THE CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALITY
IN G.W.F. HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC
AND LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis answers a complex of problems concerning historical individuality by relating the concepts of historical individual that underlie Hegel's *Philosophy of History* to the middle sections of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. These problems are: 1) How does intelligible structure relate to the contingency of historical events? 2) How do individual persons and collectives relate to totalities?

These questions are answered by means of the concept of the spirit of the world, illuminated by the concept of reciprocity. These concepts provide a theoretical basis for understanding the place of individuals in the totality of history that allows for plurality and contingency while ensuring that history remains comprehensible. I argue that, contrary to a widespread view, Hegel's philosophical history does not expound a progressive, linear succession of nations. Instead, it subordinates the nation in a reciprocal, simultaneous global totality.

This thesis provides an original and detailed reading of the logic of essence from Hegel's *Science of Logic* that brings out its structure as an ontology of historicity and its applicability to history. Furthermore, this thesis sets out and examines for the first time the various forms of individuality found in the widely neglected *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. My reading is distinctive in part because it emphasizes the lectures themselves over the often-quoted introduction.
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Contents

A. Introductory Section
1. Introduction 1
2. "History Deals with the Individual" 3
3. Logic and History 10
4. Interpretation and Method 26

B. Application of the Logic of Essence to History
5. Essence 36
6. The Essentialities 44
7. Ground 50
8. Existence 59
9. Appearance 71
10. Essential Relation 83
11. Absolute 97
12. Actuality 100
13. Absolute Relation 110
14. Reflection and History 126

C. Individuality in the Philosophy of History
15. Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of History 140
16. The Forms of Historical Individuality: Humans 144
17. National Individuals 153
19. Conclusion 173

Bibliography 180
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Problem and its Solution

The following thesis answers a complex of problems concerning historical individuality by relating the concepts of historical individual that underlie Hegel's *Philosophy of History* to the middle sections of Hegel's *Science of Logic*.

These problems are: 1) How does intelligible structure relate to the contingency of historical events? 2) How do individual persons and collectivities relate to totalities? These problems will be elaborated in the introductory section.

The solution to these problems will be Hegel's concept of spirit of the world, as illuminated by key concepts from *Science of Logic*. In particular, this thesis makes use of the concepts of recollection-inwardization (*Erinnerung*), reflection, law and appearance, and causal reciprocity. The answer to the problems will be that the spirit of the world is a form of self-determining totality that is itself individual, and that individuates itself through self-contradiction into a series of finite forms. At the same time, it also uses this self-negation to develop itself. This provides both an overall scheme for history and a concept of the final phase of history.

1.2 The Structure of the Thesis

In the first chapter of the introductory section, Collingwood shows that the problem of historical individuality is one of ontology rather than epistemology, and that its solution requires a conception of a rationally structured historical object, such as a narrative entity. However, Collingwood's account is undeveloped, and fails to include an account of how the totality relates dialectically to an individual. In the second chapter, we discover that individuality can be thought in several ways: 1) It signifies contingent actuality and finite objective relations. 2) It signifies the manner in which categories are not behind or above this actuality, but rather are a totality that is dialectically related to the contingent and to the individual that stands out against the background. 3) We further discover that being reflects on itself through the spiritual mediation, and thus through history. A key feature of history is that it cannot be thought against a background of static concepts. In the third chapter, several questions of interpretation that bear upon the execution of this dissertation are discussed. These all concern the relation of Logic to history, and how this necessitates a dissertation that a) unfolds the categories of the logic of essence as a narrative while bringing out their relation to history and b) then uncovers the categorical structure as it occurs in philosophical history itself.
In the second section, I show how a dialectic of essence could emerge from an assembly of natural conditions and then generate a series of totalizing relations to spatio-temporal externality. This sequence reveals that the logic of essence is the categorical structure of historical time, and thus that historical time is premissed upon the existence of a self-reflective entity. This reflective entity establishes a series of categorical forms in which it is other to itself in the form of an individual against a universal, or as particularity against totality. The ultimate form in this series is a totalizing-individuating relation of the historical world to itself in the form of reciprocal causal substance. As such, the historical world becomes explicitly self-determining. Firstly, this means that the world recognises the past series of its forms as its own self-determining movement. Secondly, this means that the world rises above the necessity of history and becomes freely self-determining.

In the third section, I turn from this hypothetical history to real history. This section comprises an analysis of the varieties of individual that occur in Hegel's writings on philosophical history, specifically in regard to the manner in which they fit into totalities. Historical individuality is broken into four topics: ordinary citizens, world-historical individuals, national spirits, and the world spirit. The chapters comprising this section explain how these levels of individuality make use of Hegel's categorical scheme that was analysed in the previous section.

In the first place, however, the problematic needs to be elaborated. This will be done through a reading of R.G. Collingwood, and through considering the way that four Hegel commentators, Marx, Kojève, Fackenheim and Hyppolite, think the relation between Logic and history.
2. "HISTORY DEALS WITH THE INDIVIDUAL"

R.G. Collingwood

2.1 Introduction

This thesis seeks to validate the intuition, essential to the historiographer's conception of history, that historical entities are concrete individuals rather than instances of general types of things. The debate in analytical philosophy between positivists, led by Carl Hempel, and idiographers, was anticipated in its important details by R.G. Collingwood. This chapter therefore follows Collingwood's elaboration of this problem and assesses his contribution to its solution. Collingwood's main contributions were to recognize that an ontological issue underlies the problem, to see that a concept of organic unity is part of the solution, and to see that the concept of extemporized narrative contributes by raising the idea of totalization of temporal moments. However, Collingwood never made the step of seeing that the solution of the problem requires an analysis of individuals not simply concreteness. Also, despite his historicism, Collingwood remains mired in an essentialistic approach to the question "what is historical individuality?"

2.1.1. History and Perception

In his recent work, History as Re-Enactment, William Dray points to Collingwood's Speculum Mentis as the statement of a view of historical understanding that puts Collingwood in the "idiographical" camp (61). Dray holds Collingwood's view to be that history concentrates on the individual and concrete rather than the general and abstract (60). Dray concedes that this view of understanding is rather mysterious. Nonetheless, he implies that Collingwood's view is that historical understanding is intuitionistic. Firstly, he notes Collingwood's association of historical understanding with "sense perception" (60). Secondly, he associates Collingwood's view with Windelband, and elsewhere notes that Windelband's view is intuitionistic (139). Thirdly, he takes it that Collingwood's view excludes any generalization, either through classification or subsumption under laws (63, 64).

For Dray, Collingwood's interpretation of the slogan "History deals with the individual" treats "individual" as meaning "what is present to the senses." The consequence of this view for historical knowledge is either skepticism, or "presentism"—the thesis that statements about the past are really statements about the present (267).

This is a view of history that takes the kind of experience that Gadamer criticizes as 'Erlebnis' as a paradigm (64-70). That is, the
experience of an event in all its sensory detail is the paradigm historical moment, and to recreate the event through graphic description is the paradigm form of historical knowledge. If we think of individuality as being a feature of things that are stuck right under our noses, a feature absent from things that are merely described since then they are under a general description, then it is easy to think of individuality as the unattainable goal of historical knowledge. If that is what "history deals with the individual" means, then we can agree with Dray that it is a false step. It backfires as a strategy for grounding history, because it undercuts the pretensions of the natural sciences only at the cost of making historical knowledge an unattainable ideal. However this interpretation of the slogan is not what Collingwood has in mind.

2.1.2. Collingwood's Concept of Individuality

In *Speculum Mentis*, Collingwood asserts that the distinction of history and the generalizing sciences is a matter of ontology. He distinguishes history from science according to a dialectical transition from conceiving of reality as an aggregate of atomic particulars, or instances of universals to conceiving reality as a concrete system of individuals. For Collingwood at this stage, the concept of individuality is the essential feature of history.

Both science and history are mind that takes itself to be knowledge of an object that is other to it (242). The difference between them is that mind as scientific consciousness thinks that experiential reality is a collection of singulars that manifest some form of unexperienceable universal, while mind as historical consciousness thinks that experiential reality is a unity in regard to which the dualism of universals and singulars is a purely external and unreal distinction. This is what it means to be individual (221).

It would seem to make sense, therefore, that historical cognition could not work on the material of experience, but should simply grasp it. This view is linked to the idea that history is a form of perception—perception taken as an immediate cognition of the present object—and by extension to the idea that history is a form of memory, a re-presenting of the past.

To interpret Collingwood in this way would be to ignore his emphatic remarks about the mediation involved in perception. For while it is true that Collingwood initially links history and perception, he does not take perception to entail an acquaintance theory of knowledge.

Collingwood states that perception is immediate, but includes mediation (204). His argument is that, although perception is of the concrete, and thus is immediate, this immediacy is an achievement. As an
example, he states that one person will see a body of troops moving across a hillside, while a trained observer will see a flock of sheep (205). Concrete cognition involves "interpretation of sense-data" or "inference from the immediately given" (205). In "The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History," Collingwood reiterates the connection between history and perception, this time denying that perception is truly immediate (49-51). Collingwood states that both perception and history are inferential work on data, the difference being merely that the work is implicit in perception and explicit in history.

Collingwood is thus not interested in preserving the concreteness of perception and apprehending it without altering it. His view is that individuality is the notion of an intelligible reality that refuses the ultimate duality of universal and particular. Perception shows that such a thing is possible—we see objects relating to each other, changing and moving around. Even if we rely implicitly on general knowledge about things, it is sublated in perception. Perception is therefore, in Hegel's terms, a sublated mediation—it returns us to the concrete object. The same is true of history, Collingwood contends.

The fact that individuality is what history is supposed to end up with, rather than begin from, is why Collingwood can say repeatedly that history makes use of the generalizing methods of the sciences, and indeed makes use of auxiliary sciences such as numismatics, but always uses generalizations as a means, not an end (Speculum 208, 211; Nature 36).

Despite this accommodation between perception and history, Collingwood eventually came to regard perception as an unsatisfactory model for history. In short, this is because the object of perception is a good model for history in terms of being knowledge of a complex, but a bad model in being sensory knowledge. Individuality had to be divorced from the sensory element in perception, which is clearly missing in historical knowledge.

From our perspective, Collingwood's theory of perception makes a great contribution in showing that cognition is self-sublating in returning to the concrete object. Nonetheless, this theory relies on the idea that concreteness is somehow an incorporation of general thoughts with sensory content. As Collingwood saw, this cannot solve the problem of the nature of historical individuals, because they are typically not sensed. Nonetheless, Collingwood's critique of universal-singular dualistic ontology allowed him to posit that concrete historical objects might have an integral rationality. He offers two possible solutions: organic wholes and extemporized narratives.
2.1.3. The Absolute Object

The first account of intelligible individuality that Collingwood provides is a description of the "absolute object" of history in *Speculum Mentis*. He states,

The mark of the absolute object is individuality, for individuality is concreteness. The object as individual is the whole of what exists, and this is concretely articulated into parts each of which is again individual, and so to infinity. Within the cycle of this infinite articulation of the absolute object, the historical spirit moves freely in all directions, never finding anything that is not individual and unique, never finding anything that is not, on the one hand, composed of individual and unique parts, and, on the other, itself a part of an individual and unique whole (219).

The absolute object is thus a whole of parts. This means that, on one hand, it is actualized as a manifold externality of parts, and on the other hand, that the manifold externality is sublated, which means, that it forms a whole. Two accounts of this enigmatic absolute object suggest themselves. This could be a mechanical whole of parts, or it could be an organic whole of parts.

In a mechanical model, the individuals exist as parts, and thus as ontologically complete, rather than as instances, which are incomplete. Secondly, individuality means relative, but actual, separation from the surrounding whole. In fact, Collingwood has the local individuals be individual in both senses: they are both wholes and parts. However, in a mechanical model, the parts merely hang together. The totality of the parts is an inessential totality which is in fact relative to an external perspective. This is not what Collingwood means, therefore.

Organic models of wholeness are better suited to such ideas of wholeness. An example of the organic notion is the organic conception of the state. Each family assigns distinct roles to each member, and each village assigns a distinct role to each family, and so on, up to the level of the whole, the state. On this model, there is a participatory individuality of the complete whole, and the separative individuality of each part from the whole. There is also a qualitative individuality, by which the individual is assigned a unique meaning by the functional articulation of the whole.

The models of whole-part relation provide a way of thinking of intelligibility at an individual level because the whole and the parts are equally individual in the sense of equally being conceptually complete. For example, the state is not on a different ontological plane from the
household: they are both equally real and equally abstract. Similarly, the whole universe is real in the same way as a locality is.

The problem with this model is that it is unclear how history is to be understood in the form of a static totality of the organic sort. Change seems to be a basic feature of history. Organic models are better suited to describing cyclical processes that maintain the systematic structure of the totality, rather than linear or branching processes.

2.1.4. Narrative

Collingwood makes a clearer connection between history and whole-part relations in "The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History." Collingwood states that the philosophy of history that sees all of history as a plot or drama is an advance on the positivistic conception. This is because the latter only sees events as instances, whereas the former "means seeing history in its individuality, seeing every incident in it as an irreplaceable and unique element in an irreplaceable and unique whole" (36).

Yet Collingwood criticizes the view of history as a drama. This is because any ahistorical elements in history will imply a rational substructure that is merely instantiated in history, as a script is instantiated in a performance.

Thus history can only be a special kind of drama. Collingwood states, "history is a drama, but an extemporized drama, co-operatively extemporized by its performers" (36). Collingwood’s point is that there is no abstract script, and there are no essential points that could be retrieved from the totality. Thus, while history is a drama in the sense of being an unfolding process that is immanently intelligible, its truth is not an underlying plot.

Collingwood’s objection to "speculative philosophy" in "Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History" is essentially the same as his objection to theocentric history in The Idea of History. While Collingwood commends Christian historiography for overcoming the substantialism of Greco-Roman history, it nonetheless places the essence of history outside history itself (54). History, for Christian historiography, is scripted by a divine author-actor. Rome and England are no longer substances around and over which history flows. Yet they are no more than vehicles for the completion of the divine project. Consequently, states Collingwood, Christian history has a future age, because the script is already written for a third act that has not yet happened (54).
On the other hand, Collingwood objects equally to character-driven history, like that of Tacitus (39). In this case, history is seen as a manifestation of character rather than plot, which leads to a subordination of plot to character. Indeed, as stated above, the merit of Christian historiography is to have destroyed this emphasis on character. Collingwood’s central objection, therefore, is to ideas of history in which history is the manifestation of something non-historical.

Collingwood praises medieval historiography for accomplishing the transition in which Rome and England cease to be entities to whom history happens, but become historical themselves. The notion that history must be extemporized narrative is therefore the attempt to think through a system in which there is no transcendent fixed point. Instead, the intelligible structure is immanent in the extemporized narrative.

I have suggested above that narrative is a more dynamic way of expressing systematicity. Collingwood’s search for a way of thinking of systematicity is in fact an implicit recognition that not all systems have the same relation to process. In fact, it is only extemporized narrative that allows change to enter the parts. In the kinetic model, the parts, although infinitely divisible, are necessarily eternal. It is only their arrangement that alters. In the organic model, although the system may form a process, just as the circulatory system in the body forms a process, the process flows within the confines of a system which itself is not supposed to change. The extemporized narrative is supposed at once to systematize its parts and to eschew any element that is not itself in process.

2.1.5. Collingwood’s Limitations

We have seen that Collingwood made several significant contributions to the question of the how the historical object is an intelligible individual. Nonetheless, Collingwood’s theory lacks a vital step, which is the move from thinking of individuality as a general quality of reality to thinking of individuality as the characteristic of individuals. For Collingwood, as for the idigraphers generally, individuality remains intimately tied to the general quality of “richness” of perceptual experience. However, this position is undermined by its generality. It cannot be reality as such that is characterized by individuality, since individuality requires differentiation. What is required, therefore, is an account of individuation. However, Collingwood already provides some groundwork for this conception. The notions of organic wholes and of narratives provide a basis for thinking the structure of individual wholes. Nonetheless, these are only hints for a solution.

The idea of extemporized narrative is very important. This concept, juxtaposed specifically against “speculative history,” no doubt with Hegel in mind, indicates that truly individual history cannot have a rational
essence. This means that theory terms, such as nation and person, but also transition and development, cannot belong to a static background of history, but will alter with history itself. However, this concept does not indicate what the logical relations are that totalize the events that make up the narrative.

A third criticism to be made is that, despite his rigorous attempt to think of historical individuality without a transcendent rational essence, Collingwood continues to think of individuality in static, essentialistic terms. That is, Collingwood’s approach is to think that the quality of individuality applies generally to history because it applies generally to reality. Collingwood partially accomplishes the transition from essentialism to historicism, by seeing that the concept of history is itself historical, as we have seen. However, a completion of Collingwood’s historicism would see that the forms of historical individuality, whether organic wholes, or narratives, cannot be ahistorical essences. Instead, they themselves develop in history. What we need, therefore, is an account of the history of historical individuality.

2.2 Conclusion

Collingwood makes a number of significant contributions to the question of the nature of historical individuals. Firstly, Collingwood sees that this problem is not fundamentally epistemological, but ontological. Secondly, Collingwood sees that it is necessary to form a conception of an intrinsically intelligible historical individual, and offers some preliminary insight into what this might look like. The idea of an extemporized narrative is most important in this regard.

However, Collingwood fails to thematize the problem of individuals rather than individuality as such. He also fails to fully historicize the problem, so that although he appreciates that historical individuals cannot have an ahistorical rational structure, he does not see that the form of such structures must also develop in history.

To resolve these problems, we now turn to Hegel. Firstly, Hegel answers that reality exhibits the same dialectical structure as thought. To think history is thus to observe its own movement. Secondly, Hegel rejects essentialist philosophizing: to answer the question of the nature of historical individuality is thus to watch how historical individuality develops immanently through its own dialectical history. Thirdly, Hegel’s logic of essence can be interpreted as a dialectical history of historicity, which is, a history of how individuals totalize time as their own history. It thereby provides an account of the logical underpinnings of narrative being.
3. LOGIC AND HISTORY

3.1 Introduction

The question of this chapter is, how does reading *Science of Logic* help us to understand history? The question of individuality in history precisely covers this question, because the question of individuality is the question of the mediation between the universal and the particular. In concrete terms, this is the question of how a rational structure relates to the contingencies of external events.

For us, the most problematic connection is between Logic and history. Hegel seems to repudiate transcendent essences in *Science of Logic* itself, and yet Logic appears to be a transcendent essence for history. Hegel's Logic is itself dialectical and developmental. Is it then a dimension of history? Is it a perspective on history? Yet Logic appears in a series, Logic-Nature-Spirit. Is it a history before human history? Could it be a history of God before the creation?

In order to bring this problem into a sharp focus, this chapter begins with Karl Marx's criticism of Hegel on the matter of abstraction and the opposition between Logic and history.

3.2 Karl Marx

Marx's interpretation of Hegel's philosophical project in *Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole* is important because it provides the challenges which any subsequent defense of Hegel will have to answer. In particular, this interpretation portrays Hegel as caught in an intellectualistic illusion that mistakes intellectual work for real work and thought-constructs for real entities. Marx promises to return to sensuous actuality from this alienated world.

Marx's interpretation of Hegel centres on Phenomenology, "the true point of origin and secret of the Hegelian philosophy" (173). Specifically, Marx examines "absolute knowledge" and therefore provides an orientation towards the nature of logic, philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit.

Marx's critique has three strands: 1) Hegel's conception of the positive as negation of the negation equates to a legitimation of alienated social structures, (172,185); 2) Hegel conflates the actual self-estrangement of humans in entities such as wealth and power with the opposition of actual, sensuous entities to abstract thought (175); 3) Hegel thinks of self-consciousness, which is in fact an abstraction from living human being (178), as the essence of human being, and therefore thinks that the
estrangement and reappropriation of human powers occurs in thought (176).

This critique is interesting for us in two ways. On one hand, it leads Marx to view Hegel’s Logic as a self-defeating enterprise. It is “the demonstration that abstract thought is nothing in itself...only Nature is something” (189). Nonetheless, Hegel’s philosophies of nature and spirit are the forlorn pursuit of concreteness by an abstract thought that cannot escape its own alienation (191-192). For Marx, Science of Logic has little to tell us about history. On the other hand, Marx treats Phenomenology as an attempt at dialectical history which opens the space for true dialectical history (187-188). Marx therefore initiates the tradition of humanist interpretation of Hegel. Furthermore, Marx is important for us because 1) he tries to refocus on the concrete world of sense and 2) this entails thinking history as immanently dialectical and thus rational. As we have seen from Collingwood, these are important features in a theory of historical individuality.

The crux of Hegel’s mistake, for Marx, lies in Hegel’s anthropology. For Hegel, “only mind is the true essence of man, and the true form of mind is thinking mind, the logical, speculative mind” (176). By contrast, for Marx, “real, corporeal man” (180) is a natural being essentially related to essential objects, which are objects of need (181). Human being is therefore replaced by human self-consciousness in Hegel. Furthermore, the structural flaw in Hegel’s dialectics means that self-consciousness both negates and preserves estranged social structures such as religion (185). Hegel’s insight that human labour is a dialectical act of self-creation does not therefore lead to a reappropriation of objectified powers, but to a being at home in other-being (188). As a consequence, dialectical process remains alienated from human species-being, as the process of an estranged absolute spirit, or God (189). Self-consciousness is therefore projected beyond human self-consciousness.

Furthermore, due to Hegel’s intellectualism, self-externality is not thought of as actual self-estrangement, or objectification. Or, to put it another way, the only objects for Hegel are objects of knowledge (183). As a consequence, reappropriation does not mean an actual process of labour for Hegel, but the removal of an illusion of objectivity (183). The object is in fact simply the self’s own positing of itself, and thus an illusion. Absolute knowing, therefore, simply amounts to the reduction of all objectivity in the pure relation of abstract thought to itself (189). Logic, following from this position, is abstract because it lacks objectivity. The transition to philosophy of nature is an attempt to stem the boredom of contentless reflection.
What is so offensive about this to Marx is that objectivity is essential for concreteness. To be means to be in a natural milieu, and this means to have essential objects (181). In particular, Marx stresses the fundamental role of sense. Humans are objective and actual because they are related to objects of need, and this relation is a sensuous relation (182). Nonetheless, Marx also includes a self-reflective element in his anthropology. Humans feel and think their suffering, which makes them passionate beings. Their sense is not simply sensibility but human sense and hence their genesis is not natural history but history proper (182).

Hegel’s history, as Marx conceives it, consists in an actual series of self-estrangements by humans through labour (187). However, because these self-estrangements are for Hegel only objects as objects of knowing, the historical reappropriation of these objects is similarly intellectual. Marx objects to Hegel’s notion of sublation in which earlier forms are preserved and nested in later forms, as in the supersession of private property by morality in Philosophy of Right (186). The alienation that Hegel recognizes is not true alienation, but only the illusion of externality caused by a forgetfulness on the part of self-consciousness. This illusion can be removed through self-recognition, and the alienated entity is then recognized as self-consciousness’s own positing of itself in externality.

Marx’s interpretation of Hegel therefore rests on the following points: 1) the purpose of the Phenomenology is to present a history of human being culminating in absolute knowing. 2) Hegel treats history as a history of self-consciousness, humans as self-consciousnesses, and entities as thought-entities. In this way, Marx opposes the history of naturally situated, objective humans to Hegel’s abstracted history of thought. The point of contact between Hegel and Marx which makes this opposition more than simply a conflict of viewpoints is that Hegel believes that the rational is the real. Any Hegelian response to Marx therefore needs to show that Hegel’s system does not operate at a level of thought abstracted from actuality.

3.3 Alexandre Kojève

In Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Alexandre Kojève presents a rich and influential interpretation of Hegel that responds to Marx’s criticisms. Kojève does this by arguing that Hegel’s philosophy anticipates Marx. According to Kojève, Hegel’s philosophy is humanist (138), atheist and finitist (259). Kojève insists that, as for Marx, the concrete Hegelian dialectic is actual history (187) and in particular, the history of objectively desiring humans working out a dialectic of master and slave (37).

Nonetheless, Kojève positions his interpretation of Hegel against Hegel himself (199, 212). Whereas for Marx the opposition to Hegel concerned an inversion of the ideal and the real, for Kojève it concerns the
provenance of Hegel's Logic. Kojève follows a humanistic strain from Phenomenology which sees all dialectic as restricted to human action, and thus a feature of being only in the senses that human discourse reveals being, and that humans are part of being (212). He acknowledges, however, that the Hegel of Encyclopedia regards dialectic as a feature of all being.

Kojève thereby presents a stark choice in Hegel interpretation. For him, Logic is a reflection on actual, historical being. It derives its dialectical quality at two removes from history. For the Hegel of Encyclopedia, by contrast, Logic is the ontology of nature and spirit. As an autonomous dialectic, we are left with the puzzle of where and when Logic occurs, and how it relates to history. Kojève's solution is thus that Logic is not an independent dialectic.

Kojève's first statement concerning the relation of Hegel's philosophy to history is a reconciliation of Hegel with Feuerbach and Marx: all philosophy is superstructure, dependent upon the actual, material dialectic of history (32). Because this dialectic is in flux, the self-understanding of humans will be ideological until the end of history, that is until the dialectic has worked itself out. The final philosophy, Hegel's, is only possible because actual history has come to an end with Napoleon (35). Absolute knowing, for Kojève, is therefore a final retrospective on history that accounts for its own possibility (33).

Furthermore, Logic is a superstructural reflection on the superstructure. During history, the nodes in the dialectic, the historical worlds, are reflected by philosopher-ideologists (190). Because history is dialectical, this series of philosophies is also dialectical, but only derivatively. Logic is a phenomenology of this philosophical dialogue (194). Its primary purpose is to gratify Man's final desire, to understand himself (206). However, it also acts as a guarantee that history has in fact ended by showing that no more philosophies are possible because they constitute a necessary sequence that forms a circle (194). Logic is however also true, because unlike all previous philosophies it is no longer opposed to reality (195).

However, this raises the question of why, even for Kojève, there is a phenomenology and a logic. Phenomenology is itself "Science" and it describes the concrete dialectic, history. So what is left for logic?

Kojève divides Hegelian Science into three parts: Phenomenology, Metaphysics and Ontology (213). Phenomenology is the science of how history appears to humans who are in its midst. Metaphysics (the Philosophies of Nature and Spirit) is the answer to the question of how reality must in fact be for it to appear to humans in the ways that it does.
Ontology (the Logic) is the answer to the question of what being must be like in order for it to form such a metaphysics. However, this hierarchy of sciences is deceptive, implying as it does that history is merely phenomenal.

In fact, Kojève’s reconstruction of Hegel has only two components, a logic and a phenomenology (150), corresponding to Hegel’s space-time dualism of the end of *Phenomenology* (154). Kojève regards the historical “appearance” of ontological categories as their actuality. Consequently, when Hegel describes the dialectics of the concept in *Science of Logic*, the actuality to which he is referring is human history. For Kojève, the fact that time is the “*daseiendes Begriff*,” the existing concept, means that it is the actuality of the concept (132). Furthermore, time is always historical time. Finally, historical time is a product of the master and slave dialectic, which produces distinctively human being from natural conditions (135). Nature or space surrounds this irruption of time on all sides, and is itself timeless (155). This space, for Kojève, is a kind of Spinozistic fullness where every possibility is actualized.

The movement of history, by contrast, is the opening up of a gap in being (155). It is firstly a desire, which creates an object relation to nature, and then seeks to preserve negativity by eliminating natural conditions (38). Then it requires a deferral of satisfaction, in order for human negativity to be preserved in being (40). This is the unsatisfactory reciprocity of master and slave (41). Fundamentally, it is a field of rarity where only some possibles are actualized (251).

Importantly, it is a continuing dialectic, whose self-consciousness is on one hand always partial and ideological, and on the other hand always a projection of the future (50). The end of history is the final achievement of satisfaction in a humanized world of mutual recognition. The stilling of the dialectic allows for a comprehensive self-knowledge, but it is also the cessation of time and Man. Logic is thus a return to nature/space from *Phenomenology* (165).

Kojève is important for several reasons. Against Marx, Kojève brings out actual historical dialectics in Hegel and a stress on artefactual reality. He brings to light the questions of the end of history and of whether we can really think dialectic outside the mediation of human consciousness. Most importantly, Kojève pursues the project of reducing the multiple Hegelian dialectics to one, history.

Kojève can also be criticized on a number of counts: for his anthropological orientation, for his loose reading of Hegel, and for contradictions that arise in the end of history hypothesis. However, for
our purposes, the main problem is the failure of Kojève's reductionist project.

Kojève’s reduction means that history, history of philosophy and Logic run in parallel. The dialectics in the latter two are derivative of the first. However, only a superficial correspondence can in fact be made out. Not only does Hegel present each of these dialectics as independent, but their dialectical natures are independent. This is especially true in the case of history and Logic.

History proceeds through the disparity between a humanly envisioned ideal and objective reality, and the consequent transformation of reality (48-49). Logic, by contrast, operates through a retreat where apparently subsistent earlier categories are revealed to be moments of later categories. Kojève glimpses this problem in describing the ontological structure of dialectic. He gives it three moments, identity, negativity and totality, but states that identity and negativity are only apparently independent of totality (206). This means that the totality is always already present and its separation only appears. But then, is Logic a description of the static end-time, or does Hegel’s onto-logic cover human being at all times? It must be the latter, due to the nature of Logic’s dialectic and contrary to what Kojève thinks. It is therefore necessary to confront the relation between the Logical and historical dialectics, since they are not identical.

3.4 Emil Fackenheim

In The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought, Emil Fackenheim claims that Hegel claims to recognize contingency, and thus the actual world (80), and simultaneously to show how the logical Idea conquers it (83). According to Fackenheim, understanding this claim requires making sense of Hegel’s threefold mediation described in Encyclopedia §§ 575-577.

Fackenheim explains the nature of the first syllogism, the “realistic mediation” in which nature mediates idea and spirit, by comparison with Schelling (87). Firstly, the extreme of the idea is explained through an idealism of nature. For Schelling, this means that nature, which appears as other-than-self to finite spirit, is pre-self for infinite spirit (87). The dilemma that attends this position is this: Either the way that nature appears to finite spirit (as other) is true, in which case nature is indeed other rather than pre-self, or it is an illusion, in which case the forms of finite spirit themselves are illusory. Schelling opts for the latter branch, and this is why, according to Hegel, his system dissolves difference (88). Nature must both mediate and separate idea and spirit, which requires nature to be actual (85).
Hegel’s solution to this problem, by contrast, is that nature’s intrinsic contingency consists in being a “fragmentation” of the logical categories (88). These categories appear as “structure” in nature, as its being a totality (88). The relation between Logic and nature, therefore, is that Logic reintegrates the categories that manifest themselves in nature (88). Logic thereby simultaneously demonstrates that nature is “pre-self” (that is, Idea in an immediate form) and also other-than-self, because it is intrinsically contingent (90). The mediation by nature is therefore for Fackenheim the union of Idea and Spirit through the manifestation of the reason immanent in nature to humans.

However, this mediation by itself is unsatisfactory and requires a second, idealistic syllogism (91). The first syllogism presents a dilemma: Either nature’s structure is essentially coherent, in which case Idea remains self-identical in nature, and nature’s contingency is appearance, or nature is really contingent and Idea is lost in it (91). However, this dilemma results from “dogmatic realism.” What this means is that we assume that nature’s mediation means Spirit looking across Nature to see Idea.

Instead of this realism, Fackenheim proposes that Spirit mediates the fixed opposition of Idea and Nature (92). That is, human activity posits nature as a given in front of it, and then sublates this givenness by demonstrating the availability of the natural as idea, as food, as material or as scientific object (92). However, this is not a subjective idealism. Rather, human immersion in the world means that human activity is Being working on itself and revealing itself (93).

From this perspective, infinite spirit would mediate nature and idea by consuming nature as material for idea (93). Nonetheless, this leads to the problem that infinite spirit reveals nature as pre-self, while finite spirit reveals nature as other (94). Fackenheim states that this problem can only be overcome if nature and spirit mutually presuppose one another (97). To be other, nature must be the death of spirit. To be pre-self, spirit must “overreach” nature. In other words, spirit must give itself over to finitude and death, become natural, as part of its own self-determination (98). In the form of philosophical thought, thought must begin from embodied relation to the world in order to go beyond this finite position. The idealistic mediation means, in other words, that a single substantial system, a Lebenswelt, negates itself into a series of human-nature oppositions, becoming finite in order to rise above that finitude by demonstrating its conditioning presupposition as its own, but only its own as a true finitude.

Nonetheless, the idealistic mediation retains an anthropological orientation that has to be corrected by a logical mediation if nature is to be
differentiated from spirit (100). Nature must be a totality in and of itself in order to be separate from spirit, and this structure is Idea. On the other hand, the idealistic mediation requires that there be a single self-differentiating movement. The solution to this is that philosophical thought, and all spiritual activity, is the self-movement of Idea (101).

The logical mediation, then, means that Logic is the pure movement of Idea, but equally nature is the self-externalization of Idea. This allows spirit in the form of philosophy to both recognize the contingent world and conquer it, because this contingent world actually is the self-externality of Idea (as a totality formed by contingent becoming) (103).

Consequently, philosophy of nature is a spiritual activity where self-comprehending Idea works on natural material to grasp its own self-externalization. Whereas nature itself is necessarily a death of Idea in the form of contingency, philosophy of nature reveals the Idea in its self-external form in nature. Similarly, the finite forms of spirit are already partial overcomings of self-externality by idea, but being partial, they have not explicitly thematized the Idea either in themselves or in nature. They are therefore phases in the self-return of Idea to itself, culminating in Logic. Philosophy of Spirit is the self-consciousness of spirit as the self-return of Idea, and therefore grasps its finite forms as phases.

Fackenheim’s key idea throughout is that both spirit and Idea are actually “overreaching” which means, that they manage to remain themselves in their other, which also means, the othering is actual. Consequently, contingency is necessary, and also, the finite forms of spirit are actual (106). Fackenheim stresses that all three aspects of the mediation: real, ideal and logical, are necessary to mediate the problem of the simultaneous reality and ideality of nature (108).

The importance of Fackenheim’s account of Hegel’s system is firstly that it focusses on the obscure but important account that Hegel himself gives of the structure of the system. In so doing it corrects one sided interpretations by laying out three structural approaches to the system, and then shows how they are mutually supporting. Fackenheim’s account is programmatic, however. More elaboration needs to be given of how these three mediations work. Furthermore, his account of the natural mediation is unsatisfying. Fackenheim has a bias towards regarding the realistic mediation as the manifestation of logical categories in nature for philosophy. However, this ignores hints in Science of Logic and Philosophy of Nature that the work of spirit on nature is equally a becoming. In other words, nature sublates itself. In concrete terms, this means that the natural mediation consists in the contingent emergence of mediating formations such as living organisms as a condition for spirit.
Fackenheim's most important contribution, however, is the perspective that the logical Idea is the categorical structure of nature and spirit even in their contingency. This means that nature and spirit form totalities which situate individuals in a space-time context. This supplements the idea of individuality as concreteness with an idea of individuality as the totality of a system in its reciprocity with its individual, particular being. This thesis will therefore be concerned with working out how categorical structures totalize and individuate in history, and how they relate to a natural conditioning substrate.

3.5 Jean Hyppolite

Jean Hyppolite's Logic and Existence divides into three sections, corresponding to the three books of Science of Logic. What is less obvious is that these sections are three viewpoints on the logos-nature-spirit relation, corresponding to the three syllogisms of Encyclopedia, §§ 575-577. Hyppolite's work can therefore be used as an elaboration of the "threefold mediation" that Fackenheim outlines. Furthermore, Hyppolite links a real distinction of the logical and historical mediations with an immanentism drawn from and in opposition to the humanist interpretation of Marx and Kojève.

The first syllogism, where nature mediates, is explained by Hegel as "Logos becomes nature, and nature becomes spirit" (§575). Hyppolite refuses to take this theological narrative at face value, however (64). Instead, he states that "Logos appears in [Spirit] through the intermediary of Nature" (103).

I suggest that, for Hyppolite, the natural syllogism has the form of a "space of names" (33) rather than a narrative. Hyppolite comments on the doctrine of being via Hegel's discussion of language in the Encyclopedia. At first sight, it appears that language mediates the sides of cognition, inner sense, or logos, and sensible being, or nature. However, this is a pre-logical, empirical viewpoint (23). Instead, sense is an immediate unity of inner and outer, logos and being (24). Sense is a linguistic world (24), a meaningful totality distributed in space and time (28). This concept, sense, runs through the commentators examined here as the term for the concrete to be preserved against logical abstraction.

The key to this concept is the arbitrariness of the sign. The sign (the spoken or written word) is at once the replacement of the sensible by the intelligible, and the placement of the intelligible in space and time (31). Language is therefore a space of names, a total background order that gives meaning to particulars (32). Furthermore, names do not refer to sensibles, but the converse. In Hegel's example, calling something "lion" does not refer the name to the actual world, but rather inserts the sensible into a system of signs (32).
Nonetheless, this concept of sense seems to have more to do with the second, "idealistic" mediation than with the realistic, natural one. However, two arguments can be made for sense as an interpretation of the first syllogism. Firstly, Hegel argues that language has the truth of being. In the case of the lion, the intelligible signification expresses the correct relation between a living organism and its phenomenality (32). Hippiolite points out that the logical structure of a name is the logical structure of Dasein. Singular being goes over immediately into nothingness, but the becoming as an immediacy, as Dasein, is already a mediation and determinate. This is the prefiguring of developed mediation in the name (12).

Secondly, there is no ineffable "I" or nature. Hippiolite points out that the first chapters of Phenomenology dismiss the idea of immediate, singular being, on "this side" of the universality of language, and the idea of an ego on the "far side" of language (8). Abstract singularity is immediately nothingness. Singularity is only actual in the context of a totality. The point here is that determinate singulants, both natural things and speaking subjects, only appear in the background context of a law-governed totality of nature, or of a social discourse.

In effect, the analysis of sense-certainty links up to Hegel’s adoption of Kant’s transcendental project (3, 80). Language is the infinite totality of meaningful objects and subjects (whole to part) prior to a finite division into the empirical mode (thing to thing.) Sense, as language, is thus a first statement of the unity of nature, spirit and logos in the mode of natural being. It is a system of significations distributed in space and time. Like Marx, therefore, Hippiolite begins from the world of sense.

Logos, spirit and nature are thus indistinct in this first syllogism. This suggests equally that the three parts of the system are alternate, incommensurable viewpoints on a single totality, sense. This establishes our problem, because the question is, how does the pure language of Logic relate to the other discourses? From this standpoint, they are immediately fused and also arbitrarily joined by sheer transitions.

Hippiolite states of the second syllogism, "This mediation is that of the reflection of one of the moments in the other, of nature in the Logos, and of the Logos in nature. It is spirit, but a spirit which remains finite, which clarifies the opacity of natural existents in the light of sense" (103). The second syllogism, as the syllogism of reflection, thus points one way to the logic of essence, and another way to the philosophy of spirit, and particularly to finite spirit, including history.

In the first syllogism, the totality for Hippiolite is language. In the second syllogism, however, the totality is reflection. Hippiolite develops
the concept of this reflection by reference to Kant and Schelling. Firstly, Hegel's speculative logic is an extension of Kant's transcendental logic (58). Specifically, Kant brings the categories to light and reveals that "the conditions of experience are the very conditions of the objects of experience" (58). Furthermore, Kant's transcendental reflection is implicitly a reflection behind empirical reflection (80). Empirical reflection determines the content as alien (80). Transcendental reflection, by contrast, discloses the constitutive a priori laws that allow singular perceptions to be situated in a total context, nature (80). This reflection recognizes the identity between this constitution of the object and the understanding (81). Consequently, "it is beyond the notions of subject and object. It states their original identity" (81).

Hegel's extension of Kant, and his turn from transcendental to speculative reflection, rests on the criticism that Kant continues to treat contradiction as subjective. Empirical reflection is alien to content, and therefore is able to subjectivize contradiction as its own (82). Transcendental reflection, however, constitutes the content, and therefore has to reflect contradiction into the content (83). Thus, "the contradictions of reflection are a knowledge of being as much as a knowledge of the self" (83). As a result, reflection for Hegel is de-subjectivised (85). Reflection in Science of Logic is therefore being's own reflection (85). Moreover, self-contradiction is the motive force of this reflection.

Dialectic, this self-contradicting reflection, is for Schelling a via negatīva to the absolute (94). By contrast, for Hegel, the absolute is absolute reflection, a unity that only is by identifying itself with contradiction (98).

The problem that the first syllogism leaves is the immediacy/exteriority of the terms, Logos/Nature/Spirit. Hegel's extension of Kant's transcendental logic means that speculative logic is not a metaphysics, because it excludes a second, intelligible world (58). Nonetheless, the immediacy of this immanence of the categories to existence, of logos to nature, means also that they are juxtaposed as exterior. As the inner of the outer, the logos looks like the essence of existence (59). For us, this is the problem that the categories of Science of Logic look like a metaphysics of history.

Absolute reflection, however, is an answer to this problem. The absolute only exists in a reflection that posits its identity, but simultaneously posits its negation, and resolves this opposition into a single generation of sense (99). Consequently, logos is distinct from nature and spirit, then appears in nature and spirit, and finally the terms are mutually reflected, and do not subsist outside the appearing (64). The absolute as identity, logos, therefore only becomes in its difference from
itself in nature (99). Furthermore, the sublation of this opposition, where the absolute is recognized as sundering itself into an opposition, is spirit (99).

Through this reflection, logos is determined as a term in opposition to nature (102). However, as such, logos contains its other, and is therefore contradictory (102). This being in contradiction is the determination of nature (102). Spirit therefore mediates logos and nature by thinking "sense in relation to non-sense" (102) or logos in its relation of identity and contradiction to nature. Nature, conversely, appears as non-sense, containing logos as its own negated identity. Through spirit, logos also grasps itself in this self-externality, hence the philosophy of nature (103).

This mediation of logos and nature by spirit, spirit saying the identity and contradiction of logos and nature, is a transition to the third syllogism. In the third syllogism, logos mediates nature and spirit. Because logos, having appeared in spirit, is able to mediate itself and nature, it is "absolute mediation." (103).

In the previous syllogisms, Hyppolite presents Hegel's speculative logic as a completion of Kant's transcendental logic. The third syllogism thematizes the speculative proposition, and its component, the category, as a completion of the transcendental project.

Kant's analysis involves two oppositions: subject/object and singular/universal (132). For Kant, these oppositions are overlaid, so that the problem of judgement is how subjective, formal universals apply to objective, intuited singulars (130). For Hegel, by contrast, the subject/object opposition has been reduced. We are concerned only with a relation of the foregrounded singular and the universal context. Furthermore, the reduction of the subject/object distinction means that thought is not empty. It is the totality of sense that has already been developed. Consequently, the judgement is not a relation between concepts and intuited singulars, but between thought and its own being (131).

Of course, the judgement referred to here is not an empirical judgement, but a speculative judgement. Again, the notion of a speculative judgement belongs on the transcendental level of the relation of the totality to its foregrounded singularity (132), not of singulars to each other, or of singulars to so-called universals that are abstracted from sensibles (152).

In empirical judgements, an ego attributes properties to a "subjectum" (142). By contrast, the speculative proposition, such as "the
absolute is being” is itself the mediation of the absolute, which is first a self-division into the singular and the universal, and then the cancellation of this division (146). The predicate position is occupied by a category which is the complete determination of the subject position, and thus the removal of the difference (146).

The predicates of the speculative proposition are not properties or abstract universals but categories (150). Categories are the self-explication or self-consciousness of the absolute, not of human consciousness (151). Hyppolite compares Hegel’s concept of category with those of Aristotle and Kant. For Aristotle, the categories are supreme “viewpoints on being.” They are distinct from other forms of predicates in fitting all existents (152). As such, they are not generalities derived from sensibles (153). The categories are intelligibles, and this means dealing with the totality, rather than with particular regions of being (154). Kant extends this notion of category by thinking categories as ways of comprehending (154). For Hegel, this transcendental view of the category as that which forms the totality is the identity of self-consciousness and being (155).

Hegel’s extension of Kant means thinking the categories as total determinations of the absolute (156). All thought, says Hyppolite, rises to the totality and is thus involved in a non-thematic manner with the universe (156). The categories, each the whole, form a dialectical whole as determinacies of the absolute, and the absolute as such only appears in this series (157).

Logic is thus a “self-genesis” (163). Furthermore, logos thinks itself and its other, nature (163). The problem for Hegel is not therefore how logos and nature are reunited in judgement, but rather how philosophies of nature and spirit distinct from logic are possible (165). Hyppolite explains that the third syllogism, the “supreme mediation,” is that logic is the genesis of the absolute idea, nature and spirit are modes of the dispersal of the absolute idea in space and time, and philosophy is the ultimate recuperation of the idea in logic (165). This sounds like a reversion to the theological story that Hyppolite earlier dismisses.

However, the originary position of absolute idea for Hyppolite is its immediacy, which translates directly into self-externality. The completion of idea in philosophy means that, as a particular historical phase, philosophy is also the point at which nature and spirit can be understood for what they are- the self-unfolding of logos. Against the teleological overtones of this viewpoint, Hyppolite insists that “dialectical evolution is attraction and instinct” (163). In other words, being develops immanently.
Ultimately, Hyppolite’s interpretative key is sense. Logos is “le verbe originaire” in the sense of an externalized word which immediately sublates its externality, and this self-opposition is the generation of sense (166). Philosophical thought thinks directly about itself (logic) but also thinks about itself in its negation (nature) and in its recuperation from externality, its making sense (spirit). Logic is therefore on one hand a mode. It seems that logos as pure thought only exists in pure thought—logic. But on the other hand, it is the universal mode, “the medium in which everything is clarified as sense” (166).

For our original question, it appears that doing logic gives us a philosophical perspective on nature and spirit. The dual universality and particularity of logic means that logic is different from “real” philosophy, but also that it is the element of all philosophy. Consequently, the categorical structures whose pure development logic traces are also essential in nature and spirit, because the latter are totalities, modes of the absolute. However, nature and spirit are also determinate negations of logic, and consequently logic (in the universal sense) embraces them as dispersions of the categorical forms. These dispersions are to logic (in the particular sense) opacities, contingencies and disruptions of the self-relating forms, but to logic in the universal sense, they are comprehended as necessitated disruptions of these very forms. Being dispersed in space and time, however, the categorical development itself is disrupted and takes on contingent forms, necessitating an a posteriori approach.

In particular, then, Hyppolite’s suggestion is that spirit is a recuperation of logos, and thus a process of mediation between categorical forms and natural conditions. That is, spirit is the process of arbitrary material conditions turning themselves into transparent language, reflecting on themselves, and becoming self-conscious as categorical thought. In more concrete terms, this would be the environment’s translation of itself into a world through human culture, the reflection of this world on itself as socio-political self-formation, and the consciousness of this world of itself as self-producing thought.

3.6 Discussion

How do we answer Marx’s criticism that for Hegel, the goal of nature and history is the philosopher? It is not just that Hegel, as a philosopher, can be expected to show how to think correctly about the world, but that he makes philosophizing the final achievement of this world. However, Hyppolite has an answer to this charge, which is that the final phase of hegelianism is a desubjectivization where the individual acknowledges what Fackenheim calls the overreaching of Idea—that is, that the individual’s thought is not only his own.
Furthermore, this is not false modesty. As we have seen from Fackenheim, the goal is not a goal in the sense that it renders the rest obsolete. Rather, the goal is only a goal because it is also the starting point. As Kojève pointed out, Hegel’s philosophy must return in a circle to account for his philosophizing.

The apparent teleological narrative in Hegel’s philosophy is only a problem if we think that Hegel’s philosophy is temporally linear, that it narrates how the actual world has been leading to this point. However, for Fackenheim this is not the case, because nature and finite spirit must persist. It seems, then, that against Kojève, Phenomenology is really only the narrative of how Encyclopedia became possible, and not the grand narrative of all history. In that case, there are multiple narratives.

Nonetheless, this narrative, of Encyclopedia, must in one sense be the grand narrative, because it shows how all of reality may be thought. But at the same time, its completion in Logic is really just an exhaustion of the possibilities of the Idea. Thus the openness of the system that Hyppolite insists upon is the possibility of a) other forms and b) other narratives which are autonomous, and merely rest on the surface of the Idea. History, art and religion play a role in Phenomenology and Encyclopedia, but they also have their own autonomous narratives, formed by an exhaustion of a particular idea. They can be understood from the encyclopedic point of view, because, as forms of spirit, they are always a relation to nature in language. As such, they must also always be fragmentations of Logic.

Hyppolite suggests that Logic is all about the relation of the singular to the totality. The self-externality of the idea in nature must be that nature is intrinsically categorical, but at the same time that the nature of this category is self-externality in time and space: a totality constituted by radically external parts, which constitute the totality by becoming other.

Similarly, the constitution of spirit must be the mode in which it forms a totality (and is therefore categorical) through an oppositional relation to nature. As a subsection of Philosophy of Spirit, history thus appears as an autonomous narrative that takes off from a certain set of conditions. Nonetheless, what we have learnt is that the Idea or logos that has returned to itself is Logic, and that this is in continuity with nature and spirit because these are self-external forms of logos.

The philosophy of history is therefore a spiritual confrontation of a self-conscious philosophy with its own past being, and the recognition of this past as externality that forms a series of dialectical totalities. The difference between Logic and philosophy of history is twofold. Firstly,
Logic is an immanent self-reflective dialectic that can be performed in thought. Philosophy of History, however, requires a deep acquaintance with history mediated through historical science, because history is permeated by contingency.

Secondly, Logic and philosophical history are distinct dialectics for two reasons. Firstly, historical dialectic is a retrieval of Idea from nature, and is therefore determined by the dialectical relation between finite spirit (particularity) and infinite spirit (totality.) Secondly, the dispersal of Idea in nature and the persistence of nature means that spirit is permanently dispersed as embodied individuals, and therefore it has a special problematic of the relation of these naturally separated individuals to the totality. Consequently, in the following sections we will need to see firstly how key categories in Science of Logic could apply to historical conditions, and secondly to look at how Hegel develops a philosophical history on the basis of the historical science then available to him.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter began with the question of how Science of Logic helps us to understand history. I interpreted this generally as a question of how Logic relates to history.

In answer, we have discovered four components: First, from Marx, we discover the need to situate history in a world of sense. From Kojève, we take the view that dialectic occurs in concrete historical processes rather than in human philosophical thought. From Fackenheim we take the view that Logic and history are distinct, but nonetheless, Logic is not a transcendent structure of nature and history. Rather, it is self-identical in nature only as self-external, and in spirit only as self-recuperating in finite forms, and hence, as with Marx, in a world of sense. From Hyppolite, finally, we take the view that Hegel is concerned with a world of sense throughout, with an immanent dialectic, and yet also with a logos. This immanence of logos is the manner in which human discourse and practice elaborates the categorical structures of the world as the self-reflection of being on itself (a notion also present in Fackenheim.) For both Hyppolite and Fackenheim, Logic, as presented in Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia Logic, is a point of self-overcoming for human thought, where Idea receives a pure embodiment as a relation of thought to itself. It elaborates explicitly its categorical structures, and thus allows us to recognize these categorical structures in the exteriority of a contingent world.
4. INTERPRETATION AND METHOD

4.1 Introduction
This chapter explains what the following section of the thesis, on Hegel's *Science of Logic*, does for the question of the thesis, and why. I defend the structure of this thesis by considering a series of interpretative questions that bear on method. Firstly, I explain why it is necessary to interpret the second book of Hegel's *Science of Logic* as a dialectical-historical narrative of forms of historical individuality, rather than as a doctrine of historical individuality. Secondly, I explain how Logic and history must relate to each other as time and dialectic. Thirdly, I examine the conditions necessary for the logic of essence to occur in history. These considerations explain why this thesis consists of two main sections: a narration of the logic of essence as it applies to history, and a consideration of how philosophical history totalizes and integrates particular individuals.

4.2 Essentialism and Historicism
The following section of this dissertation treats the second book of Hegel's *Science of Logic* as a guide to the self-developing dialectic of forms of historical individuality. This treatment raises two methodological questions: Firstly, if Hegel has something valuable to say about the nature of historical individuality, why not simply explain his doctrine? Secondly, even if we have to narrate the development of the logical categories, why not treat them as a series of hypotheses about individuality? The answer to these questions lies in Hegel's turn away from essentialistic philosophizing to a dialectical-historical method. This turn explains why I approach the Logic of Essence as a dialectical history of forms of individuality.

The questions above are a way of approaching the fundamental controversial question on *Science of Logic*: "What in general is Hegel attempting to do in the *Logic*?" (Inwood 261). Furthermore, this thesis approaches this question from the direction of "the murkiest single issue in Hegel interpretation" (Kolb, *Critique* 85), that is, the relation of the Logic to Realphilosophie, of which history is a part. Nonetheless, choices have to be made on the question of what *Science of Logic* is doing, and consequently, what its relation to historical individuality is.

There are many subtle interpretations of *Science of Logic*. However, McCumber usefully orders them into two main schools: those that see the *Logic* as about some kind of "large entity" and those for whom the *Logic*
is about the “theory of consciousness” (19). However, McCumber places himself in company with a contemporary school that regards *Science of Logic* as not *about* anything else than thought thinking itself (19). Despite their differences, Burbidge, McCumber and Houlgate, for example, agree in seeing Logic as the self-development of linguistic thought (Burbidge, *On Hegel’s Logic* 4; McCumber 19; Houlgate, *Hegel* 137).

In fact, a more pertinent opposition among contemporary schools concerns the significance of the unity of thought and being with which *Science of Logic* begins. The “large-entity” theorists reason that the necessity of the categories means that the Kantian view of the categories as limited to human experience is sublated, and thus that they reflect the nature of the absolute (E.E. Harris 7-9, Hartnack 5). As Berthold-Bond states, “The dialectical structure of thought reflects the dialectical structure of the world” (91). By contrast, the non-metaphysical interpretation holds that Hegel’s supersession of Kant means that the categories are not formal (Dahlstrom 36). The ontological reference of the categories is thus to the categories themselves (Johnson 5). I agree with Houlgate that Logic is an immanent, categorical, dialectical self-development of thought (*Hegel* 138). I also agree with Burbidge that the distinction of the Realphilosophie from the Logic depends upon the contingency by which only some possibles are actualized (*On Hegel’s Logic* 224), and thus that *Science of Logic* cannot be a metaphysics of the absolute.

However, further questions must be raised before we can consider the relation of the categories to history: is the progression of *Science of Logic* a disclosure of a hitherto unrecognized complex or is it the development of this complex? Does a situated or pure thinker work through progressively more adequate concepts (Di Giovanni, *Category* 192; Burbidge, *On Hegel’s Logic* 38-39), or are the dialectical movements of thought themselves the content (Houlgate, *Hegel* 137; McCumber 57-58; Dahlstrom, *Hegel’s Science* 36)? The significance of these questions is that if we maintain a distance between agent and object level thought, then the later categories will be better categories for making sense of reality, and thus those are the ones we should use. However, if there is no radical agent-object level distinction, *Science of Logic* describes a genesis of categories (against Kolb, *Critique* 56), and this genesis itself can be thought as history.

Interpretations such as that of Burbidge, Houlgate and Dahlstrom (Dahlstrom, *Between Being* 110) surreptitiously maintain a distinction between agent-level thought (thinker) and object-level thought (category). Inwood insists upon such a view, because, against Hegel, concepts do not become—they simply are. It is *we* who have to think them through (310). However, the concept of a foundationless philosophy, developing
immanently, means 1) that a thinker would have to be part of the conceptual determination itself and 2) that this thinker would merely be an element in the self-development of the category. For example, in the test-case of the dialectic of being, Houlgate wrongly holds that the difference of being and nothing is merely meant (by the thinker) (Hegel 134). However, this is a constitutive difference. It is incorrect to assign it to subjectivity over against the objectivity of the unity of being and nothing.

Instead of thinking in terms of agent and object levels, the subjective and the objective, Hegel is concerned with the complete conceptual form. There is a realm of investigation, therefore, of conceptual forms which have hitherto been analyzed in terms of subjectivity. For example, difference and the externality of the difference are elements of the concept of identity-and-difference. This can be analysed without reference to subjectivity. The realm of investigation in which such an analysis takes place is Hegelian logic.

This is a turn from essentialism to historicism. The questions that we have been pursuing, “what is individuality in the context of history?” and “what is a historical individual?” are essentialist because they assume that individuality and the historical individual have essences, the description of which is the answer to the question. However, such a process of enquiry assumes that the process of enquiry itself is subjective and thus inessential to the answer.

For Hegel, the logic of this process of finding an essence is completely described when we take into account the relation between the answer and the self-sublating process that leads to the answer. The answer is determined as the essential by a self-sublating process of reflection. From a logical point of view, the answer is both the essence and the product of the process of reflection. Hegel is therefore historicist rather than essentialist because he studies processes of production rather than essences.

Nonetheless, Hegel's historicism might be limited to the ideal realms of cognition and logic. Might it not be that the end result of these developments, being the adequate answer, describes reality? If this were the case, we would have the following methodological options: 1) We could still give a narrative treatment of Hegel’s logic, but find the final result of this development to be the timeless essence of historical individuality, or 2) we could provide a thematic treatment of this essence and merely refer to the narrative of the Science of Logic to find Hegel’s arguments for why concept is the correct conceptualization of the timeless essence of historical individuality.
My position, however, is that Hegel’s method is a thorough-going historicism which treats categories as movements of thought. This means that historical individuality is the product of actual dialectical processes, that is, embodiments of dialectical categories.

Firstly, Hegel’s logical approach to the dialectic of thought means that error and contradiction are actual moments in the process of production of thoughts. This finding has the double effect that on one hand, thought is no longer determined as the repository of the inessential, and on the other hand, reality is no longer determined as that which is self-consistent.

Secondly, the Logic is as much a becoming of immanent thought as it is a discovery of what is implicit in thought. It does not rely upon a thinking subject to run its categories through—they run themselves through. This implies that the dialectical process described in Hegel’s Science of Logic could occur in any self-referential system that fits the description of thought thinking itself. It is not essentially confined to the thinking of an individual person. This is because it is a description of the consequences of a certain kind of self-referential system. Consequently, we can hypothesize that it may be embodied in any number of systems that meet formal criteria for self-reflection. This is not to say that Hegel’s Logic is ontologically independent of its embodiments, but that its embodiments are not limited to individual human thinkers and readers.

Thirdly, Hegel’s Logic contextualizes essences in relation to processes of determining reflection. For example, an individuality stands in relation to its own process of production from which it derives its complex determination. If we are to attribute our theoretically derived answers to reality, then we are committed to thinking of historical individuality as in reality related to an actual process of production that resembles our own theoretical inquiry.

4.3 Time and Concept

The question of the relation of the Logic to history requires us to examine the question raised by Kojève, and more recently by Burbidge in “Concept and Time in Hegel”, of the relation of time and concept. This is for two reasons. Firstly, both metaphysical and categorial interpreters of Hegel agree that the Logic is supposed, in addition to being a worthwhile subject matter in itself, to illuminate concrete reality. But is this because the categories timelessly describe all the possibilities of being, or are Science of Logic and its many readings repeated productions of the categories?

These considerations bring us back to the opposition of Kojève and Marx to Fackenheim and Hyppolite, however. That is, both sides
acknowledge that dialectic is real and immanent. However, the first disjunct claims that Logic and history are identical. The second disjunct claims that Logic and history are distinct. The distinction between these positions, as we have seen, is that for Marx and Kojève, Logic is an abstractive reflection on categories already deployed in history. Hyppolite holds that Logic is the pure self-development of Idea, but only possible on condition of the historical occurrence of philosophers capable of thinking the Logic. My answer to the question of whether the Logic is discovery or becoming, that it is only a discovery in the form of a becoming, means that I am disposed to seeing the categories as emerging in history, and furthermore, disposed to seeing the categories as a pure self-development in thought, rather than as an abstractive recollection.

The second reason for raising the question of the relation of time and concept is a problem raised by this interpretative choice. The problem is to relate the linear progression of Science of Logic to its recursivity, reversals and cycles. For Kolb, the problem is that if the categories form a genetic process, then the early stages are self-subsistent. But this does not make sense of the idea that the later stages are the truth or ground of the earlier stages (Critique 56).

Hegel describes essence as timelessly past being, and describes the conversion of being into nothing as immediate. What that might mean on a general scale is that, while it takes the reader time to read through Science of Logic, the transitions themselves take no time. This could mean that the categories are timelessly available at all moments of time, and that the linearity of the Logic is outside on the reader’s side, as Burbidge thinks (Concept and Time, 409). The problem with this is that moments in the Logic, such as the appearance of identity that immediate terms have, such as being-in-itself and being, would only be an illusion caused by the fact of reading rather than the dialectic itself. This may look like an attractive solution, since it means that the initial appearance of self-identity is always an illusion caused by temporal thought, which is always resolved once we see that identity is always in relation to non-identity. However, since the Idea is only complex on condition of the negative relations that seem to be illusory, the Absolute Idea would be a simple Absolute.

The problems here arise from the fact that the dialectic of Logic proceeds as a process of discovery, but also as a becoming. This is encapsulated in Hegel’s view that a category includes its negation. That is, the thing is a positive, but also the negation of its background, and also determined by this background. So also, being is an immediacy, but also a negated thing over against nothing, and then over against becoming, from which it is an abstraction. Thus, the category already contains its background conditions within itself—*implicitly*. Implication is for Hegel a primary dialectical self-opposition—that identity is at once difference.
Once we think being, or follow its thought, it negates itself and starts to unfold. The Science of Logic subordinates the thought of the reader to itself, because a thought that moves from being to nothing, then discovers them as moments of becoming is simply moving through the very relations of being-nothing-becoming. Again the problem is that thought is both linear and recursive, both becoming and discovery, and thus essentially self-sublating as the actual structure of logic, not as an external reflection.

We expect a temporal series to be homogenous and linear, but the logic cancels prior moments. For example, we first have being, then we have nothing, then we realize the difference between them is null. So it seems that the progression from being to nothing is immediate, and only apparently took time for us. But we cannot come to this conclusion because it is the movement of thought itself—the temporal moments constitute the difference of being and nothing over against their identity. This is an overcoming of the opposition between the temporal succession and the immediacy of the identity, but simultaneously a recommencement of this difference, because being is immediately nothing. Becoming is the instantaneous junction between temporal succession and spatial identity. Consequently, we have to read Science of Logic from the start as the cancellation of pure succession in historicity. This means that the simple being of being at the beginning is and is not an illusion. It is an illusion in the sense that it appears to be momentarily self-subsistent. It is not an illusion in the sense that it is a moment that is simple, and is dialectically related to nothing and becoming precisely through its own negation.

What then is the difference between dialectical-historical relations and temporal relations? Temporal relations are pure succession. Dialectical relations, by contrast, consist in sublation. That is, they consist in the mobile systematicity of three terms which form a complex but each of which also contradicts the others. Dialectical relations look like and incorporate temporal relations because they include negation.

As a consequence, we have to think of the totality of dialectical relations, logic, as historical, specifically as the process of cancelling immediate being, and with it pure time, in the form of history. The analysis of this process takes place particularly in the book of essence. This means that in order to work out precisely how logic, nature and spirit fit together, we have to look at the options that the doctrine of essence presents.

4.4 The Conditions for Dialectic
My position on the appearance of dialectical processes in history is that they are a pattern of behaviour that emerges in a system given certain conditions. It is initially tempting to interpret the dialectic of the logic as
the dialectical motor for actual historical examples. Houlgate suggests that Science of Logic licenses dialectical use of the categories for finite things (Hegel 139). For example, the decline of the Roman Empire looks like a whole-parts problem. The structural problems of the whole-parts relation might explain this decline. However, this is an invalid procedure because it avoids the task of discovering whether the conditions for a dialectical process have been established.

The logic of essence is a description of an autonomous, self-reflective process of thought. To apply it to history would therefore require finding objective historical processes that shared the distinctive features of thought itself. Firstly, the dialectic is self-referential: for example, the negation of being in essence reflects back onto the being of essence itself, so that essence is negatively related to itself. Secondly, the dialectic is self-determining: for example, the negative relation of essence to itself develops essence, and this development is autonomous.

The key to these special properties of thought are that they describe a process of reflection that reflects upon itself. Hegel’s logic of essence describes a dialectic that is set in motion by the appearance of this kind of process. Consequently, the embodiment of this process in history requires such a self-related process of reflection.

The logic would be embodied by an actual entity only if this entity were a reflective being. Further, entities other than humans could be thought of as being reflective, since Hegel describes reflection as the structure in which the past is preserved in the present, and this seems to be in principle generalizable beyond human memory.

This is precisely the problem which Hegel discusses in the final chapter of the Science of Logic, in the section on the living individual. In contrast to the immediate state of an inanimate being, which has no reference to its past or future, the immediate state of a living being has a reference to a trajectory from birth to death. It is a moment in the life process of the individual. The living individual therefore embodies the reflective sublation of immediate being that we find in the second book of Science of Logic.

However, as Hegel points out, the death of a living being only leads to another living being, which means that the passing away of a finite life does not lead to the preservation-in-negation of that life, but merely a repetition of finite life. Only spirit preserves its finite forms in their negation. Since Hegel’s notion of spirit means social-cultural being, it appears that the logic of essence is native to the historical realm. This view is confirmed in the Introduction to Philosophy of History (74-75) where Hegel speaks of the triumph of spirit over natural death.
What is it about spirit that allows it to reflect upon itself and so preserve itself? As is explained in the section on the Philosophy of History, spirit requires a set of material and conceptual resources in order to reflect on itself and preserve itself, such as laws, writing and historiography. By these means, human culture is able to learn from its fatal mistakes.

Several more elements are needed to posit spirit as embodying the logic of essence, however. Firstly, the dialectic of essence works by being self-referential. For example, essence is the negation of all being, including itself. Consequently, once a culture has acquired the necessary reflective resources, such as methods of recording, we also require that a culture should reflect upon itself as a process of reflection.

Secondly, thought determines itself in the logic of essence. By contrast, it may be tempting to think that reflection on a culture goes on at a remove from the actual productive processes of the culture. In Philosophy of History, Hegel theorizes that civilizations collapse through contradictions in their constitutive principles, but this is not to say that individuals are conscious of such contradictions, but that the ethos of the civilization becomes conflictual and ultimately unliveable. By contrast, the reflective process of the logic of essence appears to imply an intellectual process that goes on alongside actual history.

To counter this detachment of the dialectic of essence from actual history, we need to posit that the reflection of reflection upon itself is not intellectual. For Hegel, spiritual life means existing in a socially determined world. Important historical change comes about through the potential that this world has for learning from its own contradictions. What is of central importance is that social-cultural beings have socially determined meanings, and what they are is essentially determined by these meanings. This is important because it means that reflection-upon-self could be self-determining. Without this insight, it would appear that a dialectical transformation would only concern thought about historical individuals, not the transformations of the historical individuals themselves. By contrast, if the historical individual were essentially constituted by its meaning, then self-reflection would also be self-transformation.

Nonetheless, it is still necessary to guard against the possibility that the level of meaning could be thought as an ideological superstructure over an actually historical material basis. To avoid this, the process of reflection cannot simply be thought as a reflection on the meanings of things, but that it must also be a process of transformative work. Hegel's analysis of work in the Lord-and-Bondsman dialectic, especially as illuminated by Kojève, provides a clue here. The passage of being into
essence can be thought as the production of an artefact out of raw materials.

However, as we have seen, it is self-reflection and self-determination which are central to the dialectic. Social production of artefacts becomes a dialectical process of self-production only when self-related. Consequently, the embodiment of the logic of essence requires that a social world produce itself as a meaningful artefact.

My answer to the possibility of the logic of essence in history, therefore, is that the precondition of the logic would be a historical individual that was its own artefact. The dialectic of essence would be established in it, and thus also the drive to produce new forms of historical individuality, by its reflection upon itself and consequent self-determination or self-production.

4.5 Conclusion to the Introductory Chapters

In the first chapter, Collingwood showed that the problem of historical individuality is one of ontology rather than epistemology, and that its solution requires a conception of a rationally structured historical object, such as a narrative entity. In particular, Collingwood’s notion of extemporized narrative set the standard for concrete history and problematized the relation of Logic and history in Hegel’s philosophical history. However, Collingwood lacks an account of what a historical individual is.

In the second chapter, we built up an account of the relation of Logic to history. We discovered that individuality can be thought in several ways: 1) It signifies contingent actuality and finite objective relations (sense.) 2) It signifies the manner in which categories are not behind or above this actuality, but rather are a totality that is dialectically related to the contingent and to the individual that stands out against the background. 3) We further discovered that being reflects on itself through the spiritual mediation, and thus through history. A final meaning of individuality is thus that categorical structures are elaborated in history itself. This ties back to Collingwood’s notion of extemporized narrative. That is, a key feature of history is that it cannot be thought against a background of static concepts. We have seen that our commentators reject such a transcendent background. This will have the consequence that philosophical history is as much historical as philosophical.

In the current chapter, several questions of interpretation that bear upon the execution of this dissertation have been discussed. These all concern the relation of Logic to history, and how this necessitates a dissertation that a) unfolds the categories of the logic of essence as a
narrative while bringing out their relation to history and b) then uncovers the categorical structure as it occurs in philosophical history itself.

The development of the logic of essence is difficult, and it may be helpful to the reader to read the synopsis provided in Chapter 14 first. Furthermore, the following three chapters develop general considerations concerning historicity, and are thus fairly abstract. More concrete application to history begins with the category of existence.
5. ESSENCE

5.1 Overview
In this chapter, I lay out the groundwork for Hegel's logic of reflection. This logic proceeds dialectically, which implies that the stages of which it is composed are laid out both as a series of alternatives and as a development. This is because a complete account of the object includes the act of reflection, which means that reflection becomes its own object.

This chapter sets out a development of historical relations in which reflective activity in history attempts to totalize its own past being. The movement begins with the simple relation of the present and past, and then proceeds to the three forms of reflection, positing, external and determining reflection. These forms provide progressively more adequate schemes for historical relations.

5.2 Essence and Past Being
"Being is the immediate" states Hegel (389, II 241). As such, the logic of being is a logic of temporal being. It is the view that once something changes, it becomes something else.

The logic of essence, by contrast, is a logic of mediation, and therefore a logic of historical being. Hegel states that "not until knowing inwardizes, recollects [erinnert] itself out of immediate being, does it through this mediation find essence" (389, II 241). Moreover, "this path is the movement of being itself" (389, II 241). Being is sublated in essence, and conversely, essence "issues from being" (394, II 244).

Central to this relation between being and essence is the movement beyond or through being to essence, described by the verb "erinnern". "Erinnern" is translated by Miller both as "to recollect" and as "to inwardize". This double meaning shows that essence has on one hand a historical significance, and on the other hand signifies an individualizing movement. However, the precise character of the historical relation of present and past that is described by the movement of recollection is elusive. The following sections outline a standard view, and then present an alternative reading.

5.2.1. Essence as the Past
Hegel emphasizes the play of words that underpins this recollective movement—the German for essence, "Wesen," is contained in the past participle of the verb "Sein", that is, "gewesen". Hegel thus states, "essence is past—but timelessly past—being," (389, II 241), which is in German "das Wesen ist das vergangene, aber zeitlos vergangene Seyn."
However, in the Phenomenology, Hegel states “What is past is in fact inessential” or “Was gewesen ist, ist in der That kein Wesen.” (63 §106, 32). This apparent contradiction arises because, according to the rubric of sense-certainty, what is past “ist nicht,” (63 §106, 32) and therefore cannot be a Wesen. However, sense-certainty is incorrect in thinking that simply immediate being is essential being. For Hegel, as Marcuse notes, the past is not simply negated, but is conserved in its sublation (Marcuse, 70). Despite being past, being is preserved in the present, but as past. Wesen, what was, thus has an ambiguous reference to both the past and the present that we need to explore.

According to Marcuse, what the logic of being reveals is the non-being behind the becoming of being. In the doctrine of being, this non-being behind being can never be enunciated because it is the “always already” of being, or perpetually what being has been, rather than what it is (68). For Marcuse, essence is the hidden ground of the various determinations that the plant runs through in its life process (69). On this interpretation, recollection/inwardizing is a backward reference, and the essence is in the past, or, is a past being.

Similarly, Clark Butler focuses on Hegel’s statement that “Essence is being-in-and-for-itself but in the determination of being-in-itself” (391, II 243) and interprets “being-in-itself” as “potentiality.” Consequently, the movement of recollection/inwardizing for Butler is a “reverse movement from being-for-self to being-in-itself, from act to mere potency” (127).

On these readings, historical individuality as essence is an identity or potentiality that is “always already” before its present manifestation. Historical individuality manifests itself by enduring over time, but a later state is only a state of the individual because it was already that individual in a prior state.

5.2.2. Essence as the Present

However, these readings miss the initial “advance” (402, II 252) from which a backwards movement only later develops. This backward reference is proper to the relation of ground rather than to essence generally. This is a vitally important point for seeing that Hegel’s ultimate concept of individuality is a negating activity, rather than a hidden ground.

Firstly, Hegel states that essence issues from being (394, II 244). Generally, the path of being is a forward motion. In the transition to essence, however, being inwardizes. The question at stake is, does it withdraw into the past, or into the future?
The crucial fact here is that being as such is negated. There are not two determinate beings, one present (a blossom) and one past (a bud). Rather, there is merely the absolute negative reflex of being upon itself that establishes being as negated, as past. In a positive direction, "essence itself is simply affirmative [seiendes], immediate essence" (394, II 245). That is, essence is initially a negative singularity (absolute difference taken as positive), projected forward as the present by the pastness of being. Essence is what being comes to, not from whence it comes.

The dialectical problem that arises here is that, if essence is immediate, then it seems to be merely another determinate being (394, II 245). Although the present moment is the moment in which immediate being is suspended and past, it is temporally related to this past being, and thus is a second moment with its own immediate being. It appears that the distinction of being and essence is purely external (394, II 245).

Hegel's answer to this problem is that the mutual externality of the past being and present essence is precisely the illusory being. Hegel argues for this through a complex definition of the kind of immediacy possessed by essence. In the sphere of being, as Houlgate points out, immediacy is simple immediacy (Houlgate, Hegel's Critique 30). In the logic of essence, on the other hand, immediacy is mediated. The identity of something with itself essentially includes a differentiation of something from itself as its other. In this case, as Burbidge points out, the different sides of the historical moment, past or illusory being and present or essence are the same movement of negation (On Hegel's Logic 65).

On one side, as being that is non-being, illusory being constitutes an internal movement in which its immediacy as being is continually negated, but in this movement it also becomes illusory being. Ruins, as ruins, internalize the act of destruction as their own coming to be.1

On the other side, essence is neither simply the process by which being is negated, nor yet another being. Rather, it is the identity of this result with the negating process itself. Hegel summarizes: "the immediacy or indifference which this non-being contains is essence's own absolute being-in-itself" (397, II 341).

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1 Ruins are a vivid example of the presence of the past as illusory being. However, they are not ruins as ruins without a reflective act, and this reflective act cannot be attributed to the ruins themselves, but only to the social world that contains them. In order to find historical examples that fully embody the logic, and are therefore subject to its dialectic, we need examples that are capable of self-reflection. This is a difficult task because valid examples become far more rare. However, an appropriate example would be the ruin of a society itself.
The difference between past and present in the sphere of essence is therefore an internal negative reflex of the present moment instead of an external transition. Hegel states, "Illusory being is nothingness or the essenceless; but this nothingness or the essenceless does not have its being in an other in which its illusory being is reflected: on the contrary, its being is its own equality with self" (400, II 250). The identity of illusory being is not mere givenness, but an identity with itself that is a returning movement, a circuit via the past. The being of the past is the difference of the present moment from itself, which is resolved in the identity of the inherent negativity of the present with the negatedness of the past.

This points to an important distinction between the temporal past and the historical past. For temporality, the logic of being, there is no real past, because the present moment cannot contain it. Temporality is pure succession, in which each moment absolutely cancels the prior moment. As regards merely temporal being, there is only a past for us. By contrast, in historical being, the present is not another moment of time. It is the self-negation of the past, and therefore has the past as its sublated content. This is concrete succession, because the past moment continues into the present as its reflected content. It turns out, then, that the apparent secondariness of the present moment is in fact a projection from its own constitution of historical time in which the past is preserved and differentiated.

The outcome of this analysis of essence is that something only becomes a historical individuality in the remembrance of its death. Hegel anticipates this analysis in the Phenomenology, in his analysis of the work of the family for the individual (270 §451, 244). The family elevates "the long succession of separate disconnected experiences," into a historical individual. In a less final way, to live with memory, to have the structure of essence, is on one hand a constant death, because it means perpetually becoming illusory being in the memory of oneself, but on the other hand it is also to retrieve oneself from the finitude of being.

5.3 Paradoxes of the Past.

In the previous section, we reviewed the fundamental premise of the doctrine of essence in its simple form. On one hand it describes the foundation of historicity as a process of reflection. On the other hand it describes individuality as self-related negativity. Together, these sides mean that historical individuality is a negating activity in which past moments are sublated into a differentiated totality.

In the current section, the implications of this starting point are drawn out in the form of four modes of reflection. These modes are on one hand fundamental tools of reflection that are integral to the later shapes of historical individuality: positing, presupposing, external and determining
reflection. On the other hand, they are basic shapes of historical individuality, engendered by the paradox of reflection grasping itself as a being. On one hand, reflection is alienated from its own being, while on the other hand, this alienation and the negative constitution of its being are the work of reflection itself.

5.3.1. Positing Reflection.

5.3.1.1. Positing as such

Hegel's explication of positing reflection contains two important concepts: positedness and positing reflection. As we have seen, the logic of essence means that the present moment is an internal reflection that establishes the past as past. Hegel states that the mode of being of the past moment, self-negating being, is "its own equality with itself" and "the absolute reflection of essence" (400, II 250). Paradoxically, this means that the past is simultaneously itself and not itself. Specifically, it is a mediated immediacy that is the negation of simple immediacy. This self-related negativity is captured by the concept of positedness (401, II 251). Positedness is a self-identity that is only such by being a negation of self.

Hegel states of positedness that "it is...only as a returning movement, or as the negative of itself" (401, II 251). The reflective process thus only appears to begin from the past moment as an immediate starting point. In fact, the starting point is the result of the process of reflection; it is a positedness. This reflection is therefore positing reflection.

Because the moment of positedness is the present's self-identity, the historical individual in the form of positing reflection arrives at its identity through its own process. However, it only arrives at this self-identity by already having passed and negated it.

5.3.1.2. Presupposing

Hegel states, "reflection is the sublating of the negative itself, it is a coincidence with itself; it therefore sublates its positing, and since in its positing it sublates its positing, it is a presupposing" (401, II 251). The movement of positing negates the difference between essence and illusory being, and so returns to itself as an individual. The inner determination that it achieves through the difference between the past and the present is thereby undercut as a self-subsistent determination. But in reducing the difference from which the positing movement is a forward movement, it simply returns immediately to itself, or to what was the case all along. It therefore is a 'presupposing' because it has inverted from a movement that moves away to a movement that affirms the identity of the start and finish. This means that the past does not move into the present, but remains in the past as the basis and presupposition of the movement that returns to it.
For historical individuality, this means that the individual discovered in death is presupposed as the same individual that underpins all of the determinate being of the individual, and for which this determinate being was merely the surface show.

Yet, this presupposition is the result of a forward movement. Hegel states, “Reflection finds before it an immediate which it transcends and from which it is the return. But this return is only the presupposing of what reflection finds before it. What is thus found only comes to be through being left behind” (402, II 252). In other words, presupposing (voraussetzen) is a form of positing (setzen).

Hegel further states that “the transcending of the immediate from which reflection starts is rather the outcome of this transcending; and the transcending of the immediate is the arrival at it” (402, II 252). That is, the presupposed identity is not a simple identity, but a historical identity, which is an identity with itself through reflection. Historical reflection thus finds its own activity as its presupposed past.

5.3.2. External Reflection

Reflection, or the inner working of the present moment, sets up its own movement as the other of the present, and thus finds itself defined as present reflection over against this other completed reflection.

The present is not defined over against a past that is an immediate being, but as a past that is the total reflection. Burbidge is inclined to regard this self-externality of reflection as an illusion (On Hegel’s Logic 68). However, we can make sense of this move by considering that, although the past is only the past in being left behind, and therefore from an idealist point of view is merely part of the present movement, it is just as much the case that the present is merely a point flung forward by the movement. It is the belated realization of an individual identity that already was.

From this perspective, it is the reflective activity of the present that appears to be the nullity, since it reflects upon the surface of a self-subsistent totality. The past is therefore a self-subsistent and indifferent individual in relation to the reflections of the present. Hegel states, “It [the external reflection] therefore finds this [the reflection as being] before it as something from which it starts” (403, II 253). As a consequence, external reflection, which defines itself in opposition to the past, and thus establishes the past as past, at the same time abstracts this movement from the past moment as merely a reflection upon the past, to which the past is indifferent.
In the final *volte-face* of external reflection, Hegel states, "This immediate from which it seemed to start as from something alien, is only in this its beginning" (404, II 253). In negating its own positing of the past, which has apparently set the past up as an original moment, reflection also negates the presupposing as such.

What we have discovered from external reflection, then, is that the forward movement of essence is equally a retrospective establishment of its origination, both in terms of its identity and in terms of its determinacy. At the same time, unlike for positing reflection, the movement is not something that rests upon the present, because external reflection suspends the validity of its own positing and presupposing. Instead, past and present are the moments of a self-determining movement.

5.3.3. *Determining Reflection*

We saw in the previous section that present recollection configures the past (which it presupposes) in a determinate manner relative to the present. However, there is in fact no other to form a surface, because the presuppositional movement is itself sublated as a positing. The reflection of the present is therefore a determination without a substrate, "only something posited" (406, II 255).

Hegel states that positing reflection is now in unity with external reflection. This is because the impossible ambition of determining the externalized other has been overcome, leaving the positedness as, on one hand a nullity, but on the other hand as something that remains through reflection, and therefore an "absolute presupposing" (406, II 256).

The being of reflection is equality with itself in its negatedness. This means that positedness cannot pass over into an other, because it would simply be itself again. It is a nothing, so the nullifying move of external reflection merely confirms its being.

As a consequence, the determinations of reflection, pure positedness, "float in the void" without relation to other (407, II 256). Hegel states that this provides us with two sides, negation as such (the past) and reflection into self (the present). These are implicitly a unity, but only implicitly. On one hand, they constitute a single determining movement. On the other hand, they are differentiated, because the negation, the past, returns into itself, not into its non-being, the present.

However, it turns out that this difference is merely the internal structure of the determination of reflection itself. The determination is internally distinguished into its positedness, as the negative over against
the reflection-into-self, and into its reflection-into-self. The one is its sublatedness and determinateness, while the other is its subsistence. The positedness refers to its other, but this is its own movement that reflects it back into itself. Past and present thus form an identity which, against the idealism of positing reflection or the realism of external reflection, cannot be reduced to either past or present. Rather, the historical individual is a relational structure, which differentiates itself into the two sides.

5.4 Conclusion

In the foregoing, we have seen five models for historical individuality—simple essence, and the four modes of reflection: positing, presupposing, external, and determining. They are models for historical individuality in the sense that they provide five different ways of thinking of the relationship between the individual and its historical narrative. The five forms are also five strategies for self-reflexive beings to re-identify themselves through their own othering, or for us to understand how beings can be both other to themselves and self-identifying. In the rest of the book of essence, these are the basic logical tools for understanding the convolutions of reflection.

Let us lay out what we have learnt that is significant for the rest of the logic of reflection. In the first place, the chapter of essence establishes the terms of a general problem. This problem is to give an account of how an individual is able to integrate the historical narrative that gives it a content. In the second place, the present chapter provides a few of the building blocks for an adequate theory. First, we have discovered the role of reflection in preserving being, and of negation as the only mode in which being can be preserved. Second, the historical individual needs to be able to sublate its own becoming, put it to use as its own content and return to self-identity as positing reflection. It will also need to be a presupposing reflection in order to objectify itself as a being. This is a necessary element in self-identity. The individual also needs to be an external reflection, because it is only as such that it grasps itself as a totality. A historical individual must be able, in some way, to present itself to itself as an object that embodies the movement of reflection.

Lastly, the individual needs to negate its otherness as a totality, and be a determining reflection that becomes a total object, and realizes itself in this object. The historical individual must somehow eliminate the difference between the internal reflection of the object and its external reflection. Determining reflection is therefore the correct answer in general. Yet it does not yet have the resources to explain how it relates to its moment of difference. The coming chapters will thus be a process of building up the resources needed for a complete account of the historical individual as a determining reflection.
6. THE ESSENTIALITIES

6.1 Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to interpret Hegel's "essentialities" as forms of historicity. In the previous chapter, we reached the concept of reflection determined as a determining reflection, and identical with its determination. Because we are applying a logic of self-related reflection to history, determining reflection is a historical development that progresses by means of the recollection of its own self-related activity.

We saw in the previous chapter that the determination of reflection and the determining reflection are identical. This is why Hegel terms the determinations of reflection "essentialities": they are reflection positing its own essence as its object (408, II 256). Reflection's quest for self-adequation lays out the moments of essence: identity, difference, opposition and contradiction. Contradiction both exhausts and fulfils the possibilities of this quest.

The past only becomes in being left behind, and is therefore positedness. In this chapter, we see how a scheme of historicity in which the posited past is the being of the present works itself out. The manner in which this operates is that successive phases of the development relate to the earlier phases as the past moment, and more specifically, they relate to the past moment as the moment of identity. Eventually this development runs into contradiction. Through contradiction, the mapping of positing/posited onto past and present is reversed. In the ground relation, the past is the hidden original moment against the positedness of present being.

6.2 Identity

Hegel defines identity as the immediacy of reflection (411, II 260). However, it is not simply being, or even non-being. Rather, it is "equality-with-self" (411, II 260). Determining reflection reflects upon itself, and therefore both discovers its essential being and produces it. Burbidge thinks of identity as the persistence of the object of thought, but this imports an ordinary usage instead of attending to the text (On Hegel's Logic 73). Instead, the essentiality of identity is this self-produced identity of the differentiating activity of reflection with itself in its posited other (411, II 260).

As identity, the past moment is posited as being identical with the present and as being the identity of the present. Paradoxically, because being is past and thus positedness, it is intrinsically the self-related negativity that is the whole historical structure of essence. The present is
therefore present to itself in its past, and thus its past takes on the meaning of being the present. However, because the past is only identity as self-related negativity, it is just as much absolute difference as absolute identity.

6.3 Absolute Difference

Reflection is identical with its essentiality, but the content of this identity is absolute difference. Most commentators interpret the categories non-self-referentially, and therefore think difference merely as a logical counterpart to identity (Burbidge, On Hegel’s Logic 74; Harris 162; Hartnack 46). Dahlstrom, by contrast, correctly interprets the essentialities as self-determinations of reflection (Between Being 106). Reflection is different from its essentiality, yet this being different from itself is its return into identity. Hegel states, therefore, that difference is both the whole, identity and difference together, and its moment, difference (417, II 266).

The converse of the paradox that the past moment is the being of the present, is that the past is only the being of the present by being self-negating, and thus by being past. Nonetheless, being difference is the manner in which the past is the identity of the present. The present reflective activity therefore remains present to itself in its past.

Difference as the present moment preserves identity as its own presupposed immediacy. However, the past moment is complete as positedness that refers to its negation in the present, and the present is likewise complete as difference that has its identity in the past. The two moments are thus identical but also externally separated. They belong to a higher essentiality in which they are identified and differentiated: diversity.

6.4 Diversity

Four main features of the logical structure of diversity need to be brought out. Firstly, it contains the ambiguous indifference of identity and difference. Secondly, it contains the background of external reflection, which duplicates the inner duality of identity/difference in the external comparing terms of likeness and unlikeness. Thirdly, the identity-difference pair are inverted in the likeness-unlikeness pair because the former are mutually indifferent wholes, while the latter constitute a mutually determining opposition. Fourthly, these two pairs are mutually mediated: on one hand through the self-sublation of the second pair into the first, and on the other through the development of the first pair into the second.

Diversity is a form of historicity in which the moment of the present, as self-external reflection, relates to the first moment as its past
negative unity. The present firstly relates itself to the past through continuity (likeness) and change (unlikeness), secondly it sublates these terms as its externality from itself, but then thirdly it produces them again as its own essentiality. The past identity is thus posited as the sublation of active reflection, and the present is posited as the activity of reflection external to its identity. Diversity is thus the generation of historical individuality as a self-opposition.

6.5 Opposition

The essentiality of opposition contains a third iteration of the identity-difference pair. The positive/negative pair represents the two dimensions of the preceding essentiality: on one hand, 1) reflection is identical with itself in being opposed to itself, 2) this is a self-external identity, 3) but it is the identity of the posited with itself, and hence 4) it is positive. On the other hand, 1) reflection is self-external opposition, 2) it is identical with itself, 3) but as such it is opposed to itself, and thus 4) it is negative. This essentiality turns into contradiction because the self-constitutive negation of the other (mutual exclusion) is also a self-negation (self-exclusion). This constitutes Hegel’s concept of contradiction.

Reflection as opposition is a historical structure differentiated into self-subsistent moments which are only self-subsistent as opposed moments of the structure. These moments are: 1) the past, historical structure in its identity with itself as self-identical positedness; 2) the whole structure again, but this time as explicit determination of negatedness that refers to its identity in the positive for its being. These sides are not subsistent aside from their places in a historical asymmetry of moments. On one hand, the past is determined as the immediate, identical moment through exclusion of opposition from itself. On the other hand, the present determines itself through opposition to its own posited identity in the immediate past. The self-constitutive exclusivity of each moment is simultaneously a contradictory self-exclusion.

6.6 Contradiction

The positive and the negative are each the totality of reflection as self-subsistent exclusions of the other. However, they fall into contradiction because their exclusion of the other is an exclusion of self (431, II 279). This is because each is self-subsistent as the totality, which implies including the other, but each is also determinate in the relation of opposition by excluding the other. Consequently, the exclusion of the other that makes each side determinate is an exclusion of itself (431, II 279).

Hegel states, therefore, that positive and negative are posited contradiction (432, II 279). Contradiction means a turning of the determination against itself, and a conversion into its other, rather than a
simple logical dead-end. It is important to grasp that contradiction is not a subjective failure of conceptualization. From the perspective of a philosophical tradition that regards contradiction as a feature of propositions, it would be natural to assume that reflection has simply taken a blind alley in pursuing its nature through the dialectic of identity.

However, contradiction has a positive significance for Hegel (433, II 280). That is, contradiction is the logical outcome of the dialectic of identity, and thus stands as a determination of reflection itself. The dialectic of contradiction both lays out the moments of the opposition as self-subsistent moments, self-subsistence and positedness, and negates these moments as positednesses. This seems to be a perpetual alternation between the contradictory terms of the opposition (433, II 280). However, the self-exclusion of the negative is not simply a negation of positedness as the positive, but a negation of positedness as the negative (434, II 281). This excluding negation is, as we have seen, a conversion of the self-subsistence into a positedness. In this case, this is a conversion of the self-subistence of the negative into a positedness. This means that contradiction both sublates itself and posits itself again (434, II 281). This is a more radical reflection into self than previously. It is the identity of self-negation with itself (434, II 281).

Contradiction appears to be unreal because all real things are posited as being identities, or at least to be identities as negations of identities. Consequently, contradiction seems at first to relate to reflection merely as a subjective failure in its self-conceptualization because, being an identity, reflection itself cannot be contradiction. However, according to Hegel, the identity of reflection is the identity of contradiction.

As a guide to the historicity of contradiction, Hegel states that, "the self-subsistent opposition through its contradiction withdraws into ground; this opposition is the prius, the immediate, that forms the starting point, and the sublated opposition is itself a positedness. Thus essence as ground is a positedness, something that has become" (434, II 282). However, the secondary moment that emerges, ground, is simply the positing of the beginning moment, opposition, as positedness. The structure of historicity here is captured by the statement that "the opposition has not only fallen to the ground, but has withdrawn into its ground" (434, II 282 my trans.). This is explained by Hegel in the terms that reflection in the determination of ground sublates itself as opposition as its own excluded immediate being (435, II 282). Over against this, as the second positedness, ground is reflected into itself (435, II 282). However, this second moment is only the sublatedness of the first as the exclusion of the self-subsistence of opposition from itself (435, II 282).
Hegel states that the positive side of ground is merely the adding of the moment of unity to self-contradictory opposition (435, II 282-283). Reflection has thus become present to itself as a self-contradictory determination that points to a unity behind itself, but a unity that only appears as a sublated immediate.

6.6.1. Application to History

We have seen that reflection determines itself as positedness, which means, self-externality. In historical terms this means that historical reflection sets itself out as identical only as essentially external to this identity. That means, it is a historical structure in which the primary moment of identity is sublated as past as the identity of the historical process of self-differentiation. The opposition of the positive and the negative is an advanced form of this historical structure in which the whole structure as a self-externality is self-identified in two mutually external moments, the moment of self-identity and the moment of difference from self. The priority of the first moment is not so much that it is sublated in the second as that it is also the whole historical totality, but reflected into itself as the undifferent. The secondariness of the moment of difference derives from its sublation of the other moment as the moment of its identity from which it differs. As we have seen from the logic of contradiction, this structure of historicity falls into contradiction.

Firstly, the primary moment, the positive, is the historical structure as a total moment only through its exclusion of the self-differentiated structure. However, as such the primary moment immediately converts itself into the negation of its own positedness, and thus into a positedness. This means, it converts itself from being an immediate primary moment into being a secondary moment in relation to the primary moment of positedness that it excludes. Self-contradiction is thus the motive force of this historical structure: it converts the primary moment immediately into the secondary moment out of itself. This conversion of the primary moment into the secondary moment means that the meaning of the secondary moment is its exclusion of itself from itself. It is a self-identical moment as the identity of the negative with itself, but this is the identity that forms the primary moment. It thereby contains its self-identity as a sublated first moment.

We can see from this perspective that self-contradiction is not a subjective failure. Rather, it is a structure of historicity. Nonetheless, it appears that this structure of historicity is a relation of primary and secondary moments that slips into a cycle of equal moments because the secondary moment converts itself back into a primary moment of self-subsistence.
This cycle is an illusion however, because the self-negation of the secondary moment is not simply a return to positive identity. The structure of historicity in which the positive converts itself into the self-contradictory negative is the second moment that contradicts itself, and therefore takes itself as the sublated first moment. This new structure of historicity is the new second moment, in which the contradictory opposition is sublated as its own identity. In contradicting itself, the secondary moment makes itself into its primary moment, but thereby establishes itself again as a secondary moment that is the whole historical structure.

Historicity as ground is therefore the final determination of determining reflection. It captures itself as the historical moment as a self-sublating, self-positing moment. It has a paradoxical historical structure, as was indicated in the previous section. It is a secondary moment in relation to the sublation of the primary differentiation of itself into primary and a secondary moment. Consequently, it is a simultaneously a withdrawing [Zurückgehen] of itself from positedness or secondariness. The second moment thus has the value of the sublation of its own historical structure in favour of an underlying unity of self-contradiction.

6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, the problem has been for historical reflection to capture its being, since its being is the negation of being. We have discovered that historical reflection can only reveal itself as a differentiated historical structure that sublates itself in favour of its unity as a ground of itself. The concept of history as negativity is the most important in the analysis above. The idea of a historical individual will not be thinkable as a simple identity that stands in a primary relation to its history. Instead, the structure of historicity is the internal structure of the historical individual both laying itself out and becoming. The concept of the posited is also of huge importance for the development of an account of historicity. Positedness provides the means of binding the immediate, first moment to the present reflection as an immediate identity that is only immediate as a retro-projection within the historical structure itself.
7. GROUND

7.1 Overview

The logic of ground is the logic of the paradox of the original moment: that it is original and indifferent to the present, and yet determined as such from within the present moment. In the logic of the essentialities, the past is sublated being, posited as posited from within the structure of the historical present. In the logic of ground, by contrast, past as original being is posited as unposited from the structure of the historical present, which is now posited as posited. Firstly, the logic of ground progressively cancels the determinedness of the original moment by positing more fundamental unities. Secondly, the logic develops the tension between historical totality and temporal externality as mutually mediating moments.

The limit point of this logic is the conversion of historicity into a proto-syllogistic form in which every moment is explicitly mediated. This generates a proto-objectivity in which historicity presupposes itself as an external immediacy, natural temporality, which is its condition. However, the condition is still related to historicity through the latter's self-presupposing reflection. This final mediation cancels itself and produces immediate presence, or existence. Contrary to what Desmond thinks, Hegel provides an explicit analysis of the idea of an origin that cannot be reduced to the triad immediacy-opposition-mediation (Rethinking the Origin 78).

7.2 Absolute Ground

Contradiction collapses into its ground. The second moment, ground, is thus both mediated by the first moment, contradiction, and is also a sublation of its mediation by the first moment (444, II 292). Absolute ground is the hidden, original past within and in relation to the formal structure of the present.

The relation of form and essence develops from the unity of ground and contradiction. On the basis of the orderly triads of Encyclopedia Logic, Hartnack and Harris view ground as the unity of identity and difference (Hartnack 50, Harris 170). However, Burbidge points out that a more subtle relation is described in Science of Logic (On Hegel's Logic 105). Essence is the unity of the ground and the contradiction and thus both the unity of the form and the moment of identity in the form (449, II 296). In this form, historical structure is self-external history that simultaneously negates and produces itself in relation to its original moment in the past.
This becomes the relation of form and matter because all of the terms of the relation have been placed on the side of the form, as Burbidge states (On Hegel's Logic 87). The form differentiates the essence and in doing so maintains it as a substrate. Historical structure therefore determines itself as an ongoing activity against its own material presupposition and continuity.

Matter and form presuppose each other. As such they are grounded by content (455, II 301). Content is once again the identity term and unity of the form, but determined as the unity of matter and form. The historical structure therefore contains content as its own potentiated matter, actualized in history and recollected as the original potential in the actualised present.

7.3 Determinate Ground

The concept of content begins a new series of forms of ground. The problem is that content is implicitly what form is explicitly. The forms of determinate ground develop this tension: 1) The original moment is the whole historical structure. 2) The historical structure differs from its original moment. 3) This difference is contained in the original moment. This paradox leads to three sets of relation: formal, real and complete ground.

7.3.1. Formal Ground

Formal ground is ostensibly an assymetrical grounding relation between two moments: content and form. However, the form collapses back into the content moment. This collapse sets the stage for a real difference between content and form. The absorption of form by the content occurs on one hand through the identity of content of the two moments, and on the other through their identity of form. As Burbidge states, the explicitation of content in the form is merely an internal reflection of the content (On Hegel's Logic 93). Under this relational form, the present moment posits the past moment as its complete potential. This form collapses the past-present relation. Firstly, the meaning of content is to be self-identical in the ground and the grounded. Secondly, the two moments have identical structures. The present contains the past as its ground and identity. Yet the past also contains itself and is negatively related to this moment of immediacy. Historicity therefore collapses into a single, self-related moment. However, in doing so, it externalizes the external difference of present and past as a temporal externality.
7.3.2. **Real Ground**

Formal ground totalizes the historical moment as a self-relation of content. By contrast, real ground brings to light the self-externality of the ground relation in temporality.

Ground and the grounded are each the totality, because each includes the other moment. As such, they are mutually indifferent (462, II 307). The grounded contains the content of the ground (462, II 308). However, the grounded is a difference between itself and the ground. This externality constitutes the second content of the grounded (462, II 308). Consequently, the grounded contains the essential content unity together with an immediate, unessential manifold which is not part of its unity, and is consequently ungrounded (462, II 308). Form has thus ceased to be a mediation and has become a self-external join (463, II 309).

The present historical structure is the whole because it contains the original moment as its own moment of identity. Secondly, the present historical structure is by the same token negatively related to itself. Consequently, the present historical structure contains itself as a second moment. It is thus the externalization of the original moment into a temporal manifold. However, this is an ungrounded conjunction. Consequently, the present historical structure is a multiplicity of equally external events that are in principle unified, but only unified in relation to an arbitrarily selected central event which appears purely externally in the manifold.

7.3.3. **Complete Ground**

Formal and real ground are counterparts, being reflection into self and self-externality respectively. Complete ground is the mutual mediation of these relations.

In the real ground relation, a conjunction has a ground. This relation has the form of a bifurcation of its external determinations into an externally determined ground and grounded. The real ground relation as a conjunction of itself and the essential content is a posited relation in relation to another ground, which is the grounding relation *in itself* (467, II 312).

This second grounding relation is the same content as the first, but in the form of a ground (467, II 312). However, it is only the moment of immediate unity of the conjunction. The two somethings, one of which is the difference of the conjunction, and the other of which is the immediate identity of the conjunction, are therefore the whole of the real ground relation (468, II 313). The ground is identical in content with the grounded, and therefore this relation has the character of formal ground. Furthermore, as real, the common content reflects itself into two different
contents, one as the relation in its diversification, and the other as this same content in the form of immediate identity (468, II 313).

The complete mediated form of complete ground builds upon this relation of an original join to a developed join. Firstly, the primary moment is the immediate ground relation, which contains itself and the other determination immediately in the form of formal ground (468, II 313). Secondly, the differentiated conjunction mediates itself as a conjunction via this original unity through the identity of itself as a whole with the primary, essential moment that it contains.

However, this immediate, original connection is only determined as such in the real ground relation. The ground relation therefore refers backwards from itself to a presupposed immediate which it takes for ground, but only through the negation of the ground relation in the immediate (469, II 314).

The determination of the immediate moment as the sublation of the real relation is the formal relation. However, this is an incomplete sublation of the real relation, because the formal relation is a determination of the real relation. Rather, the absolute negation that is mediated out of the complete ground is the immediate aside from its determination as formal ground. Against E. E. Harris, who supposes that this transition is a consequence of the failure of grounding as a way of thinking (174), ground as a whole both posits and sublates itself, and presupposes itself as its immediate condition.

The present historical structure is an external nomination of temporal events as grounded present and past-as-ground. This external structure relates itself back to the past-as-ground, which is a temporal event determined as a historical moment, and thus as the historicity of the present structure in itself.

As we have seen, this past event is again a self-external historicity, but now determined as the immediate identity of the conjunction with itself. The secondary moment is therefore already contained implicitly in the essential historical moment. The present historical structure is a conjunction of its own identity as an essential historical moment with the temporal manifold, and this conjunction is reflected into itself as a privileged event in the manifold.

The present historical conjunction and the historical moment are the same content, but reflected into two sides, as a self-external relation to a temporal manifold, and as this reflection in unity with itself. The moment of identity is the essential moment over against the conjunction.
Conversely, the present conjunction contains the present moment along with its own external determination as a temporal conjunction. The present conjunction is thus a historical structure with a ground by virtue of the immediate unity of the present moment with the present conjunction.

At the same time, the immediate event-moment is only the ground for the historical structure through the historical structure which takes it as its original moment. Furthermore, this historical structure is only a historical structure by finding itself in the immediate moment. Consequently, the historical structure presupposes itself as the indeterminate immediacy of the event prior to its determination as an essential historical moment.

### 7.4 Condition

#### 7.4.1. The Relatively Unconditioned

Initially, condition and ground are mutually indifferent and simultaneously mutually dependent terms. This makes them self-contradictory and leads to condition as the absolutely unconditioned. As Burbidge recognizes (On Hegel’s Logic 97), condition has three determinations: 1) it is the immediate manifold of the real ground relation (470, II 315); 2) it is the condition of the ground; 3) it is the content of the ground. However, it is only these three determinations by being indifferent to them. Conversely, because condition is determined as indifferent to these determinations, they belong to the ground relation, which is therefore complete and indifferent to its condition (471, II 315). Condition and ground are therefore unconditioned in relation to each other. However, condition is only this indifference as a positedness of the ground (471, II 315). Conversely, the self-subsistence of ground is the presupposition of itself as an immediacy, or condition of itself. Condition and ground are consequently both negatively related to themselves (472, II 315).

We have seen that the ground relation is historical structure. Here, the historical structure presupposes itself as an immediate, natural, temporal event. This event is the original moment, condition and immediate content of the historical moment. Yet it is only such as indifferent to these historical determinations. Consequently, the historical moment is self-contained in relation to this original moment. The temporal manifold becomes material to be transformed by spontaneous historical relations. However, this state of being relatively unconditioned is self-sublating, because temporal events are only such as presupposed by a historical structure, and conversely, the self-containment of the historical means that it presupposes itself as condition.
7.4.2. The Absolutely Unconditioned

Condition and ground showed themselves to be the terms of a self-sublating presupposing relation. They prove, furthermore, to be identical, and thus to have a common unity over against their self-externalization as condition and ground. In historical terms, historicity and temporality are 1) mutually presupposing, 2) self-sublating and 3) organized in a common third, the fact.

The genesis of the fact comes about because ground and condition prove to be the same form and content. In regards to form: condition is the indifferent in-itself of the ground relation, but it only becomes this as a return from ground, and thus has the ground reflection as its own reflection into itself. Conversely, the ground relation is essentially a presupposing relation that posits its in-itself outside of it, but equally becomes from this in-itself as its origin. Thus 1) condition and ground both contain the whole form and 2) ground and condition are moments of the same self-presupposing reflection. In regards to content, condition is only the condition as the immediate content of the ground relation. Ground and condition therefore presuppose a common unity of both form and content. This unity is the fact.

The fact appears firstly in the position of an absolute condition for the self-sublating relative conditioning relation. However, it is condition that is essentially ground. The fact can stand in the relation of condition to a presupposed ground, or of ground to a presupposed condition, but this has already been demonstrated as its own internal reflection. Consequently, Hegel states, "It is the fact's own act to condition itself and to oppose itself as ground to its conditions, but its relation, as a relation between conditions and ground, is a reflection into itself, and its relation to them is its union with itself." (474, II 319).

7.4.2.1. Application to History

Firstly, the historical moment establishes a paradoxical mode of historicity for the condition in which it is determined as the negation of historicity, which is immediate temporal being. However, this flight from determination on the part of the event is brought up short by the nature of immediate being itself. The logic of being is a logic of finitude. The immediate event is only an event in the context of a continuum in which it is external to itself. The event is an indefinite manifold which is only fixed as a determinate event by the wholesale negation of being into essence. Its immediate determinate being is the reflection of the historical moment. On the other side, the ground determination sets itself apart from itself as an immediate event, and sets this determination apart from the immediate event in itself. However, the radical externality of the event is overcome through the event itself, which only is as the immediate reflection into itself of the ground. Consequently, the original moment that is contained
in the historical structure is a dynamic original moment that establishes the structure through its separation of itself into a reflected immediacy and a historical reflection upon this immediacy, and returns into itself as the identity of these sides. This identity of conditioning event and grounding moment is the fact.

The original moment is both a temporal event and a historical moment. As an event, it is the sublation of the reflective historical movement that separates event and moment. However, as moment, which the event essentially is, it is the negative relation of the historical moment to its immediate being in the event. The original moment of the fact therefore separates itself into an immediate, manifold event and a ground. The historical moment sublates itself as an external determining of the event and presupposes itself as an event. However, the event is only the event in relation to the reflective movement of the historical moment. Consequently, the sublation of the differentiation of event and moment is a restoration of the unity of the fact. As we see in the next section, this restoration is a sublation of the presupposing reflection itself.

7.4.3. The Emergence of The Fact into Existence

The previous section established the fact as the unity of ground and condition. This section establishes the logic by which a fact emerges into existence. For Hegel, it does not stand in a grounding relation to a ground and conditions. Instead, it sublates its relation to ground and conditions because these are posits of the fact itself. Emergence into existence, and existence itself, are the sublation of mediation by past ground and conditions.

The fact is firstly doubly presupposed as condition and ground (475, II 319). We have seen that conditions are intrinsically related to the grounding relation and conversely that ground presupposes itself as conditions. It appears at first, therefore, that the fact’s existence is related to a presupposed original potential for itself (475, II 319).

However, this self-mediation is a vanishing mediation. The presupposing of the conditions is now determined as the act of the grounding relation, and is therefore a determining reflection (476, II 320). In sublating the presupposing of the conditions, the ground relation equally sublates itself as the presupposing reflection, as Burbidge states (On Hegel’s Logic 104). The emergence of a fact into existence is therefore 1) a self-external relation of itself to prior conditions, 2) the conversion of the immediate conditions into the ground relation, and 3) the sublation of this grounding relation through the sublation of the presupposition of the conditions (476, II 320). A present fact proves its conditions merely to be its apparent self-externalization by casting off their otherness and with it the grounding relation itself.
7.4.3.1. Application to History

The fact as a historical moment separates itself from itself and presupposes itself as its own potential in the form of grounding conditions. This moment of immediacy is the whole of itself, but spread out externally as a set of conditions. In historical terms, this means that the original moment presupposes itself as 1) a sequence of events and 2) an accumulation of these event-conditions as grounds.

However, the dialectic of the absolutely unconditioned has shown us that these conditions are posited as such by presupposing reflection. This means that the conditions for the fact are retrospectively posited as such by the fact itself. Furthermore, because the events are laid out through the presupposing action of the fact, their self-sublation is equally the sublation of the presupposing as a positing. That is, the immediacy of the events is an illusory immediacy, and their becoming past, or passing away, is in fact the removal of the illusion of presupposition.

Although the fact gives itself grounds and conditions, it does not have the same relation to the past that has characterized the ground relation. In the latter, the present moment stands as a positedness towards its original moment. In the fact, by contrast, the externality of the conditions, and the relation of the fact backwards to itself as an original moment, is sublated. In effect, the emergence of the fact is a qualitative leap, for which the past moments are only conditions.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter is both a series of forms and a development. As a series of forms, we have been provided with a series of logical forms of historicity. These forms are templates for theorizing history in terms of the original moment of identity. As such, they provide categories for actual historical entities which have determined themselves as relations to presupposed original moments. Furthermore, the dialectics of these forms provide a critique of such entities, and a guide to their logical development.

As a development, the logic of the ground takes place over against the logic of the essentialities. The logic of ground is a sublation of the mediated determinations, and a reference back to the original moment. The logic of ground is therefore a project for both determining the grounding moment from within the historically structured present moment, and releasing it from this determination. This provides us with the series of forms that we have reviewed.

The conclusion to which the logic of ground comes is that reflection presupposes itself in a self-external form, and then sublates this presupposition. This, then, is a unification of the conclusions of both the
logic of the essentialities and the logic of ground. Firstly, reflection sublates its determination as a historical structure and presupposes an original, self-identical grounding moment, but then it discovers that this presupposed grounding moment is itself a manifold, and furthermore, is merely the self-determination of the ground. This means that both the external manifold and the past reference of the grounding relation are sublated. The existent historical moment is therefore a contraction of external time into a unity. However, this unity is neither the product of the contraction nor the ground of it, since the externalization of time for the historical moment is its differentiation of itself which it sublates as such. The past is thus merely the groundless givenness of the present historical moment. This form of historicity is the basis for the logic of existence.
8. EXISTENCE

8.1 Overview

In "Existence," Hegel explains why the concept of thinghood arises from the concept of existence, but also why it disintegrates. This is an account of why it is possible to show the artificiality of the fundamental things (identities) of any history. More radically, however, it is an account of an objective process of illusory being. That is, the individuals of history, for example peoples, rely upon the illusion of givenness for their essentiality, and their participation in history itself removes this illusion.

The conclusion of this chapter is that the essential thinghood of society is only the identity of the unessential with itself. We reach this conclusion because reflection posits itself as the essential medium of history, and finds its subsistence in continuous matters. However, reflection can only achieve individuality, or thinghood, as a contradiction. Social reflection thus reveals that its essential being, or existence, is not a given people, nor a substrate of materials. Instead, the essential being of social reflection is the spontaneous emergence of a mutually determining system of artificial entities. This is the world of appearance.

8.2 Things with Properties

8.2.1 The Thing

Hegel’s logic of the thing-in-itself is a general description of how individuals only exist in a context defined by their interrelation. This argument has three phases: 1) the splitting of existence into the thing and its background conditions; 2) the splitting of the thing into a plurality of things; and 3) the restoration of the essential identity of the things set against their collective differentiation in property.

Firstly, Existence is the result of the sublation of the ground relation. Paradoxically, existence is mediated into immediacy through the sublation of mediation (483, II 326). Consequently, existence comprises firstly an immediate thing-in-itself, and secondly external existence as the sublated mediation of this thing-in-itself (484, II 327). Furthermore, the differentiation of existence into the thing and its unessential existence is an external reflection upon the thing (485, II 328). The outer layer of quality is thus an external differentiation of the thing-in-itself for another, but this other is merely reflection relating negatively to itself.

Secondly, the thing-in-itself and its external reflection are essentially identical, which introduces difference into the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is "a self-repelling thing-in-itself which therefore is related to itself as to an other" (486, II 328). The self-repulsion of the thing-
in-itself means that a plurality of thing-in-themselves is generated. This is because the collapse of external reflection into identity gives us two different determinations of the thing-in-itself. The first is the thing determined in separation from its sublated mediation. The second is the thing determined as the sublation of reflection, or as Hegel puts it, reflection-into-self. The difference between things is external, always belonging to the second person (486, II 329). The other thing, or second person, is the reflection-into-self of external, qualitative and quantitative existence. It is therefore a concrete thing with qualities. Furthermore, the external manifold means that the number of these others is undetermined: it is a plurality rather than a duality.

Thirdly, the plurality collapses. The thing-in-itself as the immediate essentiality of existence is a privileged moment of the totality. The totality, Hegel states, is the reciprocal mediation of the things-in-themselves through external existence. Each of the others, then, comprises the whole movement of mediation, reflection into self, and externalisation of the other as this movement. Because each of the other things goes through the whole movement of existence, including the first moment of being an immediate essentiality, there is no longer a privileged thing. The plurality is thus only external, since each thing is a sublation of its external mediation, and thus they are essentially identical. The thing’s sublation of this externalisation converts its determinateness into property (487, II 330). The relation between the two things, which is a qualitative determination, becomes a property of one thing.

8.2.1.1. Application to History

At this stage, we will concretize the application of the logic to historical individuality by considering it as a logic of a Volk, or people. Two things need to be borne in mind: on one hand, the logic is dialectical because it is self-referential. We therefore need to keep self-referentiality as the yardstick for applying the logic. On the other hand, the idea of a people belongs to a later conceptual level. The application of the logic to history at this stage will therefore only be a partial account.

Firstly, we need to determine the meaning of existence as a form of historicity. On one hand, existence is the sublation of its production out of external conditions. This means that the fact that a people and its culture are the result of a series of external events and processes is sublated. On the other hand, the grounding relation sublates itself, so that the people is a present existence that contains its conditions as its immediate being. In the last chapter, conditions are material happenings that are necessary for historical moments. For example, a fort is built, a kind of boat is invented, or a mythology is developed. In the transition to existence, these conditions are contemporized as the accumulated results of the past.
Hegel's central example of this phase of existence in history is the forgetfulness of the Greeks towards their origins. The Greeks are from one perspective the product of the conflux of pre-hellenic peoples and foreign, especially Egyptian, cultural influences. However, they cut off this relation to the past by making use of it as a repository of linguistic, genetic and cultural materials.

We now need to determine the historical meaning of the difference of thing-in-itself and external existence. As we have seen, the duality of thing-in-itself and its existence is the product of self-alienating reflection. This means, in historical terms, that the people's capacity for self-reflection 1) relates the people to its past; 2) sublates this relation to the past by positing the people as an existence; 3) distinguishes the existent people into materials and self-identity; and 4) sublates this distinguishing reflection as external to the people's self-identity. The consequence is 1) the people as a self-identical thing, 2) the rich, diverse material life posited as belonging to the people and 3) the self-reflection posited as negated.

The next step is to interpret the transition of the people into a plurality of things. The self-sublation of reflection converts it into another thing. In the first place, this means that the material resources of the people are activated because the external things relate themselves reflectively to the people. Further, these reflective things are identified with the people as primary thing. We can therefore determine the secondary things as individuals, groups and corporations within the people that activate its material life. Furthermore, the material substrate of the people becomes determined as a series of interactions between these individualities. The erstwhile conditions become a material heritage, are now the material results of interactions between the individualities.

Finally, the multiple individualities of the people all have the people itself as their essential thinghood. They are therefore the multiple facets of the people. The people therefore becomes a thing through its self-diremption into multiple individualities which constitute the material life of the people through their interaction. The people is thus a circular process of self-concretizing action upon itself. This leads to a further conversion of the actualized interactions between the corporations into objective actions of the people. This self-sublating outer existence is property.

8.2.2. Property

The concept of property is a key moment in Hegel's argument that thinghood finds its complete expression in its external existence. This is because a thing's property is its externalized essence. Firstly, property is a reiteration of quality. Quality is the negation which constitutes the difference between something and its other, and thus constitutes a
something (115, I 102-103). In considering quality, Hegel distinguishes between constitution and determination, being respectively determinateness in relation to another, and determinateness in itself (123-124, I 111). This distinction collapses, however, and this means that the something is determined by its other. For property, by contrast, the interaction with the other gives the thing a constitution, but because the thing identifies itself with itself as an other, this constitution is a determination (487, II 330).

As such, property is both identical with the thing and external to it. Property is firstly “the external reflection and the side of the thing’s positedness” (487, II 330). However, the plurality of properties are identical with the thing-in-itself. Initially, Hegel formulates the relation between the thing-in-itself and its properties as the ground-relation (488, II 330-331). However, property is “ground that has passed over into its externality and is therefore truly ground reflected into itself” (488, II 331). It is necessary to bear in mind that existence is the self-sublation of the entire ground relation. Consequently, thinghood is not simply the ground term in the ground relation. It is the immediacy of the ground relation, and is thus wholly exposed in the property, which is the ground-relation as an external immediacy.

Hegel explains that property for the thing is “the form of its identity with itself” (488, II 331). That is, property is the external manifold that differentiates the thing-in-itself from itself but then reflects into its essential identity. As the reflection of the thing-in-itself, as its own [eigenes] property [Eigenschaft], the property is the thing-in-itself in its existence (489, II 331).

8.2.2.1. Application to History

In the previous application, we saw a people divide itself into a plurality. However, these corporations were self-negating, and had the people as their essence. Property, as a plurality of properties, is the external reflection of these oppositional interactions of the corporations to one another and to the people.

Importantly, however, the identity of the people with itself in the form of the corporations meant that the people was inherently self-repelling. On one hand, the inherent self-repulsion of the people means that the difference between itself and the corporations is sublated, and on the other hand it means that the negativity of the corporations is incorporated into the people. The people is thus a plurality in itself.

The people externalizes itself as a multiplicity of corporations which act and have material results. This externalization returns into the people firstly through the sublation of the corporations, and secondly
through the sublation of the independent existence of the acts. As such, the reflective process merely expresses the people itself.

8.2.3. Reciprocal Action

A thing only has a property as the *sublation* of alterity. Property is therefore both a self-determination *and* a relation to another thing (a constitution). Since property both refers back to the first thing and out to the second, it mediates both things. Moreover, this action is not in fact asymmetrical: the primary thing is just as much mediated by the secondary things. It is a reciprocal action (490, II 332). In fact, the reciprocity of the two things is a single difference with two extremes. Furthermore, the difference between the things is wholly contained in the property since aside from it, the two things are abstractly identical.

Property is "the difference reflected into itself, through which the thing, in its positedness, that is, in its relation to another, is at the same time indifferent to the other and its relation to it" (491, II 333). The property is a middle that both relates and distinguishes the extremes. It is a simple difference expressed through the difference of the two things. However, it also repels itself into things-in-themselves as relata, which negate their difference and form a single identity. Property, then, is in fact the essential, self-subsistent existence, whereas the things are 1) unessential, illusory moments and 2) a single self-related negativity.

The continuity of property with itself is an indifference to its difference, which means that its self-related negativity results merely in a self-external diversity (492, II 334). On one hand, the property is material continuity, while on the other, the thing is now the external negative unity of the property. The result is an inessential negative identity, the thing, subsisting in a substrate, the positive identity, which is a diversity of matters (492, II 334).

8.2.3.1. Application to History

The people only has a property by opposing itself to itself in the form of corporations. It is therefore necessarily particular. However, as a particular thing, a corporation among corporations, it is mediated by its interactions with the other things. Firstly, the people only has a determinate material life when split up into a multiplicity of individualities. Secondly, these individualities are only differentiated by their interactions and the material results of these interactions. Thirdly, this other related material life is the expression of the people itself.

As a result, the thinghood of the people is now merely a mediated term of the total material culture of a particular epoch. Specifically, the people is the unity of the whole. However, it problematically combines the positive and negative unities of the property: identity with self, and
simple difference. The distinction of form and matter contains this problematic combination. The matter is the continuity, or positive unity, of the epoch. Form is the negative unity of the epoch, which means, its differentiation into the opposed corporations. However, the corporations only subsist in the material continuity of the epoch. Consequently, all the differences of the epoch are differences in its matter, that is, between different materials. This means that peoplehood becomes inessential.

The consequence of this development is that the distinction between things and actions is eroded. As we have seen, the external existence of the thing has been progressively determined from inherited material resources, to objectified interactions, to objective actions. I add the qualifier "objective" because these are not simply ephemeral transactions, but transactions embodied in an objective outcome. Hegel insists upon this point in the Philosophy of History. At this stage, the difference between things and objective actions has been removed. Both are negative unities constituted in the continuity of property.

8.3 Matters

8.3.1. The Constitution of the Thing from Matters

The development from property to matter is the conversion of the properties of things into component materials. That a thing has a property \( x \) is explained by the inclusion of matter \( x \) in the composition of the thing. It is a case of explanation through the translation of the same phenomena from one ontology to another (492, II 334). Significantly, there is nothing more to these matters than is already present in the same phenomena previously described under the ontology of thing-and-properties.

Johnson notes that Hegel elsewhere rejects the ontology of matters (127). Nonetheless, "making the transition from properties to matters, or postulating that properties are in truth matters" (492, II 334) is a necessity. This is because property has been recognised as the essential and self-subsistent element in the thing (492, II 334). However, the inadequacy of the ontology of matters is that it is merely a reversal of the values of essential and unessential. The chemists believe that they have analysed the thing into its matters, but they continue to treat an essential element of the logic of existence, the thing, as unessential.

In order to bring Hegel's concept of a matter more clearly into focus, it is useful to contrast it with two features of the ordinary conception of a matter. Hegel's notion of matters or stuffs shares two important features with this ordinary ontology. First, matters are indifferent to things, and ignore their boundaries. Second, matters are determined as the essential subsistence of the property, which corresponds to the ordinary idea that matters are substances.
The difference between Hegel’s notion and the ordinary conception is again two-fold. For Hegel, matterhood and thinghood are oppositional rather than diverse modes of existence. Matters are the primary mode and thinghood is a secondary composite. Second, in the ordinary conception, matters and things both have properties. In the Hegelian conception, however, matterhood is the self-subsistent counterpart to property. Matters do not have properties; rather, they embody properties.

Despite being determined as the essential term, the matter is only one side of the whole reflection, it is the positive continuity of the property with itself (492, II 335). The thing, on the other hand, is the negative unity. Property is only continuous with itself through the sublation of the difference of the two things and its reduction of the thing to its own moment.

The thing as a this is external to its composite matters. They are diverse and self-subsistent, and only externally related in the thing: “The difference of one thing from another depends upon whether and in what amount a number of the particular matters are present in it” (494 II 336). That is, the world is objectively heterogeneous, but this heterogeneity consists in quantitative variations in composition. Furthermore, the matters are indifferent to this composition, since they are qualitatively not quantitatively defined. The world, therefore, is essentially distinguished into a variety of elemental matters, which are contingently mixed in various ways. Things and the world as a thing, therefore, are merely external combinations of matters. Things are the “also” of diverse matters (494, II 336).

8.3.1.1. Application to History

The spatio-temporal extension of a people, or its “epoch,” should be thought of as property. Just as the totality of a set of interactions could be thought as the complete property of a thing, we can also think of the events that compose the epoch, which would be particular interactions, as individually referring back to the thing as properties, which means as objective actions.

The matters are different from the properties of things in an important way, which is that they are not bounded by the things. In other words, we could think of the matters as merely a materialisation of the properties of things, but this would miss the material continuity of the matters. As a material basis, the matter is indifferent to the things in which it is combined.

The idea of a history of matters or stuffs is therefore paradoxical, because the matters, being the essential term, and therefore the present term of existence, are indifferent to the manner in which they are
combined. This manner in which they are combined is as thing-events, which, as we saw in the last section, are the unified category of individualities and objective actions.

Manuel de Landa has explored the possibilities of this way of thinking history in One Thousand Years of Non-Linear History. The first question that one might ask is what the concept of matter is supposed to cover. De Landa stratifies matter into three levels: "geological, organic and linguistic materials" (22). The reversal of perspective on the three levels is firstly, that we stop paying attention to the physical artefacts, and see them instead as concrescences of materials. That is, we replace a city with properties, such as New York, with the building materials which give the city the properties that it has. At the same time, De Landa sees Deleuze's "abstract machines," forming meshworks and hierarchies, as the blueprints for similar operations in social organisation (60). Similarly, instead of seeing individual animals and plants, we see different kinds of genetic material that coalesce, and biological process that are the templates for processes in apparently more complex matters. Likewise, instead of seeing individual thinkers and speakers, we see the anonymous linguistic materials that come into play in any speech act.

We cannot pigeonhole De Landa as a historian of Hegel's matters, however. This is because his account of matters is underpinned by the idea of abstract machines. What this means is that matters, such as granite and sandstone, are products of processes such as sedimentation and vulcanism. Temporality is integral to De Landa's theory, especially through his inclusion of some of the insights of modern thermodynamics.

Nonetheless, De Landa's history shows us how we might think of history in which things are the inessential. Firstly, he exemplifies the turn from things to their material bases. Secondly, he indicates that the category of materials or stuffs can be extended to cover mass phenomena, such as the economy, which are not normally thought of in terms of matters. This seems plausible, since people and cars are known to exhibit matter-like behaviour, such as waves, when gathered in large quantities, as in crowds or traffic jams.

Having said this, a key element in Hegel's concept of matters is that they embody properties. This is a major difference between Hegel and De Landa. A fundamental analysis of history would therefore involve analysing matters that have properties into matters that embody properties. The distinction is between matters like gold that have different properties, and thus enter into different events in different ways, and matters such as money that have an essential determination. Consequently, candidates for matterhood must, on Hegel's terms, have an essential attribute.
The other element to historical matter is that it composes the material basis of the inessential things, while being indifferent to these things. We can therefore think of an individual such as a state as being composed of various matters—the matter that enables it to trade, money, the matter that enables it to make war, weapons, the matters that enable it to sustain itself, food and water, the matter that gives it extension in space, territory, and so forth. All of these matters give the state properties, and without them it is nothing. Furthermore, the matters are indifferent to the state they compose.

Consequently, a history of matters traces the movements and distribution of these great historical matters, whose number and type is open for discussion.

8.3.2. The Dissolution of the Thing

Hegel describes the self-external thing as “alterable” and “dissoluble” (494, II 336). Alteration, [Veränderung], according to an earlier analysis, is when a determinate being becomes another determinate being (116, I 104). The thing therefore remains a thing, but becomes a different thing. It is dissoluble because its alteration signifies changes in the sorts and quantities of matter that make it up (494, II 336). This is an intrinsic dissolubility because the thing is determinate through an external collection of matters.

However, dissolubility has a more radical meaning. We have seen already that the matters are only one side of the total reflection of property. Hegel states that “these matters are not things, they do not have negative self-subsistence” (495, II 336). The thing is the side of difference reflected into itself, or simple difference. As we saw in the chapter on the essentialities, the matters are simple identities, but this makes difference an external difference, or diversity. However, the identity of the matters is a determinateness constituted by this difference. Recall that property is both a reflection into self and a relation to other. The materiality of the matter is the reflection into self, but its qualitative determinateness is a relation to other. The matters therefore require this external difference for their own determinateness. The thing is therefore not merely an also, but is also the negative relation, or difference, of the matters. In fact, the determinateness of the matters together in the thing produces the thisness or “puncticity” of the thing through their mutual negation (495, II 337).

The thing as also and as puncticity are two sides of the same coin, but they are also contradictory. Each matter requires the presence of other matters, because this negative is what gives it determinacy. However, its determinacy is the exclusion of the other matter or matters. As a mere also, the thing contains the matters in an external way. They are merely diverse and mutually external. However, to be determinate, they must be mutually
exclusive, which means, where one is, the other is not. This mutual exclusivity is the puncticity of the thing (495, II 337).

Hegel claims that what we need is a way by which each of the matters can simultaneously contain and exclude the other matter or matters. The spatial model for this is porosity. The thing subsists as a primary matter, which is determinate because it contains what it is not in its pores. However, for the contents of these pores to be determinate, they must equally contain the other matter in their pores, and so on to infinity. The vanishing point of this conception is where every point of the primary matter both contains and does not contain the other matter or matters (496, II 338).

The primary matter thereby attains to the complete reflection of property only by having its thinghood, or negative subsistence, in the form of a contradiction (498, II 339). There is only a manifold of subsistent matters through the thing, but equally, this thing runs them into contradiction. Conversely, the substrate of the thing is contradictory. The thing has its subsistence in the matters, but negates these matters and thus also its own subsistence.

Existence corresponds in the logic of reflection to Dasein in the logic of being. The contradiction that we have encountered here corresponds to the contradiction encountered in the dialectic of the limit in the earlier book. Hegel shows that, given a lack of distinction between haecceity and quiddity, which is to say, given that something's being is its qualitative determinateness, a something only has being in relation to another something that it excludes (127-128, I 114). The limit is the constitutive difference of the two somethings and thus their mutual exclusion. The two somethings fall outside the limit and each other, but in so doing are indeterminate.

The thing, now distinguished from its qualitative determinateness, is the constitutive limit of the matters. The matters only exist in their mutual externality, but they lose their determinacy in this externality, and require a constitutive point in which they exclude each other. However, this constitutive point is not the essential thing-in-itself, but, in Kantian terms, the inessential transcendental object=x, which Hegel terms the "also". E. E. Harris points out that Hegel's understanding of "in itself" [an sich] has more to do with potentiality than Kant's Ding-an-sich (175). Nonetheless, this section clearly has Kant in mind and works with the possibilities for thinking a thing as such. This means that the constitutive point of the matters is determined as subsisting in the matters, not as existing apart from the matters. Otherwise, we might be tempted to think of the point of contradiction as the counterpart to the thing as the noumenal ground of the matters. This way is barred, however. The thing
as contradiction is nothing more than the meeting point of the matters, not an underlying, non-contradictory reality.

This is the structure of appearance [Erscheinung], according to Hegel. Appearance is not defined over against the thing-in-itself, as it is for Kant. Instead, it is defined by having contradiction for its essence. What this means is that we cannot simply think that things are inessential. They are essential as the points through which matters become determinate, but they can only be this as contradictions. Equally essentially, the things have their subsistence in the matters, but not in the matters as simple subsistence, but as self-exclusion. In general, then, existence subsists in its absolute other, contradiction (496, II 337). E. E. Harris and Johnson regard the ontology of matters as a simple mistake, and therefore cannot explain the actually contradictory nature of the thing and its transition to appearance (Johnson 128, E. E. Harris 178).

8.3.2.1. Application to History

The dissoluble thing is the thing composed of matters, whose identity is merely a formality. We see this in history, where the identity of an individual, such as a people, becomes questionable because of alterations in its component matters. The people is absolutely alterable as an abstract and formal name that adheres externally.

However, the radical point about dissolubility is that the matters only have their negative unity in the event-things. That is, money, land, food and so forth only receive their essential determination in the event-things. For example, territory has a positive subsistence aside from its determination, but lacks a qualitative determination. It only receives this in being put into play in an event-thing. For example, territory only acquires its determination in a perpetual contest of ownership. The problem is that the things are nothing more than composites of materials. This means that the contest, where ownership is the exclusion of the ownership of the other, is limited to the exclusion of non-territory from the territory. However, this merely material exclusion sets the land and sea alongside one another as diverse matters which cease to exclude one another, and therefore become indeterminate. It is only in the event of exclusion, or the thing of exclusion, the sea wall, that the two sides are determined. Yet the event-thing excludes the exclusion by completing itself, and thus returns the sides to indeterminacy.

If we consider the Roman epoch to be a characterized region of space over an extent of time, then the problem of material history comes into focus. Material history invites us to think of the epoch as a composition of various materials. The epoch, therefore, is an event-thing as a whole. Its subsistence is the region over time, but this subsistence is further split into various matters. The intersection of these matters
provides the epiphenomena of events, things, and ultimately, the epoch itself. Consequently, if we take the region over time to be the primary matter, the territory, then it has to contain the other materials in its pores. The idea of a surface combines the same elements of inclusion and exclusion as the idea of porosity, but in a two-dimensional instead of three-dimensional way. The territory gets its determination by being a surface, and thus includes negative as well as positive unity. This removes the distinction between thing (Rome), event (the Roman epoch), and matter (the Roman world). The last is the most complete expression.

However, the primary matter only includes the other matters by excluding them. They do not penetrate the substrate but lie on its surface. However, it is only at the point where it excludes its other that territory becomes territory. The vanishing point of the territory is the infinitely thin surface where the land and what it carries both include and exclude one another. The land achieves thinghood at its surface, but only by becoming self-contradictory. The Roman world is a land. However, it is only as a land that is perpetually being worked and converted into something else over its entire extent.

The truth of existence, for Hegel, is that the moment of mediated immediacy, the thing-in-itself, is not the indifferent inner of events, but the contradiction of the surface. Conversely, the contradiction of the surface is the essence of existence. This sheds a new light on Hegel’s dictum that periods of peace are the blank pages of history (26, 41). This is because it is at the contradictory surface that things simultaneously become and perish. However, this means that we need a logic of self-negating surfaces, or a logic of appearance.

8.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, social reflection posited itself as 1) an essential thing in which reflection is sublated and 2) a radically self-external reflection of historical relations. The progress of the chapter was a deepening of the content of the self-external reflection until it became the essential term. However, it could only become the essential term as a system of differences that became contradictory. This has two consequences: firstly, any thinghood of social reflection is a contradictory and self-sublating thinghood, and secondly, the system of differences produced by social reflection is contradictory and refers to a ground in an essential thinghood.
9. APPEARANCE

9.1 Overview
The logic of appearance has both a positive and a negative significance. The negative side is that it terminates the foregoing set of historical ontologies in which a thing or a matter is the essential and self-subsistent term. The positive side is the re-emergence of an immanent self-identity. This identity, that of Kant’s “transcendental object=x,” is the self-identity of the apparent.

These two sides are the ingredients necessary for conceptualising systematic totalities in history. The negative side frees history from an extra-systematic term. The positive side, however, means that these relative identities are also subsistent through their mutual mediation.

What we have, therefore, are a series of self-subsistent identities that are at the same time thoroughly context dependent. Hegel’s interest shifts, therefore, to a cosmological level on which the individual porous matters form a totality through their mutual dependence. The question now is how the manifold of porous matters, where there is no grounding being, relates to itself as a self-subsistent totality.

The movement begins with the law of appearance. The nature of the law is the identity of one positedness with another in their mutual sublation. The result of the subsequent dialectic is that each side explicitly contains the other within it as a moment, and converts itself into a side against this other moment. This containment of the determinate other by each side is the development of law into essential relation.

9.2 The Law of Appearance
Appearance [Erscheinung] is a higher form of illusory being [Schein] (500, II 342). The crucial distinction between illusory being and appearance is that illusory being’s “unstable moments have, in Appearance, the shape of immediate self-subsistence” (500, II 342). This means on one hand that the matters/things are phenomenal, and on the other hand that they are subsistent in this phenomenality.

As we saw in the previous chapter, a matter becomes a thing only by being a porous matter, but as such it is a contradiction. In the sphere of reflection, this does not mean that the thing ceases to be, but that it is an illusory being. What distinguishes appearance from illusory being is that this negatedness is generalised over all existents. Previously, thinghood became the unessential in relation to the essential matters. However, now both matters and things are unessential.
Here we have something analogous to the grounding relation, except that the ground of each posited matter is not a non-posited ground, but another posited matter (501, II 343). The dialectic of the previous chapter converted reflection back into a concrete thing that determines its plural matters, but only as a porous matter. As a porous matter, the thing is contradictory and refers to its ground in another thing. Yet this other thing undergoes the same process and is only a thing as a porous matter. Because the other thing that serves as the ground is a positedness, the first relates to the second both as its negation and ground, and as a positedness (501, II 343).

The restoration to subsistence of appearance has the following three elements: 1) the component matters are as much the moments of the thing (porous matter) as it is their moment; 2) the other matters negate themselves and relate to the first matter as their subsistence; 3) an appearance needs to be a negated subsistence in order to be an appearance. Hegel’s argument then, is that the negation of the subsistence of the first matter makes it an appearance, while the negation of the other matters means that the first matter subsists as an appearance. Self-subsistent identity is no longer, therefore, the other of positedness. It is the identity of positedness with itself.

The truth of identity, therefore, is the identity of appearance, which is the identity of the flux with itself (501, II 343). The reflection into self of appearance is the simple determinateness of the opposed matters as an opposition (502, II 344). Further, this sublation of the matters is the identity of the apparent, because it is positedness reflected into identity. This moment of identity is what Hegel terms “the law of Appearance” (502, II 344).

Law [Gesetz] is the return to itself of positedness [Gesetztsein], or positedness posited (502, II 344). Law is the positive identity of appearance over against the other moment of appearance, which is immediate, contingent existence (502, II 344). Consequently, law is a posited side in the opposition, but as the identity of positedness for both sides of the opposition.

As Hartnack points out, law is not the beyond (or past), of appearance, but is present in it (63). Law is the identity of the sides of the opposition in their positedness, and is therefore an identity indifferent to the form distinction of appearance and law. That is, it is a content (503, II 345). However, the form difference of appearance and law is a second content that belongs to appearance (503, II 345). This second content is the existent as a sublation of matter and form, and thus as a thing with properties (503, II 345). However, this thinghood is a contradictory opposition of appearance which has the other content (law) as its identity
Consequently, appearance contains law as its moment of self-identity.

The difference of law and existent is not merely the difference of law from itself, but also the incorporation of external difference into appearance as an unessential manifold alongside the identical, essential content. This is determined as unessential, but is also essential as the splitting of self-identical difference, or law, into a differentiated manifold. Hegel states, “The realm of laws is the stable content of Appearance; Appearance is the same content but presenting itself in restless flux and as reflection-into-other” (504, II 346). Appearance thus contains law, but also contains the self-externalizing movement into existence, and from existence back to law. Consequently, appearance is a perpetual process of law-formation on one hand and expression of the law on the other hand.

However, this also means that the essentiality of law is only a posited relation between law and existence, and not the whole of appearance (505, II 346). Law is the content of appearance, and is therefore internally diverse. However, this diversity is only immediately identical, and not a mediated identity, because the differentiated structure of appearance is external to the law. Law as yet only contains the moment of identity (505, II 347).

9.2.1. Application to History

Understanding the relationship between the world of laws and the world of phenomena is crucial to understanding the forms of essential relation. The specific problem is the meaning of law when we apply the Logic to history: It is not immediately clear whether law is a discovery or an invention.

The first option is that law is a fundamental set of sociological rules that social reflection discovers about itself. In this option, society has a manifold of mutually determining matters and things, such as money, banks, markets, governments and so forth, and law is the structural principle of their interplay. Law is the identity of this system, but only as the positing of the negatedness of the terms, their mutual determination, and the mutual negation that is necessary for this determination.

The second option is that law is produced by society through its processes of reflection. These processes of reflection, as we have seen, are the mutual determinations of the matters. In this option, the constitutive matters spring up spontaneously and unsystematically. Since the matters are only determined in their interplay, we cannot explain this spontaneous emergence through the coalescence of already existing determinate matters. For example, a food matter changes into a commodity through its being put into play in the market. However, the determination of the
market at the level of porous matters means that the nature of the market is tied to particular relations between the matters, and the market dissolves once these matters alter. The dialectical contradiction in the market is that it is determined as subsistent through the exclusion of the matters, but it only exists as an inclusion of the matters.

In the non-dialectical sphere, changes in the market structure seem to be random alterations in composition. However, in the dialectical sphere, change is the feeding back of the contradiction onto the structure of the market. On one hand, the market keeps changing because it is caught in a feedback loop where information about its current structure alters its configuration. On the other hand, it also posits this constant state of dissolution in itself as its enduring principle or law.

This positing of the law has an ambiguous status. Firstly, it registers the reflected identity of the historical entity, in this case the market, with itself. Secondly, it alters the structure itself. That is, the historical entity becomes a historical entity with an identity in the law, and thus with a negative relation to its identity. After this point the historical entity’s dialectical problem is the relation between itself as a flux and itself as an enduring law of this flux. Under this interpretation, therefore, law is produced by the social processes of reflection as their identity.

To defend this interpretation, it is useful to contrast the treatment of law in Science of Logic with the treatment of law in the Phenomenology. The Phenomenology approaches law from within the problematic of the epistemology of the understanding, whereas the Science of Logic approaches law as part of the self-unfolding of the world in appearance. The former is concerned with the problematic status of the supersensible world (is it objective or subjective?) (95 §155, 95). The latter, however, takes law as part of the world’s relation to itself.

For the Phenomenology, the concept of law appears as an aspect of the supersensible world of the understanding (90 §148, 91). Briefly, the play of forces in the Phenomenology is a self-sublating veil of appearance between the understanding and the inner essence of things (86 §142, 88). The inner essence of the play of forces is an abstract universal (90 § 148, 91). However, because the play of forces also mediates or expresses the inner essence, this inner essence is also simple difference. Hegel calls this simple difference “the law of Force” (90 §148, 91). The realm of laws is the beyond of appearance because law is only present in it in the finite form of the self-sublating play of forces, and yet also present in this world of appearance because it is the principle of appearance.
This contrasts with the corresponding passage in the *Science of Logic*: “Law is not the beyond of appearance but is immediately present in it” (503, II 345). This contrast arises because of a difference of emphasis in the two works. In the *Phenomenology*, appearance is a curtain that differentiates the two sides and keeps the understanding in a subject-object mode. By contrast, appearance is the central focus in the *Science of Logic*. Hegel states “The substrate of Appearance, which constitutes law, is Appearance’s own moment” (503, II 345). The moment of law is differentiated from the moment of existence in appearance, but not as a beyond. Rather, this difference falls into appearance itself.

In the *Phenomenology*, therefore, we could think of the law of a society as being a discovered structural law. The actual society would express essential principles or laws for the observer who understands the society. In the *Science of Logic*, on the other hand, there is no external observer or essential beyond. Law must therefore be a moment of identity for the society itself, and the formation of law must come about through the movement of the society itself. Having said this, the posited law is the truth of the self-contradiction of society, and is thus presupposed by it as its implicit truth. Law is thus an invention in the sense of being a transformative result, and a discovery in the sense of being the truth of the lawless society.

The consequence of the positing of law in the world is that the apparent world has two sides, its self-identity as an apparent world, which is its law, and its existence, which is a process of dissolution. Its law is therefore its enduring substrate. It becomes a permanent feature of the world because the social world is self-identical in this law precisely through its dissolution at the level of being a totality of determinate matters.

Nonetheless, the law of a historical world is defined in opposition to the phenomenal existence of the world. The former is the enduring identity of the phenomenal world with itself, while the latter is its passing away. Furthermore, the nature of appearance is now determined over against its identity in the law as a loss of identity. The historical world in appearance is a manifold of determinate matters and institutions alongside an enduring essential law.

However, the law is the identity of this world, and thus is an identical content in both the law and the existent historical world. The existent historical world has the permanent form of a transient manifold of institutions over against a singular, enduring law. The law of the world is therefore the indifferent content of the two sides of the world of appearance, which are, the manifold existent world and its posited law.
Nonetheless, the apparent historical world is not only this indifferent content of law but also the differentiation of the law into an opposition. Specifically, this is an opposition within the world between two sides, the posited law and the self-opposed world. The recursive nature of the self-opposed world, which includes law as a term but as an excluded term, makes the self-opposed world into the identity of the negative with itself. However, this is simply the law again. Consequently, the law of the historical world is the identity of itself and the existing world as a determinate content. Yet although the law is the general truth of the ephemerality of the apparent world and thus its opposition to its identity, it does not contain the developed form of the apparent world as a concrete world of institutions and matters.

9.3 The World in appearance, and in and of itself.

Law initially lacks the diversity of the manifold of appearance: it is the essential content contained alongside another content within appearance (504, II 346). However, law is also the negative identity of appearance (505, II 347). The other content of appearance is the diversified manifold that contains law as a posited moment. Hence it is a contradictory content that withdraws into law as its ground (506, II 347). The law is just as much a posit, and the existent as appearance unites with itself in the law. This identity with itself in law is the negation of appearance. Law is thus the self-identity of the apparent, but only as its negation. Consequently, law is a relation between its sides in which the sides are opposed and withdraw into law as a negative unity, rather than simply being related as diverse sides (506, II 347-348). Because it contains both the positive identity of appearance and its principle of difference, law becomes the totality of appearance.

At this stage, it seems that law is an abstract determination that contains the simple identity and simple difference of appearance, while appearance as such contains the differentiated manifold. However, Hegel argues that law is in fact a “realm of laws” (507, II 348). The argument for the manifoldness of law is that “as an immediate content, law is determinate in general, distinguished from other laws, and of these there is an indeterminable number” (507, II 348). Law in general has a particular form, because it is the particular law of the identity of law and appearance. It is therefore also determinate against other laws that identify other appearances. Consequently, in its positive mode, law in general diversifies into a manifold of laws.

Secondly, this manifold is a coherent realm or world due to the negativity of law (507, II 349). Law is the principle of difference for appearance, and therefore the differentiated content of appearance is contained in law. This, as we have seen, is a transformation in law, so that it is no longer merely a diverse content, and thus a diverse manifold of
laws, but is also the return of this manifold into negative unity, and is therefore a coherent totality of laws.

Hartnack introduces the problematic of the next chapter by stating that the two worlds, in-itself and in appearance, are different "in a metaphysically innocent sense" that is, only as a way of speaking (65). However, the problem is that the worlds are both identical and different in the form of an essential relation. The next step is to introduce the basic form of the essential relation, which is that the world as a totality must necessarily be a side of the totality, and that each side of the totality is the totality. Firstly, the world in and of itself is the totality of existence. However, because law is the negative principle, it is negatively self-related: It is only a single totality as an opposition of itself to itself, and the totality therefore separates into a world in and of itself, and a world of self-otherness, or appearance (508, II 349). Law in general is the principle for the difference between itself and appearance, but also the principle for the manifold of laws, which are themselves the principles for the manifold content of appearance.

From the side of the world in and of itself, the world in and of itself is the negative unity of itself and the world in appearance, but this equally means that it is the opposition of these two worlds (508, II 350). From the side of the world in appearance, its own form is reflection into otherness, or positedness, and consequently it is the totality of itself and the world in and of itself, but opposed to this other (509, II 350).

9.3.1. Application to History

Hegel gives us an idea of how to apply this logic to history: "It is only as things of another, supersensuous world that things are posited first, as veritable existences, and secondly as the true in contrast to what simply has affirmative being; in them it is acknowledged that there is a being distinct from immediate being, a being that is veritable existence" (507, II 349). It should be recognized that this is an application of the Science of Logic to epistemology, not a part of the Science of Logic. However, it gives us a guide: The epistemological model is that of comprehended perception, which has first a surface of immediate sensed being, and then a true level of intelligible being. Consequently, both levels of the world of appearance have being, but one level is immediate, inessential being, and the other level is essential, reflected being.

It must be stressed that appearance is not an epistemological determination. Appearance is real, but its reality is identity with itself in the world in and of itself. Nonetheless, the appropriate understanding of the relation of the two worlds is similar to the presence of supersensuous elements in the known world.
The idea of a law of a society which serves as an enduring substrate corresponds to the idea of a constitution. At this stage, this constitution is simply the identity of the society with itself through its externality. The constitution is the fundamental being of society, as reflected out of the coming and going of contingent institutions. The sense of the constitution is that of a structure that is acknowledged, and indeed, derives its power from being acknowledged. For example, a society has a set of traffic rules that are posited in it, but are also actual rather than aspirational.

Further, the constitution is more than the enduring substrate of society. Society, as an appearance, is self-identical in its constitution, but this equally means that it is self-opposed in its constitution. The society is identical with itself when it differs from itself, but conversely, it differs from itself as an appearance when it is identical with itself in its constitution. Consequently, society that is identical with itself in its constitution is the negation of itself. The constitution is therefore a "negative unity" or a self-opposed identity.

What this means is that the constitution of a society is a dynamic principle. At the general level, it generates the difference between itself and the society. However, this also means that the difference inherent in the flux of historical configurations is native to its constitution.

Law is thus the identity of itself and external society. It is therefore the particular law of this determination. This law is chief among an indefinite number of other laws that are the principles of finite determinations of the existing manifold. That is, there are laws that determine the relation of money and commodities, of gender, of madness and sanity, and so forth. The constitution is chief among these laws only in being the most general.

The relation of law and existence is that, firstly, the possibilities of existence are ordered by the laws, and secondly, that the reflection into self which constitutes the laws is historical change. These are therefore universal societal laws that fall into a series of contingent patterns in existence. They are fundamental as the background possibilities for acting within a society.

The addition of the reflection that the constitution is a negative unity makes the abstract realm of laws into the totality. Previously, the diverse plurality of laws was a consequence of the immediate relation of the law to existence. However, difference is not external to the single content of law. Law is the identity of a society that develops itself into a determinate difference, which opposes itself and develops dialectically into a logically related manifold of differences.
The relation between the manifold of laws and the changing society was that the former were posited in society as an enduring substructure. Now, however, the process of the changing society is included in the constitution. The constitution is the dialectical principle of the society, so that societal changes are no longer merely external, but the playing out of the dynamic principle of its constitution. The apparent historical flux of society is therefore posited as the immediate side of a self-developing world.

This world is therefore a single totality, but in order to be what it is, the totality of society must oppose itself as a totality, and therefore make the totality into one of two opposed parts of itself, the other being the explicit opposition itself, the appearing society.

Society necessarily suffers a radical rupture, therefore. It has posited itself in and of itself as a negative principle and hence as the totality of society. Furthermore, this totality, being in and of itself, is posited as producing the appearing society, and then of identifying itself with the apparent self-externality of this society as its own dialectical principle. From this point of view, the society in appearance and the society in and of itself are the same thing, but they are also determined as opposites. The society therefore appears to be the inverse of what it is in and of itself.

9.4 Dissolution of Appearance
The world in appearance is a manifold that negates itself and withdraws into the world in and of itself, but this is in turn a coherent manifold (509, II 350). Consequently, the difference that constitutes appearance, over against the identity of law, is an opposition of corresponding manifolds, or inversion (509, II 350).

Hegel states, however, that thinking the opposition of the worlds as inversion means removing the difference between them. The two worlds were hitherto determined in distinct ways—one as the contraction into identity, and the other as a self-sublating manifold. However, as inverted worlds, these two worlds are each the totality (509, II 351). The relation of the two worlds has become a totality which differentiates itself into two opposed totalities. Johnson treats the idea of the inverted worlds as a "reductio ad absurdum" of a "certain mode of thinking" (130). Once again, this externalization of the dialectic makes the transition to essential relation, which develops from the logic of the inverted world, unintelligible.

Each world is identical with itself by reflecting itself into its other. Firstly, the world in appearance is defined as a world that is reflected into its other (509-510, II 351). The world in and of itself is therefore posited as
the ground and essential moment in this world. However, it is only determined within the apparent world. The world of appearance is the totality, and thus has the world in and of itself not only as its opposite, but also as its own identity.

On the other hand, the world in and of itself is initially determined as the tranquil realm of laws that excludes change from itself (510, II 351). However, as the identity of the self-opposition of the world of appearance, the realm of laws is the self-identity of difference (510, II 351). This world initially stands as the ground of the other, but because it is negatively self-related, it sublates the ground and produces itself as a manifold immediate existence (510, II 351). In so doing, it remains in continuity with itself and is therefore the totality.

The difference between the two worlds is supposed to be that one is the inner, reflected totality of existence, while the other is the outer, immediate totality. However, each in fact continues itself into the other (510, II 351). They are thus both distinctly self-subsistent through reflecting through the other moment (510, II 352).

This is the nature of essential relation. It is a totality of opposed totalities which itself is one of the totalities and continues itself into the other (511, II 352). This is a significant development, since it directly establishes the problem that will be resolved in the concept of the concept. That is, the world in and of itself prefigures the concept of the individual. It is the totality of the world, but only as a difference from itself that is reflected into itself. On the other hand, the concept of the world in appearance prefigures the concept of the universal. The world in appearance is again the totality, but this time as the continuity of one totality into its other. The concept of concept will be the ultimate form of the relation of the universal and the individual. The proximate form is essential relation. In essential relation, the two totalities are identified as an individual, the world in and of itself. At the same time, this individual is a universal, the world in appearance, differentiated into two self-subsistent totalities, the world in and of itself and the world in appearance (511, II 352).

9.4.1. Application to History

In the previous application, we developed the idea of law to the idea of a world in and of itself opposed to a world in appearance. The former has been determined as an underlying world that is the identity and totality of laws for the changeable and manifold world in appearance. However, because the underlying world is developed into a totality, it is determinate over against the world of appearance simply in the manner that the world of appearance is the negation of the determinate forms of the world in and of itself.
The world in and of itself is not only the identity of the society, but is this identity as self-opposition. It is therefore one side of the total determinateness of society. Similarly, on the absolutely concrete level, a speed law is not only the determination of what counts as speeding, but is also the definition of a car driving at safe speed against a car driving too fast. The car driving too fast is the appearance of the law, because it is the law in a self-external form. Appearances are not therefore epistemological appearances, but the self-externalities of the laws of the society. Society in and of itself ordains a coherent set of determinations, but these are determinations and therefore imply also their negations in a corresponding negative world.

As we have seen, the fact that the lawful substructure of society produces the society in appearance, which is the society of transgression, means that the society in appearance and the society in and of itself are identical. On the side of the society in appearance, its transgressive and contingent determinations are determined in opposition to laws which ground the various forms of transgression. This means that the laws and their ideals are determinate sides against the appearances. The society in appearance is defined as the self-externality of the society in and of itself, but as such it is a duality and has the society in and of itself contained within it as its own essential moment, but only as a determinate side of itself. The society in appearance is therefore the whole society, and therefore the society in and of itself.

Society in and of itself generates a coherent totality of laws because it is the negative unity of society. However, as we saw, the last phase of this generation of laws was also the production of an inverted, transgressive level. Consequently, the society in and of itself both completes itself as a totality, and becomes external to itself.

The completion of the society in and of itself is its coming into existence. This occurs because its general position as a ground is sublated, and therefore both the positive and negative sides of the laws come into existence. For example, the law on speeding determines both what a non-speeding and a speeding car are, and so the law itself appears in existence as a law-abiding car. The laws are therefore concretized as privileged terms in the totality of existence.

The dialectical level of this development is that the society in appearance is now determined as the totality, and is therefore universal over itself and its laws. Conversely, the society in and of itself produces the world in appearance out of itself, and is therefore equally the whole.

At one level, then, society has identified itself with itself in its contingent and self-transgressive forms as a systematic structure of laws.
This is a partial triumph for the society in and of itself, because it proves that the most transgressive element in society is only the society's own law-governed functioning. However, it is also a radical disruption for society. This stage in society's relation to itself is akin to the first stage of the essentialities where both identity and difference are identities. In so doing, society fosters a radical externality where two inverted reflections are at work. The first totalizes society into a society in and for itself, while the other totalizes society into a society in appearance. For the first, the continuation into a society in appearance is merely a demonstration of the power of law, while for the other, the continuation of society in appearance into a society in and for itself is a demonstration that society is a perpetually disruptive power. This is the essential relation of society to itself.

9.5 Conclusion

The most important feature of the logic of appearance is the discovery that being in and of itself is not only illusory, but is the self-subsistent illusoriness of appearance. In historiographical terms, this means that it would be one-sided if one were merely to decide that essences are illusory. Instead, it is the view that individualities in history are self-consciously illusory, but that they are self-subsistent in this illusoriness. In other words, historical events, things and matters are artificial, but real in this artificiality. In historical terms, it means that the soulless world of inessential things, where what appeared to be fundamental identities have been made inessential, can be replaced with a self-consciously artificial world, where identities are restored.

In more detail, in this chapter, we have discovered that the individuals within a totality, that is, events and things in the model of porous matters, are negated subsistences, mutually determining, but at the same time abstractly and immediately subsistent in this phenomenality. In more concrete terms, this means that event-things, such as nations and commodities, are context-dependent and artificial, but nonetheless objective. Second, we have learnt that individual totalities are individual in the sense of having a singular negative principle. Third, we have learnt that individual totalities are only subsistent in the form of essential relation, which means, being both self-subsistent and mediated through their other.
10. ESSENTIAL RELATION

10.1 Overview

Essential relation is the groundwork for the theory of how systematic totalities work. This is important for a theory of historical individuals for two reasons. Firstly, in the previous chapter I made a distinction between individuals that are elements of a whole, and wholes that are individuals. A theory of historical individuality needs to account for the relation between these two levels. Secondly, individual wholes are the kind of large-scale phenomena that are the subject matter of history. A theory of historical individuality is therefore on its native ground in discussing these kinds of individuals.

Essential relation is formed by two contradictory pairs of propositions. First, the existents are phenomenal, which means that they only have their subsistence in their negation. Second, they are also self-subsistent as phenomena. Third, the totality that they form is self-subsistent as the all-inclusive totality. Fourth, this totality is only subsistent in the phenomena. These paradoxes have their root in the paradox that we saw in the last chapter that phenomena are self-subsistent as phenomena, but the nature of phenomenality is to be non-self-subsistent.

Essential relation is the generic term for three kinds of relation: whole-parts, force-expression and inner-outer. The defining feature of the genus is that it is a conceptual form that achieves self-subsistence by reflecting itself into its other (512, II 353). That is, whole and parts, force and expression, inner and outer, are the same content on both sides of the relation, but as opposite poles. At the same time, these are not merely opposite poles, because each is the totality by relating itself to its other (513, II 354). The trajectory of the genus is from a merely implicit totality that exists as two alternatives, to an explicit totality, in which the difference between the sides is an internal difference.

10.2 Whole and Parts

The immediate form of the essential relation is the whole-parts relation (513, II 354). The whole is both an existence in its other, in its manifold parts, and a subsistent, through the return of the parts into the whole. Equally, the parts are an immediate existence, yet also subsisting in the other, by participating in a whole (514, II 355). The question for essential relation is how the total manifold of parts relates to the totality of the whole.
In brief, this question is answered by this development: First, whole and parts are diverse alternative modes of the totality. However, they convert into sides of the totality. Second, this movement is captured as the equality of the whole and parts. However, as equals, they convert into abstract moments and negate the totality. This movement is the more developed essential relation of force and its expression.

Whole-and-parts is the immediate form of essential relation because the whole and the parts are immediately identical. This has the paradoxical consequence that the two sides are both posited as being the self-subsistent totality and as being only a moment of the other side.

The point here can be shown by concretizing the logic of the essential and inessential as a subjective approach to a body. On one hand, one recognizes it as a whole. Consequently, one's reflective distinction of the body into immediate parts abstracts from the essential community of the parts. On the other hand, one's recognition of it as a whole is sublated as a subjective reflection upon a series of parts occupying distinct regions of space.

Generalizing the logic of this subjective encounter, what we find is two logical alternatives: either the whole is the essential term, for which the parts are the positedness, or vice versa. However, from a logical point of view, and against Hartnack, for whom this is a matter of ordinary wholes such as machines and loaves of bread (67), there is no subjective side, and no fixation on the question of which is the essential term. Both sides are simultaneously phenomenal and self-subsistent. The parts sublate themselves into the whole, and this is the totalization of the whole. Conversely, the whole sublates itself into the parts.

Essential relation is therefore a form of relation between two positednesses. On one hand, because the world in and of itself is the negative self-identity of the world in appearance, it is negatively related to all identities including its own. On the other hand, the parts are the world in appearance. This, as we saw, collapses internally and has its self-subsistence in the law, which is the principle of the world in and of itself, or the whole (515, II 356). The parts and the whole are the sides of the relation, but the total essential relation is either the whole or the parts. However, each of these diverse totalities converts itself into a side of the relation again, with its subsistence in the other side.

Each side is therefore self-subsistent, but only in its condition, the other side. This means that the two sides are the sides of one identity. That is, *they form a whole*. However, this identity still has two modes, the first in which the parts are the condition of the whole, and the second in which
the whole is the condition of the parts. That is, they are parts of the whole. Consequently, the two sides are equals, not identicals (515, II 356).

However, the whole is only equal to the unity of the parts, and the parts are only equal to the diversity of the whole (516, II 357). The subsistence of each in the other is therefore an externalization of the otherness of the other. The logic of appearance has shown us that the sides are only self-subsistent by being mediated through their other. However, their equality with the other does not capture this mediation. Instead, it is a tautological self-mediation that lacks the moment of difference between the sides.

The consequence is that the whole becomes simple abstract identity, while the parts become simple diversity (516, II 357). The whole-and-parts form is supposed to be the self-subsistence of the phenomenal world in its immanent unity, and of this unity in its differentiation (516, II 357). Without this relation, the sides become abstract difference and abstract identity.

By each world identifying itself with either identity or difference, they not only negate themselves, but also carry out the process of eradicating the whole and its parts. However, this is not a merely negative outcome. Rather, the whole and the parts, as reflected and immediate existence respectively, have now been posited as mediated by a ground (517, II 357). As we know, ground sublates itself and becomes existence, existence becomes appearance, and appearance becomes whole and parts (517, II 358). This means that there is a cycle that restores the whole and parts.

At the same time, whole and parts is also sublated, because the model of an immediate whole of parts has been replaced by a negative unity that sublates itself and appears in a self-external form, only to sublate itself in this form and return to itself. The dialectic of whole and parts leads to a mediation of the unified totality (the negative unity of force) and the differentiated totality (the self-externality of the whole and the parts), so that, instead of having an immediate relation, they have a mediated relation. This is the relation of force and expression (518, II 359).

10.2.1. Application to History

In order to apply the logic of the essential relation, some considerations are in order. In the last chapter, society's historical being appears as two modes of totality. On one side, society is self-opposed. Synchronically, this is the appearance of law as law-embodying event-things opposed to the transgressive event-things in society. Diachronically, it is historical development as an opposition to the explicit law-governed structure of an earlier stage. On the other side, society is
continuous with itself. Synchronically, the transgressive event-things are self-external reflections of lawful event-things. Diachronically, the successor stage is the immanent development of the antecedent law-governed structure.

The whole-and-parts relation thus first appears to be two alternative views of part-whole relations in the same historical world of laws and event-things. However, the dialectic of whole-and-parts does not principally operate on this level. Rather, it operates at the recursive level of the relation between these apparent “world-views.” They are either a whole, in which case the disjoint world-views are the self-development of the whole, or they are parts, in which case the disjuncts are a radical and total opposition. Furthermore, these are not subjective meta-reflections on an indifferent world of laws and event-things. The determinations of the event-things themselves depend upon the question of the relation of law and transgression. This in turn depends upon the question of the nature of the whole-part relation.

To see how to apply this complicated picture to history, two factors have to be borne in mind. Firstly, the reflection of the whole-parts relation into itself is not an infinite regression. It terminates with an infinite disjunction in which the disjuncts are rival interpretations of the disjunction itself. Secondly, we have already been provided with a scheme for understanding the relation of self-identity and self-opposition. Consequently, an application of the whole-parts logic must mean mapping the infinite disjunction onto the disjunction that resulted from the application of the logic of appearance. This means that the law-embodying and the transgressive event-things are each self-determining through rival and essentially contestable ideologies.

In order to characterize this as a historical relation, the disjunction should be grasped in both 1) its synchronic and 2) its diachronic significance. From the part-disjunct interpretation of the disjunction: 1) the law-embodying event-things are a totalizing system that posits the hitherto transgressive event-things, now recast as anti-systematic elements, as the outgrowth of the system, but the anti-systematic elements are spatially external to and opposed to the totalizing system, and thus posit the mutual part relation of the system and anti-systematic elements as a sublated totality. 2) The law-governed structure is now a total system that claims the successor stage as its own immanent development, against which the successor stage sets itself as a radical break with its past, and thus posits historical structure as a rupture between external and mutually negating periods.

From the whole-disjunct side: 1) The system of lawful event-things posits the external and anti-systematic event-things in their opposition to
the system as its own dialectical self-relation, and thus its self-externality as the mode of its own totality. 2) The ideology of the system posits its transition into a successor period in which it appears as a part of the social totality as its own development, and thus posits the historical structure as a continuous development.

The determinations of the parts of society as totalities rely upon their ability to sublate the other as moment. At a basic level, this is a relation of equality. There is therefore a consensus in society. Not only do the sides identify themselves in the other according to their own modes of totalization, but they identify themselves with the other in accordance with the meaning of the other. The system finds itself in the claim of the other side to be the totality. The anti-systematic elements likewise find themselves in the system through the latter’s claim to be expressed as an opposition to itself, and thus as being particular.

However, this self-identification of each side with the other is only an identification of sameness. It is a temporary ideological triumph for the ideology of systematicity and continuity which results in the radicalization of their difference. The identification of each side with the other is a traduction of the other. For the system, the difference between itself and the totality of anti-systematic elements is an illusory difference. For the anti-systematic elements, it is the system which is the illusion. Society therefore ceases to have a consensus and becomes a war. This war occurs on two fronts: 1) history is a systematic development or a rupture; 2) society is a synthetic whole of opposed parts or a radical opposition. Furthermore, these two fronts overlap, because the synchronous sides are determined by their relation to history. Both sides acknowledge the system as the original moment, but dispute the form of the historical relation to the anti-systematic elements.

The ultimate consequence is not only social conflict but the internal contradiction of both determinations. The system is now no longer the system, because it fails to totalize difference. Historical development is reduced to sameness, and societal diversity and opposition is reduced to homogeneity. Paradoxically this means that the system becomes synchronically and diachronically finite, because difference is externalized. The system is therefore a particular, finite system, and therefore the opposite of its own determination. The anti-systematic elements are similarly no longer anti-systematic because these elements posit themselves as pure difference, and therefore as systematic difference from self. The anti-systematic elements convert into system and vice versa.

Consequently, 1) the system and anti-systematic elements are determined as mutually mediating; 2) the mediated complex posits itself
as grounded by a unity in the form of a unity mediated by its self-externality in time and space.

10.3 Force and Expression

The concept of force and expression more adequately grasps the nature of essential relation than the concept of whole and parts for two reasons. First, the relation between the sides is part of the concept, rather than being an immediate and thus external relation. Second, the concepts of force and expression contain the idea of the mutual interdependence of the sides. That is, as Hartnack points out, a force only exists in expressing itself, and an expression refers back to its ground in force (68).

The translation of “Force and Expression” for “Kraft und Aeusserung” (518, II 359) misses the etymological connection between this category and the next, outer and inner [Aeussern und Innern]. We need to keep in mind that expression is the ‘outering’ of force, which leads to the relation of inner and outer.

Force is the negative unity of the whole and its parts (518, II 359). As a unity, force replaces the concept of the whole (whole-and-parts), and expression replaces the parts (the whole and the parts) (519, II 359). As we have seen from the foregoing section, force and expression are mutually mediated. The force expresses itself, and only is in expressing itself, while the expression withdraws into force as its ground (519, II 359). This also means that force is both the origin of the expression, and presupposes the expression as a condition that solicits it (519, II 359).

Force is immediately a being. As such it appears to be a determinateness of the thing or matter, and the thing or matter is its condition (519, II 360). Force is secondly the point of negative identity where each side presupposes its negation and negates its negation. Taken together with the first determination, this means that force is this negative identity turned against itself and expressed as the diversity of primary and secondary matters. Force is thus a self-opposed activity that produces its external condition from out of itself (520, II 361). Force is thirdly the negation of the negation. Because the negation of force is self-opposed, its return into itself through the other is at the same time a separation from itself in its negative unity. It therefore confronts itself as another force that conditions it (520, II 361). This other is the presupposing activity of force itself. Similarly, the second force presupposes the first. The difference that divides the force is thus the single act of self-presupposition (521, II 362).

This other force is necessarily an other, as the being from which the force begins as a condition. However, the otherness of force from itself is equally its becoming self-identical (521, II 362). Consequently, the other
force is not a condition but an impulse \([\textit{Anstoss}]\), and its alterity is not a determination but a solicitation (521, II 362).

The self-othering of force is its own activity, which is therefore not an interplay of distinct forces, but an expression of force. The expression of force is this self-distinction into a soliciting and a solicited force. Yet, there is nothing to distinguish between the two because they are essentially the same (522, II 363). However, there is only a distinction of forces because this asymmetry has been introduced. Nonetheless, because both convert the externality of the other into an impulse, this means that the solicitedness of the second force is due to an impulse that it has solicited, and so on. So, there is an infinite reciprocity of solicitation (523, II 364).

The asymmetrical axis itself is the unity of force, expressed as an asymmetry of forces (523, II 364). Furthermore, this is not simply an identity of the limit with the two sides that it determines. Instead, it is the unity of the action by which force conditions itself and then recuperates this conditioning as its own conditioning of itself.

Hegel states, “what force in truth expresses is that its relation to other is relation to itself, that its passivity consists in its very activity” (523, II 364). That is, the force is activated by encountering a presupposed force, and is therefore the passive (suffering) force. However, this other force is only an active force by encountering the passive force, and is therefore equally activated by it. The distinction between the forces is thus removed because both are passive and active. Nonetheless, they only exist because of the difference. Force can only be force by becoming self-external and confronting itself as a condition.

The externality that conditions and solicits force is its own soliciting of itself. The identity of force with itself is similarly an involution of force against itself. Indeed, the moment of identity of force is the external passivity that conditions it and solicits it. Consequently, the inner being of force is its external being (523, II 364).

10.3.1. Application to History

The dynamism of a historical world has the function of unifying the tension between the tendency of the world towards totalization and its tendency towards particularization. As we have seen, there are terminal options available to the world, which are the the polar tendencies of France and Britain in the 19th Century, according to Hegel (454, 536). The self-conception that the world needs is not that of whole and parts because the whole and parts relate as opposed alternatives and are therefore mutually destructive. Instead, it needs the self-conception of
force and expression, because this category unifies the tension between becoming-whole and becoming-part.

The idea of dynamism in a historical world firstly means that the world has resources for generating opposed parts and has resources for collapsing those parts back into the totality. At the same time, the dynamism only has its being in the opposition of parts and whole, or of itself to its expression. Consequently, the world of force and expression means a set of parts, which are parts through their mutual antagonism, and thereby both destroy their diverse self-subsistence and produce a totality. In producing a totality, they are also reassembled as parts. The totality is thus the expression of force, because it is only in the process of destroying each other that the parts are parts, and this process of creation-destruction is the expression of the force.

The historical world does not therefore preserve a set of institutions through its history. The total process of interaction by which one set of institutions, persons, matters and so forth is activated in the process of being set against one another and destroyed constitutes it. In this process, a new configuration comes into being.

Any given configuration of a historical world is therefore both the product of the dynamism and its condition. In this mode, the dynamism of the world is not the identity of the world, but rather belongs to the world. This is because it is always conditioned by a state of affairs from which it springs. It appears, therefore, that the identity of the world is this primordial state of affairs, to which the dynamism adheres merely immediately and thus contingently. There is change, in the dynamic processes in which the various elements of the world are set against each other. However, this constitutive process appears to be an externality over against the being of the elements. The current configuration is therefore an object of conservation.

The given configuration is a naturalized object. The processes of production and destruction that bring the configuration into being are set outside of it as inessential, with the consequence that the current configuration has the value of the essential. Furthermore, there is some truth to this, because the dynamism only has an existence in the current configuration.

However, the dynamism is also the origin of the conditioning configuration because a configuration only exists as the condition against which the dynamism acts. The primordial separation of the dynamism and its condition is already the dynamism in act, separating itself from its own immediate being. In other words, the object of conservation only comes into being in being subverted. This means that the configuration is
the domestic production of the dynamism, which therefore merely
develops itself in producing a configuration and then turning against it.

The dynamism set into opposition with its condition is the
dynamism outside itself. This means that the splitting of the world into an
object of conservation and a dynamism comes from outside, in the form of
a jolt from a presupposed dynamism. The native dynamism requires an
external jolt in order to set itself in motion and produce configurations of
institutions, opposed parties, nations, materials and individuals. On one
hand, we can take this as a primitive act of world formation, as when the
Greek world is set in motion by incursions from Asia. These incursions are
catalysts that lead to an intensification of interactions between the parts of
the Greek world. Indeed, they are only parts of a whole through this
intensification.

This catalyzation also occurs in established worlds where a
configuration has become sedimented. The Roman World, let us say, has a
series of well-developed institutions and a series of domesticated
oppositions. However, the dynamism of the world has dissipated, which
means, the constituent elements are becoming more autonomous and less
differentiated. An incursion from a new power then brings about a new
intensification, so that the diverse parts are revitalized into oppositions.
Parts are again destroyed and others created.

It appears that the catalyzing dynamism, or soliciting force, comes
from outside. It appears at first that the dynamism of the barbarian world
collides with the Roman world and reanimates its dynamism. However,
the dynamism of the barbarian world equally requires a catalyst, and in a
simplified model, this is provided by the collision of the barbarian tribes
with the Roman world.

In the first instance, the Roman world appears to suffer barbarian
incursions. These incursions activate the dynamism of the Roman world.
However, the activating force, the barbarian tribes, are only an activating
force in relation to Rome (without Rome they would merely be an
undifferentiated migration). Therefore, Rome equally activates the
barbarian tribes. Both sides are therefore both active and passive forces.
They are only the totality, however, through a systematic interaction with
the other, where the moments of activity and passivity are distributed.
Each side therefore places its self-identity outside itself as the other upon
which it, being a force, acts.

The dynamism of a world, therefore, is most active in a state of
war, or at least of competition. In war, the dynamism of the world
manifests itself by splitting into opposed dynamisms that catalyze one
another. At the same time, this means that the inner of the first force, for
example the dynamism of the Roman world, is identical to the outer that confronts it in the barbarian world. This is because the dynamism of the Roman world is the self-external dynamism that presupposes itself in the form of an other. It is the same dynamism catalyzing itself in the form of the other. The inner identity of Rome therefore confronts it as an outer.

Furthermore, the dynamism of the world is nothing other than the self-catalyzing intensification of the two opposed nations. The dynamism only comes into being in splitting itself into opposed dynamisms. Although it appears that there are two dynamisms that confront one another and then form a single world with a single vital opposition, the two dynamisms themselves are co-eval with this world, and are the products of its self-opposition. Therefore, the single dynamism becomes itself in its opposition to itself. Its outered form is therefore its inner being. In other words, Rome considered as a dynamism is only itself when it is outside itself, invading. It is hard not to think of the standard example of a historical event, Caesar crossing the Rubicon, as having this deeper significance.

10.4 Inner and Outer

The concept of inner and outer is the last vestige of the idea of an inner being. On one hand, the concept of force has developed to the point where force is always self-external, so that its inner being is outside. This gives us the idea of the identity of the opposed form determinations of inner and outer.

Again, we have the problem that the inner and outer are identical, yet they also have opposite form determinations (524, II 365). In the first place, the inner is reflected immediacy, the essence of force, over against simple immediacy, its self-external being. However, the essence and the immediate being are a single identity, a content. This content is opposed to the formal distinction of inner and outer. However, the outer is not merely identical to the inner in terms of content, it is the same fact (524, II 365).

The formal distinction of inner and outer is thus merely formal. Yet the identical content is a reflected identity, which thus has the form as its reflection into itself. Inwardly, inner and outer are the same content, but outwardly inner and outer are two diverse forms (524, II 365). These are the forms of essential inwardness and unessential externality. The outward formal relation between inner and outer itself alternates between two diverse modalities: 1) the outer is essentially the inner, and 2) the inner is an outer. In other words, the formal relation asserts that the unessential outward relation of outer and inner is identical in essence to the inner content, but also asserts that the inner is a moment of the external form, as content external to form, and is therefore an outer.
Consequently, the inner is only an outer, and the outer is an outer because it is only an inner (524, II 366). If the inner is the essence and the outer is the being, then the essence is only in essence and is an undeveloped externality to the developed existence. Conversely, the simple fact that just is is undeveloped and only in nuce, or in essence (524, II 366).

What we see in the preceding two paragraphs are two kinds of identity of inner and outer. In the first, we have an identity of content, which is indifferent to form (527, II 368). In the second, we have an identity of form that captures the difference, but loses the developed content (527, II 368). However, these two kinds of identity are two sides of the same movement. The mutual conversion of inner and outer of the form is also the conversion of form into content. The content is only an indifferent identity through this mediation of form (527, II 368). The form is the whole movement, differentiating the sides, converting them into each other, into an identity indifferent to form, and thus into an external form. Conversely, the content is the whole movement, externalizing the difference, splitting itself into the outer of form and the indifferent inner of content, and then repositioning itself as the content indifferent to this form (528, II 368).

Both the outer and the inner are therefore the totality of the movement (528, II 368). They not only convert immediately into the other, but also mediate themselves with the other. The movements of the outer and the inner are identical, but it is the outer that contains the whole movement as its determinateness. Hegel can therefore say "What something is, therefore, it is wholly in its externality; its externality is its totality and equally is its unity reflected into itself" (528, II 368).

The outward world of appearance has the world in and of itself as its inner. However, this inner essence has turned out to be merely the product of the outer. This content appears in the world of appearance set against appearance itself. The world of appearance converts the inner into itself and itself into an inner, thus distinguishing itself as the whole outward form from the true inner content. Yet this true inner content only appears as a product of the world of appearance and is in truth the surreptitious self-production of the world of appearance. It is the essence of the world of appearance only as essential appearance (528, II 368).

10.4.1. Application to History

In the previous section, we saw that the dynamism of a world comes into being by becoming self-external and approaching its identity as an externality. In the essential relation of inner and outer, this means that the difference of inner and outer is sublated. That is, the opposition of the forces is the inner content of force. From the Roman point of view, this is a recognition that the barbarian tribes are equally a force, that the
differentiation of Romans and barbarians is the expression of force, and that barbarian raids upon Rome are equally Roman in character, that is, active and expansionist. In sum, there is an identical inner content of force. This inner content is that the Roman dynamism always finds itself outside its identity. This identity alternates between Rome, seen from the outside, and the invader, recognized as a force. However, this alternation between the inner and the outer is overcome in the common content. That is, Rome and the barbarian tribes are no different. They are the outer of the same inner force.

If Rome says “we have seen the enemy, and they are us,” then it takes on the role of the essential inner content. Conversely, it means that being barbarian means being outwardly different from the Romans. This means that the distinction between the inner and the outer, between Romans and barbarians, is itself the outer. That is, barbarians are essentially Romans, and their difference from the Romans is merely formal.

However, this recognition of essential identity relies upon the differentiation of Romans and barbarians. This is because the inner content is the force that externalizes itself, which is why the Romans can recognize themselves in the barbarians. Consequently, the inner content is a product of form, and a moment of form. The form contains the inner content, which is essentially being Roman, and the outer form, which is the difference of the inner and the outer, which sits, for the time being, on the foreignness of the barbarians.

The first mode of the form means that the difference of Romans and barbarians is the essential inner content, that is, the content of being Roman. The second mode means that being Roman is set over against being barbarian, and is therefore equally an outward and formal thing. The universality of being Roman, which in principle includes being barbarian, in fact is set over against being barbarian, because it assumes that being barbarian is inessential and outside being Roman. Conversely, being barbarian or Roman, as a simple, outward fact, means being barbarian or Roman only inwardly, since being barbarian or Roman in truth means being a self-outering force.

Again, being Roman and being barbarian prove to be identical, but this time because being Roman is only an outer designation, and being barbarian is only inner. We therefore have two kinds of identities between the two worlds or forces. First, there is an identity of content, indifferent to the outward determinations of Roman or barbarian. Second, there is an identity of form. As we have seen, these identities are dialectically related as phases in a cycle. The mutual conversion of the moments of the form, Roman into German and vice versa, is a sublation of form. In other words,
the outward difference of the Roman and German worlds turns out to be no difference, which makes the inner content, the force that becomes self-external, into the essential content of the world. However, we have already seen that this essential content produces the form by throwing off the form as an externality. Consequently, both form and content are the same self-reproducing movement. The content, the Roman world, is inwardly a self-externalizing force. As such, its own activity is the production of itself as a self-opposed force, the barbarians, and hence of a formal distinction between its inner being, Rome and its outer existence, the barbarians. This difference reduces itself since the formal distinction between the sides proves to be an identity. This restores the world as an inner content. However, it is only this inner content as the reproduction of an outer form.

The Roman world has an inner, but this inner is merely the encapsulation of the whole process of which it is one phase. It expands by setting the barbarians outside itself, not by distinguishing them as other, but by claiming them as its own. It then relativizes the outward difference between Romans and barbarians. Rome thereby incorporates the barbarian world. However, this also means that the Roman world is an external totality of antagonistic worlds.

10.5 Conclusion

The category of essential relation, I stated at the beginning of this chapter, comes up in order to conceptualize the way that existents form a totality and relate to this totality. During this chapter I have reviewed the three forms of essential relation that Hegel presents: whole and parts, force and expression, and inner and outer. The result has been twofold. Firstly, the negative result is that the forms of essential relation, and the general category, have been sublated. What this means is that they are relativized to a larger concept. For example, in the last form we saw that the inner is merely a moment in the external totality. Similarly, the forms of whole and parts and of force and expression are elements in a bigger picture. More historically, these are inadequate forms that will destroy themselves if they cannot transcend themselves and form part of a higher logic.

The conclusion of the dialectic of inner and outer was that the totality is a world of antagonistic regions. Within this world, the dialectic of inner and outer continues to function. That is, the regions recognize themselves in each other, thereby both forming an inner reconciliation, and an outer difference. However, the inner content is self-outering force. In the context of inner-and-outer, this is because the formation of the inner is always a becoming outer of the difference of inner and outer. The mutual recognition of the regions is therefore a reduction of the difference of the other, and so a production of this outer difference. This perpetual
self-externalization is what accounts for force. Force is the dynamism of a region, firstly in relation to itself as another force, and secondly in relation to its condition, or immediate existence. In reacting against another region, the individual parts of the region are activated into a whole of parts.

The world of appearance, therefore, is an external totality of opposed and mutually catalyzing regions. The concept of inner being arises in the relation between these regions. This inner being becomes force when considered as the interaction between the regions, and the negative self-relation of a region. This force expresses itself within a region as a tension between becoming whole and becoming parts. The parts become more highly determined and individuated as they interact, but they simultaneously become subordinated to the whole of their interaction.
11. THE ABSOLUTE

11.1 Overview

Hegel's development of the concept of the absolute has two functions. Firstly, Hegel's concept of the absolute begins as the traditional concept of that which is beyond reflection. It ends as the concept of manifestation that manifests itself. In historical terms, the absolute is initially the historical totality beyond historical relations. It then becomes, as mode, a process which embodies itself in its particular phases. Secondly, the absolute is transformed from a static totality of relations to an absolute activity. From this point on, the Logic is concerned with the totality as a self-opposed dynamic.

The three phases of the logic of essence: reflection, appearance and actuality, therefore emphasize in turn the past, present and future. This analysis provides the matrix for three basic types of history: histories that are recollective individualizations (Erinnerungen), histories that are systems of oppositions, and histories that are processes.

11.2 The Absolute

The absolute is initially the product of the self-sublation of essential relation. It is the culmination of a process of supersession in which even the difference of inner and outer has been resolved. Consequently, Hegel argues, although the absolute itself can be figured in the various forms that it contains, such as the ground relation, this exposition is nullified in the absolute (532, II 372). However, as Byrne notes, the absolute is determinately related to this sublated exposition (121). Consequently, the concept of the absolute sublates itself in relation to this process and therefore distinguishes itself into the absolute relative to reflection, or attribute, and the absolute absolute, which is the sublation of the dualities of reflection (533, II 372). The absolute absolute therefore perpetually reflects into itself as attribute and into itself out of its attribute. As Byrne states, this absolute is a purely exclusive, negative identity, rather than the positive substance that Spinoza wanted (121).

Historically speaking, the absolute is the total concept of a single self-constituting process of identification of the world and differentiation into rival trading blocs or particular epochs. This internalization makes self-externality into a surface play. Synchronically, the existence of rival trading blocs is an appearance. Diachronically, the absolute sublates the prior historical epochs as surface effects of an unthematized capitalism. However, as part of a progression, absolute capitalism is also late on the scene. The attribute is the late phase in which the world system thematizes itself.
11.3 The Attribute

The absolute absolute is the identity of inner content and outer form. The attribute as self-external absolute is thus both the totality of the self-sublating outer form (533, II 373) and the identity term in the form. The attribute is therefore the mediated totality of the absolute (533, II 373). It sublates itself and returns into the unity of the absolute (534, II 374) but only as the identity term of the form. The attribute therefore remains self-external in returning into itself. Attribute as external form is a mere mode.

The attribute is the totality of the world and the totality of history. As such, it sublates all the particular structures of historicity and becomes the absolute. Synchronically, the attribute is the posited absolute, which means that it is the identity of the world system, but related to the world system as its inner unity. Further, this self-externality of the totality produces the world system as an outer expression that has its unity in the attribute. Diachronically, the attribute is the world system posited as an all-inclusive dynamic process which therefore totalizes all prior phases, but which also relates temporarily to these phases as a phase. The attribute sublates itself in both of these aspects, positing its particular existence as an internal reflection of the absolute system. In so doing, it restores itself as absolute unity, but again, only as a self-external element and phase.

11.4 Mode

The dialectic of the attribute is the absolute as internal reflection. As such, it is “the loss of itself in the mutability and contingency of being, the accomplished transition of itself into opposites without the return into itself” (535, II 374). However, this externality, mode, also has a positive side. It is externality posited as externality. As such, it is “the reflection of the form into itself—hence the identity with itself which the absolute is” (535, II 374). Attribute posits itself as the essential identity of the form, but in so doing also turns against its identity and generates itself as a self-external relation. Mode captures this self-externality as something self-identical. In mode, the absolute is captured in its truth as a self-externalizing reflection that negates its own self-identity, and so identifies with itself. As Byrne states, mode is thus the absolute as self-externalizing self-mediation. Hegel transforms the expressivist ontology of essential relation by claiming that, while mode is a manifestation, it is only a manifestation of itself (536, II 375).

The absolute in history is self-negating reflective movement. It is self-identical in the absolute world system because it is self-externalized as a manifold of self-external forms. Yet as this self-identity it is also self-external. Consequently, the absolute externalizes itself in all historical forms, including the phase of its self-identity, and yet in the phase of world system posited as mode, it also restores its self-identity as that which is self-identical in self-externality.
11.5 Conclusion

I stated in the introduction that the chapter on the absolute transforms both the concept of the absolute and the temporal dimensions of the logic of essence. The first of these transformations means seeing the concept of the absolute as the dynamic process of self-externalization and return into identity in externality, rather than the unthinkable negation of all positivities. We see now that this absolute in history has the immediate form of an institutionalized disjunction of opposed regions. This institution is the posited recognition that, in splintering into manifold forms, the world system is merely being itself.

The second transformation is the shift from thinking of the articulations of the simultaneous world to thinking of the negative relation of this world to itself. That is, in mode the world system is self-identical in immediate externality. However, this means that the world is both an actual dispersal of capitalism over the globe, and also the reflection of this dispersal into itself. This forms a point of identity on the surface of the globe, which is the identity in itself of the global system. This point falls over the institution that represents the posited identity of global capitalism in its disjunction, which is some such institution as the World Trade Organization. However, because this identity is merely the posited identity of the contingent, external world, it is its inner possibility. The world system as mode is therefore disposed, as a thoroughly contingent phase of history, towards the future.
12. ACTUALITY

12.1 Overview

The logic of actuality firstly transforms the concept of actuality. In this operation, actuality is determined as a matrix of two oppositions, actuality-possibility, and contingency-necessity. The concept of actuality develops from being a completion of existence as immediate externality to being a process in which immediate externality is determined as the moment of existence.

Secondly, the logic of actuality develops reflection from manifestation to causality. The difference between the two concepts is that simple actuality, the being of the mode, is the reflective movement as an immediate self-manifestation: it is what it is. Substance, on the other hand, is being that encapsulates this reflective movement as a movement of necessity: it is because it is (537, II 376).

Hegel distinguishes three kinds of necessity: formal, real and absolute. Common to all three is that necessity is a relation between possibility and actuality; and that contingency is the counterpart of necessity, as well as being its opposite. Contingency is the reflective alternation between actuality and possibility, while necessity is their totality.

12.2 Analysis

12.2.1. Formal Necessity

Formal actuality is the immediacy of the mode (542, II 381). As such, it is the identity of self-externality and self-identity. Immediate actuality is therefore the existence of the absolute (542, II 381). However, actuality is not merely the moment of immediately self-identical externality, because mode is also the whole self-negating movement, reflected into itself. Its reflection into itself is its formal possibility (542, II 381).

Formal possibility is firstly the reflected self-identity of the actual (543, II 382). Hegel states, "A is possible means only that A is A" (543, II 382). However, possibility is the essentiality of identity brought into relation to external existence, as Burbidge states (Necessity 202). Possibility is the reflected totality of actuality, but only as the formal moment of being-in-itself. It is thus the self-external identity that was previously attribute. Possibility is thus identical with actuality, since it is self-external, and also the negation of actuality since it is the negation of itself. The second determination of possibility is therefore to be "only a possible and the ought-to-be of the totality of form" (543, II 382). Possibility
is actuality reflected into identity, and therefore the determinate content of
actuality. However, it is this content only as a possible. Possibility is thus
both the reflected identity of actuality, and the reflected negation of
actuality. It is thus the comparing reflection of two opposite possibles,
their mutual implication as opposite possibles, and their contradiction as
exclusive mutually inclusive and exclusive opposites (544, II 383). It is
contradictory because, as Lampert states, no one possible can “express all
that it itself is” (Contingency 2). Finally, being contradictory reflection,
possibility sublates itself and returns to its negative in the immediacy of
actuality.

Hegel offers two definitions of contingency. Firstly, it is the “unity
of actuality and possibility” (545, II 383). Secondly, it is the “absolute
unrest of the becoming” of actuality and possibility (545, II 384). These
two definitions arise because formal actuality and possibility 1) are
identical and 2) are opposites that convert immediately into each other.
Firstly, formal contingency results from the transference of the features of
possibility into actuality. Possibility, as we saw, is the co-possibility of
opposites. The contingent, states Hegel “is an actual that at the same time
is determined as merely possible, whose other or opposite equally is” (545,
II 383), or an actual “with its possibilities removed” (Lampert,
Contingency 3). Contingency for Hegel is therefore a reiteration of
appearance: actuality co-exists with its negation. Furthermore, as in the
dialectic of porosity, the actual occupies the same space as its contrary,
and is thereby contradictory. Secondly, the actual, as opposed to the
possible, sublates itself and becomes only a possible. As a possible,
however, the actual is a self-sublating reflection, and an immediate actual
again. Contingency is thus the immediate identity of actuality and
possibility and their restless becoming other.

Necessity is the same movement as contingency, but with the
emphasis on totality rather than becoming other (Burbidge, Necessity
206). Hegel argues that, “because each immediately turns into its opposite,
equally in this other it simply unites with itself, and this identity of both, of
one in the other, is necessity” (545, II 384). Hegel uses the logic of inner and
outer to make this point. Actuality is possibility because, as the reflected
external immediacy of the contingent, it is only one of the alternative
possibles. Possibility is equally actual because, like actuality, it is an
immediate in-itself. The conversion of the actual into the possible and vice
versa means that the two alternatives are each the whole. The negative of
the actual, the possible, now has both moments. Formal necessity is
possibility and actuality mediated through their other, which as Lampert
points out, means being set into the total multiplicity of possibles
(Contingency 3). Lampert’s interpretation usefully stresses the nature of
necessity as multiplicity, but fails to incorporate the reflection of this
totality on itself, as opposed to merely within the totality.
12.2.1.1. Application to History

Absolute actuality, as we saw in the conclusion of the previous chapter, is the immediate existence of the global system as a self-identical externality. The totality is identical with itself in having a history of diverse phases and being a global system of diverse and opposed nations. Each nation is determined as a manifestation of the global system in space and time. It is thus a finite phase of world history or an element in the global system. The nature of an actual world, therefore, is to be self-identical in its externality, and this implies that the nations posit themselves as existing as particular manifestations of the totality. The logic of formal necessity in history, therefore, is a development in the self-determination of the system. It re-determines itself in terms of the relation between its reflected identity and its external actuality. On one hand, actuality, possibility, contingency and necessity are progressive re-determinations, while on the other, necessity preserves the prior stages as an internal matrix.

The posited global identity is the reflection into self of the actual world, and thus its constitutive possibility. The constitutive possibility of the world is a reiteration of the law of a world. However, it is a higher determination because the law has been re-determined as a self-negating negativity. It is an absolute that is only self-identical in its mode. Possibility is thus initially the reflection of self-subsistence of the diverse, oppositional world.

Possibility is at the same time the opposite of the actual world, because it is posited as its negated identity. Possibility therefore becomes posited as an aspirational unity, negated by the actual externality and opposition of the nations. Thus, A) the global system is posited as the constitutive possibility of the nations because they are posited as 1) mutually determining and 2) determined as self-externalizations of the system itself. It is tempting to think of this existent identity as an institution, such as a government or the United Nations. However, its existence is the actual world itself. Consequently, any totalizing institution would only stand for the total system. The nations must each be determined as particular manifestations or actualizations of a single system which is their totality and possibility. B) This constitutive possibility remains self-identical because its self-externality as a totality of nations is self-manifestation. C) This self-identity is only self-identity if it is also actualized as a negative relation to its identity.

The global society and economy is therefore simultaneously posited as unreal by each of the nations. Firstly this means that the actual world is internally contradictory, while being externally a determinate immediate existence. Secondly, however, it means that the external world is infected with the duality of the conditions of its possibility. It has a
determinate systematic form, but equally the meaning of this form is the loss of systematicity in the free-play of the self-externalizing system. Consequently, the actual world is only a possible firstly in the sense that it is opposed as a possible to its constitutive possibility, and secondly in the more concrete sense that it is an externally (naturally) conditioned configuration.

The formally actual global system is therefore contingent as the co-possibility of the global system and its negation, and in the fact that conditionedness has been posited in each of the nations. While they are self-identical as the actualizations of the system, they are also self-negating as random mutations.

However, as we have seen, this is also the basis of the world-system's formal necessity. The posited future is the possibility of the actual system, but only as an aspiration to the negation of the self-externality of the actual system. This constitutes possibility as an inner in nuce, a merely outer inner. Possibility is thus actual as a seed of the future. Conversely, the actual world system is also determined as merely a possible. Yet as this possible it is actual. As a seed of the future, then, the actual world system is necessary, because both actuality and possibility return into themselves in it.

12.2.2. Real Necessity

Real actuality is formal necessity in its immediate form. Further, it is no longer formal actuality because the previous mediation of the form of actuality and possibility into a content-unity gives it an immediate content (546, II 385). As Lampert emphasizes (Contingency 4), real actuality "is a manifold content in general," (546, II 385) because it is immediate externality as a content unity. As such, Hegel states, it is the existent world (546, 385). Unlike existence, however, the internal manifold of actuality is a self-manifestation of its absolute form (546-547, II 386).

Real possibility is once again a reflective movement that moves from actuality to actuality. As real possibility, this movement is a transition from one actuality to another. Formal necessity gives us actuality and possibility in union with one another. From the side of possibility, this means that real actuality is an immediate in-itself for another future actuality (548, II 387). Real possibility is "the determinations, circumstances and conditions of something" (547, II 386). Furthermore, real possibility is once again a self-sublating possibility through contradiction, since having a manifold of diverse conditions inevitably leads to contradiction (548, II 387). The actual manifold is disposed as a possible towards its other, sublates itself and produces the future actuality. The possibility of something withdraws into that of which it is the possibility. This cancels the phase of actuality having its in-
itself in something else, and thus being a possibility (549, II 389). The negation of real possibility is therefore its identity with itself, since it becomes in actuality what it already is in itself. Furthermore, since its in-itself is already the in-itself of what it becomes, “under the particular conditions and circumstances, something else cannot follow” (549, II 389).

However, this transition is contingent in the following senses: Whether or not the sufficient conditions obtain is contingent (550, II 389). Furthermore, the content of the successive state is a contingent actuality (550, II 389). Most importantly, the two external actualities are outwardly only contingently related. Di Giovanni reiterates that the real multiplicity is external and amorphous (Category 190). Indeed, real necessity relies upon this difference in order for it to be a return into identity out of the difference (550, II 389).

Real necessity is reiterated in the subjective logic as a conditional, or hypothetical judgement (652, III 79). In real necessity, the conditional relation presupposes an outward difference between the terms. This difference not only appears between the terms, but as one of the terms, the sufficient condition, which is defined as the outward actuality that opposes its in-itself. Conversely, the manifested consequent is the extinction of the self-opposition of the prior actuality, and is thus the inner unity of the terms. However, the relation is also symmetrical because there are outwardly two different terms, and the outward difference is a symmetrical relation. This means that being the outward difference or being the inner identity are the outward modes of the identical inner necessity. Real necessity is therefore a unity of two opposed forms, possibility and actuality.

What this means in temporal terms is: 1) that one actuality necessarily succeeds another; 2) that the antecedent actuality has the nature of a self-sublating manifold, while the consequent actuality has the nature of an identity resulting from the self-sublation. At the same time, the two actualities are mutually external and contingent, and their transition is only an inner necessity. Real necessity therefore means sublating not only the antecedent, but also the externality and contingency of the consequent, and converting the consequent into manifested necessity. Yet to do so is to presuppose the externality of the terms of the conditional. As Di Giovanni states, contingency is the result of a line of necessity having been established (Category 193). Di Giovanni’s reading makes the subtle point that contingency is both the outside of Logic, but as posited and elaborated by absolute thought. However, Di Giovanni errs in thinking the Logic as an abstractive reflection on experience. Unlike Realphilosophie, the Logic is its own lived experience.
The consequent actuality is both necessary and contingent. This means that it is determined both in terms of being, as an external transition from one actuality into another, and in terms of essence, as the illusory being of the past moment in the present. As such it is absolute actuality.

### 12.2.2.1. Application to History

We saw in the previous section that the alternation of formal and actual possibility transforms the posited identity of the social world with itself from formal possibility to formal necessity. Necessity is thus reflected back onto the actual system. The meaning of being a unity of formal actuality and possibility is reintegrated into the actual system. The nations now collectively contain the meaning of the possibilities that they exclude, and are thus concretely determinate.

While the really actual system mediates itself via possibility, it is equally determined as possible, and is immediately also real possibility. The nations collectively have a determinate form, excluding their other possibles, and so also, as a possible, they give possibility a determinate form. At the same time, this is a negated possibility, because sublated into actuality. On one hand, then, possibility is identical with the actual geo-political configuration. On the other hand, the current geo-political situation is pregnant with the other actuality for which it is the real possibility.

This current geo-political situation therefore alters. Hegel refers back to the logic of identity and opposition for the motor for this change. That is, the actual configuration has a manifold existence, and diverse manifolds go over into contradiction, ground, and then a new existence. We cannot understand this dialectical account of historical change simply as a transition of immediate existences. Such existences would not undergo the dialectics of essentiality and ground. Rather, the actual system of nations is determinate because the elements of the system have actual meanings over against one another and against the alternatives that they both exclude and include.

Contradiction arises because the differences between the nations are not merely a matter of diversity. The meanings of the nations include their indifferent diversity to one another, but also the determinate reflection by which one determines itself by excluding the others. The nations are therefore locked into a struggle for survival and self-determination, the conclusion of which is the annihilation of all and reproduction of a new configuration. Externally, there is a transition from one external actual geo-political configuration to another. However, the meaning encapsulated in the later configuration is of a return-to-self from temporal exteriority. In the historicity of the later phase, the temporal
succession is a manifestation of the return to itself of the later phase from its self-externality in the earlier phase. The superseding phase is the fulfilment of the earlier phase.

The absolutely actual system of nations contains real actuality: Not only is it the result of the prior configuration, which was itself contingent, but it preserves its external relation to the prior configuration in the form of its self-mediation. This preservation of exteriority also gives rise to real possibility again, so that the second configuration is again disposed towards its own future.

Nonetheless, real necessity is the re-determination of the identity of the world system as the necessity of this paradoxical formulation. It draws the configuration together as a configuration that has a historical relation to its past. That is, the actual system is a resolution of the problematic past. Nonetheless, the actuality remains self-external. That is, the really necessary system is a succession of contingent phases. The geo-political phases resolve the contradictions of the prior stage, but immediately set up new contradictions.

12.2.3. Absolute Necessity

Absolute actuality is the duality of real necessity expressed in an immediate form (550, II 389). That is, real necessity is both necessity, because it sublates the outwardness of the sufficient condition, and contingency, because it presupposes the sufficient condition as its other actuality (550, II 389). As we have seen above, the nature of the sufficient condition is to have an inner possibility that is other than its outer actuality. This is the same form as that which necessity has in presupposing contingency as its outward form.

Absolute actuality is necessary, because as essence it includes the antecedent possibility as a sublated moment, but equally it is contingency, because as being it is indifferently either possibility (551, II 389). This means that absolute actuality is absolute possibility. Absolute possibility means being either actuality or possibility. Absolute actuality appears at first sight to transcend its possibility, since it is absolute but its possibilities are real. However, the phases of actuality and possibility are self-referential, which means that the possibilities of absolute actuality are absolute. Absolute actuality covers itself and absolute possibility, while absolute possibility is this possibility of being either absolute actuality or possibility.

Absolute actuality and possibility are therefore moments of a single content-identity (551, II 390). This single identity is real actuality again. However, the new actuality is a negative, as we might expect. That is, it is a term that has already been sublated. Confusingly, Hegel explains this in
terms of real actuality and possibility (551, II 390). That is, Hegel explains that the new actuality is mediated with itself via real possibility. The explanation must be that immediate actuality sublates itself, becomes real possibility, sublates itself and becomes real actuality again. Real actuality is therefore mediated with itself (551, II 390).

However, this brings the function of the mutual sublation of absolute actuality and possibility into question. The answer is that the latter sublation is necessary because the mutual sublation of real actuality and possibility provides a model of alternating phases, a "restless otherness of actuality and possibility towards each other," (550, II 389) and thus bad infinity, while the mutual sublation of absolute actuality and possibility provides a model of mutual conversion into an immediate identity. The importance of this is that necessity is the cyclical reflection of absolute actuality and possibility that resolves into a self-external immediacy of real actuality.

The next step is to state that the new actuality is an immediacy mediated by its negation, and is therefore possibility (551, II 390). It is possibility because it has the form of mediation by its negation that possibility has (551, II 390). This is not just a conversion again, however. Hegel states that possibility is not a moment of the mediating but the mediating itself (551, II 390). Hegel treats this as a conclusion of the foregoing, so the argument must be that actuality is a return-to-self via mediation, and possibility is this mediation.

Furthermore, because actuality and possibility have been mutually sublated, the moment of in-itselfness, or possibility, and the moment of immediacy, or actuality, are moments of the mediation, and the mediation is their identity. Most importantly, actuality has been reduced to a moment of possibility, which contains both sides. Possibility is both the mediating and the mediated, and actuality is simply the moment of immediacy for the mediating.

Necessity is both the external reflection of absolute actuality and possibility that presupposes an immediate actuality, that is, "the sublating of this positedness or the positing of immediacy and the in-itself" and the determining reflection that determines the sublation of the reflection as a positedness, that is, as external. That is, the presupposed, external actuality is a moment in the mediating of possibility. Furthermore, it is the moment of self-identity through mediation.

Hegel concludes that necessity determines itself as contingency, which means, sublates the mutual conversion of absolute actuality and possibility and produces an immediate actuality, but that this determination is simply its own activity as possibility, mediating itself
into actuality and possibility, thereby returning into itself in its actuality, but equally repelling itself from itself as the self-externality of actuality in possibility (551, II 390).

Absolute necessity is this self-involved movement (551, II 390). It is the positing of itself in actuality, but equally the identification of this actuality with the process from which it is externalized. In other words, the actuality is the actuality of a self-productive process of which actuality is a phase.

In fact, the reflective process is not something over and above actuality. It is an immanent process, deriving from the self-contradictory nature of actuality. Actuality is only being as absolute negativity. That is, it is contingent and self-opposed in this contingency. Consequently, it goes over into its negation but in so doing is manifesting the absolute necessity of which it is the actuality. Absolute necessity is therefore the process of change, manifested in each contingent actuality. This is Hegel’s concept of substance (553, II 392).

12.2.3.1. Application to History

We saw above that real necessity appears as a historical identity for the actual world system which remains outwardly part of an external temporal series. The centre is external reflection posited in the actual system as an institution. The transition to absolute necessity is provided by seeing that the outward form of temporally successive configurations is merely the self-external moment of determining reflection. In other words, the temporal series is a product of the historical reflective movement rather than the historical reflective movement being an external reflection upon the series.

The centre is necessity because it contains both actuality and possibility. This reflects back on the actual system. The actual system is now a process—it remains actual, even though its configurations alter by sublating themselves into new configurations. The actual configuration is at once real actuality as a particular configuration, and absolute actuality as an indifference to this particular configuration. The elements of the actual system have taken on an indifference to their own contingent forms. Their absoluteness consists in their persistence through multiple configurations. This persistence derives from the fact that the transitions between configurations are determinate transitions.

Absolute actuality is not merely an indifference to forms of real actuality, however. It is also an indifference to the difference between absolute actuality and possibility. The actual system has taken on the meaning of being a process actualized in a contingent phase. The contingent phase is actuality, but only as the moment of immediacy for
the process of reflection. External reflection can be interpreted as the reference of self-external elements to a centre. Determining reflection, on the other hand, is the feeding back of this externalization onto the self-external parts, so that, while having the meaning of self-external, immediate parts, they also have this meaning only with reference to a past and a future. This is captured in the actual configuration as an indifference to self, that is also the presupposition of some configuration.

Absolute necessity retains a moment of being external reflection, which is the formation of a memory centre in the external temporality of the configurations of the actual system. However, it also reflects back on the actual system, converting it into the duality of absolute actuality and possibility. This duality mediates real actuality again as possibility, however, which means that absolute necessity is again a reconfiguration of the meaning of the centre as the reflected identity of the determining reflection. Determining reflection is thus recorded in the structure of the actual system in a self-external form. The centre has the meaning of a centre that externalizes itself as an actual system and mediates this system, while the system has the explicit meaning of a self-external actuality that has a past and is disposed toward the future, but as such is the persistence of a process mediated through its self-externality.

12.3 Conclusion

Absolutely necessary actuality, or substance in history, is reflection that posits itself in a self-external form in time and space. It is both actual as a contingent phase of a temporal series and as a geographically distributed manifold, with both of these externalities referring to a central institution that is posited as necessary, historical determining reflection in itself.

This centre functions as the spatial and temporal totalizer of the process. It performs the first function by articulating the geographical regions as a system, which means both identifying the system and being self-external in the system. It performs the second function by being the memory centre of the system, which means recording the role of the current configuration as the resolution of the prior configuration. Lastly, the centre redistributes meanings to the elements, converting them into absolute actualities, or contingent actualities that are posited as the immediacy of the historical process.
13. ABSOLUTE RELATION

13.1 Overview

The problem of necessity is that it is an inner identity of an outward difference. The resolution of this problem is the "unveiling" of necessity as freedom. This unveiling is reciprocity. Reciprocity is a conversion of one side into the other in which it remains self-identical, and consequently is a conversion between different sides that prove themselves to be the same in their difference.

The first form of absolute relation is substance-and-accidents, or the relation of substantiality. The second form of absolute relation is causality, which is the relation between two external substances. Lastly, reciprocity is the reduction of the substantial difference to its truth as a vanishing illusion. This last determination slips out of the logic of essence altogether into concept. The concept of reciprocity, in this overview, is the point where the relation, which is identical in its distinguishing, is posited into the moments of its distinguishing. That means that the moments are each fully the totality and identical to one another, but only as one of three distinct and equal forms of totality.

13.2 Substantiality

Substantiality has two moments, substance and accidents. Hegel's concept of substance corresponds to the post-Cartesian conception in two main ways. Firstly, it is being that is because it is, which corresponds to the concept of *causa sui*. Secondly, substance is the being in all beings (555, II 394). However, Hegel is careful to state that substance is not "an abstract being standing behind essence and appearance" but rather "it is immediate actuality itself" (555, II 394). Substance is the identity of necessity with itself in its exposition. The accidents, on the other hand, are the same totality, but this time as the positedness of the totality. The accidents are the substance in the mode of self-externality, set out as a flux against its identity.

The initial question, then, is how substance remains self-identical in its accidents. At first sight, it appears that substance is externally related to its accidents. Substance is the reflection into self of the accidents, and thus is produced by the accidents. However, it is also a cancellation of accidentality, and therefore a presupposition. In fact, Hegel sees the production and presupposition of substance as the same act.

Hegel explains that accidentality is both a conversion of itself, as a being, and a reflection into itself, as essence. Hegel calls this "the actuosity of substance." Substance is not a force that works on a material
presupposition, because this immediacy, accidentality, only becomes itself in the immediacy-sublating act (556, II 394). Conversely, the act of substance begins from its actuality as a presupposition, but this beginning act is precisely the positing of itself as the actuality from which a beginning is made (556, II 395).

Consequently, substance is the totality, which includes accidentality as its external reflection. Accidentality is both its self-manifestation and becoming what it is. Substance forms itself into a form distinction of substance as reflected identity over against the flux of accidents which it contains (556, II 395). By so doing, it has established itself once again in a self-external form: substance/accidents, with an inner identity. However, this diremption is merely the reflective act of substance itself.

In this answer to the mode of identity of substance, the essential meaning of substance has shifted from immediate self-identity to self-identity as a process. Firstly, the flux of accidents has the self-external form of real actuality and possibility—the accidental is an actuality that converts into another actuality through its possibility (556, II 395). Consequently, the sublation of the outward flux of accidents is a manifestation of inner substance as creative and destructive power. As such it is substance-as-power (556, II 395).

Substantial power is, most importantly, the middle between the substance and the accidents, and they are posited extremes (557, II 396). Substance-as-power is the process through which the extreme of substance-as-identity is produced, but equally the process through which accidentality is produced.

Further, according to the middle term of substance-as-power, accidentality is in-itself substance through the creative-destructive power, but is only posited as accidentality and flux (557, II 396). Substance itself is not posited in the flux itself, which means that it is only an external reflection that fails to totalize the accidents (557, II 396). Consequently, the shape that substance first gives itself is pure power with unreal accidents.

However, accidentality is already reflection as well as being, so the inner of substantial power is also posited in the accidents, as having power as their inner being. Accidentality therefore becomes posited as substantial power that acts upon itself and negates itself—powerful substance existing for itself. This is the relation of causality (557, II 396).

13.2.1. Application to History
In “Kausalität oder Substantialität?” Gerhart Schmidt states:
Hegel's doctrine of essence is a genetic ontology of history, of historical spirit. The showing-in-each-other of the categories of being and the reflective determinations, which belong to essence, is the ontological (for Hegel “logical”) condition for the appearance of objective spirit, which apprehends nature in itself, and therewith the overcoming of the opposition of intelligible and sensible world. (171 my trans.)

Specifically, Schmidt locates the category of substantiality as Hegel's response to a problem of a historical ontology (147-148). The problem is that the Kantian category of causality is deterministic, and thus, as Dilthey perceived, fails to account for the “categories of freedom” deployed by historians (150). Substance for Hegel is an ontology for history of spontaneous individual substances. Incarnate as a people (157), world history is substantial power in the form of “actuosity of substance”—over-abundant, spontaneous actuality. For Schmidt, causality and the other categories are then to be seen in light of this key concept whose completion draws history to a close.

Let us see how this is accomplished. As we have seen, substance is the intro-reflection of the flux of accidents. It is absolute actuality, as that which remains the same in its contingent, temporal alterations. Necessity is the inner identity of two temporal phases that is posited in the consequent. The consequent is thus a historical phase, and thus the solution of a problem, or the extinction of an apparent temporal difference. Nonetheless, this historical recuperation was also the presupposition of the externality of the temporal phases. This process was actualized as absolute actuality that is indifferent to its contingent form but also identical with it.

Substance is change itself, which makes itself manifest through change. This reflection into self of change as substance is the becoming of history, but history is also the laying out of time, and thus the identity of change. Further, once the substance is reflected into itself as history, it remains time, which is its actuality. As well, because time and the becoming of history are the same process, the reflection-into-self is the immediate identity of the substance with its becoming as its own act. However, it is not to be thought that substance merely incorporates already existing materials in the shape of prior periods of time as its history. The point here is that there are no prior periods of time without the reflection that establishes them as immediate, external periods of time. As we discovered in the chapter on essence, there are no temporal relations of past, present and future without reflection.

This means firstly that history appears in time as a configuration of the world-system that identifies itself with the historical process itself.
However, as such, the configuration has a past and a future, and locates itself as subject to the process that it is in itself. Again, the historical "consciousness" of this configuration would take the form of the distribution of meanings to the parts through the interaction of the parts. The general form of this historical consciousness is fate—the imbuing of contingent events and the parts of the system with the meaning of being contingent institutions that are marked for eventual destruction. The idea of fate arises from substance or history being necessity, the inner of events that manifests itself through their destruction.

The distinction between substance and accidents leads to a polarization in which substance is the indifferent in-itself of history over against the plurality of events and finite historical forms. However, substance is identical with this actuality and with the dual process of alteration and reflection-into-self. As this process, substance is the actual dynamic or activity of history, substance-as-power.

In terms of the fatalistic world, history becomes actual in this world because it is reflected into itself. However, as a contingent phase of history, the current world is only fate as a self-external actuality that has always operated in time. It is not that fate is an inner power over events, but that the process in which old structures disappear and new structures appear is history or fate itself. The current configuration posits itself explicitly as the identity of this process in its self-externality.

Despite this, substance is posited by substance-as-power as the inner of the accidents, so that history is posited as having substantial power as its inner being. The temporal phases of history are not posited as being merely temporal and ephemeral. They are also posited as the actuality of a historical process.

The historically conscious world therefore partially resolves its fatalism by identifying itself with its inner being, which is, substantial power. The state of this world, therefore, is a series of external institutions that are explicitly historicized, meaning that they are both instituted and will eventually be destroyed, but which finds itself given meaning by being the point of exploitation of the process of creation and destruction. Furthermore, this is not merely a temporal process, but is a historical process, which means that creation and destruction occur through the reflection of the current period on its immediate conditions. The transition from substantiality to causality is thus the transition from a fatalistic to a progressive world historical consciousness.

13.3 Causality
The relation of causality develops out of substantiality because the final stage of substantiality has the accidents being produced by
substance-as-power but also being the actuality of substance-as-power, which is their inner being. This can be re-described as the relation between an effect and its cause. Effect is an immediate actuality which is produced by a prior, original activity, cause, but which is also the actual being of this activity.

13.3.1. Formal Causality

Hegel's treatment of formal causality has two major elements: the formal conceptualization of the relation of causality, and the transformation of this relation into an external relation. Taking the first point, cause and effect are not as yet two determinate beings or events. Rather, cause is the self-actualizing origin of outward actuality, effect. In order to understand Hegel's approach to causality fully, it is helpful to retrieve some etymological connections that are lost in Miller's translation. Firstly, the term "effect" [Wirkung] belongs together with "actuality" [Wirklichkeit] and "acting" [Wirken]. Secondly, the term "cause" [Ursache] resonates with the term "original" [ursprüngliche]. Cause is thus the origin of the activity and of its effect.

Hegel explains the relation of cause and effect in terms of self-determining substance. Firstly, the determinant, the subject of the action, is already the determined. That is, substance-as-power presupposes itself as the subject of the action, and then posits itself as this presupposed subject. Further, to make itself the subject of the action is also to be the object of the determining. Finally, the determining substance returns into itself in positing itself because it sublates its presupposing of its self. This is the transition from presupposition to originality. This is similar to the ground relation because the distinction of the determining into subject and object is the posited effect, whereas the determining itself is the positing cause. However, it is also similar to force-expression, because cause has its actuality in its effect.

The second phase of formal causality is the conversion of the identity of cause and effect into an external relation. The concept of necessity, as we saw in the previous chapter, is the inner identity of the external terms. Similarly, the activity of the cause is a movement towards self-identity by negating its self-externality (self-presupposition) in the effect, but this return to itself is the separation of cause and effect and thus the becoming of the effect (559, II 398). The necessity of the cause is its inwardness, and this both completes itself by becoming actual and exhausts itself in the effect. Cause that has ceased to act is extinguished, and effect that is no longer effected is immediate actuality (559, II 398). Consequently, the causal relation is an external reflection attaching to an immediate, manifold actuality. This forms a transition to the more familiar form of causality as a determinate relation (560, II 398).
13.3.1.1. Application to History

In the previous application, we saw that the relation of substantiality is ultimately the identification of the formerly fatalistic world with history as a dynamic. It is a transition from fatalism to progressivism. This means that the world's institutions take themselves to be transitory forms on a path of self-improvement, since substantial power is the world's own immanent reflection upon itself.

This world determines itself as essentially self-determining substance. The self that the world determines and the self that world presupposes are the same self, and the presupposing and determining are the same act. The world first presupposes itself as a causal agent, and thus attributes its cause to a prior grounding moment. However, it also recognizes that giving itself this past-related historical structure is its own act. It therefore sublates the prior grounding moment as a presupposing. In doing so, it establishes itself as an original moment. But it is only an original moment in relation to its completed activity, or effect. The dynamic of history is thus not a subterranean current underlying surface effects.

The necessity of historical causality in the formal sense is the compulsion of the world to actualize itself. The world has the meaning of being a causal origin, but only exists in its effect. Consequently, the world is not related to a prior grounding moment, because it sublates this relation as its own self-determination. The world thus becomes self-identical in its effect, but this is also the negation of its self-opposition as a causal relation. As with the existent thing-in-itself, the world in this phase is self-confident as the self-identity of self-determining substance in its actuality, but this means that the historical causal process is posited as merely external or merely internal.

13.3.2. Determinate Causality

The externality of causality, for Hegel, is not an external reflection in the sense of being a reflective determination on the part of an observer. Instead, Hegel sees that the conception of causality as an energetic state of disequilibrium that is transmitted from one substance to another can be explained in terms of external reflection. The idea of causal substance is central to this conception. Hegel uses the dual self-identity and self-extinction of the cause in its effect as the drive for causal necessity in a causal substance. Causal substance is necessitated because it strives to neutralize its own causality, but in so doing it becomes causal. The consequence of this will be an opposition of active and passive substances.

Hegel argues that the external reflection of the causal relation involves the self-subsistent product of the causal relation in an inner-outer relation. The sublation of causality in its effect is "finite substance" (560, II
It can only be this, however, as the content identity of a formal difference. As the identity of the form, it contains the form difference, but only as a secondary external content, as in the real ground relation (563, II 401). This second content is an immediate manifold, which is, a togetherness of external parts. Finite substance is itself broken up into cause and effect by the presence of the formally different second content in it. This is causal substance, because its self-identity is the negation of causality in its identity in the effect (the essential first content) (563, II 402).

Causal substance acts against causality that appears externally in it and returns to identity as effect. However, as we have seen, this is also the externalization of formal causality, and thus the positing of causality in another substrate. However, what we are dealing with here is causality operating globally. Consequently, causal substance acts upon itself (566, II 404). The causal substance acts to remove its general positedness, but its effect is not merely a return to self-identity, but a return to self-identity in self-opposition.

The consequence of this permanent self-externality is that causal substance presupposes its own identity as quiescent causality. This quiescent identity is the effect of the causal substance, but the effect is also the re-positing of causality in the substance and thus the presupposing of the identity. This self-externality has the form of the presupposition of self-identity as an externality. Secondly, causal substance receives the active causality from outside itself. Thus it is also a presupposed condition of causality (566, II 404). Therefore, the act of causality is to presuppose itself as a quiescent material and condition (566, II 404). Active causality thus presupposes itself as a passive substantial identity.

13.3.2.1. Application to History

The world as a substrate is both the immediate starting point of historical change and the product of this change. Yet as the exhaustion of the change, it is also in the historical series as an identity defined in opposition to historical causality, and thus standing in relation to it. That is, causality presupposes itself in history as the material condition of history.

The historical dynamic is powered by the restless alternation caused by causality finding its identity in its effect, but also externalizing itself in the effect. The current world configuration identifies itself with the historical process. This substantial identity is finite substance, which is an enduring world configuration posited as the substance of process, but equally the process itself is set outside as external events. Next, however, these external events are reflected as the process having its identity in the finite substance. The world, which is in itself the historical process, also
has differentiated events, determined as cause and effect, posited in it. The world is thus inwardly a resolution of history into a historical constant, and outwardly the play of history that begins from and ends with the historical constant.

However, this is no longer merely an enduring of the historically constant world through history. Rather, it is the external eruption of a cause-effect disequilibrium that returns into the historical constant. Further, this cause-effect eruption is precisely the standing out of causality from its extinction and identity in the historically constant world. As we have seen, this happens first through the externalization of the world as a manifold of different events. The historically constant world breaks apart into a series of events that terminate in the historically constant world. The historically constant world is simultaneously the enduring element of history and the projected end of history. As such, it is a constant actuality that stands over against its actual rupture into causally related events. This means that the historically constant world does not simply endure, but perpetually reproduces itself both against and through events. The world configuration, therefore, is distinguished into a constant self that is maintained, and a second level of actuality that is its maintaining. This distinction occurs at the level of the self-reflection of the world into meaningful elements.

Furthermore, this reproduction of itself is simultaneously the setting aside of the process of reproduction as an external history. The causality embodied in external events is negated as an externality because the historical constant returns to itself. The historical constant’s movement through history is therefore negated. However, the sequence of events also perpetually recommences, because the negation of causality is the self-externalization of the active, causal side of causality, and thus the eruption of external events.

The presupposed starting point is established in the laying out of history itself. The quiescence of history in its historical constant is simultaneously the externalization of this historical constant from history as a condition and starting point. Causality is both a quiescent causality and a causality that brings itself into being as its own condition. History is thus also a historical subject or constant and a historical reflective activity that brings this subject into being by moving away from it. The meaning of the current world configuration is thus to be the substance and subject of history, but in the form of an immediate configuration that is brought into being as its identity through its own act. This self-opposition appears as a substantial distinction between history as a reflective, self-presupposing act and history as the presupposed identity and condition of this act.
13.3.3. Effect and Countereffect

The relation of effect and countereffect is a relation of two asymmetrical substances, an active [wirkende] substance, and a passive substance. Passive substance is both the quiescent identity of causality and the presupposed condition (566, II 404). Active substance is what was previously the causal phase of substance. Because this phase restores itself through its effect, it has become a distinct substance that “mediates itself with itself through its negation” (566, II 405).

From the side of active substance, active substance is a cause that eliminates its internal distinction into cause and effect (567, II 405). The elimination of the causal difference is a return of active substance into itself in its effect, which is passive substance (567, II 405). However, this is also a determining of the passive substance as effect, and the introduction of positedness into the passive substance. Consequently, active substance has an effect in the passive substance (567, II 405).

From the side of the passive substance: passive substance is first a presupposed other substrate, and second, it is the in-itself of active substance (567, II 405). Consequently, the activity of the other substance upon it is both the negation of the substantial otherness of the passive substance and the preservation of this otherness. Hegel terms this contradictory activity “violence” [Gewalt] (567, II 405). However, what the violence is in truth is causality externalizing itself. Passive substance is the self-positing of causal substance as other, and the act of substance upon it is the extinction of this otherness through the positing of the posited condition as a positedness. Passive substance is preserved as a self-identical positedness (567, II 406).

We saw above that the sublation of the presupposed condition for substance is the positing of the original substance (568, II 406). Passive substance is therefore now original, causal substance. Passive substance is presupposed identity posited as a posit of the activity of causal substance. Consequently, passive substance is original substance that posits itself as a positedness.

Hegel describes the activation of passive substance as the countereffect to the effect of active substance upon it (568, II 406). The sublation of the effect is simultaneously the sublation of the active substance. Active substance first sublates itself in its extinction in the effect, but further, its effect is sublated through the countereffect of the hitherto passive substance (568, II 406).

On one hand, therefore, the substantial difference of the two sides has been converted into an illusory moment of the self-related action of causality. On the other hand, active and passive substance are phases in
this circular movement. Consequently, "the action [Wirken]...is bent round and becomes an action that returns into itself, an infinite reciprocal action [Wechselwirken]" (567, II 407).

13.3.3.1. Application to History

Historical substance is the world with the meaning of a total system over the globe, enduring through history. However, the world is not merely an enduring identity, but is only such through its constant reproduction as the immediate identity of global historical action, or the development of its configurations. The dialectical side of these developments is the self-negating relation of world history to itself as its own immediate identity. This dialectical self-relation is firstly the perpetual arrival of historical action at its immediate identity in the world. Secondly, it is the manifestation of power over itself through the implantation of historical activity in the world. That is, the world as an immediate identity has the meaning of the quiescence of history, but historical activity activates the world into causal substance. The world is therefore outwardly, as causal substance or historical agency, what it is in itself, causality or history. As such, the world has become self-identical in its self-exteriority.

The world sublates the externality of historical activity, and thereby becomes historical agency through its counter-effect to the active substance, which is external historical activity. The externalized historical activity has an effect in passive substance by simultaneously positing the world first as the immediate identity of history, and second as historical agency. However, this effect removes the externality of historical activity. Furthermore, the world, now the historical agent, sublates the external historical activity upon it by converting this externality into its own relation to itself. The world, as a reactive substance, thus takes external historical activity as its own material to work on. The world as reactive substance thus separates itself into a passive substance and an activity upon this passive substance, but this passive substance is merely the termination of this separation and the countereffect is the simultaneous re-emergence of the difference of the world from itself as substance and activity.

On one hand, therefore, the world is circular action that reproduces itself as the agent of world history by externalizing itself. On the other hand, it is only this agent by mediating itself through its negation, which means positing itself as a condition, and then sublating this condition. It is thus both a single self-related reciprocal action, and the reciprocal effecting of two substantial phases.
13.4 Reciprocity

At the end of the last section we had apparently reached the idea of self-mediating causality in the idea of reciprocal action [Wechselwirken]. This section, however, starts instead with reciprocal effect, [Wechselwirkung] that, Hegel states, is still "a mutual causality of presupposed, self-conditioning substances" (569, II 407). Further, Hegel claims that reciprocal effect is an empty mode which simply needs to be externally pulled together (569, II 407-408).

Reciprocal effect is reciprocal action in an immediate, self-external form, but as such already has the resources to enact the final conversion of itself into reciprocal action. Reciprocal action first externalizes its movement as an asymmetry of active and passive substance, and thus as a reciprocal effect.

However, reciprocal effect and reciprocal action are identical because reciprocal effect, the passive side, is equally the active side. First, causality is now a relation between substances, because the condition of causal substance is another substance that is acted upon (570, II 408). Second, the action comes from a causation that is mediated by its condition in the effect. The consequence of this is that cause is both conditioned and stands as condition to itself. As the condition, it is passive substance, but it is also passive substance as the conditioned. As a result, reciprocal effect is a conditioning of causality, and so, is its passivity and negation.

Further, reciprocal effect is "only causality itself; cause not only has an effect, but in the effect it stands, as cause, in relation to itself" (570, II 408). Self-determining substance established cause as the negativity of the determining over against the effect, with which it was also identical. Here we have the same model again. The difference between the earlier form of substantiality and this later form of reciprocal effect, however, is that in the latter, each side mediates itself with itself through its negation. On one hand, reciprocal action acts by becoming effect, conditioning itself, and thereby being act, while on the other hand, reciprocal effect is set out and acted upon, but as such is also original, and sets itself in action against itself. Finally, these self-mediations are both the vanishing of the substantial difference through mediation. These two sides are no longer substances, because the effect side is now equally a self-mediation via activity. Consequently, causality is fully realized in reciprocal effect.

Despite this, the previously active and passive substances retain a difference because each requires mediation, and therefore sets itself out in formal terms as an opposition. There are therefore two mirrored ways for causality to set itself out: either as reciprocal effect or reciprocal action.
However, these alternative totalities are both explicitly a sublation of this differentiation and identity with the other.

Hegel draws three consequences from this development. First, "Causality has hereby returned to its absolute notion" (570, II 408). Second, "In reciprocity...necessity and causality have vanished" (570, II 408). This is because necessity is determined as the inner identity of external contingency. Once external contingency has become reciprocal effect, the inner identity is fully manifested, and thus no longer inner. Necessity and contingency thereby both convert over into freedom.

Freedom is thus a relation between two different totalities, both of which define themselves through an internal differentiation which includes the other, but which also posits the reduction of this difference and the return to identity of both sides, but this identity is equally the difference of the totalities.

This is Hegel’s third conclusion, that not only has causality reached and been extinguished in its notion, but that it has passed over into notion itself (570, II 408). Notion is the way of formulating the complex relation of identity and difference that we have reached.

Absolute substance differentiates itself, therefore, on one hand into the hitherto passive substance, and on the other into hitherto active substance (571, II 409). The first side is the side of the simple identity of causality and reciprocal effect, in which they are posited as identical. This identity is a self-production mediated via its other, which is causality, but an other that is posited as identical. This side, states Hegel, is the universal (571, II 409).

The second side was formerly active causality. Causality finds itself in its other, reciprocal effect, and is othered by its extinction and identity in this other, but equally becomes itself in its other, because reciprocal effect is equally a reactive side. Causality is thus reflected into itself as volatile, self-related negativity that reflects into itself by negating its identity. However, this negative self-identity is equally the identity of the difference, and thus the whole. This is the individual (571, II 409).

Further, these two sides are in and of themselves identical with each other. This is because the universal is the sublation of its determinateness, thus the identity of the difference, and thus the individual. Conversely, the individual, because it is the simple identity that reflects itself out of difference, is the universal (571, II 409).
Hegel terms this moment of identity, "particularity" (571, II 409). Each is identical with the other by sublating the difference and letting the other go free, but there are thus two radically external totalities which are also identical. Particularity is this identity in radical externality.

At this point, the logic of the concept begins and the logic of essence is closed. The moment of closure for the logic of essence is that reflection has found itself adequately echoed in its determination. The individual, the negative self-identity of reflection, thus finds itself in the universal, the self-identical positedness.

13.4.1. Application to History

In the previous section, the world determined itself as the agent of world history, acting upon itself. The world reabsorbs its external historical activity, which is both a countereffect and an effect. It is both because, as countereffect, the world returns to identity by reducing the effect upon it to its own conditioning of itself, but as effect, the world posits the action upon it as a condition and differentiates itself from this condition. There are thus two worlds, each positing the other as a presupposition and working on it, and in so doing, preserving the other as an other reactive substance.

It is tempting to think the foregoing as a reciprocity of mutually defining warring nations. However, these are finite entities that cannot support the dialectic. In order to support the dialectic, we need global entities that have explicit meanings as activities that terminate in the other, and moreover, as activities that cancel the otherness of the other, but in so doing posit the other as causal substance. This can only be thought as a reciprocity of history and world, where world is initially the totality of institutions and technologies, and history is human activity arising from this organization of human life. The reciprocity between the two is firstly the separation of human activity from the world. Human activity is a negative relation to its immediacy, and thus firstly the establishment of the existing order as a presupposed condition. Secondly, human activity acts against its own separation from its being by acting against its self-separation. This takes the form of work, or violence, upon the world to convert it into a self-adequate form. That is, human activity converts the world into a negatively self-related world by introducing the causal difference of the world from human activity into it. This means that the world becomes an active world that takes human activity as its condition and works upon it. That is, the world works to eliminate the otherness of human activity. It is thus a world of active systems that produces the forms of human activity as its own activity. At the same time, it produces human activity as its condition, and thus preserves human activity as an other to be systematized. The result is that human
activity and the world are mutually defining and producing historical substances.

This reciprocal effect is the effect phase of reciprocal action. Being the effect phase of reciprocal action is posited in the world, so that the world has two moments, itself, reciprocal effect and human activity, reciprocal action, and these convert immediately into each other. The world is now a totality of opposed moments, itself and its difference from itself. On the other hand, reciprocal action is human activity as a difference that is self-identical.

Let us look at the effect of this development on the movement from necessity to freedom. The world as reciprocal effect was still a world of necessity and violence because human activity takes the given order of the world as a constraining condition to be fought against, and conversely, the given order takes human activity as a cancerous excess to be neutralized and ordered. This world of necessity arises because neither side is capable of making the inner identity of human activity and world explicit in the other. The reflection of this action as reciprocal effect converts necessity and contingency into freedom. The world is posited as a cycle of moments where external activity is itself the totality that the world is, and the world’s difference from this activity vanishes. Consequently, the world recognizes its other in human activity as itself, and conversely, for human activity, externalization in the world is its own action.

Firstly, the substance and agent of history, the world, is self-determining by setting itself out through human historical activity. Secondly, within history, the sides are no longer constrained by each other. Human activity finds itself at home in the world that it has brought into being. Conversely, the activated world finds human activity as its own self-creative activity. Hegel states that causality attains to its concept, and attains the concept of concept itself. History reaches the concept of history itself, and the end of history. This is because history has been a relation between a reflection that lays out the moments of history against an identity that occurs as one of those moments, but which fails to gather the moments in as a totality.

In concept, the identity of history with its reflective exposition has been achieved. The end of history is a self-reflective world that knows that action against itself is its own self-creation. The world therefore has no past, because its past is its own work, including the presupposition of itself. It also has no future, because it has already attained itself, and therefore is not disposed towards the future as an ought. Equally we could say that the future is absolutely open, because the world is not compelled towards anything. Concept is the closure of history in the sense of being a resolution of the external difference of world and human
activity. However, it is also only this closure as the perpetual regeneration of negative activity. The cyclical form of this activity is described in the outline of concept. This closure is logical, unlike Fukuyama’s “End of History” which merely satisfies humans essentialistically characterized as “thymotic” (165).

Firstly, as we have seen, the world is the totality that finds itself in its other of human activity. The world thus determines itself by negating itself, becomes an other, and remains itself in this other. This universal is thus a dynamic motion of differentiation and return to simple totality. In concrete terms, the world as a continuous system of dynamic processes produces an activity that works on these processes, and then finds this activity as its own production of itself. This other is human activity or history as individual. The individual is the power of history itself, differentiating itself from its own immediate being and forming a historical difference of cause and effect, but then resolving this difference by finding itself reflected in its effect. Historical individuality is thus historical activity reflected into itself through its effect.

On one hand, the world, being the simple totality that identifies itself with its other, is the identity of the difference. On the other hand, the individual, as the negative self-relation identical with itself, is also difference reflected into itself. The individuality and universality of world history are thus identical, but only identical by differentiating as opposites. The universal is world history as a constant process of self-creation. At one level it is externalized in time, but it recapitulates time as history by presupposing itself as original substance. Against this, world history as individual is the negative relation of substantial world history to itself, and thus is its constant self-creative activity.

13.5 Conclusion

The problem of this chapter was that history had the form of an absolute relation, which meant that it had the form of two alternate totalities that were incapable of realizing their inner identity. In the relation of substantiality, we saw history as the substantial identity of events and evenemental features, and appearing as a fatalistic world. However, this fatalistic world became a progressive world through the incorporation of substantial power as the inner of events. This gives us history as formal causality. In this world, the contingent features of the world take themselves to be ephemeral phases in the path to self-improvement. In determinate causality, causality is turned inside out, so that it appears as a causal flux over against an enduring historically constant actuality. As a relation of effect and countereffect, history is an antagonistic relation between its substantial identity in the world, and its activity. The fundamental identity of history as a process is expressed outwardly as mutual violence done by its two sides.
Lastly, in reciprocity, the side of substantial identity, the world, and the side of activity or negativity, history, find themselves in their other. This is expressed in the mutual interrelation of world history as universal and individual. World history differentiates itself into its universality and its individuality, and the individuality works upon the universality. Yet the universal only becomes itself again through this work, which is its own work. Consequently, world history is a free activity that works upon itself.
14. REFLECTION AND HISTORY

14.1 Overview

Over the previous chapters, I have developed a series of historical forms based on the logic of reflection. This chapter outlines the story of this development. I have interpreted Hegel’s logic of self-referential reflection as a logic of the historical individual. This interpretation or application implies an identity and a difference between the logic in pure thought and the logic as applied to history.

The identity between the logic and its application is the common dialectical structure. When Hegel discusses, for example, the logic of whole and parts, the logic is self-referential: the whole is whole-and-parts, the parts are the whole on one hand and the parts on the other. The dialectical development of the Logic rests upon self-referentiality. Consequently, the application of the Logic to history requires us to describe a historical entity that is self-referential.

The difference between the Logic and its application to history rests on two main characteristics: Firstly, the fundamental relations of historicity implicit in Logic are made explicit in the application to history. Secondly, the application describes how history embodies self-referential logic. The historical entity must be able to reflect upon itself, and its reflection on itself must alter its own constitution. This is possible because 1) elements of a culture are constituted by social meanings, 2) social meanings are changed through social processes of reflection and 3) social processes of reflection are elements of a culture.

The suggestion, therefore, is that a historical entity enacts the logic of reflection when the social processes of reflection attempt to grasp the whole of society, including the society’s reflection upon itself. This enactment of the logic of reflection sets a dialectical development of the society in motion. Furthermore, the fundamental structures of history itself, the relations of historicity, are produced by this dialectical development.

The term “individuality” applies properly to the product of this reflection, since the drive towards self-inclusion means that the historical entity attempts to grasp itself as self-subsistent. This individuality is historical because 1) it is the logic of a society and 2) because it generates relations of historicity.

The purpose of this summary chapter is twofold. Firstly, it brings together the foregoing ‘applications’ into a single history. Secondly, it
brings out the manner in which the relation of reciprocity concludes the problem of historical individuality.

14.2 The Forms of History

The forms of history separate into three main sections: having a past, being in the present, and being driven towards the future. The first of these sections concerns the thematization of social reflection for itself. It culminates in social reflection fully thematizing and suspending itself in its own being, social existence. The second section concerns the relation between the being of social reflection as a permanent identity and its outward mediation in history as a self-opposition. This section brings out the dual totalities of differentiated existence and intro-reflected negativity. It culminates in the mutual mediation of these totalities into a single identity, the absolute. The third section concerns human reality as a historical dynamism. Again, the problem is to relate the negativity of dynamism with its being. The conclusion is that human reality has the form of a concept.

14.2.1. Reflection: Having a Past

In this section, the problem is broached that society as a reflective process is negatively related to itself. It thus thematizes and develops its own self-determining reflective activity. When it determines itself, it must determine itself as the negative of itself. The conclusion of this is the positing of the being of the reflective activity as existence.

14.2.1.1. Essence as Such: A Prologue

The prologue to the story of self-reflective society is the chapter on essence as such. In that chapter we learn that essence is a structure of historicity—the pastness of being. So we know firstly that society has a being by reflecting on the passage of finite events. Secondly, through the dialectic of pure reflection, we learn that reflection becomes a determining reflection, which means that the past moment of being is the being of reflection. However, this past moment is illusory being reflected into itself, and this reflection into itself is the determining reflection.

The relevance of this for our story is that society is firstly the pastness of finite events, but we learn more about what this involves because society itself has a being as an event, and reflects upon its own being. This story is dialectical because it concerns the moments when society relates to itself.

Initially, this means that present society is only the memory of a past self. However, the final outcome is that society grasps that the self that it both recalls and negates as a past moment is a posited being, which means, a being essentially turned against itself, and therefore already containing the dynamic resources for self-reflection. Further, the historical
structure of reflection is merely the reflection of this society itself. The final moment, therefore, is for the historical reflection of society to complete itself by identifying with itself.

14.2.1.2. The Essentialities: Society Identifies with Itself

The forms of the self-identifying society are not merely a series of hypotheses about its nature. Rather, they are reconfigurations of itself. What we have examined is the history of an abstract society as it develops its own historical being. This is a dialectical history because the development occurs through the society's reflection upon itself. As I stated above, this is only a possible history if the society is capable of being a determining reflection. What this means is that the society must have 1) processes of reflection, 2) a determinable substance, which is a culture and 3) that these two are identical.

Society identifying with itself is the basic position for this development. At first, society identifies itself as identity. This means that society caps off the fact that it has processes of reflection and a determinable culture with the reflection of identity. This is a basic historical configuration, because the society has its whole structure as a determination, and thus as a past moment which it identifies with itself, and which self-identification is part of the determination.

This forms the basic historical matrix for the history of this society, allowing the society to identify itself with finite aspects of its past being. The category of identity allows a people, for example, to have certain cultural peculiarities as its own.

The second stage of this self-identification, as we have seen, is difference. This is a new configuration in which the negative relation between society as self-determining and society as determination is included in society's configuration. Society is now explicitly configured as a relation to itself as a past moment.

The historical forms of self-recollecting society are brought to a close when the society identifies itself with itself as an opposition to itself as the positive or negative, but this identity with its past determination is precisely what it excludes from itself. Conversely, society succeeds in capturing itself, but only as the absolute negativity of contradiction. Consequently, the historicity of society shifts. As a society that identifies with itself, the past is a determination, but one that is the being of society. As the echo society, on the other hand, the determination is the society's present being, but only as a determination left behind by its own original activity.
14.2.1.3. Ground: The Echo Society

The society that identifies with itself, as we saw, was an immanent development of historical forms. The echo society continues this development, except that the structure of reflection has been re-designed. Society posits itself by negating its immediate identity, but also negates this secondary self-identification of itself with its differentiated structure and thus re-establishes the identity as an original identity. Present society is the echo of an original activity that has passed it by.

The reflection operates by differentiating society from its original unity and at the same time negating the self-subsistence of this differentiation. The negation of the differentiation does not simply collapse the differentiated configuration into identity. Rather, the negation is what gives the echo society its determinate historical form as a posited relation to a past original unity.

As we saw, this mode of historicity, which Hegel calls "form", attempts to free its original being from the structure of the historical form. Three main phases of historicity derive from this attempt: the form relation, the determinate ground relation, and the conditioning relation. The main consequences of the protracted struggle of the echo society to presuppose itself outside of the inessential historical structure are these: 1) the being of society is set outside itself as a sheer event, 2) the historical structure of society becomes self-subsistent and spontaneous and 3) the opposition between society as an immediate event and society as a determinate historical structure is sublated into an essential unity.

The starting position for the echo society is the negation of itself as a determinate present being in favour of itself as a grounding unity always prior to itself. The development of this society gradually transfers the whole grounding relation into the historical structure, while leaving simple, immediate being as the presupposed identity. Ultimately, even this presupposing reflection is gathered into the historical structure. The echo society reconfigures itself to include, and therefore negate, its presupposing. The consequence of this is that the echo society sublates its own self-differentiation into a later historical structure and a prior immediate event.

The self-subsistent society is society freed from its past. It has a past, in being mediated through the development of the echo society, but equally this development sublates itself. That is, the development of the echo society proves that the immediate being of society is the immediate being of its self-differentiating reflection. The historical relation to a past is sublated, because what is added to society is that the historical relation itself is its own determination. The development of the echo society is therefore first the becoming of the society free from its past. Second, it is
the realization of the potential society free from its past. But finally, this developmental history has taught society that the historical structure of self-preservation is its own self-reflection, and consequently, the whole historical development is an illusory development.

14.2.2. Appearance: Being in the Present

In this section, the relation between the existence of reflection as society and its determining negativity is explored. This leads to a distinction between external and inner existence. This distinction is self-sublating, however, and consequently these immediate existences are turned into posited existences. The effect of this is to posit social reflection as a mediating relation between its inner and outer existence. This relation develops into totality, but as two totalities, because it is a relation between two extremes of existence, and thus is, as an existence, either of the extremes. Finally, these extremes prove themselves to be absolutely identical.

14.2.2.1. Existence: Society Free from its Past

The chief importance of the chapter on existence is that the historically reflective entity, which is a people or society, identifies itself as a simple being that transcends historical and temporal relations. Firstly it is a thing, which is a history-transcendent essence or people-as-hero. Secondly, it is the property, which is the epoch as the totality of historical relations. Thirdly it is a material or stuff, which is the basic material substrate or territory. The outcome of this chapter is that people, epoch and territory are all defined within a total mutual reflection, and thus are all phenomena. This conclusion eliminates the illusion of an essential historical identity that transcends historical relations.

The story of the chapter proceeds in this way: The society free from its past is society configured as an individual that is identical with the spontaneous unfolding of itself as a history, and as a spatio-temporal externality. Nonetheless, society is firstly a historical thing because society’s reflection is the externalization of reflection itself, and this externalization of reflection is a reflective act. Consequently, the unity of society as the enduring substance of time and history enters into time and history as an essential thing which is indifferent to temporal and historical relations. This is the people-as-hero.

This entry of society as a thing into history is the basic step towards a pluralistic view of history, and thus towards the idea of world history rather than national history. This is because the people-as-hero is opposed to its own external reflection, which appears as another people opposed to the first, the antagonist people. Soon there are a multiplicity of peoples, constituting history through their interaction. The multiplicity of peoples collapses into a plurality of monads, as each society becomes the reflection
of the whole into itself. However, this is again the externalization of the differentiating reflection. The whole epoch, as the totality of interactions between its plural centres is "property". Property is firstly the external totality. However, the historical totality is what distinguishes the peoples. Aside from the historical manifold, they are identical. The peoples are therefore not the essential things of historical reflection. Instead, they are inessential points within the totality.

This is an important point in the story, because the society or people ceases to be the hero. Instead, the reflection as embodied in the epoch is the essential thing. This transition into plurality is a development, not a discovery. Society in the previous chapters has not been a society with borders, but rather society as such. The reflection of the things is thus the process of people formation from general society. It is quickly, however, also the passage of peoples into inessentiality over against the total epoch.

The epoch, which means, the totality of temporal and historical relations between peoples over a region, is therefore configured as the concrete subsistence of the peoples. However, the total epoch itself is made up of continuities between the peoples. These continuities are stuffs. As we saw, this means that each society configures itself as a thing, but as an inessential thing made up of stuffs. The stuffs have become the imperishable element in the historical totality. However, the stuffs that make up the historical totality through their various combinations are only part of the total reflection. The totality itself is the point of intersection for the stuffs by which they become determinate. The existent identity of the historically reflective identity thus ultimately falls upon an individual. This individual is firstly a thing, as the also and the point of the stuffs, secondly an epoch as the enduring surface put into play by the stuffs, and thirdly a stuff itself. However, this essential identity of the historical world is only such as something contradictory. The historically reflected totality is thus a world whose essential identity is defined by its essencelessness.

14.2.2.2. Appearance: Reflective Surfaces
The previous chapters have worked at the essential identity of the historically reflective entity. The candidates have been its determinate essence or essentiality, its ground, its condition, and then three varieties of existent: thing, property, and stuff, or people, epoch and territory. All of these ways of thinking identity have been reduced to self-contradictory posits of the reflective activity itself. The logic of appearance is the positing of the individuality of the historical reflection as the identity of the phenomenal with itself, rather than as a transcendent identity, or essence.
The world of appearance has two sides, as we saw. It is a historical flux, and it is the identity of this flux. The former is the result of the self-referentiality of society conceived as a porous stuff or territory: it feeds its self-conception back into itself as part of its determination, but this also negates its determination and changes it into something else. Law is the reflection by changeable society that it remains identical in this dialectical principle. Social reflection thereby gives itself a law as its identity.

The chapter on appearance works out the relation between this inner law and its outward manifestation as a world in appearance. Firstly, law is a simple identity posited in the world as its essence. Law is the permanent element in the history of the social world. Secondly, being essentially negative, the law differentiates itself into a realm of laws. Social reflection therefore posits its identity as a series of laws that are the contingent formations of the social world reflected as simple differences. Thirdly, the realm of laws collapses into a unified law, and thus the totality of social reflection is a duality of a world in and of itself and a world in appearance. Lastly, social reflection splits into two incommensurable factions that both totalize the world. These concepts prefigure universality and individuality respectively. The two totalities are each subsistent, because they include the other. However, they are also non-subsistent because each is a side of itself over against the other.

14.2.2.3. Essential Relation: The World at War

The world in appearance was the world reflecting itself into itself as a world in and of itself. What is the nature of this intro-reflection? The temptation is to think of it as a mental reflection. Even if we think of the world in and of itself as the deep structure of the world in appearance, this still has the overtones of being an object of science, and thus of not being the product of the world’s own reflection.

Rather, at the dialectical level, society’s reflection upon itself, which I have termed “social reflection,” leads to a distinction in its substance, but also only exists as a distinction in social substance. The general paradox of essential relation is that the sides of the social totality are each the totality.

The first form of this paradoxical world is the whole-and-parts. The world as whole-and-parts balances the inward negativity of reflection with the existent totality of society which this reflection produces. It does this by being the identity of two forms of identity. The first form of identity is the determination of a part of society as the dynamic, negative, reflective element which is therefore also the whole of society because it generates the existent partition of society. The second form is a part of society determined as the moment of parts. This part identifies itself with the other part because both are parts. This social world is the essential relation of these two forms of the world in which the essential relation of
the two forms is merely a relation of immediate identity. Each continues itself into the other by equating itself with the other. On one hand, the whole is equal to the totality of the parts, and on the other, the parts are equal to the whole as part.

However, this is a contradiction in social reflection, since the two forms of reflection simply identify with themselves, and thus externalize the other. More critically, the self-identification of reflective society in its existent, differentiated form is blocked, since it only continues itself as a whole and thus not as parts, and vice versa. The society's determinations do not therefore allow the society to totalize itself as a concrete reflection.

Social reflection therefore reconfigures its relation to its social substance as the relation between a force that has its existence as a condition and an expression in existence that is only the expression of a force. The paradox of the form of force and expression is that the terms of the relation are mutually mediated. That is, the force is a determinate element in society only as a term in a particular configuration of social substance. Force is the developed version of the whole, and therefore is the dynamic unity faction, but only now as also participating in a social substance that is also its negation. This part of society thus has the reflection of the other faction in it, that it is the unity of itself and the other, but only as a term in a relation. However, the other social faction is simultaneously mediated by force, and therefore is equally the differentiated social substance, but only as the product of its own self-related negativity. Consequently, the dynamism of society posits the other faction through its own dynamism, but it also presupposes it as its other.

Society determines itself as a reciprocity of presupposing forces, which were previously the two opposed factions. Their identity is the mutual presupposition of the other as immediate identity. Society determines itself as a process of reflection turned against itself. Consequently, its outward determination, which posits itself as a self-partitioning society, is merely the reflection of what it is internally.

The culmination of the relation of force and expression is that social reflection produces a determinate configuration of society, as an opposition of forces, but that each of these forces has the same content, which is, self-negating reflection. The society therefore determines itself as an inner identity, the essence of the dialectical dynamic, that is identical with its outward form.

This identity of the inner and the outer takes three forms. Firstly, society is an outward existence of the inner dynamic, but only as a relation to an inner identity with which it is identical. Secondly, the dual determinations of society are external determinations over against a
common substrate. Society determined as self-identical is immediately a one-sided determination of society, and thus an outer. Conversely, society determined as outer is opposed to itself and contracts into an identity, but again, only a one-sided formal identity. Thirdly, the two foregoing kinds of identity are folded back onto the opposed factions as their own forms of totalization, and these forms are identified through their own movement. Inner-and-outer is thus an improvement on whole-and-parts because the two forms of totalization mediate themselves with the other, rather than identifying themselves immediately with the other.

The faction of the inner determines itself into its other by reflecting into itself as inner identity and thereby opposing itself to itself. Conversely, the faction of the outer returns into itself as outwardness by mediating both terms, the inner and the outer, thereby sublating the form difference and returning to the content identity of the faction of the inner. Form thereby returns into content, which establishes the totality of the faction of the inner, but equally each side is mediated by the other, which establishes the faction of the outer. Self-reflective society has therefore determined itself as self-reflective society. The determinate outward form of society therefore directly expresses its dialectical essence, which is to express itself.

14.2.3. Actuality: Driven into the Future

In the logic of appearance, the focus of the dialectic was social reflection as the essential inner existence of the social world. The logic of actuality, on the other hand, focusses on society as having an explicit self-directed negativity. The problem of actuality, therefore, is how reflective society embodies itself in an existent phase and mediates itself as a dynamic through this phase. The ultimate conclusion is the absolute embodiment of dynamism in existence.

The identity of dynamism and existence, which is the essential dialectical difference, appears both as universality and individuality. The former is the side of existence, the latter the side of dynamism. Through their reflection, individuality and universality convert into each other, and are thus both the totality, and also identify absolutely with each other. Dialectical history therefore ceases, since social reflection is absolutely identified with its object. This final form is therefore the culmination of history and the discovery of the absolute historical individual.

The three phases of the logic of essence: reflection, appearance and actuality, therefore emphasize in turn the past, present and future. The rest of the analysis therefore deals with actual society as a negation of itself and disposition towards the future.
14.2.3.1. The Absolute: The World at the End of History

The culmination of essential relation was a world system. This world system incorporates all opposition to itself because all opposition is simply its self-opposition, and therefore its self-expression. The world system is, by this means, absolute.

The absolute world system produces itself through self-differentiation, but equally it reduces this self-differentiation to a play, because it is identical with itself in this internal opposition. Furthermore, because the opposition of the absolute is an internal play, the present world in which the absolute world system posits itself as self-identical is also a posited, historical phase of the absolute world system. The absolute world system appears as the last in a historical series of forms.

This absolute world system, as the end of history, is both the totality of the previous forms, and the last in their series. As such it is the absolute externalized from itself and therefore identical with itself. History as a whole is the self-externalization of the absolute world system, and therefore this world is thematized as being identical with the previous forms of social system. The historical standpoint of the absolute world system that has determined itself as mode is that the absolute world system has developed itself through its successive forms.

14.2.3.2. Actuality: The World with a Future

The consequence of the dialectic of the absolute was to develop the social world as equal to itself as a reflective process. This identity with itself, or between its reflective character and its outward existence, is actuality.

The forms of actuality are composed of the dialectical relation between the existent totality of actuality and its identity. The forms developed by this dialectic are formal necessity, real necessity and absolute necessity. The last is the nature of the absolute relation.

In formal necessity, the actual world is a contingent world. However, contingency means that actuality is a duality of itself and its negative identity, possibility, but this future possibility is the same duality. Consequently, some contingent social world is necessary.

In the phase of real necessity, the really actual world system is determinate as the identity of itself and possibility. In other words, it has determined itself as a formally necessary contingency. Nonetheless, it is self-external necessity. The world system is determined as the real possibility of another actuality in which its difference from itself is overcome.
The alteration of the actual world system occurs because it is posited as being external to its identity and therefore as being essentially self-contradictory. The new phase of the actual world is therefore determined as the cancellation of the exteriority of the previous actuality from its identity, and of this inner identity, possibility, from its outward actuality. The new phase is therefore determined as the resolution of the previous external world.

The new actual world determines itself both in terms of history and in terms of temporality. It is external to the surpassed actuality, and also external in itself as a diverse existence. On the other hand, it resolves the externality of the previous actuality from its possibility, and has this resolution as a determination. It is therefore determined as both an existence and an essence.

The final form of actuality is absolute actuality and absolute necessity. The shift from real actuality is that real actuality is an externally reflected historical identity over against an external temporal manifold. By contrast, absolute actuality determines temporal and spatial existence as the self-externalization of historical identity. As we saw, the phase of real actuality makes the actual world system an intro-reflected event in a temporal series. In absolute actuality, the actual world system is an existence, but it posits this existence as its own self-externalizing mediation as an absolute system.

14.2.3.3. Absolute Relation: The World of Production

In this chapter, the problems of the historically reflective society in determining itself as the totality are finally brought to a close. Over the previous chapters we have seen that the problem is that of the difference of society from itself capturing itself as a determinate element of its existence. The solution that is required is that society as a process of reflection on itself should remain identical with itself in its existence. The problem to overcome is that reflection is necessarily a difference from itself.

The preceding chapters have brought out essential negativity and outward existence as the extremes of social reflection and then have attempted to express their identity. However, the problem is that the identity of the terms has to be a mediation of the terms, but one which simultaneously preserves the difference of the terms. The logical configuration that Hegel puts forward as the ultimate answer to this problem is the concept.

The relation of substantiality means, in historical terms, that the inner dynamism of society is only self-identical in a historical phase of society as an opposition of society to its identity. However, it proves that
the substantial power that is the inner nature of society requires embodiment in contingent phases of history and mediates itself as the historical dynamic through them.

Causality comprises three modes of the relation between the dialectical dynamism and its existent form. The dynamism only exists in act, or in its self-differentiation in the existent historical phase. This becomes a relation between pure dialectical activity and the concrete, self-reflective processes. These processes are determined by the historical dynamism, but equally, the historical dynamism is determined as an existent by the processes. It is therefore a reciprocity between the same social identity activating itself against itself and thus also determining itself as an existent opposition to itself.

The existence of the world is therefore the universal, which is, the continuation of the historical processes into the historical dynamic. The dynamism of the world, on the other hand, is the reflection into itself of the difference of the world from itself. However, as such, the individual is the same totality that the universal is.

The historical individual has hereby reached a self-adequate form. This means that the fundamental determination of the social world is as a world of processes of determination that relate to themselves and determine themselves, and that this process of self-determination is an essential historical dynamism.

14.3 Conclusion and Transition

The narrative given above has two aspects. On one hand, it is an account of the logical trajectory that comes about when the natural conditions for dialectical reflection occur. On the other hand, it is a generation of categories whose content itself is the question of how the category relates to the singular individual on one hand and to external actuality on the other. The conclusion in reciprocity is thus on one hand the end of a hypothetical logical sequence where the actuality has become adequate to itself. On the other hand, it is also a recapitulation of the whole trajectory as a series of finite forms.

The key question to be answered now is, what is the significance of this series for understanding concrete history? As we have seen, there is a final adequate form, but this final form also preserves the prior forms as its own necessary self-externalizations. Consequently, the series is as much a series of forms as a progression. Furthermore, this series lays out the categorical possibilities for history. That is, any historical totality, considered geographically or temporally, must rely on one of these forms to a) integrate a spatio-temporally external actuality into a totality and b)
to account for the oppositional relations between individuals and the totalities to which they belong.

As I stated in chapter three, Logic and philosophical history are distinct dialectics for two reasons. Firstly, historical dialectic is a retrieval of Idea from nature, and is therefore determined by the dialectical relation between finite spirit (particularity) and infinite spirit (totality). Secondly, the dispersal of Idea in nature and the persistence of nature means that spirit is permanently dispersed as embodied individuals, and therefore it has a special problematic of the relation of these naturally separated individuals to the totality. Two things follow that make a distinction between the foregoing hypothetical history and real philosophical history. Firstly, although we have to posit self-reflection in history to make a distinction between history and nature, this does not mean that a logical dialectic will occur. As we saw in chapter four, we have to posit the categories as an atemporal dialectic which is activated in time by particular conditions. Consequently, historical societies, being affected by contingency, are unlikely to follow the logical order, or to neatly distinguish the categories. Secondly, the set of conditions for the self-manifestation of the dialectic of world-history is more complex than the conditions for the history that we have described above. Principally, distribution in space means that society is always a society of individuals. Philosophical history will additionally have to account for the preservation and support of the human individuals even in their incorporation into the dialectical structure of society.

Finally, the foregoing analysis has brought to light several key categories. Firstly, the general concept of essence provides a structure of historical time. As we have seen, this structure is Erinnerung. Erinnerung is the fundamental structure of 1) the negative relation of a society to itself, 2) continuity between periods of history and 3) the relation between a society’s substantial actuality and its totalizing principle. In connection with this, the concept of Law is of huge importance for Hegel’s philosophical history. It functions as the manner in which the actuality of a world as an external set of materials, determined though their interaction and reflected into themselves, limits and ultimately concentrates the people into a point of totality. This for Hegel is the concept of a national principle. The notable development of the concept of Law is Force and expression. For Hegel, peoples cannot simply be thought of as law-governed totalities, but also as expressions of force. In connection with this, force and its opposition to external reality is manifested in the world-historical individual. However, the ultimate concept is causal reciprocity. Causal reciprocity both provides the idea of how a transition is made from finite to infinite spirit, and also explains the integration of human individuals into the substantial totality of the
people. The following section will analyze how these key concepts, among others, are integrated into philosophical history as a whole.
15. HEGEL'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

15.1 Introduction
In the previous section, an ideal history was outlined based upon Hegel's logic of essence. Specifically, the themes of historicity and the structure of an individual totality were emphasized. The previous section therefore laid out the logical resources for philosophical history. In this section, the attention of the thesis turns to real history.

The difference between ideal history and real history is that the latter is essentially exposed to the vagaries of externality in its development. Chief among these vagaries are that history is a conditioned ground and that there is a plurality of self-reflecting things. The distinction between ideal and real history therefore means: 1) that history is a building up of dialectical self-reflection out of external conditions, rather than simply through dialectical self-reflection; 2) that the development of the historical individual is constantly a tension between the totality and its components, and that its central problematic is freedom; and 3) that the philosophical historiographer needs to describe the progress of spirit by actually doing historical research, and the product will be a history, rather than a philosophical treatise on historical concepts.

Here, however, a philosophical history in Hegel's sense is not attempted. Instead, this section of the thesis is a consideration of the concepts of historical individuality in general that Hegel uncovers in the course of considering the project of a philosophical history, and in the course of executing this history.

15.2 The Status of An Introduction
However, is an introduction to philosophical history possible? Hegel's philosophy of history, in its main part, is dialectical. Just as we cannot properly abstract and define theory terms such as "sublation" from Science of Logic without misrepresenting them, so also the theory terms in Hegel's history are specifically anchored to moments in history. This is what makes it philosophical history. Is it possible, then, to talk about philosophical history in general without doing philosophical history?

Hegel seems to think so. The introduction to Lectures on Philosophy of History (hereafter called "Introduction") and the Philosophy of Right mainly deal with history from a general perspective. This is true in two ways for Philosophy of Right. Firstly, it deals with a dialectical history of the formation of the state from the family, but in general terms. Secondly, the section on World History deals generally
with nation-states, their requisitioning by World Spirit, and their demise. Hegel thereby implies that it is legitimate to discuss some historical individuals at a generic level. The question is whether history is itself an immanent rational process or whether it merely embodies a logical process. The treatment of world history in Philosophy of Right, in which the four worlds in Hegel’s history are four necessary stages in self-reflection, seems to imply that history’s development is in fact simply a logical development.

However, this conclusion would be a mistake. An examination of Hegel’s Philosophy of History shows on one hand that an outline of philosophical history is possible because human products below a historical threshold are characterized by natural repetition, and therefore display generic features, and on the other hand, that a schematic description of the course of history can be given because an immanent dialectic takes off in human society, the outline of which can be determined retrospectively.

Partly due to the desire to bring Hegel’s philosophical history into line with contemporary philosophy of history, and partly due to the attraction of its discursive, non-dialectical style, Introduction is the focus of much of the literature on Hegel’s history. For example, McCarney’s recent Hegel: On History joins the works of Wilkins and O’Brien as commentaries that attempt to delineate Hegel’s general theory of history on the basis of Introduction without examining the history itself for any other purpose than to provide examples. This is a mistake because it takes at face value the generalizations that Hegel makes about the course of history, its means and its materials without asking how such generalizations are possible.

15.3 A Note on Hegel’s Application of the Logic to History

Before proceeding with an examination of Hegel’s philosophy of history, it is important to briefly consider two questions concerning the relation between Logic and history. The first question is how philosophical history relates to Logic in epistemological terms. In answer, philosophical history is not merely a development of Logic. Hegel states that the historian must proceed empirically, (8-9, 21) and that the standpoint of the philosophical historian is to approach the historical material with the correct categories and make judgements (64, 86). Historians are likely to use two kinds of categories: categories picked up from everyday use, and categories adopted from theory. Science of Logic supplies the historian with categories. Hegel may make incorrect judgements, from lack of knowledge or bias, without thereby condemning the project as a whole.
The ontological question is how does the dialectic of the Logic relate to the dialectic of history? Spirit and nature are self-external Idea, which means, they are categorical totalities composed of self-external, contingently related parts. This contingency is external to the Logic but intrinsic to history. If we are to think of it as a philosophical narrative, therefore, we need an account of how conditions came together in such a way as to produce an immanent dialectic. In order to explain this appearance of dialectic, Hegel distinguishes between reason in history and its means. This distinction sounds anthropomorphic, but it means the distinction between the logical form of history and the mechanics of how it has that logical form. In fact, this is a distinction of ground and conditions. The emergence of history determines its externalities as its own conditions. My approach to Hegel’s philosophical history, therefore, is that it contends that history exhibits a dialectical development because the conditions of dialectical development are present.

15.4 The Argument of the Introduction

The key claim of Introduction is this: human history is the development of the consciousness of freedom (19, 31). The potential for freedom is a complex of different conditions, chief among which are human self-consciousness (17, 29) and the stabilization of human society into a state (61, 83).

This process has two modes of development, growth and rupture (29, 43-44). In the growth phase, an immediate political principle is developed into a concrete social formation. This social formation determines all aspects of culture, and is consequently a national spirit (53, 72). The rupture phase is the point where the political principle has exhausted itself and the social formation can be grasped in thought (77, 102). This allows a more universal, although undeveloped, political principle to emerge. This will develop into a new nation. The rational structure of history consists in this process of expansion and rupture. This process, consequently, is Spirit’s embracing of death that Hegel describes in Phenomenology (492 §808, 433-434).

Although this is the structure of history, the concrete process of change is not primarily intellectual. Instead, the period of growth occurs through the interplay between subjective desires and a normative background (28, 43). The points of rupture occur through the ambitions of well-positioned individuals (30, 45). Because the ruptures require a grasp of the weaknesses and relativity of the existing form of life, the new order must embody a more comprehensive principle. Consequently, political history is a process of social learning, and therefore is cumulatively more adequate to the potential which forms its ground principle, which is, the freedom of self-consciousness. Ultimately, this process results in a socio-political order that is adequate to the principle of freedom.
The commencement of this dialectic relies upon the natural accumulation of the conditions for dialectical self-development. The primary conditions are human self-consciousness on one hand, and a culture on the other hand. Secondly, this culture must have advanced to the position of statehood. History proper is therefore the history of states (61, 82). Human events outside the state are not history, because they are not part of dialectical self-development.

15.5 Conclusion

The philosophical historian's task is to look at the evidence. Most importantly, however, the philosophical historian must elaborate the concretely arising conceptual formations of history. As we have seen, pre-historical human activity is characterized by repetition, which allows us to talk in general terms about such things as human individuals, nations, and national principles. However, once history begins to develop itself, such general terms become abstract. As we will see in the next chapters, terms cease to be univocal in historical development, but become dialectically defined. Even the transitions involved in history are modified by history itself.

This means that an introduction to philosophical history, which is a general description of the nature of such a project and the manner in which it functions, comes up to a limit. However, we can also go beyond this limit in showing examples of how Hegel's philosophical history works in combining logical categories with actual history in order to show the nature of the project.
16. THE FORMS OF HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALITY: HUMANS

Historical individuality can be broken into four topics. An initial distinction can be made between the individuality of individual people and the individuality of social formations. Secondly, individual people can be distinguished into ordinary citizens and world-historical individuals. Thirdly, social formations can be divided into peoples and world-historical spirit. The four topics for examination are therefore: ordinary citizens, world-historical individuals, national spirits, and the spirit of the world.

Human individuals of two kinds are the topic of this chapter. I have mentioned in brief that Hegel distinguishes between periods of expansion and periods of rupture. This distinction corresponds to the distinction between the activity of humans in general, or ordinary citizens, and the activity of unusual individuals, who can claim the title of “world-historical individuals.”

16.1 Ordinary People

The interest of this dissertation in ordinary people is in determining their function in history. The correct starting point for understanding human individuals as a historical function is the question of why self-consciousness appears in history as a plurality of self-consciousnesses. From this perspective, the introduction to Philosophy of History can be read as a theory of how human individuality and society develop reciprocally. The following section will therefore be divided into three parts: the emergence of human individuals, the reciprocal determination of individuals and society, and the limits of the historical effectiveness of individuals.

16.1.1. The Emergence of Human Individuals

The pole of human individuality has two functions. Firstly, it is determined as absolute finitude (26, 40). Hegel derives the particularization of the universal into an indefinite multiplicity from this limitation. Secondly, individuality is “the formal will” that “desires that this I should be in everything that it intends and does” (26, 40). Human individuals emerge in history, as the result of the self-opposition of the Idea. It breaks apart into a general abundance and intro-reflected negativity, and this negativity takes the form of a multiplicity of particular wills (26, 40).

Hegel’s conception of the starting point of history is therefore structured by the diremption of the Idea into a multiplicity of human beings determined as wills, each representing the individuality pole of the
Idea. Several logical categories are relevant for understanding this starting point, the most significant of which are reciprocal substances in the form of the concept, things, and real actuality. The first underpins the opposition of the universal and the individual, the second underpins the sundering of the individuality pole into a multiplicity, and the third underpins the structure of the universal-individual opposition as desire and volition.

As we have seen, the universal is the substantial totality of things. Hegel inveighs against the imaginary "state of nature" in which individuals are supposed to exercise absolute freedom. Part of his objection is that a pre-social human condition is an unfounded assumption: "Examples of a savage state of life can be pointed out" yet "however rude and simple their conditions, they involve social arrangements" (40, 57). The pre-historic human state, therefore, is not one of isolated human individuals, but of a common social substance in which subjectivity has not yet formed as a possibility (116, 146).

The beginning of history is a transition from the relation of substance to the relation of the concept. In the case of China, where social substance embodies the substance-accidents relation rather than the concept, "every change is excluded, and the fixedness of a character which recurs perpetually, takes the place of what we should call the truly historical" (116, 146). The beginning of history therefore corresponds to the activation of social substance against itself.

Let us now consider the role of the concept of existence. The universal-individual opposition of the beginning of history is initially an immediate existence. Despite having the accumulated resources, or conditions, of self-reflecting substance, it does not yet have a historical relation to itself. On the other hand, it has sublated its relation to natural conditions, as we saw in the transition from ground to existence. It is therefore a universal-individual opposition in the form of existence.

As we have seen, the concept of existence begins with the universal in the form of an immediate totality of existence. However, this existence is only a totality as a sublation of the manifold of external relations into its immediate condition. Social substance therefore separates on one hand into a universal social background and on the other into negativity for itself, which is individual self-consciousness—a contraction of social substance into a point through reflection on itself. However, this contraction into a point, which Hegel calls absolute finitude, means becoming a thing in the world. Social substance is only reflected into itself as a determinate individual, and it can only be a determinate individual among determinate individuals.
Hegel also works on this problem from the other side in *Phenomenology*, showing how there can only be an individual self-consciousness if there is a reciprocal recognition of self-consciousnesses, and thus the universal 'we' of social substance (110 §177, 143). The self-reflection of social substance therefore takes the form of a plurality of individual self-consciousnesses which are highly determinate and yet are implicitly universal.

Finally, individuals are "formal volition." As we saw, actuality is the existence of the absolute. As substance, the social formation is absolute in the sense that everything has its meaning in it. The next section will elaborate the manner in which this category appears as a tension between individuals and social substance.

16.1.2. The Reciprocity of Individual and Universal Will

Hegel's philosophy of history emphasizes the role of reason in history. Yet Hegel is clear that the motor of history is the activity of human individuals. Hegel therefore uses the concept of the "cunning of reason." There are two motives for this concept. Firstly, Hegel confronts the paradox that much of human activity seems to be purely self-interested, and yet history as a whole seems to tend towards a gradual improvement in political arrangements. Secondly, the purpose of a philosophy of history is to explain how history forms a totality without expunging the contingency of actual existence, manifested in humans in the form of unreason. The cunning of reason explains how history functions at a universal level while preserving the finite level of individual interests. Hyppolite points out that Hegel here takes up the idea of a system that organizes itself through multiple private interests from Adam Smith in order to theorize the universal that mediates itself through the individual that specifically characterizes the modern state (Introduction 67). By contrast, McCarney and O'Brien assume that passionate self-interest refers only to the world-historical individuals (McCarney, 106-107; O'Brien 120). They therefore ignore the historical function of ordinary individual humans.

In taking up the categorical form of real actuality, the relation of human individuals and history is an expression of a general transformative will (22, 35). Against Kojève, the reflection into possibility that is the transformative element in the logic of actuality does not correspond to a visionary ideal of freedom. Rather, it stems from the formal and universal aspect of the particular wills. Although Hegel begins by noting that selfish desires are the most effective causes in history, his interest is in the formal side of these desires, passion, rather than their objects (22, 35). Consequently, it is not so much the selfishness of human desires that provides an effective motor as formal passionate interest.
The conscious goal of a passionate act is the particular goal, such as making oneself powerful. The unconscious goal is to find one’s inner being reflected in one’s actuality. It is a goal in the sense that the basic structure of self-consciousness, once assembled, drives towards self-realization. This is the same structure of necessity that we have seen in the logic of essence. That is, firstly, the particular will is a negative relation to the given. Secondly, the reflective product of this is to realize oneself as negativity. This therefore provides the condition for a logic of reflection.

16.1.3. Law and the state as actualizations of freedom.

Human formal will drives towards self-actualization and through this, the actualization of freedom. The product of this realization is the state. “It is the moral Whole, the State, which is the form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom” (38, 54). Furthermore, “Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys itself—it is independent and so free” (39, 56). For us, the questions here are: 1) what is the categorical form of the reciprocity between social substance and individual humans such that humans are free in the state? 2) How is the categorical form realized from natural, pre-historic conditions?

Hegel’s hint at an answer to the latter question rests upon the transition from the temporality of clan-based (or “patriarchal”) society to the historicity of the state. In prehistoric society, the edicts of the ruler form “merely subjective mandates on the part of government” (61, 82). This is because a reciprocity between meaningful action and law has not yet been established. The state gives itself permanence by framing laws. However, to do so it requires a practice of chronicling royal actions, edicts and so forth as a wealth of experience to base laws upon, or in other words, as a supply of precedent (61, 82). However, in order to store up precedent, the state needs meaningful actions, but the precondition for such actions is law.

Consequently, meaningful actions and laws arrive on the scene at the same time, beginning in an immediate form. The origins of law and meaningful action are therefore likely to be the chronicles of royal acts, which give reflection and solidity to these acts, in accordance with the formal subjective desire for self-recognition. The evidence for this is phrased negatively, that prehistoric society is “destitute of objective history, because they present no subjective history, no annals” (61, 83).

The second stage in the conversion of the formal will into an actual state is the differentiation of the law. Hegel states that agents have particular aims, but that these aims occur against a normative social background that establishes what kinds of things are good (28, 43). In the logic of appearance, we saw that law is the reflection into itself of the world of appearances. Here too, we have a normative social background,
a social substance, which sets out the possibilities of life in a particular culture, and is the reflection into identity of this culture.

Once a law is promulgated, it becomes the normative background of the society. Individuals become free in law because their actions become transparent to them. Hegel states that an individual, moral person is only possible in the state (59, 80). Prior to the institution of law, human activities are simply related to their particular objects. After the introduction of law, humans can reflect upon their acts as instantiations of laws, and thus as objective moral acts.

As in the logic of appearance, law becomes differentiated and the determination of the world. The idea, spirit, is absolutely particularized in the form of an existing being, a human individual, and consequently in a plurality of self-consciousnesses (26, 40). Further, “this limitation originates all forms of particularity of whatever kind... This is the sphere of particular purposes, in effecting which individuals exert themselves on behalf of their individuality—give it full play and objective realization” (26, 40).

In summary, particular acts and aims are reflected into themselves in law. After this point, particular acts are also moral acts, in which the self-conscious individual is able to recognize him or herself as a moral agent. The development of the social totality occurs through the diversity of particular needs, the multiplicity of social interactions needing mediation through an explicit convention.

16.2 The World-Historical Individual

16.2.1. The Account of the World-Historical Individuals in the Introduction

The theory of the world-historical individuals provides an explanation of how passionately interested individuals further the course of world-history without intending to do so, a phenomenon known as the “cunning of reason.” Hegel suggests that there is a difference between the internal, self-enriching reciprocity between a society and its individual agents on one hand, and the negativity of a truly historical agent towards society as a whole on the other (29, 44). The difference is this: The internal agents of a society act within the parameters of that society, and their passionate activity merely furthers the diversity of the society. By contrast, world-historical individuals concretize a principle that is at odds with the existing society.

O’Brien stresses the importance of the world-historical individuals because, like the present work, he is interested in the question of historical individuality (121). World-historical individuals therefore loom large as idiosyncratic characters that dominate “impersonal forces” (122).
However, O'Brien does not sufficiently heed his own warning that “the proper individuals in history are peoples” (122). As Bourgeois points out, the world-historical individuals are in fact side-lined by the cunning of reason (61).

Hegel extends the idea that action is a duality consisting of an objective background and a conscious subjective goal (29, 44). For ordinary people, the objective background is law and custom. However, for the world-historical individual, the background is “a general principle of a different order from that on which depends the permanence of the people or a State” (29, 44).

This raises the question of where this new principle comes from. However, Hegel does not give a direct answer. Nonetheless, in his example of Caesar, Hegel gives an indirect answer. That is, in the course of securing his own interests, Caesar came into conflict with enemies who were not merely private interests, but “had the form of the constitution, and the power conferred by an appearance of justice” (29, 44). Caesar’s opposition to these enemies therefore took the form of an opposition to the state as a whole. However, this was not merely the opposition of a rebellious private citizen to the state. What makes Caesar a world-historical individual is that he “had an insight into the requirements of the time—what was ripe for development” (30, 45). Caesar was therefore able to further his personal ends by exploiting the weakness of the constitution ranged against him, and thereby allying himself with the opposed principle.

The private interest of the world-historical individual therefore exploits the political weaknesses of the society. It is necessary, therefore, that the world-historical individual’s interests should be opposed to those of the existing society. Conversely, spirit exploits the world-historical individual in this sense: in pursuing his or her selfish interests, the world-historical individual exposes the particularity of a social formation and leads to its conversion into its opposed principle.

We can therefore see two processes of historical change and development. Firstly, mass human activity produces an objective social world on the basis of the drive towards individual self-realization as expressed confusedly through the pursuit of particular goals. This is the evolutionary phase of historical development. Secondly, rare individuals find their personal interests to be in conflict with the state, and the even rarer individual knows the weakness of the state and is in a position to exploit this weakness. This is the revolutionary phase of historical development.
16.2.2. The World-Historical Individuals in the History

The account of the world-historical individuals in the Introduction thus suggests that they function at the limits of national formations, and are the means by which the exhausted actual principle of one historical phase passes over into a new phase with a new, though dialectically related phase. However, a different picture emerges from a consideration of the world-historical individuals in the History itself.

When we examine the transitions between the Mediterranean empires, we see that the two outstanding world-historical individuals, Alexander and Caesar, do not function as the points of transition between empires. Instead they serve two functions. Firstly, they install a monarchical principle lacking in their respective worlds (271-272, 330; 313, 381). Secondly, they effect the transition from a national state to an empire.

It appears, therefore, that the function of the world-historical individuals is more specific than the Introduction suggests. Hegel’s perspective on the world-historical individuals is that they are justified by the results of their actions: “They are great men, because they willed and accomplished something great” (31, 46). This great achievement has two sides.

Firstly, states have a tendency towards collapsing into the particular. As we have seen from the Logic, a state formed on the basis of the whole-parts relation tends towards disintegration. The great men supply a necessary monarchical principle (43, 61). However, they are not merely a focus for the whole, but their individual will becomes the will of the state, and therefore lifts the state from the whole-part relation into the force-expression relation. The world-historical individuals therefore hold the state together, and do this by enacting a great project: “Nations are what their deeds are” (74, 98). Once a nation has achieved its great work, it falls into senescence and death.

Secondly, Hegel sees two phases of development for the Greeks and Romans, and the same pattern can be observed in the Persians: a national period, where the nation matures, and an expansive period, where the nation rises to world domination (224, 275-276). A similar pattern can be seen in the cases of the Franks under Charlemagne and France under Napoleon. The great project of the nation is thus usually imperial expansion, and it is powered by the personal will of a world-historical individual.

Consequently, the function of the world-historical individual is revolutionary in two directions. Firstly, it tramples on the rights of particular elements in the nation in the interest of imposing a monarchy. It
is therefore a mistake to take it that the world-historical individual embodies a new principle against his own society. Rather, the stress is on the fact that the maturity of a society firstly expresses itself as a detailed particularization, an established, 'permanent' order. The principle of individual will therefore confronts the previous particularizing phase in national development rather than the national principle itself. Secondly, the individual will revitalizes the nation into becoming an empire, and thus overthrows the defunct old order of the previous world-historical empire. In this sense, the world-historical individual does overthrow an old principle, but it is the principle of the previous order.

Hegel over-emphasizes the role of world-historical individuals in the Introduction, and interpreters of the Introduction such as O’Brien see Hegel’s history as concretized and individualized by these fully actualized individuals. However, they in fact occur only occasionally and as the dialectic requires. Furthermore, as in the case of Caesar, the contingent human individual is used by the necessity of the circumstances. The actual level of historical individuality thus transcends even the world-historical human individual.

16.3 Conclusion

As we have seen, Hegel rejects the idea of self-reflective spirit beginning with human individuals in an anarchic natural condition, who then form a primitive social order which transforms them. For Hegel, while human individuals are immediate individuals, they are also absorbed in an undifferentiated social substance. The paradox of human history, taken broadly, is that individuals only actualize themselves as individuals by developing their social substance, making it the possibility of individuality. Developing society and human individuality are therefore dialectically related.

As we have seen, culture mediates human individuals with themselves. It is, in logical terms, their property. For most of human existence, the cultural property is self-reflective and allows for a degree of individual differentiation and totalization. Humans become aware of themselves as social beings in culture, and also become aware of the social substance itself as some form of national consciousness. History proper only takes off, however, once humans reflect their social substance into itself in the form of laws. Laws make it possible for humans to objectify their actions and become moral agents. Furthermore, the processes of recording that go along with law-formation also make it possible to have a historical consciousness and to make a transition from a cyclical time-consciousness to historical time-consciousness in regard to society itself.

Rare human individuals sometimes function within the state and nation in a non-collective capacity. Yet human individuals are reciprocally
related to their social substance, and the development of one is the
development of the other. However, the implication of this is that social
substance, as the totality, becomes the primary individual of history. The
activity of human individuals becomes its internal mechanism, as
Bourgeois recognizes (61). Humans are, as Balibar states, merely supports
of a historical combination (252). Having said this, while humans only
occasionally oppose the totality as individuals, they often stand opposed
to it as the individuality which it is supposed to make possible. That is, the
nation, and particularly the state, can stifle the very individuality that it is
supposed to foster. This collision between the individual and the universal
is the primary contradiction of society.
17. NATIONAL INDIVIDUALS

17.1 People [Volk]

"In the history of the world, the individuals that we have to do with are peoples, wholes that are states" (14, 25 my trans.). What business does Hegel have with a concept of a people? It seems that a dialectical philosopher of history should show how peoples emerge in history dialectically. Yet Hegel discusses the concept of a people in general (74-76, 98-100). Hegel’s discussion of a people in general can be defended because the concept of a people is in fact a pre-historical rather than a historical concept. It is therefore subject to repetition. History for Hegel only has to do with those peoples that have formed states (38, 55; 61, 83). Once in history, peoples become individual moments in a developmental narrative (63, 86). Prior to this point, they are a geography of sameness of form over a difference of particular content.

In this section, we are concerned with the pre-historical integrity of a people as an individuality, particularly in regard to the people as condition for the state and for world-history. It seems at first that Hegel thinks of a people as a quantitative expansion from the family, via clans [Stämme] and tribes [Völkerschaften] (62, 84). However, the significance of this relation to the family has to do with the concept of the spirit of a people [Volksgeist]. Firstly, the spirit of the family is a model for the spirit of the people in the way that the individual and the whole are "one substantial essence" (42, 59 my trans.). Secondly, the family is a model of piety—the individual reveres the family in the form of the penates, which corresponds to the national deity of the people. The spirit of a people thus has the double meaning of being a substantial whole and of being objectified as a religious subject. As a substantial whole, the spirit of a people is the content which the form of culture [Bildung] marks out (50, 68). Hyppolite points out that the spirit of a people makes the moral ought into actuality by actualizing the individual’s values (Introduction 8). As a subject, the spirit of a people is the religious objectification of the true [Wahr], and thus reflects the shared values of the people for its members. This complex of reverence and belonging is exemplified by the significance of Athens/Athena for the Athenian (52-53, 71-72).

Furthermore, the exemplary role of the Athenians shows that the people is not rooted in the family—like the Romans, the Greeks are a “colluvies”—the barrel-scrapings of other peoples (226, 277). Indeed, as McCarney points out, Hegel thinks that heterogeneous ethnic roots are essential for making it onto the world stage because difference is essential for spiritual development (141). The people is a quantitative term, therefore, but only as an entity tied together by a shared culture, religion and sense of belonging—a spirit.
Hegel thus unifies a people through the unity of the spirit of a people. The nature of this unity is an ongoing issue for Hegel. On one hand, it is a historical problem: the question of unity is a theological question that configures the political form of each historical world. On the other hand, it is a theoretical question, because it affects the concept of a people in general. Hegel perhaps intuits that a purely substantial concept of spirit will not do. This would make it impossible to distinguish peoples in regions sharing similar cultures, or to unify groups differing in varying degrees. Reflection-into-self is necessary, and this is why spirit is self-conscious subject in the form of a national religion.

Hegel states that religion is the place where a people gives a definition [Definition] of the true (50, 69). The definition is a reduction to essentiality, a fundamental determinateness that mirrors all other particularities. Consequently, “the conception of God constitutes the basis of a people” (50, 69). This reflection into self is thus also an act of constitution for the people. It is the formation of a principle [Prinzip].

The concept of a principle leads back to the environmental conditions of the formation of the people, and forward to its incorporation in world history. On one hand, the principle of every world-historical people actually exists as a people in time and space, so that each principle is also a natural determinateness (79, 104-105). Hegel states that a people derives its character from the type of natural locality. He mentions geographical origins for each people in his history. On the other hand, the principle of a people is its dialectical determinateness in relation to other peoples in world history (64, 86). The principle of a people is thus firstly the product of background conditions, secondly the reflection of the culture into itself as a religion, so that the people constitutes itself by identifying with itself, and thirdly the point of articulation for world history.

At the same time, a principle is, as we already know from Science of Logic, only an inner in relation to an outer (22, 35). The spirit of a people actualizes its principle through self-differentiation as the various aspects of its cultural and political life (53, 67). Nonetheless, a principle is an interpretative key for Hegel that allows us to grasp a people synthetically and to arrange peoples as a developmental series.

Hegel presents the concept of the principle of a people in the Introduction in a schematic way, but also employs this concept in the body of the history itself. For example, the difference between the Greek and Persian principles explains why Persia was defeated by the Greeks (222, 273). The concept is not therefore simply a schematic gloss. The concept of a principle appears to act as a master key: Hegel explains that the empirical side of philosophical history means finding this principle for
each people (64, 86). We will return to the concept of a principle below. For now, it is sufficient to point out that a people is unified firstly through the spirit of a people, which is not merely a shared culture but also the objectification of shared culture, and this spirit is in turn unified by having a principle.

McCamey claims that Hegel prefers the term “nation” [Nation] to “people” [Volk] when speaking of the natural descent of a people (at least in the Hoffmeister edition of the Introduction) (140). There may be some truth to this variance in meaning between the synonyms “people” and “nation” throughout the history. Nonetheless, later, explicitly aggregated European peoples [France, Spain (420, 500), Poland (430, 510) and England (454, 535)] are also called nations.

In fact, a more significant nuance is that “nation” usually characterizes peoples who are parts of a larger whole. The term “nation” leads us from a stress on the apparently irreducible individuality of peoples to their essentially problematic nature—that they are finite regions with borders, as Lampert points out (Locke 70). Alongside the historical problem of the freedom of the individual in the state is the problem of the co-existence of peoples. As we shall see, this is a major theme in Hegel’s view of history.

This theme brings to light the fact that, being natural existences, peoples are akin to protoplasmic natural organisms, not only in having a finite life process (75, 99), but also in being able to coalesce, to be subordinated and to be crushed and consumed. The stuff-like quality of peoples is shown by the ambiguity of peoplehood in Greece. The Greek people (226, 277) is made up of multiple tribes [Völkerschaften] (225, 276), but the Athenians (260, 317) and Thebans (266, 324) are also peoples. It is not so much that Hegel is unsure where the proper level of peoplehood lies in the case of the Greeks, but that it is essentially ambiguous. This is because peoples coalesce, and thus form transitional phases where two or more peoples are becoming a single people. Rome is similarly a coalescence of earlier peoples in its origins and then also a crushing and digestion of peoples in its imperial phase.

Peoples are therefore protoplasmic entities formed by reflection-into-self of the cultural substance of a human population in the form of a religion. As a people, rather than a people with a state, the options for individuality are limited. Religion functions as a primary means of reflection-into-self for a people, but it does not generate history. Thus the dynamic modes of the self-actualization of a principle is not available to pre-historic peoples. Pre-historic peoples are therefore restricted to the more static models of totality, from thing-with-properties to whole-and-parts. This is why Hegel tends towards organic metaphors for peoples at a
general level: they suggest harmonious, unhistorical wholes rather than strife-torn historical narratives. In order for peoples to enter history, they require mechanisms for complete Erinnerung: a state apparatus and practices of history-writing. In this way, a people makes itself objective to itself in and for itself.

17.2 State

We must ask once again to what extent it is legitimate to discuss the concept of a state in general. States differ from peoples in being historical. This means two things. First, states have histories, and second, the state evolves in world history. The concept of a state can be generalized on two bases. Firstly, there is an element of natural repetition, as in the case of the concept of a people. Because many states grow up independently, they are also repetitive and thus have generalizable features. Secondly and more dialectically, the state is a historical product, and therefore is generalizable in the dialectical sense of being a single problematic that develops from a simple basis. The state in general is only the state in the abstract, and “in the abstract” means for dialectical philosophy, “at the outset.” The concept of state is thus not a general category instantiated in various ways, but a historically developing form that must be understood historically.¹

In the first place, states are politically organized peoples. However, Hegel reserves the term “state” for political arrangements that are objective. In the case of China, objectivity consists in detailed practices of recording (126, 158). This leads to a detailed history, laws and a constitution (161, 200). Political orders that lack this objectivity are not states. Consequently, India has many kingdoms but no states (161, 200).

The transition to history occurs with the state because “it is the State which first presents subject-matter that is not only adapted to the prose of History, but involves the production of such history in the very progress of its own being.” (61, 82). The point here is that the adoption of the practice of the recording of events gives rise to historicity. Prior to this point, human events are a “uniform course of events” which nonetheless ”may have been filled with revolutions, nomadic wanderings, and the strangest mutations.” (61, 83). Change does not add up to historicity.

Time-consciousness in the pre-historical conditions of patriarchy is therefore a general assumption of timelessness with the occasional intrusion of a memorable “turn of fortune.” (60, 82). Only society organized in the form of a state has a narrative-historical mode of being.

¹ Kolb maintains that the rational modern constitution is not instantiated in any single nation (Final, 165). This seems to mean that the modern state is a general form. However, the particularization of the ideal modern state, with its incorporation of contingency, must be understood as actualization of a one-sided universal.
The issue here is that only a society that is capable of reflecting on itself is capable of dialectical development. This requires practices of recording, and these, reciprocally, are the condition for objective action (61, 83). The restriction of history to dialectical development means that not all human existence in time counts as history. However, if we allow for this restriction of meaning, the point is that the state is the primary individual of history because only in the state is history possible.

The relation of people and state is not straightforward. On one hand, the state is a department of the life of the people, but on the other hand, the people is a sublated element in the state. As it turns out, this opposition is a necessary element in the state.

Initially, the constitution is an outgrowth of the spirit of a people (46, 64). However, immediately it is the state that becomes the individual totality. The spirit of the people animates the state (50, 68). What this means on one hand is that the spirit of the people provides the state with concrete goals. On the other hand, it means that the state derives legitimacy from the people, especially through the relation of the constitution to the national religion (51, 69). Lastly, it is the people that particularizes and concretizes the "abstraction" of the state by connecting it to existence via the constitution (43, 61).

The meaning of the people alters at this point. The people now becomes a problematic political element in the state. The people, as the totality and object of patriotic veneration, is the source of all validation. However, the state has a necessary negative relation to itself which, as we have seen in the Science of Logic, is a necessary ingredient in activity. Even a democracy needs generals to lead in war (43, 61), and the Athenians relied on Pericles (254, 309).

Consequently, the people, the totality, becomes a part of the totality over against the government: the Greek demos or the Roman populus or plebs. Set against this part is the governing class, as in England (455, 537). The corrupt representative democracy of England allows the aristocracy to continue governing, as it should. The political class is the part of the whole that stands for the whole. Hegel's historicist view of this whole-parts problem is that different phases of history require different solutions. In any case, the relation of state and people is that the people is the part of the state, against the government, that is the simple unity of the whole, the whole that is only implicitly a part, whereas the government is the part of the state that is the differentiated, active whole, the whole that is explicitly a part. It is the explicitly negative, reflective relation to self that makes states historical and peoples unhistorical.
The emergence of the state from the people allows the state to transcend the people. Although states and peoples are intimately connected in the Introduction, the relation of states to peoples is an explicit problem in the main body of the work. McCarney claims on this basis that Hegel thinks of the state as being multi-ethnic (154). However, as Hyppolite points out, the conception of the spirit of a people as lying at the base of the state does not disappear even in Hegel's later works (Introduction 60). Instead, the relationship between the private individual, and thus of the citizen with divided ethnic loyalties, to the state is the fundamental modern problem. It is solved, in Hegel's history, precisely because of the suitability of the spirit of the Germanic peoples, in its Protestant guise, to the constitution of a liberal state.

The universalistic "Rights of Man and Citizen" are proclaimed in France, but in a formalistic way. Liberalism in the Catholic Romanic nations is merely a surface effect, but is enduring in the Protestant Germanic nations because it corresponds to the spirit of the people (453, 534). Paradoxically, the Protestant, Germanic spirit is necessary for the state to transcend the people by including that which is other to it. It is only in a Protestant, Germanic state that ethnic background and religion can become irrelevant for citizenship.

On the other hand, the geographical variations among peoples means that a single cosmopolitan state is doomed to failure, as the various experiments in empire, from Persia to Napoleon, have shown. Hegel sees the success of the germanic West over Islam as arising from the particularization and concretization of the principle of the Germanic world in multiple peoples, which Islamic universalism precludes. As a result, history begins with a people that coincides with a state, China, goes through diverse political arrangements between cities, states and empires, and then returns to nation-states in a European union of states.

17.3 World

Hegel discovers four worlds in the totality of world-history. Generally, the concept of a world indicates a self-contained but nonetheless finite totality. This finite totality can be examined from two sides: how it totalizes the peoples and states that make it up, and how it relates to other worlds. In fact, these two aspects cannot be considered separately. The totality of world-history, the totality of totalities, has three distinct expressions: simultaneity, succession and historicity.

The first totalizing structure is simultaneity. In this structure, the worlds are diverse. The first world in Hegel's history is the oriental world. Firstly, the oriental world is a totality because it has a single principle: "Moral distinctions and requirements are expressed as Laws, but so that the subjective will is governed by these Laws as by an external force."
Secondly, the Orient is, essentially, the land of valley-plain civilizations (175,225). These two totalizations are, on one hand, the character of the totality, and on the other, the material explanation of why the totality has this character. The Orient embodies diversity and simultaneity, because it consists in isolated, permanent worlds.

The manner in which the Greek principle constitutes a world is different from that of the oriental world. The question of what constitutes the Greek world is initially identical with the question of what constitutes the Greek nation. In the secondary phase, the Greek world is identical with the Empire of Alexander, and then with the Hellenistic area controlled by Alexander's successors.

While the Roman world has a superficially similar national origin to the Greek, Hegel is inclined to treat the extension of a political universality over national origins as essentially Roman, while in the Greek World, empire is a late phase. Greece is based in a substantial common culture, which Italy lacks (280). Furthermore, the nature of the Roman world is to subjugate individuals to the state, and that includes national individualities (107). The Roman world is therefore principally the Roman Empire. Its principle is from the start an exercise of state power to incorporate populations (284), and continues in the same manner, extending itself through force.

The Germanic world, lastly, is not constituted in any of the ways above. It has to be admitted that, like the Greek world, the Germanic world has a common ethnic basis: the Germanic peoples who moved into the Roman Empire. This common ethnicity provides the unifying feature for the Germanic world because it brings with it a Germanic knowledge of subjective freedom. It is unlike the Greek form of national culture, however, because it does not simply absorb elements of other cultures into itself. Rather, the Germanic culture is displaced wholesale by Roman culture (343). The native Germanic principle actualizes itself by reconfiguring this alien objective world as its own (343).

The foregoing gives an account of the worlds as an external simultaneity. The worlds also fall into a second order of totalities which exist in succession rather than simultaneity. We have seen that the Greek and Roman worlds coincide with Greek and Roman empires. Similarly, since the oriental world is only a whole of external parts, the oriental world appears as an empire through one of its parts, Persia. We can also speak, loosely, of a Germanic empire. These empires form a series in the lands around the Mediterranean, which is "the heart of the Old World," (87) through their succession as the dominant cultural and political configuration of the region. The difference between this series and the geographical series is that each empire cancels the previous one. The
series of worlds is therefore a series of diversity and simultaneity, and thus of space, while the series of empires is a series of opposition and succession, and thus of time.

The final form of totality is captured only in the Germanic world. We have seen that the other worlds form a series in space and time. Only the Germanic world internalizes the principle of difference and therefore forms a true history. The difference between the Germanic world and the previous empires is that it does not oppose a new actuality to the old regime embodied in the prior empire. Instead, Hegel describes the negation of the Roman Empire by the Germanic people as a "deluge," (225) implying that the antediluvian civilizations of Persia, Greece and Rome were swept away by a population flood. Germanic history begins after this point and reiterates previous history as its own development (345-346). The Germanic world is therefore total in space and time; there is, "no absolute existence outside its sphere, but only a relative one which is already vanquished, and in respect to which its only concern is to make apparent that this conquest has taken place." (342). This refers in the first instance to the Germanic absorption of the older civilizations. However, it also refers to and explains the spread of Western culture around the globe.

The concept of a world, therefore, is the concept of totality. In the first series, the worlds totalize a particular geographical area, but are also abutted by other, simultaneous worlds. In the second series, the worlds are, at least in principle, absolute totalizations of an entire region, but only for a finite period of time. In the last series, the world is absolutely total in space and time.

17.4 The Concept of a Principle

As we have seen, Hegel uses the concept of a principle as a means of totalizing peoples, states and worlds as historical individuals. However, it is an abstract and unconvincing element in his theory. The problem is that other ways of thinking peoples and states as individuals present themselves: they could be cultural or political wholes assembled on the basis of various characteristic values and metaphors without a governing principle, or they could in fact not be wholes at all. Hegel argues that the concept of a principle derives from the Science of Logic (63, 85). However, this does not tell us why we should think that peoples are in fact principle-governed in the way that logical phases are. The second argument is that the concept of a principle helps make sense of history. However, Hegel's history is controversial to say the least, particularly as regards its broad characterizations of peoples.

When the concept of a principle is treated as a general explanatory ground, it appears as a tourist mentality, where a foreign culture is reduced to multiple expressions of the same trite epitomy. However, it
looks more credible as a historical concept in the context of the logical unity of identity, diversity and opposition. In this context, a principle is a point of contact in a dialectical systematic totality which is totalized through diversity and opposition. The principle might therefore be the self-identity of the people in the dominant religious conception, which then encounters its negation in society, or it may be a simple original environmental determination which then develops dialectically as a reaction to this environment. This would mean that there could be multiple principles in a people, which would be unified by its spirit rather than by its principle.

However, the reason why Hegel supplements the idea of a spirit with the idea of a principle is shown by a problem that Kolb brings out in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Religion*. Hegel was never able to resolve the proper developmental order for Judaism, Greek and Roman religion, because different axes resulted in different orderings (Final 170). The possibility of multiple unaligned axes is a general historical problem. It is solved for Hegel through the concept of a general principle. By having a single, over-arching dialectical series, other possible orderings are subordinated. Is it possible to have a dialectical history without the ad hoc device of general principles?

The problem with having multiple principles that form various different series is that we want the series to be historically dialectical, rather than an external theoretical arrangement of cultures. This means that it should have a temporal direction, in which the more developed cultures actually develop from the earlier cultures. In this case, only aligned axes could actually be dialectical. Other axes would be merely external series.

However, this problem only arises for Hegel because he mistakenly takes the Greeks as the paradigmatic world-historical people, and the Greek-Roman transition as paradigmatic of world-historical dialectics. This succession demands a dominant axis and relativizes counter-directional axes. Yet, as we have seen, it is only one of three forms of relation between worlds. The succession series puts peoples in a purely linear sequence, but the properly historical series, embodied in the Germanic world, does not. Here we find the world broken up into regions and these regions developing at different speeds. The most radical disjunction of the germanic world is between the West and Islam, which actualize the same principle of inwardness in different directions and at different speeds (355, 427). Islam then feeds back on the West—although Hegel could have made a lot more of this cross-cultural interchange. Similarly, within the West, France, Germany and England develop in different ways and at different speeds, and also interact. This situation suggests that a historical dialectic with multiple unaligned axes is
possible. France and Islam leap ahead of Germany in some regards because their development is less concrete, and there are therefore competing axes of development.

We can therefore draw on the latter concept of historical development in order to correct the concept of a principle. A principle is not the single governing idea of a people, but instead is a point of contact on one of multiple axes that relate simultaneously developing regions.

17.5 Conclusion
In summary, the second level of individuality in a philosophical history is social substance, a people-with-a-state. The idea of a national principle initially seems to reinforce ideas of national character and stereotypes, and the idea that institutions have to grow organically within a culture and cannot be externally introduced. However, as we have seen, the idea of a principle in fact undermines the ordinary idea of nation-state. The ordinary idea associates nationhood with language, blood, homeland, religion, or some other illusory or contingent essence. However, the idea of a principle is not essentially tied to any of these features and becomes fully liberal in the German, Protestant state. Consequently, a national principle can be used to incorporate further populations into the state.

The dialectical significance of social substance particularized as nations is that it allows for the working through of phases of social substance. Each nation is the idea of a form of universal in which individuals can recognize themselves, and which thematizes their relation to each other and to the universal. Furthermore, in the fully historical germanic phase of world, dialectical relations take the form of reciprocity between regions developing at different speeds, connected via principles on multiple axes.
18. THE SPIRIT OF THE WORLD [WELTGEIST]

18.1 The Idea of a Spirit of the World

The final form of individuality to consider is the individual totality of history. Yet can world history really be considered an individual? As we have seen, the idea of a super-individual called the "world spirit," as championed by Charles Taylor (80), is one of the major targets of the categorical interpretation of Hegel's project. Hyppolite stresses the importance for Hegel of the concept of the spirit of a people in opposition to Kantian cosmopolitanism (Introduction 27). The spirit of the world is individualized in a people (Introduction 37). However, Hyppolite admits the spirit of the world as a single developmental process that separates the Greek and modern worlds, and in which individual peoples are parts (Introduction 51).

The spirit of the world is the means of thinking history as absolute relation. This concept, which McCamney regards as the ultimate level in "a nested structure of concrete universals" (140) but then fails to discuss, is the absolute developmental process of history. I maintain that the spirit of the world is the appropriate way of thinking history as an individual on one hand, but also as an entirely immanent process on the other. Hegel outlines this concept in three places: Phenomenology of Spirit, Introduction, and Philosophy of Right.

In Phenomenology, the spirit of the world is explicated as a process of sense-giving and idealization. The key concept for understanding the totalization of history is Er-Innerung (inwardization-recollection) (492 §808, 433). This is the mechanism by which one historical world dies off and passes over into another, but without thereby succumbing to a merely natural cycle. The result of a civilization is a contraction into a point which provides the principle for the next. The succession of worlds that is thereby established is a progressive series because they are determinately related.

Secondly, Er-Innerung happens in the context of the externalization of spirit into nature, as we have learned from Hyppolite in Chapter 3 above. This self-externalized self becomes itself again in nature through natural "free contingent happening." Bearing the dialectic of inner and outer in mind, Er-Innerung is both the inwardization and the externalization of Spirit. Spirit contracts out of natural conditions into memory. Initially, this is a conversion of natural environment into a world of sense. Secondly, it is an idealization of the world. This inner presents itself as a simple immediacy, a principle, and thus as something external. However, in the gradual progress of the spirits, this spatial extension is overcome in the continuity of memory.
In the introduction to Philosophy of History, Hegel regards the general process as a matter of finite national projects. Spirit is historical, which means that in its embodiment as a people it is able to learn from what is past (73, 98). The people’s mode of being is a force-and-expression relation; it consists in negatively actualizing its principle as a national work (74, 98). However, peoples eventually die because their activities are tied to specific principles (75, 99). However, as in Phenomenology, the death of a nation is a lesson for thought and the birth of a higher principle (78, 103). The containment of the prior principle in the latter means that the spirit of the world is universal only as a concrete process that sublates its particular moments.

We have seen in the logic of actuality that the later actuality cancels the temporal self-exteriority of the prior actuality. Similarly, the culmination of the final phase of history is a restructuring of historicity. The successiveness of the past, in which one phase is cancelled by its successor, is itself cancelled, and the moments are simultaneously present, albeit collected into a totality (78, 104).

Philosophy of Right provides a different perspective on the succession of worlds. The starting point for this account is a geographically distributed system of states (§340: 215, 502). The spirit of the world initially appears alongside this system as a tranquil overview (§341: 216, 502). However, it also retraces its own becoming from the blind interactions of states. This progressive development makes use of the general conflict of nations and their constitutive naturally-based principles (§347: 217, 504-505).

The process by which conflict becomes progressive development is twofold. Firstly, nature generates multiple natural principles of nations. Some of these are suitable for the development of the world’s spirit in providing one-sided perspectives (§347: 218, 505). Secondly, nation-states engage in dialectical struggles for recognition. The point of these struggles is to get the other nation to recognize the particular national principle as the universal (§351: 219, 507). The conclusion of these struggles is a truly comprehensive totality. Retrospectively, spirit can therefore see its contingent becoming as following a logical pattern (§352: 219, 507).

The universality of the spirit of the world is thus a single, immanent process rather than an abstraction. This process is viewed as 1) the product of a social hermeneutical process, 2) a series of national projects that learn from their predecessors, and 3) as the dialectical competition of co-existing states for recognition of their national principles. When we try to fit these explanations to Hegel’s history, however, we discover that the first two explanations only fit in the successive phase: Persia, Greece, Rome. The third explanation perhaps fits
modern Europe, as is to be expected from the Philosophy of Right's concentration on the modern nation-state.

Hegel erroneously tries to generalize the nature of historical dialectical process from particular historical phases, and this is the fundamental reason for the inadequacy of these explanations. They ignore the fact that the nature of dialectical transition itself changes in history. Hegel states that the life-process of the Greek people is generalizable to all world-historical peoples (224, 275-276), and then has to retract this statement in the case of the Germanic peoples (341, 412). Such a generalization ignores the stasis of the Oriental world, and the enduring power of the Germanic world.

By suggesting that these formulations are a general account of the spirit of the world, Hegel increases the degree to which his theory of history involves unhistorical elements: peoples which have a common life-process, or nation-states with principles. I have already given an explanation of how people and state might be generalizable: they are subject to natural repetition. However, once history begins, the state develops. Hegel uses this as an argument for why Greece and Rome cannot serve as models for the modern state (47, 66).

What Hegel needs instead of one account of dialectical historical transitions is a series of accounts of the different kinds of transition that correspond to the different phases of world history. What the explanations given above have in common is the idea that spirit survives and learns from the death of its own particular forms. This is the general concept of the spirit of the world. The concrete description of the spirit of the world is world history itself. However, we can give an outline of how spirits of peoples are articulated into the spirit of the world by looking at the three major articulations of the historical worlds and their modes of transition.

18.2 The Phases of World History and Their Relation

In order to make the concept of a spirit of the world convincing, Hegel needs an account of how the historical material itself forms the logical scheme. He needs a mechanics of the dialectic. Furthermore, as we have seen, this dialectic must not import unhistorical elements. At an outline level, there are three kinds of transition to be explained: simultaneity, succession and historicity.

18.2.1. Simultaneity

The relation of simultaneity in the Oriental world is problematic for an account of the spirit of the world as a development. How does it come to be that two adjacent but geographically isolated nations, China and India, form the sides of an antithesis? Why is there a linear dialectical progression from China to Persia? The linear quality of the text of
Philosophy of History suggests that China is earlier than India. Two explanations for this ordering suggest themselves. Firstly, Hegel was attracted to the East-West movement of spirit—the incidental fact of the emergence of civilization in the east of Asia meant that subsequent civilizations necessarily progressed westward. However, Hegel contradicts this hypothesis by characterizing the oriental world and its sub-worlds as isolated. Secondly, India and China might form a purely logical series, but then world history would be an external reflection on our part, rather than the internal reflection of the spirit of the world.

Instead, we should dispense with the linear ordering of China and India as unsuited to a world of simultaneity. Although China is in a sense first and India second, representing identity and difference respectively, identity and difference represent alternate starting points for the logic of identity and difference. Consequently, we can rethink the parts of the oriental world as three alternate starting points, which are simple forms of individuality (China), particularity (India) and universality (Persia). The oriental world is thus not a series, but a laying out of the basic options for civilization. From this point of view, we can hypothesize that any relatively isolated civilization will have one of these three forms. China, India and Persia are not therefore the only examples of each type. This hypothesis is confirmed by Philosophy of Right. Hegel states of the Oriental World: “A still substantial, natural, mentality is a moment in the development of the state, and the point at which any state takes this form is the absolute beginning of its history” (§355 Z).

18.2.2. Succession

Hegel supplies two accounts of the mechanics of world history in the Introduction. The first mechanism is individual human activity, especially in the case of the world-historical individuals. The second mechanism is the Er-Innerung of the state in collective thought. As we have seen, these transitions are explanations of how the succession of Mediterranean empires forms a process.

In Philosophy of Right, Hegel insists that all dialectical transitions are accomplished by world-historical individuals (§348). As we have seen in Chapter 16, although Hegel suggests that peoples are tied to principles, and the world-historical individuals inaugurate new principles, in fact these individuals appear uniformly tied to a shift from a national to an imperial phase within a world. Furthermore, Hegel states that the second, expansionist phase in a national life cycle is the encounter with the preceeding world-historical people (224, 275).

Yet the concept of the world-historical individual does not explain why the successor state has a higher principle than the prior state, because the world-historical individuals actualize an opposition within the state,
not across states. At best, the theory of the world-historical individual would explain why there is a cyclical turnover of empires. This situation is symptomatic of Hegel's tendency to generalize the life-cycles of peoples as if they were plants, which leads to a natural-cyclical view of history.

According to the idealization theory of dialectical development, the ultimate individuality of world-spirit arises through three phases of thoughtful reflection on the part of a nation. These phases are: the phase in which a national principle actualizes itself fully in the state; the phase in which a nation kills itself off through the corrosive effects of reflection; and the phase in which the nation preserves itself in thought. In the mature state, the state not only gives itself an objective form, but comprehends this objective form (76, 100-101). This is therefore a double reflection, firstly of the immediate customs of the nation into the laws and constitution of a state, and then of the laws and constitution of the state into art and systematic knowledge (76, 101).

Hegel suggests that this doubling of the world has two effects. Firstly, the world of action is partially supplanted by a world of talk (76, 101). Secondly, the becoming-contingent of actuality against its possibility means that the immediate legitimacy of the state in its various institutions is removed. The citizens become egotistical (76-77, 101). These forces vitiate the state and lead to its demise. However, because what is destroyed is the particular state but not human society, the state is converted from what is into what was, or from being into essence (77, 102). This essence, as we have seen from the logic of essence, is a simple but higher principle from which a new society can grow (78, 103).

Hegel speaks in general terms, as if all nations go through these phases. However, it is problematic even as an account of the transition between the successive empires. It accounts for dialectical development through the fact that the product of the collapse of the antecedent nation is the new principle of the consequent nation. However, in Philosophy of History, the Greek and Roman national principles are indigenous, and developed prior to contact with the earlier world-historical people.

The first answer to this problem that Hegel provides in the Philosophy of History is that the successor nations were able to triumph over the prior nations because their indigenous principles were higher. It is for this reason that Persia is defeated by Greece (222, 273), and Greece by Rome (277, 337). This theory links dialectical development with success in dominating other nations. Hegel indeed explains the outcome of these contests in terms of a defeat of particularity (Persia) by individuality (Greece), and of the latter by crushing universality (Rome). But this has the effect of reducing dialectical progress to an individuality-crushing development in military cohesion.
However, this is really only a problem if we think that succession means progress. Lampert points out that succession is in fact the "opposite of progress" (Dates 217). It is however an essentially necessary succession, rather than a contingent one. Necessity is precisely its character. Against Lampert (Dates 217), destiny [Schicksal] is a Greek relation to historical necessity, as a key element in Greek tragedy (Hyppolite, Introduction 25). It is the point at which the historical agent confronts the finitude through which it is individual and concrete. Rome has the role of destiny for the Greeks as a whole. The Romans, by contrast, lose the idea of destiny, but take up and develop the idea of fate [Fatum] which is only nascent in the Greek period. As Hyppolite points out, destiny is a form of reconciliation, and thus more satisfying than fate (Introduction 27). This typifies the worsening of conditions in the succession narrative. This is explained by the logical transition that we have observed in the Science of Logic from necessity to freedom. The succession narrative is a sharpening of extremes, so that the social universal takes on the role of abstract violence [Gewalt], forcing the particular individual back on itself so that the individual discovers the Christian principle of inwardness and self-reliance, which, as we see in the historicity narrative, is a transition to reciprocity.

Yet this dialectics still requires a mechanics. The notable feature of the Mediterranean is that the empires always have a certain finite extent. Greece, Rome and Germania were able to develop outside but in relation to the prior empire, observing its demise. The Mediterranean region therefore saw destruction but also continuity. The natural conditions supply an initial introduction to the dialectical development of the people, but autonomous national development cannot get past the dialectically necessary stage of national death. This problem is overcome through observing the death of another nation. The Romans, for example, admired the Greek way of life, but also knew that it was done with. Caesar embodies this consciousness of necessity: he knows what the need [Not] of the time is (30, 45).

A theory of marginal dialectical relations therefore gives an explanation of the succession of Mediterranean empires. It is notable that, despite being a logic of dialectical succession, this phase presupposes a geographical region in which multiple, interconnected populations are developing at different speeds. It appears, then, that the overall story here concerns the alternative ways that a geography of multiple populations can be figured.

18.2.3. Historicity

Germanic history is an internalization of the dialectic of the successive empires. The individuality of the dialectical progress of the spirit of the world is realized in the Germanic world. The logical model for
this difference would be that the Greek world has finite actuality as its logical structure. Its ideality is the reflection of itself as possibility, and it goes over into another actuality. By contrast, the Germanic world has substantial power as its logical structure. It actualizes itself but also turns against this actuality, and realizes itself as the self-related negativity.

Why is the West a single development rather than a succession? This mode of historicity has two aspects: the side of ideal self-determination, and the side of actual structure. The side of ideal self-determination concerns Christian self-understanding. There is a relation of succession among the Mediterranean empires because the empires are tied to national projects. Each people is universal in the sense of being able to incorporate both change and diverse ethnic groups. However, this universality is limited. By contrast, the Germanic world is able to survive national death through its religious self-reflection in Christianity. Christianity provides a religious figuration of the particularization of the universal principle. According to Hegel, Christianity enunciates a present Kingdom of Christ, not merely a future one (332, 400). The universal side of the Kingdom of Christ is the religious side, but the secular side is the particular, phenomenal Christian state: “The religious existence of the Church is governed by Christ; the secular side of its government is left to the free choice of the members themselves” (332, 400). The particular political achievement of Christianity is the religious idea of the relativization of the particular secular order as the phenomenal existence of the present divine state.

The Germanic world therefore has the form of substantial power, since its political and national forms are posited as manifestations of a divine kingdom. Yet it is also a principle that is working itself out, because the principle of substantial power is initially only a principle. Subsequent Western history is therefore structured around the working out of the sense in which the universal is present in the particular, from the investiture contests, through the theory of the divine right of kings, to the modern problem of democratic legitimation (452, 533-534). Nonetheless, this developmental self-relation is what we should expect from an entity with the form of substantial power, as we have seen in the Logic.

On the other hand, the Kingdom of Christ is not simply an abstract universal. As we have seen, Hegel sees the advantage of the Western development of interiority over Islam to be its concretization. The continuum of European civilization occurs across its particularization as a variety of peoples, states and political orders. The structural aspect of the continuity of the West therefore seems to be that the unthematized continuity of society which allowed Rome to relate dialectically to Greece is now thematized. Christendom is never a successful political entity, but it nevertheless organizes the network of Western civilization that
transmits and disseminates the political experiences of its particular peoples. Christianity gives this European cultural area a self-understanding that allows it to remain an individual and develop across the proto-plasmic mutations of its peoples and the repeated re-ordering of its states.

This is the religious basis for the modern world of reciprocal effect and recognition. Mutual recognition between states is precisely what pre-Christian Rome lacks: “The equal right to existence entails a union of states, as in modern Europe” (308, 373). Rome lacks this respect for other nations because of the manner in which its religion is universalistic. The universalism of Christendom, by contrast, is that of the universal that becomes particular.

As we have seen, pluralism re-emerges in modern Europe as reciprocity. The spirit of the world particularizes itself as a reciprocity which finds determinate expression in its composite nation-states. Like simultaneity and succession, historicity is a determination of geography, converting the externality of succession and dialectics at the margins into historicity and internal reciprocity.

A schematic history of world-spirit can therefore be reconstructed that gives an account of the mechanism of all three of its main phases: simultaneity, succession, and historicity. In the first phase, geographically distinct human populations form collective identities which are based on one of the three forms of totality: universality, individuality and particularity. In isolation, the future possibilities of these phases are either destruction or arrested development. Political changes are merely alternations on the surface of this enduring substrate.

The second phase of development requires an interplay between cultures. Under conditions in which human populations are broken up but also connected, such as a region broken up by mountains or the sea, it is possible to have interconnected parallel developments, and therefore the marginal dialectics needed for more developed phases of political organization.

The third phase of development occurs when the dialectical development between the preceding successive civilizations is posited as a development by the world itself. The world ceases to identify itself with its particular configuration, but regards the configuration as a phase in its own development. This thought is initially posited in a religious form. Retrospectively, the turn-over of the Mediterranean empires becomes Heilsgeschichte, while prospectively, the particular political forms of the world are the existential aspect of the present Kingdom of Christ.
This analysis of the mechanics of the development of world-spirit shows that two stories about history can be distinguished. The first story is the story of human freedom as played out in different social configurations. The second story is the development of dialectical development itself. There is a meta-process with three phases: simultaneity, succession, historicity.

The final form of history should be the fulfilment of this development—a rational world where the individual is reconciled to the totality and a further intensification and conclusion of the series simultaneity-succession-historicity. The interconnection of these two stories is already implicit in the fact that philosophical history is an element in the realization of freedom. The rationality of the world which allows the individual to be reconciled to it is an essentially historical rationality. Consequently, the development of history as single individual on one hand requires the thought of the development of the universal across its particular phases as we saw in the case of the Germanic world, and on the other hand, the explicit thought of this unity requires that the unity already be actualized. Furthermore, once this thought is made explicit, the Germanic world is in one sense terminated, since its history has been the struggle to realize the divine-human reconciliation, and on the other hand is perpetuated, since its principle has been made explicit. After this point, the structure of historicity should be self-conscious dialectical self-development. D'Hondt reminds us that the sense in which Hegel allows us to draw lessons from history is precisely this mode of self-consciousness (27).

The closure of history that we anticipated in chapter 13, is beset by the problem of both regulating all possible narratives and being one among many (Kolb, Circulation 66). The concept is Hegel's answer, but it needs a concrete content (67). This complex categorial content is actualized in the state (71). However, the ideal state is never actualized—it only has contingent forms, and consequently the universal in fact never fully particularizes itself (72). Bourgeois makes the same criticism (78). Burbidge similarly locates the closure in Hegel’s open future on a religious-philosophical level, rather than a historical level (Hegel's Open Future 187). These views are correct in seeing that the people-with-a-state is not the level of adequate historical individuality. Instead, the spirit of the world is the appropriate level. This over-all narrative provides the means to integrate local narratives as its own particularizations. Not only is it equipped with the logical categories, but also with the alternatives for structuring a global totality. Indeed, the ability of the concept to remain itself in its alterity mean that global reciprocity simultaneously preserves itself as a reciprocity even in its self-external forms, such as war.
18.3 Summary

History can be considered from a philosophical perspective because the spatio-temporal conditions for self-reflection give rise to a logical development. An outline of a philosophical history is possible because we can describe from a purely philosophical point of view the conditions of this development, without finding the precise details of the actual history.

There are essentially three levels of individuality that operate in a philosophical history: human individuals, peoples and the spirit of the world. The idea of a spirit of the world is perhaps the most controversial of the forms of individuality in the history. The spirit of the world is an accumulation of conditions by which dialectical self-development intensifies. An entity that is able to relate to and sublate its external forms in space and time arises as a contingent accumulation of conditions. However, once it has assembled, this entity can retrace its own becoming. In logical terms, it converts mere externality into presupposed conditions.

The spirit of the world therefore appears merely as an initial potential for itself. This is a general condition, and therefore occurs in multiple instances in space, a simultaneity. This allows for a general theory of society. The next condition for world-spirit appears to be a simultaneous connection and separation of populations. On this basis, world-spirit is the dialectical in-itself of a succession of empires. The final major condition is for the particular form of the nation to be thematized as particular. At this point, spirit becomes a dialectical entity that posits its conditions as conditions and becomes the principle for synthesizing history. The final form of the spirit of the world actualizes itself by relating the external, parallel forms of its initial problematic which remain distributed around the globe in the form of distinct cultures. Western culture is disseminated throughout the globe, and the question of the nature of the mode of globalization is paramount. We can be confident that future development will be an extension of mutual recognition, albeit through painful self-opposition.
19. CONCLUSION

19.1 Summary
This thesis has three sections: an introductory section, chapters 1-4; a section applying the logic of essence from Hegel's Science of Logic to history, chapters 5-14; and a section analyzing the forms of individuality and the manner in which they are totalized in Hegel's philosophy of history, chapters 15-18.

In the first section, Collingwood showed that the problem of historical individuality is one of ontology rather than epistemology, and that its solution requires a conception of a rationally structured historical object, such as a narrative entity. However, Collingwood's account was undeveloped, and failed to include an account of how the totality relates dialectically to an individual. In the second chapter, we discovered that individuality can be thought in several ways: 1) It signifies contingent actuality and finite objective relations. 2) It signifies the manner in which categories are not behind or above this actuality, but rather are a totality that is dialectically related to the contingent and to the individual that stands out against the background. 3) We further discovered that being reflects on itself through the spiritual mediation, and thus through history. A key feature of history is that it cannot be thought against a background of static concepts. In the third chapter, several questions of interpretation that bear upon the execution of this dissertation have been discussed. These all concerned the relation of Logic to history, and how this necessitates a dissertation that a) unfolds the categories of the logic of essence as a narrative while bringing out their relation to history and b) then uncovers the categorical structure as it occurs in philosophical history itself.

In the second section, I showed how a dialectic of essence could emerge from an assembly of natural conditions, and then generate a series of totalizing relations to spatio-temporal externality. This sequence reveals that the logic of essence is the categorical structure of historical time, and thus that historical time is premissed upon the existence of a self-reflective entity. This reflective entity fulfils Fackenheim's demand that spirit be "overreaching" by establishing a series of categorical forms in which it is other to itself in the form of an individual against a universal, or as particularity against totality. The ultimate form in this series is a totalizing relation of the historical world to itself in the form of reciprocal causal substance. As such, the historical world becomes explicitly self-determining. Firstly, this means that the world recognizes the past series of its forms as its own self-determining movement. Secondly, this means that the world rises above the necessity of history and becomes freely self-determining.
In the third section, I turned from this hypothetical history to real history. This section comprised an analysis of the varieties of individual that occur in Hegel’s writings on philosophical history, specifically in regard to the manner in which they fit into totalities. Historical individuality was broken into four topics: ordinary citizens, world-historical individuals, national spirits, and the world spirit. The subsequent chapters explained how these levels of individuality made use of Hegel’s categorical scheme that were analyzed in the previous section.

19.2 An Introduction to Philosophical History

The foregoing analysis of Hegel has provided us with two strands of inquiry into the nature of historical individuality. It is now necessary to bring these two strands together in order to conclude our inquiry. The first strand provides a series of categories to articulate the relation between the totality, the individual and the particular. The second strand, the historical, examines the appearance of self-reflective entities in the world, how they interrelate collectively, and how they form a history. In this conclusion, what is necessary is to run through the manner in which human individuals are articulated into states, and the manner in which states are articulated into a total history, with emphasis on the way that a rational totality is formed that nonetheless preserves its self-externalization as particular individuals and finite spirit.

19.2.1. Human Individuality

In history, the identity of the universal and the individual that we saw at the conclusion of the logic of essence is expressed as the problem that the people has its self-identical negativity as a human individual, while the human individual has its identity-with-self in society. The mediating particular is the determinate form of society, as determined by its principle.

The radical opposition of the human individual and the national universal does not connote an essential independence on the part of humans, or in other words, an original freedom. Rather, this opposition is a self-externality. Specifically, human consciousness is in principle the capacity for free self-development. However, in this ‘in principle’ form it has two external aspects—either it is what is abstractly common to all humans, or it is an immersion of the human individual in her or his particular situation. In either case, the human individual is the opposite of a free self-development. That is, the human individual in this state is externally conditioned by society and by nature. This is world in an inner-outer opposition. The solution to the fundamental historical problem, which is, the reconciliation of the human individual with the state, should therefore mean that the human individual is also self-reconciled and fully individuated.
We have seen that the concept is the ultimate solution to the logic of essence, because the terms at once differentiate themselves and remain themselves in the difference. The concept therefore expresses the identity of difference with itself. This allows us to thematize truly historical being as something that is what it is in becoming other. In the history, this conceptual form is the fundamental capacity for thought of the human individual. Consequently, the form of the concept comes up immediately at the beginning of history. However, as we have seen, it is self-external, as a political universal over against its self-externalization as a plurality of individuals. The concept thus comes up originally in the form of the category of existence. The problem is that the universal cannot simply subsume the individuals, because as a plurality of individuals, the individuals are the self-externalization of the universal, and therefore, supposedly, its free self-expression.

The chapters from the Logic which we have analyzed above can be read as a theory of the development of the idea of what it means to be a human individual. The guiding theological idea, as we have seen from the History, is the idea of incarnation, which is the bringing together of the universal with the particular.

The appropriate part of the logic to begin with is the confrontation of the existing thing with its mediation through ground and conditions. The historical problem is that the essential individuality of thought is split up into many human individuals. Similarly, the existing thing repels itself from itself in its particularity and becomes a self-external manifold of things. This is a basic configuration for thinking society. The human individuals in a society sublate the ground provided by society and nature as their substantial background.

However, the reflection into self which they achieve, cutting off their own mediation, is also a particularization. The contradiction here is that human individuals are particularized as this or that person, while for themselves they are essentially the central thing of existence, for which everything else is sublated mediation. Society is thus both the concrete totality of inter-subjective relations and concrete human existence and also the continuity of thinghood which sublates this difference between people and makes them essentially the same intro-reflection of society.

As we saw in the analysis of thinghood given above, society becomes the dominant term over the individual humans, since their particularity is merely a participation in the totality, and their individuality is merely an instantiation of universal subjectivity. Being a human individual is therefore firstly a generic mode of relation between non-particular subjectivity and particular conditions. However, as we saw, the dialectic of stuffs makes the particular things, human individuals,
into points of concentration and exclusion for social materials. Further, the character of the individuals then becomes law. That is, the individuals become points of differentiation and determination for social materials, against a background universal of social meanings, which is, the ethical background.

Individuality is no longer an indifferent thinghood. Instead, it is a manifesting activity that manifests itself as a manifesting. As we saw, this is the general form of force and expression, inner and outer, absolute and mode, possibility and actuality and cause and effect. The side of pure negativity only has an existence by laying itself out, and this laying out of itself is its completion in its other. The problem of human individuatedness is the relation between the implicitly universal human characteristic of self-reflection, or individuation, and the particularization of this essence as a particular human being. The forms of self-manifestation are ways of articulating this self-othering of the universal.

The negativity of human individuation thus appears in the relation of actuality-possibility as a negative relation to one's own existence as the potential caused by the contradictoriness of this existence. This self-conscious negativity discharges itself as a new actuality in which the self-opposition of consciousness is resolved. The human individual is therefore not a thing but a reflective activity.

We have seen from the History that the individual cannot become objective to itself simply through the self-actualization that terminates possibility. The logic suggests that such actualities are a bad infinity where the individual remains negatively self-related. In other words, actuality never captures its self-opposition. Instead, the human individual can only realize itself in a result which is posited as an effect of itself. This is the origin of the requirement for an objective social background in which actions are recognized and recorded. Human individuation is activity which exists in being an action.

The individual posited as causal substance does not merely express itself through action, however, but presupposes its effect as its own identity. In terms of the human individual, this means that the resolution of the will-actuality opposition in an objective work is presupposed by human individuation. As we saw, objective human action presupposes law and a state, which is itself a work. The last phase of the historical problem at this individual level, therefore, is the self-externality of the human individual in the form of a presupposed identity, or passive substance. Because the universal, the people, is actual in its individual members, active causality and its identity in passive substance will appear in the form of opposed individual humans.
The final resolution, therefore, is firstly criminal violence perpetrated by the active individual, who takes up the role of active causality or individuality, upon the passive individual, who takes up the role of passive substance, or universality. The act of violence is not merely any act of violence, but a constitutive act of separation between two individuals in which they are both separated from a familial substance and become opposed persons. Reciprocity between these two persons means that each takes the role of the active individual and the role of the restored universal, or effect. The human individuals therefore become fully individuated by reacting against their own external determination by the other and re-determining the social relation between the two individuals.

However, this reaction shifts from violence into freedom when the continuity of substance is recognized as the continuation of activity into its effect, and of effect into activity. That is, the intrusion of the opposition into social substance is recognized on both sides not as violence but as the essential nature of individuality. Active and passive substance are united on each side as reactive substance.

The individuals are in the continuity of ethical action, while the individual in the active phase stands out from and opposes this continuity. However, this opposition is simply the reconstitution of the universal again. Reciprocity ceases to be a war, and becomes a mutual actualization and development of the inter-subjective universal. This should mean that humans are fully individual in working out their differentiated universal, society, through difference-constituting action.

What actual philosophical history must show us is how human individuals have worked out how to relate in particular to other individuals (community) and to other individuals as a whole (society). Logic suggests that the general form of this working out must be a mutual recognition of individuals as ethical individuals jointly engaged in this work of differentiation. This concludes the question of the incorporation of human individuals as individual into a totality.

However, the totality that human individuals form is always particular, as we have seen, in being given. The next level of integration is thus the incorporation of particular totalities into an absolute totality.

19.2.2. National Individuality

We have seen that social substance enters into the account of human individuals. It features as their ground and condition, as their concrete actuality, and as the continuity of subjectivity between one individual and another. However, because of this the social background can be read as the primary individual, for which human individuals are
merely the internal mechanism. Furthermore, as we have already noted, and as became apparent in the last section, the people is also implicitly the social totality, or global universal. Its problematic is thus again a relation between the particularity of a given people and its implicit identity with the global society.

The people undergoes a similar transformation on the macroscopic scale as its component individuals, finding itself as a finite spirit, that is, a particular people, rather than the intro-reflection of humanity as a whole. Once again, a mediation between particularity and the essential universality of the people is needed. As we have seen from the History, Hegel stresses that a people is not a thing but an activity or process. It is an individual only when it is working itself out as an effect, and it is terminated in the effect.

Furthermore, Hegel suggests a parallel between the role that law plays for human individuals in making their actions objective and the role that having a principle plays for the people. Only peoples which contribute to world-history achieve objectivity. World-history thus corresponds at a national level to law-governed society at the level of human individuals. Peoples concretized into states therefore identify themselves with global principles, and consider themselves to be bearers or exemplars of such principles.

The forms of essential relation express the relation between a global configuration, which is the essential totality that the people is implicitly, and the particularity of the phenomenal expression of this totality. This spatial problem is resolved in the dialectical relation between inner and outer. That is, the particular national expressions in a world form a system. As we saw in the chapter on essential relation, and in the analysis of the History, peoples become systematic through a marginal dialectic.

The shift to absolute actuality corresponds to the shift in the historicity of the Germanic world. As we saw in the Logic, absolute actuality is a dynamism that is particularized in self-opposed phases. The modern people-with-a-state becomes historical and thereby internalizes time. This shift also acts as a de-emphasis of people itself. As we saw in the History, people separates from its natural basis in ethnicity, language and even religion. Furthermore, the transition to historical society reduces the significance of the spatial distribution of people. Particular configurations of human society are therefore relativized in the face of a systematic global totality. The final, self-conscious phase of society is therefore no longer a spatial history, but a truly historical self-relation, in the categorical form of reciprocal causality. The final form of people, therefore, is world-spirit, as the historical entity that acts upon itself as a condition. As we saw in Chapter 13, this means that human activity works
upon the world as a condition, but equally the world produces human activity.

Bringing together the conclusions of chapters thirteen and eighteen, we can make out the determinate form of the fully historical age, which is also the age which totalizes all ages. An introduction to philosophical history cannot state more than the outline of what causal reciprocity would look like in history. However, causal reciprocity shows that self-externality in the form of a conditioning, natural being is in fact merely the effect of historical being on itself. The final form of historical consciousness is therefore free, immanent self-development.

In chapter eighteen, we discovered that world-spirit is not only the continuity of the various forms of human civilization, but also the final form that organizes the others. In particular, in the history of the Germanic world, the world spirit overcomes spatial and temporal finitude by making this finitude into its own explicitly internal process. As we saw, the structure of this world was substantial power. Nonetheless, the Germanic world was essentially parallel with the Roman world in its self-opposition. The final step, therefore, must be for the globalized world to take itself for its own absolute condition.

How this is worked out in concrete is the task of philosophical history, based on empirical research, to discern. The paradox is that only observation of the world can show us precisely what it means for the world to have the structure of causal reciprocity. As Kojève and Fackenheim argue in different ways, Hegel believed that he could see the reconciled world in contemporary historical conditions—either the Protestant, bourgeois world, or the post-Napoleonic world. However, this seems less certain today. Yet we can also have the idea of how such reconciliation can occur, because the logical categories give us the means to think even nature as totality. In the end, the category of causal reciprocity thereby gives us the means to think even a fractured world as a self-determining system.
NOTE: Citations of Hegel’s works give the English translation first, followed by the German original, as below. References to Science of Logic include the volume number of the original division into three volumes, as reflected in the pagination of the Meiner edition. References to Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right include paragraph numbers. Quotations from Lectures on Philosophy of History are mine, based on and with reference to Sibree’s translation.


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