

## **'SECURING' THE HOMELAND?**

**'SECURING' THE HOMELAND? A COMPARISON OF CANADIAN AND AMERICAN  
HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-9/11 PERIOD**

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## ***ABSTRACT***

In the post-9/11 period, the United States can be seen to have securitized its approach to homeland security policy. Canada did not follow suit. Instead, the Canadian state sought to respond to American securitization initiatives in order to protect its own state interests. An in-depth examination of securitization theory demonstrates that this theoretical construct has been re-interpreted by scholars and adapted to various research agendas. This dissertation differentiates amongst three variants of securitization theory: philosophical, sociological, and post-structural. Common to these competing variants of securitization theory was the finding that the role of the audience had remained vague, hindering the use of this theoretical model for examining the policy creation process. Focusing on the philosophical variant of securitization theory, as originally articulated by the Copenhagen School, this dissertation re-evaluates the role of the audience while examining the ways in which the American approach to homeland security was securitized in the new security environment that emerged following 9/11, as well as Canada's response to this securitization.

This project divides the audience into two separate groups, made up of three components. The elite audience, which is comprised of members of the state policy elite, and the media first determine whether or not an issue poses an existential threat to the security of the state. The populist audience - the state's public - then determines for itself whether or not it accepts the existential nature of the threat. This division of the audience into two separate groups allows for a clearer understanding of whether or not a given issue has been successfully securitized.

In the post-9/11 period, the American audience groups willingly accepted that the threat of terrorism posed an existential threat to the state. The Canadian audience groups, prompted by their own authorized speakers of security, did not recognize terrorism as posing an existential threat to the Canadian states. Ultimately, an examination of the audience groups in these two states demonstrates the utility of the philosophical variant of securitization theory for evaluating states' responses to security threats.

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***INTRODUCTION: 'SECURING' THE HOMELAND***

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States fundamentally changed the way that state approached domestic security. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States came to view the threat of potential terrorist attacks as posing an existential threat to the continuance of the state. As a result, the U.S. undertook the most comprehensive reorganization of the federal bureaucracy in its history, culminating in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the enactment of new laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act, which were intended to convey to the public that the government was taking the threat of terrorism seriously. While the United States' government securitized its approach to homeland security, Canada did not follow suit. Instead, the Canadian state sought to respond to American securitization initiatives in order to protect its own state interests. This study in contrast between two most-similar states, one of which securitized its approach to homeland security, and the other that did not, allows for an evaluation of securitization theory as a means of assessing the formulation of security policies in times of crisis. An in-depth examination of securitization theory demonstrates that this theoretical construct has been re-interpreted by scholars and adapted to various research agendas. In spite of the continuous rearticulation of competing variants of securitization theory, the role of the audience has remained vague, hindering the use of this model for examining the policy creation process. This study will seek to re-evaluate the role of the audience in the philosophical variant of securitization theory while examining the ways in which the American

approach to homeland security was securitized in the post-9/11 period, as well as Canada's response to this securitization.

### **The American Securitization of Homeland Security**

This study begins from the premise that, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, that state securitized its approach to homeland security. Noted Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis succinctly captured the change in American sentiment precipitated by the 9/11 attacks, noting that, "It's as if we were all irradiated, on that morning of September 11, 2001, in such a way as to shift our psychological makeup – the DNA in our minds – with consequences that will not become clear for years to come."<sup>1</sup> Regardless of whether or not we accept that claim that the events of 9/11 irrevocably transformed global politics, it is impossible to question the effect this cataclysmic event had on the collective American psyche. Mark B. Salter concurs that, "the Global War on Terror, embodied by the Al Qaeda terrorist network, was accepted by the vast majority of American audiences as an existential threat to the American way of life."<sup>2</sup> The September 11 attacks were markedly different from previous threats to American domestic security. The threat environment resulting from the attacks paved the way for the securitization of the United States' approach to the formulation of homeland security policies and practices.

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<sup>1</sup> John Lewis Gaddis. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup> Mark B. Salter. "When Securitization Fails: The Hard Case of Counter-Terrorism Programs." in Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (New York: Routledge: 2010), p. 126.



While the United States had experienced a number of paramilitary attacks before, these attacks took place away from the continental United States. In the mid 1990s, US soldiers were killed in attacks carried out in Riyadh and Saudi Arabia. In 1996, an attack on the Khobar Towers accommodation block at the US Air Forces' King Abdul Aziz Air Base at Dhahron in eastern Saudi Arabia, killed ten support workers and wounded one American employee. In August of 1998, the bombings of the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam killed six US citizens and wounded six more.<sup>3</sup> While these attacks demonstrated American vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, they took place outside of the United States, suggesting that, while Americans may face threats in foreign lands, the American homeland was secure against external threats. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon brought this threat home and generated renewed interest in the idea of securing the American homeland against internal and external terrorist threats.

For these reasons the United States securitized its state approach to homeland security and domestic counter-terrorism measures. President George W. Bush articulated the existential threat posed by the potential for future terrorist attacks on the American way of life. This existential threat was both accepted and propagated by the American policy elite. These bureaucrats and policy specialists sought to legislate against the threat of terrorism by creating new government departments such as the Department of Homeland Security and enacting new

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<sup>3</sup> For more details on prior attacks see: Paul Rogers. "Global Terrorism" in Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, eds., *US Foreign Policy*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 339-340.

legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act. The American media also accepted the assertion that terrorism posed an existential threat to the state and developed media frames that transmitted the immediacy of this threat to the general public. Having witnessed firsthand the death and destruction that resulted from the 9/11 attacks, the American public was responsive to the articulated threat and accepted the securitization of the United States' approach to homeland security.

### **The Canadian Approach to the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks**

The Canadian approach to the enactment of homeland security measures in the period following the 9/11 attacks was markedly different from the American response. While the United States sought to securitize its approach to homeland security in the post-9/11 period, Canada did not securitize its policy formation process. The most obvious reason for this, of course, is that the attacks were carried out on American soil and were targeted directly at disrupting the American way of life. However, the Canadian state's decision not to securitize its approach to homeland security is rooted in other factors as well. The Canadian approach to the 9/11 attacks was rooted in the state's past experiences with domestic terrorism, and in its desire to promote policies that were consistent with Canadian values. For these reasons, Canada developed its own definition of terrorism and adopted a legislative approach to counter-terrorism. In order to protect Canadian interests, Canadian policymakers sought bilateral solutions that would satisfy American calls for increased security, while at the same time protecting trade interests with its southern neighbour. As a result, Canada's first-ever national security strategy was

released in 2004. Thus, while Canada did not securitize its approach to homeland security, the state did not sit idly by while accepting American security reforms. In true Canadian fashion, the development of a distinctly “Canadian response” replaced the need to securitize the issues of homeland security and counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 period.

American citizens were not the only victims of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Twenty-four Canadians were killed as a result of the attacks. Canada’s past experiences with domestic terrorism demonstrate that the Canadian state is capable of securitizing its approach to defense policy. While some may argue that the American political system makes it easier to securitize facets of state policy, the Canadian parliamentary system gives the Prime Minister the power to introduce measures deemed necessary in times of national emergency. In the case of the October Crisis, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act, which instituted martial law in the province of Quebec. This can be seen as a ‘securitizing move’ in that the Prime Minister determined that the issue of domestic terrorism in the province of Quebec necessitated an immediate response. Thus, while the Canadian state is able to securitize its policy response to issues deemed to pose an existential threat to the state, in the case of the 9/11 attacks, Canada made a conscious decision not to securitize its approach to homeland security policy.

Canada’s approach to homeland security was influenced by its past experiences with incidents of domestic terrorism. These past episodes of domestic

terrorism demonstrated to Canada, “... the dangers of both overreacting and underreacting to terrorism.”<sup>4</sup> During the 1970 October Crisis, British diplomat James Cross was kidnapped by one cell of the Front du Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), and Quebec Cabinet Minister Pierre Laporte was kidnapped by another of its cells. In response to these incidents, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act to be put into effect at four o’clock on the morning of October 16. The government’s response to the FLQ ultimately demonstrated the dangers of overreacting to crimes committed by terrorist cells through, “... the declaration of martial law and arrests of five hundred people, the vast majority of whom were only associated with the political cause of Quebec separation as opposed to political violence.”<sup>5</sup> The government’s overreaction to the October Crisis, and the harsh measures imposed by the War Measures Act led to the creation of CSIS, Canada’s civilian intelligence agency that operates without specific law enforcement powers and is subject to careful review. The 1982 enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a bill of rights entrenched in the Canadian Constitution, and the 1988 Emergencies Act, which restrained emergency powers, further demonstrated the government’s overreaction to the October Crisis.

In 1985, Canada witnessed an even deadlier incident of domestic terrorism with the bombing of an Air India Flight from Vancouver that killed all three hundred and twenty-nine passengers, most of whom were Canadian citizens. Following this

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<sup>4</sup> Kent Roach. *The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 366.

<sup>5</sup> IBID, p. 373.

incident, the Canadian government was accused of distancing itself from the investigation into the cause of the bombing, and was faulted for doing too little to protect the safety and security of the Canadian passengers on board. Canada's response to the 9/11 attacks draws on the lessons learned from these previous experiences with domestic terrorism, and seeks to find a middle ground between the implementation of oppressive security measures and the perception that the state is not doing enough to guarantee its citizens' security.

The Canadian decision not to follow the United States' securitization of all issues pertaining to homeland security and defense is consistent with Canadian values. Senator Hugh Segal explains, "Much of Canada's social and fiscal infrastructure, however imperfect, has been designed explicitly, or been modified, to reflect our regional and multinational realities in a way that seeks to promote not just a civil society but more importantly, a society that is truly civil."<sup>6</sup> The securitization of the state's approach to homeland security would not have been consistent with Canada's longstanding support of multiculturalism. Kim Richard Nossal further argues that, "Canadians were encouraged to see their country as a generous and activist contributor to the global good. Canada, it was commonly said, was a 'norm entrepreneur' – an 'innovative player' working to entrench global rules."<sup>7</sup> As will be demonstrated further in this study, Canada has long sought a

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<sup>6</sup> Hugh D. Segal. "The Balance of Freedoms: A Fresh Strategic Framework." in David S. McDonough, ed., *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), p. 58.

<sup>7</sup> Kim Richard Nossal. "Rethinking the Security Imaginary: Canadian Security and the Case of Afghanistan." in Wayne S. Cox and Bruno Charbonneau, eds., *Locating Global*

multilateral approach to global issues. Adopting the American securitization of the issue of terrorism would not be consistent with the image Canada seeks to project internationally.

Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Canada responded to the threat of terrorism by introducing its own definition of “terrorism” and crafting its own anti-terrorism legislation. Of central importance to Bill C-36, Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act, is the definition of “terrorism” that was added to Section 83 of the Criminal Code. This section of the Criminal Code defines terrorism as, “an act committed in whole or in part for a political, religious, or ideological purpose, objective, or cause with the intention of intimidating the public... with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government, or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act.”<sup>8</sup> Canada took a restrained approach to categorically defining terrorism. For example, the definition of terrorism did not include all property damage, but only property damage that endangered life, health, and safety. This limitation minimized the chance that protestors could be investigated or charged with terrorism. In keeping with lessons learned from past experiences with domestic terrorism, the post-9/11 definition of terrorism, “... remained broader than the definition used in the October Crisis, which had focused on the ‘use of force or the commission of crime as a means

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*OrderL American Power and Canadian Security After 9/11.* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), p. 108.

<sup>8</sup> Department of Justice Canada. “Definitions of Terrorism and the Canadian Context.” <[http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2009/rr09\\_6/p3.html](http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2009/rr09_6/p3.html)>

of or as an aid in accomplishing governmental change in Canada.’”<sup>9</sup> The development of a distinctly Canadian definition of terrorism demonstrated the state’s desire to set its own course of action in responding to the attacks on the United States.

Prime Minister Jean Chretien adopted an intelligence and legislation-based approach to addressing Canadian homeland security following the 9/11 attacks. In December 2001, following the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, Canada passed its own anti-terrorism legislation, Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act. This Act, which will be discussed in more detail in this study, granted Canadian law enforcement agencies expanded authority to monitor and detain those suspected of involvement in terrorist organizations. In one hundred and eighty-six pages of bilingual text, the Act charted a uniquely Canadian approach to homeland security.

While Canada’s past experiences with domestic terrorism led to the Canadian executive branch’s decision not to securitize the state’s approach to homeland security in the post-9/11 period, the Canadian government sought to protect the country’s interests by addressing the threat of terrorism in its own ways. In April, 2004, the Paul Martin government released Canada’s first-ever national security strategy entitled, “Securing an Open Society”. This policy document outlined Canada’s security interests in a post-9/11 world. Ultimately, Canada’s post-9/11 security strategy, “... was based on an appreciation of the need to both protect

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<sup>9</sup> Roach 2011, p. 377.

Canada from threats from within and to prevent Canada from being used as a doorway to the United States, or elsewhere, for terrorist activities.”<sup>10</sup> Canada needed to be cognizant of the American securitization of its approach to homeland defense and security while protecting its own trade and security interests as the United States’ northern neighbour.

### **Securitization Theory: An Overview**

This study utilizes the philosophical variant of securitization theory to examine the differences in the creation of homeland security policies in the United States and Canada. Securitization theory, however, is not a static concept. There are different variants of this conceptual model, each with its own ontological and epistemological assumptions.<sup>11</sup> This first chapter of this thesis will examine the different variants of securitization theory in order to demonstrate the utility of the philosophical variant of this theory for examining the creation of security policies. It will also address some of the shortcomings inherent in this approach and will outline the ways in which this study will address these deficiencies. In particular, the chapter will discuss the lack of understanding concerning the role of the audience in the Copenhagen School’s original formulation of securitization theory in

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<sup>10</sup> Wesley K. Wark. “Smart Trumps Security: Canada’s Border Security Policy Since 11 September.” in Daniel Drache, *Big Picture Realities: Canada and Mexico at the Crossroads.* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2008), p. 139.

<sup>11</sup> This differentiation amongst different variants of securitization theory owes much to comments made by Ole Waever concerning an earlier draft of the first chapter.



their seminal text, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”.<sup>12</sup> This chapter will propose that the “audience” is actually comprised of two distinct components: the elite audience and the populist audience. The ensuing chapters of this study will develop this new formulation of the audience in securitization theory as a means of assessing the American securitization of the homeland security policy process, and Canada’s response to this securitization.

### **Authorized Speakers of Security**

The second chapter of this study will examine the role of the authorized speakers of security in initiating the securitization process. In the philosophical variant of securitization theory, the authorized speakers of security articulate an issue as posing an existential threat by means of security speech acts. President George W. Bush’s post-9/11 speeches reveal that his take-charge manner of addressing the existential threat posed by the potential for further terrorist attacks bolstered his public support. His patriotic addresses to the public have formed the basis for what can be referred to as the “Bush narrative”. This narrative was comprised of speeches that addressed four dominant themes: the declaration of a “War on Terror”, the assertion that America must present a united front against a threat common to the whole nation, the presence of an “evil other” bent on destroying the American way of life and finally, Bush sought to equate the events of 9/11 with past attacks on the United States. At the time of the attacks on the United States, Canada’s cautious leader, Jean Chretien, refrained from making the sort of

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<sup>12</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998),

pronouncements made by President Bush. Instead, Chretien appointed other Ministers and policy advisors to act as authorized speakers of security in informing the public about the 9/11 attacks. The comments made by these Canadian authorized speakers of security emphasized five points: first, that Canada was a good friend and neighbour to the United States; they emphasized the importance of a multilateral approach to the threat of terrorism; they stressed that 9/11 was a crisis situation for the U.S., but that this was an isolated incident; they articulated that the maintenance of Canada's trade relationship with the United States was a security concern for Canada; and finally, they stressed to all Canadians that Islam and Muslim individuals were not enemies to Canadian values. The manner in which the American and Canadian authorized speakers of security addressed their respective audiences affected the ways in which the elite and populist audiences responded to the 9/11 attacks and the renewed threat of terrorism.

### **The Elite Audience: Members of the Policy Elite**

Chapter three will examine the first component of the elite audience, members of the policy elite and their role in the securitization process. The policy elite - which is comprised of bureaucrats and elected officials at the national, state, and local levels as well as administrative officers and employees of the national and state/ provincial governments and superintendents in government offices - is the first audience group to respond to the articulation of a threat by an authorized speaker of security. In the United States, Republican and Democratic Representatives worked together to initiate policies aimed at countering the

terrorist threat. Members of the American policy elite deferred to the executive in adopting new legislation that focused on preventing future terrorist attacks on the United States. This bipartisan approach to the foundation of security policies led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. In Canada, past experiences with domestic terrorism resulted in members of the policy elite adopting a more cautious approach to enacting counter-terrorism legislation. Canadian policymakers developed a definition of terrorism specific to Canada, and embedded that definition in the Canadian Criminal Code before enacting Bill C-36, the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act.

### **The Elite Audience: The Media**

The media can be identified as the second component of the elite audience in the philosophical variant of securitization theory. The central role played by the media in framing and shaping public opinion of events points to the importance of considering the relevance of media frames as a component of the securitization process. The media is a crucial component of the elite audience since this group is responsible for distilling information about the threat and then disseminating it to the general public. In examining the American media's reaction to the terrorist attacks, this study identifies the creation of a "blame Canada" narrative, which sought to shift the blame for the 9/11 attacks away from American policymakers by identifying Canada as the weak-link in North American security. Following an overview of the concentration in ownership of Canadian media outlets, it is suggested that some Canadian media frames contradicted those created by

members of the policy elite. For example, some media outlets such as the *National Post*, introduced the idea that the “Evil” Muslim “Other” that had attacked the United States was likely to carry out similar attacks on Canada. This Orientalist depiction of the enemy led to the portrayal of terrorists as vermin or infectious diseases that needed to be destroyed in order to protect the Canadian way of life. Some Canadian media outlets further claimed that it was Canada’s duty to participate in foreign interventions in order to protect the ideals of Western democracy against irrational Middle Eastern radicals. While these media frames seem to echo American sentiments, they were balanced by other Canadian media reports that questioned the root causes of the attacks on the United States and criticized American foreign policy decisions which may have contributed to the rise of anti-American sentiment.

### **The Populist Audience**

Following an in-depth examination of the two components of the elite audience – members of the policy elite and the media – chapter five examines the second audience group identified in this study - the populist audience. The populist audience can be simply defined as the populace of a given state. The populist audience plays an important role in the securitization process since this audience group has the final say about whether or not the securitization process is successful. In order to compare the elite and populist audiences, this chapter examines the reciprocal relationship between the two audience groups. It is possible to determine the populist audience’s acceptance or rejection of a given securitizing move by observing public opinion through the examination of public opinion polls.

The American populist audience can be seen to have accepted President Bush's articulation of terrorism as posing an existential threat to the American state. This is evidenced by strong public support for President Bush, and for counter-terrorism legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act. The American populist audience also demonstrated a willingness to accept limitations on civil liberties in exchange for enhanced security measures. The Canadian public sought to differentiate Canada from the United States by supporting a distinctly "Canadian" approach to counter-terrorism by favouring the enactment of policies that demonstrated the nation's differences from the United States. In many respects, Canadian public opinion in this period was a study in contrast, with strong public support for multiculturalism and the protection of civil liberties being matched by a rise in Islamophobia. The populist audience's policy preferences demonstrate this group's level of support for the claims made by the authorized speakers of security and the ways in which this audience group is influenced by the elite audience.

### **The Canada-U.S. Border in the Post-9/11 Period: Case Study**

The final chapter in this thesis is a case study examining the American securitization of the Canada-United States border in the post-9/11 period, and Canada's response to this securitization. While the Canadian state made a conscious decision not to securitize its approach to homeland security following the terrorist attacks on the United States, it has had to respond to the American securitization of this policy area. This case study examines how the philosophical variant of securitization theory can be operationalized in order to demonstrate its utility as a

tool for examining the ways that states react to threats to national security. Following an overview of bilateral cooperation on border issues prior to 9/11, this chapter considers the implications of the American securitization of the border for Canada. Ultimately, it can be demonstrated that the creation of bilateral partnerships allows Canada to participate in the creation of policies aimed at policing the border, while at the same time, protecting its national interests. In this way, Canada is able to demonstrate to the U.S. that it is taking American security concerns seriously while protecting the important trade relationship with its southern neighbour. When applied to this case study, the philosophical variant of securitization theory demonstrates the impact and implications of a state's decision to securitize a given issue on neighbouring states.

### **Moving Forward**

This study has two primary objectives. First, it seeks to advance the use of the philosophical variant of securitization theory for examining the ways in which states respond to national security crises. As pointed out in the opening chapter, critics have repeatedly questioned the utility of this theoretical construct because of its vague definition of the “audience” and this group's role in the securitization process. While it is clear that the audience responds to the authorized speaker of security's articulation of an issue as posing an existential threat to the state, the make-up of this group has not been clearly identified. By differentiating amongst three different variants of securitization theory, this study elaborates on the role of the audience in the philosophical variant of securitization theory by dividing this

group into three distinct components. Dividing the audience into an elite group with two parts – members of the policy elite and the media, as well as a populist group allows for an in-depth examination of the ways the audience groups interact with each other and with the authorized speakers of security. This reconfiguration of the audience will address some of the concerns leveled at securitization theory by its critics.

The second objective of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of Canada-United States relations in the post-9/11 period. While further articulating the role of the audience in the philosophical variant of securitization theory, it also serves as an examination of American and Canadian approaches to homeland security following the terrorist attacks on the United States. As such, in the context of examining the roles of the different audience groups, this study considers the differing ways in which Canada and the United States have adopted and implemented homeland security policies since 9/11. This comparative approach to homeland security policy contributes to the literature on Canada-U.S. relations. The ways in which the two countries have drifted apart and coordinated their respective homeland security and counterterrorism policies have defined this bilateral relationship over the last decade.

Ultimately, this study will show how the United States' securitization of the homeland security policy process, and Canada's decision not to securitize, demonstrates the importance of the role of the audience in the philosophical variant

of securitization theory, and the need to clarify what this role entails. Further elaboration of the role of the audience paves the way for an examination of the implications of American securitization of the homeland security policy process for Canadian defense decision-making in the future.



***CHAPTER ONE: SECURITIZATION THEORY – A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW***

***Introduction***

Securitization theory provides a useful theoretical framework for comparing the homeland security policy responses of the United States and Canada in the post-9/11 period. However, 'securitization theory' is not a coherent theoretical construct. There are three variants of securitization theory into which most scholarly works can be categorized: philosophical securitization, sociological securitization, and post-structural securitization. The work of the Copenhagen School, and its initial development of the concept of securitization as the "new framework for analysis" serves as the dominant articulation of this theory; however, this perspective is only one expression of the philosophical variant of securitization. An overview of securitization theory and its various expressions will outline the commonalities among the three derivations. Ultimately, it can be demonstrated that the philosophical securitization model lends itself best to a comparison of the cases of the United States and Canada. However, this theoretical model is not without its own inherent flaws. The definition and role of the audience remains unclear in the philosophical articulation of securitization theory. These deficiencies can be corrected by recognizing the link between the context in which securitization is taking place and the audience, as well as by differentiating between the securitizing actor(s) and the audience(s), and by dividing the audience into two groups: the elite audience, and the populist audience. Addressing the limitations in the philosophical securitization model allows for this theoretical construct to be applied to an

examination of the ways in which the United States has securitized the homeland security policy process while Canada has refused to securitize.

### **Securitization Theory: An Overview**

#### *Three Shared Assumptions*

The three variants of securitization theory share three common assumptions. First, the philosophical, sociological, and post-structural approaches to securitization theory all recognize the centrality of the audience. Thus, in order for an issue to be classified as a security issue it must be accepted as such by the audience. For example, in order for a state to securitize the issue of border security, its citizens must recognize that there is a critical threat posed by border security issues. Balzacq explains that the empowering audience, “is the audience which: (a) has a direct causal connection with the issue; and (b) has the ability to enable the securitizing actor to adopt measures in order to tackle the threat.”<sup>13</sup> An authorized speaker - often the state - invokes the term “security” in order to convince the public that an issue requires immediate attention and that the response to such an issue is too urgent to be subject to conventional political debate. Gabriele Kasper explains that, “...securitizing agents always strive to convince as broad an audience as possible because they need to maintain a social relationship with the target group.”<sup>14</sup> Securitizing actors, such as state officials, are cognizant of the fact that winning formal support while breaking social bonds with constituencies can weaken their credibility. Kenneth Burke explains that effective persuasion requires

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<sup>13</sup> Thierry Balzacq, p. 9

<sup>14</sup> Gabriele Kasper, “Linguistic Politeness: Current Research Issues,” *Journal of Pragmatics*. V. 14, N. 2 (1990), p. 205.

that the securitizing actor's argument employs terms that, "resonate with the hearer's language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying his/ her ways with the speaker's."<sup>15</sup> An issue cannot be securitized until it is accepted by the target audience as posing an imminent threat and requiring immediate attention.

The second common assumption made by the three variants of securitization theory is that of the co-dependency of agency and context. Balzaq asserts that, "the performative dimension of security rests between semantic regulatory and contextual circumstances."<sup>16</sup> In this sense, the word "security" is imbued with agency – the term has the power to push an issue beyond the realm of traditional politics. The term, "security" does not point to an objective reality since, "it is an agency in itself to the extent that it conveys a self-referential practice instantiated by discourses on existential threats that empower political elites to take policy measures to alleviate 'insecurity'."<sup>17</sup> Securitization theory, in all of its incarnations, must account for all of the factors and circumstances that led to an issue being classified as a "security" issue. Securitization is successful when the securitizing actor and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. Since securitization is the product of a complex repertoire of causes, an investigation focused on a unique factor (such as speech acts) may fail if other elements exert a significant influence on the process. White explains that, "To

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<sup>15</sup> Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*. (Berkeley: University of California, 1955), p. 55.

<sup>16</sup> Balzaq, p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p. 12.

analyze the construction of a security problem, then, we ought to take note of the fact that any securitization encompasses not only the particular pieces of persuasion that we are interested in but also all other successful and abortive attempts at modification that are relevant to experiencing the rhetoric.”<sup>18</sup> For example, border security can be seen to have been securitized by the United States following September 11, 2001; however, this move must be assessed in light of the perceived threat demonstrated by those attacks on the United States. Securitization theory accounts for both the securitization of an issue, and the circumstances in which the issue came to be accepted as a “security” issue.

Thirdly, philosophical, sociological, and post-structural securitization theories share an assumption of the dispositive and the structuring forces of practices.<sup>19</sup> The process of securitization occurs in a field of struggles and consists of practices, which, “instantiate intersubjective understandings and which are framed by tools and the habitus inherited from different social fields. The dispositive connects different practices.”<sup>20</sup> It can be argued that the speech act model of security emphasizes the creation of security problems and not their constructions. Thus, it “conceals more than it reveals about the design, let alone the emergence of security problems.”<sup>21</sup> Securitization theory accepts that security practices are enacted primarily through policy tools. These tools are the social

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<sup>18</sup> Eugene Edmond White, *The Context of Human Discourse: A Configurational Criticism of Rhetoric*. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), p. 13.

<sup>19</sup> See Balzaq, p. 15 - 19

<sup>20</sup> Balzaq, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> Balzaq, p. 18.

devices through which professionals of (in)security think about a threat.<sup>22</sup> Security practices relate essentially to two kinds of tools: regulatory and capacity.<sup>23</sup> Regulatory tools seek to ‘normalize’ the behaviour of target individuals and aim to influence the behaviours of social actors by permitting certain practices to reduce a given threat.<sup>24</sup> Capacity tools call for skills that allow individuals, groups, and agencies to make decisions and carry out activities, which have a reasonable probability of success.<sup>25</sup> These policy tools allow scholars to account for the “securitizing moves” that render issues “security threats”.

### **Philosophical Securitization in Theory**

Philosophical approaches to securitization contend that the utterance of the term, ‘security’ is in itself, an act that constitutes a threat as existential. This approach places special emphasis on the notion of speech acts as developed by John L. Austin and John R. Searle. Austin first articulated the concept of speech acts in his 1962 text, *How to do Things With Words*. He contends that speech acts “do” things; thus, saying something is doing something.<sup>26</sup> Speech acts emphasize the process by which threats are securitized. Austin posited that these speech acts can be conceived as forms of representation that do not simply depict a preference or view

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 15

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 16

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 17

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. See also, Helen Ingram and Anna Schneider, “Target Population and Policy Design.” *Administration and Society*. V. 23, N. 3 (1991), p. 517

<sup>26</sup> K.M. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 104

of an external reality.<sup>27</sup> Instead, he proposes that, “many utterances are equivalent to actions; when we say certain words or phrases we also perform a particular action.”<sup>28</sup> Austin further argued that the point of speech act theory was to challenge the assumption that, “the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’, which it must do either truly or falsely.”<sup>29</sup> In keeping with Austin’s theory, certain statements do more than merely describe a given reality and, “...as such cannot be judged as false or true. Instead these utterances realize a specific action; they ‘do’ things – they are ‘performatives’ as opposed to ‘constatives’ that simply report states of affairs and are thus subject to truth and falsity tests.”<sup>30</sup> Therefore, speech act theory recognizes the ways in which language can do more than just convey information. Austin was especially interested in, “phrases that constitute a form of action or social activity in themselves,” such as phrases like, “thank you”, “I promise”, and “You are fired”.<sup>31</sup> Scholars in the philosophical securitization tradition have applied Austin’s speech act framework to the use of the term, “security”. A more nuanced understanding of speech acts suggests that when certain words are used, they have the effect of prioritizing issues.

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<sup>27</sup> See Paul Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction*. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008), p. 69 for further elaboration.

<sup>28</sup> Quoted in: Nick Vaughan-Williams, Columba Peoples, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009), p. 77

<sup>29</sup> John L. Austin, *How to do Things With Words*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> Balzacq, p. 175

<sup>31</sup> Stefan Elbe, *Security and Global Health*. (New York: Polity Press, 2010), p. 11.

Speech act theory has been co-opted by philosophical securitization theorists. Waever explains how Austin's theory can be applied to security issues, noting that, "With the help of language theory, we can regard 'security' as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act."<sup>32</sup> Waever argues that the process of securitization is initiated by a speech act that serves as a "securitizing move" which marks the transformation of an issue not previously thought of as a security threat to a recognized security issue necessitating an exceptional response.<sup>33</sup> In their seminal work, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde note that both internal and external elements must be present in order for a speech act to be accepted by its intended audience. First, among the internal conditions of speech acts,

"the most important is to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out – the general grammar of security as such plus the particular dialects of the different sectors, such as talk identity in the societal sector, recognition and sovereignty in the political sector, ... and so on."<sup>34</sup>

In contrast, the external aspect of a speech act has two main conditions. The first is the social capital of the enunciator, the securitizing actor, who is in a recognized position of authority. The second external condition relates to the actual threat. Buzan et. al. explain that, "it is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally held to be threatening."<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 55.

<sup>33</sup> Vaughan-Williams and Peoples, p. 78

<sup>34</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 33.

<sup>35</sup> IBID, p. 33

While the philosophical tradition centres on the speech acts themselves as the focus of securitization, the securitizing actors and audience are another important component of this theoretical model. Speech acts do not occur in a vacuum – they are embedded, “rhetorically, culturally, and institutionally in ways that make them somewhat predictable and not wholly open or expandable.”<sup>36</sup> Security as speech act occurs in structured institutions where some actors are in positions of power by being generally accepted voices of security; by having power to define it. Buzan and his colleagues note that securitization relies upon, “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of the rules. It continues to be structurally focused in existing authoritative structures.”<sup>37</sup> In this respect, the philosophical approach to securitization seems to be premised on statist conceptions of security. This approach holds that it is often “the state” that initiates the securitizing speech act. Buzan and his colleagues explain that, in contrast to the post structural approach to security studies, the Copenhagen School (which is situated in the philosophical tradition), “abstain(s) from attempts to talk about what ‘real security’ would be for people, what are ‘actual’ security problems larger than those propagated by elites and the like.”<sup>38</sup> Although typically classified as a “critical approach to security studies”, the philosophical variant of securitization theory accepts the state as a

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<sup>36</sup> Natalie Florea Hudson, *Gender, Human Security and the United Nations: Security Language as a Political Framework for Women*. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009), p. 31.

<sup>37</sup> Buzan et. al., p. 26

<sup>38</sup> IBID, p. 35



valid referent object, and ignores the emancipatory agenda adopted by other critical methodologies.<sup>39</sup> While there is nothing explicitly prohibiting this approach from being applied to groups other than states, there is a notion that, “at the heart of the security concept we still find something to do with defence and the state.”<sup>40</sup>

### **Philosophical Securitization in Practice**

#### *The Copenhagen School of Security Studies*

The Copenhagen School of Security Studies (or CS) serves as the most recognizable articulation of the philosophical approach to securitization. The label, “Copenhagen School” was given to the collective research agenda of various academics at the (now defunct) Copenhagen Peace Research Institute in Denmark. This term was applied specifically to the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. The label “Copenhagen School” itself and its central concepts, “developed over time, less initially as a specific project for the study of security than as a series of interventions on different concepts and cases.”<sup>41</sup> The CS agenda ultimately came to represent the fusion of two significant conceptual and theoretical innovations in security studies: Barry Buzan’s notion of different sectors of security (first articulated by Buzan in, “People, States, and Fear” in 1983 and later updated in Buzan 1991), and Ole Waever’s conception of ‘securitization’.<sup>42</sup> The collaborative work of the CS culminated in the 1998 publication of, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis,” by

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<sup>39</sup> This is in contrast to the post structural approach to securitization theory, as will be discussed later.

<sup>40</sup> Waever, 1995, p. 47

<sup>41</sup> Paul Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction*. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008), p. 68.

<sup>42</sup> Nick Vaughan-Williams and Columba Peoples, 2009, p. 76. Also, see Waever 1995 for an early iteration.

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. This work became the foundational text of the Copenhagen School's research agenda. The Copenhagen School can be classified as a philosophical approach to securitization theory because it seeks to, "emphasize that social constructions often become sedimented and relatively stable practices."<sup>43</sup> It follows that the task, in philosophical securitization theory, is not only to criticize this sedimentation but also to understand how the dynamics of security work and so as to change them.

The research agenda of the so-called "Copenhagen School" sought to broaden the concept of security; however, instead of widening the debate over what constituted a "security" threat, the CS wanted to, "displace the terms of the dispute from security sectors to rationalities of security framing."<sup>44</sup> To this end, the CS extends the breadth of "security" beyond the traditional politico-military sphere to what it identifies as the five discrete political, economic, environmental, military, and societal sectors.<sup>45</sup> The primary question addressed in "Security: A New Framework for Analysis," is how to define what is and what is not a security issue in the context of a broadened understanding of security. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde argue that if the security agenda is broadened, then there is a need for some sort of analytical grounding or principle to judge what is and what is not a security issue; otherwise, there is a danger that the concept of 'security' will become so broad that

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<sup>43</sup> Fierke, p. 102

<sup>44</sup> Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration, and Asylum in the EU*. (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 28

<sup>45</sup> For further elaboration see Roland Donnreuther, *International Security: The Contemporary Agenda*. (New York: Polity, 2007), p. 42

it covers everything and hence becomes effectively meaningless.<sup>46</sup> The CS posits that “security” is primarily about survival. Thus, “Security action is usually taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a collectivity. The referent object is that to which one can point and say, ‘It has to survive, therefore it is necessary to...’.”<sup>47</sup> Accordingly, whether the referent object of security is an individual, group, state, or nation, “security” is an ontological status, that of feeling security, which at any one time may be under threat from a number of different directions.

The CS employs a methodology that seems to draw heavily from the theoretical assumptions of constructivism. The key constructivist insight of the Copenhagen School is to, “shift attention away from an objectivist analysis of threat assessment to the multiple and complex ways in which security threats are internally generated and constructed.”<sup>48</sup> In this way, the CS brings greater nuance to the constructivist argument that security is not an objective condition but the outcome of a specific kind of social process, susceptible to criticism and change. The CS research agenda denies the existence of any objectively given preconditions and circumstances in politics. This conceptualization of securitization rejects the realist assumptions that, “groups are formed in response to threats from the outside.”<sup>49</sup> There is no such thing as an objective security concern because *any* public issue may

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<sup>46</sup> For further elaboration refer to Vaughan-Williams and Peoples, p. 76

<sup>47</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 36.

<sup>48</sup> Roland Donnreuther, *International Security: The Contemporary Agenda*. (New York: Polity, 2007), p. 42

<sup>49</sup> Pal Kolsto, *Media Discourse and the Yugoslav Conflicts: Representations of the Self and Other*. (New York: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009), p. 10.

be identified by the actors as political or non-political or as posing a threat to the community writ large. Although they criticize mainstream constructivism for its deliberate state-centrism, the CS remains, “firmly within methodological collectivism saying that not only states, but also other units such as nations, societies, social movements, and individuals, can act as agents in the name of collective referent objects.”<sup>50</sup> The Copenhagen School’s social constructivist tendencies are especially evident in its distinction between the subject and object of security. According to the suppositions of constructivism, there is no implicit, objective, or given relation between the subject – the security actor – and the object of securitization. Rather this relation is constructed intersubjectively through social relations and processes.<sup>51</sup> The foundational aspects of philosophical securitization theory, as outlined by the CS, have been elaborated on by other authors working within this theoretical framework.

The Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization has been advanced by other scholars working in the philosophical securitization tradition such as Jef Huysmans. In his text, “The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU,” Huysmans posits that the notion of security serves as “a technique for governing danger”. He argues the importance of a more technocratic understanding

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<sup>50</sup> Pami Aalto, *Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia*. (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 44.

<sup>51</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, p. 30 – 31. See also Alessandro Gobbicchi, *Globalization, Armed Conflict and Security*. (Rubbettino Editore, 2004), p. 212.

of the politics of insecurity (as well as its Foucauldian grounds).<sup>52</sup> Huysmans contends that the term “security framing” can be employed to describe how government and public approaches to security are generated, the contextual conceptualization of security itself, and how these definitions correspond with governmental and administrative security techniques. He notes that, “Securitization constitutes political unity by means of placing it in an existentially hostile environment and asserting an obligation to free it from threat.”<sup>53</sup>

*Jef Huysmans’ “The Politics of Insecurity”*

Although Huysmans works in the philosophical securitization tradition, he disagrees with aspects of the Copenhagen School’s approach. He is more concerned with ascertaining the true ‘meaning’ of the term “security”. He notes that, “Although the debate on expanding the security agenda to non-military sectors and non-state referent objects launched an interesting discussion about the security (studies) agenda, it has not really dealt with the meaning of security.”<sup>54</sup> Huysmans does not agree with the CS concept of securitization as the extreme form of politicization. Drawing heavily on the work of Carl Schmitt, Huysmans argues that the political realist project of securitization is “less the suspension of the normal rules of liberal politics than the destruction of the liberal concept of the political itself.”<sup>55</sup> His work suggests that securitization embodies a political logic and normative agenda in

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<sup>52</sup> Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 1-6.

<sup>53</sup> Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration, and Asylum in the EU*. (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 50

<sup>54</sup> Jef Huysmans, “Security? What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier.” *European Journal of International Relations*. V.4, N. 2 (1998), p. 226.

<sup>55</sup> Quoted in Fierke, p. 111

which “the threat is the essence of the political”.<sup>56</sup> In other words, Huysmans argues that the articulation of a “threat” is a political act. This is in contrast to the Copenhagen School assertion that the articulation of a “threat” moves an issue beyond the realm of traditional politics. Huysmans further departs from the Copenhagen School’s research agenda with respect to the concept of desecuritization. He argues that this concept refers to shifting the regulation of a phenomenon from one functional sector to another, as from the security sector to the economic domain. Desecuritization, according to Huysmans, “implies the dissolution of enmity as the foundation of political community, or the unmaking of representations of existential threat.”<sup>57</sup>

Huysmans’ articulation of securitization theory is best exemplified by his text, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. In this work, he addresses the concept of “security forming” whereby the government and public approaches to security are generated. His examination of immigration, asylum, and refugee policy serves as a case study for his theoretical analysis of securitization theory. Huysmans’ model of securitization emphasizes the constructed quality of security definitions by questioning what is being secured and the consequent governmental techniques of securitization qua policy responses to publicly perceived threats. He notes that, “Securitization theory illustrates how the rhetoric of security reifies political and policy solutions by invoking an imagined unity, threatened by outside forces. Securitization constitutes political unity by means of

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<sup>56</sup> Huysmans 2006, p. 575

<sup>57</sup> Fierke, p. 111

placing it in an existentially hostile environment and asserting an obligation to free it from threat.”<sup>58</sup> His application of securitization theory to immigration policies illustrates how political objectives are inherent in this theoretical model. He uses the concept of “security technique” to differentiate his approach from the more linguistic readings of security. The framework employed by “The Politics of Insecurity” demonstrates a philosophical approach to securitization theory, different from that of the Copenhagen School that can be applied to policy decisions.

### **Sociological Securitization in Theory**

While the Copenhagen School’s model of securitization can be classified as being philosophical, the pragmatic approach to securitization is termed sociological. This sociological model was developed in Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom. In contrast to the philosophical tradition, sociological securitization proposes a pluralist approach to securitization wherein discourse analysis and process tracing work together.<sup>59</sup> The sociological model of securitization theory emphasizes the mutual constitution of securitizing actors and audiences. Thus, the audience is viewed as an emergent category that must be judged empirically before being accepted as a level of analysis.<sup>60</sup> This theoretical model focuses on argument analysis instead of on the individual speech acts that constitute the assertion that an issue is a “security” issue. Thus, “while a speech act can produce effects just by following rules, argument analysis holds that for a discursive process to succeed, it

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<sup>58</sup> Huysmans 2006, p. 50.

<sup>59</sup> Thierry Balzacq. “Constructivism and Securitization Studies” in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, eds., *Handbook of Security Studies*. (London: Routledge, Forthcoming), p. 10 – 11.

<sup>60</sup> Balzacq 2011, p. 2.

needs a strategy of reasoning and persuasion.”<sup>61</sup> The sociological model uses a process of argument and reasoning to explore how variations in security symbols determine the very nature and consequences of the political structuration of threats.<sup>62</sup> From this perspective, the pragmatic act of security aspires to, “determine the strategic and tactical uses of language to attain a certain aim, while looking at the consequences of ‘saying security’. By doing so, it creates a more solid approach to securitization.”<sup>63</sup>

The sociological approach to this theory is also referred to as pragmatic securitization because it focuses more attention on the context in which securitization occurs, accounts for the status of the speakers, and attends to the effects that security statements provoke in the audience. Thus, the sociological model accepts that the process of securitization itself does not always lead to the adoption of exceptional measures. This approach contends that securitization is better understood as, “a strategic process that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.”<sup>64</sup> Scholars immersed in this tradition emphasize performatives, which are situated actions mediated by agents’ habitus. Balzacq explains that these performatives, “are thus analyzed as nodal loci of practices, results of power games

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<sup>61</sup> Balzacq Forthcoming, p. 17

<sup>62</sup> IBID

<sup>63</sup> Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, and Thierry Balzacq, *The Changing Dynamics of Security in an Enlarged European Union*. (CEPS: Research Paper No. 12, 2008), p. 2.

<sup>64</sup> Balzacq 2011, p. 1



within the social field or context on the one hand, and between the latter and the habitus on the other.”<sup>65</sup>

This theoretical perspective draws on symbolic interactionism and on Bourdieu’s contribution to the symbolic uses of language. It is important to consider how the use of language is an essential component of interactions. In the context of securitization, the aim of interactions, as constituted or mediated by language, is to convince or persuade an audience to see the world in a specific way and then act as the situation commands.<sup>66</sup> The sociological approach to securitization can thus be viewed as a process,

“...whereby patterns of heuristic artifacts (metaphors, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions) are contextually mobilized by a recognized agent who works persuasively to prompt a target audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), that concurs with the enunciator’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura or unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized political act must be undertaken immediately to block its development.”<sup>67</sup>

This view of security as a pragmatic act can be further categorized into three distinct levels: that of the agent, that of the act, and that of the context, and each, in turn, have interwoven facets.

### **Sociological Securitization in Practice**

The sociological approach to securitization has been equated with the so-called “Paris School” of Security Studies. Scholars such as Didier Bigo and the “Paris School” of security studies call into question the ‘narrowness’ of the Copenhagen

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<sup>65</sup> IBID, p. 2.

<sup>66</sup> For further explanation see Balzacq Forthcoming, p. 17

<sup>67</sup> IBID, p. 17-18.

School's exclusive focus on speech acts and advocate a sociological approach to securitization. For these theorists, "security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinized practices rather than only through specific speech acts that enable emergency measures."<sup>68</sup> Bigo contends that, "security is often marked by the handing over of entire security fields to 'professionals of unease', who are tasked with managing existing persistent threats and identifying new ones."<sup>69</sup> Thus, securitization emerges from security professionals and their administrative practices that are designed for the management of fear.

This sociological model of securitization theory has been applied to the rise of private military corporations (PMCs) by scholars such as Christian Olsson. Olsson argues that, "rather than speak of 'security', as if the term referred to a fixed reality, one would thus have to speak of the process of securitization."<sup>70</sup> PMCs are imbued with the authority to 'speak security' because of their unique role within the state's security apparatus. In this context, the commodification by private firms of security, "considered as a 'good' or as a 'service', constitutes on the contrary the ultimate

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<sup>68</sup> Matt McDonald. "Securitization and the Construction of Security." *European Journal of International Relations*. V. 14, N. 4 (2008), p. 570.

<sup>69</sup> Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease." *Alternatives*. V. 27, N. 1 (2002), p. 65.

<sup>70</sup> Christian Olsson, "Military Intervention and the Concept of the Political: Bringing the Political Back Into the Interactions Between External Forces and Local Societies." In Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, eds., *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes After 9/11*. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008), p. 170.

objective of the concept.”<sup>71</sup> If the actor (in this case PMCs) who offers protection is capable of controlling the process of (in)securitization, that actor can also determine the demand of protection. Olsson focuses on the discursive act of PMCs both speaking security and providing protection from perceived threats. She explains that, “by determining against which threats one has to be able to defend oneself, they also determine what supply is able to respond to the existing demand.”<sup>72</sup>

### **Post-Structural Securitization in Theory**

Post-structural securitization theory goes beyond the philosophical and sociological approaches to securitization. This theoretical concept contends that, in order to preserve security, “the entire human environment is being taken into consideration.”<sup>73</sup> This formulation of securitization fits succinctly within the critical approach to security studies in espousing an emancipatory agenda that seeks to move beyond the constraints of a state-centric model. Scholars following this perspective, focus on the background assumptions and discourses belonging to a culture from which threats are defined. Their intent is to denaturalize what has come to be assumed in order to open a space for alternatives.<sup>74</sup> The post-structural approach to securitization draws on the work of scholars such as Agamben and Foucault. It contends that the suspension of politics becomes an ongoing “state of exception” which is worthy of further investigation.

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<sup>71</sup> IBID, p. 170

<sup>72</sup> IBID, p. 171

<sup>73</sup> Nina Graeger, “Environmental Security?” *Journal of Peace Research*. V. 33, N. 1 (1996), p. 109.

<sup>74</sup> K.M. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 102.

This formulation of securitization theory addresses some of the shortcomings inherent in the dominant Copenhagen School's approach. In conceptualizing a rational-actor-model – where policymakers logically respond to threats because they threaten human existence – the CS model ignores real-world situations where, for domestic reasons, securitizing actors can deliberately choose not to securitize an existential threat posed by an issue falling outside of “traditional” state security emergencies.<sup>75</sup> As a result, the post-structural approach to securitization theory rejects a state-centric conception of security. This conceptual model argues that, “to preserve security, the entire human environment must be taken into consideration, including the need to resolve environment problems and ensure a sustainable future.”<sup>76</sup> Post-structural securitization considers the ways in which this model can be applied to international organizations, or across state borders. The elimination of the state allows for post-structural securitization theory to address a wider range of issues that extend beyond traditional border demarcations.

This model of securitization is often applied to issues that are not traditionally considered to be under the regular purview of security studies, such as environmental degradation, health issues such as HIV/AIDS, and humanitarian initiatives. A post-structural approach to securitization allows scholars to consider the ways in which these issues are “securitized” and mobilized by political actors so

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<sup>75</sup> Catherine Lo-Ping and Nicholas Thomas, “How is Health a Security Issue? Politics, Responses, and Issues.” *Health Policy and Planning*. V. 25 (2010), p. 448.

<sup>76</sup> Graeger, p. 109

as to be considered existential threats. Instead of relying on a state response to address a “security” issue, the post-structural model allows for the consideration of an international response to a security issue that transcends state borders.

### **Applying Securitization Theory to Post-9/11 Policy Formation**

Securitization theory has become en vogue in the post-9/11 period as scholars attempt to apply this formulation to a wide array of policies.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, securitization theory, especially its philosophical variance, as espoused by the Copenhagen School, is especially useful for examining the creation of homeland security and defense policies in the United States following the 2001 terrorist attacks. This theory lends itself well to the examination of the creation of homeland security policy in the post-9/11 period because of its ability to account for the role of different actors in the securitization process.

The application of securitization theory to the “exceptional” creation of homeland security policy in the United States in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, provides a useful frame of reference for examining the policy creation process during this period. Differentiating amongst the three variants of securitization policy (philosophical, sociological, and post-structural) is crucial because it helps to clarify the theoretical assumptions made by each of these approaches. For purposes of this dissertation, securitization theory, particularly the

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<sup>77</sup> For further elaboration on how this theory has been applied in the post-9/11 period refer to Nicola Phillips, “The Limits of ‘Securitization’: Power, Politics, and Process in US Foreign Economic Policy.” *Government and Opposition*. V. 42, N. 2 (2007).

philosophical variant, will serve as a practical method for comparing the creation of Canadian and American homeland defence and security policies in the so-called “terrorist era”.

The philosophical variant of securitization theory is especially well suited for examining the creation of homeland security policy in the post-9/11 period, since it allows for the inclusion of the various elements of the securitization process that have influenced decision-making in this issue area. This framework accounts for the role of the “authorized speaker”, which has emerged as an important component of the securitization of homeland security policy since this process has been initiated by designated actors who have been imbued with the power to designate an issue as a “security” issue. Secondly, this model considers the institutional state responses to invoked threats to national security. The philosophical variant of this model provides a framework for assessing the role of the media as an agent of securitization and allows for the consideration of whether or not the media affects the public’s acceptance of the securitization of an issue area. This model is also useful for studying the public’s response to the articulation of an imminent existential threat. Finally, this model allows for a comprehensive examination of a specific case in order to determine whether or not securitization has taken place, and to ascertain the different stages of the securitization process.

### **Challenges Inherent in the Philosophical Variant of Securitization Theory: What is “The Audience”?**

The philosophical model of securitization theory is well-suited to examining the creation of homeland security policy in the post-9/11 period; however, there are inherent deficiencies in this approach that must be addressed. This theoretical framework lends itself well to this issue area because of its emphasis of the role of the audience in the process of securitization. Yet current articulations of this model are vague in defining the groups that constitute the “audience”. Further, the Copenhagen School’s articulation of this theory does not provide a framework for determining whether or not the audience has accepted the securitization of a given policy area. In order to strengthen the philosophical articulation of securitization theory, there is a need to define what is meant by the “audience”. Guidelines must be established for determining whether or not the audience has been persuaded by a designated “speaker of security” that there is an imminent threat that must be dealt with outside the realm of politics. An examination of some of the challenges presented by traditional philosophical securitization formulations of the audience reveals that these problems can be corrected in order to strengthen the utility of this theoretical construct.

#### *What is the “Audience”? How does the Audience Recognize Existential Threats?*

The Copenhagen School, which serves as the most dominant articulation of philosophical securitization, offers only a cursory definition of the term, “audience”. It is important to define the role of the audience since one of the key facets of this framework is that an issue is only securitized after the audience has accepted the

representation of a threat. It is important for the framework to offer a clear conceptualization of who constitutes the audience and how its acceptance can be assessed.<sup>78</sup> While the sociological variant of securitization theory emphasizes the mutual constitution of securitizing actors and audiences, the philosophical variant conceives of the audience as a formal given category, which is often poised in a receptive mode.<sup>79</sup> Thus, the empowering audience is the audience that, "...has a direct causal connection with the issue; and has the ability to enable the securitizing actor to adopt measures in order to tackle the threat."<sup>80</sup> The act of securitization is therefore contingent on the acceptance of the empowering actor of a securitizing move.

These definitions of the audience offered by the philosophical tradition remain vague, and attempts to clarify the structure of this component of securitization are limited. The Copenhagen School suggests that the audience is defined as, "those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific nature of some issues."<sup>81</sup> Waever argues that the audience can be defined as,

"...those who have to be convinced in order for the securitizing move to be successful. Although one often tends to think in terms of "the population" or citizenry being the audience (the

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<sup>78</sup> Sarah Leonard and Christian Kaunert, "Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory" in Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 57.

<sup>79</sup> Thierry Balzacq, "A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants." In Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 2.

<sup>80</sup> IBID, p. 8-9.

<sup>81</sup> Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde 1998, p. 41



ideal situation regarding ‘national security’ in a democratic society), it actually varies according to the political system and the nature of the issue.”<sup>82</sup>

These definitions, however, are only marginally precise. Neither definition seeks to impose any boundaries on the group that can be considered the audience. No precise criteria are outlined to identify what exactly constitutes the audience in practice. This definition does not lend itself to an empirical application of the framework and remains ambiguous and confusing to scholars applying this framework to policy securitization.

#### *How is Audience Acceptance Ascertained?*

The second challenge inherent in this model is the question of how best to measure audience acceptance of the securitization of an issue area. It is not clear what the acceptance by the audience means and entails exactly, and as a result, it is difficult to determine how this process could be identified in practice.<sup>83</sup> The Copenhagen School notes that, in the case of audience acceptance, “...accept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion,” since, “securitization can never be imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case.”<sup>84</sup> This challenge in determining whether or not audience acceptance has occurred has been noted by various scholars. Dunn Caveltly points out that, “... it remains largely unclear which audience has to accept what argument, to what degree, and for how long.”<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Ole Waever. *Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Program in Security Studies*. (New York, Mimeo, 2003), p. 11 – 12.

<sup>83</sup> Leonard and Kaunert 2011, p. 58.

<sup>84</sup> Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde 1998, p. 25.

<sup>85</sup> Myriam Dunn Caveltly, *Cyber Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age*. (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 26.

Likewise, Salter argues that, “the actual politics of the acceptance by the audience are left radically under-determined by the CS securitization model. It is precisely the dynamics of this acceptance, this resonance, this politics of consent that must be unpacked further.”<sup>86</sup> While the Copenhagen School posits that a “significant audience” must accept the threat articulated by the securitizing actor – one who “speaks security” – in order for a referent object (or threatening event) to be securitized, the nature and status of that audience remains unaccounted for in the philosophical variant of securitization theory. As a result, it is difficult to determine when and how securitization has taken place since there are no metrics for ascertaining audience acceptance.

*The Role of the Securitizing Actor and the Role of the Audience*

Another challenge posed by the philosophical approach to securitization is the lack of clarity in articulating the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience. The Copenhagen School notes that Security is a “structured field” in which some actors are, “placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security.”<sup>87</sup> The CS also notes that, “this power... is never absolute: No one is guaranteed the ability to make people accept a claim for necessary security action.”<sup>88</sup> How then, is one to differentiate between the role of the securitizing actor and that of the audience? It is

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<sup>86</sup> Mark B. Salter, “Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Authority.” *Journal of International Relations and Development*. V. 11, N. 4 (2008), p. 324.

<sup>87</sup> Buzan, Weaever, and De Wilde 1998, p. 31.

<sup>88</sup> IBID

further stated that, “it is the actor, not the analyst, who decides whether something is to be handled as an existential threat.”<sup>89</sup> Does this mean that the analyst is part of the audience? Policymakers implement policies that are designed to respond to perceived existential threats. These policymakers respond to threats articulated by the securitizing actors, and impose legislation and policies on the general public. This group is both acting in response to a threat, and acted upon by the securitizing actor. Edelman contends that, “the success of securitization is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor’s ability to identify with the audience’s feelings, needs, and interests.”<sup>90</sup> In order to persuade the audience to accept an issue as posing an imminent threat, that is, to achieve a perlocutionary effect, the speaker must “tune” his or her language to the audience’s experience.<sup>91</sup> Further differentiation between the securitizing actor and the audience is necessary in order to examine, in more detail, the tools used by the former to convince the latter of an existential threat.

*Securitization: A Speech Act or an Intersubjective Process?*

The lack of clarity concerning the definition of the audience in philosophical securitization calls into question whether or not securitization can be conceptualized as a speech act, an intersubjective process, or both at the same time. On the one hand, the notion that securitization is a speech act indicates that it is a self-referential activity that is governed by discursive rules. On the other hand, the proposal that the acceptance of the audience is crucial for successful securitization

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<sup>89</sup> IBID, p. 34.

<sup>90</sup> Murray Edelman, *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).

<sup>91</sup> Balzacq 2011, p. 9.

emphasizes that it is intersubjective.<sup>92</sup> The Copenhagen School notes that, “A successful speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes the speech.”<sup>93</sup> The securitizing actor must “speak security” by identifying an issue as an existential threat, and at the same time the audience must accept that threat. Fierke argues that each speech act, “... must be negotiated with an audience which ultimately consents to a change in the rules. This may take a variety of forms, from active support for new legislation... to a failure to challenge or question proposed changes.”<sup>94</sup> Balzacq notes that the requirement of a “direct causal connection with desired goals” is important because, “audiences do not have the same power over a securitizing actor”.<sup>95</sup>

It seems clear that the Copenhagen School regards securitization as an intersubjective act of a securitizing actor towards a significant audience. However, it is possible that this assertion negates the importance of the speech acts that are directed at the audience. The philosophical variant of the theoretical model accepts that the process of securitization must involve both a speech act and an intersubjective process at the same time. The ambiguity concerning the definition of the audience makes this confusing. Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, citing Huysmans, do note that, “One danger of the phrases *securitization* and *speech act* is

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<sup>92</sup> See Balzacq 2005, p. 172

<sup>93</sup> Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde 1998, p. 32.

<sup>94</sup> K.M. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 107.

<sup>95</sup> Balzacq 2011, p. 9.

that too much focus can be placed on the acting side, thus privileging the powerful while marginalizing those who are the audience and judge of the act.”<sup>96</sup> It is necessary to evaluate the audience’s acceptance or rejection of the articulation of a given issue as posing an existential threat in order to determine whether or not the process of securitization has been successful.

### **Overcoming the Inherent Challenges: Reconceptualizing the Role of the Audience in Philosophical Securitization**

In order to utilize philosophical securitization theory as a means of assessing homeland security and defense policies, it is necessary to clarify some of the challenges pertaining to the audience that are inherent in this theoretical construct. Modifying this approach does not detract from the overall intent of the philosophical securitization model as articulated by scholars such as Huysmans and the members of the Copenhagen School. Indeed, Ole Waever himself noted the theoretical weaknesses regarding the audience within his theory and called for more work on the issue.<sup>97</sup> The role of the audience in philosophical securitization can be clarified by implementing three measures; first, situating the audience in the proper context, second, differentiating between multiple ‘audiences’ in a single attempt at securitization, and, finally, by clearing delineating the difference between the securitizing actor and the audience.

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<sup>96</sup> Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde 1998, p. 41 citing Jef Huysmans, “Making/Unmaking European Disorder: Metatheoretical and Empirical Questions of Military Stability After the Cold War.” Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculteit de Sociale Wetenschappen, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Nieuwe Reeks van Doctoraten in de Sociale Wetenschappen, no. 26.

<sup>97</sup> Ole Waever, *Securitization Theory: Taking Stock of a Research Program in Security Studies*. (Unpublished manuscript, 2003). Ole Weaever spoke of this during our meeting in San Diego in 2012.

*The Audience in Context*

Since the nature of the audience defies exact definition within the philosophical securitization model, it is necessary to determine context in order to understand what threat representations and rhetorics resonate with specific audiences. Balzacq argues that it is necessary to pay more attention to the audience, as well as to the context more generally, in the securitization framework. He argues that it would be analytically beneficial to, "... conceptualize securitization as a strategic or pragmatic practice – rather than a speech act – taking place in a specific set of circumstances, including a specific context and the existence of an audience having a particular 'psycho-cultural' disposition."<sup>98</sup> This notion borrows from the sociological model of securitization theory, which focuses on argument analysis, rather than on individual speech acts. Without abandoning the philosophical model's emphasis on speech acts, it is necessary to consider the context in which the process of securitization is taking place. For example, if the philosophical tradition considered the existence of, "... various settings, which are characterized by specific actors and debates, and audiences with particular expectations, as well as specialized language, conventions and procedures,"<sup>99</sup> this model would be better able to identify the specific audience being targeted by 'securitizing actors' seeking to identify an existential threat. Clearly the audience varies depending on the issue and the perceived threat.

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<sup>98</sup> Balzacq 2005, p. 172.

<sup>99</sup> Leonard and Kaunert 2011, p. 62.

The audience's acceptance of a security issue as an existential threat is contingent on the specific context in which the securitizing actors are presenting that threat. In order to identify the audience, it is necessary to define the context in which the threat is being presented. Salter notes that, "Securitizing moves occur within the universe of the audience imagination. It is not simply a power relationship – but a knowledge-authority game."<sup>100</sup> Thus, it is necessary to determine the context in which the securitization is taking place in order to understand what threat representations and rhetorics resonate with specific audiences. Speech acts function differently in various institutional and bureaucratic settings; therefore, it is necessary to differentiate between proximate and distal audiences.<sup>101</sup> This context is important since the audience does not necessarily exist prior to securitization. It is possible that securitizing actors can, "...create a receptive audience, by bringing it to consciousness of itself as a unified process."<sup>102</sup> Determining the context in which the securitizing actors are attempting to delineate an existential threat helps to identify the targeted group at whom policies are being directed. This group can subsequently be identified as the audience in the context of the securitization process.

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<sup>100</sup> Mark Salter, "Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority." *Journal of International Relations and Development*. V. 11 (2008), p. 330.

<sup>101</sup> Michael C. Williams, "The Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory" in Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 213.

<sup>102</sup> Williams 2011, p. 215.

*Multiple Audiences: The Populist Audience and the Elite Audience*

While it is important to determine the context in which a securitization is taking place in order to identify the audience involved, it is also necessary to recognize that there can be different audiences involved in a single securitization process. Since the category of “the audience” is so large, it is sometimes necessary to conceptualize the audience as actually comprising different audiences.<sup>103</sup> Different audiences respond to different elements of the securitization process. For example, Vuori notes that these audiences, “... depend on the function that the securitization act is intended to serve.”<sup>104</sup> Thus, in some instances of securitization, the intended audience can be quite general – such as “the public” – whereas some acts of securitization in situations of crisis may be intended for an elite audience only. Given that the audience depends on each specific socio-historical situation, it can be argued that, “it would be impossible to define who constitutes the audience in (philosophical) securitization theory”<sup>105</sup> if there could only be one designated audience.

A differentiation must be made between an “elite” audience – that which ultimately enacts policy decisions to combat an existential threat - and the “populist” audience – that which accepts those policy decisions. This differentiation helps to narrow down what is meant by the general expression of “the audience” in

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<sup>103</sup> For examples see: Balzacq 2005, Salter 2008, and Vuori 2008

<sup>104</sup> Juha Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Orders.” *European Journal of International Relations*. V. 14, N. 1 (2008), p. 72.

<sup>105</sup> Leonard and Kaunert 2011, p. 62.



philosophical securitization theory. Too often it is assumed that “the audience” is synonymous with “the public”. But this is often not the case. Salter notes that, “There is a network of bureaucrats, consultants, parliamentarians, or officials that must be convinced that securitization is appropriate, efficient, useful, or effective.”<sup>106</sup> The securitizing actors who articulate the threat also act upon this elite audience. The elite audience, once convinced that an existential threat exists, enacts a policy response that must then be accepted by the populist audience. The populist audience will “accept” the securitization of threats differently from an elite or scientific audience.<sup>107</sup> The elite audience, which is comprised of policymakers, can offer the formal support necessary for the implementation of extraordinary measures aimed at responding to a security threat. The populist audience, which is made up of voting citizens of the state, can then offer moral support regarding the priority of a given security issue that must be dealt with by the elite audience. Audience acceptance of the securitization process can thus be measured based on whether or not policy makers enact legislation to respond to threats, and whether or not the general public supports the policies generated by the elite audience.

*Differentiating Between Securitizing Actors and the Audience*

Finally, in order to clearly delineate the audience(s) targeted by a given attempt to securitize an issue area, it is necessary to differentiate between the securitizing actor and the audience. The very premise of securitization theory is that a “significant audience” must concur with the securitizing actor – who “speaks

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<sup>106</sup> Salter 2008, p. 328.

<sup>107</sup> Salter 2008, p. 326.

security” for a referent object – the threatening event – to be securitized.<sup>108</sup> Since previous articulations of philosophical securitization theory remain vague in outlining the differences between the securitizing actor(s) and the audience(s), it is important that the former is not confused with the elite audience. Thus, the securitizing actor(s) are those individuals who have the power to “speak security” within the state. This group is comprised of elected officials, such as state leaders and their advisors. In order to persuade the audience(s) that the securitization of an issue area is necessary, to achieve a perlocutionary effect, these securitizing actors have to “tune their language” to the audiences’ experience.<sup>109</sup> Thus, the requirement of a “direct causal connection with desired goals” is important since audiences do not have the same “power over” a given securitizing actor.<sup>110</sup> The complex role of the “authorized speaker of security” will be developed in depth in the second chapter of this thesis when the “first moves” towards securitization are considered.

### **What Constitutes “The Audience” in This Project?**

Waever notes that, “... the audience is not made up of the entire population – which would be the democratic ideal in situations regarding national security – but rather, it actually varies according to the political system and the nature of the issue.”<sup>111</sup> For purposes of this study, two separate, yet equally important audiences can be differentiated in the two cases – in the post-9/11 period, both the United States and Canada had an elite audience and a populist audience that had to be

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<sup>108</sup> Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998

<sup>109</sup> Balzacq 2011, p. 9.

<sup>110</sup> IBID, p. 10.

<sup>111</sup> Ole Waever, *Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Program in Security Studies*. (Unpublished manuscript, 2003), p. 12.

convinced that the possibility of future terrorist acts posed an existential threat to their respective states. Here, securitization can be seen as a three-step process. First, a threat is expressed by the “authorized speakers of security”. Second, this security issue is accepted by the elite audience as posing an imminent threat to the state. Finally, the elite audience “sells” the necessity of securitization to the populist audience by enacting policies to combat the threat and demonstrating the immediate need to address the issue. The acceptance of the securitization process can be judged separately after the second and third steps: has the elite audience accepted the need to securitize a given issue? Has the populist audience accepted the elite audience’s securitization of an issue?

The elite audience is the first to respond to the articulation of an existential threat. This group is comprised of policymakers and the media. These actors accept the existential threat articulated by those authorized to “speak security” and then generate policies to mitigate the threat. The media can be included in the elite audience, since the media must also decide whether or not to accept a threat as posing an imminent danger to the state. In the United States, the elite audience is represented by Congress (with the exception of the executive branch of government), American media outlets, and security policymakers (including the State Department, the Defense Department, and those belonging to newly created departments such as the Office of Homeland Security and Department of Homeland Security). In Canada, the elite audience is comprised of individual members of Parliament, policymakers (such as those belonging to the Department of National

Defense, The Department of Public Safety, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), as well as the Canadian media (including the CBC, CTV, the Globe and Mail, and other media outlets).

The populace audience responds both to the original articulation of a threat, and the elite audience's reaction to it. The populist audience is comprised of the voting public – the citizens of each state. This audience's participation in the securitization process is limited to either accepting or rejecting the measures implemented by the elite audience in response to a security threat. Gauging this group's acceptance of implemented measures can be difficult since opportunities for civic engagement in this process are minimal. However, public dissent and rejection of proposed legislation or institutional responses to a given threat are often reflected in the media coverage of a given issue.

A key component of this study will be an examination of the ways in which the American audiences, both elite and populist, accepted the articulation of terrorism as an imminent crisis facing the state, while the Canadian audiences rejected attempts to securitize the state's homeland security policy response. This process of acceptance and rejection is visible in the two states' authorized speakers' articulation of the threat, the differences in the two states' policy responses, their institutional responses, their media responses, and in the response of the general public to the elite audience's representations of the threat of terrorism. Following an examination of authorized speaker's articulation of a threat, this study will trace

the audience groups' acceptance of this threat by considering the responses of the policy elite, media, and populist audience to the speaker's threat articulation.

***CHAPTER TWO: AUTHORIZED SPEAKERS OF SECURITY AND THE  
SECURITIZATION OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RESPONSE***

***Introduction***

The first step in the securitization process is the articulation of an existential threat by a so-called “authorized speaker of security”. While various scholars have alluded to shortcomings in the philosophical variant of securitization theory and its articulation of the role of the audience, few have fully explored the role of elites in initiating the securitization process. In order to determine whether or not a successful securitization has taken place it is necessary to consider the role of the authorized speakers of security in initiating this process. Authorized speakers of security articulate an issue as posing an existential threat by means of a security speech act. These speech acts emphasize the risk posed by a given issue to a state audience. In this respect, in the philosophical model of securitization theory, authorized speakers of security demonstrate the continued importance of the state as a valid referent object of security.

In the United States, the authorized speakers of security were quick to identify terrorism as posing an imminent threat to the American public. These elite actors sought to implement extra-legal policies and actions in order to demonstrate that an immediate response was necessary so as to adequately address this threat. In contrast, Canadian authorized speakers of security took a more cautious approach in responding to the threat of terrorism. Canadian elites sought to balance a desire to signal to the United States Canada’s willingness to co-operate on security initiatives in order to maintain trade relations, with a desire to introduce security

reforms gradually in a manner that would not upset the public. These different approaches by elite actors in the two states imply that, while American elites initiated a securitization process in response to the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 period, Canada did not enter into this process. The different courses of action taken by elites – the so-called, ‘authorized speakers of security’ in the two states – demonstrates the role played by these actors in the securitization process.

***Who Are the Authorized Speakers of Securitization?***

To identify the authorized speakers of security, or “securitizing actors” it is necessary to consider one of the key questions in security analysis: who can ‘do’ security in the name of what?<sup>112</sup> These authorized speakers of security are those actors who initiate the securitization process by declaring something – a referent object – as existentially threatened by a given issue. Waever notes that, “Security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.”<sup>113</sup> These elites possess certain specific characteristics that grant them the authority to speak on behalf of the population.

There are two factors that can be used to identify an actor as an authorized speaker of security. First, such actors must be considered by the audience to be in a position of power by being generally accepted voices of authority for the general population. They are selected by the populace to make decisions on its behalf. Second, authorized speakers of security can be recognized by the perceived

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<sup>112</sup> See for example Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 45.

<sup>113</sup> Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization” in R.D. Lipschutz, ed. *On Security*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 57.

credibility attributed to them by the group they represent. In the most general formulation, authorized speakers of security are those elites who have been elected by the population to represent the public and make decisions that affect their day-to-day lives. These authorized speakers include: kings, presidents, prime ministers, and other such elite rulers. Waever suggests that these speakers are usually agents of a given state, noting that, “By uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”<sup>114</sup> Those assumed to be “security experts” are also granted the ability to initiate the securitization process since, typically, these “security experts” are assumed to, “...have the capacity to speak authoritatively on what constitutes a security issue due to their background and qualifications, whereas non-experts are not usually assumed to have the same capacity to ‘speak security’.”<sup>115</sup> Certain elite actors and security professionals are better at initiating the securitization process than others since they are perceived to be more credible by the relevant audience.

It is important to note, however, that these perceptions of actors’ credibility can fluctuate significantly over time. The credibility of political leaders can be won or lost, and this can have a radical impact on determining whether or not a given issue will be successfully securitized. This fluctuation in perceived credibility is important since it can mean that an individual who was once a generally accepted

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<sup>114</sup> Ole Waever. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In R. Lipschutz, ed. *On Security*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 55.

<sup>115</sup> Nick Vaughan-Williams and Columba Peoples. *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*. (Taylor and Francis, 2010), p. 79.



‘speaker of security’ can lose his or her standing as such for political reasons. The ability to initiate a security speech act is contingent on an actor’s legitimacy and his or her ability to successfully influence the target audience. Indeed, the entire securitization process is essentially political – elite actors are often self-motivated to invoke the existence of an existential threat to hold on to their own political power.

*Authorized Speakers of Security as Policy Entrepreneurs*

In order to clarify the role of the authorized speaker of security, the philosophical variant of securitization theory can borrow from the field of Public Policy Analysis. Since the end result of the securitization process is generally the establishment of a set of policies aimed at combating a perceived existential threat, this IR construct is already on the cusp of the Public Policy sphere. One useful way of conceptualizing authorized speakers of security, which emphasizes the political nature of these actors, is to conceive of them as policy entrepreneurs. John W. Kingdon was amongst the first to develop the concept of the policy entrepreneur.<sup>116</sup> Policy entrepreneurs, “... can be thought of as doing for the policymaking process what business entrepreneurs do for the marketplace.” Thus, policy entrepreneurs, “... serve to bring new policy ideas into good currency.”<sup>117</sup> These actors have pre-prepared solutions in hand for problems that have yet to emerge. Therefore, when these issues do arise they are first on the scene with solutions.

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<sup>116</sup> John W. Kingdon. *Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policies*. (Boston: Little Brown, 1984). For further discussion of policy entrepreneurs see also: Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Eyestone, 1978; King, 1988; Mintrom, 1994; Polsby, 1984; Schon, 1971; Walker 1981; Young 1991; and Weissert, 1991.

<sup>117</sup> Michael Montrom and Sandra Vergari, “Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Policy Change.” *Policy Studies Journal*. V. 24, N. 3 (1996), p. 422.

Authorized speakers of security and policy entrepreneurs alike face choices about which issues to push and how to push them. As a result, “...arguments in support of the policy idea sometimes have to be crafted in different ways for different audiences. How well this is done will prove critical for how the policy debate unfolds.”<sup>118</sup> When initiating significant policy changes (or a securitization process), authorized speakers of security, as policy entrepreneurs, have to justify the need for reform but, simultaneously, shake up the existing “policy monopoly” that favours the reproduction of previously enacted measures through institutional inertia and ideological justification.<sup>119</sup> The role played by these actors, in a sense, “... underlies the relationship between timing, policy ideas, strategic interests, and political institutions in policy-making”.<sup>120</sup>

The conflation of authorized speakers of security with policy entrepreneurs is further supported by Kingdon’s assertion that policy entrepreneurs have, “... one of three sources: expertise, an ability to speak for others, or an authoritative decision-making position. They are usually known for their persistence... [and] their negotiating skills.”<sup>121</sup> These traits share a clear connection with the securitization framework where successful securitizing actors are purported to be

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<sup>118</sup> For a discussion of this issue see: J.T. Kaji and M. Mintrom, “Staking Claims: How Policy Entrepreneurs Should Sell Their Ideas.” (Paper Presented at the Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, Long Beach, California: 1995).

<sup>119</sup> See F.R. Baumgartner and B.D. Jones. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

<sup>120</sup> Daniel Beland. “Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective.” *Social Policy and Administration*. V. 39, N. 1 (February, 2005), p. 10.

<sup>121</sup> John W. Kingdon. *Agenda, Alternatives and Public Politics: Second Edition*. (New York: Longman, 2003), p. 180.

in possession of “social capital” and to “be in a position of authority”.<sup>122</sup> An examination of the ‘policy entrepreneur’ traits shared by those elites who are able to serve as authorized speakers of security demonstrates the ways in which these actors are able to initiate the securitization process by means of the security speech act.

### ***What is a Security Speech Act?***

Within the securitization framework, the authorized speakers of security initiate the securitization process through the utterance of speech acts.<sup>123</sup> In keeping with the definition outlined in the first chapter, a speech act involves the naming of an issue as a security issue, following the linguistic theory of illocutionary speech acts.<sup>124</sup> The securitizing speech act serves as a linguistic element of the securitization process in that it serves as the communication of a threat with words.<sup>125</sup> The utterance of the term, ‘security’ is itself an act that is central for understanding the political investment made in moving towards the establishment of an issue as posing an existential threat. The concept of ‘act’, “... conditions the political critique of security practice that is possible within this approach”.<sup>126</sup> The security speech act legitimates elite actors to move an issue out of the realm of the

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<sup>122</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 33.

<sup>123</sup> A comprehensive definition of the ‘speech act’, and the differentiation between the philosophical, sociological, and post-structural variants of the speech act are included in the first chapter.

<sup>124</sup> For further elaboration see Mark B. Salter and Genevieve Piche, “The Securitization of the US-Canada Border in American Political Discourse.” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*. V. 44, N. 4 (2011), p. 933 – 934.

<sup>125</sup> See K.M. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 104 - 105.

<sup>126</sup> Jef Huysmans, “What’s in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings.” *Security Dialogue*. V. 42 (2011), p. 372.

procedures of democratic political measures. The speech act designating a given issue as posing an existential threat allows for the use of exceptional political measures by proposing that the recognized threats cannot be met within the confines of the ‘usual’ democratic procedures and repertoire of actions.

In articulating the philosophical variant of securitization theory, the Copenhagen School posits that the speech act serves as, “... the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat to have substantial political effects... to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by.”<sup>127</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde further explain that:

“The attempt at securitization is called a ‘securitizing move’, which must be ‘accepted’ or rejected by the target audience. The authors argue that the conditions for success are (1) the internal grammatical form of the act, (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor – that is, the relationship between the speaker and the audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and (3) features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization.”<sup>128</sup>

It is the security speech act itself that moves an issue beyond the realm of “traditional” politics – rendering the necessity of immediate action that cannot be debated. Waever further explains, “The point of my argument, however, is not that to speak ‘security’ means simply to talk in a higher-pitched voice. It is slightly more complex than that: ‘security’ is a specific move that entails consequences which involve risking oneself and offering a specific issue as a test case. Doing this may have a price, and, in that sense, it could be regarded as a way to ‘raise the bet’.”<sup>129</sup>

Declaring that the existing normative order is unable to cope with an imminent

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<sup>127</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 25.

<sup>128</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 33

<sup>129</sup> Waever 1995, p. 75.

threat paves the way for the creation of new policies and measures, which would not have been acceptable previously.

Policy innovation as a means of addressing a perceived threat suggests that the question of identifying the authorized speakers of security is less about the presentation of the speech acts themselves than the logic that shapes the action. To determine whether or not a speech act has occurred, one should ask, “Is it an action according to individual logic or organizational logic, and is the individual or the organization generally held responsible for other actors?”<sup>130</sup> Thus, the Copenhagen School – representative of the larger body of philosophical securitization theory – asserts that, “Focusing on the organizational logic of the speech act is probably the best way to identify who or what is the securitizing actor. Once the securitizing actor has been identified, this party must be differentiated from the referent object of securitization.”<sup>131</sup> The philosophical variant of securitization theory analyses the statements of elites in terms of three things: first, security discourse and language (the so-called ‘grammar’ of security); second, institutional, historical, and empirical context; and, third the ‘audience’ of securitizing moves.<sup>132</sup> The security speech act is the first step in this process.

The security speech act is tied up in conceptions of sovereignty and survival. Often, the first move towards the securitization of a given issue area is taken

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<sup>130</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 41.

<sup>131</sup> IBID

<sup>132</sup> Andrew W. Neal. “Events Dear Boy, Events: Terrorism and Security From the Perspective of Politics.” *Critical Studies of Terrorism*. V.5, N. 1(2012), p. 112.

because an elite actor has determined that sovereignty – either that of the state or the individual’s own decision-making power – has been threatened as a result of a particular threat. Political leaders frequently justify the decision to securitize a threat on the basis of protecting state sovereignty.<sup>133</sup> The Copenhagen School explains that:

“Sovereignty implies a right to decide on the political form of the state without external forceful interference, which means that even if this form is decided by undemocratic means – and thus hardly qualifies as self-determination by the people – it is self-determination in the negative sense of avoiding foreign discussions by virtue of being self-contained within the political space of a state.”<sup>134</sup>

It is important to explore the importance of a state-centric model for the philosophical variant of securitization theory in order to fully explain the securitization speech act process.

### ***Authorized Speakers of Security and State-Centric Conceptions of ‘Security’***

#### *Differentiating Between Actors and Referent Objects*

Waever asserts that at the heart of the security issue there is “... still something to do with defense and something to do with the state”<sup>135</sup>. The philosophical variant of securitization theory is explicit in its belief that the state-centric political system is still the primary model for defense and security organization. As a result, this theoretical construct tends to view the state as the referent object of securitization. For this reason, it is necessary to differentiate

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<sup>133</sup> For further elaboration refer to Colin Gordon. “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction.” In Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), p. 1 – 52.

<sup>134</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 152.

<sup>135</sup> Get Citation from ISSS/ISAC speech

between actors and referent objects in the securitization process. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde note that it is more difficult to identify actors than it is to recognize referent objects. This is because, “Unlike the case with the referent object, a speech act is often not self-defining in terms of who or what speaks, and the designation ‘actor’ is thus in some sense arbitrary.”<sup>136</sup> This difficulty in separating the two categories is made easier by considering the two groups in the context of the state.

Indeed, the Copenhagen School asserts that:

“The state (usually) has explicit rules regarding who can speak on its behalf, so when the government says ‘we have to defend our national security,’ it has the right to act on behalf of the state. The government is the state in this respect. No such formal rules of representation exist for nations or the environment; consequently, the problem of legitimacy is larger in these areas than in the case of the state.”<sup>137</sup>

The protection of the state is often used by elite actors to justify the commencement of the securitization process. When considering issues such as homeland defense and security - two issue areas firmly within the ‘military’ sector of society - the state is, “...the most important – but not the only – referent object, and the ruling elites of states are the most important – but not the only – securitizing actors”. Thus, political elites often initiate the securitization process in the name of ‘protecting the state’.

Allowing the state to serve as the referent object in a securitization process facilitates the identification of the securitizing actors. When the state serves as the referent object of securitization, then it is generally the securitizing actors who can

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<sup>136</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 40.

<sup>137</sup> IBID, p. 41.

usually be determined to be members of the government of that state. Since the securitizing actors make appeals to the audience about the survival of the referent object, then it makes sense that those authorized to ‘speak security’ are those who are seen as “...commanding supreme allegiance and wielding coercive power,” over the population.<sup>138</sup>

The Copenhagen School asserts the continued relevance of the state, noting that, “The predominant form of political organization in the contemporary international system is the territorial state, which is obviously the main referent object of the political sector.”<sup>139</sup> Since the primary function of the state is the safety and security of its citizens, it is easier for elite actors to ‘speak security’ when they are doing so in the context of protecting state sovereignty. The recognition of an existential threat to the state is often presented as a threat to that state’s sovereignty. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde explain that:

“Sovereignty implies a right to decide on the political form of the state without external forceful interference, which means that even if this form is decided by undemocratic means – and thus hardly qualifies as self-determination by the people – it is self-determination in the negative sense of avoiding foreign decisions by virtue of being self-contained within the political space of the state.”<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 146.

<sup>139</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 145.

<sup>140</sup> IBID, p. 152.



In this way, securitization theory melds together traditional security scholarship and critical security scholarship in that both fields perform the same classic security trope: that security is an existential realm of sovereign or executive prerogative.<sup>141</sup>

The articulation of an existential threat does not always pose imminent danger to the physical construct of the state. In keeping with the highly political nature of security speech acts, sometimes the threat posed by a given issue is to an elite leader's political career, and not directly to the general population. Thus, it is not the state's sovereignty that is being compromised; it is the politician's sovereignty over his or her own decision-making capabilities. Andrew Neal explains that, "... the fear and threat that drive politicians and governments may not be existential but political. The survival at stake for politicians is not existential survival, but political survival."<sup>142</sup> This is because the way in which security issues are handled (or not handled) directly affects the lifespan of a government. Buzan Waever and de Wilde correctly point out that, "A government will often be tempted to use security arguments (in relation to the state) when its concern is actually that the government itself is threatened."<sup>143</sup> If the public audience determines that a given administration has not properly responded to a 'security' issue, they will be punished at election time.

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<sup>141</sup> See for example, Andrew W. Neal. "Events Dear Boy, Events: Terrorism and Security From the Perspective of Politics." *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. V.5, N.1 (2012), p. 107 – 109.

<sup>142</sup> Neal 2012, p. 114.

<sup>143</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 146.

***Why are Securitizing Actors and Speech Acts Important?***

The identification of authorized speakers of security and the speech acts that they initiate are important because the process of securitization serves to remove issues from political debate. An issue that has been securitized falls into the realm of exceptional politics. When an issue is determined to pose an existential threat, measures and policies that might not otherwise be considered are enacted without the consent of the governed. The shift to exceptional politics authorizes transgressive authority and enacts limits on a given order by referencing existential threats.<sup>144</sup> The initiation of the securitization process “... does not simply enact a given legal and political order that sanctions transgressive power in emergency situations.”<sup>145</sup> This process also removes issues from the public domain and hands them over to be ‘dealt with’ by supposed experts. It is important to identify securitizing speech acts and the actors who initiate them since this process has implications for the understanding of the politics of insecurity.

***Authorized Speakers of Security in the United States in the Post-9/11 Period: The Creation of the “Bush Narrative”***

President George W. Bush can be easily identified as the most important authorized speaker in the United States immediately following the September 11 attacks on the state. The President, as commander-in-chief, has a special authority, which adds to the legitimacy of his ability to ‘speak security’ for the general

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<sup>144</sup> For further elaboration see Jef Huysmans, “What’s in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings.” *Security Dialogue*. V. 42 (2011), p. 374 – 378.

<sup>145</sup> Huysmans 2011, p. 374.

public.<sup>146</sup> Indeed, state leaders have traditionally been accorded legitimacy in articulating the nature of threats to the state; however, acceptance of that threat remains the purview of the elite and populist audiences. Since an American president can be accepted as having more legitimacy and authority to initiate a securitizing move than, for example, a mayor or average citizen, President Bush was automatically afforded the authority to articulate for the American populace the continued threat posed by terrorism following the initial attacks. Bush's authority as leader was cemented by the events of 9/11. Prior to the attacks, his administration suffered a lack of support from certain components of the American audience as a result of his narrow electoral victory and his perceived reliance on senior advisors to generate policy. An examination of President Bush's speeches in the days following the attacks reveals that his take-charge manner of addressing the existential threat of terrorism bolstered his public support and legitimacy as president and ultimately led to the creation of the "Bush narrative" which initiated the American securitization process.

Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the American public regarded the legitimacy of President George W. Bush with skepticism. During his presidential campaign, Bush was often presented by the media as a "green" politician who lacked the experience necessary to run the country effectively.<sup>147</sup> His lack of foreign policy experience and perceived dependence on advisors were acknowledged as major

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<sup>146</sup> For further elaboration see K.M. Fierke. *Critical Approaches to International Security*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 107.

<sup>147</sup> For further elaboration refer to George W. Bush and John W. Deitrich.

issues. During the 2000 campaign, his propensity for malapropisms and mangled syntax resulted in questions from the media about his ability to govern and led to jokes about his intelligence on late-night television talk shows.<sup>148</sup> Late-night host, Bill Maher, discussing an electoral debate between the candidates quipped, “This was a town-hall debate, and Bush says he likes the personal feel of a town hall. There’s something about getting out there and lying directly to people’s faces.”<sup>149</sup> These jokes and the presentation of Bush as a simpleton continued after the election. Following a debacle involving the ballots used in the election, late-night host, David Letterman joked that, “... down in Florida in the early voting, there were computer glitches, confusing ballots, long lines and chaos. And when President Bush heard about this he said, ‘Mission Accomplished’.”<sup>150</sup>

Although Bush ultimately won the 2000 American presidential election, this result did little to quell jokes about his competency. It was the fourth election in US history in which the electoral vote winner did not also receive a plurality of the popular vote. The outcome of the election was delayed for more than a month as a result of vote re-counts in the state of Florida. The final election numbers resulted in a narrow win for Bush, with the majority of the popular vote going to his opponent, and the necessary electoral votes and crucial Supreme Court decision

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<sup>148</sup> For specific examples see David Frum. *The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush*. (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 5.

<sup>149</sup> *Late Night Jokes about President Bush*.

<<http://politicalhumor.about.com/library/blbush2004jokes.htm>>

<sup>150</sup> IBID

going to him.<sup>151</sup> The contestation over the ultimate outcome of the election hampered Bush's public support following his inauguration. In January 2001, the economy floundered, and Bush's approval rating fell from 60% to 50%, the lowest presidential approval rating in five years, which led Republican Party officials to hold a press conference to defend the president's popularity.<sup>152</sup> The blow to the President's legitimacy precipitated by the dip in popular support was compounded by the defection of Senator James Jeffords of Vermont, shifting control of the Senate to the Democratic Party. Presidential speech-writer, David Frum, dubbed the summer of 2001, "the summer of our discontent" as questions about the future of Bush's presidency abounded.<sup>153</sup> Following his election, half of surveyed Americans admitted to the belief that, "other people are really running the government most of the time".<sup>154</sup> The implication was that more established politicians in the administration with whom the President had surrounded himself, were actually determining the course of policy. Questions about Bush's electoral legitimacy coupled with concerns over his political leadership, and personal traits seemed to prevent the American public and media from fully investing him with the office.<sup>155</sup> Bush seemed intellectually thin and politically vulnerable. On September 10, 2001, it seemed certain that Bush was destined to be a one-term president.

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<sup>151</sup> Denise M. Bostdorff. "George W. Bush's Post-September 11 Rhetoric of Covenant Renewal: Upholding the Faith of the Greatest Generation." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. V. 89, N. 4 (November 2003), p. 300.

<sup>152</sup> See Richard L. Berke, "G.O.P. Defends Bush in Face of Dip in Poll Ratings." *New York Times*. (29 June, 2001) Section A19.

<sup>153</sup> David Frum. *The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush*. (New York: Random House, 2003).

<sup>154</sup> Richard L. Berke and Janet Elder, "60% in Poll Favour Bush, But Economy is Major Concern." *New York Times*. (14 March, 2001), A1.

<sup>155</sup> Bostdorff 2003, p. 300.

The events of September 11, 2001, completely changed the course of Bush's presidency. Against the backdrop of 9/11, President Bush gained the legitimacy and the public support necessary to convey to the public the existential threat posed by the potential for future terrorist attacks. Murphy asserts that, "In times of crisis, citizens expect to gain verbal reassurance from their leaders."<sup>156</sup> Historically, in crisis situations in the United States, the president is granted a wide breadth of powers and authority.<sup>157</sup> The occurrence of the terrorist attacks changed the political arithmetic in the president's favour. Bush's rhetorical response to the tragedy constituted citizens as members of a great nation that stood diametrically opposed to an evil force bent on destroying American resolve. The president's discourse about the attacks, "... was his inauguration into the presidency such that questions about his leadership quickly became so September 10<sup>th</sup>."<sup>158</sup> Presidential scholar, Fred I. Greenstein noted, "a dramatic transformation in his performance," arguing that Bush, "became strikingly more presidential", and that, "there has been an impressive increase in his political competence."<sup>159</sup> This change in presidential perception paved the way for the establishment of what can be termed that "Bush narrative", which served as the speech act initiating the securitization process in the United States.

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<sup>156</sup> John M. Murphy. "Epideictic and Deliberative Strategies in Opposition to War: The Paradox of Honor and Expediency." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. V. 43 (1992), p. 67 – 68.

<sup>157</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *The Imperial Presidency*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 450 – 451.

<sup>158</sup> Thomas DeFrank. "The 2000 Presidential Campaign: A Journalist's Perspective." *Address Presented at the Ninth Annual Texas A&M University Presidential Rhetoric Conference, College Station, Texas*. (28 February, 2003).

<sup>159</sup> Fred I. Greenstein. "The Changing Leadership of George W. Bush: A Pre- and Post-9/11 Comparison." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. (June 2002), p. 387.

***The Post-9/11 “Bush Narrative”: The President’s Securitizing Speech Acts***

Following the increased legitimacy accorded to Bush in the wake of the terrorist attacks, the President’s securitizing speech act took the form of four separate assertions which served to reinforce the existential threat to the American populace. These four assertions were: (1) That the United States was at War, (2) the American populace was a unified nation that needed to pull together to counter threats to the state (3) the creation of an “Evil Other”, and (4) the relationship between the current security dilemma and past threats to American security. These four arguments were the basis for what can be deemed, the “Bush narrative”. Most of the president’s rhetoric following the attacks fit neatly into one of these four categories. The unified and coherent presentation of the existential threat posed by the potential for future attacks solidified the public’s acceptance of Bush’s role as an authorized speaker of security.

*The Bush Narrative: (1) The Declaration of War*

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush was quick to assert that the United States was “at war”. Addressing the American people on the day of the attacks, he asserted that, “The deliberate and deadly attacks... were acts of war,” and that the United States would, “... not allow this enemy to win the war by changing our life and restricting our freedoms.”<sup>160</sup> Bush’s rhetorical invocation of a “Global War on Terrorism” or

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<sup>160</sup> George W. Bush. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.” *White House*. (11 September, 2001).  
<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html>>

“GWOT” was bolstered by the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) by Congress which granted the President the authority to:

“Use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”<sup>161</sup>

The AUMF is legally tantamount to a formal declaration of war and carries with it the right for the president to enact policies aimed at addressing a given security threat.<sup>162</sup>

Bush’s speeches in the post-9/11 period constantly referenced the notion that America was at war with an enemy set on crippling the American way of life. In a September 15, 2001 radio address, announcing a “comprehensive assault on terrorism” the President outlined the kind of war that should be expected:

“This is a conflict without battlefields or beachheads, a conflict with opponents who believe they are invisible... Those who make war against the United States have chosen their own destruction. Victory against terrorism will not take place in a single battle, but in a series of decisive actions against terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them. We are planning a broad and sustained campaign to secure our country and eradicate the evil of terrorism.”<sup>163</sup>  
This was to be a protracted war against an atypical enemy that was difficult to identify.

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<sup>161</sup> Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The AUMF was approved by both houses of Congress on September 14, 2001, and signed by the President on September 18, 2001.

<sup>162</sup> For further clarification of the legal implications of the AUMF see Harold Honju Koh. “The Spirit of the Law.” *Harvard International Law Journal*. V. 23 (2000), p. 30 - 31. And Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith. “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism.” *Harvard Law Review*. V. 118, N. 7 (May, 2005), p. 2047 - 2133.

<sup>163</sup> George W. Bush. “Radio Address of the President to the Nation.” *White House*. (15 September, 2001).

<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html>>



President Bush's use of war rhetoric demonstrated that, as an authorized speaker of security, he had to appeal to the public and win public acceptance before a policy area could be securitized. An examination of this rhetoric demonstrates the way in which his invocation of war was aimed at inspiring public acceptance of the threat posed by terrorism. Bush's repeated assertions that the nation was at war were reminiscent of political scientist, Edward Keynes statement that,

"Future presidents should recall one of the Vietnam War's most important lessons – the nation should not wage a long, protracted, undeclared war without fundamental prior agreement between Congress and the President and broad, sustained public support for the government's decision to send the nation's sons and daughters off to war."<sup>164</sup>

His references to the nation being at war were deliberate. Bush's establishment of the Global War on Terrorism is consistent with five pivotal characteristics of presidential war rhetoric throughout U.S. history. First, every element in it proclaims that the momentous decision to resort to force is deliberate, the product of thoughtful consideration. Second, forceful intervention is justified through a chronicle or narrative from which argumentative claims are drawn. Third, the audience is exhorted to unanimity of purpose and total commitment. Fourth, the rhetoric not only justifies the use of force, but also seeks to legitimize presidential assumption of the extraordinary powers of the commander-in-chief; and, as a function of these characteristics, fifth, strategic misrepresentations play an unusually significant role in its appeals.<sup>165</sup> The act of declaring war on terrorism

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<sup>164</sup> Edward Keynes

<sup>165</sup> The five characteristics of presidential war rhetoric are discussed at length in Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

was a calculated play by President Bush to secure the support of the American audience for measures that were still to come.

*The Bush Narrative: (2) America as One Nation Facing a Common Threat*

The second component of the Bush narrative was the assertion that the United States of America was one nation facing a threat common to all of its citizens. In his speeches, President Bush called for national unity in order to counter the threat posed by terrorism. In his September 11 address to the nation, President Bush emphasized the unity of the nation stating that, “America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that from shining.” He went on to note, “Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature, and we responded with the best of America, with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could.”<sup>166</sup> The implication is that America must present a united front to would-be attackers. There is also the notion that all of the individual parts and persons of America add up to one strong united front that is willing and able to take on any enemy attackers that threaten its values and its ‘goodness’.

In seeking the resolve of the American audience, President Bush sought to emphasize that the events of 9/11 affected the entire nation equally, and that a unified front was necessary in order to adequately address the threat. In his 2002

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<sup>166</sup> George W. Bush. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.” *White House*. (11 September, 2001).  
<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html>>

State of the Union Address, Bush asserted, “Those of us who have lived through these challenging times have been changed by them. We’ve come to know truths that we will never question: Evil is real, and it must be opposed.”<sup>167</sup> In the same speech, he appealed to the collective American conscience, stating, “None of us would ever wish the evil that was done on September the 11<sup>th</sup>. Yet, after America was attacked, it was as if our entire country looked into the mirror and saw our better selves. We were reminded that we are citizens with obligations to each other, to our country, and to history.”<sup>168</sup> This appeal to a unified nation is consistent with Bush’s role as authorized speaker in that he is seeking to shore up audience support.

President Bush’s appeal to a unified nation is bolstered by his admonishments that, in presenting a unified front, the United States will be successful in its war on terrorism. On September 11, in transit to the White House, the President made a brief statement at Barksdale Air Force Base in which he said, “The resolve of our great nation is being tested. But make no mistake: we will show the world that we will pass the test.”<sup>169</sup> A few days later, in his weekly radio address to the nation, Bush implied that the country had already been successful in countering the terrorist threat, noting that, “A terrorist attack designed to tear us apart has instead bound us together as a nation.”<sup>170</sup> This assertion of American

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<sup>167</sup> George W. Bush. “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address.” *Washington Post*. (29 January, 2002), A5.

<sup>168</sup> IBID.

<sup>169</sup> George W. Bush. “Remarks on the Terrorist Attacks at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.” *WKPD 33* (September 11, 2001), 1300.

<sup>170</sup> George W. Bush. “The President’s Radio Address.” *WKPD 37*. (15 September, 2001), 1321. As referenced in Denise M. Bostdorff. “George W. Bush’s Post-

victory was again proclaimed in the President's 2002 State of the Union Address in which he declared, "The men and women of our armed forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the United States: Even 7000 miles away, across oceans and continents, on mountaintops and in caves, you will not escape the justice of this nation."<sup>171</sup> The message was clear – if the American people came together as one in support of presidential measures aimed at addressing security threats, then terrorism would be eradicated and freedom would be preserved.

*The Bush Narrative: (3) The Creation of the "Evil Other"*

The third element of the Bush narrative involved the creation of an "Evil Other" – a sinister group whose aim was nothing less than the destruction of the United States. This notion of a so-called "evil other" harkens to Edward Said's concept of Orientalism – whereby a minority group is further marginalized by the majority that seeks to emphasize the differences between the two groups. Three characteristics were presented that differentiated the "evil attackers" from the American people. The "Others" were represented as being both Arab and Muslim. They were deemed uncivilized and diametrically opposed to American values, and they were seen as posing an imminent danger to the American people. This representation of the enemy was a calculated move since, the Evil Other can be used as a hegemonic device, a 'common enemy' that serves to distract and divert aggression and energy toward a common threat. The representation of a common enemy, by the authorized speakers of security to their audiences, is important in

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September 11 Rhetoric of Covenant Renewal: Upholding the Faith of the Greatest Generation." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. V. 89, N. 4 (November 2003), p. 307.

<sup>171</sup> George W. Bush. "Text of President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address." *Washington Post*. (29 January, 2002), A5.

organizing evolutionary-based survival strategies that rely on perceptual and behavioural patterns that are a fundamental part of human nature.<sup>172</sup> Speeches given by Bush in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 established this representation of the Evil Other and made this group the focus for the prevention of future attacks. Consistent with the American political tradition of dealing with incidents like Pearl Harbor in WWII, the clear lines were drawn and the moral right of the United States was theirs to deal with this Evil Other.

As an authorized speaker of security, President Bush sought to emphasize the differences between the attackers and the American people. As such, early speeches quickly identified the “Evil Other” as both Muslim and Arab. This portrayal was evident in Bush’s political rhetoric and constant use of words and expressions such as “us”, “them”, “they”, “evil”, “those people”, and “demons” to characterize people of Arab/ Middle Eastern descent.<sup>173</sup> Throughout his public statements about September 11, the President constantly conveyed the villainy of the enemy. He stated that the evildoers were, “...thugs and criminals” who “slit the throats of women on airplanes in order to achieve an objective that is beyond comprehension.”<sup>174</sup> Bush used language that depicted the Muslim enemy as espousing inhuman and immoral values. In reference to Al Qaeda’s network of

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<sup>172</sup> Debra Meskin. “The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush.” *Mass Communication and Society*. V. 7, N. 2 (2004), p. 158.

<sup>173</sup> Debra Meskin (2004), p. 157.

<sup>174</sup> George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Homeland Security From Atlanta.” November 8, 2001. *WCPD 37 (2001)*. Available from <<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>>

caves in Afghanistan, the President called the attackers, “... parasites that find holes to get into.”<sup>175</sup> Five years after the attack, he sought to reinforce the difference between so-called Islamist values and American ideals. In his Address to the Nation five years after the attack, President Bush noted that, “Five years after 9/11, our enemies have not succeeded in launching another attack on our soil – but they have not been idle. Al Qaeda and those inspired by its hateful ideology have carried out terrorist attacks in more than two dozen nations.”<sup>176</sup> The implications of such language were clear – these Arab evildoers sought to bring harm and destruction to the American people.

The second characteristic attributed to the 9/11 attackers was that they were uncivilized people who espoused un-American values. In his brief – 593 word – address to the nation of September 11, 2001, President Bush laid the foundation on which his future rhetoric would build, solidifying the evil enemy image. Indeed, the term “evil” was mentioned four times in this brief address.<sup>177</sup> In the first few sentences of this speech, Bush invoked the notion of good versus evil when he provided an initial reason for the attack, “Our very freedom came under attack... America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world... thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil,

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<sup>175</sup> George W. Bush, “Remarks in a Meeting With the National Security Team and an Exchange With Reporters.” September 15, 2001. *WCPD*, 37 (2001), p. 1320. Available from <<http://fewebgate.gpo.gov>>

<sup>176</sup> George W. Bush. “Text of President Bush’s Address: Five Years After 9/11” *USA TODAY*. (September 11, 2006), A1.

<sup>177</sup> George W. Bush. “Address to the Nation on September 11, 2001”.

despicable acts of terror.”<sup>178</sup> This identification of the enemy with evil values can be explained by Spillman and Spillman’s description of the “American Enemy” – a despicable foe, identified by its un-American values and desire to destroy the so-called “Most Powerful Nation”.<sup>179</sup> In further emphasizing the un-American values of the attackers, Bush identified the nations of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the “Axis-of-Evil”, a collection of countries that were “arming to threaten the peace of the world” with their collection of “weapons of mass destruction”. In further explaining the nature of the Axis-of-Evil, the President’s speech detailed what these countries had done to their own and other countries’ people, he pointed out, “This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis-of-evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”<sup>180</sup> Clearly, the objective was to demonstrate as many differences as possible between the democratic, peaceful United States of America and the “evil”, “uncivilized”, and “un-American” terrorists bent on destroying the state.

The creation of the “Evil Other” as a foe common to all Americans was bolstered by the notion that this enemy posed an immediate danger to the safety and security of citizens of the United States. The President’s speeches pointed to the potential for future attacks on American soil if the threat posed by this Evil Other was not taken seriously. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush

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<sup>178</sup> IBID, 9/11 Address to the Nation

<sup>179</sup> K.R. Spillman and K. Spillman. “Some Sociobiological and Psychological Aspects of Images of the Enemy.” In R. Fiebig-von Has and U. Lehmkuhl, eds., *Enemy Images in American History*. (Providence, Rhode Island: Berghahn, 1997).

<sup>180</sup> George W. Bush. “State of the Union Address” January 29, 2002.

sought to bolster support for the conflict in Afghanistan by noting that, “...the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of American power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world.”<sup>181</sup> The suggestion that the terrorists were planning another attack on the United States served to further galvanize the American people against a common enemy attacker. Bush’s mention of the discovery of these plans and surveillance maps was calculated to convey to the audience the imminent threat posed by the Evil Other. Bush reiterated the threat posed by future terrorist attacks five years after 9/11, stating, “... Just last month, they were foiled in a plot to blow up passenger planes headed for the United States. They remain determined to attack America and kill our citizens – and we are determined to stop them. We will continue to give the men and women who protect us every resource and legal authority they need to do their jobs.”<sup>182</sup> The suggestion that the enemy is constantly planning future attacks reinforces the need to confront these would-be attackers. The imminent threat posed by the terrorists bolsters the audience’s support for future securitization measures.

*The Bush Narrative: (4) Relating 9/11 to Events of the Past*

In order to initiate the securitization process, President Bush sought to connect the events of 9/11 to events in American history that necessitated an exceptional security response. Drawing comparisons between the terrorist attacks

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<sup>181</sup> George W. Bush. “2002 State of the Union Address” January 29, 2002. *Washington Post Online*.

<sup>182</sup> George W. Bush. “Text of the President Bush’s Address: Five Years After 9/11”. *USA TODAY*. (September 11, 2006), A1.



and historical events such as Pearl Harbor and America's involvement in the Second World War enabled the president to frame the issue for the public. The inclusion of analogies associated with past events in American history in Bush's speeches suggested continuity with the past. Bush's discourse implied that the U.S. faced the same type of enemies today as the so-called 'greatest generation' had during the Second World War, a significant point given the cultural context in which the president spoke.<sup>183</sup> Stressing the need for recognizing the connections between previous American security emergencies and the events of September 11, Bush told reporters that, "We need to be alert to the fact that these evildoers still exist. We haven't seen this kind of barbarism in a long period of time."<sup>184</sup> The Bush narrative sought to strengthen the securitization process by suggesting that the audience's reaction should be the same as its collective reaction to past security threats that faced the United States.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, President Bush sought to liken the events of 9/11 to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor during the Second World War. In his address to Congress, the president alluded to, "One Sunday in 1941", a phrase that suggested the Pearl Harbor attack without explicitly using a name that might

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<sup>183</sup> For further discussion of the so-called 'greatest generation' refer to: Denise M. Bostdorff. "George W. Bush's Post-September 11 Rhetoric of Covenant Renewal: Upholding the Faith of the Greatest Generation." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. V. 89, N. 4 (November 2003), pp. 293 – 319.

<sup>184</sup> George W. Bush. "Remarks on Arrival at the White House and an Exchange With Reporters." *WCPD*. (September, 2001), p. 1323.

alienate America's current ally, Japan.<sup>185</sup> The implication was that September 11 was not the first time in American history that the state had fallen victim to a surprise attack, and that an immediate response was necessary. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor public opinion shifted in favour of the United States participating in WWII. President Bush's lexical connection between the two events was calculated to shift public opinion in favour of another offensive mission, this time against terrorism. This analogy was useful since the President's descriptions of September 11 were consistent with the Pearl Harbor comparisons already being made by the media.<sup>186</sup>

In an attempt to further emphasize the connections between 9/11 and past American security threats, Bush utilized World War II analogies that equated the acts of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with U.S. enemies of the past such as Hitler's Nazi Party. Bush declared that the September 11 attacks were, "...heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism and Nazism and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends, in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies."<sup>187</sup> The use of this analogy implied that the United States once again faced the

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<sup>185</sup> George W. Bush. "Address Before Joint Session." *WCPD* (September 20, 2001), p. 1347.

<sup>186</sup> See for example: Denise M. Bostdorff. *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crises*. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), p. 70 – 71, and 103 – 104.

<sup>187</sup> George W. Bush. "Remarks on Arrival at the White House and an Exchange With Reporters." *WCPD*. (September 20, 2001), p. 1323.

same type of enemy as it had during the Second World War and that if proper measures were taken, America could once again triumph over its evil enemies. President Bush's WWII analogies allowed him to redefine the lessons of that conflict as supporting his preference for offensive strikes against states he deemed "terrorist nations". In his address at the United Nations, Bush cited World War II as an event in which the United States learned that, "There is no isolation from evil. And we resolved that the aggressions and ambitions of the wicked must be opposed early, decisively, and collectively, before they threaten us all."<sup>188</sup> As an authorized speaker of security, the President was suggesting to his audience that the moral imperative of fighting evil and preventing the potential for future unprovoked attacks, meant that pre-emptive actions might have to be taken. Later in his speech to the UN, Bush asserted that the evil from WWII, "... has returned, and that cause is renewed... It is our task, the task of this generation, to provide the response to aggression and terror. We have no choice because there is no other peace."<sup>189</sup> Clearly, the American people would have to be prepared to accept new security measures if their safety was to be guaranteed.

***Authorized Speakers of Security in Canada in the Post-9/11 Period: Good Neighbours and the 'Canadian Way'***

*Jean Chretien as Canada's Authorized Speaker of Security*

Former Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien once wrote that:

"The art of politics is learning to walk with your back against the wall, your elbows high, and a smile on your face. It's a survival game played under the glare of lights. If you don't learn that, you're

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<sup>188</sup> George W. Bush. "Remarks to the United Nations." *WCPD*. (September 2001), p. 1638.

<sup>189</sup> *IBID*

quickly finished. The press wants to get you. The opposition wants to get you. Even some of the bureaucrats want to get you. They all may have an interest in making you look bad.”<sup>190</sup>

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, this cautious leader came to represent the voice of security for the Canadian audience. His articulation of the threat posed by terrorism and the potential for further terrorist attacks stood in stark contrast to the message delivered by President George W. Bush to the American audience.

As Prime Minister of Canada at the time of the 9/11 attacks, Jean Chretien is easily identified as the most visible authorized Canadian speaker of security; however, his expression of this role varies greatly from that of his American counterpart, President Bush. While Bush responded immediately to the attacks, Chretien did not address the tragedy until the next day. While Bush established himself as the preeminent commentator and interpreter of the events, Chretien relied on a trusted group of Cabinet Ministers to relay information to the Canadian public. The Canadian response to the 9/11 attacks was characterized by a markedly different narrative than that presented by American speakers of security. First and foremost, Chretien sought to convey to the Canadian audience that the country would adopt a distinctly Canadian response to terrorism. Secondly, Chretien and his ministers presented the events of September 11 as a somewhat isolated incident – describing the events more as a criminal act than a catastrophic event. Thirdly, the Canadian response sought to emphasize the importance of multilateralism over the

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<sup>190</sup> Jean Chretien. *Straight From The Heart*. (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1985), p. 18.

American “go it alone” strategy. Canadian speakers of security also emphasized the difference between the peaceful religion of Islam and those who carried out the attacks on the United States. There was also a recognition that Canadian security was intrinsically linked to the economics and the maintenance of the Canada-United States trading relationship. Finally, above all, Canadian speakers sought to demonstrate to the United States that it would be a good neighbour and friend throughout the crisis.

Jean Chretien successfully led the Liberal Party to three consecutive electoral victories. According to Kim Nossal, Prime Minister Chretien must be seen, “... as a leader with the capacity and motivation to change political trajectories.”<sup>191</sup> The Canadian parliamentary political system is markedly different from the American republican political system. At the time of Chretien’s terms as prime minister, Canadian governments were typically single-party majorities, which meant that foreign policy decisions were highly centralized at the top of the government’s hierarchy, with the PM sitting firmly at the top of this pyramid. As a result of this structure, Prime Minister Chretien’s role as the pre-eminent Canadian authorized speaker of security in the post-9/11 period is self-evident. As the leader of a Liberal majority government, Chretien was mandated to represent the Canadian public and to inform them of threats to the nation’s security. Donald Savoie notes that, “Chretien... is rightly described as one of the most powerful PMs in recent Canadian

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<sup>191</sup> Richard Kim Nossal. *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*. (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1997).

History.”<sup>192</sup> He was imbued with the authority to make all national security and foreign policy decisions. However, prior to the terrorist attacks on the United States, Chretien lacked a decisive foreign policy strategy, instead favoring ‘Team Canada’ trade missions.

*The Canadian Speakers’ Narrative: The Canadian Way*

Jean Chretien’s “Canadian Way” approach to the crisis in the United States did not result in the creation of a “Chretien narrative” as was the case with President Bush. Instead, Chretien and his key ministers adopted several speaking points that collectively form the Canadian speakers’ response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States. These included the notion that Canada would respond in its own way to the attacks, that Canada would be a “good friend and neighbour” to the United States, the view that 9/11 was an isolated incident, the need for a multilateral approach to counter-terrorism initiatives, the necessity of maintaining a Canada-U.S. border that was open for trade, and the refusal to scapegoat Arab-Muslim Canadians.

The notion of the “Canadian Way” approach to the 9/11 terrorist attacks is in keeping with the idea of “Brand Canada” which was introduced by Prime Minister Chretien earlier in his administration. He argued that there was a “Canadian Way” in which historic Canadian policies reflected socially progressive yet fiscally conservative values.<sup>193</sup> Throughout his public speeches, Prime Minister Chretien

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<sup>192</sup> Donald J. Savoie. “Chretien: La Politique, Une Question de Pouvoir.” *Policy Options/Options Politiques*. V. 24, N. 6 (2003), p. 82 – 87.

<sup>193</sup> Jean Chretien. “The Canadian Way in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.” *Speech to the Conference, Progressive Governance for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. (June 2 – 3, 2000).

seemed to focus on the differences between Canada and the United States. Jeffrey Simpson argues that Chretien's response to 9/11 was coloured by,

“... a fear or being seen to have agreed with Washington, and being accused of having ‘caved’, ‘sold out’, or not adequately protecting Canadian sovereignty... A confident country, whose identity is rooted in its sense of self rather than a determination to highlight differences, would not have worried, as the Chretien government did, about criticism of being too close to the United States.”<sup>194</sup>

As Simpson points out, Canadian governments have historically preferred to react to policy decisions made by Washington so that they can pick and choose amongst responses while protecting themselves from the audience's charge that a given administration was becoming “too American”.

Canadian authorized speakers of security sought to emphasize the uniquely “Canadian” response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States in their speeches. John Manley noted that, “Each Canadian has responded in his or her own way. Volunteering, offering flowers and cards at embassies and consulates, seeking consolation in assemblies of worship.”<sup>195</sup> Likewise, Prime Minister Jean Chretien noted that, “... Canada's fight against terrorism – in all of its forms – long predates the terrible events of September 11. Strong partnerships already exist among Canadian law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, and their international counterparts.”<sup>196</sup> The implication was that, while the United States had suffered the actual terrorist attacks, Canada too was affected by the events of 9/11 and would respond in its own unique way.

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<sup>194</sup> Jeffrey Simpson. “Timing is Everything for PM's New York Trip.” *The Globe and Mail*. (Friday, September 28, 2001), A.7

<sup>195</sup> John Manley. *Speech to Special Session of Parliament*. (September 17, 2001).

<sup>196</sup> Jean Chretien. *Speech on Counterterrorism in Canada*. (September 25, 2001).

*The Canadian Way: A Good Friend and Neighbour to the United States*

Above all, Canadian authorized speakers of security emphasized a message of solidarity with the United States in the wake of the terrorist attacks on that state. Chretien and his ministers recalled the long history of cooperation between Canada and the United States and stressed Canada's role as a good friend and neighbour. Chretien's statement on 9/11 immediately following the attacks asserted that, "We stand ready to provide any assistance that our American friends may need at this very, very difficult hour and in the subsequent investigation."<sup>197</sup> On September 12, Chretien informed the Canadian public that he had spoken with President Bush and, "... told him that, as our closest friend and partner, America could count on our complete support and solidarity in the days to come."<sup>198</sup> This was followed by Chretien's pledge to American Ambassador Paul Cellucci on September 14 that, "We (Canada) will be with the United States every step of the way. As friends. As neighbours. As Family."<sup>199</sup> In a statement to the public later that same day, Chretien referred to the Canada public as, "A people who, as a result of the atrocity committed against the United States on September 11, 2001, feel not only like neighbours, but like family."<sup>200</sup>

Statements made by other Canadian authorized speakers of security further underscored Canada's strong relationship with the United States. On September 17

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<sup>197</sup> Jean Chretien. *Statement on 9/11*. (September 11, 2001).

<sup>198</sup> Jean Chretien (September 12, 2001).

<sup>199</sup> Jean Chretien. *Meeting with US Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci*. (September 14, 2001).

<sup>200</sup> Jean Chretien (September 14, 2001).



John Manley asserted that, “Our friend and closest ally was viciously attacked.”<sup>201</sup> Minister of National Defense, Art Eggleton, issued a press release stating, “I also want to reaffirm Canada’s long-standing commitment to working with the United States to defend the North American continent and our common interests and values. At this difficult time, our thoughts and prayers go out to our closest ally and friend.”<sup>202</sup>

The representation of Canada as a close friend and ally of the United States was meant to signal to the Canadian audience that cross border cooperation on security initiatives would be necessary in the coming months. While Canada has always been a “good neighbour” to the United States, in order to maintain a relationship beneficial to both parties, Canada would have to adopt American-initiated security policies in order to protect its own cross-border trade objectives. Canadian speakers sought to reassure the United States that it would be a “good neighbour and ally”, while at the same time preparing the Canadian public for increased security measures.

*The Canadian Way: Multiple Authorized Speakers of Security*

Scholars interpreting the foreign policy strategies of the Chretien-Martin years face unusual difficulty.<sup>203</sup> During his decade in office Chretien moved from being a prime minister with a limited foreign policy agenda to a seasoned leader

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<sup>201</sup> John Manley. *Speech to a Special Session of Parliament*. (September 17, 2001).

<sup>202</sup> Art Eggleton. *Press Release on the Role of the CF in US Coalition*. (September 14, 2001).

<sup>203</sup> For further explanation refer to Smith, 1995.

whose foreign policy drove his agenda.<sup>204</sup> Unlike the former Liberal Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, and Conservative Prime Minister, Kim Campbell, before him, Prime Minister Chretien did not outline a clear, comprehensive vision of what his foreign policy approach would be, during either of his electoral campaigns, or his first years in office. Instead, his definitive “statement” on foreign policy, unveiled on February 7, 1995, appeared to have been overtaken within a year by a very different doctrine forged by his new Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, and ultimately by the “Dialogue” report released by Foreign Minister Bill Graham in June of 2003. As a result of this fragmented approach to foreign policy decision-making, Chretien came to designate some key ministers and representatives as additional authorized speakers of security when responding to the September 11 attacks on the United States. These included: John Manley, Bill Graham, Art Eggleton, and Michael Kergin.

In the aftermath of the attacks on the United States, Prime Minister Chretien looked to his deputy prime minister, John Manley, to assist in articulating the Canadian response to the events of 9/11. To this end, Chretien created an Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, headed by Manley, that was to map out Canada’s policy changes. This move imbued Manley with the authority to “speak security” to the Canadian audience.<sup>205</sup> In his position as Chair of

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<sup>204</sup> Graham Fraser, “Liberal Continuities: Jean Chretien’s Foreign Policy, 1993 – 2003.” In David Carmet, Fen Oster Hampson, and Norman Hillmer, *Canada Among Nations 2004: Setting Priorities Straight*. (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).

<sup>205</sup> This committee will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter; however, for more information see: Donald Barry. “Managing Canada-U.S. Relations in the Post-

the Ad Hoc Committee, Manley rejected the American-favoured security perimeter approach to border security in favour of one that would deal with “specific areas of concern.”<sup>206</sup> In a press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to discuss the future of security at the U.S. – Canada border, Manley stated, “And I think that realizing that the nature of the risks that we have and the effect that we could face from those risks is so great, is necessarily going to change the way we deal with that risk assessment and the security element in a whole series of ways in our life.”<sup>207</sup> The implication of this approach was that Canada would select its own policies rather than integrate its policies with those of the United States. Manley sought to convey to the Canadian public that he would pursue a distinctly Canadian approach to securing the border.

Manley’s authority as a recognized speaker of security was further evidenced by the speeches he gave in the days after 9/11. On September 17, 2001, in a special session of Parliament, he spoke on behalf of the Canadian public, noting that, “All Canadians, both at home and abroad, have been profoundly affected. Our lives will never be the same, and 100 000 Canadians gathered to share their grief on Parliament Hill last Friday.”<sup>208</sup> This was the first of many public statements by the

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9/11 Era: Do We Need a Big Idea?” *Policy Paper on the Americas – Center for Strategic and International Studies*. V. XIV, Study 11 (November 2003), p. 10 – 11.

<sup>206</sup> Paul Wells, “We Don’t Pull Our Weight: Manley.” *National Post*. (October 5, 2001), p. A6.

<sup>207</sup> John Manley, *Foreign Minister John Manley, Press Conference with Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington DC*. (September 21, 2001).

<sup>208</sup> John Manley, *Speech to Special Session of Parliament*. (September 17, 2001).

Deputy Prime Minister that would serve to form the basis of Canada's representation of the attacks to the Canadian audience.

Prime Minister Chretien also relied on other Ministers to serve as authorized speakers of Canadian security. Canada's participation in the conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan was explained to the Canadian audience by Defence Minister Art Eggleton, who repeatedly informed citizens that the state was, "... a full partner in the war on terrorism."<sup>209</sup> Likewise, following his decision to forego participation in the American-led invasion of Iraq, Chretien charged Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham with making a public announcement to the US Secretary of State Colin Powell explaining Canada's position. To explain the economic implications of the attacks, Chretien turned to Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Michael Kergin who, in an address to the Canadian public stated that, while he wished he could be present in Canada, "My presence is required in Washington as our governments work together to overcome these tragic events."<sup>210</sup> While the American President sought to control the messages reaching the public audience, the Canadian Prime Minister sought to assign different aspects of the Canadian response to different authorized speakers.

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<sup>209</sup> David Pugliese, "Canuk Snipers Win U.S. Praise." *Edmonton Journal*. (July 9, 2002).

<sup>210</sup> Michael Kergin

*The Canadian Way: The Importance of Multilateralism*

All of the Chretien-designated authorized speakers of security emphasized the necessity of a multilateral, international approach, approved by the United Nations, in responding to the terrorist attacks on the United States. While President Bush emphasized that the United States would pursue unilateral action against those states harbouring and supporting terrorist organizations, Canadian speakers chose to stress the need for a coordinated, multilateral approach. Prime Minister Chretien insisted on multilateralism and UN authority from the onset of the crisis. On September 25, 2001, in a speech about counter-terrorism in Canada, Chretien noted that, "Canada has signed all twelve of the UN counter-terrorism conventions and has ratified ten. Work is underway to implement and ratify the remaining two."<sup>211</sup> John Manley was quick to support the Prime Minister's position noting that, "This is the path of multilateralism. It is critical that members of the international community act as one."<sup>212</sup> In January of 2003, he stated that, "The position of Canada is that we were insisting right at the beginning, you remember, that Canada act through the United Nations, through international institutions. We believe in multilateralism very strongly."<sup>213</sup> In a public speech given in Chicago in February of 2003, the Prime Minister further explained that multilateralism is part of Canada's "... distinct international personality." One month later, on March 17, after months of considerable parliamentary debate, Chretien announced that Canada would not join the U.S.-led coalition of the willing and go to war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

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<sup>211</sup> Jean Chretien. *Counter-Terrorism in Canada*. (September 25, 2001).

<sup>212</sup> John Manley (September 17, 2001).

<sup>213</sup> Jean Chretien quoted in: Sean McCarthy and Daniel Leblanc, "Canada's Position on Iraq Divides Cabinet." *The Globe and Mail*. (January 30, 2003), p. A1.

The rationale behind the refusal was not so much the principled opposition to war, but the fact that the United Nations' Security Council failed to pass a resolution authorizing armed intervention in that state. In all of these assertions, the belief in the necessity for a multilateral response is argued to be at the core of Canada's difference from the United States. While the government could have ostensibly framed the Iraq decision in terms other than independence and multilateralism, doing so would have detracted from the desire to pursue a distinctly Canadian response to the attacks on the U.S.

*The Canadian Way: Crisis Not Catastrophe – 9/11 as an Isolated Incident*

Canadian authorized speakers of security were more reserved in labeling the events of 9/11 as a "catastrophe". While American speakers, such as President Bush, were quick to announce the wanton destruction caused by the terrorist attacks, and to emphasize the imminent threat posed by the potential for future attacks, Prime Minister Chretien and his ministers seemed to suggest that this event was an isolated incident. In a short statement made on September 13, 2001, announcing a National Day of Mourning in Canada in memory of the victims of the terrorist attacks in the United States, Prime Minister Chretien referred to the attacks as an "awful crime" that had been committed, but he refrained from linking this "crime" to any specific community or faith.<sup>214</sup> In referring to the attack on the United States as a violent crime, the Prime Minister suggested that this attack, while horrific, was an isolated incident, a criminal act as opposed to the onset of an ethnic struggle (as suggested by American speeches). In a later address on October 7, 2001,

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<sup>214</sup> Jean Chretien (September 13, 2001).

Prime Minister Chretien indicated that the events of 9/11 were, "... an act of premeditated murder, on a massive scale, with no possible justification or explanation."<sup>215</sup> Likening the attack to a large-scale murder case seems to be an attempt to normalize the events of that day, and suggests to the Canadian audience that the terrorist attacks visited upon the United States were an isolated incident targeted only at that state.

The notion of 9/11 as a one-time crisis as opposed to an on-going catastrophe was further emphasized by former Canadian Minister of National Defense, Art Eggleton, who announced that, "The CF has also pre-positioned CF assets for other potential humanitarian support. These measures are being taken to ensure that a variety of options are available for rapid initiation should the government of Canada decide to exercise them upon request from the United States government."<sup>216</sup> Initially, following the attacks on the United States, the Canadian Forces anticipated participating in a rescue operation there. Resources were mobilized that could be used to assist in securing infrastructure and rescuing trapped members of the American public.

*The Canadian Way: Business as Usual – Trade as a Security Concern*

It can be argued that, in Canada, the continuance of uninterrupted trade with the United States is a primary security concern for this state. As such, Canadian

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<sup>215</sup> Jean Chretien *National Address on the International Campaign Against Terrorism*. (October 7, 2001).

<sup>216</sup> Art Eggleton. *Press Release on the Role of Canadian Forces in US Coalition*. (September 14, 2001).

authorized speakers of security were quick to emphasize the need for business to continue as usual with the United States in the wake of the terrorist attacks. It is worth noting that, at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, approximately 500000 people and 50000 trucks crossed the border between Canada and the United States every day.<sup>217</sup> As such, authorized speakers such as Prime Minister Chretien, Minister of Foreign Affairs Manley, and Ambassador to the United States Michael Kergin, sought to emphasize the need to keep the Canada-U.S. border open to trade. One year after the attacks on the United States, Prime Minister Chretien argued that, “Canada and the United States face a serious threat to our way of life. A challenge to our security, our prosperity, and our values... the goal of the terrorists is to intimidate us into retreating from our openness and to abandon the pillars of prosperity and freedom which support our quality of life.”<sup>218</sup> The continuation of Canadian financial prosperity was clearly an important Canadian security objective which would involve increased security measures at the Canada-U.S. border.

This focus on securing cross-border trade was in keeping with Canadian foreign policy at the time, which, rather than focusing on military security, instead focused on economic security as the key to securing Canadian interests.<sup>219</sup> Great emphasis, for example, had been placed on “Team Canada” trade missions over

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<sup>217</sup> Marie-Christine Therrien, “The Canada-United States Border: Achieving An Efficient Inter-Organizational Policy Coordination” in *Perspectives on U.S.-Canada Relations Since 9/11: Four Essays*. (Canadian-American Public Policy: Number 54, September 2003), p. 60

<sup>218</sup> Jean Chretien. *Speech Given on September 9, 2001*. Quoted in Erin E. Gibbs Van Brunschot and Alison J. Sherley. “Communicating Threat: The Canadian State and Terrorism.” *The Sociological Quarterly*. V. 45 (2005), p. 652.

<sup>219</sup> For additional information on Canadian foreign policy at this time refer to:



troops and planes as the means of ensuring security. John Manley, who was tasked with coordinating a border strategy with US Homeland Security “Czar” Tom Ridge, reiterated the importance of maintaining Canadian economic security. He noted that, “The terrorist attacks in the United States have profound implications for Canada’s security and prosperity.”<sup>220</sup> The message to the Canadian audience was that while imminent terrorist attacks on Canada were not likely, the closure of the Canada-U.S. border and a slow down or stoppage of cross border trade would have serious implications in terms of Canadian financial security.

The message of Canadian concern about the continuance of cross-border trade was further reinforced by statements made by Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Michael Kergin. Kergin emphasized the importance of Canada-United States cross border trade for the Canadian economy, noting that, “Over time – in particular during the last decade, as the FTA has been implemented – the Embassy in Washington has taken on an increasingly important responsibility as steward of our remarkable economic relationship with the United States.”<sup>221</sup> He later stated that, “This exotic (American) system of government rules over an economic market which is of overwhelming importance to Canadian business.”<sup>222</sup> Kergin was foreshadowing the need for the Canadian audience to accept increased security measures in order to maintain trade with Canada’s southern neighbours. To this end, Kergin noted that, “We (Canada) need to move into the fast lane on border

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<sup>220</sup> John Manley. *Speech to a Special Session of Parliament*. (September 17, 2001).

<sup>221</sup> Michael Kergin. *Statement*. (September 17, 2001).

<sup>222</sup> IBID

management. It cannot be denied that the recent tragedies in New York and Washington will make this goal more challenging over the short term.”<sup>223</sup> It seems clear that the imminent threat for Canada was not the potential for terrorist attacks on the state, but the closure of the border to trade by the United States.

*The Canadian Way: Islam is Not the Enemy*

While the United States was quick to designate an “evil other” – Arab Muslim attackers bent on destroying the United States - Canadian speakers of security did not single out any particular ethnic group as being responsible for the attacks. On the contrary, Prime Minister Chretien reaffirmed the notion that “we are all Canadians” and sought to discourage the Canadian audience from attacking specific ethnic or religious groups. Just days after the attacks, Chretien stated, “I also want to emphasize that we are in a struggle against terrorism. Not against any one community or faith.”<sup>224</sup> Days later, the Prime Minister visited the Ottawa Central Mosque and gave a speech to media outlets in which he asserted, “I wanted to stand by your side today, and reaffirm with you that Islam has nothing to do with the mass murder that was planned and carried out by the terrorists and their masters.”<sup>225</sup> He further stated, “Above all I want to stand by your side and condemn the acts of intolerance and hatred that have been committed since the attack.”<sup>226</sup> The message to the Canadian audience was one of tolerance and reserved judgment. While American speakers sought to designate a scapegoat, the Canadian speakers

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<sup>223</sup> IBID

<sup>224</sup> Jean Chretien, quoted in Tanja Collet and Tom Najem, “Word Choices in Post-9/11 Speeches and the Identity Construction of the Other.”

<sup>225</sup> Jean Chretien. *Speech at the Ottawa Central Mosque*. (September 24, 2001).

<sup>226</sup> IBID

advocated tolerance and understanding. The adage that it is dangerous to generalize came into the distinct Canadian response to 9/11.

***Authorized Speakers of Security and the Audiences They Address***

While the messages presented by American and Canadian authorized speakers of security in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks varied greatly, both groups of speakers sought to address very different audiences. While President Bush sought to emphasize the immediate threat posed by the potential for future terrorist attacks, he was addressing an audience that had just suffered an attack on its own homeland. As such, the American audience was, arguably, ready to accept the initiation of the securitization process. On the other hand, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and his ministers sought to advise the Canadian audience that future cooperation with American-led security initiatives would be necessary in order to secure Canadian financial objectives. In order for the securitization of a given issue to take place, the audiences must accept the message from the authorized speakers of security that there is an imminent threat posed by that issue. The following chapters will examine the roles played by the elite and populist audiences in Canada and the United States.

***CHAPTER THREE: DETERMINING THE ELITE AUDIENCE – THE POLICY ELITE AND THE ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF THE SECURITIZING MOVE***

***Introduction***

While it is relatively easy to determine the authorized speakers of security who first identify a given existential threat, it is important to determine this group's initial target audience. All variants of securitization theory posit that the securitization of a given issue is not possible unless the audience accepts it as posing an existential threat. However, the notion of the audience has been left under-theorized by scholars working within this framework. One way of rectifying this lack of clarity concerning the audience, as outlined in the first chapter, is to divide this group into two separate categories: the elite audience and the populist audience. Following this model, the elite audience, which is comprised of members of the policy elite including bureaucrats and elected-officials, serves as an early indicator as to whether or not the securitization of a given issue area has taken place. If there is little to no debate amongst members of the policy elite about the immediate implementation of security measures and policies as well as the creation of institutions to support those policies, then there is a strong indication that securitization has taken place.

Since the securitization of an issue cannot take place without the acceptance of the entire audience, it is important to carefully consider those at whom the securitizing speech acts of designated authorized speakers of security are aimed. Members of the elite audience serve as “first responders” in that they either accept that an issue poses an existential threat and then transmit that threat to the populist

audience, or, they reject the threat and thus effectively cancel-out the securitization process. This chapter will consider the role of the policy elite in the securitization process and will examine the differences between members of the policy elite in Canada and the United States in order to clarify the role of the elite audience in the securitization process.

***Differentiating Between the Elite and Populist Audiences: A Re-Cap***

In order for the securitization of a given issue to take place, that issue must be accepted as posing an existential threat to the security of the state by the audience. The importance of the role of the audience cannot be overstated in securitization theory. For this reason, it is crucial for the philosophical variant of securitization theory to offer a clear conceptualization of who constitutes the audience and how this group's acceptance or rejection of a given threat can be assessed.<sup>227</sup> This weakness in clearly delineating the composition and role of the audience in securitization theory has even been acknowledged by the theory's leading progenitor, Ole Waever, who recognized that the concept of 'audience', "... needs a better definition and probably differentiation."<sup>228</sup> Previous scholarly attempts to assess the philosophical variant of securitization theory have remained vague about the composition of the audience. It is not clear what the acceptance by

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<sup>227</sup> For further discussion of the importance of better articulating the role of the audience refer to: Sarah Leonard and Christian Kaunert, "Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory." In Thierry Balzacq, ed. *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 57 – 62.

<sup>228</sup> Ole Waever 2003, p. 26 While Waever recognized the need to clarify the role of the audience, his work does not offer suggestions for better defining this concept.

the audience means and entails exactly, and, therefore, how this acceptance or rejection of a given threat could be identified in practice.

As outlined in the first chapter of this dissertation, in order to utilize the philosophical variant of securitization theory as a means of assessing the policy response of a state to a given threat, it is necessary to address some of the challenges pertaining to the role of the audience that are inherent in this theoretical construct. Scholars agree that there is a need to clearly delineate the role of the audience in securitization theory. One way of addressing this lack of clarity is to view the audience as comprising two separate groups: the elite audience, and the populist audience. The elite audience is comprised of policy elites such as elected officials and bureaucrats as well as the media.<sup>229</sup> This faction of the audience must accept or reject an existential threat articulated by an authorized speaker of security. If the elite audience accepts that there is an immediate threat to the state, then this group enacts policy decisions and creates institutions to combat that threat. In addition, it informs the public of the imminent danger. The populist audience, comprised of the voting public of a given state, must then accept or reject the threat being promulgated by the elite audience.

***Members of the Policy Elite as Elite Audience Members***

According to the Copenhagen School, members of the policy elite, which includes bureaucrats and elected state officials, comprise half of the elite audience. The Copenhagen School explains that, in the case of issues affecting national

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<sup>229</sup> The next chapter will examine the role of the media as a component of the elite audience.

security, this policy elite audience, “influence(s) the dynamics of the sector without being either referent objects or securitizing actors.”<sup>230</sup> This audience group is important since, “... subunits within the state are of interest in military security terms either because of an ability to shape the military or foreign policy of the state or because they have the capability to take autonomous action.”<sup>231</sup> In other words, the policy elite is tasked with implementing measures aimed at countering a given threat that has been articulated by the authorized speakers of security. If the policy elite accept that a given issue poses an imminent threat, then they, “... have the ability to influence the making of military and foreign policy; this is the familiar world of bureaucratic politics.”<sup>232</sup> This bureaucratic process is the first step on the continuum of acceptance or rejection of a given threat by the wider audience.

The first stage of acceptance (or rejection) of an existential threat takes place within a bureaucratic field in which many agencies, ministries, or actors are all seeking executive attention, public imagination, and public funding. Members of the policy elite operate within prescribed frameworks. For example, elected officials must operate within the boundaries prescribed by their elected positions, while bureaucrats must operate within the limits of their departmental mandates. The policy elite can be likened to Max Weber’s conception of social administration,

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<sup>230</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 56.

<sup>231</sup> IBID

<sup>232</sup> IBID

which he proposed, "... was a product of the rationalization process – procedural, bureaucratic means to carry out rules of legitimacy and legal authority."<sup>233</sup>

### ***Defining the Policy Elite***

Building on definitions of the "public policy elite" proposed by Lomax Cook and Skogstad, for the purposes of this analysis, the term, "policy elite" can be defined as consisting of two groups. One is the political elite, such as elected officials at the national, state, and local levels. The other group is made up of administrative officers and employees of the national and provincial governments and superintendents in government offices.<sup>234</sup> This group comprises decision-makers are who considered to have a high-level of expertise in specific issue-areas and, as a result of this expertise, often have privileged access to others concerned with the same issue areas. As a result of their positions, members of the policy elite concerned with a specific area of responsibility (as for example, public health) would be able to contact and meet the top executives of multinational companies concerned with this area (such as Bayer) or with high-ranking members of an international agency (such as the WHO).<sup>235</sup> This group gains its expertise in a variety of ways: by working their way up in the public bureaucracy within a specific

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<sup>233</sup> Quoted in Kevin Walby and Sean P. Hier. "Risk Technologies and the Securitization of Post-9/11 Citizenship: The Case of National ID Cards in Canada." *Working Paper*.

<sup>234</sup> This definition borrows from wording used in the definition of "policy elite" prescribed by M. Manisha and Sharmila Mitra Deb, *Indian Democracy: Problems and Prospects*. (Anthem Press, 2009), p. 183. See: Fay Lomax Cook with J. Barabas and B. Page. "Invoking Public Opinion: Policy Elites and Social Security." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. V. 66, N. 2 (2002). See also Grace Skogstad, "Policy Paradigms, Transnationalism, and Domestic Politics.

<sup>235</sup> See for example: Kent Buse, Nicholas Mays and Gill Walt. *Making Health Policy: Second Edition*. (Maidenhead: Open University Press, McGraw-Hill Education Edition, 2012), p. 6-7.



ministry, gaining experience in private corporations, as university researchers, in labour unions, in law firms, and in many other places.<sup>236</sup> The common characteristic for all members of the policy elite is that they are involved in either making or implementing policies either in government or private organizations at the top levels.

While members of the policy elite possess a high level of expertise in specific issue areas, they do not form a “ruling class” that can be viewed as a cohesive structure. Dahl notes that, “Like intellectuals generally, policy elites are a diverse lot.”<sup>237</sup> This is to say that policy elites do not all share a unified agenda. They do not all think alike, or move in lockstep to advance a collective outcome. Birkland explains that these elites are not static entities. Thus, “while the American system of government favors more powerful and more focused economic interests over less powerful, more diffuse interests, often the less powerful interests – or, disadvantaged interests – can coalesce and, when the time is right, find avenues for the promotion of their ideas.”<sup>238</sup> At the same time, newly elected government administrations often seek to replace existing policy elites with those who will be more sympathetic to the governing party’s policy agenda.

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<sup>236</sup> For a more extensive list of where members of the policy elite gain their expertise see: Robert A. Dahl. *Democracy and Its Critics*. (Yale University Press, 1991), p. 335.

<sup>237</sup> Robert A. Dahl. *Democracy and Its Critics*. (Yale University Press, 1991), p. 335.

<sup>238</sup> Thomas A. Birkland. *An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of Public Policy Making – Third Edition*. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2011), p. 168 – 169.

*Theoretical Origins of the Policy Elite – Democratic Theory and Rational Choice*

As a component of the elite audience, members of the policy elite are intrinsically bound by a symbiotic relationship with members of the general public. The notion of a policy elite – a group of area-specific policy specialists – is grounded in democratic theory, which asserts that, “... democracy is supposed to involve policy makers paying attention to ordinary citizens – that is, the public.”<sup>239</sup> Thus, while members of the policy elite are influenced by authorized state speakers – the executive authority within a given state - they are also expected to demonstrate concern for the public sentiment. Page cites studies suggesting that, “... ordinary citizens have tended to be considerably less enthusiastic than foreign-policy elites about the use of force abroad, about economic or (especially) military aid or arms sales, and about free trade agreements.”<sup>240</sup> Members of the policy elite must be cognizant of public opinion. Since members of this group are elected by the people, they are held responsible for their policy decisions by the public at election time.

This symbiotic relationship between members of the policy elite and the general public is further reinforced by rational choice theorists who suggest that, “... public officials in a democracy have reason to pay attention to public opinion.”<sup>241</sup> Advocates of the rational choice model have long argued that vote-seeking politicians are compelled to advocate and enact policies favored by a majority of

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<sup>239</sup> Fay Lomax Cook, Jason Barabas and Benjamin I. Page. “Invoking Public Opinion: Policy Elites and Social Security.” *Public Opinion Quarterly*. V. 66 (2002), p. 236.

<sup>240</sup> Benjamin I. Page. *Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 118

<sup>241</sup> Fay Lomax Cook, Jason Barabas, and Benjamin I. Page. “Invoking Public Opinion: Policy Elites and Social Security.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* V. 66 (2002), p. 237.

voters.<sup>242</sup> Black explains that, “If citizens’ preferences are ‘jointly single peaked’ (i.e. uni-dimensional), the median voter theorem indicates that politicians’ rhetoric and policies should exactly reflect the preferences of the average voter.”<sup>243</sup>

This reciprocal relationship between members of the voting public and members of the policy elite has important implications regarding the securitization of a given policy issue area. There is substantial scholarly evidence of rather close connections between citizens’ preferences and public policies. These studies have found a significant correspondence between national policies and majority opinion at one moment in time<sup>244</sup>, between policies in several states and the liberalism or conservatism of public opinion in those states<sup>245</sup>, and between changes over time in public opinion and public policy<sup>246</sup>. While members of the policy elite must either accept or reject a securitizing move made by the authorized speakers of security (often the executive power within a state), this group must also gauge whether or not the public has accepted or rejected the initiation of a securitizing move. For

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<sup>242</sup> See for example: Otto A. Davis and Melvin Hinich. “A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society.” In Joseph L. Bernd, ed., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966), p. 175 – 205.

<sup>243</sup> Duncan Black. *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), Chapter Four.

<sup>244</sup> Alan D. Munroe. “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980 – 1993.” *Public Opinion Quarterly*. V. 62, N. 1 (1998), p. 6 – 28.

<sup>245</sup> Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. *Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>246</sup> Christopher Wlezien. “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending.” *American Journal of Political Science*. V. 39, N. 4 (1995), p. 981 – 1000. See also Larry M. Bartels. “Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup.” *American Political Science Review*. V. 85, (1991), p. 457 – 474.

example, while the executive power of the state can make speeches alerting the public to the threat of an imminent attack, if the public does not accept that there is an existential danger to the state, then the policy elite will have to consider both the claims made by the authorized speakers of security and the beliefs of the public before generating a response. Since the securitization of a given issue area is contingent on the acceptance or rejection of a given threat by the entire audience, it is sometimes the case that the elite audience is influenced by the acceptance or rejection of a threat by the populist audience. Thus, if the populist audience rejects an authorized speaker's articulation of imminent danger, then the elite audience will not implement measures that would reinforce the securitization of the issue. Ultimately, the two audience groups (elite and populist) form a sort of feedback loop with one group affecting the acceptance or rejection of the threat by the other audience group.

### **How do Members of the Policy Elite Advance or Reject the Securitization Process?**

As a component of the elite audience, the relationship between the policy elite of a given state and the general public is relevant to the role the former plays in either advancing or rejecting the securitizing move initiated by the authorized speakers of security. The Copenhagen School suggests that the role played by the elite audience in the securitization process is somewhat minimized in the case of persistent security threats that have become institutionalized. In these cases, "...urgency has been established by the previous use of the security move. There is no

further need to spell out that this issue has to take precedence.”<sup>247</sup> This does not mean that issues already recognized as threats to the state are not securitized. On the contrary, these issues were most likely first established through a securitizing move, and are often continuously justified through the discourse of security.<sup>248</sup> The Copenhagen School uses the example of dykes in the Netherlands – there is already an established sense of urgency concerning the potential for catastrophic floods in that state; therefore, members of the policy elite do not need to be persuaded by authorized speakers of security to enact measures to protect the state’s system of dykes – the need for immediate action has already been recognized. It follows that, when the existence of an existential threat has been legitimized within the state by security rhetoric, “... it becomes institutionalized as a package legitimization, and it is thus possible to have black security boxes in the political process.”<sup>249</sup> Therefore, the policy elite are likely to respond quickly to developments related to a threat that has already been articulated by the authorized speakers and accepted by the state audience.

Following the acceptance of an issue as posing an imminent security threat, members of the policy elite advance the securitization process by implementing policies and creating institutions aimed at responding to the threat. Mabee explains that the recognition of this entrenchment of issue-specific securitization is important because it draws attention to specific threats as well as to the broader

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<sup>247</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 28.

<sup>248</sup> IBID

<sup>249</sup> IBID

threat environment of a state. He notes that, “the creation of new state security institutions and their reproduction, is dependent to a certain extent on the existence of a discourse about their necessity and actual role.”<sup>250</sup> The institutionalization of a specific threat affects the ways in which the policy elite will respond to that threat. Therefore, the institutionalization of a specific threat as posing imminent danger to the state will, over time, result in the reification of a particular kind of state, which is, “... geared institutionally towards specific ways of both deciding what is a threat and responding to threats.”<sup>251</sup> Threats that have been institutionalized within a state are subject to prescribed responses that are consistent with previous attempts to address those threats.

Issues that have been institutionalized and are therefore accepted as warranting an immediate, securitized response are often automatically, “... placed beyond the realm of ‘reasonable public scrutiny’ and given an unwarranted basis of legitimacy.”<sup>252</sup> In these cases, securitization is taken for granted and the need to convince the audience of the validity of a threat is removed. Securitization, then, “... can be seen as an act that successfully fixes the definition of a situation as one encapsulated with ‘threat’, thereby excluding other possible constructions of

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<sup>250</sup> Bryan Mabee. “Re-Imagining the Borders of U.S. Security After 9/11: Securitization, Risk, and the Creation of the Department of Homeland Security.” *Globalizations*. V.4, N. 3 (Summer 2007), p. 388.

<sup>251</sup> IBID, p. 389.

<sup>252</sup> Kyle Grayson. “Securitization and the Boomerang Debate: A Rejoinder to Liotta and Smith-Windsor.” *Security Dialogue*. V.34, N. 3 (2003), p. 339.

meaning.”<sup>253</sup> When a threat has been institutionalized, the security environment of the state and its preconceived notions of what constitutes an appropriate response limit the actions taken by the policy elite in response to that threat.

The different spheres in which members of the policy elite find themselves further influences the response of this group to an articulated threat. The ‘acceptance’ of the audience and the ‘resonance’ of an existential threat is different in different spheres and is shaped by the different institutional bounds that constrain the actions of members of the policy elite. For example, Sociological securitization specialist, Salter, notes that, “Within the security sphere, different narratives are deployed for security threats in different sectors, different characters may attempt a securitizing speech act, and the relationship between the audience and the performer structure how those speech acts are made and received.”<sup>254</sup> The actions of members of the policy elite are constrained by their individual roles within the bureaucracy. For example, a Finance Minister will not respond to the threat of foreign invasion in the same manner as a Minister of Defense. While both officials may accept the validity of an impending threat, their individual responses are bounded by the mandates of their elected positions. The restrictions of bureaucratic groupthink will influence the individual responses of members of the policy elite.

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<sup>253</sup> Lene Hansen. “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School.” *Millenium*. V. 29, N. 2 (2000), p. 306.

<sup>254</sup> Mark B. Salter. “Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.” *Journal of International Relations and Development*. V. 11, N. 4 (2008), p. 330.

### **The American Policy Elite in the Post-9/11 Period**

The response of the American policy elite to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, provides a strong indicator that the elite audience in the United States accepted the securitizing move initiated by President Bush. As Robert Johnson has noted, in the United States, security issues are generally filtered through a political process that is characterized by a lack of consensus among policy elites.<sup>255</sup> The American congressional decision-making process is characterized by a diffusion of power, whereby policy decisions are the result of disaggregated and pluralistic opinions. Although the President generally has the most power with regard to agenda setting, he depends on Congress to appropriate funds for the measures he proposes, and Congress can block issues or push forward others that the President has not chosen.<sup>256</sup> Terrorism normally appears on the national policy agenda as a result of highly visible and symbolic attacks on the American populace or American property.<sup>257</sup> The way that members of the American Congress address the threat of terrorism is indicative of that body's perceived threat level. This typical lack of Congressional consensus was notably diminished in the period immediately following the 9/11 attack. Instead, Republican and Democratic members of the House and Senate worked together to initiate security policies aimed at countering the terrorist threat. This bi-partisan cooperation is indicative of the deference

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<sup>255</sup> See Robert Johnson. *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After*. (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), Ch. 2, p. 31-48.

<sup>256</sup> For more details on agenda-setting in Congress see Martha Crenshaw, "Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process" in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, eds., *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. (Guilford: McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, 2004), p. 450 – 454.

<sup>257</sup> See for example, Thomas A. Birkland. *After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events*. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001).



theory, and strongly suggests that this component of the elite audience wholly accepted the securitizing move initiated by the executive.

*Congressional Response to 9/11 – The Relevance of the Deference Thesis*

The 9/11 attacks on the United States served to turn the Congressional agenda completely on its head. When members of Congress returned to Washington after Labour Day, they expected to resume debate on a long list of domestic issues including: campaign finance reform, a patient's bill of rights, and Medicare reform, to name a few.<sup>258</sup> Instead, the attack immediately shifted all discussion to the threat of terrorism and the government's response to the threat. Domestic issues that once seemed pressing were put on hold as questions about homeland defense and security dominated the political agenda. The Congressional response to the 9/11 attacks demonstrates that members of the policy elite had accepted the securitizing move initiated by President Bush. The response of this group was indicative of the deference theory, which posits that, in times of crisis, members of the House and Senate should defer to the executive. Ultimately, an examination of the USA PATRIOT Act signals that members of the American policy elite accepted the securitizing move made by the authorized speaker of security, and opted to defer to the executive branch when legislating a response to the threat.

The Congressional response to the attacks of September 11 demonstrates three indicators that the policy elite had accepted the securitizing move initiated by

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<sup>258</sup> James M. Lindsay, "Congress After 9/11" in James M. Lindsay, ed., *American Politics After September 11*. (Concinnati, OH: Atomic Dog Publishing, 2005), p. 79 – 84.

the executive. First, the threat was accepted by members of the House and Senate as the only issue warranting discussion in Congress. When Congress resumed following the summer break, the sole topic on the agenda was to address the threat of terrorism and to strengthen homeland security efforts. Members of Congress sought to address whether or not to authorize the President to use military force against those responsible for the terrorist attacks and decided that a military show of force was necessary. Next, they considered whether or not to re-write state counter-terrorism laws and determined that these laws would have to be re-assessed. Finally, members of the House and Senate debated overhauling the whole process of airport security and decided that this too was an area where policy reform was necessary. In the days following the terrorist attacks on the United States, members felt an urgency to act quickly to address what had happened. Members of Congress worried that moving slowly might leave the United States and the American people vulnerable to future attacks.<sup>259</sup> This acceptance of the potential for future terrorist attacks as posing an existential threat to the state, resulted in the removal of all other topics from the political agenda. Counter-terrorism and homeland security were recognized as being the only topics worthy of consideration given the pervasive threat environment.

The second indicator that the securitizing move had been accepted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks was that the issue of government financing for the various counter-terrorism measures being proposed was notably absent from discussion.

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<sup>259</sup> Lindsay 2005, p. 80.

While it was generally accepted that new measures be implemented immediately to address the threat of future attacks on the state, no one was asking about the price tag for all of these new initiatives. Lindsay notes that, “In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the hottest topic during the summer of 2001 – how could Congress preserve the federal budget surplus? – disappeared from the political agenda.”<sup>260</sup> There was a notion that the need to respond to the attacks and prevent future attacks was more important than balancing the federal budget. The enormity of what had happened outweighed any desire for fiscal constraint.

Finally, bi-partisan cooperation between Republicans and Democrats increased as members of both parties sought to respond to the 9/11 terrorist threat. The clearest example of this bi-partisan cooperation took the form of the September 14 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution authorizing President Bush to use all necessary and appropriate force against those responsible for perpetrating the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The AUMF was passed into law by the Senate, without debate, in a roll call vote. This resolution provided that, “The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.”<sup>261</sup> The AUMF is

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<sup>260</sup> Lindsay 2005, p. 80.

<sup>261</sup> PL 107-40; 115 Stat. 224. Also quoted in David Abramowitz, “The President, the Congress and the Use of Force.” *Harvard Journal of Legislation*. V. 43, N. 71 (2002).

an important example of the Republican-Democrat cooperation in the period following the 9/11 attacks because this resolution was a, "... broad grant of authority to use force against both nations and non-state actors. It focused on the use of force of those responsible for the attacks and as a means to prevent future attacks."<sup>262</sup> Such a resolution, with serious implications for the future of American foreign policy, would not have passed without debate if it was not generally accepted by members of Congress that the potential for future attacks warranted an immediate and wide-sweeping response.

*The US Congress and the Deference Thesis*

The cooperation of Republicans and Democrats in the House of Representatives and the Senate can be explained by what Eric Posner has called the "Deference Thesis". This thesis posits that, "... legislatures, courts, and other government institutions should defer to the executive's policy decisions during national security emergencies."<sup>263</sup> This concept has evolved from the notion of colonial political defense, which held that deference to colonial authority in times of crisis constituted the central ingredient in colonial political ideology.<sup>264</sup> In the American political system, events requiring a legislative response are filtered through a political process that is characterized by a lack of consensus among

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<sup>262</sup> Kent Roach. *The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 174.

<sup>263</sup> Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, "Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts." *Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper*. (The Law School, The University of Chicago, 2007), p. 15.

<sup>264</sup> For further elaboration on the origins of the Deference Thesis refer to, John B. Kirby. "Early American Politics – The Search for Ideology: An Historiographical Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Deference." *The Journal of Politics*. V. 32, N. 4 (November 1970), pp. 808 – 838.

political elites.<sup>265</sup> Crenshaw notes that, "... the decision-making process is disaggregated and pluralistic, and power is diffused."<sup>266</sup> Since it would be impossible for all issues to be dealt with simultaneously, political elites – the President, different agencies within the executive branch, Congress, the media, and 'experts' in academia as well as the consulting world – compete to set the national policy agenda. In normal times, that is, when the state does not see itself to be in imminent danger, the three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) share power through a series of checks and balances. The President needs legislative approval in order to take action on a given issue. At the same time, the judicial branch reviews the policies set by the legislative branch and signed into law by the executive in order to ensure their conformity with pre-existing legislation. Thus, while the President typically retains agenda-setting power, he depends on Congress to appropriate funds for the measures he proposes, and Congress can block issues or push forward others that the President has not chosen. According to the deference thesis, these checks and balances should disappear in times of crisis, granting the President exclusive power in legislating a response to the crisis.

The deference thesis states that in times of imminent threat, both the legislative and judicial branches of government should defer to the executive. Posner explains that the thesis, "... assumes that the executive is controlled by the

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<sup>265</sup> For further elaboration refer to, Robert M. Johnson. *U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 31 – 48.

<sup>266</sup> Martha Crenshaw, "Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process." In Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, eds., *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. (Guilford: McGraw-Hill Dushkin, 2004), p. 450.

President, but to the extent that the President could be bound by agents within the executive, the deference thesis also holds that those agents should follow the President's orders, not the other way around."<sup>267</sup> Clearly, while the legislative and judicial branches of government are eager to assert their constitutional prerogatives in times of relative state security, the recognition of an existential threat to state security causes these branches of power to adopt a "rally 'round the flag" mentality that is marked by deference to executive authority. Ultimately, the change in Congressional/ Presidential relations precipitated by the 9/11 attacks was not unprecedented.

A historical overview of power relations between the legislative and the executive branches of government throughout American history supports the deference thesis. In times of peace and security, Congress can be seen to defy executive authority in favour of more aggressive policy-setting. In contrast, Congress will defer to presidential executive authority when there is a recognized, imminent threat to the state. Lindsay asserts that, "The pendulum of power on foreign policy has shifted back and forth between Congress and the President many times over the course of history."<sup>268</sup> In the latter half of the nineteenth century, a time of relative security from external threats, Congress dominated the creation of

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<sup>267</sup> Eric A. Posner, "Deference to the Executive in the United States After 9/1: Congress, the Courts and the Office of Legal Counsel." *Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 363*. (The Law School, The University of Chicago, September 2011), p. 2.

<sup>268</sup> James M. Lindsay, "Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. V. 33, N. 3 (September 2003), p. 531.

foreign policy. Following the start of World War I, the executive branch regained its foreign policy supremacy; however, the end of the First World War saw this power returned to Congress as members of the House and Senate sought to avoid America's involvement in what was viewed as "Europe's problems". The bombing of Pearl Harbor invalidated the isolationist tendencies of Congress and returned decision-making authority to President Roosevelt. Following the Second World War, concerns over Soviet aggression saw more policymakers step to the sidelines on defense and foreign policy issues. This led to the so-called "imperial presidency" of the 1960s, which saw members of Congress, "...stumbling over each other to see who can say 'yea' the quickest and the loudest."<sup>269</sup> The Cuban Missile Crisis stands out as perhaps the clearest example of the American Congress deferring to President Kennedy. This deference to presidential authority came to an end with souring public opinion about the Vietnam War.

The deference thesis provides a useful tool for examining whether or not members of the policy elite have accepted an issue as posing an existential threat to the state. How aggressively Congress exercises its policy-making authority is a direct result of whether or not members of the House and Senate see the state as being threatened or secure. This deference thesis has clear implications for the philosophical variant of securitization theory. If Congress, or the elite audience in general, acquiesces to the requests of the executive, those authorized speakers of security, then there is a high probability that the process of securitization has been

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<sup>269</sup> Sundquist 1981, p. 125.

initiated. An examination of the USA PATRIOT Act demonstrates Congressional deference to the President following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

### **The USA PATRIOT Act and Congressional Deference to Presidential Authority**

#### *The USA PATRIOT Act: An Overview*

“USA PATRIOT Act” is a somewhat Orwellian acronym that stands for, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism”<sup>270</sup>. This three hundred and forty-two page Act was drafted and passed by overwhelming majorities in both the House and Senate, and signed into law by President Bush on October 26, 2001 – just six weeks after the 9/11 attacks. This Act was enacted in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 to demonstrate to the American public that the state was not entirely helpless against the terrorist threat. Gouvin explains that, “Bringing the terrorists ‘to justice’ would have been an excellent way to make that demonstration. Unfortunately, fighting the human combatants in a terrorist war is extremely difficult.”<sup>271</sup> This Act gave the Secretary of the Treasury greater regulatory powers in order to address the potential for corruption of U.S. financial institutions for money laundering purposes. Further, it sought to prevent future terrorists from entering the United States and allowed for the detention and removal of those non-citizens identified as posing a potential threat. The Act created new crimes, new penalties, and new

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<sup>270</sup> Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing the Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001., Pub. L. No. 107 – 56 § 802, 115 stat/ 272, 376 (2001).

<sup>271</sup> Eric J. Gouvin. “Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA PATRIOT Act, Money Laundering, and the War on Terrorism.” *Baylor Law Review*. V. 55 (Fall 2003), p. 958.



procedural efficiencies for use against domestic and international would-be terrorists.<sup>272</sup> Recognizing that intelligence collection and dissemination amongst governmental institutions would be important in attacking the threat of potential terrorist attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act gave federal officials and law enforcement personnel greater authority to track and intercept personal communications for intelligence gathering purposes.

The USA PATRIOT ACT was predicated on an understanding that intelligence reform was an important component of the state's counterterrorism strategy. Building on the Antiterrorism Act of 1996, enacted in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma bombings, the USA PATRIOT Act sought to update standard intelligence procedures in order to increase their relevance in the information age.<sup>273</sup> One of the functions of the Act was to "tear down walls" existing in the 1996 legislation that prevented the sharing of intelligence between different organizations and hindered inter-agency information sharing and coordination. There was general consensus, in Congress that it was necessary to tear down the regulatory "walls" that prevented anti-terrorism intelligence agents and anti-terrorism criminal agents from sharing information. Heather McDonald, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, explained in a Senate Committee hearing that these regulatory walls, "... were neither constitutionally nor statutorily mandated, but their effect was dire:

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<sup>272</sup> Charles Doyle, CRS Report for Congress: Received Through the CRS Web. *The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch*. (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress: April 18, 2002), p. 1.

<sup>273</sup> For more information on the Antiterrorism Act of 1996 refer to James X. Dempsey and David Cole. *Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security: Second Edition*. (New York: The New Press, 2006).

they torpedoed what was probably the last chance to foil the 9/11 plot in August 2001.”<sup>274</sup> In order to facilitate inter-agency intelligence collaboration, Section 203 of the Act permits unprecedented sharing of sensitive information sources across several independent agencies, including the FBI, CIA, INS, and other state and federal organizations. Section 214 of the Act increased the power of the FBI to allow it to access both criminal and foreign intelligence cases so long as a judge ruled that the information would be ‘relevant’ to an on-going investigation. Perhaps more shockingly, Section 215 of the Act changed the law surrounding record checks so that third party holders of financial, library, travel, video rental, phone, medical, church, synagogue, and mosque records can be searched without the knowledge or consent of the target.<sup>275</sup> It seems clear that, with these reforms to intelligence collection and data sharing, Congress was willing to sacrifice concerns over personal privacy in favour of enhanced national security.

Under the pretense of enhancing national security and reforming intelligence collection as well as inter-agency cooperation, the USA PATRIOT Act increased the power of the executive branch of government, while decreasing judicial oversight. Examples of this enhanced executive power include Section 802 of the Act, which created a new crime – “domestic terrorism” – that includes any dangerous acts that,

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<sup>274</sup> Prepared Statement of Heather McDonald. USA PATRIOT Act, “Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate One Hundred Ninth Congress First Session.” (April 19, 2005; April 27, 2005; May 24, 2005) Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 2006b <<http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate>> Used With Permission.

<sup>275</sup> Jill Hills. “What’s New? War, Censorship, and Global Transmission.” *The International Communication Gazette*. V. 68, N. 3 (2006), p. 206.

“... appear to be intended... to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.”<sup>276</sup> Section 411 of the Act diminishes the right to due process for immigrants by expanding the term, “engage in terrorist activity” to include any use of a weapon, as well as non-violent acts of fundraising for “suspect” organizations.<sup>277</sup> Section 215 of the Act redefines the standards of probable cause as outlined in the Fourth Amendment. All of these sections of the Act increased federal powers in the name of enhanced national security.

While the USA PATRIOT Act was heralded as a comprehensive legislative response to the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 period, there were serious criticisms leveled against this piece of legislation following its enactment. The primary concern over the Act stemmed from its potential to violate citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. The most controversial measures of the Act involved information sharing from criminal investigations among the FBI and other intelligence agencies. The use of roving wiretaps across multiple communication devices, which facilitated government access to business records, and “sneak and peek” search warrants that allowed the authorities to search homes and businesses without prior notice were also considered to be questionable violations of civil

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<sup>276</sup> USA PATRIOT Act

<sup>277</sup> Lisa Funnegan Abdolian and Harold Takooshian. “The USA PATRIOT Act: Civil Liberties, the Media, and Public Opinion.” *Fordham Urban Law Journal*. V. 30, N. 4, p/ 1431.

liberties.<sup>278</sup> In reviewing terms of the Act set to expire as a result of the 2005 sunset clause, Representative Bob Barr noted that,

“When Congress created foreign intelligence roving wiretap authority in the USA PATRIOT Act, it failed to include the checks against abuse present in the analogous criminal statute. This is troubling because, as roving wiretaps attach to the target of the surveillance and not to the individual communications device, they provide a far more extensive and intrusive record of a person’s communications.”<sup>279</sup>

These concerns over provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act were ultimately overlooked by Congress in favour of a speedy legislative response to the events of 9/11.

*The Deference Thesis and the USA PATRIOT Act*

In keeping with the principles of the deference thesis, Congress can be seen to have acquiesced to the demands of the executive with regards to the terms of the USA PATRIOT Act. This deference to the executive branch is most evident in the strong bilateral cooperation between Republicans and Democrats in passing the Act. The Act was passed by large majorities in both the Senate (98-1) and the House (357-66) without public hearings or debate.<sup>280</sup> The fact that only one Senator, Russell Feingold of Wisconsin, and only sixty-six members of the House voted against the Act speak to Congress’ commitment to passing this piece of legislation quickly.<sup>281</sup> Despite concerns about the potential for governmental abuse of power and a loss of personal privacy, both Republican and Democratic representatives

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<sup>278</sup> Congressional Digest. “Civil Liberties in Times of War: 2005 – 2006 Policy Debate Topic.” (September 2005), p. 193. Used With Permission.

<sup>279</sup> Prepared Statement of Bob Barr. USA PATRIOT Act, “Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate One Hundred Ninth Congress First Session.” (April 19, 2005; April 27, 2005; May 24, 2005) Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 2006b <<http://www.aces.gpo.gov/congress/senate>> Used With Permission.

<sup>280</sup> Finnegan Abdolian and Takooshian, p. 1429.

<sup>281</sup> Gouvin 2003, p. 961.

agreed to a 'sunset clause' that required over a dozen provisions in the Act to expire on December 31, 2005 pending Congressional renewal. Representatives were willing to endorse the Act in spite of its similarities to the Antiterrorism Act of 1996, which had already been ruled partially unconstitutional by federal courts.<sup>282</sup>

The USA PATRIOT Act was enacted with minimal Congressional deliberation. Covering three hundred and fifty different subject areas, as well as forty different agencies; this Act was the largest piece of anti-terrorism legislation ever tabled in the United States. While issues are generally debated for months before being put to a vote, the USA PATRIOT Act was pushed through Congress in less than a month. In order to speed up the implementation of this Act, members of both the House and Senate agreed that the law should be, "... hammered out in private negotiations between the Justice Department and party leaders."<sup>283</sup> As a result, there were no final hearings to allow dissenters to voice their concerns and no committee reports on the implications of the legislation. Shockingly, many members of Congress were so eager to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate that they did not take the time to read all three hundred and forty-two pages of the Act.<sup>284</sup> The bipartisan cooperation in passing the USA PATRIOT Act was a testament to the desire of Congress to enact legislation quickly in response to the terrorist attacks. The bipartisan cooperation of members of the American policy elite is indicative of this group's acceptance of the securitizing move made by President Bush.

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<sup>282</sup> Finnegan Abdolian and Takooshian, p. 1429.

<sup>283</sup> Gouvin 2003, p. 961.

<sup>284</sup> Conference Reference

The willingness of House and Senate Republicans and Democrats to cooperate in passing the USA PATRIOT Act was compounded by their shared belief in the importance of enacting immediate legislation dealing with the threat of terrorism. This need to respond to the crisis as quickly as possible is what fueled Congressional acceptance for the ‘sunset clause’ contained in the Act. There was agreement that it was better to enact the legislation immediately, and worry about the sixteen questionable provisions of the Act as well as the “lone wolf” amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act when they expired in 2005.

Statements made by members of the policy elite at the 2005 Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate hearing on the renewal of provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act demonstrate the commitment of members of Congress to passing this legislation. Bob Barr, Georgia’s Seventh District Representative in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1995 to 2003 noted that,

“Even though I voted for the USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001, as did many of my colleagues, I did so with the understanding that it was an extraordinary measure for an extraordinary threat; that it would be used exclusively, or at least primarily, in the context of important antiterrorism cases; and that the Department of Justice would be cautious in its implementation and forthcoming in providing information on its use to the Congress and the American people.”<sup>285</sup>

John D. Rockefeller III, Vice Chairman of the committee similarly remarked that,

“There were good reasons to act quickly after the September 11 attacks. Because of the need for speed then it was wise to require, through a sunset provision, that there be a further evaluation of portions of the Act after several years of experience.”<sup>286</sup>

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<sup>285</sup> Prepared statement of Bob Barr from: USA PATRIOT Act, “Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate One Hundred Ninth Congress First Session.” (April 19, 2005; April 27, 2005; May 24, 2005) Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 2006b <<http://www.aces.gpo.gov/congress/senate>> Used With Permission.

<sup>286</sup> Prepared statement of John D. Rockefeller III, IBID

James X. Dempsey, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology, also echoed this sentiment about the need to act quickly to legislate against the threat of terrorism, noting that,

“In 2001, in response to some legitimate complaints of the Administration that the prior rules for counterterrorism investigations were unreasonable or were out of date or ill-suited to the threat of terrorism, Congress adopted the PATRIOT ACT... In the anxiety of those weeks after 9/11, Congress eliminated the old rules...”<sup>287</sup>

These statements, made by various members of the U.S. policy elite, are evidence of the perceived need by Congress to act quickly to demonstrate to the public that the government was taking seriously the renewed threat of terrorism. Members of the House and Senate were willing to defer authority to the executive – President Bush – so as to expedite this process.

### **The Canadian Policy Elite in the Post-9/11 Period**

#### *Canada's Past Encounters with Terrorism*

Contrary to reports made by the American media following the attacks on that state, Canada had not been immune to terrorist attacks prior to 9/11. The response of Canadian policymakers to the September 11 attacks on the United States borrowed heavily from lessons learned by dealing with both the FLQ crisis in 1970, and the Air India bombing in 1985. These two past encounters with terrorist actors became part of the bureaucratic institutional memory, and Canadian policymakers drew on these events when shaping their policy response to the American tragedy. Discussions with Canadian policymakers responsible for drafting the state's policy response to the 9/11 attacks universally emphasized the

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<sup>287</sup> Prepared statement of James X. Dempsey, IBID

importance of understanding Canada's previous experiences with terrorism in order to appreciate the evolution of this country's counter-terrorism policies.

*1963- 1968: The FLQ and the October Crisis*

Between 1963 and 1973, The Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) sought to establish an autonomous French state of Quebec that would operate independently of the rest of Canada. The FLQ established connections with Algeria and Cuba and even sent members of its organization to the Middle East to train at Palestinian resistance camps.<sup>288</sup> From 1963 until 1968, the group's mandate was based on traditional nationalistic sentiment, and its main demand was the separation of the province of Quebec from the rest of Canada.<sup>289</sup> During this period, the organization employed demand-terrorism techniques and perpetuated small bomb attacks in order to get media attention. By late 1968, the FLQ evolved from demand-like tactics to revolutionary terror, and became increasingly violent. These revolutionary tactics began in January of 1969 when a bomb exploded near the home of the Montreal police chief. In February of that year, a bomb at the Montreal Stock Exchange seriously injured thirty people. On June 24, 1970 – the National Day Of French Canadians (St. Jean Baptiste Day) – one person was killed when FLQ operatives set off a bomb at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa.<sup>290</sup> This

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<sup>288</sup> Jeffrey Ian Ross. "The Rise and Fall of Quebec Separatist Terrorism: A Qualitative Approach of Factors from Two Models." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. V. 18, N. 4 (1995), p. 287.

<sup>289</sup> For further elaboration refer to Louis Fournier. *FLQ: Histoire D'Un Movement Clandestine*. (Montreal: Editions Michele Brule Inc., 1998).

<sup>290</sup> For further description of the escalation of FLQ tactics leading up to the 1970 October Crisis see: Stephane Leman-Langlois and Jean-Paul Brodeur. "Terrorism Old



escalation in attacks culminated in the October 5, 1970 kidnapping of British diplomat, James Cross at the consulate in Montreal by one cell of the FLQ, and the kidnapping and execution of Quebec Cabinet Minister, Pierre Laporte, by another cell. These kidnappings and the subsequent response of the federal government to these actions came to be known as the October Crisis, and marked the first time that the Canadian federal government had to deal directly with terrorism in Canada.

In response to the October Crisis, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau proclaimed the “War Measures Act” to be in effect at four o’clock in the morning on October 16, 1970. The next day, Minister Laporte was found strangled to death, his body located at St. Hubert Airport after midnight on October 18. The following day, the House of Commons passed a motion supporting the government’s introduction of the War Measures Act. This Act, originally introduced in 1914 before the beginning of the First World War, was adopted to, “... protect national security and to prepare for the conditions of war.”<sup>291</sup> The Act was applicable to the October Crisis under its “Public Order Emergency” clause, which stipulated that,

“Where the Governor in Council believes that a public order emergency exists in Canada, he or she could, on reasonable grounds, after consultation with the Lieutenant Governor in Council of the province or provinces in question, issue a proclamation declaring this to be the case. If the public order emergency exists in only one province, such a declaration should issue only if the Lieutenant Governor in Council is in agreement (ss. 17(1) and 25)”<sup>292</sup>

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and New” in Andrew Millie and Dilip K. Das, eds., *Contemporary Issues in Law Enforcement and Policing*. (E-Book: CRC Press, 2008), p. 91 – 92.

<sup>291</sup> Emergencies Act <<http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb0114-e.htm>>

<sup>292</sup> IBID

The War Measures Act greatly enhanced the authoritative power of the state, and allowed for the arrest and detention of anyone suspected of being involved in the FLQ attacks. However, this Act did not define what was meant by “terrorism” in the context of the Canadian state. Instead, the FLQ and other groups that advocated the use of force or the commission of crime as a means of accomplishing governmental change within Canada were declared “unlawful associations”.<sup>293</sup> While the War Measures Act served to effectively end the FLQ crisis, it did not establish a permanent Canadian response to episodes of domestic terrorism. The invocation of the War Measures Act by Prime Minister Trudeau did however demonstrate that it was possible for the Canadian state to securitize a facet of its policy process. Even within the parliamentary system, Trudeau was able to remove the issue of ‘securing’ the province of Quebec from the general political agenda.

*1985: The Bombing of Air India Flight 182*

Canada once again experienced domestic terrorism with the 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182 aboard the “Kanishka”, which killed all three hundred and twenty-nine passengers on board, two hundred and eighty of whom were Canadian citizens<sup>294</sup>. This attack was the work of members of the Sikh militant group, Babbar Khalsa, which had a network of operatives in Canada. Although Canadian intelligence assets had knowledge of a plot to plant a bomb on an Air India flight originating in Canada, a lack of organizational coordination, and the absence of

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<sup>293</sup> Kent Roach. *September 11: Consequences for Canada*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), p. 29.

<sup>294</sup> Testimony from CSIS Experts on the Air India bombing at the 2012 “Kanishka Conference” in Ottawa, Ontario. (November 7-8, 2012).

legislation clearly delineating the parameters of a domestic terrorist attack, meant that this tragedy went largely unstudied until 2006. Following a (largely unsuccessful) trial of those deemed responsible for the bombing, the Canadian government called the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. The Commission's final report, "Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy" recognized that Canada's past experiences with domestic terrorism are an "... important opportunity to learn from the past to better secure our future."<sup>295</sup>

It is important to note that Canada was directly affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, but not in the same way as its southern neighbour. Twenty-six Canadians were killed in the attacks on September 11, 2001. While Canadian citizens were killed by the attacks on the United States, the fact that these attacks did not take place on Canadian soil did not prompt the government to see the events of 9/11 as a direct attack on Canada. Drawing on past experiences with domestic terrorism, Canadian policymakers took a cautious approach to developing legislation aimed at combating the threat posed by the potential for future terrorist attacks in North America.

Consultation with members of the policy elite from CSIS, the Department of National Defense, Public Safety, and the Canada Revenue Agency all asserted how

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<sup>295</sup> Public Safety Canada. "The Government of Canada Response to the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182." (June 19, 2012).

<<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ai182/res-rep-eng.aspx>>

discussions of the Air India bombing led to the development of a Canadian definition for “terrorism”.<sup>296</sup> Members of the policy elite noted that they drew on Canada’s experiences with domestic terrorism when involved in drafting counter-terrorism policies for Canada in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. There was general consensus that the Canadian response should demonstrate an evolution in Canadian law and policies that reflects lessons learned from past failures in addressing acts of domestic terrorism. These members of the policy elite sought to draw on Canada’s bureaucratic memory in order to avoid repeating mistakes of the past with regards to evidence reporting and clearly delineating the legal boundaries of “terrorist offences”. These lessons culminated in the creation of Bill C-36, more commonly referred to as the “Anti-Terrorism Act”.

**Bill C-36, Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act**

Like its southern neighbour, Canada sought to counter the threat of terrorism by enacting legislation that rendered acts of “terrorism” illegal, and provided the means of prosecuting those engaged in planning or carrying out terrorist activities against the state. The Canadian government introduced Bill C-36, The Anti-Terrorism Act, in response to calls to action from both the United States and the United Nations. An examination of Bill C-36 reveals more evidence of policy diffusion than of policy convergence when comparing the Canadian legislation to its American counterpart, the USA PATRIOT Act. This policy diffusion is the result of intense debate amongst members of the Canadian policy elite over the terms and conditions of the Canadian legislation. The Anti-Terrorism Act faced opposition

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from members of both Parliament and the Senate, and also from members of civil society groups. The debate arising from this opposition led to amendments of the legislation so as to balance the perceived need for counter-terrorism legislation with protecting so-called “Canadian values” enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Ultimately, the compromise surrounding the enactment of Bill C-36 demonstrates that the response of members of the Canadian policy elite was not consistent with the process of securitization. In contrast to the USA PATRIOT Act, Bill C-36 was not a catch-all response to counter-terrorism. This legislation was merely the first in a series of Acts aimed at addressing homeland security and counter-terrorism in Canada, and was followed almost immediately by the Public Safety Act. Instead of the deference to elite authority shown by the American policy elite to the executive branch of government, members of the Canadian policy elite can be seen to have consented to pressures from the U.S. and the United Nations to legislate against the threat of terrorism. In Canada, the threat of terrorism did not supersede the realm of tradition politics so as to become securitized. Instead, counter-terrorism legislation was debated alongside other issues relevant to the Canadian polity at that time.

*Canada’s Legislative Response to Terrorism: Convergence and Diffusion from the American Model*

Media commentators commonly refer to Bill C-36, The Anti-terrorism Act as “Canada’s PATRIOT Act”. This false comparison led to is an overestimation of the similarities between the two pieces of legislation. Critics, such as the former head of CSIS, Reid Morden, charged that, “... the anti-terrorist legislative changes brought

before Parliament were largely the result of pressures to keep up with the neighbours.”<sup>297</sup> While it is true that “...Canada moved swiftly to change its legislation to reflect the new U.S. priorities...”<sup>298</sup>, the response of members of the policy elite in Canada was markedly different from American attempts to “legislate away the threat”. Canada’s legislative response to counter-terrorism was precipitated by a section in the USA PATRIOT Act entitled, “Protecting the Northern Border” which singled out the U.S.’s shared border with Canada as a potential soft target for would-be terrorists seeking to gain entry into the United States. This American fear was predicated on the notion that, as primary targets are hardened by enhanced security measures, terrorists would seek out softer targets in other countries.

Canada’s desire to respond to American concerns about counter-terrorism policy in this state served two purposes. First, discussions with members of the Canadian policy elite, particularly those engaged in intelligence collection and dissemination, recognized that there was the potential for Al Qaeda, or an “AQ-like” non-state organization to carry out an attack on Canadian soil following the 9/11 attack on the United States.<sup>299</sup> Reg Whitaker expresses this concern, noting,

“As a liberal, capitalist, ‘infidel’ democracy allied closely to the United States, Canada is obviously implicated as a target of radical Islamist terror. The apparently authentic statement issued by Osama

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<sup>297</sup> See: Reid Morden, “Finding the Right Balance.” *Policy Options*. V. 23, N. 6 (2002), p. 47.

<sup>298</sup> Patrick J. Smith, “Anti-Terrorism in North America: Is There Convergence or Divergence in Canadian and U.S. Legislative Responses to 9/11 and the U.S. – Canada Border.” In Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, ed., *Borderlands: Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe*. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2007), p. 286.

<sup>299</sup> From Interviews... See notes

bin Laden in the fall of 2002 specifically threatened Canada along with other Western states associated with the United States.”<sup>300</sup>

Intelligence collected by NATO forces in Afghanistan following the attacks on the United States listed other Western states that Al Qaeda sought to “punish” for their close relationships with the United States. Canada was included in this list. Further, members of the Canadian policy elite, on advice from the Department of National Defence, recognized that Canada’s legislative and administrative response to the potential for biological or nuclear attacks as well as the state’s emergency preparedness quotient lagged behind those of the United States and its Department of Homeland Security.

The second purpose of Canada’s legislative response to counter-terrorism was the recognition by members of the policy elite of the state’s need to limit the collateral economic harm to the Canadian economy that would result from an American loss of confidence in Canadian security measures. There was unspoken consensus that U.S. homeland security would be protected either at the Canada-U.S. border or around a wider North American perimeter. If security was imposed along the Canada-U.S. border by the United States, it would come at an economic cost unacceptable to Canada, which sends more than 85% of its exports to the United States. A closing of the northern American border would decimate Canadian industry, which employs a just-in-time trade model of shipping goods to the United States. Several Canadian counter-terrorism policies were adopted by members of

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<sup>300</sup> Reg Whitaker. “Keeping Up With the Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 9/11 in Historical and Comparative Context.” *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*. V. 41, N. 2 (2003), p. 252.

the policy elite out of the necessity of complying with pre-existing American policies. For example, Canada's Anti-terrorism Act included policies relating to federal aviation regulations, which were in direct response to the American policy of demanding advance production of a range of personal data on passengers arriving from abroad at U.S. airports. Whitaker explains that, "Canada had no choice in this matter, short of losing landing rights for Canadian carriers, even though this American policy did necessitate overriding Canadian privacy law."<sup>301</sup> While some policy convergence between the USA PATRIOT Act and the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act can be identified, often this convergence is the result of an understanding by members of the Canadian policy elite that certain policies would have to be adopted in order to secure Canadian economic interests. In other areas, analysis of the Anti-terrorism Act discloses little that can be seen as directly responding to American demands, as such, or reflecting American provisions and practices. There was recognition that, "Canadian public opinion demands distance from the appearance that Canadian policy is being dictated from Washington. This latter tendency is heightened when the U.S. leadership is perceived by many in Canada as immoderate and potentially dangerous...".<sup>302</sup> Canada's counter-terrorism legislation has much more in common with British and Australian policies.

*Responding to the UN: Canada's Counter-terrorism Legislative Response*

In addition to responding to American concerns about Canadian security legislation, the federal government and members of the Canadian policy elite sought to respond to the United Nations' resolutions calling for member states to enact

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<sup>301</sup> Whitaker 2003, p. 258.

<sup>302</sup> IBID, p. 264.



counter-terrorism legislation. Most relevant for Canada was UN Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted on September 28, 2001, which stipulated that,

“... all states should prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, as well as criminalize the willful provision or collection of funds for such acts. The funds, financial assets, and economic resources of those who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts and of persons and entities acting on behalf of terrorists should also be frozen without delay.”<sup>303</sup>

The Resolution further stated that member states would be expected to,

“... prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate, or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other countries and their citizens. States should also ensure that anyone who has participated in the financing, planning, preparation, or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice. They should also ensure that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the seriousness of such acts is duly reflected in sentences served.”<sup>304</sup>

The Canadian government took the position that this UN Resolution required that Bill C-36 become law by December 18, 2001, in time for Canada to report to the new United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee. UN Security Council binding Resolution 1373 called on all states under the mandatory provisions of chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to ensure that terrorism was treated as a serious crime, but it did not attempt to define terrorism.<sup>305</sup> The necessity of defining terrorism before legislating against this threat resulted in Bill C-36, The Anti-terrorism Act, which was closer in nature to legislation passed by Britain and Australia than to that of the United States.

*Bill C-36: The Anti-Terrorism Act*

Canada’s attempt to satisfy both American and United Nations’ expectations regarding counter-terrorism legislation resulted in Bill C-36, The Anti-Terrorism

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<sup>303</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)

<<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm>>

<sup>304</sup> IBID

<sup>305</sup> Kent Roach. “The Canadian Parliamentary Review of the Anti-Terrorism Act”. *IRPP Choices*. V. 13, N. 5 (September 2007), p. 5.

Act, which was introduced in the House of Commons on October 15, 2001. Bill C-36 had four central objectives: (1) to stop terrorists from entering Canada and to protect citizens from future terrorist attacks, (2) to design and implement tools aimed at identifying, prosecuting, convicting, and punishing would-be terrorists, (3) to prevent would-be terrorists from affecting Canada-U.S. cross border relations and negatively affecting the Canadian economy, and, finally, (4) to work with the international community to bring terrorists to justice and to address the root causes of insurgency and terrorism.<sup>306</sup> One of the most important facets of this Act was its creation of a Canadian definition of terrorism. This Act enabled the Cabinet, “... to designate groups as ‘terrorist’ with only a limited possibility of judicial review of its decision, created a range of new offences, expanded police powers, and provided for preventive arrest.”<sup>307</sup> Bill C-36 was produced with record speed. According to Kent Roach, its main sections, “... were drafted between September 11 and October 13, with the crucial definition of terrorism discussed up until the last minute before the bill was introduced in Parliament.”<sup>308</sup> Following a truncated debate after the third reading of the bill, the Anti-terrorism Act was passed on November 29, 2001, by a vote of 189 in favour to 47 opposed, and was later approved without amendments

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<sup>306</sup> Department of Justice (Canada). “News Release: ‘Government of Canada Introduces Anti-Terrorism Act,’” (October 15, 2001).

<[http://www.canada.justice.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc\\_27785.htm](http://www.canada.justice.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27785.htm)>

<sup>307</sup> Patrick J. Smith, “Anti-Terrorism in North America: Is There Convergence or Divergence in Canadian and U.S. Legislative Responses to 9/11 and the U.S. – Canada Border.” In Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, ed., *Borderlands: Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe*. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2007), p. 286.

<sup>308</sup> Kent Roach, *September 11: Consequences for Canada*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), p. 21.

by the Senate.<sup>309</sup> Bill C-36 was proclaimed to be in force on December 24, 2001, in time to be included in Canada's report to the United Nations on the state's compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373.

Although the speed with which Bill C-36 was drafted and implemented may seem to suggest a 'securitized' response to the issue of homeland security in Canada, this was not the case. The haste with which this legislation was enacted reflects the Canadian desire to demonstrate to the United Nations and the United States that it was taking the steps necessary to address the international threat posed by terrorism. In the interest of protecting cross-border trade, members of the Canadian policy elite were particularly concerned with demonstrating to the United States that Canada did not pose a threat to American security.<sup>310</sup>

### **Bill C-36: The Product of Intense Debate**

Canadian policymakers did not show the deference to the executive demonstrated by American policy makers and members of the policy elite to the American President. Instead, the resulting legislation was the product of intense debate between members of Parliament and the Senate, and members of interested civil society groups. This debate, and the lack of deference to the executive branch of government, further demonstrates the absence of securitization in Canada. The philosophical variant of securitization theory can be seen as constituting a continuum. First, an authorized speaker of security articulates a threat as posing an existential and imminent danger to the state. Second, the elite audience either

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<sup>309</sup> Roach 2003, p. 21. (IBID)

<sup>310</sup> This desire to protect Canada-U.S. trade by demonstrating that Canada was "taking security seriously" will be discussed further later in this chapter.

accepts or rejects this threat and transmits its opinion to the populist audience, who must then accept or reject the threat articulation in their own right. The creation of a feedback loop allowing for the inclusion of policy debate and public insight into the creation of a given security policy demonstrates that there has been no attempt to securitize the policy issue. In this way, recognition of the deference thesis has important implications for determining whether or not the audience must accept or reject a given threat as posing an existential risk to the state. While members of the American policy elite accepted that the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 period posed an imminent danger to citizens of the state and thus deferred to the President in crafting a legislative response to that threat, this was not the case in Canada. Members of the Canadian policy elite expressed dissent at the executive's vision for the state's counter-terrorism policy. Canadian policymakers actively debated various facets of the legislation and sought to amend aspects of Bill C-36 that did not serve their vision of the "Canadian interest". In addition to Parliamentary and Senate debates over the Bill, the opinions of members of various civil society groups were also considered. The acceptance and inclusion of public opinion into the policy making process further demonstrates a lack of securitization. Instead of transmitting an "official view" of a threat to the audience, the executive and the elite audience welcomed public input into crafting the state's legislative response.

*Bill C-36: Debate and Dissent Within the Government*

Within the Canadian government, there was important opposition to sections of Bill C-36, The Anti-Terrorism Act. Various governmental actors, including the Privacy Commissioner, the Information Commissioner, and the Canadian Human

Rights Commissioner all voiced concerns about terms contained in the bill. An overview of these concerns demonstrates the lack of executive deference. George Radwanski, then Canadian Privacy Commissioner, expressed his strong concerns about the preemption of privacy legislation once the Attorney General issued a certificate prohibiting access to information to protect national security, national defence, or international relations.<sup>311</sup> Likewise, Liberal backbencher and noted human rights lawyer, Irwin Cotler publicly opposed Bill C-36, and identified what he determined to be eleven ‘deficiencies’ with the legislation. These included,

“...over breadth in the bill’s definition of terrorism, the lack of prior notice to a group listed as a terrorist group, concerns about access to information and the right to privacy, the need to sunset provisions for preventive arrests and investigative hearings, the need for charities to have a due diligence defence if their charitable status was revoked, and the need for more oversight mechanisms, such as a parliamentary officer to monitor and supervise the legislation.”<sup>312</sup>

Concerns about the legislation resulted in uncharacteristic breaches in Cabinet solidarity pertaining to support of the bill. For example, Liberal Fisheries Minister, Herb Dhaliwal noted that, “Civil liberties are extremely important to Canadians... certainly as someone from the ethnic community and a visible minority this is something extremely important to me.”<sup>313</sup>

The Anti-terrorism Act was hotly debated in various governmental committees following its introduction in the House. One of these committees, the

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<sup>311</sup> Privacy Commissioner of Canada, News Releases, 8 November, 2001 and 21 November, 2001.

<sup>312</sup> Irwin Cotler. “Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy” in Daniels, Macklem, and Roach, eds., *The Security of Freedom*. P. 65.

<sup>313</sup> T. MacCharles and A. Thompson, “Anti-terrorism bill worries Dhaliwal”, *Toronto Star*. (October 30, 2001) A2.

Special Senate Committee on Bill C-36 issued an important bi-partisan report on November 1, 2001, which reflected both the Liberal majority and Conservative minority Senate position on the bill. This report called for extensive revisions to Bill C-36 including: changes to the definition of terrorism, enactment of a non-discrimination clause, the appointment of an officer of Parliament to monitor the implementation of the bill, reporting requirements on actions taken under the bill, and judicial review of time restrictions on security certificates to protect information from disclosure. The report also called for a five-year sunset clause that would force the reintroduction of the bill in the future.<sup>314</sup> The bi-partisan findings of this special committee demonstrate the opinion of the policy elite, that Canada's legislative response to counter-terrorism must be balanced with its citizens' Charter rights.

*Bill C-36: Opposition from Civil Society Groups*

Governmental debate over the provisions of Bill C-36 was mirrored by debates that took place within civil society groups about the legislation. Of primary concern was that the original wording of the bill would have equated illegal strikes and anti-globalization protests as 'terrorist' acts.<sup>315</sup> Much like the governmental critics of the legislation, civil society groups expressed trepidations over some of the powers and controls outlined in the act. They were especially concerned about,

"... the power to detain a suspect without charge, with judicial approval, for 72 hours to a year if the person did not agree to reasonable restrictions on his or her behaviour as a condition of release; the possibility of up to ten years imprisonment for 'legally participating or contributing' to the activities of a known terrorist group; the requirement to testify at 'investigative hearings'; and the new power

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<sup>314</sup> Special Senate Committee on Bill C-36, First Report. (November 1, 2001).

<sup>315</sup> For further elaboration refer to: Kent Roach. *September 11: Consequences for Canada*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), p. 8.

given to the Solicitor General to create a list of terrorists on ‘reasonable grounds’ without any requirement to notify individuals or groups that they were on the list.”<sup>316</sup>

Representatives from various groups spoke out about their concerns that Bill C-36 would unnecessarily infringe on the civil liberties of Canadian citizens.

The Anti-terrorism Act drew criticism from a wide array of civil society groups including: those representing Aboriginal peoples, unions, charities, refugees, lawyers, and watchdog review agencies. A sampling of some of the statements made by these groups demonstrates the diverse input that influenced the development of Bill C-36. These civil society groups addressed issues such as the definition of terrorist activities, and recommended that an exemption from the definition for strikes and protests not be limited to lawful protests and strikes. The result of the criticism from these groups has been described as, “... the most balanced example of legislative activism to date, and one that demonstrated the ability of Parliament to take rights considerations into account.”<sup>317</sup> These civil society groups were able to put a human face on those individuals who might be harmed by the broad definitions contained in first drafts of the bill. Civil rights lawyer, Alan Borovoy, the head of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, presented his concerns to parliamentary groups and to the media arguing that, “... the bill should require a judicial warrant before it authorized either the secret recordings of Canadians

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<sup>316</sup> Patrick J. Smith, “Anti-Terrorism in North America: Is There Convergence or Divergence in Canadian and U.S. Legislative Responses to 9/11 and the U.S. – Canada Border.” In Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, ed., *Borderlands: Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe*. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2007), p. 299.

<sup>317</sup> James Kelly. *Governing With the Charter*. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), p. 246.

speaking with people in other countries or the declaration of a group or an individual as a terrorist.”<sup>318</sup> Likewise, Eric Rice, the President of the Canadian Bar Association, following consultations with more than two hundred lawyers affiliated with his group, raised concerns about, “investigative hearings, broad terrorism offences, and mandatory sentencing provisions that would undermine the operation of the justice system.”<sup>319</sup> These criticisms of the bill founded on legal grounds were accompanied by a host of concerns from other groups in society.

Various religious and ethnic groups issued statements to the media and made presentations before parliamentary groups expressing their concerns about the proposed legislation. For example, a representative of the Canadian Council of Churches and Catholic Bishops argued that the bill would negatively impact on charities. He noted that, of these charities, “... nearly one half of which are religious organizations... the section (of Bill C-36) could catch church groups that in good faith, and after due diligence, provide funds to their overseas partners for humanitarian or development assistance.”<sup>320</sup> Representatives of the National Jewish Congress of Canada and the Canadian Buddhist Association echoed his sentiments.<sup>321</sup> Speaking at a Special Senate Committee meeting, a representative of the Canadian Arab Federation expressed concerns that Bill C-36, combined with

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<sup>318</sup> T. Tyler, “Law Societies Seek Changes to Terror Bills.” *Toronto Star*. (4 December, 2001).

<sup>319</sup> Quoted in S. McIntyre, “Redefining Reformism: The Consultations That Shaped Bill C-49,” in J. Roberts and R. Mohr, eds., *Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of Legal and Social Change*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 59.

<sup>320</sup> Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (1 November, 2001), p. 1540

<sup>321</sup> IBID



other legal initiatives, “... was an attempt to stifle the current evolution of human rights culture among the general population...”<sup>322</sup> Similarly, speaking before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come of the Assembly of First Nations argued that the proposed legislation would lead to a proliferation of events such as the killing of Dudley George at Ipperwash. In his presentation, he sought to, “... demonstrate the risk posed to First Nations by legislation that gives heightened powers to police, narrows the civil rights of those involved in legitimate dissent and protest activities and limits or suspends the civil rights of those perceived by the government to be involved in ‘terrorist’ activities.”<sup>323</sup>

#### *Relevance of Debate Over Bill C-36*

Ultimately, members of the policy elite had to amend aspects of the Anti-terrorism Act so as to address concerns raised by members of Parliament and the Senate, and by civil society groups. These amendments were significant because they indicated that the policy elite were conscientious of public opinion, and were more concerned with ensuring that the public would accept the terms of the final legislation. The allowance of dissenting opinions regarding the original draft of the bill signified the absence of the securitization process. While those who opposed the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States were made to feel that they were somehow contradicting what was in the best interest of that state, Roach notes that, “critics of Bill C-36 were generally not made to feel that they were being disloyal or

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<sup>322</sup> Special Senate Committee on Bill C-36 (6 December, 2001).

<sup>323</sup> Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (1 November, 2001), p. 1540

unpatriotic.”<sup>324</sup> Ultimately, the Anti-terrorism Act was amended to include a ‘sunset’ provision on preventative arrest and investigative hearings, a new provision requiring the federal Attorney General and Solicitor General and their provincial equivalents to report annually to Parliament on any use of preventative arrest or investigative hearings, and, a separate interpretive clause for greater clarity regarding the protection of political, religious, or ideological beliefs and expressions.<sup>325</sup> Members of the policy elite responded to the concerns of critics of the legislation and amended the bill accordingly.

While Bill C-36 was ultimately passed by the government invoking closure, which limited Parliament to two days of debate when the bill was reported back after the third reading, the amendments made to the final draft of the act took into account the criticisms presented by different groups. The invocation of closure was not intended to stifle the input of civil society groups, but rather to allow the government to meet the deadline set by the UN Security Council for reporting on counter-terrorism legislation. The Minister of Justice, Anne McLellan, defended closure noting that, “our allies around the world are moving and it would be irresponsible for us, as a government, not to move.”<sup>326</sup> Forcing closure indicates that the policy elite was more concerned with protecting Canadian interests by keeping our allies satisfied than with convincing every member of the public that terrorism posed an imminent threat to the state.

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<sup>324</sup> Roach 2003, p. 56.

<sup>325</sup> Smith 2007, p. 299 – 300.

<sup>326</sup> Hansard, 27 November 2001, p. 1000, per House Leader Don Boudria.

**The Other Half of the Elite Audience**

The members of the policy elite are only half of the elite audience group. While this group is the first to interact with the authorized speakers of security, they also collaborate with the second component of the elite audience – the media. The media reports on the policies and institutions created by the policy elite. In this way, the media translates the policy elite audience's response to the articulation of a given threat to the populist audience. The role played by the media in framing and shaping public opinion of distant events points to the importance of considering the relevance of media frames in the process of securitizing a given issue. The following chapter will examine the ways in which the media, as a component of the elite audience, interacts with the other audience groups.

**CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE SECURITIZATION PROCESS**

***Introduction***

The philosophical variant of securitization theory has been criticized due to its lack of attention to the role the media plays in the securitization process. This absence of analysis regarding the participation of the media negates the important role that this body plays as part of the elite audience. Harold Lasswell's summary of communication, "who says what, to whom, through what channel, and to what effect," is especially relevant when considering the role that the media plays in the securitization process.<sup>327</sup> The central role played by the media in forming and shaping public opinion of distant events points to the importance of considering the relevance of media frames in the process of securitizing a given issue. Securitization theory has traditionally drawn little specific attention to the media, or political communication more generally. This gap is important to address, "...given the implicit relevance of news media to any such interplay of issues, elite opinion, and public opinion."<sup>328</sup> The media, as part of the elite audience, plays a pivotal role in framing events for the public. The frames created by the mass media determine how a given event will be represented. The media frames generated in the United States following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States have differed greatly from those in Canada. This difference in media framing and narrative creation demonstrates one of the ways that the United States has securitized the

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<sup>327</sup> Harold D. Lasswell. *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1935).

<sup>328</sup> Fred Vultee. "Securitization: A New Approach to the Framing of the 'War on Terror'." *Journalism Practice*. V. 4, N.1 (2010), p. 33.

homeland security policy process, while Canada has not taken such drastic measures.

Traditional International Relations' models commonly ignore the role of the media in the policy creation process. These theories, by default, regard this institution as an actor, "...indifferent to international relations and foreign policy, even at the same time that they convey leaders' representations of the crisis..."<sup>329</sup> While there have been some recent attempts by scholars such as Robert Entman to theorize the role of the media in the creation of foreign policy, for example, these models do not account for the ways in which the media interact with other actors in order to influence the state's decision-making process.<sup>330</sup>

An assessment of the role of the media in the securitization process will serve to strengthen the philosophical securitization model. There is a need to consider the notion that images or visual representations can be central to the construction of security in general, and securitization in particular.<sup>331</sup> Several scholars have pointed out the necessity to consider the media in this theoretical construct. Michael Williams notes that incorporating the media into securitization models is a key challenge in moving forward with this theoretical construct. He calls

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<sup>329</sup> Nathalie Frensey and Nelson Michaud. "Media, Securitization, and the War on Terrorism: Comparing Bush's Speech Frames in US, Canadian, and European News Reports." *Working Paper* (2004), p. 3.

<sup>330</sup> See: Robert M. Entman. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2004).

<sup>331</sup> Matt MacDonald. "Securitization and the Condition of Security." *European Journal of International Relations*. V. 14, N. 4 (2008), p. 10.

for, “...broader techniques for ‘reading’ the rhetorics of securitizing acts, techniques attuned to the rhetorics of visual representation and reception, and their contextual aspects.”<sup>332</sup> This need to assess the role of the media has been further echoed by Frank Moeller, who suggests that visual representations of “security” are able to communicate meanings of existential threats to the public. He points to images of the September 11 attacks on the United States and those in Iraq as examples of how the media, and the use of visual representations serve to convey messages about the need to ‘securitize’ a given issue to the general public.<sup>333</sup> Williams also stresses the importance of images presented by the media in the securitization process. He argues that televised images of the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers on 9/11 were central to the development of dominant perceptions of security and threat in the American context.<sup>334</sup> More than a decade later, these images are still powerful reminders to the American public of what happened on that day, and are often invoked when justifying the implementation of security policy measures.

### **The Media as a Component of the Elite Audience**

As described in the first chapter, the “audience” in the philosophical variant of securitization theory, is best represented by two groups: the populist audience, and the elite audience. The populist audience is comprised of the general voting public - the citizens of any given state. While the populist audience is the larger of the two groups, its participation is limited to either accepting or rejecting the

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<sup>332</sup> Michael C. Williams. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics.” *International Studies Quarterly*. V. 47, N. 4 (2003), p. 527.

<sup>333</sup> Frank Moeller. “Photographic Interventions in Post-9/11 Security Policy.” *Security Dialogue*. V. 38, N.2 (2007), p. 179 – 196.

<sup>334</sup> Williams 2003.

measures implemented by the elite audience to respond to an articulated threat. The elite audience is made up of policymakers and the media. This segment of the audience is important since it serves a dual purpose by either accepting or rejecting a threat as being “existential”, and then interpreting that threat for the populist audience.

The media is a crucial component of this elite audience since this group is responsible for distilling information about the threat and then disseminating it to the general public. The media’s acceptance or rejection of a security issue as posing an existential threat is part of the securitization process. The Copenhagen School recognizes the importance of considering the role played by the media in this process, noting, “... In all of these cases, the media is an important actor that contributes significantly to the definitions of situations. Who are the parties to conflicts? What are the conflicts about?”<sup>335</sup> Much like the role of the audience in general, the actual function that the media plays in the securitization process has remained under-theorized. The media plays an interesting role in the securitization process since, as part of the elite audience, it is both acted upon by authorized speakers of security, and then, in turn, itself acts upon the populist audience in order to disseminate the threat.

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<sup>335</sup> Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, p. 124.

In order to properly assess the role of the media as part of the elite audience, it is important that this institution be regarded not only as a structure, but also as an agent. Martin Shaw asserts that,

“What is at stake is more than adding the media as a significant category of “actor” alongside states and other non-state actors. The idea of the media as a single, powerful agent – whether a faithful servant of the state and corporate interests... or an intruder into their realms... - is the bane of serious discussion, indicating that we have not even started a meaningful analysis. What is needed is a complex conceptualization of media as both structure and agency.”<sup>336</sup>

In order to fully understand the media’s role in the securitization process, one must consider not only the images and accounts it provides, but also the production of those images and accounts. The media can be considered to be both a structure and an agent in the securitization process because it is acted upon by elites who are the authorized speakers of security, and then, in turn, acts upon the populist audience.

*Authorized Speakers of Security Act Upon the Media*

Authorized speakers of security often seek to harness the media in order to “speed-up” the securitization process. In this sense, the media can be likened to a loaded gun lying in the street. The first person to pick it up determines how it will be used.<sup>337</sup> This is how those initially articulating a security threat view the media. They see it as something that must be harnessed in order to proliferate the “correct” perception of a threat. Since the ability to “speak security”, as articulated by the Copenhagen School, carries with it the power to implement extraordinary rules to

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<sup>336</sup> Martin Shaw. “Media and Public Sphere Without Borders? News Coverage and Power from Kurdistan to Kosovo,” in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia (eds). *Decision-Making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 29.

<sup>337</sup> Richard Clutterbuck. *The Media and Political Violence*. (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 76.



deal with a recognized existential threat, political actors seek to control the media – viewing it as a sort of “securitization switch”.<sup>338</sup> In this sense, securitization can be viewed as both an independent variable – an effect in the media – as well as a dependent variable, or an effect of the media. Vultee proposes that these effects, “... are created in a multi-sided, often recursive interaction among political actors, the media, and the public that underscores the Copenhagen scholars’ emphasis on identity as a centerpiece of security at the societal level.”<sup>339</sup> The ‘facts’ presented by the media gain validity when they are accepted as ‘truth’ by the rest of the audience.

As a component of the elite audience, the media either accepts the assertion of an existential threat by those authorized speakers of security, or rejects it. In its simplest form, media acceptance (or refusal) attempts at securitization initiated by those authorized speakers of security can be gauged by the ways in which a security issue is presented to the public. However, media acceptance of an issue as posing an immediate threat is only one part of the securitization process. This decision to represent a threat is not monolithic, and is only one link in the larger chain of public acceptance that is necessary for a successful securitizing move.<sup>340</sup> The media provides a link between the state’s leadership and the mass public (the populist audience). By reporting on the actions and statements of the political leadership, news stories serve to mediate the process of leader persuasion of the citizenry in

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<sup>338</sup> Fred Vultee. “Securitization: A New Approach to the Framing of the ‘War on Terror’.” *Journalism Practice*. V. 4, N. 1 (2010), p. 45.

<sup>339</sup> Fred Vultee. “Securitization as a Media Frame: What Happens When the Media ‘Speak Security’?” in Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 78.

<sup>340</sup> Vultee, 2010, p. 45.

accepting that a given issue poses a significant danger and must be dealt with appropriately, and often immediately.

Authorized speakers of security recognize that the media, as part of the elite audience, is in a unique position to influence the populist audience. In the emergency management phase of a threat response, the media is the primary risk communicator. In this capacity, the media is responsible for, "...raising citizen awareness to the presence of an existing or future hazard, and providing information to those citizens regarding prevention or protection."<sup>341</sup> Burkhart asserts that, "...in the preparedness phase, the mass media are positioned between the actors who evaluate a threat and decide upon a message, and the media audience."<sup>342</sup> He further adds that it is, "... the media's ability to influence perceived risk and the credibility of the source of information that gives them such power over public behavior."<sup>343</sup> For these reasons, policy elites seek to harness the media early in the threat recognition process in order to maximize their influence on the public.

*The Media Acts Upon the Populist Audience*

Just as the media is acted upon by authorized speakers of security, this institution exerts influence over the populist audience by disseminating information on a given security issue. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the media plays a crucial role in transmitting warning messages and alerts, and in providing the

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<sup>341</sup> Jane A. Bullock, George D. Haddow, Damon Coppola, Erdem Ergin, Lissa Westerman, and Serp Yeletaysi. *Introduction to Homeland Security: Second Edition*. (London: Elsevier, Inc., 2006), p. 415.

<sup>342</sup> F.N. Burkhart. *Media, Emergency Warnings, and Citizen Response*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 53.

<sup>343</sup> IBID

public with instructions about where to evacuate, where to seek medical care and shelter, and where to go for more specific information. The media plays a recognized role in disaster and emergency management both before and after an event occurs. It is an important agent in articulating the government's plan for how emergency efforts will be mobilized. This role as a conduit of emergency management information cements the media's ability to influence the public. Long before the events of 9/11, a notable study by McCombs and Shaw determined that (populist) audiences are not only alerted to important issues by the media, but that they learn, "... how much importance to attach to an issue or topic from the emphasis the media place on it."<sup>344</sup> In this way, the media serves an agenda-setting function that determines how a given issue will be represented.

In order to convey the importance of a given threat or security issue to the broader, populist audience, the media employs frames in order to distill the message being presented. It can be argued that one of the reasons why the invocation of the term, "terrorism" continues to generate immediate public attention is the result of successful media representation and perpetuation of this existential threat. Daya Thussu states that the United States' perspective of terrorism has dominated the international media in the post-9/11 period because of, "... the media's ability to create and sustain the social image of terrorism."<sup>345</sup> These social images are the

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<sup>344</sup> M. McCombs and D. Shaw. "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. V. 36 (1972), p. 178.

<sup>345</sup> Daya Thussu. "Televising 'The War on Terrorism': The Myths of Morality." In A.P. Kavoori and T. Fraley, eds., *Media, Terrorism, and Theory: A Reader*. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p. 75.

result of the conscious selection and application of media frames that are used to filter information to the public. These images resonate with the public as they depict “average Americans”, like themselves, being unjustly harmed by terrorist attacks. These images justify the implementation of enhanced security measures by the policy elite in order to protect and defend the rest of the population.

### **Explaining the Role of the Media in the Securitization Process: Entman’s Cascading Activation Model**

Robert Entman’s “Cascading Activation” model serves as a useful framework for conceiving of the reciprocal relationship amongst the authorized speakers of security and the elite and populist audiences. This framework builds on previous work examining the ways in which mediated communication influences foreign policy decision-making. The cascading activation model attempts to synthesize hegemony theory models, in which the government is seen as dominant over a pliant media, and indexing models, where scholars examine how elite disagreement influences the representation of foreign policy issues.<sup>346</sup>

Entman’s model seeks to demonstrate the ways in which the ideas of the executive filter down through the rest of the state system. The cascading activation model can be conceived of as a hierarchical network with four nodes: the Administration (The President, White House staff); Other Elites (Congress, Experts); Media (journalists and news organizations); and the public (essentially the populist

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<sup>346</sup> For an overview of these models see: Raymond Williams. *Marxism and Literature*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). And Meenaksi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, eds., *Media and Cultural Studies: KeyWork* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

audience).<sup>347</sup> [See FIGURE 1] The administration, elites, and media generate news frames, which are then disseminated to the public. Public opinion then filters back to the other nodes and affects the way in which issues are presented. Entman explains that this model can be thought of as “a network of individuals and organizations, jostling to influence the political environment and being affected by it in turn.”<sup>348</sup> Connections between the different actors affect the ways in which frames are created. For example, the connections between the administration and the elites connect the executive branch with policy elites and issue-area experts. Discussions between these two groups serve as the starting point of an issue frame. Elites, in turn, form relationships with journalists and the media before transmitting these frames where they are packaged for public consumption. In this way “influence” cascades down a series of steps with the Administration at the top and the public at the bottom. Le explains how a feedback loop allows for public input on the framing of issues, “While the major current of information goes down to the media and then to the public, it goes partly back up as the public gives feedback to the media, and media frames are received and reacted to by elites and the administration.”<sup>349</sup> Public opinion, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, serves as a means of measuring the efficacy of the media frames created by the administration and elites and transmitted by the media. It is relevant to this chapter to note that, in Entman’s model, the media is also stratified, with publications such


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<sup>347</sup> Robert M. Entman. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 10

<sup>348</sup> Entman 2004, p. 11.

<sup>349</sup> Elisabeth Le. *Editorials and the Power of Media: Interweaving of Socio-Cultural Identities*. (John Benjamins Publishing, 2010), p. 11.

as the New York Times and other leading media outlets transmitting frames to other media sources through a process of inter-media agenda-setting.<sup>350</sup>



**Figure 1: Entman's Cascade Activation Model**

Robert M. Entman. "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11." *Political Communication*. V. 20 (2003), p. 419.

Entman likens his media model to a waterfall, with the metaphor serving to explain how the different actors influence the creation of media frames. He notes that, "As with real-world waterfalls, each level in the metaphorical cascade also

<sup>350</sup> For further explanation see: Manuel Castells. *Communication Power*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 1649.

makes its own contribution to the mix and flow of ideas.”<sup>351</sup> While the “cascade” of ideas and media frames allows different groups to shape issue definitions and aspects of policy discourse, in keeping with the waterfall metaphor, “secondary players (the populist audience) are themselves often responding to the initial frame promoted by the White House.”<sup>352</sup>

The cascading activation model defines media frames as “the central process by which government officials and journalists exercise political influence over each other and the public.”<sup>353</sup> The frames initiated by the executive and influenced by elites refer to pre-established paradigms dictating the use of certain resonant wording and images in constructing the news. These paradigms then, “...encourage the public to make connections perhaps leaping from an event like 9/11 to apparently similar matters like Pearl Harbor or the 1995 bombings in Oklahoma City.”<sup>354</sup> Ultimately, these frames influence public opinion – and, in turn, the populist audiences’ reaction to a given event – by galvanizing public support for the government’s chosen response.

## **Media Frames and Information Dissemination**

### *What Is a Media Frame?*

Media frames determine the way in which information about a security issue is presented to the general public. Since most members of the public will not

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<sup>351</sup> Entman 2004, p. 10.

<sup>352</sup> Holli A. Semetko and Margaret Scammell, eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Political Communication*. (SAGE, 2012), p. 328.

<sup>353</sup> Robert M. Entman. “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11” *Political Communication*. V. 20 (2003), p. 417.

<sup>354</sup> Entman 2004, p. 26.

witness an event firsthand, it is up to the media to relay what has taken place. In this sense, the public knows the outside world only in a second-hand way. Thus, Lippmann observed that, “We can see how indirectly we know the environment in which nevertheless we live. We can see that news of it comes to us now fast, now slowly; but that whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat as if it were the environment itself.”<sup>355</sup> Media frames determine which “facts” are presented about a given issue or event as being the truth about what has taken place. They are important because they help the media to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely, and then package it for efficient relay to the audience. Information is distilled into manageable packages, which suggest how the public ought to feel about a given issue.

Media frames are commonly discussed in academic disciplines such as Communication Studies and Sociology; however, discussion about these constructs remains largely absent from mainstream Political Science. In order to demonstrate the importance of media frames in the securitization process, it is first necessary to explain what is meant by this concept. The purpose of a media frame is to, “... assemble words and pictures to create a pattern surrounding an event.”<sup>356</sup> This pattern becomes a symbolic representation of an event, which allows for audience participation from a distance. Thus, “... television and other media spin the event so

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<sup>355</sup> Walter Lippmann. *Public Opinion*. (Harcourt, Brace, and Company: 1922), p. 4.

<sup>356</sup> Jonathan R. White. *Terrorism and Homeland Security: Sixth Edition*. (Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), p. 77.



that it can be translated into the understanding of popular culture.”<sup>357</sup> These frames are tools used by the media to pre-package an event for public consumption. In this way, frames serve to, “... help make clear what kind of a problem a problem is, what sort of tools are used for dealing with it, and which actors are protagonists and antagonists.”<sup>358</sup> In keeping with the tenets of philosophical securitization theory, media frames can be used to convey to the public whether or not a given issue poses an existential threat. The frames interpret news events and effect how people react to a given scenario. Media frames tell the public how hard to think about what they are told. Framing, “provides not just a set of cues for organizing data but a heuristic signal about the relative need to pay attention to text and context.”<sup>359</sup>

#### *The News Frame*

The dominant frame employed by the media is the news frame. This is the frame used to turn large, significant events into manageable sound bites for public consumption. Karim explains that this news frame, “... creates a narrative for understanding a deadly drama. Characters are introduced, heroes and villains are defined, and victims of violence become the suffering innocents.”<sup>360</sup> News frames communicate symbols in order to tell a story. For example, the image of the burning World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, has come to represent the entire events of that day. The purpose of the news frame is to assemble words and pictures to create a pattern surrounding an event. While all media use the news frame, it is

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<sup>357</sup> IBID

<sup>358</sup> Robert N. Entman. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” *Journal of Communication*. V.43, N.4 (1993), p. 52.

<sup>359</sup> Vultee 2011, p. 80.

<sup>360</sup> K.H. Karim. *Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence*. (Ottawa: Black Rose Books, 2001), p. 18-19.

especially applicable to television. The television news frame usually fuses short visual clips with a brief description of the event designed to present viewers with “the latest information”. Although “facts” are presented, the story told largely ignores any background information or context. Instead it is, “superficial and alters reality into violent actions and reactions,” where the underlying causes of conflict are basically ignored.<sup>361</sup> The news reporting frame is the simplest form of a news frame. It is a quick, “fact”-driven report that summarizes the “latest” information about a story. It does not contain a beginning or an ending, and it assumes that the consumer understands the context of the facts. Without situating a news story in proper context, the populist audience trusts that they are not being misled by the media, and take the story at its face value. This can have the effect of speeding up the securitization process.

*News Frames and the Process of Securitization*

Media frames are especially relevant to the securitization process because they both highlight for the public the existential threat of an issue and diminish the arguments for handling it as a matter of political routine. In this way, securitization can be conceptualized as a news frame in its own right because it cues several results. For example, “when the right actor invokes the right threats under the right conditions to the right audience, the results should reflect a greater willingness to place authority, as well as civil liberties, in the hands of the government for the

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<sup>361</sup> Simon Cottle. “Mediatizing the Global War on Terror.” In A.P. Kavoori and T. Fraley, eds., *Media, Terrorism, and Theory: A Reader*. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

duration.”<sup>362</sup> The Copenhagen School acknowledges the relevance of the media in generating news frames that expedite the process of securitization, noting that, “With its attraction to simple stories, the media will often tell the news in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ or, in the case of foreign news, of ‘Serbs’ and ‘Muslims’.”<sup>363</sup> By presenting an event as creating an “us versus them” scenario, the media acts as an agent of securitization by presenting, and polarizing, one side of a conflict as posing an existential threat to the other side. Securitization, then, can be viewed as a mediated process in which the media functions as a sort of gatekeeper by selecting the frame for the story that will be presented to the public. In this way, the media is an integral part of the securitization process by creating and sustaining a constant frame of cultural peril.

*News Framing and Securitization in the Post-9/11 Period*

In the post-9/11 period, media framing has been employed, particularly in the United States, to demonstrate to the public the need to securitize the state’s homeland security response to the threat of terrorism. The securitization frame that has developed along with the so-called ‘new security environment’, can be distinguished from other news frames since it includes specific features. Frequent references are made to the rhetoric of the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), the need to “take the fight to the enemy”, to name a few. Visual aids that can be used to identify this frame include photos of the burning World Trade Centre, the Pentagon with a gaping hole in its side, and images of Osama Bin Laden. The public has only to view these images to know exactly what news story is being presented. Cottle

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<sup>362</sup> Vultee 2011, p. 84.

<sup>363</sup> Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, p. 124.

believes that this homeland security media frame serves to, "... 'mediatize' the presentation of terrorism; that is, it shapes the way an event is communicated."<sup>364</sup> Following the events of 9/11, the American media quickly established a dominant news frame to represent the terrorist attacks. This frame sought to pattern the attacks as a "clash of civilizations", and suggested that the only viable response was an offensive military strategy.<sup>365</sup> The dominant news frame created in the wake of the terrorist attacks served to reinforce to the public the need for enhanced security measures to combat the existential threat posed by the potential for future terrorist attacks.

#### *News Frames and Narrative Creation*

News frames strengthen the securitization process by creating dominant narratives that serve as "truths" when presenting certain issues. These narratives present an issue in a specific way. It is important to explore these dominant narratives since, "Emphasizing discourse in the creation of historical narratives and process tracing analyses of policy choices (rather than, say, delving into the psychological motives of key decision makers) offers a route for reconciling different constructivisms."<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>364</sup> Cottle 2006.

<sup>365</sup> S.K. McGuire. "An Offensive Strategy of Forward Defense: The United States Homeland Security Response to 9/11." In Sabrina Hoque, ed. *Geopolitics vs. Global Governance: Reinterpreting National Security*. (Halifax: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2009).

<sup>366</sup> K.M. Fierke, Knud Erik Jorgensen. *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*. (M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p.229.

### **American Media Frames**

Many of the American media frames that were dominant in the post-9/11 period have already been discussed in Chapter 2: Authorized Speakers of Security. President Bush's speeches formed the basis for these narratives as his words were used by the media in shaping media frames. President Bush's assertion that the nation was "at war" became a dominant media frame, as did his call for a "unified American nation". The "Evil Other" narrative also dominated American news coverage in the post-9/11 period as reporters assigned blame for the terrorist attacks and vilified people of Muslim and Arab heritage. Similarly, the President's speeches linking the events of 9/11 to past experiences in American history, such as the Second World War and Pearl Harbor, formed the basis for a "fight for democracy" media frame which pitted the United States against "uncivilized" nations bent on destroying American values. These media narratives have been the subject of numerous academic articles, and further discussion of them is not the primary focus of this study. Instead, the following will discuss one American media narrative, which has gone un-discussed in the post-9/11 period – the "Blame Canada" narrative. This 'Blame-Canada' narrative contextualizes the two countries' reactions and subsequent policies following 9/11.

#### *The "Blame Canada" Narrative*

Following the conscious securitization of homeland security issues in the United States in the post-9/11 period, there has been a focused effort on behalf of some American politicians and the media to shift the blame for the attacks away from policymakers in the United States. A rhetorical sense of risk has been

constructed which, “externalizes the inherent security threat to the U.S. and shifts scrutiny towards the outside borders of America”.<sup>367</sup> Since discourse relating to the U.S.-Mexican border centres on issues of immigration and drug trafficking, policymakers and the media have focused on Canada as the weak-link compromising the security of the American border. The American “blame Canada” narrative incorporates complaints that Canadian immigration and refugee policies are too lax and that the Canadian government has not done enough to enforce security at border crossings.

Policymakers in the United States have repeatedly impressed on the American media that Canadian immigration policies are conducive to would-be terrorists. In the early 1990s, there were increased incidents of fraudulent or stolen Canadian passports being used by transnational criminals to enter North America. There were reports that Canadian passports were available for sale anywhere in the world from \$5000 to \$ 25000, and could be rented for \$5000.<sup>368</sup> It has been argued that individuals entering Canada illegally from all over the world bring with them the hatreds and political luggage of their homelands. Would-be terrorists are able to “hide out” in Canada’s large ethnic communities where they are able to raise money and recruit supporters to their cause.<sup>369</sup> The media in the United States has sought

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<sup>367</sup> Victor Konrad and Heather Nicol, “Boundaries and Corridors: Rethinking the Canada-United States Borderlands in the Post-9/11 Era.” *Canadian and American Public Policy*. N. 60 (December, 2004), p. 23

<sup>368</sup> Sandra K. Hoffman and Tracy G. McGinley, *Identity Theft: A Reference Handbook*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010), p. 89

<sup>369</sup> Stewart Bell, *Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World*. (Toronto: John Wylie and Sons, 2007), p. 6-9

to differentiate between Canadian and American immigration models by distinguishing the Canadian “cultural mosaic” where immigrants are encouraged to retain their own cultural practices from the American “melting pot” where immigrants are encouraged to assimilate into American cultural ideals.

The American media has expressed repeated concerns about Canadian procedures for dealing with refugees. Reporters point to the problem that those arriving in Canada seeking asylum are allowed to stay in the country to await an asylum hearing. Many of those who are denied asylum at these hearings and are ordered deported have ignored their deportation orders and have simply disappeared in Canada. Between 1995 and early 2000, nearly 20000 people were ordered to be deported from Canada. Instead of honouring their deportation order, approximately one third of those individuals disappeared within the country.<sup>370</sup> Officials in the United States argue that these “missing” refugee claimants will use identity theft to travel from Canada into the United States in order to plan criminal activities.<sup>371</sup>

Concerns over immigration and refugee policies have led to the development of an American media perception that Canada is “failing” at border security. It does not seem to matter that none of the 9/11 terrorists entered the United States through Canada, as is repeatedly reported by the American media. The FBI distributed a classified intelligence report that warned,

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<sup>370</sup> Hoffman and McGinley, p. 90

<sup>371</sup> IBID

We believe Al Qaeda continues to have a terrorist infrastructure in Canada, one with documented links to the U.S. While many border security measures have been implemented since 9/11, the vast expanse of the 4000-mile-long U.S. northern border, with eighty-six official points of entry and various unofficial crossings, may still provide opportunities for operatives to penetrate U.S. national security, particularly if Western passports are used.<sup>372</sup>

This FBI document was picked up by sources in the United States and is an example of how media accounts of such “facts” have led to the portrayal of Canada as a haven for would-be terrorists plotting attacks on the United States. Since the “blame Canada” narrative has become part of the securitization of the American border, the fact that all of the nineteen 9/11 terrorists arrived legally on tourist, business, and student visas is completely ignored. In keeping with securitization theory, the mere repetition of the speech act that Canada has become a “pathway for terrorists” has sufficed to make it so.<sup>373</sup> The US PATRIOT ACT contains a section entitled, “Defending the Northern Border” which portrays the Canada-US border as a permeable line dividing the two countries that required additional American attention to prevent would-be terrorists from crossing the border into the United States. Since the USA PATRIOT Act is a federal policy directive, it has had the effect of perpetuating and legitimizing the notion, expressed by both American politicians and media outlets, that Canada is a spawning ground for terrorists seeking to enter the United States.

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<sup>372</sup> Bell, p. 6, Document verified by classified source

<sup>373</sup> Harlan Koff, *Social Cohesion in Europe and the Americas: Power, Time, and Space*. (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009), p. 259



*Congress and the “Blame Canada” Narrative*

The “blame Canada” narrative has been strengthened and legitimated by statements made by American politicians, and reported in the media, that the 9/11 attackers entered the United States through Canada. Richard Holbrooke’s pre-September 11 statement that Canada was, “a Club Med for terrorists” was repeated over and over again by the media.<sup>374</sup> In Congressional testimony prior to 9/11, Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas reiterated this “Club Med for terrorists statement” thus reinforcing its validity.<sup>375</sup> Various US Representatives have made the erroneous claim that the 19 individuals who hijacked the planes that crashed into the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania were able to enter the US by crossing the Canadian border into the country.<sup>376</sup> Even Senator Hilary Clinton stated that the terrorists had come to the US through Canada. These inaccurate comments by various prominent politicians, which were in turn reported by the media, reinforced the American public’s view of Canada as posing a threat to the security of the United States.

These erroneous assertions of Canadian border security failings have not been limited to Congress members unfamiliar with issues of homeland security.

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<sup>374</sup> Stephen Clarkson, “The View From the Arctic: Toward a Gated Continental Community?” in Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds, *The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*. (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 76

<sup>375</sup> Judith Warner. *United States Border Security: A Reference Handbook*. (ABC-CLIO, 2010), p. 53.

<sup>376</sup> A. Imitiaz Hussain, Satya R. Pattanayak, and Anil Hira, *North American Homeland Security: Back to Bilateralism?* (Westport: Praegar Security International, 2008), p. 132.

Former United States ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, announced before numerous reporters that it was, “...inevitable that terrorists would look to Canada as a potential launching pad to get into the U.S.”<sup>377</sup> U.S. Congress members have postured to the media demonstrating Canada’s security failings. Senator Byron Dorgan (D-North Dakota) generated media “buzz” when he held up an orange rubber cone at a congressional hearing on border security in late 2001 to demonstrate what met those arriving at some Canada-United States border checkpoints after 10pm. He released a statement proclaiming, “This is America’s security at our border crossings. America can’t effectively combat terrorism if it doesn’t control its borders.”<sup>378</sup> The implication was that Canada’s lax approach to border security was compromising the security of the United States.

Two examples of Canada’s inability to monitor the activities of would-be terrorists who had already entered North America are frequently employed by both policymakers and the media in support of the argument that inadequate Canadian border security measures are hazardous to American security. These examples are the 1997 case of Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer and the 1999 case of Ahmed Ressam, two would-be “terrorists” who came to Canada before entering the United States.

Gazi Ibrahim Mezer was a Palestinian who entered the United States through Canada using a false Jordanian passport. He met up with Lafi Khalil, another

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<sup>377</sup> Quoted in Warner 2010, p. 54.

<sup>378</sup> Quoted in Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, *Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Controls in International Relations*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 40.

Palestinian national, who was in the US on a visa overstay. The two men rented rooms in a boarding house in Brooklyn, New York, where they plotted to blow up the Atlantic Avenue subway in New York City.<sup>379</sup> Mezer and Khalil travelled to North Carolina together to build the bomb they would use. When they returned to Brooklyn to detonate the bomb in the subway system, an Egyptian man living in their boarding house reported their plot to the police. On July 31, 1997, police and members of the FBI arrived at the boarding house. Upon their arrival, Mezer and Khalil detonated the suicide vests they were wearing and were shot by police. Neither was killed, and both were subsequently charged and convicted of possession of pipe bombs, which they intended to detonate in the subway and in other public places in New York City.<sup>380</sup>

This incident was rehashed by the American security apparatus as well as the media following the 9/11 attacks to demonstrate the threat Canada supposedly posed to the United States. Mezer, the Palestinian bomb-maker first arrived in Canada, claimed political asylum based on alleged persecution by Israelis, then skipped his hearing and entered the United States in 1996. He then returned to Canada and re-entered the US in 1997.<sup>381</sup> Although the US was quick to label the Mezer incident a Canadian security failure, Mezer used a false Jordanian passport both times he entered the United States, which was never detected by US border

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<sup>379</sup> Robert K. Hudnall, *No Safe Haven: Homeland Insecurity*. (El Paso: Omega Press, 2004), p. 191-192

<sup>380</sup> Michael A. Sheehan, *Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing Ourselves*. (New York: Random House Inc, 2008), p. 105

<sup>381</sup> Hudnall, p. 193

officials. Khalil, Mezer's associate, entered the US directly from Palestine, bypassing Canada totally. In the post-9/11 period, the American media often cited this case as an example of how Canada was a "weak link" in the homeland security chain. This narrative was quickly accepted by the American public, who disregarded the seemingly obvious American security failures pertaining to this case.

Another case which has been cited to demonstrate Canada's "failure" to secure the border is that of Ahmed Ressam, the would-be "millennium bomber". Ressam left Algeria for France in 1992 using a forged French passport and claiming political asylum from persecution. Avoiding detection in France, Ressam fled to Corsica when his visa expired where he obtained another fake French passport.<sup>382</sup> In February of 1994, Ressam boarded a plane to Canada. Canadian authorities in Montreal detected his fraudulent passport and he was arrested. To avoid being deported, Resam applied for political asylum in Canada. After failing to show up at various court dates, he was ordered deported and fled to an Al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. In 1996, Ressam entered the United States through Afghanistan and then returned to Canada. Security personnel at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) stopped him, but after questioning him, he was allowed to return to Canada.<sup>383</sup>

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<sup>382</sup> Sandra K. Hoffman and Tracy G. McGinley, *Identity Theft: A Reference Handbook*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), p. 90

<sup>383</sup> IBID

On December 14, 1999, Ressam, who was then in Vancouver, Canada, boarded the M/V Coho ferry in Victoria, British Columbia and then attempted to enter Port Angeles, Washington. While the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had notified U.S. customs that Ressam posed a potential bomb threat, he was pre-cleared by U.S. immigration officers in Victoria. Upon arrival in Port Angeles, he attempted to flee further inspection when Diana Dean, a U.S. border agent decided to search Ressam's car and found explosives that he intended to detonate at LAX.<sup>384</sup> Ressam was tried in the United States and sentenced to 22 years in federal prison plus five years supervision after release. Sentencing was delayed by the U.S. State Department in order to secure Ressam's cooperation in providing investigators information on Al Qaeda sleeper cells in the United States. The FBI projects that he will be released on July 6, 2019, and deported back to Algeria.<sup>385</sup>

Ahmed Ressam was dubbed "The Millenium Bomber" by the U.S. media and was touted as the embodiment of the threat Canada poses to U.S. security interests. The "blame Canada" narrative drowned out the fact that Ressam had returned to Canada from an Al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan through the United States. Similarly, the failure of French officials to detect Ressam's fraudulent passport in 1992 was also absent from media reports. Nowhere was there mention that Ressam had received a lenient sentence in exchange for information regarding would-be terrorists already living in the United States. Instead, American politicians and the

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<sup>384</sup> Judith Warner, *U.S. Border Security: A Reference Handbook*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), p. 201 - 202

<sup>385</sup> IBID

media alike seized on this event as an indicator of Canada's lax immigration security practices – completely ignoring the fact that Ressam was cleared by U.S. immigration officers twice before finally being arrested. The Ressam case reverberated strongly after the 9/11 attacks and was frequently employed as an example of how the hijackers had “likely entered the U.S. via Canada”.<sup>386</sup> The media, like some American politicians, had neither checked out all of the details of the story, nor hesitated in reporting it throughout both Canada and the United States.

*Portrayals of the Border on Popular Television Programs*

These statements influenced the media's post-9/11 portrayal of Canada's border security apparatus. The TV show, “America's Most Wanted” aired an episode that stated that the nineteen 9/11 attackers had all entered the United States through the Canada-US border. American citizens living along the border were called to be vigilant in watching for “suspicious” or “dangerous-looking” individuals crossing the border.<sup>387</sup> “Law and Order”, an American crime drama popular on both sides of the Canada-United States border, featured an episode in which an Arab man who had entered the US via a border crossing in Quebec blew up an office building in New York City. When US detectives attempted to investigate how the man had ended up in New York, Canadian officials and security personnel were portrayed as lazy and disinterested in America's security concerns. Similarly, a 2001 episode of “The West Wing” referred in one episode to terrorists crossing the (nonexistent)

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<sup>386</sup> Hussain, Pattnayak,, and Hira, 2008, p. 132

<sup>387</sup> Clarkson in Andreas and Biersteker, p. 76

Ontario-Vermont border in order to carry out attacks on the United States.<sup>388</sup> More recently, episodes one and two of the second season of the popular US television show, “Homeland” portrayed terrorists purchasing Canadian passports in a Middle Eastern market in order to carry out attacks on the United States. Geographical errors aside, such television episodes suggest to the American public that Canada is the “weak link” in combating terrorism and protecting the US border.

### **Canadian Media Narratives in the Post-9/11 Period**

#### *Media Ownership and Concentration in Canada and Canadian Media Biases*

Journalist Robert Parry noted that, “News organizations are hierarchical organizations often run by strong-willed men who insist that their editorial vision be dominant within their news companies.”<sup>389</sup> This assertion is especially true in Canada where media ownership has been traditionally concentrated in the hands of a few elite families such as the Aspers and the Thomsons. Indeed, Canada has one of the highest concentrations of media ownership in the Western world, and several high-profile mergers have further consolidated this ownership in recent years. Nesbitt-Larking notes that, “With its 3.5 billion-dollar purchase of Hollinger-Southam in August 2000, media conglomerate CanWest Global corporation acquired over half of Canada’s one hundred and four daily newspapers in a breathtaking act of sudden corporate convergence.”<sup>390</sup> CanWest Global’s significant worldwide

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<sup>388</sup> IBID

<sup>389</sup> Robert Parry. “The Price of the Liberal Media Myth” *ConsortiumNews.com*. (January 1, 2003). <<http://www.consortiumnews.com/2002/123102a.html>>

<sup>390</sup> Paul Nesbitt-Larking. *Politics, Society, and the Media: Canadian Perspectives*. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, LTD., 2001), p. 110.

media holdings include the Global Television Network's TV stations and eleven of Canada's daily newspapers, including the *National Post* and the *Ottawa Citizen*, along with numerous local community papers. Today, along with the remnants of Hollinger, Quebecor, Thomson and TorStar, CanWest Global – which is owned and operated by the Asper family – dominates news circulation figures.

The concentration of media outlets in the hands of a few select families has resulted in a consolidation of media bias and a convergence of media frames in Canada. Monopoly ownership over the means of media distribution has led to media owners enforcing, "...their political views and other preferences by installing senior editors whose careers depend on delivering a news product that fits within the owner's prejudices."<sup>391</sup> This convergence of media ownership has led to a decrease in journalistic investigation and independence in Canada. Perhaps the most notable example of this can be found in the decision made by CanWest founder Israel Asper's two sons, Leonard and David, to replace the words "insurgents" and "rebels" with the word "terrorists" in Reuters wire service news articles printed in CanWest-owned newspapers. In 2004, Reuters forced CanWest to drop the Reuters byline from its articles because their editors were re-writing copy originating from the Middle East in order to frame the articles in a specific way.<sup>392</sup> The Asper family has been explicit in their support for Conservative pro-Israel policies. Company

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<sup>391</sup> Parry 2003.

<sup>392</sup> See Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills. "Discourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror." *Global Media Journal – Canadian Edition*. V. 2, N. 2 (2009), p. 18.



executive Murdoch Davis stated that, “CanWest is unabashedly pro-Israel.”<sup>393</sup> The strong pro-Israel stance taken by the Asper family has led to questions regarding the corporation’s position regarding CanWest’s coverage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent America-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Each of the major Canadian daily newspapers has traditionally catered to a different readership demographic, and as a result, these newspapers can be seen to have different political biases. *The Globe and Mail*, which calls itself “Canada’s National Newspaper”, has traditionally espoused a centrist ideology on social issues and a slightly right-of-centre perspective on economic matters. *The Globe* has national distribution and is often considered the paper of choice for Canadian decision makers. As such, this paper’s editorials are politically influential.<sup>394</sup> The *National Post* emerged as a rival to *The Globe and Mail* in 1998 when it was founded by Conrad Black. From its inception, the *Post* set out to become “the leading voice of Canadian neo-conservatism”.<sup>395</sup> Between 2000 and 2001, the *National Post* was sold to CanWest. Following the sale, the paper retained its right-of-centre editorial stance and has advocated a national approach to domestic issues concerning the state, while at the same time expressing criticism for Quebec-specific policies.<sup>396</sup>

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<sup>393</sup> Quoted in Katherine Macklem. “CanWest’s Dominant Newspaper Ownership.” *Maclean’s*. (April 8, 2002).

<sup>394</sup> For more of traditional biases in Canadian media outlets see: Nathalie Frensley and Nelson Michaud. “Public Diplomacy and Motivated Reasoning: Framing Effects on Canadian Media Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy Statements.” *Foreign Policy Analysis*. V. 2 (2006), p. 201 – 221.

<sup>395</sup> Phil Ryan. *Multicultiphobia*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), page unknown.

<sup>396</sup> See Frensley and Michaud 2006, p. 213.

Prior to the establishment of the *National Post*, the *Toronto Star* served as the main competitor to the *Globe and Mail*. The *Toronto Star* has traditionally espoused a more “social-liberal” editorial stance than the *Globe*, and has been concerned with “speaking for the powerless.”<sup>397</sup> Its very nature as a Toronto daily paper has resulted in the *Star* speaking more to industrialized Ontario rather than to Canada as a whole; nonetheless, it is widely read by Ottawa-based policy wonks. In Quebec, Montreal based *La Presse* refers to itself as “le plus grand quotidien francais d’Amerique – “the most important French language paper in the Americas” and views its readership as French Canadians living throughout the country.<sup>398</sup> *La Presse* has traditionally held a left-of-centre social bias, while taking a conservative stance on economic issues. Frensley and Michaud note that this paper’s foreign policy positions, “are premised upon being respectful toward, but independent from, the United States”.<sup>399</sup> Finally, *Le Devoir*, French Canada’s other daily newspaper, has declared itself “Canadian Nationalist” in response to the paper’s support for an independent Quebec state. *Le Devoir* generally takes a humanitarian, peacemaking approach to foreign issues, while at the same time advocating a role separate from the rest of Canada for Quebec in world affairs.<sup>400</sup> The concentration of media ownership in Canada coupled with the traditional media biases of the country’s major newspapers has had a significant impact on the ways in which news stories are framed in the Canadian media.

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<sup>397</sup> Elke Winter. *Us, Them, and Others: Pluralism and National Identity in Diverse Societies*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), p. 96.

<sup>398</sup> See Frensley and Michaud 2006, p. 213.

<sup>399</sup> Frensley and Michaud 2006, p. 213.

<sup>400</sup> IBID, p. 214.

*Canadian News Frames: The Muslim/Arab "Other"*

Following the expression of an "evil" Muslim "Other" by the American executive branch, the Canadian media introduced this narrative to Canadian consumers. Steuter and Wills note that the Canadian media have, "participated in mediating constructions of Islam and Muslims, mobilizing familiar metaphors that linguistically frame the enemy in particular ways."<sup>401</sup> The *National Post*, perhaps evidencing the expressed biases of the paper's owner, CanWest, which is controlled by the Asper family, has dominated the creation of this frame. Journalists for this paper strongly suggested that there was the potential for future terrorist attacks on Canadian soil, carried out by radical Muslim-Canadians. Media coverage sought to examine the source of the attacks, the "terrorists" themselves, by examining the actions and beliefs of Muslims and Arabs.<sup>402</sup> Racial profiling was encouraged as a means of rooting-out would-be terrorists already living in Canada. For example, George Jonas encouraged Canadians to look closely at the activities of those living in their communities since, "... we have to fear our neighbours down the street... a degree of ethnic or religious profiling is unavoidable... Though few of our neighbours are terrorists, some are sympathizers. They provide the culture in which the fifth column grows."<sup>403</sup> Likewise, in an editorial published on the same day as

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<sup>401</sup> Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills. "Discourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror." *Global Media Journal – Canadian Edition*. V. 2, N. 2 (2009), p. 7.

<sup>402</sup> For examples see the following: Andrew Coyne. "The Calculus of Liberty." *National Post*. (November 19, 2001), and Gillian Cosgrove. "Canada Waited Too Long to React: Meek Outrage Shows Our Fear of Offending Someone, Anyone." *National Post*. (September 14, 2001).

<sup>403</sup> George Jonas. "Muslim mushrooms, terrorist toadstools – Fifth columnist ushers bin Laden within our perimeter." *National Post*. (October 15, 2001).

Jonas' piece, Canadians were advised that, "... a small but substantial number of Canadian Muslims and Arabs are willing to assist terrorist operations."<sup>404</sup> A few days later, Jonathan Kay wrote that, "We should not pretend that an effective fight against terrorism in Canada can be waged in a truly colour-blind fashion. The fact is, those who plot the annihilation of our civilization are of one religion and, almost without exception, one race."<sup>405</sup> Perhaps most shocking was journalist Mark Steyn's cover story which called for the colonization of Afghanistan as a means of controlling the influx of immigrants from that country into Canada. Steyn, "advocated the colonization of Afghanistan, as well as much of the Islamic world, and called for the return of the "white man's burden"."<sup>406</sup>

These calls for racial profiling and the containment of Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East served to negatively affect the Canadian public's perception of Arab-Canadians. As will be discussed in the next chapter, despite support for policies enforcing multicultural ideals, Islamophobia rose drastically following the 9/11 attacks. The Canadian media generally, and the *National Post* in particular, sought to equate this entire ethnic group with those who carried out the attacks in the United States. By mobilizing the familiar metaphor of Arab as terrorist, journalists such as Steyn, Jonas, and Kay created a media frame which sought to alienate this group from the rest of Canadian society. Steuter and Wills explain the significance

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<sup>404</sup> Editorial. "Willing to Assist." *National Post*. (October 15, 2001).

<sup>405</sup> Jonathan Kay. "A Healthy Dose of 'Bigotry'." *National Post*. (October 18, 2001).

<sup>406</sup> Mark Steyn. "What the Afghans Need is Colonizing." *National Post*. (October 9, 2001). See also: T.Y. Ismael and John Measor. "Racism and the North American Media Following September 11: The Canadian Setting." *Arab Studies Quarterly*. V. 25, N. 1-2 (2003), p. 104-105.

of the casting of Muslim and Arab-Canadians as the “Other”, in that, “This dehumanizing frame... has direct consequences on lived experiences. These include a subtle, but significant re-casting of Muslim-Canadian identity, evidenced, for example, in cases of the media calling Canadian Muslims suspected of terrorist activity “Canadian-born” or “home-grown” rather than simply “Canadian”, insinuating that Muslim-Canadians are not authentic citizens.”<sup>407</sup> Ismael and Measor assert that, “Islam and events in Arab states are generally only portrayed or examined in mainstream Canadian media when they affect Canadians, or arise as stories examining staggering events of political violence.”<sup>408</sup> As a result of the absence of news articles discussing events in Arab countries, the Canadian public is more malleable, and more accepting of Muslims and Arabs being framed in negative ways in the Canadian media. These media reports imply that Muslims and Arabs can be equated with a monolithic community bent on attacking North America. Self-proclaimed “experts” offer interpretations of Islamic texts in order to further the “evil Other” media frame.

*Rationalizing the “Evil Other”: Terrorists as Vermin, Insects, and Disease*

One of the ways in which the Canadian media sustained the “evil Other” media frame was by portraying would-be terrorists living in the Middle East as prey that needed to be hunted down by Western military forces. Those identified as terrorists are often portrayed as vermin needing to be exterminated. Headlines such as: “Canadian Soldiers Mop up Taliban Rat’s Nest in Afghanistan”, “Raid Zaps

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<sup>407</sup> Steuter and Wills 2009, p. 9.

<sup>408</sup> T.Y. Ismael and John Measor. “Racism and the North American Media Following September 11: The Canadian Setting.” *Arab Studies Quarterly*. V. 25, N. 1-2(2003), p. 108.

Iraqi Rat”, and “Iraq War Breeding Terrorists of the Future” suggest that the “enemy” is a pest who can be wiped out without much forethought.<sup>409</sup> The Taliban in particular are singled out as dangerous animals that must be hunted to extinction. Headlines utilize this hunting metaphor to describe the search for terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, *The Globe and Mail* ran a story titled, “British Police Continue Hunt for Terror Suspects” while the *National Post* proclaimed, “Forces Return From Arduous Mediterranean Terror Hunt”.<sup>410</sup> An element of this hunting metaphor involves “smoking out” the enemy so that it can be captured and destroyed. Frequent reference was made to smoking out bin Laden in Afghanistan. For example, one headline read: “Why is Bin Laden So Difficult to Smoke Out”; “America’s New Dilemma: How to Smoke Bin Laden Out of Caves”.<sup>411</sup> The enemy is described as hiding in a nest or lair that must be uncovered and wiped out. This is evidenced by headlines such as: “US Jets Hit Taliban Lairs in Deadly Sweep”; “Inside the Ruined Lair of Iraq’s Secret Police”; “In the Lair of the Terrorist: Hero of Radical Islam”; “Afghanistan Teeters on the Brink: Canadian Troops Stepping Into Khandahar Lion’s Den”; and “Israeli Tanks Encircle Hornet’s Nest of Terror”.<sup>412</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> See: “Raid Zaps Iraqi Rat” *Toronto Sun*. (April 18, 2003); “Canadian Soldiers Mop up Taliban Rat’s Nest in Afghanistan” *Calgary Herald*. (September 14, 2006); and “Iraq War Breeding Terrorists of Future” *Windsor Star*. (June 22, 2005). Referenced in: Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills 2009, p. 13.

<sup>410</sup> “British Police Continue Hunt for Terror Suspects” *Globe and Mail*. (July 2, 2007); “Forces Return From Arduous Mediterranean Terror Hunt” *National Post*. (December 15, 2004).

<sup>411</sup> “Why is Bin Laden So Difficult to Smoke Out” *Ottawa Citizen*. (October 28, 2001); and “America’s New Dilemma: How to Smoke Bin Laden out of Caves” *Edmonton Journal*. (December 1, 2001).

<sup>412</sup> Respectively: *Globe and Mail* (August 26, 2003); *National Post* (April 11, 2003); *National Post* (September 13, 2001); *Kingston Whig-Standard* (February 20, 2006); and *Province* (September 12, 2001).

These portrayals of would-be terrorists as petulant creatures that must be trapped and eliminated served to reinforce the narrative of Muslim and Arab Canadians as the “Other” who do not fit into Canadian society.

When not described as vermin or dangerous animals, the Canadian media likened potential terrorists to virulent diseases that would spread if not contained and eliminated immediately. Steuter and Wills explain that this characterization serves to present the “evil Other” as “... a disease so that the enemy is not only inhuman, but an utterly different kind of organism: the microbial, the bacterial, the viral or the cancerous.”<sup>413</sup> Examples of this terrorist as disease metaphor include: “Terrorism as Cancer”; “Afghanistan Corruption a Cancer”; “Stop Sectarian Cancer in Iraq, Urges UN”; “The Terror Virus”; and “Al Qaeda Mutating Like a Virus”.<sup>414</sup> This representation of the enemy as a less than human organism threatening the existence of Western civilization suggests that terrorism is a disease that needs to be excised from Canadian society by monitoring Arab and Muslim Canadians.

#### *Echoing American Calls to War*

The influence of American media outlets on the creation of Canadian media frames is evident in the Canadian media’s echo of the U.S. call to war. This “call to action” frame took the form of sensationalistic media reports urging the Canadian government to respond to the 9/11 attacks with military force. Recalling the Pearl Harbor attacks on the United States, *The Globe and Mail’s* September 12, 2001

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<sup>413</sup> Steuter and Wills 2009, p. 17.

<sup>414</sup> Respectively: *Daily News* (August 26, 2006); *Winnipeg Free Press* (June 24, 2008); *Toronto Star* (November 26, 2006); *Ottawa Citizen* (September 1, 2002); and *Toronto Star* (June 22, 2003).

headline proclaimed September 11 “A Day of Infamy”.<sup>415</sup> In keeping with the bellicose nature of the American media in the days following the September 11 attacks, Canadian media headlines called for military retaliation against those responsible. Headlines such as: “Let’s shatter the Terrorist Hothouse” and “Mortal Threats and Moral Questions: Vengeance is Not Our Aim But We Must Be Prepared to Kill” served as a call to action for the Canadian public and policymakers alike.<sup>416</sup> These headlines suggest a coming conflict between would-be terrorists and those seeking to stop them. The *Globe and Mail* columnist, Marcus Gee argued that American rage over the attacks would “shake the world” and that Canadians should “expect an all-out war on terrorism that will almost certainly include some kind of U.S. military strike. Expect a far more assertive United States, far more willing to throw its weight around and far less likely to listen to the doubts of its allies on the United Nations.”<sup>417</sup>

Some Canadian journalists called for the Canadian government to act swiftly to help our American neighbours. Headlines such as “Canada’s Free Ride Ended September 11”; “Tepid Speech, Tepid Nation: Chretien’s Yawner Illustrates How Soft Country Has Grown”; and “Time to Stand With US” indicate the media’s support for

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<sup>415</sup> *Globe and Mail* (September 12, 2001), A1.

<sup>416</sup> Elizabeth Nickson. “Let’s Shatter the Terrorist Hothouse” *National Post*. (September 29, 2001); and Andrew Coyne. “Mortal Threats and Moral Options: Vengeance is Not Our Aim But We Must Be Prepared to Kill” *National Post*. (September 17, 2001).

<sup>417</sup> Marcus Gee quoted in Ismael and Measor 2003, p. 111.



Canadian involvement in the United States' homeland security measures.<sup>418</sup> Media outlets such as CanWest-controlled paper, the *National Post*, sought to put the government on the spot as to its level of involvement in potential U.S.-led interventions aimed at taking retaliatory action against those responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Nationally syndicated journalist Graham Green wrote, "... the United States needs to know that its allies will stand with it, including militarily, if its retaliatory actions provoke a wider conflict."<sup>419</sup> Certain media outlets suggested that Canada's role would be reduced to that of "useless bystander" if the government was not pushed to respond immediately to American calls for assistance. Gord Henderson suggested that decreased military spending in Canada in the years leading up to the attacks on the United States would limit participation in American-led interventions, and would reduce Canada's traditional middle power status on the world stage.<sup>420</sup> It was implied that the American way of life was also the Canadian way of life, and that the terrorist attacks had challenged certain fundamental principles that needed to be protected. Media coverage reflects the bias of the news owners as demonstrated by the headlines and editorials. These explicit biases serve as an attempt to affect the populist audience's perception of Canadian foreign policy decisions.

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<sup>418</sup> Christie Blatchford. "Tepid Speech, Tepid Nation: Chretien's Yawner Illustrates How Soft the Country Has Grown" *National Post*. (September 29, 2001); Editorial. "Our Invisible Government" *National Post*. (September 15, 2001); and Graham Greene. "Time to Stand With U.S." *The Windsor Star*. (September 12, 2001).

<sup>419</sup> Graham Greene. "Time to Stand With US" *The Windsor Star*. (September 12, 2001).

<sup>420</sup> Gord Henderson. "Canada as Bystander" *The Windsor Star*. (September 25, 2001).

*Generating Support for Canadian Involvement: Democracy, Humanitarianism, and Peer Pressure*

Inherent in the media's call for Canadian support of an American-initiated response to the terrorist attacks on that state was the notion that Canada had an obligation to participate in the protection of the ideals of Western democracy against "irrational" Middle Eastern radicals bent on destroying it. Ismael and Measor argue that, "The U.S. was portrayed not as another country, but as the representative of enlightenment values such as freedom and democracy, as the representative of civilization itself."<sup>421</sup> Newspapers sought to call to action the Canadian government to protect these ideals. The *Toronto Star* editorialized that, "The assault on America is a threat to every civilized nation",<sup>422</sup> while the *Ottawa Citizen* argued that, "... this was not just an attack on American targets or U.S. citizens. It was a well-planned and deliberate attack on the very essence of all truly democratic countries."<sup>423</sup> The *Windsor Star* repeated this sentiment, noting, "The real targets of the hijackers and their flying bombs were freedom, democracy, and capitalism... It is time to draw a line in the sand. On one side is democracy, individual freedom, and the capitalism that makes the two most essential qualities of life possible. On the other side lies terrorism."<sup>424</sup> In this us versus them dichotomy, Canadian values were equated with those of the United States as the media attempted to incite a sense of moral outrage in the general public.

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<sup>421</sup> Ismael and Measor 2003, p. 113.

<sup>422</sup> Editorial. "Democracy Will Prevail Over Barbarous Hate" *The Toronto Star*. (September 12, 2001).

<sup>423</sup> Editorial. "Assault on Democracy" *Ottawa Citizen*. (September 13, 2001).

<sup>424</sup> Editorial. "Freedom: A Struggle The Involves Us" *The Windsor Star*. (September 13, 2001).

The Canadian media sought further support for American-led foreign military intervention by emphasizing the U.S. government's "humanitarian" justifications of invasion. Valenzano argues that Canadian media outlets produced editorials which, "took up the White House humanitarian frame by detailing what humanitarian issues faced Afghanistan."<sup>425</sup> For example, while discussing the need for Canadian intervention in Afghanistan, Barbara Yaffe wrote that, "The country is a humanitarian nightmare with a 90% illiteracy rate. Starving people are eating poisonous plants for sustenance."<sup>426</sup> Likewise, an editorial in the *Toronto Star* recalled UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's call for action in Afghanistan where the population would face "imminent disaster" if the Americans did not intervene.<sup>427</sup> Writing in the *Toronto Star*, Linda Diebel justified Canadian intervention in Afghanistan by quoting U.S. President Bush stating, "We will also drop food, medicine, and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children in Afghanistan." In the same article, Diebel also quoted U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who noted that the United States would, "...stand with the Afghan people who are being repressed by a regime that abuses the very people it purports to lead."<sup>428</sup> In this way, the media implicated the Canadian government in the protection of the Afghan people by emphasizing the humanitarian objectives that were part of the U.S. mission. This media frame, "... made intervention seem

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<sup>425</sup> Joseph M. Valenzano, III. "Framing the War on Terror in Canadian Newspapers: Cascading Activation, Canadian Leaders, and Newspapers." *Southern Communication Journal*. V. 74, N. 2 (2009), p. 178.

<sup>426</sup> Barbara Yaffe. "Bin Laden's Baiting the U.S. Response" *Vancouver Sun*. (September 21, 2001), p. A14.

<sup>427</sup> Editorial. "Give UN Tools" *The Toronto Star*. (March 21, 2003), p. A26.

<sup>428</sup> Linda Diebel. "Beans, Biscuits Dropped From Sky For Starving Afghans" *The Toronto Star*. (October 8, 2001), p. A3.

justified on more than simply reactionary grounds.”<sup>429</sup> The Canadian media allowed the U.S. frame of intervention on humanitarian grounds to cascade down to the Canadian public so as to justify Canadian involvement in an American-led intervention.

The Canadian media further emphasized the desire for Canadian support of American-led intervention by harshly criticizing those who were disapproving of American policies following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Many in the Canadian media especially derided suggestions that the attacks were somehow the result of poor American foreign policy decisions. Discussing the benefits of Canadian participation in Afghanistan, Richard Gwynn of the *Toronto Star* wrote that the attack on the United States, “... was done without warning, not in response to American aggression but as an act of aggression in itself.”<sup>430</sup> Margaret Wente, writing in *The Globe and Mail*, dismissed the notion that American foreign policy was to blame for the attacks by calling such ideas “the delusional anti-American rants of leftists and oppositional voices of the developing world.” She continued that, “Those who are responsible are most likely men from remote desert lands. Men from ancient cultures built on blood and revenge. Men whose unshakable beliefs and implacable hatreds go back many centuries farther than the United States and its young democracy, pluralism, and freedom.”<sup>431</sup> In reaction to the shocking attacks against

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<sup>429</sup> Ismael and Measor 2003, p. 178.

<sup>430</sup> Richard Gwynn. “Democracy Will Prevail Over Barbarous Hate” *The Toronto Star*. (September 15, 2001).

<sup>431</sup> Margaret Wente. “US Will Never Be the Same” *Globe and Mail*. (September 12, 2001).

the United States, the Canadian media, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, dismissed outright arguments that past actions of the United States were to blame for what had happened. The emphasis was placed on what had just happened and the fallout of those attacks.

This rejection by the Canadian media of the notion that U.S. foreign policy was somehow to blame for the 9/11 attacks was perhaps best exemplified by the media's outright condemnation of Sunera Thobani. Thobani, a Canadian academic whose story will be further discussed in the next chapter, made a presentation at an academic conference in which she placed the blame for the 9/11 attacks squarely on American foreign policy. Canadian media outlets, and the general public, were quick to denounce Thobani's comments as being inappropriate and contradictory to Canadian perceptions of our "friend and ally" the United States. Various media outlets labeled her assertions "tactless"; "hateful and manipulative"; "vicious"; and "hate-filled".<sup>432</sup> Ross McLean of the *Winnipeg Sun* branded Thobani as a "hysterical, spittle-spewing, feminist equivalent to the Taliban."<sup>433</sup> Margaret Wentz argued that her speech demonstrated that Thobani was, "... stupid and morally bankrupt" and argued that Thobani's freedom to make such comments at an academic conference "negated her assertion that women were repressed." Wentz further added that individuals such as Thobani who did not appreciate the democratic rights afforded to those living in countries such as Canada should leave the country in order to, "...

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<sup>432</sup> See Ismael and Measor 2003, p. 118.

<sup>433</sup> Ross McLean. "Sunera Thobani Rides Again" *Winnipeg Sun*. (October 5, 2001).

live under the totalitarian despotic regime of their choice.”<sup>434</sup> The media, emphasizing Thobani’s Tanzanian origin, strongly denounced her comments and implied that she was not a “true Canadian” for espousing such views. The outcry by the media concerning Thobani’s dissent from the “acceptable” media frame regarding the events of 9/11, is indicative of the media’s compliance with the elite audience in controlling the interpretation of the attacks that transpired on September 11.

*What About the Root Causes of 9/11?*

While some journalists and media outlets in Canada denounced those who criticized American foreign policy, others sought to question the root causes for the 9/11 attacks on the United States. *The Globe and Mail*, in particular questioned the reasons for the attack. Writing in the *Globe*, academic Thomas Homer-Dixon’s article, “Why Root Causes are Important” demonstrated, “... the need to be able to make crucial distinctions... between culpability and innocence, combatant and non-combatant, and the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.”<sup>435</sup> Some journalists argued that Canadians needed to learn more about Arab and Muslim cultures before using the label “terrorist” to mark all individuals of Arab or Muslim descent. Matthew Ingram questioned the role of U.S. oil policies in instigating the attacks. He argued that Osama bin Laden was only “... the latest in a series of Middle Eastern

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<sup>434</sup> Margaret Wente. “US Will Never Be the Same” *Globe and Mail*. (September 12, 2001).

<sup>435</sup> Thomas Homer-Dixon. “Why Root Causes are Important” *Globe and Mail*. (September 26, 2001).

figures who have become public enemy number one as a result of U.S. oil policy.”<sup>436</sup> Journalist David Hirst called on the public and policymakers alike to differentiate between those following bin Laden and peaceful followers of Islam. He noted that bin Laden was not the voice of Islam, but rather, “... the leader of a disaffected political organization, willing to use violence to pursue a self-appointed agenda for reform within the societies of the Middle East.”<sup>437</sup> What these examples demonstrate is a check on the media’s influence in a democratic state such as Canada.

*Print Media in Quebec*

It is necessary to consider print media outlets in the province of Quebec separately from those operating in the rest of Canada. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, political culture and popular opinion differ from the rest of Canada in that province. Nesbitt-Larking asserts that the Quebec media outlets include a greater degree of political coverage than other Canadian newspapers since Quebec papers tend to view national issues as “Canada versus Quebec” scenarios.<sup>438</sup> Arthur Siegal supports this notion, writing that while English Canada journalists, “... are expected to approximate some objective, or at least fair and balanced, standard of conduct, Quebec journalists are expected to be opinionated, engaged, and politically

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<sup>436</sup> Matthew Ingram. “Hatred of the United States Rooted in Oil” *Globe and Mail*. (September 14, 2001).

<sup>437</sup> David Hirst. “Bin Laden Appeals to Arab Frustration, Not Religious Values” *Globe and Mail*. (October 9, 2001).

<sup>438</sup> Paul Nesbitt-Larking. *Politics, Society, and the Media: Canadian Perspectives*. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, Ltd., 2001).

active.”<sup>439</sup> Quebec journalists tend to be more partisan and more opinionated than their colleagues in other provinces. As a result, it is not surprising that these journalists vehemently opposed Canadian participation in an America-led intervention in the Middle East. While expressing regret and disgust for the 9/11 attacks on the United States and sympathy for the victims of those attacks, the Quebec media reacted strongly against foreign intervention aimed at attacking would-be terrorists before they could reach the United States. Quebec media outlets encouraged the public to participate in demonstrations against Canadian involvement in the intervention in Afghanistan, leading to the largest political demonstration in Quebec’s history.<sup>440</sup>

### **The Media as Elite Audience and the Populist Audience**

The media plays an important role as a component of the elite audience by shaping and framing events. By packaging the “news” for public consumption, media frames are an important component of the securitization process. These frames created by the mass media determine how the state’s response to a given threat will be represented to the general public. The following chapter will consider the role of the populist audience in the securitization process. The populist audience, which can be generally defined as the populace of a given state, responds to the media and policy elite audiences and forms its own opinion about whether or

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<sup>439</sup> Arthur Siegel. *Politics and the Media in Canada, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1996), p. 216.

<sup>440</sup> To be discussed further in the next chapter. This was the largest political demonstration in Quebec up to that time. Student protests against increased tuition rates were even larger in 2012.



not an issue ought to be securitized. The populist audience is influenced by both the actions of the policy elite and the representations of the issue by the media.

***CHAPTER FIVE: THE POPULIST AUDIENCE – THE ROLE OF THE STATE PUBLIC***

***Introduction***

The importance of the audience in the philosophical variant of securitization theory cannot be underestimated. To this point, only one half of this audience group has been considered - the elite audience. While the elite audience is responsible for transmitting the initiation of the securitization process from the authorized speakers of security to the people of a given state, it is the populist audience that has the final say about whether or not a given securitization process will be successful. The populist audience is important because it serves to reconcile the inherent contradiction in the philosophical variant of securitization theory about whether or not securitization is an intersubjective or discursive act. By dividing the audience into two separate, but equally important groups, it is possible to deconstruct the process of audience acceptance in securitization theory. Thus, while the elite audience is the first group to either accept or reject a securitizing move made by an authorized speaker of security, the populist audience has the final say in whether or not an issue will be successfully securitized. The elite and populist audiences are two equal parties in a reciprocal relationship. The elite audience both influences the acceptance or rejection of a given threat by the populist audience, and, in turn, is influenced by the acceptance or rejection of that threat by the latter group. Ultimately, it can be determined that the context of the interactions between the two audience groups plays an important role in determining whether or not the securitization of an existential threat will be successful.

## **The Populist Audience Defined**

In its simplest terms, the populist audience can literally be defined as the populace of a given state. The populist audience can be differentiated from the elite audience by virtue of the fact that they do not hold public office, and are not in a position to directly participate in the policy creation process. This differentiation between the elite and the populist audiences can be traced back to Machiavelli's, *The Prince*, in which he categorizes the population of the state into two groups.

## **The Role of the Populist Audience in the Securitization Process**

### *Why Two Audience Groups?*

The successful securitization of a given policy issue is contingent on whether or not the audience accepts the articulation of an existential threat by the authorized speaker of security. For example, if the President of the United States held a press conference and announced that extra-terrestrials were poised to invade America, this issue would only be securitized if both the elite and populist audiences accepted that this threat posed a real and immediate danger to the state. The Copenhagen School (CS) places a strong emphasis on the role of the audience in either accepting or rejecting a proposed securitizing move. However, in practice, the distinction between successful and unsuccessful attempts at securitization is far less clear than the CS suggests. Charlotte Wagnsson argues that:

“... it is helpful to be cautious when applying the notion of ‘successfully’ securitized. A political leader may, for example, ‘speak security’ primarily with an external audience in mind, with the aim of deterrence or to improve his/ her state’s position in a negotiation. If s/he then gains the ear of the public, securitization has been achieved more or less ‘by mistake’, since the primary intention was not to convince the population that the problem amounted to an existential threat. Alternatively, if the president leads his/ her country to war, but is widely criticized by the opposition and eventually

ousted from office in a coup d'état, is this a case of successful securitization? In both cases, securitization has been reached, but not necessarily 'successful'.<sup>441</sup>

How can scholars determine whether or not a given attempt at securitization has been successful? If the acceptance or rejection of an existential threat articulated by the authorized speaker of security is the final determinant of success or failure, how can one conclude whether the audience supported or rebuffed the presentation of an existential threat? One such way to measure audience sentiment is to be specific about *which* audience is being examined. It is necessary to distinguish between the elite and populist audiences because conflating the two groups creates a body that is too large to effectively measure. Borrowing from the sociological variant of securitization theory, Salter explains that, "We cannot accept a simple binary result of 'accepted' or 'failed' securitizing moves: in other words, a single snapshot or coup de grace. Rather, there are several steps in the acceptance or failure of a securitizing move."<sup>442</sup> The first step in assessing whether or not a securitization has been successful is to divide the audience into two separate groups. Following this differentiation, it is then necessary to consider the elite and the populist audiences separately before examining the interactions between the two groups.

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<sup>441</sup> Charlotte Wagnsson. *Russian Political Language and Public Opinion on the West, NATO, and Chechnya*. (Stockholm: Akademityck AB, Edsbruk, 2000), p. 95.

<sup>442</sup> Mark B. Salter. "Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority." *Journal of International Relations and Development*. V. 11, N. 4 (2008), p. 325.

The elite audience and the populist audience reach separate decisions about whether to accept or reject a given securitization. When both groups reach a consensus that a given issue poses an existential threat to the state, then the securitization of that issue has been successful. Salter proposes four indicators that can be used to determine whether or not both groups have accepted a securitizing move. First, to what extent is the issue-area discussed as part of a wider political debate? Second, did both audience groups accept or reject the description of the threat as posing an existential danger? Third, was the solution to the threat accepted or rejected? Finally, were new or emergency powers accorded to the securitizing agent?<sup>443</sup> These metrics can be used to determine where consensus was reached between the two groups. An examination of the two separate audience groups is also important because it helps to resolve the debate about the actual role of the audience in the securitization process.

Various securitization scholars have articulated the necessity of dividing the audience into different groups as a practical solution to the challenges inherent in trying to assess such a large unitary structure. Leonard and Kaunert argue that, “the idea of ‘audience’ oversimplifies the fact that there can be multiple audiences with different characteristics.”<sup>444</sup> They further argue that, in dividing the audience in separate groups, these groups should be characterized as espousing ‘different

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<sup>443</sup> Mark B. Salter. “When Securitization Fails: The Hard Case of Counter-Terrorism Programs.” In Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 120.

<sup>444</sup> Sarah Leonard and Christian Kaunert, “Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory.” In Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (London: Routledge, 2011), p.73.

logics'. Thus, while these groups are influenced and persuaded by different types of arguments, they are all "inter-linked as they are part of the same policy-making process."<sup>445</sup> While Salter argues that it is possible to identify four audience groups: elite, technocratic, scientific, and popular<sup>446</sup>; this mass categorization diverts from the simplicity intended by the original CS model of securitization theory. Similarly, Huysman's division of the audience into two groups: popular and technocratic, fails to account for the interaction between audience factions. The division of the audience into the elite audience – discussed in the preceding chapters – and the populist audience – to be examined in this chapter – serves to reconcile the conflicting descriptions of the audience presented by the Copenhagen School.

*The Role of the Audience in Philosophical Securitization: Intersubjective or Discursive?*

There is an inherent contradiction in the Copenhagen School's description of the role of the audience. On the one hand, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde emphasize the importance of the role of the audience, presenting the securitization process as an intersubjective dialogue between the authorized speaker of security and those who must accept or reject his or her claims. The CS notes that, "Our argument is that securitization, like politicization, has to be understood as an essentially intersubjective process. Even if one wanted to take a more objectivist approach, it is unclear how this could be done except in cases in which the threat is unambiguous and immediate."<sup>447</sup> The significance of the role of the audience seems clear; the audience must be on the same wavelength as the securitizing actor in order for a

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<sup>445</sup> IBID, p. 74.

<sup>446</sup> Mark B. Salter. "When Securitization Fails: The Hard Case of Counter-Terrorism Programs." In Balzacq, eds. 2011, p. 120.

<sup>447</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 30.

securitization to be successful. However, despite the claim that this is an intersubjective process in which the audience is an important half of a two-step process, this notion remains vague and somewhat under-specified. As a result, it remains unclear how this intersubjective process could be operationalized in empirical studies.<sup>448</sup> This view of the role of the audience fails to account for the Copenhagen School's description of securitization as a speech act, which indicates that this is not so much an intersubjective process as a self-referential one that is governed by discursive rules.

While the Copenhagen School suggests that securitization is an intersubjective process that involves the articulation of a threat by an authorized speaker of security and the subsequent acceptance or rejection of that threat by the audience, this view negates the assertion that securitization can be conceived of as a speech act. While the CS argues that the audience is an important component of this process, they leave this group largely undefined in their analysis. Indeed, the philosophical variant of securitization theory also posits that the securitization of a given issue area can be decided upon solely by the authorized speaker. In this respect, the CS downplays the role of the audience, arguing that, "... thus, it is the actor... who decided whether something is to be handled as an existential threat".<sup>449</sup> The term "actor" here refers to the 'securitizing actor' – the authorized speaker of security. This notion directly contradicts the CS's assertion made three pages

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<sup>448</sup> See Sarah Leonard and Christian Kaunert, "Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory." In Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 59.

<sup>449</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 34.

earlier that, “... successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act.”<sup>450</sup> This ambiguous position further complicates any attempts to determine whether or not the securitization of a given issue has been successful.

How can this contradiction pertaining to the role of the audience be reconciled? Balzacq suggests that one way to clarify the Copenhagen School’s contradiction is to accept that, “Securitization can be discursive and non-discursive; intentional and non-intentional; performative but not ‘an act in itself.’ In short, security problems can be designed or they can emerge out of different practices, whose initial aim (if they ever had) was not in fact to create a security problem.”<sup>451</sup> In considering the relationship between the Copenhagen School’s view of securitization as both an intersubjective process and a discursive act, Stritzel raises the question of whether or not the idea of a securitizing speech act taking place at one discrete point in time can be combined and reconciled with the idea of securitization being an intersubjective process. He suggests the existence of some sort of ‘negotiation’ between the securitizing actor and its audience.<sup>452</sup> This is in keeping with the CS’ observation that the, “... process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a

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<sup>450</sup> Buzan, Weaever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 31.

<sup>451</sup> Thierry Balzacq. “A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants.” In Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 2.

<sup>452</sup> Holger Stritzel. “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond.” *European Journal of International Relations*. V. 13, N. 3 (2007), p. 357 – 383.



threat.”<sup>453</sup> Perhaps the best way to resolve the differences between these two perceptions of the audience is to consider the reciprocal relationship between them.

### **The Elite Audience and the Populist Audience: A Reciprocal Relationship**

#### *Elite Influence over the Populist Audience*

The elite and populist audiences interact in a variety of ways, with each facet acting upon and influencing the other. The Copenhagen School often refers to the role of the ‘analyst’ in the securitization process. The analyst can be conceived of as the collective elite audience, which, by virtue of its position within society, seeks to exert pressure over the populist audience. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde posit that these analysts serve an important function in the securitization process since, following the articulation of a threat by an authorized speaker, “... analysts interpret political actors’ actions and sort out when these actions fulfill the security criteria.”<sup>454</sup> These analysts then, “... judge whether the actor is effective in mobilizing support around this security reference...”<sup>455</sup> The Copenhagen School suggests that members of the general public look to members of the policy elite for “expert” opinion on the degree to which a given issue poses an imminent threat to the state.

The elite audience can be seen to exert influence over the populist audience by framing the threat presented by the authorized speaker in ways that resonate

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<sup>453</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 26.

<sup>454</sup> IBID, p. 33.

<sup>455</sup> IBID, p. 34.

with the mass public. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde note that, “Approaching security from a speech-act perspective raises questions about the relationship between actors and analysts in designing and understanding the security agenda.”<sup>456</sup> The implication here is that the ‘analysts’ – members of the elite audience – have the ability to frame issues for the general public. Due to its position within society, the elite audience is often privy to information that is not made available to the general population. As a result of this information gap, it can be argued that it is possible for the elite audience to “marshal the assent of a target audience” by implying that information about a specific threat is being withheld from the public for strategic reasons.<sup>457</sup> It follows that the general public, cognizant of the information gap concerning the temporal proximity of threats, are inclined to accept the views of state officials. The populist audience often believes that these members of the elite audience possess additional information about a given threat, and are therefore imbued with the legitimacy to explain the threat to the public. Risse notes that this perceived additional information, “... touches on the authoritative knowledge pertaining to the issue and/or the associated moral authority that “incites” the audience to believe that the speaker’s statement is accurate and then to act accordingly.”<sup>458</sup> The general public is easily susceptible to suggestion, and can be heavily influenced by the framing of given security issues by members of the policy elite.

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<sup>456</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 33.

<sup>457</sup> Phrase borrowed from Balzacq 2011, p. 25.

<sup>458</sup> T. Risse. “Let’s Argue: Communicative Action in World Politics.” *International Organizations*. V. 54, N. 1 (2000), p. 35.

While the populist audience can be influenced by the elite audiences' acceptance or rejection of a given attempt at securitization, the public also influences the response of the policy elite. It is important to recall that many members of the elite audience are also elected representatives who are intended to represent the views of the people they serve. The Copenhagen School asserts that, "... the attempted securitizers are 'judged' first by other social actors and citizens, and the degree of their following is then interpreted and measured..."<sup>459</sup> Those responsible for enacting legislation aimed at countering a given threat rely on members of the voting public for re-election. As such, if the public is opposed to the creation of additional security legislation, their elected representatives will be inclined to alter the legislation so that it is more palatable to the electorate. Securitization will not be successful if the populace of the state is not willing to accept enhanced security measures because they do not believe that there is an imminent threat to their immediate safety. Even if the elite audience initially agreed with the authorized speaker that there is an existential threat to the state, they will not legislate against the threat unless the voting public agrees that such measures are necessary. This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

*The Importance of Context in Elite-Populist Audience Interactions*

When considering the ways in which the elite audience is able to influence the populist audience, it is important to consider the context in which these interactions take place. The Copenhagen School notes the difficulty political scientists encounter when trying to decide whether or not a given issue is a

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<sup>459</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 33.

“security” issue. They note that, “It is not easy to judge the securitization of an issue against some measure of whether that issue is “really” a threat; doing so would demand an objective measure of security that no security theory has yet provided.”<sup>460</sup> Since there is no way to quantify a “security” threat, it is necessary to consider the context in which the securitizing move and elite acceptance of that move takes place. Thus, context is an important component in determining audience acceptance of an attempted securitization. Balzacq highlights the need to locate the initiation of securitizations against the backdrop of what he deems, “what the audience already knows”.<sup>461</sup> It follows that it is important to consider the information that the two audience groups already have about a given threat. The failure to fully account for the context in which a securitizing move is initiated makes it difficult to address the practically important question of what the “proportionate causal weight of audience and contextual factors” are in securitization theory.<sup>462</sup> Context includes both the threat environment of the state and the information about the given threat that has been disseminated to the general public by the media.

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<sup>460</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 30.

<sup>461</sup> Thierry Balzacq. “Trust: From Securitization to De-securitization, and Back.” *PhD Seminar*. (Aberystwyth: University of Wales, 2009).

<sup>462</sup> For more information refer to: Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience, and Context.” *European Journal of International Relations*. V. 11, N. 2, p. 178.

Since securitization involves a perlocutionary act<sup>463</sup> on the part of the securitizing actor, actors seeking to move an audience's attention towards a given threat will utilize language that resonates with the context in which his or her actions are conducted. In order to win over the audience to the speaker's way of thinking, security statements must be related to an external reality.<sup>464</sup> This means that the audience, especially the populist audience which largely relies on the elite audience for "news", is more likely to accept the articulation of a given threat when it is related to real-life, tangible examples of how that threat might be realized. For example, politicians seeking to securitize the construction of dykes in the Netherlands would remind the public of past tragedies resulting from the lack of these structures.<sup>465</sup> Similarly, calls for increased airport security in North America in the post-9/11 period have featured photos of the twin towers' collapse and of the would-be shoe bomber. The photos of the twin towers demonstrate that the threat has been realized in the past, while the photos of the shoe bomber remind the public that terrorism remains a pressing threat to state security. Balzacq explains, "... success, that is, the possibility of marshaling the assent of an audience (perlocutionary effect), rests with whether the historical conjuncture renders the

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<sup>463</sup> A perlocutionary act, as outlined in the first chapter, is an act performed *by* saying something, and not *in* saying something. These acts cause psychological changes in the audience. Examples of perlocutionary acts include: angering, persuading, and comforting.

<sup>464</sup> For further elaboration see George W. Grace. *The Linguistic Construction of Reality*. (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 48 – 49.

<sup>465</sup> This is the example used by the Copenhagen School in their text, "Security: A New Framework for Analysis".

audience more sensitive to its vulnerability.”<sup>466</sup> As was pointed out in the second chapter, the authorized speaker of security will often attempt to link events of the past to present threats in order to galvanize public support for securitization.

The success of a securitizing move is contingent on audience acceptance. As a result, the context in which a threat is introduced to the public is important since the success of a securitizing move is dependent on a perceptive public. The authorized speaker of security, and in turn the acceptant elite audience, must choose the appropriate time to introduce the threat to the public. They must also utilize framing to broach the threat in terms and contexts that will resonate with the public. In other words, the use of “context” by the authorized speakers and the elite audience “activates certain properties of the concept, while others are concealed.”<sup>467</sup> Selecting the context in which to present the threat to the populist audience is one of the ways that the elite audience can influence the public’s response to a given issue.

*The Populist Audience and the Politics of Fear*

The populist audience is also influenced by what can be termed “the politics of fear”. This concept relates to, “... decision makers’ promotion and use of audience beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk and fear in order to achieve certain goals.”<sup>468</sup> In conjunction with the authorized speakers of security, members of the

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<sup>466</sup> Thierry Balzacq. “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience, and Context.” *European Journal of International Relations*. V. 11, N. 2, p. 182.

<sup>467</sup> IBID, p. 182.

<sup>468</sup> David L. Altheide. *Terrorism and the Politics of Fear*. (Oxford: AltaMira Press, 2006), p. 1.

policy elite sometimes employ fear tactics in order to convince the public of the need to address a given issue. They seek to generate fear in the public by exaggerating the risk posed by a threat because they know that concerns for personal safety will tempt even the most cynical members of the public to accept government intervention in the name of security. One of the ways that politicians generate fear is by framing the acceptance of additional legislative measures as a choice between enhanced security or being at risk.<sup>469</sup> Fear for personal safety can be a tremendous motivator in generating public support for security initiatives.

The importance of the politics of fear is acknowledged by the relevant literature as a motivating factor in generating audience acceptance for the securitization of a specific threat. The Copenhagen School references the “politics of existential threats” which corresponds to an instance in which “an issue takes priority over everything else and therefore allows for a breaking of the rules.”<sup>470</sup> Members of the policy elite and the media employ the politics of fear by framing the issue as one that poses an immediate danger to citizens of the state. Williams explains, “Even the most technical... of discourses and practices, if they are related to security, take on their special resonance as a result of their connection to fear – indeed this is what tends to make them recognizable as ‘security’ practices in the

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<sup>469</sup> See for example Jeremy W. Crampton. “The Role of Geosurveillance and Security in the Politics of Fear.” In Daniel Z. Sui, ed., *Geospacial Technologies and Homeland Security: Research Frontiers and Future Challenges*. (Springer, 2008), p. 284.

<sup>470</sup> Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, p. 33.

first place.”<sup>471</sup> The philosophical variant of securitization theory holds that there is a clear distinction between “normal” politics and the state of exception. One of the ways that the populist audience can be convinced that there is a need to securitize a policy issue is by generating mass fear that neglecting to act immediately could have serious consequences.

### **Public Opinion as a Measure of Populist Acceptance of Securitization**

#### *What Is Public Opinion?*

While the philosophical variant of securitization theory privileges the role of the audience in the acceptance or rejection of a securitizing move, the theory does not attempt to explain how to quantify audience acceptance or rejection. Public opinion serves as a useful metric for evaluating the populist audience’s acceptance or rejection of a securitizing move. Before examining the ways that public opinion can be measured, it is first necessary to define this concept and consider its historical evolution.

Public opinion serves as a useful measure of populist audience sentiment, since, at its most simplistic level, “public opinion” can be defined as, “views prevalent among the general public”<sup>472</sup>. In International Relations, this concept defies exact definition, with scholars imparting their own views for the phenomena they are examining. With respect to issues of foreign policy, public opinion can be

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<sup>471</sup> Michael C. Williams. “The Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory.” In Thierry Balzacq, ed.

<sup>472</sup> Oxford English Dictionary. “public opinion”.



characterized as “... a set of dependent variables at least partly determined by individuals’ basic motivational dispositions.”<sup>473</sup> The study of public opinion seeks to assess the attitude of the general public about a specific issue area. In keeping with the notion of a populist audience, most conceptions of public opinion posit that all adults in a jurisdiction, “...are members of the general public whose aggregate views are to be considered in determining public opinion.”<sup>474</sup> On one hand, this concept can be conceived as a long-term attitude grounded in “the mental process of evaluation and the presence of an attitude object.”<sup>475</sup> By this definition, public opinion can be equated with the long-held beliefs of a given public, and is something that is deeply engrained in the public psyche. In this respect, public opinion can be equated with the political culture of a society, in that it refers to beliefs that have become engrained in the collective conscience that would be difficult to change. On the other hand, public opinion can also be defined as, “temporary convictions which are formed when needed, based on information that is accessible in the given situation.”<sup>476</sup> These competing definitions of public opinion relate to the ways in which this concept is viewed by competing political perspectives.

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<sup>473</sup> William O. Chittick and Annette Freyberg-Inan, “The Impact of Basic Motivation on Foreign Policy Opinions Concerning the Use of Force.” In Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*. (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 30.

<sup>474</sup> Barbara A. Bordes. *Public Opinion: The American Mind*. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), p. 8.

<sup>475</sup> Gerd Botiner and Michaela Wanke, “The Psychology of Attitudes and Persuasion.” In Jane Wood and Theresa Gannon, eds., *Public Opinion and Criminal Justice*. (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2009), p. 4.

<sup>476</sup> IBID, p. 5; See also Schwartz 2007

*Competing Perspectives on Public Opinion*

Political scientists define public opinion according to two competing theoretical frameworks: the liberal-democratic perspective, and the realist perspective.<sup>477</sup> Liberal-democratic conceptions of public opinion are couched in the general assumption that, in an open and democratic society, the views of the public will, in some way, be translated into public policy. This concept was first articulated by theorist Jeremy Bentham, who posited that the public's beliefs and attitudes were at the center of legitimate and effective public policy. Specifically, Bentham argued that public opinion, which he described as the "Public-Opinion Tribunal", was the "sole remedy" for many of the government's problems.<sup>478</sup> John Stuart Mill summarized the liberal perspective on public opinion as a 'repository of wisdom', stating,

"Every man, possessed of reason, is accustomed to weigh evidence, and to be guided and determined by its preponderance... When all opinions, true and false, are equally declared, the assent of the greater number, when their interests are not opposed to them, may always be expected to be given to the true. These peoples, the foundations of which appear to be impregnable, suffice for the speedy determination of every practical question."<sup>479</sup>

Political theorists espousing the liberal perspective contend that the public could only act in its own best interest, and that public sentiment would reflect this interest.

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<sup>477</sup> For a comprehensive overview of the two perspectives refer to: Ole R. Holsti. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. (The University of Michigan Press, 2004), p. 3 – 12.

<sup>478</sup> Bentham 1962, 8:561, 2:547 quoted in Holsti 2004, p. 3.

<sup>479</sup> John Stuart Mill. 1913, 16, 18

The liberal understanding of the role of public opinion was further articulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, both of whom considered the role of this concept with respect to foreign policy and war. Rousseau and Kant affirmed that self-interested monarchs had the potential to engage in wars that would not benefit the interests of their subjects. In contrast to these independently motivated, solitary actors, in a democratic society, the public would constrain leaders from entering wars because the government's accountability to the public would restrain the war-making proclivities of individual leaders. Kant posited that, when contemplating the constraints facing republics and non-republics considering war, the former are more likely to proceed with caution, because leaders would be constrained by the interests of the general public.

In a general sense, the liberal-democratic conception of public opinion is premised on the notion that, “the person whose first thoughts on an issue came in response to the interviewer’s question is equivalent to the person who has spent a great deal of time reading about, thinking about, and refining a position.”<sup>480</sup> The liberal perspective assumes that the public will have a general understanding of the issues at hand, and will base their collective opinion on what is best for society as a whole. Members of the public are understood to be well-informed on the issues that affect their daily lives. It follows that policymakers will take into account public sentiment on a given issue, and will enact policies that reflect the public’s collective will.

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<sup>480</sup> Barbara Bordes. *Public Opinion: The American Mind*. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), p. 7-8.

This liberal conception has been challenged by scholars such as Walter Lippmann, who argue that the liberal-democratic understanding of public opinion assumes too much of public knowledge about given issues. Adopting a sociopsychological perspective on politics, Lippmann challenged the core assumptions of the liberal perspective. He argued that, “The symbols of public opinion in times of moderate security, are subject to check and comparison and argument. They come and go, coalesce and are forgotten, never organizing perfectly the emotion of the whole group.”<sup>481</sup> Lippmann’s assessment of public opinion held that it is only in times of war that public sentiment will coalesce and be representative of the general will of both the people and the state. He argued that those studying this phenomena, the ‘social analysts’ must, “... (study) how the larger political environment is conceived, and how it can be conceived more successfully.”<sup>482</sup> In contrast to the liberal-democratic understanding of public opinion, the realist theoretical perspective takes a more pessimistic view of the public’s ability to discern its collective interest.

The realist theoretical framework questions the ability of the general public to form enlightened and effective opinions on issues facing the state. Holsti explains that realists are “skeptical of institutional arrangements for promoting international

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<sup>481</sup> Walter Lippmann. *Public Opinion*. (New York: Free Press, Reissue Edition., 1997), p. 13.

<sup>482</sup> IBID, p. 22.

cooperation in an anarchical system...”<sup>483</sup> As a result, this framework contends that the public’s interest in, “... nationality, justice, or traditional friendships and enmities”, selling the proposition that “yesterday’s friend is today’s enemy, or vice versa” will be difficult.<sup>484</sup> It follows that realists conceive of public opinion as a barrier to thoughtful and coherent foreign policy since efforts to bolster long-term national interests may be condemned by the “moods and passions” of the moment.<sup>485</sup> Alexander Hamilton and the other authors of the *Federalist Papers*, were early proponents of this perspective. They argued that the American Senate (which at that time was an appointed body) was better suited to making foreign policy decisions for that state since the members of the House of Representatives were elected by the public. Likewise, Alexis de Tocqueville’s views on public opinion in democracies questioned the public’s ability to make foreign policy decisions, “I do not hesitate to say that it is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to be decidedly inferior to other governments.”<sup>486</sup> In keeping with realist notions of public opinion, de Tocqueville noted the tendency of the public to be “led astray by ignorance and passion.”<sup>487</sup>

In keeping with the philosophical variant of securitization theory, this study contends that the definition of public opinion rests somewhere between these two perspectives. Public sentiment is almost certainly influenced by those in positions

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<sup>483</sup> Ole Holsti. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. (The University of Michigan Press, 2004), p. 5.

<sup>484</sup> Wright quoted in Holsti 2004, p. 5.

<sup>485</sup> Holsti 2004, p. 6.

<sup>486</sup> De Tocqueville 1958, 1:243, 45

<sup>487</sup> IBID

of authority within the state; those who can be categorized as authorized speakers of security, or members of the policy elite. Political leaders, elected representatives, and the media present to the public ways to think about a given issue. However, the opinions of the general public are not just reflections of the dominant elite opinions. Public opinion takes into account competing perspectives on a given topic. For example, public opinion on a proposed armed conflict will take into account arguments in favour of armed intervention, as well as critiques of the planned action. While the government may choose to enact policies or carry out foreign interventions without consultation of the general public, public opinion does not always support these actions. In keeping with the philosophical framework of securitization theory, elites (authorized speakers) may propose a given action or policy, but the public (the audience) is capable of forming a collective opinion about the actions of the elites. It appears that, irrespective of the public's level of information about a given issue, the populist audience is able to form an opinion regarding the actions taken by authorized speakers of security. An examination of public opinion, then, forms the simplest way of assessing the views of the populist audience in order to draw conclusions about whether or not a securitizing move has been accepted by this segment of the audience. Leaders in Western states are elected by the populace of the states they govern. It stands to reason that they will consider the opinions of the public when proposing policies since they rely on the electorate to return them to office at election time. Scientific polling and the examination of opinion polls best represent the public opinion of the populist audience.

*Measuring Public Opinion*

In today's society, public opinion can be quantified by means of scientific polls, which seek to evaluate the public's perspective on given issues. This scientific assessment of public opinion dates back to the interwar years. In 1936, *Literary Digest*, mailed out ten million ballots in order to sample the public, and predict the outcome of the Roosevelt-Landon election. This method of mail-in ballot sampling had allowed the publication to accurately predict Franklin D. Roosevelt's victory over Herbert Hoover in the 1932 election. Of the ten million ballots sent out, two million were returned, and *Literary Digest* (incorrectly) predicted a landslide victory for Landon.<sup>488</sup> In the same year, the American Institute of Public Opinion, commonly referred to as the Gallup poll, sought to predict the election outcome using a sampling that included fewer respondents, but a more representative sample. The Gallup poll correctly predicted Teddy Roosevelt's victory, but underestimated the magnitude of it. The State Department in the United States was quick to recognize the utility of public opinion polls, creating a Division of Information before World War I, which was used to assess public sentiment on national defense issues.<sup>489</sup> From this period onwards, polling has become an important component of the policy process. Governments and the media alike conduct public opinion polls in order to assess public attitudes about specific issues.

In order to assess whether or not the populist audience of a state has accepted or rejected a securitizing move made by an authorized speaker of security,

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<sup>488</sup> *Literary Digest* 1936, p. 5-6.

<sup>489</sup> See for example: William O. Chittick. *State Department, Press, and Pressure Groups: A Role Analysis*. (New York: Wiley, 1970).

it is necessary to consider two aspects of public opinion: the public's level of approval of the state leader, and the public's approval of implemented policies and legislation. If public support for the state leader is high, and public opinion regarding proposed policies and legislation is high, then it is reasonable to assume too that the public has accepted the securitizing move. Burnstein notes that, "...measured public opinion is increasingly used as an index of the public's interest in and support for particular policy options."<sup>490</sup> The use of public opinion polls to examine the populist audience's views on securitizing measures serves to address some of the empirical questions posed by scholars studying the relationship between the populace and elites. The positions taken by elites are easily identifiable in the speeches they make, and in media reports. The views of the public are more difficult to determine. Public opinion polls conducted by responsible polling companies using a scientific process are one way of summarizing the public's collective attitude towards a given issue. Public opinion polls are especially useful when considering security issues since various studies have shown that, "...the relationship between constituent opinion and the policies supported by legislators is likely to be closer at the state than at the (local) level."<sup>491</sup> An examination of American and Canadian public opinion polls conducted following the 9/11 terrorist attacks reveal that the American public was very receptive to calls for increased securitization, while the Canadian public was more cautious in accepting state security reforms.

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<sup>490</sup> Paul Burnstein. "Bringing the Public Back In: Should Sociologists Consider the Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy?" *Social Forces*. V. 77, N. 1 (1998), p. 32.

<sup>491</sup> E. B. Sharp. *The Sometimes Connection: Public Opinion and Social Policy*. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999).



## **The American Populist Audience: Measuring Public Opinion**

### *Public Approval of State Leaders: George W. Bush's Public Approval Ratings*

It is evident that President George W. Bush initiated a securitizing move following the 9/11 attacks on the United States. What is not immediately evident, however, is whether or not the American populace accepted this securitizing move. In order to assess the public's support for measures proposed by the President, it is possible to examine President Bush's approval ratings in public opinion polls before the 9/11 attacks and after them. Opinion polls measuring presidential approval by the general public have been produced by Gallup since the 1936 U.S. election. The typical questions asked by Gallup, and since adopted by most polling organizations, include, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (president's name) is handling his job as president?"<sup>492</sup> An examination of presidential approval ratings generally represents, "a continuous referendum on the president's performance in office."<sup>493</sup> While some may argue that the public is not well enough informed to adequately assess how well the president is doing his job, and that, as a result, these polls represent the public's support of the president's personality, this is an oversimplification. Since the president's personality remains the same throughout his term in office and presidential approval ratings fluctuate constantly, "...it follows that a president's job approval rating represents the public's support for the president's performance in office, not his personality."<sup>494</sup> While presidential

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<sup>492</sup> Question taken from Gallup Presidential Approval Rating Polls see <<http://www.gallup.com>>

<sup>493</sup> John Gray Greer. *Public Opinion and Polling Around the World: A Historical Encyclopedia, Second Edition*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), p. 50.

<sup>494</sup> John Gray Greer. *Public Opinion and Polling Around the World: A Historical Encyclopedia, Second Edition*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), p. 50.

approval ratings are generally high following an election - positivity bias - they tend to drop significantly after a few months in office in response to what has been termed the “decay curve”. President George W. Bush’s public approval ratings were on track to follow this pattern until the 9/11 attacks.

The polls indicate that President George W. Bush enjoyed a strong “honeymoon” period following his election in 2001. In his first eight months, the President’s approval ratings hovered around 55%. Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, his approval ratings were starting to decline, as the residual category (those who declined to answer either “approve” or “disapprove”) declined.<sup>495</sup> In a poll taken in August, 2001, asking the public whether or not they approved of the way Congress was doing its job, 49% of respondents expressed a positive, non-neutral opinion.<sup>496</sup> Public approval of the President at this time was only slightly higher than approval of Congress as a whole. A Gallup poll posted on October 9, 2001, demonstrates that, prior to 9/11, President Bush’s approval rating fell from 57% to 51% in one month.<sup>497</sup> Three days after the attack, in the single

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<sup>495</sup> September 21 – 22, 2002 Gallup Poll, cited in: Brian J. Gaines. “Where’s the Rally? Approval and Trust of the President, Cabinet, Congress, and Government Since September 11.” *PS* (Sept 2002) <<http://www.apsa.net>> p. 531.

<sup>496</sup> James A. Stimson. *Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 6.

<sup>497</sup> David W. Moore. “Bush Support Rides Wave of Anti-Terrorism.” (October 9, 2001)

<<http://www.gallup.com/poll/4975/Bush-Support-Rides-Wave-AntiTerrorism.aspx>>

greatest jump in presidential approval recorded by Gallup, 86% of those polled said that they approved of the job President Bush was doing.<sup>498</sup>

The 9/11 attacks on the United States generated a surge in President Bush's approval ratings that was unprecedented in American history. According to Gallup, "his average job approval rating for his second year in office places as the eighth best of any president since Gallup began regularly tracking this measure in 1945."<sup>499</sup> In his second year in office, Bush's approval rating averaged out to 71.4%, beating his first year average of 67.1%.<sup>500</sup> A September 21-22, 2001 poll, taken by Gallup (the first after the September 11 attacks) placed the President's approval rating at 90% - a record high.<sup>501</sup> The terrorist attacks resulted in a shift of 30% from disapproving to approving of the president's performance. Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center indicate that confidence in the executive branch rose by 38 percentage points, to 51.5% in the wake of the attacks.<sup>502</sup> Gallup polls indicate that, in addition to an increase in the public's perception of how the President was doing his job, ratings of Bush's personal characteristics – particularly his leadership qualities – rose significantly as well. In a poll conducted on January

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<sup>498</sup> IBID

<sup>499</sup> Jeffrey M. Jones. "Bush Second-Year Approval Rating One of Best Ever" (January 17, 2003). <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/7600/Bush-SecondYear-Approval-Rating-One-Best-Ever.aspx>>

<sup>500</sup> IBID

<sup>501</sup> See Brian J. Gaines. "Where's the Rally? Approval and Trust of the President, Cabinet, Congress, and Government Since September 11." *PS* (September 2002), p. 531.

<sup>502</sup> Original figures quoted in Gregory M. Maney, Lynne M. Woehrle and Patrick G. Coy. "Harnessing and Challenging Hegemony: The U.S. Peace Movement After 9/11." *Sociological Perspectives*. V. 48, N. 3 (2005), p. 359.

10 - 12, 2003, “Eighty-three percent of Americans said Bush was willing to make hard decisions and seventy-six percent said he was a strong and desirable leader.”<sup>503</sup> This increase in the public’s perceived support for President Bush is indicative of the public’s receptivity to a securitizing move.

*What Do High Presidential Approval Ratings Mean?*

President Bush’s high public approval ratings following the 9/11 terrorist attacks indicate the public’s willingness to allow the executive branch to take the lead in implementing security measures aimed at counteracting the terrorist threat. Historically, a surge of 30 to 40 percentage points in presidential approval is exceptional. This wave of approval signals the public’s confidence in allowing the president to make difficult decisions about security policies. This immediate surge in support also signals that the public sentiment swung towards the president before he had the chance to respond to the terrorist attacks. This immediate increase in approval is in keeping with Brody’s assertion that, “...the dominant understanding of rallies is that they follow from a (temporary) suspension of elite criticism of the president and a concomitant absence of media of cues justifying disapproval of presidential performance.”<sup>504</sup> In the case of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, public reaction and condemnation of the attacks was immediate and preceded any waiting to see how elites would respond. Indeed, catastrophic events such as the terrorist attacks have the ability to precipitate seismic shifts in public opinion. These extreme cases can lead to a change in, “...how

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<sup>503</sup> Jones for Gallup 2003.

<sup>504</sup> Richard A. Brody. *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

people feel about government in all aspects. It is a dynamic in which people can reevaluate long-standing prejudices and draw new considerations.”<sup>505</sup> What is interesting in the shift of public opinion towards President Bush is that the increase in his approval ratings continued beyond the initial months following 9/11.

The substantial increase in President George W. Bush’s public opinion ratings, before he had time to respond to the crisis, demonstrates the reciprocal relationship amongst all actors who participate in the securitization process. The populist audience’s acceptance of Bush as a leader was influenced by the 9/11 attacks. The increase in support generated by the attacks made the populist audience more receptive to the securitizing move initiated by the President. To contextualize this phenomenon the immediate response to the 9/11 attacks was an instant political consensus of both the elite and populist audiences in giving strong support for President’s Bush articulation of the threat of terrorism.

#### *Public Opinion on Anti-Terrorism Legislation*

While presidential approval ratings are one means of calculating the populist audience’s views on a given issue, this rating only speaks to the public’s view of the state leader, and does not offer insight into what this group thinks of policies enacted in response to a specific issue. In order to assess the public’s opinion of specific policies, it is necessary to examine opinion polls that ask questions about particular policies. In order to determine whether or not American citizens were receptive to legislation enacted in response to the 9/11 attacks, it is necessary to

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<sup>505</sup> James A. Stimson. *Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 6.

consider American attitudes towards counterterrorism legislation before and after the attacks.

Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, policies and legislation aimed at countering the threat of terrorism were of seemingly little importance to a majority of Americans. Indeed, prior to the attacks, a poll conducted by Gallup revealed that, “less than one half of one percent of Americans mentioned terrorism as the nation’s most important problem”.<sup>506</sup> It is difficult to find data about American opinions on counterterrorism policies prior to the attacks since the issue was largely absent from the public agenda. Prior instances of both domestic and foreign terrorism on American soil failed to produce the change in public attitude precipitated by the 9/11 attacks. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center by a group affiliated with Al Qaeda, which killed six people and injured more than a thousand more, failed to register on a large scale outside of the city of New York. In a poll conducted in April of 2001, only four percent of Americans said they were “very worried” about the chances of becoming a victim of terrorism or of a family member becoming a victim.<sup>507</sup> In May of 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62, “Combating Terrorism.”<sup>508</sup> While the former President and

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<sup>506</sup> Frank Newport. “Nine Years After 9/11, Few See Terrorism as Top U.S. Problem.” (September 10, 2010). <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/142961/Nine-Years-Few-Terrorism-Top-Problem.aspx>>

<sup>507</sup> Lydia Saad. “Have Americans Changed?” (September 11, 2002). <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/6790/Americans-Changed.aspx>>

<sup>508</sup> For more information see: Jane Bullock et. al. *Introduction to Homeland Security: Principles of All-Hazards Risk Management*. (New York: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2011), p. 32 – 35.

government officials demonstrated concern about the potential for future terrorist attacks, this concern failed to register with the mass public.

Public concern about the enactment of counterterrorism policies increased exponentially in the months following 9/11. According to a survey conducted by the PEW Center, public interest in the government's response to the attacks was high. More than fifty percent of those sampled indicated that they were "very closely" following news about the September 11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. campaign against terrorism, the highest level of sustained public interest in the news in more than a decade.<sup>509</sup> This support for government counterterrorism policies was not short-lived. Approval of the government's post-9/11 policies remained high in the years following the attacks. In 2006, a Fox News poll conducted by Gallup, showed that forty-six percent of Americans believed that the absence of terrorist attacks since 2001 were the result of administrative policies.<sup>510</sup> A CBS poll conducted in the same year showed similar results. This poll, which was conducted between January 5 – 8, 2006 found that policymakers were doing a "very good job" of addressing the threat of terrorism.<sup>511</sup> This approval of government-initiated security policies is evident in the public's support for the USA PATRIOT Act, despite concerns raised by media outlets over the act's erosion of civil liberties.

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<sup>509</sup> Pew Research Center. "Terror Coverage Boosts News Media's Image." (November 28, 2001). <<http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=143.html>>

<sup>510</sup> Fox News. "Fox News Opinion/ Dynamics Poll." (January 12, 2006). <[http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/poll\\_011206.pdf](http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/poll_011206.pdf)>

<sup>511</sup> Pollingreport.com "Problems and Priorities" <<http://www.pollingreport.com/priotiti.htm>>

*Support for the USA PATRIOT Act*

The public's support for the USA PATRIOT Act demonstrates the populist audience's acceptance of extreme security measures enacted by the government in the wake of the terrorist attacks. Results from a Gallup poll conducted in the U.S. following the terrorist attacks in London demonstrate that public awareness of the USA Patriot Act was high and that, despite concerns over the protection of civil liberties, support for the Act was also high.<sup>512</sup> A majority of Americans, sixty-four percent of those polled, said that they were either "very" or "somewhat" familiar with the law.<sup>513</sup> A follow up question about the Act asked respondents whether or not they thought the USA PATRIOT Act went "too far", "is about right", or "doesn't go far enough" in restricting people's civil liberties in order to investigate suspected terrorism. The plurality of Americans polled, 47% said that the Act was "about right" in terms of protecting civil liberties and preventing future terrorist attacks.<sup>514</sup> Support for the Act was further evidenced by an additional Gallup poll conducted in 2003, in the wake of the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) announcement that the USA PATRIOT Act violated twelve constitutional rights. This survey revealed that, in spite of backlash against the Act by various political groups, including the ACLU, the percentage of Americans who believed that the federal government was a menace to civil rights was down considerably from levels prior to

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<sup>512</sup> Darren K. Carlson. "Liberty vs. Security." (date)  
<<http://www.gallup.com/poll/17392/Liberty-vs-Security-Public-Mixed-Patriot-Act.aspx>.>

<sup>513</sup> IBID

<sup>514</sup> IBID



September 11.<sup>515</sup> This same poll demonstrated public support for then- Attorney General John Ashcroft, who, at that time, was touring numerous law enforcement agencies across the country in support of the USA PATRIOT Act.<sup>516</sup> The American public's support of this Act must be viewed in light of more general attitudes towards civil liberties in order to more clearly demonstrate the public's support for post-9/11 counterterrorism policies.

*American Attitudes Towards Civil Liberties: Shifting Sentiments*

Another means of measuring the populist audience's collective opinion to a security matter is to examine the balance between state-initiated security measures and civil liberties<sup>517</sup>. The need to balance enhanced security measures with civil liberties is a recurrent trend in American history and an important facet of American strategic culture. I have previously referred to this phenomenon as "security without sacrifice", whereby the government seeks to implement security measures that can be seen by the public to reduce the risk of future attacks without causing seemingly unnecessary costs and delays for people going about their day-to-day lives.<sup>518</sup> In times of crisis, threats to the security of the state often prompt incursions on civil liberties. The implementation of additional security policies

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<sup>515</sup> Lydia Saad. "Most Americans Don't Feel Government Threatens Civil Rights." (October 1, 2003). <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/9385/Most-Americans-Don't-Feel-Government-Threatens-Civil-Rights.aspx>>

<sup>516</sup> IBID

<sup>517</sup> "Civil Liberties" can be defined as, "...issues relating to freedom of expression, due process, restrictions on government surveillance, and discrimination against minority groups; thus encompassing what are sometimes called civil rights. See: Daniel Farber, "Introduction" in Daniel Farber, ed., *Security vs. Liberty: Conflicts Between Civil Liberties and National Security in American History*. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008), p. 1-2.

<sup>518</sup> McGuire 2009b, p. 90.

following the 9/11 attacks resulted in restrictions being placed on certain civil liberties in the name of ‘security’. These restrictions followed the established pattern of civil liberties being eroded in exchange for enhanced domestic security. An examination of the public’s sentiment towards civil liberties and the collective willingness to allow restrictions on personal freedoms in the name of enhanced security serves as another means to determine the populist audience’s receptivity to a securitizing move.

An examination of opinion polls conducted in the United States in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks demonstrates that the public was willing to accept encroachments on established civil liberties in order to prevent another terrorist attack from taking place. A Gallup poll conducted in 2003 revealed that, although sixty-seven percent of Americans said that the government should not take steps to prevent terrorism if those steps would violate their basic civil liberties, twenty-nine percent of respondents said that the government should take “all steps necessary” to prevent additional acts of terrorism, even if doing so meant that basic liberties would be violated. Despite this overwhelming desire to protect personal freedoms, a large majority of those polled said that the Bush administration had not violated any civil liberties.<sup>519</sup> A similar study revealed that public opinion was polarized by fears that the government would enact repressive legislation that would restrict civil liberties (34%), and the fear that the government would fail to

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<sup>519</sup> David W. Moore. “Public Little Concerned About PATRIOT Act.” (September 9, 2003). <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/9205/Public-Little-Concerned-About-Patriot-Act.aspx>>

enact strong laws that would protect the nation (34%).<sup>520</sup> Davis and Silver note that, “repeated surveys (conducted) immediately after 9/11 showed that the public were more afraid of the terrorists than concerned with their own civil liberties.”<sup>521</sup> This finding was further qualified by a Harris poll which revealed a “dramatic shift” in public sentiment regarding the importance of personal privacy as it relates to concerns about security. American citizens were willing to sacrifice personal privacy in the name of preventing potential future attacks.<sup>522</sup>

The American public’s initial support for policies which favoured enhanced security over the protection of civil liberties was bolstered by a notable absence of civic group protest over diminished personal freedoms. A study by Leone notes that in the two years following the attacks, “...there (was) remarkably little debate about many of the changes in national policy, especially those that have significantly compromised the civil liberties of U.S. citizens.”<sup>523</sup> Following the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, there was little protest by community groups. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which seeks to champion the protection of personal rights and freedoms, seemed to ignore incursions on personal privacy rights. The

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<sup>520</sup> Samuel J. Best and Monika L. McDermott. “Measuring Opinions vs. Non-Opinion – The Case of the USA Patriot Act” *The Forum*. V. 5, N. 2 (2007), p. 108.

<sup>521</sup> D.W. Davis and B.D. Silver. “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America.” *American Journal of Political Science*. V. 48, N. 1 (2004), p. 31.

<sup>522</sup> Harris Poll. “Support is Still Strong for Increased Surveillance Powers.” (March 27, 2002). *The Wall Street Journal Online*.

<sup>523</sup> Richard C. Leone. “The Quiet Republic: The Missing Debate About Civil Liberties After 9/11” in Richard C. Leone and Greg Anrig Jr. eds., *The War on Our Freedom: Civil Liberties in An Age of Terrorism*. (New York: The Century Foundation, 2003), p.

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organization's criticisms of the Bush administration's post-9/11 security policies focused almost entirely on the mistreatment of aliens by the Department of Justice. Despite its reputation for challenging rights violations in court, the ACLU waited until July 30, 2003 to file the first constitutional challenge to the USA PATRIOT Act.<sup>524</sup> The absence of coordinated criticisms of the state's post-9/11 security policies suggests that the public was willing to accept restrictions to civil liberties in return for state's ability to better counter the threat posed by terrorism.

### **The Canadian Populist Audience – A Study in Contradiction**

An examination of the Canadian populist audience is, by necessity, markedly different from that of its American counterpart. Canadian public opinion in the post-9/11 period is a study in contrast. While there was an initial, short-lived rise in public concern regarding the potential for future terrorist attacks on Canadian soil, this fear quickly dissipated. The Canadian public demonstrated a strong desire to differentiate itself from its southern neighbour; however, this desire to convey independence was balanced by a willingness to adopt U.S-centric security policies. Likewise, public support for multiculturalism and a strong desire to protect civil liberties was matched by a rise in Islamophobia and anti-Arab sentiment. In keeping with this notion of Canadian public opinion representing seemingly contradictory views, public opinion in Quebec regarding the implementation of security policies and support for armed intervention in the Middle East diverged sharply from that of the rest of the country.

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<sup>524</sup> Howard Ball. *The USA PATRIOT ACT*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2004), p. 73.

*Reactionary Fear: A Short-Lived Desire for Enhanced Security Reform*

In the period immediately following the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Canadian public expressed a desire for enhanced security policies that would prevent a terrorist attack from taking place in Canada. In an opinion poll conducted by EKOS in the wake of the attacks on the U.S., sixty-six percent of those polled asserted that the most important response to 9/11 was for the Canadian government to prevent future attacks and punish those responsible for the attacks on the United States.<sup>525</sup> Pollster Chris Baker suggests that the Canadian public suffered a “moment of crisis” in the months immediately following 9/11.<sup>526</sup> As a result of this temporary fear that Canada might be the next state to experience a domestic terrorist attack, citizens favoured strong policies that would prevent future attacks before they could be realized. This precipitated a drastic shift in public opinion. While a poll conducted in July of 2001 to determine what Canadians thought was the most pressing issue for the state found that twenty-five percent of the population believed healthcare to be the most important issue, eleven percent answered unemployment, eight percent taxes, seven percent felt the economy in general was the most serious issue, and less than one percent of those polled mentioned world conflict or war as the most serious issue.<sup>527</sup> The next Focus Canada poll, conducted on September 19, 2001, produced different results. This time, terrorism and security issues were ranked as the most urgent concern for the state by twenty percent of those polled, while only ten percent said healthcare, and

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<sup>525</sup> EKOS Research Associated. “Security, Sovereignty, and Continentalism: Canadian Perspectives on September 11.” (September 27, 2001).

<sup>526</sup> Chris Baker. “Canada After September 11: A Public Opinion Perspective.” (EnviroNics Research Group, 2002).

<sup>527</sup> Focus Canada 2001

eight percent responded with unemployment.<sup>528</sup> Support for military spending also increased in this period. This change in the public's perception of state priorities can be attributed to the fact that, immediately after the attacks on the U.S., fifty-five percent of Canadians believed in the possibility of a follow-up attack on Canada.<sup>529</sup> This change in attitude in support for reforms to state security policies was short lived as the threat of imminent attack failed to materialize.

Immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Canadian public opinion shifted in favour of enhanced security measures. Support for a national security state, however, was not sustained, and the shift in Canadian public opinion was short-lived. Concern about the potential for terrorist attacks in Canada, was quickly eclipsed by worries over the healthcare system (twenty percent) and the state of the economy (eighteen percent) by December 2001. Only three percent of those polled still felt that terrorism and security were the most pressing issues for the state.<sup>530</sup> Likewise, by March of 2001, only thirty five percent of the population still thought that a terrorist attack in Canada was possible.<sup>531</sup> This finding is consistent with a study conducted in July of 2002, which also found that public concerns over the state of the healthcare system and the economy were much higher than concerns about "personal security". The report's authors further determined that the public's perception of government spending on security "... could perhaps be seen as disproportionate to the increased sense of risk among

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<sup>528</sup> Focus Canada 2001 (September 19, 2001).

<sup>529</sup> Quoted in Chris Baker 2002, p. 2.

<sup>530</sup> Focus Canada 2001 (March 2001).

<sup>531</sup> Quoted in Baker 2002, p. 2.

Canadians, particularly in light of their other, ongoing sources of insecurity.”<sup>532</sup> The public’s continued focus on issues that were relevant to the state prior to September 11, 2001 is indicative of the absence of the securitization process in Canada. This brief heightened concern with issues of national security in Canada was accompanied by a rise in Canadian nationalism, expressed in support for a “Canadian” approach to counterterrorism.

*Exerting the “Canadian Way” While Adopting U.S.-Centric Policies*

In keeping with the “Canadian Way” narrative adopted by the executive branch following the attacks on the United States, Canadian public opinion in the post-9/11 period favoured a differentiation of Canadian values from American security policies. Canadians aimed to affirm their distinctiveness from their Southern neighbours. This is demonstrated by a survey, released on Canada Day in 2002, which found that, while fifty-eight percent of those polled thought that Canada had become more like the United States in the past decade, fifty-two percent said they wanted Canada to become “less like the U.S.” in the future. Only a small minority (twelve percent) favoured increasing convergence with the United States.<sup>533</sup> Another survey, conducted around the same time, found similar results. Of those polled, thirty-five percent wanted “more distant ties” from the United States, thirty-six percent wanted to “remain the same”, and only twenty-eight percent wanted “closer ties” to the U.S.<sup>534</sup> Another study concluded that ninety-four

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<sup>532</sup> T. MacCharles. “Canadians Healthier, Wealthier, But More Pessimistic, Study Finds.” *Toronto Star*. (July 15, 2002).

<sup>533</sup> P. Calami. “Canada Growing Stronger, Poll Says.” *Toronto Star*. (July 1, 2002).

<sup>534</sup> L. Moore. “Canadians Frustrated With U.S., Poll Finds.” *The National Post*. (September 7, 2002).

percent of Canadians believe that they “live in one of the best countries of the world”; with seventy-seven percent answering that they “would be born in Canada if they had the choice” and only nineteen percent supporting Canada becoming part of the United States.<sup>535</sup> This study, released by the Center for Research Information on Canada (CRIC) a year after the 9/11 attacks further reveals that Canadian public opinion favours Canadian policy differing from American policies in order to avoid claims that, “Canadian policy is being dictated from Washington”.<sup>536</sup> This support for a Canadian approach to counterterrorism was influenced by a divergence in Canadian public opinion from American public opinion with respect to support for armed intervention abroad.

While the American public supported armed intervention in the Middle East as a means of mitigating the threat posed by the potential for future terrorist attacks, the Canadian public was more cautious. In keeping with the executive’s support for UN-sanctioned intervention, the Canadian public was reluctant to get drawn into an American-led conflict. This is not to say that Canadians did not want to participate in foreign missions abroad. The desire for Canada to participate in world affairs on its own terms was especially strong in young Canadians. A 2001

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<sup>535</sup> D. York. “Canada Is Still No. 1 In the Hearts of Most Canadians, Studies Suggest.” *The Globe and Mail*. (July 27, 2002). And D. York. “Canadians Overwhelmingly Happy With Homeland.” *The Globe and Mail*. (July 26, 2002).

<sup>536</sup> See Center for Research and Information on Canada. “More Canadians Distance Themselves from U.S. Neighbours”  
<[http://www.cric.ca/pdf/cric\\_poll/borderlines\\_ca\\_us/borderlines\\_pressneighbours\\_sept2002.pdf](http://www.cric.ca/pdf/cric_poll/borderlines_ca_us/borderlines_pressneighbours_sept2002.pdf)>

See also: Reg Whitaker. “Keeping Up With the Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 9/11 in Historical and Comparative Context.” *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*. V. 41, N. 2, 3 (2003), p. 253 – 264.



survey by CRIC determined that only nine percent of Canadians aged eighteen to twenty-four wanted the country to be “less involved” in world affairs.<sup>537</sup> Public opinion expert, Matthew Mendelson, suggested in a speech made in Banff in 2002 that, “Strands of internationalism have been incorporated into Canadian’s identity: they believe Canada has a moral obligation to the world, they would like to encourage the adoption of Canadian values abroad, and they believe these can be furthered by trade and engagement in the world.”<sup>538</sup> An Ipsos-Reid poll conducted in 2002, found that both Canadians and Americans supported a UN-led military intervention in Afghanistan: however, Canadians favoured higher spending on foreign aid, while American citizens wanted less spending on foreign aid.<sup>539</sup> This divergence in opinions should not be confused as a Canadian dislike for their Southern neighbours. While a January, 2003 Ipsos-Reid/CTV/Globe and Mail survey showed that while only thirty-nine percent of Canadians said that they thought the Bush administration was “a force of good in the world”, eighty-three percent nonetheless said that they liked Americans.<sup>540</sup> This interest in a distinctly Canadian approach to world affairs demonstrates the public’s desire to assert Canada’s difference from the U.S. This is confirmed by a CRIC survey, which demonstrated that two-thirds of Canadians felt that their own basic values were different from American values. Clearly, the Canadian public is interested in demonstrating that

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<sup>537</sup> Study quoted in: Andrew Parkin. “Pro-Canadian, Anti-America or Anti-War? Canadian Public Opinion on the Eve of War.” *Policy Options*. (April 2003), p. 5.

<sup>538</sup> Matthew Mendelson, quoted in Andrew Parkin. “Pro-Canadian, Anti-American or Anti-War? Canadian Public Opinion on the Eve of War.” *Policy Options*. (April 2003), p. 5-6.

<sup>539</sup> Ipsos-Reid (2002).

<sup>540</sup> Ipsos-Reid/CTV/Globe and Mail (January 2003).

the state should be seen as an independent entity, outside of American control and influence.

The influence of the media on defense and security issues is evident in public perceptions regarding the cause of the terrorist attacks, where there is a surprising convergence of public opinion. A poll sampling both Canadian and American responses conducted in early May 2002 found that both public audiences had “widespread suspicions about the oft-noted porous border”, and that seventy-five percent of the American respondents and eighty-one percent of the Canadian respondents believed that “potential terrorists had slipped into the United States through Canada.”<sup>541</sup> Even more surprising is the assignment of blame by the two state publics. Over seventy percent of Americans placed the blame for inadequate border security on their own government and its lack of immigration and border security measures. In Canada, however, forty-two percent of those polled put the blame on Canada’s immigration and refugee system, with an additional twenty percent blaming both Canada and the United States.<sup>542</sup>

In keeping with the seemingly contradictory nature of Canadian public opinion, the public’s desire to express their difference from their American neighbours was accompanied by support for the adoption of U.S.-centric security policies. Concerns about maintaining a border open for trade with the United States

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<sup>541</sup> Ipsos-Reid. “Three Quarters of Americans Believe Potential Terrorists Have Slipped Into U.S. Through Canada.” (May 10, 2002).

<sup>542</sup> Ipsos-Reid 2002.

suggest that the public did not equate the adoption of more stringent security policies with a forfeiture of Canadian sovereignty. For example, eighty-seven percent of those surveyed in a poll published in the *Globe and Mail* in October, 2001, said that they supported eliminating major differences between how Canada and the United States treat undocumented travellers, refugee claimants and illegal immigrants.<sup>543</sup> Other polls suggest that Canadians were not concerned about adopting stricter terrorist screening measures restricting national sovereignty.<sup>544</sup> Additional public opinion polls determined that Canadians were “willing to give up some freedom in return for security,<sup>545</sup>” suggesting that the public would go along with American-initiated changes to airport security and border security policies. Focus Canada data supports the claim that the Canadian public did not equate co-operation with the United States on border security or defence issues with reduced national sovereignty.<sup>546</sup> Support for American-initiated policies was not limited to the security sector. In the same time period, despite a lack of confidence in the Bush administration, Canadian public opinion polls demonstrated support for an expansion of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement to cover labour as well as goods and services, and increased support for a common border policy.<sup>547</sup> The conflict between the public’s desire to express the “Canadian difference” from the United States and the willingness to support policies that seem to favour American

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<sup>543</sup> A. Picard. “Most Want PM to Cede Sovereignty Over the Border.” *The Globe and Mail*. (October 1, 2001).

<sup>544</sup> “Canadians Feel Closer to US Since Attack.” *Toronto Star*. (September 28, 2001).

<sup>545</sup> Ipsos-Reid. (October 5, 2001). See also: H. Adelman “Canadian Borders and Immigration Post 9/11.” *International Migration Review*. V. 36, N. 1, p. 15-28.

<sup>546</sup> Baker 2002, p. 6.

<sup>547</sup> Parkin 2003, p. 6.

interests corresponds to another contradiction in Canadian public opinion between support for multiculturalism and civil liberties and a rise in post-9/11 Islamophobia.

*The Protection of Civil Liberties, Support for Multiculturalism, and Rising Islamophobia*

Another important aspect of Canadian public opinion in the post-9/11 period was support for the protection of civil liberties in the face of American requests for security sector reforms. Surveys conducted by Environics Research Group found that, following the attacks on the United States, a majority of Canadians answered that the threat of terrorism did not justify placing limits on any of our civil rights and freedoms. This same poll also indicated that, while Canadians were willing to consider some limitations being places on “rights protecting unreasonable search and seizure and freedom of association”, support for these rights restrictions was highly conditional.<sup>548</sup> It was also revealed that eighty-seven percent of those polled believed that they had the freedom to criticize the Canadian government.<sup>549</sup> This suggests that the populace felt that the government would take into consideration the public’s support for the safeguarding of civil liberties. It is interesting to note, however, that the public’s support for the protection of rights and freedoms is inapplicable in some circumstances. For example, while Canadians indicated their preference for the protection of rights guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there seem to be limits on the level to which they are willing to protect these rights.

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<sup>548</sup> Baker 2002, p. 5

<sup>549</sup> IBID

While Canadians indicated their support for the protection of civil liberties in the post-9/11 period, there was public criticism of individual citizens who were perceived to have taken these rights “too far”. The incident that came to be known as the “Thobani Affair” is an example of the self-imposed limits on free speech Canadians accepted in this time period. A University of British Columbia professor, Sunera Thobani, made a presentation at a conference in which she publicly criticized the Bush administration and its foreign policy, calling it “bloodthirsty” and “vengeful”. She also questioned Canadian acceptance of an American-led war in Afghanistan and foreign intervention in Iraq. An outpouring of public rage at Thobani’s “insensitive” comments at the conference led to a police investigation into whether or not she should be charged criminally with the willful promotion of hatred against Americans. Her conference presentation was publicly denounced by both the Premier of British Columbia and Prime Minister Chretien. Canadian jurist, Kent Roach, notes that the University of British Columbia sought to uphold Thobani’s right to freedom of speech from the beginning of this affair. The university later supported her complaint to the Police Complaints Commission, which ruled that the RCMP had acted “inappropriately” in investigating Dr. Thobani.<sup>550</sup> Despite public condemnation of her conference remarks, an Ekos poll found that many Canadians supported Thobani’s position that American foreign policy was one of the causes of September 11. This poll, which was conducted prior to Thobani’s presentation, determined that thirty-three percent of Canadians polled

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<sup>550</sup> See Kent Roach. “Security and Civil Liberties After September 11: The Canadian Response” in Bruce Campbell and Ed Finn, eds., *Living With Uncle*. (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, Ltd., 2006), p. 55 – 56.

believed that the most important cause of the 9/11 attacks was American foreign policy.<sup>551</sup> It is noteworthy that criticisms of Thobani's presentation often referenced her race as justification for the imposition of limits on her free speech. Media reports suggested that it was inappropriate for her, as an immigrant to Canada, to criticize the policies of one of our allies.<sup>552</sup> This reference to Dr. Thobani's race is in keeping with the contradiction inherent in the Canadian public's support for multiculturalism during a period of increased Islamophobia.

Multiculturalism, the notion that different cultures can exist in a given state, has long been an important facet of Canadian culture. Polls show that support for multiculturalism remained steady even after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. An Environics poll conducted in 2002 determined that Canadians hold positive views of immigration and multiculturalism. The poll further concluded that the majority of Canadians view their multicultural society in a positive manner, "either as a source of pride, cultural enrichment or as part of the essential nature of (the) country."<sup>553</sup> The Canadian public overwhelmingly supported the rights of immigrants with seventy-seven percent of those polled disagreeing with the statement, "citizens who were not born in Canada should not have the same rights and privileges as those who are born here."<sup>554</sup> The public also supported the retention of immigrants'

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<sup>551</sup> Ekos Research Associates. "Security, Sovereignty and Continentalism: Canadian Perspectives on September 11. (September 27, 2001). Quoted in: Kent Roach. *September 11: Consequences for Canada*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), p. 121.

<sup>552</sup> See Roach 2003, p. 12.

<sup>553</sup> Baker 2002, p. 5.

<sup>554</sup> IBID

cultures and religious traditions, with fifty-five percent of respondents disagreeing with the statement that, “in order to be fully accepted into Canadians society, minorities must give up parts of their religion and culture that conflict with Canadian norms.”<sup>555</sup> Multiculturalism was further recognized as an important component of Canadian identity by another poll, which concluded that even in the post-9/11 period, active support for cultural diversity remained strong. This poll found that ninety-two percent of those questioned agreed that “every Canadian has a responsibility to make sure that people from different races and cultures feel welcome in this country”.<sup>556</sup> This support for multiculturalism suggests that Canadians, following then Prime Minister Chretien’s lead, would support the fair and equitable treatment of Arab-Canadians in the post-9/11 period. Despite support for the principles of multiculturalism, however, there was a rise in Islamophobia in the months following September 11, 2001.

Again, the contradictory nature of Canadian public opinion in the post-9/11 period, was seen in the support for civil liberties and multiculturalism, but was matched by a rise in Islamophobia. ‘Islamophobia’ can be broadly defined as “a social anxiety toward Islam and Muslims.”<sup>557</sup> This fear then, “translates into individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression and discrimination.”<sup>558</sup>

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<sup>556</sup> CRIC 2002 in Andrew Parkin 2003, p. 6.

<sup>557</sup> Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg. *Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy*. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), p. 5. See also Chris Allen. *Islamophobia*. (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010).

<sup>558</sup> Jasmine Zine. “Dealing With September 12<sup>th</sup>: The Challenge of Anto-Islamophobia Education.” *Orbit*. V. 33, N. 3. (2002).

This social unease often leads to people of Arab descent being marginalized within the state, and can be further expressed by violence against Muslims. A poll conducted by Ekos in late September of 2001 found that fifty percent of those surveyed supported police and customs officials giving “special attention” to “individuals of Arab origins.”<sup>559</sup> These findings were supported by a poll conducted by the Toronto Star which found that, even a year after the 9/11 attacks, forty-eight percent of Canadians supported the racial profiling of Arabs and thirty-seven percent indicated that September 11 had a negative effect on their perceptions of Arab people.<sup>560</sup> The negative perception of Muslims led to a rise in racially motivated incidents directed at Arab Canadians. The Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Association (CMCLA) reported an increase in verbal abuse, physical threats, and destruction of property reported by Canadians of Arab descent.<sup>561</sup> An independent poll conducted by CSIS determined that sixty-one percent of Canadians who are worried about terrorism dislike Muslims.<sup>562</sup> This same poll further concluded that a majority of Canadians view Islam as a “violent religion” which encouraged followers to participate in anti-Western attacks.<sup>563</sup> As a result of this rise in Islamophobia, a poll conducted by Environics found that Muslim Canadians felt increasingly isolated and marginalized in Canadian society. Twelve percent of those polled stated that the aspect of Canadian society that they liked the least was

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<sup>559</sup> Ekos Research Associates. “Security, Sovereignty and Continentalism: Canadian Perspectives on September 11.” (September 27, 2001).

<sup>560</sup> “Canadians Moving On” *Toronto Star*. (September 9, 2002).

<sup>561</sup> Jasmine Zine. “Dealing With September 12<sup>th</sup>: The Challenge of Anti-Islamophobia Education.” *Orbit*. V. 33, N. 3. (2002).

<sup>562</sup> Kanishka Notes.

<sup>563</sup> IBID See also: Wayne Hanniman. “Canadian Muslims, Islamophobia and National Security.” *International Journal of Law, Crime, and Justice*. V. 36 (2008), p. 271-285.



“discrimination”.<sup>564</sup> This anti-Muslim sentiment was further expressed by support for the creation of more stringent refugee policies in Canada.

Anti-Arab and Anti-Muslim public sentiment were also used to support the creation of more restrictive refugee policies. Roach notes that public distrust of those of Arab descent led to “support in Canada for tightening immigration and refugee policies.”<sup>565</sup> A newspaper poll released by *The Ottawa Citizen* found that forty-nine percent of Canadians supported “restricting the number of immigrants that come to Canada from Muslim countries.” In November of 2002, the same poll found that forty-four percent of those questioned still supported restrictions on immigration of people from Muslim countries.<sup>566</sup> This rise in what can only be deemed “intolerance” stands in stark contrast to the support for multiculturalism advocated by the Canadian public opinion.

*Une Nation Distincte: Public Opinion in Quebec*

Public opinion in the province of Quebec varied significantly from that of the rest of the country in the post-9/11 period. Louis Belanger argues that, in the post-9/11 period, it is necessary to examine public opinion in Quebec separately from that held by the rest of the country since there has been a noticeable shift in public

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<sup>564</sup> Environics. “Policy Research Initiative, Seminar on Second Generation Canadians: Muslims and Multiculturalism in Canada.” (August 23, 2007).

<sup>565</sup> Roach 2003, p. 144.

<sup>566</sup> M. Blatchford. “Canadian Attitudes on Immigration Hardening Against Muslims.” *Ottawa Citizen*. (December 21, 2002).

opinion in Quebec since the 9/11 attacks.<sup>567</sup> The difference in public opinion in Quebec when compared to the rest of the country was most noticeable when it came to the issue of foreign intervention in the Middle East and ‘security’ issues more generally. For example, a poll conducted by Environics found that fifty-six percent of Quebecers polled opposed Canadian participation in a UN-sanctioned intervention in the Middle East following the September 11 attacks, while only twenty-seven percent of the rest of the country opposed such an intervention.<sup>568</sup> Quebecers were also found to be much more strongly opposed to American-initiated security reforms. This rejection of foreign intervention signals a shift in Quebec public opinion given that support for Canada’s involvement in the NATO-led action in Kosovo in 1999 was the same as the rest of the country. The Quebec public’s rejection of foreign intervention was further signaled by a massive peace rally held in Montreal in February of 2003. This rally, which was organized by a loose coalition called “Collectif echec a la guerre”, led a march of 150 000 people to demonstrate their opposition to the war in Iraq on a freezing cold day in February.<sup>569</sup> This rally was the largest in the history of Quebec (at that time) and was “more than double the total mobilization in English-speaking cities in Canada on the same day.”<sup>570</sup> This massive demonstration against Canada’s participation in a foreign intervention signifies the importance of examining public opinion in Quebec

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<sup>567</sup> Louis Belanger. “Quebec and the World After 9/11: A ‘French’ Turn?” in Robert Wolfe, “More Safely on the Fence? A Round Table on the Possibility of a Canadian Foreign Policy After 9/11.” *Canadian Foreign Policy*. V. 11, N. 1 (Fall 2004), p. 109.

<sup>568</sup> Parkin 2003, p. 7.

<sup>569</sup> Belanger 2004, p. 108.

<sup>570</sup> IBID

separately from the rest of the country in order to get a more complete picture of public sentiment in Canada as a whole.

**The Populist Audience as One Component of “The Audience”**

While the elite audience is the first to respond to the articulation of a threat by the authorized speaker of security, the populist audience has the final say in determining whether or not an issue will be securitized. All three components of the audience in the philosophical variant of securitization theory must accept the threat articulated by the authorized speaker in order for an issue to be successfully securitized. The populist audience interacts with the two components of the elite audience – the policy elite and the media. While these two elite audience groups influence the populist audience, public opinion also shapes the responses of the media and policy elite. Thus, while both the policies and institutions created by the members of the policy elite, as well as the media frames used by the media affect public opinion, in this interconnected relationship amongst the audience groups, public opinion also shapes the policy formation process and the creation of media frames. The next chapter, a case study examining the American-initiated securitization of the Canada-United States border, demonstrates in more detail the various ways in which the three audience groups interact with each other.

***CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDY – HOMELAND SECURITY AT THE CANADA-UNITED STATES BORDER IN THE POST-9/11 PERIOD***

***Operationalizing Philosophical Securitization Theory***

The preceding chapters have demonstrated the ways in which the different audience groups interact with the authorized speakers of security during the securitization process. The authorized speakers of security initiate the securitization process by articulating an existential threat. If the process is to be successful, that threat will be accepted by the elite audience – members of the policy elite and the media – and transmitted to the populist audience – the general public. In order to fully understand the relationship amongst these different actors, it is useful to consider the interactions of the various audience groups during an actual security emergency. Case studies allow us to operationalize the philosophical variant of securitization theory in order to demonstrate its utility as a tool for assessing the ways that states react to threats to national security. While this study as a whole has considered some of the ways in which the United States came to securitize homeland security following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, an examination of the securitization of one aspect of this phenomena – the border – allows for a more complete, in-depth assessment of this process. This chapter will examine the American-initiated securitization of the Canada-United States border in the post-9/11 period.

An examination of the securitization of a specific policy area allows for consideration of the ways in which states interact when one state securitizes an issue area common to both. The United States' securitization of the Canada-United

States border has serious implications for Canada. While the Canadian state chose not to securitize this issue area, it has been directly impacted by the implementation of American security initiatives. Following the securitization of the Canada-United States border the Canadian state was compelled to respond to calls for increased security at the American approaches. These enhanced security measures have complicated the unique economic relationship between the two states. Canada has had to reform its own security measures in order to protect its special trade relationship with its southern neighbour. By studying Canada's response to the American securitization of the shared border, it is possible to suggest ways in which it might better respond to the potential securitization of future security threats by the United States so as to best secure Canadian interests.

### ***The Canada-United States Border: An Overview of Pre-9/11 Cooperation***

The Canada-United States border has traditionally been hailed as the “longest undefended border” in the world. Throughout the nineteenth century the two states' presence along the forty-ninth parallel was limited to the collection of customs duties.<sup>571</sup> Despite early disputes amongst the two states concerning the demarcation of the boundary line dividing the two countries, Canada and the United States have generally sought to collaborate on issues of border security. Traditionally, Canadian and American border security policies have focused on a “perimeter” approach to security, whereby the two states seek to harmonize their security policies in order to stop threats from reaching North America as a whole.

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<sup>571</sup> Stephen Clarkson. *Does North America Exist? Governing the Continent After NAFTA and 9/11*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 2008), p. 372.

For example, security concerns during the First World War led to a strengthening of immigration policies on both sides of the border aimed at preventing individuals who could pose a threat from being admitted to either country. While security concerns during the Second World War and the Cold War fueled an American desire to implement enhanced domestic security measures, the US did not single out its northern border as a weak spot in protecting the American homeland; instead, the state chose to focus on, "... building a perimeter around itself and Canada as protection against possible German, Japanese, and ultimately Soviet attack."<sup>572</sup> Historically, the United States has been more concerned with security issues at its southern border with Mexico such as illegal immigration and drug trafficking. This is evidenced by the fact that, prior to the 9/11 attacks, there were thirty times more US border officials patrolling the US-Mexico border than there were at the much longer, US-Canada border.<sup>573</sup> As a result of the seemingly "good" relationship between Canada and the United States, the two countries have managed their border relationship by creating bilateral partnerships to govern issues concerning immigration, trade, and security.

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the United States and Canada entered into numerous bi-lateral partnerships aimed at enhancing North American security while facilitating the free and secure movement of people and goods across the shared border. In 1995 the two states signed the US-Canada Shared Border Accord,

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<sup>572</sup> IBID

<sup>573</sup> See Patrick Lennox. *At Home and Abroad: The Canada-U.S. Relationship and Canada's Place in the World*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), p. 127.

which was intended to enhance collaboration between customs and immigration officials in order to address issues such as illegal immigration and smuggling. This agreement was followed by the 1997 Border Vision Initiative, which was established by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. This agreement was intended to facilitate intelligence sharing in order to combat illegal migration.<sup>574</sup> It led to the creation of the Cross-Border Crime Forum, an initiative established at various levels of government in order to generate cooperation amongst law-enforcement agencies in fighting transnational crimes such as cybercrime, missing children, money laundering, smuggling, and telemarketing fraud.<sup>575</sup>

These bilateral agreements culminated in the 1999 creation of the Canada-US Partnership (CUSP) signed by Prime Minister Jean Chretien and President Bill Clinton to “promote high-level dialogue among governments, border communities, and stakeholders on border management.”<sup>576</sup> CUSP was intended to streamline and harmonize border policies and management while expanding bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiency in managing issues such as immigration, law enforcement, and environmental protection. This agreement would allow the United States and Canada to employ a collaborative response to border issues affecting the two states. According to a press release describing CUSP, this agreement was, “... intended to serve as a forum to promote an integrated, binational approach to border

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<sup>574</sup> Stuart Farson. “From 49<sup>th</sup> Parallel to Security Perimeter: Changing Conceptions, Values, and Structures Along the US-Canada Border.” In James J.F. Forest, ed., *Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets*. (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), p. 48.

<sup>575</sup> IBID

<sup>576</sup> Clarkson 2008, p. 372.

management, and foster public dialogue and research on the border of the future.”<sup>577</sup> CUSP set forth three guiding principles for Canada-US cross-border cooperation: (1) streamline and harmonize border policies and management; (2) expand cooperation at and beyond the border; and (3) collaborate on common threats from outside Canada and the United States.<sup>578</sup> Since this was the last bilateral border agreement enacted prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it served as a model for cross border security initiatives in the post-9/11 period.

***The American Securitization of the Canada-United States Border***

Joseph S. Nye famously noted that, “Security is like oxygen. You tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it.”<sup>579</sup> The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States precipitated an immediate change in the way the U.S. views its borders. These attacks reaffirmed American vulnerability and precipitated a change in the way that the U.S addresses homeland security measures. As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters, the United States sought to securitize issues pertaining to homeland security in the post-9/11 period by framing the potential for future terrorist attacks as an existential threat against the state. While border security is an element of the state’s homeland security strategy, securing the American approaches against future attacks became especially important. For this reason, American policy towards the Canada- United States border shifted away

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<sup>577</sup> Quoted in Victor Konrad and Heather N. Niccol. *Beyond Walls: Re-Inventing the Canada- United States Borderlands*. (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), p. 10.

<sup>578</sup> Katharyn Bryk Friedman. “The Border After 9/11 – Security Trumps All.” *Policy Options*. (February 2010), p. 51.

<sup>579</sup> Joseph S. Nye. “Strategy for East Asia and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.” *Defense Issues*. V. 10, N.35 (1995).



from promoting bilateral agreements aimed at maintaining the two states' trade relationship by facilitating the movement of goods and people across the border in favour of restrictive border security policies. This un-precedented shift in American border policies has had serious implications for Canada. While the Canadian government opted not to securitize issues concerning homeland security, it has had to respond to the American securitization of border security policy in order to protect its own interests, particularly those concerning cross-border trade.

*Border Security on 9/11 – Alert Level One*

Following the initial attacks on September 11, United States border inspectors were placed on Alert Level One, which is defined as a “sustained, intensive, antiterrorism operation.”<sup>580</sup> By eleven o'clock in the morning, all airports, seaports, and land border crossings in the United States were placed on this alert level. At the time, this was the highest threat level short of a complete closure of the US border. Alden explains the significance of this alert status, noting that, “If the passenger information system that helped to identify the hijackers is the equivalent of a sieve, allowing most people to pass through unhindered and leaving behind only a few to be examined, a level one alert is like a sponge that traps everyone and everything.”<sup>581</sup> The implementation of Alert Level One necessitated that US Customs and INS officers carried out intensive examinations of all people and transport cargo approaching the US border.

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<sup>580</sup> Quoted in Peter Andreas and Thomas Biersteker. *The Rebordering of North America.* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 9.

<sup>581</sup> Edward Alden. *The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 9/11.* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008), p. 42.

The implementation of Alert Level One at all points of entry into the United States was the first indication that Canada would have to be cognizant of American efforts to securitize all facets of homeland security. This meant that every vehicle approaching the US border had to be stopped by border guards and thoroughly inspected. In some cases, this required completely unloading cargo from transport trailers and searching the contents before reloading the trucks and allowing the drivers to continue. All drivers were required to hand over valid driver's licenses and were then subjected to intensive questioning from border patrol guards. The increased scrutiny of those attempting to enter the United States created massive line-ups at the border. Capling and Nossal note that, in the days immediately following 9/11 the, "... line-ups of trucks stretched for more than thirty kilometers down highways leading into the U.S., with reported cross border waits of up to ten to twelve hours."<sup>582</sup> These inspections dramatically slowed the pace of cross-border traffic. Andreas and Biersteker found that, in the days after the attacks, "...delays for trucks hauling cargo across the border increased from one to two minutes to ten to fifteen hours, stranding parts, shipments, and perishable goods."<sup>583</sup> As will be demonstrated further in this chapter, the increased scrutiny of traffic entering the United States from Canada, and the resulting slow down in cross-border traffic, had an adverse affect on the Canadian economy by rendering the "just-in-time" trade model ineffective.

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<sup>582</sup> Ann Capling and Kim Richard Nossal. "The Contradictions of Regionalism in North America." In Rick Fawn, ed., *Globalising the Regional, Regionalising the Global*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 156.

<sup>583</sup> Andreas and Biersteker 2003, p. 10.

The designation of the Alert Level One security status at all American ports of entry demonstrated the immediacy with which the previous US model of border security, emphasizing collaboration and cooperation with Canada, shifted towards a securitized model where other states were expected to adopt American security standards. The “blame Canada” narrative, outlined in chapter four, came to dominate American elite perspectives on border security. A report in the *Christian Science Monitor* in the days immediately following 9/11 emphasized the need for American politicians to push for tighter controls at the northern border in order to prevent future terrorists from entering the US from the “safe haven for terrorists”, Canada.<sup>584</sup> The effect of the promulgation of this narrative was immediate, as the changes at the Canada-US border were given more permanent institutional expression with the creation of new bureaucracies focused on securing the homeland. Robert Bonner, then Commissioner of the US Customs Service noted that, “... after 9/11 our priority mission... changed from the interdiction of illegal drugs and the regulation of trade to a security prevention mission: preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States.”<sup>585</sup> Further proof that the United States sought to securitize its northern border is demonstrated by the fact that one month after the terrorist attacks (by October, 2001) the number of customs and immigration officers along the Canada-US border tripled. The

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<sup>584</sup> See Mark Clayton and Gail Russell Chaddock. “Terrorists Aided by Leaky US-Canada Line.” *Christian Science Monitor*. (September 19, 2001).

<sup>585</sup> Robert Bonner speaking in front of National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Seventh Public Hearing. (January 26, 2004).  
<[http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing7/witness\\_bonner.htm](http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing7/witness_bonner.htm)>

institutions and policies created by members of the American policy elite accelerated the securitization process. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, American Democrats and Republicans alike, "... rushed to pledge their commitment to strengthen border security."<sup>586</sup> As a result of this surge in support for renewed border security initiatives, all agencies tasked with the job of border control declared that counterterrorism was now their primary mission.

*President George W. Bush and the Securitization of the U.S. Border*

Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, President Bush's policy focus on the US border was dominated by his position on Mexican immigration. Bush's 1994 victory over Democrat incumbent, Ann Richards to become the Governor of Texas demonstrated that the future President's brand of Republicanism was decidedly different from other conservative politicians at the time. In opposing Proposition 187, an anti-immigration bill that sought to deny social services and education to Mexicans who had illegally immigrated to the United States, Bush stated, "I am not opposed to educating or providing social services to people who are in our state."<sup>587</sup> Alden argues that, "Bush's beliefs about borders arose from a particular strain of western conservatism that was reinforced by his own life experiences."<sup>588</sup> Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Bush, while not in favour of dismantling all border controls, strongly supported social programs aimed at educating the children of illegal Mexican immigrants, and even learned Spanish with the hope of increasing his share of the Hispanic vote in Texas. It is important to

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<sup>586</sup> Peter Andreas. *Border Games: Policing the U.S.- Mexico Divide, Second Edition*. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 154.

<sup>587</sup> Quoted in Alden 2008, p. 55.

<sup>588</sup> IBID

note that, following his election as President, Bush's first official state trip was not to Canada, as was traditionally the case, but rather to Mexico to meet with Mexican President Vincente Fox. That Bush's policy towards the US border shifted so significantly, from a stance that favoured open immigration and limited controls at the ports of entry to one that advocated strict controls over who could be admitted to the United States, demonstrates how quickly the issue of border controls was securitized.

While President Bush did not explicitly mention the Canada-United States border in his speeches immediately following the 9/11 attacks, his call for increased homeland security measures to protect American citizens served to convey the existential nature of the threat to the American approaches. As seen earlier in this study, President Bush sought to convey to the American public that the potential for future terrorist attacks on American soil constituted an existential threat to the state's security. Implicit in the President's calls for enhanced homeland security policies was the notion that security needed to be strengthened at the US borders in order to prevent would-be terrorists from entering the United States to carry out attacks.

In his second State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, delivered just four months after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush affirmed that, "Our first priority must always be the security of our nation, and that will be reflected in

the budget I send to Congress.”<sup>589</sup> This statement affirms the President’s conviction that more money needed to be spent in order to secure the American approaches. The President further stated, “My budget nearly doubles funding for a sustained strategy of homeland security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence.”<sup>590</sup> Border Security emerged as an important security objective in order to prevent would-be terrorists from entering the United States to carry out future attacks.

President Bush continued to emphasize the importance of securing the American border approaches throughout his two terms in office. In a speech given in Atlanta, Georgia on September 7, 2006, President Bush affirmed that, “Since 9/11 we’ve addressed the gaps in our defenses that these operatives exploited. We’ve upgraded technology. We’ve added layers of security to correct weaknesses in our immigration and visa systems.”<sup>591</sup> Many of the “defenses” that Bush was describing were implemented to harden the United States’ border in order to prevent would-be terrorists from entering the States through Mexico or Canada. Bush’s speech further noted, “We merged 22 government agencies into a single Department of Homeland Security and tripled spending for homeland security on our airlines, on our ports and our borders and other critical areas.”<sup>592</sup> Five years after the 9/11 terrorist

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<sup>589</sup> George W. Bush. “Second State of the Union Address.” (January 29, 2002). <[http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/George\\_W.\\_Bush%27s\\_Second\\_State\\_of\\_the\\_Union\\_Address](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/George_W._Bush%27s_Second_State_of_the_Union_Address)>

<sup>590</sup> IBID

<sup>591</sup> George W. Bush. “Speech in Atlanta Georgia.” Printed in *The New York Times*. (September 7, 2006).

<sup>592</sup> IBID

attacks, the President still acknowledged the existential threat of terrorism, and the need to reinforce border security as part of the nation's homeland security response.

*The Elite Audience – Members of the Policy Elite and Securitization of the U.S. Border*

The securitization of the United States' border is perhaps best demonstrated by the response of the policy elite to calls from the executive to implement strict homeland security protocols. Following the 9/11 attacks members of the House and Senate and career bureaucrats implemented sweeping changes to U.S. border security policies. The 9/11 Commission Report suggested that past failings in properly screening and investigating those entering the US had contributed to the terrorist attacks. The report offered recommendations that called for sweeping changes to the way the US had approached border security in the past. The USA PATRIOT Act, which has been discussed in detail in preceding chapters, contained a specific section titled, "Protecting the Northern Border", which singled out lax Canadian security policies as a potential risk to U.S. security. Additional legislation such as the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 further demonstrated the ways in which members of the policy elite perpetuated the securitization of the Canada-United States border.

In late 2002 the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission), an independent, bipartisan commission was created by legislation and the signature of President George W. Bush. The objective of this independent body was to report on the events leading up

to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Commission was also, “mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.”<sup>593</sup> The Commission’s final report was released on July 22, 2004. One of the findings released in the Commission’s report was that weak security at the United States’ northern border with Canada posed a significant risk to U.S. security. The Commission argued that, “the challenge for national security in an age of terrorism is to prevent the very few people who may pose overwhelming risks from entering or remaining in the United States undetected.”<sup>594</sup> The report stated that, “It is elemental to border security to know who is coming into the country. Today more than nine million people are in the United States outside the legal immigration system. We must be able to monitor and respond to entrances between our ports of entry, working with Canada and Mexico as much as possible.”<sup>595</sup> It also asserted that, “Americans should not be exempt from carrying biometric passports or otherwise enabling their identities to be securely verified when they enter the United States; nor should Canadians or Mexicans.”<sup>596</sup> The implication is that Canada will have to modify its own methods of verifying citizenship if it wants its citizens to be allowed entrance into the United States. Canada was expected to adopt the biometric monitoring systems that were to be used in the United States if it wanted to ensure the continued movement of goods and people across the border.

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<sup>593</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.  
<<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm>>

<sup>594</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report. (W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., Authorized Copy, 2004), p. 383.

<sup>595</sup> IBID, p. 390.

<sup>596</sup> IBID



The USA PATRIOT Act singled out a lack of security at the United States' northern border, and lax Canadian border security protocols, as posing a threat to American homeland security. In the section of the Act titled, "Protecting the Border" there is a subsection dedicated to "Protecting the Northern Border." This section of the act calls for increased spending to allow for more U.S. border guards to be hired to secure the northern approaches to the United States. Subsection 402 of the Act states that the number of U.S. border guards at the Canada-United States border needs to be tripled. It further recommends appropriations of an additional fifty million dollars each for the INS and the Customs service to improve and supplement their monitoring equipment at the northern border.<sup>597</sup> This Act also calls for the Department of Homeland Security to take the lead in standardizing screening procedures at the U.S. border. Subsection 403 proposes "Access by the Department of State and the INS to certain identifying information in the criminal history records of visa applicants for admission to the United States". Specifically, it calls for better intelligence sharing between the FBI and U.S. customs and border officials in order to prevent those suspected to be involved in terrorist activities from entering the U.S. through Canada.

The section of the PATRIOT Act concerned with the Northern Border is not the only part of the report that has direct relevance for Canadian policymakers. The section titled, "Enhanced Immigration Provisions" also implied that Canada would

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<sup>597</sup> For a complete summary of the 9/11 Commission report see: Charles Doyle. "Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act." *CRS Report for Congress*. (December 10, 2001), p. 32-35.

have to make changes to its own immigration policies. This section directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to implement the use of biometric technology and tamper-proof documents at all ports of entry so that this information can be used by federal law enforcement officers to identify and detain individuals who pose a threat to U.S. national security. In this way, the legislation supports the 9/11 Commission's finding that,

“The U.S. border security system should be integrated into a larger network of screening points that includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclear reactors. The President should direct the Department of Homeland Security to lead the effort to design a comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and setting common standards with systemic goals in mind.”<sup>598</sup>

The implication was that Canada would also have to adopt biometric screening methods to monitor the movement of people across the border.

The securitization of the U.S. border is further evidenced by the enactment of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVRA). This Act represented, “the most comprehensive immigration-related response to the terrorist threat.”<sup>599</sup> Signed into law by President Bush on May 14, 2002, Ackelson notes this legislation was the result of, “... numerous federal politicians (who) joined the call for stronger border enforcement, arguing... that the defense of the nation begins with the defense of its borders.”<sup>600</sup> This law necessitated that U.S. consulates

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<sup>598</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, p. 384.

<sup>599</sup> Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act 2002. (PL 107-173). Center for Immigration Studies.

<[www.cis.org/articles/2002/back502.html](http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/back502.html)>

<sup>600</sup> Jason Ackelson. “Constructing Security on the U.S.-Mexico Border.” *Political Geography*. V. 24, N.2 (2005), p. 177.

and embassies create a terrorist “look-out” committee to search out known and suspected terrorists within their jurisdictions. This information would then be shared with other agencies in the United States with information on potential terrorists residing abroad being added to domestic government databases.<sup>601</sup> This act also required that all visas issued by October 2004 have biometric identifiers. In addition to increasing consular officers’ access to electronic information needed to issue visas, the EBSVRA also expanded the training requirements for all embassy and consular officials involved in the issuance of visas granting entry to the United States.<sup>602</sup> The strengthening of American security protocol for issuing visas to the United States suggests that Canada would be expected to follow suit in adopting new policies for granting visas and monitoring out-of-state visitors.

*The Elite Audience – The Media and the Securitization of the U.S. Border*

The American media perpetuated the securitization of the U.S.-Canada border by framing reports about the terrorists as having entered the United States through Canada. The “blame Canada” narrative suggested to the American public that there was a need to harden the northern border. According to Donald K. Alper and James Loucky, the images of potential danger emanating from Canada that dominated American media reports, “...became part of a national narrative about security in North America. They conform to a script of international relations that attaches meanings to borders associated with dominant post-9/11 images of threat

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<sup>601</sup> For more information refer to: Julie Farnam. *U.S. Immigration Laws Under the Threat of Terrorism*. (Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 85.

<sup>602</sup> See: Ruth Ellen Wasem. *Visa Security Policy: Roles of the Departments of State and Homeland Security*. (DIANE Publishing, 2011), p. 4.

stemming from dangerous transnational forces.”<sup>603</sup> Canada was portrayed as a safe haven for terrorists and the Canadian border was described as a sieve that allowed fanatics to gain entry to the United States in order to carry out attacks.

*The Populist Audience and the Securitization of the U.S. Border*

The polls examined in Chapter Five demonstrate the degree to which the American populace was willing to accept all measures aimed at securing the United States against further terrorist attacks. Public support for strict border controls at ports of entry into the United States was steady in the years after 9/11. A May 2006 Gallup Poll found that seventy-four percent of Americans said that it was “extremely important” or “very important” to control the U.S. border, and seventy-one percent said it was important to “deal with existing illegal immigrants” in order to strengthen the country’s security.<sup>604</sup> The same poll further demonstrated that a majority of the American public (fifty-two percent) felt that implementing more stringent border security policies was necessary in order to prevent future terrorist attacks.<sup>605</sup> It seems that the promulgation of the “blame Canada” narrative had the effect of generating public support for increased security at America’s borders.

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<sup>603</sup> Donald K. Alper and James Loucky. “Canada-U.S. Border Securitization: Implications for Binational Cooperation.” *Canadian-American Public Policy, Occasional Paper N. 72* (University of Maine, November 2007), p. 6

<sup>604</sup> Frank Newport. “Bush’s Speech on Immigration Closely Follows Public Opinion.” (May 17, 2006).

<<http://www.gallup.com/poll/22834/Bushs-Speech-Immigration-Closely-Follows-Public-Opinion.aspx>>

<sup>605</sup> IBID

## **Implications of Securitization of the American Border for Canada**

### *Protecting the Canada-United States Cross Border Trade Relationship*

Canada's primary concern regarding the securitization of the U.S. border has been the protection of continued cross-border trade. These two countries have the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Canadian imports from the United States amount to twenty-four percent of total U.S. merchandise exports, while American import of Canadian goods accounted for almost nineteen percent of total U.S. merchandise import.<sup>606</sup> Three land crossings account for the majority of trade between the two states. Two of these crossings are between Michigan and Ontario, and the other is at the border between New York and Ontario. Daniel Drache explains that the bulk of cross-border trade involves "the Foundry", the area around the Great Lakes region that stretches between Chicago, Toronto, and Ottawa and is anchored in Middle America and central Canada.<sup>607</sup> The province of Ontario sends ninety-five percent of its exports to the United States, and "... almost eighty percent of U.S.-based multinationals operate from the golden triangle of south-western Ontario."<sup>608</sup> This high volume of cross-border trade is bolstered by a reliance on a just-in-time production model.

Border security measures can affect trade by halting the movement of materials necessary for production across the Canada-U.S border. Much of the

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<sup>606</sup> Steven Globerman and Paul Storer. *The Impacts of 9/11 on Canada-U.S. Trade*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2008), p. 25.

<sup>607</sup> Daniel Drache. *Borders Matter: Homeland Security and the Search for North America*. (Black Point: Fernwood Publishing, 2004), p. 45.

<sup>608</sup> Drache 2004, p. 45.

production that takes place in the two states relies on a just-in-time manufacturing model. This model of production, which originated with Toyota, functions by, “... organizing manufacturing processes so that the best quality parts, manufactured or purchased, are supplied to the shop floor only when they are needed – not too soon and not too late.”<sup>609</sup> Since the supply chains of many manufacturing sectors, such as the automobile industry, span the Canada-U.S. border, business relies on the continued movement of production materials across state lines. Bonsor notes that, “In the automobile sector, assembly plants in both countries have contracts with suppliers located across the Canada-U.S. border that specify delivery of parts in periods as short as six hours.”<sup>610</sup> Industries such as automobile assembly and the produce industry, where perishability is a factor in cross-border shipping, are examples of time-sensitive commodities, “... for which shipment delays significantly degrade the economic value of the shipments.”<sup>611</sup> Delays in the transport of parts needed for production or of perishable food items because of American concerns relating to securing the border would have negative consequences for industry on both sides of the border.

The American securitization of the border threatened the continuation of the Canada-United States trade relationship. In a presentation to business leaders in Toronto, Paul Cellucci, who was then the U.S. Ambassador to Canada warned

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<sup>609</sup> Steve Krar. “Just-in-Time Manufacturing” in Stephen F. Krar and Arthur R. Gill. *Exploring Advanced Manufacturing Technologies*. (Industrial Press, Inc., 2003), p. 10-5-1.

<sup>610</sup> Norman Bonsor. “Fixing the Potholes in North American Transportation Systems.” *Choices*. V. 10, N. 8 (2004), p. 14.

<sup>611</sup> Globerman and Storer 2008, p. 30.

industry leaders that, “There is a lot of disappointment in Washington over the level of Canadian support for the war effort.” He suggested that this lack of support and cooperation on security issues could have a disastrous effect on Canadian business because in post-9/11 America, “security will trump trade”.<sup>612</sup> Delays at the border due to enhanced security measures would affect not only companies using a just-in-time manufacturing model, but also the movement of people across the border, which is also essential for trade. For example, the movement of salespeople and engineers across the border complements the cross-border sale of electronic and pharmaceutical products. In this way, slowed down border crossing times, for both people and goods, would impede cross-border trade in the affected industries. Globerman and Storer note that, “Canadian production that can be easily substituted for by U.S. production is particularly vulnerable to border delays because the additional costs incurred in shipping goods from Canada could cause buyers to source their supplies in the United States.”<sup>613</sup> Enhanced security at the Canada-U.S. border has diminished the profitability of cross-border trade.

The American securitization of the border has increased the costs for Canadian businesses conducting cross-border trade. Delays in the movement of people and goods across the Canada-U.S. border have financial consequences for industry. A study conducted by Taylor, Robideaux, and Jackson identified two broad categories of costs incurred by manufacturers shipping goods across the border.

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<sup>612</sup> Quoted in Bernard Simon. “Trade Concerns as Canada Sits Out War.” *New York Times*. (April 1, 2003).

<sup>613</sup> Globerman and Storer 2008, p. 30.

The first category relates to increased transit times and greater uncertainty in predicting when goods will arrive across the border. The second category includes administrative costs associated with complying with new U.S., security-conscious customs procedures.<sup>614</sup> Their study further found that unexpected transit times for goods crossing the border led to the inefficient operation of shipping and manufacturing capacities, which led to additional costs to business. Ultimately, based on information gathered during the summer of 2002, the authors concluded that, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, “border related costs range from US \$7.52 billion to US \$13.2 billion with a ‘most likely’ cost estimate of US \$10.3 billion.”<sup>615</sup>

A study conducted by DAMF Consulting in 2003 focused on the cost of Canadian businesses’ compliance with new U.S. border security policies. It examined the costs of delayed border crossings and the transaction costs associated with additional paperwork generated by the new American policies. The authors determined that truck drivers crossing the Canada-U.S. border in the post-9/11 period faced an additional sixty to ninety minute delay at the border resulting from enhanced security measures. They concluded that, “the estimated cost impact of security measures on the Canadian trucking industry is between CAN \$179 million

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<sup>614</sup> See John Taylor, Douglas Robideaux and George Jackson. *The U.S.-Canada Border: Cost Impacts, Causes, and Short to Long Term Management Options*. (Allendale: Grand Valley State University, 2003).

<sup>615</sup> IBID



and \$406 million in 2005 dollars.”<sup>616</sup> Canadian businesses had an interest in pushing the state to negotiate bilateral agreements with the United States that would allow for trucks to be “pre-cleared” so as to minimize wait times at the border.

*Preventing the “Mexicanization” of the Canada-United States Border*

Canada sought to respond to the American securitization of the border in order to protect its “special relationship” with the United States. Specifically, Canadian policymakers sought to prevent what Andreas has termed the “Mexicanization” of the Canada-United States border. In the period prior to the 9/11 attacks, Canada enjoyed a relatively close relationship with the United States where the movement of people and goods across the shared border took place with minimal inspection. This was not the case with the United States shared border with Mexico where U.S. concerns over the illegal movement of drugs and people resulted in careful inspections of all vehicles crossing into the United States. Andreas explains that, “What began as U.S. drug and immigration control anxieties, mostly focused southward, have now been extended northward, as U.S. border security worries have shifted in the post-9/11 era to focus on the potential entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.”<sup>617</sup> Canada’s response to the American securitization of the border has sought to differentiate the Canada-U.S. border from the U.S.-Mexico border.

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<sup>616</sup> DAMF Consulting. “The Economic Impact of Post-September 11, 2001, U.S. Border Security Measures on the Canadian Trucking Industry.” (DAMF Consulting, 2005).

<sup>617</sup> Peter Andreas. “The Mexicanization of the US-Canada Border.” *International Journal*. (Spring 2005), p. 449.

Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the border relationship between the United States and Mexico was contentious at best. American concerns about illegal Mexican immigration and drug trafficking resulted in the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border. Stemming from a perceived “crisis” of illegal immigration from Mexico, the United States launched “Operation Gatekeeper” south of San Diego, and “Operation Hold-the-Line” in El Paso. These initiatives, which were implemented in 1994, were part of a larger effort to deter illegal immigrants from attempting to cross the border into the United States. These programs deterred Mexicans from attempting to enter the U.S. by drastically increasing the number of American border guards posted to that section of the border, and by constructing a fourteen mile-long wall, which stretched to the Pacific Ocean.<sup>618</sup> In addition to these measures aimed at preventing illegal immigration, the United States also called on the military to “play an interdiction support role” in preventing illegal drugs from crossing the border.<sup>619</sup> The growing trade relationship between the U.S. and Mexico resulting from NAFTA did not prevent the U.S. from enacting strict militaristic policies aimed at preventing the illegal movement of people and goods across its southern border. The hard line taken by the United States in dealing with its shared border with Mexico was something Canadian policymakers sought to avoid in the post-9/11 period.

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<sup>618</sup> For more information on these initiatives see: Lee Stacey. *Mexico and the United States*. (Marshall Cavendish, 2001), p. 607.

<sup>619</sup> Peter Andreas. “A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada Lines After 9/11.” *Center for Comparative Immigration Studies UC San Diego*. (June 22, 2003), p. 3.

### **Canada's Response to the American Securitization of the Border**

In order to protect its important trade relationship with the United States and prevent the “Mexicanization” of the Canada-U.S. border, Canadian policymakers responded to the American securitization of the border by seeking out bilateral initiatives aimed at addressing border security issues while strengthening cross-border trade. These bilateral partnerships allowed Canada to participate in the border policy creation process while, at the same time, demonstrating the state's commitment to American security concerns and protecting its cross-border trade interests. Canada-United States border initiatives created after 9/11 include: the Smart Border Declaration, the Security and Prosperity Partnership, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, NEXUS, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.

#### *The Creation of Bilateral Border Security Institutions: Smart Border Declaration*

In order to maintain a border that is open for trade while responding to the American securitization of the border, Canadian policymakers had to demonstrate to the United States that trade and security were not mutually exclusive objectives. The easiest way to reassure the United States that security was a top priority was to establish bilateral (and in some cases trilateral) initiatives that would both improve border security and preserve free trade. The first step towards reconciling Canada's trade objectives with the American securitization of the border was the Smart Border Declaration. This policy was signed by then-Secretary of the American Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Tom Ridge, and then-Canadian Deputy

Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, John Manley, on December 12, 2001.

This Smart Border Declaration encompassed a collaborative thirty-point Action Plan for, “identifying and addressing security risks while expediting the legitimate flow of people and goods across the border.”<sup>620</sup> The agreement explains that both countries will cooperate in identifying high-risk goods, while at the same time, ease the shipment of consumer products across the border. According to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Smart-Border Declaration was intended to develop a border that, “...securely facilitates the free flow of people and commerce, and that reflects the largest trading relationship in the world.”<sup>621</sup> Smart Border initiatives include: the expansion of the Free and Secure Trade Program and NEXUS program, as well as the expansion of joint teams of customs officials to target marine containers. According to a Government of Canada website, “The 2008 federal budget has allocated \$174 million over the next two years to ensure Canada has the best equipment, infrastructure, regulations, and cooperative framework in place to maximize the security and efficiency of the Canada-U.S. border.”<sup>622</sup> Canada’s participation in the Smart Border Declaration can

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<sup>620</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. “The Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration.”

< <http://www.international.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/declaration-en.asp>> (Last updated; 2003-02-07),

<sup>621</sup> The Centre for Research and Information on Canada, “Security at Canada’s US Borders: The Smart Border,”

<[http://www.cric.ca/en\\_html/guide/border/border.html#smart](http://www.cric.ca/en_html/guide/border/border.html#smart)>

<sup>622</sup> Government of Canada, “A Unique and Vital Relationship”

<<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/can-am/offices-bureaux/welcome.html>>

be viewed as a strategic speech-act on Canada's behalf, aimed at reassuring the United States that it will live up to its "good neighbour" promise. It is mutually beneficial to the two countries in that it addresses American security concerns while at the same time it helps maintain the free flow of goods over the Canada-U.S. border.

*Security and Prosperity Partnership*

Following the signing of the Smart Border Declaration, Canada also chose to participate in the American-initiated Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), along with Mexico. This trilateral partnership sought common approaches in three key areas: emergency preparedness and infrastructure protection, improving aviation, border, and maritime security, and exploring ways to enhance economic cooperation in important sectors.<sup>623</sup> According to a Government of Canada website, the Partnership:

"... is based on the principle that our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary. Cooperation in intelligence, border management, law enforcement and transportation security is intended to reduce criminal activity and terrorist risks, thereby making our communities safer, facilitating legitimate trade and travel, and protecting our quality of life. Collaborative planning and prevention strategies will help ensure reduced impact, coordinated response and faster recovery from disaster situations, whether public health, cyber, natural, human error, or terrorist in nature."<sup>624</sup>

The SPP addresses the American securitization of the border by promising to secure North America from external threats by means of traveler and cargo security and bioprotection measures, preventing and responding to threats within North

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<sup>623</sup> Joel J. Sokolsky and Philippe Legasse, "Suspenders and a Belt: Perimeter and Border Security in Canada-US Relations," *Canadian Foreign Policy* V.12 n.3, p. 15

<sup>624</sup> Government of Canada. *Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America*. <<http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca>> (Last updated 2009-10-20)

America by developing common approaches to critical infrastructure protection, port security, intelligence sharing, and transnational threats, and finally, streamlining low-risk travelers and cargo across state borders.<sup>625</sup>

American securitization changed the ways that policymakers in the United States conceived of North America. The region was no longer considered a single coherent unit – the view advocated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Instead, it was viewed as three separate entities with the United States in a vulnerable security position since it was in the middle of these three countries. The American intention of the SPP was to equate the economic gains garnered by NAFTA as contingent on the implementation of additional security initiatives by both Mexico and Canada. For this reason, the SPP was not codified and thus remains ambiguous. There is, “no text that can be reviewed or a unitary set of goals and objectives. Nor was it subject to parliamentary approval or oversight.”<sup>626</sup> Instead, the only official information released about the SPP comes from press releases issued by the partner governments. The day-to-day workings of the Partnership are carried out by means of working groups made up of government officials and business representatives.

The structure of the SPP is ambiguous and is inherently biased in favour of American interests. This fact is immediately evident since the SPP website declares

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<sup>625</sup> Jason Ackleson and Justin Kastner. “The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.” *The American Review of Canadian Studies*. (September 2006), p. 207

<sup>626</sup> Laura Carleson. “NAFTA’s Dangerous Security Agenda.” *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*. V. 20, p. 442

that the partnership is, “a White-House initiative among the United States and the two nations it borders – Canada and Mexico – to increase security and prosperity among the three countries through greater cooperation.”<sup>627</sup> The lack of a coherent structure for the partnership suggests that it has clearly been driven by the American post-9/11 desire to securitize all aspects of daily life - including trade. It seems that the primary purpose of the SPP was to bring America’s weaker neighbours into the “Bush counterterrorism paradigm” by threatening failed compliance with reduced access to the American market.<sup>628</sup>

*C-TPAT/ PIP and FAST*

The Smart Border Declaration resulted in the creation of additional Canada-U.S. bilateral border security initiatives. The Free and Secure Trade Program (FAST) was created by combining the American Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program with the Canadian Partners in Protection (PIP) program. As part of C-TPAT, United States Customs created a list of security regulations for sea carriers, port terminal operators, and importers. The implementation of these measures would qualify businesses for admittance to the C-TPAT program. Certified companies would be classified by U.S. Customs as “low risk” thus allowing their goods to be quickly routed through Customs procedures.<sup>629</sup> Partners in Protection (PIP) was established by the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) as a response to the C-TPAT program. Companies that wish to join

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<sup>627</sup> SPP.gov, “A North American Partnership.”

< [http://www.spp.gov/factsheet.asp?dName=fact\\_sheets](http://www.spp.gov/factsheet.asp?dName=fact_sheets) > (Last updated: 2006-03-31)

<sup>628</sup> Carleson, p. 442-443

<sup>629</sup> Brian P. Gilbride. “Trade Wins Gather Momentum.” *Security Management*. V. 47, N.12, p. 49 - 52

the PIP program sign an agreement with CCRA. The PIP program is designed to assist companies in understanding the requirements of both the Canadian Border Protection Agency and U.S. Customs in order to allow for faster movement of goods into and out of Canada.<sup>630</sup>

Companies that have been admitted to both C-TPAT and PIP, are eligible to join FAST. This program operates at specific border points of entry where, “dedicated travel lanes streamline the entry process for participating companies. This expedited entry is the biggest advantage to the Program,” since wait times at the border are significantly reduced for companies registered with FAST. The FAST system allows goods to flow across the border without being delayed at the port of entry for a lengthy inspection. Darren Prokop writes that this system works by allowing, “...freight and vehicle operators to be explicitly granted access across the border while tougher scrutiny is reserved for the remaining cargos...This is to be managed by dividing shippers and carriers into two distinct categories.”<sup>631</sup> FAST encourages the private sector on both sides of the border to pre-certify its commercial shipments and transporters as low-risk. By 2003, FAST was in operation at twelve of the highest-volume border crossings. By the end of 2004, the program was available at all of the major Canada-US crossings.<sup>632</sup>

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<sup>630</sup> Ibid, p. 53-54

<sup>631</sup> Darren Prokop, “Smart Borders and Safe Borders: Is There a Distinction?,” in Alexander Netherton, Allen Seager, and Karl Froschauer, *In/Security: Canada in the Post-9/11 World* (Centre for Canadian Studies: Simon Fraser University, 2005), p. 287.

<sup>632</sup> Government of Canada, *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy*, (April 2004), p. 57.



*NEXUS*

While FAST seeks to speed up the shipment of goods across the Canada-U.S. border, the NEXUS program's objective is to sustain the flow of people across the border. This program also resulted from the Smart Border Declaration. It recognizes the high volume of cross-border movement involving citizens of the United States and Canada. Sloan describes NEXUS as, "...a clearance system that uses high-tech cards to allow frequent travelers between the two countries – especially business travelers – to cross the border more quickly."<sup>633</sup> The Transport Canada website indicates that individuals approved to take part in the program will be issued a membership identification card to use when entering Canada or the United States at a border crossing equipped to support the NEXUS program.<sup>634</sup> NEXUS procedures differ on the opposite sides of the Canada-US border. When entering the United States, NEXUS users display their pass cards as they approach a designated NEXUS lane. A computer chip embedded in the card sends a signal to the federal officer monitoring the lane with the participant's picture and personal information. Participants entering Canada will enter a designated lane where their license plates will be scanned. They will then present their pass card to the inspector monitoring the lane to confirm their identity and membership in the program.<sup>635</sup> The NEXUS program allows low-risk individuals to bypass lengthy wait times at high-traffic border crossings, and allows officials from both Canada and the United States to spend more time investigating individuals who might pose more of

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<sup>633</sup> Sloan, p. 62.

<sup>634</sup> Government of Canada: Transport Canada, "NEXUS Border Crossing Program" (May 2004).

<<http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/tbwg/361.htm>>

<sup>635</sup> Ibid.

a security threat. This program recognizes that trade is contingent not simply on the free flow of goods across the border, but also on the ability of people to cross the border in a timely and efficient manner.

*Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS)*

Canada also participates in another initiative that focuses on security between border ports of entry called Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS). This program was established in 1996 as a pilot project, before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.<sup>636</sup> The IBETS are made up of both Canadian and American law enforcement agencies. According to the RCMP's IBETS website, "The bi-national partnership enables the five core law enforcement partners to work together daily for more efficient sharing of information and intelligence."<sup>637</sup> These five law enforcement groups include: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Border Services Agency, US Customs and Border Protection/ Office of Border Patrol, US Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the US Coast Guard. IBETS engage in information gathering and then that information is shared among agencies on both sides of the border. Canada's national security statement, "Securing an Open Society," notes that following September 11, "Canada and the United States have expanded Integrated Border Enforcement Teams to cover the fourteen geographic regions along the land border. These multidisciplinary teams deal with potential terrorist and criminal activity between ports of entry."<sup>638</sup>

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<sup>636</sup> Sloan, p. 62

<sup>637</sup> Royal Canadian Mounted Police. "Integrated Border Enforcement Teams"  
< <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/index-eng.htm> > (Last updated: 2009-03-03)

<sup>638</sup> Government of Canada, Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, (April 2004), p. 52.

According to the Canadian Border Services Agency website the purpose of the IBETS, in the post-9/11 period, is to, "...enhance border integrity and security at our shared border by identifying, investigating, and interdicting persons and organizations that pose a threat to national security or are engaged in organized criminal activity."<sup>639</sup> The IBETS mission statement makes it clear that this initiative is meant to address the perceived American need to securitize the border. The statement reads, "IBET is a cooperative bi-national initiative that ensures that borders are open for trade, but closed to crime."<sup>640</sup> The IBETS program allows Canada to demonstrate to the United States that security is a top priority in this country and ensures that Canada will play an important role in working with America on border security. This cooperation, in turn, leads to the maintenance of an open border policy that facilitates trade for both countries.

*Forced Participation in American Securitization Efforts: The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI)*

Some American securitization efforts have forced Canadian compliance. Unilateral initiatives such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) were imposed on Canada by American policymakers determined to demonstrate their commitment to securing the state in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. WHTI, or the "passport law" as it became known in the Canadian media, enacted document requirements for travelers entering the United States who were previously exempt

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<sup>639</sup> Canadian Border Services Agency. "Canada-U.S. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams."

< <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/ibet-eipf-eng.html>>

(Last updated: 2006-08-25)

<sup>640</sup> Ibid

from having to produce ID, including citizens of the U.S. and Canada. The United States' government-run website for WHTI proclaims that, "The goal of WHTI is to facilitate entry for U.S. citizens and legitimate foreign visitors, while strengthening United States border security. Standard documents will enable the Department of Homeland Security to quickly and reliably identify a traveler."<sup>641</sup> This policy was implemented following the American Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

The WHTI is clearly a product of the American securitization of the border. This program, "...perhaps more than any other post-9/11 border control measure, signified a major shift in approach to the Northern Border."<sup>642</sup> WHTI was the product of a recommendation to the 9/11 Commission that more detailed information about the people entering the United States was needed. As a result of this finding, the policy was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This Act, "...requires the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State to develop and implement a plan to require all travelers, US citizens and foreign nationals alike, to present a passport, or other acceptable document that denotes identity and citizenship when entering the United States."<sup>643</sup> This was the first major policy that was implemented by the United States alone without any consultation with its North American neighbours.

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<sup>641</sup> US Government, "WHTI – FACT SHEET"

<[http://www.getyouhome.gov/html/eng\\_map.html](http://www.getyouhome.gov/html/eng_map.html)>

<sup>642</sup> Alper and Loucky, p. 15

<sup>643</sup> Embassy of the United States of America, Ottawa, *Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative*

Following the announcement of WHTI, then-Prime Minister Paul Martin urged the U.S. to reconsider such a policy; however, President Bush maintained that the law was necessary and would not hinder trade or tourism if, "...we can be wise about the use of technologies."<sup>644</sup> Similarly, in a speech given at the American Chamber of Commerce, Ambassador David H. Wilkins stated, "The bottom line is...we live in a post-9/11 world. There is no turning back, and as the President has said, you cannot have prosperity without security and the US is committed to both. They are not mutually exclusive."<sup>645</sup> The Canadian concerns about the implementation of WHTI demonstrate Canada's hesitation to blindly accept American initiatives in the name of enhancing security. The state's fears concerning the establishment of WHTI centre on the fact that more than 300000 business people, tourists, and regular commuters travel between Canada and the United States every day."<sup>646</sup> The Conference Board of Canada produced a report outlining additional concerns it had about the impact of WHTI on Canada. One concern outlined in the Board's report was the belief that the WHTI would result in, "...an estimated cumulative loss of 14.1 million inbound trips from the US between 2005 and 2010. The associated shortfall in Canadian tourism receipts is expected to reach

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<[http://canada.usembassy.gov/content/textonly.asp?section=can\\_usa&subsection1=borderissues&document=borderissues\\_whti](http://canada.usembassy.gov/content/textonly.asp?section=can_usa&subsection1=borderissues&document=borderissues_whti)>

<sup>644</sup> Quoted in Wendy Tso, "The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and Its Effect on Canadians." (Centre for Constitutional Studies, University of Alberta)

<sup>645</sup> Embassy of the United States of America, Ottawa, *Remarks By Ambassador David H. Wilkins at the American Chamber of Commerce*, (October 19, 2006)

<[http://canada.usembassy.gov/content/textonly.asp?section=embconsul&document=wilkins\\_101906](http://canada.usembassy.gov/content/textonly.asp?section=embconsul&document=wilkins_101906)>

<sup>646</sup> Government of Canada, *Canada-United States: The Secure Flow of People – Potential Impact of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative*, (August 2005).

nearly \$13.6 billion (CDN)."<sup>647</sup> The Board further suggested that because Canadians spend less money when traveling in Canada than Americans do, the offset provided by substituted travel expenditures is expected to be significantly smaller than the shortfall in US receipts.<sup>648</sup> Canada is clearly reluctant to adopt American securitization policies that do not benefit the Canadian state; however, the government is often compelled to accept such measures so as to protect their valuable trade relationship with their hegemonic neighbour.

*Beyond the Border Declaration*

Bilateral cooperation on issues pertaining to the shared border has continued in the period following the 9/11 attacks. On February 4, 2011, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the establishment of the "Beyond the Border Declaration". This Declaration established a new long-term partnership between the two countries based on a perimeter approach to security, which sought to defend against threats at the North American approaches instead of at the Canada-U.S. border. The Beyond the Border Declaration seeks to promote the goals of post-9/11 bilateral border agreements by "...enhancing security and accelerating the legitimate flow of people, goods, and services."<sup>649</sup> This Declaration outlines four joint priorities for Canada and the United States: addressing security threats early, trade facilitation, economic growth and jobs, cross-border law enforcement, and critical infrastructure and cyber-security. By implementing an

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<sup>647</sup> The Conference Board of Canada, *An Update on the Potential Impact of The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative on Canada's Tourism Industry*, (August 2006), p. 4.

<sup>648</sup> Ibid, p.5.

<sup>649</sup> Canada's Economic Action Plan. "Beyond the Border Action Plan"  
<<http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/page/bbg-tpf/beyond-border-action-plan>>

effective risk-management approach that improves information sharing across the border, the Beyond the Border Declaration will improve cross-border security and trade cooperation in the new, post-9/11 security environment.

## **Conclusion**

This case study examining the United States' securitization of its borders demonstrates that the enactment of bilateral programs aimed at developing policies to govern the Canada-United States border is, for the most part, in Canada's interest. While it did not make sense for Canada to securitize its approach to homeland security in the wake of the attacks on the United States, it did have to be cognizant of the American securitization of such issues. Supporting bilateral partnerships allows Canada to participate in the creation of policies aimed at policing the border. In this proactive way, Canada is able to protect its national interests while demonstrating to the United States that it is taking its southern neighbour's security concerns seriously. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States that took place on September 11, 2001, Canada and the United States' 'undefended border' has become the focus of much discussion and debate. Following 9/11, the United States sought to securitize the Canada-U.S. border as a means of preventing future threats from entering the country. The nature of securitization is such that the goal of "security" came to take precedence over all other objectives. Salter explains that, "Rather than securitization being a coup de grace that occurs only once...securitization, instead, is a continual process of threat construction and justification."<sup>650</sup> Thus, Canada will

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<sup>650</sup> Salter in Beier and Wylie, p. 75

have to continue to strive towards realizing the dual objectives of maintaining a “smart” border that is open for trade with the United States, and demonstrating to the U.S. that security objectives are not irreconcilable with trade. Canada has to continue to work collaboratively to ensure that the shared border is kept secure by means of bilateral institutions that allow for Canadian input.



## ***CONCLUSION***

Homeland security remains an important priority in the post-9/11 North American security environment. As such, understanding the ways in which homeland security and counter-terrorism policies are formulated and implemented are of continued importance. The philosophical variant of securitization theory serves as a useful tool for understanding the ways in which security policies are crafted in times of perceived crisis. By re-conceiving of the role of the audience in securitization theory, it is possible to examine how different audience actors function in the securitization process. The American securitization of the homeland security policy process has had important implications for Canada. Understanding the ways in which the United States government has securitized its approach to homeland defense and security is essential for the protection of Canadian interests when responding to American calls for enhanced security measures. Ultimately, the United States' securitization of the homeland security policy process, and Canada's refusal to securitize, demonstrates the importance of the role of the audience in philosophical securitization, as well as the need to clarify what that role entails. Further elaboration of the role of the audience allows for an examination of the implications of American securitization of the homeland security policy process for Canadian defence decision-making in the future.

### **The Continuation of the Terrorist Threat**

Terrorism has continued to pose a threat to both the United States and Canada in the post-9/11 period. While the terrorist acts of 9/11 were carried out by foreign nationals who entered the United States for the sole intention of carrying out

these attacks, there has been a rise in “homegrown terrorism”, or domestic terrorism, in recent years. This concept refers to groups or individuals who are based and operate entirely within the state without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at elements of the state government or population.<sup>651</sup> In the years following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States there have been numerous thwarted terrorist attacks. In December, 2001, only three months after the 9/11 attacks, a man was taken into custody after attempting to detonate a shoe bomb aboard an American Airlines flight. In 2003, a man was arrested in New York after giving money to Al Qaeda and plotting to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge. The threat posed by homegrown terrorism continues today. In mid-April 2013, two brothers detonated bombs at the Boston Marathon, killing three bystanders and injuring countless others. The United States will continue to securitize its approach to homeland security so long as the threat of homegrown and foreign terrorism continues to present an immediate danger to the States.

Homegrown terrorism in the post-9/11 period has not been limited to the United States. Canada too has thwarted attacks planned by Canadian nationals carrying out terrorist agendas. The “Toronto 18” case in 2006 involved the plotting of a series of attacks on targets in Southern Ontario by a group of men based in the Greater Toronto Area. These men were successfully arrested on June 2, 2006, following counter-terrorism raids in and around Toronto that resulted in the arrest of the eighteen individuals, who were found to be members of an Al-Qaeda related

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<sup>651</sup> See the FBI definition of “domestic terrorism” in Philip Purpura. *Security and Loss Prevention: An Introduction*. (New York: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2013), p. 441.

terrorist cell operating in Canada. In April, 2013, two former schoolmates from London, Ontario were killed in an Algerian military raid on a factory where the two Canadians, along with twenty-seven other armed Islamists led by Al Qaeda-linked Mokhtar Belmolchta, were holding hundreds of workers hostage. Later in April, 2013, a terrorist plot to target Canada's national rail service, between Toronto and Montreal, was prevented by Canadian intelligence services. Despite the emergence of Canadian homegrown terrorists, the Canadian government has not securitized its state approach to homeland security and counter-terrorism. One of the reasons for this is that, while the United States witnessed an actual terrorist attack on its own soil, Canadian authorities have prevented attacks from taking place in Canada. There is a belief that 'securitizing' the state's response to these events would have a negative effect on Canadian citizens.<sup>652</sup> The United States' response to the threat posed by homegrown terrorism will always be influenced by the 9/11 attacks that killed American citizens on their own soil, while Canada has not witnessed the realization of this threat within the state borders in the post-9/11 period.

### **Assessing the Role of the Audience**

The purpose of this study has not been to determine the effectiveness of state responses to terrorism, or the utility of homeland security policies and practices. Instead, it aims to examine the ways in which these policies are created in response to a threat to a state's national security. In doing so, this study has sought to re-evaluate the role of the audience in the philosophical variant of securitization theory

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<sup>652</sup> This was suggested by comments made by Canada's Minister of Public Safety, Vic Toews at the Kanishka Conference in Ottawa on November 8, 2012 and by comments made by CSIS officials.

in order to demonstrate this theoretical model's utility as a tool for analyzing the creation of security policy. The audience can be conceived as comprising two separate groups: the elite audience, made up of the policy elite and the media of a given state, and the populist audience, which can be defined as the general populace of the state. These two audience groups respond to the articulation of a threat by the authorized speaker of security in different ways. These audience groups then influence each other in determining whether or not to accept the securitization of a given issue. While previous articulations of securitization theory remained vague in defining the audience and its role in the securitization process, this study has sought to clearly define these different audience groups in order to clearly assess whether or not the securitization of a given issue has taken place. In order to operationalize these different audience groups, a comparison of American and Canadian homeland security responses to the 9/11 attacks was examined.

#### *Authorized Speakers of Security*

The authorized speaker of security initiates the securitization process by expressly stating that a given issue poses an existential threat to the state's security. In the United States, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush, the state's authorized speaker of security, clearly articulated to policymakers and the general public that the threat of future terrorist attacks posed an immediate danger to the United States. In what came to be known as the "Bush narrative", the President initiated the securitization of the United States' approach to homeland security by declaring that American was at war, that the United States needed to stand as one nation united in combating terrorism, that Islamic radicals were an

“evil other” bent on destroying American values and by comparing the 9/11 attacks to past attacks on the United States. In Canada, Prime Minister, Jean Chretien emerged as a cautious leader who allowed other Ministers to serve as co-authorized speakers of security. The Prime Minister stressed that Canada would follow its own path in addressing the threat posed by terrorism. He also emphasized that Canada would serve as a good friend and neighbour to the United States in its time of need. He further stressed the importance of multilateralism in combating the threat of terrorism, while at the same time noting that the 9/11 attacks were an isolated incident. Chretien further stressed the need for business to continue as usual, and urged Canadians to realize that the Muslim faith did not pose a threat to the Canadian way of life.

*The Elite Audience: The Policy Elite*

Members of the American policy elite, bureaucrats and elected officials, were the first audience group to respond to the authorized speaker, President Bush, and his assertion that terrorism posed an existential threat to the state. Demonstrating bipartisan cooperation, Republican and Democratic members of the House and Senate cooperated in initiating security policies aimed at countering the terrorist threat. This audience group deferred to the executive in enacting the USA PATRIOT Act and establishing the Department of Homeland Security. In Canada, members of the policy elite drew on past experiences with domestic terrorism when crafting Bill C-36, the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act. They sought to chart a “Canadian” course in responding to UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which called on member states to implement a legislative response to counter-terrorism.

*The Elite Audience: The Media*

The media is the second component of the elite audience, and plays an important role in framing and shaping public opinion. The media frames used to represent a given event affect the public's perception of it. The United States media adopted the "Blame Canada" narrative, which sought to shift the blame for the 9/11 attacks away from the United States by implying that Canada was the weak-link in ensuring North American security. In Canada, where media ownership is highly concentrated, would-be terrorists were portrayed as an "Evil Other" bent on destroying Western values, and were likened to vermin or disease. At the same time, however, Canadian media outlets also sought to question the motives behind the 9/11 attacks, and past American foreign policy decisions.

*The Populist Audience: Public Opinion*

The second half of the audience, in the philosophical variant of securitization theory, is the populist audience – literally the populace of the state. This group has a reciprocal relationship with the elite audience, whereby it is influenced by the elite audience's response to the authorized speaker's articulation of a threat and the creation of security policies, and, at the same time, influences the elite audiences' acceptance or rejection of a given threat. Public opinion polls and surveys are a useful way to determine public sentiment concerning the proposed securitization of a given issue. In the United States in the post-9/11 period, the populist audience demonstrated high support for President Bush and all counter-terrorism legislation. The public also supported the restriction of civil liberties in the name of enhanced security measures. In Canada, the populist audience's response to the 9/11 attacks

on the U.S. was a study in contrast. While the Canadian public demonstrated a short-lived desire for stricter security measures, it ultimately favoured the protection of civil liberties and multiculturalism. Likewise, while the public supported a distinctly “Canadian” response to counter-terrorism, there was a notable rise in Canadian Islamophobia following the 9/11 attacks.

### **Further Applications of Philosophical Securitization Theory**

Securitization occurs when an issue is seen to pose an existential threat to the state. While this study has focused on the threat terrorism posed to the United States in the period immediately following the 9/11 attacks, securitization is not unique to this time period. The model of securitization theory developed and operationalized in this thesis, specifically the philosophical variant of the theoretical construct, can be applied to any national security crisis where an issue is seen as posing an immediate threat to the continuation of the state. As such, this theory’s applications are wider than the breadth of this study. Dividing the audience into distinct groups allows for in-depth analysis of the ways in which security policies are crafted by state actors in response to issues deemed to pose an existential threat to the state. While the philosophical variant of securitization theory is best suited for examining the policy response to national security threats, moving forward, it can be applied to threats other than terrorism. This theoretical model is well suited for examining all issues posing a threat to the national security of a given state, such as: conventional attack or CBRNE<sup>653</sup> attack by a state or non-state actor, violent

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<sup>653</sup> CBRNE – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive

extremism, protection of critical infrastructure, cyber security, as well as terrorism beyond the North American context.<sup>654</sup>

Although this study has sought to re-examine the role of the audience in the securitization process, there is room for further study regarding the initiation of the securitization process by the authorized speaker of security. While the role of the authorized speaker is well-established by the Copenhagen School, the Canadian case examined in this study demonstrates that the authorized speaker of security may not be a single unitary actor. Prime Minister Jean Chretien authorized other Parliamentary Ministers to speak to the public about the 9/11 attacks and the potential for future terrorist attacks. These Ministers shared the same authority as the Prime Minister in influencing the elite and populist audiences. A future study may wish to consider the ways in which authorized speakers are designated and accepted by the various audience groups.

The philosophical variant of securitization theory serves as a useful framework for examining the ways in which security policies are created in response to national security threats. This theoretical model demonstrates the interactions amongst the authorized speaker of security and the audience groups, allowing scholars to take an in-depth look at the policy formation process. An examination of the way in which the United States securitized its approach to homeland security, and Canada's refusal to securitize its own approach to homeland

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<sup>654</sup> Public Safety Canada. *National Security*. (February 26, 2013).  
<<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/>>



security demonstrates the importance of understanding the interactions amongst the different audience groups and the authorized speaker. A state's conscious decision to securitize a facet of its policy process has serious implications for neighbouring states. In this case, the American securitization of the homeland security policy process has meant that Canadian officials have had to be cognizant of this securitization in order to protect their own state interests.

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