THE DETERMINANTS OF CANADA'S
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY (1968 TO 1984)
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Abstract

An examination of the Trudeau government's rhetoric, United Nations activity, and economic relations with South Africa reveals that the government's South African policy was twofold in nature. From 1968 to 1984, the Canadian government consistently condemned South Africa's apartheid system. Nonetheless, it was unwilling to enact policies that would aid in the destruction of that system.

How can we account for the government's unwillingness to bring rhetoric in line with reality? In other words, what determinants influenced the government's South African policy? The hypothesis of this thesis is that while Canada's economic interests in South Africa were not unimportant, they were not the overriding determinant in the formulation of Canada's South African policy. Consequently, it will be demonstrated that South Africa's strategic and economic importance to the West was the most significant determining factor in shaping Canada's policy toward that country. Because of the obligations of the NATO alliance and the array of socio-economic, cultural and traditional links between Canada and its Western allies, notably the United States and Britain, the Trudeau government was not
willing to undertake unilateral policies that would have impinged on the interests of its allies. By adopting this approach, the government avoided possible economic or political repercussions that might have resulted if the Canadian government adopted concrete unilateral initiatives. In order to circumvent these parameters, the government preferred to act in multilateral forums. Within these bodies the government could comfortably initiate policies knowing that it was not acting alone and thereby avoided the potential anger of those countries with more substantive interests in South Africa.
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INTRODUCTION

From 1968 to 1984, the Canadian government consistently expressed its abhorrence of South Africa's system of apartheid. Under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, however, the policies of the Canadian government were not consistent with its stated public rhetoric. An examination of the policy behaviour of the Trudeau government reveals that it was unwilling to alter the nature of its economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa.

The Trudeau government's South African policy can be roughly divided into three periods: 1968 to 1977, 1977 to 1978, and 1978 to 1984. The first period was characterized by the bifurcation of Canada's South African policy. On the one hand, the government repeatedly condemned the apartheid system, while on the other hand, it was not willing to give effect to its publically expressed sentiments by severing diplomatic or economic relations with South Africa. Consequently, between the years 1968 and 1977, Canada's relations experienced only minor changes. These changes were for the most part costless or undertaken in cooperation with other Western allies. They included such initiatives as: the granting of humanitarian assistance (in accordance with the 1973 Commonwealth Declaration).
to liberation groups in Southern Africa, the 1975 boycott of sporting activities between Canada and South Africa, and the 1970 United Nations Arms Embargo (Resolution 282). A more detailed discussion of these initiatives will follow in Chapters One and Two respectively. This period was also marked by a desire on the part of Ottawa to balance the two themes of economic welfare and social justice. This desire was outlined in the government's 1970 white paper on foreign policy.¹

During the second period (1977 to 1978) it appeared that the government was prepared to move concrete action closer to rhetorical posturing. In 1977 the government undertook unilateral action toward South Africa. These actions can be summarized under the following five points.

1. The withdrawal of commercial counsellors from Cape Town and Johannesburg and the closure of commercial offices in these two cities.

2. The withdrawal of all Export Development Corporation (EDC) government account support from any transaction relating to South Africa.

3. The introduction of a code of conduct and ethics for Canadian companies operating in South Africa.

4. The introduction of a new regulation that would require all South African citizens to acquire non-immigrant visas before entering Canada.

5. A review of the Commonwealth preferential tariff accorded to South Africa.²

However, these initiatives, as will become apparent in Chapter Three, had little or no effect on the existing commercial
relations between Canada and South Africa because they were never effectively implemented or enforced.

After this transition in 1977, the dichotomous nature of Canada's South African policy was resumed with what appeared to be one exception. In 1980, the Clark government (1979-1980) terminated its preferential tariff agreement with South Africa. The significance of this change in policy will be further discussed in Chapter One. Apart from this initiative, the government from 1978 to 1984 remained unwilling to adopt policies that would contribute to the dismantling of apartheid.

How can one explain the government's reluctance to give some effect to its rhetoric? The hypothesis of this thesis is that while Canada's economic interests in South Africa were not insignificant, they were not the overriding factor in determining the Trudeau government's foreign policy toward that country. Canada's economic links with South Africa were relatively inconsequential compared with the overall value of Canadian trade with other countries. Moreover, Canada did not have a direct strategic interest in the country, with the single exception of certain mineral deposits. Canada's mineral imports consisted of chromium, manganese, vanadium, platinum, and gold. According to Chester Crocker (Assistant Secretary of State for Africa):

Africa contains a major proportion of the world's reserves of a few commodities important to US strategic needs. In the future, the US will probably have to look
to Africa for, among other projects, its chromite, platinum group metals, tantalite, petalite, gold, long-fibred amosite, and other natural industrial diamonds (in 20-30 years)...most of these key minerals are found in Southern Africa.4

These minerals are important to Canada and its Western allies because of their economic and industrial worth. The other major supplier of these mineral deposits is the Soviet Union.

Consequently, since Canada had no direct interests in South Africa, it must be concluded that its policies from 1968 to 1984 were motivated by other factors. In particular, it will be demonstrated that South Africa's economic, strategic and/or geographical importance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with particular emphasis placed on the United States and Great Britain, has been the most significant factor in shaping Canada's policy toward South Africa. Before expanding on this hypothesis, it is necessary to briefly describe the economic and strategic interests of the United States and the European Communities.

Essentially, there are three major themes which are prevalent in the West's position toward South Africa. Firstly, conflict in southern Africa is seen within the parameters of the East-West conflict. Secondly, South Africa is viewed as a friend and potential ally in the Southern region of Africa. And thirdly, economic and strategic interests play an important role in determining the Western countries' policies in that country.5
The overriding interest in South Africa of the US is geopolitical. Washington especially values South Africa's ship repair and logistic facilities because of its concern over a perceived growing Soviet involvement in South Africa and the effect of this involvement of US interests in the region. 

In the post colonial era, Africa was redivided along ideological grounds. The United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies tried to win over the "professedly Marxist-Leninist states of Angola and Mozambique." During the period under study, South Africa was backed with what appeared to be a "blank American cheque to pursue a military victory over Soviet backed insurgencies." If so desired, these South African military strategies had de facto American support to proceed and escalate their attacks in Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique.

Some analysts adopt an extreme position in an attempt to legitimize Western (especially American) interests in South Africa. For example, James Dornan states: "The Soviet interest in Africa is part and parcel of their global strategy to erode the influence and independence of the West." However, the position taken in this quote is an exaggeration. The African liberation movement was not initiated by the Soviet Union, but rather by indigenous African forces.

Nonetheless, the 1975 civil war in Angola and Mozambique did provide an excellent opportunity for the Soviet Union to
"establish its presence and influence in South Africa." \(^{10}\)

Future Soviet policy regarding South Africa will depend on how other states decide to act in that region. In the meantime, they will maintain their "foothold" in the frontline states, such as Angola, Botswana, and Mozambique, that actively support an end to apartheid. At the same time, however, they will only act in such a manner that will not pull them into a "serious commitment of power or risk a major loss of prestige." \(^{11}\) According to a report prepared by the Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa,

Moscow's disposition to act boldly in southern Africa may be further inhibited by a reluctance to fan the distrust that its invasion of Afghanistan generated among Third World countries. Although the USSR's growing proclivity for intervening in conflicts in Africa had produced misgivings on the part of some of these nations, the trend in the Third World prior to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan was toward acceptance of the argument that Socialist states were the "natural allies" of the aligned nations. \(^{12}\)

This concern over a growing Soviet presence in South Africa, more or less, characterized the South African policies of the Nixon, Ford, Carter and the Reagan administrations. \(^{13}\) The desire to minimize Soviet involvement in southern Africa became more acute in the early years of the Reagan administration, US relations with South Africa were shaped by the policy of 'constructive engagement'. In August 1981, Assistant Secretary of
State Chester Crocker announced: "It is not our task to choose between black and white. We will not lend our voice to support those dedicated to seizing or holding power through violence." However, Steve Godfrey notes that "[f]ar from bringing peace to the region or change to South Africa, it has encouraged the cynical use of power to strengthen repression at home and domination in the region."\textsuperscript{15}

In the period under study, while publicly pronouncing disdain for apartheid, Washington was still extremely receptive to conducting business in South Africa. According to M. A. El-Khawas and C. M. Hope, the United States "has been confronted with the dilemma of reconciling its economic and strategic interests in South Africa with the American commitment to human rights and domestic principles."\textsuperscript{16}

The countries of the European Economic Community, (EEC) such as Great Britain, West Germany, and France were also faced with a similar dilemma. These three countries subscribed to an EEC statement that "condemns apartheid without reservation."\textsuperscript{17} Yet they were not willing to advocate the cessation of economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa. These countries also have substantial economic and strategic interests in South Africa.\textsuperscript{18}

However, compared to the US\textsuperscript{19}, the EEC had a much greater economic interest in South Africa. According to a report
European investment in South Africa is more than three times as great as that of the United States. Direct and indirect British investments represent nearly 40 percent of total foreign investment in South Africa; German investment makes up about 10 percent, and French investment nearly 5 percent.  

From 1968 to 1984, because of their economic and strategic interests in South Africa, these European countries were only prepared to advocate slow gradual change in South Africa. Of the three Western European nations, Britain was most in favour of this policy. In the early 1980s, Britain even went so far as to endorse President Reagan's policy of 'constructive engagement'.

The underlying logic behind the South African policy of the US and Western Europe was a desire to preserve the status quo. In this way, these countries tried to prevent the possibility of black liberation and subsequent black rule that might be hostile to Western interests in that region.

Consequently, the Canadian government, because of the interests in South Africa of its allies, was discouraged from engaging in unilateral action that would substantially change the present situation in South Africa. The government was also willing to let the obligations of the NATO alliance influence its South
African policy because South Africa was peripheral to Canada's national interest.

Implicit in Canada's commitment as an ally is the notion of acting on behalf of the alliance. By behaving in such a fashion the government contributes to the appearance of a strong and unified alliance. Thus, NATO allies are expected to contribute on a military and ideological front. The latter obliges the government to "coordinate" its foreign policy on issues such as defence and nuclear weapons with other members of the alliance. Canada's economic, defence, and territorial ties with the US also explain and reinforce this commitment.22

Thus, by adopting this cautious position toward Pretoria, Ottawa did not have to worry about possible economic or political repercussions23 that might have occurred if Canada did decide to take the lead and impose economic and/or diplomatic sanctions. According to Kim R. Nossal:

They know that the United States has a huge capacity to absorb sanctions against it, and just as substantial a capacity to administer more damaging sanctions to Canadian interests should a dispute intensify and escalate. They know too that the higher the stakes are for American interests, the more likely it will be that the United States will use its power resources to protect its interests.24

The government's actions represent an explicit desire to avoid accusations of "recklessness" or of overstepping its boundaries as a middle-power25, especially when Canada had no
direct interests in South Africa. This is not to say that the Trudeau government blindly mirrored every foreign policy decision of its Western allies. As Brian Tennyson notes:

Canada no doubt contributes to the development of the overall approach which it shares with Great Britain and the United States. The value of Canadian support is that it suggests that British and American policies have won the backing of an independent-minded middle power.26

Thus, because of the peripheral nature of South Africa to Canada's national interests, it will also be argued that the government was prepared only to undertake major and concrete initiatives in multilateral forums or in unison with its NATO allies. Annette Baker Fox argues that Canada "preferred to work through multilateral organizations which magnified their voice, brought others into the bargaining situations, and offered more ways to trade off concessions."27

Canada, by maintaining diplomatic and economic ties with South Africa, was in fact serving its own interests by serving the interests of the Western alliance. When viewed from this perspective, one is better able to understand why the government oscillated between "claims to be asserting international, moral and political leadership, and obvious reluctance to stick its neck out."28

Furthermore, this thesis takes issue with the usual explanations of the Trudeau government's policies in the
literature. A review of the literature on Canadian-South African
relations reveals that it cannot adequately explain why the
Canadian government's behaviour has not mirrored its rhetoric.
The literature on Canadian and South African relations can be
divided into two camps. The first is for the most part
descriptive and/or normative, whereas the second camp is more
analytical.

Within the first group are the works of Taylor and
Keenleyside, the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate
Responsibility (T.C.C.R.), and the YWCA's Black Paper Taylor and
Keenleyside examine the problems that the Canadian government was
confronted with in its bilateral approach, from the 1977
initiatives and the Code of Conduct to human rights issues. The
section dealing with South Africa is extremely critical of the
government's approach. However, it offers no explanation for
government policy. In an earlier article, Keenleyside notes
the ineffective and symbolic nature of the Canadian initiatives
in 1977 and 1978, but fails to address the broader question of
why these initiatives were ineffective.

The Taskforce examines the government's explanations for
its lack of concrete policy initiatives from a descriptive and
prescriptive perspective. The major flaw with the Taskforce's
research is that it fails to go one step further and examine the
assumptions behind these explanations. The Taskforce could have
taken this step by asking whether or not these arguments were actually believed by decision makers. I will return to this question in Chapter Four. The only explanation offered by the YWCA's Black Paper section dealing with southern Africa is that the "government arrived at some balance...between its moral position and what it perceives as the country's economic interests."32

The second approach is analytical in nature. It examines the causal factors behind Canada's South African policy. This approach can be broken down into two sub-categories: the economic (or "dominant class")33 paradigm or the "mixed-motive" paradigm. The latter paradigm may or may not include elements of the former paradigm. Authors such as Cranford Pratt, Robert Matthews,34 and Linda Freeman35 fall within both categories of the analytical camp.

While this literature attempts to explain the governments foreign policy rationales, it does so using the explanation provided by the "dominant class" or structural Marxist paradigm. Pratt defines the "dominant class" theory as one that assumes significant state autonomy but sees the state as heavily influenced by structural and class factors in ways that will favour capitalism in Canada and as especially attentive to the interests of the dominant class and its attitudes and values.36

More specifically, Freeman states that "continuing economic difficulties in Canada have strengthened the process whereby
short-term economic interests have come to play a central role in foreign policy..." Pratt and Matthews further argue:

The process and decision-making that shape Canadian foreign policy is an unquestioning commitment to the promotion of Canadian capitalism. The 'National interest' indeed is often reduced to the promotion of Canadian economic interests.

This thesis will argue that while economic interests of the corporate sector have undoubtedly had an effect on Canada's foreign policy initiatives in South Africa, they alone cannot account for the totality of the government's policy direction with respect to that regime. Other factors have influenced Canadian foreign policy decision-making besides the accumulation of capital for the "dominant class".

The second subsection of the analytical approach is by far the most comprehensive in its coverage of the motivating factors behind the Trudeau government's policy initiatives. This body of literature attempts to move away from the descriptive/normative and "dominant class" analysis by placing Canada's decision-making within a broader "mixed-motive" perspective. Nonetheless, it still is not completely satisfactory. Writers such as Linda Freeman, Clarence Redekop, Brian Douglas Tennyson, Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt fall within this category. Although these analysts adequately enumerate a number of factors, they fail to
address the most pertinent factor that influenced Canadian policy towards South Africa. Only by isolating the key determining factor behind Canadian foreign policy, can one hope to understand and, perhaps, influence the Canadian government's position towards that regime.

Linda Freeman, for example, notes that "...Canadian activities in Africa can best be understood less as the product of major interests of immediate concern to Canada than of a number of structural and ideological factors in both the domestic and the international contexts." Freeman specifically highlights Canada's "political alignment" with NATO and its commitment to capital accumulation.

During the 1970s Canada's approach to Africa has been developed in concert with its major allies, Britain and the United States, in the service of larger Western interests. These have included an effort to contain the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence on the continent, to maintain a political and economic environment receptive to open economic relations with the developed capitalist world, and to support regimes that are genuinely pro-West in their orientation.

Even though Freeman attributes Canadian foreign policy decision-making to a multiplicity of factors, one still has the impression that she places a greater emphasis on Canada's economic interests than on its direct strategic interests in South Africa. For the most part Freeman glosses over the predominant geopolitical importance of South Africa to the United
States and NATO. She never mentions the significance of South Africa's strategic minerals to Western economies nor the importance of the Cape route for the transportation of oil.

Redekop even goes as far as to note that "[i]t is impossible to identify one over-riding element which has shaped the (Canadian) policy." He assumes that Canada's economic interests in South Africa are as significant as Canada's interest in South Africa's strategic importance to the US and NATO. Nonetheless, Redekop does recognize the importance of the latter factor. He states:

...the objective of harmonious Canadian-American relations remains the basis of Canadian foreign policy. The Canadian Government thus has a strong interest in allied cooperation on policy matters involving South Africa, in order to eliminate the ineffectiveness of unilateral action.

Tennyson, like Freeman and Redekop, also recognises the significance of South Africa to the United States and the NATO alliance. Nonetheless, he fails to isolate any one predominant "determining factor". For example, he notes,

Canada has always tended to support the policies with respect to South Africa of its senior allies, Great Britain and the United States. Their objectives are, of course, shared by the Canadian government: the containment of Soviet and Chinese influence, the maintenance of a political and economic environment receptive to trade and investment, the support of a pro-Western regime, and above all, regional stability in an increasingly important part of the world.
Of the above writers that employ a "mixed-motive" approach, Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt present the most comprehensive list of factors which determined Canada's South African policy. They argue that Canada's South African policy was determined by four influences:

(a) the ideological perceptions with which the Government and the Department "understand" Canadian national interests and the issues relating to South Africa; (b) the image of Canada's role in international politics which is widely held within the Government and the Department; (c) a particular responsiveness to Canada's major allies, the United States and Britain, and the interests of "the West", and finally, (d) a sense of common cause with Canadian economic interests which are involved in South Africa.

While Matthews and Pratt mention the strategic importance of South Africa to Canada's Western allies, they do not emphasize the primacy of this factor over others. Another problem with their "mixed-motive" approach is that it is presented without a great deal of substantiating evidence. One is left to guess at how they arrived at their conclusions.

This thesis will be divided into four Chapters. The purpose of the first chapter is to determine the extent to which there existed a gap between the government's stated policy and its concrete policy initiatives. This chapter will consist of a chronological overview of the public rhetoric of the Trudeau government from 1968 to 1984. Chapter One will also contain a
brief discussion of the Progressive Conservative government under Joe Clark from 1979 to 1980.

The purpose of Chapter Two is to highlight a number of recurrent themes in Canada's voting record at the United Nations in relation to South Africa. A review of Canada's voting record is essential to this thesis because it exposes another arena in which the government's policy did not fall in line with its rhetoric. A review such as this will also reveal the disinclination of the Canadian government to adopt resolutions that would in any way endanger or conflict with the West's strategic and economic interests in South Africa. For example, the government consistently supported resolutions which condemned apartheid. At the same time, however, the government consistently abstained or voted against resolutions which mentioned economic, diplomatic, and military sanctions: namely, those that championed the cause of liberation groups in southern Africa; that equated Zionism with racism; and that specifically mentioned other countries (mainly the US) that were implicated in the maintenance of the South African regime.

Chapter Three discusses the extent and significance of Canada's economic relations with South Africa from 1968 to 1984. More specifically, this will entail a discussion of Canadian investments in South Africa, South Africa's investments in Canada, Canadian-South African trade, and financial relations.
Finally, the "1977 initiatives" and the Code of Conduct (1978), inaugurated under the Trudeau government, will be discussed. As previously mentioned, these changes allowed the government to appear as though it was operationalizing its expressed repugnance of apartheid, without significantly harming the South African government, or affecting Canadian relations with that country.

Chapter Four will explain the reason for the lack of consistency between the government's stated policy and its concrete policy initiatives. In order to understand and explain why the government was not willing to bring policy in line with rhetoric, it is necessary to critically evaluate a number of possible explanations for government policy. First, this chapter will examine the government's explanations for continuing a policy of trade, investment and diplomatic relations with South Africa. Secondly, this chapter will address the role of the anti-apartheid movement in influencing government policy. And thirdly, the impact of Canada's economic interests on its South African policy will be examined. These three factors, while they cannot be completely discounted, cannot adequately account for the government's policy during the sixteen years under study. Rather this chapter will argue that harmonious alliance relations were the cornerstone of Canada's South African policy.

From an evaluation of the Trudeau government's rhetorical posturing, economic relations with South Africa, and its voting
record at the United Nations, the final chapter will argue that Canada, along with its Western allies, placed a greater importance on South Africa's geopolitical and economic importance to the Western alliance, than it did on the elimination of apartheid during the Trudeau years.
Footnotes


11 Ibid.

12 Study Commission, South Africa, p. 328.


14 Quoted from Chester Crocker, "Regional Strategy for Southern Africa," United States Department of State, Bureau of


17 Study Commission, South Africa, p. 301.

18 According to a report prepared by the Study Commission on US Policy Toward South Africa: "The importance of the Cape route is beyond question. Some 2,300 ships travel it each month. They deliver 57 percent of Western Europe's imported oil and 20 percent of the U.S. imported oil. Some 70 percent of the strategic raw materials used by NATO are also transported via the Cape route." Study Commission, South Africa, p. 329.

19 According to the Yearbook of International Trade and Statistics, in 1971, US total general imports (in relation to its world total amount of imports) only imported .63 percent from South Africa and in 1981 imports from South Africa rose by only .32 percent. In 1971 the US (in relation to its total world exports) exported 1.42 percent to South Africa and in 1981 this amount increased by .15 percent.

20 Study Commission, South Africa, p. 301.


23 The aftermath of Ottawa's energy and investment policies (i.e. The National Energy Programme (NEP) and the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA)) are two examples of the


27 Fox, The Politics of Attraction, p. 199.


33 Pratt explains his usage of the "dominant class" terminology in the following manner: "I have settled finally upon the term 'dominant class theory'. It is simple and it provides an appropriate signal of the theory's content. Moreover, the term is central in the writing of Ralph Miliband, who provides a model of clarity and careful argument." Cranford Pratt, "Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: Basis for an Explanation," *Studies in Political Economy* 13 (Spring 1984), p. 52.


36 Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory," p. 100.

38 Matthews and Pratt, "Canadian Policy Toward South Africa," pp. 171-172.

39 The following articles can also be included in the descriptive and/or normative approach: J. Naiman et al., "Relations Between Canada and South Africa," United Nations Centre Against Apartheid: Notes and Documents 10 (August 1984); and North-South Institute, Briefing: Conflicting Priorities--Canadian Policy Toward Southern Africa. Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1983.


42 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa.


44 Freeman, "Canada and Africa in the 1970s," p. 794.


46 Redekop, Reconciling Canadian Objectives, p. 77.

47 Ibid., p. 79.
48 Tennyson, *Canadian Relations with South Africa*, pp. 187-188.


50 See Matthews and Pratt, "Canadian Policy Towards Southern Africa."
Chapter One

The Trudeau government's South African policy was characterized by a lack of policy content to match its rhetorical posturing. If the government was not prepared to sever its diplomatic or economic relations with Pretoria, why did it consistently condemn that country in domestic and international forums? It would appear, as Annette Baker Fox has observed, that the government attempted to "assert a perfect congruence between enlightened national self-interest and the interest of the wider international community." More specifically, the incongruity between the government's rhetoric and policy can be interpreted as a sincere desire to criticize South Africa, while, at the same time, an unwillingness to undertake unilateral initiatives that would seriously promote the dissolution of apartheid.

The following chapter will present an overview of the Trudeau government's rhetoric and policy toward South Africa from 1968 to 1984. This chapter will also include a brief discussion of Clark's incumbency from 1979 to 1980. A review of Canada's foreign policy towards South Africa will enable us to examine the government's unwillingness to close the gap between rhetoric and
concrete policy. "We have come to see Canadian policy towards southern Africa," Cranford Pratt states,

not in terms of an absence of rhetoric and a quiet, determined pursuit of liberal and humanitarian objectives but rather in terms of a highly audible liberal rhetoric that is combined with a diplomacy that is either inactive or is quietly pursuing objectives that are narrowly self-seeking.\(^2\)

From the very beginning of Trudeau's tenure as prime minister in 1968, the tone of the Canadian government's rhetoric towards South Africa was characterized by quiet acquiescence and its support of the status quo. The following quotes are indicative of this policy. In late 1968, in a speech to the House of Commons, Trudeau stated that:

No state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state... [t]he principle of non-intervention is a dominant consideration, as an example I need only to recall that for all the concern of the countries of Africa for the plight of the native population in the Republic of South Africa, there has never been a proposal from an African country that the United Nations possesses the right to violate the territorial integrity of South Africa.\(^3\)

In January 1969, in response to the 1965 Commonwealth's condemnation of racial discrimination, the Canadian government reiterated "its condemnation of the Apartheid policy of the South African Government, and expressed its concern at the continued refusal of South Africa to accept its international obligation in South West Africa."\(^4\) Yet in the same year, Jean-Luc Pepin, the
acting Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, was asked by Stanley Knowles, a member of the NDP, if it was "the policy of the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce to stimulate trade opportunities between Canada and South Africa, in spite of Canada's expressed opposition to South Africa's racial policies?" Pepin replied:

Yes, normal trade promotional activities are continued. Canada has maintained trade posts in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa for many years which process trade enquires from both the Canadian and South African business communities. During fiscal year 1968-1969 two trade missions visited South Africa as well as other countries.

In June, 1970, the Trudeau government published its white paper on foreign policy. The white paper examined Canada's foreign policy in terms of its past and future decision-making direction. It stated that "Canada's foreign policy, like all national policy, derives its content and validity from the degree of relevance it has to national interests and basic aims." The paper concluded that there were six basic issue areas under which Canada's "national interests" could be promoted. They were:

- safeguarding sovereignty and independence;
- fostering economic growth;
- working for peace and security;
- promoting social justice;
- enhancing the quality of life, and;
- ensuring a harmonious natural environment.

The Trudeau government concluded that it would give greater emphasis to economic growth, social justice, and the
quality of life policies. However, of the three themes, overriding emphasis was given to economic growth because it was thought to be the only solution to circumventing regional disparities and reducing Canada's economic dependence on the United States. This emphasis on economic growth was also seen to be a priority for Canada's relations with the South, and for Southern development. For example, on 18 September 1970, Mitchell Sharp, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (1968-1974), stated that Canada's economic interests and those of all developing nations, were dependent on a healthy world market.  

In the section of the white paper dealing with southern Africa, the government set forth two ambiguous policy stances. On the one hand, the government condemned South Africa's system, stating that it was "possessed by the cancer of apartheid." The paper went on to state that the Canadian government felt a sense of "broad revulsion against the racial discrimination practised in southern Africa, a general agreement that self-determination for Africans is a principle that cannot be denied." In addition, the government expressed its intention to "increase its contribution to the UN Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa as one way of giving more positive expression to the social justice policy theme in the Southern African context."
On the other hand, the government clearly stated that it would not interfere with Canadian trade and investment in that country because of the interests of those in the corporate sector who see better-than-normal opportunities for trade and investment in the growing economy of the Republic of South Africa, of those who are conscious of the practical limitations of effective outside influence on the pace of development.

Despite the government's intention "to give more positive expression to the Social Justice policy theme," the emphasis on economic growth seemed to override the theme of social justice. However, in 1970, the secretary of state asked one Crown Corporation, Polymer Corporation Limited, to "divest itself of investments in the Republic of South Africa." Influenced by the white paper, this public gesture was allegedly motivated by a belief that crown corporations should not profit from the system of apartheid. Nonetheless, Polysar (as it is now named) did not divest until late 1972. In the end, this decision was motivated by economic concerns rather than a concern for the non-white population. As George Bracewell, the vice-president of Polysar, explained: "We run this business on a commercial basis. We got out (of South Africa) when the market was favorable, when we could get a good price. That's all."

While at the same time that the government asked Polysar to divest, it allowed another Crown Corporation - Air Canada - to
sign a commercial agreement between Air Canada and South African Airlines. 18 Also, during this same period, the government never instructed two other corporations (that were partially or fully owned by the Canadian Development Corporation (CDC)-Texas Gulf and Connaught Laboratories) to divest themselves of investments in South Africa. 19

As will become increasingly apparent, the balancing of these two incongruent themes characterized Canada's foreign policy towards South Africa throughout the Trudeau years. In February 1970, Trudeau openly admitted the inconsistency of his government's position towards South Africa. He was quoted as saying that "I am not very proud of this policy...It's not consistent...We should either stop trading, or stop condemning." 20

However, Trudeau's statement appeared to have little effect on policy. From 1968 to 1984 the government persistently presented a set of arguments to justify its position towards South Africa. In 1970, the authors of the Black Paper succinctly summarized these explanation:

"1. Canada is a trading nation. Except when we follow explicit United Nations sanctions, we ought not to permit political or moral judgements to influence our economic relations with other countries...We should therefore accept the moral inconsistency of the Canadian position, rather than correct it."
2. If Canada were to restrict its economic links with southern Africa, other Western interests would replace Canadian involvement. No damage would be done to the regime of southern Africa, but some Canadian economic interests would be hurt. Moreover, if Canada were to cease to encourage trade with South Africa...it would also face possible additional reprisals from South Africa.

3. Any gains to Canada from a more liberal policy have been seen primarily in terms of African approval of such a policy. This approval is expected to be short-lived and not worth any economic sacrifice.

4. Canada must always deplore the use of violence in the settlement of disputes, and therefore cannot accept or support the use of violence by Africans in southern Africa."

In addition, the government argued that by maintaining political and economic ties with Pretoria, the Canadian government had an opportunity to moderate apartheid and keep dialogue open between the two nations. In the House of Commons, for example, Mitchell Sharp stated:

"We believe that we should encourage trade as a means of making useful contacts between peoples. We believe that this is a principle that is worth preserving and we should follow our practice, as in the past, of breaking trading relations only when sanctions are approved by the United Nations."

The government also maintained that severing relations with South Africa would perpetuate if not strengthen apartheid by alienating the government and further lessening its
accountability to the developed world. Thus, Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1980-1982, speaking to the International Commission of Jurists, asked:

Should we, for instance, sever all diplomatic ties with South Africa as we have been urged to do? I think not. Such action might give vent to our frustrations. It would not, I fear, make a real contribution to ending apartheid. Confrontation and condemnation in some cases may only serve to harden attitudes and provoke harsher measures.

Finally, the Canadian government argued that cutting off aid to South Africa would only hurt the non-white population. In a statement addressed to the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, MacGuigan argued that:

Unilateral boycotts—though costly to the country imposing them—have no significant impact. Even universal boycotts may not improve a human rights situation. And I do not believe that the operation of the international financial institutions should be disrupted by political considerations.

Since the 1970 white paper, Canada's relations with South Africa, underwent only minor modification. At the 1971 Commonwealth Prime Minister's Meeting, Trudeau condemned racial discrimination as a "moral abomination...which poisons the relations between human beings," and supported the Commonwealth Declaration which decried racial discrimination as a "dangerous sickness" and "an unmitigated evil"; yet it denounced economic coercion as a policy instrument. The Canadian
government consistently rejected the notion of coercing a
government to change its policies for fear of alienating or
isolating that government and of therefore making the possibility
of change even more remote.

At the same Conference, the government became involved in
the issue of the British government's plans to sell arms to South
Africa. For some Commonwealth members the arming of South Africa,
which the British argued was needed for the safeguarding of the
sea lanes in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans, was seen as a
threat to the black population of that country.

In spite of Trudeau's condemnation of the apartheid
system, he was prepared to draw attention to the long term
strategic importance of that area.

...[i]f, to ensure the security of the sea
lanes, we encourage the British to take
steps which make the assurance of the communist
penetration of Africa even greater, then we
have perhaps not even gained much...And if,
while we're arguing this short-term immediate
question, we permit circumstances to develop
which could end up so that we have another mid-
East situation on our hands-then not only will
that be disastrous for Africa, but I submit it
will be disastrous for the world.27

Furthermore, the question of selling arms to South Africa,
according to Mitchell Sharp, threatened to "polarize" the
Commonwealth "along racial lines."28 However, in response to
this situation and in contrast to the urgent tone of the above
quotation, Trudeau stated: "Arms sales to South Africa is [sic] very important for some countries who want to proceed with the sales and very important for those who don't want to see it proceeded with [sic]. But to me it is just one item on the agenda."29

This question also caused a considerable amount of debate and criticism in the Canadian House of Commons. Heath Macquarrie (PC), Andrew Brewin (NDP), and Patrick Nowlan (PC) were quick to criticize the government's inconsistency on this issue. They were especially disturbed at the government's failure to draw attention to the French sale of military aircraft to South Africa. In the House Macquarrie asked: "...what representations the government had made to the French government on this very important issue?" He went on to state:

I am appalled at the distinction he [Trudeau] made when he confessed that this government had not made representations to France against the sale of arms to South Africa. Only to Great Britain had such representations been made. These were made, in the minister's words, on the basis of "trying to avoid a rupture in the Commonwealth"...[s]urely, trafficking in arms can be judged in a more direct and explicit way than by checking the international membership of the country engaged in this practice. Are we to believe that the sale of naval frigates by Great Britain is a more serious threat to world peace than the sale of 100 Mirage jets by France?

Speaking for the government, Andre Ouellet replied: "Of course, we made some [representations] to Great Britain, because the
Commonwealth Conference was to be held and we feared that the course that the British government was about to follow would blow up the Commonwealth. 30

Canada's position in 1971 can best be summarized by the Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs:

While Canada will continue to trade in peaceful goods with South Africa, as indeed with all countries and territories regardless of political considerations, it will no longer allow the export of arms, military equipment, spare parts or ammunition for use by South African military or para-military forces. 31

Thus, while denouncing apartheid, the Canadian government continued to maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa and continued to take advantage of the "better-than-normal" trade and investment opportunities in that country. 32

Though the government emphasized the importance of trade with South Africa, it simultaneously articulated its abhorrence of apartheid, resolved to give more economic aid to Black African states in southern Africa, increase its contributions to the United Nations Educational and Training Program for southern Africa, and expressed its desire to open a diplomatic mission in Zambia. 33

In 1973, in accordance with the Declaration of the Commonwealth Conference 34 held in Ottawa, Canada "agreed to provide humanitarian assistance to the indigenous peoples of the territories in Southern Africa engaged in the effort to achieve
self-determination and independence.\textsuperscript{35} The aid program\textsuperscript{36} exposed what many critics regarded as a "minimal compliance with that commitment to the Commonwealth."\textsuperscript{37} The aid was ostensibly to be granted only on the condition that it would not involve the direct transfer of money to liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC). Mitchell Sharp stated that:

\[\ldots\text{Canada does not advocate violent solutions. They hope for a peaceful solution, and, therefore, we could not support violence and this was a view taken by some other countries too, but what was significant was that there was complete unanimity on the provision of humanitarian aid.}\textsuperscript{38}\]

According to Cranford Pratt, this Canadian policy had three main features.

Firstly, we have condemned apartheid and colonial rule and we have expressed the judgement in the White Paper that the white regime in question will fight to the bitter end to preserve their privileges.

Secondly, we have continued to deplore the use of violence by Africans as they seek to gain their rights.

And thirdly, we have continued to facilitate and to encourage increased Canadian trade with and investment in Southern Africa.

Pratt goes on to state that:

\[\ldots\text{the decision to grant humanitarian assistance to Southern Africa is welcome but...it is occurring within an over-all policy which on a number of more important issues continues to reinforce and to augment our linkages with those who are oppressing African's in southern Africa.}\textsuperscript{39}\]
In response to Pratt's concerns, Kenneth H. W. Hilborn remarked:

To promote trade with South and South West Africa, to increase our investment there, and to oppose all forms of external assistance to liberation (terrorist) factions—here is the basis for a wise Canadian policy.40

In a brief presented to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, on 9 April 1974, Reverend T. E. Floyd Honey stated that the provision of aid to liberation movements...

...was a logical, necessary and just extension of previous government policies and was nothing more than a concrete expression of our often voiced revulsion against racial discrimination there and of our endorsement of the principle of self-determination for Africans.41

Besides the government's unwillingness to deal with African liberation groups, the other problem with this policy was that the government was willing to provide aid only to those Canadian voluntary agencies that already had "acceptable" humanitarian projects in operation in South Africa.42 Ottawa also stipulated that they would give aid only to voluntary agencies that were able to supply the "matching grants to projects organized or supported by Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations or reputable International Organizations."43

According to Pratt:

This meant, therefore, that a technique which elsewhere in the world provides marginal supple-
mentary aid to direct Canadian aid is, in the case of southern Africa, to be relied upon entirely for all the aid Canada plans to offer outside of its multilateral programs. 44

On 8 June 1974, the Ottawa Citizen reported that Ottawa's proposed assistance to liberation groups in southern Africa had been "temporarily postponed". The report stated that "...the government wanted the fullest possible information on the policies to be followed in Africa by the new Portuguese regime before it proceeded with the aid programme. 45

In 1972, a few months after the Singapore Commonwealth Conference, the Trudeau government "refused to provide funds to Canadian sporting bodies for competitions in Canada to which South African representatives are invited, or for Canadian athletes to compete in South Africa." 46 In 1975, the government further extended its opposition to apartheid and stated that "Canada has strongly condemned the practice of apartheid as a denial of fundamental human rights." In order to actively support this statement the government decided that:

...in addition to not providing financial or moral support for Canadian participation in athletic events in South Africa, it would not support any athletic event in Canada that allowed South African participation. 47

The Canadian government attempted to implement this policy by "threatening to withdraw federal funds from the sporting bodies
involved, as well as the denying of visas to visiting athletes." 48

At the Commonwealth Conference of June 1979, Canada once again reaffirmed its prohibition against sporting contacts with South Africa. At this conference the government signed the Gleneagles Agreement, which opposed sporting contacts between Commonwealth countries and South Africa. 49 On 15 July 1981, Iona Campagnola, the acting Minister of Sports, stated that Canada was also prepared to "...bar South African athletes and sports organization representatives by refusing to give them visas..." Campagnola went on to explain that these "...restrictions are in accordance with an agreement reached by leaders of Commonwealth countries in Scotland last summer..." 50

In retrospect, these initiatives were relatively ineffective and costless. The Canadian government, for the most part, relied on sports governing organizations to monitor compliance. This resulted in a continuation of exchanges in such sports as auto racing, golf, tennis, and professional boxing. In the face of criticism the government responded that "these are professional businessmen rather than sportsmen or women and, therefore, they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Gleneagles Agreement." 51

These efforts were also relatively costless from Ottawa's point of view since sporting links between South Africa and
Canada were very limited in nature. Sports such as rugby and cricket, which are popular in South Africa, are not popular in Canada. It was also easier for Canada, than Australia and New Zealand, to undertake these initiatives because rugby and cricket are far more popular sports in those two countries.

Furthermore, the government, in its discussion of sporting contacts with South Africa, never commented on the fact that the Quebec Nordiques hockey team and the Toronto Argonauts football team are owned by Carling O'Keefe Ltd., a subsidiary of Rothman's Canada. According to a UN Report, "South African Investment in Canada is dominated by two companies: the Anglo American Corporation and the Rothman's-Carling O'Keefe group. The Rothman's group holds a 50.1 per cent interest in Carling O'Keefe..." When in January 1979, the Mayor of Toronto voiced his concern to the government about the possible takeover of the Argonauts by a South African based company, he was told that it is the corporate behaviour of Rothman's Canada, past, present and future in Canada, rather than that of its associated company in South Africa, which must be taken into account in reviewing its current proposal under the Foreign Investment Review Act.

Between the years 1968 and 1977 Canada's relations with South Africa underwent only minor changes. However, in 1977, the government took unilateral action against South Africa. These initiatives and their concrete effect on Canadian-South African relations will be discussed more fully in the following chapter.
In 1979, the Progressive Conservative Party was elected as the new government of Canada and on 22 May 1979 Joe Clark was sworn in as Prime Minister. In her first address to the General Assembly that September, Flora MacDonald, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated:

Too often the international community has been reluctant—or culpably slow—to take steps to condemn and rectify these violations of human rights. Too often the political convenience of governments has caused them to remain silent when ordinary people cried out for action. Public opinion today is calling us into account for this lethargy, this disregard for human suffering, this irresponsibility.

On the surface it appeared that the new Clark government (1979-1980) was prepared to take concrete action against countries that violated human rights. In 1980, Canada terminated its preferential tariff agreement with South Africa. However, this decision reflected the size of the imbalance in preferential trade in South Africa's favour ("the preferential duty and tariff applied to 60 per cent of South Africa's exports to Canada, compared with only 2 per cent of Canadian exports to South Africa") which meant that there was little economic justification from the government's point of view in continuing to exchange preferential tariff treatment. Also, interest groups had been pressing the government for years to abandon this agreement. Hence, it can be argued that this change in policy did not signify a new direction in policy vis-a-vis South Africa, but rather that it was a change that would have eventually occurred.
under a Liberal or Progressive Conservative government. This change appeared to be motivated by economic rather than humanitarian or political concerns.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this overview, from 1968 to 1984, reveals the government's unwillingness to bring rhetoric in line with coordinated and consistent policy. More specifically, this chapter highlights two recurrent and persistent themes in Canada's South African policy. On the one hand, the government's public rhetoric expressed an abhorrence over "institutionalized racism and racial oppression" in South Africa. On the other hand, it also demonstrates the government's tendency, as Paul Ladouceur notes, "to recoil when more direct, immediate interests and beliefs were involved, such as support for violence and economic self-interest...." These two themes will become more apparent in the following chapter.

Chapter Two will examine Canada's voting activity with regard to South Africa at the United Nations from 1968 to 1984. By surveying Canada's voting activity at the United Nations it will become apparent that the Canadian government was again unwilling to give substance to its stated abhorrence of apartheid. The government consistently refused to support resolutions that
infringed on the strategic and economic interests of its major allies in South Africa. Thus, this chapter will reflect the government's willingness to let these interests, because of Canada's obligations to the Western alliance, override its expressed desire to end apartheid.
Footnotes


6 Ibid.

7 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 11.

8 Ibid.


13 Ibid., p. 20.

14 According to James Richardson, then the Minister of Supply and Services, "Polymer, had a 5.6 % interest in Sentrachem Ltd., a South African firm which owned the synthetic Rubber Co. Ltd., of South Africa". House of Commons, Debates, 1970, Vol. 7, 6 May- 4 June, p. 6622.


17 Ibid.


26 Ibid., p. 1.

27 Ibid.


32 For more discussion on Canada's contribution to apartheid see Canadian Industry in South Africa: Misconduct or Code of Conduct? Briefing Paper: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (Canada: June 1985).


34 For a summary of the Principles of the Declaration of the Commonwealth see the Ottawa Citizen 23 January 1971.


37 Cranford Pratt, "Canadian Attitudes towards Southern Africa," p. 73.


39 Ibid., p.9:11.


45 Ottawa Citizen, 8 June 1974.


52 Ibid., p. 37.

53 Ibid., p. 56.


56 J. Naiman et al., "Relations Between Canada and South Africa," p. 5.

57 Paul Ladouceur, "Canadian Humanitarian Aid," p. 100.

58 Ibid.
Chapter Two
THE UNITED NATIONS: CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will review and analyse Canada's voting record in the United Nations General Assembly with regard to South Africa from 1968 to 1984. A review such as this will demonstrate another forum in which the Canadian government was not willing to follow up its expressed moral condemnation by adopting resolutions that exerted pressure on South Africa in economic, military and nuclear matters. Canada's voting record was characterized by an unwillingness to take the lead on resolutions aimed at dismantling apartheid and, thus, resolutions that would interfere with its NATO allies' geopolitical and economic interests in that region.

I) THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA

The United Nations (UN) has provided an international forum for the discussion of racial discrimination. In particular, the question of South Africa's racial policies has been raised at the UN since 1946, when India first raised the issue of how the
South African government was treating its Indian population. Since that time the UN has ardently condemned South Africa's racial policies through numerous resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly. Article 5 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1963) specifically states that:

An end shall be put without delay to governmental and other public policies of racial segregation and especially policies of apartheid, as well as all forms of racial discrimination and separation resulting from such policies. \( ^1 \)

The UN Charter has been repeatedly used by both the South African government and those who oppose and condemn that government to support their respective positions. Before reviewing the Trudeau government's voting record at the UN vis-a-vis South Africa it is important to briefly look at South Africa's use of international legal constraints. A brief examination of these constraints will enable us to better understand the environment in which the Canadian government was confronted with when deciding whether to adopt or reject a resolution at the UN.

For three years, beginning in 1955, South Africa was unwilling to participate in General Assembly sessions and any committee meetings that addressed the issue of apartheid, \(^2\) because it saw the actions of the General Assembly as an
intrusion into what South Africa perceived as a matter of "domestic jurisdiction", under Chapter 1, Article 2 of the UN Charter. The South African government also called to its defence Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which recognizes the principle of non-intervention into the domestic jurisdiction of other states.

Article 2(7) states:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter... 3

On the other hand, those nations opposed to South Africa's racial policies have invoked Article 1 paragraph 2 which states that one of the purposes of the UN is to "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace," and under Article 1 paragraph 3 to "achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 4

The equation of equal rights and self-determination with international peace has been consistently used by those UN members who have introduced resolutions which condemn or oppose
the apartheid system. They have also called upon Chapter VII of
the Charter which deals with acts of aggression, breaches of the
peace and threats to the peace. Those opposed to apartheid feel
that the perpetuation of apartheid violates fundamental human
rights and that such a policy consequently represents a threat to
international peace. 5

II) CANADA'S POSITION ON SOUTH AFRICA AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Over the last forty years the problem of South Africa has
increasingly affected the entire UN system. According to J. F.
Tanguay, the issues of economic, military, and diplomatic
sanctions, the recognition and support of liberation groups, and
the 1975 definition of Zionism as a form of racism have "raised
political and legal questions in almost all UN agencies and
subsidiary bodies." 6

Since 1946, the Canadian government has attempted to
pursue a policy at the UN that would, on the one hand, not
isolate or alienate South Africa, a former Commonwealth country
with which it had commercial and diplomatic relations, and yet
that would, on the other hand, allow Ottawa to maintain close
ties with and appease those African and Asian nations critical of
South Africa.
It would appear that the Trudeau government, according to its voting record in the UN, actively supported resolutions that would have an impact on South Africa. However, upon closer examination, it is clear that the Canadian government refused to support resolutions that would concretely affect the government of South Africa. The Trudeau government consistently supported UN resolutions that condemned apartheid as a crime against humanity but (with two exceptions that will be discussed below) refused to support resolutions that called for military, economic or diplomatic sanctions, that wished to recognize liberation groups, or that specifically mentioned other countries (mainly the US) that are involved in the maintenance of the South African government. According to Adair and Rosenstock: "Canadian policy in the United Nations is thus characterized by abstentions on resolutions with teeth and votes for resolutions stating higher purposes such as moral condemnation."  

In the late sixties, the General Assembly's efforts, frustrated by many years of passing resolutions that had been unsuccessful in bringing about racial equality in South Africa, became increasingly ardent in their condemnation of South Africa and its major trading associates, as well as in their push for significant measures that would bring about political change in that country. In 1968, Canada abstained on the General Assembly's resolution 2396 (XXIII), adopted by a vote of 85 to 2 with 4
abstentions. It called apartheid a crime against humankind and asked for the exercise of rights to self-determination by the people of South Africa in order to attain majority rule founded on universal suffrage. This resolution also asked all states "to provide greater moral, political, and material assistance to the South African liberation movement in its legitimate struggle." It was because of the latter part of the resolution that the Canadian government felt that it could not support a resolution with those words in it. The 1968 Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs stated that "Canada supported resolutions containing practical proposals designed to combat racial discrimination and further the aims of self-determination for dependent peoples."  

On 25 May 1970, Mitchell Sharp told a conference of Canadian-African specialists that "there had been a marked change in the pattern of Canada's votes on the Southern African question at the UN since he and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had taken up their posts in 1968." Sharp also noted: "But it isn't enough just to say what is right. Our policies must be consistent." It is also telling that Paarl wine was served at the conference until it was brought to the government's attention that this was a product of South Africa.
A) Resolution 282: Arms Embargo

In 1970, on the request of 40 states, 36 of them members of the Organization of African Unity,11 the Security Council met to examine the question of violations of the South African arms embargo, which had been introduced in 1963. On 23 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 282, a non-mandatory resolution condemning all violations of the embargo called for in previous resolutions, and extending Security Council resolution 181 of 1963, the voluntary arms embargo, to include the sale of military spare parts. Although there were no votes against this resolution, the US, Britain, and France abstained.12

After this decision, resolution 282 then went to the General Assembly for consideration. On 13 October 1970, at the 25th session of the General Assembly, the Canadian delegation was asked by a number of African states to endorse this resolution. However, Canada declined this overture and decided to abstain on resolution 282.13 The explanation given for this position was that the Canadian government had "not yet reached a decision on the question of spare parts."14 As a further qualification the government stated:

Canada could not accept this resolution since it overlooked the fact that it was the prerogative of the Security Council to determine whether a situation requiring action under Chapter VII existed and, if so to decide upon the precise
nature of the response required. Since the Security Council had made no such judgement about the situation in South Africa, it was in the Canadian view, inappropriate for this resolution to suggest Chapter VII action.  

The Canadian government had been applying a general arms embargo against South Africa since 1963. With the above qualification in mind, the 1970 resolution should not have presented any difficulty for the government to adopt. However, according to *International Canada*, "Canada continued to furnish some spare parts for equipment which had been supplied to South Africa under contracts entered into before Security Council resolution 181 of August 7, 1963, was passed." Nonetheless, on 2 November 1970, the government changed its position and announced that it would adhere to the request contained in the Security Council resolution of July 23 with respect to the provision to South Africa of spare parts and vehicles and equipment for use of its armed forces and military organization.  

Why did Ottawa abstain on resolution 282 in October and yet only one month later decide to ratify this resolution? This decision, it can be argued, was strongly influenced by the British government's decision (previously discussed in Chapter One) to resume arm sales to South Africa and the upcoming 1971 Commonwealth Conference in Singapore. "The action of the Trudeau government," according to Redekop, "undoubtedly strengthened Canada's credibility on the issue of arms sales and enhanced
Ottawa's ability to play a mediating role in the crisis at the Singapore Conference. It should also be noted that the Canadian government's decision to adopt this resolution was motivated more out of a desire to preserve a viable Commonwealth rather than out of opposition to British arms sales to South Africa.

In that same year, the Canadian delegation also ratified the agreement on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and stated that "racism and racial discrimination were diseases afflicting all of mankind and should be countered vigorously on all fronts and at all levels." The decision to ratify this agreement reflected the Canadian government's willingness, on the one hand, to support resolutions that condemn racial discrimination, whilst, on the other hand, its unwilling to support resolutions that would significantly change the policies of the South African government.

During 1971, the problem of South Africa continued to receive attention at the UN. This year was marked by a desire to extend the condemnation of South Africa to include those nations that had supported the South African regime through the "maintenance of economic, political, or military relations with it." According to the 1971 Department of External Affairs Annual Report:

The Canadian Delegation voted for a number of resolutions condemning various aspects
of apartheid and for resolutions calling for
cessation of arms shipments to South Africa,
and abstained on other resolutions that
were unsatisfactory in their financial,
procedural or political implications. 21

In 1971, the General Assembly also adopted a resolution calling
for "specialized Agencies to support insurgent movements in the
territories of Southern Africa and to withdraw facilities from
Portugal and South Africa to participate in the work of these
Agencies." 22 Once again the Canadian delegation abstained on
this resolution because of its policy of peaceful change in
South Africa.

When questioned in the House of Commons in 1971 about
Canada's role in Southern Africa, Sharp replied:

I think that we should realize and accept
that our capacity to influence the White
racist minorities in Southern Africa is
limited and can best be exercised multi-
laterally through the UN and the Common-
wealth. What we can do ourselves is to
offer economic and political support for
the developing countries of Black Africa.
This is bound to be more rewarding for
Africans and Canadians alike than wasting
our energies in empty gestures designed
to tell the world of our moral rectitude
on racial questions. 23

This quote characterizes the government's attitude towards the
effectiveness of measures such as economic or diplomatic sanctions
and aid to liberation groups in South Africa.

On 16 December 1974, Canada abstained on a resolution
(3324E) which condemned the South African government for its
"policies and practices of apartheid" as well as "the policy of those member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of other Powers which are assisting the racist regimes in southern Africa..."24 The Canadian delegation particularly felt that the latter part of this resolution was

...unacceptable because it referred to an organization, which "from a technical viewpoint has no power of decision in this respect' since NATO had no jurisdiction over the foreign policy of its members outside those areas set out in the treaty itself.25

On 10 December 1975, the Canadian delegation abstained on another resolution (3411Gxxx) which called South Africa an "illegitimate regime" and stated that the "national liberation movements are the authentic representatives of the people."26

In 1975, a similar resolution to the one adopted on 16 December 1974, was passed. On this occasion the Canadian government joined seven other Western countries including the US, Britain, West Germany, and France in abstaining on resolution 3383(XXX) which pointed out "the adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of political, military, economic and other forms of assistance given to colonial and racist regimes in South Africa" by nations depicted as "accomplices."27 However, because of Canada's alliance obligations, one would have been surprised if the Canadian government adopted such an unflattering and hostile resolution.
B) The Recognition of the Transkei

On 26 October 1976, Transkei, the South African bantustan was given 'independence'. Bantustans are a part of South Africa's overall policy of "separate development". Although blacks comprise seventy per cent of the population, they are in theory restricted by this policy to ten artificially-produced tribal "homelands" which constitute thirteen per cent of South Africa's total area.

These 'homelands', termed bantustans, are made up of patchworks of land mostly unwanted by the white farming community. They contain little in the way of basic infrastructure and offer few employment opportunities beyond subsistence agriculture.28

Just prior to this so-called independence a three-man Transkeian delegation, led by the Transkei Minister of Justice Mr. Matanzima, visited Canada in order to persuade Ottawa to grant the Transkei bantustan diplomatic recognition.29 The delegation only managed to arrange interviews with a few minor officials in the Department of External Affairs--indicative of the government's unsympathetic attitude towards the delegation's arguments for recognition. Shortly after the 'independence' of Transkei Ottawa announced that it would not recognize Transkei as an independent nation. According to the government:

The first Bantustan 'homeland'- the Transkei- was declared independent in October. Except for South Africa, no state has recognized the Transkei, and
the UN resolution condemning this 'independence' as a further manifestation of apartheid drew overwhelming support, including that of Canada. 30

The decision not to recognize the Transkei was influenced by international demands for diplomatic sanctions and a recognition that the bantustans would merely be used as labour reservoirs for the South African government. As Redekop noted:

The whole Bantustan scheme, under which nine economically unviable and geographically discontinuous areas were to move to formal independence from South Africa, serves as the theoretical and moral justification for the denial of civil and political rights of the black population by the minority white government. Any foreign cooperation with these territories could therefore be viewed as tantamount to acquiescence in the racial policies of the South African regime. 31

It can also be argued that this decision was costless because of the universal decision of non-recognition. This decision was consistent with the government's expressed public abhorrence of apartheid, while, at the same time, this decision did not jeopardize the West's strategic and/or economic interests in South Africa.

C) The 1977 Arms Embargo

In November 1977, following the death of Steve Biko, the 1976 Soweto riots, and during Canada's two year term on the Security Council, resolution 41832 was adopted by the Security Council. This resolution called for a mandatory arms embargo
against South Africa. In announcing this decision Jamieson stated that the Canadian government would "continue to hope that the problem of South Africa would be resolved peacefully" and that "Canada would continue to have diplomatic relations with South Africa."33

However, since 1977 Canada's arms embargo against South Africa has not been rigidly enforced. In 1978, Levy Auto Parts, a Canadian company, received substantial sums of money under "U.S. and overseas defence contracts."34 Levy Auto Parts (LAP), specializes in rebuilding tank engines and transmissions for NATO member nations. A report commissioned by the UN stated:

In 1980, Levy became involved in a plan to procure and ship spare parts, including engines and transmissions, for Centurian tanks to South Africa... The shipment of engines was accomplished both from Canadian ports, and from the U.S., using Levy as a go-between.35

It was also discovered that shipments of shells, artillery, and technical information, by the Space Research Corporation of Highwater P.Q., were made to South Africa from 1967 to 1977. "The arms," according to International Canada, "had allegedly been used by South Africa to attack refugee camps and to threaten other countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique."36 In 1977, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police began to investigate the Space Research Corporation. The investigation was undertaken when Joshua Nkomo, a black African leader of the Patriotic Front
of Zimbabwe, criticized Canada's illegal shipment of arms to South Africa. On 15 August 1980 the Space Research Corporation was found guilty of exporting 50,000 long-range artillery shells to South Africa in violation of a UN embargo and of declaring falsely that the shells were being sent to the Caribbean island of Antigua. The Company was fined a total of $55,000.

From the above incidents it is evident that the Canadian arms embargo was not adequately enforced. Hence, in 1983 the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility asked the government to undertake a "review of the existing legislation and enforcement mechanisms" relating to the arms embargo against South Africa. Mark MacGuigan replied:

[W]e believe that Canada has adhered to both the letter and spirit of Resolution 418. Where clear breaches of our regulation have occurred, they have only escaped attention for a time as a result of the deliberate and thorough falsification of records and export permit applications.

He went on to argue that "[n]o system is fool-proof in the face of deliberate evasion, but the action has, we have no doubt, strengthened the operation of the system and acted as a deterrent against further malpractice." 40

D) Peaceful Change

Canada has always tried to work through the UN for peaceful change in South Africa. According to a UN report:
The Canadian government's objective has consistently been to promote peaceful change, rather than violent solutions, to the problems of South Africa. It has therefore refrained from measures which would inhibit peaceful change or promote violence.41

In order to encourage peaceful change, in 1982-83, the Trudeau government donated $350,000 to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa (UNETPSA), $20,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (UNTPSA), and $200,000 to the United Nations Fund for Namibia (UNFA).42 However critics of this initiative felt that

[w]hile Canadian support for the training programs offered by UNETPSA and UNFA is considered reasonable by international comparison, questions have been raised about the purely token contribution made toward UNTPSA's work in providing legal assistance and aid to persecuted South Africans.43

E) Universality

The Canadian government also continued to support the right of South Africa to participate in the UN and other international organizations of which it is an acting member. For example, on 28 September 1974, the Canadian delegation at the UN voted against a resolution (A/9779) which "called for the rejection of the South African delegation's credentials."44 In an address to the General Assembly, on 29 September 1976, Jamieson emphasized "that once a country had been granted
membership there should be no question of expulsion unless the whole assembly agreed that this member had violated the principles of the Charter.  

In a statement to the 30th Session of the UN Commission of Human Rights in 1980, Ambassador Yvon Beaulne further emphasized Canada's position on the principle of universality. He declared:

> Despite all that divides us, let us apply ourselves to developing techniques of practical cooperation. Whatever our differences, I believe that beyond philosophical arguments, we must strive in our work to conciliate in a pragmatic manner the aspirations which are shared by all people and which are evidence of their ineradicable hope for a better, more just and more fraternal society.

Furthermore, according to a UN report, the Canadian government attaches a tremendous importance to the "principle of universality of membership within the UN system."

If governments are not prepared to sit down and discuss their differences, there can be no solutions to international problems. The Canadian government considers that exposing South Africa to the pressure of world opinion and maintaining a frank dialogue- at the United Nations and bilaterally- is a more effective way of promoting peaceful change, than isolating it totally from the world community. Countries which are isolated find it most difficult to change.
F) Zionism-Racism

On 10 November 1975, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the third committee, stated that "zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." In that same year, resolution 32/105(L.23) also condemned "the strengthening of relations and collaboration between the racist regime of South Africa and Israel in the political, military, economic, and other fields." Both the Soviet Union and the developing nations voted in favour of this resolution. However, most of the Western nations either voted against this resolution or abstained.

Canada voted against both of these resolutions. The result of this resolution led to the twinning of the two problem areas, the Middle East and South Africa, and has consequently undermined the 'consensus' that previously existed on the definition of racism.

Canada's objection to the Zionism-racism link was influenced by a number of factors. Besides an unwillingness to affect the US-Israel alliance, these factors included

a historical commitment to the existence of Israel that extends back at least as far as Lester Pearson's participation in the 1947 Palestine debate in the General Assembly's First Committee, a strong pro-Israel lobby within Canada, the lack of a similarly effective Arab lobby, and a sympathy with the Jewish people due to the prevalence and intensity of anti-Semitism.
Hence, in 1977 Canada abstained on a resolution (31177) which urged "all states to combat racism and racial discrimination within their own jurisdictions and to assist in combating racism in Southern Africa."\(^{51}\)

This issue also proved to be a major stumbling block at the 1978 UN sponsored World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. It resulted in the withdrawal of the Canadian delegation along with eleven other Western countries from the Conference. According to the 1978 External Affairs Annual Review:

Canada, with several other Western countries, withdrew from the conference when their attempt failed to remove from the final declaration contentious references to the Middle-East situation, including a reference to the alleged Zionism-racism link.\(^{52}\)

In 1979, General Assembly resolutions condemning apartheid increased substantially. The tone of these resolutions were also increasingly severe in their demand for greater action to combat apartheid and for an end to all international relations with South Africa. Of the 18 resolutions adopted in 1979, Canada subscribed to 10 while voting against 4 and abstaining on 4 others. External Affairs explained the Canadian delegation's voting record in that year:

Canada considers apartheid an affront to mankind in its denial of fundamental human rights..., and is thus prepared to support effective action designed to end it, but not some of the more polemical and extreme
proposals. Canada voted against resolutions that urged termination of economic and other relations with South Africa, that linked Israel with South Africa (or Zionism with racism), and that endorsed armed struggle as a legitimate means of opposing apartheid. Abstentions were entered on resolutions where the above issues were implicit, where two radical liberation movements were designated the sole authentic representatives of the South African people, and where apartheid was judged to be a threat to international peace and security.

In 1980, the number of Canada’s votes on South Africa in the General Assembly, as compared to the previous year, increased substantially. In 1980, 24 resolutions were adopted, of which Canada supported 9, abstained on 4, and voted against 11. The explanation offered by External Affairs was consistent and almost verbatim to their explanation offered in the previous year.

From 1981 to 1983, the Canadian government continued to take an anti-apartheid position, but at the same time continued to vote against or abstain on resolutions that called for economic sanctions. In 1981, at the 36th Session of the General Assembly, Canada voted against resolutions that called for an "International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa and an Oil Embargo against South Africa." At the 37th Session of the General Assembly in 1982, the Canadian delegation abstained on resolutions that mentioned "Concerted International Action for the Elimination of Apartheid, Comprehensive and Mandatory Sanctions against South Africa, and a Condemnation of
Foreign Investments in South Africa." In 1983, at the 38th Session, Canada's voting pattern did not deviate from its position in previous years. Once again it voted against a resolution calling for sanctions against South Africa and abstained on two resolutions, one which condemned foreign investment in South Africa and another which favoured an oil embargo against South Africa.56

CONCLUSION

Over the sixteen years under study there were a number of recurrent themes apparent in Canada's voting pattern at the UN in relation to South Africa. Canada refused to vote for resolutions which viewed apartheid as a threat to international peace and security. The Canadian delegation felt that such a decision could only be determined by the Security Council and that the General Assembly "should not prejudge such an important decision..."57 The Trudeau government also consistently abstained or voted against resolutions which mentioned an oil embargo against South Africa and military or nuclear collaboration with South Africa because they felt that such action "could only be implemented effectively through mandatory decisions of the Security Council."58 Canada voted against resolutions concerned with relations between South Africa and
Israel, economic activity in South Africa, and abstained on or voted against resolutions concerning aid to liberation groups.

With regard to Canada's voting record on nuclear cooperation and military collaboration with South Africa, the Canadian delegation, according to J. F. Tanguay, argued that "these resolutions might weaken incentives for South Africa to become a full adherent to international nuclear safeguards."\(^5^9\)

"The position taken by Canada at the UN in the recent past," according to Anne-Marie Jacomy-Millette, "seems to be based on a policy of discrimination and prudence, caution and hesitancy which reflects the ambivalent nature of Canada's overall multilateral diplomacy at the UN."\(^6^0\)

In 1977, in a statement to the General Assembly, Jamieson criticized the volume of resolutions passed or raised against South Africa and stated that "by passing more resolutions, we have succeeded, paradoxically, in ensuring that they receive less, not more attention."\(^6^1\) In that same year Canada voted on 16 out of 30 General Assembly resolutions dealing with South Africa. External Affairs explained Canada's voting record in that year as follows:

The inclusion of unacceptable elements in 3 resolutions, such as the singling-out of some countries for one-sided criticism or the blanket criticism of all economic relations with South Africa, led Canada and many other Western countries to vote against them. Canada abstained on the remaining eleven
because it had reservations on certain aspects of their provisions, or because they prejudged questions that were still to be discussed in the Security Council. 62

In conclusion, an examination of Canada's voting performance at the UN, from 1968 to 1984, further demonstrates the government's unwillingness to give expression to its articulated abhorrence of apartheid. On the one hand, the government repeatedly voted for resolutions which condemned or decried racial oppression in South Africa, while, on the other hand, the government consistently abstained or voted against resolutions that might have had a significant and direct impact on the government of South Africa and its racial policies. Furthermore, the Canadian government was prepared to adopt the latter type of resolution only in unison with other Western countries, notably the US and Britain. Therefore, the government did not have to worry about affecting the strategic and economic interests of the West in South Africa. Nor did it have to worry about stepping outside the parameters set by its membership in the Western alliance.

Chapters One and Two outlined the government's policy toward South Africa from 1968 to 1984. This policy was characterized by a reluctance to sever economic and/or diplomatic relations with South Africa. In the face of such ardent anti-apartheid rhetoric, how can one understand the government's reluctance to impose such measures? The thesis has
argued that South Africa's importance to the West has been the most significant factor in shaping Canada's South African policy. However, many analysts argue that South Africa's economic importance to the "dominant class" was the determining factor behind the government's policy. In order to address this argument the following chapter will examine the impact and significance of these economic interests on Canada's South African policy. Chapter three will examine Canada's financial relations with South Africa, with special emphasis on the 1977 initiatives.
Footnotes


4. Ibid., pp. 195-196.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.


35 Ibid.


40 Ibid.

41 UN Centre Against Apartheid, "Canadian Policy on Human Rights in South Africa," Notes and Documents, No. 9, August 1984, p.2.

42 N-S Institute, Briefing, p. 9.

43 Ibid.


47 UN Centre Against Apartheid, "Canadian Policy on Human Rights in South Africa," p. 3.


51 Tanguay, "UN: Recap of Canada's Activities," p. 18.


55 Title of UN Resolution.


58 Ibid., p. 20.

59 Ibid.

60 Jacomy-Millette, "Canada at the UN," p. 22.


62 Ibid.
Chapter Three
CANADIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter illustrated the gap between the government's public rhetoric and its policy decisions toward South Africa. As was noted in the introduction, some writers attribute this gap to Canada's economic interests in South Africa. However, this chapter will argue that Canada's economic relations played a relatively insignificant role in determining the government's South African policy. In order to substantiate this argument, the following chapter will discuss the extensiveness of Canadian-South African trade relations, the nature of their trade, the amount of Canadian investment in South Africa and the significance of Canadian chartered bank loans to South Africa from 1968 to 1984. This chapter will also discuss the initiatives introduced in 1977 by the Trudeau government.

For the most part, this chapter will focus on Canadian private corporations. Although trade figures that outline Canadian trade and investment with South Africa are published, it is by and large not the Canadian government which has commercial relations with Pretoria. An examination of the private sector's
economic relations with South Africa will reveal the government's unwillingness to infringe on these relations. Many authors have suggested that the government is reluctant to interfere with activities of the private sector, and especially with their activities abroad. But the minimal extent of these economic relations and the strategic interest of the West in South Africa, suggests that economic considerations were not the overriding determinant behind Canada's South African policy.

While Canada's economic relations with South Africa were marginal, they directly and indirectly provided support for the policies of that government. According to John Vorster, the former Prime Minister of South Africa, "each trade agreement, each bank loan, each new investment is another brick in the wall of our continued existence. South Africa's legislation (e.g. wage laws) allowed Canadian companies to pay non-whites a lower wage than white South Africans. Apartheid legislation also permitted Canadian firms to pay non-whites a much lower wage than they would be able to pay workers for similar work in Canada. For example, in 1982, according to the South African Household Subsistence Level, the poverty line for the average household in the Durban vicinity was R236.26 a month. According to a Globe and Mail report, "if Bata, a Canadian owned company, had been paying according to the Canadian guideline, its minimum monthly wage would have been R354.39 for a family wage
earner." Also in 1982, it was reported that Bata paid 90 per cent of its Kwazulu workers approximately 200 rand a month ($140 Canadian). Another example of Canada's support for apartheid was the subsidiary of the Aluminium Company of Canada's share participation program. The company structured this program "on a racial basis with shares offered to all white employees, some colored, and a few Africans."

Canadian companies became increasingly implicated in South Africa's system of institutionalized racism when Pretoria introduced the Key Points Act in 1980. According to Elizabeth Schmidt:

The law requires all companies designated as "key" industries to co-operate with the South African Defense Forces in the event of "civil" (i.e. Black) unrest. Under the terms of the act, "key" industries will be offered financial incentives to buy weapons and other security equipment and to train company security guards. A number of subsidiaries of foreign corporations have been asked to form military commando units among their white workers...They may not inform their parent companies whether they have been designated "key points".

Alcan Aluminium Ltd., Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd., and Rio Algom Ltd. (a subsidiary of Rio Tinto Zinc) are among a number of Canadian industries that have been chosen as "key points".

Thus, Canadian companies, that had been designated as key points, actively contributed to the maintenance of apartheid.
I) CANADIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

A) Canadian Investments in South Africa

Canadian investments\textsuperscript{10} in South Africa are marginal compared to that of Britain or the United States. In 1984, Canada's investments were "estimated at only about one per cent of the total foreign investment in South Africa, compared to roughly 20 per cent by the United States and more than 50 per cent by Britain."\textsuperscript{11}

In 1968, Canadian investment in South Africa totalled $58 million (0.1 per cent of all direct investments). By 1976, Canadian investment had more than doubled to $126 million. However, in real terms Canada's investment in South Africa still accounted for only 0.1 per cent.\textsuperscript{12} By 1978, direct foreign investment in South Africa continued to account for only 0.1 per cent of total direct foreign investment.\textsuperscript{13}

Canadian companies, in the period under study, were interested in investing in South Africa for two principal reasons. First, there was a high rate of return available to companies investing there. According to Statistics Canada, in 1980, Canadian investments in Africa (South Africa not included) totalled $136 million (see Table 2).\textsuperscript{14} Secondly, Canadian investors were attracted to South Africa because of its relative "political stability, a comparatively stable labour force, and
### Table 1

**Canadian Direct Investment in South Africa 1968-1980**

**Canadian Companies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Controlled in Canada ($m.)</th>
<th>Controlled in all Foreign Countries ($m.)</th>
<th>Total ($m.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Statistics Canada, Canada's International Investment Position.*
### Table 2

**Canadian Direct Investment in Africa (not including South Africa): Canadian Companies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Controlled in Canada ($m.)</th>
<th>Controlled in all Foreign Countries ($m.)</th>
<th>Total ($m.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tr>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, *Canada's International Investment Position*. 

the commitment of major political parties to the principles of free enterprise.\textsuperscript{15}

A study done by the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1982 listed twenty-eight Canadian corporations that have direct investments in South Africa. Of the twenty-eight companies\textsuperscript{16}, Alcan Aluminium Ltd., Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Ford of Canada, Hudson's Bay Company, Massey Ferguson, and Rio Algom Ltd. were the most prominent investors in South Africa.\textsuperscript{17}

The above mentioned investment figures do not include portfolio (non-direct) investments or investments made in South African stocks by private citizens. In 1970, "portfolio investments abroad amounted to a book value of $2.7 billion... About eighty-five per cent was accounted for by holdings of foreign stocks, mainly of U.S. corporation."\textsuperscript{18} Canadians may directly hold South African shares, but, for the most part, they held shares in investment funds such as the "Canadian-South African Gold Fund, [and] the Morton Schulman Gold Fund...These funds keep a mix of gold... and other stocks which include South African gold mining shares."\textsuperscript{19}

When asked in the House of Commons in 1973 about the activities of Canadian companies in South Africa, Mitchell Sharp replied that the Canadian government had urged companies "to act as good corporate citizens in ways that will make the Canadian people proud of them..."\textsuperscript{20}, but beyond that the government
would make no further comment. Ottawa felt that it could neither encourage nor discourage corporations to invest in South Africa. Nor could it ask companies to operate in a way that would be contrary to South African legislation. According to Robert Matthews:

...when opinion at home or abroad was stirred up by the conduct of Canadian corporations abroad, the government would do what it could to minimize the resulting bad publicity, but it was constrained from doing anything more by the economic system, which discourages, even prevents, intervention in corporate affairs. 21

However, in 1978, the Canadian government challenged the South African government's legislation by introducing a code of conduct and ethics for Canadian companies operating in South Africa. The nominal impact of this code will be examined further in this chapter.

B) South African Investment in Canada

South African investment in Canada increased during the Trudeau years (see Table 3), from "$24 million in 1966 to $153 million in 1978". 22 South African investments, as noted in Chapter One, are predominantly controlled by Harry Oppenheimer's Anglo-American Corporation (AA) and the Rembrandt Group.

Since the early 1960s, AA had been actively involved in Canada, when Oppenheimer sat on the board of directors of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. As of 1980, AA held interests
Table 3
African Investment in Canada 1968-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Direct Investment ($m.)</th>
<th>Controlled Investment ($m.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>232</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>98</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>185</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>1976</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>557</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian International Investment Position.

Note: The above figures are for total African investment in Canada but are useful if one assumes that much of this investment might be derived from South Africa.
in sixty-one companies and directly controlled forty-two of those same companies operating in Canada. The Rembrandt Group, on the other hand, was controlled by Anton Rupert. The Rembrandt Group extends its corporate interests via Rothmans. Rothmans had a 50.1 per cent interest in Carling O'Keefe and also had interests in Les Nordiques, the Toronto Argonauts, Jordan wines, and Rothmans, Dunhill, Craven A and Craven M cigarettes. According to SACTU, AA and Rothmans together directly controlled seventy-four of the eighty-three companies listed in Statistics Canada as being controlled from South Africa.

C) Canadian-South African Trade Relations

Canadian-South African trade relations were historically linked to mutual British Empire and Commonwealth connections. In 1968, Canada imported goods from South Africa, totalling $39,315,000 (0.3 per cent of Canadian total imports). Nine years later, in 1975, South African imports to Canada reached $201,425,000 (0.6 per cent of total imports). Despite the 1977 initiatives, Canadian imports from South Africa reached an all time high of $402,867,000 (0.5 per cent of total imports) in 1981 (see Tables 4 and 5).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports ($000)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Imports</th>
<th>Exports ($000)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Exports</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>39,315</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>68,341</td>
<td>.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>45,944</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>78,501</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>354,545</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>402,867</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>261,641</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>218,718</td>
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<td>194,143</td>
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<td>171,475</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>222,155</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>201,830</td>
<td>.2</td>
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Source: Statistics Canada, *Imports by Countries and Exports by Countries.*
Table 5
South African Trade with Canada 1968-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Exports ($m.)</th>
<th>Percentage To Canada</th>
<th>Total Imports ($m.)</th>
<th>Percentage From Canada</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1,831.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2,394.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<td>2,495.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3,355.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>4,191.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>6,283.4</td>
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<td>7,199.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td>5,723.9</td>
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<td>7,520.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7,011.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6,572.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>8,133.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8,028.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Countries and Exports by Countries.
Of all the Canadian provinces that imported goods from South Africa, Ontario was ranked the highest (65.7 per cent). In 1985, Quebec imported 24.7 per cent, New Brunswick imported 4.4 per cent (mostly sugar) and British Columbia imported 4.1 per cent. The remaining six provinces in the Maritimes and the Prairies imported less than 2 per cent of the total South African goods\textsuperscript{27} to Canada.\textsuperscript{28} According to SACTU:

The geographical concentration of South African products imported into Canada is matched by the concentration of the value of these imports in a relatively small number of products. The top four categories (metal concentrates of uranium, lead, silver and zinc for processing, Krugerrand gold coins, coal tar, coal pitch and raw sugar) taken together, total 54 per cent of the value imports from South Africa (1983). The top 10 categories which include fruit products, wool, ferrochrome and aircrafts exceed 75 per cent of the total.\textsuperscript{29}

Other significant non-edible imports from South Africa include chrome, manganese, ferromanganese, and tungsten. Canada is dependent on South Africa for its supply of manganese; "approximately 95\% of its imports come from that country with small amounts from the United States, which has no manganese resources of its own."\textsuperscript{30} Furthermore, manganese, similar to chromium, is necessary for the production of steel. South Africa contains 75 per cent of the world's ore deposits. The other major supplier of this ore, and the other previously mentioned ores and metals, is the Soviet Union.
In 1968, Canada exported goods to South Africa, totalling $68,341,000 (0.5 per cent of Canada's total exports). By 1975, Canada's exports to South Africa were recorded at $136,967,000 (0.4 per cent of total exports). In 1981, Canadian exports to South Africa decreased to $261,641,000 (0.3 per cent of total exports) and by 1984, Canadian exports had decreased to $201,830,000 (0.2 per cent of total exports). Of the total Canadian exports to South Africa, sulfur was the single largest export at $50,000,000. In 1982, manufactured goods accounted for the total exported to South Africa.  

The availability of foreign capital to South Africa to finance massive economic self-sufficiency, to overcome payments deficits, and to meet the costs of the arms race and oil import surpluses which were needed to achieve industrial self-sufficiency, to survive economic crises such as those after the 1960 Sharpeville incident, has always translated into support for the South African state: the extension of large amounts of foreign capital to South African borrowers has been motivated by vested interest on the part of the banks in South Africa's economic and political stability which, historically, have been supported by the availability of foreign capital to South Africa.
status quo. Thus, the overall impact of foreign bank loans to South Africa... has been that of facilitating the implementation of increasingly repressive measures.\footnote{32}

Over the last fifteen years, South Africa borrowed over $7 billion from Western banks. Between 1972 and 1982, Canada's four major banks or their subsidiaries abroad arranged loans to South Africa valued at over $1.4 billion. In this same period, 1972 to 1978, Canada ranked 10th among countries supplying loans to South Africa.\footnote{33} Although these loans were important to South Africa and Canadian banks, one cannot attribute a direct causal relationship between Canadian banking interests in South Africa and the government's South African policy. While the Canadian government might have taken these banking interests into consideration, the West's strategic interest in South Africa played a much greater role in shaping Canada's South African policy. The influence of these Western interests on Canada's South African policy will be discussed in Chapter Four.

By 1980 most of the Canadian chartered banks decided to stop issuing loans to South Africa.\footnote{34} This decision appeared to be the result of the tactics of anti-apartheid lobby groups and the resurgence of violence and a subsequent period of instability that followed the 1976 Soweto riots. A few of these banks might also have stopped doing business with South Africa because of the relative insignificance of the South African market compared to that of other countries to which these Canadian banks made
loans. However, it is difficult to measure the extent of the involvement of these banks in South Africa because "of the international banking community's practice of working through international consortia, and the banks' refusal to provide information." According to information gathered by SACTU, Canadian chartered banks helped to finance apartheid in the following manner:

**Bank of Montreal**

- Direct participation in loans to the Republic of South Africa and the Ministry of Finance totalling $100 million in 1972.
- Loans and bond purchases through the Bank of Montreal's international bank associations totalling Can $450 million in the 1970s.
- Bank of Montreal loans tend to favour the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) and ESCOM, and to a lesser extent the S.A. Railway and Habours Commission.
- Bank of Montreal has in the past cited support from puppet bantustan leaders to rationalize its loan policies.

**Royal Bank**

- Extensive loans to South Africa through the London-based Orion Bank, in which Royal had a 20% interest. Through this connection, nine separate loans, totalling Can $350 million, have gone to ISCOR, ESCOM and the South African Railway and Habours.
- Three long-term loans (expiry day 1987/88) through Bankhaus Burkhardt and Brocklschen (West Germany), in which the Royal Bank has a 100% interest, to ISCOR worth Can $130 million; these were issued in 1972-3.

**CIBC**

- Between 1972 and 1975, CIBC participated in four major loans totalling $260 million--one to ISCOR,
two to the government and one to the African Explosives and Chemical Industry, a company involved in supplying military resources to the apartheid regime.

-CIBC has a 3.5% interest in Credit Commercial de France, which participated in 32 separate loans or bond purchases equal to US $1.158 million between 1972 and 1976.

-The California Canadian Bank, a wholly-owned CIBC subsidiary, manages the Pension Fund of the Fluor Corporation, the major contractor for South Africa's oil-from-coal conversion plants (SASOL) and one of the largest construction firms in the world. This makes the CCB the largest identified shareholder in Fluor, with voting power of more than 800,000 shares, just less than 5% of the total.

**Bank of Nova Scotia**

-Scotia Bank revealed in March, 1981, that it made a number of bilateral loans to the apartheid regime, the most recent being worth $5 million.

-Nova Scotia was appointed an agent of the S.A. Chamber of Mines for the sale in Canada of the Krugerrand gold coin; the Bank of Nova Scotia became the official distributor in 1979.

-C.E. Ritchie, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, also sits on the Board of MINORCO (Minerals and Research Corporation), a Bermuda-based company controlled by the Anglo-American Corporation. Oppenheimer uses the "off-shore" location to try to conceal his company's corporate penetration of the North American economy. The Chairman of CITICORP, the largest US bank lender to South Africa, also sits on the MINORCO Board.

**Toronto Dominion Bank**

-Three loans totalling Can $130 million were made in the early 1970s.

-A TD loan of $2.6 million was extended to ESCOM in 1979.

-The TD Board of Directors issued a "no future loans" policy in March 1980.[37]

In defence of Canadian bank involvement in South Africa,

Fred McNeil, chairperson of the Bank of Montreal, told a shareholder's meeting that
while lending in South Africa involved a moral question, a boycott of the country would not be morally consistent. The boycott would hurt black Africans by bringing about economic hardships, exacerbating conflict and bringing an end to progress that is now being made...

During the Trudeau years, the public sector also issued loans to South Africa. In November 1982, the Canadian director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) voted in favour of an IMF loan to South Africa for $1.1 billion. The government felt that IMF decisions should not be based on political factors but rather on the organization's "financial and technical mandate". According to a paper by the North-South Institute, Allan MacEachen, a former Minister of External Affairs, was reported to state that "if South Africa had not received the loan, it was unlikely that South African defence spending would have been cut, but rather that the impact of any ensuring economic restraints would have been most acutely felt by the black population."

E) Krugerrand Gold

The sale of Krugerrand gold coins in Canada, although marginal, helped to furnish Pretoria with foreign exchange at "premium rather than market prices." In 1978, the importation of Krugerrands was valued at $4 million. As the price of gold rose to over $800 per ounce, the worth of this coin also rose to $32 million in sales in 1980 at the height of the boom.
Regardless of the decline in the price of gold, the value of this coin (1983) still totalled $28 million. According to the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility: "Krugerrand sales are aggressively promoted in an effort to gain foreign exchange through such gold sales at a premium rather than market prices. Approximately 25 per cent of South Africa's gold production is sold as Kruggerand coins."

The Canadian government never clearly stated whether the sale of this import required official authorization. The government took the position that the sale of Kruggerands constituted "...trade in peaceful goods..." and that it was neither encouraged nor promoted. In response to the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility's request "to prevent the Kruggerand from being sold in Canada," Mark MacGuigan replied that:

While the Government of Canada does not promote trade with South Africa, neither as a matter of policy, does it stand in the way of legitimate overseas activities of Canadian companies and individuals, except where such activities contravene sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.

Ottawa, during this same period, also produced its own gold coin (the Maple Leaf). Consequently, these coins were in direct competition with those of the South African government's gold coin.
F) The 1977 Initiatives

On 19 December 1977, Don Jamieson (the Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1977 to 1979) announced in the House of Commons that Canada

along with a great many other countries, has been re-examining the attitude it ought to take beyond what has already been done by the world community in response to those actions which in recent times have been undertaken in South Africa to which we in Canada take the strongest possible objection...45

He went on to say that

South Africa...stands alone. It is the only country which as a basic part of its government structure...has a declared and unequivocal policy. It stands apart as a country which makes decisions affecting human beings on the basis of race and colour.46

What promoted this change in the direction of Canada's policy towards South Africa? This change can be subsumed under the following three categories: international environment, Canadian opportunities and a shift in US policy.

In the fall of 1977, after the popular outcry over the death of the black leader Steve Biko as well as the Soweto riots in 1976, the government of South Africa reacted by imposing repressive measures on all those who were critical of the government. These events led to an international reaction and a heightened global awareness of the situation in South Africa.
Secondly, these events were followed by Canada's two-year term on the UN Security Council. During this period and in response to Biko's death and the Soweto riots, the Security Council, in 1977, unanimously adopted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa (Resolution 418). Canada's term on the Security Council also had the effect of giving a higher profile to Canadian-African relations and policies.

However, the most significant motivating force behind this change in policy was the shift in US foreign policy under the administration of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981). The Carter administration was the first American government in recent years to "raise the banner of human rights." But, Carter's policy towards South Africa was characterized by elements of "change and continuity." Hence, some scholars viewed Carter's policy towards southern Africa as one of accommodation.

The accommodationist posture of the Carter administration rested on several basic premises: that nationalist change in Southern Africa, even when it brought to power "Marxist" parties associated with the Soviet Union, did not necessarily threaten the interests of the United States; that, therefore Southern Africa could and should be insulated from East-West competition and conflict; and that the only way in which American influence and interests in Southern Africa could be maintained and extended was for the United States to identify itself with the aspirations of the African states in the region.
According to Jimmy Carter:

Our own actions in the field of human rights must vary according to the appropriateness and effectiveness of one kind or another, but our judgments must be made according to a single standard, for oppression is reprehensible whether its victims are blacks in South Africa or American Indians...

In response to this shift in US rhetoric, W.H. Barton, the former Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN, declared to the Security Council:

The Canadian government believes it is essential at this stage to take fullest advantage, and to make constructive use, of any influence that can be brought to bear on the government of South Africa by those countries that maintain relations with it. In this group of countries,... the United States is preeminent and we are impressed by the resolved expressed by the new administration to use its best efforts to achieve our common purpose.

The 1977 initiatives were also prompted by the Sullivan Code of March 1977, a code devised by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, and the European Economic Community (EEC) Code of September 1977 which emphasized trade union rights. Both of these codes, like the Canadian code of conduct, dealt with employment and related practices of companies operating in South Africa. More discussion will follow on the Canadian Code of Conduct. All of the above events had a considerable effect on Canada's policy vis-a-vis South Africa in the years between 1976 and 1980.
In expressing concern over augmenting repression and the death of the black activist Steve Biko, Jamieson stated: "We strongly believe that what must come in South Africa is the destruction of that kind of system, the introduction of the principle of one man, one vote and of the normal democratic process which all of us in this part of the world take for granted."\(^{56}\) Jamieson then announced the government's intention to phase "out all its government-sponsored, commercial-support activities in South Africa."\(^{57}\) The Canadian government's unilateral actions, as previously noted in the introduction, can be summarized under the following five points.

1. The withdrawal of commercial counsellors from Cape Town and Johannesburg and the closure of its commercial offices in these two cities.

2. The withdrawal of all Export development Corporation (EDC) government account support from any transaction relating to South Africa. (EDC is a crown corporation that supplies export credit insurance, loan insurance and foreign investment insurance to Canadian companies operating abroad. It has two main accounts—the "government account" administered by the cabinet, and the "corporate account" administered by the EDC.)

3. The introduction of a code of conduct and ethics for Canadian companies operating in South Africa.

4. The introduction of a new regulation that would require all South African citizens to acquire non-immigrant visas before entering Canada.
5. A review of the Commonwealth preferential tariff accorded to South Africa. This tariff, enacted in 1933, was still in operation even though South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961.58

These measures attracted considerable attention both domestically and internationally. Within Canada, opinion was divided between those groups who felt that the government's moves did not go far enough and those who believed that the government would be putting Canadian jobs at risk. The latter opinion was supported by Canadian officials, such as Tony Eaton, acting director-general of the Pacific, Asian, and African bureau of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. Eaton argued that: "the withdrawal of Canada's trade commissioners would have a substantial effect on small and medium-sized Canadian firms which would no longer have the necessary encouragement to sell to South Africa."59 Internationally, Canada was heralded as the first major Western trading partner of South Africa "to cut off all official commercial links with South Africa, maintaining only diplomatic ties."60

By 1984, six years after the introduction of these measures, it was clear that while the 1977 initiatives certainly marked a transition point in the Canadian government's opposition to apartheid, they were more rhetorical than concrete in nature because they were never effectively implemented or monitored. For example in 1977, Canada had three trade commissioners located in
South Africa. In 1978, Ottawa closed its trade office in Johannesburg and its office in Cape Town in 1979. After the closure of these commissions, it appeared as if the government had fulfilled its promise. However, as of 1982, the number of officers were seven, the same figure as at the beginning of the Trudeau era. In 1977, Jamieson stated that: "We will, of course, maintain our offices in Pretoria for normal business, because we do not feel that breaking off of diplomatic relations at this time is advisable." T.A. Keenleyside attributes the "maintenance of a sizable embassy," as rationalized by Ottawa, to three main factors.

Canada's increasing developing assistance involvement in Botswana and Lesotho, for which the Pretoria embassy has responsibility; the expanded immigration load as a result of the implementation of the visa requirement for South African visitors to Canada, announced in December 1977, and the generally increased administrative load of operating the mission.

Regardless of the plausibility of these explanations, much of the trade between South Africa and Canada had been well secured by 1978, the Trade Commissions were no longer needed. Trade with South Africa, since the closing of these offices, actually increased from 1978 to 1981 with the exception of a 0.1 per cent decrease in imports from South Africa between 1977 and 1981. Imports from South Africa increased by 0.2 per cent between
1978 and 1981 and exports to that country also increased by 0.1 per cent (see Table 4).

The 1977 initiatives also included the cessation of all EDC government account transactions. According to a Globe and Mail report: "[w]hen deals are too risky to be handled as usual by the EDC's own corporate account, but the Cabinet still wants to go ahead with the financing, the loans are put on the government account." In August 1981, the government further extended its sanctions on EDC activity to encompass the withdrawal of all EDC "corporate account concessional financing of Canadian exports." Both of these initiatives pertaining to the EDC were, as previously mentioned, symbolic in nature because they were never effectively implemented. For example, government account transactions had not been used to conduct either investment or trade relations with Pretoria since 1967. Furthermore, the government account financed only ten per cent of the EDC's global activity.

As for the 1981 initiatives, as indicated in Table 6, no such credits had been given since 1976. In fact, even before 1976, this type of financing was extremely minimal. EDC has never played a great role in offering loans to South African importers.

More significantly the 1977 initiatives drew no attention to: the EDC "corporate account" guarantees; insurance to Canadian exports (while operating in South Africa) in case of non-payment
of contracts; the promotion of the South African market in the
government trade journal—Canada Commerce, and the Department of
Industry, Trade and Commerce’s Programme for Export Market
Development (PEMD) in relation to South Africa.

In 1982, the government did suspend the "corporate
account" lending facility but only for South African buyers of
Canadian goods. Furthermore, as Table 6 demonstrates, the amount
of export credit insurance and guarantees available to Canadian
suppliers for their export to South Africa have been higher, in
every year but one, since the 1977 announcement. This further
reveals the ineffective nature of the contraints on EDC
activities.

Other forms of government-sponsored, commercial
activities, which were not covered under the 1977 announcement,
included the government trade journal—Canada Commerce. This
journal informs Canadian businessmen of commercial opportunities
in foreign countries. Attempting to promote the South African
market, a 1974 issue stated:

South Africa may be far away, freight and trans­
port costs may pose problems, but there are markets
waiting for those Canadian businessmen wise enough
to realize that trade outlets should be diversified ... There should be opportunities there for your firm.

Since 1975 there have been no articles appearing in Canada
Commerce that promote trade and investment opportunities in South
Africa. Since the 1977 announcement, Canada Commerce also discontinued
the listing of the South African embassy from its periodic listing of Canada's foreign overseas commercial offices. However, since August 1979 the listing of the South African embassy has been reinstated. 69

As previously noted, the 1977 initiatives did not mention the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce's Program for Export Market Development (PEMD) in relation to South Africa. PEMD offers assistance for: "a) precontractual and binding costs for capital projects; b) travel and related costs in market identification and market adjustments; c) individual participation in foreign trade fairs; d) specific costs of bringing foreign buyers to Canada; e) costs associated with forming and operating an export consortium; and f) costs associated with sustained market development." 70 According to Table 6, Canadian firms, under the guidance and support of PEMD, were, up until 1985, still encouraged to trade with South Africa. After the announcement of the 1977 initiatives, the amount of funding decreased slightly between 1978 and 1980. However, since that period, PEMD support has reached levels equal to or higher than the pre-1977 period.

In essence, Canada's bilateral initiatives against South Africa in 1977 had little or no effect on the existing commercial relations between these countries. In 1978, Jamieson stated:

We continue to emphasize at every opportunity that apartheid is a unique and particularly
Table 6

Canada-South Africa Relations ($1,000's)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EDC Loans</th>
<th>EDC. Ins.</th>
<th>PEMD</th>
<th>Trade Articles</th>
<th>Emb Staff</th>
<th>Cdn Exports</th>
<th>Cdn Imports</th>
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<td>63,684</td>
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<td>4,907</td>
<td>$54.9</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>213,787</td>
<td>218,718</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>11,153</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>165,770</td>
<td>194,143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:

insidious policy...and that under no circum-
stances can we be supportive of any moves that
would tend to reinforce apartheid... 71

However, the inconsistent nature of the Canadian position is
exemplified in Jamieson's subsequent remarks:

At the same time, there is no question, either
that insofar as Canada is concerned an equally
important objective is to co-operate in every
possible way with the government of South
Africa and with other friendly governments in
Southern Africa to provide a counter-weight to...
the Soviet threat. 72

The government's 1977 initiatives appeared to present a
desire to close the gap between rhetoric and policy. However, the
latter quote by Jamieson also highlights the government's
previous decision "to cooperate in the general context of the
Atlantic Alliance and in the specific context of its obligations
to the United States." 73 Thus, Jamieson's latter remark
suggests that the Canadian government placed a greater importance
on South Africa's strategic importance to the West, than it did
on the dismantling of apartheid.

G) The Code of Conduct

The 1978 code of conduct for Canadian companies operating
in South Africa further demonstrates the Trudeau government's
lack of consistency between words and deeds. In 1978, Jamieson
had claimed in an address to the Canadian Human Rights Foundation
that "Canada has a moral and legal obligation to be involved in
the promotion of human rights both at home and abroad." When the code was implemented in 1979, Jamieson outlined what he perceived to be the purpose of the Canadian code of conduct.

We are especially hopeful that Canada's opposition to apartheid and its support for racial equality can be underlined in practical terms through a growing realization of the objectives of the code of conduct...

The code of conduct was designed to appeal "to all employers in South Africa to take urgent measures to promote the conditions necessary for acceptance of the well established standards in the field of human rights." The prevailing assumption behind the drafting of this code was that Canadian corporations could be instrumental as "agents of change" in South Africa. The code specifically called upon Canadian firms to improve the wages, benefits and working conditions of their black employees, desegregate facilities, pay equal wages for equal work, accept black union activities and free collective bargaining, assist with housing, education, training and generally raise the living standard of their black workers.

According to Jamieson, the policy objectives underlying this code were twofold.

First, we must continue to seek to advance Canadian interests and respond to Canadian concerns by pursuing a range of significant bilateral relations and keeping them in good repair.
Secondly, the welfare of Canadians will depend increasingly on finding solutions through international cooperation to global problems; this means that a congenial global order must rank high in our endeavours. 78

Because of its voluntary nature, the code of conduct since 1977 has been criticized by the interdenominational Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility as "completely useless." 80 While companies were expected to report annually to the government, they were not legally required to do so and there was no provision made for action to be taken if they did not adhere to this code. In 1979, six out of the twenty-eight companies operating in South Africa issued public reports on their implementation of the code. However, as of 1984 only one company—Alcan Aluminium Ltd.—continued to issue a report. 81

In an exchange between the T.C.C.R. and Mark MacGuigan, the Taskforce asked the government to "reassess the usefulness of its present code of conduct with the view of amending it to include:

a) the abolition of the migrant labour system;
b) the abolition of influx controls;
c) securing the right of workers to live with their families;
d) equality in education;
e) equal access to housing and health care services;
f) making adherences to the Code legally binding and establishing penalties for non- or inadequate adherence;
g) requiring companies to file an annual report which would include comparative data on an itemized basis as well as all contracts with South Africa's military or police;
h) establishment of a public review committee
to include representatives of the Canadian
Labour Congress, the churches, and other
concerned organizations.82

One External Affairs official interviewed admitted that
the code was "not very effective" and went on to call it a
"political gesture."83 Why was the code so ineffective? Ottawa
said that it could not make the code mandatory because this would
involve the extra-territorial application of Canadian law. The
government felt that this might set a precedent for foreign
governments (e.g. the US) wishing to apply their laws while
operating on Canadian soil. "A long standing cause of irritation
between Canada and the United States of America is the assumption
of jurisdiction by the United States government and regulatory
agencies over persons, property and events in Canada."84 In a
House of Commons debate Trudeau stated: "[W]e are making no
legislation to prevent Canadian businessmen from trading in South
Africa if they so desire. There is absolutely no restriction on
the issuance of passports for them if they want to go to
trade..."85 Once again, the argument was put forth that
Canadian companies by operating in South Africa, were supposedly
providing a liberalizing force by setting an example of
'equality' within the work place and furthering 'racial
integration'. In support of this notion Trudeau further remarked:
"We believe that as a general rule, trade between nations is a
good thing. It is not only good economically but it is also good
in terms of human relations between the peoples of these countries.\textsuperscript{86}

Another problem with the enforcement of the code of conduct was that there was a sizable amount of portfolio investment in South Africa. While firms such as International Thomson Organization and Bata were privately owned, others such as Massey-Ferguson Ltd., and Falconbridge Mines Ltd. were controlled by minority shareholders. A minority role means that these firms, even if the Canadian directors wished to do so, would most likely be unable to comply with the code.\textsuperscript{87}

In 1982, the Department of External Affairs asked interest groups that were concerned about southern Africa to suggest two possible questionnaires that could be used in standardizing the code's reporting procedure and to look at three possible techniques for reviewing the reports that are submitted. The latter entailed the options of:

a) setting up a tripartite review board composed of representatives from business, labour and the churches;
b) hiring a private consultant to do the job, or
c) having the government assess the reports and table their findings in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

In conclusion, this chapter argued that the 1977 policy changes, initiated under the Liberal government, did not
significantly alter Ottawa's previous policy towards South Africa. It permitted the Canadian government to appear as though it was sincerely operationalizing its articulated abhorrence of apartheid, without in any real way harming the South African government, or restricting Canadian commercial relations with that regime.

Normally, economic considerations are an important force in government decision making. However, because of their minimal nature, they cannot fully account for the government's gap between rhetoric and policy. They did nonetheless contribute to South Africa's system of racial oppression. In order to understand the overriding motivating influence behind Canada's South African policy, one must examine Canada's obligations to the NATO alliance. The following chapter will argue that the Canadian government was unwilling to initiate policy decisions that would endanger or interfere with South Africa's strategic or economic importance to the West.
Footnotes


6 According to a UN report the following Canadian companies have also helped, as of 1984, to maintain Pretoria's system of institutionalized racism: "Alcan, which is likely, through its partners in South Africa, to sell specified equipment to the military; Falconbridge Ltd., which, although it has sold its major mine in Namibia, still has a 25 per cent interest in Western Platinum in South Africa; Ford Motor Co. of Canada, which has contracts to supply vehicles to the South African military and police; Massey Ferguson, in which the Canadian Government now owns a major interest, is selling technology for diesel engines to the Atlantis Diesel Engine Co., owned by the South African Government; and Noranda Mines, which through its subsidiary, Canadian Wire and Cable, has a 33 per cent interest in a South African magnetic cable company." Sheila Kappler, "Canadian Governmental Policy, Banks, and Corporate Relations with South Africa," *United Nations Centre Against Apartheid: Notes and Documents* 8 (August 1984), p. 7.


9 York University Divestment Committee, "Brief on the

10 According to Peter B. Kenen, foreign direct investment
refers to "international transactions between related
enterprises-parent companies and foreign affiliates-and portfolio
[or indirect] investment as transactions in stocks, bonds, bank
deposits, and money-market instruments involving independent
firms or individuals." "Private International Capital Movements,"
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, PP. 27-28,
quoted in Annette Baker Fox, The Politics of Attraction: Four
Middle Powers and the United States (New York: Columbia University


12 Statistics Canada, Canada's International Investment

13 Brian Douglas Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South

14 Statistics Canada, Canada's International Investment

15 Ann and Neva Seidman, US Multinationals in South

16 Alcan Aluminium Ltd., Barringer Research Ltd., The
Bata Group; Bayer Foreign Investments; Canada Development
Corporation; CIL Inc., Cominco Ltd.; Convexco Ltd.; Dominion
Textile Inc.; Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd., Ford Motor Co. of
Canada Ltd., G.T. Fulford Co. Ltd.; Hudson's Bay Co.; ICS
Construction Ltd.; Inco Ltd.; International Thomson Organization;
Dennecott Canada Ltd.; Laurasia Resources Ltd.; Massey-Ferguson
Ltd.; Moore Corporation Ltd.; Noranda Mines Ltd.; Placer
Development Ltd.; Reed Stenhouse Companies Ltd.; Scintrex Ltd.;
Seagram Co. Ltd.; B.F. Stene and Sons Ltd.; Tino Holding Canada
Ltd.; The W. Garfield Western Group.

17 For a break down of the involvement of these
companies in South Africa see SACTU, Guide to Canadian
Collaboration with Apartheid (Toronto: SACTU, 1983).

18 Statistics Canada, Canada's International Investment
Position, September 1975,
19 SACTU, * Trafficking in Apartheid*, p. 94.


22 Tennyson, * Canadian Relations with South Africa*, p. 196.


25 For a discussion of Canada's historical ties with South Africa see Tennyson, * Canadian Relations with South Africa*.

26 Statistics Canada, * Imports by Countries and Exports by Countries*.

27 According to a SACTU report, Canada imported $1,705,000 worth of South African grape wine, sherry and port in 1983. These products accounted for 0.8 percent of Canada's imports from South Africa. SACTU, * Trafficking in Apartheid*, pp. 33-34.

28 Ibid., p. 34.


30 Statistics Canada, * Imports by Countries and Exports by Countries*.

31 Naiman, "Relations Between Canada and South Africa," p. 27.

32 Klein, "Bricks in the Wall," pp. 2-3.

33 Naiman, "Relations Between Canada and South Africa," p. 29.

35. Naiman, "Relations Between Canada and South Africa," p. 29.


37. SACTU, Guide to Canadian Collaboration with Apartheid, pp. 84-85.


41. SACTU, Trafficking in Apartheid, p. 34.


47. Canada's previous terms on the Security Council were in 1948-9, 1958-9, and 1967-8.


51 Ibid., p. 52.


54 According to a report prepared by the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, the Sullivan Code emphasizing desegregation, was "adopted by a dozen companies when first announced in 1977..., and by late 1980 the list of signatories had grown to 137 and included most of the major American firms operating in South Africa." This code was further amplified in 1978 and 1979. Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, South Africa: Time Running Out (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1981), p. 96.

55 Ibid., p. 98.


57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.


67 Ibid.


69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.


72 Ibid.


79 For more discussion on the Code of Conduct see "Canadian Policy Towards Southern Africa: A Brief presented to the Honourable Mark MacGuigan Secretary of State for External Affairs and to the Honourable Herbert Gray Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce prepared by T.C.C.R.," May 5 1981.


81 Globe and Mail. 18 February 1985.


83 Interview, Ottawa, 28 March 1985.

84 Canada, "Relations Between Canada and the US," Canadian Foreign Policy Texts, 83/2, 1983, p. 10.


86 Ibid.


88 North-South Institute, Briefing, p. 8.
Chapter Four
AN EVALUATION OF THE TRUDEAU GOVERNMENT'S
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY FROM 1968 TO 1984

INTRODUCTION

From 1968 to 1984, the Canadian government's policy toward South Africa was dualistic in nature. Chapter One demonstrated that the government was hesitant or unwilling to impose certain measures that would give substance to its rhetorical posturing. This policy was also mirrored in Canada's voting activity at the United Nations. The government readily supported resolutions which condemned apartheid. However, for a number of reasons, which were discussed in Chapter Two, the government consistently abstained or voted against resolutions which, if multilaterally employed and enforced, might have aided in dismantling apartheid. Thus, because of the government's reluctance to undertake unilateral action, Canada's economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa underwent only minor changes during the sixteen years under study. These changes were costless, reactive, and limited in nature. The government was only prompted to act or react when events in South Africa reached such proportions as to spark world condemnation or in response to the South African initiatives of other Western countries.
For instance, in 1971, at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, the Canadian government strongly opposed the British government's plans to sell arms to South Africa. However, this position was adopted, not so much out of a concern for blacks in South Africa, but because Trudeau felt that an issue like this could possibly divide the Commonwealth along racial lines. Also, the government's South African sports boycott was a cosmetic initiative because of the limited nature of Canadian-South African sporting links. The Clark government's termination of Canada's preferential tariff agreement with South Africa was also of little significance because it reflected the size of the imbalance in preferential trade in South Africa's favour. This initiative did not signal a deviation from the Trudeau government's policy toward South Africa because of the costless nature of this gesture.

Finally, the 1977 initiatives and the 1978 code of conduct, both discussed in Chapter Three, were greatly influenced by the international environment, Canadian opportunities and a shift in US policy. More specifically, the 1977 initiatives were motivated by the following events: the Carter Administration's emphasis on human rights; the Soweto riots (1976); the death of Steve Biko (1977); Canada's two year term on the UN Security Council; and the 1977 mandatory arms embargo (Resolution 418). In addition, the 1978 code of conduct was also influenced by the
above mentioned factors, as well as the adoption of similar codes by the United States and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1977.

Why was the Canadian government unwilling to bring its stated abhorrence of South Africa's racial policies in line with concerted policy initiatives? More specifically, what factors determined the government's South African policy? This chapter will examine a number of possible policy determinants. First, it will address how the government explained or accounted for its policy behaviour. Secondly, the role of the anti-apartheid movement in determining or influencing the government's policy will be examined. Thirdly, this chapter will assess the economic-"dominant class" rationale for government inaction. After analysing these explanations, the thesis will argue that they do not adequately explain the Trudeau government's policy toward South Africa. Instead, it will be argued that the government, even though it abhorred apartheid, never sincerely desired to close the gap between rhetoric and reality. Because of the strategic and economic interests of the West in South Africa, the Canadian government was discouraged from pursuing unilateral initiatives that would seriously challenge the predominance of the South African white minority government.
A) The Government's Explanations

That there existed an inconsistency between the Canadian government's rhetoric and concrete action was admitted by Prime Minister Trudeau himself. In order to account for this inconsistency the government employed a number of explanations. Since the government's explanations were outlined in Chapter One, they will only be briefly restated at this juncture. At times the Trudeau government argued that economic investment acts as a "liberalizing force" through which blacks accrue economic advantage and, therefore, indirectly fosters social and political change. Hence, the government stated that the imposition of sanctions would be counterproductive because they would only hurt the black population and needlessly harm Canadian business interests in that region. In addition to this, and inconsistent with the latter argument, the government also reasoned that Canada is a "trading nation" and that it therefore should not allow political or humanitarian concerns to influence its economic relations with other countries. If investment acts as a "liberalizing force" then how can trade possibly be apolitical or neutral? The government also consistently deplored the use of violence in order to end apartheid. Rather, it called for the maintenance of an open dialogue and contacts in order to bring about the process of peaceful change. According to Cranford Pratt:

The government's continued acceptance of the idea that investment is a liberalizing force
in South Africa is an ideological affirmation not a conclusion based on an empirical appraisal of the role of foreign investment in South Africa.\(^2\)

One is forced to question the first explanation for a number of reasons. Foreign companies have been investing in South Africa for decades, and during these decades, contrary to the Canadian government's belief, the socio-economic, political, and civil rights of the black majority population have not improved. For example, in 1980 the amended South African Constitution abolished the upper house of parliament, the Senate and established a President's Council.

The council's sixty-one members are to be appointed by the president acting on the advice of the cabinet. White, Coloured, Indian, and Chinese citizens of South Africa are eligible for membership, but the main concern seems aimed at mollifying the discontented Coloured and Indian populations.\(^3\)

These constitutional "amendments" still left South Africa's 22 million black population excluded from any form of active political involvement and decision-making. Furthermore, according to the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (T.C.C.R.):

New security laws have been enacted to redefine and enlarge existing ones... Black influx control is to be further tightened by the *Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Law*, depriving vast numbers of black citizens of all remaining rights of residence and citizenship in over 86 per cent of the country.\(^4\)
Hence, it would appear that Canadian companies operating in South Africa did not enhance the welfare of the non-white population. Canadian firms, by their very presence, as was demonstrated in Chapter One, helped to uphold and reinforce the apartheid system. Cranford Pratt noted:

The [Canadian firms] do not exist outside the apartheid system as liberal counter-examples. They are fully complying participants within the system, economically benefitting from the tranquillity and exploitation of blacks which is so far ensured by the power of the regime, and playing a full part in reinforcing that power. They may not like apartheid but they are constrained by law and self-interest from opposing it with any effort.  

Hugh Nangle's 1973 report, and subsequent reports since, demonstrated that the majority of Canadian companies paid their black workers below subsistence levels, and that they also fully co-operated in the racial job classification systems that perpetuate apartheid. The very fact that the government issued a code of conduct and the disinclination of Canadian firms to comply with this code demonstrated that investment was not a "liberalizing force". Black workers, during the period under study, were still confronted with inadequate wages, poor living and working conditions.

Secondly, the Trudeau government consistently argued that sanctions were ineffective and would only harm the black majority. Black South Africans, however, had been calling for the imposition of sanctions for years. The African National Congress
(ANC) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) have ardently called for sanctions since the 1960 Sharpeville incident. Imposing sanctions would more likely hurt the white minority than they would the rest of the South African population. The South African economy is extremely dependent on international markets and, consequently, vulnerable to international actions. "It is estimated," according to SACTU, "that over 60% of South Africa's Gross National Product is linked to external forces either through dependence on external markets or the importation of technology, expertise and finance capital." 

The argument that blacks will suffer the most from the imposition of sanctions also appears fallacious. Blacks had been suffering for decades under the yoke of apartheid. Approximately four million bantustan dwellers were relegated to the status of permanent unemployment. Since they are unable to enter into a wage-labour relationship, the employment of sanctions would have had very little effect on their welfare.

Also, the Trudeau government's argument that it is a "trading nation" and, therefore, should not be affected by political or moral considerations, tended to be applied selectively and inconsistently. The Trudeau government was quite willing to impose sanctions on other nations when it was politically or morally convenient. For example, the Canadian government readily adopted sanctions against Poland after General
Jaruzelski imposed martial law in 1981 and also imposed sanctions against Argentina when it occupied the Falkland Islands in 1982. Also, in 1984 the Export Development Corporation (EDC) persisted in continuing its ban on insurance coverage for Canadian businesses operating in Brazil even though Canada exported a considerable amount to that country. These sanctions against Brazil were part of the policy of coordinated international banking consortia and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Canadian government also argued that if it applied sanctions towards South Africa, it would be forced to apply sanctions to other countries that violated fundamental human rights. However, Don Jamieson's acceptance of South Africa's uniqueness tends to undercut this line of reasoning. In an address to the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, Jamieson noted that

South Africa is a case unique in the present-day world. It is the single country in which racial discrimination has been institutionalized as a basis for the entire social, political and economic system.

If South Africa is indeed a unique case, conventional policies need not apply. Similarly, since the apartheid issue "stands alone", the imposition of sanctions need not have created general precedents. Hence, from the above examples we can see that the Trudeau government's application and rejection of sanctions was
selectively applied when the government found it politically, morally, or economically convenient to do so.

Thirdly, the Trudeau government often claimed that its objectives included the promotion of peaceful change in order to prevent conflict or violence. It presumably still believed that the potential for fundamental change in South Africa existed and that violence could be avoided. However, it might be asked how could there have been peaceful change in a country where violence was already institutionalized through the practice of apartheid? The government was disinclined to recognize the "omnipresence of state-directed violence against the persons and the rights of blacks in southern Africa." 14

In addition, the South African government has, over the course of the period under examination, constantly engaged in violence in its external relations with Namibia, Angola and Mozambique.

Despite the five-year-old attempt to bring independence to Namibia, South Africa is still firmly in military and administrative control of the territory. From there it repeatedly launches attacks into Angola. South Africa trains and supports rebel bands in efforts to destabilize the Government of Mozambique and to destroy vital installations and supply routes to landlocked Zimbabwe. South African acts of sabotage and sporadic incursions have broadened its destabilization efforts in Zimbabwe. Its December 1982 military raid and massacre of Lesotho residents have increased "destructive violence" in this country as well. 15
All of these incidents must be kept in mind when we examine the government's desire to bring about "peaceful change".

After considering these explanations for inaction, one is compelled to ask if the Trudeau government truly believed its own arguments. Given the evidence and inconsistency of many of these arguments, it would be improbable that decision-makers remained convinced of the validity of these explanations. Rather, it would appear that politicians and bureaucrats used these arguments to cloak other less respectable explanations or those not able to be talked about openly. In fact, the government seemed to fear the dismantling of apartheid. It had a greater distaste and abhorrence for the violence and instability that might be borne out of the severing of economic and diplomatic relations than it did for the system of apartheid itself. The government's arguments were employed in order to mask the Canadian government's misgivings about revolutionary change in South Africa and a subsequent "unfriendly" and unstable South Africa.

B) The Anti-Apartheid Movement and its Role in Influencing the Government's South African Policy

The second possible explanation given to account for government action, versus government inaction, is the role of interests groups or anti-apartheid lobby groups. The anti-apartheid movement, encompassing such groups or organizations as the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), The Canadian Union of
Public Employees (CUPE), OXFAM Canada, Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), Canadian University Students Overseas (CUSO), SACTU Solidarity Committee (Canada), Canadians Concerned About South Africa, and the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR), had a minimal impact on the government's South African policy. If anything the Trudeau government's initiatives can be interpreted as an attempt "to defuse potential criticism than to ensure that the administration of policy directly conforms to the interests of these groups."  

Generally, these groups can be described, as Redekop noted, as "'issue oriented' pressure groups, those non-establishment groups concerned with particular issues and lacking both an intimate knowledge of the governmental process and access to influential decision-makers." He goes on to state that:

The difficulties faced by these groups in pressing their views on the Government relate not only to the strength of the opposing institutional pressure groups and the shared ideological beliefs of the Canadian elite. They also arise, firstly, from the presence in Canada of a substantial body of public opinion unsympathetic to the demands and actions of the black nationalist movements in southern Africa, hostile to the provisions of financial assistance to these groups, and deeply suspicious of Russian-Cuban intervention in southern Africa.18

Thus, the government, during its sixteen years in office, was rarely called upon to react towards South Africa's inhumane
racial policies. For the most part, Canadians were uninterested in or unconcerned about the plight of black South Africans. 19

C) The "Dominant-Class" Explanation

Some analysts have argued that Canada's policy towards South Africa is motivated solely by economic interests, and is, therefore, a "product of ideological predispositions which promote the dominant class interests in the Canadian social formation." 20 While Canada's economic relations with South Africa are marginally significant, they have played a relatively minor role in charting the Trudeau government's policy toward that country. The South African market

is small relative to Canada's total exports, less than 0.2 per cent, and none of Canada's top 20 exports to South Africa (which accounted for over 80 per cent by value of the goods exported there) exceeded 7 per cent of the total exports in any particular category. 21

Also, in 1974, Canada imported 0.4 per cent of its total imports from South Africa. By 1984, Canada's imports from South Africa had dropped to 0.2 per cent of its total imports (see Chapter Three). Nonetheless, even though Canada's economic interests in South Africa cannot adequately explain the Trudeau government's policy in that country, one must acknowledge the government's refusal to dissuade Canadian firms from investing or trading with South Africa.
During the period under study, Canadian banks, as noted in Chapter Three, had considerable financial links with South Africa. Nonetheless, there is no necessary correlation between these banking interests and the government's policy decisions. For example, by 1980 most of the major Canadian Chartered banks had discontinued their supply of loans to South Africa. This decision did not result in a redirection of the government's policy toward Pretoria. Indeed, it would appear that the cessation of loans was influenced by the aftermath of the Soweto riots and the government's 1977 initiatives.

South Africa was also of considerable importance to Canada and its Western allies because of its wealth of strategic mineral deposits. Some analysts argue that states can find ways of decreasing their reliance on South Africa's minerals. D.G. Haglund notes that the West has five main options. They can stockpile minerals, increase their own production, diversify their importation, use substitute mineral sources, and/or increase conservation of their minerals. Obviously, these options will depend on the size and resources of a respective country. Of the five options, number three will be especially difficult to employ since the only other major supplier of these strategic minerals is the Soviet Union.

While one cannot completely discount the influence of industrial and banking interests on the government's South African
policy, one must weigh their importance in relation to other interests. Hence, noted Tenneyson: "The Canadian-South African economic relationship should continue in the near future much as it is: relatively small, not insignificant in nature, but not a major factor influencing the formulation of Canadian policy."²⁴

D) The Obligations of the Alliance and their Effects on Canada's South African Policy

On the contrary, this thesis argues that the Trudeau government's lack of concrete policy can best be explained within the broader parameters²⁵ of the Western alliance. The Canadian government was not willing to undertake unilateral initiatives (i.e. economic and diplomatic sanctions) that would have endangered South Africa's strategic and economic importance to the West, notably Britain and the United States.²⁶

This is not to say that the end result of the imposition of Canadian sanctions would necessarily mean an end to apartheid. Rather, Canadian unilateral initiatives might have caused a bandwagon effect, whereby other middle and small power countries would also have adopted sanctions. The outcome of this scenario is possibly threefold. First, it would have heightened global concern about South Africa and increase awareness about the extent of Western countries' involvement in that country. Secondly, countries that maintained relations with South Africa would be forced to account for their policies towards South
Africa. And thirdly, by stepping out ahead of Britain and the US, the Canadian government would weaken the appearance of a strong and unified NATO alliance. However, the government was unwilling to contribute to the fruition of the latter outcome for a number of reasons. The Trudeau government placed a greater importance on the obligations of the NATO alliance than it did on dismantling South Africa's racial policies. What do these obligations entail and why have they played such an overriding role in influencing Canada's South African policy?

The North Atlantic Treaty establishes a number of principles or obligations. Besides the principle of collective security, outlined in Article 5, NATO members are expected to maintain and promote "economic and political stability," and "closer ties among them in general..." Acting on behalf of the alliance is implicit in a country's obligations to an alliance. "The commitment of an ally, as set out in Article 2 of NATO," noted John Holmes, "is to take into consideration other allies' interests before differing."  

Unlike other NATO members, these obligations weighed especially heavily on Canada's foreign policy decisions because of its relations with Britain and the US. Although traditional in nature, Canada's ties with Britain continued to reassert themselves in the Commonwealth. Canada's activity in that forum, with regard to South Africa, was motivated more out of a desire to preserve a
harmonious Commonwealth than out of a desire to collectively initiate concerted policy against South Africa.

Canada's obligations to NATO are further augmented because of Canada's geographical proximity to the leader of the alliance. As Stephen Clarkson noted, "Canada has a further bilateral dependency that is the product of a very advanced degree of integration in the continental part of the United States' military command and in the bulk of its military industrial complex." Canada is also tied to the United States through a plethora of political, economic, and cultural linkages.

However, the Canadian government has been known to undertake policy decisions which have conflicted with those of Washington. Although these instances are infrequent and occur mainly when there is little danger to Canada's economic or political interests, as Tucker observed:

The "domestic" and "international" concerns bearing on the conduct of Canadian foreign policy have been issues because of the American capability, if not the American intention to exact "penalties" for deviant behaviour by its northern neighbours and ally.

What role did these Western obligations and relations have on the formulation of Canada's South African policy? It would appear that the above mentioned set of parameters greatly influenced this policy. The government did not want to be accused of "recklessness" or of overstepping its boundaries, especially when South Africa was peripheral to its vested interests. Hence,
there was an unwillingness to adopt initiatives that would conflict with the West's interests in South Africa. According to John Holmes:

> It is of very great importance to Canada to maintain amicable relations with whatever administration the Americans elect. That does not mean supine agreement, but it suggests caution in picking a quarrel. The danger is that we forfeit not only our vested interests but also the disposition in Washington to listen to our arguments on world affairs.

In order to circumvent these parameters, the government preferred to act in multilateral forums, such as the United Nations or the Commonwealth. Within these arenas the government could comfortably adopt initiatives knowing that it was not acting alone and thereby avoided the potential anger of those countries with more substantive interests in South Africa. The government's preference for multilateral action was also motivated by a desire to give maximum effectiveness to its South African initiatives. Because of its limited economic ties with South Africa, the government's policy was characterized by a realization that Canada could have little effect on the policies of that country. For example, in reference to the 1977 initiatives, Jamieson stated:

> We have already taken certain measures. We are prepared and are examining the possibility of going further. It is strictly a question of how far we can go on our own without still greater
support from the world community, and at what point such actions become counter-productive to the principal goal of getting apartheid eliminated as a basic principal.\textsuperscript{32}

The above quote highlights the government's unwillingness to undertake measures vis-a-vis South Africa without the support of its Western allies.

In summary, Canada, by maintaining relations with Pretoria, was in fact serving its own interests by serving the interests of the Western alliance.

In much the same way that Israel ultimately serves United States and Western strategic interests in the Middle East, so South Africa acts as a regional policeman for Western interests in the whole southern African region. Thus, while Canada's approach to South Africa might differ at times from some of the other Western nations, there can be no question that all agree on the paramount importance of South Africa to their long-term strategic interests.\textsuperscript{33}

Canada fulfilled an important role in supporting broader Western concerns in southern Africa because of its "middle-power status". As Carsten Holbraad explained: "[t]he real power [of middle-powers] in relation to the central conflict is as supporter or lieutenants of the alliance leader."\textsuperscript{34} The Trudeau government, by virtue of its membership in the Western alliance and its limited interests in South Africa, was able to serve Western interests in southern Africa. As Linda Freeman observed:

In the event that those countries in southern Africa move further away from the West, friendly ties with Canada, strengthened by strong Canadian
statements in the Commonwealth and at the United Nations serve the West's purpose admirably. In the past, Canada had played the role of intermediary with great discretion in Tanzania where it handled a programme of military assistance in a period of escalating warfare in South Africa and a growing Chinese influence. In the Commonwealth, Canada eased Britain's position following its ineffectual handling of the Rhodesian crisis.

It appears, therefore, that the government's explanations for inaction, the role of the anti-apartheid movement and Canada's economic interests in South Africa cannot adequately account for the government's policy in that region from 1968 to 1984. Because of the obligations of the Western alliance, the Canadian government placed a greater importance on South Africa's strategic and economic importance to the Western alliance, than it did on the elimination of apartheid.

CONCLUSION

From an evaluation of the Trudeau government's rhetorical posturing, voting activity at the United Nations, and its economic relations with South Africa, it can be concluded that the government was reluctant to enact unilateral initiatives (i.e. diplomatic and economic disengagement) that would endanger the interests of its Western allies in South Africa. This desire to preserve the status quo was influenced by Canada's commitment to NATO and its relations with Britain and the United States.
These associations required that the government "take a common stand or rather coincidental stands to the wider world."³⁶

What broader lessons about the nature of Canada's South African policy can be drawn from this thesis? First, the government's policy was grounded in a policy of realpolitik. Its policy decisions placed the morality of national interest over the morality of actively trying to dismantle apartheid. This meant that the government placed a greater importance on defence and territorial questions than it did on global and humanitarian questions such as apartheid. By reversing this order the government would have endangered those interests it deemed more vital. Some analysts argue that "since Canada can have but marginal influence on these questions (i.e. global issues) to make them the prime concerns of foreign policy is little short of intellectual indulgence."³⁷

Secondly, the above analysis accounts for why the government persistently indulged in condemning apartheid in domestic and international forums. The rhetoric was employed to soothe the moral conscience of politicians and bureaucrats and to "satisfy" the demands of concerned citizens. It also propagated the impression that the Canadian government was sincerely concerned about South Africa and as a result was attempting to coordinate viable policy initiatives.

To say that the government's South African policy was formulated within certain parameters, does not, however,
necessarily justify or excuse that policy. While it explains or facilitates an understanding of why the government was unwilling to bring rhetoric in line with substantive policy, it fails to address the ethical shortcomings of that policy. Thus, regardless of the obligations of the alliance and the possibility of endangering Canada's more vital interests, the government still had a moral responsibility to take a stand on the apartheid issue by imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa.

Even though sanctions should not have been considered as an end in themselves and would most likely, according to Professor D. G. Haglund, "prove rather more of a sideshow than the main event in the saga of the dismantling of apartheid," they would have been a worthwhile tactic if only from a moralistic and humanitarian perspective. Henry Shue convincingly argued that:

Any national government has a double duty not to contribute to the deprivation suffered by persons in other countries: a duty in its own right as a powerful social institution to avoid causing deprivation for anyone and a secure duty as agent for its own constituents not to violate their duties to avoid depriving.

By severing all economic and diplomatic ties with Pretoria, regardless of possible repercussions, the Trudeau government could not have been accused of collaborating with the South African government in depriving black South Africans of their basic human rights.
Footnotes


9 Ibid., p. 9.

10 Ibid., p. 11.

12 SACTU, Trafficking in Apartheid, p. 5.


19 Gallup Poll interviewers found, in August 1985, that 52 per cent of Canadians were "unaware of the racial policies" followed by the South African government. The Gallup Report, Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion 22 August 1985, p. 1.


22 T.C.C.R., "A Few Words from the Canadian Banks About Loans to South Africa," (February 1985).


25. According to Denis Stairs, parameters set "certain limits on what the policy-makers are actually able to do—that is, within the range of what they regard as acceptable, or tolerable, political and other costs. Such opinions can serve, in short, to confine the policy community's range of politically workable choices." Denis Stairs, "Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 33 (Winter 1977-78), p. 131, fn6.

26. See the introductory chapter for a review of the West's interests in South Africa.


30. Tucker, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 79.


36 Holmes, *Life with Uncle*, p. 87.


38 Haglund, "South Africa, Minerals and Sanctions," p. 4

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