view solely in terms of "admiration" attenuates the complicated, problematic image that emerges from the total body of evidence we have, published and posthumous.

The best example to expose Kaufmann's agenda, tactics and tendencies, noble or otherwise, is his commentary on Nietzsche's attitude in Beyond Good and Evil. While he reads admiration into 212 and 295—as something of a diversion?—the fundamental evidence of the Preface and 190-191 receives negligible treatment. As well, discussion of "The Problem of Socrates" in Twilight is too brief, limited to only two paragraphs.

To repeat, does Chapter 13 deliver an unambiguous proof unequivocally demonstrating Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates? In fact are there foundations in the texts for a
"Socratic" view of Nietzsche, which by implication might substantiate a 'Yes' interpretation of Ecce Homo?

Should we conform to Kaufmann's view of Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates, to use Nietzsche's words in this context, we must "abandon exact observation because exact thinking there becomes painful...we draw a conclusion on the basis of data in which the exceptions outweigh the rule" (Dawn, 115). Kaufmann "wants to persuade us to see a very simple causality where in truth a very complicated causality is at work" (Dawn, 6). In short, admiration is not "the content, goal, and sum total" (Dawn, 43) of Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates.

As for the specific contents of Kaufmann's brief case in Section III, the sufficient argument and evidence for an adequate defence and development of a classical interpretation of the text cannot be captured in a couple of short paragraphs. Kaufmann's cursory demonstration that the chapter headings of Ecce Homo recall motifs of Socrates and the Apology simply opens the horizon of the question and affirms 'a Yes.'
ii) Dannhauser, *Nietzsche's View: 'a No'*

Where Chapter 13 can appear to be, but in reality is not, a comprehensive examination of the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates, Dannhauser's *Nietzsche's View* is just such a study.

Eclipsing Kaufmann's select survey, this book contains an exhaustive chronological expatiation of all passages with references to Socrates, as well as many related materials containing no explicit reference.12 As noted, this fulfils the prescriptions and recommendations proposed in the prefaces to *Nietzsche* and exordium of Chapter 13. However, in so doing Dannhauser constructs a counter-image of the problem to challenge Kaufmann's influence: Nietzsche's view is ambiguous and complex, but at bottom reflects a perpetual quarrel with Socrates.

For Dannhauser, from beginning to end substantial evidence in the texts expresses Nietzsche's direct attack on Socrates the man, his ideas, his followers, and logical Socratism as doctrine, not to mention the very critical attitude toward Plato and Platonism throughout.

At the beginning of the "Introduction, Dannhauser states that Nietzsche "understood what he opposed and attacked...Socrates and classical philosophy...he condemned them" (14). "Nietzsche must be viewed as the enemy and attacker of Socrates" (14).
In the "Conclusion," we are told "to study Nietzsche's image of Socrates is primarily to study Nietzsche's attack on Socrates" (269). "Nietzsche may be fascinated by Socrates... but he must finally reject classical philosophy... The perpetual encounter with Socrates must perpetually turn into a quarrel with him" (272-273). 13

Three direct counter-points to Kaufmann's treatment of the problem in Chapter 13 are set out in the programmatic "Introduction," the second theme being Dannhauser's 'No' case contra Kaufmann's 'Yes' in Section III.

Should one attend to similarities between Nietzsche and Socrates, and between *Ecce Homo* and the *Apology*, Dannhauser reminds, then one must also appreciate the truth that, in rank order, both in quantity and by degree, the substantive contrasts have more significance (40).

To defend his 'Yes,' Kaufmann neatly overlooks such an obvious contrast as the fact that Plato, not Socrates, created the written text (40). Socrates, so it is said, wrote next to nothing (*Phaedo* 60d-61c; *Phaedrus* 257b-279c; cf. *BT*, 14).

Citing three other outstanding contrasts between the philosophers and texts, Dannhauser also notes that the tone of what becomes Nietzsche's last composition, if not exactly the opposite, differs dramatically from the classical calm struck by Plato's Socrates on trial (40).
These critical comments undermine Kaufmann's 'Yes.' How can Nietzsche's last work affirm Socrates if from the beginning evidence shows he quarrels with him? How is Ecce Homo a "self-portrait," based on Plato's model, when the tone and substance of the two texts are so different?

Even supposing Nietzsche's chapter headings do recall the Apology, by no means is it necessarily so that Nietzsche must therefore have based the structure, style or substance of his text on the Platonic model. This recollection itself only emphasizes aspects of Nietzsche's attack on Socrates.

In "The View of Socrates in the Final Period," reviewing Nietzsche's final notes on Socrates in Ecce Homo, Dannhauser returns to resolve his 'No' case contra Kaufmann.

From Dannhauser's 'No' point of view, Ecce Homo only amplifies the discussion of Socrates in Twilight, recently completed for publication by Nietzsche in 1888.

In "The Problem of Socrates," Nietzsche quarrels with Socrates and denounces him for being a decadent. What few references to Socrates in Ecce Homo there are add little new to Nietzsche's image. The text simply supplies more information linking Socrates to decadence (235). Reinforcing his denunciation in terms of the diagnosis of "dialectics as a symptom of decadence," Nietzsche now describes the case of Socrates as "the most famous case of all" (I, 1, p. 679). For
Dannhauser, the text therefore becomes Nietzsche's final skirmish with Socrates.

To be fair with Nietzsche, and to read his outpouring of writings of 1888, one must remember the psychology and physiology of his personal tragedy. These works were composed on the very edge of the impending sudden collapse, complete breakdown, and descent into utter madness, and because of which Nietzsche would abruptly cease to write.

The "terrible truth" (Foreword, 2-3, pp. 673-75; IV, 1, pp. 782-83) is that an apparently unbounded conceit, delusions of grandeur, visions of splendour—the shocking, shrill tone of the Ecce Homo we have, and even more radically pronounced in discarded drafts and suppressed passages—barely contain the author's fatal, mortal insanity.

With understandably circumspect and taciturn comments handling these dangerous, explosive elements of the text, Dannhauser tactfully concludes his brief review leaving unspoken the most striking contrast between the philosophers: whereas toward the end of 1888 Nietzsche was reduced to a deluded lunatic, at the age of seventy certainly Socrates had not lost effective command of his faculties (234-237).

There can be no doubt that Dannhauser's Nietzsche's View subjects Kaufmann's "Socratic" Nietzsche interpretation to the critical and strict test of the texts. Along with
Kaufmann, Dannhauser aims to be at once "Apollinian" and "Dionysian," "Yes-saying" and "No-doing." The irony is that Kaufmann himself is first and foremost the worthy foil.

Dannhauser's "constructive refutation" exposes Kaufmann's reading of the problem as too cheerful and optimistic, as too "Socratic." Kaufmann's "revaluation" of the problem is not sustained by a close and complete reading of all evidence, much of which testifies to a more complex attitude toward Socrates than Kaufmann's conception of admiration will allow. Nietzsche is not quite so "gentle" toward Socrates, toward his reason, morality or indeed philosophy itself, as Kaufmann would lead many to believe:

The attack on Socrates is the prelude to the most radical questions: Why Truth? Why Science? Why Philosophy? Nietzsche's philosophy, which asks these questions, will later be understood by himself as a philosophy different from previous philosophies not only in content but in mode. He will not cease to call himself a philosopher, but he will reevaluate the terms philosophy and philosopher (86).

Dannhauser thus transposes his idea of Nietzsche's mode of "revaluation" and politics of philosophy to apply to his own case contra Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 13, III. Careful to clarify his position, though, as distinct from the prejudice that Nietzsche unforgiveably hates Socrates, Dannhauser does in fact contend that an element of admiration is evident in some of Nietzsche's writings on Socrates, particularly so in the series of works in the middle, aphoristic period.
However, holding that it surely is as untenable to level, reduce or totalize Nietzsche's view to admiration, Dannhauser usurps for his own argument the right and authority to command the very point Kaufmann attempts to demonstrate.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche's View is not intended as a complete and utter condemnation of Kaufmann, Nietzsche or Chapter 13. Quite the contrary is true. The irony that Kaufmann is the foil also implies that Dannhauser honours and values his scholarship as intelligent and pertinent.

The critique of Kaufmann's image of the problem implicitly initiates a sustained literary conversation, a dialogue and negotiation, engaging that image in the collaborative, "constructive" sense of dialectic. The scholarly art and utility of Nietzsche's View is such that, when read critically and conjoined with Nietzsche, its contents and design facilitate in-depth critical study of the subject and research in the field.

With this in mind, Dannhauser's "attitude toward" Kaufmann is neither hateful nor ambiguous. Dannhauser can "admire" Kaufmann while still taking issue with many of his arguments. Though Dannhauser "attacks" his arguments, Kaufmann is not the arch "villain."

Where Kaufmann suggests that "Nietzsche's repudiation of Christ cannot be fully understood apart from his admiration
for Socrates" (390), the same is true of Dannhauser's respectful critique of Nietzsche, which cannot be fully understood apart from his debt to Kaufmann's scholarship. And where Kaufmann argues that Nietzsche affirms Socrates and Socratism as necessary in the history of philosophy, Dannhauser re-affirms Nietzsche as required reading for scholars investigating Nietzsche's image of Socrates.

One basic premise of Kaufmann's "revaluation" Dannhauser does not dispute: the problem of Socrates is a central theme of the Nietzschean oeuvre. Indeed, Dannhauser agrees that Nietzsche's view is a focal point of his thought and reflects his views of reason, morality, and culture. This premise is entrenched in Dannhauser's study. Therefore, Nietzsche's View buttresses Kaufmann's recovery of Socrates at the core of Nietzsche's thought (but not as the whole of this core, nor accounted for simply in terms of admiration).\(^15\)

Ultimately, though, since a "necessary lie" predicates Kaufmann's "revaluation" of the problem, and a "constructive refutation" of Kaufmann's position prefaces Dannhauser's comprehensive overview, Nietzsche's View represents the necessary "increase in truthfulness" \((UO, II, 10)\).

Documenting complicated dimensions of the contest with Socrates, Nietzsche's View supercedes the optimistic image portrayed in Nietzsche. Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates,
such as it is, is put in proper perspective as but a problematic part of Nietzsche's protracted struggle.

And yet, although it is clearly shown that Nietzsche perpetually contests and quarrels with Socrates, in the end Dannhauser still finds it necessary to acknowledge "a strange kinship between Nietzsche and Socrates." 16

With respect to the question of the thesis, Dannhauser's review of *Ecce Homo* is at best an aphoristic glance and explores the text in terms of the *Apology* in no more depth or detail than Kaufmann.

On closer inspection, while the 'No' case rather effectively critiques and refutes the specific contents of Kaufmann's 'Yes' stated and defended in 13, III, a classical interpretation of *Ecce Homo* is itself not necessarily negated. Dannhauser admits as much when he grants that certain formal comparisons may be drawn between the philosophers and two texts (40, 236).

Furthermore, while quite correct to criticize Kaufmann's dissembling silence on the quarrel with Socrates for doing no justice to Nietzsche's complex view, when given so few direct references to Socrates in *Ecce Homo*, Dannhauser himself, sub silentio, passes over Nietzsche's telling self-comment on The Birth, to the effect that with Socrates he had discovered his only "parable and parallel in history" (III, BT, 2, p. 727).
iii) Craig, "Nietzsche's 'Apology'": 'a straight line'

Juxtaposed with Kaufmann's Nietzsche, 13, III, Dannhauser's Nietzsche's View forms a binary case: an initial thesis versus its antithesis, 'a Yes' against 'a No.'

The case of Dannhauser contra Kaufmann is the point of departure for Professor Craig's "Nietzsche's 'Apology.'"

In sequential and dialectical relation, this paper essays 'a straight line' of analysis of Ecce Homo.

Contending that Nietzsche does consciously identify with the Platonic model, arguing that the text is best read as a Nietzschean equivalent, in one immediate sense "Nietzsche's 'Apology'" represents the proverbial Hegelian "negation of the negation." The reactive 'No' force negating an original 'Yes' thesis is itself negated in 'a straight line.'

However, aware that in Ecce Homo Nietzsche notes the harmony of opposites as one of the preconditions for carrying out his task, for Professor Craig both Nietzsche's "oppositions" and "likenesses" to Socrates are essential "moments" in understanding the equation of Ecce Homo.

Toward a synthetic approach, a perspective beyond 'Yes' and 'No,' as it were, Professor Craig affirms both positions as in and for themselves fundamentally necessary.17 Ecce Homo, he argues, is best read with constant dialectical reference to Socrates and the Apology.
In effect, "Nietzsche's 'Apology'" attempts to resolve the "contradiction of values" (CW, Pre.) inherent in the case of Dannhauser contra Kaufmann (Dawn, 474). Nietzsche's self-styled opposition to Socrates is thus advanced as the first principal part of the case. However, it is then demonstrated that the manifest opposition to Socrates in the text, unmistakeable as it may be, is an ironic mask qualifying other profound similarities and striking parallels.

Just as Dannhauser's 'No' is the "increase in truthfulness" overcoming Kaufmann's "necessary lie" and "revaluation" of the problem with his 'Yes,' so Professor Craig's 'straight line' incorporates Dannhauser's perspective, progressing in the process to elevate the dialectical interplay of the argument to new and higher spheres. The active position is thus restored on the foundations of a much more compelling interpretative case.

Whereas both Nietzsche and Nietzsche's View only offer rather brief, not to say surface, readings of the Platonic and Nietzschean works, "Nietzsche's 'Apology'" provides rigorous and sustained examination of the two key texts in question.

Cancelling Kaufmann's 'Yes,' Dannhauser notes three differences between the philosophers and two texts, remarking that this number could be greatly multiplied. Reviewing Ecce Homo much later, additional examples are adduced.
Picking up the question of the thesis at precisely this point where Dannhauser's 'No' leaves off, Professor Craig proceeds to systematically select and gather, divide (and subdivide), and greatly multiply first "opposites" between the philosophers and texts, followed by "likenesses."

First, in bold contrast, where Socrates embodies his docta ignorantia, Nietzsche is "So Wise"; when Socrates denies he is a clever speaker, Nietzsche is "So Clever"; while Socrates does not write, Nietzsche writes "Such Good Books"; and while Socrates was but buffoon and gadfly, Nietzsche declares his world-historic "Destiny."

On autobiographical information in the two texts, and elsewhere, Socrates was at home and never left his beloved Athens; Nietzsche was a nomadic hermit, alienated from his people and fatherland. Socrates, well-known in Greece, speaks at a very public trial, before a large jury; Nietzsche, alone with himself on his forty-fourth birthday, addresses his life to himself and an anonymous and posthumous audience. Socrates was evidently pious, displaying humility before his Gods; Nietzsche appears as the disrespectful immoralist, boastful of his atheism. Socrates was accused of inventing new gods; Nietzsche's intent is to destroy the old idols.

Detailing these and numerous other "opposites" between the philosophers and works, subsequently documenting many more
"likenesses," Professor Craig aims to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Nietzsche's portrayal of himself is composed to be read with constant dialectical reference to Plato's portrayal of Socrates in the *Apology*.

By comparison, Nietzsche claims to know and defend truth; Socrates defends his speech as truthful. Nietzsche quotes his Zarathustra to advise potential "disciples"; Socrates denies ever being anyone's teacher. Nietzsche implores us to not misunderstand him; Socrates disassociates himself from Sophists. Nietzsche is "the last antipolitical German"; Socrates justifies his apolitical life. Nietzsche asserts his task of "the revaluation of all values so far" as an act of supreme self-examination; Socrates exhorts Athenians to the Delphic injunction "know thyself." Nietzsche wants to raze old idols; Socrates is charged with raising new deities.

As well, Nietzsche was unfashionable, before his time and is posthumous; Socrates was also untimely, yet through the dialogues he is reborn anew in each generation of readers. Socrates, writes Nietzsche, is the most famous case of dialectics as a symptom of decadence. Yet Nietzsche admits that he too is a dialectician and writes of his own decadence.

Further, Nietzsche evidently has some sense of humour and appreciates play, typical of Socrates, too. Nietzsche's voice delivers "oracles," and he blesses us with his madness,
"The madman" (JS, 125) incarnate; in the dialogues Socrates partakes of his divine, mystical, and prophetic in a number of ways. Proclaiming the death of God, the revaluation, the overman, eternal return and will to power, Nietzsche ushers in the "great politics" of his future; Socrates compels philosophy to politics, thus becoming "the one turning point and vortex of world-history."

Commenting on Nietzsche's discussions under each of the four chapter headings, the final "Identity" section completes the case demonstrating that Nietzsche intends *Ecce Homo* to ironically parallel Plato's portrayal of Socrates.

On reflection, can there be any doubt that in the *Apology* Socrates does indeed explain his wisdom, exemplify his cleverness, and indicate he knows very well that he is the author of a destiny--the author of his own destiny?

Providing much interesting and suggestive scholarship, "Nietzsche's 'Apology'" is an invaluable study of *Ecce Homo*. One critical note is to insist upon the following fine distinction: the chapter headings of *Ecce Homo* are title statements, below which are thematic disquisitions; they are not questions which Nietzsche proceeds to answer, as Kaufmann suggests. The question mark is implicit, but strictly speaking it is "why I am so wise," not "why am I so wise."

The contents under each heading do provide "answers"
to "questions" ("Why do I know a few more things? Why am I altogether so clever?" [II, 1, p. 692]; "I shall be asked why I have really narrated all these little things..." [II, 10, p. 712]).

Socrates also "answers" in the Apology ("Perhaps someone will say, 'Do you feel no compunction, Socrates, at having pursued an activity which puts you in danger of the death penalty?" [28b]; "'Socrates, on this occasion we shall disregard Anytus and acquit you, but only on one condition: that you give up spending your time on this quest and stop philosophizing. If we catch you going on in the same way, you shall be put to death!'" [29c]; "'But surely, Socrates, after you have left us you can spend the rest of your life in quietly minding your own business!'" [37e]).

However, the philosophers tell their lives according to their own contrived questions, displaying artful irony and complex rhetorical strategies vis-à-vis their audience.¹⁹

The more serious question concerning the classical interpretation is the presumption that Nietzsche consciously crafted Ecce Homo in the form of his own "apology."

Professor Craig clearly demonstrates that overt and covert connections to Plato's Socrates abound in the text. The careful examination of Ecce Homo in relation to the Apology seems to yield the grounds necessary to justify a
classical interpretation. Nevertheless, a skeptic will still question whether Nietzsche intended the text as his "apology." In the special case of Ecce Homo, the possibility may exist that the parallel Nietzsche strikes with the Apology manifests itself largely unconsciously.

Was Nietzsche anticipating his impending breakdown? Was he aware that he was about to cease writing forever? Ecce Homo could and would not be studied as his "apology" had he not encapsulated his life and works to the point of his forty-fourth birthday, 1888, and then collapsed into insanity precisely when he did. For if his fate and/or fortune were different, had he continued composing unabated, had he produced one more original work, or many more, what became his last testament would not compare for him as the trial dialogue does in Socrates' life and Plato's literature.

The works of 1888, including his discovery by Brandes, could indicate that Nietzsche was looking ahead to the next decade, planning to prepare another book. Not expecting his rapid demise, he may never have intended this brief biography as a final summation of his life and philosophy.  

Yet both the cosmological and psychological dimensions of the eternal return theorem and Nietzsche's avowed amor fati must preclude such paradoxical speculation. Supposing Socrates' jury voted against Anytus and Meletus—what then?
II: Resolving the Problem of Nietzsche's Socrates

Exactly what is Nietzsche's fundamental predisposition toward Socrates? In fact what is Nietzsche's view? Let us now resolve the case of Nietzsche's Socrates for ourselves.

Nietzsche wrote extensively on Socrates. Extended discussions are contained in his first book, The Birth, and in Twilight, the last book he himself saw through to print. Socrates is often referred to in each of Nietzsche's numerous works in the intervening years.

What image finally emerges from this large body of evidence, this complicated assortment of untimely thoughts, reflections, maxims, opinions, notes, and comments?

Many studies presume that Nietzsche hates and opposes Socrates. Others suggest that Nietzsche's Socrates is either contradictory or irreducibly ambiguous. Another perspective recommends looking beyond Nietzsche being "for" or "against" Socrates.

The first question is how one determines Nietzsche's view (exegesis) and appropriates his thought (interpretation). There are correct and incorrect hermeneutic principles to be observed in terms of reading Nietzsche's texts. As a classical philologist, Nietzsche reminds of the value of reading well, reading carefully. He writes as an educator, legislator, musician, poet, prophet, psychologist (BGE, "We
Scholars"; JS, Bk. V). Fusing the elements of artist and philosopher (UO; E), when he does speak of Socrates, he does not speak of him with a single voice with a single meaning. This is one obvious reason why such great variety of interpretation of the same body of evidence is extant--and not only in relation to the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates.

With respect to the exegesis and interpretation of Nietzsche's views on the many subjects he discusses, to do him justice one must privilege his works with the strict genealogical philology he recommends.

The later prefaces, including those postscripted, Book Five of The Joyous Science, as well as the self-commentaries of Ecce Homo, however self-critical all of the above are, speak to the experiments, evolutions, and self-overcomings in Nietzsche's authorship. The mature Nietzsche studies and carefully integrates his earlier efforts.

Therefore, for any select subject or object treated in his texts--such as Socrates--to accurately comprehend Nietzsche's view, one's understanding must not remain at a level of origins (The Birth). One must study subsequent statements (e.g., Human, All Too Human, The Joyous Science, Beyond Good and Evil) and genealogically interrelate a whole body of evidence (letters, philologica, early and late posthumous notes, works of 1888).
As Kaufmann was the first to discover, the whole fact of Socrates occupies a special status in Nietzsche's works. The monumental figure of Socrates unquestionably casts light and shadow over virtually all of Nietzsche's philosophic activity: his multifarious styles and inclinations, his thoughts on humanity and culture, his views on reason and morality, knowledge and truth, his visions of the philosopher and of philosophy's relation to politics.

Socrates decisively influenced Nietzsche. What is important, however, is to evaluate this influence. The following series of comments on selected evidence for the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates is designed to map out and synthesize facts and arguments relative to this problem, with reference to the cases of the three preliminary studies. The comments do not pretend to address all the issues raised. The primary goal is to resolve the problem as the context for answering the question asked.
The Birth

Nietzsche's first book is driven by the problem of Socrates. It is an attempt to fathom the depths of Socrates, and through Socrates, to enucleate the classical mind, art, and culture (and through Schopenhauer and Wagner, modern European civilization).

With intense dramatic effect, Socrates is not even mentioned until almost midway—that other, second spectator to whose judgement Euripides would deem worthy of deference (BT, 12). At this point of introduction, is Nietzsche portraying Socrates as protagonist or antagonist? Or is the phenomenon of Socrates to be understood as something altogether different?

This is what strikes us as so tremendously problematic whenever we consider Socrates, and again and again we are tempted to fathom the meaning and purpose of this most questionable phenomenon of antiquity. Who is it that may dare single-handed to negate the Greek genius that, as Homer, Pindar, and Aeschylus, as Phidias, as Pericles, as Pythia and Dionysus, as the deepest abyss and the highest height, is sure of our astonished veneration? What demonic power is this that dares to spill this magic potion into dust? What demigod is this to whom the chorus of the noblest spirits of mankind must call out:

Alas!
You have shattered
The beautiful world
With brazen fist;
It falls, it is scattered (BT, 13).

Tragedy is dead. Socrates, with his theory and optimistic belief in knowledge as a corrective, in conspiracy with and through the Euripidean mask, assassinated the tragic
world-view. The cheerful faith in science as panacea becomes dominant. Nietzsche will later theorize perspectivism and the will to power. Already in The Birth he repudiates the aesthetics, epistimology, ethics and metaphysics of so-called "logical Socratism." Clearly, however, Socrates is not finally brought on stage and named only to be condemned as the infamous villain in Nietzsche's history of Greek tragedy.

But the logical urge that became manifest in Socrates was absolutely prevented from turning against itself; in its unbridled flood it displays a natural power such as we encounter to our awed amazement only in the very greatest instinctive forces (BT, 13).

As he names Socrates as the second spectator, in the same breath, Nietzsche targets a Socratic tendency. "The enormous driving-wheel of logical Socratism is in motion, as it were, behind Socrates... it must be viewed through Socrates as through a shadow" (BT, 13). "In view of the Platonic dialogues we are certainly not entitled to regard it as a merely disintegrating, negative force" (BT, 14).

Nietzsche's view of Socrates is, to state the obvious, intricately interconnected with his attitude toward Plato (in his works references to Plato outnumber those to Socrates). Here we glimpse an ambiguity in Nietzsche's understanding of the divided line between Socrates and Plato in the dialogues. On the one hand, Socrates is the progenitor of scientism, the barren nihilism of which the young romantic Nietzsche claims
must be forever circumscribed by art (BT, 15). Yet he does not underestimate Socrates' Athenian life of Greek philosophy. He does not trivialize the trumped up political trial that was Socrates' fate. It is implied that the heroic martyrdom of Socrates is itself tragedy of the highest order.

Thus Socrates is introduced in The Birth as more than an anti-aesthetic logician or Platonic literary character. Nietzsche affirms Socrates as a fateful historical person. He ascribes to him status as a demigod, almost the equal of Apollo and Dionysus, as a myth, a force. "The influence of Socrates, down to the present moment and even into all future time, has spread over posterity like a shadow that keeps growing in the evening sun" (BT, 14).

In the end, Nietzsche imagines the consequences if "the whole incalculable sum of energy used up for this world tendency had been used not in the service of knowledge" (BT, 15). Without Socrates, Nietzsche suggests, without what Kaufmann describes as "the Socratic heritage, the elemental passion for knowledge" (395), Western civilization we know was actually impossible.

Nietzsche discovers in Socrates "the one turning point and vortex of so-called world-history" (BT, 15). Attempting to demonstrate that the "artistic Socrates" is a new necessity, The Birth itself, imbued with Schopenhauer's
metaphysics and Wagner's aesthetic romanticism, exemplifies Nietzsche's self-appointed task as the "musical Socrates."

**Fragment**

Socrates himself wrote nothing. Nietzsche was a prolific writer. Though we have notes from his lectures as classical philologist, he did not produce a formal study of any of the dialogues. Throughout his writings he remains elusive as to clues of where in the dialogues to draw the dividing line between Socrates and Plato, to say nothing of implications of this division.

Early in his important "Introduction" to *Nietzsche's View*, Dannhauser suggests the following:

The crucial role played by Socrates in Nietzsche's thought can be glimpsed in a single fragmentary sentence of Nietzsche, written around 1875: "Socrates, simply to confess it, stands so near to me, that I almost always fight a battle with him" (15).

Kaufmann translates this fragment at the beginning of section II of Chapter 13, in relation to his point that Nietzsche never suffered a "Brutus crisis" over Socrates.\(^2\)

Typifying the degree of difficulty in penetrating Nietzsche's equivocal and oscillating position on Socrates, this fragment provides a point of intersection to contrast the 'Yes' and 'No' perspectives on the problem.

As almost always, Nietzsche of the early 1870's writes--apparently suddenly exasperated--Socrates stands so
close to him that he must do battle against him.

The fragment is associated with Basel work toward an intended companion piece to follow and complement The Birth, the incomplete "Philosopher's Book," including the surviving draft essay Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks.

Nietzsche's plan was to explicate the history of ancient Greek philosophy through the life and thought of each of the Pre-Platonics, from Thales to Socrates. Incomplete, in this draft Nietzsche covers only Thales to Anaxagoras. Empedocles, Democritus and Socrates are forborne.

The second and last direct reference to Kaufmann in Nietzsche's View after the "Introduction," and before "In the Final Period," occurs late in the long second chapter. Dannhauser disputes Kaufmann's interpretation of the early notes for his argument that Nietzsche admires Socrates:

I have compared and contrasted his image of Socrates in The Birth with his image of the pre-Socratic philosopher...if Nietzsche himself had explicitly compared Socrates with the pre-Socratics, Socrates would have fared badly...The image of Socrates in The Birth is ambiguous enough to permit the making of a case for Nietzsche's admiration of Socrates. In Chapter 1, I gave a summary of this case as Kaufmann has presented it. Kaufmann does not ignore Nietzsche's Philosophy in the Tragic Era of the Greeks but uses it to further his case. He points out correctly that near the beginning of the book Nietzsche writes that he will speak of the pre-Platonic philosophers as a group that belongs together, just as he gave lectures on the pre-Platonic philosophers. A single mention of the term "pre-Platonic" in Philosophy in the Tragic Era of the Greeks is, however, hardly decisive...Nietzsche's primary intention in including Socrates...has nothing to do with his admiration of Socrates (136).
Dannhauser is a source for numerous commentators who contrast Nietzsche's sharp critique of Socrates with his warm view of Heraclitus. It is argued that Nietzsche always prefers the Pre-Socratic models of philosophy and the philosopher over Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the later Greeks, with their schools and sects. This argument is usually supported with reference to both early and later notes, such as this fragment and incomplete essay, as well as to Nietzsche's comments on *The Birth* in *Ecce Homo*.

While it is true that Nietzsche is critical of Socrates and Socratism in many of the early (and later) notes, it is necessary to recall that this fragment is part of his unpublished working and lecture notes, composed in the wake of *The Birth*. In the early 1870's Nietzsche is fully engaged with the classical tradition, teaching and thinking perennial questions and problems of philosophy. For Nietzsche—as for all scholars—Plato's Socrates is a signpost against which one may discern one's own theoretical justifications for epistemology and ontology, value and truth, if any at all.

The fact is that Nietzsche conceives the history of ancient Greek philosophy in terms of a novel Pre-Platonic classification, as opposed to the orthodox Pre-Socratic distinction. Socrates is re-evaluated as the omega-man in Nietzsche's Schopenhauerian "Republic of Geniuses," from
Thales to Socrates, the part-historical and part-mythological line of pure types of sages *(PTA, 1, 2; cf. *UO*, 1, 2, 9).

Nietzsche promotes Greek culture and philosophy in the Tragic Age because he thinks it expresses the "will to power" and "the great health" *(JS, 382)* to the highest degree. For once and all time, philosophy is in proper symbiosis with the healthy culture that produced and propelled it. The Pre-Platonics discovered and created "the archetypes of philosophic thought" *(PTA, 1, 2)*. Each of the Pre-Platonics are monolithic, original archetypes of philosophers and thought. Contrary to Dannhauser, including Socrates in this line has everything to do with Nietzsche's affirmation of Socrates as heroic individual.

Nietzsche's conception of philosophy and education was decisively influenced by the image of Socrates as "physician of culture." *(30)* To some degree, Nietzsche's affirmation of the principles and goals of Socrates as "cultural physician" is incorporated in his own task and activities as artist and writer, educator and philosopher.

Plato is here presented as the first hybrid Greek philosopher, a mixing together of a number of the elemental, fundamental types of sages. With Plato's dialogues something altogether new commences *(PTA, 2)*.
Part of the "Philosopher's Book" is compressed in "Tyrants of the Spirit" (HH, 261), the fourth longest "aphorism" of this work. Nietzsche suspects some inexplicable gap in Greek philosophy, paralleling a gap in Greek history. He surmises that it obscures some tremendous catastrophe relative to the evolution of culture. Tragic Homeric culture, consummated in the centuries leading up to the Periclean Age, rapidly consumes itself in its own glories.

Now Nietzsche laments the passing of tragedy and philosophy in the Tragic Age and tries to make sense of it:

Alas, Greek history moves so fast! Life has never since been lived so prodigally, so exorbitantly. I cannot convince myself that the history of the Greeks pursued that natural course for which it is so celebrated...everything goes quickly forward, but it likewise goes quickly downwards; the movement of the whole machine is so accelerated that a single stone thrown into its wheels makes it fly to pieces. Socrates, for example, was such a stone; in a single night the evolution of philosophical science, hitherto so wonderfully regular if all too rapid, was destroyed. It is no idle question whether, if he had not come under the spell of Socrates, Plato might not have discovered an even higher type of philosophical man who is now lost to us for ever (HH, 261).

The curious ambiguity in Nietzsche's distinction between Socrates and Plato already noted again manifests itself. Apparently unable to fully grasp the unfathomable Socrates, a fascination for the legendary philosopher is balanced by a critical, skeptical, suspicious attitude. The tension may be traced to the nature of the dialogues
themselves, and to Nietzsche's imprecision as to Socrates, man and myth, and the ingenious hand of the anonymous Plato.

Not as an artist or writer, nor simply a literary character, but as a founder of political philosophy, Socrates is irrefutable for Nietzsche. He again acknowledges Socrates as an heroic individual, the original "free spirit" (HH, 225).

And yet, Nietzsche shows little clemency endorsing the jury's verdict. Socrates was guilty of corrupting the youth. Specifically, Nietzsche charges, Socrates corrupted Plato, whose genius fell under the seductive spell of a despotic Socratic dialectic. Because of this, according to Nietzsche, we may have lost forever "a new, hitherto undiscovered highest possibility of the philosophical life" (HH, 261).

However, the history of philosophy and philosophy itself is measured by Socrates' self-appointed divine mission as seeker and gadfly to test and refute the cryptic utterance of the Delphic oracle (WS, 72). All the roads of philosophy return to Socrates (WS, 86), who was the "simplest and most imperishable of intercessors" and "able to be serious cheerfully" (WS, 86):

The pathways of the most various philosophical modes of life lead back to him; at bottom they are the modes of life of the various temperaments confirmed and established by reason and habit and all of them directed towards joy in living and in one's own self; from which one might conclude that Socrates' most personal characteristic was a participation in every temperament (WS, 86).
This tension in Nietzsche's image is rooted in a misunderstanding of Plato as "the memorabilia of Socrates" (WS, 86). This results in seemingly contradictory messages about Socrates. Strangely enough, though, perhaps by a reasoned instinct, Nietzsche still seems to speak to the "real" Socrates and Plato.

Nietzsche's life philosophy of the early positive period is as practical as Socrates' ceaseless quest for knowledge and self-knowledge. Like Socrates, Nietzsche brings philosophy down from the clouds, probes himself and others, and questions art, education, ethics and law. Moreover, as with Plato, his soul is that of an artist and writer.

\textbf{Daybreak}

Nietzsche credits Socrates with the discovery of "the antithetical magic, that of cause and effect, of ground and consequence" (Dawn, 544). However, in Nietzsche's eyes, it took more than the power of cold logic to drive Dionysus beneath the ocean. The theoretical father of dialectics, logic, and syllogism, these techniques are, ultimately, only useful instruments and premises for Socrates' ethical goal. Above all, he is a practical political philosopher. For him, the culture of the good life is lived according to the custom of reason; knowledge is virtue. Knowledge must be in the service of life and provide the advantage of how best to live.
The Joyous Science

"The dying Socrates" (JS, 340) is found at the end of the original edition of this work. Followed only by "Das grosste Schwergewicht" (JS, 341, "The Greatest Weight"), the first direct reference to the eternal return, and Incipit Tragoedia (JS, 342, "The Tragedy Begins"), Zarathustra's first speech, the strategic position of this discussion throws the significance of Socrates for Nietzsche into bold relief.

The title alludes not only to the earlier aphorism in the same book on "Last words" (JS, 36), but is also continuous with The Birth, where Nietzsche wrote to the effect that

Hence the image of the dying Socrates, as the human being whom knowledge and reasons have liberated from the fear of death, is the emblem that, above the entrance gate of science, reminds all of its mission--namely, to make existence appear comprehensible and thus justified; and if reasons do not suffice, myth has to come to their aid in the end--myth which I have just called the necessary consequence, indeed the purpose, of science (BT, 15).

In the text the term "Pied Piper" signifies Socrates. This term is also found throughout Beyond Good and Evil, as well as in the preface to Twilight of the Idols. The recurrence of this thematic signifier confirms Nietzsche's affirmation of Socrates.

Yet Nietzsche's knowledge of Socrates' greatness does not translate into blind admiration. This becomes clear when considering how Nietzsche goes on to interpret the reported
last words of the dying Socrates, "Crito, we owe a rooster to Asclepius. See to it, and don't forget" (Phaedo 118a).³³

Nietzsche's comments leave lingering doubts about Socrates. At first, Nietzsche cheerfully admits that he admires Socrates for his courage and wisdom in all he did, said, and did not say. In the "wisdom of his courage to die," he later notes in Twilight, Socrates became a fate, a destiny, a kind of saviour for Western culture (TI, II, 12).

However, Nietzsche wonders whether with his last words Socrates is confessing that life is only a sickness unto death. From the cultural physician's clinical and historical point of view, Socrates was a decadent who could not cure himself or his decadent culture. Socrates has known all along—at least he now knows something—that he is fundamentally unhealthy. Lacking a "pessimism of strength" (BT, Pre.) and "the great health" (JS, Pre., 382), death alone is the Silenian cure for the sick Socrates.³⁴

However, read more carefully (notice the number of questions Nietzsche asks in this section, as well as later on in Twilight), Nietzsche would rather not believe that the "spirit of revenge" lies at the origins and core of Socrates.³⁵ If there was one person with "overrich virtue" who did live "cheerfully and like a soldier in the sight of everyone" (JS, 340), it was Socrates. The ultimate
pessimistic question mark Nietzsche forces the reader to confront is that if a Greek like Socrates secretly suffered life, what prospects can there be for a modern?

Even Socrates suffered life? Even Socrates could not overcome himself? Then we must overcome even the Greeks. However, precisely this may never be possible. Is not greatness possible, again and again? There are none greater than Socrates. If even Socrates did not overcome decadence and ressentiment, it may well be impossible for moderns.

The hope Nietzsche holds out—but refrains from saying—is that with his whole life, with his trial, his last days, and now, at the moment before his death, the dying Socrates' last words to his old friend Crito mean that a cure has already been effected. 36

Nietzsche admires everything Socrates said and did and did not say because Socrates chose to martyr himself in defence of philosophy and truth.

It is Plato who in the dialogues consolidates the schools and scholars, poets, orators, writers and rhetoricians, playwrights, sophists and philosophers. Plato privileges Socrates as the true epic-tragic hero [as a semiotic sign language].

The traditional teaching of Platonic idealism is treated as such (JS, 344, 372), but Socrates the individual
stands beyond reproach. Attempting to overcome decadence, ressentiment, and nihilism, Nietzsche must overcome even the profundity of the Greeks. Thus, he wills the "artistic Socrates," the "Socrates who practices music".

**Beyond Good and Evil**

This work is a vivisection of modernity by a self-styled "physician of culture." In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche characterizes it as the destructive, "No-saying" part of his task, following the affirmative, "Yes-saying" of Zarathustra (III, BGE, 1, p. 766).

The famous Preface refers to both Plato and Socrates. Plato is presented as the ancient source of the Christian morality and liberal democratic political philosophy that Nietzsche diagnoses at the heart of decadent, nihilistic late 19th century European civilization—"Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia" (*BGE*, Pre.).

Reading him traditionally as the dogmatic idealist, Nietzsche fights against Plato's "invention of the pure spirit and the good as such" (*BGE*, Pre.). For Nietzsche, traditional Platonism has "meant standing truth on her head and denying perspective, the basic condition of all life, when one spoke of spirit and the good as Plato did" (*BGE*, Pre.).

However, the ambiguous division of the dialogues becomes evident again. On the other side of Zarathustra,
Nietzsche now has, it seems, only more question marks and critical doubts about Socrates and Plato:

Indeed, as a physician one might ask: "How could the most beautiful growth of antiquity, Plato, contract such a disease? Did the wicked Socrates corrupt him after all? Could Socrates have been the corrupter of the youth after all? And did he deserve the hemlock?" (BGE, Pre.).

Yet Nietzsche is not "ungrateful" to Plato. He speaks of "a promise across millennia" and "the heirs of all that strength that has been fostered" (BGE, Pre.). "It seems that all great things first have to bestride the earth in monstrous and frightening masks in order to inscribe themselves in the hearts of humanity with eternal demands" (BGE, Pre.).

The consecutive sections 190 and 191 of "Natural History of Morals" deconstruct the moralism of Socrates and Plato. Managing to be both playfully Aristophanic and seriously Sophoclean, Nietzsche detects something in the dialogues that is ignoble and beneath Plato, namely, the precepts of Socratic morality, in the form of the equation virtue equals reason equals happiness.

"The greatest strength any philosopher so far has had at his disposal" (BGE, 191) is attributed to Plato. It is Socrates who is now diminished, caricatured and mocked by Nietzsche as a base plebeian. Unfortunately for the noble, aristocratic Plato, and an immeasurable tragedy for posterity,
Plato became a willing disciple of Socrates. Dutifully, the Protean virtuoso Plato improvises the simple tune of the barefoot street buffoon into the ingenius intricacies of "all of his own masks and multiplicities" (BGE, 190).

Evidently, then, the answer to the Preface is that the wicked Socrates is to be blamed for Plato's supposed idealism; Socrates corrupted Plato to be the dogmatic moralist.

Nevertheless, with this work Nietzsche takes it upon himself to be the sting of the unmodern modern gadfly, the untimely bad conscience of his time, the strong, bitter medicine of the cultural physician--everything but dogmatic. Nietzsche is in the process of becoming a "Socrates who practices music" (BT, 15, 18), "the last disciple and initiate of the god Dionysus" (BGE, 295). In short, Nietzsche "advocates and exemplifies" Socrates as a "kind of philosopher and philosophy." 37

The parallels between the philosophers are striking: Nietzsche endorses the principle of the maxim "know thyself" with his "supreme self-examination"; he exhorts one to "become who/what you are"; he is shameless but noble, untimely yet timeless, for everyone and no one, and a posthumous person. Who but Nietzsche could be another "vortex of world-history" (BT, 15)? In this century, all the pathways of philosophy
lead back to him and he participates in all of the temperaments (WS, 86); and perhaps Nietzsche opens the door to beyond cultural nihilism.

To put this another way, one of Nietzsche's primary goals as author, artist, scholar, educator, philosopher is to produce the conditions for another profound Heraclitus, another critical Socrates, other creative Platos, in order to bring forth and educate a hundred or more such "free spirits" and "philosophers of the future."

**Twilight**

From a musical point of view, this work is composed in the form of a sonata. In the Preface Nietzsche describes himself as "an old pied piper before whom that which would remain unspoken must become audible" (TI, Pre.; cf. BT, Pre.; HH, 118; JS, 340; BGE, Pre., 295).

"The Problem of Socrates" is the second of the ten not-consecutively-numbered chapters, following the forty-four short "Maxims and Arrows." Now Nietzsche returns once more to variations on Socrates, sustaining his treatment of this major theme at relative length, in twelve brief sections.

Nietzsche discusses innumerable subjects in his works, but Socrates remains a focal lietmotif. Nietzsche's classical sense of duty and obligation to the truth and honour demand
that he engage Socrates in Homeric agon. To the very end Nietzsche challenges the problem of Socrates to a duel (I, 7, p. 688). What he would say of himself to Brandes in a last letter is true of Socrates for Nietzsche.39

Nietzsche will delineate a decided undecidability toward Socrates,40 repelled by him as an Aristophanic buffoon and monstrum per defectum (BT, 13; TI, II, 3), but to the end driven to speculate on the historical, psychological, and theoretical dimensions of "The Problem of Socrates."

Where Nietzsche admires is Socrates as the "free spirit." Drawn to the intellect, irony and wit of Socrates the philosopher, he wants to emulate his heroic individualism. Nietzsche incorporates the educational tasks of Socrates as "cultural physician" in a time of decadence and nihilism.

Yet it is the traditional image of Socrates as a wise sage that is the first of the hollow idols, out of tune with life, that Nietzsche wants to expose with his musical hammer. To be brought back in tune with life, nothing will escape Nietzsche's searching study of modernity. Everything is open for radical revaluation. Socrates is the first case in point.

Perhaps much like Athenians who may have beheld with equal fascination and repulsion his eristical contests with orators and sophists, Nietzsche is both fascinated and
repelled by the spectacle of Socrates (TI, II, 8).

Where Nietzsche offers objections is in terms of strict "logical Socraticism," with respect to Plato as idealist, in the form of "Platonism." In The Birth, Nietzsche finds Socrates "the most questionable phenomenon of antiquity" (BT, 13). In Twilight Socrates is diagnosed as a decadent. With Socrates, Nietzsche's reading suggests, logic and reason, manifest as dialectic, tyrannize the other instincts.

In "What I Owe to the Ancients" idealism in morality is blamed on the "Philistine moralism of the Socratic schools" (TI, X, 2, 3). As for Plato: "In the end, my mistrust of Plato goes deep: he represents such an aberration from all the basic instincts of the Hellene" (TI, X, 2). For Nietzsche, the domination of idealism and rationalism over the cultivation of healthy instincts and the testimony of the senses is a symptom of the exhaustion of tragic Hellenic culture, and, therefore, the pale shadow of decadent modern culture.

Ultimately, the great Pre-Socratics could not overcome themselves and sustain Greek philosophy. "Greek philosophy: the decadence of the Greek instinct" (TI, X, 2). The exhaustion of the Greek line of geniuses is symptomatic of decay and disorder in the physiological and psychological dynamics of the cultural body at large.41 All that was left
was Socrates (Cf. "Socrates considered that to delude oneself that one possesses a virtue one does not possess is an illness bordering on madness" [UC, II, 6]; "Already in ancient Greece Socrates was defending himself with all his might against this arrogant neglect of the human for the benefit of the human race" [WS, 6]; "Plainly, one now knows in Europe what Socrates thought he did not know and what that famous old serpent once promised to teach—today one 'knows' what is good and evil" [BGE, 202]).

To repeat, however, in the end Nietzsche holds out the benefit of the ironic doubt for Socrates and his dialectics. Nietzsche remains acutely aware that this "most brilliant self-outwitter" perhaps saw through the idiosyncrasy of his own unique case (TI, II, 12).

Socrates knew he was decadent. He freely admitted that he was "a cave of bad appetites" (TI, II, 3, 4). However, Socrates managed to check his own human, all too human appetites by compelling his despotic logic to rule tyrannically.42

Socrates ameliorated the symptoms of decadence for himself, yet he also knew that he could not instill in his audience "the great health," for they were more decadent than he. The tyranny of logic was the idiosyncratic cure for
Socrates; in desperation, others imitated his means and method to master the anarchy of their instincts (TI, II, 9-11).

Socrates, however, was only the extreme case, symptomatic of a widespread decline and fall of Greek philosophy and culture (TI, II, 9-11). According to Nietzsche, the optimistic improvement morality of logical Socratism was a physiological and psychological misunderstanding: Socrates was a misunderstanding (TI, II, 11). His syllogisms and theoretical optimism are only other forms of decline and ressentiment toward life.

Perhaps Socrates could live by his famous formula for self-improvement, but to be absurdly rational, to have to combat the instincts betrays itself as a symptom of and formula for further, compounded decadence: "To have to fight the instincts--that is the formula of decadence: as long as life is ascending, happiness equals instinct" (TI, II, 11).

Clearly, Nietzsche challenges "Socratic" rationalism, as well as the lingering metaphysical effects and moral affects of "Platonism" as idealism. He routinely deconstructs dogmatic "Socratic" and "Platonic" doctrine. Yet Nietzsche never wavers in his estimation of Socrates as an archetype of philosopher and philosophy.

Even as Nietzsche subjects Socrates to the most scathing ad hominem attacks in his post-Zarathustra works, one
is left with the impression that, to repeat, in the end, the benefit of the ironic doubt is held out for Socrates.

Steadfast in his appreciation of Socrates as a great human being, as an heroic individual, Nietzsche does "admire" Socrates, to the extent that his fundamental predisposition is to affirm Socrates as a great fate.

Nietzsche honours the Greeks; Socrates is a "peak of Greekness," as George Grant put it;\textsuperscript{43} therefore, Nietzsche honours Socrates. Socrates is the unique "great individual" whom Nietzsche celebrates. First among even the Greeks, who were once the "truly healthy nation," and who have justified philosophy for all time (\textit{PTA}, 1), Socrates remains singular, "the one turning point and vortex of so-called world history" (\textit{BT}, 15). Nietzsche pays homage to the wisdom and courage Socrates displays in dying a martyr's death. Indeed, Socrates was a kind of cultural saviour, his life and his death potentially the cure for Western civilization's discontents.

Nietzsche's notion of philosophy was decisively influenced by the prototypical image of Socrates and philosophy presented to us in Plato's dialogues. In 1888, perhaps even more than before, Socrates is affirmed as the exemplary philosopher. Nietzsche creates his own life in terms of tragic, heroic individualism, espousing a "musical," Dionysian philosophy and politics:
And herewith I again touch that point from which I once went forth: *The Birth of Tragedy* was my first revaluation of all values. Herewith I again stand on the soil out of which my intention, my ability grows--I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus--I, the teacher of the eternal recurrence (*TI*, X, 5).

In the end, as Nietzsche reads and studies Socrates, so we may read and study Nietzsche. That is to say, the best way to approach Nietzsche is to do so in light of his own writings on Socrates. Already in the earliest works, the "masks and multiplicities" (*BGE*, 190) of Nietzsche's "most manifold art of style" (*III*, 4, p. 721) evolve as a semiotic sign language of himself as the musical, artistic Socrates (*BT*, 12-15).
III: To Ask the Question of Ecce Homo

Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is truly is the second "Book for Everyone and No One." Read widely and appreciated in the original German purely for its prose style, scholars have always plundered it for their own purposes, drawing especially from Nietzsche's self-commentaries. However, in the second revised and expanded 1968 edition of the International Nietzsche Bibliography, listing nearly 5000 pieces of literature, in languages from Bulgarian to Vietnamese, less than ten titles include Ecce Homo. All of these were written shortly after the text first appeared in 1908 and 1909, and before the end of World War One.

Of the five works Nietzsche completed and prepared for publication in 1888, only Ecce Homo was posthumously published. It was first released privately in 1908 by the sister, eight years after her brother had died (August 25, 1900), two decades after he had completed the manuscript, only to suddenly become insane.

The Case of Wagner was written in the spring of 1888 and appeared in August. The final four works—The Antichrist, Twilight, Ecce Homo, and Nietzsche contra Wagner—were completed and prepared for publication by Nietzsche in the second half of 1888. At the beginning of January, 1889, Nietzsche collapsed into his madness. At this time, the
proofed manuscripts of the final four works of 1888 were in the possession of his publisher, C. G. Naumann. Apparently Naumann had already begun to set the type for printing.48

Twilight was printed and would be published by the end of January, 1889, as planned, becoming the last book Nietzsche saw through to publication. Shortly thereafter, all the manuscripts were seized from Naumann by Nietzsche's family (mother and sister), who indefinitely withheld them, pending the prognosis for poor "Fritz's" medical problem.49

As fate had it, for her own human, all too human reasonings, the sister withheld Ecce Homo for nearly two decades, long after her brother had died. Meanwhile, out of the Nietzsche Archive the bogus "book" The Will to Power first appeared in Europe in 1901, second revised edition, greatly expanded, 1911. After the First and Second World Wars, in North America this non-book was falsely considered the final and systematic magnum opus of Nietzsche the proto-Nazi.50

The old and new accusations of the "Nietzsche Legend," based in part on this erroneous reputation of the non-book The Will to Power, continue to obscure the truth that Ecce Homo is the real jewel in the crown of the Nietzschean oeuvre.51

Podach was an early proponent of the view that Nietzsche did not complete the text before he collapsed.52 Nietzsche's later editors agree, however, that on the basis of
the corroborating correspondence in the fall and winter of 1888, Nietzsche did complete a final version of *Ecce Homo*.\(^{53}\)

What is very likely is that we do not have the final draft exactly as prepared by Nietzsche for publication.\(^{54}\)

Beginning with his early school years, Nietzsche sketched numerous "self-conscious memoirs" (*BGE*, 24).\(^{55}\) The second letter to Brandes, April, 1888, for Brandes' forthcoming lecture series, includes a *curriculum vitae*.\(^{56}\)

Apparently commencing the work with the dedication of the *augenblick* on his forty-fourth birthday, October 15, 1888, Nietzsche completed a draft by 4 November, revising certain sections until the new year.\(^{57}\) His last communications with his publisher were on January 1 and 2, 1889.\(^{58}\) Thus, what began as a brief account of his life and philosophy, as he lived and understood it, turned out to be his final account.

Was it in the euphoric spirit of the "great health" and "will to power" that Nietzsche composed his brief piece, unaware it was to be his "last will and testament"?

There is no pathological trait in me; even in periods of severe illness I never became pathological; in vain would one seek for a trait of fanaticism in my nature. There is not a moment in my life to which one could point to convict me of a presumptuous or pathetic posture (II, 10, p. 713).

As much as it is meant as an end, Nietzsche considers the text another new beginning. Presented as a compass to his works so far, it also serves as a proleptic prelude to the
larger book he planned to publish as "The Revaluation of all Values." Written to prepare the public for this future publication, the herald of this anticipated literary event, his "autobiography" glances at his life and reviews his works, quite possibly not realizing he was about to be struck down.

The task of the "Revaluation," for which the text is advance notice, was conceived by Nietzsche in four parts, the text of The Antichrist being the first. The intercalated augenblick of Ecce Homo identifies "the first book of the revaluation" (p. 677) as one of the gifts of 1888 (he received and bestowed), his year of discovery and creation--and his final productive year. Montinari and others have shown, however, that shortly before his collapse Nietzsche began to reconsider the task of "Revaluation" to be embodied in this work alone. Tellingly, aside from Nietzsche contra Wagner, prepared for publication concurrently with Ecce Homo, The Antichrist is the only work Nietzsche does not review.

On the other hand, suddenly everything changes for Nietzsche. If we assume he has some knowledge anticipating his tragic fate (IV, 1, p. 782), it seems sensible that the last item of business would be the brief of his life and philosophic activity, in order to explain who he is, what his writings teach, to prevent misunderstandings and misuse of his name and writings, and to defend his posthumous reputation.
There are conflicting reports on the exact day and time, exactly where in Turin, the cast of characters, and even the factual veracity of a dramatic collapse in the street. If Nietzsche did collapse and cause a public scene, supposedly it was staged before noon, January 3, 1889, the piazza Carlo Alberto, near the room he rented from a Mr. David Fino.

In any event, beginning in December, around the time of Christmas, 1888, and the New Year, 1889, there appears to be a clear break, a point of no return in the life of Nietzsche (BGE, 25; JS, 382). After the sudden collapse and breakdown, Nietzsche's decades-long career as a scholar and writer abruptly ceases. It is now ingrained as his biography that by the end of January, 1889, Nietzsche was hopelessly insane, although in the early stages both Overbeck and Gast, his closest associates, could not escape the impression that somehow their friend was only acting.

The probable cause and type of condition could remain a matter of speculation for some time. In the week that followed the collapse, before he was removed by Overbeck from Turin to Basel, and by his mother from Basel to Jena, Nietzsche dispatched a number of disjointed, unbalanced letters and postcards (signed "Nietzsche Caesar," "Dionysus," or "The Crucified"), alarming his friends and others who were recipients, and reflecting his rapid descent into the abyss of
his madness. The rest of the tale is by now all too familiar: as darkness engulfs the thinker's mind, paralysis and decay follow.

Kaufmann and Hollingdale both agree that among even Nietzsche's works, this poignant volume *Ecce Homo* sounds out a clarion note *non plus ultra*. Knowing that Nietzsche's breakdown was imminent, permanent, and ultimately fatal; that only that very year he was "discovered" and would soon be famous; that the anti-Semitic sister would seize the rights to his literary estate; suppress publication of the text for two decades; greedily manipulate her brother's newly-found fame for her own fortune; promote her production of the non-book *The Will to Power*; fashion the proper name of Nietzsche into a proponent of the crude German chauvinism, state idolatry, and "cultural philistinism" that would pave the way for Nazism and petty economic and political particularism—the very things the "good European" Nietzsche categorically repudiates throughout his life, and most emphatically in the text itself; knowing all of this to be the case for Nietzsche and *Ecce Homo*, the reader cannot ignore the tragic and ironic pathos that sets this work apart. "Listen to me! For I am such and such a person. Above all, do not confound me with what I am not!" (Foreword, 1, p. 673).
Introducing his edition (1968), Kaufmann describes the text as "one of the treasures of world literature." It has been largely ignored or misunderstood. Yet it is Nietzsche's own interpretation of his development, his works, and his significance; and we should gladly trade the whole vast literature on Nietzsche for this one small book.

However, according to Kaufmann, of all Nietzsche's works, "none has proved harder to understand." That the text has been read widely while being ignored, and that none of Nietzsche's works is harder to understand is understandable. Nietzsche did go insane, and critics have dismissed him altogether, or perhaps only the works of 1888, at least The Antichrist and/or Ecce Homo. In light of the frenzy of activity in 1888 and sudden breakdown, Nietzsche's apparent eschatological megalomania and self-apotheosistic hyperbole strike some as, if not tragically laughable, certainly questionable at best (III, 1, p. 715).

Ecce Homo is a document alien to many readers, absurd and strange, especially when it is evaluated only in terms of the "autobiography" genre. The tone and contents of Nietzsche's tortured narcissistic soliloquy can seem difficult to appreciate. This may be a case of what Nietzsche refers to as an "acoustical illusion" (III, 1, p. 717). According to him, without access to the heights and depths of the tragic philosophy out of which he writes, one will either hear
nothing, or fabricate something of him far from the truth.

For "the perfect reader" (III, 3, p. 720), grounded in his previous writings, related to him "through loftiness of will" (III, 3, p. 719), Nietzsche threatens "veritable ecstasies of learning" (III, 3, p. 719; III, 2, 6, pp. 760-62): "He who knows how to breathe the air of my writings knows that it is an air of the heights, a robust air" (Foreword, 3, p. 674); "it is also the profoundest, born out of the innermost abundance of truth, an inexhaustible well into which no bucket descends without coming up again filled with gold and goodness" (Foreword, 4, p. 675).

Such passages pose real difficulties with dismissing Ecce Homo and the other works of 1888 due to Nietzsche's encroaching madness. Not only are they clear and lucid, but until December Nietzsche's letters betray hardly a trace of what was imminent. He is still corresponding as usual with Naumann, Gast, and others. Since they follow Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil and Genealogy, the works of 1888 must be treated seriously as the most complete expressions of Nietzsche's mature style and thought.74

Interpreting Ecce Homo in terms of his discovery of Nietzsche's Socrates, Kaufmann effectively sailed right over previous readings of the works of Nietzsche's collapse. Revaluing Nietzsche for post-World War Two North America (III,
Kaufmann charged the text with a commanding value encompassing purely aesthetic, analytic, biographical, historical, literary, and psychological "nooks" (BGE, 41). Nietzsche's hitherto strange, if not insane, "autobiography" is now to be judged by the tradition of political philosophy.

Nietzsche's final reflections on the Greeks, in particular his last words on Plato and Socrates are contained in the text. As much as it is his final skirmish with Socrates, Ecce Homo culminates Nietzsche's affirmation of him.

The first reference occurs, quite conspicuously, in the first section of the first part, "Why I Am So Wise": "My readers perhaps know the extent to which I regard dialectics as a symptom of decadence, for example in the most famous case of all: in the case of Socrates" (I, 1, p. 679).

From The Birth to Ecce Homo, the problem of Socrates stands out for Nietzsche as a protracted existential struggle. The margin of error detected in Nietzsche's reading of Plato's dialogues and the problem of the Platonic Socrates provides the hermeneutic key to approach Nietzsche and his writings. The goal is to interpret Nietzsche in view of his interpretation of Socrates. From this point of view, Nietzsche's unending quarrel with Socrates is self-critical, along the lines of his "Attempt at a Self-Criticism" prefacing the 1886 "On Hellenism and Pessimism" version of The Birth.
Even Socrates was decadent. Nietzsche has learned from his own experiences with the "enigmatic ironist" to see through his own decadence and attempt to overcome it. He attempts to resolve his inner dialectic of doubles and opposites by going "beyond" himself.

Thus it is recommended that to not misunderstand Nietzsche, his writings should be read existentially, in terms of the ways he understands Socrates. In this sense, the best way to approach Nietzsche is in terms of his own thoughts on Socrates: Nietzsche is the untimely gadfly, cultural physician, one turning point and most problematic phenomenon of this century.

Socrates is noted again in the first self-commentary in the third part of the text, "Why I Write Such Good Books." Touching upon his "exceedingly strange beginning" in The Birth (III, BT, 1-3, pp. 726-31), Nietzsche three times refers to Socrates by name. He points out the two novelties of his first book: his discovery of the Dionysian phenomenon in Greek art and culture, and his unmasking of logical Socratism "as a dangerous force that undermines life": "Socrates is recognized for the first time as an agent of Hellenic disintegration, as a typical decadent" (III, BT, 1, p. 727).

Looking back to his own beginning, although at the time he could have no idea of what he would become (II, 9, pp.
it now seems clear to Nietzsche that in Socrates he had already discovered his own historical likeness:

I had discovered the only parallel and parable in history for my own inmost experience—and thus became the first to comprehend the wonderful phenomenon of the Dionysian. At the same time my discovery that Socrates was a decadent proved unequivocally how little the sureness of my psychological grasp would be endangered by any moral idiosyncrasy: seeing morality itself as a symptom of decadence is an innovation and a singularity of the first rank in the history of knowledge (III, BT, 2, pp. 727-28).

In this sense I have the right to understand myself as the first tragic philosopher—that is, the most extreme opposite and antipodes of a pessimistic philosopher. Before me this transposition of the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos did not exist: tragic wisdom was lacking; I have looked in vain for signs of it even among the great Greeks in philosophy, those of the two centuries before Socrates. I retained some doubt in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better than anywhere else (III, BT, 3, p. 729).

Many commentators misunderstand Nietzsche's conception of the "tragic philosopher." Subscribing to the view where he only attacks Socrates and an idealistic Platonism does no justice to Nietzsche's thought. Nietzsche attains cynicism and irony, but his art and philosophy is decidedly not nihilistic, nor pessimistic. To recognize this in his works requires the pathos of tragic wisdom. Rather the laughing buffoon than the crying saint, Nietzsche affirms. He has the courage to face reality, and to not flee for an absolute elsewhere. His Truth requires the resistance of the Lie:

I am a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus, I prefer to be even a satyr rather than a saint. But you have only to read
this writing. Perhaps I have succeeded in giving expression to this antithesis in a cheerful and affable way--perhaps this writing had no point at all other than to do this. The last thing I would promise would be to "improve" mankind. I erect no new idols; let the old idols learn what it means to have legs of clay. To overthrow idols (my word for "ideals")--that rather is my business (Foreword, 2, pp. 673-74).

The final reference to Socrates is recorded in the subsequent discussion of his four Unfashionable Observations: "It was in this way that Plato employed Socrates, as a [semiotic-sign language] for Plato" (III, 2, p. 736).75

Nietzsche's literary experiments, metamorphoses, and "most multifarious art of style" also bear the influence of his encounter with the dialogues and the problem of Socrates. As a compositional form, the dialogues present readers with a problem-based, pragmatic approach to thinking and doing art, education, ethics, law, poetry, rhetoric and oratory, politics, and philosophy. In dozens of different dramatic scenarios, the tragic-comic buffoon, Socrates the philosopher, driven by the utterance of his divine oracle on a ceaseless Odyssean quest for knowledge, and self-knowledge, challenges various individual Greeks--just as Plato challenges the reader--to think and account for the assumptions, beliefs, horizons, principles, standards, values by which they live. Nietzsche's "most multifarious art of style" is a semiotic sign language of himself, through which he speaks as an "artistic Socrates." He creates himself in his texts as a
modern, futuristic "musical Socrates." His many masks, fusion of literary styles, and "many different eyes and consciences" (BGE, 211), his skeptical probity, sarcastic wit and irony—all of these qualities Nietzsche's "kind of philosopher and philosophy"76 cultivates the spirit of Socrates.

In this light, Ecce Homo becomes the ultimate "self-portrait" identifying with the Socratic model.

At this point, a substantial clarification is in order. While it is reasonable to recommend that Ecce Homo be studied with continual reference to Nietzsche's view of Socrates, particularly the parallel to the Apology, reading Ecce Homo in light of Plato is by no means all that is involved in understanding Nietzsche or the text. The case has been argued for recognizing an affinity with other literary, philosophical and religious masterpieces as well.77 The Platonic mask is one of a number of Nietzschean selves. Unmistakeable allusions to other authors informing Nietzsche's work include Aquinas, Shakespeare, Bacon and Hobbes.78 Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's Nichomachean Ethics and Guide for the Perplexed, Nietzsche's Principia and Confessions, Nietzsche's Dichtung und Warheit and Self-Reliance.

However, in the case of Ecce Homo, good reason and sound instinct point to this irrefragable truth: the true fons et origo of Ecce Homo can be nothing less than the Apology.
It has been theorized that Nietzsche constructed his life, and life itself, as written body. Educated as a classical philologist, growing into a political philosopher, Nietzsche lived his life and literature by the standard of the Greeks, and those related to the Greeks. Therefore, above and before all, Nietzsche learned from the Platonic Socrates. The trial was a world-historical event, and the *Apology* stands alone as an irresistible, *de rigeur* masterpiece of world literature.

The evidence of the text supports the classical interpretation. Nietzsche delivers his ironic account of himself in terms of the four cardinal characteristics of his chapter headings. Pointedly comparing and contrasting with the dialogical Socrates, on the surface, the Homeric contest is thrown into bold relief. Nonetheless, considering it is the only non-dialogue dialogue (Socrates' defence speech, counter-penalty proposal, and afterword) and the only dialogue where Plato is noted as present (in the *Phaedo* he is said to be ill and unable to be present), the chapter headings that govern *Ecce Homo* indicate Nietzsche's profound identity with the ironic Socratic motifs of the Platonic text.

The biographical argument completes the case for the classical interpretation. *Ecce Homo* culminates Nietzsche's life and works in much the same way that his *Apology* becomes a moment defining Socrates' (and Plato's) life.
CONCLUSION

"Formula of our happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal..." (A, 1)

Is Ecce Homo Nietzsche's Apology? The nature of this question is less whether the text is generically an "apology," in the sense that as narrated autobiography Nietzsche recounts to the reader facts of his life and work. The question is whether Nietzsche self-consciously cast it as his "apology."

The necessary condition in the case for the classical interpretation is to demonstrate that the evidence for the problem of Nietzsche's Socrates supports the argument. The sufficient condition is to consider the internal contents and structure of the text itself, and to show beyond a reasonable doubt that this evidence also confirms the classical view.

As a sequential and systematic inquiry, pursuing the pattern given in Nietzsche's formulae (Cf. III, BT, 1, pp. 726-27; III, BGE, 1, p. 766), Kaufmann's 'Yes,' Dannhauser's 'No,' and Professor Craig's 'straight line' are the necessary stages of development in the process and structure of this thesis itself. The binary opposition of Dannhauser contra Kaufmann is unified in Professor Craig's synthetic case for the classical interpretation. The 'goal' evaluates and resolves the thesis in light of the evidence of the texts.
Nietzsche's perception of Socrates is complex. Waxing and waning between antipathy and sympathy, he contests him from first to last, but he does not despise him. Nietzsche steadfastly affirms Socrates as a destiny, a great individual.

Though Nietzsche misreads Plato in the traditionalist sense as a dogmatist and idealist,\(^1\) his observations could indicate that he read in the dialogues "the real" Socrates—the relentless self-critic too ironic not to see through and beyond his own human, all too human self.

"The Problem of Socrates" is a kind of one fixed point of reference for Nietzsche. At least to not misconstrue his intentions and meaning at large, one must study his writings and think his thought in light of his view of Socrates.

It is recommended that one read Nietzsche "existentially," as he teaches we read Socrates: thus, Nietzsche is the cultural physician, untimely gadfly, bad conscience of his age, most problematic phenomenon of this century, the poison and perhaps cure all the world now needs.

"The one turning point and vortex" (BT, 15), his "only parallel and parable in history" (III, BT, 2, 727), Nietzsche—the other "enigmatic ironist" and "brilliant self-outwitter"—conceives Socrates by the measure of his own decadence.

Strictly speaking from a logical point of view, no such creature as a "Nietzschean" or a "Socratic" may exist at
Unique and ruggedly self-reliant; often ironic, deliberately difficult to decipher, or purposely provocative; both Socrates and Nietzsche defy easy classification or definition. Each gained a reputation for oddity and met with a tragic fate. More moral agents and practical life philosophers than detached thinkers and abstract theoreticians, neither store any absolute faith in doctrine and/or discipleship. Both embolden one to take action to "know thyself," to become a "free spirit."

In the dialogues Socrates practices a midwifery to help his interlocutors give birth to their own ideas and self (Theat. 149a-151e). In a similar dialectic of discovery, from the perspective of "the great health" (JS, 382), Nietzsche attempted his searching studies in order to strengthen one to the task of living one's life well, to begin the ascent to the goal of knowledge and practice of prudence and courage, truth and justice.

Nietzsche's works probe problems and questions of art, culture, history, literature, morality, philosophy, politics, religion, science, technology. For the "scholars," "free spirits," and "philosophers of the future" who will sincerely study the writings, Ecce Homo can be read as a kind of practical manual for living in the spirit and letter of philosophy, challenging those to become who they are.
Nietzsche is, so to speak, further required reading in the continuing education of the Guardians.

Like Socrates, Nietzsche will forever be as much a conclusion as an initiation. The unending search for Truth is as invaluable as the telos of Truth itself (*BT*, 15). "One lives before him, or one lives after him" (IV, 8, p. 789).

Was it Nietzsche's conscious intent to recall Plato's portrayal of Socrates in the *Apology*? Professor Craig's case study of *Ecce Homo* identifies how and the extent to which Nietzsche's work is crafted with constant reference to Plato's Socrates. It thus appears as though Nietzsche cleverly cast *Ecce Homo* to pointedly parallel the *Apology*.

Perhaps Nietzsche was very much aware, in 1888, he was on the verge of total breakdown. In any event, to repeat, apparently begun in dedication to his forty-fourth birthday, October 15, completed and prepared for publication in the few weeks up to his dramatic collapse at the beginning of 1889, *Ecce Homo* was destined to become the Nietzschean equivalent. Due to his timely/untimely collapse, *Ecce Homo* becomes Nietzsche's *Apology*. Thus, *Ecce Homo* is Nietzsche's *Apology*. It is fitting to read the final account of himself as the way into Nietzsche, just as for Socrates (and Plato) one ought to begin with the *Apology*. The text is best read as a sustained ironic commentary on the problem of Plato's Socrates.
ENDNOTES

Introduction, pp. 1-3:


Chapter One, pp. 4-33:

1. In North America after the First World War, the 20 year's crisis, and World War Two (HH, 56; Dawn, 548; JS 258; Bk. V; EH, III, BT, 4), Nietzsche commanded little scholarly or philosophical interest (BGE, "We Scholars"; JS, 371). He was known chiefly as the late 19th century German philosopher of the Nazis who went insane.

At this time, the only English translations in circulation were those earliest versions, rendered by several different translators, varying in degrees of competence, contained in the first and only "authorized" English edition of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, in 18 volumes, collected and edited by Dr. Oscar Levy, published before the outbreak of World War One (New York: MacMillan, 1909-13; re-issued by Russell & Russell, New York, 1964). Few, if any translations of any of his writings had been published since.

It was none other than the late Walter Kaufmann who introduced an altogether new, unexpectedly profound "Socratic" Nietzsche—and not only for the English-speaking world. A seminal contribution to Nietzsche studies, the original edition of Kaufmann's *Nietzsche* appeared in 1950.


Produced for the immediate post-war context of North America, *Nietzsche* is a comprehensive attempt "to explode the legends woven around Nietzsche and to analyze the break with Wagner, the relation to Lou Salome and to his sister, the final madness, and, above all, his philosophy, psychology, and critique of Christianity" (The Portable Nietzsche, "Acknowledgments," p. vii).

In 1968 Kaufmann completed a second series of new translations, edited, with commentaries, collected in his volume *Basic Writings of Nietzsche* (New York: Modern Library, 1968), including, complete, The Birth, Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals (jointly translated by Kaufmann and
Hollingdale), The Case of Wagner, and Ecce Homo. The same year a revised, updated and greatly enlarged edition of Nietzsche was issued, superceding the original edition (an inexpensive pocket paperback appeared in 1956, truncated).

In the Preface, Kaufmann traces Nietzsche's reception in the English-speaking world and lists some significant literature following in the wake of his book: "By 1950 Nietzsche had been linked in turn with evolution, with depth psychology, and with the Nazis; but in the English-speaking world he had not come into his own as a philosopher. In the United States, my book probably did its share to get Nietzsche to be taken seriously as a philosopher; but soon it became fashionable to see him as a precursor of existentialism. In 1961 Heidegger's two-volume Nietzsche appeared in German, and in 1965 an American translation of Jaspers' Nietzsche appeared. R. J. Hollingdale's Nietzsche, the first decent biography in English, also came out in 1965; and so did paperback reprints of George A. Morgan, Jr., and Crane Brinton, originally published in 1941, and Arthur Danto's attempt to link Nietzsche with analytical philosophy" (p. ix).


2. See Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 4th ed., "Preface to the First Edition," pp. xiv-xv: "...the proclamation that 'God is dead' marks the beginning, just as the revaluation is generally considered the end, of Nietzsche's philosophy" (see Dannhauser, Nietzsche's View, p. 33); "Prologue: The Nietzsche Legend," pp. 17-18; Part II, "The Development of Nietzsche's Thought," Ch. 4, "Art and History," pp. 121-22: "The crown of
Nietzsche's philosophy is the dual vision of the overman and the eternal recurrence; its key conception is the will to power... When it is shown... how Nietzsche came to invoke such extreme conceptions, it will appear that his later doctrines are answers--worthy of consideration, although hardly entirely acceptable as they stand--to problems that still plague us today... The question arises as to where we are to find the thread of Ariadne to guide us through the labyrinth of Nietzsche's thought: where is Nietzsche's most fundamental problem on which all his philosophic labors are focused? This crucial question is easily overlooked; but asking it almost means answering it--so little doubt does Nietzsche leave concerning his primary concern: values... the dilemma that haunts modern man and threatens our civilization... Modern man finds that his values are worthless, that his ends do not give his life any purpose, and that his pleasures do not give him happiness. Nietzsche's basic problem is whether a new sanction can be found in this world for our values; whether a new goal can be found that will give an aim to human life; and what is happiness?"; and later in the same Ch. 4, p. 149: "The goal of humanity cannot lie in the end [Ende] but only in its highest specimens' (UM, II, 9). Perhaps there is no more basic statement of Nietzsche's philosophy in all his writings than this sentence. Here is the most crucial point of his philosophy of history and theory of values--no less the clue to his 'aristocratic' ethics and his opposition to socialism and democracy. This sentence also shows how the historical and supra-historical are finally integrated. In the highest specimens of humanity we envisage the meaning of life and history: what can an additional ten or twenty centuries bring to light that we could not find in contemplating Aeschylus and Heraclitus, Socrates and Jesus, Leonardo and Michelangelo, Shakespeare and Goethe, Caesar and Napoleon, or Platô and Spinoza? In them the events of history have truly 'intensified into symbols.' Kaufmann could include Moses and Mohammed, Confucious and the Buddha, Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven. Also, Part III, "Nietzsche's Philosophy of Power," Ch. 11, "Overman and Eternal Recurrence," pp. 307-33. For an enucleation of this deepening value crisis that "haunts modern man and threatens civilization," see George Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1959; 1966).


Examining "Nietzsche's Method" in Ch. 2 of Nietzsche, Kaufmann restores the appropriate "relation of his opus postumum to the books which he published" (76): "A division of the posthumous material into at least three parts seems obvious. First, there are the works Nietzsche completed but did not publish because he collapsed while still negotiating with publishers. In this category belong Antichrist, Ecce Homo, and Nietzsche contra Wagner—and they may be treated
exactly like Nietzsche's other books. Secondly, there are the notes Nietzsche used for his lectures at the university of Basel: they are an important source of information concerning Nietzsche's relation to the ancient Greeks; they are 'full' notes and can be read continuously; and they present no great difficulty, provided one keeps in mind that they represent lectures Nietzsche gave while working on some of his earlier books. Finally, there is the mass of fragments and notes which includes unfinished essays, long continuous passages, brief notebook scribbles jotted down on Alpine hikes, and outlines for projected works yet to be written. This third part of the opus postumum can be further divided into two classes: the material that never found its way into a published work and, secondly, the notes that were eventually put to use and developed in his later works. This last type does not reveal his final views but rather the manner in which he arrived at these views which we find in the finished books. The material, on the other hand, which was not used in the composition of any book was almost invariably held back because it had not yet been fully thought through and was not developed to the point where Nietzsche might have been willing to stand up for it. In either case, whether used or not, all of this material in the third group must be sharply distinguished from the books Nietzsche completed; and a careful examination of the notes of which he availed himself in the composition of his later works furnishes ample evidence for the assertion that he frequently used, or planned to use, them in a context in which they turn out to have a meaning quite different from that which they appear to have in isolation. These notes, including those contained in The Will to Power, are of great interest, frequently very suggestive, and distinctly helpful as background material for a better understanding of the finished books. In the past, however, they have been vastly overestimated--and this has prevented a correct understanding of Nietzsche's method, i.e., of the manner in which he deliberately availed himself of the 'style of decadence' in an effort to transcend any mere 'anarchy of atoms' and to achieve a coherent philosophy. Thus Jaspers poses an alternative between two current modes of approach: some writers discount the finished books and prefer the posthumous material 'as the ground out of which the publications are only scattered and in themselves incomprehensible growths,' and they suspect all that Nietzsche says in his published books because there his phrases seem polished for effect; other interpreters prefer the books and suspect the notes because Nietzsche did not examine them critically--which is a striking understatement. The two
suspicions are hardly of equal force. It seems wholly preposterous to ignore the works which a philosopher has published, to claim that he did not really mean what he said in them, and to prefer to them the scattered scribblings which he penned on his walks. To speak concretely, this was the Nazis' approach, frankly maintained by Baumler. Confronted with books in which Nietzsche quite consistently, from the Untimely Meditations to Ecce Homo, poured invective on State idolatry, Germanomania, racism, nationalism, and almost the entire Nazi creed, Baumler resorted to the subterfuge that Nietzsche did not mean it. The Nazis ignored the fact that the notes and letters contain the identical ideas, usually in less polished form, but frequently even sharper. No serious scholar has ever preferred the notes to the books, but most of them consider books and notes on the same plane. While this is, of course, far better than Baumler's notion that the sister's edition of The Will to Power was Nietzsche's 'main work' and his 'system,' it still seems wholly unjustifiable" (76-78).


"What of [Kaufmann's] comments on [Nietzsche]? Can his interpretations really be taken seriously?...Let us be specific: Do his comments...make sense? Very little written...is as illuminating, and most discussions...are dated by [Nietzsche], which long antedates them" ("Editor's Introduction" to Ecce Homo, p. 660-61).

While some of Kaufmann's views are less persuasive than others, measured against the standards of pre-Kaufmann Nietzsche literature, as Kaufmann writes of Nietzsche's own self-reviews in Ecce Homo, his work has "several inestimable advantages over almost everything that passes as serious literature about him: he did not discuss any of his works without having read them carefully, more than once; indeed, he did not discuss any without knowing all of them, in the sequence in which they were written--and, of course, in the original. He also knew all of his letters, as well as his unpublished fragments and notes. And he wrote about his oeuvre with singular penetration, wit, and style" ("Editor's Introduction," pp. 661).

Kaufmann's "Prologue" to Nietzsche exploded the Nietzsche legends circulating early in this century, propogated first by the sister and later by the Nazis. Kaufmann criticizes Stefan Georg and the Circle's poetic
licensure with Nietzsche's works. His point is, to again put it as Nietzsche does, with respect to 19th century historiography of the French Revolution, the text finally disappeared under the interpretation (BGE, 38).

One of the "legends" Kaufmann deconstructs, which arose in part due to Nietzsche's experiments with the aphorism, and his multifarious styles, is that Nietzsche's thought is irreducibly contradictory. Kaufmann aims to overrule Ernst Bertram's "cultivated incoherence...wilful disregard for the sequence of Nietzsche's thought--even for the immediate context of his utterances" (13). "What Bertram meant was actually not so much a predilection for equivocal statements as constant self-contradiction, for he failed to see that this self-contradictory quality is merely the characteristic of legend and not typical of Nietzsche. And the alleged contradictions can generally be resolved in one of two ways. The utterly superficial inconsistencies dissolve as soon as one checks the quotations and recognizes the meaning they had in their original context. Bertram makes this difficult by withholding exact references. His work is full of phrases in quotation marks that are integrated into his own prose, though this sometimes involves an alteration of both text and meaning" (14).

In the Preface for the third edition, he writes that "It was the surpassing merit of Karl Jaspers' Nietzsche (1936) that he counseled Nietzsche's readers never to rest content until they had also found passages contradicting those found first. This should have spelled the end of the theological era of Nietzsche exegesis, but of course, it did not: some recent studies are as arbitrary as any. Alas, Jaspers' own interpretation rests content with superficial contradictions and ignores the context...the development of Nietzsche's thought, and the difference between Nietzsche's notes and books" (vii).

Providing groundwork for a sound philological approach, Kaufmann argues that "the apparently more profound contradictions can be resolved by the discovery of a larger context, namely that of Nietzsche's philosophy, his development, and his basic intentions—all of which are ignored by Bertram and in the legend generally. Nietzsche, we are told, was in some ways more Christian than pagan although he attacked Christianity so bitterly; he valued not only health but also suffering and sickness; he both loved and hated Socrates and Wagner. Why can one not ask in Nietzsche's case, as one would in any other, what he opposed in Christianity and to what elements he shows an affinity? How he defined health and why he valued suffering? What, more
precisely, was his relation to Socrates?...with Wagner?" (14).


7. Ibid., p. 273.


10. Revaluation of all values, transvaluation of all values: See Kaufmann, Basic Writings: Beyond Good and Evil, Part Five, "Natural History of Morals," 195, 203; Part Six, "We Scholars," 211, 212; Part Eight, "Peoples and Fatherlands," 253; Part Nine, "What is Noble," 260; Genealogy, Preface, 6; I, 7, 8, 17; Ecce Homo, I, 1; II, 9; III, 1; HH, 6; Dawn, 1; BGE, 1; GM; TI, 3; CW, 4; IV, 1, 7; also The Portable Nietzsche: Twilight, Foreword; The Antichrist, 62.

11. In the Introduction to Nietzsche's View, Dannhauser observes that "Kaufmann's book contains two closely connected but separate strands; it is partly negative or refutative and partly positive or interpretive-expository" (28). He comments that "compelling reasons exist for the inclusion of both strands. The author is surely right to show the need for a comprehensive reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought by pointing to the errors and insufficiencies of previous interpretations...Nevertheless, the presence of the two strands makes an exposition of Kaufmann's point of view somewhat difficult. The negative or refutative aspect of the book finds its most sustained expression in the Prologue,
which is subtitled 'The Nietzsche Legend,' but is by no means confined to it; it runs through the book, at times going underground into footnotes but never completely vanishing. The book is permeated by a polemical zest, which in some places heightens its liveliness but in others threatens to obscure the author's position. It is not always possible to tell whether he is offering his own view or deliberately exaggerating in order to counteract prejudice and misapprehensions" (pp. 28-29).

12. On the choice between the translated spelling of Apollinian or Apollonian, see Kaufmann, "Translator's Introduction" to The Birth, fn. 9, p. 9.


16. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

17. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

18. Crane Brinton, Nietzsche, Ch. IV, "What Nietzsche Hated," p. 83: "He hated extensively and energetically, so that it is hard to distinguish among his hatreds. One of the
most constant of them, however, one which appears clearly in
his very first book, is a hatred for the tradition of European
rationalism. Socrates, one of the great heroes of that
tradition, is for Nietzsche a villain."

19. The Birth emerged directly out of polished lecture
notes and essays Nietzsche prepared teaching and researching
as a professor of classical philology at Basel. See Vorstufen
der Geburt der Tragödie (3 vol., Liepzig, 1926-28) which
records the stages on the way toward The Birth, as well as the
original version, Sokrates und die Griechische Tragödie, ed.
H. J. Mette (Munich, 1933).


21. Among other interesting items dating from the
Basel years, Nietzsche's detailed copy and lecture notes for
a course he taught on ancient oratory and rhetoric in 1872-73
are included in Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979; trans. by Carole

22. Philosophy and Truth contains important selections
from Nietzsche's theoretical and philosophical work toward
this unfinished project. See Professor Breazeale's commentary
and elaborate critical apparatus of the "Preface," pp. ix-xi,
"Introduction," pp. xiii-xlvi, "Note on the Text, Translation,
and Annotation," pp. li-lixi, and extensive footnotes.

23. Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age
with an introduction by Marianne Cowan. This is the essay
fragment of an historical component to the "Philosopher's
Book": "It is necessary to know that the work as it is here
published was never completed. It occupies a place in the
posthumously published voluminous notes and fragments.
Nevertheless it is different from the bulk of these notes in
that Nietzsche had a clean copy of it made, within a year or
two of its writing, and refers to it as the manuscript of a
new whole book, albeit far from completion. Various plans for
completion are also extant, none comprising more than a
paragraph or two, as well as jottings consisting mainly of the
names of the pre-Socratic philosophers followed by various
key-words of characterization. In addition, serious study of
the essay in question demands some acquaintance with
Nietzsche's concurrent plans for other (also not completed)
books on related topics, notes and fragments of which add up,
at present, to several hundred printed pages" (pp. 4-5). See Breazeale, Philosophy and Truth, "Introduction," pp. xv-xxiii: "a relatively finished historical survey of the development of ancient philosophy" (p. xxii); "Note on the Text, Translation and Annotation," p. liii, fn. 4: "an unfinished though polished text written in the spring of 1873 and based upon the texts of his lectures. In the spring of 1874 Nietzsche had a fair copy of this draft made by a student...and in 1879 he made a few minor corrections in the manuscript and dictated the brief second preface."


26. Supra, en. 3.

27. Supra, en. 2, 5; cf. p. 18.


29. In his translation of the text, Kaufmann offers a revised version of the first half of this very last line: "Have I been understood?--" (IV, 9, p. 791). Hollingdale endorses the emended formulation (p. 134).


**Chapter Two, pp. 34-47:**

1. Dannhauser notes Kurt Hildebrandt's small volume (supra, en. 15) as "extremely helpful, especially since it provides, among other things, an extensive catalogue of Nietzsche's references to both Socrates and Plato" (Ch. 2, p. 84, fn. 56; cf. p. 87, fn. 62). In German, see Herman Josef Schmidt, *Nietzsche und Sokrates* (Meisenheim: Anton Hain, 1969). See Dannhauser, p. 278; Nehamas, *Nietzsche*, p. 241.

Among the major works, aside from *The Birth and Twilight* (both include extended discussions of Socrates), *Daybreak* contains the most references. No references occur in "David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer," and "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth" (first and the last of four *Unfashionable Observations*), "Mixed Opinions and Maxims" (the first supplement in volume two of *Human, All Too Human*), *Zarathustra*, *The Case of Wagner*, nor in any of the passages Nietzsche selected and edited for *Nietzsche contra Wagner*. References to Socrates in *Philosophy and Truth*: I, "The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between Art and


The following is the entry under "Socrates" in the "Glossary of Names" to Hollingdale's volume Twilight. The Antichrist., p. 205: "'Socrates...stands so close to me that I am almost always fighting with him,' Nietzsche confessed in the notes for an uncompleted essay of 1875 (Wissenschaft und Weisheit im Kampfe) and the fight went on until the end. Socrates is the type of 'the philosopher' and in investigating the mind and heart of Socrates Nietzsche is investigating his own: with none of the figures he discusses is the tremendous inner dialect of Nietzsche's lifelong monologue so clearly displayed as it is in the passages dealing with Socrates (of which there are hundreds). The 'problem' of Socrates is the problem of reason, of the status of reason in the life of man: and Nietzsche finds that problem inexhaustible."

2. Nietzsche's View is organized along the customary division of Nietzsche's literary life into three distinct periods (pp. 19-20): the "orthodox" professorial Basel period, from the early 1870's to the break with Wagner, including The Birth (1872) and the Unfashionable Observations (1873-76); the "experimental" middle "aphoristic" works, beginning with Human, All Too Human (1878), ending with The Joyous Science (1882); and the final "mature" Nietzsche: Zarathustra (1883-85), Beyond Good and Evil (1886), prefaces written for re-issues of all "early" and "middle" books less the Unfashionable essays (1886-87), Book V of The Joyous Science (1887), Genealogy (1887), and the final series of five works (1888), (which should be considered another distinct period).
Exceptions in treating the evidence for Nietzsche's view of Socrates in strict chronological order are as follows:

A: The "Attempt at a Self-Criticism" postscripted to the 1886 edition of The Birth (pp. 45, 75-80).

Chapter Two of Nietzsche's View, the exposition and analysis of "Socrates in The Birth of Tragedy and in Nietzsche's Early Writings on the Greeks," consists of "Background" (pp. 42-45), "Exposition" (pp. 46-75), "Nietzsche's Self-Criticism" (pp. 75-80), "The Novelty of The Birth of Tragedy" (pp. 80-87), "Nietzsche's Socrates" (pp. 87-103), "Nietzsche's Aesthetics versus Aesthetic Socratism" (pp. 103-19), "The Tragic versus the Theoretical View of the World" (pp. 119-29), and "The Artist Philosopher" (pp. 129-39).

B: Book V of the revised 1887 edition of The Joyous Science, along with the original "Prelude in Rhymes" and new preface and "Appendix of Songs" (pp. 171, 175-78).

C: Zarathustra, considered in Ch. 5, "Conclusion" (pp. 175, 240-41). As noted, in Zarathustra there is no explicit mention of Socrates (p. 240); other than one reference to Jesus (First Part, "On Free Death"), and, of course, Zarathustra, no actual historical figures are mentioned in the text at all (p. 241).

Dannhauser's exegesis and commentary on the text consists of "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" (pp. 241-45), "Zarathustra versus Socrates" (pp. 245-50), "The Teaching of Zarathustra versus the Teaching of Socrates" (pp. 250-69).


4. Dannhauser, Nietzsche's View, "Introduction," p. 20: "Nietzsche wrote in a variety of forms, including essays, poetry, aphorisms, and the strange speeches of Zarathustra, which almost defy categorization. The interpretation of Nietzsche's aphorisms constitutes an especially [difficult] undertaking. As a result of Nietzsche's stylistic experimentation, innovations, and pyrotechnics, his thought comes to view as tantalizingly ambiguous. That ambiguity, however, is not due solely to the form of Nietzsche's writings. In part it is the consequence of his desire to be as provocative as possible, and in part it reflects what I shall attempt to identify as certain inescapable tensions in his thought. Nietzsche's image of Socrates, too, is
ambiguous. Provisionally, it can be said that for Nietzsche the Socratic life is somehow both a great temptation and something to be rejected" (Cf. pp. 31-32).

5. Ibid., p. 20: "Although the periodization of Nietzsche's writing, to use Karl Löwith's phrase, makes the analysis of his thought a complex matter, it provides a singular justification for considering Nietzsche's view of Socrates. Nietzsche's concern with Socrates runs through all his writings and can thus be used to explore that which changes and that which remains unchanged in the course of Nietzsche's development. At this point, I can state tentatively that during the second stage of his development Nietzsche is most favorably disposed to Socrates" (Cf. pp. 36, 38-40, 174-75, 232-33).

6. Ibid., p. 40: "The tone of a work appears on its very surface. Kaufmann's interpretation suffers from a neglect of the obvious and massive surface meaning of Nietzsche. Thus instead of qualifying the obvious and commonsense impression that The Birth of Tragedy, which after all calls Socrates a monstrosity, constitutes one of the rare attacks on Socrates in the history of philosophy, Kaufmann tends to overlook it. Similarly, while acknowledging that Nietzsche mentions the ugliness, decadence, and plebeian descent of Socrates, he does not account for Nietzsche's dwelling on them with enthusiasm."

7. Dannhauser quotes Löwith's book review of the original edition of Kaufmann's Nietzsche, in Social Research, Vol. 18 (September, 1951), pp. 397-98. Löwith makes a like point in his comments on Ecce Homo in From Hegel to Nietzsche, trans. David Green (New York: Holt, 1964), p. 189: "This ecce homo, branded as the fate of Europe, can appear as the megalomania of a diseased mind, but also as prophetic knowledge, as madness and as profound insight. In his mad insight, Nietzsche, the pensioned professor of philology, became the crucified god Dionysus, who must sacrifice himself to determine the spiritual fate of Europe. But at the same time he had the feeling that he was ultimately only a 'buffoon'--'of eternities.'"

8. The dialogues in parentheses constitute, in this order, Plato's tetralogy of the trial, last days and death of Socrates.

9. For information on Nietzsche's sudden collapse

10. Dannhauser, Nietzsche's View, p. 234, fn. 123. Questions concerning the integrity of the received text, ed. Dr. Raoul Richter, and whether or not Nietzsche even completed a text continue to be debated. Some passages are now thought to have been edited or suppressed by Nietzsche's executors—first Gast, then the sister (I, 3; II, 10; III, UM, 3; CW, 3, 4). These have been restored by Colli and Montinari.

Apparently correspondence and corroborating evidence confirm that Ecce Homo was composed and completed by Nietzsche in the last quarter of 1888, and that a manuscript was already proofed and being set for type by his publisher, C. G. Naumann. For details and further considerations on these issues, consult the items noted in the Preliminaries, supra, "Abbreviations, Text and Translation," pp. vi-ix.

11. Italics added.

12. At this point, in the third of ten footnotes to this three page section, Dannhauser observes that except for one reference to Socrates he will discuss below—the Socrates [as-a-semiotic-sign-language-for] Plato comment— all of Nietzsche's references are to be found in the section on The Birth. Dannhauser doesn't mention here, or below, that his discussion consists only of two points in two sentences of another footnote that follows. Instead, he notes that he has already commented on these in his Chapter 2, though there seems to be only one reference to Ecce Homo anywhere in all of Chapter 2. This occurs in the review of Nietzsche's "Attempt at a Self-Criticism": "Yet Nietzsche's fondness for The Birth of Tragedy shines through his severe stricures on the book. Moreover, he recognizes its significance in the development of
his thought. Since he also emphasizes the immense historical importance of that thought—two years later, in Ecce Homo, he is to proclaim himself a destiny—he invests the book itself with historical significance" (76).

13. Italics added.

14. Dannhauser's presentation and overview analysis of Nietzsche's Socrates in Twilight consists of a "General Background" (pp. 192-95), "The Aphoristic Style and Structure" (pp. 195-207), "The Problem of Socrates" (pp. 207-23), and "The Conclusion of the Argument" (pp. 223-33).


16. Transposed-Transposition: in the Dionysian sense Nietzsche intends in the passage from Ecce Homo cited at the beginning of this Chapter Two of the thesis (III, BT, 3, pp. 729-30). Nietzsche's View is a book-length deconstruction of Kaufmann's view of Nietzsche's Socrates as presented in Nietzsche, Ch. 13. Asserting Nietzsche's "aphorism" on philosophy and war at this point in the text ("In the Final Period," Ecce Homo), Dannhauser is negotiating a complex dialectical and rhetorical position, with specific reference to his case against, versus Kaufmann's "Socratic" interpretation of Ecce Homo. Dannhauser directly contests Kaufmann's 'Yes' thesis and case with his own 'No' or 'antithesis.' The point is, Dannhauser contra Kaufmann. See Dannhauser's "Introduction," pp. 13-41; as well, en. 8 to Professor Leon Craig's essay, "Nietzsche's 'Apology,'" p. 58.


Also see Ronald Hayman, Nietzsche: A Critical Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Ch. 12, "Euphoria, Melancholia and Madness," pp. 319-50; the relevant chapters of


Noting that Socrates was the one man, being both a critic and a creator, whom Nietzsche supremely admired, in the "Epilogue" to Nietzsche Kaufmann characterizes Nietzsche as "the 'gadfly' who would follow 'the truth into all hide-outs' and die rather than cease philosophizing" (412). Kaufmann identifies "this leitmotif of Nietzsche's life and thought" with what he regards as the Socratic and Platonic "theme of the anti-political individual who seeks self-perfection far from the modern world" (418).

In light of the crude Nazi appropriation, Kaufmann sought to defuse the dangerous explosive Nietzsche. Yet Nietzsche thinks political thought throughout his writings, particularly in his later works. As for Kaufmann's interpretation of Socrates, though for most of his life, perhaps in deference to his *daimonion*, he remained inactive in the institutions and processes of Athenian political culture, it is still true that Socrates was the quintessential talker, driven to people and the city to learn. He was a lover of wisdom, but no hermit in a cave seeking self-perfection far from the "world." As the tradition has it, Socrates was invariably to be found somewhere in Athens, perhaps at the agora, barefoot, conversing with people. At seventy years old, rarely had he left the surrounding Greek region.

19. *Ecce Homo*, "Appendix: Variants from Nietzsche's Drafts," p. 800: "If we could dispense with wars, so much the better. I can imagine more profitable uses for the twelve billion now paid annually for the armed peace we have in Europe; there are other means of winning respect for physiology than field hospitals.--Good; very good even: since the old God is abolished, I am prepared to rule the world--"

Chapter Three, pp. 48-81:


4. Nietzsche often repeated his condemnation of the growing German "Reich," with its Wagnerian cultural chauvinism and particularistic nationalism. Nevertheless, he remains a German who wrote in German. Brandes wrote in his first letter: "Your nature is so absolutely different from mine that it is not easy for me to feel at home. In spite of your universality you are very German in your mode of thinking and writing*" (*Friedrich Nietzsche*, [New York: Haskell House Publishers Ltd., 1972], p. 63). Nietzsche responded: "I am afraid you will find it a difficult position. I myself have no doubt that my writings in one way or another are still 'very German'" (p. 64).

5. See Ahern, *Nietzsche as Cultural Physician*.


7. "Someone who after his forty-fourth year can say he has never striven after honours, after women, after money!" (II, 9, p. 711): Kaufmann, unlike Hollingdale, suppresses the aside "Not that I could not have had them [...]

8. Plato's Socrates does not employ eristic merely to win verbal battles--his aim is to lead his interlocutors and readers to philosophy. Consider the Gorgias and Phaedrus.

9. In 450 B.C. Anaxagoras was accused of impiety and treason, tried, condemned to death, but escaped to an exile in Lampsacus with the help of Pericles. It is with Nietzsche's thoughts on Anaxagoras (sections 14-19) where Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks ends, incomplete.

10. Aristophanes' The Clouds, circa 423 B.C.

11. Augenblick: Shapiro, Nietzschean Narratives, p. 143, ff. Ecce Homo was begun by Nietzsche composing the augenblick, on the day of his forty-fourth birthday, October 15, 1888: "On this perfect day, when everything is ripening and not only the grapes are growing brown, the eye of the sun just fell upon my life: I looked behind me, I looked forward, and never have I seen so many and such good things at once. It was not in vain that I buried my forty-fourth year today; I was entitled to bury it--whatever there was of life in it is saved, is immortal. The first book of the Revaluation of All Values, the Songs of Zarathustra, the Twilight of the Idols, my attempt to philosophize with a hammer--all of them gifts of this year, indeed of its last quarter! How should I not be grateful to my whole life?--And so I tell my life to myself" (Hollingdale, p. 37; Kaufmann, Basic Writings, p. 677).


18. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial* (Princeton, 1989), p. 31: "According to Diogenes Laertius, the precise wording of the indictment (reported by Favorinus to be preserved in the Metron--the temple of Cybele, where the Athenians kept their state archives) was as follows: 'This indictment and affidavit is sworn by Meletus, the son of Pithos, against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus of Alopec: Socrates is guilty of refusing to recognize the gods the state recognizes, and of introducing other new divinities. He is also guilty of corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death.'"
Chapter Four, pp. 82-147:

1. The Joyous Science ("la gaya scienza") was first published by Nietzsche in 1882. It contained the prelude in rhymes and the first four books of aphorisms. The three famous final aphorisms of Book Four are 340, "The dying Socrates," 341, "The greatest weight" (the first statement of the doctrine of the eternal return), and 342, "Incipit trageodia" (what became the first speech of Zarathustra's Prologue). An expanded edition, with a new Preface, Book Five (343-383), and an appendix of songs, appeared in 1887.

2. Walter Kaufmann has played an unparalleled role in the short but dramatic history of Nietzsche studies. In North America it was, above all, Kaufmann, a gifted literary pentatholos--author, editor, scholar, translator, philosopher--who was responsible for redirecting Nietzsche scholarship out of the Dark Ages. His eleven translations, in combination with Nietzsche, constitute an unprecedented contribution, indeed, the unique "unveiling" (JS, 339). He still "holds a unique place in the Nietzsche literature: nobody else has contributed" (425) a more significant body of scholarship. It is not an idle question to ask what would have happened to Nietzsche scholarship without Kaufmann's influence. It is well known he helped bear "the greatest weight" (JS, 341) of the attempt to rescue Nietzsche from the violence he suffered at the hands of the Nazis. Kaufmann defended the value and virtue of Nietzsche, the legitimacy of the man and his writings, as a philosopher and educator par excellence.

Half a century after the death of Nietzsche, Kaufmann began a new era in the appreciation of Nietzsche (BGE, 256). From the perspective of the half century since, it is clear that Kaufmann was "the greatest recent event" (JS, 343) in Nietzsche studies. He was a fate, a tour de force, "a force majeure, a destiny--he breaks history of mankind into two parts. One lives before him, one lives after him" (IV, 8, p. 789). The rescue and restoration of Nietzsche to his rightful rank and position in the grand tradition of philosophy helped bring about Revolution, Renaissance and Enlightenment within Nietzsche studies. Kaufmann may be likened to a Solonic reformer, an Athenian Stranger, the Rousseauian Lawgiver, an Overman, creating new laws and values.

In English-speaking Nietzsche studies--and not only in this realm--Kaufmann's Nietzsche effected a radical "revaluation of all values." The text "spelled the end of the theological era of Nietzsche exegesis" (vii). Although it
could and did not "find the riddle and compress the problem of the world into the simplest riddle-form" (Dawn, 547), nor "reach the mid-point of being with a single leap and thence solve the riddle of the universe," (HH, 261) or "settle all questions with a single answer," (Dawn, 547) "to solve everything at a single stroke, with a single word" (Dawn, 547), Kaufmann's Nietzsche has served to inform every informed investigation of Nietzsche ever since.

The polemics and refutative rhetoric of Chapter 13 are in tune with Kaufmann's intention, as Nietzsche's biographer, editor, historian, scholarly exegete, and translator, to explode the "Nietzsche Legend." In Genealogy, Nietzsche anticipates the question "'What are you really doing, erecting an ideal or knocking one down?"' His answer: "If a temple is to be erected a temple must be destroyed: that is the law--let anyone who can show me a case in which it is not fulfilled!" (GM, II, 24). Nietzsche carried out the double-edged Dionysian--Apollinian task of destruction and creation: on the one hand, "Yes-Saying," a comprehensive reconstruction of Nietzsche's life and thought is presented. On the other, to seriously address Nietzsche's thought in North America in 1950, Kaufmann was compelled to carry out a very necessary "No-Doing" task of defending Nietzsche and his writings from what may be called the "old accusation": his guilt by association with the Deutschland of Bismark, the Reich and the Great War; and also against a "new accusation": Hitler, the Nazis, and the Second World War. Nietzsche became free of the sister's distortion of his literary legacy, the enthusiastic poetic and romanticized myths cultivated early on by Stefan Georg and the Circle, including Bertram's "Attempt at a Myth," and most importantly, his fateful appropriation by the odious Nazi ideologues. And as Kaufmann points out in the last sentence of his Prologue, "correctly understood, [Nietzsche] explodes the very core of the legend itself" (18).


6. A cornerstone of Kaufmann's "revaluation" is his discovery of Nietzsche's Socrates: refuting the dogma that Socrates is Nietzsche's arch "villain," demonstrating instead that Nietzsche admires Socrates, Kaufmann completely inverted the prevalent view of Nietzsche's attitude.

   In different contexts leading to Chapter 13, Kaufmann throws light on other aspects of Nietzsche's Socrates: "Nietzsche...gradually came to regard himself as another Socrates who had no system of his own and encouraged intellectual independence" (47). "The model philosopher is pictured as a physician who applies the knife of his thought 'vivisectionally to the very virtues of the time.' As a paragon of such a philosopher Nietzsche pictures Socrates whom he would emulate" (109). "His own calling he conceives as that of a doctor; for, as he said of Plato, Nietzsche himself also 'received from the apology of Socrates the decisive thought of how a philosopher ought to behave toward man: as their physician, as a gadfly on the neck of man'" (145). "It is as if Nietzsche had purposely left behind our entire civilization to travel back through the centuries to ancient Athens to join the company at Plato's Symposium. Perhaps no other philosopher has tried so hard to re-experience the spirit of Socrates and his disciples" (366). "The general practice of completely ignoring Nietzsche's exaltation of friendship...has gone together with the false assumption that Nietzsche was decisively influenced by, and loved, only the pre-Socratic Greeks. Yet what Nietzsche probably tried to recapture more than anything else was the spirit of Socrates and his disciples" (389).

The other references to Socrates in Kaufmann's *Nietzsche* outside the prefaces and Chapter 13 are: I, pp. 5, 6, 8, 14, 23, 33, 53, 62, 65, 71, 82, 84, 90, 108, 111-12, 117; III, 129, 153, 159-60, 192, 220, 243; IV, 384, 389; epilogue 414, 422; "Appendix," 425 fn., 438-39.


8. Ibid., 340, fn. 70, p. 272. In an essay on "Das Drama Zarathustras" (*Nietzsche Studien*, 15 [1986], pp. 1-15), Gadamer notes that his hermeneutic pays attention to the beginning and end of books for clues that usually play key roles in deciphering and interpreting the work.

10. Kaufmann resembles Nietzsche's warlike Greek thinkers: a "brutal tyrant" (*HH*, 261), "taking that word in every sense, including the most spiritual" (*BGE*, 242). He was "a beginning, a begetting and first cause...tough, powerful, self-reliant" (*BGE*, 207). He "overthrew all...contemporaries and predecessors" (*HH*, 261; cf. *WS*, 230; *Dawn*, 547).


12. Supra, Chapter Two, en. 1.

13. "By going behind Plato and Platonic philosophy and challenging Socrates himself, Nietzsche inaugurated a more radical attack on ancient philosophy than those of his predecessors...Nietzsche's attack on Socrates questions the possibility of philosophy as such...To the later Nietzsche all philosophers since Socrates will be questionable phenomena because they have been decisively influenced by Socrates or a Platonism whose decisive component is Socratic" (85-86). "Nietzsche sees Socrates as the archetype of the theoretical man--the father of modern science, one might almost say--but he is fully aware that Socrates is traditionally understood as a moral philosopher, as the man who brought philosophy down to earth" (79). "Nietzsche's quarrel with Socrates is not merely over the latter's alleged failure to understand art in the limited sense. Nietzsche expounds a tragic view of the world and asserts that there is an eternal battle between it and the theoretical view...As the archetype of the theoretical man, Socrates is both the greatest exponent of the theoretical world view and its symbol. The battle between the two views centers around the definition, value, and status of instinct, consciousness, reason, science, and teleology" (118-19; 123). "For Nietzsche, the Greek philosophers beginning with Socrates are the decadents of Greek culture; classical philosophy goes against the grain of the Greek instincts" (232).


15. To reiterate some of the key points of evidence not to be accounted for strictly in terms of "admiration," re-assembled by Dannhauser in *Nietzsche's View* for his 'No' counter-argument: Nietzsche blames Socratic logic, reason and optimistic faith in dialectics and theoretical knowledge for
the death of the tragic world-view; later, Nietzsche attacks the doctrinal influence of idealism and rationalism, in the forms of Socratism and Platonism; in 1888, he levels his most personal attacks on Socrates, his decadence, ignoble descent, oddities and peculiarities, even his legendary ugliness.

16. In the "Introduction" Dannhauser states that "Lukacs correctly stresses that Nietzsche's moral philosophy lies at the centre of his thought. In this, Nietzsche is curiously at one with Socrates, or at least with the tradition celebrating Socrates for bringing philosophy down to earth. This strange kinship with Socrates, which persists through the most extreme substantive opposition, is one of the things I hope to articulate" (26). He concludes Nietzsche's View:

"To study Nietzsche's image of Socrates is primarily to study Nietzsche's attack on Socrates. Yet in attempting to articulate the scope, meaning, and vehemence of that attack, one repeatedly finds similarities between Socrates and Nietzsche.

One cannot read Nietzsche without being struck by how much of the wisdom of the ancients is recaptured by this most modern of thinkers...one is surely reminded of Socrates (or Plato) when Nietzsche praises madness; when he criticizes the poets for being valets of some morality or other and for lying too much; when he insists that warriors must obey the "saints of knowledge"; when he subjects philanthropy and pity to critical scrutiny; when he argues that good political orders are hierarchical orders; when he distinguishes between the good and the noble; and when he asserts that "the greatest events--those are but our stillest hours."

Such examples could be multiplied, but even the most exhaustive listing of correspondence would not give an adequate picture of the resemblance between Nietzsche and Socrates-Plato. There is a similarity between Nietzsche's whole way of philosophizing and the Socratic-Platonic way. Nietzsche did not write dialogues, but the various strategies he devised for presenting his thought--aphorisms, poems, the speeches of Thus Spoke Zarathustra--show a remarkable awareness of the same problems that dialogues are meant to surmount. Nietzsche's attack on philosophic systems and the predilection for indirect communication he shared with Kierkegaard surely are reminiscent of Plato's statement in his Seventh Letter that "there is no treatise of mine on these things nor will there ever be, for it is not a matter communicable in words like other studies." In this context, one must also remember Nietzsche's awareness of the ancient distinction between esoteric and exoteric writing.
Even Nietzsche's two major doctrines, around which the whole of his thought tends to revolve, are not so alien to classical thought as they appear at first sight to be, and as Nietzsche chooses to present them. The will to power repeatedly reminds one of eros, albeit eros without a goal...the eternal return of the same can be thought of as an attempt, perhaps not a successful one, to understand the world as a cosmos within which man can live well.

All these similarities may be less significant than the kinship--amidst great difference, of course--between the Nietzschean and the Socratic-Platonic understanding of philosophy itself. When Nietzsche calls philosophy the most spiritualized form of the will to power, he means many things, but, given his views of spiritualization and sublimation, one of the things he means is that philosophy is the highest way of life. He understands, as did Socrates, the requirements of being a philosopher; for example, he knows that one must bind one's heart if one's mind is to be free, and that moral indignation prevents one from philosophizing. Moreover, he understands, as did Socrates, the immense gulf between the gifted few and the vulgar many, and that it is wise for the philosopher to speak differently to different people. To appreciate Nietzsche's profound understanding of the problematic relationship between philosophers and non-philosophers one has only to read Zarathustra's critique of the state and society, which is reminiscent of the Socratic-Platonic articulation of the inevitable tension between the philosopher and the polis.

Above all, both Socrates and Nietzsche understand that the philosopher must examine morality critically, and both are critics of morality...Both...saw morality as a problem, as the problem. Notwithstanding the differences in style and tone, there is a kinship between Socrates' attempt gently to lead man from conventional morality to a life according to nature and Nietzsche's fierce attack on the "good and the just" in the name of creativity. Indeed, it was because he saw this kinship that Nietzsche never ceased to be fascinated by Socrates. It is as if his perpetual preoccupation with morality involved a perpetual encounter with Socrates.

And yet, once one thinks of creativity, one is brought back to the differences between Socrates and Nietzsche...specifically of the differences between discovering and creating moral standards, and generally of the vast difference between philosophy understood as contemplation and philosophy understood as creativity. Nietzsche may be fascinated by Socrates; he may see the life of theory as a great temptation; in certain instances he may even be trying to effect a return
to certain classical views; but he must finally reject traditional philosophy as a delusion that becomes impossible to maintain once it is recognized as a delusion. Finally, he seems privileged or doomed to carry philosophy into new and uncharted regions: the perpetual encounter with Socrates must perpetually turn into a quarrel with him.

That quarrel can scarcely be said to issue in a clear victory for Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the quarrel with Socrates is part of a vast historical drama which he recounts and which features Socrates as the first villain and Nietzsche himself as the final hero. But in painting so vast a canvas Nietzsche is bound to paint with too broad a brush. Many of the strictures on all previous philosophy miss the mark, if Socrates and Plato are understood as that mark. Thus the critique of dogmatism and systems may hit Hegel, but it misses Socrates and Plato; and many of the attacks on reason, rationality, and rationalism may hit Descartes, but they miss with Socrates and Plato. And even when he quarrels specifically with Socrates and Plato, Nietzsche is likely to miss the mark, if only because he is likely to refuse to concede to Socrates and Plato an awareness equaling his own. No sustained analysis of even one Platonic dialogue buttresses any of Nietzsche's criticisms. The "historical sense," which Nietzsche was proud to possess and which he characterized as one of the proudest possessions of modernity, apparently does not necessarily lead to an understanding of the past that does justice to it. Instead this sense, it seems, promotes a tendency to dismiss the thought of the past as culture-bound and to encourage an opinion that one understands the thinkers of the past better than they understood themselves.

If the quarrel between Nietzsche and Socrates is viewed as a personal contest, an agon, as Nietzsche occasionally hints it should be viewed, it is again doubtful whether Nietzsche achieves victory. When all is said and done, Socrates emerges as the fuller, more profound, and more enduring figure. Socrates, who wore only one mask, compounded of irony and urbanity, emerges as more intriguing than Nietzsche, the man of many masks. In order to be as truthful and provocative as possible, Nietzsche was willing to violate all canons of public responsibility. Socrates, by contrast, managed to be at least as profound and ultimately as shocking, while giving moderation its due and dignifying the canons of public responsibility. One would be hard put to it to make a list of desirable traits or characteristics present in Nietzsche and absent in Socrates.

I hasten to add that many of my criticisms of Nietzsche's view of Socrates miss the mark because Nietzsche
is aware of them and presents them with an eloquence and clarity I cannot hope to rival. In any event it is not for me to judge the outcome of a quarrel between two such giants as Socrates and Nietzsche, because only a philosopher can do justice to a quarrel between philosophers. My own articulation of Nietzsche's image of Socrates can lay no claim to anything except a modest amount of scholarship, and in this connection I am compelled to remember that according to Zarathustra a scholar is someone who thinks the thoughts of other men--and turns them to dust.

The thoughts I have attempted to think without turning them to dust are Nietzsche's, and not the least reason I am grateful to him is that those thoughts lead one to a Socrates freed of all the crusts of tradition and shining as a representative of the grandeur that is philosophy" (269-74).


18. Nehamas, Nietzsche, p. 28, reminds us of Socrates' continual cultural rebirth through the Platonic dialogues.


21. "I should never have believed that it would be such a close thing; but now it seems that if a mere thirty votes had gone the other way, I should have been acquitted" (36a).

22. E.g., Brinton, Deleuze, Grant, and Theile.

23. E.g., Dannhauser and Nehamas.

24. E.g., Craig.


27. On Nietzsche's work during this period, consult Breazeale, Philosophy and Truth, pp. xiii-lxi.

28. In Young Nietzsche: Becoming a Genius (Toronto: The Free Press, 1991), Carl Pletsch claims that Nietzsche abandoned this project because Wagner was not moved by it and wanted Nietzsche to be under his direction (pp. 159-66). Though Wagner may have influenced the direction of Nietzsche's philological work, it may be that on the road to another wrenching encounter with Socrates, Nietzsche became inspired by his own literary and philosophical possibilities. Consider his comment on Human, All Too Human in Ecce Homo: "How I
thought about myself at that time (1876), with what tremendous sureness I got hold of my task and what was world-historic in it... " (III, HH, 6, pp. 744-45).


30. See Ahern, Nietzsche as Cultural Physician.

31. The three longer passages are also in Volume One: 111, "Origin of the religious cult," 221, "The revolution in poetry," and 472, "Religion and government."

32. Italics added.

33. Asclepius, healing god of the Greeks.

34. Silenus, god of the Greeks, who once revealed a terrible, tragic truth: The best for mortals is to not be born. The second best is—to die soon (BT, 3, 4, 7, 24).


36. Ibid., p. 177.


39. "To the Friend Georg: When once you had discovered me, it was easy enough to find me: the difficulty now is to get rid of me [...] The Crucified." Brandes, Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 97.


41. Ahern, Nietzsche as Cultural Physician, passim.
42. Ibid., Chapter III, en. 42, pp. 162-63.


44. Zarathustra is "A Book For All and None" in Kaufmann's translation. According to Hollingdale, the Latin title of Ecce Homo is a phrase "taken from the Vulgate version of John 19:5, where it renders the words rendered in the Authorized Version as 'Behold the man!'" (Introduction, pp. 13-14). The sub-title, "How One Becomes What One Is," is a final variation on Pindar's Delphic theme genoi hoios essi (Pyth., II, 73), a theme that first emerged in Nietzsche's earliest days as a student and would recur throughout his letters and works (Hollingdale, "Introduction," pp. 14-15). Cf. UO, III, 1; Dawn, Pre., 1; AOM, 366; JS, Prelude, 62; "Ecce Homo"; 99, 270 (see Kaufmann's fn. 69), 335; BGE, 209; TI, X, 6; EH, II, 9, pp. 709-11; III, HH, 1, p. 739; III, Z, 8, p. 765.

45. Down to this comprehensive bibliography, few sustained discussions of the text in English or in translation are extant. Other than Kaufmann ("Editor's Introduction," pp. 657-65), most notable scholars, including Jaspers, Heidegger and Morgan, offer only general or sporadic comments. Witness Brinton, Nietzsche, p. 65: "The Ecce Homo, Nietzsche's last work, she withheld until 1908. It is a kind of autobiography, wholly unsystematic, reviewing one after another Nietzsche's books. It is not apologetic, not an attempt to justify himself. Nietzsche in the fall of 1888 was well beyond that stage, well beyond a mere sense of martyrdom and persecution. Some of its chapter headings have become famous: 'Why I am so clever,' 'Why I write such good books.' And sentences: 'I am not a man: I am dynamite.'"

46. None of these works are written in English. See items 84, 971, 978, 2780, 3019, 3028, 3383, 3670.

47. Supra, Chapter Two, en. 10 and 17.


49. See Hayman, Nietzsche, Chapter 12, pp. 319-50.

50. Supra, Chapter One, en. 5.
51. Given the experiences and feelings documented in his letters, it seems highly unlikely Nietzsche would consent to his sister having sole right to his literary estate—only to withhold publication of *Ecce Homo*. *Infra*, en. 63.


54. Ibid., pp. 161-62.


58. Ibid., p. 669.


62. *My Sister and I* (Los Angeles: Amok Books, 1990; 1951) is considered a hoax. A manuscript (lost), supposedly furtively penned by Nietzsche during lucid moments in the Jena clinic, was smuggled to Canada, and later translated by Oscar Levy. The translation (never mentioned by Levy) appeared shortly after Levy's death and apparently was also lost.

63. Did Nietzsche fake or feign his madness? (Overbeck reports that when he found him in Turin, the philosopher was crouched on the chesterfield in the room he rented from Fino, pouring over final proofs of *Nietzsche contra Wagner*). After his dramatic collapse (the exact date and even veracity of which is disputed), he was examined in a clinic in Basel
(January 10, 1889), transferred to the Jena clinic (January 17), "treated" there for over a year, and then returned to live in the care of his mother in Naumburg (1890). From the point of his collapse, he apparently gradually became a hopeless invalid. He lived over a decade more, but had ceased to be independent, let alone write. See Breazeale, "Ecce Psycho," en. 9, p. 29.


67. "An autobiography, though a misfired one; a summary of and coming-to-terms with the work and conflicts of his life; a final statement of his position as philosopher, psychologist and anti-Christ; a proclamation of the coming revaluation of all values: upon these factors in *Ecce Homo* there is laid a particular, a peculiar pathos from which the book acquires its individual tone of voice—a tone which sets it by itself even within the corpus of Nietzsche's own writings: the pathos of absolute affirmation" (Hollingdale, "Introduction," p. 12).


69. Ibid., p. 657.

70. Ibid., p. 658.


72. "There are worse, much worse, things than this. Some passages are crazy—they are the products of a mind no longer master of its fantasies, no longer able to segregate fantasy from fact; close allied to which are those dithyrambs of self-appreciation, unparalleled public relinquishments of inhibition, which led the earliest readers of the manuscript—e.g. the theologian Franz Overbeck—to reject it as a document of insanity" (Hollingdale, "Introduction," p. 7).
73. Ibid., pp. 7-9; Tanner, "Introduction," p. 5.


75. Ibid., fn. 1, pp. 736-37: "The words placed in brackets are not in Nietzsche's hand and were added by a German editor--presumably Gast."


77. In "Beholding Man: On the Political Teaching of Ecce Homo," presented to the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September, 1983, en. 4, p. 31, Professor Craig refers to "Joy and War," presented at the APSA annual meeting, September, 1981: "Michael Platt, in an essay filled with suggestive insight... contends that Ecce Homo is consciously modelled on other 'autobiographical' works as well." For Nietzsche on biography and autobiography, see UO, II, 2; AOM, 395; JS, 91; GM, III, 19.

78. E.g., I, 7, pp. 687-89; II, 4, pp. 701-02.

79. See Nehamas, Nietzsche.

80. Ibid., p. 234: "Nietzsche wanted to be, and was, the Plato of his own Socrates."

Conclusion, pp. 148-51:


4. On the harmony of theory and practice, see Planinc, Plato's Political Philosophy, Preface, pp. ix-xi, passim.
APPENDIX
Selection of Nietzsche's Published References to Socrates

Human, All Too Human


Daybreak

Book V, aphorism 544, How philosophy is done today.

The Joyous Science

Book IV, aphorism 340, The dying Socrates.

Beyond Good and Evil

Preface;

Part Four, "Epigrams and Interludes," aphorism 80;

Part Five, "Natural History of Morals," sections 190 and 191;

Part Six, "We Scholars," section 212.

The Birth of Tragedy

"Attempt at a Self-Criticism," section 1.

Twilight of the Idols

Only where the radiance of the myth falls is the life of the Greeks bright; elsewhere it is gloomy. Now, the Greek philosophers deprived themselves of precisely this myth: is it not as if they wanted to move out of the sunshine into shadows and gloom? But no plant avoids the light; fundamentally these philosophers were only seeking a brighter sun. The myth was not pure, not lucid enough for them. They discovered this light in their knowledge, in that which each of them called his "truth". But in those days knowledge still possessed a greater lustre; it was still young and as yet knew little of the perils and difficulties of its path; it could still hope to reach the midpoint of being with a single leap and thence solve the riddle of the universe. These philosophers possessed a firm belief in themselves and their "truth" and with it they overthrew all their contemporaries and predecessors; each of them was a warlike and brutal tyrant. Perhaps happiness in the belief that one was in possession of the truth has never been greater in the history of the world, but nor, likewise, has the severity, arrogance, tyrannical and evil in such a belief. They were tyrants, that is to say that which every Greek wanted to be and what everyone was when he could be. Perhaps Solon alone constitutes an exception; he says in his poems how he disdained personal tyranny. But he did it for love of his work, of his lawgiving; and to be a lawgiver is a more sublimated form of tyranny. Parmenides also gave laws, Pythagoras and Empedocles probably did so; Anaximander founded a city. Plato was the incarnate desire to become the supreme philosophical lawgiver and founder of states; he appears to have suffered terribly from the non-fulfilment of his nature, and towards the end of his life his soul became full of the blackest gall. The more the power of the Greek philosophers declined, the more they inwardly suffered from this bitterness and vituperativeness; when the various sects came to the point of battling for their truths in the open street the souls of all these wooers of truth were totally choked with jealousy and spleen, the tyrannical element now raged as poison through their own bodies. These many petty tyrants would have liked to have eaten one another raw; not a spark of love was left in them, and all too little joy in their own knowledge.--In general, the rule that tyrants are usually murdered and that their posterity has but a brief existence also applies to the tyrants of the spirit. Their history is brief and violent, their posthumous influence
ceases abruptly. Of almost all the great Hellenes it can be said that they seemed to have come too late: such is the case with Aeschylus, with Pindar, with Demosthenes, with Thucydides; one further generation—and it is all over. This is what is uncanny and violent about Greek history. Nowadays, to be sure, we adhere to the gospel of the tortoise. To think historically today is almost to believe that at all times history has been made according to the principle: "as little as possible in the longest possible time!" Alas, Greek history moves so fast! Life has never since been lived so prodigally, so exorbitantly. I cannot convince myself that the history of the Greeks pursued that natural course for which it is so celebrated. They were much too multifariously gifted to have proceeded gradually in the step-by-step manner of the tortoise in its race with Achilles: and that is what is meant by natural evolution. With the Greeks everything goes quickly forwards, but it likewise goes quickly downwards; the movement of the whole machine is so accelerated that a single stone thrown into its wheels makes it fly to pieces. Socrates, for example, was such a stone; in a single night the evolution of philosophical science, hitherto so wonderfully regular if all too rapid, was destroyed. It is no idle question whether, if he had not come under the spell of Socrates, Plato might not have discovered an even higher type of philosophical man who is now lost to us for ever. We gaze into the ages that preceded him as into a sculptor's workshop of such types. The sixth and fifth centuries seem, however, to promise even more and higher things than they actually brought forth; it remained only a promise and proclamation. And yet there can hardly be a more grievous loss than the loss of a type, of a new, hitherto undiscovered highest possibility of the philosophical life. Even the older realized types have mostly come down to us ill-defined; all the philosophers from Thales to Democritus seem to me extraordinarily hard to discern; but whoever succeeded in recreating these figures would move among forms of the mightiest and purest type. This capacity is rare, to be sure; even the later Greeks who took notice of the older philosophy lacked it; Aristotle especially seems to have no eyes in his head whenever he stands before those we have named. And so it seems as though these glorious philosophers had lived in vain, or as though their only function had been to prepare the way for the quarrelsome and logquacious hordes of the Socratic schools. Here, as aforesaid, there is a gap, a breach in evolution; some great disaster must have occurred and the only statue from which we could have perceived the purpose and meaning of that great
preparatory exercise in sculpting have miscarried or been shattered: what actually happened must forever remain a secret of the workshop.--That which eventuated among the Greeks—every great thinker, in the belief that he was the possessor of absolute truth, became a tyrant, so that in the case of the Greeks the history of the spirit exhibits the same violent precipitate and perilous character as does their political history—this kind of event was not therewith exhausted: many things of the same sort have occurred right up to the most recent times, though they have gradually grown rarer and can hardly occur now with the same naive clarity of conscience as they did among the philosophers of Greece. For on the whole contradiction and scepticism now speak more powerfully and too loudly. The period of the tyrants of the spirit is past. In the spheres of higher culture there will always have to be a sovereign authority, to be sure—but this sovereign authority will hereafter lie in the hands of the oligarchs of the spirit. Their spatial and political division notwithstanding, they constitute a close-knit society whose members know and recognize one another, a thing which public opinion and the judgements of the writers for the popular papers may circulate as expressions of favour and disfavour. The spiritual superiority which formerly divided and created hostility now tends to unite: how could the individual keep himself aloft and, against every current, swim along his own course through life as if he did not see here and there others of his own kind living under the same conditions and take them by the hand, in struggle against both the ochlocratic character of the half-spirited and the half-educated and the attempts that occasionally occur to erect a tyranny with the aid of the masses? The oligarchs have need of one another, they have joy in one another, they understand the signs of one another—but each of them is nonetheless free, he fights and conquers in his own place, and would rather perish than submit.
 aph. 72, Divine missionaries:

Socrates too feels himself to be a divine missionary: but even here there is perceptible I know not what touch of Attic irony and sense of humour through which that unfortunate and presumptuous concept is ameliorated. He speaks of it without unction: his images, of the brake and the horse, are simple and unpriestly, and the actual religious task to which he feels himself called, that of putting the god to the test in a hundred ways to see whether he has told the truth, permits us to imagine that here the missionary steps up to his god with a bold and candid deportment. This putting of the god to the test is one of the subtlest compromises between piety and freedom of spirit that has ever been devised. -- Nowadays we no longer have need even of this compromise.

 aph. 86, Socrates:

If all goes well, the time will come when one will take up the memorabilia of Socrates rather than the Bible as a guide to morals and reason, and when Montaigne and Horace will be employed as forerunners and signposts to an understanding of this simplest and most imperishable of intercessors. The pathways of the most various philosophical modes of life lead back to him; at bottom they are the modes of life of the various temperaments confirmed and established by reason and habit and all of them directed towards joy in living and in one's own self; from which one might conclude that Socrates' most personal characteristic was a participation in every temperament--Socrates excels the founder of Christianity in being able to be serious cheerfully and in possessing that wisdom full of roguishness that constitutes the finest state of the human soul. And he possessed the finer intellect.
Daybreak, Bk. V, aph. 544, How philosophy is done today:

I have observed that our philosophizing youths, women and artists of today want of philosophy precisely the opposite of that which the Greeks derived from it! He who does not hear the continual rejoicing which resounds through every speech and counter-speech of a Platonic dialogue, the rejoicing over the new invention of rational thinking, what does he understand of Plato, of the philosophy of antiquity? In those days, souls were filled with drunkenness at the rigorous and sober game of concept, generalisation, refutation, limitation—with that drunkenness which the great ancient rigorous and sober contrapuntal composers perhaps also knew. In those days there still lingered on the palate of the Greeks that other, more ancient and formerly all-powerful taste: and the new taste presented so magical a contrast to this that they sang and stammered of dialectics, the "divine art", as though in a delirium of love. That ancient way, however, was thinking under the spell of custom, for which there was nothing but established judgements, established causes, and no other reasons than those of authority: so that the thinking was an imitation and all pleasure in speech and language had to lie in the form. (Wherever the content is thought of as eternal and universally valid, there is only one great magic: that of changing form, that is to say of fashion. In their poets, too, from the time of Homer onwards, and later in their sculptors, what the Greeks enjoyed was not originality but its opposite.) It was Socrates who discovered the antithetical magic, that of cause and effect, of ground and consequence: we modern men are so accustomed to and brought up in the necessity of logic that it lies on our palate as the normal taste and, as such, cannot help being repugnant to the lustful and conceited. These take delight in that which stands out in opposition to it: their more refined ambition would all too gladly have them believe that their souls are exceptions, not dialectical or rational beings but—well, "intuitive beings", for instance, gifted with an "inner sense" or with "intellectual intuition". Above all, however, they want to be "artistic natures", with a genius in their head and a demon in their body and consequently enjoying special rights in both worlds, and especially the divine privilege of being incomprehensible.—That is what now does philosophy! I fear they will one day see that they have made a mistake—what they want is religion!
The Joyous Science, Bk. IV, aph. 340, The dying Socrates:

I admire the courage and wisdom of Socrates in everything he did, said--and did not say. This mocking and enamoured monster and pied piper of Athens, who made the most overweening youths tremble and sob, was not only the wisest chatterer of all time: he was equally great in silence. I wish he had remained taciturn also at the last moment of his life; in that case he might belong to a still higher order of spirits. Whether it was death or the poison or piety or malice--something loosened his tongue at that moment and he said: "O Crito, I owe Asclepius a rooster." This ridiculous and terrible "last word" means for those who have ears: "O Crito, life is a disease." Is it possible that a man like him, who had lived cheerfully and like a soldier in the sight of everyone, should have been a pessimist? He had merely kept a cheerful mien while concealing all his life long his ultimate judgment, his inmost feeling. Socrates, Socrates suffered life! And then he still revenged himself--with this veiled, gruesome, pious, and blasphemous saying. Did a Socrates need such revenge? Did his overrich virtue lack an ounce of magnanimity?--Alas, my friends, we must overcome even the Greeks!
Beyond Good and Evil, Preface:

Supposing truth is a woman—what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for winning a woman's heart? What is certain is that she has not allowed herself to be won—and today every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged. If it is left standing at all! For there are scoffers who claim that it has fallen, that all dogmatism lies on the ground—even more, that all dogmatism is dying.

Speaking seriously, there are good reasons why all philosophical dogmatizing, however solemn and definitive its airs used to be, may nevertheless have been no more than a noble childishness and tyronism. And perhaps the time is at hand when it will be comprehended again and again how little used to be sufficient to furnish the cornerstone for such sublime and unconditional philosophers' edifices as the dogmatists have built so far: any old popular superstition from time immemorial (like the soul superstition which, in the form of the subject and ego superstition, has not even yet ceased to do mischief); some play on words perhaps, a seduction by grammar, or an audacious generalization of very narrow, very personal, very human, all too human facts.

The dogmatists' philosophy was, let us hope, only a promise across millennia—as astrology was in still earlier times when perhaps more work, money, acuteness, and patience were lavished in its service than for any real science so far: to astrology and its "supra-terrestrial" claims we owe the grand style of architecture in Asia and Egypt. It seems that all great things first have to bestride the earth in monstrous and frightening masks in order to inscribe themselves in the hearts of humanity with eternal demands: dogmatic philosophy was such a mask; for example, the Vedanta doctrine in Asia and Platonism in Europe.

Let us not be ungrateful to it, although it must certainly be conceded that the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far was a dogmatist's error—namely, Plato's invention of the pure spirit and the good as such. But now that it is overcome, now that Europe is breathing freely again after this nightmare and at least can enjoy a healthier—sleep, we, whose task is wakefulness itself, are the heirs of all that strength which has been fostered by the fight against this error. To be sure, it meant standing truth on her head and denying perspective, the
basic condition of all life, when one spoke of spirit and the good as Plato did. Indeed, as a physician one might ask: "How could the most beautiful growth of antiquity, Plato, contract such a disease? Did the wicked Socrates corrupt him after all? And did he deserve his hemlock?"

But the fight against Plato or, to speak more clearly and for "the people," the fight against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia--for Christianity is Platonism for "the people"--has created in Europe a magnificent tension of the spirit the like of which had never yet existed on earth: with so tense a bow we can now shoot for the most distant goals. To be sure, European man experiences this tension as need and distress; twice already attempts have been made in the grand style to unbend the bow--once by means of Jesuitism, the second time by means of the democratic enlightenment which, with the aid of freedom of the press and newspaper-reading, might indeed bring it about that the spirit would no longer experience itself so easily as a "need." (The Germans have invented gunpowder--all due respect for that!--but then they made up for that: they invented the press.) But we who are neither Jesuits nor democrats, nor even German enough, we good Europeans and free, very free spirits--we still feel it, the whole need of the spirit and the whole tension of its bow. And perhaps also the arrow, the task, and--who knows?--the goal----

"Epigrams and Interludes," aph. 80:

A matter that becomes clear ceases to concern us.--What was on the mind of that god who counseled: "Know thyself!" Did he mean: "Cease to concern yourself! Become objective!"--And Socrates?--And "scientific men"?--

"Natural History of Morals," sec. 190:

There is something in the morality of Plato that does not really belong to Plato but is merely encountered in his philosophy--one might say, in spite of Plato: namely, the Socratism for which he was really too noble. "Nobody wants to do harm to himself, therefore all that is bad is done involuntarily. For the bad do harm to themselves: this they would not do if they knew that the bad is bad. Hence the bad are bad only because of an error; if one removes the error, one necessarily makes them--good."
This type of inference smells of the rabble that sees nothing in bad actions but the unpleasant consequences and really judges, "it is stupid to do what is bad," while "good" is taken without ado to be identical with "useful and agreeable." In the case of every moral utilitarianism one may immediately infer the same origin and follow one's nose: one will rarely go astray.

Plato did everything he could in order to read something refined and noble into the proposition of his teacher—above all, himself. He was the most audacious of all interpreters and took the whole Socrates only the way one picks a popular tune and folk song from the streets in order to vary it into the infinite and impossible—namely, into all of his own masks and multiplicities. In a jest, Homeric at that: what is the Platonic Socrates after all if not prosthē Platon opithen te Platon messe te Chimaira.

"Natural History of Morals," sec. 191:

The more ancient theological instinct of "faith" and "knowledge"—or, more clearly, of instinct and reason—in other words, the question whether regarding the valuation of things instinct deserves more authority than rationality, which wants us to evaluate and act in accordance with reasons, with a "why?"—in other words, in accordance with expedience and utility—this is still the ancient moral problem that first emerged in the person of Socrates and divided thinking people long before Christianity. Socrates himself, to be sure, with the taste of his talent—that of a superior dialectician—had initially sided with reason; and in fact, what did he do his life long but laugh at the awkward incapacity of noble Athenians who, like all noble men, were men of instinct and never could give sufficient information about the reasons for their actions? In the end, however, privately and secretly, he laughed at himself, too: in himself he found, before his subtle conscience and self-examination, the same difficulty and incapacity. But is that any reason, he encouraged himself, for giving up the instincts? One has to see to it that they as well as reason receive their due—one must follow the instincts but persuade reason to assist them with good reasons. This was the real falseness of that great ironic, so rich in secrets; he got his conscience to be satisfied with a kind of self-trickery: at bottom, he had seen through the irrational element in moral judgments.
Plato, more innocent in such matters and lacking the craftiness of the plebeian, wanted to employ all his strength—the greatest strength any philosopher so far has had at his disposal—to prove to himself that reason and instinct of themselves tend toward one goal, the good, "God." And since Plato, all theologians and philosophers are on the same track—that is, in moral matters it has so far been instinct, or what the Christians call "faith," or "the herd," as I put it, that has triumphed. Perhaps Descartes should be excepted, as the father of rationalism (and hence the grandfather of the Revolution) who conceded authority to reason alone: but reason is merely an instrument, and Descartes was superficial.

"We Scholars," sec. 212:

More and more it seems to me that the philosopher, being a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, has always found himself, and had to find himself, in contradiction to his today: his enemy was ever the ideal of today. So far all these extraordinary furtherers of man whom one calls philosophers, though they themselves have rarely felt like friends of wisdom but rather like disagreeable fools and dangerous question marks, have found their task, their hard, unwanted, inescapable task, but eventually also the greatness of their task, in being the bad conscience of their time.

By applying the knife vivisectionally to the chest of the very virtues of their time, they betrayed what was their own secret: to know of a new greatness of man, of a new untrodden way to his enhancement. Every time they exposed how much hypocrisy, comfortableness, letting oneself go and letting oneself drop, how many lies lay hidden under the best honored type of their contemporary morality, how much virtue was outlived. Every time they said: "We must get there, that way, where you today are least at home."

Facing a world of "modern ideas" that would banish everybody into a corner and "specialty," a philosopher—if today there could be philosophers—would be compelled to find the greatness of man, the concept of "greatness," precisely in his range and multiplicity, in his wholeness in manifoldness. He would even determine value and rank in accordance with how much and how many things one could bear and take upon himself, how far one could extend his responsibility.

Today the taste of the time and the virtue of the time weakens and thins down the will; nothing is as timely as weakness of the will. In the philosopher's ideal, therefore,
precisely strength of the will, hardness, and the capacity for long-range decisions must belong to the concept of "greatness"—with as much justification as the opposite doctrine and the ideal of a dumb, renunciatory, humble, selfless humanity was suitable for an opposite age, one that suffered, like the sixteenth century, from its accumulated energy of will and from the most savage floods and tidal waves of selfishness.

In the age of Socrates, among men of fatigued instincts, among the conservatives of ancient Athens who let themselves go—"towards happiness," as they said; towards pleasure, as they acted—and who all the while still mouthed the ancient pompous words to which their lives no longer gave them any right, irony may have been required for greatness of soul, that Socratic sarcastic assurance of the old physician and plebeian who cut ruthlessly into his own flesh, as he did into the flesh and heart of the "noble," with a look that said clearly enough: "Don't dissemble in front of me! Here—we are equal."

Today, conversely, when only the herd animal receives and dispenses honors in Europe, when "equality of rights" could all too easily be changed into equality in violating rights—I mean, into a common war on all that is rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, and the abundance of creative power and masterfulness—today the concept of greatness entails being noble, wanting to be by oneself, being able to be different, standing alone and having to live independently. And the philosopher will betray something of his own ideal when he posits: "He shall be greatest who can be loneliest, the most concealed, the most deviant, the human being beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, he that is overrich in will. Precisely this shall be called greatness: being capable of being as manifold as whole, as ample as full." And to ask it once more: today—is greatness possible?
The Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," Pt. 1:

Whatever may be at the bottom of this questionable book, it must have been an exceptionally significant and fascinating question, and deeply personal at that: the time in which it was written, in spite of which it was written, bears witness to that—the exciting time of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71. As the thunder of the Battle of Worth was rolling over Europe, the muser and riddle-friend who was to be the father of this book, sat somewhere in an Alpine nook, very bemused and beriddled, hence very concerned and yet unconcerned, and wrote down his thoughts about the Greeks—the core of the strange and almost inaccessible book to which this belated preface (or postscript) shall now be added. A few weeks later—and he himself was to be found under the walls of Metz, still wedded to the question marks that he had placed after the alleged "cheerfulness" of the Greeks and of Greek art. Eventually, in that month of profoundest suspense when the peace treaty was being debated at Versailles, he, too, attained peace with himself and, slowly, convalescing from an illness contracted at the front, completed the final draft of The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music.—Out of music? Music and tragedy? Greeks and the music of tragedy? Greeks and the art form of pessimism? The best turned out, most beautiful, most envied type of humanity to date, those most apt to seduce us to life, the Greeks—how now? They of all people should have needed tragedy? Even more—art? For what—Greek art?

You will guess where the big question mark concerning the value of existence had thus been raised. Is pessimism necessarily a sign of decline, decay, degeneration, weary and weak instincts—as it once was in India and now is, to all appearances, among us, "modern" men and Europeans? Is there a pessimism of strength? An intellectual predilection for the hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspect of existence, prompted by well-being, by overflowing health, by the fullness of existence? The sharp-eyed courage that tempts and attempts, that craves the frightful as the enemy, the worthy enemy, against whom one can test one's strength? From whom one can learn what it means "to be frightened"? What is the significance of the tragic myth among the Greeks of the best, the strongest, the most courageous period? And the tremendous phenomenon of the Dionysian—and, born from it, tragedy—what might they signify?—And again: that of which tragedy died, the Socratism of morality, the dialectics, frugality, and cheerfulness of the theoretical man—how now? might not this
very Socratism be a sign of decline, of weariness, of infection, of the anarchical dissolution of the instincts? And the "Greek cheerfulness" of the later Greeks—merely the afterglow of the sunset? The Epicureans' resolve against pessimism—a mere precaution of the afflicted? And science itself, our science—indeed, what is the significance of all science, viewed as a symptom of life? For what—worse yet, whence—all science? How now? Is the resolve to be so scientific about everything perhaps a kind of fear of, an escape from, pessimism? A subtle last resort against--truth? And, morally speaking, a sort of cowardice and falseness? Amorally speaking, a ruse? O Socrates, Socrates, was that perhaps your secret? O enigmatic ironist, was that perhaps your--irony?
Twilight of the Idols, "The Problem of Socrates"
(Trans. by R. J. Hollingdale):

1. In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgement on life: it is worthless. [...] Everywhere and always their mouths have uttered the same sound—a sound full of doubt, full of melancholy, full of weariness with life, full of opposition to life. Even Socrates said as he died: "To live—that means to be a long time sick: I owe a cock to the saviour Asclepius". Even Socrates had had enough of it.—What does that prove? What does it point to?—Formerly one would have said (—oh, and did say, and loudly enough, and our pessimists most of all!): "Here at any rate there must be something true! The consensus sapientium is proof of truth."—Shall we still speak thus today? are we allowed to do so? "Here at any rate there must be something sick"—this is our retort: one ought to take a closer look at them, these wisest of every age! Were they all of them perhaps no longer steady on their legs? belated? tottery? decadents? Does wisdom perhaps appear on earth as a raven which is inspired by the smell of carrion? [...]  

2. This irreverent notion that the great sages are declining types first dawned on me in regard to just the case in which learned and unlearned prejudice is most strongly opposed to it: I recognized Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decay, as agents of the dissolution of Greece, as pseudo-Greek, as anti-Greek (Birth of Tragedy, 1872). That consensus sapientium—I saw more and more clearly—proves least of all that they were right about what they were in accord over: it proves rather that they themselves, these wisest men, were in some way in physiological accord since they stood—had to stand—in the same negative relation to life. Judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against, can in the last resort never be true: they possess value only as symptoms—in themselves such judgements are stupidities. One must reach out and try to grasp this astonishing finesse, that the value of life cannot be estimated. Not by a living man, because he is a party to the dispute, indeed its object, and not the judge of it; not by a dead one, for another reason. For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life thus even constitutes an objection to him, a question-mark as to his wisdom, a piece of unwisdom.—What? and all these great wise men—they have not only been decadents, they have not even been wise?—But I shall get back to the problem of Socrates.

3. Socrates belonged, in his origins, to the lowest orders: Socrates was rabble. One knows, one sees for oneself, how ugly he was. But ugliness, an objection in itself, is among the Greeks almost a refutation. Was Socrates a Greek at all? Ugliness is frequently enough the sign of a thwarted development, a development retarded by interbreeding. Otherwise it appears as a development in decline. Anthropologists among criminologists tell us the typical
criminal is ugly: *monstrum in fronte, monstrum in animo*. But the criminal is a *decadent*. Was Socrates a typical criminal?—At least that famous physiognomist's opinion which Socrates' friends found so objectionable would not contradict this idea. A foreigner passing through Athens who knew how to read faces told Socrates to his face that he was a *monstrum*—that he contained within him every kind of foul vice and lust. And Socrates answered merely: "You know me, sir!"—

4. It is not only the admitted dissoluteness and anarchy of his instincts which indicates *decadence* in Socrates: the superfetation of the logical and that barbed malice which distinguishes him also point in that direction. And let us not forget those auditory hallucinations which, as "Socrates' demon", have been interpreted in a religious sense. Everything about him is exaggerated, *buffo*, caricature, everything is at the same time hidden, reserved, subterranean.—I seek to understand out of what idiosyncrasy that Socratic equation reason = virtue = happiness derives: that bizarrest of equations and one which has in particular all the instincts of the older Hellenes against it.

5. With Socrates taste undergoes a change in favour of dialectics: what is really happening when that happens? It is above all the defeat of a *nobler* taste; with dialectics the rabble gets on top. Before Socrates, the dialectical manner was repudiated in good society: it was regarded as a form of bad manners, one was compromised by it. Young people were warned against it. And all such presentation of one's reasons was regarded with mistrust. Honest things, like honest men, do not carry their reasons exposed in this fashion. It is indecent to display all one's goods. What has first to have itself proved is of little value. Wherever authority is still part of the accepted usage and one does not "give reasons" but commands, the dialectician is a kind of buffoon: he is laughed at, he is not taken seriously.—Socrates was the buffoon who *got himself taken seriously*: what was really happening when that happened?

6. One chooses dialectics only when one has no other expedient. One knows that dialectics inspire mistrust, that they are not very convincing. Nothing is easier to expunge than the effect of a dialectician, as is proved by the experience of every speech-making assembly. Dialectics can be only a *last-ditch weapon* in the hands of those who have no other weapon left. One must have to *enforce* one's rights: otherwise one makes no use of it. That is why the Jews were dialecticians; Reynard the Fox was a dialectician: what? and Socrates was a dialectician too?—

7. Is Socrates' irony an expression of revolt? of the *ressentiment* of the rabble? does he, as one of the oppressed, enjoy his own form of ferocity in the knife-thrust of the syllogism? does he *revenge*
himself on the aristocrats he fascinates?--As a dialectician one is in possession of a pitiless instrument; with its aid one can play the tyrant; one compromises by conquering. The dialectician leaves it to his opponent to demonstrate he is not an idiot; he enranges, he at the same time makes helpless. The dialectician devitalizes his opponent's intellect.--What? is dialectics only a form of revenge in the case of Socrates?

8. I have intimated the way in which Socrates could repel: it is therefore all the more necessary to explain the fact that he exercised fascination.--That he discovered a new kind of agon, that he was the first fencing-master in it for the aristocratic circles of Athens, is one reason. He fascinated because he touched on the agonal instinct of the Hellenes--he introduced a variation into the wrestling-matches among the youths and young men. Socrates was also a great erotic.

9. But Socrates divined even more. He saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was already no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end.--And Socrates understood that all the world had need of him--his expedient, his cure, his personal art of self-preservation. [...] Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the monstrum in animo was the universal danger. "The instincts want to play the tyrant; we must devise a counter-tyrant who is stronger." [...] When that physiognomist had revealed to Socrates what he was, a cave of every evil lust, the great ironist uttered a phrase that provides the key to him. "That is true," he said, "but I have become master of them all." How did Socrates become master of himself?--His case was after all only the extreme case, only the most obvious instance of what had at that time begun to be the universal exigency: that no one was any longer master of himself, that the instincts were becoming mutually antagonistic. He exercised fascination as this extreme case--his fear-inspiring ugliness expressed it for every eye to see: he fascinated even more, it goes without saying, as the answer, as the solution, as the apparent cure for this case.--

10. If one needs to make a tyrant out of reason, as Socrates did, then there must exist no little danger of something else playing the tyrant. Rationality was at that time divined as a saviour; neither Socrates nor his "invalids" were free to be rational or not, as they wished--it was de rigeur, it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or--be absurdly rational. [...] The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato downwards is pathologically conditioned: likewise their estimation of dialectics. Reason = virtue = happiness means merely: one must imitate Socrates
and counter the dark desires by producing a permanent daylight -- the daylight of reason. One must be prudent, clear, bright at any cost: every yielding to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downwards [...] 

11. I have intimated the way in which Socrates exercised fascination: he seemed to be a physician, a saviour. Is it necessary to go on to point out the error which lay in his faith in "rationality at any cost"? -- It is self-deception on the part of philosophers and moralists to imagine that by making war on decadence they therewith elude decadence themselves. This is beyond their powers: what they select as an expedient, as a deliverance, is itself only another expression of decadence -- they alter its expression, they do not abolish the thing itself. Socrates was a misunderstanding: the entire morality of improvement, the Christian included, has been a misunderstanding. [...] The harshest daylight, rationality at any cost, life bright, cold, circumspect, conscious, without instinct, in opposition to the instincts, has itself been no more than a form of sickness, another form of sickness -- and by no means a way back to "virtue", to "health", to happiness. [...] To have to combat one's instincts -- that is the formula for decadence: as long as life is ascending, happiness and instinct are one. --

12. -- Did he himself grasp that, this shrewdest of all self-deceivers? Did he at last say that to himself in the wisdom of his courage for death? [...] Socrates wanted to die -- it was not Athens, it was he who handed himself the poison cup, who compelled Athens to hand him the poison cup. [...] "Socrates is no physician," he said softly to himself: "death alone is a physician here. [...] Socrates himself has only been a long time sick [...]"
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1. Nietzsche in English
   a: The Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale Translations
   b: Other Editions

2. Principal Research Materials

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1. **Nietzsche in English**

**a: The Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale Translations**

The following is a comprehensive list of all the editions and volumes containing the de facto standard Kaufmann and Hollingdale English translations.

**Walter Kaufmann**

**The Portable Nietzsche**


**Thus Spoke Zarathustra**


**Beyond Good and Evil**


**The Birth of Tragedy. The Case of Wagner.**


**On the Genealogy of Morals. Ecce Homo.**

Kaufmann's version of Nietzsche's final original writing, *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is (Ecce Homo: Wie Man Wird, Was Man Ist)*, Edited, with Commentary, is located at the end of this volume (pp. 199-344), which it shares with the joint Kaufmann and Hollingdale translation of **On the Genealogy of Morals** (as well as a strategic sampling of seventy-five aphorisms from the five aphoristic works).

**Zur Genealogie der Moral**, Nietzsche's eighth book, was written and published in 1887. It consists of "three inquiries...three decisive preliminary studies by a psychologist for a revaluation of all values" (III, GM, p.
769). The third is Nietzsche's own example of how to study his aphorisms. In the last section of his Preface he explains: "If this book is incomprehensible to anyone and jars on his ears, the fault, it seems to me, is not necessarily mine. It is clear enough, assuming, as I do assume, that one has first read my earlier writings and has not spared oneself some trouble in doing so: for they are, indeed, not easy to penetrate...people find difficulty with the aphoristic form: this arises from the fact that today this form is not taken seriously enough. An aphorism that has been honestly struck cannot be deciphered simply by reading it off; this is only the beginning of the work of interpretation proper, which requires a whole science of hermeneutics. In the third essay of this book I give an example of what I mean by true interpretation: an aphorism stands at the head of that essay, and the body of the essay forms the commentary" (trans. Francis Golffing, p. 157). The third essay is entitled "What Is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?" and the aphorism prefixed to it is from the "On Reading and Writing" section of the first part of Zаратustra (The Portable Nietzsche, p. 153): "Unconcerned, mocking, violent--thus wisdom wants us: she is a woman and always loves only a warrior."

As in his previous Nietzsche editions, this edition contains Kaufmann's valuable supplemental editorial apparatus and scholarly commentaries. For both books, the commentary and apparatus fall into four forms: Editor's Introductions (Kaufmann also provides a technical "Note on the Publication of Ecce Homo"); copious footnotes; and Appendix supplements which contain Kaufmann's translations of selections from Nietzsche chosen for the purpose of illuminating key facets of each text--in the case of Genealogy, the seventy-five aphorisms from five works, from the first 1878 volume of Human, All Too Human, to the first 1882 edition of The Joyous Science (most of these selections themselves being the numerous aphorisms to which Nietzsche refers in the text of Genealogy itself, itself being sub-titled by Nietzsche "A Sequel to My Last Book, Beyond Good and Evil, Which It Is Meant to Supplement and Clarify"). In the case of Ecce Homo, translations and comments on previously untranslated passages from Nietzsche's variants and preliminary drafts follow the text. Finally, helpful Indexes are also provided for the two translated texts, as well as for the set of seventy-five aphorisms. New York: Vintage Books of Random House, Inc., 1967. (In Canada: Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto).
Basic Writings of Nietzsche


The Joyous Science

Translated, with Commentary. Kaufmann's English translation of Nietzsche's Emersonian title of this book is in error. This thesis, endorsing J. P. Stern's precedent, makes reference to the true translation, with the proper sub-title: The Joyous Science ("la gaya scienza"). The original 1882 edition consisted of "Joke, Cunning and Revenge" (the prelude in rhymes, 1-63), and the first four books of titled aphorisms (1-342). A quatrain from Emerson appears on the title page (in Nietzsche's German). In 1887 Nietzsche published an expanded edition, including an important new four-part Preface, a fifth book of aphorisms (343-383), and an appendix of "Songs of Prince Free-as-a-Bird." Emerson's quote is now replaced with Nietzsche's own and the sub-title ("la gaya scienza") was added. On the cover and title pages of his English edition, Kaufmann does away with Nietzsche's sub-title. To the uncritical reader it will appear that "with a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs" is Nietzsche's subtitle. New York: Vintage Books of Random House Inc., 1974. (In Canada: Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto).

R. J. Hollingdale

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Twilight of the Idols. The Anti-Christ.

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b: Other Editions Available

The Nietzsche-Wagner Correspondence

The Birth of Tragedy, On the Genealogy of Morals.

Nietzsche: Unpublished Letters
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks
Translated, with an Introduction, by Marianne Cowan.

Thoughts Out of Season. Third Part. Schopenhauer as Educator
Translated by J. W. Hillsheimer and Malcolm R. Simpson.

The Philosophy of Nietzsche

The Will to Power
Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale.

Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche
Edited and Translated by Christopher Middleton.

Nietzsche: A Self-Portrait from His Letters
Edited and Translated by Peter Fuss and Henry Shapiro.

Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's

Human, All Too Human
Translated by Marion Faber, with Stephen Lehman. Introduction and Notes by Marion Faber. This edition does not contain Volume Two (the second Preface, Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow). It only includes Volume One, with its Preface. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.

Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language
Translated and Edited with a Critical Introduction by Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blaire, and David J. Parent. This
useful volume contains previously unpublished lectures on rhetoric Nietzsche delivered in 1872/73. As well, the text provides new translations of several other short, previously unpublished philological pieces from the early 1870's. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

**Unmodern Observations**  

**The Birth of Tragedy**  

**On the Genealogy of Morality**  
Edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson. Translated by Carole Diethe. Supplementary material includes "full translation of all the material which Nietzsche either refers to or partly cites from in the text" (p. 129), as well as the early essays "The Greek State" and "Homer on Competition." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

**The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche**  
Edited by Ernst Behler. "This is the first English translation of all of Nietzsche's writings, including his unpublished fragments, with annotation, afterwords concerning the individual texts, and indexes, in 20 volumes. The aim of this collaborative work is to produce a critical edition for scholarly use. Volume 1 also includes an introduction to the entire edition. While the goal is to establish a readable text in contemporary English, the translation follows the original as closely as possible. All texts have been translated anew by a group of scholars, and particular attention has been given to maintaining a consistent terminology throughout the volumes" (Vol. 2, p. ix).  
2. Principal Research Materials


Kaufmann, Walter. *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950; paperback edition, with different pagination, including a new preface and the unabridged text and notes of the original edition (footnotes are collected as endnotes), but with a truncated bibliography, index including names only, as well as omissions of mottoes and the "Appendix: Nietzsche as Poet," New York: Meridian Books, 1956; third edition, with different pagination again, restoring the adumbrations and omissions of the second, returning to the format of the first, very extensively revised and greatly expanded by over a hundred pages, updated to deal with research and writing published in the intervening years, and containing, among other substantial additions and major revisions, another new preface and a new appendix on the editing and publication of Ecce Homo, supplanting the original translated selection of poetry (adapted from his article in the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, "Nietzsche in the Light of His Suppressed Manuscripts," Vol. II, No. 2 (1964), pp. 205-25, which
deals with the discovery of a page that Nietzsche asked his publisher to insert in Ecce Homo, as well as with Schlecta's and Podach's controversial German editions). The third edition also contains a rather comprehensive bibliography for the juvenalia, philologica, Naschlass, major books, correspondences, collected German editions and materials not included in these [now superceded by the Colli-Montinar edition], English translations including Kaufmann's own, and works about Nietzsche by over a hundred authors, including Kaufmann, Princeton and Vintage, 1968; fourth revised edition, including another new preface in addition to the first three, with a new title and revisions to Chapter 13, previously unpublished letters reproduced in facsimile, and important additions supplementing and updating the appendix and bibliography, Princeton, 1974, pp. xvii, 1-532).


3. Selections on Nietzsche and the Apology, and Other Works Consulted


Allison, David B., editor. The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1977. Kaufmann's Nietzsche, sec. XI (pp. 452-58) added to the Appendix for the 4th ed., last sentence: "We may be grateful to the two Italian scholars who are editing the new critical edition that, unlike Schlecta and Podach, they have refrained from sensationalism and do not claim to have given us a new Nietzsche."


'It would be pointless to calculate how many attempts Nietzsche had made at autobiography between his schoolboy efforts and *Ecce Homo*... Most of *Ecce Homo* is inferior writing, failing to communicate those thrills from the past... Rereading his own books he felt full of pleased amazement at how good they were... and in December he was maniacally convinced that nothing was beyond his powers: 'the most unheard of tasks are easy as a game; my health like weather, coming up daily with boundless brilliance and assurance. The world will be inverted for the next few years: since the old god has abdicated, I shall be ruling the world.' On Christmas Day he predicted: 'in two months I shall be the foremost name on planet earth.' He believed he had godlike powers, that his thoughts could control events: 'There are no coincidences any more, either. If I think of someone, a letter from him comes politely through the door.' And in the draft of a letter breaking off relations with his sister: 'You have no conception of what it means to be closely related to the man and the destiny in whom the question of millennia has been resolved--quite literally, I hold the future of humanity in the palm of my hand'...He believed that he had disposed finally of 'the Wagner question', and his anti-German feelings came to a head in his belief that he could intervene politically: 'I am myself now working on a memorandum for the European courts, with a view to forming an anti-German league. I want to sew up the 'Reich' in an iron shirt and to provoke a war of desperation. My hands will not be free until the young Kaiser and all his attachments are in my power.' There is no clear point at which he had come to believe insanely in his omnipotence; the progression had been gradually...no change in his handwriting is noticeable until October, and the main change does not come until the end of the year. As Overbeck wrote, 'His madness—and no one had closer experience of his outbreak than I
did--had been as abruptly catastrophic as I originally believed. It occurred between Christmas Eve 1888 and Epiphany 1889'. To Strindberg Nietzsche later wrote: 'I have ordered a convocation of princes in Rome. I want to have the young Kaiser shot'. He signed the note 'Nietzsche Caesar'. This is the last letter to include his own name in the signature. Strindberg's reply, written entirely in Greek and Latin, started with a quotation from an Anacreotic poem, 'I want, I want to be mad,' and ended 'Meanwhile it is a joy to be mad'. It was signed 'Strindberg (Deus, optimus maximus)'. On the morning of 3 January Nietzsche had just left his lodgings when he saw a cab-driver beating his horse in the Piazza Carlo Alberto. Tearfully, the philosopher flung his arms around the animal's neck, and then collapsed. The small crowd that gathered around him attracted Davide Fino, who had his lodger carried back to his room. After lying unconscious or at least motionless for a while on a sofa, Nietzsche became boisterous, singing, shouting, thumping at the piano. He probably thought he was deliberately clowning. Both Socrates and Shakespeare, he maintained, had been obliged to play the buffoon...But the 'inspired clowning' which had already been hard to control by the end of November was now in unchallengeable possession of his mind. He wrote notes to the King of Italy ('My beloved Umberto'), the royal house of Baden ('My children'), and the Vatican Secretary of State. He would go to Rome on Tuesday, he said, to meet the pope and the princes of Europe, except for the Hohenzollerns. He advised the other German princes to ostracise them, for the Reich was still the enemy of German culture. Writing to Gast, Brandes, and Meta von Salis, Nietzsche signed himself 'The Crucified', and writing to Burckhardt, Overbeck and Cosima Wagner, signed himself 'Dionysus'. The note to Meta runs: 'The world is transfigured, for God is on the earth. Do you not see how all of the heavens are rejoicing? I have just seized possession of my kingdom, am throwing the pope in prison, and having Wilhelm, Bismark and Stoker shot'...He wrote again to Burckhardt, a day or two later: 'Actually I would much rather be a Basel professor than God, but I have not ventured to carry my private egoism so far as to desist from creating the world on his account. You see...one must make sacrifices, however one may be living, and wherever...Since I am condemned to while away the next eternity with bad jokes, I have a writing business here
which really leaves nothing to be desired—very pleasant and not at all exhausting. The unpleasant thing, which offends my modesty, is that fundamentally I am every name in history. As for the children I have brought into the world, I have to consider with some suspicion, whether all those who enter the 'Kingdom of God' do not also come out of God'. Burckhardt showed this letter to Overbeck who immediately wrote to Nietzsche asking him to come to Basel, but the following day Overbeck received a letter from Turin saying that Nietzsche had just had all the anti-Semites shot...Overbeck was advised to go immediately to Turin...He found Nietzsche sitting in the corner of a sofa revising Nietzsche contra Wagner...When the time came Nietzsche refused to get out of bed, but Overbeck had enlisted the help of Miescher, a German dentist experienced in handling the insane, and he told Nietzsche that receptions were going to be laid on for him in Basel, together with pageants and musical festivals. At the station, where they had to wait for half an hour, and at Novara, changing trains and waiting for three hours, Nietzsche wanted to address the crowds and to embrace everyone, but Meischer convinced him that he was too eminent not to travel incognito. On the train he slept most of the time, drugged with chloral, but when he woke he sang, sometimes quite loudly...They arrived at Basel on the morning of 10 January at 7:45 and went straight to Dr. Wille's clinic in a taxi...When the doctor introduced himself, Nietzsche responded quietly: 'Wille? Ah, you are an alienist. Some years ago I had a talk with you about religious mania a propos a madman called Adolf Vischer, who was living here'...Wille decided Nietzsche could not be released, and he made contact with Baumann, a doctor who had seen him once in Turin. He sent a signed statement diagnosing 'mental degeneration': 'Claims he is a famous man and asks for women all the time'...Wille's diagnosis was 'progressive paralysis'...In Jena on Friday 18 January he was admitted to the psychiatric clinic, and a three-day medical examination was begun on the Saturday. According to the notes taken, his face was very flushed, his tongue slightly furled. The pupil of his right eye was wider than the left. While walking he spasmodically screwed up his left shoulder, and he was in a state of hyper-aesthesia. When he was led into the psychiatric department, he kept bowing politely, and he strode majestically into his room, thanking the attendants for
the 'magnificent reception'... He was noisy and slept little, despite the tranquilizers he was given. He complained of headaches. After three weeks of confinement he was enraged, frequently screaming wordlessly. On 9 February his mother came to see him, bringing cherries and a new pair of gloves. She was unable to persuade Bisswanger to take any interest in Nietzsche's recent notebooks... Nor did Bisswanger want to read any more of *Ecce Homo* than the preface... In April he was less prone to delusions of grandeur and more conscious of being ill, complaining of headaches and pains around the eyes. He spoke little to the other patients, and often spoke in French... In September 1895, Overbeck paid his last visit to his friend... In August 1896 Elisabeth moved into a flat near the centre of Weimar, taking the Archive with her... in the summer of 1896, when he had a minor stroke, his condition deteriorated, and after a more serious one in May 1899 he was weaker, and able to talk only with so much difficulty that he did not want other people to hear his voice. 'I do not speak nicely'. But when given a new book, he said: 'Didn't I write good books too?'... On Monday 20 August 1900 Nietzsche caught a cold... 'At about midday on Friday the 24th, as I was sitting opposite him, his whole expression suddenly changed, and as the stroke came, he sank back unconscious'. He was dead. It was seven weeks before his fifty-sixth birthday."


International Studies in Philosophy. Beginning in 1983, each summer issue is comprised of papers delivered to the North American Nietzsche Society. Includes invited essays, panel discussions, review articles and indexes.


Nietzsche, Friedrich. *My Sister and I*. Translated by Dr. Oscar Levy. Los Angeles: AMOK Books, 1990. Originally published by Boar's Head Books, distributed by Seven Siren's Press, Inc., 1951. Allegedly a second autobiographical work, supplementary to *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche is said to have secretly written it in "hours of lucidity" during the early days of his year at the Jena clinic (he knew *Ecce Homo* was being suppressed by his sister). The lively and sometimes explosive manuscript was entrusted to a soon to be discharged fellow patient at the clinic, a semi-literate merchant whose young son had brought the ink, pens and paper Nietzsche used to write. Nietzsche instructed the man to take it to a publisher, to thus refute his sister's suppression of *Ecce Homo*. The merchant failed to show the manuscript to any publisher. However, in the alleged words of the esteemed Dr. Oscar Levy (dated March, 1927),
who supplies all of this information in a lengthy introduction to his purported translation (Dr. Levy was dead four years before this work would first appear), the Nietzsche manuscript that eventually fell into his hands (apparently from the publisher) "might have gone lost completely if the son of this small merchant, on migrating to Canada many years later, had not taken it with him out of sheer whim" (pp. xii-xiii). This is not a case of forgery, since both Nietzsche's manuscript and Levy's translation were unfortunately, but conveniently, lost. See Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 4th ed., p. 503, fn. 1.


Woodbridge, Frederick, J. E. The Son of Apollo. Boston: 1929.

