

CHIH-I AND MĀDHYAMIKA

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BY

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis a systematic comparative study is made between Chih-i's thought and the Mādhyamika. The study is a response to a basic problem that can be formulated as follows. Indian Mādhyamika influenced the development of Chinese Buddhism amply and deeply. Chih-i, the founder of the Chinese T'ien-t'ai School, had a close relationship with the Mādhyamika tradition textually and theoretically. However, in his classification of the Buddhist doctrines, he regarded the Mādhyamika as "Common Doctrine" and theoretically lower than his "Perfect Doctrine". Here, then, are our questions:

1. Why is Chih-i not satisfied with Mādhyamika thought?
2. Why does he advocate the Perfect Doctrine?

Our study shows that these questions are mainly concerned with the understanding of Truth and its realization. For Chih-i, the Mādhyamika Truth (termed Emptiness or the Middle Way) lacked permanence, function and all-embracing nature; the Truth explicated in the Perfect Doctrine (termed the Middle Way - Buddha Nature) is permanent, functional and all-embracing. With regard to the realization of the Truth, Chih-i mainly points out that in the Mādhyamika, the Truth is attained in the extirpation of defilements, while in the Perfect Doctrine, the Truth can be attained in making use of defilements. Chih-i obviously advocates that Truth should be permanent, functional and all-embracing, and that it is better to realize Truth in the midst of defilements than by eliminating them.

It is hoped that the study of these questions will enhance our understanding of Chih-i's thought in light of its relation to the Mādhyamika as well as our understanding of the essence of the Mādhyamika as viewed by Chih-i. We shall consequently be able to see how a Chinese thinker absorbed Indian Buddhist doctrines, developed them, and eventually built up a great Buddhist school in a distinct, Chinese style.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Original Text in Sanskrit:

- Kārikā-P Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā
Commentaire de Candrakīrti, ed. Louis de la Vallée Poussin,
Bibliotheca Buddhica, No. IV. St. Petersburg, 1903-13.

Original Texts in Chinese:

- CL Chung-lu (中論) of Nāgārjuna, with Commentary by Piṅgala,
trans. Kumārajīva, T. 1564. (For the meaning of 'T' cf. below).
- FHHI Fa-hua hsüan-i (法華玄義) of Chih-i, T. 1716.
- FHWC Fa-hua wên-chü (法華文句) of Chih-i, T. 1718.
- MHCK Mo-ho chih-kuan (摩訶止觀) of Chih-i, T. 1911.
- SCI Ssü-chiao i (四教義) of Chih-i, T. 1929.
- T Taishō-shinshū-daizōkyō (大正新修大藏經) (Note: With
regard to the technical uses of this 'T', T. 19 for instance
refers to the nineteenth text of the Taishō-shinshū-daizōkyō,
whereas T.38.561b the Taishō-shinshū-daizōkyō, Vol. 38,
p. 561, column b.)
- TCTL Ta-chih-tu lun (大智度論 Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sāstra), trans.
Kumārajīva, T. 1509.
- TTSCI T'ien-t'ai ssü-chiao i (天台四教儀) of T'i-kuan, T. 1931.
- WMCHS Wei-mo-ching hsüan-shu (維摩經玄疏) of Chih-i, T. 1777.
- WMCLS Wei-mo-ching lüeh-shu (維摩經略疏) of Chih-i, T. 1778.
- Z. Zokuzōkyō (續藏經)

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INTRODUCTION

A. Basic questions

Nāgārjuna (A.D. 150-circa 250) is unanimously regarded in India and China as the founder of the Indian Mādhyamika School, one of the most important Schools in Mahāyāna Buddhism.¹ He is also revered in the T'ien-t'ai (天台) tradition as the founder, or at least an extremely important teacher, of this Chinese Buddhist School. Many T'ien-t'ai sources acknowledge Nāgārjuna's supreme position in the tradition. For example, in the Mo-ho chih-kuan (摩訶止觀) of Chih-i (智顗, A.D. 538-597), the actual founder of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, it is recorded that Chih-i himself studied with Hui-ssu (慧思), Hui-ssu with Hui-wên (慧文), and that Hui-wên's conceptions were exclusively based on Nāgārjuna's Ta-chih-tu lun (大智度論).² Chih-i himself is closely related to the Mādhyamika tradition, both textually and philosophically. In his works there are many Mādhyamika quotations; in addition, his philosophical conceptions are in many aspects based upon Mādhyamika ideas.³ However, in his theory of the "classification of the Buddhist doctrines" (p'an-chiao 判教), in which he sums up hierarchically the various Buddhist doctrines into four categories, namely, the Tripiṭaka Doctrine (tsang-chiao 藏教), the Common Doctrine (t'ung-chiao 通教), the Gradual Doctrine (pieh-chiao 別教) and the Perfect Doctrine (yüan-chiao 圓教), Mādhyamika can merely be taken as pertaining to the Common Doctrine.⁴ While acknowledging Nāgārjuna as the founding Patriarch of

the School, Chih-i has in many places criticized the Common Doctrine severely. He considers the Perfect Doctrine to be ultimate and theoretically higher than the Common Doctrine. It is explicated in the Fa-hua ching (Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra 法華經). This position would bring up two important questions:

1. Why is Chih-i not completely satisfied with Mādhyamika thought?
2. Why does he seek ultimate satisfaction in the Perfect Doctrine?

These questions can be formulated in a more concrete manner.

The major concern of Buddhism as a religion is, beyond doubt, liberation (Skt., mokṣa; Chi., chieh-t'o 解脫). It is commonly maintained by all Buddhist Schools that liberation is to be attained in the realization of the Truth (Skt., satya; Chi., ti 諦). However, Buddhist Schools have different conceptions of the Truth as well as different ways of its realization. In the Mādhyamika context, for example, the Truth is Emptiness (Skt., śūnyatā; Chi., k'ung 空), which Nāgārjuna complements and, in fact, identifies with the Middle Way (Skt., madhyamāpratipat; Chi., chung-tao 中道). Emptiness in Buddhism generally signifies the Truth of the non-substantiality of phenomena. Nāgārjuna's use of this concept is actually derived from the earlier Prajñāpāramitā sūtras. He understands the Middle Way in terms of transcending extremes. With regard to the realization of the Truth, the Mādhyamika School proposes the method of the Four Alternatives (Skt., catuṣkoṭi; Chi., ssu-chü 四句) and their negatives. The Four Alternatives are four possible ways in which to view an existent,

i.e., is, is not, both is and is not, and neither is nor is not.

Mādhyaṃika shows that they are educational in leading one to approach the Truth, but that from the ultimate point of view, none of these really paves the way to liberation because each has its own limitation. Chih-i basically inherits the key concept of Middle Way and the method of the Four Alternatives and their negatives. He is, however, not completely satisfied with the Middle Way formulated in the Mādhyaṃika manner. He develops this concept and elevates it to a different dimension. That is, on the ground of this concept he establishes the concept of Middle Way - Buddha Nature (chung-tao fo-hsing 中道佛性), and identifies it with No-emptiness (pu-k'ung 不空). This is a compound concept in which we see the identification of the Middle Way and Buddha Nature (Skt., Buddhata; Chi., fo-hsing 佛性). Buddha Nature is understood in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra as a universal endowment of every sentient being. It is the basis of the attainment of Buddhahood or enlightenment. The Middle Way - Buddha Nature is the Buddhist Truth for Chih-i, who insists that the Truth should be spoken of in terms of both the Way and the Nature. In our understanding of this claim of Chih-i, he feels that the Mādhyaṃika Middle Way will tend to be of a negative and static nature, denoting a state free from all extremes; whereas his Middle Way - Buddha Nature denotes a positive, dynamic and immanent nature. This compound concept is, indeed, the key concept which clearly differentiates the Perfect Doctrine from the Common Doctrine. On the comprehension and attainment of this Truth, i.e., the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, Chih-i basically uses the method of the Four Alternatives, their negatives, the Threefold Contemplation

(san-kuan 三觀) and identification (chi 即). The Threefold Contemplation consists of the Contemplation of Emptiness (k'ung-kuan 空觀), the Contemplation of the Provisional (chia-kuan 假觀), and the Contemplation of the Middle Way (chung-kuan 中觀). In the Threefold Contemplation, one sees simultaneously the three aspects of the Truth; namely, Emptiness, Provisionality and Middle Way. Identification is the identification of Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra and means that Nirvāṇa is to be attained in saṃsāra. For the Buddhists, Nirvāṇa denotes the world of absolute purity, whereas saṃsāra denotes the impure world of life and death. These are Chih-i's philosophical methods, all of which can be related to Mādhyamika. In their applications, Chih-i does not hesitate to make modifications of them. In such modifications, Chih-i's own interests and concerns can be witnessed, particularly in the Threefold Contemplation and identification. To speak in terms of his way of thinking, Chih-i's method of the Four Alternatives and their negatives still bear considerable Indian traces, whereas his Threefold Contemplation and identification are very much Chinese in character. From this understanding three questions become critical:

1. How does Chih-i understand and criticize Mādhyamika's concepts of Emptiness and Middle Way?
2. How does Chih-i's Middle Way - Buddha Nature differ from Mādhyamika's Middle Way?
3. What are Chih-i's philosophical methods in relation to the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, and how can they be related to Mādhyamika?

The present work is devoted to the study of these questions. The third and final one is the most complicated, and so its discussion will occupy more space. This study will lead to the understanding of Chih-i's thought in light of its relation to Mādhyamika, and will show how Chih-i established his Perfect Doctrine by utilizing the philosophy of Mādhyamika. We shall thus be able to see how a Chinese thinker absorbed Indian Buddhist doctrines, adapted and developed them, and eventually built up a great School of Chinese Buddhism. We may also see some differences in the ways of thinking manifested in Chinese and Indian Buddhisms.

Before proceeding to the next section, we wish to explain two terms often used in our study. First, 'Truth' means the authentic nature of the phenomenal world, including our human existence. It is, as generally construed by the Buddhists, absolute and pure; for this reason it transcends all kinds of relativity and impurity. This term corresponds to satya, tattva, tathya, and other terms in Sanskrit. In Chinese Buddhism, it is usually called ti (諦), shih-hsiang (實相), shih-chi (實際), shih-hsing (實性), ju (如), as well as others. Ti is Truth proper, whereas ju denotes the Truth as it originally is, without any distortion or perversion. It consequently refers to Suchness. As for shih, it denotes the nature of ultimacy. That is, Truth is ultimate. In Chih-i's terminology, shih is often contrasted with ch'üan (權), which denotes the nature of expediency. On some occasions, Truth is termed fa-hsing (法性; Skt., dharmatā), signifying the true nature or character of dharmas or entities. It is also termed ti-i-i-ti (第一義諦; Skt., paramārtha), in which the nature

of its supremacy is emphasized. In Chih-i's works, shih-hsiang is the most commonly employed term to signify the Truth, or more appropriately, the ultimate Truth.

These are the general meanings of the term, 'Truth'. To go further, different Buddhist schools or masters often have their own emphasis in understanding the Truth, in addition to these general meanings. For instance, Mādhyamika specifies the Truth as Emptiness and the Middle Way, emphasizing the nature of its non-substantiality and its transcendence of extremes. In particular, Chih-i specifies the Truth as Middle Way - Buddha Nature, to which he ascribes some important characteristics to be discussed in great detail later in this work.

In our study, 'Truth' or "ultimate Truth" will refer to the general meanings mentioned above. In most cases, these phrases correspond to shih-hsiang. However, when we speak of the Truth in a particular context, e.g., in Mādhyamika or Chih-i's system, we will specify it as Emptiness, the Middle Way, or Middle Way - Buddha Nature.

Secondly, the term fa (法 ; Skt., dharma) is often found in Chih-i's works. It may be translated as 'thing', but this is not an ideal rendition. Fa or dharma denotes whatever is in the phenomenal world, including both sentient and non-sentient beings. 'Thing' usually represents the non-sentient class of beings, while excluding the class of sentient beings. Therefore, in our study we let the term remain in its original form, i.e., dharma. A dharma represents an item in the phenomenal world, whereas all dharmanas (Chi., i-ch'ieh fa 一切法) represent the phenomenal world as a whole.⁵

It should be added that in his translation of Nāgārjuna's

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, i.e., the Chung-lun, Kumārajīva often renders the term bhāva as fa. Bhāva is usually translated as 'entity' by modern scholars (in Inada and Ruegg, for instance). We will follow the modern translation and refer to bhāva as 'entity'.

Essentially, there is no great difference between dharma and entity. Both denote the non-sentient and sentient realms of phenomena. In the present thesis, dharma and entity will often be used interchangeably.

B. Sources

It is our intention to study Chih-i and Mādhyamika through the most reliable sources. This study covers two groups of sources: the works of Chih-i and the works of the Mādhyamika, particularly by Nāgārjuna.

i) On Mādhyamika

Among the many works attributed to Nāgārjuna, a number are still available today.⁶ The Kārikā, i.e., Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, was, no doubt, written by Nāgārjuna and is his most important work. In this work nearly all the major doctrines of the Mādhyamika School can be seen. K. Venkata Ramanan also points out that in the Kārikā itself one finds practically all the principal conceptions of the philosophy of Nāgārjuna.⁷ It has had a tremendous influence on Chih-i. We shall basically understand the thought of Mādhyamika through this work in the Sanskrit original.

The Chinese translation of the Kārikā is CL, Chung-lun, which was made by Kumārajīva (A.D. 344-413), who himself was also a prominent Mādhyamika scholar. Chih-i probably did not know Sanskrit. He

definitely approached the Kārikā through the CL, and often made quotations from it in his works. Indeed, in Chih-i's works we cannot find any reference to the Sanskrit Kārikā. Consequently, in our study we will also make use of the CL when dealing with Nāgārjuna's thought. We will, however, pay attention to the cases where Kumārajīva's translation does not completely correspond to the original.⁸

The voluminous TCTL, Ta-chih-tu lun (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra), the Chinese translation of which was also made by Kumārajīva, had been attributed to Nāgārjuna for several centuries in Chinese Buddhist circles. Its Sanskrit original and Tibetan translation are not available; its authorship has been the topic of controversy among scholars for years. Étienne Lamotte refuses to admit that the TCTL was written by Nāgārjuna.⁹ Yūichi Kajiyama and Ramchandra Pandeya are also doubtful about the ascribability of this work to Nāgārjuna. Thus, in their studies of Nāgārjuna's thought (namely, Kajiyama's Kū no ronri: chūgan (空の論理: 中觀) and Pandeya's "The Mādhyamika Philosophy: A New Approach," in his Indian Studies in Philosophy) no references are made to this work.

There are, however, other scholars who hold opposite views. K. Venkata Ramanan, for example, strongly stands in favour of Nāgārjuna's authorship of the TCTL.¹⁰ He claims that there is an intimate connection between the TCTL and the Kārikā, that almost the whole of the Kārikā is reproduced in fragments here and there throughout the TCTL, and so that the TCTL can be regarded as of one piece with the Kārikā.¹¹ He is convinced that the doctrines explicated in the TCTL are a natural continuation and development of those found in the Kārikā.¹² Moreover, it should be noted that modern Chinese scholars have not expressed the

slightest doubt on this matter. Tsung-san Mou, in his Fo-hsing yü po-jê (佛性興般若), understands Nāgārjuna's thought through the TCTL without any hesitation. He explicitly assumes Nāgārjuna's authorship of the TCTL.

Here we are not in the position to discuss this issue fully nor attempt to offer a solution. Rather, we are concerned about whether it is appropriate to incorporate this great work into our study. Our response is quite positive and is based on the following considerations:

1. It was firmly believed in the Chinese Buddhist tradition that Kumārajīva was responsible for the translation of the TCTL. Seng-jui (僧叡, A.D. 352-436), one of Kumārajīva's most eminent disciples, mentions in the Preface of the TCTL that Kumārajīva abridged the original Sanskrit text and made the translation.¹³ And in the colophon of the work, a detailed description of how Kumārajīva made the translation is given.¹⁴ It therefore seems safe to say, even if the issue of authorship remains unsolved, that Kumārajīva had an extremely close relation with the TCTL in its Chinese translation.

2. Kumārajīva himself was an outstanding master in Mādhyamika thought.¹⁵ Even if one were to prove that the TCTL was not written by Nāgārjuna -- suggesting that it was forged by Kumārajīva or that he had done more than a mere translation of the TCTL -- we should still hold to the fact that the work reflects Mādhyamika thought.

3. In viewing the TCTL in textual and doctrinal terms, its intimate relation with Nāgārjuna's thought can hardly be denied. It is basically a commentary on the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, whose unknown author had always kept Nāgārjuna's Kārikā in mind. This

is evidenced by its frequent quotation from the Kārikā.¹⁶ It should be noted that many of these quotations concern extremely important issues.¹⁷ Insofar as the doctrinal aspect is concerned, the major concept expounded in the TCTL is, undoubtedly, pāramitā. This is, nevertheless, explicated within the context of the philosophy of Emptiness and the Middle Way. As far as we can see, the conceptions of Emptiness and the Middle Way in the TCTL are in line with that found in the Kārikā. We can even go further to assert that the TCTL is a continuation and a fuller development of the Kārikā in this regard. The case of the Middle Way concept is particularly conspicuous.¹⁸ We thus come to the understanding that the TCTL is a good complementary source to understand Mādhyamika based on the Kārikā.

4. The relationship between the TCTL and Chih-i deserves our special attention. This work was, indeed, the central focus of his study in his youth. It was only later that he switched his interest and concern from this work to the Fa-hua ching. Despite this change, his major works still carry a tremendous amount of quotations from this text.¹⁹ This work is, for Chih-i, a crucial text belonging to the Mādhyamika tradition. He had never doubted Nāgārjuna's authorship. In brief, this TCTL is, whether or not it was written by Nāgārjuna, an important work in Mādhyamika and a good complement to the Kārikā. As stated earlier, it has also had tremendous influence on Chih-i. Though our study of Mādhyamika will orient itself around Nāgārjuna, it is nevertheless not confined to him. We will thus make use of this great work, the TCTL, in our study, being convinced that it will be highly beneficial.

In addition to the Kārikā and TCTL, there are a few other Mādhyamika texts taught by the Chinese Mādhyamika masters. These include Shih-er-mên lun (Dvādaśamukha-śāstra 十二門論), Shih-chu-pi-p'o-sha lun (Daśabhūmika-vibhāṣā-śāstra 十住毘婆沙論) and Pai-lun (Śata-śāstra 百論). Both the Shih-er-mên lun and Shih-chu-pi-p'o-sha lun are attributed to Nāgārjuna, while the Pai-lun is attributed to Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna's direct disciple. All of them were translated by Kumārajīva. It is also interesting to note that both the Sanskrit originals and the Tibetan translations of these three works are not available. Obviously, there also exist in these cases problems with authorship, particularly with regard to the Shih-er-mên lun and Shih-chu-pi-p'o-sha lun.

Chih-i does not seem to be much impressed by these works. Only on rare occasions does he mention them.²⁰ As regards Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī (迴諍論), the Sanskrit original and its Chinese and Tibetan translations are all available. Chih-i in his major writings makes no mention of it at all. All of these works will not be our central concern, inasmuch as we wish to cover only those sources where a close connection is found between Chih-i and Mādhyamika.

There are several commentaries to the Kārikā.²¹ Within Chinese Buddhist circles, however, only the one done by Piṅgala was widely read. This Commentary was translated by Kumārajīva, its Sanskrit original and Tibetan translation being unavailable. Chih-i is, to some extent, influenced by this Commentary. He quoted from it a few times,²² including one important reference to the Middle Way.²³ This Commentary will therefore be consulted in our study.

Bhāvaviveka's Po-jê-teng lun-shih (Prajñāpradīpa 般若燈論釋) is a comprehensive commentary of the Kārikā. Chih-i does not seem to be attracted to this work. Nevertheless, we will consult it in our study, because it provides important clues to the understanding of Nāgārjuna's Four Alternatives.

ii) On Chih-i

When we approach the issue of the sources related to Chih-i, the situation is a little complicated. There are numerous works attributed to him, but some of these include forgeries. These works were supposed to have been written in the two periods of his study. Prof. Tetsuei Satō has divided Chih-i's thought into two periods, i.e., the 'early' and the 'later'. Chih-i first studied with Hui-ssu in Ta-su Mountain (大蘇山) of Kuang-chou (光州). He went to Chin-ling (金陵) at the age of 31, and remained in Wa-kuan Monastery (瓦官寺) for eight years. At age 38 he moved to T'ien-t'ai Mountain (天台山) and remained there for eleven years in seclusion. This is what Satō calls the "early period". At 50 he returned to Chin-ling again, where he lectured on the Fa-hua ching in Kuang-chai Monastery (光宅寺). At 56 he went to Ching-chou (荊州), his hometown, and resided there until his death. This is the "later period".²⁴ In our study, we will use only those which can undoubtedly represent his own thought, most of which were written in the later period. First, let us consult Tetsuei Satō's Tendai daishi no kenkyū (天台大師の研究) for a precise understanding of Chih-i's works in verification of their authorship.

Among the huge bulk of works attributed to Chih-i, twenty-eight are lost, and forty-six are extant. The forty-six works can be classified

into three categories:

1. Works written by Chih-i himself. They include those established in his early period, such as the Fa-chieh tz'u-ti ch'u-mên (法界次第初門), Fa-hua-san-mei ch'an-i (法華三昧懺儀), Fang-teng ch'an-fa (方等懺法) and Chüeh-i san-mei (覺意三昧). They also include the ten-chapter Ching-ming hsüan-i (淨名玄義) written in his later period.²⁵

2. Works representing Chih-i's thought. These can further be divided into two groups:

- a. Works established in the following way: Chih-i's followers recorded what he had delivered orally and subsequently submitted the draft to him for correction and approval. These include the Tz'u-ti-ch'an mên (次第禪門) in his early period, and the thirty one-chapter Ching-ming-ching shu (淨名經疏) in his later period. The one-chapter Kuan-hsin lun (觀心論), which was recorded shortly before his death, should also be put here.²⁶
- b. Works established in the following way: the followers, particularly Kuan-ting (灌頂, A.D. 561-632), took notes of Chih-i's lectures. The drafts were made available after Chih-i's death, and so do not bear his stamp of approval. Among these works are the celebrated San ta-pu ("Three Great Works", 三大部), i.e., FHHI (Fa-hua hsüan-i 法華玄義), FHWC (Fa-hua wên-chü 法華文句) and MHCK (Mo-ho chih-kuan 摩訶止觀), all of which were recorded by Kuan-ting.

3. Works publicized under Chih-i's name. These works were actually made by scholars after him. They include a few outright forgeries. They also include works whose contents are mixed with Chih-i's writings. These works are, to name a few, the Chin-kuang-ming-ching hsüan-i (金光明經玄義), Chin-kuang-ming-ching wên-chü (金光明經文句), Kuan-yin hsüan-i (觀音玄義), Kuan-yin i-shu (觀音義疏), Ch'ing-kuan-yin-ching shu (請觀音經疏), Ssü-nien ch'u (思念處), and the works related to Pure Land Buddhism.²⁷

Prof. Satō also discusses particularly the Wu hsiao-pu ("Five Small Works", 五小部) of T'ien-t'ai, i.e., Kuan-ching shu (觀經疏), Chin-kuang-ming-ching hsüan-i, Chin-kuang-ming-ching wên-chü, Kuan-yin hsüan-i, and the Kuan-yin i-shu. He strongly doubts Chih-i's authorship in any of them, even though they were traditionally attributed to him.²⁸ In regards to the Jên-wang-ching shu (仁王經疏), which allegedly contains Chih-i's expression of the Threefold Truth (san-ti 三諦), Satō remarks that it was written by a T'ien-t'ai scholar after Chih-i's death.²⁹

Satō also mentions the following works, which may be attributed to Chih-i. The Ch'an-mên k'ou-chüeh (禪門口訣) and Chêng-hsin lun (證心論) were written in the early period and so may represent Chih-i's early thought. The Ch'an-mên yiao-lüeh (禪門要略) and Ch'an-mên chang (禪門章) were written in the later period, or published probably after Chih-i's death. Both reflect to some extent Chih-i's views developed in the later period. The Kuan-hsin-shih fa (觀心食法), Kuan-hsin-sung-ching fa (觀心誦經法), Kuan-hsin shih-er-pu-ching i (觀心十二部經義) and Tso-ch'an fang-pien-mên

(坐禪方便門) are works concerning psychological and technical problems that involve the Ch'an practitioner. It is hard to decide whether they represent Chih-i's views.³⁰

So far we can see that only those works listed in the first two categories and a few mentioned in the previous paragraph are reliable sources for studying Chih-i's thought. By "reliable sources" we mean those representing or reflecting Chih-i's views. Some of these works were written in the early period, and some in the later period. Generally speaking, works written in the later period of a thinker are more mature and thus deserve more attention. This is true in the case of Chih-i. Prof. Satō, on many occasions, stresses the division of Chih-i's thought into the two periods.³¹ This is in fact a division between his early attention to the Emptiness of the Prajñāpāramitā literature and his later attention to the ultimate Truth (shih-hsiang 實相) of the Fa-hua ching. From the early to the later period, there is a manifest progress of thought in Chih-i's life. This progress can be seen in his classification of Buddhist doctrines, where he considers the Fa-hua ching to be more perfect than the thought expressed in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. He even expressed his great concern for the Fa-hua ching at the moment of death.³² We will, in our study, pay more attention to works established in the later period.

Consequently, the sources on Chih-i in our study will be basically confined to the following: The FHHI (T. 1716), FHCW (T. 1718), MHCK (T. 1911), Kuan-hsin lun (T. 1920), Ch'an-mên yiao-lüeh (Z. 0070), Ch'an-mên chang (Z. 0022), Ching-ming hsüan-i and Ching-ming-ching shu. In this thesis we refer to these sources as Chih-i's major works.

Among these works the FHHI and MHCK are most important, since they reflect comprehensively Chih-i's most mature thought and cover nearly all of the key concepts and philosophical methods involved in the study of our basic questions.

Here a brief explanation is in order concerning the Ching-ming hsüan-i and Ching-ming-ching shu. Both are commentaries of the Wei-mo ching (Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra 維摩經), in which Chih-i was very much interested during his old age. The ten-chapter Ching-ming hsüan-i was written by Chih-i in A.D. 595, at the invitation of Yang Kuang (楊廣, A.D. 569-618), who was then the Crown-Prince of the Sui Dynasty. The twelve-chapter SCI (Ssü-chiao i 四教義, T. 1929), which is now widely read, is another edition of it, sharing the same origin. The thirty one-chapter Ching-ming-ching shu was written at a later date, i.e., after Chih-i returned to T'ien-t'ai Mountain. This work is actually the composition of two independent works, namely, the six-chapter WMCHS (Wei-mo-ching hsüan-shu 維摩經玄疏, T. 1777) and the twenty five-chapter Wei-mo-ching wên-shu (維摩經文疏, which was later abridged into the ten-chapter WMCLS (Wei-mo-ching lueh-shu 維摩經略疏, T. 1778) by Chan-jan (湛然, A.D. 711-782), an outstanding thinker in the T'ien-t'ai tradition. In our study, we will use the SSI, WMCHS and WMCLS.

Finally, we will make a special exception and include the Fa-chieh tz'u-ti ch'u-mên (T. 1925) in our study. This work was, as pointed out previously, written in Chih-i's early period. The work, however, contains a few important ideas which Chih-i fully developed in the later period. They include the theory of classification of

Buddhist doctrines,³³ the concept of Middle Way - Buddha Nature,³⁴ and the two approaches to Emptiness.³⁵ The two approaches are t'i-fa (體法), i.e., to realize Emptiness directly in the dharmas or phenomena, and hsi-fa (析法), i.e., to realize Emptiness through disintegrating and eradicating the dharmas or phenomena. They are ascribed by Chih-i in his classification of Buddhist doctrines to the Common Doctrine and Tripiṭaka Doctrine respectively. Prof. Satō consequently proposes that because of its discussion of the classification of Buddhist doctrines, this work should be taken to be the last one written in the early period. He argues that the idea of the classification of Buddhist doctrines hardly appeared in Chih-i's early works, and that it was formed in his later period, when he established his Buddhist conceptions based on the Fa-hua ching.³⁶ It therefore seems safe to presume that Chih-i was approaching maturity in thought when he wrote the Fa-chieh tz'u-ti ch'u-mên.

Notes

1. The Sanskrit term, Mādhyaṃika, is normally used by modern scholars to denote the School of Nāgārjuna. It also signifies the doctrine, namely, the concept of Emptiness (śūnyatā) as expounded by Nāgārjuna. It can also mean a person who subscribes to the doctrine of this School. In the present work, the term Mādhyaṃika covers all three meanings, with particular emphasis on the doctrinal aspect. Another variation is Madhyamaka, which refers specifically to the thought or philosophy espoused by Nāgārjuna. For details about the term Madhyamaka, see Ruegg, pp. 1-3.

2. MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.1b.

3. Leon Hurvitz maintains that, of all the philosophical tendencies in Buddhism, it was the Mādhyaṃika more than any other that molded Chih-i's thought (Hurvitz, p. 24).

4. In the development of Buddhism in China, it was necessary to reconcile and integrate the different and even contradictory doctrines transmitted from India, so that they could all be regarded as true teachings of the Buddha. This was usually done by classifying the doctrines and viewing them as instructions of the Buddha given to different listeners by means of various methods used for different occasions. This sort of work is called "classification of the Buddhist doctrines". Cf. Chih-i's WMCHS, chap. 6, T.38.561b-c, where the author explains why different doctrines were taught by the Buddha. With regard to the translation of pieh-chiao as "Gradual Doctrine", see Part I, B, section iii in this thesis.

5. Prof. Kalupahana has rendered dharma with different terms, such as 'Phenomena' (Kalupahana, pp. 29, 34, 46), 'entity' (Ibid., p. 39), 'elements' (Ibid., pp. 51, 84, 85), "elements of experience" (Ibid., p. 51), and 'thing' (Ibid., p. 71). No specific reasons are given for such different renderings.

6. For a detailed description of Nāgārjuna's works, cf. Ramanan, pp. 34-37, where K. Venkata Ramanan suggests that the works that can be attributed to Nāgārjuna may be classified into six categories. Cf. also Yūichi Kajiyama, "Chūgan shisō no rekishi to bunken" (中觀思想の歴史と文献), in A. Hirakawa, et. al., ed., Chūgan shisō, Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1982, pp. 4-5. One of the most extensive studies of Nāgārjuna's works is made by D.S. Ruegg. Cf. Ruegg, pp. 9-33.

7. Ramanan, p. 42.

8. The Sanskrit text of the Kārikā has never appeared by itself. The one available now is found incorporated in Candrakīrti's commentary of the Kārikā entitled Prasannapadā. According to some Japanese scholars, even the Kārikā found in the Prasannapadā is not necessarily the same as the original text. The Kārikā text, on which Bhavaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa

is based, is slightly different from the one found in the Prasannapadā. Cf. Susumu Yamaguchi, "Chūronge no shohon taishō kenkyū yōron" (中論偈の諸本対照研究要論), in his Chūgan bukkyō ronkō, Tokyo: Kōbundo Shobō, 1944, pp. 1-28. Cf. also Yūichi Kajiyama, "Chūgan shisō no rekishi to bunken", op. cit., p. 7. For an exhaustive enumeration of modern studies on the Prasannapadā, cf. Yūichi Kajiyama, *ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

9. Cf. his Le Traité de la grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna, vol. 3. Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1970, Preface.

10. Ramanan, p. 13.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

13. T.25.57b.

14. T.25.756c.

15. For a good introduction to Kumārajīva's life and thought, cf. Yung-t'ung T'ang, Han wei liang-chin nan-pei-ch'ao fo-chiao-shih (漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史). Peking: Chung-hua, 1955, chap. 10, pp. 278-340; Robinson, chap. 3, pp. 71-95.

16. For instance, T.25.61b, 64b, 97b, 107a, 198a, 245c, 338c, as well as others. In some cases the quotations are made with slight literary changes.

17. E.g., the catuskoṭi, i.e., the Four Alternatives (T.25.61b), the Eight Negations or the Eight-'No's' (T.25.97b), the concepts of Emptiness, Provisional Name and Middle Way (T.25.107a), and the relation between samsāra and Nirvāṇa (T.25.198a, 338c).

18. For a brief description of TCTL's doctrinal contents, cf. Ramanan, pp. 44-45. Prof. Ramanan has suggested that the principal theme of Nāgārjuna's works is Emptiness and the Middle Way (*Ibid.*, p. 35). For a detailed description of Emptiness and the Middle Way expounded in the TCTL, cf. below (Part I, A, entitled "Emptiness and the Middle Way as presented by the Mādhyamika").

19. According to Tetsuei Sato's statistics, Chih-i quotes the TCTL 114 times in his FHFI, 103 times in MHCK, 59 times in FHCW, and 83 times in his early work, Tz'u-ti-ch'an mên (次第禪門). Prof. Satō regards the TCTL as the predominant Buddhist text that Chih-i worked on in his early age (Satō, pp. 96-97).

20. As far as we are aware, each of these works is mentioned no more than two times throughout all of Chih-i's major writings. Shi-er-mên lun is mentioned and quoted in the FHFI, chap. 8 (T.33.779a-c); Shi-chu-pi-p'o-sha lun is mentioned in the FHCW, chap. 5 (T.34.65a) and

chap. 7 (T.34.96c); the Pai-lun is mentioned in the WMCLS, chap. 1 (T.38.568a).

21. For a brief description of the commentaries to the Kārikā, cf. Kajiyama, pp. 143-146. Cf. also Yūichi Kajiyama, "Chūgan shisō no rekishi to bunken", op. cit., pp. 9-14.

22. For example, WMCHS, chap. 3, T.38.535c, and chap. 6, T.38.557c; WMCLS, chap. 5, T.38.626a.

23. I.e., WMCHS, chap. 3, T.38.535c.

24. Satō, pp. 25-27; also Preface, pp. 1-3. For a comprehensive biography of Chih-i, cf. Hurvitz and Jikō kyōdo, Tendai daishi no shōgai (天台大師の生涯). Tokyo: Regulus Library, 1975.

25. Satō elsewhere regards the Hsiao chih-kuan (小止觀) as written by Chih-i himself. Cf. Satō, p. 263.

26. Prof. Satō elsewhere regards the Liu miao-mên (六妙門) as representing Chih-i's thought. Ibid., pp. 151-172.

27. A commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā, i.e., the Chin-kang-po-jê-ching shu (金剛般若經疏), was alleged to be the work of Chih-i. Satō rejects this idea and places this work in the third category. (Ibid., p. 412)

28. Ibid., p. 77.

29. Ibid., p. 554.

30. Ibid., p. 290.

31. Ibid., p. 27, pp. 44-45.

32. [天台智者]...稱:"我位居五品弟子,事在法華."
(Kuo-ch'ing pai-lu 國清百錄, chap. 3, T.46.811b) This Kuo-ch'ing pai-lu, compiled by Kuan-ting, is a record of what Chih-i lectured on during his sojourn in the T'ien-t'ai Mountain.

33. T.46.686a.

34. T.46.688a.

35. T.46.681a-b.

36. Satō, pp. 236-237.

PART I

KEY CONCEPTS

A. Emptiness and the Middle Way as presented by the Mādhyamika

The first of our basic questions concerns Chih-i's understanding and criticism of Mādhyamika's Emptiness and Middle Way. Before we deal directly with this question, however, we will examine the basic meaning of these two concepts of the Mādhyamika as presented in the basic texts. This will render us a more fundamental and critical perspective from which we can discuss Chih-i's views on Mādhyamika.

As is commonly known to students of Buddhism, Mādhyamika's concepts of Emptiness and Middle Way have been widely and deeply studied by modern scholars, particularly Western scholars. Their studies, based on Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese sources, are easily accessible. We do not wish to repeat these studies here. Rather, we would like to examine the meaning of Emptiness and the Middle Way specially through the Kārikā, TCTL and Piṅgala's Commentary of the Kārikā, in view of the fact that Chih-i basically understood these concepts through these works. We will, by all means, try to situate our examination in the context of previous scholarship where necessary, but our primary intention will be to emphasize those issues which enhance our study of Chih-i's thought in light of his relation to Mādhyamika, the Kārikā and TCTL in particular.

Let us start with Emptiness. Emptiness is, without much controversy, the central concept in the Mādhyamika system of thought.

This has been pointed out by many scholars.¹ Indeed the whole Kārikā can be regarded as an exposition of this concept; the aim of the arguments in the Vigrahavyāvartanī is no more and no less than eliminating the concept of Self Nature (svabhāva) and establishing the nature of Emptiness. What, then, is Emptiness for the Mādhyamikas? Nāgārjuna's declaration in the Kārikā -- that whatever is of Dependent Origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is Emptiness -- naturally comes to our mind.² In this declaration, Emptiness is related to the causal relationships of all entities and is identified with Dependent Origination. These issues are critically important in understanding the meaning of Emptiness. However, this approach to Emptiness seems to be endorsed by most Mahāyāna Buddhist schools; consequently it does not sufficiently reflect the particular meaning of Emptiness in Nāgārjuna's and Mādhyamika's contexts. Moreover, in the declaration, Emptiness is treated as a predicate of Dependent Origination, which is the subject matter. Nāgārjuna, obviously, does not intend to explicate Emptiness positively. For this reason, in our discussion of Emptiness we will not focus on this declaration. We intend to undertake a more sophisticated project through which the argumentative and practical interests of Nāgārjuna can be shown. Nevertheless, reference to the relationship of Emptiness and Dependent Origination will be made wherever necessary.

From the Kārikā, the meaning of Emptiness can be summed up as the negation of Self Nature and false views. Whether it be the negation of either aspect, the negative implication of this concept is obvious.³ As a matter of fact, this understanding has been expressed by Ruegg, who speaks of śūnyatā (i.e., Emptiness) both as emptiness of "own being"

(i.e., Self Nature) and as release from all speculative dogmatic views.⁴ He refers to speculative views as dr̥ṣṭi, or "false views".⁵ However, he does not elaborate this understanding in detail. In the following sections this issue will be handled in a thorough manner, straightforwardly delineating the implications of these claims.

i) Emptiness as the negation of Self Nature

Nāgārjuna does not explicitly define Emptiness in the Kārikā. He basically expresses this concept in terms of the negation of Self Nature. Still, he does not explicitly imply that Emptiness is the negation of Self Nature. Rather, before coming to this implication, he makes reference to the conception of Dependent Origination.

The concept of Self Nature must first be examined. Self Nature (Skt., svabhāva; Chi., hsing 性, as translated by Kumārajīva in the CL, but literally should be rendered tzu-hsing 自性) denotes the unchangeable and thus permanent substance, or substantiality. Nāgārjuna, however, does not positively mention in detail what Self Nature is. He prefers to express it negatively, as can be seen in the following two verses of the Kārikā:

How is it possible for the self-nature to take on the character of being made? For, indeed, the self-nature refers to something which cannot be made and has no mutual correspondence with something else.⁶

If existence is in virtue of a primal nature, then its non-existence does not follow. For, indeed, a varying character of a primal nature is not possible at all.⁷

It can be seen that Nāgārjuna regards Self Nature as what cannot be made or manipulated (Skt., akṛtrima; Chi., wu-tso 無作); it is devoid of "varying character" (Skt., anyathābhāva; Chi., i-fa 異法). With regard to the understanding that Self Nature refers to something which cannot be made,

Ruegg offers the following remark:

In the course of the discussion and refutation of it in the MMK [i.e., Mūlamadhyamakakārikā] and the rest of the Madyhamaka literature, svabhāva 'own being, self-nature, aseity' has been defined as some thing unproduced (akṛtrima) which is independent of all other things (nirapekṣaḥ paratra); those who postulated a svabhāva have indeed conceived of it as not produced through causal conditioning.⁸

The Sanskrit term for Self Nature in the two verses above is svabhāva and prakṛti respectively. Kumārajīva translates both as hsing (性), making no difference between them. Svabhāva, prakṛti and hsing unanimously express the nature of unchangeability. They are not subject to the transition from a state of existence to one of non-existence or nothingness. Therefore, whatever is in possession of Self Nature will not undergo nothingness (Skt., nāstitā; Chi., wu 無). Nāgārjuna approaches Self Nature in terms of the negative nature of being made, of varying character and of non-existence, all of which are attributes usually ascribed to what is empirical or phenomenal. We consequently can say that Nāgārjuna reveals Self Nature through negating the phenomenal.

From the negation of Self Nature Emptiness is introduced, as seen in the following verse:

From the perception of varying natures all entities are without self-natures. An entity without self-nature does not exist because all entities have the nature of śūnyatā.⁹

In this verse, the nature of having no Self Nature (Skt., niḥsvabhāvatva; Chi., wu-hsing 無性) and Emptiness (śūnyatā) are brought together to describe the entities. That is, entities are on the one hand devoid of Self Nature, whereas on the other they are empty. Two propositions can now be affirmed: namely, entities are devoid of Self Nature, and entities are empty.¹⁰ From the two propositions, we cannot directly

infer that the empty nature or Emptiness is identical to the negation of Self Nature. However, as both Emptiness and the negation of Self Nature are used to describe entities, there must be a close relationship between them.

This relationship is strengthened through the concept of Dependent Origination. Nāgārjuna declares that whatever is of Dependent Origination is Emptiness. He also says elsewhere:

Any entity which exists by virtue of relational origination is quiescence in itself.¹¹

Here is mentioned quiescence (Skt., śānta; Chi., chi-mieh 寂滅), which Nāgārjuna regards as the nature of relational origination or Dependent Origination. This 'quiescence' can be viewed as a synonym of 'Emptiness', as seen in Piṅgala's comment on the verse:

Entities originated from various causes do not have Self Nature, and are therefore quiescent. Quiescence is called 'nothingness'. . . . Entities originated from various causes do not have Self Nature. It is because they have no Self Nature that they are empty.¹²

Here, 'quiescence' is identified with 'nothingness' (wu 無), and we have no way of knowing the original Sanskrit term in Piṅgala's Commentary. But Kumārajīva translates śūnyatā as 'nothingness' elsewhere in the Kārikā.¹³ It seems safe consequently to infer that here, in Piṅgala's Commentary, the original Sanskrit term for 'nothingness' is śūnyatā. By this we can assume that Piṅgala identifies quiescence with Emptiness. Prof. Kajiyama also remarks that quiescence is the state of having no Self Nature, and that it is used as the synonym of Emptiness.¹⁴

In view of the identification of quiescence and Emptiness, we are convinced that the half verse of the Kārikā quoted previously

expresses the same thing as Nāgārjuna's declaration: whatever is of Dependent Origination is Emptiness. Both stress the identity of Dependent Origination and Emptiness. Furthermore, as shown below, Emptiness is associated with the negation of Self Nature through the concept of Dependent Origination.

In another verse Nāgārjuna deals with Self Nature and causes:

If you perceive the various existences as true beings from the standpoint of self-nature, then you will perceive them as non-causal conditions.¹⁵

Here one is warned not to see existences or entities in terms of Self Nature, otherwise entities will be causeless; this means that the Principle of causality will be violated. An opposition between Self Nature and causality is manifest here. In regard to entities, if one maintains the principle of causality, one has to refute the supposition of Self Nature. It is not possible for both to be maintained at the same time. Piṅgala makes a helpful comment on this verse:

If entities determinately have Self Nature, then they should not originate and extinguish. Why then should there be causes for them? If entities originate from causes, then they will not have Self Nature. Thus, if entities determinately have Self Nature, then they will not have causes.¹⁶

Piṅgala points out that the concept of Self Nature contradicts the concepts of origination and extinction, which form the phenomenological basis of causality. Thus the concept of Self Nature also contradicts the principle of causality. If 'a' is causality and 'b' is Self Nature, it clearly shows in the latter part of the comment that, logically,

$$a \supset \sim b, \quad b \supset \sim a$$

This means that 'a' and 'b', or causality and Self Nature, cannot stand together. They logically reject each other.

The Buddhist expression of causality is Dependent Origination. From the above discussions we see that Nāgārjuna identifies Emptiness with Dependent Origination, the latter of which is incompatible with Self Nature. It therefore seems natural to Nāgārjuna that Emptiness is likewise incompatible with Self Nature, and that they cannot be maintained simultaneously. In order to realize Emptiness, Self Nature must be negated. Nāgārjuna obviously understands Emptiness in terms of the negation of Self Nature, although he does not explicitly and straightforwardly state this understanding. Piṅgala's assertion that it is because entities have no Self Nature that they are empty (cf. note 12) is also expressive of this understanding. He is, indeed, well-versed in the Kārikā and Nāgārjuna's thought.

We have said earlier that Nāgārjuna understands Emptiness in relation to Dependent Origination. This is extremely important. Dependent Origination refers to a principle, which prescribes how entities are to become as they are. Entities must come from causes; their existence depends on causes. As they are from causes, they are naturally of the nature of being made (Skt., kṛtrima; Chi., tso 作). They are subject to change including disintegration; for the causes, which make them as they are, may themselves disappear. These entities are manifestly devoid of Self Nature, which defies changeability. They are, indeed, empty.¹⁷ It is in this context that Nāgārjuna speaks of Emptiness. Dependent Origination is nothing but the nature of the empirical world, the phenomenal world, in which all entities are formed by causes. What is important to note is that Nāgārjuna's Emptiness is the Emptiness of this phenomenal world, or more appropriately, the Emptiness of the Self Nature of phenomena,

not an Emptiness spoken of in an isolated sense.

Ramanan briefly remarks that śūnyatā is the comprehension of the non-substantiality of things in their mundane nature.¹⁸ This remark also points to our emphasis of the phenomenal or mundane world in comprehending Emptiness. "Non-substantiality" is just another expression referring to being devoid of Self Nature.

The close relationship of Emptiness to the phenomenal world can also be described in a logical manner. We have seen that Nāgārjuna speaks of Self Nature in terms of the negation of phenomena. Now we know that he sees Emptiness as the negation of Self Nature. If 'p' be the phenomena, then Self Nature will be ' $\sim p$ ', and Emptiness will be ' $\sim (\sim p)$ ', which equals 'p' logically. Emptiness in this manner finally returns to the phenomena, or the phenomenal world. This means that Emptiness cannot be established apart from the phenomenal world.

Emptiness conceived in this way is, for Nāgārjuna, the Truth. The Truth is the very Truth, i.e., the non-substantiality, or non-self nature, of the phenomenal world. This conception of Emptiness is more explicitly and fully discussed in the TCTL. It says:

The various entities originate from the combination of causes. As these entities [originating] from combination do not have determinate nature, they are empty. Why? Entities originating from causes are devoid of Self Nature. Because they are devoid of Self Nature, they are ultimate Emptiness. This ultimate Emptiness is originally empty, not being made by the Buddha or anyone else.¹⁹

It is clearly shown in this passage that things originating from causes do not have Self Nature and are consequently in the nature of Emptiness. That is, "being devoid of Self Nature" and 'Emptiness' are identified with each other, both being spoken of in the context of things

originating from causes.

Elsewhere in the TCTL the concept of "Nature Emptiness" (hsing-k'ung 性空) is proposed:

'Nature' (hsing 性) is called 'self-existence', and it does not rely on causes. If it relies on causes, then it is something made, and is not named 'Nature'. In the various entities there is no Nature. . . .The Nature of all entities cannot be found. This is called 'Nature Emptiness'.²⁰

From the definition of Nature Emptiness, that the Nature of all entities cannot be found, it is easy to see that Emptiness is the emptiness or the negation of Nature, which is no more than Self Nature. It should also be noted that this Emptiness or Nature Emptiness is spoken of in regard to the phenomenal realm; this suggests that no Nature as such is to be found in the various entities.²¹

ii) Emptiness as the negation of false views

Nāgārjuna also discusses Emptiness in terms of the negation of false views. He states:

The wise men (i.e., enlightened ones) have said that śūnyatā or the nature of thusness is the relinquishing of all false views.²²

The implication, here, is that from the Buddhist point of view, Emptiness is the relinquishing or negation of false views (dr̥ṣṭi). For the Buddhists, all views are partial and relative and thus have limitation. They tend to be false with regard to the understanding of the Truth. But what do these false views exactly denote? To this question Nāgārjuna does not explicitly and fully respond in the Kārikā. Piṅgala, however, explicates this in his Commentary:

The Great Saint preached Emptiness, in order to refute the sixty-two various views (dvaṣaṣṭi-dr̥ṣṭi) and defilements such as ignorance, love, etc.²³

This explication occurs right after the above verse. We can be sure then that for Piṅgala, the false views in question denote mainly the sixty-two various views. These views are, in the Buddhists' eyes, false views on the self and world committed by non-Buddhists. They are, like defilements such as ignorance and love, obstructive to our understanding of the Truth.²⁴

Although Nāgārjuna does not specify the false views in the Kārikā, he tends to associate them with conceptualization, discrimination, differentiation, as seen in the following verse:

Non-conditionally related to any entity, quiescent, non-conceptualized by conceptual play, non-discriminative, and non-differentiated. These are the characteristics of reality.²⁵

Here, the characteristics of the Reality or Truth are enumerated, which include non-conceptualization, non-discrimination and non-differentiation. It can be inferred that the opposites of these characteristics -- conceptual acts such as conceptualization, discrimination and differentiation -- are either incompatible with the Truth or obstructive to the attainment of the Truth. In view of the fact that Nāgārjuna also speaks of the Truth in terms of quiescence here (which, as pointed out earlier, is used as the synonym of Emptiness), we are certain that by the 'Truth' he means Emptiness or the "Truth of Emptiness".

Therefore, both false views and acts such as conceptualization, discrimination and differentiation are harmful to the attainment of Emptiness. The close relationship between them cannot be denied. It is very possible that the false views arise from such acts. Discrimination and differentiation, which are based on the use of concepts and so promote conceptualization, will tend to initiate the dichotomy of

the Truth. This will destroy the wholeness and absoluteness of the Truth, which Nāgārjuna regards as non-discriminative and non-differentiated. When Nāgārjuna mentions the false views, we believe he is referring to the perverse views which split the Truth from its wholeness and absoluteness. His vehement refutation of concepts and conceptualization is vividly seen in the dedicatory verses with which he starts the Kārikā:

I pay homage to the Fully Awakened One, the supreme teacher
who has taught the doctrine of relational origination, the
blissful cessation of all phenomenal thought construction.

(Therein, every event is 'marked' by:) non-origination, non-
extinction, non-destruction, non-permanence, non-identity,
non-differentiation, non-coming (into being), non-going (out
of being).²⁶

Here is seen the famous Eight-Nos or Negations, which have been widely studied by scholars. What we want to point out is that the meanings of the concepts in the 'Nos', whether they be eight or otherwise, are established unanimously in a relative and dependent sense. For example, the meaning of origination is relative to and dependent upon that of extinction, and vice versa. This relative and dependent nature of the concepts cannot reveal the Truth of the events: Emptiness in its absoluteness and wholeness. Rather, it discriminates, differentiates and consequently bifurcates the Truth into dichotomous falseness.

Conceptualization (in the form of discrimination, differentiation and bifurcation) may also induce false views and obstruct us from attaining the Truth. This could occur in the sense that the concepts used are bound to form a duality of extremes, both of which are irrelevant to the Truth. Taking an event occurring in the empirical world as an example, one is likely to apply the opposite pair of definite concepts, being and

nothingness, to describe it and asserts that it exists or that it does not exist. However, from the standpoint of Dependent Origination, we can only say that the event exists causally; and that it is devoid of Self Nature and consequently in the nature of Emptiness. This is the Truth of the event. To assert that the event exists or does not exist on the basis of the definite concept of being or nothingness will miss this Truth. Such assertions are false views.²⁷

There is in Buddhism a specific term for conceptualization, viz., "conceptual play" (Skt., prapañca; Chi., hsi-lun 戲論), which is expressive of the character of mental fabrication and of its irrelevance to Reality or the Truth. Inada's rendition of the Sanskrit, prapañca, i.e., "thought constructions" as in the first verse above conveys the same message. As conceptual play is what causes false views, the negation of false views, in terms of which Nāgārjuna understands Emptiness, naturally entails the negation of conceptual play. In fact, the insistence that conceptual play be banished is seen throughout the Kārikā.

iii) Further reflections

So far we know that Nāgārjuna's Emptiness has two objects to negate: Self Nature and false views. His understanding of Emptiness is revealed in the negation of these two aspects. As seen in section i above, Nāgārjuna, Piṅgala and the TCTL all see Emptiness as the negation of Self Nature; they all stress the incompatibility of Self Nature with the concept of causality or Dependent Origination, and so they arrive at the need to refute Self Nature. They have little interest in metaphysical issues and do not make an extensive study of the characteristics of Self

Nature. What they are concerned about is that Self Nature renders the relational origination, and consequently the changeability of the empirical world, impossible. This is because anything in possession of the unchangeable and self-sufficient Self Nature will defy causal formation. That is, Self Nature will destroy the world of Dependent Origination. The need of its refutation is therefore unavoidable. This shows their deep concern with the empirical world. This concern will be unpacked a bit more in section viii, when we refer to the TCTL in the discussion of the harms caused by attachment to being and nothingness. Moreover, the discernment of Emptiness as the negation of Self Nature enhances our understanding of the empirical world, as this discernment is spoken of in reference to the empirical world. That is, in this discernment, we are asserting the very Emptiness of the empirical world, or that the empirical world is devoid of Self Nature. Accordingly, this discernment bears an epistemological implication with regard to the empirical. In the negation of false views, however, the concern is very much practical and soteriological. That is, Emptiness is to be realized as the Truth through the relinquishing of false views. In this sense, Emptiness is a practice which relinquishes false views.

Still, we must go deeper into this issue. The negation of Self Nature tends to respond to the question, "What is the meaning of Emptiness?" The answer will also convey the meaning of "being devoid of Self Nature". The manner in which to deal with the question is to reveal what the subject matter is devoid of, rather than that with which it is associated. It is important to note that the negation of false views tends to respond to the question, "How is Emptiness to be

realized?" Strictly speaking, the negation as such concerns mainly an educational method rather than a meaning, with regard to the achievement of a soteriological goal. As a matter of fact, with regard to the half verse cited above,

The wise men (i.e., enlightened ones) have said that śūnyatā or the nature of thusness is the relinquishing of all false views,

which understands Emptiness in terms of the negation of false views,

Kumārājīva makes a significant modification in his translation. It reads:

The Great Saint taught the doctrine of Emptiness in order to free [sentient beings] from various [false] views.²⁸

This modification emphasizes the pragmatic and educational aspect of teaching the doctrine of Emptiness. Piṅgala's comment on the same verse also reveals similar emphasis.²⁹ This signifies that both Kumārājīva and Piṅgala are aware of the pragmatic implication of Nāgārjuna's understanding of Emptiness as the negation of false views. In view of the point that the negation of Self Nature and the negation of false views correspond to different questions with different concerns, these two negations must be carefully clarified. If not, the understanding of Nāgārjuna's Emptiness is bound to involve confusions.

One way to understand these differences is as follows. Nāgārjuna is not merely a great thinker, but also a great practitioner and teacher. In the explication of the philosophy of Emptiness, he is not merely concerned about the meaning of the Truth of Emptiness, but also concerned about the way to realize it. This renders his thought highly practical and educational. The negation of Self Nature ("being devoid of Self Nature") reveals what he means by Emptiness. Yet he also asserts that

Emptiness should be realized in the relinquishing of false views; Emptiness is the negation of false views. For Nāgārjuna, the negation of false views is a complement to the understanding of Emptiness in a practical and educational sense.

Although how the negation of false views is related to the negation of Self Nature is not explicitly delineated in the Kārikā, the close relationship between the two negations is not difficult to perceive. The false views undoubtedly include one about Self Nature, in which Self Nature is conceptualized and substantiated. That is, Self Nature, which is essentially a mental fabrication, is taken as a concept having its own existence in the external and empirical world. The substantiation of Self Nature is likely to induce attachment to the empirical world, which will in turn cause defilements. Nāgārjuna's advice is that this false view -- i.e., the substantiation of Self Nature -- must be relinquished or negated, and that the correct understanding of Self Nature must be established. For him, Self Nature is mentally fabricated, devoid of any external existence whatsoever. This is the negation of Self Nature, which is what Emptiness denotes.

iv) Emptiness itself is not to be adhered to

In response to the understandings of Emptiness as the negation of Self Nature and as the negation of false views, one is apt to ask two questions. First, does Emptiness itself as the negation of Self Nature have any objective reference, or does it correspond to something in the substantive world? Secondly, in view of the negative tone in the understanding of Emptiness, one is also apt to see Emptiness from an

annihilative angle and take it as an equivalent to nothingness. Is Emptiness really annihilative? These doubts arise from an inappropriate understanding of Emptiness which should be refuted. The Mādhyamika School proposed the well-known thought that Emptiness itself is not to be adhered to. It is highly likely that this thought was aimed at dealing with these doubts. Because it can be seen as a complementary point to a fuller understanding of Emptiness, it will be discussed here.

That Emptiness itself is not to be adhered to is clearly expressed in the Kārikā:

The wise men (i.e., enlightened ones) have said that śūnyatā or the nature of thusness is the relinquishing of all false views. Yet it is said that those who adhere to the idea or concept of śūnyatā are incorrigible.³⁰

Here is mentioned the false idea or concept, or false view of Emptiness (śūnyatādrṣṭi), which is to be negated. Piṅgala also speaks of the view of Emptiness in negative terms. He says that the Buddha teaches Emptiness in order to prevent people from committing the sixty-two various views and defilements such as ignorance, love, etc. Yet when one holds a view of Emptiness, he will not be subject to cultivation.³¹ The view of Emptiness in question is, to be sure, a false view. Piṅgala proposes the well-known expression, "Emptiness is to be emptied" (k'ung i-fu k'ung 空亦復空).³² His advice, no doubt, is made in the context of the thought that Emptiness itself is not to be adhered to, in which Emptiness refers to the "false view of Emptiness".

What the false view of Emptiness precisely denotes is not expounded by Nāgārjuna. It seems reasonable, however, to relate it to the distortion of the understanding of Emptiness as the negation of

both Self Nature and false views. This distortion can be shown as follows. First, one is apt to see Emptiness as something that can initiate the act of negating others; this might suggest that one substantiates and objectifies it. Emptiness becomes a substantive object eventually.³³ This understanding is false for Mādhyamikas. A substantive object is so only in a relative and individual sense. To take Emptiness as a substantive object will degrade it to the realm of relativity and individuality and deprive it, as the Truth, of the significance of absoluteness and wholeness.

Modern scholars have made valuable warnings against the distortion of Emptiness as a substantive object. For example, Tsung-san Mou says:

'Emptiness' is a descriptive word, not a substantive word. It is spoken of in the context of describing the meaning of Dependent Origination. If we should assert that it is an entity, a concept or an idea, for example, it can only be an entity in the nominal sense and in the secondary order. It cannot be an entity originated from causes which would be of the primary order.³⁴

The late Richard Robinson also pointed out that Emptiness is not a term in the primary system referring to the world, but a term in the descriptive system (meta-system) referring to the primary system, and that it has no status as an entity.³⁵

Both Mou and Robinson take Emptiness to be of a descriptive nature, without any substantive reference. That is, it is descriptive about something. For instance, it describes the empirical world as being devoid of Self Nature. There is, however, no substantive object or entity called 'Emptiness' in the actual world. By "primary order" or "primary system" they refer to the substantive entities in this

actual world. Emptiness does not pertain to this. The view that takes Emptiness to be a substantive object in the actual world must be refuted.

Secondly, as hinted above, the negative tone in the understanding of Emptiness may induce one to view Emptiness in annihilative terms, i.e., as nothingness. This annihilative understanding of Emptiness is by all means false. The negation of Self Nature and false views should not be confused with nothingness in any way. Although the falsity of taking Emptiness as nothingness is obvious, it is still committed occasionally. Even in the Buddha's time, there were still Buddhist disciples who took an annihilative and nihilistic view on Emptiness.

The "false view of Emptiness" consequently signifies the fact that Emptiness can be falsely understood in various ways, particularly as a substantive object or as nothingness. As a matter of fact, a substantive object is an item in the actual world, which is in possession of existence or being. Accordingly, to take Emptiness as a substantive object is not different from taking it as being. The view of Emptiness may in this context indicate the view which regards Emptiness as being or nothingness. This is a distortion that should be refuted.

In an excellent article on the Middle Way and the view of Emptiness (Jap., kūken 空見), Nakamura points out that the so-called "view of Emptiness" is a distortion of the original meaning of Emptiness as non-being and non-nothing. This distortion reduces Emptiness to being (bhāva) and nothingness (abhāva).³⁶ Nakamura tends to regard the view of Emptiness as a false understanding of Emptiness, namely, Emptiness is being and nothingness. This is in fact quite in line with the analysis given above. His "view of Emptiness" is just the "false view of Emptiness".

We believe that it is in the context of avoiding to commit the false view of Emptiness that Nāgārjuna advises us not to adhere to Emptiness. In this respect, Prof. Nakamura also understands the expression "Emptiness is to be emptied" to be the refutation of the view of Emptiness.³⁷ This means that what should be refuted is the false view or distortion of Emptiness. In this distortion, Emptiness is taken as being or nothingness.

It is a regret that Nāgārjuna did not elaborate on the false view of Emptiness in the Kārikā. Nevertheless, our understanding of this issue is also justified in Piṅgala's Commentary. He comments on the verse quoted above, where one is advised not to adhere to the false view of Emptiness:

A person whose guilt is heavy, whose greed and attachment are deep in the mind, and whose wisdom is obtuse, takes [false] views on Emptiness. On the one hand, he says that there is Emptiness [as a being]. On the other hand, he says that there is no Emptiness [i.e., Emptiness is nothingness]. [These views of] being and nothingness in turn initiate defilements.³⁸

Therefore the false view of Emptiness may denote the view taking Emptiness as being or nothingness. Candrakīrti, an authoritative commentator of the Kārikā, also speaks of the false view of Emptiness in terms of taking Emptiness as being or nothingness.³⁹

v) Emptiness of Emptiness

The radical expression that Emptiness itself is not to be adhered to is referred to as the "Emptiness of Emptiness" (Skt., śūnyatā-śūnyatā; Chi., k'ung-k'ung 空空). This idea originally appeared in the Prajñāpāramitā literature and was fully expounded in the TCTL. In this idea, Emptiness is not merely that from which to be detached, but also it is to be 'emptied' or relinquished. Emptiness by all means denotes

here the "false view of Emptiness", or that 'Emptiness' which causes disaster. Before the need of relinquishing it arises, Emptiness can be pragmatic and instrumental. It needs to be relinquished only when it causes disaster. This pragmatic and instrumental character of Emptiness significantly enhances our understanding of this concept and deserves our further attention. The TCTL expounds the idea of the Emptiness of Emptiness in the following manner.

Emptiness destroys all entities. There is only Emptiness tenable. Having destroyed all entities, Emptiness itself should also be relinquished. Hence the need of Emptiness of Emptiness. Moreover, Emptiness deals with all entities, whereas Emptiness of Emptiness deals with Emptiness alone. For instance, even though a strong person can beat all thieves, there is still somebody who can beat this strong person. The same is true with Emptiness of Emptiness. [That is, Emptiness can tackle all entities, there is yet Emptiness of Emptiness that can tackle Emptiness.] Again, in the example of taking medication, the medication can overcome the disease. After the disease is overcome, the medication should leave [i.e., be relinquished]. If it does not leave [i.e., if it is taken continuously], it will itself induce disease. We use Emptiness to cure the disease caused by various defilements. Being concerned that Emptiness may in turn cause disaster, we use Emptiness to relinquish Emptiness. This is called the 'Emptiness of Emptiness'.⁴⁰

In this delineation, it is shown that Emptiness and Emptiness of Emptiness deal with different subject matters. On the one hand, Emptiness deals with entities, or more appropriately, the entities understood falsely. How they are falsely understood is not elaborated. It is possible that they are taken as having Self Nature, the negation of which is what Emptiness denotes. The purpose of (the doctrine of) Emptiness is to lead people to a correct understanding of the entities, that is, that they are devoid of Self Nature. On the other hand, the Emptiness of Emptiness deals with Emptiness, when the latter has completed its purpose and

causes disaster. From the analogy in which Emptiness is compared to medication, showing that even medication can be harmful when treated improperly, it can be inferred that Emptiness can likewise be harmful when treated or understood improperly. What is to be emptied or relinquished is not plain Emptiness, but the Emptiness causing disaster.

Here, an important point concerning the character of Emptiness is referred. In the analogy of Emptiness to medication, Emptiness is taken as an effective measure to deal with entities, or more appropriately, to eradicate the attachment to or incorrect views of entities. This is done by releasing the sentient beings from their attribution to entities with Self Nature. Emptiness, with its implication that entities are devoid of Self Nature, certainly can rectify any supposition of Self Nature in entities. Indeed, this is the very aim of Emptiness. When this aim is completed, Emptiness will lose its reason for persistence and so should be set free. Emptiness is, in this sense, very much of a pragmatic and instrumental character. It persists not for its own sake, but for its pragmatic and instrumental implication. This is an interesting but important facet of Emptiness, which does not seem to attract much attention from modern scholars.

In certain circumstances, obviously, Emptiness may be treated improperly and cause disaster. What these circumstances are is not mentioned in the above quotation. But the TCTL says elsewhere:

The practitioner sees being as hindrance. So he goes on to eradicate being with Emptiness, but in so doing in turn values the latter. In clinging to Emptiness, one falls into [the realm of] annihilation. With this [disaster] in mind, one should employ Emptiness to eradicate being, but one should not cling to Emptiness either.⁴¹

'Being' in this passage does not denote the plain being or phenomenal existence; rather, it denotes the incorrect understanding of being (as having Self Nature). Emptiness, as the negation of Self Nature, can be employed to erase such an incorrect understanding. But this pragmatic and instrumental implication of Emptiness may be over-emphasized, and so Emptiness may be clung to. When this occurs, one will tend to employ Emptiness uncontrolledly and unlimitedly. That is, one will blindly overthrow everything, without distinguishing between the correct and false, the pure and impure. This will unavoidably result in complete annihilation, which is vehemently refuted in Buddhism. It is this disaster that Emptiness may cause, making necessary both the warning that Emptiness itself is not to be adhered to and the need for the Emptiness of Emptiness.

vi) Emptiness as the true state of entities as such

From the above discussions we conclude that Emptiness is, for Nāgārjuna and his followers, the true state of entities as such, free from all human fabrications, which include the supposition of Self Nature and taking false views. These entities are what we face in our daily life and are causally originated. The doctrine of Emptiness basically reveals the true situation or state of entities, of having no permanent Self Nature. The state is revealed in a negative manner, rather than in a positive one. That is, it does not convey what the entities are, but what the entities are not: namely, they are not in possession of Self Nature. Moreover, the state is purely descriptive, without any substantive or objective reference whatsoever. That is to say, there

is absolutely no such thing called "being devoid of Self Nature" or "empty state" at all, whether it be a thing in the phenomenal sense, or a thing in the noumenal sense (a thing-in-itself).

This approach to Emptiness is clearly epistemological in character, with a practical and soteriological purpose behind it. When proposing this doctrine of Emptiness, the major concern of the Mādhyamikas was not merely to teach people how to see the world, but also to teach them how to act toward the world. When people understand that the world is in essence empty, devoid of Self-Nature and permanency, which they are so eager to seek, they will naturally cease to cling to anything and control their thirst for worldly objects. Perversions and defilements can eventually be avoided. This is, as the Mādhyamikas and Buddhists in general understand, crucial to enlightenment.

In relation to the practical and soteriological purpose of Emptiness, we should pay attention to two points. First, Emptiness is pragmatic in the sense of helping us erase the attachments to and false understandings of entities, yet it has nothing to do with any annihilation of entities. This is the positive significance of Emptiness. This significance, however, has its restrictions. That is, Emptiness is pragmatic insofar as there are attachments and false understandings. When the latter are erased, Emptiness will have no object to work upon and so should not be made to persist any longer. Unconditioned persistence of Emptiness will tend to direct one to annihilation and nihilism. To decide whether one should make Emptiness persist or make it not persist is, indeed, a matter of wisdom and experience.

Secondly, the understanding of Emptiness in terms of relinquishing

false views shows Nāgārjuna's deep practical concern for Emptiness. The idea of the Emptiness of Emptiness can be construed in this practical context, because the Emptiness to be refuted refers to the false view of Emptiness. Since the false view of Emptiness denotes the view that regards Emptiness as a substantive object, or the view that sees Emptiness as nothingness, the aim of this idea is, to be sure, to prevent people from substantializing, objectifying or annihilating Emptiness. Paradoxically, this 'Emptiness' of Emptiness can likewise be substantialized, objectified or annihilated by false views. If it is treated in this way, it has again to be emptied or negated. So, theoretically speaking, the negation of Emptiness can go on ad infinitum. This signifies that the practitioner has to remind himself constantly of the nature of Emptiness: it denotes the true state of entities. In addition, he must not abide in this nature of Emptiness by mistaking it as a substantive object or nothingness.

This state of Emptiness is the Truth of entities. As a matter of fact, the nature of Emptiness as a state has been pointed out by scholars, but without much elaboration. Inada sees śūnyatā or Emptiness as the "the state of śūnya".⁴² Sprung translates śūnyatā as the "absence of being in things".⁴³ Being, in this context, means Self Nature or a permanent element. Ruegg speaks of śūnyatā in terms of the true state of affairs.⁴⁴ Our conclusion in this section may be helpful in providing more understanding of Emptiness as the true state of entities.

Incidentally, our understanding of Emptiness as the true state of entities is reminiscent of a crucial question regarding Emptiness, namely, whether or not Emptiness refers to the Absolute. This has been

a controversial problem among scholars for a long time. Our position is that Emptiness is revealed in the refutation of false views which originate from our attachment to relative concepts (being and nothingness, for example). In this manner Emptiness transcends the realm of relativity. In this sense, Emptiness is absolute. Kalupahana also remarks:

(Emptiness) helps the individual to attain freedom from views and upholding it as the absolute or ultimate truth without any reference to the 'empty' would be the last thing either the Buddha or Nāgārjuna would advocate.⁴⁵

In fact, we have spoken of Emptiness in terms of absoluteness and wholeness in section ii above. But we must note that this understanding of Emptiness is mainly in a practical and soteriological context. Its absolute sense should not be related to metaphysical substantiality or Substance, with which the Absolute is apt to be associated. As far as the present thesis is concerned, we do not sense the need to discuss the controversial problem of the relationship of Emptiness and the Absolute, much less work out a solution of it. It is sufficient in this work to reach the conclusion that Emptiness denotes the true state of entities.

vii) The Middle Way is a complement to Emptiness

The Middle Way is an important concept in the Buddhist system, whose emphasis can be traced back to a very early period.⁴⁶ It also played a crucial role in formulating the Mādhyamika philosophy, as could be seen from the fact that this very name is used to identify the Mādhyamika School and its doctrine. In the corresponding Sanskrit term, madhyamāpratipad, madhyamā means middle, and pratipad or prati-pad is road or track. It is apparent that Mādhyamika came from madhyamā, assuming the abstract meaning of 'middle'. In the Karika,

however, Middle Way is mentioned only once. In the following we will first determine its relationship to Emptiness, so as to figure out its proper meaning.

Kumārājīva's translation of the verse in the CL, where Middle Way appears, reads:

I declare that whatever is of Dependent Origination is Emptiness (nothingness); it is also a Provisional Name; it is also the meaning of the Middle Way.⁴⁷

According to the Chinese grammar, this verse should be seen as describing the relationship of Dependent Origination to Emptiness, to the Provisional Name and to the Middle Way, respectively. Dependent Origination is the subject throughout, whereas Emptiness, the Provisional Name and the Middle Way are equal predicates, the latter three assuming the same position towards the former. That is, the Middle Way and Emptiness are coordinates.

But the original verse is somewhat different in its grammatical structure. Its Sanskrit runs:

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe,
sā prajñaptirupādāya pratipatsaiva madhyamā.⁴⁸

In the former half verse, yaḥ corresponds to tām, the pattern being that of correlative and relative; and tām refers to śūnyatām. Therefore the half verse means:

We declare that whatever is of Dependent Origination is Emptiness. This is the same as Kumārājīva's translation, with Dependent Origination as subject and Emptiness predicate. The latter half verse is, however, quite different. Here, the subject is sā, being feminine singular. It is apparent that it refers to the śūnyatā of the former half, which is

also feminine singular. And upādāya or upā-dāya is the pattern of "because. . . .therefore", expressing a reason. Hence we have the meaning of the latter half as:

Because this Emptiness is a Provisional Name, therefore
it [Emptiness] is indeed the Middle Way.

Here, the subject is Emptiness, and Provisional Name and Middle Way are predicates. We can see that the Sanskrit original has not placed these three concepts in parallel positions; rather, it stresses the meaning that Emptiness is the Middle Way because of its provisionality. That is, the Middle Way, with the indication that Emptiness itself is yet provisional but not ultimate, serves as a complement to a better understanding of Emptiness. The indication that Emptiness is provisional and not ultimate will be elaborated later. What we want to point out here is that the Middle Way in this passage is subordinate to Emptiness. It can only be appropriately accounted for in the context of the latter. Indeed, in the assertion that Emptiness is the Middle Way, the Middle Way is taken as a predicate to describe the subject, Emptiness, and so enhances our understanding of the latter. The complementary implication of the Middle Way with regard to Emptiness is beyond doubt.⁴⁹

It is true that the Middle Way is identified with Emptiness in the verse, but the identification is made on the point that the Middle Way complements Emptiness in providing a more thorough understanding of the latter.

The clarification of this point is important, in the sense that we know by means of it that Nāgārjuna does not assertively take the Middle Way as the Truth independent of the Truth of Emptiness, not at

least in the sense of what Emptiness is. Consequently, the endeavour to elevate it to the level of a Truth higher than the Truth of Emptiness, as done by the T'ien-t'ai School, cannot be justified from Nāgārjuna's standpoint.

viii) The Middle Way in terms of transcendence of extremes

What does the Middle Way denote in the Mādhyamika context?

This is a subtle question that needs careful study. As stated above, the Kārikā does not mention this concept more than once, giving no explication of it. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to detect its meaning from the Kārikā and Piṅgala's Commentary. From the above-quoted verse, we see that Emptiness is identified with the Middle Way because it is a Provisional Name, that is, because of its provisionality.⁵⁰ The meaning of the Middle Way has to be understood in the context that Emptiness is a Provisional Name. How can Emptiness and Provisional Name introduce the emphasis of the Middle Way and its identification with Emptiness? The assertion that Emptiness is a Provisional Name tends to speak of Emptiness in reserved terms. That is, it is provisional and not ultimate. This reservation towards Emptiness may be related to the latter's restriction and the denial of its unconditioned persistence as described in the previous section. It may also refer to the descriptive character of Emptiness, as delineated by Mou in his quotation found in section iv. That is, it is a descriptive word revealing the state of entities as such, with their lack of Self Nature. Whatever the case, with regard to the issue of the Middle Way we wish to argue as follows:

1. The assertion that Emptiness is a Provisional Name entails a warning: Emptiness should not be adhered to as something ultimate. This can be responded to simply through a proper understanding of Emptiness. In this way the assertion also entails that Emptiness should not be distorted in meaning. This gives sense to the advice regarding the non-distortion of Emptiness.

2. As the Middle Way has to be understood in the context of the assertion that Emptiness is a Provisional Name, which is closely associated with the non-distortion of Emptiness, it follows that the meaning of the Middle Way cannot be found apart from the non-distortion of Emptiness.

3. The distortion of Emptiness indicates a false view of Emptiness, while the non-distortion of Emptiness can be taken as a relinquishing of false views. As pointed out earlier, Nāgārjuna understands Emptiness in terms of the relinquishing of false views. It follows that Emptiness can be understood by means of clarifying the non-distortion of Emptiness itself.

4. From the above arguments we can come to the point that both the Middle Way and Emptiness can be understood by means of clarifying the non-distortion of Emptiness.

5. According to our previous study and Nakamura's suggestion, the distortion of Emptiness may be situated into the context of the so-called "false view of Emptiness", i.e., śūnyatādr̥ṣṭi, which denotes the false understanding of Emptiness as being or nothingness. In other words, the distortion of Emptiness may denote the very distortion of Emptiness as being or nothingness. It follows that the non-distortion

of Emptiness may be taken as the transcendence of this distortion. In view of the fact that this distortion is based on the discrimination or duality between being and nothingness, the non-distortion of Emptiness manifestly consists in the transcendence of this duality.

6. It therefore can be inferred that both the Middle Way and Emptiness are, as far as their meanings are concerned, closely related to the transcendence of the duality of being and nothingness. We may straightforwardly say that the Middle Way and Emptiness can be understood in terms of the transcendence of the duality of being and nothingness or simply the transcendence of being and nothingness. This transcendence of being and nothingness is the basis on which the Middle Way and Emptiness are identified with each other.

Therefore we may respond to our question raised in the beginning of this section and conclude that Nāgārjuna's Middle Way denotes the transcendence of being and nothingness. This understanding is supported by Piṅgala who comments on the verse at hand with the following words:

When the various causes assemble and combine, the thing originates. This thing belongs to the various causes. Therefore it is devoid of Self Nature. In view of this, it is empty. Emptiness is also to be emptied. However, for the sake of educating the sentient beings, it is taken as a Provisional Name to explicate [the nature of the things]. The transcendence of the two extremes of being and nothingness is called the 'Middle Way'.⁵¹

In this passage, the subject matter is Emptiness or the nature of entities. This nature is revealed in terms of causal origination or Dependent Origination and the lack of Self Nature. There are two important points. First, Piṅgala relates the assertion that Emptiness is a Provisional Name to the expression that even Emptiness is to be emptied, tending to

explain the former through the latter. It should be noted that Piṅgala's comment was made on the Sanskrit text of the Kārikā, not on Kumārajīva's translation. Accordingly, the claim that Emptiness is to be emptied should correspond to the claim that Emptiness is a Provisional Name, not the case that whatever is of Dependent Origination (entities) is a Provisional Name, as in Kumārajīva's translation. Obviously, Piṅgala explicated Nāgārjuna's assertion that Emptiness is a Provisional Name in terms of the advice that Emptiness is to be emptied. As delineated above in section iv, the advice that Emptiness is to be emptied is made in the context of the thought that Emptiness itself is not to be adhered to; in this context Emptiness refers to the false view of Emptiness, or the distortion of Emptiness. Accordingly, Piṅgala tends to take the assertion that Emptiness is a Provisional Name to entail a warning against any adherence to the distortion of Emptiness, and so one against any distortion of Emptiness as well. In doing so, he significantly justifies our association of the assertion that Emptiness is a Provisional Name with the non-distortion of Emptiness. Secondly, Piṅgala explicitly speaks of the Middle Way in terms of the transcendence of being and nothingness. This is exactly the position we reached in our arguments above.

But we must pay attention to a crucial point: Nāgārjuna identifies Emptiness and the Middle Way in the assertion that Emptiness is a Provisional Name, and so is focusing on the provisionality of Emptiness. How one steps from the provisionality of Emptiness to the identification of Emptiness and the Middle Way needs some elaboration. This point is ignored by many scholars. Even Piṅgala himself does not divulge any

explicit hint. As shown in our arguments, we infer from the provisionality of Emptiness the implication of the non-distortion of Emptiness as being or nothingness, and consequently move to the further implication of the transcendence of being and nothingness. We take this transcendence of being and nothingness as the basis for the identification of Emptiness and the Middle Way.

We are convinced that this is the most appropriate way to deal with the issue of the Middle Way, if we wish to stick to the Sanskrit text of the Kārikā and account for the identification of Emptiness and the Middle Way in the context of the verse at hand. In supporting this position it is important to note that Kumārajīva's translation of the verse is not only questionable in grammar, but also vague in meaning with regard to the issue of the Middle Way. It says that whatever is of Dependent Origination is the Middle Way and tends to identify Dependent Origination with the Middle Way. But in what sense are the entities of Dependent Origination the Middle Way? This question is not dealt with. There is no way in this perspective to figure out the meaning of the Middle Way at all.

In regard to Nāgārjuna's understanding of the Middle Way in terms of the transcendence of being and nothingness, it should be added that he has warned that both being and nothingness are devoid of independency; consequently he strongly advocates the need to transcend both of them. This can be seen from the following verses in the Kārikā:

If existence does not come to be (i.e., does not establish itself), then certainly non-existence does not also. For, indeed, people speak of existence in its varying nature as non-existence.⁵²

Those who see (i.e., try to understand) the concepts of self-nature, extended nature, existence, or non-existence do not perceive the real truth in the Buddha's teaching.⁵³

According to the Instruction to Kātyāyana, the two views of the world in terms of being and non-being were criticized by the Buddha for similarly admitting the bifurcation of entities into existence and non-existence.⁵⁴

The issue in these three verses is about being and nothingness, or existence and non-existence. The supposition of being and nothingness which represents the two extremes of existent nature and non-existent nature, will, as seen by Nāgārjuna, bifurcate the world and entities, obstructing us from intimating the undifferentiated Truth. Specifically, the world and entities as such are formed on the basis of Dependent Origination. They are devoid of Self Nature and so subject to change. This is the undifferentiated Truth of Emptiness. They are not being in the sense of possessing a permanent substantiality. They are not nothingness either, because they arise from causes. To ascribe the extremes of being and nothingness to them will be to completely miss their basis in Dependent Origination and to bifurcate the Truth of Emptiness into duality.

It is important to note that being and nothingness here merely symbolize two extremes. What Nāgārjuna vehemently rejects is, no doubt, all kinds of extremes, which he believes, would bifurcate the undifferentiated Truth into duality. This justifies his rejection of the distinction made between Self Nature (svabhāva) and extended nature ("other nature", parabhāva), both of which tend to form a self-other duality and express two extremes. Although the term, "Middle Way", is not specified in these verses, it is very likely that the issue of rejecting or transcending extremes refers to this concept. In other words, Nāgārjuna understands the

Middle Way in terms of the transcendence of extremes.

With regard to this understanding of the Middle Way, Ruegg also states:

(The Middle Way) falls neither into annihilationism by denying what originates in dependence, nor into eternalism by hypostatizing as real what are constructs and designations originating in dependence and, consequently, empty of own being.⁵⁵

Apparently, both annihilationism and eternalism are the results of taking the world and entities, which are based on Dependent Origination, as nothingness and being respectively. They are extreme views strongly refuted by Nāgārjuna and his followers.

This understanding of the Middle Way receives more definite and detailed expositions in the TCTL. First, the TCTL repeatedly stresses that the Middle Way is the detachment from the two extremes, and that it is revealed in the liberation from the two extremes.⁵⁶ Secondly, it specifically identifies these two extremes to be being and nothingness.⁵⁷ Thirdly, it also specifies other items than being and nothingness, such as pleasure and suffering, eternalism and annihilationism, commencement and non-commencement, identity and differentiation, and others.⁵⁸

Among these three points, we wish to explain further the second one. In identifying the two extremes to be being and nothingness, the TCTL inspiringly details the harms caused by attachment to being and nothingness as follows:

In such ways, the sentient beings attach to the views of being and of nothingness. These two views are false and untrue, and can destroy the Middle Way. It is like one walking on a narrow road. On one side [of the road] is deep water; on the other, a large fire. Both sides can cause death. Both the attachment to being and the attachment to nothingness are faulty. Why? Because, if the various entities are determinately real, then

there will be no major and subsidiary causes. . . . If, however, there are no entities that are real, then there will be no difference between evils and merits, bondage and liberation. Neither will there be any difference between various entities.⁵⁹

The TCTL wants to clarify two points. First, the supposition of the extremes of being and nothingness destroys the doctrine of the Middle Way. This entails that the doctrine of the Middle Way must be established on the transcendence of these extremes. Secondly, such a supposition also contradicts the nature of the Dependent Origination of the entities. The arguments are that if the entities are taken as being -- as determinately real in the sense of having Self Nature -- then the entities will originally be there, without undergoing any causal origination. On the contrary, if the entities are taken as nothingness -- as completely unreal in the annihilative sense -- then everything will be the same as nothingness, whether they be evils or merits, or any other significant entities. In this case, causal origination cannot 'originate' entities which are different from each other, and will then be functionless or meaningless. In either case, the supposition of being and nothingness destroys Dependent Origination. This point exactly reveals the harm we have just mentioned caused by the ascription of the extremes of being and nothingness to the world and entities.

ix) The Middle Way as a state complementing Emptiness

It is obvious that the Middle Way understood in the above manner refers to a state of detaching from or transcending extremes. Logically speaking, when a pair of extremes is negated, what is really negated is not merely the two extremes, but the whole realm pertaining to these

extremes. In the case of the Middle Way, which is established by the negation of being and nothingness or other extremes, both being and nothingness are relative in nature. What is negated is the whole realm of relativity. When relativity is transcended, the absolute significance of the Middle Way will be revealed. The Middle Way therefore refers to a state of absolute meaning. This state is still spoken of (as with the term, Emptiness) in a descriptive sense. The Middle Way is not a way as such; it does not have any substantive reference. Neither does it denote a concrete position, a position between two things or extremes, as does the Aristotelean mean. It denotes a total spiritual state that one must realize for a soteriological purpose.

Like Emptiness, the Middle Way also bears a deep practical implication. It is not merely an absolute state to be cognized, but also a method or practice through which such a state can be attained. This practical implication is mostly emphasized in the TCTL. For instance, it states:

The disciples of Buddha relinquish the two extremes and act in accordance with the Middle Way.⁶⁰

It also states:

The two views of being and nothingness being relinquished, [one] employs the wisdom of non-conceptual play and acts according to the Middle Way. This is called 'the wisdom eye'.⁶¹

There are many occasions on which one is urged to act in accordance with the Middle Way.⁶² One is also warned against falling into the extremes of being and nothingness.⁶³ In either case, the message is the same. That is, one should do his best to transcend all extremes or overcome the attachment to extremes.

The Middle Way as the state of transcending extremes reveals the nature of the entities. That is, they are originally free from all sorts of duality and dichotomy formed by extremes, being and nothingness in particular. This is the Truth of the entities. But does this Truth differ from the Truth of Emptiness? Can there be two Truths, namely, the Middle Way and Emptiness? Our response is negative. The authentic Truth is not relative but absolute in nature. It is undifferentiated. The Middle Way cannot be different and separate from Emptiness.

As a matter of fact, the transcendence of extremes, which the Middle Way indicates, is embraced in Emptiness. This is seen through two perspectives. First, as delineated earlier, Emptiness is revealed in the non-distortion of Emptiness itself, which is the transcendence of being and nothingness. That is, Emptiness is revealed in the transcendence of being and nothingness, which are extremes. We may certainly say that Emptiness embraces the transcendence of extremes. Secondly, Nāgārjuna understands Emptiness in terms of the negation of false views. These false views include, no doubt, the views of being and nothingness as extremes, or the attachment to extremes. In this sense, Emptiness may imply the transcendence of extremes.

Accordingly, in the Middle Way an important aspect of Emptiness -- the transcendence of extremes -- is reflected. Nāgārjuna obviously employs the Middle Way to emphasize this aspect of Emptiness. It is in this sense that we assert that the Middle Way is a complement to Emptiness. As a state of transcending extremes, the Middle Way can be taken completely as the Truth. Still, it is not a Truth different and separate from Emptiness. It complements Emptiness by emphasizing a particular aspect

of the latter among many others. This aspect is the transcendence of extremes.

The understanding of the Middle Way in terms of the transcendence of extremes is, incidentally, not confined to Nāgārjuna and his followers. It is commonly maintained in many Buddhist texts, such as in the Samyutta-nikāya, in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, and in the Satyasiddhi-śāstra, among others. Nakamura, in the article mentioned previously, has made many relevant quotations from these texts to reveal this point clearly. However, the relationship of the Middle Way and Emptiness is seldom discussed carefully in these sources. It is Nāgārjuna who brings the Middle Way into the context of Emptiness and proposes the complementary relationship of the former to the latter. This should be taken as a new element added to the traditional understanding of the Middle Way.

Notes

1. Cf., for example, Ramanan, p. 35; Inada, p. 144. The fact that Prof. Kajiyama entitled his book on Mādhyamika as Kū no ronri, i.e., Logic of Emptiness, also shows his primary emphasis on this concept.

2. Kārikā-P, p. 503. This declaration is from a very famous verse in the Kārikā, which we will deal with in detail when we come to the discussion of Mādhyamika's conception of the Middle Way.

3. It is interesting to note that śūnya, the Sanskrit term for 'empty', means 'zero' in mathematical sense. Cf. also Matilal, pp. 151-152; Ruegg, p. 3.

4. Ruegg, p. 45.

5. Ibid., p. 14.

6. Inada, p. 98. svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham, akrtrimah svabhāvo hi nirapekṣah paratra ca. (Kārikā-P, pp. 260-262) Kumārajīva's rendition: "性若是作者,云何有此義?性名為無作,不待異法成." (CL, 15:2, T.30.19c) All references to the translations of the Kārikā will come from Inada unless specified otherwise. The correspondent Sanskrit original and Kumārajīva's Chinese translation of the Kārikā will also appear with each translation.

7. Inada, p. 99. yadyastitvaṃ prakṛtyā syānna bhavedasya nāstitā, prakṛteranyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate. (Kārikā-P, p. 271) Kumārajīva's rendition: "若法實有性,後則不應無;性若有異相,是事終不然." (CL, 15:8, T.30.20b)

8. Ruegg, p. 2, note 5.

9. Inada, p. 92. bhāvānām niḥsvabhāvatvamanyathābhāvadarśanāt, asvabhāvo bhāvo nāsti bhāvānām śūnyatā yataḥ. (Kārikā-P, p. 240) Kumārajīva's rendition: "諸法有異故,知皆是無性;無性法亦無,一切法空故." (CL, 13:3, T.30.18a) Strictly speaking from Sanskrit grammar, however, the first half of the verse should read, "The entities' nature of having no Self Nature is from the perception of varying characters."

10. Nāgārjuna elsewhere has made these two propositions separately. The major theme of chapter 15 of the Kārikā is to propose and argue that entities do not have Self Nature. Cf. verses 1, 2, 8, 9 (Kārikā-P, pp. 259-262, 271-272; CL, 15:1,2,8,9, T.30.19c,20b). Cf. also Kajiyama, pp. 77-81. As regards the proposition that entities are empty, cf. Kārikā-P, p. 505; CL, 24:19, T.30.33b.

11. Inada, p. 67. pratītya yadyadbhavati tattacchāntaṃ svabhāvataḥ. (Kārikā-P, p. 159) Kumārajīva's rendition: "若法眾緣生,即是寂滅性." (CL, 7:17, T.30.10c)

12. 象緣所生法，無自性，故寂滅。寂滅名為無。 . . .
從象緣生法，無自性。無自性故空。 (T.30.10c)

13. Cp. Kārikā-P, p. 503 and CL, 24:18, T.30.33b.

14. Kajiyama, p. 65. Here, he refers to the verse in the Kārikā which discusses the characteristics of the Truth (Skt., tattvasya lakṣaṇa; Chi., shih-hsiang 實相). Cf. Kārikā-P, p. 372; CL, 18:9, T.30.24a.

15. Inada, p. 147. svabhāvyadyadi bhāvanām sadbhāvananupaśyasi, ahetupratyayān bhāvaṃstvamevam sati paśyasi. (Kārikā-P, p. 503) Kumārajīva's rendition: "若汝見諸法，決定有性者，即為見諸法，無因亦無緣。" (CL, 24:16, T.30.33b) It should be noted that in the first half of the verse, Kumārajīva's translation does not fully correspond to the original grammatically. The Sanskrit text reads, "If you see entities' true being from the standpoint of Self Nature (svabhāvat)"; whereas Kumārajīva translates, "If you see various entities as determinately having Self Nature." Both nevertheless are concerned with the same perversion that one may commit in ascribing to entities a Self Nature, which actually does not exist.

16. 若法決定有性，則應不生不滅。如是，法何用因緣？
若諸法從因緣生，則無有性。是故諸法決定有性，則無因緣。
(T.30.33b)

17. We have no intention to give a detailed exposition of Dependent Origination here. Prof. Kajiyama has made an examination of this concept. See Kajiyama, pp. 67-75, in which the views of Nāgārjuna and other Mādhyamikas are introduced. For an excellent philosophical explication of this concept, see Ruegg, pp. 43-46, p. 43 in particular.

18. Ramanan, p. 294.

19. 諸法因緣和合生。是和合法無有一定法，故空。何以故？
因緣生法無自性。無自性故，即是畢竟空。是畢竟空從本
以來空，非佛所作，亦非餘人所作。 (T.25.581b-c) There
are still other places in the TCTL, where the same conception of Emptiness
is expressed. Cf. T.25.207c, T.25.211a.

20. 性名自有，不待因緣。若待因緣，則是作法，
不名為性。諸法中皆無性。 . . . 一切諸法性不可得故，名為
性空。 (T.25.292b) The TCTL also discusses Nature Emptiness elsewhere,
e.g., T.25.716b-c.

21. This Nature Emptiness indeed corresponds to svabhāva-śūnya, which appears in the Sanskrit text of the Hṛdaya-sūtra. For the Sanskrit Hṛdaya-sūtra, cf. E. Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1967, pp. 148-167.

22. Inada, p. 93. śūnyatā sarvadr̥ṣṭīnām proktā niḥsaraṇam jinaiḥ. (Kārikā-P, p. 247) Kumārajīva's rendition: "大聖說空法, 為離諸見故." (CL, 13:9, T.30.18c) Dr̥ṣṭi in Buddhist texts usually denotes false view, as seen in Inada's rendition of the verse. Kumārajīva does not specify its false nature in his Chinese translation. He simply renders the term as view (chien 見). However, in the final chapter of the Kārikā -- this chapter discusses false views exclusively -- he renders its title, Dr̥ṣṭi parīkṣā as Kuan hsieh-chien p'in (觀邪見品). He obviously takes dr̥ṣṭi to be hsieh-chien (邪見), viz., false view. Cf. Kārikā-P, p. 571; CL, 27, T.30.36c. In this thesis, if not specified otherwise, we will take dr̥ṣṭi as false view.

23. 大聖為破六十二諸見, 及無名、愛等諸煩惱, 故說空. (T.30.18c)

24. These sixty-two various views are found in the Brahmajāla-sutta (in Dīgha-nikāya, i, 1) in Primitive Buddhism. We cannot discuss them further because of limited space here. For an explication of them, cf. H. Nakamura, et. al. ed., Shin butten kaidai jiten (新・佛典解題事典). Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1965, pp. 63-64.

25. Inada, p. 115. aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcairaprapañcitaṃ, nirvikalpamanānārthametattattvasya lakṣaṇam. (Kārikā-P, p. 372) Kumārajīva's rendition: "自知不隨他, 寂滅無戲論, 無異無分別, 是則名實相." (CL, 18:9, T.30.24a) In the Sanskrit verse, the term 'śānta' (quiescence) is used, instead of 'śūnyatā' (Emptiness). They are, however, identical in the Kārikā as pointed out earlier.

26. Inada, p. 39. anīrodhamanūtpādamanuṣṣedamaśāśvataṃ, anekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamaṃ. yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcōpaśamaṃ śivaṃ, deśayāmāsa sambuddhastam vande vadatām varam. (Kārikā-P, p. 11) Kumārajīva's rendition: "不生亦不滅, 不常亦不斷, 不一亦不異, 不來亦不出(去). 能說是因緣, 善滅諸戲論; 我稽首禮佛, 諸說中第一." (CL, 1, T.30.1b)

27. The problems of false views in the understanding of the Truth have also been discussed by many scholars. Cf. Ramanan, p. 41; Matilal, pp. 147-148.

28. For Chinese and Sanskrit texts, see note 22 above.

29. Cf. T.30.18c. For Chinese text, see note 23 above.

30. Inada, p. 93. śūnyatā sarvadr̥ṣṭīnām proktā niḥsaraṇam jinaiḥ, yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādr̥ṣṭistānasādhyaṃ babhāṣire. (Kārikā-P, p. 247) Kumārajīva's rendition: "大聖說空法, 為離諸見故; 若復見有空, 諸佛所不化." (CL, 13:9, T.30.18c)

31. 大聖為破六十二諸見, 及無明、愛等諸煩惱, 故說空。若人於空復生見者, 是人不可化. (T.30.18c) Cf. also the previous section.

32. T.30.33b.

33. In this regard, Prof. Ruegg also points out that the term śūnyatādr̥ṣṭi denotes a speculative view that hypostatizes Emptiness. (Ruegg, p. 2)

34. Mou, p. 1208. (My translation).

35. Robinson, p. 43.

36. Nakamura, p. 172.

37. Ibid., loc. cit.

38. 有人罪重，貪著心深，智慧鈍故，於空生見，或謂有空，或謂無空。因有無，還起煩惱。 (T.30.18c)

39. Cf. Nakamura, pp. 171-173.

40. 空破一切法，唯有空在。空破一切法已，空亦應捨。以是故，須是空空。復次，空緣一切法，空空但緣空。如一健兒，破一切賊；復更有人，能破此健人。空空亦如是。又如服藥，藥能破病。病已得破，藥亦應出。若藥不出，則復是病。以空滅諸煩惱病；恐空復為患，是故以空捨空，是名空空。 (T.25.288a) Cf. also Ramanan, p. 329.

41. 行者以有為患，用空破有，心復貴空。著於空者，則墮斷滅。以是故，行是空以破有，亦不著空。 (T.25.396a)

42. Inada, p. 13.

43. Sprung, p. 13.

44. Ruegg, p. 44.

45. Kalupahana, p. 49.

46. For a very brief description of this concept in early Buddhism, cf. Inada, pp. 21-22; Nakamura, pp. 151-152.

47. 象因緣生法，我說即是空（無），亦為是假名，亦是中道義。 (CL, 24:18, T.30.33b)

48. Kārikā-P, p. 503.

49. Toshio Andō says that the meaning of this verse in its original form is that the various things are Emptiness, Emptiness is Provisional Name, and Provisional Name is Middle Way. (Tendai shōgu shisō ron 天台性具思想論, Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1953, p. 68) This interpretation is by no means correct.

50. In Buddhism, Provisional Name is used to distinguish entities from each other. It signifies the nature of provisionality and lack of ultimacy. For an extensive discussion of this concept, cf. the present work, Part II, B, on the Threefold Contemplation.

51. 眾緣具足和合而物生。是物屬眾因緣，故無自性；無自性故空。空亦復空。但為引導眾生故，以假名說。離有、無二邊故，名為中道。(T.30.33b)

52. Inada, p. 98. bhāvasya cedaprasiddhirabhāvo naiva sidhyati, bhāvasya hyanyathābhāvamabhāvaṃ bruvate janah. (Kārikā-P, p. 267)
Kumārajīva's rendition: "有若不成者，無云何可成？因有有法故，有壞名為無。" (CL, 15:5, T.30.20a)

53. Inada, p. 99. svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvameva ca, ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāsane. (Kārikā-P, p. 267)
Kumārajīva's rendition: "若人見有無，見自性他性如是則不見，佛法真實義。" (CL, 15:6, T.30.20a)

54. Inada, p. 99. kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayaṃ, pratisiddham bhagavata bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā. (Kārikā-P, p. 269)
Kumārajīva's rendition: "佛能滅有無，如化迦旃延，經中之所說，離有亦離無。" (CL, 15:7, T.30.20b)

55. Ruegg, pp. 16-17.

56. Cf. T.25.538b, 551a, 581b, 610a, 622a, 714b, and others.

57. Cf. T.25.171c, 331b, 348a, 370b, 466a, 492c (cp. Ramanan, p. 88), 587a, 607a-b, 648c, 732c, 747a, and others.

58. Cf. T.25.59a-b, 110a, 170a, 291a (cp. Mou, p. 47 on commencement and non-commencement), 370a (cp. Ramanan, p. 108 on eternalism and annihilationism), 711b, 732c, and others.

59. 如是等眾生著有見、無見。是二種見虛妄非實，破中道。譬如人行狹道，一邊深水，一邊大火，二邊俱死。著有、著無，二事俱失。所以者何？若諸法定實有，則無因緣。...若無法是實，則無罪福，無縛無解，亦無諸法種種之實。(T.25.331b)

60. 佛弟子捨二邊，處中道行。(T.25.538b)

61. 是有無二見捨，以不戲論慧，行於中道，是名慧眼。(T.25.348a)

62. For instance, T.25.370a-b, 587a, 607b, 732c, and others.

63. T.25.466a.

B. Chih-i on Mādhyamika: the Concepts of Emptiness and the Middle Way

With some fundamental understanding of the Mādhyamika concepts of Emptiness and the Middle Way, we may now proceed to deal with our first basic question: How does Chih-i understand and criticize those Mādhyamika concepts? This question is closely related to Chih-i's theory of the classification of Buddhist doctrines, which is the backbone of Chih-i's system of thought. Any attempt to penetrate his thought cannot leave this theory untouched. This is particularly true in dealing with our question here. Only after we have a clear idea about how he classifies the important Buddhist doctrines can we be in a better position to find out how he evaluates and accommodates the Mādhyamika, especially with regard to its major concepts of Emptiness and the Middle Way. We now turn the discussion to this theory.

i) Chih-i's classification of Buddhist doctrines and its leading issues

Among Chih-i's major writings -- viz., those which reflect his mature thought -- the descriptions of his classification of Buddhist doctrines are found in many places.¹ The SCI, in particular, gives an extremely detailed and systematic analysis of this theory.² Like most original Chinese thinkers, who initiated new ideas but were always reluctant to claim authorship under their own names, Chih-i let it be known that the theory of classification was not his own creation; he claimed that its basic idea could be found in a number of Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras.³ As a matter of fact, there had been various theories with

regard to classifying the Buddhist doctrines before Chih-i proposed his own.⁴ Yet the comprehensiveness and clarity of his own theory, and so its supremacy over others, should not be neglected.⁵ This theory definitely reveals Chih-i's unique way of digesting or crystallizing the Buddhist doctrines and his view on what the perfect Buddhist doctrine should be.

As a matter of fact, Chih-i's classification of Buddhist doctrines has been amply studied by modern scholars (for example, by Andō and Tamura in Japan and by Hurvitz in the West).⁶ However, as will be clearly explicated below, Buddha Nature (or more appropriately, Middle Way-Buddha Nature) is the key concept in Chih-i's system of thought, in which the classification of Buddhist doctrines is an important item. These scholars do not pay attention to this concept and so, in our opinion, fail to provide a precise understanding of Chih-i's theory of classification. To be specific, both Andō and Tamura make no mention of Buddha Nature, much less Middle Way - Buddha Nature. Hurvitz, in the main body of his work discussing Chih-i's classification, does not mention Buddha Nature either. He merely introduces the three aspects of Buddha Nature (san-yin fo-hsing 三因佛性) in a footnote in order to explain the feature that the cause is separate; this is one of the features that made Chih-i distinguish and designate the "Separate Teaching" ("Gradual Doctrine" for us) pieh-chiao 別教.⁷ This does not seem to reflect Hurvitz's awareness of the importance of Buddha Nature in Chih-i's classification.

In view of our dissatisfaction with these scholars' understanding of Chih-i's theory of classification, we have to undertake an original study of this theory. Chih-i classifies the Buddhist doctrines into four

types in accordance with the difference in contents that the Buddha preached. This is called Hua-fa ssü-chiao (化法四教), in contrast to the Hua-i ssü-chiao (化儀四教) which was also proposed by Chih-i, to classify the four types of methods the Buddha was supposed to have undertaken in his preachings. These four types of doctrine are the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, the Common Doctrine, the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine.⁸

The leading issues that govern Chih-i's classification of the Buddhist doctrines are shih-hsiang (實相, "the Truth") and the way to realize it. For Chih-i, the Truth explicated in both the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine is Emptiness, while the Truth explicated in both the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine is the Middle Way. As regards the way to realize the Truth, Chih-i maintains that the Tripiṭaka Doctrine proposes to analyze, disintegrate and eliminate dharmas in order to enter into the state of Emptiness, while the Common Doctrine advocates that one should realize Emptiness right in the nature of dharmas, without destroying anything whatsoever. On the other hand, the Gradual Doctrine teaches people to penetrate into the Middle Way through a gradual process, while the Perfect Doctrine advises that one should realize the Middle Way instantaneously. The expressions to show these four different ways are: hsi-fa ju-k'ung 析法入空 (Tripiṭaka Doctrine), t'i-fa ju-k'ung 體法入空 (Common Doctrine), ts'u-ti ju-chung 次第入中 (Gradual Doctrine) and yuan-tun ju-chung 圓頓入中 (Perfect Doctrine).⁹

ii) The Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine

The Truth of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine is termed a "partial Truth" (p'ien-chên 偏真) in contrast to the "perfect Truth" (yuan-chên 圓真) of the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine.¹⁰ This is because Chih-i regards the Emptiness of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine as negative, static and transcendent, whereas the Middle Way of the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine is positive, dynamic and immanent. The point is that for Chih-i the Emptiness spoken of in this context is mere Emptiness (tan-k'ung 但空);¹¹ the Middle Way, on the other hand, is identified with Buddha Nature, which is characterized by permanence, function and the all embracing nature. These three characteristics reveal the positive, dynamic and immanent dimensions.¹²

What, then is the difference between hsi-fa (to analyze and disintegrate dharmas) of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, and t'i-fa (to embody dharmas) of the Common Doctrine? Chih-i's interpretation is that those who advocate the Tripiṭaka Doctrine tend to see dharmas as something real. They therefore analyze and even disintegrate them in order to reach the point where they find nothing really left, and so realize that all dharmas are empty. On the contrary, those advocating the Common Doctrine understand that dharmas are dreamlike and empty by nature. These people consequently attain the Truth of Emptiness right in the nature of dharmas, without analyzing and destroying anything.¹³

It is obvious that Chih-i, in the midst of the comparison, applauds the way of t'i-fa and denounces the way of hsi-fa. In his opinion, the Tripiṭaka Doctrine confuses the unreal for the real, the non-substantial

for the substantial. In order to attain the Truth of Emptiness, dharmas would have to be disintegrated and eliminated. This way is described as inappropriate and 'dull' (cho 拙, literally, 'awkward') by Chih-i. On the contrary, the Common Doctrine is right in understanding dharmas as essentially empty or non-substantial. Emptiness or non-substantiality can be attained in such a way as to keep dharmas as they are. We need not touch or disturb, much less eliminate, them. Chih-i considers this way as appropriate and 'skillful' (ch'iao 巧).¹⁴

It should be noted that hsi (析, to 'disintegrate') in hsi-fa and t'i (體, to 'embody') in t'i-fa are used as methodological terms. Chih-i in many places also employs the terms hsi-mên (析門) and t'i-mên (體門), i.e., the "door of disintegration" and the "door of embodiment".¹⁵ From his explanation that mên (門, door) is what one "passes through",¹⁶ it is obvious that the term has methodological implications.

To penetrate deeper into the issue of Truth, it is necessary to introduce the idea of the Twofold Truth (êrh-ti 二諦), which was very much on Chih-i's mind. In the Buddhist circle, it was generally accepted that the realm of entities or phenomena is causally conditioned and represents the worldly Truth; consequently the absolute nature of Emptiness represents the transcendent Truth. In regard to the two Truths, Chih-i undoubtedly appreciated the maintenance of both, rather than sacrificing one in favour of the other. This is clearly shown in his severe criticism of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine in which he states:

When entities are present, there is no [attainment of the] transcendent; and when entities are eliminated [and the transcendent attained], there is no [recourse to the] conventional.¹⁷

He concludes that, in the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, the idea of Twofold Truth cannot be established.¹⁸ Chih-i's point is that for the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, the transcendent (chên 真) Truth (Emptiness) and the conventional (su 俗) or worldly Truth cannot stand together. Emptiness can merely be attained by the elimination of all entities or the worldly realm. The conclusion is precisely that in which the way of hsi-fa ju-k'ung is bound to result.

On the contrary, in the Common Doctrine, phenomena and Emptiness do not contradict each other; consequently, the worldly Truth and the transcendent Truth can be established simultaneously. This is because in this viewpoint phenomena or entities do not hinder Emptiness. Rather, they are the very realm where Emptiness is to be realized. That is, Emptiness is the Emptiness of entities; it is attained relative to entities. Consequently, in order to attain Emptiness, entities would have to be maintained as they are, rather than being eliminated. Therefore, Chih-i's depiction of the characteristic of the Common Doctrine with regard to the relation of the worldly entities and Emptiness runs as follows:

The transcendent [is realized] right in the conventional nature of entities.¹⁹

Another similar depiction is:

The transcendent [is realized] right in the embodiment of dharmas.²⁰

Indeed, this depiction with regard to the realization of the transcendent or Emptiness in the Common Doctrine can be seen here and there in Chih-i's works. The word t'i (體, 'embodiment') in t'i-fa ju-k'ung prevents the elimination of dharmas or entities.

iii) The Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine

Emptiness as the Truth, whether in the Tripiṭaka Doctrine or the Common Doctrine, for Chih-i is negative. He refers to this Truth by the conventional term "partial Truth" or "one-sided Truth" (p'ien-chên 偏真).²¹ When Chih-i speaks of the Truth, he usually uses chên (真) to refer to Emptiness, which he takes to be the Truth of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine, and chung (中) to refer to the Middle Way, which he regards as the Truth of the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine.²² Emptiness and the Middle Way tend to be identified with each other in the Kārikā; at least the Middle Way is taken as the complement of Emptiness. They are, however, not at all the same for Chih-i. He thinks that Truth should be spoken of in positive terms as No-emptiness (pu-k'ung 不空), which is the Truth relative to the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine.²³ This No-emptiness is nothing but Buddha Nature,²⁴ which Chih-i identifies with the Middle Way.²⁵ In this context he introduces the concept of Middle Way - Buddha Nature, which he also refers to as Buddha Nature - Middle Way. The point here is that Buddha Nature as the Truth is an extremely important concept which specifies the characteristic feature of the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine. This concept is, in fact, what distinguishes the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine from the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine. That is, where the former relates to the Buddha Nature, the latter does not.²⁶ When Chih-i makes reference to the four Doctrines, he usually relates the Tripiṭaka Doctrine to the worldly dharmas, the Common Doctrine to the unreality of dharmas, and both the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine to the Buddha

Nature. This understanding is revealed throughout his major works.

The Buddha Nature is proposed in contrast to Emptiness, which, as Chih-i sees it, obviously tends to be negative. He approaches this Buddha Nature in terms of permanency, dynamism and immanence. It is permanent because it is itself the spiritual Dharma Body (Skt., dharma-kāya; Chi., fa-shên 法身), which, unlike our physical bodies, is not subject to change. It is dynamic in the sense that it is capable of functioning. It is immanent because it by nature embraces all dharmas.²⁷ This approach to Buddha Nature is very important, in the sense that Buddha Nature is identified by Chih-i with the Middle Way, which is the Truth. It follows that Truth is permanent, dynamic and immanent as well. Chih-i ascribes this Truth to the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine exclusively. This new conception of Truth is, we must admit, a great contribution to the development of Buddhist thought in China.

In the voluminous work on the T'ien-t'ai doctrines (Tendaigaku: Kompon shisō to sono tenkai), Andō discusses the Gradual Doctrine in terms of the Middle Way and takes the Middle Way as the central principle of the Gradual Doctrine. The Middle Way of the Gradual Doctrine, he claims, transcends both extremes of being and nothingness, and is consequently different from either one of them.²⁸ Andō does not mention the Buddha Nature at all. In the discussion of the Perfect Doctrine, he does not mention the Buddha Nature either, but refers to the principle of the Middle Way. He regards this Middle Way of the Perfect Doctrine as not detached from being and nothingness.²⁹ The approach to the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine in terms of Middle Way is proper except that the understanding of the Middle Way is insufficient. The major

point of Chih-i's conception of the Middle Way of both the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine lies in the identification of the Middle Way with Buddha Nature, which, as noted earlier, is permanent, dynamic and immanent. Therefore, the Middle Way as the Truth assumes permanence, dynamism and immanence. In our opinion, the Middle Way cannot be properly understood without reference to Buddha Nature. This novel conception of the Middle Way is, in fact, original and highly inspiring.

The Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine share the view which regards the Middle Way as the permanent, dynamic and immanent Truth. They part company, however, with regard to the manner in which the Truth is realized. For the Gradual Doctrine the manner is gradual; and for the Perfect Doctrine, instantaneous or sudden. In the Gradual Doctrine, the term which expresses the gradual manner is li-pieh (歷別), or tz'u-ti (次第), meaning "undergoing gradations". That is, ignorance is to be eradicated and the Truth attained by a step by step process, from the lower position to the higher. The Gradual Doctrine even goes so far as to declare that one has to "undergo cultivation for kalpas" (li-chieh hsiu-hsing 歷劫修行), an interminably long period of time, before the final goal can be attained.³⁰ It should be noted that the word pieh (別) in pieh-chiao (別教), i.e., "Gradual Doctrine", has two denotations according to Chih-i. The first is 'different', in the sense that the Doctrine in question is different from the other three Doctrines. The second is 'gradual', in the sense that this Doctrine advocates the gradual manner in which one attains the Truth.³¹ Some scholars, Leon Hurvitz for instance, adopted the first denotation and

translated the Doctrine as "Separate Doctrine".³² In this thesis, we emphasize the second denotation and translate the Doctrine as "Gradual Doctrine". In our opinion, the word 'gradual' transmits the true characteristic of the Doctrine, whereas the word 'separate' does not.

In the Perfect Doctrine, the term which expresses the sudden manner is yüan-tun (圓頓), meaning "perfect and sudden". The term pu tz'u-ti (不次第) is also used, meaning "non-gradual".³³ This signifies the fact that ignorance can be overcome and the Truth attained suddenly or instantaneously, without undergoing gradations. It should be added that tz'u-ti and pu tz'u-ti are also employed with methodological implications. This is evidenced by the terms, tz'u-ti mên (次第門) and pu-tz'u-ti mên (不次第門), or the "gradual door" and "non-gradual door", as seen in FHW. ³⁴ As pointed out in the previous section, mên (門) or 'door' is what one "passes through".

Between the two Doctrines, as would be expected, Chih-i views the Perfect Doctrine as superior. He says that although both Doctrines see No-emptiness, the gradualism of the Gradual Doctrine does not possess ultimacy; only the Perfect Doctrine realizes ultimate Reality without the slightest reservation.³⁵

iv) General observations

Chih-i's classification of the Buddhist doctrines is comprehensive, clearcut and systematic. The following points deserve our special attention. First, among the four types of doctrine, the difference between the former two (the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine) and the latter two (the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine) is crucial. This is with

regard to the issue of Truth, which was the major concern of all Buddhist schools. That is, it is a difference between the Truth conceived in static and transcendent terms, and that conceived in dynamic and immanent terms.

Secondly, the difference between the former two types of doctrine and between the latter two are equally methodological. That is, the Tripiṭaka Doctrine's disintegration of dharmas and the Common Doctrine's embodying of dharmas are both concerned about the way in which the Truth is to be realized. The same can be said about the gradualism of the Gradual Doctrine and the suddenness of the Perfect Doctrine.

Thirdly, logically speaking, the conceptualization of the Truth precedes the way to realize it. Chih-i's scheme of the four types of doctrine is articulated in such a way that they are placed on two different levels, rather than on parallel positions. The primary level is concerned with the nature of Truth itself, while the secondary level is concerned with the method of practice. The method of practice is by all means closely related to or dependent on the conception of the Truth. Indeed, Chih-i's articulation is very logical and systematic.

Fourthly and finally, Chih-i always enumerates the four types of doctrine in an ascending order: from the Tripiṭaka Doctrine to the Common Doctrine, then to the Gradual Doctrine, and finally to the Perfect Doctrine. The hierarchy of the four Doctrines has axiological implications. That is, the elevation from the Tripiṭaka Doctrine to the Perfect Doctrine, via the Common and Gradual Doctrines, should be understood in valuational and soteriological terms. This is evidenced by Chih-i's concepts of ch'uan (權), which means 'expedient' or 'makeshift', and shih (實),

which means 'ultimate'. He sees what is ch'uan as for merely temporary purposes, and assigns what is shih to finality.³⁶ With the contrast of these two concepts made, he classifies the Perfect Doctrine as ultimate, and relegates the rest to the realm of expediency.³⁷ In other words, the previous three Doctrines have instrumental values which lead to the final and ultimate Perfect Doctrine.

v) Mādhyamika as Common Doctrine

In order to answer our first basic question concerning Chih-i's understanding and criticism of Mādhyamika's Emptiness and the Middle Way, we must first examine how Chih-i understands the Mādhyamika in the context of his classification of Buddhist doctrines. Our concern here will focus on the Kārikā and the TCTL, the major texts of the Mādhyamika. Specifically, where are these two texts positioned in Chih-i's classification of Buddhist doctrines?

This concern is logically preceded by another question: do the major Mādhyamika texts have a place in Chih-i's classification? The answer is obviously positive. Chih-i states that the four types of doctrine were initiated by the Buddha to accommodate all sūtras, and furthermore, all śāstras are commentaries to the sūtras; therefore, they cannot exceed the realm of the four types of doctrine.³⁸ There is no reason to believe that the major Mādhyamika texts, which were regarded as being so important to the Buddhist tradition, should be excluded from this classification.

Unfortunately, Chih-i never explicitly classifies the Kārikā and TCTL in the scheme of the four Doctrines. This is unlike the case of

the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and Fa-hua ching, which Chih-i identifies with the Common Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine respectively. Though the classification theory is extremely important in formulating Chih-i's whole philosophical system, he is not much concerned about the direct references of the four types of doctrine relative to the actual sūtras and śāstras. In some places, however, Chih-i discusses the four Doctrines in conjunction with many important Buddhist texts; in these contexts we can judge vaguely which text belongs to which Doctrine. But the position of the Kārikā and TCTL is not clear.³⁹ Nevertheless, from the doctrinal point of view, we can reasonably be sure that the Kārikā and TCTL belong to the Common Doctrine. Hurvitz also suggests that the Common Doctrine (he uses the rendering, "Pervasive Teaching") may be virtually identified with the Mādhyamika philosophic system.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, he does not elaborate this suggestion. Our ascription of the Kārikā and TCTL to the Common Doctrine can be argued as follows:

First, the fundamental concept of the Kārikā is Emptiness, the nature of Truth. As pointed out previously, this Truth indicates the nature of causal origination of entities. It is realizable directly in these entities. This conception of the Truth entails a positive thought in the realization of the Truth by which entities of the nature of origination and extinction can be and should be maintained as they are, rather than being eliminated entirely. This thought, undoubtedly, corresponds mostly to the Common Doctrine, which is characterized by the assertion of t'i-fa ju-k'ung (i.e., the Truth of Emptiness is to be attained in the context of embodying the entities or dharmas). This manner of thinking with regard to the realization of the Truth has nothing

in common with the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, which advocates the disintegration and elimination of dharmas.

It is not easy to relate the Kārikā to the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine, especially with regard to the issue of Truth. The difficulty is that the Kārikā speaks of the Truth in terms of Emptiness, a state revealed in the negation of both Self Nature and false views; the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine speak of the Truth in terms of Buddha Nature, which possesses positive contents and dynamic functions. Full explication of this concept will be done in the next chapter. Here it can be mentioned that, for Chih-i, Emptiness is very different from Buddha Nature, which is comparable to No-emptiness.

Secondly, the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths (Skt., catuḥsatya; Chi., ssū-ti 四諦) is always mentioned in Chih-i's major works. What attracts our attention is that he expounds this doctrine in the context of his classification theory. That is, he classifies the methods to realize the Four Noble Truths into four types, and matches them with the four Doctrines respectively. According to Chih-i, the realization of the Four Noble Truths employed in the Common Doctrine is by No-origination, or wu-shēng (無生).⁴¹ He understands the meaning of No-origination as follows:

If dharmas have origination, they will have extinction. As dharmas essentially do not originate, they will not extinguish.⁴²

Apparently, Chih-i is speaking of No-origination in the context of the Truth; this refers to the ultimate nature of dharmas, which transcends all extremes, including origination and extinction. No-origination then transcends origination as an extreme. This is exactly what Nāgārjuna's

Middle Way implies. Nāgārjuna himself seems to ascribe special significance to the transcendence of origination and extinction, as he begins his Kārikā with the verse on the eight negations (pa-pu 八不), which is inclusive of the negation of origination and extinction.⁴³ In addition, he immediately argues for the concept of No-origination by using the important logical method, the negative of the Four Alternatives.⁴⁴

The concept of No-origination also entails the following message of transcendence. As dharmas essentially do not originate and extinguish themselves, there is no need to eliminate them in order to attain the Truth. Chih-i also points out in his FHFI that the nature of No-origination with regard to the attainment of the Truth is that Truth is realizable right in the events, but not after their elimination.⁴⁵ This nature of No-origination closely conforms to the Kārikā's conception of Emptiness, which advises (as in section i of the previous chapter) that Nāgārjuna's Emptiness is the Emptiness of the phenomenal world, not the Emptiness spoken of in an isolated sense. Consequently, the realization of Emptiness occurs right in the phenomena or events, not apart from them.

We see, therefore, that Chih-i explicates the Common Doctrine's manner of realizing the Truth in terms of No-origination, which is also a crucial concept in the Kārikā. Chih-i himself is also clearly aware of the importance of this concept in the Kārikā, as he asserts,

Every chapter in the Chung-lun has its own goal. Yet all of them converge in the concept of No-origination.⁴⁶

Chih-i, apparently, summarizes the twenty-seven chapters in the Kārikā in terms of their converging (hui 會) in No-origination. This means

that all chapters in the Kārikā are expressive of No-origination. It is clear that the family resemblance of the Common Doctrine and the Kārikā cannot be denied. Not only are we able to conclude that the Kārikā pertains to the Common Doctrine, but also that the Kārikā itself is an important text expressive of the Common Doctrine.

Thirdly, the affiliation of the Mādhyamika with respect to the Common Doctrine can be justified by reference to the Prajñāpāramitā thought. Chih-i clearly states in his SCI that the various Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras pertain to the Common Doctrine.⁴⁷ On the other hand, there is an extremely close doctrinal relationship between Nāgārjuna and the Prajñāpāramitā literature.⁴⁸ With regard to this relationship, Chih-i himself also states as follows:

[Nāgārjuna] destroys all closures and clingings with the unattainable Emptiness and advocates the non-substantiality of all dharmas. This is called conformity to the prajñāpāramitā.⁴⁹

This is a recognition of doctrinal intimacy between Nāgārjuna and the Prajñāpāramitā literature. We will, of course, not forget the fact that Chih-i is well aware that the TCTL is an important commentary to a great Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra. It therefore seems beyond controversy, that the Mādhyamika, with such a close relationship to the Prajñāpāramitā thought and which is clearly Common Doctrine for Chih-i, is to be seen as Common Doctrine as well.

From the above arguments we are confident that Mādhyamika is, in Chih-i's view, the Common Doctrine. His criticism of the Common Doctrine should be regarded as applicable to Mādhyamika.

It is a matter of fact that Chih-i is highly critical of the

Common Doctrine, as can be seen throughout his major works. The criticism comes from the standpoint of the Perfect Doctrine. This reminds us of the dissatisfaction with the Kārikā expressed by Chih-i in light of the Fa-hua ching, which he ascribes to the Perfect Doctrine. In his FHHI, a commentary on the Fa-hua ching, Chih-i states twice that the Kārikā is not comparable to the Fa-hua ching.⁵⁰ He also states that Nāgārjuna in the TCTL praises the profundity of the Fa-hua ching.⁵¹ These indicate Chih-i's parting of company with the Mādhyamika, asserting at least his preference for the Perfect Doctrine over the Mādhyamika.

Yet on most occasions when Chih-i criticizes the Common Doctrine, he seldom makes reference to the Mādhyamika. This does not mean that he does not see Mādhyamika as the Common Doctrine. We may rather infer that Chih-i is reluctant to explicitly criticize Mādhyamika because of Nāgārjuna's supreme position in the T'ien-t'ai tradition. Nevertheless, his underlying dissatisfaction with the Kārikā cannot be denied. We take it that this dissatisfaction is well expressed in his criticism of the Common Doctrine.

vi) Emptiness in its relationship to Dependent Origination

With the understanding that the Mādhyamika belongs to the Common Doctrine, we come to the discussion of how the Mādhyamika Emptiness is viewed by Chih-i. As stated before, Chih-i speaks of the Common Doctrine's Emptiness in terms of t'i-fa; this means that Emptiness is to be realized in the context of embodying dharmas. The nature of t'i-fa should also be applicable to the Mādhyamika Emptiness. Indeed, Chih-i himself does not always clearly specify the Mādhyamika Emptiness in his major works.

There are, however, a few occasions, on which he does. First, he regards the first half of the famous verse in the Kārikā -- where the concepts of Dependent Origination, Emptiness, Provisional Name and Middle Way are introduced -- as expounding the Common Doctrine.⁵² This part of the verse reads,

I declare that whatever is of Dependent Origination is Emptiness.⁵³

This is expressive of the identification of Dependent Origination and Emptiness. It seems to speak of Emptiness in the context of Dependent Origination. That is, Emptiness is the negation of Self Nature, the falsely ascribed nature of dharmas that are causally originated; in other words, the falsely ascribed nature of dharmas based on dependent origination. The presumption is that Emptiness is to be properly understood in light of its relationship to Dependent Origination.

Secondly, Chih-i praises Nāgārjuna with regard to the treatment or employment of Emptiness. He states:

[Nāgārjuna] destroys all closures and clingings with the unattainable Emptiness After purifying various dharmas, he specifies Emptiness to explicate the dharmas and concludes [the explication] with the aspects demonstrated by the Four Alternatives.⁵⁴

In Chih-i's view, Nāgārjuna teaches the doctrine of Emptiness to rid people of false understandings of, and clinging to, dharmas. "Unattainable Emptiness" (pu-k'o-tê k'ung 不可得空) by no means signifies that Emptiness cannot be attained or realized. Rather, it signifies that Emptiness cannot be grasped and by that means attached to as an object. Chih-i obviously is well aware of the pragmatic and instrumental character of Emptiness, which is demonstrated in the TCTL and explained in detail

in our previous chapter, section v. This character indicates that Emptiness can be taken as an effective measure to eradicate the clinging to, or incorrect view of, dharmas. He took Nāgārjuna as the author of the TCTL and highly appreciates this character of Emptiness.

The statement that Nāgārjuna specifies Emptiness to explicate the dharmas (tien-k'ung shuo-fa 點空說法) should particularly attract our attention. It entails the message that dharmas appear as dharmas on the basis of Emptiness. That is, it is due to the nature of being devoid of Self Nature that dharmas can remain causally originated and by that means assume the character of dependent origination. In brief, this is to speak of the dharmas of Dependent Origination in terms of Emptiness. The statement is, in fact, comparable to an important verse in the Kārikā, which reads:

Whatever is in correspondence with śūnyatā, all is in correspondence (i.e., possible). Again, whatever is not in correspondence with śūnyatā, all is not in correspondence.⁵⁵

Inada notes after his translation that the meaning conveyed is that śūnyatā is the basis of all existence, and that without śūnyatā nothing is possible.⁵⁶ All existence (Skt., sarvam; Chi., i-ch'ieh fa 一切法) here denotes, of course, the entities or dharmas which are causally originated. This verse has also been frequently quoted by Chih-i in his works.

From the above two occasions, we see that Emptiness and Dependent Origination are mutually dependent on each other. This is one of the important points in understanding the identification of Dependent Origination and Emptiness. Chih-i seems to be happy with Nāgārjuna's Emptiness as related to Dependent Origination, particularly with that

he does not isolate the Truth of Emptiness from the causally originated dharmas. This approach to Emptiness closely conforms to the Common Doctrine's nature of t'i-fa, whereby dharmas are perceived together with the realization of Emptiness.

vii) Emptiness is not No-emptiness

At the same time, Chih-i is critical of the Emptiness taught in the Common Doctrine. In FHFI, he comments on the Common Doctrine:

The wise sees Emptiness. He should also see No-emptiness.
How can he steadfastly abide in Emptiness?⁵⁷

On one occasion, when he criticizes the Prajñāpāramitā as the teaching of no-characteristic (wu-hsiang chiao 無相教) he asserts:

The teaching of no-characteristic expounds Emptiness and eradicates characteristics. It still belongs to [the realm of] impermanence as it fails to expound the permanence of Buddha Nature.⁵⁸

This is actually a criticism directed at the Common Doctrine, to which the Prajñāpāramitā belongs. As pointed out earlier, Chih-i's criticism of the Emptiness of the Common Doctrine should also be applicable to that of the Mādhyamika. What then is No-emptiness? It is, for Chih-i, nothing but Buddha Nature.⁵⁹ Consequently, Chih-i's criticism of the Emptiness of the Common Doctrine or the Mādhyamika is essentially that it refers to mere Emptiness, not No-emptiness and not Buddha Nature. As far as the literal meaning is concerned, Emptiness is of course not No-emptiness. This is not that about which Chih-i is concerned. Rather, his point is that the Truth, no matter what name it goes by, should not only include what Emptiness entails, but also what No-emptiness or Buddha Nature involves.⁶⁰

Emptiness is negative in nature. No-emptiness should signify positive implication, about which Chih-i unfortunately does not explicitly elaborate. Nevertheless, it is possible to detect what he ascribes to No-emptiness on the occasion when he expounds the Twofold Truth teaching based on his classification of the Buddhist doctrines. Specifically, he divides the Twofold Truth teaching into seven types. Four of them are from the viewpoints of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, the Common Doctrine, the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine respectively. The rest of them are from the viewpoints of "the Gradual directing the Common" (pieh chieh t'ung 別接通), "the Perfect directing the Common" (yuan chieh t'ung 圓接通) and "the Perfect directing the Gradual" (yuan chieh pieh 圓接別). Chieh (接) is chieh-yin (接引), meaning to direct one from a lower spiritual stage to a higher one. The major purpose of this division (the division of the Twofold Truth teaching into several types) is to show the interrelationship among the four Doctrines.⁶¹

While mentioning the three types of Twofold Truth teaching from the viewpoints of the Common Doctrine, "the Gradual directing the Common", and "the Perfect directing the Common", Chih-i proposes three kinds of No-emptiness:

Eradicating the clinging to Emptiness, we therefore speak of No-emptiness. When the clinging to Emptiness is eradicated, one may merely see Emptiness, without seeing No-emptiness. Those of sharp faculties say that No-emptiness is a wonderful being, and so teach No-emptiness. Those of sharpest faculties, upon hearing somebody speak of No-emptiness, say that it is the tathagatagarbha, and that all dharmas move toward the tathāgatagarbha.⁶²

Here, the No-emptiness resulting from the eradication of the clinging

to Emptiness reminds us of the Mādhyamika thought of the Emptiness of Emptiness.⁶³ This No-emptiness is the No-emptiness of the Mādhyamika, which Chih-i does not view as the authentic No-emptiness; because it merely emphasizes the negative side, namely, its eradicating character. What Chih-i is in favour of is the other two kinds of No-emptiness: that which is a wonderful being, and that which is the tathāgatagarbha, which all dharmas move toward. It is obvious that they are the No-emptiness of the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine, respectively. To be specific, Chih-i relates the wonderful being to those of sharp faculties, who assume, in this context, the viewpoint of "the Gradual directing the Common". From this viewpoint, the Gradual Doctrine dominates over the Common Doctrine. It is therefore obvious that the wonderful being is ascribed to the Gradual Doctrine. Similarly, Chih-i relates the tathāgatagarbha, which all dharmas move toward, to those of sharpest faculties, who assume the viewpoint of "the Perfect directing the Common". From this viewpoint, the Perfect Doctrine dominates over the Common Doctrine. It is therefore obvious that the tathāgatagarbha is ascribed to the Perfect Doctrine. Mou, referring to the above quotation, also states that the first No-emptiness pertains to the Common Doctrine, the second to the Gradual Doctrine, and the third to the Perfect Doctrine.⁶⁴

We now see that Chih-i speaks of No-emptiness in terms of miao-yu (妙有), or "wondrous existence", and i-ch'ieh-fa ch'ü ju-lai-tsang (一切法趣如來藏), or "all dharmas moving toward the tathāgatagarbha". What then is miao-yu? Chih-i does not define it clearly in his major works. According to the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thoughts, this concept refers to the realm of beings or dharmas which are viewed as

empty in nature, without any clinging or attachment. Consequently the emphasis of miao-yu would imply an affirmative but non-attaching attitude toward the dharmas in the world.⁶⁵ As regards i-ch'ieh-fa ch'ü ju-lai-tsang, Chih-i relates it to the embracing of all Buddhist dharmas (ch'ü i-ch'ieh fo-fa 具一切佛法).⁶⁶ That is, all Buddhist dharmas move toward the tathāgatagarbha. Consequently, all Buddhist dharmas are embraced in the tathāgatagarbha, which is what makes Buddha a reality and is thus called the Buddha Nature. It is apparent that both miao-yu and i-ch'ieh-fa refer to the realm of experience, the realm of phenomena, bearing worldly implications. It is in this context of bearing worldly implications that Chih-i speaks of No-emptiness. It is also in this context that we consider that No-emptiness carries a positive tone.

So far it is clear that Chih-i is critical of the Mādhyamika concept of Emptiness as the Truth, because it is negative in character and lacks worldly connection. That is, it fails to refer to the wonderful being and does not embrace all dharmas. For Chih-i, wonderful being and embracing dharmas are attributes ascribable to the Truth (shih-hsiang, 實相).

Does this criticism do justice to the Mādhyamika? In response, we make the following points.

1. It seems too much to assert that the Mādhyamika Emptiness lacks worldly connection. The intimate relationship between Emptiness and Dependent Origination, as held by Nāgārjuna, gives evidence against Chih-i's position. Rather, we should assert that Nāgārjuna strongly defends the importance of worldly connection to the realization of Truth. He argues in the Kārikā that the supreme Truth, Emptiness, should be

attained in common practices, which are performed in the phenomenal world. Apart from the common practices, there is no Truth realizable. This point will be discussed in full detail in Part II, C.

2. The concept of "wondrous existence" may also be ascribed to the Mādhyamika. In various places of the TCTL the attitude of "non-clinging and non-forsaking" (pu-cho pu-shê 不著不捨) expressed toward the phenomenal world is very present. This attitude is one of the major components of the Prajñāpāramitā thought, of which the TCTL is a good example and explication. This attitude is quite conformable to the concept of a wondrous existence", which teaches of the strength in non-clinging and non-attachment to entities.

3. From the viewpoint of the Perfect Doctrine, which speaks of the Truth in terms of the Buddha Nature, Chih-i's criticism certainly makes sense; for in this context, the worldly entities are all embraced (chü 具). They are therefore included in the Truth itself, rather than in a realm in which the Truth is to be realized, as seen in the t'i-fa thinking. Speaking from an ultimate viewpoint, the worldly entities in the Perfect Doctrine are inseparable from the Truth; they are not inseparable in the Common Doctrine or the Mādhyamika. The concept of 'embrace' (chü 具) in Chih-i's system of thought implies "having as a part of itself", and so "being inseparable from". To distinguish the Perfect Doctrine and Mādhyamika in terms of worldly connection, we can at least say that the former's worldly connection is closer and much more rigid than that of the latter.

4. The distinction of separability and inseparability is based on whether or not the Buddha Nature can be established as the Truth

(shih-hsiang, 實相). The concept of 'embrace' is spoken of merely in the context of the Buddha Nature. As we will see in the next chapter, the Buddha Nature as the Truth is one of the most important concepts in Chih-i's system of thought. It is however very much ignored in the major Mādhyamika texts. It is, for instance, not mentioned in the Kārikā at all.⁶⁷

viii) The Middle Way revealed in the transcendence of extremes

We now come to the discussion of Chih-i's understanding and criticism of the Middle Way as presented in the Mādhyamika. We wish, first of all, to note that he has in mind two kinds of Middle Way. One is the Middle Way revealed in the transcendence of extremes; the other is the Middle Way spoken of in terms of Buddha Nature. He is quite aware of their difference, as he states:

That which transcends annihilation and eternalism is called the Middle Way. It is however not the Buddha Nature - Middle Way.⁶⁸

That is, he makes a sharp distinction between the Middle Way in reference to the transcendence of extremes and the Middle Way manifested in the Buddha Nature.

The concept of Middle Way revealed in the transcendence of extremes appears quite often in Chih-i's works,⁶⁹ and the extremes to be transcended are akin to those specified in the Mādhyamika texts. For example, when he raises the issue of negation of being and nothingness, origination and extinction -- terms Nāgārjuna often enumerates as extremes -- he states,

If being is not determinate, it is non-being. If nothing is not determinate, it is non-nothing. What is called non-being is non-origination. What is called non-nothing is non-extinction. That which transcends the level of being and nothingness is called the Middle Way. This is identical with the Chung-lun.⁷⁰

This is an acknowledgement that the conception of the Middle Way is identical with that mentioned in the Kārikā. To the extent of transcending extremes, Chih-i's understanding of the Middle Way indeed conforms to that of the Mādhyamika, and he is well aware of the fact that it is equivalent to the Mādhyamika way of understanding the Middle Way.

In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that Nāgārjuna's Middle Way is a complement to his Emptiness, and that he does not assert that the Middle Way as the Truth is independent from the Truth of Emptiness. This conception of the Middle Way is affirmed by Chih-i when he discusses the two Truths, i.e., paramārtha-satya (chên-ti 真諦) and lokasaṃvṛti-satya (su-ti 俗諦), the "absolute Truth" and the "relative Truth". As explicated in the Common Doctrine, he says that Emptiness and the Middle Way are combined in the absolute Truth,⁷¹ and that the Middle Way itself is incorporated into the absolute Truth.⁷² In the context of the Common Doctrine, the absolute Truth is referred to as Emptiness, while the relative Truth is referred to as provisionality. It seems clear that Chih-i does not consider the Middle Way as an independent Truth distinguished from Emptiness, but sees it rather as a subordinate conception and so a complement to Emptiness. In view of this, we may say that Chih-i has a proper understanding of the complementary character of the Mādhyamika Middle Way as pointed out in the previous chapter.

We have also mentioned the Mādhyamika thought of the Emptiness of Emptiness in the previous chapter. Corresponding to this thought,

Chih-i discusses the Emptiness of the Middle Way (chung-tao k'ung 中道空). The purpose of this Emptiness of the Middle Way is exactly the same as that of the Emptiness of Emptiness. That is, the Middle Way, being identical to Emptiness, is not to be adhered to; otherwise, it itself becomes a hindrance.⁷³ As pointed out earlier,⁷⁴ Chih-i is well aware of the Mādhyamika thought of the Emptiness of Emptiness as the Truth; it is only natural that he now speaks of the Emptiness of the Middle Way as the complement to the Truth itself. This Emptiness of the Middle Way in all respects conforms to the Mādhyamika spirit of advising against clinging to anything, including the Truth itself.

There is no doubt that Chih-i is well-versed in the Mādhyamika conception of the Middle Way as the transcendence of extremes. He also appreciates its import, but does not accept it without reservation. His criticism is shown in the following section.

ix) The Middle Way is devoid of functions and does not embrace dharmas

We have mentioned that Chih-i has in mind two conceptions of the Middle Way; one revealed in the transcendence of extremes and the other as a manifestation of the Buddha Nature. He constantly criticizes the former from the standpoint of the latter. It is interesting to note that, as the former is expounded in the Mādhyamika which Chih-i regards as Common Doctrine, he on many occasions goes so far as to accuse the Common Doctrine of not understanding the Middle Way at all.⁷⁵ What he means by the Middle Way is, of course, the identity with the Buddha Nature. He asserts in various places in his works that the Middle Way is conceived in this way only in the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine.

Chih-i's criticism of the Middle Way explicated in the Common Doctrine is that it is devoid of functions and does not embrace dharmas. This criticism is made when Chih-i divides the Threefold Truth teaching into five types. In section vii it was mentioned that Chih-i divides the Twofold Truth teaching into seven types. This Twofold Truth refers to the absolute Truth, or chên-ti (真諦), and the relative Truth, or su-ti (俗諦). The absolute Truth in turn refers to Emptiness, and the relative Truth to provisionality. These seven types of Twofold Truth will become seven types of Threefold Truth, if the Truth of the Middle Way is added. Chih-i thinks, however, that the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine, to which the first two types of the Twofold Truth teaching belong respectively, do not fully understand the Middle Way. This Middle Way is spoken of in terms of the Buddha Nature, which, for Chih-i, is not explicated in these two Doctrines. Therefore, Chih-i only speaks of five types of the Threefold Truth teaching. The five types are as follows: "the Gradual entering the Common" (pieh ju t'ung 別入通), "the Perfect entering the Common" (yüan ju t'ung 圓入通), the Gradual Doctrine, "the Perfect entering the Gradual" (yüan ju pieh 圓入別), and the Perfect Doctrine.⁷⁶ In the description of the first type -- the Threefold Truth teaching from the viewpoint of "the Gradual entering the Common" -- Chih-i states:

The Middle Way explicated in the Doctrine in question only differs from Emptiness. This Middle Way is devoid of functions and does not embrace various dharmas.⁷⁷

In this quotation Chih-i is speaking about the Threefold Truth in the context of the Gradual Doctrine's nature of entering (ju 入) or directing (chieh 接) the Common Doctrine. Chih-i uses the word ju, as in pieh

ju t'ung, and the word chieh, as in pieh chieh t'ung, interchangeably.⁷⁸

In the above passage, the Middle Way is specified and criticized. As far as the Chinese grammar is concerned, this Middle Way may be related to either the Gradual Doctrine or the Common Doctrine, both of which are Doctrines in question (tang-chiao 常教). But from the context of this type of Threefold Truth, in which the Common Doctrine is to be guided by the Gradual Doctrine, we can be sure that this type of the Middle Way under criticism should be related to the Common Doctrine.⁷⁹ Indeed, this is a rare occasion in Chih-i's major works, on which the Middle Way of the Common Doctrine is clearly criticized.

The Middle Way criticized is also the Middle Way of the Mādhyamika, and is thus related consequently to the transcendence of extremes. But what does Chih-i's criticism mean? And what are the nature of "a function" and the "embracing of dharmas"? These questions will be dealt with in great detail in the next chapter. In order to avoid repetition, we wish to say that both 'functions' and "embracing dharmas" are spoken of normally in the context of the spatio-temporal world. That is, functions are what are imposed on this actual world, so as to initiate any transformation within it; what are embraced are actually nothing but worldly entities. In Chih-i's view, 'functions' and "embracing dharmas" are truly expressive of the dynamism and immanence of the Middle Way. Indeed, dynamism and immanence are the two attributes of the Buddha Nature, which is identical with the Middle Way.⁸⁰

In sum, Chih-i's criticism of the Mādhyamika Middle Way is to point out that it is not dynamic and immanent; consequently it tends to be interpreted as transcendent of this world. Does this criticism do justice

to the Mādhyamika? We would have to answer in the affirmative, especially in view of the understanding that the Mādhyamika Middle Way is revealed in the transcendence of extremes and is therefore no more than a true principle or state of the entities. This type of the Middle Way tends to be static and transcendent, in the sense that it, as a principle or state, merely provides a method by which to avoid commitment to the extremes. It does not have much to do with the unique force, by which one can act upon and transform the phenomenal world.

It may be helpful to relate this criticism of the Middle Way to Chih-i's comment on the Twofold Truth teaching, which reads as follows:

The Twofold Truth is devoid of the substance of the Middle Way. Therefore, when the absolute [Truth] is clarified, it is eternally quiescent as Emptiness. When being is clarified, it resembles the gold existing in a rock. Both the rock and the gold are beings, yet are different.⁸¹

Here, Chih-i is referring to the Common Doctrine. However, the Twofold Truth teaching is clearly discussed in the Kārikā.⁸² It would seem that Chih-i should have been aware of it. In view of these points, it seems safe to assume that the above comment is directed at Nāgārjuna. As shown in the Kārikā, Nāgārjuna's Twofold Truth is composed of the relative and absolute Truth. The absolute Truth is Emptiness, complemented by the Middle Way. Chih-i's comment that the Twofold Truth is devoid of the substance of Middle Way by all means does not infer that Nāgārjuna does not understand the Middle Way. Rather, he is criticizing Nāgārjuna's Middle Way as a state derived from transcending the extremes. It is a criticism based on the Middle Way as related to the Buddha Nature. Tsung-san Mou also points out that Nāgārjuna's Middle Way pertains to the t'i-fa thought of the Common Doctrine.⁸³ As we have noted before,

this thought does not expound the concept of the Buddha Nature. The word 'substance' (t'i 體) in the concept of the "substance of the Middle Way" (chung-tao t'i 中道體), which Chih-i prefers, suggests that the Middle Way so conceived is more than a state. Though this Middle Way does not necessarily denote substantiality or a metaphysical Substance, which are strongly refuted by all Buddhist schools, it has something to do with the source of actions and functions. The term t'i here is reminiscent of a pair of important categories in classical Chinese philosophy: t'i and yung (用, 'function'). These two categories express the two aspects of entities respectively: their potentiality and their manifestation or function. We are not in a position to discuss in detail these two categories here. Nevertheless, it is certain that chung-tao t'i is spoken of here in the context of potentiality and function. We are convinced that the source of actions and functions can be related to the Buddha Nature, which, for Chih-i, can initiate functions as such. It is therefore quite understandable that Chih-i raises the concept of the substance of the Middle Way in contrast to the expression of the "eternally quiescent as Emptiness" (永寂如空). 'quiescence' (chi 寂) in Chinese usually denotes a transcendent state which lacks function and dynamism. For Chih-i, the Mādhyamika Middle Way is no more than a static type of Emptiness. He earnestly believed that the authentic Middle Way, as shih-hsiang (實相) or the ultimate Truth, should be identical to No-emptiness and dynamic at all times.

Notes

1. For example, in MHCK, T.46.30b, 31c, 34a-b, 47c, 69c, 74c-75b, 79c, 128a-b; in FHFI, T.33.682c-683a, 702c-703c, 737b, 742a-c, 784a-790c; in FHCW, T.34.3b; and many places in SCI and WMCHS.

2. In this work, for example, seven points are summed up with regard to the explication of the theory. They are: explanation of the names of the four doctrines, on the interpreted, on entering the principle through the four doors, on the difference of positions, on expediency and ultimacy, on contemplation of the mind, and finally, on harmonizing various sūtras and śāstras. Cf. T.46.721a. Indeed the full name of this work, Ssū-chiao i, suggests that this is the work devoted to the explication of the meaning of the four doctrines classified by Chih-i.

3. Cf. WMCHS, chap. 3, T.38.533a-b; SCI, chap. 1, T.46.723c. In the SCI, Chih-i even goes as far as to quote the sūtras and śāstras generally (T.46.723c) and specifically (T.46.723b), in order to justify the four types of Buddhist doctrines.

4. For an extensive study of the various ways of classifying the Buddhist doctrines before Chih-i, cf. Hurvitz, pp. 214-229.

5. For a brief overall estimation of the characteristic of Chih-i's classification theory, cf. T'ang, pp. 1111-1116.

6. Andō, Tendaigaku: Kompon shisō to sono tenkai (天台学: 根本思想, その展開). Kyoto: Heirakuji Shōten, 1968, pp. 92-111; Tamura, pp. 81-97; Hurvitz, pp. 248-271.

7. Hurvitz, p. 264.

8. In Chih-i's works, although reference is frequently made to these four types of Buddhist doctrine, a clear enumeration and explanation of them are often lacking. In this regard, the first chapter of SCI (T.46.721a-722b) and the third chapter of WMCHS (T.38.532b-533a) are the exceptions. There the four doctrines are enumerated and their implications are dealt with in detail. Yet there are some crucial points missing. Indeed, there is not a single paragraph in Chih-i's works which gives a satisfactory description, including all the important points. Many crucial points, such as those concerning Chih-i's conception of Buddha-Nature and No-emptiness, are scattered here and there. Our Observation and reflection of Chih-i's classification theory will consequently be based on the SCI, the WMCHS, and those scattered expressions found throughout Chih-i's works.

9. Cf. FHFI, chap. 1, T.33.688a-b. Incidentally, a special point should be mentioned with regard to Chih-i when he speaks of the way of realizing the Truth advocated by the Tripiṭaka Doctrine in terms of hsi-fa ju-k'ung. The term hsi (析) usually means "to analyze". Hurvitz describes this way as 'analytic'. (Hurvitz, p. 260) In Chih-i's use,

however, hsi means more than to analyze because it must cover the implications of disintegration and elimination. This point will be made clearer later.

10. FHHI, chap. 8, T.33.785b; SCI, chap. 3, T.46.730a-b.

11. FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.703c.

12. Cf. the chapter below, where the concept of Middle Way-Buddha Nature is treated in full. It should be noted that the predicates such as "negative, static and transcendent", on the one hand, and "positive, dynamic and immanent", on the other, are our own terminologies to describe Chih-i's understanding of the concepts of Emptiness and the Middle Way. Why these terminologies are used will be accounted for in due course.

13. Fa-chieh tz'u-ti ch'u-mên, op. cit., chap. 2, T.46.681a-b. For an excellent elaboration of the difference between hsi-fa and t'i-fa, cf. T'ang, pp. 1134-1135.

14. The contrast of the terms, 'dullness' and 'skillfulness', are seen throughout Chih-i's works, e.g. FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.688a-b, 690a; chap. 8, T.33.785b; MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.5c, 7b; SCI, chap. 3, T.46.730a-b; chap. 12, T.46.766b; WMCHS, chap. 2, T.38.526a-b. They are also mentioned in T'i-kuan's TTSCI, T.46.778a. T'i-kuan was traditionally regarded as a faithful disciple of Chih-i.

15. FHHI, chap. 6, T.33.754c; chap. 8, T.33.784c; FHCW, chap. 1, T.34.5a; WMCHS, chap. 2, T.38.526a-b.

16. FHHI, chap. 9, T.33.790c.

17. 實有時無真, 滅有時無俗. (FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.702c)

18. 二諦義不成. (Ibid., loc. cit.)

19. 即俗而真. (Ibid., loc. cit.)

20. 體法即真. (FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.690a)

21. MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.33a. Cf. also TTSCI, T.46.778a.

22. Cf. FHCW, chap. 2, T.34.17a.

23. WMCLS, chap. 1, T.38.579b.

24. SCI, chap. 9, T.46.752a.

25. SCI, chap. 3, T.46.729c.

26. Chih-i raises Buddha Nature as the determining factor on many occasions. See, for example, when he makes a general observation

of the four types of doctrine (SCI, chap. 1, T.46.726a-b), of both the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine (FHHI, chap. 8, T.33.785b), and of the Gradual Doctrine alone (MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.75a). He also states that both the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine see No-emptiness, which is Buddha Nature (FHHI, chap. 8, T.33.781c). In the WMCHS, where the concept of Middle Way- Buddha Nature is often mentioned, Chih-i points out that the Common Doctrine does not understand the nature of Middle Way - Buddha Nature (chap. 4, T.38.546b), that the Gradual Doctrine understands it (chap. 4, T.38.540b), and that the Perfect Doctrine penetrates the realm of the supreme Truth of Middle Way - Buddha Nature (chap. 4, T.38.541b).

27. The permanency, dynamism and immanence of Buddha Nature will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

28. Andō, op. cit., pp. 102-106.

29. Ibid., pp. 106-111.

30. For li-pieh, cf. FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.688a-b; chap. 1, T.33.690a; chap. 3, T.33.710b. For tz'u-ti, cf. FHWC, chap. 1, T.34.5a; WMCLS, chap. 1, T.38.576a; FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.688a-b. For li-chieh hsiu-hsing, cf. WMCHS, chap. 3, T.38.538b-c; SCI, chap. 9, T.46.752a; TTSCI, T.46.778a.

31. FHHI, chap. 8, T.33.785a.

32. Hurvitz, p. 262.

33. For yuan-tun cf. FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.688a-b. For pu tz'u-ti cf. FHWC, chap. 1, T.34.5a.

34. FHWC, chap. 1, T.34.5a.

35. FHHI, chap. 8, T.33.781c.

36. WMCHS, chap. 4, T.38.542b.

37. FHHI, chap. 7, T.33.764a-b.

38. WMCHS, chap. 4, T.38.544b.

39. Cf. SCI, chap. 1, T.46.721a-722b; WMCHS, chap. 4, T.38.544b-c; chap. 6, T.38.560c-561c; and other locations.

40. Hurvitz, p. 260.

41. For the sake of brevity, we cannot explicate these four types of realization of the Four Noble Truths and their respective relationships to the four Doctrines. For details of these issues, cf. FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.701a-b; SCI, chap. 2, T.46.725b-726b. Chih-i even goes so far as

to regard these four types of realizing the Four Noble Truths as wisdom. Cf. FHHI, chap. 4, T.33.720c-721b. For a brief but excellent description of these various types of approaches to the Four Noble Truths, cf. Tamura, pp. 90-91.

42. 法若有生, 亦可有滅。法本不生, 今則不滅。(FHHI, chap. 4, T.33.721a)

43. Kārikā-P, p. 11; CL, chap. 1, T.30.1c.

44. Kārikā-P, p. 12; CL, 1:1, T.30.2b. For the employment of the negative of the Four Alternatives, cf. Part II, A, in this thesis.

45. 即事而真, 非滅後真。(FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.701a)

46. 中論品品別意, 而俱會無生。(MHCK, chap. 8, T.46.117a)

47. SCI, chap. 1, T.46.722a.

48. We have no intention to discuss the close doctrinal relationship, as it has already been pointed out by many scholars. For instance, Robinson admits that to some extent Nāgārjuna expounds the teachings of some important Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. (Robinson, pp. 61-65) Kajiyama suggests that Nāgārjuna inherits and accepts the world of mystical intuition expressed in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. (Kajiyama, p. 34) Inada regards Nāgārjuna as the heir to the teachings of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. (Inada, p. 21) And, according to Sprung, scholars such as E. Conze, N. Dutt, M. Winternitz, E. Frauwallner, et. al., all agree that there is a most intimate and creative relationship between Nāgārjuna's thought and the philosophy of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. (Sprung, p.26)

49. [龍樹]以不可得空, 洗滌封著, 習應一切法空。是名與般若相應。(FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.742b) For the meaning of the expression "unattainable Emptiness", see below.

50. FHHI, chap. 3, T.33.713c; chap. 9, T.33.792b-c.

51. FHHI, chap. 10, T.33.813b.

52. SCI, chap. 2, T.46.727b; WMCHS, chap. 3, T.38.534b-c.

53. Cf. Part I, A, vii, of this thesis, where the Sanskrit original and Kumārajīva's translation of the verse are quoted.

54. [龍樹]以不可得空, 洗滌封著, . . . 淨諸法已, 點空說法, 結四句相。(FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.742b)

55. Inada, p. 147. sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate, sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyam yasya na yujyate. (Kārikā-P, p. 500) Kumārajīva's rendition: "以有空義故, 一切法得成; 若無空義者, 一切則不成。" (CL, 24:14, T.30.33a)

56. Inada, p. 147.

57. 智者見空,復應見不空。那得恒住于空? (FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.738a)

58. 無相教明空蕩相,未明佛性常住,猶是無常. (FHHI, chap. 10, T.33.801c) This criticism is directed at the teaching of no-characteristic, which Chih-i identifies with the Prajñāpāramitā. This identification is evidenced in the compound terms po-jê wu-hsiang chiao 般若無相教 (FHHI, chap. 10, T.33.803b) or wu-hsiang po-jê chiao 無相般若教 (FHHI, chap. 10, T.33.803c), which Chih-i views as one of the three Buddhist teachings. For a fluent explanation of these teachings, cf. Taya, p. 154b.

59. FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.700c; WMCHS, chap. 3, T.38.538b-c; WMCHS, chap. 6, T.38.555c.

60. It is interesting to note that the concept of No-emptiness (Skt., aśūnya; Chi., pu-k'ung 不空) also appears in the Kārikā (Kārikā-P, p. 511; T.30.34a; Kārikā-P, p. 512; T.30.34b; Kārikā-P, p. 521; T.30.34c). This No-emptiness, however, is spoken of in terms of substantiality, and so is different from Chih-i's. That is, Nāgārjuna's No-emptiness is the opposite of Emptiness, which is the negation of the metaphysical substantiality, or, in other words, is non-substantiality. It follows that, being logically conceived, No-emptiness is another form of substantiality. Chih-i's No-emptiness however is identified with Buddha Nature, which is not a substantiality in any metaphysical sense.

61. FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.702c-703b. For a comprehensive explication of this division, cf. Mou, pp. 648-665.

62. 破著空故,故言不空。空著若破,但是見空不見不空。利人謂不空是妙有,故言不空。利人聞不空,謂是如來藏,一切法趣如來藏. (FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.703a)

63. Chih-i is in fact well aware of this thought of the Emptiness of Emptiness. In MHCK (chap. 4, T.46.38c) he quotes the famous verse of the CL, in which the Emptiness of Emptiness is clearly expressed (CL, 13:9, T.30.18c). (Chih-i's quotation of this verse is slightly different in wording from the original. The slight difference, however, can be ignored.) In the same work he also stresses that the sickness of Emptiness is also to be emptied. (空病亦空. MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.51a)

64. Mou, pp. 661-662.

65. For an explication of miao-yu, cf. H. Nakamura, ed., Shin Bukkyō jiten (新・佛教辭典). Tokyo: Seishin Shōbō, 1976, p. 2971.

66. 圓人聞不空,即知具一切佛法,無有缺減,故言一切趣不空也. (FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.703b) Here, "all Buddhist dharmas" (i-ch'ieh fo-fa 一切佛法) by all means include worldly entities. Indeed, when

Chih-i speaks of "embracing dharmas", he usually refers to the worldly entities. The concept of 'embrace' (chü 具) will be fully treated in the next chapter.

67. Though the term "Buddha Nature" appears occasionally in the *Prajñāpāramitā* text (e.g., T.25.420b, 491c, 715b, and others), it is not mentioned in the TCTL itself. This shows that although the author of the TCTL is aware of the concept of Buddha Nature, he does not pay any attention to it.

68. 離斷常名中道, 非佛性中道. (MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.7a)

69. For instance, FHWK, chap. 1, T.34.8a; chap. 8, T.34.120a; chap. 10, T.34.145c; MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.6c; WMCLS, chap. 8, T.38.672c; chap. 9, T.38.690a; T.38.695a; chap. 10, T.38.695c-696a; T.38.701c.

70. 若不定有, 則非有; 若不定無, 則非無. 非有者, 非生也; 非無者, 非滅也. 出于有無之表是名中道. 與中論同. (MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.66b)

71. 通教真諦, 空中合論. (MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.35a)

72. 如通教所明二諦含中道在真諦中. (WMCLS, chap. 10, T.38.702b)

73. 若計有中道, 則於中道有病. 此病亦空, 故言中道亦空. (WMCLS, chap. 8, T.38.672c)

74. Cf. notes 62 and 63 above.

75. This accusation is mainly made in FHHI, for instance, chap. 2, T.33.704a, T.33.704c-705a; chap. 5, T.33.740a, T.33.746b; chap. 7, T.33.762c; chap. 9, T.33.787c-788a. This accusation is also applicable to the *Tripiṭaka* Doctrine.

76. For details about the five types of the Threefold Truth teaching, cf. FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.704c-705a.

77. 當教論中, 但異空而已. 中無功用, 不備諸法. (Ibid., loc. cit.)

78. For the use of chieh, cf. section vii.

79. Mou also points out that tang-chiao here should denote the Common Doctrine. Cf. Mou, p. 749.

80. For details concerning these two attributes and the identification of the Middle Way with the Buddha Nature, cf. the next chapter.

81. 二諦無中道體. 故明真時, 則永寂如空, 明有時如石裏有金, 石金有異. (WMCLS, chap. 10, T.38.702c)

82. 諸佛依二諦, 為衆生說法: 一以世俗諦, 二第一義諦. (CL. 24:8, T.30.32c) Cf. also Kārikā-P, p. 492. This Twofold Truth teaching will be dealt with in great detail in Part II, C.

83. Mou, p. 562.

C. Middle Way-Buddha Nature as the Truth

The above discussions have shown our response to the first basic question raised in this thesis. Let us now deal with the second one: namely, How does Chih-i's Middle Way-Buddha Nature differ from the Mādhyamika's Middle Way? As a matter of fact, when we explicated Chih-i's understanding and criticism of the Mādhyamika's Middle Way in the above chapter, we responded to this question to a limited extent. That is, Chih-i is dissatisfied with the Mādhyamika's Middle Way in the sense that it is devoid of functions and does not embrace dharmas. This dissatisfaction is equally applicable to the Mādhyamika concept of Emptiness as the Truth, which Chih-i regards as partial or one-sided (p'ien 偏), and without direct and strict connection with the empirical world. Therefore, for Chih-i, the Truth expounded in the Mādhyamika and the Common Doctrine, whether it be termed 'Emptiness' or "Middle Way", tends to be negative, static and transcendent. He thinks that Truth should be quite otherwise. It should be permanent, dynamic and all-embracing.

It has been mentioned before that Chih-i speaks of Truth in terms of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature. Indeed, he himself is well aware of the fact that Middle Way-Buddha Nature is an issue of Truth, with deep soteriological implications. He states:

The Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine contemplate [the nature of] Origination and No-origination respectively, penetrating the one-sided Principle, which they call the True and Ultimate. On the other hand, the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine contemplate [the nature of] Immeasurability and No-creation respectively, penetrating the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, which they call the True and Ultimate.¹

Here Chih-i is discussing the four types of understanding the Four Noble Truths in Primitive Buddhism in the context of his classification theory. He ascribes the nature of Origination (shêng 生), No-origination (wu-shêng 無生), Immeasurability (wu-liang 無量) and No-creation (wu-tso 無作)² to the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, Common Doctrine, Gradual Doctrine and Perfect Doctrine respectively. The term chên-shih (真實), or "True and Ultimate", explicitly signifies that the issue in question is about the Truth, or the ultimate Truth.

Chih-i also states:

What is called liberation is the realization of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature.³

This statement is made in the WMCLS, chap. 8. In the following chapter, Chih-i remarks that the penetration of the Gradual and Perfect Doctrines into the Middle Way is the Buddha Way.⁴ This shows the extreme importance of penetrating the Middle Way as the way to Buddhahood. As this Middle Way is spoken of in the context of the Gradual and Perfect Doctrines, it is, no doubt, the Middle Way-Buddha Nature.⁵ In view of the understanding that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature is what is to be penetrated and realized in order to attain Buddhahood and liberation, Chih-i undoubtedly regards it as the Truth, or the ultimate Truth.

As has been pointed out earlier, the concept of Middle Way-Buddha Nature compounds and identifies the Middle Way and Buddha Nature. This identification is, in fact, declared by Chih-i himself in his FHFI, when he discusses the Buddhist merits.⁶ This compound concept appears very often in Chih-i's most important works, viz., MHCK, FHFI, SCI and WMCHS. It occasionally appears in the WMCLS and once in the Fa-chieh tz'u-ti

ch'u-mên.⁷ Sometimes the concept is termed "Buddha Nature - Middle Way" (fo-hsing chung-tao 佛性中道), rather than "Middle Way-Buddha Nature."⁸ There is, however, not the slightest difference between these two terms.

Although Chih-i does not explicitly enumerate the characteristics of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, from a wide study of his major works we are able to find out that it has three characteristics, which are for Chih-i entirely lacking in the Mādhyamika's Middle Way. They are, in Chih-i's own terminology, "ever-abidingness" (ch'ang-chu 常住), "meritorious function" (kung-yung 功用) and "embracing various dharmas" (chü chu-fa 具諸法). Only after all these characteristics are fully accounted for can we have a clear picture of the differences between the Middle Way-Buddha Nature and the Mādhyamika's Middle Way. Since these differences are extremely significant to the understanding of Chih-i's system of thought, the three characteristics must be delineated in detail.

Incidentally, although the Middle Way-Buddha Nature assumes a crucial position in Chih-i's thought, it is widely ignored by modern scholars in T'ien-t'ai Buddhism. Not only is there no examination of its characteristics, in fact the concept is not even mentioned in the works of Andō, Satō, Tamaki, Tamura and Hurvitz listed in our bibliography. Accordingly, the study of this concept is all the more necessary for a proper understanding of Chih-i's thought.

i) The ever-abidingness of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature

Ever-abidingness denotes the nature of permanence which is not subject to change. Whatever has this nature is able to abide by itself and persist forever. Chih-i basically ascribes this nature to the Dharma

Body (Skt., dharmakāya; Chi., fa-shên 法身) and the Buddha Nature.⁹

On the one hand, as seen in the final section of the above chapter, he criticizes Nāgārjuna's Twofold Truth as "devoid of the substance of the Middle Way" (二諦無中道體). On the other hand, he often raises the issue of the ever-abidingness of the Buddha Nature and the Dharma Body, which, as we will know very soon, he identifies with the Middle Way. It seems that Chih-i is in favour of the Middle Way as a body or substance, which is for him the Buddha Nature or the Middle Way-Buddha Nature; he therefore ascribes the ever-abiding nature to the Middle Way-Buddha Nature as an important characteristic.

The nature of ever abidingness of the Dharma Body is often stated by Chih-i in its contrast with the physical body, which obviously pertains to the realm of life and death, and is consequently impermanent. This is mainly done in his FHFI, where he remarks:

The Vairocana Buddha stays on the lotus flower sea with the great bodhisattvas. All of them are not human beings subject to life and death.¹⁰

What Chih-i wants to convey is that the Vairocana Buddha and the great bodhisattvas all have the form of the Dharma Body, which is different from the physical body that undergoes birth and death. Consequently he further remarks:

What is quiescent is liberation. Liberation necessarily involves a person. This person is [spoken of in terms of] the Dharma Body, which is not the actual [physical] body.¹¹

The ever-abidingness seems to refer to something spiritual, something with a permanent nature. This point, that the Dharma Body is spiritual and permanent, is described in a most detailed manner in the WMCLS. There Chih-i speaks of two kinds of body, namely, shēng-shên (生身)

and fa-hsing shên (法性身). Shêng-shên is the corporeal body in the nature of life and death, while fa-hsing shên is the body in reference to the Truth. The Sanskrit for the term fa-hsing is dharmatā, or dharmatva, which means the true nature or Truth of dharmas. The difference according to Chih-i is that shêng-shên is affected by nine kinds of defilement (Skt., kleśa; Chi., fang-nao 煩惱): hunger, thirst, cold, heat and other ailments. When these troubles come, the body has to be cured; for example, when it is hungry, one should drink some milk. On the other hand, fa-hsing shên is free from these troubles. It is in fact the Dharma Body, which is in the nature of a diamond and is everlasting.¹² Chih-i later positively asserts that the authentic Dharma Body is devoid of these ailments.¹³ Following this assertion an analogy between the Dharma Body and a diamond is elaborated:

The body of the tathāgata has the substance of a diamond. This is the permanent body of the Dharma Body. The purpose of the analogy [of this Dharma Body] with the diamond is [to indicate] that the substance [of this Body] is indestructible, that its functions are beneficial, and that it penetrates completely into Reality. The 'indestructibility' suggests that the Dharma Body is not infected by the impurities of illusion, defilement and life and death, remaining ever-abiding and unchangeable. The 'beneficence' suggests the quality of wisdom belonging to the Dharma Body. The merit of illumination of the prajñā [wisdom over phenomena] is all-inclusive. And the 'complete penetration into Reality' suggests the power of the severance of the Dharma Body. The liberation attained is ultimate and the hindrance of defilements is completely severed.¹⁴

It should be noted that the analogy of the Dharma Body with a diamond does not mean that both are of the same dimension. The diamond, no matter how 'indestructible' it may be, is still destructible as an item within the realm of Dependent Origination. Rather, this analogy signifies that Chih-i is inclined to speak of the Dharma Body in terms of its permanent,

functional and ultimate nature. The permanent nature refers to indestructibility (chien 堅), the functional nature to beneficence (li 利), and the ultimate nature to Reality (pên-chi 本際).

Chih-i also ascribes the ever-abiding nature to the Buddha Nature. When he does so, he usually mentions without much elaboration the expressions, "Buddha Nature is ever-abiding" (fo-hsing ch'ang-chu 佛性常住), or "the ever-abiding Buddha Nature" (ch'ang-chu fo-hsing 常住佛性).¹⁵ Nevertheless, he identifies the Middle Way and the Dharma Body.¹⁶ He even coins a compound term, "Middle Way - Dharma Body" (chung-tao fa-shên 中道法身), to express this identification.¹⁷ It is thus clear that, for him, the Middle Way, Dharma Body and Buddha Nature all denote the same subject: the Middle Way-Buddha Nature. It is also clear that the ever-abiding nature he ascribes to the Dharma Body is also ascribed to the Buddha Nature. He creates a rather complicated statement, "Buddha Nature-Dharma Body is ever-abiding" (fo-hsing fa-shên ch'ang-chu 佛性法身常住), to express this idea.¹⁸

In view of the identity of the Dharma Body and the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, it is certain that the latter also has the ever-abiding nature, which is expressed in terms of substance (t'i 體), function (yung 用) and Reality (pên-chi 本際). It is also certain that the Mādhyamika, as the Common Doctrine, is devoid of this nature. On some occasions, Chih-i criticizes the Common Doctrine for failing to understand the permanent nature.¹⁹ Mou also points out that the Chung-lun is devoid of the idea of the permanence of the Buddha Nature.²⁰ This is expected because this permanent nature is spoken of only in the context of the Buddha Nature, a concept which is lacking in the Mādhyamika as we mentioned earlier.

ii) The functional nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature

Chih-i also ascribes a functional nature to the Middle Way-Buddha Nature as a characteristic; and he places much stress on this nature. This is evidenced in the following points. First, Chih-i vehemently criticizes the Middle Way explicated in the Mādhyamika and Common Doctrine as being devoid of functions and lacking the nature of "embracing dharmas", as described in the previous chapter.²¹ Apparently this criticism is made from the standpoint of the Perfect Doctrine, the highest Buddhist doctrine for Chih-i. It consequently can be inferred that the functional nature must, in Chih-i's view, play an important role in the establishment of the concept of Middle Way-Buddha Nature, which is the Truth in the Perfect Doctrine. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, Chih-i speaks of the Dharma Body in terms of t'i and yung, i.e., substance and function. On some occasions, he speaks of this function as "the great function without limits" (wu-fang ta-yung 無方大用). For example, he divides liberation into two types: conceivable liberation and inconceivable liberation. He remarks that the latter has this "great function without limits", whereas the former has not.²² This inconceivable liberation, which is the authentic one, is attained in the realization of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature.²³ He also relates the "great function without limits" to the tathāgata,²⁴ which is the potential state of the Dharma Body.²⁵ This, it should be remembered, is another expression of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature. Therefore we see that Chih-i speaks of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature in terms of function, which is great and without limits.

To signify this functional nature, Chih-i proposes three terms in his major writings: kung-yung (功用), li-yung (力用), and simply

yung (用).²⁶ Generally speaking, these three terms all refer to the same thing, namely, the function or functions exerted toward this empirical world. Once one penetrates more deeply into the issue, however, a seemingly slight but actually very significant difference can be discerned. That is, in the cases of kung-yung and li-yung, Chih-i divides them into kung and yung, li and yung, respectively. With regard to kung-yung, he states:

Kung refers to self-cultivation, while yung refers to the benefit to entities [or others]. If taken together, they signify the transformation of others.²⁷

With regard to li-yung, he specifically refers li to the power of wisdom which enables one to understand the Principle or the Truth; by yung he refers to the function of wisdom in transforming others.²⁸ This reference is further reflected in Chih-i's discussion on the part of Function (yung) in his FHFI. As a matter of fact, the FHFI, one of Chih-i's most important works, is composed of five parts dealing with five topics. The fourth part is devoted to the discussion of function. This demonstrates Chih-i's emphasis of the concept of function in his system.²⁹

As we have just seen, kung-yung and li-yung can be divided into two components. Both divisions further indicate that the functional nature can be realized and completed in two steps: in self-cultivation and in the transformation of others. The former represents the first step and the latter the second. It is natural for one to cultivate himself sufficiently before exerting himself in transforming others. Chih-i is clearly aware of this point. He remarks that the yung is deeply influenced by the kung. This is just like the case of trees. Only when they are deeply rooted, can their branches, flowers and leaves flourish.³⁰

Here, kung is associated with the roots, while yung represents the branches, flowers and leaves.

Given these differences between kung and yung, and li and yung, Chih-i nevertheless views yung alone as expressive of the functional nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, and greatly emphasizes the aspect of the transformation of others. In a brief but precise explanation of the five topics dealt with in the five parts of the FHHL, he simply enumerates yung as the topic of the fourth part, and states that yung is transforming others.³¹ Later he adds that yung is benefitting other.³² In view of this, we will employ in the following discussions the term yung (or 'function') to signify the functional nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature. This term is, if not otherwise specified, expressive of the above mentioned implications of kung and li.

Chih-i asserts that this functional nature is to be realized in relation to the actual world of space and time. That is, one has to enter this actual world and engage himself in its affairs. This is the so-called ju-chia (入假), or "entering the provisional [realm]". This ju-chia is an indispensable step in benefitting others, as Chih-i states:

If [one] abides in Emptiness, that will never be beneficial to the sentient beings. If [one] aims at benefitting others, that is the meaning of entering the provisional.³³

The expression ju-chia appears quite often in the MHCK, chapter 6.³⁴

Indeed, Chih-i spends ample space in this chapter discussing the motivations and circumstances (yin-yuan 因緣) of ju-chia³⁵ and the process to complete it.³⁶ These things are usually related to the bodhisattvas. In this connection, Chih-i also mentions ch'u-chia (出假).³⁷ In Chinese, ch'u (出), "to leave", is commonly used as the opposite of ju (入),

"to enter". Interestingly enough, in the context in which ch'u-chia appears, it means exactly the same as ju-chia, i.e., to "enter the provisional world". This can be inferred in the MHCK, which states:

Originally, the bodhisattva practises Emptiness, not because he values Emptiness, but for the sake of the sentient beings. He does not value Emptiness, therefore he does not abide [in it]. For the sake of benefitting the sentient beings, he has to enter [their realm].³⁸

The word for 'enter' here is ch'u. The sentient beings stay in the empirical or provisional world. In order to benefit them, the bodhisattva has to enter this world, ch'u-chia. Chih-i makes no difference between ch'u-chia and ju-chia. Indeed, both ch'u and ju mean 'enter' in the context in question. Yet it should be noted that entering the provisional with or without Emptiness makes a big difference. This difference deserves our attention. To enter the provisional with Emptiness entails a non-attachment to the substantiality of the provisional, while entering without Emptiness does not. As will be seen in Part II, B below, Chih-i speaks of the Contemplation of the Provisional (chia-kuan 假觀) in terms of "entering into the Provisional from Emptiness" (ts'ung-k'ung ju-chia 從空入假). This Contemplation embraces the Contemplation of Emptiness (k'ung kuan 空觀); it is likely that entering the provisional or ju-chia in the present context is one with Emptiness.

Chih-i understands ju-chia or entering the provisional in terms of benefitting others. This benefitting others mainly denotes the saving of the sentient beings, who suffer constantly in this world of life and death. That is to say, the function in question is basically confined to the saving of the sentient beings. This can also be inferred from Chih-i's statement that if one does not save the sentient beings, one

is not capable of functioning.³⁹

iii) To put the sentient beings into correct places with the perfect function

The issue of the function in question is that the function has to be performed in the world which is by nature provisional. Consequently one has to enter this world to save the sentient beings. The nature of the function is shown by means of this action. Here, then, a crucial question arises: How does the function operate? Or more specifically, how are the sentient beings to be saved? In response to this issue, Chih-i explains in the context of describing the perspective of the Perfect Doctrine:

The bodhisattva hears the perfect Dharma, awakens the perfect faith, establishes perfect actions, abides on the perfect position, decorates himself with perfect merits, and puts the sentient beings into correct places with the perfect function. . . . How does he place the sentient beings perfectly? He may shed light, enabling the sentient beings to benefit from the wisdom of penetrating the identity of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way, and to acquire the method of the Four Alternatives. Or they may attain [the goal], whether they are walking, standing, sitting, lying, speaking, remaining silent or working. . . .

[The Dragon King] makes various kinds of clouds, thunder, lightning and rain. The Dragon stays in his own palace, yet he is able to make all of these without slightest movement himself. The bodhisattva is likewise. Penetrating into the identity of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way, he enables [the sentient beings] to obtain various kinds of benefit and acquire various kinds of ability, yet with no effect on the Dharma Nature. This is called 'putting the sentient beings into correct places with the perfect function'.⁴⁰

This is a beautiful and lively elaboration of the bodhisattva's function with respect to the saving of the sentient beings. "The Bodhisattva hears the perfect Dharma, . . . decorates himself with perfect merits" corresponds obviously to kung, "self-cultivation"; while "putting the

sentient beings into correct places with the perfect function" corresponds to yung, signifying the benefitting of others. The function in the statement that the bodhisattva "put(s) the sentient beings into correct places with the perfect function" (以圓力用建立衆生), is undoubtedly the function of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature. The treatment of the sentient beings with this function is manifestly soteriological. This is shown in the point that what benefit the sentient beings are the wisdom of the Threefold Contemplation (i.e., the penetration into the identity of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way) and the method of the Four Alternatives. Both are, for Chih-i, closely related to the realization of the Truth and attainment of liberation.⁴¹

To put the sentient beings into correct places with the perfect function concerns an endeavour to cope with the afflictions (defilements and ignorance), with which the sentient beings are confronted. With regard to this endeavour, Chih-i proposes three steps by means of a medical analogy dealing with the curing of diseases. The three steps are: to diagnose the diseases, to select the medicine, and to distribute the medicine.⁴² With respect to the diagnosis of the diseases, Chih-i remarks that the diseases are closely analogous to the attachment to false views of self (wo-chian 我見), which arise from the delusive mind (huo-hsin 惑心). This delusive mind can initiate numerous false views, all of which are conducive to various kinds of evil conduct, trapping one in the realm of transmigration.⁴³ With respect to the selection of the medicine, Chih-i points out that just as there are numerous diseases, there are also equally numerous medications.⁴⁴ He also states:

Every dharma has various names, characteristics and efficacies.

All bodhisattvas who enter the provisional world should distinguish and understand them. For the sake of [saving] the sentient beings, they collect various dharma-medications like the sea-instructors. Whoever does not understand [the dharma-medications] cannot benefit [the world of] entities. In order to understand [them], [the bodhisattvas] practise cessation, contemplation, great compassion, vow-taking and the power of persistent exertion whole-heartedly and thoroughly.⁴⁵

With respect to the distribution of the medicine, Chih-i remarks that this should be done with the consideration of the talent of the sentient beings. He divides the talent of the sentient beings into four categories, and proposes the distribution of 'medicine' in the context of his theory of the classification of the Buddhist doctrine. That is, the medicine of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine is distributed to those of low talent, that of the Common Doctrine to those of medium talent, that of the Gradual Doctrine to those of high talent, and that of the Perfect Doctrine to those of supreme talent.⁴⁶

The diseases and their remedies are, of course, symbolic; they are spoken of in an entirely soteriological sense. What is important is that the soteriological goal -- liberation of the sentient beings -- must be achieved by means of actions. These actions, usually undertaken by the bodhisattvas, must be imposed upon the spatio - temporal world of life and death, "the world of sufferings".⁴⁷ The bodhisattvas, who are capable of the attainment of Nirvāṇa, must leave the transcendent state of Emptiness, enter the provisional world (ju-chia), and undertake actions. The functional nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature can only be spoken of in these actions. In light of this functional nature, we can also speak of the dynamism of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature.

The concept of function -- whether it be termed ying, kung, or

li -- appears very frequently in Chih-i's works. Interestingly enough, Chih-i occasionally employs a compound term, ta-yung-kung-li (大用功力),⁴⁸ uniting yung, kung and li to express their greatness. Chih-i's stress of the function is undeniable. From the function's extremely close relationship with the empirical world, Chih-i's emphasis of this world is also clear. This emphasis deserves our attention even more, in view of Chih-i's comparison of the function with the Transformation Body, one of the three bodies of the Buddha. We will end up this section with the delineation of this point.

The theory of Three Bodies (Skt., trikāya; Chi., san-shên 三身) states that the Buddha has three forms of body: the Dharma Body (Skt., dharma-kāya; Chi., fa-shên 法身), the Bliss Body (Skt., saṃbhoga-kāya; Chi., pao-shên 報身) and the Transformation Body (Skt., nirmāṇa-kāya; Chi., ying-shên 應身). It can be traced back to Indian Buddhism and has been widely studied by scholars.⁴⁹ Generally speaking, "Dharma Body" denotes the essence of the Buddha, or the Buddha in and of Himself. "Bliss Body" denotes the body through which the Buddha enjoys the bliss resulting from enlightenment. "Transformation Body" refers to the body the Buddha assumes in cultivating and transforming the sentient beings. Chih-i himself has his own understanding of the Dharma Body, the Transformation Body, and their relationship, as he remarks:

In the [very] first moment that the Dharma Body as the origin is attained, the function of the Transformation Body is initiated right within the substance [of the Dharma Body].⁵⁰

Chih-i speaks here of the Dharma Body and the Transformation Body in terms of pên (本), 'origin' and yung (用), 'function' respectively.⁵¹

Elsewhere he refers to the Dharma Body as t'i (體) and to the Trans-

formation Body as yung.⁵² In Chinese, pên and t'i entail each other in meaning, and the combination of them, pên-t'i (本體), is expressive of the ultimate Reality. Chih-i also states that the function of the Transformation Body is the manifestation of the Dharma Body, and praises this function as inconceivable.⁵³ In view of this yung-t'i relationship between the Transformation Body and Dharma Body, and the identity of the Dharma Body and the Middle Way-Buddha Nature which was described in section i above, we are certain that the function spoken of here is also the function of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature.

The functional nature in relation to the Transformation Body can be seen in the apparition of the Buddha or bodhisattva. That is, the Buddha or bodhisattva, with the Dharma Body as their spiritual root, can assume different apparitions in order to save the sentient beings. The apparitions assumed are in accord with the individual needs and circumstances of the sentient beings. Indeed, the term ying (應) in ying-shên signifies this point. Chih-i elaborates this issue in the following manner:

If the sentient beings should attain liberation by means of the [form of a] Buddha body, [the Buddha or bodhisattva] will assume the Buddha body to preach and distribute medicine to them. If they should attain liberation in the form of a bodhisattva, or pratyekabuddha, or śrāvaka, or the eight lower classes of life, such as god, dragon, etc., [the Buddha or bodhisattva] will assume the correspondent bodies.⁵⁴

This is clearly a soteriological transformation of the sentient beings in the world, but with a mystical sense. The function revealed in the Transformation Body once again verifies Chih-i's emphasis regarding the world. This transformation is, to be sure, a vivid example of putting the sentient beings into correct places with the perfect function.

iv) The Truth in terms of the Mind

The functional nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature signifies the dynamism of the Truth. That is, the Truth itself can act, or initiate actions, in order to convert the sentient beings. This conception of the Truth is, in fact, quite different from what we usually think the Truth to be. We tend to conceive the Truth in terms of the Principle (Chi., li 理), which assumes permanence and universality. In other words, the Truth remains constantly as it is, without undergoing any change; it is universally applicable, whether it be in a logical, epistemological or metaphysical sense. We tend to ascribe an unchangeable and static nature to the Truth. It is hard to imagine that the Truth moves, much less that it functions and acts.

Chih-i's understanding of the Truth, which he terms "Middle Way-Buddha Nature", is rich in content. It is, on the one hand, the Middle Way, which is the Principle. This is evidenced in various compound terms composed of chung-tao (中道), chung (中), and li (理), which he articulates in his works. To give a few examples: chung-tao li (中道理),⁵⁵ chung-li (中理),⁵⁶ chung-tao chih li (中道之理),⁵⁷ chung shih-li (中實理),⁵⁸ chung-tao i-shih chih li (中道一實之理),⁵⁹ chung-tao fa-hsing chih li (中道法性之理),⁶⁰ and others. The nature of the Principle assumed by the Middle Way is shown in its signification of the right state from which we are to see dharmas. This is the state of detachment from every extreme. The nature of the Principle spoken of in the context of this state is obviously static. Chih-i himself seems to be aware of the static nature of the Principle. In the delineation of the ten "such-likes"⁶¹ or categories (shih ju-shih 十如是)

of the Fa-hua ching, he ascribes three implications to 'nature' (hsing 性) which is one of the categories. One of these implications is unchangeability (pu-kai 不改), or motionlessness (pu-tung hsing 不動性). Another implication is that this category of nature is the nature of Reality (shih-hsing 實性), which is identical to the nature of the Principle (li-hsing 理性).⁶² In this way, the Principle is associated with unchangeability and motionlessness, both of which signify nothing but the static nature.

On the other hand, Chih-i approaches the Buddha Nature, which he identifies with the Middle Way, in terms of the Mind (hsin 心). This approach is from the standpoint of the Perfect Doctrine:

If one contemplates the Mind to be the Buddha Nature and practises the Eightfold Noble Path perfectly, one is capable of writing the sūtra of the Middle Way immediately. With the understanding that all dharmas originate from the Mind, [then] the Mind is the Great Vehicle and the Mind is the Buddha Nature.⁶³

We see here the identification of the Buddha Nature and Mind. This identification is also evidenced in the compound term "Buddha Nature-True Mind" (fo-hsing chêng-hsin 佛性真心), which Chih-i articulates on an occasion discussing the initiation of the Mind.⁶⁴

It is the Mind that Chih-i associates with function and action. In the delineation of the ten categories, he states with regard to the two categories of force (li 力) and action (tso 作):

Force as such denotes the force capable of functioning. This is like the bodyguard of the king who has numerous techniques. Because he is ill, the techniques are taken as missing. When the illness decreases, he is capable of functioning. The same is true with the Mind. It embraces various forces. Due to the disease of defilements, it cannot operate. To view it in its true nature, it embraces all forces. With regard to action, operation and construction are called 'action'. Apart from the Mind, there is nothing acted upon. Therefore we know that the Mind embraces all actions.⁶⁵

In this passage, 'force', 'function', 'operation' (yün-wei 運為), 'construction' (chien-li 建立) and 'action' are all raised in the context of the Mind. All these terms are expressive of a dynamic nature. The statement, "apart from the Mind, there is nothing acted upon" (若離心者, 更無所作), should mean that apart from the Mind, there is no action possible; apart from the Mind there is neither an object of action nor object to be acted upon (so-tso 所作). What Chih-i wants to emphasize is the Mind as the source of all actions. To speak of the object of action is nonsense outside of the context of actions which arise from the Mind. In fact, the statement in question reveals that Chih-i ascribes dynamism to the Mind exclusively.⁶⁶ As the Mind is identical to the Buddha Nature, which stands for the Truth, we therefore can speak of the functional and dynamic nature of the Truth. This, indeed, complements our discussion in the above sections concerning the functional nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature.

v) The Middle Way-Buddha Nature embraces all dharmas

As has been pointed out previously, Chih-i criticizes the Middle Way explicated in the Common Doctrine and the Mādhyamika as devoid of functions and not embracing all dharmas, and that this criticism is made from the standpoint of the Perfect Doctrine. In view of this criticism, the functional and all-embracing natures must have been attributed to the Middle Way-Buddha Nature as its characteristics. As a matter of fact, in the delineation of the five types of the Threefold Truth, in which such criticism is found, Chih-i frankly attributes the all-embracing nature to the Middle Way-Buddha Nature. He states:

The former two types of the Twofold Truth are excluded, due to their failure to understand the [true] Middle Way. With the [true] Middle Way added to the five types of the Twofold Truth, we then have five types of the Threefold Truth. In respect to 'the Gradual entering the Common', the aspect of 'neither delusive nor non-delusive' is specified, [and so] the Threefold Truth teaching is completed. [This means,] the delusive being conventional, and the non-delusive absolute, the 'neither delusive nor non-delusive' is the Middle Way. The Middle Way explicated in the Doctrine in question only differs from Emptiness. This Middle Way is devoid of functions and does not embrace various dharmas. In respect to the Threefold Truth of 'the Perfect entering the Common', its Twofold Truth does not differ from that of the former, [i.e., 'the Gradual entering the Common']. However, it specifies the 'neither delusive nor non-delusive' [Middle Way] which embraces all dharmas and is different from the former Middle Way [of 'the Gradual entering the Common']. In respect to the Threefold Truth of the Gradual Doctrine, it develops the conventional Truth into two Truths, [i.e., the Truth of Emptiness and that of Provisionality.] It takes the absolute Truth as the Middle Way, which is merely the Middle Way as the Principle. In respect to the Threefold Truth of 'the Perfect entering the Gradual', the two Truths do not differ from the former [i.e., the Truths of Emptiness and Provisionality in the Gradual Doctrine]. But the absolute Middle Way is specified, which embraces the Buddhist dharmas fully. In respect to the Threefold Truth of the Perfect Doctrine, the Buddhist dharmas are embraced by not only the Middle Way but also by the absolute and conventional.⁶⁷

With regard to this delineation, it should be noted that when Chih-i speaks of the Twofold Truth, he is referring to the Mādhyamika's (Nāgārjuna's in particular) absolute Truth: Emptiness and relative Truth, which is the provisionality of entities or dharmas. Chih-i is not satisfied with this Twofold Truth. Rather, he is in favour of the Threefold Truth, which includes the Middle Way as identical to the Buddha Nature. In this delineation, there are two points which deserve our attention:

1. The Middle Way in the context of the Threefold Truth of the Perfect Doctrine is spoken of in terms of embracing the Buddhist dharmas. This embracing nature is also ascribed to the Middle Way of other types

of the Threefold Truth when the Perfect Doctrine is the guiding doctrine (the Threefold Truth of "the Perfect entering the Common" and that of "the Perfect entering the Gradual"). The term, "Buddhist dharmas" (fo-fa 佛法), is sometimes replaced with "all dharmas" (i-ch'ieh fa 一切法) or "various dharmas" (chu-fa 諸法). They all refer to the entities in the empirical world.

2. The embracing nature is not mentioned when Chih-i raises the issue of the Middle Way in the context of the Threefold Truth of the Gradual Doctrine or the other type of the Threefold Truth in which the Gradual Doctrine is the guiding doctrine (the Threefold Truth of "the Gradual entering the Common"). Chih-i seems to be dissatisfied with the Middle Way of the Threefold Truth of the Gradual Doctrine when he mentions it in a regretful tone, pointing out that it is "merely the Middle Way as the Principle" (中理而已). Furthermore, in the descriptions of the Threefold Truth of "the Gradual entering the Common" and that of "the Perfect entering the Common", the Middle Way, as the "neither leaky nor non-leaky" (非有漏, 非無漏), is mentioned in both cases. Chih-i points out, however, that the Middle Way in the latter case is "different from the one in the former case" (與前中異也). These two points seem to suggest Chih-i's reluctance to ascribe the embracing nature to the Middle Way of the Gradual Doctrine, which is nevertheless identical to the Buddha Nature. Indeed, on an occasion when Chih-i discusses the Gradual Doctrine, he explicitly remarks that its Middle Way is a mere Principle (tan-li 但理) which does not embrace various dharmas.⁶⁸

Chih-i also states that the tathāgata-garbha contains all dharmas.⁶⁹ For him, the tathāgata-garbha is not different from the Buddha Nature⁷⁰

and the Truth (shih-hsiang, 實相).⁷¹

vi) The meaning of 'embrace' in passive voice

When Chih-i raises the issue of embracing dharmas of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, he uses the terms chü (具) and pi (備) interchangeably. In the above quotation, for example, pi in 不備諸法 and chü in 具一切法 represent the same meaning: 'embrace'. Our present concern is, What does 'embrace' mean in the assertion that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature embraces all dharmas? This is crucial to the understanding of the all-embracing nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature.

On the basis of our studies in the major texts, we have discovered no place where Chih-i has explicitly and in detail explained what 'embrace' means in this context. Its implications are not impossible to detect, however, and will be developed in the following discussions.

Chih-i asserts that liberation is attained in the realization of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, as pointed out in the beginning of this chapter. This is quite apparent to those Buddhists advocating the doctrine of the Buddha Nature. This doctrine teaches that every sentient being is endowed with the Buddha Nature, and that enlightenment means the realization of this Buddha Nature.⁷² Chih-i basically admits this doctrine. He expresses the claim that every sentient being has the Buddha Nature on some occasions.⁷³ However, he does not confine the Buddha Nature to the sentient beings, but broadens its dimension so as to cover the non-sentient. This is done by identifying the Buddha Nature with the Dharma Nature (Skt., dharmatā, dharmatva; Chi., fa-tsing 法性), which means the true nature of dharmas or entities. He states straightforwardly:

Buddha Nature is Dharma Nature.⁷⁴

The expression, "true nature of dharmas", signifies the character of inseparability from the dharmas, and thus the embracing of them. That is, the Dharma Nature embraces all dharmas. In view of the identification of the Dharma Nature and Buddha Nature, the latter also embraces all dharmas. It is in this context that we speak of the all-embracing nature of the Buddha Nature or Middle Way - Buddha Nature. We must not forget that the dharmas in question contain both sentient and non-sentient beings. Consequently, we can say that the Buddha Nature or Middle Way - Buddha Nature embraces not only sentient beings, but also non-sentient beings.

This all-embracing nature entails, in fact, that in the endeavour for enlightenment or liberation, one has to realize not only the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, but also the dharmas (all the sentient and non-sentient beings). If not, the characteristic of embracing the dharmas of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature will be of no importance. But what does such entailment mean?

Let us first discuss the case in which the dharmas denote sentient beings. In view of the assertion that all sentient beings possess the Buddha Nature, which makes them capable of attaining Buddhahood or liberation, the realization of the Buddha Nature naturally contains the realization of the sentient beings. That is, they are all liberated. In this context, the assertion that the Middle Way - Buddha Nature embraces all sentient beings actually means that this Nature is possessed as a potential by all sentient beings and that its realization will result in the liberation of the latter. Accordingly, 'embrace', by itself in the active voice, is transformed into the passive voice to mean "possessed by".

With regard to the case in which the dharmas denote non-sentient beings, we may make reference to Chih-i's well-known declaration from the perspective of the Perfect Doctrine:

Even a single item of colour or smell is the Middle Way. The 'dharma' of the Middle Way embraces all dharmas.⁷⁵

In the second half of this declaration, the expression chung-tao chih fa (中道之法) simply denotes chung-tao or the Middle Way itself. Fa in the expression does not have any substantial meaning. It is not the same as the fa in chü i-ch'ieh fa (具一切法), where fa stands for the entities in the phenomenal world.

This declaration can be approached in two different ways, in which 'embrace' assumes different meanings. Speaking ontologically, the colour or smell, as an existent, has its origin in the Middle Way because the Middle Way possesses all existents or dharmas. 'Embrace' takes the active voice here to mean 'possess'. Speaking practically and soteriologically, however, the declaration involves quite another picture. Even a colour or smell is expressive of the Middle Way. That is, the Middle Way can be revealed even in a common non-sentient being. What Chih-i wants to assert is not the origination of the colour or smell from the Middle Way, but rather the unlimited pervasiveness of the Truth of the Middle Way. It is possessed by and therefore can be revealed in everything. It is in this context that Chih-i asserts that the Middle Way embraces all dharmas (中道之法, 具一切法). 'Embrace' takes the passive voice here to mean "possessed by".

In Chih-i's major works, there is no sign that he is much interested in ontological issues. But his deep concern with practical and soteriological affairs is undeniable. In view of this, it is likely

that 'embrace' should be understood in the passive sense of "possessed by", and that the assertion that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature embraces all dharmas actually means that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature is possessed by all dharmas. Accordingly, the realization of the dharmas consists in the realization of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature or the Truth right within them. As a matter of fact, Chih-i himself has understood the all-embracing nature of the Truth of the Middle Way in practical and soteriological terms. He remarks:

If one understands that the various dharmas do not originate, one at once embraces all Buddhist dharmas.⁷⁶

That the various dharmas do not originate signifies the insight of No-origination, which in turn indicates the transcendence of all extremes. As described previously, the transcendence of extremes denotes the realization of the Truth of the Middle Way which will result in liberation. This insight can lead one to the soteriological goal and has to be acquired in practice. Chih-i relates the issue of all-embracing nature to this insight. For him, the assertion that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature embraces all dharmas consists in the realization of the Middle Way not anywhere else but within the various dharmas themselves. This is possible only on the basis that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature is possessed by the dharmas.⁷⁷

It is worthwhile to note that the idea of the non-sentient beings possessing the Buddha Nature (wu-ch'ing yu-hsing 無情有性) appeared within the T'ien-t'ai tradition after Chih-i. Chan-jan (湛然, A.D. 711-782), an eminent T'ien-t'ai thinker, was a strong advocate of this idea.⁷⁸ There must be a close relationship between this idea and Chih-i's

thought of the all-embracing nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, both historically and philosophically speaking. One of the major reasons is that the assertion that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature embraces all dharmas was taken to mean, as just has been argued, that this Nature is possessed by all dharmas, and consequently that the non-sentient beings possess the Buddha Nature. This is so because a part of the dharmas are non-sentient. This idea is a very straightforward and radical one. It is likely that the T'ien-t'ai followers, Chan-jan included, understood the term 'embrace' in the assertion that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature embraces all dharmas in a passive manner, and their understanding of the assertion became that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature is possessed by the dharmas. In order to emphasize the unlimited pervasiveness of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, they eventually worked out the radical idea in an active tone: even the non-sentient beings possess the Buddha Nature. A detailed discussion of this issue is, however, out of the question here.⁷⁹

vii) 'Embrace' in active and methodological sense

Is 'embrace' entirely passive in meaning? Can we say in some sense that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature does embrace the dharmas, which include both the sentient and non-sentient beings? To speak in terms of compassion, the answer may be affirmative. As is commonly known to the Mahāyāna Buddhists, compassion (Skt., maitreya-karūṇa; Chi., tz'u-pei 慈, 悲) is an indispensable element in the practice of a bodhisattva, who is much concerned about the liberation of others.⁸⁰ Authentic compassion is all-embracing, rather than confined to a certain realm. That is, a true Buddhist should have compassion on both sentient and non-sentient

beings. To have compassion on sentient beings is easy to understand, while having compassion on non-sentient beings seems unnatural in view of the latter's lack of feelings and consciousness. However, it is the non-sentient beings that constitute the vital conditions or circumstances of the sentient beings, which Chih-i calls the "pure Buddha Land". He has once remarked in a regretful tone that if one abides in Emptiness, there will be no pure Buddha Land.⁸¹ Consequently, if the sentient beings are to be purified, the non-sentient beings themselves should be purified, too. It is in this sense that we may say that the non-sentient beings are embraced by the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, or the latter embraces the former, in which 'embrace' is in active voice.

It is interesting to note that Chih-i divides compassion into three kinds in the light of his theory of the Threefold Contemplation. They are the compassions related to the Contemplation of Emptiness, the Contemplation of the Provisional, and the Contemplation of the Middle Way. He states that the former two compassions are shared by the bodhisattvas, whereas the latter compassion is confined to the tathāgata, and is consequently called "tathāgata compassion" (ju-lai tz'u-pei 如來慈悲). He also states that this compassion shares the same substance with shih-hsiang (實相) or the Truth.⁸² He says that the compassions related to the Contemplations of Emptiness and the Provisional have limits, while the tathāgata compassion is limitless and is the sea where various dharmas of the tathāgata-garbha assemble.⁸³ Although he does not elaborate this image, it is likely that the limitless nature of the tathāgata compassion consists in the embracement of both non-sentient and sentient beings by this compassion.

The all-embracing nature is also what determines shih-hsiang or the Truth to be entitled tathāgata-garbha, i.e., the receptacle of all entities in Thusness. Chih-i, on an occasion of enumerating the various names of the Truth, remarks that because the Truth broadly embraces various dharmas, it is called tathāgata-garbha.⁸⁴ This Truth is, for Chih-i, nothing but the Middle Way-Buddha Nature.

The all-embracing nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature may be spoken of in methodological terms. That is, the Middle Way-Buddha Nature embraces all sorts of methods, which may be used for educative and soteriological purposes, for the liberation of the sentient beings. How they are to be used must be in line with the individual needs of various sentient beings.

Chih-i remarks from the standpoint of the Perfect Doctrine that the Mind (hsin 心) of all sentient beings fully embraces "all doors toward the Truth" (i-ch'ieh fa-mên 一切法門); this means that the tathāgata (the Buddha) examines clearly the nature of this Mind and, on the basis of it, declares that there are countless doctrines and methods coming from the Mind.⁸⁵ Prior to this remark, he points out that in the context of the Perfect Doctrine, all things come from the Mind, which is both the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna) and the Buddha Nature.⁸⁶

We observe two important points made by Chih-i in this context:

- a. The Mind embraces all doors leading to the Truth.
- b. The Mind is identical to the Buddha Nature.

The second point was already discussed above in section iv. We will therefore concentrate on the first point, which is simply expressive of the all-embracing nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature spoken of in

methodological terms. On the basis of our study, there was found no straightforward elaboration of this point in Chih-i's major works. However, its implication can be inferred through making reference to the concept of expedience (fang-pien 方便), which entails the "door toward the Truth" (fa-mên 法門) in meaning, and vice versa. This expedience, in terms of its methodological nature, appears very often in Chih-i's works. It is particularly ascribed to the Buddha and bodhisattvas, as special weapons in their pursuit of transforming the world. For example, in the practice of the Contemplation of the Middle Way, Chih-i enumerates five items one has to undergo, among which is the learning of the "great expedience" (hsüeh ta-fang-pien 學大方便). With regard to this great expedience, he gives some concrete examples: these include apparitions, analogies and discursions. He emphasizes that expedience is indispensable in benefitting others and in awakening them to the Truth. Indeed, the great expedience is, for Chih-i, a major way to express the tathāgata's "great function without limits".⁸⁷

It should be noted that in the operation of fa-mên or fang-pien, evil elements may be introduced or even taken as necessary. For example, in the conversion of a robber, the Buddha or bodhisattva himself may assume the apparition of a robber and perform evils with him. This is done in order to enhance the intimacy with the robber, which is most conducive to the robber's conversion.⁸⁸

The proposition that the Mind embraces all doors toward the Truth is raised merely once in Chih-i's major works. These doors toward the Truth can in fact be viewed as dharmas in a broader sense. We therefore think that the methodological implication of the all-embracing nature

may be regarded as a complement to the implications explicated earlier concerning the meaning of 'embrace'.

viii) Chih-i's Middle Way-Buddha Nature and Mādhyamika's Middle Way

With the understanding of Chih-i's conception of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature assumed from the above discussions, we now wish to respond to our second basic question concerning the difference between Chih-i's Middle Way-Buddha Nature and the Mādhyamika's Middle Way. This will focus on five points in the following discussion.

First, Chih-i's Middle Way-Buddha Nature is an issue of shih-hsiang or the Truth, and is the core of his whole system of thought. As seen from Chih-i's theory of the classification of the Buddhist doctrines, this Middle Way-Buddha Nature is his most crucial and important concept, and is consequently the most emphasized doctrine among others. The Mādhyamika's Middle Way is only a complement to Emptiness, which is the Truth in the Mādhyamika system. As discussed in detail in the first chapter, this Middle Way reveals the transcendent nature of Emptiness. This nature is the transcendence of extremes, being and nothingness in particular. Although the Middle Way also has the sense of the Truth, it is still subordinate to Emptiness; therefore it does not attract the greatest attention from the Mādhyamikas. For the Mādhyamikas, it is the concept of Emptiness that gives the basic feature to their system, not the Middle Way.

Secondly, Chih-i's Middle Way-Buddha Nature, on the one hand, implicates the Mādhyamika's Middle Way, i.e., the transcendence of all extremes. On the other hand, it involves the functional nature, of which both

Mādhyaṃika's Middle Way and Emptiness lack. This is because Chih-i sees the Middle Way not merely as a Principle, but also as the Mind. It is the Mind that is functional and capable of initiating actions. In Nāgārjuna's Kārikā, there is neither any mention of the nature of function nor any discussion of the relationship between the Mind, the Middle Way, or Emptiness.

Thirdly, Chih-i's Middle Way-Buddha Nature is attributed to the ever-abiding nature. This is due to his identification of the Middle Way with the Dharma Body and Buddha Nature. Chih-i takes the Dharma Body and Buddha Nature, the former in particular, as an indestructible spiritual entity; the ever-abiding nature is also spoken of in this context. On the contrary, there is no mention of the Dharma Body and Buddha Nature in the Kārikā, much less the identification of the Middle Way with them. There is therefore no "ever-abiding nature" revealed in the Kārikā. Chih-i's criticism of Nāgārjuna, that his Twofold Truth is devoid of the "substance of the Middle Way" (二諦無中道體),⁸⁹ seems to reveal Chih-i's disagreement with Nāgārjuna's conception of the Truth. That is, Nāgārjuna's Truth, whether it be termed 'Emptiness' or "Middle Way", is not established in terms of an indestructible spiritual substance or body, which Chih-i associates with the Dharma Body and Buddha Nature.

Fourthly, with regard to the third characteristic of Chih-i's Middle Way-Buddha Nature -- the "all-embracing nature" -- there is in the Kārikā no such mention that Emptiness or the Middle Way embraces all entities or dharmas. Nevertheless, the Kārikā does contain an idea in connection with the relationship between Nirvāṇa and samsāra, the world of life and death. This idea can be, to a certain extent, regarded as

similar to the first implication of 'embrace' explicated previously. This implication basically advises that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature is the dharmatā, the "nature of dharmas", that this Nature is possessed by the dharmas, and that this Nature is to be realized and liberation attained within these dharmas. Therefore, this entails the inseparability of the dharmas from this Nature, and its embracement of them. The idea in the Kārikā -- that it is not possible that Nirvāṇa is tenable apart from life and death⁹⁰ -- is akin to this implication in view of that the attainment of Nirvāṇa results in the realization of the Truth, which is, for Nāgārjuna, Emptiness complemented by the Middle Way. It therefore seems possible to say that Emptiness or the Middle Way, as expounded in the Kārikā, embraces the entities or dharmas in the world of life and death.

This idea of Nāgārjuna is elaborated elsewhere in the Kārikā:

Saṃsāra (i.e., the empirical life-death cycle) is nothing essentially different from nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is nothing essentially different from saṃsāra.⁹¹

The limits (i.e., realm) of nirvāṇa are the limits of saṃsāra. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference whatsoever.⁹²

These two verses advise that Nirvāṇa and the world of life and death are not different from each other at all with respect to their koṭi, their 'realm'. In other words, the realm of Nirvāṇa is just the realm of the world of life and death. It follows that Nirvāṇa is realized nowhere but within the world of life and death. To replace Nirvāṇa and the world of life and death with Truth and the dharmas respectively, we can say that Truth is realized nowhere but within the dharmas. This seems to imply that the Truth, whether it be Emptiness or the Middle Way, embraces

the dharmas.

Despite this similarity of emphasis on the dharmas in Chih-i's thought and the Kārikā, we must cautiously remind ourselves that there is still a difference in the degree of emphasis. Chih-i explicitly states that the Middle Way-Buddha Nature embraces all dharmas, while Nāgārjuna remarks in a reservedly qualified manner, that there is no slightest difference between Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. It is clear that Chih-i adopts a more concrete and constructive attitude towards the world. As regards the other two implications of the all-embracing nature -- the implication associated with the compassion of the tathāgata and the implication in its methodological references -- there is no hint at all in the Kārikā.

Finally, Chih-i's Middle Way-Buddha Nature and Mādhyamika's Emptiness and Middle Way are bound together by the issue of Truth. Chih-i is well aware of this. How he criticizes Mādhyamika's Middle Way and establishes his Middle Way-Buddha Nature is, undoubtedly, closely related to his conception of the Truth. The attribution of the three characteristics to the Middle Way-Buddha Nature clearly displays this conception: Truth is permanent, dynamic and all-embracing. This conception seems to be directed to an extremely positive and constructive attitude toward the empirical world. What Chih-i has in mind is that Truth must be established and realized in a close and concrete relationship with the empirical world. The functional and all-embracing natures of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature sufficiently give evidence to this point. Particularly, the concept of function is frequently emphasized in the FHFI and MHCK. The ever-abiding nature of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature

also evidences this point, but in an indirect manner. That is, this nature renders the Middle Way-Buddha Nature in the status of t'i, or spiritual body, which is the substance or basis of all functions. From this vantage point this nature sustains and strengthens the functions exerted toward the empirical world.

It is in this sense that Chih-i criticizes the Middle Way of the Common Doctrine and Mādhyamika. His dissatisfaction is that this Middle Way does not have a concrete and constructive relationship with the empirical world. His criticism that this Middle Way is devoid of ever-abidingness and functional nature is, indeed, plausible and deserves our reflection, especially in view of the fact that this Middle Way merely signifies a state of transcending all extremes. This criticism is also applicable to the Mādhyamika concept of Emptiness, which, as explicated in the Kārikā, signifies the state of negating all false views and the state of negating the Self Nature, the state of non-substantiality.⁹³ This state is bound to be empty in content and futile in function. As signifying the Truth, it can merely be static. However, in view of the fourth point we made in this section and the idea of t'i-fa (the embodying of the entities of the Common Doctrine and Mādhyamika), Chih-i's criticism that this Middle Way does not embrace the dharmas may not fully do justice to the Common Doctrine and Mādhyamika (the latter in particular). Chih-i's interpretation seems slanted toward his system of thought, in which the all-embracing nature of the Truth (the Middle Way-Buddha Nature) is an important element. It seems that he distorts Nāgārjuna's Kārikā to serve his purpose of emphasizing this nature as one pertaining exclusively to the Perfect Doctrine.

In this chapter, we have depicted the characteristics of the Middle Way-Buddha Nature or Truth. The Truth is not merely to be depicted, but also to be realized. This is particularly so for Chih-i, in view of his deep practical and soteriological concern. Indeed, the Truth can be more vividly and concretely understood in its realization, which is the topic of the forthcoming Part.

Notes

1. 藏通觀生、無生，入偏真理，名為真實。別、圓觀無量、無作，入中道佛性，名為真實。(WMCLS, chap. 3, T.38.607b)
2. With regard to the translation of the terms, shêng, wu-shêng, wu-liang and wu-tso, we basically adopt that of Leon Hurvitz. Cf. Hurvitz, p. 252.
3. 解脫者，即見中道佛性。(WMCLS, chap. 8, T.38.674b)
4. 別圓入中，即是佛道。(Ibid., chap. 9, T.38.683b)
5. Earlier in the same chapter a clear definition of the Buddha Way (fo-tao 佛道) is given. (Ibid., chap. 9, T.38.683a)
6. 佛性即中道。(FHHI, chap. 6, T.33.761b)
7. I.e., in WMCLS, T.38.569b, 593a-b, 614a, 630c, 674b, 688b and 691b; in Fa-chieh tz'u-ti ch'u-mên, T.46.688a.
8. Cf. FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.735b, SCI, chap. 12, T.46.764b and WMCLS, chap. 9, T.38.688b.
9. Dharma Body is one of the important concepts characterizing Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. For an excellent explication of this concept, cf. Nagao's "On the Theory of Buddha-body", The Eastern Buddhist, 6:1, (May 1971), pp. 25-53.
10. 盧舍那佛處蓮華海，共大菩薩。皆非生死人。(FHHI, chap. 7, T.33.772c)
11. 滅者即解脫，解脫必有其人。人即法身，法身不直身。(FHHI, chap. 7, T.33.776b)
12. 生身九惱，飢、渴、寒、熱、疾病等事。所以身小有疾，須用牛乳。阿難不知是法性身，謂有疾是實，故持鉢乞乳。不聞法身金剛之體，常住湛然。(WMCLS, chap. 5, T.38.632a) The quotation informs that Ānanda (阿難), a faithful disciple of the Buddha, did not understand the permanent Dharma Body. Ānanda was traditionally regarded as an advocate of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and scriptures.
13. 真法身無此疾也。(Ibid., loc. cit.)
14. 如來身者，金剛之體，即法身常身。所以喻金剛者，體堅用利，徹至本際。譬法身不為妄惑生、死所侵，常住不變。利喻法身智德，般若照用之功，無所不備。徹至本際譬法身斷德，解脫終窮，惑障斯斷。(WMCLS, chap. 5, T.38.632a-b)
15. E.g., in FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.736a; chap. 10, T.33.804b, 805c, 806a.

16. 中道即法身。 (WMCLS, chap. 8, T.38.674b) 如來行是名行實。所見中道, 即一究竟, 同於如來所得法身, 無異無別。 (MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.33a)

17. SCI, chap. 12, T.46.766c.

18. FHHI, chap. 10, T.33.801c.

19. FHHI, chap. 3, T.33.709c; chap. 4, T.33.731a; chap. 6, T.33.749b; WMCLS, chap. 6, T.38.654a. Cf. section vii in the preceding chapter.

20. Mou, p. 1207.

21. Cf. also FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.704c-705a.

22. WMCHS, chap. 5, T.38.551b.

23. Ibid., T.38.550c.

24. MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.81b.

25. FHHI, chap. 7, T.33.774a.

26. For kung-yung, cf. FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.732b. For li-yung, cf. FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.683a; MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.2a-b. For yung, cf. FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.685a, 685b, 686c, 689c-690a; WMCHS, chap. 4, T.38.541c; MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.81b.

27. 功論自進, 用論益物。合字解者, 正語化他。 (FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.736c) On this occasion, Chih-i is discussing the position of the Perfect Doctrine, the fourth point of which is kung-yung. (Ibid., T.33.732b)

28. 自行二智照理理周, 名為力; 二種化他二智鑒機機遍, 名為用。 (FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.683a)

29. Cf. FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.681c-682a. Hurvitz translates yung discussed in the fourth part of FHHI as "practical manifestation". (Hurvitz, p. 206) 'Function' seems to be more straightforward than "practical manifestation" in transmitting the original meaning of yung.

30. 若智功未深, 橫用不廣; 智功若深, 橫用必廣。譬如諸樹, 根深則枝潤, 華葉亦多。 (FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.736c)

31. 用是化他。 (FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.685a)

32. 用是益他。 (Ibid., T.33.685b)

33. 若住于空, 則於眾生永無利益。志存利他, 即入假之意也。 (MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.75c)

34. E.g., T.46.75c, 78a, b, 80a, etc.

35. T.46.75c.

36. T.46.76a-79a.

37. MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.75c, 77c, 80a.

38. 菩薩本不貴空而修空，本為衆生故修空。不貴空，故不佳；為益衆生，故須出。(chap. 6, T.46.79c) For the following discussion, I am indebted to the comments on the draft of this thesis made by Prof. Inada.

39. 不度衆生，故不能用。(FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.689c) This is actually Chih-i's criticism of those favouring the Tripiṭaka Doctrine. It can be inferred that, for Chih-i, the function is nothing but the saving of the sentient beings.

40. 菩薩圓圓法，起圓信，立圓行，住圓位，以圓功德，而自莊嚴。以圓力用建立衆生。云何圓建立衆生？或放一光，能令衆生得即空即假即中益，得人、出、變入出、不入出益。歷行、住、生、圓、語、默、作、亦如是。[龍王]與種種雲，震種種雷，權種種電，降種種雨。龍於本宮，不動不搖；而於一切，施設不同。菩薩亦如是。內自通達即空即假即中，不動法性，而令種種得益，得種種用，是名圓力用建立衆生。(MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.2a-b) A few words should be added here with regard to the translation. The expression, 入、出、變入出、不入出, in the original text, obviously denotes the method of the Four Alternatives, which will be dealt with in full in Part II of this thesis. To enhance the readability, I did not translate the expression word for word, but used "the method of the Four Alternatives" to stand for it.

41. It should be noted that the term, chien-li (建立) here, which we translate as "put into correct places", is used in an entirely soteriological sense. It is difficult to find a good corresponding phrase in English. 'Establish' and "build up" may be options. Both are, however, not good enough.

42. That is, 知病, 識藥, 授藥. These steps are delineated in great detail on the occasion when Chih-i elaborates the bodhisattva's endeavour to enter the provisional world (ju-chia) and to provide remedies for the sickness of the sentient beings. Cf. MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.76a-79a.

43. 我見為諸見本，一念惑心為我見本；從此惑心起無量見，縱橫稠密，不可稱計。為此見故，造象結業，墮墮三途，沈迴無已。(MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.76a)

44. 病相無量，藥亦無量。(Ibid., T.46.77a)

45. 一法有種種名、種種相、種種治，出假菩薩皆須識知。為衆生故，集衆法藥，如海導師。若不知者，不能利物。為欲

知故，一心通修止、觀、大慧、誓願及精進力。(Ibid., T.46.77c) Here, Chih-i qualifies the bodhisattvas as ch'u-chia, which actually means ju-chia, as was pointed out above.

46. 隨其病故，授藥亦異。謂下、中、上、上上、下根。
 . . . 智慧鈍故，斷姓怒癡，名為解脫，是為授因緣生法之藥。
 . . . 次中根人授藥者，. . . 為說因緣即空，得入中
 . . . 授即空藥。上根人授藥者，. . . 次第斷五住，得入中
 道，是為授即假藥。上上根授藥者，. . . 為
 如理直說，善如空生，障如空滅，入究竟道，是名授即中藥。
 (Ibid., T.46.78c-79a)

47. Chih-i often mentions the bodhisattvas' symbolic remedies for the diseases of the sentient beings. Cf. FHHI, chap. 4, T.33.721b; MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.56c. 75c, 79c-80a. The example delineated above, which includes the three steps, is the most detailed and systematic one in this aspect.

48. MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.81c.

49. For an Indian interpretation of the theory, cf. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 284-287; Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-body", The Eastern Buddhist, 6:1 (May 1971), pp. 25-53. For Chih-i's explication of this theory, cf. FHCW, chap. 9, T.34.128a, 129c. We are not in a position to discuss this theory in detail here. But a few words about the translation of the three forms of body. Dharma-kāya or fa-shên can naturally be translated as Dharma Body. With regard to sambhoga-kāya or pao-shên, and nirmāṇa-kāya or ying-shên, both W.T. de Bary and W.E. Soothill associate them with 'bliss' and 'transformation' respectively. (W.T. de Bary, ed., The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan, New York: Vintage Books, 1972, p. 196; W.E. Soothill et. al., comp., A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, Taiwan: Buddhist Culture Service, 1971, p. 77) 'Bliss' refers to the bliss or reward of the Buddha, while 'transformation' points to the transformation of the sentient beings by the Buddha. These are acceptable renderings which our translations follow.

50. 初得法身本故，即體起應身之用。(FHHI, chap. 7, T.33.764c)

51. Hurvitz has translated pên (本) as origin in contrast with chi (迹), 'traces'. (Hurvitz, p. 206) We think that such a rendition of pên is also applicable in the present context.

52. 法身為體，應身為用。(WMCHS, chap. 4, T.38.545b)

53. 由於應身，得顯法身。(FHHI, chap. 7, T.33.764c) 由此法身，故能垂不思議應用之迹，由此應用，能顯法身。(WMCHS, chap. 4, T.38.545b)

54. 應以佛身得度，即作佛身說法，授藥；應以菩薩、二乘、天龍八部等形得度，而為現之。(MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.79c)

55. MHCK, chap. 4, T.46.41c, chap. 7, T.46.89a; FHCW, chap. 8, T.34.114a; WMCLS, chap. 1, T.38.577b, chap. 2, T.38.590a, chap. 4, T.38.620b, chap. 6, T.38.643c, 646c, chap. 8, T.38.672b, 676c, chap. 9, T.38.690a, 691a, chap. 9, T.38.691c.

56. FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.703a; FHCW, chap. 2, T.34.19b; MHCK, chap. 9, T.46.127b; WMCLS, chap. 4, T.38.622a, chap. 7, T.38.661a, chap. 9, T.38.688b.

57. WMCLS, chap. 10, T.38.702a, chap. 10, T.38.703a; Fa-chieh tz'u-ti ch'u-mên, chap. 3, T.46.697b.

58. FHHI, chap. 6, T.33.757b.

59. MHCK, chap. 4, T.46.37b.

60. FHCW, chap. 3, T.34.43c.

61. Hurvitz translates ju-shih (如是) as "such-like". (Hurvitz, p. 205) The ju-shih is, in fact, a philosophical category.

62. 如是性者,性以據內,總有三義.一.不改名性.無行經稱不動性,性即不改義也.又姓名性分,種類之義,分不同,各各不可改.又性是實性,實性即理性. (MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.53a) For the description of the ten categories, cf. Fa-hua ching in Kumārajīva's translation, T.9.5c. For an extensive explication of the ten categories, cf. Hurvitz, pp. 280-308.

63. 若觀心即是佛性,圓修八正道,即為中道之經.明一切法悉出心中,心即大乘,心即佛性. (MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.31c) The Eightfold Noble Path (Skt., āryaṣṭāṅga-mārgaḥ; Chi., pa chêng-tao 八正道) was originally taught by the Buddha.

64. WMCHS, chap. 4, T.38.541a.

65. 如是力者,堪任力用也.如王力士,千萬技能,病故謂無,病差有用.心亦如是,具有諸力,煩惱病故,不能運動.如實觀之,具一切力.如是作者,運為、建立名作.若離心者,更無所作.故知心具一切作也. (MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.53b) We translate li 力 and tso 作 as 'force' and 'action' respectively; Hurvitz translates them as 'power' and 'function' (Hurvitz, p. 280). Our renditions are, we think, more faithful to the original meanings of li and tso. With regard to li or 'force', it is closely related to function. When force operates, it will initiate function. In fact, the description of the ten categories in the Fa-hua ching is not seen in the Sanskrit text of the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra. There is consequently no way of tracing back to the original word in order to refine the meaning of li.

66. It should be noted that Chih-i has in mind two levels of mind: the pure and the delusive. The one in question here is the pure Mind.

67. 却前兩種二諦，以不明中道故。就五種二諦，得論中道，即有五種三諦。約別入通，是非有漏。非無漏，三諦義成。有漏是俗，無漏是真，非有漏非無漏，中但異空，非而已。中無功用，不備諸法。圓入通三諦者，二諦不開彼俗為中，[有]漏非無漏，具一切法，與前中異也。別三諦者，二諦不異前，點真諦對真為中，中理而已。圓入別三諦者，二諦不異前，點真道，具足佛法也。圓三諦者，非但中道具足佛法，真俗亦然。(FHHI, chap. 2, T.33.704c-705a) For more understanding of this delin-eation, cf. the previous chapter. Cf. also Mou, pp. 748-750.

68. 此中但理，不具諸法。 (FHHI, chap. 3, T.33.709c)

69. FHHI, chap. 3, T.33.714a.

70. FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.743c.

71. FHHI, chap. 5, T.33.743a, chap. 8, T.33.783b; WMCHS, chap. 6, T.38.558c.

72. We are not in a position to discuss this doctrine in detail. Cf. I. Ogawa, Busshō shisō 佛性思想, Kyoto: Buneidō, 1982, for a textual explication of this doctrine.

73. Cf. FHHI, chap. 6, T.33.757b; FHCW, chap. 5, T.34.72a; WMCLS, chap. 3, T.38.598c.

74. 佛性即是法性。 (WMCLS, chap. 8, T.38.681a)

75. 一色一香，無非中道。中道之法，具一切法。 (MHCK, chap. 4, T.46.42b)

76. 若知諸法不生，即具一切佛法。 (WMCLS, chap. 9, T.38.684b)

77. The assertion that the Buddha Nature embraces all dharmas is reminiscent of the expression of hsing-chü (性具), or hsing pên-chü (性本具), which the T'ien-t'ai scholars regarded as representing the major thought of their School. As a matter of fact, this expression is not found in Chih-i's major works. It was obviously proposed by the T'ien-t'ai advocates after Chih-i, with an intention to strengthen the all-embracing nature of the Buddha Nature. It should be noted, however, that their understanding of this all-embracing nature may not be the same as Chih-i's. Cf. Kuan-yin-ching-hsüan-i-chi hui-pên (觀音經玄義記會本), chap. 2, Z.55.81a-b. We are not here in a position to discuss this issue any further.

78. Cf. his Chin-kang pei (金剛經), T.46.784c.

79. Incidentally, the passive meaning of the term 'embrace' (viz., "possessed by"), was originally suggested by Yün-hua Jan in his comments on the draft form of this thesis. Our further studies evidenced that it is a significant suggestion.

80. Maitreya or tz'u means to "bestow happiness", whereas karuṇa or pei means to "withdraw sufferings". In Chih-i's works, however, they are always used interchangeably. Therefore we will use compassion to stand for tz'u, or pei, or both, if not specified otherwise.

81. 若住於空,則無淨佛國土. (MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.75c)

82. Cf. MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.81a.

83. 上兩觀慈,慈有邊表;如來慈者,即無齊限. . . 是如來藏諸法都海. (Ibid., loc. cit.)

84. [實相]多所含受,故名如來藏. . . . [實相]含備諸法,故名如來藏. (FHFI, chap. 8, T.33.783b)

85. 一切衆生心中具足一切法門. 如來明審照其心法,按彼心說無量教法從心而出. (MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.32a)

86. 若觀心即是佛性,圓修八正道,即寫中道之經,明一切法悉出心中,心即大乘,心即佛性. (Ibid., T. 46.31c) This description was also quoted in note 63. On this occasion Chih-i is introducing the four types of contemplating the Mind from the four Doctrines he classifies.

87. Cf. MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.81a-c. For a discussion of the "great function without limits" cf. section ii above.

88. This evil implication is reminiscent of the T'ien-t'ai idea that the Buddha Nature embraces evil (hsing-o 性惡). Among the works traditionally attributed to Chih-i, this idea is found merely in the Kuan-yin hsüan-i (T.34.882c-883a). As this Kuan-yin hsüan-i is not a reliable source for the study of Chih-i's thought (cf. the Introduction of this thesis), we are not in the position to discuss the idea of hsing-o. Y. Tamura, however, claims that this idea can be regarded as representing the thought of Chih-i himself. Cf. Tamura, p. 121.

89. Cf. above the previous chapter, section ix.

90. 不離於生死,而別有涅槃. (CL, 16:10, T.30.21b) It should be noted here that Kumārajīva's translation does not completely conform with the Sanskrit original. Cf. Kārikā-P, p. 299; Inada, p. 103.

91. Inada, p. 158. na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃ cidasti viśeṣaṇam, na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃ cidasti viśeṣaṇam. (Kārikā-P, p. 535) Kumārajīva's rendition: "涅槃與世間,無有少分別,世間與涅槃,亦無少分別." (CL, 25:19, T.30.36a)

92. Inada, p. 158. nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ saṃsārasya ca, na tayorantaram kiṃ citsusūksmamapi vidyate. (Kārikā-P, p. 535) Kumārajīva's rendition: "涅槃之實際,及與世間際,如是二際者,無毫釐差別." (CL, 25:20, T.30.36a)

93. For our detailed discussion of the Middle Way and Emptiness of the Mādhyamika, cf. the first chapter above.

PART II

PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS

A. The issue of Four Alternatives in Mādhyamika context and Chih-i's treatment of it

Our first and second basic questions had been dealt with in Part I, which were concerned with key concepts. In part II, we will cope with our third basic question exclusively. The question in two parts is (a) What are Chih-i's philosophical methods as related to the realization of the Truth? and (b) How can they be related to Mādhyamika? With respect to the realization of the Truth, we find that Chih-i amply employs the methods of the Four Alternatives and their negative, the conception of identification, and the epistemology of the Threefold Contemplation. These, as Chih-i's philosophical methods, all have their origin in the Mādhyamika. However, in utilizing Mādhyamika thinking, Chih-i does not hesitate to modify and establish his own type of philosophizing. This is particularly true in the cases of the Threefold Contemplation and identification.

In response to our third basic question, we will start with the discussion of the Four Alternatives. First, let us examine it in the Mādhyamika context. As a matter of fact, the nature of the Four Alternatives of the Mādhyamikas, Nāgārjuna in particular, had been studied by many modern scholars. They include R.H. Robinson, Y. Kajiyama, K.V. Ramanan, R. Pandeya, S.S. Chakravarti and myself.¹ Robinson's study is inspiring, in terms of interpreting the Four Alternatives in an educational

context. Our concern is to make reference to these studies and work out the nature of the Four Alternatives.

i) Contradictions of the Four Alternatives and its association with the Truth

The Four Alternatives (Skt., catuṣkoṭi; Chi., ssū-chū 四句), or tetralemma, is an important form of thinking in Mādhyamika philosophy. It is also employed in the Kārikā. As suggested in its title, it normally consists of four alternatives or statements, including an affirmation, a negation, a synthesis of both affirmation and negation, and a transcendence of both affirmation and negation. These four forms exhaust the ways in which we may express our approach towards something. In this thesis, the "Four Alternatives" in capital letters will refer to the form of thinking and will therefore be in singular form, while the "four alternatives" in minuscule letters will refer to the four statements in this form of thinking. The typical example of the Four Alternatives, which is also often mentioned by scholars, is shown in the Kārikā as follows:

Everything is suchness (tathyam), not suchness, both suchness and not suchness, and neither suchness nor not suchness. This is the Buddha's teaching.²

This verse includes four alternatives:

1. Everything is suchness.
2. Everything is not suchness.
3. Everything is both suchness and not suchness.³
4. Everything is neither suchness nor not suchness.

They can be taken as four propositions which can be easily symbolized, respectively, as follows:

1. P
2. $\sim P$
3. $P \cdot \sim P$
4. $\sim P \cdot \sim \sim P$

P implies the affirmation of suchness, $\sim P$ the negation, $P \cdot \sim P$ the synthesis of both, whereas $\sim P \cdot \sim \sim P$ represents the transcendence of both. Apparently, these four alternatives are full of contradictions. The first one, P, and the second one, $\sim P$, contradict each other. The third one, $P \cdot \sim P$, is a combination of the first and second and is of course contradictory. It is opposed to the law of non-contradiction in Aristotelean logic. As regards the fourth alternative, $\sim P \cdot \sim \sim P$, $\sim \sim P$ can be turned into P through the principle of double negation. Thus the alternative is rendered as $\sim P \cdot P$, or $P \cdot \sim P$, which is simply the third alternative. Therefore the fourth one is also self-contradictory.

Despite the contradictions, the Four Alternatives is taken as concerning the apprehension of the Truth. This is evidenced by the Sanskrit expression, buddha-anuśāsana (buddhānuśāsana), i.e., the instruction of the Buddha, which is the understanding and realization of the Truth. Kumārajīva's translation, chu-fo fa (諸佛法), the Dharma of the Buddhas, is also expressive of this aspect. The corresponding expression in the verse in question, quoted in the TCTL, even pinpoints the Truth of the dharmas (chu-fa chih shih-hsiang 諸法之實相) as the target of the employment of the Four Alternatives. (This point is developed in footnote 3.)

The thinking of the Four Alternatives also appears in another verse in the Kārikā:

The Buddhas have provisionally employed the term ātman and instructed on the true idea of anātman. They have also taught that any (abstract) entity as ātman or anātman does not exist.⁴

This verse lacks the third alternative. But this should not affect the structure or nature of the Four Alternatives. The affirmation of self (ātman) and negation of it (anātman) are linked together. Kumārajīva's Chinese translation is:

The Buddhas sometimes talk about self, sometimes non-self. In the Truth of the dharmas, there is no self nor non-self.⁵

Here, self is affirmed, negated, and both self and non-self are transcended. Obviously, the verse is presented in the form of the Four Alternatives. The association of the Four Alternatives, and the fourth alternative in particular, with the Truth of the dharmas is also mentioned.

In the TCTL, a verse, which reveals the Four Alternatives, is quoted:

1. The dharmas are [in the nature of] non-origination and non-extinction,
2. not [in the nature of] non-origination and non-extinction,
3. both [in the nature of] non-origination and non-extinction, and not [in the nature of] non-origination and non-extinction,
4. neither [in the nature of] non-origination and non-extinction, nor not [in the nature of] non-origination and non-extinction.⁶

It is also remarked that this verse is related to deep penetration into the Truth of the dharmas (深入諸法實相).⁷ Although the subject matter in the verse (i.e., the nature of non-origination and non-extinction) is a very complicated one, the Four Alternatives' structure in the verse is conspicuous; it is also important to note that its association with the realization of the Truth is emphasized.

Now we have a problem. The Four Alternatives is occupied with

contradictions, yet it is associated with the Truth and is obviously taken by the Mādhyamikas as conducive to the realization of the Truth in methodological terms, at least as the way in which the Truth is expressed. How can this be so?

ii) Educational implication of the Four Alternatives

In dealing with this problem, let us re-examine the Four Alternatives. The first alternative, P , and the second one, $\sim P$, contradict each other. The third one, $P \cdot \sim P$, brings the previous two together and is thus nothing but a repetition of the contradiction between the latter. The fourth one, $\sim P \cdot \sim \sim P$, can be reduced to the third one and is therefore a repetition of such contradiction as well. In this sense, both the third and fourth alternatives do not suggest anything new, and the first and second alternatives would be sufficient. But this should not be so. It is four alternatives that are proposed, not two. The third and fourth alternatives must have their own roles to play and cannot be replaced by the previous ones. The crucial point is, we think, that we should not see the four alternatives logically or formally. Rather, we should pay attention to the content of each alternative and the occasion on which the related alternative is proposed. In this respect, we may consider two possibilities. First, different alternatives are employed to respond to various sentient beings with diverse talents in particular circumstances in the teaching of the Truth. In the employment, any subject matter may be picked up to fit the individual condition. Secondly, different alternatives are employed to classify the diverse understandings of the Truth or other subject matters of the sentient beings. The first possibility

reveals the educational implication of the Four Alternatives, while the second possibility reveals its classifying implication.

As a matter of fact, some outstanding commentators of the Kārikā, such as Piṅgala, Candrakīrti and Bhavaviveka had explicated the Four Alternatives in educational and classifying terms. And their explications were brought to our attention by modern scholars such as Robinson and Kajiyama. In this section, we will discuss the educational implication.

Robinson remarks that the Four Alternatives can be used as a pedagogical device. In his Early Madhyamika in India and China, he quotes Piṅgala's comments on the typical verse of the Four Alternatives, in which suchness (tathyam, but Robinson renders it 'real') is picked up as the subject matter. Piṅgala's comments in Robinson's translation are as follows:

As for 'everything is real', when you analyze the real-nature of the dharmas, [you find that] they all enter the absolute truth, are all equal, are all of one mark, that is, they are markless. It is just like the different colors and different tastes of all the streams which become one color and one taste when they enter the great ocean.

As for 'everything is unreal', when the dharmas have not entered the real-mark, they are contemplated analytically one by one, and they are all [seen to] have nothing real in them. They only exist because of the combination of many conditions.

As for 'everything is both real and unreal', there are three classes of living beings - superior, medium, and inferior. The superior contemplate the marks of the dharmas as 'not real and not unreal'. The medium contemplate the marks of the dharmas as 'all both real and unreal'. The inferior, because their powers of knowledge are shallow, look on the marks of the dharmas as 'partly real and partly unreal'. Because nirvāṇa, and the [other] unconditioned dharmas are imperishable, they look on them as real. Because samsāra and the conditioned dharmas are counterfeit, they look on them as unreal.

As for '[everything] is not real and not unreal', [the Buddhas] declared 'not real and not unreal' in order to refute 'both real and unreal'.⁸

Piṅgala specified that the four alternatives in the verse are expressed by the Buddhas to transform sentient beings, and that the Buddhas are in possession of countless expedient devices.⁹ Piṅgala, apparently, takes the Four Alternatives to be an effective device in teaching sentient beings the Truth of the dharmas or entities, with each alternative responding to a particular situation.

Robinson also introduces Candrakīrti's comments on the Four Alternatives in the verse in question. He remarks that Candrakīrti's interpretation is slightly different from Piṅgala's. Robinson states:

[Candrakīrti] considers the tetralemma as an expedient device (upāya) that the Buddha uses in giving progressively higher instruction to the different grades of living beings. First the Buddha speaks of phenomena as if they were real, in order to lead beings to venerate his omniscience. Next, he teaches that phenomena are unreal, because they undergo modifications, and what is real does not undergo modifications. Thirdly, he teaches some hearers that phenomena are both real and unreal--real from the point of view of worldlings, but unreal from the viewpoint of the saints. To those who are practically free from passions and wrong views, he declares that phenomena are neither real nor unreal, in the same way that one denies that the son of a barren woman is white or that he is black.¹⁰

As seen from the quotations, both Piṅgala and Candrakīrti's interpretations of the Four Alternatives are quite clear, and the educational implication of the Four Alternatives is also beyond doubt. For instance, in Candrakīrti's interpretation, the first alternative advises that phenomena or the empirical entities are real. It gives an affirmation of the entities in order to initiate and enhance the faith in the Buddha and Buddhism of the hearer, who is probably a novice in the religion. The understanding of the entities as such is, of course, superficial. In the second alternative, the nature of Dependent Origination of the entities is touched upon. The reality of the entities

is negated because of their being subject to changes, which result from Dependent Origination. In order to avoid the hearer's tendency toward an annihilative understanding of the entities, the third alternative suggests that the entities are both real and unreal. That is, they are real from the worldly viewpoint, but unreal from the viewpoint of the saints, or the supreme viewpoint. At this stage, a more sophisticated understanding of the entities is involved. They cannot be approached in a merely affirmative or negative manner. To obtain a fuller understanding of the entities, a synthetic viewpoint has to be adopted. Practically speaking, however, this stage is not to be resorted to. Because in practice, there is nothing to maintain, including this synthetic viewpoint. This justifies the rejection of both the reality and unreality of the entities in the fourth and final alternative.

Another verse of the Four Alternatives, in which self is picked up as the subject matter, also shows the educational implication.¹¹ In the delineation of this verse, Bhavaviveka remarks that the Buddhas instructed the sentient beings about the provisional self in light of the continuity of the mind and its mental states such as love, hate, and others. When the sentient beings attach themselves to the self and take it as having permanent substantiality, which tends to initiate perversions and sufferings, the Buddhas preached the doctrine of non-self. In order to awaken those having deep faith in the Dharma to the supreme Truth of Emptiness (i.e., the nature of being devoid of Self Nature), the Buddhas just refrained from explicating self and non-self.¹² In the above delineation, it is obvious that the Buddhas employed the first, second and fourth alternatives to educate the sentient beings

respectively, corresponding to their individual conditions.

The educational implication of the Four Alternatives can be spoken of in two aspects. First, each alternative can be taken as expressive of the understanding of the entities or the Truth from a particular angle in conformity with the hearer's individual conditions. There will generally be four angles for four different hearers or groups of hearers (sometimes three when one alternative is missing). It is not necessary for these angles to have any logical or practical relationship between each other. What is important is that the alternative employed can educate the hearer and enhance his understanding of the Truth. The interpretations of Piṅgala, Candrakīrti and Bhavaviveka reveal this aspect. Yet they tend to put the four angles and alternatives in an ascending order and regard the latter ones as more pertinent to higher or more mature understanding of the Truth.

Secondly, the four alternatives and angles are in a progressive and ascending order and the hearer is educated to understand the Truth on a gradual and progressive basis. In this case, there is only one hearer or group of hearers and the four alternatives are introduced one after the other. Education is a progressive process. One cannot be educated to attain perfect understanding of the Truth all of a sudden. Consequently, the latter alternatives can be introduced only when the former are fully digested and absorbed.

In view of the progressive and ascending order of the four alternatives in the understanding of the Truth from the lower stage to the higher, the Four Alternatives, as a thought device, may be construed as dialectical. An alternative in the form of affirmation or thesis (i.e.,

the first alternative), tends to see the Truth from a relative and partial angle. So does one in the form of negation or antithesis (i.e., the second alternative). An alternative in the form of synthesis of both affirmation and negation (i.e., the third alternative), can rectify the relativity and partiality. But it is apt to be attached to psychologically. Such attachment can be overcome by an alternative in the form of the transcendence of both affirmation and negation (i.e., the fourth alternative). We have pointed out in Part I, A, that the authentic Truth should be absolute and undifferentiated in nature. There is little doubt that the latter two alternatives pertain more to this nature than the early two. If the dialectics is understood as a thought process in which the level of the Truth is elevated through negation, antithesis or transcendence, we can roughly say that the Four Alternatives is a form of dialectics.

This dialectical character is also admitted by Robinson, who states that the alternatives form an ascending series in which each alternative except the first is a counteragent to the one before it. He concludes that this is a dialectical progression, each alternative negating and cancelling its predecessor, and that the whole argument moves forward to the negation of the fourth alternative, which is supposed to dispose of all 'views'.¹³ Here, "The negation of the fourth alternative" does not denote "the negation" of the fourth alternative; rather, it refers to "the fourth alternative" whose function is negation, i.e., the negation of its predecessors. In the explication of the fourth alternative in terms of disposing of all views, Robinson tends to associate this alternative with the attainment of the highest Truth, which is free

from all relative and partial views. This hermeneutics is echoed by Kajiyama, who suggests that the previous three alternatives can be taken as reflecting an expedient purpose, while the fourth alternative reveals the highest Truth and cannot be refuted. He concludes that the Four Alternatives is dialectical.¹⁴

iii) Classifying implication of the Four Alternatives

Robinson emphasizes the educational implication of the Four Alternatives without, however, mentioning its classifying implication. Kajiyama is aware of the latter, in addition to the former. He states:

The Four Alternatives, on the one hand, reveals the different understandings of people having different talents and dispositions towards the same object. On the other hand, it represents the gradual and progressive instructions directed to students of different grades.¹⁵

The revelation of people's different understandings is, indeed, based on a classification of these understandings. In this respect, Kajiyama, regretfully, does not extend any further elaboration. This classification of different understandings suggests the classifying implication of the Four Alternatives, which is important in the sense that it can be closely related to Chih-i's classification of Buddhist doctrines. In view of this connection, we must study the classifying implication in detail.

As a matter of fact, the typical verse of the Four Alternatives, where suchness or reality is picked up as the subject matter, is expounded by Bhavaviveka in classifying terms. In his Po-jê-têng lun-shih, he comments on this verse in the following way:

The objects such as internal and external organs and forms, etc., are taken as non-pervasive from the viewpoint of worldly and provisional Truth. Therefore, everything is real. From

the viewpoint of the supreme meaning, however, the internal and external organs, etc. originate from causes and are produced from delusion, without any substantiality. This nature is different from what they appear to be [i.e., the real entities they seem to be]. Therefore, everything is unreal. In view of the mutual dependence of the two Truths, [everything is] both real and unreal. When the practitioner attains the fruit [of enlightenment], he discerns the authentic nature of all entities without discriminations. He does not see [the difference of] reality and unreality. This is why we say that everything is neither real nor unreal.¹⁶

Bhavaviveka's point is very clear. The very same thing -- the empirical entities that we encounter in this actual world -- can be understood from different viewpoints expressed by the different alternatives. The outcome is different understandings of the same thing. The first alternative advises that the entities are real in the light of common sense. The second alternative advises that, in light of the doctrine of Dependent Origination or Emptiness, the entities are devoid of substantiality or Self Nature and therefore unreal. Common sense and Emptiness represent two different viewpoints dependent upon or relative to each other. In order to avoid attachment to any one of them, the third alternative synthesizes both of them and advises that the entities are both real and unreal. Nevertheless, 'reality' and 'unreality' represent two understandings based on the discrimination of entities, which has no place to stand in the experience of enlightenment. When one is enlightened, he does not maintain any discrimination including that of reality and unreality. It is in this context that the fourth alternative advises that the entities are neither real nor unreal.

In this way, the Four Alternatives form a classifying scheme in which the understandings of the same thing can be classified as affirmative, negative, synthetic and transcendent corresponding to their related

alternatives. All of the understandings may be held to be true in the light of a specific viewpoint. This is the classifying implication of the Four Alternatives. Interestingly, the viewpoints or angles related to the four alternatives are also in an ascending order with regard to the understanding of the entities.

Therefore the Four Alternatives has both educational and classifying implications. One may ask if there is any relationship between these two implications. Our understanding is that the classifying implication can be closely related to the educational implication in the sense that it is the basis of the latter. This means that the instructor has to be familiar with the various possible understandings of a certain subject matter and be able to classify them in logical and practical order, before he can pick up a suitable one to instruct the hearer. Effective education of sentient beings via the Four Alternatives depends on the appropriate application of the classification of the various understandings in terms of the Four Alternatives.

iv) The negative of the Four Alternatives and its revelation of the Truth

The issue of the Four Alternatives consists of two forms in Mādhyamika: the affirmative and negative. So far we have been dealing with the affirmative one. We will now turn to the negative form.

The negative form of the Four Alternatives is seen in the following typical verse, which is often quoted and employed by Chih-i and other T'ien-t'ai thinkers:

At nowhere and at no time can entities ever exist by originating out of themselves, from others, from both (self-other), or from the lack of causes.¹⁷

This verse refutes four statements: that entities exist by self-origination; that entities exist by other-origination; that entities exist by self-other origination; that entities exist by the lack of causes. If self-origination is taken as the subject matter, then the statement that entities exist by self-origination is composed of an affirmation. The statement that entities exist by other-origination denotes that they do not exist by self-origination. In this connection, the statement can be taken as composed of a negation. That the statement that entities exist by self-other origination is composed of a synthesis of self-origination and other-origination is apparent. As for the statement that entities exist by the lack of causes, because causes are confined to self-causes and other-causes, it simply means that entities exist by neither-self-nor-other origination. This statement is composed of a transcendence of both self-origination and other-origination. In view of the fact that affirmation, negation, synthesis and transcendence are entailed in the four statements respectively, these four statements can be taken as in the form of Four Alternatives, or as the affirmative form of Four Alternatives. Piṅgala also speaks of these four statements in terms of the Four Alternatives in his Commentary of the Kārikā.¹⁸ The refutation of these four statements indicates the negative of the Four Alternatives.

What is the purpose of using the negative of the Four Alternatives?

Piṅgala comments on the verse as follows:

What is called 'non-self-origination' means that entities cannot originate from their own substantiality. [Their origination] must depend on the causes If the self is untenable then the other is also untenable. Why? Because [the existence of] the other is dependent upon [the existence of] the self. If [the entity] does not originate from the self, it cannot originate from the other either. As regards self-other origin-

ation, it involves two faults: self-origination and other-origination. If entities can originate from lack of causes, this would mean [that they are] permanent. This is not the case. If there are no causes, there will be no effects.¹⁹

Piṅgala speaks of the origination of entities in terms of causality or relational conditions, which do not include self, other, and the other alternatives. That is, entities originate from combination of causes, not from self, other, and the other alternatives. But, then, what do "self, other," mean when we say that entities cannot exist by originating "out of themselves, others," or that entities cannot undergo self-origination, other-origination, ? In response, Piṅgala states:

There is no Self Nature in the causes. Because there is no Self Nature, therefore self-origination is impossible. Because there is no Self Nature, therefore there also is no Other Nature. Why? Because [the existence of] Other Nature is dependent upon [the existence of] Self Nature. Other Nature to the 'other' is also Self Nature.²⁰

It is specified that self, other, and the other alternatives are spoken of on the level of Self Nature, which actually does not exist at all. "There is no Self Nature, therefore self-origination is impossible." That is, entities are devoid of Self Nature, therefore they cannot originate from themselves. Because 'other' is related to 'self', therefore there is no Other Nature and entities cannot originate from 'others' either. On this occasion, Piṅgala speaks of the refutation of Self Nature and Other Nature and that of self-origination, other-origination, and self-other origination. As regards the origination without causes, it violates the principle of causality and is also to be refuted. Piṅgala concludes that the origination of entities is untenable from self, other, both, and neither, as expressed by the four alternatives respectively.

Therefore he arrives at the Truth of No-origination (pu-shēng 不生).²¹

The major concern of the verse in question is, according to Piṅgala, to reveal the Truth of No-origination in the sense that the origination of entities cannot be from self, other and both, which are spoken of in terms of Self Nature, and that it cannot be from the lack of causes either. This is done via the employment of the negative of the Four Alternatives. Does No-origination, then, imply that there is no origination of entities at all? The answer is by all means negative. The Truth is that entities originate from causes or Dependent Origination; they are in the nature of Emptiness. Consequently, the entities are devoid of Self Nature. In No-origination, what is refuted is the origination of entities from the standpoint of Self Nature, not the origination of entities from the standpoint of Dependent Origination or Emptiness. Our understanding as such is echoed by Kulapahana, who, in expounding Nāgārjuna's position in question, remarks:

When Nāgārjuna said, 'The self nature of an existent is not evident in the causal condition, etc.' (I.3), he was not rejecting or denying conditions, but only self nature (svabhāva) that some philosophers were positing in the condition (pratyaya) in order to account for the arising of the effect.²²

Conditions, here, are the basis of Dependent Origination. The empirical world can originate merely from dependence on these conditions. The concept of conditionality logically rejects the supposition of Self Nature, which is self-sufficient.

In view of the fact that No-origination signifies the refutation of origination spoken about in the context of the discussion of Self

Nature, which itself is vehemently rejected in the doctrine of Emptiness, we may infer that No-origination can be closely associated with Emptiness. In fact, No-origination can be taken as a form to negate Self Nature and is therefore expressive of Emptiness. We should not forget that Nāgārjuna mainly understands Emptiness in terms of the negation of Self Nature. The negative of the Four Alternatives, in demonstrating No-origination, can also be taken as a device to negate Self Nature.

We may also infer that the negative of the Four Alternatives, by which No-origination is revealed, can be closely associated with the revelation of Emptiness. This association is strengthened by Nāgārjuna's understanding of Emptiness in terms of the relinquishing of false views. This understanding has been detailed in Part I, A, above. Nāgārjuna's point is that all views based on concepts which are attached to as extremes can split the Truth of Emptiness from its wholeness and absoluteness. This is because concepts taken as extremes, or simply 'extremes', are partial and relative, being contrary to the undifferentiated and absolute nature of the Truth. Therefore, these views are false and need to be relinquished in the revelation of Emptiness. It is also inferred that all extremes should be refuted. Now, any one of the forms in the four alternatives -- whether it be an affirmation, a negation, a synthesis, or a transcendence -- is apt to be taken as an extreme. When this happens, it has to be refuted. Therefore, the negative of the Four Alternatives is proposed in the revelation of Emptiness. Self-origination, other-origination and self-other origination are all false views based on the extreme nature of self, other and self-other respectively. The extremity is formed in the ascription to the self and other of Self Nature, which

is a mere fabrication. The origination from lack of causes is, of course, also a false view or extreme that violates the principle of causality. The negative of the Four Alternatives is, in fact, a vivid model in which the refutation of false views is demonstrated.

At this point, one may raise a doubt as follows. It is not difficult to understand that the previous three alternatives are to be refuted, for they tend to create problems of attachment. That is, in the first alternative, the affirmation is conducive to the attachment to the affirmative aspect of something. In the second alternative, the negation is conducive to the attachment to the negative aspect of the thing. In the third alternative, the synthesis is conducive to the attachment to both the affirmative and negative aspects of the thing. However, it is somewhat unnatural that the fourth alternative, which reveals the state of transcendence, should be refuted as well. This state tends to mean the transcendence of attachment to extremes. Here, we must remind ourselves of the warning from the *Mādhyamikas*, that Emptiness is not to be adhered to, or that Emptiness is to be emptied. This is because Emptiness, as the negation or transcendence of Self Nature and false views, itself may in turn be attached to. The same is true with the transcendent implication in the fourth alternative. The refutation of this alternative means that even the transcendent state should not be attached to. The attachment to a transcendent state will by all means cause false views.

From the above discussions, we come to the understanding that the major concern of the negative of the Four Alternatives is the refutation of Self Nature and false views. As Nāgārjuna understands

Emptiness and its revelation in terms of this refutation, it seems safe to construe the negative of the Four Alternatives as a straightforward device through which Emptiness is revealed.

To go further into the issue, the refutation of the four forms in the negative of the Four Alternatives reflects the overcoming of the limitation of concepts. This overcoming is the power of the negative of the Four Alternatives and is closely related to the revelation of the Truth. To demonstrate this point, let us study two verses in the Kārikā.

It cannot be said that the Blessed One exists after nirodha (i.e., release from worldly desires). Nor can it be said that He does not exist after nirodha, or both, or neither.²³

It cannot be said that the Blessed One even exists in the present living process. Nor can it be said that He does not exist in the present living process, or both, or neither.²⁴

The message communicated here is that the categories or concepts of 'exist' (is), "not exist" (is not), "both-exist-and-not-exist" (both-is-and-is-not) and "neither-exist-nor-not-exist" (neither-is-nor-is-not) cannot be ascribed to the Blessed One, whether He is released from worldly desires or is in the present living process. Piṅgala does not essentially comment on these two verses. Our understanding is that 'exist' and "not exist" linguistically indicate two opposite states of something taken as an item in this empirical and relative world. So also do "both-exist-and-not-exist" and "neither-exist-nor-not-exist". They are used to depict the world. Such categories or concepts have serious limitations in two senses. First, the relationship between the concepts and the states they imply are conventional. In our use of language, whatever concept corresponds to any particular object, state or act, is decided conventionally. To relate concepts to the world, so

that the latter can be established, is a conventional process. Secondly, the concepts themselves are relative and dependent, as far as their meanings are concerned. 'Exist' is relative to and dependent upon "not exist", and vice versa. There is no concept that can claim its absolute and independent meaning about the world. Therefore the world, as treated in this manner, is a conventional and relative one; the concepts to comprehend the world can only exist in a conventional and relative sense. Conventionality and relativity are the limitation of concepts. In view of this limitation, the concepts cannot transmit the Truth, which is ultimate and absolute in nature. They can only transmit what is conventional and relative. Accordingly, in order to realize the Truth as such, the conventionality and relativity of the concepts must be transcended or overcome. This can be done by the refutation of the four forms in the negative of the Four Alternatives. As a matter of fact, false views often come from the improper use of concepts, taking them as expressive of the Truth.

With regard to the refutation of concepts or categories in the negative of the Four Alternatives, Sprung tends to share this same understanding. He remarks:

The catuskoṭi exhausts the ways in which the verb 'to be' may be employed in assertions: one may affirm the 'is' of something, or affirm the 'is not' or 'both-is-and-is-not', or 'neither-is-nor-is-not'. In all four ways language is being used ontologically; the verb 'is', in whatever variation, implies the being or non-being of what the assertion is about. Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti repudiate all of the four alternatives. They repudiate the ontological implication of the verb 'to be'.²⁵

"In all four ways language is being used ontologically" means here that language, whose major elements are concepts, as used in the Four

Alternatives, is taken as correspondent to the Truth of the world and entities; it therefore is able to transmit the Truth. This is an improper understanding of language, and has to be repudiated. The "ontological implication" in Sprung's remarks is for us the potential to transmit the Truth of the world and entities. Language or concepts, whether they be expressed in the Four Alternatives or whatever form, cannot claim this implication or potential because of their provisional and relative character.

Incidentally, the negative of the Four Alternatives appears quite often in the Kārikā.²⁶ It is also mentioned in the TCTL, as:

The meaning of ultimate Emptiness is devoid of definite forms and should not be clung to. Awakening cannot be achieved by means of communication and interpretation. It cannot be termed being, or nothing, or both, or neither.²⁷

This quotation explicitly informs the reader that the ultimate Emptiness or Truth transcends the Four Alternatives. The negative of the Four Alternatives is also seen in the TCTL elsewhere, though indirectly.²⁸

v) From Mādhyamika to Chih-i

With reference to the issue of the Four Alternatives, it is important to note that in the Mādhyamika this issue consists of two forms: the affirmative form of the Four Alternatives, and its negative, as delineated above. Both of these forms are, in fact, not creations of the Mādhyamikas, but have their origin in Primitive Buddhism.²⁹ There the Four Alternatives is taken as expressive of four extremes, while the negative of the Four Alternatives is favoured as expressive of the state of release from these extremes: the Middle Way. Nāgārjuna

does not make a clear-cut contrast between the Four Alternatives and the negative of it. Rather, he tends to speak of both forms in positive terms and regard them as conducive to the revelation of the Truth. That is, the affirmative form of the Four Alternatives is educational in leading the hearers to know the various aspects of the Truth in accordance with their individual conditions, or in leading them to know the Truth on a gradual basis from the lower stage to the higher. This has already been elaborated in our previous discussions. As for the negative form of the Four Alternatives, he sees it as a straightforward device through which to reveal the Truth. In the operation of this device, the four forms of affirmation, negation, synthesis and transcendence represented by the four alternatives respectively are refuted simultaneously. The Truth is revealed straightforwardly in such a simultaneous refutation. In view of the fact that there is no sign that Nāgārjuna downplays or negates the affirmative form of the Four Alternatives in favour of the negative form, we are reluctant to term the latter the "negation of the Four Alternatives". Rather, we refer to it as the "negative of the Four Alternatives" in the sense that it is the negative from of the Four Alternatives. There is, for Nāgārjuna, no distinctive contrast between the Four Alternatives and its negative. We must bear this in mind before coming to a comparison of Chih-i and Nāgārjuna in the issue of the Four Alternatives.

The issue of the Four Alternatives receives full and specific treatment in Chih-i's system. He frequently quotes in his major works the two typical verses in the Kārikā, which reveal the Four Alternatives and the negative of it, respectively.³⁰ There is no doubt that Chih-i

inherits the Four Alternatives and its negative from Nāgārjuna, and that he was a great thinker in Chinese Buddhism who seriously adopted these methods and elaborated them.³¹

Chih-i's employment of Nāgārjuna's methods is a big topic, which would in itself require a whole book to deal with. This is because this employment is found scattered throughout Chih-i's major works, and is articulated in considerable detail. Yet what deserves our attention most is that the employment is often done on different occasions, during which a variety of concepts and issues are touched. Before delineating this employment, we wish to make the following statistical and literary observations and reflections on these instances.

1. Among the Four Alternatives and its negative, the former appears much less in the Kārikā. It is merely mentioned twice. (Cf. notes 2 and 5.) With regard to the frequency of employing these two methods, Chih-i does not have one dominate over the other. Each method enjoys approximately the same opportunity of employment. The Four Alternatives is mostly found in the SCI and FHFI,³² while its negative appears most frequently in the MHCK.³³

2. With regard to the Four Alternatives, Kumārajīva translates the predicates of the four alternatives, which appear in the typical verse in the Kārikā (cf. section i and note 2), as real, unreal, both real and unreal, neither real nor unreal (實, 非實, 實、非實, 非實、非非實) respectively. Chih-i sometimes holds to this translation, but sometimes he renders the predicates as 'being', 'emptiness', (有, 空,). He has also felt free to turn 'being', 'emptiness', into 'being', 'nothingness',

(有, 無, . . .).³⁴ Plainly speaking, the difference is only literary.

3. In the Kārikā, the Four Alternatives is typically presented in the process of making reference to 'suchness' (cf. section i and note 2), while its negative appears in the reference to 'origination' (cf. section iv and note 17). In principle, reference to suchness, origination, or whatever, does not affect the nature of these two methods. The difference is merely literary. This is because, whatever subject matter is taken, the outcome of the logical symbolization remains unchanged. For instance, the Four Alternatives composed of suchness, not suchness, both and neither, and the Four Alternatives composed of self-origination, other-origination, both and neither, are equally symbolized as: $P, \sim P, P \cdot \sim P, \sim P \cdot \sim P$. Chih-i is aware of this point. Therefore, in the employment of the Four Alternatives and its negative, he makes reference to suchness, origination and other subject matter interchangeably.

4. In practice, however, the implications of the employment of the two methods cannot be found merely in the outcome of their logical symbolization. These implications are often related to the subject matter picked up in the presentation of the methods. For instance, the frequent reference made to ignorance and the delusive mind shows a practical concern for working on these subjects in revealing or attaining the Truth. This is particularly true with Chih-i's employment of the methods. On the basis of the interchangeability of the subjects, he does not hesitate to pick up those which are more relevant to the practical and soteriological purpose. This point will be discussed more in due course.

vi) Chih-i's treatment of the Four Alternatives

The issue of the Four Alternatives treated by Nāgārjuna has been widely studied by scholars. However, the same issue treated by Chih-i has not yet attracted much attention from them. The study which follows therefore reflects very much our own conclusions regarding the related matters.

With regard to the method of the Four Alternatives, Chih-i seems much more concerned about how to use it than what it denotes. There is, however, an occasion in the WMCLS on which the issue of denotation is indirectly addressed. After quoting the typical verse from the TCTL (cf. note 3) and indicating that this verse is also used in the Kārikā, Chih-i remarks:

Therefore we know that the Buddhas taught the Dharma in terms of these four doors. The real denotes the Dharmatā, as the authentic Principle, and [the category of] being is used as the door. As regards the unreal, the ultimate Emptiness is taken as the door. As regards both the real and unreal, it denotes the identity of ignorance and wisdom, and the identity of wisdom and the ultimate Emptiness, as mentioned earlier. This is the door of both the real and unreal. As regards neither the real and unreal, it denotes the double negation of Emptiness and being. This is the door of the Middle Way, which is neither Emptiness nor being. These four doors are for those who wish to attain the Way. They will be enlightened immediately upon hearing this.³⁵

Chih-i chooses here the typical verse in the Kārikā as an example to express his own view of the Four Alternatives. On the one hand, he speaks of the Four Alternatives in terms of four doors, which are characterized by being, Emptiness, both being and Emptiness, and neither being nor Emptiness. On the other, he relates the Four Alternatives to four epistemological states we may have about the world or entities: the real, the unreal, both the real and unreal, and neither the real nor

unreal. He uses terms and relationships such as 'Dharmatā', 'Emptiness' and the "identity of ignorance and wisdom" to expound these states. These terms and relationships are very much characterized by practical and soteriological motifs. The identity of ignorance and wisdom, in particular, suggests an extremely important manner in Chih-i's thought, in which the Truth is to be attained. This relationship will be dealt with in great detail in Part II, C, below. In view of this connection, the four states are highly relevant to the realization of the Truth. They can be taken as representing four approaches to the Truth, or four levels of Truth. This accounts for the correspondent apprehension of the four levels of Truth through the four doors.

Chih-i's employment of the Four Alternatives is based on this view, and is therefore an issue of realizing the Truth. This employment is called the "penetration of the Way via four doors" (Ssŭ-mên ju-tao 四門入道),³⁶ or the "penetration of the Principle via four doors" (Ssŭ-mên ju-li 四門入理).³⁷ There are various ways through which to approach the Buddhist Truth. They can be, for Chih-i, summarized into four basic patterns which he calls the "four doors". He entitles these four doors "the door of being", "the door of Emptiness", "the door of both being and Emptiness", and "the door of neither being nor Emptiness".³⁸ We have pointed out earlier, that Chih-i's theory of the classification of Buddhist doctrines is the backbone of his system. The employment of the Four Alternatives here is also undertaken from the perspective of this theory. Chih-i remarks that the four doors are explicated in each of the four Doctrines, and that each of these four doors is conducive to penetration into the Truth. However, for expedient purposes, the

sūtras and śāstras usually emphasize and use one door among the others, in relation to the realization of the Truth expounded in each of the four Doctrines. That is, the Tripiṭaka Doctrine emphasizes and uses the door of being, the Common Doctrine the door of Emptiness, the Gradual Doctrine the door of both being and Emptiness, and the Perfect Doctrine the door of neither being nor Emptiness.³⁹ Obviously Chih-i is seeking here from the sūtras and śāstras as authorities justification for his association of the four doors with the four Doctrines in a correspondent and ascending order. What we are concerned with is not the endeavour to seek justification from the Buddhist authorities. But we observe that such an association is strikingly in conformity with Chih-i's understanding of the four Doctrines. That is, the four doors are differentiated into two groups. One group contains the door of 'being' and the door of 'Emptiness', while the other contains the door of "both being and Emptiness" and the door of "neither being nor Emptiness". This differentiation is made on the basis that the Truth advocated in the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and Common Doctrine is one-sided (p'ien 偏). Hence these two Doctrines are associated respectively with the door of being and the door of Emptiness, in which Chih-i will tend to regard both being and Emptiness as one-sided. On the contrary, the Truth advocated in the Gradual Doctrine and Perfect Doctrine, which Chih-i specifies as the Middle Way-Buddha Nature, is perfect (yüan 圓). Therefore these two Doctrines are associated with the door of "both being and Emptiness" and the door of "neither being nor Emptiness", respectively.⁴⁰ In view of this association, it seems that "both being and Emptiness" and "neither being nor Emptiness" can be related to the concept of 'perfect'.

Chih-i does not elaborate this point. Nevertheless, "both being and Emptiness" and "neither being nor Emptiness" are certainly not one-sided. In Chinese, what is not one-sided is adequate, and will tend to be perfect. As regards the difference within each of the two groups, Chih-i contrasts the manners of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and Common Doctrine by which the Truth is to be attained as inferior and skillful respectively; he typifies their doors as the "side door" (p'ien-mên 偏門) and "main door" (chêng-mên 正門). He also contrasts the doors of the Gradual Doctrine and Perfect Doctrine as "side door" and "main door" respectively.⁴¹

Chih-i's classification of Buddhist doctrines is articulated in an ascending order. The final Doctrine (the Perfect Doctrine) is for Chih-i the highest one. In view of the parallel relation between the four doors and the four Doctrines, it is logical to infer that the four doors are also arranged in an ascending order. As a matter of fact, Chih-i has noted this point:

The people functioning in the three realms [of desire, form and non-form] see these realms as differentiation. The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas see these realms as Suchness. The bodhisattvas see these realms as both Suchness and differentiation. The Buddha sees these realms as neither Suchness nor differentiation, and illuminates both Suchness and differentiation as well. Here, we take what the Buddha sees to be the correct substance of Truth.⁴²

Chih-i speaks here of the Truth in terms of four levels, and presents these four levels of Truth in the form of the Four Alternatives. The four doors correspondent to the four levels of Truth are also implied, although Chih-i replaces being and Emptiness with differentiation and Suchness, respectively. The ascending character of the four alternatives

and four doors can be seen through the ascending order of the people in the realms of desire, form and non-form, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the bodhisattvas and the Buddha, who approach the Truth through different doors. This ascending process terminates in the Buddha, who, going beyond others, attains the correct substance of Truth (shih-hsiang chêng-t'i 實相正體). This Truth for Chih-i is superior to the Truth attained by others. Correspondingly, the door to the correct substance of Truth, which is clearly established on the basis of the fourth alternative, is superior to the other doors. This also shows Chih-i's ascription of superiority to the fourth alternative with regard to the attainment of the Truth.

vii) The Four Alternatives as an analogical device

Now we wish to reflect on Chih-i's Four Alternatives in the light of Nāgārjuna's, the latter having educational and classifying implications. Let us start by asking a question: What is the most striking feature in Chih-i's employment of the Four Alternatives? The answer is obvious. That is, he uses the Four Alternatives to analogize four different doors to express four different aspects of the Truth respectively; all this is done in the light of his classification of Buddhist doctrines. To be specific, the first alternative is used to analogize the door of being in order to express the Truth advocated by the Tripiṭaka Doctrine. The second alternative is used to analogize the door of Emptiness in order to express the Truth advocated by the Common Doctrine. The third alternative is used to analogize the door of both being and Emptiness in order to express the Truth advocated by the Gradual Doctrine. Finally, the

fourth alternative is used to analogize the door of neither being nor Emptiness in order to express the Truth advocated by the Perfect Doctrine. In doing so, the hearers are taught with a specific door that is most pertinent and correspondent to their individual conditions (their interest, concern, talent, etc.). In this respect, Chih-i also remarks explicitly:

[The four doors] are all different expressions responding to individual talents.⁴³

Accordingly, the hearers are led to know the different aspects of the Truth. However, in view of the fact that the four doors, like the four Doctrines, are in an ascending order, each hearer will finally be taught with the door of neither being nor Emptiness; in this way the hearer will be led to the Truth advocated by the Perfect Doctrine, i.e., the correct substance of Truth. In this sense, the Four Alternatives is taken as an analogical device in which analogies are made for educational and soteriological purposes. We may definitely assert that the Four Alternatives as such has deep educational implications. In this point, Chih-i and Nāgārjuna can be brought together.

Here, one may raise two doubts. First, why should the analogy be articulated in this manner? Is there any logical basis for such an articulation? In other words, why should the first alternative be used to analogize the door of being, the second the door of Emptiness, and so forth? Secondly, why should the door of being be associated with the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, the door of Emptiness the Common Doctrine, and so forth? Is there any doctrinal or practical ground for such association?

In response to the first doubt, our understanding is that the

articulation of analogy has to do with the four logical forms composing the four alternatives respectively (affirmation, negation, synthesis and transcendence). The affirmation in the first alternative tends to reveal the affirmative or phenomenal aspect of the Truth, which is spoken of in the understanding of the world and entities. So the analogy of the first alternative is expressed appropriately in the door of being. The negation in the second alternative tends to reveal the negative or non-substantial aspect of the Truth. In this case the analogy of the second alternative is best expressed by the door of Emptiness. The synthesis in the third alternative combines both aspects of the Truth. Correspondingly, the analogy of the third alternative is pointed out clearly in the door of both being and Emptiness. The transcendence in the fourth alternative reflects the state of transcending both aspects. So the analogy of the fourth alternative is described appropriately as the door of neither being nor Emptiness. Each analogy articulated has, indeed, a logical basis.

With regard to the second doubt, Chih-i himself does not explicitly account for this kind of an association. This issue is, however, not difficult to deal with in light of his classification of Buddhist doctrines which is delineated in Part I, B, above. Chih-i holds that the Tripiṭaka Doctrine emphasizes the phenomenal aspect of entities and tends to see them as something real. Its association with the door of being seems natural. The Common Doctrine emphasizes the non-substantial or empty nature of entities, leading to its association with the door of Emptiness. The Gradual Doctrine advocates the gradual procedure in the realization of the Truth of entities, in which one has

to experience different levels of understanding of the Truth, from the lower to the higher. These different levels are presented by being and Emptiness. The association of the Gradual Doctrine with the door of both being and Emptiness is consequently proper. Finally, the Perfect Doctrine advocates the sudden manner in the realization of the Truth of entities, in which all differentiations including those of being and Emptiness have to be transcended and overcome suddenly. Here lies the basis for its association with the door of neither being nor Emptiness. In this sense, the association of the four doors and the four Doctrines also has doctrinal and practical bases.

Let us return to the comparison of Chih-i and Nāgārjuna. Chih-i's Four Alternatives as an analogical device is based on his classification of Buddhist doctrines. As can be seen from the above delineation, by parallelling the four alternatives with the four Doctrines, he refers each alternative to a specific Doctrine. As each Doctrine has its own favoured type of Truth, each alternative is therefore associated with, or regarded as the door to, a specific type of Truth. It should be noted particularly, that this does not imply the splitting up of the Truth. Rather, this implies that the Truth can be approached through different dimensions or doors. Chih-i himself has also pointed this out:

The Truth cannot be [ascribed even with the numeral of] one, how can it be [ascribed with the numeral of] four? We should know that 'four' denotes the [four] doors to the Truth.⁴⁴

Chih-i's point is that what can be spoken of in terms of numerals is countable and in relative nature, and that the Truth is absolute in nature and goes beyond the realm of countability. It cannot be counted even with the numeral of one, much less those larger than one. If it is the

one, it is the one in an absolute sense: the absolute One. The 'four' or four doors simply imply various understandings of the Truth. Consequently, Chih-i's employment of the Four Alternatives in the form of analogy can be taken as a constructive scheme in the development of Buddhist thought in terms of synthesizing different Buddhist doctrines and leading one to a more comprehensive understanding of the Buddhist Truth. In addition, from the analogy articulated in the light of his classification of Buddhist doctrines, we can see that Chih-i skilfully uses the Four Alternatives to expound and advertise this classification. The first alternative expresses the Tripiṭaka Doctrine, the second alternative the Common Doctrine, and so on. With regard to Nāgārjuna, the situation is different. He does not parallel the four alternatives with specific Buddhist doctrines. He does not seem to have a clear and strong idea of the classification of Buddhist doctrines, much less does he refer the four alternatives to various Buddhist doctrines. However, we should not forget that his Four Alternatives has a classifying implication which is helpful in classifying different understandings of the same thing. It is not impossible to develop a classification scheme of various Buddhist doctrines on the basis of this classifying implication of the Four Alternatives. In view of the close relationship between Chih-i and Nāgārjuna, it is likely that the former's classification of Buddhist doctrines was influenced by this classifying implication. We are not in the position here to explore this possibility. It is sure, at least, that this classifying implication is entailed in Chih-i's treatment of the Four Alternatives as an analogical device, because the paralleling of the four alternatives (or doors) with the four Doctrines presupposes a classifying scheme of various Buddhist doctrines.

The method of the Four Alternatives is, for both Chih-i and Nāgārjuna, educational in leading sentient beings to know the different aspects of the Truth, leading finally to the correct substance of Truth. Chih-i's analogy of the four alternatives to the four doors on the basis of his classification of Buddhist doctrines is a positive and constructive development of the method in the sense that it helps us understand the abundant contents of the Buddhist Truth. However, there is an important point to which we must draw our attention. As far as it is used as an analogical device, the limitation of the Four Alternatives is unavoidable. That is, the analogy is articulated provisionally and conventionally, and undertaken through relative concepts or names, such as 'being', 'Emptiness', and the others. This renders the Four Alternatives in a relative manner. Moreover, in the analogy, the Truth is not demonstrated straightforwardly, but by a medium to which it is analogised. The analogy cannot lead one to encounter the Truth face to face. It is in this sense of limitation that Chih-i views the Four Alternatives with a reservedly qualified attitude. He calls it 'conceivable'.

'Conceivable' (ssü 思, ssü-i 思議) is spoken of in contrast to the 'inconceivable' (pu-ssü 不思議, pu ssü-i 不思議). In Chih-i's terminology, the conceivable refers to what can be described by names and consequently is relative in nature; while the inconceivable refers to that which cannot be described by names and consequently is absolute. It is also possible to see the conceivable as pertaining to the realm of speculation, and the inconceivable as beyond this realm. On an occasion, Chih-i contrasts the conceivable and inconceivable in relation to the Four Alternatives:

[What is] named in terms of the Four Alternatives pertains to the origination of causality and dependence, and is therefore conceivable and speakable. . . . [The absolute cessation and contemplation] is beyond dependence and relativity, and so is not what is made. It cannot be conceived in terms of the Four Alternatives. Therefore, it is inexpressible in language and not an object of cognition.⁴⁵

Chih-i is plainly associating the Four Alternatives here with causality and relativity, which he regards as in the nature of what is originated; he thinks that what is originated is conceivable and speakable. It is in this context that he cautiously evaluates the method of the Four Alternatives. That is, the conduciveness of this method to the understanding of the Truth can be admitted, so far as this understanding is confined to the conceivable and relative.⁴⁶ This simply means that the Four Alternatives can merely lead us to attain the relative Truth. It has nothing to do with the absolute Truth, which is inconceivable in character and must be attained through another method. To go further, Chih-i is aware of the danger of attachment to the Four Alternatives and warns us against this attachment. His point is that the categories used in the Four Alternatives (being, nothingness, etc.) cannot be asserted determinately, otherwise one is bound to become committed to ignorant views.⁴⁷ This seems to imply that these categories should not be in any way associated with the determinate Self Nature, the attachment to which is the cause of all false views.

What is the other method which has to do with the absolute Truth? It is obviously the negative of the Four Alternatives.

viii) Chih-i's treatment of the negative of the Four Alternatives

Now we come to the discussion of the negative of the Four Alternatives in Chih-i's system. Similar to what he does in the case of the Four Alternatives, Chih-i is more interested in the use of the negative of the Four Alternatives than giving a clear definition of this method. On one occasion, however, he makes the following remarks:

As things do not undergo self-origination, how can there be knowledge of the self as its object? As there is no other-origination, how can there be knowledge of mutual dependence as its object? As there is no self-other-origination, how can there be knowledge of the major and subsidiary causes as its objects? As there is no non-causal-origination, how can there be knowledge of the natural [origination] as its object? If one clings to these four views [of self-origination, other-origination, self-other-origination and non-causal-origination], various kinds of ignorance and defilement will arise, but then, how can these be called knowledge? Now, with the [understanding of] no-origination, etc., we eradicate the [clinging to] fourfold Self Nature. When [the clinging to] Self Nature is eradicated, there will be no dependence [on the Self Nature], neither will there be any karma, or suffering, etc. With a pure Mind in the constant state of non-dichotomy, one is able to manifest the Prajñā [wisdom].⁴⁸

In this remark, the so-called "knowledge of the self as its object" (tzu-ching chih 自境智), as well as the other similar phrases, do not constitute true knowledge. They are spoken of in the context of clinging to Self Nature. That is, "knowledge of the self as its object" denotes the knowledge whose object is the self, which is taken as having its own Self Nature. "Knowledge of mutual dependence as its object" denotes the knowledge whose object is an 'other' upon which something depends in its origination. This 'other' is taken as having Self Nature.⁴⁹ The others follow similar conclusions. These conclusions come from the views of self-origination, other-origination, etc., which are also spoken of in terms of Self Nature. Consequently, they lead to the fourfold Self Nature responding to the four sorts of origination. Chih-i seems

to think that these views represented by the Four Alternatives are false due to their clinging to Self Nature which is nothing but a conceptual fabrication. He suggests that we should eradicate the clinging to the fourfold Self Nature, or simply Self Nature with the correct understanding of non-self-origination, etc., which is expressive of No-origination. The eradication of clinging to Self Nature will result in the non-dichotomous state of the mind, the "pure Mind". This pure Mind can initiate the Prajñā wisdom, which is, for all Buddhists, the very wisdom with which the Truth can be realized.

Chih-i's point is that if the Four Alternatives, represented by self-origination, etc., is clung to and associated with Self Nature, false views are bound to arise. He also seems to conceive that the clinging to Self Nature is what makes the mind dichotomous and prevents the Prajñā wisdom from being manifested. Therefore, one should refute the Four Alternatives and renounce any speculation regarding Self Nature. In doing so, one is able to reveal the authentic nature of knowledge, viz., the Prajñā, and see the Truth. Here, Chih-i seems to relate the Four Alternatives to the clinging of Self Nature and the dichotomous tendency of the mind, both of which only obstruct one's apprehension of the non-substantial and non-dichotomous Truth. This is, we believe, the sense in which Chih-i refutes the Four Alternatives and emphasizes its negative. This by all means implies that the Truth is to be attained in the negation of Self Nature and the rejection of dichotomous or false views. Nāgārjuna also held to this implication. Consequently, with regard to the issue of the negative of the Four Alternatives, Chih-i and Nāgārjuna basically shared the same conception.

Chih-i employs the negative of the Four Alternatives on many occasions and makes reference to a variety of subjects, such as ignorance, Suchness, dreams, various dharmas and the delusive mind. Among these various subjects the delusive mind is mentioned most. In view of the limited space in this thesis, it is impossible to describe in detail all of Chih-i's references. We can only concentrate here on an example, in which the manner and basic concern of Chih-i's employment of this method can be seen. The example reads:

To behold this mind of desire, [one may ask] if it originates from the organ, or the object, or both, or neither. If it originates from the organ, it would have originated by itself before encountering the object. If it originates from the object, [then there will be a difficulty, namely,] the object is another thing from the self, how can it be related to me? If it originates from the organ and object together, then two minds should have arisen [one from the organ and the other from the object]. Yet it is impossible to originate without a cause. To trace the desire in terms of the Four Alternatives, [we find that] the desire does not have a place to come from. . . . Ultimately it is empty and quiescent.⁵⁰

The mind of desire is a delusive mind. Chih-i endeavours to employ the Four Alternatives here to trace the origination of this delusive nature. Each of the four alternatives cannot avoid a difficulty, causing the failure of this endeavour. Here, some explanations are needed concerning the form of the Four Alternatives in this example, especially with regard to the second alternative. The origination of the organ, or organ-origination is taken as the affirmation in the first alternative. This is all right. But in the second alternative, Chih-i picks up the object and tries to form a negation in terms of object-origination. This sounds problematic because the object is not an opposite of the organ, and object-origination cannot be taken as in the form of a negation in contrast with organ-origination as an affirmation.

To speak in terms of symbolization, if organ-origination is symbolized as 'p', object-origination cannot be symbolized as ' $\sim p$ '. This identifies the difficulty of taking origination from the object (or "object-origination") as the second alternative which is based on a negation. In this case, our understanding is that we should see the issue in a looser and more flexible sense. We need not adhere too much to the logical form of negation. Chih-i does not have a deep logical interest. He is more concerned about the practical and soteriological. In the affirmation of organ-origination the organ is posited as the subject matter. Anything that is not the organ, i.e., "not-organ", can be taken loosely as its opposite. This gives rise to "not-organ" origination as the negation of organ-origination. In the present example, the object is picked up to represent whatever is not the organ. Accordingly, object-origination is expressive of not-organ origination and thus the negation of organ-origination. In this sense, the second alternative can be worked out in conjunction with the former alternative in accordance with the normal relationships among the four alternatives.

In the remark, Chih-i obviously argues two points concerning the negative of the Four Alternatives. First, the delusive mind cannot come from anywhere; there is no background to which the origination of the delusive mind can resort. Secondly, the nature of the delusive mind is fundamentally empty. With regard to the first point, our explanations and elaborations are as follows. To speak from common sense, it is natural for one to relate the origination of something to a cause, whether it be self, other, both, or neither. In the example at hand, the organ stands for the self-cause, while the object stands for the other-cause,

as seen in the above delineation. Indeed, these aspects of self, other, both and neither exhaust all the logical causal natures (causes) one can conceive. Chih-i would not object to the tendency to seek a cause to account for the origination of something, so far as this origination is regarded as a phenomenon in empirical and relative terms. He also remarks that the origination of the mind has to depend on the major and subsidiary causes.⁵¹ In fact, the category of origination is what we use to describe entities coming into being prior to our sensation, as well as ideas that appear in our thought. Origination is, in this sense, no more than a conventional device and thus has relative nature. Apart from this sense, origination has no meaning. But people tend to attribute to the concept of origination an ultimacy and to envision that outside the realm of relativity, there is something in the nature of 'origination'; this then promotes problems of self-origination, other-origination, self-other-origination, or non-causal-origination, all of which take an absolute status and could exist by themselves. Such attribution and perception are nothing but issues based on our conceptual fabrication, which unavoidably initiate false views. It is such attribution and perception that Chih-i objects to, and the negative of the Four Alternatives expresses this objection. In relation to this point, Chih-i states:

What is called delusion is the origination of the mind. This origination is [in reality] devoid of self-nature, other-nature, self-other-nature and non-causal-nature. When the origination takes place, it does not come from self, other, both and neither.⁵²

Here are mentioned four natures, which exhaust all the natures that can be conceived. These four natures can be associated with the four logical forms (affirmation, negation, synthesis and transcendence) in the four alternatives respectively. To be specific, origination from self-nature is in the form

of affirmation. Origination from other-nature denotes the origination from not-self-nature and therefore is in the form of negation in contrast with origination from self-nature as an affirmation. Origination from self-other-nature is a synthesis of the previous two. Finally, origination from non-causal-nature denotes a transcendence of this synthesis. We may certainly say that the four natures correspond to the four alternatives. In view of this correspondence, the negation of the four natures is obviously demonstrated in the negative of the Four Alternatives. The four natures are, indeed, equally expressive of Self Nature or svabhāva in the absolute sense. What Chih-i is doing here is to employ the negative of the Four Alternatives to bring to our attention the fact that the origination of the mind (or whatever else) in whatever form (i.e., self-origination, other-origination, etc.) is really devoid of Self Nature or any definite ground or status of existence. This is, actually, the Truth of No-origination with which Nāgārjuna was deeply concerned.

With regard to the second point that Chih-i argues, namely, that the nature of the delusive mind is fundamentally empty, it is logically entailed in the first point. The reason is, if the origination of any entity does not have Self Nature, then there will be no origination in the absolute sense. It follows that the entity, which originates in the relative sense, will not originate in the absolute sense at all. That is, it is devoid of the absolute Self Nature and is therefore empty.

From the arguments of Chih-i as shown above -- namely, both origination and whatever originates are devoid of Self Nature and are therefore in the nature of Emptiness -- it is clear that the concern guiding Chih-i's employment of the negative of the Four Alternatives is the

realization of the Truth: the Truth of No-origination that is absolute in nature. This No-origination is just another expression of Emptiness. This is a straightforward realization of the absolute Truth, in which no analogy is undertaken. We have shown in section iv that both Nāgārjuna and Piṅgala also share this understanding of No-origination. As explicated in Part I above, Chih-i basically speaks of the Truth in terms of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. This Middle Way - Buddha Nature by all means embraces the meaning of Emptiness. In most cases, in which the negative of the Four Alternatives is used to reveal the Truth, Chih-i seldom specifies the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. There is an occasion, however, on which Chih-i refers to the Truth revealed through this method as Emptiness, Provisionality and the Middle Way. That is, he employs this method in a threefold process (san-fan 三反) and concludes that through this threefold process one can penetrate into the meaning of Emptiness, Provisionality and the Middle Way.⁵³ Emptiness, Provisionality and Middle Way are, for Chih-i, expressive of various aspects of the Truth of Middle Way - Buddha Nature. This will be discussed in the following chapter.

ix) The significance of Chih-i's negative of the Four Alternatives from the practical and soteriological perspective

Now we wish to reflect on Chih-i's negative of the Four Alternatives in the light of Nāgārjuna's. Our study so far has demonstrated that both Chih-i and Nāgārjuna admit without the slightest reservation that the negative of the Four Alternatives is conducive to the straightforward revelation of the Truth in the absolute sense. In the Kuan-hsin lun, a

small work written shortly before his death, Chih-i remarks that the typical verse in the Kārikā, where the negative of the Four Alternatives is found (cf. section iv and note 17), is meant to interpret the doctrine of No-origination.⁵⁴ This No-origination is the first of the Eight Negations or the so-called "Eight-Nos" (pa-pu , ㄋ ㄟ), which appears in the beginning verse of the Kārikā.⁵⁵ This verse of Eight-Nos transmits the most profound Buddhist message by means of the negation of eight categories (origination, extinction, destruction, permanence, etc.). The message is that the absolute Truth transcends all extremes based on relativity, and so cannot be ascribed with categories, which are relative in nature. This brings about doctrine of No-origination, No-extinction, No-destruction, No-permanence, etc. Chih-i's remark plainly shows his view that the negative of the Four Alternatives aims at attaining the absolute Truth of No-origination, which is, as pointed out previously, expressive of Emptiness. It also shows his close relation to Nāgārjuna on this issue. We should not be oblivious of the special importance Chih-i ascribes to No-origination. He thinks that all chapters in the Kārikā are expressive of No-origination. This point has been discussed earlier.⁵⁶ Indeed, in Chih-i's eyes, No-origination represents the absolute Truth expounded in the Kārikā. It is presented by means of the negative of the Four Alternatives. In the understanding and employment of the negative of the Four Alternatives, Chih-i's views are basically in conformity with Nāgārjuna's. In this regard, we can certainly state that Chih-i inherits Nagarjuna's thought.

There is, however, a significant difference between the two great thinkers, with regard to the employment of the negative of the Four

Alternatives. Nāgārjuna usually makes reference to general matters, as he is not much concerned about specifying a particular subject matter. This is evidenced in the typical verse on No-origination mentioned above, as well as in others. In this typical verse, the subject matter to be ascribed with the nature of No-origination is bhavaṇ, which denotes entities or dharmas in general. With respect to this point, Chih-i is quite different and precise. On many occasions he specifies the subject matter as the mind, or more appropriately, the delusive mind. He often argues by means of the negative of the Four Alternatives, that the delusive mind does not originate from itself, other, both or neither. By this means he comes to the conclusion that the delusive mind is in the nature of No-origination, or is not to be gained in the ultimate sense.⁵⁷ Theoretically speaking, whatever is taken as the subject matter does not affect the outcome of the argument, which is the awakening to the Truth through the realization of the nature of No-origination. The Truth is No-origination, and can be demonstrated in anything. In practice, however, in the endeavour to awaken to the Truth of No-origination, it is always better to pick up an intimate or particular subject matter to start with, than to stray into the midst of external and indefinite things. The delusive mind rises out of our own existence and is consequently an intimate subject matter to work upon. Once we realize the nature of No-origination of this mind by means of the negative of the Four Alternatives, we will tend to restrain ourselves from giving rise to any delusive motives. Gradually this delusive mind is kept under control. Chih-i himself is certainly aware of the practical importance of the specification of this delusive mind. In the MHCK, he classifies the subjects for cessation and contemplation into ten

categories, among which the leading one is composed of the five aggregates (Skt., skandha; Chi., yin 陰), the eighteen realms (Skt., dhātu; Chi., chieh 界) and the twelve entrances (Skt., āyatana; Chi., ju 入).⁵⁸ Within this category, he picks up the aggregate of consciousness (Skt., viññāna-skandha; Chi., shih-yin 識陰), and advises us to concentrate on it in the practice of contemplation. The reason is that it is intimate to each of us. This aggregate of consciousness is nothing but the mind, the root of defilements. He states:

The mind is the root of defilements, and is described as such. If one wants to contemplate and observe [the defilements], he must tackle their root. This is like the acupuncture treatment, in which one must find out the acupoint. Now, we should leave the chang [i.e., the distant] and pick up the ch'ih [i.e., the less distant], leave the ch'ih and pick up the ts'un [i.e., the least distant]. Let us put aside the four aggregates of form, etc., but contemplate the aggregate of consciousness alone. The aggregate of consciousness is the mind.⁵⁹

Chih-i's point is, obviously, that after the nature of No-origination of the intimate delusive mind is realized, the realization of the nature of No-origination can easily incorporate distant things in general. This is indeed a commendable way to follow from the practical point of view.⁶⁰

To go further, the specification of the mind in the realization of the nature of No-origination signifies the No-origination of the mind. This is an extremely important practice in the soteriological sense. The No-origination of the mind should not be taken in the annihilative sense to mean the extirpation of the mind. As will be delineated in chapter C in this Part, the mind embraces both the pure and impure (for instance, Dharma Nature and ignorance) in any single moment and is consequently delusive. In the practice of the No-origination of the mind, what one is concerned about is the overcoming of the impure and the

revelation of the pure in the mind. The outcome is that the delusive mind is transformed into the pure Mind, which is the basis of enlightenment and liberation. In this sense, the negative of the Four Alternatives, through which the No-origination of the mind is revealed, is highly soteriological.

To emphasize the soteriological significance of the negative of the Four Alternatives, Chih-i even goes so far as to specify the subject matter as liberation itself in the employment of the method. He states:

[The liberation] does not originate from self-liberation, therefore it is not named in terms of the self-nature. It does not originate from other-liberation, therefore it is not named in terms of other-nature. It does not originate from self-other, therefore it is not named in terms of self-other-nature. It does not originate from neither-self-other, viz., the non-causal, therefore it is not named in terms of non-causal-nature. . . . The liberation does not depend on the four extremes for origination.⁶¹

The paradigm is quite similar here to the one used to refute the origination of the mind.⁶² It is patterned on the negative of the Four Alternatives. Chih-i's argument is that the origination of liberation cannot be related to any form of Self Nature -- whether it be self, other, self-other, or non-causal -- and that liberation has nothing to do with Self Nature. It is in this sense that he advises soteriologically that liberation does not arise from the four extremes, which obviously denote the four alternatives associated with Self Nature.

The delusive mind and liberation as the soteriological goal tend to form two opposite poles to each other. It is apparent that the origination of the former should be refuted. It is, however, somewhat unnatural that the origination of the latter should likewise be refuted. In the employment of the method of the negative of the Four Alternatives, Chih-i does not distinguish between them. This may cause confusions.

Our understanding is that what Chih-i aims at in the employment of the method is the refutation of the origination of anything or any event ascribed with Self Nature, including even liberation as the result of enlightenment. This refutation has of course to do with the realization of the Truth. In this respect, Chih-i is quite in line with Nāgārjuna. That Chih-i picks up liberation as the subject matter in the argument of No-origination should not be taken as his objection to initiating liberation. He simply holds that liberation does not take place in any association with Self Nature. The advice that liberation does not arise from the four extremes tends to mean that liberation is possible in the transcendence of the four extremes. This advice demonstrates a deep concern for liberation, rather than an objection or indifference to it.

Nevertheless, there is a problem which remains. The Truth for Nāgārjuna is Emptiness, which he mainly understands in terms of the negation of Self Nature. The purpose of the negative of the Four Alternatives is the refutation of Self Nature. Accordingly, the method is quite correspondent and conducive to the realization of the Truth. It appears, then, that this method is a sufficient one. Chih-i's case, however, is different. The Truth for him is the Middle Way - Buddha Nature which, as described in some detail in Part I above, has very abundant content including Emptiness. The negative of the Four Alternatives does not fully correspond to the realization of this Truth. It is an insufficient method. It is in this sense that Chih-i has to rely on other methods, which will be discussed shortly.

Notes

1. Robinson, pp. 50-58; Robinson S, pp. 301-303; Kajiyama, pp. 82-84, pp. 115-120; Ramanan, pp. 160-170; R. Pandeya, "The Logic of Catuskoṭi and Indescribability", in his Indian Studies in Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977, pp. 89-103; S.S. Chakravarti, "The Mādhyaṃika Catuskoṭi or Tetralemma", Journal of Indian Philosophy, 8 (1980), pp. 303-306; NG Yu-kwan, "The Arguments of Nāgārjuna in the light of Modern Logic," Journal of Indian Philosophy, 15 (1987), pp. 363-384.

2. Inada, p. 115. sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ cātathyameva ca, naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyametaḍbuddhānuśāsanam. (Kārikā-P, p. 369) Kumārajīva's rendition: "一切實非實, 亦實亦非實, 非實非非實, 是名諸佛法。" (CL, 18:8, T.30.24a)

3. According to the Sanskrit original and Kumārajīva's translation, the subjects of all these four alternatives are the same: 'everything' (Skt., sarvaṃ; Chi., i-ch'ieh - 一切). This verse is also quoted in the TCTL a number of times, with slight changes. For instance, 一切實, 一切非實, 及一切實亦非實, 一切非實非不實, 是名諸法之實相 (T.25.61b), and 一切諸法實, 一切法虛妄, 諸法實亦虛, 非實亦非虛 (T.25.338c). In these two quotations, it is very clearly shown that 'everything' is the subject throughout the four alternatives. Robinson, however, takes the subject of the third alternative as 'something'. (Robinson S, p. 303; Robinson, p. 57) His understanding of this rendering is completely questionable.

4. Inada, p. 115. ātmetryapi prajñāpitamanātmetryapi deśitaṃ, buddhānātma na cānātma kaścidityapi deśitaṃ. (Kārikā-P, p. 355) For the Chinese text please see the following footnote.

5. 諸佛或說我, 或說於無我, 諸法實相中, 無我無非我。 (CL, 18:6, T.30.24a)

6. 諸法不生不滅, 非不生非不滅, 亦不生滅非不生滅, 亦非不生滅非非不生滅。 (T.25.97b) The Arabic numerals have been added by us for the sake of clarity.

7. Ibid., loc. cit.

8. Robinson, p. 56

9. 諸佛無量方便力, 諸法無決定相, 為度衆生, 或說一切實, 或說一切不實, (T.30.25a)

10. Robinson, p. 56.

11. Cf. the above section for the verse.

12. Po-jê-têng lun-shih, chap. 11, T.30.106c.

13. Robinson, p. 56.

14. Kajiyama, p. 117

15. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

16. 內外諸入色等境界，依世諦法，說不顛倒，一切皆實。第一義中，內外入等，從緣而起，如幻所作，體不可得，不如其所見故，一切不實。二諦相待故，亦實亦不實。修行者證果時，於一切法得真實無分別故，不見實與不實，是故說非實非不實。(Chap. 11, T.30.108a)

17. Inada, p. 39. na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyam nāpyahetutaḥ, utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvaśana ke cana. (Kārikā-P, p. 12)

Kumārajīva's rendition: "諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共不無因，是故知無生。" (CL, 1:1, T.30.2b) The same verse also appears in the Kārikā elsewhere. (Kārikā-P, p. 421; CL, 21:12, T.30.28c) Incidentally, the verse has been quoted in the TCTL, with slight modifications, as:

諸法....非自作，非彼作，非共作，非無因緣。(Chap. 6, T.25.104b)

18. T.30.2b.

19. 不自生者，萬物無有從自體生，必待衆因。.....自無故他亦無。何以故？有自故有他。若不從自生，亦不從他生。共生則有二過：自生、他生故。若無因而有萬物者，是則為常，是事不然。無因則無果。(Ibid., loc. cit.)

20. 衆緣中無自性。自性無故，不自生。自性無故，他性亦無。何以故？因自性有他性。他性於他，亦是自性。(Ibid., loc. cit.)

21. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

22. Kulapahana, p. 28.

23. Inada, p. 157. param nirodhādbhagavān bhavatītyeva nohyate, na bhavatyubhayaṃ ceti nobhayaṃ ceti nohyate. (Kārikā-P, p. 534) Kumārajīva's rendition: "如來滅度後，不言有亦無，亦不言有無，非有及非無" (CL, 25:17, T.30.35c)

24. Inada, p. 157. tiṣṭhamāno 'pi bhagavān bhavatītyeva nohyate, na bhavatyubhayam ceti nobhayam ceti nohyate. (Kārikā-P, p. 534)
Kumārājīva's rendition: "如來現在時,不言有亦無,亦不言有無,非有及非無。" (CL, 25:18, T.30.35c).

25. Sprung, p. 7.

26. For an enumeration of the negative of the Four Alternatives, cf. my article, "The Arguments of Nagarjuna in the Light of Modern Logic." Op. cit.

27. 畢竟空義,無有定相,不可取。不可傳釋得悟。不得言有,不得言無,不得言有無,不得言非有非無。(TCTL, chap. 55, T.25.448b) Perhaps it is more appropriate to render "畢竟空義,無有定相,不可取" as: "The meaning of ultimate Emptiness consists in the nature of being devoid of definite forms and should not be clung to."

28. For example, chap. 2, T.25.74c – 75a; chap. 7, T.25.110a. In the former case, the Four Alternatives is employed to present fourteen difficult questions. The author gives no response, remarking that this business has nothing to do with the Truth. In the latter, four kinds of views are raised through the Four Alternatives. They are all false views. It follows that the Four Alternatives is irrelevant to the Truth.

29. They are mentioned, for instance, in the Chinese version of the Samyutta-nikāya, the Cha a-han ching (雜阿含經), chap. 13, T.2.86a.

30. Cf. notes 2 and 17 above.

31. It is said that before Chih-i, a person, revered as Fu Ta-shi (傅大士) in the Chinese Buddhist circle had composed a short poem, in which the issues of the Four Alternatives and No-origination were touched. Cf. Chan-jan, Chih-kuan i-li (止觀義例), T.46.452c. Cf. also T. Andō, Tendai shōgu shisō ron, p. 26. As a matter of fact, Fu Ta-shi was a vague personality. The poem ascribed to him is too brief to reveal what the issues of the Four Alternatives and No-origination are exactly about. In our opinion, Fu Ta-shi does not deserve our attention in relation to the Chinese response to the Four Alternatives and its negative.

32. Eg., SCI (T.46.729a – 730a, 731c – 732a, 747a, 751c, 760a); FHHI (T.682b – c, 687a, 782b, 784a – 790b). It is also mentioned in MHCK (T.46.20c – 21a, with the third alternative lacking, 53c); WMCHS (T.38.520c, 528b, 557b – 558b); WMCLS (T.38.695a). On these occasions, the Four Alternatives is taken as conducive to the realization of the Truth.

33. Eg. MHCK (T.46.4c, 8a, 21c — 22a, 29a, 46c, 54a — b, 54c, 63c — 64b, 70b, 82a, 82b — c, 111b, 127b). It is also mentioned in WMCHS (T.38.525a — b, 526c, 528b, 550a); WMCLS (T.38.564a, 638c — 639a); FHHI (T.33.696a — b, 699c); Fa-chieh tz'u-ti ch'u-mên (T.46.691b). On these occasions, the negative of the Four Alternatives is regarded as the method through which the Truth can be approached.

34. For details cf. FHHI, chap. 8, T.33.784a — 785b; SCI, chap. 8, T.46.747a; chap. 9, T.46.751c.

35. 故知諸佛說法，無不約此四門。若實者，即是法性實理，用有為門。若非實，即是約畢竟空為門。若亦實亦不實，即是上文無明即明，明即畢竟空，即是亦實亦不實為門。若非實非不實，即空有變非之義，如用中道非空非有為門。如是四門，為向道之人，聞說即悟。(WMCLS, chap. 9, T.38.695a).

36. SCI, chap. 4, T.46.731c.

37. SCI, chap. 3, T.46.729a.

38. 尋佛三藏，赴緣多種，尋其正要，不出四門入道。其四門者，一者有門，二者空門，三亦有亦空門，四非有非空門。(SCI, chap. 4, T.46.731c).

39. 四教各明四門，雖俱得入道，隨教立義，必須逐便。若是三藏教四門，雖俱得入道，而諸經論多用有門。通教四門雖俱得入道，而諸經論多用空門。別教四門雖俱得入道，而諸經論多用亦有亦空門。圓教四門雖俱得入道，而諸經論多用非有非空門也。(SCI, chap. 4, T.46.731c — 732a).

40. 今明佛法四門，皆得入一理，但有二種不同。一者，三藏、通教兩種四門，同入偏真之理。二者，別、圓兩教四門，同入圓真之理。(SCI, chap. 3, T.46.730a).

41. SCI, chap. 3, T.46.730a — b.

42. 三界人見三界為異，二乘人見三界為如，菩薩人見三界亦如亦異，佛見三界非如非異，雙照如異。今取佛所見為實相正體也。(FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.682b — c).

43. [四門]皆是赴機異說。(FHHI, chap. 9, T.33.791a) This is a conclusion Chih-i arrived at after discussing in great detail the issue of penetration into the Truth through the four doors. Cf. FHHI, chap. 9, T. 33.784a — 790b.

44. 實相尚非是一，那得言四？當知四是入實相門耳。
(FHHI, chap. 8, T.33.784a).

45. 四句立名，是因待生，可思可說。．．．．．〔絕待止觀〕待對既絕，即非有為。不可以四句思，故非言說道，非，心識境。(MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.22a) Chih-i is discussing here the relationship between the relative and absolute cessation and contemplation.

46. This cautious evaluation of the Four Alternatives is seen in Chih-i's discussion of the supreme Meaning (Skt., siddhānta; Chi., hsi-t'an 悉檀), which refers to the Truth or shih-hsiang. Chih-i differentiates this supreme Meaning into the unspeakable and speakable. With regard to the speakable one, he enumerates the four alternatives and concludes that all of them are conducive to the understanding of the Truth. (第一義悉檀者，有二種；一，不可說；二，可說。．．．約可說者，一切實，一切不實，一切亦實亦不實，一切非實非不實，皆名諸法之實相。 FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.687a.)

47. 若定謂是有，即是若法。乃至定謂是非有非無，亦名若法者。．．．若定言諸法非有非無者，是名愚癡論。(FHCW, chap. 10, T.34.141b).

48. 諸法不自生，那得自境智；無他生，那得相由境智；無共生，那得因緣境智；無無因生，那得自然境智。若執四見著，愚惑紛論，何謂為智？今以不自生等破四性。性破，故無依倚，乃至無業苦等。清淨心常一，則能見般若。(MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.29a - b).

49. The expression, "mutual dependence" or hsiang-yu (相由), sounds somewhat unnatural in the context in question. Chih-i associates self-origination with "knowledge of the self as its object", or tzu-ching chih (自境智). He should associate other-origination with "knowledge of the other as its object", or t'a-ching chih (他境智), rather than "knowledge of mutual dependence as its object", or hsiang-yu-ching chih (相由境智). Accordingly, it seems possible and indeed better to take hsiang-yu as t'a (他), or 'other'.

50. 觀此欲心，為從根生，為從塵生，為共為離。若從根生，未對塵時，心應自起；若從塵生，塵既是他，於我何預？若共生者，應起兩心；若無因生，無因不可。四句推欲，欲無來處。．．．．．畢竟空寂。(MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.70b).

51. 夫心不孤生，必託緣起。意根是因，法塵是緣，所起之心，是所生法。(MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.8a).

52. 妄謂心起。起無自性，無他性，無共性，無無因性。起時不作自、他、共、離來。(Ibid., loc. cit.)

53. MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.81c — 82c. This threefold process is one of the most complicated examples in which Chih-i employs the negative of the Four Alternatives to reveal the Truth. It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate this process. For a delineation and elaboration of this process, cf. T'ang, pp. 1168-1170.

54. Kuan-hsin lun, T.46.586a.

55. For this verse cf. Kārikā-P, p. 11; CL, chap. 1, T.30.1b; Inada, p. 39. It has been discussed in Part I, A and B above.

56. Cf. the second chapter of Part I, section v and note 46.

57. This argument is mostly found in the MHCK, e.g., chap. 1, T.46.8a; chap. 5, T.46.54b; chap. 5, T.46.63c — 64b; chap. 6, T.46.70b. In MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.63c — 64b, this argument is articulated in a very subtle and detailed manner.

58. MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.49a — b. For a detailed denotation of the five aggregates, eighteen realms and twelve entrances, cf. H. Nakamura, Bukkyōgo daijiten (仏教語大辞典), vol. I, Tokyo: Shoseki, 1975, 355a, 660c, 657c.

59. 心是惑本，其義如是。若欲觀察，須伐其根，如斧病得穴。今當去丈就尺，去尺就寸，置色等四陰，但觀識陰。識陰者心是也。(MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.52a — b) Here, chang 丈, ch'ih 尺 and ts'un 寸 are units of length. A chang is ten ch'ihs and a ch'ih is ten ts'uns. A ts'un is about the size of one inch or three centimeters.

60. The practical significance of the emphasis of the mind in the employment of the negative of the Four Alternatives has also been pointed out by Chun-i T'ang. However, he does not elaborate the significance. Cf. T'ang, p. 1159.

61. [解脫]不從自脫起，故不從自性以立名。不從他脫起，故不約他性以立名。解脫不從自、他起，故不從共性以立名。解脫不從離自、他無因緣起，故不約無因緣性以立名。... 解脫不依四邊起。(WMCHS, chap. 5, T.38.550a).

62. Cf. the above section as well as notes 50 and 52.

B. Epistemic-soteriological Character of the Threefold Contemplation

Between the Four Alternatives and its negative, Chih-i considers the latter to be the authentic philosophical method leading to the realization of the Truth. He would not, however, be satisfied with this method. The reason is as follows. The negative of the Four Alternatives is a method based on negating the categories, which, being relative in nature, are often falsely attributed to the absolute Truth. Origination, for example, is an important category attributed to the Truth of entities in an absolute sense, whether it be self-origination, other-origination, both or neither. It is thought in the Mādhyamika that all these four sorts of origination do not pertain to the absolute Truth, and that they must be negated to pave the way for the revelation of the absolute Truth. This method of negation represents the way to reveal the Truth in a negative manner: to tell what the Truth is not. It can never positively reveal what the Truth is. Indeed, this method is particularly in conformity with the Truth whose negative aspects are emphasized. The Mādhyamika Emptiness and Middle Way -- which are taken as the negation of Self Nature and false views, and the transcendence of extremes, respectively -- are just what this method is suitable to reveal. The nature of non-origination, non-extinction, etc., is quite in line with the negative character of this method. In view of this character, it is very understandable that Nāgārjuna uses the negative of the Four Alternatives so frequently in the Kārika. Chih-i's case is different. Although he does not ignore the negative and transcendent aspects of the Truth, he is certainly more concerned about the positive

and constructive relationship between the Truth and worldly entities and affairs. From the functional and all-embracing nature that he ascribes to the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, he is undoubtedly of the opinion that the Truth cannot be spoken of and fully understood without making reference to this empirical world. The Truth is, for Chih-i, comprehensive in content, covering both the negative and positive, the transcendent and worldly aspects. It is both Emptiness and No-emptiness. It cannot be fully realized until both aspects are accounted for. This purpose cannot be served by the negative of the Four Alternatives, which merely accounts for the negative. The Threefold Contemplation is proposed precisely in the context of serving this purpose.

The Threefold Contemplation (san-kuan 三觀) is composed of the Contemplation of Emptiness (k'ung-kuan 空觀), Contemplation of the Provisional (chia-kuan 假觀), and Contemplation of the Middle Way (chung-kuan 中觀). We will explain the translation of kuan (觀) as 'contemplation' later. As a philosophical method of revealing the Truth, the Threefold Contemplation is different from the negative of the Four Alternatives in the sense that the latter merely copes with the nature of No-origination or the empty nature of the object; the Threefold Contemplation, on the other hand, copes with both the empty nature and the provisional or worldly nature of the object as well as the synthesis of these two natures. Chih-i claims that this Threefold Contemplation has its origin in the Mādhyamika. To be more specific, it can be traced in Nāgārjuna's concepts of Emptiness, Provisional Name and Middle Way.¹ As a matter of fact, the Threefold Contemplation does have a close relationship with the Mādhyamika concepts of

Emptiness, Provisional Name and Middle Way. In view of this, we have first to examine the meaning of these three concepts in Mādhyamika context, before the study of the character of the Threefold Contemplation. As Emptiness and the Middle Way have been dealt with in the first chapter of Part I above, we will now focus on the Provisional Name here.

i) Provisional Name in Nāgārjuna's context

Provisional Name (Skt., prajñapti; Chi., chia-ming 假名) appears in the Kārikā twice. It is mentioned in the verse of the Threefold Truth (cf. note 1) together with Emptiness and the Middle Way. In this verse, Nāgārjuna reminds us of the provisionality of Emptiness, or the fact that Emptiness is a Provisional Name. His point seems to be that Emptiness is provisionally established to denote the Truth. Emptiness as a name or concept does not convey anything ultimate. (Cf. Part I, A, vii above.) Nāgārjuna here does not take a positive view of provisionality, or the Provisional Name.

Provisional Name is also mentioned in the following verse:

Nothing could be asserted to be śūnya, aśūnya, both śūnya and aśūnya, and neither śūnya nor aśūnya. They are asserted only for the purpose of provisional understanding.²

In this verse, Nāgārjuna negates the Four Alternatives composed of Emptiness (śūnya), Non-emptiness (aśūnya), both Emptiness and Non-emptiness, and neither Emptiness nor Non-emptiness, and treats this form of thinking as of provisional character. We have analysed in the previous chapter the fact that Nāgārjuna speaks of the Four Alternatives in educational, classifying and therefore expedient terms. The provisional character of the Four Alternatives here may be related to this context.

What Nāgārjuna wants to say is that the Four Alternatives does not pertain to anything absolute and ultimate. Consequently, from the negative of the Four Alternatives and the reduction of this Four Alternatives to provisionality, Nāgārjuna's reluctance to take a positive view of the Provisional Name is also inferred.

Provisional Name in Sanskrit, prajñapti, means 'appointment', 'agreement', and 'engagement'.³ Generally speaking, it denotes some sort of mental articulation, in which a name is appointed to represent certain worldly entities, which are in the nature of dependent or relational origination. From the standpoint of the ultimate Truth, all entities are devoid of Self Nature and are therefore empty. However, these entities all originate from the combinations of conditions or factors, and consequently assume their existence in space and time as appearances or phenomena. In response, we provisionally appoint names to denote and distinguish these entities. This is how the Provisional Name comes. Provisionality here just pinpoints the character of appointing names. 'Provisional' in Chinese, chia (假), means 'borrowed', 'instrumental', and therefore without any absolute reference whatsoever.

With regard to the meaning of the Provisional Name, prajñapti, Sprung also states:

I understand a prajñapti to be a non-cognitive, guiding term which serves to suggest appropriate ways of coping with the putative realities on which it rests for its meaning and to which it lends meaning. 'Person' rests on the putative reality of psycho-physical traits, and 'chariot' presupposes wheels, axle, and so on. There is, in truth,⁴ no entity 'person' and none 'chariot' named by these words.

That there is in Truth no entity 'person' and none 'chariot' named by these words means that there is no such entities as person and

chariot which have an independent Self Nature. 'Person' is a Provisional Name that we appoint to denote the assemblage of certain psycho-physical traits, and the assemblage does not refer to anything that has its own Self Nature and can exist independently.

In the Kārikā, no explicit meaning of Provisional Name is given. Nāgārjuna might have thought that such meaning as described here is commonly known already, and so there was no need to care for it. Or perhaps he simply did not emphasize the Provisional Name. The latter conjecture is supported by the fact that the Provisional Name is not mentioned at all in his other important work, the Vigrahavyāvartanī.

When penetrating deeper into the Provisional Name, however, the issue becomes more complicated. Naming an entity is different from the entity itself. The former is a mental manipulation, which is conceptual in nature, while the latter refers to the empirical and worldly existence. Provisional Name here is spoken of in the context of the former, rather than the latter. In other words, Provisional Name primarily refers to the act in which something is provisionally named, rather than the object that is named. This act is, in fact, an act of naming, with the purpose to distinguish something from others. As naming is undertaken with names or concepts, such as 'chariot', 'table', etc., this act is clearly conceptual. Moreover, names and concepts pertain to the realm of language, and naming is expressive of the function of language. It follows that this act is an act of utilizing language. It should also be noted that as an act of naming is to name something on a provisional or conventional basis, this act would naturally infer the provisionality or conventionality of the

name. Provisional Name may therefore also denote this nature of provisionality and conventionality.

To regard the Provisional Name as an act of naming entails a concern for the conceptual, while to construe it in the sense of an object to be named entails a concern for the empirical and worldly. This distinction is extremely important, especially in terms of determining one's attitude toward the empirical world. In the case of Nāgārjuna, when he declares Emptiness to be a Provisional Name, he is pinpointing the provisionality of Emptiness as a name or concept. That is, in reality there is no name or concept, including 'Emptiness', that can represent the ultimate without restriction. 'Emptiness' is nothing but an articulated name or concept with which to denote the ultimate Truth. Provisional Name here obviously refers to the act of articulating names or concepts. With this conceptual articulation, the message of the provisionality of Emptiness as a name is also inferred. And when Nāgārjuna connects the Four Alternatives with a provisional understanding or the Provisional Name, he is reducing the Four Alternatives to an operation of language, whose main content is names and concepts. Provisional Name is also taken here as an act of using names and concepts. As seen from the Kārikā, Nāgārjuna undoubtedly construes the Provisional Name in the sense of an act of naming or utilizing language. Indeed, the Sanskrit term, prajñapti, is expressive of an act. Matilal delineates the Provisional Name in terms of dependent designation. This dependent designation is, according to him, the act of designating something like a chariot which is dependent upon other things, such as the set of wheels and the axle. He points out

that all our designations are 'synthetic' in operation, in which we synthesize various elements into something in order to designate it.⁵ The act of designating something is exactly what we understand Nāgārjuna's Provisional Name to be, i.e., the act of naming.

ii) Provisional Name in the context of the Ta-chih-tu lun (TCTL)

In the TCTL, the Provisional Name assumes the denotation as seen in the Kārikā, but it also goes further. On some occasions, the Provisional Name is used as a verb:

The five aggregates assemble. [The assemblage] is provisionally named 'sentient being'.⁶

Because of the transcendence of the two extremes, [the state] is provisionally named 'Middle Way'.⁷

The various factors assemble, and so [the state] is provisionally named 'old age'.⁸

The Provisional Name on the first occasion conveys a thought process in which the name "sentient being" is provisionally worked out. On the second occasion, the name "Middle Way" is provisionally introduced to denote the state of the transcendence of extremes. We can therefore assert that the Middle Way is a Provisional Name. This assertion is akin to the assertion that Emptiness is a Provisional Name, in the sense that both the Middle Way and Emptiness are names provisionally worked out to denote the ultimate. On the final occasion, "old age" is provisionally named to depict the state of somebody caused by the assemblage of various factors. On these three occasions, it is beyond doubt that the Provisional Name is treated as an act of naming.

The author of the TCTL does not, however, see the Provisional Name as merely an act of naming. He tends to ascribe to the Provisional

Name some substantive bearing through associating it with objects or entities. For example, he says:

The common people, because of their erroneous views, regard [what is made] as being. The wise do not cling to the form of what is made, understanding that it is merely a Provisional name.⁹

The Provisional Name here is directed to entities as phenomena, such as a chariot, house, corporal body, etc. As these things are causally originated, or, as mentioned in the text, what is made (yu-wei 有為) by causes, there are indeed no entities that have Self Nature and that can exist independently. Nothing can maintain its existence apart from the assemblage of causes. What the Provisional Name denotes is the assemblage of causes. For example, the assemblage of the head, legs, stomach, vertebrae, and so on, is provisionally named "corporal body".¹⁰ The Provisional Name denotes the assemblage of these causes, not the 'entity' in itself.

This tendency of associating Provisional Name with objects is strengthened in the articulation of two terms: "provisional name-being" (chia-ming yu 假名有) and "provisional name-form" (chia-ming hsiang 假名相). In these terms, the subjects are being (yu 有) and form (hsiang 相), but they are established on the basis of the Provisional Name or provisionality. With regard to the provisional name-being, the TCTL states:

The provisional name-being is like the curd, which is composed of four factors, i.e., colour, smell, taste and touch. When these causal factors combine together, there is provisionally the name 'curd'. The being of the curd is not of the same sort as that of its causal factors. It is unreal and yet it is not unreal in the sense as the hare's horn, or the hair of the tortoise.¹¹

The provisional name-being is therefore that kind of being between the real and the unreal. This kind of being is based on the combination of causal factors; so it is apparent that this kind of being denotes the combination itself, which appears as entities. With regard to the provisional name-form, it refers in the TCTL to things such as chariot, house, forest, etc.¹² As both provisional name-being and provisional name-form denote entities as objects, the Provisional Name is also brought close to the objects.

On another occasion, the Provisional Name is identified with things and given considerable emphasis. The TCTL states:

[Subhūti] delineates the ultimate Truth of various entities without eradicating the Provisional Names. . . . The bodhisattva recognizes that all entities are Provisional Names, and consequently one should learn to acquire the [wisdom of] prajñāpāramitā. Why? Because all entities have nothing but Provisional Names, and they all follow the [wisdom of] prajñāpāramitā [which recognizes] the characteristic of ultimate Emptiness.¹³

The idea of delineating the ultimate Truth of various entities without eradicating the Provisional Name originally comes from the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra.¹⁴ This is just another expression of the idea of realizing Emptiness right in the embodiment of the entities (t'i-fa ju-k'ung), with which Chih-i characterizes the Common Doctrine. Mādhyamika and the Prajñāpāramitā thought belong, in Chih-i's view, to the Common Doctrine. The Provisional Name in this context obviously denotes the realm of entities, and the ultimate Truth in question is by all means Emptiness. What is conveyed here is the inseparability of the realization of the absolute from the relative empirical entities, leading to the importance of these entities in soteriological aspects. The Provisional Name is construed in the sense of an object or objects.

iii) Provisional Name in Chih-i's context

So far we have discussed the concepts of Emptiness, Provisional Name and Middle Way in the Mādhyamika's context. We will now proceed to see how Chih-i understands them. As Emptiness and the Middle Way have been dealt with in Part I, B, in what follows we will merely focus on the Provisional Name.

With regard to the meaning of the Provisional Name, some important changes can be witnessed in Chih-i's system. First, the term, "Provisional Name", or chia-ming, is in most cases reduced to "the Provisional", or chia. This deletion of the term 'Name', or ming does not simply signify a change in terminology. Rather, it signifies a shift in its denotation from a stress on the nominal aspect to that of its substantive aspect. This shift in denotation is based upon a greater concern about the substantive and worldly than the nominal and conceptual. In our terminology, the stress placed on the nominal aspect reveals the tendency to take the Provisional Name as an act of naming, while the emphasis made on the substantive aspect reveals the tendency to construe the Provisional Name in the sense of an object.

Secondly, Chih-i does speak of Emptiness, Provisional Name and the Middle Way in terms of objects (ching 境). In delineating the operation of the contemplation, he remarks:

To contemplate an object with the contemplation, the object would be tripled. To initiate the contemplation with the object, the contemplation would be tripled. . . . To contemplate the three [objects] as one and to initiate the one [single contemplation] into three is inconceivable.¹⁵

The contemplation denotes the Threefold Contemplation, while the triple object denotes the three aspects of the object: Emptiness, the Provisional

and the Middle Way. The triple object is also mentioned elsewhere:

The three sorts of wisdom formed by the Threefold Contemplation in one single Mind apprehend the triple object that is inconceivable.¹⁶

For Chih-i Emptiness and the Middle Way are manifestly not real objects;

'objects' (ching 境) ascribed to them should not be taken seriously.

Only the Provisional can be construed as an object in its proper sense, i.e. the substantive entity or the world of substantive entities. This Provisional is detailed elsewhere:

With regard to the Provisional to be contemplated, there are two sorts of Provisional, which contain all entities [or dharmas]. The first is the Provisional of love, and the second is the Provisional of [false] views.¹⁷

Chih-i attempts here to classify the Provisional. The classification is not our concern at the moment. Our concern is that the Provisional contains all entities or dharmas (i-ch'ieh fa 一切法) and so is another expression for the world of dharmas. It is beyond doubt that the Provisional (chia 假) in Chih-i's context is basically construed in the sense of objects, referring to the substantive world, which is empirical and relative in nature. It is beneficial to relate this understanding to the issue of ch'u-chia and ju-chia discussed in Part I, C, above. Chia or the Provisional is expressive of the empirical world of dharmas, which includes both sentient and non-sentient entities.

It should be noted that when the substantive dharmas or the world of substantive dharmas are spoken of in terms of the Provisional, they are in the nature of relational or dependent origination. They are non-substantial and consequently empty; they are provisional and not ultimate. Chih-i is fully aware of the nature of their provisionality, but he does

not assume a pessimistic viewpoint. Rather, he tends to think that this provisionality is just what makes the dharmas and the world as they are. It is due to it that the world is subject to change and transformation, which is initiated by the function of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. We can also say that it is only in the Provisional, with its provisionality, that the functional nature of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature can secure its manifestation. It is in this sense that Chih-i emphasizes and is concerned about the Provisional and its provisionality.

It should be added as well that although Chih-i substantiates the Provisional Name and ascribes to it the sense of an object, he does not forget its original meaning as an act of naming. For example, in the exposition of the Contemplation of entering into the Provisional from Emptiness, which will be described in detail soon, Chih-i remarks that the illusive is provisionally named "worldly Truth" (shih-ti 世諦).¹⁸ The Provisional Name, here, is taken to mean the act of naming. He also defines the Provisional as the "provisional appointment of what is null in nature".¹⁹ He also employs the expression of the "provisional name-being",²⁰ which did not appear in the Kārikā, but appeared in the TCTL, and which seemed to relate the Provisional Name to the sense of an object. Nevertheless, the discussion elaborating the sense of the act of naming is very seldom found in Chih-i's works, and may be appropriately ignored. There is certainly a transition in the denotation of the Provisional Name from the Kārikā to Chih-i via the TCTL. This transition is a shift from the emphasis on the nominal and conceptual to the emphasis on the substantive and worldly. It seems clear that Nāgārjuna is more concerned about the former and Chih-i, the latter.

iv) The epistemic-soteriological character of contemplation

Having clarified the denotations of Emptiness, Provisional Name and the Middle Way in the Mādhyamika context as well as Chih-i's understanding of these three concepts, we now come to the discussion of Chih-i's method of the Threefold Contemplation. First, let us examine how Chih-i construes contemplation in general.

Chih-i gives contemplation a clearcut definition as follows:

The Dharma Sphere being penetrated and illumined, [everything] being magnificently bright, this is called 'contemplation'.²¹

The quiescence of the Dharma Nature is called 'cessation', while being quiescent but constantly illuminating is 'contemplation'.²²

It is obvious here that the contemplation in question is predominantly epistemological in character. This character is also deeply practical and soteriological. What is contemplated is not an object as a phenomenon, but the Truth itself, or more appropriately, the ultimate Truth, shih-hsiang (實相). What is achieved in the contemplation is not confined to objective knowledge about the relative empirical world. Rather, the major concern is the realization of the Truth in a broad sense. Through the contemplation as such, the Truth can be properly understood and realized. Chih-i explicates contemplation elsewhere in terms of "contemplate to attain" (kuan-ta 觀達) and "contemplate to penetrate" (kuan-ch'uan 觀穿). "Contemplate to attain" is proposed in the sense of attaining the Truth and the original pure nature of the sentient beings, while "contemplate to penetrate" is mentioned in the sense of overcoming all kinds of defilement and eventually penetrating into the Absolute without obstruction.²³ What deserves our attention most in this matter is that contemplation concerns not merely the

realization of the Truth, but also the realization of our pure nature. This pure nature refers to our Buddha Nature, which is, for Chih-i, also the Mind. This equivalence is not surprising at all, if we remind ourselves of Chih-i's unique conception of the Truth in terms of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, which is both the Way or Truth, and our Buddha Nature or Mind. People may tend to think that the way or Truth is objective and our Buddha Nature or Mind is subjective; but this object-subject duality does not exist in Chih-i's system of thought. It is overcome in the synthesis and identification of the Middle Way and Buddha Nature in the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, which is the authentic and ultimate Truth for Chih-i.

Another point deserving our attention is that the contemplation in question assumes a strong dynamic sense and a close association with the empirical existence of dharmas. In the above quotation, Chih-i characterizes contemplation as "being quiescent but constantly illuminating" (chi erh ch'ang-chao 寂而常照), in contrast with the mere quiescent denotation of cessation. This conveys the sense that the contemplation is established on an ever-dynamic and ever-functional ground. In a contemplation as such, what is contemplated is by all means the Truth, i.e., the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. This Truth is not some 'Truth' in a transcendent and consequently isolated sense. Rather, it has an all-embracing nature and is therefore the very Truth of the dharmas: the Truth of the empirical world. The contemplation is undertaken in a close association with the empirical dharmas. In the contemplation, the dynamism is directed toward these dharmas. The dynamic sense and empirical association in this kind of contemplation are also

reflected in Chih-i's criticism of the Tripiṭaka Doctrine advocated by the Hīnayānists as follows:

Although the cessation and contemplation [of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha] lead to the liberation from the life-death cycle, they are dull as they enter Emptiness by the destruction of matter. This Emptiness can be named 'cessation', as well as 'neither cessation nor non-cessation'. However, it cannot be named 'contemplation'. Why? Because this involves the destruction of the body and the annihilation of the wisdom, therefore it is not named 'contemplation'.²⁴

Chih-i is accusing the Hīnayānists here of being nihilistic. In the pursuit of attainment of the Truth (i.e., Emptiness), they commit two mistakes. First, in order to attain Emptiness, they destroy matter, which denotes the empirical realm of dharmas. The destruction of matter is undertaken by the disintegration of the latter, as detailed in Part I, B above. Consequently the Truth is contemplated without any association with the empirical world. Secondly, the Hīnayānists destroy the body and annihilate wisdom. This criticism is reminiscent of the permanent nature of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature expounded in Part I, C above. Chih-i's point seems to be that the Hīnayānists do not establish the permanent Buddha Nature, which is identical to the Mind, as the spiritual ground in the pursuit of enlightenment. The Mind is, in fact, the source of all sorts of wisdom. For this reason, when the practitioner perishes physically, the Hīnayānists believe that there would be nothing of the individual left behind; consequently there is no way to speak of function or dynamism of any sort. In view of this lack of empirical association and dynamism in the Hīnayānists' contemplation, Chih-i does not regard this contemplation as authentic. It therefore can be inferred that the contemplation Chih-i has in mind assumes a strong dynamic sense and a close association with the empirical world. This will be expounded in full when we discuss Chih-i's

Threefold Contemplation in the forthcoming sections. This conception of the contemplation is exactly in line with the permanent, functional and all-embracing nature of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. Chih-i's Threefold Contemplation is in fact worked out in the perspective of this Middle Way - Buddha Nature.

At this point it is necessary to discuss the translation of the two terms, chih (止) and kuan (觀), the latter in particular. In many Chinese Buddhist schools, chih and kuan were taken as two important practices in the attainment of the Truth. What we are concerned about here is their denotations in Chih-i's system. Chih-i understands chih in terms of the quiescence of the Dharmatā, which signifies the termination of all the sorts of perversions and attachments obstructing us from seeing the true nature of the dharmas. It consequently can be rendered as 'cessation', which means the cessation of these perversions and attachments.

With regard to kuan, the interpretive problem is more complicated. Scholars have made many suggestions. For instance, Hurvitz renders it as 'view',²⁵ Tamaki as 'observation',²⁶ W.T. de Bary as 'insight',²⁷ and Chung-yuan Chang as 'contemplation'.²⁸ Chang renders Chih-i's san kuan (三觀) as "Threefold Contemplation".²⁹ The rendition of kuan as 'view' or 'observation' is feasible, but the problem is that both view and observation are too common and are hardly reminiscent of the attainment of the Truth. It is unnatural to speak of viewing or observing the Truth in a soteriological sense. 'Insight' and 'contemplation' are better renderings in the sense that they are more pertinent to the attainment of a soteriological goal. Chih-i defines

kuan as "being quiescent but constantly illuminating". He seems to emphasize the aspect of the constant illumination of kuan, which involves a deeply functional and dynamic sense. Between 'insight' and 'contemplation', the latter seems to transmit the implication of dynamism more straightforwardly. Therefore we have translated kuan as 'contemplation' and san-kuan as the "Threefold Contemplation".

v) The epistemic-soteriological character of the Threefold Contemplation

In Chih-i's system, the specific method of contemplation through which the Truth is seen is the Threefold Contemplation. This Threefold Contemplation is, as described above, epistemic-soteriological in character; this is specified in the following way:

What is illumined is the Threefold Truth; what is initiated is the Threefold Contemplation; [what results from] the accomplishment of the contemplation is the Threefold Wisdom.³⁰

The issues of the Threefold Truth (san-ti 三諦) and Threefold Wisdom (san-chih 三智) are raised in the context of the Threefold Contemplation. The Threefold Truth can be regarded here as corresponding to the cognized object; the Threefold Contemplation, to the cognition; and the Threefold Wisdom, to the cognizing subject. The epistemological structure in the Threefold Contemplation is very clear. The concern here is not only with the knowledge about the empirical world, but also with enlightenment in a soteriological sense. The term, 'threefold' in the so called "Threefold Truth", "Threefold Contemplation", and "Threefold Wisdom", refers unanimously to Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way. The Threefold Truth is composed of the Truth of Emptiness (k'ung-ti 空諦), the Truth of the Provisional (chia-ti 假諦)

and the Truth of the Middle Way (chung-ti 中諦). The composition of the Threefold Contemplation has been accounted for in the opening remarks of this chapter. With regard to the Threefold Wisdom, more explanations are needed here. The components of this wisdom are on many occasions enumerated as i-ch'ieh chih (一切智), tao-chung chih (道種智) and i-ch'ieh chung chih (一切種智).³¹ On these occasions, i-ch'ieh chih is associated with Emptiness, tao-chung chih with the Provisional, and i-ch'ieh-chung chih with the Middle Way. That is, they are the wisdoms to illumine Emptiness, the Provisional and Middle Way respectively. In view of the fact that, for Chih-i, (1) Emptiness denotes the empty and therefore universal nature of dharmas, (2) the Provisional denotes the empirical world in the nature of variety and particularity, and (3) the implication of the Middle Way includes the synthesis of Emptiness and the Provisional, it seems safe to construe (1) i-ch'ieh chih to be the wisdom of universality, (2) tao-chung chih to be the wisdom of particularity, and (3) i-ch'ieh-chung chih to be the wisdom of both universality and particularity. We can also formulate a rough picture of the epistemology of the Threefold Contemplation: in the Contemplation of Emptiness, the wisdom of universality illumines Emptiness; in the Contemplation of the Provisional, the wisdom of particularity illumines the Provisional; and in the Contemplation of the Middle Way, the wisdom of both universality and particularity illumines the Middle Way.

Still we must take a further step, in order to obtain a more subtle and precise epistemic-soteriological picture of the Threefold

Contemplation. In the MHCK, Chih-i states:

The contemplation consists of three kinds. [The first,] 'entering into Emptiness from the Provisional' (ts'ung-chia ju-k'ung 從假入空) is called 'Contemplation of the Twofold Truth' (erh-ti kuan 二諦觀). [The second,] 'entering into the Provisional from Emptiness' (ts'ung-k'ung ju-chia 從空入假) is called 'Equal Contemplation' (p'ing-teng kuan 平等觀). These two Contemplations are ways of expedience. They lead to the Middle Way and simultaneously illumine the two Truths [of Emptiness and the Provisional]. Every intention dying out, one spontaneously flows into the sea of all-embracing wisdom (sarvajñā). This is called the 'Contemplation of the Middle Way - Supreme Truth' (chung-tao ti-i-i-ti kuan 中道第一義諦觀).³²

Chih-i discusses the Threefold Contemplation here in more specific terms. The three Contemplations of Emptiness, the Provisional and Middle Way, which comprise the Threefold Contemplation, are not taken in isolated context. Rather, the Contemplations of Emptiness and the Provisional entail each other, and the Contemplation of the Middle Way synthesizes the other two. At this point we will concentrate on the Contemplations of Emptiness and the Provisional.

The Contemplation of Emptiness is specifically taken as the Contemplation of the Twofold Truth. It takes place along the direction "from the Provisional to Emptiness", with Emptiness as its focus. The Contemplation of the Provisional is specifically taken as the Equal Contemplation, which takes place along the direction "from Emptiness to the Provisional", with the Provisional as its focus. With regard to the titles, "twofold-truth" and 'equal', Chih-i's explanation is that "twofold-truth" refers to the combination of two aspects (i.e., Emptiness and the Provisional) in the act of contemplating Emptiness. In other words, the Provisional is what Emptiness is based upon, and through which Emptiness can be expressed. It follows that the Provisional is

the expressing, and Emptiness the expressed. The Contemplation of the Twofold Truth is made possible through the combination of these two aspects.³³ 'Equal' in the term "Equal Contemplation" can be accounted for by dividing the Contemplation into two steps: "(coming) from Emptiness" and "entering into the Provisional". The practitioner, after realizing Emptiness, does not abide in the transcendent state of Emptiness. He knows that this is not yet the ultimate Truth. He retreats from Emptiness and enters into the Provisional (i.e., the world of provisionality), devoting himself to helping others. This is "(coming) from Emptiness". In helping others, he offers different remedies according to their individual needs. This is "entering into the Provisional". The so called 'equal' is contrasted with the 'unequal' of the Contemplation of the Twofold Truth. This is because in the Contemplation of the Twofold Truth, one negates the Self Nature of the Provisional and regards the Provisional as empty. In this action one negates the Provisional with Emptiness. One does not, however, turn back to negate Emptiness with the Provisional. In the Equal Contemplation, in which one negates the attachment to Emptiness and turns back to the Provisional, one negates Emptiness with the Provisional. This, together with the previous Contemplation, in which one realizes Emptiness through negating the Provisional with Emptiness, forms a situation in which Emptiness and the Provisional are equally made use of and negated once each. Therefore this Contemplation is called "Equal Contemplation".³⁴

Now we come to the Contemplation of the Middle Way, or that of the Middle Way - Supreme Truth. The above quotation from the MHCK merely refers to this Contemplation as "simultaneously illumining the

two Truths of Emptiness and the Provisional". The passage continues to give more comprehensive descriptions about this Contemplation:

In the former Contemplation (i.e., the Contemplation of the Twofold Truth), one contemplates the Emptiness of the Provisional, which is equivalent to emptying samsāra. In the latter Contemplation (i.e., the Equal Contemplation), one contemplates the Emptiness of Emptiness, which is equivalent to emptying Nirvāṇa. [In the Contemplation of the Middle Way - Supreme Truth,] one simultaneously negates the two extremes [of samsāra and Nirvāṇa], and this negation is called 'double-emptiness contemplation'. It is the expedient way, by which one is able to realize the Middle Way. Therefore we state that every intention dying out, one flows into the sea of all-embracing wisdom. Moreover, the former Contemplation uses Emptiness, and the latter Contemplation the Provisional; this is the expedient way for simultaneous preservation of the both. Therefore when one enters into the Middle Way, one can simultaneously illumine the two Truths.³⁵

Some interpretation is needed here. In the Contemplation of the Twofold Truth, one contemplates the negation of the Self Nature of the empirical world, which the Buddhists often express in terms of samsāra or the life-death cycle. This is the Emptiness of the Provisional, or the negation of the Provisional. In the Equal contemplation, one contemplates the negation of the Self Nature of Emptiness. This is the Emptiness of Emptiness, or the negation of Emptiness. These two negations, if held separately, are bound to be extremes, which are not pertinent to the perfect state. To attain the perfect state, they have to be synthesized to form a twofold negation (shuang ché 雙泯), a simultaneous negation of both Emptiness and the Provisional. This expresses the state of the Middle Way. However, the pictures of the Contemplation of the Twofold Truth and Equal Contemplation can be looked at from another angle. That is, on the one hand, the Contemplation of the Twofold Truth negates the Provisional with Emptiness. This can be construed as an affirmation of Emptiness.

On the other hand, the Equal Contemplation negates Emptiness with Emptiness. This Emptiness of Emptiness logically implies a return to the Provisional, or the affirmation of the Provisional. Therefore, as a result of this synthesis, we come to the affirmation or illumination of both Emptiness and the Provisional. This is, in fact, a twofold affirmation or illumination (shuang-chao 雙照,) of Emptiness and the Provisional, and so also expresses the state of the Middle Way. It is consequently seen that in the Contemplation of the Middle Way, one not only negates and transcends both Emptiness and the Provisional, acquiring a state of transcendence and non-duality, but also one synthesizes both Emptiness and the Provisional. This synthesis may entail a positive and constructive attitude toward the empirical world by means of a non-dual mind. In this Contemplation, the sense of function is also obvious, in view of the role one plays in the affirmation of the Provisional, or "entering into the Provisional" (ju-chia 入). This role is, as mentioned above, to help others by offering different remedies according to their individual needs.³⁶

vi) How is the Threefold Contemplation possible?

We have completed above separate discussions of the three Contemplations of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way. Now we must note that these three Contemplations actually form a threefold contemplation. That is, in practice, the three Contemplations are undertaken not separately and gradually, but simultaneously and suddenly, as if there is only one contemplation. This simultaneity and suddenness of the three Contemplations is expressed in the so-called "Threefold

Contemplation in one single Mind" (i-hsin san kuan 一心三觀). With regard to this expression, Chih-i states:

As regards[the idea that]one dharma is all dharmas, which means the dharma originated from causes and conditions, this is the Provisional Name and [is pertinent to] the Contemplation of the Provisional. If one thinks that all dharmas are one dharma, I would declare that it is Emptiness. [This is pertinent to] the Contemplation of Emptiness. If it is non-one and non-all, it is [pertinent to] the Contemplation of the Middle Way. Focusing on Emptiness, [one realizes that] everything is Emptiness, and no Provisionality and Middle Way are available, which are not Emptiness. All are synthesized in the Contemplation of Emptiness. Focusing on the Provisional, [one realizes that] everything is Provisionality, and no Emptiness and Middle Way are available, which are not Provisionality. All are synthesized in the Contemplation of the Provisional. Focusing on the Middle Way, [one realizes that] everything is the Middle Way, and no Emptiness and Provisionality are available, which are not the Middle Way. All are synthesized in the Contemplation of the Middle Way. [Those three Contemplations] are the inconceivable Threefold Contemplation in one single Mind explicated in the Chung-lun.³⁷

A similar description also appears elsewhere,³⁸ where Chih-i adds:

If we merely pick up one Contemplation [of either Emptiness, the Provisional or the Middle Way] as the name [of the three Contemplations], the understanding mind would penetrate into all.

Chih-i speaks here of Emptiness and the Provisional in terms of one dharma (i-fa 一法) and all dharmas (i-ch'ieh fa 一切法) respectively.

"One dharma" denotes the universal empty nature of all dharmas viz., Emptiness. "All dharmas" denotes the variety of empirical existence and consequently the Provisional. The identification of the one dharma and all dharmas signifies that Chih-i does not isolate Emptiness and the Provisional from each other, but sees them as entailing each other in meaning. One cannot be properly understood without making reference to the other. This relation between Emptiness and the Provisional is reminiscent of the relation between Emptiness and Dependent Origination

expounded in the Kārikā. The second half of the first quotation above is particularly significant, in the sense that it divulges Chih-i's harmonious understanding of the Contemplations of the three aspects of Emptiness, the Provisional and Middle Way. This understanding involves the fact that the Contemplation of one of the three aspects necessarily embraces the other two. It follows that the Contemplation of either one among Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way is at the same time the Contemplation of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way as a unified totality. The difference between the separate Contemplations is merely a difference of emphasis. That is, the Contemplation of Emptiness emphasizes Emptiness, and so on. In view of the simultaneous apprehension of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way, this sort of Contemplation is called the "Threefold Contemplation". And in view of its being completed all in suddenness without gradualness, it is called the "Threefold Contemplation in one single Mind."

Ultimately speaking, there are in fact no such things as these three Contemplations. This is because the Contemplation -- whether of Emptiness, the Provisional, or the Middle Way -- is in content a Contemplation of these three aspects altogether. There is one Contemplation only, in which Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way are realized simultaneously. It is exactly in this context that Chih-i proposes his well-known slogan, chi-k'ung chi-chia chi-chung (即空即假即中), which means that there is no temporal interval in the realization of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way. Chi in this slogan signifies the simultaneity, or the negation of any

temporal interval. Chih-i states:

The three Truths are completely embraced in the one single Mind only. To distinguish their features, they can be depicted one after the other. With regard to the true principle, however, they are all only within the one single Mind. Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way are realized all of a sudden, as if three characteristics are revealed in one single moment.³⁹

The three Truths denote Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way. What attracts us most, here, is the simultaneous realization of these Truths. It is due to this simultaneity that the three Truths can be termed the "Threefold Truth", which signifies the inseparability of the Truths. It is exactly this simultaneity that the slogan pinpoints; Chih-i has, indeed, laid great emphasis on this simultaneity.⁴⁰ The idea that the three Truths are completely embraced in the one single Mind only (三諦具足, 只在一心) also deserves our attention. It serves as a complement to the slogan, to proclaim the simultaneous realization of the three Truths to be purely a matter of the Mind itself.

In our experience of knowing things, we can only know one object at a time if we wish to know it clearly. If two objects, e.g., an orange and an apple, are to be known at the same time, confusion is bound to arise and distinctive images of both objects will be impossible. Two objects can be distinctively known merely through a step-by-step manner. Obviously it is impossible to know two objects simultaneously, much less more than two. Here then is a crucial question: How is the Threefold Contemplation possible, in which Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way are contemplated by one single Mind simultaneously? This question is crucial because the slogan

is closely associated with the absolutely authentic Truth, the attainment of which is the true concern of the sūtras, i.e., enlightenment.⁴¹ The Threefold Contemplation is what Chih-i sees to be the way to attain the absolute Truth. It is even more important than the negative of the Four Alternatives in the sense that it provides a positive way to attain the Truth, while the latter only provides a negative way.

To our disappointment, however, Chih-i has not positively addressed this important question in his major works. He has contrasted the theory of the three Contemplations explicated in the Perfect Doctrine with that explicated in the Gradual Doctrine, declaring that the latter favours the gradual manner in carrying out the three Contemplations, while the former advocates the sudden manner.⁴² He also depicts the epistemic context of the Threefold Contemplation in beautiful and admirable expressions, such as the "non-expedient and non-ultimate, non-superior and non-inferior, non-anterior and non-posterior, non-juxtaposed and non-separate, non-large and non-small",⁴³ and states that in such Contemplation the wisdom is the object and the object is the wisdom, both penetrating each other without any obstruction.⁴⁴ These descriptions are paradoxical to common sense. They divulge the fact that relative categories -- such as expedient and ultimate, superior and inferior, etc. -- are not applicable to the Threefold Contemplation; they also demonstrate that the epistemic context of the Threefold Contemplation is different from the epistemic context based on a subject-object dichotomy. The problem of how Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way, as three different aspects, can be contemplated simultaneously remains untouched. Likewise, this problem has not been pinpointed and seriously dealt with by modern scholars.

Tamura has once picked up the issue of the Threefold Contemplation in one single Mind. He states:

The common people clinged to the secular Provisional, without knowing that the Provisional is Emptiness. Therefore Emptiness was asserted. The Hīnayānist śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas clinged to Emptiness and forgot to leave for the Provisional. Therefore the Provisional was asserted. The Mahāyānist bodhisattvas came and descended to the Provisional. But the Mahāyānists also had a danger. They penetrated too much into the Provisional and consequently forgot Emptiness. . . . Thereupon the Middle [Way] was asserted, so that Emptiness should not be forgotten in the midst of the Provisional. Ultimately, or as a result, the epistemology of the coherence and mutual identity of Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle [Way] (perfect and sudden cessation and contemplation, Threefold Contemplation in one single Mind) was formed.⁴⁵

This description is, as Tamura himself puts it, a historical retrospection of how the Threefold Contemplation came into being in the Buddhist context. It tells from the practical and educative point of view why the Threefold Contemplation is needed. We believe that Chih-i would have agreed with Tamura in this regard. It does not, however, pinpoint our problem raised here, which is concerned with the possibility of the Threefold Contemplation as such.

vii) The Middle Way - Buddha Nature in the Threefold Contemplation

Here we will attempt to tackle the problem mentioned above: the possibility of the Threefold Contemplation in one single Mind. It will be done largely through references to Chih-i's own conceptions. The key to the solution of this problem is, we think, the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, which is for Chih-i the authentic Truth, i.e., shih-hsiang. Our observation is that what is contemplated in the Threefold Contemplation must be the authentic Truth, i.e., the Middle Way - Buddha Nature; Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way are nothing but the

three aspects of this Middle Way - Buddha Nature.

We have discussed the three characteristics of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature in Part I, C above. These three characteristics -- permanence, dynamism and all-embracing nature -- are proposed in contrast with the Emptiness advocated by the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and Common Doctrine (which is severely criticised by Chih-i). They by no means exhaust all the characteristics of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. Chih-i certainly would not object to the ascription of Emptiness (i.e., non-substantiality) to the Middle Way - Buddha Nature as an attribute. What he would vehemently object to is the ascription of mere Emptiness to the Truth. Indeed, he has declared:

The Contemplation of Emptiness is commonly shared by the Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, One-sided Doctrine and Perfect Doctrine.⁴⁶

This means that Emptiness is a common concept acceptable to all Buddhist schools and doctrines. On this basis we have good reason to believe that the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, which represents the Truth in the Perfect Doctrine, contains the implication of Emptiness.

The fact that the Provisional is contained in the Middle Way - Buddha Nature is obvious in view of the all-embracing nature of the latter. It has been made clear that Chih-i substantiates the Provisional and takes it as expressive of the empirical world of dharmas. These dharmas are exactly what the all embracing nature pinpoints. The Provisional and all-embracing nature are indeed closely related to each other. The Middle Way - Buddha Nature contains, undoubtedly, the implication of the Middle Way in the Contemplation of the Middle Way. This implication is, as the expressions shuang-chê and shuang-chao suggest, that both Emptiness and the Provisional are to be negated and

yet affirmed.⁴⁷

Therefore Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way are the three aspects of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. What, then, do we mean when we say that Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way are contemplated in one single Mind? The meaning involves the fact that both natures (i.e., the non-substantiality and provisionality of the dharmas) are apprehended in the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature without attachment to either nature. In this kind of contemplation, what we are concerned about, basically, is not the separate aspects of Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way, but rather the Middle Way - Buddha Nature as a totality, which embraces these aspects. In such a context, what is worked on is not any member or members, but only a singular unified nature of contemplation.

This understanding of the Threefold Contemplation -- which reduces Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way to the Middle Way - Buddha Nature -- seems reasonable. But there still remains an important issue: namely, in the epistemic situation of the Threefold Contemplation, the main concern obviously is not to cognize anything in a subject-object dichotomous relationship (whether it be the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, or whatever), but to be involved in an event of profound soteriological purpose. Chih-i is aware of this point. As a matter of fact, he justifies this sense of the event by means of interpreting the Threefold Contemplation in terms of the transformation of the empirical world. In the WMCLS he states:

First, [the Contemplation of] entering into Emptiness from the Provisional aims at the destruction of dharmas and overcoming them. Then, [the Contemplation of] entering into the Provisional from Emptiness aims at the establishment of dharmas and embracing

them. The authentic Contemplation of the Middle Way aims at teaching and transforming the sentient beings, [which then attain] the wisdom of penetrating the Ultimate. Penetrating the Ultimate is called the long-abidingness of dharmas; and the long-abidingness of dharmas infers the permanence of the Dharma Body.⁴⁸

[What is called the] long-abidingness of dharmas means to lead [the sentient beings] to realize the Buddha Nature and so to abide in the Mahānirvāṇa.⁴⁹

These are extremely significant and inspiring descriptions of the Threefold Contemplation. It is plainly revealed here that the Threefold Contemplation has an ultimate concern, i.e., the establishment of dharmas and transformation of sentient beings. The establishment and transformation are events in which the three characteristics of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature all assume their proper meanings, as shown in the following elaborations.

In the Threefold Contemplation, the role of the Contemplation of Emptiness is to destroy the dharmas and overcome them. This tends to denote the negation of the empirical world. However, the Emptiness in question is not mere Emptiness. Rather, it is Emptiness associated with the Provisional, as suggested in the expression, "entering into Emptiness from the Provisional". In this context the negation of the empirical world is not entirely nihilistic, and what is to be destroyed are not the dharmas themselves, but the attachment to them. Chih-i elsewhere speaks of the destruction of dharmas and overcoming them in terms of destroying the attachment to dharmas.⁵⁰ The role of the Contemplation of the Provisional is to establish the dharmas and embrace them. It is manifestly evident that the establishment of dharmas and embracing them carry a soteriological sense; cultivating the sentient beings and leading them to enlightenment is their main concern.

Chih-i also refers the establishment of dharmas and embracing them to persuading others to endeavour for the attainment of the Buddha Body,⁵¹ which also means the attainment of Buddhahood. Here, the affirmation of the dharmas or empirical world is evidenced; this empirical world is, for Chih-i, what the Provisional signifies. Likewise, this Provisional is not the mere Provisional, but the Provisional associated with Emptiness, as suggested in the expression, "entering into the Provisional from Emptiness". Having this association with Emptiness, the affirmation of the empirical world can be held in the awareness that this world is non-substantial after all, and the attachment to it should consequently not happen. In regard to the Contemplation of the Middle Way, Chih-i speaks of its role in terms of the teaching and transforming of sentient beings so that they will attain the wisdom of penetrating the Ultimate. This role may embrace a very profound religious meaning. The Ultimate (shih 實), which by all means denotes the ultimate Truth (shih-hsiang), or simply the Truth, is very much in association with the empirical world. This is seen from Chih-i's identification of the penetration of the Truth with the long-abidingness of dharmas (fa chiu-chu 法久住), which obviously pinpoints the affirmation and preservation of the empirical world. Here Chih-i's deep worldly concern is manifested. Nevertheless, we need to ask, what does the identification of the penetration of the Truth with the long-abidingness of dharmas mean? From the association of the long-abidingness of dharmas with the permanent Dharma Body (dharmakāya) and Buddha Nature (buddhata), it seems that the Dharma Body and Buddha Nature are what supports and strengthens the dharmas or the empirical world. As the Dharma Body and Buddha Nature

assume permanence, the empirical world also inherits this permanence. For Chih-i, the Dharma Body and Buddha Nature are identical with each other, and are nothing but the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. This Middle Way-Buddha Nature is exactly what shih (or the Truth) denotes. The realization of this Middle Way - Buddha Nature also embraces the realization of the empirical world, and renders the latter into permanent nature. This leads to the identification of the penetration of the Truth with the long-abidingness of dharmas.

That with which the Threefold Contemplation actually is concerned is the transformation of perception of the empirical world in the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. This transformation entails a deep sense of the affirmation and preservation of the empirical world, and closely conforms to the all-embracing nature of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. This nature can be fully developed and realized only in the transformation of perception of the empirical world. In this transformation, what is focused on is the sentient part of the dharmas. This is evidenced in Chih-i's explication of the authentic Contemplation of the Middle Way in terms of teaching and transforming the sentient beings and enabling them to attain the wisdom of penetrating the Ultimate. This authentic Contemplation of the Middle Way (chung-*tao* chêng kuan 中道正觀) is, no doubt, more emphasized than the Contemplations of Emptiness and the Provisional. With regard to the transformation or establishment of non-sentient dharmas, Chih-i does not elaborate. In our opinion, this involves only a hyperbolic sense, rather than a substantial or actual sense. That is, it signifies that the transformation is all-covering. If the transformation is to be carried out by the bodhisattva, this will just signify that

the bodhisattva's compassion is all-covering. It covers not only the sentient beings, but also the non-sentient. In the transformation, the endeavours undertaken are due to the functional nature of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. The statement that the bodhisattva puts the sentient beings into correct places with the perfect function expounded in Part I, C above, vividly evidences the operation of this nature. The permanent and persistent significance of this kind of transformation also comes from the permanent nature of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. Indeed, the three characteristics of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature all reveal their significance in the transformation of the empirical world, focusing on the sentient beings in particular.

In light of the above study, we are in a better position to respond to the difficult question: how is the Threefold Contemplation possible? First, the establishment of the empirical world of dharmas is not separable from the destruction of attachment to this empirical world. It is not that one goes after the other, but that both take place simultaneously. Once the attachment is destroyed, the empirical world is established. The empirical world is established right at the moment of the destruction of the attachment. There is no temporal interval whatsoever. They are not two events but one. Therefore the Contemplation of Emptiness and the Contemplation of the Provisional are, in essence, two aspects of one Contemplation. The main concern of this one Contemplation can be concluded to be the establishment of the empirical world. Again, we must point out that the establishment of the empirical world or dharmas (li-fa 立法) should be understood in a specified sense. That is, the empirical world is established in the sense that the sentient

beings, or human beings in particular, undertake a correct attitude toward it. We should emphasize the importance of the empirical world as the place (and the only place) where enlightenment is attainable. Yet we should not be attached to the empirical world as something that has Self Nature or substantiality. Although Chih-i himself does not explicitly spell this sense out, it can be inferred from his emphasis of the all-embracing nature of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature.

Secondly, the teaching and attainment of the wisdom of penetrating the Truth on the part of sentient beings take place at the same time as the establishment of the empirical world. They are, likewise, not consecutive events but one event with different aspects. Consequently we can understand that the former two Contemplations and the Contemplation of the Middle Way are but one Contemplation, which is the Threefold Contemplation. In this Threefold Contemplation, the empirical world is transformed in the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, and the Middle Way - Buddha Nature is realized in the transformation of the empirical world. This is, for Chih-i, the experience of enlightenment. In this context, the Threefold Contemplation can be better construed as the Contemplation of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, where 'contemplation' is taken not only in the cognitive sense, but also in a practical and soteriological sense. The latter sense is even more important in view of Chih-i's deep practical and soteriological concern. Accordingly, Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way are not treated separately, but are unified in the Middle Way - Buddha Nature; the Threefold Contemplation concerns nothing but the realization of this Middle Way - Buddha Nature. As this realization is one single event, there does not exist the

difficulty of coping with Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way in temporal dimensions. In consequence, there is no such problem as the possibility of the Threefold Contemplation.

viii) The Threefold Contemplation and the verse of the Threefold Truth

We pointed out in the first note of this chapter that Chih-i explicitly relates his Threefold Contemplation to the verse of the Threefold Truth in the Kārikā. In some places, he takes his slogan of chi-k'ung chi-chia chi-chung to be the predicate of the things of causal origination, tending to ascribe this slogan to the Kārikā.⁵² He also construes the Emptiness delineated in the verse of the Threefold Truth as expressive of the transcendent Truth, the Provisional Name as expressive of the conventional Truth, and the Middle Way as expressive of the Middle Way - Supreme Truth, and concludes that this verse expounds Mahāyānism and explicates the doctrine of the Threefold Truth.⁵³ Chih-i even goes so far as to interpret the Emptiness delineated in the verse of the Threefold Truth in terms of destroying and overcoming the dharmas; the Provisional Name in terms of establishing the dharmas and embracing them; the Middle Way in terms of teaching and transforming the sentient beings and securing the long-abidingness of the dharmas.⁵⁴ Chih-i clearly acknowledges an extremely close relationship between his Threefold Contemplation and the verse of the Threefold Truth. Is this really the case from the doctrinal perspective? Let us wind up our long discussion in this chapter by examining this issue carefully.

It is true that Chih-i lays deep stress on the verse of the Threefold Truth, as could be evidenced by the frequent quotation of this verse in his major works.⁵⁵ It is also true that the three concepts in

the verse -- Emptiness, Provisional Name, and the Middle Way -- have considerable bearing on the formation of the Threefold Contemplation, in the sense that the meanings of these three concepts are, by and large, inherited by the Threefold Contemplation. This is particularly true with Emptiness. Chih-i's understanding of Emptiness in terms of destroying and overcoming the dharmas (which, as pointed out previously, actually pinpoints the attachment to the dharmas) is very much in line with Nāgārjuna's conception of Emptiness, which is the negation of Self Nature and false views. Both Chih-i and Nāgārjuna emphasize the practical and soteriological significance of this concept.

This similarity is nevertheless outweighed by the difference. A close relationship between the Threefold Contemplation and the verse of the threefold Truth can hardly be endorsed. First, although there are Mādhyamika traces in the Threefold Contemplation, Chih-i's own elaborations are overwhelming. In Mādhyamika, Emptiness stands for the Truth and tends to be an independent concept. That is, as expressive of the Truth, it can stand by itself without associating with anything else. Emptiness in the Threefold Contemplation is quite different. The Contemplation of Emptiness is more appropriately termed by Chih-i as the "Contemplation of entering into Emptiness from the Provisional". Emptiness in this context is not mere Emptiness, but the Emptiness with the Provisional as its background. It is spoken of in the context of a process, in which both Emptiness and the Provisional are involved, rather than in the context of mere Emptiness. Such Emptiness is inseparable from the Provisional. Mere Emptiness is one-sided and transcendent, and therefore cannot stand for the perfect Truth. Emptiness backed by the Provisional is an Emptiness

with close connections to the empirical, and is consequently more embracing. For Chih-i, Emptiness does not seem to stand for the Truth by itself. Rather, it is an aspect of the Truth: the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. So is the Provisional. Both Emptiness and the Provisional are subordinate to the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. In this sense, Emptiness does not tend to be an independent concept. The Provisional Name in the Kārikā (as studied in section i) denotes the act of naming, while the Provisional in Chih-i's system is substantiated and taken as referring to either an object or the empirical world. The difference is beyond controversy. As regards the Middle Way, it is clearly shown in Part I that Nāgārjuna's Middle Way denotes the state of the transcendence of extremes, while Chih-i's Middle Way is substantiated in the dimension of the Buddha Nature. The former is subordinate to the Truth of Emptiness, while the latter is taken to be the authentic Truth itself, i.e., the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. With regard to these three concepts, Chih-i had made distinguishable modifications and elaborations, which would have been hardly imagined by Nāgārjuna and his Mādhyamika followers.

Secondly, in the Threefold Contemplation, what is to be contemplated is the Threefold Truth. This Threefold Truth is a combination of the Truths of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way. What Chih-i terms as "transcendent Truth" and "conventional Truth"⁵⁶ are the Truth of Emptiness and the Truth of the Provisional respectively. The important point, to which we should pay full attention, is that the articulation of the Threefold Truth is based on the supposition that Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way stand in parallel positions, and so each

of them is independent of the other. Only out of such a supposition can one work out the Truths of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way and sum them up into a Threefold Truth. Such a supposition, however, is not held by Nāgārjuna at all. In the Sanskrit original of the verse of the Threefold Truth, the concepts of Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way are not placed in parallel positions. Rather, they are brought together to reveal the denotation of Emptiness in a more subtle manner: Emptiness is the Middle Way because of its provisionality. It is clear that the major issue is Emptiness, and that the Provisional Name and the Middle Way are complementary in helping cope with this issue. We have made a detailed analysis of the Sanskrit original of the verse of the Threefold Truth earlier.⁵⁷ To be more specific, Nāgārjuna regards Emptiness as the Truth. He does not take the Middle Way to be the Truth independent of the Truth of Emptiness, not at least in the sense that Emptiness is the Truth. The Middle Way is, in the Kārikā, subordinate to the Truth of Emptiness. As regards the Provisional Name, we have shown earlier that in the Kārikā it mainly denotes the act of naming and does not attract much attention. There is a long way to go, in order to elevate such a Provisional Name to the Truth of the Provisional, in which the whole empirical world is encompassed, and which is so much emphasized by Chih-i. There is, indeed, no sign that Nāgārjuna sees Emptiness, the Provisional Name, and the Middle Way to be three Truths. To entitle the verse in question, "the verse of the Threefold Truth", is inappropriate and misleading. It therefore is unlikely that the interpretation of this verse in terms of the Threefold Truth should be justifiable.⁵⁸

In the Threefold Truth verse, or even the whole Kārikā, there is clearly no indication that Nāgārjuna has the conception of Three Truths, or the Threefold Truth, much less the thought of chi-k'ung chi-chia chi-chung. Nāgārjuna, however, has the conception of Two Truths, or the Twofold Truth, which will be touched upon in the forthcoming chapter.

Notes

1. Chih-i explicitly relates his Threefold Contemplation to the Kārikā in two places: MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.25b; chap. 5, T.46.55b. When he mentions the Kārikā, he particularly refers to the verse entitled by the T'ien-t'ai tradition as the "verse of the Threefold Truth" (San-ti chieh 三諦偈). In this verse, the concepts of Emptiness, Provisional Name and Middle Way are given. Cf. CL, 24:18, T.30.33b; Kārikā-P, p. 503. Cf. also Part I, A, vii above. Chih-i's point is that this verse is expressive of the Threefold Contemplation. Chih-i, however, claims elsewhere that the name of the Threefold Contemplation comes from the sūtra, Pu-sa-ying-lo-pên-yeh ching (菩薩瓔珞本業經). (WMCHS, chap. 2, T.38.525c) This sūtra is, according to Satō, a forgery which was composed in China rather than in India. (Satō, pp. 699-703) Satō also points out that the establishment of this sūtra was under the influence of CL, i.e., the Kārikā. (Ibid., pp. 702-703) It should also be noted that the Threefold Contemplation has been related to Fu Tai-shi (傅大士), who composed a poem in which the Threefold Contemplation is mentioned. (Cf. Chan-jan, Chih-kuan i-li 止觀義例, T.46.452c. Cf. also Satō, pp. 717-718 and T. Andō, Tendai shōgu shisō ron, pp. 26-27). Despite the fact that the name of "Threefold Contemplation" appears in Fu Tai-shi's poem, there is however no sign as to what this Threefold Contemplation denotes. Moreover, Fu Ta-shi was a vague personality in Chinese Buddhist circles. In view of these two points, we do not think that a rigid relationship between Chih-i and Fu Ta-shi, with regard to the issue of Threefold Contemplation, can be acknowledged.

2. Inada, p. 134. śūnyamiti na vaktavyamaśūnyamiti vā bhavet, ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ ceti prajñaptiyartham tu kathyate. (Kārikā-P, p. 444) Kumārajīva's rendition, "空則不可說, 非空不可說, 共不共叵說, 但以假名說." (CL, 22:11, T.30.30b)

3. Cf. Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Delhi, Patna, Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974, p. 659.

4. Sprung, p. 17. Sprung also expresses his understanding of Provisional Name elsewhere, Sprung N, pp. 245-246, for example.

5. Matilal, p. 150.

6. 五眾和合, 假名衆生。 (TCTL, chap. 81, T.25.630b) It should be noted that Provisional Name in Chinese, chia ming (假名), remains unchanged in its verb form.

7. 離二邊故, 假名為中道。 (TCTL, chap. 80, T.25.622a)

8. 諸法和合, 作又名而老。 (TCTL, chap. 80, T.25.622b) Cp. Ramanan's freer and more detailed rendition:

"All the necessary causal factors gather together and hence, depending on this togetherness, there comes into being the state called old-age." (Ramanan, p. 244)

9. 凡夫顛倒見故有。智者於有為法不得其相，知但假名。(TCTL, chap. 31, T.25.289a)

10. 如頭，足，腹，背和合故，假名為身。
(TCTL, chap. 89, T.25.691a)

11. 假名有者，如酪有色，香，味，觸四事。因緣合故，假名為酪。雖有不同因緣法有，雖無亦不如兔角龜毛無。(TCTL, chap. 12, T.25.147c) Our translation is made in reference to Ramanan's. Cf. Ramanan, p. 83.

12. TCTL, chap. 61, T.25.495b. Cp. Ramanan, p. 87.

13. 不壞假名，而說諸法實相... 菩薩知一切法假名，則應般若波羅蜜學。所以者何？一切法但有假名，皆隨順般若波羅蜜畢竟空相故。

(TCTL, chap. 55, T.25.453a)

14. 不壞假名，而說諸法實相。This idea appears in the Chinese translation of the Pancaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, of which the TCTL is the commentary. Cf. TCTL, chap. 55, T.25.452a.

15. 以觀觀於境，則一境而三境；以境發於觀，則一觀而三觀... 觀三即一，發一即三，不可思議。
(MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.25b)

16. 一心三觀所成三智，知不思議三境。
(MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.26b)

17. 所觀之假者，有二種假，攝一切法。一者受假，二者見假。(WMCHS, chap. 2, T.38.525c)

18. WMCHS, chap. 2, T.38.525c

19. 無而虛設。(Ibid., T.38.525b)

20. MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.63b.

21. 法界洞朗，咸皆大明，名之為觀。(MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.56c)

22. 法性寂然名止，寂而常照為觀。(MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.1c-2a) 'Cessation' (chih 止) and 'contemplation' are often enumerated together in Chih-i's works, as the two practical methods through which to attain the Truth. Indeed, the MHCK is named after these two methods. We do not particularly delineate cessation in this thesis, because, with regard to this method, there is no close connection witnessed between Chih-i and Mādhyamika.

23. 觀以觀達為義，亦是觀穿。言觀達者，達象生本源清淨，如從假入空觀之所照達。雖復凡聖有殊，同歸空寂，一如無二。... 觀穿義者，菩薩從假入空時，貫穿俗諦見思之磐石，滯真無知之沙，無明覆蔽一實之石樂，洞徹無礙。即是窮至心性本際金剛。(WHCLS, chap. 8, T.38.672b).

觀以觀穿為義，亦是觀達為能。觀穿者，穿見思、恒沙、無明之惑，故名觀穿也。觀達者，達三諦之理也。(WMCHS, chap. 2, T.38.525c).

24. [二乘]止觀，雖出生死，而是拙度，滅色入空。此空亦得名止，亦得名非止非示非，而不得名觀。何以故？友身滅智，故不名觀。(MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.23c-24a).

25. Hurvitz, p. 315.

26. K. Tamaki, *Shin hasoku no tenkai*, Tokyo: Sankibo-busshorin, 1961. "Introduction" (English version), p. 11.

27. W.T. de Bary, ed., *The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan*, New York: Vintage Books, 1972, p. 165.

28. Chung-yuan Chang, *Original Teachings of Ch'an Buddhism*, New York: Vintage Books, 1971, pp. 12, 39.

29. Ibid., loc. cit.

30. 所照為三諦，所發為三觀，獲見成為三智。(MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.55c).

31. E.g., FHHI, chap. 9, T.33.789c; MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.26b, 28c; FHWC, chap. 2, T.34.22c. It is extremely difficult to translate these three sorts of wisdom (chih 智) into another language literally. We do not venture a translation in order to avoid misunderstandings. Chih-i acknowledges that the Threefold Wisdom in the present context comes from the TCTL (SCI, chap. 1, T.46.723c), and we do find that its three components are discussed there (TCTL, chap. 27, T.25.258c-259b). However, because of the ambiguity in his discussion, it is not easy to decide what the exact denotations of these three components might be.

32. 觀有三。從假入空，名二諦觀。從空入假，名平等觀。二觀為方便道，得入中道，雙照二諦，心心寂滅，自然流入薩婆若海，名中道第一義諦觀。(MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.24b).

33. 所言二諦者，觀假為入空之詮，空由詮會，能所合論，故言二諦觀。(Ibid., loc. cit.)

34. 從空入假名平等觀者，若是入空，尚無空可有，何假可入？當知此觀為化衆生，知真非真，方便出假，故言從空。分別樂病，而無差謬，故言入假。平等者望前稱平等也。前觀破假病，不用假法，但用真法。破一不破一，未為平等。後觀破空病，還用假法，破用既均，異時相望，故言平等也。(MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.24c)

35. 前觀假空，是空生死；後觀空空，是空涅槃。雙遮二邊，是名二空觀。為方便道，得會中道。故言一心寂滅，流入薩婆若海。又初觀用空，後觀用假，是雙存方便。入中道時，能雙照二諦。(Ibid., loc. cit.)

By the way it should be noted that Chih-i here refers the Provisional to samsāra or the life-death cycle. He obviously sees the Provisional to be the empirical world. His tendency to substantiate the Provisional is very clear. It is important to note that the description of the Threefold Contemplation appears quite often in Chih-i's works. What we quoted from the MHCK is most concise. Cf., however, WHCHS, chap. 2, T.38.524c-532a; FHW, chap. 8, T.34.110c-111a for more details.

36. Cf. note 34.

37. 若一法一切法，即是因緣所生法，是為假名，假名觀也。若一切法即一法，我說即是空，空觀也。若非一非一切者，即是中道觀。一空一切空，無假、中而不空，總空觀也。一假一切假，無空、中而不假，總假觀也。一中一切中，無空、假而不中，總中觀也。即中論所說不可思議一心三觀。(MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.55b)

This i-hsin san-kuan is elsewhere reversed as san-kuan i-hsin 三觀一心 (e.g., MHCK, chap. 9, T.46.131b), without, however, any change in meaning.

38. WMCLS, chap. 7, T.38.661c-662a.但以一觀當名，解心皆通。(Ibid., T.38.662a)

39. 三諦具足，只在一心。分別相貌，如次第說；若論道理，只在一心。即空即假即中，如一刹那，而有三相。(MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.84c-85a) A few words should be given to explain the translation of the term tao-li (道理) in the quotation above. It is difficult to find a straightforward rendition for this term. In the A New Practical Chinese-English Dictionary edited by Shih-ch'iu Liang,

the renditions given for this term are 'reason', 'rationality', the "right way", and the "proper way". (p. 1112) None of them is good enough. In the context in question, Chih-i contrasts tao-li with hsiang-mao (相貌) or features of the three Truths, viz., Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way. Hsiang-mao tends to denote what appears to be and is therefore external, while tao-li signifies the internal and true nature or principle of something. Therefore we translate tao-li as "true principle". It should also be pointed out that in the expression, i-hsin san-kuan, or Threefold Contemplation in one single Mind, the term hsin (心) may denote either the pure Mind or the delusive mind. If it denotes the pure Mind, this pure Mind will be the acting subject in the epistemic aspect of the Contemplation, and consequently the origin of the Threefold Wisdom (cf. the previous section). In this context, the expression in question means that the pure Mind by itself can realize Emptiness, the Provisional, and the Middle Way simultaneously. However, if hsin stands for the delusive mind, this delusive mind will be the object acted on in the epistemic aspect of the Contemplation. It is not different from the so-called nien (念), or 'intention', which usually appears delusive in our daily life. In this context, i-hsin san-kuan means that the mind or intention, though tending to be delusive, is contemplated as in the nature of Emptiness, Provisionality and Middle Way simultaneously. This interpretation by all means presupposes an acting or contemplating subject, whether it be entitled the pure or impure Mind. As regards the slogan, chi-k'ung chi-chia chi-chung, it equally makes sense in either context of the i-hsin san-kuan. In the former context, the slogan reveals the simultaneous illumination of Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way by the pure Mind; in the latter context, the slogan signifies that the delusive mind is penetrated and its nature as Emptiness, Provisionality and Middle Way is realized simultaneously. In Chih-i's works, the former context seems more dominant. In our study we will focus on this context, in which hsin is construed as the pure Mind.

40. This is evidenced by the observation that the slogan of chi-k'ung chi-chia chi-chung appears extremely often in Chih-i's most important works. For instance, it appears 13 times in the FHHI (T.33.692c, 695b, 714a, 721b, 726a, 733a, 739a, 736b, 777b, 781a, 781b, 789c, 811b); 18 times in the MHCK (T.46.7b, 8c, 25b, 31c, 41b, 67b, 84b, 85a, 87b, 88b, 88c, 95b, 99c, 100a, 100c, 128b, 130c, 131b); and 4 times in the FHWC (T.34.4c, 5a, 17a, 25a). It is important to note here that this slogan appears only in Chih-i's works established in his later period, such as the FHHI, MHCK, FHWC, WMCHS and WMCLS. This shows that the idea of the simultaneous Threefold Contemplation was not developed until Chih-i's thought became mature. In the works established in his early period, the simultaneity of the realization of the Threefold Contemplation is not mentioned.

41. 一實諦即空即假即中。...。一實諦者，即是實相。實相者即經之正体也。如是實相即空假中。
(FHHI, chap. 8, T.33.781b)

42. WMCLS, chap. 7, T.38.661c-662a.
43. 不權不實, 不侵不劣, 不前不後, 不並不別, 不大不小。
(MHCK, chap. 3, T.46.25b)
44. 智即是境, 境即是智, 融通無礙。(FHHI, chap. 3, T.33.714a)
45. Tamura, p. 79. The English translation from the Japanese original is mine.
46. 空觀通於小、大、偏、圓。(MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.85b)
47. For shuang-chê and shuang-chao, cf. section v above.
48. 初, 從假入空, 是破法折伏義也。次, 從空入假, 是立法攝受。中道正觀, 即是教化眾生, 入實慧也。入實者, 名法久住; 法久住者, 則法身常存。(WMCLS, chap. 3, T.38.597b)
49. 法久住者, 令見佛性, 住大涅槃。(Ibid., T.38.597a-b)
50. Ibid., T.38.597a.
51. Ibid., loc. cit.
52. For instance, FHHI, chap. 1, T.33.682c; MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.67b. In the former case, Chih-i says, "It is stated in the Chung-lun [i.e., the Kārikā] that the dharmas originating from major and subsidiary causes are Emptiness, the Provisional and the Middle Way simultaneously." (中論云: 因緣所生法, 即空即假即中.)
53. 中論偈云: 因緣所生法, 我說即是空, 此即詮真諦; 亦名為假名, 即詮俗諦也; 亦是中道義, 即詮中道第一義也。此偈即是申摩訶衍, 詮三諦之理。(SCI, chap. 2, T. 46.728a) The same description is also seen in WMCHS, chap. 3, T.38.535a. Transcendent Truth (chên-ti 真諦) can be otherwise termed "absolute Truth", and conventional Truth (su-ti 俗諦) "relative Truth". The last sentence in this description also accounts for the coming to be of the title "the verse of the Threefold Truth".
54. 因緣所生法, 我說即是空, 破法折伏也。亦名為假名, 立法攝受也。亦是中道義, 教化眾生, 令法得久住。(WMCLS, chap. 3, T.38.597a)
55. For instance, FHHI, T.33.682c, 695c, 758a; MHCK, T.46.1b-c, 5c-6a, 7a, 28b, 31b; FHCW, T.34.3a, 4a; SCI, T.46.724a, 727b, 728a, 728b; WMCHS, T.38.525a; WMCLS, T.38.597a-b.
56. Cf. note 53.

57. Cf. Part I, A, vii above.

58. It should be noted cautiously that for the misinterpretation of the verse, Chih-i is less to blame than Kumārajīva. In the latter's Chinese translation of the verse, Emptiness, the Provisional Name, and the Middle Way are treated as equal predicates to Dependent Origination, assuming the same position. It is natural for Chih-i to take a parallel view on these three concepts and see them as expressive of three Truths, in view of the Truth nature ascribed to Emptiness. From this misinterpretation, it is also shown that Chih-i did not consult the Sanskrit original of the verse, but got to know the Mādhyamika via Kumārajīva's translations. Chih-i probably did not know Sanskrit.

C. Practical Significance of Identification

In the realization of the Truth, we are unavoidably confronted with a question: In what manner is the Truth to be realized? This question can be formulated more subtly and straightforwardly as follows:

1. Should we realize the Truth in an isolated context, apart from this spatio-temporal world, as if the Truth itself has nothing to do with our empirical circumstances whatsoever? Or, should we realize the Truth in association with our empirical circumstances?

2. If the answer to the second part of the first question is affirmative, how close, then, should the association of the Truth be with our empirical circumstances?

We will later see that both Chih-i and the Mādhyamika respond affirmatively to the position that the Truth should be realized in a close association with the empirical world. They speak of such association in terms of identification or non-difference. Nāgārjuna claims that the life-death cycle and Nirvāṇa are not different from each other. They are consequently identical to each other. This identity occurs in a reserved sense, as will be delineated soon. Chih-i adopts a very radical attitude, declaring that defilements are themselves enlightenment, and that the life-death cycle is itself Nirvāṇa.¹ The life-death cycle pertains here to the empirical world, and Nirvāṇa and enlightenment are the result of realizing the Truth. It is in this sense that we will discuss the identification of the Truth and the empirical world.² As Nirvāṇa, enlightenment, liberation, and realization of the Truth are unanimously

understood in the sense of a soteriological goal sought by sentient beings, we will not, except in special cases, distinguish them in our discussion of this issue of identification. Nāgārjuna generally uses Nirvāṇa to express this goal, while Chih-i uses the term, 'liberation' (Skt., mokṣa; Chi., chieh-t'o 解脫). There is essentially no difference between these two terms.

This identification suggests a method in which to realize the Truth. 'Method' here is taken in a broad sense. It means a correct practical relationship of identification between the Truth and the empirical world. It may also signify an appropriate manner: the Truth should be realized in the light of its close connection with the empirical world.³

It should be noted, however, that Chih-i holds a somewhat different viewpoint towards this identification from that of Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamikas, besides sharing some common understanding with the latter. In this issue of identification, he is also critical of the Common Doctrine, which includes Mādhyamika. To obtain a clear picture as to how Chih-i can be related to and differentiated from the Mādhyamika in this issue, let us first examine Nāgārjuna's position regarding the practical significance of his identification.

i) The identification of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle

In the Kārikā, Nāgārjuna explicitly declares the non-difference between Nirvāṇa and samsāra, or the life-death cycle. This is done in the following two verses:

Samsāra is nothing essentially different from nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is nothing essentially different from samsāra.

The limits (koṭi) of nirvāṇa are the limits of saṃsāra.
Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference
whatsoever.⁴

It should be cautiously noted that with regard to the relationship between Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, Nāgārjuna uses "non-difference", rather than 'identity'. He does not spell out 'identity'. Our understanding is that the denotation of identity can be inferred logically from "non-difference". However, there is a difference in tone between identity and non-difference, which signifies different degrees or attitudes in affirming the identity of Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. To be specific, to say that Nirvāṇa is saṃsāra signifies a straightforward and resolute affirmation of the identity of Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. But to say that Nirvāṇa is not different from saṃsāra reveals the affirmation of the identity in a reserved sense. This reserved sense will be vividly seen when we come to the contrast between Chih-i's and Nāgārjuna's attitude toward the empirical world in the realization of the Truth. We must bear this reserved sense in mind when we speak of Nāgārjuna's identification of Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra.

In the two verses quoted above, Nirvāṇa refers to the uncommon enlightened life, which is achieved in the realization of the Truth of Emptiness, while saṃsāra or the life-death cycle refers to common everyday life lived in this empirical world. In this sense, the identification of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle is another expression of the identification of the Truth and the empirical world. As is commonly maintained by Buddhists, including Nāgārjuna himself, Nirvāṇa is pure in nature, and the life-death cycle impure; so it is appropriate to ask in what sense they can be identified with each other. The Sanskrit word, koṭi, which appears in the first half of the second verse, suggests that they are

identified in their limit or realm. That is, Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle share the same realm: the realm of one is exactly that of the other. What Nāgārjuna means here is that Nirvāṇa is attained nowhere else than within the life-death cycle. The realm in which Nirvāṇa can be established is that of the life-death cycle, or simply the life-death cycle itself. There is therefore a practical implication in this identification of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle: the Truth is to be realized right in the life-death cycle and not elsewhere. Nāgārjuna also warns that it is not possible that Nirvāṇa exists apart from the world of life and death.⁵

It should be noted here that the statement that Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle share the same realm should be taken in a purely practical and soteriological sense. This means that Nirvāṇa is to be attained in the life-death cycle; the realm is the realm of the life-death cycle. Nirvāṇa is not a place; therefore it cannot have a realm of its own, but it can have a realm where it is to be attained. This realm is the realm of the life-death cycle, or simply the life-death cycle.

In light of the contrast that Nirvāṇa is pure, and the life-death cycle impure, Nāgārjuna tends to construe them as the outcome of different lives lived differently. One who clings to and is for this reason manipulated by his surroundings will remain in the life-death cycle, while one who does not cling will attain Nirvāṇa. This distinction between Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle is testified in the following verse:

The status of the birth-death cycle is due to existential grasping (of the skandhas) and relational condition (of the being). That which is non-grasping and non-relational is taught as nirvāṇa.⁶

Therefore, whether one lives in the life-death cycle or Nirvāṇa depends upon whether he is manipulated by causes or conditions (pratītya) or free from them. Whatever the outcome, one has to remain closely associated with this actual, empirical world. Nirvāṇa must be, and yet can only be, achieved on the ground of this empirical world, which is the only possible realm that Nirvāṇa can assume actual meaning. This empirical world is simply the life-death cycle, where the liberation of sentient beings -- human beings in particular -- is emphasized. It is in this context that Nāgārjuna does not distinguish between Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle.

with reference to the three verses quoted in this section,

T.R.V. Murti remarks:

There is no difference whatever between Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra; Noumenon and Phenomena are not two separate sets of entities, nor are they two states of the same thing. The absolute is the only real; it is the reality of saṃsāra, which is sustained by false construction (kalpanā).⁷

Murti tends to categorize Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle here as the noumena and phenomena respectively, and regards them as referring to the same set of things. This set of things definitely denotes what one faces in the empirical world. Murti's remarks also pinpoint the same realm shared by Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle. This realm is precisely the realm occupied by the set of things. In addition, with regard to the relationship held by Nāgārjuna between Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle, Sprung remarks that Nirvāṇa has no other ontic range than that of the life-death cycle. He renders koṭi as "ontic range".⁸ This ontic range denotes nothing but the realm of actual empirical things. Sprung undoubtedly also regards Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle as having the same realm.

ii) Identification of Emptiness and form

With regard to the identification of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle, or the unworldly and worldly, there is a similar idea in which Emptiness and form (rūpa), extending even to the whole realm of aggregates (skandha), are identified with each other. This idea is not found in the Kārikā, but is seen in the TCTL in various places. This idea complements the identification of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle, therefore deserving our attention.

As a matter of fact, this idea originally appeared in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, whose thought is extensively expounded in the TCTL. The Hṛdaya-sūtra, for instance, states:

Form is emptiness and the very emptiness is form; emptiness does not differ from form, form does not differ from emptiness; whatever is form, that is emptiness, whatever is emptiness, that is form,⁹ the same is true of feelings, perceptions, impulses and consciousness.

Here, form and Emptiness are identified with each other. We have no intention to study this identification in detail.¹⁰ We want to point out that in the statement that form is Emptiness, Emptiness is used as a predicate to explain form: form is non-substantial and is empty. There is imbedded here an epistemological concern on the part of form. In the statement that Emptiness is form, in which form is used as a predicate to explain Emptiness, the situation is different. Emptiness, which means the state of non-substantiality, does not need form to explain it epistemologically. It is consequently difficult to talk about the epistemological concern which is involved with Emptiness. We think that the concern is practical. That is, the statement that Emptiness is form means that Emptiness should be understood and realized in form. If our hermeneutics makes sense, it is possible that the identification of Emptiness and form is also one in realm. The realm of Emptiness is the realm of form. Although Emptiness is not a place and therefore it

it cannot have a realm of its own, it has a realm in which it is to be realized. This realm is nothing other than that of form. Therefore Emptiness shares the same realm with form and is identical to form from a practical point of view. The affirmation, "Whatever is form, that is Emptiness, whatever is Emptiness, that is form", means that Emptiness and form refer to the same thing. This meaning may be approached in different ways. It nevertheless entails the practical implication that Emptiness has to be realized in reference to whatever is within the realm of form. In this sense, we may say that Emptiness shares the same realm with form and that they are identical to each other.¹¹

Form stands for the five aggregates -- form, feelings (vedanā), perceptions (saṃjñā), impulses (saṃskāra) and consciousness (viññāna) -- which are the elements comprising human existence. Human existence is in the nature of Dependent Origination and is not different from the empirical world essentially. Therefore form tends to stand for the empirical world as well. Accordingly, it seems possible to say that Emptiness shares the same realm with and is identical to the empirical world in a practical sense. That is, Emptiness is to be realized in the empirical world.

If the above understanding is correct, it is possible to relate the identification of Emptiness and form to that of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle, construing them as different ways of expressing the immanent character of the realization of the Truth. That is, the Truth has to be realized in the empirical world. Indeed, these two identifications can be 'identified' with each other in the sense of equally expressing this immanent character. In view of Nāgārjuna's intimate connection with the

Prajñāpāramitā thought, we believe that he inherited the latter's view and went on to identify the unworldly with the worldly, maintaining the need to realize the unworldly within the worldly.

As a matter of fact, the author of the TCTL does relate the identification of Emptiness and form to that of Nirvāṇa and the world or the life-death cycle. He states:

the Buddha told Subhūti, 'Form is Emptiness, and Emptiness is form. . . . ' Emptiness is Nirvāṇa, and Nirvāṇa is Emptiness. It is also stated in the Kārikā: 'Nirvāṇa is not different from the world, and the world is not different from Nirvāṇa. The realm of Nirvāṇa and that of the world are the same, without the slightest difference.'¹²

Here, the author of the TCTL not only relates the identification of Emptiness and form to that of Nirvāṇa and the world or the life-death cycle, but also identifies Emptiness and Nirvāṇa with each other. He obviously regards both identifications as conveying the same message, which contains the practical implication that Nirvāṇa or Emptiness has to be attained in the empirical world.

iii) The importance of ordinary practices

Nāgārjuna's identification of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle shows his affirmative response to our first question proposed in the beginning of this chapter. This response is that we should realize the Truth in a close association with the empirical world. Nirvāṇa, the Truth, must be attained and is only attainable in the empirical world. This point is by all means important, but is still quite formal. How close should the association be? Speaking specifically, in the empirical world where we live, we communicate with each other through language, we perform practices such as educating our children and looking after

the sick. Here, language and practices affect us deeply in our daily life. Can they be related to the realization of the Truth? These considerations are that with which our second question is concerned; they should be accounted for in the issue of identification. To deal with this question, we must first resort to Nāgārjuna's theory of the Twofold Truth.

To examine this theory, let us start by quoting the related verses in the Kārikā:

The teaching of the Dharma by the various Buddhas is based on the two truths; namely, the relative (worldly) truth and the absolute (supreme) truth.¹³

Those who do not know the distinction between the two truths cannot understand the profound nature of the Buddha's teaching.¹⁴

It is shown here that the Twofold Truth is composed of the worldly Truth (Skt., lokasaṃvṛtisatya; Chi., shih-su ti 世俗諦) and the supreme Truth (Skt., paramārthasatya; Chi., ti-i-i ti 第一義諦). In the Kārikā, Nāgārjuna does not explicitly mention what the two Truths denote. He merely emphasizes the need to distinguish between them in understanding the Buddha's profound teaching. As a matter of fact, the issue of these two Truths has been extensively studied by modern scholars, whose works are quite well-known and accessible to students of Buddhism.¹⁵ It is beyond doubt that the supreme Truth signifies here the Truth of Emptiness, which is absolute in nature. But what does the worldly Truth signify? The Sanskrit term, saṃvṛti, which is the key to the understanding of this Truth, is ambiguous in meaning. It may mean language itself. It may also mean what is expressed by means of language. In this respect, Matilal says:

Whatever is expressed in our speech behavior along with the speech behavior itself constitutes the realm of saṃvṛti, the

'conventional', the 'practical'.¹⁶

Speech behavior is based on language. Matilal tends to understand samvṛti in terms of language and what it expresses. Language functions conventionally and relatively; what it expresses is also conventional and relative. Accordingly, samvṛti concerns what is conventional and relative, which can be nothing but things and behavior in the empirical world. It seems safe, therefore, to construe the worldly Truth as roughly signifying the Truth or knowledge of the empirical world. The term, 'Truth' (Skt., satya; Chi., ti 是), is in fact not a good expression, as it is commonly associated with a sense of absoluteness. Nāgārjuna advises that we should distinguish between the supreme Truth and the worldly Truth. Such a distinction has to be based on the distinction between the supreme and the worldly; Emptiness and the empirical world.

Because of the limited space in this thesis, we cannot study the theory of Nāgārjuna's Twofold Truth in detail. Our concern here is to examine how this theory can be significantly related to the association of the realization of the Truth with the empirical world. In this respect, the distinction between Emptiness and the empirical world is not constructive. The clue, however, lies in the verse just following the two quoted above. This verse, being an elaboration of the previous ones, reads:

Without relying on everyday common practices (i.e., relative truths), the absolute cannot be expressed. Without approaching the absolute truth, nirvāṇa cannot be attained.¹⁷

The same verse also appears in the Vigrahavyāvartanī.¹⁸ Nāgārjuna speaks here of the worldly Truth in terms of vyavahāra, which means actions or ordinary practices undertaken in our ordinary daily life. These practices certainly include items such as educating children and

looking after the sick. Piṅgala focuses them on the operation of speech or language, stressing its worldliness and conventionality.¹⁹ Kajiyama points out that in Mādhyamika philosophy, vyavahāra and saṃvṛti are synonymous.²⁰ Samvṛti, as remarked above, may mean language. Language is undoubtedly an important element in rendering ordinary practices possible. It is itself a practice prevailing in our daily life. It therefore seems possible to take vyavahāra as signifying ordinary practices, with the emphasis on language and its behavior. In the verse above, Nāgārjuna articulates a hierarchy with regard to the attainment of Nirvāṇa: a person expresses the supreme Truth through ordinary practices, and attains Nirvāṇa through the supreme Truth. He strongly asserts that the supreme Truth cannot be expressed (deśyate) without relying on ordinary practices. In other words, the supreme Truth can merely be expressed through ordinary practices.

We must pay the greatest attention here to this assertion. Let us re-examine its Sanskrit original:

vyavahāramanāśritya paramārtho na deśyate.

Inada's translation -- "without relying on everyday common practices, the absolute truth cannot be expressed" -- is adequate. So is Prof. Ui's.²¹ Both of them render the Sanskrit verbs (āśritya being in continuative form, and deśyate, in the passive voice) as 'relying' and 'be expressed' respectively. Kalupahana renders āśritya as 'relying' and deśyate as 'taught', translating the statement in question as: "Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught".²² The rendition of deśyate as 'taught' is more correct grammatically and literally. The difference is, however, not serious. These scholars tend to see ordinary

practices or conventions as instrumental to the expression of the supreme Truth. That is, ordinary practices function as a means for us to get to know the supreme Truth. This shows Nāgārjuna's emphasis on ordinary practices in revealing the supreme Truth.

Murti holds a similar understanding. He speaks of the supreme Truth in terms of the end or goal, and saṃvṛti in terms of the means. He sees saṃvṛti as the ladder or the jumping board which enables us to reach our objective: the supreme Truth.²³ By saṃvṛti he denotes what is conventionally believed in common parlance.²⁴ This denotation is quite akin to what we mean by vyavahāra here, i.e., the practices in the empirical world. For Murti, the conventional or empirical is indispensable in the revelation of the supreme Truth.

Still we may go even further. In Nāgārjuna's Sanskrit assertion, āśṛi (the root of āśṛitya) may signify 'affix', 'adhere', "rest on", 'inhabit', besides the denotations of "relying on" and "depending on".²⁵ This additional denotation links the paramārtha and vyavahāra in a stronger sense. The supreme Truth has to be expressed not merely through relying on ordinary practices, but also right in ordinary practices themselves. It also signifies that apart from ordinary practices, the supreme Truth cannot be expressed. There is a subtle and significant difference between relying on ordinary practices to express the supreme Truth and expressing the supreme Truth right in ordinary practices themselves. In the former case, ordinary practices still tend to be instrumental and consequently external to the act of expressing the supreme Truth. In the latter case, ordinary practices become a part of expressing the supreme Truth. There is no instrumental and external sense to the issue at all.

Theoretically speaking, ordinary practices in the instrumental sense may be dispensed with when the supreme Truth is expressed. Ordinary practices, if they are a part of expressing the supreme Truth, can never be dispensed with.

Secondly, the passive deśyate may denote "being expressed". It may also denote "being demonstrated" or "being realized" in a stronger sense of action. Kumārajīva rendered deśyate as "(being) attained" (te 得), apparently favouring the latter option.²⁶ Therefore the issue with regard to the supreme Truth is not merely its expression, but also its realization or attainment.

In view of these interpretations, Nāgārjuna's statement can assume more of a practical and soteriological implication. That is, one should not merely express the supreme Truth through relying on ordinary practices, but one should also attain the supreme Truth right in these practices. Ordinary practices can never be dispensed with. As they can be undertaken only in the empirical world, the empirical world therefore should never be forsaken. This practical and soteriological implication is also in line with Nāgārjuna's identification of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle, which insists that Nirvāṇa shares the same realm with the life-death cycle and can be attained only in this realm. In this respect, Kalupahana also comments:

Freedom (nirvāṇa) would not be absolute freedom that has nothing to do with human life. It is no more than the absence of certain constraints (such as greed, hatred, and confusion) in the life of a human being.²⁷

iv) Extirpation of defilements

When we talk about the realization of the Truth or the achievement of liberation, we certainly admit that we are common people and live in the life-death cycle, which is full of suffering. Why is this so? All Buddhists would agree that this is due to our various defilements (kleśa) caused by false views and attachments. It follows naturally that liberation is to be achieved through the extirpation of these defilements. In light of the doctrine of identification, the Mādhyamika position would be that liberation, which results from the realization of the Truth, should be achieved right in ordinary practices in the empirical world, but with defilements extirpated. This need to extirpate defilements is, in fact, strongly asserted by Nāgārjuna in the Kārikā:

There is mokṣa (release or liberation) from the destruction of karmaic defilements which are but conceptualization. These arise from mere conceptual play (prapañca) which are in turn banished in śūnyatā.²⁸

Nāgārjuna's position is very clear; defilements must be first destroyed or extirpated before liberation can be achieved. This is spoken of in a strong practical sense. Defilements are just what obstruct our liberation. In other words, liberation is nothing but the liberation from sufferings and defilements. Liberation and defilements cannot stand together. Accordingly, liberation can merely be achieved in the extirpation of defilements. And, as the conceptual play is what gives rise to defilements, it should be banished or extirpated as well. The urge to extirpate conceptual play and false views in order to attain liberation or Nirvāṇa is seen throughout the Kārikā. As seen in Kalupahana's comment quoted in the previous section, he speaks of freedom or liberation in

terms of the absence of certain constraints such as greed, hatred and confusion. These constraints can indeed be taken as defilements. The absence of them tends to denote their extirpation.

The need to extirpate defilements in attaining liberation is also detailed in the TCTL:

The ultimate Truth of the entities is permanent and immovable. However, due to various defilements such as ignorance, etc., sentient beings deviate from the ultimate Truth and commit distortions. The Buddhas and saints teach [the Dharma] with various expedencies, destroying defilements such as ignorance, etc., enabling the sentient beings to regain the ultimate Nature which is not different from the original. This is called 'Suchness'. When the ultimate Nature combines with ignorance, deviation occurs. Hence the impurity [of everything]. If ignorance, etc. are extirpated and authentic Nature attained, this is called 'Dhama Nature' (Dharmatā), which is the pure and ultimate Realm. This [practice of extirpation] is called 'penetration into the Dharma Nature'.²⁹

In this quotation, ultimate Truth (shih-hsiang 實相), ultimate Nature (shih-hsing 實性), Suchness (ju 如), authentic Nature (chên-hsing 真性), ultimate Realm (shih-chi 實際), and Dharma Nature (fa-hsing 法性) are synonymous and their common ground is Emptiness. The crucial point here is that deviations and distortions arise from the combination of the ultimate Truth and defilements, such as ignorance. The deviations and distortions will cause sufferings and keep us in the life-death cycle. The ultimate Truth (or simply Truth) originally immanent in us can be restored to its purity by the extirpation of defilements. Consequently, liberation is attained.

Therefore the extirpation of defilements is an important practice in Mādhyamika in the achievement of liberation. This practice of extirpation of defilements is closely connected with the issue of the identification of the unworldly and worldly as explicated in Mādhyamika.

However, we must cautiously note that this practice does not imply that the world itself has to be extirpated as well, although both the defilements and the world are empirical in nature and are consequently oftentimes associated with each other. In this respect, the author of the TCTL makes the following distinction:

In [the practice] of the Prajñāpāramitā [wisdom], what is extirpated is merely false views, not the four causes.³⁰

The false views pertain to defilements, while the four causes represent the empirical world of causal relation.³¹ In the practice of the Prajñāpāramitā wisdom to realize the Truth, what is extirpated is the defilements, not the empirical world itself. This is because the latter is where Emptiness can be realized.

Nāgārjuna himself has also expressed his objection to extirpating the empirical world. He states in the Kārikā:

You will thus destroy all the everyday practices relative to the empirical world because you will have destroyed the śūnyatā of relational origination.³²

In this verse, Nāgārjuna refutes his opponent who tends to negate the doctrines of Dependent Origination and Emptiness. His point is that the empirical world as such is possible in virtue of these doctrines. If these doctrines are negated, the empirical world will be destroyed. In such case, one is bound to result in nihilism. Nāgārjuna is by no means a nihilist, in view of his emphasis of the realization of the supreme Truth right in our ordinary practices in this empirical world. He would certainly be in favour of preserving the nature or realm of the empirical world. This positive attitude towards the empirical world is in line with the idea of t'i-fa or embodying the dharmas in realizing Emptiness, with which Chih-i characterizes the Common Doctrine.

v) Chih-i on the issue of identification: No-extirpation

Let us now take a pause and sum up Mādhyamika's position with regard to the issue of identification of the unworldly and worldly. It identifies Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle, going to the extent that the supreme Truth (or simply the Truth) has to be realized in ordinary practices in the empirical world. It holds that defilements must be extirpated, before liberation can be achieved. In the Mādhyamika context, identification is the identification of Nirvāṇa or liberation with the life-death cycle, not with defilements. In view of the fact that defilements are part of samsaric existence or the life-death cycle, we have to make a distinction that the identification in question is one of liberation not with the defilements, but with the rest of the life-death cycle.

Must we extirpate defilements in achieving liberation? It is true that defilements often obstruct our liberation in ordinary lives, and that liberation is precisely the liberation from defilements. But can we not imagine a situation in which we achieve liberation via overcoming or transcending defilements, instead of extirpating them? Both Nāgārjuna and the author of the TCTL obviously are not aware of this possibility. They take a completely dim view of defilements. Let us bear this point in mind and come to the discussion of Chih-i's conception of identification.

In view of Chih-i's intimacy with the TCTL, which was the centre of study in his early period, and his high appreciation of the idea of t'i-fa of the Common Doctrine, a close relationship between him and the Mādhyamika with regard to the issue of identification can be

ascertained. He has once stated:

The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says, 'It is that form itself is Emptiness, not that Emptiness is attained in the eradication of form.' The Ta-chih-tu lun explains, 'Form is the life-death cycle, while Emptiness is Nirvāṇa. The realm of the life-death cycle and that of Nirvāṇa are one and not two.' Does this [oneness] not indicate that the delusive and pure are harmonized?³³

This vividly reveals his awareness of the same realm shared by the life-death cycle and Nirvāṇa. He sees the life-death cycle as containing delusive (jan 染) elements and Nirvāṇa as pure (ching 淨). The harmonization of the delusive life-death cycle and pure Nirvāṇa signifies a relationship of identification.

With regard to the realization of the Truth, Chih-i is by all means in line with the Mādhyamika in asserting that the Truth should be realized right in the empirical world, not apart from it. He states this claim in the following manner:

The Dharma Nature and all dharmas are the same without difference. . . . To keep away from the mundane dharmas and yet seek the ultimate Truth [elsewhere] is similar to avoiding this Emptiness and seeking Emptiness elsewhere. The mundane dharmas are themselves the ultimate Dharma [i.e., the Truth]. There is no need to forsake the mundane and adhere to the sacred.³⁴

The non-difference between, or the identification of, the sacred Dharma Nature and mundane dharmas implies that the Truth and the empirical world share the same realm, or that the empirical world is precisely where the Truth is to be realized. This manifests the emphasis of the empirical world. There is no doubt about Chih-i's deep worldly concern in the realization of the Truth. But he goes further. He claims that in the attainment of Nirvāṇa or liberation, even defilements themselves should not be extirpated. That is, liberation and defilements can co-exist, without the former being hindered by the latter. He works out

the famous idea of No-extirpation (pu-tuen 不斷) in this sense. This idea is seen throughout his major works in various expressions: for example, "To attain Nirvāṇa without extirpating defilements" (不斷煩惱而入涅槃), "Defilements are Bodhi (i.e., wisdom of enlightenment)" (煩惱即菩提), "Ignorance is wisdom" (無明即是明), "The realm of the devils is the realm of the Buddha" (魔界即佛界), "To initiate wisdom and liberation without extirpating ignorance and delusive love (trṣṇā)" (不斷癡愛, 起於明脫).³⁵ These expressions, though numerous and touching various subjects, can be summed up into two basic patterns: "to attain the pure without extirpating the impure" and "the impure is the pure". In both patterns the impure may denote ignorance, defilements, and so on; the pure, Nirvāṇa, liberation, etc. Both patterns can be construed as expressive of the identification of Nirvāṇa or liberation and defilements. Identification as such is, indeed, a radical form in identifying the unworldly and worldly.

It is this radical attitude that makes Chih-i different from the Mādhyamika with regard to the issue of identification. As summed up earlier, the Mādhyamika holds that the Truth should be realized right in the empirical world, insisting that the extirpation of defilements is a necessary condition to liberation. Their identification is one involving Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle. Chih-i recognizes this worldly association, but admits the existence of defilements in liberation. Therefore his identification is not only one of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle, but also one of Nirvāṇa and defilements, which are commonly regarded as harmful to liberation. It is this latter form of identification that Chih-i emphasizes vigorously. Our discussion here will focus on this

form. As a matter of fact, defilements in Chih-i's view are not necessarily harmful. Rather, they may have two positive significances. These issues will reveal the unique structure of Chih-i's identification and his deep practical interest.

vi) The expedient significance of defilements

The first significance of defilements for Chih-i is that they can be taken as expedient measures for educational purposes. This expedient significance of defilements has both positive and passive aspects. With regard to the positive aspect, Chih-i states:

If the body extirpates defilements and enters Nirvāṇa, like [the prisoner who] breaks the wall and escapes, [it will mean that one] fears life and death, failing to use defilements to perform Buddha affairs. The bodhisattva, with the wisdom to Buddhahood, enters [Nirvāṇa] without extirpating [defilements]. He is like one who, acquiring super-natural power, is not obstructed by a wall. It means to use defilements in performing Buddha affairs. This is called 'to enter Nirvāṇa without extirpating defilements'.³⁶

Chih-i mentions the role of performing Buddha affairs and associates it with defilements. What are Buddha affairs (fo-shih 佛事)? Although Chih-i does not enumerate them, it is obvious that they have much to do with promoting the realization of the Truth and the attainment of enlightenment among sentient beings. With regard to this role, defilements can serve as expedient measures. How this happens is not detailed in Chih-i's major works. But it is not difficult to imagine that defilements include evil deeds, which can be undertaken expediently to convert evil sentient beings. In Part I, C, section vii above we have pointed out that the Buddha or bodhisattva, in the process of converting robbers, may assume the apparition of a robber and perform evils with them; this is

done in order to enhance the intimacy with the robbers, which is conducive to their conversion. Defilements can be expedient in this sense, and the conversion of robbers is by all means a Buddha affair. The performance of evil deeds in this way is not evil at all. As an expedient measure, it is justifiable from the viewpoint of the Buddha affair which is the end.

This positive aspect of the expedient significance of defilements refers to something to be used or adopted, whether it be a deed or a form, while the passive aspect is quite different. Chih-i refers to this latter aspect and remarks:

In tackling the rebels, for an example, the rebels are [indeed] the root of exploits. In destroying the rebels, one attains high rank and great wealth. Likewise, the immeasurable greed and sensuous desires are the seed of Buddhahood. [They] enable the bodhisattva to produce countless doors to the Dharma. More firewood makes the flames [rise] fiercely, and the dung fertilizes flowers. This is why [we say] that greed and sensuous desire are the Way. If [one] extirpates greed and sensuous desire and abides in the Emptiness of greed and sensuous desire, how can [he] produce all doors to the Dharma?³⁷

Defilements can help produce the doors to the Dharma (fa-mên 法門) to promote Buddha affairs. Actually, they are not something to be used. In promoting Buddha affairs, they play the expedient role of a trigger, not in a positive and mechanical sense, but in a passive and dialectical sense. This 'trigger' initiates the acts for Buddhahood. That is, it is because there are defilements that practical measures have to be undertaken to overcome them, and it is due to the overcoming of these defilements that one attains Buddhahood. Buddhahood cannot be established on nullity. Rather, it is established on endeavours which are mainly the overcoming of defilements. The same is also true with high rank and great wealth, which are available merely through doing something, such as destroying the rebels. It is in this sense that defilements serve

expediently as a dialectical trigger in promoting Buddha affairs, just as the rebels do in initiating great honour and wealth. The term 'passive' in "passive aspect" indicates the passive significance of defilements in promoting Buddha affairs. That is, defilements do not positively and directly initiate Buddha affairs. Rather, Buddha affairs are initiated on the basis of "overcoming defilements". It is the defilements' nature of "being overcome" that initiate Buddha affairs.

Chih-i, here, is analogizing the defilements to the rebels. Yet a significant problem remains. That is, high rank and great wealth are achieved through the destruction of the rebels, who will vanish for good as a result; on the other hand, Buddha affairs are achieved by overcoming and yet maintaining defilements. There is, therefore, a discrepancy in the analogy, of which Chih-i apparently was not aware. The issue of overcoming and yet maintaining defilements will be discussed in detail below.

Chih-i sometimes distinguishes between the positive and passive aspects of defilements, but sometimes he does not. In his remark that greed and sensuous desire enable the bodhisattva to produce the doors to the Dharma, for example, both aspects may be involved. Greed and sensuous desire, being the major defilements, obviously play the role of a dialectical trigger. This is the passive aspect. But the doors to the Dharma may denote certain concrete defilements to be used. This is the positive aspect. In either aspect, the expedient significance of defilements is beyond doubt.

In view of the expedient significance of defilements, it is natural for Chih-i to suggest the idea of No-extirpation of defilements

in entering Nirvāṇa.³⁸ Obviously, No-extirpation presupposes a special understanding of the nature of defilements. This understanding precedes the using of defilements and renders the latter possible. In the quotation directly prior to the above one, Chih-i analogizes the bodhisattva's wisdom to a super-natural power. This wisdom actually possesses such understanding. He elaborates the analogy as follows:

[Someone] asked, 'If you do not extirpate the karma resulting from the assemblage of defilements, how can you obtain liberation?' [I] answered, 'It is like one in the prison [who wants to escape]. If he has not acquired the super-natural power, he must break the wall in order to escape. But if he has acquired the super-natural power, he can leave and enter the prison without obstruction, leaving the wall unbroken.'³⁹

Chih-i's point is that the attainment of liberation in the form of No-extirpation is based on a special wisdom which is not obstructed by, but rather embraces, defilements. This wisdom tends to understand that defilements originate from causal relations and do not have permanent Self Nature. They are empty in nature. Chih-i himself has, in fact, identified the nature of ignorance -- the major defilement -- as empty.⁴⁰ Chun-i T'ang also points out that the liberation explicated by Chih-i indicates the understanding of the empty nature of defilements.⁴¹ Ultimately speaking, because defilements are empty, therefore they cannot affect and harm us; because they are empty, therefore we can use them at our disposal. It is due to such an understanding that we can be free from the obstruction of defilements, manipulate them, and make them beneficial. When we can do this, defilements become a positive instrument to us. There is no need to extirpate them.

vii) Identification of Dharma Nature and ignorance in and of themselves

The expedient significance opens for defilements a new facet in which they can be soteriologically beneficial. Yet this also indicates conditionality; it has to be justified by the end. When the end is completely fulfilled, the expediency can be dispensed with. Theoretically speaking, when every sentient being acquires liberation, and there is nothing to enlighten, defilements will lose their expedient significance automatically and will have to be extirpated. In view of this conditionality, the idea of No-extirpation is not ultimate, and the identification based on this idea cannot be guaranteed.

There is, for Chih-i, yet another significance of defilements which opens a completely different picture for the identification. Chih-i goes so far as to declare that Dharma Nature and ignorance are identical and are simply different aspects of the same thing. In this context, Dharma Nature and ignorance stand for liberation and defilements respectively. The relationship between Dharma Nature and ignorance is just like that between water and ice. Chih-i remarks:

The defilement of ignorance is originally Dharma Nature. Due to stupidity and confusion, Dharma Nature turns into ignorance and gives rise to various perversions, [the duality of] good and evil, etc. It is like water turning into solid ice in cold weather, or the mind having various dreams in sleep.⁴²

Dharma Nature and ignorance are therefore different states of the same thing under different conditions. This relationship is similar to that of water and ice, which are two different states of the same thing, i.e., H₂O, under different temperatures. Chih-i particularly warns that Dharma Nature and ignorance do not refer to two different things. He remarks:

There is merely [the difference of] names and words [between Dharma Nature and ignorance]. How can there be the identification of two things? [The situation is] like a pearl which will produce water when it is put toward the moon, and produce fire when it is put toward the sun. If it is not put [toward them], there will be no water nor fire. The thing has never been divided, but the pearl of both water and fire is there.⁴³

Chih-i's point is that Dharma Nature and ignorance are not two entities divided from one source, but result from the one single source which acts or is acted upon differently. For Chih-i, this case is like water and fire which do not result from the division of the pearl, but from the different manipulation of the one single pearl. This pearl image does not communicate to us clearly. But that to which we should pay attention is Chih-i's reduction of the difference of Dharma Nature and ignorance to one of names and words. That is, the difference is nominal, not substantial. The question, "How can there be the identification of two things?" does not conflict with the identification of Dharma Nature and ignorance. Rather, it entails a rejection of the identification of Dharma Nature and ignorance in the sense that Dharma Nature and ignorance are taken as two separate things. This sense is, for Chih-i, a misunderstanding of the nature of Dharma Nature and ignorance.

It is in the sense of not being two separate things, but being different states of the same thing, that Chih-i identifies Dharma Nature and ignorance. In his terminology, this is an identification of Dharma Nature and ignorance in and of themselves (tang-t'i 當體). Chih-i himself has stated that the various perversions are in and of themselves Dharma Nature.⁴⁴ The perversions spoken of here are the perversions of the Truth, which originate from ignorance. Identification as such is, in fact, the most radical form in which ignorance or defilements

acquire their positive significance.⁴⁵

In the identification as such, liberation or enlightenment consists in a transition of states; namely, from the prevalence of ignorance to the overcoming of ignorance and the revelation of Dharma Nature. This transition does not take place smoothly, but rather involves a moral or religious struggle between Dharma Nature and ignorance. Consequently the characteristic of this identification has to be understood in a practical and dynamic context. This is what makes Chih-i's identification one of the most difficult issues in Buddhist philosophy and practice. To cope with this crucial point, let us quote Chih-i's remark:

In evil there is good; apart from evil there is no good. It is the overturning of various evils upon which the tenability of good is based. The situation is like the bamboo in possession of the potency of fire. This potency is not actual fire, therefore the bamboo does not burn. But when the potency meets subsidiary causes and is actualized, the bamboo can burn things. [Likewise,] the evil is [the potency of] good, though it has not yet become actually [good]. When it meets subsidiary causes and is actualized, it can overturn evil. Similar to the potency of fire in the bamboo, which burns the bamboo when actualized, the potency of good in evil will overturn the evil when actualized. Therefore the aspect of evil potency is identical to the aspect of good potency.⁴⁶

Chih-i analogizes evil to the bamboo, and good to fire. Evil embraces the potency of good, just as the bamboo embraces the potency of fire. Good reveals itself on the basis of overturning evil, just as fire comes into reality on the basis of burning the bamboo. Chih-i's point is that good and evil do not make terms with each other, but are constantly in a struggle. Good must overturn evil in order to prevail, and good can prevail merely by the overturning of evil. It follows that the overturning of evil is the necessary and sufficient condition for the prevalence of good. But the overturning of evil does not imply its extirpation. The

former means to overcome evil, obstructing it from prevailing and affecting our life; the latter contains the sense of annihilation, i.e., to extinguish evil completely so that it could never come again. In Chih-i's view, evil should not be extirpated, because good is tenable merely in evil; apart from evil, there is no good. This relationship of evil with good is not spoken of in expedient or instrumental terms. Evil should not be extirpated, not because it is expedient to the realization of good; rather, this relationship is spoken of in terms of the identification of evil and good in and of themselves. Evil and good pertain to the same thing and so cannot be separated from each other. If there is no evil, neither will there be any good. Therefore evil should not be extirpated.⁴⁷

There is then a constant struggle, and yet also there is a constant association, of good with evil. Good and evil stand for Dharma Nature and ignorance respectively. There is a similar struggle and association of Dharma Nature with ignorance. Speaking both logically and practically, there is hardly a common point on which the struggle and association of Dharma Nature with ignorance can come to terms. Struggle is the struggle of Dharma Nature with ignorance to overturn the latter, or at least to get away from it. This is directly opposite to an association with it. But they are simultaneously taken as a relationship between the pure Dharma Nature and impure ignorance, which are identified in and of themselves. There is a sophisticated antinomy of the constant struggle and the persistent association between the two poles of Dharma Nature and ignorance. This antinomy makes Chih-i's thought extremely difficult to comprehend. It has hardly been dealt with seriously by scholars.

viii) The mind and its acts

The solution to this antinomy cannot be found in either side, or even both sides, of Dharma Nature and ignorance. It can be found solely in a third possible condition, which synthesizes Dharma Nature and ignorance. As the identification in question is one of Dharma Nature and ignorance in and of themselves, which refer to different states of the same thing, the third condition must be this 'thing'. This can be nothing but the mind which embraces Dharma Nature and ignorance among others.

Concerning this mind, Chih-i states:

This mind is [where] ignorance, Dharma Nature, Dharma-dhatū, the ten realms of existence, the one hundred categories of dharmas and countless [states of] concentration and deconcentration are all embraced in one single moment. Why? Because of the delusion toward Dharma Nature, there are all evil dharmas such as deconcentration and confusion, etc.; and because of the awakening to Dharma Nature, there are all dharmas of concentration. . . . There is no difference in nature between not awakening and awakening [to Dharma Nature], concentration and deconcentration.⁴⁸

Chih-i tries to enumerate all sorts of states of existence and to sum them up in terms of concentration and deconcentration, which he relates to the pure Dharma Nature and impure ignorance respectively. His point is that whether one is in the state of concentration or deconcentration depends on whether or not he awakens to Dharma Nature; this in turn depends on how his mind acts. When Chih-i claims that there is a non-difference in nature between not awakening and awakening to Dharma Nature (i.e. between deconcentration and concentration), he is pinpointing the mind and its activities. If it acts in accordance with Dharma Nature, it will result in enlightenment; if not, then ignorance will occur. Dharma Nature and ignorance seem to be the two opposing aspects of a cycle in which the mind rotates. It is in the context of this mind that Dharma

Nature and ignorance are identified with each other; likewise, the struggle and association of Dharma Nature with ignorance are spoken of in this context. This struggle and association are not taken in an isolated and ultimate sense. They are related to the mind as two forms of relationship of Dharma Nature and ignorance embraced in the mind.

In relating the struggle and association of Dharma Nature with ignorance to the mind, Chih-i delineates:

When ignorance determines Dharma Nature, the one mind [differentiates into] all kinds of mind. This is like one who is asleep. When one realizes that ignorance is Dharma Nature, all kinds of mind [will return to] the one mind. This is like one who is awake.⁴⁹

Although Chih-i does not specify the association and struggle of Dharma Nature with ignorance, such implications are undeniable. "Ignorance determines Dharma Nature" implies the association of Dharma Nature with ignorance, in which the former is submissive to the latter. This is expressive of the differentiation of the one mind into all kinds of mind. In Chih-i's terminology, "one mind" (i-hsin - 一心) usually denotes the pure mind in an absolute sense, while "all kinds of mind" (i-ch'ieh hsin - 一切心) denotes the delusive mind in a relative sense. The pure mind and delusive mind are, however, not two separate minds. Rather, they are different manifestations resulting from different acts of the same mind. Chih-i's point here is that when ignorance determines Dharma Nature, the mind will act ignorantly. In this case, the mind is delusive. On the contrary, when one realizes that ignorance is essentially not different from Dharma Nature and acts in conformity to the latter, his mind will be pure. This implies a struggle of Dharma Nature with ignorance, in which the former triumphs over the latter.

In view of the fact that Dharma Nature and ignorance are simultaneously embraced in the mind, their association is unavoidable. As they are opposite to each other in nature -- Dharma Nature is pure, while ignorance is impure or delusive -- their struggle is likewise unavoidable. Depending on the outcome of the association and struggle, the mind acts ignorantly or in conformity to Dharma Nature. Dharma Nature and ignorance equally indicate a direction along which the mind may act; as a consequence, they are identical to each other. The annoying antinomy can therefore find its solution in the mind and its acts.

It should be cautiously noted here, that the claim regarding Dharma Nature and ignorance as embraced in the mind does not imply that they appear simultaneously in our actual life. If they did, the mind would then act in conformity to both Dharma Nature and ignorance simultaneously. This is impossible, and would render the identification of Dharma Nature and ignorance into an antinomy. The implication is, rather, that either Dharma Nature or ignorance will prevail, subject to how the mind acts. Theoretically speaking, the mind has complete freedom to conform or be opposed to Dharma Nature, achieving enlightenment or remaining ignorant correspondingly. Nevertheless, the achievement of enlightenment or revelation of Dharma Nature must stand on the overturning of ignorance. In the revelation of Dharma Nature, ignorance has nowhere to conceal itself. The revelation of Dharma Nature and overturning of ignorance take place at the same time. This has also been pointed out by Chih-i himself, who states:

When Dharma Nature is revealed, ignorance will be transformed into wisdom.⁵⁰

When ignorance is transformed, it will become wisdom, like ice thawing and turning into water. It is not something else coming from another place. Both [ignorance and wisdom] are embraced in the mind in one single moment.⁵¹

When ignorance is overturned, it will be transformed into wisdom or light, which is precisely the light of Dharma Nature. This means the revelation of Dharma Nature. As a matter of fact, the overturning of ignorance and revelation of Dharma Nature are two facets of the same event: the act of the mind. Both ignorance and Dharma Nature are embraced in the mind. It is the mind which acts ignorantly; it is also the same mind which overturns its ignorance and simultaneously reveals its Dharma Nature. When Chih-i states that it is the overturning of various evils that the tenability of good is based upon (cf. above), he is also referring to the two facets: overturning of various evils, and making the good tenable in terms of the act of the mind. It is in this sense that Chih-i identifies good and evil (or Dharma Nature and ignorance) in and of themselves, and declares that they are not two separate things.

Now we are in a better position to account for the difficult idea of No-extirpation of defilements. Defilements, represented by evil and ignorance, are, together with good and Dharma Nature, what the mind embraces in nature. Their extirpation in an annihilative sense would indicate the extirpation of the mind as well. Such a condition would further result in the extirpation of good and Dharma Nature, rendering Nirvāṇa and liberation impossible. This justifies the qualification: "In evil there is good; apart from evil there is no good." Therefore defilements can only be transcended or overturned. They can never be extirpated.

The idea that the mind embraces both Dharma Nature and ignorance (or the pure and impure) in one single moment is widespread and emphasized in Chih-i's major works as well as the works of his followers.⁵² The term, "in one single moment" (i-nien — 一念) actually means "in any single moment". It characterizes the mundane nature of the mind indicated, that is, the mind appearing in any single moment in our daily life. It is therefore the mind in an ordinary state, not in a special state.

Chih-i's identification of Dharma Nature and ignorance, as shown above, can be situated in the context of the mind. In this kind of a context, the identification is clearly expressive of something about the mind; the mind embraces both Dharma Nature and ignorance and consequently may act in conformity to Dharma Nature or ignorantly. It also conveys the message that Dharma Nature or liberation is to be attained right in the moment of the transcendence of ignorance or defilements; what we should work upon is nothing but the mind. This is just our ordinary mind in our daily life. It is not far from us at all. We have no need to leave our ordinary mind and daily experience to seek liberation elsewhere. This message is a very practical one, in the sense that our ordinary mind is the most concrete and intimate subject matter to start with in our soteriological pursuit. Liberation is tenable merely in the overturning of defilements. Yet in beginning this pursuit, it is evident that there are various defilements and they seem to be everywhere. In practice, one cannot overturn all defilements in the beginning, but must select some of them with which to deal. In the overwhelming "sea of defilements", one is likely to remain in the dark as to the selection of defilements. In such a case, the identification of Dharma Nature and

ignorance situated in the context of the mind advises that one may concentrate on the ignorant tendencies arising in his ordinary mind in any moment. One should watch these ignorant tendencies and try to stop them. Once they are stopped, Dharma Nature is revealed. The outcome will be that the mind treated in this manner will act in full accord with Dharma Nature.

As regards the cultivation of the mind, to make it act along the direction of Dharma Nature and abandon ignorance, Chih-i has suggested his own sophisticated and technical methods. The delineation of these methods exceeds the scope of this thesis.

ix) Chih-i's criticism of the Common Doctrine

We have discussed in detail the two significant factors of defilements. One refers to their expedient sense; the other is that ignorance and Dharma Nature are embraced in the mind, making the mind what one should start with in his soteriological pursuit. Because defilements have these two significances, they should not be extirpated. It is in this sense that Chih-i proposes the idea of No-extirpation of defilements. It is in the context of this idea that Chih-i identifies Dharma Nature and ignorance, or liberation and defilements. No-extirpation is, indeed, an important practice. From it also arises the practical significance of the identification of liberation and defilements.

In light of this identification, Chih-i criticizes the Common Doctrine, which includes the Mādhyamika. The criticism deserves our attention because it can enhance our understanding of the relationship between Chih-i and the Mādhyamika on the issue of identification. But,

before going into the criticism, we have to explain two technical terms used by Chih-i: the conceivable liberation and inconceivable liberation.

In light of his unique identification of Dharma Nature and ignorance, Chih-i classifies two forms of liberation, i.e., the conceivable liberation (ssü-i chieh-t'o 思議解脫) and the inconceivable liberation (pu ssü-i chieh-t'o 不思議解脫). He certainly favours the latter form. This classification is mainly based on whether or not the liberation is achieved in the pattern of No-extirpation. If the liberation is a No-extirpation one, it is inconceivable; if not, it is conceivable. In fact, Chih-i associates the nature of inconceivability with two features: the non-separation from language, and No-extirpation of defilements.⁵³ But it is the latter that he emphasizes to the greatest extent. On some occasions he explains inconceivability in terms of No-extirpation exclusively.⁵⁴ He goes so far as to claim that only the liberation based on the idea of No-extirpation is inconceivable. In response to why this is so, he remarks:

The Sumeru Mountain enters into the mustard seed, so that the tiny does not obstruct the huge, nor the huge obstruct the tiny. This is why it is called inconceivable. Now, the assemblage of defilements do not obstruct Prajñā and Nirvāṇa, nor do Prajñā and Nirvāṇa obstruct the assemblage of defilements. This is [also] called 'inconceivable'.⁵⁵

Nirvāṇa results from the revelation of Prajñā. Chih-i suggests that Nirvāṇa and defilements do not obstruct each other, just as the tiny mustard seed and the huge Sumeru Mountain do not obstruct each other. There is a relationship of non-obstruction in both cases. What draws our attention is the suggestion that the pure Nirvāṇa is not obstructed by the impure defilements, just as the tiny mustard seed is not obstructed by the huge Sumeru Mountain. This relationship is inconceivable to common

sense. It entails a special wisdom which tends to see the defilements and Sumeru Mountain as empty in nature and consequently non-obstructive. From the standpoint of such wisdom, defilements do not need to be extirpated. This is quite akin to the analogy explicated earlier, in which Chih-i compares such wisdom with the super-natural power that enables one to escape the prison without being obstructed by the wall. The idea of No-extirpation resulting from non-obstruction as such is what Chih-i denotes by 'inconceivable'.

Chih-i also relates the contrast of conceivable liberation and inconceivable liberation to his classification of Buddhist doctrines. For him the liberation based on the Tripiṭaka Doctrine and the Common Doctrine is conceivable; the liberation based on the Gradual Doctrine and the Perfect Doctrine is inconceivable.⁵⁶

As Chih-i ascribes to the Perfect Doctrine the nature of inconceivability in terms of No-extirpation, it is beyond doubt that he takes the liberation advocated by the Perfect Doctrine as based on No-extirpation: the identification of Dharma Nature and ignorance, or Nirvāṇa and defilements. His criticism of the Common Doctrine is also made in the light of this No-extirpation and identification. In this respect, he states:

[Someone] asked, 'If the entering of Nirvāṇa without extirpating [defilements] is inconceivable, then the Common Doctrine also teaches the No-extirpation of entering Nirvāṇa, why is that liberation not inconceivable?' [I] answered, 'The Common Doctrine does not see the characteristic of defilements. Although it uses the term 'No-extirpation', it in fact extirpates [defilements], like the case in which light prevails and there is no darkness. This is different from the case in which the tiny size of the mustard seed does not undermine the huge size of Sumeru Mountain.'⁵⁷

In this conversation, both the questioner and Chih-i have a particular sūtra in mind when they speak of the Common Doctrine, though it is not specified. It is however evidenced by the following statement, "It uses the term 'No-extirpation'", which refers to a sūtra commonly categorized as belonging to the No-extirpation thinking. What is this sūtra? We infer it to be the well-known Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra. This sūtra is classified by Chih-i as preaching the Common Doctrine; its text is widely occupied with expressions featuring No-extirpation.⁵⁸ Chih-i's point is that the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra preaches the doctrine of extirpation rather than No-extirpation. The reason is that it does not understand the true characteristic of defilements.

Chih-i's criticism of the Common Doctrine is that it fails to understand the true characteristic of defilements and merely extirpates them in liberation; its liberation is therefore in the nature of conceivable liberation, not inconceivable liberation. Chih-i does not elaborate in what specific points this failure of understanding the true characteristic of defilements occurs. Instead, he relates the failure to the situation in which light does not admit darkness and draws a contrast in terms of the tiny mustard seed not undermining the huge Sumeru Mountain. In these two cases, he obviously appreciates the latter and downgrades the former. In the former case, the relationship of darkness to light is obstruction, while in the latter, the relationship of the Sumeru Mountain to the mustard seed is one demonstrating non-obstruction. Chih-i's ideal is the relationship of non-obstruction, which he happily assigns as 'inconceivable'. As defilements and liberation are placed in the context of such an inconceivable relationship,

the outcome will be that defilements do not obstruct liberation.

Therefore, defilements need not be extirpated in liberation.

What does the "characteristic of defilements" denote? In response, we must first remind ourselves that Chih-i is criticizing the Common Doctrine from the standpoint of No-extirpation of defilements, which he ascribes to the Perfect Doctrine. In such a context, we believe the characteristic denotes the two significances of defilements detailed previously. In view of these two significances, Chih-i suggests that the No-extirpation of defilements is higher, and expounds the identification of liberation and defilements. In Chih-i's view, the Common Doctrine is not aware of these two significances. Rather, it takes defilements to be obstructive, and therefore advocates their extirpation.

It is not our concern here to examine whether Chih-i's criticism does justice to the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra. However, as this criticism is directed at the Common Doctrine, it should naturally be directed at the Mādhyamika. Does it do justice to Mādhyamika?

This question is mainly concerned with the Mādhyamika conception of defilements. Let us examine what the Mādhyamikas, Nāgārjuna in particular, see defilements to be. In the Kārikā, Nāgārjuna says that defilements are in the nature of Emptiness (śūnya).⁵⁹ He also says that defilements are similar to the nature of an imaginary city in the sky, and that they are a mirage and a dream.⁶⁰ On some occasions, Nāgārjuna says that defilements are devoid of real nature (Skt., tattva; Chi., shih 實).⁶¹ Piṅgala speaks of this shih in terms of Self Nature and explains that defilements are devoid of Self Nature.⁶² Both Nāgārjuna and Piṅgala tend to see defilements as empty in nature. This

is quite understandable in light of the standpoint of Dependent Origination. That is, all things or entities, including defilements, originate from the relationship of dependence upon others and are therefore devoid of Self Nature and empty.

In the Kārikā, there is no indication that defilements have the two specific significances. Nāgārjuna's attitude toward the extirpation of defilements in liberation is very clear and firm. We can conclude, therefore, that Chih-i's criticism of the Common Doctrine definitely applies to Nāgārjuna.

x) No-extirpation and the Middle Way - Buddha Nature

As seen from above, Chih-i's identification of liberation and defilements is spoken of in the context of No-extirpation of defilements, which is an extremely important practice in Chih-i's system. Accordingly, the identification in question is a practical issue. Its major concern is the attainment of the soteriological goal: liberation. We may also definitely say that, for Chih-i, liberation is basically attained in the practice of No-extirpation. But Chih-i also declares that liberation is attained in the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature (cf. Part I, C, i). There must be a close relationship between No-extirpation and the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. It must be possible that the practice of No-extirpation is directly related to the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. As the two significances of defilements are the basis of No-extirpation, such a relationship cannot be made clear without taking them into account.

We will discuss this relationship by referring to two points, focusing on the two significances of defilements. First, one of the three characteristics of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature is that it embraces all dharmas. These dharmas may not necessarily be confined to the good and the pure. They may include the evil and the delusive, i.e., defilements. Accordingly, the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature entails the realization, or at least the preservation, of defilements. This, however, does not indicate that one may act delusively in an ultimate and isolated sense. Rather, defilements should be preserved because they may serve as expedient measures in teaching certain sentient beings. This has been detailed in our chapter on the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. This message is, indeed, what the expedient significance of defilements conveys. Chih-i claims that defilements can be very helpful in promoting Buddha affairs, among which the teaching of sentient beings is an important item. It is obvious that the expedient significance of defilements can be situated in the context of the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. It also provides a better understanding of the all-embracing nature of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature.

Another characteristic of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature is that it is functional. The realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature is impossible apart from the exertion or manifestation of its function. As pointed out previously, this function focuses on the transformation of the empirical world, sentient beings in particular. "The bodhisattva. . . puts the sentient beings into correct places with the perfect function."⁶³ In doing so, the bodhisattva may use various methods and

skills. The expedient significance of defilements could, no doubt, facilitate the bodhisattva in dealing with difficult cases. That is, the bodhisattva may first assume defilements or act delusively to obtain an intimacy with the evil sentient beings, and try to convert them gradually. In this sense, defilements as expediencies may be contributive to the conversion of sentient beings, and their significance can be affirmed in the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature.

Secondly, in the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, which embraces both the pure and the delusive dharmas or elements, the major task is to reveal the pure elements and overcome the delusive. But how are we to do this in the midst of various pure and delusive dharmas? The other significance of defilements suggests that we can start our task with our ordinary mind, which embraces Dharma Nature and ignorance in any single moment. It is the act of this mind that determines whether we are in enlightenment or delusion. We must watch this mind with full attention, to see that it does not act ignorantly, but acts in the light of Dharma Nature. If it acts ignorantly, it will be a delusive mind; if it acts in the light of Dharma Nature, it will be a pure mind. This pure mind is in fact the True Mind (chên-hsin 真心), which Chih-i identifies with Buddha Nature.⁶⁴ As Buddha Nature is not different from the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, this pure mind is not different from the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. Accordingly, the realization of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature can be achieved through the attainment of the pure mind, which is based on practice in terms of our ordinary mind. The concern of such practice is the restoration of Dharma Nature and the overcoming or overturning of ignorance or defilements.

We have related the two significances of defilements to the Middle Way - Buddha Nature in practical terms. This is not surprising at all, because the No-extirpation of defilements is of a deeply rooted practical character.

xi) Extirpation and No-extirpation of defilements

Finally, let us wind up our discussion of the difficult issue of identification by reflecting on two questions: Why does Nāgārjuna insist on the extirpation of defilements in liberation? Is the No-extirpation of defilements a positive development of the extirpation of defilements?

With regard to the realization of the Truth or attainment of Nirvāṇa, Nāgārjuna does not differentiate Nirvāṇa from the life-death cycle, tending to identify them. His advice is that the Truth should be expressed and attained right in ordinary practices in the empirical world, and that liberation can be achieved on the condition that defilements are extirpated. To express and attain the Truth right in ordinary practices reveals the immanent character of the Truth. That is, the Truth is not at all far from us and the empirical world. It also indicates that the Truth is an intimate soteriological goal to us. But this intimacy seems to be restricted by the extirpation of defilements. Nāgārjuna tends to put defilements outside of ordinary practices. In his view, the Truth is immanent in ordinary practices, not in defilements. As pointed out earlier, he was not aware of the two significances of defilements, but aware of its empty nature. Like most Buddhists, he is likely to take defilements as a great hindrance to enlightenment. It is therefore very understandable that he insists on the extirpation of defilements.

Defilements, like other things or events, are involved in the nature of Dependent Origination and are therefore empty. It is also true that in most cases they are harmful to our pursuit for enlightenment, because they often obstruct us from revealing the luminosity of Dharma Nature or Buddha Nature. Accordingly, defilements can be and should be extirpated. But can we not see the issue from another angle? Can we not think that, due to their empty nature, defilements cannot harm us eventually and need not be extirpated? Furthermore, if defilements are empty in nature, being devoid of the unchangeable and immovable Self Nature, can they then not be subject to our manipulation and made beneficial in certain circumstances?

Chih-i must have considered these questions carefully, and his response is affirmative. The crucial point seems that he does not take an exclusively negative view of defilements. He tends to think that the harm resulting from defilements can be avoided by a wisdom of non-obstruction, which can be cultivated through practice. This is similar to the case in which the wall of the prison does not obstruct the prisoner with super-natural power from obtaining freedom. He also discovers the two significances of defilements, which are helpful in our pursuit for liberation. It is from this background that Chih-i proposes the practice of No-extirpation of defilements and identifies Nirvāṇa or liberation with defilements. As remarked previously, this identification does not reject in any sense Nāgārjuna's non-difference or identification of Nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle, advising us to attain the Truth right in ordinary practices. In view of his high appreciation of the t'i-fa (體法) thinking of the Mādhyamika, it

seems certain that Chih-i would applaud this manner of attaining the Truth wholeheartedly. Furthermore, he is eager to incorporate the employment of defilements into these ordinary practices. Nāgārjuna obviously was not aware of the possibility and implication of this incorporation.

Based on this understanding, we may conclude that Chih-i does not reject Nāgārjuna on the issue of non-difference or identification. On the basis of Nāgārjuna's conception of non-difference or identification he establishes his own conception of identification, in which the comprehensiveness of the method in practice, and the flexibility in adopting appropriate methods to cope with particular cases, are greatly enhanced. In his new conception of identification, defilements are something not to be extirpated, but to be overcome, transcended and manipulated. This identification, indeed, opens a new picture for the practitioner in his pursuit of the soteriological goal. It is in this sense that we may affirm that Chih-i's identification based on the No-extirpation of defilements is a positive development of Nāgārjuna's non-difference or identification which entails the extirpation of defilements. In other words, the practice of No-extirpation of defilements is a positive development beyond that of extirpation of defilements.

Notes

1. Cf. below for the details of these assertions.
2. The practical importance of this identification in Buddhism is obvious. There was in fact hardly a Mahāyāna Buddhist school that could deny such an identification. Inada has remarked that the understanding of this relationship is the constant challenge and the most profound feature of the Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy. (Inada, p. 12)
3. Yin-shun has also spoken of the Twofold Truth in methodological terms. He says that the doctrine of the Twofold Truth is the basic method in leading sentient beings from ignorance to enlightenment. (Chung-kuan chin-lun. Taipei: Hui-jih Chiang-t'ang, 1971, p. 205) The doctrine of the Twofold Truth in this context mainly denotes that of the Mādhyamika, which preaches the non-difference of the Truth of Emptiness and the world of conventionality.
4. Inada, p. 158. The Sanskrit original of these verses has been given in Part I, C, vii.
5. Cf. Part I, C, vii and note 89 above.
6. Inada, p. 156. ya ājavamjavibhāva upādāya pratītya vā, so 'pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇamupadiśyate. (Kārikā-P, p. 529) Kumārajīva's rendition: "受諸因緣故,輪轉生死中;不受諸因緣,是名無涅槃。" (CL, 25:9, T.30.35b) Cp. Matilal, p. 156.
7. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1955, p. 274.
8. Sprung, pp. 19, 260.
9. E. Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1958, p. 81.
10. For an extensive elaboration of this identification, cf. Conze, op. cit., pp. 81-85.
11. It should be noted that Tibetan sources also mention the relationship between Emptiness and form. In the delineation that Emptiness and form do not differ from each other, Vimālamitra remarks that there is no respective external entity (bāhyārtha) of form and Emptiness. That is to say, Emptiness is not external to form, and vice versa. Cf. A. Wayman, "Secret of the Heart Sutra", in L. Lancaster, ed., Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems. Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series. Printed in Korea, 1977, p. 143. (Wayman renders śūnyatā as 'voidness', rather than 'Emptiness'.) That Emptiness and form are not external to each other means that there is no Emptiness apart from form, and there is no form apart from Emptiness. That there is no Emptiness apart from form may bear the practical implication that

Emptiness can only be realized in form, whose realm is precisely that of Emptiness. The consequence is the identification of Emptiness and form in terms of sharing the same realm.

12. 佛告須菩提：色即是空，空即是色。... 空即是涅槃，涅槃即是空。中論中亦說：涅槃不異世間，世間不異涅槃；涅槃際世間際，一際無有異故。 (T.25.198a)

13. Inada, p. 146. dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanā, lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ. (Kārikā-P, p. 492)
Kumārajīva's rendition: "諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法；一以世俗諦，二第一義諦。" (CL, 24:8, T.30.32c)

14. Inada, p. 146. ye 'nayorna vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayordvayoḥ, te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane. (Kārikā-P, p. 494)
Kumārajīva's rendition: "若人不能知，分別于二諦，則于深佛法，不知真實義。" (CL, 24:9, T.30.32c)

15. Cf., for instance, M. Sprung, ed., The Problems of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973; T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, op. cit., pp. 228-255; Kajiyama, pp. 130-136; Ruegg, pp. 42-47; Kalupahana, pp. 67-70, 331-335.

16. Matilal, p. 153.

17. Inada, p. 146. vyavahāramanāśritya paramārtho na deśyate, paramārthamanāgamyā nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate. (Kārikā-P, p. 494)
Kumārajīva's rendition: "若不依俗諦，不得第一義；不得第一義，則不得涅槃。" (CL, 24:10, T.30.33a)

18. T.32.14a.

19. T.30.33a.

20. Kajiyama, p. 131.

21. H. Ui, Ui Hakuju chōsaku senshū, Vol. 4, "Japanese Translation of the Sanskrit Text of Madhyamakakārikā". Tokyo: Taito Press, 1974, p. 51.

22. Kalupahana, p. 333.

23. Murti, p. 19.

24. Ibid., p. 17.

25. Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, op. cit., p. 158b.

26. Cf. note 17.

27. Kalupahana, pp. 89-90.

28. Inada, p. 114. karmakleśakṣayānmokṣa karmakleśa vikalpataḥ, te prapañcātprapañcastu śūnyatāyām nirudhyate. (Kārikā-P, pp. 349-350) Kumārajīva's rendition: "業煩惱滅故, 名之為解脫。業煩惱非實, 入空戲論滅。" (CL, 18:5, T.30.23c)

29. 諸法實相常住不動。衆生以無明等諸煩惱故, 於實相中, 轉異邪曲。諸佛賢聖種種方便說法, 破無明等諸煩惱, 令衆生還得實性, 如本不異是名為如。實性與無明合, 故變異, 則不清淨。若除却無明等, 得其真性, 是名法性, 清淨實際, 名入法性中。 (T.25.298c-299a)

30. 般若皮羅蜜中, 但除邪見, 而不破四緣。
(T.25.297b)

31. It is commonly maintained by all Buddhist schools that the empirical world is formed via the assemblage of causes (pratyaya). The Yogācāra School goes further by articulating a sophisticated theory of four causes to account for this issue. In this theory, the causes are divided into major cause, i.e., hetu-pratyaya and subsidiary causes, the latter of which are again specified as ālambana-pratyaya, samanantara-pratyaya and adhipati-pratyaya. For details cf. Dharmapāla's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra (Ch'eng-wei-shih lun 成唯識論), chap. 7, T.31.40a-41a.

32. Inada, p. 152. sarvasaṃvyavahārāmśca laukikān pratibādhase, yatpratītyasamutpādaśūnyatām pratibādhase. (Kārikā-P, p. 513) Kumārajīva's rendition: "汝破一切法, 諸因緣空義, 則破于世俗, 諸餘所有法。" (CL, 24:36, T.30.34b)

33. 大品云: 即色是空, 非色滅空。釋論解云: 色是生死, 空是涅槃。生死際、涅槃際一而無二。此豈非染淨俱斷乎?
(FHHI, chap. 10, T.33.805a)

34. 法性與一切法無二無別。... 離凡去更求實相, 如離此空, 彼處求空。即凡法是實法, 不須捨凡向聖。 (MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.6a-b)

35. The idea that the condition of liberation is identical to defilements -- whether the latter be termed ignorance, delusive love, etc. -- or that liberation is achieved without extirpating defilements appears so often in Chih-i's works that one would tend to think that it is the major feature of Chih-i's thought. This is particularly true with the MHCK, in which this idea is seen at least eighteen times: T.46.9a, 11c, 14b, 21b, 47c, 49c, 56b, 82c, 100b, 103b-c, 104c, 116b, 126c, 127a, 128c, 129a, 131a, 140b.

36. 若身子(等)斷惑入般,如破壁得出,怖畏生死,不能用煩惱而作佛事。菩薩以趣佛慧,不斷而入,如得道者壁不能礙。是則還用煩惱以為佛事。是名不斷煩惱而入涅槃。(WMCLS, chap. 4, T.38.612b) The term te-tao chē (得道者) is very taoistic in tone. It seems to mean a person who has acquired or realized the Way. However, in view of the fact that the text describes such person in terms of being not obstructed by a wall, we understand him to be a person who has acquired the super-natural power of penetrating the wall without obstruction.

37. 譬如對寇,寇是勳本。能破寇故,有大功名,得大富貴。無量貪欲是如來種,亦復如是。能令菩薩出生無量百千法門。多薪火猛,焚壞生華。貪欲是道,此之謂也。若斷貪欲,住貪欲空,何由生出一切法門?(MHCK, chap. 4, T.46.47a)

38. In this respect, Chih-li (知禮, A.D. 960-1028), an outstanding follower of Chih-i, goes even further by associating "the door to the Dharma" with the idea that Buddha Nature embraces evil (cf. Part I, C, note 88) in order to form a sophisticated idea of "Evil Nature as the door to the Dharma" (hsing-o fa-mên 性惡法門). In this idea, defilements are emphasized as an important element to be practiced. Chih-li states: "Defilements and the life-death cycle are the evils to be practiced. All of them are Evil Nature as the door to the Dharma. Therefore there is no need to extirpate and reverse them. However, the other masters do not know this Evil Nature; they consequently need to reverse the evil to the good, extirpate the evil and realize the good." (Shih-pu-erh-mên chih-yao ch'ao 十不二門指要鈔, T.46.707b)

39. 問曰·若不斷煩惱結業,云何而得解脫?

答曰:譬如未得神通之人,若在牢獄,必須穿牆破壁,方得走脫。若是得神通之人,處在牢獄,雖不穿牆破壁,而出入無礙也。(WMCHS, chap. 5, T.38.550c-551a)

40. 畢竟空即是無明之性。(WMCLS, chap. 9, T.38.701a)

41. T'ang, p. 1174.

42. 無明癡惑,本是法性。以癡迷故,法性變作無明,起諸顛倒,善不善等;如寒來結水,變作堅冰,又如眠來變心,有種種夢。(MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.56b)

43. 但有名字,寧復有二物相即耶?如一珠,向月生水向日生火;不向,則無水火。一物未曾二而有水火之珠耳。(MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.83a)

44. 當體諸顛倒即是法性。(MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.56b)

45. With respect to the form of identification, Chih-li enumerates three types: combination of two things (erh-wu hsiang-he = 物相合); mutual reverse of the back and front (pei-mian hsiang-fan 背面相背); and complete identification in and of the related matters (tang-t'i ch'üan-shih 當體全是). Chih-li regards the final type as the authentic identification. (Shih pu-erh-mên chih-yao ch'ao, T.46.707b. For an explication of these three types of identification, cf. Tamura, pp. 121-122) Obviously, the prior two types treat the matters as two separate things, while the final one treats the matters as two different states of the same thing. Chih-li certainly refers Chih-i's identification in question to this final one.

46. 由惡有善，離惡無善。翻于諸惡，即善資成。如竹中有火性，未即是火事，故有而不火燒。遇緣事成，即能燒物。惡即善性，未即是事。遇緣成事，即能翻惡。如竹有火，火出還燒竹。惡中有善，善成還破惡。故即惡性相是善性相也。(FHFI, chap. 5, T.33.743c-744a) In the text, hsing (性) and shih (事) are enumerated to represent the opposite states of potency and actuality of entities respectively. In view of this, we render hsing 'potency', rather than 'nature', the latter being the common rendition of hsing.

47. Again, there is a problem in the analogy, as remarked by Yün-hua Jan in his comments on the draft of this thesis: "The bamboo contains the potency of fire, yet when fire comes from the bamboo, the latter will be destroyed by fire. If this is the case, how could the impurity or defilement (i.e., bamboo) remain without extirpation?" His point is that when fire burns the bamboo, the latter will be destroyed and vanish completely, while evil or defilement, when overturned by good, does not vanish completely. This is a discrepancy of which Chih-i was not aware. It should also be noted that the issue of good and evil carries a practical and soteriological sense, while the issue of fire and bamboo carries an ontological sense. As will be shown below, both evil and good have a common ground or origin, i.e., the mind. Because the mind never vanishes completely, both evil and good always have the opportunity to prevail. As for the bamboo and fire, a common ontological origin does not exist. Although Chih-i asserts that the mind embraces dharmas (see below) which may include fire and bamboo, the assertion is not in ontological sense. That is, the mind does not produce fire and bamboo and so is not an ontological origin of them. There is no sign in Chih-i's works that he is interested in any ontological issue.

48. 此心是無明、法性、法界、十界、百法、無量定亂，一念具足。何以故？由迷法性，故有一切散亂惡法；由解法性，故有一切定法。...迷解定散，其性不二。(MHCK, chap. 9, T.46.131a)

49. 無明法法性，一心一切心，如彼昏眠。達無明即法性，一切心一心，如彼醒寤。(MHCK, chap. 5, T.46.55c)

50. 法性顯，則無明轉變為明。(MHCK, chap. 6, T.46.82c-83a)

51. 無明轉，即變為明，如融冰成水。更非遠物，不餘處來。但一念心普皆具足。(MHCK, chap. 1, T.46.9b)

52. In the Ssü-nien chu, for example, this idea is crystallized into a highly sophisticated compound concept entitled "the mind of ignorance and Dharma Nature in one single moment" (i-nien wu-ming fa-hsing hsin 一念無明法性心). Cf. Ssü-nien chu, chap. 4, T.46.578a-c. This work, publicized under Chih-i's name, was written by his followers. Cf. our Introduction.

53. 思議解脫即是離世文字之解脫... 若不思議解脫即是不離世文字之解脫... 若離世文字之解脫，即是斷煩惱入涅槃。不離世文字之解脫，即不斷煩惱而入涅槃。(WMCHS, chap. 5, T.38.550a-b) At this point, we may remind ourselves that Chih-i has spoken of the Four Alternatives and its negative in terms of conceivability and inconceivability respectively. Cf. Part II, A, vii above.

54. 雖言斷盡，無所可斷，不思議斷。不斷無明受取，而入圓淨涅槃；不斷名色七支，而入性淨涅槃；不斷行有善惡，而入方便淨涅槃... 是名不可思議境也。

(MHCK, chap. 9, T.46.127a) 不斷凡夫陰身，而能成就法身，即是不思議。(WMCLS, chap. 3, T.38.607a) It is interesting to note that in the former quotation, Chih-i paradoxically entitles the liberation based on the idea of No-extirpation "inconceivable extirpation" (pu ssü-i tuan 不思議斷). 'Extirpation' (tuan 斷) here simply means liberation. It should not be taken to mean the same as the 'extirpation' in the idea of No-extirpation.

55. 須彌入芥，小不障大，大不礙小，故云不思議耳。今有煩惱結惑，不障智慧涅槃，智慧涅槃不礙煩惱結惑，乃名不思議。(WMCHS, chap. 5, T.38.550b)

56. 若思議解脫，即是三藏教、通教三乘人所得二種涅槃灰身滅智解脫也。若是不思議解脫，即是別、圓兩教菩薩證佛所得大般涅槃常寂，即是不思議之解脫也。(WMCHS, chap. 5, T.38.550b-c)

57. 問曰：若不斷而入是不思議者，通教亦說不斷而入涅槃，何故非不思議解脫？答曰：通教不見惑相，名為不斷，而實是斷。如明時實自無暗。不同有芥子之小不妨須彌之大也。(WMCHS, chap. 5, T.38.550b) A few words about the word fang (妨) in the statement that the tiny size of mustard seed does not 'undermine' the huge size of Sumeru Mountain. This word has two meanings: obstruct and undermine, as in fang-ai (妨礙) and fang-hai (妨害) respectively. Accordingly, the statement may mean that the tiny mustard seed does not undermine the huge Sumeru Mountain, or that the tiny mustard seed does not obstruct the huge Sumeru Mountain. As will be seen below, this statement carries an inconceivable sense. It is manifest or conceivable that the tiny mustard seed does not obstruct the huge Sumeru Mountain. Consequently, this statement should carry the first meaning: the tiny mustard seed does not undermine the huge Sumeru Mountain. In fact, the assertion that the Sumeru Mountain 'enters into' the mustard seed, which Chih-i associates with the inconceivable nature (cf. note 55 above), entails the meaning that the tiny mustard seed 'absorbs' the huge Sumeru Mountain and thus that the former 'does not undermine' the latter. These arguments support our translation of fang as 'undermine'.

58. Chih-i has not explicitly specified that the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra pertains to the Common Doctrine. In his commentary to this sūtra, the WMCLS, he speaks of it in terms of Fang-têng (方等; Skt., Vaipulya), which in Chinese Buddhist circles represents a group of Mahāyāna sūtras. (Chap. 9, T.38.684a) Both Hurvitz and Tamura have also noted that Chih-i regards the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra as a Fang-têng sūtra. (Hurvitz, pp. 224, 234; Tamura, p. 94) In addition, in the SCI Chih-i enumerates the Mahayana sources expressive of the Common Doctrine, including the Fang-têng sūtras. (Chap. 1, T.46.722a) The same enumeration is repeated in T'i-kuan's TTSCI. Cf. T.46.778a. It is therefore certain that Chih-i relates the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra to the Common Doctrine in his classification, and that he takes it to be a Common Doctrine sūtra.

59. Inada, p. 110; Kārika-P, p. 327; CL, 17:27, T.30.23a-b.

60. Inada, p. 112; Kārika-P, p. 334; CL, 17:31, T.30.23c.

61. Kārika-P, pp. 326, 453; CL, 17:26, T.30.23a; 23:2, T.30.31a.

62. T.30.23a; T.30.31a.

63. Cf. Part I, C, iii above.

64. Cf. Part I, C above.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the preceding pages we have discussed the three basic questions proposed in the Introduction. The first two questions concerning the concept of Truth were dealt with in Part I, while the third one concerning the realization of the Truth in terms of philosophical methods was dealt with in Part II. In comparison, we spent more space on the discussion of the third question. This does not mean that the third question is more important than the first two, nor that the issue of philosophical method is more crucial than that of the concept itself. Rather, this is because the discussion of the philosophical methods involved more related problems which were complicated and necessarily called for more clarifications and elaborations. Speaking both logically and practically, the conception or understanding of the Truth preceeds and determines the method of its realization. As shown in our discussions, Chih-i's understanding of the Truth (shih-hsiang or the Middle Way - Buddha Nature) is different from that of Nāgārjuna, who takes Emptiness or the Middle Way as the Truth. Accordingly, in the realization of the Truth, Chih-i's methods are likewise different from Nāgārjuna's. This demonstrates that the issue of concept is more fundamental than that of philosophical method.

Although it is undeniable that Chih-i inherits much from the Mādhyamika's understanding and realization of the Truth, his affiliation with the Mādhyamika in thought is far outweighed by his difference from this School. This is mostly evidenced in his unique conception of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, the Truth or ultimate Truth for him. As

delineated in Part I, C, he ascribes three characteristics -- namely, permanence, function and all-embrace of dharmas -- as belonging to the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. These characteristics are unanimously spoken of in the context of Buddha Nature. As the Middle Way (itself the Way or Truth) is identified with Buddha Nature, it follows that the Truth is in possession of these characteristics; the Truth is permanent, functional and all-embracing in nature. Nāgārjuna does not mention the concept of Buddha Nature in his Kārikā; the Truth for him, whether it be Emptiness or the Middle Way, has nothing to do with these characteristics.

Among these characteristics of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature, the functional nature is mostly depicted and elaborated in Chih-i's works, the FHFI and MHCK in particular. This evidences Chih-i's special emphasis on the functional or dynamic aspect of the Truth. In view of the fact that this nature is basically delineated in terms of the transformation of sentient beings undertaken by bodhisattvas, Chih-i's deep concern about the welfare of sentient beings and their residence, the empirical world, is beyond doubt.

But how can Truth be functional or dynamic? Or, how can Truth initiate actions? Chih-i's understanding is that Truth can be construed not only as a Principle, which tends to be static, but also as a pure Mind that can act. He identifies the Buddha Nature with the pure Mind and consequently speaks of the various functions of the Middle Way - Buddha Nature. As Buddha Nature is not different from the Middle Way, which is revealed as a Principle in the transcendence of extremes, the pure Mind therefore is not different from or identified with the Middle Way. This identification of the pure Mind and Middle Way or Principle

is comparable to the fundamental idea in Neo-Confucianism: namely, the Mind is the Principle (hsin chi li 心即理). This idea, advocated by Lu Hsiang-shan (陸象山) and Wang Yang-ming (王陽明), characterizes the Chinese way of philosophizing with regard to the issue of Truth. That is, Truth is not only the Principle, but also the Mind.¹ Roughly speaking, Chih-i's identification of the pure Mind and Middle Way can be taken as a Buddhist expression of this idea.

Does Nāgārjuna touch the issue of pure Mind? In the Kārikā, Nāgārjuna does mention the mind, but in a negative tone:

Where mind's functional realm ceases, the realm of words also ceases. For, indeed, the essence of existence (dharmatā) is like nirvāṇa, without origination and destruction.²

Nāgārjuna speaks here not only of the mind (citta), but also of the mind's functional realm (citta-gocara). Kumārajīva renders the latter as hsin-hsing (心行), which means actions of the mind. The functions or actions of the mind, however, have to be stopped in order to attain the Dharma Nature (dharmatā) or the Truth. This mind is by all means delusive. Piṅgala also comments on citta-gocara or hsin-hsing in the following way:

All actions of the mind are delusive. Because of the delusiveness, they should be eliminated.³

Nāgārjuna is definitely aware of the issue of mind, but only as a delusive mind. There is no sign in the Kārikā that he has the idea of pure Mind, much less the identification of the pure Mind and Middle Way. He does not understand the Truth, whether it be Emptiness or the Middle Way, in terms of the pure Mind. Accordingly, his Truth is not functional or dynamic.

Chih-i also differs significantly from the Mādhyamika in the issue of the realization of the Truth. The most striking feature in

this issue is seen in his conception of expediency. That is, even defilements can play important roles in transforming sentient beings, so long as they are employed properly and kept under control. Defilements can be of highly expedient value on many occasions. Expediency is all-embracing in the sense that there is nothing that cannot be utilized. This conception of expediency, focusing on the radical but constructive attitude toward defilements or evils, is indeed unique in Indian and Chinese Buddhism.

Hurvitz understands Chih-i as both a Mādhyamika and a confirmed dhyāna-practitioner.⁴ A dhyāna-practitioner is one who practises meditation, with a major concern on the concentration of the mind. This practice is akin to Chih-i's cessation (chih 止) and contemplation (kuan 觀). This understanding of Chih-i is correct, in view of his inheritance from the Mādhyamika doctrine as well as the extremely deep concern and involvement he had in the practice of cessation and contemplation. But he is more than a Mādhyamika. His unique conception of the nature of Truth and its realization enabled him to go far beyond the Mādhyamika and found a new school of Buddhism: the T'ien-t'ai School. This opened up a new era in the development of Buddhism.

Notes

1. We are not in a position to deal with this proposition here. For a profound and extensive delineation of it, cf. Tsung-san Mou, Ts'ung Lu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan (從陸象山到劉戡山). Taiwan: Student Book Co. Ltd., 1979. Cf. its first chapter, pp. 3-78 in particular.

2. Inada, p. 115. nivṛttamabhidhātavyaṃ nivṛtte cittagocare, anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇamiva dharmatā. (Kārikā-P, p. 364) Kumārajīva's rendition: "諸法實相中, 心行言語斷, 無生亦無滅, 寂滅如涅槃。" (CL, 18:7, T.30.24a)

3. 一切心行皆是虛妄。虛妄故應滅。(T.30.25a)

4. Hurvitz, p. 271.

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