CLAIMS MAKING AND POLICYMAKING

IN

STATE ANTI-RACISM IN ONTARIO
CLAIMS MAKING AND POLICYMAKING IN
STATE ANTI-RACISM IN ONTARIO:
THE CASE OF THE ONTARIO ANTI-RACISM SECRETARIAT

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A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy
TITLE: Claims Making and Policymaking in State Anti-Racism in Ontario: The Case of the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat

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NUMBER OF PAGES: xviii, 241
Abstract

This dissertation offers a critical analysis of State Anti-Racism in Ontario, Canada, from 1990 - 1995. Particular attention is paid to the politics surrounding the emergence and operation of a dedicated provincial agency - the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat (OARS). The study highlights the central role of social problems work and claims making in the determination of anti-racism policy. The emergence of state anti-racism is accounted for in terms of the relationship between the state and ethno-racial community groups, strategic events associated with the politicization of racial inequality, the ideological orientation of the ruling political party, and changing demographic composition of Ontario. The study demonstrates that social democratic political ideals reflected in government, in conjunction with high-profile strategic events and sustained pressure from ethno-racially based advocacy groups produced the conditions conducive to the emergence and acceleration of state anti-racism initiatives.

The nature of state anti-racisms in distinct areas of programming is accounted for in terms of the claims making activities of the parties involved in the policy-making process. I argue that stakeholders’ influence on the nature of anti-racism initiatives varied depending on the particular realm of policy or programming under examination. State agents determined the nature of anti-racisms in some areas, while community stakeholders held sway in other areas.

The research draws on a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of the state and racial inequality from sociology, political
science, and policy studies. Qualitative methods including open-ended interviews and content analysis of archival materials are used to account for different dimensions of state anti-racism.

Empirical evidence for this study comes from accounts provided by key players involved with anti-racism in Ontario including representatives from community groups, the Ontario Public Service (OPS), academia, media, and the Ontario New Democratic Party (ONDP). Materials housed at the Canadian Jewish Archives and the Provincial Archives of Ontario were also used.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following people for their involvement in this research: Bob Andersen, Micheal Atkinson, Neil McLaughlin, Billy Shaffir, and Harley Dickinson. Thanks also to Olga Cannon and Corinne Jehle who gently guided me through the bureaucracy.

I would like to thank my interviewees. I would especially like to thank those who were OARS staff members, and Anne-Marie Stewart in particular for an invaluable perspective into the workings of the OARS.

I would also like to thank my examining committee. Alastair Bonnett and Bonny Ibhawoh provided challenging observations of the final work. Jeff Denis served as a committee member for the final year. Dorothy Pawluch served on the committee for the duration of the research and provided both personal support and essential guidance into social constructionism. Vic Satzewich served as the thesis supervisor and was patient, wise, and firm when needed. I feel very fortunate to have worked with him on this research.

Of course, I would like to thank my family. My extended family were consistently supportive. My parents, Eldon and Doris Kempthorne, can not be thanked enough. The support of my immediate family was essential and unwavering. Erika, Katrin, Monica, Patrick, and Natalia…thanks for your patience, strength, and encouragement.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v

List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... x

Introduction: ......................................................................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS: .......... 1

1.1 Introduction: ............................................................................................................................... 1
  1.1.1 Theorizing The State and State Power I: Pluralist Approaches: ......................... 3
  1.1.2 Theorizing the State and State Power II: neo-Marxist and post-Marxist Approaches: ................................................................................................................................. 7
  1.1.3 Theories of Social Policy and the Policymaking Process: ................................ 11
  1.1.4 Theorizing the Role of Community and Advocacy Groups in the Policy- making Process: ................................................................................................................................. 21
  1.1.5 Theorizing 'Racial' Knowledge, Discourses, and Hegemony: ....................... 23
  1.1.6 Contextual Constructionism: ..................................................................................... 30
  1.1.7 Discourse Theory: ......................................................................................................... 32

1.2 Conclusions: ............................................................................................................................... 37

1.3 Research Problem and Research Questions: ............................................................................. 38

CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES OF DATA: ............ 41

2.1 Introduction: ............................................................................................................................... 41

2.2 General Analytical Strategy: ................................................................................................... 42

2.3 Interviews: ................................................................................................................................. 47

2.4 Government Documents: ........................................................................................................ 51

2.5 Printed News Media: ................................................................................................................ 54

2.6 Other Sources of Data: ............................................................................................................ 55
2.7 Whiteness, Voice, and Studying the ‘Other’: The Investigator’s Subject Position: ................................................................. 56
2.8 Ethics and Ethics Approval: ......................................................... 60
2.9 Conclusions: ........................................................................... 60

CHAPTER THREE: THE EMERGENCE AND ACCELERATION OF STATE ANTI-RACISM IN ONTARIO: ......................................................... 62

3.1 Introduction: ........................................................................... 62
3.2 A Confluence of Anti-Racism Forces: Setting the Stage for State Anti-Racism in Ontario: ................................................................. 64
3.3 The Anti-Racism Aspirations of the NDP: ..................................... 68
3.4 The 1990 NDP Victory and Aftermath: Hope and Optimism: ............. 73
3.5 The Establishment of the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat: .................. 80
3.6 Organizational Tensions and Anti-Racism Claims-Making by the OARS Leadership: ....................................................................... 86
3.7 The 1992 Yonge Street Riot: ...................................................... 92
3.8 Conclusions: ........................................................................... 98

CHAPTER FOUR: THE STEPHEN LEWIS INQUIRY AND REPORT: CATALOGUING PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES: ........................................... 100

4.1 Introduction: ........................................................................... 100
4.2 The General Context and Process of the Lewis Inquiry and Report: ......... 103
4.3 The ‘Anti-Black Racism’ Focus of the Lewis Inquiry and Report: ............ 104
4.4 Framing Racism in the Lewis Inquiry and Report: ............................... 107
  4.4.1 Criminal Justice: .................................................................. 108
  4.4.2 Education: .......................................................................... 115
  4.4.3 Government and the Ontario Public Service: ................................. 118
  4.4.4 Employment: Access to Trades and Professions: ............................ 119
  4.4.5 Employment Equity: ............................................................. 121
  4.4.6 Community Development: .................................................... 122
4.5 Conclusions: ........................................................................................................ 123

CHAPTER FIVE: RACIAL HEIRARCHIES AND ‘DESERVING’ VICTIMS: THE ONTARIO ANTI-RACISM ADVISORY WORKING GROUP: ........................................ 127

5.1 Introduction: ........................................................................................................ 127

5.2 The Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group: ........................................ 130

5.3 The Black – Jewish Dialogue: ........................................................................... 146

5.4 Conclusions: ........................................................................................................ 152

CHAPTER SIX: DEMONSTRATING ANTI-RACISM ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: ........................................................................................................ 155

6.1 Introduction: ........................................................................................................ 155

6.2 The General Context and Process of the Demonstration Projects: ................ 157

6.3 The General Diagnostic and Prognostic Framing of Systemic Racism in Organizations: ........................................................................................................... 161
  6.3.1 Organizational Culture: ..................................................................................... 162
  6.3.2 Anti-Racism Interventions in Organizational Cultures: Framing a Model for Organizational Change: ...................................................................................... 163
  6.3.3 The Specific Diagnostic and Prognostic Framing of Systemic Racism in Procurement: ............................................................................................................... 170

6.4 Conclusions: ........................................................................................................ 184

CHAPTER SEVEN: JOINT ANTI-RACISM PROJECTS: ........................................... 186

7.1 Introduction: ........................................................................................................ 186

7.2 The General Context and Process of Joint Anti-Racism Programming: .......... 189

7.3 Case Studies in Community – State Joint Anti-Racism Projects: ................. 192
  7.3.1 The Ontario Native Women’s Association’s “Project Designed to Combat Racism”: ................................................................................................................. 193
  7.3.2 The Canadian Council of Muslim Women’s “Youth Leadership Development Forum”: ............................................................................................................. 198
  7.3.3 Tongu Youth and Children Evangel, Canada’s “Youth Harmony Club”: .... 202
  7.3.4 The Walpole Island First Nation’s “Living in a Diverse Community” Project: ................................................................. 206
7.4 Conclusions: ...................................................................................................................212

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS: .................................................................214

8.1 Introduction: ..............................................................................................................214

8.2 Answers to the Central Research Questions: ......................................................214

8.3 Secondary Theoretical Considerations: ...............................................................217
  8.3.1 Reductionism in Anti-Racism Practice: .........................................................217
  8.3.2 Anti-whiteness in Anti-Racism: .................................................................217
  8.3.3 State Solicitation of Information for Policymaking: ................................219
  8.3.4 The ‘Statization’ of Anti-Racism: .................................................................221

8.4 Directions for Further Thought and Study: .......................................................222

References .......................................................................................................................227

Appendix A Competing Frameworks in the Management of Diversity: Race Relations, Multiculturalism, and Anti-Racism.................................................................234

Appendix B General Interview Schedule ...................................................................238

Appendix C Interview Schedule for Stephen Lewis Interview: ...............................239

Appendix D Interview Consent Form .............................................................................240

Appendix E List of Members of the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group: 241
List of Abbreviations

CANS – Community Advisory Networks
CCMW – Canadian Council of Muslim Women
MAOB – Minority and Aboriginal Owned Businesses
OARAWG – Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group
OARS – Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat
ONDP – Ontario New Democratic Party
ONWA – Ontario Native Women’s Association
OPCC - Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner
OPS – Ontario Public Service
ToYACE – Tongu Youth and Children Evangel, Canada
WIFN – Walpole Island First Nation
Introduction:

In Canada, opinion on the efficacy of the role of the state in anti-racism efforts is split. Henry and Tator (2006) assert that state involvement in anti-racism initiatives is essential to alleviating the negative consequences of racism. However, Henry and Tator (2006) also argue that state anti-racism in Canada is destined to fail so long as it is undertaken within an individually orientated liberal democratic framework, and since liberal democracy remains the predominant political orientation in Canada, state anti-racism initiatives are seen as fundamentally and fatally flawed. Dei (2007) also holds little hope for the state as a set of mechanisms that can address racism in Canada. Yet despite these indictments, several of the most active and vocal supporters of state anti-racism lament state retreats from anti-racism initiatives (Benjamin, 2002; Harney, 2001).

The following quotations represent a range of viewpoints on state anti-racism in Canada:

“The influence of state policies and practices at various levels (federal, provincial, and municipal) is critical to the eradication of racism and the promotion of racial equity. As such, the state has a special responsibility to assert leadership.” (Henry and Tator, 2006, p 282).
“When you become the government you find out very quickly there are all kinds of contingencies you never anticipated, and although we wanted to do something about anti-racism we very quickly found out how difficult that negotiation would be, and believe me, everything in government is a negotiation.” (anonymous, 2005)

“...it happens all the time when it comes to dealing with issues of anti-racism, what I call the ‘hierarchy of pain’... my pain is greater than your pain, my suffering is greater than your suffering, and it became, not a bone of contention, but an issue of passionate discussion.” (Farber, 2005).

”... the real struggles [over anti-racism policy] take place behind the back of society.” (Harney, 2001, p 17).

These quotations offer a glimpse into the some of the debates and divergent opinions surrounding state anti-racism policy, they also raise questions concerning why states undertake anti-racism initiatives and how states make decisions about what form those anti-racism initiatives take.

Very generally, there are two types of explanations for why and how the state undertakes anti-racism initiatives. Some observers argue that anti-racism policies stem from partisan orientations of governing political parties, while others point to the range of material and ideological variables present in the
general social and political context as accounting for the emergence and specific form of state anti-racisms.

First, exemplified best by the work of Bonnett (2000a), state anti-racism is explained primarily as a consequence of partisan politics. This explanation emphasizes the congruity of political ideology shared by left-orientated political parties and political constituencies advocating for anti-racism change. Consequently, the retreat or demise of state anti-racisms is also explained relative to partisan political ideology and government loyalty to supportive constituencies. Referencing the national political tradition and culture in Canada, Bonnett (2000a) cites liberal-oriented multiculturalism as hegemonic and ultimately subverting anti-racism efforts which, at best, exist in counter-hegemonic formations. Although this offers a partial explanation for the rise and fall of state anti-racism in Ontario, it falls short of explaining the specific power dynamics of anti-racism policy formation, and it fails completely to account for the particular form anti-racism policies take under social democratic political regimes. Such an approach also tends to reproduce a dichotomous conception of hegemonic multiculturalism versus counter-hegemonic anti-racism\(^\text{1}\), which oversimplifies the nature of relations between state agents and anti-racism advocates, and overstates the practical distinctions between different approaches to the management of diversity.

\(^{1}\) Anti-racism is distinct from the two other approaches commonly adopted to respond to racism in Canada, namely race relations and multiculturalism. For a general discussion of the differences between competing approaches to the management of diversity in Canada, see appendix A
Another explanation for why and how state anti-racisms transpire adopts a more nuanced ‘contextual’ approach. Here the emphasis is on a variety of contextual variables which are seen as conducive to the formation of state anti-racism policies. This approach is most evident in the work of British theorists through their problematization of historically specific ‘local politics of race’ (Ben-Tovim, et al., 1986). The contextual approach correctly addresses state anti-racism interventions as historically specific - at particular historical junctures in particular jurisdictions, particular anti-racism initiatives are preferred by states over other possible ways of addressing racism. Solomos and Back (1995), list a broad inventory of factors they argue may come to bear on the anti-racism policymaking process including: broader (national) conceptions of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘difference’; the nuances of minority political mobilizations; extra-polity factors; and finally partisan responses to minority mobilizations and majority preferences. In a similar vein, Ball and Solomos (1990) offer a slightly different range of variables that may be seen as causally related to the emergence of state anti-racisms including the aforementioned list of factors, as well as the presence or absence of overarching national policies and the possibility of urban unrest. The breadth and flexibility afforded by this line of theorizing is illuminating, but it leaves the more precise theorization of why states undertake anti-racism initiatives, and the question of the determination of the particular content of state interventions, in a state of contingency. We get no indication from Solomos and Back, for example, of the relative weight accorded each causal
variable. Further, these analyses often involve making a leap from the identification of the presence of a variable or combination of variables, to theorizing their causal effect on the state’s decisions concerning what to do about racism. This type of approach has been used by some Canadian researchers to examine the history of state equity initiatives. Walker (2002), for example, accounted for early equity legislation in Ontario, Canada, using a similar approach that located contextual factors in relation to the emergence of early legislation to address discriminatory treatment of minorities.

Although accounts such as those offered by Solomos and Back (1995), and Ball and Solomos (1990) are useful in that they identify the most likely contextual variables influencing states’ decisions to undertake anti-racism initiatives, I suggest that they under-theorize the process of how expert and minority knowledge regarding the nature, location, consequences and responses to racisms are solicited by the state and incorporated into the anti-racism policymaking process. At some point in the anti-racism political process, information about the social problem of racism must be translated into a set of claims by interested parties. These claims are subsequently communicated to, interpreted by, and responded to by the state. Although the possibility of considering knowledge in the form of competing claims forwarded by stakeholders as a significant factor influencing state anti-racism exists in the theoretical schema forwarded by Bonnett (2000a), Ball and Solomos (1990), and Solomos and Back (1995), it remains latent in their analyses as the particular role
of claims-making is not emphasized. Further, theoretical accounts such as those forwarded by Ball and Solomos (1990), and Solomos and Back (1995), were developed relative to local political scenes in Britain during a period of relatively intense public action to address the problems of racism as they were experienced and understood in those contexts, which begs the question: What happened in other jurisdictions and other national contexts?

Little analytical and theoretical attention has been paid to social problems work and associated claims-making as the link between various stakeholders involved in the anti-racism policymaking process. The absence of studies focussing on social problems work and claims-making becomes more problematic over time as the boundaries between the state and the community continue to blur, and policymaking processes evolve to rely increasingly on ‘consultations’ with community ‘partners’ or community ‘stakeholders’,

In the face of the shortcomings of earlier theoretical explanations, a framework that more fully accounts for the role of social problems work and claims-making in theorizing anti-racism policymaking would both refine and extend our understanding of: i) why states undertake anti-racism initiatives, and ii) how they determine the nature of those initiatives. Such an approach, especially when applied to a previously unexamined empirical example, constitutes a

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2 One notable exception to this is work done by Omi (2001) on the conceptual and theoretical basis of anti-racism practice in the United States. Omi’s research addressed conceptions of racism inherent in community based groups’ anti-racist mobilizations rather than state or joint state – community anti-racism initiatives which are the focus of this thesis.
significant advancement to our understanding of how state anti-racism initiatives come about and unfold.
CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

1.1 Introduction:

The following literature review presents theoretical and substantive contributions to understandings of state anti-racisms\(^3\) that inform this thesis. Research from British, French, US, New Zealand, and Canadian contexts is presented with an eye to distilling the significant aspects of theory for the current study of state anti-racisms in Ontario. The two key theoretical questions addressed in this thesis are: 1) Why do states undertake anti-racism initiatives? and 2) What determines the specific form and content of state anti-racism initiatives?\(^4\) The purpose of this chapter is to identify existing theoretical frameworks that hold potential for addressing the main research questions of this thesis, to identify their strengths and shortcomings, and to introduce an alternative theoretical schema that attends to the gaps in explanations of state anti-racism in Ontario, Canada.

Although the theories and conceptual framework used in this study are presented here as relatively unified and integrated, they were adopted in a sporadic and incremental manner throughout the duration of this project. Many

\(^3\) Following Goldberg (1990, xiii) I frequently use the plural racisms to refer to the multiple manifestations of racism. “[T]he presumption of a single monolithic racism is being displaced by a mapping of the multifarious historical formulations of racisms.” I also frequently refer to anti-racisms to draw attention to the multiple forms anti-racism may take.

\(^4\) The focus of these research questions reflects two central concerns of constructionist approaches to the social problem of racisms. Best (2008, p 14), for example, identifies the constructionist approach to social problems as allowing researchers to address the following questions: “Why do people decide that something needs to be done about some conditions, and how do they decide exactly what should be done?”
contradictions, debates, and internal tensions relating to the theories and concepts used throughout this thesis are not dealt with explicitly in the literature review. These omissions are intentional and necessary. I have tried to refer to the most relevant debates, controversies, and omissions; and by temporarily setting others aside I do not intend to close the debates surrounding them. Rather, I have attempted to take a position on several inter-related debates for the practical reason of proceeding with the analysis. Throughout the literature review I have also emphasized the main theoretical gaps to which the results of this thesis contribute.

The literature is presented in three main parts. First, I present a discussion of the main theoretical approaches to understanding state power, policymaking, and the role of advocacy groups in the policy-making process. Second, I present a discussion of approaches to understanding knowledge of racisms, including a discussion of discourses and hegemony concerning diversity and inequality. Finally, I present a discussion of constructionist approaches to social problems, and discourse analytical approaches to analyzing social problem discourses. This includes a discussion of the social problems approach to racism and anti-racism with an emphasis on contextual constructionism. I also identify what an amalgamation of approaches offers as a new way to theorizing the link between anti-racism claims-making and the expression of state power in the form of anti-racism policy and programming. This constitutes a theoretical and analytical framework that extends and refines earlier understandings by allowing for a
pointed and fuller consideration of claims-making inherent in the anti-racism policymaking process.

1.1.1 Theorizing The State and State Power I: Pluralist Approaches:

A persistent question related to theorizing state power has been: “Whose interests are met through the use of state power?” There have been several answers to this question based on empirical examinations of what states actually do. Pluralist conceptions of the state hold that the state may be influenced by different factions or elements of society. In terms of the relationship between the state and other components of society, pluralists tend to hold one of three general positions: i) the state may be seen as a ‘weathervane’ with policies reflecting the interests of the political party in power and other power brokers in society; ii) the state may be seen as a ‘neutral arbiter’ in policy development either stepping in on behalf of people in need, or attempting to balance competing interests; or iii) the state may be seen as a ‘broker’ where policy reflects the interests and wishes of officials within government or state bureaucracies (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987).

In the ‘state as weathervane’ explanation assumes that the main force influencing state policymaking is the ideological orientation of the ruling party and/or other groups (for example trade unions, professional bodies, ethno-cultural groups, etc) that have relationships with decision makers in the state, or whose interests state officials take into consideration in policy decisions. This type of
explanation assumes that political parties will generally act in predictable ways based on their stated political values and partisan identity. ‘Left’ parties, for example, are assumed to act in a labour-friendly manner rather than a pro-business manner. ‘Right’ parties, in turn, are assumed to want to reduce social spending and government intervention into the economy and social relations.

When this version of pluralism is applied to the case of anti-racism in Ontario, OARS is viewed as a manifestation of the ‘left’ thinking of the Ontario NDP, as a symbol of their political values regarding equity, and as a statement that they felt racism was significant enough to warrant a dedicated provincial agency. Further, according to Bonnett (2000a), the particular content of the NDP’s anti-racism policies and programs, are assumed to reflect a uniquely NDP way of responding to racism. It is true that the NDP undertook anti-racism in a very different way than governments before and after, but there was more to how the NDP undertook anti-racism than simply translating their stated partisan values into anti-racism policies and programs. Generally speaking, Bonnett’s is a valid explanation; however, many particulars are left unaddressed by his theoretical tact. For example, this explanation does not account for the way the state solicited information from interested parties, how those parties constructed and communicated understandings of racism to the state, and how the state, in turn, constructed and translated understandings about the problem of racism into particular anti-racism actions.

The state as neutral arbiter approach suggests that the state is appropriately
seen as a referee of sorts, as a third, relatively uninterested party aiding in the resolution of conflicts between various groups in society. Social policy is generally seen as a compromise between the interests of competing groups, as an attempt to strike a balance between groups and meet the interests of as many groups as possible. When applied to the case of the OARS, the neutral arbiter approach explains state anti-racism as the compromise struck between oppressed and marginalized groups in Ontario, and the rest of Ontario society. Policies of the OARS are seen as a safeguard against the exclusionary practices of social systems and institutions, as a way of at least partially responding to the concerns of victims of racism. Similar to the ‘weathervane’ approach, the ‘neutral arbiter’ approach tends to be quite general, and does not take into account the role of social problems work and claims-making. Claims-making regarding the problem of racism is implicit in this approach. An approach that focuses more explicitly on claims-making would help clarify how the social problems work of various parties influenced the policy-making process.

Finally, the ‘state as broker’ approach assumes that the pluralist state acts as an intermediary for the interests of particular individuals in either government or the civil service. Through the structures of the state individuals in influential positions (such as politicians, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Ministers, managers, and front line workers) may impact the policy-making process and the delivery of programs. When the broker explanation is applied to the case of the OARS, the processes of initiating and accelerating state anti-
Racism are seen as reflective of the wishes of particular individuals within the government and the civil service. Similarly, the particulars of policies and programs are explained relative to the interests of individuals who hold sway over the development and implementation of these initiatives. Again, the role of claims-making by interested parties remains latent in this theoretical schema, and the central focus of answering questions about why states undertake particular initiatives, or how the nature of policies and programs are determined, is assumed to stem from individuals within the state. It is true that much of what the NDP did in the area of anti-racism reflected the preferences of individuals in key positions within the power structures of the NDP and the OPS, but this approach fails to detail the claims making work of those individuals, nor does it account for the influence of claims made by extra-state actors or the impact of how strategic ‘racial’ events were framed by representatives within government.

All three versions of pluralist theorizing noted above offer partial explanations of the OARS, and all may be used to explain elements of the anti-racism work undertaken through the OARS. In its varying capacities, the OARS reflected state as broker, neutral arbiter, and conduit for partisan orientation roles. One common limitation of these pluralist approaches, however, is that they do not account for the role of claims-making in deliberations of anti-racism policy.

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5 This was particularly the case with a small cadre of OARS workers, and two individuals from the Première’s office. Activists from the anti-racism movement had been recruited specifically to work in the OARS and other agencies within government and the OPS, and these individuals worked to establish and expand anti-racism programming within government and the OPS.
1.1.2 Theorizing the State and State Power II: neo-Marxist and post-Marxist Approaches:

Since the Miliband – Poulantzas debates of the 1970s, the state has been reconceived by ‘neo-Marxian’ theorists. The state in capitalist societies is now commonly seen as a collection of institutions where elected and non-elected people represent various interests and constituencies, as a collection of sites where conflict and competition over resources occurs, and debates and negotiation concerning social policy happens. Jessop (1990, p 366) contended the capitalist state should be seen as “… a complex institutional ensemble with its own mode of calculation and operational procedures and as a site of political practices which seek to deploy its various institutions and capacities for specific purposes”. Jessop’s conception of the state stresses the ongoing and processual nature of how the dynamic constellations of players and power relations that constitute state structures are implicated in struggles concerning these ‘political practices’ and ‘specific purposes’. For Jessop, the state has no fixed nature, nor essential or trans-historical ties to particular social classes or groups. Rather, the state is seen as populated and influenced by different players at different times attempting to marshal its potential in service of their own interests or the interests of those they represent.

Because Jessop asserts the dynamic and organic nature of the state, he advocates centering analyses on the ways different branches of the state come into being and take particular forms, a process he calls ‘statization’. This is a useful
general conception for the analyses undertaken in this thesis because it allows critical examination of the formation of a new state agency dedicated to anti-racism.

Following Jessop’s line of theorizing, state power is conceived in the following manner:

State power can only be assessed relationally. The state as such has no power - it is merely an institutional ensemble; it has only a set of institutional capacities and liabilities which mediate that power; the power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state. These forces include state managers as well as class forces, gender groups as well as regional interests, and so forth. State power also depends on the forms and nature of resistance to state interventions - - both directly and at a distance from the state (Jessop, 1990, p 269 – 270).

Jessop’s ‘strategic – relational’ notion of the capitalist state and his concept of statization are adopted as the general theoretical conception of the state and state power used for this thesis. This conception of the state is useful in that it draws critical attention to the way the state is implicated in regulating social relations (including political mobilizations such as community based anti-racism) through policy and programming, and it also draws critical analytical attention to forms of resistance to state interventions. Adapting this general perspective of the state and state power to the case of anti-racism involves locating anti-racism as a set of resistance-orientated forces and projects co-existing with other, sometimes opposing, forces in the political arena. Anti-racism advocacy is therefore
considered both a form of resistance\textsuperscript{6} to older and predominant policies and ideological orientations – multiculturalism and race relations - and simultaneously a form of resistance to racisms. The analysis undertaken in this thesis extends an application of Jessop’s conception by adding to it a consideration of discursive power involved in claims-making processes, which took place through deliberations and decisions over what anti-racism direction the state should undertake.

Some analyses of state power that adopt a ‘state as regulator’ of minoritized groups that consider, albeit marginally, the role of discursive deliberation have been done in Canada (Das Gupta, 2007; Lee, 1996; and Ng, 1996). Ng (1996) problematized how regulation and resistance took place in and through the state in a case study of an employment agency. Ng highlighted the centrality of the documentation process in the constitution and control of workers, and argued for a notion of the state as a site of struggle between competing class, race, and gender interests. Ng’s analysis offers a way to conceive the particular forms of regulation, and therefore the expression of state power, that exist at the border between a state-contracted agency and minoritized\textsuperscript{7} women workers, and a

\textsuperscript{6} Resistance here refers to the ways advocacy groups and other groups responded to state intervention – it refers to a form of resistance to state power and control in the processes of determining the specific form and content of state anti-racism initiatives. Here resistance is enacted by supporters or advocates of anti-racism. In the last section of this literature review the term resistance is used more generally to refer to the different ways anti-racism initiatives were criticized and discounted. These latter forms of resistance were enacted primarily by people who opposed anti-racisms.

\textsuperscript{7} Throughout this thesis I use several versions of verb forms of common nouns such as race (racialize) and minority (minoritized) to acknowledge the processes by which these categories are constructed and maintained. This contrasts with the view that such categories are natural or exist \textit{sui generis}. 
similar approach will be used to analyze how the OARS interacted with community representatives and civic bodies in joint anti-racism interventions. Further, Ng’s analysis is useful in that it pointed to the process of discursive deliberation inherent in the negotiation of the incorporation of workers into the paid workforce, although she did not use an explicitly constructionist approach to analyze those deliberations.

Das Gupta (2007) assessed the relationship between the state and community groups advocating for immigrant and women of colour’s interests. Das Gupta’s (2007) work emphasized the controlling role of the state through funding community based efforts at anti-racist change. Das Gupta’s approach to examining the funding of community based women’s groups doing anti-racism work incorporated a neo-Marxist perspective that emphasized co-optation and control that came with state funding, rather than a more equitable partnerships. In this work, however, she does acknowledge the late 1980’s and early 1990’s as a period where consultation between anti-racism advocates and state agents was most open and productive. Since that time, however, she argues that the input of community based anti-racism advocacy groups in policy-making has decreased, largely as a result of ‘defunding’. A more common approach now is one of ‘polite negotiation’ rather than stronger counter-hegemonic resistance that characterized the anti-racism activism of the early 1990’s.

Finally, Lee (1996) examined the regulation of minority-language groups in Saskatchewan through policies embedded in the education system. Lee
conceived of the policies as forms of control that ultimately limited minority groups. All these analyses suggested an organic view of the state and state power in that they theorized the state as a location where the interests of different categories of people were played out or enacted.

The main significance of studies rooted in a Marxian view of state power and regulation to the current research is that they suggest that the claims making activities of the community players may have been constrained by state agents or policies. Although not the central analytical or theoretical focus of a constructionist approach, the constraining or co-opting influences of the state will be considered as a variable in the analysis of the social problems work of various players involved in state anti-racism policy development and implementation.

1.1.3 Theories of Social Policy and the Policymaking Process:

A sub-area of state theory focuses on social policy and the policy-making process. The basic questions addressed in this area concern why states take the courses of action they do, what role administrative and organizational capacities of the state play in policy-making, and what pressures and limitations bear on the policy-making process. State theories differ in terms of their conceptions of the policy-making process with pluralists tending to see the process as generally open and representative and others, especially instrumentalists, seeing the policy-making process as generally closed and elitist.

Rational choice theory within the new right perspective suggests that state
action and policy formation is a result of the calculated decisions made in an attempt to maximize benefit for the decision makers in some way, usually in terms of political support or votes (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). Bureaucratic dominance theory within elite theory suggests that policy making reflects the interests of the policy makers or the elites in society that policymakers represent. Here ideological orientations are assumed to heavily influence policymaking, and advocacy groups or concern for the public good are seen as less influential (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). The neo-pluralist theory suggests that bureaucrats within the state may make policy that reflects not the interests of any social class or class faction, but rather their professional training, public interest ethos, and individual dispositions (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). All of these approaches may be used to frame different components of the anti-racism work undertaken through the OARS, but, as with the more general state theories discussed earlier, none of them focus specifically on the claims-making processes inherent to policy-making.

Some theoretical attention has been paid to the relationship between policy stakeholders and the state in the policy-making process (Rueschmeyer and Skocpol, 1996). However, since these observations have not yet been applied to the empirical examples of anti-racism policy-making, their relevance to that context remains speculative. Theoretical accounts of the link between claims-making and policy-making are particularly useful in contexts where there are multiple and competing stakeholders with divergent interpretations of which
problems require policy attention and how those problems should be addressed. There seems to be considerable potential for application to anti-racism policy-making contexts, and although the theoretical offerings are admittedly tentative (Rueschmeyer and Skocpol, 1996), they are useful as a general orientation to the policy-making context considered in this thesis.

This work identified key variables bearing on the policy process as the nature of knowledge or information available to the state, and the authority/legitimacy of the actors making claims in attempts to influence policy. Based on a number of historical studies by other authors, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol (1996) offered some general conclusions about how ‘social knowledge’ has been used in policy arenas. First, the *social location* of the bearers of new ideas played a determining role in how far those ideas move into the policy arena - the more authority and legitimacy accorded to the knowledge carriers, the more likely their influence on policy. Unfortunately, a clear and reliable method for assessing or measuring authority and legitimacy of claims-makers is not specified. Second, the *nature of the claims* influenced how they were interpreted by state authorities, with empirically based claims as well as claims based on moral or political norms both assuming relevance under different conditions (Rueschmeyer and Skocpol, 1996, p 301). This suggests a range of types of information may serve as the basis for anti-racism claims-making. Third, for any given claim to influence policymaking the *requisite social networks* connecting the state with extra-state sources of expertise were required. “Competent
information and analysis were the entering wedges for projects of moral and political influence that required much more – such as the building of institutions, the establishment of new associations, the stimulation of new audiences, and the deployment of fresh channels of communication” (Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1996, p 304). This is of particular interest in this thesis because of the short time period in which the case under consideration transpired, and the relatively long time period usually required to establish these ‘requisite social networks’.

Another closely related observation from Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1996, p 308) was that state officials ‘manage’ the policymaking process in part by balancing concerns of the legitimate claims from extra-state sources with the set of concerns internal to the state, which necessitated that the claims intended to inform and affect policy had to be “… condensed and fused with political considerations, before they can help determine policy outcomes”. According to Rueschmeyer and Skocpol (1996), this suggests that claims often had more influence on the background assumptions of power brokers within the state rather than the specifics of any particular policy (Rueschmeyer and Skocpol, 1996). The ‘political considerations’ noted in the previous quotation relate to considerations of both i) public opinion, and ii) internal state structure and dynamics. In terms of the role of public opinion, Walker (2002), in an assessment of the role of Jews in early equity legislation in Ontario, found that direct lobbying by interest groups was less influential than the sense decision makers in the state had about what the public wanted. Walker’s foregrounding of public opinion as a causal variable in
policy-making was based on his analysis of the situation in Ontario in the years immediately following World War II, and they may not necessarily apply to more recent periods.

More general work on the role of public opinion in policy-making has been done by considering it relative to the actual form policies take when implemented. Schuman et al. (1997) referred to the ‘principle-implementation gap’ that characterized most equity-related policy. Schuman et al. intended this to reflect the contradiction in white public opinion whereby there was general support for equity principles, but much less support for corrective and specifically targeted equity initiatives. Young (1985) also noted the ‘gap’ that frequently existed between the principles policy rests on as compared to the form policy takes when it is actually put into practice. The notions of the implementation gap and the principle – implementation gap are useful observations concerning how social knowledge is transformed as it serves as a basis for equity policymaking, hinting at the process of negotiation and or compromise inherent in dealing with the multitude of policy-making contingencies.

Cohen (1992) commented on how understandings of racism may be transformed in the process of determining anti-racism policy. Cohen (1992) used the notion of reductionism to describe this process as it happened in the anti-racism policy-making arena. According to Cohen (1992), policies and programs aimed at racism reduce the complexity of the social problem of racism in order to make anti-racism interventions practical. Practical anti-racism responses are
always simpler and narrower than the complex and entrenched reality of racism. An application of the ‘gap’ and ‘reductionism’ points would benefit from a more precise specification of how the principles underpinning claims and the complexity of racisms are actually transformed in empirical examples of anti-racism policy-making. This shortcoming may be at least partially addressed by adapting a combination of contextual constructionist and discourse theory approaches for the anti-racism policymaking processes involved in the work of the OARS. The analytical foci of these two approaches, namely the social construction of social problems and specific discursive strategies of claim-makers in political contexts, addresses the theoretical silence evident in approaches such as those taken by Young (1985) and Schuman et al. (1997).

Finally, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1996, p 296) also noted the impact that policies may have not just on the production of social knowledge, but on “…the content and deployment of social knowledge” as well. The way the state solicits information from stakeholders in the policy arena has a determining influence on the nature of the information submitted for consideration, and may be thought of as a potential form of containment or regulation of extra-state interests. This observation resonates well with one of the main theoretical contributions from the discourse theorists Laclau and Mouffe (2001) who argued that ‘the political’ (by which they mean the expression of power evident in the exercise of state authority) has a determining effect on the specific discursive strategies of stakeholders in policy arenas.
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol’s (1996) observations rest on work that addressed broad, epochal transformations in epistemology and ontology expressed through variants of ‘social knowledge’, as well as more specific forms of social scientific knowledge. The ideas embodied in their observations are applied to the more modest transformations in ways of knowing (including competing claims about racism and equity) under consideration in this thesis, namely the partial transition from a multicultural and race relations orientation of equity policy to a more exclusively anti-racist orientation. These aspects of the relationship between social knowledge and policy-making were identified rather tentatively by Rueschmeyer and Skocpol as ‘observations’, rather than as a developed theory. In picking up their approach to understanding the link between social knowledge and policymaking, I hope to refine our understanding of the theoretical relationship between how social knowledge, expressed discursively through claims-making, is related to the anti-racism policy-making process. In order to do this I bring together approaches not explicitly identified by Rueschmeyer and Skocpol. In this sense, the observations provided by Rueschmeyer and Skocpol serve more as a general starting point, as a set of observations taken to be generally valid but in need of specification. I achieve this extension and refinement of their observations by combining them with contextual constructionist and discourse theoretical approaches, which are both discussed later in this literature review.

Other variables, besides those noted by Rueschmeyer and Skocpol, bearing on the policymaking process are found in the broader context within
which policymaking takes place. With specific reference to race policies in Britain, Solomos and Back (1995) suggested that it is necessary to understand 1) the specific interpretations of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and difference which set the stage for the political institutions and cultures under examination, 2) the strategies of minoritized groups to mobilize and advocate for specific policy changes as well as efforts to achieve anti-racism changes outside the polity, and 3) the response of political parties and institutions to racial and ethnic issues more generally. Ball and Solomos (1990) identified the presence or absence of national policies aimed at racial inequality, political mobilization of minority groups, and the possibility of urban unrest as key variables. Allahar (1998) theorized that in Canada extra-state factors such as the shifting dynamics of racial composition, the nature of ethnic and racial conflict in Canada and elsewhere, and the larger constitutional and legal framework within which state action and political mobilization take place as all having determining influence on policy in the area of state anti-racism initiatives. Importantly, the nature and intensity of minority political mobilization, including those that aim to pressure government to initiate anti-racist policies, are affected by a sense of cultural loss (Allahar, 1998). This is of particular relevance to groups such as Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, who center culture in expressions of collective identity and historical experience.

In terms of relating state anti-racism policymaking to the concerns of neo-Marxian state theory, some empirical evidence from Britain suggests a structuralist interpretation of the responses of the state to the pressures to
undertake anti-racism initiatives. The research conducted by Young (1985), for example, concluded that many race policies were based on reacting to pressure from advocacy groups (legitimation and/or crisis management in structuralist terms) rather than a more objectively reasoned weighing of opposing positions and possible policy directions as implied by pluralist state theory.

Some of the theoretical offerings from social policy research provide insight into the anti-racism policymaking process in Ontario. Theoretical accounts of the policymaking process from the social policy literature typically identify the main players in a certain policy arena (Interest/advocacy groups, the general electorate, business and economic elites, bureaucrats, and elected officials). Young and Connelly (1981) argued that the number of policy players was an important factor influencing the policy formation process and the content of policies. Their general observation was that the more players there are in a given policy network the more difficult it is to work out a policy that is agreeable to all, especially in areas of policy where the claims made by different stakeholders were highly contentious. This is of interest to the research presented in this thesis as there were many diverse ‘inputs’ in the form of claims from a wide variety of stakeholders involved in negotiating the activities of the OARS. A crowded policy arena also makes for significant challenges in orchestrating the submission and

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8 The notion of a policy ‘network’ or ‘community’ suggests a degree of stability and longevity characterizing the relationship between stakeholders in a given policy arena. This is appropriate to depict the relationship between some, but not all of the ethno-racial advocacy groups and the state considered in this thesis. The use of the network concept is not appropriate to describe the involvement of several more marginal stakeholders. Many of the groups considered in this thesis felt excluded from policymaking networks prior to the OARS.
consideration of competing claims presented by interested parties.

Although an increase in the number of players in a given policy arena has been seen as complicating the policy-making process, at times an increase in the number of groups in a policy arena is actively sought out for strategic political reasons. Walker (2002) documented the equity-lobbying strategy adopted by Jews in Ontario in the late 1940’s as purposefully reaching out to other oppressed groups in order to neutralize the stereotypical criticism of ‘pushy Jews’. By entering into coalitions Jews hoped to dispel the belief that they were only interested in advancing their own issues and were not supportive of the efforts of other groups to address their oppression. The salient theoretical point here is that coalition politics in multi-group anti-racism efforts is approached strategically by groups with the hope that their claims will be amplified and strengthened through inclusion of other claims makers making similar claims. It is not simply the case that coalition politics works because of strength of numbers, but it may also work for groups by strengthening the legitimacy of their claims through demonstrating that others are in similar predicaments, or work to dispel criticisms they faced when making claims on their own. Coalition politics, however, also bring challenges in the form of harmonizing competing claims and building consensus on where all players are located relative to the problems being addressed.

All of these theoretical offerings concerning policymaking are useful, and each makes significant contributions to understanding equity policy in Canada. None, however, specifically address the theoretical role of discursive power and
claims-making in anti-racism policymaking.

1.1.4 Theorizing the Role of Community and Advocacy Groups in the Policy-making Process:

Speaking very generally, advocacy or community groups’ role in the political process has changed over time – they now tend to be more closely melded with the state in that they play important advisory roles regarding the specific type of information government and the civil service neither has knowledge of, nor means to obtain on its own. This fact heightens the importance of theoretical analyses capable of accounting for the link between state agents and knowledge expressed in the form of claims made by advocacy groups.

From Marxian and Foucauldian perspectives, advocacy groups serve as a means to accommodate a variety of interests into policy-making by representing the community’s interests to government and policymakers, while simultaneously legitimating the state to communities. This is a useful backdrop to the process of negotiation involved in working out specific policy directions. Neither of these approaches, however, offers fruitful ways to analyze the specific processes of negotiation, communication or regulation inherent in governance.

The pluralist view holds that advocacy groups, like an independent media, are vital to democracy and provide an essential counterbalance to the monopoly of state power by elites. Their specific role in policymaking, however, is inconsistent. “From one policy context to another, from one period to another,
from one institutional context to another, the values and norms to which interest groups adhere, the objectives which they pursue, and the strategies they develop, as well as their contribution to democratic life, all differ” (Montpetit, 2004, p 305). In his analysis of the strategies of US community based anti-racism groups, Omi (2001, p277) noted that “…contemporary antiracist organizing has a varied relationship to the state. In most instances, the organizing does not rely on access to the state and state resources but takes place, instead, ‘outside’ of state institutions. Organizations may call upon the state to enact legislation…and enforce existing regulations…, but most do not seek to fundamentally transform state activities with respect to race.” This observation renders the case of the OARS interesting because it is an example of the ‘statization’ of anti-racism.9 In a closely related observation, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1996) suggest that the likelihood of marginalized groups achieving some influence on the policymaking process is increased when the party to which those groups had traditional ties was in power. Given that many anti-racist activists and ethno-racial community groups had ties with the ONDP, the influence stemming from these ties will be assessed.

Advocacy groups use different strategies in their communications with the state regarding policymaking. In a very general sense I adopt Montpetit’s typology of forms of advocacy group action to help with the analysis of claims

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9 Constructionists, such as Best (2008), adopt the concept of policy domain to reflect the institutional infrastructure and network of civil servants and government departments that emerge to assume responsibility for the state response to a particular social problem. Although the focus of this thesis is the anti-racism social problems work associated with the OARS, the anti-racism policy domain extended into other governmental departments and OPS factions. The other major pillar of equity work undertaken by the NDP, besides the work within OARS, was employment equity, which was administered in another jurisdiction of the OPS separate from the OARS.
making strategies relating to the form state anti-racisms took. Montpetit (2004) distinguished between *strategic* action and *problem-solving* action on the part of advocacy groups. Groups making specific claims or demands in the policymaking process are engaging in strategic action. “…groups participate in problem solving activity when their communication with the state is centered on the provision of knowledge, arguments, evidence, and new information” which is more involved and detailed than making demands for policy changes through strategic action (Montpetit, 2004, p 309). “It is simply the case that the more an interest group has the resources to move beyond communicating demands, to become instead a source of knowledge… the more it becomes of interest to civil servants” (Montpetit, 2004, 317). What remains unclear in Montpetit’s distinction, however, are the specific claims making strategies adopted in each of the categories he identifies, and their relationship to the strategies of other interested parties including the state. I intend to specify the strategies adopted by various players unaccounted for by Montpetit’s rather gross distinction between types of strategies. This will be done, once again, by incorporating the concerns of social problems theorists and discourse theory into the analysis of problem solving strategies of interested parties.

1.1.5 Theorizing ‘Racial’ Knowledge, Discourses, and Hegemony:

The linguistic turn in the social sciences opened up a number of theoretical opportunities for researchers studying racisms. Older theoretical concerns with the
expression of racialized power and manifestations of inequality, as well as concerns regarding the constitution of subjectivity, have been recast with analytical focus centering on the deployment of talk and text in social relations and the exercise of domination and resistance. This introduced the possibility of more fully considering the role played by discourses relative to both racisms and anti-racisms.

A central concern in this thesis is how discourses were deployed in the anti-racism policy-making arena, and how they were implicated in addressing the problem of racisms. A basic tenet of problem solving is that the cause and nature of a problem must be identified if an appropriate solution is sought. Problem solving that happens in an anti-racism policy-making context requires information or knowledge of the problem of racism. This type of knowledge includes information about individual and group identities, the historical experiences of a group, and its current predicament regarding racial inequality. It also includes information about where and how ‘others’ (non-group members) are located relative to instances of racism. This information may be articulated on many levels, but in policy-making contexts it must be translated to written or oral forms and presented as a series of claims framing the problem of racism, and presented in the ‘discursive realm’ wherein anti-racisms are negotiated and determined. Kobayashi and Johnson (2007, p 6), argue that the articulation of discourses on racism and anti-racism locates players in stories of racisms, and exerts a powerful influence on consciousness and policy: “Words have power because they are so
much more than just words… all interaction is a process of discourse through which the relative places of human beings, and their relative power, are negotiated.” Underscoring the necessity of constructing anti-racism discourses to affect change, Kobayashi and Johnson (2007, p6) offer: “It follows that for anti-racist strategies to succeed, they must intercede within that discursive realm.”

Discourses on anti-racism are strategically constructed in particular contexts with the intention of responding to the predominant ways difference and inequalities are conceived. Such discourses on racism and anti-racism “…specify what political actions will be seen as legitimate and what will be seen as merely ‘trouble making’; they lay out what counts as social progress and how it can be impeded; and they provide a sense of what racism is and how it should be most appropriately countered” (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p 1).

The relationship between identity and the production of discourses is not always direct. That is, possessing a certain identity and sense of group belonging does not necessarily lead to the articulation of particular discourses. Rather, discourses are deployed in the policy-making realm with strategic intentions to achieve policy outcomes rather than faithfully represent an individual’s or group’s understanding of objective reality. This does not mean that information in the discourses is not factual or accurate, rather they are crafted and communicated with particular emphases intended to ‘make a case’ for a policy response. In the policymaking realm they are often not produced and enacted with the intention of educating the general public, but rather to convince decision-makers of the gravity
of a problem and necessity of a certain type of policy response.

Some work has been done on how discourse concerning blacks in Ontario influenced government policymaking. Lewinberg (1999), writing specifically on the role of black ‘insiders’ in the policymaking process of the Ontario NDP in the early 1990’s, observed that the Ontario NDP adopted a ‘homogenized’ view of blacks in Ontario. Because the advisors the government relied on in certain facets of policymaking were primarily Caribbean, the homogenized view favoured issues of this segment of the Ontario black population rather than issues of concern to the broader black community. According to Lewinberg (1999, p 195), the government preferred to work with a ‘one community’ model of blacks in Toronto and Ontario, and “…a small and select group of primarily middle-class blacks who claimed to speak for the black polity” held great influence on the policymaking process. Lewinberg’s (1999) focus was on anti-racism work as it related to blacks and subsets of the black population rather than on the broader policymaking work of the OARS. He therefore did not offer insights on the social problems work undertaken in relation to other minoritized communities. Although Lewinberg (1999) implied that the discourse concerning blacks adopted in the policymaking activities was homogenous and Caribbean-centric, he did not specify the claims-making contents of that discourse.

The state has traditionally had to rely on limited sources of information to make policy in the areas of equity. Census data, opinion polls and survey data in a variety of forms have often served as the basis of information for equity policy.
State’s ideological orientations, of course, also played into the policymaking process, but they needed to combine their ideological orientations with information about the population and the issues to make policy.

Beliefs and attitudes about ethno-racial differences and conflicts, and attitudes towards racial issues, have been studied in Canada (as elsewhere) largely through opinion polls and survey data. In Canada, for example, Berry and Kalin (1977) conducted longitudinal studies on attitudes towards ‘diversity’ that consistently reveal patterns in those attitudes. Although providing some generally useful demographic data such as population composition and distribution on very gross categories of race and ethnicity, these data sources’ ability to specify particulars of the nature and functioning of racism was extremely limited. These types of data sources were designed to measure and quantify Canadian’s attitudes towards racial and other issues in very general ways, not to specify the nature of social problems such as racism and therefore serve as a policymaking basis for decisions.

Information concerning minoritized groups was also often collected and arranged in ‘community profiles’ which were (and still are) intended to provide information to outsiders about the composition and nature of a group along general demographic or other more specific criteria. In some cases community profiling concentrates on the cultural or religious dimensions of a racial or ethnic group in order to distinguish them from others or the mainstream. The utility of information from attitudinal studies or more specific community profiling in anti-
racism efforts is questionable – they are seen as highly problematic, but they are used. First, they tend to represent an outsider’s view and therefore may lack authenticity or accuracy. Second, they tend to downplay diversity within communities. Regardless of their shortcomings, however, they are often implicated in the framing strategies and claims-making work of anti-racism policymaking. A more accurate and authentic source of knowledge about racial and ethnic minorities would be representative members from those communities – this research examines how that knowledge played into policymaking concerning anti-racism.

One useful concept to help think about attitudes and beliefs on a collective level is hegemony. Generally speaking, the concept of hegemony refers to the processes by which rulers obtain and maintain consent to rule from the majority of the population. Typically, the idea of hegemony has been applied to analyses of class-based politics, but post-modern revisions have broadened the range of bases on which group political action is conceived. Extra-class bases of identity, solidarity, and political action considered through the concept of hegemony now include gender, race, ethnicity, ability, sexuality, age, as well as others.

Winant (1994), applied the concept of hegemony to racial cognizance, and identified both structural dimensions and signification dimensions as part of hegemonic thinking about race. The structural dimensions of hegemony included political processes such as policymaking, elections, and how resources were distributed. The signification dimension of racial hegemony referred to the
cultural and social-psychological processes by which individuals are constructed and “...assigned their structural positions in society” (Winant, 1994, p 114). Hegemony concerning racial difference and equity, then, may be seen as a form of rule which constitutes part of the normalized and routinized forms of governance most states engage in. In the case under consideration in this thesis, the multicultural ethos and the myriad of public multicultural programs along with race relations approaches constituted the hegemonic orientation regarding racial and ethnic diversity. Winant’s assertion that the state is implicated in the maintenance of racial hegemony would benefit from a specification of exactly how the significatory dimensions interact with the structural dimensions of racial hegemony to reproduce dominant ideological orientations. The important theoretical point to be taken from the application of a neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony to thinking about anti-racism advocacy in Canada is that anti-racism social problems work necessarily involves signification of self and other (through framing the social problem of racism) in a context where the (pre)dominant perspective is multiculturalism. Less prevalent, but still dominant relative to anti-racism is race relations perspective. Seeing multiculturalism and race relations as dominant discourses relative to anti-racism renders anti-racism an oppositional discourse. Anti-racism frames challenge both racisms themselves, and dominant discourses concerning diversity. In a general sense, anti-racism is considered a

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10 Harney (2001, p 20) commented on the significatory dimension of his anti-racism work within the OARS. Srivastava (1993) also addressed the signification of identities and relative positions in anti-racism workshops.
counter-hegemonic force throughout this thesis; and as such it stands in contradistinction to hegemonic multiculturalism.

1.1.6 Contextual Constructionism:

Much of how the micro-physics of power unfolded in the projects undertaken by the OARS involved constructing and deploying claims concerning the location, nature, outcomes and appropriate responses to racisms. The manner in which an analysis of those claims proceeds depends largely on the theoretical approach researchers adopt. A ‘contextual constructionist’ approach favoured by researchers working in the social problems tradition such as Loseke (2003), Best (1995), and Spector and Kitsuse (2001) is most appropriate for the analysis undertaken here because it allows for a relatively large amount of material to be managed, comparisons to be made between competing claims, themes from the content of claims making to be drawn out for analytical consideration, and specific discursive strategies in claims making to be considered.

According to Loseke (2003), claims identifying social problems and offering responses or solutions to the identified problem may be thought of as ‘framing’ social problems in three separate but related ways. The identification of the problem to be addressed and its sources occurs through ‘diagnostic framing’; understandings of why actors (in this case state agents) should feel compelled to do something happens through ‘motivational framing’; and finally suggestions for appropriate responses are communicated through ‘prognostic framing’.
Constructionist analyses focus on the meaning-making activities of social actors, and they are cautious of according causal primacy to social structural conditions and relations in those meaning-making activities. Constructionism, as promoted by the central proponents of ‘contextual constructionism’, allows for a consideration of the influence (rather than constitutive nature of or determining nature of) social structures and systems. For the analysis undertaken here this aspect of constructionism suggests that state actors did not necessarily adopt frameworks or perspectives in policymaking that stemmed from their positions as state actors. It was not necessarily the bureaucracy or broader policy orientation of the government that influenced the anti-racism work of individual state workers. This has some resonance with state theories such as bureaucratic dominance theory which suggests that individual actors heavily influence if not outright determine certain activities relating to their specific area of jurisdiction extending from their occupational position within government or the civil service.

True to its phenomenological roots, constructionist approaches to social problems also do not presume the existence of structured and ongoing asymmetrical power relations, an idea that dovetails nicely with the central theoretical conception of ‘strategic relational’ state power forwarded by Jessop. Jessop’s basic conception of how power is exercised in and through the state is highly contingent on who is involved in which relative positions representing specific interests. Although this allows for consideration of a broad range of possibilities to be accounted for in analyses of state action, it also allows for a
validation of some of the observations and conclusions forwarded by both instrumentalist and structuralist neo-Marxian accounts of the nature and the role of the state in capitalist societies.

Although not explicitly identified as such, claims making involves constructing narratives, or what discourse theorists would label as a variant of discourse. The constructionist perspective of discourses implies that the central ontological assumption about discourses is that they are strategically created through claims making activities, and once deployed, especially in the political realm, they are treated as though they are an objectively existing empirical referent - as constructions (noun). They are also viewed as the end-product of a process of construction, as a thing that may be seen or discovered in the records of the state, in the narratives of interviewees, and in the articulations of agents acting in the environment where these issues are being discursively negotiated.

1.1.7 Discourse Theory:

Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 2001) are frequently cited as offering a promising approach to the analysis of political discourse (Torfing, 2005; Howarth, 2000; Therborn, 2006). Howarth (2000) suggested that to date the ideas of Laclau and Mouffe hold the most promise as an orientation that strikes a workable compromise between left-leaning theorists interested in analyzing discourses with a sensitivity to power inequalities, and older more explicitly Marxist oriented theories of state power. Laclau and Mouffe defend their approach as both post-Marxist and post-Marxist, suggesting their framework revises and updates
Marxist approaches and separates itself from what have come to be seen as the more arcane and limiting elements of Marxist theoretical approaches. Essentially this means they have retained a ‘spirit’ of Marxist analyses that concerns itself with inequality and change, but adopted conceptual and analytical frameworks that have emerged since the rather dogmatic application of Marxist theories of the past. Several components of their theory of political discourse resonate with what Loseke forwarded as the general interpretive schema commonly employed by constructionists.

To simplify as much as possible for the purposes of demonstrating the potential compatibility between Loseke’s central constructionist current with what is being touted as a promising left-rooted theory of political discourse, Laclau and Mouffe’s offerings may be seen i) to extend and refine the methodological and analytical approach of constructionists, and ii) to introduce a theoretical consideration of asymmetries of power inherent in social relationships. That is, the analytical method that extends from Laclau and Mouffe’s theorizing lends itself quite well to a more structured analytical approach to the claims framework favoured by Loseke (2003), while accounting more fully for social inequalities.

Whereas constructionist approaches relying on Loseke’s three part framing approach to interpreting the construction of social problems make reference to analysis of ‘rhetoric’ in a generic manner, they tend to leave the process of determination of what exactly rhetoric is and which rhetorical strategies on the part of claims makers are worthy of analytic attention largely
unstated. Discourse theory, on the other hand, makes the process of deciding what aspects of rhetoric the researcher ought to focus on in their analysis of discourse more structured. Whereas constructionist approaches are likely to argue that the claims making process allowed actors to make particular claims, discourse analysis, or at least its analytical method, affords a more structured and richly textured analysis of strategies employed in claims making.

On the one hand, constructionist approaches, if they are to be carried out in proper constructionist form, try as much as possible to rid themselves of preconceived notions of where power lies and how power is expressed in and through claims making. One enduring contribution from postmodern theorizing is the recognition of the constitutive and generative power of discourses, a concern which is decidedly absent in any consistent or institutionalized form in constructionist ontologies. Although a consideration of power relations is possible through a constructionist evaluation of the status and influence of the claims maker, when discussing claims making or the construction of discourses in political contexts Laclau and Mouffé’s theory allows for an updated, post-Gramscian use of hegemony as a general way of conceiving power relations between actors variously engaged in making competing claims. Further, discourse theory offers the advantage of a more sophisticated although analytically abstract conception of how analysis of talk and texts should proceed.

The central tenets that guide discourse theory’s approach to interpreting claims rely on the core concepts of ‘articulatory practice’, ‘social antagonisms’,
'dislocation’, and ‘equivalencies and differences…’. Very briefly, articulatory practices involve putting into discursive form ideas and meanings in such a manner as to construct relationships between their elements in a way that alters identities. For example, constructing a discourse about class and race as closely related in a way that alters the meaning (or what they call the ‘identities’) of both entities: class becomes seen in racial terms, and race comes to be seen in relation to class. Articulatory practices are seen as purposeful, intentional, and involved in the power relations between actors involved in communication regarding a topic, such as negotiating possible policy alternatives. Social antagonisms refers to the differences between entities, such as racial or ethnic groups, that constitute part of the overall discourse. Although the term antagonism is used in this concept it does not necessarily imply intentional opposition or active positioning of one actor or group relative to another. Dislocations are interruptions, or intentional and strategic attempts at change in dominant or hegemonic belief systems. Counter hegemonic anti-racism may be seen as an attempt to dislocate hegemonic multiculturalism. And finally equivalencies and differences refer to the specific rhetorical strategies used by actors or claims makers in the construction and communication of their claims. Equivalencies are usually established in one of two ways, through metaphor or metonymy. An example of the construction of an equivalency would involve making the case that two entities are the same in some important way, therefore deserving of similar treatment or fundamentally similar enough so as to establish a basis for another part of the claim. Universal appeals,
such as making reference to the fundamental equality of all human beings, are often used in these elements of discourses. Metonymy usually involves the use of a category, label, term, similar to a form of branding that serves as the symbol that represents elements of the problem or aspects of identities claims makers wish to emphasize. It may also involve the use of a symbol or name that often has strong moral overtones, such as the use of the term ‘victim’, ‘injured’, or ‘marginalized’.

‘Differences’, on the other hand, refer to aspects of properties or characteristics of actors that are unique or that differentiate them from others in some important way, such as claims to cultural or national identities evidenced in terms such as ‘First Nations’, ‘Black’, or ‘Jewish’.

This theoretical schema may be usefully brought up against Loseke’s three-part model of the components of claims which involves breaking claims down into ‘diagnostic’, ‘motivational’, and ‘prognostic’ frames. What I suggest, then, is an analytically specific use of constructionist approaches that relies on a particular modified form of discourse theory. The main modification to discourse theory involves tempering the intensity of causal primacy accorded what Laclau and Mouffe call rather generically ‘the political’ (or what contextual constructionists would think of as an influential rather than determinate elements of the general context in which political discourses unfold. These include but are not limited to what were forwarded by Rueschmeyer and Skocpol as ‘observations’ concerning the relationship between social knowledge and policymaking). By picking up on the analytical strategies and most of the ontological assumptions of discourse
theory, the analytical strategies commonly employed by constructionists are made more specific. What is unclear at this point is the broader applicability of such an approach. While authors writing from and about both approaches repeatedly advocate cross fertilization between their preferred approaches and other approaches, practical application in empirically based studies remain relatively scarce. This is one of the theoretical and methodological gaps I hope to address through this thesis.

1.2 Conclusions:

The theoretical framework for this thesis draws from several different sources. Bonnett’s (1993) conception of anti-racism as a counter-hegemonic force within the larger context of national hegemonic multiculturalism is adopted as the over-arching conception of anti-racism in Canada. A post-Gramscian understanding of hegemony informs the application of Bonnett’s ideas by extending the basis of hegemony beyond class affiliations. I use Jessop’s ‘strategic relational’ theory of the state and state power in combination with a Foucauldian notion of power and resistance generally and a micro-physics of power in particular, to frame the analysis of containment and resistance exemplified through some of the operations of the OARS. The state is viewed as contested terrain where competing claims regarding anti-racisms were represented and shaped the initiatives undertaken, and in so doing ultimately contributed to the reproduction of hegemonic multiculturalism. Loseke’s framing approach to
social problems work is used in conjunction with some of the directives from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory.

In terms of policymaking and programming, the ideas of Rueschemeyer and Skocpol regarding the relationship between policymaking and claims/social knowledge is modified to incorporate forms of ‘racial’ knowledge and their attendant claims. Strategic events analysis is used to place the Yonge Street riot in relation to rapid acceleration of state anti-racism initiatives. Gilroy’s and Knowles’ theoretical accounts of the relationship between social democratic parties and anti-racism advocacy are used to interpret the relationship between the various ethno-racial groups and the NDP government. And finally, Solomos and Ball’s, Solomos and Back’s, and Allahar’s observations on contextualizing anti-racism initiatives are used to help explain the emergence and operation of the OARS within its broader environment.

1.3 Research Problem and Research Questions:

Bonnett’s (2000a) cursory observations of state anti-racism in Ontario serve as a starting point for this thesis. The research presented in this thesis builds on Bonnett’s interpretation by providing a more nuanced and contextualized account of the emergence and operation of state anti-racism initiatives in Ontario. The brief period of ascendancy and influence of state anti-racism in Ontario during the early 1990’s stands in stark contrast to the longer history of
multiculturalism as the predominant ideology and policy regarding diversity and inequality. The historical processes by which anti-racism came into the orbit of the Ontario state, and the attendant forms of regulation and resistance, remain under-theorized. We know very little about how state anti-racism in Ontario transpired, and how the everyday anti-racism activities of ethno-racial communities and anti-racism advocates played into and were affected by state initiatives. Even less is known about how regulation and resistance, in terms of how they existed as relations of power exercised in and through the state surrounding anti-racism initiatives, related to larger changes in Ontario society or the more specific social problems work undertaken by various players in the anti-racism policy arena.

The main research problem addressed in this research is the changing nature of state equity initiatives. More specifically, this thesis problematizes the emergence and operation of state anti-racism as these are not self-evident processes. The maintenance of multicultural hegemony over historical periods requires renewal and reformulation as emerging counter-hegemonic forces, such as anti-racism, are absorbed and neutralized in and through state action. State anti-racism in Ontario in the early 1990’s was a brief interruption of Canada’s multicultural hegemony. To help better understand that interruption, anti-racisms’ dynamic, emergent, contingent, and contested nature are problematized within a vision of the state as contested terrain. State anti-racism is assessed as a process of ‘statization’, the role of claims making and more generally social problems work
surrounding that process is examined. The specific research questions used to address the larger research problem are: i) Why do states undertake anti-racism initiatives? and ii) How are the form and content of state anti-racisms determined?

Theoretically, I posit: i) That state anti-racism emerged in Ontario as a result of the confluence of social democratic political ideals and strategic racial incidents, and ii) That the specific form and content of state anti-racisms were determined by the negotiation of differently framed understandings of racism by the OARS and a variety of other players including state agencies, community groups, and agencies of civil society; and iii) That the outcome of the relations of power linked to the emergence and practice of anti-racism in the OARS ultimately contributed to the reproduction of hegemonic multiculturalism. These theoretical assertions rest on empirical and materially based analyses into the nature of contestations over the necessity, meaning, and content of state anti-racisms. These analyses required different levels of analysis. The main level of analysis is the margin between ‘public’ institutional life and other agencies and groups.
CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES OF DATA:

2.1 Introduction:

This chapter presents a discussion of the research methodology and data sources used in this study, and it includes a discussion of some of the technical and ethical concerns encountered through the research. The two primary theoretical questions addressed through this thesis influenced the selection of data sources and analytical approaches. For example, the first research question problematizing the emergence of state anti-racism required research into the party platforms of the 1990 provincial election, the relationship between the NDP and ethno-racial advocacy groups, state and advocacy group responses to the Yonge Street riot, and analysis of the Lewis Inquiry, and the implementation of its recommendations. The second research question probing the determination of the form and content of state anti-racism required analysis of the formal actions of the Ministry of Citizenship in hiring, setting programs parameters, and communications that would highlight the interface between the community, civic agencies, and the Anti-Racism Secretariat.

The research for this thesis involved using a variety of methods. The primary advantage of a multi-method approach was that it allowed several different data sources to be considered in the critical reconstruction of the events and relations surrounding the rise and operation of state anti-racism.
2.2 General Analytical Strategy:

The original exploration of the data involved a review of government documents, newspaper and academic accounts of the OARS, Hansard transcripts, biographies and historical accounts of key players in government, and interviews with individuals from the media, cabinet, and Premiere’s office. This initial exploration facilitated a general and broad orientation to the chronology of events and major players involved in the life of the OARS. The study took further shape with a more focused application of the theoretical and conceptual framework to the data. As my understanding of the chronology of events and nature of relationships surrounding the OARS took shape, and as themes began to emerge through the research, I frequently returned to material previous reviewed for further consideration. This ‘cyclical’ approach, moving variously between stages of data collection, analysis, theory, and background context, also included two second interviews and one third interview. As an outsider I found this approach useful in that it allowed me to become familiar with the general history surrounding the OARS before a more focused analysis of specific aspects of the life of the OARS was conducted. Although it was both time and labour intensive, I preferred this approach as it allowed both the individual stories to be told and an overall story emerge outside the often limiting parameters of theoretical considerations. This also meant that the data collected were far broader that those that were eventually included in the analysis and presentation here. The story of the OARS is much richer and more complex than I suggest through my analysis.
Anti-racism discourses are disparate and do not constitute a unified whole, but in protracted environments they assume particular forms and may be ‘located’ or ‘mapped’\(^{11}\). In considering the discourse data I adopted Wetherell and Potter’s general approach to discourse analysis:

> Discourse analysis focuses, above all, on quintessentially psychological activities – activities of justification, rationalization, categorization, attribution, making sense, naming, blaming and identifying. Discourse studies link those activities with collective forms of social action, and thus have the potential to integrate psychological concerns with social analysis (1992, p 3).

The claims considered in this thesis were located in the interview data where interviewees constructed narratives outlining their vision and understanding of the nature of racism and communicated prescriptions for addressing those racisms. Claims were also located in the government documents that outlined the OARS’s ‘official’ approach to various forms of anti-racism initiatives. The claims from state agents were located in public pronouncements, training documents, internal communications, program and service delivery guidelines, applications for funding, and policy statements. Claims about racism were also noted as being generated by the advocacy groups through the submissions they made to the OARS for support in the various anti-racism projects they proposed. The interview data often served to clarify and extend the

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\(^{11}\) I adopt the ‘map’ metaphor in the organization of the claims and racial discourse data used by Wetherell and Potter (1992). This metaphor has the advantage of helping organize competing claims relative to one another as well as providing a ‘laying out’ of the inventory of the different aspects of these claims.
claims evident in the official documents and written communications.

The strategy used to analyze claims involved considering the content of claims produced by different categories of stakeholders. The analytical typology of ‘actors’ or stakeholders emerged from the initial exploration of the data and academic accounts of the OARS. Groups of actors opposing one another were also identified through some of the interviews, with opposition existing both within and between groups in different instances. Both these sources influenced the identification of the following typology of interested parties:

1) Ethno-racial advocacy groups, and individuals representing such groups interacting with the OARS (including those involved in advisory capacity).

2) Individuals and state agents receptive to state anti-racisms

3) Individuals and state agents resistant to state anti-racisms

4) Political leaders including Premiere Rae, members of cabinet, and chairs of investigative bodies including Stephen Lewis.

5) Various civic bodies such as local multicultural committees and race relations committees.

6) Private training organizations that were contracted to provide training to the OARS staff and more broadly the OPS.

These analytical categories were used in the interpretation of the documents recording the interactions between the OARS and its partners in anti-racism projects. The purpose of setting up analytical categories was comparison. For comparison both variability and similarity of claims were sought. Following Wetherell and Potter (1992, p 102) I see variability between the claims of the
actors in the different analytical categories as important

…because it is a signal that different ways of constructing events, processes or groups are being deployed to achieve different effects. Patterns of variation and consistency in the form and content of accounts help the analyst to map out the pattern of interpretive repertoires that the participants are drawing on. More broadly, it is a way of helping to reveal the different ways in which discourse is orientated to social action.

This allowed for the discursive practices of actors variously located in relation to the OARS to be better understood. In this process, I was particularly interested in the power relations underlying the negotiation of concrete state anti-racism practices. These included both large scale and more specific policy initiatives, and various forms of anti-racism programming. The orientation and nature of those projects revealed whose vision, whose interests, and whose will amongst all the parties involved, emerged as the ‘victorious’ claim or had the most impact on what form practical anti-racism work actually took.

The specific strategy used to analyze claims was organized around the three part framing typology from Loseke (2003). Loseke (2003) advocates using an approach to assessing the social construction of social problems by examining the construction and communication of three distinct but inter-related frames. First, the ‘diagnostic frame’ includes identification of the problem to be addressed and its nature, sources or causes; understandings of why people should feel compelled to do something happens through the ‘motivational frame’; and finally suggestions for appropriate responses to the problem are communicated through
Although I have presented Loseke’s frames as separate, in practice they do not exist as distinct elements of discourses. Rather, they are often intertwined in complex ways. My main concern, stemming from the research question of: “What determines the nature and content of state anti-racisms?” led me to focus on the framing of racisms, and I adopted Loseke’s three part typology of social problems framing with emphasis on the diagnostic and/or prognostic frames. Motivational framing, while part of the social problems work surrounding discussions about what to do in response to racism, were not emphasized because the willingness of the state to act had been determined prior to the more specific discussions about the nature of the problem and how to react. In addition to these various components of racial discourses and claims, secondary aspects of the analytical strategy related to semantics, argument structuring, and the use of metaphor and specific terminology.

The social problems work associated with the anti-racism work of the Secretariat was examined in several different contexts. I examined: i) the events surrounding the emergence of the OARS; ii) the Stephen Lewis Inquiry and

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12 Diagnostic frames of racism often include comparative statistics outlining the differences between groups on some specified grounds, such as school performance or streaming, that is often presented as evidence of racism in schools. In the early 1990’s the collection of ‘racial’ data was controversial. The position of the OARS was outlined nicely by Citizenship Minister Ziemba when she argued for the expansion of the use of racial data noting that it was a fundamental tool for comparisons between women and men and was foundational in the diagnostic framing of the problem of sexism in work and other venues that led to national employment equity legislation in the 1980’s. There was general concern amongst minoritized communities that such data could also be used to harm groups’ images.
Report; iii) an advisory body called the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group that was charged with consensus building regarding the overall nature and character of racism in Ontario; iv) demonstration projects wherein the anti-racism organizational change ‘best practices’ were featured; and finally v) an area of joint-project programming where the OARS worked with various community partners: the Community Grants Funding Program and the Community Partnerships Initiative Project. Each of these areas of inquiry are represented in the five analytical chapters, and the variable contexts where anti-racism social problems work was considered yielded different responses to the research questions.

2.3 Interviews:

The interviews were conducted between October 2005 and February 2008. Key informants from a variety of locations were interviewed on a number of different aspects of the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat. Interviewees included: elected officials and NDP members; bureaucrats and civil servants; academics; media personnel; service recipients; and community representatives and anti-racism activists. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their involvement with and knowledge of the OARS operations, and a ‘snowball’ approach was taken to selecting most individuals for participation. I had only 2 rejections from the 25 individuals contacted for interviews. 23 interviews were conducted in total, and 7
of those interviewees granted me permission to attribute quotations from the interviews directly to them. 7 interviewees granted permission to use quotations anonymously, and 9 allowed the information from the interviews to be used only for background purposes, without direct use of quotations from the interviews. The 23 interviews ranged from 45 minutes to over 8 hours (conducted over three sessions). 17 interviews were done in person, and 6 were conducted by phone according to the preference and availability of the interviewee.

Although two general interview schedules were used, the interviews were semi-structured to allow for the unique perspective and expertise of each interviewee to be highlighted. The general interview schedule is included in appendix B, a modified schedule for the interview with Stephen Lewis is in appendix C, and the consent form for participation in the interviews is in appendix D. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed in their entirety. The transcripts were then content analyzed thematically on the basis of the key considerations of the OARS emergence and operation. Questions guiding the interviews were crafted to try to highlight how state power was used in the OARS story, and they addresses themes such as leadership, the exercise of power, decision making, and barriers to anti-racism.

The interview schedule served only as a rough guide and usually the conversation and questioning took a path that followed the interviewees experience, knowledge and insight into the issues under consideration. For example, the two interviews with members from the Ontario Anti-Racism
Advisory Working Group focussed on the struggles that Group experienced rather than on broader issues of policymaking. The interview with the Assistant Deputy Minister extended over three meetings and eight hours and covered a broad range of topics which reflected her perspective and involvement in the work of the OARS.

In considering the data the interviews yielded, I was sensitive to the fact that some interview data would reflect: i) the political (re)enactment of their perspectives, and ii) the reconstruction of justifications for their actions. Interviewees ‘represented’ themselves as workers and constructed discourses rooted in their positionality, identity, and politics. However, the interviewees were not only seen as political actors representing their interests in the reconstruction of their experiences with the OARS. I had the distinct sense in many interviews of a more candid side of the interviewees. They often spoke with fondness, anger, regret, frustration, and admiration for their work and others they worked with.

Interviewees all had their own perspectives to offer. Some interviewees provided historical perspective; others offered analysis of the limitations on anti-racisms and forms of state and extra-state resistance to anti-racisms. Other interviewees discussed the practical application of principles of anti-racist change within specific organizational contexts. About half the people interviewed were active members of ethno-racial advocacy groups as well as part of the system of state anti-racism under consideration. During the interviews several individuals explicitly stated the perspective of the communities they were part of, and their
commentary was taken to represent part of the perspective of the various ethno-racial advocacy groups. Some provided insight into the internal workings of the bureaucracy and its import for understanding how this example of state anti-racism played out. Others provided data that focused on particular events, such as the Yonge Street riot, that were significant to advancing the work of the OARS.

From the perspective of viewing anti-racism as a counter-hegemonic force opposing hegemonic multiculturalism, the anti-racism workers from the community who took positions within the OARS and other government posts may seem to have been neutralized and co-opted. Information in the interviews revealed, however, that although multicultural hegemony may have been preserved and reproduced in the broader historical picture, as individual political actors their anti-racism struggles continued well beyond the life of the OARS. This was evident through accounts of their activities following the disbanding of the OARS. These accounts revealed continued involvement in a variety of social justice efforts and strong commitments to equity work. I see this as a testament to the significance of political choices made by these individuals as they continue to play necessary and significant roles in broader anti-racism and social justice projects. Their personal paths reveal that although anti-racism coalesced briefly in the state and was then purged from the state by the Harris conservatives, many of its most influential change agents dispersed into a variety of spaces and locales where their struggles continued.

The interviews proved to be one of the most enjoyable aspects of the
research conducted for this thesis. With very few exceptions interviewees were gracious and open to the research being done. As an outsider I was exposed or ‘let in’ to the world of anti-racism, and their personal experiences with it, to varying degrees by different interviewees. My sense was that a few interviewees were reserved and defensive, even suspicious of my interest in anti-racism. Most others were welcoming and receptive, happy and eager to share what they knew and aid my research, and often pleased that someone was paying attention to the work they had undertaken. In 5 of the interviews there was a palpable bitterness about the whole OARS experiment. These interviewees reported harbouring resentment towards others involved in OARS laying some of the blame for its shortcomings on various groups and individuals involved.

One of the most interesting aspects of the interviews was the responses to the closing question used in every interview. The question was: “Is there something else I should be considering in my study of the OARS that we didn’t talk about?” This yielded a variety of responses including: “the vision, what we were trying to do” to “no” which I took to mean they felt I had thought too much about the OARS already and perhaps could usefully think about something else.

2.4 Government Documents:

Records of activity of the OARS were located in the Provincial Archives of Ontario, in Toronto. Under research agreement number 2005 – 283, I was able
to access all existing materials besides those relating to cabinet. In total 35 boxes of material were examined, containing information dealing with anti-racist terminology and ideology, policy, training, and specific programming conducted by the OARS. In addition, the archives housed at the Canadian Jewish Congress in Toronto yielded valuable data concerning inter-group deliberations and the ideological and practical elements of training documents. These data were collected and content analyzed on the basis of their claims making activities, specifically the framing strategies used in the documents. They were also used for general historical background information and to outline the relative positionality of the various actors involved.

In terms of the negotiation of specific anti-racism projects, claims were identified in both the documents produced by the OARS and the submissions for funding which included claims regarding the history, contemporary position, and suggested responses from the perspective of the group (both identity-based advocacy groups and civic bodies). There were over 200 joint projects undertaken by the OARS and its partners, and all were reviewed by first examining their summary sheet which provided basic information about the group requesting support, the nature of the anti-racism project they proposed, and the amount of money they sought. This screening allowed particular projects to be selected for more involved examination. Specific cases or projects were selected for more in-depth analysis on the basis of the information accompanying the submission and/or the atypical or extraordinary nature of the submission. There was one box
of files of rejected projects that was also used to identify some of the reasons submissions were not successful. This box of ‘rejects’, which included 33 separate files, indicated some of the reasoning for rejection on the part of OARS workers behind the decision making process regarding funding. Some of the more common reasons for rejection of a funding application were: 1) that the proposal’s anti-racism work fell outside the parameters of the identified targets of the funding program, 2) the proposal requested money to do things OARS thought were either covered by other programs, and 3) the proposal was incomplete in terms of meeting the requirements of the funding program – often there was not enough supporting documentation or the proper and required components for insurance were not in place.\(^\text{13}\)

One limiting factor relating to the official documents was that the cabinet material, especially that dealing with the rejection of two versions of a proposed far-reaching provincial anti-racist policy, was unavailable. There is a 20 year ‘freeze’ on cabinet – related material in Ontario and since the period under consideration fell between 1990 and 1995, this material was not available before the data collection and analysis were undertaken. Although I inadvertently came across some material relating to the activities of cabinet in the documents made available to me in the provincial archives, the research agreement I entered into with the provincial archives required that I inform the archivist of the existence of

\(^\text{13}\) One OARS staff interviewed for this research reported that OARS also made decisions to ‘spread the money around’ and therefore had to reject applications from groups that they felt were already receiving their share of funding. No specific identifiers of well-funded groups were offered, and the interviewee did not clarify this point further.
the cabinet material and it was subsequently secured by provincial archival staff.

Hansard Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario were also accessed for this research. These were analyzed for the ‘official stance’ of the governments, as well as the consultative process that included various interest groups’ appeals to the government regarding anti-racist policies and services and the recommendations of inquiries such as the Lewis inquiry of 1992. Admittedly much of the debate in the Legislative Assembly involves ‘playing politics’, the substantive cases of racism raised and used in exchanges between Assembly members is somewhat telling of the relative positioning of parties, individual representatives, and ethno-racial groups. Frequent references were made to high profile racial incidents such as particular police shootings of minoritized individuals and public disturbances, but allowance had to be made in the evaluation of these data for the fact that claims in this context were often incomplete or used more for their value in political optics rather than informed policy making.

2.5 Printed News Media:

Some of the research utilized news media accounts as secondary data sources to help round out the understanding of particular aspects of the life of the OARS. Lexis Nexis was used to search major English dailies available in Ontario for articles citing the OARS and/or anti-racism. The newspapers included: the Toronto Star, the Toronto Sun, the Ottawa Citizen, the Hamilton Spectator, the
Globe and Mail, and the National Post. These papers were selected in an effort to have different ownership, readership, and editorial bents represented in the research. The articles were gathered and analyzed primarily for what they suggested about the role of the media in contributing to common public conceptions about racial issues and the specific activities of the OARS. Critical discourse analysis similar to that outlined by van Dijk (1991) was used to content analyze the papers. This approach to analyzing media discourses concerning racism and anti-racism focuses on: the choice of topics discussed in the press; and sources of information (whose voices are seen as credible). van Dijk (1991, p 50) also noted the significance of headlines and the role they played in influencing the public’s perception of events. This research also used methods outlined by Fairclough (1995, 2000) in that the rhetorical style of politicians and the manner in which discourse is used in service of broader political agendas informed the analysis of media material.

2.6 Other Sources of Data:

Historical accounts and biographies of key players were consulted for accounts of the influences on the policy making process and perspectives on the events under consideration. For example Bob Rae’s longstanding concern with equity and his intent to act on this concern once in power was examined through these means.
2.7 Whiteness, Voice, and Studying the ‘Other’: The Investigator’s Subject Position:

It is generally accepted that the subject position of researchers influences their interpretation of their subject matter. Indeed, it has become somewhat of a convention in much academic work to prominently identify oneself relative to a series of groups distinguished along political, racial, ethnic, class, gender, sexual, and ability lines. It is further assumed that your positionality affects but does not necessarily dictate your interpretation of processes and events. Dei (2007), citing the tenets and politics of ‘critical integrative anti-racism,’ recently noted that the white body is always suspect in anti-racist work. I found some support for this observation throughout the interviews. There was often some surprise upon arrival to conduct in-person interviews, as though the interviewees had been expecting someone else or someone who looked different from myself.

Although some of the intensity that characterized debates over the ‘appropriation of voice’ that permeated the 1990’s has quelled, the place of the white researchers in race and ethnic studies remains at issue. The debates concerning voice occurred mostly in relation to literature and art, but the social sciences also housed its share of discussion concerning who may rightfully study what, and who may rightfully speak to issues that most negatively affected minority communities. Certainly speaking for, or taking the perspective and voice of the Other is problematic, however, this does not mean that there is no place for scholarship done by members of majority groups on topics such as anti-racism.
My experiences as a ‘white’ researcher studying anti-racism raised a few eyebrows when I arrived to conduct my interviews with people who were more often than not members of marginalized and minoritized groups. Although the people I talked with were uniformly gracious and polite, many inquired as to why I wanted to study anti-racism. I faced the same question at two conferences I attended while conducting the research for this dissertation. One experience in particular stands out. At a conference in Toronto I was talking with a Sikh woman about her presentation on the racial and racist elements of Canadian Arts Policy when a man, who self-identified as ‘a Sikh’, interrupted our conversation asking me what my area of study was. When I replied ‘anti-racism’, he responded shortly ‘why would you want to study anti-racism?’ and quickly excused himself commenting that it had been ‘nice to meet you’ in a rather dismissive fashion.

Besides the obvious reality that racism is a problem that negatively affects all people exposed to it, and that all people share the burden of responding to racism, his comments and that experience brought a particularly thorny issue to the fore. At some point whites who study racism have to deal with issues surrounding their whiteness, both as they perceive it and as it is perceived to be a factor by others, especially minority scholars and activists who work in areas such as anti-racism. For the most part when I explained to the participants of this research that I had grown up in the Canadian Prairies during the 1970’s and 1980’s, and that I felt that context was imbued with racial tensions between
whites and aboriginals,\textsuperscript{14} and that this had sparked curiosity in the role of the state in relation to racisms, most people seemed to accept this as justification for my interest in the topic. Still, especially at academic conferences, I encountered some people who felt that the area of study should rightfully be the purview of minoritized scholars and activists. I did not always feel welcomed in these conference atmospheres.

I generally concur with Bishop’s (1996) account of the role of the ‘ally’, and I have come to see my work as allied to the work of minoritized scholars. I do not, however, consider myself to be only, or even primarily an ally. My work may be of interest and some practical utility to minoritized advocates, but it also may be seen as embedded in a body of scholarly work that examines political history, state – community relations, and equity studies. In a way this position is facilitated by the ‘public’ nature of much of my subject matter and data – policy debates, government programs, and community – government relations. This subject matter differs significantly from the sort of identity and cultural representations and revisionist historical accounts that so often draw criticisms as examples of voice appropriation. Issues of policymaking, public funding of community groups, and political power are in the public realm and are therefore fair game for all scholars.

This is not to say there were not times when a sense of voyeurism troubled me. A case in point was the Black – Jewish dialogue that had strained articulation

\textsuperscript{14} In this sense I would characterize the racial environment of the Canadian Prairies during the 1970’s and 1980’s as epitomizing Goldberg’s notion of a ‘racial state’.
in one working group I studied. On this issue I most certainly was an outsider, but I felt it necessary to address the issue somewhat to provide some context for what happened within the government working group I spoke of (the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group).

It is difficult to calculate the effect my physicality (white male), and the sharing of my personal positioning relative to the issues in Saskatchewan, had on the interview data I collected. Whether a minority scholar would have collected different information, elicited different responses to the same interview questions, brought a perspective to the research than I did, or indeed even considered the topic worthy of examination remains unknown to me. As an outsider to both the province of Ontario and the issues, I had little prior knowledge of the dynamics at play, the political alliances, and the general tone of politics in Ontario during the time I examined anti-racism policymaking. I feel this advantaged me in my analysis in that I was not set in an understanding of what happened, nor was I intent on justifying any particular perspective or position relative to these issues. I was not laden with vendettas, as some of my interviewees seemed to be.

I was very pleasantly surprised as the candid nature of exchanges with the interviewees, and many of them seemed to speak quite openly about what they saw as problems with ‘white people’ in a manner that suggested they believed I would not be offended or become defensive, almost as though I wasn’t really one of ‘them’. Many problematized forms of whiteness inherent in institutional systems and embedded in personal identities and ideologies, and cited them as a
significant barrier to anti-racisms

Many of the people I interviewed encouraged me to continue to address these issues in my scholarship in the future. Many were also very happy that someone finally was going to write at least part of the OARS story. Given the animosity that characterizes much of the memory of the NDP rule in Ontario society, many seemed pleased that what they saw as a bright spot in this history was receiving attention. Finally, although I rely heavily on the perspectives and voices that were shared with me through the interviews, the interpretation of the OARS story presented in this thesis is mine.

2.8 Ethics and Ethics Approval:

Approval for this research was obtained in September 2005. The McMaster Research Ethics Board provided guidance in the process of obtaining ethics approval, and for this I am indebted in particular to Mr. Wilson.

2.9 Conclusions:

The rationale for selecting the research methods used in this study was presented in this chapter, and the nature of the methods was discussed relative to the research questions. A multi-method case study approach was adopted because of the advantages it offered for examining the two central research questions that guided this thesis. A contextual constructionist analysis will constitute the main
approach to the data and serve to clarify the position of relevant stakeholders in the policymaking process.
CHAPTER THREE: THE EMERGENCE AND ACCELERATION OF STATE ANTI-RACISM IN ONTARIO:

3.1 Introduction:

This chapter addresses the research question: “Why do states undertake anti-racism initiatives?” Analytical attention is paid to the racial equity initiatives that preceded the Anti-Racism Secretariat, the social problems work dealing with racism conducted by the NDP early in their reign, and the impact of the Yonge Street Riot on the anti-racism efforts of the government. The analysis of the claims making activities surrounding the emergence of state anti-racism in Ontario revealed that in 1990, at the start of the NDP rule, state anti-racism policy was relatively undeveloped. Although there were plans to intensify anti-racism, the implementation of those plans was hindered by a lack of consultation with community stakeholders as well as political considerations within the government. At the start of the NDP rule, the understanding of racism evident in diagnostic and prognostic framing of state agents did not identify pointed forms of anti-racism intervention. State anti-racism in Ontario also lacked an organizational home and infrastructure. What was in place at the start of the NDP rule was political will in the form of a rather amorphous commitment to do something about racism in Ontario (Wolfe, 1997). There was also a general understanding of the problem areas that had garnered a lot of attention as ‘hot

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15 There was intention to move forward with employment equity, but because this initiative included other target groups (women and the disabled) in addition to those suffering from racial discrimination it can not be considered only to be a form of anti-racism.
spots’ where controversy over racism had recently erupted. Further, the NDP had publicly stated its commitment to addressing racism, so the motivation on the part of the state had been acknowledged. That motivation was bolstered through the motivational framing of racism evident in the Yonge Street riot, which ultimately catapulted anti-racism forward more than any other single factor by heightening the ‘problem recognition stream’ of the construction of racism as a problem in Ontario. The role of the riot in relation to the evolution of state anti-racism initiatives was that it served as a motivational catalyst, a very powerful public statement reflective of the potential for unrest, and as a rough gauge of the discontent of members of groups victimized by racism. It was, among other things, a dramatic event that impacted policy work (Redding et al. 2005).

The actions exhibited by rioters were intended to vent the anger of those involved, and also to send a clear message to the rest of Ontario society that the recent events in Toronto, like recent events in Los Angeles surrounding the acquittal of the officers involved in the Rodney King case, were unacceptable and required protest. Further, the riot was interpreted within government as a message that the government should proceed quickly with measures to address racism. While the pre-riot claims making emanating from community factions regarding anti-racism was quite refined, until the riot occurred those claims had not successfully impacted concrete changes or interventions.

The central argument presented in this chapter concerns the embryonic form of anti-racism at the start of the NDP rule, and the catalytic role played by
the riot in the acceleration of state anti-racism initiatives. While governmental will in the form of stated intent and community involvement of some form were both necessary for the emergence of state anti-racism in Ontario, it was the riot that stimulated significant acceleration of state anti-racism initiatives.

The main data sources used for the analysis in this chapter were: transcripts from interviews conducted with individuals familiar with the transition from a Liberal government to the NDP government and the Yonge Street Riot; and government documents outlining the Anti-Racism Strategy for Ontario. Secondary sources of data were English newsprint accounts of the riot and its aftermath.

3.2 A Confluence of Anti-Racism Forces: Setting the Stage for State Anti-Racism in Ontario:

The story of the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat begins with the convergence of interests between a collection of community-based groups and the Ontario provincial New Democratic Party in the late 1980’s. Several ‘special interest groups’, as they were called at the time, had been trying to make connections with the major political parties of Ontario with the aim of furthering their causes through policy changes. Many of these groups were identity-based, and different communities had been advocating for specific policy changes in areas such as policing, housing, social services, childcare, and education. In terms of the general level of public awareness of racial issues, there had been several
high profile ‘racial incidents’ popularized through the media that had
“…heightened the public’s awareness of the shifting multicultural nature of
Ontario society, and the challenges that posed in the area of social policy”
(Galabuzi, 2005). Besides the concerns in policing, several incidents had drawn
public and media attention to questions concerning the nature and extent of racism
in other areas of Ontario’s Public Service (OPS), which resulted in a moderate
level of public pressure being put on the provincial government to address racism
in Ontario society. On the International Day for the Elimination of Racism, for
example, student protesters at Queen’s Park were drawing attention to problems at
University of Western Ontario concerning controversial professor Phillipe
Rushton. Rae responded that he did not agree with Rushton’s views, but “…the
simple reality is the government of Ontario doesn’t have the power or the
authority… to dismiss a university professor.” (Armstrong, 1991, p A5). The same
day 80 other protesters met at Queen’s Park to protest a racist leaflet left on cars
in the South Riverdale neighborhood. The protest included Jack Layton, and the
leaflet which sparked the protest was from a white supremacist group.

In order to better understand the context that surrounded the emergence of
state anti-racism in Ontario in the early 1990’s, it is helpful to understand the
equity initiatives that preceded the OARS. In the years immediately preceding the
establishment of the OARS some initial steps towards racial equity policies were
taken by the Ontario Liberals, although they fell short of embodying anti-racist
principles and practices. Racial equity was addressed in part through human rights
legislation and a special branch of the human rights commission, and in part through the Race Relations Policy of 1987. When the NDP came to power they introduced what was known as the Ontario Public Sector Anti-Racism Strategy. Prior to the riot the Ontario Public Sector Anti-racism Strategy represented the most advanced and concrete plans that outlined the state’s intent regarding a response to racism.

At the time of the provincial election in 1990, several ministries had disjointed collections of equity policies, and some even had versions of anti-racism policies in the developmental and early stages of implementation. The race relations policy was administered primarily by the Race Relations Directorate, which was the organizational progenitor of the Anti-Racism Secretariat. Although the Race Relations Directorate eventually became the Anti-Racism Secretariat, there were fundamental ideological and practical differences between the two bodies. The Race Relations Policy acknowledged the importance of racial and cultural diversity and how diversity had enriched the province. The policy stated the government’s commitment to the principle of equality of treatment and opportunity. More specifically, the 1987 policy on race relations stated that “The government will take an active role in the elimination of all racial discrimination, including those policies and practices which, while not intentionally discriminatory, have a discriminatory effect.” By claiming that racism exists in systemic forms within Ontario society, the policy served as a clear acknowledgement of systemic racism and the government’s obligation to address
it. What was unclear was the specific ‘active’ role the Directorate played in responding to systemic forms of racism. From the perspective of anti-racism theory, the Race Relations Directorate lacked an effective strategy outlining how to challenge systemic racisms. The prognostic framing of racism in the policy was general and vague, and while this may have served well as a statement of general intent, is did not serve well as a basis for identifying particular problem areas in need of particular interventions. In this regard Harney (2001, p 29) characterized the race relations directorate and the race relations policy as extolling “…platitudes…”, and appearing less like an effective policy and more like a “…prayer”.

Generally speaking, the paradigm which existed under the banner of ‘race relations’ came into popular use mainly as a tool to convince Ontarians to try to work to understand each other better, as well as raising issues of equal access to institutions, and working to end discrimination and stereotyping. Although the race-relations paradigm was somewhat progressive, and perhaps was a necessary step en route to a more explicitly anti-racist paradigm, it was less effective than anti-racism as an ideological basis for effective anti-racism policy and service delivery.
3.3 The Anti-Racism Aspirations of the NDP:

“The New Democrats had often promised that if elected, they would create a special agency to fight racism, especially what they termed systemic racism” (Harney, 2001, p 29). In the years immediately preceding the NDP’s election victory of 1990, links were forged between the NDP and groups such as The Urban Alliance on Race Relations. This particular relationship served as the basis for a private members bill in the late 1980’s which was an early articulation of the key elements of proposed legislation to addressed issues such as racial discrimination in housing, employment, education, and criminal justice as seen from the perspective of community activists.

Changing how the government responded to racism had been identified as a priority for the provincial NDP, and Bob Rae had expressed interest in addressing racism if elected. Rae had some personal experience dealing with racism related issues, and a lot of his familiarity with these issues came from spending time studying and protesting in relation to aboriginal issues in the early 1980’s. Commenting on Rae’s anti-racism aspirations at the start of his time in power, Farber (2005) asserted:

Bob did have a vision…whether it was a secretariat or whatever, it may not have coalesced in his mind, but he knew he wanted to do something about anti-racism… he is a good man, I think of him that way, and I am convinced that he believed he had to try to bring this multicultural experiment in Ontario together, he really wanted to do something about the plight of those being discriminated against.
Piatkowski (2005) noted that although Rae’s sentiments may have supported the idea of decreasing inequality in Ontario society, there was dissention within the NDP party and “…some party members saw his ideas as naive - for example the idea that we can just all get along, recognize our compatibility, while others felt that the NDP needed to take a strong and aggressive stand against systemic racism.” Although Rae’s general sentiment towards equity was conducive to progressive policies, Rae had to rely on others to determine the specific form anti-racism efforts should take. No claims supporting specific measures were forwarded by Rae, but evidently he was motivated to respond to racisms in Ontario in some fashion, and he sought consultation with various factions of Ontario society regarding their insights on how to proceed with an anti-racism agenda. One concrete way Rae felt the NDP could move towards this was to broaden the range of candidates running for the NDP in the 1990 election.

The NDP attempted to recruit several minority candidates to run in the 1990 provincial election. Pam Grant, who worked as Bob Rae’s personal assistant, was important in this effort in that she often helped make contacts with prospective candidates. This was an effort the NDP was strongly committed to.

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16 in 1993 - Rae tried to get the song “we’re in the same boat now” recorded by Sony Music.-- the song itself was a bit sappy and simplistic - the song represented Rae’s feelings on the topic of diversity and advocated solutions to the differences between people. Many in the party saw these views as too liberal and not radical enough - some party members were in line with more radical solutions - and were influenced by the radical politics of separatist from the black and aboriginal movements.
and they pursued their recruitment with zeal. Zanana Akande, who became the first black female MLA in Ontario in the 1990 election, described how aggressive the NDP was in their attempts to convince her to run: “I had been asked previously to run by another political party in another election before… I was reluctant to run, I didn’t want to run, I was courted and I say that with no ego involved, it was just a fact. …nine people [from the NDP] met with me in a cluster and three others at a separate time to secure my running” (Akande, 2005).

The attempts by the NDP to secure more minority candidates was politically prudent given the growing proportion of minority citizens in Ontario, and the fuller inclusion of minority candidates also dovetailed with the general ideological stance and traditional constituencies of the party. The deliberate attempt to have an increased number of minority candidates run in the 1990 election achieved two things that supported anti-racism. First, by increasing the representation of a hitherto underrepresented category of candidates, the NDP was exemplifying one form of anti-racism action. Second, by having these candidates involved with the party the NDP was establishing the presence of legitimate voices within the party that could speak to the specific challenges of anti-racism policy development and implementation, as well as serve as links to community anti-racism factions. According to Harney (2001, p 29) some of the most active and influential people involved in advocating for anti-racism changes included individuals who were NDP supporters who had come from the Indian and African Diasporas and who were involved in school administration in Toronto. These
people brought with them considerable knowledge and experience based on their experiences outside Canada, and some played leading roles under the NDP rule in the civil service and government.

Prior to the 1990 election several other interest groups attempted to build alliances with the provincial NDP, some of whom had only a peripheral interest in anti-racism. A number of these community groups came together and formed a coalition called ‘Adjust Ontario’. These groups included activists interested variously in women’s issues, anti-poverty, employment equity, and racial inequality. They came together in order to better communicate their interests to individuals who were running for office. Through a series of all-candidates forums it became clear the NDP most closely represented their shared concerns. Importantly, Adjust Ontario did not stress identity issues, rather they represented a diversity of groups, and one interviewee who was an Adjust Ontario member commented that “…we were issue based rather than identity based at that point” (Galabuzi, 2005). The sense shared on both sides of this relationship, the NDP and the interest groups, was that they were working towards common causes and the relationship was mutually beneficial. Grace Edward Galabuzi, who had been involved in anti-racism community activism and later played a key role in the premier’s office advising Bob Rae on racial and other issues, noted: “We [the community groups] had an ongoing relationship with the NDP and they were our allies…” (Galabuzi, 2005). When the NDP won the election, “…a number of us [community anti-racism activists] had a really difficult decision to make about
whether we stayed with our groups that we were working within civil society up until that point, or whether we go into government and see whether we can implement some of the programs that we had been advocating for (Galabuzi, 2005). According to Richardson (2000), this is a common dilemma facing community workers who rely on state resources. On the one hand they have to remain open, especially when the power and monetary resources of the state appear attainable or accessible, on the other hand the history of state – community cooperation does not bode well for hope that the original intentions of the community will be preserved when they enter into joint projects with the state. Apparently the potential perils of cooperation with the state were seen as a risk worth taking, and several anti-racism advocates aligned themselves with the government and civil service. Harney (2001, p 28) suggested the following about the move several community based anti-racism workers made to government and civil service work: “Rather than see the [anti-racism] movement as safe in civil society and threatened by government, Ontario’s antiracism movement perceived itself as threatened in civil society and attempted to use the apparatus of government to counter that threat”. The situation at the time of the 1990 election, then, had several anti-racism advocates poised to join forces with the NDP in a variety of capacities within the government and civil service if the NDP won the election.
3.4 The 1990 NDP Victory and Aftermath: Hope and Optimism:

At the time of the 1990 election, the relationship between the NDP and ethno-racial community groups was amicable and mutually supportive. There appeared to be a general but strong ideological congruence between these parties, and the sense that there was a need for changes to address systemic racisms was strong. The interest and willingness to undertake anti-racism initiatives had been stated publicly by the NDP, the requisite human resources within the party to facilitate an anti-racism strategy had been arranged, but the diagnostic and prognostic framing of racism remained rudimentary and simplistic. Further, the motivational framing of the issue had not really been tested with a case that would allow the NDP to actually demonstrate their commitment to anti-racism. The specifics of an anti-racism response within the state were unclear at this point. For anti-racism to proceed what was needed was a clarification of the diagnostic and prognostic framing of racism, and an intensification of the motivational framing of racism.

Few analysts predicted the outcome of the 1990 provincial election in Ontario. The NDP won, which was surprising given that a social democratic party had never ruled Ontario prior to that time. Few people expected the NDP’s time in power to last for more than a single term. Many mainstream Ontarians view the Rae government retrospectively as “…an unfortunate accident in Ontario’s power

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17 Many anti-racism supporters were disappointed with the NDP because of their apparent lack of resistance to the public showing of ‘Showboat’. Many felt it was a chance for the state to symbolically register its opposition, but did not do so adequately.
game” (Harney, 2001, p 25). For supporters of anti-racism, however, the few months following the election were filled with hope and optimism. One OARS worker commented:

…they knew they were only going to be a one term government, and I think they felt that it was a rare opportunity to shift some things in a very fundamental way…, it started out being a real genuine attempt to have a big tent for the folks on the left and to get community folks with experience and expertise to help them do that (anonymous, 2005).

Following the election it appeared the anti-racism movement had an inroad to government and the bureaucracy for the first time, and considerable hope was placed in the idea that some of the many longstanding issues they had been advocating for might finally receive some effective attention from government.

Very shortly after taking power the Rae government launched what was known as the “People’s Agenda”, and equity concerns were featured prominently in that agenda. Although the People’s Agenda had many supporters inside the OPS and obviously much support within government, there was also considerable resistance to this agenda.

…there was a lot of resistance to that sort of broad based equity agenda from the offices, from people on the political side. They felt there were key elements of that equity agenda that needed to proceed over a period of time, where there was sort of a phasing in process where certain things had to be done, and essentially I think the position of those who run the government was that there needed to be some sort of political
management of the equity agenda (Galabuzi, 2005).

Although their intentions to undertake anti-racism initiatives had been clearly stated, the NDP faced several difficult tasks following up on their campaign promises. Very difficult practical questions needed to be answered including precisely what changes should be made and how fast those changes should proceed. During the first few months of NDP rule the specific direction of anti-racism remained unclear. The NDP had been quite successful at including and representing social movements like the anti-racism movement when they were in opposition, but when they assumed power they quickly realized they also had to represent broader interests (Harney, 2001). The NDP faced the daunting task of ruling Canada’s largest and most diverse province at a critical time when the general economic conditions were deteriorating and ethno-racial tensions were intensifying. Although Rae had campaigned largely on equity related issues, he quickly announced that the interests of all Ontarians had to weigh in to policy decisions made by the government. This meant that the interests of the entire province “…essentially had to be considered against the [anti-racism] agenda and its implications for all the other publics.” (Galabuzi, 2005). The fact that Rae had only a very general idea about how to structure the response to racism slowed the response in the first few months of their rule. Rae was aware of the general areas that needed attention, but not the particular responses that might be appropriate in the various sectors. To put this in claims-making terms, Rae was motivated to move on the anti-racism front but lacked valid and specific diagnostic and
prognostic framing of racisms in Ontario.

In the period immediately after the election in 1990 Rae began to strategize about how to best implement anti-racism changes within the state. During this time Rae was guided largely by elements of the newly incorporated factions of the anti-racism movement who had made the leap to government or bureaucratic positions. He was provided with packages of claims regarding racisms from the individuals who better represented the communities state anti-racism was intended to respond to. Although the Anti-Racism Secretariat had yet to be created, it was clear that there was a wave of new thinking about the nature of racism bringing with it a sense that new organizational structures were required to administer this new perspective. The deepening recession was a major concern, however, and many of Rae’s economic advisors felt that the economic conditions in the summer and fall of 1990 were not conducive to implementing new equity related policies: “…the idea here was to try and ride out the worst part of the recession before trying to redistributing employment opportunities” (Galabuzi, 2005).

Although anti-racism seemed to lag somewhat early in the tenure of the NDP, other areas that affected equity were seeing more significant changes:

There were other projects that were proceeding, for example childcare was proceeding and there were significant consultations on childcare involving different ministers in the government, labor law was proceeding, no doubt about that. Other key features of the government’s activities were proceeding much faster than certainly [anti-racism related] police reform was proceeding, certainly employment equity was
proceeding (Galabuzi, 2005).

This apparent lack of action frustrated and concerned many of the strongest supporters of anti-racism.

In addition to resistance to anti-racism on the political side and the limiting contextual factor of the intensifying recession, there was also resistance in the form of incomplete support for the new anti-racism agenda. The likelihood of a change of government after the next election prompted different responses amongst anti-racism supporters and equity workers in the NDP party and the OPS. On the one hand it emboldened some within government and the bureaucracy to bowl ahead and attempt to implement changes they felt were long overdue because they felt the opportunity to do so in the future may be restricted. Another very different response, particularly prevalent in some of the career civil servants who had worked in the Ontario Race Relations Directorate, was to simply wait out the NDP’s time in power and see what the following government’s policies might bring. It was a time of rapid change that instilled hope in some and concern in others, and the manifestation of the tension inherent in the different responses would later serve as a major dividing force within the Secretariat.

During the latter parts of 1991 and into the beginning of 1992, some initial steps were taken towards the development of an ‘Ontario Public Sector Anti-Racism Strategy’, which was planned for full implementation in mid 1993. This strategy later became one of the four main components of a broader ‘Anti-Racism
Strategy for Ontario’. This initial work included a review by the Ministry of Citizenship of what other ministries and departments were already doing in the area of equity and anti-racism work; discussions and plans for implementing organizational change in various ministries; and the Ministry of Citizenship working together with ministries such as Culture and Communications to “...identify and eliminate systematic racial bias in the purchase of goods and services” (Citizenship, p 5). In March of 1991, a month before the creation of OARS, cabinet approved the Anti-Racism Strategy for Ontario, which set out the

...government’s goals and priorities for combating racism in the community and in the broader public and private sectors. The strategy has four components: an Ontario Anti-Racism Policy to replace the Ontario Policy on Race Relations (1987); a mandatory Ontario Public Sector Anti-Racism Strategy to provide a consistent approach to anti-racism measures throughout government; consultations on changes that may need to be made to existing policies, programs and legislation to implement anti-racism measures; and an Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group, a consultative body of community members to advise the Minister of Citizenship on the implementation of the Anti-Racism Strategy for Ontario (Citizenship, p 5).

The Anti-Racism Strategy was the first relatively coherent and public iteration of the state’s more specific intentions regarding anti-racism. When read from a constructionist perspective, the Strategy may be seen as an early articulation of claims regarding how the state perceived the problem of racism in
Ontario. The state apparently did not require further motivational framing of the issues, although this would eventually come in the form of civil unrest associated with the Yonge Street riot. What the state did require was an elaboration of the diagnostic and prognostic framing of racism in order to proceed with concrete anti-racism initiatives. The race relations directorate continued with the work it had been engaged in prior to the shift in governmental power in 1990, but there was a sense that its work needed to be intensified and refocused more along the lines of anti-racism. There needed to be a reframing of racism if the shift to anti-racism was to proceed.

In general, the intensity of commitment that community activists brought to their new positions in civil service and government, and the hope that permeated the minority communities for the period shortly after the NDP took power, combined to set the expectations quite high concerning the ultimate outcome of the OARS ‘experiment’. There was a sense within the NDP and in the ranks of community activists that in the early 1990’s anti-racism was being tested in Ontario.

Perhaps the most significant limiting factor was the economic context. Ontario was fast approaching the depths of what would be the worst recession since the 1930’s. This contributed to an atmosphere of caution in business circles, and it was thought unlikely that they would respond well to the diagnostic framing of the problem of racism. The diagnostic framing of racism in the area of employment was often interpreted as ‘imposed’ restrictions in the area of hiring
and other changes that were being considered to force implementation of anti-racist measures in workplaces.

3.5 The Establishment of the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat:

The establishment of the OARS was announced in the Ontario Legislative Assembly on April 3, 1991 by the Minister of Citizenship, Elaine Ziemba. As was common with such announcements, great aspirations were articulated outlining how the Ontario NDP both recognized and had a set of practical response to the insidious and persistent forms of racism that plagued Ontario society:

...we are establishing the Ontario anti-racism secretariat as a strong advocacy body to spearhead the fight against racism both within and outside the government... The new organization will carry out crucial policy development, research and evaluation roles. It will provide both consulting advice and financial assistance to help various sectors plan and implement anti-racism programs. It will organize anti-racist public education initiatives to change attitudes (Ziemba, 1991).

In addition to the functions of the newly created Secretariat noted above, there were four other key aspects of the NDP’s anti-racism platform that had implications for the work of the Secretariat. These four components were also part of the aforementioned Anti-Racism Strategy for Ontario and to quickly reiterate here they included: 1) replacement of the older race relations policy with a new anti-racism policy; 2) a mandatory public sector anti-racism strategy covering all ministries, agencies, boards and commissions; 3) a plan for community
consultation; and 4) establishing the Ontario Anti-racism Advisory Working Group which was to be a diverse and representative advisory body reporting to the Minister of Citizenship. These initiatives were intended to address the deficiencies in the diagnostic and prognostic framing of racism.

The establishment of the OARS was only part of the broader equity agenda, the other main pillar was employment equity. Within the broader equity agenda, the OARS function was in part to provide support for other aspects of the agenda, “… and it was a very broad agenda. It involved employment equity for sure, you know a commitment to different hiring strategies than before, but it involved other dimensions as well, like looking at policing and the justice system, reforming education, and community development was an important one” (Galabuzi, 2005). A prominent Montreal human rights lawyer, Juanita Westmoreland-Traore, was recruited by the NDP to head up the employment equity program, and Anne-Marie Stewart moved from an administrative position in Education to the newly created OARS to act as the Assistant Deputy Minister. Stewart’s position as the head of the Secretariat entailed not only general supervisory and public relations roles, she also contributed significantly to the social problems work involved in the reframing of racism. Her leadership in this process of reframing anti-racism would prove to be pivotal.

The Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat was part of the Ministry of Citizenship which at that time was also responsible for services for disabled people, seniors, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission. The Ministry of
Citizenship also had a Citizenship Development Branch which was involved in providing some support to immigrants - they were connected with the Ontario Welcome House network and some ESL programs. Within the Citizenship Development Branch, there was a “Multicultural Workplace Program” which operated in 16 locations in Ontario and affected more than 7000 workers in both public and private sectors, the aim of the program was to help organizations change to accommodate the needs of a culturally diverse work force by changing policies and programs where necessary, and altering how communication took place in those workplaces. Although necessary and significant, the multicultural focus of these programs and interventions did not reflect the more stringent requisites of an anti-racism approach. The creation of the Secretariat provided the organizational shift that eased the introduction of a different theoretical and practical approach, one that was different from those present in the work of these other branches of the Department of Citizenship. Harney (2001, p 26) noted that “Anti-racism in Ontario began in opposition to two other not always distinct approaches to combating and analyzing issues of race and cultural diversity: race relations and multiculturalism”. For many of the activists who were part of the anti-racism project, the shift was one they had been working towards for years in their struggles to get Ontario governments to go beyond a multiculturalism or race relations approach. Many of the activists had been variously involved with fighting racism and promoting an anti-racism ethos with limited success in different locations throughout Ontario society. What the establishment of the
Secretariat offered was hope that the centralization of anti-racism efforts within the state might give it the institutional status required to achieve desired changes across Ontario society. The general diagnostic framing of racism advocated by anti-racism supporters highlighted systemic forms of discrimination: “It maintained that discrimination against visible minorities was embedded in institutions and systems, and their practices and cultures. It also emphasized that discrimination could be unintentional - that is, have no singular, human agent, yet create class and race beneficiaries” (Harney, 2001, p 27).

The Secretariat was created at a time when there was growing advocacy for state sponsored racial equity work to shift away from a race relations / multiculturalism focus to a more explicitly anti-racism and anti-oppression focus. The forging of relationships between the NDP and community groups was part of that paradigm shift, as were popular academic trends critiquing the shortcomings of both a multicultural and race relations approach to equity. The very establishment of the OARS, its operations, and eventual demise were all critical moments in the rise and fall of that paradigm shift. The time of the NDP take over was also a time that marked the end of a period of liberal thinking about race that saw a popularization of the notions that race did not really exist and race really should not affect social relations. There was growing acceptance and support for the idea that race was an important and defining feature of society, and that systemic forms of racism needed to be addressed in any equity related work conducted by government.
Not surprisingly, this transition to a new paradigm in equity work in Ontario proceeded more quickly in the OARS than some other areas of the OPS, and the rapid ideological shift was facilitated by the following factors: the OARS was a newly created body with many new personnel with experience as community anti-racism activists; the OARS was headed by a woman with extensive working knowledge of anti-racism theory and practice; and the OARS was intended to reflect and embody the equity principles of the new government as distinct from those of the previous governments.

One of the most notable features of the Anti-Racism Secretariat was that it was unprecedented in terms of its explicitly anti-racism orientation. Most of its workers who were interviewed for this research realized that they faced both opportunities as well as formidable challenges in heralding in a new anti-racism approach to responding to racism. Because it was new there was the opportunity to bring in new people with new ideas, which proved vital to making the transition from a multicultural and race relations focus to an anti-racism focus. Many of the new recruits were from the very ‘special interest groups’ that had been so actively lobbying for anti-racism change prior to the 1990 election. One obvious benefit to this was the dedication and passion these people brought to their social problems work and the work of the newly formed Secretariat. They possessed a zeal which catapulted their work forward, but also proved difficult to manage within a bureaucratic context. Many were not used to the slow pace of change in government, and many were also impatient with some of the staff who
had been retained from the older Race-Relations Directorate. There was a sense that especially amongst certain long serving civil servants who made the move to OARS from the older Race Relations Directorate, their approach to the ‘new’ work of anti-racism was overly cautious as they concerned themselves more with riding out the NDP government’s time in power and awaited a different regime that might put things back to the way they were during the time of the Liberals. This proved to be a constant source of tension within the OARS, and it contributed to the strained nature of working relations therein. Another factor that detracted from efficiency within the Secretariat was the lack of bureaucratic experience of many of the upper level OARS workers. As many had been recruited from outside government, they were not familiar with the nature of work within government, and brought with them naïve expectations for what might realistically be accomplished.

The creation of a dedicated branch of government to deal with anti-racism, such as the OARS, is sometimes seen by its critics as political pandering to minorities. In the 1995 election this conception was promoted by the NDP’s opposition, and the argument went so far as the leader of the Conservative party, Mike Harris, accusing Bob Rae of dividing the province along racial lines. Bonnett (2000a) argued that one of the main justifications for the demise of the OARS was the perception on the part of the Conservatives that it too closely represented misguided NDP ideology, which is a view consistent with the idea that the NDP was too closely aligned with and influenced by the its minority
constituencies. Because the OARS was created shortly after the NDP victory, it was relatively easy for the media, and for critics of anti-racism, to associate the OARS with the NDP – temporally they appeared to be one and the same. What this meant was that criticism of the OARS became part of the more general criticism of the NDP, and when contextual factors such as poor economic conditions continued to deteriorate, the NDP and especially certain policy areas took the brunt of criticism through the media. However, “…it makes no sense to argue that it [the anti-racism agenda] was about vote getting simply because of the numbers involved. No, no, that is very inaccurate. That is a very poor analysis, it is simply wrong” (Galabuzi, 2005). Galabuzi felt this was wrong because the minority vote was not enough to justify the specific catering to them, as they alone were not enough to get the NDP elected. Other interviewees, however, felt that the creation of the OARS was a strong symbolic statement on the part of the NDP that racism and its deleterious consequences was important to the NDP and by virtue of creating the OARS they were reaching out to marginalized groups by way of a response to their concerns regarding racial inequity in Ontario.

3.6 Organizational Tensions and Anti-Racism Claims-Making by the OARS Leadership:

The new head of OARS was Anne Marie Stewart. Stewart had been selected from over 250 applicants for the position. She had previously worked as an administrator in education, and ironically had been the part of the target of
protests from some of the community activists who later took government and civil service positions and whom she would eventually oversee as workers in the Secretariat. The internal job posting for the new ADM position called for someone who could

…design a proactive and systemic approach to combat racism in the community, public and private sectors, including developing a distinct approach to racism affecting aboriginal people… create a policy framework, design programs and initiatives to combat racism… [and] work with an external advisory committee achieving consensus in the identification of issues, strategies, and programs (Citizenship, 1991).

All of these duties identified in the job posting ultimately proved to be great challenges for the new ADM. According to Steen Lal, the Deputy Minister of Citizenship at the time Stewart was hired, Stewart was selected on the basis of her awareness of issues, bureaucratic experience, and potential as an individual well positioned to negotiate the bridge between government and community. As Stewart herself noted, however, not all stakeholders shared this view. As might be expected in this situation, she was seen by factions of the minority populations, especially by factions of black communities as “…not a real sister” (Stewart, 2005), and as such lacked the full support of the diverse communities she was trying to serve. In light of this observation, it should also be noted that to find the ideal individual for a position that involved overseeing newly recruited and intensely passionate individuals all representing, at least in part, their own political constituencies as well as acting as newly appointed civil servants was a
difficult task at best. Most people interviewed for this research agreed that Stewart was the best choice for the position\(^{18}\) and carried out her duties as well as anyone could be expected to under such strained and volatile circumstances.

Stewart took up her new post in late April of 1992, and she had a tumultuous start to her work. She not only faced the challenges of dealing with the fallout of a public riot in Toronto within one week of starting her new job, but she immediately found intense disagreement regarding the diagnostic framing of racism. The main issue of disagreement concerned exactly who the rightful targets of anti-racism intervention should be. Ontario’s Jewish population was most notable in the controversies surrounding this question. The place of Jews in anti-racism, however, was only the first of many challenges presented by the coalition politics reflected throughout the duration of the Secretariat. The challenges of coalition politics associated with bringing a diverse range of passionate individuals together in a collective effort are formidable at the best of times, and were perhaps exacerbated because the groups were identity-based rather than issue based. When she arrived, Stewart found a widespread sense of resentment concerning the involvement of the Jewish community. Later, especially through the deliberations of the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group, the issue

\(^{18}\) Other staff who eventually rounded out the complement of OARS managers included Nina Chahal who headed up Consultative Services Unit; Dan Dignazio managed field operations; Selwyn McSween ran the policy shop that also included Elizabeth Price, who also worked closely with a variety of Aboriginal groups; Stephano Harney headed up publications and public education; Kwasi Kafele worked in leadership resources and did a lot of work with youth; and Felicity Somerset worked on the demonstration projects. The two Deputy Ministers who oversaw the Secretariat were first Steen Lal, and later Naomi Alboim.
of Jewish involvement in anti-racism would again spark controversy as black and Jewish representatives in that working group engaged in debating a “hierarchy of pain” concerning which groups should rightfully take a place as the most legitimate targets of anti-racism state intervention. Stewart’s response, and her directive to the Working Group members did not pertain to the motivational or prognostic framing of the issues. Rather, she emphasized the fact that the work of the secretariat needed to be anti-oppression rather than more narrowly conceived. This meant that in the vision of the new Assistant Deputy Minister heading up the OARS there needed to be an appreciation of the multiple and overlapping forms of oppression invariably involved with racisms.¹⁹

There was tension within the new OARS. There were many bases of tension, but one fairly enduring base was the differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ workers and their preferred approaches. When the Anti-racism Secretariat replaced the Race Relations Directorate several civil servants were asked to make the transition to the Secretariat and to adopt its new focus on anti-racism. Many of these people had invested considerable time and energy in developing expertise in different theoretical and practical paradigms – namely multiculturalism and race relations. Their preferred understanding of racism differed significantly from the conception of racism associated with an anti-racism approach. As might be expected, this contributed to the ideological and practical rifts within the secretariat as the orientation and actions of some of the staff retained from the

¹⁹ The struggles of the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group are more fully discussed in chapter 5.
directorate served as sources of counter claims to anti-racism. This dichotomy of claims and counter claims regarding equity did not typically take the form of open debate within the ranks of the Secretariat staff. Instead, these fundamental differences manifested in behavioural claims of ‘resistors’ that most often took the form of foot dragging and weak support of the newer anti-racism direction of the newly formed secretariat. Further, the morale of some who were retained was low as a result of the Race Relations Directorate “housing minorities who were put there, and nobody expected them to accomplish much, they were just sort of supposed to keep quiet and keep their jobs” (Stewart, 2005). They were definitely not leaders or significant change agents. Galabuzi (2005) summarized the operations of the directorate in the following way:

…essentially what they did was they gave out a bit of money they acted as the government’s special troops at the point of attack... when people came to the government to complain or make their case, this was the unit they talked to so their responsibility was to hear them and respond in some way. And if the political masters needed a response crafted, then they would work one out for them, that was their role… they were not change agents

Stewart (2005) commented that the lack of compliance from this faction of OARS staff contributed significantly to rifts within the OARS, and although the OARS was supposedly “…a repository of expertise on racism…” (Galabuzi, 2005) many of the workers from the old Race Relations Directorate served as a significant barriers to anti-racism program implementation. Many of these workers who had been retained from the older Directorate were career civil
servants and were reluctant to invest significantly in the new anti-racism paradigm as it was seen as a risky career move and one that may ultimately lead to their obsolescence and eventual elimination from the public sector (Harney, 2001).

The tensions and conceptual differences did not only exist between the new and the old workers within the OARS. Within the ranks of self-identified supporters of anti-racism there were differences of opinion regarding the diagnostic and prognostic framing of racism. Some felt that attention should be paid to the topical controversies popularized through the media in order to send a symbolic message of the anti-racism orientation of the new government. Others felt that the work of the secretariat should proceed more quietly, out of the scrutinizing view of the public. Harney (2001) felt that one of the first ‘testing grounds’ for the effectiveness of the OARS to significantly represent the interests of the anti-racism movement came in the form of its response the controversy over the musical Showboat. The musical’s Toronto showing had generated considerable controversy and the OARS did not play the role of strong moral and vocal opponent as many of its newly recruited members would have liked. According to Harney (2001) this issue brought many problems inherent in state anti-racism to the fore. The Showboat and other controversies involving allegations of racism at the Royal Ontario Museum were the examples of the apparently muted response of OARS regarding public issues of racism in the Arts made evident to the public through the media, and they had symbolic significance
in that they raised early questions about the dedication of the NDP and the effectiveness of the OARS. It should be noted that there was debate within the ranks of the OARS workers over the questions of whether protesting Showboat was within the OARS mandate or not. Ultimately, the OARS did very little in terms of challenging the validity and legitimacy of Showboat. They did, however, provide some funding to a private citizen, Mr Henry, who was heavily involved in challenging the public presentation of Showboat.

3.7 The 1992 Yonge Street Riot:

Until May 1992 the expressed intent of the Ontario NDP to undertake anti-racism had not translated into significant anti-racism initiatives in the form of concrete policies and programs. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s there had been a number of “…difficult to explain…” police shootings in Ontario and elsewhere involving black male victims (Galabuzi, 2005). The now well known video footage of a group of white Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney King, while he lie on the ground, served as a sober reminder of how police in North America were seen to embody racism. Further, the acquittal of the police officers in the Rodney King case in California had recently been announced and had sparked protest and rioting in several major cities in the United States. The unrest also reverberated in Canada. There was a shared sense amongst Toronto’s black communities that the police force was not responding to interactions with members from the black communities appropriately.
On May 4, 1992, what came to be called the ‘Yonge Street Riot’ occurred following an anti-racism protest rally which began at the American Consulate in Toronto. The protest was organized by the Black Action Defense Committee around the acquittal of California police officers associated with the Rodney King case, and the shooting of 22 year old Raymond Constantine Lawrence from Toronto who was shot twice in the chest on Saturday May 2nd in the Bloor and Landsdowne area by Toronto police officer Robert Rice. According to Toronto Police they had been perusing Lawrence for some time, and claimed he turned around and made a threatening gesture and was then shot. Grace Edward Galabuzi, who participated in the political rallies on May 4th, commented that amongst the multi-racial protesters “…there was a rage that really couldn’t be contained and people just felt like being together and there was sort of a collective action that could not be satisfied by a speech and walking away. So we went down [to Yonge street] and came back up again, and on the way back up it got very violent…” (Galabuzi, 2005).

The riot was a key turning point for state anti-racism efforts in Ontario. Many members of Ontario’s mainstream were shocked and concerned, and couldn’t believe an event such as this could have happened in Canada. “…that forced the race issues not just in government but in terms of the mainstream discourse in terms of how we needed to address these issues before we became LA, and New York and Chicago in the 60’s, and Brixton in the early 80’s” (Galabuzi, 2005). “…on a psychic level, I think there was a call for action, right,
‘we can not afford to become like them’ and it wasn’t just in government” (Galabuzi, 2005).

The riot provided strong motivational framing for an acceleration of anti-racism policy work for the NDP, and in very short order things began to happen.

…government was forced to deal with the equity agenda more urgently than they had previously. I have to tell you, for months we had been asking for changes and specifically for a work plan on [police] use of force regulations...And we couldn’t get anything from them. And two days after, after the riot, they had a comprehensive work plan… a comprehensive work plan, which of course was uncanny (Galabuzi, 2005).

Galabuzi (2005) commented further that: “…it was sort of a ‘conversion on the road to Damascus’ type turn around in terms of how enthusiastically they responded after those events… the risk factor went up substantially with regards to the implications of not taking action on these issues.” The symbolism of the riot and the intensity of the public concern were unprecedented, especially in the Greater Toronto Area. “I don’t think it ever became hegemonic, but I think at the moment, it’s a moment thing, at the moment at which the action on that file became compelling for the government and at least for the people of Southern Ontario. (Galabuzi, 2005).

The actual activities surrounding the political protest and riot may be read as a form of claims-making. During the May 4th protest that preceded the riot, a large crowd had gathered at Queen’s park. At one point the crowd chanted: “No justice, no peace!” There were speeches from leaders of the black communities
when Dudley Laws, Dari Meade, Ed Clarke, and others spoke out identifying the frustration and anger of blacks and other minorities in Toronto as the motivation behind the protest.

More anti-racism rallies took place on May 7th despite politicians’ appeals to not hold rallies (Metro council voted 31 - 1 on May 6th to ask the protest organizers to postpone the rally)… in part the concern revolved around police information which indicated the rally would be disrupted by skin heads and neo-Nazis, which was a relatively common occurrence at anti-racism rallies in Southern Ontario. Indeed, the tensions and animosities between white supremacist groups and supporters of anti-racism was reflective of a claims – counter claims process that formed one of the sub-plots of the anti-racism story in Ontario. Police promised to tighten control and surveillance of protests and protesters, and sent out the Public Order Unit which had been specially trained in crowd control, complete with riot gear, for the 1988 Economic Summit of World Leaders held in Toronto. Even though these events reflected the general dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Ontario concerning racial inequality, “…in the wake of all of the nasty and horrible stuff, there was this air of hope and collective action…” (Galabuzi, 2005).

The response on the part of community groups was, to use ‘strategic’ claims in combination with very generalized ‘problem solving’ claims – that is they both made demands and presented broad schema in the form of solutions (Montpetit, 2004). There were particular demands being made of the state and
several groups made suggestions for how the problems of racism might usefully be addressed. For instance, the Black Action Defense Committee outlined a number of ‘demands’ following the riot, including:

The implementation of legislation that makes racism a criminal offence; the establishment of a commission to investigate alleged racism in the police force; ensuring the province’s special investigations unit, which investigates police shootings, is accountable to the community; appealing the acquittal of Peel Region police officers in the Wade Lawson murder trial; taking steps to stop police shootings and train police in alternative ways of arresting suspects; creating programs to meet needs of black youth focusing on education, training, employment, housing and health issues (cited by Priest, 1991).

Several high ranking officials echoed some of the sentiment expressed by the Black Action Defense Committee following the riot. On May 12th, for example, the chief commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Max Yalden, called on the Ontario government to uproot racism from the education system, the labor market, police and court systems. Also on May 12th, Jean Chretien commented in the House of Commons criticizing the lack of federal policies for youth employment in Toronto. Chretien had met with black leaders and youth in Toronto a day earlier, and alleged that 10,000 inner-city youth had ‘lost hope’. Chretien also cited refugee support, infrastructure, law enforcement, housing and drugs as key areas in need of address. In terms of specific prognostic framing of the problems, however, these public statements by high ranking individuals served more as a statement of their support rather than a
comprehensive plan for how to respond to racism in Ontario society. They should be read, then, as very general diagnostic claims, strong motivational statements endorsing some sort of action, but not as useful prognostic claims.

Some of the cleavages within and between the black communities became apparent, or more apparent, in the aftermath of the riots. Specific factions identified other factions as problematic and as having contributed to the violence. Claims and counter-claims were being made concerning how different factions had contributed to the violence or had not responded to the violence appropriately. Some were disassociating themselves from the violence, others were blaming professional and high profile athletes for not taking an active leadership role disclaiming the violence, and others were looking to the churches to do more in terms of offering leadership.

In contrast to the fragmentation experienced at the community level, in government the riot acted as the catalyst that coalesced anti-racism supporters and accelerated the anti-racism agenda. It resulted in a fairly widespread consensus that something had to be done very quickly to address the potential for more violence and the sentiment that lay behind that threat. The riot served to heighten awareness across the province about the level and intensity of discontent, and potential social volatility, associated with the perceived unacceptable level of racism in Ontario. For a period of about 24 months this heightened awareness garnered the anti-racism agenda the prioritization it needed to make a number of significant advancements.
3.8 Conclusions:

This chapter presented an analysis of the advancement and acceleration of state anti-racism in Ontario, and addressed the research question: “Why do states undertake anti-racism initiatives?” The advancement of state anti-racism in Ontario was accounted for in terms of traditional connections and ideological congruencies between the Ontario NDP and ethno-racial communities, and the framing of strategic events in the form of the Yonge Street riot of 1992. In this sense media coverage and subsequent framing of The Yonge Street riot may be seen as ‘landmark narrative’ (Best, 2008). Best (2008, p 339) described such landmark narratives as “A typifying example that dominates news coverage of a troubling condition, shaping the terms in which the problem is covered and how the news audience understands the problem.”

The NDP government was agreeable to implementing anti-racism measures, but at the beginning of its tenure lacked the legitimate voice and vision required to frame the problems and solutions to racisms. The strength of the motivational framing of racism exemplified through the riot provided the stimulus for the advancement of state anti-racism initiatives. Put simply, the Ontario state undertook anti-racism initiatives because it was run by a government that was committed to that cause, and had established relationships with agents who provided valid diagnoses of the nature of the problem, and who suggested appropriate responses to racism in the form of policies and programs intended to address racism. Further, and this point is paramount, the Ontario state intensified
and accelerated its adoption of anti-racism measures immediately following the Yonge Street riot, which compounded the motivational framing of the problems of racism in Ontario.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE STEPHEN LEWIS INQUIRY AND REPORT: CATALOGUING PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES:

4.1 Introduction:

Chapters four through seven explore four separate moments in the negotiation of state anti-racisms in Ontario. Each chapter addresses the broad research question: “What determines the nature of state anti-racism initiatives?”, and the analyses and conclusions in each chapter contribute to answering the research question in unique ways. This chapter deals with the social problems work surrounding the Lewis Inquiry and Report, which constituted the state’s immediate anti-racism based response to the Yonge Street riot. The Inquiry and Report represent an important moment in state anti-racism in Ontario for three reasons. First, the document stands as one of the most comprehensive collections of diagnostic and prognostic framing of racisms in Ontario government and the OPS, and it was intended to serve as a work plan for subsequent state anti-racism initiatives.

Second, the Inquiry brought representatives from victim communities into close contact with state-appointed agents for the express purpose of cataloguing victims’ views regarding the nature of, and appropriate responses to, racisms in Ontario. From the view of most victim communities, the Inquiry and subsequent Report were conduits for key elements of their vision of anti-racism to be communicated to people in decision making positions within government and the
Third, the document is important because an unusually high number of its recommendations were implemented. A committee was established and met regularly to monitor the progress of the implementation of recommendations from the Inquiry. This sets the document apart from many such government reports that are often not translated into action.

In this chapter analytical attention is paid to the diagnostic and prognostic framing strategies used to typify racisms in the social problems work of the Inquiry and Report. The interpretation of the riot as a clarion call to government action provided the requisite motivational framing for the state to intensify activity on the anti-racism front, especially in the area of policing. To complete their plan for anti-racism interventions the government required a set of concrete responses based on valid diagnoses of the problems of racism in a number of different sectors of government and the OPS. The mechanism of the Lewis Inquiry and Report served to translate the views of victims into a package of claims regarding the nature of racism in Ontario and appropriate responses to those racisms. The Report, then, may be read as a package of claims about the nature, location, consequences, and appropriate responses to racism. I argue that the Report contributed significantly to the perceived ranking of victim communities by virtue of the special attention paid to ‘anti-black’ racism, and the

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20 There were several follow-up measures applied to the Stephen Lewis Report on Race Relations in Ontario to monitor the implementation of its recommendations.
relative absence of Aboriginal voices represented in the Report. I also argue that many state anti-racism initiatives undertaken by the Rae administration were determined through this process of consultation with stakeholders.

The conclusions from this chapter have theoretical significance in two main areas. First, the reinforcement of the notion of a hierarchy of victim communities, with black communities at the ‘top’, is relevant to theoretical debates and discussions regarding inter-group coalition politics implicit in collective and state anti-racism projects in multi-racial societies.

Second, the central role played by community groups through their social problems work in the Inquiry and Report speaks to the discrepancy between different theoretical explanations for how state anti-racism initiatives are determined. Bonnett (2000a) highlighted the role of partisanship and national political culture in the determination of state anti-racism initiatives. Solomos and Ball (1990), and Solomos and Back (1995), stressed the role of contextual factors in the determination of state anti-racism initiatives. The analysis undertaken in this thesis refines and extends these explanations by considering them in light of a constructionist perspective on the social problems work surrounding the Inquiry.

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21 The diagnostic framing of racism as it affected Aboriginal people in Ontario tended to focus on one of five main problem areas: i) identifying and responding to expressions of interpersonal racisms directed towards Aboriginal individuals; ii) systemic and overt racism in educational institutions; iii) Criticisms of the unique rights of Aboriginal people, especially hunting and fishing rights; iv) Aboriginal – non-Aboriginal conflicts regarding land claims; v) sovereign rights assertions and harassment from the Klu Klux Klan and Aryan Nations groups.

22 After the Report was issued consultation with representatives from ethno-racial minority communities continued through the Stephen Lewis Report Coordination Committee, which met intensively to ensure the timely implementation of Report recommendations and ensure continuation of minority input.
and Report. A constructionist approach to state anti-racism accounts for how racism, and associated anti-racist responses, were framed, communicated, and responded to by the state. This provides a fuller and more detailed account of the determination of state anti-racisms than the previously cited theoretical explanations.

The main sources of data for this chapter include the Lewis Report on Race Relations in Ontario and related documents found in Provincial Archives of Ontario including personal communications between individuals involved with the Inquiry and Report. A large portion of this data dealt with the implementation of Lewis Report recommendations. Other sources of data were transcriptions from interviews with people who spoke of the process and significance of the Inquiry and Report. These included two key individuals who were closely involved with assisting Lewis in the process of the Inquiry, and the transcript from an interview with Stephen Lewis.23

4.2 The General Context and Process of the Lewis Inquiry and Report:

Immediately following the Yonge Street riot, the government’s anti-racism orientated response was swift. Bob Rae commandeered Stephen Lewis, who had previously led the provincial NDP, to conduct “…very short term very targeted consultations to reach out and hear the voices of the various groups and

23 The general interview schedule was modified for the interview with Stephen Lewis to accentuate his interpretation of events surrounding the Inquiry and Report. For a list of interview questions that guided this interview see appendix C.
then write a very action oriented report” (Galabuzi, 2005). Lewis was assisted by several people including individuals from the black communities who were able to make the necessary community contacts required to facilitate such an intense inquiry, and within the span of about a month the Lewis Report was submitted to Bob Rae citing 24 key recommendations.

Lewis met with a wide array of individuals and groups, all of whom provided him with diagnostic, and in most cases, prognostic frames of reference concerning racisms in Ontario. The insistence of community stakeholders to ‘make the inquiry count’ and actually affect change by concretizing the plan for action was reflected in the protracted time frame of the Inquiry. In the final Report, the prognostic framing was significantly bolstered by the inclusion of time-lines which were attached to many recommendations. Time lines also served to impart a sense of seriousness and appreciation on the part of the state to the urgency with which these issues needed to be dealt. “Stephen Lewis was trying to reflect the urgency within the communities, and also defray the concern that this was going to be another report that was going to be thrown on the shelf” (Galabuzi, 2005). “It was a period of greatly hurried work, there was a real sense of the imperative to act” (Lewis, 2008).

4.3 The ‘Anti-Black Racism’ Focus of the Lewis Inquiry and Report:

The Report weighed in on the issue of who was most deserving of state
anti-racism attention. Whereas there were conscious attempts to equally distribute resources across victim-communities in other areas of state anti-racism programming, the Lewis Inquiry and Report emphasized the plight of black communities in Ontario and thereby reinforced the notion of a hierarchy of victimization. Indeed, this was the first substantive point Lewis made in the report when he wrote:

First, what we are dealing with, at root, and fundamentally, is anti-Black racism. While it is obviously true that every visible minority community experiences indignities and wounds of systemic discrimination throughout Southern Ontario, it is the Black community which is the focus. It is Blacks who are being shot, it is Black youth that is unemployed in excessive numbers, it is Black students who are being inappropriately streamed in schools, it is Black kids who are disproportionately dropping-out, it is housing in communities with large concentrations of Black residents where the sense of vulnerability and disadvantage is most acute, it is Black employees, professional and non-professional, on whom the doors of upward equity slam shut. Just as the soothing balm of ‘multiculturalism’ cannot mask racism, so racism cannot mask its primary targets (Lewis, 1992).

The anti-black racism focus reflected what Lewis saw as the reality of racial oppression in Ontario society. “For so many years they were on the outside, they were marginal, my overwhelming sense, before the inquiry, but this was significantly reinforced during the inquiry, was that this was the epicentre, this had to have attention” (Lewis, 2008). The anti-black racism focus also reflected
the fact that black communities had been most closely associated with the public protests that preceded the Yonge Street riot.

In the Report, Lewis acknowledged the leading role Black activists played in pushing an anti-racism agenda forward when he quoted an anonymous member of the Urban Alliance of Race Relations who said: “The Blacks are out front, and we’re all lined up behind.” Interestingly, an anonymous commentator offered that within a few short years after the Yonge Street riot and the Lewis Inquiry, it became obvious that “This was another case of the blacks kicking the door down, and everybody else trampling over our backs to get ahead” (2005). This quotation captures some of the resentment and animosity regarding the distribution of resources through the anti-racism project sponsored by the NDP. During the Inquiry, however, Lewis (2008) reported that there was no apparent animosity between groups and that he “…felt the groups involved realized who was most negatively affected by racism. And each knew their place, and none could truthfully or legitimately claim to be alongside black communities in terms of racial oppression.” “I think the other groups realized that the Inquiry was more about black people’s concerns than theirs. You know, the Japanese, and the South Asian groups, you know they were doing alright compared to Blacks” (Lewis, 2008).

There was little mention of Aboriginal people in the Lewis Report. “…the absence of Aboriginal Peoples in this report is glaring. But in truth, their
representatives did not come forward, and I firmly believe that it’s because there’s a process in place in Ontario to negotiate with First Nations. Indeed, I accepted this assignment on that assumption” (Lewis, 1992, p 36). “If the task had been to account for all the many ways Aboriginals experienced racism, historically and currently, and then to make suggestions for how to deal with that, well… it would have been far too ambitious a task to take on” (Lewis 2008).

4.4 Framing Racism in the Lewis Inquiry and Report:

A sense of frustration and impatience characterized most of the diagnostic framing of racisms in the Lewis Inquiry. This typified both the claims forwarded from the communities to Lewis, as well as those offered by Lewis to Premiere Bob Rae in the Report. The process of formulating and communicating claims regarding the nature of racisms was very familiar to the community representatives consulted through the Inquiry, so their task had more to do with deciding where to place emphasis and how to arrange and communicate their claims rather than deliberating over the nature of the problems. “It [racism] was something that everybody just knew, that everybody from minority communities just lived with on a day in - day out basis. So it was easy to pass this information on to Stephen Lewis when the Inquiry came about” (Grant, 2005).

From the perspective of minority communities that made submissions to Lewis, there were many reliable pre-existing diagnostic frames produced through
earlier investigations and inquiries. This meant that “…another tortured examination of the obvious wouldn’t wash” with minority communities (Lewis, 1992, p 14). This rendered much of the Lewis Inquiry an exercise in re-articulation or re-iteration of previously identified problems rather than an exercise involving the generation of new perspectives on racism. In some cases this involved pointing Lewis to earlier documents, such as the Clare Lewis Report on Race Relations and Policing that had accurately diagnosed problems, but had not been fully implemented. Because this highlighted the incomplete implementation of recommendations from previous investigations, it contributed significantly to the sense that Lewis’ recommendations needed to be acted on.

There were many different areas identified through the Lewis Report that required anti-racism interventions. These included policing and criminal justice, education, employment, government and the OPS, and community development. The following sections address the claims making activities associated with the Lewis Inquiry and Report in relation to each of these areas.

4.4.1 Criminal Justice:

The perception of racism in policing was a key precipitation factor to the Yonge Street riot, and a major pillar of the diagnostic framing of racism in the Inquiry. In this area Lewis (2008) reported a direct transmission of community concerns. As the author of the report he did not alter the framing of racism
communicated to him by community consultants. Lewis (1992, p 3) referenced “The eight shootings [of black men] over the last four years” as stark evidence of discriminatory police behaviour. In terms of claims from the community, anecdotal as well as statistical evidence was forwarded, and specific manifestations of racism in policing were articulated including differential surveillance rates and patterns. Lewis found a very different framing of the issues on the part of Metro police representatives he interviewed for the Inquiry. The police were reluctant to admit guilt in the form of acknowledging racism in policing cultures or the existence of racial profiling strategies. The issues were not framed as examples of racism by police authorities, and Lewis (1992, p4) reported being frustrated by the adversarial nature and attitude of Metro Police leadership, and how they were “…determined not to give ground to what they regard as clear patterns of criminality”. For Toronto Police, the shootings and differential contact rates were indicative of differential patterns of criminality, not racist police officers or racist police culture. Police were neither intentionally targeting nor unfairly treating any particular segment of the population, but by virtue of carrying out their duties in a race blind manner they had more encounters.

24 In other areas of the Report, Lewis (2008) reported modifying or adding to the framing strategies offered by community consultants. The suggestion of a cabinet committee on anti-racism discussed in section 4.4.3, was contrived by Lewis as a prognostic response stemming from the diagnostic framing from communities that problematized a lack of an ongoing mechanism for communication with decision makers. Another part of the Report where Lewis did not translate the prognostic framing precisely was in relation to ‘community development’. Here Lewis (2008) reported that his communication was “…more impressionistic than anything else, their concerns were expresses diffusely and were largely outside the central themes of the Inquiry”.  

25 The racial profiling practices of Toronto Metro Police have remained a hotly contested topic since the time of the Lewis Inquiry. Interestingly, there was a recent reversal of position when Toronto chief of Police Bill Blair admitted in 2009, after years of formal denials, that the Toronto Police indeed have and continue to use racial profiling strategies.
with individuals from minority communities. This specific counter claim by Police echoed what they had been saying more broadly through the media, so from their perspective there was no admission of responsibility for systemic racism.

The construction of the diagnostic framing of racism in policing indicted and villainized both individual actors within the system, as well as the more general organizational cultures in various areas of criminal justice. For example, the practice of conducting internal investigations, rather than having investigations conducted by outsiders, was seen as sacrificing the impartiality of investigations into cases of alleged police wrongdoing. Community claims makers argued that until the process of investigating the activities of police officers, especially allegations of discriminatory conduct, was removed from individuals who, by virtue of their placement in the criminal justice system, could not be impartial justice would remain elusive and the systemically racist elements of the system could remain intact. Lewis (1992, p 7) endorsed what he called the “...logic of civilian control...” in this area, advocating for power sharing in the process of monitoring police action”.

The diagnostic framing of racism in criminal justice by minoritized individuals involved several claims making strategies. These included the articulation of anecdotal accounts of inappropriate surveillance, arrest, questioning, and detention of members of victim communities. Statistical over-representation in custodial facilities was frequently invoked to bolster diagnostic
framing. The effects of differential and racist practices on the part of the criminal justice system were emphasized several ways including through the very powerful and moving testimony of mothers, a tactic which played on the cultural values of parents’ concern for children. The image of a mother worrying about whether or not her son would return at night or perhaps come to some harm was a very moving and powerful way to communicate some of the psychological strife associated with racism.

Other areas of concern in criminal justice articulated through diagnostic framing of racism included the need for a general review of the criminal justice system with an eye to uncovering systemic racism therein; much stronger regulations concerning use of force; significant changes to how audits, complaints and special investigations were handled; changing the process for monitoring and regulating police activity in general; and strengthening anti-racism initiatives in the areas of training and governance - especially regarding the governance of the process of making complaints against the police and other state actors in the criminal justice system. Regarding the problematization of the Special Investigations Unit, which had only been established 22 months earlier in part to conduct criminal investigations into allegations of police wrongdoing, Lewis (1992, p 9) noted: “Many members of minority communities simply do not believe that the reliance on ex-police officers or the OPP to do investigations of other police officers will work”. These and other elements of prognostic framing advocated protective measures intended to shield victims from systemic racism.
There was also a strong case made for legitimacy of some of the diagnostic and prognostic work that had been done previously in the criminal justice system but had not been fully implemented. For example, the report compiled by Claire Lewis on the problems of racial inequality in the justice system that had been completed in 1989 was referred to frequently throughout the Lewis Inquiry. This Report was also mentioned frequently during the interviews. Claims makers often expressed frustration that the diagnostic and prognostic elements of that Inquiry had not resulted in more change to the typical practices of the system. Most community input that commented on the significance of the Claire Lewis Report endorsed it as a valid diagnostic and prognostic tool in addressing racisms, however, most also lamented the fact that for the most part the Claire Lewis Report had affected little real change. The main difference cited between 1989 and 1992 was that the political will to act on Inquiry recommendations was much weaker in 1989, largely because of the different government and the effects of the motivational framing of racism the riot afforded. Even though the Claire Lewis Report was commissioned by the previous Liberal government, it was seen as an accurate and useful measure of the problems of racism in the justice system, and recent enough to still be valid.

Community claims makers also articulated the need for changes to how police were trained and monitored. In the area of training, the problem was seen as inadequate sensitization to the existence of systemic racism in policing culture and more generally in Ontario society. To ask police to include this sort of self-
indictment in how they trained their new recruits was contentious, especially
given the general lack of admission of problems within forces and services.
Further, there was clear articulation that the police training regarding use of force
needed to change. This most persuasive evidence supporting this diagnostic and
prognostic claim were the series of “difficult to explain police shootings” that had
occurred in Toronto in the 1980’s and early 1990’s (Galabuzi, 2005). This
component of claims making was a direct response to the police shootings. The
hope for practical change through altering training practices, however, was
tempered by the realization of the woefully inadequate nature of much anti-racism
training typically undertaken at the time. Here Lewis reiterated a claim forwarded
by an Inquiry informant that the current state of training was inadequate and
unfair to police in general and new recruits in particular. Lewis’ translation of
these very serious diagnostic allegations tempered them somewhat when he noted
that police were simply not getting the appropriate training that might equip them
to do their work. The villianization implied in the indictment of the police as
literally embodying systemic racism was downgraded by Lewis when he offered
the following comments regarding the expanding diversity of Ontario society: “…
we don’t prepare our police for dealing with it.” (Lewis, 1992, p 13). This
suggested that police as individuals could not be held fully accountable for
systemically racist practices, and that the degree of systemic racism may be
reduced through intensified and modified training procedures. “…[I] was assured,
repetitively and with feeling, by people deeply involved, that training programs
are still grossly deficient in their multicultural and anti-racism components” (Lewis, 1992, p 12). Based on criticisms from community advocates Lewis (1992, p 12) concluded that ‘race relation’ issues in general were being treated in a “…capricious, highly legalistic, episodic fashion with police training programs of Ontario.” This ‘bracketed’ approach to educating police about race relations and anti-racism was in keeping with their general denial of the existence of systemic racism within their ranks. Lewis’(1992, p 12) criticism of police training also invoked the observations of the earlier Clare Lewis Task Force which was “…was so concerned about the state of training that it suggested a moratorium on existing training practices…”.

The police were not the lone villains in the diagnostic framing of racism in the criminal justice system. Other players from the justice system indicted in the diagnostic framing of racism included judges, lawyers, custodial and facility workers, probation and parole workers, but none were as vehemently or consistently criticized as the police.

The general governance practices criticized through the diagnostic framing concerned the powers granted to the office of the police complaints commissioner and the process of how reviews and audits were conducted within the justice system. There was a widespread concern that the processes of monitoring be democratized by the fuller inclusion of community representatives in the process of regulation. Lewis (1992, p 6) endorsed the role of audits as a “…potentially powerful tool by which to identify unacceptable practices, monitor management
performance and introduce important improvements in race relations policies.”
At the same time he noted the limitations of this response and that he had heard from the people doing it that there was “…not yet a fully developed or adequate methodology to deal with race relations” (Lewis, 1992, p 6). The prognostic prescription concerning the composition of boards of inquiry and other governing and regulatory bodies clearly located minoritized individuals as key players. Lewis (1992, p 6) emphatically stated: “Gone are the days when racial minority communities can be excluded from such processes”.

4.4.2 Education:

Racism in education had been a long standing concern of community anti-racism activists in Ontario. Indeed, many of the recruits from the anti-racism movement who had recently taken up positions in the government and civil service had previous experience in anti-racism work within the education system and as protesters advocating for equity related changes in the education system. Inappropriate streaming of minority students, high leaving rates, lower relative rates of high school completion, lack of role models in teaching and administrative positions, inequities accessing post-secondary programs, and inappropriate and non-representative curricula had all been identified as problems in need of revision. The negative cumulative effects of racism were highlighted in the diagnostic framing strategies of claims makers, and the multiple and
overlapping forms of oppression were also acknowledged. As a result of this diagnostic framing, the subsequent prognostic framing identified strategies to address the problems that were identified within the education system. For instance, the response to the problem of the under-representation of minority persons in teaching and administrative positions was to specifically direct the Minister of Education to be personally responsible for overseeing the implementation of employment equity principles in the school system. Also, the Report directed the Minister of Education to use the ADM of Education to ensure that multicultural and anti-racism education policies were implemented in all Ontario school boards. The hope behind this was that if the children in the Ontario Public School System were exposed to this sort of educational experiences it would increase appreciation of cultural differences and reduce the incidence of racism in the future.

The Report also responded to a long standing concern that minoritized children were inappropriately streamed in the school system effectively limiting their levels of success within and beyond the school system. On the curricular front the Report specifically identified Zanana Akande, previously an educational administrator, to continue with work she had already been undertaking that involved revising curricula to better reflect the diversity within Ontario society. Interestingly, these curricular revisions were targeting all levels of public schooling. Akande (2005) reported that although the Lewis Report clearly articulated this particular prognostic response, and even though ample materials
were distributed to schools in Toronto, upon visiting schools she frequently found the materials underutilized. This underscores a particularly confounding aspect of implementing anti-racism in educational contexts: the discrepancy between having access to anti-racism resources and actually using them effectively to address anti-racism needs within schools. There were no dates for the implementation of these recommendations as there were with most other recommendations the Report made. Whether the underutilization of anti-racism resources in schools was a form of resistance to anti-racism by school employees or a reflection of employees being too busy to incorporate such material is unclear. Both possibilities suggest a relatively low prioritization of anti-racism.

An anonymous OARS worker summarized the resistance within the school system:

...generally schools are not very receptive to that stuff, and they’ll say they were busy and stretched and whatever, and there are some teachers who want to make a difference, but generally as a system, as a structure, I don’t think they’re very different from other systems and structures where to get them to actually change in a fundamental way is a huge challenge (2005).

So the Report was advocating changes to what was taught in schools, how students were streamed, how teaching was conducted, how teachers and administrators were hired and promoted, as well as changes to the policy framework governing Ontario’s school boards. To the extent that these anti-racism measures were intended to address racisms in the school system they were quite sweeping, presumably involving enough flexibility and responsiveness to
particular problems through the multicultural and anti-racism policies that they could respond to emerging and ongoing manifestations of racism in an effective manner provided they were actually implemented.

4.4.3 Government and the Ontario Public Service:

The Report made some recommendations regarding the recently created OARS, principally that it be expanded and given a similar status as the Women’s Directorate. It was reasoned that such institutional entrenchment would strengthen the Secretariat and make its longevity more likely. “…it would have capacity to be a lens through which all policy in government would filter, the same way as the Ontario Women’s Secretariat was being used, and so all policy would move through it for comment and suggestions on how to bring it in line with the principles of anti-racism” (Galabuzi, 2005). This never came to fruition.

Another significant recommendation was for a cabinet committee on anti-racism. The lack of anti-racism advocacy at higher levels of government was identified as a problem, and representation at this level was seen as necessary to support initiatives in specific sectors. A committee was seen as the preferred structure for such representation.

They were absolutely desperate for a mechanism that might institutionalize the relations between themselves and government, they had been locked out for so long, and they realized that this was an important pillar of the anti-racism piece, but they did not know what it should look like. I knew
that the connection had to be on the political side, it had to get at the people who were making political decisions on an ongoing basis. (Lewis, 2008).

Lewis felt that it was important that the agendas for the committee be set, at least in part, by the community representatives participating in them rather than by members of cabinet. This would impart a sense of empowerment and control to the community participants. “…if we could make it work, it would be a fascinating experiment in democratic participation and accountability” (Lewis, 1992, p 33). The job of the cabinet committee on anti-racism “…would be to filter policy directly related to anti-racism directly up into cabinet, but also to lend a lens to all the policy making that was happening at the time” (Galabuzi, 2005). As Micheal Mendhelsson, (2005) commented “this was really no one’s issue in Cabinet, it didn’t really have anyone to carry the issue at that level”.

4.4.4 Employment: Access to Trades and Professions:

The longstanding issue of the limitations to accessing professional and trade jobs based on foreign academic credentials and professional experience was also part of the diagnostic and prognostic framing of racism in the Lewis Report. These issues were so commonly known they often were discussed as a cliché, especially regarding the taxi industry in Toronto. The stereotype of over-educated under-employed men driving cabs in the Greater Toronto area was only one form of racism articulated. The task force report on this issue from 1989 was cited
frequently as defining the parameters of the problem, and recommendations were to implement the recommendations from that report more fully. So, there was not a redefinition of the problem and appropriate solutions, rather a reiteration of earlier social problems work regarding these issues. What is significant in the Lewis Inquiry and Report was how the problem of limited access to professions and trades was linked with other manifestations of racism. The problem of Canada’s under use of foreign trained professionals was linked to the experience of racism more generally, and it was cited as one in a series of inter-connected negative experiences with discrimination that marked the experiences of many migrants now living and working in Ontario. The way to address this, as articulated through the prognostic framing of responses, was again to return to the valid diagnoses of earlier social problems work, in this case another 1989 Access to Trades and Professions Report. “It’s painful to hear the endless stories of people who have excellent trade or professional skills driving taxi part-time. You bump into them; I bump into them; sometimes there is a lot of hyperbole, but the basic proposition is real” (Lewis, 1992, p 26).

Lewis cited some work being done in the Community College system to assess prior learning and working experiences as a possible model for other facets of the education system to follow. The beneficiaries of these anti-racism strategies were seen to be the entire society, increased productivity, reductions in the problems associated with labor shortages in certain professions (although during the depressed economic times of the early 1990’s the demand for labour
was not as acute as in stronger economic times). Interestingly, the positive spin
off effects of fuller and more appropriate employment for foreign trained
professionals and trades-people was emphasized in the claims making strategies
of the victim communities. The fact that there would be less bitterness and
resentment towards Canadian society and employers was noted as a positive
benefit of anti-racism changes in this area.

4.4.5 Employment Equity:

Besides the OARS, provincial employment equity legislation constituted
the other key component of the NDP’s equity agenda. At the time of the Lewis
Inquiry in 1992, provincial employment equity legislation had not been passed,
but it was eagerly anticipated and supported by anti-racism advocates. “…
employment equity is a kind of cause celebre for visible minority communities
everywhere. They see it as the consummate affirmation of opportunity and
access” (Lewis, 1992, p 17). There was, however, considerable suspicion that the
provincial legislation would not be fully implemented in the OPS. This concern
was expressed in particular by Black civil servants who harboured “…huge
scepticism about the resolve of the bureaucratic leadership of the OPS to
implement employment equity” Lewis (1992, p 18). “…to be blunt, there’s a real
crisis of faith” (Lewis, 1992, p 18). The main fear was that employment equity
would have similar disappointing outcomes as the federal policy. In response to
these aspects of diagnostic framing that located foot dragging and less than full support in the leadership of the bureaucracy, Lewis (1992, p 18) said: “I’d go so far as to suggest that once the legislation is introduced, you might consider gathering the entire Deputy Minister cadre together, and make it clear that the days of inertia are over”.

4.4.6 Community Development:

The role of sustainable community development as a means to counter the deleterious effects of racial inequality had been touted by anti-racism and other advocates prior to the 1990’s. So, as with other areas identified as needing anti-racism intervention, diagnostic framing in this area was a reiteration of earlier problematizations rather than completely new constructions specifically devised for the Inquiry and Report. This was the area of the Report that Lewis (2008) referred to as “…impressionistic…” because of the vague and ambiguous nature of prognostic framing associated with it. Significantly, the role of community development was constructed as closely tied to other areas of anti-racism change. The role of healthy vibrant communities where viable economic opportunities and socio-political stability would contribute to the increase in living standards for all residents was clearly acknowledged. The obligation on the part of the state in the process of fostering increased and sustainable community development was outlined in general terms, but specific strategies were not brought forward.
4.5 Conclusions:

When the impact of the social problems work surrounding the Lewis Inquiry and Report on state anti-racism initiatives is considered, it becomes clear that the existing theoretical explanations of the determination of state anti-racism interventions are in need of revision and specification. The Lewis Inquiry and Report are not adequately interpreted as partisan efforts reflecting a uniquely NDP approach to anti-racism, nor is it adequate to see the Inquiry and Report as mechanisms for taking the various contextual factors into account in the crafting of a response to racisms in Ontario. Although there is validity in both these explanations, they fall short of accounting for the central role played by claims makers involved with the Inquiry, and the more general role of the Report itself as a foundational document defining the nature of racism and appropriate responses. The analysis conducted in this chapter suggests that state anti-racism initiatives were determined largely by the particular ways the social problem of racism and appropriate responses to it were constructed and articulated through the claims making activities of various players influencing the process of the Inquiry and subsequent Report. In addition, the Inquiry and Report contributed significantly to the perception of a ranked ordering of legitimate victim communities. As Lewis (1992, p 3) put it, “[racism] violates certain minority communities more than others”. The Report also emphasized the inter-related nature of different manifestations of racism and the need for similarly inter-related pro-active as well as re-active responses.
The report’s validity stemmed from several factors. First, the fact that it immediately followed the riot was significant – it benefited from heightened public concern for, and state receptivity to, practical anti-racism measures. Second, the fact that consultations were guided by legitimate representatives from minoritized communities lent support the validity of the findings and recommendations. As the contacts were chosen largely by the individuals helping Lewis make community connections, the allegations that Lewis had listened to the wrong people or hadn’t talked with the right people were minimized. Finally, the mandate of the Inquiry, specifically that it be an action oriented document, supported the whole process in that participants had the sense that this document was going to have significant impact on what the government and civil service were going to do to address racisms in Ontario. The Report conveyed the sense that integrated changes were necessary on a number of fronts, and sporadic or partial changes would fall short of what was needed to address racism. So, not only did the Report legitimize the notion that racism was largely systemic in Ontario, it went further by noting that systemic forms of racism in particular areas of Ontario society negatively affected and supported manifestations of racisms in other sectors. This diagnostic framing required a prognostic framing that was similarly integrated and multi-faceted, and the sense of the widespread and deeply entrenched nature of racism in Ontario loomed large in the Report. This contradicts Cohen’s (1992) assertion that to talk about practical anti-racism necessarily requires a form of ‘reductionism’ whereby the complexity and scale of
racism are simplified. Although there may have been a measure of reductionism in the diagnostic and prognostic claims making of community representatives, their accounts remained complex and based on intimate experiences and careful reflection. They often included references to not only the objective manifestations of racism; but personal, subjective, psychic, and emotional dimensions also.

One individual interviewed for this research, who wished to remain anonymous regarding this observation, commented on the irony of the Lewis Report. She marvelled at how a political party, led by a white man, who appointed another white man to conduct an inquiry on ‘race relations’ in the wake of a public disturbance that was actually not a ‘race riot’ could serve as the catalyst for so much state anti-racism activity. Both Bob Rae and Stephen Lewis were largely accepted as legitimate carriers of their portion of the anti-racism project, indeed necessary to give the effort the legitimacy it required in political circles. Several interviewees also commented on the role of fear in accelerating anti-racism in the wake of the riot. There was general empathy combined with fear, not anger at the protesters or denial of minorities’ claims to racial victimization.

The significance of the Lewis Inquiry and subsequent Report as key moments in the history of state anti-racism in Ontario can not be overstated. In practical terms they answered the very difficult question of what should be done at a critical time in the NDP reign, a time when they were in desperate need of such answers. The high priority given to the Report’s recommendations is evident in the minutes of meetings from the committee struck to oversee its
implementation, which met weekly and closely monitored the implementation of the Report’s recommendations.

Although it sparked considerable political action within government and the OPS (perhaps reaction is a more appropriate descriptor) there is debate over how the report was interpreted in the mainstream. “I think there was a lot of resistance to the fact that Lewis was really talking about us, you know, us white people” (Tator, 2005). Tator went on to suggest that regardless of the dearth of public discourses drawing linkages between structural forms of racism and the riot, many members of the majority interpreted the riot and the subsequent Lewis Report and systemic racism they pointed to as unrelated to themselves personally. Most members of the majority tended to interpret the riot as “simply a brief moment of youth, mixed race youth, and they were simply out of control and… I think that people never collectively accepted the fact that racism was endemic to our culture” (Tator, 2005). This may have been the case in the broader mainstream, but within the government and the OPS, the compilation of diagnostic and prognostic frames that constituted the Lewis Report had a significant impact on the subsequent anti-racism initiatives undertaken by the state.
CHAPTER FIVE: RACIAL HEIRARCHIES AND ‘DESERVING’ VICTIMS: THE ONTARIO ANTI-RACISM ADVISORY WORKING GROUP:

Different communities of color need to confront divisions and conflicts between them, and coalitions and alliances need to be built among all racial groups, with people of color in the leading roles. The movement for racial justice will demand the participation of all groups and a commitment to thoroughly interrogate the dimensions of racialized power. Such an interrogation of power needs to be attentive to how different groups have been positioned in the racial hierarchy and how such locations affect the framing of political interests. This will prove to be quite a challenge (Omi, 2001 p 290).

5.1 Introduction:

This chapter addresses the social problems work undertaken by the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group (OARAWG). Analytical attention is paid to the process of debate and negotiation through which the Working Group pursued its mandate, and to how the state responded to the ‘input’ of advice from the Working Group. Analytical attention will also be paid to the process of selecting Group participants.

The OARAWG was chosen for analysis for several reasons. First, as a government sponsored, multi-racial advisory working group, it was unprecedented. The Working Group represented a first attempt at bringing community representatives together to try to achieve consensus on the diagnostic framing of racism. The issues the Working Group struggled with had not been dealt with previously or elsewhere. This renders the Working Group an interesting early example of cross-group negotiation concerning the diagnostic framing of
Second, the social problems work of the Group is interesting as an example of domain expansion. New political projects, or existing political projects attempting to expand into new domains, usually include the generation of modified rhetorical strategies developed for application in those new contexts (Best, 2008). Within the context of the Working Group, the diagnostic frames were intended for an audience of representatives from other ‘victim communities’ rather than for government agents or the broader public. The diagnostic constructions evident in the negotiations of the Group differed significantly from diagnostic constructions found in other state forums. Third, the Working Group is interesting as an instance of the resolution of an ongoing challenge of anti-racism coalition politics in multi-racial societies: how to coordinate, and respond to, the interests of diverse communities in an equitable manner. In Ontario in the early 1990’s the main question in this regard concerned the relative place of Blacks, Jews, and Aboriginals in the anti-racism movement and more specifically in the range of anti-racism initiatives sponsored by the state. As this chapter’s introductory quotation from Omi (2001, p 290) alludes, the debates and negotiations of the Working Group represent an ‘insiders’ dialogue concerning “…how different groups have been positioned in the racial hierarchy”. An analysis of the issues and exchanges that characterized the work of the Group thus provides insight into “…how such locations affect the framing of [the] political interests’ of each group” (Omi, 2001, p 290).
The main data sources analyzed in this chapter were the transcriptions from interviews with two of the Working Group’s members, and the available recorded minutes from the meetings of the Working Group. Secondary sources of data were government documents pertaining to the establishment and operation of the Working Group, and supplementary documentation outlining the foundational claims of both Blacks and Jews that were used to inform the dialogue between the two groups. Several other transcriptions from interviews with people outside but familiar with the Working Group were also used. Much of the analysis focuses on the process of claims and counter claims between Black and Jewish community representatives. A focus on competing claims is useful in that it highlights the similarities and differences between the approaches taken by various stakeholders, including civil servants as state actors and agents of change, to the practical problem of consensus building. By looking at what different categories of stakeholders and claims makers were saying about the nature of racisms, barriers in the form of disagreements were revealed as ‘sticking points’ to the advancement of state anti-racisms.

The central theoretical contribution of the analysis in this chapter involves furthering our understanding of how state anti-racism initiatives are determined. This is done by highlighting the essential role of inter-group dialogue in anti-racism projects in multi-racial societies. The outcome of the claims and counter claims was to formally determine the broad based range of communities to be included in the anti-racism efforts of the Ontario state, a significantly different
sentiment and practical policy target than that advocated through the Lewis Inquiry and Report which concluded that the main problems were with ‘anti-black’ racism.

5.2 The Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group:

The Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group was set up as part of the Ontario government’s initial Anti-Racism Strategy, which was announced just prior to the establishment of the OARS. It predated the OARS by about a month, but was intended to work closely with the ADM of the OARS. Early in their deliberations the Working Group sought direction from the OARS ADM concerning what, exactly, their task was.

The mandate of the OARAWG encouraged participants to focus on how they, as members of marginalized groups, had been affected by racism. “…we all came to the work with our own experiences, perspectives, and expertise” (anonymous, 2005). The mandate also encouraged different participants to focus on commonalities, shifting their approaches away from strategic to problem solving activities. Participants were charged with the task of sharing their narratives, and hearing the narratives of others, which resulted in a collection of competing claims where knowledge of the identity, social location, and

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Montpetit (2004) noted different forms of interaction between the state and advocacy groups. On the one hand ‘strategic’ advocacy stressed particular demands of the group, while ‘problem solving’ stressed more long term planning aimed at providing the state with knowledge, information, statistics, etc. in order to facilitate policy making.
victimization status of each group was debated. The claims forwarded by Black and Jewish participants established rightful participation as a key issue that the working group struggled with. The challenges in reaching consensus, especially over the issue of who rightfully should be the target of anti-racism initiatives, or rather where each group fit relative to others in the ‘hierarchy of pain’, reflected one highly contentious issue that has to be addressed if anti-racism was to be pursued collectively rather than on a community by community basis. The establishment and operation of the group succeeded in bringing diverse groups together to try to negotiate a degree of consensus concerning definitions of racism and anti-racism, and to clarify the range of groups to be targeted by anti-racism initiatives as well as to provide general advice to the Ministry of Citizenship.

The working group’s mandate was to convene and report to the minister of citizenship, Elaine Ziemba, and provide advice on how to proceed with the anti-racism agenda. The working group was to be supported by the OARS, and ultimately their work was intended to influence all the policy and practical work the OARS undertook on anti-racism. More specifically, the mandate of the committee involved “…providing expertise and advice to the Minister of Citizenship on anti-racism issues, and to help ensure that the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat has effective policies and programs developed and delivered across all parts of Ontario”. (Farrell and Sims, 1992).

When the members\(^{27}\) of the OARAWG convened to deliberate the

\(^{27}\) For a list of individuals who made up the working group, see appendix F.
meaning of racism and advise the Ministry of Citizenship on how to proceed with their anti-racism agenda, the problem of racism was certainly not seen as a new social problem. The social problems work and claims making activities of the various ethno-racial communities in Ontario were also well established. What was new was the existence of a state-endorsed forum for the collective negotiation of claims forwarded by the collectivity of communities whose output was intended to be used to inform government policy making on anti-racism.

The group was made up of representatives from the major ethno-cultural communities of Ontario. Individuals were selected on the basis of practical working experience in the fields of equity, and all were members of identity-based community groups.

…most people came to OARAWG with specific community interests, and when I say community interests I don’t mean that at all in a negative way. But we have to recognize that they came to the work of the group with the understanding that they were there to speak to the needs of a specific community, but at the same time they were there also to advise the minister of citizenship on how to deal with a more broad range of issues than just their own community (anonymous, 2005).

It was considered vital that the working group be:

…as inclusive as possible so that as many communities as possible were invited to participate and give advice, but also it was very political because if any group is excluded they are going to ask the question ‘why not us’ you know? So it was both political and practical. We couldn’t have done a good job if the group wasn’t inclusive of as many groups as we could find (anonymous, 2005).
Farber (2005) noted of the individuals selected to make up the Working Group: “…they were pretty wise choices because they were people with singular narratives to tell, plus they were communally connected”. Some of the individuals from OARAWG eventually went on to sit on Premier’s advisory group on anti-racism – in part to give ongoing advice and to help with the implementation of the recommendations of the Lewis Report. Minister Ziemba and Assistant Deputy Minister Stewart considered it essential that representation in the group be as broad based as possible both to ensure diverse perspectives were represented and to guard against the sense, or criticism, that any particular group was being left out. The lack of involvement of the Aboriginal community, especially early in the deliberations of the group, was of particular concern. The co-chairs of the group specifically reached out to Rodney Bobiwash of the Native Canadian Center of Toronto requesting their involvement: “…we may not be appropriately dealing with issues of racism that have been directed towards the Aboriginal community…” they wrote in a letter (Farrell and Sims, 1992). Although broad inclusion and representation in the group was a goal, in practice Aboriginal concerns were not well addressed: “I don’t think there was much room for it” an anonymous (2005) commenter offered, noting the majority of the debate of the group dealt with the relative positioning of Jews and blacks in anti-racism.

The Working Group was co-chaired by Mary-Woo Sims and Lennox Farrell. Sims had previously been the manager of human rights and employment equity for the municipality of metropolitan Toronto, and by all accounts there was
little controversy concerning her appointment as a co-chair. Farrell, by contrast, was a more controversial appointment as co-chair. Farrell had a reputation as a vocal and public critic of the police and school system, and notably had been involved with the protests preceding the riot on Yonge Street and had actually been arrested and charged in relation to those incidents. He was a founding and active member of the Black Action Defence Committee, had run for the NDP in Oriole but lost in 1990, and was relied on frequently by the Toronto press to feed them ‘quotable quotes’ on racial incidents. Some of the more notorious commentary included referring to the Toronto Police as ‘shock troopers’ and commenting on the fire-bombing attack of the home of a prominent Toronto white supremacist as ‘understandable’ and ‘justified’. From the point of view of another Working Group member, Bernie Farber, who as a Jew frequently debated the politics of anti-racism with Farrell both within and outside the Working Group, Farrell was an essential member of the Group. “…placing someone like Lennox on there was essential…He was a clear thinker, I mean he had some deeply felt feelings, about the plight of African Canadians, especially around Jane and Finch, but they weren’t off the wall, not at all” (Farber, 2005).

Because of the different perspectives represented on the Working Group, and in part because of the relative newness of multi-group dialogue on anti-racism, “…our first goal was really to define our term, we use the term anti-racism now and most people know what it means, but at the time it wasn’t really well known and well appreciated” (Farber, 2005). This discussion soon led to
debate not only about how to define terms, but the more contentious issue of where all the different groups fit into the overall picture of where each group was located relative to contemporary racial inequality in Ontario society. Because the Lewis Inquiry had just identified the most pressing concern as forms of ‘anti-black’ racism, this was addressed early in the deliberations of the Group, and they concluded that in Ontario there were “…hierarchical discrimination practices with Black persons being the hardest hit. Other communities have a legitimate concern, but it is important to realize that the Black community is not necessarily benefitting at the expense of other communities” (OARAWG, 1992). This point, that blacks were the hardest hit but in state anti-racism responses did not necessarily benefit more other groups that were not as negatively affected by racism, was to linger as a point of contention throughout the work of the Group. Concern for this issue extended beyond the OARAWG, and as an anonymous commenter noted in retrospect, much of the work in anti-racism was led by blacks and there was concern that anti-racism outcomes would reveal “…blacks kicking the door down, and everybody else trampling over our backs to get ahead” (2005). Different group members participated in these debates to different degrees, but “…most of us were more comfortable with standing beside and you know helping as opposed to taking over the issue if you will…” (anonymous, 2005).

To be sure, the issues the Group were struggling with were diverse and not easy to conflate or correlate:

we were dealing with anti-aboriginal racism and…

it was different because the history was different…
they have had issues around residential schools for example, the manner in which their land was taken from them and those kinds of things, and Black Canadians had different issues, they had issues around color, and how the color of their skin impacted on their ability to make a life in Canada and affected their experiences and how people perceived them in different institutional systems in Ontario, and Jews had different issues. They were somewhat more comfortable, you know, as quote-unquote white Canadians, but, by the fact of being Jewish and that long extended history anti-Semitism leading to genocide, we had a different paradigm to deal with. So we struggled with that, with those differences, for really a long time, and we didn’t come to any real conclusions other than to accept the fact that it had to be understood on these different levels (Farber, 2005).

These debates over rightful participation in state anti-racism initiatives brought the competing claims of different communities into stark relief. Because the experiences were different, virtually all the contributions were unique, so the challenge emerged as one where the group members had to struggle with finding common ground or points of agreement. This required that the members shift focus from the particular concerns of their community or constituency, and concentrate more on what Montpetit (2004) called ‘problem solving’ action. Given the highly emotional nature of issues of racism this proved difficult for some members. The Working Group received direction in this from Stewart, the ADM of the OARS. Stewart (2005) stressed that the group should be thinking in very broad terms about what constitutes racism. Her contribution to the negotiations of the Group was mainly to reinforce the importance of open-mindedness and cooperation, and more specifically to emphasize that she saw
anti-racism broadly as *anti-oppression*, reflecting a concern with intersectionality and multiplex oppressions. This was not received well by all Group members, however, as some saw her not as an ally in government, but as a bureaucrat primarily serving her political masters, so her contribution was seen as suspicious by some Group members (anonymous, 2005).

Ultimately the audience for the report of the Working Group was the Minister of Citizenship, but Working Group members constituted the more immediate audience for each other when they were sharing their interpretations of the nature of racisms in Ontario. The fact that Working Group members shouldered the dual responsibility of both representing their communities’ interests and working with the representatives of other communities with sensitivity to their lived experiences with racism in Canada meant that certain ‘equivalencies’ were required in the discursive constructions that constituted the claims each member forwarded. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argue that in political discourses, equivalencies serve to make two entities similar in some respect and therefore ‘equivalent’ in that sense. Applied to this example, Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘equivalencies’ does not imply that the experiences with racism claimed by the different groups were equal or framed in a way that made them seem equally bad for each group. Rather the notion of ‘equivalencies’ suggests that the diverse victimization experiences with racism shared some quality in common, and in that sense were similar to one another. As observed by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), the use of equivalencies usually happens relative to the identity (characteristics) of
some entity; in this case the entity was the identity and victimization experiences of different groups that had representation on the Working Group. To establish an equivalence a case has to be made that two different entities are share enough characteristics with each other to be considered the same in that regard. In this case, generally speaking, the equivalence that was constructed through the narratives each Working Group member shared was that both in the past and in the present, their group’s members had suffered the indignities of racism in some form or another. As the deliberations and negotiations of the Working Group proceeded, each member in turn shared their perspective on how they saw their group experiencing racism in historical and contemporary contexts. Of course, because of the different experiences the narratives were all unique, but there were also commonalities running through the various accounts. These commonalities of experience were the basis for the establishment of equivalencies, or to put it another way: all the groups were considered the same in that in the past they had been victimized by racism and racism continued to plague them today. As previously noted, there were also significant differences in the groups’ experiences with racism as each group had a unique history in Canada and contemporary experience with racism. This turned out to be a point of disagreement and a significant barrier to the progression of the anti-racism agenda.

To use a term common in policy circles, the ‘output’ of the Ontario Anti-racism Advisory Working Group was a report to the Minister of Citizenship
outlining their common concerns and shared understandings of racism in Ontario. This final report occluded much of the difficult negotiations that characterized the working life of the advisory group. The significance of the work of the working group, however, far surpassed this written report. The interviews conducted with participants from the working groups afforded a glimpse of the significance of the Working Group to the communities that had representation in the group, and to future collective efforts at addressing racism. Those interviewees who were close to the working group noted the significance of the working group as representing the first time such a diverse group came together and attempted to work out some cohesive and collective perspective for government on what racism is and what should be done about it. Many of the participants joined with reservations, especially those with prior knowledge of the limitations of government sponsored committees. “I did have some hesitancy and resistance in joining the committee at first, only because I’m not a great fan of committees, its been my experience that committees are usually attempts by governments or what have you to give the appearance of something being done…” (Farber, 2005). Another committee member commented:

...you have to work with government to achieve change, but you know you’re going to get screwed by government (laughter) pardon the vernacular...because really so long as they look at this as a politically expedient thing and you know that that is going to be the case, and you know you have to go in there and do the best that you can quickly, before they change their minds (anonymous, 2005).
Clearly many of the members of the Working Group understood the potential limitations of participation in such a process. Most were sophisticated and experienced with committee and group work, but felt compelled to enter into this process nonetheless, which suggests that they felt there was at least a possibility that the state may have been acting as a neutral arbiter, or at least a broker regarding anti-racism. A deciding factor for many was their confidence in Bob Rae and his apparent commitment to issues of racial equality. This was echoed frequently in the interviews, and the importance of commitment to the anti-racist agenda from political leaders is essential, and it seemed to make advocates feel there was a genuine concern on the part of the NDP and the OARS to do something practical about racial inequality.

Throughout its duration the Working Group struggled with some of the most difficult aspects of coalition politics that characterize cooperative relations between identity-based groups. The resentment of Jewish involvement was evident from the first meeting of OARAWG. Farber (2005) noted that amongst the individuals who made up the Working Group, there were a number “…who were really struggling with whether or not Jews should be a part of this effort”. Simply put, Jews in Ontario in the early 1990’s were understood by some other minoritized groups to not be as negatively affected by racism as Blacks and

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28 In contrast to the strained relations evident between Black communities and the Jewish community in Ontario, there were some efforts that demonstrated cooperation between groups. For example in a joint submission by the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Canadian communities to Bob Rae on the plight of their populations and their concerns the groups displayed cooperation and mutual support (RG 74 – 45, box 29 File ars 94 – 177
Aboriginals. One anonymous Working Group member reported that the
discussion about the inclusion of Jews was “…something I found most
unhelpful….whether anti-Semitism was a form of racism… there was this view
that anti-black racism was the priority and needed to be addresses, and in some
folks’ view to the exclusion of work on other forms of racism” (2005). Although
cooperation between group members was hoped for and achieved to a degree,
various group members struggled with the impetus to remain true to the
representation of their own groups’ position, and this made discussion very
difficult at times. Although a degree of consensus was met, it was a very difficult
process:

…but I don’t want to mislead you and say it was an
easy and obvious consensus, those discussions were
hot and heavy, they were very heated and some
might say even hurtful, you know because when
you think about people who are working in the field
of anti-racism we ought to be the most able to draw
the links between different types of oppression, and
some of those discussions in my mind demonstrated
that we are not all there yet. I mean we all work in
the field but some of us are so mired in working on
our own community-specific concerns, and I’m not
saying that’s wrong, I think its important not to be
scattered, I mean if you are an African Canadian
and you want to work on those issues, that’s great,
but don’t say that that’s the only form of oppression
in Canada. And don’t forget there are others who
are similarly oppressed or have been similarly
oppressed, I mean don’t forget the plight of
Aboriginal Canadians, right, they’re still dealing
with it (anonymous, 2005).

This issue highlighted elements of the claims of some of the communities
represented on the Working Group, especially the elements of the claims that concerned the group’s status as victims of racism. “...it happens all the time when it comes to dealing with issues of anti-racism, what I call the ‘hierarchy of pain’, and it was a difficult one, you know, my pain is greater than your pain, my suffering is greater than your suffering, and it became, not a bone of contention, but an issue of passionate discussion” (Farber, 2005). There were attempts to debase the legitimacy of the perspective of other Working Group members, especially when their claims were to a sensitivity to the lived experiences of others’ victimization. At times, the debate became quite pointed with Working Group members accusing other members of not having the ability to appreciate the plight of their group’s victimization. For example, the following quotation encapsulates some of the tension over ‘feelings territoriality’ and the ability to empathize:

Lennox would say once in a while...‘how could you understand what’s going on in Jane and Finch?’ Well I can’t necessarily understand it in the same way that you can, but in a way you’re not giving me credit as an individual because I can empathize to at least a certain extent and understand it based on my own history, you know. I am a child of holocaust survivors, I didn’t have grandparents, I didn’t have aunts and uncles, they were murdered because of who they were, and that’s the ultimate form of discrimination...‘don’t tell me about what I can’t feel’... and those are good discussions to have, and we got into them, they were strong, they were passionate and I remember them with fondness to tell you the truth, because it was one of the very few times in my experience to this day that there was a comfort zone set up for those talks to happen (Farber, 2005).
Farber, a Jewish member of the Working Group, was justifying his ability to empathize on the basis of his own and his group’s experience, while Farrell was discounting that ability on the basis of the Jewish experience with racism being fundamentally different from the Black experience. Although neither claims maker denied the existence of the other groups’ victimization, both felt the other could not fully appreciate their groups’ experience. Further, Jews as whites who as a group had achieved a relatively privileged status in Canadian society were resented as equivalent victims of racism. Jewish people had their own experiences with racism in Canada and elsewhere of course, but their contemporary relative position in Canada combined with the perception of their whiteness as a marker of privilege meant that other groups, especially Blacks, viewed their participation in anti-racism efforts with suspicion.

Although Working Group members shared their individual stories and listened to one another, ultimately they faced restrictions of time. There was widespread agreement amongst interviewees that to work through the differences between the various ethno-racial community groups would not only be emotionally taxing but very time consuming as well. This proved to be a frustrating aspect of the experience for the Group members interviewed, both commented on how channelling the Working Group’s efforts into the necessary task of producing a document at the end of their deliberations detracted from a more complete learning experience the Working Group offered. Although much
was learned about how other groups experience racism, many issues of cultural difference remained beyond the capacity of the group.

…we couldn’t deal with cultural differences to the extent they required, but we were able to share our felt experiences and how we all saw that meshing with a common felt experience, and sometimes it did, but more often than not it didn’t and it created a few roadblocks I must say because we couldn’t have a grasp of each other’s cultural reality as the other experienced it, and really know what that meant to the other person. We just didn’t have enough time (Farber, 2005).

when I talk about our failure, I pin it as a government failure because it just didn’t get continued, you know the next government comes in with another set of priorities and its all over. But the pain continues. This was an honourable attempt, to start the ball rolling, and had it continued I’m not sure we would be facing to the extent that we are facing you know the violence and the poverty and the absolute degradation that the black community faces here, its just a very sad irony that we did this in 92 and 14 or 15 years later we continue to juggle the same damn ball. It’s the most frustrating thing for me (Farber, 2005).

An anonymous Working Group member reported that that “…we did a lot of our work quietly…”(2005) and they tried to stay under the radar of local media, “…we had a lot of work to do to become a cohesive unit, and the worst thing you can be doing is to be arguing about whether anti-Semitism is really a legitimate form of racism… that would have just killed the group, you know in
the public’s perception, and it wouldn’t serve any useful purpose” (anonymous, 2005). Despite their attempts to work behind closed doors, the efforts of the Working Group were criticized heavily by the English print news media in Toronto. “I’ve got to tell you, we didn’t have a lot of help from the media…” (Farber, 2005). Not only did the controversy over Farrell’s involvement detract from the public perception of the Working Group as legitimate, there were other criticisms also, many of which became popularized through local print news media. There seemed to be widespread concern amongst supporters of anti-racism that the print news media in general provided very little support during the Rae administration generally. For example both Harney (2001) and Benjamin (2002) noted the intense critique of the ‘right-wing’ media on the coalition that had emerged between the NDP and anti-racism supporters. According to Harney (2001) this media assault began immediately after the NDP took power and did not subside until after anti-racism was played out as a central political issue during the 1995 election which was won by the conservatives headed by Mike Harris. Benjamin chose the term ‘banishment’ to describe the effects of media and conservative party dismissal anti-racism. Even Now Magazine, a popular Toronto publication, covered both the Working Group and the OARS with negative editorials, and the Toronto Sun newspaper was identified repeatedly in the interviews as consistent sources of criticism of OARS generally and the OARAWG in particular. In relation to Now Magazine’s portrayal of the activities of the OARAWG, Farber (2005) noted:
I did expect more from a progressive sort of left leaning magazine, I expected support, I expected out and out support. And you know what effect that has on public opinion, its huge, that’s all they see, they’re not in our room, they don’t know what’s going on, all they know is what they read, they don’t hear what I’m telling you here, all they are exposed to is what they see on TV, read in the papers and magazines, and hear on the radio, and it was a false perception, it was not a correct perception, it was a stupid perception, you know nobody came to me, nobody talked to anyone who was there, you know they editorialized about it, they didn’t get it is what it came down to, they just didn’t get it… I think that played a key role in its diminution in the long run

Although the prevailing sentiment within the Working Group was cooperative and focused on producing something of practical use to policymakers and government, tensions ran very high and at different times, and both the Working Group members interviewed for this research reported they gave serious consideration to leaving the group. Both were spurred on, however, by their recognition of the importance of the work of the group and their recognition of the rare opportunity they faced. This was a sentiment they reported was shared by all Working Group members.

5.3 The Black – Jewish Dialogue:

The manifestation of tensions between various groups involved with the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group occurred within a broader dialogue concerning relations between Blacks and Jews. Following the relatively
harmonious relations between Blacks and Jews during the civil rights movement in the United States and similar successful coalitions between Blacks and Jews in Canada, relations began to be strained between the two groups as their relative location in equity agendas and the perceptions and articulation of commonalities shifted during the post civil rights era. These relations are complex and diverse, and a complete presentation is beyond the purposes of this thesis, but some discussion will help contextualize the form these debates took in Ontario in the early 1990’s.

In the United States there had been several attempts to rebuild relationships between the two groups, largely spearheaded by church-based groups from each side. ‘Dialogues’, as they were commonly called, had been established in attempts to facilitate exchange of viewpoints and clarify understandings each side held of themselves and the ‘other’. A Canadian version of these efforts was initiated in Toronto on January 10, 1990, notably before the NDP took power, and similar to its American antecedents it was called the “Black - Jewish Dialogue”29. The initial meeting was held in the Jamaican – Canadian Association headquarters and included leaders from both Jewish and Black communities. Several issues were identified to serve as a basis for future discussions and although the meeting was generally amicable, some tensions were evident. For example, several members, expressed concern that the dialogue

29 Walker (2002) discussed earlier forms of cooperation and dialogue between blacks and Jews in Ontario in his discussion of the ‘Jewish phase’ of the history of equity work in Ontario. Walker’s discussion, however, did not highlight the tensions and focus on difference that characterized the Black-Jewish Dialogues of the early 1990’s.
proceed slowly to allow adequate time for participants to reflect, study, and prepare for the meetings. This was seen as necessary especially because considerable learning was required to broaden participants’ views of the history of the ‘other’ group, and to come to appreciate the current manifestations of racism each group experienced. Notably, several key players in this dialogue were to shortly take up positions in Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat, bringing with them some appreciation of the challenges facing the Black / Jewish dialogue and also bring some of the tensions that characterized relations between the two groups. During the dialogue much historical, cultural, and identity-related information was exchanged with the intent of educating all participants on the various perspectives involved Black – Jewish relations. Julies Lester, a noted Black Jewish scholar from the United States was frequently referenced, and some of his writings that distilled opposing positions and competing analyses and claims-making activities of each side were used to help frame the discussions in Toronto. This was helpful to delineate the claims communities presented in relation to each other and in relation to racism more generally. In one publication Lester commented: “Jews begin with an assumption, namely that they share with blacks a common experience of oppression. It is an assumption many blacks find offensive and historically inaccurate” (Lester, date unknown). Noting the commonalities and divergences of Black and Jewish experiences in America, Lester (date unknown) commented that “…I doubt that anyone would say that anti-Semitism in America was equivalent to two hundred years of slavery and its
legacy.” And “…despite anti-Semitism, Jews had white skin” and could therefore assimilate more easily than Blacks could. “The simple truth is that Jews are among the ‘haves’ of American society; Blacks comprise a significant portion of the ‘have-nots’” (Lester, date unknown). Lester (date unknown) also contended that a common response from Blacks to Jewish claims to victimization through contemporary oppression “…is a shrug of the shoulders, as if to say, so what?” Noting the retention of historical memory in the contemporary construction of Jewish identities, Lester (date unknown) suggested that “…much of their identity as Jews is involved with seeing themselves as victims… However, with the rise of Jewish affluence and the Six Day War, the image of Jews-as-victim ceased to match the reality…So important is the self image of Jew-as-victim that some Jews borrow such an identity through identifying with the Holocaust, with American Blacks…” and by comparison, “Blacks do not need to borrow suffering from the past of from other groups. Anti-Black racism stalks the land daily” (Lester, date unknown).

A Jewish perspective on what the general context was like in Toronto regarding Jewish – Black relations is reflected in Farber’s (2005) comments:

there was a lot of animosity in the Black community against Jews, you know it was around the time Louis Farrakan was popular, as a matter of fact they were attempting to make inroads into Toronto, at this very time, you know the Nation of Islam, and you know they had an office on Rogers Road, and later as I recall there was the Million Man March, you know, they were there and they were selling their newspaper and it was filled with anti-Jewish invective.
Clearly there were barriers and divisions that ran deep between committee members. Regardless of these challenges, the committee forged ahead with their work. Commenting on the overall evaluation of the efforts of the Working Group, one member summarized:

to me it was visionary, it was really visionary, but we just didn’t accomplish everything we wanted to accomplish and as I said it was not a failure, it was in many ways a semi-success, if I may put it that way, I mean just this group coming together was quite an accomplishment. The sharing of these ideas in a government – sanctioned, premiere – supported committee, just that having been put together for the first time ever, and bringing together these provocative and experienced and passionate people you know there were people from all walks of life, just putting us together was a success, and some of these discussions we had were a success, they had never happened before (Farber, 2005).

the fact is for those of us who were on the inside and had the absolute honor of sitting in various capacities, and sitting in a room with these people and I’ll tell you to this day, and I have done much in my time, it still stands as… you know Maslow? He speaks of peak experiences; well, that was one of my peak experiences, without question. That we didn’t accomplish what we wanted to accomplish? Well, you know, life is like that (Farber, 2005).

When asked about regrets concerning their involvement in the Group, one member opined that she felt a more binding agreement with government to actually do something with the recommendations would have made it seem more worth the effort of the difficult work they did:
I think that before we decided to serve on the committee we should have made the government sign in blood (laughter) or make public commitments to or somehow bind them to dealing with the recommendations or at least do something to make them more accountable to the committee and the issues we dealt with or have some other way of ensuring that this wasn’t just going to be window dressing because I think that for many of us in the end that’s what we thought it ended up being (anonymous, 2005).

Commenting on his most lasting impressions of the work of the Working Group and the OARS, Farber (2005) concluded:

was this just a colossal failure? An honourable attempt, but a colossal failure? I’ve thought about this and the conclusion I reached was NO, it was an honourable attempt that didn’t see the light of day, and then it was a colossal failure because it was killed by the successive government. But the attempt is as important as anything else, that’s what kept me going on all of this (Farber, 2005).

Both interviewees also acknowledged that when claims of diverse ethno-racial communities are brought together, the strained process of groups finding their place, or being assigned their relative place, in the overall hierarchy of legitimate beneficiaries of state anti-racism initiatives was imminent. This necessarily involved some of the strategic or particular claims made by some groups – in which they’d identify how they were negatively affected by a particular practice and offer pointed suggestions as to how that inequality might be eliminated – to be displaced by concerns for the common good of all oppressed groups. The inherent difficulty of this process was exacerbated by the fact that
many groups saw power and the resources of the state as a zero-sum-game where the advances made by some would be made at the expense of others. The debates as they took place through the operations of the Working Group concluded, the ongoing debates were set aside although not completely resolved, with all groups agreeing that in whatever the state undertook in way of anti-racism initiatives in the future should try to balance a generally inclusive approach that made space for every group with consideration of the particular plight of those communities that were hardest hit by racism – namely black and aboriginal groups.

5.4 Conclusions:

This chapter offered a critical examination of the establishment and social problems work of the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group. The OARAWG, given that it was an unprecedented coming together of representatives from diverse groups, was certainly a new social problems marketplace (Best, 2008). This analysis lends further support to the constructionist understanding of state anti-racism by advancing our understanding of how inter-group negotiations in a particular context unfolded. By focusing on the claims making activities, it becomes clearer how community agents and agencies interacted and struggled with various factions of the state, and with each other, to help shape the direction of state anti-racism and the clarification of ‘deserving’ victims of racism.
The deliberations of the OARAWG resulted in a broadening and evening out of the range of victim-communities that were to be the targets of state anti-racism interventions. This meant that state resources would be spread more thinly across a broader range of groups, and state attention would also be more divided than the spirit of the Lewis inquiry suggested. This outcome contributed to animosity, resentment, and strained relations between groups as they came to see one another as variously located within a hierarchy of deserving victims, some with more publicly validated and acknowledged reasons to be claiming contemporary victim status than others. The claims of some groups were presented as more worthy of intervention because the victims were more immediately apparent, more recent, more local, more vocal, and more systematically mistreated than other categories of victims. The nature of the racism affecting them was understood as closely tied to the exercise of power in the major systems of Ontario society. Other groups, in particular Jews, were understood to be contemporarily victimized through expressions of hate, rather than power, which rendered their victimization qualitatively different from that of Blacks and Aboriginals.

Essentially, the challenge of the Working Group was to come up with a way for the state to consider all victim communities simultaneously while at the same time realizing the important differences in the lived experiences and particular interests and needs of each group. Some degree of consensus concerning these matters was required for a collective state anti-racism project to
advance, and by the accounts of representatives from communities most bitterly divided on this point, a working consensus was achieved. The outcome of the social problems work of the OARAWG suggests that while inter-group coalition politics necessary for state anti-racism in multi-racial societies are difficult and fraught with controversy, they are possible.
CHAPTER SIX: DEMONSTRATING ANTI-RACISM ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE:

6.1 Introduction:

Like the previous two chapters, this chapter addresses the research question: ‘What determines the nature of state anti-racism initiatives?’ This chapter examines the framing of racism and anti-racism in state-produced documents intended to guide several ‘demonstration projects’ aimed at organizational change. The empirical materials for this analysis were a series of anti-racism guides produced by the Secretariat, and interviews with Secretariat management and workers who created those documents and were involved in the delivery of anti-racism programs based on them. The “Building Blocks for Equity” documents were a six volume guide designed to serve as educational references and practical change workbooks for anti-racism organizational change.

The demonstration projects’ guiding documents are interesting to examine as concrete cases of anti-racism social problems work for a number of reasons. First, they represent a primarily state-determined anti-racism effort. In this way they stand apart from other initiatives examined in this research that relied on

<sup>30</sup> Although the ‘Building Blocks to Equity’ series contains one sentence referencing consultations with the ‘community’ in the compilation of the documents, the interview data suggested that the information gleaned from those consultations only served to verify and strengthen the State manager’s and workers’ views on how to frame the problem of racism and what to do about it on a practical level in different organizational contexts. Therefore, these documents are considered to be the outcome of the state’s perspective on these issues. The Secretariat is cited as the lone author of the documents and interview data clearly revealed that Secretariat staff were responsible for the social problem framing contained in the documents.
considerable input from extra-state sources in determining anti-racism program content. Second, they included the most comprehensive framing of racism and practical anti-racism aimed at organizational forms of systemic racisms produced by the Secretariat. The “Building Blocks to Equity” series was intended to showcase the Secretariat’s strategy for how to affect change in the systemically racist elements of the organizational cultures of the OPS. The documents offered clear, extensive and flexible diagnostic and prognostic framing of systemic racism, and were intentionally crafted to be responsive to a variety of organizational settings. Third, this case is interesting in that it allows for the role of state agents as claims makers to be accounted for in the overall determination of the nature of state anti-racism interventions. This directly addresses the research question: ‘What determines the nature of state anti-racism initiatives?’ I argue that key individuals within the Secretariat determined the nature of state anti-racism interventions. This interpretation is very much in line with the pluralist ‘state as broker’ perspective that identifies individuals in positions to influence important policymaking decisions do so based largely on their own perspectives. In this particular case, these state agents were guided largely by their personal experience with anti-racism and organizational change, adherence to a particular model for organizational change, and their anticipation of resistance they were likely to face ‘in the field’ in different organizational contexts.

31 See Calliste (1996) for a discussion of specific forms of resistance to anti-racism organizational change as it was experienced in the nursing field in Ontario.
6.2 The General Context and Process of the Demonstration Projects:

The idea of having demonstration projects was part of the original Ontario Anti-Racism Strategy. In this sense it was part of the higher-level social problems work done early in the reign of the NDP – they intended to do something in the way of demonstration projects. The specific content of the demonstration projects, where they would take place, and what their content would be was not determined when the Ontario Anti-Racism Strategy was announced. The more specific social problems work, especially the work concerning the model for organizational change, was done primarily by the ADM, Anne-Marie Stewart. The rationale behind the projects was that the state could usefully model anti-racism organizational change in order to show how it may be accomplished, as well as display its general commitment to anti-racism by providing some demonstration projects that might be modelled in other organizational contexts.

The host agencies and organizations provided workers to cooperate with the OARS workers and form a ‘team’ to facilitate the projects, and host agencies and ministries were encouraged to be receptive to anti-racism organizational change by virtue of the fact that the majority of funding for the projects was provided by the OARS. Precisely how receptive target organizations were, however, varied from one project to another. In some demonstration projects there was knowledge of particular ‘hot spots’ of racism, sometimes in the form of one or a few key individuals within that organization against whom complaints had
been laid, and in response to this prior knowledge OARS staff prepared themselves for specific forms of resistance.

In different demonstration projects different forms of systemic racism were targeted. Besides procurement\(^{32}\) other specific problem areas included: recruitment and selection in the equity field, communication and relations with community based (minority) organizations, providing resources to minority communities, and the use of advisory committees in dealing with equity issues.

Although one OARS staff interviewee reported that she recalled “about six” demonstration projects being done, records were obtained from three. The first involved the establishment of “…a system of community advisory networks (CANS) across the province to act in a consultative capacity to the OPCC (Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner) on a regional and provincial basis” (OARS, 1992). This project focussed on using anti-racism principles and practices in accessing minority and aboriginal communities, effective communication between police and minority and aboriginal communities, and most specifically how to incorporate anti-racism into the process of establishing the network of advisory boards. The second was aimed at improving procurement policies and practices in the Ministry of Community and Social Service and the Ministry of

\(^{32}\) It was becoming widely recognized in the early 1990’s that the old approach of organizations “going with who they know” constituted a form of systemic discrimination. Although some of the Secretariat’s demonstration projects addressed this form of systemic racism, this form of anti-racism was occurring elsewhere. The City of Toronto, for example, with a purchasing budget of $325,000,000 in 1992, identified this as a problematic area in need of proactive intervention. (Racial Minority and Aboriginal Owned Business and The Provision of Goods and Services to the Municipality of Toronto: Report Commissioned by: Multicultural and Race Relations Division Chief Administrative Officer’s Department Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, March 1992).
Culture, Tourism and Recreation. More specifically this project involved identifying barriers that Minority and Aboriginal owned businesses (MAOBs) experienced selling goods and services to the two Ministries. The overall goal was to assess and modify existing purchasing practices within those Ministries, and implement barrier-free procurement policies. The third demonstration project occurred at Northwestern General Hospital in Toronto. This project addressed several manifestations of systemic racism including hiring and promotion practices, the valuing of out-of-country experience as well as discrimination by supervisors in assigning tasks to workers.

Each of the three examples of demonstration projects for which data was obtained presented interesting case studies. Likewise, the data from interviews with Secretariat staff involved in the production of the guiding documents and delivery of the projects provided interesting insights that expanded and clarified the framing of racism and anti-racism in the documents. The case addressing procurement a provincial ministry of the OPS was selected for discussion in this chapter because it involved several key dimensions of the Secretariat’s prescription for anti-racism organizational change including: 1) addressing the structural and procedural interrogation of host ministries; 2) addressing the

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33 The acronym MAOBs will be used to shorten “Minority and Aboriginal owned businesses”, but this is not intended to homogenize the two entities. Important differences existed between minority owned businesses and Aboriginal owned businesses, and indeed within each category important differences also existed. The Secretariat staff involved in the demonstration projects were aware of these differences, and I use one acronym here only to simplify the reference to them in the following discussion.

34 A human rights complaint had been laid in relation to systemically racist conditions within the hospital, and the work the Secretariat did in the demonstration project contributed to the settlement of that complaint (OARS, 1995). This included establishing a new position of ‘Vice-President of Ethno-racial Equality” in the hospital.
anticipation of probable forms of resistance to anti-racism intervention, and 3) addressing the constitution of intervention teams.

As was generally common\textsuperscript{35} with the motivational framing strategies analyzed in this thesis, those present here were important but certainly not emphasized. In this case the most general motivational statement was that “…The social, political and economic well-being of the province requires the full and equal participation of all members of Ontario’s diverse population. This is achieved through the elimination of systemic barriers that deny access and opportunity to participation to certain disadvantaged groups” (OARS, 1992a, p1). Although certainly important, this vision alone was too vague to be of practical use in applied anti-racism interventions. “The government didn’t need convincing to move on anti-racism, they needed direction”\textsuperscript{36} (anonymous, 2005). Direction came in the form of the diagnostic and prognostic framing in the Building Blocks to Equity series – they provided extensive and flexible strategies for dealing with systemic racism in OPS procurement policies. To the extent that a motivational frame accompanied the prescription for reducing barriers in procurement, it was suggested that changes would result in “…a more equitable, inclusive and efficient/effective ‘fair’ procurement process; better use of resources; increased accessibility to suppliers; better value for money; greater accountability; and

\textsuperscript{35} The exception to this was the Toronto riot which constituted a vital part of the motivational framing of racism for the ONDP.

\textsuperscript{36} This was so because these efforts took place under the auspices of the OARS, so motivation to do something about racism was assumed. They did not involve making the case that something should be done, rather more narrowly making the case for what should be done, hence the focus on diagnostic and prognostic framing strategies.
purchasing services which are responsive to the diversity of the province” (OARS, 1992b, p 12).

The following sections present a discussion of the key dimensions and the different levels of the state-produced diagnostic and prognostic framing of systemic racism involved in this project, including discussions of forms of resistance and pro-active framing strategies designed to reduce those forms of resistance.

6.3 The General Diagnostic and Prognostic Framing of Systemic Racism in Organizations:

The specific framing of racism in procurement occurred within a broader understanding of the nature and functioning of organizations. Two of the key dimensions of that understanding that held relevance for framing systemic racism in procurement were: 1) an appreciation of organizational culture – including its potential to envelope and sometimes hide racism, and 2) a specific model for organizational change that outlined how to approach anti-racism change within organizations. The following sections present brief discussions of these two key elements of the conceptual backdrop for the more specific framing of systemic racism in procurement.
6.3.1 Organizational Culture:

From the perspective of the authors of the Building Blocks series, the very nature of organizations and how they operated was seen as a fundamental dimension of the problem. Although racist individuals in positions of power may have been present, and certainly they were a problem in anti-racism intervention contexts, it was how organizations operated that allowed these individuals to remain hidden or undetected that required as much attention. To address this in practical organizational anti-racism interventions, the Secretariat Staff relied on the notion of organizational culture. All organizations were seen to have a ‘culture’ which was socially constructed and usefully conceived as a negotiated order. Negotiated orders are by definition changeable rather than static (Fine, 1984), although they were noted to have continuity or momentum in the form of forces supporting their maintenance and resisting change. In terms of actual content, organizational culture “… includes shared patterns of informal social behaviour, such as communication, decision making, and interpersonal relationships, which are the observable evidence of deeply held and largely unconscious values, assumptions and behavioural norms” (Agocs and Jain, 2001, p3). Organizational cultures also encompass relationships the organization has with service recipients, suppliers, and contractors outside the organization.

The organizational culture rested on and operated through the structure and the processes of the organization. In order to develop a way to discuss this with the personnel from the ministries ‘hosting’ the anti-racism intervention, the
ADM relied on a particular analytical framework of how organizations were structured and how they worked. The specific analytical framework of organizational structure was seen to underpin the organizational culture, and was therefore necessary to clarify so subsequent anti-racism problem identification could take place. This framework was intentionally simple and included a three part conception of organizational systems: 1) the people who worked within the organization, 2) the beliefs and values they held and those reflected in the activities of the organization, and 3) the policies and procedures of the organization, which also often embodied the values underpinning the practices of the organization. It was continually emphasized by the Secretariat staff through the interviews that all three aspects of organizational systems had to be addressed simultaneously for anti-racism change to be effective. They believed that simply addressing people (racist or not), or process, or beliefs/values alone fell short of what was needed for procurement practices to change. Secretariat staff used their understanding of organizational systems and their appreciation of the momentum of organizational cultures in the development of their model for organizational change.

6.3.2 Anti-Racism Interventions in Organizational Cultures: Framing a Model for Organizational Change:

As with the Secretariat’s dealing with the idea of organizational culture, the model for how to change that culture had to be translated into a form that
would work when applied in organizational settings; this was foremost in their consideration of how to package these ideas for actual anti-racism interventions. This included an appreciation of the importance of how the anti-racism change process would be perceived by participants involved in that process from both majority and minority groups. Agocs, Burr, and Somerset (1992) referred to this as a concern with ‘procedural justice’ - a sense that the processes of change are happening in an appropriate manner including all stakeholders, and that the agents of change were not simply interested in the outcomes of change, but the processes of change also. Secretariat staff reported that if organizational change was perceived as heavy handed, or too ‘top down’, the probability and strength of resistance would increase. Support from the top (the minister of the host ministry), however, was seen as essential. This sort of support was valuable in maximizing the potential for acceptance of anti-racism change through the demonstration projects.

They determined that an overall intervention process using a combined team and the strategies of training/orientation followed by review and follow-up would be most successful. They began with a set of four principles that were to be used to set guidelines for how the organizational change process was to proceed and facilitate ‘procedural justice’ in the change process. These were: 1) change was to be inclusive of the diversity in the broader society, 2) change was to be as

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37 This concern with the process of change may be contrasted with a different notion of justice, ‘distributive justice’, which was concerned more with outcomes or effects of anti-racism organizational change. Of course equitable outcomes were the ultimate goal of the demonstration projects, but the path to that end was understood to be equally important.
equitable as possible in terms of power sharing, especially in terms of facilitating the empowerment of Aboriginals and minorities, 3) change was to be ongoing through the entrenchment of equity initiatives\(^{38}\) (usually through their inclusion in long term strategic planning). Finally 4) change was to be results oriented in that the organization and especially aboriginals and minorities were to benefit from the change process (OARS, 1992a, p6).

In addition to these principles that were intended as general guides for how anti-racism change would happen within organizations, a more specific model for how the organizational change would unfold was devised. The model for organizational change also included addressing some of the key dimensions of what Secretariat staff saw, and had experienced through prior anti-racism work, as limitations of organizational anti-racism.\(^{39}\) The Secretariat’s staff used a combined model for organizational change which drew on aspects of three different approaches to change within organizations including: a ‘top down’ approach, an ‘organizational development’ approach, and a ‘stakeholder participation’ approach. The following discussion outlines each approach and its contribution to the overall model for organizational change used by the Secretariat in the demonstration projects.

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\(^{38}\) To support the ongoing efforts at equity within the organizations, the documents also included a component which could be used by agents of change from the host Ministry to continue to monitor and evaluate anti-racism change after the demonstration project was completed.

\(^{39}\) Some of these have been identified by Henry (2000) as forms of resistance, for example not having higher level support through involvement of supervisors, managers. The data used for this analysis did not allow me to identify non-participation of management as an active or passive form of resistance to anti-racism. Secretariat staff did report, however, that if support from ‘the top’ was not present, the chances of anti-racism change efforts working was diminished.
A top down approach to organizational change relied on the power inequities inherent in the hierarchical organization of most government ministries. Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and ADM’s served as the source of decision making authority in the organizations. It relied on the ‘word from above’ (or what is most recently being referred to as ‘the tone at the top’) and was generally dictatorial in nature. It may seem odd that Secretariat staff partially embraced a top down approach to organizational change given their recognition of its shortcomings, but the support and direction of leadership within the organization undergoing change was understood to be essential. Not only was it necessary to set up the demonstration projects in the first instance, but support from the top sent a message to the rest of the organization that the changes were prioritized within those ministries. Leaders from different ministries also played key roles in putting together teams or workers from those ministries that were to work with the team from OARS on the demonstration projects.

The second approach to organizational change which informed the model used by OARS staff was an organizational development approach. It also relied on the authority of leadership within organizations, but less so than the top down model. In this model external consultants were hired and served as ‘facilitators’ within the organization undergoing change. A necessary step in organizational change under this model was an assessment of the nature of the organizational culture in question. The way everyday or mundane activities of the organization occur is problematized in this approach, and using resources from within the
organization through ‘team building’ strategies and ‘information feedback loops’, problematic aspects of the normal operations of the organization were identified. The significance of this strategy stemmed from the realization that embedded within organizational practices are assumptions about the nature of cultural and racial identities and constructions of identity which, often subliminally, resulted in exclusion for minority groups. A concern in this approach is that an outside consultant coming into an organizational context might face resistance as an outsider and a critic, so caution was used in the process of identifying problematic aspects of organizational culture in need of change, and workers from those ministries were involved as much as possible in diagnosing areas of concern. Secretariat staff reported giving very careful consideration to the negotiation of this potentially difficult aspect of organizational change. Inclusion of members from the host ministry’s team in the diagnostic process and the importance of good working relations with the group of individuals from other ministries were seen as essential by the Secretariat staff.

The third approach incorporated into the model for organizational change used by the Secretariat was a ‘stakeholder participation’ model. This involved ensuring that the broadest range of interested parties was involved in the change process, including members from majority and minority groups. Stakeholders from the majority could positively represent the need for and process of organizational change to other perhaps more sceptical members of the
organization. Members from minority groups, especially MAOBs, could provide essential insight necessary for accurate problem identification.

Elements from each approach offered partial solutions to counter common shortcomings anti-racism change typically encountered by change agents working in institutional settings. Each approach alone contained limitations, for example the top down model alone resulted in forms of resistance that were based in part in the oppositional nature of management - civil servant relations. This was compensated for by including the stakeholder participation approach, which also facilitated meeting part of the ‘inclusive’ principle. The organizational change and the stakeholder participation approaches faced the risk of degrees of usurpation of pain and loss of authenticity and appropriate representation of difference in the service delivery environment. Although the Secretariat staff involved in the demonstration projects reported being aware of the limitations and dangers of each approach, they stressed that to move forward with a state based anti-racism project within the limited time and resource constraints they faced they had to choose the “best tools available for the job” which in their judgment was the amalgamated model (OARS staff, 2005).

The stakeholder participation approach offered a buffer to a problem Secretariat staff anticipated if the anti-racism intervention was not racially representative and inclusive of ministry ‘insiders’. This was important in that too close an association of the processes of change with the agents of change detracted from the effective participation of other stakeholders and opened up the
possibility that the Secretariat staff, or other members from minority communities, would be targeted as trouble-makers agitating for change. A more favourable situation, especially in dealing with elements of organizational cultures which excluded minorities, was to have stakeholders from those organizations actively participate in diagnosing problems so pressure for change did not seem to come only from sources outside the organization. As one interviewee put it, “You’ve got to get them [people from the ‘host’ organizations] involved, or it just won’t work. The changes won’t stick” (anonymous, 2005).

In each context where the demonstration projects were being done, this analytical model was clearly articulated before proceeding with the ‘diagnostic process’ whereby specific problem areas were identified. This was done both as a form of consensus building early in the change process to establish an agreed upon way of viewing the organization, and also as a practical tool that facilitated the de-individualization of anti-racism intervention. They deliberately attempted to construct a tool for change which appeared non-threatening and simple to use, but at the same time was comprehensive in addressing the three elements of organizational systems (people, beliefs and values, and policies and practices).

40 This diagnostic process used in the specific determination of the elements of organizational culture that needed intervention is different from the more general and temporally prior construction of ‘what is wrong and in need of change’ referred to by the diagnostic framing component of the social problems work used to form the general approach to developing the model for organizational change. The specific diagnosis of problematic aspects of organizational culture is of a more particular nature to the organizational culture in question, while the diagnostic framing involved in the development of the model was more general and presumably covered a variety of forms of more specific diagnoses of problems within particular organizations.
6.3.3 The Specific Diagnostic and Prognostic Framing of Systemic Racism in Procurement:

The organizational culture was seen to underpin the more specific problem areas, and so served as the starting point for diagnostic framing. After the stage was set through clarification of the ideas of organizational culture and the form of organizational analysis that would allow for a critical evaluation of that culture, the more specific framing of problems proceeded.

Because MAOBs were targeted for fuller inclusion, the Secretariat outlined some of the key characteristics and misconceptions about these businesses. They did so as a general orientation to the typical nature of these businesses, and this characterization was intended to outline what MAOBs were like so later accommodations could be made within procurement practices to reduce unequal outcomes. This was an area where language selection played a key role in the strategy adopted by the Secretariat, and where some of its critics focus attention. Largely guided by their interest to make anti-racism successful, Secretariat staff used the term ‘barrier’ to indicate what might otherwise be called ‘systemic form of racism’ excluding MAOBs. Secretariat staff judged that ‘barriers’ was less threatening and condemning than the stronger and more indicting ‘racist’. By talking about ‘barriers’ within the system, rather than ‘racist elements’ of the system they hoped to reduce embarrassment or shame, or resistance to the anti-racism efforts they were engaging in. As will be discussed later, ‘barrier-free purchasing’ was the ultimate goal, not explicitly ‘non-racist purchasing’, but it is important to point out that Secretariat staff were aware of the
compromise they made trading terminological specificity for a degree of practical change. Although this might be interpreted as an unnecessary compromise, inaccurate, or even a cop-out, one Secretariat staff reported they were “much more concerned with making things better than terminological accuracy. It doesn’t matter what you call it, it has to change” (2005).

Returning to the characterization of MAOBs, they were framed as generally small businesses, and therefore as suffering from the limitations of all small businesses in terms of limited resources for advertising, purchasing, and growth. They were also seen as generally being undercapitalized, partly because “…financial and other institutions discriminate against racial minority businesses by denying them loans and financing capital” (OARS, 1992b, p3). Secretariat staff also worked in the diagnostic framing to dispel the myth that minority businesses were most interested in doing business within the minority community rather than the larger community. Similarly Aboriginal owned businesses were also seen to be small and undercapitalized. Further, Aboriginal owned businesses were identified as being “…concentrated in a few sectors of the economy” but “…diversifying into other non-traditional areas – this needs to be recognized when planning or awarding government contracts” (OARS, 1992b, p3). These particularities of MAOBs were to be considered in the critical assessment of policies and practices of procurement to see if they served as barriers to full

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41 This was evident throughout the efforts of the OARS, and would serve as a major point of criticism from those who felt it should be named more precisely. Indeed the name of the government body overseeing the entire enterprise was the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat, rather than the Ontario Anti-Racist Secretariat.
inclusion. Once this ‘this is what MAOBs are typically like’ aspect of the diagnostic frame was in place, the diagnostic framing then proceeded to a more critical analysis of elements of procurement that served as ‘barriers’ to MAOBs.

This critical analytical dimension of anti-racism intervention was delicate work, but held the host ministries to considerable account. The term ‘review’ was used rather than ‘audit’, but the analysis amounted to the same thing in terms of assessing problem areas. The critical elements of the prognostic framing of anti-racism at this stage included determining the composition of the intervention team and the terms for the review process. Secretariat staff relied on their inclusive model of organizational change here to cite necessary ‘team’ members. Because the Secretariat’s staff used a combined model for organizational change which drew on aspects of three different approaches to change within organizations including a ‘top down’ component and a ‘stakeholder participation’ component, they prescribed the following in terms of composition of the team: First, the team’s overall composition was to reflect the diversity of the province, with “…racial minority and Aboriginal staff [from the host ministry] in active roles and … gender parity … The team also needs to include senior purchasing staff and representation of management staff…” (OARS, 1992b, p7). Further, “It may be desirable to include representation of racial minority and Aboriginal vendors in the review team” (OARS, 1992b, p7). Ultimately a multi-racial team was settled on, and in keeping with the stakeholder’s participation approach to organizational change, management, procurement, and MAOBs were all to be represented. There
was little controversy over the inclusion of these three parties, the inclusion of white workers from OARS in the intervention teams, however, was somewhat more controversial. The place of whites in anti-racism was an issue in the deliberations OARS staff engaged in while forming the plan for intervention and in their more general discussions of anti-racism. The interviews revealed that there was considerable tension over the involvement of one particular white anti-racism worker involved in the anti-racism projects aimed at organizational change. For example one interviewee commented on one of the white managers in OARS: “I don’t know what the hell makes [that individual] think [they] should be doing anti-racism work” (anonymous 2005). This was only one of many forms of friction that characterized the anti-racism demonstration projects.

A challenging aspect of the framing of racism in organization involved deciding how to deal with what they ultimately called ‘white skin privilege’. Although it has become commonplace to theorize whiteness as integral to the maintenance of racisms (Dei, 2007, Razak, 2007), in the early 1990’s the state of theorizing whiteness and its inclusion in anti-racism strategizing was relatively undeveloped. Today anti-racism practitioners commonly talk about interrogating whiteness, challenging the innocence of whiteness, and the importance of naming whiteness in anti-racism practice. In this regard the demonstration projects’ guiding documents were particularly noteworthy – they stand out as some of the earliest examples of anti-racism practice that involved strategies for dealing with normalized whiteness. These early efforts at challenging whiteness did not,
however, specifically name whiteness as current popular anti-racism theorizing suggests. Secretariat staff reported being aware of the developing notions of whiteness, but assessed that it was too controversial at that time to integrate fully into the prognostic framing and documents used to guide the demonstration projects. They had to be prepared to respond to the issue as it arose through the intervention, and one OARS staff reported that from time to time in the demonstration projects the issue did arise. This was done because Secretariat staff felt there was too much resistance to the ideas of whiteness and white skin privilege, in the early 1990’s they often elicited defensiveness and denial and therefore served as barriers to anti-racism organizational change.

Secretariat staff often had to deal with aspects of personal level changes that went beyond the information contained in the training documents. Secretariat staff reported witnessing the initial phases of some white participants coming to realize their complicity with the inherent whiteness of their work environments. This was a particularly delicate, frustrating, but at times gratifying part of the demonstration projects for one OARS manager overseeing the projects. She reported that in the process of diagnosing problematic aspects of organizational culture in conjunction with the team from the host ministry, she often observed the beginnings of what she described as a “journey”. She was referring to the process of individual or personal change that many white people embark on when they are first introduced to, or come to realize, white privilege. For white people involved in the demonstration projects the identification of white privilege usually
included a personal component whereby participants located themselves as beneficiaries of organizational cultures that favoured them, and disadvantaged others. In addition to gratifying she described this process as frustrating because for most people it is a long and slow journey that, in her words, “…can’t be rushed, can’t be forced, but can only be facilitated. You sit there and do what you can to make it possible, but you can’t make it happen, they have to”. She also reported that in many cases the result was excitement and intensified motivation to change the work environment based on the realization of this aspect of organizational culture.

Secretariat staff felt “It is important to develop a common vision, vocabulary and framework for the equity work about to be undertaken” (OARS, 1992b, p7). To that end some pre-training was to take place. “Before starting on the tasks, the entire team will need at least one equity orientation session on doing business with racial minority vendors and another specifically on Aboriginal vendors’ experiences, needs and concerns in accessing government contracts” (OARS, 1992b, p7). The crux of the review process as outlined in the prognostic frame, however, was to look at how procurement actually happened. “Senior purchasing staff on the team may need to do a presentation on government purchasing policies and practices” (OARS, 1992b, p7).

The clarification of how things were done was intended to “…make it easier for purchasing and non-purchasing people to work together…” in determining where, exactly, the barriers lie (OARS, 1992b, p7). This was
intended to lay bare the procurement process, and to set the terms of contracting out so they could be interrogated for ‘barriers’ that might be inherent in them. This process, especially in conjunction with the aforementioned awareness training, MAOBs characterization, and outlining of the ‘fair purchasing principles’, were to lay the groundwork for identifying what were very specific problems. If all these pieces were in place, Secretariat staff reasoned, there could be little denial of or resistance to change. After the anti-racism guided review of procurement occurred there was to be a report prepared on the “…internal purchasing systems review…” including “…the identification of options or recommendations for change for the ministry to consider” (OARS, 1992b, p7).

This point of the anti-racism change process – where specific procurement practices were interrogated - held the most potential for ‘individualization of racism’, that is, it was the point at which the power and decisions of key purchasing personnel could be identified as the source of previous ‘barriers’. Individuals experiencing changes to the organizations they work in often find it easier to distance themselves and others from aspects of the organization which are the targets of change, and few people are comfortable either identifying themselves or being identified by others as prejudiced or discriminatory. Built into the process, therefore, was the allowance for ignorance or lack of awareness as a possible response to being ‘outed’ as a racist or someone who was responsible for unequal outcomes. The balance Secretariat staff sought between effective problem identification and eradication on the one hand, and pro-active
reduction of potential resistance on the other, involved planning for and reducing the potential negative consequences of ‘exposure’ of individuals directly implicated in racist practices through the intervention.

Further to the presentation by purchasing personnel on procurement practices, “The review team can prepare a list of questions for key purchasing staff/managers to answer in order to identify possible barriers in purchasing process. The answers may also reveal reasons why staff do business in a certain way. In order to encourage openness, pose the questions in a way which is non-threatening and respects the confidentiality of the respondents. (OARS, 1992b, p 9). Although contemporary critics would identify this as problematic and potentially a cop-out, in a practical anti-racism intervention of the early 1990’s this allowance served a purpose – it allowed for the problems to be brought out, for practices to be held accountable for perpetuating inequalities, but not the naming and exposure of racist individuals.

After all the previous groundwork had been laid, the specific problems particular to the intervention context could be identified, and in the final report they could be outlined with recommendations. Some flexibility was built into this stage of the process. The review team had the capacity to “…decide what information is needed from racial minority and Aboriginal vendors, if there is a need to consult with them and whether these consultations need to be large public sessions or small gatherings. The team may decide, for example, that holding focus group consultations with racial minority and Aboriginal businesses
throughout the province is the best and most direct way of obtaining information on barriers. In that case 10 – 12 vendors may be very effective” (OARS, 1992b, p 9). Further, “For best results, hold separate consultations with Aboriginal business people who live on reserve and those who live off reserves” (OARS, 1992b, p9).

Based on previous consultations with MAOBs, OARS had compiled a list of five areas that had consistently been identified as points where barriers existed. These had been identified prior to the writing of the Building Blocks documents, and were actually identified as the building blocks necessary for equity. The construction metaphor was intentionally adopted to reflect a step-wise approach to putting the necessary pieces for greater equity in place. Each ‘block’ was also looked at as an area where systemic racism existed, and where remedies were offered to allow minorities to have access to what they needed to achieve greater parity. The five building blocks were: information, connections, experience/expertise, decision making, and resources (OARS, 1992a, p 9).

“Some groups in Ontario are excluded from the use of these Building Blocks to Equity, and because of this exclusion, they are disadvantaged. Those who are able to use the Building Blocks to Equity become more advantaged, while those who are excluded may become more disadvantaged” (OARS, 1992a, p 3).

The five building blocks were used in all the demonstration projects and adapted specifically for use in each. In the demonstration project under consideration in this chapter, for example, the prognostic framing included the use of these building blocks in the specific directives for organizational change - as
guides to the procurement review process, and as points of evaluating change. In the procurement demonstration project, the use of the five building blocks served as ‘problem areas’ that directed attention of the intervention team to likely areas where systemic racism occurred. In response to each specific problem area recommended ways to reduce barriers were presented. The following discussion outlines these five typical problem areas (building blocks) and some of the specific suggestions for addressing them.

The first concerned information about the nature and availability of potential contracts as unavailable, unknown, or unfamiliar to MAOBs. In response the Secretariat suggested the “…information about tenders be distributed to a list of vendors which includes racial minority and Aboriginal owned vendors” (OARS, 1992b, p 11). The wording of the tenders was also identified as needing revision to be sure that “…messaging is positive and inclusive of racial minority and Aboriginal vendors…” (OARS, 1992b, p 11). The specific problem of some MAOBs lack of experience and familiarity contracting with government was addressed through the suggestion that “…communication [about tenders] contain enough information to assist those who have traditionally not had access to government contracts…” (OARS, 1992b, p 11). Finally, the time frame for submitting tenders was addressed through the suggestion that “…sufficient time be given for less well-resourced vendors to respond” (OARS, 1992b, p 11). These dimensions of prognostic framing were specific and direct responses to the problems the Secretariat staff identified regarding the ways that a lack of
information, familiarity, and experience had served as a ‘barrier’.

Consideration of the second building block identified a lack of ‘connections’ between MAOBs and individuals within the government purchasing system as well as a lack of information on the part of procurement personnel about what MAOBs existed and might be suitable for contracts. Here the response was identified as obligating the procurement personnel to reach out and make connections rather than leaving the responsibility for making connections on the MAOBs. Procurement personnel were to plan and implement “…an outreach strategy to increase its knowledge of and connections with racial minority and Aboriginal vendors” (OARS, 1992b, p11). The procurement personnel were also to encourage local economic development, although nothing more was specified in this regard and what constituted development was not clarified. Finally a database of potential MAOB vendors was to be compiled to keep procurement personnel abreast of who from the MAOB community might be available and suitable for contracts. The prognostic framing in this dimension of problem solving obligated the procurement personnel to change the way they had been doing business in the past and develop and use tools specifically designed to result in fuller inclusion of MAOBs in procurement contracts.

In relation to the third building block problems were identified related to how MAOBs’ experience and expertise were not valued within the government, which left them out of the process of advancing in these areas – a ‘can’t get experience because they don’t have experience’ type of argument. Another major
part of this dimension of diagnostic framing pointed to a much discussed issue – that of the under-valuing of foreign qualifications and work experience. Here two main suggestions were put forward, first that “…expertise and experience that may come from sources other than previous government experience is recognized and valued… (OARS, 1992b, p 11). This did not directly address the devaluation of foreign credentials in the formal sense of equating one form of certification obtained abroad with one from a Canadian source, but it did encourage open-mindedness and careful consideration what experience MAOBs had and how that might be resourced through procurement. The second suggestion made to address problems in this area involved encouraging procurement personnel to positively value the assets that MAOBs possessed through recognizing “…the fact that racial minority and Aboriginal vendors provide access to information and expertise that is not found in more traditional providers of service to government…” (OARS, 1992b, p11). These suggestions required procurement personnel to be receptive to reconsidering how MAOB submissions were evaluated.

In considering the fourth building block to equity, problems were commonly found in the decision making processes surrounding procurement. Lack of representation from MAOBs and minority and Aboriginal communities in the design, evaluation, and awarding of contracts was seen as a significant contributor to systemic racism, exclusion from these decision making processes was seen to directly or potentially lead to bias. Here “…decision making on
proposals includes representation from racial minority and Aboriginal staff” was offered as the remedy (OARS, 1992b, p11). Notably, the specific prognostic framing here did not suggest that MAOBs be involved in decision making positions, although that was identified as part of the problem, rather it was minority and Aboriginal staff from within procurement who were identified as those to be included.

The final building block area concerned resources, and Secretariat staff identified the lack of resources in MAOBs that rendered them less competitive in the bidding process. Here the Secretariat suggested that “…when assessing proposals, recognizing that limited resources may affect the vendor’s ability to respond in a very short timeframe… (OARS, 1992b, p 11). Procurement personnel were also encouraged to accommodate this limitation by “…recognizing that the content of the proposal is more important than the presentation, and that a glossy presentation sometimes depends on resources which racial minority and Aboriginal businesses may not have…” (OARS, 1992b, p 11). The smaller size of MAOBs was directly addressed by encouraging procurement personnel to consider that “…racial minority and Aboriginal businesses may not have the capital or human resources to bid on large contracts, but may be in a position to provide such services through subcontracting…” (OARS, 1992b, p 11). This obligated procurement personnel to adjust the contracting process to accommodate the size and capacity of MAOBs and try to work it into the tendering process, a suggestion clearly aimed at changing to better
suit the characteristics of MAOBs. Further, financial limitations that were seen to exist in many MAOBs were attended to in the prognostic framing by suggesting that “…when assessing payment terms, recognizing the cash flow challenges that small minority and Aboriginal businesses face” (OARS, 1992b, p11). Precisely how this financial limitation was to be addressed, however, was not specified, but one obvious solution would have been partial pre-payment from procurement to MAOBs.

These five building block areas where common barriers to MAOBs were seen to prevent full inclusion in procurement were clearly laid out in the supporting documents for the demonstration projects, and integrated into the training involved with the demonstration projects. All were classic examples of systemic racism in that the unequal outcome did not result from a practice or policy explicitly aimed at exclusion. Rather, exclusion in these cases was seen to result from a combination of seemingly non-racist procurement practices and the particularities of MAOBs – easily and often explained away in organizations as an unfortunate and unintended consequence. The demonstration projects, however, specifically targeted this sort of ‘unintentional’ systemic racism. Although they were not the only problem areas identified, they were the most common. The plan for organizational intervention was comprehensive and flexible enough to deal with other specific problems that might have been identified through the procurement review process.
6.4 Conclusions:

The social problems work done by state workers and managers was the primary determinant of state anti-racism policy in the example examined in this chapter. In their work they were guided primarily by their prior experiences working in anti-racism organizational change, their adherence to a particular model of organizational change, and their anticipation of forms of resistance to their anti-racism work inside the OPS. The analysis of the demonstration projects documentation shed light on the question of the racial composition of anti-racism training and intervention teams, use of ‘in house’ or ‘host’ resources, the question of specific language selection in anti-racism interventions, as well as practical strategies for reducing the potential resistance associated with ‘individualizing’ systemic racism.

The package of diagnostic and prognostic claims included in the documents may be read as the state’s overarching and definitive position concerning ‘embedded’ racism within the systems and structures of the OPS as it pertained to procurement. In this sense they are quite different from change strategies generated by ‘the community’ or by other organizations and civic agencies. It must, however, also be read as a compromise. There was a difference between what Secretariat knew about the nature of racism, and what they believed would be practical and effective in anti-racism interventions, and it was the latter that most impacted the content of the intervention guide. Although this is a clear example of what Schuman et al. (1997) called the ‘principle - implementation
gap’, the decisions Secretariat staff make that produced that gap\textsuperscript{42} were made conscientiously after careful gauging of the capacity for change in organizational contexts in intervention situations. Secretariat staff felt they needed to ‘soften the blow’ of anti-racism intervention, or at least adjust the impact to an acceptable level. This was reflected in their framing of the problems and responses to those problems evident in the Building Blocks documents. A case in point was the way whiteness was managed throughout the social problems work undertaken in the development of the intervention documents, and in the demonstration projects themselves. Although an early understanding of whiteness was part of the diagnostic framing of racism informing the development of demonstration projects, the practical prognostic framing muted the communication of whiteness.

Some of the dimensions of the diagnostic framing indicted the people, systems and practices embedded in the OPS Ministries involved, and the main thrust of change was directed at the host organization. Some of the framing of these problems in procurement attended to the specific characteristics of MAOBs and how they, when brought up against apparently non-racist procurement practices, served as barriers and resulted in unequal outcomes and exclusion of MAOBs. In these cases, the prognostic framing included accommodation recommendations for Ministries to reduce the effects of these barriers.

\textsuperscript{42} The compromises in specific language used in the demonstration projects (anti-racism rather than anti-racist; barrier rather than racist element of policy; white skin privilege rather than hegemonic whiteness) may also be read as forms of reductionism as discussed by Cohen (1992). However, given the broad, flexible, and comprehensive manner in which this demonstration project interrogated the problematic elements and multiple forms of systemic racism in procurement it is considered generally non-reductionist.
CHAPTER SEVEN: JOINT ANTI-RACISM PROJECTS:

7.1 Introduction:

The analyses conducted in the previous three chapters revealed that the nature of state anti-racism interventions was determined differently in different areas of OARS programming. In each of the contexts analyzed in those chapters (the Lewis Inquiry and Report, the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group, and the demonstration projects) the social problems work, and in particular how the problem of racism was framed, played a large part in the determination of state interventions. Like chapters four, five, and six, this chapter addresses the research question: “what determines the nature of state anti-racism initiatives?”

This chapter presents an analysis of the social problems work involved with four specific proposals for joint anti-racism projects. The projects were administered under the Community Grants Funding Program and the Community Partnerships Initiative Project. These two programs were intended to allow the Secretariat to partner with various organizations, agencies, and institutions to support anti-racism initiatives conceived and delivered by those groups rather than by state agents.

The analysis undertaken in this chapter is relevant to several theoretical points under consideration in this thesis. First, Cohen’s (1992) assertion that
practical anti-racism initiatives are reductionist is partially supported. Cohen (1992) asserted that when anti-racism theorizing is translated into ‘doable’ anti-racism projects, typically the complexity and extent of the problem of racism is lost. In its place, we tend to see extremely protracted definitions of where and how racism exists, and equally protracted suggestions for what can and should be done about it.

Second, the notion that anti-racisms tend to be anti-white is only partially supported. Bonnett (1993) noted that some members of the British media had critically alleged that anti-racism often tends to be ‘anti-white’. Some of the examples analyzed in this chapter indicted white people as sources of racism, while others did not. Further, only some of the examples included white people as targets of anti-racism interventions.

The third theoretical point addressed here concerns the central research question “what determines the nature of state anti-racisms?” The analysis of the social problems work of the state’s partners revealed its importance in the determination of community based anti-racism interventions. In these cases anti-racism was determined more by the community partners than by the Secretariat.

The main data sources used for this chapter were the formal records of project proposals submitted to the Secretariat and interviews with state workers involved with the funding programs. The funding programs operated via a process of application for financial support from the community partners to the OARS. Most relevant to claims-making analysis undertaken here, however, was the
requirement that each project proposal include a synopsis of the problem or problems the group purported to address and their intended mode of intervention. This typically took a form similar to that conceived by Loseke’s typology of social problems work - the nature of the problem was described in the prognostic framing, reasons for caring were presented in the motivational framing, and finally practical anti-racism responses were proposed in the prognostic framing.

All available records of joint program funding applications available in the provincial archives were reviewed and, where possible, the following aspects of framing strategies accompanying funding proposals were noted: 43 1) the name of the group applying for support, 2) the diagnostic framing of the problem, 3) the motivational framing of the problem, 4) the prognostic framing and plan for intervention, 5) the amount of financial support provided. The theoretical advantage of this analytical tact was that the specific funding applications were, in effect, a direct response to constructionist analytical questions posed by Loseke’s approach. This allowed for the constructionist analysis of the social problems work done in the examples to be applied directly to a consideration of the broader theoretical concerns listed above. For example, the observation of anti-racisms being anti-white could be assessed fairly directly by examining whether or not

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43 Given the incomplete nature of the records available in the provincial archive, not all funding applications were accompanied by a more fully developed framing of the problem of racism and the proposed response to it. Some, for example, only cited the organization, what they intended to do about racism (sometimes in very vague terms), and the amount of money they requested to carry out their work. As required by the funding program parameters a more detailed proposal for funding would have been produced and submitted with the application, but not all made their way to the provincial archives. Stewart (2005), the former head of the OARS, expressed astonishment at the completeness of the records in the provincial archive, noting that she thought Mike Harris “…had thrown them all in Lake Ontario or gotten rid of them some other way.”
white people figured in the diagnostic and prognostic framing done by the community groups. Cohen’s ‘practical anti-racism is reductionist’ stance could be similarly assessed by examining the breadth or specificity of diagnostic and prognostic framing of racism and anti-racism evident in the cases considered here.

One shortcoming of this analytical strategy, which was also related to the large number of projects from this program, was that the richness and creativity that characterized many of the interventions could not be emphasized in the analysis. Further, some of the records on joint community – state anti-racism projects in the provincial archive contained more detailed information than others. At minimum, a rough sketch of the diagnostic and prognostic framing accompanied funding applications analyzed, and in cases more amenable to constructionist analysis, a detailed framing of racism and proposed anti-racism accompanied the application. Therefore, the specific examples of projects chosen for analysis in this chapter were necessarily selected from that group of projects for which the detailed framing data were available. This allowed for at least some of the richness and specificity of individual interventions to be captured and reflected in the analysis.

7.2 The General Context and Process of Joint Anti-Racism Programming:

The Community Grants Funding Program and the Community
Partnerships Initiative Project\textsuperscript{44} had very broad objectives. They elicited a broad array of funding requests from a variety of groups including government, the civil service, labour unions, ethno-racial groups, cultural associations, professional associations, transition houses, child care facilities, arts and culture groups, and civic agencies including multicultural and race relations committees from various municipalities.\textsuperscript{45} In the funding requirements outlined for the Community Partnerships Initiative Project, the Secretariat indicated they would “…support and participate as partners in the planning and implementation of short-term projects that directly address racial minority issues.”\textsuperscript{(OARS, 1994)}. Following this general statement of intent to support, seven possible foci for projects were listed. If a proposed project met one of these criteria, it would be considered for funding, the more criteria that were covered off in funding application, the stronger the case for approval. The Secretariat outlined that projects:

\begin{itemize}
\item …should focus on one of the following : i) undertake activities which lead to the prevention and elimination of racial conflict; ii) focus on organizational development; iii) increase networking capacity; iv) develop workshops on anti-racism, career opportunities, community economic development possibilities; v) address leadership development and/or provide mentoring
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{44} There were other funding programs operating under the auspices of the OARS, for example they ran a core funding program that was intended to provide operational funding to organizations that were unable to secure funds on their own. According to Debbie Burke-Benn (2005) this allowed several organizations to retain staff and maintain their core activities of advocacy and education.

\textsuperscript{45} The list of community partners was very long, and although I was unable to determine the completeness of the data housed in the provincial archive, what was there suggested an active and broad based funding effort. Burke-Benn (2005) noted there was an effort to spread the support as evenly as possible across the range of potential partners.
and peer support; vi) general initiatives that address anti-racist organizational change as it pertains to racial minority youth (between 17 and 25 years) (OARS, 1991).

Clearly these were very broad criteria.

The Secretariat staff interviewed for this research clearly understood the importance of partnering with the community, both as a means of building trust between various communities and the state, and as a means of promoting practical and effective community-determined anti-racism projects by utilizing existing community resources. The importance of sharing influence over decisions about how to respond to racism was frequently referenced during the interviews, and it was also frequently referred to in the internal communication documents found in the provincial archives.

In keeping with the more open approach to accessing government advocated by the NDP, the OARS frequently provided specific coaching in the form of feedback on proposals that were not initially approved for funding. This feedback mainly concerned how the ideas of community partners could be presented in a manner that met funding requirements of the programs, and did not attempt to influence what the groups wanted to do nor how they wanted to do it. This was very helpful for community groups that had little or no experience.

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46 One of the formal requirements for funding application was that prospective community partners state a ‘willingness to work with the Anti-racism Secretariat.’ Although this suggests a high degree of control by the OARS, Burke-Benn (2005) noted that the Secretariat was not interested in controlling the content and delivery of anti-racism projects conducted in the community. There was a direct effort to hand over control of the delivery of projects to the various community partners rather than retain control within the state (Burke-Benn, 2005). The state had the financial resources, but community partners were seen as more effective agents of anti-racism change.
liaising with government or the bureaucracy. Burke-Benn (2005) reported that in some cases, workers from the OARS actually went out into various communities they felt were underutilizing these programs, and informed community members of the existence of support as well as the way to go about obtaining state support.  

7.3 Case Studies in Community – State Joint Anti-Racism Projects:  

The four cases discussed in this chapter are: 1) a province wide general project undertaken by the Ontario Native Women’s Association (ONWA); 2) a specific Toronto based ‘youth leadership development forum’ done primarily by the Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW); 3) An Ottawa based ‘youth harmony’ project organized by Tongu Youth and Children Evangel, Canada (ToYACE); and finally 4) an ‘inter-community relations’ project conducted by the Walpole Island First Nation (WIFN) in Walpole Island and Wallaceburg, two communities in Chatham Kent close to the Canada – US border. These four cases were selected because they represented projects done on different scales in

47 An internal document located in the provincial archives from a supervisor within OARS ‘strongly reminded’ field agents not to make promises to community organizations about funding and not to reveal the status of their applications or the amounts of funding they might expect prior to ministerial approval. This document alleged that some field agents had been sharing too much information with prospective applicants before the final funding arrangements were signed off, and a last minute change in support from OARS had resulted in great disappointment and anger on the part of prospective community partners who had been led to believe that support was forthcoming. Another internal document on record is from a field agent to the acting director of field services (the branch of OARS that dealt with coaching and approving funding requests). The letter strongly urges reconsideration of support for a particular project that had been previously rejected, citing specifically the applicant’s strong media connections and awareness of the lack of racial minority representation in certain branches of the OARS.
different locations targeting different populations. They therefore represent to some degree the diversity of state - community partnership projects. The Ontario Native Women’s Association and the Walpole Island / Wallaceburg projects both dealt with racisms against First Nations, but the first was with a gender-based province wide organization addressing general principles and guidelines for the development of Native women while the second dealt with specific conflict between two small adjacent communities in the South-West corner of Ontario. The projects done by the Canadian Council of Muslim Women and the Tongu Youth and Children Evangel Canada both dealt with youth (ages 17 – 25), but the first specifically addressed anti-Muslim sentiments in Toronto while the latter addressed visible minority (but primarily black) youth in Ottawa. In the following four sections each example is briefly introduced, the framing of racism and anti-racism in the funding application is analyzed from a constructionist perspective, and the broader theoretical implications of the constructionist analysis are presented.

7.3.1 The Ontario Native Women’s Association’s “Project Designed to Combat Racism”:

The Ontario Native Women’s Association work analyzed here was sponsored through the Community Project Grants Program in 1991 and 1992. They were a political advocacy group representing all Native women in Ontario, regardless of legal categorization. They were generally concerned with the
“…preservation and promotion of Native Indian culture, language, and heritage.” (ONWA, 1991). Their interests were quite broad and they served as a “…forum through which Native women can become involved in the solution of their problems…” (ONWA, 1991).

The ONWA applied for $34,960.00 to help pay the projected $43,700.00 cost for a one year appointment of a ‘race relations’ coordinator within their ranks to promote and generally support their vision of equity and justice. The social problems work accompanying the funding request addressed in a very general manner the principles and ideals the person in the position was to adhere to in their work within the ONWA and beyond. As was often the case in practical anti-racism work, the formal or recorded titles of projects and positions did not equate directly with activities and work done in the community. The title of the position, ‘race relations coordinator’, for example, was a hold over from the previous government’s focus on race relations rather than anti-racism. The title of the project, ‘A Project Designed to Combat Racism’ only roughly reflected the efforts the money would be put towards. Racism was indeed combated through this project, but through the general development and advancement of First Nations women.

The tone of the diagnostic framing in this example was condemnatory of white society and colonialism, and “…the coming of the white man” was cited as the general root cause for the current situation (ONWA, 1991). The diagnostic framing located Native women in the following manner: “…at the bottom of the
social ladder, the economic ladder, and indeed the bottom of any ladder. Whether we examine the educational circumstances, the employment situation, the factors of family stability, criminal involvement ratios, alcohol and drug abuse rates, and personal health and wellbeing, this holds true.” (ONWA, 1991) A litany of statistical comparisons highlighting the depressed socio-economic situation of Native women relative to immigrant women and Canadian-born women further supported the general diagnostic framing.

The motivational framing implicit in the supporting documents, and was perhaps most pointedly presented by an entitlement claim to basic security: “Aboriginal women are entitled to a decent place to live, to be able to raise their children in an acceptable degree of comfort and security. This is not happening.” (ONWA, 1991). They also cited government inaction in the wake of several prior studies that clearly outlined racial inequality using statistical and qualitative measures.

The prognostic framing in this example began with identifying women themselves as the resources that could be developed and put to use for the betterment of their communities: “…what is there in my community that can be economically utilized and beneficial to me or my community? The answer is to be formed in ourselves.” (ONWA, 1991). Developing the potential of women to the fullest was seen as the anti-racism answer in this case, the women themselves would serve as the response to the problem, primarily through advocacy and personal/community development.
This general, principle-oriented prognostic framing was situated relative to the broader stated concerns of the ONWA (specifically the earlier stated focus on preserving culture, language, and heritage).

We realize that our development does not depend on a return to the past, or an out-of-hand rejection of non-native technologies. We need a blending of our cultural, economic, social, and political aspirations with the appropriate tools for today. We want to take from the past, and blend it with the present, and come out with something that is acceptable to and can be carried out by us (ONWA, 1991).

Clearly the prognostic framing stressed autonomy from outsiders and the state in addressing challenges and problems. In this case the ‘race relations coordinator’ was certainly not coordinating race relations. Although she may have done some race relations work, primarily she was to support and “…encourage Indian women to assume a more positive and active part in developing skills to support their people in the achievement of their rightful place in society.” (ONWA, 1991).

The overall framing of racism in this example reflected a broad based and historical perspective on the nature of racism, clearly not reductionist in any sense of Cohen’s (1992) use of the concept. The extensive nature of the statistical and comparative support establishing First Nations women’s relative position in Canadian society covered many facets of life including education, work, criminal justice involvement, family stability, welfare reliance, alcohol and drug abuse rates as well as others. Clearly this reflects a broad understanding of the areas of
life where racism has an impact. The prognostic framing, however, was more protracted in that it narrowed the focus of anti-racism work on First Nations women. Although the target for anti-racism intervention was narrowed, the broad based nature of possible and intended forms of intervention (development and support of women generally) left room for considerable flexibility for actual anti-racism work this project supported.

Notably, although ‘white man’ was indicted in the diagnostic framing, the prognostic framing included no reference to addressing white people or white society. This was a form of anti-racism focussing on the development of victims of racism, not changing the attitudes, behaviour or practices of institutional or individual perpetrators of racism. To put this in terms of the ‘anti-racism is anti-white’ assertion, the diagnostic framing was anti-white, but the prognostic framing was not.

Finally, in this case it is clear given the stated intent to be independent in the determination and pursuit of anti-racist goals (here noted as the general development of women as resources in and for their communities) that the community partners, rather than the state, determined the specific nature of anti-racism work.
7.3.2 The Canadian Council of Muslim Women’s “Youth Leadership Development Forum”:

This case involved Canadian Council of Muslim Women\(^{48}\) receiving $3100.00 for an anti-racism project that intended to address anti-Muslim sentiment and activity in Toronto by bringing together youth from various faith backgrounds for a day of discussion. In the prognostic framing of the issue the conflict between Muslim youth and youth from other religions was identified as having an extra-Canadian source, specifically “…tensions in Bosnia and India” between Muslim and non-Muslim groups\(^{49}\) (CCMW, 1993). “Racial remarks, discriminatory behaviour and other forms of hostility are often directed against Muslim youth from Arab, Bosnian, South Asian and Somali origins. Canadian Muslim youth feel that their identity and integrity are maligned and questioned” (CCMW, 1993). A structural and systemic dimension to the problem was also drawn out in prognostic framing by noting “…that the media, educational institutions and religious groups display a systemic silence, avoidance or ignorance of fair Muslim perspectives. Some observe an open anti Muslim

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\(^{48}\) The Canadian Council of Muslim Women assumed the lead role in organizing the day of discussion and, of particular importance to the analysis undertaken here, framing the problem and response in the funding application. In this process they consulted with other agencies and groups on the content of the discussions and especially for the selection of non-Muslim participants for the inter-faith talks. These groups included: The Canadian Council of Churches, Muslim Youth of Canada, Student-Christian movement, the Hindu Solidarity Association, the Ontario Council of Sikhs, York University, and the Urban Alliance on Race Relations.

\(^{49}\) In Bosnia-Hercegovina there was conflict between Muslims and Christians, while in India there was conflict between Muslims and Hindus. Although the nature and outcome of these conflicts is complex and rooted in historical experiences of those groups, for purposes of analysis in this thesis they will be conceived of as ‘extra-Canadian’ conflicts that influenced the expression of inter-racial and inter-faith conflicts in Canada.
stance” (CCMW, 1993). In the prognostic framing, then, extra-Canadian conflicts, extra-racial conflicts, and structural elements of Canadian society were presented as influencing religious and racial aggression towards Muslim youth in Metro Toronto. This was a relatively broad prognostic framing which included a more specific citing of the negative effects of these conflicts on individual Muslim youth which also appeared in the motivational framing of this issue.

The motivational framing referenced the Lewis Report’s identification of the need to respond to youth victims of racism. Further, the citing of Ontario’s “...commitment to zero-tolerance of racism and religious bigotry in any shape or form” obliged the state to support interventions aimed at harmonizing relations between groups (CCMW, 1993). Personal level impacts were also cited, “...there is a feeling among Canadian Muslim youth in Metro Toronto that they are humiliated and discriminated against because of their racial and religious backgrounds. This affects their mental health, performance at school and at work, and meaningful participation in Canadian society” (CCMW, 1993).

The prognostic framing was somewhat narrower than the diagnostic framing. Intervention into the conflicts abroad was not proposed, rather attention was paid to local attempts to “...reassure Merto Muslim youth that their rights to self-identity, self worth, equality and freedom of religion are guaranteed under the charter of rights and freedoms” (CCMW, 1993). A forum for open discussions between youth from the various groups involved in the conflict was proposed. The specific methods used as a basis for inter-faith discussions were to be
videotapes, simulations of inter-faith and racist conflict, and case studies. A basic method of material presentation followed by group discussion was used, with Muslim and non-Muslim adults serving as facilitators/moderators. There was also a key-note speaker from the Secretariat provided to outline the Province’s perspective on the issues, and support the general principles of inclusion and non-discrimination. These efforts were intended to provide the youth participants with “…training in conflict mediation, anti-racist education, networking and partnership strategies across faith and racial boundaries” (CCMW, 1993).

Significantly, this was not an exclusively anti-racist effort, and the targets for intervention were chosen on the basis of faith, not race. There was, however, an implicit anti-racism component to this project. Talking across borders, it was hoped, would educate and therefore reduce the likelihood of discrimination in the future. It would also confirm the more widely held and legislatively supported view that in Canada individuals were to be free from religious and racial persecution.

The framing of the issue in this example was not reductionist. Clearly the complexity of the overlap of race and religion was part of the framing, as was the effect of conflicts occurring in other parts of the world. Further, the open-ended nature of the discussions proposed in the prognostic framing support a non-reductionist approach to this anti-racism project. This example did not lend support to Cohen’s (1992) assertion that practical anti-racisms are reductionist.
The argument that anti-racism tends to be anti-white also was not supported in the analysis of this example. Nowhere in the framing of this issue was whiteness cited, rather religious affiliation was the key line along which conflicting groups were identified. The identifiers ‘Christian’ and ‘Hindu’ were used, not ‘white’. Although ‘racial remarks’ and ‘racial background’ were referenced, they were not emphasized as they were in other cases such as those dealing with anti-black racism or racism towards First Nations. In the practical delivery of the anti-racism project, however, opportunity was provided for the explicit discussion of racisms generated by white people, albeit within the context of a religious identity that opposed and criticized Muslims rather than an exclusively white vs non-white conception and framing of the issue.

The state did not exert control over the specific content of the discussions that took place in this anti-racism project. They did influence the nature of the anti-racism intervention through providing a key-note speaker, and therefore offered one topic amongst many for discussion that day, but that constituted only a portion of the day’s activities, and the discussions between members of conflicting groups was by its nature uncontrollable by the state. The moderators, notably from differing faith backgrounds, also exerted some control, but final determination of the nature of this project lay with the participants themselves, and would have been influenced by the nature of the material they were provided with as a basis for their discussions and their personal perspectives on the topics being discussed.
7.3.3 Tongu Youth and Children Evangel, Canada’s “Youth Harmony Club”:

This example involved a community development organization, Tongu Youth and Children Evangel Canada, responding to the “aimlessness” of youth at risk through a skills development, cultural adaptation, and cross-race mentorship program in Ottawa (ToYACE, 1993). They received $25,000.00 from the Secretariat to aid in the overall program cost of $45,000.00, the remaining costs were covered by the Black Business Association of Ottawa-Carleton, the Ontario Ministry of Education, and the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program of Immigration Canada. In addition to other services, ToYACE helped visible minority immigrants and refugees “…develop appropriate techniques for dealing with racism” under their ‘cultural adaptation program’ (ToYACE, 1993).

The diagnostic framing of racism in this example began with noting that “…youngsters of all communities aimlessly roam the shopping malls in Ottawa…” and “…the frequency for visible minority youths, especially blacks, attracts special attention. This aimlessness manifests itself in social vices such as shoplifting, drugs, and fighting” (ToYACE, 1993). ‘Colorism’ was also identified in the diagnostic frame, “Those with darker skin colour such as blacks experience a more severe form of racial discrimination” (ToYACE, 1993). The prognostic framing was then broadened and included references to the systemic racism in the education system: “The frustration of black children with the existing school curriculum and the discriminatory practices of mainstream teachers result in high
drop out rates…” (ToYACE, 1993). And: “…the discriminatory practices of the Ontario school system…by arbitrarily placing them in ‘special programs’, marking them down, using curriculum that is mainstream focused, as well as racial overtones from their teachers and peers…” (ToYACE, 1993).

Inadequate adaptation to Canadian society was noted as part of the issue in the diagnostic framing, and skills training and anti-racist education was seen to be the response. Further structural dimensions of the prognostic frame included indicting the intentional racist efforts of the mainstream: “The mainstream has over the years put in place policies and practices aimed at blocking the socio-economic prosperity of visible minorities, especially blacks” although no more specific commentary was offered on these intentional racist efforts.

Some white youth were noted as being racist and instigating inter-racial conflict, “…there is violence between black and white youths due to name calling and racial overtones from the latter. Many white youngsters are increasingly being attracted to emerging racist organizations” (ToYACE, 1993). Some black youth were presented as having a “…lack of problem-solving skills particularly concerning conflict resolution techniques…” therefore “…many youngsters resort to physical violence as a means of redressing their differences or getting even” (ToYACE, 1993). Further, “To protect themselves from these physical attacks or to avenge attacks from stronger peers, many students arm themselves with assault weapons” (ToYACE, 1993) Clearly, the diagnostic framing in this example presented a volatile and dangerous situation.
The motivational framing in this example involved referring to government stated priorities of the funding program, the prioritization of anti-racism focusing on youth outlined in the Lewis Report, as well as more generally the “…great cost to society” imposed by racism (ToYACE, 1993).

The prognostic framing in this example included general and specific dimensions. Broad references intended to downplay differences such as “We are all human beings of the same biological constitution” and “Racial harmony can best be achieved by working and living together” were presented (ToYACE, 1993). Most of the prognostic framing, however, was of a more specific nature. The main proposal in the prognostic frame involved a year long program for 30 students (75% visible minority and 25% mainstream) involving skills development, cultural adaptation, and cross-race mentorship. This program was intended to “…improve their chances of securing jobs in Canada, adapt effectively to their new environment, and build their self-confidence in order to enable them [to] compete effectively in the job market” (ToYACE, 1993). Although the education system figured prominently in the diagnostic framing, it was not part of the prognostic framing of these issues. White youth and mainstream youth also figured prominently in the diagnostic framing, and the mainstream youth selected for the year long program were identified as “…having difficulty with other cultures/races” (ToYACE, 1993). Through participation in a racial harmony conference and cross-cultural seminars, the program intended to “…make the mainstream participants become more sensitized to racial issues and
be more willing to become partners in the anti-racism campaign” (ToYACE, 1993).

Participation in this program included specific skills training for all participants intended to prepare them for inclusion in a province wide employment program called Jobs Ontario Youth (JOY), and this was identified as a significant motivator for youth to participate in the Harmony Club. Besides learning job skills, tolerance, and anti-racism, they were to get good summer jobs through participation which in the early 1990’s would have been an effective motivator.

Cohen’s (1992) notion of anti-racism being reductionist is partially supported in this example. The diagnostic framing was generally broad, condemning the structure of society, the ‘mainstream’, and both visible minority and white youth as generating problems. The prognostic framing narrowed the focus of the response to youth themselves, rather than systemic dimensions of education system which had figured so prominently in the diagnostic indictments. Attempts to address a broad audience were carried out through the method of having visible minority and mainstream youth publicly perform skits in malls and schools intended to raise awareness to the problem of inter-racial conflict and systemic discrimination. The education system did appear in the prognostic framing, but only as a forum for increased awareness rather than as a target of organizational change.
This example is of particular relevance to the assertion that anti-racism tends to be anti-white. In this instance, it is more accurate to say anti-racism was anti-white supremacy. Racist organizations, racist white youth, and an intentionally racist mainstream were central to the diagnostic framing, and were also part of the prognostic framing and practical anti-racism activities. Indeed, this was the main thrust of this project, to bring youth in conflict with one another together and work with them to overcome perceived differences and animosities, and at the same time provide practical job related skills and cross cultural education. It addressed racism by attending to deficiencies of people on both sides of the conflict.

The example of the Youth Harmony Club was an instance where community partners held much more influence over the nature and content of anti-racism programming than did the Secretariat. As with earlier examples the Secretariat provided financial support, but the real and difficult work of anti-racist intervention in this example was done by their community partners. This is clear in the diagnostic and especially the prognostic framing of the issue.

7.3.4 The Walpole Island First Nation’s “Living in a Diverse Community” Project:

‘Living in a Diverse Community’ was a 10 day intensive anti-racism training program sponsored by the Secretariat and delivered by the Walpole Island First Nation to members from its community and the adjacent non-native
community of Wallaceburg. The population of Walpole Island was 3000 and the population of Wallaceburg was 12,000, and members of the two communities came into frequent contact with one another. Wallaceburg\textsuperscript{50} was the locale of most frequent interaction as people from Walpole Island frequently went into town to shop, eat, attend school, recreate, and access health and other services. Many of the Wallaceburg population went to the beach at Walpole Island and used the services supporting hunting and fishing. Sports teams, especially baseball and hockey teams of all ages, went back and forth between the two communities competing against each another. With this frequent interaction came “…increased opportunity for racial tension, prejudice and stereotyping” (WIFN, 1993).

The diagnostic framing in this example included both specific and broad components. The specific prognostic framing noted issues particular to conflict between members of the two communities, and four areas were identified for particular attention: education, recreation services, police services and retail shopping that “Occurrences of racism within the schools lead to fighting and polarization of the children…” (WIFN, 1993).

Intercommunity rivalries [in hockey and baseball] are easily used as vehicles of racial discrimination…racial slurs are often used to gain advantage by distracting the opposing team. This leads to increased aggression and fighting during competition…this aggression doesn’t end when the ball game or hockey game ends. It is carried back to the schools and to the streets in the form of tension,

\textsuperscript{50}The larger Wallacburg provided services used by both its population and the population from Walpole Island First Nation, including: retail shopping, police services, judicial and legal services, commercial and industrial employment, health services, recreation services, dining, and education services. All these areas of interaction were cited as housing racism and in need of attention.
resentment and the desire to ‘get even’ (WIFN, 1993).

Concerning policing services, “In incidents of aggression between native and non-native persons … the police authority assume that the native person is the problem and instigator…This may be a result of stereotyping, prejudice and fear” (WIFN, 1993). Finally, the specific prognostic framing in this example noted the under-representation of Native people in Wallaceburg’s retail sector.

More generally, the prognostic framing of these issues referenced a general understanding of Native history and rights across the Canadian population. “Federal and Provincial policies related to taxation, funding and land claims go unexplained to the general public. This fosters misconceptions that lead to resentment and further deterioration of racial harmony” (WIFN, 1993).

The basic form of anti-racism advocated was the use of specific training to counter the resentment and physical violence between the two communities. A ‘train the trainers’ approach was adopted whereby the individuals participating in the anti-racism project from both communities were expected to leave the project and act as anti-racism educators and facilitators in formal and informal capacities in their respective personal and professional capacities. Participants were to be provided with “…the necessary skills and knowledge to transmit this information to others persons” (WIFN, 1993). Wallaceburg retailers, for example, were expected to ‘spread the word’ to other retailers who did not participate in the anti-racism training. Likewise the participating police officers were expected to use
the training in their interactions with the Walpole Island population, and discuss and promote anti-racism within the ranks of the Wallaceburg police services.

Concerning the specific content of the anti-racism project, the prognostic framing incorporated anti-racism efforts stemming from both the broad and the narrower diagnostic framing of this issue. Broadly, the anti-racism training was to attend to the identified pan-Canadian ignorance about First Nations history and culture. More specifically, it was to be directed to participants from both communities, including individuals from Wallaceburg who worked in the police, educational, retail and recreational sectors who were identified for special attention.

In terms of what was actually to be done in the project, education and training was aimed at increasing sensitization of participants by “…increase[ing] participants knowledge…of the dynamics, effects and consequences of racism” (WIFN, 1993). Frank discussions about what racism was, how it worked, and what it resulted in for both Native and non-Native individuals was intended to heighten awareness of what was wrong with being racist. This included increasing the “…understanding [of] the relevance in their own lives of these issues and to prepare them for working with others in the community.” Further to this ‘personalization of racism’ tact was the identification in the prognostic framing of the need to discuss how experiences with racism are internalized by victims and perpetrators. This very personal dimension to anti-racism work is identified as one of the most difficult to address, especially in a mixed group setting. Anti-racism
trainers frequently note that it is much easier and more comfortable for participants to locate and discuss racisms outside their immediate experience. Talking about how you benefit by or have been hurt by racism is much more difficult.

The prognostic framing of the issue also included attempts to use cultural awareness training to both “…examine similarities while honouring political and historical differences” (WIFN, 1993). An exchange program was also used to strengthen sensitivity training efforts. Selection for participation was on a voluntary basis, but given the intensity and frequency of physical confrontations between members of the two communities there was sufficient will on both sides for people from the various sectors to come forward in an attempt to use the program as a means to address the conflict.

This constructionist analysis of this example holds significance for the three broader theoretical concerns this chapter addresses. First, Cohen’s reductionist stance is not supported. In both the diagnostic and prognostic framing of the issue, attention is paid to both the structural and individual dimensions of racism. The training undertaken in this example intended to cover large scale historical, cultural, social and political issues that underpinned the more interpersonal forms of conflict the communities were struggling to address. Further, this project went as far as any into the realm of the personal dimensions

51 Proponents of mandatory anti-racism training programs typically identify about 30% of ‘forced’ participants are open to what is presented, and the remaining 70% are either indifferent or openly resistant to the messages being taught. This low rate of openness or receptivity suggests that such programs have limited impact (Tator, 2005).
of racism, both from perpetrator’s and victim’s perspectives. Here the conception of racism in the diagnostic framing was not reduced when translated into practical anti-racism interventions through the prognostic framing of these issues.

The assertion that most anti-racism is anti-white was not supported. Neither white people nor whiteness was specifically identified in the framing of these issues. Rather, the way some white residents thought and behaved was problematized, and white people were included as targets of anti-racism intervention alongside First Nations people. Both were to learn about the history and perspectives of the other, and aggression and stereotyping on the part of all involved in the training was to be addressed.

Finally, the constructionist analysis undertaken here reveals that although the state provided financial support, it did not determine the nature of the anti-racism intervention. Like the project addressing anti-Muslim activities in Toronto, the specific content of the training depended mostly on the developers and providers of the training and because of the project’s intent to personalize racism, the individual perspectives and experiences of participants would have heavily influenced the actual content of the training. Indeed, this was an example of the type of anti-racism work the state was very ill-equipped to do – it was localized and specifically tailored to what was happening in and between the two communities involved. In this type of example the state was reliant on its community partners to determine and deliver anti-racism programming.
7.4 Conclusions:

Because the theoretical implications of the constructionist analyses were discussed relative to each example considered in this chapter, they will only be briefly reviewed here. First, considering Cohen’s (1992) notion that practical anti-racism is reductionist, the constructionist analysis revealed that Cohen’s observations were generally supported in three of the examples (not in the Walpole Island example). Where reductionism was evident it occurred in the prognostic framing, and was more a result of program funding parameters than preference for narrow diagnostic framing by community partners. The diagnostic framing of racism in all cases was quite broad, and an appreciation of the far-reaching and complex nature of racism was evident in all cases.

Second, the anti-racism is anti-white assertion was only partially supported. As with the first theoretical point from Cohen, it was refined through the constructionist analysis done in this chapter. Of the four examples chosen for specific discussion here, three included white people as the targets for anti-racism interventions,

52 and they did so as only one component of a broader effort to deal with racism. Although white people were indicted to a greater or lesser degree in

52 More specifically, ‘whiteness’ was not ever mentioned in the framing of racisms assessed in these examples. Although as noted earlier in the analysis on anti-racism in organizational cultures, whiteness as a theoretical and analytical category was in its infancy in the early 1990’s and although the individuals undertaking the anti-racism work in these examples may have known it (as whiteness or some other version of a similar concept) it was not referenced in any examples other than the work done by the Ontario Native Women’s association. The ONWA referenced the prominent place of Native women in pre-contact Native societies: “…prior to the coming of the white man, the women and their families were vital and respected members of the community…” (Ontario Native Women’s Association, 1991).
the diagnostic framing of racism in all cases discussed in this chapter, they were variably included in the prognostic framing and usually in ways that were not explicitly ‘anti-white’.

Third, the analysis conducted in this chapter lends strong support to the notion that the state did not determine the nature of state anti-racism alone. In fact, this was the area of programming where agents outside the OARS had the highest degree of influence on the nature of anti-racism initiatives\textsuperscript{53}. Put simply, ‘community partners’ determined the specific nature of anti-racism interventions, but they could only do so under programs that accorded them the opportunity to define racisms and resources to respond to racisms. The general political will and financial resources were provided by the state, but the specific nature of anti-racism interventions was determined by the state’s community partners.

\textsuperscript{53} Montpetit (2004) asserted that when community groups went beyond making demands for change (‘strategic’ communication) to offering solutions to problems the state had to deal with (‘problem solving’) they became more effective in influencing state policy. Here the diagnostic framing of racism may be roughly likened to ‘strategic’ demands, and the prognostic framing wherein solutions and practical responses to racisms were proposed, may be seen as effective ‘problem solving’ and therefore heavily relied on by the state.
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS:

8.1 Introduction:

This final chapter presents an overview of the conclusions drawn from the analyses undertaken through this research. First, I present a discussion of the central research questions that guided analysis throughout the thesis, then I address the implications of the research for four secondary theoretical considerations. In the final section I discuss three directions for further thought and study on state anti-racism.

8.2 Answers to the Central Research Questions:

The central research questions addressed in this thesis were: “Why do states undertake anti-racism initiatives?” and “What determines the nature of state anti-racism initiatives?” To answer these questions, the case of the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat was considered by analyzing aspects of its emergence and operation. Existing theoretical explanations were expanded and modified with analyses undertaken from a constructionist perspective that focused on the social problems work involved in different facets of the Secretariat’s work.

In response to the first research question, the NDP undertook anti-racism because they believed in its fundamental tenets, they had close ties to communities that wanted the government to do something about racism, and the
Yonge Street riot brought issues of racism to a head. While partisan ideological commitment and political ties with ethno-racial communities were necessary for the state to commit to undertake anti-racisms, significant external events (the Yonge Street riot) provided the final motivational force that accelerated state anti-racism in Ontario.

The answer to the second research question is contingent on the policy making context in question. The constructionist analysis undertaken in this research highlighted the fact that the specifics of anti-racism policy depend on the framing of racism as a social problem and anti-racism as a response to that problem. In the examples examined through this research, the perspectives of representatives from ‘victim communities’ played a central role in framing how racism was understood. Their knowledge and experience was relied on for the diagnostic and prognostic framing of racisms necessary for policy making. This afforded them considerable influence in determining the nature of state anti-racism interventions.

The precise role of social problems work and claims making activities in the anti-racism policy making process was not consistent across policy making contexts. Chapters four, five, six, and seven revealed that claims making in relation to anti-racism policy was highly varied. The NDP determined a general course of action at the beginning of their tenure that included a plan for consulting community partners in the more specific determination of initiatives. In some contexts, community claims makers had more influence on policy making than in
other contexts. The state was able to control and determine certain elements of anti-racism initiatives, usually through setting program parameters or priorities for inquiries. Beyond that, however, much more influence fell to community and other partners in the determination of the specifics of anti-racism programs. For example, with the Lewis Inquiry and Report, the government set the broad parameters of those processes, but beyond that Stephen Lewis, along with a plethora of community ‘consultants’, decided what would be emphasized in the advice submitted to government.

Similarly, with the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group, the state mandated debate and negotiation between groups in an effort to generate consensus concerning a definition of racism and where each group was ‘located’ relative to racism. The individual group representatives determined how they would frame the perspectives of their groups, and how they would respond to framing by other representatives, and ultimately what would be offered to the government in their final report.

The case of the demonstration projects was somewhat different from the cases previously noted. Here state officials, rather than extra-state or community claims makers, determined the nature of interventions. This reflected a division of labor wherein state agents assumed responsibility for organizational change strategies within the OPS, and other agents of change determined the nature of interventions elsewhere. The strategy for anti-racism organizational change was generated by OARS management and workers and therefore reflected their
framing of the problem of systemic racism in organizational cultures of the OPS, and responses to that problem.

The cases of joint projects revealed the important influence of the state’s community based partners in deciding where and precisely how small scale anti-racism efforts should happen. Here the state set general program parameters, but did so in a broad manner that afforded community groups considerable influence on small scale projects.

8.3 Secondary Theoretical Considerations:

The central theoretical questions addressed in this research were: “Why do states undertake anti-racism initiatives?” and “What determines the nature of state anti-racism initiatives?” These questions emerged through the literature review as the central concerns of this research. Through the literature review several other theoretical points also stood out as interesting and appropriately addressed through this research. In the following discussion some concluding observations are offered in relation to five of these secondary theoretical concerns.

8.3.1 Reductionism in Anti-Racism Practice:

According to Cohen (1992), practical anti-racism interventions tend to reduce the complexity of the social problem of racism. The constructionist
analysis done through this research suggested some refinements to Cohen’s observations. Although it may be said that the Lewis Inquiry and Report ‘reduced’ the more general problem of racism in Ontario to that affecting black communities, in terms of the extensive inventory of structural and systemic changes the Report advocated it was decidedly non-reductionist. The Lewis Report is more accurately portrayed as specifically focussed on issues affecting blacks rather than reductionist in its prognostic framing. Reductionism was not evident in the organizational change work undertaken by the Secretariat. An anti-racism target of altering the structure, processes, and culture of large scale organizations is clearly not reductionist. It attended to both the systemic and attitudinal dimensions of racism. Reductionism was also not part of the work of the OARWG, indeed reductionism would have been highly unlikely given the plethora of perspectives and experiences represented in that advisory body. There were struggles to specify the focus of state anti-racism, and some members advocated a narrowed, and therefore somewhat reductionist focus excluding Jews, but ultimately the group settled on a very broad-based vision of anti-racism. Although there was some practical reductionism evident in the joint projects, all were non-reductionist in diagnostic framing, and where there was reductionism in prognostic frames it resulted not from narrow visions but rather from the practicalities of program delivery.
8.3.2 Anti-whiteness in Anti-Racism:

It has been argued that most practical anti-racism involved being, at least in part, ‘anti-white’. White people and institutions established by white society figured prominently in the many of the diagnostic frames of racism examined in this research. In different examples white police were arresting and shooting black youth, the inclusion of white Jews was seen as problematic in some collective anti-racism efforts, whiteness as an embedded ideology was problematized in the demonstration projects, white kids were taunting and instigating violence with visible minority and black kids, and the coming of the white man was the root source of many problems First Nations people experienced. White people and whiteness (both implicitly and explicitly referenced), were prominent in many of the prognostic frames examined for this research. In these ways the anti-racism efforts undertaken and sponsored by the OARS may be seen to be anti-whiteness.

In some framing strategies examined through this research, anti-whiteness was not evident. The inclusion of whites as partners in anti-racism, for example, was often supported through prognostic framing of racism.

8.3.3 State Solicitation of Information for Policymaking:

Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1996, p 296) argued that state approaches to soliciting information from extra-state sources greatly influenced the production and presentation of information needed for policymaking. Rueschemeyer and
Skocpol (1996) viewed this as a potential form of containment or regulation of extra-state interests. In the cases examined for this research, this was not the case. Requests for input and consultations were open and general, community partners evidently has great latitude in offering recommendations, and the OARS was so responsive to extra-state suggestion that containment can not be seen to be the main intent of the Secretariat. Although they did ‘dictate’ the nature of demonstration projects, the Lewis Inquiry and Report as well as the OARAWG and joint projects are more accurately conceived as forms of empowerment of extra-state actors in policymaking. It should be noted that this ultimately depended on the willingness of the state to be open to power-sharing, but in the case of the OARS this was fairly clear. The Secretariat wanted to facilitate anti-racism, not contain it. An unavoidable degree of regulation associated with setting program parameters and funding requirements remained inheret in the state as it exercised its administrative role, but this was intentionally minimized in many areas of policy and programming undertaken within the OARS.

Montpetit’s (2004) observation that ‘problem solving’ is of more practical use to governments than ‘strategic’ demands was supported throughout the research. Montpetit asserted that when groups make general demands, rather than offer specific problem solving strategies, they have less effect on policy and are of less use to governments open to community input. Indeed most of the claims making done by state change agents and community partners was a form of problem solving, including clear delineations of where racism was located, how it
worked, and importantly what might be done about it.

8.3.4 The ‘Statization’ of Anti-Racism:

The entire OARS ‘experiment’ may be seen as an example of what Jessop (1990) called ‘statization’. For Jessop, statization involves the ways different branches of the state come into being and take particular forms. The establishment of the OARS, and the attempts to replace a race-relations ethos with anti-racism ideological stance in policy and programming were key to the statization process, and this was facilitated structurally by transitioning the older Race Relations Directorate to the newer Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat. The process of statization also included recruiting key anti-racism advocates from the community to act as agents of change within the bureaucracy. In this manner, anti-racism was literally brought into the state, certain individuals personified anti-racism within their state capacities. More relevant to the constructionist approach used in this research, statization included reliance on the community for direction and specific framings of racisms in the determination of the nature and content of specific anti-racism projects.

In the OARS example of statization, anti-racism was marginalized by virtue of its location in a “…minor and unimportant…” ministry (Henry, 2005). The fact that it achieved even this degree of state integration and institutionalization, in combination with its attendant programs and policies,
however, is notable. This process of statization is thought by many to represent the ‘high water mark’ of state anti-racism in Canada (Trickey, 1997). The ultimate demise of the OARS under the Harris government, however, attests to the relative fragility and brevity of the overall statization process. Thin strands of anti-racism continue, some implicit in other state based equity agendas, and others through the work of ex-OARS staff representing anti-racism in their post-OARS placements in the public sector. There is also a significant strain of anti-racism rooted in Canadian academia.

8.4 Directions for Further Thought and Study:

Throughout the course of this research several issues arose as potentially interesting and fruitful avenues for future investigation. The following three stood out as interesting potential future projects.

First, the issue of the precise relationship between Aboriginal Peoples and anti-racism arose as several points in the research. Their relative absence from the Lewis Inquiry and Report, their distinct legal and political status, and their complicated relationship to various levels of government, including forms of self government, all stood out in the research. There was some inclusion of the concerns of Aboriginal people in the activities of the OARS, and, like other minoritized groups, they are affected by other equity initiatives such as employment equity. Explicit state anti-racism initiatives hold potential to address some concerns of Aboriginal Peoples, especially patterns of integration into
broaden social structures and systems. Anti-racism efforts to reduce systemic racism in the labour market, for example, are of import to Aboriginal People. Similarly, as evidenced through some joint anti-racism projects undertaken between various First Nations and the OARS, public education regarding the history and the exercise of treaty rights may also serve the interests of Aboriginal Groups.

Whereas state – community relations are considerably simpler in the case of other ethno-racial groups, Aboriginal People’s connections to the state are complex. The significant questions relating to sovereignty appear to be beyond the capacity of anti-racism to address. And as with policies such as multiculturalism, First Nations would be likely to resist or reject any efforts that appear to ‘reduce’ their status to ‘just another ethnic or racial group’. On the one hand all the problems Aboriginal people face may be, in one way or another, framed in relation to historic and contemporary manifestations of ‘racism’ on the part of the Canadian state and majority populations. A diagnostic framing of racism on this grand and trans-historic a scale, however, does not lend itself well to simple prognostic framings of solutions, although there was some evidence for this on a very small scale in one of the joint projects examined. For example, if ‘colonization’ is identified as a central component of the problems Aboriginal people face today and have faced in the past, then ‘decolonization’ seems the logical response. Decolonization, however, has proved difficult to enact. Forms and shades of decolonization have happened, but complete decolonization,
measured by a return to pre-colonial cultural values, systems, and relations, is more elusive. One obvious contradiction that inheres in the idea of state anti-racism as part of the route to sovereignty is that relying on or even accepting state support in this implies a reduction or absence of sovereignty. This is only one of the difficult and challenging aspects of conceiving of what anti-racism can offer First Nations. As one First Nations interviewee put it: “… the state can help, but they can’t lead us there…and there is a lot of mistrust and bad blood to deal with before a partnership like that can happen” (anonymous, 2005).

Second, the issue of regionalism loomed large in the research. Put simply, anti-racism needs, as articulated through diagnostic and prognostic framing, differed greatly from one part of Ontario to another. Because the demographic composition of Canada varies by region, and over time, the research questions might be usefully be applied to other jurisdictions, and perhaps to other historical eras. It is unclear how the Ontario state anti-racism experience compares to situations in other jurisdictions and other time periods. I find the Canadian prairies of particular interest in this regard, as is the Lower Mainland of British Columbia. Certainly Eastern Canada and Northern Canada also present unique contexts for pursuing similar research questions as well. In the Prairies, the main ‘racial’ dynamic has been between First Nations and ‘white’ people, and in British Columbia’s lower mainland, ‘Asian’ – ‘white’ relations predominate. It is

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54 Both Bonnett (2000b) and Winant (1994) have conducted analyses of aspects of racism that span historical eras and geographies. This sort of historical and comparative work is useful in contextualizing more localized and historically protracted analyses such as those undertaken in this thesis.
likely that these contexts present unique challenges for anti-racism advocates and states that wish to undertake anti-racism initiatives. An exploration of reasons provincial governments in these areas undertake anti-racism initiatives, or don’t undertake such initiatives, as well as a consideration of the determinants of state anti-racism initiatives there, would expand our understanding of state anti-racism in general by adding valuable empirically based and context-specific accounts of these concerns.

Finally, the issue of the role of news media was continually raised during the research. Fully accounting for the content and impact of news media coverage of anti-racism was beyond the scope of this research, but it remains an interesting background question. Interviewees reported very different interpretations of the role of news media in relation to the state anti-racism project examined through this research, and it seems it concurrently plays both supportive and critical roles in the advancement of state anti-racism. It would be interesting to examine the strategies and relationships various ethno-racial groups have with news media, and how they related to news media as a resource in their political mobilizations. More specifically, it would be very interesting to examine the specific framing strategies groups adopt when interacting with news media, as well as how they respond to ‘bad press’. Somewhat tangential to this concern is the role of public opinion in relation to state anti-racism.

Viewed retrospectively and in broad historical perspective, the impact of the OARS was relatively modest. It was short lived, but significant as an initial
attempt at state anti-racism. In terms of impacting the extent of racism in Ontario society it must be seen as limited. It was successful in raising awareness of issues, naming problems, formulating responses, and somewhat successful at implementing change strategies. The subsequent government, however, quickly dismantled the equity initiatives advanced by the NDP. After the NDP lost the 1995 provincial election to Mike Harris’ conservatives, provincial employment equity policy was quickly abolished, and the OARS was dismantled. Critical observers spoke of the ‘banishment’ of anti-racism in Ontario, and the advancements that had been achieved in the previous five years were quickly erased. This is an important observation of the tenuous nature of state anti-racisms in the forms they took under the NDP, and also a comment on the difficulty of entrenching anti-racism within the state.
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Appendix A

Competing Frameworks in the Management of Diversity:

Race Relations, Multiculturalism, and Anti-Racism

Over the past forty years there have been three major approaches to the management of ethno-cultural and racial diversity and inequality in Canada: multiculturalism, race relations, and anti-racism. These approaches differ in terms of their ideological underpinnings, their discursive frameworks, their practical or applied foci, and the degree to which they were embodied in policies and programs offered by the state and agencies in civil society. Although it is possible to neatly separate these approaches for purposes of discussion, in practice the approaches overlap considerably rather than existing as separate entities. Speaking very generally, multiculturalism has been the dominant paradigm regarding diversity in Canada since the early 1970’s. Race relations, popularized in the United States 80 years ago and sporadically since then, gained some popularity in Canada in the 1980’s and 1990’s but never surpassed multiculturalism’s popularity. Anti-racism experienced a brief ascent and rapid contraction in the 1990’s. The following discussion outlines the main components of each of these approaches to the state’s management of racial and ethnic diversity.
Multiculturalism:

As a political doctrine, multiculturalism promotes cultural diversity as part of the moral, social, and political order of Canada (Fleras and Elliot, 1992). Toleration of ‘cultural others’ on behalf of members of the mainstream is promoted, and commonalities based on shared humanity between groups are stressed. The usual publically stated political goal of multiculturalism is to increase understanding of cultural differences and create a nation where there is space for all cultures and peoples to thrive. Multiculturalism assumes a level playing field for all ethno-cultural groups, and if cultural understanding is achieved equity is assumed to follow. “…multiculturalism heralds the mosaic, cherishes diversity and plurality and promotes an image of multiple, thriving, mutually respectful and appreciative ethno-cultural communities” (Dei, 2000, p 21). To its critics, multiculturalism is notable for what is absent from its discursive framework – a critical analysis of power and inequality. Although there are some versions of multiculturalism that purport to account for power inequalities, such as McLaren’s ‘radical multiculturalism’, for the most part the question of power is absent from multicultural thinking.

Race Relations:

The term ‘race relations’ was first articulated by Park in 1924. In the 1960’s Gordon expanded the usage of race relations concept by introducing a
consideration of the role of power differences between racialized groups in group interaction. Both Park’s and Gordon’s conception of race relations assumed the end point of the race relations ‘cycle’ to be assimilation. The problem of inequality between races from this perspective is seen to stem from inadequate relationships between groups of people defined as belonging to different races. Race relations perspectives tend to reify race, and assume a degree of cultural homogeneity within racial groups that is seen as an important element in the tensions that exist between groups. Although most race relations approaches assume a degree of racism is present in society, they tend not to locate those racisms within the structures of society. Rather, race relations approaches locate the source of the problem of racial inequality in faulty attitudes, especially of the members of the majority. If relations between different races were characterized by understanding and sensitivity, a greater degree of peace and harmony would characterize race relations rather than tension and competition, and discrimination against minorities would be alleviated. Because a race relations approach does not problematize systemically reproduced inequalities, it does not advocate systemic or structural changes as part of the appropriate response to racial inequality.

**Anti-Racism:**

Anti-racism centers critical analysis on power differences between majority and minority groups. Like multiculturalism, understanding of the cultural other is sought, but this is only part of the aim of anti-racism. In its most popular
Canadian iteration, ‘critical integrative anti-racism’ ambitiously theorizes intersectionality and whiteness in its interrogation of systemic forms of racial inequity. Anti-racism also problematizes several manifestations of liberalism, namely colour-blindness, the favouring of individual over group rights, and the notion of equal opportunity (Henry and Tator, 2006, p 40). Dei (2000, p 21) asserted “Anti-racism shifts the talk away from tolerance of diversity to the pointed notion of difference and power” and “…anti-racism discourse highlights persistent inequities among communities, focusing on relations of domination and subordination”. The political goal in anti-racism is to dismantle the oppressive structures of society, including beliefs and values held by people in power. Oppression is assumed to be ‘multiplex’ (hence the inclusion of intersectional theorizing), although race is foregrounded relative to other bases of oppression. Theoretically, critical integrative anti-racism is quite complex, accounting for multiple and varying bases of difference including race, class, gender, age, ability, sexuality, culture, and religion.

This typology of approaches to managing diversity will be used as a heuristic tool in the analysis of the social problems work of various parties involved in the determination of anti-racism policy in Ontario. Locating elements of the different approaches in the diagnostic and prognostic framing of racisms and anti-racism will allow for an assessment of the degree to which what was being referred to as ‘anti-racism’ interventions actually reflect anti-racism principles as opposed to multicultural or race relations principles.
Appendix B
GENERAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

How was the decision to create an anti-racist secretariat made? What do you think the government’s goals were by establishing the secretariat?

What were the Secretariat’s main accomplishments?

What kinds of obstacles and resistance did the Secretariat face, both within and outside of government?

Who were the main players and what influence did they have on the policy formation process?

Did any news of political events lead to or directly contribute to the government’s decision to create the Secretariat?

Was the government responding to public demand and pressure, or was the Secretariat established without public pressure?

How was the structure and mandate for the Secretariat determined? Who was in charge and what were the main influences on them?

How was the Secretariat received by the public? Was it popular or unpopular?

How were staff recruited for the Secretariat?

Who held the most influence within the Secretariat?

Were there any proposals for policies which were not implemented?

How was racism conceived in the policy formation process?

Is there anything else you think is important about OARS that I should look at?
Appendix C

Interview Schedule for Stephen Lewis Interview:

How did you decide what to put in the final report?

Did the recommendations accurately reflect the ‘solutions’ from the view of the communities you consulted? Did you have to change or modify their suggestions to make them workable for government or the OPS?

Did some groups have more credible claims than others? If so, which ones? Were their tensions evident between the various community groups?

Did you ever worry about ‘white backlash’ or other forms of resistance?

What did you think of the anti-black racism focus of the report, did you feel it might be divisive between communities?
Appendix D

INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM

Title of research project: Case Studies in Anti-racism in Ontario
Researcher: Eric Kempthorne, PhD candidate in the department of sociology, McMaster University. Faculty supervisor: Dr Victor Satzewich

Purpose of the Research: The purpose of this research is to better understand the anti-racist efforts of the Ontario Provincial government during the Rae administration, from 1990 - 1995.

Procedures involved in the research: You are being asked to participate in an interview that will involve questions about the anti-racist initiatives of the Rae government. Policies relating to racial equity are often controversial and although it is unlikely there will be any adverse effects associated with your participation in this interview, you may feel uncomfortable discussing some of the topics. You may decline answering any of the questions, and you may stop the interview at any time if you which to discontinue.

The information you provide will be held in confidence and your anonymity will be protected unless you specifically indicate your willingness to be quoted or otherwise identified. There is a possibility that anonymous comments can serve to identify individuals within the communities under study. The record of the interview will be secured under lock and key until the research is completed, then it will be destroyed. Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw from the interview at any time without consequence.

If you wish, I will provide you with a summary of the research when it is completed.

This research has been approved by the McMaster Research Ethics Board, and you may contact them at The McMaster Research Ethics Board Secretariat, c/o the Office of Research Ethics, 905 525 9140, ext 23142, or at ethicsoffice@mcmaster.ca.

You may contact me at kemptheg@mcmaster.ca, or my supervisor Dr Victor Satzewich at satzewic@mcmaster.ca

I have read the information presented above about Mr Kempthorne’s research into anti-racism in Ontario. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about my involvement in this research and receive additional details I wanted to know about the study. I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time, if I choose to do so, and I agree to participate in this study without compensation. I have been given a copy of this consent form.

Name of Interviewee __________ date __________

Please indicate your wishes concerning confidentiality:

a) I agree to be interviewed and have the contents of the interview used only anonymously as background information.
b) I agree to be interviewed and quoted without attribution.
c) I agree to be interviewed and quoted with attribution.

In my opinion, the person who has signed above is agreeing to participate in this study voluntarily, and understands the nature of the study and the consequences of participating in it.

Name of Researcher __________ date __________

If you would like a summary of the results of the research, please record your mailing address below:
Appendix E

List of Members of the Ontario Anti-Racism Advisory Working Group:

The following people were listed as OARAWG members as of September 20, 1992:

Co-chairs:
Lennox Farrell
Mary Woo Sims

Members:
Simon Adler
Razia Ali Hassan
Monohar Singh Bal
Charlotte Chiba
Bernie Farber
Aida Graff
Jacqueline Jean-Baptiste
Rose Lee
Rolly Mainville
Moffat Makuto
Shahrzad Mojab
David Onyalo
Judy Orr
Ben Sennik
Nizam Sidduqui
Marlene Thomas-Osbourne