AN ANALYSIS OF ROMAN MILITARY MUTINY
NARRATIVES

AN ANALYSIS OF ROMAN MUTINY NARRATIVES
THROUGH MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES

By

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ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with the use of mutiny narratives in historical texts as a microcosm of the historians' goal of the work as a whole. This study is built upon the recent trend in scholarship, where a particular feature of a text has been studied to provide an analysis on the author or the underlying purpose of his work. Mutinies and, more specifically, mutiny narrative patterns have not been studied to a great extent for this type of analysis. However, based upon their tradition delineation and explanation of events and their ubiquitous speeches, mutiny narratives are capable of providing a new avenue for this type of analysis. The first chapter will look at the mutiny of Scipio Africanus' troops at Sucro in 206 B.C.E. as presented by the historians Polybius and Livy. Both attempted to organize their works upon particular moral and didactic lines, the results of which are clearly expressed in their construct of the mutiny. This intentional framework is also present in the poet Lucan's historical epic the *Bellum Civile*, who shaped the mutiny of Caesar's troops in 47 B.C.E. in order to express his own belief in the inherent cataclysm and paradox of civil war. Finally these same themes of chaos and contradiction are also present in my third chapter and its analysis of five mutinies found in Tacitus, two in 14 C.E. and three in 69 C.E. under Galba, Otho and Vocula. Tacitus deliberately engineered the earlier mutinies in order to create both thematic and linguistic echoes to the later seditions in order to prove that the same problems that caused the later civil war were present under the earliest emperors.

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TABLEOF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Mutinies have been the plague of all military regimes throughout recorded history. Whether they were an impromptu force adjured to combat an immediate threat, or a standing "professional" army, discontent, rebellion and outright mutiny were present in each one at any given time. The Roman army, from its first incarnation down to its fall, was no exception despite the traditional perception of the Roman army as an institution built upon the unshakable loyalty of its troops, aside from a few isolated instances. As Messer discussed in his seminal work, this preconception was based more upon a legend attributed to early scholars on Roman discipline or indiscipline in the army, which was perpetuated throughout the years.[1] However, in his analysis of Rome's history from its foundation to the advent of the Principate, he found no less than forty instances of rebellion and mutiny, which were not confined to any particular time. Furthermore, although a similar treatment has not been done for the time of the Principate onwards, the fact that there were over ten mutinies during the year 69 C.E. alone strongly suggested that the number of mutinies did not decline with the advent of the Principate. Therefore, the idea that Roman armies rarely mutinied is a misconception based partly on an unsubstantiated myth, and partly on the fame of a relatively small number of mutinies.

The mutiny under Scipio Africanus in 206 B.C.E., those under Caesar in 49 and 47 B.C.E., the ones in Pannonia and Germany in 14 C.E., the revolt of Vindex in 68 C.E. and the series of successive rebellions from Galba to Vespasian in 69 C.E., and finally the revolt of Civilis also in 69 C.E. were some of the most famous and oft-mentioned

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[1] Messer 1920.

mutinies. As well, the large intervals of time between these famous mutinies helped in

large part to propagate the mystique about the discipline of the Roman army. However,

these mutinies were so well known often because of the survival of numerous accounts of

them. This survival, in turn, allowed for a considerable amount of scholarly attention,

which also served bolster the general knowledge of them. However, it must not be

forgotten that these mutinies did not exist in isolation, but were only a few in a long series

of rebellions that stretched the thousand year span from Rome's foundation to its fall.

Nevertheless, it is some of these mutinies that I will be treating in my present discussion,

specifically the mutiny of Scipio's troops at Sucro in 206 B.C.E., the mutinies under

Caesar in 49 and 47 B.C.E., the Pannonian and German mutinies in 14 C.E., the rebellion

under Galba and Otho in 69 C.E., and the mutiny under Dillius Vocula also in 69 C.E. All

of these mutinies were described by one or more authors, either historians or poets, and

each author developed and followed a strikingly similar narrative pattern, which was

typically structured chronologically as:

1. A description of the causes of the mutiny: including both the events surrounding

   the mutiny as well as the soldiers' specific grievance and sources of discontent.

2. A speech by the mutinous troops: either by its ringleaders or a more inclusive

   speech that included all the mutineers.

3. A speech by the soldiers' commander (either its supreme commander or some

   other man ranked higher than the soldiers) answering: either the grievances of the

   troops or their act of mutinying more generally.

4. Numbers 2 and 3 could occur multiple times if the mutiny was not quelled by the commander's first speech

5. Finally the results of the mutiny are discussed: either the effectiveness of the commander's speech is discussed, or the troops' punishments are discussed. This is also the time when the commander would offer a concession or a reward. Rarely were these concessions offered by a commander in order to instigate the mutiny's end, but they were more commonly given at the mutiny's end in order to reward the loyal troops or to mitigate some of the soldiers' immediate grievances.

Almost all the historians and poets followed this pattern, when they gave adequate time to discuss the mutiny, with only a few exceptions and variations reflective of a particular author's quirks. What is explicit from this continuity, therefore, is that there was a literary precedent and an ascribed narrative pattern for describing mutinies, which helps to explain how descriptions of mutinies were very similar, despite their disparate instances in texts. This similarity is also paralleled in the authors' descriptions of the causes of the mutiny as there was a traditional moral precept that soldiers were greedy and their excessive avarice was the cause of most mutinies. However, Chrissanthos has attempted to validate the material basis to various mutinies and has concluded that it was not greed, but arrears in their already depleted pay that caused these mutinies.[2] Thus, ancient authors were correct to provide a material basis to these mutinies; however, the culpability of the soldiers and commanders was distorted. Nevertheless, despite the validity of the soldiers' grievances, their purported greed was often used by authors to promote their own

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[2] Chrissanthos 1997, 2001.

interpretation of the mutiny as a whole. Furthermore, when authors differed from this tradition an alternate reading can also be supposed. However, it is the second and third stages of the mutiny, the speeches by the mutineers and the commander, which will provide much of my paper's focus.

Speeches, in both direct and indirect discourse, were a composite feature of nearly all the extant histories of the Greco-Roman world. The oral poems of Homer, with their extended speeches, and the rise of rhetoric in the 5th c. B.C.E. began the textual tradition of direct speeches. This continued until it became a prerequisite for a historian to insert a speech in his work in order to properly depict a history. The veracity of these speeches, however, runs parallel to my intended use of these speeches. The insertion of an original speech, accurately transcribing the exact words of person's speech would have been next to impossible for a variety of reasons, both technical and stylistic. However, except in obvious cases where a historian supposedly provided an accurate transcription of a secret meeting, we cannot oscillate in the opposite direction and dismiss all speeches in histories as merely the rhetorical exercises of the author. I prefer to base much of my work somewhere in the middle between these two extremes. Consequently, I follow those scholars who assumed that a verbatim copy of a speech was inaccessible, but a historian may have had access to a list of points made during a speech, or the tradition of preserving a single memorable word or phrase that he could build his speech on. However, failing this, the best route he could take was to construct a speech from what he imagined was possible, or upheld the speaker's known character or actions. Nevertheless, despite the possibility that there was some kernel of truth in these speeches, a historian

was free to colour and direct the speech in his own way. This can be seen most clearly when extant parallel sources record multiple versions of the same speech; the difference between the speeches is then attributed to the historian's own particular stylistic goals. It is this invention that I base the majority of my study on; in that a speech's individual emphasis was reflective of the author's own unique biases and focuses, which were a side-effect of their attempt to shape their work in a particular way.

Each author had his own personal goal for his work; therefore, he used these techniques to perpetuate this goal. Whether it was a teleological study or a polyvalent correspondence between two works, the historian used their own artistic license to form the speeches and the other elements of these mutinies. Similar studies to this have been done with narrative patterns and specific characters and themes in other works, but this type of examination for mutinies has mostly been done when their narrative overlapped with these other works. Therefore, in the following chapters I will trace the author's own colourings in the mutinies in order to prove that mutiny narrative patterns provide another area for scholars to examine in order to analyze an author's own particular biases and goals in his narrative. I have arranged my study chronologically, for both the mutinies and the individuals who wrote about them, which also allowed for a clearer picture to emerge of the shift from Republican to Imperial governments, as well as Roman public life. Furthermore these texts often recalled earlier author's description of mutinies to the end that a particular language of mutiny began to develop. Later authors used this same language; however, they often shifted its previous unique resonance in order to advance their own colourings.

In my first chapter I will analyze the mutiny under Scipio at Sucro in 206 B.C.E. This was first described by the Greek historian Polybius and his written work, the *Histories*, developed many of the events and digressions in the mutiny in order to explain what specific qualities led to Rome's rise to power and its dominion over the Mediterranean. Much of this was conducted in a virtuous sphere as he concluded that Rome succeeded because it possessed people imbued with the virtues of ἀγχίνοια, λογισμός and πρόνοια, all of which were the antithesis of θυμός and ἄλογος; superior peoples, like the Romans, possessed the former virtues and their possession allowed them to combat and overcome inferior peoples who possessed the latter qualities. Thus, Polybius shaped this mutiny narrative pattern as a battle between the superior Scipio and the inferior mutineers. His virtues, which allowed him to quell the mutiny and a rebellion of another inferior barbarian people, were the same ones that allowed Rome to gain ultimate hegemony. The second to describe this mutiny was the Roman historian Livy.

His work, the *Ab Urbe Condita*, was the eponymous history from the founding of Rome down almost to Augustus' death. Generally, history, according to Livy, was meant to be useful. Therefore, he deliberately designed his history in specific way in order to teach his contemporary readers methods to cure their present-day ills. This was done by invoking a series of *exempla* that he presented throughout the history. These *exempla* were often illustrious men and women, who were introduced into scenes that featured an internal audience. This internal audience provided an arena for Livy's external audience to directly engage with the narrative. In the case of the mutiny, Livy presented it so that his contemporary readers would become reacquainted with a political regime that his

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readers had lost much of their sense of definition with. This lack of definition also highlighted the Caesarian and Sullan echoes that Livy attributed to the mutiny's events. Their echo allowed his readers to recall the more immediate danger that a rebellious troop could present to the *res publica*; consequently, Scipio's actions were designed to cure the ills of the late Republic more than those of his own time.

In my second chapter, I will analyze the two mutinies under Caesar, at Placentia in 49 B.C.E., and at Campania in 47 B.C.E. In this instance, I will look at the poet-historian Lucan's description of a single mutiny under Caesar in his poem the *Bellum Civile*. However, unlike the other histories which I am basing my analysis on, the *Bellum Civile* was a historical epic, a unique text in that the poet relayed actual historical events in epic form – in this case the civil war between Caesar and Pompey in 49 and 48 B.C.E. This license allowed him to combine these two mutinies into one, ascribing the events of 47 B.C.E. to the earlier mutiny in 49 B.C.E. Nevertheless, a comparison between his text and surviving historical accounts of the mutiny confirms that he replicated the relevant portions of this mutiny narrative pattern including its causes, speech, and punitive end. The only key element that differed between his account and the actual event was the date – a relatively minor regard in the face of the similarities. In his work Lucan developed this mutiny, particularly its language and the relationship between Caesar and his troops, in terms of paradox, chaos, and breaking boundaries. All of these elements were programmatic of civil war; therefore, he shaped this mutiny in order to act as a microcosm to the civil war.

In my third chapter I will look at the mutinies in 14 C.E., preserved by the Roman

historian Tacitus in his *Annals*, and their resonances with later rebellions of 69 C.E. in Tacitus' other work, the *Histories*. These two works, conversely, were written in opposite chronological order with the later *Histories* written first, and the earlier *Annals* written second. This chronology, however, helped to shape the *Annals* into a type of prologue to many of the themes that would become present in the later *Histories*. Through this, Tacitus often presented events in the *Histories* whose causes could be traced back to the *Annals*; an occurrence that fully recognized and developed. Many of these correspondences revolved around the upcoming civil war and the prior mutinies' herald of it. Tacitus foreshadowed the later civil war when he described these mutinies in terms of madness – a disease that required *remedia* by its commander to be ultimately defeated. These *remedia*, however, were not the past Republican precedents, but were new cures in order to combat the new type of unified mutiny at the advent of the Principate. This same necessity for new *remedia* was again brought up in the *Histories*, whose commanders had to negotiate with an army fully cognizant of their power to depose and install new emperors. Thus Tacitus created a polyvalent correspondence throughout his two works: between the Republic and the Principate, between *remedia* and madness, and between disorder and mutiny. A mutiny was at the same time: madness and order, and it could only be quelled by disorder and *remedia* that drew from Imperial themes, not of the earlier Republic. This was repeatedly invoked by various actions of the commanders and the legions in both works to the end that the mutinies in the *Annals* were described in almost the same way as the events of 69 C.E., and therefore, acted as a prologue to his earlier work

Chapter One

Scipio Africanus in Polybius and Livy: A Virtuous Roman Paradigm[*]

Polybius' *Histories* was concerned with, in his own words, that it be "the best, and at the same time, the most beneficial (ὠφέλιμος) for the readers of my enterprise that they come to know and to learn, how, and by what sort of government, in less than fifty-three years nearly the whole world fell under the sole rule of Rome" (6.2.3).[1] This statement encompassed what Polybius termed *pragmatike historia*, the type of history which was concerned with *praxeis* – deeds, and those persons doing them. The individual person was a paramount figure within the *Histories*. For individuals as leaders, it was their rule that allowed entire nations to change and develop a new character.[2] Other individuals, although not national leaders, still had tremendous power to shape the events of history. As such, a great deal of the *Histories* is devoted to an analysis of these prime movers of history and what were "the prevailing and dominant tendencies in their public and private lives" (3.4.6).[3] It is through this manner of analysis that Polybius' foreign status made him intimately aware of a comparison between his native Hellenic culture, and the burgeoning Roman. His own stated thesis then, to explain the causes of Rome's rise, forced him to examine the key character traits and qualities that drove Rome to success.

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[*] All texts are taken from their most current Loeb edition unless otherwise indicated. All translations are my own unless specified otherwise.

[1] "ἐν ᾗ τοῦτο κάλλιστον ἔφαμεν, ἅμα δ᾽ ὠφελιμώτατον εἶναι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπιβολῆς τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τῇ πραγματείᾳ τὸ γνῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν οὐδ᾽ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἔπεσεν".

[2] "ὥστε καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἔθη ταῖς τῶν προεστώτων διαφοραῖς συμμεταπίπτειν." – 9.23.8.

[3] "τίνες παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις ἐπεκράτουν καὶ κατίσχυον περί τε τοὺς κατ᾽ ἰδίαν βίους καὶ τὰς κοινὰς πολιτείας."

He concluded that the paramount of these traits was the ability of Rome's people and its leaders to use their own rationalities and foresight, in contrast to the irrationalities of other groups of peoples.

This definition was most explicit in his social-political digression in his Sixth Book, and the role which these abilities played in shaping the superior governments of the Mediterranean. Of the three governments that he described, as well their antitheses, the best were formed when its rulers, and its people, acted out of reason. The last, and therefore worst of these governments, within Polybius' cyclical view of the degeneration of governments, was ochlocracy, i.e. the notion of mob-rule. Polybius constructed his definition and polemic against an ochlocracy as one fundamentally opposed to the superior rule of those governments controlled by reason. Those negative traits, which described an ochlocracy, also continued to resonate in Polybius' depiction of the masses. Within this depiction, he drew heavily upon a pejorative view of the masses as liable to shifting and destructive passions, which stood in contrast to the shrewd actions and thoughts of Rome's leaders. Polybius then reiterated all of these elements during the mutiny of Scipio's troops at Sucro in 206 B.C.E. This type of literary set piece, where a leader stood in opposition to an unruly and seditious mob, allowed Polybius to focus on these subjective ideas through the speeches and the events of the mutiny.

The *Histories*, as Polybius himself stated, was concerned with an explanation of Rome's rise to power and the reason for its success. For him, Rome's hegemony was predicated on various individuals throughout its history, who were instrumental in shaping its success. A thorough analysis of these prominent persons was a key feature of

Polybius' didactic purpose within the *Histories*. A *pragmatike historia* was concerned with the deeds of great men, whom Polybius evaluated in order to explain how and why they became great. Polybius' analysis and delineation of their characters allowed his readers to understand and learn to emulate these types of great men. This methodology of character and action analysis was instrumental to Polybius' understanding of the usefulness of history.[4] However, rather than ascribing these exemplary deeds to Rome's warriors, which was the prescribed method for this type of exploration, Polybius shifted his focus onto Roman leaders and generals.[5] One such individual was Scipio Africanus, whose presence within the *Histories* highlighted his place of prominence. In doing so he tied these two affairs together: his exploration of a character's motives and essential features that contributed to their greatness, which then provided him a paradigmatic figure for the readers of his work.

Prior to his assault at New Carthage, Polybius developed an extended character study of Scipio. This type of character study often provided an explanation a character's actions throughout the *Histories*, and these actions were often the driving force behind the events that pressed Rome's rise to power. In this study Polybius rebutted other historians and biographers who attributed Scipio's success at New Carthage to fortune and chance (10.2.5) as opposed to his λογισμός (calculation) and πρόνοια (foresight).[6] Beyond stating this explicitly, throughout the passage Polybius continued to reiterate these traits, and the

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[4] McGing 2010, 27.

[5] Balot 2010, 496 – 497; Baronowski 2011, 130.

[6] "ὅτι δ᾽ ἕκαστα μετὰ λογισμοῦ καὶ προνοίας ἔπραττε, καὶ διότι πάντα κατὰ λόγον ἐξέβαινε τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων αὐτῷ, δῆλον ἔσται διὰ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων." – 10.2.13.

types of actions which exemplified these traits, in order to create a unifying theme.[7] As a

result of this repetition, a clear portrayal of Scipio's character emerged, which was then

vital for understanding both his actions during the siege, and his subsequent successes.[8]

The use, or misuse, of λογισμός was integral to Polybius' interpretation of a success

among both Greek and Roman peoples.[9] It fell under the verbal realm of νοῦς, the

paramount character trait for Polybius' purposes, according to Pédech.[10] This mental

faculty also encompassed a commander's use of ἀγχίνοια – the ability to analyze a

situation quickly and to immediately develop a course of action.[11] Thucydides first

recognized and delineated the superiority of this faculty in military leaders. He cited a

commander's success in battle as evolving from this mental acuity.[12] Polybius continued

this reasoning in his own work and combined a commander's use of ἀγχίνοια with his

possession of λογισμός and πρόνοια, as under Scipio.[13] Although λογισμός was primarily

used as a military attribute, Polybius transferred this attribute to encompass both

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[7] Longley (2012, 75) finds that in Polybius' extended character analysis of Scipio as well as in his description of the sack of New Carthage Scipio's actions are described as a result of his λογισμός, πρόνοια and ἀγχίνοια, or their cognates, nineteen times.

[8] McGing 2010, 10.

[9] Pédech 1964, 211; Champion (2004, 255 – 260) provides a study of all the instances of λογισμός as well as its cognates within the *Histories*.

[10] Pédech 1964, 210 "*Le* νοῦς *est donc la faculté suprême*."

[11] Wheeler 1988, 47.

[12] Wheeler 1988, 47; cf. Thuc. 1.138.3.

[13] Pédech 1964, 211: "*tous les deux* [λογισμός and πρόνοια] *concourent à produire l'*ἀγχίνοια, *l'intelligence pénétrante, qui aperçoit les conséquences cachées au common*."; Leoni 2009, 87 – 88: "*Polibio, que reconocía la importancia de esto, elaboró claramente la idea de* ἀγχίνοια *como un compuesto de* πρόνοια *y* λογισμός, *ocupando la primera noción un lugar clave en la medida en que permitía evitar errores de cálculo*."

successful military and civilian leaders.[14]

Throughout his work, Polybius classified the Roman people as at times possessing and other times bereft of these qualities. These and other remarks, in turn, have led scholars to assign to Polybius either a pro- or anti-Roman stance, or some combination thereof. They have attempted to trace these, often contrasting, views and provide a succinct explanation for these contradictions within his work.[15] I follow most closely the work of Champion, who determined that both arguments are valid, and that Polybius oscillated between presenting the Romans with these positive traits in order to emphasize their kinship to a civilized people, and their antithesis, alienating them from these virtues.[16] Although I do not agree with the full force of his thesis, that these dual representations can best be explained as catering to his dual audience, his unwillingness to rectify these two portrayals is instrumental to my argument.[17] Polybius' prevailing idea of history's usefulness, and his stated goal to explain Rome's rise to power, necessitated these depictions. He relied on these antagonistic portrayals in order to emphasize a person, or group of people, as a success or failure in terms of virtue. This moralistic divide also tied into Polybius' view of "the one and the many", and the notion of leaders, the people they led, and the qualities that defined the two. All of these features are self-evident in his extended digression on political and social theory within his Sixth Book.

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[14] Walbank *HC* 1.7 and n. 8; Eckstein 1995, 118 – 60; Champion 2000, 430; Champion 2004, 6.

[15] Mioni 1949, 24, 85 and 115; Walbank 1967, 176; 1985, 152-53; Dubuisson 1985, 284-85.

[16] Champion 2004, 4.

[17] Champion 2004, 4.

This book, formulated these antagonisms in the clearest way. Rather than merely an exposition on Rome's political institutions, Polybius' Sixth Book defined Rome's construct.[18] His programmatic statement concerning the *Histories* was to elucidate for his audience, presumably Greek, the causes of Rome's rise to power, and so the Sixth Book dealt most succinctly with those people within the Roman state.[19] Within it, he described a cyclical rise and fall of governments, i.e. *anakyklosis*, and through this, those characteristics which defined the "one and the many" throughout the *Histories*. The actual process and the logic behind this cycle does not concern my argument, rather, the terminology that Polybius used to define these cycles, and the people within them, is more relevant.[20] Within the text itself, Polybius defined the characteristics of the "one and the many", the leaders and the led, for each political organization in each cycle, by a particular set of characteristics. Within these definitions, there was an explicit connection drawn between Rome's political regimes, and, subsequently, the types of people that made up those regimes and the resultant hegemony that Rome would achieve over the Mediterranean. His digression was the first extended look at Rome within the *Histories* and provided a key introduction to his idea of human nature as a driving force in history.

He began his analysis with a populace in their primordial chaotic state, whose natural inclination was to band together in order to protect themselves from the dangers of

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[18] Walbank 1943, 73 – 89; Walbank 1972, 130 and 147 – 149; Eckstein 1995, 65.

[19] Walbank 2002, 221. For Polybius' audience see Walbank (1972, 3 – 6).

[20] Walbank 1972, 130 – 156; Nicolet (1974, 209 – 265) discusses this book at length and the multitude of problems that it presents in a variety of fields; McGing (2010, 169 – 202) also traces the inherent fallacies within an analysis of Polybius' Sixth Book. He also cites the few occurrences of Polybius' extended descriptions of decline in comparison to the number of actual examples within the extant *Histories*

the world. Those people, who chose to separate and gather themselves together, were distinguished from animals by virtue of their capacity for reason (τοῦ γάρ γένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταύτῃ διαφέροντος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ᾗ μόνοις αὐτοῖς μέτεστι νοῦ καί λογισμοῦ – 6.6.4). Out of this band a monarchy arose, with the monarch firstly ruling only by his bodily strength and reckless character (τῇ σωματικῇ ῥώμῃ καί τῇ ψυχικῇ τόλμῃ – 6.5.7). In contrast, the many, using their capacity for reason, imbued this same trait upon their leader and little by little, the monarch became a king, as his anger (θυμός) and strength (ἰσχύς) gave way to the rational superiority of λογισμός (6.6.12). Then, if the people were not content with the king's descendants ruling them, the new potential ἄρχων and βασιλεύς were chosen to rule because of their γνώμη (judgements) and λογισμός (6.7.3). Thus, for Polybius, when people were ruled by their capacity for reason, they elected those leaders into power who shared the same virtues as themselves. The resultant political system was marked as a triumph of intelligence and foresight over wanton force.

However, as the leaders' descendants took over, they convinced themselves of their superiority and gave unmitigated license to their passions, which changed the monarchy into a tyranny. This degenerate form of monarchy would then be overthrown by the people and an aristocracy would develop in its place, ruled by those who were most just (δικαιοτάτων) and most wise (φρονιμωτάτων).[21] Because of its very nature, however, the aristocracy would, once again, fall victim to their own lusts and an oligarchy would develop. The oligarchy would subsequently again be overthrown by the people,

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[21] "οὐδὲ μὴν πᾶσαν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίαν νομιστέον, ἀλλὰ ταύτην, ἥτις ἂν κατ᾽ ἐκλογὴν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαιοτάτων καὶ φρονιμωτάτων ἀνδρῶν βραβεύηται." – 6.4.3

who would place the state in the hands of a δημοκρατία. However, this democracy, as

Polybius was careful to note, was not one in which "all the multitudes of the populace

have the power to do whatever they wish and whatever they will" (6.4.4 – 5).[22] Rather, he

supported those democracies where the πλῆθος did not have full reign, and power was

still held by a type of elite.[23] Thus, even in the best forms of a people-run state, a firm

hand was still needed to control the masses; when this was not present, democracy would

inevitably become corrupt and fall into the corrupt order of an ochlocracy. This most base

form of government would then eventually disintegrate into the war and chaos that

mirrored the people's primordial state and the cycle would begin anew.

In contrast to these positive traits, of both the leaders and the led, the opposing

governments were described with a myriad of negative traits. Monarchs were subject to

θυμός and ίσχύς, as stated previously, and it was only after their refuge to λογισμός that

they were transformed into the higher order βασιλεύς. The degeneracy of the βασιλεύς,

eroded the state into one ruled by a τυραννίς, a state whose leaders did not control their

passions and resorted to pursuing them whatever the cost.[24] It was these types of wanton

and uncontrolled urges that forced the people to overthrow the tyrant, and change the state

into an aristocracy. However, in contrast to the δικαιοτάτων and the controlled behaviour

of the aristocracy, its degenerate form, an oligarchy, supported leaders who "abandon

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[22] "παραπλησίως οὐδὲ δημοκρατίαν, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν πλῆθος κύριόν ἐστι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸ βουληθῇ καὶ πρόθηται παρὰ δ᾽ ᾧ πάτριόν ἐστι".

[23] Walbank 2002, 215.

[24] "ἀναντιρρήτους δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείας καὶ συνουσίας." - 6.7.7.

themselves, some in greed and unjust (ἄδικον) money making, others in wine and insatiable excesses that follows it" (6.8.5).[25] Finally, arising from the failed aristocracy, the people degenerated into the last, and therefore worst, type of government, the one ruled by the ὄχλος – the mob. In his extended speech on the negative traits of the mob, Polybius treated them as explicitly inferior to the rulers in the elite bodies of government. He wrote that: "consequently in Carthage the mob (δημος) had already come into the largest majority in deliberations, while at Rome the Senate had come into power. Therefore on the one hand the masses (πολλόν) deliberated in Carthage, and at the other it was the best men (ἀρίστων), consequently at Rome their decisions concerning public affairs were superior".[26] Indeed, it was these people, those behind the disastrous state of the ochlocracy, which warranted Polybius' habitual derision. For Polybius, the mob, with its unchecked passions, exemplified those traits which were the antithesis of the logic and reason of superior governments and people. Indeed, the majority of these negative characteristics were those that described an excessive loss of control. Consequently, for Polybius, without the restraint of λογισμός and δίκη any group could fall victim to these urges, which led their downfall. As a result, any persons exemplifying these traits could be easily dismissed as inferior to those marked by reason.

Polybius offered this type of delineation within the narrative itself, more often than not presenting it in a person's actions, rarely was there an outright remark upon a

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[25] "ὁρμήσαντες οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαργυρίαν ἄδικον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ μέθας καὶ τὰς ἅμα ταύταις ἀπλήστους εὐωχίας".

[26] "διὸ καὶ τὴν πλείστην δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς διαβουλίοις παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίοις ὁ δῆμος ἤδη μετειλήφει, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀκμὴν εἶχεν ἡ σύγκλητος. ὅθεν παρ᾽ οἷς μὲν τῶν πολλῶν βουλευομένων, παρ᾽ οἷς δὲ τῶν ἀρίστων, κατίσχυε τὰ Ῥωμαίων διαβούλια περὶ τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις." – 6.51.6 – 7.

person or people themselves. For Polybius these groups embodied the worst traits of the

reputable and enviable governments; they marked the disorder and chaos that aristocratic

males would need to fend off with their rational conduct.[27] The first of these groups were

the barbarians characterized by their παρανομία, ὕβρις, πλεονεξία,[28] and most

importantly, by their θυμός and ἄλογος.[29] Those barbarians, and others who fell victim to

θυμός, were those who "did not respond to any logic and were governed by the rage,

anger and violence of an irrational and emotional nature."[30] Barbarians, however, were

not solely associated with these irrational and extreme behaviours. These traits also linked

them to those negative qualities associated with Polybius' worst of the political states, the

ochlocracy – where the multitude were fickle and full of lawless desires, illogical passion,

and violent anger (ἐλαφρὸν καὶ πλῆρες ἐπιθυμιῶν παρανόμων, ὀργῆς ἀλόγου, θυμοῦ

βιαίου – 6.56.11).[31] The masses were often liable to extreme and shifting behaviours, the

end results of which Polybius reiterated throughout his text. These verbal parallels

between Polybius' depiction of the barbarians and the ὄχλος placed both these groups in

contrast to those people who championed the paramount virtue of λογισμός. Neither

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[27] Eckstein 1995, 119.

[28] Pédech (1964, 211 – 212) lists the parallels between the qualities Polybius gives to barbarians and his general lament on persons imbued with these negative virtues.

[29] In possessing this ἄλογος Polybius places the barbarian peoples in contrast to the superior Roman peoples by virtue of their possession of λογισμός. Polybius encapsulates these negative qualities of barbarians, in contrast to the Romans, when he states that the Celts lost as "τὸ μὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην ἅπαν τὸ γινόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ βραβεύεσθαι." – 2.35.5.

[30] Leoni 2009, 94 "*que no responde a lógica alguna y se rige por la furia, la ira y la violencia de carácter irracional y emocional.*"

[31] Champion (2004, 241 – 244) lists the parallels between Polybius' language of ochlocracy and the language of barbarism.

barbarians nor the mob possessed the faculties of reason and foresight, which Polybius supported as the hallmark of Rome's success. Thus, through the set piece of the mutiny, Polybius brought together all those elements that he considered intrinsically important to his history in order to develop his examination of Scipio's successes and the causes for the mutiny's failure.

The extant text of the mutiny is largely concerned with Scipio Africanus' speech to his troops. However, the text, as it survives, has a sizable *lacuna* within it regarding Scipio's opening actions against the mutineers. A comparison between Polybius' account and Livy's suggests that a large portion of the text is missing.[32] Polybius' account, however, does preserve the entirety of Scipio's speech to his troops, as well as a lucid account of his actions prior to the speech. However, the authenticity of Polybius' speeches has been a question for many scholars.[33] There has been a large debate in terms of their validity and accuracy – which I combine into placing a speech as authentic or not – despite Polybius' own comments on the matter and his critiques of previous historians. One of the most vehement was against his predecessor Timaeus and the speeches that he placed in his history. However, rather than critiquing the authenticity of Timaeus' speeches, Polybius faulted the actual arguments that Timaeus placed in his speakers'

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[32] Walbank (*HC* 11.26.6.2.): "οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διανοηθέντες ἐγίνοντο περὶ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐπιμέλειαν ... τῶν δὲ χιλιάρχων διασαφούντων τὰ δεδογμένα, γνοὺς ὁ Πόπλιος ἀνεκοινοῦτο τῷ συνεδρίῳ τί δέον ἐστὶ ποιεῖν." For a recent synthesis on Livy's use of Polybius as a source see Levene (2010, 126 – 163). Although Levene analyzes the two writers on the basis of intertextuality and allusion, the close narrative parallels between the texts would predicate such an analysis. From this, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Livy's description of the events of the mutiny can give an adequate summary of the events lost in Polybius' text.

[33] Sacks (1981, 79 – 95) analyzes this particular aspect of Polybius' writing in detail alongside other scholar's views of this subject.

mouths.[34] Timaeus was want to relay all possible arguments and avenues that a speaker

could have spoken on, a practise that Polybius rejected. He concluded that the historian

should not relate all possible arguments (πάντας ... τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους) within a speech,

but should select only an argument that was suitable and opportune (τοὺς ἁρμόζοντας καὶ

καιρίους) from all possible ones.[35] The implication of these statements regarding the

authenticity of Polybius speeches has led scholars to reach two separate conclusions:

either that all the speeches presented in Polybius are authentic,[36] or while some are

authentic, others include some elements of invention.[37] I follow the latter group of

scholars, as a verbatim copy of the speeches, as transmitted by the historian, cannot

reasonably have been a requisite for ancient historians. It fell to the historian then, to

determine and present the essential characteristics of the speech from what was *a priori*

probable.[38] In terms of authenticity, this would mean that the speeches presented in

Polybius were "restrict[ed] to what was actually said ... but he may cast it in his own

words".[39] As such, although the full version of this mutiny cannot be ascertained, the

remaining text allows for particulars of Polybius' methodology to be elucidated through

Scipio's existing speech and actions.

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[34] Polyb. 12.25.11

[35] Polyb. 25.1.4 – 5.

[36] Musti 1972, 1125 – 1130.

[37] This can be further divided into scholars who determine that entire speeches are authentic, and others entirely not (see Pédech 1964, 254 – 302), or that Polybius presents authentic speeches with some degree of invention within them (see Champion 1996, 321 – 324; 1997, 112 – 117; 2000, 436 – 437; Walbank 2002, 215 – 220; Marincola 2007, 123 – 126; McGing 2010, 80).

[38] Walbank 1962, 5.

[39] Walbank 2002, 249.

The subject and nature of speeches amongst ancient historians, as stated previously, was problematic. Most historians developed a unique writing style, which included their own particular posture within their speeches, which modern scholars have attempted to illuminate. Pédech was one of the first scholars to examine Polybius' speeches not just for the historical reality behind them, but to see them as a functional part of Polybius' narrative. He linked these speeches and the speaker as a "historical cause", driving history forward through these speeches.[40] More recently, Waiter built upon this interpretation, and concluded that the speeches in Polybius highlight the speakers' interpretation of the events spoken in the speech, a concept which he calls "positioning".[41] These interpretations of "positioning" and "historical cause", however, do not preclude a speech's authenticity; rather, they reflect the emphasis Polybius wished to draw on the events. The historian would use his judgement to elucidate what would have been the essential characteristics of the speech, and then to transmit it to the audience in their own words, while still preserving the import and the aim of the speech. In this way they would maintain the essential component of a speeches' authenticity, in regard to the content said, but still allowed them to focus and draw attention to his own particular subjectivity, within the rendering of the speech.

Scipio's speech during the mutiny, therefore, played an important role in Polybius' historical methodology. It enabled him to comment on the inferiority of the Roman troops, in their act of mutiny, specifically recalling their mob-like actions and their

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[40] Pédech 1964 254 – 302.

[41] Waiter 2010, 79.

willing allegiance to barbarians and mercenaries. He further elucidated the character and

means through which Scipio quelled this mutiny, placing him in moral opposition to the

degenerate Roman soldiers. Polybius had previously and systemically determined that the

best leaders were those who possessed ἀγχίνοια and λογισμός. Throughout the text then,

and especially within the mutiny, Polybius imbued Scipio with these traits in order to

place him in a prestigious. In contrast to his place of prominence Polybius made little to

no description of the men, who were merely depicted as a homogenous mass of

discontented troops. The only differentiation that Polybius drew was regarding the thirty-

five instigators of the mutiny whom Scipio laid out for special punishment (οὗτοι δ᾽ ἦσαν

εἰς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν – 11.26.3). Thus Polybius set up a categorical "one"

versus the "many" providing two characters, as the mutineers behaved almost always as a

single unit, with the singular traits associated with leaders and the led.[42]

Immediately prior to his depiction of the mutiny, Polybius described the subject of

mutinies in more general terms. Within this description, his vocabulary recalled a prior

mercenary revolt against their Carthaginian employers. That prior event allowed Polybius

to examine and comment on the behaviours of mercenaries, particularly those in revolt. In

it, the mercenaries had resolved to torture Carthaginian prisoners and return them to their

allies with their hands removed. These actions led Polybius to begin an extended medical

metaphor on the causes of their actions. He likened their degeneracy to a tumour which

grows both upon their bodies and upon their souls (οὐ μόνον τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων

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[42] Walbank 2002, 216: "Polybius was also interested in 'the one' as an element dialectically engaged in various political constellations with 'the many'."

καί τινα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς γεννωμένων ἑλκῶν καὶ φυμάτων ἀποθηριοῦσθαι συμβαίνει καὶ τελέως ἀβοήθητα γίνεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα τὰς ψυχάς – 1.81.5). His use of the phrase ἀποθηριοῦσθαι – to become savage, had a dual purpose within the text, both as a description of the nature of the mercenaries' actions as well as encompassing the medical sense where a tumour becomes malignant.[43] Thus Polybius likened a mutiny or a revolt to a type of internal disorder which grew and festered, in a similar to the way that a disease spread amongst a given populace. This terminology further summarized their revolt when the mercenaries had become so savage (ἀποθηριωθέντες), that they were unable to be called human beings.[44] Polybius continued this type of medical metaphor, which he previously used to describe the degeneracy and mistreatment of the mercenary revolt, and likened the mutiny at Sucro to the internal and external injuries of the body.[45]

Polybius prefaced the mutiny with a general sketch of mutinies and how they grew amongst a soldiery. Within it he reiterated the metaphor used to describe mercenaries and posited that external injuries to the body were easily be guarded against (ἐκτὸς αἰτίας τοῦ βλάπτειν ... πρὶν γίνεσθαι φυλάξασθαι δυνατὸν καὶ γενομέναις εὐμαρὲς βοηθῆσαι), but internal injuries were difficult to discover or to guard against (τὰ δ᾽ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων γινόμενα ... δυσχερὲς μὲν προϊδέσθαι, δυσχερὲς δὲ γενομένοις βοηθεῖν).[46] In this same way plots and disturbances outside an army were easily remedied (ἐπιβουλὰς

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[43] Walbank 2002, 198.

[44] "τέλος δ᾽ ἀποθηριωθέντες ἐξέστησαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως." – 1.81.10.

[45] Polyb. 20.4 – 6 again uses a medical metaphor to describe the moral and political deterioration of the Boeotians. He describes them as καχεκτοῦντες – unwell or sick in the body, before describing the political failures in Boeotia that led to the state's ruin.

[46] Polyb. 11.25.2.

καὶ πολέμους πρόχειρος ὁ τρόπος), but an internal disturbance (ἐν αὐτοῖς γενομένας ἀντιπολιτείας) required a commander of both vast cleverness and surpassing shrewdness (καὶ μεγάλης ἐπιδεξιότητος καὶ διαφερούσης ἀγχινοίας) in order to quell it.[47] Through this metaphor, Polybius was explicit in likening the Roman mutiny to an internal disease, similar to that which ravaged the Carthaginian mercenaries, as opposed to one evolving from outside the group.[48] This theme of the internal disorder paralleled Polybius' opposition to a country's use of mercenaries. Mercenaries were a foreign people, knowingly invited into a civilized group;[49] to allow mercenaries to fight in the place of a country's own people was to allow their innate incivility to enter and threaten the country and its people. Polybius, however, excused a mercenary revolt as they were motivated only by pay, and when it did not arrive, which he admitted as a possibility, then a revolt was justified.[50] However, a Roman revolt was inherently unjustifiable as in doing so the Roman troops were behaving like the barbarian mercenaries, motivated only by payment, and they were revolting against their homeland, which had nurtured and raised them.[51]

Polybius then delineated Scipio's character with those traits he described in his preface to the mutiny.[52] As the one who would inevitably crush the mutiny his speech and actions towards the mutinous troops were developed in order to highlight his use of

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[47] Polyb. 11.25.4 – 5.

[48] Walbank 2002, 200.

[49] Eckstein 1995, 125.

[50] Polyb. 11.28.7.

[51] Polyb. 11.28.7.

[52] See above n. 47.

ἀγχίνοια. Defined as the ability to analyze a situation and develop a course of actions, Scipio, upon learning of the mutiny, immediately devised a stratagem in order to quell it.[53] The plan's intended course was to first make a show of collecting the money in order to remedy the soldiers'' arrears in pay and at the same time to petition to leaders of mutiny to come forward and receive said pay. Secondly, Scipio deployed his remaining loyal troops upon a pretext (ὡς ἐπὶ) that they were to attack Andobales, the leader of the Spaniards that had also revolted upon hearing of Scipio's illness.[54] Thirdly, he sent his loyal tribunes in order to seize the leaders of the mutiny after they had been lured back into the camp, and, after calling an assembly of all the troops, Scipio began his speech towards them. All the preceding actions correctly identified Scipio as a man endowed with ἀγχίνοια. As a lack of pay was one of the driving forces of the mutiny, Scipio engineered a pretence in order to correct the arrears and, by falsely sending his men against Andobales, to make himself appear more vulnerable than he actually was. These actions established Scipio's knowledge of the leader's motivations of the leaders and the proper way to manage the situation in order to successfully quell the mutiny.

Throughout the speech Scipio also demonstrated the quality of λογισμός both in his capacity for calculation and reason, but also demonstrating it as a mark of "positioning". Through this concept, Waiter concluded that Polybius formulated his speakers' words and actions, in his history, in order to lay out the correct interpretation

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[53] Polyb. 11.25.8.

[54] "τῷ δὲ μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ στρατοπέδῳ παρήγγειλε πρὸ ἡμερῶν τριῶν ἐφόδια παρεσκευάσθαι κατὰ πλείω χρόνον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην αὐτῶν μετὰ Μάρκου πορευομένων." – 11.26.6

(λογισμός) of an event at hand, which preceded a successful reaction to said event.[55]

Thus, Scipio's speech to his troops was both: a summation of the events prior to, and

during the mutiny, which, in turn, allowed him to successfully quell the mutiny.

Continuing the verbal link between the mutinous soldiers and the mercenaries, which was

previously drawn by Polybius, Scipio subsequently made an explicit connection between

the soldiers and the barbarian rebel Andobales. In this, he surmised that the mutiny had

been driven out of a desire for greater profits (πλείω τὰ λυσιτελῆ), but he condemned the

troops as they would have obtained these profits by joining Rome's enemies.[56] The desire

for greed had overridden any logical and rational actions that the Roman forces may have

had if they were not afflicted by greed. In this way, for Polybius, excessive greed

developed from those people ruled by θυμός as opposed to the rational λογισμός.

Andobales and his men, as Polybius alleged during the similar mercenary revolt, were a

force driven only by their own internal passions without affiliation to any single cause.

Prior to their rebellion, they had been allied to the Carthaginians and had subsequently

betrayed them in order to ally with Rome once again affirming the volatile nature of a

group ruled by their passions.[57] Therefore, the troops proposed alliance to Andobales only

served to further degenerate their character as they would have been branded as traitors

after allying to Andobales.

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[55] Waiter 2010, 54.

[56] Scipio mentions this option twice, once at (11.29.2) "ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἐρεῖ τις τῶν ἀπηλπικότων ὅτι πλείω τὰ λυσιτελῆ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς προυφαίνετο καὶ μείζους ἐλπίδες καὶ βεβαιότεραι" and again at (11.29.5) "οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐν αὑτοῖς εἴχετε τὰς ἐλπίδας ὡς κρατήσοντες τῆς Ἰβηρίας· οὐδὲ γὰρ μετ᾽ Ἀνδοβάλου ταχθέντες ἱκανοὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἦτε διακινδυνεύειν, μή τι καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ταττόμενοι."

[57] Polyb. 11.29.3.

As Chrissanthos pointed out, however, that contrary to these remarks, the men did not go over to Andobales as Scipio threatened.[58] The mutinous troops were still stationed at Sucro when Scipio arrived as opposed to being at Andobales' camp. This extended digression, therefore, was more a rhetorical flourish then an actual remark on the troop's situation. However, its utterance did allow Scipio to develop a highly critical dialogue of the men's actions, which were made more ignoble by their allegiance to Andobales. Conversely, the lack of pay and plunder that first prompted the mutiny was indeed a reality for both Scipio and his troops. These payments, which had become the hallmark feature of the Republican commanders, were instrumental in ensuring a soldier's loyalty.[59] Throughout the entirety of the mutiny, however, Scipio never refuted the men's claims. On the contrary, he admitted that their pay was less than timely,[60] and, although he permitted himself some error, he readily dismissed the default as no fault of his own.[61] This mutiny then, was not about the grievances of the troops, however legitimate, but the actions the men were willing to take during it. Thus, within Scipio's speech, Polybius enhanced the typical literary polemic against mutinous soldiers and also compared them to those groups possessing the most ignoble qualities; in order to reinforce the demeaned position a mutinous force would be assigned. Their lack of judgement was reiterated

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[58] Chrissanthos 1997, 181.

[59] Scullard (1970, 100) states that the men "were deprived of the plunder which active service involved". For the role of monetary allotments for Scipio in particular see Pinzone (2010, 95).

[60] "ἐμοὶ δῆλον ὅτι δυσηρεστήσασθε, διότι τὰς σιταρχίας ὑμῖν οὐκ ἀπεδίδουν" – 11.28.3.

[61] " 'ἐρωτῶ δὲ τί τούτων ὑμῖν ὑπῆρξεν; ἐμοὶ δῆλον ὅτι δυσηρεστήσασθε, διότι τὰς σιταρχίας ὑμῖν οὐκ ἀπεδίδουν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐμὸν μὲν οὐκ ἦν ἔγκλημα: κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν ὑμῖν ἐνέλειπε τῶν ὀψωνίων' " – 11.28.3 – 4.

again, when, immediately following the mutiny, Polybius introduced Andobales' ill-

conceived revolt. Polybius linked these two episodes together by the mutineers'

previously alleged defection to Andobales' camp. In doing so it allowed Polybius to

highlight the soldiers' lack of foresight that allied them to Andobales in the first place. It

also focused, once more, on Scipio's virtues, which would allow his upcoming success

over Andobales to parallel his previous success in quelling the mutiny.

Prior to this assault, Scipio was credited with an indirect harangue to his troops

regarding their upcoming attack against the rebel Andobales.[62] It was commonplace for

these pre-battle harangues to be a reiteration of a forces' previous successes and an

occasion to document their superiority over the enemy.[63] Therefore, within the speech,

Scipio enumerated all the reasons why his men would succeed against Andobales

including: their previous victories against combined forces of Carthaginians and

Spaniards (3 – 4), his refusal to call upon additional allies (5 – 6), and how he himself

would secure victory – τὴν καθήκουσαν πρόνοιαν (8). This final remark once more

recalled Polybius' "positioning" of Scipio through this speech. It was Scipio's own ability

to analyze the present situation and formulate a strategy that would allow him to defeat

Andobales and his men. Just as he was able to analyze the prior mutiny and formulate an

efficient solution, he now informed his men that he would use the same faculties in order

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[62] Polyb. 11.31.1 – 8. Usher (2009) examines the role of *oratio obliqua* and *oratio recta* within Polybius to the end that *oratio obliqua* is used more often in cases where only a list of salient points is maintained from a speech.

[63] In contrast to this typical motivating factor, Leeman (2001, 101 – 103) points to instances where Julius Caesar greatly exaggerates or diminishes the size of the enemy's forces in order, paradoxically, to motivate his troops.

to ensure victory over Andobales.[64] It was his possession of these types of mental

faculties that would allow Scipio to engineer his success in upcoming battle. This was

shown most saliently in his actions, all of which further elucidated Polybius' notion of the

wanton nature of inferiors, in comparison to the calculation and foresight of Scipio.

Scipio was presented as applying the mental faculties of ἀγχίνοια, λογισμός and

πρόνοια in order to defeat Andobales and his men, who possessed qualities inferior to

those of Scipio. Just as the Roman troops' irrational desire for additional booty and profits

had prompted their ill-conceived mutiny, Scipio was able to exploit these same flaws in

order to crush Andobales' revolt. Scipio's first actions in order to precipitate the battle

were to drive some cattle into the valley between his and Andobales' forces. In contrast to

his foresight to tempt the Spaniards, they swiftly (ταχὺ) fell upon the cattle unbeknownst

to the precarious position they were placing themselves in.[65] Polybius likened the Roman

soldiers' previous irrational lust for greed to the situation that Scipio placed Andobales'

men in. Indeed, it was their overwhelming desire for booty that drove them into this

disadvantageous position where they could be easily routed by Scipio's forces. His

foresight, which allowed him to rout the trapped βάρβαροι, further incited them to anger

(παροξυνθέντες), and they, consequently, drew themselves up for a counter-assault in a

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[64] Davidson 1991, 12; Zoido 2007, 146 – 153 esp. 146. These types of speeches first introduced in Thucydides and show both the character and intelligence of the commander, and are used "to elucidate the real reasons behind a victory or a defeat".

[65] Scullard (1970, 102) delineates the site of the Battle of the Ebro as taking place in a valley between the two hills where the Roman and Spanish forces are encamped. Each end of the valley is blocked by mountains trapping the Spanish forces in the valley where Laelius eventually routs them. Although the exact site of the battle is unknown, this recreation is most plausible based upon the written accounts of the battle. Polybius concurs with the error that the Spaniards made after their charge into the valley that – ταχὺ δὲ τῶν Ἰβήρων ἐπιπεσόντων ἐπὶ τὰ θρέμματ' 11.32.3 as well as Scipio's assessment of the terrain which allows for this stratagem to work.

pitched battle.[66] This assault was once again ill-timed and ill-manoeuvred as Polybius pointed out that Scipio, seeing the irrational (ἀλόγιστος) nature of the Spaniards' tactics, waited until as many Spaniards as possible fell into the trap.[67] Their position then allowed Scipio to decisively defeat Andobales and his men, as Polybius presented, as a result of their own urgency and lack of foresight. Scipio's use of these tactics recalled his prior quelling of the mutiny, which had also been motivated by ἄλογος and θυμός.

Scipio concluded, at the end of his extended polemic against the troops' mutiny, with a summary disregard for both their grievances and their actions. Throughout the speech, he had previously rebuked the troops for the ἄλογος of their actions during the mutiny. At the beginning of the speech Scipio wondered what grievances or what manner of beliefs (τίνι δυσαρεστήσαντες ἢ ποίαις ἐλπίσιν) had led them to revolt.[68] Their greed, which was the supposed cause of their purported allegiance to Andobales, paralleled the subsequent irrational desire for booty shown by Andobales and his men. Thus Polybius created an explicit interplay between the degenerate behaviour of the Roman troops, in mutinying over issues of pay, and the irrational mindset that drove their barbarian enemies to defeat. Scipio's final remark to the troops encapsulated all of these ideas through another metaphor, which explained the reasons behind the mutiny and its

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[66] "παροξυνθέντες οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ διαγωνιάσαντες μὴ διὰ τὸ προηττῆσθαι δόξωσι καταπεπλῆχθαι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἐξῆγον ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ καὶ παρέταττον εἰς μάχην ἅπασαν τὴν δύναμιν." – 11.32.5.

[67] "βουλόμενος ὡς πλείστους ταύτῃ χρήσασθαι τῇ παρεμβολῇ, πιστεύων μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι τοῖς ἰδίοις, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς πεζοῖς, διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ συστάδην μάχας τόν τε καθοπλισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν Ἰβήρων. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔδοξε τὸ δέον αὐτῷ γίνεσθαι, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν τῇ παρωρείᾳ τεταγμένους τῶν πολεμίων ἀντέταττε πρὸς δὲ τοὺς εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα καταβεβηκότας ἄθρους ἄγων ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἐπὶ τέτταρας κοόρτις προσέβαλε τοῖς πεζοῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων." – 11.32.6 – 11.33.1

[68] Polyb. 11.28.1.

subsequent failure. He derided the men's actions in that "all mobs are easily misled and easily impelled towards all things, so that both the mob and the sea are ever liable to the same passions" (11.29.9).[69] It was the very nature of the Roman troops' mob mentality that prompted and developed throughout the mutiny. Their lack of internal reason and calculation, both of which were the hallmark of a person's or action's success, meant that the mutiny was doomed to fail in the face of Scipio's mental acuity.

Polybius' depiction of the mutiny and his entire history, more generally, highlighted a greater perception of the virtues of both the superior and inferior peoples within it. Scipio's ultimate success in quelling the mutiny resulted from his own ἀγχίνοια, λογισμός and πρόνοια. It was these qualities which counteracted the θυμός and ἄλογος of his opponents, both internal and external. The triumph of these virtues also allowed him to successfully analyze the rebellions of his own troops as well as Andobales', in order to determine the best way to defeat them. In the same way, Polybius presented the failures of both these rebellions as a result of the irrational greed and anger of the men. These verbal parallels between Andobales and the Roman forces, prior to and during the mutiny, were developed in order to highlight a symmetry between these two events. This symmetry then allowed for Scipio's success in quelling the mutiny to parallel his following success in the rebellion as a result of his rationality and foresight. Thus, Polybius' delineation of Scipio's character created a decisively positive tradition for his actions during the mutiny. This tradition was picked up by later authors who further enhanced his laudatory view of

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[69] "ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ διότι πᾶς ὄχλος εὐπαραλόγιστος ὑπάρχει καὶ πρὸς πᾶν εὐάγωγος. ὅθεν αἰεὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος συμβαίνει περί τε τοὺς ὄχλους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν."

Scipio's character and actions. At the same time, just as Polybius presented, the actions and ideas that drove the Roman forces to mutiny were again degraded and dismissed in the face of Scipio, as a paragon of a Roman Republican commander.

Many of these same themes were revisited by the Roman historian Livy in his grand work the *Ab Urbe Condita*, which was his attempt to write a history of the Roman people, "from their founding" down to the events of his own lifetime.[70] Only thirty-five of its total one-hundred and forty two books survive in reasonably complete form – books one to ten and twenty-one to forty-five. These covered the mythical founding of Rome by Aeneas down to the Samnite Wars, and, after the gap, the events of the Second Punic War down to the war against Perseus of Macedon. Although his descriptions of 1st century B.C.E. events only survive in the *periochae*, Livy's relationship with this time period both personally and textually is important for my purposes as it affected his ability to describe the period in question. Presumably, he would have articulated the events surrounding the ending of the Republic: including Julius Caesar's death and the events preceding it, from his own experiences or those of other contemporary persons. The same presumably held true for the events of a generation before. In this vein it is prudent to note that Livy, born in either 58 or 56 B.C.E. was a historian of the Republic, whose preoccupations were more closely related to the work of the predeceasing Republican historians, rather than his successors who were concerned with the Principate, an institution not yet in existence at the time of Livy's death.[71] The *Quellenforschung* for Livy's earlier books, which described events centuries before his birth, has been of considerable interest for modern

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[70] As only thirty-five of the one hundred and forty books survive in a reasonably complete form we must rely on the *periochae* for the remaining books. The actual relationship between the *periochae* and the books themselves is examined in brief by Syme 1959, 29 – 30; the exact genre of the *periochae* is abridged by Henderson (1998, 313) as "summaries? résumés? abridgements? glosses? subtitles?" What is conclusive, based upon their extremely brief description of events and the annalist nature of Livy's work, is that his full work would have covered up until the year 9 B.C.E.

[71] Levene 2010, 277.

scholars.[72] Much of this, however, has been replaced by the "industry" of scholars listing

Livy's errors throughout his narrative.[73] These errors were often the fault of Livy's

sources, and his lack of diligence in citing his, admittedly, flawed predecessors.[74]

However, a thorough analysis of these sources is extremely difficult as all the sources

mentioned by Livy, except Polybius, do not survive, other than in brief citations. On the

other hand, Polybius' narrative of the second Punic War has survived almost fully intact,

and this survival has allowed scholars to examine two different narratives of the same

events during the Punic Wars.

Furthermore, the similarity between the two narratives has led many scholars to

argue for Livy's reliance on Polybius for his narrative of the Third Decade, even though

he mentioned Polybius by name only once.[75] In contrast, for his narrative of the Fourth

Decade, spanning books 31 – 45, scholars have clearly marked Polybius as Livy's major,

if only source for that span of time, a clarity that is not found in the earlier decade.[76] In its

case, Livy's reliance is more problematic as he appeared to have turned to his Latin

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[72] For the purpose of this paper I will focus only on those authors he mentions in his Third Decade and none for his other books. These were Coelius Antipater, Valerius Antias, Cincius Alimentus, Fabius Pictor, Claudius Quadrigarius, Piso, Silenus and Polybius.

[73] Ridley (2000, 15 – 17) surmises the most famous of these "blunders" Livy made in his narrative of the Second Punic War including military and political matters, diplomatic history, chronology and geography. Walsh (1982, 1058 – 1074) conducts a more in depth analysis of Livy's "virtues and limitations as a historian" through a detailed analysis of a succinct portion of Livy's extant work in his Third Decade.

[74] "*adeo nullus mentiendi modus est*." – 26.49.3.

[75] Levene 2010, 127; cf. Polyb. 30.45.5. As he insightfully states "the question is how much, if at all, he used him prior to that."

[76] Walsh 1982, 1059: "Livy's history is virtually that history of Polybius translated and modified for Roman readers". See also Walbank (1972). The most vocal dissenter for Livy's use of Polybius during the Third Decade is Tränkle (1977), who concludes that Livy only began to use Polybius at the beginning of the Second Macedonian War.

predecessors at the expense of the more diligent historian Polybius, from whose narrative

he would have been able to avoid the glaring errors in both political and military contexts

that scholars have remarked upon. Nevertheless, the general consensus amongst scholars

who suppose that Livy followed other sources than Polybius, still point to an increased

reliance on him for the later books, with books 21 – 23 being entirely non-Polybian.[77] The

most obvious similarities between Polybius and Livy occurred at the end of the Decade,

with the paired set of speeches by Scipio and Hannibal before the battle of Zama.[78]

Despite the similarities between the two speeches, however, Livy amended Hannibal's

speech to include elements not found in Polybius, in order to heighten his own subjective

representation of Hannibal.[79] As a result, despite Livy's debt to the Polybian narrative for

his facts and general order of events, Livy was not bound to exactingly reproduce

Polybius, at least not at this point in his work.[80] Therefore, when both narratives survived,

it is be beneficial to see both where Livy followed Polybius, as well as instances when he

inserted his own digressions and emphasis in order to shape the narrative and the reader's

impression of it as his own.

Therefore, for the mutiny at Sucro in 206 B.C.E. it is fruitful to examine the

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[77] Walsh 1961, 124 – 132; Burck 1971, 26 – 27; Luce, 1977, 178 – 180. The similarity between these books and Book 3 of Polybius, as Walsh and Burck argue, is the result of a common source between the two authors.

[78] Burck 1967, 440 – 452; Miller 1975, 52; Rossi 2004, 359; Levene 2010, 16 – 17, 239 – 244, 286 – 288.

[79] Rossi (2004, 363): they "set up an exemplary antithesis between the tales of Rome's past *virtus* and her present decline."

[80] For the later Decades Livy's reliance on Polybius increases substantially with the ultimate effect that he often reproduces Polybius' narrative exactly. See above n. 76.

technical aspects of Polybius' and Livy's narratives in order to situate them within the text, before moving onto the thematic elements of their narratives. Immediately prior to Polybius' depiction of the mutiny (11.25 – 30) he described Scipio's attack against Hasdrubal near the town of Silipia (11.20 – 24). Livy preserved this same chronology, and immediately prior to his description of the mutiny (28.24 – 29) he also described Scipio's attack against Hasdrubal (28.12 – 23). Both authors subsequently followed the same chronology and course of events, but further minute and inconsequential parallels between the two points to a greater diligence on Livy's use of Polybius' text.[81] As a result, it is fruitful to examine Livy's divergences from Polybius' text in order to gain an understanding of the particular emphasis that Livy wished to draw in the episode. Indeed, both authors situated the mutiny and Scipio's actions prior to it in a similar way but the

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[81] After recounting the numbers of Hasdrubal's troops both Polybius and Livy specify that Scipio sent one of his lieutenants to Culchas in order too take over the forces enlisted there. Livy adds that Scipio did this after receiving news concerning the number of Hasdrubal's forces (28.13.1 "*cum ad eum fama tanti comparati exercitus perlata esset*"). Polybius (11.20.3) also describes Scipio's decision to acquire more troops after recounting the number of Hasdrubal's forces (Πόπλιος δὲ Μάρκον μὲν Ἰούνιον ἐξαπέστειλε πρὸς Κολίχαντα, παραληψόμενον τὰς ἑτοιμασθείσας αὐτῷ παρὰ τούτου δυνάμεις), yet he does so without the causal explanation found in Livy. Both writers also mention the potential disaster that could ensue if the Romans used foreign forces in the upcoming battle, however, both mention that the same necessity compelled Scipio to do so. In Polybius, (11.20.6 – 7) Scipio's inferior numbers, when only the Roman troops were accounted, would make the upcoming battle to risky to undertake, yet he cannot rely on the support of the Culichan allies in a decisive engagement. Nevertheless, he is forced by circumstance to use the Spaniards in order to impress Hasdrubal with the sight of the size of his forces (ἐπὶ τὸ συγχρῆσθαι κατηνέχθη τοῖς Ἴβηρσιν οὕτως ὥστε φαντασίαν μὲν παρασκευάζειν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις), but he leaves the actual fighting to his own men. Similarly in Livy (28.13.1 – 2) Scipio does not think that the size of his force is enough to match Hasdrubal's without the appearance of barbarian auxiliary (*ut non in speciem ... barbarorum auxilia*), yet, similarly, their numbers must not be so large as to sway the outcome of the battle to Scipio's detriment if they changed sides. Both Polybius and Livy discuss Scipio's need for additional manpower in order to attack Hasdrubal, yet the allies he has make their use in an engagement risky. Therefore, both authors stipulate that the allies were only used as a show of force against Hasdrubal. The similarities between the two versions, including such small details as Scipio's use of his foreign allies merely for appearance sake bespeaks Livy's close use of Polybius as a source. Livy does add some additional details such as: the use of any barbarian force (he does not mention the Culichan in particular) being risky because they had previously changed sides during battles with his father and uncle, which led to their defeat. However, these additional details do not detract from his use of Polybius as a source, but merely point to Livy's own elaborations, which reflect his own particular goal in the work.

authors' descriptions of the course of the mutiny and its themes were radically different. This is most clearly seen in Scipio's speech towards the troops, as speeches in Livy, especially during his early books were essentially formed by Livy; it would be a far stretch for scholars to presume that Livy preserved an authentic speech from hundreds of years before he was born. Therefore, his speeches, particularly during the mutiny, shed light on Livy's own treatment of the narrative; a speech possessed the greatest latitude for an author's inventions and it also allowed for him to construct the major part of this narrative pattern in his own fashion, in order to shift the narrative focus as he wished. Therefore, once again, a comparison between Polybius and Livy's speeches is fruitful in order to discount any similarities between the two and to excise them as a feature particular to Livy's individual inflection.

In Polybius, Scipio's speech was relatively short and revolved around on his question to the troops: what grievances led you to revolt? Because of either: their command, their present situation, or, that they mutinied out of a desire to increase their fortunes.[82] Polybius reiterated this, immediately following Scipio's question, when he discussed their arrears of pay both under him and under previous commanders, and, finally, harangued his troops for their purported betrayal to Andobales.[83] However, despite

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[82] "τρεῖς γὰρ αἰτίας εἶναι, δι᾽ ἃς τολμῶσι στασιάζειν ἄνθρωποι πρὸς πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς ἡγουμένους, ὅταν τοῖς προεστῶσι μέμφωνταί τι καὶ δυσχεραίνωσιν, ἢ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασι δυσαρεστῶσιν, ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία μειζόνων ὀρεχθῶσι καὶ καλλιόνων ἐλπίδων. ἐρωτῶ δὲ τί τούτων ὑμῖν ὑπῆρξεν; ἐμοὶ δῆλον ὅτι δυσηρεστήσασθε, διότι τὰς σιταρχίας ὑμῖν οὐκ ἀπεδίδουν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐμὸν μὲν οὐκ ἦν ἔγκλημα· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν ὑμῖν ἐνέλειπε τῶν ὀψωνίων· εἰ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἦν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης, διότι τὰ πάλαι προσοφειλόμενα νῦν οὐ διωρθοῦτο". – 11.28.2 – 5.

[83] "ἢ παρ᾽ Ἀνδοβάλῃ καὶ Μανδονίῳ; καὶ τίς ὑμῶν οὐκ οἶδε διότι πρότερον μὲν οὗτοι παρασπονδήσαντες Καρχηδονίους πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπέστησαν, νῦν δὲ πάλιν ἀθετήσαντες τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐχθροὺς ἡμῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναδεδείχασι?" – 11.29.3.

the legitimacy of their grievances, Polybius transformed their mutiny into an undisciplined and irrational desire for money, which caused the soldiers to behave most ignobly and looked to Rome's enemies for restitution. This was made particularly clear at the close of Scipio's speech, when much of his preceding speech was reiterated for effect. In it he concluded that the mutiny was totally unjustifiable, and it was driven by the soldiers' inherent mob-like irrationality where they were "easily misled and easily impelled towards all things, so that both the mob and the sea are ever liable to the same passions" (11.29.9).[84] In the face of this greed and irrationality, which supposedly promoted the mutiny, Polybius tailored Scipio with a range of virtues, which allowed him to combat the mutineers. Furthermore, the same antithesis to Scipio's virtues, which characterized the onset of the later barbarian rebellion as well as its resonance to the earlier mutiny, confirmed Scipio's virtuous superiority.[85]

Livy's version of the mutiny, in contrast, provided a much more nuanced account of the army's state of affairs during the build-up and the introduction of the mutiny.[86] First of all, however, I will examine those areas where Livy does parallel Polybius, in order to make Livy's divergences more clear. Firstly, both authors ascribed the same causes to the outbreak of the mutiny: that it was a result of untimely or absent payments. In Livy's case, he stated that the soldiers, "each demanded their pay more impudently than was

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[84] "ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ διότι ... εὐπαραλόγιστος ὑπάρχει καὶ πρὸς πᾶν εὐάγωγος. ὅθεν αἰεὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος συμβαίνει περί τε τοὺς ὄχλους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν."

[85] For a fuller treatment of his actions see above pgs 22 – 32.

[86] Although there is a *lacuna* in Polybius' text that makes Polybius' introduction to the mutiny incomplete, the *lacuna* appears to correspond with chapter 25 in Livy. Furthermore, the majority of the information given in Livy's preceding chapter is abridged in Polybius to the essential point of the mutiny that: mutinies developed after periods of inactivity (Liv. 28.24.9; Polyb. 11.25.6).

customary for the discipline of soldiers ... and at night certain [soldiers] went out to plunder the surrounding peaceful territory" (28.24.8),[87] and when asked what was the cause of their sedition "the common answer was that their pay had not been given to them according to the date ... and that there was no one to reward them for their good deeds" (28.25.6.).[88] In Polybius' case he stated that a commander should "never allow any [force] of them to remain long indolent and inactive and especially when they enjoy prosperity and plenty" (11.25.5).[89] Secondly, both Livy and Polybius attributed the same ruse to Scipio, who collected money from his allies in order to pay the troops, sent his loyal men with Marcus Silanus to lure the seditious men into complacency, and ordered his loyal tribunes to entertain the authors of the mutiny and to restrain them for their final public punishment.[90] Following these parallel introductions, however, Livy did not recreate the emphasis that Polybius placed on the greed, particularly the irrational desire for it, which characterized Scipio's speech to his men.[91] This is particularly surprising in light of the emphasis that Livy placed on greed in his Preface. In it, he stated that it was *avaritia luxuriaque* that caused the time when "customs (*mores*) in the spirit first declined and thereafter lapsed more and more until at such a time that they began to fall headlong up to

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[87] "*flagitatum quoque stipendium procacius quam ex more et modestia militari erat ... et noctu quidam praedatum in agrum circa pacatum ierant.*"

[88] "*volgo stipendium non datum ad diem iactabatur ... suis recte factis gratiam qui exsoluat non esse.*"

[89] "πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς γενομένας ἀντιπολιτείας καὶ στάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς δύσχρηστος ἡ βοήθεια καὶ μεγάλης ἐπιδεξιότητος καὶ διαφερούσης ἀγχινοίας δεομένη."

[90] Liv. 28.25.8 – 28.26.15; Polyb. 11.25.8 – 11.27.7.

[91] Walsh 1961, 99: "Livy ignores the question of pay and makes Scipio's theme the soldiers' dereliction of duty."

the arrival of these present times in which we are neither able to bear our vices nor their cures" (pr. 9).[92] The danger of *avaritia* and *luxuria* was a common *topos* in Latin poetry as well history, and was often used to explain Rome's decline.[93]

As he explained in his preface his own time was characterized by "a gradual sliding of discipline as if sinking morals follows ... then they begin to advance headlong, until by our time we are not able to suffer our ills nor our cures (*remedia*)" (pr. 9).[94] Therefore, despite this precedent and his own mention of *avaritia luxuriaque*, Livy did not parallel Polybius' emphasis on greed and its resultant destruction of the state. Polybius repeatedly emphasized that history resided in the sphere of the virtuous and in this case, the troops were infected by mutiny because of own their moral failings. Thus, the infection of *avaritia luxuriaque* could be cured by a commander who possessed the necessary virtues to combat those infected with it.[95] Similarly, Livy also referred to the mutiny as an illness, and the language of disease was reiterated multiple times throughout the passage.[96] However, Livy did not conclude that it was a commander's remedial powers which were necessary to quell a mutiny amongst his troops, despite Polybius'

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[92] "*desidentis primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora, quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus, peruentum est*".

[93] Luce 1977, 271 – 275; Edwards 1993, 176 ff; also Miles 1995, 80: "*luxuria* shows the power of wealth to distract Romans from their essential responsibilities"; Feldherr (1998, 43 – 46) also describes how the *avaritia* of the Romans after their conquest of the Veii led to their abandonment of the city and its sack by the Gauls, who in turn were blinded by avarice (*caeci avaritia* 5.51.10) and were only able to see the material value of the statues and monuments in the city.

[94] "*deinde paulatim disciplina velut desidentes primo mores sequatur animo ... tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus peruentum est*."

[95] "πλὴν ἑνὸς παραγγέλματος, ὃ πᾶσιν ἁρμόσει, δεῖ καὶ στρατοπέδοις καὶ πόλεσι καὶ σώμασιν, ὡς ἐμὴ δόξα" – 11.25.6.

[96] E.g. 28.25.7; 28.25.11; 28.25.12; 28.27 11 – 12; 28.28.8; 28.29.3; 28.29.8.

precedent. He alluded to Scipio as being both the cause and the cure to their grievances, but the explicit didactic nature found in Polybius, where he specifically stated what virtues were necessary for a commander to quell a mutiny, is not replicated by Livy.[97] Therefore, despite the similar provocations for the mutiny, the same cures were not found in both works. However, Livy did discuss the need for a remedy of the mutiny, which was found in his history itself as he subsequently explained in his preface.

As Feldherr has demonstrated, one of the key features of Livy's preface was his emphasis on the visual nature of history and its relationship to the *inlustri monumento* (illustrious monuments) that he would describe in his work.[98] Thus, according to Livy "one's knowledge of history is made more healthy and profitable to behold (*intueri*) instructions from all sorts of examples entrenched in *inlustri monumento*" (pr. 10).[99] Livy's use of the word *monumento* is particularly striking, especially in regard to the visual component that he encouraged in his history. The Roman idea of a *monumentum* envisioned a particular nexus between memory and the physical world. They were a visual cue to their immediate viewers of past persons and events and were created with particular emphasis on their ability to transmit their "memory" to the future. For the Romans, *monumenta* needed to be seen in order for their viewer to enter into a "monumental space" where, upon seeing the *monumentum*, its viewer would be

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[97] "*redierant enim in fines omisso incepto Mandonius et Indibilis, postquam viuere Scipionem allatum est*" – 28.25.11; "πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐν αὑτοῖς γενομένας ἀντιπολιτείας καὶ στάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς δύσχρηστος ἡ βοήθεια καὶ μεγάλης ἐπιδεξιότητος καὶ διαφερούσης ἀγχινοίας δεομένη" – 11.25.5.

[98] Feldherr 1998, esp. 1 – 22.

[99] "*hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri*".

transported back to time and place which that *monumentum* recognized and it, in turn, would move itself forward into the future of the person viewing it.[100] Livy, as his preface stated, intended to do the same thing with his history where the reader was meant to behold, not just the words on the page, but the *monumenta* that he would describe within it. Furthermore, by pairing the word *inlustri* with these *monumenta*, the reader was meant look for monuments that were not only famous, but were also illustrious – characterizing illumination and visibility as well as superiority in these *monumenta*.[101] This, as Livy intended by his next statement, was not a passive process. His appeal to an unnamed second person, which he emphatically repeated throughout the preface (*te, tibi, tuaequae*), placed the onus of this work on his readers.[102]

His contemporary readers were urged to actively learn and choose from the plethora of examples that Livy catalogued, both good and bad, in order to learn what to imitate and avoid.[103] The entirety of his work was, therefore, meant to engage both his contemporary as well as his future readers with an ability to analyze their own history and to learn from the examples he put forth. The study of Livy's use of *exempla*, however, has often been narrowed to a specific set of static moral qualities that Livy's contemporary

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[100] Jaeger 1997, 17: "the word *monumentum*, then, denotes a reminder, but one that also exhorts. Present temporally as well as spatially, Janus-like in pointing back to the past and forward into the future, from the viewer's perspective *monumenta* link together all of time ... where his or her thoughts move back through this monumental space to the person, place, or event that the *monumentum* commemorates, and the *monumentum* projects them forward into the future." Häusle (1980, 29 – 40); Wiseman (1986, 87 – 100).

[101] Feldherr 1998, 5.

[102] Kraus and Woodman 1997, 55: "this monument is there explicitly to be useful ... and not just for anyone, but for *you*. *Tibi tuaeque rei publicae* is a striking phrase, which suggests that Livy is thinking about his potential reader not simply as an individual, but as a citizen."

[103] "*inde … quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foredum exitu quod vites*" – pr. 10.

audience could look to.[104] However, this narrow focus, as Chaplin pointed out, limited the didactic nature of Livy's work, and placed the reader in a passive state.[105] The type of active engagement that Livy called for can only be recaptured if the visual nature of Livy's history is not forgotten, as well as his idea of *monumentum*. Their presence, both in physical form and in narratives, demanded that they be seen, as Livy pointed out in his preface. However, I agree with Jaeger, that Livy did not see his work itself as a *monumentum*, which contained the examples he wished to relate to his audience. Rather, his work showcased *inlustri monumento* and entrenched (*posita*) within the *monumentum* were the *omnis exempli documenta*. The figure of Scipio Africanus, then, was one of these *inlustri monumento*. His character, from his family's first introduction through to his own actions during the war in Spain, marked him as someone for Livy's contemporary audience to "watch out for". Indeed, Feldherr recognized that much of Livy's narrative is built upon various audiences looking at the episodes that Livy introduced in his history, which Feldherr shorthanded to narrative "spectacles".[106]

These spectacles, which surround the *monumentum* within the narrative, allowed Livy to draw attention to scenes of particular interest – his ideas of *exempla*. However, in tracing Livy's use of the terms *exempla* and *documenta* throughout his work, it does not rectify Livy's stated thesis regarding *exempla*, as well as the ability for his audience to

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[104] Chaplin 2000, 15: "scholars have often treated Livy's *exempla* as moral truths for an Augustan audience."

[105] Chaplin 2000, 2: "this approach encourages a concentration on the first part of his claim – that history is a storehouse of beneficial lessons – to the detriment of the second – that people can tailor their actions from what they have learned in the past."

[106] Feldherr 1998.

learn from them. Rather, as stated previously, his history devolved into a one-sided

portrait of examples to imitate. Indeed, one of Livy's most famous *exempla* – the rape and

suicide of Lucretia, being one of the few stated *exempla* in the work, lacked any

exemplary dimension beyond the basest form. Her suicide, which led to her being named

as an *exemplum*, held a comparatively short place in the narrative, especially in

comparison to the greater actions that her death initiated, and the narrative itself contained

very little didactic possibilities.[107] Indeed, it was only after her death, and the narrative

became one of visual display, that much of her exemplary character came into effect.

It was this transformation from her single exemplary act to a public spectacle that

provided a clear picture of what Livy meant by *exempla* and his reader's ability to learn

from them; the *illustria monumenta* functioned more as narrative storehouse for the

various *exempla* that he wished his readers to learn from.[108] In the case of Lucretia, Livy

formed her character as an *illustris monumentum* of womanly virtue.[109] However,

Lucretia was not an *exemplum* in of herself, but it was her actions and the spectacle that

Livy placed around her actions, which transformed her into *exempla*. This is most clearly

demonstrated when, following her death, Brutus and the other men carried Lucretia's

body to the forum – the place of public rituals and in itself a public space. Brutus' display

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[107] Livy gives only one line to encompass both the exemplary nature of Lucretia's deed as well as the didactic possibilities of it when she states " '*vos' inquit 'videritis quid illi debeatur, ego me etsi peccato absoluo, supplico non libero; nec vlla diende impudicia Lucretiae exemplo viuet.*' " – 1.58.10.

[108] Jaeger 1997, 23. Although applying the concept of *monumentum* to actual physical places at Rome the same principle holds true, albeit figuratively, when she states that "one does not even look on *monumentum* itself except as a space, a context for the *documenta* [of examples]."

[109] "*ubi Lucretiam haudquaquam ut regias nurus, quas in conuiuio luxuque cum aequalibus viderant tempus terentes sed nocte sera deditam lanae inter lucubrantes ancillas in medio aedium sedentem inueniunt. Muliebris certaminis laus penes Lucretiam fuit.*" – 1.57.9.

of her body as well as his speech before the assembly of the Roman people became the catalyst for change that her mere suicide could not. Although her suicide was displayed in front of other people, mainly her family, her action carried no popular power until it was displayed in front of the Roman populace.[110] Indeed, it was only during Brutus' speech before Lucretia's body that the people "re-learned" the vices of the Tarquins and came together to overthrow Superbus and the rest of the Tarquins.[111] The mark of Livy's *exempla* therefore was the presence of an internal audience in the narrative, watching and reacting to events and the people that Livy described. In the case of Lucretia there was the internal audience – the Roman people watching and reacting to Lucretia's body and Brutus' speech, and there was the external audience – Livy's contemporary readers also watching and reacting to the body and the speech. In the case of the former, they became conscious of the ills done against them, which motivated the overthrow of the monarchy at Rome and ushered in the Republic; but the true didactic possibility of these *monumenta*, and their embedded *exempla*, lay in the external audience reading Livy's text. During their reading the presence of an internal audience during a particular scene or speech marked a point for the external reader to become engaged with both the work and the *exempla* that Livy presented in it.[112] In holding the same place as the internal audience

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[110] Feldherr 1997, 149 – 150: "her death thus becomes another means of representing the impropriety of her violation, but now in a medium that affects not only thus *domus* but the entire state."

[111] Superbus' actions appear to have been well known amongst the populous, although they had made no attempt to overthrow the tyrant prior to Lucretia's suicide. It was only after her death, and the visual spectacle that Livy placed on it, which forced the populous to acknowledge the tyranny of Superbus and to take action.

[112] Levene 2006, 75: "internal audiences are in effect adopting a position analogous to that of the reader and so insinuate one possible way in which the reader might respond to the narrative."

before Lucretia's body and hearing Brutus' speech against the Tarquins, the reader also became cognisant of the Tarquins' degeneracy and the specific remedy to it, death to either themselves or the tyrants. It was only when *monumenta* were seen that they activated their exemplary possibility.

Therefore, Livy's goal of his work: to present a history whose study would allow his readers to learn from the past in order to be able to cure their contemporary ills, was achieved by these *illustria monumenta* and the *exempla* entrenched within them.[113] In the same way, the internal audience that Livy introduced during these spectacles allowed him to speak directly to his contemporary audience and to elucidate the proper course of action. Indeed, whereas Polybius' *exempla* were found mostly in direct discourse – when he directly stated what virtues were necessary for a commander to quell a mutiny, Livy was more likely to place these *exempla* within speeches.[114] Therefore, moving back to the mutiny, it is clear that Livy shaped it in order to be one of these spectacles; he shaped the character of Scipio's Africanus in order to become a figure *par excellence*. From his election in the twenty-sixth book he played an increasingly larger role in the conflict and the twenty-eighth book revolved almost solely around Scipio including: his conquest and victories in Spain, the mutiny at Sucro and his election as consul, and his famous debate with Fabius. His lineage was also a measure of his prestigious character as the Scipionic family had been previously been granted a series of extra-ordinary commands – Scipio

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[113] Kraus and Woodman 1997, 52: "history and future come together in the troubles present: only by means of memory can the present – and by implication the future, the time both of publication and reading – be cured".

[114] Chaplin 2000, 25.

being only the last in a long line.[115] Indeed, after the deaths of Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, the appointment of a new commander was put to a *comitia centuriata*, out of which Africanus became a *pro consul* having *summum imperium* in *Hispania*.[116] However, because of both his age and his relative inexperience, those who contested Scipio's election also appointed the *pro praetore* Marcus Junius Silanus with consular *imperium* equal (*pari*) to the *summum imperium* of Africanus.[117] Vervaet and Hoyo concluded that the more mature Silanus was meant to act as a "supervisor" to Africanus in light of his "powerful and quite exceptional legitimation of a *lex centuria* (sic)."[118]

Therefore, the series of extra-ordinary commands in Spain beginning with the Publius and Gnaeus Scipio and ending with Africanus, as well as the latter's successes in both war and peace, raised Scipio's character until he was one of the "men by whose skills in war and peace dominion was expanded and achieved" (pr. 9);[119] he was one of the *monumenta* that embodied these didactic *exempla*. Furthermore, throughout the mutiny, Livy introduced an internal audience in the mutineers, who watched the evolution

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[115] Vervaet and Hoyo 2007, 22 – 23. Prior to Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus' appointment Publius Cornelius Scipio and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio were acclaimed *prorogatio imperii* and consul *suo iure* respectively. Following their deaths Gaius Claudius Nero was given *imperium* by means of *plebiscitum ex s.c.* Vasaly (1987) also notes, although discussing the various gens in the First Pentad, that Livy consistently introduces the same character traits, whether good or bad, within a specific family line. As a result, the people within a family line, often living generations apart, demonstrate the same attributes as others who lived before them. See also Mazzolani (1970, 111) "at intervals of a few years or of centuries two Brutii suppressed a tyrant, two Decii offered their lives to the gods in order to save Rome, three Valerii proposed to law of appeal whereby the people could change a death sentence into exile, two Grachii were killed because of their love for the people, two Catos rose up as champions of ancient austerity."

[116] Vervaet and Hoyo 2007, 29.

[117] Vervaet and Hoyo 2007, 31.

[118] Vervaet and Hoyo 2007, 31.

[119] "*per quos uiros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit*".

of the mutiny and who circled around Scipio during his speech.[120]As to what Scipio was intended to cure, once again I look to Livy's divergences from Polybius and the disparate emphasis that he developed in order to elucidate what specific cures he believed were necessary for his readers. This was brought up quite early in the mutiny, when, after a brief period where the camp maintained a show of loyalty, the troops openly declared their sedition and threw the appointed military tribunes from the camp and the men elected the leaders of the mutiny to be their new commanders.[121] Polybius briefly alluded to their action but quickly moved away from the topic "of which it is disgraceful to speak even further" (11.29.6).[122] Livy's depiction of their acclamation, in contrast, highlighted the particularly Roman outrage it would have held for both Scipio and Livy's contemporary readers. He did not sustain Polybius' discretion, and repeatedly invoked the impiety of the soldiers' actions until it became the unifying theme of the mutiny narrative.

Where Polybius only mentioned that thirty-five leaders of the mutiny that were singled out for particular punishment, Livy gave names and ethnicities to the two leaders of the mutiny in order to draw the reader's attention to them – C. Albius of Cales and C. Atrius, an Umbrian.[123] They were the ones whom the mutinous soldiers endowed with the

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[120] "*uocati deinde ad contionem qui pridie uenerant, ferociter in forum ad tribunal imperatoris ut ultro territuri succlamationibus concurrunt*". – 28.27.

[121] "*erupit deinde seditio, postquam reprehendere atque improbare tribunos ea quae fierent et conari obuiam ire et propalam abnuere furoris eorum se futuros socios senserunt. fugatis itaque ex principiis ac post paulo e castris tribunis ad principes seditionis gregarios milites C. Albium Calenum et C. Atrium Umbrum delatum omnium consensu imperium est.*" – 28.24.12 – 13.

[122] "ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδὲ λέγειν πλείω καλόν."

[123] cf. Liv. 28.24.13. Although Livy mentions later, presumably following Polybius, that thirty-five leaders of the mutiny receive capital punishment, it is these two who receive particular mention throughout

fasces and axes, an action that Livy condemned them for as those "who were not content with the tokens of the tribunes, dared to violate the insignia of even the highest in command – the *fasces* and the axes" (28.24.14).[124] It was this action that received the full force of Scipio's vehemence in his speech; it was this action that required a remedy, according to Livy, not the soldiers' decline into greed and luxury. The latter was a cause, but the election of Albius and Atrius unified the entire mutiny from its beginning, to Scipio's speech, and its eventual resolution and aftermath. Similarly, Polybius' virtuous framework shaped the mutiny's build up, speech and aftermath. In Livy's case, Scipio enumerated the exact legal and moral violations of the soldier's actions, detail that was not present in Polybius' version. Their actions violated the command of the tribunes, and conferred it upon men who had never owned nor commanded a slave (14).[125] Albius and Atrius were lodged at the (commander's) headquarters, the trumpet sounded at their tent, they sat at Scipio's tribunal and gave out the watchword (15), and lictors attended and proceeded before them holding the *fasces* and the axes, which denoted their command (16). Although the actions of the men were decisively impious, it was in Scipio's speech

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both the introduction to the mutiny and Scipio's speech. However, at the close of the mutiny, when the leaders were scourged and beheaded, no mention is made of Albius' or Atrius' fate. Presumably they were one of the thirty-five leaders of the mutiny, as Livy himself states, but because of their repeated appearances throughout the mutiny and the central role their appointment played in shaping Scipio's speech, it is curious that Livy makes no mention of them at the close of the mutiny.

[124] "*qui nequaquam tribuniciis contenti ornamentis, insignia etiam summi imperii, fasces securesque, attractare ausi.*"

[125] Scipio slanders Albius in Atrius in two ways when he states that they had never owned a slave. Firstly, it speaks to their low-class background as only the poorest citizens were unable to afford least one slave, and, as a result, their poverty would have made them unsuitable for command. Secondly, although there were instances when common soldiers were elevated to command, this was done only after they had proved themselves in battle and gained the experience necessary to lead other men. Livy never states that Albius and Atrius received this command experience in battle, and the fact that they received no command training with their slaves at home made them doubly unsuitable to being given supreme command of an army.

that the Livy formed the clearest programmatic statement about the mutiny as a whole, when Scipio asked if he should call his troops citizens, soldiers, or enemies?[126]

The question fulfilled two of Livy's requirements: first, in questioning the exact allegiances of the troops, whether citizens or soldiers, Livy forced the reader to recall not only the mutiny of Caesar's troops in 47 B.C.E., but also the entire tumultuous period of the late Republic beginning with Marius' and Sulla's campaigns after the Social War. Secondly, where Caesar's utterance was engineered as a succinct call for their disbandment, Livy's embellishment of the phrase sustained the belief, held by many ancient writers, that the language of a work, both thematically and linguistically, reflected the present.[127] Therefore, when Scipio asked "how to speak to you for words and thoughts escape me. I do not even know what name I should call you" it spoke to the estrangement between words and their meanings which was extremely definitive of the late Republic (28.27.1).[128] Livy's further elaborations, drawn from Caesar's singular phrase drove this point home. As both soldiers and citizens they behaved in ways utterly opposed to their defined role. A citizen was now someone who rebelled against their country and a soldier was one who rejected both the command and the auspices and had broken their oaths.[129]

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[126] "*apud vos quem ad modum loquar nec consilium nec oratio suppeditat, quos ne quo nomine quidem appellare debeam scio. cives? qui a patria vestra descistis. An milites? qui imperium auspiciumque abnuistis, sacramenti religionem rupistis. hostes? Corpora, ora, vestitum, habitum civium adgnosco; facta, dicta, consilia, animos hostium video.*" – 28.27.3 – 4.

[127] Kraus and Woodman 1997, 70.

[128] *"tum silentio per praeconem facto ita coepit: 'nunquam mihi defuturam orationem qua exercitum meum adloquerer credidi, non quo uerba unquam potius quam res exercuerim' ".*

[129] " '*ciues? qui a patria uestra descistis. an milites? qui imperium auspiciumque abnuistis, sacramenti religionem rupistis. hostes? corpora, ora, uestitum, habitum ciuium adgnosco: facta, dicta,*

Scipio's inability to address his men, although he indeed did so for a great deal of time, bespoke the "lack of reliable rules and shared unconscious assumptions" which often "hobbled speech and action. And so immobility and stupor are frequently depicted as violence".[130] The soldiers behaved, and indeed, were described in a way much more characteristic of the late Republic, where a series of civil wars had blurred the moral and linguistic lines between a citizen and a soldier. Therefore, Livy's emphasis on the impiety of the soldier's actions as well as Scipio's question to the troops, whether to call them citizens or soldiers, recalled the situation of many commanders during the end of the Republic. This phrase then invited the external reader to read the subsequent events in the mutiny, as well as Scipio's speech, within this particular framework. From this, Livy developed a new more contemporary dialogue regarding the two major themes of the mutiny: bestowing the fasces and axes upon two unworthy men, which I briefly discussed previously, and the men's purported betrayal to the Carthaginian leaders Mandonius and Andobales – an action that would warrant a charge of high treason against Rome.

However, as Chrissanthos pointed out, it was unlikely that the soldiers actually sent information or men to the Carthaginian leaders, because the men were still at Sucro despite the time it took for Scipio to recover from his illness and to send envoys to the men.[131] However, through Scipio's speech Livy intertwined this fiction with his earlier censure against the troops – that they bestowed the *fasces* and axes on Albius and Atrius

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consilia, animos hostium uideo.'" – 28.27.4

[130] Barton 2001, 94.

[131] Chrissanthos 1997, 181; n. 69: "this was part of the pro-Scipionic tradition that made the men guilty of high treason against Rome, not just of voicing their grievances."

and provided information and allegiance to Rome's enemies, in an attempt to equalize

these two actions where the former held the same culpability as the latter.[132] Firstly,

Scipio proclaimed that the men had "the hearts of enemies. For what else did you wish or

hope for, nothing but the same as the Ilergetes and the Lacetani? Yet they followed

Mandonius and [Andobales], men of royal rank ... you gave the auspices and command to

Atrius the Umbrian and Albius the Calenian" (28.27.5).[133] Livy's phrasing implied that

the men aligned themselves with Mandonius and Indibilis because they had the same

goals as the Ilergetes and the Lacetani, who also followed Mandonius and Indibilis; for

such a serious charge, however, the causal sequence was rather ambiguous. What is not

ambiguous, for Livy's purposes, was their crime of proclaiming Atrius and Albius

commanders. It was this action that branded the men enemies to the Roman state, a

punishment, however, which was given when a force betrayed to an enemy. Thus, even

when their supposed allegiance to Mandonius and Indibilis was alluded to, Scipio still

placed more emphasis on the men's allegiance to Albius and Atrius.

     Firstly he cited the example of the tribune Decimus Vibellius who, as leader of the

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[132] Although not directly congruent with this idea Levene (2010) analyzes the subject of causation in Livy's Third Decade in detail. Within it he traces three different manners of causation within the narrative: temporal, moral, and narrative. The closest similarity in this instance lies in narrative causation where events were (335) "influenced by their proximity to certain other events in Livy's narrative rather than by more mundane historical connections ... where narratively juxtaposed but not necessarily chronologically adjacent events are nevertheless causally connected with one another." Therefore, although these two actions, the soldiers' acclamation of Albius and Atrius and their betrayal to Indibilis, are not causally based, it is quite clear that Livy freely directed his reader's beliefs about the causes of events by manipulating their place within the narrative in order to imply causation, even when none was present. In the same way Levene (350 – 352) points out that the misconduct of the troops during the mutiny appears to have been caused by their prior transgressions at Iliturgi and Astapa, even though it was a different force that sacked Iliturgi and Astapa from those who mutinied.

[133] "*animos hostium video. quid enim vos, nisi quod Ilergetes et Lacetani, aut optastis aliud aut sperastis? et illi tamen Mandonium atque Indibilem, regiae nobilitatis viros ... vos auspicium et imperium ad Umbrum Atrium et Calenum Albium detulistis.*"

garrison at Rhegium in the Pyrrhic War, along with the men expelled and massacred the

town's leading men as well as its citizens, and held the city for ten years. However, Scipio

went on to state that his actions were less criminal than the mutineers because they

followed the lawful tribune Vibellius, and not their own appointed Albius and Atrius.[134]

Immediately following this Scipio remarked that the mutiny of Vibellius' troops was less

terrible because they did not ally themselves to Pyrrhus and the Samnites – the enemies of

Rome, like his own men did with Mandonius and Indibilis.[135] Subsequently Scipio shifted

back to his first attack against the men and stated that "they, just as the Campanians held

Capua ... and the Mamertines held Messana in Sicily, would have permanently held

Rhegium, and it would not have been so great of an attack against Rome or its allies."[136]

As with the previous examples, Livy repeatedly intertwined the men's two actions, their

allegiance to Albius and Atrius and their purported betrayal to Rome's enemies

throughout Scipio's speech. However, in citing examples of other mutinous legions the

core issue became, as Livy intended, larger than their mutiny suggested in the beginning.

For their actions against Rome, Vibellius and his were scourged and beheaded.[137]

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[134] "*sed illi primum non Atrium Umbrum semilixam, nominis etiam abominandi ducem, sed D. Vibellium tribunum militum secuti sunt.*" – 28.28.4.

[135] "*nec cum Pyrrho nec cum Samnitibus aut Lucanis, hostibus populi Romani, se coniunxerunt: uos cum Mandonio et Indibili et consilia communicastis et arma consociaturi fuistis.*" 28.28.4 – 5.

[136] "*illi, sicut Campani Capuam ... ademptam, Mamertini in Sicilia Messanam, sic Regium habituri perpetuam sedem erant, nec populum Romanum nec socios populi Romani ultro lacessituri bello.*" – 28.28.5.

[137] App. 3.1; Dio 9.7 – 12; Liv. Per. 12, 15; Polyb. 1.7. Polybius states that there were only three hundred survivors of the Roman's counter-siege against Rhegium and only that number were scourged and beheaded. Contrastingly, in Livy's narrative the entire legion, four thousand men, was beheaded and scourged. This is also the exact number that Polybius records for Vibellius' entire force and exact numbers are not preserved in any of the other sources. This number, however, does seem probable based on a full

However, Livy is not clear once again as to which action required their deaths. The extant

sources imply that it was the men's occupation of the city, and the murder of its citizens,

that warranted their deaths.[138] However, none of the sources indicate that Scipio's men

made any attempt to capture or hold the relatively insignificant garrison at Sucro, nor was

there any wealth there similar to that which had detracted Vibellius and his men to hold

Rhegium.[139] Furthermore, even if death was the punishment for the murders of the

citizens of Rhegium, the mutiny at Sucro was bloodless, at least on the part of the

mutineers, as both Livy and Scipio acknowledge.[140] Indeed, the capital punishment of an

entire force was unprecedented before that time, as much as our remaining sources are

able to indicate.[141] As a result, unless Scipio merely wished to cite an example of the

harsh punishments given to mutinous troops, his extended digression on Vibellius' men's

occupation of Rhegium is somewhat out of place. However, this issue was again brought

up when he subsequently compared Vibellius' men actions to the Campanians' occupation

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force of four thousand people who numbers diminished after their assault against Rhegium, a ten year lapse, and then another siege by the Romans.

[138] "*regium quondam in praesidium missa legio interfectis per scelus principibus ciuitatis urbem opulentam per decem annos tenuit, propter quod facinus tota legio, milia hominum quattuor, in foro Romae securi percussi sunt.*" – 28.28.2. See above n. 137.

[139] Eckstein 1987, 255 n. 154: "the purpose of the large Sucro garrison was to keep watch on the allegedly 'pacified' peoples of the central coasts" cf. Livy 28.24.5 – 7

[140] Zon. 9.10; "*suam seditionem sine uolnere, sine sanguine fuisse nec ipsam atrocem nec atroci poena dignam*". – 28.25.14.

[141] Messer 120, 148 – 168 esp. 168. Although Messer acknowledges the fragmentary and legendary tone of the majority of the sources of this period, in tracing the quantitative instances of mutinies prior to this one he finds only one other instance where soldiers were executed because of a mutiny, and even then it was only for those men who were "betrayers of military discipline": the men who had lost their weapons or their standards and centurions who had abandoned their men. Furthermore, he finds that only some of the remaining men were killed through decimation and therefore such an exhaustive punishment, or indeed any punishment at all, was rare for this period as he points out that Vibellius' men were "less lucky than the majority of their predecessors."

of Capua as well as the Mamertines' of Sicily, both of whom were Rome's enemies, once more equating the unauthorized occupation of a town as an action done by Rome's enemies.[142] Although, Scipio attempted to dismiss this saying that "it would not have been so great of an attack against Rome or its allies" once again his meaning is unclear. It was implied that the occupation of Rhegium was less of an attack against the Roman people than, presumably, an allegiance with Mandonius and Indibilis. Strikingly, however, this is the last mention of the men's purported betrayal to the Carthaginians, as Livy's primary goal in Scipio's speech had been reached. By first alleging that his men had gone over to Mandonius and Indibilis they would have been accused of high treason against Rome just as Vibellius' illegal capture of Rhegium was an act of high treason. But indeed, the mutineer's actions were worse as they not only shared Rome's plans with the enemy but actively "captured" Sucro, presumably, on behalf of the Carthaginians.

Only in this framework does Scipio's final question to the men make sense when he finally asked if "Sucro was to be your domicile?" (28.28.7)[143] This was the final criminal outcome of their plan, which, for the most part, Scipio had placed into the mutineers' mouths. Their mutiny, which had begun over issues of pay, had now been transformed into an act of high treason against Rome, led by two illegally elected officials. Finally, from this betrayal came the final step: the men would not have stopped

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[142] Although the Mamertines sought protection from Rome and were granted it, despite their previous actions, this does not appear to be the goal of Scipio's example of this story. As Chaplin (2000, 32 – 40) surmises the same example could be used for multiple purposes depending on the context of its utterance, therefore the fact that the Mamertines were eventually helped by Rome is irrelevant for Scipio's argument.

[143] "*sucronemne vos domicilium habituri eratis*?"

with "capturing" Sucro, but would have tried to take over the entire Spanish province. Indeed, Scipio transformed the men's actions into an attack on the state and government, asking if his death would have destroyed all of Rome and the entire *res publica*.[144] From his hypothetical death, the mutineers' actions went even further and turned their mutiny into a civil war as his brother and lieutenants would set "army against army, generals against generals ... bearing arms against your country and against your fellow-citizens" (28.28.15).[145] This civil war would then end, just as Scipio's example of Coriolanus was meant to invoke, with the soldiers besieging Rome itself, another, quite obviously, "foul treason to the state" (28.29.1).[146] In tracing the line that Scipio painted through the mutiny it becomes quite clear that many of these fears were much more relevant to a man who had lived through the tumultuous late Republic, and had experienced the aftermath of these events, than the actual middle Republic he was writing about.

As I stated previously, much of the crisis of the late Republic was not an absence of *mores*, but that they had been maligned into an unrecognizable form.[147] Thus, Scipio's opening question to his troops as to what name he should call them imagines this same scenario where the troop's actions were incongruent with their definition. This deceit was

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[144] "*quid? si ego morerer, mecum exspiratura res publica, mecum casurum imperium populi Romani erat? ne istuc Iuppiter optimus maximus sirit, urbem auspicato dis auctoribus in aeternum conditam huic fragili et mortali corpori aequalem esse*" – 28.28.11.

[145] "*exercitus exercitui, an duces ducibus ... arma contra patriam contra ciues uestros ferretis*?"

[146] "*ad oppugnandam patriam impulit*".

[147] Galinsky 1996, 59: "instead of viewing the decline of *mores* simply as a decay of individual morals in the sense of corruption (though corruption certainly existed), it describes the phenomenon in terms of the 'disappearance of the substance of shared moral, cultural, and human efforts' and the lack of public spiritedness."

also revealed during the opening actions of the mutiny that were shrouded by the image

(*forma*) and the show (*speciem*) of a loyal camp (28.24.10 – 11).[148] However, in contrast

to this image of loyalty, the men were eventually blinded by their unfounded belief in

Scipio's death and openly proclaimed their sedition so that "what they had themselves

done would be less conspicuous" (28.24.16).[149] Livy's emphasis on visibility during this

scene, or lack thereof, was instructive of the decayed state of society at the end of the

Republic when "the words and signs of honor had become severed, abstracted from their

physical and emotional bases."[150] Therefore, the mutineers deliberately hid their rebellion

under the guise of an obedient camp, thereby rendering any other loyal camp a potential

place of *seditio* because of the duplicity of their actions. Indeed, the Republic, as

envisioned by Livy, only existed as a facade of what it had been, operating under the

same structures, but whose ideas and legalities, and even its very words, carried little or

none of the prior meaning.[151] Although Barton pointed out that "Roman culture (like all

cultures) had always been a necessary lie ... with the acceleration of Roman contacts and

conquests, its deceptive theatricality begins to be decried".[152] The gulf between image and

meaning and the double-speak of the *res publica* had gradually become apparent to

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[148] "*forma tamen Romanorum castrorum constabat una ea spe quod tribunos ex contagione furoris haud expertes seditionis defectionisque rati fore … ita speciem dicto parentium ultro sibi ipsi imperantes seruaban.*"

[149] "*minus insignia fore quae ipsi fecissent.*"

[150] Barton 2001, 91.

[151] Minyard 1985, 2: "only some words and the shells of old habits, which we call the institutions of the Republic and their articulation in law remained. The old structure of ideas, purposes, and values no longer offered what everyone accepted as the explanation of the nature of things."

[152] Barton 2001, 93

writers and the common people, and so both actively attempted to reinterpret the past in order to explain the would that they lived in.[153]

Livy was born into and wrote in a world where many of the Republican checks and balances had disappeared or were all but unrecognizable, and, as a result, his task was to recreate a political, but more importantly moral system, that was not unrecognizable.[154] Thus, Livy revisited the earlier ages of Rome in his history and re-imagined them in a way designed to speak to the contemporary issues at Rome. In this way Livy's work is deeply political,[155] however, it is not the "formal, institutionalized setting of government ... where people seek and discharge public offices, and compete to set and carry out particular policies or agendas."[156] Rather, it is the political as defined by Hammer as "the examination of the ideas and ideologies that emerged as social groups responded to each other and to larger structural issues and events."[157] Indeed, the nostalgia that runs rampant

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[153] Galinsky 1996, 42 – 79, esp. 58 – 77.

[154] Hammer 2008, 8: "in the wake of tumultuous violence, naked self-interest, hypocrisy, corruption, and terror, the markers lose both their objectivity and their salience ... the Romans do not respond to this loss of objectivity and salience though, by taking us to a place outside this world to imagine some better realm; rather, each of these Roman thinkers attempts to reanimate one's relationship to a political world that may have been forgotten or perhaps never have been known."

[155] Feldherr 1998, 3: "the importance of vision in the reception of his narrative relates particularly to his work's political function. By imitating the visual images that they behold in Livy's *monumentum* ... [it] provides the means through which the historian's literary representation of Rome's past becomes a part of the political life of the Republic in the present." See also Wallace-Hadrill (1997, 9 – 10) who argues for a similar political to Augustus' programme where "all Augustus' reforms, the 'political' ones too, are aimed at *mores* ... he was in the business of restoring ancestral *exempla*, supplemented by a few of his own."

[156] Roller (2009, 153) goes on to note that traditionally most scholars focused on the political nature of Livy's work on the basis of his view of Augustus and his political career at Rome see (154 – 155).

[157] Hammer 2008, 33. A similar definition is given by Roller in his analysis of *The Politics of Aristocratic Competition* (2009, 154) where "retaining the idea that 'politics' refers to a struggle for power though the assertion of claims against others, the broader understanding extends beyond government to embrace a variety of social arenas in which struggles occur, and strategies by which agents compete for

throughout his work is more complex than a simple yearning for the good old days of some undefined time and place in the past.[158] Rather, in recreating the past and forcing his contemporary readers to re-engage with it through these spectacles, Livy attempted to teach or indeed, re-teach the political and moral dimensions of a Republic that no longer existed. More specifically, Livy had lived through a series of commanders such as Sulla and Caesar, who, imbued with extra-ordinary commands and powers, had brought the society to the brink and beyond of civil war.[159] Their actions would them become characteristic of the late Republic, where there was an increased probability that soldiers would illegally acclaim their commanders as a dictator and follow them to civil war. This trend has often been summarized that late Republican armies operated only as extensions and vehicles for their commander's political and military goals. However, de Blois was correct to point out that this idea of the late Republican *Heeresgefolgschaft* too often simplified the relationship between soldiers and commanders, where the soldiers merely became an extension of their commanders because of their dependency on him.[160] Notwithstanding the fact that soldiers were now able to acclaim their own commander as dictator, what was more striking about this period, and something that these soldiers were

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advantage" and (172) "in this respect, Livy's history is 'political' not in the sense of being 'for' or 'against' Augustus, but in the sense that Livy, Augustus, and their elite contemporaries were collectively immersed in a world characterized by novel problems, constraints and possibilities."

[158] Hammer 200, 6: "rather than a *utopia* – a perfect nowhere – the Roman task can be better understood as reconstituting a *terra recognita* – an attempt to know again, to recognize, the world that we inhabit. Roman political thought becomes world-building, not as an 'architectonic vision' where ... one imagines a better world that exists outside the existing order, but as an attempt to restore our experience of the world and the contours of the political terrain"

[159] Roller 2009, 170: "the civil war years and preceding decade or two – the era in which Livy and Augustus came of age – featured aristocratic competition run amok".

[160] de Blois 2007, 373.

clearly cognisant of, was their own value to the general who was powerless to fulfil his aims without them. As a result, threats of sedition and, indeed, actual mutinies often stopped the actions of an illegal commander in his tracks. Therefore, a commander was forced to acquiesce to his soldiers' demands in order to recognize his own aims. This was the "independent-minded soldiery" that the writers of the 2nd century B.C.E. knew nothing about.[161] A writer such as Livy, who had experienced the aftermath of this epiphany, was then able to transform the mutiny at Sucro into an *exempla* speaking directly to these present day. One of the guiding threads that Livy drew through this mutiny was his emphasis on the seditious troops' appointment of Albius and Atrius to fulfil their own aims in the mutiny. However, Livy never makes clear how the election of Albius and Atrius gave the troops license to plunder the surrounding country; actions that the troops had already undertaken before their acclamation of Albius and Atrius.[162] Thus, moving back to Scipio's speech and the framework he introduced in it, this mutiny was about the critical impiety of the soldiers' election of Albius and Atrius, and the resultant capture of Sucro, which would have led to an attack against Rome in civil war. These actions would have had an obvious resemblance to the actions of Republican commanders such as Sulla and Caesar, whose troops had hailed them as their commander in a civil war.

Indeed, Scipio's first words to the mutineers were descriptive of the mutiny and its exemplarity as a whole. Scipio's inability to address the troops bespoke the separation

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[161] Chrissanthos 1997, 174.

[162] "*noctu quidam praedatum in agrum circa pacatum ierant*." – 28.24.8; cf. 28.24.13 when the troops acclaimed Albius and Atrius.

between definition and action at the end of the late Republic, and following this, his question: "I do not know even by what name I ought to address you" would have immediately brought to mind the mutiny of Julius Caesar's troops at Placentia in 49 B.C.E. Despite the fact that an account of this mutiny only survived in later histories, all were consistent in attributing the end of the mutiny to Caesar's address of them as *quirites* – citizens.[163] The earliest extant author who wrote about this was the poet-historian Lucan, who preserved an account of a mutiny that Caesar quelled by calling his men *quirites*, as opposed to *commilitones*.[164] Therefore, Livy, as well as his other contemporaries, must have been aware of Caesar's famous utterance and its echo here allowed Livy to pursue a dialogue much more relevant to his present day circumstances. Although the exact events do not precisely match up, the parallels between the extra-ordinary martial history of Caesar and Scipio and the latter's evoke of Caesar's future speech, implies that there is meant to be some greater connection between the two commanders. Indeed, it must not be forgotten that Caesar faced two mutinies during his careers firstly the mutiny at Placentia in 49 B.C.E., which, as their legal commander, Caesar was able to quell through decimation. The second and arguably more famous mutiny at Campania in 47 B.C.E., which Scipio invoked in his opening lines to his troops, occurred during a civil war, the alleged ending of Sucro mutiny.[165]

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[163] App. 2.93.388 – 396; Dio.42.52 – 55;

[164] Although his work is primarily regarded as a poem, it is the earliest surviving depiction of Caesar's mutiny. Therefore, the consistency between all these sources stretching across many years would, in turn, mean that Lucan preserved a true anecdote of the mutiny.

[165] Walsh 1961, 100 n.2: "it is difficult not to conclude that Livy's version of Scipio's speech to his

This was the major reason why Scipio repeatedly and consistently likened the soldiers' acclamation of Albius and Atrius as tantamount to an attack against Rome. It was to showcase the danger that an independent-minded soldiery could and did have on the world. Their election began the process whereby the soldiery hailed someone of their own, in order for them to achieve their own personal aims. Albius and Atrius, however, were not the force's actual commanders as Caesar and Sulla were, but they were, as Livy is explicit in saying, the leaders of the mutiny. Therefore, much of the mutiny was self-contained amongst the actual mutineers. Scipio was neither the person of their acclamation, nor did he play any part in availing himself to his troops as Albius and Atrius had done. Rather, his character was delineated in order to provide a model for the dangers inherent in the soldiers' independence. Indeed, Scipio himself became the quasi-personification of Rome, which would have been at the mercy of commanders such as Albius and Atrius. Thus, if the mutinous troops continued in their actions and engaged in civil war, the end result would have been the same – the destruction of the state.[166] Their assault, and indeed his death could have spelled the downfall of the Republic.

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disaffected troops is influenced by Caesar's words to the mutineers at Placentia."

[166] "*si ego morerer, mecum exspiratura res publica, mecum casurum imperium populi Romani erat?... meo unius funere elata esset res publica*?" – 28.28.6.

Chapter Two

Lucan and Caesar: Poetry of Madness and Disorder

The poet Lucan's epic poem *De Bellum Ciuile*,[167] chronicled the civil war, which

began in 49 B.C.E. and stopped incomplete, at the beginning of the Alexandrian War.

Within the extant text, Lucan also depicted a mutiny of Caesar's troops which occurred

during that time. As a historical epic, Lucan's poetical license has led some scholars to

question the veracity of the events depicted.[168] Although historicity is not in question in

my thesis, Lucan did appear to parallel the relevant portions of the Placentia mutiny in his

presentation of the events.[169] What is more important to my thesis, however, is Lucan's

depiction also reflected his thoughts and ideas about the whole of the civil war. His text,

and the mutiny within it, is best interpreted as an attempt to reflect the subversive nature

of civil wars by intentionally subverting literary convention. His unique stylistic

inventions were previously dismissed as: "absurd rhetoric, ludicrous exaggerations, ill-

timed philosophizing, ponderous misinformation".[170] A closer look at these elements,

however, allows for a greater appreciation for the poem's eccentricities and irregularities.

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[167] The exact title of the poem is still debated amongst scholars between *Bellum Ciuile* and *Pharsalia*. For a recent synthesis of the arguments see Ahl (1976 326 – 332). For the purpose of this thesis I have chosen to use the title *Bellum Civile* and all other instances of the term civil war refer to the conflict in general.

[168] Lintott 1971, 488 – 505, especially 497 – 498; Ahl 1976, 62 – 81; Fantham 1985 19 – 20; on the problem of Lucan's bias in his writings see Bartsch (2011, 303 – 316).

[169] Lucan combines the two most famous of Caesar's two mutinies together so that chronologically this mutiny is more consistent with his first mutiny at Placentia in 49 B.C.E. However, the occurrence of the term *quirites*, which Caesar used to quell the mutiny, recalls the second mutiny of his troops at Campania in 47 B.C.E. The reason behind this amalgamation is probably more stylistic as it would have rendered his work repetitive for Lucan to present two separate mutinies of Caesar's men.

[170] Hadas 1936,155.

It is precisely the appearance of devices, which prompted Ahl and the "post-Ahlian"[171] scholars to look for an explanation of these elements. These included a violation of boundaries, both physical and social, as well as a corruption of Stoic ideas and themes. Lucan included these tropes in order to verbally express the upheaval of the civil war as well as its resultant destruction of the world, in all its forms. All of these elements are readily found within the poem, as a whole, and their inclusion in the depiction of the mutiny at Placentia placed them into a historical context. There, they helped to unify trends that Lucan developed regarding the exact nature of the relationship between Caesar and his men as well as to explain the causes of the mutiny.

The first element that Lucan recalled in the mutiny was a depiction of boundaries, both physical and social, being broken. The most obvious example of this, and the action which began the civil war, was Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon river in the poem's first book. This invasion heralded the onset of civil war[172] and served as a fitting opening for the poem.[173] Civil war, for Lucan, was, in many ways, reduced to a violation of "the boundaries that constituted human society at Rome before the fall of the Republic".[174] These boundaries also helped to shape a Roman's definition of virtue and evil, and heroism and cowardice. In highlighting the violation of these boundaries Lucan twisted

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[171] Masters 1992, ix.

[172] Drogula 2007, 441.

[173] Caesar's civil war *Commentaries* begin not at the Rubicon, but with Caesar already stationed at Ravenna. For Lucan to begin his narrative before Caesar crossed the river allowed for him formulate the upcoming civil war as a "breaking of boundaries" in the most memorable way.

[174] Bartsch 1997, 13 – 14. These boundaries include those between Italy and her provinces, those between family members and friends from strangers and enemies, citizens from aliens, and patriots from traitors.

these definitions to their categorical opposite wherein heroism became a crime and of "legality conferred on crime" (1.2).[175] Indeed, this preoccupation with boundaries and their destruction is demonstrated by Masters as evidence of Lucan's reluctance to treat the forthcoming *unspeakable* acts of the poem. [176] Indeed, where the role of previous poets was to sing of glorious events, Lucan's knowledge of the forthcoming disastrous events compelled him to create additional "literary and artificial" barriers, delaying the inevitable actions of Caesar and the other actors of the poem.[177] In crossing the boundary between Italy and Gaul, Caesar broke the boundaries between soldiers and their commander, between *quirites* and *milites*, and between war and peace.

This disruption of boundaries is then reiterated in Book Five during Lucan's opening description of the mutiny. He was explicit in prefacing the mutiny as occurring "within the tents of the confines of the camp" (5.242).[178] Other authors, in contrast, depicted mutinies as arising from amongst the troops, rather than the camp which held them.[179] Lucan's depiction of the mutiny, however, allowed him to make a contrast

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[175] "*iusque datum sceleri*"; Hömke (2010, 91) states that "the replacement of the ethical parameters *ius* and *uirtus* by *nefas* and *crimen*, applies ... to the *bella plus quam ciuilia*".

[176] Masters 1992, 1-5. In tracing instances of violation of boundaries in the first book of the *Bellum Civile*, aside from the first crossing of the river, he finds three other instances where Lucan describes Caesar violating boundaries including: breaking the boundaries of conventional military practice, boundaries of time, and those of resistance by his troops.

[177] Feeney 1991, 277; Masters 1992, 6; Henderson 1998, 133 – 134.

[178] "*intra castrorum ... tentoria*".

[179] Ap. *B.C.* 2.92 "ὡς δ᾽ ἦλθεν ... ἑτέρα δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἀνίστατο τοῦ στρατοῦ"; Dio 42.52 "τὰ δὲ δὴ στρατόπεδα οὐχ ἡσυχῇ αὐτὸν ἐτάραξε: πολλὰ γὰρ λήψεσθαι ἐλπίσαντες, καὶ εὑρόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἀξίας οὐκ ἐλάττω τῆς δὲ προσδοκίας καταδεέστερα, ἐθορύβησαν"; Suet. *Iul*. 69 "*Seditionem per decem annos Gallicis bellis nullam omnino mouerunt, ciuilibus aliquas, sed ut celeriter ad officium redierint, nec tam indulgentia ducis quam auctoritate*"; 70 "*decimanos autem Romae cum ingentibus minis summoque etiam urbis*

between the dangers and violence inherent to a commander outside a camp's walls, and the supposed safety within the walls. Just as a commander should be free of danger within the walls of his camp, he should also expect obedience and safety from his troops, as opposed to violence and disloyalty. In contrast, during the mutiny, Caesar was at risk of violence and disloyalty within the camp's walls and from his own troops. These themes of loyalty and disloyalty, and the tension between these bonds, are also traced throughout the poem. The Rubicon River was the physical boundary where a soldier's bond of loyalty, formed upon recruitment, should have dissolved. During recruitment each soldier swore the *sacramentum militare* (hereafter *sacramentum*) declaring their loyalty to their commander. However, elements of this *sacramentum*, and its perversion by Laelius in Book One, as well as its breach during the mutiny in the fifth book, demonstrated the paradox inherent in abiding by bonds of loyalty during a civil war.

According to Chrissanthos, the Roman definition of a mutiny was intimately connected with the *sacramentum*. It was one of the oaths of loyalty sworn by the troops to their commander.[180] The act of swearing marked the troops' shift from a citizen and into soldier and, in turn, made them subject to the laws and discipline of the military.[181] Any breach of the particulars of this oath was subsequently tantamount to a mutiny, or a

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periculo missionem et praemia flagitantes."

[180] The other being the *ius iurandum*. For its references in writing see Liv. 22.38; Front. 4.1.3. The difference between the two oaths, and when they were sworn, is still a subject of debate for modern scholars. However, the accepted terminology referencing the oath of loyalty sworn by the troops is to call it a *sacramentum*, whether referring to the older *sacramentum* or the newer *ius iurandum*. This comprehensive term is supported by Caesar's use of the term *sacramentum* when referring to the *ius iurandum* see *Bel. Civ.* 1.23.5. "*milites Domitianos sacramentum apud se dicere iubet atque eo die castra movet iustumque iter conficit vii omnino dies ad Corfinium commoratus.*"

[181] Chrissanthos 1999, 8.

seditio, amongst ancient authors.[182] Some scholars have challenged the use of the term

mutiny for those acts occurring during the course of a civil war.[183] It appears, however,

that the legitimacy of a commander's political decisions did not lessen the obligation of

his soldiers to follow his orders. Thus mutinies against Caesar during the civil war were

described as *seditiones*.[184] Lucan was aware of the power of the *sacramentum* and its

impact upon *seditio*; this is apparent in the actions and dialogue of Caesar and his troops

after crossing the Rubicon. After their crossing, wherein their previous bonds of loyalty

should have been dissolved, Caesar asked his troops to once again follow him to war.

Lucan developed the scene that followed into a corruption of the typical swearing of the

sacramentum. Firstly, Caesar called the men to the standards (*conuocat armatos extemplo*

ad signa maniplos 1.296) and the soldier Laelius answered his call to follow him to civil

war. During the actual swearing of the *sacramentum*, troops were called to assemble by

their commander, usually the consul.[185] Then, out of all the soldiers, one who was most-

suitable (ἐπιτηδειότατον) swore the oath to the commander. [186] Laelius, described as

"having the office at that time of first centurion and bearing the signifier of his deserved

gift, the garland of oak-leaves a reward given for saving the life of a fellow-citizen" (356

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[182] Chrissanthos 1999, 11.

[183] E.g. Gruen 1974, 373.

[184] Suet. *Caes*. 69 "*Seditionem per ... civilibus aliquas, sed ut celeriter ad officium redierint*"; 70 "*ac sic quoque seditiosissimum quemque et praedae et agri destinati tertia parte multavit*"; Front. *Strategemata*. 1.9.4. C. "*Caesar, cum quaedam legiones eius seditionem movissent*"; Front. *Strategemata*. 4.5.2. "*C. Caesar, seditione in tumultu civilium armorum facta*."

[185] Polyb. 6.19.5 "ἐν ᾗ δεήσει παραγενέσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις Ῥωμαίους ἅπαντας."

[186] Polyb. 6.21.2. The typical swearing of the oath had the "most-suitable" man first swear the oath.

– 358), was aptly presented for Lucan's purposes.[187] Laelius' oath to Caesar, however, destroyed any semblance to the actual *sacramentum* as he pledged to kill his brother (376), parent (376), pregnant wife (377), rob and burn the temples of the gods (379), and finally to besiege and to breach the walls of Rome herself (383-386), all under Caesar's command. Following this blasphemous oath, "all the cohorts assented as one" (386).[188] Lucan once again modelled the troop's reactions on the standard oath, where, following the first man, all those following said they would do the same as the first.[189] It was this twisted parody of the *sacramentum* and the contradictions of loyalty that could occur during a civil war, which Lucan explored throughout the *Bellum Civile*.

Caesar's first act in crossing the Rubicon should have terminated his authority over his troops. However, after crossing this boundary the soldiers maintained their loyalty to Caesar by the twisted *sacramentum* that they pledged. Its full impact was expressed during the later mutiny with the soldiers' insight that:

> nec fas nec uincula iuris
> hoc audere uetant: Rheni mihi Caesar in undis
> dux erat, hic socius; facinus quos inquinat aequat.[190]

> Neither divine law nor the bounds of oath
> prevent this deed: on the waters of the Rhine Caesar
> was my commander, here my comrade; crime makes equal that which it stains.

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[187] "*summi tum munera pili ... emeritique gerens insignia doni / seruati ciuis referentem praemia quercum*". Laelius' rank of first centurion of the legion placed him in a position of authority over the troops. Furthermore his decoration of the *corona civica* placed him in the ideal position – both factually and ironically – for swearing the oath.

[188] "*cunctae simul adsensere cohortes*".

[189] Polyb. 6.21.3.

[190] Luc. 5.288 – 290.

Barratt sees the juxtaposition of *fas* and *ius* as representative of the two different oaths of

loyalty sworn by the troops, the *sacramentum* and the *ius iurandum.*[191] As previously

stated, however, such a distinction went unacknowledged by ancient authors, and as a

result this type of distinction seems suspect. A juxtaposition which is warranted was

between the divine and human spheres of law which *fas* and *ius* entail. With this added

detail, Lucan again reinforced the idea that no bonds of laws prevented their mutiny, as

they shed them all in crossing the Rubicon. The troops mistakenly believed, however, that

"on the waters of the Rhine / Caesar was my commander, here my ally" (5.289 – 290).[192]

Their pledge upon crossing the Rubicon reaffirmed their hold under Caesar's command,

although not under sacrosanct bounds of law. As Lucan succinctly placed in the troops'

mouths, neither *fas* nor *ius* held them. Rather, although they professed to be Caesar's

equal, they were still held by their fervent and manic devotion to him.[193] Their twisted

devotion to him resulted from the corrupted *sacramentum* that they swore.

This perversion of their bonds of loyalty also fostered the irrational desire for

spoils, which had pushed the troops to mutiny. The soldiers professed their causes for

rebellion as: their old and weakened bodies (274 – 277), as well as their apparent disgust

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[191] Barratt 1979, 94.

[192] "*Rheni mihi Caesar in undis / dux erat, hic socius*". My summation differs from Ahl (1976, 203) who summarizes that "while Caesar was their legal commander in Gaul, he is their equal in Italy, since they are all present illegally". Rather, the pledge which Laelius and the others swore to Caesar in the first chapter still holds true during the mutiny. Although the soldiers are stationed illegally during the mutiny, their pledge still provides their assurances and loyalty to Caesar as their "legal" commander.

[193] Leigh (1997) fittingly entitles the chapter discussing this loyalty to Caesar as *The Crazy Gang* and sees the "deep loyalty of the centurions to their general and their desire to fight in his sight" (191) as described in Caesar's *Commentaries*, as only a small leap to the extreme acts of loyalty seen by Caesar's centurions in the *Bellum Civile*. These include the suicide of Vulteius and his men during the siege at Illyria as well as, most strikingly, the character of Scaeva and his twisted *aristeia* at Pharsalus.

at Caesar's insatiable desire for warfare (261 – 269). Lucan preceded these appeals,

however, with their more alarming reason that it was in search of greater prizes that the

troops rebelled – "or was it a desire for greater booty / that doomed their cause and

leader" (246 – 247).[194] Following their appeal, Lucan confirmed that it was this desire for

spoils, which had prompted the mutiny, as they were the terms that Caesar later granted

> non illis urbes spoliandaque templa negasset
> Tarpeiamque Iouis sedem matresque senatus
> passurasque infanda nurus.[195]

> He would not have refused them Rome and temples to be plundered
> and Jupiter's Tarpeian seat and the Senate's mothers and daughters
> to suffer the unspeakable.

This duplicity between the troops stated cause of their mutiny and the actual cause is

further revealed when the troops appealed to Caesar *ad mortem dimitte senes*, recalling

the injured bodies that had caused the mutiny. Lucan continued that their pleading was

inproba (277) – defined as a "persistent lack of regard for others in going beyond the

bounds of what is fair and right",[196] their plea to be dismissed and be allowed to die in old

age does not seem such an outrageous plea. Rather, it was their criminal desire for spoils

and to plunder Rome to achieve these spoils, which was the actual basis of their plea.

It was only through Caesar's acquiescence that they would be able to gain the

plunder that they hoped for in their mutiny and consequently end the mutiny. Their

reliance upon Caesar, however, was not totally one-sided, as Lucan confirmed that:

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[194] "*seu, praemia miles / dum maiora petit, damnat causamque ducemque.*"

[195] Luc. 5.305 – 307.

[196] Barratt 1979, 277.

> tot raptis truncus manibus gladioque relictus
> paene suo, qui tot gentis in bella trahebat,
> scit non esse ducis strictos sed militis enses[197]
>
> Maimed by the loss of so many hands and swords and forsaken
> Almost to his own, the one who dragged so many nations into war,
> Knew the unsheathed swords are not the general's but the soldier's

Caesar was at the mercy of his soldiers and it was their swords which drove the war not his own. The soldiers were his "hands", without which, he would be unable to wage his war. This depiction of the soldiers as Caesar's hands, symbolizing his reliance on them, continued throughout the mutiny when Lucan asked: "when those hands had been nearly faithful / through so many wars were at last filled with blood / were set to forsake their commander" (242 – 244)[198] and "does it not shame you Caesar that you alone find pleasure in the war / now damned by your hands" (310 – 311).[199] With their mutiny, the soldiers had, quite literally, removed Caesar's hands and, as a result, he was unable to carry out his civil war plans. The soldiers realized that without them, Caesar was unable to wage war. In declaring "he must know that we are his destiny" (293),[200] the soldiers acknowledged that they were no longer reliant upon Caesar to fulfil their *fatum*; he was subject to their whims. In the same way, Caesar's only fear was that the troops would realize the impiety of their greed, which had prompted the mutiny, and abandon him, thwarting his civil war plans:

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[197] Luc. 5.252 – 254.

[198] "*cum paene fideles / per tot bella manus satiatae sanguine tandem / destituere ducem.*"

[199] "*non pudet … Caesar, soli tibi bella placere / iam manibus damnata tuis.*"

[200] "*nos fatum sciat esse suum*".

> uult omnia certe
> a se saeua peti, uult praemia Martis amari;
> militis indomiti tantum mens sana timetur.[201]

> He wants them to demand war from him
> all atrocities, without a doubt, to love the prizes of war;
> He fears only the sound mind of the untamed troops.

Their twisted *sacramentum*, driven by greed, which Laelius and the other soldiers pledged, was all that held them to Caesar and, without them, he had nothing. Juxtaposing these two ideas, the army for Caesar was more than a way to achieve his goals: the possession and leadership of an army was intrinsic to Caesar's identity just as one's "hands" were unable to be removed from their body.[202]

The preceding lines bring a final paradox to this scene, culminating in the reader's inability to ascertain any notion of right and wrong within civil war. In mutinying, the troops broke their oath to Caesar and to follow his commands, but, after crossing the Rubicon, there should have been no more bonds between a commander and his troops, they should be *socii* as the troops proclaimed. However, they were bound by the promises which Laelius and the other soldiers confirmed, to follow and to sack Rome under Caesar's command. This duty and their loyalty, however twisted, heralded their place as a soldier, which was subsequently broken in their mutiny. In rejecting Caesar, and refusing to attack Rome Lucan prayed that "when piety and loyalty / desert and the only remaining

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[201] Luc. 5.307 – 309.

[202] Green (2010, 169) notes the similarities between Caesar and Achilles as two warriors known for their singular prowess and their "world-engulfing individuality". Thus in scorning his troops "*vadite meque meis ad bella relinquite fatis / inuenient haec arma manus, vobisque repulsis / tot reddet Fortuna viros quot tela vacabunt*" Caesar confirms his need for no one. And, by extension, the troops, who are themselves an extension of Caesar's sense of self, could not be allowed to mutiny as then the identity of Caesar would be lost.

hope (*spes*) is in wicked deeds / let discord (*discordia*) bring an end to civil war" (297 –

299).[203] For Lucan, the only *spes* to end this madness of civil war was to allow the troops

to continue their mutiny, which his appeal affirmed. Its end was again prayed to by Lucan

when he wrote, "when the troops are angered (*irato*) Caesar / there will be peace" (294 –

295).[204] However, this was the antithesis of what one would expect to end a civil war.

Indeed, the *discordia* and *irato* of the troops was all that could end the civil war, and so

Lucan paradoxically prayed for these troops to continue their mutiny. For Lucan the

sacrilege of mutiny was indeed preferable to the further violence which Caesar would be

robbed of without the benefit of his "hands".

Finally, Lucan recalled Caesar's famous utterance of *quirites* in his poem, which,

according to the historical record, quelled the mutiny. However, he added another layer to

this rebuke, which once more hearkened back to Laelius' perverted oath of loyalty to

Caesar; he stated that "he is no fellow citizen (*civis*) of mine, against whom I hear your

trumpet Caesar" (1.373 – 374).[205] The *corona civica*, which Laelius was first introduced

as wearing, now took on a disturbing aspect as a man, praised for having saved the life of

a citizen, now pledged all *cives* to be his enemy. [206] Because of this transference, from

saving a fellow citizen to pledging their deaths as enemies of Caesar, the admonishment

Caesar gave to his troops was particularly apt. Scholars have cited the effectiveness of

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[203] "*quando pietasque fidesque / destituunt moresque malos sperare relictum est / finem civili faciat discordia bello.*"

[204] "*irato milite Caesar / pax erit.*"

[205] "*nec civis mens est in quem tua classica, Caesar / audiero.*"

[206] Ahl (1976, 201) points out the grim irony of Laelius' decorations.

Caesar's phrase stemming from the fact that in naming them *quirites*, he had effectively

disbanded the troops.[207] Also, coming from a general who was more want to call his

troops *commilitones* or by their names,[208] such a designation would have been highly

effective.[209] Lucan expanded upon Caesar's historic singular use of the phrase to produce

a two-fold rebuke of the troops: "you contemptible crowd, old men, exhausted by blood /

will sink to the level of those Roman civilians and will now see us triumphant"(333 –

334),[210] and (357 – 358) "depart from the camp / surrender our standards to men you

cowardly civilians".[211] In both these instances, Leigh remarks, Lucan constructs the text

so that "the soldiers are mocked as citizens in the particular sense of being civilians".[212]

Rather than merely *cives*, as opposed to the *milites* or *commilitones* of their previous rank,

the soldiers now took the place of Caesar's enemies. They were transformed into the *cives*

of Rome, whom Laelius had previously pledged to kill on behalf of Caesar. Those Roman

men who, by virtue of their manic devotion to Caesar, were willing to sack Rome and kill

its inhabitants, now took their place. Thus, Lucan again revisits the paradox inherent in

the loyalties of troops during a civil war. These opposing sentiments, on the morality of

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[207] Palmer 1970, 157: "the appellation of Quirites may have released the soldiers from their military oath which they had subordinated their public rights to military discipline."

[208] Suet. *Iul*. 67.2; Ap. *B.C.* 2.13.93; Caes. *B.G.* 5.44.1.

[209] Viewing this event from a psychological perspective, Cheshire (1976, 74) states that it was "the *change* of wording, as much as the word itself, which did the trick: what he did *not* say, as much as what he did say".

[210] "*uos despecta, senes, exhaustaque sanguine turba / cernetis nostros iam plebs Romana triumphos*."

[211] "*discedite castris / tradite nostra uiris ignaui signa Quirites*."

[212] Leigh 1997, 207.

civil war and the actions of its combatants, are also present in the Stoic overtones of the poem. Although concepts of Stoicism in Lucan have been debated and expanded upon by multiple authors, I do not follow those who see Cato, and other elements of Lucan's work, as categorically Stoic in nature.[213]

The very essence of Lucan's *Bellum Civile* is one of turmoil, dissent and outright contradiction. Lucan's programmatic subversion of an epic's typical language, style, and structure render any linear depiction of these elements suspect.[214] Therefore, his refuge to an "all-pervasive Stoic world Logos and the relevant natural philosophy" is at odds with his attempts to refer to a universe constantly in opposition.[215] At its crux, regarding Stoic elements in Lucan, Sklénăr posits that "Lucan accepts – for the purpose of destroying Stoicism – the Stoic position".[216] Therefore, the elements of Stoic theory that define and characterize the universe, including the theory of *ekpyrosis*, i.e., the belief in the periodic destruction of the universe, have strong parallels to the depiction of the universe and its destruction in the first book. However, to once again reiterate his belief in the utter chaos of civil war, Lucan takes these elements and transformers them almost beyond recognition in order to substantiate his belief.[217]

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[213] Marti 1945; George 1988; George 1991; Behr 2007; Fraenkel 2010; Wiener 2010.

[214] Batinski (1992) discusses Lucan's catalogue of Caesar's troops as congruent with descriptions of barbarians, as opposed to Roman troops, which places them on the level of enemies of Rome. Gorman (2001) and Hömke (2010) discuss the *aristeia* that were typical of epics and how Lucan's conscious rendering of his heroes, or lack thereof, once more distances his epic from any typical renderings of heroes.

[215] Fraenkel 2010, 34.

[216] Sklénăr 2003, 9.

[217] This summary of the relevant portions of various Stoic authors and their impact and relevance to

> inuida fatorum series summisque negatum
> stare diu nimioque graues sub pondere lapsus
> nec se Roma ferens. sic, cum conpage soluta
> saecula tot mundi suprema coegerit hora
> antiquum repetens iterum chaos, [omnia mixtis
> sidera sideribus concurrent,] ignea pontum
> astra petent, tellus extendere litora nolet
> excutietque fretum, fratri contraria Phoebe
> ibit et obliquum bigas agitare per orbem
> indignata diem poscet sibi, *totaque discors*
> *machina diuolsi turbabit foedera mundi*.[218]

> It was the envious chain of destiny, impossibility of the very high
> standing long, huge collapses under to much weight
> Rome's inability to bear herself. So, when the final hour
> brings to an end the long ages of the universe, its structure dissolved
> reverting to primeval chaos, then fiery stars will
> into the sea, the earth will be unwilling to stretch flat her shores
> and will shake the water off, Phoebe will confront
> her brother for herself and demand the day, resentful
> of driving her chariot along its slanting orbit, and the whole
> discordant mechanism of the universe torn apart will disrupt its own laws.

The Stoic cosmology was driven by *logos* entwining all its elements of reason, order, and an "internal tension" between its elements. Consequently, when the Stoic poet Manilius discusses in his *Astronomica* that the divine nature of the universe "dispensed mutual bonds (*foedera*) between all of its parts" (1.252),[219] the *foedera* he speaks of are the bonds between these elements of the universe. Furthermore, during this time of dissolution, the bonds that held it in place were broken, the ramifications of which are described in the preceding passage. This dissolution of bonds which led to the destruction of the universe echoed, once more, the violation of boundaries that Lucan shaped throughout the *Bellum*

Lucan are taken from Lapidge's (2010) article on these concepts.

[218] Luc. 1. 70 – 80.

[219] "*mutuaque in cunctas dispensat foedera partes.*"

Civile. The destruction of the universe with all its boundaries and rationalities is heralded

by the *totaque discors / machina diuolsi turbabit foedera mundi*. This *discors machina*,

and its appearance, which heralded the destruction of the universe, is reiterated a few

lines later, in the *concordia discors* (1.97) of the First Triumvirate.[220]

Where previous imperial poets spoke of *concordia* between nature and the

systems of government,[221] the civil war, for Lucan, was instigated by discord within the

Triumvirate, which in turn destroyed this *concordia*. This notion is also found within

Stoic cosmology in the writings of Seneca, whose depiction of the dissolution of the

universe has definite resonances with the opening passage of Lucan. Seneca vividly wrote

that "with this sudden confusion of the universe let the stars collide with stars and when

the divine harmony (*concordia*) of the universe is destroyed let it fall into ruin ... let all

things be taken by fire and thereon let sluggish night overtake the fires and let a boundless

abyss consume so many deities".[222] When the *concordia* of the universe was disrupted

there was a resultant destruction of the universe. And so, the *concordia discors* of the

Triumvirate was the *discors machine*, which was tantamount to the destruction of the

universe under this Stoic doctrine. The juxtaposition of *concordia discors* allows for the

harmonious bonds between elements of the universe to be defeated by the *discors*

machina of the Triumvirate. However, this eventuality in Stoic doctrine is not the

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[220] "*exiguum dominos commisit asylum / temporis angusti mansit concordia discors / paxque fuit non sponte ducum*".

[221] Norbrook (1999, 33) cites the poetry of Virgil and Horace.

[222] Sen. *Ben*. 6.22.1. "*subita confusione rerum sidera sideribus incurrant, et rupta rerum concordia in ruinam divina labantur ... ignis cuncta possideat, quem deinde pigra nox occupet, et profund a vorago tot deos sorbeat.*"

apocalyptic scenario as described by Lucan. Rather, this destruction of the universe was part of the "cycle of renewal" where the destroying fires planted the seeds for the creation of the new universe.[223] There is no such hope under Lucan, however, who once more distorts the normal concept of *ekpyrosis*, which his readers would have been familiar with, and turns it into a doomsday scenario brought about by the civil war. Therefore, according to Lucan, from this civil war, which would bring utter destruction to the state as well as the cosmos, there was no hope of reparation.

These elements of destruction are again described in the first book by the astrologist Figulus, who surmises the movements of the universe and the stars, recalling the *mundus* and the *sidera* of the aforementioned passage:

> "aut hic errat" ait "nulla cum lege per aeuum
> *mundus* et incerto discurrunt *sidera* motu,
> aut, si fata mouent, urbi generique paratur
> humano matura ***lues***."[224]

> "either this *universe* wanders lawless through time
> and the *stars* roam with uncertain movements,
> or, if Fate affects, imminent ***destruction*** is prepared
> for Rome and humankind."

The use of the word *lues* in the preceding passage helps to unify this destruction with the other elements Lucan used to explain this destruction. Defined as "that which is not bound" it is dissolution of boundaries, which the poem began with, and continually resonated with, that would be the cause of this destruction. This type of termination

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[223] In this I follow Sklénăr (2003) who contradicts Lapidge's (2010) attempt to apply this lack of renewal to Stoic doctrines. Much in the same way as I spoke previously, one is unable to apply any coherent doctrine to Lucan's work, as he deliberately shaped the work to subvert and destroy all the traditional measures of epic and thought within the *Bellum Civile*.

[224] Luc. 1.642 – 645.

spelled the destruction of the city of Rome, as well as humanity and the world. This imminent destruction was referred to, and paradoxically wished for, previously, during the mutiny, when Lucan proclaimed to let discord bring an end to civil war. The cataclysm of *discors* was preferable as it heralded the mutiny, which would, in turn, stop the destruction of Rome and the world by this Civil War. Utter destruction by itself took the upper hand in comparison to this destruction as a result of civil war. As Sklénăr points out, the use of future verbs within Lucan's text elevates this eventuality of destruction to a certainty "that must and will occur."[225] The appeals that Lucan makes throughout the text, and more specifically during the mutiny, are all formed in the future tense. Thus, when he states that *irato milite Caesar / pax erit*, it is formulated that it was somehow possible for Lucan to change the fixed past events of the war. Behr termed this an "appeal to futurity",[226] i.e., that this annihilation of the universe, heralded in the introduction of the poem with the *concordia discors* of the Triumvirate, could somehow be combated by Lucan vainly attempting to change the past.

Tied up in the elements of destruction by means of a cosmological catastrophe, described by Figulus, was the explicit tension between *incerto motu* and *fata*. As stated previously, the lack of Homeric gods within Lucan's epic required that some other mechanism for these events must be pronounced. Yet, throughout the poem, the inability to articulate whether the randomness or Fate was behind the civil war is repeatedly found where depictions of *fatum/fata, fortuna/fors,* and *dei/superi* are used almost

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[225] Sklénăr 2003, 5.

[226] Behr 2007, 44.

interchangeably.[227] This is in direct contrast to the Stoic conception of *fatum*, wherein

fatum, *casus*, *fortuna*, and *natura* depict the order inherit within the universe and can be

readily used in exchange for the terminology of the divinity inseparable from nature and

reason (*logos*).[228] Lucan forced these elements to have an equal effect upon each other in

placing them almost directly adjacent to their antithesis. This arrangement invalidated one

term as it was counterbalanced, and outright refuted by another term within its vicinity.

Much in the same way the *ekpyrosis* was pushed into a state where no Stoic would

recognize the nihilistic end, the structure of the universe, which, while it still stood, was

nullified by the presentation of terms directly contrary to those which make up the

universe.[229] Through these juxtapositions, Lucan highlighted, once again, the complete

anarchy of the civil war. He made it impossible to have a cohesive doctrine of the

universe and the elements which made it up. The causes of the civil war, and the actions

of the actors within it, were thrown into confusion by his language. His refusal to rely on

any conventional or coherent explanation or driving force in the narrative also helps to

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[227] Feeney 1991, 280.

[228] Sklénăr 2003, 5.

[229] The beginning of the mutiny is thus prefaced by the gods' intervention in derailing the course of Caesar's destiny ("*cum prope fatorum tantos per prospera cursus / auertere dei*" – 5.239 – 240). The achievements of the troops are labelled Fortune, but the Fate of Caesar is suspect to the whims of the soldiery, although it is his hope that he is granted it from the gods ("*quidquid gerimus fortuna uocatur / nos fatum sciat esse suum. licet omne deorum / obsequium speres*" – 5.292 – 294). Caesar desires to achieve his own Fate and commit to his own fortunes ("*fata sed in praeceps solitus demittere Caesar / fortunamque suam per summa pericula gaudens / exercere uenit*" – 5.301 – 333). Caesar once more harangues his troops to leave as Fortune will give him more soldiers to fulfil his Fate ("*uadite meque meis ad bella relinquite fatis / inuenient haec arma manus, uobisque repulsis / tot reddet Fortuna uiros quot tela uacabunt*" – 5.325 – 327). The safety and death of his soldiers are presided by an intertwined Fate and the gods ("*numquam sic cura deorum / se premet, ut uestrae morti uestraeque saluti / fata uacent*" – 5.340 – 342). And, finally, the gods and Fortune conspire to assist Caesar in his war by removing his mutinous soldiers ("*sunt ista profecto / curae castra deis, qui me committere tantis / non nisi mutato uoluerunt milite bellis / heu, quantum Fortuna umeris iam pondere fessis / amolitur onus*" – 5.351 – 355).

explain the complete lack of conventional gods within the epic.[230] Where gods were previously the prime movers of epics, now Lucan posited a conflagration of theology and Stoicism. His reliance, however, on this foundation of Stoicism, allowed for him to introduce the gods with the express purpose of refuting Stoic ideals.

The unique formulations of Lucan throughout his epic were his means to verbally express the utter chaos of civil war. For Lucan, civil war heralded the destruction of the world and the universe. This destruction began when those bonds which held the universe together broke, just as those bonds and boundaries, throughout the text, were also continually broken. These violations forced any coherent explanation of characters, motivations and relationships within the narrative to be twisted almost beyond recognition. All of these elements foreshadow their reappearance within the mutiny narrative in Lucan's fifth book. There, those issues which Lucan brought up in the first book became a driving force in the development of the narrative. The twisted bonds between Caesar and his men resulted in the mutiny, with the soldiers attempting to force their desires upon an unwilling Caesar. However, as their mutiny was the only thing stopping Caesar's civil war plans, Lucan paradoxically wished for the mutiny to continue, if only in a vain attempt to stop the civil war and its resultant destruction of the universe.

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[230] Fraenkel 2010, 34. Homeric gods had become obsolete and tedious within the Neronian world and the educated audience of Lucan's work would have appreciated this reliance on Stoic thought as opposed to divine intervention. For a full treatment of the gods, or lack thereof, within Lucan see Feeney (1991, esp. 250 – 312).

Chapter Three

Mutiny in Pannonia and the Rhine: Beginning or Cause of 69 C.E.?

One of the only surviving Imperial historians, Tacitus, also delineated a series of mutinies in his two major historical works: the *Annals* and the *Histories*. The *Annals*, written after his *Dialogues* and the *Agricola*, covered from the death of Augustus and the acclamation of Tiberius as emperor, down to, presumably, the death of Nero in 68 C.E.[231] The latter began on January 1st 69 C.E., which preserved the annalistic format of other historical works,[232] and covered down to the assassination of Domitian in 96 C.E.[233] The portion of the work which survives covers the so-called "year of the four emperors" and its breadth has allowed contemporary scholars to retain a detailed delineation of this tumultuous period in Rome's history. Despite the sequential nature of these two works, however, the *Histories* was actually written first, and, disregarding his promises to write about his own time period for his second work, Tacitus moved further back from his own

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[231] Martin 1981, 104.

[232] Martin (1981, 68) lists other reasons as to why Tacitus chose to begin the *Histories* at the beginning of the consular year such as: a promise, although not immediately fulfilled, to arouse the reader's interest by beginning in *media res*, also, within a fifteen days from the beginning of the year the emperor Galba is assassinated, Otho is hailed as his successor and the rival emperor Vitellius is acclaimed in Germany; these events, given in such close succession, give an immediate dramatic impact to the beginning of the work. Syme (1958, 1 – 2), however, points out that Tacitus spent very little time reviewing the last decade of Augustus' reign before opening the *Annals*, an oversight that would come to have many disadvantages to the work as a whole, the largest being that many persons and issues brought up in the *Annals* were caused by events, or began prior to 14 C.E.

[233] Only four and a quarter of the twelve or fourteen books of the *Histories* survive in fairly complete form down to the end of 70 C.E., a full twenty-six years before the death of Domitian and the anticipated end of the *Histories*. The number of books for the *Histories* is dependant on the number of books for the *Annals*, which also survives incomplete. The correlation between the works comes from the later writer Jerome (c. 347 – 420 AD) who discusses a book called Tacitus' *Life of the Caesars*, which was a consolidated version of both the *Annals* and the *Histories*, with a total of thirty-one books in it. For the debate on the number of books in the *Annals* see Ash (2006).

time to write about the advent of the Principate in the *Annals*. This inverse chronological process, beginning with the civil wars of 69 C.E. and a subsequent window of stability under the Flavians, and then moving onto the accession of Rome's first hereditary emperor, is key for a coherent reading of many of the scenes within Tacitus' two works.

In this study I will limit myself for the most part to the interrelationship between these two works; however, both works also look back in time for many of its explanations, in the case of the *Annals*, as well as forward in the case of the *Histories*. Therefore these two works do not comment only on their own period, but are expressly concerned with their place within a historiographical tradition where the *Annals* continues roughly after where Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* ended, and socially, where the *Histories* looked forward to the time of stability under Nerva and Trajan of Tacitus' own time.[234] However, moving back to the primary feature of this study, I will begin by addressing the text of the *Histories*, and then analyze the correspondences between both actual mutiny scenes within it and the earlier *Annals*. Also, more importantly, I will trace a more general resonance between the overall political and social instability found throughout the *Histories* and the prior description of the Pannonian and German mutinies. Woodman traces this type of self-imitation, wherein he observes a close parallel between Tacitus' depiction of Germanicus' Teutoburg expedition, and the later description of Vitellius' visit to the site of the first Battle of Cremona, as well as another Roman battle with the

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[234] Syme 1970, 3: "the year 97 ... is also behind the *Historiae* of Tacitus. As the subject of his projected work, the eloquent consular announced the reign of Domitian. As it happened, he went back to 69. The reason is plain. The brief reign of Nerva had brought the past back to life again, sharp and terrifying. The parallel between Galba and Nerva was inescapable – a weak emperor, the threat of civil war, the rôle of the Praetorian Guard, and an adoption in extremity."

Germans from the later *Histories*.[235] In a later study, Woodman built upon this analysis

and labels these as examples of "substantive self-imitation ... the technique of giving

substance to a poorly documented incident by the imitating of one which is much better

documented."[236] More specifically, however, Tacitus repeatedly shaped the mutiny scenes

in the *Annals* in order to evoke the later elements of civil war found in the *Histories*.[237]

Since the *Histories* was written first it was very easy for Tacitus to use these past events

in order to comment on his own present time as well as the "present" time in his

narratives.[238] It is from these two bases that I will be basing much of my discussion on:

the civil war themes and images found in the mutinies and rebellions of the *Histories* had

immediate parallels in earlier mutinies of 14 C.E., suggesting that the same issues which

came to light in the later civil war were also present in earlier times.

Despite Tacitus' claim to begin the *Histories* with the "year when Servius Galba

was consul for the second time, along with Titus Vinius" (1.1.1), he forestalled these

actions and began his work with an eleven chapter prologue discussing the general

condition of the world in order that his reader could better understand the forthcoming

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[235] Woodman 1988, 168 – 179. cf. *Ann.* 1.61 – 65; *Hist.* 2.70; 5.14 – 15.

[236] Woodman 1998, 70 – 83, esp. 81.

[237] Woodman (1988, 186 – 190) traces Tiberius withdrawal from Rome and how (186) "he made war on his own people ... an intensified version of the civil war motif"; cf. *Ann*. 4.58.2 – 3; 4.67.1 – 3; 6.1.1 – 2; 6.39.2 esp. 4.62 – 3. In the last account Woodman finds, following the precepts put forth by Quintillian (8.3.67 – 70), that Tacitus mentions all the key elements ancient writers would have used to describe a besieged city. However, Tacitus places all these elements in a scene of an amphitheatre's collapse, which he then infers as being indirectly Tiberius' fault. See also Keitel (1984) who discusses many of these same episodes in greater detail.

[238] Ash 2009, 85: "in his historical works, Tacitus consistently uses the past to set up a meaningful dialogue with the present (both the 'now' internal to the narrative and the external 'now' of his own era).

events and their causes. These eleven chapters formed a type of preface to both the work,

and the period, as a whole.[239] Immediately following this preface, Tacitus began the

narrative proper and described the first incident in the civil war, which occurred only a

few days after the beginning of the year. The beginnings and endings of books were often

used to delineate significant motifs and themes, and often provided a frame of reference

for much of the book as a whole;[240] Tacitus began his narrative with a disturbance among

the troops of Upper Germany who "had broken their reverence for their oath (*sacramenti*)

and were demanding another emperor" (1.12.1).[241] Thus, the sedition amongst the troops

and their desire for a new emperor were events that would characterize the entirety of the

civil war, and even echoed back to the Praetorians' assassination of Nero and their

election of Galba. However, Tacitus' immediate focus was on the short reign of Galba,

and Otho's machinations to become emperor. It was only later, after Galba's death and

Otho's accession, that Tacitus delineated the full circumstances behind Vitellius' revolt

and the role the legions in both Upper and Lower Germany played in his acclamation as

emperor.[242] In this work, however, I will limit myself mostly to the reigns of Galba and

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[239] Martin (1981, 68 – 70) briefly discusses these eleven chapters and sees them as split into three distinct parts: in the first section (chapter 1) Tacitus distinguishes himself from the other historians of the Republic and orients himself within the greater historiographical field, in the second (chapters 2 – 3) he announces the subject matter of the *Histories* and the social consequences of the period, lastly (chapters 4 – 11) he describes the state of affairs both at Rome and amongst the provinces in order to understand the events of the civil war and its outcome, but also its underlying causes. See also Ash (2006, 80), who concludes that "many historians felt obligated, for the sake of their readers, to explain later events by pushing the focus back to clarify the root causes which emerged before the formal beginning of the narrative proper."

[240] Ash 2009, 96.

[241] "*rupta sacramenti reverentia imperatorem alium flagitare*".

[242] Tac. *Hist*. 1.61 – 70.

Otho, focusing mainly on Galba and Otho's revolt in the first fifty chapters of the *Histories*. The only later event that I will discuss is the mutiny of Dillius Vocula's troops during the civil war with Civilis, which concluded many of the themes that Tacitus introduced already in the *Histories*. This limitation will allow me to concentrate on the immediate parallels between the first events of Tacitus' two works. Furthermore these two series of events also served as a prologue for Tacitus' *oeuvre* as a whole, where the same themes that will occur throughout his works were introduced.[243]

Furthermore, the break between the events of Galba and Otho and the rise of Vitellius, while allowing for a more linear portrayal of the events, also served to create a striking parallel between the *Annals* and the *Histories*, both of which, after a brief digression by Tacitus on the greater circumstances of his work, began with unrest amongst the legions, specifically, in the Germanies. The mutinies in the *Annals* occurred, historically, almost immediately after Tiberius' accession as emperor in 14 C.E., with Tacitus recounting the Pannonian mutiny first and the Rhine mutiny second despite the fact that they occurred on "almost the same day and for the same causes" (1.16.1).[244] Textually, Tacitus covers the former mutiny in fifteen chapters of his first book and the latter in an additional twenty-two chapters. Combined, these two mutinies cover well over half of the chapters in Book One, a breadth that cannot be wholly explained by the

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[243] Keitel 2006, 244: "the revolt of Otho and the destruction of Galba, then, function very much as paradigms for the account of 69 as a whole. Fundamental themes, distilled in generalities, are set out very fully in nearly every block of the narrative. Tacitus continues this technique through his account of the entire civil war, but less intrusively." See also Devillers (2011, 162 – 183); O'Gorman (2000, 25) points out that many of the themes that Tacitus introduces in the 14 C.E. mutinies including elements of chaos, disorder and, potential civil war are also present in the other sections of the book thereby shaping these mutinies into a type of prologue foreshadowing elements that are found the whole book.

[244] "*isdem ferme diebus isdem causis*".

outward historical significance of the mutinies.[245] As well, both mutinies are distinctly

separate from the narrative as a whole, despite the annalistic format that Tacitus was

following.[246] Broadly, Germany was a historically troublesome region with multiple

reported instances where its stationed forces either mutinied or proclaimed their own

commanders as emperor.[247] As a result of this instability, it is not surprising that two

mutinies occurred in that area, one under Tiberius and the other under Galba.

After this first introduction of mutiny, Tacitus immediately moved onto events at

Rome and its new emperor Galba. The first impression the reader received of Galba,

shaped in large part by Tacitus' narrative, was his doctrinal adherence to the past,

paradoxically introduced by his appointment of a successor. His speech, which

proclaimed Piso's adoption, was overwhelmingly characterized by appeals to the past and

a marked lack of reference to the future. Firstly, he elaborated on his decision to appoint a

successor as an action based on Augustus' precedent where both emperors "offer[ed] in

peace the Principate ... which [was] obtained in war" (1.15).[248] Augustus had chosen a

multitude of successors, all from his own line (15), but he was forced to look to the entire

state now that the Julian and the Claudian lines had ended (16). The decision to adopt

Piso, more specifically, was based upon his prestigious lineage, which would have added

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[245] Goodyear 1972, 194 – 195.

[246] Tacitus covers the events at Rome in chapters 1 – 15, following this the Pannonian mutiny in chapters 16 – 30, then the German mutiny in 31 – 49, then Tacitus continues with the events outside of Rome with Germanicus' German campaign in chapters 50 – 71, finally he ends the first book back at Rome in chapters 72 – 81.

[247] Tac. *Hist.* 1.8. The legions in Germany first hailed Verginius Rufus as emperor after the death of Nero but were persuaded to acclaim Galba instead.

[248] "*principatum ... bello adeptus quiescenti offeram*".

weight to his own mighty past (15). Furthermore, he stipulated that he adopted Piso because of the military custom where one man chose another (*quo uir uirum leget*) (18.2).[249] Galba's appeals were not to an unnamed time in the past, but specifically alluded to the Republic and its values. Indeed, he was forced to appoint a successor because his own character was more suited to life under a Republic, yet he lived presently under an empire (16). Finally, the adoption and the future of his and Piso's rule, one supposedly unhindered by the discontent of the German legions (16), was laid out in only the basest of terms. Indeed, the only advice Galba gave to his successor was to not give further advice because "all the counsel is fulfilled if I have chosen you well" (16).[250] The wisdom of his choice, as introduced at the beginning of his speech, was that Piso was someone who did not have to excuse his past actions (15). Therefore, Galba, a man marked by his atavist personality, deliberately chose a successor who was bound to repeat past cycles of action and inaction.[251] This reverence for the past was what would eventually cause both Galba's and Piso's downfall, which Tacitus made very clear in Galba's choice to appoint Piso, as well as his introduction to the Praetorian Guard.

Immediately prior to his speech to the Guard, Galba entered the Praetorian compound under undue auspices, which "in earlier times ... would have broken up an

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[249] Edwards (2011, 244) deduced that *quo vir virum leget* referred to the *lex sacrata*, an ancient Italian custom for choosing men for military service; this once again confirmed Galba's insistence on relying on traditional military discipline. Furthermore, this practise was "ill-omened" because it was first adopted by the Samnites, and many of those who originally swore the oath consequently ended up dead. cf. Liv. 10.38.

[250] "*impletum est omne consilium si te bene elegi.*"

[251] Keitel 1991, 2775: "the old emperor delays the adoption until it is too late, then chooses someone too like himself to be able to deal well with the situation."

election, but they did not deter Galba from going to the Praetorian camp" (1.18).[252]

Paradoxically, the one instance when Galba did not adhere to past actions was the one that

Tacitus marked as the cause of his death; implicit in this atavism was the issue of the

donative, and Galba's failure to pay it to the legions and the Guard. Tacitus subsequently

made this one of the running themes of Galba's reign, its inclusion made all the more

striking by the relatively short amount of time Tacitus gave to it. This donative, paid out

by the emperor upon his accession, had become an increasingly important act in order to

bind the allegiances of both the legions and the Guard, the former with its ability to

acclaim new leaders, and the latter with its ability to assassinate the old.[253] Indeed, despite

his desire to adhere to the old-fashioned relationship between an emperor and his troops,

Galba elected to acclaim Piso in front of the Praetorians, which revealed his, and the

empire's, dependency upon the troops.[254] This dependency is also explicit in the speeches

throughout this first book of the *Histories*, with three of the four speeches in *oratio recta*

addressed to the Praetorians, a majority that clearly pointed to the group who possessed

the real power at Rome.[255] Tacitus was highly critical of this type of dependency as "it

was dishonourable when acquired through bribery and solicitation" (1.17).[256]

Furthermore, a man such as Galba, who desired to win the loyalties of his soldiers rather

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[252] "*id antiquitus comitiis dirimendis non terruit Galbam quo minus in castra pergeret.*"

[253] "*evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri.*" – 1.4.

[254] Ash 1999, 24: "Galba may emerge from this episode as an idealist, but at the same time his decision to adopt Piso before the soldiers, rather than in the forum or the senate betrays his dependency on them"; cf. *Hist*. 1.17.

[255] Keitel 1991, 2773.

[256] "*quorum favorem ut largitione et ambitu male adquiri*".

than buy them, was a relic of a former age and his desire was an "honourable sentiment in regards to the interests of the state, but dangerous for himself; because everything was in opposition to his desire" (1.5.).[257] Indeed, Tacitus explicitly wrote that the Guard's loyalty would have been assured if only the miserly Galba was willing to pay the donative to the troops; but his critique was focused not only on Galba's failure to acquiesce to the soldiers, but also on the entire Roman people who could no longer bear Galba's old-fashioned strictness and excessive severity.[258]

Tacitus' striking use of the plural proclaimed that it was not only the soldiers who were unable to bear a return to the old-fashioned virtues of austerity and strictness, but the populace as a whole was totally enamoured by the vices of the present age. Galba's strictness, which "they had once praised and extolled him [now] his severity choked them and they scorned his old-fashioned discipline" (1.5).[259] Indeed, Galba's more insightful successor Otho recognized that "an empire obtained by crime cannot be upheld by previously unencountered discipline and old-fashioned morals" (1.83.1).[260] Thus, during a mutiny of his Praetorians he was forced to pay them off before he even dared to enter the camp to fully quell the mutiny. In contrast, Tacitus' emphasis on Galba's severity combined with his refusal to award his troops created a running theme of Galba's reign

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[257] "*vox pro re publica honesta, ipsi anceps … nec enim ad hanc formam cetera erant.*"

[258] "*constat potuisse conciliari animos quantulacumque parci senis liberalitate: nocuit antiquus rigor et nimia severitas, cui iam pares non sumus.*" – *Hist.* 1.18.

[259] "*laudata olim et militari fama celebrata severitas eius angebat aspernantis veterem disciplinam*".

[260] "*non posse principatum scelere quaesitum subita modestia et prisca gravitate retineri*" also Keitel (1991, 280): "Otho is much more a man of his time, as the success of his speech and his *coup* shows."

that "served to emphasise the dangerous gulf between the old-fashioned general and his materialistic troops."[261] Therefore, speaking of the first emperor after the extravagance of Nero's reign, in a time when soldiers and politicians were used to such extravagance, Tacitus explicitly stated that it was Galba's austerity which would lead to his downfall.[262] Tacitus carried this theme all the way to Galba's death, who ended his life regretting his decision not to pay the donative and "pleaded begging for just a few more days to pay off the donative" (1.41.2).[263] In this powerful moment, strikingly placed at the end of the book, Tacitus reaffirmed that the donative had become the single greatest factor in deciding and holding the empire. Galba's refusal to adhere to this new premise engineered his own downfall, which Tacitus continually emphasized by repeatedly suggesting the power of the donative and Galba's refusal to use it.

This atavism was also true during the earlier mutinies when, in the case of the Pannonian mutiny, its commander Blaesus attempted to quell the mutiny by referring to past precedents which had quelled mutinies. He interrupted the men during their mutiny shouting "it is better to dye your hands with my blood for it is a lesser disgrace that you would kill your legate than for you to rebel from your emperor. Either alive I will keep you loyal or dead I will hasten your penitence" (1.18.3).[264] The language of his appeal would have immediately recalled other Roman leaders who had successfully quelled

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[261] Ash 1999, 25.

[262] "*ita quattuordecim annis a Nerone adsuefactos ut haud minus vitia principum amarent quam olim virtutes verebantur.*" – 1.5.

[263] "*paucos dies exolvendo donativo deprecatum.*"

[264] " '*mea potius caede imbuite manus: leviore flagitio legatum interficietis quam ab imperatore desciscitis. aut incolumis fidem legionum retinebo aut iugulatus paenitentiam.*' "

mutinies by threatening suicide.[265] However, Blaesus' first appeal was totally ineffective

and the soldiers refused to be swayed by his words. It was only Blaesus' persistence that

allowed him to temporarily halt the mutiny. His second speech, designed to shame the

troops into disbandment, was another example of a successful measure that commanders

had taken in the past.[266] Indeed, Blaesus' attempts to quell the mutiny were all based upon

actions that had worked for previous commanders, with Tacitus employing many of the

same literary conventions as in prior mutinies. However, their ultimate ineffectualness

betrayed Tacitus' sentiments about the changed nature of the legions at the advent of the

Principate. Although they had not reached the fully degenerate state of later legions,

Tacitus directly implied that earlier successes in quelling mutinies, and the reasons behind

those successes, were not guaranteed in this new age. Consequently, it was only after

Blaesus unprecedentedly relented to the troops' demands that he achieved a lull in the

mutiny.[267] Thus, neither the previously successful threats of death nor shame could

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[265] Pelling (1993, 62 n. 8) states, although discussing Germanicus' offer of suicide to his troops, "such extravagant language was used by other generals, and was sometimes successful". Indeed, even the great general Pompey availed himself to his troops during a mutiny, crying as he offered up his life. This type of behaviour, whether true or false, was, according to Plutarch, consistent with the type of behaviour that could be attributed to a popular and dignified leader. Scipio makes a similar comment to his troops during their mutiny at Sucro (28.27.10) "*equidem si totum exercitum meum mortem mihi optasse crederem hic statim ante oculos uestros morerer, nec me uita iuuaret inuisa ciuibus et militibus meis*". These words were not so far removed from what a commander could, and was willing to offer in order to quell a mutiny.

[266] *Ann*. 1.16.19.

[267] The demands were land, timely discharge and bonuses cf. Tac. 1.17. Williams (1997, 48) criticizes Blaesus' capitulatory actions as "a serious sign of weakness, to judge from Tacitus' disapproval of the soldiers' anarchy"; contra Shotter (1968, 178) who praises Blaesus' actions as "a logically considered step which was designed to appeal to both logic and emotion .... We see here very dearly the difference between the seasoned professional and the youthful amateur, for by contrast, Germanicus' action is seen for what it really was – the impulsive and desperate act of bravado."; or the more moderate opinion of Ross (1973, 212) that "it matters not that some concessions have been made ... only that *modicum otium* has been restored."

singularly quell a mutiny, only some manner of concession. Blaesus' control was

extremely tenuous, which later events proclaimed, as an influx of mutineers from another

group quickly destroyed the peace he won. This second group had begun their mutiny

with a rebellion against their centurions, specifically the *praefectus castrorum* Aufidienus

Rufus. He was someone "who recalled the strict military discipline of the past" (1.20) and

was the particular focus of the soldiers' ire.[268] Once again, Tacitus drew attention to the

incompatibility of traditional discipline with the new mindset of the legions. Those

commanders who all attempted to enforce these measures, like Rufus, Galba, and, to a

certain extent, Blaesus, were all met with either complete indifference or only a

temporary peace in the face of mutinous troops.

    In the case of the latter, despite the fact that the majority of the centurions and the

general rank and file still obeyed Blaesus, they were all soon corrupted by invested in the

mutiny. Indeed, after Blaesus attempted to arrest and punish the most criminal of the

looters, they appealed to their fellow comrades through all manners of kinship including:

friends, century, cohort, and legion – pushing the mutiny into wider and wider circles of

affiliation.[269] Those who were previously unaffiliated subsequently rose up to free those

arrested, and then both groups immediately mixed (*miscent*) together in their mutiny.[270]

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[268] "*antiquam duramque militiam revocabat*". Another centurion who was also a fierce disciplinarian
met his end later on the mutiny, and was again the particular focus of the soldier's anger. "*et centurio
Lucilius interficitur cui militaribus facetiis vocabulum 'cedo alteram' indiderant, quia fracta vite in tergo
militis alteram clara voce ac rursus aliam poscebat.*" – 1.23.

[269] "*illi obniti trahentibus, prensare circumstantium genua, ciere modo nomina singulorum, modo
centuriam quisque cuius manipularis erat, cohortem, legionem, eadem omnibus inminere clamitantes.*" –
1.21.

[270] "*adcurritur ab universis, et carcere effracto solvunt vincula desertoresque ac rerum capitalium*

Tacitus' repetition of the word *miscere* recalls its use at the beginning of the mutiny, when its propagator Percennius stirred up (*miscere*) the legions.[271] At the beginning of the mutiny, the soldiers had resolved to join (*miscere*) the three legions together into one to signify their unity in the mutiny, but were unable to amalgamate because of jealousies and infighting.[272] This unity, or lack thereof, would become one of the defining features of Tacitus' mutinies throughout both the *Annals* and the *Histories*; it would characterize both the outbreak of a mutiny and the new measures that a commander would have to take in order to quell a mutiny. Thus, mutinies now revolved around the treacherous unity of the mutineers and a commander's attempts to divide and separate them and, consequently, bring an end to the mutiny.[273] The repetition of the term *miscere*, during the various inflammations of the mutiny, strongly confirms a relationship between mutiny and an indeterminate mixing of bodies. Conversely, disorder amongst the troops signalled a faltering of the mutiny. Therefore, Blaesus, and eventually Drusus, could only quell this mutiny by instituting disorder amongst the order of the legions – either by their own hands, or because the soldiers were already fragmented in their rebellion.

In the first instance the soldiers, although unable to fully amalgamate their three legions, were sufficiently able to act in common in order to build a tribunal (*congerunt ...*

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damnatos sibi iam miscent." – 1.21.

[271] "*erat in castris Percennius quidam, dux olim theatralium operarum, dein gregarius miles, procax lingua et miscere coetus histrionali studio doctus*" – 1.16.3.

[272] Tac. *Ann*. 1.18.

[273] O'Gorman 2000, 29: Tacitus "evokes the unity of the well-regulated army, with its proper divisions, through the use of *contio* and *cohors*, the mutineers ... do not appropriate any such terms of unity to counter the commander's mode of description. Indeed the indiscriminate mass of the mutinous army is called *permixta*, 'all mixed up', a term of mingling or confusion."

tribunal) as to make their position more marked (*conspicua*).[274] The repetition of the

prefix *con-*, denoting connection and unity, assumed a collective force behind the

mutineers' actions, which their earlier inability to coalesce into one legion had marred.[275]

Furthermore, despite Blaesus' earlier to failure to end the mutiny by speech alone, he was

eventually able to achieve a lull in it after he assured that the soldier's common good

(*publicae causae*) had been achieved.[276] Put another way, he was only able to pause the

mutiny when he acknowledged the unity of the troops and of their demands. However,

although his measures were successful, Tacitus undercut the consensus reached as

disingenuous stating that Blaesus' actions "showed what could be pressed by force what

would not have been obtained by moderate actions" (1.19).[277] Indeed, despite Blaesus'

actions in attempting to punish the most seditious troops and, at the same time, to

maintain the loyalties of the majority of the troops, the end result was a greater cohesion

in their mutiny – perversely expressed as a tumultuous (*turbatos*) mob.[278] In the face of

the soldiers' tumultuous cohesion, Drusus' words were ineffective. It was only a chance

eclipse that gave Drusus an opening to quell the mutiny. The eclipse, as Tacitus

disparagingly attributed to the superstitious troops, proclaimed the mutiny's eventual

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[274] "*simul congerunt caespites, exstruunt tribunal, quo magis conspicua sedes foret.*" – 1.18.3.

[275] O'Gorman 2000, 30: "the unity ... is emphasised by the repeated *con-* prefixes of *congerunt* and *conspicia*. The construction of a tribunal mirrors the collection of the tree standards, but also, as an organised project, manifests the unity of the mutineers, countering descriptions of them as a disorderly mass."

[276] "*sed superbire miles quod filius legati orator publicae causae satis ostenderet necessitate expressa quae per modestiam non obtinuissent.*" – 1.19.

[277] "*ostenderet necessitate expressa quae per modestiam non obtinuissent.*"

[278] "*et Vibulenus quidam gregarius miles, ante tribunal Blaesi adlevatus circumstantium umeris, apud turbatos et quid pararet intentos*". – 1.21.1.

disaster and severely disheartened the troops' enthusiasm for the mutiny. Their resultant

discouragement then allowed Drusus to insinuate (*inserunt*) his loyal officers amongst all

the divisions of the troops.[279] Tacitus' use of the verb *inserunt* is particularly apt as the

antithesis to his former use of the word *miscere* – when Percennius roused the troops to

mutiny, and the second group of soldiers who broke the calm afforded by Blaesus. Drusus

knew that the only way to quell the mutiny was to break up the unity of the mutineers,

which Tacitus' use of the verb *insero* neatly encompassed.

Tacitus made this explicit when he stated that the mutiny was only quelled when

"they separated recruit from veteran and legion from legion" (1.28).[280] In contrast to their

proposed amalgamation of the standards at the beginning of the mutiny, with the soldiers'

separation and return to obedience, they "returned the standards to their proper places

from the assembly they had placed them in at the beginning of the mutiny" (1.28).[281] The

end result of this recurrent imagery of unity and disorder was to equate: images and

words of disorder with obedience, and those of unity with rebellion. In this same way

civil war, or civil discontent, was often expressed through verbal and visual images of

disorder and chaos, and Tacitus had a major surviving precedent in this use of language in

the poet Lucan's *Bellum Civile*.[282] Indeed, Woodman stated that "events are at their most

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[279] "*hi vigiliis, stationibus, custodiis portarum se inserunt*". – 1.28.

[280] "*tironem a veterano. legionem a legione dissociant.*"

[281] "*signa unum in locum principio seditionis congregata suas in sedes referunt.*"

[282] O'Gorman 1995, 117: "there is a language of civil war available for exploitation to the Roman writer, and that for Tacitus this language is inevitably dominated by the precedent of Lucan, the strong poet of civil war"; also O'Gorman (2000, 29), who defines the term *permixta* as a term "which also recurs throughout the mutiny episodes as a pejorative term of chaos, madness and civil war."

abnormal during civil war"[283.] Therefore, Tacitus was consciously attempting to define

these mutinies in terms of disorder, which in earlier literary traditions, including his own

Histories, was tantamount to imaging them as civil wars. Thus, by unifying the images

and themes between the *Annals* and the rebellions of 69 C.E., Tacitus strongly suggested

that the symptoms of the later civil war were already present in earlier generations.

 After Galba's election of Piso, Tacitus delineated the events surrounding the first

of the rival emperors. The rival emperor during that time was Otho, whom Tacitus

described as someone "who had nothing to hope from a peaceful arrangement, and whose

purpose depended wholly on disorder" (1.21.1).[284] This disorder was paradoxically

introduced with Otho's machinations to insert himself into the legions. In doing so, he

often referred to the soldiers as messmates (*contubernalis*), and gave them the money and

influence that Galba was unwilling to give for their support (1.53).[285] Otho's actions

proclaimed a shift in the traditional military hierarchy, which illustrated the specific

manner of disorder that Tacitus attempted to introduce in his narrative. Whereas previous

historians had placed the majority of blame on the soldiers for acts of rebellion and

sedition, Tacitus also censured the commanders for their willingness to partake in the

actions of civil war.[286] Indeed, Otho's actions, in calling his troops *contubernalis*, could

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[283] Woodman 1998, 136.

[284] "*cui compositis rebus nulla spes, omne in turbido consilium.*"

[285] "*sed sceleris cogitatio incertum an repens: studia militum iam pridem spe successionis aut paratu facinoris adfectaverat, in itinere, in agmine, in stationibus vetustissimum quemque militum nomine vocans ac memoria Neroniani comitatus contubernalis appellando.*" – 1.23.1.

[286] Describing the earlier mutiny in Pannonia, Fulkerson (2006, 170) states that "Tacitus is typically Roman both in his unthinking bias against the common people and in his simultaneous recognition that the

recall Julius Caesar's vaunted camaraderie with his soldiers.[287] However, his actions were particularly disgraceful as they were designed solely to win popularity amongst the soldiers, and consequently to attain the seat of emperor.[288] Indeed, Tacitus was especially critical of this equality between soldiers and commanders during a civil war, or, at its worst incarnation, when commanders obeyed their soldiers; so, Otho, upon his proclamation as emperor, "was not found wanting and stretched out his hands to pay homage to the soldiery, throwing kisses and was in all ways a slave to their power" (1.36).[289] In Otho's aforementioned speech Tacitus specifically defined these reversals of traditional military hierarchy as the unchecked license of the troops. These reversals were also present in the actual language of his speech, as well as Otho's other speeches in the *Histories*, all of which followed a similar template to a general's traditional battle-harangues.[290] However, Tacitus used this template to twist his reader's expectations.

Indeed, the language of his speech, after his acclamation of emperor, would have immediately brought to mind Scipio's speech at Sucro as both commanders rhetorically asked what name they should call the soldiers in their mutiny.[291] This recollection would

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soldiers had legitimate grievances."

[287] Suet. *Iul*. 67.2; Ap. *B.C.* 2.13.93; Caes. *B.G.* 5.44.1.

[288] "*studia militum iam pridem spe successionis aut paratu facinoris adfectaverat*" – 1.23.1.

[289] "*nec deerat Otho protendens manus adorare vulgum, iacere oscula et omnia serviliter pro dominatione*."

[290] Keitel 1987, 73 – 82 esp. 75 - 80.

[291] "'*quis ad vos processerim commilitones, dicere non possum, quia nec privatum me vocare sustineo princeps a vobis nominatus, nec principem alio imperante. vestrum quoque nomen in incerto erit donec dubitabitur imperatorem populi Romani in castris an hostem habeatis.*'" *Hist*. 1.37.1 – 2; Liv. 28.27. "'*quos ne quo nomine quidem appellare debeam scio. ciues? qui a patria uestra descistis. an milites? qui imperium auspiciumque abnuistis, sacramenti religionem rupistis. hostes? corpora, ora, uestitum, habitum*"

have led the reader to assume a similar manner of censure in Otho's speech. However, once again, Tacitus used this phrase to twist the readers' expectations and employed this as a *cohortatio* to civil war. Furthermore, instead of asking what name he should call the legions, revoking their right to the title of *milites*, he asked what name they should give to him – *priuatus*, *princeps*, or *hostis*. His willingness to take his name from the troops, just as they would take their name from him, betrayed their interdependence; as opposed to Galba who always maintained a strict division between his and the troops' interests.[292] Otho's speech and actions toward the troops further bolstered Tacitus' summation of the indiscipline and chaos of the civil war. Instead of Otho chastising his soldiers for their actions, which the *topos* of his speech suggested, he revelled in their acclamation and further perverted his "harangue" by forming Galba as the enemy in their upcoming "battle".[293] In his status as an enemy, Otho criticized Galba for his double-speak, however, immediately afterwards he himself used the same contradictory language; before he opened the armoury and gave the troops license to shed blood in his *coup* he stated that "I do not call you to war or to danger" (1.38).[294] This contradiction continued

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ciuium adgnosco' ". Syme (1958, 686 – 687) is the first to draw attention to his speech, as well as its later allusion in Vocula's speech toward the mutineers. See also Woodman (2006, 312 – 317).

[292] Devillers (2011, 168): both Otho's and his soldier's destinies were "shrewdly presented as interconnected and sometimes fused into one first person plural suggesting solidarity between Otho and those who support him."

[293] Keitel 1987, 74: "Tacitus' reworking of this topos thus illustrates the precariousness of Otho's own position while underscoring the reversal of normal values in civil war. Here a Roman commander calls his men not to discipline but instead to war against the state; he does not check his men, he colludes with them." cf. Tac. *Hist*. 1.38.1. where Otho praises the *uirtus* of the Praetorians in their goal to overthrow Galba on behalf of the senate and the Roman people.

[294] "*non ad bellum vos nec ad periculum voco*"; for the falsity of Otho's attacks see Keitel (2006, 236 – 237); for the irony of Otho's statement see Keitel (1991, 2779), who states that "Otho, while indicating Galba falsely on the charge of misusing language, succeeds brilliantly by doing exactly the same thing."

in the soldiers' next actions, which encompassed many of the aforementioned themes and

succinctly introduced the disorder of civil war.

Immediately following Otho's exhortation, Tacitus delineated the next events in a

short but extremely programmatic passage, where, after opening the armoury:

> rapta statim arma, *sine more et ordine militiae*, ut praetorianus aut legionarius
> insignibus suis *distingueretur misc*entur auxiliaribus galeis scutisque, *nullo*
> tribunorum centurionumve *adhortante*, sibi quisque dux et instigator.[295]

> They immediately seized arms, *without regard for custom or rank*, and since they
> would be *recognized* by their insignia of a praetorian or a legionary they *confused*
> their ranks and all wore the helmets and shields of auxiliaries, *no* tribune or
> centurion *led* them, each one roused and commanded himself.

This entire passage is marked by a continual emphasis on the disorder of the troops'

actions and their active attempts to form an identical and, therefore, unidentifiable, mass

of troops. As O'Gorman succinctly established "the sense here is not so much a unity as a

lack of definition."[296] Their cohesion, however, was not a true military order because no

one commanded the troops, each one answered only to himself. Furthermore, by re-using

the term *miscere* to describe the troops' actions, Tacitus deliberately recalled the earlier

Pannonian mutiny. Unlike the earlier mutiny, however, the troops did not mix of their

own regard, but it was Otho who roused the legions and allowed them to mingle in their

revolt. Consequently, there was no higher authority to quell their mutiny as in the case of

Blaesus; rather, Rome was at the mercy of this disorder within the military hierarchy,

which was paralleled in the social structure at Rome. Just as the legions and the

Praetorians intermingled in an indiscriminate mass without regard for hierarchy, so too

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[295] 1.38.

[296] O'Gorman 2000, 29.

"all the people at Rome filled the palace and amongst them were also slaves" (1.32.1).[297] Finally, after Galba's death and Otho's acclamation, Tacitus recalled Otho's previous interactions with the troops, however, now it was the people who "kissed Otho's hands; however great their actions were in deceit, they did them with greater magnitude" (1.45.1).[298] These descriptions of disorder were also present in Tacitus' later descriptions of the earlier German mutiny.

Its beginning was described as arising on "almost the same day and from the same causes" (1.31.1), as the near contemporaneous Pannonian mutiny.[299] However, it was "more violent by their great numbers and ... it was not one person who spoke these things as Percennius to the legions of Pannonia ... but it was a sedition of many faces and voices" (1.31.1).[300] Indeed, outside observers would have commented that the mutiny was "neither divided or inspired by a few persons, but they were equally inflamed, and likewise equally composed and resolute that one would think that they were under command" (1.32).[301] To this end, despite the multiple voices that Tacitus attributed to the mutineers, it was a remarkably singular in entity.[302] This singularity was reiterated

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[297] "*universa iam plebs Palatium implebat, mixtis servitiis*".

[298] "*exosculari Othonis manum; quantoque magis falsa erant quae fiebant, tanto plura facere*."

[299] "*isdem ferme diebus isdem causis*"

[300] "*quanto plures tanto violentius ... non unus haec, ut Pannonicas inter legiones Percennius ... sed multa seditionis ora vocesque*".

[301] "*id militaris animos altius coniectantibus praecipuum indicium magni atque inplacabilis motus, quod neque disiecti nec paucorum instinctu, set pariter ardescerent, pariter silerent, tanta aequalitate et constantia ut regi crederes*."

[302] O'Gorman 2000, 34: "despite the disorderly appearance of the German mutiny ... the many voices of sedition given in indirect speech are strikingly univocal in substance."

throughout the mutiny beginning with Germanicus' first speech before the troops, where the soldiers stood all mixed up (*permixa*) before him, and so his first order was for them to divide into maniples; when they refused, he allowed them to bring the standards forward in order to distinguish the cohorts.[303] Thus, despite the apparent unity of the troops, they were actually unified only in their mutiny, and their refusal to separate into their individual maniples was tantamount to a refusal to accept their subordination to command.[304] This refusal of hierarchy, as I previously discussed, was characteristic of civil war narratives where there was a break-down in understandable relations amongst military personnel. Thus, the standards had become a symbol, or act-in, for military order, which was strikingly reiterated a few chapters later.[305] In it, a second rebellion at an outside garrison was quickly quelled when its *castrorum praefectus*, Marcus Ennius, during the rising violence, seized a standard and proclaimed that anyone who left the ranks would be named a deserter.[306] Similarly the standard's power to symbolize order was also recalled when the legate Munatius Plancus was forced to take refuge with the standards and the eagle during the Rhine mutiny. Indeed, Tacitus commented that if he

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[303] "*adsistentem contionem, quia permixta videbatur, discedere in manipulos iubet: sic melius audituros responsum; vexilla praeferri ut id saltem discerneret cohortis: tarde obtemperavere.*" – 1.34.3.

[304] O'Gorman 2000, 28: "their refusal [to separate into maniples] constitutes a refusal to accept the hierarchical structure of the military body."

[305] O'Gorman (2000, 28) discusses the difference between the standards symbolizing or standing-in for military order. Regarding this passage she concludes that "the extent to which their obedience is significant depends on how significant the banners are to them or to Germanicus – or to Tacitus' reader."; see also Oakley (1998, 161 – 162) and Ash (2009, 91) who concludes that the standards and the eagles are "archetypal symbols of order and discipline within the Roman army"

[306] "*simul exterritis qui obstiterant, raptum vexillum ad ripam vertit, et si quis agmine decessisset, pro desertore fore clamitans, reduxit in hiberna turbidos et nihil ausos.*" – 1.38.

had not sought refuge there "the altars of the gods would have been stained with his blood in a Roman camp."[307] This symbolism was also present in the Pannonian mutiny, which I discussed briefly before, but I will now discuss it at a greater length.

As I stated previously, one of the soldiers' first actions during the Pannonian mutiny was an attempt to amalgamate the three legions into one.[308] Although Tacitus did not describe their attempt in detail, their later actions imply that it was some attempt to unify the legions under one standard and eagle. Thus, in order to make the unified area of the standards more distinct, the men began to build a tribunal – the action that Blaesus first interrupted. This building of a tribunal also became a symbol of their unified mutiny, as the repetition of the *con-* prefixes denoted. As a result, Blaesus' first failure to quell the mutiny, also failed to stop the building of the tribunal.[309] It was only after he persevered in his argument and suspended the mutiny that the men stopped building.[310] Following this, the second outbreak of the mutiny began when its soldiers "tore down their standards"; thereby destroying any division between the soldiers and creating one unified rebellious force.[311] It was this mob that Drusus met upon entering the camp, which

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[307] "*Romanis in castris sanguine suo altaria deum commaculavisset*." – 1.39.

[308] See above n. 272.

[309] O'Gorman 2000, 30: "the construction of a tribunal mirrors the collection of the three standards, but also, as an organised project, manifests the unity of the mutineers."

[310] O'Gorman 2000, 30 n. 5: "the mutineers inexplicably abandon this construction, which appears as a sign of their disorder." Although she states that the project was "inexplicably" abandoned, Tacitus clearly stated that it was Blaesus' tenacity that eventually won them over and they stopped building (1.19.1.) "*cum tandem pervicacia victi inceptum omisere*." Thus, he makes a clear link between their building activity and the unified mutiny. When Blaesus is unsuccessful in quelling it, the men continue to build, and when he suspends the mutiny, the troops also suspend their building.

[311] "*postquam turbatum in castris accepere, vexilla convellunt direptisque proximis vicis*" – 1.20.

crowded around Drusus during his address, shattering the image of the formal *adlocutio* scene.[312] Drusus was only able to quell the mutiny by introducing his own men into the mutineers, who separated into their typical divisions, and, consequently, restored the legions and the eagles to their proper places.[313] Once again, although it is not stated explicitly, Tacitus must have conceived the proper place for the standards as ones marking the divisions between the legions. Thus, Tacitus created a striking correlation between the movements of the standards, and the ebb and flow of the mutiny from unity to disunity.

The standard's symbolism was again reiterated at the end of the German mutiny, as well as during Otho's *coup* and Galba's subsequent death. In the former, the standard bearers were responsible for the slaughter of a second group of mutinous troops, which I will discuss later. In the latter, after Galba and Piso were killed by a mob of legionnaires, their heads were placed on spears and displayed them amongst the standards and the eagles. Their deaths, and their heads, had become a symbol of the "disastrous a fragmentation of normal Roman identity in civil war."[314] Indeed, Tacitus' description of Galba's decapitation is particularly striking in light of the other traditions that referred to his death. Plutarch describes only a single soldier who raised Galba's head on a spear, but Tacitus places the blame on all the soldiers who "vied with one another and showed off their bloody hands – those who had done the killing, whose who had been present, some legitimately, some falsely, they were all boasting as if it were a fine and memorable deed"

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[312] Hammer 2008, 154: "turmoil, more than traditional dignity and order, mar the *adlocutio*, the formal imperial address to the troops".

[313] See above n. 281.

[314] Ash 2009, 91.

(1.44.2).[315] There was a collective responsibility to their actions, displaying the severed heads of Galba and Piso inside their column and alongside the standards and the eagles.[316] Thus, throughout these mutinies Tacitus convincingly proved that, what we might term, tumultuous unity characterized civil wars. All the forces at Rome bore the responsibility of killing Galba and in placing the ultimate symbol of their order/mutiny in and amongst their *signa* of discipline; Tacitus created a powerful scene of opposition. Furthermore, this disorder reached its zenith during the rebellion/civil war of Julius Civilis coupled with a Roman mutiny, and its attempted suppression by the legate Dillius Vocula.

Vocula's character and actions were both the best, and the worst, a commander could possess during a civil war.[317] His first introduction was particularly noteworthy because he was described as someone who was of *mira constantia*.[318] This trait was particularly laudable during a civil war where its combatants often betrayed their allegiances on a whim. His resoluteness would have brought to mind other exemplary characters in the *Histories* who showed the same trait, in particular, the Ligurian woman who showed *constantia* during her torture.[319] Indeed, the other commander whom he was first introduced with, Hordeonius Flaccus, and who received such ire from the legions,

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[315] "*certatim ostentantibus cruentas manus qui occiderant, qui interfuerant, qui vere qui falso ut pulchrum et memorabile facinus iactabant*".

[316] "*praefixa contis capita gestabantur inter signa cohortium iuxta aquilam legionis*" – 1.44.

[317] Ash 2010, 212 – 225 esp. 212 – 217. Much of the following analysis is drawn from her conclusions, which in some cases I have augmented.

[318] "*conscendit tribunal Vocula mira constantis prensumque militem ac vociferantem duci ad supplicum iussit, et dum mati pauent, potiums quisque iussis paruere*" – 4.25.4.

[319] "*auxit invidiam praeclaro exemplo femina Ligus, quae filio abdito, cum simul pecuniam occultari milites credidissent eoque per cruciatus interrogarent ubi filium occuleret, uterum ostendens latere respondit, nec ullis deinde terroribus aut morte constantiam vocis egregiae mutavit*" – 2.13.2.

was as a man *sine constantia*.[320] Therefore, by describing Vocula as having *constantia*, it allowed Tacitus to both elevate Vocula himself, while at the same time to degrade those who do not posses this quality.[321] Furthermore, after this promising introduction, Vocula quickly and effectively put down a mutiny of his colleague's troops by executing the ringleaders of the mutiny.[322] His decisive actions, as Ash commented, "show impressively decisive leadership in the murky world of the *Histories*."[323] This positive introduction, however, was readily dispelled by his subsequent ineffectualness both in battle and in combating discontent among his own troops.[324] Indeed, Vocula's actions were now the opposite of how he was first introduced. Whereas he was previously praised for his ability to suppress a mutiny, he was now reduced to dressing as a slave to avoid death during a rebellion of his own.[325] Nevertheless, Vocula achieved his greatest renown during his attempt to stop a treasonous group of soldiers during the war with Civilis, which was ultimately unsuccessful and cost him his life; but helped to fulfill Tacitus' conception of the relationship between commanders and troops during a mutiny and a civil war.

His speech, as well as the events surrounding the mutiny, has been convincingly proved to recall Livy's famous depiction of the surrender at Claudine Forks. As Keitel

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[320] Tac. *Hist*. 1.91.

[321] Ash 2010, 213: "Vocula is in impressive company as a result of being credited with this quality."

[322] Tac. *Hist*. 4.27.2.

[323] Ash 2010, 214.

[324] Tac. *Hist*. 4.34 – 36.

[325] Ash 2010, 215; cf. *Hist*. 4.34 – 36: "what we have seen of Vocula so far can lead us to view him as an eloquent case study of the overwhelming corrosive power of these Roman soldiers, who can dramatically transform a promising general conspicuous for his *constantia* until he is reduced to take such embarrassing action, with his reputation in tatters."

concluded, these reminiscences did not only enhance the pathos of the troops, but they drew a specific contrast between the values and morals during that period of the *Histories* and the earlier, more virtuous, time during the Republic.[326] However, I intend to argue that Tacitus did not only recall Livy in this scene, but he would later address these same issues in the *Annals* in order to introduce continuity between the various episodes. Throughout the mutiny, Vocula attempted to impress upon the soldiers many of the same precepts that Blaesus also brought up in his speech to the seditious troops. Firstly, after failing to quell the mutiny by offering his own life, Blaesus specifically constructed his later speech to shame the troops into ending their mutiny.[327] Similarly, the ultimate purpose of Vocula's speech was to shame the troops.[328] However, Vocula's attempts were from of a greater necessity because of the ultimate consequences of his rebellion. Blaesus' troops had mutinied only to remedy their immediate grievances, without giving thought to how close their actions tread to civil war.[329] In Vocula's case, some of his men had already proclaimed gone over to Gallic tribes allied with Civilis against Rome, and his attempt to quell the mutiny was a last ditch attempt to stop all the soldiers from allying to a foreign power and actually engaging in civil war.[330] This alternative was also expressed in the earlier German mutiny of 14 C.E., whose troops offered to install Germanicus upon the

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[326] Keitel 1992, 335: "rather he uses Livian echoes to enhance the gravity of the situation and to underscore the decline in Roman morality which he adverts to repeatedly in the Histories. The whole cluster of reminiscences in this narrative may be read as a sad comment by Tacitus on outworn traditional values."

[327] See above n. 266.

[328] Ash 2010, 219.

[329] "*denique pro Neronibus et Drusis imperium populi Romani capessent.*" – 1.28.

[330] Tac. *Hist*. 4.57.

throne. Indeed, their actions realized the precedent begun in the Pannonian mutiny and recognized that "theirs were the hands that held the destinies of Rome; theirs the victories by which the empire grew; theirs the name which Caesars assumed" (1.31).[331] However, despite the soldiers' desire, Germanicus refused their offer; but the fact that the legions recognized their own power to install and depose emperors would have resonated strongly with the later events of 69 C.E.[332] Thus, in order to preserve this continuity, Tacitus repeatedly invoked similar descriptions and themes between the earlier mutinies and the mutiny under Vocula.

Firstly, Blaesus and Vocula employed similar verbal tactics in the beginnings of their speeches: both commanders opened their appeals to the troops in a language that was as unselfish as possible; they offered to give up their own lives in return for the soldiers' loyalty and in order that they would end their rebellion.[333] They both also stated that their deaths would be better, and indeed, more preferable if only to shock the legions back to their senses.[334] Following this *prooemium*, both commanders attempted, in their own way, to encourage elements of rivalry and its resultant disorder between the

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[331] "*sua in manu sitam rem Romanam, suis victoriis augeri rem publicam, in suum cognomentum adscisci imperatores.*"

[332] Pelling 1993, 69: "these mutinies illuminate the crucial role an army can play in making or breaking a *princeps*. These themes ... would clearly have recurred ring-fashion in the closing books, where the power of the legions will at last be shatteringly unleashed."

[333] Ash 2010, 219: "to be convincing, he must establish himself as a man who addresses the soldiers for unselfish motives ... casting his own death as inevitable, welcome even, is a good way to achieve this." See also Shotter (1968, 198) on Blaesus that "this was a logically considered step which was designed to appeal both to logic and to emotion. By making his own life of less value than the well-being and loyalty of his men, Blaesus was showing them the care to which they might respond."

[334] "*mea potius caede imbuite manus: leviore flagitio legatum interficietis quam ab imperatore desciscitis*" – *Ann*. 1.18; *Hist*. 4.58.1 "*mihi excitium parari libens audio ... finem miseriarum expecto.*"

troops.[335] However, as I discussed previously, the Pannonian mutiny had already suffered various setbacks because of infighting.[336] Therefore, the soldiers were already predisposed to Drusus' final action to forcibly divide the troops' loyalties. Vocula attempted a similar tactic to encourage dissent between the troops; however, he faced a unified group of mutineers, which made his attempts more difficult. Firstly, he contrasted the soldiers' present actions with other *vetera exempla* in Rome's past whose legions "preferred to die rather than to abandon their posts" – relayed much more strikingly in Latin as *perire praeoptauerint ne loco pellerentur* (4.58.2). Secondly, he contrasted the soldiers with Roman *socii* who had allowed themselves and their families to be burnt to death, if only to be known as "the loyal ones".[337] Thirdly, Vocula mentioned other *Vetera* legions that were, at that very moment – *apud*, experiencing hunger and siege.[338] These attempts to incite rivalry, by comparing his soldiers in the most unflattering way to other groups, although not directly paralleling Drusus' tack, should also have been effective.[339] Indeed, a striking example of the power of rivalry to quell a mutiny is present in the later German mutiny, which also presented many of the same interests as Vocula's speech.

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[335] Ash (2010, 218 – 219) saw Vocula's speech as divided into four distinct parts, the *prooemium*, *narratio*, *argumentatio*, and the *peroratio*. This four-part division followed Quintilian's description of a speech (9.4.4).

[336] See above n. 272.

[337] "*socii saepe nostri excindi urbis suas seque cum coniugibus ac liberis cremari pertulerunt, neque aliud pretium exitus quam fides famaque.*" – *Hist*. 4.58.2.

[338] "*tolerant cum maxime inopiam obsidiumque apud Vetera legiones nec terrore aut promissis demoventur*". – *Hist*. 4.58.3. This comparison is particularly belittling, as immediately following this Vocula mentions the troops' own adequate resources and defences.

[339] Ash 2010, 222: "Vocula cannot count on activating a sense of shame to control these soldiers, then triggering rivalry is a good alternative."

Like Blaesus and Vocula, Germanicus opened his speech to his troops with a traditional mutiny narrative motif – a proclamation of his death.[340] This scene occurred twice during the course of the mutiny, in the first instance, it followed the troops' offer of empire to Germanicus, who replied by leaping off the tribunal and threatening to plunge a sword into his chest.[341] It is important to note that, despite his extravagant gesture, his immediate failure to quell the mutiny paralleled Blaesus' first failure to quell the mutiny. It was only through persistence that the latter was able to suppress it. Therefore both mutinies developed in remarkably similar ways, although the German mutiny did so at a slower pace.[342] The climax of the German mutiny was the tragic scene of Agrippina and the other women and children being forced to leave the camp for their safety. This image unwittingly accomplished what Blaesus and Vocula had attempted to do in their speeches, to shame the troops so thoroughly that they would disband their rebellion. In this case, the soldiers, who recalled Agrippina's prestigious family line, were immediately incited by a rivalry between themselves and the soldiers tasked with protecting Agrippina; it was this jealously, as Tacitus specifically stated, that swayed the troops from their mutiny.[343] Therefore, the sense of shame that Blaesus and Vocula worked so hard for was achieved

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[340] Pelling (1993, 59 – 85) traces the contrast between Germanicus' traditional style of fighting, leadership and politics and concludes that Tacitus' presentation of him is designed to comment on the difference between the Republic and the Principate.

[341] "*tum vero, quasi scelere contaminaretur, praeceps tribunali desiluit ... at ille moriturum potius quam fidem exueret clamitans, ferrum a latere diripuit elatumque deferebat in pectus, ni proximi prensam dextram vi attinuissent.*" – 1.35.

[342] Woodman (2006, 305 – 307) traces all the verbal and pictorial instances between these two mutinies, but despite the fact that similar actions occur at different times during the mutinies and sometimes involve different characters, their parallelism was unprecedented.

[343] "*sed nihil aeque flexit quam invidia in Treviros*" – 1.41.

and it allowed for Germanicus to give "a long and emotional speech, one which promises nothing and settles noting, but merely attends on the fact of the soldiers' contrition."[344] Although Vocula was successful in stirring up a small manner of *pudor* and disorder amongst the troops, his failure to disband the mutiny and his subsequent murder betrayed the ultimate failure of a Roman commander's attempt to apply previously successful *exempla* to a mutiny. However, despite Germanicus' successful attempt to foster rivalry, and, subsequently, division between the troops, the same movement from a unified soldiery to a dispersed one, the paradoxical shift from mutiny to disorder is not present in the German mutiny.

Rather, Germanicus' closing orders to "withdraw from their contagion and to separate the mutinous" could be credited as an attempt to instil the type of disorder/obedience that Drusus achieved.[345] However, the main difference between Germanicus' and Drusus' actions was that it was Drusus who divided the troops; in Germanicus' case, he withdrew himself from leadership and gave the soldiers unthwarted licence to end the mutiny however they saw fit. Indeed, following the resultant killings, Tacitus expressly stated that "Germanicus did not stop them because this was done not by his order but was the responsibility of the soldiers".[346] Their self-motivation created a perverted kind of order during their punishment of the guilty parties as they "stood before/fulfilled the function of/acted as a substitute for, an assembly of the legions with

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[344] Ross 1973, 217.

[345] "*discedite a contactu ac dividite turbidos*" – 1.43

[346] "*nec Caesar arcebat, quando nullo ipsius iussu penes eosdem*" – 1.44.

their swords drawn."[347] Their actions had become a parody of the order/disorder that would end a mutiny. As opposed to signalling a return to order because of the troops' division, their cohesion betrayed the fact that the mutiny was not over. Furthermore, troops' actions were done of their own volition, just like at the beginning of the mutiny, when an ignorant reader could have mistaken their unity for their state under order; once again, this self-motivation betrayed a disturbance of the proper relationship between a commander and his troops. A lack of proper military hierarchy was also present in the unprecedented review of the centurions (*centurionatum*) was done, not by the commander Germanicus, but by legionnaires who sat in judgement of the centurions.[348] This was the second instance when Germanicus gave unchecked license to the soldiers and gave them the power by refusing to stop them. Therefore, his lack of complete resolution to this first phase of the mutiny allowed for another outbreak of rebellion.

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[347] The first translation that the men "stood before ... an assembly of the legions" is my own. All other translations are taken from O'Gorman (2000, 36) who discusses the range of meanings *pro contione* could have. "The exact meaning of *pro contione* then depends on the notion of metaphor; are the 'repenting' mutineers *like* an assembly, or *are* they an assembly." She also mentions another commentator Furneaux 1884 (212) who translates this passage as "after the fashion of an assembly" a translation (36), "which emphasises that the assembly was self constituted".

[348] Rutland (1987, 155) calls this scene an "a voice-vote trial of those considered most guilty among the rebels and a bloody frenzy of revenge" with the conclusion that "there was no question of Germanicus' wishes having been misunderstood." Her discussion of the unique phrase *centurionatum* also sheds light on Germanicus' uncomplimentary ambivalence to the situation. She finds that the exact definition of the term is contested, but based upon the only other surviving instance of the word in Valerius Maximus (3.2.24) meaning "a rank of centurion" and combined with the verb *egit*, it must mean some type of review of the centurions (156 – 157). The other possibility is that it meant an election of centurions; however, this definition does not fit with the following actions, so again it must mean some type of evaluation. A *centurionatum*, if it means a review of the centurions, is then unparalleled in any extant literature, despite the modest amount of mutiny narratives that survive, which suggests that such a review was not necessary in the past because other commanders had invoked harsher punishments on guilty parties. Indeed, the very fact that Germanicus often refuses to take decisive action against the mutinous troops, or any actions that would provoke ill will against himself in his relatively mild action to dismiss the guilty centurions from service, complements his character as a man who is (158) "dangerously inclined to shirk responsibility in a time of crisis".

This second rebellion had been the first group to mutiny, and, in order that their

mutiny not reach the crescendo like the one that he had just quelled, Germanicus pre-

emptively sent a letter to its commander warning him that: unless he did not execute the

leaders of the mutiny with extreme prejudice (*in malos*), then he would launch an

indiscriminate massacre (*promisca caedes*) of, presumably, all the troops.[349] As Goodyear

commented, Tacitus' use of the form *promiscus* throughout both the *Annals* and the

Histories, as opposed to the more common *promiscuus*, allowed him to recall his use of

the *miscere*, which, as I discussed previously, indicated the movement of mutinies.[350]

Furthermore, Tacitus had previously used the term *caedis* to refer both to the deaths of the

officers at the hands of the troops, as well as the execution of the guilty at the ends of the

mutinies.[351] Therefore, Germanicus' threat of a *promisca caedes* was more akin to the

disorderly massacres during the mutiny as opposed to the efficient action that Drusus took

to quell the mutiny. In it, Drusus summoned Vibulenus and Percennius and ordered them

to be killed.[352] However, Drusus' actions were not wholly successful, and after the deaths

of Vibulenus and Percennius, the ringleaders of the mutiny were cut down (*caedi*),

betraying that the mutiny was not fully over.[353] Indeed, the mutiny was only completely

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[349] "*ni supplicium in malos praesumant, usurum promisca caede*" – 1.48.

[350] Goodyear 1972, 309.

[351] Deaths of the officers: Tac. *Ann*. 1.18; *Ann*. 1.23; *Ann*. 1.32. *Ann*. 1.39. Executions of the guilty: Tac. *Ann*. 1.44 and foreshadowing the eventual massacre at *Ann*. 1.48.

[352] "*uocatos Vibulenum et Percennium interfici iubet*" – 1.29. O'Gorman 2000, 37: "what Germanicus threatens, therefore, bears more resemblance to the chaos of sedition than to some sort of limiting disciplinary action.

[353] "*tum ut quisque praecipuus turbator conquisiti, et pars, extra castra palantes, a centurionibus*

put down when the soldiers acknowledged the impiety of their actions and their need to absolve themselves.[354] The German mutiny followed a similar script; however, its resolution was more disturbed because of Germanicus' aforementioned letter.

It forced Caecina to pre-emptively kill the mutiny's guilty parties in order to save the entire company from disgrace (*cunctos infamiae*), and, presumably, death at the hands of Germanicus. A similar desire to atone for their actions was found at the end of the Pannonian mutiny, however, in this case, their atonement lay before a massacre, which they would have to again absolve themselves from. Thus, despite the chaos at the end of the Pannonian mutiny, it forced the soldiers to recognize the infamy of the actions and led to a final resolution of the mutiny. On the other hand, Germanicus, by forcing the men in the Lower Camp to pre-emptively and collectively cut down the rebellion in order to save the camp, opened up the possibility for another purging of their guilt to atone for these ordered killings. In order to stop this *promisca caedes*, Caecina was forced to slaughter both the innocent and the guilty alike (*innocentis ac noxios iuxta cadere* – 1.48.3). Tacitus explicitly named this action a *caedis*, recalling the aforementioned actions and images of a mutiny. Tacitus' final summation that this slaughter: "was done differently than all the civil battles which ever occurred" (1.49.1) concluded his belief regarding the equation of *caedis*/mutiny/civil war.[355] Indeed, it was only when Germanicus saw the full aftermath of his letter's actions that he correctly cried: "this was not a cure (*medicam*) but a disaster"

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aut praetoriarum cohortium militibus caesi" – 1.30.1.

[354] "*non aliud malorum levamentum, quam si linquerent castra infausta temerataque et soluti piaculo suis quisque hibernis redderentur*" – 1.30.

[355] "*diversa omnium, quae umquam accidere, civilium armorum facies*."

(1.49).[356] This cry also invoked the end of a series of medical images relating the idea of mutiny being a type of madness or *furor*, which characterized both the Pannonian and the German mutinies, as well as foreshadowing the madness of civil war.[357]

The Pannonian mutiny, as Tacitus explicitly stated was defined when the soldiers "moved towards madness (*furoris*)" (1.18.2).[358] Indeed, from this definitive statement it is possible to read Tacitus' introduction to the mutiny in terms of medicine and disease; it is worthwhile to transmit the entire prologue in full:

> Hic rerum urbanarum *status* erat, cum Pannonicas legiones seditio *incessit*, nullis novis *causis* nisi quod *mutatus* princeps licentiam turbarum et ex civili bello spem praemiorum ostendebat.[359]

> This was the *state* of affairs in the city, when the Pannonian legions *began* to mutiny, there was no new *cause* except because a *change* in emperor had revealed a license for dissent and hope for the prizes of civil war.

Each of these terms can be read in terms of illness or disease with: *status*, meaning one's medical condition, *incessit*, the break out of an illness, *causis*, describing the cause of disease, and finally *mutatus*, where Greek and Roman writers often saw disease resulting from change. Therefore, reading this prologue again with this subtext it would read: that the diseased condition (*status*) of the city resulted from an outbreak (*incessit*) of madness (*furoris*) amongst the Pannonian legions because of a change (*mutatus*) in emperor. A similar reading can be done throughout the entire text of the mutiny, which Tacitus

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[356] "*non medicinam ... sed cladem appellans*."

[357] In the following discussion I am indebted to Woodman's (2006) insightful and detailed work on the recurrent imagery of madness which runs through these mutinies. All conclusions unless otherwise stated are from his work.

[358] "*postremo eo furoris uenere ut tres legiones miscere in unam agitauerint*."

[359] Tac. *Ann*. 1.16.1.

repeatedly describes in the language of madness and as an outbreak of disease that needs to be healed. Indeed, Blaesus' first attempts to quell the mutiny, by beating and imprisoning the offending troops, were the same actions done to cure people of insanity. However, his actions were ineffective because of the minority he applied them to and so, it allowed the mutiny/madness to reach greater amounts of people. Indeed, those who were afflicted and singled out to be punished/cured, appealed to those who were still unaffected and corrupted them to the end that the violence flamed (*flagrantior*) higher.[360] Then the second speech, by Vibulenus, stoked the flames (*incendebat*) of the mutiny again, recalling the fever of madness that arose during the mutiny (1.23.1). This medical imagery continues through to the end of the mutiny when Drusus was given a choice of *remedia* in order to quell the mutiny (1.29). Such a phrase was particularly associated with disease, however, Drusus' *remedia* were not totally successful, as I stated previously. It was only when the soldiers realized that "there was no other alleviation for their afflictions (*malorum*) than to leave the inauspicious and infected (*temerata*) camp and to purge themselves of their guilt (*soltui piaculo suis*)" (1.30).[361] Therefore Tacitus shaped this mutiny, as well as the later German mutiny, in terms of madness and disease that had to be cured by its commander and themselves in order to fully quell the mutiny.

Similarly, the mutinous German troops were described as mad (*furentibus*) and, upon offering Germanicus the empire, he jumped off the tribunal so as not to be

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[360] Tac. *Ann*. 1.22.1. "*flagrantior inde vis*" this particular phrase also evokes disease with *vis* often being a technical term for disease, and *flagrantior* as fever, which was often symptomatic of madness.

[361] "*non aliud malorum levamentum, quam si linquerent castra infausta temerataque et soluti piaculo suis quisque hibernis redderentur*."

contaminated by their crime (*scelere contaminaretur*) (1.35.4). Tacitus' use of the word

contaminaretur suggests pollution as well as contamination, side effects, which I have

discussed previously, of the mutineers' diseased actions. Furthermore, after the outbreak,

Germanicus, just like Drusus, debated different *remedia* for the mutineers' madness.

However, when he was unable to cure them, he was forced to remove his pregnant wife

and child for their safety from such a maddened (*furentes*) group (1.41.2). Indeed,

Germanicus actually called the soldiers madmen (*a furentibus*); an action neither Blaesus

nor Drusus had taken (1.42.1). Finally, at the end of his speech he prayed for Augustus to

"wash away this stain (*maculam*) and turn (*uertant*) this civil violence to the destruction

of the enemy ... withdraw from their contagion (*contactu*) and to separate the mutinous

(*turbidos*)" (1.43.3 – 4). Thus, all the themes that characterized these mutinies were

brought up in Germanicus' speech. However, his apotropaic prayer was not enough to

fully expiate their madness. The soldiers "took pleasure the slaughter of their

compatriots", ending the mutiny, but it did not release them of their madness as "they

killed them as if (*tamquam*) it would absolve them" (1.44.4). Therefore, their camp was

polluted by their guilt as before, rather, now it was polluted because "the memory of their

crime was no less severe then its remedy (*remedii*)" (1.44.4). Their remedy, the deaths of

their fellow mutineers, was named a crime and it forced the men to leave – not because of

any acknowledgement of their maddened state, as Drusus' men had done, but only

because of their crime. This is again paralleled at the end of the second outbreak, where,

after another slaughter, Germanicus cried "that this was no cure (*medicinam*) but a

disaster" (1.49.2). However, this failure did prompt the soldiers to finally acknowledge

their madness (*furoris*) and their need to purge (*piaculum*) themselves it (1.49.3). It was only after the recognition of both their own madness and their guilt over the slaughter of their comrades that Tacitus drew the two mutinies to a close. Therefore it is quite clear that the theme of madness and disease is fundamental to these mutinies, and I argue that the reason Tacitus shaped the mutinies in this way was to again delineate these mutinies as harbingers of the later civil war.

As I have discussed previously, civil war was often characterized by disorder and chaos so it is not surprising that madness was often characteristic of civil war.[362] Indeed, prior to Tacitus, Livy developed a fairly extended connection between mutiny and madness in his account of the Sucro mutiny in 206 B.C.E.[363] Madness was a particularly apt term to define civil war because, on the one hand, it described the chaos and the disorder that plagued civil wars, and, on the other hand, it described the dissolution and powerlessness of the traditional ruling bodies at Rome including: the senate, the emperor, as well as even other commanders.[364] In contrast to this increasing powerlessness, there was, as Tacitus described in his prologue to the *Histories*, a shift in power from the consular Republic to the sole rule of the emperors.[365] This shift, which he disparagingly

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[362] Jal 1963, 422: "*furor était un véritable synonyme de bellum ciuile*."

[363] Woodman (2006 312 n. 91) does point out that although Polybius prefaces his depiction of the same mutiny with an elaborate metaphor on the relationship between mutiny and illness, it is confined to the body and he makes no mention of the type of mental illness that plagues these soldiers.

[364] Ash 2009, 96: "normal hierarchies of power have been repeatedly inverted or side-stepped and any respect for the Romans state has slowly drained away in a welter of self-destruction and violence." E.g. even the eventual winner of the civil war, Vespasian, was not free from mutinies when one of his generals Antonius Primus, after sacking Cremona, held Rome in his own stead.

[36] Devillers 2011, 164: "chapters 1.1 – 11 are a summary of the political situation on the brink of 69,

concluded as a shift toward despotism, laid the foundation for his work as a whole as an

attempt to understand the "malady of despotism".[366] This disease was, paradoxically, best

understood in the instances where the healer of this disease was often the same person

who was responsible for the spread of the disease. Indeed, just as Pompey and Augustus

were hailed as the healer (*corrigendis*) and the cure (*remedium*) for the ills of the late

Republic, their actions often propagated the same maladies that their presence was

attempting to heal.[367] Therefore, the theme of madness/disease and *remedia*, first

introduced in the *Annals*, continued throughout the *Histories.*

Indeed, Tacitus inserted his own opinion regarding Galba's decision to adopt Piso

as one motivated out of concern (*curam*) for the state.[368] However, his attempts to cure

the state merely motivated Otho's subsequent actions. Indeed, his adoption only met with

the senators' approval because they entertained private hopes and cared (*cura*) nothing for

the empire.[369] Therefore, his cures were ultimately unsuccessful in holding the empire

because of its changed nature.[370] He attempted to revert to traditional Republican cures –

adoption of a man like himself, more suited to a Republic.[371] His adoption was ultimately

so they seem like a historiographical reflection conditioned by a political statement: the concentration of power in the hands of one person."

[366] Hammer 2008, 137.

[367] Hammer (2008, 142 – 143) lays out a brief overview of their "remedies" to the state.

[368] "*credo et rei publiae curam subisse*" – 1.13.2.

[369] "*privatas spes agitantes sine publica cura*" – 1.19.1.

[370] Edwards 2011, 245: "Galba tries to apply *remedia*, but his attempts are undermined by his failure to recognize that republican paradigms can only function under the principate when the princeps wields *auctoritas*."

[371] Edwards (2011, 243): where "Galba, when addressing his men, would like to restore the republic,

unsuccessful in curing the Principate and, therefore, Otho was able to use Galba's atavism in order to muster the troops to rebellion when he asked "what camp is not soaked and polluted with blood or, as he [Galba] would say 'purged' and 'cured' (*correcta*)? For what others call crimes he calls 'cures' (*remedia*) (1.37.4)".[372] Thus, Galba's Republican *remedia* failed after the shift in values in the post Julio-Claudian Principate. However, as I discussed previously, these same *remedia* were not guaranteed to work even during the early reign of Tiberius. Furthermore, the ultimate failure of Galba's *remedia* allowed Otho's *coup* to grow and eventually succeed because Otho employed those things that were the opposite of Galba's proposed *remedia* to the state. Indeed, Tacitus described the men who followed Otho as infected (*infecit*), however, Galba's *remedia* were unable to cure them of their disease. As a result, his murder only further inflamed their infection, with Tacitus writing that Otho's violence had succeeded in infecting the entire city with Galba's blood and the violence would continue until the infection had been expiated.[373] Thus, Tacitus repeated this theme of a failure of Republican *remedia*, which was first introduced by Blaesus and Germanicus during the Pannonian and Rhine mutinies, in the later civil war.

In these, Tacitus drew a great deal of attention to the fact that prior *remedia* did not guarantee present success. Blaesus and Germanicus both attempted to re-create the

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but knows it is not possible. In the place of true republican freedom, he offers the adoption of the best man ... Tacitus uses Galba's speech to emphasize that Galba's republican sentiments will not work in the post Julio-Claudian principate." cf. *Hist*. 1.16.1.

[372] "*quae castra sunt nisi cruenta et maculata aut, ut ipse praedicat, emendata et correcta? nam quae alii scelera, hic remedia vocat*".

[373] "*populus cum lauru ac floribus Galbae imagines circum templa tulit, congestis in modum tumuli coronis iuxta lacum Curtii, quem locum Galba moriens sanguine infecerat*" – 2.55.1.

contexts of previously quelled mutinies, but were ultimately unsuccessful. It was only by interjecting disorder and rivalry into the order of the mutiny that they were able to successfully end the mutiny. However, Vocula's attempts to follow the same script ultimately ended in failure, despite a limited success in achieving the same results as Drusus and Germanicus. Thus, this last relevant mutiny was a culmination of the themes that had began in the *Annals*. Firstly, the mutinies were characterized by the soldier's immediate grievances and desires. It was only after Blaesus and Drusus opened the soldier's eyes to their civil-war like actions that the soldiers realized the power of their actions as well their present failure to achieve any lasting results.[374] Secondly, under Germanicus, the soldiers were aware of civil-war like character of their actions, and they were also in possession of a commander who would have been able to fulfil their aims as emperor. However, Germanicus failed to realize their wish, and stayed loyal to his father and emperor Tiberius. Furthermore the recurrent images of disorder/obedience and order/mutiny strongly suggested the chaos of civil war; therefore in both action and imagery these two mutinies foreshadowed later actions of civil war. Thus, Galba's attempt to recall the discipline and traditions of the past met with the same failure that Blaesus' and Germanicus' revival of responses to past mutinies had encountered. Just as Blaesus and Germanicus were forced to adopt new tactics in the face of a new mutiny, Galba's failure to adapt do so was tantamount to his failure to hold the empire. Conversely, Otho was a man who succeeded where Galba failed and embodied this new paradoxical

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[373] "*Percennius et Vibulenus stipendia militibus, agros emeritis largientur? denique pro Neronibus et Drusis imperium populi Romani capessent?*" – *Ann*. 1.28.

equivalence between order and mutiny.[375] His success in adapting to this new world,
however, brought about the civil war that these prior mutinies had threatened. Finally, in
the midst of the civil war that Otho brought about, Vocula's attempt to quell a mutiny
once again recalled all the most successful elements from prior mutinies. However, even
though he achieved some of the same successes as previous commanders, he met with the
same failure because of his inability to adapt to the changing nature of the legions

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[374] Devillers 2011, 172: "generally speaking, the account of Otho's coup d'état shows him in his way
of being, acting, and expressing himself like the regime's development itself, in contrast with Galba, who
does not adjust his behavior to the situation."

Conclusion

Throughout this work I have attempted to prove that a mutiny narrative pattern was a set-piece formula, which acted as a vehicle for its author's colourings. By this, I mean that the author shifted the focus of the narrative, wherever possible, in order to draw attention to a specific reading of the narrative, or to trace a programmatic theme throughout the text. The mutiny narrative was apt for this purpose because of its standard inclusion of a set of speeches – one from the mutineers to the soldiery, and the other from the commander to the troops. Therefore, in my first chapter, I analyzed how Polybius shaped the Sucro mutiny in order to demonstrate the particular goals of his work. The *Histories* was designed to demonstrate how Rome won hegemony over the Mediterranean, which Polybius answered – by the virtues of its people. They possessed calculation, foresight, and mental acuity and were superior to the antithetic traits of anger and nearsightedness. Inferior people, including barbarians and mobs possessed these base qualities. This was fundamental for Polybius' construct as it allowed him to demonstrate first-hand how this superiority was delineated in a smaller context, but would have had wider applications to the entirety of Rome's conquests. Indeed, Polybius linked both a civil and foreign rebellion by these negative traits, both of which Scipio was able to quell using his aforementioned virtues. Therefore, this mutiny, for Polybius, was merely a smaller event that proclaimed world-engulfing actions. What is most clear about the episode is that Scipio was able to quell both domestic and foreign turmoil using actions built on these virtues – betraying their ultimate success, and it also proved Polybius' thesis that it was because of these virtues that Rome won ultimate success abroad.

My analysis continued with this same mutiny, which was delineated in Livy's later work the *Ab Urbe Condita*. This work was written in order to provide *monumenta* with *exempla* entrenched within them in order for Livy to teach his contemporary readers ways to cure their present-day ills. However, Livy shaped Scipio, and the mutiny he was forced to quell, into a dialogue more consistent with his own time period than Scipio's own. Indeed, the specific ills of the mutiny, and its cures, were described in a way as to invoke the disturbingly common feature of the late Republic where soldiers proclaimed their commanders as their leader and launched attacks against Rome in order to fulfil their general's aims. Therefore, Scipio's ability to quell the mutiny bespoke to the way that Livy's own commander should face these mutinies, and to not acquiesce to the soldiers.

The ultimate purpose of Lucan's historical epic was to verbally express the chaos of civil war, which was tantamount to the destruction of the universe. This destruction began with a breaking of boundaries: between civil and foreign war with Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon, and with the bonds of allegiance between him and his troops. Lucan varied these themes throughout the narrative more generally, and in the mutiny scene, in order to describe the various ways that civil war destroyed, distorted, or corrupted boundaries. In this way, civil war equalled destruction of Rome and the world. The mutiny, however, was paradoxically expressed as the cure for civil war and a block to the world's destruction, because in the mutiny Caesar's troops were able to stop him from engaging in civil war.

In my final chapter I traced the verbal and pictorial resonances between two different time periods, and two different works by Tacitus. Tacitus shaped two earlier

mutinies to suggest that causes of the later civil war in 69 C.E. were already present at the advent of the Principate. The Principate ushered a new type of mutiny, and forced its commanders to adapt to this new age and new mutiny, or face disaster or death. Blaesus', Drusus' and Germanicus' first attempts to quell their respective mutinies failed because they did not recognize the now characteristic symptom of mutiny as unity. However, when this was recognized, they were able to succeed in quelling their respective mutinies. In the same way, Galba's attempts to hold the empire and his seat as emperor failed in the face of someone who negotiated with this unity of the legions, as opposed to his attempts to rekindle previous ages in his rule. The final mutiny under Vocula merely recapitulated these same themes, and showed once again the ultimate failure of blind, atavistic conservatism during the Principate and in civil wars.

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