PAULINE MIMESIS: THE REALIZATION OF AN ETHIC
PAULINE MIMESIS: THE REALIZATION OF AN ETHIC

by

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ABSTRACT

The Revised Standard Version of the New Testament translates the Greek cognates of mimesis with various English cognates derived from the Latin word imitatio. This thesis argues that the word imitation distorts the intent of the mimesis texts and that, in order to understand these texts, one must first understand the meaning of mimesis. A brief study of classical and hellenistic Greek literature demonstrates that mimesis is a process whereby the imitator brings into being a concrete expression of an immutable principle. The Pauline texts focus upon a particular act of mimesis. The imitator brings into being a Christian community, an expression of his baptism into the body of Christ, through conduct based upon the ethic of self-renunciation.

The first two chapters argue that Paul does not draw upon an Old Testament concept of imitation. On the contrary, his usage derives from the Greek tradition. The classical Greek notion of mimesis is still common usage in the first century C.E. and is evident within the work of Paul’s contemporary, the Jewish historian Josephus.

The third chapter offers an exegetical study of the Pauline mimesis texts which substantiates the hypothesis that the author means that the imitator engages in an act of mimesis and is not simply an imitation, that is a copy of an example. The exegesis also demonstrates that the Pauline mimesis is not an attempt on the part of the imitator to adopt the attributes of his example. This is not an imitation of Christ in the tradition of Thomas à Kempis.
The fourth chapter explains the logic of Paul's decision to encourage his addressees to be imitators. Paul is attempting to remedy a problem which arises after baptism. Through baptism, man is recreated in the image of Christ, yet man's conduct does not always reflect this new ontological reality. The ethic of self-renunciation is inherent to man's new nature, his divine likeness. The process of mimesis is the means by which man brings this ethic to concrete expression and, thereby, creates harmony between his conduct and his new condition.
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INTRODUCTION

PROBLEM

The progression of modern art through impressionist, expressionist, surrealist, cubist and abstract movements seems to stand in flat contradiction to Aristotle's definition of art as an imitation (mimesis) of nature. Given the modern artist's attempt to bring to expression the innovative and even the unique, he is likely to use "imitation" in a disparaging sense. Imitation is academic, derivative, dull. Artists believe in Ezra Pound's precept, "make it new."

But in the ancient world, "imitation" referred to a creative process. Drawing was mimesis. When the artist applied paint to lime plaster, he drew on techniques, forms, colours germane to his art; but the picture, as resemblance of its object, was a product of mimesis.

Just as the classical meaning of mimesis bears little relation to "imitation," Paul's use of the cognates of mimesis does not signify a modern notion. Because we cannot assume that we understand the words of Paul's mimesis texts, this thesis addresses the following questions: what meaning does Paul attribute to the cognates of mimesis? Specifically, what activity does Paul expect the imitator to perform? What is it that the imitator imitates? and what purpose do these words serve within Pauline thought?

METHODOLOGY

Only with careful attention to the usage of the words μιμέωμαι, μίμησις, and συμμίμησις within the contemporary setting of Pauline
thought may one determine the intent of the Pauline texts. Accordingly, this thesis contains a philological component. The investigation supports the conclusion that Paul's use of the mimesis cognates echoes their meaning in classical literature. It argues that the linguistic derivation is of consequence to Paul's intent.

This thesis goes against the mainstream of current research in Pauline thought on two counts. The current generation of scholarship tends to examine the Hebraic source of Pauline thought. This thesis turns to the classical Greek tradition in order to explain Paul's understanding of mimesis. In agreement with this approach, those scholars who have studied Paul's use of the mimesis cognates concur that the concept of "imitation" does not appear in the Jewish sources until the hellenistic period. There is no antecedent for mimesis within the Hebrew lexicon, nor does Paul use these words to translate some concept from the Old Testament. In opposition to this thesis, these scholars, for the most part, deny the existence of continuity between Paul's usage and the classical usage.

A second source of opposition is James Barr's attack on word studies. He has argued that etymological studies give a "spurious twist to the meaning of a word." On the positive side Barr has argued that content determines meaning. On the one hand, the sentence or the literary complex, rather than a single word, is the bearer of meaning, so that changes in word combinations result in semantic changes. On the other hand, the Hebrew background, "the thought context," is of valid consideration only as long as the study of patterns of thought
does not slip into linguistic description. An examination of a word in other contexts runs the risk of creating artificial associations rather than describing actual associations. Barr's strictures on word-studies do not, however, frustrate our approach to the mimesis texts.

The original context from which Paul's use of these words arose was an oral tradition. The conciseness of Paul's written expositions suggests that his addressees are often already familiar with his ideas. A single word may introduce a world of meaning. Hence, all Pauline epistles in which the words in question appear, as well as the pre-understanding of the predominantly gentile audience, must be taken into account. Interpretation, in short, calls for the examination of a context broader than the sentence.

"Spurious twists" to be sure may easily be given to Paul's words, owing to the interpreter's association of Paul's words with modern ideas of imitation. The philological study of mimesis is an effort to control the tendency to make such false associations. By taking account of Greek literature, we hope to comprehend the semantic horizons within which Paul worked. Barr's condemnation of word studies does not undermine this thesis; rather, his warnings against spurious associations are a positive help.

The task of determining Paul's intent in the use of μιμομαί, μιμητής, and σύμμιμητής will be fourfold. The first chapter will demonstrate that the Old Testament does not influence Paul's use of these words. The second chapter will explain the precise meaning of these words in their classical context and then prove that the same
meaning is still common usage in the first century C.E. The third chapter is an exegetical analysis of the *mimesis* texts which will demonstrate that Paul intends to use the words in the classical sense. The imitator does not strive for perfection by attempting to become an "imitation" of Christ. He fulfills the ethical principle that one should subordinate personal interests and privileges to the good of the community. This is a creative process rather than the mimicry of another's behavior. The final chapter will explain why Paul would choose to use the Greek idea of *mimesis* when transmitting a tradition which has its roots within Hebrew soteriology and eschatology.

This is not the first study to address the meaning of Paul's *mimesis* texts. W. Michaelis, D.M. Stanley, E.J. Tinsley, and most recently, Willis de Boer, have all approached the subject. This thesis does not wholly agree or disagree with any of the above; its specific difference lies in the history-of-religions perspective. Unlike most other studies, it argues for a specifically Greek component in Pauline thought. If this component were to be ignored, the meaning of the *mimesis* texts would escape us. The tradition of the "imitation of Christ" is not a helpful heuristic resource here. The word *mimesis* and its cognates must be brought to life for the modern reader.
CHAPTER ONE
THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Pauline epistles present a fusion of two worlds: the Judaic and the Greek. The salvation history that Paul affirms continues the Hebrew tradition, but the addressees are Gentiles and their language is Greek. One might suppose that in the process of fusion, Paul translates his ideas from Hebrew to Greek. In at least one instance this is not the case, for there is no word corresponding to mimesis or its cognates in the Hebrew lexicon. To recover the meaning of the word as Paul intends it, we must study its use in Greek literature.

Yet, if one subscribes to J. Barr's position, the lack of linguistic evidence connecting Paul's use of the mimesis cognates to the Old Testament need not prevent the Old Testament from influencing Paul's thought. Two biblical themes appear to contain a notion of "imitation" or mimesis: the "image" of God, and "walking" in God's "ways." Rather than being thematically related to the mimesis texts, we shall find that these biblical themes do not inform Paul's understanding of mimesis. The discord between Paul and the Old Testament encourages the examination of Greek literature.

The idea that man imitates God because he is created in God's image rests upon the premise that man is obliged to strive for a form of perfection. This interpretation of Gen 1.26 ignores the theology of the text and adopts a social scientific perspective: a society constructs its religious beliefs by projecting its ideals onto a deity,
and then it worships that deity. Primitive man conceives of God in terms of his own humanity. The social scientist reverses man and God's roles in creation: man creates God in man's own image. This anthropomorphized deity stands as the apex of ideal humanity. Man can reproduce God's actions and attributes, because these features are essentially human.6

The possibility that unredeemed man may attain perfection through his own actions is anathema to Pauline thought. The texts, in which the social scientist finds the notion of imitation, lead Paul to a different conclusion. Man, according to Paul, bears "the image of the man of dust" (I Cor 15.49), and Christ is born in the likeness of men (Phil 2.7), "the likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom 8.3).7 Paul has set the creation story of Gen 1 in a context developed from Gen 2-3. Moreover, he uses Gen 2-3 as a part of a new vision, an apocalyptic conception of humankind made new in a new Adam. Wolfhart Pannenberg finds the key to this apocalyptic eschatology in Paul's grasp of the resurrection of Jesus:

For mythical orientation to a prototypal distant past, he substituted an eschatologically oriented concept of human history. Although this repeats what Daniel had already expressed by symbolizing the coming Kingdom of God in the figure of a "man" (the Son of Man), Paul establishes this conception in a different way, namely, with the beginning of the reality of this "new man" that has already occurred in Jesus' resurrection. Only in this way is there a real parallel between Adam and Christ, because the reality of the new, last man is destined to become effective for all men through Jesus, just as sin and death affected every individual through the first Adam.8

Paul effected a change in the centre of gravity of human history. The possibility of "true humanity" is determined by the consequences of the
resurrection of Jesus. The activity of unredeemed humanity, such as the copying of divine attributes, cannot lead to perfection.

Paul places drastic limits upon man. Human perfection is not the result of behaviour; it is a state conferred by God through an act of recreation. Paul clearly identifies God as the power who transforms man from the image of Adam to the image of Christ (Rom 8.29-30). Man's image determines the conditions in which man lives. He functions within an ontological state not subject to change brought about by human factors.

The hypothesis that "walking" in God's "ways" is a form of imitation, and thus, as a theme, is influential to Paul's thought, finds support in the work of E.J. Tinsley and I. Abrahams. Both argue that the words walk (הלח), love (Љה), and cleave (came) signify the ways that Israel imitates God.9 But if Israel imitates God's ways, then God must provide an example for the imitator.10 This is not the case. Israel's actions are guided by a legal principle. In Deuteronomy 11.1, the injunction "to keep his [God's] charge, his statutes, his ordinances and his commandments" immediately follows the command to "love the Lord your God." Later in the chapter, the failure to obey these commandments is equated with turning aside from God's way (Deut 11.28). Israel receives a revealed law, fulfills the law, and God responds. The specific text in which these three verbs appear marks a reciprocal relation:

For if you will be careful to do all this commandment which I command you to do, loving the Lord your God, walking in all his ways, and cleaving to him, then the Lord will drive out all
these nations before you, and you will dispossess nations greater and mightier than yourselves (Deut 11.21-23).

Walking, cleaving, and loving are part of a covenantal relationship.

J.G. McConville isolates the verb natan, to give, as the key to the reciprocal relationship between God and Israel. God gives Israel the land and demands that Israel respond with obedience. Israel does not fulfill their obligation as an ethical response but from necessity. If Israel disobeys, they are punished. God's wrath is manifest through the victories of other nations. According to Deuteronomy, if Israel is victorious in its conflicts with other nations, their victory is a result of their fulfillment of the law.

The theme of "walking" in God's "ways" implies neither the current idea of "imitation" nor the classical idea of mimesis. In order to be an imitator in the modern sense, there should be a one-to-one correspondence between Israel's and God's actions. The Israelites obey, they follow, but they do not imitate. In light of the classical idea of mimesis, where the imitator engages in a creative process, God is the party who does the mimesis. The imitator expresses an idea or principle in a concrete form. In this case, the idea is Israel's disobedience which indicates their separation from God, their failure to walk in his ways. This, in turn, becomes manifest, through the agency of God, in historic events, such as Israel's defeat in battle.

For the most part, this discussion has focused upon the idea that the imitator mimics the characteristics of God. E.J. Tinsley offers a notion of mimesis which consists of a creative process. According to Tinsley, ancient Israelite cult is drama, a re-living of the exodus experience:
Hebrew piety was to live the present as though it were the privileged stretch of the remembered past, so that it was actualized and realized afresh again and again.12

The relation between the cult and God's acts in history leads Tinsley to conclude that Israel is an "imitator Dei."

There is one flaw in Tinsley's description of Israel's mimesis which limits its possible influence upon Pauline thought: the example for this cultic mime is Israel itself. Through the cult, Israel confirms its relationship to God by recreating the history of its ancestors. By imitating the Israelites who first received the covenant in the Sinai, the participants in the cult make the institution of the cult immediate.

Tinsley, as a historian of religion, may recognize an element of mimesis within Israelite worship. But is it appropriate to suggest that Judaism in the hellenistic period understood the cult from this perspective? Consequently, while the feasts recreated the ancient history, their observance is intimately linked with legal observance. Most feasts commemorate the exodus event. Even the observation of the Sabbath fulfills the injunction to "remember that you were a servant in the land of Egypt and the Lord brought you out thence with a mighty hand" (Deut 5.15). But, according to the biblical text, the feasts are also instituted at that time in the form of commandments (Deut 16.1-17). By the time that the Pentateuch took its written form, the cult was not simply commemoration; it had become law.

The covenantal character of Israel's mimesis limits its influence upon Paul's call to imitate. Again, Paul's understanding of the Christ
event governs his attitude toward the cult. Paul does not analyze the law to determine its origins within Israelite tradition. For Paul, the law was a "custodian until Christ came" (Gal 3.24). It is scarcely conceivable that Paul should advocate that his addressees become imitators, if he believed that the legitimacy of such an act derived from the cult of ancient Israel.

To deny the influence of the Old Testament on Paul's idea of mimesis is not, however, to exclude the possibility of all Old Testament influence. The process of mimesis is a Greek idea, but the ethic which Paul exhorts the imitator to express is found in Deuteronomy. J.G. McConville finds this ethic, that is, the subordination of personal privilege to the well-being of others, present within prohibitions against taking interest on loans, in the treatment of freed slaves, in the laws of gleanings, and other acts of charity. The Old Testament encapsulates this principle within law, whereas Paul calls for its expression through mimesis. The precedent for the imitator to realize an ethic through mimesis lies within Greek literature.
CHAPTER TWO
CLASSICAL AND HELLENISTIC GREEK

A full survey of mimesis in Greek literature would, of course, be far too ambitious for our purposes. Our more modest and practical aim is to distinguish the technical use of mimesis from common usage. The difference between the two is apparent within the work of four authors: Plato, Aristotle, Philo, and Josephus.

Two characteristics of Greek literature merit attention here. First, Greek is capable of producing a wide variety of cognate words. From a verb root of a word such as μιμέωμαι (I imitate), one can form the noun τὸ μὴμαι (an imitation). Secondly, Greek differentiates a product from its process. English is less precise. For example, English uses the word imitation to designate both product and process. Greek, in general, avoids such abstractions which detract from precise prose.15

George Whalley, with these characteristics in mind, draws particular attention to the word mimesis in his article "On Translating Aristotle's Poetics":

It is in words of active or indicative termination that English seems to be particularly weak for the business of translating the Poetics - words that by their form clearly imply process or continuous action. English has no word to match the processive implications that abide in the very form of the words mimesis and poiesis. Too often we have to fall back on nouns formed from Latin past participles (imitation, conception, notion, construction).16

The word imitation obscures the meaning of mimesis, because it can stand for either the act of imitation or a concrete product. Whalley
chooses to transliterate rather than to translate mimesis in order to avoid confusing the two meanings. We will heed his advice. A survey of Greek literature justifies this practice, for the noun τὸ μίμημα appears rarely. The common form is mimesis, a process, and the imitator ὁ μιμητής, engages in the process of mimesis.

**PLATO AND PHILO**

Plato's dialogues give rise to two attitudes toward mimesis which Philo perpetuates and which subsequently become aspects of the modern notion of "imitation." The first is the impression that the imitator is to be disparaged. The second is the idea that mimesis produces a copy (τὸ μίμημα) of something. Τὸ μίμημα is a technical term distinct to Platonic thought.

Plato's dialogues do not, in fact, present a critical view of all acts of mimesis. The difference between the treatment of the craftsman's mimesis and that of the painter indicates clearly that mimesis may be meritorious if it is directed toward the appropriate purpose.

In the Cratylus, Socrates provides, without critical evaluation, a description of the mimesis of sign language. According to Socrates, if man had neither voice nor tongue,

we should imitate (μιμοῦμαι) the nature of things: the elevation of our hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness ...

The idea of mimicry is absent. Mimesis is a process whereby one expresses the essential characteristics of the object that one imitates. Just as a word is not a copy of its object, the product of mimesis is not necessarily a copy.
The disparaging treatment of mimesis occurs within The Republic when Socrates creates a distinction between the material world which is finite and essence or "form" which is eternal. On the basis of this distinction, Socrates criticizes the painter as imitator and praises the craftsman. The object of their mimesis is the focal point of the discussion. The craftsman "fixes his eyes on the idea or form" and, then, makes a couch or table. If the painter paints a picture of a couch, he does not imitate the form. His product is three times removed from the idea. Socrates finds greater merit in the mimesis which leads to "genuine knowledge" of a form than in the mimesis which leads to knowledge of appearance.

The distinction between the forms and appearance gives rise to the idea that one object can be an imitation, a copy, of another object, as opposed to a genuine article. To µίμημα appears frequently in the Platonic dialogues as the technical term for the objects of sense perception. In The Timaeus, the visible world is to µίμημα because it imitates, through its actions and appearance, the intelligible world, the world of ideas. Moreover, the visible world comes into being through a process of mimesis. The creator has made an idea apparent within matter.

Plato does not create the noun to µίμημα. It occurs in Euripides as well; however, Euripides' use does not consistently reflect the same distinction between the real and the copy. On only one occasion may the word be translated as a copy. On other occasions the meaning is very different. To µίμημα may even refer to the example which one
imitates. The variety of uses of τὸ μῦνονα indicates that Plato's technical terminology is not common usage.

Philo, Paul's contemporary, promotes the notion that the product of mimesis is always a copy, because he uses the word frequently. When he uses the word, he presupposes the Platonic cosmology of the intelligible world and the sense world. This is evident in his work On Dreams in which he discusses God's theophany in the likeness of an angel:

He is unchangeable, but conveying to those which receive the impression of His presence a semblance in a different form, such as they take the image to be not a copy (μῦνονα) but the original form itself.

Τὸ μῦνονα continues to mean the reflection of the intelligible in the sense world.

Paul does not presuppose the dichotomy between the intelligible and the sense world, nor does he use the word μῦνονα. Μῦνονα is undeniably a rare cognate. It appears infrequently in the corpus of classical, Greek literature. Neither Homer nor Pindar nor Herodotus nor Aristophanes uses it. Apparently, the idea of an imitation or copy should not figure prominently in defining Paul's understanding of mimesis.

ARISTOTLE AND JOSEPHUS

The work of Aristotle and Josephus illustrates the tendency to use cognates of mimesis to refer to activity rather than the results of activity. Aristotle provides an understanding of both the characteristics of mimesis and the potential application of mimesis to education.
and ethics. Josephus demonstrates that Aristotle's use of these words is still common usage in the late Hellenistic period.

In the Poetics, Aristotle speaks of the origin of poetry which he attributes to the following cause:

From childhood men have an instinct for representation (μιμείσθαι), and in this respect man differs from other animals that he is far more imitative (μιμήσασθαι) and learns his first lessons by representing things and all rejoice in the representation.25

The comparison of man to the animals accentuates the pedagogic value of mimesis and indicates that mimesis requires a cognitive process. It is not mimicry or rote repetition of gestures or words. On the contrary, Aristotle means that man learns through making, as the English translation implies. Man represents ideas in dance, literature, and so forth, and learns by the process of bringing the idea into being. For example, a child draws a man and thereby recognizes the physical attributes of which a man consists. In play, a child represents a man by enacting the role of a king and, as a result, learns the nature of governing.

When Aristotle explores the principle that man learns about poetry through mimesis, the distinction between imitating and mimicry becomes clear. According to Aristotle, the discovery of tragedy began with improvisation.26 At first poets used trochaic meter with laughable results. When they began to imitate ordinary speech through the use of iambic meter, they discovered the meter appropriate to tragedy, for tragedy ultimately teaches about the character of real men. In short, by making a tragedy, the poets came to understand the nature of
Aristotle's treatment of mimesis also highlights the ethical decision inherent in that process. The imitator chooses the means, the object and the manner of mimesis. According to Aristotle, man enjoys looking at the products of mimesis; he learns about the original object from the representation or example. As a result, if the imitator is cognizant of the power of mimesis to instruct, he may teach about either the good or the bad. For example, the artist teaches the observer the nature of beauty by painting beauty, or he teaches ugliness by representing the ugly. The imitator must make an ethical decision, for he provides an example for others which may shape society.

On the one hand, Aristotle's analysis of tragedy and his argument that tragedy is mimesis contribute significantly to our understanding of poetry. On the other hand, his usage of mimesis is not exceptional. The fact that mimesis is a process of making or creating is evident in the Platonic dialogues and in the example from Euripides' Children of Heracles. One final example highlights this conclusion. Democritus, in the Ethics, writes, "It is necessary either to be good or to imitate goodness." Since this is an ethical injunction, it cannot mean that if one is not good, then one should take on the appearance of goodness. On the contrary, one should do good acts. Again mimesis is an act of creating an outward expression of a principle. It is not the act of adopting attributes.
Four centuries stand between Aristotle and Paul. Perhaps the change in Greek usage during this interval is not as drastic as the transition from Shakespeare to Hemingway; nevertheless, it is necessary to demonstrate that Paul's generation used *mimesis* in the same sense or a similar sense as Aristotle. Philo is too steeped in Platonic and neo-Platonic thought to be representative of common usage, whereas Josephus, as a historian, avoids technical terms. Consequently, Josephus' work reflects common usage.

Josephus, in his four literary works, uses the various cognates of *mimesis* sixty-three times. On only two occasions does the form μίμημα appear, once to refer to an artist's representation of an event and once to refer to gold leaves which appear to be real. On the second occasion, Josephus qualifies τὸ μίμημα with the word τέχνη in order to make the distinction between the natural and the manufactured clear. The word μίμημα alone does not convey the idea that the leaves are artificial.

In contrast to Josephus' limited use of μίμημα, he uses the verb μιμέωμαι forty-one times, μίμησις seven times and ὁ μιμητὴς thirteen times. Josephus' use of these cognates indicates that *mimesis* is the act of expressing the nature or essence of a thing.

It is true that Josephus uses the verb μιμέωμαι for acts as simple as the imitating of another's handwriting. Yet, he is also capable of rendering the fuller meaning of the word. By the act of imitating, one man may make the wickedness of another man apparent in his own behavior. This is the case when King Baasha imitates
Another example, taken from the account of Antipater's protest against Herod's will, illustrates that the act of mimesis lies in Caesar's power to make actual, through his own deeds, the malevolence of Antipater and his brothers:

Caesar would certainly not annul the will of a man who had left everything to his decision, who had been his friend and ally, and who had put his trust in Caesar in making that will. Nor would the virtue and good faith of Caesar, which were unquestioned throughout the entire civilized world, so far imitate (μιμούσθαι) the malice of these men as to condemn a person of kingly rank. If Caesar were to imitate Herod's sons, he would not copy their behaviour. Instead, he would determine the means by which he could make their malice have effect.

Josephus, without explicitly exploring the nature of mimesis, indicates an awareness of its active and processive qualities. Given that Josephus is not a philosopher and is not accustomed to creating a technical language in order to convey meaning, it is apparent that mimesis and its cognates retain the same sense that the classical authors intended by their usage.

As Aristotle, calling a poet an imitator, does not mean that the poet adopts the qualities of the object he imitates, so Paul does not mean that the imitator is a mirror reflection of his object, but that he engages in an activity which brings an idea to expression. The English word imitation robs mimesis of its meaning. Unlike the coin that bears the impression of a monarch and is a passive imitation, the imitator is the creator of the resemblance. He does not produce a facsimile, nor is he a facsimile. The comparison of Pauline use to
classical usage need not be limited to the active connotation of mimesis. Although Paul does not base his thought upon Aristotelian philosophy, he recognizes the pedagogic and ethical dimensions of the act of mimesis. The proof of this hypothesis obtains in the Pauline texts themselves.
CHAPTER THREE

THE PAULINE MIMESIS TEXTS

In order to master a craft, the artisan repeats each technique of his trade until the movements become second nature. The man and his art are one. This principle holds true for the pedagogue. The lessons, phrases, and the words, through repetition, become habit. Given the duration and the geographic scope of Paul's mission, Paul would have repeated his ideas so frequently that his vocabulary became organized according to specific concepts and lessons. Although the words ἑιμέομαι, μιμητής, and συμμιμητής appear only seven times within five epistles, they appear with sufficient consistency of usage within the Pauline epistles to warrant the suspicion that they are part of Paul's habitual vocabulary.

The particular epistles in which this word group appears represent correspondence to communities with which Paul has had prior contact. As a result, Paul need not discuss at length the content of his gospel. He may allude to one point or use a key word and, then, rely upon the memory of the community to provide the entire context of the lesson. The use of mimesis cognates reflects an oral tradition. The modern reader who is no longer in possession of the entire context, views only fragments of Paul's full meaning in a single epistle. Nevertheless, Paul's use is sufficiently clear in each epistle to determine his meaning. The examination of all seven mimesis texts provides a more thorough view of his understanding of mimesis.

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Five epistles form the basis for this investigation: I and II Thessalonians, I Corinthians, Philippians, and Ephesians. We will first examine the two letters to the Thessalonians and, then, I Corinthians in order to determine Paul's notion of mimesis. Philippians elucidates an issue which emerges from the reading of I Corinthians: what role does Christ play in Paul's notion of mimesis? Ephesians stands apart from the first four epistles. On this occasion, the author of the letter chooses God as the object of mimesis. The choice of God seems to suggest that the goal of mimesis is a personal perfection. This interpretation will be refuted. Although the Letter to the Ephesians differs from the other epistles in its object, and perhaps its author, it contains a similar understanding of mimesis.

All five epistles contain an essentially similar notion of mimesis. Mimesis is a process in which the imitator expresses the essence of an idea in concrete form. For Paul, this form is conduct. In all cases, the standard to which these communities' mimesis conforms is the ethic that one should subordinate his or her rights to the interests of others. Their mimesis is the means by which the Christian communities create unity within the church.

I THESSALONIANS

You know what kind of men we proved to be among you for your sake. And you became imitators of us and of the Lord, for you received the word in much affliction, with joy inspired by the Holy Spirit (I Thess 1.5-6).

For you, brethren, became imitators of the churches of God in Jesus Christ which are in Judea; for you suffered the same
things from your own countrymen as they did from the Jews ... (I Thess 2.14).

The Thessalonians' first experience as members in the Christian sect is persecution. In the midst of their struggles, they receive a letter from the apostle Paul in which he praises them for their work and rejoices in their faith. The tension between joy and suffering is not unique to the Thessalonians' experience. The churches in Judea and Paul himself endure threats and assaults from their opponents. The resemblance between the Thessalonians, Paul, and the churches in Judea provides fertile ground for misinterpretation, for within the same letter Paul notes that the Thessalonians "became imitators of us and the Lord" (I Thess 1.6) and they "became imitators of the churches ... in Judea" (I Thess 2.14). At first glance, the meaning of this attribute seems straightforward. The Thessalonians accepted the gospel, and as a result they are persecuted; therefore, they resemble Paul. Paul and the Thessalonians are stamped with the same pattern. The Thessalonians are imitators in that they are imitations.

Although many commentators accept this explanation, they disagree whether it is the act of accepting the gospel or suffering that makes the Thessalonians resemble Paul, the Lord, and the churches in Judea. The lack of consensus attests to the fact that the meaning is not straightforward and that the passive interpretation is untenable. The Thessalonians, in fact, are active in their role as imitators. They act upon the ethical principle, exemplified by Paul's actions, that the interests of others supersede one's own interests. Because this
activity is a process which conforms to Paul's example, the Thessalonians are imitators; they do their mimesis.

The proof for this conclusion lies in two observations. First, Paul's description of his own activities indicates that he provides an example for the Thessalonians. His conduct conforms to the principle of self-renunciation. The second observation is that the Thessalonians' behaviour is active, it is directed toward a result, that is the conversion of others, and it conforms to the same principle that Paul's example realizes.

**Context**

The purpose of this epistle is threefold: to praise the Thessalonians for their resolute faith and prior conduct, to encourage them to continue their Christian conduct, and to answer questions with regard to the coming of Christ. The mimesis texts appear within the context of Paul's praise. The activity or manner which characterized the community at the time of its conversion and continues to characterize it when Paul writes signifies that the Thessalonians are imitators.

**The Example**

The Thessalonians as imitators have three examples: Paul with his associates, the churches in Judea, and the Lord. Because the epistle focuses upon Paul's relation to this community, the essence of the three examples is best illustrated by an examination of Paul's comments about his own conduct.
Paul explicitly acknowledges that his behaviour conforms to the principle of self-renunciation. Prior to noting that the Thessalonians are imitators, Paul mentions that they are familiar with what kind of men he and his associates proved to be. Paul qualifies this description with the phrase "for your sake." On a superficial level, this qualification means that Paul's purpose is to evangelize, to convert, and the Thessalonians benefit from this conversion. On another level, the phrase implies that Paul orients his conduct toward the interests of others. He describes himself as a nurse taking care of her children (I Thess 2.7). Later in the letter, he adds that he "worked night and day" in order not to burden the Thessalonians (I Thess 2.9). The unifying principle is that Paul attends to the nature of the community in order that his behaviour will be conducive to learning. He accommodates his own behaviour so that he does not cause offense or stress within the community.

Paul acknowledges that his way of behaving is in step with an essential order; therefore, his conduct reflects a process of mimesis. His comments about his own ministry provide the key to understanding how he consciously shapes his ministry to conform to this order. Paul claims that his visit was not in vain. By this he does not simply mean that he was humble. In vain refers to emptiness, a lack of efficacy. Paul's use of this image involves a complex of meaning. On the one hand, he means that his preaching is successful, because it gains converts. On the other hand, he means that his gospel is the one, true gospel. For Paul, the unity of the church is integral to the truth of
the gospel. If Paul had found that his gospel did not agree with the gospel of the churches of Judea, then his teaching would be in vain.

The importance of unity is evident in Paul's concern that "those of repute" in Jerusalem recognize the gospel which he is preaching. He uses the same imagery, "lest somehow I should be running or had run in vain" (Gal 2.2), to describe his purpose in visiting Jerusalem. His teaching would be empty, without purpose, if it had been accepted and, as a result, caused division within the church.

The notion of unity is inherent in the process of mimesis. When an artist accepts the authority of a style of painting, he bends his will to conform with that authority. In a similar manner, both the churches in Judea and Paul express conformity in their approach to preaching and the gospel.

When we move on to the examples of the churches in Judea and the Lord, we find no explicit references to the activities that characterize either of the two. The mimesis texts alone allude to common experiences, namely, "receiving the word," "affliction," and "joy." The first cannot be the event that makes the Thessalonians imitators, for the Lord does not "receive the word." The last two experiences describe the consequences of an activity rather than how one is an imitator. The key to this puzzle lies in an examination of the Thessalonians' activity. The Thessalonians, along with all three examples, by acting upon the principle of self-renunciation, participate in the process of building a church.
The Mimesis

The Thessalonians take part in activity which conforms to the same principle that shapes Paul's conduct. In order to make this apparent, we must first dispel the mistaken impression that the Thessalonians are "imitations," that is, they are like Paul in appearance.

When Paul describes the time at which the Thessalonians became imitators, he uses the aorist passive form of the verb γίνομαι-ἐγενότε. One might expect either the middle aorist or the perfect form. The passive termination leads to two erroneous conclusions. The first, represented by Charles Masson, is that the passive indicates that the Thessalonians are passive. They do not intend to be imitators. God is the "unnamed agent" who confers this attribute upon them.37 The second conclusion, advocated by Ernest Best, is that the passive aorist indicates that the Thessalonians were imitators at one particular point in the past.38 There are two corrolaries to this conclusion. Best equates the act of accepting the gospel with the act of the imitator. Others identify suffering to be the designated event. In both cases, the Thessalonians simply resemble Paul.

Best's proposal that "imitation" occurs only at the moment the Thessalonians receive the gospel illustrates two problems which arise when one equates imitator with imitation. First, the title imitators cannot have the same import when Paul uses it later in the epistle. In the case of "imitators of the churches ... in Judea," Best concedes that the Thessalonians are imitators because they suffer.39 If this conclusion is consistent with his interpretation of I Thess 1.6, then
the Thessalonians suffered at one particular time. But the letter suggests that they continue to suffer. It is more probable that Paul means that they are imitators in the same sense that one is an artist. A man does not cease to be an artist when he lays down his brush, nor does a single act mark the completion of the Thessalonian's role as imitators.

The second problem with Best's conclusion is that there is a lack of congruency between the act of conversion and the list of models which Paul names. Paul, Silvanus, and Timothy all experience the "coming of the gospel"; this statement does not hold true for "the Lord." D.M. Stanley attempts to reconcile the inclusion of the Lord with the conclusion that the Thessalonians imitate Paul by accepting the gospel. He suggests that Paul adds "and the Lord" as an afterthought. Paul intends the Lord and the gospel to stand in conjunction, for when one accepts the gospel, one accepts the Lord. This act of exegetical juggling hinges upon the conclusion that Paul intends the act of acceptance as the object of mimesis and that his sentence structure is careless.

A simple observation may eliminate the confusion that creates. Paul uses the verb γίνομαι frequently in this epistle. In fact, in eight of the twelve instances, Paul favours the passive form over the middle. The phrase "became imitators" in I Thess 1.6 follows immediately after ἔγινομαι and ὑπήκοον in verse five. Given that there is no difference in meaning between the aorist middle and the passive of γίνομαι, it is plausible that the author simply preferred to
make persistent use of the passive. Just as Paul happens to be among the Thessalonians in verse five, the Thessalonians happen to be imitators. The sequence of events is as follows: the Thessalonians accept the gospel, and in subsequent situations they act as imitators.42

The conclusion that the Thessalonians continue to be imitators does not completely dispel the idea that the Thessalonians are passive. The quest for congruency between the imitators and their examples leads some commentators to conclude that the Thessalonians do not actually do anything; they suffer at the hands of their persecutors. The most persuasive proponent of this view is Willis de Boer.43 De Boer argues that suffering is necessary in order to be a Christian, for Paul predicts the inevitability of suffering in I Thess 3.4: "For when we were with you, we told you beforehand that we were to suffer affliction; as it has come to pass."44 De Boer acknowledges that the suffering of the Thessalonians has an active quality in that the Thessalonians hold fast to their faith and endure suffering.45 Moreover, they consciously hold the churches of Judea as their model.46 He stresses, nonetheless, the idea that Paul calls the Thessalonians imitators because he observes the resemblance between their suffering and his own.46 De Boer finds no ethic at work in the role of imitator.

De Boer focuses upon the word affliction (ἔλθεσθαι) in his interpretation of I Thess 1.6 on the basis of his interpretation of I Thess 3.4. By doing this, he ignores several significant components of both verses. The first of these components is that the Thessalonians
experience joy as well as persecution. Joy may suggest two different responses. De Boer argues that suffering is a credential of Christian faith. Thus, he identifies joy as the response to suffering, because suffering confirms the authenticity of the Thessalonians' faith. The Thessalonians' joy, however, may exist in spite of their affliction, that is, the affliction is inconsequential; it does not deter their activity. I Thess 3.4 implies that the Thessalonians anticipated their affliction. Again, there may be two reasons for this anticipation: they hoped for confirmation of their true faith, or they gave it occasion to occur. In the later case, the Thessalonians are not necessarily passive victims. The equation of "imitation" with suffering afflicts ignores the fact that the Thessalonians were engaged in some activity that incurred the opposition of others. The possibility that the role of imitator has active implications remains open to investigation.

Neither accepting the gospel nor suffering satisfy as answers to the question: what earns the Thessalonians the title of imitator? The answer lies at least one step back before the advent of suffering. The epistle makes a number of allusions to the Thessalonians' activity which leads to persecution. The first hint occurs in the introduction when Paul uses the same vocabulary to describe the Thessalonians' activity as he habitually uses to describe his own mission. The Thessalonians receive praise for their "work of faith," and their "labor of love" (I Thess 1.3). As a result of this labor, "the word of the Lord sounded forth from you in Macedonia and Achaia" (I Thess
It is clear that the Thessalonians continue preaching the gospel after Paul and his associates are driven from Thessalonica. Paul confirms the conclusion that the Thessalonians are imitators when they preach when he states that the Thessalonians suffered the same things from their own countrymen as the churches of Judea suffered from the Jews (I Thess 2.14). The Jews had driven Paul and company out from Judea and hindered them from spreading the gospel to the Gentiles. The nature of the opposition which the Thessalonians encounter hinders them from speaking the gospel. Paul, his associates, the churches of Judea, and the Thessalonians are engaged in the same sort of activity: they preach the gospel.

Once again the issue of how the Lord participates in this activity arises. It becomes apparent that the comparison of activity alone cannot supply an adequate explanation of how the Thessalonians are imitators. Paul's exhortations to the Thessalonians indicate that the common element is a principle rather than a one-to-one correspondence between the activity of the Thessalonians and their examples.

The Thessalonians do not simply copy Paul's actions when they preach. They preach the gospel in order to serve the interests of others. This fact is clear, for they receive affliction for their efforts. It is this principle of placing the interests of others before one's own that guides their actions.

Several aspects of the mimesis texts now attract attention. Paul and his companions are examples of men who deny their own desires or privileges in the interests of others. Their behaviour reflects an
ethic which the Thessalonians imitate. That is, the Thessalonians express this ethic in their own behaviour. As a result of the Thessalonians' **mimesis**, they spread the word or gospel not merely by speaking but through the example of their own conduct, namely, their willingness to continue to speak in spite of persecution.

**Conclusion**

Paul's intent in calling the Thessalonians imitators is comparable to Aristotle's intent in calling the tragedian an imitator. The tragedian's **mimesis** is the making of a play; the Thessalonians' **mimesis** is the making of a church. Paul builds the church through his teaching. The Lord participates in this act of creation through his act of obedience on the cross. The Thessalonians imitate the principle of unity through self-renunciation in the service of others. They, thereby, create unity and promote growth within the church. The fact that the Thessalonians became imitators may be, in Paul's view, an act of grace. Just as spiritual gifts require the one who possesses the gift to use it on behalf of others, the imitator possesses the ability to express his understanding of the gospel through his conduct as a member of the church. In the case of the Thessalonians, their willingness to suffer affliction indicates that they are fulfilling their role as imitators.

**II THESSALONIANS**

Now we command you, brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you keep away from any brother who is living in idleness and not in accord with the tradition that you received
from us. For you yourselves know how you ought to imitate us; we were not idle when we were with you, we did not eat any one's bread without paying, but with toil and labor we worked night and day, that we might not burden any of you. It was not because we have not the right, but to give you in our conduct an example to imitate (II Thess 3.6-9).

There is something paradoxical about Paul's second letter to the Thessalonians. On the one hand he includes a rousing account of the parousia in which "mighty angels" appear in "flaming fire" (II Thess 1.7). On the other hand, he seems to rebuke them for curtailing their normal activity in expectation of this parousia. The third chapter, which contains his criticism of idleness, seems not to follow logically from the eschatological discourse of the first two chapters. In fact, the contradiction between preparation for the parousia and everyday work is more apparent than real.50

If Paul means that the Thessalonians ought to imitate him only by copying his industry, then it is true: the first half of the letter has no bearing upon the second half. This is not the case. Although Paul does not present his thought in a systematic order, the structure and content of both sections indicate that his concern entails more than whether or not an individual earns his living. He is concerned with the relationship between faith and behavior. Paul provides an example, and mimesis is the means by which the Thessalonians shape their behavior.

**Context**

In the first two chapters of the epistle Paul has three points to make. First, he is thankful for the Thessalonians' faith. Secondly,
he provides an eschatological discourse. Thirdly, he prays that God will make the Thessalonians worthy. He repeats each of these themes, with minor variations, in the following order:

Thanks 1.1-4
Worthiness 1.5
Eschatology 1.7-10
Worthiness 1.11-12
Eschatology 2.1-12
Thanks 2.13-15
Worthiness 2.16

Paul consistently returns to the issue of worthiness. The design of the epistle indicates that, in the face of persecution and despite expectations of the parousia, the Thessalonians have a responsibility to conduct themselves in an appropriate manner.

The central prayer in the first two chapters alludes to the Thessalonians' responsibility:

To this end we always pray for you, that our God may make you worthy of his call, and may fulfil every good resolve and work of faith by his power, so that the name of our Lord Jesus may be glorified in you, and you in him, according to the grace of our God and the Lord Jesus Christ (II Thess 1.11-12).

J. Terence Forrestell calls this "a concise expression of the delicate co-ordination of divine initiative and grace with human effort in the progressive work of man's glorification." Although the decisive event of the Thessalonians' salvation has already been determined by an act of God's grace, it is incumbent on the Thessalonians to make this act apparent. The final section of the epistle contains specific
instruction with respect to how the Thessalonians are to behave in order to express this worthiness.

**The Example**

Paul's role in the mimesis of the Thessalonians is to provide an example. He performs an act which expresses the principle that he hopes the Thessalonians will manifest in their own behavior, just as a teacher will illustrate a particular lesson through the presentation of an example. Paul is not the object which they imitate. They do not attempt to produce copies of Paul by becoming like Paul in every possible way. This distinction appears in Paul's assertion that he gives an example (II Thess 3.9). Paul explicitly states that he has the right to expect support from others; the purpose of his labor is not only to earn an income but to make an example. That is, by working, Paul participates in mimesis. He produces a perceptible expression of a principle to stand as an example of how the Thessalonians should go about their mimesis.

What the Thessalonians imitate is evident from Paul's example. By working, in spite of his right to claim support, Paul expresses the ethic of subordination of personal privilege or interest to the good of others. This ethic leads Paul to decide not to burden the Thessalonians by demanding that they support him.

Paul's reference to his motive might be discarded as apologetic, in a disguised assertion of his apostolic authority. Nevertheless, self-renunciation is a recurrent theme in this epistle. Paul condemns
the persecutors, those who spread falsehoods, busybodies, and those who rely upon others for their keep. All of the above act in accord with their own interests. It seems probable that Paul views his own disinterested behaviour as exemplary.

David Stanley argues that Paul's demand that the Thessalonians work reflects a Jewish cultural bias: Greek society believed that work was ignoble, whereas the Jewish culture valued work. The commandment "If anyone will not work, let him not eat" is paralleled in rabbinic literature. If this is the case, Paul deviates from his usual call for acculturation, that is, his attempts to conform to the customs of the people with whom he lived (I Cor 9.19-23; Rom 14.1-21).

The necessity of work and Paul's demand for acculturation stem from the same concern. On the one hand, Paul conforms to a tradition, namely, a set of norms for the church. On the other hand he adapts his behaviour to accommodate the needs of a particular community. Both practices promote unity within the church. When Stanley argues that Paul's call to imitate reflects a cultural bias, he relies upon a modern notion of imitation. In this case, Paul demands that the Thessalonians resemble him: he works, they should work. Paul's call to imitate involves a more creative endeavor on the part of the Thessalonians. This fact becomes clear in the analysis of the Thessalonians' mimesis.
The Mimesis

The first sign that Paul is not calling for a simple copying of his own diligence appears in the phrase "you yourselves know how you ought to imitate us" (αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἶδατε πῶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς) (II Thess 3.7). W. Michaelis points out that "the δεῖ gives us reason to suppose that this idea has already had a place in his oral missionary preaching." In this case, Paul acknowledges that the Thessalonians' mimesis involves much more than the single instance to which Paul refers. Paul expects the Thessalonians to know what behavior is appropriate in all situations. The emphatic construction with the pronoun αὐτοῖ and the verb οἶδατε suggests that Paul means that the Thessalonians should possess understanding rather than a memory of a lesson. The knowledge of how they ought to imitate proceeds from their comprehending the whole tradition which Paul delivers to them.

Knowledge of the tradition allows the Thessalonians to determine appropriate behavior in various situations. Thus, some latitude in behavior is necessary. Paul's advice that the Thessalonians stand aloof from the idle illustrates the ingenuity that the community must employ in order to maintain the tradition (II Thess 3.14). Paradoxically, by not associating with the idle, and thereby causing them shame, the Thessalonians preserve the unity of the church. The choice to stand aloof is based upon the principle that the idle's welfare is of ultimate concern.

Paul's command to stand aloof also reveals that idleness itself does not place an individual outside the church. The reverse must be
true as well. Imitating Paul does not place one in the group of the elect. Just as the first section indicates, an act of God's grace determines one's status in the last judgement. Whether the Thessalonians are worthy of this status depends upon their active attempt to realize their faith in their "good resolve" and "works of faith." In the specific example which Paul elaborates in the last section of the letter, these works include both concern for their brothers and employment.

**Conclusion**

D.M. Stanley suggests that II Thessalonians offers "imitation on a less heroic scale than suffering." Indeed, the result of their mimesis is less laudable, but the nature of the act and the motive for the act remain the same as in the case of suffering. Despite the different results, Paul's use of μιμεῖσθαι in II Thessalonians is consistent with his use of μίμησις in I Thessalonians.

The similarity between I and II Thessalonians rests in the ethical principle that one should abandon self-interest for the good of others. The difference between the two reflects the different occasions for writing. In I Thessalonians mimesis is the application of the ethic to spreading the gospel beyond Thessalonica; in II Thessalonians, the imitators apply the ethic to the healing of division within the church at Thessalonica.

Given the particular behavior that Paul asks the Thessalonians to make manifest, it is appropriate that he limits the sources for
examples of mimesis to himself and his associates. Jesus does not provide an example of behavior that directly corresponds to the earning of an income. Nevertheless, the absence of the Lord as an object of mimesis does not signify that the two occasions for writing indicate two different kinds of mimesis. Both presuppose that behind the act of mimesis stands one order to which the Thessalonians should conform. Thus, industry is only one example of the behavior which demonstrates that the Thessalonians are imitators.

In this epistle, when Paul focuses his attention upon a specific problem, mimesis may appear to signify the copying of a random event or act. What this narrow reading of the text ignores is that Paul does not separate motive from act. The same concern for unity and for one's fellow man informs the Thessalonians' choice to work and their decision to stand aloof from those who are idle. Through their mimesis the Thessalonians make their faith manifest.

I CORINTHIANS

I urge you, then, be imitators of me. Therefore I sent to you Timothy, my beloved and faithful child in the Lord, to remind you of my ways in Christ, as I teach them everywhere in every church (I Cor 4.16-17).

Give no offence to Jews or to Greeks or to the church of God, just as I try to please all men in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that of many, that they may be saved. Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ (I Cor 10.32-11.1)

In I Thessalonians, Paul praises the community for being imitators; in II Thessalonians, he reminds them to be imitators, but in I Corinthians, Paul exhorts the community to be imitators. The community
in Corinth has problems which are severe enough to threaten the survival of a united church. More than the odd individual errs in judgement. Factions divide the community. Some claim that they belong to Paul, others belong to Apollos, some belong to Cephas, and another group, to Christ. In order to mend this rift, Paul urges the Corinthians to be imitators of him, first in the context of his condemnation of the disorder, and then again in his response to questions which trouble the community. Perhaps the urgency of the situation requires Paul to be explicit in his intent, for 1 Corinthians provides the clearest picture of Paul's understanding of mimesis. Consequently, scholars generally agree that Paul intends that the Corinthians bring their faith to expression by placing the interests of others before their own. As a result, they may restore the harmony between faith and action.

Context

At the centre of the problem in Corinth stands a misunderstanding of "wisdom." The Corinthians have confused God's wisdom with a worldly sort which lends man power or nobility. As a result, they form personality cults in reverence of leaders within the church (1 Cor 1.12), and they boast of the superiority of particular leaders (1 Cor 3.3; 5.6). Their conduct, in general, is inappropriate. They take up lawsuits against each other. Of those who consider themselves to be spiritually superior, some deny their partners' marital rights, and others criticize those who fail to understand that meat is permitted. Paul's
purpose in exhorting this community to be imitators is to educate them to a proper understanding. His example demonstrates humility, for his conduct is guided by the interests of others rather than self-interest. The Corinthians' *mimesis* of this principle leads to conformity between their behavior and their faith, and consequently, to genuine "wisdom." Thus, Paul recognizes the pedagogic value of *mimesis*.

**The Example**

In both of these *mimesis* texts, Paul identifies himself as an example for the imitator. This may seem odd, for Paul criticizes the practice of forming personality cults. Paul's exemplary conduct, in fact, works against this practice by demonstrating maturity marked by humility.

Paul argues that even though he has the right to food and drink, to the company of his wife, and to refrain from working (I Cor 9.4-7), he does not make use of these rights (I Cor 9.15). He explains:

> I have made myself a slave to all that I might win the more. To the Jews I became as a Jew, in order to win Jews; to those under the law I became as one under the law .... To the weak I became weak that I might win the weak. I have become all things to all men, that I might by all means save some (I Cor 9.19-22).

The logic behind this act appears in the following chapter:

> "All things are lawful," but not all things are helpful. "All things are lawful" but not all things build up. Let no one seek his own good, but the good of his neighbor (I Cor 10.23-24).

When Paul realizes this ethic in his own conduct, he provides an example. A call to imitate his own standard then becomes appropriate:
just as I try to please all men in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that of many, that they may be saved. Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ (I Cor 10.33-11.1).

Clearly, Paul insists that the Corinthians act on the ethical principle that the interests of others dictate how one should behave.

Conforming with Paul's example would prevent schism within the community, because his behavior reflects his relationship to Christ and not personal power. In one mimesis text, he identifies his conduct with "my ways in Christ," and in the other, he claims that he is an "imitator" of Christ.

How one is to interpret this aspect of Paul's mimesis generates disagreement between commentators, for the two phrases "my ways in Christ" and "as I am of Christ (καθὼς καὶ ἔμμεθα ἐν Χριστῷ)" permit latitude in interpretation. D.M. Stanley states that these two phrases indicate "the hierarchical structure of the Pauline conception of imitation" in which Paul acts as a mediator; ultimately one imitates Christ. 

Willis de Boer argues that Paul's ways in Christ refer to Christ's ways. Thus, the phrase in I Cor 11.1 indicates that Paul and Christ are interchangeable. The Corinthians may imitate either Paul or Christ with the same result. John Howard Schütz claims that Paul refers to Christ's weakness or humility. Morton Smith argues that Paul refers to participation in the suffering of Christ. Boykin Sanders refutes Smith's position by saying that "Paul does not seem to have encouraged any of his churches to imitate his sufferings." He suggests that "my ways in Christ" refers to the communal existence which results from baptism into the body of Christ.
Of these five interpretations, that of Boykin Sanders seems most probable because it also explains the meaning of I Cor 11.1. Paul's ways in Christ promote unity, and to be an imitator of Christ is to realize this unity. Sanders states that "to imitate Christ establishes the communal principle and excludes the divisiveness which is introduced by boasting in the name of particular leaders."65

In light of this interpretation, Paul's call to be imitators is a response to his earlier rhetorical question: "Is Christ divided?" (I Cor 1.13). The answer is no, for Christ's way is to promote unity. Paul's example, by eliminating the discord which results from self-interested boasting and jealousy, restores the unity inherent in Christ's way.

The Mimesis

Unlike the Thessalonians, the Corinthians are not said to have been imitators. Consequently, Paul provides a description of the wisdom that makes mimesis possible, he indicates that mimesis is a voluntary response based upon an ethical principle, and he alludes to the pedagogic value of becoming imitators.

According to Paul, the gospel reflects God's choice to contradict man's worldly standards. God's gospel is "foolish," "weak," "low," and "despised" (I Cor 1.27-28). An inversion in the normal power structure parallels this reversal of worldly wisdom to worldly foolishness. God's elect become servants rather than princes:
What then is Apollos? What is Paul? Servants through whom you believed as the Lord assigned to each. I planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the growth (I Cor 3.5-6).

Consequently, no man can claim possession of any converted community.

In an attempt to move the Corinthians to shame, Paul refers to them ironically as kings (I Cor 4.8). In contrast, Paul and his associates are "the refuse of the world" (I Cor 4.13). The first call to imitate then follows. Thus, in order to become imitators, the Corinthians must first recognize the context in which this act is possible, namely, in the light of the "foolish" wisdom of God where the elect serve rather than rule over men.

Once the Corinthians recognize this truth, they are capable of choosing the appropriate response, that is, mimesis. As Nils Alstrup Dahl points out, Paul uses the παρακαλω formula in the mimesis text to indicate that this exhortation is the purpose of his letter. As well, παρακαλω indicates a call for a voluntary response. In order for the Corinthians to participate in this inverted social order, they must freely choose the appropriate conduct. By being imitators of Paul, the Corinthians shed their arrogance and become servants.

In the second mimesis text, Paul elaborates upon the nature of service. The discussion takes the shape of a direct response to several questions: Is celibacy necessary (I Cor 7.1ff)? And may one eat meat offered to idols (I Cor 8.1ff)? Paul states that celibacy is preferable and that all food is permitted (I Cor 8.4). Yet he does not insist that one should always observe or demand that others observe
these standards. He recognizes that man's passions are often stronger than his will:

If anyone thinks that he is not behaving properly toward his betrothed, if his passions are strong, and it has to be, let him do as he wishes: let them marry--it is no sin (I Cor 7.36).

In the response to the second question, Paul requests tolerance from the Corinthians. He explains that although all food is permitted, "not all possess this knowledge" (I Cor 8.7). Because some have a weak understanding, Paul puts aside his right to eat some foods:

Therefore, if food is a cause of my brother's falling, I will never eat meat, lest I cause my brother to fall (I Cor 8.13).

Thus, Paul artfully uses the Corinthians' own questions to indicate that they should adopt a tolerant attitude to others in order to behave in the interest of others.

Although Paul does not explicitly explain that mimesis leads to wisdom or understanding, there are several statements within the epistle that suggest that Paul recognizes the pedagogic value of this process. In direct conjunction with the first mimesis text, Paul refers to himself as a father and to the imitators as children. In the hellenistic world, the transition between childhood and adulthood is made by means of education or an act of initiation. Paul's use of the child motif bears resemblance to the Greek notion of education. Immediately before and after the mimesis text Paul indicates that his role as father is also the role of educator. He is both their guide and their teacher (I Cor 4.15; 4.17). This suggests that by imitating Paul, the Corinthians will not only conduct themselves in a manner
comparable to one who is spiritually mature, but that they will also gain maturity.

Earlier in the epistle, Paul accuses the Corinthians of behaving "as babes in Christ" rather than "as spiritual men" (I Cor 3.1). Paul also states that "among the mature we do impart wisdom, although it is not a wisdom of this age ..." (I Cor 2.6). Because the Corinthians are "babes in Christ," Paul claims that they are not ready for this wisdom which he describes metaphorically as "solid food" (I Cor 3.2). Evidently, in order to progress from being "babes" to spiritual maturity, the Corinthians must begin to behave in an appropriate manner.

The process of progressing from immaturity to maturity is mimesis, in this case, of Paul. The behavior which the Corinthians display prior to becoming imitators is marked by boasting in worldly wisdom. This concern for the "wisdom of this age" prevents them from comprehending God's "foolish" wisdom (I Cor 3.18). Prior to gaining this spiritual wisdom, one must first become humble. By imitating Paul's example, the imitator behaves with humility. Evidently, the process of imitating makes possible the transition from the inability to understand Paul's meaning to the point of comprehension by teaching the Corinthians to assume this humility.

Mimesis, as a process of education, is neither the Skinnerian education of the late twentieth century nor the Bentham ideal of the nineteenth century. In both of these cases, the educator shapes his pupil. In the mimesis of Paul's letter to the Corinthians, the
imitator, by acting as Paul acts, gains cognition of the meaning of his actions. The actions should be deliberate and self-shaping in order to realize the goal of spiritual maturity. Simple mimicry cannot achieve such an ideal. In mimesis, a pattern or order, which becomes apparent to the imitator as he performs his mimesis, stands behind the example. Just as the child learns what parts comprise his body by drawing the body, the Christian learns what a spiritual man is by acting like a spiritual man. That is, by performing their mimesis of Paul, by being imitators, the Corinthians learn the nature of spiritual men, and cease to behave as men of flesh. They are, then, capable of comprehending the wisdom of God.

**Conclusion**

Paul's use of mimesis in I Corinthians bears resemblance to Aristotle's use in a number of ways. Mimesis plays a pedagogic role for the imitator. It requires a decision to behave in an ethical manner. Finally, the result of mimesis need not be identical to the example. Instead, it expresses the same order. Paul does not provide the only possible example. Christ also provides an example, one which man cannot duplicate. Nevertheless, man can imitate this example. The product of that mimesis is not a hollow reflection of Christ's humility but an act which creates genuine unity.

**PHILIPPIANS**

Brethren, join in imitating me, and mark those who so live as you have an example in us (Phil 3.17).
Christ, as an example for the imitator, assumes a secondary and, at times, a shadowy role in Paul's epistles. In the letter to the Philippians, Paul identifies himself as the primary example for the imitator, those who live as he does are secondary examples, and Christ is absent in the context of the mimesis text. Nevertheless mimesis, with Paul as the model, makes possible the expression of Christian living. In Philippians, the distinction between individual perfection and the goal of mimesis is clear. Perfection is an eschatological event, and mimesis is the ongoing realization of an ethic. The role of Christ within Paul's concept of mimesis is made evident by the inclusion of a pre-Pauline hymn (Phil 2.5-11). This hymn serves to illustrate the ethical principle of self-renunciation which mimesis brings to expression. The fact that self-renunciation is central to the role of imitator is evident in Paul's instruction to the Philippians.

Context

Paul writes the Letter to the Philippians from prison to express his appreciation for a gift which they have sent and to assure them that his internment does not deter the advance of the gospel. He focuses attention upon the meaning of his own situation and his hopes for the Philippians. Within this context, he finds grounds for comparison between himself, the Philippians, and Christ. Paul adjures the Philippians to look "to the interest of others," a principle which he
illustrates by referring to Christ (2.4-5), and he encourages them to be "co-imitators" of his own example (Phil 3.17).

**The Example**

Although Paul is identified as the example for the imitator, the prominence of the Christ hymn within Paul's encouragement to the Philippians to live in accord and in humility suggests that the hymn has exemplary implications. Ernst Käsemann rejects this idea and argues that this hymn has gnostic origins and contains soteriological drama. Its soteriological meaning is evident: the crucifixion leads to the exaltation of Christ and the possibility of faith. This import need not negate the exemplary status of the passage, particularly in its Pauline context. The hymn emphasizes the behavior which Paul claims to display and which he encourages the Philippians to display. Christ, in an act of humility, empties himself and takes the form of a servant (Phil 2.7-8). The issue at hand seems not to be whether Paul intends to use the hymn to exemplify an ethical principle but the relationship between the eschatological significance of this event and Christ's role as an example for the imitator.

The eschatological significance of the Christ event, in reference to Paul's concept of *mimesis*, is that it effects the radical reversal of the order of power. The humble one becomes exalted. To die is to gain. This reversal represents the order in which Paul's use of *mimesis* is possible. First, an order must exist to which the mimesis can conform. Secondly, the denial of personal privilege for the sake
of others is only efficacious if there is some benefit that the others will receive. In the context of the Pauline epistles, others will gain salvation because of the Christ event.

Because Jesus' ultimate act of self-renunciation establishes the order to which the mimesis of the Philippians conforms, it seems logical that Christ, rather than Paul, should be the object which one imitates. In this epistle, Paul draws attention toward his own actions and those of others: "Brethren, be co-imitators of me, and mark those who so live as you have an example in us" (Phil 3.17). Christ is a unique example, but on a different level, he is one example among many. The exemplary role of Christ functions independently from his soteriological function, but his example is in harmony with the soteriological result. The Philippians' mimesis may result in the expression of the same ethical principle, but it cannot result in a repetition of this soteriological event.

The Mimesis

It is possible that Paul chooses to set himself rather than Christ as the example for mimesis in order to avoid the idea that the goal of the imitator is perfection. This epistle is not a systematic presentation of one idea. Consequently, ideas which may confuse Paul's meaning appear in proximity to the mimesis text. Before Paul calls the Philippians to be co-imitators, he presents several ideas in rapid succession. He looks forward to becoming like Christ in death so that he may "attain the resurrection from the dead" (Phil 3.10-11). He
seems to suggest that he attempts to make Christ's perfection his own (Phil 3.12). Then, he leaps to the exhortation for the mature to be "thus minded" (Phil 3.15). When Paul turns to the exhortation to be co-imitators, he continues to refer to his maturity and the community's common purpose. The last reference to Christ is with respect to perfection. If Paul were to refer to Christ in the context of mimesis, he would run the risk of associating Christ's perfection with the goal of that act. The choice of his own example avoids this error.

Paul has already offered evidence of his maturity earlier in the epistle. He does not lament his imprisonment for it advances the gospel (Phil 1.12). Moreover, he remains in the flesh on others' account (Phil 1.24).

Some commentators start at the power which Paul assigns to the role of imitator. Morna Hooker claims that appeals to imitate the example of others are all very well, but do not in the long run provide the power which is necessary to put the appeal into effect.75

Hooker's problem with the mimesis text reflects the failure of the modern notion of imitation to convey the meaning that Paul's use of μιμήσις intends. The Philippians do not mimic Paul; they take the ideal that Paul's actions represent and apply it to their own behavior. Paul's emphasis lies on the concrete manifestation of honor and not upon some abstract ideal of a state of perfection.

In Paul's instruction to the Philippians, the admonition to place the interest of others before one's own is explicit. Paul says, "In humility count others better than yourselves" (Phil 2.3), and "let each
of you look not only to his own interests, but also to the interests of others" (Phil 2.4). This principle stands in conjunction with the exhortation to be of the same mind. In order to be of the same mind, the individual bends his will to conform to the will of others. The purpose behind his actions becomes identical with that of the community. Consequently, unity of mind requires that one act with common purpose rather than one think the same thoughts as others or share a common attitude which is not necessarily expressed in conduct. The principle of subordinating personal interests and privileges for the good of the community is inherent within the concept of one mind. Mimesis is a process which conforms to a pattern; it becomes the appropriate means of co-ordinating the actions of various individuals into a unit. The mimesis of the Christian represents his participation in the church just as the mimesis of a single craftsman contributes to a single construction project.

Paul emphasizes the co-ordinated effort of the Philippians by calling them συμμιμηταί (co-imitators). The importance of the prefix συμ is a point of contention. The R.S.V. translates the word with "join in imitating." This translation suggests that the Philippians, just as those who live as Paul lives, are imitators. In fact, Paul uses the noun συμμιμηταί, which implies that the imitators act in association. J. Paul Sampley argues that the Philippians form a "societas," a traditional Graeco-Roman partnership. In a "societas," individuals willingly enter partnership in order to make possible a particular goal. In Philippians, this partnership is the church.
Conclusion

Paul's use of both Christ as an exemplary figure and his own life as the example for the imitator in no way distorts or subordinates the soteriological significance of the Christ event. The individual, in his role of imitator, does not seek to become Christ-like in order to attain perfection, and, thereby, to circumvent the need of Christ's redemptive act. Instead, his mimesis serves to produce the appropriate expression of the reality made possible by the crucifixion and exaltation of Christ. Paul's concern is with concrete action. It is, therefore, appropriate that Paul focuses upon the edifying aspect of a specific action within the life of Christ rather than try to create abstractions about Christ's mental state. His call to be co-imitators sustains his concern for the concrete, for it encourages the Philippians to take action in order to express the fact that they are of one mind.

The mimesis of the Philippians stands squarely within the tradition of mimesis found in classical Greek literature. It recognizes the existence of an order to which one's actions should conform. It seeks to find the appropriate expression of this order. It recognizes that mimesis does not change man's relationship to this order but makes the relationship apparent. Finally, the Philippians as imitators mimic neither Paul nor Christ. Instead, they find the essence of their examples and create a new expression of that essence in their own particular situation.
EPHESIANS

Let all bitterness and wrath and anger and clamor and slander be put away from you, with all malice, and be kind to one another, tenderhearted, forgiving one another, as God in Christ forgave you. Therefore be imitators of God, as beloved children. And walk in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God (Eph 4.31-5.2).

The authorship of the epistle to the Ephesians is a topic of debate. F.W. Beare and M. Dibelius, among others, argue that the language, style, and doctrinal emphasis of Ephesians differ from other Pauline epistles. Moreover, significant portions of the letter seem to be copied from Colossians. This evidence suggests that Paul is not the author of Ephesians. The mimesis text corroborates this position. Ephesians contains the single instance in which God is the example for the imitator. Moreover, the author commands rather than exhorts them to be imitators. If, in fact, Paul is not the author of Ephesians, the use of μίμησις in this epistle affords an opportunity to substantiate the hypothesis that the classical usage is still the common usage in the first century C.E. God, as the object of the imitator, is unique to Ephesians; yet the process of mimesis is comparable with mimesis in other epistles.

The Context

The author of this epistle is ultimately concerned with the unity of the universal church. In the passages preceding the mimesis text, he lists a series of injunctions aimed at ethical conduct which will prevent the individual, in his quest for salvation, from harming the church within which salvation occurs. The call to be imitators of
God concludes this section. In the verses which follow, the author continues to explain the behavior appropriate to a "beloved child," one who participates in the unity of faith.

The Example

An obvious question is how is God the standard to which the Ephesians conduct should conform. According to what divine attribute should they shape their behavior? The easy solution to these questions is to look at the line which immediately precedes the mimesis text and to answer "forgiveness." But this answer provides only a single instance of the principle which governs God's hand in human history. Forgiveness, as revealed in Christ, is an aspect of the divine plan to "unite all things" in Christ (Eph 1.10). It is God's will to eliminate the distinction between gentile and Jew and to create a universal church (Eph 2.15).

There is a principle which harmonizes God's purpose with God Himself, namely unity. God is the transcendent unity, and this unity is expressed through His will within the Christ event. As a result of God's unity, there can be a unified church. According to the author of this epistle:

There is one body and one Spirit, just as you are called to the one hope that belongs to your call, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of us all, who is above all and through all and in all (Eph 4.4-6).

The uniqueness of God and the consequence of this quality for human history reverberates throughout the epistle.
The significance of the oneness of God for the mimesis text is clear. Forgiveness, as a means of fulfilling God's plan, is a manifestation of God's unity; therefore, the principle which the imitator expresses in his mimesis is the essential unity of God.

The Mimesis

Between the principle, divine unity, and the objective, man's unity, lies the process by which the objective is achieved. The Christ event makes unity possible, but the injunction to be imitators suggests that it is man's responsibility to make unity apparent.

The aim of the imitator is ethical conduct. Numerous ethical imperatives surround the mimesis text. For example, a thief should work not simply in order to avoid stealing, but also in order to help "those in need" (Eph 4.28).

The phrase "walk in love," which recalls the Deuteronomic ethic of walking in God's way, immediately follows the mimesis text. This possible allusion to an Old Testament concept leads G.B. Caird to conclude that "the imitation of God is a general ethical principle taken over from the Old Testament by Jesus." If Caird's conclusion is correct, the use of μιμηται bears no relation to its meaning within Greek literature. The author assumes that his audience will associate "walk in love" with the Old Testament covenant relationship in which the one who follows God's way is obedient to God. The imitator, then, simply obeys God.
Markus Barth provides a compelling argument which counters Caird's position. He argues:

But in spite of some acquaintance with the OT (and maybe some rabbinical teachings) which Paul apparently presupposed among his readers, he could not assume that they would automatically translate his Greek words into Hebrew conceptuality.

The idea that the author unconsciously assumes that his reader will know that he does not mean imitator when he writes imitator suggests that the author is not concerned with making sense.

The opposite of Caird's position seems logical. The author of the epistle uses the Greek word in its original sense to explain how one is to behave within a new situation. The Greek addressee, familiar with the idea that the imitator produces an object or an action guided by a transcendent principle, then seeks to comprehend the principle which should govern his conduct. Barth also points out that the imperatives of Eph 5.3-20 encourage this reading of the text. These imperatives refer to human activity which expresses joy, such as the making of music (Eph 5.19). If these passages qualify the mimesis text, to imitate does not mean to obey, nor does it mean that one should become perfect like God. Instead, it means that one should express some aspect of God in one's conduct.

Besides the immediate context of the mimesis text, the principle theme of the epistle discourages the interpretation that the individual imitator attempts to be loving or forgiving simply because God is loving and forgiving. The theme of the epistle is the establishment of the universal church. The role of the imitator is to make this pos-
sible. As a beloved child, he is to grow to maturity. The metaphor of the body illustrates the manifestation of this maturity. Each member of the community performs a function which supports the work of the entire community.

The difference between the form of mimesis outlined above and the idea that man imitates God by taking on an attribute or by copying an attribute seems subtle in this context. The imitator is loving and forgiving when he participates in "building up" the body of Christ. The distinction lies in the fact that the imitator expresses this love in a concrete form, that is by creating a community, when he performs mimesis.

An analogy from the world of art illustrates this distinction. From the modern perspective, Michelangelo's Pieta is an imitation of an event. It resembles Mary and the dead Christ. If Michelangelo imitated God, he did so as a creator. In the classical sense of mimesis, Michelangelo's mimesis, through his use of form, line, perspective, and marble, adheres to principles which allow the statue to express divine love. For example, the figure of Mary, who holds her dead son in her lap, is unusually large in proportion to the figure of Christ. This deviation from physical reality helps to express a transcendent reality. The Ephesians, like Michelangelo, imitate God, but instead of marble, they use conduct as their tool and the structure of the community as their medium. Forgiveness is only one aspect of their mimesis.
Conclusion

If one neglects the Greek meaning of the role of the imitator, the command to be imitators of God stands in isolation from the imagery within the epistle to the Ephesians. If it means that one should obey or mimic God or seek individual perfection, the theme of the body of Christ assumes secondary significance. The imitator then seeks salvation as an individual rather than within a community. Moreover, the act of copying God's love or forgiveness bears only limited relation to the central theme of this epistle, that is the revelation of God's will in Christ. The full, classical meaning of mimesis comprehends the full meaning of the epistle. The imitator takes the idea of the body of Christ or the unity of God and makes it apparent within human society.

CONCLUSION

Paul visited each of the communities which he called to be imitators prior to the composition of their respective epistle. He could, therefore, presume that the reader possessed some familiarity with his ideas. If the call to imitate was a standard component in Paul's oral teaching, one would suspect that he consistently used the cognates of mimesis with one meaning in mind.

Exegesis of the mimesis texts, in light of the use of mimesis in Greek literature, points to a uniformity in Paul's usage. This view conflicts with W. Michaelis' contribution to Kittel's dictionary. Michaelis argues that Paul uses three distinct meanings. In I Thessalonians, imitator means imitation, implying that there exists a resemblance between two entities. In II Thessalonians and Philip-
pians, the communities mimic Paul's example, and in Ephesians and I Corinthians, the imitators obey Paul. Michaelis' failure to observe the similarity of meaning in all epistles reflects his failure to look beyond the limits of a modern notion of imitation.

In the Pauline texts, the imitator neither seeks to be an imitation, nor does he mimic another man's actions. In all four Pauline epistles, and in Ephesians, the imitator engages in mimesis, a process whereby he makes an idea a reality. The imitator is not a passive character who merely resembles some other person. He seeks to accomplish the same sort of end as the individual he imitates. Without exception, in Paul's four epistles, the ethical principle that the imitator renounces his privileges or interests for the sake of others guides the action that the imitator chooses. The end of his act of mimesis is the growth and unity of the church.

The use of mimesis and the ethical principle behind Paul's mimesis are compatible. Paul's ethic is teleological. He is concerned with the result of an action. In order to fulfill the principle that one should subordinate personal interests for the interests of others, actions which seem good in themselves are subordinate. For example, Paul believes that it is good that a man should be celibate, but since celibacy within a marriage might tempt a partner to immorality, both husband and wife should perform their conjugal duties (I Cor 7.1-3). The principle of celibacy becomes subordinate to the survival of the marriage. The role of the imitator permits this flexibility in conduct, for the imitator is concerned with the consequence of his
action. Strict adherence to the particular way that Paul makes this ethic apparent does not hamper the imitator. On the contrary, a latitude in conduct is necessary. The letter to the Philippians contains the most glaring example of polarized responses to the ethic, responses which result in the same end. Jesus dies for the sake of others, whereas Paul lives for the sake of others.

Because the process of mimesis permits stages or degrees of understanding, Paul may encourage different communities to be imitators irrespective of their comprehension of the gospel. Just as the child and the mature artist both perform an act of mimesis when they draw, both the Corinthians and the Philippians are imitators. Moreover, the activity of engaging in mimesis will promote understanding. Only by performing acts on the basis of the ethic of self-renunciation will the Corinthians understand the meaning of the principle.

The variety of objects which Paul offers in the four epistles does not indicate that the mimesis of the various communities should necessarily be different. All examples demonstrate the same principle. Christ, of course, produces the paramount example. Beyond the exemplary nature of his act of self-renunciation, this event establishes the order in which a principle of self-renunciation makes sense. Prior to the crucifixion and exaltation, serving others could not lead to the possibility of the growth or unity of the church. Despite the soteriological purpose of Christ's act, the imitator does not imitate Christ's example in order to be Christ like, that is perfect. Paul indicates in Philippians that his own lack of perfection
does not prevent him from being an example. The emphasis of these texts lies upon the activity and the result of that activity, namely the promotion of the interests of others rather than an ontological transformation within the imitator. Consequently, Christ is one example among many, and in some cases, a secondary example. Because Paul's concern is the growth of the church, and this is the purpose of the activity with which he is engaged, his own example is more prevalent.

The consistent, yet elliptical, use of the cognates of *mimesis* indicate their place in Paul's curriculum. He uses these words in letters addressed to communities that he has visited; therefore, it is possible that he used them in his speech. The recipients of the letters, familiar with the oral context in which he used the cognates, were able to comprehend his intent when he invited them to be imitators. The modern reader gains the same understanding by reflecting upon the use of the cognates within Greek literature and by drawing clues from the written context in which Paul uses them.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE PLACE OF THE MIMESIS TEXTS IN PAULINE THOUGHT

The claim that Paul uses the words μιμητής, συμμιμητής and μιμέομαι with the classical Greek usage in mind stands poised for attack. The last generation of New Testament scholarship represents a swing away from the search for Hellenistic influences. The Paul of academia has once again become a Jew raised at the feet of Gamaliel. The origin of his thought lies in the world of Judaism and not within that of the Greek speaking communities to which he preached.

This treatment of Pauline thought raises its own problems. How can one explain the meaning of μιμητής without reference to its etymology, for μιμητής has no counterpart in the Hebrew lexicon? Barr's response to word studies of this sort is that the context within the Biblical text, rather than etymology, defines the word's meaning in those texts. Yet, this approach runs the risk of interpreting μιμητής in the light of the modern concept of imitation. On the one hand, Pauline thought undeniably grows out of the Hebraic tradition; on the other hand, μιμητής is a word charged with meaning from the tradition of Greek literature.

Educational theory offers a solution to this dilemma. Full command of a tradition or a subject does not make one an educator. The teacher introduces new concepts by using conceptual knowledge with which the student is familiar. Transference is the technical term for this association of new concepts with known concepts. In the process
of teaching, the educator may introduce ideas from the student's background into the new conceptual framework. He acknowledges the pre-understanding of his pupils. These ideas may be conceptually compatible with the lesson without affecting the integrity of the tradition which the educator transmits.

Paul's use of the cognates of mimesis seems to belong to this principle of education. The words provide a bridge between the background of the Gentiles and the aspects of Pauline thought informed by his Hebraic background. Given the fact that Paul engages in the process of establishing the perimeters of the new framework, the ideas which he introduces may become integral to his pattern of thought. These words are not mere signs which point beyond themselves to some other idea. They name the process in which Paul and his students participate, and by that act of naming both educator and pupil understand the nature of their activity.

In considering the function of the mimesis texts in the context of Pauline thought as a whole, it is necessary to address several questions. First, what problem in the scheme of Paul's thought requires the introduction of a Greek concept? I Corinthians provides a preliminary answer. Paul finds a disjunction between how the community ought to behave and how individuals actually do behave. One ought to behave according to his or her spiritual maturity. The proper mimesis, with Paul as a model, fulfills this expectation.

Edvin Larsson, in his book Christus als Vorbild, examines the mimetic nature of the sacrament of baptism which places the individual
within the ontological framework in which it is possible to be an imitator. A summary of Larsson's work provides a view of Paul's anthropology and, thereby, explains the context in which the disparity between faith and conduct arises.

The second question asks: what in the process of mimesis guarantees the actual conformity of conduct to faith rather than the appearance of conformity? Why is mimesis a satisfactory solution to this particular problem? The answer to this question focuses upon the question of Paul's authority. Paul's act of obedience in the sacrament of baptism, together with the harmony between his conduct and the new nature to which baptism gives rise, makes him an authoritative example for the imitator. This authority resembles the power of a good tragedy, one which achieves conformity with the nature of tragedy, to arouse fear and pity. The ultimate source of authority lies neither with the imitator nor the example, but with the immutability of the standard to which they conform. Because the standard is immutable, any act which expresses the essence of the standard necessarily represents true conformity.

As a consequence of the discussion of authority, a third question is answered: why is Paul, in particular, an appropriate example for the imitator? Paul's choice of his own example is not arbitrary. By placing Paul's use of mimesis in the broader context of both Hebraic and Pauline thought and then locating the specific point of juncture between mimesis and this context, one reconstructs the logic in Paul's use of μιμεωμαι, μιμητης, and συμμιμητης.
THE PROBLEM

The first chapter of this thesis described, from a Pauline perspective, the impotency of man's attempts to imitate God in order to attain perfection. It noted that, according to Pauline thought, creation and the fall determine man's nature. The lack of continuity between the Old Testament and Pauline thought led to the examination of the Greek usage of the cognates of mimesis. The discussion of mimesis demonstrated that mimesis does not alter one's nature but conforms to nature. Now that the meaning of mimesis and its Pauline use have been established, it is appropriate to return to the discussion of the origin of Paul's understanding of man's nature and divine likeness. This discussion elucidates the context within Pauline thought in which a lack of congruency between action and nature may occur and why a Greek speaking community might fail to recognize this discrepancy.

Although Adam's act of disobedience introduces physical death, the Old Testament does not condemn man to a fallen state. In Genesis 5.3, Adam transfers his own image to Seth. According to Larsson, the act of procreation is a repetition of God's act of creation. Man retains his divine likeness.88

The Old Testament consistently emphasizes two nascent features of the Gottesebenbildlichkeit, the divine likeness. Genesis 1.26 appears to identify divine likeness with dominion over nature. This dominion is not forfeited by the fall, for God confirms Noah's mastery over nature after the flood (Gen 9.3-6).89 Psalm 8 presents this theme of dominion in explicit terms:
What is man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou dost care for him? Yet thou hast made him little less than God, and thou hast crowned him with glory and honor. Thou hast given him dominion over the works of thy hands (Psalm 8.4-6).90

Within Psalms 8, 45, and 110, the theme of dominion acquires the characteristics of political rule.

Wisdom is the second dimension of the Gottesebenbildlichkeit. The author of Ezekiel takes the theme of knowledge from Genesis 3.5 and shapes it into divine wisdom:

Son of man, raise a lamentation over the King of Tyre, and say to him, Thus says the Lord God. "You were the signet of perfection, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty. You were in Eden, the garden of God" (Ez 28.12-13).91

Man's possession of this two dimensional likeness of wisdom and mastery hinges upon his obedience to God. The idea that Adam's disobedience taints all men is not apparent.

Paul presents a radically different picture: prior to baptism man is the heir to Adam's disobedience. Consequently, man is no longer in complete possession of the image of God.92 Larsson argues that this attitude belongs to a tradition which finds its roots in the Old Testament but gains full expression in the intertestamental literature. The interpretation of man's Gottesebenbildlichkeit gradually changes from one era to the next until it adopts messianic implications.93

Larsson finds the idea that Adam's disobedience has both anthropomorphic and cosmological consequences for all men scattered through the apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature.94 The author of IV
Ezra writes:

This is my first and last word. It would have been better if the earth had not produced Adam, or else, when it had produced him had restrained him from sinning. For what good is it to all that live in sorrow now and expect punishment after death? O Adam, what have you done? For though it was you who sinned, the fall was not yours alone, but ours also who are your descendant (4 Ezra 7.116-120).95

Similar statements, with regard to the idea that the fall brings transgression and sin to all generations, appear in The Apocalypse of Moses 14.2, Jubilees 3.18, and Vitae Adam 35.3. Larsson finds no evidence of a belief in original sin; however, death is clearly the consequence of Adam's sin. The belief that man inherits the consequence of Adam's sinfulness leads to a different view of the Gottesebenbildlichkeit than the notion found in the Old Testament. The divine likeness is degraded.96

According to Larsson, the post biblical response to the degradation of the divine likeness takes several forms. The theme of wisdom becomes prominent because it involves ethical insight. With this insight man may choose good or evil and, by choosing good, escapes sin.

The role of the Law gains prominence in that wisdom is found in the study and observance of the Law. This attitude appears in the Book of Baruch:

That thou art defiled with the dead,  
That thou art counted with them that go down into the grave?  
Thou hast forsaken the fountain of wisdom.  
So they perished, because they had no wisdom.  
They perished through this new foolishness.  
This is the book of the commandments of God  
And the law that endureth forever:
But they that hold it fast are appointed to life
But such as leave it shall die.
Turn thee, O Jacob, and take hold of it:
Walk towards her shining in the presence of the light thereof.
Give not thy glory to another ... (Book of Baruch 3.9-4.4).97

The soteriological implications are evident. Without the Law man is condemned to death; observance of the Law brings life, perhaps some form of resurrection from the dead. The increased emphasis upon death and the role of the Law leads to the idea that Israel alone retains or may regain the likeness of God. Israel's covenant mediates the divine likeness.98

The second response to the degradation of the divine likeness is the personification of majesty and wisdom in one archetypal figure who will restore the image of God in an eschatological context. The "son of man" text in Dan 7.13 is the prime example of this messianic figure. Larsson argues that the personification of wisdom is not simply a figure of speech but represents a concrete phenomenon. He also notes that the emergence of this prototype is accompanied by an increased emphasis upon the sinfulness of man.99

It is the view that fallen man is in need of a redemptive figure who possesses the divine likeness which Paul adopts in his image of Christ texts.100 Paul completes his picture of the divine likeness by adding the restoration of God's glory to the theme. Sin brings death to the world and robs man of his glory (Rom 1.23; 3.23).101 The association between this glory and divine likeness is evident in II Corinthians:
And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit (II Cor 3.18).102

Christ makes possible the reconciliation with God in which man first regains the glorified divine image and then is made perfect at the parousia.

The focus of Larsson's book is an exegetical examination of the Tauftexte, baptism texts, and the Eikontexte, the image texts.103 These texts explain precisely how the image is restored and also the nature of the Gottesebenbildlichkeit present in Christ.

The sacrament of baptism is more than an act in the legal sense where one enters into a relationship with Christ. It is definitive and irrevocable. Larsson argues that baptism is mimetic in nature. The moment of immersion is the burial of Jesus.104 Jesus, as a man, was obliged to be obedient unto death.105 Thus, the candidate for baptism, who is condemned to death by sin, must demonstrate the same obedience. As a result of this mimetic death, the one who is baptized is resurrected into a new life. Baptism places him in a new condition, a new creation.106 For example, Larsson cites Romans 6.10-11:

The death he [Jesus] died he died to sin, once for all, but the life he lives he lives for God. So you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus.107

The implication is clear. Paul does not refer to a metaphoric death but an actual transformation from one state, death, to a new state, life.
The mimetic character of baptism is clear in that, by immersion in water, the individual makes present the reality of the historic event of Jesus' death. The theological implications of this sacrament add a new dimension which is not typical to mimesis. The act of baptism intends to conform to the paradigm set by Christ, but the success of that act depends upon divine intervention. The candidate for baptism is not the maker of the event. Moreover, the role of God blurs the pedagogic and active nature of mimesis.

Paul's use of mimesis echoes the classical usage with clearer reverberation than Larsson's presentation of the mimesis of baptism. Larsson's view of mimesis resembles Tinsley's view of ancient Israelite festivals. In order to recognize the mimetic quality, one must be an analytical observer of the event. Despite the lack of complete congruency between Larsson's use of mimesis and the mimesis of Pauline thought, Larsson's analysis of the connection between the baptism texts and the image texts explains the problem with the mimesis texts.

The image texts call for the transformation of man. They are significant to baptism, because transformation comes as a consequence of baptism, as a continuation of the sacramental Nachfolge.108 Through the process of baptism, the glory of God is restored. Man, obedient unto death, is recreated in the image of Christ. Christ, the new prototype, is the "son of man" who possesses God's glory, wisdom, and mastery. He is the image of God. Texts, such as I Cor 15.44-49 and Phil 2.5-11, indicate that the Gottseebenbildlichkeit of Christ is precisely the image to which man's behavior should conform and is
capable of conforming. Paul's problem is that although baptism is a death to sin, and man is recreated in the image of God, his behavior is not always in conformity with that image.

The mimesis texts stand in close relation to the Tauftexten and the Eikontexten, because mimesis is the process of conforming behavior to a transcendent reality such as man's image. The distinction between the image texts and the mimesis texts lies in the imitator's capacity to create, a power which depends upon pre-existing order. Mimesis is not a means of bringing about an ontological change. The image of God is not something which man takes for himself. Yet once it is conferred upon man, he can create a community which reflects his new found glory by adhering to the ethic of self-renunciation. This ethic is immutable because it derives from man's nature, his divine likeness.

The idea that the ethic of self-renunciation derives from man's image is precisely the idea that causes cognitive dissonance and requires a leap in conceptual understanding. Jesus' act of obedience expresses humility and weakness, two principles antithetical to the traditional characteristic of dominion. The other traditional element, wisdom, is also overturned by Paul's depiction of the crucifixion. God's wisdom confounds human wisdom. The jarring effect of this inversion, which is necessary to Paul's entire argument that the Christ event is a radical remedy for man's situation, results from its participation in the tradition of the Old Testament and the development of an understanding of human nature and eschatology which lies within the history of Judaism. Cognizance of the notions of creation, re-
creation, the glory of God, and above all the Gottesebenbildlichkeit makes possible the grasp of the import of Paul's discussion. These concepts may have been alien to a Greek speaking community.

The mimesis texts focus upon one of Paul's central concerns, that is, the concrete manifestation of man's nature in his actions. By calling the baptized communities imitators, Paul strikes a familiar chord. He expresses just this notion that man's activity, the events and society he shapes, must be done in conformity with some principle other than the force of either circumstance or man's will. The imitator is necessarily obedient to these principles, for mimesis requires that one submit to authority. The obedience inherent in mimesis is consistent with the obedience to death. In both cases, the imitator concedes to the nature of his universe; however, the mimesis of one who is baptized adheres to his divine likeness rather than his mortality as the heir to Adam. The divine likeness of man is not mastery nor is it the assertion of one's will; it is humility, weakness, and obedience. The pre-understanding that the imitator is obedient, that his activity is not a sign of his own authority, orients the thought of the Greek to the condition operative after baptism.

**AUTHORITY AND MIMESIS**

The issue of authority and its relation to mimesis bears upon the question of why Paul is an appropriate example for the imitator. In fact, Michaelis reduces the question of the meaning of two mimesis texts, Ephesians 5.1 and I Corinthians 4.16, to the question of author-
ity alone. When Paul calls others to imitate him, he exercises his authority. Michaelis is correct in that authority is a principle theme; however, the authority Paul commands is not manifest in his ability to demand that others imitate him. The wording of the texts in all cases but one, Ephesians 5.1, implies that the imitator chooses to imitate. Paul makes requests, not demands. An intricate web of meaning unites Christ's humility, Paul's weakness in Christ, the acknowledgement of authority in mimesis and the authority of the true act of mimesis.

Authority is a word that demands definition. The modern social sciences examine this phenomenon in terms of its function within the structure of society. When Michaelis refers to Paul's apostolic authority as a mandate to command and admonish and, consequently, to be obeyed, he adheres to the tenets of modern social science. Authority exists only in relation to its ability to gain a response; therefore, compliance by the ruled to the ruler is a necessary component of authority.

This discussion addresses a theoretical concern, that is, how did Paul and his audience conceive of authority with respect to the call to be imitators. Consequently, the question of the institutional or charismatic source of Paul's authority is not paramount. An alternative perspective, namely, the legitimacy of Paul's example, rises to the fore. According to Bengt Holmberg, "legitimacy is the quality of being in accordance with the norm of 'rightness.'" The legitimacy of
Paul's request forms the basis for the authority of the invitation to be imitators of him.

The cross symbolizes Paul's own view of his authority. The cross equals power in that it equals weakness, and, in the inverted order marked by the Christ event, weakness becomes power. Paul does not become an authority through the assertion of his own willfulness, but through his obedience to baptism and submission to death which draws him into this new order.

Paul comes to Corinth "in weakness" and "in fear and in much trembling" (I Cor 2.4). John Howard Schütz points out that these phrases, together with references to the fact that his success results from "the demonstration of spirit and power" rather than "pervasive words of wisdom" (I Cor 2.1-4), focus attention upon the way Paul teaches.114 Of course, the content of his preaching retains significance. If humility and weakness belong to the divine likeness of man, and Paul's gospel teaches man's weakness, then it is appropriate that Paul's own ways reflect this weakness. Hence, Paul displays the congruity between behavior and nature which he hopes to elicit from his audience. The conformity of Paul's outward actions to his teaching that man "in Christ" possesses Christ's image, lends his example legitimacy.

Weakness and humility are the characteristics, the aspects of one's nature, which make it possible to accept the authority of Paul's example. If the divine likeness to which one was restored were mastery and wisdom, the individual would be able to guide his or her behavior
through an act of will. In this context, mimesis has no authority, for there is a humility inherent in the act of mimesis which concedes that any appropriate act reflects an order that already exists beyond one's will to create. The actor is not the creator of the form; he is the agent who exercises his abilities in order to reproduce that order in a concrete form. If his actions are to be "legitimate," he must concede that neither he nor his personal interests define "legitimacy." By adhering to external authority, the actions of the agent are more powerful than any action of which he can conceive on the basis of his own determination.

Intrinsic to the act of mimesis is the acknowledgement of the fact that the legitimacy of authority stands apart from the charisma of the individual or the structure of an institution. Mimesis is the subservience of personal will to the responsibility to adhere to nature. The art analogy is once again helpful, for a good tragedy is not good because the audience or critics consider it to be good, but because it conforms to the nature of tragedy. Its authority lies not within its own content, but in its relationship to a form which is immutable and, hence, authoritative. The good tragedy participates in the power of tragedy. In a similar manner, the imitator participates in the power of his divine likeness.

Once the imitator acknowledges Paul's authority, he or she shares in the power of that authority. John Howard Schütz examines this question in his work Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority. He believes that "when others perceive this power correctly and act
accordingly, they share in the same power with Paul and are themselves authoritative.\textsuperscript{115} In terms of mimesis, once one becomes an imitator, he concedes to the authority inherent within Paul's example and, thereby, expresses the same authority in his mimesis. One becomes a co-imitator just as Paul himself is an imitator. Those who do not recognize his authority become the ruled, those over whom Paul must exercise his power.\textsuperscript{116} Shared power does not constitute egalitarian rule, for the power is not the capacity to rule over others but the capacity to serve others and, therefore, be examples to others, as the Thessalonians did.

This theoretical discussion of mimesis makes the potential for its application to Pauline thought multifold; however, Paul uses it in a limited capacity. He focuses upon the specific ethical principle, the renunciation of personal interests, which proceeds from man's divine likeness. This ethic is grounded in the humility which man must necessarily display as a consequence of his baptism. It is not a situational ethic determined by an imminent parousia or the political ambitions or a growing church. Nevertheless, the growth of the church is contingent upon the expression of the power of the cross through man's humility. Thus, the imitator of Paul makes apparent the power of the cross, which he has gained in baptism, through the act of "building up" the church. True to the character of the power of the cross, he achieves this through acts of humility in which he places others interests before his own. There is an undeniable logic to Paul's thought.
PAUL AS EXAMPLE

The question of the "imitation of Christ" arises one last time. The distinction between mimesis with Paul as an example and the imitation of Christ is both blatant and subtle. First, the imitation of Christ, in the tradition of Thomas à Kempis, is the active attempt to gain perfection. Its end is soteriological; however, perfection is not the result of human activity. One gains the image of Christ through baptism. Thus, imitation of Christ, in this sense, is not possible within the context of Pauline thought, whereas mimesis, because it signifies human activity in conformity with a pre-existing principle, is possible.

Mimesis is an act of making. Although it would be inappropriate to speak of the making of Christ, it is appropriate to speak of the making of an example or the shaping of conduct. The subtle distinction lies in the fact that it is possible to be an imitator of Christ's example. Because of the specific orientation of the mimesis texts to the question of conduct, Christ provides an example; however, unlike Paul, Christ is not an imitator.

It is Paul who provides an example of one who strives to conform and to make this conformity apparent through the growth of the church. His success in this capacity sets his example apart from that of Christ. The call to imitate Paul expresses with greater clarity Paul's intent than the call to imitate Christ, for Christ's example may be understood only in the context of the crucifixion. Paul's audience
finds itself in the same situation as the apostle; therefore, Paul's example is readily accessible.

Paul is not a systematic thinker. Instead, the term organic thinker seems more appropriate. One idea exists in a synergistic relationship with the whole of Pauline thought. Themes fit together in an intricate web of dependency. Amid this organization, the role of the imitator is fundamental in that it explains how the individual behaves within the context of the church. Without the process of mimesis, the incongruity between conduct and nature remains.

**CONCLUSION**

The task of the historian is difficult: he attempts to reconstruct events and intent, often with a meagre amount of evidence. Over the last century, in the endeavor to comprehend both the world into which Christianity was born and the character of primitive Christianity, scholars have vigorously debated whether Pauline thought lies within a Hellenistic or Hebraic setting. Battle lines have been drawn, and bullets fired, but as is the case in any war over opinion, truth stands veiled on both sides. This thesis, grounded on the side of the Hebraists, for Paul's anthropology and soteriology stem from Judaism, makes a foray into the camp of the Hellenists. Paul lived and taught in a Greek world. The success of his mission is a witness to his skill as a teacher. No one who has attempted to teach a new concept denies the difficulty of conveying meaning. A teacher draws from the experience of his pupils; he uses their language to teach. The value
of this study lies, in part, in the recovery of how Paul knits ideas together to produce sense from concepts which may seem confusing to a gentile audience.

The task of reconstructing the logic of Paul's thought is two tiered, for before one can understand how the cognates of mimesis inform the Greek audience, it is necessary for the modern audience to understand the meaning of mimesis. This has been the principle objective of this thesis. This may seem to be a modest task in comparison to the more ambitious reconstruction work of modern scholarship. It does not ask how far Paul's influence extended or what power structures existed in the early church. Nevertheless, the retrieval of a single word is important in order to communicate with the past. When a word becomes dead, the meaning of the event which it names is lost. The presupposition behind this statement is that words are not always used casually, nor are they mere signs which point to some meaning beyond themselves. Context alone does not determine their meaning. The idea that the author determines the meaning of a word is a modern notion. When Paul names the activity in which he is engaged, he comes to understand the activity. Because the word is not a sign, another word cannot take its place; therefore, in order to understand the activity, the word mimesis must be brought back to life.

The contribution of this thesis to scholarship rests in its success in making the word mimesis and its cognates alive to the modern reader. The first chapter demonstrates that the Old Testament does not provide Paul with a precedent for the call to be imitators. Paul finds
a disjunction between the image of God and the image of man which prevents man from participating in the process of mimesis. The realization of the ethical principle of self-renunciation occurs within the fulfillment of Israel's covenant with God and not by mimesis. If mimesis exists in the text, it is only evident in retrospect, and it is not the conscious intent of the participants in Israelite rituals.

The absence of a correlative of mimesis within the Old Testament leads to the exploration of the meaning of the word within Greek literature. It appears that the Aristotelian use of the mimesis word group prevails at least until the first century C.E. Mimesis signifies a process whereby one brings an idea to concrete expression. The imitator is one who engages in the act of mimesis. He is not an imitation, that is a copy, of the object which he imitates, nor is his action the mimicry of another's behavior. The Platonic concept of μιμησις, in which something is a reflection of a transcendent form, is peculiar to Plato and Philo and has no bearing upon Paul's thought. It is, therefore, inappropriate to speak of becoming an imitation of something. The imitator is an active agent who produces something through his activity.

The third chapter provides an exegetical study of the mimesis texts. In all cases, the active role of the imitator is evident. Paul also makes use of the pedagogic role of mimesis and acknowledges the ethical choice inherent in that act. Moreover, Paul makes consistent use of these words to explain the ethical dimension of Christian conduct. In particular, he addresses the principle of self-renunci-
ation. In I Thessalonians, the community risks persecution in order to teach others. In II Thessalonians, the imitator works in order to avoid burdening others. The community at Corinth receives explicit instruction that they ought to be imitators by seeking the good of their neighbors rather than one's own good. The Philippians succeed in becoming co-imitators, for they look not only to their own interests but also to the interests of others. Their interests have become single minded in purpose in that they seek to 'build up' the church. Even in the letter to the Ephesians, in which the object of the imitator is God, the result of mimesis is the growth of the church and not the salvation of the imitator. The exegesis of the mimesis texts demonstrates that Paul does not describe an imitation of Christ. He discusses ethical conduct in the context of a baptized community.

The fourth chapter establishes the context of the mimesis texts within the whole of Pauline thought. The imitator is a baptized member of the community, who is capable of acting in accord with the ethic of self-renunciation, because his divine likeness has been restored. How he behaves ought to reflect what he is. Mimesis is the process of ensuring that his nature is apparent by conforming his behavior to the ethical imperative. Thus, mimesis is not a onetime event but an ongoing process which describes the appropriate conduct of a member of the church.

When Paul wrote of imitating, he believed that a transcendent principle determined the "rightness" of his conduct. He retained from the classical Greeks the idea that human activity, be it art or ethics,
was a mimesis of nature. In the conception of art, and even ethics, now prevalent among modern society, mimesis of nature seems to be no longer possible, because the possibility of an immutable nature is questioned. Language is no longer a mimesis. Consequently, a word's meaning is not rooted in tradition but in its context. Once this sense of permanence is lost, the meaning of mimesis is also lost. The English word imitation is not synonymous with mimesis; therefore, the modern horizon and Paul's horizon do not overlap. Consequently, by identifying the process of mimesis, the interpreter gains a new attitude and relationship to Paul's world.
FOOTNOTES


2Ibid., p. 263.

3Ibid., pp. 278-9.

4Cognates of mimesis appear in the Septuagint five times and then only in apocryphal books: Wisdom of Solomon 4.2 "When it is present men imitate (μιμούνται) it [virtue]"; 9.8 the temple is "a copy (μιμημα) of the holy tent"; 15.9 potters "imitate (μιμεῖται) workers of copper"; IV Macc 9.32 Judas Maccabees suggests that his brothers "imitate (μιμοῦσατε)" him by not deserting their posts; and 13.9 the Maccabees encourage each other by saying "Let us imitate (μιμήσασθε) the three youths of Assyria." The late date of the documents, the presence of hellenistic influence, the frequency with which the mimesis cognates appear, and the lack of original Hebrew texts make these texts an inappropriate basis for discussion of Hebrew influence upon Pauline thought.


6I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, pp. 140-142, represents this view. He argues that since man cannot imitate the absolute, the deity which he imitates possesses man's nature. Abrahams begins with the premise that primitive man imitates God, and then he interprets the Biblical text to conform to his theory.


10W.P. de Boer, p. 29, raises the question: does God provide an example? He answers the question with a flat "no."


12E.J. Tinsley, p. 49.


14J.G. McConville, pp. 15-16.

16Ibid., p. 86. Willis de Boer, The Imitation of Paul, p. 211, also recognizes the processive character of mimesis. De Boer's conclusions differ from this thesis in that he claims that imitation serves salvation and leads to direct "imitation" of Christ.

17Ibid., p. 91.


20Ibid., X 597 e.

21Ibid., X 599 b.

22Euripides, Helen, 875; when Menelaus returns without Helen's wraith, a servant calls the wraith a μιμήματος.

23Euripides, Children of Heracles, 74 (Loeb translation); "The Lord's example (μυήσα) I cannot thrust from me."


26Ibid., 1449 a 10.

27Ibid., 1448 a 23.

28Ibid., 1448 a 24.

29Ibid., 1449 a 16.

30Ibid., 1449 b 25.


32Josephus, The Jewish War, 7.142, (Loeb translation) describes a pictorial account of Titus' triumph which "was shown by numerous representations" (δια πολλών δε μιμήματων δολείμοι).

33Ibid., 1.529.

34Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 8.300, (Loeb translation).

35Ibid., 17.1246.

36Bengt Holmberg, Paul and Power, p. 27; a long list of eminent scholars agree that Paul requires the approval of the church in Jerusalem: Bauer, Stuhlmacher, Schlier, Bultmann, and Barrett.

38 Ernest Best. The First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians, p. 77.

39 Ibid., p. 112.

40 D. M. Stanley, p. 866.

41 Ibid., p. 866; Stanley's hypothesis conforms to his central thesis that imitation of Paul is a "mediated" imitation, in which, by God's design, the kerygma reaches men through the mediation of other men. Thus, imitation refers to acceptance.

42 Ibid., p. 865; Père Rigaux supports this view. According to Rigaux, the conduct of the Thessalonian community since their conversion signifies that the Thessalonians are imitators.


44 de Boer, p. 96.

45 Ibid., p. 103.

46 Ibid., p. 124.

47 John Howard Schütz, p. 226, applies the term credential directly to the persecution: "That they accepted it as God's word working in them is shown by the fact that they have now become imitators of the Judean Christians. Their persecution has become the index, the credential which authenticates their reception of it as λόγος Θεοῦ."

48 W. P. de Boer, p. 97.

49 I Cor 3.8; II Cor 10.15, 11.23; I Thess 3.5.

50 Although there is some debate with regard to the Pauline authorship of II Thessalonians, I accept the authenticity of this epistle on the basis of the arguments put forward by J. Terence Forestell in "The Letters to the Thessalonians," p. 228. Forestell points to the similarity of vocabulary and phraseology in I and II Thessalonians.


Gen Rabba 2.


O.M. Stanley, "Become Imitators of Me," Apostolic Tradition in Paul," p. 869. Although Stanley agrees that "imitation" is the "incorporation of Christian living," that is the conformity of conduct to the events of salvation, he finds no parallel in Greek literature for Paul's usage. As a result, he does not recognize the continuity between I and II Thessalonians.

Ibid., p. 874; D.M. Stanley assigns an unworthy motive to this passage: "His [Paul's] assertion that he puts the spiritual profit of others ahead of his own is simply a paradoxical way of saying that he aims at saving his own soul by saving theirs." This analysis overlooks the fact that Paul has clearly stated in 1 Cor 3.7 and 3.15 that this work does not determine salvation. Mimesis occurs only after one lives in the Spirit.

Ibid., p. 874.

Willis de Boer, p. 150.

Ibid., p. 166.


Ibid., p. 361.

Ibid., p. 362.


Peter Richardson, Paul's Ethic of Freedom, p. 171, identifies this attitude as an accommodation ethic. Bengt Holmberg, Paul and Power, p. 85, notes a pattern in Paul's use of this liberty. It seems to apply only to community or social relations, but in matters which concern Christ and his unity, Paul is unyielding. This second category includes the tradition to which Paul adheres in II Thessalonians.

Philippe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood, pp. 411-412.
69 John Howard Schütz, p. 255, questions: "How can Paul make such distinctions if the origin of Christians is the same and all have received alike the Spirit?" On the one hand, the Corinthians are babes in Christ; on the other hand, Paul accuses them of being in the flesh. One must suppose that Paul adopts a pragmatic approach to teaching the Corinthians rather than referring to the actual status of the Corinthians.

70 Philippians presents an exegetical problem, because it appears to be a compilation of three letters (cf. Joseph Fitzmyer, "The Letter to the Philippians," p. 248). The Christ-hymn and the mimesis text appear in different sections of the epistle which may have been composed on different occasions. In spite of this possibility, the following discussion treats the epistle as a single literary unity. Whoever was responsible for the editing may have recognized a relationship between the mimesis text and the Christ-hymn. Indeed, both point to the ethic of self-renunciation.


73 L.W. Hurtado, "Jesus as Lordly Example in Philippians 2:5-11," p. 116, points out that the theological reaction against Liberalism led to Küsemann's rejection of the idea that Jesus is an ethical example.

74 My translation deviates from the R.S.V. translation which translates συμμιμηται "join in imitating." The original Greek text reads: "συμμιμηται μου γίνεσθε."

75 Morna Hooker, Pauline Pieces, p. 78. Hooker's solution to this problem is to replace the idea of imitation with the idea of conforming, p. 80. N.A. Dahl, Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church, p. 34, replaces "imitatio" with "conformitas."

76 J. Paul Sampley, Pauline Partnership in Christ, pp. 61-62. Sampley also states that the hymn of Christ provides the referent for the societas: "Christ though never a partner with the Christians in a society is the basis," pp. 66-67.

77 Ibid., p. 13.


79 Markus Barth, p. 452.
Joseph A. Grassi, p. 348, claims that Eph. 5.1 is related to the preceding verse. Markus Barth, p. 555, claims that Eph. 5.1 introduces a new section. Because chapters four and five do not indicate a radical shift in the author's train of thought, it does not seem necessary to make this distinction. The author appears to conclude Eph 4.17ff with Eph 5.2. The image of the child seems to spark new, but related, associations which the author then pursues.


W. Michaelis, "μίμεσθαι, μιμητὴ, συμμιμητή," pp. 671-672, limits the possible meaning to obedience. He defines imitation as the means whereby one becomes "similar or equal to the model." Because one cannot be equal to God, God is not a model for the imitator.

Markus Barth, *Ephesians 4-6*, p. 591. Among the commentators who choose to discuss Paul's use of mimesis, Barth stands in closest agreement with this thesis.

Ibid., pp. 591-591 identifies three aspects of the Greek idea of mimesis which explain the allusions to light, wisdom, music and joy in Ephesians 5.8-20:

1. the idea that the visible world is formed after the pattern of the invisible and reflects in some way the perfection of ideas, pure forms, or the gods;

2. the conviction that the inspiration of muses or special qualifications enable outstanding men such as artists, actors, soothsayers or priests to recognize and express better than others true being, true life, the nature of existence;

3. the joie de vivre (eudaimoniā, "happiness") which is believed to be accessible to every wise man.

W. Michaelis, pp. 671-672.

In the early twentieth century, members of the "History of Religions School," such as R. Reitzenstein and W. Bousset, claimed that the hellenistic mystery religions exerted influence upon Pauline thought. The next generation of this school, represented by Rudolf Bultmann, recognized gnostic influences within the Pauline material. More recently, scholars, such as B. Gerhardsson, have examined the continuity between Pauline thought and the rabbinic tradition.

Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1452 b 34. According to Aristotle, the arousal of fear and pity is the proper function of such mimesis.

Edvin Larsson, *Christus als Vorbild*, p. 117.
Ibid., p. 117; Larsson proposes that man continues to be the image of God in soul and body as long as he exists.

Ibid., p. 119-120; Psalm 8 is a königspsalms. The king holds a special degree of the divine likeness which is manifest in his rule over creation.

Ibid., p. 120; Larsson notes that Ez 28 becomes a polemic against the notion that the king is in some sense divine.

In II Cor 3.18, Paul speaks of the transformation of one who turns to the Lord as a transition from one degree of glory to a greater degree. In II Cor 4.4, this greater degree of glory is associated with Christ who is the likeness of God. The implication is that unredeemed man does not possess the full glory which belongs to the image of God. Thus, the degree of the image that he does possess is a degradation of the image of God.


Edvin Larsson, Christus als Vorbild, pp. 139-145.


Edvin Larsson, Christus als Vorbild, p. 149ff.

Ibid., p. 134.

Ibid., p. 171.

Ibid., p. 186.

This text numbers among Larsson's Eikontexten.

The Tauftexte include Rom 6.1-11, Col 2.11-3.4, Gal 2.19ff, and Eph 2.4-7. The Eikontexte include Col 3.10, Eph 4.24, Phil 2.5-11, II Cor 3.18; 4.4, Rom 8.28-30, and I Cor 15.44-49.

Edvin Larsson, Christus als Vorbild, p. 58; this summary of Larsson's view of baptism relies, for the most part, on his analysis of Rom 6.1-11.
Larsson qualifies this statement by explaining that Paul did not deem Jesus' earthly life as slavery to sin but as part of a divine plan.

Ibid., p. 69.

Ibid., p. 48ff.

Ibid., pp. 109-110.

Although Phil 2.5-11 does not contain the word εἰκῶν, Larsson provides a strong argument for its inclusion in the Eikontexten. Instead of the word εἰκῶν, the word μορφή appears. Larsson argues that μορφή is a synonym for εἰκῶν because the Aramaic counterpart of מִרְכָּבָה, מְרָכָבָה, which is found in Dan 3.19 is translated in the LXX as μορφή rather than εἰκῶν.


Michaelis states with reference to I Cor 11.1: "The apostle means that I have commanded you, and Christ has commanded me ... Certainly 11.1 does not refer to examples to be emulated, let alone to models to whom one is to become similar or equal by imitation, but to authorities whose command and admonitions are to be obeyed."

Bengt Homberg, Paul and Power, p. 130, cites Bendix's analysis of Weber's "Herrshaft" which contains five components: "(1) the ruler, (2) the ruled, (3) an expression of the ruler's will to influence the behavior of the ruled (even if this is only anticipated or even imagined by the ruled), (4) the actual compliance of the ruled and (5) the subjective acceptance of this by the ruled."

Ibid., p. 128.


Ibid., p. 204.

Ibid., p. 204.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 377: "A word is not a sign for which one reaches, nor is it a sign that one makes or gives to another, it is not an existent thing which one takes up and to which one accords the ideality of meaning in order to make something else visible through it. This is a mistake on both counts. Rather, the identity of the meaning lies in the word itself. It is meaningful already. But that does not imply, on the other hand, that the word precedes all experience and simply joins up with an experience in an external way, by subjecting itself to it. The experience is not word-
less to begin with and then an object of reflection by being named, by being subsumed under the universality of the word. Rather, it is part of experience itself that it seeks and finds words that express it. We seek for the right word, i.e. the word that really belongs to the object, so that in it the object comes into language."

BIBLIOGRAPHY


