ANTHROPOGONY AND THEOLOGY IN THE HODAYOT AND THE LETTERS OF PAUL
ADAM’S DUST AND ADAM’S GLORY: RETHINKING ANTHROPOGONY AND THEOLOGY IN THE HODAYOT AND THE LETTERS OF PAUL

By

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TITLE: Adam’s Dust and Adam’s Glory: Rethinking Anthropogony and Theology in the Hodayot and the Letters of Paul

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ABSTRACT

This study presents an investigation into and reassessment of the theological frameworks within which traditions of anthropogony, or the origin of humankind, are best comprehended in the Qumran Hodayot and the letters of Paul. The dominant framework in which such traditions are usually comprehended is that of the creation, fall, and restoration of humankind. The argument put forward is that this framework does not adequately account for the manner that both the Hodayot and the apostle Paul severely problematize created human nature and anticipate a transformation of human ontology as determined by its initial creation by God.

The study of anthropogonic traditions in the Hodayot demonstrates that the creation of Adam from dust presents an obstacle to the fulfillment of “all the glory of Adam/adam.” Through a deconstruction of the adam-of-dust motif that is inspired by the book of Job and assisted by the equation of creation from the earth and gestation in the womb, the Hodayot severely problematize the moral integrity and innate impurity of the human condition as represented by the creation of Adam. In this way, the creation of humankind from Gen 2:6-7 is put into tension with the accounts of creation in Gen 1:26-29 and Psalm 8, which stand behind exalted depictions of humankind in the Hodayot. This is shown to be an adaptation of the theodicy contained in the Treatise on the Two Spirits.

The study of anthropogonic traditions in the apostle Paul is undertaken in two parts. In the first, which deals with letters outside Romans, Paul is found to be preoccupied largely with the category of the “image of God.” It is argued that Paul
assumes the continuing operation of Adam’s creation in the “image of God” in his
descendants and that conformation to the heavenly image of Christ is, therefore, modeled
not on fall-restoration but the duality of heaven and earth, reflected in the creation of
humankind after a heavenly prototype.

In the second part, which deals with Romans, Paul is found to be preoccupied
with Adam’s relationship to creation and his proven inability to carry forward God’s
ordering work of creation, a perspective Paul introduced in 1 Cor 15:20-28. Here it is
argued that the framework that comprehends Adam’s initial state is not that of a
supernatural condition of grace or glory, but of initial innocence and immaturity and yet
also innate corruptibility, not only materially but morally. Consequently, it is only in
assimilation to the heavenly image of Christ that “Adam” can exercise dominion over
creation.
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ABBREVIATIONS


TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, I have followed the translation in the *Discoveries in the Judaeans Desert* XL for the Hodayot and *The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition* for the remainder of the scrolls (with occasional minor alterations to each). Quotations from the Hebrew Bible, Apocrypha, and New Testament are drawn from the *New Revised Standard Version* (with occasional minor alterations), unless otherwise noted. Citations from Philo are drawn from the *Loeb Classical Library*. 
Chapter 1. Introduction

Long before nature made reason rave and threw it into the transcendental illusion, the contradiction felt between the destination of man, projected in the image of primordial innocence and final perfection, and the actual situation of man, acknowledged and confessed, gave rise to a gigantic ‘Why?’ at the center of the experience of existing.

~Paul Ricoeur¹

The Questions

This study asks how the transition from the good beginning in Gen 1 to its disruptive ending in Gen 3 is understood in the corpora of two Second Temple Jewish writings, the Sectarian Psalms of Qumran—primarily, the Hodayot—and the letters of Paul. What kind of break does this disruption entail—from God’s verdict that it was good, to the sentence of death? At the centre of the investigation is that formation from dust into which God exhales the breath of life. The whole narrative hinges on how this one, who becomes two, responds to God’s command. What accounts for their disobedience, and why is their end-fate so different from the beginning, to be blown upon, not by divine breath, but by the wind that rushes through trees and tears up the dust of the earth?

A typology of myths of the beginning of evil developed by Paul Ricoeur provides a useful springboard to begin to think about these issues. He speaks first of “the drama of creation,” in which “the origin of evil is coextensive with the origin of things; it is the ‘chaos’ with which the creative act of the god struggles.” A change in type is represented “with the idea of a ‘fall’ of man that arises as an irrational event in a creation already completed.” Intermediate to the drama of creation and the fall of man is the “tragic” type

of “the god who tempts, blinds, leads astray.” Ricoeur stresses the need to go beyond the attempt at classification toward a “dynamics that has as its task the discovery of the latent life of the myths and the play of their secret affinities.” He speaks, for instance, of the “secret affinities of the Biblical myth” carrying it “toward the myth of chaos and the tragic myth,” and he severely qualifies the language of “fall,” lamenting speculations that “tend to make Adam superior and hence a stranger to our condition.”

It has been widely assumed that the Hodayot and, especially, the letters of Paul interpret the biblical witness as a straightforward example of the second type, the fall of man. This study questions in what way and to what extent that is true. It seeks to uncover the “secret affinities” that the Hodayot and the Apostle Paul find and exploit in the biblical narratives of Adam and Eve’s creation and disobedience.

After the separate analyses of the Hodayot and Paul, I will summarize the results as answers to three questions:

**What is the purpose and destiny of humankind as relayed in association with traditions of creation?**

**How is human creatureliness evaluated from the perspective of this purpose; is humanity innately equipped to fulfill it?**

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2 A fourth type Ricoeur regarded as “marginal” to the preceding triad: “the myth of the exiled soul” . . . divides man into soul and body and concentrates on the destiny of the soul, which it depicts as coming from elsewhere and straying here below, while the cosmogonic, or theogonic, background of the other myths receives little emphasis.” Ibid., 174.

3 Ibid., 171–74, some emphasis has been removed; cf. also, idem, “Evil,” ed. Lindsay Jones, *Encyclopedia of Religion* (Detroit: Macmillan, 2005). Among those “secret affinities” is the presence of the serpent in the garden (cf. p. 311), in connection with which Ricoeur speaks of evil as “already there” (p. 258).

What means are provided within the mythology of creation to comprehend negative evaluations of human creatureliness?

The Comparison, Its Rationale

This study is concerned with the use of traditions of the origin of humankind (“anthropogony”) in the theological anthropology of the Qumran Hodayot and the letters of Paul. The similarities between these two corpora in terms of the pessimistic account given of human nature and the prioritizing of divine agency in making the sinner righteous is well-documented, from the early period of research into several contemporary studies. The most significant challenge to this comparison was made by E. P. Sanders, who with the pressure of a harmonizing reading of the major Qumran


documents reduced the radical statements concerning humanity in the Hodayot to a function of their genre and of the rhetorical effect of magnifying God.\(^7\) More than one reason will be found to question this sort of argument,\(^8\) but the concern of this present study is less to compare the constructive anthropologies and systems of salvation in these corpora than it is to compare the implied and explicit hermeneutical procedures which are applied to their traditions of anthropogony. For the most part, I will let their particular theological anthropologies speak for themselves, but the effect will be to confirm the substantial agreement between them.

The insight that such a scriptural-hermeneutical perspective might form the basis of a fruitful comparison of the Hodayot and Paul emerged with the realization that both construct their negative anthropologies in large part through motifs drawn from narratives of the creation of humankind. This is widely accepted in the case of Paul. In the Hodayot, many saw it before Sanders, and then Hermann Lichtenberger sealed the case in his 1975/80 dissertation, arguing that “die Frage, wie die Sünde in die Welt gekommen ist, wird nicht mit Sünden- oder Engelfall beantwortet; Sünde beruht auf der Kreatürlichkeit

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Indeed, the startling aspect of the Hodayot’s use of creation traditions is the manner in which they get behind any contingencies of human behaviour and describe corruption as innate in the very creatureliness of the human being. In this way, “the self enacts its own nothingness,” in the words of Carol Newsom. While other ancient Jewish authors might be drawn upon to illustrate such a negative application of the creation narratives, the degree of overlap in the anthropological pessimism and prioritization of divine grace between these corpora suggests that the comparison might be especially fruitful if undertaken between them.

However, a negative conception of the human being is only one side of the coin in the Hodayot and the letters of Paul. Both corpora contain fantastic anticipations of human destiny which are set in direct relief to the dark hues with which traditions of creation, especially from Gen 2-3, are used to paint a forlorn view of the human being. The exalted destiny of the (saved) human being in the letters of Paul shows the influence of the creation narratives as well, although there is little agreement on how they are being used. Traditions concerning humankind’s creation in the image of God and its commission to rule over creation (Gen 1:26-28; Ps 8) are prominent. Whether the Hodayot’s depiction of exalted human destiny also has a basis in traditions of anthropogony is one of the questions to be asked.

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9 Hermann Lichtenberger, Studien zum Menschenbild in Texten der Qumrangemeinde (SUNT 15; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980), 90. For his particular contribution, cf. the discussion of Niedrigkeitsdoxologie in Chapter 2.

10 Carol A. Newsom, The Self as Symbolic Space: Constructing Identity and Community at Qumran (STDJ 52; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 220. I describe Newsom’s important work more at various points in Chapter 2.
That the Hodayot sustain an extraordinarily high view of human destiny while severely problematizing human ontology, apparently without a robust doctrine of the fall, will give us occasion to reconsider Paul’s use of anthropogenic traditions, and that Paul constructs human destiny as in part a fulfillment of anthropogenic traditions will give us occasion to ask whether and how the same traditions are informing the Hodayot. Although they share a related cultural space, the Hodayot do not depend upon Paul, and Paul, in all likelihood, does not depend upon the Hodayot. The juxtaposition of these corpora is heuristic, to assist us to ask new questions, perhaps answer old ones, and engender fresh insights. The remainder of this introduction therefore sets forth the most important issues of scholarly discussion to which this study is addressed.

Issues of Anthropogony in the Hodayot

There are two broad frameworks within which the origin of evil is comprehended in Second Temple Jewish literature. John Collins distinguishes these as apocalyptic and wisdom. The paradigm text for the first is the Enochic myth of the fall of the watchers (cf. 1 En. 6-36), which comprehends evil in relation to the development of traditions of the mating of the sons of God with the daughters of men in Gen 6:1-7, and for the second, one may single out the sage Ben Sira (cf. 15:11-20; 17:1-24; 25:24; 33:10-13), who privileges the narratives of Adam and Eve’s creation and disobedience in Gen 2-3. Typically, the scriptural matrix within which scholars have situated the Hodayot’s infamous texts of anthropological abasement (e.g., 1QH V 30-33; IX 23-25; XV 39-40)

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includes the J narratives of creation, particularly Gen 2-3, Ps 51, and the book of Job.\textsuperscript{12} Ostensibly, this would situate the Hodayot within the wisdom trajectory. Many recent treatments of the thought of the Hodayot confirm this setting,\textsuperscript{13} and studies related to the proliferation and development of wisdom tradition, including within the Hodayot, suggest the plausibility of this framework.\textsuperscript{14} However, Enochic elements are also to the fore in much of the Qumran literature, and several scholars have recently emphasized their presence in the Hodayot (cf., e.g., 1QH\textsuperscript{a} XI 6-30; XII 30-41).\textsuperscript{15} Stephen Hultgren, in particular, has suggested that the most severe traditions of anthropological abasement, those which tie impurity and sin to creatureliness (e.g., 1QH\textsuperscript{a} V 32; IX 24; XX 27-28), might be informed by the Enochic myth rather than the creation of Adam and Eve.\textsuperscript{16} The issue is of decisive importance for this undertaking. This study finds that the Hodayot are indeed influenced by the watchers mythology but that they have contracted all subsequent

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{12} Cf., e.g., Lichtenberger, \textit{Menschenbild}, 183; James Philip Hyatt, “View of Man in the Qumran ‘Hodayot’,” \textit{NTS} 2 (1956): 284.
\textsuperscript{16} Hultgren, \textit{Covenant}, 436–437.
\end{footnotes}
developments of human erring and failing into the creation of humankind *per se*, partly under the pressure of a heightened sense of divine sovereignty.

Related to this question is the matter of purity and sin. Scholars such as Jonathan Klawans and Hannah Harrington have argued that biblical distinctions between ritual and moral impurity breakdown in the DSS. Klawans even quips, “what is evil is impure, what is impure is demonic.” Harrington is a bit more cautious, but she asserts concerning the Hodayot that the author “describes the human being as hopelessly depraved and inherently impure.” Hultgren, we have seen, wants to push the negative significance of this category away from creation to the impure spirits that affect humankind since the *nephilim* were wiped out in the flood. William Loader cautions that human sexuality is not in fact an object of loathing. This study concludes the opposite of these two qualifications, that human sexuality is fundamentally problematic in the Hodayot, and that the roots of this problem are in Adam’s creation from dust. The specific scriptural and conceptual warrants for these claims will also be spelled out.

The antecedents of the form-critical category *Niedrigkeitsdoxologie*, a term coined by H.-W. Kuhn to describe the Hodayot’s “chains of self-abuse,” were initially identified by J. Becker as the Hebrew Bible’s *Gerichtsdoxologien*. However, these texts

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share more with the widely attested category “self abasement” and “insult formula,” specifically, what I call “anthropological interrogatives,” which derive in the Hodayot primarily through Job, and from there, through the eighth psalm. In fact, the importance of Job for the Hodayot is being noticed by others, but the argument in the following pages suggests that the full extent of this influence has yet to be noticed.

It is well known that the Hodayot are characterized not only by the “pathological abhorrence of human nature” but also by the celebration of an extraordinarily exalted destiny: “By joining the sect our author becomes somehow a citizen of heaven, an almost superhuman being.” Angela Kim Harkins and Eric Miller have argued that the motif of heavenly exaltation should be comprehended within the Enochic tradition (cf. 1QH XI 6-30; XXV 34-XXVI 9). Crispin Fletcher-Louis has made the case that heavenly exaltation reflects an implicit belief in the angelo-morphic or divine anthropology of humankind, the conviction that original humanity enjoys “ontological affinity” with God, that it “embod[ied] God’s glory.” He points to Gen 1:26-27 as providing the foundation for this conception. However, explicit links and traditional precedents for understanding this exalted destiny as an anthropological category within the Hodayot might still be

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24 Licht, “Doctrine,” 11, 101. Note the word “almost”: according to Licht, the author “does not claim to have become a member, so to speak, of the angelic choir, or to enjoy personally the company of these exalted beings; he is no mystic. The companionship of the angels is claimed through membership of the sect. . . . It is thus a choir parallel, so to speak, with the choirs in heaven” (101).
26 Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam: Liturgical Anthropology in the Dead Sea Scrolls (STDJ 42; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 94, 97.
more clearly identified. This study seeks to make such an identification with the aid of 4QInstruction and the Treatise on the Two Spirits (1QS III 13-IV 26), which are widely thought to stand in the same tradition, perhaps even to have influenced the Hodayot. I complete the study of the Hodayot with the depiction of an exalted figure par excellence, the so-called “Self-Glorification Psalm,” arguing on the basis of traditions of anthropogony that it expresses the fulfillment of the original intended destiny of humankind.

Finally, the contextualization of the Hodayot’s exalted depiction of elect humankind as an anthropological category, an enjoyment of “all the glory of adam” (1QHa IV 27), raises an issue at the heart of this study. How can the Hodayot tie a profoundly negative view of human creatureliness directly to the conditions established in creation and at the same time draw upon anthropogonic traditions to depict the exalted destiny of elect humankind? Fletcher-Louis has what might be characterized as a two-pronged approach: he argues for the concept of the restoration of Adam’s lost glory and undermines the extent to which human ontology is problematic, for the Adam created from dust has not yet entered the garden of glory: “the movement within the Hodayot from the status of a creature of dust and clay to the exalted position of the pre-lapsarian Adam in the Eden of Glory is a movement from outside to inside the cult and the community it circumscribes.” In contrast, Harkins observes that the speaker is


28 Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory, 108 (emphasis original). He adds that much cultic language has been overlooked in the Hodayot (e.g., in XI 20-24), and then offers the tantalizing suggestion that “the
confounded by his own humanity in response to celestial experience (comparing Isa 6:1-7). 29 Elsewhere, she suggests this otherworldly context as an important feature of Niedrigkeitsdoxologien in general. 30 Jason Maston insists that the psalmists read Gen 2:7 through the lens of 3:19, so as to “maintain that the very material used to create Adam is the ultimate cause of his failure.” 31 Yet Maston, too, accepts that the Hodayot are largely “a reflection on how God redeems sinners from themselves and restores to them the glory once held by Adam.” 32 Two points of nuance and caution will be added to this discussion: the abasement of Adamic ontology in the Hodayot ought to warn against reading an uncomplicated framework of fall-restoration into their employment of anthropogonic traditions; similarly, caution is also warranted about the manner that the lost glory of Adam is interpreted, since the clearest accounts of Adam’s glory as a supernatural

tension between the exalted and a transformed identity on the one hand and the earthly, fleshly creature of clay on the other . . . is a matter of . . . different modes, times and places within the liturgical and cultic world.” Ibid., 112. Eileen Schuller has pointed to possible liturgical features in some Cave 4 copies: “Some Reflections on the Function and Use of Poetical Texts Among the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Liturgical Perspectives: Prayer and Poetry in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls: Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, 19-23 January, 2000 (ed. Esther G. Chazon; STDJ 48; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 178–79. The liturgical interests of the Hodayot are now also stressed in different ways by Harkins, “A New Proposal”; Esther Chazon, “Liturgical Function in the Cave 1 Hodayot Collection,” in Qumran Cave 1 Revisited: Texts from Cave 1 Sixty Years After Their Discovery: Proceedings of the Sixth Meeting of the IOQS in Ljubljana (ed. Sarianna Metso, Donald W. Parry, and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar; STDJ 91; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 135–52. 29 Harkins, “Reading the Qumran Hodayot,” 40; cf., also, idem, “A New Proposal,” 111–12. 30 Harkins, “A New Proposal,” 111–22. Philip S. Alexander also comments that “the texts are filled with a sense of unworthiness, of the continuing burden imposed upon the mystic by the world, the flesh and the devil. The final transformation will only be achieved at the eschaton, but it clearly can be anticipated in moments of ecstasy now”; “Qumran and the Genealogy of Western Mysticism,” in New Perspectives on Old Texts: Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, 9-11 January, 2005 (ed. Esther G. Chazon, Betsy Halpern Amaru, and Ruth Clements; STDJ 88; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 215–35; cf., also, idem, Mystical Texts (ECDSS; London: T & T Clark, 2006), 74. 31 Maston, Agency, 93. 32 Ibid., 81.
property of his date at the earliest to the first century CE. It cannot be assumed that where certain amenable presuppositions are already in place so too is the fully formed tradition. Traditions develop, evolve, and one must take care not to mistake Cro-Magnon for modern man. Instead, a more thoroughgoing reading of the Hodayot in the mythological framework of the Treatise on the Two Spirits will be advanced.

Issues of Anthropogony in Paul

Pauline scholars do not know what to do with anthropogonic traditions in Paul, or to use a potentially misleading simplification, his “Adam references.” Some scholars appeal to categories of fall and restoration, sometimes while admitting their inadequacy; others assert that such categories are unhelpful and that Adam is basically an empty container in Paul, serving to supply whatever negative content is needed to put salvation in Christ into relief. The confusion that persists is still well illustrated by an article published in 1979 by John Ziesler.

“Anthropology of hope” is the term Ziesler lends to the Pauline focus on the Last, rather than the First, Adam as “the definitive man.” Ziesler argues that “Paul’s view of man is directed so firmly to the Last Adam and to the goal of man that he has no doctrine of the ‘fall’—or, to be more circumspect,” he adds, “that notions of a fall and a

33 Cf. the conclusions of John Levison, “There is remarkably little speculation about the original nature of Adam in the authors of Early Judaism which we examined”; Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: From Sirach to 2 Baruch (Sheffield: JSOT, 1988), 152–4. Jubilees, for example, is restrained about Adam and Eve’s original condition and stresses rather the extraordinary nature of Eden itself (cf. 2:7; 3:9-31). The clearest expressions of Adam’s original condition being characterized by supernatural glory, outside of the Rabbinic corpus (e.g., Gen. Rab. 21), occur in the Life of Adam and Eve (cf., e.g., Apoc. Mos. 20:1-2; 21:1-6) and (with less clarity) 2 En. 30:10-11. Neither text can be dated with confidence any earlier than the first century CE and both are often dated a good deal later than that.

34 I hesitate to use the analogy lest I be thought to degrade the early stages of the tradition. I intend no evaluation of the worth of these traditions, nor would I insult Cro-Magnon Man (to his face).

restoration perform no function in his theology.” In contrast then to Jewish traditions that focused on a glorious Adam and later Christian, especially “Augustinian,” traditions that highlighted a fall from righteousness, Ziesler correlates Paul rather with an Irenaean type of soteriology that stressed Adam’s immaturity or incompleteness. However, the identification can only be partial—in as much as Paul, Ziesler claims, “never discusses man’s original state,” but instead looks ahead (to Christ) rather than back (to Adam) for “the true definition of humanity.” It is illuminating how quickly Ziesler reverts to the idea of the fall, even though he wants to debunk the three stage framework, creation-fall-restoration. Ziesler, for instance, permits himself to “disregard” the plain meaning of 1 Cor 11:7 (“man is the image and glory of God”), which, he says, “oddly uses [Gen 1:26-27] as if there had been no fall.” The justification given for dismissing this statement is that it does not occur in a “soteriological context.”

Ziesler is not alone in struggling with Paul’s Adam statements. In his important study, The Last Adam, Robin Scroggs argues that “whereas [Paul’s] contemporaries tend to contrast the past (the first Adam) with the present, Paul uses only a contrast of the present with the future (the Last Adam).” This is because “Adam” is said to be a largely

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36 Ibid., 105.
40 Robin Scroggs, The Last Adam: A Study in Pauline Anthropology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 60. Cf., too, “The unique features of Paul’s Adamic Christology then lies precisely in the shift of these important theological functions [i.e., defining true humanity] from the first Adam to the Last” (91).
negative figure in Paul, who defines the present “fallen” condition of humanity; true humanity is revealed not in Adam but in Christ.\(^{41}\) But Scroggs fails to paint a consistent picture. He reasons that “since the world to come is a new creation, it is apparent that Paul has accepted the *Urzeit-Endzeit* formulation so characteristic of the Judaism of his day.”\(^{42}\) This guards against the suggestion “that God’s intention at creation was inferior . . . [which] would have foundered on the notion of God’s mercy and grace.”\(^{43}\) When commenting on Rom 8:20, he says, “The original paradise has disappeared and the world doomed to corruption and decay.”\(^{44}\) But this idea of original perfection does not sit well with other features of Paul’s thought as described by Scroggs: “Nowhere in the Epistles is Adam the perfect man before his sin. Paul knows only the Adam of sin and death.”\(^{45}\) Likewise, “curiously enough, Paul never says that Adam caused the loss of the glory and image which God intended for man, although he clearly knows man now lacks these.”\(^{46}\) And, yet commenting on Rom 3:23: “As a result of sin man no longer possesses that glory which he had in the beginning.”\(^{47}\) Paul’s statement that “man is the image and glory of God” (1 Cor 11:7) is attributed to a “lapse” in thinking—somehow Paul temporarily gives up the view that “man” no longer possesses these qualities as a result of the fall.\(^{48}\)

The discussion of death in 1 Cor 15:45–49, where the creation of Adam is in view, is


\(^{42}\) Scroggs, *The Last Adam*, 62.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 91.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 100.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 90–91.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 73.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 70 n. 3.
made to cohere with “Paul’s basic affirmation” of Rom 5:12;\textsuperscript{49} hence, later Scroggs imports Adam’s “fall” into 1 Cor 15, stating, “To bear the image of the man of dust means to exist in the same nature as the fallen Adam.”\textsuperscript{50}

The inconsistency of Ziesler and Scroggs illustrates the need to thoroughly rethink Paul’s Adam references as well as to seek out alternative presuppositions which might lie beneath them. Clearly, neither alternative of creation-fall-restoration nor a limited interest in Adam-the-villain accounts very well for the number and diversity of Paul’s statements. This study seeks out other presuppositions, other ways that Paul might have read Gen 1-3 in order to attempt to give a more thoroughly coherent account of anthropogony in his letters.

Scholars have begun to emphasize the inter-connected destinies and ontologies of Adam and creation. In his classic work, \textit{From First Adam to Last}, C. K. Barrett signalled his agreement with the likes of Ernst Käsemann in emphasizing the essential “cosmological” or “apocalyptic-mythical” elements of Paul’s thought in addition to the anthropological. Barrett argues that Adam gives up the vocation to exercise dominion over creation and rather becomes himself subject to hostile powers (Rom 8:38-39; Gal 4:3, 9; 2 Thess 2:1-12; Col 1:16, 20; 2:15) of a perverted creation (Rom 8:19-21).\textsuperscript{51} At present, then, creation, being fallen, does not reveal God’s true intention, which can only be known in the Heavenly Man and the process of redemption.\textsuperscript{52} Christ, therefore, must

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 73.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 83–88.
reclaim “the dominion promised to man in creation” (Rom 5:12ff.; Phil 2:5-11). This study argues that the interconnected ontologies of Adam and creation militate against the concept of an originally completed creation, which was for a time subject to Adam. Moreover, the typical “apocalyptic” emphasis on the ruination of creation will be severely qualified in as much as Paul is found on several occasions to make positive theological use of the present state of creation. This insight, moreover, into Paul’s ability to think of creation as a material reality in distinction to creation under the aspect of a spiritual-moral influence goes some way toward accounting for the different emphases in the use of Adam-traditions between Galatians, the Corinthian letters, and Philippians, on the one hand, and the letter to the Romans, on the other.

Paul’s use of the category of creation is intimately connected with that of the image of God. We have already seen Ziesler and Scroggs struggle with Paul’s positive application of the concept to present humanity. Scholars’ ubiquitous use of the language of the image of God being lost or defaced apparently reflects the assumption that if the believer is being conformed to the image of Christ, then the original image of God must be lost or tarnished. The problem is created by conceiving of the image of God strictly

53 Ibid., 16, cf. 68–87.
54 N. T. Wright likewise emphasizes the interrelated destinies of Adam and creation, but he puts a familiar twist on them, asserting that “speculation about Adam, in the intertestamental and rabbinic literature in particular . . . is not about ‘humankind in general.’ It is about Israel, the people of God”; The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991), 20. In this light “Paul’s Adam-christology is basically an Israel-christology, and is predicated on the identification of Jesus as Messiah, in virtue of his resurrection” (20). Wright’s emphasis captures an important aspect of the Adam narratives, both in their canonical and Second Temple contexts, but the bald antithesis that “Adam theology” is “not about humankind in general” “but about Israel” will be shown to be a false dichotomy. This way of framing the issue sacrifices too much of the cosmological and anthropological elements of Paul’s thought, which are reflected in his discussion of both the first and the last Adam.
as an anthropological category. Gordon Fee represents many others at present when he argues with no shortage of conviction that the original *adamic* image of God is restored in Christ, who in his humanity bore that image perfectly, because he was also God. James Dunn argues differently that Paul applies the term “image of God” exclusively to the *risen* and *exalted* Lord who in his heavenly state fulfills the vision predicated of humanity in Ps 8:(5b-)6 (with Ps 110), and bears and restores the image and glory that Adam “lost” and “failed to reach.” However, this study finds that a plain reading of 1 Cor 11:7, “man is the image and glory of God,” coheres readily, for instance, with 1 Cor 15:49, “we shall bear the image of the heavenly,” with the insight that Paul distinguishes between the earthly and the heavenly image, both of which he finds intimated in Gen 1:26-27. Scholars have been vexed over another aspect of Paul’s statement in 1 Col 11:7 (“. . . and woman is the glory of man”) which readily implies some unequal relationship between man and woman in relation to the image of God. However, the recognition of the predominately *somatic* character of Paul’s image language, recently emphasized by Stephanie Lorenzen, serves to make this claim coherent, and at the same time to show

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that 1 Cor 11:7 and 15:45-49 also serve to unlock the enigmatic statement that “in Christ” “there is no longer male and female” (Gal 3:28).

Two final areas of contribution relate to the burgeoning interest in Paul’s participatory soteriology. The focus on Gen 1-3 and Ps 8 in Paul, texts which are explicitly involved in the negotiation of human identity relative to divinity, puts the present discussion in conversation with those who are exploring the category of participation as deification, divinization, or (apo)theosis.60 Robin Scroggs may be taken as a negative example of the application of this category. Commenting on 1 Cor 15:49, he writes, “The believer is identified specifically with the resurrected humanity of the Messiah. . . . This means . . . that no question can arise as to a possible deification of the believer through his eschatological existence, for the uniqueness of Christ as kyrios is nowhere compromised.”61 The strong bifurcation in the nature(s) of Christ in Scroggs’ account of Paul’s anthropological soteriology is related to the dubious affirmation that Jesus as ἐκκόν (in 1 Cor 15:49 as well as 2 Cor 3:18; 4:6) speaks specifically to his humanity. Ironically, Scroggs’ view concerning the image into which believers are transformed is not so different from two prominent advocates of theosis. Michael Gorman argues that Christ “truly and faithfully incarnated the image of God that Adam, by his disobedience, embodied unfaithfully and falsely.”62 Thus, with believers’ “participation in the divine dikaiosynē and doxa,” Paul envisions a “new humanity” “on

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60 The importance of the Adam tradition for Paul’s participatory soteriology was highlighted by one of the early prominent proponents of this aspect of Paul’s letters, Morna Hooker; cf. the essays collected in idem, From Adam to Christ: Essays on Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Proponents of deification or theosis often stress that the concept offers a remedy to Ed Sanders’ confessed inability to contextualize Paul’s participatory language; cf. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 518–23.
61 Scroggs, The Last Adam, 88.
62 Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 36.
its way to being restored to the original glory for which it was created but that has been lost for a very long time.”  

Ben C. Blackwell, commenting on 2 Cor 4:4 and 3:18, likewise interprets the “image of God” as referring to Christ’s humanity in which believers come to share. He thinks the somatic connotation of image supports this, as well as the use of imagery from Gen 1 in 2 Cor 4:4-6. A similar interpretation is applied to 1 Cor 15:45-49. However, the argument made in this study that Paul conceives of the image of God on the model of heaven and earth and anticipates the consummation of the present Adamic image of God in the heavenly image of Christ buttresses David Litwa’s view that believers become the same image of the divine (not merely human) Christ.  

Finally, this study has relevance for the discussion of the relationship between participatory and forensic categories in Paul’s thought. An investigation into Paul’s understanding of Gen 1-3 has the potential to shed light on the subject in as much as his thinking appears to be shaped by the relational and dynamic ontologies reflected in creation as well as by the appearance of the commandment in the Eden narrative. This represents a new approach to the discussion.

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65 Ibid., 216–19.
Looking Forward

This investigation proceeds first with a study of anthropogonic traditions in the Hodayot, seeking to illuminate both its low and high anthropologies and the framework within which they are comprehended. It continues with three chapters on Paul. In the first I consider anthropogonic references outside Romans, in Galatians, 1-2 Corinthians, and Philippians, and then I continue with the somewhat different emphases of Paul’s best known letter. I bring my conclusions on Paul into a separate chapter. Finally, I conclude the whole study, directly comparing the use of anthropogonic traditions in Paul and the Hodayot, and proceeding to offer directions for further research in relation to each.
Chapter 2. Adam’s Dust and Adam’s Glory: Dichotomizing Anthropogonies in the Hodayot

In the Thanksgiving Psalms, election to knowledge of divine things and to communion with heavenly beings collides with the earthly origin and the flesh and blood ontology of the human being. Paradoxically, however, both realities are expressed in the mythological idioms of the biblical creation traditions: God must overcome the creaturely condition of the one he created from the womb of the earth in order to bring to fulfillment the destiny God creates for the human being. As will be shown, the paradox is not resolved by firmly distinguishing a pre- and post-lapsarian world, but rather the tension between human destiny and ontology is expressed as a feature inherent within divine creative will and operative from the moment of creation. This chapter will aim to show how scriptural traditions of creation, as found particularly in Genesis, Psalms, and Job, are taken up and transformed in the Sectarian Psalms’ expression of this tension. The insights gleaned will then be applied to the so-called “Self-Glorification Psalm” in order to show that the claims made therein can be contextualized as anthropological motifs expressing the same mythological portraiture apparent elsewhere in the Hodayot.

1 There is no agreed upon standard to refer to this literature. I will generally adopt the terminology of “Thanksgiving Psalm(s),” “Hodayot,” or “Sectarian Psalms” for the various collections, and typically “psalm” for individual compositions. Cf. the “note on terminology” in Eileen M. Schuller, “Recent Scholarship on the Hodayot 1993-2010,” CBR 10 (2011): 121–22.

2 Contrast, for example, Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory, who consistently distinguishes between the pre- and post-lapsarian condition of humankind in relation to the Hodayot.
Matters of Introduction and Method

The primary textual basis of this study are the Hodayot scrolls, including manuscripts of Cave 1 (1QHabc) and Cave 4 (4QHab/4Q427-432), as well as 4Q491, which preserves (a form of) the “Self-Glorification Psalm.” Very close in style and vocabulary to the Hodayot is the “Maskil’s Psalm” in the Community Rule (1QS X-XI; 4QSh/4Q256 XIX, XX; 4QSh/4Q258 VIII-X; 4QSh/4Q260 II-V; 4QSh/4Q264), and close in didactic intent is The Two Spirits Treatise (1QS III 13-IV 26; 4QSc/4Q257 V).

The Community Rule (1QS) and the Hodayot (1QHa) are classic “sectarian” texts, probably composed no earlier than the mid-second century BCE. However, manuscript evidence published subsequent to the major cave 1 copies demonstrates conclusively that both are composite documents, raising complex and still unanswered questions about their textual history. Consideration of the authorship of the Hodayot has

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7 That is, texts originating from within the movement described as separating itself from the dominant politico-religious powers of the mid to late Second Temple Period in such texts as CD and 4QMMT and thought to be responsible for the collection of scrolls stored at Qumran. On the complications involved in the terminology “sectarian,” cf. Carol A. Newsom, “‘Sectually Explicit’ Literature from Qumran,” in *The Hebrew Bible and Its Interpreters* (ed. David N. Freedman, Baruch Halpern, and William H. Propp; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 167–87.

8 The earliest manuscripts date to 100-50 BCE (4QHab), for the Hodayot, and 125-100 BCE (4QSc), for the Community Rule.
undergone major shifts of opinion: from the early assumption of unity of authorship, including the contested attribution to the Teacher of Righteousness, and then the distinction between Teacher and Community Psalms, to the (sometimes) present dissatisfaction with both the Teacher-Psalms Hypothesis and the rigid generic distinction between “Teacher” and “Community” Psalms—little is now certain, including the conclusion that the collections are wholly sectarian in provenance.

Concerning the Community Rule, of particular importance at present is the possible non-sectarian provenance of the Two Spirits Treatise, or TST (1QS III 13-IV 26), and the

9 With caution, J. Licht, “The Doctrine of the Thanksgiving Scroll,” Israel Exploration Journal 6 (1956): 2, states, “insofar as we can judge now, DST is the work of one man.” For the revival of this view, cf. n. 13. [Cross-references between footnotes are internal to their chapter unless indicated otherwise.]

10 Sukenik, Scrolls, 39.

11 Gert Jeremias, Der Lehrer der Gerechtigkeit (SUNT 2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963); Kuhn, Enderwartung.


15 Cf. Lange, Weisheit und Prädestination, 126–32.
debatable extent to which its theology is representative of the Hodayot.\(^\text{16}\) Besides 1QS, the TST is extant in only one additional version of the Rule (4QS\(^c\) V), and almost certainly never included in at least another (4QS\(^d\)). Likewise, cols. X and XI, containing the *Maskil’s* Psalm, are absent from at least one copy (4QS\(^e\)). Clearly, it would be a mistake to read the Hodayot and Rule texts as if they all reflect the same place and time in history and the same authorial point of view.\(^\text{17}\) Nevertheless, more-or-less comprehensive forms of both the Rule texts and the Hodayot are preserved, in which all the material relevant to this investigation is collected in a single composition (1QS and possibly 4QS\(^b\); 1QH\(^a\) and possibly 4QH\(^b\));\(^\text{18}\) it is at least theoretically justifiable therefore to ask how the parts might illuminate each other.

Some additional grounds suggest that the Community Rule and the Hodayot are profitably read together. They are associated with the enigmatic figure of the *Maskil*,\(^\text{19}\) mention of whom may be reconstructed at the beginning of the Community Rule,\(^\text{20}\) prefaces the TST (1QS III 13), concludes the regulations (1QS IX 12), and is found in the material introducing the times of worship and the so-called “Psalm of the *Maskil*” (1QS IX 21). Likewise, the *Maskil* is prominent in 1QH\(^a\), being mentioned in the “preface” to

\(^\text{16}\) See below, as well as nn. 35 and 77.


\(^\text{18}\) Harkins would dispute the claim that material corresponding to 1QH\(^a\) I-VIII was contained in 4QH\(^b\); cf. “A New Proposal,” 125–30. Contrast Schuller, *DJD* XXIX, 125-31.


at least four psalms (or groups of psalms) \((1QH^a\ V\ 12\ \text{[partially reconstructed]}, 21\ VII\ 21\ \text{[partially reconstructed]};\ XX\ 7\ \text{[=4QH}^a\ 8\ \text{ii}\ 10;\ 4QH^b\ 12\ \text{ii}\ 3];\ XXV\ 34), 22\) and the enigmatic figure even speaks in XX 14, giving precedent to the suggestion that it is also the \textit{Maskil} who speaks in the first person in 1QS X-XI. Beyond the mere mention of a figure, overlapping content, language, and evidence of liturgical practice further link these texts. 23 Moreover, the inclusion in 1QS of a psalm very much in the style of the Hodayot, particularly those which are immediately preceded by reference to the \textit{Maskil}, provides a sort of hinge between the works, inviting one to read the \textit{Maskil}’s psalm in tandem with not only the Community Rule but also, by extension, the Hodayot.

A legitimate question is often raised about the effort to read poetic/psalmic material for the theology it contains: Is one well-advised to do so? However one might want to reply to this in general, 24 there are special considerations applying to the present material. In his early exploration of the doctrine of the Thanksgiving Psalms, Jacob Licht expressed the conviction that the author’s “poetry proves to be to some extent a lyrical elaboration of speculative themes.” While he did not think that doctrine was meant to be inferred from the text, since it was written for those already familiar with the sect’s teachings, he remarked that “the repetitiveness of phrases and motifs” assists the outsider,

\begin{footnotesize}

22 Puech, “Quelques aspects,” 52–53, suggests that there were originally five such headings (one also at the beginning of the scroll), introducing five sections, patterned on the five books in the Psalter.

23 Evidence in the Hodayot of a community structure resembling that described in 1QS may be found particularly in 1QH\(^a\) VI 28-33 and XX 25-27.

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for “in the end a pattern of thought emerges.” But more importantly, Licht made use of the TST—“a summary statement of the sect’s doctrine”—in order to read the Hodayot (DST) for the beliefs reflected therein:25 “the result of the examination of DST can be checked with DSD [=1QS] and, where fragmentary, completed by a reference to an authentic document.”26 Licht did not adduce much evidence to support the claim that the psalms elaborate on the doctrine of the sect. However, Siegfried Schulz pointed to four characteristics of the statements concerning nothingness, misery, and justification in order to argue that they emerge from catechetical material of the yahad, namely, their presence in multiple genres, formulaic character, impersonal teaching style, and didactic quality;27 such characteristics suggested to him, furthermore, their use for initiates in the Covenant Renewal Ceremony.28 The Sitz im Leben of these texts, or their respective units, whether liturgical or private-devotional, is a matter of debate,29 but their didactic

26 Licht, “Doctrine,” 2–4. It is important to state that Licht recognized that “there are considerable differences both in details and in stress” between the documents. Note, too, Lawrence Schiffman’s not too different method of exploration of the “Faith and Belief” of the sect; he refers to the “Thanksgiving Hymns’ author’s . . . desire to convey his views through poetry” noting that a “basic theological picture of the sect emerges primarily from these two documents,” referring also to the Community Rule; Reclaiming the Dead Sea Scrolls: The History of Judaism, the Background of Christianity, the Lost Library of Qumran (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 145–57, here 145–46.
28 Ibid., 171–77; cf. also, “For What Purpose were the Hodayot Written?” in Svend Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot: Psalms from Qumran (Aarhus: Universitetsforlaget, 1960), 332–48; and Kuhn, Enderwartung, 29–33.
29 Around ten years ago, Eileen Schuller noted that scholars seemed to be weighing in favour of the private-devotional setting; cf. “Some Reflections on the Function and Use of Poetical Texts Among the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 177–79. She noted her own contrasting suggestion that the contents of certain Cave 4 copies of the Hodayot (e.g., 4Q427 and 4Q431) may reflect their use in a liturgical setting. For the private-devotional setting, cf. Bilhah Nitzan, Qumran Prayer and Religious Poetry (STDJ 12; Leiden: Brill, 1994), 321–55. Harkins’ recent studies suggesting that the Hodayot were used in the practice of “performative prayer” and “meditation” seem consistent with the private-devotional setting, although with a strong focus on religious and ritual experience; cf. Harkins, Reading With an “I.” 267, 273, also 4–8; idem, “Performative Reading”; idem, “A New Proposal.” Esther Chazon, however, detects evidence of liturgical
intention is a separate issue and, with the reconstruction of the original placement of fragments in 1QH², may be shown more clearly than was previously possible.

The Hodayot’s affinities with the corpus of Wisdom literature have been emphasized of late.³⁰ This lends added weight to the presupposition that its statements concerning creation and anthropology, major concerns of the Wisdom corpus, are the product of reflection and the intent to instruct. More specifically, the placement of fragments 15a, 15b i, and 31 at the beginning of the psalm that fills the preserved parts of col. V furnishes perhaps as clear a (fragmentary) statement of didactic intent with regard to anthropology as is found nearly anywhere in Second Temple literature:

12 [A psalm for the Instructor, that he may prostrate himself before God] deeds of God
13 [and that the simple may understand] forever
14 [that humankind may understand concerning flesh and the council of the spirits of] they walk

The didactic intention of this psalm—for the משלכני (“Instructor/Sage”)—is stated both in principle and in particular. It is intended to bring about “understanding” (להבין 2x) for the “simple” (פתי) and “humankind” (אנוש). If the content of the psalm is any indication, the text may have stated that the simple would be instructed in the ways of God, but the damage completely prevents a reconstruction; one can, however, discern the subject(s)

about which understanding is to be gained by humankind (l. 14): the “[יצר or רוח] of flesh” and “the council of the spirits of [ ]” in which humankind walks. These topics are taken up, after the “deeds of God” (cf. l. 12 [and 13?]) are described (ll. 15-30), in ll. 31-33, where the emphasis falls on “flesh,” and VI 22-27, where the emphasis falls on “spirit(s).” An effort to consider the sect’s anthropology, therefore, would be ill-advised to dismiss the statements made in this psalm.

The didactic intention of these psalms, therefore, is now more securely grounded in the explicit aims of the text than was obvious to Licht. This same material reconstruction of col. V, moreover, allows one to establish a strong presupposition in favour of reading the Hodayot in connection with the TST, at least insofar as the former can be associated with the Instructor. Note the close agreement in the statement of didactic intent and scope between 1QH¹ V 12-14 and the preface to the TST:

למשכיל להבין וללמד את כל בני אור בתולדות כל בני איש לכול מיני רוחותם אותותם במשכילות בתקיפות גופי פנים עם

13 Blank For the Instructor, that he should instruct and teach all the sons of light about the nature of all the sons of man, concerning all the ranks of their spirits, in accordance with their signs, concerning their deeds in their generations, and concerning the visitation of their punishments and the times of their reward.

The didactic intent is explicit in both col. V of the Hodayot and the TST, the anticipated actor is the same, and the subject alike is anthropology. Moreover, the similarities go beyond these formal agreements and extend to the content that these units introduce, as

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31 Puech suggested on the basis of his detection of the traces of a resh; “Un hymne essénien,” 63, 70. Stegemann (DJD XL, 78-79) saw only blackened leather here, while admitting that there is space for a word. Besides רוח (cf. XVIII 25; XXIV 6) the only other obvious candidate supplied by the Hodayot usage of “flesh” is יצר (cf. ll. 15 and 30, as well as IV 37). Qimron, Hebrew Writings, 1:64, also reconstructs יצר, without indicating the detection of a resh.
scholars have noted. But the differences, too, should be stated and assessed. Already evident in these introductory statements is the most critical distinction between the Hodayot and the TST: the explicit dualism of light and darkness, with their angels, sons, and spirits, is absent from the Hodayot. The Hodayot are hardly wanting of dualism (cf., e.g., 1QHa VII 27-33; XVIII 26-32), but they do lack a fixed terminology articulating clear conceptual boundaries that are at the same time cosmic, ethical, and psychological, such as is found in the TST. How significant is this difference? The same features are lacking in the Maskil’s Psalm in cols. X and XI of the Community Rule. Both the Hodayot and the Maskil’s Psalm place greater focus on the internal dynamic between the self as a site of negativity and as object of gracious divine action rather than the external contrast between Group A and Group B. These different emphases need not be construed as contradictions. The TST itself describes clearly both aspects of the sect’s worldview.

32 Tigchelaar, To Increase Learning, 194–207.
33 I adopt the terminological classifications for speaking of dualisms made by Jörg Frey, “Different Patterns of Dualistic Thought in the Qumran Library: Reflections on Their Background and History,” in Legal Texts and Legal Issues: Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies, Cambridge, 1995: Published in Honour of Joseph M. Baumgarten (ed. Joseph M. Baumgarten et al.; STDJ 23; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 280–85. These are 1) metaphysical: two opposed coeternal and causal powers of equal rank; 2) cosmic: the world and humanity divided in two, but the division is neither coeternal nor strictly causal; often encompasses several of the following dualisms; 3) spatial: spatial oppositions (e.g., heaven and earth) can describe a cosmic dualism, but may also function non-dualistically; 4) eschatological/temporal: two opposed aeons (not merely an expectation of final judgement); 5) ethical: humankind divided in two by virtues and vices; 6) soteriological: humankind divided by faith and disbelief; 7) theological/prophetical: God vs. humanity, Creator vs. creation, but if the opposition is not particularly emphasized the label dualistic is to be avoided; 8) physical: matter and spirit strictly divided; 9) anthropological: a subset of the previous, the opposition of body and soul; 10) psychological: two opposite principles at war within human beings.

A further distinction that has been drawn between the Hodayot and the TST concerns their pneumatology in particular: the prevailing concept in the Hodayot appears to be that the spirit of God is received upon entrance to the sect, whereas the TST implies that one’s predetermined spiritual condition is operative from birth.35 Clearly, there are important differences between the TST and the Hodayot. Nevertheless, the indications that these texts share some literary relationship as well as didactic intent and even association with the same figure establish sufficient grounds to set them alongside each other in an interpretive conversation, as it were.

The Sectarian Psalms, then, ask to be read as didactic literature,36 whose concern is to elaborate on the mysterious divine plan (see below) in relation to the cosmos and anthropology. The thesis of a didactic intent coheres well with the function Carol Newsom attributes to this literature from a socio-rhetorical perspective. She notes that

35 For a history of this discussion, cf. Arthur Everett Sekki, *The Meaning of Ruach at Qumran* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 7–69, who concludes negatively, that these are not compatible thoughts. He finds the TST pneumatology elsewhere only in 1QH² VII and 4Q186 (cf. pp. 221-223). Cf., too, John R. Levison, “Two Spirits in Qumran Theology,” in *The Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. James Charlesworth; vol. 2; Waco., Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2006), 169–94; Robert W. Kvalvaag, “The Spirit in Human Beings in Some Qumran Non-Biblical Texts,” in *Qumran Between Old and New Testaments* (ed. Frederick H. Cryer and Thomas L. Thompson; JSOTSup 290; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 159–80. Kvalvaag maintains that while the TST conceives of God creating two spirits for the human being, the Hodayot conceive of only one. Interpretive cruxes abound. The thesis that the texts differ seems sound, but difficulties remain: one must explain 1QH² IV 29, 35-37; V 14 and VI 22-23, which closely resemble the TST’s emphasis on a plurality of spirits in contexts that also speak of the singular spirit of the human being (IV 37; V 32-33), and it must address precisely what the multiplicity of spirits in either composition signifies, i.e., physiological (“animating spirit”/essence of a person), psychological (“inclination/disposition”), or trans-human, metaphysical (“angels/demons/spirits”) realities or some combination of these. Probably the most significant difference in the anthropology of the works, and one which largely explains their differently constructed pneumatologies, is the report of the Hodayot that the expectation of purification by the spirit of God in the TST at the time of visitation is already experienced in the life of the community. (This might confirm the earlier provenance of the TST.) The hastening of this re-creative act of God would be testament to the Hodayot’s even more radical anthropological pessimism and would explain the diminished significance of a teaching on two spirits, for the efficacy (though not necessarily the presence) of the “good” spirit would be negated.

“sectarian movements must be particularly explicit and intentional in constructing the language and practices that will give tangible shape to their world,” for they “had to detach members from their prior identities and offer them new ones.” Newsom demonstrates how this is achieved through the Bakhtinian phenomenon of “reaccentuation”: “Not infrequently in the Hodayot the conventional exaggeration of pious cliches (e.g., ‘no one can direct his steps’) may be taken not in the ordinary sense as a loose expression of pious humility but as the very basis for understanding one’s situation.” If Newsom is right, it would be a mistake to regard the Hodayot’s statements concerning human nature as the mere poetic reflex of pious conventions. The radical anthropology of the Hodayot sustains and shapes its readers’ unique place in the world, and should be taken with the full weight of its semantic signification.

Creation and the Divine Plan

Creation\(^\text{38}\) is a major theme of the Hodayot, especially of psalms that have been described as *Gemeindelieder* or “Community Psalms.” Daniel J. Harrington notes of 1QH\(^\text{39}\) as a whole that “creation often provides the horizon against which other theological concerns are developed.” If one spoke of the Community Psalms specifically, it could be claimed that creation is *the* major theme of such Hodayot. Some nuancing of the term “creation”


is necessary, however. There is little prolonged concern with the physical world as an entity in itself, but creation in the sense of the origin and coming-to-being of things is central. The Sectarian Psalms often explicitly preface or interweave their own anthropological statements with reflections on the preordained orderliness of the cosmos and human history, much as the TST inserts its famous statements that “from the God of knowledge stems all there is and all there shall be” (1QS III 15-16) between announcing its anthropological concerns and then developing them within an epochal scheme. Similarly, in the midst of its reflections on human lowliness (1QS XI 9-11; 11-15) the Maskil’s Psalm affirms, “By his knowledge everything shall come into being, and all that does exist he establishes with his calculations and nothing is done outside of him” (l. 11). Armin Lange argues that such texts expand on the sapiential idea of “an ethical and social order according to which God created the world and ordered human life.” The sapiential order is developed to include both a cosmic dualism, encompassing an historical order of epochs, and an “ethical” or “soteriological” dualism, according to which an individual’s participation on one side or the other is predestined.

Three psalms in the Hodayot may briefly illustrate the idea of predetermined order that governs the cosmos, history, and anthropology. The “Creation Psalm” of col. IX is thoroughly pervaded by the notion of a divine intentionality that underlies not only an initial cosmic order characterized by a mirrored duality between heaven (ll. 11-15) and earth (ll. 15-20, with an extended anthropological component, ll. 20-22) but also a history that unfolds and concludes according to the divine blueprint: “According to your will”

everything [comes] to pass” (l. 22). The psalm knows no dichotomy between “creation” and “salvation-history”; it is all one and the same, enfolded in the wise (חכמה, ll. 8, 9, 16, 21) predetermination (חכוני, ll. 19, 21; פליג, l. 20) of God. The ethical dimension of the cosmos’s blueprint comes to the fore in the opening, but fractured, lines of the psalm beginning at 1QH⁸ V 12, where a “two-ways” topos is blended into the creative intention for the cosmos: “you yourself have revealed the ways of truth and the works of evil, wisdom and folly[ ] righteousness [ ] their works, truth [ ] [ ]h and folly. All have walke[d ] [ ]m and eternal mercies for all their time[s] for peace or (for) destruction” (ll. 20-23). And in col. XX of 1QH⁸ the thanksgivings and prayers of the Maskil are to be regulated by the fixed alteration of the “dominion of light” (מבע איר לע ещל[ות]) and the “dominion of darkness” (ממשלת חושך), the cycle of which is associated with “the birthing of time, the foundations of the seasons, and the cycle of the festivals in the order fixed by their signs, for all their dominion in proper order, reliably (לכול ממשלתם בתכון נאמנה), at the command of God” (ll. 7-12). This order points beyond itself: “It is a testimony [תעודה] of that which exists. This is what shall be, and there shall be no end. Apart from it nothing has existed nor shall yet be. For the God of knowledge has established it, and there is none other with him” (ll. 12-14). Precisely what correlations exist between this cosmic order and all that exists or shall be might be glimpsed through fragmentary lines in the context which immediately follows. In a reflection on appointed times (מועדי, l. 20) of eschatological judgement (ll. 14-25), those who fear God are assured: “In the time of your [i.e., God’s] glory they will rejoice . . . fo]r according to their insight you bring them near, and according to their dominion they serve you in
[their] division[s, neither ] turning from you nor transgressing your word” (ll. 25-27). Subject matter, poetic parallels, and common vocabulary all suggest an overlapping interpretive relationship between the structure of creation, including the division between heaven and earth and the intersecting periods of light and of darkness, and the binary structure of human history and society as well as the orderliness of the community itself. The homology is accounted for by the single divine plan giving expression to each.

The order which grounds creation enables a sort of hermeneutical revolution. Both the creation, its cosmos and history, and the scriptural texts of creation can be read for signs of a prior reality, if one has been given insight into the divine plan (מחשבת). Carol Newsom demonstrates this in the TST, which shares so much language with Gen 1. She argues that 1QS 3-4 manages “to insert itself into that space” behind the moment(s) of creation that is the focus of Gen 1: “It establishes itself as the pre-text for Genesis 1. Where Genesis 1 is concerned with creation, 1QS 3-4 is concerned with the מחשבת that grounds creation. It is not just that 1QS 3-4 is to be read in the light of Genesis 1, but that henceforth Genesis 1 must be read in the light of 1QS 3-4.”42 For instance, whereas the division of light from darkness in Gen 1:4b-5 formerly “disclosed only God’s organization of the created world, now it alludes as well to an antecedent spiritual reality that informs the structures of creation,” and “the aesthetic feature of balanced pairs in Genesis 1 now takes on a moral resonance.” Newsom focuses on Gen 1, yet the TST shares much also with Gen 2-3. The Hodayot clearly share the comprehensive view of the cosmos and its history as the product of direct, divine intentionality; this chapter will

42 Newsom, Symbolic Space, 86. Emphasis added.
suggest that its deterministic view of creation has influenced the reception of Gen 2-3 as well.

From such statements concerning the divinely determined orderliness of the cosmos and human history, perhaps most scholars have been persuaded that the Hodayot and the TST express a strong form of determinism, in which the course of history is not only divinely foreknown but also unilaterally predestined. Alternatively, such texts might be read to claim that God has foreordained the course of history to the extent that God created the world with perfect foreknowledge of the course it would take, in part due to the capacities of self-determination which would inhere in it. Between these alternatives one might add the position according to which God foreordains the structures, the dualistic order of the cosmos, but leaves individuals under the power of spiritual forces outside and within them to find their place within this order. According to the latter two views, human willing would then be predetermined not in a strong sense but in a secondary sense that is contingent upon the impossibility of there being any deficiency in God’s (fore-) knowledge.

As will be seen, the second and third interpretation strain to account for the pessimistic anthropology of the Hodayot, which concerns not merely humanity in a

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moment of its own temporal contingency but rather humanity as a product of divine creative activity. This perspective will become apparent by the continued allusion to scriptural texts concerning the creation or created nature of humankind and also by the Hodayot’s explicit reference to God’s creative activity in the determination of human nature and destiny, including its baseness. Thus, it would seem that the qualities of being-human are comprehended within the positive, not merely the permissive, will of the Creator. On this suggestion the overwhelming baseness of human nature in the Hodayot does not appear the part of an “irrational intrusion” into a good creation. Rather, human nature, as it is now known, would be a native component of God’s creation and yet would not in itself possess the means to direct its own steps according to the norms and standards of God’s holiness and righteousness.

In view of the above, one might expect the Hodayot to have little use for the Chaoskampf as an explanation for the origins or present state of the world, and in a sense that is correct. The entire course of creation is the product of an all-powerful, all-knowing divine being. But the influence and power of that early mythological framework is felt in the modified dualism of the community that describes the opposition of certain metaphysical beings to those angels and human beings who are favoured by God, as well as in the terrors posed to the elect by those realms that are typically associated with chaos. These vestiges of the myth, however, do not function as first-order explanations, for behind everything stands the will of the Creator (cf. 1QM XIII 10-15).
Anthropogony: Adam’s Dust

The Sectarian Psalms are perhaps infamous for expressing, as Jacob Licht put it, “an almost pathological abhorrence of human nature.” Carol Newsom describes these texts as cultivating the “masochistic sublime” in which “the self enacts its own nothingness in radical contrast to the being of God.” They reinforce the dominant subjectivity inculcated by the Hodayot, “the fundamental characterization of the speaker as recipient of a divine gift.” She contrasts the subjectivity of Israel’s Psalms, where the language of self-abasement is primarily that of misery rather than self-loathing, and where the speaker is still capable of conceiving of the self as an operating moral agent in whom is the power “simply to do what is right” and who can “unashamedly name[s] his moral accomplishments.” There is in the Hodayot, in contrast, a “total self-repudiation.” This section will highlight the manner that statements of human loathing reflect the perception that created human nature is incongruous with the high destiny God has predetermined for true humanity. This perception of incongruence fits well with the function which Newsom attributes to statements of self-loathing, and the scriptural-didactic foundation of such statements will be emphasized.

The statements of human loathing are a persistent feature of the Hodayot, integrated into the fabric of its conceptual world. They often appear in form-critically distinct units (particularly, the Niedrigkeitsdoxologien), with numerous variations on highly stylized phrases. They appear also in less stereotypical fashion, for instance in

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45 Newsom, Symbolic Space, 220.
46 Ibid., 206. The priority of divine agency and gift is argued at length by Maston, Agency.
47 Newsom, Symbolic Space, 219–20, 269–71, in the latter instance citing Ps 119.
They sometimes form the major contrast in a psalm on which thanks is offered to God for being the object of God’s electing grace, as in XV 29-36; XV 37-XVI 4; and XVII 38-XVIII 14. They appear not only in the Community Psalms but on a handful of occasions in typical Teacher Psalms (XI 24-26; XII 30-34), though many scholars have not been convinced of their originality in this setting, if it is proper to speak of a collection of Teacher Psalms extending from cols. IX/X-XVII/XIX, then statements of human loathing are amply attested there (cf., additionally, IX 23-25; XV 35, 39-40; XVIII 5-8; XIX 15, 22-24). Moreover, the remnants of the sometimes extremely fragmentary cols. XX-XXII indicate an unparalleled degree of preoccupation with human baseness, returning to the theme over and over, as if in a refrain. Thus the anthropology of lowliness and loathsomeness is a diffuse feature of the Hodayot in general, but finding a high concentration in some Community Psalms in particular, and generally most recognizable in the those clearly demarcated chains of self-deprecation known as Niedrigkeitsdoxologien.

48 Michael Douglas provides a convenient chart of the different classifications which have been made of compositions and units within the “Teacher-block”: “Teacher Hymn,” 245.
49 Douglas argues on literary-critical grounds that cols. X-XVII are likely the work of a single author (whose “signature phrase” is הגבירכה בי), that col. IX was added as an introduction, and that cols. XVIII-XX 6 may have formed a gradually expanded conclusion; cf. Douglas, “Teacher Hymn”; idem, “Power and Praise.”
50 אזן עפר: XXI 13; איש פשע: XXII 8; בשר: XXI 7, 9, 23; יולד אשה: XXI 2, 9 (both partially reconstructed); יזר: XXI 19, 31; XXII 19; זר: XX 29, 35; XXII 12; יזר: XXI 30; ושאול לחם; יזרל פפר: XXI 17, 25, 34; יזרל לחם: XXI 12; שפ: XXI 10; וחמ: XXI 30; לחם: XX 28; מַעֲבִּד: XX 30; לחם: XX 28; מָצָא עָבָר: XX 28; מַעֲבִּד: XXII 29; מָצָא עָבָר: XX 28; מָצָא עָבָר: XX 27, 29 (2x), 34; XXI 12, 20 [4QH 13 3]; XXII 8, 30; שפ: XX 30; שפ: XX 28. And cf. the interrogatives: XX 30-31, 34-38; XXI 4-5, 7, 12, 24-26, 32; XXII 29-30.
The very name they have adopted for them indicates that scholars connect the Lowliness Doxologies to the biblical Doxologies of Judgement or Gerichtsdoxologien, declarations of God’s justice in meting out punishment. Though H.-W. Kuhn coined the neologism for the Qumran texts, it was J. Becker who first compared them to the form-critical category of Doxology of Judgement. The Hodayot produce statements of Gerichtsdoxologie (1QH a IV 32; V 36; VI 26-27; VIII 27; IX 8, 27-28; XII 31-32, 37-38, 41; XVII 9-10; XIX 10-12, 20-21; XX 22-23, 33-34) which can still be distinguished from or within the Niedrigkeitsdoxologien. These have been studied by Esther Chazon, who emphasizes that the contexts in which such statements are found now reflect the sectarian determinism and dualism of the sect, for the righteousness of God takes on the added nuance of mercy or graciousness for the one offering praise.

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51 In the category Niedrigkeitsdoxologie, cf. 1QH a IV 29-32; V 30-35; VII 34; IX 23b-29; XII 30-34; XV 31-36, 38-40; XVIII 5-14; XX 27-39; XXI 2-3, 7-13, 24-26, 31-38; XXII 8, 12, 19, 28-30; XXIII 24-28; XXVI 32-40; and also 1QS XI 9-11, 20-22; 4Q400 2 6-8; 4Q511 28 + 29 2-5. Perhaps also to be included: 1QH a III 27-32; VIII 12-14; and 4Q33 1 1-10. Typically included in the Elendsbetrachtungen, which are supposed to lack the affirmation of justice or doxology are 1QH a XI 24b-26 and XIX 22-25b, but the doxological element is not far from either (XI 20-23; XIX 21). Cf. the discussions of Lichtenberger, Menschenbild, 73–75; Tanzer, “Sages at Qumran,” 20–21; Kuhn, Enderwartung, 26–29.


The Lowliness Doxologies are characterized by some fairly consistent formal markers. They typically begin with an interrogative particle, such as מה, איכה, מי, or the first person pronoun אני, either of which may be preceded by the disjunctive waw; the pronoun “I” is generally prominent throughout, the root צדק is often present, and the most common way to refer to humanity relates to its earthly origins, such as in the terms “a creature of clay” (איש har), “structure of dust” (מענה עפר), or “a thing kneaded with water” (מגבל מים). They often pile anthropological pejorative upon pejorative, emphasizing less specific sins or acts of sinning and more the offensiveness of the human condition per se.

The content or subject-matter of the Lowliness Doxologies is, despite their name, more than the insignificance of the human person or speaker. Also prominent is the sinfulness endemic in human nature and coming to expression in human deeds (cf., especially, XII 30-31; XV 39-40; 1QS XI 9-10). And perhaps equally revealing are the aspersions cast against the impurity of humanity—terms for sexual impurities are applied to a general abhorrence of human nature as a whole (1QH a V 32-33; IX 23-24; XX 27-28). Any attempt to interpret these texts must account for all three features—finitude, sinfulness, and impurity—and not simply the first of these.

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55 Kuhn, Enderwartung, 26–29.
56 As Greenfield and Lichtenberger maintain, the phrase foreshadows the rabbinic interpretation (e.g., Midr. Gen. 14) according to which God forms Adam from dust moistened with the recently watered earth (Gen 2:6-7); cf. Jonas C. Greenfield, “Root GBL in Mishnaic Hebrew and in the Hymnic Literature from Qumran,” RevQ 2 (1959): 157–58; 161 n. 31; Lichtenberger, Menschenbild, 81–84. See, too, n. 99.
57 From 1QH a V 32-33: ערוה, “nakedness,” “pudenda” (BDB); קלון, “ignominy,” “dishonour” 1. of nation under fig. of woman = pudenda (Jer 13:26; Nah 3:5) (BDB); מקור, “spring,” “fountain”: 3. source of menstruous blood (Lev 12:7); 4. = flow of blood after child-birth (Lev 12:7) (BDB); נדה, “impurity” 1. especially of menstruation (BDB). Cf. Lichtenberger, Menschenbild, 84–85. Hultgren rejects Lichtenberger’s conclusion that the term סוד הערוה/סודו ערות קלון draws from language concerning human sexuality to speak of the impurity of the human condition; instead, citing Job 10:15; 1:21; and Gen 2:25
The broad context in which these texts occur is typically God’s omnipotence and omniscience as shown in deterministic creative acts and intentions, as described above. The immediate context to which the disjunctive waw responds is the experience of election, exemplified either by revealed knowledge (cf. V 30-31; IX 23; XVIII 5-9) and/or participation in the community of the elect, both human and angelic (1QS XI 9; 1QH a XI 23-25; XX 27; XXVI 35-36). While, in past studies, emphasis has been placed on the Lowliness Doxologies almost exclusively as a response to the experience of privileged knowledge, this rather misses the more profound disjunction they form, that between human nature and participation in the (heavenly) communion of worshippers, which such knowledge partially enables; this contrast may introduce the doxology and/or emerge within it (as in V 34; XXI 24-26).

The Lowliness Doxologies differ from their biblical namesake, the Gerichtsdoxologien, in their disconnection from historical events (personal or national) and grounding in general circumstances. As J. Becker describes, “Nicht des Menschen Verfehlung gegenüber den geschichtlichen Heilstaten am Volk Israel, sondern seine Nichtigkeit angesichts der Schöpfungstaten Gottes und ihrer Güte, durch die Gott sich als gerecht erweist, wird bekannt.” This generalization of human lowliness results in (noting the similarity between ערותה and ערות, he suggests, “it may be that also comes from reflection on created human nature and refers to nothing more than the human’s low state”; Hultgren, Covenant, 436. The point which Hultgren does not permit of the Hodayot, as shall be seen below, is precisely that they can both reflect on “created human nature” and simultaneously look down on the inherent properties of impurity that attach to it. Hultgren also fails to reflect on the collective impact of these terms in settings where they are piled one upon the other; cf. V 30-33, for instance. Moreover, he does not offer an alternative interpretation to the critical text in XX 27-28; see below.

58 For Niedrigkeitsdoxologie as a response to heavenly exaltation, cf. now Harkins, “Reading the Qumran Hodayot,” 40; idem, “A New Proposal,” 111–12.
59 Becker, Das Heil Gottes, 135–36.
60 Ibid., 139. Cf. also Kuhn, Enderwartung, 27.
statements akin to the sweeping denials of true human righteousness found in texts such as Ps 143:2 and Eccl 7:20; but those texts have little else in common with the Lowliness Doxologies form-critically conceived. In fact, the Lowliness Doxologies are often more closely aligned in terms of form and content neither with these isolated statements nor with the Gerichtsdoxologie, but rather with the anthropological variants of the biblical “self-abasement” and “insult” formulas. George W. Coats studied these; he summarizes the syntactic characteristics as comprising

two principal structural elements, an introductory question constructed as a noun clause with interrogative particle מָה or מִי and pronoun, name, or noun, and a following assertion, introduced by כִי, אֲשֶׁר or a waw consecutive imperfect and constructed around a verbal form. The second element regularly picks up the object of the first element as the subject or object of the verb or the object of a preposition.61

The formula performs a consistent semantic function: “It poses a question in element a, then abases the noun or pronoun subject by an implied answer to the question. On the basis of the implied answer, the verb in element b is negated.”62 One could paraphrase, on the model of Ps 8:5 (E: 4), which through Job, stands behind the Niedrigkeitsdoxologien: “What is a mortal that you should care for him? You should not, for he is insignificant.” This form is much better suited to the dehistoricized and thoroughly anthropological

62 Ibid., 26.
nature of the Hodayot’s concerns. Perhaps we can call these statements in which the Doxologies of Lowliness take part the “anthropological interrogatives.”\textsuperscript{63}

No agreement exists concerning how these statements are to be understood. Becker, for instance, struggled to reconcile the Doxologies’ generalization of human nullity and their celebration of God’s creative act and justice. For Becker, human sin and the order of God’s creation stand juxtaposed in unexplained antithesis. However, he deduces a sort of explanation in the antithetical structure of the \textit{Niedrigkeitsdoxologien}:

“Die Gewaltigkeit der Schöpfung offenbart dem Menschen, dass er Staub ist. Zeigte sie ferner, dass Gott in ihr sich als Gerechter erweist, so muss in Antithese dazu die Nichtigkeit des Menschen Aufweis seiner Sündenverfallenheit sein.”\textsuperscript{64} On the one hand, this antithetic structure is thought to exonerate God, who created all things well, and on the other, to place the responsibility for iniquity on humankind itself.\textsuperscript{65} But this is not entirely satisfactory, and Becker seems to have been influenced by the generic distinction that is evident, for instance, in col. IX between the Creation Psalm proper, and the worshipper’s response in the form of a Doxology of Lowliness. The solution fails if the sentiments the Doxologies express are more widespread in the Hodayot than the form

\textsuperscript{63} Cf. also Sir 18:8; 4 Ezra 8:34; 2 Bar. 48:14-17. Often elements of the complete formula are only implied, but cf. 1QH\textsuperscript{a} VII 34-35; XV 35-36; XVIII 5-7; XXV 35-36.


\textsuperscript{65} Human culpability for individual acts of sin appears to be assumed in the Hodayot; however, statements concerning human iniquity stand alongside others which connect nothingness, impurity, and sin to the physical makeup of humanity itself. Becker himself recognized this when he observed that, uniquely, in comparison with biblical texts, the Lowliness Doxologies make “flesh”/\textit{בשר} the locus of sin (cf. 1QS XI 9-15; 1QH\textsuperscript{a} XII 30-31). Thus, the magnitude of God’s creation may explain a sense of human insignificance, but, in the psalms, it does not lead, via God’s righteousness, to human iniquity; in fact, the magnitude of creation does not elicit the psalmists’ anthropological abasement so much as does the experience of election.
itself (as I have already indicated), and particularly, if the Doxologies themselves speak of humanity as part of God’s creative act.

The latter point is affirmed by Lichtenberger.\textsuperscript{66} He pointed to the use of the rare word קרץ in line 27 of 1QH\textsuperscript{a} XX, which has been restored on the basis of Job 33:6 (מדתור, קרץ, "I too was formed from a piece of clay") and is confirmed by a similar use in a few other Qumran texts (1QH\textsuperscript{a} XVIII 6; 1QS XI 22; 4Q511 28/29 4). The full statement reads, “from dust [you] took [me, and from clay] I was [n]ipped (ורצתי) as a source of pollution and shameful dishonour (למקור נדה ורות קלון) (1QH\textsuperscript{a} XX 27-28). The use of the \textit{lamed} with this verb points to the goal or purpose of the act of forming.\textsuperscript{67} God created the psalmist to be a “source of pollution and shameful dishonour.” Thus, contra Becker, in the Hodayot there is no fundamental antithesis between God’s creation and human nature. 1QHodayot\textsuperscript{a} XX 27-28 makes explicit the startling implication a reader may have drawn from the ubiquitous presence of terms drawn from the creation of humankind in contexts of self-abasement and insult, namely, that part of God’s mysterious plan includes the creation of mortals for whom sinfulness and impurity are innate to their physiology.

The Lowliness Doxologies emerge in part from the worshipper’s view of human nature as a product of God’s creation. While human nature may appear insignificant on a purely physical level in the view of the psalmists, the critical contrast is not between humankind and the rest of the created world \textit{per se}. Rather, it is between human nature

\textsuperscript{66} Lichtenberger, \textit{Menschenbild}, 88–90.

\textsuperscript{67} Cf. the “\textit{lamed} of purpose” in Bruce K. Waltke and Michael Patrick O’Connor, \textit{An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax} (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 209.
and God’s electing favour demonstrated in the possession of secret knowledge and participation in the communion of heavenly beings. With the doxologies, the psalmists marvel that one whom God created so lowly could be elected to a destiny so extraordinary. In fact, the contrast is even deeper, for in contradistinction from the eighth biblical psalm, there runs a deep *antithesis* between created human nature and the destiny God intends for the elect.

*The Man of Dust.* In the Hodayot, the reader is most often, but not exclusively, reminded of those primal humanity traditions that describe the creation of humankind from terrestrial materials; the gesture to such traditions occurs in statements involving some degree of self-predication, and, as with all scriptural inter-texts in the Hodayot, is only rarely direct and predominately by allusion. Yet not all who read these texts find or stress allusions to the Genesis accounts of creation—the nexus through which such traditions begin to be read in Second Temple times. Julie Hughes cautions that, apart from the presence of additional elements signaling a particular text, a phrase such as יִצְרָה הַחַמָר וּמְגֶבֶל הָמֵי (“creature of clay, kneaded with water”) may not be an allusion to Gen 2, despite its possible origin there, but rather merely idiomatic for human sinfulness.68 However, if it is found that a large number of Hodayot show concern with the creation of humanity *per se*, and if one regularly finds the presence of additional intertextual cues to related tradition clusters, then a strong presupposition can be made in favour of (un)conscious engagement with such traditions even in the periodic absence of more

68 Citing Job 10:9; 33:6; Isa 29:16, and Isa 41:25, she remarks, “such multiple use of a phrase is more easily explained as the use of an idiom”; she does, however, admit of an allusion to Gen 2-3 in col. XX 27-31; Hughes, *Allusions and Exegesis*, 46–47.
technical criteria for identifying them. John Elwolde’s study of interrogatives in the Hodayot confirms that such texts are preoccupied by anthropological “abasement” and “thingness” and that borrowings from traditions of the creation of Adam allow the speaker to become “everyman.”

Still, Hughes’ point is well-taken, and this study is cautious about relating every reference to adam or yetzer to the biblical myths.

A more direct challenge to reading the Hodayot’s anthropology in the light of traditions of creation is made by Stephen Hultgren. To be sure, Hultgren recognizes the dependence of the Hodayot on that pessimistic strain of the wisdom tradition (primarily represented by the book of Job) that stresses the lowly nature of the created human condition. Yet the more extreme sentiments related to human spiritual perversity and impurity he reads in the light of the Enochic tradition of the fall of the watchers, which is evident both outside the Hodayot, in texts closely related to its ideology (1 En. 15:8-16:3; Jub 7:20-33; 11:4; 4Q444 1 i 8; 4Q511 48-49+51, 2-3), and within (col. XXIV, especially). He understands, in particular, the term מִין הָנָדָה (“fount of impurity”), and, possibly, “spirit of error” and “depraved spirit” as reflecting the polluting effect of the fall of the angels and the “spirits of bastards” רוּחִי מַמְזַרְיִים on humankind. Hultgren’s case for the influence of the myth on these psalms would be strengthened had he cited col. XXIV of the reconstructed 1QH.

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70 Gary Anderson’s survey of “Adam” in EDSS, 7–9, does not reference the Hodayot at all.
71 Hultgren, Covenant, 434–36.
72 Although col. XXIV is unique in the Hodayot for its mention of “the spirits of the bastards,” vestiges of the Enochic watchers myth and various other Enochic elements are present elsewhere. Harkins in particular has drawn our attention to these; cf. Chapter 1, “Issues of Anthropogony in the Hodayot.”
73 Hultgren, Covenant, 436–37.
everlasting angels,” the column describes the “mysteries of transgression in order that flesh [בשר] be changed through [their] guilt” (ll. 8-10) and speaks of “the bastards” who act “wickedly with flesh” (l. 26). Nevertheless, even here where traces of the Enochic myth are most distinct and anthropologically relevant the key terms under discussion (besides “flesh”) are absent and statements bearing on human nature do not appear to operate on the same level of fundamental or archetypal anthropology as others that shall be encountered in this chapter. Moreover, the “change” effected on human flesh occurs in relation to the “everlasting angels” (cf. l. 8) and likely refers to the production of the “giants”—or the “bastards,” as it were; the רוחי ממזרים who act wickedly with flesh refers, as in the myth (1 En. 15:8-16:3), to the spirits of the mutant giants who presently harass the elect, the term “flesh” being singled out because it is already a suitable residence—especially the innards/bowels (תוכמים)—for deleterious spiritual influences (cf. col. IV 13-20, 35-37; 1QS IV 20; 4Q444 1 i 2-4; 4Q511 48, 49+51 3-4).74 Even in these statements, therefore, the Enochic myth does not operate as the basis from which to describe human ontology per se. The myth doubtless contributes to the Hodayot’s (and the TST’s) depiction of the human being as spiritually conflicted, but the Hodayot move the origin of this condition to the moment of creation, which provides a more suitable

74 Although this theodicy is capable of functioning independently of, and even supplanting, one based on the creation stories it clearly did neither such thing, at least in documents most closely allied with the sectarian movement behind the scrolls. Rather, as we shall see, in the Hodayot (and the Community Rule) the tendency is toward a conflation wherein later conditions, such as those represented in the Enochic myth, are contained or prepared for in the creation of humankind, a logical outworking (a “perfection”) of the predestinational framework of the more distinctively sectarian scrolls. One can already see this at work in CD II 14-III 12, where the fall of the angels has virtually no anthropological impact and the root of evil, the יצר אשמה ועני זנות II 16, is a prior innate condition affecting angels and humans equally. In the Enochic tradition, the emphasis appears reversed, with the fall of the watchers myth carrying greater anthropological ramifications than the creation traditions proper; cf. Annette Yoshiko Reed, Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity: The Reception of Enochic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 84–121.
framework to express the defining features of human anthropology within the intentions of a predetermined divine plan. The fall of the watchers remains a momentous event in the history of the mysteries of sin, but in the Hodayot it does not effect a change in human anthropology per se.

That humankind has been created from dust is an almost ubiquitous feature of the Hodayot, and in as much as the Hodayot are concerned with anthropology, terms reflecting this tradition typically carry far more semantic weight and mythological resonance than can be attributed to the automatic expressions of idiomatic speech. The tradition is reflected in a fairly consistent manner. Often the “I” of the speaker and the “everyman” of third person descriptors merge at the same time as they draw on the primal man traditions reflected in the Genesis narrative of creation from the ground.²⁵ Both the blending of identities and the scriptural borrowing are readily illustrated in col. XVIII:

[4] No one can contemplate [your] wis[dom],⁵ and on your [secret] mysteries no one can gaze. What, then, is he only אדם,⁶ pinched off c[lay] (ךָּרְצָּן), whose return is to dust (ולעפר תשובתו)—that you have given him insight into wonders such as these, and that the secret counsel of [your] tru[th]⁷ you have made known to him? As for me, dust and ashes (ואני עפר ואפר), what can I devise unless you desire it, and what can I plan for myself⁸ without your will? . . . How can I have insight unless you have formed it⁹ for me? What can I say unless you open my mouth?”

The move from “primal man” (ll. 5-7) to this “man” (l. 8) is evident, although even the primal man was not “everyman” in the strict sense, since the rhetorical point was to ask how some in the category primal man might be privy to the divine mysteries for the cosmos (ll. 6-7). The psalmist makes good on the ambiguity of the Hebrew אדם in Gen

2:7 (Adam or “the human”?) as well as making explicit the wordplay implied in the adam’s formation from הָאֲדָמָה (l. 5). In a borrowing from Job 33:6 (מהקם וַיִּרְא), the creation from dust (עפר, also Gen 2:7) blends into the picture of working with clay. And, finally, the explication of the primal man’s mortality in Gen 3:19 is echoed in the “return” (שוב) to dust (ll. 5-6). When the psalmist turns to the first person (ll. 7-9), a self-description is employed that merges the “I” with adam by again referencing the earthy composition of the primal human; both Job and Abraham used the same term of self-deprecation, “dust and ashes,” in order to contrast human finitude implicitly with God (Job 42:6; Gen 18:27; cf. also Job 30:19). The identification of the “I” with adam is even more complete in col. XX 27 as the psalmist remarks, “As for me, from dust [you] took [me] (תָּקַח [יְחַלֵּל]).” Such examples are sufficient to show that the anthropological sentiments of the psalms, including highly formulaic ones, often grapple with the tradition of the creation of adam from the earth; they do so because, even when speaking in the first person, it is human nature itself that is their concern.

The adam-of-dust tradition highlights the natural epistemic and (other) physiological shortcomings of the speaker. Human creation from dust signifies a lack of the capacity to know. In col. XVIII cited above, the creatureliness of the psalmist provokes a sense of unworthiness (“What, then, is adam,” ll. 5-6) but also poses an obstacle to knowledge (“How can I have insight?” ll. 8-9); such knowledge comes from without and despite himself. The same problem is posed and resolved somewhat more
tantalizingly in cols. V and VI, in the context of a psalm that is widely recognized to depend on 4QInstruction.\(^{76}\)

\(^{20}\) [But how i]s a spirit of flesh (רוח בשר) to understand all these things and to discern bs [ _ ] great? What is one born of woman amid all your [gre]at fearful acts? He is a thing constructed of dust and (a creature) kneaded with water. Sin[ful gu]lt is his foundation, obscene shame, and a so[urce of im]purity. And a perverted spirit rules him (ורוח נעוה משלה בו). If he acts wickedly, he will become[ a sign for]ever and a portent for dis[ta]nt generations of flesh. Only through your goodness can a person be righteous, and by [your] abundant mer[cy ] By your splendour you glorify him, and you give [him] dominion [with] abundant delights together with eternal peace for long life. For [ and] your word will not turn back. And I, your servant, know by means of the spirit that you have given me (ידעתי ברוח נתתה בי). (Col. V)

In lines 30-31 the psalmist wonders how a “spirit of flesh” can know “these things,” i.e., God’s mysterious plan for creation, which had just been described in the course of ll. 15-30. There the psalmist had already apparently identified with the “spirit of flesh” (l. 15) and had explained that “in your wonderful mysteries [you] have instructed [me for the sake of your glory” (l. 18). But now the epistemic dilemma re-emerges: How can a spirit of flesh understand? Before answering the question, its rationale is first given. The “spirit of flesh” is merely one “born of a woman.” The ensuing description of the compromised ontological status of this creature draws from the account of adam’s creation in Gen 2 (ll. 31-33, see below); this being is totally dependent upon God for righteousness (ll. 33-34) and for perfection (ll. 34-35, see below). This creature is unfit and unable by nature to grasp the divine plan. The rationale for the question being given, the answer now comes: “I know by means of the spirit that you have given me [ _ ]” (ll. 35-36). The obtuseness of

\(^{76}\) Cf. Rey, 4QInstruction, 22–28; Goff, “Reading Wisdom”; Tigchelaar, To Increase Learning, 194–207.
the “spirit of flesh” is overcome by a gift of spirit. The connection between spirit and knowledge is made again later in the same psalm: “And as for me, I know from the understanding that comes from you (מבינתך) that through your goodwill toward a person you multiply (הרב) his portion in your holy spirit (ברוח הקודשך). Thus you draw him closer to your understanding (تجישה ליבנתך)” (VI 23-24). The Joban interloper, Elihu, alluding to the tradition recorded in Gen 2:7, had asserted, “But truly it is the spirit in a mortal, the breath (ניםמה) of the Almighty, that makes for understanding” (Job 32:8), but our psalmist appears to have little confidence in the epistemic efficacy of the creaturely ontology established in Gen 2-3.

The term “spirit of flesh” occurs elsewhere in the Hodayot only in col. IV, where it appears as part of a supplication for strength to withstand the dominion of spirits which inhabit the worshipper (“for your servant is a spirit of flesh,” ll. 35-37); a similar association between “spirit of flesh” and enslavement to evil spirits is probably made in

77 Possibly, this single psalm combines the same two conceptions of pneumatology that are the grounds on which the Treatise on the Two Spirits and the Hodayot are typically contrasted, namely “spirit” as gift of God upon conversion (V 35-36), thought typical of the Hodayot (cf. XII 32), and “spirit” as one of two warring parties placed within humankind from birth (“For according to (their) spirits you cast (the lot) for them (i.e., humankind, אדם, l. 22) between good and evil,” VI 22-23; cf., too, col. IV). The following statements in col. VI, concerning “spirit,” make firm distinctions extremely difficult: “according to (their) spirits you cast (the lot) for them between good and evil” (ll. 22-23); “through your goodwill toward a person you multiply his portion in your holy spirit” (l. 24); (from a new psalm:) “you have favoured me with the spirit of knowledge to choose truth and righteousness and to abhor every unjust way. And (so) I love you freely, and with all (my) heart[” (ll.36-37). The link between the two conceptions (spirit by right of birth/spirit as subsequent gift) might be the thought that the ‘good’ spirit is to be identified with God’s; toward the end of the TST this thought may be implied (note the confluence between “[God’s] truth,” “spirit of holiness,” and “spirit of truth” in 1QS IV 20-21). However, for the Hodayot, as in 1QH IX 29-35 as well as 1QS XI 9-15, the “human” spirit must first be purified before any proper or upright function can be attributed to it. Thus, there is no real struggle between “two spirits” prior to one’s conversion to the sect.

78 On this term, cf. Frey, “The Notion of ‘Flesh’ in 4QInstruction and the Background of Pauline Usage”; Rey, 4QInstruction, 299–303; Tigchelaar, To Increase Learning, 186–88; and now with greater emphasis on the negative connotations of the term, idem, “בשר (flesh),” ed. Heinz-Josef Fabry and Ulrich Dahmen, Theologisches Wörterbuch Qumran (Stuttgart: Kolhammer, 2010).
the present psalm (“a perverted spirit rules him,” V 32-33). Yet here the term primarily connotes a being whose “fleshliness” inhibits understanding,79 which very much coheres with the appearance of the term in 4QInstruction, 4Q417 1 i 14-18, where revealed knowledge80 is accessible to “a people of spirit” (-hashem) who is “fashioned after the pattern of the holy ones,” but withheld from “a spirit of flesh” (brosh), which “did not know the difference between good and evil,” the two kinds being contrasted by allusion to Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2-3, respectively.81 Similarly in the present text, the spirit of flesh is identified with the adam of Gen 2-3, while an enlightenment by spirit effects a transformation more in line with what is predicated in the tradition of the image of God in Gen 1:26-27 (ll. 34-35; see below). Both in 4QInstruction and 1QH8 V, the adamic (“spirit of”) flesh connotes ignorance, while “spirit” connotes knowledge; however, while

79 The same implication is found elsewhere where comparable terms are employed, e.g., VIII 18-21; IX 24-25; XII 32-33; XIX 15.

80 Both texts even refer to a vision: 4Q417 1 i 16 and 1QH6 VI 18.

81 So far as I am aware John Collins was first to suggest that Gen 1-3 provides the framework for this dualistic construal of humanity; cf. “In the Likeness of the Holy Ones: The Creation of Humankind in a Wisdom Text from Qumran,” in Provo International Conference on the Dead Sea Scrolls (ed. Donald W. Parry and Eugene Ulrich; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 609–18; idem, “Interpretations of the Creation of Humanity in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Biblical Interpretation at Qumran (ed. Matthias Henze; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 36–39. The major alternative is advocated by Armin Lange, who sees the text making reference in ll. 15 and 16 to the time of the patriarchs Seth and Enosh. But the occurrence of the term “sons of Seth” (בני שית, l.15) in other Qumran texts (Jub. 22:12; JQM XI 6; CD VII 21; and 4QTestimonia I 13) shows that it alludes to Num 24:17. As such it is a cipher for the enemies of the elect, rather than a reference to the time of the patriarch and his progeny. This makes it extremely difficult to read אנו (l. 16) as a reference to the patriarch, Enosh, rather than “humankind.” Cf. Lange, “Wisdom and Predestination in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 341–43; idem, Weisheit und Prädestination. Lange’s interpretation is adopted by Frey, “Flesh and Spirit,” 397–99. For an alternative interpretation, cf. also Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, “Spiritual People,” ‘Fleshly Spirit,’ and ‘Vision of Meditation’: Reflections on 4QInstruction and I Corinthians,” in Echoes from the Caves: Qumran and the New Testament (ed. Florentino Martínez; STDJ 85; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 103–18. With different nuances of interpretation, the framework suggested by Collins is favoured by many; cf., e.g., John Kampen, Wisdom Literature (ECDSS; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 100–01; Rey, 4QInstruction, 277–306; Matthew J. Goff, Discerning Wisdom: The Sapiential Literature of the Dead Sea Scrolls (VTSup 116; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 29–36; Benjamin G. Wold, Women, Men and Angels: The Qumran Wisdom Document Musar leMevin and Its Allusions to Genesis Creation Traditions (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 124–48, including an extensive survey of interpretations.
in 4QInstruction the “spirit of flesh” designates a category of humanity opposed to God, from which the elect are distinguished. In the Hodayot it describes the deprived human condition in general, with which the psalmist identifies, testifying to the Hodayot’s more radical anthropology.

The dust-man is not only inherently deaf and dumb but also structurally and morally compromised. This is already apparent in col. V 32-33, above, but the created nature of this condition is most clearly stated in col. XX:

[27] As for me, from dust [you] took [me (תני) and from clay] I was [נ]ipped a heap of dust and a thing kneaded [with water (במים), a council of magg]ots, a dwelling of darkness. And there is a return dust for the creature of clay (ליצר חמר) at the time of [your] anger [ ]dust returns to that from which it was taken (לקח). What can dust and ashes reply concerning your judgement? And how can it understand its [d]eeds?

In this remarkable text the story of Adam has become that of the speaker (ll. 27-28, first person, earlier = the Maskil, ll. 14-15), yet not the speaker as a particular individual, but rather (in the third person now) a “creature of clay” (ll. 29-31). One can hear the story of Adam in the verbs of creation (l. 27 + the nominal יצר in of l. 29), the reference to dust kneaded with water (l. 28), and the decree of mortality—the return to dust (ll. 29-30). The confrontation between God and Adam (and Eve) echoes through the psalmist’s disavowal of any power or words with which to stand before God’s judgement (ll. 30-31; also ll. 33-

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82 Cf. 4Q416 1 12 (=418 2,2a-c,4 with diff verb); 4Q417 1 i 17; 4Q418 81 2; and once reconstructed from 416 2 ii 2-3, 417 2 ii 4 and 419 8 ii 7.

83 Cf. Rey, 4QInstruction, 301, “Contrairement aux Hymns, ou le syntagme désignait l’humanité en général, l’expression a ici un caractère fortement négatif et désigne un catégorie opposée à Dieu.” This description may fail to capture the negative valence of the phrase in the Hodayot, but it accurately defines the difference in reference the phrase has in relation to both works.
The terms reflecting sexual impurity (l. 28), here generalized of the human condition, resonate with the shame Adam and Eve feel before God in their naked creatureliness (ירע, Gen 3:8, 10, 11).

Not only does the psalmist allow the creation of Adam to reflect the creation of everyman—a natural extension of the myth itself—but he also permits the condition of everyman to be reflected in the creation of Adam. The human predicament is coextensive with human creation. The lamed of l. 28 points to the intended outcome of the verbs of creation that precede it. Thus the characterization of the human condition as a source of pollution, shameful dishonour, and a heap of dust expresses the product of divine creative-intentionality. This remarkable statement makes explicit a connection that was only implied in the stringing together of terms in col. V 31-33, above: Terms relating to creation from dust (יצר חמר, etc.) were applied to the human being in parallel with those signifying human procreation (ילוד אשה, V 31; XXI 2; XXIII 13-1-4; cf., too, XII 30-31) and sinful impurity (מקור נדה, ערות קלן, ממקור דדה, as here), overlooking any distinction that might be made between pre- and post-lapsarian humanity. Human mortality (Gen 3:19) is comprehended in human creation (Gen 2:7)—it is both an effect of creation (hence, “a council of maggots, a dwelling of darkness,” XX 27-28) and of punitive judgement (“anger,” l. 29). The negative valence of the death-bringing yetzer, as it appears in Gen 6:5 and 8:21, is possibly read back into the product of the LORD God’s work of

[^84]: Concerning 1QHא IX 25, “terrified by righteous judgements” (ונבעתה במשפטי צדק), John Elwode (“Interrogatives,” 132) suggests an “allusion to Adam’s fear of God’s discovery of their disobedience.” An allusion is even clearer here.
“forming” in Gen 2:7 (l. 29). The “history” of Adam and Eve and their descendants is contained within their creation.

If the psalmist can look forward to allow the creation of Adam to cohere with what humanity becomes, he can also look backward to read into the same creation the earlier history of the earth from which Adam was taken. A handful of texts associate Adam’s constituent parts with the materials of chaos: XXI 30 (of the same psalm), וеньк[ל]י וַאֲנִי אָמַרְתִּי לְרִּיק יָגַעְתִּי לְתֹהוּ וְהֶבֶל כִּלֵיתִי (“[a knead]ing of nought and nothingness”); XV 35, וַאֲנִי אָמַרְתִּי לְרִּיק יָגַעְתִּי לְתֹהוּ וְהֶבֶל כִּלֵיתִי (“what is a person of nothingness and a possessor of vanity”), and possibly III 29, וַאֲנִי אָמַרְתִּי לְרִּיק יָגַעְתִּי לְתֹהוּ וְהֶבֶל כִּלֵיתִי (“formlessness and a creature of clay”). Thus the qualities of the earth in Gen 1:2, its formlessness, emptiness, and dark waters, are transposed into the creation of Adam from the moistened earth in Gen 2:6-7.

The above texts are typical of the Hodayot: traditions drawn from the creation of Adam in Gen 2 are presented as an obstacle to the reception of the privileges involved in election. In Israel’s psalms the motif of Adam’s dust functions mostly as grounds to elicit divine pity; similarly, it might highlight the delimited span of meaningful human service to God, as when the psalmist laments, “What profit is there in my death, if I go down to

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85 The juxtaposition of the nouns תוהו and הבל is most closely paralleled in Isa 49:4a, where they appear not as a statement concerning human ontology per se but as a lament for the insubstantiality of the speaker’s efforts (וַאֲנִי אָמַרְתִּי לְרִּיק יָגַעְתִּי לְתֹהוּ וְהֶבֶל כִּלֵיתִי). That the juxtaposition may be inspired by this context is suggested by the additional emphasis in the psalm on the speaker’s unmerited privilege before God (וַאֲנִי אָמַרְתִּי לְרִּיק יָגַעְתִּי לְתֹהוּ וְהֶבֶל כִּלֵיתִי, l. 31), matching 49:4b, כֹּהֵן מִשְפָּטִי אֶת־יְהוָה וּפְעֻלָתִּי אֶת־אֱלֹהָי. The terms, however, when made statements of ontology, clearly evoke traditions of the creation of the world and humanity (cf. Gen 1:2; 4:2ff.; Ps 144:4; Job 7:16).
86 Where Qimron, Hebrew Writings, 1:106 makes out הרוח תוהו, “a spirit of formlessness,” Stegemann reconstructed only a final mem + והו. There are only a few minute traces of letters at this point.
87 Cf. 4Q511 28 + 29 4 [חמר קורצתי ומחושך מגב לי] “Chaos” (בשובך מתוהו) is also mentioned in 1QH IX 2 (=frg. 24), at the beginning of the “Creation Hymn,” according to the reconstruction of DJD XL, but unfortunately little can be made of it.
the Pit? Will the dust praise you? Will it tell of your faithfulness?” (Ps 30:10 [E: 9]).

While this psalmist could only imagine an extension of mortal life, the sectarian was assured of an immortal existence. Against such an exalted horizon it is not surprising that the tradition of the dust-man functions rhetorically less as grounds for pity than the illustration of an opposite or the creation of a contradiction. Even the giving of breath (Gen 2:7b) is either (nearly) entirely muted or replaced—at best by the “spirit of flesh”.

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88 Cf., too, Ps 90:3; 103:14; 104:29; also Eccl 3:20; 12:7.

89 One possible exception is IX 29-30: “You yourself created breath for the tongue” (אתה בראתה רוח בלשון), a statement later correlated to making proclamation and offering praise (ll. 31-33); however, there is little indication that the reader is to think of Gen 2:7 (the vocabulary differs entirely), and in any case, the positive function attributed to this creative act (proclamation and praise) requires first the merciful intervention of God (ll. 33-35). It is admittedly difficult to determine the significance of another expression in the Hodayot, namely, that which uses the verb יצר with הרוח (cf. VII 35 [w. 34]; IX 17; XII 32; XVIII 24) to speak of the spirit formed by God. It is to be noted that the verb is commonly used of God’s various creative activities and can be used where Gen 1-2 use אדם (e.g., Isa 45:7, 18; Amos 4:13; Jer 1:5; but cf. Zech 12:1). This expression also occurs in col. IX, where in the midst of the description of God’s fashioning the heavens and their inhabitants as well as the earth and its inhabitants, the words are preserved, “ ] for the spirit of adam that you fashioned (לרוח אדם אשר יצרת) in the world for all the days of eternity”; the possibility of an allusion to Gen 2:7 (in addition to Zech 12:1) is weakened by the statement that introduces this section, “You formed every spirit” (יצרתה כל רוח, ll. 10-11), which introduces both the spirits of the heavens and then, in transition, the spirit of adam. Elsewhere, 1QH VII 34-35 states, “But what is flesh that it should have insight into [these things? And] how is [a creature] of dust able to direct its steps? vacat You yourself have formed the spirit (אתה יצרתה רוח) and determined its activity [from of old]. And from you (comes) the way of every living being”; this may reflect a deliberate pairing of Gen 2:7a and b but it is extremely difficult to tell; in any case the point would simply be to stress that humans, righteous or wicked, are completely under the predeterministic agency of God. The same point is made in col. XII 32-33: “The way of humanity (אנוש) is not established except by the spirit God has fashioned for it (ברוח ייצר אל לו) in order to perfect a way for the sons of adam (לבני אדם).” Likewise, col. XVIII 24 has the speaker affirm, “I wait hopefully, for you yourself have formed the spirit of your servant, and according to your [will] you have determined me”; in context this is an affirmation of the speaker’s election, the fact that God has not made him depend on what is “flesh” (ll. 24-25, cf. Jer 17:5), and it may reflect the Isaianic use of the verb in context of the servant songs (Isa 43:21; 44:2, 21, 24; 49:5; cf., too, Jer 1:5). In fact, the lack of the use of the word הרוח in Gen 2:7b may have served (despite Gen 6:3, 17; 7:15, 22) as a further sign of the natural spiritual depravity of the adam-of-dust; alternatively, if one were to press the Hodayot’s attenuated reflection of the Two Spirits doctrine, then there might be found in Gen 2:7b not indications of depravity but glimmers of a contrasting spiritual orientation. In view of the difficulty of these attempts to relate these texts to Gen 2:7, the absence of the more distinctive elements of that verse (contrast 4Q504 8 recto 5), and the widespread generic use of רוח to describe God’s creation of just about any aspect of the world and cosmos, it seems likely that most of these cases are merely idiomatic.

90 As suggested by Matthew J. Goff, The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom of 4QInstruction (STDJ 50; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 98.
and at worst, the “perverted spirit.” Thus, the semantic value of the creation of Adam tradition drawn from Gen 2 is entirely negative. The peculiar force of this observation should not be missed: It is the *creation* of Adam, into which the subsequent story of Adam and his progeny is subsumed, that carries this negative semantic value—not merely what this *adam* becomes in distinction to its creation. This application of the creation story of Gen 2, startling as it may be, may reflect a sensitivity to several elements of the biblical narrative including the agreement of the punitive decree of mortality with the creation of Adam from perishable materials; that Adam and Eve’s shame before God centres on their creatureliness; the restrictions on knowledge, which is first prohibited and then of a limited nature; the readiness (or *yetzer*) with which the couple disobeyed God’s command; and finally the creation of *adam* from an earth which has an ambiguous history with the elements of chaos.

*Impurity and Sin: Refracting the Psalms and Job.* In their scriptures, the sectarians would have encountered implicitly two categories, ritual and moral impurity. The bulk of the purity regulations therein are concerned with ritual purity, and relevant to human participation in or proximity to the Israelite cult. The Holiness Code of Lev 17-27 is unique in the emphasis it applies to social practices, the language of purity referring largely to morality, and this remains the major purity concern outside of the Torah. The result is two kinds of impurity, ritual and moral, which are generally kept distinct. Ritual impurity, which attends primarily conditions of life that are inevitable, is not in itself

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91 As suggested by Levison, *Filled*, 203, referring to 1QH XI 22 (cf., too, VIII 18, “a perverted spirit has ruled over a vessel of dust”).

92 Ibid., 202–5: “nearly without exception . . . the author of many of the hymns that were preserved in Judaean caves takes the language of creation in Gen 2:7 as more than a muted harbinger of physical death; inbreathing, dust, and earth become instead the ingredients of despair” (202).
indicative of sin, and moral impurity is not typically subject to the ablutions of ritual impurity (except in metaphors) until Second Temple times.

Jonathan Klawans, though not the first, is especially to be noted for making the case that such distinctions maintained in the HB concerning matters of moral and ritual purity have collapsed in the sectarian scrolls (especially 1QS, 1QH, 1QM). Klawans formulates the dictum: “At Qumran, sin was considered to be ritually defiling, and ritual defilement was assumed to come about because of sin.”

Hannah Harrington, another prominent voice, likewise describes, a little more cautiously, “a blurring of the line, between the two types of impurity.” “Both,” she adds, “require ritual purification.”

The Hodayot are important in these studies. According to Harrington, the author “describes the human being as hopelessly depraved and inherently impure”; impurity is thus “an ontological category resulting from the human condition.”

The intimate association between the adam-of-dust motif and impurity has already been seen; the impurity of the human condition is entailed ontologically in its very creation by God. This matter-of-fact reality becomes a critical problem in the Hodayot, but it remains to be seen how this association between creation from dust and

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94 Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 88.

95 Harrington, The Purity Texts, 30.

96 Ibid., 56–57.

97 Cf. Helmer Ringgren: “there is the use of sexual expressions such as ‘erwah, shame (lit.: nakedness, pudenda) and niddah, impurity (lit.: menstrual blood). They have lost their original literal
innate impurity might be substantiated. There is evidence that it has benefitted from the equation of creation from the ground and gestation in the womb. The scriptural tradition already connects these motifs. Psalm 139:13 and 15, for instance, speak of the two acts of creation in parallel: “For it was you who formed my inward parts; you knit me together in my mother’s womb. . . . My frame was not hidden from you, when I was being made in secret, intricately woven in the depths of the earth.” An even more direct identification between the womb and the earth is achieved in Job 1:21, “Naked I came from my mother’s womb, and naked shall I return there,” and Sir 40:1, “a heavy yoke is laid on the children of Adam, from the day they come forth from their mother’s womb until the day they return to the mother of all the living” (cf. 16:30; Eccl 5:15; Gen 3:19b). Carol Newsom remarks, “The womb of the mother becomes the metaphor for the grave, and indeed for the earth, from which one comes and to which one returns.”

The psalmists transfer associations of ritual impurity to the very act of creation from dust, which is applied to themselves implicitly we might suppose through the metaphorical relationship of womb and earth. This is confirmed by the sexual terms used to belittle human ontology.

[27] As for me, from dust [you] took [me (להבתנ) and from clay] I was [n]ipped (למקור הדת השורט [האבטנים]), a heap of dust and a thing kneaded [with water (מקוי עפר ומגבל במים), a council of magg]ots (מה[ה רד רד), a dwelling of [darkness (ומדור חושך) (1QH\* XX)


Being “nipped from clay as a source of pollution and shameful dishonor” relates creation directly to impurity. Two further texts offer variations on this theme:

[31] What is one born of woman (ילוד אשה) amid all your [gre]at fearful acts? He is a thing constructed of dust and (a creature) kneaded with water. Sin[ful gui]lt is his foundation (אשמה וחטאה), obscene shame (ערות קלח), and a so[urce of im]purity (ומקור הנדה). And a perverted spirit (רוח נועה) (rules) him. (1QHª V)

[23] Yet I am a creature of clay and a thing kneaded with water, a foundation of shame (ומקור הנדה), a furnace of iniquity (כור העוון), and a structure of sin (מbufio החטאה), a spirit of error (רוח התועה), and a perverted being (ונעוה), without understanding, and terrified by righteous judgements. (1QHª IX)

Here creation from the earth timelessly comprehends the normal sexual conditions of being human, but negatively construed. Terms originally signifying (female) ritual impurity (נדיה) and especially apropos of human sexuality (ערוה, קלון) or suggestive thereof (מבקע העדות, כור העונות) are here used to convey a deep moral disgust for created human nature. Their direct juxtaposition to terms conveying innate corruption (סוד רמה, מדור חושך, אשמת החטאה, יוסי, מבנה החטאה, רוח נועה, החטאה) suggests that impurity and sinful corruption have similar symbolic significance. Innate impurity—
conveyed in creation—is not a passing, naked fact, but a state pregnant with negative connotations.

The concentration on human impurity in the above texts is given more epigrammatic expression in the Maskil’s Psalm: “in his justice he will cleanse me from the uncleanness of the human being (טהורין מנדת אנוש) and from the sin of the sons of man” (1QS XI 14-15). The parallelism in this text conforms to the close relationship the Sectarian Psalms draw between impurity and sin: The one is indicative of the other. Klawans rightly cites the ritual terminology in this text, as well as that in 1QHa IX 24 (cf. too cols. V and XX above), as evidence that the boundaries between moral and ritual purification have broken down at Qumran. Yet he seems to understand these texts as evidence that terms for ritual impurity are used to describe moral sinfulness. Since the texts are concerned above all with human physiology or ontology, it would be more accurate to say that the abhorrence which is typically reserved for matters of moral impurity is transferred here to the innate ritual impurity of the human condition.101 Ezekiel 36:17 perhaps comes closest to this in the biblical tradition: “Mortal, when the

God will refine (יברר), with his truth, all man’s deeds, and will purify for himself the structure of man (ךסם רדיה), ripping out all spirit of injustice from the innermost part 21 of his flesh (מותמיא), and cleansing him (ליו ולבו) with the spirit of holiness from every wicked deeds. He will sprinkle over him the spirit of truth like lustral water (כמי נדה) (in order to cleanse him) from all the abhorrences of deceit (תועבות שקר) and (from) the defilement 22 of the unclean spirit (והתגולל ברוח נדה).” The text nicely illustrates how the sectarians avoided a Gnostic or Greek-type anthropological dualism, where spirit is exalted above matter, and the flesh is irreparably evil. In fact, the problem with the flesh here is its spirit( ), a spirit which has been divinely given, but which will also be removed, giving the flesh an integrity it did not know even in creation. The adam-of-dust motif may encompass this anthropology through the pneumatic element in the story of the adam’s creation (Gen 2:7). This might be confirmed by the three-way relationship between the rabbinic doctrine of the two yetzers, the doctrine of the two-spirits, and its radicalization in the Hodayot. Cf. P. Wernberg-Moller, “Reconsideration of the Two Spirits in the Rule of the Community (IQSerek III,13 - IV,26),” RevQ 3 (1961): 413–41; Collins, “Interpretations.” On the relationship between the Hodayot and the TST, cf. n. 35.

101 Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 78.
house of Israel lived on their own soil, they defiled it (הָיוֹרָה) with their ways and their deeds; their conduct in my sight was like the uncleanness of a woman in her menstrual period (כטֻמְאַת הַנִּדָה).” The Hodayot share with this text (cf., too, Isa 64:5 [E: 6]) an abhorrence for ritual defilement, but differ from it in elevating ritual defilement to a normative ontological category. In Ezekiel the people’s conduct is as abhorrent as sexual impurity, but in the Hodayot people per se, as sexually impure creatures, are abhorrent. The frayed remains of the last phrases of 1QHa XXIII, in fact, appear to refer to the speaker twice as יִצְרָא תַּתָּב, an “abhorrent creature” (ll. 37-38).

A look at the scriptural antecedents of the above and related texts will highlight the intensified focus on the impurity of the human condition in the Hodayot.

The Hodayot’s deconstruction of the adam-of-dust motif is most in debt to the book of Job. Carol Newsom rightly points also to Ps 14:1b, 3//53:2b, 4 (E:3b, 5) as sharing the language of loathing, but also notes that “the language is not referred directly to the speaker.” Curiously, she cites three texts from Job (4:17-21; 15:14-16; 25:4-6) as “only remotely comparable” and denies any “direct connection between these passages and the traditions in the Hodayot.”

On the contrary, it appears that the psalmists have been heavily influenced by the book of Job. One clear connecter is the unique Joban phrase, in the HB, “born of woman” (נַשָּׁה; cf. 14:1ff.; 15:14-16; 25:4-6). It appears not only in V 31, above, but also in XXI 2 and 9 (both partially reconstructed), XXIII 13-14, and 1QS XI 20. While the term (or typically its plural) occurs in Sir 10:18

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103 Newsom, Symbolic Space, 220, n. 44.
and the NT (Matt 11:11/Luke7:28; Gal 4:4 [sing.]), only the Joban texts are linked in their contexts by form-critical elements. In particular, 15:14 and 25:4 (but cf. 14:1+4) take the shape of the “anthropological interrogatives,” which in the biblical tradition seem to develop from Ps 8:5 (E: 4). Chapter 15 of Job, for instance, reads,

14 What are mortals (ָמִּה אֱנוֹשׁ), that they can be clean (כִּי־יִזְכֶה)? Or those born of woman (יְלוּד אִשָּׁה), that they can be righteous? 15 God puts no trust even in his holy ones, and the heavens are not clean (וּלֹא־זַכְּ) in his sight; 16 how much less one who is abominable and corrupt (נִּתְעָב וְנֶאֱלָח), one who drinks iniquity like water!

And chapter 25,

4 How then can a mortal be righteous before God (וּמַה־יִּצְדַּק אֱנוֹשׁ עִם־אֵל)? How can one born of woman be pure (וּמַה־יִּזְכֶּה יְלוּד אִּשָּׁה)? 5 If even the moon is not bright and the stars are not pure (וּזַכְּ) in his sight, 6 how much less a mortal (יְלוּד), who is a maggot (רִּמָּה), and a human being (בֶּן־אָדָם), who is a worm (תוֹלֵעָה)!

Whereas there is little reason in the Joban texts to attribute any particular sexual significance to the term יְלוּד אִּשָּׁה,105 it may yet evoke such connotations for those who are inclined toward them. 1QHodayot a V 31-33 is distinguished from the Joban texts by the appearance of terms which transfer a deep ambivalence about sexuality and ritual impurity to the human being in general. It is hard, therefore, to fail to see such a move as anticipated already in that text’s use of the phrase יְלוּד אִּשָּׁה.106 This appears to be a familiar sectarian reaccentuation of the language of the biblical tradition.107 The Joban texts establish an ontological argument against the possibility of true human righteousness based on the logic of greater-to-lesser, “if not the heavenly, then certainly

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105 The language of purity is both syntactically distanced from the phrase (in 15:14) and (mostly) non-cultic.
106 Its other appearances in the Hodayot and 1QS continue to have a negative valence and associations with sin, but the sexual connotations are not as clearly to the fore: 1QH a XXI 2, 9 (both partially reconstructed); XXIII 13-14; 1QS XI 20.
not the earthly,” while the Hodayot text needs no further proof than human creatureliness itself, which bears the signs of total sinfulness in its own innate impurity.

In addition to Joban traditions, the Sectarian Psalms’ deprecation of the human condition also reflects the influence of another scriptural text. Psalm 51:7 (E: 5) reads ambiguously, והרアイ הוללתא ואבהום אתי, Two texts appear to have been influenced by this statement:

30 What being of flesh is like this ( מי בשר חמה)? And what creature of clay ( יצר חמר) is able to do wondrous greet deeds? It (exists) in sin from the womb ( והוא באמ מרחם), and until old age in faithless guilt. (1QHa XII)

39 [But I am] an unclean person ( ואני איש טמ), and from the womb of the one who conceived me ( הוריתי) I have lived in faithless guilt, and from the breasts of my mother in iniquity, and in the bosom of my nurse (attached) to great impurity (לרוב נדה), and from my childhood in blood guilt (בדמים), and unto old age in the iniquity of flesh (בעוון בשר) (1QHa XV) These are classic examples of the application of terminology of purity to moral concerns, a phenomenon known in the biblical tradition, and expressive of Klawans’ category of moral impurity. What distinguishes these texts from the biblical tradition is the insistence that this impurity attaches to the human being in utero, which is only one possible way to take Ps 51:7 (E: 5).110 If this sense is adopted of the psalm text, there is still reason to attribute it to poetic-hyperbole, whereas the same is not likely to apply to the Hodayot. The emphasis here on the human being per se as morally impure (بشر, יצר תמר, איש, אתי)

108 The appearance of this term further confirms that Ps 51 (cf. v. 16 [E: 14]) is the literary precursor to this text.
109 The text is restored based on overlapping text in 4QHb 10 1-6; the final phrase is a conjecture, for which, cf. DJD XL 212-213. Contrast these sentiments with Noah’s claims for himself in 1QapGen VI 1-2.
110 Unlike the Psalm, the Hodayot texts leave no room to implicate the mother or the process of conception in sin. The preposition mem before “womb” is indicative of the thought of the text, which spans the furthest points of the psalmist’s life to describe the saturation of the human being in moral defilement.
טמא, בעוון בשר (טמא, בעוון בשר) speaks against such an interpretation. Yet, these texts differ from the preceding examples from the Hodayot in that moral defilement, or the defilement of sin, remains the primary locus of self-deprecation, while there is little hint that ritual defilement is in view. Nevertheless, the insistence on the pervasiveness of sin and the foregrounding of human ontology and not merely the will as complicit in this condition take a step beyond the scriptural inheritance of the sectarians, at least in emphasis.

The deep loathing of human ontology which is expressed partly in the identification of ritual and moral impurity and partly in the attribution of the pervasive presence of sin in the human creature does not exist in a vacuum in the Hodayot, nor is it primarily an outgrowth of excessive prudishness and despondency. Rather it frequently operates as a foil for what is predicated of humanity in the adam-of-glory tradition, which shall be explored in more detail shortly. In particular, this ontology is ill-suited for membership in an otherworldly communion. This is clear in the Maskil’s Psalm of the Rule:

[5] My eyes have observed what always is, wisdom that has been hidden from mankind, knowledge and prudent understanding (hidden) from the sons of man, fount of justice and well of strength and spring of glory (hidden) from the assembly of flesh. To those whom God has selected he has given them as everlasting possession; and he has given them an inheritance in the lot of the holy ones (הברך קדושım). He unites their assembly to the sons of the heavens (ב nike, קדושים) in order (to form) the council of the Community and a foundation of the building of holiness (לסוד מבני קדוש) to be an everlasting plantation (למטעת עולם) throughout all future ages. However, I belong to evil humankind (לאדם רשעה, לסוד בשר Universe); my failings, my iniquities, my sins, {...} with the depravities of my heart, belong to the

This holds true for the phrase בעוון בשר, which is best understood to convey the moral defilements to which flesh is susceptible.

Hultgren suggests, against the view that they are additions, that these statements, particularly in col. XII, prepared for the more expansive and radical comments on human ontology found in the Community Psalms; Covenant, 415–16.
assembly of worms (ולסוד רמה) and of those who walk in darkness...[12] if I fall in the sin of the flesh (ואם אכשול בפשע בשר), in the justice of God, which endures eternally, shall my judgment be...[14] in his justice he will cleanse me from the uncleanness of the human being (יטהרני מנדת אדם) and from the sin of the sons of man. (1QS XI)

The text begins with motifs that will be correlated via 1QS III-IV and 1QH a IV to the motif of *adam’s* glory (ll. 5-7) and culminates in the elects’ participation in the life and worship of the angels (ll. 7-9). The elect community is described as a foundation of the building of *holiness* and an *everlasting* plantation. These extraordinary claims appear to be contradicted by the psalmist’s creatureliness: אני לא אדם רעיה (l. 9). No mere polite and pious deference, this poses a real problem: How can a human being possibly participate in the eternal and heavenly worship of a righteous God? The same contradiction between ontology and destiny is observed in 1QH a XI:

20 I thank you, Lord, that you have redeemed my life from the pit, and that from Sheol-Abaddon you have lifted me up to an eternal height (העלותי לרום עולם), so that I walk about on a limitless plain (ואתהלך במישור לאין קום). I know that there is hope (מקוה) for one whom you have formed from the dust for an eternal council (לאשר יצרתה מעפר לסוד עולם). And a perverted spirit (רוח נעוה) you have purified (טהרתה) from great sin that it might take its place with the host of the holy ones (ללהתיצב מבעמד עם צבא קדושים) and enter into community with the congregation of the children of heaven (ולבוא ביחד עם עדת בני שמים). And you cast for the man an eternal lot with the spirits of knowledge (ותפל לאי ש גורל עולם רוחות דעת), that he might praise your name in a common rejoicing (ביחד רנה) and recount your wonderful acts before all your works.

Here the divine plan for humanity (seen in its *גורל*) both creates and bridges the chasm between human ontology (לוסר עולם) and human teleology (ורח냐 ונה, etc.).

The text appears to conceive of a transformation or recreation (cf. XIX 13-17, esp. 16, חדש) of the human condition in order to make it suitable for the heavenly communion.

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113 The second term is related to created human condition in 1QH a V 30-33; cf., too, 1QS IV 20-22.
Likewise, col. VII 28-30, describing the destiny of the righteous as “eternal salvation and everlasting peace, without lack” (l. 29), interprets this anthropologically in the following way, “And so you raise his glory higher than flesh” (ותורם מבשר כבודו, ll. 29-30). As Lichtenberger argues with regard to these texts, the worshipper remains flesh, but a transformation has taken place qualitatively (purification, angelic life) and functionally (angelic activities associated with knowledge, service and praise). Sjöberg correctly stressed the agreement of this transformation with the Hodayot’s “sehr pessimistische Auffassung vom Menschen.” A “purification” (טהר) of the nature of the human-being is required in order for humankind to fulfill its destiny; so human nature is viewed as an obstacle and becomes an object of self-abasement.

How completely is this purification effected in the sectarian’s liturgical life? Opting for the overwhelming efficacy of their institutions, Fletcher-Louis points to cultic terminology and associations in the above text as evidence of the movement into paradise that occurs within the liturgical life of the community. Contrariwise, Klawans advocates for a model of “quasi-purity at Qumran” and suggests that the sectarians sustained a “culture of inadequacy” toward their own limited institutions of ritual

114 כבוד and בשר admit of at least two interpretations here. “Flesh” may be understood as “humanity” and “glory” as status, together in this sentence signifying the speaker’s superior honour compared to his fellow human beings. Alternatively, “flesh” may be taken corporeally rather than corporately and “glory” ontologically rather than (merely) honorifically, together signifying a transformation in the speaker’s creaturely nature. The second interpretation suits the predestinarian context better (cf. ll. 27ff.), as well as the confluence of these terms or their synonyms in related texts, such as XI 21-24, but also XIX 13-17 and XXVI 27-30.
117 Thematically, the text is self-evidently concerned with participation in the heavenly liturgy (סוד עולם, עדת בני שמים) and the purification (טהר) required for it (cf. 1QM VII 4-7; 1QSa II 3-9); additionally, Fletcher-Louis hears cultic associations in the phrase ותורם מבשר כבודו (cf. Mal 2:6) and מיקוה (“miqveh,” referring to the numerous physical remains of such institutions at the site of Qumran); cf. All the Glory, 108–12.
cleansing and atonement.\(^\text{118}\) For Klawans the Thanksgiving Psalms’ “pessimistic views concerning the pervasiveness of defilement and the limited human capacity to overcome it” should temper too strong an emphasis on the sectarians as a “purity-community” who view themselves as a substitute for the corrupt cult of the Jerusalem temple—or who enter into paradise, for that matter.\(^\text{119}\) Perhaps, a middle-way between these views best represents the evidence: Fletcher-Louis’ tendency to deny the eschatological element in the Hodayot\(^\text{120}\) bespeaks his over-emphasis on the present-time fulfillment of human destiny in the liturgy of the sectarians and his undermining of the psalmists’ persistent dissatisfaction with human ontology; Klawans’ privileging of the pessimism of the Hodayot strains to account for the sense one has that the psalmists have indeed already experienced something of the transcendent heavenly life. \(^\text{121}\) Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of the Niedrigkeitsdoxologie clearly signals some level of anticipation and dissatisfaction with the present situation of the sectarians. Ritual purifications in the present state of the body can only grant temporary access to an eternal hope.

In conclusion, then, the Hodayot bring sin and (ritual) impurity into a mutual relationship, such that the (ritual) impurity that inheres in the human condition is

\(^{118}\) Klawans, “Purity in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 395–96.


\(^{120}\) For instance, with reference to 4Q427 7 ii 2-7; cf. Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory, 210.

\(^{121}\) Fletcher-Louis suggests that rather than attribute the tension in the Hodayot’s anthropology to the eschatological now and the not yet one might better speak of a tension “between different modes, times and places within the liturgical and cultic world.” Ibid., 112. Yet, surely, both realities (tensions) must be maintained: there is an eschatological “now” and a “not yet,” and the “now” is manifest in the disruption of ordinary time in the liturgy of the community.
understood as symptomatic of depraved humanity generally. Thus Loader is incorrect to write of the Hodayot, “Human sexuality is an aspect of that creation which also entails living with impurity, but never appears as in itself a source of evil or as something to be despised.”\textsuperscript{122} This statement does not sufficiently account for the Hodayot’s penchant for choosing words evocative of sexual impurity or sexuality in order to characterize the human condition as morally repugnant. Loader refrains from attributing any ontological significance to such statements, despite the fact that they often answer the question “what is a human being?” Whereas Loader writes helpfully that the Hodayot pose the paradox of “reconciling self-deprecation and belief in divine creation” and rightly suggests that “theistic predestination” makes such a paradox possible,\textsuperscript{123} he steps back from the implications of this when he echoes J. Becker’s view that human sin is simply confessed without any reflection on its origin.\textsuperscript{124} Conversely, I have pointed to indications that human sin and impurity are grounded in creation. Human sexuality is deeply problematic for these psalmists and emblematic of a human creature whose proper destiny is intrinsically out-of-reach.\textsuperscript{125} Like death and decay, even the occasional taint of ritual defilement is ultimately irreconcilable with eternal life in a heavenly liturgy. From such an otherworldly perspective, if once ritually defiled, then always ritually defiled.

\textit{A Mortal in the Presence of its Maker: On a Theme from Job.} As is now clear, the Hodayot wrestle profoundly with the problem of how a human being can stand in the presence of God. A common motif of religious thought concerns the strain which is put

\textsuperscript{122} Loader, \textit{Sexuality}, 254 (cf. 250–54; 348–51).
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 250–51.
\textsuperscript{125} Similarly, cf. Schiffman, \textit{Reclaiming}, 151.
on the humanity of one who comes before the divine, and the biblical tradition furnishes numerous examples. With a few others who have early and of late emphasized the importance of the book of Job for the Hodayot, I want to suggest that the author(s) of these psalms were deeply affected by its probing of this theme.

The topic of “standing before God” is a significant feature of each section of the book of Job. One may begin with the implicit contrast between human and divine beings (בני אלהים) in the prologue; whereas the latter routinely present themselves before the LORD (לְהִתְיַצֵּב עַל־יְהוָה, 1:6; 2:1), in direct open communication, Job has not the benefit of direct access, though he does appear as God’s “servant” (עֶבֶד) and performs the functions of a priest, mediating between his family and God (1:5). The same divine figures appear as a chorus of worshippers privy to the secrets of the universe in the Whirlwind Speeches in order to remind Job of his own lack of knowledge (38:4-7). In the dialogues, Job’s harmonious relationship with God famously breaks down: while his friends insist that he cannot be pure or righteous before God (4:17, 15:14; 25:4), Job

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126 Berg, “Religious Epistemologies.” William Tooman points to two instances of uniquely Joban expressions reflected in the Hodayot: “Between Imitation and Interpretation: Reuse of Scripture and Composition in Hodayot (IQHa) 11:6-19,” DSD 18 (2011): 69–70. More expansively, Dwight Swanson points to evidence that the Elihu speeches shaped the Maskil’s instruction in 4QCrypt, culminating in the suggestion that “the editor who placed the Elihu speech in the book of Job is presenting a viewpoint which uses catchwords of a group which later is represented at Qumran—for the purpose of showing the inadequacy of its arguments. In Job, then, we may be witness to one of the early arguments involving the precursors of the Qumran community”; cf. Dwight D. Swanson, “4QCrypa Words of the Maskil to All Sons of Dawn: The Path of the Virtuous Life,” in Sapiential, Liturgical and Poetical Texts from Qumran: Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies, Oslo, 1998: Published in Memory of Maurice Baillet (ed. Maurice Baillet et al.; STDJ 35; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 53–56, here 56. In early scholarship, Hans Kosmala, Hebräer, Essener, Christen: Studien zur Vorgeschichte der frühchristlichen Verkündigung (Leiden: Brill, 1959), 292, spoke of Job as an Essene “Vorbild.” E. W. Tuinstra argued that the Aramaic translation of Job (11Q10) made the figure of Job typological of the Teacher of Righteousness; Hermeneutische aspecten van de Targum van Job uit grot XI van Qumran (Groningen: Dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit te Groningen, 1970), 66–69. Others have highlighted a similar theology of suffering; cf. Jean Carmignac, “La théologie de la souffrance dans les hymnes de Qumrân,” RevQ 3 (1961): 386. In light of evidence to be discussed below, it does not seem unlikely that the Hodayot are indebted to 11Q10.
protests that he is, but that as a mere hireling or slave labourer (7:1-2), he lacks an effective setting or mediator by which to establish his case before an almighty God (chs. 9-10). If God would withdraw his hand a bit, then maybe Job could answer and challenge him (9:34; 13:22); instead, God remains a hidden adversary (13:24). As the dialogues unfold, Job becomes more hopeful of finding a mediator and seeing God in his flesh (cp. 9:33, מִכִּיחַ; 16:18-22, דַע, דַעְש, and מָמֵּית; 19:23-27, לָאָלָה), and thus he grows bolder about the prospect of facing God in a lawsuit. He ends his personal defence with the confidence to assert that he would “approach” (קָרַב) God “as a prince” (נָגִּיד, 31:37).

When, at last, Job’s eye sees God (cf. 42:5) in a tempest (סְעָרָה, 38:1; 40:6), with no mediator between them, Job’s initial fears of divine power appear to come to fruition: Can Job gird his loins and stand to answer the Creator of the universe (38:3; 40:7)? Does he have knowledge of (divine) counsel (עֵצָה, 12:13; 38:2; 40:3; סוֹד, 15:8), the wonders of God (נִפְלָאוֹת, 5:9; 9:10; 37:14; 42:3)? Despite his stuttering, deferential offerings (40:4-5; 42:2-6), which suggest that things might turn badly for him, Job appears finally to be vindicated and restored as priest and servant of God (42:7-8).

The focus will be primarily on two passages from 1QH² XX-XXII. They are, alas, very fragmentary but anthropologically rich. Two initial sections demonstrate the Maskil’s possession of “wondrous secret counsel” (סוד פלאכה XX 15): his worship is properly synchronized to the variations in the cosmos (ll. 7-15) and his community is synchronized to the divine will (ll. 15-27). But he is painfully aware that none of this can

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be attributed to his own merit nor is it even compatible with what he knows of his humanity as such. In order to express this, the psalmist launches into a familiar *Niedrigkeitsdoxologie*, the individual motifs of which appear, uniquely, again and again throughout these columns.\(^{128}\)

As the initial doxology demonstrates (i.e., 1QH\(^a\) XX 27-31), these statements are heavily indebted to Joban anthropological terminology and attitudes. The *Maskil* describes himself as “nipped from clay” ([ نهاמר ראותי ]\(^{129}\) XX 27), using an exact phrase from Job involving an uncommon word (33:6: [ מזרחי קרץ ]).\(^{130}\) He asks, “what can dust and ashes ([ עפר ואפר ] (עפר יאפר) reply” to God’s judgement or “how can it stand before ([ מוכיח ] the one who reproves (methodName) it?” (ll. 30-31). Such queries recall the exact situation (theophany) in which Job too used the rare phrase “dust and ashes” (42:6)\(^{131}\) and also confessed his loss for words (42:3), when God called upon him to elucidate the divine plan (38:2-3) and answer for his charges against divine justice (40:7-8). In another statement, where the author concedes, “As for me, I remain silent. What could I say concerning this? According to my knowledge I have spoken, a creature mixed from clay” (XX 35), one might again hear echoes of Job’s deferential response to the divine epiphany: “See, I am of small account; *what shall I answer you? I lay my hand on my mouth. I have spoken once, and I will not answer; twice, but will proceed no further . . . Therefore I have uttered what I did not understand*, things too wonderful for me, which I

\(^{128}\) Cf. n. 50.
\(^{129}\) The reconstruction of the verb and the restoration of the noun are supported by 1QH\(^a\) XVIII 5-6; 1QS XI 22; 4Q511 28+29 4.
\(^{130}\) For [ קרץ ], cf. also Ps 35:19; Prov 6:13; 10:10; 16:30.
\(^{131}\) In HB appearing only also in Gen 18:27; Job 30:19; cf., too, Sir 10:9; 17:32; 40:3; 1QH\(^a\) XVIII 7; XXIII 27; XXVI 35 (=4QH\(^a\) 7 II 16); 4Q267 1 5; 4Q511 126 2; cf. 1QH\(^a\) XXI 25-26.
did not know” (40:4-5; 42:3). These statements agree not only in the general disposition of the speaker but in *resolving upon silence after having spoken out of creaturely ignorance*. Later the psalmist will use the uniquely Joban phrase “born of a woman” in a self-effacing manner (XXI 2, 9-10). The *Maskil* has absorbed the critique levelled by Job’s friends against the possibility of taking confidence in human righteousness, and he has made Job’s self-effacing response before the Divine interlocutor his own.

The next column of the same psalm contains an even more striking resemblance to Job’s (final) response to the theophany (עַל־כֵּן אֶמְאַס וְנִּחַמְתִּי עַל־עָפָר וָאֵפֶר, 42:6), especially according to the understanding of that response that is found in the Qumran Aramaic translation of Job (11Q10).132 1QHodayota XXI is fragmentary but rich in evocations of the psalmist’s election before God: he has insight into wonders (l. 7), likely some kind of association with the heavenly host (l. 9), is brought into covenant (l. 10), and has some experience of “the eternal dwelling for the light of dawn forever” and “times of peace without limit” (ll. 15-16; cf. “paths of peace,” l. 26). Evidently, despite confidence in his own election, the psalmist remains in an ambiguous position; from a

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132 Although the possibility of a sectarian provenance of the work was early suggested (by Tuinstra) and then roundly abandoned (by nearly all others), the date of this copy (late Herodian) indicates, at the very least, an abiding interest in the text in circles associated with the finds at Qumran. For a study of hermeneutical aspects in the translation, and an argument for the sectarian origin of the work, highlighting affinities with the Hodayot, cf. Tuinstra, *Hermeneutische aspecten*. For an early and brief appraisal of the figure of Job in the Qumran community, and a rejection of Tuinstra’s hypothesis, cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “Some Observations on the Targum of Job from Qumran Cave 11,” *CBQ* 36 (1974): 504–8, 508–13. Concerning the nature of the work as an Aramaic translation, cf. David Shepherd, *Targum and Translation: A Reconsideration of the Qumran Aramaic Version of Job* (Assen: Uitgeverij Van Gorcum, 2004). Finally, for the text itself, cf. Florentino García Martínez, E. J. C. Tigchelaar, and A. S. van der Woude, eds., *Qumran Cave II.1I: (11Q2–18, 11Q20–31)* (DJD XXIII; Oxford: Clarendon, 1998); Michael Sokoloff, *The Targum to Job from Qumran Cave XI* (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1974); J. P. M. van der Ploeg and A. S. van der Woude, eds., *Le Targum de Job de La Grotte XI de Qumrân* (Leiden: Brill, 1971). The discovery of a second Aramaic translation, dating to roughly the same period, and preserving portions of chs. 3-5, 4Q157, should be noted, as well as the existence of four Hebrew texts of Job (2Q15; 4Q99; 4Q100; 4Q101). One of these (4Q101) is written in Paleo-Hebrew script, usually reserved for Torah scrolls.
phenomenological point of view, he is threatened by demonic traps and nets (ll. 20-21; 35-36), and appears to understand them as indicative of divine testing. The Maskil ponders how he might fare before God’s tribunal:

How can I, as a creature of dust, be preserved from being divided and from dissolving (like) wax when it melts before the fire[ ] and a heap of ashes. How can I stand before the stormy wind? (1QH^a XXI + 4QH^b 13 1-2; 4QH^a 11 1-5) \[133\]

The Qumran Aramaic Job’s translation of the notoriously difficult Hebrew of Job’s second reply to the theophanic “storm” (MT 38:1, 40:6::') סערת; 11Q10 XXXIV 2 [רוחא] furnishes some noteworthy comparisons.

I have heard of you only by hearsay, and now my eye has seen you; for this I will be poured out and dissolved, and I will turn into dust and ashes. (11Q10 XXXVII)

This translation suggests that the ambiguous אמא of Job 42:6 was understood not as מ, “to refuse,” or “reject,” but rather מ, “to melt”; hence, “I am poured out and dissolved” to which can be compared the Maskil’s expression, “divided and dissolved

\[133\] This is the text as Stegemann read it (cf. DJD XL, 266 for notes on readings). Qimron, Hebrew Writings, 1:92-93, differs on two points: [133] המרות is transcribed with a final resh and הבמות with an initial mem rather than beth. Concerning the latter, Stegemeann admitted that mem is the easier reading paleographically, but allowed the likely overlap with 4QH^a 11 3 to push him to the more difficult but not impossible reading of the beth; the difference does not affect the present matter. On the other hand, Stegemann was certain of the verb פרד, citing the overlap with 4QH^b 13 8, which Schuller (DJD XIX, 118, 148) also read as פרד (in the transcription of the overlapping segment of 4QH^a 11 3 the verb is mistakenly restored with a second resh). There is little at stake in the choice of verb here for the present discussion. Contextually, פרד would be slightly favoured (cf. 1QH^a XV 7; Ps 22:15 [E: 14]). Finally, it should be noted that וַיַּקָּח is the verb נתך (cf. Ezek 22:22; so DJD XL, 266 and XIX, 119) rather than the prepositional phrase “in the midst.”
like wax when it melts (=םוס).” The most distinct link between these texts, however, is found in the references to “ashes” (ですか/קטם). The Maskil’s appended expression “and a heap of ashes” somehow describes the outcome of the dividing and dissolving, much in the way that the Aramaic translator understood the sense of Job’s last words invoking “dust and ashes” (42:6): “I will be poured out and dissolved, and I will turn into dust and ashes” (cf., too, the initial, יציר עפר of the Maskil’s description, XXI 25). Finally, the reference to taking a “stand before the stormy win[d” (רוח סוער) can now also be seen as evoking the Joban sub-text. It would appear, then, that the confrontation between God and Job, and particularly, “Aramaic Job’s” acquiescence in his own inadequate humanity, became emblematic for the psalmist of his own standing before God; his humanity leaves him confounded and speechless before a righteous and all-powerful judge.

And yet the psalmist’s own confidence in God’s electing mercy may have been strengthened by the turn of events in Job. Here is a lead into the other half of the story of anthropogony in the Hodayot, the adam of glory tradition. Without a mediator to intervene (cf. Job 33:23), Job was vindicated and restored all the same. He was established again as servant of God and priest to his associates (42:7-10). Likewise, the psalmist also knows God’s righteousness as mercy, enjoys a priestly status, and celebrates immediate access to God (ולא יש بينו/אין מליין [בכון], 4QHא 7 ii 18-21; 4QHא 177 14). 

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134 “Melting,” “trembling,” “dissolving,” “withering” are common descriptions of the disintegration of one’s constitution when confronted by theophany (cf. 1QH4 XII 34-35; XVIII 34-35); the other elements of the Maskil’s description are much more unique.

135 קטם also appears as the complement to פע (“dust”) in 11Q10 XXXIV 8-9.
XXVI 36-40; cf., too, 1QH⁴ XIV 16). If Job, both pre- and post-theophany, remains on the plane of “earthly” realities, and the divine beings remain for Job throughout a model of contrasting epistemology and ontology (cf. Job 38:4-7), the fairytale conclusion to Job’s story, with its many excessive blessings, including wealth, family, inheritance, and long-life—“the LORD blessed the latter days of Job more than his beginning” (Job 42:12)—might have inspired the psalmist’s rather more direct translation from an earthly to an immortal life. It has even been suggested that the depiction of the angels’ fellowship when they witnessed the wonders of creation (ברון ייחד כוכבי בוקר וירשו כל בני אלהים, 38:7) inspired the sectarians’ adoption of the term yahad to characterize their own epistemic insight and privileged participation in an angelic communion (cf., esp., Job 38:7a: בירת קדש with 1QH⁴ XIX 17: בירת רוח). This brings us from adams’s dust to adams’s glory.

**Anthropogony: Adam’s Glory**

The negative emphasis on adams as adamah does not prepare one for the Hodayot’s more positive use of anthropogenic traditions to express an ideal humanity. Indeed, if scholarship on the Hodayot may be taken as the standard, the dominance of the adam-of-dust tradition has clouded the Hodayot’s adoption of the adam-of-glory trope to express the exaltation of the speaker and his communion with the heavenly beings. But the latter days of adams will be greater than the beginning. Whereas Holm-Nielsen found that

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136 מְלִיץ (cf. Job 33:23; 16:20) in the non-biblical corpus is rare; a search using M. Abegg’s *Qumran Sectarian Manuscripts* returns only one clear case outside the Hodayot with the sense of “mediator”: 4Q374 7 2 (and 4Q368 3 7?).


138 Of course, there are exceptions, most prominent among them: Fletcher-Louis, *All the Glory*. 
outside of the Psalms and the prophets, particularly Isaiah, the use of scripture in the Hodayot “bears the mark of being haphazard.”\textsuperscript{139} we in fact find a pattern. The lowliness passages contract the whole scope of human sinfulness into the creation from dust in Gen 2:6-7, while the exaltation passages seem to be grounded in the depiction of the creation of humanity in Gen 1:26-27 and Ps 8 and tend to depict the elect enjoying the pleasures of Eden or even being identified directly with the Garden.\textsuperscript{140} Three texts or text-groups are particularly clear in their dependence on such traditions.

*Adam’s Glory and Eden’s Pleasures.* In the first couple of texts, the psalmist appears twice to allude to traditions concerning primal or archetypal *adam* in contexts that have a positive bearing upon the relationship between God and humanity.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{26} [   ]th for those who serve you loyally [so that] their posterity (זרעם) [may] be before you for all time. And [their] na[mes] you have raised up \textsuperscript{27} [   ]transgression and casting out all their iniquities and giving them an inheritance in all the glory of *adam* for long life (והנהilateivid אדום לורב ימים). (Col. IV 26-27)

\textsuperscript{38} [Blessed are you, God Most High, that ] you have spread your holy spirit upon your servant[ and you] have purified m [   ]t his heart \textsuperscript{39} [   ]mankind (נוש), and to the whole covenant of *adam* (כֶּלָּל בְּרִית אֲדֹם) I will look [   ] [   ]h they will find

\textsuperscript{139} Holm-Nielsen, *Hodayot*, 312. Seemingly with the caveat of one undeveloped and not completely adequate observation: “Gen.1-3 is so used that one would understand the community to have considered its existence under eschatological circumstances as a reincarnation of the paradise of old, but at the same time the curse of man at the end of Gen. 3 forms the assumed basis for the portrayal of man in his earthly corruptibility in the existing world” (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{140} Notably, Eden is enjoyed without any hint of the prohibitions on knowledge enjoined in Gen 2-3; rather, access to divine knowledge is celebrated in these texts. It is possible that this finds justification exegetically in Gen 1:29: “God said, ‘See, I have given you every plant yielding seed that is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall have them for food.’”

\textsuperscript{141} I treat the following selections from col. IV as coming from the same psalm; cf. Hartmut Stegemann, “The Number of Psalms in 1QHodayota and Some of Their Sections,” in *Liturgical Perspectives: Prayer and Poetry in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, 19-23 January, 2000 (ed. E. Chazon; STDJ 48; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 210–13. If this is not the case, the texts share some linguistic and contextual features that make it amenable to treat them together.
it 40 [ w]b those who attain it and those who love it [ yk] for everlasting ages (ע』לצֵלֶמ). (Col. IV 38-40)

In the first selection, an inheritance in “all the glory of adam” is preceded by forgiveness or purification from sins and explained as the bestowal of “long life.” In the second, the purification of the psalmist’s heart by God’s spirit is followed by the resolution to focus on the “whole covenant of adam.” The phrase the “glory of adam” is found only here in the Hodayot and in a few other texts closely associated with the sectarian movement behind the scrolls (cf. 1QS IV 23; CD III 18-IV 4; 4QpPs8 II 27-III 2; cf. also 4Q504 8 recto 4; Sir. 49:16); the “covenant of adam” is not found elsewhere in the scrolls, and is textually uncertain.¹⁴²

However, the TST presents a remarkably similar collocation of themes and a close juxtaposition of “covenant” with “glory of adam.” The text describes the time appointed for “visitation” (רָחַבָק, l. 19; cf. II. 18-20; 25-27), when God does away with the dominion of darkness:

¹⁴² The matter concerns the word “covenant” and the resulting phrase “covenant of Adam,” whose meaning is regarded as unclear. The first and last letters of “covenant” are unproblematic, a beth and a taw. Sukenik read בְּרִית, and Stegemann followed, although he considered adopting בֹּית; the latter is the reading of Puech and Qimron: Sukenik, Scrolls, 51; Puech, La croyance, 2:394 n. 286; Qimron, Hebrew Writings, 1:63. In DJD XL the problems with Sukenik’s reading are said to be that “the upper part of the second letter is unusually narrow for a reš (and no shrinkage of the leather can be observed at this point) and there seems to be a bottom stroke at right angles that suggests a bet, less likely a nun or kap” (p. 72). I cannot detect this bottom stroke. The alternative בֹּית is problematic concerning the third letter, since only a short, thin downstroke is visible on the faded leather. Contextually, one expects the object of נבט is problematic concerning the third letter, since only a short, thin downstroke is visible on the faded leather. Contextually, one expects the object of נבט to be understood positively since it appears to be the antecedent of the suffixes on the following preserved verbs (יָצַד, נָעַב,犹 אָהַב); this complicates Wise, Abegg’s and Cook’s translation, “I examine every human covenant,” and it fits poorly with the alternative reconstruction, which would necessitate something like “I examine all human understanding”; Michael O. Wise, Martin G. Abegg, and Edward M. Cook, The Dead Sea Scrolls: A New Translation (2nd ed.; San Francisco: Harper, 2005), 173. I will try to show that בְּרִית אֲדֹם, which may yet be the best reading paleographically, is not so problematic semantically. For related uses of “covenant” in connection with Adam, cf. 4QpHos6 7-8; Sir 17:11-12, 14; Apoc. Mos. 8:2; also important are 4Q504 8 recto 4-9 and L.A.B. 13:8-9.
Then God will refine, with his truth, all man’s deeds, and will purify for himself the structure of man (מבני איש), ripping out all spirit of injustice from the innermost part of his flesh . . . he will sprinkle over him the spirit of truth like lustral water (in order to cleanse him) from all the abhorrences of deceit and (from) the defilement of the unclean spirit (ברוח נדה), in order to instruct the upright ones with knowledge of the Most High, and to make understand the wisdom of the sons of heaven to those of perfect behaviour. For those God has chosen for an everlasting covenant (לברית עולמים) and to them shall belong all the glory of adam (כל כבוד אדם). (1QS IV 21-23)

Here a cleansing and transformation of the human condition, the “structure” and “flesh,” (cf. “heart,” 1QH a IV 38), by “spirit” precedes the fulfillment of the “everlasting covenant,” which entails the enjoyment of “all the glory of adam.” Earlier in the TST, the “reward” ( которого) of those who walk “in the spirit of the sons of truth” (IV 6) is described as “healing, plentiful peace in a long life (בארור ימים), fruitful offspring (פרות זרע) with all everlasting blessings (עם כל ברכת עדת), eternal enjoyment with endless life (ושמחת עולמים), and a crown of glory (וכליל כבוד) with majestic raiment in eternal light (עם מדת הדר באור עולמים).” This reward, which mixes metaphors relating both to abundant mortal and immortal life, is surely expressive of the glory of adam that is promised to members of the eternal covenant in IV 22-23.

This requirement of anthropological transformation prior to the attainment of adamic glory is prepared for in the opening statement of the TST, which relates the divine intention for, and creation of, humanity: “[God] created man (אנוש) to rule the world and placed within him two spirits so that he would walk with them until the moment of his visitation (פקודתו); they are the spirits of truth and of deceit” (1QS III 143 On this phrase, cf. Yigael Yadin, “A Note on DSD IV:20,” JBL 74 (1955): 40–43.
144 Cf. the similar language which is used of royal man in Ps 8:6 (E: 5) and 21:4-7 (E: 3-6); similar also is 1QH a XVII 24-28.
17-19). Here, remarkably, God’s creative intention for humankind (“to rule the world”), is mismatched or strained by God’s actual creation of humankind (“placed within him two spirits”; cf. III 25, “he created the spirits of light and darkness”). The fulfillment of God’s creative intention, therefore, requires a “new creation” (التворaporan, IV 25), at the time of “visitation” (פקודה, III 18; IV 19; cf. ll. 18-20; 25-27), which involves the restructuring of the human frame, the “ripping out the spirit of injustice” (IV 20). Thus the “glory of adam” does not involve a straightforward return to “pre-lapsarian” humanity, for created human ontology is part of the problem to be resolved. The “glory of adam,” therefore, is more a hope than it is an ontological model of humanity, a promissory feature of divine intentionality for humankind that awaits the proper anthropological conditions for fulfillment. Insofar as the phrase looks back to Adam, it looks back to the conditions Adam enjoyed (for a time) in Eden, but for which Adam’s creaturely nature proved him to be unsuitable. Adam himself is less an object of idealization than that which Adam necessarily forfeited. The phrase “glory of adam,” then, refers to the glory which is intended for or proper to humanity but for which humanity, as Adam proved, has not yet been properly constituted. In this sense, the TST (and the Hodayot) may capitalize on the ambiguity of the noun, אדם, in its ability to evoke Adam and the conditions to which he had access but also to anticipate the

145 Though noted by Wernberg-Møller, “Two Spirits” the tension is not often remarked upon; but cf. Lichtenberger, Menschenbild, 124–26, 136–41. Wernberg-Møller, however, overemphasized the similarity with the rabbinic doctrine of the two-yetzers and underemphasized the predestinarian outlook of the TST, and therefore came to a very different conclusion than that presented here: “It is significant that our author regards the two ‘spirits’ as created by God, and that according to IV,23 and III,17-18 both ‘spirits’ dwell in man as created by God. . . . That [روح] is used here as a psychological term seems clear; and the implication is that the failure of man to ‘rule the world’ is due to man himself because he allows his ‘spirit of perversion’, that is to say his perverse and sinful propensities, to determine his behaviour” (p. 422). J. Licht, on the other hand, stressed absolute predestination and overplayed the dualism of the text, minimizing the struggle that occurs within the sons of light; “Analysis,” 91 n. 13, 94, 98.
fulfillment of human destiny in the condition of a newly created humanity.\textsuperscript{146} George van Kooten comments:

Since the ‘configuration of man’ was dual from the outset (Col. IV 20-21), when God placed two spirits in Adam (Col. III 17-18), it seems to be only the latter-day Qumranic Adam who has the evil spirit ripped out ‘from the innermost part of his flesh’ (Col. IV 20-21); to him belongs ‘all the glory of Adam’, i.e. a glory exceeding the still limited glory of the first Adam.\textsuperscript{147}

This commentary rightly captures the manner that the phrase “all the glory of adam” is forward-looking, but it also introduces the explanatory notion of degrees of glory, which is alien to the TST. The Treatise does not emphasize that God created a (relatively) glorious Adam, but rather \textit{אנוש},\textsuperscript{148} a spiritually conflicted humanity that cannot yet possess the glory God intends for it.\textsuperscript{149} This de-emphasis on original Adam as modelling an ideal ontology becomes even more pronounced in the Hodayot, with its still more radical anthropology. One might hypothesize that incorporation of traditions related to the creation of Adam from dust into the negative assessment of humanity in the TST and the Hodayot frustrates the development or elaboration of a tradition of an initial, ideal human creation. In the TST the apparent lag in the creation of the anthropological

\textsuperscript{146} Translators have puzzled over whether to gloss \textit{אדם} as the proper name “Adam” or the generic “human.” For instance, Wise, Abegg, and Cook: IV 27, “glory of man (or Adam),” IV 39, “human covenant”; 1QS IV 23 (“glory of Adam”); CD III 20, “human honor”; \textit{The Dead Sea Scrolls}, 172–73, 122, 54.


\textsuperscript{148} Collins argues that this is a clear case of \textit{אנוש} meaning “Adam”; cf. Collins, “In the Likeness,” 610–612. Instead, at this point, the TST appears to adhere to texts like Gen 1:27 and Ps 8:6-7 (E: 5-6) which are not clearly limited to Adam as opposed to humankind. In the HB, \textit{אנוש} may parallel \textit{אדם} but only, it seems, when the latter has its generic sense (cf., e.g., Isa 13:12; 56:2; Ps 144:3). So there is little support for taking \textit{אנוש} as a reference to “Adam,” although Adam must be included in it.

\textsuperscript{149} Likewise, William Loader observes, “When hope is expressed in 1QS/1Q28 5.15 [sic] as inheriting ‘all the glory of Adam’, this does not appear to be interpreted as reversing the effect of a fall”; \textit{Sexuality}, 250 n. 59.
conditions immediate to the fulfillment of God’s high intentions for humanity can only be attributed to the “mysteries of his knowledge” (IV 18; cf. III 23) and his “glorious design” (III 16). Thus one can understand the “everlasting covenant,” in 1QS IV 22-23, as God’s commitment to his creative intention for humanity.

The terms in which the Adamic ideal is expressed in the laconic statements of 1QHª IV 26-27 and 38-40 can now be better understood. The primary association this ideal conjures up is life, again expressed by a variety of metaphors drawing on tropes that describe a good (“abundant”) mortal life (l. 26). Specifically, the כבוד אדם results in (ל)רוב ימים. Moreover, the phrase “covenant of Adam” can be readily explained if the thought of the TST may be supposed: ברית אדם expresses God’s commitment to bring about the conditions which will allow for the fulfillment of God’s intention for humankind, despite the present apparent neglect of that intention implied by God’s creation of a “spirit of flesh” (רוח בשר) whose subjugation is partly to nefarious spirits (ll. 35-37; cf. 13-20). The elect one looks with anticipation toward God’s intention to fulfill all the glory of Adam in himself and the members of the movement. God’s establishment of the sect is in fact a signal of his commitment to bring about a humanity who can fulfill God’s creative intention for it.

In the second text reflecting a positive use of Adamic traditions, the psalmist’s description of the experience of election draws on traditions of the edenic splendour and glory enjoyed by Adam. Following directly on a classic Niedrigkeitsdoxologie (1QHª V 30-32, cited above), this text sets a positive use of Adamic motifs immediately following the negative man-of-dust motif.
Only through your goodness can a person be righteous, and by [your] abundant mercy. By your splendour you glorify him ( GPI4) together with eternal peace and long life. For [ and] your word will not turn back. (Col. V 33-35)

Although without explicit reference to אדם, this section is rich in allusions to Gen 1:26-30 and its ideological co-text, Ps 8. God “glorifies” (פרא) the elect “by” or “with” his “splendour.” The word וחרז is used to describe the glory and splendour with which God crowns the humanity made a little less than אלוהים in Ps 8:6 (E: 5). Next, God gives to the elect “dominion” with abundant “delights.” The word משלי, “to rule,” is commonly used in this period, as it is in Ps 8:7 (E: 6) (and 1QS III 17-18), in place of רדה in God’s command to “rule” the earth in Gen 1:28. “Delights” is the word עדן, which is used with the same root for “glorify,” פרא, in XVI 21 to describe the community of the elect metaphorically as the Garden of Eden. The divine favour also entails “eternal peace for long life,” implicitly contrasting the mortality that inheres in the fleshly humanity described in the immediately preceding lines. As in the preceding psalm (col. IV), where an “inheritance in all the glory of adam” is said to issue in “long life” (להנחילם בכול כבוד אדם לרוהו ב ימים, IV 27), here too “glory” (פרא) and eternal life are brought into association. Such traditions likely reflect the understanding that creation in the image of God anticipates the possession of incorruptible life (Gen 1:26-27; cf. Wis 2:23). The fashioning of Adam in the likeness of God’s glory in the Words of the Luminaries probably stands in the same tradition (4Q504 8 recto 4). And the

150 Connections to prophetic eschatology are made below.
151 It need not be assumed that this text refers to a supernatural possession of glory, which is subsequently lost. The language of being formed “in the likeness” most likely indicates that Adam is a copy
fashioning of a “people of spirit” (עם רוח, חבטת קדושים) according to the pattern of the holy ones (4Q417 1 i 16-17) in 4QInstruction is probably modified here, insofar as the psalmist—in distinction to 4QInstruction—confesses to being at present a “spirit of flesh.” Finally, we might venture to suggest that the “word” (דבר) of God which is the ground of the psalmist’s assurance in the final colon is in fact the same “word” expressed in Gen 1:26-30 and Ps 8. This would be of a piece with that commitment expressed in col. IV, “to the whole covenant of adam I will look” (ואל כולם ברית אדם אבם, IV 39). It is noteworthy that all these traditional links look backward to exalted depictions of humankind in creation. Our psalmist, however, had just looked backward (1QHᵃ V 30-32) and was horrified by what he saw in the dust-man of Gen 2:6-7. The result is to problematize the high intentions signalled by the creation of humankind in Gen 1:26-28 and Ps 8 by the state of human ontology established in Gen 2:6-7. But the psalmist is confident that God will bring about the higher destiny that seems corollary to what is predicated of humankind in the former texts.

In the final text-group in which anthropogonic traditions are used to speak of an exalted humanity, the psalmist describes the community and himself, its leader,

and the mention of glory shows that Gen 1:26-27 is being read in the light of Ezek 1:26-28, where the glory of God has the likeness of a human form. 4Q504 only indicates that the image in which Adam is created is the (human-like) image of God’s glory. It is not at all clear that glory is a property of Adam’s that can be lost. A loss of glory, however, is inferred by van Kooten, who however does not go so far as Fletcher-Louis; cf. van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 14–8, 21–22; Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory, 92–95; and James R. Davila, Liturgical Works (ECDSS; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 245, sees a loss of glory implied.

What difference is to be attributed to Adam’s fashioning in the pattern of God (so 4Q504) or angels (so 4QInstruction) is hard to say, and whether the Hodayot is closer to one tradition than the other cannot easily be determined. Perhaps significant in this connection is that the present psalm describes the elect as אנשי חזוןך ("persons of your vision," l. 18), which recalls the חזון הגלוי ("vision of meditation") which is given to those who are patterned after the holy ones in 4QInstruction. But pointing in the opposite direction might be the superior status to the angels described in the “Self-Glorification Psalm.”
metaphorically as and dwelling in a functioning Eden. The most elaborate example of this theme is XVI 5-28, but many of its motifs are expressed more concisely here:

15 Thus all the nations will acknowledge your truth and all the peoples your glory, for you have brought [ ] your secret counsel (סודכה) to all the people of your council (עצתכה), and in a common lot with the angels of the presence (ובגורל יחד עם מלאכי פנים), without an intermediary between them la( to)reply 17 according to the spirit. For l[ ]td b and they repent because of your glorious command, so that they become your princes (שריכה) in the [eternal] lot (ובגורל) and[ ]their [shoot] 18 opens as a flower [blooms, for] everlasting fragrance, making a sprout (נצר) grow into the branches of an eternal planting (מרשת עולם). And it will cast shade over all the world, and its [branches] 19 will reach to the clouds, and its roots as far as the deep. All the rivers of Eden (וכול נהרות עדן) [make] its [br]anches m]oist and it will (extend) to the measure[less] seas . . . [20 ] and[ ]the spring of light will become an eternal 21 fountain (יאירה מעין אור למקורות עולם), without lack. (Col. XIV 17-21)153

The primary metaphor is of the planting (מרשת) and the shoot, “sprout” (נצר), while the “Edenic” motif is introduced into the picture in order to supply a source of water (namely, “rivers”) for the trees of the planting. These rivers appear to be associated with a spring of light that is to become an eternal fountain (ll. 20-21). The scriptural source of this planting metaphor appears to be Isa 60:21 and 61:3, 154 which describe the eschatological transformation of the once beleaguered Israel into the glorified (פער) planting of the LORD, and this is confirmed when the context of each text is compared.

The same metaphor of the planting and the shoot is developed, in a sometimes confusing

153 Cf., too, col. XV 21-24, with emphasis on the leader.
155 This word appears 10 times in the second half of Isaiah to describe the glorification of Israel or of God in Israel in the restoration; outside Isaiah the texts closest to this use are Ps 149:4 and Ezra 7:27; the word also appeared above in the related text of V 33-35 and as a noun in the extended use of the planting metaphor in col. XVI 21.
manner, at great length in col. XVI, but with a more thorough identification with the Garden of Eden as depicted by Ezekiel 31.\textsuperscript{156} The psalmist writes concerning the “shoot” (נץ) which becomes an “eternal planting” (מעץ), l. 7) that “you, [O G]od, have hedged in (בְּמֶשֶּׁכֶת) its fruit by means of the mystery of the strong warriors \textsuperscript{13} and spirits of holiness, and the whirling flame of fire (להט אש מתהפכת) so that no [stran]ger might [come] to the fountain of life (מֵימּוֹן), nor with the eternal trees (עצי עולם) \textsuperscript{14} drink the waters of holiness, nor bear its fruit with the plantation of heaven (שתים).” This transparent allusion to God’s setting (מִשְׁכַּן) the cherubim (הַכְרֻבִּים) at the east of Eden to guard (לִשְׁמֹר) the way to the “tree of life” (עץ חיים) in Gen 3:24 allows the author to associate his marginalized community’s access to privileged knowledge with the luxuries of Eden. Doubtless in part by the recognition that God “planted a garden in Eden” (וַיִּטַע יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים גַּן־בְּעֵדֶן) Gen 2:8),\textsuperscript{157} the Isaianic motif of the “planting,” which concerned Israel’s restoration, is read with the mythological decor of Eden and transferred to the community of the speaker. Three motifs interlock in this third text-group with the Edenic planting.

One is worship with the angels.\textsuperscript{158} The angelic guard which is set upon the plantation in col. XVI 12-14 supplies a ready association between Edenic existence and


angelic communion. Communion with the angels can hardly be clearer than in the text first quoted. The members of the council share a lot (בגוֹרֵל בְּגוֹרֵל, XIV 16). The phrase refers to the angels who stand before God without a mediator, and appears in a similar context twice in The Rule of Blessings (1QSb IV 24-26). The added statement that the people of God’s council “become your princes in the [eternal] lot” (ויהו שריכו בגורל [ל עולם, l. 17) could be read as denoting a position that ranks even higher than that of the angelic counterparts of the elect. The plantation is also described in 1QS VIII 5-10, which emphasizes the liturgical element; angelic communion is incorporated into the theme in 1QS XI 7-9. Additionally, 4Q174 1 I 6 refers to a מקדש אדם, which offers the familiar ambiguity of the כבד אדם phrases and the attendant scholarly uncertainty as to its significance. However, if one prominent line of interpretation is correct, the text should be considered as belonging to the same constellation of traditions that project motifs of primal humanity on to the destiny God


160יְנָשׁ denotes a position at the top of a hierarchy, whether tribal, political, militar, priestly (Ezra 8:24-29; 10:5; 1 Chron 15:22; 24:5; 2 Chron 36:14) or angelic (Dan 10: 13, 20, 21; 12:1; cf. 1QH 18 10.יְנָשׁ). 4Q381 1 10-11 might support the interpretation of human exaltation above the angels; so Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory, 98–100. For discussion, cf. Schuller, DJD XI, 96.
decides upon for the elect. Of course, communion with the angels is prominent throughout the Hodayot, and not only in these texts concerned with the plantation.

Knowledge, quite naturally, belongs in the constellation of Edenic motifs that emerge within the metaphor of the eternal planting. In col. XIV 15-17 (cited above), the people’s participation in God’s council was associated with their participation in the lot of the angels of the presence, who need no mediator between themselves and God. “Counsel/council” (קדש and/or עזה) is naturally associated with knowledge (cf. Job 15:8), as the abundance of terms relating to cognition in the immediately preceding lines confirms: “teaching them according to your command (וכפיכה להורותם) and establishing them in your counsel (בעצתכה), according to your proper truth (וכי ושיר) for the sake of your glory. And for your own sake you have acted to magnify the teaching (לגדל תורה) and [ ] l the people of your counsel (אנשי עצתכה) in the midst of...


162 Recently Harkins has proposed that the theme of communion with angels played a key role in the editorial shaping of 1QH, showing a crescendo effect beginning in the Teacher Psalms and then into the second block of Community Psalms; cf. Harkins, “A New Proposal.” While Esther Chazon likewise sees the theme having a principal role in the shaping of the scroll, cf. Chazon, “Liturgical Function.” Likewise, Qimron’s reconstruction of the scroll, Hebrew Writings, 1:XXVI, puts an emphasis on exaltation to angelic rank right at the beginning thereof. Critical in this discussion is the placement of frgs. 10 and 12. However, communion with angels may also be detected in VI 16-17 (cp. XI 22; XXV 26-27).


humankind that they may recite (לְסַפֵּר) for everlasting generations your wonderful deeds, and they [medi]tate (וחַחו) on [your] mighty acts 15 without ceasing.” Participation in the divine council here entails instruction in God’s command and truth, and is oriented toward functions that are both outward (recitation) and inward (meditation). The linkage of knowledge with Eden, though natural, is not unproblematic, since on the surface, the narrative of Gen 2-3 implies God’s intention to restrict rather than share with the human pair a knowledge which can be described as divine (cf. not only Gen 3:5 but 3:22). However, it may not be the knowledge of good and evil per se with which the text is concerned and which in keeping with Gen 2-3, according to the TST, is now the possession of humankind (1QS IV 25-26). The knowledge which is here prized gains rather than restricts access to the plantation, or even causes the plantation to grow (cf. XVI 11-14, above). Knowledge, in fact, is accessed in the teaching of the psalmist. In the extended plantation/Eden metaphor of col. XVI the psalmist intones, “But you, O my God, have put in my mouth (words) like early rain for all [ ] and a spring of living water which does not fail” (l. 17). The psalmist elaborates on “hidden things” (מחובאים) which “bubble forth in secret (בְּסַתַּר)” and “become waters of con[ten]tion” (l. 19). One group of trees “in flames of fire . . . whither” but “the plantation of fruit trees [ ] eternal [so]urce becomes a glorious Eden (עדְּנָן) and [an everlasting] sple[n]t (דָּוָּר)” (l. 21). The knowledge to which the psalmist’s teaching gives access effects a stark division between those who meet judgement and those who are identified with the conditions of Eden. The lifting of the prohibition of knowledge for the Edenic community may again signify that what is pictured is not so much a restoration of what the original humanity
enjoyed—they were restricted from knowledge—but rather the bringing about of the perfection of humanity, here portrayed picturesquely not so much as a glorified Adam, but Eden itself.

A third motif that emerges in relation to the plantation metaphor likewise crystallizes in the extraordinary experience of the teacher himself, who embodies in a seemingly highly personal and unique manner the conditions of light and life which are characteristic of the Edenic situation of the community. At the beginning of the psalm already referred to above, involving the extended garden metaphor, the author seems to have referred to himself “as” (beth essentiae?) the spring of life: “you have placed me in a Wellness of being somewhere middle of time” (1QHª XVI 5); in any case, the teaching which flows from his lips is so identified (l. 17). In another text, the psalmist apparently describes himself as the plantation: “upon your [overflowing] kindness I wait, in order to bloom like a plant (להציץ כמטע,) and in order to make a shoot grow” (XV 21-22). At the conclusion of this same psalm, the psalmist becomes a focal point of the divine light: “I shine forth with sevenfold light (והופעתי באור שבעתים) you have established...”


167 The completion of the lacuna here with some reference back to the light (cf., e.g., Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory, 105, reflecting a widespread hypothesis) is rejected in DJD XL, 208 on the basis that the traces following the beth cannot be an aleph. By contrast, Qimron, Hebrew Writings, 1:80-81, indicates the aleph is almost certain and reconstructs, in which case the object (“me”) supplied...
(me) for your glory (לכבודכה). For you are an eternal light (מאור עולם) to me, and you set my feet upon level [ground]” (ll. 27-28). While the terminology of the “sevenfold light” is most closely paralleled in Isa 30:26, one can detect two additional scriptural matrices within which this motif operates. One can think, of course, of Gen 1:3-5 and/or of Moses’ illuminated countenance in Exod 34:29-35. The following texts, which share the strong emphasis on the individuality of the psalmist, resonate with the latter context: “you ], O my God, have made my face shine (האירתה פני) for your covenant” (XI 4), and “you have illumined my face (האירתה פני) for your covenant . . . I seek you, and as sure as dawn (כשחר נכון), you appear to me as early [li]ght (לאור [הופעתה לי)” (XII 6-7).\footnote{In the translation of DJD XL would be negated. This only makes explicit what one might deduce in any case, that the psalmist is drawn into the light of God’s own glory.} However, a pair of texts redirect our attention to that mysterious light of creation: “all the rivers of Eden . . . move streaming over the world without end, and as far as Sheol [ and] the spring of light (מעין אור) will become an eternal fountain, without lack” (XIV 19-21); and “for by yo[ur] insight [you have instructed me ]and by your glory my light shines forth (וכבודכה הופעה אזור). For light from darkness you cause to shine (כי מאור מחושך הائرעה)” (XVII 26-27). The Rule of Blessings (1QSb) IV 24-28, which combines the themes of teaching, illuminated face, and priestly blessing, strongly suggests that this light be read in the context of that light which is associated with God’s holy dwelling and which the TST (1QS IV 6-8) associates with the primordially intended destiny of humankind. Finally, confirming this reading is the text of Isa 30:26 itself, which possibly refers to the seven day light of creation, as distinct from the light of the sun (cf. Gen 1:3,
The tradition is fully consonant with that of the “glory of adam” and it was likely thought that ideal humanity, Moses, and the members of the community (exemplified by the teacher) all share in the light of creation, which is here identified as God’s own (esp. 1QH a XVII 26-27; cf., too, Ps 36:10 (E: 9); 104:1-2; Isa 60:19-20).

More clear than the discussion above might indicate is the role of God’s spirit in bringing about the adamic glorification. In 1QH a IV 38-40 the purifying effect of God’s spirit was closely associated with the ברית אדם and in V 35-36 the reception of the spirit entails knowledge and confidence in God’s bringing to fruition an adamic glorification of the elect. It is regularly thought that the typical language with which spirit-giving in the Hodayot is expressed—Blake and מַלְאָךְ—derives from Ezek 11:19; 36:25-26, but Ps 51:12-14 (E: 10-12) is also likely to stand in the background (cf. XII 30-31 + 32-34). Both contexts concern new creation (ברא, חדש) and associate spirit-giving with purification. The less typical means of expressing this gifting of spirit—being poured or spread על—cf.

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170 Cf. 4Q504 6 10-12 with 8 recto 4.

171 This is clearly a multivalent image that allows for the presence of Adamic and Mosaic associations as well. Unlike Paul (cf. 2 Cor 3:7-4:6), the covenanters would have had no motivation to distinguish the underlying reality reported in these traditions and scriptural sub-texts. Cf. Andrei A. Orlov, “Vested with Adam’s Glory: Moses as the Luminous Counterpart of Adam in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Macarian Homilies,” in From Apocalypticism to Merkabah Mysticism: Studies in the Slavonic Pseudepigrapha (JSJSup 114; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 327-43. For a comparison of Paul and the scrolls, cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “Glory Reflected on the Face of Christ (2 Cor 3:7-4:6) and a Palestinian Jewish Motif,” Theological Studies 42 (1981): 630-644, who only by failing to cite 1QH 26-27 can say, “the medium of illumination is, indeed, not the glory of God, as it is in 2 Corinthians 3-4” (640).


173 Newsom argues that “this holy spirit is not something that he possesses by right of birth but is external to his original status”; “Flesh, Spirit,” 349; cf., too, Levison, Filled, 185–88, 203.
1QH⁴ IV 38 and XV 10—yields, in one instance, a fascinating intertextual relationship with Gen 2:7 and 1:1-5: “And over the dust you have spread [your holy] spirit” (וַיִּפַח עַל עַפְּרָה הַנִּפְטְפָה רֹ֣זֶק וָדַת [קְוֵדָכָה] 1QH⁴ XXIII 29-30). At first glance, the text reminds one of God’s breathing (וַיִּפַח) breath into Adam, but the image here is different. God does not “breathe in” (נפח + ב) the spirit but rather “spreads over/upon” (נוף + על) the spirit.¹⁷⁴ The image is more like the description of the spirit of God “hovering over the face of the waters” (מְרַחֶפֶת עַל־פְנֵי הָמָיִם, Gen 1:2), about to exercise creative will over the unformed and unfilled earth (cf. III 29; XV 35; XXI 30). The next broken line refers evidently to transportation from (or transformation of) the mud (טיט)¹⁷⁵ to the heavenly communion (l. 30). Two broken lines follow, but they carry on from Gen 1:2: “and there is no return (תִשְׁתַּבֵּת) of darkness” (l. 31) “and the light you have revealed and not to return [darkness]” (l. 32). These lines likely refer to human association with the light of creation or even of God’s very own being.¹⁷⁶ The following lines, 33-35, recapitulate the same themes, confirming the interconnection of these thoughts despite the lacunae. In particular, note l. 33: “your [h]oly [spirit] you have spread forth in order to atone for guilt.” These lines profoundly express the creative function of God’s spirit to bring about a new human creature who is

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¹⁷⁴ נוף does not appear in the HB in any of those contexts which describe the spirit coming upon a person, although the image is clearly related (cf., too, 1QH⁴ IV 38; XV 10). Instead, it is used to speak of “wielding” a tool “upon” something (Exod 20:25), of “waving” a hand (2 Kgs 5:11; cf. 1QH⁴ XVI 23-24, 34; 1QM XVII 9), or as “waving” an offering over the altar (Exod 29:24; Lev 23:11; 11Q19 XV 11 et al.).

¹⁷⁵ Cf. the different reconstructions of DJD XL, 277 (טיט) and Qimron, Hebrew Writings, 1:97 (טיט).

¹⁷⁶ Light and the absence of darkness are referenced in the beginning lines of the column, likely near the beginning of the psalm, where the light is specifically God’s and “set up from of [old]” (l. 2-4). The psalm continues with references to a human personality being “magnified” “in your glory” (l. 9) and being “glorious” “among the divine beings” (l. 23).
cleansed from the sinfulness of adamic humanity and enjoys eternally the splendour of heavenly glory (cf., too, 1QS IV 20-23; 6-8).

Thus, next to the adam-of-dust motif, the Hodayot introduce the adam-of-glory. Despite the Hodayot’s single reference to adam’s glory, symbols of primordial abundance, such as light, life, and Edenic splendour, coalesce with traditions of adam as created in the image of God (Gen 1:26-27) or a little less than elohim (Ps 8) in order to associate humanity with the divine or angelic life. The tension within this anthropology does not fit the pattern of creation-fall-restoration. Instead one finds in the TST, for example, intention-beginning-history-fruition, and the Hodayot appear to cohere with this schematic by its persistent depreciation of the adam-of-dust and flesh vis-à-vis the glorious destiny God has in mind for humanity. The tension is an expression of a predetermined design, whose beginning in time (adam-of-dust) already looks forward to an end-time ideal (adam-of-glory). The creation of Adam from dust comprehends the whole range of signification of human alienation from God. In this way, human rebellion is brought within the deterministic worldview of the community; if humanity is alienated from God, God must have hardwired this into the design of the cosmos, specifically into the creation of the human being itself. But if God intends something loftier for humanity, as the sectarians believed, then there are also to be found in the creation traditions indications of a different archetype according to which God brings to fruition a new humanity, which finally might be suited to enjoy all the glory of adam. We shall now see

177 Though the terminology/conceptuality is very much present in recent discussion of the Hodayot; cf. Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory, 87–112; Yates, Spirit and Creation, 74; Hultgren, Covenant, 437, 438 n. 69. Contrast Loader, Sexuality, 250; and Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot, 274–77, despite some equivocation on p. 277. There is now no support for the notion that “the fall” is referenced in XVII 31, as suggested by Wallenstein, as cited by ibid., 161 n. 11.
if one of the most profound depictions of an exalted human being in Second Temple Judaism can be comprehended within the same anthropogonic motifs of *adam’s glory*—this is found in the Hodayot’s “Self-Glorification Psalm.”

*The Anthropology of Glory and the Self-Glorification Psalm.* The most striking articulation of divine/angelic status in the Hodayot is found in the so-called “Self-Glorification Psalm” (1QH* a XXV 34-XXVII 3; 4QH* b/4Q427 7 i + ii; 4QH* a/4Q428 21; 4QH* e/4Q431 = 4Q471* b),178 but the nature of the claims made and the identity of the speaker herein occasion much disagreement.179 Interpretation is hampered somewhat by

178 For the precise column and line numbers of the psalm in 1QH*, cf. DJD XL, 292, 300-1. It is just possible that 4QH* 7 ii contains a new psalm, to be distinguished from the “Self-Glorification Hymn” in col. i, but the reasons the editor has given against it are sufficiently compelling; cf. Eileen M. Schuller, “A Hymn from a Cave Four Hodayot Manuscript: 4Q427 7 i+ii,” *JBL* 112 (1993): 607.

179 Bearing in mind that most have given precedence to the 4Q491 material in making their identification, the following interpretations can be noted. As far as I am aware, García Martínez is the only one to have proposed a separate identification for the Hodayot copies and the War Scroll related material in 4Q491; cf. Florentino García Martínez, “Old Texts and Modern Mirages: The ‘I’ of Two Qumran Hymns,” *ETL* 78 (2002): 321–39. For the Hodayot he favours the identification of the speaker as the Teacher of Righteousness, whether in actuality or in memoriam (cf., too, Abegg, “Who Ascended” and Wise, “A Study”), and for the material in the eschatological war tradition, he favours the identification as the archangel Michael. In the latter position, he comes to the defence of the much-maligned identification made originally by the editor, Maurice Baillet (DJD VII, 29–35); for a response to García Martínez, cf. Brian Schultz, *Conquering the World: The War Scroll (1QM) Reconsidered* (STDJ 76; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 29–30, n. 67. Morton Smith, who is famously thought to have decisively refuted Baillet’s view, proposed that the speaker was a member of the community who had experienced a mystical ascent into heaven; cf. the essay originally given in 1972, Morton Smith, “Ascent to the Heavens and Deification in 4QMa,” in *Archaeology and History in the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. Lawrence H. Schiffman and Yigael Yadin; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990), 181–88; a revised version was published in, idem, “Two Ascended to Heaven - Jesus and the Author of 4Q491,” in *Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. James Charlesworth; New York: Doubleday, 1992), 290–301; and for the problems of considering this an ascent text, cf. Alexander, *Mystical Texts*, 86–89; and against such a reading, John J. Collins, *The Scepter and the Star: Messianism in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 160–63. Another prominent view has been to see in the speaker the eschatological high priest; cf. Esther Eshel, DJD XXIX, 424–427 and John J. Collins, “A Throne in the Heavens: Apotheosis in Pre-Christian Judaism,” in *Death, Ecstasy, and Other Worldly Journeys* (ed. John J. Collins and Michael A. Fishbane; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 43–58; Collins appears less certain of this identification in idem, *Scepter*, 163–64. Émile Puech identifies the speaker as the Teacher of Righteousness/eschatological priest-prophet who reports his own mystical experience or is represented posthumously as experiencing the reward of the resurrection from the dead: Émile Puech, “L’hymne de la glorification du maître de 4Q431,” in *Prayer and Poetry in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Related Literature: Essays in Honor of Eileen Schuller on the Occasion of Her 65th Birthday* (ed. Jeremy Penner, Ken M. Penner, and Cecilia Wassen; STDJ 98; Leiden: Brill,
the uncertain relationship between the Hodayot material and very similar statements found within a bundle of fragments edited as 4Q491, the relevant fragment, number 11, carrying its own unresolved questions of textual relationship to the whole. Some consideration will be made of expressions only preserved in 4Q491 11 in order to account for the possibility that their absence from the Hodayot is due to the poor preservation of the textual remains, as seems likely in at least a few cases. Here I will seek to demonstrate that the claims for the different persons (both the “I” and the “you”?/”we”) of the Self-Glorification Psalm are homologous and to a large degree expressive of the archetypal anthropology with which this chapter has been concerned; additionally, the anthropological character of these claims, particularly those made for the singular voice, will further be demonstrated in the manner that they bring together topoi from scriptural narratives of self-deification and the Isaianic tradition of the Servant of Yhwh.

The argument presented here builds on the work of others. For instance, Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis detects in the psalm “the autobiography of one who is both human

2012), 377–408. For the view that the speaker adopts a priestly persona and reports on his experience in the liturgical life of the community, see below, and for the view that the speaker is Enoch, cf. n. 188.

180 In “Who Ascended,” Martin Abegg argued that 4Q491 consists in fact of three separate manuscripts: 4Q491a (=the War Scroll, known from Cave 1), 4Q491b (eschatological war material, not identical to 1QM), and 4Q491c 11 i + 12 (including, the “Canticle of Michael” and “Canticle of the Righteous”). The separation of manuscript c from b was challenged by García Martínez, “Mirages.” And it is now reported that Abegg has retracted from this distinction; cf. Joseph L. Angel, “The Liturgical-Eschatological Priest of the Self-Glorification Hymn,” RevQ 96 (2010): 590, n. 23.

181 The predominant conceptuality used to relate the two textual traditions of this psalm has been literary; they have been considered as two recensions, with disagreement about which might be first. The only objection to this conceptuality that I am aware of comes from García Martínez, who understands them as two instantiations of the same genre, with no necessary literary connection (cf. Mirages). I have tried to heed the criticisms made by Schuller (DJD XXIX, 102) and García Martínez (Mirages, 114-18) about the failure to respect the different contexts of the textual remains of this psalm.

and yet divine.” Fletcher-Louis thinks it likely that the speaker was a priest, whose extraordinary experience of transformation occurred within the context of the liturgical life of the community. In Fletcher-Louis’ treatment, the claims made by the “I” of self-exaltation appear to be commensurate with the traditions of glorification in the Hodayot he earlier related to the “pre-lapsarian” Adam whose “every glory” is accessed in the community. Joseph Angel, likewise, argues that the speaker is a priest, or at least adopts a priestly persona, and “is to be understood as a present member of the community who, by means of liturgical experience, has undergone an extraordinary transformation.” He contends, furthermore, that “the homology drawn between the speaker and the righteous worshippers implies that he leads them to an experience of heavenly glorification comparable to his own.” Whereas in 4Q491 11 the self-exaltation and the call for the community to praise God appear to be two separate psalms, in the Hodayot they appear as one psalm, confirming the case for a correspondence between the two parts. Angel, like Michael Wise before him, points out common features predicated of the single and plural referents in the psalm(s), including the claims of exalted heavenly status, suffering, and access to divine knowledge. While the priestly-anthropological nature of the claims made has thus been maintained in certain scholarship, it would appear that these claims could still be more clearly demonstrated as being expressive of the Hodayot’s adam-of-glory tradition by a simple method of topicalization and

183 Fletcher-Louis, *All the Glory*, 200.
184 Ibid., 104–12.
185 Angel, “Priest,” 585, 604.
186 No break falls between the first person paean and the call to the community to praise God in 4Q427 7 i 13; the same appears to be the case in 1QH² XXVI 9, whereas in 4Q491 11 12 an exaggerated *lamed* following a vacat appears to mark a new composition; cf. Wise, “A Study,” 191–93.
comparison. In this way, it will be demonstrated that while the speaker adopts a priestly persona, his persona does not define priests per se, but rather expresses the broader anthropological vision of the Hodayot.\textsuperscript{188}

The following analysis will juxtapose and consider the relationship between claims made for the “I” in the psalm of glorification, the community in the same psalm, and the figures outside this psalm in the Hodayot.

The voice that celebrates his own singular glorification does so by asserting his companionship with the divine beings in the heavenly realm. He refers to himself, apparently, as “beloved of the king (ידיד המלך), companion to the holy ones (מעון אלים)” (4QH\textsuperscript{a} 1 6/4QH\textsuperscript{a} 7 i 10=1QH\textsuperscript{a} XXVI 6), and asserts, “as for me, my station (מעמדי) is with the divine beings (מעון אלים)” (4QH\textsuperscript{a} 7 i 11=1QH\textsuperscript{a} XXVI 7). These features are matched in the remaining parts of the psalm, where the focus is on the members of the community: They bear the title ידידים (4QH\textsuperscript{a} 7 i 13=1QH\textsuperscript{a} XXVI 9)\textsuperscript{189} and are located in the “congregation of God” (ברע[ע]ת אל), “the tents of salvation” (העמותה), and “the holy dwelling” (המעון), “with the eternal host” (בעצב女主角) and “in common assembly” (ביחד קהל, 4QH\textsuperscript{a} 7 i 13-18=1QH\textsuperscript{a} XXVI 9-14); “from the dust” they (i.e., “the poor”) have been raised “to the eternal height and to the clouds” where they are “with the divine beings in the congregation of the community” (מעון אלים בעדות), enjoying “eternal joy in their dwellings, everlasting glory without ceasing” (שמחת

\textsuperscript{188} The same observation would apply to Enochic elements of the psalm; cf. Christophe Batsch, “Les cantiques d’ascension de Qumrân (4QSelf-Glorification) et le ravissement de Paul (2 Corinthiens 12),” \textit{Hen} 34 (2012): 314–30; Miller, “Reexamined.” If the person of Enoch is in the background, then Enoch’s experience typifies that of glorified humanity.

\textsuperscript{189} The adjective occurs only here in the Hodayot; the equivalent section of 4Q491 11 13 reads צדיקים, the difference being taken by Wise of the Hodayot redactor’s effort to merge the two canticles into one; Wise, “A Study,” 217.
and yet again, they, “dust and ashes,” have “taken station (לחותש בהמשה) before [God]” and “come into community with the children of heaven” (לבח בחד עמי שמים, 4QHa 7 ii 16-18=1QHa XXVI 35-36). Such statements are entirely at home in the Hodayot.  

Membership in the heavenly citizenry naturally involves exaltation and glorification, as already glimpsed immediately above; the more distinctive claims will be marshalled here. A reference to the מלכי קדם (“the kings of the East/of yore,” 1QHa XXV 35) might have been made in the context of the speaker’s claim to have been given the mighty throne they had never occupied, a conjecture based on 4Q491 11 5. In any case, it is almost certain that somewhere in this self-description the speaker refers to his having taken a seat in the heavens. The single voice declaims early in his paean, “I exalt myself” (אתרומם, 1QHa XXV 37), according to one reconstruction. He then demonstrates this exaltation prolifically in broken lines that repeatedly ask on different

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190 Cf. 1QHa VI 16-17 (?); VII 17-18; VIII 14-16; XI 21-23; XII 23-24 (?); XIV 15-18; XVI 11-14, 21; XIX 13-17; XX 5-6; XXI 9; XXXIII 26-30; XXV 26-27; and 1QS XI 7-9.  
191 The reading would gain in plausibility if frg. 47 could be placed here: cf. Wise, “A Study,” 204–9; Qimron, Hebrew Writings, 1:101. Then the next line would begin with a reference to “nobles” (נדיבים, 1QHa frg. 47 2) which also follows in 4Q491 11 5. However, Stegemann rules it out, but without stating a decisive reason, and is admittedly tentative in placing it in col. XXII (DJD XL, 271, 296 n. 8). Puech, “L’hymne de la glorification du maître de 4Q431,” 385 n. 13, also would place it in col. XXII 24-28.  
192 Besides the evidence 4Q491 11 and the use of frag. 47, there is 4QHa 6 2, which the editor believes “may belong” to the present psalm (Schuller, DJD XXIX, 95); in fact, the placement of frag. 6 in the psalm is regarded as so certain that it forms part of the rationale for choosing to restore ר’[ך]オリ in 4QHa 1 3 (=1QHa XXVI 4) instead of י[ך]オリ (so Eshel, DJD XXIX, 427) on the basis that “it is unlikely that [the phrase] would appear twice in the same section of the psalm” (DJD XXIX, 205; similarly DJD XL, 302). Thus, while it is uncertain how many times or where, it is virtually certain that the psalm describes the speaker’s enthronement or taking a seat in the heavenly realm.  
193 For the restoration cf. DJD XL, 296; contrast והם ותרומם (ו!?) respectively in Qimron, Hebrew Writings, 101; Puech, “L’hymne de la glorification du maître de 4Q431,” 386 n. 16. The reading in question concerns the last preserved line on the right side of frag. 7; the photos make a reading extremely difficult.
points of comparison who is/has been “like him” (כמוני/דמה/שוה); most strikingly, he asks, “Who is like me among the divine beings?” (מי כמוני באליים, 4QH 1 4/4QH 7 i 8=1QH XXVI 4-5) and asserts, regarding some difficult to ascertain subject, “to my glory it will not compare” (לכבודי לא ידמה, 4QH 7 i 11/4QH 1 6-7=1QH XXVI 7). This exaltation seems to involve attainment of superhuman capacities, as the speaker boasts, “the utterance of my lips who can sustain? Who in speech is comparable to me?” (4QH 1 5/4Q427 7 i 9=1QH XXVI 5-6).

These statements are paralleled, though with less audacity and specificity in statements relevant to the community. The community is bidden to “sanctify his name with strong lips and a mighty tongue” (4QH 7 i 16=1QH XXVI 11-12). The boast against the kings is matched by two reversal formulas in which “the lofty assemblies of the eternally proud” are “brought low” (שפל) and those who stumble and the poor are “raised up” (רומ, 4QH 7 i 19-20, ii 7-9=1QH XXVI 15-16, 26-30). The exaltation involves physiological transformation: “he lifts up the poor one from the dust to the eternal height, and to the clouds he makes him tall in stature (ועד שחקים יגביה בקומה . . . ) and everlasting power is with their step (וגבורת עד עם מצעדם)” (4QH 7 ii 7-9/1QH XXVI 27-29). If the single voice can boast of being (in some sense) greater than the elim, the plural voices can at least celebrate immediate access to God: the lines are broken, but the point is clear: “There is no mediator (איש מלוי) to answer at your command . . . and we possess strength to hear wonders such as these [ ] We speak to you and not to an intermediary (ולא לאיש בינם [ ] And you inclined an ear to the utterance

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194 The presence of the last verb is debated: cf. n. 192.
195 For the combination of being made tall (גבה) to the “clouds,” cf. Ezek 19:11; 31:1-14.
of our lips” (4QH² 7 ii 18-22/1QH¹ XXVI 36-41). These are all bold claims on the part of the single and the plural voices.

But they are well prepared for in the Hodayot. The royal status and glorification of the elect (cf. 1QS III 17-18) are implied in V 34 (“by your splendour you glorify him, and you give [him] dominion [with] abundant delights”) and VI 16-17 (“that they may do justice [in] the world”); XIV 16-17 speaks of the “princes” (שרים) in the eternal lot, who require no “intermediary” (מליץ) before God. The motif of royal status is combined with personal glorification in XV 25-28: “And you have raised my horn (קרני) above all who despise me . . . My dominion (ממשלתי) (extends) over those who scorn me. For [you, ]O my God, have given aid to my soul and have raised my horn on high, and I shine forth with sevenfold light b [ ] you have established me for your glory.” The trope of an extraordinary individual describing his own glorification is amply attested elsewhere, too, with the motif of being lit by (eternal, primordial) light being prominent (XI 4-5; XII 6; XVII 26-28; cf., also VII 12; VIII 14; frag. C2). In the context of the description of primordial light that appears to be reflected, or to shine on, or from, the cognitive and communicative capacities of the worshipper, the motif of self-exaltation is presaged in XXIII (2-9; 31-32): your servant will “magnify himself in your glory” (ויתגבר בכבודכה, l. 9); and later in the same psalm an implicit comparison with the angels in his company is made: “among the divine beings he is glorious” (הבונים אלים יכבד, l. 23; for a similar statement concerning a community, cf. XXV 26-27: “in the council of the ho[ly ones] [they] will be exalted,” ויבסוד קד[ yahoo] ויתרומם;) and, again, in perhaps the same psalm, in the context of “heavenly beings” who are “cast down” from the “holy place” or God’s
“glorious dwelling” (XXIV 11-12), and where mention of the “bastards” (תומרים, l. 26) is made, there is yet another comparison involving a human with the angels: “you are [ho]noured (or “glorified”) more than the sons of God” (יוֹנָדֵת מַבְנֵי אֵל l. 33-4). Thus the motifs of royal status, glorification and even self-exaltation (sometimes above the angels) are very closely matched in the Hodayot outside of the Self-Glorification Psalm. The self-glorification of the singular voice is unique only in degree, not in kind.196

The single voice also admits (sparsely in the Hodayot remains) of being subject to adversity, while also claiming extraordinary prowess as a teacher. In a fragment of what is likely a question, the single voice asks, “[Who is/has been] despised like me (נָבָה כְּמִי)?” (4QHe 1 i=1QHa XXVI 2); then, after a line or so, he asks, “[What] will be like my teaching (אֱוֹרִית)” (4QHe 1 i 3=1QHa XXVI 3-4).197 The community, likewise, views itself as “those who stumble” (כושלים, 4QHa 7 i 19, ii 10=1QHa XXVI 15, 29) and “the poor” (אביון, 4QHa ii 8=1QHa XXVI 27), monikers which may be connected to social conflict and isolation.198 They are also the beneficiaries of privileged knowledge: They “wait for knowledge” (4QHe 7 i 20=1QHa XXVI 15) and they sing at length of possessing it in 4QHa 7 ii 12-16=1QHa XXVI 31a-34. The emphasis placed on suffering on the part of the single voice is strong evidence that the person is indeed a human figure.

In the broader context of the Hodayot, it bears a striking resemblance to the declaration that introduces the psalms which bear the strong persona of a formative and afflicted leader of the community (1QHa X-XVII). In col. IX 35, the speaker vows, “And I will

196 The same language is used by Collins, Apocalypticism, 147.
197 Cf., too, 4Q491 11 9, cited below, n. 200.
198 Angel, “Priest,” 597.
recit[e continually] in their midst [i.e., of all God’s creatures] the judgements which have
afflicted me.” Thus, the liturgical recitation of suffering which the single voice raises in
notes of self-exaltation is matched here, inviting the identification with that formative
figure in the history of the community who recites at length his suffering within the
Teacher-block of psalms in particular (e.g., 1QHª X 8-16; XIII 9-11, 17-21, 27-28),
though not exclusively (cols. XXI-XXII). Not only is the liturgical recitation of one’s
suffering accounted for outside this particular psalm, but so is the association of that
suffering with the consequence of the speaker’s glorification. On two occasions this
glorification is even portrayed as a type of royal coronation: “the contempt of my foes
will become a crown of glory ( Cald יבשא) for me, and my stumbling, eternal strength”
(1QHª XVII 25) and “You have raised my horn above all who despise me . . . My
dominion (extends) over those who scorn me. For [you, ]O my God, have given aid to my
soul and have raised my horn on high, and I shine forth with sevenfold light” (1QHª XV
25-28).

Finally, the single voice performs the function of leading a chorus of (heavenly)
worshippers in the praise of God. The transition from self-adulation to the imperatives of
praise directed at the community (4QHª 7 i 13=1QHª XXVI 9) maintains the same
implied speaker. The single voice asks, “the utterance of my lips who can sustain? Who
in speech is comparable to me?” (4QHª 7 i 9=1QHª XXVI 5-6) and then beckons the
community, “Sanctify his name with strong lips and a mighty tongue!” (4QHª 7 i
16=1QHª XXVI 11-12). The one who celebrated his own exaltation now calls upon the
community to praise God for working a similar exaltation on their own behalf. Finally,
towards the end of the psalm (4QH\textsuperscript{a} 7 ii 14ff.=1QH\textsuperscript{a} XXVI 32ff.), the community itself speaks, as the transition is made to the first-person plural. Throughout all this, worship occurs in community with the heavenly beings, in the very presence of God. This has been the vision for the elect throughout the Hodayot. The following highlights resemble the strong individuality represented in the “I” of the Self-Glorification Psalm: “A source of light you have opened[ ] and for your council you have called me to praise your holiness by the mouth of all your creatures, for you have don[e to be un]ited with the host of eternal [wa]rrriors” (1QH\textsuperscript{a} VIII 14-16 = frg. 13);\textsuperscript{199} “What am I that . . . you have put thanksgiving into my mouth, pr[ai]se upon my tongue, and (made) the utterance of my lips as the foundation of jubilation?” (1QH\textsuperscript{a} XIX 7-8); “I have spoken in the congregation of your holy ones, ascribing greatness and wonder to God for you are God of knowledge. With a [strong] voice [from dawn to evening I will bless your name” (1QH\textsuperscript{a} XXV 32-33/4QH\textsuperscript{b} 20 3-4).

The psalm, therefore, permits one to speak of multiple homologies. The words of the single voice are echoed in what is characteristic of the plural voices. The words of both give expression to common themes throughout the Hodayot: communion with the angels, exaltation and glorification, an experience of worship, and access to privileged knowledge. Each of these themes comes within the orbit of the glory of adam (1QS IV 23; 1QH\textsuperscript{a} IV 26-27), and thus are properly anthropological. They express the original intended identity of humankind (1QS III 17-18; IV 6-8; 1QH\textsuperscript{a} V 34-35; XIV 15-18; XVI 11-14, 21), which has been fashioned here by a convergence of royal and priestly

\textsuperscript{199} Qimron disputes the placement of frg. 13 at this point in the reconstruction offered in DJD XL, 38, 110; cf. Hebrew Writings, xxx, 106.
qualities, not unlike what one finds in Exod 19:5-6 or Ps 110. But the psalm also gives expression to the discontinuity between this lofty vision and what it knows of the human condition. In familiar fashion, the worshippers intone towards the end: “What is flesh in relation to these things? And how is [dust and ashes] to be reckon[ed] that it should recount these things continually or take (its) station[ before you or come into community with] the children of heaven?” (4QH^a 7 ii 16-18=1QH^a XXVI 35-36). The disconnection between the human condition (flesh, dust and ashes []) and the human calling (unceasing praise, heavenly standing) here expresses the deep antithesis which the authors of the Hodayot construct from their traditions of creation and anthropology. At the same time, however, there is perhaps a glimpse of an understanding that the human predicament provides the channel through which God sees fit for humanity to realize its higher destiny. This brings us to the traditional antecedents behind the singular voice’s self-proclamation.

The claims of the single voice reflect the influence of a number of traditional antecedents. I want to highlight two of them. The first is more widely recognized: the speaker’s self-presentation is shaped by the persona of the Isaianic Servant of Yhwh. This is clearest in 4QH^e 1 1(=1QH^e XXVI 2) where the words are preserved [בֶּזֶה כָּמֻמָּנֶּה יִ], “despised like me,” reflecting Isa 53:3: “He was despised (נִבְזֶה)” (cf., too, 49:7). The following line of the scroll, preserving the words [הָדָל], may be translated “and evil ceases” or “without companion,” carrying on from Isa 53:3: “He was despised and
rejected by men (מִי כְמוֹנִי בְּאֵלֶּים).” The speaker’s own exaltation corresponds to that promised for the suffering servant: “he shall be exalted and lifted up, and shall be very high” (וַחֲדַל אִּישִּים), Isa 52:13; cf. 53:12). Additionally, the references to teaching (4QH 1 3), the “outpouring of lips” (4QH 1 4-5), and uniqueness of speech (4QH 7 i 9) may reflect the depiction of the Servant of Yhwh as a teacher and agent of justice (note the first person in Isa 50:4—“the Lord GOD has given me the tongue of a teacher”; also 42:4, 21; 49:2-3), and the expression “beloved of the king” (ידיד המלך, 4QH 1 6) may reflect the tender affection Yhwh feels for the servant: “Because you are precious in my sight, and honored, and I love you” (משא עמך ונאבדך אני אחבדיך, Isa 43:4).

The adoption of terminology from the Servant Songs is evident in the so-called Teacher Psalms as well, whose stark personal claims are most closely matched here.

The second complex of traditions I want to highlight concern self-deification; these texts have received little attention in relation to the Self-Glorification Psalm, and perhaps not surprisingly, for their protagonists are roundly condemned from the perspective of the authors. Before we look at two such texts, it will be well to stress how nearly the speaker in the glorification psalm equates himself to God. The speaker makes numerous claims of super-exaltation, most audacious of which is the question, “Who is like me among the divine beings?” (מי כימי באלים, 4QH 1 4=1QH XXVI 4-5).

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200 Additionally, cf. 4Q491 11:9: מִי שֶׁשֶׁאָכַדְּנִי צְטַעְקִי מֵעֶם תְמוּם לַעֲרֵי רְדֵהוּ בָּאָי. “Who bears sorrows like me, and who (suffers/lacks) evil like me?”


202 In other respects, the psalm fits better in the category, Community Psalms. For a discussion, cf. Schuller, DJD XXIX, 100-2.

203 Eshel, DJD XXIX, 422 n. 9, considers the comparison with Isa 14:13 only to dismiss it on these grounds.
This bold claim and the repeated use of the root דָּמָה (and שָׁוֶה) in the surrounding statements of a similar nature are astonishingly close to the form and content of statements with which God is celebrated as without peer or rival. First consider, from Second Isaiah, “To whom then will you compare me, or who is my equal?” (וְאֶל־מִּי תְדַמְיוּנִּי וְאֶשְוֶה, Isa 40:25; cf., too, 40:18; 44:6-7; 46:5); or Ps 89:7 (E:6): “For who in the skies can be compared to the LORD? Who among the heavenly beings is like the LORD?” (כִּי מִי בַשַחַק יַעֲרֹךְ לַיהוָה יִדְמֶה לַיהוָה בִּבְנֵי אֵלִּים; and lastly, the nearly exact phrase to that of 4QH 1 4 in Exod 15:11: מִי־כָמֹכָה בָאֵלִּים יְהוָה 204. In adopting the same forms of expression in which the uniqueness of God is asserted and by insisting on his exaltation above the gods, the speaker comes remarkably close to identifying himself with God.

Of course, the speaker has no designs to supplant, rival, or equal God, and, crucially, the points of his comparison with the heavenly beings are different from those in which God’s uniqueness is asserted—the psalmist is neither deliverer nor creator. Nevertheless, the language of self-deification, implying an assumption of new status, calls for comparison with Isaiah’s and Ezekiel’s portrayals of the kings of Babylon and Tyre.205 It will be seen that motifs of self-deification found therein are recontextualized and transformed in the present psalm by the concept of servanthood as it appears in Isaiah 40-55.

204 Cf. Eshel, DJD XXIX, 431, who also notes that the phrase מִי כָמֹכָה “is used only in speaking of God” (citing Ps 35:10 and 1QM X 8).
205 Besides the egomaniacal claims made on behalf of these kings of disrepute in the imagination of Israel, the closest biblical precedent one finds for the claims of self-deification in the present Thanksgiving Psalm is found on the lips of Lady Wisdom in Proverbs 8; cf. Collins, Apocalypticism, 143–47. There are interesting parallels here, but unlike those of the kings of Babylon and Tyre, the claims of Lady Wisdom do not involve a purported elevation in status.
I begin with the *mashal* delivered against the king of Babylon in Isaiah 14:3-23.²⁰⁶

The text records the judgement decreed for a king whose oppressive arrogance is likened to the mythological transgression of having designs on the status of the most high God.

Sheol beneath is stirred up to meet you when you come; it rouses the shades to greet you, all who were leaders of the earth; it raises from their thrones all who were kings of the nations (הֵקִּים מִכִּסְאוֹתָם כֹּל מַלְכֵי גוֹיִם). ¹⁰ All of them will speak and say to you: “You too have become as weak as we (כָּמֹנ)! You have become like us (אֵלֵינוּ נִּמְשָלְתָ)!”¹¹ Your pomp is brought down to Sheol, and the sound of your harps; maggots are the bed beneath you, and worms are your covering. ¹² How you are fallen from heaven, O Day Star, son of Dawn! How you are cut down to the ground, you who laid the nations low! ¹³ You said in your heart, “I will ascend to heaven (השָמַיִם אֶעֱלֶה); I will raise my throne above the stars of God (מִמַעַל לְכוֹכְבֵי־אֵל אָרִּים כִּסְאִי); I will sit on the mount of assembly on the heights of Zaphon (וְאֵשֵב בְהַר־מוֹעֵד בְיַרְכְתֵי צָפוֹן); ¹⁴ I will ascend to the tops of the clouds (אֶעֱלֶה עַל־בָמֳתֵי עָב), I will make myself like the Most High (אֶדַמֶה לְעֶלְיוֹן).” ¹⁵ But you are brought down to Sheol, to the depths of the Pit. . . ¹⁸ All the kings of the nations lie in glory (בְכָבוֹד), each in his own tomb; ¹⁹ but you are cast out, away from your grave, like loathsome carrion, clothed with the dead, those pierced by the sword, who go down to the stones of the Pit, like a corpse trampled underfoot.

Points of contact here with the Self-Glorification Psalm include the juxtaposition of the speaker with kings of yore and reference to their thrones (v. 9); the positioning of the speaker with such kings in an agonistic relationship (vv. 10, 18); a reference to the claimant’s own throne and his taking a seat in the realm of the gods (v. 13); the boast of exceeding in status the heavenly beings (vv. 13-14); the likening of oneself with God (v. 14); and the use of the term כָבוֹד to characterize the claimant’s position (v. 18). Before commenting on the transformation of these motifs, I turn to the Ezekielian oracles.

²⁰⁶ Whether the text can actually be attributed to the 8th century prophet (which raises the question, “why Babylon”?) makes little difference here.
Ezekiel delivers two oracles concerning the prince/king of Tyre (28:1-10; 11-19) that are of present concern. The first records the divine judgement against a king whose wisdom turns to pride and to the accumulation of wealth.

[2] Because your heart is proud and you have said, “I am a god; I sit in the seat of the gods (מלשך אלהים ישבת), in the heart of the seas,” yet you are but a mortal (אדם), and no god (אל), though you compare your mind with the mind of a god. You are indeed wiser than Daniel; no secret is hidden from you; by your wisdom and your understanding you have amassed wealth (חיה) for yourself, and have gathered gold and silver into your treasuries (רחל). By your great wisdom in trade (רכלה) you have increased your wealth, and your heart has become proud in your wealth.

Following this, a new oracle (a “lamentation,” קינה, 28:12) turns to metaphor as the case against the king is reprised in the hues of the story of the primal couple’s rebellion against God.207 “You were in Eden, the garden of God,” “the holy mountain of God,” the prophet relays (vv. 13, 14), elaborating in brighter mythic colours the hallucinations of the prior oracle (“I sit in the seat of the gods”). “Every precious stone was your covering, carnelian, chrysolite, and moonstone, beryl, onyx, and jasper, sapphire, turquoise, and emerald; and worked in gold were your settings and your engravings” (v. 13). Here the prior description of the great wealth amassed by the king becomes the exuberance of riches in the garden-temple.208 He has the company of the guardian cherub (v. 14), permitting his access to the holy mountain and its company of beings (“the stones of fire”)?209 vv. 14, 16). But the story cannot end well:

207 The oracles are closely related; Zimmerli speculates that vv. 1-10 have been secondarily prefixed to the lament (vv. 11-19) “as its obvious justification”; Ezekiel: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel (trans. James D. Martin; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1983), 73. My language merely reflects the canonical ordering of the oracles.

208 The description of the stones corresponds to the notice in Gen 2:11-12 and draws from the description of the high priest’s breastplate in Exod 28:17-20.

209 Cf. Zimmerli, Ezekiel, 93.
You were blameless in your ways from the day that you were created, until iniquity was found in you. In the abundance of your trade you were filled with violence, and you sinned; so I cast you as a profane thing from the mountain of God, and the guardian cherub drove you out from among the stones of fire. Your heart was proud because of your beauty; you corrupted your wisdom for the sake of your splendor. I cast you to the ground; I exposed you before kings, to feast their eyes on you.

These texts likewise reveal points of contact with our present thanksgiving psalm: the claim to divine status (v. 2); the taking of a seat in the company of the divine beings (v. 2, 13-14); the association of treasure and status (vv. 3-5, 13); the celebration of one’s radiance (v. 17); and, again, the agonistic relationship with kings (v. 17). Ezekiel’s metaphorical adoption of the situation and circumstances of the primal couple’s sin in order to characterize his subject’s arrogation of divine status confirms that such claims for glorification have deep archetypal signification for humanity. The king’s claim to sit in the seat of the gods is likened to the situation of the primal pair; but he was filled with violence and his wisdom was corrupted, both, it seems, for the sake of increasing his own station (vv. 16-17), as in Gen 3:6. Moreover, as in the story of the primal couple, the king of Tyre’s judgement involves a reversal of what his desired status implies, namely, death instead of immortality (so, too, Isa 14:15-19): “Will you still say, ‘I am a god,’ in the presence of those who kill you, though you are but a mortal (אַתָּה אָדָם), and no god, in the hands of those who wound you?” (Ezek 28:9; cf. 18-19). Finally, the appearance of the myth in two forms—one concerning a celestial being (in Isaiah) and the other

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210 There is uncertainty about whom precisely the myth reflects, but that this is no mere human being seems certain; cf. H. Wildeberger, A Continental Commentary: Isaiah 13-27 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 62–65.
recapitulating the experience of the first humans\textsuperscript{211}—confirms the close association of an attenuated divine status with primal or archetypal humanity.

The appearance of these traditions of self-deification is made possible because the single voice in the sectarian psalm has adopted the position of servant rather than usurper. In particular, his concept of servanthood appears to be influenced by the depiction of the suffering servant of Yhwh, as indicated above. He boasts in his suffering and his teaching, and thus his glory is achieved through his service to God. He uses his words—
to celebrate his own position, yes, but then to summon others to the praise of God, signalling that he hints or hopes not to be “like (i.e., equal to) God” (that direct claim is absent), but that the celebration of his own exaltation is intended as an ode to the mighty acts of God. He has no use for the accoutrements of wealth, gold or precious stones, so he only boasts of their absence.\textsuperscript{212} His glory comes by other means. Therefore, the kings of nations cannot claim him as their own, or speak from their thrones and pull him down to Sheol, for his station is altogether different from theirs. If they sought a throne like his, they did not know how to obtain it. They may lie in “honour” (כבוד) in their tombs, but this one celebrates a glory which not even the elim, the envy of those dead kings, can match.

Thus, traditions that orbited around primal humanity, applied derisively against these Gentile kings, have contributed to the positive portrayal of the speaker as fulfilling that for which the first humans’ inclination (cf. Gen 3:4-6; Job 15:7-8) and these kings’

\textsuperscript{211} On the human identity of the figure, cf. Zimmerli, \emph{Ezekiel}, 90–91.
\textsuperscript{212} Not already cited above is the (broken) statement: “not with fine gold I will k for myself, and gold or precious stone not with me” (4QH\textsuperscript{a} 7 i 12-13=1QH\textsuperscript{a} XXVI 8-9).
aspirations were regarded, and treated, as an affront to God—the self-aggrandizing grasp at divine status.\textsuperscript{213} The myths show that divine status is incompatible not with humanity per se, but only with the attempt to secure or increase it outside of the bounds God has erected.\textsuperscript{214} God, rather, glorifies the one who accepts their (relative) poverty and brings a gory end to the one who grasps at riches.

These scriptural antecedents combine with the contextual parallels throughout the Hodayot to confirm that the psalm of self-glorification is indeed concerned with the fulfillment of all the glory of adam.

Conclusions

The use of anthropogenic traditions in the Hodayot is thus dichotomous: on the hand, the adam-of-dust motif (Gen 2:6-7) forms the basis for the trope of self-abasement and severely problematizes the enjoyment of the privileges involved in election; on the other hand, traditions which are associated with the creation of humanity after the divine image (Gen 1:26-28) or a little lower than elohim (Ps 8) undergird a vision of an exalted, eschatological humanity which is able to enjoy the glory intended for humanity. By putting the two narratives of the creation of humankind in Genesis into tension, the Hodayot seem to reflect an inchoate tendency emerging in other texts as well, such as 4QInstruction and the TST.\textsuperscript{215} The Hodayot have been greatly assisted in this by the

\textsuperscript{213} It should be noted that in Gen 2-3 itself, Adam and Eve’s disobedience is not treated as an attempt to supplant God, but as a grasping after a good thing from which they were forbidden.

\textsuperscript{214} “The prince comes to grief precisely on his exalted state and on his splendor. Instead of ennobling him, his beauty makes him ignoble, highhanded, proud of himself. What is a gift, he seizes to himself with greedy hands as his own property”; Zimmerli, Ezekiel, 95.

\textsuperscript{215} 4Q417 1 i 16-18 does this by dichotomizing the “people of spirit” formed in the “pattern of the holy ones” and the “spirit of flesh” which “did not know the difference between good and evil.” 1QS III
equation between the earth and the womb and by elements within the book of Job that deconstruct adamic ontology and moral integrity. Consciously or not, the sectarian psalmists have taken and emphasized tensions latent in their scriptural sources and made them expressive of a divine plan for human beings that includes a temporary frustration of an exalted human destiny by created human ontology. Created human nature, therefore, is experienced and portrayed more as an obstacle to the fulfillment of God’s purposes than a lost ideal; implicitly, the story of Adam illustrates that a humanity taken from the earth and defined by normal flesh and blood ontology is ill-suited to the high intentions God has for it. The “glory of adam” looks back to that which Adam temporarily enjoyed and ultimately forfeited, but it does not hold up Adam per se as the model for ideal humanity, in so far as Adam’s earthly ontology frustrates his enjoyment of the heavenly worship. Adam’s expulsion from the Garden and the sentence of death are comprehended in terms of Adam’s creation from the earth and are ultimately rationalized as expressive of the mysterious divine will of an all-powerful figure—God, the creator of all things. In this tradition, Adam is not construed so as to lose his

17-18 does this by putting into tension the creation of humankind to rule the world and the constitution of humankind as characterized by two warring spirits, which resemble the two yetzers, one of which must be removed prior to the fulfillment of “all the glory of adam.” While I have not emphasized it heretofore, a similar technique appears to be at work in 4Q504 8 recto 1-10, which narrates the creation of Adam in the image of God’s glory but then appears to recount Adam’s disobedience. In the latter part, an addition to the biblical narrative is made which in the present light appears to be very significant. In alluding to the decree of Gen 3:19 (“you are dust, and to dust you shall return”), the broken text reads, “he is flesh, and to dust.” The inclusion of בשר goes beyond the biblical narrative and emphasizes the connection between dust and flesh in such a way as to problematize human ontology with greater emphasis than Genesis.

Cp. the conclusions of Loader, who notes the paradox of self-deprecation and divine creation more clearly than most: “It is not resolved by attributing human sinfulness to a primeval fall by Adam or by angels, or to evil spirits, nor by alleging contaminating influence from some external force such as Belial . . . nor . . . does ‘flesh’ depict a sphere of evil power.” Rather the “framework of thought” that makes such a paradox possible is “theistic predestination”; Sexuality, 250, 251. And Lichtenberger: “Die Diastase zwischen seiner Vorfindlichkeit, die von seiner schöpfungsmäßigen Niedrigkeit konstituiert wird, und dem
identification with *everyman*; he has not become “a stranger to our condition,” as Ricoeur worried. The terminology of fall-restoration must be so heavily qualified in this framework as to have little value.

I now put the findings of this chapter into the form of answers to the three questions I described in Chapter 1.

*What is the purpose and destiny of humankind as relayed in association with traditions of creation?* The high calling to which the psalmists believe themselves elected is unmistakable. These psalms relay an experience and expectation of worship with the angels that includes knowledge of divine mysteries, immortal life, and glorification. The anthropogonic basis of this high calling might be somewhat less obvious—perhaps for two reasons: first, it is easy to be impressed by the radical negation of the self in the Hodayot, the destruction of the creature of dust; second, precisely because creation is not perceived as a single event from which a fall altered the course of history but an unfolding destiny, the anthropogonic basis for a high anthropology is only obliquely intimated. These exalted motifs, however, represent the fulfillment of the original intended destiny of humankind, which is confirmed by the faint recollection of Adam’s experience of them and their broad rootedness in traditions of creation and anthropogony.

*How is human creatureliness evaluated from the perspective of this purpose; is humanity innately equipped to fulfill it?* The dominant tendency in the Sectarian Psalms is to disparage human creatureliness. They see the conditions of mortality, impurity, and sin as entailed necessarily or innately in creation from dust. Precisely because of the high
anthropological expectations of the psalms, these conditions or qualities have become fundamentally problematic. A mortal creature cannot praise God eternally, a creature subject to impurity cannot worship the holy God unceasingly, and a creature who sins cannot stand before a righteous Judge. Yet these are the privileges entailed in election in the Sectarian Psalms. Their didactic quality and intent, the contraction of the whole scope of human imperfection into its creation, and the mismatch between earthly human ontology and heavenly destiny in these psalms all militate against the view that their base view of human creatureliness is merely an aesthetic effect of their poetic quality or of the feeling of being overwhelmed by the majesty of God. Humankind has not been created with the capacities necessary for it to fully enjoy, let alone secure, its own higher destiny.

And yet human nature can be purified and the elect do join in the company of the angels already in the worship of the sect; the identification of the sect with the Garden of Eden itself is a picturesque way of indicating its experience of the heavenly life. These experiences are based on traditions of creation in the image of God or the holy ones, and they indicate that a more positive understanding of human nature also operates at some level within the Hodayot, one which draws the elect into relationship with the divine beings. The Hodayot do not supply the information necessary to define carefully how these two conceptions of human nature relate to each other. It can be said with confidence, however, that the sectarian psalmists felt that as long as they are identified with the adam-of-dust, their experience of the heavenly life faces persistent obstacles and is threatened with the same fate that befell Adam.
Finally, what means are provided within the mythology of creation to comprehend negative evaluations of human creatureliness? God created humankind with a destiny which is provided for in creation in the divine image but which is strained by normal human ontology. This intuition gives rise to the *Niedrigkeitsdoxologien*, which deconstruct the *adam-of-dust*, and is neatly expressed in the TST’s pithy statement, “[God] created man to rule the world and placed within him two spirits . . . they are the spirits of truth and of deceit” (1QS III 17-19). This tension is not indicative of a lack of foresight or power on God’s part, nor is it attributed to the contingencies human free will introduces into creation. Rather, it is a feature of the divine plan which encompasses all things, including, mysteriously, the temporary reign of evil.
Chapter 3. Adam and the Image of God:

Anthropogony outside Romans

The investigation into anthropogenic traditions in Paul begins with letters other than Romans. In particular, I use the implication of Gal 3:28 that some aspect of gender inequality established in creation is overcome in Christ as a springboard, to set up a question, the answer to which begins to take shape in 1 Cor 11:7-12 and then is rounded out in 15:45-50. The latter text at the same time moves us on from the image of God, which Adam and his descendants bear, to the image of the heavenly Christ, while 2 Cor 3:18 and 4:4, 6 introduce a present aspect of assimilation to the image otherwise missing from the discussion. Philippians 2:5-11 and 3:20-21 help us to address a matter about which we are able only to speculate in earlier discussions concerning the glorious, heavenly image of Christ, and 1 Cor 15:20-28 begins to focus on the moral-vocational corollary of being God’s representatives which will become prominent in Romans.

The leitmotif of this chapter is the image of God. I shall make the following arguments. Paul’s operative assumptions are the normative and continuing status of creaturely ontologies established in creation. The image of God describes a somatic condition that unequally relates male to female. The image is best comprehended within the framework, not of fall and restoration, but of the duality of heaven and earth which is inferred from Gen 1 and reflected in the very act of creation in the image of God (vv. 26-27). That same duality typologically indicates God’s intention for humankind as conformation to the heavenly image of Christ. Despite the basic integrity of this ontology, it is exposed to the adverse effects of a morally and vocationally deviant
subject, making Christ the only means whereby God’s intention for humankind and creation can be fulfilled.

Male and Female No Longer: Galatians 3:28

Galatians 3:28 constitutes theclearest “Adam-reference” in the letter to the Galatians, and it brings us face-to-face with the complex issue of the relationship between creation and new creation in this polemical letter. But not everyone recognizes—or comments upon—the apparent allusion to Gen 1:27 (ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτοῖς; cf. 5:2 LXX) at the tail end of three oppositions in Gal 3:28 (“there is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ”).¹ There are several possible reasons for this. On the one hand, one might question how much weight is to be invested in an allusion to Gen 1:27—if indeed it is there—given that Paul’s main concern appears to be with the first of the three pairs (Jew/Gentile) and that the others are possibly carried over from the purported liturgical tradition Paul is sometimes thought to quote in this passage (cf. 1 Cor 12:13; Col 3:11, which omit the final pair).² On the other hand, the simplest

¹ The last of the three pairs abolished in Christ stands out from the others by employing the conjunction καί rather than οὖν (οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὖν Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δούλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ—the difference is masked in some translations, such as the NIV, NAS). As a result, it replicates exactly a phrase in Gen 1:27 and 5:2 (cf. Mark 10:6 par; for ἄρσεν and θῆλυ in different types of coordination: Exod 1:16; Lev 3:1, 6; 15:33). Comparison with the two other instances of this baptismal formula (if it may be called that) shows this alteration to be somewhat unexpected. 1 Corinthians 12:13 has two pairs, coordinated by the conjunction έτε (έτε Ἰουδαίοι έτε Ἕλληνες έτε δούλοι έτε ἐλεύθεροι). Colossians 3:11 has four pairs, the first two coordinated by καί and the last two standing in succession, asyndetically, where—although the parallelism of opposites breaks down in the first case—one is still likely to infer the same grammatical structure (οὐκ ἔνι Ἕλλην καὶ Ἰουδαῖος, περιτομή καὶ ἄκροβοστία, βάπτισαν, Μαρτυρίας, δούλος, ἐλεύθερος). This shows, moreover, that even if a baptismal liturgy or form is being employed, it was hardly rigid, so that the attribution of some level of intentionality to the shape it takes in Gal 3:28 is not ruled out. The likelihood of a reference to Gen 1:27 is further strengthened by the image-language employed in Col 3:10-11.

² Cf. the reasons set out for believing this to be such a formula in Wayne A. Meeks, In Search of the Early Christians (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 11–12; this is a reprint of his influential article, “Image of the Androgyne: Some Uses of a Symbol in Earliest Christianity,” HR 13 (1974): 165–
reading of such an allusion involves a negation of a feature of the created order found in a celebrated text describing humankind as the bearers of the image and likeness of God. The text would then upset the familiar category of fall-restoration, which guides so much thinking on Paul and Adam. Even more problematically, it might threaten the biblical claim that the creation was/is “very good” (καλὰ λίαν/טוב מאד) if a feature thereof needs to be overcome in Christ. At the outset, then, Paul confronts us with a text that has the potential to force a re-evaluation of conventional ways of thinking about Adam and creation in his letters. The possible allusion to Gen 1:27 opens up a number of provocative associations; however, given its very allusiveness and its lack of contextual determination, it can only serve as a teaser which will anticipate the full disclosure of Paul’s letters.3

There are three broad ways in which the apparent allusion to Gen 1:27 in Paul’s statement that in Christ “there is no longer male and female” has been handled. In the first case, it has often simply been ignored. Scholars who argue that Paul merely wants to affirm the impartiality of God toward male and female in matters of justification have been found in this category, and what relevance a negative reference to Gen 1:27 could have for this view is less than clear, indeed.4 Others, however, can be found in this

4 Thomas R. Schreiner, Galatians (ECNT; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010), 259.
category, including James D. G. Dunn, who generally presents a maximalist construal of “Adam-references” in Paul.⁵

Alternatively, the allusion has been read as signalling a *return* to conditions which initially inhered in creation. The suggestion that a *negation* of a phrase borrowed from Gen 1:27 can signal a *return* to primordial conditions requires some explanation. In a classic article, “The Image of the Androgyne,” Wayne Meeks suggested that the pre-Pauline setting of the formula originally reflected “the myth of an eschatological restoration of man’s original divine, androgynous image.”⁶ In this reading, the “male and female” of Gen 1:27 refers not to a “them” but to a bi-sexed “him,”⁷ and the formula “suggests that somehow the act of Christian initiation reverses the fateful division of Genesis 2:21-22.”⁸ Ben Witherington presents a variation of this understanding of the function of the allusion as signalling a return to primordial conditions that does not include androgyny, tentatively suggesting that Paul may be “saying that in Christ there is no necessary coupling of male and female.”⁹ Similarly, William Loader suggests that the LXX’s allowance for a distinction “between the man of Genesis 1 and the Adam of Genesis 2” is conducive to an “ultimate hope . . . to return to be as the being in Genesis 1

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⁷ The evidence for such an interpretation of Gen 1:27 cited by Meeks includes Philo, *OQG* 1.25; *Opif.* 151f.; and *b. Meg.* 9a; *b. Mek.* Pisha 14; and *Gen. Rab.* 8.1.

⁸ Meeks, *In Search of the Early Christians*, 14. Taken as further indication that the formula reflects the *Urzeit-Endzeit* pattern is its use in Col 3:10 (“clothed yourself with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator”). Meeks was followed by Betz, *Galatians*, 195–200. Betz notes, however, that Paul never discusses androgyny in itself, changes his mind by the writing of 1 Corinthians (11:11-12), and drops the matter entirely in Romans.

where male and female aspects are present, but—despite 1:28—are not acted upon.”10 Such interpretations are plausible but they require a lot of the reader. We would be justified in preferring an interpretation which does not have Paul cite and negate a feature of Gen 1:27 in order to envision a return to primordial conditions.

Other scholars have argued that Paul intends a straightforward undoing of an element of creation. Rather than reflecting an Urzeit-Endzeit formula, the text inserts a wedge between creation and new creation by making the original distinction between male and female an obstacle to be overcome.11 This may be taken to mean different things in terms of the male-female relationship. Judith Gundry-Volf takes this view of the function of the allusion, but she forestalls the possible implication that it entails the end of sex-distinction; rather, “it refers to the adiaphorization of sex difference in a new creation where being male or female is no advantage or disadvantage in relation to God and others and where man and woman are reconciled and united as equals.”12 In constituting an undoing of some element of creation, this view of the meaning and function of the allusion reflects an understanding of Gen 1:27 according to which the creation of male and female is tied less to their equal instantiation of the image of God

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than to marriage and procreation (citing 1 Cor 11:7; Gen 1:28),\textsuperscript{13} as well as a holistic reading of Gen 1-3 in which features of the created blueprint have become burdens “under the conditions of the fallen creation.”\textsuperscript{14}

J. Louis Martyn takes the view that some aspect of creation is undone in a somewhat different direction. Paul is not concerned about equality between the sexes, but rather “with a newly created unity.”\textsuperscript{15} Believers are “taken into the corpus of the One New Man.”\textsuperscript{16} The allusion to Gen 1:27 signals the death of the old cosmic antinomies of religious differentiation (Jew/Greek, Slave/Free, Male/Female) in the cross and announces the appearance of the new creation in Christ (cf. 6:14-15). Paul identifies these antinomies as “the elements of the cosmos” (4:3; cf. v. 9) that have been terminated in Christ (“for neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything,” 6:15).\textsuperscript{17} “In baptism the structure of the original creation had been set aside.”\textsuperscript{18}

The simplest construal of a negative reference to Gen 1:27 involves some undoing of a feature of original creation, rather than its restoration, as Gundry-Volf and Martyn recognize. While Paul does not, therefore, work with the logic of creation’s restoration, he may, however, work with that of its intended fulfillment. This possibility has not been sufficiently considered in the literature. In order to begin to see how Paul might imagine

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Gundry-Volf, “Male and Female,” 113.
\item J. Louis Martyn, Galatians (AB; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 377.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid., 393–406, 570–574; see also the essays “Apocalyptic Antinomies” and “Christ and the Elements of the Cosmos” now reprinted in his Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul (Studies of the New Testament and its World; Nashville: Abingdon, 1997).
\item Martyn, Galatians, 375.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
both a sort of “undoing” and a “fulfilling,” it is necessary to recognize that “image of God” conceptuality thoroughly imbues this text through the permeation of the themes of sonship and inheritance in the wider context of Galatians. This provides the necessary contextualization for a reference to “male and female” drawn from the account of the creation of humankind in the divine image.

The following texts indicate that the language of sonship, and with it inheritance, belong to the same conceptual framework as the image of God:\textsuperscript{19}

Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.” (Gen 1:26; cf. vv. 28-30)

When Adam had lived one hundred thirty years, he became the father of a son in his likeness (דְּמַוְתִּי; LXX ἴδεα, NETS “form,” alt., “appearance”), according to his image (ὡς θεόν; LXX εἰκόνι), and named him Seth. (Gen 5:3; cf. Luke 3:38)

Yet you have made them a little lower than God, and crowned them with glory and honor. You have given them dominion over the works of your hands; you have put all things under their feet. (Ps 8:4-5 [E: 5-6])

For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son (συμμόρφως τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ), in order that he might be the firstborn within a large family (πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλαῖς ἀδελφῖς). (Rom 8:29)

[His beloved son . . .] is the image (εἰκόν) of the invisible God, the firstborn (πρωτότοκος) of all creation. For in him all things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or powers—all things have been created through him and for him. (Col 1:13, 15-16)

\textsuperscript{19} Eltester points to the confluence of the themes of image and son in Hellenistic literature; \textit{Eikon}, 104. He cites Plato’s \textit{Tim.} 92c (which relates εἰκόν to θεοῦ and μονογενής); Resp. VI 508a ff; Plutarch, \textit{E Delph.} 21, 393 D (which relate language of the sun as image and then later as son or offspring); \textit{Quaest. plat.} II 1, 1001 B; VIII 4, 1007 C (cosmos as image of God); \textit{Quaest conv.} VIII I, 718A (God as father of the cosmos); Philo, \textit{Agr.} 51, II 106, 1 (logos as firstborn) and \textit{Fug.} 101, III 132, 7 (logos as image of God), et al. Incidentally, the connection between “image” and “son” might put the lie to the view of those who hold that Jesus’ sonship, but not his being image, relates to his pre-existence. Cf., too, Rudolf Bultmann, \textit{Theology of the New Testament} (repr.; Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2007), 132–133.
[His Son] is the reflection (ἀπανθαμάμα) of God’s glory and the exact imprint (χαρακτήρ) of God’s very being, and he sustains all things by his powerful word. (Heb 1:2-3)

In these texts, one can see that image-language partly constitutes a filial relationship.20 Genesis 1:26-27 suggests that humankind stands somewhere in that spectrum (note the prepositions ב/כ) of beings (plural: “Let us”; “in our image”; cf. Gen 3:22) who belong to the class of sons of God (Gen 6:2; Ps 28:1 [E: 29:1]; Ps 89:7 [E: 6]; Job 1:6; 2:1; 38:7).21 The filial associations of image of God language elucidate the connection between the image-motif and rule: humankind is granted the world as an inheritance, as of sons from a father. Correspondingly, the sons of God were associated with the heavenly bodies that rule over the earth (Job 38:7).22 That the underlying connection between these motifs is not lost on Paul is confirmed by Rom 8:29, where the language of image and sonship blend together: with the conformation of the elect to the “image of [God’s] Son,” Christ becomes “the firstborn within a large family.”

The wider context of Gal 3:28 is replete with the motifs of sonship and inheritance; it is critical to notice that Paul lends to them a transcendent character.

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20 Recently, this has been argued at length by Carly Crouch: “The description of humans as in God’s צלם and דמות in the same terms used to describe Seth’s connection to Adam is an attempt to draw a parallel between the father-son relationship of 5:3, between Adam and Seth, and the divine-human relationship of 1:26-7 and 5:1”; “Genesis 1:26-7 as a Statement of Humanity’s Divine Parentage,” JTS 61 (2010): 10. She, however, goes astray on or overlooks a few points: she understands the terminology entirely as metaphor; she does not note its connection to the language of “sons of God” who are summoned in the creation (“Let us,” of Gen 1:26); nor does she note the correlation to Ezek 1:26-28. Had she noted the latter text she might not have discounted the physical sense of the term. In view of that text, it is hard to avoid the implication that image-language in Gen 1:26-27 and 5:1-2 is related to the visible bodily form of the human being, who resembles God as a son does a father. On the bodily aspect of the image, cf. n. 54.

21 On these points, cf. Litwa, Transformed, 100–105.

22 In the application of the concept to humankind there is a democratization of ANE kingship ideology. The king as image/son of God claims the earth as his inheritance/possession: Gen 1-3 and Ps 8 bestow that status and claim on humankind itself. Cf. David J. A. Clines, “Humanity as the Image of God,” TynBul 19 (1968): 94.
Although Paul’s immediate polemical aim is to establish the Galatians’ proper membership as the seed of Abraham and heirs of the Abrahamic promises apart from their observance of the law (3:5-7), he consistently transcends these categories, or undergirds them by reference to a more fundamental reality. In Christ, the seed of Abraham (3:16), the Galatians are not merely τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα (3:29, the immediate polemical point) but they are vioi θεοῦ (3:26, the ground and transcendence of the Abrahamic). Through their incorporation into Christ, the son of God, the Galatians are adopted into God’s family, receive the spirit of God’s son, and call on God, not simply Abraham, as αββα ὁ πατήρ (4:3-6). Likewise, the inheritance or the promise is not what one might expect, land or descendants, but rather the blessing of Abraham, righteousness/justification, or the spirit (3:6, 8, 14, 21). It is not the present-earthly Jerusalem, but the Jerusalem above which has given birth to the Galatians (4:21-31), and which is likely the focus of their inheritance.

Paul’s redefinition of sonship and inheritance in a transcendent manner facilitates the termination of this worldly distinctions of “Jew or Gentile, slave or free, male and female” to define who is in and who is out or to define a relation of advantage and disadvantage. In this context, permeated by the categories of sonship and inheritance,

23 Dunn detects an Adam Christology in these verses, which is certainly not too far-fetched if the image of God motif informs the text; cf. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 214–218: “The purpose of Christ’s death was to recover for the ‘sons of Adam’ the status of ‘sons of God’” (p. 218).


25 As Mary Rose D’Angelo notes, the negation of “male and female” is relevant to the illustration of the passage to majority, the attainment of sonship (3:23-25; 4:1-7), for the privilege did not in fact apply to foreigners, slaves, and women under the law. Cf. “Gender Refusers in the Early Christian Mission: Gal 3:28 as an Interpretation of Gen 1:27b,” in *Reading in Christian Communities: Essays on Interpretation in*
the formally anomalous reference to “male and female” can be recognized as evoking the category of image of God (Gen 1:27) and is coherently related to Paul’s new creation hermeneutic.²⁶

With the knowledge that “male and female” in this context evokes the category of the image of God, as it does in Genesis, we can comprehend how Paul signals both the undoing of some element of creation and its fulfillment. If we recall that the creation of humankind in the image of God involves humanity in a negotiation of its identity vis-à-vis the divine beings, especially through participation in eternal life,²⁷ then the termination of male and female may signal the transcendence of the earthly strictures or categories which define the Adamic image in a manner comparable to what Paul has done with the categories of sonship and inheritance. Luke 20:35-36 is pertinent: “But those who are considered worthy of a place in that age and in the resurrection from the dead neither marry nor are given in marriage. Indeed they cannot die anymore, because they are like angels and are sons of God, being sons of the resurrection” (cf. also 2 Bar. 51:7-17). This framework for understanding the termination of “male and female”

²⁶ Cf. Gal 6:14-15: “May I never boast of anything except the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which the world (κόσμος) has been crucified to me, and I to the world (κόσμος). For neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything; but a new creation (καινὴ κτίσις) is everything!” Discussion surrounding Paul’s new creation language continues to generate debate: Barclay argues that it is primarily sociological: John M. G. Barclay, “Paul, the Gift and the Battle over Gentile Circumcision: Revisiting the Logic of Galatians,” ABR 58 (2010): 48 n. 37. Adams argues that it comprehends both cosmic and sociological categories: Edward Adams, Constructing the World: A Study in Paul’s Cosmological Language (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), 224–228. Whole monographs are devoted to the question.

²⁷ When Ps 8 reflects on the finitude and limitations of humankind in comparison to the heavens and asks, “What is man?” the response is “a little lower than elohim.” The statement of divine-human relationship in Gen 1:26-27 puts humankind ambiguously “in/after” (less likely, “is”) the image of God. The narrative of Gen 2-3 works this out, with humankind losing the opportunity to ascend the higher ranks of the elohim or sons of God through attaining everlasting life due to its disobedience (though it gets half-way there: Gen 3:22-23), while the remainder of the primordial history shows the first pair’s seed variously transgressing its post-Eden limitations (Gen 6:1-4; 11:1-9).
demonstrates how tricky it can be to determine if the termination of sex and marriage or the end of gender distinction per se is being anticipated. The text from Luke nicely illustrates this ambiguity: marriage ends in the heavenly status of “sons of God.” In any case, we can offer the suggestion that in Christ believers participate in eternal life and the heavenly world, thereby transcending the earthly, mortal instantiation of the image of God, which is comprehended by the term “male and female.”

Galatians does not offer the necessary material to substantiate these claims. Moreover, it does not provide the categories to comprehend what happens to the image of God in this participation in the transcendent heavenly realm, nor to comprehend why Paul would invoke the concept of the divine image in order to define a relationship of disadvantage between male and female, as is suggested by the other pairs in this formula. There is no need to speculate further when the whole Pauline corpus lies ahead of us. In particular 1 Cor 11:7-12 and 15:45-50 will assist us both to define how a relationship of disadvantage might be entailed in Gen 1:27 as well as to substantiate and clarify the

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28 The proximity of v. 28 to Gen 1:27 and the subsequent account of Eve’s creation might suggest that Paul has in mind the termination of the normal functions attributed to male and female, which are grounded in creation.

29 The citation of Gen 1:27 readily suggests this as well as the androcentricity of the new reality; e.g., πάντες γάρ ὑμεῖς ἐξ [masc.] ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ; cf. Martyn, Galatians, 377. Note that each of the other categories can be interpreted as signalling an end of distinction per se in Christ: instead of Jew/Greek Paul can be read to imply that we are all Jews; instead of slave/free, he in fact argues that all are free. Teasing out these elements of the argument would take us too far afield, however. The term “androcentricity” is preferred to “androgyny” because scholars now tend to consider the latter category as inherently problematic in relation to antiquity. On this point, cf. Martin, Sex and the Single Savior, 82–87; Kari Vogt, “‘Becoming Male’: A Gnostic and Early Christian Metaphor,” in Image of God and Gender Models in Judaic-Christian Tradition (ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen; Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1991), 172–87; Lone Fatum, “‘Image of God and Glory of Man’: Women in the Pauline Congregations,” in Image of God and Gender Models in Judaic-Christian Tradition (ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen; Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1991), 56–137. One should emphasize that in the biblical tradition deity and divine beings are predominately, if not always, “male” (cf. Gen 6:4!). On the other hand, Paul’s theology of the body (cf. Rom 12:4-5; 1 Cor 12:12-31) might provide grounds for anticipating the continuation of male and female. None of these factors, however, appears decisive.
suggestion that the image of God is drawn into the conceptuality of the earthly and the heavenly duality.

We conclude that there are good grounds to hear the language of the termination of “male and female” in terms of a reference to Gen 1:27 and creation in the image of God, and we tentatively suggest that it signals the transcendence of the earthly-mortall determination of the image through participation in the heavenly reality made available in Christ. At the same time, we are left to wonder how “male and female” might signal a relationship of disadvantage in terms of the image of God as well as what the termination of “male and female” means in practical terms. Immediately, then, we are plunged into a sea of questions and familiar categories are proving an unfit vessel to navigate the waves. A feature of initial creation is overcome in Christ. “Fall and restoration,” therefore, proves to be an inadequate category to comprehend our first example of a reference to the creation of humankind in the letters of Paul.

The Gendered Image of God: 1 Corinthians 11:7-12

First Corinthians 11:7-12 picks up where Gal 3:28 left off. In fact, it has been suggested that some among the Corinthians did indeed take the tradition Paul handed on, which is recorded in Gal 3:28, and proceed to obliterate the usual signs of gender distinction (such as head coverings) and patterns of gendered relations (such as sex and marriage, cf. 1 Cor 7). While we cannot here speculate on what motivated the Corinthians, matters of gender and its relationship to the image and glory of God are explicit concerns in the

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30 David Garland provides a summary, which ultimately concludes that “we are left only with guesses”; 1 Corinthians (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 505–507 (507).
present text. Two reasons why 1 Cor 11:2-16 is a candidate for the most disputed text in the Pauline corpus bear directly on these matters and the riddle of Gal 3:28. On the one hand, Paul unblushingly applies the concept of the image of God to the present condition of humankind. This has been an embarrassment to many scholars and theologians who are accustomed to talking about the defaced and especially the lost image of God. On the other hand, Paul interprets the concept of the image of God in categories which have proven to be an embarrassment to modern sensibilities in general: namely, as an inherently bodily and gendered reality which “presumes the metaphysical, viz. intrinsic, inferiority of women.” Given these inconveniences it is little wonder the text has proven a thorn in the side of scholars and laymen alike, often generating tortured explanations.

31 Matters that do not impinge on or determine the argument here concern the translation of κεφαλή in v. 3 (literally, “head,” but as “ruler,” “source,” or “pre-eminent”?) and whether a head-covering, veil, or (less likely) long hair is described in vv. 4-6. However, with reference to the first matter, I should note that connotations of differential authority are almost certainly to accrue to the relationship described between the individual members of this hierarchy; cf. the related texts, 1 Cor 14:33-36; 15:27-28; Eph 1:22; 5:22-23; Col 2:10; 1 Tim 2:11-13. On κεφαλή, cf. the extensive overview in Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 812–823.


33 Michael Lakey, Image and Glory of God: 1 Corinthians 11:2-16 As A Case Study In Bible, Gender And Hermeneutics (LNTS 418; London: T & T Clark, 2010), 135.

34 For example, arguments which are, prima facie, historically and contextually unlikely and yet not uncommon in the interpretive discussion of this text include attempts to deny elements of subordination therein (whether in v. 3 or vv. 7-12); avowals that Paul does not distinguish between man and woman in relation to the image of God (only in terms of glory, v. 7); and the construal of Paul’s argument whereby he supports the signs of gender distinction (vv. 4-6) via hierarchical arguments in vv. 7-10, which arguments are then suddenly contradicted by vv. 11-12 (despite v. 3), but the distinctions maintained nevertheless and on new grounds in vv. 13-16! The simplest, most elegant, interpretations of this text are produced by those who place Paul in the (to us, alien and uncomfortable) context of ancient discourse on gender and cosmology and honour and shame; cf., e.g., Lakey, Image and Glory; Susan A. Calef, “Kephalē, Coverings, and Cosmology: The Impenetrable ‘Logic’ of 1 Corinthians 11:2-16,” JRSSup 5 (2009): 21–44; Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale Univ Press, 1995), 229–249. For theological engagements with Paul that do not by-pass an historically contextualized understanding of his constructions of gender, cf., again, Lakey, Image and Glory; also, Benjamin H. Dunning, Specters of Paul: Sexual Difference in Early Christian Thought (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).

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or being marginalized as unclear and limited in scope. However, while 1 Cor 11:2-16 is sometimes construed to stand in opposition to Gal 3:28, it in fact supplies the presuppositions about the image of God which were hidden in the implied transcendence of inequality between male and female in Galatians, and it proves to hold insights that unlock, clarify, and cohere with Paul’s anthropogenic references generally.

Paul’s scriptural argument in this text (vv. 7-12, cf. 3) aims to provide cosmological grounds for the maintenance of the signs of gender distinction as construed in an agonistic culture (vv. 4-6), in particular the covering of the woman’s head, in the context of the Corinthian community’s worship practices. The argument is introduced in v. 3 by a general theological principle stating an order of being: “But I want you to understand that the head of every man is Christ, the head of a wife is her husband, and the head of Christ is God.” That Paul begins with man/Christ (rather than, for instance, Christ/God) shows that he already anticipates his argument for the covering of the woman’s head, for each stage in that argument involves a statement of contrast between man (first) and woman (second) (vv. 4-5, v. 7, vv. 14-15). This coheres with the fact that the rationale for the covering of the woman’s head is her relation to the man. The setting of the male/female in the context of God/Christ, Christ/male provides the cosmological

35 Recall that Ziesler “disregards” the plain meaning of the text because it does not occur in a “soteriological context” and that Scroggs attributes it to a “lapse” in Paul’s thinking; cf. Ziesler, “Anthropology of Hope,” 107; Scroggs, The Last Adam, 70 n. 3. Cf. Chapter 1: Introduction, “Issues of Anthropogeneity in Paul.”
36 E.g., Fatum, “‘Image of God and Glory of Man.’”
37 Against Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “Sex and Logic in 1 Corinthians 11:2-16,” CBQ 42 (1980): 482–500, who thinks that Paul is equally concerned with male behaviour in this text; Paul’s focus, attention, and directives consistently point to the women in the congregation.
38 ESV.
39 Garland is partly right that “Paul’s purpose is not to argue for the subordination or inferiority of the woman” but only insofar as he presupposes these things in order to argue that woman should cover her head; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 523.
structure which supports Paul’s transition from the discourses of honour and shame (vv. 4-6) to the perspective of scripturally revealed insights (vv. 7-12). Paul will argue that the relationship between man and woman is determined in the order of creation and ought to be reflected in the covered head of the woman, but not the man.

The claim on which the whole discussion turns is Paul’s statement that “a man (ἀνήρ) ought not to have his head veiled, since he is the εἰκών and δόξα of God; but the woman (γυνή) is the δόξα of man (ἀνδρός)” (v. 7). Paul proceeds to expound this statement by reflecting on the creation of woman and man in Gen 1-3. The contrastive conjunction πλήν in verse 11 signals a development in the argument, and the verse has become the basis for an application of a “new creation hermeneutic” whereby Paul is thought to subvert the argument for male privilege that was grounded on the order of creation in vv. 7-10.

Mary Rose D’Angelo and Francis Watson have offered different versions of this reading. D’Angelo understands 1 Cor 11:7-12 to contain two extended interpretations of Gen 1:26, which are in fact antithetical. In vv. 7-9 Paul establishes an argument for the necessity of head-coverings which interprets Gen 1:26-27 in light of 2:7, and then on the basis of the subsequent creation of Eve (2:18-20 and 21-23) understands her as derivative. In verse 11 Paul rejects this argument, stating what now applies ἐν κυρίῳ: “neither woman without man nor man without woman.” Genesis 2:21-23 is now reinterpreted in v. 12 to mean οὔτως καὶ ὁ ἄνηρ διὰ τῆς γυναικός. In the phrase οὔτε γυνή

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χωρὶς ἀνδρὸς οὔτε ἀνήρ χωρὶς γυναικὸς (v. 11), D’Angelo detects the traces of a rabbinic argument (cf. Gen. Rab. 8:9; 22:2; y Ber. 9:1),\textsuperscript{41} which applied the phrase to Gen 1:26-27 in order to rule out prescriptions for male and female based on the separate creation of Eve from Adam. “This interpretation proclaims that all are ‘from God’ [v. 12]: all come from God and bear God’s image, as the child is from and like father, mother, and God.”\textsuperscript{42}

Having thus defeated the first scriptural argument by the second, Paul must offer new grounds for woman’s head-coverings (hence, vv. 13-16).

An entirely different basis supports a “new creation hermeneutic” according to Francis Watson. He argues that the subordinationist language of vv. 7-9 “outline a problem to which the head-covering is the solution.” That problem is the “asymmetrical construal of eros,” which Paul finds in the creation account itself, according to which woman is an object of erotic attraction.\textsuperscript{43} The “semantic slippage” in the sense of δόξα in v. 7 illustrates this: “man as the manifestation of God should not cover his head, but woman as the object of man’s erotic joy, love and devotion should cover her head.”\textsuperscript{44} The allusions to Gen 2 in vv. 8-9 evoke the decree that it was not good for the man to be alone (Gen 2:18): “When [woman] arrives on the scene, she is greeted with an ecstatic look of

\textsuperscript{41} The texts were pointed out by Madeleine Boucher, “Some Unexplored Parallels to 1 Cor 11:11-12 and Gal 3:28: The NT on the Role of Women,” CBQ 31 (1969): 50–58, who did not, however, make the exegetical argument D’Angelo employs; her purpose was to establish that rabbinic texts, like Paul’s, contain statements that sound “egalitarian” but also like Paul’s had limited impact in the social sphere. Aspects of D’Angelo’s argument are shared by Jervell, Imago Dei, 309–312.

\textsuperscript{42} D’Angelo, “The Garden,” 27. The details are complex, but central to the argument is a distinction between two perspectives on the creation of humankind derived from the plural verb of divine action in Gen 1:26 (“Let us…”) and the singular in Gen 1:27 (“God created…”). The singular anticipates the unrepeatale events of Gen 2, the creation of Adam and Eve, and the plural looks forward to the participation of male and female in propagating the human race (cf. Eve’s statement that she conceived “with the Lord,” Gen 4:1).


\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 531. For this sense of δόξα as “joy, pride” citing v. 15; 1 Thess 2:20; Phil 3:19.
recognition . . . that intends and initiates the movement of reunion in which man becomes one flesh with his wife (2:24).” 45 The head-covering remedies this male oriented asymmetry, and signals the woman’s authority to participate fully and reciprocally with men in the new community (v. 10). “The head-covering he seeks to impose marks the turning-point between the old order of eros and the new order of agape.” 46

Besides problems which are inherent to each particular proposal, 47 central to these interpretations is a problematic appeal to a kind of “new creation” hermeneutic. This hermeneutic is thought to undermine a particular construal of the relationship between man and woman having its basis in the original creation as revealed in Gen 1-2, whether a hierarchy of image and glory or a male-oriented asymmetry of eros. However, signs that vv. 7-10 and 11-12 are in continuity with each other are detrimental to these proposals. An exegesis is provided below, but in summary it can be said that the prepositions of v. 12 seem chosen to accord with v. 8, suggesting that v. 11 does not contradict 48 but only qualifies what came before. 49 The additional allusion to the narrative of the creation of the woman in v. 12 in order to support v. 11 is poorly chosen if the

45 Ibid., 532.
46 Ibid., 533.
47 D’Angelo makes a complex and sophisticated argument but if she is correct about the interpretive assumptions undergirding Paul’s logic, it is no wonder readers have struggled to comprehend what Paul is saying (for he omits to mention the key interpretive details) and one may wonder if the Corinthians fared any better. Likewise, if Watson is correct then it is little wonder that no one before the emergence of feminism arrived at the correct understanding of the text. Rather, if an interpretation can be offered that appeals to broadly attested assumptions about males and females in antiquity, and does not involve Paul in an argument with himself, it is certainly to be preferred.
48 Often cited here is Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians (trans. James W. Leitch; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 190: “The contradiction between v 8 and v 12 seems particularly crass.” Yet he goes on to state that the claim of v. 12 “can be made without prejudice to [woman’s] subordination in principle.” See below on v. 11.
49 Although perhaps particularly Pauline (hence ἐν κυρίῳ), these qualifications are hardly unique, as Lakey notes: “an emphasis upon both hierarchy and mutual necessity between the sexes . . . is uncontroversial,” citing Aristotle, Pol. 1.1252a-b and Philo, Cher. 125; cf. Lakey, Image and Glory, 143.
intent is to contrast creation and new creation, especially given that the formula in v. 12 is compatible with v. 8. Moreover, that the order of being in v. 3, which is introduced as a sort of foundation for the argument, informs vv. 7-9 and finds an echo in τὰ δὲ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ in v. 12 suggests that the entire scriptural argument is premised on a hierarchical structure imprinted on creation and applying ἐν κυρίῳ (v. 11).

The argument put forward here is largely in keeping with that of William Loader, who thinks that Paul “is clearly influenced by the stronger emphasis in the LXX on the chain of being,” as well as Francis Watson himself, who in an article published prior to that discussed above, made the same argument as Loader’s on the basis of the Hebrew text of Genesis and informed by modern scholarship on the image of God. Indeed, Paul’s argument as constructed in 1 Cor 11:7-10 appeals to no special features of the LXX per se. Nevertheless, that LXX Genesis can be shown to reflect or encourage such an understanding can be taken to substantiate Paul’s doing so as well. On this view, Paul understands the man as male to be the image of God; the woman, being derivative, relates to God through the man, and the details of her creation are read to confirm such convictions and ground her present subordination under the superior ontology and status of the man. Commentators, however, regularly appeal to the implied plain sense of Gen

50 Loader, Septuagint, Sexuality, 101. Loader also emphasizes the integration of Gen 2:18-25 with Gen 1:26-27, including the use of ποιήσωμεν in 2:18 (rather than the singular), the introduction of “likeness” in 2:20 (ὁμοιός αὐτῷ), and the use of ἄνθρωπος in 2:24 instead of ἄνηπ. Ibid., 27–52, 120.
52 Which is not to say Paul nowhere reflects its peculiar emphases; cf. Loader, Septuagint, Sexuality, 86–107.
1:26-27 to assure us that Paul does not wish to make a distinction between man and woman in terms of the image of God, which that text applies to both sexes, but only in terms of glory.\(^{53}\) Not only have modern scholars cast doubt on this supposed plain sense of Genesis;\(^{54}\) early interpreters of 1 Cor 11:7 regularly understood Paul “as literally affirming men’s exclusive God-likeness,” according to the study of the reception of this text by Kari Elisabeth Børresen.\(^{55}\) We shall analyze the text and then return to the

\(^{53}\) Thomas R. Schreiner, “Head Coverings, Prophecies, and the Trinity: 1 Corinthians 11:2-6,” in Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood: A Response to Evangelical Feminism (ed. John Piper and Wayne Grudem; Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2006), 132–133; Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 515; Craig S. Keener, 1-2 Corinthians (NCBC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 93 (reflecting, however, more nuance in terms of Paul); Ben Witherington, Women in the Earliest Churches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 86, also cf. 87 (though without the appeal to Genesis, but stating that ἄνθρωπος applies to “humanity in general”).


\(^{55}\) Kari Elisabeth Børresen, “God’s Image, Man’s Image? Patristic Interpretation of Gen 1.27 and 1 Cor 11.7,” in Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition (ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen; Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1991), 199–200. She adds further: “Augustine is the first church Father I have found who directly affronts 1 Cor 11.7 by stating that women τοίοι are created in God's image. . . . Augustine neutralises Paul by explaining that god-like man signifies the superior element of the human soul, which is dedicated to contemplation of eternal truth; in contradistinction to non-God-like woman, who represents the soul's inferior element and is charged with earthly matters. . . . Creational gender hierarchy is a self-evident premise of this reasoning, with corollary disparity between femaleness and God-likeness. It follows that human female beings are themomorphic in spite of their bodily sex, whereas men's spiritual imago Dei corresponds to their exemplary maleness. Exclusion of femaleness at the divine level remains basic in Augustine’s God-language” (ibid., 200). Thus, even when Augustine affirms the female’s participation in the image of God, he does so through an allegorical exegesis which (as was common)
question of the relationship between woman and image of God, the interpretation of Gal 3:28, and the significance of this text in the broader discussion of image of God in Paul.

Paul’s argument expounds the concept of the image of God in terms of body and gender.  

In the context of an argument for the covering of the woman’s head, the appeal to the image and glory of God in order to ground a distinction between the sexes plainly suggests as much—the challenge is to make sense of it. The distinction between the man and the woman in the covering of the head corresponds to a distinction in their relationship to God and to each other: a man ought not to cover his head εἰκὸν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ ὑπάρχουν,  

but woman δόξα ἄνδρος ἐστιν (v. 7). That Paul seizes on the term δόξα to build his contrast between man and woman is important for the implications of his understanding of εἰκόν because it emphasizes the visible, which is important in a context concerned with the comportment of the body. Δόξα is also effective since it serves both to evoke the agonistic language which preceded (vv. 4-6; also vv. 13-15)  

and to exegete εἰκόν (or less likely ὁμοίωσις, Gen 1:26) in a manner that prioritizes the man’s relationship to God over the woman—he is the image and glory of God, woman is the glory of man. While “glory” does not mean “reflection,” it can pick up that connotation


56 The somatic orientation of the image of God in Paul has been stressed recently by Lorenzen, Eikon-Konzept; but she strangely pays little attention to this text (cf. p. 255).

57 Paul’s focus on the gendered aspect of εἰκόν might have something to do with the omission of the preposition κατά (found in Gen 1:26-27; 5:1.3 LXX; Sir 17:3; Col 3:10; Jas 3:9; omitted in Wis 2:23), for the point is to speak directly to the asymmetrical relationship of man and woman to the image and not (yet) to expound the creation of humankind per se. We shall see that Paul distinguishes between an earthly and heavenly image, reflecting this kind of distinction.

58 Δόξα is well attested in this sense, but see its use directly in parallel to agonistic language in 2 Cor 6:8; Phil 3:19; and already in 1 Cor 11:13-14.
where it is used in connection with image terminology.\textsuperscript{59} It is the head of the man which is not to be covered, presumably because the reflection is most clearly concentrated or seen there (specifically, in the face). \textit{2 Enoch} 44:1 illustrates the logic: “The LORD with his own two hands created mankind; in a facsimile of his own face, both small and great, the LORD created them.” Thus, the man is a reflection, i.e., revelation of God’s glory, while the woman reflects that of the man.\textsuperscript{60} When sexual difference relates men and women differently to the “image and glory of God” its gendered connotations are inescapable.\textsuperscript{61} After following the course of Paul’s scriptural-theological argument in vv. 8-12, we will return to this claim.

Paul moves from Gen 1:26-27 to the creation of woman in Gen 2 in order to support (γάρ, vv. 8 & 9) the claim that she is δόξα ἀνδρός. He argues from the order of creation itself; the events of creation reflect eternal truths about the constitution of man and woman. He first alludes to the creation of Eve ἐκ Adam (1 Cor 11:8; cf. Gen 2:23), stating οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄνηρ ἐκ γυναικὸς ἄλλα γυνὴ εξ ἀνδρός. Then he recalls the reason for Eve’s creation as specifically on account of the man (Gen 2:18): καὶ γάρ οὐκ ἔκτισθη ἄνηρ διὰ τὴν γυναῖκα ἄλλα γυνῆ διὰ τὸν ἀνδρα (1 Cor 11:9). Γυνῆ is thus both derived from and directed toward ἄνηρ. These archaic events are archetypal of a constitutional

\begin{footnotes}
\item[59] Conzelmann, \textit{1 Corinthians}, 187. Cf. the emphasis on seeing and revelation in 2 Cor 4:4, 6; cf. Heb 1:3; Wis 7:26.
\item[60] Following the argument put forward by A. Feuillet, “La dignité et le rôle de la femme d’après quelques textes pauliniens: comparaison avec l’Ancien Testament,” \textit{NTS} 21 (1975): 157–91; and idem, “Homme ‘glorie de Dieu’ et la femme ‘glorie de l’homme’,” \textit{RB} 81 (1974): 161–82, Thiselton contends “that this has nothing whatever to do with any supposed ‘antifeminism’ in Paul, for this differentiation is defined in terms of greatness and glory, not inferiority”; Thiselton, \textit{First Corinthians}, 835. This is badly misleading: is man as “glory of God” not inferior to God?
\item[61] The agonistic language of the text can still be heard in δόξα, and it may be that those connotations are to the fore here as well, especially in the case of the woman vis-à-vis the man, if we allow some “semantic slippage”; so Watson, “Authority,” 531; cf., too, Fee, \textit{First Corinthians}, 516.
\end{footnotes}
hierarchy of man over woman; this is why he continues to use the generic terms “man” and “woman” rather than “Adam” and “Eve.” Thus Paul, with some justification from Gen 1:26-27, can claim that man is image and glory of God, but woman the glory of man, for woman, he learns from Gen 2, is derivative of man. After drawing a conclusion on the matter of head covering on the grounds of the scripturally revealed order of creation in v. 10, Paul nuances the argument thus far.

In verses 11-12 Paul safeguards the previous verses from a potential misapplication. Against too strong a construal of the hierarchical relationship between man and woman, Paul stresses that their proper mutual interdependence (οὐτε γυνῇ χωρὶς

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62 The conclusion adds little to the present focus. The argument thus far can accommodate either the construal of ἔξουσία as signifying man’s authority over woman or woman’s own authority. For the latter view, cf. Morna D. Hooker, “Authority on Her Head: An Examination of 1 Cor 11:10,” NTS 10 (1964): 410–16; repr. in, idem, From Adam to Christ; for the former view, citing evidence (a single case) for the use of “authority” in a passive relationship to its subject, cf. Schreiner, “Head Coverings,” 135–136. Even if ἔξουσία denotes woman’s authority, that it stands in metonymically for “head-covering” or “veil” is proof enough that it does not overturn the argument so far made concerning the constitutional hierarchy established between man and woman. These symbols tend to be mandated in antiquity in the context of androcentrically determined socio-cultural systems, in which the sexuality of the woman is perceived as a threat to male status and control of resources as well as vulnerable on account of the different constitution of the female body to negative spiritual influence. (The latter concern is perhaps reflected in the reference to angels in v. 10.) “Authority” will continue to connote man’s authority in this case. On the symbolic significance of head covering, cf. Loren T. Stuckenbruck, “Why Should Women Cover Their Heads Because of Angels? (1 Corinthians 11:10),” Stone-Campbell Journal 4 (2001): 227–231.

63 διὰ τούτων ἀγγέλους may mean many compatible things, none of which would decisively shape the present argument: e.g., that angels are the guardians of the created order, participate in the worship of the assembly, or are vulnerable to the woman’s sexuality (or hers to them). Cf. the excellent discussion of Stuckenbruck, “Because of the Angels”; also Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “A Feature of Qumran Angelology and the Angels of 1 Cor 11:10,” NTS 4 (1957): 48–58.

64 Πλὴν has the sense of “however,” “nevertheless,” drawing out a contrary (but not contradictory) direction of the argument; cf. Phil 3:16; 4:14; Rev 2:25. Hence, vv. 11-12 add a qualification; they do not reinterpret what came before but anticipate and correct a potential misinterpretation of what came before by specifying further. The transition is well expressed by L. Ann Jervis, “‘But I Want You to Know...’: Paul’s Midrashic Intertextual Response to the Corinthian Worshipers (1 Cor 11:2-16),” JBL 112 (1993): 245: “Verse 11 is Paul’s reiteration of his previous [orally delivered] teaching that in the Lord men and women find harmonious unity. While Paul has had to recast his basic teaching [in the previous verses] because of his converts’ offensive practice of disregarding gender-specific appearance at worship, he nevertheless (πλὴν) affirms that teaching.” Cf. BDF § 449, “Πλὴν means . . . ‘only, in any case’ in Paul, used to conclude a discussion and emphasize what is essential.”
ἀνδρός οὖτε ἄνηρ χωρίς γυναικός65 is affirmed ἐν κυρίῳ, that is, in the sphere of salvation effected by Christ. Paul implies here that the relationship of δόξα that applies between God and man cannot be fully transposed to the man and woman, for woman and man exist in a relationship of interdependence that does not characterize God and man. This claim is also established by creation: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ γυνὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνδρός, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνηρ διὰ τῆς γυναικός (v. 12). The statement “man is διά woman” carefully preserves and expands the constitutional hierarchy asserted in v. 8 (“man is not ἐκ woman”), emphasizing now woman’s necessary role in reproduction,66 but also implicitly qualifying the whole argument via a semantic distinction from v. 9 (then: “woman is διά the man”, now also: “man is διά the woman”). The special emphasis that these creational interrelationships (interdependence within hierarchy) apply “in the Lord”67 insists on their continuing validity in the present (for τὰ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, v. 12).68

We can now step back and consider again the statement that ἄνηρ is εἰκόν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ but that γυνὴ is δόξα ἀνδρός in v. 7. According to Paul’s reading of Genesis, Adam is the image and glory of God par excellence, the bodily representative of God on

65 The translation of the clause is difficult, but that it establishes a relationship of interdependence (most translations supply “independent”; BDAG χωρίς, “neither (is) woman (anything) apart fr. man, nor man fr. woman”) rather than equality (“man is not different from woman”) is the easiest construal of the grammar and the context.

66 Noted by Ronald Cox, By the Same Word: Creation and Salvation in Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 149–150, among many others, including Lakey.

67 Noting that the phrase is parallel to “from God” in v. 12, Anders Hultgård, “God and Image of Woman in Early Jewish Religion,” in Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition (ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen; Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1991), 45, suggests that “the Lord” may here mean YHWH, not the Messiah.

68 It is possible to take this a step further: In the ἐκκλησία original creational intent is properly directed toward God (in this sphere τὰ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, v. 12), construing the relationship between man and woman as a microcosm of the divine agency of God and Christ (cf. the related prepositions in 1 Cor 8:6) and a sphere of God’s cosmic redemptive work (cf. 1 Cor 12:4-6; 15:20-28). For this argument, cf. Lakey, Image and Glory, 77–96, 114–117, 122–134. The agreement in prepositions with 1 Cor 8:6 is also noted by Sean M. McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 170.
earth, while Eve’s secondary creation allows her to be defined by what she brings to and complements in Adam. Her creation ἐκ Adam puts her at a distance from the original image and glory—she is derivative. “Men” and “women” as bodily descended from Adam and Eve repristinate this relationship of differentiation (cf. Gen 5:3). But what does this mean for whether woman is also the image of God?

The Adam and Eve “aetiology of gender,” wherein woman is derivative but of the same substance as man,⁶⁹ is at first blush easily assimilated to what Thomas Laqueur has termed the “one-sex model” of gender, which he describes as prevailing in antiquity; here male and female are differences not in kind but in degree, with maleness being closest to deity.⁷⁰ This “metaphysics of hierarchy” finds echoes in the present text, and could militate against drawing an absolute distinction between man and woman in terms of image of God.⁷¹ But if Paul, as Lakey believes, thinks the male’s God-likeness lies in a unique generative capacity over-against the woman’s merely instrumental role in conception (highlighting the prepositions of v. 12),⁷² then Paul has perhaps already taken a step toward the “physiology of incommensurability,” which Laqueur describes as becoming dominant in the eighteenth century. In this case, the answer to the question, is woman the image of God, would be “no.” And yet, Lakey’s argument, while plausible, requires a surplus of meaning beyond or behind the immediate claims and connections of Paul’s argument—but so would the affirmation that woman is indeed the image of God.

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⁷¹ Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 47, refers to ways that gender can still be construed as “mutually exclusive” in this model.
It seems that Paul is like Genesis, therefore, ambiguous concerning the issue. But we can be confident that he thought of the εἰκών θεοῦ, as it applies since and within creation, first and foremost in terms of the man.\footnote{This was hardly unique, as it was readily facilitated by reading Gen 1:26-27 in light of the events of Gen 2, and is even more strongly implied in Gen 5:1 and 3. Traditions that refer to the first human being crafted in the image of God by the name “Adam” can be read to make the same assumption of male privilege (4 Ezra 7:70; Sib. Or. 1:22-24); cf. Hultgård, “God and Image of Woman.”}

Paul’s positive affirmation of the created order in this text appears to contrast sharply with our reading of Galatians.\footnote{In 1 Cor 6:16 Paul quotes Gen 2:24 in order to interpret bodies in relation to the created order as well. Here, as in the present text of 1 Cor 11:7-12, somatic relationships established in creation continue to represent ontological conditions or possibilities even in the present.} Whereas Paul can affirm that “in the Lord woman is not independent of man or man independent of woman” (1 Cor 11:11), in Galatians he said, “there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” (3:28). The former is an affirmation of gender difference and interdependence as founded on creation; the latter, not clearly determined by its context, affirms the end of some construal of sex distinction which has its basis in the created order. However, the texts do have an important point of coherence: both are concerned explicitly or implicitly with the image of God, and in context both imbalance the relationship between male and female on grounds of God’s created order. Whereas even a minimal construal of Gal 3:28 must entail a rectification of the gender imbalance founded in creation, Corinthians implicitly affirms the (relative) goodness and validity of the order of the present embodied constitutional hierarchy of the sexes arranged in creation. Thus 1 Cor 11:7-12 spells out the relationship of disadvantage between male and female that calls for its termination in Galatians. That relationship is entailed in the bodies of men and women, who are
asymmetrically related to the image and glory of God. In this way, both texts make use of the image of God, and apply it to the present form of men and women.

We find then a tension not between creation as fallen and restored, but creation as a good and theologically pertinent reality (1 Cor 11:3, 7-12) and yet one which does not directly define and determine God’s eschatological purposes for humankind (Gal 3:28). Our next text in 1 Corinthians doubly employs the εἰκόν-concept in a manner that can be mapped on to this discussion. As we shall see, an eschatological frame of reference goes some way to addressing Paul’s apparently ambivalent attitude toward the continuing validity of norms that accord with the created order. It will also become apparent that, far from being anomalous, the somatic character of the image of God is well entrenched in Paul’s thinking. However, the subject matter shifts from an explicit concern with humans as sexually bi-gendered to that of creatures facing the ambiguity of death.

The Images of Two Men: 1 Corinthians 15:45-50

Just as in the previous text, where Paul spoke of man as the image of God without any sense of the image being defaced, let alone lost, in the present text the Adamic-image (the change in terminology is to be noted) is borne by the descendants of the man of dust. The distinction Paul delineates in the present text between the images of the first and last man has been read as a transparent reference to the concept of the restoration of the image of God: how else shall Adam be opposed to Christ in terms of the image except as the one who spoils it with sin and death? Two issues in fact confront us: how the images of the

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75 So Fee, *First Corinthians*, 778: “At stake is the biblical doctrine of creation. According to Scripture, God created the material order and pronounced it good. But in the Fall it also came under the
first and last Adam are to be related to the concept of image of God, if at all; and how the
distinction between the two images is affected by the sin of Adam. This text has the
potential to add significantly to the picture of how Paul reads Gen 1-3, and if we can
unlock its secrets, we will glimpse something of Paul’s construal of God’s intentions for
humankind in the creation of the world.

A long tradition extending back to the early church interprets the resurrection
body from the antithetic standpoint of the deleterious effects of Adam’s fall on the flesh
and blood bodies known to all humans. Ronald Sider and N. T. Wright stand in some
continuity with this tradition. While neither views the resurrection body as a mere return
to a pre-fall state, the primordial body remains in important respects the model for the
eschatological body for each. In the early church, the sinfulness of the Adamic body had
an important polemical function in battles with Gnosticism, and for Wright and Sider it

curse. In Paul’s view, therefore, the material order must also experience the effects of redemption in Christ,
and that involves the physical body as well. Since in its present expression it is under the curse, it must be
transformed; and that happens at the Eschaton, so that beginning and end meet in Christ Jesus.”

76 Cf. the majority of patristic authors in Gerald L. Bray, ed., I-2 Corinthians (ACCS; Downers
Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 165–174. An exception appears to be Theodore of Mopsuestia: “In
the resurrection a better body is constructed, one which is no longer flesh and blood as such but which is an
immortal and indestructible living being” in Pauline Commentary from the Greek Church (NTA 15:195);
ibid., 167. Contrast Augustine: “We will still be bodies, so vivified by the spirit, however, as to retain the
substance of the flesh without suffering the accidents of sluggishness and mortality,” Civ. Dei, 13.22; ibid.,
169. Similarly, Calvin, I Corinthians, on 15:50, ad loc. Cf. Outi Lehtipuu, “Flesh and Blood Cannot
Inherit the Kingdom of God’: The Transformation of the Flesh in the Early Christian Debates Concerning
Resurrection,” in Metamorphoses: Resurrection, Body and Transformative Practices in Early Christianity
(ed. Turid Karlsen Seim and Jorunn Økland; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 147–68. Yet even
within this trend of reading Paul’s words here in light of the sinful human body, patristic authors at a
cursory glance still appear more comfortable with the language of heavenly glorification in a manner
analogous to the shinning of the stars than is Wright or Sider.

77 Although the problem of sin does not enter into the discussion of vv. 35-50, the matter of sin
and its relation to death are not far to be found in the context. Paul cites, in 1 Cor 15:3-4, the early tradition
“that Christ died for our sins”; insists in v. 17 that “if Christ has not been raised . . . you are still in your
sins”; narrates in 21-22 that “death came through a human being” and, in a concluding flourish,
proverbializes in 56 that “the sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law.” Below I offer a
suggestion for how these themes are related to the two bodies of Adam and Christ.
serves to defend against interpretations of the resurrection body as “composed of glorious light rather than anything physical.”

Dale Martin, Jeffrey Asher, and Troels Engberg-Pedersen may be taken as among the best representatives of the position that concerns Wright and Sider. It is to be noted, however, that the physicality of the resurrection body per se is not called into question. These scholars, rather, raise the critical issue of the function of Paul’s statements concerning the natural world which introduce the discussion of the resurrection body (vv. 36–41). These are interpreted as introducing a cosmological hierarchy (or “polarity”) within which the present and post-mortem body are directly identified. The claim is substantiated by identifying a common substance which was thought to characterize both the heavenly bodies and soul or pneuma, whether fire/ether or pneuma itself. Since no such identification is explicitly made by Paul, the claim can only be evaluated based on how well it explains details of the text and coheres with

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78 N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Christian Origins and the Question of God; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 342. In fact, with these words Wright seems to pose a false alternative (construing “glorious light” and, elsewhere, “spiritual” as the opposite of physical) which does not represent the best of the more recent alternatives to his own conception of the resurrection body in this text. See below.


80 One difference between Martin and Engberg-Pedersen should be noted: whereas Martin speaks of flesh, blood, and soul being shed, so that only immortal spirit remains, Engberg-Pedersen emphasizes the transformation of flesh and blood into pneuma; Martin, The Corinthian Body, 126; Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self, 32.

81 By posing this false alternative, Wright makes his task somewhat easier. Notice how much space is devoted to proving the physicality of the resurrection body while arguing against the view that this body is analogous to the heavenly bodies or that the soma pneumatikon is a body composed (in part?) of spirit; cf. Wright, Resurrection, 347–352, 357.

Paul’s thought generally. On this score, the proposal runs into problems. We should note how easily such an identification could have been made in order to resolve the Corinthians’ question, “with what body does it come” (15:35). Precisely because the Corinthians are uncertain, one would expect Paul to make an explicit identification of common substance if that were the answer he had in mind. Rather, the common terms applied to both the heavenly bodies and the resurrection body (ἐπουράνιος, δόξα) need not denote an identity in substance, and other terms which characterize the resurrection body (especially, ἀφθαρσία) can only be applied to the heavenly bodies in an extenuated sense (cf. φθορά in Rom 8:21-22).

In order to insert some interpretive space between Paul’s reflection on the spatio-physical cosmos and his discussion of the resurrection body, both Wrigth and Sider paint the contrast between the present and future body in strong moral or ethical colours. Sider sees the issue in vv. 42 and especially 43, where the natural body is characterized as ἄτιμία and ἀσθενεία, claiming, “The primary contrast specified in v. 43 is therefore the ethical superiority of the resurrected person. He is no longer tainted by sin.” The interpretation is capped by reading ἐφορέσωμεν (aor. sub.) in v. 49 (“Let us bear the image”), with the conclusion that “the ‘spiritual body’ then is the total person freed

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83 Volker Rabens denies that the Corinthians’ questions (as formulated by Paul in v. 35) show “an interest in the very physics” of the resurrection body; *The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul: Transformation and Empowering for Religious-Ethical Life* (WUNT 283; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 90. But Rabens cannot adequately account for Paul’s reflections on the natural world in vv. 36-41 and he seems interested here to guard his own negative claim that Paul does not conceive of the spirit materially or in the class of the heavenly bodies. Perplexity concerning the physics that would characterize a resurrection body, it should be noted, fits well within Greco-Roman assumptions; cf. Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 108–123.

84 Rabens, *Holy Spirit and Ethics*, 90.


86 Ibid., 434.
from all connection with sin and filled with the gift of the spirit.” While Wright does not adopt Sider’s arguments concerning vv. 42 and 43 he still leans on the contrast between “the body itself” and “sin and death which had taken up residence in it,” between the goodness of “being an embodied human” and the badness of “being [a] rebellious human, a decaying human, a human dishonoured through bodily sin and bodily death.” There are two devastating problems with this interpretation which make it a non-viable alternative to what is beginning to appear to be the more attractive interpretation of Martin, et. al.: first it must reduce Paul’s reflections on nature to badly misleading “metaphors and similes,” the payoff of which are a couple of underwhelming principles (resurrection as gift; varieties of bodies), and second, Paul in vv. 45-49 entirely undermines the heuristic value that any appeal to the sinfulness of the body could have when he goes straight to Gen 2:7 in order to contrast this and the resurrection body.

Thus neither position seems to satisfactorily account for the details of Paul’s argument, one of them construing the relationship between the natural world reflections and the scriptural world reflections too strongly and the other too weakly. The key to a proper construal of the argument is in the typological nature of Paul’s thinking: creation contains within itself signs of the eschaton. Paul applies a typological hermeneutic to the created world that recalls the manner in which the Two Spirits Treatise reads an antecedent spiritual reality into the structures of creation reflected in Gen 1 and the manner in which the Maskil saw the order of the heavens and alteration between dark and

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87 Ibid., 435.
88 Wright, Resurrection, 343; cf., too, p. 356 where the implication is made of the restoration of the image described in Gen 1:26-27, also suggesting the framework of the fall.
light as reflecting the experience of the community.\textsuperscript{89} The details differ but the underlying conviction is the same: the creation artfully reflects the divine plan which is unfolding in history. One rarely encounters the application of the typological argument to anything but Paul’s correlation of the two Adams in vv. 45-49, although the application was made some time ago by Geerhardus Vos, who simultaneously deals with the weakness of the moralizing argument we critiqued above:

The apostle was intent upon showing that in the plan of God from the outset provision was made for a higher kind of body . . . The abnormal (body of sin) and the eschatological are not so logically correlated that the one can be postulated from the other. But the world of creation and the world to come are thus correlated, the one pointing forward to the other.\textsuperscript{90}

In particular, the duality of heaven and earth (vv. 39-41) anticipates the transformation of believers into the eschatological/resurrection state, according to the same workings whereby God transforms a seed into a plant (vv. 36-38). Paul finds these things in Gen 1-3. This will provide the clue to a proper interpretation of the relationship between the two Adams and the image of God.

The exposition of the nature of the resurrection body begins in v. 42 with the words οὔτως καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν. Immediately, then, Paul indicates the close relationship (“so also”) between his reflections on the world of nature (vv. 36-41) and his statements concerning the nature of the resurrection body. But it is not apparent yet what that relationship will be. The next sentence begins with the word σπείρεται (“it is sown”), which links back to the first reflection on nature, in vv. 36-38, where Paul impatiently

\textsuperscript{89} Cf. “Creation and the Divine Plan” in Chapter 2.

reminds his interlocutor that death precedes the coming to life of what is sown (ὁ σπέιρες, v. 36), that what is sown is not (οὐ) the body that shall be (v. 37), and that God gives to each seed a predetermined body (v. 38). Verse 36 establishes continuity in event between what happens to seeds and human bodies, v. 37 the discontinuity between the before and after of the seed-body, and v. 38 God’s oversight and activity in the whole process. Reminding ourselves that Paul is answering the question “with what kind of body do they come” (v. 35), it is the assertion of discontinuity between seed and plant that carries the brunt of the argument. We expect, therefore, that when Paul begins to speak of the resurrection of the dead with the words “it is sown . . . it is raised . . .” in v. 42, we will learn something of the contrasting ontology of the body before and after resurrection.

This feature of the discourse was prepared for in Paul’s second group of reflections on the natural world, in vv. 39-41, where Paul stops speaking of seeds and their new bodies, and takes up the difference between σώματα ἐπουράνια and σώματα ἐπίγεια (v. 40). Though each has its own δόξα (v. 40), Paul characterizes the latter as having different kinds of “flesh” (σάρξ, v. 39) and the former as possessing different degrees of “radiance” (δόξα). So when Paul wants to contrast different kinds of bodies, he turns to the duality between heaven and earth, even though either sphere in itself could have offered such a contrast.91 Therefore, when Paul turns to elucidate the difference

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91 C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (2nd ed.; BNTOC; New York: Harper & Row, 1992), 371, regards the change to “flesh” (from body) in v. 39 as “unfortunate” given its “theological connotation” elsewhere in Paul, whereas this is pure “physiology” and “enters theology only as analogy,” but I doubt such distinctions carry much weight. Instead, Paul’s shift to “flesh” here facilitates his argument later that the transformation the body undergoes in resurrection involves a type of reconstitution into a heavenly existence. The example of the seed-plant demonstrated transformation, but
between bodies pre- and post-resurrection we expect the contrast to be informed by the difference between earthly-fleshly bodies and heavenly-radiant bodies.

How these two sets of expectations are fulfilled in what follows is the key question. One expects to learn of contrasting ontologies and for the difference in heavenly and earthly bodies to have some role in the explication of that contrast. The difference in heavenly and earthly bodies does not simply establish the point that there is more than one kind of possible body. Paul begins his explanation with a statement of four contrasts answering to σπείρεται and ἐγείρεται: ἐν φθορᾷ/ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ, ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ/ἐν δόξῃ, ἐν ἁσθενεῖ/ἐν δυνάμει, σῶμα ψυχικόν/σῶμα πνευματικόν (vv. 42-44). According to one stream of interpretation our first expectation—to learn of contrasting ontologies—is let down: Paul’s contrasts are said to concern mode not substance, both the ἐν preposition and the –ικος adjectives pointing in this direction.92 Paul, however, has no such distinction in mind. This is particularly clear in relation to the dominant terms φθορά/ἀφθαρσία (v. 42, 50, 52, 53, 54), the former of which corresponds closely with the adjective χοϊκός in vv. 47-49, which can hardly exclude a reference to substance, despite its suffix.93 We need not yet attempt to dissect the contrast between σῶμα ψυχικόν and σῶμα πνευματικόν, except to question the efficacy of arguments designed to rule out a difference in substance between the two bodies. The adjectival ending is not decisive,94 as

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93 BDAG: “made of earth/dust.”
94 According to Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (2nd ed.; ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1914), 372, “the adjectives mean ‘congenital with,’ ‘formed to the organ of.’” Robertson and Plummer themselves did not understand this to rule out a change in substance, however.
we just saw, and some weight should be given to the fact that πνευματινός is nowhere extant. Furthermore, if ψυχή and πνεῦμα are conceived as themselves substantial/material (and there is debate), then a body animated by such is a body partly composed of such (they need not be seen as solely composed thereof, which is impossible of the first; cf. v. 45). 95 Finally, and this is the important point, even a body animated by (rather than composed of) spirit will be a body of transformed substance. 96 Verse 50, which may contain an unfortunate choice of words or a deliberately chosen phrase, bears this out: “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.” This statement cannot be separated from the previous discussion concerning the nature of the resurrection body and made to refer generically to “the natural man as a frail creature in opposition to God.” 97 There is no choice to be made between mode and substance therefore. In part, this multivalence emerges from Paul’s sowing metaphor, which appears to speak almost simultaneously at times of the body as it is, as created, and as buried. 98

95 Cf., e.g., Litwa, Transformed, 130–1.
96 “For the Kingdom an incorruptible body wholly controlled by spirit is necessary, and this ‘flesh and blood’ cannot be”: Robertson and Plummer, First Corinthians, 375.
97 Pace Joachim Jeremias, “‘Flesh and Blood Cannot Inherit the Kingdom of God’ (1 Corinthians 15:50),” NTS 2 (1956): 152. Jeremias’ argument rests on his understanding of how the whole passage is structured in relation to the questions of v. 35, with vv. 36-49 answering the what of the resurrection body and vv. 50-57, the how of the events. Instead, it seems that both questions are addressed in the initial section (for the how, cf., esp., v. 38), and that v. 50 simultaneously sums up the section that began with v. 35 and anticipates the new direction begun in v. 51; cf. James D. G. Dunn, “How Are the Dead Raised? With What Body Do They Come? Reflections on 1 Corinthians 15,” SwJT 45 (2002): 12–13. We have in this phrase, as in Paul’s reflections on the natural world (vv. 36-41), more misleading words on the apostle’s part if “flesh and blood,” like the prior reflection, is not supposed to bear on the nature of the resurrection body per se.
98 For the three positions, cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008), 595, who denies that a choice can be made; Asher wants to deny the third sense (burial), but that seems forced in view of v. 36; still his argument that the sowing metaphor is anthropogenic is of value and finds confirmation in various parts of the text, not least vv. 44-45; cf. Asher, “Speiretai”; Asher, Polarity and Change.
How is the second expectation met, that the contrast between the body before and after resurrection will be informed by the distinction between earthly and heavenly bodies? From Paul’s initial series of contrasts (vv. 42-44), the only lexical agreements with his discussion of heavenly and earthly bodies (vv. 39-41) concern the use of σῶμα and δόξα. Paul distinguished between σώματα ἐπίγεια and ἐπουράνια and now of the resurrection distinguishes between σῶμα ψυχικόν and σῶμα πνευματικόν; the change in terms complicates a direct identification between the two sets of bodies.99 Δόξα characterized the heavenly bodies in particular, where it denoted radiance,100 and it is used here in vv. 42-43 of the resurrection body opposite ἀτμία and parallel to ἀφθαρσία and δόναμις.101 Opposite ἀτμία it need not denote radiance, but parallel to the other terms that connotation is not far from mind (cf. Ps 62:3 [E: 63:2]; Wis 7:25; Matt 24:30; also Rev 18:1; 4 Esd 16:12), as indeed it seems present in the closely parallel Phil 3:21.102 The

99 Unless we can assume that Paul had in mind the Stoic assumption that the stars are composed of πνεῦμα, which cannot be verified (if he had, why did he not make full use of the point rhetorically?). Alternatively, Paul may have in mind the concept of angels as spirit beings (Heb 1:14) who dwell in heaven (12:22-23; Gal 1:8-9) and can be (somehow) identified with the stars (Job 38:7; Dan 8:10; Rev 12:4). Again, however, the connection would only be implicit; Paul does not speak of angelic spirits, only of the sun, moon, and stars.

100 Wright is certain that the δόξα (1 Cor 14:40) of the earthly bodies has no connotation of radiance, splendour; Resurrection, 345–6. I am less certain; cf. Ps 8:6 (E: 5); 21:6 (E: 5).

101 The strongest proof for the view that Paul has in mind the body under the domination of sin is in his use of the term ἀτμία, but it must be interpreted relative to the contrast with the resurrected body as δόξα. The parallel in Phil 3:21 is instructive, although there the term is ταχίνωσις, but most decisive are Rom 9:21 (“Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one object for special (τιμὴν) use and another for ordinary (ἀτμίαν) use?”) and the same two terms in 1 Tim 2:20 (“In a large house there are utensils not only of gold and silver but also of wood and clay, some for special use, some for ordinary”). In this light, ἀτμία does not refer to sinful corruption and shamefulness, but to the lowly, ordinary earthly body in comparison with the exalted, glorious heavenly body.

102 Wright, Resurrection, 345 and n. 100, does not want to admit the notion of radiance in these references (nor in 1 Cor 2:7-8), but that is most improbable. Cf. BDAG δοξά and, especially, Carey C. Newman, Paul’s Glory-Christology: Tradition and Rhetoric (NovTSup 69; Leiden: Brill, 1992), 17–24, 83–92, 92–104, 134–53, 157–63, 188–96. Newman (pp. 193-96), furthermore, plausibly argues for a connection between the glorious body in 1 Cor 15:35-50 and the appearance of Christ to Paul in glory on the road to Damascus (1 Cor 9:1-2; 15:1-12).
alignment of these contrasts, the earthly with the pre- and the heavenly with the post-
resurrection body, becomes explicit only in vv. 47-49, but it does become explicit, and immediately thereafter Paul sets “flesh and blood” alongside that which is φθορά as not being able to inherit the kingdom of God. Thus, in Paul’s initial four-fold contrast between the pre- and post-resurrection body the contrast between its being φθορά in one state but δοξά in the next is already informed by the initial contrast between the earthly bodies as kinds of “flesh” and the heavenly bodies as degrees of “glory.”

However, it is sometimes remarked that οὐρανός and cognates undergo a shift in meaning from v. 40 to vv. 47-49, but the change from “starry skies” to “abode of God” (if that is what the latter mean) should be seen as different points on a continuum (cf. 2 Cor 12:2-4). When Paul thus speaks of Adam as ἐκ γῆς but of the second man as ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (v. 47), we are surely invited to reflect back on the natural world duality between heaven and earth (vv. 39-41). That duality points to the glorious, immortal, and heavenly condition of the resurrection, as opposed to the corruptible dust and flesh of existence on earth. Paul points to the starry skies not because they consist of immortal substance and are themselves incorruptible, but because they anticipate the future life of believers (cf. Dan 12:2-3; I En. 104:2, 6; Wis 3:7; 4 Macc 17:5; Matt 13:43; Col 1:5, 12). Perhaps they do so by directing one’s gaze (up) to heaven—where there is a heavenly Jerusalem (Gal 4:26) and

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103 Similarly, earlier in the letter where Paul had contrasted the ψυχικός with the πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος (2:13-14), the former were further belittled as σαρκικός (3:1). On the textual variant, σαρκικός, cf. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 186.


105 “This physical demarcation [the duality of heaven and earth] pointed toward a spiritual distinction: earth as the dwelling place of humankind, the heavens as the place where God dwells”; Maile, “Heaven, Heavenlies, Paradise,” in DPL, 381 (381-83).
paradise (2 Cor 12:2-4) in addition to the last Adam. Probably there is a different reason
the starry skies anticipate the future life of believers. In Paul’s initial fourfold contrast, it
appears that the earthly stands on the side of the corruptible, dishonourable, weak, and
σῶμα ψυχικόν (Paul will confirm the latter’s position there in just a moment, v. 47) and
that the heavenly, by a matter of degree, proximity, or loose association, stands on the
side of the incorruptible, glorious, powerful, and σῶμα πνευματικόν (cf. v. 47).106 In as
much as the dominant contrast throughout the text is that of corruptibility vs.
incorruptibility, it appears that the durability of the heavens is the most significant way in
which they anticipate the resurrection body, followed closely by their radiance (cf. Deut
11:17; Ps 89:3, 29 (E: 2, 28); Job 14:12; Sir 45:15; 2 Cor 5:1-4 with 12:2-4).

The natural world reflections with which Paul introduces the resurrection of the
body establish God’s power to transform the σῶμα ψυχικόν into the σῶμα πνευματικόν
(vv. 36-38), and introduce the categories by which that transformation is best grasped in
terms of observable realities (vv. 39-41). In creation Paul sees God’s power at work and
God’s intentions reflected.107 The duality of heaven and earth in particular stands in a
typological relationship to the eschatological destiny of believers as those who will
experience the transformation into “heavenly” persons with “heavenly” bodies. The term
“heavenly body” is one that Paul does not use, though he comes close (vv. 47-49).

106 Cf. Fitzmyer: “Moreover, the eschatological aspect is introduced in vv. 44b-49, because σῶμα
psychikon and σῶμα pneumatikon contrast not only times (protos and eschatos), but also the terrestrial and
the celestial”; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 592; cf. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 725.
107 John Paul Heil, The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians (Studies in Biblical
Literature; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 237–38: “With the two related but distinct examples of God’s creative
power in 15:36–41, each of which alludes to the Scriptural account of creation, Paul is leading his audience
to the realization that, since God gives to something that is sown and dies a body as God wishes (first
ever example in 15:36–38), the God who created both earthly and heavenly bodies that differ in glory (second
ever example in 15:39–41) can transform an earthly body that has died into a heavenly body.”
“Heavenly” in this construction is not merely natural (i.e., astral), but eschatological/cosmic: the resurrection provides bodies which are fitted for the world-to-come, in which the cleft between heaven and the observable cosmos is finally overcome (cf. 1 Cor 15:24-28). The typological sense of Paul’s reflections is further enhanced by noting that scriptural allusions have silently informed the argument heretofore.

When Paul finally takes up his explicit scriptural argument (vv. 45-49), he wants to elaborate on the claim, Εἰ ἐστιν σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐστιν καὶ πνευματικόν (15:44). Paul’s scriptural argument will show that the language of “sowing” and “raising” in vv. 42-44 served in part to qualify the body in both states as an aspect of the creative activity of God; he does not have in mind its defilement by sin. He writes, “Thus it is written, ‘The first man, Adam, became a living being’ (ψυχήν ζῶσαν); the last Adam became a life-giving spirit (πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν). But it is not the spiritual that is first, but the natural (ψυχικόν), and then the spiritual” (vv. 45-46). Much has been made to stand behind the explicit denial οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικόν, but in context of the argument it serves to

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109 Paul’s scriptural context is God’s creative activity in Gen 1, particularly the duality of heaven and earth. Already, Paul’s talk of sowing (σπέρμα), seeds (σπέρμα), and the bodies God gives to seeds (ίδιον σώμα) in vv. 36-38 recalls Gen 1:11 (καὶ έπεξέθειν ὁ θεὸς βλαστησάτω ἢ γῆ βοτάνην χόρτον σπέρμαι κατὰ γένος καὶ καθ’ ὀμοιότητα, and v. 12). The varieties of flesh, in addition to those of ἄνθρωπον, namely κτηνίων, πτηνών, and ἵγιόνων (1 Cor 15:39), are drawn in reverse order from the pronouncement of humankind’s vocation to “rule” (ἀρχέτοσαν) such creatures in Gen 1:26, 28 (moving backwards from days six to four, vv. 20-25). The heavenly bodies—sun, moon, and stars (1 Cor 15:41)—recall the “lights” of day four, “greater” and “lesser,” and the “stars,” and their “rule” (ἄρχας, ἄρχαν) over day and night (vv. 14-18). The basic duality of heaven and earth, of course, introduces and concludes the whole account of God’s creative activity (Gen 1:1; 2:1, 4), wherein each realm is outfitted with its distinct inhabitants (πάς ὁ κόσμος αὐτῶ/δικαιούσῳ), Gen 2:1), just as Paul emphasizes varieties in each respective realm. It has also been suggested that the description of the sown seed as γυμνόν κόκκον (1 Cor 15:37) reflects the nakedness of Adam and Eve (Gen 2:25, etc.). This is possible in view of vv. 45-49, but the use of the term here may simply reflect Paul’s overarching concern, the human body.

110 Hence, the passives there may be regarded as “divine”; cf. Asher, “Speiretai,” 109.
underscore the basic point that ‘this’ body is not the body that shall be (apart from a transformation), and in that sense it implicitly justifies Paul’s extrapolation of the ἐσχάτος Adam from the πρῶτος Adam of Gen 2:7 (v. 45). In fact, the denial’s place in the argument is the same as that at v. 37 concerning the planted seed: οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὸ γενησόμενον σπέρμα. The earthly body of the first Adam is not the body that shall be. Because Paul knows nothing of Adam’s lost glory or supernatural condition he can add the rhetorically pertinent point, “it is not the spiritual that is first.” Instead, Paul cites and lightly modifies Gen 2:7c to elucidate the difference between the first and the last: the first man Adam became a ψυχὴν ζῶσαν. The last Adam, on the other hand, Paul continues, became a πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν. The difference between “living (being)” and “life-giving (being)” speaks to the superiority of the last Adam, but also likely reflects the different manner in which each stands at the head of humanity, the first as biological

111 The similarity between v. 37 (and 38) and v. 46 is too little noted, but it shows how integral and natural the latter claim is to the argument. The sense of its being out-of-place has led many to postulate that Paul polemizes against Gnostic or Philonic tendencies among the Corinthians; cf., e.g., Martinus C. de Boer, The Defeat of Death: Apocalyptic Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 5 (JSNTSup 22; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988), 95; and the rebuttal in Stephen J. Hultgren, “The Origin of Paul’s Doctrine of the Two Adams in 1 Corinthians 15:45-49,” JSNT 25 (2003): 343–70, although his own thesis is highly speculative. Instead, it is possible to see Paul adopting and adapting exegetical tendencies which were “in the air” in relation to Gen 1-2 in order to assist his primary polemical point: the body will be resurrected, but not as this earthly (Adamic) body.

112 Although the phrase is possibly informed by Gen 2:7b, it is not presented as an exegesis of that text; Paul does not find the last Adam in the words ἐννεφόσησεν αἷς τὸ πρῶτον πνεύμα τοῦ πρῶτος ζωῆς. For this argument, cf. Gregory E. Sterling, “‘Wisdom Among the Perfect’: Creation Traditions in Alexandrian Judaism and Christian Christianity,” NovT 37 (1995): 358–359; also Menahem Kister, “‘First Adam’ and ‘Second Adam’ in 1 Cor 15:45-49 in the Light of Midrashic Exegesis and Hebrew Usage,” in New Testament and Rabbinic Literature (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 353–354. If the phrase recalls Gen 2:7b, perhaps it is not merely in reflecting the tradition that substitutes πνεῦμα for πνεύμα (Gen 6:17; 7:15) but in the manner that the last Adam comes to stand in a position analogous to God who created Adam, for the last Adam is not merely a “living spirit” (analogous to “living soul”) but a “life-giving spirit”; similarly, cf. Romano Penna, “Adamic Christology and Anthropological Optimism in 1 Corinthians 15:45-49,” in Paul the Apostle: A Theological and Exegetical Study (2 vols.; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1996), 209, 220.
head, the second by supernaturally imparting the πνεῦμα which he himself became (cf. Rom 8:9-11).

The key to grasping what the terms σῶμα ψυχικόν and σῶμα πνευματικόν convey may lie in Paul’s citation of Gen 2:7c, which clearly intends (οὕτως) to explain the terms, or at least the former. It is clear that Paul means to tie the former of these to the first Adam, who became ψυχήν ζῶσαν, according to Gen 2:7. Typically the phrase “living being/soul” is understood to lend to the term σῶμα ψυχικόν the sense that Adam’s body is animated or composed by soul. But the scriptural context suggests otherwise. Paul cites the third of as many clauses (the parentheses show the text as Paul cites it):

καὶ ἐπλάσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἀνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς
cαι ἐνέφυσεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς
(καὶ) ἐγένετο ὁ (πρῶτος) ἀνθρωπος (Ἀδὰμ) εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν

The first clause recounts the material construction of the human being, and corresponds to the outward bodily aspect. The second describes the animation of that body with “breath of life.” The third, which Paul cites, appears to describe the combined result of each of the preceding actions: Adam (so Paul) became a “living being.” The term does more than simply repeat the animating principle of the second line, but rather refers to the totality of Adam as an earthling in whom is the breath of life. The Hebrew behind the text will confirm that ψυχή corresponds closely to the material component designated in clause A. The adam in Hebrew becomes נפש חיה. The phrase appears to reflect the antonymous use of נפש for the dead person or a corpse in such texts as Lev 21:11 (נפש).

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113 Benjamin Gladd stresses that Gen 5:3 is already in mind here in v. 45 in addition to v. 49, thus reinforcing the typological nature of Paul’s hermeneutical method; cf. “The Last Adam as the ‘Life-Giving Spirit’ Revisited: A Possible Old Testament Background of One of Paul’s Most Perplexing Phrases,” WTJ 71 (2009): 297–309.
The word ψυχή, then, in 1 Cor 15:45 does not designate a “soul” as separate from or animating the body but rather defines a kind of (living) body itself, namely an earthly, natural, even “animal body”; it designates the whole corporeal being from the standpoint of its participation in earthly, created life. In the language of Gen 1-2 (for the exact term: Gen 1:20, 24; 2:19; cf., too, 1:21, 30), ψυχήν ζῶσαν places the first human on the level of the very animals Paul had enumerated as kinds of flesh in v. 39. Likewise, σῶμα ψυχικόν will not describe a body animated or composed of ψυχή but rather the body that is earthly, fleshly, and subject to decay (whether animated or not). Their contextual antonyms in Paul’s argument, πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν και σῶμα πνευματικόν, will likewise employ πνεῦμα not primarily to designate an animating principle or substance (although these are not contradicted), but rather to designate an orientation to that which is incorruptible, heavenly, a participation, that is, in the very nature of God. Remarkably, Paul appears to share the thoroughly naturalistic interpretation of Gen 2:7 we saw in the Hodayot. Thus John R. Levison even suggests that “the seeds of Paul’s contrast of the two Adams may lie in the arid soil of Qumran.”

114 Cf. HALOT ψυχή 4-5 (noting that this use of the term first appears in the LXX).
115 For the latter term: Robertson and Plummer, First Corinthians, 372.
117 Cf. Paul’s words in 2 Cor 5:1–5: “For we know that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. . . . He who has prepared us for this very thing is God, who has given us the Spirit as a guarantee” (vv. 1 & 5). The key point is that both texts describe the future life of the believer as a participation in a heavenly, eternal reality, and one which the spirit secures. We may skirt the issue of whether the text speaks of resurrection or an intermediate state, or perhaps neither.
118 Levison, Filled, 313.
The last section of the text (vv. 47-49) returns to the contrast between the earthly/corruptible and the heavenly/incorruptible, making explicit the significance of the two Adams (who are now simply men, ἄνθρωποι, v. 47) for those who are connected to them (esp. v. 48). The breakdown in parallelism in v. 47 is significant:

ο̣ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοῖκος,
ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.

The earthly/heavenly contrast of vv. 39-41 returns, but significantly, while Paul defines the first man as not only “from earth” but “earthly,” he only describes the second man as “from heaven.” The presence of χοῖκος confirms that Paul understands there to be a substantial difference between the two men, while the absence of a corresponding term in the parallel construction suggests that the eschatological body cannot be comprehended entirely within the scale of nature. Instead, the duality of “earthly” and “heavenly” includes a symbolic, typological significance by which it reflects the contrast between the present earthly realm, which is known, and the eschatological heavenly realm, which is not fully known (1 Cor 13:12).

Finally, to reflect on Paul’s use of εἰκών-language in v. 49: καὶ καθός ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοίκοῦ, φορέσομεν119 καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου. 1 Corinthians 11:7 indeed did not lead us astray, for the “bearing” (φορέω) of the image

119 Φορέσομεν, the aorist subjunctive, is both much better attested and more difficult, the two of which combined would normally point in its favour. However, the fact that the short o of the future was likely heard the same as the long o of the subjunctive puts the weight back on the exegetical argument, and here the future indicative is far to be preferred. Cf. Barrett, First Corinthians, 369 n. 2; Thiselton, First Corinthians, 1288–9; Bruce Manning Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (2nd ed.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Biblegesellschaft, 1994), 502. Yet see Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians (SP; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1999), 572; Fee, First Corinthians, 794–795.
here is without doubt somatic.\textsuperscript{120} the image of the man of dust corresponds to the \(\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\ \wp\nu\chi\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\) and the image of the man of heaven to the \(\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\ \pi\nu\varepsilon\omega\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\). In the former case, the image is borne through the natural processes of descent, which has rightly led many scholars to highlight Gen 5:3 as being similar in thought.\textsuperscript{121} That text stands at the head of a litany of obituaries (note the unusual “and he died,” vv. 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 27, 31),\textsuperscript{122} which corresponds to the condition which is overcome in the bearing of the image of the man of heaven in the present text. And, yet, the mention of “image” in so close connection with “Adam” can scarcely fail to call to mind Gen 1:26-27,\textsuperscript{123} which is also referenced immediately prior to Gen 5:3 in vv. 1-2, and which, of course, appeared in 1 Cor 11:7-12, where it was conflated with Gen 2-3 and inseparably related to biological realities, implicitly including death.\textsuperscript{124} However, to presuppose that there is a \textit{restoration} of the image of God in the heavenly man would put the text on a collision course with

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Human beings bear the image of Adam in as much as they bodily descend from Adam, “the first man” (v. 45, 47). The verb, which regularly refers to the wearing of clothes or adornments, is used metaphorically for wearing the same bodily constitution; the concept is further reflected in vv. 53-54 where the verb \(\epsilon\nu\delta\omega\omicron\) (“to put on, clothe”) is used to speak of the transformation of the body from being mortal and corruptible to their opposite.
\item “[Adam] became the father of a son in his likeness \([\psi\nu\tau\omicron\alpha\varsigma\tau\iota\alpha\upsilon\delta\epsilon\alpha\nu\iota\tau\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\]; \(k\acute{a}t\alpha\ \tau\eta\nu\ \iota\delta\epsilon\alpha\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\)\), according to his image \([\tau\iota\nu\rho\omicron\varsigma\tau\iota\alpha\upsilon\varsigma\upsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma\tau\omicron\upsilon\]\, and named him Seth.”
\item It is perhaps not without significance that the exception to those who receive the notice of death in this lineage is Enoch, whom the LXX relates to have been “translated” \((\mu\epsilon\tau\omicron\theta\omicron\iota\kappa\epsilon\sigma\kappa\omicron\nu)\) by God (Gen 5:24). Of course, Enoch’s experience becomes paradigmatic of the heavenly life for a whole stream of Jewish thought.
\item Some dispute this. For recent examples: Worthington, \textit{Creation in Paul and Philo}, 192–195; Lorenzen, \textit{Eikon-Konzept}, 161. Fee thinks \(\varepsilon\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\upsilon\) here is “probably not fraught with theological overtones”; \textit{First Corinthians}, 794 n. 34. If Paul links male and female in a bodily relation to Adam as image and glory of God in a context combining Gen 1:26-27 with Gen 2:7ff. as in 1 Cor 11:7, how can it seem unlikely that Gen 1:26-27 has some resonance here as well? In an effort to deny this, Worthington, \textit{Creation in Paul and Philo}, 194, stresses that “Paul has in mind Adam’s bodily construction.” That is precisely to the point.
\item Thus, \textit{contra}, C. Kavin Rowe: “\(\varepsilon\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\upsilon\) has to do with some primordial god-like image within, but with the character, stamp or shape of bodily life”; “New Testament Iconography? Situating Paul in the Absence of Material Evidence,” in \textit{Picturing the New Testament: Studies in Ancient Visual Images} (ed. Annette Weissenrieder, Friederike Wendt, and Petra von Gemünden; WUNT 193; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 302. Rather, \(\varepsilon\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\upsilon\) has to do with some primordial god-like image borne in the \textit{somatic}-existence itself of either the man of dust or the man of heaven.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
everything said thus far, which has focused on the original created condition of Adam, and reduce to ashes the argument Paul made in 1 Cor 11:7-12, where no interruption in the bearing of the image from Adam to his descendants was envisaged.

Rather, the conceptuality that best explains the pairing of two images is again the duality of heaven and earth. The application of such a duality to the term εἰκόνα derives warrant directly from Gen 1:26-27 itself.\(^{125}\) The image of the man of dust and the image of the man of heaven reflect the creation of humankind κατὰ the image and likeness of God: Paul presupposes that man as image of God reflects a corresponding transcendent image of God, an interpretation which LXX Genesis appears to make explicit and which is arguably present in the original.\(^{126}\) The heavenly image (v. 47) is borne by the second man: Paul himself is not focused on the question of the pre-existence or incarnation of Christ, but on the transformation to the heavenly reality which is achieved through the bodily resurrection of Christ, the head of a new humanity.\(^{127}\) Paul leaves undertermined the question whether the heavenly, divine counterpart in which Adam was created also had a pre-existence or was purely an eschatological/typological reality. (Genesis itself highly suggests pre-existence.) Implied in the argument, therefore, is the identification of

\(^{125}\) This argument is further supported if Ciampa and Rosner are correct to write concerning v. 40: “Paul’s usage of the word for ‘glory’ in this verse and the next and the distinction he makes here between the glory of the earthly bodies and the glory of heavenly ones prepares the way for his introduction of the concept of the ‘image’ of the earthly man and the heavenly man in v. 49. In 11:7 Paul tied together the concepts of ‘image’ and ‘glory,’ as he also does in Romans 1:23 and in 2 Corinthians 3:18; 4:4. In the case of human beings, at least, a body’s glory is directly related to the image it bears”; The First Letter to the Corinthians (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 807.


Christ, the heavenly image, as that image of God referred to by Gen 1:26-27.\(^{128}\) The emphasis on the heavenly “man,” therefore, should neither be taken to imply a restoration of Adam’s original image nor should its oxymoronic character be avoided, for what happens in the heavenly man stretches the category “human” to its limit.\(^{129}\)

Paul’s discussion of the earthly and heavenly body points without embarrassment to the condition of Adam straight from the potter’s lathe, as it were.\(^{130}\) As one possessing a corruptible body (v. 42) taken from the dust of the earth (v. 47), death was according to nature. Paul, however, does not take the natural for granted: Death is experienced as an enemy (vv. 54-55). And Paul knows that Adam is in close company with the nemesis, for he said earlier in the same chapter, “Death came through a human being” (δι᾽ ἀνθρώπου θάνατος, v. 21). These contrary emphases, between death as according to nature and death as an enemy, can best be explored by bearing in mind the narratives of Gen 1-3, for

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\(^{129}\) Qualifying somewhat the claims of Scroggs: “The believer is identified specifically with the resurrected humanity of the Messiah. Paul continually here, as well as in Rom. 5, refers to Christ in his resurrected state as ἄνθρωπος. This means, on the one hand, that no question can arise as to a possible deification of the believer through his eschatological existence, for the uniqueness of Christ as kyrios is nowhere compromised. On the other hand it suggests Paul’s main concern with his Adamic Christology, to speak of the believer’s future human existence. The parallelism in verse 49 speaks also against any attempt to water down the identity between Christ and believer which would affirm that the believer will possess only a reflection of Christ’s resurrected glory. To bear the image of the man of dust means to exist in the same nature as the fallen Adam; to bear the image of the man of heaven must be understood in a similar manner”; The Last Adam, 88-89. What Scroggs overlooks is that the stress on ἄνθρωπος serves to explain the corporate character of each figure, the fact that humanity is taken up in their destinies; the nature of those destinies is another matter. The same qualifications apply to Blackwell, Christosis, 218. That Paul does not parse the divine and human natures of Christ here is perhaps evident in v. 45: “the last Adam became a life-giving spirit,” on which cf. the statement of Penna: “Now, the attribution of this verb and of this activity in a Christological sense to the last Adam makes of him a being set on a footing of equality with God himself”; Penna, “Adamic Christology,” 220.

\(^{130}\) Rightly, Fitzmyer: “There is not even a hint here that Adam is being considered ‘as a sinner,’ . . . he is simply the first human being created”; First Corinthians, 597. Contrast Ciampa and Rosner on vv. 42-44: “Corruption, or the condition of being perishable, is a result of the fall of humanity” and “We have all worn the (perishable and mortal) image of (fallen) Adam, but we will end up clothing ourselves with the (imperishable and immortal) image of Christ (the new Adam), in the resurrection from the dead”; Ciampa and Rosner, First Corinthians, 808, 826.
the tension is already there in the creation of Adam from the dust to which he must return because he broke God’s commandment and lost the opportunity to eat from the tree of life and become like one of the divine beings in whose image he was made. In this story, Paul finds the natural body, which corrupts on its own, the reality of death as punishment for sin, and the proffer of eternal life as an unrealized aspect of creation in the image of God. First Corinthians 15:56 probably contains a hint that Paul has these additional narrative details in mind (“The sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law,” 15:56), as Romans will confirm. Death is, therefore, at once natural (or participatory) and punitive (or forensic). These contrary emphases can be held together most readily in the context of the Adam narratives on which Paul is drawing.


132 Bultmann had distinguished three conceptions of death: the juristic (death as punishment), the organic (death as fruit of sin), and that conveyed in the present text, the equation of earthly with perishable. (for which he does not give a name); he regarded none of these to be in agreement with each other: cf. Theology, 249. The “organic” and the third (what is here called “natural”) are not so different in the light of the full narrative of Gen 1-3. Scroggs subordinates the natural to that of Rom 5 (death as a result of sin), stating, “Paul does not necessarily see present nature as ‘natural’”; cf. Scroggs, The Last Adam, 73.

133 Martinus C. de Boer does not capture the nuances well when he writes, “Neither mortality nor corruption denotes for Paul a necessary and natural process of decay, nor can either of them be equated with death as such. Rather, human mortality refers to the susceptibility of living human beings with their ‘natural’ bodies to the onslaught of death. . . . It is thus because of death’s great power that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God and that corruption does not inherit incorruption”; The Defeat of Death, 132 (emphasis original). De Boer is guided by his isolation of two tracks of apocalyptic eschatology for heuristic purposes, the cosmological and the forensic: in the former death is viewed as a cosmic enemy, in the latter as the consequence of sin. The forensic conception of death as a consequence of the transgression of Adam is said to be characteristic of the latter track. In terms of Paul, the foremer is said to be primary and the latter to be solely the adoption of the framework of Paul’s opponents for polemical purposes (and, hence, 15:56 is “seemingly parenthetical,” p. 95). This dichotomous framing is puzzling in the light of the fact that he acknowledges the two frameworks are often found together. It does not enable us to see the intrinsic relationship of the “cosmological” or what I am calling participatory/natural and the forensic in Paul’s thought. Cf. Martinus C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 31–34; idem, The Defeat of Death, 39–91. Likewise, Beker misses the narrative
Paul’s discussion of the resurrection body presupposes that the duality of heaven and earth points typologically to the transcendent destiny of humankind. As Andrew Lincoln put it, there is “an inherent eschatological structure to creation.”\(^{134}\) Jesus, the second man, secures this destiny which God had all along intended for humanity, but which Adam and Eve never achieved. The human body is caught up in this destiny through transformation. Paul is guided by the Genesis narratives, from which he learns that the creation of the earthly Adam in the image of God evokes a transcendent heavenly reality in which Adam had the opportunity to participate. In signifying a bodily/filial relationship between God and human, the image can be determined by the Adam of dust or the Adam of heaven, the resurrected Christ. In the former expression, male and female are unequally related to the image (1 Cor 11:7), but in the latter this disadvantage will have no relevance (Gal 3:28). Throughout, Paul maintains the goodness of the present created world (cf. 1 Cor 8:5-6; 10:26),\(^{135}\) including its theological pertinence (1 Cor 11:7; 15:35-49; also Rom 1:18-28), but he interprets it within a dialectic of natural and temporal hierarchies that points toward the transcendent destiny of humankind.\(^{136}\) In the

\(^{134}\) Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 43.

\(^{135}\) Cf. Penna, “Adamic Christology,” 223–231. Creation is here viewed from a material rather than moral/spiritual aspect. Note the observation of Penna’s: “Even before becoming the antitype of Adam on a very different level, Jesus himself was participant with and heir to the first Adam, i.e., simple ‘living soul’ or ‘psychic body.’” In light of this, it is hard to see the element of sin as an integral part of the definition of the ‘psychic body’” (p. 228).

\(^{136}\) Penna complains that the chronological stress on “first/then,” in which the first is viewed under the aspect of its creation by God, involves “an original conception of the history of salvation, which is however, systematically disregarded in the studies.” Ibid., 229.
following text, we learn how that destiny is coming to pass already in the lives of believers.

**Transformed into the Image: 2 Corinthians 3:18; 4:4, 6**

With a thread spun from the cloth of Gen 1:26-27, in these three texts Paul weaves a picture of salvation into the identity of Christ in support and exposition of the surpassing glory of his own ministry in comparison with that of Moses (3:4-18; cf. Exod 34). Paul asserts boldly that believers are already in the process of being transformed into the glorious image of God. 2 Corinthians 3:18, in particular, has a prominent place in recent discussions of Pauline soteriology as a form of deification/theosis. It is, according to Stephen Finlan, “the most frankly theotic passage in Paul.”\(^{137}\) While the identification of that “same image” (τὴν ἀυτῆν εἰκόνα) into which believers are being transformed permits more than a single possibility, for most scholars,\(^{138}\) it is made, in part, on the basis of 2 Cor 4:4 and 6, and identified as Jesus himself.\(^{139}\) Yet the identification of “the same


\(^{138}\) Notable exceptions are Wright, *Covenant*, 147; Linda L. Belleville, *Reflections of Glory: Paul’s Polemical Use of the Moses-Doxa Tradition in 2 Corinthians 3:1-18* (JSNTSup 52; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), 290. For Wright, believers are being transformed into the same image as each other; for Belleville it is gospel ministers who are being transformed in such a fashion. The notion of reflection conveyed in the verb κατοπτριζόμενοι (whether understood to be explicit or implicit) then pertains to believers. A comparable emphasis on the communal aspect is made by Duff, who argues that believers are the mirror, but that the image into which they are being transformed is still Christ; Paul Brooks Duff, “Transformed ‘from Glory to Glory’: Paul’s Appeal to the Experience of His Readers in 2 Corinthians 3:18,” *JBL* 127 (2008): 773. Against the communal construal of this verse, cf. Rabens, *Holy Spirit and Ethics*, 178 n. 25. While the notion is contextually possible, there is little in the verse itself to commend such a reading.

\(^{139}\) This is supported by the terminology of “seeing” throughout. Just as Paul had spoken of “seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror” as the catalyst for transformation into that “same image” (3:18), he now speaks of those whose minds have been blinded “to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God (εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ)” (4:4). That thought is reprised almost immediately: as the “image of God,” the glory of God is manifest “in the face (ἐν προσώπῳ) of Jesus Christ” (4:6).
image” as that of Jesus still begs the question what it means for Paul to call Jesus the “image of God.”

Jesus as the image of God, it is widely agreed, in 2 Cor 4:4 refers to the revelatory function of Jesus, as the one through whom God, particularly, the “glory of God,” is known.\textsuperscript{140} Thus Eltester remarks, “Christus als Eikon Gottes ist der die Erkenntnis Gottes ermöglichte. . . . Christus als Abbild Gottes ist also die Offenbarung und Repräsentation Gottes.”\textsuperscript{141} Typically this has been taken to indicate the heavenly existence of Christ, as Jervell argues: “Die Ebenbildlichkeit Christi bezeichnet nicht die Menschlichkeit, sondern die Göttlichkeit Christi. Nicht der irdische Jesus, sondern der auferstandene und erhöhte Herr, der Geist ist, ist die wahre Eikon Gottes.”\textsuperscript{142} Christ, as “Gottebenbildlichkeit,” then, “ist ein Bekenntnis zu der Göttlichkeit Christi, zu seinem Einssein mit dem Vater.”\textsuperscript{143} Both Jervell and Eltester broach the topic of pre-existence, suggesting that though they do not see it in view here, Paul’s use of the motif of the


\textsuperscript{142} Jervell, \textit{Imago Dei}, 332. Controversially, Jervell argued that Paul did not regard humanity to have been created in the image of God (“Der Mensch wurde nie gottebenbildlich geschaffen”); that Gen 1:27 had an exclusively Christological application in Paul (and through Christ to believers: “Nur die Glieder der christlichen Gemeinde sind gottebenbildlich”); so Jervell’s dismissal of the humanity of Christ in the present text is part of that cloth. Ibid., 285, 284.

“image of God” is of a piece with other texts which do emphasize pre-existence (1 Cor 8:6; Col 1:15; Phil 2:6).144

The view that Paul has in mind the heavenly glory of Christ has met with stern resistance, however, among those who think that by “the image of God” Paul refers to the perfect humanity of Jesus, who bears the εἰκόν, as the second Adam—interpreted as a reference to his humanity (Gen 1:27). Robin Scroggs joined German scholars H. Windisch and W. G. Kümmel in giving expression to the view among English language scholars that Paul has in mind the humanity of Christ:145 “When Paul relates the concept of εἰκόν to Gen. 1, he suggests that Christ is the reality of true humanity. . . . Paul now knows Christ to be true man, and this means that Christ is the image and glory of God. . . . [H]is Lord is the regained humanity God intended to exist at creation.”146 More recently, this view has been taken up especially by Gordon Fee, Stephanie Lorenzen, and Jonathan D. Worthington.147

The debate profoundly effects our understanding of Paul’s theological use of anthropogenic traditions—particularly, what it means to be transformed into the image. It is therefore necessary to indicate why I think that arguments in favour of Jesus’ restoring the Adamic image of God in his humanity are without a basis in the text.

144 “Das in II Cor 4,4 nur vom Auferstandenen und nicht vom Präesistenten die Rede ist, bedeutet keine sachliche Schwierigkeit; denn Präesistenz und Postexistenz entsprechen einander”; Eltester, Eikon, 134; cf. Jervell, Imago Dei, 333.
145 Hans Windisch, Der Zweite Korintherbrief (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), 136f.
146 Scroggs, The Last Adam, 98–99.
147 For references, see below. Additionally, cf. Blackwell, Christosis, 193–197: “As God’s divine agent Christ reveals God as the ‘image of God’ only as he lives a human life, which the association with the creation language from Genesis 1-2 makes evident” (195); and Rowe, “New Testament Iconography,” 299–301.
There appear to be three arguments in favour of the perspective that Paul specifically has in view the humanity of Jesus when he speaks of the image in 2 Cor 3:18; 4:4 and 6. Fee argues programmatically that “Paul uses this language [i.e., image of God] with regard to Christ only with regard to his being the divine image-bearer in his incarnation.” He is emphatic that no other use of the term “would make . . . sense as an echo of Gen 1-2.” Fee argues programmatically that “Paul uses this language [i.e., image of God] with regard to Christ only with regard to his being the divine image-bearer in his incarnation.”

Because he is divine, reasons Fee, Christ bears the (anthropological/adamic) image of God perfectly, the same image which is being restored (after its defacement in the fall) in believers’ transformation. Lorenzen stresses that Paul’s rhetorical point to emphasize the paradoxical nature of the glory of God being expressed in weakness favours an emphasis on Jesus’ earthly humiliation: “dass Paulus im Kontext durchgängig die Doxa Gottes in der Schwachheit betont.”

Therefore, it is said to be appropriate to see εἰκών here as functioning within the second Adam motif, construed in terms of Jesus’ earthly life: “In dieser Hinsicht ist er auch auf Erden Prototyp für seine Anhänger und übernimmt die Funktion des Zweiten Adam.”

And Worthington adds the closely related stress that Jesus stands parallel to Moses, both of whom bore the glory of God in their face, and therefore the earthly-human nature of

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149 Ibid., 174–187; 519–520. A similarly strained attempt to parse the divine and human natures of Christ in this text—drawing on a reading of 1 Cor 11:7; 15:42-59 I have attempted to discredit above—is made by Scott J. Hafemann, Paul, Moses, and the History of Israel: The Letter/Spirit Contrast and the Argument from Scripture in 2 Corinthians 3 (WUNT 81; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 416–418. For a critique, cf. Litwa, “Thesis,” 122–128, though I think Litwa relies too much on a narrative of fall-restoration, as seen for instance in his treatment of 1 Cor 11:7. In distinction from Fee’s method, Hafemann applies “image” language to Christ’s deity, but insists that it is Christ as second Adam, i.e., in his humanity, to whom believers are being conformed.
150 Lorenzen, Eikon-Konzept, 253.
151 Ibid., for the whole argument, cf. pp. 211-255.
Jesus is in view. Perhaps the most spirited defence of the anthropological construal of the image is made by Worthington, who regards as “spurious” any finding of a “Philonic-type use of the κατά-concept whereby empirical man is distinguished from the actual (metaphysical) image, who is the pre-incarnate Jesus.”

The flaw in these arguments is that they conflate two distinct concepts of the image of God, to which are correlated distinct uses of “Adam.” Where Paul in 1 Corinthians spoke of the “last Adam” (1 Cor 15:45) the reference was to Christ in his resurrection as the manifestation of the heavenly image in contrast to the earthly image of the first man. (Likewise 1 Cor 15:20-23 had Christ’s resurrection existence in view.) The concept of εἰκών was made to reflect the dualism of heaven and earth. In his earthly life Jesus implicitly shared the Adamic image. Only in his heavenly resurrection life, does he become the model for a new, glorified humanity (cf., too, Phil 3:21; Rom 8:29). The same pattern holds in 2 Corinthians, except that Paul refers explicitly to but one εἰκών (=...)

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152 “Paul is presenting Jesus as someone who is historically after Moses, having a human ‘face’ that replaces Moses’. Thus not only is 4:4 like Paul’s own use of ‘image of God’ in 1 Cor. 11:7 in that he identifies the ‘image’ with the referent directly and immediately, but the referent in both passages is a human as the image”: Worthington, Creation in Paul and Philo, 158–159.

153 Ibid., 154 n. 62. Worthington puts 1 Cor 11:7 in opposition to this, where “man” is “the image and glory of God.” (He objects to “import[ing]” 1 Cor 11:3 into “this part” of the argument on the basis that it would “confuse Paul’s own revealed logic for the sake of a seemingly neater system”; ibid). But this hardly means that man as the image of God is not modeled on some corresponding image. Cf. van Kooten’s point that Philo, who generally retained the preposition, could have easily omitted it (citing Praem. 114; Prob. 62); Paul’s Anthropology, 54. On the absence of the preposition in 1 Cor 11:7, cf. n. 57. Moreover, in my own construal of Paul’s understanding, he does not distinguish between the “true”=“metaphysical image” and a (physical) copy, but rather between the heavenly and earthly, which exist in a sort of mirrored relationship which has both ontological, typological, and eschatological dimensions. Unfortunately, Worthington devotes no sustained attention to 1 Cor 8:6; Phil 2:6; and Col 1:15.

154 The other relevant text here is Rom 5:14, where Adam is described as the type of “the one who is to come.” It is to be noted that Rom 5:12-21 compares Christ and Adam in moral-vocational terms and their distinct impact; here the concept of “last” or “second” Adam is not explicitly employed. This is because Jesus according to the flesh is in view (Rom 1:3; 8:3); what Jesus does in the flesh is preparatory to his becoming the somatic model of the new humanity.
pneumatic soma/heavenly image) and introduces the dynamic of present transformation into that image by the spirit (3:17-18).\footnote{If one accepts the aorist subjunctive reading in 1 Cor 15:49, then the latter concept was already implied there; cf. n. 119.}

Transformation into the image ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν of 3:18 is taken up in 4:7-5:5. With the dualism of the inner and outer ἄνθρωπος (cf. 4:16), Paul preserves the same basic distinction between the two images of 1 Corinthians, for the transformation into the image presently effects only the “inner man” (ὁ ἐσω ἄνθρωπος, 4:16), which is the new element in 2 Corinthians, and its outcome (at death) is the putting on of the heavenly “house” (i.e., body) of glory (4:16-5:1). The present body, or “outer man” (ὁ ἔξω ἄνθρωπος, 4:16)—which Paul styles “jars of clay” (ὁστρακίνα σκεύη, 4:7), perhaps recalling “the man of dust” of 1 Cor 15:47\footnote{“Clay” and “dust” become interchangeable means of referring to the creation of Adam from the earth; cf. Job 4:19; 10:9; 33:6; 1QH* XI 21-25; XX 27.}—is “wasting away” or even “destroyed” (4:16; 5:1). It does \textit{not} constitute the glorious εἰκών Paul has in mind in 2 Corinthians.

Nothing changes where Paul draws Jesus into the discussion in 4:10: “always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be made visible in our bodies” (v. 11 repeats the thought, with the notable change from σώμα to θνητὴ σάρξ). In the afflictions Paul suffers as a minister of the gospel (“we are afflicted . . . perplexed. . . . persecuted . . . struck down . . .”), he replicates the death of Jesus, but to the degree that he carries out his service (“afflicted . . . but not crushed . . . not driven to despair . . . not forsaken . . . not destroyed”), the life of Jesus is manifest. “Life” here refers not to the earthly sojourn of Jesus, but to the resurrection power which brought him to life (cf. 4:7, 12, 14).
That Jesus in his resurrection glory is in view with the concept of εἰκόν is confirmed by the fact that the real point of comparison is not Moses and Jesus, despite the coincidence of πρόσωπον (3:7, 13; 4:6), but Moses (and the Israelites) and Paul (and believers) (3:12-13). Whereas Moses concealed the fading glory from his face in the presence of the Israelites, Paul and the community of believers with faces (πρόσωπον) unveiled are being transformed into glory and greater glory (3:18). Scott Haffemann rightly points this out as well: “The comparison throughout 2 Cor. 3:7-18 is not between Moses and Christ as mediators of the glory of God, but between Moses and Paul,” and he adds a point which supports the argument here, that, rather, “Christ [is] equated with YHWH himself as the glory of God.”

It is quite mistaken therefore to construe Paul’s references to εἰκόν in 2 Cor 3:18 and 4:4 and 6 in terms of the earthly, crucified body of Christ or to Jesus’ bearing the (adamic-anthropological) image of God in his humanity. The somatic connotation of εἰκόν does not automatically qualify the image in terms of the earthly Adamic image. Instead, Jesus’ earthly humiliation models the circumstances under which transformation into the glorious image occurs, but it is not itself, in the terms of Paul’s present discussion, expressive of the image. This is why transformation presently occurs in the renewal of the inner man by the spirit, while the outer man wastes away. The same spirit that transforms the inner man acts as a “guarantee” (ἀρραβών, 5:5) of the completion of that transformation upon death in the resurrected body, when the dualism of the inner and

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157 Hafemann, Paul, Moses, 416. (As pointed out above, n. 149, Hafemann incongruously goes on to construe the image into which believers are transformed as the anthropological image of a restored Adam.) On the terms of the comparison involving Moses and Paul, cf. also Newman, Glory-Christology, 229.

158 Contra Worthington, Creation in Paul and Philo, 158 n. 77, who strongly implies this.
outer is dissolved. Thus an allusion to Gen 1:26-27 must be construed in terms of the heavenly reality which is the transcendent counterpart of Adam’s image.

When Paul refers to Christ as the “image of God,” we conclude, he has in mind the heavenly, glorified existence of Christ.

Having established that Christ as εἰκών speaks to the divine nature of the resurrected Jesus, we can return to 2 Cor 3:18 in order to plumb the significance of the transformation Paul describes. The verse itself and the smaller unit of which it is a part (vv. 16-18) are riddled with exegetical difficulties; space permits that we address only what is necessary. The translation of the NRSV basically reflects my own exegetical decisions:

And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror (τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενον), are being transformed into the

159 Blackwell has a good discussion of this point: Christosis, 197–219; although he incorrectly reads “image of God” as a reference specifically to the adamic humanity of Jesus and in terms of the restoration of that image (pp. 193-197).

160 This conclusion finds broad support in the work of Newman, who argues that Paul identified Christ with the glory of God (גְּדֹלָה יְהוָה, Ezek 1:28) as a result of Christ’s appearance to him in glory on the road to Damascus: cf. Newman, Glory-Christology, 92–104, 201–04, 229–40, 244; cf. also below “The Form of God.” Moreover, while Paul does not seem to make a point of it here, the thought is compatible with the pre-existence of Christ as the “image of God” and this may indeed have been assumed in Paul’s argument in chapter 3 (pre-existence was already essentially asserted in 1 Cor 8:6; 10:4, 9), and yet since it has no necessary argumentative function there, we must be content merely to note that the assumption would facilitate the parallel between Moses and Paul, both of whom will have seen the glory of God qua “Christ,” even if Moses’ experience of that glory will have only been partial both objectively (cf. Exod 33:20-23; cf. 2 Cor 4:6) and subjectively (as per 2 Cor 3:7-13). If it is possible to see Christ in (at least some of) the references to “Lord” in 2 Cor 3:16-18, and if 3:16 is acknowledged to be a citation of Exod 34:34, then Paul makes an explicit claim for Christ’s pre-existence. This identification of Lord as Jesus is uncertain, however, and many now rather follow James D. G. Dunn, “2 Corinthians 3:17: The Lord Is the Spirit,” JTS 21 (1970): 309–20. For an attempt to interpret the text with the claim of pre-existence at the forefront, cf. Anthony T. Hanson, “The Midrash in 2 Corinthians 3: A Reconsideration,” JSNT 9 (1980): 2–28.

161 According to LSJ s.v., the verb κατοπτρίζω has the sense “to show as in a mirror, reflects oneself in it” or “behold oneself as in a mirror,” and parenthetically it is added of 2 Cor 3:16 “but here perhaps reflect,” BDAG, s.v., gives, “look at something as in a mirror, contemplate something,” citing Philo, Leg. 3, 101 (μηδὲ κατοπτρισάμην ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ τὴν σὴν ἰδέαν ή ἐν σοί τῷ θεῷ). Three ways of handling the verb are: (1) “reflect, mirror,” (2) “behold,” (3) “behold as in a mirror.” Given the prominence of the term κάτοπτρον in the papyri for “mirror” and the
same image (τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφοῦμεθα) from one degree of glory to another (ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν); for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit. (v. 18)

The points which are necessary to make are three.

First, the image into which believers are being transformed is Christ. The most likely antecedent of τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα is that image implied in the verb κατοπτριζόμενοι and rendered explicit by the NRSV’s “as though reflected in a mirror.” The image is therefore “the glory of the Lord.” Surprisingly, given the context (cf. Exod 33:18-23; cf. Num 12:8 LXX), this is the first explicit reference to the concept. While the concept of the “image” appears to be generated by the reference to the mirror, the choice of metaphor appears deliberate as a mere four verses later Christ is identified as the image of God (4:4). Even if “Lord” is to be identified as Yhwh of the Exodus text, the reference to the Lord’s “glory,” which the believer sees, must constitute a reference to Christ in view of 4:4 and 6: Christ in his glory (δόξα τοῦ Χριστοῦ) is identified as “the image of God,” and the “glory of God” is known “in the face of Jesus Christ.” Following Paul’s relatively infrequent use of the verb in this period, the “mirror” element is unlikely to have been lost (as in later Patristic readings); cf. Jan Lambrecht, “Transformation in 2 Cor 3:18,” Bib 64 (1983): 246–248. “Reflect” has notable support in the literature; cf. those cited in BDAG and more recently Belleville, Reflections of Glory, 273–296; Wright, Covenant, 180–185; Blackwell, Christosis, 185–188. However, the largely contextual arguments in favour of this view, namely, the contrast between Paul (and sometimes the community) and Moses, whose face is veiled, and the sense of the community as “letters,” reflecting Christ’s life (cf. 4:7-10), are far from decisive. Instead, the more immediate contrast between the “we all” (v. 18, i.e., the community) and the “sons of Israel” whose perception is veiled (vv. 13-16) provides for the simplest lexical sense of the verb, i.e., “behold.” The wider contextual expectation that Paul and the community of believers will also “reflect” the glory is provided for in the transformation into the image which is beheld in the mirror. Cf. especially Margaret E. Thrall, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (2 vols.; ICC; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), 1:290–292; also Annette Weissenrieder, “Der Blick in den Spiegel: II Kor 3,18 vor dem Hintergrund antiker Spiegeltheorien und ikonographischer Abbildungen,” in Picturing the New Testament: Studies in Ancient Visual Images (ed. Annette Weissenrieder, Friederike Wendt, and Petra von Gemünden; WUNT 193; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 316–319; Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 314; Duff, “Transformed,” 769 n. 48; Lorenzen, Eikon-Konzept, 228 n. 121.

162 So Thrall, 2 Corinthians, 1:285.
163 Ibid., 1:283.
train of thought to its extraordinary conclusion, Thrall writes that “the divine nature as expressed in Christ as God’s image is progressively expressed also in those who are transformed into the same image.” 164 Believers are transformed into the same image as the divine Christ.

Second, this transformation is primarily viewed as a present process of inner renewal, but it culminates in total somatic conformity in the future. It is generally thought that the phrase ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν refers to a gradual increase in degrees of glory or “progression from one state of glory to a further state.” 165 Nevertheless, an oblique reference to the final state of the glorious body must remain a live possibility, since it is the state of glory par excellence, partially anticipated in Moses’ shining face, and a point of discussion a short while later (4:17; 5:1-5). 166 Moreover, the organic connection between these two states (the present-inward and the future-outward) is indicated by the fact of the spirit’s being the guarantee (ἀρραβών) of the latter (5:5) and the effective agent or cause, 167 or perhaps origin, 168 of the former (καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος,

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164 Ibid., 286. Emphasis added. Litwa adds, “insofar as Christ can be called ‘divine’ as God’s image, humanity, fully transformed into the ‘same image’ which Christ is (2 Cor 3:18 . . . ), can also be called ‘divine’”; “Theosis,” 125.

165 Thrall, 2 Corinthians, 1:286. It is tempting to suggest that these two states are the present inner renewal (cf. 4:16) and the future total transformation (4:17; 5:1-5), but the present tense of μεταμορφόω places a strain on that interpretation, since Paul later contrasts the inner renewal with the “wasting away” of the outer aspect of the person (4:16). Both δόξα, qualifying μεταμορφώμεθα, will apply to present experience, and therefore the sense of a gradual increase is to be preferred, probably in direct distinction to the fading glory on Moses’ face (3:7-11). Cf. Harris, Second Corinthians, 316.

166 Murray Harris tries to hold these together, finally arguing against the likelihood that the sense is from glory received in regeneration to that received at the parousia in favour of “the nature or direction of the transformation” as a gradual increase. But then he states, “the ultimate δόξα, the last in the series ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, will be the believer’s acquisition as the result of a final μετασχηματισμός, of τὸ σῶμα τῆς δόξης (Phil. 3:21; cf. Col. 3:4), a body suffused with the divine glory and perfectly adapted to the ecology of heaven (1 Cor. 15:43-44)”; cf. Harris, Second Corinthians, 316–317. Newman interprets the phrase in terms of a process that begins with the glory of Christ’s initial appearance to Paul and culminates in the glory of final transformation of the body to Christ’s glorious body; cf. Newman, Glory-Christology, 227.

167 Thrall, 2 Corinthians, 1:286.
The present transformation has a pronounced noetic character. Perception of glory is later characterized as “knowledge” of the gospel (4:6) and a “looking” at things that cannot be seen (4:18), whereas the “minds” of the unbelieving have been “blinded” (4:4). Romans 12:2, containing the one other occurrence of the verb, speaks of transformation “by the renewal of the mind.” Indeed, μεταμορφούμεθα in 3:18 is sometimes thought itself to metaphorically relate the noetic activity of meditation. Thus, van Kooten’s emphasis on transformation into the image of God as a pneumatic-noetic phenomenon captures an essential aspect of Paul’s use of the concept, and adds an important qualification to Lorenzen’s thesis that εἰκών is thoroughly a somatic concept in Paul. While Paul’s “image” language is more characteristically somatic, the pneumatic-noetic element has an inestimable importance, since it more readily expresses the present experience of salvation as enlightenment and moral enablement (2 Cor 4:2; Rom 12:2).

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168 Harris, Second Corinthians, 317.
169 The translation of the prepositional phrase is disputed. Ibid., 317–318, provides options. In any case, the reference to “spirit” is of a piece with the chapter’s persistent opposition of “spirit” under the administration of the new covenant to ink, the letter, and the ministry of death (3:3, 6, 7-8), and it complements the pneumatic character of conversion described in vv. 15-17.
171 The inter-connection between pneumatic enlightenment and the pneumatic body of the resurrection is already hinted at in 1 Corinthians (cf. 2:10-3:1 and 15:45-49), but they are not connected by way of eikon terminology. Van Kooten has ably highlighted the noetic component of transformation into the image of God and being made into the likeness of Christ as well as its Graeco-Roman antecedents, but he severely underplays the somatic component of the image throughout his monograph, both in the treatment of the Hebrew Bible (pp. 1-7) and especially Paul (cf. e.g., pp. 199-218), and he also works within the framework of the restoration of a lost or defaced image; van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology. It is in this connection—the somatic—that Paul’s eikon language fits poorly within the framework of Hellenistic traditions of transformation into the divine image.
172 On the moral aspect, cf. Rabens, Holy Spirit and Ethics, 195–202; Litwa, Transformed, 220–223; idem, “Theosis,” 129–132. Litwa quips: “To become ‘the same image’ as the divine Christ is not, then, merely to become a shiny astral body in the eschatological sky. In this life, at least, it involves developing the self-subordinating virtues of Christ—assimilating to the Image of God—and thus to God himself”; Transformed, 223. This must be viewed in connection with participation in Christ as spelled out in 5:21. Cf. Plummer: “It is by union of Christ with man that Christ is identified with human sin, and it is by union of man with Christ that man is identified with Divine righteousness”; Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians (ICC; New York:
Finally, it is vital to note how the theme of transformation into the image is interwoven into Paul’s concept of new creation in the subsequent context.\(^{173}\) The mirror-generated reference to the “image” in 3:18 leads into Paul’s explicit identification of Christ as “the image of God” in 4:4, and then in 4:6 to recall Gen 1:3: “For it is God who said, ‘Let light shine out of darkness,’ who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.” In this way the work of redemptive transformation which is accomplished through Christ, the image of God, is conceived in continuity with God’s creative work at the beginning. There may be an echo of this original creation in the next verse where Paul speaks of having “this treasure” (likely the gospel, vv. 4, 6) ἐν ὀστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν (“in clay jars”), by which he may mean to capitalize on the fact of Adam’s creation from dust to characterize the present

\(^{173}\) A thorough-going reading of 4:7-5:21 as an explication of the restoration of the lost glory of Adam through the righteous suffering of Christ is undertaken by C. Marvin Pate, *Adam Christology as the Exegetical and Theological Substructure of 2 Corinthians 4:7-5:21* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991). There are problems with this interpretation: Its reliance on a maximalist construal of the presence of the myth of Adam’s lost glory in Second Temple texts (relying heavily on Scroggs), often asserting its presence on the principle that the *Endzeit = Urzeit,* many of the purported echoes of Gen 1-3 detected in 2 Cor 4:7-5:21 (e.g., “man,” 4:16; “naked,” “groan,” “clothed,” 5:1-3; “life,” “Spirit,” 5:4, 5) are only convincing if one is committed to the pervasiveness and importance of the restoration of Adam’s lost glory; and, finally, the matter that Paul’s commitment to the myth is undermined by those texts where Paul most clearly does allude to Gen 1-3, either making nothing of the myth (as in Rom 5 and 7) or essentially contradicting it (as in 1 Cor 11:7 and 1 Cor 15:45-49, see above). On Rom 1:23 and 3:23, cf. n. 104 in Chapter 4. “Adam, Corruption, and the Cosmos.” My criticism of Pate is less about his detection of references to Gen 1-3, than about the interpretive grid he pushes them through. This is in evidence in 2 Cor 5:3, 4, for instance: “the nakedness that Paul desires to avoid . . . proceeds from his belief that Adam, originally clothed with divine glory, was divested of the covering because of his sin. In other words, Paul does not want to experience Adam’s nakedness” (p. 115, citing 3 Bar. 6:16; 2 En. 22:8, 30:12; *Gen. Rab.* XX, 12; *Apoc. Mos.* 20:1). Indeed, Pate admits that this is “a lose parallel,” but Paul’s use of the word γυμνός to speak not of the present, earthly (i.e., Adamic) soma (contra p. 146) but to some sort of post-mortem existence is counterintuitive at best if the tradition Pate purports to be in the background is at all present to Paul’s consciousness.
somatic existence (cf. σῶμα in vv. 8-11, 4:16-18). Less ambiguously, Paul exclaims in 5:17, “So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation (καινὴ κτίσις): everything old (τὰ ἀρχαῖα) has passed away; see, everything has become new!” Transformation into the image of Christ is part of Paul’s conceptuality of the new creation, confirming that transformation into the image is not about “return” or “restoration” but about transcendence.

We can conclude therefore that in 2 Cor 3:18 believers are transformed into the divine image of Christ. We found no compelling reason to interpret this in terms of the restoration of Adam’s lost glory or of a restoration of Adam’s image by way of the humanity of Christ. Instead, in Christ, the believer realizes the true intention of Adam’s creation in the image of God, a potential which Adam never realized.

The Form of God: Philippians 2:6-11; 3:20-21

While it has been argued that the image of God as an epithet of Christ refers to his heavenly, glorified existence, it has not been necessary or possible to argue that pre-existence is in view with the title, although the implication was not far when Gen 1, including vv. 26-27, was seen to lend conceptual content both to the earthly and heavenly image. Philippians 2:6 offers the best chance of addressing this question within the

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174 Supporting this is Paul’s reference to the “first man” in 1 Cor 15:47 as ἐκ γῆς χοίρος, where the same contrast between the present, earthly and future, heavenly existence is in play that can be seen in 4:16-5:10. It is not necessary to delve into the murky waters of chapter 5:1-10, but cf. Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet, 59–71.

175 The debate continues whether Paul has in mind here a cosmic as well as an anthropological-ecclesiological new creation. As in Gal 6:15, the anthropological seems at the forefront, but from the dual standpoint of Pauline theology as a whole (1 Cor 7:31; 15:20-28; Rom 8:19-23) and the tradition-history of the term (“new creation,” e.g., Isa 43:18-19; 65:17; 66:22; Jub. 4:26; 1 En. 72:1; but cf. Jos. Asen. 8:10-11), it would be dubious to insist on the anthropological without any acknowledgement of the cosmic consequences of the Christ-event in Paul’s letters. The balance is captured by Adams, Constructing the World, 234–235; Thrall, 2 Corinthians, 1:420–428.
undisputed letters of Paul, and Phil 3:20-21 contributes to the discussion by relating the aspect of the believer’s conformation to the body of Christ’s glory. I will argue that the basic category underlying these texts is the “image of God,” and the effect will be to shore up several aspects of the argument to this point.¹⁷⁶

The statement that Christ existed in the form of God in Phil 2:6 has been at the centre of controversy, with some seeing a reference to the image of God here and then making different proposals for how Adam might be thought to relate to the text. The debate hinges on whether the semantic domain of μορφή overlaps with εἰκών, and thus whether the phrase that Christ ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (2:6) evokes the εἰκών θεοῦ of Gen 1:27, and how. If a relationship to the image language of Gen 1:26-27 is granted, the question becomes whether Christ is seen as subsequent or prior to Adam. If the former is preferred, then we should speak of an Adam Christology in Paul, but if the latter is preferred, we ought rather to speak of an Image Christology, to which Adamic themes are

¹⁷⁶ Both texts have generated debate concerning their form and provenance: Phil 3:20-21 in large measure due to its similarity to the earlier text has been thought to be a hymnic fragment; cf. John Henry Paul Reumann, “Philippians 3:20-21 - A Hymnic Fragment?” NTS 30 (1984): 593–609. It is more common to consider 2:6-11 a hymn; it at least has an elevated poetic style. The classic work here is Ernst Lohmeyer, Kyrios Jesus: Eine Untersuchung Zur Phil. 2, 5-11 (2d. ed.; SHAW 4; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1961). Philippians 2:6-11 constitutes as likely a text as any one might consider to have had a prehistory without explicit citation formula, and yet Paul seems capable of forging such a statement himself. What can be stated with confidence is that the text is thoroughly integrated into Paul’s thought; Gorman argues that it is Paul’s “master story”; at the very least, Wright seems justified on the basis of the content of Philippians itself (especially 3:2-21; but see also 1:20-24; 2:20-21, 25-30; 4:12) to argue that Paul had “the material and language of 2:5-11 in his blood stream”; Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 9–39; idem, “‘Although/Because He Was in the Form of God’: The Theological Significance of Paul’s Master Story (Phil 2:6-11),” JTS 1 (2007): 147–70; Wright, Covenant, 59. Many recent commentators treat the “hymn” as Pauline (in origin): Stephen E. Fowl, Philippians (THNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 108–113; Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians (BNTC; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 1998), 117–120; Peter Thomas O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 198–202. An exception is Charles B. Cousar, Philippians and Philemon: A Commentary (NTL; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 52–53; who follows what has perhaps been the majority critical opinion; cf. also Ralph P. Martin, Carmen Christi: Phil 2:5-11 in Recent Interpretation and in the Setting of Early Christian Worship (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 42–62, 287.
structurally subordinate. I will argue that not only do “form” and “image” conceptuality overlap, but that Phil 2:6 identifies Christ as the pre-existent glorious image of God.

The case in favour of what I have termed an Image Christology has met with strong resistance on the part of Gordon Fee in his *Pauline Christology*. While Fee makes a strong case for the pre-existence of Christ based on Phil 2:6-7, he is exasperated by scholars who detect a semantic parallel in Gen 1:26-27: “there is not a single verbal connection of any kind between this passage and the Septuagint of Gen 1-3. The alleged semantic overlap between these two words [μορφή and εἰκών] is in fact a piece of scholarly mythology based on untenable semantics.” In a footnote, he makes additional arguments against the probability of “genuine semantic overlap”: (1) that the terms never appear together in the multiple entries of Louw and Nida’s *Greek-English Lexicon*, (2) that the matter is not simply about two words but the phrases μορφή θεοῦ and εἰκών θεοῦ, and (3) lastly that since Paul elsewhere uses εἰκών of Christ to speak of “imaging God” the use of something other than the Septuagint’s word here suggests a different underlying concept. The first argument is inconsequential, and does not trump the

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177 Fee, *Pauline Christology*, 378–379. It has to be noted that he makes a dubious attempt to define μορφή as denoting “‘form’ or ‘shape’ *not usually in terms of the external features* by which something is recognized but of those characteristics and qualities that are essential to it.” Ibid., 378. Emphasis added. The explicit denial (“not usually in terms of external features”) runs contrary to the definitions supplied in BDAG (“form, outward appearance, shape”); Muraoko, GELS (“1. Shape, form . . .; almost = ‘body’; 2. A way sth or sbd looks”); and LSJ (“form, shape, . . . 2. form, shape, figure . . . 3. generally, form, fashion, appearance . . . 4. a form, kind, sort”). A positive emphasis on “essential qualities” is made in the definition supplied by Louw-Nida, though only citing Phil 2:6 as an example, and J. Behm, “μορφή.” *TDNT*, 4:743-4. Notably these last two definitions are offered without any attempt to contrast external appearance and inward reality. Fee cites Dave Steenburg in his favour, accurately to the effect that Steenburg thinks “form of God” militates against a comparison “to the mundane Adam of the Old Testament Genesis account” (85; emphasis added), but inaccurately to the effect that Steenburg considers the reason for this to be that the phrase connotes “the *visible* aspect or appearance of God” (78; emphasis added): “The Case Against the Synonymity of Morphē and Eikōn,” *JSNT* 34 (1988): 77–86.

178 Fee, *Pauline Christology*, 379 n. 20.
abundant evidence of semantic overlap in the co-occurrence of these terms in ancient Jewish (and other) texts, sometimes in contexts specifically reflecting on Gen 1:26-27 (see below). The second argument Fee borrows from Larry Hurtado, but Hurtado is specifically concerned with an allusion to Adam in the phrase μορφή θεοῦ and he in any case somewhat overstates the homogeneity in wording used to allude to Gen 1:26-27 in the sources, as well as neglects to note (as does Fee) the verbal link in ὀμοίωμα of Phil 2:7 to its cognate ὀμοίωσις of Gen 1:26, each characterizing the human being (though with inverse denotations).179 The third argument assumes the conclusion, namely, that the words do not significantly overlap. We will be able to make a suggestion as to why μορφή might be used rather than εἰκόνα after we consider the semantic relationship between them.

George van Kooten has recently marshalled the evidence and made a convincing case for the semantic overlap of morphic and iconic language in ancient Greek, arguing that “the extent of the semantic and conceptual field of the divine image . . . is so large, and especially its inclusion of morphic language so important that, without much exaggeration, one could characterize Paul’s Christology and anthropology as ‘morphic.’”180 Broadly, support for semantic-conceptual overlap can be found in Josephus who remarks, “[God’s] form (μορφή) and magnitude surpass our powers of description.

179 Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 121–123. Hurtado claims that “when subsequent writers wish to make allusions to this idea [the creation of humans according to the eikòn theou], they consistently use the eikòn theou phrase (Wisdom of Sol. 2:23; 7:26; Sir. 17:3)” (122). This overlooks the variability Genesis itself introduces in 1:26 which speaks both of creation κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν as well as ὀμοίωσιν (which is reflected in Jas 3:9 without reference to eikón) and in 5:3 where κατὰ τὴν ιδέαν Ἀδὰμ is parallel to κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ as well as texts in the DSS (4Q504 8 recto [צדיקין קדשים]; 4Q417 1 i 17 [حماة مكتوب]; 4Q517 4 i 17 [רazed מוקבים]), not to mention the cases mentioned below in ancient literature where μορφή stands alongside εἰκόνα in connection to Gen 1:27.

180 Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 71.
No materials, however costly, are fit to make an image (εἰκόν) of Him” (C. Ap. 2.190-191). Van Kooten also cites Philo, Somn. 1.232-233, 238; Leg. 210-211; 346; and Plutarch, Alex. fort. 335C-D; as well as Ages. 2.2. But particularly to the point are those texts highlighted by van Kooten that use morphic language in direct connection to Gen 1:26-27. Sibylline Oracles 3:8, the prime example, speaks of “Men, who have the form (μορφήν) which God moulded in his image (ἐν εἰκόνι)” (cf. also Sib. Or. VIII 256-273).

Celsus, in a passage preserved by Origen, criticizes the aniconism of Christians, remarking, “But if they mean that we ought not to suppose that images (εἰκόνας) are divine, because God has a different form (ἰδίαν θεοῦ μορφήν) . . . they have unwittingly refuted themselves. For they say that ‘God made man his own image (ἰδίαν εἰκόνα)’ and made man’s form like his own (τὸ δὲ ἐιδος ἐαυτῶ)” (Cels. 7.62; Origen’s reply, 7.66, uses the same language; cf. also Corp. herm. I.12181). Van Kooten concludes that “in the common idiom of images and their forms, ‘form’ refers either to the form of the image itself, or to the form which the image represents.”182 The words occupy the same conceptual field, as van Kooten points out and clarifies, because images have forms. Paul’s own usage conforms to and confirms this: believers are predestined to be συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (Rom 8:29), and they are already τὴν αὐτήν εἰκόνα μεταμορφοῦμεθα (2 Cor 3:18).183

181 Cited by Jervell, Imago Dei, 228–229; referred to by Steenburg, “Synonymity.” Mead’s translation: “But All-Father Mind, being Life and Light, did bring forth Man co-equal to Himself, with whom He fell in love, as being His own child; for he was beautiful beyond compare, the Image of his Sire. In very truth, God fell in love with his own Form; and on him did bestow all of His own formations.” To be noted here, too, is the overlapping of filial with eikon language.

182 Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 91.

183 Steenburg explains these texts with the comment, “the use of symmorphon and metamorphomai with regard to the Lord’s eikōn may convey that the transformation will involve specifically visible
Solid linguistic grounds therefore support the inference that the statement that Christ existed ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ explicates part of Paul’s Image Christology. But is the phrase “synonymous” with εἰκὼν θεοῦ, as van Kooten argues? It may be, but it seems in this case there is an additional resonance to the phrase beyond the common idiom of images and their forms, which is clarified by the tradition-historical background of “form of God.” In this framework, the “form of God” refers specifically to the manifest “glory of God.” Dave Steenburg argues that “form of God” refers to “the visible aspect or appearance of God.” Likewise, Markus Bockmuehl argues that it “denote[s] quite straightforwardly the visible identifying features” of Christ, and therefore speaks of appearance—the chosen will come to manifest the divine beauty/splendor. Without these derivatives of morphē the explicit character of the conformity to the Lord’s eikōn remains ambiguous and unspecified; Steenburg, “Synonymity,” 85. Steenburg’s analysis coheres with van Kooten’s in his stress that εἰκὼν lacks the heightened or (nearly) singular emphasis on the visual aspect conveyed by μορφῇ. This agrees in a way with van Kooten’s statement that “form” specifies the particular shape or characteristics of an image.

Unfortunately, van Kooten retains the language of “Adam Christology” and even speaks of “the pre-existent Adam from heaven,” but this reverses the relationship between the creation of Adam in the image of God and Christ’s pre-existence as the image of God; Paul’s Anthropology, 90.


Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, “‘The Form of God’ (Phil 2:6): Variations on a Theme of Jewish Mysticism,” JTS 48 (1997): 11; idem, Philippians, 127–129. Likewise, Fowl: “In this light, the ‘form’ of the God of Israel would be a reference to the glory, radiance, and splendor by which God’s majesty is made visible to humans. By locating Christ in this glory, Phil 2:6 places Christ within that aspect of God’s identity which is most visible to humans. In this regard, Paul’s description fits neatly with John 17:5, in which Christ shares in God’s eternal glory (cf. Heb 1:3)”; Philippians, 92. Though Fowl cites 1 Cor 11:7; 2 Cor 3:18 and 4:6, he does not emphasize the notion of the “image of God.” Cf., also, Steenburg, “Synonymity”; and Jarl Fossum, “Jewish-Christian Christology and Jewish Mysticism,” VC 37 (1983): 263. Fossum points to the evidence of the interchangeability of μορφῆ and δοξά in the theophanies of Septuagint: “In Job 4, 16, the têmûnâ, ‘form’, ‘appearance’, of the divine spirit (rûah) which revealed itself to Eliphas is rendered by morphē in the LXX. In Num. 12, 8, however, the LXX translates God’s têmûnâ, which is beheld by Moses, with doxa. In the same way, Psalm 16, 15 renders God’s têmûnâ, which the psalmist expects to be revealed unto salvation, by doxa. We also ought to note that, in the Christologically important text of Is. 52, 14, the to’ar, ‘form’, ‘appearance’, of the Servant is rendered by morphē by Aquila, but by doxa by the LXX.”
him as revealing God’s own self in a visible aspect.  

Within the conceptuality of the image of God, “form of God” therefore specifically connotes in Paul’s thought the glorious image of God (cf. 2 Cor 4:4 and Phil 3:21). Ezekiel 1:26-28 supplies the connection between Christ as the “form (=glory) of God” and the “image of God” of Gen 1:26-27. The vision of “the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the LORD” (יְהֹוָה צְלֵם דְמוּת כְּבוֹד־יְחֹוָה, Ezek 1:28) in the guise of “something that seemed like a human form” (ὁμοιόμορφον ὡς ἀνθρώπον/ הָעֵדַת כְּמַרְאֵה דְמוּת כְּבוֹד־יְ, 1:26) is the tradition-counterpart to humankind’s creation in the image and likeness (הָעֵדַת) of God (Gen 1:27). The glory of God, which Ezekiel strives to say, has a human

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189 Pace Bockmuehl, “The Form of God,” 11, who downplays those traditions witnessing to overlapping of image and form motifs. The case for this has largely been made with reference to van Kooten above; but we should add other notable uses of μορφή including Dan 3:19 for the disfiguration of the king’s δόξα (θ = δόξας); and Dan 4:36; 5:6, 9, 10; 7:28 where θ has the word again for the disfiguration of the face=ἴπτω (“brightness,” “splendour,” i.e., of one’s countenance).

190 Against this view, Hawthorne argues that μορφή as “glory” cannot be applied to the second, parallel use of the term in the phrase μορφή δούλου (2:7), but 1 Cor 15:40 suggests otherwise, and the objection only really carries weight if one argues that μορφή is synonymous with “glory” rather than that it connotes Christ’s glory by way of speaking of his manifest form. In that case, it very precisely parallels μορφή δούλου, which Paul describes as ἐν ὑμεῖς ἀνθρώπων and σχήματι ἀνθρώπου; his second argument concerns the “lack of linguistic evidence” linking μορφή and δόξα, but this is already supplied in Phil 3:21 which reprises so much of the language and conceptuality in Phil 2:6-7 but with the addition of δόξα (cf., too, of course 2 Cor 3:18), not to mention the abundance of material in the LXX and Second Temple literature which describes the visible presence of God—which, we have seen, μορφή θεοῦ denotes—in terms of “glory” (e.g., Exod 24:16, 17; 33:18; 40:34-35; Ezek 1:26-28; Sir 49:8; 1 En. 14:20); moreover, once the connection between μορφή and εἰκών is recognized, δόξα is but a short step away (1 Cor 11:7; cf. Gerald F. Hawthorne, “In the Form of God and Equal with God (Philippians 2:6),” in Where Christology Began (ed. Ralph P. Martin and Brian J. Dodd; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster, 1998), 100.


192 Cf. Zimmerli, Ezekiel, 1:124, highlighting the connection to P in general.
appearance, is the image in which humankind is created (cf. Wis 2:23; 4Q504 8 recto 4).

Later traditions (Jewish-mystical, Jewish-Christian, and Christian) attest to these connections, but we must not simply equate those traditions with the Pauline concept, which (unlike some of them) is careful to restrict anthropological denotations specifically to Christ’s incarnation and subsequent glorification; in pre-existence, Christ is not “the heavenly man” or “heavenly Adam.” Christ is the image of God, specifically, in form, the manifest glory of God.

This interpretation that “the form of God” refers to the manifest glory of God, or God’s glorious image, confirms that Christ’s pre-existence is in view, which is now widely, but not universally, accepted. “The form of God” and the “form of a servant” are clearly two different states, the latter of which is explicitly defined anthropologically (2:7). It is most easily on the condition of pre-existence that the one who existed in the form of God can be said to make an act of will (ἡ ἐγέμα, 2:6) away from equality with God and toward kenosis, i.e., to becoming human, and then to obedience to death. This

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193 Cf., e.g., Justin Martyr, Dial. 126.1 (also 61.1; 114; 127.4); Ptoimandres 12; Ps. Clem. Hom. XVII.7; Rec. I.28. See, especially, Fossum, “Jewish-Christian Christology and Jewish Mysticism.”

194 We do not respect Ezekiel’s heavily qualified language in our speaking of “the heavenly man” and we neglect the context of Paul’s own use of the same phrase (1 Cor 15:48) by employing it of the pre-incarnate Christ. Gedaliahu A. G. Stroumsa, “Form(s) of God: Some Notes on Metatron and Christ,” HTR 76 (1983): 283–284; and Gilles Quispel, “Ezekiel 1:26 in Jewish Mysticism and Gnosis,” VC 34 (1980): 1–13, go astray on this point.

195 It is noteworthy that where the word “glory” does appear in this text (but recall Phil 3:21), the same blurring of identities is seen: “every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father” (v. 11). In the confession of the universal lordship of Christ, God is given glory. While “glory” here does not denote visible radiance, it remains the case that God’s glory is mediated through Christ.

196 Cf., e.g., Bockmuehl, “The Form of God,” 10; Bockmuehl also cites Jürgen Habermann, Præexistenzaussagen im Neuen Testament (Europäische Hochschulschriften; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1990), 115; Otfried Hofius, Der Christushymnus Philipp 2:6-11: Untersuchungen zur Gestalt und Aussage eines urchristlichen Psalms (WUNT 2/17; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1991), 116–118.

197 For a grammatical argument in favour of this, cf. Fee, Pauline Christology, 376–377. Two alternative interpretations are offered by Dunn, either that the first movement (form of God to form of a
interpretation is necessitated if “form of God” refers to the heavenly glory of God. The conclusion is well grounded, therefore, that, rather than setting Christ within the history of Adam, the phrase ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ sets Adam, modeled on the glorious image of God, within the story of Christ.198

It is worth pausing to note that this interpretation of Christ’s existence “in the form of God,” namely speaking to his pre-existence as God’s glorious image, is confirmed by 1 Cor 8:6 and Col 1:15. In the former text, Christ is identified as the medium of God’s creative and salvific agency (δι’ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι’ αὐτοῦ) in a context where Christ displaces any ultimate significance of idols; the idea of the medium servant) corresponds to the transition from Adam’s representative/mythic significance (adam=humankind) to Adam the patriarch (adam=the progenitor of Seth), or that it corresponds to the first of the two phases of Adam’s dying, so that the first movement (form of God to form of a servant) parallels Adam’s banishment from the garden and its tree of life (Gen 3:22-24; cf. 2:17) and the second (form of a servant to obedience to death) Adam’s physical corruption and death (Gen 5:5). It is doubtful, however, that such subtleties of the Genesis text are alluded to in so obscure a fashion. Cf. James D. G. Dunn, “Christ, Adam, and Preexistence,” in Where Christology Began (ed. Ralph P. Martin and Brian J. Dodd; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster, 1998), 78; idem, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 281–8; and idem, Christology, 114–21. For earlier interpretations not involving pre-existence, cf. George Howard, “Phil 2:6-11 and the Human Christ,” CBQ 40 (1978): 2; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “Christological Anthropology in Phil 2:6-11,” RB 83 (1976): 25–50; Charles H. Talbert, “The Problem of Pre-existence in Philippians 2:6-11,” JBL 86 (1967): 141–53.

198 Despite the ready acceptance of pre-existence and the connection between “form of God” and “glory of God” by scholars such as Gorman, Fowl, and Bockmuehl, it is not clear that the insight has been fully exploited in the explanation of Christ’s “self-emptying.” Gorman can be taken as representative: Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 9–39; ibid., “Paul’s Master Story.” He argues that inherent in Christ’s kenotic activity is not merely a concessive (“although being in the form of God . . .”) but a causal movement (“because he was...”). This causal sense is theologically appealing, and might make a good piece of sachexegese or sensus plenoir, but it transgresses the semantics of “form of God,” which primarily highlights Christ as the revelation of God’s visible, even somatic, brilliance and glory. Kenosis, then, being concessive, communicates the divestiture of the glorious splendour of Christ for a “form of a servant.” Other aspects of Gorman’s argument start to break down, as when he states that kenosis (2:7) “should not be read as a reference to the divestiture of something (whether divinity itself or some divine attribute), or even as self-limitation regarding the use of divine attributes, but ‘figuratively,’ as a robust metaphor for total self-abandonment and self-giving, further explained by the attendant participial phrases ‘taking on the form of a slave’ and ‘being born [found] in human likeness’”; Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 21. However, if “form of God” links Christ to the “glory” of God, there must be something more thanfigurative in his taking on the form of a servant, for “glory” in this iconic tradition is primarily visible presence. Likewise the reverse transformation described in Phil 3:21 from the “body of humiliation” into the “body of [Christ’s] glory” cannot be metaphorical.
is expanded to include God’s dealings with the Israelites, which Paul understands to have been conducted through Christ (1 Cor 10:4, 9; cf. v. 26; 15:20-28). There is clear conceptual overlap between the portrayal of Christ as the true mediator of creation and salvation-history, we might say, as “the genuine mediator between the divine and human worlds,” and that of the image of God, even if the latter term does not appear until similar associations bring it out in 2 Cor 4:4. The coherence of these categories is most obvious in Col 1:15.

This hymnic text describes Christ as “the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation,” which leads immediately to the elaboration (ὅτι): “for in him all

199 While 8:6 is often understood within the context of wisdom motifs, it is highly doubtful that wisdom is a controlling or exclusive category, i.e., one in which Paul simply sees Christ displacing wisdom. A recent and very literal example of this is provided by Cox, who argues that 1 Cor 8:6 was originally a Corinthian slogan about God and his Sophia, which Paul corrected by replacing the latter term with Christ; cf. Cox, *By the Same Word*, 148–158.

200 McDonough, *Christ as Creator*, 158–159. McDonough develops the argument by emphasizing that in the context Christ displaces idolatrous cults; Christ, it is implied, is the true image.

201 Fee notes the close connection between 1 Cor 8:6 and Col 1:15-20, noting that the two halves of the latter text look like an elaboration of the two διά phrases of 8:6: Fee, *Pauline Christology*, 299.

things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or powers—all things have been created through him and for him” (Col 1:15-16). While traditions associated with wisdom speculation appear to be reflected, we should understand the term “image of God” here to include a reference to the creation of humankind in Gen 1:26-27, alluded to also in Col 3:10, just as it does elsewhere in the Pauline corpus. Even here Fee takes this allusion to mean that Christ “replaces Adam (Gen 1:26-27) as the true image bearer of God,” by which he means, “it is through the Son, who alone by way of his incarnation perfectly bears the Father’s image, that the unseen God is now known (cf. 2 Cor 4:4-6). Thus the eternal Son, whom the Father sent into the world (Gal 4:4), has restored the ‘image’ of God that the first Adam bore but that was defaced by the fall.”

203 Attempts to deny the pre-existence of Christ in either of these texts (1 Cor 8:6 and the present) are underwhelming. In the present text, Dunn asserts that the effect is not to assert the “actual (pre)existence” of Christ “prior to or in creation itself, but to affirm” that Christ, as the Torah for Ben Sira (24:23), “[is] to be understood as the climactic manifestation[s] of the preexistent divine wisdom, by which the world was created”; Dunn, Colossians, 89. The problem with this: in contrast to the text in Ben Sira, the hymn is about Christ, not wisdom, and while there are conceptual parallels (i.e., what is ascribed to Christ is elsewhere in Hellenistic traditions ascribed to wisdom), this hardly means that Christ is a double for wisdom.

204 Cf., e.g., Wis 7:25-26 and Philo, Conf. 146-167, discussed by Cox in relationship to Col 1:15; By the Same Word, 172–175. Unfortunately, Cox wants to impose a choice between Hellenistic wisdom traditions and Gen 1:26-27. Also, cf., C. F. Burney, “Christ as the APXH of Creation,” JTS 27 (1925): 160–77. For Burney, the poem applies to Christ what could be said of wisdom by combining Gen 1:1 and Prov 8:22, though he did not mention Gen 1:26-27. McDonough is suspicious of any significant impact from wisdom tradition on Col 1:15-20, and offers instead an interpretation based on a Messianic reading of Gen 1; cf. McDonough, Christ as Creator, 172–191. The attempt to force a choice between “Hellenistic” and “biblical” influences is wrong-headed in this case, as it often is; instead, our efforts should be directed at spelling out how each have contributed to a new synthesis.

205 Fee, Pauline Christology, 299, 301. Does Col 3:10 imply that the image of God has been defaced or lost by a fall and restored in Christ? It is often thought so, as Fee sums up the text, “in the new creation the Son restores the ‘image of God’ in humankind that was lost in the first creation through human sin.” Ibid., 303–304, 522 (here, 304). The full text reads: “Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have stripped off the old self (τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον) with its practices and have clothed yourselves with the new self (τὸν νέον), which is being renewed (ἀνακαινοῦμεν) in knowledge (ἐπὶ γνώσεως) according to the image of its creator (κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσματος αὐτῶν). In that renewal (Gk: ὑπαίτιον) there is no longer Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all and in
the hymn’s meditation on Christ’s role in the creation and maintenance of the cosmos, such a strictly anthropological and redemptive historical sense to the term “image of God” never seemed more unlikely. The text’s relationship to wisdom speculation has an important exegetical impact here, confirming that εἰκών τοῦ θεοῦ relates to the heavenly pre-existence of Christ. A reference to Gen 1:26-27 is not excluded by this background, if that text is understood to refer to the heavenly prototype of Adam.206

Even having identified Christ as the glorious pre-existent image of God, weighing the anthropological implications of Phil 2:5-11 is no light task, and taken on its own would require a closer analysis of questions I have not addressed, either directly or in sufficient detail. What sort of relationship, for example, is envisaged between Jesus and God in the language of “form” and “equality” in 2:6, and what is the role of the difficult term harpagmos? How does the language of “form,” “likeness,” and “fashion” in v. 7 relate Jesus’ to humanity? And how precisely is the exaltation of Jesus as Lord in 2:9-11 all!” (3:9-11). There are several points to note about the renewal here: The old self is not renewed, but replaced. It is the new self which is being (continually) renewed. That renewal is according to the image of its creator. Whatever the identity of the creator (God or Christ), the image must be Christ (cf. 1:15). Because the renewal applies not to the image of God in the strictly anthropological sense but in the Christological sense, there is no compulsion to read this in terms of the restoration of a lost or disfigured image. Helpful remarks are made by Moule, Epistles, 119–121. Besides evoking the concept (absent in Paul) of a lost original glory in humanity, Sumney accurately sums up the force of the text in Colossians: “This echo [of Gen 1:26] need not suggest that the primary thought of Colossians is that the new self . . . is humanity restored to the nature intended in creation . . . . Rather, Colossians refers to a new eschatological reality that goes beyond restoration of the original glory of humanity. The reality of which Colossians speaks includes participation in the resurrection of Christ and the new kind of life initiated with the acts of God in Christ”; Sumney, Colossians, 203.

206 Cf. Wright: “From all eternity Jesus had, in his very nature, been the ‘image of God’, reflecting perfectly the character and life of the Father. It was thus appropriate for him to be the ‘image of God’ as man”; Wright, Colossians, 70. And McDonough: “While a simple correspondence between Adam and Christ fails to explain the agent-of-creation motif, the idea that Christ is the archetypal glory/image of God in whose likeness Adam was created opens up a fresh biblical-theological avenue. According to the author of our poem, Adam’s dominion was from the beginning derivative. Adam himself was a copy of Christ, the genuine image of God, and thus his dominion was a copy of the absolute dominion exercised by God’s anointed one”; McDonough, Christ as Creator, 183. Cf., too, Gregory E. Sterling, “The Image of God”: Becoming Like God in Philo, Paul, and Early Christianity,” in Portraits of Jesus (ed. Susan E Myers; WUNT 2/321; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 157–73.
related to (a) his pre-human existence and (b) his human identity? Without needing to sort through all the exegetical options, we can still make at least three significant observations.

First, Phil 2:5-11 can be situated within the context of archetypal images of self-deification. Outside of the Adam narrative itself, scholars have little explored this context. But it shares enough in the constellation of motifs that we spelled out previously with regard to the similes directed against the kings of Babylon and Tyre and to the Hodayot’s “Self-Glorification Psalm” to merit such a study. No other figure to whom the type applies is so closely enfolded into the identity of God as the phrase “in the form of God” makes of Christ, but there is sufficient distinction between “God” and “Christ” in Paul’s thought, including elements of subordination (1 Cor 11:3; 15:24-28), to

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208 There has been some exploration along these lines; cf. the summary in Martin, *Carmen Christi*, 157–164. In contrast to the present approach which considers narrative types, Martin (159) unnecessarily juxtaposes the Adam-Christ parallel as an alternative background. He notes also (158) the plausibility of the contrast (in the case he considers, between Christ and Lucifer/Satan) if ἄρπαγμος has the sense of res rapienda (that is, something yet to be seized), but I do not regard this as necessary. Even if ἄρπαγμος has the sense of res rapta (a thing seized), “equality with God” retains the place of something which may be chosen (in clinging to) or deserted (in letting go, emptying), and this supplies the necessary minimum for a comparison with narratives of self-deification. The tertium comparationis remains “the desire to rival God” (158), only the starting point is different.

209 Namely, the presence of a figure whose identity or status vis-à-vis divinity is explicitly negotiated with accompanying motifs of “grasping” for one’s advantage, “equality with God,” succumbing to death, and universal sovereignty. See the discussion in Chapter 2 under the heading of “Anthropology of Glory and the Self-Glorification Hymn.” A similar constellation of motifs is used to characterize the end-time enemy of God; cf. Dan 11:36; 2 Thess 2:4; Rev 13:4-8.
make the comparison viable. As with all other instances of the type, there is the shared issue of a fraught status, one which may, narratively, seek its own sort of deification or accept the limitations given to it. The key point in the comparison to such narratives is that just as in the Self-Glorification Psalm the archetype is subverted by depicting super-exaltation as following not from seeking one’s own advantage but in self-giving modeled in part on the Isaianic Servant of the Lord. In the Christ-narrative, the choice not to grasp equality with God and instead empty himself, has the culturally counter-intuitive and counter-type outcome of universal lordship. The close association between Christ and the identity of God (i.e., God’s very form) makes the entire drama speak to the character of God, who through Christ enjoys not only majesty and glory but also gives these up for the sake of God’s creatures. As Richard Bauckham notes, this too may be rooted in verbal links established by Isaiah between the servant and God who are both “exalted” and “lifted up” (יהושע, Isa 52:13; 6:1; 57:15).

Second to be noted is the homology that emerges between the two levels of Christ’s existence, i.e., “form of God” and “form of a servant” (i.e., human form), and

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213 The combination of verbs being rare; cf. Bauckham, God Crucified, 49–51.
Paul’s explicit εἰκόν language in 1 Cor 15:49, i.e., “the image of the man of heaven” and “the image of the man of dust.” Behind each duality stands the concept of the creation of humankind after the image of God—an earthly expression of a heavenly prototype. Since the form of God is a way of speaking of Christ as that heavenly image of God, it can be inferred that the creation of humankind according to the same image makes the downward metamorphosis of Christ a coherent prospect. The corollary to this is the possibility of the elevation of humankind on that same scale of divinity in consequence of the career of Christ.

Third, ample lexical agreements and conceptual overlap in Phil 3:20-21 confirm this possibility:

While it is true that the common vocabulary in these passages works differently, it simply does not follow, as Stephen Fowl argues, “that 3:21 is not picking up the language of 2:6-
8 in any significant way.”214 There are several reasons to think otherwise. In the first instance, Phil 2:6-11 was introduced as part of an exhortation to have the same mind, i.e., one focused not on the advantage of self but that of others, which was also in Christ (2:1-5),215 so that in addressing Christ’s reversal of status from humiliation to exaltation, Phil 2:6-11 invites the question how these events are related to the advantage of believers, even whether they might also share in his state of exaltation by virtue of his sharing in their state of lowliness. Second, the implication is in fact borne out. In the third chapter Paul appears to pattern his own biography on that of Christ as narrated in 2:6-11, just as he had encouraged the Philippians to pattern their own mindset, only adding the explicit goal that he would be found “in Christ,” knowing “the power of his resurrection,” and would press “toward the prize of the heavenly call (τῆς ἁνω κλήσεως)” by συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ (“becoming like him in his death”) (Phil 3:8-14). The coincidence in language cannot be accidental or incidental, therefore. As Morna Hooker observes, “It is almost as though Paul wrote: Christ humbled himself, becoming man, in order that by his humiliation we might become glorious in him.”216

We must note the extraordinary implications deriving from this association of Phil 2:5-11 and 3:20-21. The transformation of the body of humiliation217 so that it conforms

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216 Hooker, *From Adam to Christ*, 21; cf., also, pp. 46-47, 92-93, and 176-177.
217 Doble argues that this ταπεινόσεξος is a state of mind adopted by those who pattern their lives after Christ who humbled himself (cf. 2:8). The “body of glory” is then received in consequence of this
τὸ σῶμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ (3:21), brings the final state of the believer into close association with that divine existence which Christ had in pre-existence, expressed as the μορφῇ θεοῦ (2:6). Clearly, this “body of glory” to which believers are conformed is that of the resurrected, rather than pre-incarnate, Christ. Nevertheless, Jesus’ “body of glory” must be closely related to “the form of God” which he possessed in pre-existence and which identified him as the glory of God. While there can be no question of a fusion of identity between the believer and Christ (cf. Phil 2:9-11), it is not going too far to say with Cousar that the body of the believer “undergoes a transformation from being one of humiliation to being the body of the divine glory.”  

While this remains the eschatological hope of the Philippians, they are already members of the πολίτευμα (“commonwealth”) of heaven, which is to provide the governing norms of their behaviour (cf. 1:27; 3:18-21). This coheres with the emphasis of 2 Cor 3-4, where transformation into the image involves a present inward renewal, followed by the putting on of heavenly glory.

In light of these observations, the Christ-myth can be seen to tie weighty soteriological implications to traditions of anthropogony. I have argued that the

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219 On πολίτευμα, cf. Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 97–101. On this text, Lincoln also remarks: “Paul’s conception corresponds to the apocalyptic motif we have seen in which the benefits of salvation awaited at the end are already present in heaven (cf. 4 Ezr 7:14, 83; 13:18; 2 Bar. 21:12; 48:49; 52:7)” (101). Cf. also John 14:2; 2 Cor 5:1; Gal 4:26; Heb 12:22.
conceptuality that underlies the notion of Christ’s “incarnation” (a downward metamorphosis) and the believer’s subsequent conformation to Christ’s exalted form is that of creation in the image of God, i.e., a sort of scale of divinity where Christ occupies a singular high point and humankind a lower earthly double. The metaphor of the scale answers to that prospect in Gen 1-3 that creation in the image of God seems to invite the possibility of progressing further in one’s likeness to God. Instead of that prospect, however, humankind has become enslaved to the powers of creation rather than exercise order-bringing dominion over creation. In Christ, this anthropological telos is realized, and creation too, reaches its fulfillment, as all creatures bow the knee to Christ (Phil 2:10-11) who, after the manner of Ps 8:7 (E: 6), subjects all things to himself (Phil 3:21). The evocation of myths of self-deification, only to transform them by disclosing the nature of divine disclosure through the nexus of the servant motif, ties anthropological hope into the counterpoint of the perennial creaturely problem of snatching for one’s own divinity; the Christ-myth reveals that it is in God’s own self-giving that humankind participates in that likeness to God that was put within the grasp of Adam and Eve.


221 I regard it likely that this enslavement is implied in Christ’s taking the μορφὴν δούλου of 2:7; generally it suits the cosmological tenor of the passage and specifically the anthropological definition of the term itself in 2:7-8 (cf. Rom 8:3). The mention of Christ’s exaltation over the powers (implicitly) in 2:9-11 describes the end result and goal of this subjection on the part of Christ, and Phil 3:21, in citing Ps 8 (cf. n. 222), further situates these events in terms of the human drama with creation (recall the opening lines of that psalm). This, of course, resonates with the parallel text in 1 Cor 15:20-28, as well as Gal 4:3. Cf., now, Gupta, “Double Agency.” Gupta correctly describes Christ as a double-agent; that is, the whole text concerns Christ’s obedience to God, so that his becoming a servant of the powers must also be seen in that context. I do not, however, think it helpful to substitute reference to demonic powers with Sin and Death.

222 The words of Ps 8:6 LXX, πάντα ὑπέταξας ὑποκάτω τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ, are most likely reflected in Phil 3:21, ὑποτάξατε αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, as the parallel citation in 1 Cor 15:27 confirms. So, too, Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet, 103.
Adam, Christ, and the Cosmos: 1 Corinthians 15:20-28

With the present text our study takes us from a concern with the image of God per se to a strict focus on Adam’s role in the cosmos. Whereas 1 Cor 15:45-49—which provided the framework of 2 Cor 3:18-4:6; Phil 2:6-11; and 3:20-21—drew the Adam/Christ correlation into a relationship of typological surfeit, 15:21-22 will draw an “analogy in contrast.” The difference corresponds to the appearance of εἰκόν terminology in 1 Cor 15:45-49, which spoke of creation strictly from a material aspect, and its absence in 15:20-28, which looks at material conditions under the aspect of a simultaneously moral, vocational, and/or spiritual component. And yet εἰκόν conceptuality is not absent: it can be detected in the same relationship that exists between “Let us make humankind in our image” and “let them have dominion . . .” (Gen 1:26). The motif of rule finds its rationale or justification in creation in the image, but it does not define it per se. The semantic overlap of “image” and filial relationships allows for the consideration of the motif of rule under the more obviously personal and morally implicated category of sonship. These related discourses will allow us to see death, moreover, not primarily as some antecedent apocalyptic power, but rather the flourishing of a weed, the seeds of which were inherent in the (corruptible) creation itself and watered by the sin of Adam. Put plainly, the moral/vocational component of Adam’s creation in the image of God lies at the root of the usurpation of the cosmos by death, and it likewise enables the reclamation of the cosmos through death’s nemesis, the resurrected Christ. All these things are


224 The language used by Wright, but certainly not exclusive to him, of “fully bear[ing] the divine image” to express the concept of carrying out humankind’s commission to rule confuses this relationship and does not respect the semantic contexts of Paul’s use of the image concept; Resurrection, 334.
contained in 1 Cor 15:20-28 and borne out by the scriptural contexts reflected in Paul’s argument.

Paul’s concern throughout the text is with the distortion that death works on the cosmos. In two different but connected ways, Paul establishes the certainty of resurrection against its deniers in Corinth (v. 12). First, in vv. 20-24, Paul asserts the essential connection between the resurrection of Christ (which they ostensibly affirm: v. 11) and that of dead Christians (the object of their denial: vv. 12-19). Second, in vv. 25-28, he casts death in the role of a cosmic enemy-usurper (which may have been news to the Corinthians). 225

The rootedness of the whole argument in traditions of anthropogony has been the source of some discussion. Negatively, while the Adam/Christ comparison inevitably draws attention to vv. 21-22, one sometimes fails to find any substantial discussion of vv. 23-28 in relation to Adamic/anthropological themes. 226 More helpfully, N. T. Wright emphasizes in relation to the entire pericope that “the human task and the messianic task . . . dovetail together,” 227 and Martin Meiser writes concerning v. 27, “Paulus . . . eine generalisierende Variante des Motives vom Verlust der Herrschaft Adams über die Natur kannte—dies würde erst durch Christus rückgängig gemacht.” 228 Finally, those stressing

225 As de Boer remarks: The Defeat of Death, 121.
226 Cf. the comments Scroggs makes in justification of this: The Last Adam, 105–106. Similarly, Gordon Fee considers the Adam/Christ discussion of vv. 21-22 separately from vv. 23-28 because the former “is not a messianic theme”; Pauline Christology, 108 n. 66.
227 Wright, Resurrection, 336, 334. Emphasis original. C. K. Barrett, likewise commented in relation to v. 25, “Messiah and Man can thus be used to interpret each other”: First Corinthians, 359; cf., too, his From First Adam to Last, 101–102. Aslo, Dunn, Christology, 109; Black, “Second Adam,” 173.
the “apocalyptic” nature of the text tend to highlight an anthropology of captivity and its soteriological consequences; de Boer, for example, writes, “The cosmological understanding of death underscores the point that salvation is and always will be God’s gift... a gift bestowed in His cosmological-apocalyptic triumph over death through the Lordship of the crucified and resurrected Christ.”\(^\text{229}\) However, the inability of humanity outside of Christ to affect its own rescue, true as it is, must not be allowed to overshadow other anthropological presuppositions of the text—which are also rooted in traditions of creation—namely, the original anthropological task of exercising dominion over creation, the momentous cosmic import of the vocation to rule, and the assumption of these functions within the role of the Messiah.\(^\text{230}\)

The Adam/Christ correlation of vv. 21-22, which doubtless assumes the narrative of Gen 1-3 in the background, is Paul’s first use of the topos, and it invites reflection on the broader anthropological ramifications of the entire unit of which it is a part, particularly up to v. 28.\(^\text{231}\) Of the three remaining texts that seem to be at play in these verses—Daniel chs. 2 and 7; Ps 110:1 (LXX 109:1); and Ps 8:7 (LXX 8:6)—not one of


\(^{230}\) In a largely neglected article, of 1972, Rudolphe Morissette drew out many similar points basing his argument predominately on the appearance of Ps 8:7 (E: 6) in v. 27, which he saw as further defining Christ’s role as the new man of v. 21; cf. Rodolphe Morissette, “La citation du Psaume [8:7b] dans 1 Corinthiens,” *ScEs* 24 (1972): 313–42.

\(^{231}\) Νυν ἰδε of verse 20 clearly marks a transition, which both concludes the previous unit, vv. 12-19, and sets up the claim (Christ’s resurrection as firstfruits) for which vv. 21-22 are the logical explanation (assuring the believers’ resurrection from Christ’s), vv. 23-28 the temporal elaboration (asserting an order of events over a period of time), and vv. 29-34 the practical ramifications. The change in the nature of the argument at v. 29 shifts the argument from the type of considerations we are exploring. The text permits various analyses of its logic and structure: cf., e.g., Anders Eriksson, “Elaboration of Argument in 1 Cor 15:20-34,” *SEÅ* 64 (1999): 101–14; Scott M. Lewis, *So That God May Be All in All: The Apocalyptic Message of 1 Corinthians 15,12-34* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1998), 23–74; C. E. Hill, “Paul’s Understanding of Christ’s Kingdom in I Corinthians 15:20-28,” *NovT* 30 (1988): 297–320; Morissette, “La citation.”
them is consistently regarded by scholars to be present with scriptural force in Paul’s argument. Most, however, recognize the citation of Ps 8 in v. 27, where Paul leaves a clear signal of his awareness of the words’ textual provenance—namely, the statement ὅταν δὲ εἴη, which immediately follows and marks the words.Psalm 110:1, words of which appear in v. 25, is even less accepted as carrying scriptural force, but a few considerations suggest that, though the words are unmarked, Paul at least would be cognizant of their scriptural pedigree. Finally, Daniel chapters 2 and 7 are often completely ignored, but strong contextual factors also suggest that book’s influence,

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232 De Boer speaks of the two Psalm texts as “scriptural citations” but argues that the Corinthians would not have heard them as such but as part of a “christological creed or hymn”: The Defeat of Death, 116–118. He cites, especially, Eph 1:20-23 in support of this, and a connection between these scripture texts and baptism (1 Cor 15:29; Col 2:6-3:4; 1 Pet 3:21b-22), but the evidence hardly necessitates this conclusion.


234 Psalm 110 is among the most frequently cited texts in early Christian tradition, making it likely that both Paul and his hearers would recognize in these words the weight of Scripture; so Heil, Rhetorical Role, 206: "Because this adapted quotation would be so readily recognizable as scriptural to Paul’s audience, he does not need to formally introduce it as a scriptural quotation any more explicitly than he has.” The subject of the verb ἔη, which on grammatical grounds appears to be Christ, but in the Psalm is God, looks in the hindsight of vv. 27-28 to be resolved in favour of God, further suggesting that the words appear with the force of Scripture; cf. Uta Heil, “Theo-logische Interpretation von 1Kor 15,23-28,” ZNW 84 (1993): 27–35; Heil, Rhetorical Role, 207 n. 8; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 573; grammatical grounds, however, are decisive for Fee, First Corinthians, 575–576; for extended argument, cf. Jan Lambrecht, “Paul’s Christological Use of Scripture in 1 Cor. 15.20–28,” NTS 82 (1982): 502–27. On Psalm 110, cf. David M. Hay, Glory at the Right Hand: Psalm 110 in Early Christianity (SBLMS 18; Nashville: Abingdon, 1973). Cf. n. 248.

235 Dan 2:44 is cited in the loci citati vel allegati of Nestle-Aland next to v. 24. Of course, Dan 7:13 is linked to Ps 110:1 in Mark 14:62 par. Matthew Black highlights the connection drawn between Ps 110:1 and Dan 7:26-27 in three related texts, the present one (15:24-27), Eph 1:20-21; and 1 Pet 3:22. Each also makes a connection between Christ’s ascension or session at God’s right hand and the defeat of angelic powers: “Pasai Exousiai Autē Hypotagéontai,” in Paul and Paulinism (London: SPCK, 1982), 74–82. Wright calls attention to the importance of these Danielic traditions: Resurrection, 333–338.
even if it is in no way cited or alluded to as a source. 236 These texts (including Gen 1-3) share two related themes: a concern with God’s royal representative and with the exercise of dominion within the context of potentially (or actually) disruptive forces. That can hardly be accidental given the content of 1 Cor 15:20-28. The most obviously “anthropogenic” of these texts, Gen 1-3 and the eighth Psalm, are the most clearly marked scriptural inter-texts in vv. 20-28, and they bracket the entire discussion.

The anthropological origins of mortality and resurrection are the explicit focus of the Adam/Christ contrast, and the identity of each man discloses their pivotal position at the beginning of two epochs, that of the original creation and that of its reclamation and fulfillment: “For since death came through a human being, the resurrection of the dead has also come through a human being; for as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ” (vv. 21-22). The Adam/Christ correlation emerges to support (ἐπειδή γάρ, v. 21) the claim that Christ has been raised as first fruits (ἀπαρχή)237 of those who sleep (τῶν κεκοιμημένων, v. 20). The corporate significance of these two epochal figures means that they affect the fates of all (πάντες) who are in (ἐν) them (vv. 21-22). In the case of Adam, it is easy to see how this works: as the one from whom all humanity descends, his bodily nature—in this case, corruptibility—becomes a relic handed on from generation to generation (ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνῄσκοντες, v. 22).238 It is less obvious in the context

236 The distinctiveness and prominence of the terms “father” and “son” in vv. 24 and 28 doubtless also reflect royal traditions such as 2 Sam 7:14 and Ps 2:7.
238 As throughout 1 Corinthians, Adam’s bodiliness is in view wherever he is detected (cf. 1 Cor 6:16; 11:7; 15:45-49).
how ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ can have the same corporate significance;239 and the concept breaks down in the image of the first-fruits (vv. 20, 24). Paul is more concerned to emphasize Christ as the representative human who secures the victory over death (ὅτ᾽ ἀνθρώπου ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν, 21) and finally vanquishes the enemy powers which Adam’s disobedience unleashed on creation (vv. 24-28).240 In the context, the death and resurrection of Christ appears as the answer to human “sins” (vv. 3, 17), so the inference is not far that human enslavement to death which is here traced to the first man (“through man, death”) was initiated by the first sin,241 although Paul does not make a point of highlighting the circumstances attending the event.242

239 This has been a perennial problem of scholarship; cf. the discussion in Dunn, Theology, 390–413. Probably, Paul simply assumes that persons have come to participate in Christ through the spirit as spelled out in 1 Cor 12:12-13; cf. 6:14-20; 10:1-4, 16-17. There may be a hint of this in the use of ζωοποίων (v. 22) if it anticipates the statement in v. 45 that Christ became πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν; cf., e.g., Hill, “Christ’s Kingdom,” 306, emphasizing the connection to vv. 45 and 49. In order to have an incorporative significance, however, this would require the additional concept of the present indwelling of spirit as “pledge” which is not explicit here or in vv. 45-49. Both this and that text are focused on the making alive that occurs in the resurrection.

240 A prominent minority reads the text as supporting Paul’s belief in the salvation of all humanity; cf. de Boer, The Defeat of Death, 111–113. This is a leap beyond Paul’s immediate focus which remains exclusively on believers (cf. v. 18: ἀρα καὶ οἱ κοιμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ ἀπόλοντε, those who are Christ’s (οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, v. 23). While v. 28, especially (God will be “all in all”), might appear to affirm the equation of “all” who die in Adam and the “all” made alive in Christ, it is just as likely that the final state described is a product in part of the annihilation of all inimical powers, including human (cf. 1 Cor 1:18-29). The verb καταργέω in vv. 24 and 26 is appropriately rendered “destroy,” “annihilate” (cf. BDAG s.v. 3; 1 Cor 6:13; 13:8, 11; Gal 5:11) and may reflect the context of Ps 110 (which is alluded to in v. 25), which speaks of more than the mere pacification of the kings’ enemies (cf. vv. 5-6; see too Ps. Sol. 17:24); also supporting this argument is the use of the verb in parallel to ἀναστάσιον in the parallel context of 2 Thess 2:8 (cf. also 2 Thess 1:9 and the parallel statement in Rom 16:20). The transition to the more (potentially) ireric verb ἀναστάσιον in vv. 27-28 likewise probably reflects in part the more universal statement of human rule in Ps 8 (i.e., enemies are not only in view). If there is universalism in Paul, it is predicated on the making alive that occurs in the resurrection.

241 Cf. Fitzmyer, First Corinthiansians, 569–570. Of course, the connection between Adam (and Eve) and mortality was already well established; cf. Sir 25:24; 1QH XX 29-30; Sib. Or. 1:38-55; 2 Bar. 48:42-43; 54:15; 56:5-7.

242 As argued above, not only does v. 56 suggest that Paul assumes this fuller narrative but it also provides the key to grasping how Paul’s statements about death in the present text cohere with what is said in vv. 45-49. Here is a criticism to be made of an overall excellent discussion of the text: Jeromey Q. Martini, “An Examination of Paul’s Apocalyptic Narrative in First Corinthians 15:20-28,” CTR 8 (2011):
Death’s status is owing to the fault of Adam. The personification of death as one of a number of cosmic ruler-enemies that occurs a little further on (v. 26; cf., too, 15:54-55) reflects two interrelated features of Paul’s thought. The first is that death is an elemental phenomenon, the fulfillment of a negative potentiality of the created-corruptible world (15:45-50), and the second is that behind the elemental structures of the world stand principalities and powers, personal agents who wreak havoc in the absence of a properly functioning humanity (15:24-26; cf. Gal 4:3, 9). The personification of death, therefore, can be comprehended as a metonymy for Satan (cf. Heb 2:14), which answers to the particular rhetorical needs of Paul’s argument, namely, to present death as enemy to which the resurrection of Christ is the answer.

61 and n. 20. Martini offers no explanation for how a man “enables” death if this narrative is not assumed, and (with many others) he sees only dissonance in the statement of v. 56.

243 On the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου, not explicitly mentioned here, as referring primarily to the four (or five) elements but often in contextual association with their personification, cf. Eduard Schweizer, “Slaves of the Elements and Worshipers of Angels: Gal 4:3, 9 and Col 2:8, 18, 20,” JBL 107 (1988): 455–68; though one need not accept every aspect of his reconstructions of the situations in Galatia and Colossae. The following are texts which both name the elements (or use the word stoicheia) and indicate some kind of personification, deification, or worship thereof: Wis 7:17-19; 13:1-3; Philo, Contempl. 3–5; Dec. 53; Josephus, B. J. 6.47; Jub. 2:2; T. Ab. 13:11; Eph 2:2. While the elements might be personified, admittedly the word itself in Paul still retains a primary reference to the four (or five) elements—or the basic “stuff” of the cosmos; the linguistic development by which the word stoicheia would in itself indicate “spirits” (T. Sol. 18:1-2; cf. 2 En. 12:1; 14:3; 15:1; 16:7) had not occurred yet (thus, NRSV’s “elemental spirits” is unwarranted), though it was but a short jump; cf. Dunn, Colossians, 149–151. Additional scholarship defending this interpretation includes Dietrich Rusam, “Neue Belege Zu Den Stoicheia Tou Kosmou (Gal 4,3.9, Kol 2,8.20),” ZNW 83 (1992): 119–25; Edward Young Hincks, “The Meaning of the Phrase Ta Stoicheia Tou Kosmou in Gal. iv. 3 and Col. ii. 8,” JBL 15 (1896): 183–92; contrast, in different ways, Adams, Constructing the World, 228–230; Frank J. Matera, Galatians (SP; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1992); Richard N. Longenecker, Galatians (WBC 41; Dallas: Word, 1990); Linda L. Belleville, “‘Under Law’: Structural Analysis and the Pauline Concept of Law in Galatians 3:21-4:11,” JSNT 26 (1986): 64–69. Cf., also, n. 249.

244 If I am correct, then both Bultmann’s emphasis on Paul’s demythologizing of death and de Boer’s argument that Paul mythologizes death (as something apparently distinct from Satan or the devil) are misguided; cf. Bultmann, Theology, 257–259; de Boer, The Defeat of Death, 179, 183–184. Romans 16:20 confirms the interpretation offered here: “The God of peace will shortly crush Satan (συντρίψει τὸν σατανᾶ) under your feet.” The text shares an interest in the future destruction of some superhuman power as well as the image of being placed under foot to describe that destruction. Rom 16:20 also seems reminiscent of Gen 3:21; it is hard to assess the difference in language as τηρέω (Gen 3:21) would be ill-
In Paul’s elaboration of the present cosmic rule of Christ (vv. 24-28), he does not leave behind the Adamic topoi. Instead he defines the role of Christ, the Messiah, in cosmological terms which are taken over from the active role with which humanity is assigned in the task of bringing order to the cosmos in several of those very texts to which Paul cites or alludes (especially Gen 1-3 and Ps 8). As Messiah, Jesus does not simply represent Israel and his kingdom is not merely national; instead, he represents humanity and his kingdom is cosmic/universal. However, his reign is temporally delimited. The reign of Christ is situated within the order (τάγμα) established in the first-fruits metaphor. His reign is active between his own resurrection and the harvest of those who are his (vv. 23-28). It is primarily in his resurrection existence that Christ brings to fruition the Adamic commission.

Verses 24-28 can be laid out chiastically, and this structuring sheds some light on the scriptural content of Paul’s statements. Grammatical cues (here set in brackets), highlighted by Charles E. Hill, serve to anchor this chiasm. The text is an expansion on the end, εἴτα τὸ τέλος; suited to the construction with God as subject. Pointing in favour of such an allusion are 1 Cor 15:55-56; 2 Cor 11:3 (cf. 2:11; 4:4; 12:7) and Rom 7:7-12 which deal with sin and death while echoing an Edenic setting, including the presence of a non-human adversary in that story. In other texts, death stands parallel to terms which are not hypostatized (Rom 8:38) or are metonyms for more recognizable personal agents (Rom 5:17, 21). Cf., too, Stephen Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The “Lutheran” Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 394 (concerning s/Sin in particular).


In 1972, Morissette detected a much simpler, but still chiastic structure: A. Thesis (v. 24) B. Scriptural development
Chiasmic structure and context agree: Paul has his sights set on the problem of death, which appears in an unusual asyndetic clause, at the central position (D). At the frame (A, A’) Paul defines the end in terms of the relationship of the agencies of Christ and God in respect to the creation and each other. Moving toward the centre (B/B’, C/C’, D) the present reign of Christ is defined in terms of the destruction (καταργέω) of hostile powers (B, C, D) and then more broadly of the subjection (ὑποτάσσω) of all things to him (C’, B’). The structurally central point, the defeat of death (D), coincides temporally with (vv. 25-27) A. Reprise (v. 28); he found the same structure in vv. 20-23, with vv. 21-22 constituting the scriptural development; cf. Morissette, “La citation,” 315–317.

247 Τέλος has been taken in three ways: 1) nominally, “the end” (with ἔσται implied); 2) adv. acc., “the end, finally”; 3) nominally, of the last in a series, “rest, remainder” (i.e., a third τέλος); cf. BDAG s.v. 2a, b, and 4. The first option (cf., too, 1Cor 1:8; Matt 24:14) is suggested by the structure of the text, anticipating the goal of creation further elaborated in v. 28. Cf. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 571; Thiselton, First Corinthians, 1230–1231; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 270–271. Εἰτε (v. 24) does not imply an interval between the resurrection of the believers (v. 23) and the end, but is rather immediately defined by the two ὅταν clauses which follow (the second of which must actually precede the first in time).

248 The matter of the agencies of Christ and God, particularly who is acting as subject of the verbs καταργήσῃ (v. 24), θῇ (v. 25), and υποτάσσεται (v. 27) is ambiguous, although v. 28b (ἀντίς οὗ τίτι υποτάγησαι τῷ υποτάζειν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα) indicates that at some point along the way (i.e., in vv. 24-27), Paul conceived of God as subject. Even so, there can be no question of the passivity of Christ: he is subject of the verbs βασιλεύειν (v. 25) and παραδίδω (v. 24) and he clearly performs a mediatory role. The ambiguity arises primarily where Paul invokes scripture (vv. 25 and 27) and in the hindsight of the theocentrism of v. 28. Paul wants to stress that the rule of Christ, in contrast to that of death and the powers, accords fully with the will and plan of God (hence, the so-called δεῖ of divine necessity in v. 25). Cf. n. 234.

249 Paul uses the language of ἀρχαὶ, ἐξουσίαι, and δύναμι (v. 24). The terms refer primarily to superhuman powers, but they have a counterpart in the socio-political structures of the world, as demonstrated by George Caird, Principalities and Powers: A Study in Pauline Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 1–30. In themselves, the terms are neutral, although Paul is generally somewhat ambivalent concerning the status of angelic powers and here strictly deals with enemies (vv. 25-26). Cf. also Rom 8:38-39; Eph 1:20-22; 6:12; Col 1:16; 2:10, 15 (and the additional terms they employ); also belonging here are the στοιχεῖα (Gal 4:3, 9; Col 2:8, 20); cf. n. 243. Carr makes the unusual argument that
the climactic point—when God becomes πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν. The vision of God’s unmediated, comprehensive rule, which is achieved through the reign of Christ, brings to a final conclusion the drama whose cause lay back in vv. 22-23, where the failure of Adam (the ‘son,’ as it were, corresponding to “the Son”) prevented creation from arriving at its intended fullness.250

It is in the outer layers of the argument (A-B, B’-A’) that Danielic influences are most apparent. As noted, Nestle-Aland27 refers to Dan 2:44 at the margin of 1 Cor 15:24; the texts share the notion of a divinely ordained kingdom251 that enacts the destruction of all anti-God governing forces, and in Dan 2:45 implies the agency of God’s intermediary (the “stone”). But it is Dan 7 that supplies the fullest parallels and explicitly describes the transaction between the divine figure and the mediator, to whom is given dominion (“the son of man,” vv. 9-14), in a way that resembles the relationship between Son and Father in the present text (1 Cor 15:24, 28). Also highly suggestive are vv. 26-27, which describe the judgement on the eleventh/little horn of the fourth beast:

26 The court will be seated, and his dominion (ἡ βασιλεία; LXX τὴν ἐξουσίαν; θ’τὴν ἄρχην) will be taken away, for destruction and perdition until the end (ἀρχήν τελευταίαν). 27 Kingdom and dominion and the greatness [LXX adds καὶ τὴν ἄρχην πασῶν] of the kingdoms under all heaven were given to the people of the holy ones of the Most High. Its kingdom (i.e., the people’s, ἡ αὐτοῦ) is an everlasting kingdom, and all the dominions (ἐξουσίας; LXX οἱ ἐξουσίαι; θ’ οἱ ἄρχαι) will

the terms never refer to hostile demonic powers: Wesley Carr, Angels and Principalities: The Pauline Phrase Hai Archai Kai Hai Exousiai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Particularly debated is the identity of the ἄρχοντες of 1 Cor 2:6, 8 (human, angelic, both?). Bibliography is considerable but an excellent summary and good entry-point is provided by D. G. Reid, “Principalities and Powers,” in DPL, 746–52.

250 Cf., too, the closely related traditions in the Similitudes (1 En. 45:1-3c; 55:3-4; 61:8; 62:1-6; 69:29), and the comments on these texts in Newman, Glory-Christology, 88–90. These traditions reflect a similar expansion on the Danielic vision, involving a figure of exalted, seemingly divine status, who metes out judgement in a context of redemption and recreation.

251 “His kingdom” (ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ) in θ and simply “this kingdom” in LXX (αὐτὴ ἡ βασιλεία), which is closer to the MT’s ממלכת (“the kingdom”).

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serve and obey (יִפְלְחֻן וְיִשְתַמְעוּן; LXX ὑποταγήσονται καὶ πειθαρχήσουσιν; θ’, δουλεύσουσιν καὶ ὑπακούσονται) it (πῇ; αὐτῷ; θ’, having omitted λαός = “him”).

Since Paul is not quoting or alluding to a specific phrase (or phrases) per se it is not necessary to sort out which textual tradition is most prominent. What is striking is the confluence of themes and vocabulary: An end (τελός) marks the transition from the reign (ἐξουσία, ἀρχήν) of the enemy of God and God’s people to the submission (ὑπότάσσω) of all authorities (πᾶσαι αἱ ἐξουσίαι/ἀρχαί) to God. The last note is especially prominent in the Greek versions (especially θ’) where there is a shift in emphasis from the kingdom received by the saints to a final climactic stress on God’s absolute rule over a pacified cosmos. With much the same language as Daniel, Paul portrays the enemies of God on a cosmic mytho-poetic scale, harkening back to the chaos myth.

Psalms 110 and 8 appear in parallel (C, C’) at the inner levels, defining Christ’s task in terms of the destruction and subordination of “all enemies” and “all things,” respectively. Paul has also linked the texts by supplying the same phrasing ὑπὸ τοῦς πόδας αὐτοῦ for each, and by the addition of the key word πᾶς to the words of Ps 110:1 in v. 25 from those of Ps 8 cited in v. 27. The synchronizing of Pss 8 and 110 does not merely indicate that Ps 8 has been read messianically, but that Ps 110 has been read with the cosmic-anthropological overtones of Ps 8.

The Christological and the anthropological mutually inform each other in this text, and reveal the close connection between the mediational role of humanity and that

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of Christ vis-à-vis the creation. When the passage is read holistically, that is, with a sense of the close connection of thought and themes throughout, illuminated by its scriptural underbelly, one can put forward the following claims concerning Paul’s anthropogenic theology.

The failure of Adam inaugurates the hegemony of death. In the alignment of death with the cosmic rulers, authorities, and powers, and in the alignment of Christ’s defeat and subjugation of the powers with the fulfillment of the human commission to rule, Paul contextualizes Adam’s disobedience as a failure to govern after the manner of the description of Gen 1:26-28 and Ps 8:7 (E: 6). Both texts convey something of the drama involved in the task, Genesis by evoking the chaos myth (even if largely to discredit it) and introducing the cunning creature in the garden, and Ps 8 by evoking the same myth in its early part. By his failure, then, Adam gives the chaos myth a new lease on life, and Paul draws on the language and conceptuality of Daniel to depict the final defeat of the disordering powers.

Thus, Adam’s task no less than his redemption falls into the hands of Christ. In fact, Adam’s redemption is complete only when Christ fulfills Adam’s task, which is what Christ is currently doing in his present reign (1 Cor 15:25-27). Though not here, elsewhere in the epistle Paul speaks to the believer’s participation in Christ’s reign (with decidedly futuristic emphasis: 1:9; 2:9; 3:21-23; 4:8 with irony; 6:2-3). The anthropologic role of Christ, whereby not only Adam’s redemption but also his task becomes Messianic business, speaks to the utterly depressed and oppressed condition of humanity (1:30; 4:7).
This is underscored by the final fulfillment of this task only in the heavenly, superhuman career of Christ.

The completion of the commission to rule in the career of Christ is but an extension of his role in creation and history, whereby he mediates God’s creative intentions and blessings to the cosmos (1 Cor 8:6; 10:4, 9).\(^{253}\) This is accented by the language Paul uses to speak of Christ and God. Christ is Son (ὁ υἱός, v. 28) to God who is Father (πατήρ, v. 24), his Sonship signifying his being as God’s agent in creation. Thus, Christ hands the kingdom (i.e., a pacified creation) τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρί (v. 24) and in this Christ is subordinated to God as ὁ υἱός (v. 28). These relational terms are being made to reflect Christ’s mediating role in creation.\(^{254}\) The work which Christ does as a new Adam, therefore, is a (re)creative work. This is compatible, incidentally, with image-Christology as a feature of pre-existence (cf. 1 Cor 15:49; Col 1:15-20).\(^{255}\)

Finally, the cosmic telos is achieved when, with the subordination (ὑποτάσσω) of Son to Father, God pervades all: ἵνα ἔν θεός πάντα ἐν πάσιν (v. 28). The root ταγ- and the adjective πάς, which have been prominent throughout, now combine in a furious crescendo to express the end-point to which God is directing creation. Contextually, the subordination of Son to Father represents the culmination of the Son’s work of cosmic pacification (cf. v. 24). The meaning of God being πάντα ἐν πάσιν likewise lies in the immediate context. The cosmic powers that worked to obstruct the divine will (they are ἔχθρα) must be destroyed (καταργέω) and all things, including the Son, must be properly


\(^{255}\) Confirming the earlier argument against the view that Christ is the true image of God *because he has become man*. 
and finally ordered (ὑποτάσσομαι) under God, and then God will be “all in all.” The imagined condition is one where God’s will is done on ‘earth’ (i.e., the realm of the cosmos) as it is in ‘heaven’ (i.e., the realm of God’s undisputed rule). All things will be directed to God without obstruction or need of mediation. Notably, this can only occur on the level of the cosmos when the heavenly powers obstructing God’s will have been reduced to nothing (cf. “the god of this world,” 2 Cor 4:4; cf. 1 Cor 2:6, 8; Eph 2:2; 6:12).

In this state, the hardened dualism between earth and heaven, for which they are partly responsible, will be entirely transformed (as it is already being transcended in the church: 15:45-49; Rom 8:38-39; Gal 4:26; Phil 3:20-21; Col 3:1-4; Eph 1:9-10, 1:20-2:6 cf. 2 Cor 12:1-5). While the climactic phrase of 15:28 might be rendered “all things to all people” (RSV), the cosmic scope of this vision demands something like the more encompassing alles in allen Dimensionen (“everything in every dimension”), as Zeller argues. Clearly, this is not a teleological pantheism, reducing all distinction between God and creation, but neither is this simply a triumph of divine will: Paul envisions a

256 Cf. Fitzmyer: “God as ‘the goal or final cause of everything.’” “All will be ordered by God to himself directly, with no further need of mediation, not even of the ‘kingdom’ or the ‘reign’ of Christ”; First Corinthians, 575. Robertson and Plummer: “The meaning seems to be that there will no longer be need of a Mediator: all relations between Creator and creatures, between Father and offspring, will be direct”; First Corinthians, 358.


cosmic God-directedness, which can be described as an immersion in the divine will (vv. 25-26) and the divine life (vv. 22, 25-26; 53-55).²⁵⁹

The interlinking of the redemptive and the cosmic within the task of the Son assumes not the restoration of an originally ideal/complete creation, but the bringing to completion of creation’s telos through the assumption of the role of Adam within the task of Messiah. The redemptive is precursor to the cosmic, for the telos of the cosmos was not to be achieved by divine fiat alone, but together with the participation of God’s image bearers.²⁶⁰ Drawing on the entire chapter of 1 Cor 15, the following points support this reading: Paul looks at creation—as a product of God’s hand—and sees signs of its own telos (15:35-49); likewise, Adam’s creation of corruptible stuff is the presupposition of his being given moral agency and vocation within creation’s and his own becoming (15:21-22; 45-59); and the use of such texts as Ps 8:7 (E: 6) and implicitly Gen 1:27ff. to describe the task of the Messiah in relation to the cosmos defines that task as anthropological.


²⁶⁰ In composing these two sentences, I am conscious of my debt to some statements of Andrew Louth concerning the two arches of creation and redemption in Orthodox theology; cf. Andrew Louth, “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology,” in Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions (ed. Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 34–36.
Chapter 4. Adam, Corruption, and the Cosmos:

Anthropogony within Romans

If Edward Adams is correct about the relationship of the story of God and creation in Romans and Galatians we will be faced with a choice, either to reconsider elements of the argument heretofore, or to deal with tension between Romans and what we have discovered thus far. Adams suggests that “whereas in Romans a ‘fall’ (Genesis 3) that frustrates God’s original design for creation is the problem to be resolved, a ‘story of God and creation’ arising from Gal. 3:28 might have had (aspects of) the original design of creation (Genesis 1-2) as part of the complication to be undone.”\(^1\) Although here construed as alternatives, we have already encountered the framework of thought within which these different emphases can be held together. It is the presupposition that Adam is given a constructive role in creation and that in failing this task Adam himself and creation are prevented from reaching their intended completion. With this framework, we would want to modify the language Adams employs to describe the different emphases of Paul’s thought. There is no “fall” from God’s original design—if that is understood as a property of ontic perfection—but rather a deviation from an original intention, from a point at which its fulfillment was only in process. The goodness but incompletion of creation is affirmed and the bridge between the two is the fulfillment of the human commission. This is writ microcosmically in Adam’s body, which was and continues to be in his descendants the (earthly) image of God, but which also anticipates assimilation to the incorruptible image of the heavenly Son. This happens when Adam’s disobedience

\(^1\) Adams, “God and Creation,” 40–41.
is corrected in the obedience of Christ. This construal of the primordial history has the advantage of offering a straightforward reading of texts which have either been ignored, marginalized, or uncomfortably read against the grain, such as Gal 3:28; 1 Cor 11:7; and 15:45-49. That this construal of Paul’s reading of the primordial history coheres with several emphases scholars have been making concerning Gen 1-3 contributes to its plausibility. One significant hurdle remains, to see if and how this framework takes shape in the context of the unique emphases of Romans. The three texts in Romans that most clearly and extensively reflect anthropogenic traditions provide material aplenty for this task: in Rom 5:12-21 Paul sets the momentous deeds of Adam and Christ in a typological relationship; in 7:7-12 Paul enfolds events in Eden into his own identity; and in 8:18-23 he elaborates on the interconnected destinies of creation and humankind.

Adam and Christ: Romans 5:12-21

Romans 5:12-21 has been construed to provide confirmation of the vitality of the doctrine of the fall or of Paul’s purported lack of interest in Adam’s original condition. At one extreme, Adam’s disobedience may be portrayed as an “irrational intrusion” that spoils his own beautified condition and a completed creation. At the other extreme, Adam may be portrayed merely as a convenient foil for Christ, whose only value is in signifying the destitute situation of humankind. Paul’s Adam-Christ comparison, however, has deeper roots in the narratives of Gen 1-3 than either scenario suggests. Three lenses will help us to gain a perspective on this important text. The topics of “Adam, Sin, and Death”; “Adam and Law”; and “Adam, the Type” will allow us to move through the text roughly as its contents unfold.
Adam, Sin, and Death. Paul’s basic statement on the matter of Adam’s sin and its effects introduces the whole section at v. 12, and it is further unpacked in vv. 15-21, after an evidently important aside concerning the law in vv. 13-14, which itself is recapitulated in v. 20. The interpretation of v. 12 is complicated by a long history of debate concerning the nature and effects of Adam’s “fall” and by grammatical uncertainties. It will be argued that Paul’s appeal to Adam does not perform the function of a theodicy: he considers sin from an historical and phenomenological perspective, not that of its ultimate origins or grounds for existence; and he strikes a balance, even a symmetry, between the baleful effects of Adam’s sin and the responsibility and situation of subsequent humanity that is uncongenial to theories which overload Adam’s sin with historically fracturous consequences, such as the origin of evil or the loss of a state of bliss and immortality.

In verse 12 Paul stakes out his basic claim concerning Adamic-humanity. The Greek text reads: Διὰ τοῦτο ὡςπερ δι’ ἑνός ἁνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἁνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν, ἐφ᾽ ὃ πάντες ἠμαρτον. Despite some attempts to salvage the grammatical structure of the passage, most scholars, translators, and many ancient readers deal with anacoluthon here.² Paul begins a comparison between events tied up in the one man

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² The initial phrase here seems only loosely connected to the preceding discussion; it may serve merely to highlight a change in thought or to indicate a logical inference from the preceding material, which supplies the grounds for that material (if there is life in Christ, 5:1-11, this is why, vv. 12-21).

³ With ὡςπερ Paul introduces a construction which is never completed; one expects οὕτως καὶ to complete the comparison (cf. v. 18, 19, 21; 6:4, 19; 11:30-31). So, e.g., Leander E. Keck, Romans (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2005), 147; N. T. Wright, Romans (vol. 10; NIB; Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 525; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans (AB; New York: Doubleday, 1993), 411; James D. G. Dunn, Romans (WBC; Dallas: Word Books, 1988), 1:273. Contrast Arland J. Hultgren, Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A
Adam and (it is assumed) the man Christ, but never finds his way out of the protasis.⁴ The result is a bald statement of the darkness that has enveloped humanity. Paul states that “sin came into the world through one man, and death came through sin.”⁵ The κόσμος is not merely “the world of men, human life,”⁶ but also the whole socio-physical cosmos,⁷ as the mythic context of Paul’s utterance suggests (cf. Gen 3:17-19) and 5:17 intimates.⁸ The choice of the verb εἰσέρχομαι does not suggest that Paul seeks to answer the question “why is there sin at all”—for Paul knows that the serpent is already there in the garden (cf. 2 Cor 11:3, “as the serpent deceived Eve”)—but rather “when and how did sin appear.” Paul has in mind a point of origin as the experience of sin and its usurpation.⁹


⁴ Cranfield argues that Paul suddenly realizes that he must first stress the radical discontinuity between “the one man” Adam and “the one man” Christ (hence vv. 15-17) before he can complete the analogy initiated in v. 12, but among other problems, that means vv. 13-14, which immediately disrupt the grammar, are yet a parenthesis to the parenthesis; C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (ICC; London: T & T Clark, 1975), 1:272–273. It is better to see v. 15, taking its cue from τούτος (at the end of v. 14), as resuming the thought or direction, if not the grammar, of v. 12. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 408.

⁵ Remarkably similar is Wis 2:23-24, “For God created us for incorruption, and made us in the image of his own eternity, but through the devil’s envy death entered the world, and those who belong to his company experience it.”

⁶ Pace Cranfield, Romans, 1:274; Adams, Constructing the World, 173; Ulrich Wilckens, Der Brief an Die Römer (EKK VI/1-3; Zurich: Benziger, Neukirchener, 1978), 1:315 n. 1037.


⁸ The statement that in Christ believers ἐν ζωῇ βασιλείας ζωής (5:17) surely intimates their creation commission to rule over the world as well as anticipates Rom 8:18-25 (cf. 1 Cor 6:2). Thus the statement that “as the exposition proceeds, the determinative events, Adam’s sin and Christ’s act of obedience, are only ever conceived of as affecting human beings” is incorrect; Adams, Constructing the World, 173. Moreover, this statement itself seems undermined by Adam’s development of the apocalyptic quality of Paul’s thought in this context when he states, “[sin and death] swept through the entire κόσμος, subjugating it and establishing their dominion over it” (ibid., 174).

⁹ If Paul does not engage in metaphysical speculation on the origin of sin and even assumes the presence of chaotic agents prior to the sin of Adam and Eve, then the sense in which sin enters the world
There is a suggestion, then, in the statement that “sin entered the world through one man,” of the organic connection between the destiny of human creature and created world, and of the chaotic effects of human misbehaviour on the created world which is intimated in Genesis and comes to prominence in 8:18-23. Death is by definition a cosmic and not merely individual phenomenon.\(^{10}\) The fate of the human body through human agency is a microcosm of the fate of creation through human agency. The treatment of sin and death as quasi-powers, indicated by the use of language that is (only sometimes) suitable of agents, speaks not to the mythologizing of these phenomena, so that in expressing Paul’s thought we should resort to speaking of Sin and Death, which then conveniently (for many moderns) displaces (even “demythologizes”) “angels” and “demons,” but to the reversal of the position of responsibility and authority humankind was to have over creation. Because of sin, there is an inversion of roles; rather than “rule in life” (cf. 5:17) humankind is ruled by death, “death reigned” and “sin reigned in death” (vv. 14, 17, 21; 6: cf. 3:9). This limited personification probably capitalizes, as in 1 Cor 15:20-28, on the intimate relationship between spheres within creation and the superhuman powers that oversaw them, according to much speculation at the time, although such would only be implicit here.\(^{11}\) “Death,” however, primarily means literal, through Adam is in the fateful existential impact of the failure of God’s chosen agent to continue God’s creative work of ordering creation.

\(^{10}\) Although not agreeing that “world” in v. 12 is the cosmos, Käsemann correctly says that “anthropology is the projection of cosmology”: “Because the world is not finally a neutral place but the field of contending powers, mankind both individually and socially becomes an object in the struggle and an exponent of the power that rules it”; but generally lost on his exegesis is the protological and eschatological sense in which one might also say, “cosmology is the projection of anthropology”; Ernst Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans* (London: SCM Press, 1980), 147, 150.

physical return to dust. That a rupture in the relationship between the man and God (“sin”) causes this corruption also suggests that death is the corollary of a more fundamental relational condition.

In the next clauses, Paul widens his view to address the relationship of the one to the many, adding, “and so (καὶ οὐτως) death spread to all humankind, ἐφ᾽ ὃ all sinned.” These words have been the centre of controversy and debate from ancient to modern times. Interpretation is clouded because of the variety of ways in which Paul’s connective constructions may be interpreted. The initial καὶ οὐτως may indicate that death spread as a result of Adam’s sin or under like circumstances. And ἐφ᾽ ὃ has been the subject of as many as twelve interpretations, which break down into those which take it as a relative clause or as a conjunction. But with the exception of Jewett, scholars have almost unanimously come down in favour of the conjunctive sense, with two alternatives emerging. Usually it is taken to mean that death spread to all because all have sinned. But Fitzmyer contends for a consecutive meaning, equivalent to the conjunction ὥστε: death spread to all “with the result that, so that” all have sinned. From here one enters a

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12 Arguing for the latter sense is Keck, *Romans*, 147. He prefers the translation of the NIV, “in this way.”

13 Eleven are catalogued by Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 413–417. Jewett’s (see below) makes twelve.

14 Jewett sees this as a reference to the realm in which humans sin, the κόσμος of v. 12a and v. 13; *Romans*, 376. In view of the strength of the position for a conjunctive clause here, the distance separating the antecedent (κόσμος) and the pronoun (ὁ) must count against this reading. The once influential Augustinian interpretation based on the Latin VL and Vg translation in quo, understood usually as a reference to Adam, has been widely abandoned.

15 Here it is understood as equivalent to διὸτι or ἐξ τούτῳ διῄ and is thought to cohere with parallel uses in Paul’s letters (2 Cor 5:4; Phil 3:12, and 4:10). Cf. BDAG, 365, and BDF §235.2, and most modern translations. Recently, Hultgren, *Romans*, 222.

maze of opinions: Fitzmyer critiques the causal sense on the exegetical grounds that Paul then seems to say something different than what he said in 12 a-c, where he asserted that sin and death are owing to Adam (taking the initial καὶ οὖντως as expressing the “connection” between Adam and humanity, not merely a similarity in circumstances). But Wright criticizes Fitzmyer because the consecutive sense makes Paul say that death causes sin, “the opposite of what he actually says throughout, which is that sin causes death.” Keck splits the difference: he accepts Fitzmyer’s consecutive sense but shares Wright’s criticism of Fitzmyer’s interpretation. For Keck, the phrase indicates “the logical inference from the ubiquity of death,” i.e., death spread to all men so that it is evident that all sinned.

Some perspective can be gained concerning the relationship of Rom 5:12c-d to 12a-b if two additional contexts are held in mind. First, account must be taken of the spiralling nature of the development of Paul’s theme, for in the ensuing context he often has occasion to restate the relationship between Adam and his descendants. Second, account must be taken of the context of Gen 2-3, which Paul doubtless has in mind.

sense, Jewett points to two of Fitzmyer’s examples which may not be strictly consecutive (Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philos 7.169.4-6; Plutarch, Arat. 44.4.1); Romans, 375–376.

17 Instead, with ἐφ᾽ ὑπ’, Fitzmyer argues, “Paul is expressing a result, the sequel to Adam’s baleful influence on humanity by the ratification of his sin in the sins of all individuals. He would thus be conceding to individual human sins a secondary causality or personal responsibility for death”; Romans, 416.

18 Wright, Romans, 527.
19 Keck, Romans, 148.
20 Light is cast on the subject by Richard H. Bell, “The Myth of Adam and the Myth of Christ in Romans 5.12-21,” in Paul, Luke and the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Alexander J. M. Wedderburn (ed. Alf Christophersen et al.; JSNTSup 217; London: T & T Clark, 2003), 21–36. He approaches the topic from a theoretical perspective rather than in terms of the narrative of Gen 2-3 itself, which results in some different conclusions than those offered here. Generally, he does not pay enough attention to Adam as an historical figure and one may wonder if he has not overstated the extent to which the biblical tradition stresses God’s separation from creation.
Paul turns from the one man who introduced sin and death to the “all” of humanity with the clause “and so death passed to all men.” There are good reasons within the logic of the verse itself, within the whole context of vv. 12-21, and within Gen 2-3, to see here not simply a statement which will compare the spread of death in the case of Adam and that of humanity (possibly implied in the NIV’s rendering “and in this way” and supported by Keck), but rather a statement of the result of the events tied to the one man upon all humanity. There is an organic connection between the events tied up in Adam and the fate of Adamic humanity. This is already intimated in 12a-b in the statement that sin, and through it death, entered (ἐἰσῆλθεν) into the world. This cosmic entrance is spelled out in 12c-d, augmented by the choice of the complementary verb, “and so death spread (διῆλθεν) to all.” Glancing down at the development of Paul’s argument confirms this train of thought: “the many died through the one man’s trespass” (v. 15); “because of the one man’s trespass, death exercised dominion through that one” (v. 17). Recalling Gen 2-3 clarifies this organic connection between the one and the all, for the disobedience of Adam and Eve entailed their seclusion from the place of the tree of life and their succumbing to their own finitude in death, the consequences of which were necessarily borne by their descendants. So death passed to all humankind as a result of its entrance into the world through the one human ancestor.

That statement is followed by a second, “with the result that [or “because”] all have sinned.” Whatever the precise connection, it is clear that Paul wants to establish that all are culpable (cf. 3:9; 3:20). The matter of individual responsibility is so important that he will immediately break his train of thought to explain why death continued to reign
even over those who did not sin in the same manner as Adam (vv. 13-14). On the other hand, Paul will also explicate the relationship between Adam and his descendants in terms which include them in his offence: “one trespass brought condemnation” (v. 16); “one man’s trespass led to condemnation for all” (v. 18); “by the one man’s disobedience the many were made (κατεστάθησαν) sinners” (v. 19). The first two of these statements (vv. 16, 18) can be understood to refer to the sentence of death which is pronounced on all humankind because of Adam’s disobedience, that is, all are borne into corruption and mortality because of Adam. The third statement (v. 19) might be understood to mean essentially the same thing if the verb καθίστημι can be granted a strictly legal sense: the many were given the status of sinners in that they suffered the condemnation fit for sinners (i.e., death) because of Adam. But probably the normal meaning of the word is operative here (cf. Acts 7:27; Jas 4:4): the many were made or became sinners as a result of the one man’s disobedience. Paul does not explain how this happened, but a little reflection on Gen 2-3 and Paul’s use of it suggest an answer. Paul’s argument assumes a reading of the Eden narrative as a trial that affects the destiny of humankind. Adam’s disobedience makes the many sinners because thereby he passes on his own creaturely qualities and limitations which guarantees that his descendants do as he did. This is dramatized in Rom 7:7-12, where, as we shall see, Paul appropriates the Edenic

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22 Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 421.

23 Contrast the answer offered by Wedderburn, who explains 19a by appeal to 19b (the many are constituted righteous): “Just as the life that is in Christ comes as a gift to men, but as a gift which they must still receive, so the decree of death and a whole environment and pattern of life blighted by sin and forsaken by God are handed down to man from his ancestor, and yet he must responsibly make his own decision as to whether to follow his fellow men or remain true to God’s word and will”; “Theological Structure,” 353.
encounter with God’s demand—a proto-law—to speak generally of the human condition in a manner that assumes that Adam’s created nature is shared by those who come from him.  

Paul does not mean, therefore, that people are born sinners, only that they become sinners because of Adam. Paul rolls up the whole history of the effects of Adam’s sin into the one act when he says “the many were made sinners.” Paul, then, understands Adam as both man of myth and history.  

The man of (primeval) history fails a trial, drastically influencing the course of history; the man of myth—the everyman—simply fails, succumbing to the desires of the flesh. The circumstances of the many are not Adam’s—they are far worse—but their nature is essentially his. “The one man’s disobedience” “made (κατεστάθησαν) sinners” of many (v. 19) because through it he forfeited God’s intention and became instead the head of a people just like him. Thus it makes little difference overall whether we translate 5:12c-d as “and so death spread to all with the result that all have sinned” or “because all have sinned.” In the first case, which is perhaps to be preferred, Paul speaks to the fact that Adam’s mortality and corruptibility

24 Elsewhere, too, we have seen Paul speak of Adam’s original condition as standing in continuity with the present condition of humankind, for instance, in 1 Cor 11:7 and 1 Cor 15:45-50.

25 Framing it as an either/or, Muddiman complains that it is impossible to tell if Adam is mythological or historical: “‘Adam, the Type of the One to Come’,” Theology 87 (1984): 106.

26 For some inchoate thoughts along these lines, cf. A. J. M. Wedderburn, “Adam in Paul’s Letter to the Romans,” in Studia Biblica 1978, 3 (Sheffield: JSOT, 1980), 423. Also his “Theological Structure.” There he concludes, “To obliterate the responsibility of the individual or to make him guilty of that for which he was not responsible may be unethical, but it is equally false to deny that de facto it is human to sin and to die and that socially and physically we are thus inevitably involved in a situation from which only Christ can release us. This tension or balance between the social or cosmic and the individual must not be destroyed, and it is to the impoverishment of Paul’s thought to seek to eliminate it there” (p 354). In general, the step from Wedderburn’s position in these articles to my own consists only in a more leisurely tour through Eden.

27 Very close to Paul’s is the pattern of thought in 4 Ezra 3:4-27; 4:30-32, especially 3:21-22: “For the first Adam, burdened with an evil heart, transgressed and was overcome, as were also all who were descended from him. Thus the disease became permanent.” Paul is less perplexed about evil than is Ezra because of his assurance of God’s plan to deal with sin and death in Christ. For a different estimation of the comparison, cf. Mark Seifrid, “Romans,” in Commentary on the New Testament, 629. See also Tobin, “Jewish Context.”
is inherited by his descendants, and therefore they sin just as he sinned. In the second, he refers to the fact that all sin, just as Adam, and therefore die (cf. Rom 6:23). This confirms the thesis that Paul is more concerned to explain the presence of death than of sin. He portrays sin is an inevitable enemy in the existential reality of being human, at least provisionally. 28

How Adam becomes the cause of sin and death for his descendants has been a perennial problem for readers of Romans. Potential answers have been many: from the un-Pauline idea of a forfeiture of supernatural grace or glory, 29 to the boogeyman of Gnostic influence, 30 to the ghostly concept of “corporate personality,” 31 to the artificiality of seminal transmission of the guilt of original sin, 32 to the lameness of Adam’s bad example, interpreters have wrestled with the conceptuality that gives sense to Paul’s words. 33 The answer may have been concealed in its simplicity: Adam passes on his humanity—and leaves creation open to chaotic powers (only implied in 5:12-21). The

28 Barrett saw this: “Paul’s sentence [vv. 12-14] . . . leaves open the question of the origin of sin . . . . The raw material of it was, in the language of Genesis, already present in Eden: the snake was there, and so was a tree with desirable fruit (Gen. iii. 6). But there could be no ‘desire to return to the lost state of bliss and immortality’; that state had, by definition, not yet been lost,” and he then proceeds to cite 9:20 and 11:32; Romans, 105. Paul shows the same lack of concern to explain the presence of evil in Rom 7:7-12, as argued below.

29 For an account and refutation, cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 408-411, but adopting the position that “Paul does not explain how that baneful effect of Adam [i.e., the origin of sin in human life] takes place” (407).


31 E.g., Frederick Fyvie Bruce, The Letter of Paul the Apostle to the Romans: An Introduction and Commentary (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 119–120.

32 Not unique to but classically associated with Augustine; see the following note.

trigger was his disobedience; the alternative was immortality. The answer is not unlike that offered in the early centuries of the church, as far as it can be determined, and by the Greek fathers in the fifth century and beyond: Adam passes on corruptibility and mortality. But its persuasiveness depends on recognizing that Paul sees in Adam what humans typically do (cf. Rom 7:7-12), and that he knows of the alternative Adam failed to achieve. That Paul is aware of the path not chosen by Adam is suggested precisely in his understanding of Christ as his typological counterpart. However, before Paul elaborates on that, another matter preoccupies him, and it confirms the picture of Adam we have discovered thus far.

**Adam and Law.** That Paul did not mention (the) law in 5:12 can be taken in one of two ways: it might be irrelevant to the subject matter, or it might be assumed but not specified. That the latter is the case becomes evident in vv. 13-14. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of Paul’s argument in Rom 5:12-21 is the manner in which Paul indirectly fashions Adam’s sin as an encounter with divine law (vv. 13-14; cf. v. 20). And yet, the proposition is sufficiently counter-intuitive to mean that this aspect of the argument is often overlooked or (implicitly) rejected by scholars. The argument here will find additional support from Rom 7:7-12, which puts into an autobiographical narrative the homologous existential encounter with sin that confronts Adam and humanity that we have seen to stand behind Rom 5:12a-b, c-d. In Rom 5:12-14, Paul has

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34 Thus, he passes on the conditions which make his descendants’ corruption inevitable; this is what it means, “the many were made sinners.”

35 Cf., e.g., Seifrid, *Romans*, in Beale and Carson, *Commentary on the New Testament*, 632, commenting on Rom 7:7-12: “[Paul] cite[s] the law, which he expressly indicated earlier was not present at the fall but came only through Moses (5:14, 20).” Of course, the *Jewish law* did not precede Moses, according to Paul, but Seifrid undermines a crucial aspect of Paul’s argument in both texts (5:13-4 and 7:7-11).
in mind an issue of historical discontinuity between Adam, on the one hand, and those between him and Moses, on the other, the latter of whom experienced the sin-death nexus apart from an encounter with divine law.\footnote{How commonplace was the notion of Adam being given divine law? Many of the texts below form some link with commandment backwards to creation or forward to the Mosaic covenant; a mere reference to commandment in a context recalling Gen 2-3 might simply reflect the biblical text itself (cf. בְּרִית in Gen 2:16; 3:11, 17) and constitute no particular emphasis on the theme: 1 En. 32:6 (ate from the tree of wisdom; notably, no stress at all on command); CD II-III (speaks of the violation of the “Creator’s precepts,” אבות וספרא, II 21, cf. III 8, on account of the evil heart in primordial times, of Abraham’s keeping them and passing them on, eventually to Israel, etc.); 4QpHos\footnote{Otfried Hofius, “The Adam-Christ Antithesis and the Law: Reflections on Romans 5:12-21,” in Paul and the Mosaic Law (ed. J. D. G. Dunn; Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 2001), 186. Käsemann: “Under the law judgment is to be expected on the last day. Even before its enactment, however, punishment falls on committed sin according to the nexus of act and consequence described in 1:24ff”; Käsemann, Romans, 149–150.} 7-8 (“תֹּמַךְ עליה they broke the covenant”; cf. Hos 6:7); 4504 8 recto 4-9 (Adam did not keep, שָׁם, was put under obligation, עָשָ׊ה, and was not to turn aside, בְּלִחוֹל), 56b (Adam and Eve transgress the law of creation, paradise, and Mosaic law; Adam and Eve break commandment, but the stress is on Adam’s priestly activities immediately following expulsion from the garden, after he is clothed); Sir 17:11-12, 14 (law of life, eternal covenant, decrees, and commandment given to Adam and Eve); Josephus Ant. 1:40-47 (commandment[s]); Philo, Opif. 1:3 (harmony of law, creation, commandment in Moses’ exordium); Leg. 1:90-108 (the earthly Adam given commandments); cf. QG 1:15; Plan. 44-45; Sib. Or. 1:38-45, 51-53 (Adam and Eve given commands); L.A.B. 13:8-9 (Adam given commandment with promise of all things subject to him; implicit comparison with the law of Moses, v. 10); 4 Ezra 3:7, 20-23 (commandment given to Adam, law through Moses, but the same evil heart prevents obedience in both cases); cf. 7:11, 21; 2 Bar. 4:3; 17:1-18:2 (implicit contrast between Adam, including most of his descendants, and Moses in terms of obedience); 2 En. 30:15-31 (Adam given a commandment); Adam and Eve transgress command: L.A.E. 18:1; 26:2; 34:1-3; 37:2; 38:2; 49:1-3; Apoc. Mos. 7:1; 8:2 (Adam forsakes the covenant, διαβήσθησιν); 10:2; 11:1-3; 21:2; 23:3; 24:1; 4; 25:1; 39:1; Apoc. Sed. 4:4; Hel. Syn. Pr. 12:44-46 (Adam given the commandment as trial with the reword of immortality); Hist. Rech. 7:8 (Adam transgressed commandment); Adam given divine law: Tg. Ps.-J. 2:15; 3:9-11, 15, 22-24; Tg. Neof. 2:15; 3:9, 22-24; Frg. Tg. 2:15. Additional Rabbinic texts: Gen. Rab. 8:2; 16:5-6; 24:5; Deut. Rab. 2:25; b. Sanh. 56b; Pirq. R. El. 13; Midr. Pss. 1:10; 6:2; Midr. Prov. 8:4; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 12:1; Maimonides, Mish. Tor. 14.5.9.1. I have adapted, expanded, and annotated the above references which are primarily drawn from Vlachos, The Law and the Knowledge, 176 n. 5; Hermann Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams und das Ich der Menschheit: Studien zum Menschenbild in Römer 7 (WUNT 164; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 205–241.}; 4504 8 recto 4-9 (Adam did not keep, שָׁם, was put under obligation, עָשָ׊ה, and was not to turn aside, בְּלִחוֹל), 56b (Adam and Eve transgress the law of creation, paradise, and Mosaic law; Adam and Eve transgress commandment, but the stress is on Adam’s priestly activities immediately following expulsion from the garden, after he is clothed); Sir 17:11-12, 14 (law of life, eternal covenant, decrees, and commandment given to Adam and Eve); Josephus Ant. 1:40-47 (commandment[s]); Philo, Opif. 1:3 (harmony of law, creation, commandment in Moses’ exordium); Leg. 1:90-108 (the earthly Adam given commandments); cf. QG 1:15; Plan. 44-45; Sib. Or. 1:38-45, 51-53 (Adam and Eve given commands); L.A.B. 13:8-9 (Adam given commandment with promise of all things subject to him; implicit comparison with the law of Moses, v. 10); 4 Ezra 3:7, 20-23 (commandment given to Adam, law through Moses, but the same evil heart prevents obedience in both cases); cf. 7:11, 21; 2 Bar. 4:3; 17:1-18:2 (implicit contrast between Adam, including most of his descendants, and Moses in terms of obedience); 2 En. 30:15-31 (Adam given a commandment); Adam and Eve transgress command: L.A.E. 18:1; 26:2; 34:1-3; 37:2; 38:2; 49:1-3; Apoc. Mos. 7:1; 8:2 (Adam forsakes the covenant, διαβήσθησιν); 10:2; 11:1-3; 21:2; 23:3; 24:1; 4; 25:1; 39:1; Apoc. Sed. 4:4; Hel. Syn. Pr. 12:44-46 (Adam given the commandment as trial with the reword of immortality); Hist. Rech. 7:8 (Adam transgressed commandment); Adam given divine law: Tg. Ps.-J. 2:15; 3:9-11, 15, 22-24; Tg. Neof. 2:15; 3:9, 22-24; Frg. Tg. 2:15. Additional Rabbinic texts: Gen. Rab. 8:2; 16:5-6; 24:5; Deut. Rab. 2:25; b. Sanh. 56b; Pirq. R. El. 13; Midr. Pss. 1:10; 6:2; Midr. Prov. 8:4; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 12:1; Maimonides, Mish. Tor. 14.5.9.1. I have adapted, expanded, and annotated the above references which are primarily drawn from Vlachos, The Law and the Knowledge, 176 n. 5; Hermann Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams und das Ich der Menschheit: Studien zum Menschenbild in Römer 7 (WUNT 164; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 205–241.

Paul states, “Sin was indeed in the world before the law, but sin is not reckoned when there is no law. Yet death exercised dominion from Adam to Moses, even over
those whose sins (ἁμαρτήσαντας) were not like the transgression of Adam (ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ), who is a type of the one who was to come” (5:13-14).

Here Paul reveals an assumption he makes: Adam encountered God’s law. Two features of the text reveal that Paul imagines an Edenic encounter with law.38 First, Paul reasons in vv. 13-14 so as to imply Adam’s encounter with law:39 in the period before the Mosaic law (v. 13-14), people sinned under circumstances unlike Adam’s; conversely, it stands to reason, Adam sinned under circumstances not unlike those after Moses.40 Second, the difference and the similitude are defined by the nature of Adam’s sin as παράβασις.

According to Paul’s own definition in Rom 4:15, “transgression” is a violation of a formalized norm, explicit legislation (οὗ δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν νόμος οὐδὲ παράβασις).41 Paul must have in mind the command of Gen 2:16-17, which put Adam in continuity with

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39 It should be stressed that Adam and Moses are not compared but rather the experience of Adam and of those under the Mosaic Law. Therefore we must disagree with Scroggs who argues that “the one who was to come” of whom Adam was a type is Moses; cf. Scroggs, “What Adam truly prefigures is Moses, since both figures were in a Torah relationship with God,” The Last Adam, 80–81; following John A. T. Robinson, The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster, 1977), 35.
40 Gerd Theissen has formulated it clearly: “If, first, people in the interim period between Adam and Moses did not sin like Adam and if, second, they sinned without law, then the sin of Adam and the sin under the law must be comparable”; Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1987); I owe the reference to Vlachos, The Law and the Knowledge, 115 n. 132. Cf. also Wright, Romans, 527.
41 BDAG s.v. supplies “act of deviating from an established boundary or norm, overstepping, transgression.” Cf. Rom 2:23; 1 Tim 2:14; Heb 2:2, 9:15; 2 Macc 15:10; Ps 100:3; Wis 14:31; Josephus, Ant. 3:218. The notorious crux in Gal 3:19 might stand in some tension with what Paul says in Romans, but it still confirms the close association between nomos and παράβασις. Jewett (among others) is unconvinced that a distinction can be made between “sin” (however defined) and “transgression” as a breach of a particular command such as Adam had received (Gen 2:16-17). While he admits that the “syntax of v. 14 suggests that ‘transgression’ and ‘sin’ are not synonymous,” he appeals to Paul’s later use of παράπτωμα (“trespass”) of Adam’s and his descendants sin in order to suggest that “the distinctions between these forms of violation remain murky”; Jewett, Romans, 378. Some distinctions are clear, however. “Sin” becomes concretized in “sins,” “trespasses,” and “transgressions.” While both “trespasses” and “transgressions” are categories of “sin,” Paul, in the light of 4:15, employs the latter of these as a technical term, for breaching specific legislation. Thus Adam’s disobedience can be “sin,” “trespass,” or “transgression,” but not all “sins” and not all “trespasses” are, in this context, “transgressions.” Cf. Hultgren, Romans, 225.
those under the Mosaic law and discontinuity with those between him and Moses’ legislation.

Paul could have made the comparison between Adam and Christ entirely without reference to law. Verses 13-14 look parenthetical. And yet the subject of law emerges again in v. 20, suggesting that Adam’s encounter with the commandment may be more integral to the argument than at first glance. Hence, Robert Jewett argues that Paul means to undermine the exclusive definition of sin as legal violation, which was used by some in the house churches to judge those who did not observe “kosher food laws” (ch. 14). Jewett argues, implausibly in light of vv. 13-14, that Paul undermines this definition by *dismantling* the notion of the eternal presence of the law (citing *Bar. 4:1; Jub. 2:33; 6:4; Sib. Or. 3:757; m. ’Abot 3:14*). However, the burden of Paul’s argument in v. 20 falls not on the temporal dimensions of the law—as in vv. 13-14, Paul simply assumes these; rather, he focuses on the negative impact of the law: “But law came in (*παρεισῆλθεν*), with the result that the trespass multiplied.” The context here indicates clearly that Paul is speaking of a time post-Adam. With the verb *παρεισέρχομαι*, however, Paul sets law on the stage in partnership with the entrance (*εἰσέρχομαι*) of sin and death (v. 12), not because law is anti-god in the same way as the latter, but because phenomenologically it works upon Adamic humanity towards the same disastrous ends.

The homology between Adam’s sin and sin under Torah is facilitated by Paul’s reference to the anarthrous νόμος in v. 20 and his use of a verb that leaves open the door

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42 Jewett, *Romans*, 377. It is unlikely that Paul would speak of “law” “entering in” (*παρεισέρχομαι*) in v. 20 if the polemical target is the eternal presence of the law. This choice of verb is ill-suited to disarming that notion. For a related argument that does not involve a polemic against the eternal presence of the law, cf. Tobin, “Jewish Context.”
for some form of pre-existence (cf. Gal 2:4). That Paul does not highlight νόμος or the commandment in v. 12 reflects the emphasis there on the anthropologically induced plight to which the man Christ is the solution. It cannot be said that “through one man law entered into the world,” for the law is divine in origin (Rom 3:21, 31; 7:12; 9:4; Gal 3:21). And yet the presence of law in Eden, in the form of the commandment, is an assured feature of Paul’s thought. This will become an important plank in the argument of Rom 7:7-12, which will offer more definite insights concerning the role of law in Pauline anthropogony. At the very least, it is apparent at this stage that the presence of law in Eden was insufficient to keep sin and death at bay!

The indirectness with which Paul discloses the presence of divine law in Eden is of a piece with other texts where Paul conveys narratively the negative soteriological impact of the law, in Gal 3:19-20 and Rom 5:20. The very obliqueness with which God is associated with these events serves to reinforce the polemic against the construal of the divine-human relationship regulated by law as indicative of a spiritual ideal. Paul rather comprehends the operation of the law as mediating between God and creation where the relationship is not yet characterized as fully mature (see below on Rom 7).

*Adam, the Type.* While Paul broke off the grammatical structure initiated in v. 12 in order to address the historical relationship between death, sin, and law, and though the syntactical form initiated there does not reappear until v. 18 (cf., too, v. 19 and 21), Paul nevertheless returns to the comparison which he had originally begun to make in v. 12 with the reference to Adam as the “type of the one who was to come” at the end of v. 14. By verse 15, he is back on track. At the heart of the entire passage (5:12, 15-21) is the
thesis that as Adam stands at the head of historical humanity and determines its destiny, Christ stands at the head of eschatological humanity and determines its destiny. Adam initiated a history of sin and death, but Christ initiates a new reign of righteousness and life. Many of the details of the text are in dispute. Our focus here shall be to demonstrate that the development of the typological correspondence is best construed by a reading of the scriptural-mythological context (Gen 1-3) not in terms of a relatively static and perfected ontology pertaining to Adam and creation which is associated with the paradigm of fall and restoration, but rather with a dynamic ontology in which Adam is invited to partake in his own and creation’s becoming.

Paul says that Adam is the τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (v. 14). By τύπος Paul relates a hermeneutical event of correspondence, which implies divine oversight, anticipating a point he will make in 8:28-30, where God predestines the elect to be conformed to the image of his Son. The word refers to the impression made by striking (τύπτω, “to strike”), as in a footprint, seal, or even a scar, and developed the sense of “form,” with nuances of “mark,” “mold,” “outline,” “figure.”43 The designation of Adam as a type of Christ has puzzled interpreters, in as much as the correspondence seems largely antithetical—and it is—but the antithesis is premised on a shared identity. Adam and Christ are two apples, or two oranges, but not one of each. Goppelt states, “Christ corresponds antithetically to Adam and also emulates him. The τύπος here is the advance presentation, but with a suggestion of the hollow form which makes an opposite

43 Cf. Goppelt, τύπος, TDNT, 8:246-259.
impression.”

Goppelt highlights the “shadow of what is to come” (σκιὰ τῶν μελλόντων) in Col 2:17 as a close parallel but the unusual aspect of contrast which seems to attach to the use of the word in Rom 5:14 is better compared to 1 Cor 10:6: “Now these things occurred as examples (τύποι) for us, so that we might not desire evil as they did.” The use of τύπος in a context in which Paul draws out correspondences in the salvific institutions in Israel’s origins and the present time (“the end of the ages,” 10:11) makes it difficult to understand τύπος as mere ethical “example” (cf. 1 Thess 1:7; 2 Thess 3:9; Phil 3:17; 1 Tim 4:12; 1 Pet 5:3). Rather, he says, “these things (ταῦτα) occurred as τύποι,” suggesting the totality of the events. Here is a similar relation of anticipation and antithesis, or continuity and discontinuity to that found in Rom 5:14: the experience of the Israelites anticipates that of the Corinthians but the Corinthians are to learn by their negative example and enjoy conversely a better outcome. In other words, the Corinthians are to stand to Israel as Christ stands to Adam. In each case, there is a combination of the usual pattern of excess of antitype over type and the unusual element of antithesis between anti-typed realities over against their typological counterparts. But the discovery of a like-pattern does not explain the precise relationship of anticipation and antithesis, or continuity and discontinuity, between Adam and Christ.

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44 Ibid. Emphasis added.
45 In Gal 4:21-31, a passage in which Paul confessedly engages in ἀλληγορέω (4:24), the dialectic between anticipation and antithesis appears on the level that Paul applies textual realities to extra-textual phenomena: thus, Jerusalem below (textually, Hagar) corresponds to Jerusalem above (textually Sarah), but one is in slavery and the other is free. While the different hermeneutical phenomena complicate the comparison and the ability to illuminate the use of τύπος in Rom 5:14, the categories broadly overlap (Adam/Hagar/earthly-Jerusalem, Christ/Sara/heavenly-Jerusalem) and a typological sense comparable in features to the Adam/Christ relationship is conveyed on the level of the external realities allegorically signified. The one Jerusalem corresponds to the other, but the one is in slavery, the other is free; one is on earth (present), the other above (eschatological).
It is not enough to stress the antithetical relationship between Adam and Christ, which is so often repeated in the literature. This hermeneutic is really the only option if one can only conceive of traditional fall-restoration paradigms of the primeval tale, for then one must assume that Paul is not presently interested in what Adam quo Adam contributes to understanding Christ, as nothing of Adam’s original perfection is intimated in the text. Then Adam becomes a mere foil for Christ, an empty cipher, and the use of τύπος becomes obscured almost beyond recognition. However, Paul’s language draws out the similarity that grounds the antithesis and makes the use of “type” comprehensible in the following ways. First, Adam and Christ are both anthrōpoi.\(^\text{46}\) Second, they are both singular agents, as Paul repeatedly stresses through different genitival constructions involving the adjective “one” ([τοῦ] ἕνός, vv. 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19). Third, Paul construes the effect of their agency homologously through the repeated use of the key word βασιλεύω on each side of the typological equation: (vv. 14, 17[x2], 21[x2]).\(^\text{47}\) In the development of this third point lies the real vitality of the typological relationship.

Paul shows his hermeneutical cards in the construal of the gift that does not merely cancel out the trespass but pushes humanity past that threshold from which Adam deviated.\(^\text{48}\) He is informed by nuances of Gen 1-3, read not only as narrative of doom but

\(^{46}\) This is the word Paul initially chose to refer to Adam in v. 12 (the proper name emerging in v. 14), and it is probably the word that would have referred to Christ had Paul not broken his train of thought there (cf. Rom 1:3; 8:3; 1 Cor 15:21); in any case, it appears of Christ in v. 15 and is implied throughout.

\(^{47}\) He says, on the one hand, that “death exercised dominion from Adam to Moses” (v. 14), that “because of the one man’s trespass, death exercised dominion” (v. 17), and that “sin exercised dominion in death” (v. 21); on the other, that recipients of the gift will “exercise dominion in life” (v. 17) and that “grace” is to “exercise dominion through justification leading to eternal life” (v. 21).

\(^{48}\) Similarly, Wright: “Nor was the result a mere restoration of where Adam was before: in Christ, the human project begun in Adam but never completed, has been brought to its intended goal”; Romans, 524.
also indicative of promise. The fullest statement of this aborted destiny from a cosmic and anthropogenic perspective arrives in chapter eight, but the Adam-Christ typology is its basis, as is confirmed by the way the discussion of that later chapter is foreshadowed in v. 17 of the present context: “If, because of the one man’s trespass, death exercised dominion (ἐβασιλεύσαν) through that one, much more surely will those who receive the abundance of grace and the free gift of righteousness exercise dominion (βασιλεύσουσιν) in life through the one man, Jesus Christ.” 49 In this verse Paul alludes to the vocation with which God’s earthly images are assigned in Gen 1:26 and 28 to “subdue” (κατακυριεύω) the earth and “have dominion” (ἄρχω) over every living thing (cf. Ps 8:7 [E: 6]), 50 and he understands Adam’s sin in the garden as the archetypal turning back from that vocation, resulting in the inversion of the pattern of power Adam was to exercise over creation, that is, resulting in the reign of death, Adam’s succumbing to his own corruptibility (alluding to Gen 3:14-19). Paul does not quite complete the parallelism here, but in the following verses the “trespass” is explicitly contrasted with the “act of righteousness” (δικαίωμα, v. 18) and the “disobedience” (παρακοή) of one with the “obedience” (ὑποκοή, v. 19) of the other. Through the completed obedience of Adam’s antitype those receiving the gift are assured to reign in life (v. 17). The result of the Christ-event therefore is not only to cancel the trespass but to complete the vocation with which humankind had been charged, the “exercise of dominion in life” (v. 17), that is, in “eternal life” (v. 21).

49 Similarly, Wright: “Rom 5:12-21 functions as a programmatic statement, awaiting the fuller explanation of Rom 8:12-30.” Ibid., 512.

50 In 6:9 Paul tells the Romans that “death no longer has dominion (κυριεύει) over [Christ]”; then in v. 12 to “not let sin exercise dominion (βασιλεύει) in your mortal bodies”; and then in v. 14 that “sin will have no dominion (κυριεύει) over you.” No significance can be attached to the fact that Paul in 5:17 does not reproduce the exact language of Gen 1:26, 28.
With this mythological substratum in place, which with the very name “Adam” Paul invites his readers to recollect and with his logic to reconstruct, certain features of Paul’s argument are given new clarity. First, as I have been arguing, the typological relationship does not consist merely in antithesis but also in the essential coherence of the world-turning potentiality which confronted each (vv. 17, 21). In both Adam and Christ, humankind is at the threshold of fulfilment. Adam missteps, but Christ corrects and completes the course. The pessimistic account Paul gives of Adam is indeed as much a product of Paul’s Christ as it is of Genesis’ Adam. And yet the Adam of Genesis also contributes to Paul’s Christ, for Paul interprets the salvation offered in Christ not merely as cancelling Adam’s debt but as fulfilling Adam’s hope, as read from Gen 1-3.

Second, the superabundance of the gift, which Paul is at pains to stress, can now be outfitted with a concreteness that often escapes accounts of this text—and this will help to advance one of our major theses. In verse 15, Paul assures the reader that if the “trespass” (παράπτωμα) brought death to the many, the “free gift” (χάρισμα) has certainly (πολλῶ μᾶλλον) “abounded” (ἐπερισσεσεν) to the many. The choice of the verb περισσεῖω indicates the excess of the “free gift”; it comes with an abundance. So how is this excess manifest? Is Paul simply speaking abstractly about God’s mercy exceeding his judgement (cf. Exod 34:6), or is something more specific in mind? With the trespass, Paul proceeds to point out its effect, “death.” Does he also have the effect “of the grace of God and the free gift in mind” in speaking of its excess, namely, that

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51 This is not to say it is pure eisegesis; Gen 1-3 is as polyvalent and open as any narrative.
which actually constitutes the gift? Verse 16 moves toward that very matter: “And the free gift (δώρημα) is not like the effect of the one man’s sin (δι’ ἐνὸς ἁμαρτήσαντος). For the judgment (κρίμα) following one trespass brought condemnation (εἰς κατάκριμα), but the free gift (χάρισμα) following many trespasses (παραπτωμάτων) εἰς δίκαιομα.” Now Paul stresses the effect as “justification” or perhaps “righteous decree.” If Adam starts out from a position of supernatural righteousness or glory, forensic justification might be sufficient to effect salvation, but then Paul’s language of the excess of the gift is reduced to an empty platitude. It would not be clear how “the free gift given by God in Christ more than matches the sin of Adam and its effects” but rather “exceeds it.” If, on the other hand, Adam begins from a position of mere innocence, the excess of the gift might consist in the manner that it not only assures acquittal (a return to innocence) but also the whole of salvation (the completion of Adam’s commission). Verse 17 again proves to be key: “If, because of the one man’s trespass, death exercised dominion (ἐβασιλεύσεν)

52 Jewett asks to what the “much more” refers, and highlights three positions which have been taken, namely, the quantity of blessings, the intensity of blessings, or their certainty. He opts for the first, which appears to cohere with the suggestion being pursued here, that Paul has in mind the manner that the free gift more than cancels out the effect of the trespass. Cf. Jewett, Romans, 381 n. 137. Keck explains the “utter disparity between ‘the trespass’ and ‘the begracement’” as founded on “an unstated contrast: Death happened to the ‘many’ as a consequence of their own trespasses (v. 12), but what occurred for the many was not a consequence of what they did but solely the result of God’s grace actualized in Christ’s grace . . . Over against the deserved consequence of Adam stands the underserved consequence of God’s gift. The ‘trespass’ is indeed not like ‘the begracement’”; Keck, Romans, 152. While the contrast between what is deserved and what is not certainly speaks to the difference between the trespass and the gift, to say that is the point of Paul’s contrasting the two phenomena here almost amounts to a tautology, and does not account for the sense of excess, the lesser-to-greater that Paul stresses.

53 Commentators regularly explain the appearance of δίκαιομα here as due to “rhetorical assimilation,” as Käsemann put it: Romans, 154; cited and followed by Hultgren, Romans, 227. Thus it is usually taken as synonymous to δίκαιον, “justification,” “vindication,” or “acquittal,” in preference to its normal meaning as either (1) “regulation,” “requirement,” “commandment,” “decree” (cf. Luke 1:6; Rom 1:32; 2:26; 8:4; Heb 9:1, 10; Rev 15:4) or (2) “righteous deed” (cf. 5:18; Rev 19:8). Cf. BDAG s.v.; G. Schrenck, TDNT 2:219-221. However, Jewett’s argument in favour of “righteous decree” should be seriously considered: “Condemnation is therefore juxtaposed with God’s righteous decree of salvation in Christ” (citing Rom 8:2; cf. also Rom 1:16-17; 3:25); Romans, 382.

54 Hultgren, Romans, 227. He does not explain how this is so.
through that one, much more surely will those who receive the abundance of grace (τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος) and the free gift of righteousness (τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης) exercise dominion in life (ἐν ζωῆ βασιλεύσουσιν) through the one man, Jesus Christ.”

This verse draws together some of the key terms used in vv. 15 & 16, the most significant of which for determining the excess of the grace-gift is in the association of the abundance of grace, the gift of righteousness, and the reign of the saints. Here it is transparent: the surplus of the gift consists in not simply cancelling Adam’s transgression—effecting a return to innocence—but in inaugurating the telos which Adam’s disobedience forestalled.55 Notably, this sense of surplus is depleted if Adam’s original condition is conceived as one of supernatural grace or glory. Instead, Adam’s liminality is assumed.56

Finally, this protological context contributes clarity to the synthesis of forensic and participatory categories in Paul’s thought. It is extremely difficult to disentangle these discourses in Rom 5:12-21, as a quick listing of some of the terminology conveys.57

Paul speaks of “the gift of righteousness” that somehow issues in “exercising dominion in

55 This interpretation of the excess of the gift relieves some of the pressure to read the passage in a universalist sense; note how the lack of content in the idea supports Hultgren’s recent defense of a universalist interpretation: Ibid., 229–234.

56 Compare Ricoeur: the “how much more” “excludes the possibility that the ‘gift’ should be a simple restoration of the order that prevailed before the ‘fault’; the gift is the establishment of a new creation”; Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 272. Also, Wright, Romans, 528. Käsemann is less helpful: “in the apocalyptic horizon the end-time is infinitely superior to fall-determined primal time”; Romans, 152.

57 In Rom 5:9-10, where the language of excess was first introduced, Paul more neatly separated the forensic, specified as justification and reinterpreted as reconciliation (=a return to Adam’s innocence), and the much more of salvation: “Much more surely then, now that we have been justified by his blood [=cleared of guilt, Rom 3:21-26], will we be saved through him from the wrath of God. For if while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more surely, having been reconciled, will we be saved by his life.” Paul’s logic is that if God worked to reconcile sinners, surely God will take those former sinners and complete their salvation. If he acted graciously to them in their sinful state, then surely he will continue to do the same in their reconciled state. God does not bring them half way. Nor does God bring them back to the start (to Eden) and say, “Now, let’s go over this again. There are two trees . . . .”
life” (v. 17), of the act of obedience actually “making the many righteous” (v. 18), of grace’s “exercise [of] dominion through justification leading to eternal life” (v. 21), and even of the effect of Christ’s “act of righteousness” as leading to δικαίωσις ζωῆς (v. 18). It is difficult to account for such expressions strictly in forensic categories; they are rather expressions of the *excess* of the gift, as we just saw: if one has one (justification), one has, or will have, the other (full eschatological life). For the same reason it is a distortion to neglect the forensic category: precisely the forensic category construed in relationship to Adam’s innocence makes possible the language of excess. Again, the anthropogonic traditions on which Paul draws offer illumination. The categories of participation and law inhere in Gen 2-3 itself, and Paul’s use of the narrative reflects the relationship and innate tension between them. The confrontation of Adam with the commandment (Gen 2:7; Rom 5:12-14, 20) spells out humankind’s universal condemnation (Gen 3:20; Rom 5:16), although Adam and Eve do not die the death promised in forensic terms (Gen 2:17; 3:21). At the same time, a dynamic and mutually related ontology characterizing Adam and creation is derived—with justification—from the same narratives (1 Cor 15:47-48; Rom 5:17; 8:19-23); even the anticipation of telic fulfillment in Genesis is symbolized mythologically under the symbol of participation in the tree of life. The mixing of these two categories should be seen within the broader phenomenon in biblical traditions, where one finds an uneasy relationship between the mythological worldview and the introduction of historicizing and rationalizing elements, as anthropologists and scholars of religion have long pointed out.58

58 Stanley Tambiah characterizes these competing rationalities as “causality” and “participation”:
It is no surprise, then, that when Paul speaks of humankind’s condemnation he
draws in large measure on the rationalizing and forensic tendencies of biblical tradition
(especially, legal and sapiential discourses, as in Rom 1-4) and when he speaks of its
salvation he draws on the participatory (chs. 5-8, with affinities to prophetic, apocalyptic,
and even myth and mysticism), but without abandoning the forensic (as here, 5:12-21;
6:7; 8:3-4), for that is part of the context in which humankind’s dilemma has been spelled
out from the beginning (Gen 2:16-17; 5:12-14; 7:7-12). If there is tension between these
categories in his thought, that must be set within the context of the heavily hybridized

__Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality__ (Lewis Henry Morgan Lectures; Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 109. On the biblical tradition _per se_, cf., e.g., ibid., 1–41; Peter L.
Berger, _The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion_ (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1969), 113–120; Max Weber, _Ancient Judaism_ (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952). In fact the
tension between these two kinds of rationality is in different degrees a universal phenomenon. Cf. Tambiah,
_Magic, Science, Religion_, 90.

59 The precise nature of the relationship is difficult to tease out. It would be possible to view the
rationalizing as representing a secondary evaluation in a highly structured and logical discourse of an
antecedent reality which basically retains all the characteristics associated with the mythological
worldview. This falters, however, in that there can be little doubt that the rationalizing tradition has also
acted on the mythological and modified it. So with Paul interpreters have puzzled over the relationship.
While the forensic discourse comes into prominence particularly in the wake of controversies centered on
the circumcision of Paul’s Gentile converts (cf. Westerholm, _Perspectives_, 352–407, 440–445), the
temporal relationship between the forensic and participatory categories may not match the logical
relationship. For some preliminary exploration, cf. Stephen J. Chester, _Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives
on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian Church_ (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 329–336 (“It
is a mistake to force a choice between the forensic and participatory elements in Paul’s theology so that
only one or the other can be regarded as truly characteristic of his thought,” p. 336); Timo Laato, “Paul’s
Anthropological Considerations: Two Problems,” in _Justification and Variegated Nomism Volume 2, The
Paradoxes of Paul_ (ed. Donald A. Carson, Peter Thomas O’Brien, and Mark A. Seifrid; trans. Sigurd
Grindheim; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 348–349 (“Paul has in mind no [theological] distinction between
the juridical and participatory categories”); Timo Eskola, _Theodicy and Predestination in Pauline
Soteriology_ (WUNT II/100; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 304–305 (“the participatory theme is actually
based on the juridical aspect. . . . Participation in Christ is possible only through justification by faith”).
The discussion often takes its starting point from Sanders, who followed in the steps of Schweitzer, and
today is dominated by the contribution of Campbell, all of whom argue strongly for the predominance of
the category of participation: Sanders, _Paul and Palestinian Judaism_, 472, 501–511, 544–545; Albert
Schweitzer, _The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle_ (trans. William Montgomery; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Rereading of Justification in Paul_ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009).
tradition to which he is committed. Thus, the assumption throughout Rom 5:12-21 is that Adam quo Adam (not merely some fallen version of him) speaks to the nature of humankind, as the mythological prototype of humanity. At the same time, there is an even more pronounced historicizing element, whereby Adam’s encounter with divine law spells out the (temporary) abandonment of human fulfilment and the inverse reign of sin and death in the cosmos. The excess of the gift of grace coherently relates not to an original supernatural condition of Adam’s but to the transcendence of his original innocence through the gift. It seems that participation of humankind in Christ’s death and resurrection, analogously to participation in Adam, is the presupposition which allows Christ’s act of righteousness not merely to cancel the effect of the transgression but with massive extravagance to make many righteous and effect the fulfillment of human destiny in eternal life and dominion over a creation made new. The category of participation begins to bubble up and spill over the forensic framing of the human dilemma and solution in Rom 1-4.

60 Contrast Campbell’s method, which is to work these two streams in Paul’s thought into total systems which must be dichotomized under the pressure of “sheer rationality.” Cf. Campbell, Deliverance, 12.

61 Chapter six, then, with its explicit emphasis on identification through baptism in the death and resurrection of Christ, can be seen not merely as the spelling out of the implications of an essentially forensic event (i.e., sanctification following from justification; e.g., Cranfield, Romans, 1:295–6) but as the elaboration of the spiritual-mythic reality that undergirds justification in Christ, but with an emphasis on the present experience and actualization of the superabundant gift. For an elaboration along these lines: “Justified by Faith/Crucified with Christ” in Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 40–104.
The Adamic “I” and its Encounter with Divine Law: Romans 7:7-12

In Rom 7:9-10 Paul narrates elements ostensibly from his own experience in a manner that is patterned on the Edenic encounter with divine law; this allows him to characterize the “I” as that of *adam*, everyman. His purpose is equally to vindicate the law and yet expose how it is commandeered by sin. Paul’s anthropological presuppositions allow him to entertain such a paradox, for, as he says in Rom 8:3, “the law” is “weakened by the flesh.” There are two rhetorical constraints on the adamic character of Paul’s “I” that are critical to an accurate estimation of the Edenic references: Paul presents the narrative as *his own* paradigmatic experience, and Paul is concerned to address the matter of the Torah’s relationship to sin. These caveats mean that Paul does not narrate events in Eden *per se*, but that the events in Eden function prototypically in the case of the present narrative. This text exposes the complete absence of any concept of an original supernatural condition in Paul’s thought and reveals instead that Paul’s thinking with respect to original humankind adopts relational and developmental categories.

This text has a long history of competing interpretations, and it would be impossible within the confines of this study to do such a history, even in the modern period, any justice. In addition to the question of adamic reference in Rom 7:7-12/13, 63

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62 There are elements of the narrative that recall the experience of Eve rather than Adam, so I have tried to follow Vlachos in speaking of the “Edenic” setting of Rom 7:7-12; at the same time, it is difficult and probably not helpful to entirely avoid reference to Adam. Sometimes I will use the phrase “adamic ‘I,’” which effectivley alludes to Eden in the prototypical aspect of the events narrated there. On traditions concerning Eve in the garden and an analysis of her role in Rom 7, cf. Austin Busch, “The Figure of Eve in Romans 7:5-25,” *BibInt* 12 (2004): 1–36. I briefly interact with Busch below.

the major interpretive questions have surrounded whether Paul has the experience of Israel, Gentile god-fearers, or Eve in mind;⁶⁴ whether he speaks in a recognizably rhetorical, non-autobiographical form, e.g., gnomically or with prosopopoeia, or at least partially autobiographically;⁶⁵ whether a choice must be made between competing identifications—Adam, Eve, Israel, Gentiles, Paul himself, Anyone—or whether some

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sort of “composite ‘I’” is preferable;\(^\text{67}\) whether he speaks of experience within or outside of Christ;\(^\text{68}\) and how the “I” of vv. 7-13 which is narrated in the past tense is related to the “I” of vv. 14-25 which is narrated in the present (with the exception of v. 24).\(^\text{69}\) If Paul’s “I” adopts an Edenic context, light is shed on many of these disputes. Given the present state of contention, we will devote considerable time to establishing and defining the relationship between Paul’s “I” and the events of Eden.

The question of\(^\text{70}\) adamic reference is most pertinent of vv. 7-12. If the events of Eden can be identified there, it will also have a bearing on the interpretation of vv. 14-25, but we will only be able to suggest how that might look.\(^\text{70}\) The text reads:

7 What then should we say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet, if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin. I would not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, ‘You shall not covet’ (οὐκ ἔπιθομήσεις).\(^\text{8}\) But sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, produced in me all kinds of covetousness. Apart from the law sin lies dead.\(^\text{9}\) I was once alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin revived (ἀνέζησεν)\(^\text{10}\) and I died, and the very commandment that promised life proved to be death to me.\(^\text{11}\) For sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, deceived (ἐξηπάτησεν) me and through it killed me.\(^\text{12}\) So the law is holy, and the commandment is holy and just

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\(^\text{67}\) “Adam” is regularly combined with other identities, such as Paul’s or Israel’s, and some have seen a multiplicity of identities; e.g., Brian Dodd,\(^\text{136}\) *Paul’s Paradigmatic “I”: Personal Example as Literary Strategy* (JSNTSup; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999), 221–234; Adam, Paul, Jews, perhaps Christians.

\(^\text{68}\) For the former: Barrett,\(^\text{130–144}\) *Romans*, Dunn,\(^\text{1377, 388, 398–399}\) *Romans*, (reflecting eschatological tension); Cranfield,\(^\text{1:341–347}\) *Romans*, (7:7-13, the Jewish people, with Adam in mind; vv. 14-25, the heightened conscience of the true Christian); Timo Laato,\(^\text{123–129}\) *Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 123–129 (though 7:7-13 are strictly Adam and Eve). For the latter, Maston,\(^\text{127–152}\) *Agency*, Watson,\(^\text{374–380}\) *Hermeneutics*, Fitzmyer,\(^\text{463}\) *Romans*, Wright,\(^\text{561–564}\) *Romans*, Longenecker,\(^\text{49–61}\) *Paul, Apostle of Liberty*; Kümmel,\(^\text{86–97, 109–116}\) *Das Bild*.

\(^\text{69}\) Cf. n. 68. Lichtenberger views the “I” of 7:7-13 as Adam’s above all, but in a universalizing aspect, and the “I” of vv. 14-25 as more individual and reflective of personal experience;\(^\text{136}\) Watson argues 7:7-12 narrate the past event of the initial encounter with the Law, and vv. 13-25 apply to the present but with “a crucial fictive element . . .: present reality is described as if it were still under the dominion of the law--which, according to Romans 7.1-6, it is not”; Watson,\(^\text{379}\) *Hermeneutics*, On the verbs for knowing and the difference in tenses in 7b, c, cf. Barrett,\(^\text{132–133}\) *Romans*.

\(^\text{70}\) Verse 13 has been connected alternately by scholars to what precedes or proceeds. The past tense connects it with vv. 7-12, but it also seems to anticipate vv. 14-21, where sin is made sinful beyond measure, i.e., the complete enslavement to sin which is the outcome of the events in vv. 7-12.
and good. 13 Did what is good, then, bring death to me? By no means! It was sin, working death in me through what is good, in order that sin might be shown to be sin, and through the commandment might become sinful beyond measure.

Within Paul’s stated desire to defend the sanctity of the law, and yet to expose its role in revealing and enticing dormant sin leading to death (vv. 7-8, 12-13), he constructs a narrative vignette employing the first person pronoun, ἐγώ, suggestive of the progression from childhood innocence to the coming of age.71 This progression in itself assists to recall the events of Eden. The coming of age topos is nicely illustrated and expanded on by Philo in his Who is the Heir of all Things, 293-299. He embarks on the discussion as an explanation of Gen 15:6, which notes of Abram’s offspring, “in the fourth generation they shall come back hither.” The generations correspond to stages in the development of the soul. Infancy to seven years is followed by tumultuous passions (πάθος) of “youth” (citing Gen 7:21), which extends into puberty, then the soul is tended upon by the healing art of philosophy, and finally it grows strong in the virtues. He summarizes:

The first number is that under which it is impossible to form any conception of good or ill (οὐτε ἄγαθὸν οὐτε κακόν) and the soul receives no impressions. Under the second we experience the onrush of sin. The third is that in which we receive the healing treatment, when we cast off the elements of sickness and the crisis of passion is reached and passed. The fourth is that in which we make good our claim to complete health and strength, when we feel that we are turning back from wickedness and laying our hands to the good. (Heir, 299)

The differences in anthropology are palpable, but the topos is the same as Paul’s, and the sequence overlaps: a period of innocence, the awakening of desire, the entrance of

71 Käsemann objects that “the idea of childish innocence . . . is completely unbiblical and part of our modern mythology”; Romans, 193. Philo shows that it is not so modern and the question is not whether it is “biblical” (yet do not the echoes of it in Gen 2-3 qualify?) but whether it is plausibly employed here. In fact, however, the idea is reflected in numerous places; e.g., Ps 8:2; Matt 18:6; Phil 2:15; cf. Reidar Aasgaard, “Paul as a Child: Children and Childhood in the Letters of the Apostle,” JBL 126 (2007): 129–59, on innocence, p. 149. Unfortunately, Rom 7:7-12 is not considered.
instruction, and the outcome. Paul collapses the second and third stage (passion-instruction) which enables him to highlight the Torah’s generative role in bringing sin to life in fleshly humanity, instead of supplying the healing boon of instruction to an already conflicted youthfulness. Below we shall encounter Philo’s application of the period of youth and the arrival of instruction to Adam and Eve in the garden. The overlap between the coming of age topos and the Edenic narrative is facilitated by the presence of such motifs within Gen 2-3 itself, especially in the progression from sexual innocence to angst, precipitated by the encounter with the serpent and the partaking of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.72

Three sorts of argument serve to establish the plausibility of the Edenic reference in Rom 7:7-12. First I will discuss precedent, then the connection to Rom 5:12-21, and finally indications within Rom 7:7-12 itself, specifically within the narrative sequence of vv. 9-10, filled out by the commentary in vv. 8 and 11.

Many Greco-Roman parallels to Paul’s use of the first person have been brought to bear on the passage, both in terms of its rhetorical form, i.e., related usually to prosopopoeia, and the use of the topos of a lack of self-mastery.73 But little to no precedent has been found for the depiction of internal conflict within an “Adamic ‘I,’” as Jewett complains.74 The theoretical basis for such can be seen in 1QS III 17-19 or 2 Bar.

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73 E.g., for the former: Euripides, Med. 1077-1080; Epictetus, Diss. 1.10.7-9; and for the latter: Euripides, Hipp. 377-83; Epictetus, Diatr. 2.26.1. Cf. scholars arguing for a Gentile identification in n. 65.
74 Romans, 442 n. 23. Jewett highlights plausible events within Paul’s own life in order to explain how the law takes on a negative character in retrospect, and he highlights comparable uses of the first
54:19 (“each of us has become our own Adam”), but the actual use of the first person to adopt a consciously Adamic persona, recalling the events of Eden, has not been identified, so far as I know. The Hodayot supply just this. Scholars have noted the relevance of the Qumran material for the interpretation of Rom 7:7-25 in the past. Early on, K. G. Kuhn claimed that the “I” spoken by the Qumranites in 1QHa XI 24-25 and 1QS XI 7-10 was identical to Paul’s, both being spoken from the perspective of salvation and contrasting flesh and spirit, while H. Braun more carefully identified commonalities and distinctions between the two “I’s,” in relation both to the law (only in Paul was it commandeered by sin) and to the position from which they spoke (only did the Qumran “I” speak explicitly from the perspective of salvation). Lichtenberger, after discussing Kuhn and Braun, concluded that the Qumran texts indeed supply a close parallel in the use of “I” and anthropological terminology, but differ radically in terms of how the predicament of lostness is overcome. Despite these insights, the manner in which the “I” of the Qumran texts sometimes adopts an Adam-persona was not stressed. This phenomenon is most clear in 1QHa XX 27-31, which I have not seen cited in this regard:

[27] As for me (ואני), from dust [you] took [me and from clay] I was [n]ipped as a source of pollution and shameful dishonour, a heap of dust and a thing kneaded [with water, a council of magg]ots, a dwelling of darkness. And there is a return to dust for the creature of clay at the time of [your] anger dust returns to that

person to argue that autobiographical reference is not excluded by the rhetorical form Paul uses. However, he ties the interpretation of the narrative too closely to events Paul does not narrate and which tend to conflict with the gnomic quality of the language. He also makes an historically questionable application of the bar mitzvah ceremony to Paul’s narrative.

77 The same applies to Fitzmyer, Romans, 465–466. Wisdom of Solomon 7:1-6 is comparable, but it retains a distance between the “I” and Adam that is one step removed from Rom 7:9-10. “I” in Wisdom speaks only as Adam’s descendant here.
from which it was taken. What can dust and ashes reply [concerning your
judgement? And ho]w can it understand 31 its [d]eeds?

Here the psalmist speaks in the first person while clearly adopting an Adamic persona,
recalling events in Eden, and lamenting human sinfulness.78 The text therefore lends
considerable plausibility to the suggestion that Paul’s “I” does a similar thing in Rom 7:9-
11, only in the form of a more sustained first person narrative. Moreover, the question
“how can it understand its deeds?” (1QH a XX 30-31) recalls the situation of
disillusionment with the self portrayed in the second part of Paul’s exposition, Rom 7:14-
25, and it is elaborately narrated elsewhere in the Hodayot.79 Strikingly, both Paul and
Qumran employ the mirror image of Adam(-Eve) because they want to point to
something about Adam’s creatureliness that confirms the pessimistic outlook each has
cconcerning the human condition.

The thematic connection between Rom 7:7-12 and chapter 5:12-21 lends support
and broad contextual probability to the appearance of Adam’s narrative here under the
cloak of Paul’s paradigmatic “I.” Like 5:12-21, the present chapter addresses the
connection between “sin,” “death,” and “law,” and the law’s role in exposing and
expanding sin.80 And just as 5:12-21 describes the terrible reign of sin in broad historical

78 Cf. the section “The Man of Dust” in Chapter 2.
79 The theme is more elaborately developed in a fashion that anticipates Paul’s in the immediately
preceding column, 1QH XIX 22-25: “As for me (אש), a fount of bitter mourning was opened to me [ ]
and trouble was not hidden from my eyes 23 when I knew the inclinations of humans (אכרי אדם), and I
They entered my heart and they penetrated my bones [ ] ימ and to utter an agonized moan 25a and a
groan to the lyre of lamentation for all gr[iev]ous mourning[ ] 25 and bitter lament until the destruction of
iniquity, when there is n[o more pain ] and no more affliction to make one weak.” Again echoes of Gen 2-
3 are apparent (though less clearly dramatized so that “I” retains greater distinction from Adam’s), but now
the depressing inevitability of sinful acts is stressed.
80 His statements that he would not have known sin apart from the law (v. 7) and that sin through
the law becomes sinful beyond measure (v. 13) compare to 5:13 and 20 respectively.
terms, 7:7-25 does so in an intensely personal narrative. Moreover, just as 5:12 conceives of a moment before sin, a threshold, so 7:9 begins in the twilight of innocence. We saw that Paul in fact speaks of transgression of the law on the model of Adam’s transgression in 5:12 and 14, and not without warrant in the scriptural text and subsequent tradition. It is perfectly coherent with Paul’s presuppositions, therefore, to expose the law as a negative existential factor in the history of salvation in a manner that capitalizes on the universalizing self of an adamic “I.”

There are three points to confirm that the full narrative sequence implied by vv. 8-11 re-lives in the form of Paul’s “I” the events of Eden. The first is in the use of the verb ἀναζάω to describe the coming to life (again) of sin. To many interpreters who subscribe to the Adamic identification of the “I” this detail recalls the manner in which sin seems to lurk behind the scenes in Eden, both in the persona of the snake but also in the ease with which desire wells up in Eve. Criticism is directed towards this proposal from different

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81 I am puzzled by Schnelle’s statement that “Paul thus ends up saying something he does not really intend: God’s first covenant was not able to restrain the spreading power of sin and death”; Udo Schnelle, Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology (trans. M. Eugene Boring; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005), 501. The point seems to be made with a clarity and emphasis that does not seem accidental.

82 It would be possible to argue that the coming to life again of sin in Paul’s narrative refers to the infinitely repeated experience of all who first embark on life under the Torah, perhaps modeled on Israel’s first encounter with the commandment rather than Adam’s. While there is reason to think that the narratives of sin and death surrounding Israel’s reception of the law here indirectly inform Paul’s first person narrative and likewise his reading of Gen 2-3 (Wright cites bSanh 38b; 102a; Exod. Rab. 21:1; 30:7; 32:1, 7, 11), it is highly improbable that Israel is to the fore in the persona projected by the “I.” The reference to the commandment and the prior discussion of the law (vv. 1-6) are not sufficient cues to identify the “I” as that of a nation. The “I” is more readily identified as a typical individual and the experiences of inner turmoil attributed to it are far more readily attributed to an individual self. Moreover, if Israel is in view, the deadness of sin prior to the law (v. 8) and the contrast between the living and dead self (vv. 9-10) becomes hard to reconcile with Rom 5:13-14, which affirms that unaccounted sin was in the world and death continued to reign prior to Moses. Cf. Wilckens, Der Brief an Die Römer, 82. Wright’s explanation is possible but strained: “He seems to indicate some kind of potential life for sin beyond simply producing death; when individuals sin and die, sin is not growing, not flourishing in new ways. When, however, the law appears, then sin gains, as we might say, a new lease of life”; Wright, Romans, 563. Esler simply equates “not taken into account” (5:13) with “inactive” (7:7); Conflict and Identity, 235. Watson’s version
directions. First, it is supposed to contradict Rom 5:12 ("sin came into the world through one man"), but no necessary contradiction is entailed. Romans 5:12 is concerned with cosmological and historical events, while Rom 7:9-11 focuses on the specific anthropological presuppositions which underlie that narrative. Nothing about Rom 5:12 precludes the possibility that Adam succumbs to some inclination or propensity which is metaphorically awakened within him. The second criticism is more probative. It is pointed out that this construal of the narrative ("sin sprang to life") requires an otherwise unattested reduction of force of the prepositional prefix attached to the verb (ἄνα). The meaning of the verb is "come to life again" in its only other undisputed NT occurrence. This criticism ought to be accepted; it rightly exposes the fact that Paul does not recount the events of Eden per se (neither Adam nor Eve speaks), but rather their recapitulation in the experience of Paul’s “I.” With the verb ἄναζάω Paul refers to the springing to life again of the Edenic sin after it lay dead in the childhood innocence of the flesh, after it

of the “I” as “Israel” is more tenable: with the “I” Paul speaks of himself as an “Israelite,” using “representative biography”; Watson, Hermeneutics, 379. He thus is able to see the progression from innocence and the deadness of sin, to sinfulness and death as modeled on the coming of age topos. One needs to add the qualification that the Edenic echoes, the choice of a commandment that represents a broad ideal, and the broad anthropological basis of the whole discussion (7:7-25; cf., with some overstatement, Käsemann, Romans, 199) lend a universality to Paul’s “I” so that its relevance and representative significance is not meant to characterize an Israelite in distinction from the non-Israelite. In speaking as an Israelite, or better, a Jew (for the narratives of Israel’s reception of the law are at best faintly echoed), Paul still thinks his “I” will speak to humanity as a whole (cf. Rom 3:19-20). As usual, for all his universalism, Paul still privileges Jewish identity and symbolic categories. Thus, Adam, while he represents Jew and Gentile, looks more Jewish than Gentile.

83 Cf. BDAG s.v. 2 “to function after being dormant, spring to life.” ἄναβλέβω 2αβ is cited as an analogous phenomenon.

lay dormant just as it once lay dormant in Eden. The dormancy of sin in Eden is still presupposed by Paul’s use of the “I.” It is simply that ἀναζάω does not narrate events in Eden, but rather refers to their reoccurrence in the narrative of Paul’s “I.”

The second indication pointing back to Eden comes in the reflection offered in v. 11, which looks back at vv. 9-10, and laments that sin took opportunity through the commandment and ἐζητήσαν ῶε and through it killed me. In Gen 3:13 Eve replies to God’s interrogation by saying, “the serpent ἠπάτησεν ῶε and I ate.” Both 2 Cor 11:3 and 1 Tim 2:14 employ the same form as Rom 7:11 (ἐξαπατάω) to refer explicitly to Eve’s deception. The former text reads: “But I am afraid that as the serpent ἐζητήσεν Eve by its cunning, your thoughts will be led astray from a sincere and pure devotion to Christ.” Just as in Romans, but in distinction from 1 Tim 2:14, the deception of Eve here is applied generally to male and female, although with the ecclesiological imagery of the bride (“I promised you in marriage to one husband, to present you as a chaste virgin to Christ,” 2 Cor 11:2). In fact, this imagery reveals a striking correlation between Rom 7:11 and 2 Cor 11:3. It is the analogy of marriage in 2 Cor 11:2 that leads Paul to think of Eve in v. 3. Likewise, immediately prior to Rom 7:7-12, Paul had used the analogy of

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85 This explanation is to be preferred to Dunn’s, who suggests that “Paul probably used the compound lest his strong language be taken to mean that the law created or gave birth to sin”; Dunn, Romans, 1:383.

86 Käsemann remarks that with λαβῶσα “the power of sin is characterized also here as already lying in ambush and present”; Romans, 194. On the sense of ναικρός in 7:8 as “inactive,” cf. Cranfield, Romans, 1:351, citing Jas 2:17, 26. This compares to sin’s “entrance” into the world in 5:12; in neither case is the language designed to address the coming-into-being-of-sin as a problem for which a defence of God’s righteousness and a demonstration of humanity’s culpability is required. Cf. Lichtenberger on this text: “Paulus rührt heir, ohne in protologische Spekulationen zu verfallen, an die Frage, die auch von der Paradiesgeschichte her offen bleibt: Wahren kam die Sünde? Die Sünde war da, aber sie war nur ,lattent‘ vorhanden”; Das Ich Adams, 131–2. Thus Bultmann’s repeated statement that “sinning is the origin of sin” applies only superficially; “Romans 7 and the Anthropology of Paul,” in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann (Living Age Books; New York: Meridian Bks, 1966), 147–57.

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marriage to describe the believer’s freedom from the law (Rom 7:1-6). Moreover, both 2 Cor 11:2 and Rom 7:3 evoke the prospect of sexual indiscretion on the part of the woman. It is possible that Paul thinks of the transgression of Eve as somehow a breach of her covenantal (i.e., marriage) relationship with Adam and that both in 2 Cor 11:2 and Rom 7:1-6 the notion of marital infidelity leads him to think of the events of Eden (cf. 1 Cor 6:15-16). These connections, which are admittedly somewhat opaque, are nevertheless conceivable from a tradition-historical perspective and numerous enough to merit consideration. In any case, the key point is that the rare word ἐξαπατάω to describe sin’s deceit in Rom 7:11 is related lexically to Gen 3:13 and explicitly used by Paul to characterize the serpent’s deception of Eve in 2 Cor 11:3.

Finally, in the sentences that set up Paul’s little drama (vv. 7-8), he cites the prohibition against coveting (v. 7; cf. Exod 20:17). Another link to Genesis is supplied therewith. Ἐπιθυμέω in Exod 20:17 translates the Hebrew verb תַּחַט (“to desire”) which is used in Gen 3:6 to describe the tree of the knowledge of good and evil as “to be desired (珧ָנָן) to make one wise” (LXX has όραϊόν ἐστιν τοδ κατανοήσαι). “ Covetousness” was commonly regarded as the root of sin (cf. Philo, Spec. Leg. 4.84-94; Decal. 142, 150-153.

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87 So Barrett, From First Adam to Last, 17; he suggests that it is implied in Adam and Eve’s shame.
88 Some have detected this innuendo also in Rom 7:7, which cites the prohibition against coveting, but that is undermined somewhat by v. 8, which speaks of “all kinds of covetousness.” Ziesler makes the point in rejection of Gundry’s claim that Paul has in mind the onset of sexual desire, with puberty colliding with the time in life of the Jewish boy’s bar mitzvah; cf. John A. Ziesler, “The Role of the Tenth Commandment in Romans 7,” JSNT 33 (1988): 45–46; Gundry, “The Moral Frustration of Paul.” Gundry did not allow for an Edenic element, but Ziesler is open to it.
89 Ziesler briefly considers the evidence for a sexual connotation to Eve’s sin, citing 4 Macc 18:8; Apoc. Ab. 23; Apoc. Mos. 19:3 (cf. ch. 25); Philo, Opif. 152, 157-160; QG 1.47-48; Leg. 2.72, 74; “Tenth Commandment,” 45.
173; Jas 1:15; *Apoc. Ab.* 24:9). In the *Life of Adam and Eve* covetousness is likewise associated with Eve’s deception: “the serpent,” says Eve, “sprinkled his evil poison on the fruit which he gave me to eat which is his covetousness. For covetousness is the origin of every sin” (*Apoc. Mos.* 19:3). Later Eve characterizes hers as “the sin of the flesh” (25:3). Her sin is certainly comprehensible as an act of covetousness. The combination of all the above evidence clearly suggests Paul has the events of Eden in mind.

The strongest objection to this reading of Paul’s little drama concerns the purported “theological incongruity” it creates within Paul’s thought, as Moo put it, citing Rom 5:13-14 and Gal 3:17. The matter has already been addressed. The objection neglects to account for the similitude between the sin of Adam and sin under the law, which Paul’s reasoning assumes in Rom 5:12-14. As argued above, it is unnecessary to postulate that such similitude means Adam was confronted by the Torah, only that both the Edenic commandment and the Mosaic law are expressions of divine law. It has also been argued that the problem in Genesis is *external* (the serpent) and not *internal* as in Paul, but this is a rather flat reading of the primordial history, which goes against the grain of ancient interpretation (cf. Sir 15:14-17; 1QS III 17-21), and it is doubtful that a strict dichotomy of the two types of factors pertains to Paul’s own thinking. Another objection is that the couple did not immediately die after eating from the tree. In the example from the Hodayot above, where the “I” is clearly Adamic, “dust” returns to

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91 Moo, *Romans*, 429. The criticisms dealt with below are drawn from the sources mentioned in n. 64.

92 Cf. the section “Adam and Christ” in the present chapter.
where it came at the moment of God’s anger, but we know events in Eden did not play out exactly in that way, despite the warning of Gen 2:17 (cf., too, Philo *Leg* 1.105-108). Finally, it has been objected that Adam was never alive apart from the commandment, but that it was given immediately. Again, this objection takes on a woodenness of interpretation that simply did not characterize early readers—but let it be entertained. *Jubilees* famously exploits narrative details to create a chronological framework to cohere with the eternal validity of the law; surely Paul can do the same under the pressure of opposite convictions. Eight verses separate the creation of Adam in Gen 2:7 and the giving of the command in Gen 2:16. During this time God plants and waters Eden and then takes Adam to reside there; it is not hard to imagine that this took some time. Alternatively, it can be asked whether the phrase χωρὶς νόμου (Rom 7:9) needs to imply the lack of awareness of the commandment or only the lack of an experiential knowledge or acquaintance with taking on its demand (cf. Rom 3:21, 28; 4:6; as in the case of the child).93 God may command a prairie girl never to jump in the ocean, but she has no practical experience of that law until presented with the opportunity; likewise for Eve and Adam, the fatal operation of the prohibition will not be felt prior to an encounter with the forbidden object.94 The question to ask of an Edenic backdrop in Paul’s little drama is not whether the details of the allusions conform to a modern critical reading of Gen 2-3 (about which there is nothing like consensus anyway), but whether the setting is coherent

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94 Thus, if living “without the law” need not imply lack of awareness of its demands, then the moment when “the commandment came” (v. 9) will be the moment when obedience becomes an existentially present necessity. Notably, Gen 3:1-5 explicitly frames Eve’s temptation as an encounter with the commandment (“Did God say...?”).
with Paul’s argument, conceivable on the standards or precedents of ancient readers, and sufficiently indicated by textual cues. The answer is “Yes” all around.\textsuperscript{95}

We can now suggest what this means for our topic.\textsuperscript{96}

“No longer Adam and Eve?” We have been conscious throughout that the “I” with which Paul speaks identifies more closely with Eve’s experience than Adam’s, above all in the confession “it deceived me.” In light of our previous discussions on the problematics of relating gender and the image of God in Paul’s thought, this convergence of a Pauline “I” with an originally feminine persona might bear on the topic. Austin Busch rightly complains that scholars have virtually ignored the fact that Eve’s experience is reflected rather than Adam’s,\textsuperscript{97} and he offers an insightful and sophisticated reading of Rom 7:7-25 on this basis. He argues that “Paul takes advantage of the tension within th[e] tradition between Eve’s passive victimization and active responsibility at the moment of her transgression in order to develop a double vision of sin and, correspondingly, a picture of the self split under sin.”\textsuperscript{98}

There are problems with Busch’s analysis from the perspective of his understanding of Paul’s adaptation of Gen 3. Busch incorrectly understands 7:7-11 as straightforward prosopopoeia: the “I” is Eve’s rather

\textsuperscript{95} Other objections, such as that raised in relation to ἄναζω (above) or to the quotation of the tenth commandment (and allusion to Lev 18:5 in the phrase ἦ ἐντολή ἵππος ζωήν, v. 10) are only pertinent to the misinterpretation that Paul’s “I” speaks for Adam or Eve.

\textsuperscript{96} It should not be objected that Paul’s concern is liberty from the (nevertheless good) law, so that it is unwarranted to speculate about the anthropological ramifications of the presence of the law in Eden. Paul’s very point about the law is established by an anthropological presupposition, i.e., the nature of the flesh (Rom 8:3). So also Maston, Agency, 127–133. And Pheme Perkins: “Rom 7:7-25 shows Paul's ability to engage an exegetical tradition which used the Adam story as vehicle for its own reflection on the human condition”; “Pauline Anthropology in Light of Nag Hammadi,” \textit{CBQ} 48 (1986): 516.

\textsuperscript{97} Busch, “The Figure of Eve,” 14. This is a bit of an overstatement; certainly, the lack of attention to this detail feels particularly egregious to Busch because he understands Paul to be speaking in the person of Eve.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 23.

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than Paul’s. But this falters on formal and technical grounds. Rather by interpreting his own highly stylized experience in the light of Eve’s, Paul implies that her experience is not peculiar to women. He may still regard passivity as basically a “feminine” trait (cf. Rom 1:27; 1 Cor 6:9) and may view females as particularly prone to deception (being acted upon) as the author of 1 Tim 2:11-15 does, but he is not concerned to make a point about woman’s responsibility for sin’s entrance into the world (cf. Sir 25:24; Apoc. Mos. 32:2). What Paul does in vv. 7-12 is not unlike what he does in Rom 5:12, where he completely ignored Eve’s role in Eden, despite what he says explicitly of her in 2 Cor 11:3, and asserts that it all happened “by one man.” In either case, Paul does not seem to be particularly concerned to make a point about gender, or of Adam over against Eve or vice versa.

Adam, Innocence, and Law. The significance has largely gone unnoticed: Paul evokes the Eden narrative to illuminate the ongoing phenomenology of human encounter with law. Two reasons suggest that Paul, therefore, is not accustomed to think of Adam and Eve as enjoying a supernatural state of grace or glory: Paul associates subjection to the authority of divine law not with a condition of maturity but of immaturity; and Paul

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99 The first person of vv. 7-8 must be capable of representing Paul, in as much as he is making an argument from experience: The “I” in vv. 7ff. must be seen in relation to the “we” in v. 5, where Paul already appealed to experience in anticipation of the elaboration that occurs here; cf. Wilckens, Der Brief an Die Römer, 2:76. The drama per se occurs only in vv. 9-10, and that “I” must at least overlap with that of vv. 7-8 and 11-12 in order to be relevant.

100 Details do not entirely fit Eve’s situation. The citation of the tenth commandment in v. 7 could be explained as an interpretive gloss (cf., e.g., Laato, Paul and Judaism, 104), but the appearance of the verb ἀναθέω in v. 9 clearly suggests that events in Eden are not being read but relived.
here wants to illustrate the catalytic function of the law on the normal bodily condition of fleshliness.\footnote{Grant Macaskill does not consider the Edenic setting of these verses; had he done so, he might not have conceded to the interpretation that behind Paul’s Adam Christology there lies the concept of the loss of Adam’s glory; cf. “Paradise in the New Testament,” in Paradise in Antiquity: Jewish and Christian Views (ed. Markus N. A. Bockmuehl and Gedaliahu A. G. Stroumsa; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 64–81.} I begin with the first point.

The operation of law in Eden speaks to Paul’s understanding of Adam and Eve as initially innocent and immature. They are minors rather than full grown heirs, or in Paul’s language of the image of God, they are earthly rather than heavenly representatives. Philo supplies a remarkable parallel.

In his Allegorical Interpretation of the Law, when Philo arrives at the giving of the commandment to Adam in Gen 2:16-17, he asks:

We must raise the question \textit{what} Adam He commands (ἐντέλλεται) and who this is; for the writer has not mentioned him before, but has named him now for the first time.\footnote{In the LXX the word ἄνθρωπος is used prior to the sudden appearance of the proper name Ἀδάμ in 2:16.} Perchance, then, he means to give us the name of the man that was moulded. “Call him earth” he says, for that is the meaning of “Adam,” so that when you hear the word “Adam,” you must make up your mind that it is the earthly and perishable mind; for the mind that was made after the image is not earthly but heavenly. (\textit{Leg.} 1.90)

Employing the allegory of the soul, Philo introduces the distinction between the earthly, perishable mind of Gen 2:7 and the heavenly, imperishable mind created after the image of Gen 1:26-27. The reason for this is that the heavenly mind has no need of the commandment:

Now it is to this being [of Gen 2:7], and not to the being created after His image and after the original idea, that God gives the command. For the latter, even without urging, possesses virtue instinctively; but the former, independently of instruction (διδασκαλία), could have no part in wisdom. (\textit{Leg.} 1.92)
Having established that the commandment only has relevance for the earthly Adam (mind), Philo proceeds to distinguish between three types of instruction ("injunction, prohibition, command accompanied by exhortation") and to relate these (unevenly) to three kinds of person (93-94). "Prohibition" (πρόσταξις) is addressed to the bad man; "injunction" (ἀπαγόρευσις) concerns the proper performance of duties; and "exhortation" (παράνεσις), which is linked to commandment, is addressed to the "neutral man" (τὸν μέσον). But to "the perfect man" (ὁ τέλειος) there is need of none of the three kinds of instruction. When he rounds out the discussion, Philo introduces a new category of person, the child (ὁ νήπιος), which corresponds in the need for instruction to the "neutral man"; they are probably one and the same: "The bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child of exhortation and teaching.” Thus, the child has need only of the third category of instruction. And he concludes: “Quite naturally, then, does God give the commandments and exhortations before us to the earthly man (τῷ γηίνῳ) who is neither bad nor good but midway between these” (95). The earthly being of Gen 2:7 is thus morally analogous to the child, and it is only to him, not the perfect man (the symbol of the soul as the image of God), that God gives the commandment. Philo returns to the childlike innocence of Adam and Eve in connection with their nakedness (Gen 2:25; 3:1) in the second book: “The mind that is clothed neither in vice nor in virtue, but absolutely stripped of either, is naked, just as the soul of an infant, since it is without part in either good or evil, is bared and stripped of coverings” (2.53). In his On Planting, Philo again stresses that it is not the man created after the image of God, stamped with the spirit, who is placed in the Garden but the composite man formed of earth:
It was to be expected, then, that God should plant and set in the garden, or the whole universe, the middle or neutral mind (τὸν μέσον νοῦν), played upon by forces drawing it in opposite directions and given the high calling to decide between them, that it might be moved to choose and to shun, to win fame and immortality should it welcome the better, and incur a dishonourable death should it choose the worse. (Plant. 44)

Here we have that neutral mind, as yet unaffected by good or bad choices, but subject to opposite inchoate tendencies, whose childlike innocence, as per the above texts, is about to be faced with the fateful prospect that Paul alludes to in Rom 7:9-11. For Paul the encounter is generative and ill-fated, but for Philo the commandment offers not only the opportunity but the means to proceed to maturity (cf. Decal. 49-50), though success is not guaranteed. We could comment at length on the differences between Paul and Philo and indulge in a lengthy comparison of their thought, but I call upon the Alexandrian here in order to show that the operation of law in Eden can be readily coordinated with anthropological speculation and that it also might readily confirm the less than complete development of Adam and Eve.

For Paul, the authority of the law pertains to humankind only outside of its maturity. It is not accidental that Paul in Galatians speaks of those under the law as being analogous to “minors” under “guardians and trustees” who await the gift of the Spirit (4:1-6; cf. 3:24), and that later he asserts, “if you are led by the Spirit, you are not subject to the law” (5:18). Paul, of course, is not speaking about Eden in these texts, but he is drawing on similar themes that Philo applies to distinguish between the Adam fashioned from dust, who has need of instruction, and the one fashioned after the image, to whom, as one possessing virtue instinctively, the commandment is not addressed. Philo might have said, “If you are led by the Spirit, you are not subject to the law. . . . The fruit of the
Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control. There is no law against such things” (Gal 5:19, 22-23). Now, if Paul in Rom 7:7-12 can conceive, even indirectly through his own paradigmatic experience, of the operation of divine law in Eden, it is apparent that at least here the category that best explains his thinking of Adam and Eve is that of childlike innocence.

In 1 Cor 3:1 Paul chastised his readers ὡς σαρκίνος, ὡς νηπίος, rather than πνευματικός, and therefore unable to discern the mind of the Lord. In Paul’s cosmological anthropology, it is the quality of being “flesh,” characteristic of the earthly Adam (1 Cor 15:45-50), which corresponds to a state analogous to immaturity, that coheres with the presence of the commandment in Eden. The normal bodily quality of fleshliness, viewed as it is in itself, is the presumed state of Adam and Eve in Eden, allowing “the catalytic operation of the law” to be illustrated from the Garden episode. The anthropological basis of Paul’s polemic falls out from under it if Adam and Eve are not “in the flesh” wherein “sinful passions” can be “aroused by the law” (Rom 7:5). The Edenic setting, moreover, demonstrates that Paul launched his polemic against the normative authority of the law on a universal anthropological basis.103

Adam, Sin, and Flesh. This use of the Eden narrative is thus another indication of its mythic, prototypical significance for the everyman in Paul.104 The propensity of the

103 For extensive argument and documentation, cf. Vlachos, The Law and the Knowledge; Vlachos, “Law, Sin, and Death.” Vlachos, however, shies away from exploring the anthropological side of the Law’s catalytic operation in Eden; that is, he does not explore Paul’s understanding of Adam per se.

104 Two texts which have been thought to reflect a fall from glory deserve comment: Romans, 1:23 and 3:23. The notion of Adam’s lost glory cannot be derived from these texts. While the narration of events in Rom 1:20-23 does seem influenced in part by the narratives of Gen 1-3, the key point to be made here is that the “exchange” (ἠλλαξαν; cf. Gen 31:7; Exod 13:30, etc.) of the glory of the immortal God for various creaturely images in v. 23 does not refer to a divesting of glory from the subjects themselves (even
flesh to be overcome by “sinful passions” which “work in our members” (7:5; cf. 6:12; 7:23) is modeled on the events of Eden. The use of the verb ἀναζάω recalls this primordial coming to life and sees its (eternal) return in the events here paradigmatically narrated. A theodic construal of these events is completely undermined. Rather, Paul points to adamic existence *per se* as having an innate propensity to sin. Sin is simply *there* as a latent potential of fleshly existence, although not yet in v. 9 clearly residing anywhere in particular. The human condition is adamic. The Adam of Gen 2 still speaks to *adam*: Rom 7:7-12 implicates Eden in the events of the “I.” However, it must

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105 In discussion of 7:13-25, which he rightly understands to narrate the impact of 7:7-12, Watson states, “‘Sin that dwells within me’ is not a general bias towards evil that is unfortunately integral to being human. It has an origin and a history, arising as it does from the disastrous encounter with the law narrated in vv. 7-12, and manifested in an ongoing subjection to ‘every kind of desire’ (v. 8)”; *Hermeneutics*, 377. This may be true as far as it goes but it does not deal with the common anthropological assumptions that underlie the appearance of sin in 7:7-12 and its domination in vv. 13-25. Something about the human constitution allows sin to activate, spring to life in the body, and take over. The attempt to avoid this implication (“unlike the situation of the fall, sin is already present within the human being who hears the law”) has Seifrid in knots: on the one hand, “Paul sees in the human encounter with the commandment the recapitulation of Adam’s transgression,” but on the other, “Paul was once ‘alive’ insofar as he is viewed as an individual apart from his connection with Adam”; “Romans,” in *Commentary on the New Testament*, 632.

106 Käsemann objects to this interpretation, a luxury afforded only because he argues, falsely, I believe, that the “I” is Adam: “There is nothing in the passage which does not fit Adam, and everything fits Adam alone”; Käsemann, *Romans*, 196. Similarly, Lichtenberger appeals to the past tense of vv. 7-13,
be acknowledged that this is an idyllic “I” of youthful innocence lost. Here the change in tense from the quasi-mythic past of the “I” in Rom 7:7-12 to the existential present of Rom 7:14-25 must also be accounted for. This change reflects the fact that the Edenic scenario is not played out repeatedly in the individual life, certainly not without degrees of relative difference. With its entrance, sin quickly and inevitably takes up residence, in Paul’s scenario. The house-guest of horror stories, it overstays its welcome, and then binds and slays you. Echoes of the Edenic drama recede from the voice that speaks in 7:14-25, and what emerges is the normal “I” of human existence. “For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am fleshly, sold into slavery under sin,” says Paul (7:14). This is now an “I” subject to the powers of sin and death, Adam and Eve after innocence, after Eden. To put it differently, this “I” speaks no longer after the model of Eden but in Adam.

explaining that “zunächst einmal wird ja die Geschichte Adams erzählt. Diese kann in ihren Einzelzügen nicht einfach auf jedes andere ‘Ich’ übertragen warden. Und doch ist, was Adam tat, für jeden bestimmend, und was seine Begegnung mit dem Gesetz erbrachte, offenbart sich, wo immer die adamitische Existenz dem Gebot Gottes begegnet”; Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams, 134.

107 The NRSV (and ESV) have “the law is spiritual, but I am of the flesh,” even though both adjectives are nominative, πνευματικός, σάρκινος. Paul probably can think of the primal couple as being σάρκινος in the more neutral sense of that word; cf. 2 Cor 3:3, usually translated “human” (ἐν πλαξίν καρδίας σαρκίνος) or 1 Cor 3:1, where it designates immaturity (ἄλλ᾽ ὡς σαρκίνος, ὡς νηπίοις ἐν Χριστῷ) and is related to ψυχικός as opposed to πνευματικός (2:13-15), terminology which reappears in connection with Adam and Christ (15:45-49). Here (Rom 7:14) its negative associations emerge, but this is because of contextual factors, Paul’s being “sold under sin.” That state is not synonymous with “fleshliness” per se; he was not “sold under sin” (except, perhaps, by fate) in the time of innocence which he describes in 7:9.

108 Thus, I follow the interpretation that Rom 7:14-25 speaks to existence as determined by Adam. The will to do good (15-21) and the delight in the law of God (v. 22) are completely ineffective against sin; this picture stands in too strong a contrast with the deliverance celebrated in 7:4-6 and 8:2-4 (or even Gal 5:16-26) in order to describe the same state. This means that Paul’s anthropology does contain concepts comparable not only to the יִשְׂרָאֵל הָיָה but also the יִשְׂרָאֵל הָיָה, the key fact being that the inclination to do good is weakened by the flesh, where the inclination toward evil finds its entry point. This correlates to Rom 2:14-15, where Paul conceives of Gentiles doing what the law requires, evidencing its inscription on their hearts. Similarly, Paul at the conclusion of Rom 7:21-25, discusses the delight in the law of God with the mind in opposition to the law of sin in his members. The rhetorical demands of Rom 2:14-15 and 7:14-25 should be allowed to balance each other in terms of human capacity to do good; nevertheless, in view not
Flesh is thus naturally corruptible, physically and morally, but not in itself “evil.” For Paul, sinfulness comes to fore in the individual in sinful passions and acts. When he draws on the scriptures, primarily the Psalms, to demonstrate human sinfulness, it is to descriptions of pervasive deeds of sinfulness that he turns (Rom 3:10-18, citing LXX Ps 13:1-3; Eccl. 7:20; LXX Ps 5:10; 139:4; 9:28; Isa 59:7-8; Ps 35:2). This corresponds to Paul’s conviction that the “image of God” is borne in the bodily constitution of humanity (1 Cor 11:7; 15:39-40, 45-49). While Paul does speak of the “body of sin” (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, Rom 6:6) and “sinful flesh” (σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας, 8:3), this is a description of the body fallen under the power of sin, not a characteristic of bodies in themselves. He also speaks of sin dwelling “in the members” (ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν, 7:5), which plainly distinguishes sin from the body of flesh per se. Even perhaps his most radical statement concerning the flesh preserves this distinction, ὁδὰ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεὶ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτ’ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν (“for I know that good does not dwell within me, that is, in my flesh,” 7:18), which is misinterpreted as saying, “Flesh is . . .

only of Rom 3:19 but also 5:12-21 and here, 7:14-25, it is apparent that Paul does not at all share Ben Sira’s optimism about the strength of the right side to stand tall in this tug of war (Sir 15:11-20). On the evil inclination in Paul, cf. Joel Marcus, “The Evil Inclination in the Letters of Paul,” IBS 8 (1986): 8–21. On the comparison of Paul and Ben Sira in terms of agency, cf. Maston, Agency.

This is not to deny the transhistorical dimension of sin whereby it functions as an “antecedent power with fateful character in every human life”; Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 500. The point is that from many angles this is the product of initial and continued human disobedience, whereby historical and cosmological conditions have become distorted and taken on an anti-god character of their own, and secondly that Paul, as I go on to note, retains a sense of the fundamental dignity of the human person (including the body) per se.

Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 57–66. Likewise, in Rom 1-2 the emphasis is on the dishonouring of bodies and sinful deeds.

This would explain the use of ἐν ὑμωμάτι in this verse in its application of the phrase “sinful flesh” to Christ. His, indeed, was real flesh (so 1:3), but it was not implicated in what Paul thinks normal of flesh.

Cf. Keck, Romans, 189. Contrast most translations, e.g., the NRSV: “For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh.” What is at issue is the lack of the power to do good, as the second half of v. 18 develops with explanatory γὰρ: “For I have the desire to do what is right, but not the
evil." Paul can speak equally of presenting our very same members (τὰ μέλη) as instruments of righteousness (Rom 6:13; cf. v. 19; 12:1). At the same time, however, the flesh, the mortal body (τὸ θνητὸν τὸ σώματον, 6:12), basically remains “dead because of sin” (8:10). Paul seems to be reacting to the fact that the body still dies, despite the believer’s redemption: a sign that sin has and continues to prevent transformation. Outwardly, we still bear the image of the earthly Adam. He also states elsewhere that “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God,” where he imagines mortality being swallowed up by immortality (1 Cor 15:50-53). The operative assumption undergirding Paul’s thinking about the body, sin, and death appears to be that physical corruptibility corresponds to moral corruptibility, and that moral corruption seals the corruption of the body. Flesh, in particular, becomes a leitmotif of moral corruption because it corresponds to bodies in their earthly rather than heavenly determination.

We find, then, in Rom 7:7-12 the same convergence of the historical and mythical sense of “Adam” as in Rom 5:12: Adam’s sin creates the historical conditions which determine the sin and death of his descendants, for thereby he passes on his humanity.

ability to carry it out” (ESV). In the “flesh” operates “the law of sin” (7:23). If Paul were looking to designate a part of the body, i.e., “flesh,” as ontologically evil, he would not also speak of sin’s operation “in the members” as synonymous with “in the flesh” (v. 18a, 23) and yet also of the “the members” as potential “instruments of righteousness” (6:13, 19).

113 Barrett, Romans, 139.

The statement is purposefully designed to exclude the cosmological impact of Adam’s sin, just as it is not to the fore in Rom 7 itself, which makes the environment in which sin comes to life in his descendants somewhat different than the semi-ideal setting of Eden. The result is to heighten the fateful character of this process, its inevitability. Sin takes on more and more the character of a hostile antecedent power. Still, even the supposed idealism of Eden should not be stated absolutely, for surely the serpent marks a negative environmental pressure of which Paul is aware in 2 Cor 11:3; it is perhaps not accidental that Paul narrates his own trip to paradise in the next chapter and that it too is connected with satanic opposition (2 Cor 12:1-9), although it is not clear that this occurs in paradise; cf. Robert M. Price, “Punished in Paradise (An Exegetical Theory on 2 Corinthians 12:1-10),” JSNT 7 (1980): 33–40; C. R. A.
The implication that Adam and Eve were under the authority of the commandment both confirms their initial childlike innocence and immaturity but also their possession of normal human ontology, the corruptible flesh. If these things are only indirectly derived from Paul’s adoption of an Edenic “I” to representatively narrate his own experience, they at least fit comfortably with everything we have discovered thus far.

Creation and the Children of God: Romans 8:18-23

Romans 8:18-23 draws into one concentrated text—conceptually centered on an allusion to Gen 1-3—many of the threads of its own chapter, and of our entire discussion of Paul up to this point. In this text, Paul discusses the symbiotic connection between humanity and creation in the context of the purpose of God. The influence of the creation narratives (Gen 1-3) here is basically accepted in scholarship, and the points which are necessary to make perhaps suffer more from a lack of emphasis than the diverging contentions of scholars, so our discussion will follow a more direct route than has sometimes previously been the case. Finally, too, Paul suggests elements of a perspective pertinent to the perennial question which hangs over every thought of human alienation and suffering, not least in the context of creation by God, Why?


The references to “suffering” and “glory” in v. 18 emerge immediately from the use of those terms in v. 17, where the important concept of joint inheritance with Christ is broached (cf. Rom 5:17; Gal 3:25-4:6; 1 Cor 15:24-28). The subjection of the creation “in hope” points backward to humankind’s sin (Rom 5:12) and forward to the discussion of God’s purpose in vv. 28-30 (cf. Rom 5:17-21; 1 Cor 15:24-28). The revelation of the children of God with the adoption and the redemption of the body (v. 18, 19, 21, 23) links with the specific purpose that God predestined the called “to be conformed to the image of his Son” (vv. 29-30; cf. 1 Cor 14:45-49; 2 Cor 3:18; Phil 3:21). The designation of the “spirit” as first fruits links backward to 8:1-17 and forward to vv. 26-27 (cf. 2 Cor 3:18; 5:5).

Certainly, however, a good share of ambiguities remain.
Paul does something remarkable in the present text. He links the corruption of creation to the curses of Gen 3:14-19, and with that establishes an anthropological hinge both to its protological (and persistent) predicament and its eschatological fulfilment.\textsuperscript{118}

The text in the NRSV reads:

\begin{quote}
18 I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory about to be revealed to us.\textsuperscript{19} For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God;\textsuperscript{20} for the creation was subjected to futility (τῇ γὰρ ματαιότητι ἡ κτίσις ὑπετάγη), not of its own will but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope\textsuperscript{21} that the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay (φθοράς) and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God.\textsuperscript{22} We know that the whole creation has been groaning in labor pains (συστενάζει καὶ συνωδίνετ\textsuperscript{119}) until now;\textsuperscript{23} and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly while we wait for adoption,\textsuperscript{120} the redemption of our bodies.
\end{quote}

The allusion to Gen 3:14-19 and 5:29 occurs in v. 20—the subjection of creation to futility (cf. 4 Ezra 7:10-12; 9:20; L.A.E. 34; 2 Bar. 56:5),\textsuperscript{121} which appears to recall

\textsuperscript{118} Hahne discusses the view of Olle Christoffersson, \textit{The Earnest Expectation of the Creature: The Flood-Tradition as Matrix of Romans 8:18-27} (CBNT 23; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1990), citing pp. 104, 120-124, who argues that the “sons of God” are angels; cf. Harry Hahne, \textit{The Corruption and Redemption of Creation: Nature in Romans 8.19-22 and Jewish Apocalyptic Literature} (LNTS 336; New York: T & T Clark, 2006), 184–186. However, the references to the sonship of believers in vv. 14-17 and 23, the distinction between believers and creation in v. 23, and the new kind of familial relationship inaugurated between Christ and now glorified believers in v. 29 suggest that we can be confident that redeemed humanity is in view. Susan Eastman’s argument that the revelation of the “sons of God” (v. 19) includes Israel does not significantly alter my limited aims in this section: “Whose Apocalypse? The Identity of the Sons of God in Romans 8:19,” \textit{JBL} 121 (2002): 263–77.

\textsuperscript{119} The NET has “groans and suffers.” The reference to “labour pains” is in part a product of reading the two verbs as hendiadys, but this is not necessary; cf. Laurie J. Braaten, “The Groaning Creation: The Biblical Background for Romans 8:22,” \textit{BR} 50 (2005): 20–21.

\textsuperscript{120} The term is omitted in several witnesses, mostly Western, likely because it seems to conflict with v.15. It is, however, the more difficult and better attested reading. Cf. Metzger, \textit{A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament}, s.v.; Brendan J. Byrne, \textit{Sons of God, Seed of Abraham: A Study of the Idea of the Sonship of God of All Christians in Paul Against the Jewish Background} (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1979), 109 n. 119.

\textsuperscript{121} There has been considerable discussion concerning the referent of κτίσις (vv. 19, 20, 21, 22), but “natural world” makes excellent sense of the context. The dialectic between humankind and κτίσις suggests that the term refers specifically to the non-human world, although Eastman argues that unbelieving humanity is included: Eastman, “Whose Apocalypse?,” 273–276. Cf. the survey and argument in support of the non-human cosmos in Hahne, \textit{Corruption}, 176–181; also Wilckens, \textit{Der Brief an Die
especially the curse on the ground which Adam suffers for his disobedience.\textsuperscript{122} The word ματαιότης ("futility") glosses the Hebrew חבל and שוא in the LXX and is overwhelmingly found in Ecclesiastes. As Fitzmyer states, "It denotes the state of ineffectiveness of something that does not attain its goal or purpose; concretely, it means the chaos, decay, and corruption (8:21) to which humanity has subjected God’s noble creation."\textsuperscript{123} There is perhaps corroborating evidence that we have here a recollection of Genesis in that the cognate verb appeared in Rom 1:20, where again Genesis is detected, to describe the cognitive impact of humankind’s neglect of the knowledge of God in creation. The groaning and labour pains of v. 22 have also been connected to the multiplication of pains in child-labour of Gen 3:16 (note the cognate στεναγμός),\textsuperscript{124} to which the reference here would have to represent a sort of metaphorical reapplication, but this is not certain. Indeed, while the allusion to Genesis in general commands wide agreement, it is not without difficulties.\textsuperscript{125} These are basically two: in the present text, God, it seems, rather


\textsuperscript{122} Objecting to this interpretation, Braaten cautions, “In Gen 3:17, God’s curse on the arable ground is ‘on account of’ Adam (בעבורך). The result is not an extensive fall of the created order, but rather the production of thorns which make Adam’s agricultural tasks more difficult and less productive. In other words, it seems that the curse is primarily on human labor in connection with the ground, not on God’s creation \textit{per se}; Braaten, “Groaning Creation,” 22–23. In reply it should be noted that the serpent, the woman, and humanity all suffer ill-effects resulting from Adam and Eve’s disobedience and not simply the ground; this broaches something more like an adversely affected “created order”—animal, humanity, earth. Moreover, the question is not whether Paul has rightly read Genesis, but whether there is evidence he is thinking of Genesis and traditions around it when he refers to the futility of creation. Jonathan Moo adopts Braaten’s suggestion that Isa 24-27 informs Paul’s discussion of the ongoing suffering of creation, and expands on it to include the believer’s endurance and the hope of resurrection, but without rejecting the influence of Gen 3: “it seems nearly certain that Genesis 3 has influenced Paul’s thinking in Romans 8”; “Romans 8.19-22 and Isaiah’s Cosmic Covenant,” \textit{NTS} 54 (2008): 84.

\textsuperscript{123} Fitzmyer, \textit{Romans}, 507.


\textsuperscript{125} Arguing for perhaps an implausible degree of harmony between Paul’s thought and Darwinian evolution, Christopher Southgate too strongly resists the allusion to Gen 3:17-19: \textit{The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the Problem of Evil} (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008),

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than Adam subjects creation, and the subjection is done “in hope,” not as a matter of curse. These two difficulties share one solution: the passage is oriented toward the unfolding of God’s plan in the eschatological future. Moreover, God’s active role can be readily detected in Genesis: God is the subject of 3:16 (“I will greatly multiply . . .”) and the language of curse (vv. 17-19) is by nature performative. The stressing of God’s role here, as opposed to humankind’s, facilitates the sense that even this has its place in the divine plan. If our argument earlier in Romans has been sound, then it will have been rhetorically effective for Paul to stress the divine plan here, for the sense of inevitability to human sin has been palpable, extending right back to Adam.

Before asking what sort of reading of Gen 1-3 this allusion might be taken to entail, it will be well to determine what precisely is meant by the creation’s subjection to futility and its subsequent freedom. It is worth pausing on this question, even though the answer is not in doubt: Paul defines the “futility” more specifically in the next verse as

95–96. While, as I understand Rom 8:18-23 there is less friction between Paul and Darwin than in the views Southgate opposes, it does not seem possible in Paul’s thought to dissociate human sin from the actual presence of death in the world, such that the travail of creation can be interpreted as the evolutionary struggle itself. Laurie Braaten’s critique of the interpretation that Gen 3:14-19 stands behind Rom 8:20 is addressed solely to a singular fall of creation; Braaten, “Groaning Creation,” 22–24.


It should be noted that creation’s involuntary subjection does seem to imply an implicit contrast with humanity (cf. Rom 1:21; 5:12), whom Paul addresses separately (as redeemed humanity) from creation in v. 23. There can be no doubt that Paul treats humans as willful and culpable, but this is far from a fully developed doctrine of free will such as we see emerging in Sir 15:14-15. Nor can one assume that Gen 2-3 implies free will; cf. the warnings of Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 233–234. We have detected no evidence that Paul engages in speculation in order to resolve issues of divine determination and human willing: both appear to operate. Eastman uses this tension in fact to argue that humanity is included in the subjection to futility, noting the passives ἐματαιώθησαν and ἐσκοτίσθη of Rom 1:21, the threefold “handing over” of v. 24, 26, 28, and the themes emerging in chs. 9-11: “Whose Apocalypse?,” 274–275.
“bondage to decay” (v.21). While the word φθορά can carry a moral connotation (Wis 14:12, 25; 2 Pet 1:4; 2:19), it more typically refers to material decay (e.g., Exod 18:18; Isa 24:3; Gal 6:8; Col 2:24; both senses appear in 2 Pet 2:12). In speaking of κτίσις the latter sense is predominant. Although human disobedience is prominent in the background—and the tradition—as the cause for this bondage, the main emphasis in speaking of the creation’s subjection to futility is brought out in the total context by the contrast between corruption and incorruption (“glory”), focusing on material states. It is noteworthy that “futility” is not said to be a condition of “corruption” alone but τῆς δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς (v. 21). The aspect of futility (of not achieving a goal) may derive from the experience of “bondage to corruption” (objective genitive) rather than the bondage that inheres in corruption per se (genitive of apposition). This bondage will be the product of creation’s subjection to the influence of sinful humanity, preventing its own flourishing. The probable echoes of prophetic language (esp. in v. 22) that describe the destruction and mourning of the earth because of human sin support this reading (Isa 24:4-6; Jer 4:27-31; Zeph 1:2-3; Joel 1:10-12, 17-20).

130 Hahne notes a third possibility, the subjective genitive (slavery that comes from corruption), but he also prefers the objective sense. He does not, however, note the nuance that corruption per se may be distinguished from futility, and instead consistently treats “corruption” along with “futility” as direct effects of Adam’s “fall.” Ibid., 194.
131 Such traditions are emphasized by Braaten, Keesmaat, and J. Moo. It has been thought that the aorist ὑπετάγη (v. 20) militates against this background, but probably “at most, the aorist verb in verse 20 (‘was subjected’) might refer to God’s initial act of subjecting the creation to the abuse that will be done to it by fallen humanity”; Richard Bauckham, “The Story of the Earth According to Paul: Romans 8:18-23,” RevExp 108 (2011): 93. However, Bauckham goes on to argue for too firm a distinction between “death as
The relationship between creation and humanity is one of mirrored and not simply related destinies.\textsuperscript{132} Earlier in Romans Paul spoke of the “mortal (\(\theta\nu\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma\)) body” (6:12) and in 1 Cor 15:42 he spoke of the human body as being characterized by \(\phi\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}\), where the corruptible body appears equivalent to that of the man taken from the earth (v. 47). Earth and body are related in protology. Moreover, when the body comes to share in “glory” or \(\alpha\phi\theta\alpha\rho\sigma\iota\alpha\) (Rom 8:17, 21, 23; 1 Cor 15:42),\textsuperscript{133} Paul also speaks of the creation obtaining “the freedom of the glory of the children of God.”\textsuperscript{134} “Freedom” here is explicitly contrasted with “bondage to corruption” (v. 21); it describes a change in the state of creation which will be made possible because it benefits from or shares in “glory” that in the first instance characterizes “the sons of God.”\textsuperscript{135} Creation goes from the state of being corruptible to incorruptible when humankind, taken from its crumbling soil, reaches the full maturity of sons and itself first possesses glory.\textsuperscript{136} The collapse of the present dualism of heaven and earth is being imagined. Paul appears to be thinking along the lines of the apocalyptic visions of a new heaven and earth (cf. Isa 65:17-25; 66:22; 1 En. 45:4-5; Jub. 4:26; 2 Pet 3:13; Rev 21-22; 4 Ezra 7:30-31, 75; 2 Bar. 31:6-32:7; 2 En.\textsuperscript{a} a universal feature of the animal and vegetable creations” stemming from Gen 3 and “processes of ecological degradation and destruction” such as the prophets describe. Ibid., 94.

\textsuperscript{132} This goes beyond the “solidarity between humanity and nature” as expressed by Hahne, Corruption, 214–215; as well as the tradition of “common fate” spoken of by Byrne, Sons of God, 105. It also looks like the typological relationship between creation and humankind that informed the argument of 1 Cor 15:35-50.

\textsuperscript{133} On this relationship in general in Romans, cf. Blackwell, “Immortal Glory and the Problem of Death in Romans 3.23.”

\textsuperscript{134} Literally, the construction is freed \textit{from decay to freedom}.

\textsuperscript{135} The genitive in the phrase “freedom of the glory” will then be one of content or source, but not “glorious freedom” (KJV, RSV, NIV), which dilutes the central term of the whole passage; cf. Hahne, Corruption, 198; Moo, Romans, 517 n. 48; Cranfield, Romans, 1:415–6.

\textsuperscript{136} “The ‘bodily’ character of the resurrection manifests the resurrection as an event that not only occurs in time but also signals the ‘bodily’ ontological transformation of the created order in the kingdom of God”; Beker, Triumph, 157.
65:8-11) as a sort of cosmic participation in God’s incorruptibility (cf., esp., 4 Ezra 7:30-31; 2 Bar. 31:6-32:7), bequeathed to and through those who (with Christ, v. 17) stand between God and world (cf. 1 Cor 15:24-28). As we sensed in Rom 5:12 (with v. 17), the fate of the body is by definition a cosmic phenomenon. The relationship between humankind and world depicted here confirms the allusion to Gen 3:14-19, where Adam’s return to dust (v. 19) is the climax of worsened conditions in creation and the corollary of being cut off from the tree whose fruit is eternal life. The creation in Paul’s thought is profoundly *anthropotelic*.

The entwined *telos* of the creation in the human condition reflects the integral role that humanity is depicted to have within the world’s own becoming in texts such as Gen 1:26-30; 2:15; and Ps 8:2, 5-8 (Eng.). The thematically linked notions of being joint-heirs of all things with Christ (v.17; 8:32) and of conformation to the image of Christ (v. 29) contribute to this overall picture and anchor Paul’s discourse in what are contextually anthropogenic motifs in scriptural tradition.

The motif of inheritance (“heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ,” v. 17) emerged as the corollary to sonship and adoption (*υἱοθεσία*, vv. 15, 23; 9:4; Gal 4:5; Eph 1:5), which are qualities emerging from the possession of the spirit (vv. 14-15). But this sonship and adoption inclines to a future realization (v. 23). The children of God do not

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137 Byrne writes, “The thought in v. 21 is that creation also . . . will gain this incorruptibility by winning its own share of the divine glory, mediated through the elect”; *Sons of God*, 107–108.
138 In Romans, however, Paul’s thought does not go so far as to depict the final submission of the Son prior to God’s being “all in all.”
come into their inheritance until they are glorified. Brendan Byrne writes, “the description of the eschatological blessings and specifically eternal life in ‘inheritance’ terms is characteristic of the Jewish background . . . which comes to the fore explicitly in Rom 4 and Gal 3-4.”\(^{140}\) While eternal life is certainly the framework of Paul’s discussion, Byrne focuses a little too exclusively on it (“To be an ‘heir (of God)’ is to be one destined to receive the inheritance of eternal life from his hands”).\(^{141}\) There is a parallel conception at work in the Hodayot: God gives “an inheritance (חזקהלים) in all the glory of adam for long life” (1QH\(^a\) IV 27), a concept which is expanded on in the next column: “By your splendour you glorify him, and you give [him] dominion [with] abundant delights together with eternal peace and long life” (V 34-35). The concept of the inheritance involves taking possession of creation as sovereigns in the condition of eternal life. The same associations are made in Romans. Later in the chapter Paul asks, “He who did not withhold his own Son, but gave him up for all of us, will he not with him also give us everything else?” (or better “all things,” τὰ πάντα ἣμῖν χαρίσεται, v. 32; cf. the χάρισμα of 5:16). The cosmic scope to the concept of inheritance elucidates the passage from the inheritance motif in vv. 15-17 to the discussion of the creation in vv. 18-23. The connection is confirmed by Rom 4:13: the promise to Abraham was that he would be κληρονόμος κόσμου. Thus as the sons of God are glorified and come into their inheritance of “all things,” the creation too experiences its freedom. Something more than mere sequence is at work.\(^{142}\) Rather, Paul sees here the beneficent consequences for the

\(^{140}\) Byrne, Sons of God, 101–102.
\(^{141}\) Ibid., 101.
\(^{142}\) As Hultgren’s comments might suggest: Romans, 321.
cosmos of the fulfillment of human destiny to rule over creation (Gen 1:26-29; Ps 8), which issues in the destruction of the powers of chaos that are unleashed from within it when it stands outside of the sovereignty of God, which God has designed to exercise through humanity (cf. 1 Cor 15:24-28). This is why creation must wait with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God. The fundamentally anthropological quality of this vision should not be lost, but it comes only to fruition through participation in the suffering and glorification of Christ (“we suffer with him so that we may also be glorified with him,” v. 17).

This leads to the second manner in which Paul’s discussion in vv. 18-23 is a development of anthropogonic traditions. The redemption of the body (v. 23) which brings to pass the “freedom of the glory of the children of God” (v. 21) is later expressed as conformation to the image of Christ, which is expounded in the contextually pertinent category of sonship: “For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son (συμμορφωσε τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ νιόθω αὐτοῦ), in order that he might be the firstborn within a large family (πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς)” (v. 29). Here there can be little doubt that conformation to the image of Christ refers to coming to possess a body conformed to his glorious, incorruptible body (cf. Phil 3:21). According to 1 Cor 15:45-49, as argued above, this is understood on the model of the duality of

143 Cf. the analysis of this text in Byrne, Sons of God, 116–118.
144 Cf. Lorenzen, Eikon-Konzept, 204–211. Following Steenburg’s analysis of μορφή and εἰκών, which identifies the former term as emphasizing the visible and the latter capable of a deeper representative signification, Lorenzen also argues that μορφή serves to define the event specifically as coming to possess a body like Christ’s (pp. 207-208).
heaven and earth, and not on the restoration of Adam’s lost or defaced image. We saw that duality as something that Paul detects in the context of Gen 1, where it is also inscribed into the concept of the creation of humankind κατά the image of God (Gen 1:26-27). Thus the language of Rom 8:29 is coherent with Paul’s use of the second Adam concept in 1 Cor 15:45-49, as long as we recognize that that concept does not look backward (to some quality Adam lost) but forward (to Christ as a new Adam, head of a new heavenly humanity). The conceptual coherence of “image” and sonship lies in the fact that the image of God expresses a likeness to the divine which inheres in the body, analogously to the concept of family resemblance (Gen 5:2-3), and that the image mediates God’s presence and will to creation. Remarkably, these associations—between image, bodiliness, and inheritance—are retained in Paul’s use of the

145 Byrne, while recognizing the coherence between 1 Cor 15:45-49; Phil 3:21; 2 Cor 3:18 and 4:6, objects to seeing a reference to Christ as the image of God in this text, which would “overload the language” where there is in fact no “explicit allusion”; Sons of God, 125. The caution is welcomed. But the combined occurrence of this language elsewhere with explicit and strongly implied allusions to “image of God” (2 Cor 3:18 + 4:4; Phil 3:21 + 2:6-7; 1 Cor 15:45-49 + 11:7) and its occurrence here in the context of a reflection on the relationship of humankind to creation does not make such an allusion seem overloaded. Unfortunately, the only possibility in which Byrne conceives of such an allusion functioning would be on the model of the restoration of the image of God, lost by Adam’s sin. That, indeed, is not alluded to here, nor anywhere in Paul. Moo’s formulation illustrates the confusion of this view; he thinks an implicit negative comparison with Adam is in the background and says, “Adam, created in God’s ‘image’ (LXX εἰκόνα) has tragically ‘transformed’ that image into one that is ‘earthy,’ sin-marred; and this image is what is now imprinted on all who were descended from him”; Romans, 534, n. 151. This is a very skewed allusion to the language of 1 Cor 15:45-49.

146 More accurate than Byrne and Moo in the previous note is Pheme Perkins: “Neither Philo nor Paul treat Adam’s disobedience as having lost or disfigured the divine ‘image,’ which then required a new Adam to restore.” But when she proceeds saying, “Therefore, one should not presume that when Paul refers to the culmination of salvation as coming to share the image of God’s Son in Rom 8:29, he is referring to Christ as a second Adam,” she reflects more the predominate interpretations of the “second Adam” concept than Paul’s own use of it; “Adam and Christ in the Pauline Epistles,” in Celebrating Paul: Festschrift in Honor of Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, O.P., and Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J. (ed. Peter Spitaler; Washington, D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 2012), 146.

147 The bodiliness of the image and its expression as a matter of sonship and adoption again remind us of the ambiguities surrounding gender and the image of God, but this text takes us no further in our comprehension of that problem.
categories.\textsuperscript{148} Genesis 1:26-27, therefore, is central to an anthropology of hope in Paul, but in the qualified sense that it holds out hope that the earthly image might also take of the fruit of the tree of life and come to possess the kind of life that characterizes the Son of God (the heavenly image). It is only in this way that Paul sees humankind as actually being empowered to adequately fulfill its commission as described in Gen 1:26-28 and the eighth Psalm, although a start is made in this life by those who are indwelt by the spirit.

In closing the discussion of Rom 8:18-23, before I offer elements of a broader perspective on the questions of sin and suffering in Paul, it needs to be stressed that the subjection of creation to decay no more suggests a prior state of “aesthetic perfection” or incorruption than did the condemnation of humankind to death, although a contrast, a before and after, is naturally implied. According to 1 Cor 15:45-49, the corruptibility of Adam is a product of his being taken from the corruptible earth. In the case of both humankind and creation, the sense might be of an initial condition of good functioning and fecundity which still needed to be acted upon for its flourishing. John Gibbs calls this a “dynamic ontology.”\textsuperscript{149} The creation has not fallen from a state of \textit{incorruption}, such as Paul anticipates, \textit{to corruption}. The creation has always been waiting for the bearers of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{148} Worthington comments on some of these relationships, but it is not clear that Paul is consciously applying, as Worthington seems to imply, the principle of Gen 5:3, a text which bears a lot of weight in Worthington’s analysis of the image concept; cf. \textit{Creation in Paul and Philo}, 199–200.
\textsuperscript{149} John G. Gibbs, \textit{Creation and Redemption: A Study in Pauline Theology} (NovTSup 26; Leiden: Brill, 1971), 140. This does not receive sufficient emphasis by Hahne, who is generally luke-warm to suggestions that corruption characterized creation from the start. Contributing to this is his heavy focus on the context of apocalyptic literature and light focus on the context of Paul’s letters themselves; cf., e.g., Hahne, \textit{Corruption}, 186–187, 192, 194–196: “The perishable bodies of believers [citing 1 Cor 15:42–43] are part of the perishable material creation that is enslaved to corruptibility” (198).}
the image to grow up into Christ. But, certainly, it had not always been waiting with the same burden and long-suffering, the same “futility.”

Finally, some perspective may be given to the logic which undergirds a scheme that appears to take for granted the inevitability of sin and ruin. While it is beyond the scope of this study to do anything more than provide the barest sketch, it would be ineffective to do anything less. There are two prongs to the perspective, which can be gleaned from Paul’s discussion in Rom 8 and beyond. We find the hint of the first prong in Paul’s statement that creation is subjected “in hope” (v. 20). Paul is confident that history is unfolding according to the designs of God, and that any “sufferings” which are corollary to that plan “are not worth comparing with the glory about to be revealed” (v. 18). He outright rejects any attempt to charge God with injustice if this plan involves “vessels of wrath fitted for destruction” (9:19-24). And if God has “imprisoned all in disobedience so that he may be merciful to all” (11:32), that is a matter “of the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God,” whose judgements are unsearchable and whose ways inscrutable (11:32-33). He expresses his confidence in the triumph of God’s purpose in 8:28; this is expounded in v. 29 as predestination of those God foreknew to conformation to the image of Christ. God’s plan all along has been to see (elect) humanity through to Christ. There is a clear sense then of the sovereignty of God who acts as a conductor over the ebb and flow of a multifarious and often oblique existence.

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150 Cf. Gibbs: “Redemption presupposes creation because redemption is no threat to the creation but, rather, carries to fulfillment what was provided as possibility in the creation”; Creation and Redemption, 142.

151 “The ‘futility’ of creation indicates that it is not able to achieve the purpose for which it was created”; Hahne, Corruption, 211.
But there is a second prong, a sort of indirect rationality (in terms of this issue) that appears to be at work in Paul’s thought, and it stands in some tension with the first. If conformation to the image of Christ is predestined, then a certain givenness attaches to all which leads up to it, good and bad.\textsuperscript{152} But precisely why should all this have been necessary? Why not create humanity in this perfected sense from the start? An answer suggests itself when Paul says that “we are . . . heirs . . . if, in fact, we suffer with him so that we may also be glorified” (Rom 8:17). Everywhere in Paul’s thought, the human being is treated as a willing, responsible agent (but certainly never “free” outside of redemption!), with whom God would enter into personal relationship. God does not circumvent this relationship. “We also boast in our sufferings,” Paul says, “knowing that suffering produces endurance and endurance produces character, and character produces hope, and hope does not disappoint us” (5:3-5). The whole creation is designed to facilitate this process, which is why it has been subjected—subjected, by design, to Adam prior to his disobedience, and subjected to decay because of his disobedience. It has been God’s way from the beginning to treat human beings as relational beings who have the opportunity for growth and maturation, which must come from experience. Where traditions of Adam’s supernatural status develop, this dimension of the divine-human relationship is short-circuited. Paul is not there yet, but he has hardly read Genesis in some historically objective sense, unaffected by his own experience. In his classic work, \textit{Evil and the God of Love}, John Hick suggested that “instead of upholding the perfection

\textsuperscript{152} Cf. Gibbs: “If God chose us in him before the foundation of the world (Eph 1:3), redemption is not the reflex of a God who was caught by surprise when sin entered the world”; \textit{Creation and Redemption}, 140.
of the universe as an aesthetic whole, we must think of it as perfect in the rather different sense that it is suited to the fulfillment of God’s purpose for it.\textsuperscript{153} Here is the root of the tension between these poles in Paul’s thought. He assumes the human being is morally accountable, even innocent in the least affected conditions (i.e., the twilight of creation and early childhood), but his particular understanding of God’s purpose for creation as conformation to the heavenly image of Christ introduced by retrospection a strong element of fatalism and pessimism into his anthropology which is reflected in his interpretation of Gen 2-3. If God relates to humankind as moral beings, and yet it is only in conformation to the image of Christ that they reach maturity and God’s purposes are fulfilled, then the picture of humanity outside of Christ will look bleak indeed.\textsuperscript{154}

One final trail along admittedly speculative line. In his paean to the unsearchable depths of God’s plan, Paul appears to cite Job 41:3 (מִי הִקְדִימַנִי וַאֲשַלֵם, Eng. 41:11) in Rom 11:35 (ἢ τίς προέδωκεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀνταποδοθήσεται αὐτῷ;). It is surprising that in his deliberations concerning the condemnation of humankind before God, Paul does not draw more on the radical dismissal of human righteousness before God on the part of Job’s friends (Job 4:17-20; 15:14-16; 25:4-6), but now Paul approaches a similar point. Paul appeals here to the radical priority of God, as one against whom no one can claim a debt. God owes nothing to his creation, “for from him and through him and to him are all things” (Rom 11:36). Both in Romans and Job the text comes in the context of the assertion of God’s radical plan and the futility on the part of a mere human to challenge

\textsuperscript{154} Readers will recognize this as a variation on the familiar theme that for Paul solution precedes plight.
God’s justice. But there is more to the story, for both texts have wrestled profoundly with the problem of evil and suffering within the context of God’s creation. The perspective offered in Job is important for the manner that it coalesces at points with the two prongs to Paul’s perspective on evil, sin, and suffering sketched above.155

As God leads Job through a tour of creation, two unsettling realities emerge. On the one hand, and primarily in the first speech from the whirlwind, God shakes Job free from his anthropocentrism: Job is without knowledge of creation’s deep workings and fine design and the creation itself is depicted as showing little knowledge of and radical indifference to the contingencies and needs of humankind. On the other hand, and even more unsettling, in the second speech, the element of the chaotic to human well-being becomes central and God’s relationship to such symbols subverts anthropocentric celebrations of God’s good ordering of creation: “From the striking metaphor of the sea as swaddled infant, to the celebration of the wildness of those creatures who mock and spurn human control, to the ecstatic description of Leviathan, the uncomfortable sense grows that God’s identification with the chaotic is as strong as with the symbols of order.” As Carol Newsom proceeds to note, here “the nonmoral and nonrational aspects of deity are highlighted.”156 However, it is in this very context that God challenges Job to take up the tasks which are apropos of one to whom God has given dominion over

156 Newsom, Moral Imaginations, 252.
creation (40:6-13).\textsuperscript{157} If we take these thoughts back to the story-world of the opening chapters of Job, which can be read as a folk-tale variation on the myth of Gen 2-3, their relevance becomes unmistakable.\textsuperscript{158} Into the idyllic innocence of Job’s well-ordered world, God sends the agent of chaos to test him: Is Job really so upright, so close to God? How can that be known in a perfectly comfortable world? The tale can be read as a parable of the plan and risks God takes in creation in order to be relationally involved with humanity.\textsuperscript{159}

Bringing this back to Paul, we can see the elements in this perspective shared by him. In the very allusion he makes to Hebrew Job, the words appear to be spoken not by God, but by Leviathan.\textsuperscript{160} This serves to underscore the frankness in each about the occurrence of \textit{anomia} (or in Newsom’s words, “God’s identification with the chaotic”) as well as their mutual assertion of God’s certain and unsearchable (“irrational”) wisdom, even while both also assume a profoundly relational construal of God and \textit{adam}. There is much to learn from Job that can throw light on Paul’s thoughts concerning creation, sin, and suffering. At the same time, there is a radical disjunction, a terminus that distinctly


\textsuperscript{158} This step in my interpretation, it should be noted, sits uncomfortably with Carol’s Newsom’s description of the “polyphonic” author’s desire to set divergent voices in dialogue, without ever intending to privilege one above the others: “The Book of Job as Polyphonic Text,” \textit{JSOT} 97 (2002): 87–108; idem, \textit{Moral Imaginations}.


shades the open-endedness and polyvalence of the Joban narrative, and lends an element of determinism and tension to Paul’s thought. In the light of the eschatological events of God’s salvific intervention through the death and resurrection of Christ, Paul has dived head-long into a perspective into which Job’s friends waded only knee-deep. In the trial of innocence, has humankind been found to be capable of righteousness? Paul’s answer is unequivocal: No, not one. Ironically, Paul came to make that claim a bedrock of his thinking as a reflex to the discovery of the one exception to the rule.
Chapter 5. Conclusions on Paul

I draw my conclusions on Paul into two separate discussions. In the first, I discuss the relationship between the two parts of the investigation into Paul, seeking to define the different emphases that emerged from each, how they might be related, and why they might have arisen. In the second, I filter the results of this entire study on Paul through the three questions which we also posed to the Hodayot’s use of anthropogonic traditions.

Romans and the Rest

Our study of anthropogonic traditions in Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Philippians found that Paul assumes for the present the normative status and continuous operation of creaturely ontologies established in creation, including, and especially, the somatic condition of the image of God in humanity. At the same time, he anticipates assimilation to the image of God on the model of the heavenly image of the resurrected Christ. This eschatological hope was typologically conveyed in the creation of the world, both in the dualism of heaven and earth and in the creation of Adam’s psychikos body, indicating that the present order of creation is also in a condition of incompleteness. For this reason, he anticipates the transcendence of aspects of the created order which were inherent in it from the beginning, prior to any negative causation arising from human disobedience, such as the asymmetrical relationship to the image of God established in the creation of “male and female.” He understands the fulfillment of creation to have been contingent on the successful completion of humankind’s commission to rule as God’s royal representatives. This task has fallen on Christ, who divests himself of his heavenly glory, takes on the image of Adam, undoes the disobedience of man and woman, and becomes
in his resurrection the new Adam, who pacifies creation, and becomes head of a new humanity conformed to his heavenly image. This conformation begins now in the continuous making new of the inner person through the spirit, the mark and guarantor of the heavenly existence.

Far from contradicting this picture, Romans fills it out by focusing on the deleterious consequences of human straying. The failing of Adam has cosmic consequences because the creation, including Adam’s own body, is open, responsive, and dependent on the human vocation to carry forward God’s creative intentions. The reign of death and the subjection to futility follow from Adam’s disobedience. Interrelated tensions of myth and history, fate and responsibility are found in Paul’s use of the creation narrative of Gen 2-3 especially. Adam fails and the human prospect is seemingly derailed. But Adam’s failure is in the truest sense, a human failing. Adam does not fall from glory. Adam simply does as Adams do in their natural condition, and thereby forfeit glory. This is why in failing and preventing the fulfillment of creation Adam subjects humankind to condemnation, for he passes on his creaturely mortality, corruptibility, and susceptibility to passions arising in the flesh. The element of fate in this failing is increased by the negative causality of Adam’s sin on the cosmic order, allowing for inherently chaotic elements to rise from the sea, as it were. Only Christ can correct this condition, he who has been the goal of creation all along. Paul is not thinking philosophically and abstractly in all of this; he is filtering his tradition through convictions which he has arrived at not by a process of detached reasoning but on the basis of his experience of God’s salvation in Christ. At the same time, since such
traditions have normative status, they simultaneously inform the character and positive content of Paul’s understanding of salvation. Adam is not simply a foil for Christ.

The different emphases between “Romans and the rest” can be comprehended largely as a product of the varied aspects under which anthropogonic traditions are called upon in each. In Galatians, Corinthians, and Philippians such traditions are drawn into the discussion usually at places where they inform aspects of the argument related to conditions of the body *per se* (the nearly complete exception being 1 Cor 15:20-28). In Romans anthropogonic traditions are more thoroughly integrated into the discussion to illuminate the total condition of the person, material and moral-vocational.

**Anthropogy and Theology in Paul**

I now summarize the findings of our chapters on Paul under the three rubrics (or questions) which we set out to explore from the first.

What is the purpose and destiny of humankind as relayed in association with traditions of creation? The destiny of humankind was not given to it in creation, and creation does not define the scope of salvation. The destiny of humankind is to be conformed to the heavenly image of Christ. Its purpose is to grow up into Christ and bring God’s order to a world which was made to be responsive to and dependent on human causation for the full flourishing of God’s purposes. Creation is and always has been the dynamic stage on which these purposes unfold.

How is human creatureliness evaluated from the perspective of this purpose; is humanity innately equipped to fulfill it? Paul can view the creatureliness of humankind from two angles. On one hand, he can think of it as an effect of the creative agency of
God. Here he has in mind its material goodness and integrity. Human beings are the earthly image of God, a condition which is somatically determined. This aspect of his thought is important and not sufficiently appreciated, but it does perhaps constitute a narrowed focus on material conditions per se, which is less than a full accounting of human creatureliness. On the other hand, then, he also thinks of humankind from a moral-vocational standpoint of the whole person. When he thinks of the body from this aspect, he emphasizes its enslavement to sin, its constitutional susceptibility to being overrun by passions, and the impotence of human will to do the good which would amount to human flourishing as God intends. That Paul has not abandoned the first more positive perspective becomes apparent in the manner that he refrains from characterizing the body, and even flesh, as evil in itself. Original or early creation is separated from this condition not absolutely, because of some aesthetic state of perfection, nor by a supernatural endowment of grace or glory, but by the relational conceptuality, as best as can be surmised, of innocence and immaturity. In as much as humankind is predestined to be conformed to the heavenly image of Christ, who in his resurrection life fulfills the Adamic commission, Paul simply “knows” that the earthly human being does not have the resources to fulfill the human commission and bring creation into its intended fullness.

Finally, what means are provided within the mythology of creation to comprehend negative evaluations of human creatureliness? Creation in the image of God seems to portend both humankind’s destiny and its limitations. The heavenly prototype of the earthly image borne by Adam and his descendants anticipates the ultimate hope or
destiny of humankind. On the other hand, the earthly image of Adam seems ill-equipped to carry out its commission because it comes too easily under the influence of inchoately chaotic powers. The typological element within creation itself, however, together in the signs of God’s creative power therein, the duality of heaven and earth, the anticipation of the heavenly image in the earthly, and the very history of Adam himself, supplies confidence in the overarching intelligence and sovereignty of God in history.
Chapter 6. Conclusions

The study of anthropogony in the theology of the Hodayot and the apostle Paul has uncovered many unexpected correlations between each and generated insights I did not foresee. In this conclusion, I gather together in brief summary a comparison of Paul and the Hodayot informed by the three questions that have been asked throughout but focusing on their employment of anthropogonic motifs from scripture. Finally, I indicate where this study most directly contributes to scholarship and where it might lead in future research.

Scriptural Dynamics in Anthropogony and Theology

Paul and the Hodayot implicitly prioritize the account of the creation of humankind in Gen 1:26-28 over that of Gen 2:6-7 when they give expression to the high destiny of humankind. While Gen 1:26-28 is drawn into the orbit of motifs of the transcendence of present humanity, Gen 2:6-7 becomes associated with motifs of innate corruption and the problematics of human sexuality. Neither makes use of the concept of a fall from grace or glory to comprehend their pessimistic accounts of the human being; rather, the reverse is the case: their pessimistic accounts of the human being explain the expulsion from Eden and whatever that setting was thought to entail.

In creation after the image of God, Paul detects the heavenly counterpart of which humanity is the earthly expression; this becomes the basis of hope for a transcendent destiny in which the earthly is finally assimilated to the heavenly. At the same time, the present earthly image of Gen 1:26-27 is read harmonistically with the events of Gen 2-3 in order to reinforce the innate corruptibility of the earthly image, the asymmetry of male
and female as expressions of the image, and the archetypal and inevitable failure of earthly humankind to achieve with its own resources the completion of its commission to bring order to creation or to arrive at the immortality which is intended for it.

The Hodayot’s genre make the dynamics of interpretation more difficult to uncover, but the recurrence of dominant motifs in combination with patterned allusions to scriptural material provides for some insights. Motifs of exaltation are developed in conjunction with traditions which centre on Gen 1:26-28 and Ps 8 in order to spell out an immortal existence and fellowship with the angels, while the dominant motif of anthropological abasement combines a Joban-inspired tradition of belittling the earthly adam with the traditional equation of the earth and the womb. From this perspective, the humanity determined by Gen 2:6-7 appears innately corrupt—physically, morally, and ritually—and human sexuality in particular becomes emblematic of a creaturely condition which is unfit for its heavenly calling.

Both the Hodayot and Paul, therefore, take Gen 2-3, perhaps also read under the influence of the subsequent primordial history, as indicative of the fact that created humanity stands radically in need of divine intervention for it to be able to attain the high calling God has for it. Remarkably, both imply a thoroughly naturalistic interpretation of Gen 2:7, according to which the breathing-in of God’s spirit serves not to distinguish humanity as possessing an immortal and enlightening divine element, but to qualify humanity’s participation on the same plane of nature as the animals. Any original cultic associations of this act of spiritual endowment, such as modern scholarship has uncovered, have been lost.
The framework that comprehends the dichotomous anthropology of each is the mysterious divine plan, revealed to the sectarians presumably through some special revelation which uncovers the true interpretation of scripture and to Paul through the Christ-event which also serves a scriptural-hermeneutical function. Both authors also see the reflection of this plan especially in various dualities in the natural world, which are also reflected in the narratives of Gen 1-3, and in the distinction between the present earthly limitations of humanity and the heavenly destiny of the elect.

**The Hodayot: Implications for Scholarship**

This study of the Hodayot has highlighted its tremendous indebtedness to the book of Job. Generally, the disavowal of any significant human claim to righteousness in Job has profoundly shaped the Hodayot. This is reflected in the use of uniquely and particularly Joban expressions and especially in adopting a distinctly Joban version of self-abasement formula inspired by Ps 8. The emphasis on this form-critical category advances the discussion of the Niedrigkeitsdoxologien, which are typically considered in the framework of Gerichtsdoxologie. However, they often most closely resemble the anthropological variations of self-abasement and insult formula found in Ps 8 and the book of Job. A particularly striking occurrence of Job’s influence on the Hodayot is felt in 1QH⁹ XX-XXI, where the treatment of Job’s concluding response to the theophanic confrontation in Aramaic Job (11Q10) provides a model on which the Maskil anticipates his own experience before God, the righteous judge. Thus, Job’s importance may extend beyond the Hodayot and be more fundamental to the distinctive writings of the Qumran
caves than has hitherto been recognized. A full study might shed more light on these documents.

Another area in which this study has broader significance is in the comprehension of the sectarians as purity communities. Jonathan Klawans has recently called into question the degree to which the sectarians were optimistic about efforts to achieve extraordinary purity in their communities. The Hodayot reveal the sense of profound dissatisfaction felt by the sectarians toward innate human impurity and sin. This study has highlighted the manner that traditions of creation are drawn into the expression of this dissatisfaction and comprehended within the framework of divine determinism. Creation from dust is singled out as the chief obstacle to the enjoyment of the privileges involved in election. Identification with Eden or the heavenly worship in the present life of the community is continually frustrated by the states of impurity and sin that accompany life in the normal human body and is threatened with the same fate that befell Adam. Therefore, a strong sense of anticipation and eschatological hope is to be expected, as these psalms express the conviction that innate human corruption that stems from Adam’s dust remains a persistent obstacle to the attainment of Adam’s glory.

The Apostle Paul: Implications for Scholarship

Three areas may be highlighted in which this study makes a contribution to Pauline scholarship and calls for further research.

Scholarship on Paul confronts us with an unhappy alternative: either filter Paul’s statements through the grid of fall and restoration or assert that he cared little about Adam as a topic in itself. This study has taken a different route. While there are
significant differences between them, we found that Paul shares the framework of the Hodayot, which sustains a pessimistic anthropology not primarily by recourse to the doctrine of the fall but by problematizing human ontology *per se* and setting creation within the framework of a divine plan. In addition, several of Paul’s presuppositions are found to be more closely tied to the accounts of creation than is commonly recognized. The most important of these presuppositions include that God’s creative activity establishes a dynamic ontology in which humankind is invited to participate, that the story of Eden is one of a lost chance of immortality, a trial of innocence, that the image of God relates humankind to God in terms pertinent to the body—which has consequences for the construction of gender and the divine—and that the image is modeled on the duality of heaven and earth. Finally, a few have suggested that an Irenaean framework might provide grounds on which to rethink Paul’s use of the creation narratives, but rarely has this suggestion extended beyond the bare fact that Paul sees humankind’s fulfillment in Christ. Although I initially had no intention to pursue an Irenaeian reading of Paul, progress has been made beyond this single point of agreement. This study found the relational and dynamic construal of creation to be the dominant framework of Paul’s thought, and he was regularly found to apply the categories of innocence and immaturity to humanity in its least affected conditions, in the twilight of creation and early childhood. Further investigations along these lines should continue to add to and refine our understanding of the nature of anthropogony in the letters of Paul.

Paul’s constructive use of the natural world as a theological category was unforeseen at the outset of this study and much of scholarship appears to share this
oversight. Paul, for the most part, assumes the continuous operation and normative status of creaturely ontologies established in creation. This study found, most strikingly, that he believes in the continuous and normative significance of humankind’s creation in the image of God, and he often reasons with the aid of insights he believes are entailed in the natural world, which on analogy to the human body, continues to bear the imprint of its Creator. Instead, scholarship usually tells us that Paul has a profoundly negative, apocalyptic view of the corruption of nature and its pervasion by sin, but the validity of these insights will depend on their ability to comprehend the more constructive functions of creation in his thought. Despite the undeniable presence of such an apocalyptic worldview in 1QS we found similar thinking about creation there, and in the Hodayot as well. Perhaps the impact of death on the hermeneutical-theological value of the created world is relativized by awareness that God’s creative act never bequeathed some static condition of ontic perfection which has been spoiled by humanity. Paul’s most negative statements about creation, including the human body, are made when it is viewed not as material reality but under the perspective of a spiritual, moral aspect. It is an important insight that Paul seems capable of separating the two.

Finally, this study has had many opportunities to wrestle with the relationship of the categories of participation and forensic thought in Paul. Paul’s thinking was found to be shaped by the appearance of these very categories in Gen 1-3. The category of participation is relayed in the dynamic ontology of creation and emblematically in the tree of life, while the forensic decisively shapes the narrative through the introduction of the commandment. Abstractly, the dynamic between these categories adds a tension and
ambiguity to the narrative that is directly comparable to Paul’s thought. Concretely, the integrity of the forensic category in Paul’s thinking is supported in as much as he recognizes it as an archetypal element in the conflicted relationship between God and humanity. (I took the presence of the commandment in Eden in an additional direction to suggest also Adam and Eve’s state of incompleteness, drawing on a theme in Philo.) Moreover, the element of participation is hereby naturally related to the discourse of deification, as some contemporary scholarship is pointing out, since that issue is inscribed into the question of what it is to be human in Gen 1-3 itself, as well as the eighth psalm. The scholarly debate concerning the relationship of forensic and participatory frameworks in Paul’s thought has yet to be framed in terms of the traditions Paul inherits, but this should prove to be a fruitful way to address the question.
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