DIONYSIUS AND GREEK TRADITION

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AND

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By

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This thesis seeks to demonstrate that although Diodorus was catholic in the choice of sources employed for the Bibliotheke, Philistus was the authority exerting the major influence on the chapters on Dionysius I.

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ABBREVIATIONS

In the notes to the chapters the following abbreviations for the journals have been used.

A. A. P.: Atti del'Accademia Scienze et Letteraria Arte di Palermo
A. H. R.: American Historical Review
A. J. Ph.: American Journal of Philology
A. and A.: Antike und Abendland
A. Ant. Hung.: Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae
A. Class.: Acta Classica
A. S. N. P.: Annali della Scuolo Normale Superiore di Pisa
A. S. S.: Archivio Storico Siciliano
B. S. C.: Bolletino Storico Catanese
B. R. L.: Bulletin of the John Rylands Library
C. H. J.: Cambridge Historical Journal
C. J. : Classical Journal
C. Phil.: Classical Philology
C. Q.: Classical Quarterly
C. R.: Classical Review
C. S.: Critica Storica
C. W.: Classical Weekly
G. and R.: Greece and Rome
G. R. B. S.: Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies
H. S. Phil.: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
H. Z.: Historische Zeitschrift
J. H. S.: Journal of Hellenic Studies
J. R. S.: Journal of Roman Studies
M. A. L.: Memoria della Classe di Scienze Morali e Storiche dell'Academia di Lincei
N. C.: Numismatic Chronicle
N. J. C. P.: Neue Jahrbucher für Classische Philologie
P. A. C. A.: Proceedings of the African Classical Association
P. B. A.: Proceedings of the British Academy
P. C. A.: Proceedings of the Classical Association
P. P. : La Parola del Passato
Pand P.: Past and Present
P. S. Q.: Political Science Quarterly
R. A. L.: Rendiconti Academia di Lincei
R. E. G.: Revue des Etudes Grecques
R. F. I. C.: Rivista di Filologia di Istruzione Classica
R. H.: Revue Historique
Rh. M.: Rheinisches Museum
R. I. L.: Rendiconti Instituto Lombardo
R. S. A.: Rivista di Storia Antica
R. S. I. N.: Rivista Storica Italiano Napoli
S. I. F. C.: Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica
T. A. Ph. A.: Transactions of the Americal Philological Association
W. J. A.: Wurzburger Jahrbucher fur die Altertumswissenschaft
Y. Cl. S.: Yale Classical Studies

INTRODUCTION

In spite of the political and military importance of Dionysius I of Syracuse, both contemporary and later evidence is severely limited. Moreover, extant contemporary testimony stems chiefly from Athens. The evidence of Lysias and Isocrates, a few notices in Xenophon's Hellenica and a small amount of epigraphic testimony shed light upon the relations of Dionysius and Athens. As regards local information, a few fragments from Dionysius' own tragedies, the seventh and eighth Platonic Epistles, and important numismatic evidence, constitute the sole testimony. A couple of references in Aristotle's Politics and some valuable notices on Dionysius' financial policies in the second book of the Pseudo-Aristotle's Oeconomica are the only other extant sources from the fourth century B. C. For the rest, we must be content with much later sources. In fact, all that is preserved with any degree of substantiality is found in the accounts of Diodorus, Justin, Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch. It is true that references are found in Cicero, Strabo, Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Frontinus, Polyaenus, Aelian, Sidonius Appollinaris and Ammianus Marcellinus. These are, however, sparse and, generally speaking, of a gossipy nature, deriving from the late hostile legacy and shedding little

light on the crucial events of Dionysius' reign. The same, indeed, applies to the somewhat fuller account, preserved in Plutarch. Justin's epitome of Trogus Pompeius' Philippica, which seems to derive from the early tradition of Theopompus, is valuable though limited, in that by its very nature it is a summary. Further, it begins with the defeat of Himilcon's army in 396 B. C. and thus does not provide any account of the rise of Dionysius and the great encounter preceding Himilcon's defeat. Nepos' account seems to derive from the early Philistus tradition, but again it constitutes the briefest of expositions.

Thus Diodorus emerges as the only source of any substance. Indeed, without Diodorus' testimony, it would be impossible to reconstruct the history of Sicily under Dionysius at all. The problem is that Diodorus lived three and a half centuries after Dionysius. Accordingly, acceptance of Diodorus' testimony is essentially conditioned by the problem of the validity of the accounts of the sources which he employed. First, the question to be asked is, did he employ one or many sources? Second, what was his approach to the sources which he utilized? Does any evidence suggest that Diodorus possessed a certain degree of individuality in the use which he made of his authorities?

Inevitably, any consideration of the sources employed by Diodorus for his Sicilian narrative is limited to the historians about whom adequate testimony exists. It

follows that little can be said about historians of the fourth century like Dionysius himself, Hermias of Methymna and Alcimus Siculus. Diodorus may have seen their accounts, as he seems to have seen the work of their contemporary, Polycritus of Mende. However, we know virtually nothing about their works, except that they appear to have discussed Dionysius. It is, moreover, very likely that Diodorus would employ as chief evidence the more distinguished historians. Indeed, the evidence of the fragments found in Diodorus clearly indicates that this was the case. Accordingly, decisive conclusions as to the influence of the lesser known historians upon Diodorus is impossible. Attention must, therefore, be focused upon the testimonies of historians about whom tradition was well informed: Philistus, Ephorus, Theopompus and Timaeus.

Research conducted upon Diodorus' Bibliotheke during the last century has concluded that Diodorus' account of Dionysius derives essentially from Timaeus, although it is often conceded that Ephorus might have exerted some influence. It has been assumed that Diodorus possessed no individuality and that he was merely capable of reproducing what his sources wrote. Even when it was conceded that more than one source was employed at a time, Diodorus was regarded as no more than a scissors-and-paste historian, stitching together the accounts of his predecessors in an entirely uncritical fashion.

It is true that a few scholars have reacted to these conclusions. In the case of the Sicilian chapters of the Bibliotheke, Holm and Freeman protested strongly against the assumption that Diodorus was only capable of reproducing the works of his predecessors.[1] However these protests had little effect upon scholarship and the conclusions of the scholars who were attacked by Holm and Freeman, were accepted and developed in subsequent studies.

A few cries of protest continued to be heard, though not in a specifically Sicilian context. M. Kunz's important study of Diodorus' Procemium attributed more individuality to Diodorus than had hitherto been considered to be the case.[2] P. Treves, in reviewing the work, expressed approval of Kunz's thesis, and in an independent study on the sources for book sixteen, sought to prove that Diodorus used many sources of less importance than the major authorities for his account of Philip II of Macedon.[3]

More recently, J. Palm's study of the purely philological aspects of the Bibliotheke reached the conclusion that a definite stylistic unity characterized the work.[4] Even more important for the point of view espoused in the present study, R. Drews has shown that the work's historiographical aims and methodology reflect a unity of conception.[5]

It must be stressed that no scholar since Holm and Freeman has deviated from the view that the chapters in

Diodorus' Bibliotheke on Dionysius I, stemmed from Timaeus, perhaps with additions from Ephorus, and that Diodorus' choice was not motivated by particular historiographical objectives, which betrayed any individuality on the part of the historian. A primary aim of this study is, therefore, to rectify this situation and re-establish the validity of the claim of Holm and Freeman. At the same time the present writer's debt to the research of the above scholars will be apparent in the course of this study, particularly in the exposition of the concluding chapter.

The first chapter will be devoted to an examination of the views of those scholars who assume that Diodorus merely reproduced the accounts of Timaeus and Ephorus. I shall seek to demonstrate the weaknesses inherent in the two approaches adopted towards source criticism of Diodorus' text. In the course of this investigation, it will be shown that Diodorus seems to have used many sources. In addition it will be suggested that a synthesis of the approaches of Laqueur and his predecessors is the course to be followed.

Chapter two will be devoted to an analysis of Diodorus' text, and the conclusion thereby derived will be shown to indicate that the source upon whom Diodorus relied the most was Philistus. Chapter three will deal with Philistus' viewpoint, in particular the relationship of Philistus' thought to that of Thucydides. In chapter four, I intend to discuss the evidence for Punic-Siceliot relations in the last decade of the fifth century. The

purpose of this enquiry is to demonstrate the unreliability of the text's view of the Syracusan demos and the governments of the Siceliot states. It will be shown that far greater strength characterized their position than the text implies, and that this reflects the Thucydidean-type animosity of Philistus towards Siceliot achievement.

Having sought to establish Philistus as the chief source of Diodorus, I shall attempt to indicate the extent to which Philistus' ideological position corresponds to that of the major fourth century political thinkers. It will be shown that similar ideals are found in Xenophon, Isocrates, Ephorus, Theopompus and Plato, and that they represent a strong conservative reaction against democracy, involving the establishment of monarchical rule rather than that of aristocratic government. Because this conservatism possessed a marked idealistic tone, the aims of these persons did not correspond to the realities of the political situation. Hence the conflictsof Philistus and Dionysius and Plato and Dionysius are closely related, and are not to be regarded as isolated from the experiences of Xenophon and the Isocratics. Finally, it will be shown that Philistus' association with Thucydides is based upon a common moral viewpoint, which contrasted strongly with that of the Isocratic school.

In chapter six, I shall trace the tradition about Dionysius which developed after Philistus; discuss the role

of Ephorus and Theopompus and the growth of the hostile tradition, culminating in the history of Timaeus of Tauromenium; and assess the extent of these influences upon Diodorus. It will be shown that though there is little doubt that Diodorus consulted all these later sources, it is, at the same time, clear that he relied mostly upon Philistus. This conclusion will be confirmed in the final chapter, where Diodorus' individuality and the unity of his conception of history will be indicated. It will thus be apparent that precise historical objectives influenced Diodorus' choice of Philistus as his chief source, and that Diodorus did tend to consult as many authorities as possible for his account of Dionysius I.

I

DIODORUS' SOURCES AND MODERN SCHOLARSHIP

The research of modern scholars, though resulting in similar conclusions, can be divided into two distinct categories. Early source criticism was based upon a consideration of external factors. Laqueur's method, which certainly resulted from the earlier techniques, constituted, in fact, a radical new approach, in that it was based upon the premise that essential to any source identification was an examination of the text. Both approaches possess a great deal of validity, though, as will be indicated, the errors of their protagonists lay in their unwillingness to effect a synthesis of both methods. In this chapter, the arguments will be examined, and reasons produced for effecting conclusions upon their unsatisfactory nature.

1. Source Criticism before Laqueur

Chr. Volquardson, in his pioneer study of the sources of Diodorus' Bibliotheke, concluded that, whereas Ephorus was the chief authority for the portion discussing the Greek mainland from the Persian Wars to the rise of Macedon, the same period of Sicilian history derived from Timaeus.[1] This certainly does not represent the ultimate word on the issue of Diodorus' sources. Yet the attempts

of Bachof, Schwartz and, indeed, Laqueur at modifying this thesis were not of a radical nature and merely introduced the possibility that Ephorus, too, might have exerted some influence upon the Sicilian chapters. Indeed, the general consensus of opinion still accepts the viewpoint that Diodorus used Ephorus for the account of the Greek homeland, while Timaeus was employed for the West. Holm and Freeman, whose reasoning was so sound when they sought to dethrone Volquardson and his colleagues from their position of supremacy, were unable to command enough support in their endeavours. Volquardson's arguments to support his contention were largely taken over by Ed. Schwartz, who certainly felt that Timaeus was the decisive influence upon Diodorus, and that he was the chief source employed.[2] Bachof, in fact, attacking Holm, anticipated Schwartz in the conclusion, that in spite of probable Ephorus influence upon the text, Timaeus was the chief source of Diodorus.[3] According to Laqueur, Diodorus had in front of him Ephorus who was his basic source: Timaeus was used to fill in the details.[4] This might appear to represent a radical step away from the Volquardson theory. However, since Laqueur attributes about two thirds of Diodorus' text to Timaeus, and thus makes Timaeus a major rather than a subsidiary source, he is much nearer to the conventional solution than might appear at first sight. Jacoby expressed disagreement with the details of Laqueur's thesis: its general nature

was, however, accepted by him.[5] Even Stroheker, whose approach differed considerably from the efforts of earlier scholars, continued to maintain that the decisive influence upon Diodorus was Timaeus.[6] Essentially, this was the view accepted by De Sanctis, Busolt, Wachsmuth, Schoenle, Sartori, Drews, Woodhead, Barber, Luria, Gsell, Berve and Arias.[7] Even R. Lauritano, who claimed that Diodorus' source was Silenus was forced to admit the weight of Timaeus' influence.[8] One scholar betrayed real hesitation and inclined towards the cautious and, it must be admitted, somewhat negative approach of Holm and Freeman. However, even in the case of M. Kunz, the decision against Timaeus was not, in any way, decisive.[9]

At the base of this contention lay the fact that the source cited most often was Timaeus. This fact lay at the root of the claims of Volquardson and Laqueur, and it is likely that similar considerations influenced the other scholars, Bachof, Laqueur and Stroheker, even if not explicitly stated by them. The next most-cited authority was Ephorus; therefore, it was argued by Schwartz, that the other source of importance employed by Diodorus was Ephorus. Schwartz indeed, by basing his argument upon the citations, followed Volquardson in attempting to discover a wider use of Ephorus and Timaeus. He differed in attempting to incorporate Ephorus into the scheme of Diodorus' source. Both Schwartz and Volquardson argued that the numbers of the

barbarians of Diodorus appear to have been based upon Timaeus, and not upon Ephorus, for it was Ephorus who gave the higher numbers and Timaeus the lower; and Diodorus seems to agree with Timaeus by adopting the lower numbers.[10] Similarly both writers believed that the excursus on Acragantine luxury was derived from Timaeus, for there are two references to him, a fact which, they argued, indicated that Timaeus was the source.[11] Jacoby accepted this thesis and the Acragantine chapters consequently appear in his collection as a fragment of Timaeus. The reference to Tellias,[12] it is argued, was therefore also taken from Timaeus, for Tellias appears in Diodorus' account of Acragantine luxury.[13] Likewise both scholars were of the opinion that since Diodorus, at one point referred back the mention of Dexippus to Timaeus,[14] therefore, the other reference to Dexippus came from Timaeus.[15] Finally agreement upon the numbers of the Acragantine inhabitants led to the conclusion that they were based upon the authority of Timaeus.[16]

The validity of these arguments which attempt to find more extensive use of Timaeus than indicated by the fragments themselves is challenged by the fact that the only evidence which we have of the use of Timaeus or Ephorus or indeed of Polycritus of Mende, is when Diodorus actually cites these writers. At no point in the narrative is it stated that these historians are represented in the whole of Diodorus' portion on Sicily and it is clear that the

fragments cannot form a basis for a wider identification.

On eleven occasions alone are we able to attribute with certainty a part of Diodorus' work to Timaeus. Very little is revealed on the five occasions when Diodorus cites Ephorus and Timaeus, in connection with the numerical problem.[17] All that we, in fact, know is that the problem of numbers represented a difference of opinion on the part of Ephorus and Timaeus. We are certainly not justified in assuming on the basis of these references, that the rest of book thirteen is entirely based upon either Ephorus or Timaeus, or that it is a compilation of both.

It must be asked whether Diodorus or his sources were compelled to cite this divergence of opinion for a definite purpose? It is possible that motives of nationalism compelled the universal historian Ephorus to adopt exaggerated numbers. Whether this is the case or not, the fact is that Timaeus adopted a more conservative estimate, and that the text's aim is to distinguish between the opinion of the local historian and the Isocratean universalist. In other words, it appears that the only reason for the reference to Ephorus and Timaeus is to indicate that a difference regarding barbarian numbers existed.

In five other cases can the evidence of Timaeus be regarded as decisive. First, there is the important digression on Acragantine luxury. This occurs between

the reference to the gathering of the crops and possessions within the city walls and the preparations of the Acragantines for the Carthaginian attack[18] and the beginning of the campaign of Carthage against Acragas.[19] In the course of this sketch, Diodorus twice singles out the authority of Timaeus. In the first case, he refers to the monument which Timaeus saw with his own eyes.[20] The second citation is connected with Tellias' generosity. Here reference is made to the actual book of Timaeus' book fifteen.[21] Whether the whole excursus on the wealth of Acragas derived from Timaeus is a question about which, on the evidence cited by Volquardson, Schwartz and Laqueur, one cannot be dogmatic. The two citations in themselves do not warrant such an assumption. All that can be said is that Timaeus saw the monument referred to above and that the story of Tellias' generosity came from Timaeus.

However, it will, in fact, be seen below that significant evidence lends support to the conclusion of Volquardson, Schwartz and Laqueur. In the first place, I shall show that Diodorus is not alone in attributing an interest in Acragantine luxury to Timaeus. Second, the evidence which we have concerning Timaeus' attitude to Acragas and Sicily in general, confirms the argument attributing this excursus to Timaeus. Third, there is the question of the comparative position of this topic in the works of Diodorus and Timaeus. Even then, the evidence is

in no respect decisive, and it cannot be proved that Timaeus is the sole authority for the Acragantine excursus. We must ask for what purpose Timaeus decided to include it in his narrative? The possibility that Timaeus' source contained the excursus cannot be discounted. Finally, there is the problem of the excursus in the general scheme of Diodorus.[22]

The second instance where Timaeus was probably the source is closely concerned with the question of numbers, which has already been referred to. Volquardson, Schwartz and Laqueur noted that Diodorus based his numbers of the barbarians upon Timaeus.[23] The same may be stated about the agreement on the number of the Acragantine population.[24] At the same time, it must be stated that other sources may have agreed with Timaeus, and Ephorus is not the only alternative.

The final three passages which obviously betray use by Diodorus or Timaeus, since he is explicitly cited, are those describing the bronze statue of Apollo and Alexander, Dexippus and the bull of Phalaris.[25]

These are the only passages which can definitely be said to derive from Timaeus and Ephorus. No evidence exists to support the contention that these were the only sources employed by Diodorus. The citations from Ephorus and Timaeus can only be regarded as the starting point for a discussion on the question of Diodorus' sources for books

thirteen and fourteen.

The problem of the existence of the authority of Ephorus by the side of Timaeus was solved in three ways. First, it was argued that Diodorus read both Timaeus and Ephorus and that the influence of both were found in his history. Thus Laqueur claimed that he knew exactly where Diodorus used each of these two authorities. Second, it has been assumed that even though Diodorus probably read Ephorus, Diodorus relied mostly upon Timaeus. Laqueur indeed came close to accepting such a view, and it is certainly implicit in Schwartz, Bachof and Stroheker, who undoubtedly attributed most of Diodorus' narrative to Timaeus. Finally, there remains the suggestion that Diodorus did not even see Ephorus, a view particularly associated with Volquardson, who had no doubt that Timaeus alone was Diodorus' source, and that the Ephorus citations were derived from Timaeus. As has been noted, Volquardson's arguments were sufficiently weighty that Stroheker, in fact, adopted him. Thus, although three different solutions have been indicated, it is clear that it is impossible to describe a consistent trend towards a single solution, with the result that the majority of the opinions of modern authorities tend to fluctuate between the three solutions. Nevertheless, for the sake of coherent argument and rejection, the three solutions have to be considered.

The question is basically of a twofold nature. First,

can it be argued that Timaeus is the sole source? Alternatively, if the authority of Ephorus is also accepted, can it be said that Timaeus and Ephorus are the only sources of Diodorus?

A general argument against both claims is closely connected with the commonly-held conception of Diodorus.[26] It is generally assumed that it was Diodorus' practice merely to stitch together excerpts from the efforts of other historians. Holm and Freeman campaigned energetically against this a priori assumption, and it is clear that the validity of their contention is supported by three factors.[27] First, the common view is often based upon vague theorizing or the acceptance of the general conclusions of earlier scholars. Second, this assumption is often associated with limited sections of Diodorus, and it is assumed that what is probably for a particular section is equally relevant for the rest of the work.[28] Finally the possibility of the existence of unity of thought on the part of Diodorus is simply ignored.[29] It is thus clear that a dogmatic conclusion that Diodorus was unable to speak for himself, and tended merely to reproduce one source at a time, either with others incorporated or alone, tends to be based upon arguments founded on limited evidence of a doubtful nature. The possibility that Diodorus in his Sicilian narrative used, for example, Philistus or Theopompus, as well as Timaeus or Ephorus, cannot be overlooked, and the existence of material

derived from these other sources cannot be denied, without producing definite reasons for Diodorus' failure to use it.

It is extremely unlikely that Diodorus ignored the authority of Ephorus. Volquardson adopted what is now the traditional view that Diodorus based his account of events in the Greek homeland predominantly upon the testimony of Ephorus. In this view he was followed in particular by Schwartz. The fact that Volquardson adopted this view renders his interpretation on the sources for Sicilian history extremely unlikely. It presupposes the view noted above, that Diodorus was a mere copyist, following one source or more at a time. Volquardson' reconstruction of the nature of Diodorus' ability as an historian is quite clearly representative of the popular picture of the simple-minded Diodorus who at the most was capable of copying word for word from efforts of his predecessors. The weaknesses inherent in this supposition have been clearly shown. The fact is that it is most unlikely that Diodorus would have read Ephorus' account of the history of the Greek mainland, and ignored his account of Sicilian events.

Volquardson was not embarrassed by references to facts recorded by Ephorus.[30] His answer was simple: Diodorus received this from quotations which he found in Timaeus. The above noted objection applies equally well to this claim: if Ephorus was used for the narrative of the bulk of Greek history, why should he not have been used

for Sicilian history?

Three further facts support the view that the influence of Ephorus in Diodorus' text cannot be discounted. First, Holm observed that Ephorus is cited solely in connection with the question of numbers, and that the reference to the figures of Timaeus is given last. Therefore, Holm argued that Ephorus was logically the source, since Diodorus would first cite the source he was following and then refer to the contrary opinion. Holm certainly raised an important issue, and it might conceivably be assumed that Diodorus' techniques followed such a pattern. It must certainly be admitted that Diodorus might equally well not have been inclined to adopt such a procedure. It is certainly a situation which calls for the avoidance of dogmatic assertions. Holm's contention does, however, lend some credence to the view that Ephorus was not, as Volquardson asserted, merely reproduced secondhand by Diodorus from the narrative of Timaeus.

Second, it is clear that, if it appears in book thirteen that Diodorus, in respect to the barbarian numbers was following Timaeus' more moderate estimate, the same cannot be said about the situation in book fourteen. Here we possess only one citation from the two writers. Ephorus records the figure of 300,000 Punic soldiers: Timaeus, however, gives 130,000 (i. e. 100,000 + 30,000).[31] Now in the seventy-sixth chapter, the Carthaginians loose 150,000 men in the plague. Therefore, it seems clear that in the

battle before Syracuse, the higher figures of Ephorus were preferred to the lower figures of Timaeus.[32]

Finally, it must be stressed that the references to Timaeus' authority with the exception of the above passage from book fourteen are confined to the thirteenth book. Therefore as regards book fourteen, there is no more reason to prefer the authority of Timaeus to that of Ephorus. In the thirteenth book there are nine definite citations from Timaeus: in book fourteen, there is only one fragment. The latter is cited together with Ephorus and, as has been seen above, the evidence of numbers in a subsequent chapter suggests heavier reliance on Ephorus' figures than in the earlier book.

It is thus clear that Bachof, Schwartz and Laqueur were essentially correct to insist on the unlikelihood of Diodorus' reliance solely upon one source - Timaeus. Evidence indicating use of Ephorus is certainly not lacking. Furthermore, it must be stated that the case against Diodorus' probable use of sources other than Timaeus and Ephorus is exceedingly feeble. The evidence of the citations cannot be regarded as decisive proof of Diodorus' reliance upon these two authorities.

Volquardson was not deterred by Diodorus' mention of the dates which marked the terminus of the works of Thucydides and Philistus.[33] He assumed that they came from Appollodorus who is indeed mentioned in this context. Against

such reasoning, it must be stressed that the fact that Diodorus used Apollodorus is in itself no proof that Diodorus did not read these writers.

The possibility of a third source,Philistus, a contemporary of Dionysius exists. Indeed Volquardson's dismissal of Philistus as Diodorus' source rests upon particularly insecure grounds.[34] It is argued that as Diodorus' notice on the date which marked the close of the first part of Philistus' work[35] appears in the narration of the Peloponnesian War and not in the narrative of Sicilian history, therefore Diodorus did not read Philistus. The untenability of this argument is apparent when it is appreciated that Diodorus rounds off the affairs of 406 B. C. with this fact, together with the death of Sophocles and the possible death of Euripides. Thus Diodorus' mention of the termination of Philistus' work occurs in a perfectly logical position, and the fact that this does not appear in the Sicilian sections cannot be regarded as decisive evidence against the possibility of direct use of Philistus by Diodorus.

Schwartz argued that Philistus' famous dictum in Diodorus XIV. 8. 5, could only come from Timaeus and not from Philistus, as Plutarch knew.[36] Diodorus related that Philistus' advice to Dionysius at the time of the hoplite revolt was that it was not fitting to run away from the tyranny on a galloping horse, but that it was seemly to be

cast out and dragged by the leg. In Plutarch's account, it is stated that boys tied a rope to Philistus' lame leg and dragged him through the city, and the Syracusans mocked him, remembering his advice to Dionysius. The important point made by Plutarch is that this was based on Timaeus' authority and not Philistus', for Philistus denied that he had given this advice to Dionysius.

Against Schwartz, it must first be noted that this evidence does not indicate complete ignorance of Philistus' authority on the part of Diodorus. It perhaps merely indicates Diodorus' choosing to follow Timaeus on this point alone. Secondly, though Philistus denied making this remark himself, he never denied placing this statement in another person's mouth. The statement is certainly consistent with Philistus' attitude.

Positive evidence certainly exists indicating Diodorus' use of sources other than Philistus or Ephorus. As Volquardson observed, the notices on the jealousy of Agathocles for Gelon's grave, and on the survival of Diocles' laws to Timoleon's and Hieron's time, indicated a late source, perhaps Timaeus.[37]

Further, more positive evidence exists of the use of sources other than Ephorus and Timaeus. First, there is the citation of Polycritus of Mende. Certainly, Polycritus is a shadowy figure. He appears to have written a work on Dionysius I and a poetical work on Sicilian history.[38] He

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certainly lived before Timaeus. However, whether he was found by Diodorus in Timaeus or whether the author of the Bibliotheke consulted his work at first hand, cannot be proved. It certainly cannot be proved that Diodorus did not consult him. Again the extremely vague nature of the generalization in the traditional attitude to Diodorus must be emphasized.

Second, one of the references to the divergence of opinion concerning barbarian numbers in book thirteen does not cite Ephorus in contrast to Timaeus. It merely refers to τινες holding an opinion.[40] The question is why on this occasion, Ephorus is not cited? It would be logical to assume that Diodorus read more sources than Ephorus and Timaeus.

In the above case, it could be argued, though not conclusively by those holding the traditional view of Diodorus as an author incapable of selecting material critically and arranging it according to his own scheme, that the reference to τινες was found in Timaeus. Such an argument does not challenge the implications of the passage dealing with the bull of Phalaris. It is a somewhat misleading passage. As has been noted this text can be cited as evidence for Diodorus' use of Timaeus. At the same time, it can be regarded as proof that Diodorus read another historian - the historian who attacked Timaeus. This other writer has generally been

identified as Polybius.[41] Indeed, there is little doubt that Polybius was one of Diodorus' sources.[42] Also, Polybius is the only authority before Diodorus who mentions Timaeus' error.[43] The important point is first, that we have here a case of Diodorus' probable use of two sources; and secondly, it is a source later than Timaeus. The latter fact is especially significant, since it cannot be refuted by the claim that all sources other than Timaeus derive ultimately from Timaeus.[44]

Finally, two passages of a more doubtful nature may be noted. Regarding the thirty-five triremes sent by the Syracusans, Diodorus later gives the figure of twenty-five.[45] Bachof argued that this indicated a change of source. This is certainly possible. However, the fact that the change in figure represents mere error on the part of Diodorus or the manuscript tradition cannot be discounted. Bachof also noted that the reference to Diocles' death was followed by an account of Diocles' legislation.[46] Bachof argued that a change from Ephorus to Timaeus is indicated in both cases. Again, it must be stressed that the possibility of a source change is there. Yet it is not a point for dogmatic assertions. It is possible that Diodorus' methodological problems are involved here or that clumsy editing is at the root of the issue.

Basic to any attempt at arriving at Diodorus' source have been the actual quotations. Yet it is clear that these

in themselves are of limited value. Acceptance of the arguments about Acragantine and Barbarian numbers do possess a certain degree of validity. However, it cannot be concluded on the basis of the two citations in the Acragantine excursus, that the whole extract is derived from Timaeus. When it is assumed that Since Timaeus mentions a character like Tellias or Dexippus once, every other reference to him must come from Timaeus, quite clearly we are entering the dangerous realms of speculation. Even in regard to the question of the Acragantine numbers, the evidence for saying that only Timaeus knew of this information is certainly not decisive.

It is, therefore, clear that a reference to a source in the text, can only account for the actual citation and not for a considerable portion of the text. Recourse to guesswork is the result of failure to adhere to such limitation of method. A single reference to an event or person must not presuppose sole ownership of it by the quoted source. Indeed it was such a dangerous speculation by Volquardson and Schwartz that laid open the path for the ingenious approach of Laqueur.

Furthermore, it is clear that the evidence of the fragments does not decisively limit the choice of Diodorus' authorities. It is logical to assume that Ephorus was extensively used by Diodorus. Indeed indirect evidence testifies to the fact that Diodorus had as much recourse

to him as to Timaeus. Furthermore, the mere fact that these sources are cited does not exclude the possibility that other sources were employed by Diodorus. Indeed it has been shown that other sources like Polybius were, in fact, consulted, not merely in their respective chronological framework, but throughout the work. This would confirm Holm's point, that Diodorus had a uniform style and that the Bibliotheke is a summary.

Volquardson, Bachof, and Schwartz supported the arguments concerned with the fragments, with contentions based upon general stylistic consideration of the possible sources and their identification with the text of Diodorus. These were of a threefold nature. First, Volquardson argued that details about local colour and topography which could only come from a source well acquainted with Sicilian affairs and Sicilian geography, indicated that Timaeus was the only source Diodorus utilized. Secondly, Volquardson, Bachof, Schwartz and Stroheker based much of their thesis about Timaeus' excessive influence on Diodorus upon the authority of Polybius, who devoted much of the eleventh book of his history to a critique of Timaeus. Finally, it was claimed that the chronological scheme of Diodorus echoed Timaeus.

First Volquardson notes the great detail of local colour which Diodorus' text on Sicliy reveals. The citations come from books eleven to sixteen. They include

the note on the Catanian seizure of Inessa, renamed Aetna; the chapter on the craters near Aetna; Diocles' temple; the citation regarding the later Lilybaeum; the excursus on Acragantine wealth; the disturbance of Theron's grave; the occupation by the Syracusan cavalry of the later Aetna; the construction of Ortygia; Archonides' foundation of Halaesa Archonidion, eight stades from the sea; the details concerning Dionysius' fortifications of Epipolae; Motya's position, six stades from the coast of Sicily; the reward of one hundred minas to Archylus, who was the first to mount the walls of Motya; the fact that while Himilcon's quarters were in the temple of Zeus, the rest of the army lay encamped twelve stades from the city; the plundering of the temple of Persephone and Kore; Magon's entry into the territory of the Agyrinaeans on the banks of the Chrysas river, near the road leading to Morgantina; the Italiot surrender at the eighth hour; the cost of wheat at five minas a medimnus because of the eleven month siege of Rhegium; the Syracusan dating system by their priests, upheld till Roman times; the buildings of Agathocles; and the decree in honour of Timoleon.[47]

Volquardson concluded that such detailed information could only come from a Sicilian source. The latter was Timaeus, first because of the arguments about the Timaeus citations. Further, many details of the narrative reveal that the source was later than, for example Philistus, the

most important Sicilian historian with Timaeus. For example, the chapters on Diocles' legislation, the note on the Syracusan calendar and the observation that Agathocles was jealous of Gelon's grave are clearly derived from sources later than Philistus, Ephorus and Theopompus.[48] Therefore, Volquardson concluded that Timaeus was obviously Diodorus' sole source. Finally, Volquardson observed the fact that Timaeus was frequently quoted in connection with discussion of geographical details of local importance. Thus Timaeus refers to monuments, Tellias, Dexippus at Gela, the bull of Phalaris and the statue of the river Gela.[49]

Volquardson finally substantiated his claim that Timaeus was the source of the Sicilian books eleven to sixteen of Diodorus' Bibliotheke with the thesis that undue prominence is given to Tauromenium, Timaeus' hometown. Thus instances provided by Volquardson are the capture of Tauromenium by the Siceli, its capture by Dionysius and its mercenary settlement, Andromachus' settlement of Tauromenium and his support to Timoleon.[50]

Thus Volquardson's thesis depends upon three considerations, and in criticizing it, we must note five questions. First, is there any validity in Volquardson's claim that the details on local colour reflect solely the view of Timaeus? Second, is it, in fact, the case, that the Sicilian details reflect a late writer of the late

fourth and early third century? Finally, there is the problem of the degree of confidence that can be placed upon the Tauromenium citations.

At the basis of Volquardson's claims lies the problem of the Timaeus citations. It has been shown above that very little can be derived from these fragments, and that they merely account for the passages in which they appear. Further, it was indicated that clear evidence exists indicating Diodorus' use of other sources, including Ephorus. Thus the chief argument favouring Timaeus' authority is immediately removed.

Secondly, as Holm observed, an historian conceivably studies topography personally, and does not necessarily take the authority of another historian on account.[51] Thus the fact that Himilcon's quarters were in Zeus' temple is not indicative of particular interest by any one historian in Sicilian affairs. There is no reason to assume that Ephorus, for example, would not have mentioned an event like the later foundation of Lilybaeum. Certainly local details would have been reflected in Philistus.

Thirdly, it can be argued that the text's Sicilian interest stems from the fact that Diodorus himself was a Sicilian. Indeed this is probably the reason for the prominent position accorded Sicilian affairs in Diodorus' plan. Especially noticeable is the fact that a half of book thirteen and fourteen deals with Sicily. Finally, the

evidence about Timaeus' life cannot substantiate the claim of Volquardson that Timaeus supplied Diodorus with precise details concerning Sicilian topography. The fact is that Timaeus' work was not based upon a personal eye witness account. Timaeus' exile due to Agathocles' enmity resulted in the fifty year absence which witnessed the writing and publication of Timaeus' history.[52] As a result, Polybius directed his attack against the bookishness of Timaeus and the latter's preference of ἀκοή to ὄρασις[53]

It is moreover clear that the evidence cited by Volquardson cannot be exclusively dated to the period in which Timaeus wrote. In the first place, much of the information can certainly be associated with an earlier authority. Diocles' temple can have been recorded by Philistus, Ephorus or Theopompus. The chapter on the crater near Aetna or the fortifications of Epipolae, to cite two further examples, need not derive ultimately from Timaeus. Secondly, it is clear that information like that of the later fate of Diocles' legislation may conceivably derive from a source later than Timaeus. The hypothesis could be stated that this information derives from the source other than Timaeus, consulted by Diodorus for the question of the bull of Phalaris. Again, there exists the possibility that Diodorus' own influence is to be felt - a fact which must not be dismissed without positive reasoning. Holm cites one important case: In Roman times, the citizens of Halaisa

were given Roman citizenship and denied kinship with the Herbitaeans.[54] This information is late and could conceivably be associated with Diodorus alone. Clearly to associate Timaeus alone with the local details oversimplifies a considerably more complex situation.

Finally, the citations about the history of Tauromenium need not merely derive from Timaeus. Certainly, one cannot be dogmatic about the early references. Even if Timaeus is the source for all the early passages, this is no proof that Diodorus did not consult other authorities.[55] Holm significantly observed that more importance is attributed to the much less important Agyrium, which was Diodorus' birthplace. Apart from two mythological references to Agyrium,[56] the latter city figures prominently in the narrative of books fourteen and sixteen. The Campanians leave their packs there on their march to Syracuse.[57] Holm argued that such a reference could only be inserted by an historian born in the town. Similarly, Diodorus noted Dionysius' alliance with Agyris.[58] Agyris had twenty thousand citizens.[59] Later the text records the forty thousand new citizens given to Syracuse and the ten thousand to Agyrium.[60] The latter reference is particularly significant. Whereas it can be argued that Agyris' relations with Dionysius may have been important, though it certainly does appear to have been attributed undue prominence in Diodorus, it cannot be claimed that Agyrium was the Siceliot town second in

importance to Syracuse. Clearly it would appear that the comparative importance attributed to Tauromenium and Agyrium indicates that the influence of Diodorus himself is more apparent than that of one of his sources, Timaeus.

Three aspects of Polybius' attack upon Timaeus have confirmed the views of Volquardson, Bachof and Schwartz. Polybius condemns Timaeus for the nastiness of his attacks upon the personalities of such men as Democharesand Agathocles;[61] for his bookishness, ignorance of geography, politics and warfare;[62] for his tendency to write from a superstitious viewpoint;[63] and for his rhetorical show of speeches.[64] It was the first and latter two characteristics that furthered the conviction of the above scholars that Timaeus' influence was felt to exist in Diodorus' text.

On the basis of the established fact that Timaeus was heavily biased against Agathocles, Volquardson claimed that Timaeus was equally biased against Dionysius. Thus evidence of Timaeus' personal animosity is said to emerge in the Sicilian narrative. It is significant that this claim was not merely developed by Bachof and Laqueur: indeed it formed the basis for the more recent reconstruction of historiographical methods regarding the events of Greek Sicily, undertaken by Stroheker and Brown.[65] The value of these researches must not be underestimated and will be considered below. The validity of their reconstruction of Timaeus' ideology and historical approach is certainly

sound. More questionable is their identification of Timaeus and Diodorus. This development is a result of the many factors discussed above; however, the basic argument concerns the hostility of Timaeus to Dionysius, which is supposedly reflected in Diodorus' text. It is accordingly essential to examine the basis of this contention, whose origin emerges with Volquardson.[66]

Volquardson observed that οἱ Χαριέστατοι τῶν πολιτῶν are against Dionysius.[67] Indeed the text clearly affirms the fact that Dionysius plunders the rich of Gela to pay his troops.[68] The people as is their wont, swing to the wrong side and Dionysius <u>deceives</u> the multitude when he manages to obtain a bodyguard, thereby establishing his tyranny.[69] Volquardson stresses that the word <u>Tyrant</u> is used. It is Dionysius' desire to increase this tyrannical power that leads to the hostilities over Naxos, Catane and Leontini.[70] Later Dionysius renounces his tyrannical power.[71] The Siceliots are clearly stated as hating the <u>tyranny</u> of Dionysius: their submission to the latter is due to their greater hatred of the Phoenician.[72] The speech of Theodorus, according to Volquardson, reflects the text's hostility to Dionysius:[73] to Bachof, Laqueur and Stroheker, this speech is central to the thesis of Diodorus' sole use of Timaeus. The chief thesis propounded in the speech is Dionysius' schemes against Naxos, Catane, Messene, Gela, and Camarina; the necessity of maintaining a Punic foe; and war as a

measure to distract the Siceliots from their internal grievances. Volquardson argued that the same attitude is revealed in the account of Dionysius' secret treaty with Carthage in 396 B. C., where it is clearly stated that Dionysius regarded the continual existence of the Carthaginian danger as a necessary guarantee for his rule.[74] Volquardson also pointed to the notice on Leptines' attempted settlement of peace among the Italiots which earned the disfavour of Dionysius because such a policy struck at the very roots of the designs of Dionysius.[75] Thus Dionysius demanded the unconditional surrender of the Italiots.[76] Hostility to Dionysius is further revealed by the account of Lysias' attack upon the tyrant at the Olympics of 388 B. C.,[77] the attack upon the Rhegine Phyton,[78] the account of Dionysius' success with his tragedy at the Lenaean festival, his victory over his betters, his overeating and resulting death.[79] Finally, there is the reference to his tyranny as "bound with fetters of steel"[80] and the note on the end of tyranny under Timoleon.[81]

This evidence consists of five types. First, there is the description of the actions of Dionysius. Dionysius depends upon the use of armed force. He merely uses the people for his own ends, discarding that element once it proves disposable. Since his basic support is the army, his main aims are by nature military. For this reason,the

tyrant conducts military operations against Naxos and Catane and the Italiots, and finds himself in opposition to the man of peace, Leptines. Because Dionysius' power is of a military nature, it is essential to have a serious foe in perpetual existence. The complete elimination of Carthage from the political and military arena will, therefore, undermine the basis of Dionysius' control. Therefore, Dionysius is determined to avoid complete defeat of the Punic foe, thereby assuring the permanence of his regime.

Secondly, it is argued that the text's general view of Dionysius supports the view, which the description of Dionysius' actions demonstrates. Dionysius is the tyrant, hated by the people, opposed by the best elements, in opposition to the wealthy, holding his empire in fetters of steel.

Thirdly, there is the evidence of the status occupied by the demos. They are devoid of political insight, and hate the tyrant who tricked them into acceding to his elevation. Fourthly, there is the evidence of a gossipy type concerned with Lysias' attack, Phyton and the death story. Finally, there is the speech of Theodorus, which, it is argued, reflects the view of Timaeus and corresponds to themes found elsewhere in the Sicilian narrative.[82]

The fact is that, even if it is argued that the text betrays hostility towards Dionysius, this need not be

indicative of Diodorus' use of Timaeus. There is little doubt that a hostile tradition grew up soon after that tyrant's death. This development emerges with the opposition of the comic poets and the failure of Plato's Sicilian adventure. The result is the creation of the tyrant type of the eighth book of the Republic.[83] The culmination of this tendency is the growth of a mass of anecdotal material, generally of a hostile kind.[84] It is certain that by Diodorus' time, this collection had grown considerably.

Therefore, when it is claimed that material of a hostile type derives from Timaeus, it is only a guess. It is true that Timaeus is a most likely storehouse of hostile information, for Timaeus was the most popular historian on Sicily, certainly by the time of Polybius, and the latter was obliged to accept the Sicilian historian's supremacy in the field of Western affairs. Hence Polybius' history continued from the point where Timaeus ended his work in 264 B. C. However the problem again centers around the issue of acceptance or rejection of the traditional theory of Diodorus as a mere copyist who was unable to influence his narrative by any personal viewpoint, and who showed no sense of judgment in the selection of his authorities. Again it must be emphasized that evidence regarding the Sicilian narrative is certainly not decisive to indicate that Diodorus was not catholic in the use made of his sources.

Volquardson and those scholars who insist upon strong Timaeus influence in Diodorus' text, supply no reason for denying this hostile element to the authority of Polycritus of Mende or Silenus. The reference of Diodorus to Polycritus can certainly not exclude the possibility of the latter as a source of the Bibliotheke. More important, the likelihood that the information might derive from the Isocratic school is not considered. The fact that Ephorus is actually cited certainly suggests the likelihood of such a fact. Stroheker has drawn attention to the growth of the Athenian hostile tradition as reflected in the orators and Athenian comic poets.[85] It is conceivable that Diodorus had recourse to such information, and more probably that Athenian hostility was found in the pages of the Isocratics. Such a possibility cannot be excluded without examination of the possibility. The philosophic hostility originating from the Academy, certainly added impetus to these tendencies, and the possibility that Diodorus consulted such opinions directly or as reflected in historiographical material cannot be discounted. The chief point to note is that the procedure of attributing hostile material to Timaeus considerably oversimplifies a most complex situation.

However, it is evident that the claim that Diodorus' text betrays distinct hostility to Dionysius is a chimaera. There are obvious dangers in assuming the existence in Diodorus' narrative of a particular approach deriving from

Timaeus. Most important is the fact that Philistus' chief work was on Dionysius the Elder. It is clear that Philistus' history was essentially favourable to the regime of Dionysius.[86] However, it must not be assumed that it was simply a work of flattery. It will be shown in the third chapter that there is good reason to believe that it was tyranny as a form of government that Philistus favoured. In other words, it was the system of government as much as the individual tyrant himself that attracted Philistus. Certainly a remarkable piece of evidence furnished by Cornelius Nepos, which will be fully discussed below, would indicate this.[87] The main point to observe is that it must not be assumed that Philistus' work was a mere panegyric. It seems to have been written from an objective angle.

Indeed, as will also be shown below, Philistus was bracketed with Thucydides by ancient authorities.[88] Hence an interest in the essence of power politics is unlikely to have resulted in the elimination of details indicating Dionysius' military aims and accomplishments. It can be assumed that Dionysius' campaigns against the Siceliots and Italiots formed as prominent a role in Philistus' as in Diodorus' history. Further, Philistus would have been only too aware of the importance of the maintenance of the Carthaginian danger for Dionysius' competent control of Sicilian affairs. He is unlikely to have omitted the significance of this factor from a consideration of the

effectiveness of Dionysius' rule. The contempt of the text towards the demos, which falls victim to the tyrant's machinations and is unable to formulate decisive resistance to Dionysius, would accord with the point of view of Philistus. Indeed, Philistus was interested in the problem of power and the arche. For this reason, he would especially record the methods employed by Dionysius to gain the adherence of the demos and defeat the aims of the Chariestatoi. The fact that Philistus was most probably a member of the latter group need not imply an unwillingness to criticize that element of the Syracusan and Geloan citizen body. Philistus' spiritual mentor, Thucydides, was quite willing to support Pericles, in spite of the latter's opposition to the historian's presumed kinsman, the Philaid, Cimon. Power,its attainment and maintenance, was the theme that occupied Philistus' attention. Thus Philistus would sympathize with Dionysius, in spite of the fact that such a viewpoint inevitably resulted in estrangement from both demos and Chariestatoi. Direct evidence is seen above all in Philistus' willingness to pay the fine, when Dionysius gained his bodyguard in 405 B. C.[89] Here the historian worked against both the democratic and oligarchic elements in favour or Dionysius. Therefore, when Volquardson argues that the text portrays Dionysius as a ruthless tyrant and cites the examples of the attack upon Catane and Naxos, the opposition of the"best"men, the deception of the multitude and the

citation regarding the "fetters of iron", he overlooks the simple fact that the same evidence would fit just as logically, and perhaps more so, into the scheme of Philistus. The fact that Dionysius, according to a distinctly hostile source, might make peace with Carthage in order to perpetuate the Punic menace, which was a necessary ingredient to the maintenance of his rule, need not eliminate use of the same view by an historian interested in the source of Dionysius' arche. By claiming that a favourable comment indicates a non-hostile source and an inimicable remark an authority in distinct opposition, Volquardson, and indeed Bachof, Laqueur and Stroheker, though adopting a convenient solution, seriously oversimplify a situation of far greater complexity. Clearly as a preliminary to the attribution of a certain viewpoint to Timaeus or Philistus, it is necessary to gain a clear picture of the outlook of these historians.

The above fact would also apply - perhaps in a somewhat limited manner - to the other historians who may have provided Diodorus' evidence. If it is agreed that most of the evidence cited by Volquardson and others need not imply hostility, it is clear that Ephorus, for example, might be equally well responsible for the data recorded by Diodorus. Certainly, the possibility must not be dismissed without adequate investigation as to its likelihood.

An additional danger resides in the process of selectivity pursued by Volquardson and his followers. To

base their reconstruction upon isolated references which they regard as representative of the Timaeus approach is to ignore the existence of an equally important part of the narrative which portrays Dionysius as the defender of Hellas against the Semitic foe. Volquardson's retort is that this aspect, too, reflects the view of Timaeus. Here, it is argued that Timaeus' nationalistic sentiments overcome his hostility to the Syracusan despot. It is a convenient solution, and the authority of Polybius, regarding Timaeus' aim to glorify Sicily at the expense of the rest of Greece, might appear to confirm the validity of this view.[90] Yet even Polybius' evidence fails to indicate any association in Timaeus' mind between Dionysius as despot and defender of Hellas. No evidence exists to indicate with any degree of certainty that Timaeus pictured Dionysius as defender of Western Hellas. Indeed the latter portrait appears to be a figment of the imagination of Volquardson and his colleagues.

Diodorus confirms Polybius' claim that Timaeus was extremely biased towards Agathocles.[91] Significantly, Diodorus adds that the Agathocles' books are to be disbelieved. Therefore, more discretion must be assumed on the part of Diodorus in his selection of source material. It is logical to assume that suspicion of the Agathocles books would be reflected in Diodorus' attitude to those books dealing with Dionysius, assuming the correctness of Volquardson's thesis that Timaeus was as biased against Dionysius as he was

against Agathocles. Consequently, Diodorus' caution in accepting the heavily biased account of Timaeus, would support the conclusions that even if it is agreed that the text is actually hostile to Dionysius, it is unlikely that the narrative reflects in every respect the hostility of Timaeus. However, the fact that it has been shown that such hostility is purely hypothetical, confirms the conclusion that Diodorus' caution prevented wholesale acceptance of Timaeus' viewpoint.

Diodorus' reference to Dionysius as tyrant and his oligarchic opponents as Chariestatoi, cannot be regarded as exclusive evidence for Timaeus, or indeed for the existence of a particularly hostile source. Both Pindar and Isocrates could use the word tyrant in addresses to Hieron and Evagoras.[92] It is true that the word Tyrant possessed elements of an evil connotation already by Solon's time. Nevertheless the possessor of tyranny was in an essentially enviable position. It was only as a result of the Platonic judgment of tyranny, that the word began to assume any likeness to the modern meaning. Yet, the fact that Isocrates employed the word in a favourable address to Evagoras is indicative that, by the mid/fourth century, the word could still be employed without a tone of philosophic disapproval. It is true that a late source would employ the word in a Platonic or Aristotelian pejorative sense. However, it is doubtful whether a source from the first part of the fourth

century would attribute to it such a meaning. This is certainly true of Ephorus or Theopompus. In the case of Philistus whose references might parallel those of Pindar and Isocrates, there is no doubt that the word tyrant would be perfectly appropriate for, as has been noted, Philistus appears to have approved of tyranny as an institution. On the other hand, if it is accepted that tyrant indicates hostile use, could it not be merely representative in a general sense of the post-Plato meaning, and not derive inevitably from Timaeus?

Similarly, the reference to the oligarchic opponents of Dionysius as Chariestatoi need not reveal favour towards this element, and opposition to Dionysius. οἱ Χαριέστατοι appears, for example, in Isocrates and Aristotle to signify men of taste.[93] In the Nicomachean Ethics the contrast is provided, οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι.[94] It would, therefore, be conceivable that the reference to Chariestatoi in Diodorus need not represent hostility. It might merely refer to those possessing aristocratic virtues. In other words the text is speaking of the Syracusan upper class or nobility. As has been seen, Philistus' chief task was an examination of the essence of absolute power. The evidence does not suggest that it was his task to depict Dionysius as a man of taste. His use of the word Chariestatoi could thus represent current expression. Philistus could have been referring to

the opponents of Dionysius in such a manner. Ephorus could also have used such a term. Further, a later source like Timaeus might have ultimately drawn the word from a contemporary or near contemporary source. The chief point again is that too great an emphasis upon words like tyrant or Chariestatoi, though convenient in an attempt to effect automatic identification with Timaeus, oversimplifies a considerably more complex situation.

There remains the problem of the speech of Theodorus of XIV. 65- 69, which, it is argued by Volquardson, Bachof, Schwartz, Laqueur and Stroheker, reflects the personal animosity of Timaeus. Bachof adds three points. First, he believes that the speech is typical of Timaeus' rhetorical tendencies, to which Polybius referred. In addition, he argues that Timaeus' attitude is balanced by his attitude to Gelon, and that the hostility does not merely associate itself with the Sicilian tyrants but with Sparta as well.[95]

The most important issue is whether the speech reflects the hostile viewpoint of Timaeus. That it reflects hostility towards Dionysius is a fact. The problem is to determine whether the sentiments therein expressed are to be equated with the viewpoint of the text of the narrative. In other words, does the author of the text, be he Diodorus himself or his source, sympathize with the verbal onslaught of Theodorus?

The first point to be observed is that the fact that

the speech expresses a viewpoint hostile to Dionysius need not imply that the material because it is hostile derives from Timaeus. The possibility that Ephorus might be the source of the speech is in the context of the fact that the speech's sentiments are hostile, very real. As has been shown above, Ephorus is cited often by Diodorus in the course of the Sicilian narrative, and he would have had a rich legacy of hostility from which to draw - particularly from the circle of the orators and Comic poets. Further, Ephorus was a pupil of Isocrates and as such is a possible source of Diodorus for the speech of Theodorus. It must be stressed that this is not the place for dogmatic assertions. However,it is to be observed that at least as much validity must be attributed the above argument as those of Volquardson and his followers.

This is not, however, the fundamental point. What must be emphasized is the fact that it must not be assumed that a source more favourably disposed to Dionysius, would omit the speech of Theodorus. This is particularly the case, when we consider the account of Philistus. It has already been suggested that Philistus' account of Dionysius was no mere eulogy. Indeed, this subject will be fully explored in the third chapter. The evidence suggests that Philistus was chiefly concerned with the issue of power politics in its manifestation in Dionysius' regime. Moreover, as will also be shown, Thucydides and Philistus were linked

in the historiographical tradition. These facts render doubtful the suggestion that Philistus would not have included Theodorus' indictment of the Syracusan tyranny. In the first place, Philistus' interest in the power structure would not have blinded that historian to the fact that Dionysius deliberately kept alive the Punic threat to secure his own position within Syracuse. He would not have felt any embarrassment at the fact that Theodorus referred to this fact. Similarly, the tyrant's treachery at Camarina, the enslavement of Catane and Naxos and the plundering of temples, were all themes in no way incompatible with the thesis of an historian concerned with power politics, and its representative Dionysius.

As a spiritual disciple of Thucydides, moreover, a considerable degree of intellectual integrity is to be expected of Philistus. It is extremely doubtful whether Philistus would compromise himself by omitting salient details, no matter how they eliminated any process of idealization. The fact that Philistus' central figure was Dionysius, whose regime that historian certainly favoured, need not preclude the fact that Philistus included a speech which attacked the central figure of the work.

It is interesting to observe that important differences characterize the information provided by the speech from that derived from the rest of the narrative.

In the speech, Dionysius is said to have fled

Motya; earlier, Dionysius is said to have left because he was widely separated from the allied cities and because his food supplies were reduced.[96] Thus Theodorus mentions motives which are absent in the narrative of the events.

Theodorus remarks that immediately after the battle at Catane with Magon's fleet, a storm arose; in the narrative this storm occurs later, after the arrival of Himilcon.[97] Theodorus simplified the issue for convenience, in order to stress that Dionysius had a chance to prevail over Carthage immediately after the battle. The storm was the key according to Theodorus. However, since the storm occurred later, it is doubtful whether Dionysius, in fact, had the strategic advantage to which Theodorus refers. Nevertheless to arouse opposition to Dionysius, such a fact could be obscured. It mattered little what actually took place: more important was what the people thought had taken place. Similarly in the speech, Dionysius is said to have treacherously avoided attacking the enemy who had arrived at Panormus after a stormy passage. Earlier however, it is stated that Dionysius was at the time before Segesta; the result was the loss of Motya.[98] Again, Theodorus is fabricating facts to suit his own purpose of arousing discontent against Dionysius.

On these two occasions, Theodorus does not actually fabricate convenient situations. He does, however, attribute motives to Dionysius which the narrative omits. The same

words are used about the destruction of Messana: as a result, the Carthaginians cut off aid to the Siceliots from the Italian Greeks, and the Peloponnesian allies. Yet there is a significant difference. The reference in the narrative does not attribute this to the express designs of Dionysius, as the comment in the speech of Theodorus certainly does.[99] Secondly, though the treachery to Gela and Camarina is noted both in the narrative and in the speech, it is significant that the notice in the narrative betrays less interest in the events as part of Dionysius' complicated motivation.[100] Clearly the picture of Dionysius the schemer appears more openly in the speech.

Bachof considered the differences insignificant in contrast to the basic unanimity of opinion regarding Dionysius' actions. Yet in the context of a non-hostile source, these facts gain added importance. An historian interested in the power structure would not ignore the fundamental issues: the importance of the continued existence of the Punic threat to Dionysius; Dionysius' policy towards the hostile Ionian bloc; and the tyrant'spolicy towards the Dorian allies of Syracuse before the treaty of 405/4 B. C. He would include such considerations in his narrative and not merely relegate them to the speech of the representative of the Syracusan knights. In addition, a Thucydidean like Philistus would be loath to omit facts of the utmost significance. The same intellectual integrity, however,

would oblige him to distinguish between the views of an opponent and the facts as they actually stood. Hence the discrepancies do not concern obvious major occurrences and policies, but comparatively minor episodes, knowledge of which at the time of the speech's delivery would be extremely vague. Dionysius' failure to relieve Motya and his inability to crush Magon's fleet - these were all occurrences about which, at the time there was no precise information. The critical historian could certainly establish the cause of these failures at a later date: at the time, however, speculation was able to prevail. It was the duty of the historian to establish the nature of the facts as they actually happened, and to declare openly what it was felt at the time had happened. Hence while the narrative records the facts that wide separation from the allied cities, and lack of food supplies were the cause of the flight from Motya, Theodorus ignores this fact. The distinction is between the fact and the fiction: the view of the historian himself and the opinion of the hostile witness. The same argument applies to the note on the storm. Theodorus might have seized upon the prevailing opinion which arose from the uncertain nature of the facts, or he may have invented this account, thereby profiting from the uncertainty. However, the historian, with his aim of establishing the facts as they happened, is careful to distinguish between the view which he believes and that

attributed by the opponent of Dionysius. Should the views of both coincide, there is no contradiction. Thus both agree on the significance of the maintenance of the Punic threat to Dionysius. But where the historian feels that the hostile witness invents facts, or indeed attributes motives with which he is unable to acquiesce, the result is a divergence of viewpoint, which is clearly indicated in the text. Inevitably Theodorus would emphasize again and again those facts which supported his case. A Philistus or an Ephorus or any other source, who would certainly not omit major events like Dionysius' evacuation of Gela and Camarina, and would perhaps concede that this was part of Dionysius' deliberate policy to gain the despotate of Syracuse and ultimately of Sicily, would be careful not to issue public declarations in an uncertain context. Thus the narrative does not press the theme as does Theodorus. To do so in the speech is, of course, perfectly justifiable and does not compromise the historian's integrity: more irresponsible, however, is the inclusion of such statements in the course of the narrative.

Two conclusions emerge. First, it is apparent that the text is greatly concerned with establishing veracity of fact, and distinguishing fact from Theodorus' fictitious statements. This suggests that Diodorus' informant possessed a responsible attitude towards his task. It certainly appears that he was the type of historian who would include

information like the speech of Theodorus, even if he was well disposed towards Dionysius. This would certainly support the contention argued above, that Diodorus' source seems to have possessed the intellectual integrity to include information less flattering to his central figure.

Secondly, the fact that the text admits that Theodorus fabricates and distorts events for his own ends, suggests that the author of the narrative cannot simply have utilized the speech to propagate his own hostile sentiments. It is accordingly difficult to assume that the author sympathized with the stand of Theodorus. This conclusion is confirmed by significant evidence, indicating that Theodorus' ideals are hardly consistent with Syracusan sentiment. The corollary is the fact that Theodorus is portrayed as an impractical statesman, whose political ineptitude is illustrative of weaknesses inherent in the camp of the opposition to Dionysius.

Thus Theodorus declares that the Carthaginians, if victorious, would merely impose tribute, whereas Dionysius takes property and plunders temples.[101] Yet, as will be shown in the analysis of chapter two, the Siceliots hated the Carthaginians for their violence, and the text devotes extensive reference to Carthaginian brutality. The narrative at no point suggests that Carthage would merely impose tribute. Indeed the treatment accorded to Selinus, Himera, Acragas and Camarina clearly testifies to the brutal policy

adopted by Carthage towards her conquests. It is this brutality which is employed by the text as a means whereby sympathy is directed towards the Siceliots, and it is suggested that a major cause of the Syracusan and Siceliot desire to join Dionysius was a wish to inflict vengeance for indignities suffered at Carthage's hands.

Theodorus argues that Dionysius gave the property taken from the private owners to the slaves through whom he ruled. Syracusan territory is in the hands of those who increased Dionysius' power.[102] Theodorus' words imply that Dionysius' support is essentially based upon the loyalty of the slaves and those of a slave mentality. It certainly appears that according to Theodorus, the majority of the Syracusans were crushed beneath an imponderable yoke which they were eager to cast off at the first favourable opportunity. This picture contrasts noticeably with that given of the popular Dionysius, launching a crusade for the survival of Hellenic civilization in the West. While it is true that the text states that the Syracusans ultimately hoped to assert their freedom and were eager to lessen the weight of Dionysius' yoke, there is no suggestion that Dionysius' rule was devoid of all leniency. Dionysius gains cooperation in his venture by creating patriotic zeal and by mixing with the populace. The declaration of war is taken by the Syracusans as a whole. The Siceliots are in a position to desert if they so desire. Further, Dionysius'

rewards are given to citizens as well as slaves and mercenaries. Finally, the very fact that Theodorus is in a position to attack Dionysius in the assembly contradicts his own statement to the effect that Dionysius depended upon slaves and mercenaries.[103] Indeed, the evidence of Theodorus' speech confirms the views which will be discussed in Chapter Two regarding the policy of leniency and the regard for constitutional practice which characterized Dionysius' rule. It is noteworthy that even if it is assumed that the speech represents the personal viewpoint of Timaeus - a view for which there is no direct convincing evidence - it would have to be concluded that Timaeus was willing to acknowledge that the situation as described by Theodorus did not accord with the facts. Indeed the ease with which the text notes that Dionysius was able to win over the Syracusans fully confirms the fact that Theodorus, far from being a realist espousing sensible policies was a man δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικός.[104]

This is confirmed by a final fact. Theodorus' references to the enslavement of Catane and Naxos, can only be viewed within the context of an idealistic pan-Siceliotism, of the type associated with a Hermocrates, and as such is hardly likely to have appealed to Syracusan popular opinion under the Dioclean democracy and Dionysius' regime.[105] Again, Theodorus hardly emerges as the practical politician. It is to be noted that this view of Theodorus accords with the general picture provided of the Syracusan opposition to

Dionysius, which will be explored in Chapter Two.

Thus, to conclude, Theodorus' speech can hardly be regarded as a vehicle whereby a hostile source like Timaeus expressed his disapproval of the regime of Dionysius. Its inclusion in Diodorus' text is accounted for by two facts. First, intellectual integrity probably necessitated the inclusion of a speech, hostile towards Dionysius. At the same time it is clear that the speech does not present a particularly edifying picture of Theodorus. In the first place, Theodorus is depicted as either distorting the facts or being in ignorance of the reality. Secondly, the Syracusan knight is painted as a particularly impractical politician, and as such his role accords with the picture given of the incompetent Syracusan demos.

The view expounded above, that the speech of Theodorus is included in Diodorus for sound historiographical reasons is challenged by Bachof's claim that its inclusion derives from Timaeus' interests in rhetorical exercises. He adds the argument that it represents a manifestation of Timaeus' patriotic feelings. In support of this thesis, he produces two pieces of evidence. First, he notes that three out of four of the major speeches found in the Bibliotheke of Diodorus deal with Sicilian affairs. Indeed, the only major speech which occurs in a non-Sicilian context is Endius' speech. Secondly, Bachof argues that Polybius' statement about Timaeus' use of speeches, to which reference

has already been made, would support his contention that the speech is representative of Timaeus' rhetorical and patriotic tendencies.

Polybius' statement certainly indicates that Timaeus employed speeches, less for their importance at elucidating the text and as a source of accuracy of fact than as a vehicle for glorifying Sicily and her great men, and indulging in feats of verbosity. Yet the problem in this context is, can the speech be regarded as patriotic in sentiment, and was it the practice of Diodorus to include speeches merely for the sake of rhetorical effect?

Certainly, on any level, the speech's sentiments can hardly be interpreted as patriotic. For Timaeus, there is little in the speech that can be considered edifying. True, it appears as a call to action, for the Syracusans to resist Dionysius. Yet it emphasizes Dionysius' despotate and the tyrant's ability to succeed in nefarious policies towards the Syracusans and other Siceliots and Carthage. It portrays the great conspiracy of the Syracusan despot. Theodorus' subsequent failure hardly lends credence to the view that the speech is representative of Syracusan or Siceliot patriotic awareness.

More important is the fact that, as has been seen, the speech is distinctly aimed at portraying the incompetence of the leader of Syracusan resistance, and as such it closely corresponds to the general sentiments expressed about the

opposition to Dionysius.

Finally, it is clear that it was not the practice of Dionysius to include speeches for reasons of rhetorical effect. The historian's own statements make this quite clear. Endius' speech was included for its succinctness and Laconianism. Moreover, Diodorus argues against the use of tedious rhetorical exercises of speech. He adds that only when the subject matter is great and the speech worthy of memory is an historian justified in including speeches.[106]

It is unfortunate that Diodorus' assertions about his own personal integrity have simply been ignored by scholars of the Volquardson genre. Their refusal to admit that Diodorus' caution in respect to the account given by Timaeus of Agathocles is likely to have affected the Timaeus' books on Dionysius has already been noted. Similarly, Diodorus' statement that he has no interest in mere verbal gymnastics, has received little serious consideration. Diodorus is explicit: the subject matter determines whether a speech be included or not. Therefore, the implication is that the speech of Theodorus is not a figment of the imagination of Timaeus or, indeed, of any other source. The fact that Diodorus rarely included speeches in the course of his history would appear to confirm the sincerity of his intentions.

It is thus clear that the importance of the

subject matter was the determining factor in Diodorus' decisions concerning the inclusion of speeches. As a Sicilian himself and an historian, devoting considerable effort on the Sicilian narrative - a fact which the mere length of the text testifies to - Diodorus, no doubt, considered the speech of Theodorus significant enough for inclusion. This is confirmed by the very fact that three out of four major speeches in the Bibliotheke refer to Sicilian events. However, the Sicilian factor is hardly decisive. It must be emphasized that the speech is to be regarded primarily as a means for determining the incapabilities of the Syracusan opposition to the tyrant.

Bachof argued that Theodorus' reference to Gelon was representative of the Timaeus tradition which aimed at contrasting the moderate rule of Gelon with the despotate of Dionysius.[107] One result was the antithesis of the basileus Gelon with the tyrannos, Dionysius.[108] A further consequence was the glorification of Himera at the expense of Salamis.[109]

However, it must be emphasized that although it is probable that Timaeus presented Gelon as the noble ruler in contrast to the absolutism of the Dionisii and Agathocles, it cannot be proved that such a view originates with Timaeus, and is solely to be associated with that historian. In the first place, the tendency to glorify the Sicilian past may be represented by all the major Sicilian historians. It is

not inconceivable that Philistus painted a similar picture of Gelon to that of Theodorus. Indeed it can be conjectured that Philistus' attachment to Dionysius arose out of attraction for past Sicilian achievement against Carthage, as epitomized by the figure of Gelon. Indeed, this tradition probably existed by the end of the fifth century. It can accordingly be argued that Philistus knew this. His intellecutal integrity enabled him to include this fact in the speech of Theodorus. In short, to attribute the Gelonian tradition solely to Timaeus obscures the complexity surrounding the growth of the tradition. Superficiality characterizes attempts to associate a tradition with any one individual. Consequently, there is a great deal of validity in the view of Oldfather that "Diodorus as a native Sicilian would not let the opportunity escape him of magnifying the exploits of his fellow countrymen."[110] Obviously Diodorus has as much right to this tradition as Timaeus. He can have received this from many sources, including non-Sicilian authorities. He might also have received it orally. The main point to observe is that this view of Gelon does not clash with the narrative of Diodorus on Dionysius.

Certainly the growth of a hostile tradition stemming from the Athenian comic writers, Plato and the philosophic schools and Timaeus accelerated the development of the favourable portrait of Gelon. It is moreover clear

that a culminating point is very likely to have been the history of Timaeus. The contrast between Gelon and Dionysius was thus emphasized. A further element was the fact that whereas a seventy-year period of cessation of hostilities followed the battle of Himera, Dionysius was unable to achieve a decisive victory. Again, the gradual divorce of the two traditions is conceivable. Nevertheless,it is not to be assumed that this was always the case. The possibility that a source earlier than Timaeus, and not necessarily hostile to Dionysius, contained this tradition, cannot be ignored, and is probable in view of the fact that there is little evidence for open hostility in the text towards Dionysius.

Finally, there remains the problem of the apparent anti-Spartan tendencies of the text, noted by Bachof. Two factors are singled out. First, there is the speech of Gylippus against Nicolaus in favour of Diocles' proposal for the meting of harsh measures against the Athenians. Gylippus appears in an unfavourable light. Consequently, Bachof concludes that the attack is ultimately directed against Sparta.[111] The reason is that Timaeus could not bear to see Sicily aided by another power-Sparta. Thus Hermocrates is regarded by Timaeus as the real saviour of Sicily, and not Gylippus. Two factors support this contention: the fact that fragments of Timaeus indicate that Hermocrates was that historian's hero;[112] and that Plutarch records Timaeus' contribution to the denigration of Gylippus.[113] This situation is accounted for by three considerations: the fact that Timaeus found

refuge in Athens would direct his hostility to Athens' foe, Sparta; the personal experience of the historian and his father would direct his sympathies towards Corinth; finally, the clear hostility which Timaeus bore towards Dionysius would automatically direct suspicion towards Dionysius' ally, Sparta.[114]

Bachof finds a second source of hostility towards Sparta in book fourteen. The text of the chapter following Theodorus' speech stresses the betrayal by the Spartan Pharacidas.[115] In the same context, the earlier betrayal by Aretes or Aristos the Spartan is noted.[116] Since Bachof views Timaeus as the source for hostility to Sparta in the speech of Gylippus, he concludes that the second manifestation of disfavour towards Sparta likewise stems from Timaeus. Bachof's conclusion is that Timaeus' problem was to reconcile his pride as a Siceliot with his hostility towards Dionysius. The solution was the adoption of an anti-Spartan attitude, which reflected disapproval of Spartan and Syracusan opposition to democratic government.[117]

The evidence of the Timaeus fragments and Plutarch certainly supports the validity of Bachof's claim that Timaeus was opposed to Gylippus and in favour of Hermocrates, and that Timaeus' influence is accordingly to be seen in Gylippus' speech. More questionable is the argument that Timaeus' views are representative in Theodorus' speech and that these views reflect pro-democratic tendencies. First,

the note on the hostility to Sparta is not given in the speech but after it. Moreover, it must be stressed that Theodorus is a knight and representative of the propertied classes.[118] He closely resembles Hermocrates. In fact, Timaeus' favour towards Hermocrates is not necessarily the result of any pro-democratic sympathies of that statesman. Hermocrates has, at the same time, much in common with Dionysius. He is a curious blend of oligarch and tyrant, a blend not necessarily incompatible, as any consideration of Gelon's and, indeed, Dionysius' career reveals.[119] Therefore, to regard Timaeus' favour towards Hermocrates as due to pro-democratic sympathies is not entirely consistent with the realities of the situation. The danger of laying too great a stress upon the identification of ideologies and practical politics is above all illustrated by the presence of Dexippus within Siceliot ranks during the crisis of 407/6 B. C.[120] During that period Syracuse was functioning under the Dioclean extreme democracy. Yet the state received the support of pro-oligarchic Sparta. At the same time, it must be admitted that, though Hermocrates was no democrat, there is good reason to suppose that Timaeus thought that he was.

More important, however, is the fact that there is equal possibility that this attitude to Sparta might stem from any Sicilian patriotic source. Further, no evidence exists indicating that Timaeus in general disapproved of

Sparta. The fact that he was contemptuous of Gylippus and approved of Hermocrates is certainly not decisive. It merely indicates disfavour towards an individual or policy of a state as epitomized by Gylippus at a particular time. Finally, the context of the remark called for a reference to Spartan aid. Again it must be said that a Philistus or indeed an Ephorus would be as likely to include such information. It has already been suggested that Philistus was not writing a mere eulogy, but a tract on power politics. Hence the inclusion in his work of the information is most likely.

It thus appears that there is little evidence for direct hostility on the part of the main body of the text towards Dionysius, of the type Timaeus was a representative of. The speech of Theodorus is not to be regarded as a vehicle of Timaeus' opposition and attempts to associate this factor with the Geloan tradition, the supposed disfavour of the text towards Sparta and Timaeus' rhetorical tendencies command little confidence. It must be added that no attempt is here being made to erase Timaeus from the problem of the sources of Diodorus: what is being suggested is that Timaeus' influence is hardly as decisive as is generally held. The fact that Diodorus cites Timaeus more than any other authority is significant enough to prevent any attempt to deny knowledge of the Sicilian historian on the part of Diodorus. Further some of the evidence which suggests

a more moralistic tone might conceivably come from Timaeus. Certainly the latter part of book fourteen contains material of a far more hostile and gossipy kind than the rest of the book and all of book thirteen. This includes the Lysias episode at Olympia and the attack upon Phyton. The material has much in common with the brief notices in book fifteen regarding Dionysius' strained relations with the literary figures at his court, - Aristoxenus, Philistus and Plato - and the condemnatory account of the tyrant's death, caused by a drinking bout, following the tyrant's triumph at the Lenaean festival. Indeed the issue of the dramatic change in the scale and nature of Diodorus' narrative and the survival of a mass of scanty material for the latter part of Dionysius' reign is a problem to be discussed below. The case for Timaeus, it will be shown, is not strong, and two considerations seem to influence the abrupt change of attitude and scale: the viewpoint of Diodorus' chief source, and the possibility of a deficiency in source material.

The important point to observe in the present context is that the overwhelming bulk of the material contained in the narrative of Diodorus, does not contain information which can be considered in a real sense, as deriving from a distinctly hostile source.

It was observed above that two different guises characterize Dionysius. On the one hand, he appears as the

military monarch, suppressing all opposition, obliging all elements to subordinate themselves to his overriding personality and designs. The other aspect revealed itself in the view of Dionysius as the epitome of Western Hellas' defence against Carthage. Having identified the former aspect with Timaeus, Volquardson and his colleagues decided very naturally to argue for a similar association in respect to the strongly patriotic episodes.[121] Dionysius thus served a contradictory function in this reconstruction of the political thought of Timaeus. On the one hand, he was their saviour and representative; on the other hand, he denied the Syracusans their political liberty.

Confirmatory evidence appeared to derive from Polybius' reference to the superstitious nature of Timaeus, as reflected in his works. The bulk of the evidence concerned the fate of Himilcon's expedition in 396 B. C.[122] and that of the earlier expedition of 406/5 B. C., culminating in the death of Hannibal. The chief argument concerned the intervention of supernatural forces in the affairs of the Carthaginians, illustrating the divine displeasure with Punic impiety.[123]

Again it must be stated that an attractive and convenient view lacks direct evidence. It was argued above that the hypothesis concerned with the narrative's interest in Sicilian affairs which appears to echo a Siceliot patriotic source, cannot eliminate the use of any Sicilian

historian. The individuality of Diodorus' own person cannot be eliminated from the discussion. In other words, the fact that a great deal of interest is shown in Sicily can be indicative of the views of a Silenus, Polycritus of Mende, or a Philistus, or indeed of Diodorus himself. Therefore, when it is argued by Volquardson that great sympathy is shown for the Siceliot suffering at the hands of Carthage, and resulting pride in the victory of the Siceliot, there is no reason to avoid the possibility that any Siceliot source is the projector of these ideals. Indeed it is not inconceivable that a non-Siceliot source might have taken similar pride in the Greek triumph over the Barbarian. This is certainly a viewpoint that might have appealed to the historians of the Isocratic school.

Further, the thesis of the helpless Siceliot in face of the Punic conqueror is one that was likely to have appealed to Philistus whose aim seems to have been to portray Dionysius as the saviour of Greek Sicily in the fourth century B. C.[124] No fragment of Timaeus records that Timaeus held such a view. Certainly Timaeus was hostile to Dionysius: his attitude to Carthage is not known. Bachof and Volquardson are, in fact merely guessing. Having assumed that the evidence discussed above is decisive - particularly that of the fragments and the supposedly anti-Dionysius bias, - they concluded that the second portrait must similarly derive from Timaeus. Yet the view that

Timaeus represented Dionysius as a necessary evil is a chimaera.

Volquardson claimed that the evidence of the plague in the fifteenth book was merely a repetition of those plagues in the thirteenth and fourteenth books.[125] The implication is serious. The fact that there are three plagues in three successive wars, is certainly strange. However, much more detail is accorded the first two plagues, particularly the second. Indeed this fact accords with the general brevity of the narrative of the fifteenth book. Thus, simply to assume that the last plague derives from the pen of the author of the thirteenth and fourteenth books, obscures the serious problem posed by the difference in scale and subject matter of book fifteen.

Finally, though it is true that the so-called superstitious elements in the text could be associated with the authority of Timaeus, it is equally possible that any other historian, including Diodorus himself, might be the originator. Drews has shown that Diodorus' religious viewpoint rendered him capable of altering the meaning of a text by simply connecting events which in the original source are merely stated and not attributed the meaning alloted to them by Diodorus.[126] It will be shown that Philistus, even though he was a disciple of Thucydides, was not above belief in divine intervention: the case for Thucydides' own rationality in respect to the divine,

though supported by considerable evidence, does not entirely dispose of the possibility that he too was not above suspicion that something other than human motivation influenced the course of his history.[127] It is certainly a more complex issue than Volquardson, Schwartz, Bachof and Laqueur are willing to admit.

There remains the problem of Diodorus' chronological scheme. Schwartz thought that the notices on the destruction of Selinus and Himera, two hundred and forty years after their foundation, reflected the chronological interest of Timaeus.[128] However, it must be stated that interests in these facts cannot be regarded as the exclusive property of Timaeus. Any other historian including Diodorus might have inserted the notices on the long existence of the two towns. Further, Timaeus' chronological scheme associated with the priestesses of Argos, Athenian archons, Olympiads and Spartan kings, is not reflected. More recently, Hejni suggested that the influence of Philistus was to be found in the chronological scheme of Diodorus' narrative, in particular of the Sicilian portions.[129]

2. Laqueur's Study of Diodorus' Sources

The most detailed study of the source problem was that of Laqueur,[130] which examined the whole Sicilian narrative as well as the books dealing with Dionysius. The thesis was in essence a development of the ideas espoused

by Volquardson, Bachof and Schwartz: however, precise analysis of the thesis is required in view of the fact that the article of Laqueur has exercised considerable influence upon the recent work of Stroheker, and has even been accepted, with reservation, by Jacoby.

Laqueur assumed that Diodorus' text was a fusion of two accounts. The failure of his predecessors, he claimed lay in their unwillingness to examine the text closely enough. In fact, as has been seen, at the root of the approach of Volquardson, Bachof and Schwartz lay the problem of the fragments, the fact that special importance is attributed to Sicily, and the information provided by Polybius concerning Timaeus' qualities, in particular his failings. Thus general associations, and not precise examination, determined their approach. Laqueur accordingly presented a close analysis of the text of Diodorus.

By following such a course, Laqueur claimed that Diodorus was following one author. Once he had done this, he claimed that he was able to work out from the account which did not fit in, what the account of the second source was. Laqueur concluded that these two authors could only be Ephorus and Timaeus. By applying such a method to the whole of Sicilian history, Laqueur hoped to discover precisely what Timaeus wrote, and, compared to Ephorus, what his grasp of history was. In short, he endeavoured to supply a true picture of Ephorus and Timaeus. It need hardly be

said that like his predecessors, he based his conclusion on the fact that Timaeus and Ephorus are the two most frequently cited sources.

Laqueur's thesis holds obvious attractions. It is skil fully argued, and if accepted, furnishes us not only with a clear picture of the manner, whereby Diodorus created his history, but also with a very real portrait of the historians, Ephorus and Timaeus. Further, there is a great deal of validity in Laqueur's basic assumption that general arguments of the type expounded by his predecessors neglect the necessary primary stage of investigation, involving a thorough investigation of the text of Diodorus.

However, upon close investigation, serious flaws emerge. The first difficulty concerns Laqueur's general thesis. The argument that Ephorus was the chief source, and Timaeus the authority providing the minor details, might appear to have three facts in its favour. First, if as seems undoubtedly the case, Diodorus relied upon Ephorus for his account of Greek affairs, it is unlikely that he laid Ephorus aside when he was writing about Sicilian events. Secondly, it might appear that Ephorus, composing a general universal history of the Greeks, would deal less fully with the Hellenes of the West, and Timaeus, writing only on the Western Greeks, would produce a much fuller account than Ephorus. Finally, Diodorus, being a Sicilian, might desire to discuss Sicily on a larger scale than his main source,

Ephorus. Hence it could be argued that he felt it necessary to include information of Timaeus, the historian who, more than any other, according to Polybius, endeavoured to glorify Sicilian affairs and personages.

By themselves, these facts carry little weight. Three points are noteworthy. First, as has already been noted, there is little reason for the automatic assumption of the view that Ephorus and Timaeus have precedence over, for example, Philistus or Theopompos. The fact that the former are cited does not in itself exclude Diodorus' use of the latter two. Hence Holm, Freeman, Hammond and Brown quite rightly laid stress upon Diodorus' use of more than one or two authorities.[131]

Secondly, it must be asked, how does Laqueur know that Ephorus is the chief source, and Timaeus the subsidiary source? The fact that Laqueur argues that most of the narrative derives from Timaeus in itself testifies against this view. Clearly Laqueur is guessing.[132] Inherent in Laqueur's thesis lies the problem of the nature of the respective scale of Timaeus' and Ephorus' portions on Sicily under Dionysius the Elder. The claim that Timaeus' account would be more detailed than Ephorus' is an attractive hypothesis. But whether this was, in fact, the case cannot be established with certainty. Diodorus, it has been shown, probably used three or more sources at once. Even if only two - Ephorus and Timaeus, are accepted, it

cannot be concluded that we simply have a potpourri of extracts, presented according to the original scale of these authors.

Finally, there is the difficulty of Diodorus' own contribution, which Laqueur simply overlooks. There always exists the possibility of Diodorus' adding colour himself, and of his liability to error in the process of transcription.[133] The dangers inherent in the common view of Diodorus as a scissors-and-paste historian have been indicated above.

Again Laqueur's thesis depends ultimately upon the question of the actual citations from earlier sources found in Diodorus. To regard these sources as representative of the whole narrative is highly speculative. Laqueur overlooks the simple fact that at no place in the narrative is it stated that these historians are represented in the whole of Diodorus' narrative. Laqueur furnishes what he considers to be a fusion of two sources. The majority of these cases, as will be seen, do not command much confidence. A few cases, however, demand more serious consideration. One such case is found in chapter eighty-eight and eighty-nine of the thirteenth book. In the last section of chapter eighty-eighty,[134] the whole population is said to have left Acragas. The first section of chapter eighty-nine describes their departure and it is implied that all, in fact, left because it was a matter of life and death. The second section of chapter eighty-nine, however, appears to

give a different story: the sick and the old stayed behind and some committed suicide. It must be observed that Laqueur's argument that this contradiction stems from the combination of two sources - Ephorus and Timaeus, is not the most obvious solution. The first reference to the complete evacuation probably merely referred to the vital elements of the state, and not the superfluous factors. However, if Laqueur's thesis is accepted, and it is granted that the second section of chapter eighty-nine is an insertion, no direct evidence exists for attributing it to Timaeus. Further, there is no reason for assuming that the last section of chapter eighty-eight, and the first section of chapter eighty-nine came from Ephorus. Also it is questionable whether both passages can be classed as general as opposed to detailed evidence. It is, in addition, conceivable that the error - if it is conceded that this is an error - ultimately derives from one particular source. For example Timaeus alone or Ephorus alone, as well as any other source, could have mentioned both facts - the complete evacuation and the note on the sick and old. Finally, it is clearly possible that an error could have crept into the text as a result of Diodorus' own transcription of the material. It is thus not necessary to assume an error as a result of the opinions of two earlier sources.

The conclusion noted above is confirmed by a close study of Laqueur's individual arguments, whereby he seeks

to prove that certain passages follow the one source and certain others the other.

First Laqueur brings forth arguments based upon vocabulary similarities. Thus he believed that use of the same word more than once indicates the employment of a common source. Thus the similarity of ῥαδίως κατεπονοῦντο and ῥαδίως ἠλαττουῦτο induces Laqueur to claim that the section coming in between derives from a single source.[135] This source, Laqueur claims, can only be Timaeus because mention is made here of the Campanians, who Laqueur knows were only written about by Timaeus. A similar argument is employed elsewhere on the basis of a double reference to the word "to force out."[136] Again one reason for excluding the words στήσας δὲ μηχανὰς τὸ τεῖχος ἐσάλευε καὶ from what Laqueur considers to be an extract from Ephorus, is the use of the word σαλεύω, which is considered to be an expression typical of Timaeus.[137] A further argument concerns Diodorus' use of the word to describe the Greeks of Southern Italy in chapters one hundred and nine and one hundred and ten. They are either referred to as οἱ κατ'Ἰταλίαν (ἐκ,ἀπο Ἰταλίας) Ἕλλήνες or as Ἰταλιῶται The former according to Laqueur is an expression of Ephorus: the latter is one of Timaeus.[138] Book fourteen also possesses vocabulary similarities with the thirteenth book: the formula τοῖς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις,[139] μεταβάλεσθαι,[140] ἀνακῦψαι ταῖς ἐλπίσιν[141] and σαλεύω.[142] σκάφη it is argued, is a favourite word

of Timaeus, because since an early passage in the fourteenth book is considered to derive from Timaeus, the later reference must also come from the same source.[143] The same point applies to the double reference to the phrase ἔρημος τῶν ἀμυνομένων.[144] Finally, the argument about the word for the Italiots is renewed in connection with Dionysius' campaigns against Rhegium.[145]

Such arguments, based upon similarity of vocabulary usage, have little to commend them. It is here submitted that the mere fact that a word is used twice or three times in succession is not indicative of the use of the same source. Perhaps Laqueur's arguments could be accepted with less reluctance if it could be proved that these words were used extensively by Timaeus. Certainly two facts would have to be indicated. First, it would have to be shown that the use of these words was extensive. A couple of references cannot warrant a conclusion of any significance. Furthermore, it would have to be indicated that these words were more or less exclusive to the sections which were supposed to derive from Timaeus. Secondly, such views would have to consider definite association of the passages from which the words derived with actual fragments of Timaeus. The two facts could not exist independent of one another. Even then, it would have to be admitted that there is no evidence to prove that these words were not used by Ephorus, Philistus or any other historian.

Another argument closely resembling the vocabulary question, is that based upon similarity of content. Laqueur claimed that Diodorus' text contained references to certain persons and facts which could only come from Timaeus. Thus whenever mention was made of the Campanians in book thirteen, the source before Diodorus was Timaeus.[146] The same applied to every reference to the aid which Diocles failed to bring to Selinus, and, in fact, brought to Himera.[147] Since Dexippus was first mentioned in connection with the authority of Timaeus, Laqueur concluded that the later references to Dexippus likewise had to come from Timaeus.[148] A similar type of argument characterized the references to Tellias. Since Diodorus declared his authority to be Timaeus, Laqueur assumed that the later reference to Tellias also stemmed from Timaeus.[149] In the latter two arguments, he was merely reiterating the views of Volquardson and Schwartz. Laqueur also noted that the recurrent theme in book thirteen is that which concerned the bravery of the Siceliot women and children. It occurred in connection with the narrative of Carthaginian hostilities directed against Selinus, Himera, Acragas and Gela.[150] Again, according to Laqueur, this theme could only come from Timaeus. Similar arguments are applied to the plague which attacked the Carthaginians,[151] to a reference to the wealth of Acragas,[152] and to the notices concerning the hatred of Hannibal towards Himera,[153] and the two Carthaginian camps.[154]

On two occasions in book thirteen, Laqueur assumes that facts which are recorded only once, the reference to the burial of the dead by Dionysius and the miseries of the flight from Acragas, Gela and Camarina, are from Timaeus.[155]

The same procedure is adopted in book fourteen. Thus deductions are sought from the revolt of the knights,[156] the flight of the knights to Aetna,[157] the notices on the autonomous Sicels,[158] the information about Philistus,[159] the reference to the plague in Libya,[160] the mole at Motya,[161] the reappearance of the theme of the bravery of the Siceliot women and children in connection with the Motyan resistance,[162] the picture of the cruel tyrant, Dionysius, who plunders temples,[163] the Sicani, Siceli,[164] the reference to Segesta and Halyciae,[165] and the existence of precise local information about Agyris of Agyrium, Tauromenium and Leptines.[166]

It is clear that these arguments can be divided into two categories: those based upon definite fragments of Timaeus; and those based purely conjecturely upon the authority of Philistus. Those concerned with the supposed cruelty of the tyrant are, of course, based on Volquardson. The problem of the fragments have similarly already been discussed. In Laqueur's reconstruction however, the arguments based conjecturely upon the authority of Timaeus predominate. First, it must be asked, is it conceivable that only Timaeus would concern himself with the Siceliot resistance against Carthage? This is, in fact what Laqueur is saying when he

claims that every mention of Diocles and the Siceliot relief force to Selinus and Himera must derive from Timaeus. There is no evidence to prove that these facts were not mentioned by Ephorus, or for that matter, by any other historian writing on this period. Similarly, there is no reason to identify the revolt of the knights, the information about Philistus, or the account of the plague in Libya with the authority of any one historian. Laqueur fails to perceive that the mere mention of a fact twice or more, does not indicate a single source. It is surely not inconceivable that two historians mentioned the same facts. Historians in antiquity felt obliged to include accounts of plagues in their narrative. Both Thucydides and Diodorus discuss the great plague which struck Athens in 429 B. C. Yet it would be naive to suggest that because a plague appears in Diodorus, this must reflect the account of Thucydides. Hence, there are no serious obstacles in the path of identification of Ephorus and Diodorus. Similarly, there is no special reason given by Laqueur for the assumption the Libyan plague derives exclusively from Timaeus. Generally the whole thesis depends upon the initial identification. One motif is sufficient to establish the relationship of the remaining citations.

Indeed there is simply no evidence for identifying these extracts with Timaeus or any other historian. If Diodorus does not directly mention Timaeus, if these passages are not found among the extant fragments of Timaeus, and if there is no reason for considering this evidence as

likely to have come from Timaeus, no authority exists for identifying any extract from Diodorus with Timaeus.

When Laqueur notes two references to the same fact, he concludes that the situation arose because Diodorus slavishly copied two sources. Thus he observes a double reference to the landing of Hannibal at Lilybaeum.[167] Because the first reference is of a more general nature, Laqueur concludes that it stems from Ephorus. The second reference in book thirteen is more detailed, mention being made of the later foundation of the city, Lilybaeum. This Laqueur claims, comes from Timaeus.

In the case of the repeated landing of Hannibal, there is a perfectly reasonable explanation for the duplication. The first passage notes the landing itself; the second refers to the pitching of the camp. Other arguments of Laqueur can be similarly refuted. For example, it is claimed that there is a double reference to Dionysius' preparations against Carthage. This according to Laqueur represents, first the account of Timaeus; the later less detailed narrative, it is argued, derives from Ephorus.[168] The fact, however, is that these references can more conceivably be regarded as complimentary statements. The first discusses Dionysius' constructions of Epipolae; the second witnesses a development of these plans in Dionysius' mind, largely as a result of the Libyan plague, and leads to an account of Dionysius' craftsmen and their products.

The details in both chapters are entirely different. Further, it is to be noted that the preparations could not be confined into one year. Hence the details were divided to correspond to Diodorus' annalistic scheme.

Laqueur argued that the two references to the two types of ships reflected different sources.[169] Yet the two references are placed in an entirely different context. The first places the emphasis upon the workmen who constructed the ships: the second concentrates upon the actual ships. Similarly the two references to the missiles reflect different circumstances.[170] In the first reference, the emphasis is upon the fact that it was the gathering of the craftsmen that led to the invention of the catapults: the second discusses the methods employed by Dionysius to effect success on their part. Again, the two references to the gathering of the skilled mechanics reveals in the first instance the actual gathering, and in the second, the fact that the workmen created the catapult.[171] Two other references to the gathering of the men refer, on the other hand, to the actual enrollment.[172] In the latter case, the details are naturally provided.

Laqueur further argues that there are two references to the dispatch of an embassy to Carthage, leading to the outbreak of hostilities. The first refers to messengers being sent: in the second one, messenger is referred to.[173] However Laqueur overlooks the fact that in the first reference

all that is stated is Dionysius' aim: later the herald is actually sent. Laqueur in the same way argues that the two references to the hundred ships of Himilcon is indicative of the existence of the two sources, he had chosen to be representative in Diodorus' text.[174] Yet the fact is that the first notice concerns the manning of the ships: the second discusses the actual sailing.

Thus Laqueur's seeming duplication appears to be purely hypothetical. However, even if Laqueur's arguments are regarded as conclusive of repetition, it is not to be concluded that two sources underlie this development. Diodorus might possibly be responsible for the duplication himself. This could result from error. More probably, it is to be regarded as the inevitable consequence of attempts to fit the narrative of his sources into his own annalistic pattern. Further, though it is true that it is difficult to refute Laqueur's claim directly, nevertheless it is an equally insoluble position to substantiate. It might be argued that the fact that there is agreement in respect to the two citations would indicate not the employment of different sources, but of one source. In both cases, substantiation and refutation are well nigh impossible. However, the alternative approach of viewing the repetition as evidence of the use of a single source certainly exists. Laqueur, in fact upon one occasion employs the latter solution, and assumes a duplication of material as deriving from a single

testimony.[175] He thus serves himself by adherence to every camp. Two references to one fact are thus regarded as evidence of one source or two sources, according to Laqueur's fancy.

Finally, there remains the problem of identification with Ephorus or Timaeus. Essentially, the question depends upon the validity of Laqueur's other arguments. Rejection of the latter inevitably results in unwillingness to consider the validity of Laqueur's final solution.

The above arguments concerned with vocabulary similarities, identifiable occurrences, frequent references to particular persons, and double citations at least have some data on which to base themselves. The majority of Laqueur's claims, however, are representative of a viewpoint of even less certainty, and are clearly based upon pure hypothesis.

Let us take an example. Laqueur's reconstruction of the chapters dealing with the legislator and constitutional reformer Diocles, may be noted. They are regarded as a mixture of two accounts. The first part speaks about Diocles' laws concerning the carrying of arms in the market place and about his death, which was the consequence of the legislator's having violated his own laws.[176] The second part noted how the Syracusans were victorious; how they sent Hermocrates and other Siceliots to the Aegean, how they rejoiced and celebrated their victory over the Athenians and how Diocles

enacted various legal and constitutional changes.[177] The change of source occurs as the word διοικεῖσθαι according to Laqueur. From this point onwards, the picture given is of Diocles the lawgiver.[178] This, Laqueur claims, derives from Timaeus. The passage preceding διοικεῖσθαι on the other hand, comes from Ephorus.

On the basis of the above reconstruction, Laqueur attempts to explain the difficulty arising out of the fact that, whereas in chapter thirty-three Diocles is killed, in chapter thirty-four he is again alive. As Timaeus wrote about the legislator, he is also to be considered the source for the story of his death in chapter thirty-three. Thus it was Timaeus who placed his death in 413 B. C. Laqueur explains the mention of Diocles after his death by saying that Diodorus found the new information from Ephorus after he had already written down the events of Diocles' death.[179]

It is indeed conceivable that the notes on Diocles in chapter thirty-four were the result of Diodorus' having received new information. At the same time, it must be asked, why, if Diodorus first read the account of Timaeus, did he record the information about the legislator in two parts? In other words, the passage which follows διοικεῖσθαι should really take its place in chapter thirty-three. The law about the carrying of the arms is part of the legislative programme and hence belongs to the account of the general legislation. That a serious chronological

problem is presented by the narrative of the text is not denied: what is being suggested is that Laqueur's neat solution fails to take notice of the close association of thematic material of the first and third sections which both deal with Diocles' legal programme.

However, the above objection only applies to the question of the validity of chapters thirty-three and thirty-four. Two general objections apply to all of Laqueur's arguments of a similar nature. First, it must be asked, what right has Laqueur to identify the new information with the authority of Timaeus? It can equally well be identified with Ephorus. Laqueur furnishes his reader with no evidence to the effect that Diocles, the constitutional reformer was the sole property of Ephorus, and Diocles the legislator, that of Timaeus.

The latter point gives rise to the final objection. Is it necessary to make the division at all? The question here asked is similar to that presented in connection with the arguments of Volquardson and Schwartz about the relief force of Diocles, Dexippus and the plague. Laqueur tends to assume that the ancient Greek historians, writing about the same period of history, never mentioned the same facts. Laqueur does not provide evidence to substantiate such a view. Is it so inconceivable that two men should write about the same two aspects of the same man's career? No authority exists to enable one to assume that because two

facts are recorded about one man, Diodorus effected a combination of two sources.

In short, two objections can be applied to the above type of argument. First, no direct evidence to any ancient authority is noted by Laqueur. Secondly Laqueur formulates problems where they do not exist. These criticisms apply equally well to other parts of Laqueur's thesis, and not merely to chapters thirty-three and thirty-four of the fourteenth book.

One such argument concerns the account of the capture of Selinus. Laqueur recognizes what he here considers to be an insertion of Timaeus.[180] The identification with Timaeus is based upon two facts: the Timaeus picture of the heroic women and children noted above and the use of the word αἰχμάλωτα and αἰχμαλωσίαν by Ephorus. The objections, as in the account of Diocles, are that there is no evidence to identify this passage with Timaeus, and that there is no reason for regarding this passage as being inconsistent with the material coming immediately before and after.

Similar criticisms apply to Laqueur's arguments about the fighting between the Himeraeans and Carthaginians.[181] According to Laqueur, Diodorus has given the Carthaginians two instead of one victory. The account of Hermocrates' career is similarly treated as a product of the confusion of sources.[182] Here basing his theory upon no direct evidence, Laqueur, not satisfied with accusing Diodorus of slavishly

combining the account of two separate sources, tampers with the text to effect agreement between the two sources. The suburbs (προαστείοις) of XIII. 75. 2 are those of Syracuse and not Himera, according to Laqueur.

Laqueur's cavalier treatment is also accorded to chapter eighty-five of book thirteen, where he notes what he considers to be an insertion of Timaeus, occurring between the account of the stationing of the Acragantine force and the renewal of the war, which was marked by Hannibal's and Himilcon's raising of the towers.[183] Again the objection is that the mere fact that there is a digression does not indicate a change of source.

Laqueur's reconstruction of Carthage's early relations with Acragas is particularly interesting. Laqueur notes that the first section of chapter eighty-five records that the Carthaginians began the siege of Acragas. Section two, however, notes that the Carthaginians offered the alternative of alliance or neutrality and friendship. Laqueur consequently claims that section two contradicts section one. He also claims that the text distinctly says that the siege was begun first after these terms were refused by the Acragantines. He then resorts to his practice of cutting up Diodorus' text.[184] It would be impossible to sympathize with such a procedure, unless justification existed for viewing the first two sections of chapters eighty-five as deriving from two independent authorities. It must,

however, be asked whether such a policy is justified. Clearly no contradiction exists. First, the Carthaginians blockaded the city: then, when their terms were refused, they actually began the siege. The word εὐθύς presents no problem: it need not be translated "first" as Laqueur does but "immediately." Even if Laqueur's translation is accepted, it accords with the present writer's reconstruction of the narration.

By similar methods, Laqueur concludes that Diodorus' account of the plague and the destruction of the monuments is taken from two sources. Basing his account on no evidence whatsoever, he concludes that only Timaeus knew of the part played by Hannibal.[185] He again divides the text arbitrarily.

Similarly Laqueur claims that two sources have been combined in the account of the initial hostilities between the Carthaginians and the Siceliots during the Acragantine campaign.[186] He concludes that according to Ephorus the Syracusans were held responsible for allowing the enemy to escape: Timaeus, on the other hand, held the Acragantine generals responsible. Again Laqueur's reconstruction is unacceptable because, first there is no proof that Timaeus or Ephorus held such opinions, and secondly, the narrative seems quite coherent in its essential points.

Laqueur also claims that the episode which follows is a combination of two accounts.[187] Ephorus and Timaeus gave different reasons for the change in Carthaginian

fortunes. To Timaeus the cause of the Carthaginian success lay in the interception of the Syracusan supply fleet: to Ephorus, on the other hand, it resided in the excessive consumption of the corn supplies. Here again Laqueur creates an argument for which there is clearly no justification. He fails to note the close relationship of the two facts. The loss of the fleet added to the hunger of the besieged. There is no need to divorce the one fact from the other.

Laqueur accords the same treatment to the chapters concerned with the rise of Dionysius.[188] The main point which he makes is that at the point in the narrative when advice is asked for, Dionysius, instead of giving advice, attacks the oligarchs.[189] When this advice is given, Laqueur informs us that we are again reading the account of the main source, Ephorus.[190] The passage in between comes from Timaeus.[191] Laqueur's conclusion is that the picture of the establishment of the tyranny comes from Timaeus: Ephorus, on the other hand, at this point, sees Dionysius as a man rising to power by more constitutional means.

The same criticism as has been noted in previous cases applies to the above reconstruction of Laqueur. The crux of the matter concerns the use of verb συμβουλεύειν Laqueur fails to realize that Dionysius does give the called-for advice: distrust the oligarchs and have the generals replaced. Hence he is distrusted by the chariestatoi and supported by the masses. His second move

is to recall the exiles.

The end of chapter ninety-six is also considered an insertion from Timaeus. Again the objection is that the mere fact that a self contained section exists is no reason for claiming that it is an insertion.

To avoid embarrassment, Laqueur has to divide the narrative of chapters one hundred and nine and one hundred and ten. As the reconstruction of the rise of Dionysius has been refuted, it is unnecessary to have recourse to this argument. However, such a procedure is in itself unnecessary, and there is no reason to suppose that these chapters represent an artificial conglomeration of two separate sources, providing entirely different information. Again it must be said that Laqueur creates problems where they do not exist, in order to prove the validity of his thesis.

The same procedure is carried through the narrative of the fourteenth and fifteenth books. Particularly important is Laqueur's attempt to indicate that it is only in the tenth chapter of book fourteen that Ephorus comprehends at last that Dionysius is attempting to set up a tyranny. The note on Lysander and the harmost system, being of a general nature, is identified with the authority of Ephorus. Laqueur then notes that Aristus is dispatched to increase the power of the tyranny. The text reads, "for they hoped by establishing the power of the tyranny" (συνκατασκευάζοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν) they would obtain his ready service." According to Laqueur,

the implication is that the tyranny had not yet been founded. This, it is claimed, is confirmed by the narrative of subsequent events. Aristus killed Nicoteles the Corinthian and betrayed those thinking that he wanted to restore freedom. Dionysius then sent the Syracusans to the harvest and removed the arms from the houses; a second wall was built around the Acropolis; warships were built and mercenaries were enrolled. Thus Dionysius secured his tyranny. All this information, according to Laqueur, is from a source not aware of the previous establishment of the tyranny, during the course of the war with Carthage. His conclusion is that Timaeus saw the establishment of the tyranny as taking place together with the fall of Acragas. Ephorus, on the other hand, observing Greek history as a whole, included Spartan aid in the development of the tyranny and delayed the establishment of the tyranny by two years.

Laqueur's theory is particularly attractive in view of Polybius' note on the existence of a division of opinion about two years regarding the commencement of Dionysius' tyranny.[192] However, the latter passage tells us little about the disagreement. It certainly does not claim to associate Ephorus alone with Spartan aid or Timaeus solely with the developments, following the fall of Acragas. The fact that Ephorus wrote a universal history can hardly be regarded as decisive evidence. Timaeus or any other Sicilian historian might equally well have included this

information about Aristus. In fact, to have omitted such vital information, would have been a highly irresponsible act on the part of any historian, Sicilian or non-Sicilian. Further, Laqueur's translation of the participle συνκατα-σκευάζοντες is rather forced, because it is impossible to place the establishment of the tyranny within precise limits. A gradual process must rather be conceived. Indeed, it is more likely that a complex development of the tyranny led to the confusion between Ephorus and Timaeus. It is far more logical to view this controversy in a context of a process of growth extending over a couple of years, at least. Finally, the text distinctly refutes Laqueur's assertion. It is stated that the Lacedaemonians on the surface aimed to restore liberty to the Syracusans. Also the text records that Nicoteles promised to restore this liberty.[193] Clearly there is no second establishment of the tyranny in the text. Laqueur's defence is to assume that the first passage is Diodorus' own interpolation.[194] The second notice is considered unimportant, no doubt in view of the fact that by then the Syracusans had lost their liberty. The objection is obvious: again adherence is necessitated towards Laqueur's highly arbitrary mutilation of Diodorus' text.

Chapters fourteen to sixteen are divided up on the grounds that whereas the details about Dionysius' campaigns against Naxos, Catane, Leontini and the Sicels

are likely to have been covered by Ephorus, the more precise details about Henna, the Herbitaeans and Halaisa, reflect the interest of a local historian like Ephorus. Assuming the correctness of Laqueur's division of material, the same objections apply here as in the case of Volquardson's claims that the Sicilian narrative revealed special Sicilian interest. Clearly the interest might stem from any Sicilian authority like Philistus or Diodorus himself. Secondly, it is surely the duty of any reputable historian to investigate local details. Thus Ephorus is as likely a choice for the inclusion of the information attributed by Laqueur to Timaeus. Thirdly, how does Laqueur know that the general information cannot also come from Timaeus, or, in other words, why should not the main text mention the general and local details together? Again Laqueur's hypothesis is based upon the assumption that Diodorus was a scissors-and-paste historian. It must be stressed that this is an assumption which Laqueur makes no endeavour to prove: he merely assumes this to be the case, in order to substantiate the thesis which he expounds. Consequently his division of the text is artificial and quite unnecessary. There is no need to carve up a narrative, which, as it stands appears coherent. It is to be noted that similar arguments occur throughout the text, and when is suits Laqueur, a major theme can also derive from Timaeus, simply because it reveals local interest.[195] It is this method which underlies Laqueur's identification,

noted above, of certain themes with the two sources.

The use of the general word σκάφη as opposed to the distinction of warships and merchantmen is supposed to indicate the use of two sources.[196] The same objection applies: it is unnecessary to make the distinction at all; and there is no evidence for the particular identification with Ephorus or Timaeus. It is possible that the notice regarding the enemy's penetration of the harbour and the subsequent observation concerning Dionysius' concentration of his forces to prevent penetration appear to conflict.[197] However, an error in Diodorus' arrangement cannot be excluded. It is also possible that the forces of the enemy were divided. On the other hand, even if the division is accepted, there is no reason to identify the one fact with Timaeus and the other with Ephorus. It is a purely arbitrary decision on Laqueur's part. The same conclusion can be assumed for Laqueur's assumption that chapters fifty-two and fifty-three echo two distinct battles: Timaeus wrote about fighting in the streets and Ephorus about fighting on the walls. Clearly, we are again dealing with an artificial and unnecessary division, based upon no direct evidence at all. Further the implications of Laqueur's reconstruction are serious. Simply to declare the existence of two different types of battles is extremely hazardous. Laqueur fails to ask how and when two such separate accounts emerged and what the reason for the two

narratives were. Finally, there remains the problem,which tradition can be considered the oldest tnd more authentic, and the reasons for accepting a particular view. Simply to attribute one tradition to a certain authority without providing any type of concrete evidence is to submit the investigation to a state of pure guesswork.

The fact that at one point in the narrative Himilcon is the general who sends an admiral, and in another point is himself admiral[198] is indicative not necessarily of a conflict of sources, but equally well of error or vague use of the word by Diodorus or his sources. Its employment need not be regarded in a highly technical sense as Laqueur assumes. Occasionally Laqueur poses serious problems. Thus the harbour of Messana is able to contain more than six hundred ships. However, at an earlier point, over one thousand Punic ships are there.[199] Laqueur assumes that fifty or more may have been sunk, and that at least nine hundred were there. He suggests that these were intended to appear in the numbers of Timaeus. The problem, however, is, why does Timaeus not give these figures? Secondly, the evidence of earlier statistics, indicates that Timaeus always gave the lower and more reasonable numbers. Laqueur's solution reverses the procedure by giving them to Ephorus, without indicating reasons for the change. In short, while it cannot be denied that a difficulty exists, it is more likely to stem from error by Diodorus or his source or sources.

The solution is as arbitrary and hypothetical as those offered elsewhere.

The same criticism applies to Laqueur's claim that the note on the indecision of the Messanians between the narrative's discussion of Himilcon's encampment at Peloris and the dispatch of the Messanian forces to prevent the entry of the Carthaginians, is from a separate source from the surrounding passages.[200] Laqueur's reason is that chronologically these events would take place before the Punic arrival. Obviously, this is really no argument. In the first place, Laqueur's attempt to set precise limits upon Messanian indecision is hardly realistic. Such hesitation might very well have lasted well after Himilcon's arrival. Secondly, Diodorus' placing of this fact need not be chronologically accurate. Further, it is not an event about which precise chronology is imperative. The text deals with a very general state of affairs whose position in the narrative is hardly of vital concern to the annalistic pattern involved. Finally, the passage is not inconsistent with the narrative surrounding it. Hence Laqueur again indulges in needless textual mutilation.

Laqueur's reconstruction of the subsequent hostilities likewise reveals that scholar's tendency to formulate difficulties where they are not warranted by the text itself. The Messanian purpose is to prevent entry of that state's borders. Yet Laqueur argues that elsewhere Himilcon observes

that the Messanians have advanced to prevent the landing of the ships. This, he claims, indicates that the coast and not the borders are meant. The rest of the battle is a mixture of a war at sea and on the walls, Ephorus echoing the sea conflict and Timaeus a land encounter.[201] Again Laqueur's division of the text is purely arbitrary and artificial. The narrative as it stands does not warrant such treatment. The result is merely increased confusion and uncertainty.

Another example of uncalled-for break-up of the narrative is Laqueur's claim that the note on the Siceliot desire for offensive action comes from Timaeus, while their desertion derives from Ephorus.[202] The text as it stands is perfectly coherent. The main theme is the Siceliot desertion only after Dionysius' failure to meet their demands. Similarly, the attempt to divide the cause of the divine wrath leading to the Punic disaster possesses no substantial confirmatory testimony.[203] The same applies to Laqueur's treatment of the narrative of the destruction of the Punic camp and the campaigns in South Italy.[204] Laqueur treats the few notices on Sicilian history in book fifteen without considering the problem of the change in scope and detail. On the assumption that nothing had changed, he continues to see the text as a confusion of two sources, providing completely different information. Thus Timaeus in particular, is associated with temple-plundering,

while Ephorus is more concerned with the relations of Dionysius and Carthage. There is no doubt that this is a very personal opinion which is not supported by any ancient testimony. Laqueur overlooks the problem why the supposed Ephorus and Timaeus narrations both possess less adequate information. It is too much of a coincidence to suppose that the narratives of both sources lacked information for the last twenty years of the tyrant's reign. Laqueur does not consider the fact that Ephorus, a near contemporary would be more likely to possess a fuller testimony than the later Timaeus. He does not ask why his authorities were so well informed for the first part of the tyrant's reign? In short, Laqueur again creates problems without their having existed before, and without sufficient consideration of the external evidence.

The dangers inherent in the approach of Laqueur are thus clear. His method is much more thorough than that employed by his predecessors. At the same time, it is accompanied by greater danger. Though it can account for every single chapter, sentence and word of Diodorus' text, nevertheless the fact is that it is largely composed of guesses. Laqueur, by simply assuming the existence of a scissors-and-paste approach fails to observe that if a source is not mentioned, no authority exists for identifying a passage with any ancient historian, unless, of course,this passage can be identified with a fragment of such an

historian. What he fails to be aware of, is the fact that in contrast to the modern practice, ancient historians did not employ inverted commas. It is interesting to observe that Laqueur claimed that the purpose of his article was to avoid the guesswork of his predecessors. In this task, he clearly failed: instead of decreasing the amount of the guesswork, he actually increased it. True occasionally an argument of Laqueur commands some confidence. However, such occasions are exceedingly rare, and are generally based upon methods of argumentation employed by Volquardson and his followers. To quote Sartori, " annalisi che, se può riscuotere un senso di ammirazione per l'accutezza e l'ingegnosità di certe soluzioni, lascia tuttavia alla fine un senso di insoddisfazione e di incredulità, perche non pare davvero possibile ricostruire con cosi grande precisione i testi originari."[205]

3. Conclusion

Clearly the acceptance of Timaeus as a source for Diodorus has been conditioned by the growth of the mass of evidence furnished by Volquardson, Bachof, Schwartz and Laqueur. As a whole this testimony certainly appears impressive: upon detailed examination, however, its strength tends to disintegrate. The evidence of the fragments of Timaeus and Ephorus serves a limited purpose: the dangers in attempting major deductions as regards the whole of the

text, have been demonstrated. The Sicilian flavour of the text can, in fact, be said to derive from any Sicilian historian. That it originates from the efforts of a non-Sicilian cannot be disproved. The arguments of an external nature would command a great deal more confidence, if the text itself would correspond with them. However, the narrative fails to support these conclusions, derived particularly from Polybius. Above all, it is difficult to agree that the text is distinctly hostile to Dionysius, or that the speech of Theodorus reflects the hostility of Timaeus or indeed real hostility of any source. Finally, Laqueur's examination is largely composed of hypothesis.

However, the results of this enquiry are not merely of a negative nature. In the first place, even if the conclusions of these scholars are to be rejected, the validity of their approach is sound. The fact is that Volquardson and his followers were right to concentrate upon the external evidence. At the same time, their failure lay in their unwillingness to conduct a thorough examination of the text. It is true that they claimed that the thought of the narrative corresponded to the evidence which they had produced. As has been shown, the narrative was employed to fit in with this testimony. It was not the primary field of investigation, as it should have been. Hence their lack of thoroughness produced the so-called hostile tendency of Diodorus, which, it has been argued, is non-existent and

has to be viewed by the side of the evidence, portraying Dionysius as the saviour of Hellenism in the West.

Laqueur's purpose was, therefore, initially correct. A thorough examination of the text was imperative. However Laqueur failed to consider the external evidence. Hence his radical conclusions were not substantiated by any direct testimony. His precise division of the text into fragments from Ephorus and Timaeus was largely a chimaera. As regards the problem of a solution to the authority of Diodorus' narrative, it is clear that precise definition of the Laqueur type will be impossible. Indeed the most that can be hoped for is a general conclusion as to the nature of the influence exercised upon Diodorus by the various sources or source. It is clear that the first task is to examine the narrative in detail to determine the nature of the thought of the text. Only after such an analysis will it be possible to summon the support of the external evidence. It should then be possible to effect agreement as to Diodorus' authorities.

Moreover it is clear that the above examination of the views has yielded certain positive conclusions, suggestive of a future course of enquiry. In the first place, the evidence of the citations is certainly indicative of Diodorus' use of Timaeus. The problem is to determine the degree of influence which he exercised over Diodorus. It is certainly clear that Ephorus, the most likely source for Diodorus'

account of general Greek history, was employed directly by Diodorus. Such a situation is plausible in view of the agreement of numbers in the fourteenth book, and of reluctance to assume that Diodorus slavishly combined his sources without adequate testimony to this effect. That Diodorus was not such a scissors-and-pastehistorian is suggested above all by the fact that the influence of other historians is indicated in Diodorus' text. Even if it is assumed that the reference from Polycritus of Mende was found in Timaeus, the reference to the τινες and the anonymous source of the bull of Phalaris narrative, certainly suggests the influence of other sources than the two openly cited. Finally, the predominance of the role of Agyrium and the references to late events, indicates the importance of Diodorus' own presence.

The mere length of the Sicilian narrative in comparison to that of the rest of the text is certainly suggestive of the fact that Diodorus relied heavily upon evidence stemming from Sicilian authorities. Whether Timaeus is the major source is questionable. Certainly, the political viewpoint of the text inclines the present writer to surmise that Diodorus' source was fairly favourably disposed towards Dionysius' achievements. Indeed, it has been suggested that Philistus is a likely candidate - a fact which at this stage is mere hypothesis, but which in the subsequent discussion, I hope to make more apparent.

II

TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

The aim of the subsequent analysis is, first, to discover the type of information which interested Diodorus' source or sources and the relative emphasis of the various topics. Such an examination should facilitate a solution as to the date of the source, and indicate the interests of the Diodorus' authority. Secondly, the source identification depends upon an assessment of the sympathies and bias of the text. Both parts of this analysis will be divided into four sections, concerned with Dionysius, Syracuse and the Siceliots, Acragas and Carthage.

1. Dionysius as Central Figure of Diodorus Text

There is no doubt that Dionysius is the central figure of Diodorus' narrative, after the fall of Acragas. Indeed, whereas until this point, the war with Carthage was central to Diodorus' theme, this war is henceforth seen against the background of the figure of Dionysius. The account of Dionysius' rise possesses two aspects: Dionysius' seizure of power within Syracuse and his relations with Carthage up to the treaty of 405 B. C. Chapter ninety-one discusses the general Siceliot and Acragantine dissatisfaction with Syracuse and the Syracusan generals, which led to the elevation of Dionysius, and Dionysius' attack upon the

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oligarchs and generals. Chapter ninety-two observes the successes of Dionysius' proposals regarding the recall of the exiles, and the dissatisfaction against his colleagues, which he instigated. The ninety-third chapter portrays the growth of Dionysius' clientela; the gaining of the allegiance of the Geloan demos; the confiscation of the wealth of the oligarchs of Gela to pay the tyrant's followers; the failure to gain the loyalty of Dexippus; and Dionysius' departure and promise to return to Gela. The next chapter describes Dionysius' return to Syracuse during a dramatic performance; the renewed attack upon his colleagues; Dionysius' appointment as Strategos autokrator; the doubling of the mercenaries and the reception of a bodyguard. The strengthening of the despotate within Syracuse occupies the ninety-sixth chapter: the distribution of arms; the promises and gaining of mercenary confidence; the rewards of military posts to loyal men; the dismissal of the disloyal elements like Dexippus; the gathering together of the exiles and the impious; the alternative offered to the people of slavery to Carthage or to the mercenaries; the marriage to Hermocrates' daughter; and the execution of the leaders of the opposition, Daphnaeus and Demarchus.

Thus it is clear that chapters ninety-one to ninety-six are devoted to Dionysius' coup. The fact that the Punic War is in progress is only considered where it

possesses relevance to Dionysius' plans for personal aggrandizement. Thus it is clearly stated that the constitutional crisis in Syracuse was the direct result of the failure of the resistance at Acragas. Throughout the narrative of Dionysius' seizure of powers, the Punic threat is clearly there: it certainly serves as a background to the story of Dionysius. It is the danger from Carthage that enables Dionysius first to dispose of the generals who had conducted the Acragantine campaign, and then to effect the deposition of his colleagues. Similarly, it is the disastrous failure at Acragas that enabled him to gain a bodyguard and control of the Siceliot fighting force. At the same time, the emphasis on the Punic-Siceliot hostilities of the earlier chapters has disappeared. The final reference to the Carthaginian destruction of Acragas and their wintering in that city's ruins in the end of chapter ninety-six appears in the form of a reminder to the reader that, while Syracuse had been experiencing a constitutional crisis, the Carthaginian conquest had been proceeding.

Chapters one hundred and nine to one hundred and fourteen continue to discuss Dionysius' rise to power. The very nature of the content brings the subject of the Punic War to the fore. Yet the war is still only considered in respect to its importance to Dionysius. Dionysius' major problem was to ensure the establishment

of his rule, and this was solved by the conclusion of the war. It was on a platform connected with the war that he managed to gain the confidence of the Syracusan citizen body. Thus the treaty of chapter one hundred and fourteen is the logical conclusion to the drama which had begun with the ninety-first chapter. Dionysius' recognition from Carthage as representative of the Syracusan state was the major step in the establishment of the Syracusan tyranny.

Before discussing Dionysius' relations with Carthage, Diodorus' text attempts to bring the reader up to date on the progress of the Punic War. It is thus intimately connected with the note at the end of the ninety-sixth chapter. Now, for a third time, the reader receives the information that Acragas was captured by the Carthaginians. This triple reference is not indicative of use by Diodorus of different sources.[1] Indeed, each reference has a specific purpose. The first is part of the general narrative; the second is in the form of a reminder of the fact that the events surrounding the capture of Acragas are coincidental with the rise of Dionysius within Syracuse; the third serves as a prelude to the hostilities against Gela, which serve, in turn, as a prelude to Dionysius' appearance upon the scene. The text discusses the seizure of the bronze statue; the decision of the Carthaginians to barricade themselves in, because of their fear of

Dionysius; the determination of the Geloan women and children not to leave their city; the successful assault of the Geloan terrorists; the Carthaginian daily assaults; and the repair of the walls of the city.

Dionysius gathered his army and advanced to Gela.[2] He pitched camp and planned his campaign. Preliminary tactics lasted twenty days. There follows Dionysius' detailed plan of campaign and the subsequent battle. The next chapter notes the decision of Dionysius and his advisors to retreat. Camarina is likewise left to its fate. The wretchedness of the evacuees is elaborated upon. Accusations are directed against Dionysius for his delay in furnishing aid. Other faults attributed to him are the fact that the mercenaries had escaped; the unreasonable retreat in view of the fact that the Siceliots had suffered no reverse, the fact that the Carthaginians had not pursued his party; the conclusion that Dionysius had used the threat to gain control of Sicily. The result was the Italiot desertion and the cavalry revolt.[3] The penultimate chapter of book thirteen narrates the successful crushing of the cavalry revolt, the retreat of the surviving rebels to Aetna, the arrival of the main Siceliot body and the retirement of the Geloans and Camarinaeans to Leontini.[4] The final chapter records the treaty, resulting in the cessation of hostilities, the confirmation of Dionysius' authority by Carthage, and the

plague in Africa, resulting after the retirement of Himilcon's army.[5]

The narrative of book fourteen likewise revolves around the figure of Dionysius. Indeed in the prooemium Diodorus regards Dionysius as a central figure of his narrative together with the subject of the thirty tyrants of Athens and the Lacedaemonian hegemony.[6] It is a strange reference, at odds with the main narrative: it does, however state clearly the degree of importance attributed by Diodorus to Dionysius. The contrast of subject matter in the prooemium is also noteworthy: whereas Lacedaemon is singled out, Syracuse is ignored in face of Dionysius. It is the tyrant who is the central figure and not the state which he represents.

The main narrative is resumed in the seventh chapter. Dionysius' resolve to strengthen his control, as manifested by his fortification of the island, the distribution of estates to the tyrant's friends, and houses to his friends, citizens and mercenaries, and the manumission of the slaves, is discussed. The Syracusan revolt against Dionysius during the siege of the city of the Herbissini is then considered.[7] The end of the revolt and the account of the Campanian occupation of Entella follows.[8] Chapter ten refers to the Lacedaemonian aid to Dionysius. The narrative which resumes in chapter fourteen discusses Dionysius' campaigns against the Ionians

of the East coast of Sicily, Aetna and the Herbitaeans, and digresses briefly to discuss Archonides' foundation of Halaesa.[9] A description of the brief Rhegine and Messanian hostility follows.[10] The preparations of Dionysius for the war against Carthage, including the account of his diplomatic marriages and his creation of public zeal occupy chapters forty-one to forty-six. The declaration of war and the Carthaginian reaction is observed in chapters forty-six and forty-seven.[11] There follows Dionysius' campaign against Carthage,especially the siege of Motya and the Carthaginian attack upon the Syracusan fleet, an account of the Punic offensive with special emphasis upon the capture of Messana and the conflict by Catane.[12] Dionysius' retreat to Syracuse, Himilcon's pursuit and the siege of Syracuse and the growth of Syracusan discontent occupy the next chapters.[13]

The account of the war ends with the plague and Syracusan victory, followed by the secret treaty between Himilcon and Dionysius and the Libyan revolt.[14] Miscellaneous details concerning Dionysius' problems with his mercenaries, the settlement of Messana and campaigns and treaties with the Siceli occupy chapter seventy-eight. There follows Dionysius' successful resistance to the Rhegine attempt to capture Messana and his unsuccessful efforts against the Siceli of Tauromenium.[15] In 393 B. C. Carthage renewed hostilities around Messana and Rhegium[16]

Italiot resistance was one result.[17] Chapters ninety-five and ninety-six continue the discussion of the Punic War and include notices on the Syracusan desertion and treaty, marking the conclusion of the war. The main narrative continues with an account of the war of Dionysius against Rhegium and the Italiot League.[18] In between the first reference to the attack on Dionysius by the orator Lysias occurs.[19]

The references to Dionysius in book fifteen are sparse and concerned with his strained relations with the intellectuals at his court, his colonization of the Northern Adriatic seaboard, the third and fourth Punic Wars and the death of the tyrant.[20]

Dionysius is thus clearly the central figure in Diodorus' narrative and the emphasis is upon his military career. This is first represented by the confrontation with Carthage, especially the first clash, central to which is the capture of Motya. Secondly, it creates the situation whereby Dionysius is able to control most of Sicily and south Italy. Central to this aspect is the clash with Rhegium and the Italiot League. Finally, it is Dionysius' military might which enables the tyrant to impose his will upon the Siceliots epitomized by the Syracusans. Dionysius' power is in the nature of a military monarchy. Hence the narrative essentially discusses three subjects: the war with Carthage; the conflict with the Italiots which was

intimately connected with the former event; and the internal situation which is likewise associated with the two former issues.

There is little doubt that predominance is given to the Punic Wars. Hence the importance of those chapters dealing with Dionysius' preparations which are clearly crucial to any consideration of the political thought embodied in the text. The fact that most of the narrative of the events following the collapse of the Athenian expedition is devoted to Punic-Siceliot hostilities confirm this conclusion. The conflict with the Sicels, Ionians, and Italiots is clearly subordinate in importance to the Punic conflict. It must be stressed that the details about Dionysius' preparations are noted in connection with the Punic War and not with his other military undertakings. They contribute to and result from Dionysius' relations with Carthage. It must be further emphasized that the account of the first conflict with Carthage is attributed the most detail, and occupies the major part of book fourteen. Further, the narrative following the conflict becomes more general in nature and scope. In fact, eighteen chapters follow the narrative of the Punic War, to which thirty chapters are devoted. Of these eighteen chapters, four are concerned with the second Punic War. In book fifteen, four from nine chapters are devoted to the third and fourth conflicts with Carthage. Those

military operations which precede the narrative of the great conflict between Dionysius and Carthage, receive twelve chapters. Finally, in the thirteenth book, twenty-three chapters are devoted to Punic-Siceliot hostilities, while eight are concerned with Dionysius' policy towards the Syracusans and Siceliots. The latter, as has been seen, are, in fact, closely connected with the narrative of the Punic War. Besides this, there are the four chapters dealing with Acragantine luxury. The later career of Hermocrates represents a weakening in Siceliot-Punic relations and his incursions into Punic territory are thus indissolubly linked to the narrative of the wars. The Acragantine excursus, it will be shown, possesses distinct relevance to the situation of 407/6 B. C., and is not to be regarded as an isolated insertion. Finally, the chapters on the legislative and constitutional work of Diocles, though not so obviously associated with the main subject, do concern themselves with the chief opponent of Hermocrates and hence are not totally divorced from the mainstream of the action.

The chapters which deal with Dionysius' military exploits against the Ionian states of Sicily and South Italy and the natives of Sicily are equally relevant to the main narrative of the Punic War. In the first place, they are of major importance in the growth of the arche

of Dionysius which led to the outbreak of hostilities with Carthage. In particular, the Ionian problem with its association with the Segesta-Selinus dispute had provoked the earlier intervention of Athens and Carthage in the fifth century on three occasions. Secondly, Dionysius' war with the Italiot League arose out of his early wars with Naxos and Catane. Indeed,it is significant that these states do not appear to have joined the Siceliot League.[21] Dionysius indeed, seems to have inherited this problem. Thus, the problem of the Ionian states and their allies, the Italiots, in particular Ionian Rhegium, could not be considered apart from the Punic question. Indeed Rhegium appears throughout the narrative.[22] The interests of Catane, Naxos and Rhegium were identical with those of Syracuse's enemies, Athens and Carthage. This pattern of political identification and sympathy must have been reinforced as a result of Dionysius' intervention in the affairs of Magna Graecia, since these developments together with the Northern Adriatic policy inevitably presented the possibility of an encounter with Carthage's allies, the Etruscan cities. It is noteworthy that the latter furnished Athens with aid,[23] and that the evidence of the narrative of Diodorus' fifteenth book suggests such a clash of interests. 24

The sections of the narrative which deal with the internal situation of Syracuse are similarly dependent

upon the narrative of the Punic Wars. In the first place, it was the Punic danger that led to the elevation of Dionysius. Secondly, the text openly affirms the fact that the Punic menace was the vital factor which assured Dionysius of control over Syracuse and all the Siceliots.[25] Finally, nowhere does the text hide the fact that Dionysius' monarchy was at root military in nature, and that the democratic image was apparent purely on the surface.[26]

That the chief interest of the text is military is, above all, indicated by the small amount of material dealing with Dionysius' private life and non-military affairs. In fact, this type of information first makes its appearance at the end of book fourteen in connection with Lysias' attack upon the tyrant and Dionysius' attack upon Rhegium, concerning itself with the fate of the Rhegine general, Phyton.[27] Thereafter, such material certainly occupies a predominant position in book fifteen. The note on Phyton might simply reflect Dionysius' irritation over Rhegine hostility, the chief source of opposition to Dionysius' military ventures. However, it is significant that the new information is confined to the later sections of Diodorus' narrative, where the text betrays distinct lack of interest in Dionysius and Western affairs. The notices on Dionysius' worsening relations with the literati at his court and Dionysius' death thus occupy a place of

almost equal importance with the narrative of the two later conflicts with Carthage and Dionysius'exploits in the Northern Adriatic. However, at this point the information supplied by the text is of almost negligible value in contrast to the detail provided for the first two decades of Dionysius' reign. The latter information is exclusively concerned with military and political affairs: anecdotes about the tyrant's private life and a tendency to moralize are significantly absent.

Thus it is clear that, whereas Dionysius is the central figure of Diodorus' narrative, there is little concern with his private life. The emphasis is upon military affairs and the key chapters are those dealing with the first Punic War and its antecedents, which stand in sharp contrast to the narrative of the Siceliot failure in the thirteenth book. The conflict with the Ionians, pre-Greek inhabitants of Sicily and Italiots is moreover, merely a contributory factor to the main event, and clearly subordinate in importance.

2. Interest of the Text in Syracuse and the Siceliots

The text is well informed about the position of Syracuse prior to the appearance of Dionysius. Indeed, the narrative of the Punic War of 409/8 and 407/5 is essentially concentrated upon Syracuse, the core of Siceliot resistance. Thus we read of the promise of

Syracusan assistance to the Selinuntines.[28] Later the Selinuntines sent for help to Acragas, Gela and Syracuse.[29] It is clear from what the text says that Syracuse is here regarded as the state upon which the destinies of the Siceliot states resided. This point is seen later, when the next step is the arrangement of peace between Syracuse and Naxos and Catane. Once this had been concluded, Syracuse was able to gather a relief force.[30] Further, the importance of Syracuse is revealed on two previous occasions. First, there is the reference to Hannibal's fear of Syracusan intervention. Second, the text notes that the Selinuntines expected the Syracusans to arrive.[31]

It is the advance guard of three thousand Syracusans which attempts to come to terms with Hannibal, after the fall of Acragas.[32] They failed in their endeavour to obtain the ransom of the captives and the safety of the temples. Soon afterwards, there is a note on the aid brought by the Siceliots to Himera. The expedition is headed by Diocles the Syracusan.[33]

It is to be noted that throughout the Himeraean campaign, we read of the Himeraeans fighting.[34] It is, however, quite clear that after the arrival of the relief force[35] supreme power is vested in the hands of the Syracusan commander, Diocles. It is Diocles who decides upon retreat, despite the opposition of the Himeraeans. He also leads the retreat of half the population.[36]

Thus it is clear that throughout the first encounter

with Carthage, the initiative according to the text had been in the hands of Syracuse. She had slowly assumed control of operations against Carthage. Her importance is again seen throughout the course of the narrative of the Acragantine campaign. First, we read how she censured Carthage for having embarked upon war with the Siceliots. She then proceeded to arrange alliances with the Italiots and Lacedaemonians.[37] It is quite clear that a Syracusan was at the head of the allied force, for again a Syracusan has supreme military authority. The general was Daphnaeuswho appears to have been the prominent personality in Syracuse after the death of Diocles.[38]

The Syracusan force engaged the Iberian and Campanian mercenaries of Carthage.[39] Daphnaeus then went to the deserted barbarian camp.[40] After the assembly, Daphnaeus was in charge of operations.[41] Two facts are noted. First, he failed to capture the Carthaginian camp; secondly he superintended the starvation tactics. Finally, it is noted that the ultimate blame for the evacuation of Acragas was attributed to the Syracusan leaders.[42] Hence the constitutional crisis which resulted in the rise of Dionysius.

Thus it is clear that the text pursues the history of Syracuse with great interest. The information, moreover, is of a fairly precise kind. Not only is the rise in importance of Syracuse set forth with great clarity.

The reader is also provided with a clear picture of the internal position of the city. The status of the generals, Daphnaeus and Diocles, in relation to that of the demos is clearly defined.

Thus we read that the Syracusans as a body ceased war with the Chalcidian cities.[43] This implies the continued existence of the extreme democracy of Diocles.[44] When we read of the remonstrances to Carthage concerning the fate of the captured Selinus,[45] it is the three thousand picked soldiers who send ambassadors to Hannibal. Thus again it is the citizen militia which has the power to effect decisions concerning questions connected with war.[46] The commander of the army was, in fact, Diocles. At a later stage in the narrative, Diocles is described as military commander. His position in no way resembles that held by Dionysius. The most that he can do is to advise the generals to leave.[47] Diocles' proposal was effected precisely because they agreed with his advice. (διόπερ ἐφαίνετο συμφέρειν αὐτοῖς ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν)

The same situation appears to have prevailed throughout the Acragantine campaign. It is the Syracusans as a whole who conclude the alliance with the Italiots and Lacedaemonians, and it is they who send emissaries to the Italiot cities.[48] It is the Syracusans who elected Daphnaeus as general, and it is they who add to their company soldiers from Gela and Camarina.[49] After the battle, Daphnaeus enters the deserted camp where an

assembly is held.[50] He continues to superintend operations. His powers are, however, limited. The text is in no doubt about the fact that the decision to retire was reached by the generals and commanders.[51]

These notices indicate the continued existence of the Dioclean constitution. With the debut of Dionysius, a change has clearly taken place. This change is explained by the digression, dealing with Dionysius' seizure of power within Syracuse.[52] The text clearly indicates that it is Dionysius who enlists the forces under the Syracusans.[53] His position as strategos autokrator provides him with special emergency powers, such as Diocles and Daphnaeus appear to have lacked. Later it is Dionysius and not the Syracusans who possesses thirty or fifty thousand men.[54] It is Dionysius who draws near and pitches camp. The whole plan of campaign appears to reside in his hands. Certainly the text does not mention any attempt by him to consult with the general and commanders.[55]

After the battle, Dionysius called a meeting of his friends. The generals and commanders are not mentioned. It is Dionysius who compels the Camarinaeans to evacuate their city.[56] Finally it is to be noted that the treaty which concluded the war was between Carthage and Dionysius[57] and that Diodorus concludes book thirteen with a reference to the fact that he has fulfilled his intention of completing this book with the conclusion of the war

between Dionysius and Carthage.

The narrative of book fourteen likewise sees the source of Syracuse's action in the figure of Dionysius. Thus Dionysius planned to strengthen his tyranny and led the army against the Siceli.[58] His arbitrary action provoked the Syracusan revolt.[59] Indeed he was forced to break off the siege of the city of the Herbissini because the citizens of Syracuse resented his rule.[60] Dionysius was bent upon safeguarding the tyranny.[61] It was the tyrant Dionysius and not the Syracusans who wanted to increase his power by attacking the Chalcidian colonies. It was accordingly he who took Aetna and conducted operations against Leontini, Enna, the city of the Herbitaeans, Catane and Naxos.[62] The Rhegines feared the power growth of Dionysius, and not that of the Syracusan state, which had led to the enslavement of their brethren, the Naxians and Catanians,[63] and to the dispatch of the Syracusan army against them.[64] It was Dionysius who decided to prepare for war against Carthage.[65] He was supported by the Syracusans, sought to enlist the good will of the Siceliots, and feared the Rhegines and Messanians.[66] By a policy of moderation,[67] the tyrant sought to win over the Syracusans. Indeed the text explicitly states that Dionysius was the determining force.[68] Dionysius was responsible for the declaration of war.[69] He conducted the initial operations against Eryx and received the support of the Greek cities.[70]

Motya was the tyrant's business.[71] Leptines was his viceroy while he went against Carthage's allies.[72] Himilcon acted against Dionysius.[73] Dionysius counteracted this naval initiative.[74] It was Dionysius' army that burst into Motya.[75] It was Dionysius who distributed honours, dealt with the Motyans, stationed the guard, and placed Leptines in charge of future operations and of the sieges of Segesta and Entella.[76]

In 396 B. C., Dionysius invaded the territory of Carthage. Carthage resolved to surpass Dionysius in preparations.[77] Leptines went against the fleet as lieutenant of Dionysius.[78] Dionysius was responsible for the decision to retire to Syracuse.[79] He set free the slaves and manned sixty ships, hired Lacedaemonian mercenaries and looked to the defences.[80] After prevailing upon the Campanians of Catane to move to Aetna, Dionysius led the army to Tauromenium, and thence to Catane.[81] It was Dionysius who was urged by the Sicilian Greeks to face Himilcon and who decided to retreat to Syracuse.[82] Dionysius sent for Italiot and Peloponnesian aid to save the Siceliots.[83]

The aim of the Syracusan revolt was to end Syracusan slavery and regain liberty.[84] Theodorus declared that Dionysius was a harsh master who was unworthy of the leadership which he possessed.[85] Dionysius had been giving the orders.[86] He was the commander who had

betrayed Gela and Camarina, dealt treacherously with Naxos and Catane, and was prepared to face Carthage in order to control the Siceliots.[87] The Syracusans were to seek a new leader.[88] The tyrant was given the opportunity to relinquish office voluntarily.[89]

Pharacidas' aim was to maintain the rule of Dionysius.[90] Dionysius then assumed control of the offensive.[91] Dionysius alone negotiated with the Carthaginian and finally led out his troops and superintended subsequent operations.[92] Later Dionysius enrolled new mercenaries to maintain his regime, waged war and made treaties with the Siceli.[93] Rhegine hostility was directed against Dionysius who reciprocated.[94] Similarly Dionysius waged war against Magon's army.[95] The hostility of the Italiot council was aimed at Dionysius.[96] Agyris joined Dionysius.[97] The tyrant finally negotiated with Carthage.[98]

The war in South Italy resulted from Dionysius' ambition.[99] He decided to attack Rhegium, and led his troops in the operations culminating in the capture of that city.[100] The Olympian representatives came from the tyranny.[101] As tyrant, freed of the Punic menace, Dionysius was free to take part in literary pursuits, plant colonies in the Adriatic, and gain control of the Ionian Sea.[102] There followed a war between Dionysius and Carthage. Dionysius' victory at Cabala was the result.[103] Dionysius'

harsh reply necessitated a truce.[104] Dionysius is said to have hoped for eventual control of all of Sicily.[105] Dionysius' troops were defeated at Cronion.[106] As a result, the tyrant was obliged to agree to the peace terms offered by Carthage.[107] The final conflict with Carthage is also attributed to Dionysius.[108]

It is thus clear that the information provided about Syracuse is of a precise nature. Not only is it most detailed: it is also aware of the contrasting nature of Syracusan constitutional affairs before and after Dionysius' coup. It can, therefore be concluded that the interest of the text especially revolves around Syracuse. It is possible to conjecture that the text's ultimate source is well-acquainted with Syracusan affairs, and is very possibly Syracusan. Such a conclusion is supported by the fact that two important sections not dealing with the Punic Wars and Dionysius concern themselves with prominent Syracusans.[109] The interest shown in Diocles and Hermocrates is particularly significant in view of the fact that Dionysius was Hermocrates' follower and Diocles was Hermocrates' opponent.[110]

The importance attributed to Syracuse is especially noteworthy, when considered beside the nature of the evidence for the other Siceliot cities.

First, it is interesting to observe that the narrative of the Selinuntine, Himeraean and Acragantine

campaigns follow a regular pattern. Each topic is dealt with in precisely the same way. A prelude which discusses the causes of the wars is followed by an account of the actual course of the fighting. The concluding section gives an account of the results of the war; the settlement imposed by the Carthaginians.

Thus Diodorus devotes chapters forty-three and forty-four to the causes of the Punic invasion of 409 B. C. Selinus' claim to undisputed land resulted in Segesta's appeal to Carthage. The latter's hesitancy between desire for possession of Segesta and fear of Syracuse, was ended by Hannibal's insistence upon vengeance for the defeat of Himera of 480 B. C. The failure of a joint Carthaginian and Segestan embassy at Syracuse due to the intervention of Selinuntine ambassadors supplied the pretext.

Diodorus then passes to the cause of the actual hostilities. Carthage dispatched five thousand Libyans and eight hundred Campanians to Sicily. After the first clash - a Segestan victory - more substantial aid was sent in the form of Libyans, Iberians and Carthaginians under the command of Hannibal.

Concerning the attitude of Syracuse, it is quite clear that according to the narrative, she determined upon direct intervention at the same time as Carthage. We know that as a result of the two embassies of 410 B. C., Syracuse determined upon an attitude of neutrality and

that this attitude was abandoned after the battle, when Syracuse promised direct assistance to Selinus.

Diodorus now passes to the preliminaries of the actual war, which he places under the year 409 B. C. Hannibal's arrival in chapter fifty-four is divided into three parts. First, there is the actual arrival which induced Selinus to send to Syracuse for aid. Secondly, there follows the disembarkation. Finally, the beaching of the ships in the bay of Motya is noted. There follows the march to Selinus and the capture of the trading station by the Mazarus river. Finally, the beginning of the siege of the city is noted.

Two chapters are devoted to the fighting itself. The first presents a picture of the Selinuntines gaining the upper hand. In the second chapter, the Carthaginians begin to make headway.

Thus in chapter fifty-five, after noting the surprise and courage of the Selinuntines, Diodorus discusses the details of the Carthaginian onslaught. Two features of the fighting are noted: the use of towers and the part played by the battering rams. The original success of the Carthaginians was due to the Selinuntine failure to look carefully enough after their walls. As a result, the Campanians succeeded in effecting entry. They failed, however, because they did not clear away the wall completely, and they did not know of the terrain.

The increasing danger which threatened the Selinuntines is described in chapter fifty-six. A renewed appeal for help from the Siceliots - this time to Gela and Acragas as well as to Syracuse - led Syracuse to call a halt to the war which she was waging with the Chalcidian cities. Meanwhile, it is recorded that Hannibal had resorted to a change in tactics as a result of the failure of the Campanians to effect an entry into the city because of concentration upon one area of the wall. A more general attack was planned: the area adjoining that which had been destroyed was broken down and the rubble was cleared away before any attempt was made to effect entry.

Diodorus relates that the fighting lasted nine days and the Carthaginians victory is ascribed to superiority of numbers. Nevertheless, we are assured that victory came later than expected, because of the opposition of the Selinuntines in the streets and because of the difficulties arising from the missile throwers on the roof tops.

Chapters fifty-seven and fifty-eight are in the nature of an epilogue to the account of the battle. The fate of the captured city is discussed. It records the flight of the remaining Selinuntines to the market place, the resulting massacre of the inhabitants, the destruction on the buildings, the defilement of the dead and the favour shown to the women and children. It is recorded

that sixteen thousand fell and that five thousand were captured. The final chapter notes the pity of the Greeks in Carthage's service for the cruel lot of their countrymen, the indignities suffered by the women and the escape of the six thousand, six hundred Selinuntines to Acragas, where they were received hospitably.

To conclude, Diodorus devotes a half a chapter to the Carthaginian settlement.[111] Three facts are recorded. First the text narrates how the Syracusan advance force failed in their endeavours to obtain the release of the captives and safety from the destruction of the temples. Secondly, Hannibal expressed his gratitude to the pro-Carthaginian Empedion by freeing his kinsmen and restoring his property. Finally, he allowed the Selinuntines to till their land upon payment of tribute to Carthage.

There follows Diodorus' account of the war against Himera. Again the division corresponds to the themes of the cause of the war, the initial operations resulting in Siceliot success and Carthaginian failure, the final Siceliot failure, the fate of the captured city and the Carthaginian settlement.

Thus the second part of chapter fifty-nine first notes how Hannibal determined upon the main purpose of the expedition: vengeance for the defeat of Himera of 480 B. C. He thus pitched camp in the hills and invested the city with reinforcements of Sicels and Sicans. The

text continues to narrate the successful attempt to shake and undermine the wall, due to the numerical superiority of the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians were, however, repulsed, and the breach in the wall was repaired. The chapter concludes by noting the arrival of the Siceliot allies at Himera.

The picture given up to this point of the Himeraean campaign closely resembles that given of the early stages of the Selinuntine campaign. On both occasions, the distinguishing feature is the initial failure of Carthaginian tactics. Similarly the major cause of Carthage's failure lay in her inability to appreciate the importance of systematic destruction of a wide area of the wall.

As in the case of the Selinuntine campaign, the besieged take advantage to launch an attack upon the besiegers. This continued success is narrated in the first part of chapter sixty. Four reasons are supplied for the Himeraean success. First, it is due to the suddenness of the attack. Secondly, the daring and skilful tactics of the besieged are mentioned. Thirdly, it is noted that the besieged were aware that they were fighting for their lives and the lives of their wives and children. Finally,one cause of the Siceliot success was the disorder of the barbarians. Thus in two respects, the theme of the Selinuntine campaign is repeated. Both

attacks are characterized by courage. The second factor, that the besieged were fighting for their lives and for the lives of their children, echoes a common motif found in the account of the resistance of the three Punic campaigns against Selinus, Himera and Acragas. It also appears during the Selinuntine attack[112] and as such is characteristic of Selinuntine, and indeed Himeraean courage. Just as in the account of the Selinuntine resistance, at first only a few resist and then more join in, so too in the later confrontation, reinforcements arrive - on this occasion from other Siceliots.[113] Thus only two new elements are introduced as contributing to early Siceliot success- the surprise factor and barbarian disorder. In other respects they are identical, in spite of the text's assertion of a difference between the two campaigns.[114]

In the second part of chapter sixty and, indeed, in the second part of Diodorus' description of the battle, the Carthaginians begin to gain the upper hand. Diodorus thus again follows established pattern.[115] Just as formerly numerical superiority contributed to Carthaginian success, so too it is the case at this point. The narrative relates how Hannibal brought down his men from the hills. These defeated the Siceliots who were chasing the defeated Carthaginian force in disorder. As a result, the Siceliot defensive ended in failure, three thousand Siceliots being slain.

Chapter sixty-one records the increasing desperation of the Siceliots. In spite of the arrival of twenty-five triremes that had gone to the aid of the Lacedaemonians, the Siceliots decided to abandon Himera, as a result of the suspected Carthaginian attack upon Syracuse. The withdrawal of half the population of Himera followed.

Chapter sixty-two notes the fact that on the second day, the city was overrun. There follows an account of the destruction, slaughter, plunder and sacrilege, in general similar to the account of the destruction of Selinus. The chapter concludes with a notice on Carthage's dismissal of the Campanians.

Thus it is clear that the description of the Selinuntine and Himeraean campaigns are dealt with in a similar manner. First Diodorus discusses the various causes of the war. Thereafter, three clearly discernible divisions make their appearance. The first deals with the two battles; the second with the capture of the cities; the third with the Carthaginian settlement. In addition, it has been observed that the two battles receive the same treatment: first the preliminary engagement which is characterized by Siceliot success is discussed; there then follows a description of the Punic successes. Parallels are even found in the details of the descriptions. This is most obviously the case in the accounts of the capture of the city. The cause of the initial Punic defeat

is the same: concentration upon a single area of the wall. The Siceliot counter attack on both occasions is viewed as due to superior daring.

Similarly, use is made of the women and children motif to indicate the desperate nature of the Siceliot position which induced such courage. Further, successful resistance leads to encouragement and the arrival of additional Siceliot support. Finally, numerical superiority is twice the decisive factor in Carthage's favour.

Diodorus' treatment of the early stages of the second Punic invasion follows a similar pattern. As in the case of the first invasion, there is an introduction dealing with the cause of the war and initial preparations of Carthage and the Siceliots. The cause of the war is dealt with very briefly in the last section of chapter seventy-nine and the first section of chapter eighty. It is simply ascribed to power lust. Hence resulted the foundation of Therma.

More space is given to the preparations of both antagonists. Most of chapter eighty deals with the affairs of Carthage: the appointment of Hannibal and Himilcon; the recruitment of the Punic force; the gathering of the fleet; the initial operations around Eryx and the Siceliot victory; and Hannibal's departure. Sections one to three of chapter eighty-one describe the preparations of the Siceliots. Two facts are recorded: the alliance

between the Siceliots, Italiots and Lacedaemonians; and the Acragantines' gathering of their crops and possessions within the city.

The narrative which is resumed in chapter eighty-five, discusses the preliminary operations. There were two Carthaginian camps, in the hills and by the city. Hannibal's failure to arrange terms of peace with Acragas resulted in the Carthaginian attack upon a vulnerable section of the wall. Meanwhile the besieged managed to enlist the support of Dexippus the Lacedaemonian and the Campanian mercenaries who had formerly served Carthage. Finally, the text records the resistance of the first day and the burning of the siege engines on the second day.

Clearly the picture thus far represented conforms closely to that given of the first Punic invasion. The Siceliots again triumph in the initial phase of the war. It is interesting to note that Hannibal according to the text, committed the same error as had been previously committed at Selinus and Himera. He had again concentrated upon one area of the wall. The result, was as before, failure. The solution corresponded to those adopted upon the two previous occasions: an attack upon different points of the wall. To achieve this Hannibal resorted to the destruction of the monuments and tombs. Thus he was able to construct mounds. Diodorus then relates the narrative of the destruction of Theron's tomb by lightning. The result

was the plague and hysteria which was followed by the sacrifice to Kronus and Poseidon. Finally, the arrival of the Siceliot and Italiot relief force at Acragas is noted. Again it is apparent that the scheme of the narrative is to place the arrival of succour after the initial success of the Siceliots.

The Siceliot success is continued in chapter eighty-seven. The victory of the Syracusan relief force over the Iberian and Campanian mercenaries is then discussed. We read how the general's fear of Himilcon's possible reappearance resulted in his restraining his men.

The soldiers in the city were prevented from attacking the fleeing enemy by the generals who, the text claims, were eigher bribed or simply afraid. The narrative continues to discuss the arrival of Daphnaeus and his men at the camp before the city, where an assembly of the people was held. Diodorus then proceeds to discuss the attacks of Menes of Camarina, the stoning of the generals and the growth of the suspicions towards Dexippus.

In chapter eighty-eight, the narrative of the war is resumed. Daphnaeus, unable to take the Carthaginian camp which has now been fortified, adopts starvation tactics. Diodorus then records the threatened desertion of the Campanian mercenaries of Carthage, which was prevented by the surrender of the goblets. The capture of the transport fleet turned the scales in Carthage's favour. The secession

of the Campanian mercenaries in the service of the Siceliots followed. Lack of provisions apparently led to the general's decision to evacuate the town.

Chapter eighty-nine contains a detailed description of the evacuation. The chapter which follows narrates the fate of the captured city. The theme is the same as that found in the description of the capture of Selinus and Himera: plunder, massacre and sacrilege.

It is clear that the three invasions receive similar treatment. The events are described as clashes between Carthage and the individual Siceliot cities. Both invasions are preceded by an account of the causes of the outbreak of hostilities. The problem is viewed from both angles. We are told, on the one hand, about the attitude of the Siceliot states - Selinus and Syracuse. On the other hand, the various considerations which influenced Carthage's decision are discussed. Both invasions are then narrated in the same way. First, the preliminaries are discussed. In the case of the first invasion, the diplomatic relations between Segesta, Selinus, Carthage and Syracuse are related. There follows the preliminary clash which resulted in the Segestan victory. Finally, the arrival of the main Carthaginian force is described. The narration of the second invasion simply concerns itself with the military and diplomatic preparations. In addition, the precautionary measures of the Acragantines are noted.

The parallel treatment, however, appears in a more direct perspective, which seems to indicate not merely a common source for the narrative of the three campaigns. It seems seriously to affect the very authenticity of the source material. The battle in all three cases appears to follow a regular pattern. The ultimate victory of the Carthaginians is preceded by a temporary Siceliot success. The initial Siceliot success is followed upon each occasion by the arrival of reinforcements. Most important is the fact that the cause of the Punic failure on all three occasions is the same: concentration upon one area of the wall. The artificiality of the situation is especially apparent when it is remembered that all three operations are under the superintendence of Hannibal whose ultimate achievement at Selinus and Himera, certainly fail to indicate that the king possessed such mediocre ability as would enable him to commit identical errors at identical moments upon three separate occasions. Hannibal's popularity within Carthage certainly speaks against such a possibility.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that once the facts about Selinus are apparent to the reader, he has no difficulty in discerning the nature of the confrontation with Himera and Acragas. This repetition of the material is not merely found in the account of the initial Siceliot success. The result on each occasion is the accretion

of Siceliot support. That Siceliot help materialized is not to be doubted: however, its immediate association with the initial Siceliot success, based upon similar errors on the part of Carthage on three separate occasions, suggests the existence of a source lacking information of a particularly original kind.

Such a situation is, moreover, suggested by the three accounts given of the capture of the three cities. Chapters fifty-seven and fifty-eight of book thirteen, deal with the capture of Selinus. Such subjects as the defilement of the dead, the bravery of the women and children, the ransacking of the buildings and the fortitude of the Selinuntines are discussed. The latter subject, together with the narration of the bravery of the women and children is narrated towards the end of the previous chapter as well. A similar treatment is accorded the description of the capture of Himera in chapter sixty-two. Again the barbarity of the Carthaginians is discussed; the outrageous treatment accorded to the dead; the Punic greed; and the bravery of the women and children. The narrative concerned with the capture of Acragas consists of similar formulae: Siceliot bravery and nobility; Punic desire for Acragantine wealth; Carthaginian barbarity.[116] The motif of Carthaginian cruelty and lust for material gain and that of Siceliot bravery appears in the accounts of the capture of Gela and Camarina as well, though on these occasions

in less detail.

The stereotyped nature of this information is especially evident, when contrasted with the vagueness of the information concerning the internal situation of the Siceliot cities. The account of the dispute between Segesta and Selinus need certainly not indicate the use by Diodorus of a source of information coming from Selinus or well-acquainted with Selinuntine affairs. The dispute was not a new occurrence and had been a major factor in the diplomatic negotiations leading to the intervention of Athens in 416 B. C. It is thus conceivable that such information would, for example, be known to a Syracusan-orientated source. Nothing of importance is revealed about Selinuntine internal policies in the narration of the first engagement of the war, the narrative of the arrival of the Carthaginian force, and in the account of the siege of Selinus. The account of the siege and capture of Himera, similarly does not betray detailed knowledge of the Siceliot position. The fact is that, although the reader is supplied with a more detailed account of the actual engagements between the Carthaginians and the Siceliots, he is seldom able to gain insight into the real source and nature of the Selinuntine and Himeraean resistance. In the case of the siege of Selinus, on only one occasion is information concerning the internal situation provided. Reference is here made to the treatment accorded

to Empedion.[118] Nowhere in the narrative of the relations between Selinus and Carthage prior to the notice dealing with the treatment accorded to Empedion is the reader given any clue as to the political situation within the city in respect to the question of Carthage. The single piece of evidence which we have, does most certainly suggest that there existed in Selinus a substantial citizen body willing to accept the suzerainty of Carthage. However, had it not been for this notice, the reader would be left with the impression that the decision of the Selinuntines to resist Carthage was unanimous.

The equally mysterious reference to the pity of the Greeks in the service of Carthage for the plight of the Selinuntines seems to reveal comparative ignorance by Diodorus' source of the Siceliot situation.[119] The reader is obliged to ask, who in fact these Greeks were? Were they Siceliots or Italiots, or indeed Greeks from the East? What was their connection, if any, with the pro-Carthage party of Empedion? The answers to these questions are not provided. It is thus evident that Diodorus' source was not well provided with information about the position of Selinus. The same may, indeed, be said of the description of the Himeraean campaign. Indeed, it is only when we arrive at Diodorus' account of the Acragantine campaign that a fuller picture of the situation among the besieged is given. The nature of this new information

will be discussed below. However, it is a fact that we do not receive any information about the Selinuntines and Himeraean generals, in contrast to those of Acragas. We do not even know their names. In short, we are left with the impression that Siceliot opposition to Carthage was not only doomed to failure because of the numerical inferiority of the Siceliots, but also disorganized to the highest degree.

Such a view is confirmed by a consideration of the nature of the evidence for the creation and existence of the Siceliot League, formed to withstand the Punic onslaught. It is significant that very little attention has been given this League by modern scholars. That this should be the case is not at all surprising. The details concerning its nature are vague, and the presentation of the facts is at times extremely confusing. No more clearly are the difficulties illustrated than in the description of the League's formation and its membership.

The first three references in the text are only to Syracuse: Syracuse's promise of help in the beginning of the war, Selinus' appeal for aid to Syracuse after the landing of the Carthaginians; and Hannibal's fear of Syracusan intervention.[120] The next notice refers to the League.[121] It is stated that the Selinuntines expected the Syracusans and other allies to arrive. Who are these συμμάχοι The one fact which the passage certainly seems

to suggest is that Syracuse had succeeded in forming an alliance of Siceliot states under her aegis.[122]

The next notice is surprising. Here it is stated that Selinus sent for help to Syracuse, Acragas, and Gela. Acragas and Gela waited for Syracuse to lead them. Syracuse, therefore, ceased waging the war which she had been conducting with the Chalcidian cities.

The facts which are known are, first that Syracusan supremacy was recognized by Acragas and Gela, and secondly that Acragas and Gela seem to have played some part in bringing about peace between Syracuse and the Chalcidians. Yet the problem of the number of cities belonging to the League is not answered. It is merely stated that Gela and Acragas joined Syracuse. No mention is made at all of Camarina and Himera. Although war ceased between Syracuse and the Chalcidians, it is not stated whether the treaty was followed by a symmachia or not. Above all, the text implies that two alliances were cemented.[123] Such an interpretation, it need hardly be said, is sheer nonsense. A League is not formed, then disbanded and then formed again in such a short space of time. The most likely interpretation is that negotiations for the purpose of forming such a League, had been going on for some time. This had come to the ears of the Selinuntines. Hence the reference in the third section of chapter forty-five. The second reference is, therefore, to the

League's actual formation. The main point to note is that the text is very vague in two respects: in the description of the membership of the League; and in its ability to date the exact formation of the συμμαχία

The Syracusans first hear of the fall of Selinus at the time of the arrival of the three thousand picked Syracusans at Acragas.[124] It must be stressed that only Syracusans are referred to. It is the latter that proceed to negotiate with Hannibal. Later Συρακόσιοι arrive at Himera. These consist, among others, of the Syracusans who were previously at Acragas. There are two notable variations. In the first place, the allies have now joined Syracuse. Secondly, the Siceliot force has grown from a force of three to four thousand.[125] A number of difficulties assert themselves. First, the text indicates that the force which was sent ahead consisted of three-quarters of the total militia. This is, indeed strange. A force which is sent ahead to enquire about the situation or to inform those seeking help about the arrival of the whole force, forms a small part of the whole. Yet the text quite clearly states that three thousand arrived at Acragas and that it was this body of men that was included in the four thousand at Himera.[126] Secondly, the preliminary detachment is stated as consisting of Syracusans. This is most strange. It would seem that Syracuse possessed an overall majority in the Siceliot

League. The three thousand men at Himera who had previously been at Acragas were certainly Syracusans. The additional one thousand included the allies. The latter do appear to form the whole new detachment. In short, three-quarters of the force of the Siceliot League is formed from the militia of Syracuse. This is unlikely, when it is remembered that the Siceliot League certainly consists of Acragas and Gela, as well as Syracuse. It seems very likely that the Chalcidian cities may have contributed some detachment for the common effort. Camarina is not mentioned at all: it seems unlikely that she was not affected by the events concerning her neighbours. Finally, what of Himera? Is the Himeraean militia to be included in the four thousand, or is that body merely formed from Himera's helpers? The text does not reveal any information. The main fact to observe is that the predominance in numbers ascribed to Syracuse is unlikely in view of the probable extent of the League.

Finally, it must be asked, why was the preliminary detachment formed only from Syracusans? Surely a representative body is formed from all the member states? It may be objected that not enough time has passed for the gathering of the League's forces. Therefore only Syracusans were sent. Such a reconstruction is doubtful in view of the fact that the alliance, if not actually formed, was certainly in the process of formation.

Again the same difficulties have made their appearance. First, there is obscurity regarding the question of formation. Secondly, there is the question of content.

There are two ways of meeting these difficulties. First, it could be argued that Diodorus has slavishly combined two sources. Hence it would follow that in chapter fifty-five where Syracuse had allies, the same source as that for the last section of chapter fifty-nine is used. The reason for this, it could be argued, is that in the latter section, Syracuse has again allies. In the first section of chapter fifty-nine, however, these allies have disappeared. On these grounds, it could be argued that the beginning of chapter fifty-nine comes from a different source-from the third section of chapter fifty-five, and the ninth section of chapter fifty-nine. Such methods do not, however, commend themselves to the present writer. They merely represent the adoption of Laqueur-type tactics. Further, they do not solve all the difficulties. It does not account for the fact that the preliminary detachment constituted three-quarters of the total force, and it does not account for the fact that the Syracusans outnumber the rest of the League's contribution to such a great extent.

The second solution has, therefore, to be adopted. It has to be conceded that the text is not at all precise in respect to the information which it provides regarding

the Siceliot League. As has been seen, the chief interest of the text has been in Syracuse. The result is vagueness regarding the cementing of the relationship between the various members of the League.

As the narrative progresses the same picture is presented. Towards the end of chapter seventy-nine, the Syracusans censure Carthage for the war and demand Carthage's future abstinence from hostilities.[127] In the subsequent chapter, the Carthaginians and Syracusans fight a sea battle, in which each side has forty triremes.[128]

In these two citations, Syracuse appears to have been alone. Now, the last which we have seen of Syracuse was when she acted as head of the Siceliot League, being chiefly responsible for the evacuation of Himera. The question which suggests itself is, what has happened to the Siceliot League? The above citation might indicate that the League had broken up.

To pass to chapter eighty-one, the Siceliots were alarmed. The result was Syracuse's performance of two functions. First, she negotiated alliances with the Italiots and Lacedaemonians. Secondly, she continued to dispatch emissaries to the cities of Sicily to arouse the masses to fight for their common freedom.[129]

Clearly, the above information clashes with the two previously cited passages. It quite openly indicates that a Siceliot League had already arisen, the leader being

Syracuse. This League is identifiable with the League brought into existence with the crisis of 409/8 B. C. Two facts indicate this. First, the use of the imperfect tense ἀπέστελλον is to be noted. Secondly, the alliance with the Italiots and Lacedaemonians is important. Such an action is unlikely to have been taken without the prior existence of an alliance between the Siceliot cities.

Again the alternative of assuming a slavish combination of sources by Diodorus or of the overstressing by the text of the part played by Syracuse presents itself. If the first approach is adopted, it could be argued that the one source saw Syracuse as having formed a League by the time of the commencement of hostilities, and that the other knew of no such League. Again it must be said that the second solution is more attractive. The variance of the two accounts appears to indicate that overemphasis by the text upon Syracuse, the League's kernel has resulted in lack of interest in its component parts. Hence in the seventy-ninth and eightieth chapters,[130] the conflict was seen entirely in terms of Syracuse versus Carthage, and in chapter eighty-one, the text presupposes the fact that the reader knows about the formation and development of the Siceliot League.

Chapter eighty-six observes how the Syracusans, fearing for the future of Acragas, decided to send that city aid. When the allied Italiots and Messanians arrived,

they elected Daphnaeus as general. Soldiers from Gela, Camarina and the interior were added to the armament, the whole force amounting to thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry.[131]

Again the text's failure to clarify the position of Syracuse over against that of the Siceliot League has resulted in confusion. Again Syracuse appears to be acting alone, and the allies play no part. It is the Syracusans who fear for the future of Acragas and decide to aid her. There is no mention of the alliance. Further, it might appear that the League is now founded for the first time. It is stated that allies came from Italy and Messana, and that more allies joined them, from Camarina Gela and those ἐκ τῆς μεσογείου It is not stated that these allies were additions to the alliance's militia. The fact that Syracuse is at first only mentioned gives the impression that the allies who now joined, formed the initial confederate army. It might thus appear that the alliance has only now come into being.

It need hardly be said that this evidence is not indicative of the formation of two Leagues. It merely indicates how overemphasis upon the part played by Syracuse has resulted in the disappearance of the League's role. The allies referred to in chapter eighty-one seem to be the same as those noted in chapter eighty-six. In the first reference, the alliance is made: in the second,

the promised aid is given. Had the text been more precise, instead of writing Συρακόσιοι in chapter eighty-six, it would have written Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ συμμάχοι

The same tendency is illustrated in the first section of chapter eighty-seven. The battle of the Iberians, Campanians and other forty thousand dispatched by Himilcon is noted as being with the Syracusans and not with the Siceliots or with the Syracusans and their allies.[132] The Italiots, Messanians, those of the interior, the Camarinaeans, Geloans, Naxians and Catanians have disappeared.

In the chapters which follow, the text, it must be admitted, begins to show far greater interest in the League. In the description of the fighting which follows, however, the picture painted only betrays interest in the Carthaginians and Syracusans. It is true that Dexippus' treachery is noted.[133] The significant fact, however, is that this point is not mentioned in the description of the fighting. The story about the bribed Acragantine generals focuses attention away from the Syracusans.[134]

In sections three and four of chapters eighty-eight, the existence of the Siceliot League is again ignored. Himilcon learned of the Syracusan supply fleet. It is then stated that the Syracusans despised the Carthaginians and became careless.[135]

In section five of the same chapter, the text is

again conscious of the fact that Syracuse is the kernal of the League. Hence the Campanians are made to desert because they consider the Greek position to be hopeless as well as because of the fifteen talent bribe.[136] The rest of the narrative follows a similar course. The existence of the whole Siceliot, or rather Greek force is noted. The desertion of the Italiots is effected by Dexippus. The generals - presumably, a representative council of the whole League since Dexippus, a non-Syracusan is a member - meet and decide to proceed with the evacuation of the whole city. The narrative of the flight from Acragas is seen from the point-of-view of the whole League. It is organized by the League: the League's soldiers form the escort.[137] Although the Syracusans give Leontini to the exiles, the Syracusans however, are censured by the other Italiots for their choice of leaders.[138] Again the text is conscious of the fact that Syracuse is no more than the leader of the Siceliot League. Dionysius' operations at Gela arise from the Geloan request for assistance from the chief state of the League.[139] Dionysius,as representative of Syracuse, promises to return to Gela and dismisses Dexippus.[140] The Carthaginians expect Dionysius to aid the Geloans, no doubt in his capacity as commander of the Siceliot League.[141] Indeed the text refers to Dionysius' summoning the aid of the Italiots and other allies.[142] However, his position

vis à vis the League is by no means precisely defined. The decision to evacuate Gela is associated with Dionysius' φίλοι : the position of the Geloan and Camarinaean representation as well as that of the captured cities and the Chalcidians is not clarified. A similarly undefined position characterizes the narrative of the evacuation of Camarina. Only at a later point is there a reference to the disintegration of the Siceliot League and the departure of the Geloans and Camarinaeans to Leontini. The relationship of Dionysius towards the League in connection with the treaty that terminated hostilities is vaguely defined: Selinus, Himera, Acragas, Gela and Camarina became tributaries of Carthage; Leontini which contained the Siceliot exiles occupied an autonomous status.[143] There is silence on the question of Chalcidian Naxos and Catane. In 397, Dionysius receives the aid of Gela, Camarina and Acragas.[144] A revival of the old Siceliot League is certainly indicated. Otherwise, three isolated references occur: Himilcon's alliance with the Himeraeans; the Messanian oracle and the resistance of Messana; and the withdrawal of Messana and Acragas from the alliance.[145]

On the whole, it is clear that the existence of the Siceliot League is clearly defined in the later chapters of the narrative of book thirteen. However, it is noteworthy that the content in these chapters refers to

the decline and collapse of the body. Hence the references concern the Campanian and Lacedaemonian treachery; the evacuation of Acragas, Gela and Camarina; Siceliot censure of Syracuse; Dionysius' treacherous dealings with Gela; and the ultimate Camarinaean and Geloan desertion. However, in the earlier stages of warfare, where Siceliot success is more apparent, more confusion is evident. Above all, difficulties concern the formation of the League and its revival in 407/6 B. C. Such representation of the facts merely serves to strengthen the conclusion which the text appears to indicate, that Siceliot failure resulted from serious lack of talent for effective organization.

3. The Acragantine Excursus

There is, however, one important exception to the claim that the text betrays little interest in the affairs of Syracuse's Siceliot allies. A lengthy passage extending from the fourth section of chapter eighty-one to the end of chapter eighty-four concerns itself with the affluence of Acragas.

The excursus can be divided into three sections. In the first, the cause of the growth of Acragantine prosperity is discussed. Two points are observed: the importance of wines and olives to Acragas; and the resulting trade with Carthage. Hence originated the great

prosperity which characterized Acragas.

In the second section, an account of Acragantine affluence is given. The temple of Zeus is discussed. Then the reader is informed about the artificial pool outside the city and the monuments which it contained. A general note on the Acragantine youth is followed by an account of the procession of Exaenetus of Acragas, after his winning the stadion in the ninety-second Olympiad. Finally, Acragantine softness is illustrated by the decree concerning the limitation of the bedding for the guards during the siege.

The third section discusses two of the city's magnates. First, Tellias is described. The text narrates how he stationed servants before his gates for the purpose of obtaining guests upon whom he could bestow the hospitality for which he was famous. His entertainment of five thousand cavalrymen from Gela is then discussed. A detailed description of his wine cellar follows. Finally, the story of his journey as ambassador for his city to the people of Centuripa is introduced to illustrate his great wisdom.

The text then discusses Antisthenes, the character second in importance to Tellias. Two facts are noted: the magnificent wedding of his daughter and the advice which he gave his son concerning the land of a poor man.

The excursus on Acragantine luxury is, in fact, not

as divorced from the rest of the narrative as might appear at first sight. The third and fourth sections of chapter ninety of the thirteenth book are significant. Diodorus refers to Himilcon's plundering of the dwellings and temples. He notes the great amount of booty which was taken. Here he provides four causes for the existence of such booty. First, he notes the large population. Secondly, the fact that Acragas had never been ravaged before is observed. Thirdly, Diodorus draws attention to the fact that Acragas had been the wealthiest city of its day. Finally, he points to the special interest of its citizens in works of art. There follows an account of the pictures and sculptures. It is here that Diodorus takes the opportunity to discuss the authenticity of the bull of Phalaris.

In the beginning of chapter eighty-nine, the distress of the Acragantines who had to leave their city is noted. The text records that not only were they afraid for their lives; the thought of leaving their possessions also perturbed them. It is noted that they, however, realized that they still had their lives.

It is thus evident that Acragas' internal affairs occupy a place of crucial importance in Diodorus' narrative. The fact that Timaeus is cited on two occasions might indicate that all this information came from Timaeus.[146] This is, as has been shown in the first chapter, by no

means to be regarded as decisive evidence for Timaeus' authorship. However, assuming the validity of this claim, this cannot be regarded in itself as a satisfactory solution as to why such great detail characterizes the text's knowledge of Acragas as opposed to the limited knowledge betrayed in connection with the wars against Selinus and Himera. To a certain extent, the problem concerns the significant viewpoint adopted by these chapters. It is, indeed, to be observed that little information is provided concerning Acragantine resistance, and that the emphasis of these chapters is upon economic and social life rather than political affairs. However, another point is equally significant. The difficulty is clearly minimized, when it is remembered that the excursus is not, in fact, divorced from the rest of the narrative.[147] Indeed, two other references to Acragantine luxury occur. Further, it is significant that the account of the Acragantine campaign is fuller than the descriptions of those of Selinus and Himera. The description of the assembly, and the events immediately leading up to it, reveal intimate knowledge of the affairs of a Siceliot city, the like of which has not been demonstrated in connection with the earlier affairs of Selinus and Himera and the first stages of the Acragantine campaign.[148]

The question then is, why are we so well-informed about Acragas? The answer to this question may lie

largely in the part played by the Syracusan militia. It has been seen that the destiny of Acragas was in the hands of a Syracusan general, Daphnaeus. The evacuation of that town was, moreover, undertaken upon the advice of that general. Again, it is important to remember that the evidence of the rest of Diodorus' narrative has suggested a Syracusan source or a source intimately connected with Syracusan affairs. Two possibilities, therefore, present themselves: on the one hand, it is possible that the source for the account of Acragantine luxury was one of the Syracusans at Acragas; alternatively, it is possible that the source who was present at Acragas supplied the information to Diodorus' ultimate source. Whatever solution is adopted, it seems likely that the information comes from a source well acquainted with Syracusan affairs and most probably Syracusan himself.

It is further to be observed that in chapter sixty-one, the text gives a brief glimpse of the Himeraean internal situation. Reference is here being made to the decision of the Siceliots to abandon Himera as a result of the suspected Carthaginian attack upon Syracuse. Now this is the first occasion that the reader is provided with an inside view of a besieged Siceliot city. Again, it seems likely that this information came ultimately from a Syracusan source, for the Syracusan army under Diocles organized the exodus from Himera.

Similar considerations affect the events at Gela. Particularly noteworthy is the reference to the statue of the river Gela which would be known to a Syracusan at the city, before the evacuation. Similarly, the account of the battle at Gela is the most vivid and detailed description of fighting found in the thirteenth book. Consequently Adamesteanou was correct to regard it as stemming from a contemporary source.[149] Probably this source was at Gela and a close associate of Dionysius, or at least a person in military or governmental circles. The same conclusion is suggested by a consideration of chapter ninety-nine which discusses Dionysius' intrigues in Gela.

Apart from the case of Acragas and the instances which could derive from a Syracusan authority, it is clear that little definite information is provided concerning the Siceliot cities, directly threatened by Carthage. As has been seen, very little is known about the internal affairs of Selinus and Himera. As regards Acragas, though abundant testimony concerning her economic and social life is provided, very little is known about the internal political situation. What is provided is only seen against the background of Syracusan politics. The small amount of evidence about the affairs of Gela and Camarina is similarly accounted for. The only city about which precise information is provided, is Syracuse.

4. Extent of Information About Carthage

Such a situation is especially strange in view of the fact that abundant information is provided concerning Punic affairs. This is first seen in the account of the situation in Carthage following the Segestan appeal. Detailed information regarding the policy of Carthage is provided. Diodorus' text observes that the Senate was in a dilemma. She wanted Segesta; yet she feared Syracuse. Further, we are distinctly told that it was Hannibal who swayed the senate.[150] Thus it is clear that the source for this part of Diodorus' history was well acquainted with the situation within Carthage. This impression is confirmed as the narrative progresses. The exact numbers of the Carthaginian preliminary detachment is provided.[151]

Similarly the account of Hannibal's force reveals intimate knowledge of the Carthaginian scene. Not only are we given the numbers - a fact which might have been known by the threatened Siceliots, but more important, information is provided concerning the peoples recruited by the Carthaginians.[152] The details about the arrival of the Carthaginian force could have come from many sources, and does not reveal intimate knowledge of Carthaginian affairs. The same may be said to apply to the details of the fighting. One point is, however, worthy of mention: the note concerning the pity felt by the Greeks in Carthage's service.[153]

Again a view of the situation within the enemy camp is given.

Interesting details concerning Hannibal's settlement after the capture of Himera are also supplied. The details concerning Empedion and the treatment of the Selinuntines who remained, is equally indicative of the use by Diodorus of a source intimately connected with the affairs of Carthage.[154]

The evidence of this episode and that concerning the "Greeks who pitied" is especially crucial. Both details are unlikely to have stemmed from a Siceliot source, for they are not placed in the context of Selinuntine politics and, as has been seen, information about Selinus is extremely limited. The extent of the party of Empedion is not indicated, and its relations within the framework of the Selinuntine scene is not elaborated upon. However, viewed from the Carthaginian angle, the information poses no problems: necessity of information is superfluous. The existence of a pro-Carthage clique is the vital factor, and not the precise details concerning the internal affairs of the Siceliot city.

Similar instances can be found in the description of the capture of Himera. Certainly the account given of the dispute between the Carthaginians and their Campanian allies indicates knowledge of the position among the Carthaginians. The same may be said to apply to the reference

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to the popularity of Hannibal upon his return to Africa.

Detailed knowledge of the situation in Carthage is again revealed in the description of the vacillation of Hannibal before the Acragantine campaign.[156] Further, the reader is supplied with full details regarding the recruitment of the Punic force.[157] In the course of the actual campaign, certain instances are particularly noteworthy. First, there is the interesting episode of the destruction by lightning of the tomb of Theron.[158] Even if the details of the story are to be suspected, it cannot be entirely rejected. The whole episode suggests use by Diodorus of a source intimately connected with Carthaginian affairs.

The episode of the rebellious Campanian mercenaries similarly provides details which would appear to originate from a source well acquainted with the Carthaginian position and are unlikely to have derived ultimately from a Siceliot source. It is distinctly stated that the Carthaginians were at starvation point.[159] Further, it is noted that the Campanians had been denied the rations which had been agreed upon.[160] In addition, it is clearly affirmed that the rebels were given the goblets of the Carthaginian troops as a pledge. The final point to observe is that Himilcon saw in the capture of the supply fleet the only hope of salvation.[161]

The narrative of Dionysius' major encounter with

Carthage in book fourteen similarly provides detailed knowledge of Carthaginian affairs. Thus details are provided about Himilcon's preparations. We are distinctly told that armaments came from all Libya as well as from Iberia.[162] The Timaeus and Ephorus figures are provided. Certainly, the respectable Timaeus figures would appear to derive from a source well-acquainted with Punic affairs.

More significant is the fact that the text records information which could not come from a Siceliot source. It appears that Himilcon gave sealed orders to all the pilots, which were to be opened only after the ships had set sail. Hence spies would be unable to obtain desired information. The orders were to sail to Panormus.[163] The latter fact would of course be known to Dionysius, for the Punic fleet did sail to Panormus. Even the instructions could have been discovered. However, the fact that these instructions were only revealed after the fleet had sailed indicates that this information is likely to have come from a source well acquainted with the Punic internal situation.

Himilcon's reasons for obtaining control of Messana are precisely delineated: the harbour could accomodate his navy; and he could intercept Italiot and Peloponnesian aid.[164] Details concerning the investment of Messana occupy chapter fifty-seven. Again Himilcon's intimate thoughts are indicated in chapter fifty-eight.[165] The text states that Himilcon reflected that the strategic value of the city and its

existence far from Carthage's allies necessitated its complete eradication.[166] The details about the oracle and Messana's internal situation may have come from a Carthaginian source.[167] Certainly, the details contrast noticeably with information proviced about other Siceliot cities.

The text knows that the eruption of Aetna necessitated the division of the Punic force.[168] The text states clearly that, whereas Himilcon encamped in the temple of Zeus, the rest of his force was twelve stades from the city.[169] Precise details about the plunder of the temples of Demeter and Kore are provided, the panic, the plague, the destruction of Gelon's tomb, and the dispatch for help to Sardinia and Libya are noted.[170] Certainly, the details provided about the plague suggest the employment of a Punic source. The same can be said of the details provided about Himilcon's end, his atonement and suicide, and of the account of the Libyan revolt. Indeed, it is stated that the cult of Kore and Demeter was adopted and that the rebels seized Tynes.[171] The text states clearly that the rebels were disorganized, divided amongst themselves, lacking capable commanders and provisions.[172] Finally, Diodorus notes Carthaginian bribery.

Less detail characterizes the description of Carthage's position during the second Punic war. Diodorus' citation of moderate Punic forces suggests Timaeus-type figures.[173] However, there is nothing which can be regarded as originating entirely from a Punic source, or a source

well-acquainted with Carthaginian affairs. This situation is not surprising in view of the brevity of the account of the second war. Similarly very little can be stated about the narratives of the last two wars: the evidence is of a most general nature.

The main point to observe is that Diodorus' narrative of the first Siculo-Punic conflict possesses details about the Carthaginian position which could only have come from either a Carthaginian source, or a Siceliot source and possessing information which derived ultimately from a Punic source. On two occasions the writer takes his reader into the Carthaginian senate.[174] We are also given a glimpse of the feelings of the Carthaginians as a whole to the question of whether hostilities were to be waged or not.[175] The situation in Africa following the destruction of Himilcon's fleet contains no reference to Siceliot affairs.[176] The Carthaginian government's recruitment policy is discussed four times.[177] Details are also provided concerning the situation within the enemy camp.[178] Most interesting are references to commands of the Carthaginians.[179] Finally, on three occasions, the text penetrates into the very mind of the Carthaginian generals.[180] It is true that on the latter occasion, caution must be employed. The possibility that the information was a figment of the imagination of Diodorus or his sources cannot be overlooked. On the whole,

however, the existence of information of a purely Punic nature, often divorced from any Siceliot association, in addition to the relative disinterest in the affairs of Siceliot states other than the chief protagonist, Syracuse, suggests the existence of a source, if not directly Carthaginian, at any rate well informed about Carthaginian affairs.

5. The Attitude of the Text Towards Dionysius

No attempt is made by the text to disguise the fact that Dionysius' rule depended upon the power of force in the last resort, and that the actions of the despot and the nature of the support given to the tyrant, reveal distinct distaste by Dionysius for the established democratic constitution. This is clearly illustrated in the chapters, dealing with the coup of 405 B. C. Dionysius works against the constitution. Hence he demands immediate judgment of the generals.[181] His is the rule of the mob. Thus the people's passions are incited.[182] He is supported by desperadoes.[183] They are the very antithesis of any patriotic element, men who lack principles, whose loyalty depends upon bribes and wages.[184] Dionysius is only interested in himself and thus does not associate with his colleagues.[185] He accuses the wealthy of Gela in order to pay his troops, and it is implied that patriotic motives are absent from his intentions.[186] Again, he gains his

bodyguard, not because of a genuine threat to his life. The story is invented merely to effect his personal designs of aggrandizement.[187] Dexippus, who is prepared to restore liberty to the Syracusans, is dismissed.[188] It follows that Dionysius has robbed the Syracusans of liberty. Two factors are crucial for Dionysius' maintenance of power within Syracuse: the greater fear of the populace towards Carthage than towards the tyrant; and the ignorance of the demos.[189] It is therefore, necessary for Dionysius to deceive the multitude and effect the total elimination of the responsible elements of the population from the state.[190]

Dionysius' opponents are the"renowned", the "ablest" and the "most respectable" elements of the Syracusan citizen body.[191] Similarly, the Geloan rulers attacked by Dionysius are the "able" men who,like Dexippus,are prepared to restore liberty to the Syracusans and are dismissed for their efforts.[192]

It follows from the last citation that those who were not prepared to restore liberty to the Syracusans form an essential nucleus of support for the despotate. Indeed the text openly states that these were desperate men, desiring a policy involving confiscation and murder.[193] They clearly constitute a most unreliable element. Thus, for example, Dionysius is able to win over Dexippus' men by promising them double wages.[194] Similarly Dionysius employed the money which he secured from the wealthy Geloans to pay his guards. At the same time he promised double wages to

the Syracusan troops.[195] A vital factor, basic to his power, seems to have been the mercenary element.[196] The text records how he won over men who lacked property and possessed great boldness.[197] Elsewhere it is stated that the mercenaries of Gela, the exiles and impious formed the basis of Dionysius' rule.[198] Indeed, the people feared Carthage and the mercenaries.[199]

The people constitute a mob who think in ignorance that in Dionysius they have found a leader, and consequently act without full realization of the consequences.[200] They are a people swayed by the wrong opinion and in the case of the Geloan populace spurred on simply by envy of the influential.[201]

Thus the narrative of Dionysius' coup establishes three facts. First, it confirms the conclusion observed earlier in connection with the consideration of the precise details furnished about the Syracusan internal situation, that Dionysius' rule was unconstitutional. Indeed his rise to power was accompanied by the employment of the most arbitrary methods. Secondly, Dionysius' opponents were the men of ability who were well known for their experience in conducting the affairs of their state. Finally, Dionysius' chief source of support came, on the one hand, from the masses, who acted from ignorance and fear of Carthage, and, on the other hand, from desperate types of persons who worked essentially for monetary profit.

The narrative of book fourteen which discusses the first two decades of Dionysius' rule, tends to illustrate in a similar fashion the nature of the Sicilian tyranny. Dionysius' opponents are those who are against tyranny and had been banished upon the establishment of the despotate.[202] The slaying of Doriscus was undertaken by a movement aimed at the restoration of Syracusan liberty.[203]

The type of persons upon which the tyranny was able to maintain itself is well-illustrated in the chapter which discusses Dionysius' establishment of his dictatorship. To the common people he gave dwellings and to his friends and officers, he gave territory. His support consisted of aliens, citizens and manumitted slaves.[204] The tyrant's reliance upon mercenary strength is often noted.[205] In particular, the role of the Campanians is emphasized. The latter are paid any price, as long as they are capable of maintaining Dionysius' rule.[206] Hence they are responsible for crushing the revolt of the Syracusans.[207] The type of men they are is fully realized in the account of their treachery to the men of Entella. The latter event was followed by the Campanians' marriage to the wives of their victims.[208] As for the Syracusan masses, they repent of their ignorance in not having joined the Syracusan cavalry.[209]

In his foreign policy, Dionysius depended upon similar elements. Thus he maintained his own tyrants at Henna, Catane, and Naxos, Agyrium and among the Centoripans.[210]

It seems that policies pursued by these individuals corresponded closely to those of Dionysius himself. Thus Agyris of Agyrium emulated Dionysius, when he murdered the wealthy citizens of his state.[211]

The text is well aware of the fact that Dionysius' rule represents a movement aimed at eliminating political liberty from the Syracusan state. Thus Dionysius strengthens the tyranny.[212] He realizes that once Syracuse has attained freedom from war, her citizens will consider the possibility of regaining their liberty.[213] Dionysius works through the utilization of bribes and armed might.[214] Hence resulted the antagonism, epitomized by the slaying of Doriscus.[215] The rebels are stated to have made a bid for freedom. Rhegium and Messana provided help.[216] It is emphasized that Dionysius' humanity to the rebels is not simply one aspect of the tyrant's gentler virtues: it is only aimed at effecting the return of the rest of the rebel party.[217] Finally, the heavy hand of Pharacidas and Aretes is employed against the freedom of Syracuse.[218]

As regards foreign policy, Dionysius' lack of scruples is clearly illustrated by a consideration of his relations with Aeimnestus of Henna. First, Dionysius supported him in his bid for the tyranny: when the latter failed to continue cooperating with Dionysius, the Syracusan tyrant assumed the guise of a democrat and supported the people against him.[219] The text also observes

how Dionysius refrained from all injustice, not because he had regard for right, but because he wanted the trust of other cities.[220] He worked through the tyrants Arcesilaus and Procles to effect the seizure of Catane and Naxos.[221] The violence committed against the Chalcidian cities is emphasized upon numerous occasions. The towns were destroyed, the inhabitants sold into slavery and the territory given to the Siceli and Campanians.[222] The Leontines were moved to Syracuse and the Rhegine assumption of hostilities against Dionysius resulted from fear of suffering the same fate as the Chalcidians of Sicily.[223] Such treatment was accorded other states and peoples. Thus the Siceli were removed from Tauromenium, which was given to Dionysius' troops.[224] Messana was given to Locrians, Medmaeans and Messanians from the Peloponnesus.[225] The settlement of the latter element appears to have irritated Sparta: consequently Dionysius removed the Messanians to the territory of the later Tyndaris, which was then part of Abacaene territory.[226] After Caulonia was levelled to the ground, its inhabitants were transported to Syracuse and given Syracusan citizenship. Locrians received the territory of this state.[227] Similarly, Hipponium was destroyed and given to the Locrians.[228]

The unconstitutional nature of Dionysius' rule is emphasized by the frequent notices to the effect that the regime depended upon a state of hostility with Carthage.[229]

Banishment and death is an early feature of his rule.[230] The Syracusans join Dionysius in 398 B. C. because they hope for lenient treatment from the tyrant, and ultimate liberty.[231] They desire to end the slavery to which they are subjected.

By far the strongest indictment of the regime occurs in the speech attributed to the Syracusan knight, Theodorus. The latter declares that Dionysius is a harsher master than the Carthaginians. He plunders temples confiscates property, kills and uses bribes.[232] He is a dictator who employs slaves and mercenaries, a harsh tyrant.[233] Whereas Gelon freed Sicily, Dionysius enslaved the Syracusans and gave other Siceliots into Carthage's hands.[234] Because of Dionysius, Theodorus argues, Gela and Camarina were subdued, Messana was in ruins and Naxos and Catane were enslaved.[235] He robbed men of their freedom and exiled and killed them.[236] His rule was a heavy yoke to which the Syracusans were obliged to submit slavishly.[237]

The above information certainly portrays Dionysius as a politician who was unwilling to allow sentiment to enter into considerations of practical politics. Stubborn opposition, particularly that of the Chalcidian cities, which had characterized Siceliot politics for the last century was clearly answered by an equal severity on the tyrant's part. However, to base an assessment of the source's or sources' viewpoint on this information alone

ignores a number of valid considerations. First, as has been observed, in consideration of the views of earlier scholars in chapter one, the speech of Theodorus which is the principle vehicle employed, cannot be regarded as expressing an hostile viewpoint on the part of Diodorus or his authorities. Its appearance in the narrative of Diodorus is conditioned by three factors: Sicilian interest on the part of Diodorus and his Sicilian sources; the integrity of purpose expected from even a source well disposed towards Dionysius; and a very real attempt to indicate the impracticable nature of the opposition to the regime of Dionysius. Secondly, the references in the narrative are devoid of moral stricture. For example, a statement to the effect that the tyrant enslaved a city or employed violent men or was opposed by the nobility or experienced men is not to be regarded as necessarily representative of a moral condemnation. An honest historian is, indeed, duty bound to include all details, even if they appear to be unfavourably disposed towards the viewpoint of the historian. Thucydides' condemnation of the Athenian Empire or indeed the Thucydidean Pericles' own testimony to this effect, in no way detracts from the fact that Thucydides was an intense admirer of the Athenian Empire and its principal figure. Further, though it is possible for the reader to pronounce a moral condemnation, this type of approach must not be confused with the words of the narrative.

Personal conclusions which are drawn, must not be regarded as necessarily illustrative of the viewpoint of the text. Finally, any attempt to base conclusions upon a single factor expounded by the narrative, involves the dismissal of equally relevant material, less consistent with this point of view. Indeed our later consideration of the role of the Syracusans, Siceliots and Punic foe, is of the utmost significance for determining the bias, sympathies and moral point of view of the text. Further, there is no doubt that Dionysius does not simply emerge as a person who abuses the power inherent in his position. His attention to the niceties of constitutional practice and his theoretical support for the workings of democratic government are dealt with in considerable detail.

Thus Dionysius emerges in 405 B. C. as a supporter of the democratic element within the Syracusan State. Philistus supported him through constitutional channels and paid the fines imposed. He considers the renowned citizens as representative of an oligarchic clique.[238] The exiles are described as the true democrats.[239] Dionysius worked through the democrats and silenced the opposition who were afraid of being considered oligarchs. At Gela, he adopted a similar strategem by pretending to support the democrats against the oligarchs. Indeed he appears to have believed that the Geloans considered Dionysius responsible for their liberation.[240] He accused the Syracusan leaders of

illegality, in that they utilized public funds not as pay, but for their own pockets.[241] He claimed that he alone did not subscribe to Himilcon's bribes. Whereas the other generals are depicted as traitors, he is the representative of a nobler ideal.[242] The continued existence of constitutional order is indicated by the enlistment of men under forty years of age and the appointment of a bodyguard.[243] Indeed, the text specifically states that Dionysius persuaded the people who were gathered together in Leontini to give him the bodyguard.[244]

That this respect for constitutional format and democrat government is not simply to be regarded as a means employed by Dionysius for seizing control, is indicated by clear testimony to the effect that in the years following Dionysius' coup, the voice of the populace was not quashed. Thus Dionysius refrained from injustice when he gave Aeimnestus over to the demos. The text, it must be admitted, argues that his aim was to win the trust of the other cities.[245] In 398 B. C. he is said to have renounced his despotism and ruled in an humane fashion: banishment and deaths henceforth ceased.[246] An assembly was called to effect the declaration of war against Carthage.[247] Later the Siceliots urged Dionysius to seek an immediate encounter with Himilcon. Dionysius appears to have been almost won over, but he finally decided to follow the alternative advice offered by his friends. He did so for purely strategic reasons.

Fearing that a defenceless Syracuse might be taken just as Messana had been lost, Dionysius decided to forfeit popular sympathy. However, the main point is that the Syracusans do appear to have been in a position to express themselves and exert considerable influence upon Dionysius.[248] The subsequent notices confirm this conclusion. The Syracusans gathered in groups and discussed the opportunities which had not been taken advantage of, whereby they could have rid themselves of Dionysius. Now with arms in their possession, they were in a position to effect Dionysius' dismissal. Dionysius then called an assembly and almost succeeded in calming them immediately.[249] Clearly a ruler who possessed complete disregard for constitutional procedure would not have resorted to employment of a popular assembly to sustain his position. Even more surprising is the speech of Theodorus. It is certainly highly critical of Dionysius. However, the important point to observe is that Theodorus is able to speak without being interrupted by pressure from Dionysius. Even if the view is adopted that the speech lacks authenticity and is merely a figment of Timaeus' imagination and inimicable approach to the Syracusan despotate, it nevertheless demonstrates clearly that, whenever possible, Dionysius attempted to govern through accepted constitutional channels and that his rule did not witness an abrupt termination of the democratic governmental structure. However, as has been emphasized, the view that

the speech does not possess authenticity, carries little weight, and it certainly suggests a willingness on the part of Dionysius to limit arbitrary use of power within Syracuse, wherever possible.

The narrative continues to discuss Pharacidas' veto of the Syracusan secessionist movement. The important point to observe is that, although Dionysius dissolved the assembly, he won over the Syracusans by offers of gifts, the celebration of feasts, and the general distribution of his friendship. Again, it is clear that Dionysius shrank from extreme methods, preferring to give his regime within Syracuse a semblance of legality.[250] It is, moreover, clear that such an attitude was pursued throughout the reign of Dionysius. Thus the later reference to the Syracusan desertion clearly implies the existence of a preliminary debate in the assembly. Again, Dionysius' decision to reject Syracusan advice is based upon purely strategic reasons, and does not appear as a manifestation of Dionysius' lack of consideration for the assembly. Dionysius based his decision to avoid a direct encounter with the enemy upon the fact that time and want would ruin the cause of the barbarian.[251]

Very little information is provided concerning Dionysius' relations with the Siceliot League. One notice is, however, especially pertinent. In 394 B. C. the Acragantines and Messanians appear to have deserted by renouncing their alliance with Dionysius.[252] This information

certainly suggests that Dionysius' relations with the Siceliot states of the old Siceliot League of 409-405 B. C. were not based solely upon the power of the sword.

As well as depicting Dionysius as a ruler willing to consider constitutional practice wherever possible, the text regards the tyrant as representative of Greek patriotic opposition to Semitic aggression. It is as a patriot that he appeals for the restoration of the exiles.[253] His use of democratic procedure during his coup of 405 B. C. similarly places Dionysius in a patriotic guise: the generals he attacks are the traitors. At a later point, patriotic feeling is evident when it is stated that Dionysius entered war with the most powerful people in Europe, and that he was about to raise up a great war.[254] The assembly of XIV. 45. 2 was called "because the Carthaginians were the enemies of the Greeks generally, particularly having designs against the Siceliots." Dionysius claimed that Carthage was plotting against the Siceliots and that the one factor preventing immediate attack upon Sicily was the plague.[255] He stated how terrible it was for Greeks to be the slaves of the barbarians and how it was necessary for the Greeks to fight for their freedom.[256] The Siceliots, it is stated, indeed hated the barbarians, though the prospect of leniency from Dionysius and ultimate independence from his yoke were also vital factors, influencing the support of their crusade.[257] Finally, the text observes that Dionysius

was obliged to prevent the escape of the Carthaginian army from destruction because of the inevitable refusal which would be forthcoming from the Syracusans and their allies.[258] Clearly Dionysius is representative of Siceliot patriotic aspirations. The same viewpoint emerges in the description of the preparations of the war against Carthage.[259]

It is true that Dionysius is depicted as a warrior and political leader, willing to undertake seemingly harsh measures to effect the success of his programme. However, there is no hint of abuse of the power which he possessed. In the case of Naxos, Catane, Leontini and Rhegium the ancient hostility of these states justified the decisive measures undertaken. The same applied to the killing of the Syracusan knights who had rebelled.[260] It is, moreover, true that if opportunity involving the sacrifice of cities necessary for the preservation of Syracuse and the Greek cause presented itself, Dionysius ignored considerations of sentiment and constitutional niceties in pursuit of his long-term aims. Indeed the text stresses that Dionysius was not the man to permit a favourable opportunity to escape his notice. This explains his anger at Leptines' conclusion of peace between the Italiots and Lucanians, which proved disadvantageous to Dionysius' plans.[261] The decision to conclude peace with Rhegium in 387 B. C. was not the result of any friendship for that city on Dionysius' part. The real purpose was to seek the elimination of that city's naval

power of seventy triremes, for Dionysius realized that a siege was only possible without Rhegium's receiving naval aid.[262] Similarly, Dionysius launched his attack upon the Syracusan rebels of 403 B. C. only when he was sure that division characterized his opponents.[263] Depending upon circumstances, Dionysius supported the tyrant or the democratic element in Siceliot cities. For example, he supported Aeimnestus, but upon the latter's treachery, Dionysius encouraged the Ennaeans to make a bid for their freedom.[264] Conversely, if circumstances did not prove to be opportune, Dionysius was not the man to tempt fortune. As has been noted, this led on occasion to the defection of Siceliot support. Similarly, the evacuation of Gela, Camarina and Acragas was necessitated by political circumstances. When tactics against Aeimnestus and the Herbitaeans failed, Dionysius simply gave up.[265] On the other hand, the outbreak of the Libyan plague furnished Dionysius with his opportunity to declare war against Carthage in 397 B. C.[266] If gifts or bribes held out possibilities, Dionysius was not slow to act. Hence derived his gift of Messanian territory.[267] His failure to form a marriage alliance with Rhegium, did not discourage Dionysius, and his adoption of a similar course of action with Locri succeeded.[268] When the Carthaginian force was crippled by an outbreak of plague, Dionysius realized his opportunity and attacked.[269] If circumstances decreed that the slaves

be freed, Dionysius would bow to the force of necessity: far preferable, however, was the comparatively less drastic solution of effecting a treaty of peace with Carthage.[270] Similarly, Dionysius realized that common sense dictated the necessity of a concentrated attack upon Rhegium at the expense of the other Siceliots.[271]

However, the fact that Dionysius was in every sense an opportunist who could, if necessary, adopt an attitude of extreme harshness, must not obscure the fact that wherever possible, he avoided the adoption of extreme measures. Indeed, there is abundant testimony, indicating that Dionysius increasingly resorted to measures involving a lenient approach. The serious threat presented by the cavalry revolt of 405 B. C. necessitated a firm solution. Thus no attempt was made to conciliate the defectors at this stage. However, later when they were joined by the Syracusan rebels of 403 B. C. at Aetna, Dionysius resolved to treat those who returned with humanity. Dionysius' aim was to encourage the other rebels to do the same.[272] Clearly in this case, Dionysius realized that the stubborn resistance of the type offered by Naxos and Catane or Rhegium was unlikely to emerge in the case of the Syracusan demos, and knights. Indeed the Chalcidian opposition to Syracusan aims of hegemony was of long standing, and drastic measures would conceivably be regarded as the only guaranteed solution. However, a policy of leniency could produce and

indeed does appear to have succeeded in effecting peaceful coexistence with the various elements of the Syracusan populace. In such a context, the Theodorus speech appears perfectly logical; and the doubts presented by those scholars who suggest that it represents pure fabrication on the part of Timaeus, are effectively quashed. The text stresses that Dionysius made every effort to conciliate the dissidents, of whom Theodorus was representative.[273] However, it must be stressed that leniency at the expense of success in practical politics was not tolerated. Leptines' ability to effect peace between the Lucanians and Italiots did not make political common sense. Hence derived Dionysius' dismissal of Leptines and the succession of Thearidas.[274] At the same time it proved profitable to Dionysius to display leniency towards the Italiots. Thus he freed the Italiot prisoners without obtaining a ransom and left their cities independent. In return, Dionysius was honoured and received gold crowns from his former foes.[275] Clearly, Dionysius' policy of leniency was justified in this case.

Further, the text aims at depicting Dionysius as a great military and political leader, acting with common sense and decisiveness. As has been noted, the emphasis is upon Dionysius' military exploits and political sagacity. His success against the cavalry revolt was due to his speed.[276] His use of the Peisistratean model and his acceptance of Philistus' advice is illustrative of his political acumen

in accepting sound counsel from others.[277] Different circumstances dictated different action: hence the varied policy to Carthage, and the Dorian and Ionian blocs. Above all, as has been noted, a willingness to seize the opportune occasion characterizes Dionysius. His industry as a builder of fortifications is well illustrated in the account of the construction of Ortygia.[278] As a military figure, Dionysius is clearly distinguished. Of his personal bravery, there is no doubt. He appears on occasion in the vanguard and exposed to considerable danger. Particularly noteworthy was his courage in the conflict with the Siceli of Tauromenium, and his important role in the trireme, while conducting hostilities against Rhegium.[279] Upon one occasion in the vanguard, he was struck in the groin by a missile.[280] The portrait of Dionysius as the great military leader emerges particularly clearly in the account of Dionysius' military preparations against Carthage. Great detail characterizes the narrative, which is essentially concerned with the variety of the weapons manufactured, the diversity of origin of those involved and Dionysius' role in inspiring zeal.[281]

6. Attitude Towards Syracuse and the Siceliots

A further consideration is ignored by those scholars who argue that the text adopts a distinctly unfavourable attitude towards Dionysius who is, in fact to be regarded as the focal point of the narrative's hostility. Dionysius'

position must not be isolated from the view adopted towards the Carthaginians and Siceliots.

It is certainly true that the text betrays sympathy towards the Siceliots. The latter are clearly associated with qualities of bravery in face of the greatest indignities. The fear of the Selinuntines is contrasted with their confidence in their forthcoming aid from their brethren.[282] The courage of the women, children and old and the indignities suffered by these elements are frequently discussed. Thus in the narrative of the Selinuntine campaign, the text notes how the women abandoned their accustomed sense of modesty in face of danger, and how, while the young fought, the old looked to the supplies and encouraged the young women and girls to see to the supply of food and missiles.[283] When the city is in the process of being captured the women utter a great cry.[284] On the roof tops, the women and children throw stones upon the enemy.[285] Later they are treated cruelly by the Carthaginians,[286] who save the temples for the wealth contained there and not because of the presence of the women and children, who had sought shelter there.[287] The women are treated indignantly and bemoan their fate which is contrasted with the earlier luxurious life which they enjoyed. The daughters of marriageable age suffer unworthily.[288] Later the text records that the Himeraean women and children were evacuated by sea and land.[289] The bravery of the women and children is noted in the next

chapter,[290] and in connection with the Geloan resistance. The Geloan women and children refused to be evacuated and the latter element was responsible for the rebuilding of the walls.[291] A note on their bravery also appears in connection with the capture of Acragas.[292] Clearly the text employs the motif of the women and children to illustrate Siceliot bravery in face of invincible forces. Equally significant is the fact that interest in the indignities suffered illustrate the means employed by the text to gain the reader's sympathies.

Both methods appear extensively in the narrative. The Siceliots are fighting for salvation or everything.[293] The Himeraeans fight to the death.[294] Their only hope for safety is in battle.[295] They are superior in skill and daring.[296] The implication is clear: the Carthaginians are cowards. The defenders are fighting for their children, parents and fatherland.[297] The Himeraeans are fighting for salvation having as spectators their parents, children and relatives.[298] They fight without thought for their lives.[299] Victory is their single hope.[300] The Siceliots are fighting with the realization that the struggle is for their existence.[301] The Geloans resist bravely and are not dismayed at the threatening danger.[302] When Carthage offers the alternative of neutrality or support for her expedition, Acragas valiantly refuses the offer.[303] The daring of the Siceliots at Himera and their unexpected resistance, force the Punic

forces to flee.[304] Three thousand brave Himeraeans continue to resist, in spite of the flight of the majority of the citizens.[305]

Stress upon the indignities suffered by the Siceliots similarly results in sympathy for that party in the conflict. Thus, the text records that the Greeks lament, while the barbarians cheer.[306] While one side saw disaster, the other side was elated and took to indiscriminate slaughter. The note on the blood and corpses has a similar aim.[307] Even the Greek mercenaries in Carthage's service are moved to pity at the brutality of the barbarians.[308] As has been noted previously, the temples were not destroyed for the wealth therein contained: considerations of mercy are noticeably absent. Free-born youths and children were not even spared.[309] The attackers are of a bestial nature. Hence their speech is incomprehensible.[310] The women envy the dead.[311] The slaughter of the barbarians continues without compassion.[312] The women see their daughters suffer indignities unsuitable for their age. They mourn for the living children as for the dead, and are wounded personally for every wound inflicted upon their progeny. They envy the fathers and brothers who had died fighting for their country.[313] When the text discusses the lamentations accompanying the exiles from Acragas, it notes that the unfortunate refugees commented upon the fact that at least they had their lives.[314] The sick and aged were abandoned

by their relatives. Men were only concerned for their own lives. Tellias' self-immolation was occasioned by a desire to prevent his having to undergo indignities to his person.[315] References to the aged and sick of Camarina and the brutality of Carthage reiterate former themes.[316] The Camarinaeans remember the fate suffered by Selinus, Himera and Acragas. They experience no compassion from the conqueror. The exiles in their haste have no time for maintaining dignity of composure.[317]

The patriotic fervour of the Siceliots is stressed throughout the narrative. The defenders of Selinus fight for their children, parents and fatherland.[318] The Acragantines commit suicide, wishing their last breath to be drawn in the dwellings of their ancestors.[319] A patriotic note is sounded when the text observes that Selinus and Himera were taken after being inhabited for two hundred and forty years.[320]

Motives of patriotism underline the account of the construction of Epipolae. The united labour amazed the spectators; all were zealous for work; as a result, the wall was built within twenty days.[321] More important, is the account of the preparations for the war against Carthage, for these chapters are particularly significant for comprehension of the text's political sympathies. It is depicted as a collective enterprise and is described as "a great war with the most powerful people in Europe."[322] Workmen are

gathered from everywhere and all types of weapons, missiles and ships are manufactured. Dionysius collected workmen and overseers, who were divided into groups according to their skills. Rewards were offered and armour was manufactured to suit the different types of mercenaries. The Syracusans are described as enthusiastically supporting Dionysius.[323] Rivalry resulted in universal activity. One result was the invention of the catapult.[324] Cooperation between Dionysius and the workmen is facilitated by the tyrant's endeavours to pose as a citizen ruler. Thus the text observes how Dionysius spoke to the workmen and ate with them. As a result, great enthusiasm was created. It was this enthusiasm that accounts for the important inventions. Two hundred ships were rebuilt and one hundred and ten refitted. One hundred and sixty ships' sheds were constructed, while one hundred and fifty were repaired.[325] The large numbers of arms and ships bewildered the beholder.[326] According to the text, it seemed as if every Siceliot was engaged in the construction of ships and armaments.[327] The narrative notes the shields, daggers, corselets and missiles that were produced.[328] The soldiers were drawn from all quarters. Goodwill was elicited from the Siceliots.[329] The Messanians were won over by a grant of additional territory: a marriage alliance cemented the contract with the Locrians. The account given of the marriage of Dionysius with its emphasis upon the splendour of the event, strengthens the

impression received of a unified patriotic bond against Carthage.[330] The Syracusans were urged to declare war because the Carthaginians were most hostile to the Greeks, and were particularly aiming at the Greeks of Sicily.[331] Thus it is clear that the expedition had assumed the appearance of a struggle for Greek civilization and not merely the preservation of Siceliot life. After pointing out that the only reason for Punic cessation of hostilities was the plague, Dionysius argued that it was a disgrace for Greek cities to be enslaved by the barbarians.[332] Again, it is clear that a struggle for Hellenic civilization was in progress. It is thus more than a mere fight for autonomy or freedom. A conflict of two civilizations is being enacted. Thus important information is provided regarding the treatment of the Phoenicians in Sicliy. Phoenician property was plundered by the Syracusans.[333] The other Siceliots drove out the Phoenicians and plundered their property.[334] They were driven by hatred of Punic cruelty.[335] War was declared in the name of the Syracusans to achieve the restoration of the enslaved Greek states and withdrawal from them.[336] The Greek states relish the idea of gaining freedom from Phoenician domination.

Thus there is little doubt that what the text considers to be Dionysius' most important and decisive war with Carthage is conceived as pan-Siceliot and almost pan-Hellenic in sentiment. Syracuse and the other Siceliot

states are inspired by ideals of unity. A conflict of two opposing civilizations is envisaged. The combatants are Greek and Phoenician. The issue to be decided is the survival of Hellenic civilization or its overthrow by barbarian aggression.

Though it is true that the text betrays sympathy for the Siceliot cause and portrays the Greek cause as characterized by courage and patriotic zeal, it would be, nevertheless, wrong to suggest that the text's analysis is devoid of serious criticisms and is to be regarded as simply an exercise in adulation. Indeed the text is well aware of the fact that serious weaknesses characterize the Syracusan camp and, indeed, the camp of the other Siceliot cities. Significantly, this is particularly the case in the period preceding the rise of Dionysius, when the presence of the despot seriously weakened the Siceliot hopes.

Whereas Selinus had great potential and a superior army, an unexpected attack gave the victory to the Segestans and their Punic and Campanian allies.[337] The Carthaginians were able to break Selinus' walls because Selinus had neglected her defences.[338] The Himeraeans who were pursuing the Punic force were defeated by Hannibal because of the disorder within their ranks.[339] The later Syracusan victory over the Iberians and Campanians was compromised because of similar disorder.[340] The text suggests that the failure of the soldiers within Acragas to effect pursuit was due to

their having received bribes from the Carthaginians.[341] An opportunity was missed.[342] Indeed the whole narrative of the Acragantine campaign suggests considerable disorganization within the Siceliot camp. Thus Menes of Camarina lodged accusations against the Acragantine generals. While four generals were stoned by the mob, the fifth, Argeius, was spared.[343] Dexippus the Lacedaemonian was also accused of treachery. The Syracusans held the Carthaginians in contempt. As a result of their carelessness, the tables were turned, and Carthage was able to sink eight ships of war and chase the others to land, and regain the loyalty of the rebellious Campanians.[344] Dexippus was corrupted by a bribe of fifteen talents.[345] Low grain supplies rendered the evacuation of Acragas advisable.[346] Clearly, Acragas had not made sufficient preparations.

Later the Acragantines accused their generals, while all the Siceliots accused the Syracusans of a wrong choice in the selection of their generals. The text adds that no man could offer adequate counsel for the conduct of war.[347]

Dionysius' rise is facilitated by weaknesses within Syracuse. All that can be employed against him is the imposition of fines. The effectiveness of such a procedure is negated by Philistus' willingness to pay the sums required. Dionysius had no difficulty in stirring up the multitude, which was implicitly weak and endowed with a sheep-like mentality. He was able to convince them that

the notable citizens were possessed of pro-oligarchic tendencies. As a result, popular leaders, instead of those endowed with capacity to govern, were chosen. Dionysius' arguments fooled the people and the people were spurred on by his words.[348] The common people were ignorant of his scheme.[349] He worked on their fear of Carthage.[350] His intention was to use the Geloan masses in the same way as he had employed the Syracusan populace to further his scheme.[351] The Geloans were blinded by their envy of the most influential citizens.[352] They were unable to look to their problems, and by implication they could not rely upon the Siceliot League and the Syracusans. Indeed, they depended upon Dionysius.[353] Hence they implored him to remain. Dionysius convinced the Geloans that their generals had been bribed by Himilcon. Dionysius pretended that he did not want to serve, and it is clear that the Syracusans did not see through his guile.[354] The multitude "as is their wont",[355] swung to the worse decision. They realized that in their desire for freedom, they had established a tyranny over their country.[356] Yet Dionysius was still able to persuade the people to give him a bodyguard. The mob were capable of being persuaded.[357] After this he openly proclaimed himself a tyrant. However, by this time the people were crushed by fear of Carthage and Dionysius' mercenaries.[358] In other words, they had failed to formulate an independent organization of their own.

It is to be noted that the little information provided about Dionysius' opponents within Syracuse is certainly not favourably disposed towards that element. Their treatment of Dionysius' wife[359] does not indicate nobility of character on their part. Upon this occasion they are incapable of effective resistance. Earlier, their fear of the people[360] rendered the importance of their role of negligible value.

The narrative of book fourteen places less emphasis upon Siceliot weakness, since the text's main aim is to depict the success of unified Siceliot resistance under Dionysius against Carthage. However, sufficient evidence is provided which confirms the view expounded in book thirteen.

Thus the text notes that Dionysius determined to strengthen his tyranny because he feared that since the immediate danger from Carthage had disappeared, the Syracusans would attempt to assert their independence. This led to the fortification of the island.[361] The text, therefore, implies that Dionysius had duped the Syracusans. Later in the same chapter, it is stated that the Syracusans were aware of this.[362] The Syracusans were neglectful when they discharged the cavalry and let the infantry roam in the country.[363] They were later divided among themselves as to whether they should continue the siege or disband their forces and abandon the city.[364] Dionysius won because

they were in disorder.[365] The Syracusans were similarly betrayed by Aristus who promised to restore Syracusan liberty.[366] Dionysius was then able to send the Syracusans to harvest the crops, while he could take away their arms.[367] Clearly the Syracusans are depicted as incapable of organization independent of Dionysius.

The text betrays a similar lack of confidence in the capabilities of other states. Stasis is a regular feature. Thus it is stated that the Ennaeans naively believed that Dionysius was the champion of their freedom against Aeimnestus.[368] Messanian internal policies in 399 B. C. similarly lack harmony. This in turn, effected the entente with Rhegium. The Messanian generals did not consult the people and listened to the Rhegine generals. The Messanian Laomedon led the opposition to the generals, the Messanians deserted and the Rhegines were forced to retire.[369]

The Syracusans declared war upon Carthage, knowing that the Carthaginian danger was a means whereby Dionysius was able to distract their attention from the real problem of their subjection to Dionysius.[370] In 396 B. C. the Messanians were divided regarding policy.[371] The walls fell because they were not defended. While Dionysius was unwilling to abandon Syracuse, the Siceliots wanted to engage the Punic force. Dionysius realized that Magon's fleet could capture the city.[372] The implication clearly is that the Siceliots were rash, lacking rational perspective.

The same idea is contained in the statement that the Syracusans murmured against Dionysius because they were puffed up with pride.[373] Dionysius was almost able to win them over[374] had it not been for Theodorus, the leader of the rebels who is described as a man δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικός The implication is clear: he was not a practical man or a man of action.[375]

As has been seen in chapter one, the contents of the speech of Theodorus clearly illustrates the impractical nature which characterized the leader of the Syracusan dissention. It is clear that the text betrays little sympathy for the secession and its mouthpiece, Theodorus who is only a man δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικός The remaining notices confirm this impression. The Syracusans naively believe that Pharacidas will help them.[376] Gifts and banquets on the part of Dionysius suffice to quell all opposition.[377] The Syracusans are again guilty of hasty and rash counsel when they desire an immediate encounter with the enemy in 392 B. C. Dionysius, on the other hand, relies on time and want.[378]

It thus appears that the evidence suggesting that the text betrays distinct sympathy for the Syracusan and Siceliot cause is somewhat neutralized by the considerable testimony which indicates that serious weaknesses characterized that camp. The evidence is inevitably largely associated with Syracuse: however, the text

clearly indicates that the position of Selinus, Himera, Acragas, Messana and Enna was no better.

A further fact is to be noted. The evidence regarding Siceliot patriotic zeal is overwhelmingly associated with Dionysius who is depicted as the source of this zeal. In other words, the text is clearly of the opinion that the person of Dionysius alone is capable of effecting the full realization of Siceliot national aspirations.

Thus far two facts can be established. First, disfavour is clearly associated with the disunited and disorganized Siceliot cities. Secondly, the portrait of Dionysius is certainly not unfavourable, in the sense that moral condemnation is associated with it. The problem then is to determine whether any disfavour or moral censure is at all apparent in the narrative.

7. Condemnation of Carthage

Indeed, such a view is clearly illustrated by a consideration of the text's view of Carthage. One aim is to indicate that Carthage's victories resulted from no great military prowess on her part. Thus a contrast is effected between Punic military inability and Greek valour. This aspect has been well illustrated by the accounts given of the initial hostilities in the campaigns of 409/8 and 406 B. C. Carthage, on three occasions had committed the same error of concentration upon one area of

the wall. The whole description, as has been seen, tends to lack conviction. Certainly this uninspiring account contrasts strikingly with the generally detailed knowledge provided about Carthaginian affairs. The conclusion is inescapable. Diodorus or his sources aimed at deliberately minimizing the military success of Carthage.

Other factors tend to the same conclusion. The Punic victory in the campaign of 409/8 and 406/5 B. C. is due to numerical superiority and not to strategic ability. Emphasis upon Punic numerical advantage is recorded upon numerous occasions.[379] The war engines and the hosts of the enemy make the Selinuntines afraid.[380] Selinus is assaulted by waves of the enemy.[381] Selinus sends envoys requesting aid from Acragas, Gela and Syracuse, on the grounds that the city cannot withstand the enemy strength for any great length of time.[382] In the description of the Selinuntine and Himeraean campaigns, the text by contrasting the large numbers of the barbarians with the few Siceliots clearly indicates the unfair nature of the conflict.[383]

The surprise attack of the Himeraeans resulting in Punic consternation leads the Carthaginians to believe that Siceliot reinforcements had arrived.[384] The implication is that the Carthaginians are only able to succeed when they possess sufficient numerical superiority. Hannibal appears to have needed extra men because his

troops were exhausted.[385] Again the only means whereby Hannibal's army could succeed was through the employment of superior numbers.

It is moreover clear that Carthaginian organization is described as chaotic. The employment of such large numbers works to Carthage's disadvantage in a confined area.[386] During the Acragantine campaign, the Carthaginian force found itself unable to risk waging a pitched battle. Again the implication is that in an open encounter, Carthage was unable to cope with Siceliot prowess. Lack of food follows. The only hope of salvation is to be found in the capture of the supply fleet.[387]

More important, there is little doubt that Carthage receives moral censure from the text. Punic barbarity and lust for plunder is stressed in book thirteen. Thus the Carthaginian insults to the women are noted.[388] The antithesis between the cheering of the aggressor and the lamentations of the Greeks serves to sustain this view of Punic barbarity.[389] The indiscriminate slaughter is illustrative of the invader's savagery.[390] The Carthaginians are described as beasts with strange tongues.[391] The distress of the women because of the barbarity of the Semite makes them envy the women who had died.[392] The invader destroys cities which had been inhabited for over two centuries.[393] The Carthaginians aim at conquest, enslavement and general barbarity.[394] Indeed their cruelty moves the

Greek mercenaries in Carthage's service to pity.[395] The text frequently alludes to the plundering.[396]

Above all, Carthaginian impiety resulting from the destruction of Greek temples and monuments is stressed. The text states explicitly that the only reason for sparing the temples was concern for the wealth which they contained and not for the human lives of those who had sought sanctuary therein.[397] Temples were plundered and destroyed.[398] Monuments were erased.[399] Hannibal arrogantly declared that the gods had departed from Selinus and that the Selinuntines had offended the deities.[400] During the second invasion, he ordered the destruction of the monuments and tombs in order that he might use the debris for the construction of the mounds. However, fear fell upon the army because the tomb of Theron was struck by lightning.[401] The soothsayers forbade this action. As a result a plague struck the Punic camp. Many died and suffered distress. Among the dead was Hannibal. The text reports that during the night spirits of the dead were seen. Himilcon was forced to put an end to the destruction and supplicate the gods by sacrificing a young boy to Cronus and drowning a large number of cattle in Poseidon's honour.[402] Even then the barbarity of the invader did not cease and they continued to defy the deity. Thus Himilcon killed those left behind in Acragas, and even dragged out and killed those who had sought refuge in the temples.[403] The self-immolation of

Tellias was conditioned by a desire to prevent Carthaginian impiety to the gods, plunder and indignity to his person.[404] The Semite in his savagery had no respect for Fortune.[405]

Book fourteen continues to discuss the theme of Carthaginian impiety. However, the main concern is the effectiveness of Siceliot vengeance and divine retribution for Punic impiety. Thus thoughts of the cruelty displayed by the Carthaginians towards the Siceliots spur on the Siceliots to join Dionysius.[406] The physical torture and counter outrage committed by the Siceliots in 398 B. C. in revenge for former miseries suffered occurs in the narrative of the preliminaries to the Great Punic War.[407] The text accordingly declares that Carthage learnt not to transgress the Law in her treatment of conquered peoples. She learnt that Fortune was impartial and that defeat brought punishment to both sides.[408] Because Phoenician domination was heavy, the Siceliots desired their freedom and joined Dionysius.[409] For similar reasons Eryx hated Carthage.[410] When Motya was taken, the Siceliots retaliated upon the Phoenicians for former injuries suffered.[411] The Phoenicians considered how they had treated their Greek captives and the prospect that they might receive the same treatment in turn.[412] The image of the Phoenician women and children fearing their fate strengthens the analogy.[413] Indeed their resistance results from their having abandoned all hope.[414] The Siceliots in their eagerness to return

cruelty for cruelty, slay even the old, the women and children.[415] Dionysius issued a decree, calling upon the Motyans to seek refuge in the temples which were revered by the Greeks. This ironically recalls the passage in book thirteen where the Selinuntine women and children seek refuge in the temples.[416] The looting which follows contrasts with Punic looting in the previous book.[417] The text states that for Himilcon's plunder of the temples of Demeter and Kore, the commander soon suffered a fitting penalty. In other words, swift retribution is prophesied. Indeed the narrative discusses the daily worsening condition of Himilcon's fortunes. The Syracusans triumphed in skirmishes, and tumult arose in the camp at night. The Carthaginians believed that they were being attacked. In addition, a plague made its appearance, causing every type of suffering.[418] Indeed the most important direct result of the seizure of the temple of Demeter and Kore was the plague which struck the army.[419] The text emphasizes the divine association of the plague. Indeed, it is stated that when news of the victory ran throughout the city, the women and children crowded together by the walls, and while some raised their hands to their gods, others declared that the barbarians had suffered the punishment of heaven for plundering the temples. From the distance, it appeared that it resembled a battle with the gods.[420] The comment is added that Fortune changed the affairs of the Carthaginians,

and that weakness was to be found in too great elation.[421] Those who had conquered Greek cities were now worried about the fate of their fatherland; those who had overthrown the tombs of the Syracusans, now gazed at the one hundred and fifty dead who had been struck down by the plague and lay in an unburied state; those who had wasted with fire the territory of the Syracusans, saw their own fleet in flames.[422] The arrogance of the Punic entry into the Syracusan harbour contrasts noticeably with the secrecy of its departure.[423] Himilcon who had encamped in the temple of Zeus and had pillaged the wealth of the sanctuaries paid for his impiety amongst the temples of the city and offered retribution for his sins against the gods. Having made atonement to the gods, he committed suicide, bequeathing to his citizens a deep respect for religion, for Fortune heaped upon them other calamities of war.[424] The significance of the Libyan revolt is indicated by the reference to the fact that the Libyans endured oppressive rule.[425] Again, it is clear that Carthage suffered retribution for her cruelty and defiance of fate. Indeed the text clearly affirms that the gods were fighting against the Carthaginians.[426] The latter besought the deity to terminate its wrath and a superstitious fear seized the city.[427] Priests to Kore and Demeter were appointed from amongst the renowned citizens; statues were consecrated; rites were conducted according to Greek fashion. Finally, the most prominent Greeks at Carthage were chosen and assigned to the service of the goddesses.[428]

Thus there is little doubt that the text is deliberately aiming at censuring Carthage. In the first place, her military ability is seriously questioned. This assumes the guise of moral condemnation when the text implies that Carthage's victories were those of cowards, relying upon numerical superiority. More important, the text emphasizes the fact that Carthage was driven by lust for material wealth and accretion of Empire. The indignities which the Siceliots have to suffer at the hands of the barbarian aggressor are frequently alluded to. Especially important are the references to the sufferings of the women and children. Carthage, not satisfied with inflicting indignities upon the male population, vents her wrath in cowardly fashion upon defenceless women and children. Finally, there is the very definite emphasis upon Punic impiety towards Greek temples and shrines. The consequence is the thesis that Carthage had challenged Tyche, for which she was obliged to suffer indignities which paralleled those which she had inflicted upon her subject peoples, particularly the Siceliots. The latter are aroused to a pitch of patriotic fervour, whereby the conflict assumes universal proportions and represents essentially a clash of two cultures or civilizations. The gods support the Greek cause which is representative of a justice. Carthage's Hybris is above all personified in the person of Himilcon whose tragic fate marks the Nemesis of the Siceliot gods. Indeed the narrative

clearly contains very real elements of tragedy.

8. The Purpose of the Acragantine Excursus

Consideration of the role of Dionysius, the Siceliots and Carthage illuminates the problem of the significance of the Acragantine excursus in Diodorus' scheme. Two conclusions have already been drawn: that the details about Acragas came from a Syracusan source; and that the excursus is not to be seen in isolation. More important is the question whether the excursus elucidates in any manner the political viewpoint adopted by the source or sources of Diodorus?

The excursus certainly emphasizes the importance of the wealth factor in determining the Carthaginian decision to intervene in Siceliot affairs. A number of passages in particular are to be noted. First, there is the notice about the Acragantines' gathering of their crops and possessions within their walls, because they assumed that Carthage would attack them first.[429] The point to note here is that the Acragantines regarded as inevitable an attack upon themselves as commencing the initial phase of the war. Secondly, the passage dealing with Himilcon's plundering of the temples and dwellings is to be noted.[430]

Two facts are clear: that Carthage aimed at extensive plunder; and that she possessed no scruples when the issue concerned wealth stored in temples or sacred shrines of the Greeks. Other passages confirm the content of these two

citations. We read that Hannibal promised his men the right to pillage Selinus.[431] When the Carthaginians captured Selinus, they agreed not to kill the women and children in the sanctuaries. As has been seen, the text explicitly states that they did this not out of pity for the Selinuntines. On the contrary, they feared that the women might set fire to the temples with themselves in them. As a result, the Carthaginians would be deprived of the wealth which the temples contained. The conclusion arrived at by the text is that Carthage's cruelty is indicated above all by the fact that motives of plunder and not fear of sacrilege accounted for Carthage's actions.[432] There follows an account of the plundering of the city. Again it is clear that Carthage's primary aim was plunder, and that insult to the deity was not avoided in pursuit of this aim.

The same situation emerges in the narrative of the sack of Himera.[433] Again plunder necessitates an end to the killing. Also, it is expressly stated that the temples were only burnt after the suppliants, who had fled there for safety, had been dragged out. Stress is again placed upon the importance of the booty in the account of the welcome of Hannibal by the Carthaginians.[434]

Three reasons are supplied to account for Tellias' sacrifice in the temple of Athena. First, he aimed at the witholding of impiety from the gods. Secondly, he saw a

way of avoiding mutilation. Thirdly, he wanted to withold plunder from the Carthaginians.[435] Recourse is again directed towards motifs of sacrilege and plunder.

The second reference to the capture of Acragas notes the transference of the votive offerings, statues and valuable gifts, and the burning of the temples.[436] The text further notes that the Carthaginian attack upon Gela and Camarina was accompanied by the seizure of booty of all types.[437] In this connection, the text digresses to discuss the subsequent history of the bronze statue of Apollo.[438] Finally, a note on the seizure of Gela is recorded.[439]

Many of these references are of a fairly general nature. Most of them, however, possess serious implications for a consideration of the significance of the Acragantine excursus as a vehicle for the expression of the political viewpoint of the text. In other words, their appearance is not purely incidental. Reference is here made first to the citations concerning the capture of Selinus and Himera, the return of Hannibal, and the suicide of Tellias. These emphasize the very real part which plunder played in the Punic expedition. This is further emphasized by the fact that the capture of Acragas is mentioned three times in the text and that of Gela twice.[440]

A second point is to be noted. There is a consistent association of Carthaginian plundering with the motif of

sacrilege and impiety. Thus Himilcon plundered the temples, and the Selinuntines in the temples were spared, not because the Carthaginians respected human life, but because the destruction of their temples involved the loss of wealth contained therein. The dragging of the Himeraeans from the temples and Tellias' self-sacrifice certainly emphasizes this theme. Finally,there is the note on the transference of the votive offerings of Acragas and the burning of the Acragantine temples. Clearly then,the Carthaginian impiety as illustrated by their plunder of Greek temples is a major motif of the text.

The significance of the wealth factor is more easily comprehended in the light of the question of why Acragas was the first city attacked by Carthage and why that same city assumed such a prominent position in the narrative of Diodorus? One reason is the simple fact that the sources of Diodorus were well provided with information about Acragas. It has, indeed, been argued that this fact cannot be divorced from the issue of the existence of detailed information about Syracusan affairs in contrast to the sparse information provided about Selinus, Himera and Acragas in the period preceding the appearance at Acragas of the Syracusan-led Siceliot militia. There is, however, another equally important point to consider. Acragas was clearly the wealthiest of the Siceliot states. Hence, according to the thesis of the text, Carthage would have special reasons

for attacking Acragas first. Indeed this was the case. Also it is noted that the Acragantines expected that they would be the first attacked of all the Siceliot cities.[441] The reason is clearly to be found largely in the wealth factor. Thus Acragas' wealth is a subject which is not to be viewed in isolation. It possesses a very definite relationship to the general Siceliot picture. The facts that Acragas was especially conspicuous for its wealth and that largely as a result of this, Carthage commenced the assault upon the Siceliot states with an assault upon that city, combined with the fact that the Syracusan source was,as a result of accidental political occurrences, particularly well-acquainted with the internal position there, meant that Acragas' splendour could be dealt with in greater detail than that of the other Siceliot cities. However, as has been shown, the wealth motif is certainly not solely associated with Acragas, and is not to be treated as an isolated episode. The difference is in degree and not in fact. Therefore Acragas appears merely to epitomize the general Siceliot position. The digression has to be placed in a wider context, and it clearly possesses a very real relationship with the position of the other Siceliot cities, Selinus, Himera, Gela, Camarina and perhaps Syracuse.

Such a conclusion is of special significance as regards the positioning of the excursus at the commencement of the second Punic invasion. The whole episode is

illustrative of wealth as a determining factor in the Punic decision to intervene in Siceliot affairs. In other words, these chapters reveal that a potential source of danger to the Siceliot states was their very prosperity which particularly characterized Acragas, the first city to bear the brunt of the Punic attack. An equally important aspect is the association of the plunder motif with the motif of impiety, which ultimately resulted in the Punic collapse. Both facts assume additional importance when placed in the context of the Punic onslaught of 406 B. C.

The Acragantine excursus possesses importance for the position of Acragas as well as that of Carthage. Indeed, the text utilizes the data on Acragas to illustrate that a prime cause of her collapse before Carthage was her very wealth.

The first piece of evidence to note is the decree of 406 B. C. This limited the bedding of the guards to one mattress, one cover, one sheepskin and two pillows.[442] Secondly, the text notes that, in spite of the fact that the Acragantines were fleeing for their lives, they still thought of the riches which they were abandoning.[443] Thirdly, there later occurs a reference to the fact that the women and children were afraid of changing a pampered life for a strenuous journey and hardship.[444] Finally, the contrast between the ransacking of the buildings and the temples and the former prosperity is to be noted.[445]

The above citations have a common characteristic. Stress is laid upon the antithesis between the great prosperity of the Acragantines before these events and their present misfortunes.

In the long excursus, there is little doubt that the stress is laid upon the former idea. The notices on the luxury of the inhabitants is to be especially observed. It is emphasized that this was common to the inhabitants from the youth upwards. The delicate clothing, gold ornaments and flasks of silver and gold are discussed. Other details concern the wine cellar of Tellias, the magnificent ornaments which adorned the city, the splendid wedding of Tellias' daughter and the desire for increased wealth as typified by Antisthenes' son.[446]

Thus it appears that emphasis is upon the fact that the citizens of Acragas having been freed from war for a lengthy period, concentrated all their interests upon wealth. It must be stressed that this does not mean that the account is entirely condemnatory. We are distinctly told that Tellias and others were men of the highest character.[447] Indeed this fact suggests that a third purpose of the excursus was to contrast the fine qualities of the Siceliots at their best with the barbarity of the Carthaginians. The text stresses that this quality was shared by other Acragantines as well as Tellias.[448] They are described as men who act in an old fashioned and friendly

manner. ἀρχαϊκῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως The reference to Tellias' wonderful character and plain appearance clearly contrasts with oriental luxury of the type very possibly associated with Carthage. The nobility of Tellias' death supports the likelihood of such a contrast.

The account of the Acragantine prosperity as a whole is certainly not condemnatory in its entirety. In itself, there is no disgrace in a Greek city possessing temples and fine buildings. Indeed, these notices combined with reminiscenses of ancient Greek virtue clearly reflect pride of the source in the Hellenic achievement. However,it is significant that in the story of Antisthenes' son and the farmer, the disastrous effects of a parent's acquisition of wealth upon his fortunate son are apparent.[449] The implication of these references is, therefore, clear: wealth constituted a twofold danger. As was argued above, the text is aware that West Greek prosperity as epitomized by Acragantine wealth, was a factor inciting Punic lust for wealth and inevitable intervention in Sicily. Equally important is the fact that wealth was capable of effecting internal corruption. Thus the well-known theme of classical historians of tryphe causing destruction, makes its appearance. The Acragantines possess a false sense of security. On the surface not a cloud was to be seen: the state was, however, rotten to the core. As such, the excursus compliments the notices in the general narrative,

to the effect that the Siceliots were internally divided.

Thus, upon close analysis, three purposes constitute the positioning of the Acragantine excursus before the great Punic onslaught, culminating in the elevation of Dionysius. In the first place, it illustrates Carthage's lust for wealth and her policy of aggression against the Siceliot states. Secondly, it illuminates the internal failure of the Siceliots. Prosperity is accompanied by a lack of internal union. Lethargy and an abandoning of pristine values brings in its wake a lack of vigour and decisiveness - elements detrimental for a confrontation with the enemy. However, pride in the Siceliot achievement is certainly not absent. In short, the same contradictions as appear in the main narrative are apparent in the discussion of Acragantine prosperity. A blend of genuine pride in the Siceliot achievement combined with a clear awareness of the existence of serious weaknesses in her defence structure added to very obvious condemnation of Punic power lust, love of wealth and impiety, constitute the main themes of the Acragantine excursus. By its chronological positioning and relationship with passages distributed throughout the text, it undoubtedly represents the source's point of view on the problem confronting all the Siceliot states. Certainly the circumstances surrounding the availability of this material to the source cannot be discounted. However, the significance of the material for the viewpoint of the text and the method

of its utilization cannot be overlooked.

9. Conclusion

It will be noted that in the above analysis of Diodorus' text, two procedures have been adopted. First, an attempt has been made to assess the nature and scope of the material available to the source or sources of Diodorus. Secondly, the sympathies and antagonisms of the text have been examined.

Dionysius is clearly the central figure in the narrative. The interest of the text is chiefly military and political in nature. Above all, the significance of the great war of 398/96 is stressed. Dionysius' other wars clearly possess subordinate interest. Indeed, this war contrasts noticeably with the Punic wars of the last decade of the fifth century, and whereas the latter represents the decline of Siceliot fortunes, the very opposite applies to the great war of Dionysius.

The text is well-informed about Syracusan affairs. Indeed, Syracuse is the main interest of the text in the period immediately preceding the debut of Dionysius. Details about the democratic constitution are well-known, and it is clearly established that the rise of Dionysius was accompanied by drastic revision of the constitutional structure. The text's interest in Syracuse is also revealed by the detailed accounts of the careers of Hermocrates and Diocles.

Little information is provided about the internal

affairs of the other Siceliot cities. The two facts which are provided concerning the party of Empedion and the "Greeks who pitied" are placed in a most obscure and isolated context. The accounts provided of the Selinuntine, Himeraean and the early stages of the Acragantine campaigns, and of the occupation of the cities, which are clearly based upon stock formulae, tend to suggest that only a minimum amount of information of an original type, was available to the source of Diodorus. It is possible that the information was of such a sparse nature that the source of Diodorus was obliged to transfer the information concerning one campaign to the other. For example, it might be conjectured that Diodorus' source knew of the valiant resistance of the Siceliot women at Selinus and added this information to the account of the Himeraean campaign. A similar procedure might account for the three-fold Siceliot failure to reconstruct the derelict walls. Finally, the obscure references to the formation and early successes of the Siceliot League confirm the thesis that Diodorus' source possessed only the vaguest of information about the affairs of the Siceliot cities.

A considerable amount of material is provided about the social and economic life of Acragas. This is certainly indicative of the fact that Diodorus' source knew a great deal more about Acragantine internal affairs than about the position of the other Siceliot cities allied to Syracuse.

I have suggested that the source was, in fact, a Syracusan present at Acragas in 406 B. C., and probably a Syracusan military figure. Indeed the information about Acragantine internal political affairs becomes fuller, once the Siceliot force has arrived in the city. Similarly, the few details about the internal position of Himera and Gela belong to the period following the arrival of Syracusan and allied aid.

Finally, the source of Diodorus is well-informed about Carthaginian affairs. This suggests a source, well-acquainted with the Carthaginian internal position.

In conclusion, it is clear that the information provided by the narrative of Diodorus derives ultimately from a contemporary source, predominantly interested in Syracuse, and probably a Syracusan himself. This source was in governmental and military circles. Hence derived the interest in politics and war. The details about Acragas, Gela and Himera and the intimate knowledge about Punic affairs originated from a source possibly in diplomatic contact with Carthage and certainly within Syracusan military and governmental ranks.

Even of greater importance is the problem of the text's sympathies and bias. Dionysius is clearly the key figure. There is no doubt that he is portrayed as a figure obsessed by a desire for power, lacking scruples when they hindered the attainment of his goal. Thus he is clearly

placed in opposition to those respectable rulers who work within the constitutional framework, are regarded as the establishment and have no intention of contravening democratic procedure at Syracuse. His followers are desperadoes, slaves, mercenaries, money-hungry individuals who are easily conquered by bribes, tyrants of his own type, and the Syracusan populace which is described essentially as ignorant, stupid and short-sighted in its policies.

However, it would be wrong to assume on the basis of the above facts, that Dionysius is the focal point of the text's hostility. In the first place, there is the danger of passing moral judgment where Dionysius does not receive moral condemnation from the text of book thirteen and the bulk of book fourteen. Secondly, as has been argued in chapter one, it must not be presumed that the speech of Theodorus echoes the viewpoint of Diodorus' source. Crucial differences between the sentiments of the speech and the narrative have been noted. It has been further observed that the content of the speech, referring to Dionysius' destruction of the Chalcidian cities is unlikely to have gained the sympathy of the Syracusan demos and of the Dorian nationalistic element in Syracuse and the other Dorian cities, for it was the Ionian bloc, which included Elymian Segesta, that represented the most ancient source of hostility to Syracuse and her allies. Further, it has

been demonstrated that Theodorus' statements about Carthaginian treatment of Siceliots are hardly likely to have inspired confidence. Finally Theodorus' ability to speak in such a way testifies to a considerable degree of freedom on the part of the Syracusan demos. Theodorus is thus hardly portrayed in sympathetic terms.

Most important, the picture of Dionysius as a power-hungry individual is qualified in a number of ways. The text clearly states that he avoided the flagrant disregard of established constitutional procedure, and his respect for democratic government certainly echoes the Peisistratean model. The text also suggests considerable respect on the tyrant's part for the functioning of the organs of the Siceliot League. Thus secession of its members was effected. Indeed, this evidence suggests that Dionysius was in no position to exercise arbitrary control over this body. Above all, Dionysius appears as a representative of Siceliot aspirations, which achieve ultimate realization only through the person of the tyrant. He is, moreover, characterized by decisiveness and courage, and leniency, wherever such a course was possible.

The Siceliots appear as patriots, bravely resisting the onslaught of the savage Carthaginians, and the struggle with Carthage is conceived as a conflict of civilizations. However, this must not obscure the fact that the narrative is only too aware of the existence of weaknesses among the

Siceliots. Military errors in the period preceding Dionysius' rise are abundant. Later, whereas Dionysius pursues a policy of caution, the Siceliots are rash. Equally significant is the fact that they lack cohesion. Thus, divided among themselves, they are easily duped and represent an appearance of ignorance and naivity. The division is both internal and external, affecting both the position of the state and the inter-relationship of the Siceliot states. The stereotyped nature of the evidence about the Selinuntine, Himeraean and Acragantine campaigns has as one effect a definite tendency to minimize the role of the Siceliots. The Siceliots lose through negligence in respect to the construction of their walls. The same impression is received by the text's obscure and confusing account of the rise of the Siceliot League. In other words, it is here maintained that the obscurity is the result of the fact that the text consciously strove to limit the military and political role of the Siceliots. Hence the rise of the League is obscured. Such a conclusion is certainly suggested by a consideration of the fact that evidence for Siceliot affairs and the Siceliot League is far more abundant for the period which witnessed its collapse than that in which it arose and achieved notable successes. It is, perhaps, not without significance that, though well-provided about Acragantine affairs, this information is devoid of political and

constitutional interest. Further, it must be stressed that the ultimate success of the Siceliots depended upon Dionysius, without whom the Siceliot ideal could not be realized. Finally, there is the problem of the speech of Theodorus. There is little doubt that this spokesman of popular opinion, though a man considered practical, in fact, was far from that, and epitomized an unrealistic viewpoint.

The fact is that as well as being severely critical of the Siceliot achievement, and being certainly not censorious of Dionysius, real hostility is focused upon the Punic invader. This criticism assumes three forms. First, Carthage is depicted as a power, cowardly in battle, relying ultimately upon superior numbers, gaining her successes through Siceliot mistakes rather than through her own achievements in military prowess and cunning. More important is the fact that a distinct moral censure characterizes the text's viewpoint. Thus Carthage in cowardly fashion attacks defenceless women and children. The Carthaginians are like beasts, effecting destruction upon ancient Greek foundations. In fact, the Punic state poses a threat to the effective continuance of Western Greek civilization. For her cowardice, Carthage and indeed the Phoenicians of Sicily, pay in full. Unable to control her lust for dominion and materialism, spurred on by animal instincts, she is obliged to face similar treatment to that

which she accorded the Siceliots at the hands of her own victims.

Finally, Carthaginian arrogance and over-confidence results in the Punic state's identification of her power with divine authority. She believes insolently that she succeeds because the gods are fighting on her side. This enables her to assault the very bastions of the gods of the Greeks. Hence, the destruction of the Greek temples. As a result, Hannibal, Himilcon and the whole Carthaginian populace are visited by divine retribution. The vengeance of the Greek gods culminates in the penitence and suicide of Himilcon, the Libyan revolt and the acceptance by Carthage of the cult of Demeter and Kore.

Thus attempts to assume that the text's hostility is directed towards Dionysius, ignore a number of important considerations. Moral condemnation which is very apparent in connection with Carthage is absent in the case of Dionysius. It has been suggested that the evidence of the speech of Theodorus has been seriously misinterpreted, when it is suggested that it can be cited as evidence of the narrative's hostility towards the despot. Its aim is rather to stress the inadequacies of the opposition to Dionysius. Further, the text stresses the fact that Dionysius was unwilling to wield arbitrary power, where more constitutional procedures could be employed with equal profit.

Indeed the aim of the narrative is to lay stress upon

the two problems facing the Siceliot cities, Carthaginian lust for power and material possessions and the inadequacies within the Siceliot defensive machine. Two elements are necessary to check the Punic threat: the solution of the Siceliot internal position as illustrated by Siceliot patriotism under the leadership of Dionysius; and the process of hybris, accompanied by divine nemesis. Stress is certainly laid upon the former; however, the role of the divinities is certainly no negligible factor.

It has been shown that in such a context, the Acragantine excursus achieves considerable importance not merely as a digression of great interest in itself, but as a section whose content is connected intimately with the rest of Diodorus' narrative. In a real sense, the excursus sets the stage for the drama enacted in the narrative which follows. The themes are Carthaginian power, lust and desire for wealth, Siceliot moral superiority over Carthage, and Siceliot internal weakness, which results from her very wealth, which in turn produces a lack of vigour and decisiveness. The solution, as the subsequent narrative indicates is to be found in the person of Dionysius as an espouser of real politik, who combines military preeminence with political acumen, and succeeds in wielding together a united Siceliot force to resist the very real threat to Western Hellenism, posed by the Punic invader.

III

THE CASE FOR DIODORUS' USE OF PHILISTUS

In the following chapter, two closely interrelated topics will be discussed. First, I shall seek to demonstrate that the evidence known about Philistus corresponds to the data provided by the analysis of Diodorus' text in chapter two and that the source exerting the greatest influence upon Diodorus was accordingly Philistus. Second, in order to clarify and indeed explain to a great extent this conclusion, the genesis of Philistus' political thought in the context of its Thucydidean associations will be undertaken.

1. Philistus and Diodorus

As has been seen in our analysis in chapter two, we are dealing with a contemporary of the events described. Also our source is a Syracusan, primarily interested in Syracusan affairs. The evidence further suggests that this historian was a close acquaintance of Dionysius. The fact that information about Siceliots affairs other than Syracuse in the last decade of the fifth century B. C. becomes substantial with the appearance of the Syracusan militia within these cities, in addition to the general military interest of the text, suggests that the source belonged to Syracusan military circles, or was well

acquainted with the Syracusan militia. Finally, the remarkably detailed knowledge about Carthaginian affairs implies the existence of an authority within Syracusan governmental and diplomatic circles.

Thus it is that first choice inevitably falls upon Philistus the Syracusan. Indeed, Philistus is the only historian originating from Syracuse in the late fifth and early fourth century B. C., who wrote exclusively about Western Greek affairs, with particular emphasis upon Syracusan history and was a contemporary of the events, which culminated in the creation of the despotate of Dionysius. Moreover the details about the historian's career, though often, as will be shown, in crucial matters confusing and enigmatic, are documented with considerable plenitude.

Philistus' father was according to the Suda a certain Archomenides: Pausanias' testimony provides an alternative in the form of Archonides.[1] The historian witnessed the conflict between Syracuse and Athens from within the walls of Syracuse. Thus Plutarch declares that he witnessed Gylippus' liberation of Syracuse.[2] It is reasonable to conjecture that he was born about 430 B. C., and that consequently he cannot have been very old at the time of his death. Indeed, such is the convincing argument of De Sanctis, who observes that Plutarch's testimony indicates that he was not a fighter, but merely a witness

of Gylippus' liberation of his city.[3] He was clearly an intelligent observer of these events. Therefore, it can be concluded that Philistus was at least ten years of age by 414/13 B. C. Jacoby similarly concludes that he was between twenty and twenty-five when in 406 B. C. he threw in his lot with Dionysius' cause, and that he was, therefore, undoubtedly younger than Thucydides and older than Plato.[4]

Thus it is clear that Philistus was a contemporary of the events described in his work, following the Athenian siege of Syracuse. Even of greater importance is the fact that he was a close associate of Dionysius. The Suda considered him a συγγενής of Dionysius: to Cicero he was familiarissimus with the tyrant.[5] He was certainly one of Dionysius' φίλοι and commander of Ortygia until his banishment.[6] He played a most important role in the events of Dionysius' coup. Indeed in these dramatic events, Philistus showed clearly where his sympathies lay, by paying the fines which were imposed upon Dionysius.[7] In the description of Dionysius' consultation with his friends after the revolution of 404/3 B. C., it is Philistus who opposes Philoxenus' advice and counsels Dionysius to maintain the power which he had obtained as long as possible. There is no doubt that the role which at this point Philistus played, was of decisive importance.[8] The evidence suggests that in the following years Philistus played a major role in Syracusan projects in the Northern

Adriatic.[9] Perhaps this role is to be associated with the office of phrourarch, attributed to him by Plutarch. In 386 B. C. or preferably 384, he was banished from Syracuse together with the tyrant's brother Leptines.[10] The details concerning the place of exile of the historian, the cause of the exile and its duration are confusing. On the whole, the evidence suggests that Philistus did not return until 367 B. C., and that during his banishment, Philistus' political activity was totally curtailed.[11] However, there is clear evidence that in 367 B. C., he once more began to play an important part in Syracusan affairs, by assuming the leadership of the anti-Plato faction. The final event recorded about Philistus before the narration of his death at the head of a naval squadron in 356 B. C., concerns Dionysius the younger's reading of a letter sent by Dion to Carthage, to Philistus.[12]

Consideration of Philistus' career sheds considerable light upon the nature of the interest of Diodorus' text. As well as being a contemporary of the events described, he was on the closest of terms with Dionysius before his exile, and, therefore, well acquainted with governmental affairs. The fact that he was a close friend of Dionysius would account for the emphasis being placed upon the fortunes of Dionysius in the chapters of book thirteen which follow the narrative of the capture of Acragas, and in the whole of book fourteen. It would also

account for the great interest of the narrative in the two other prominent Syracusans of this period, Hermocrates and Diocles, the one the forerunner of Dionysius, the other the opponent of any attempt to revise the constitution of extreme democratic government.[13] Because the emphasis in the accounts of the Selinuntine, Himeraean and Acragantine campaigns is placed essentially upon Syracuse, and because the information about Acragantine affairs, and to a lesser extent about the situation in Himera and Gela, becomes fuller at the point where Syracuse makes her appearance upon the scene, it is clear that the source of Diodorus appears to have been a Syracusan within Syracusan political and military circles. This source was either personally present with the militia of Syracuse and her allies or well acquainted with such a person. Above all, the detailed information provided about the Acragantine internal social and economic position tends to such a conclusion. Further the comparatively detailed knowledge provided about Carthaginian affairs suggests Diodorus' employment of a source in close contact with the Punic information circles. Again Philistus is the inevitable choice. The latter was in governmental circles. Indeed, he belonged to the inner council of Dionysius' φίλοι His role in the Northern Adriatic testifies to the importance of that person's position. The possibility that he occupied a diplomatic post and was in close contact with Carthage, can certainly not be discounted.

His very presence as φίλος of Dionysius suggests that detailed information about Carthaginian affairs was accessible to him. Certainly, there can be no doubt that Philistus' position within Syracusan governmental circles brought him into close contact with a source which was well provided with knowledge about the Punic situation.

The possibility that Diodorus had access to a Carthaginian source unconnected with Philistus is unlikely. Diodorus does not mention his employment of a Carthaginian source. Indeed, he relied exclusively upon Greek sources for his account of Greek history. Clearly, had he employed a Punic source, mention of this fact would have been made.

Nor is it plausible that another source was in close contact with Punic affairs. No other historian shared the intimacy with the tyrant and his court which characterized Philistus' position in Syracuse.

The final point to observe is that the text's exclusive interest in political and military events likewise suggests a source within governmental circles,well acquainted with and directly interested in Dionysius' policies. Thus reference is particularly directed towards the chapters on the preparations against Carthage and the vivid account of the battle of Gela of 405 B. C. Again the choice falls upon Philistus, though inevitably more precise conclusions depend upon a detailed investigation of the political viewpoint of Philistus, which will be undertaken below.[14]

Consideration of the methods employed by Philistus in dividing up his subject matter tends to confirm the impression gained that Philistus was the source chiefly followed by Diodorus. It has been observed in the previous chapter that the real dividing line in Diodorus' text comes with the capture of Acragas. Henceforth Diodorus' main interest was the career of Dionysius. Philistus' work seems to have been similarly divided. It contained three parts. The first part of the work (Περὶ Σικελίας) consisted of seven books, dealing with the history of Sicily from earliest times to the capture of Acragas in 406 B. C. There followed four books which covered the reign of Dionysius (Περὶ Διονυσίου) These ended with the year of the death of the tyrant in 367/6 B. C. Finally, there appeared two books dealing with Dionysius II, going down to 363/2 B. C.[15] The important point to observe is that the dividing line between parts one and two occurs at the capture of Acragas. From then onwards, the narrative discusses Dionysius' career. This procedure has been carried into Diodorus' text, and the narration of the Carthage-Siceliot conflict becomes the history of Dionysius' career.

Thus far, three contentions support the claim that Philistus was Diodorus' chief source. First, the fact is that certain information could only derive from a contemporary. The nature of the emphasis of the text upon Syracuse is especially significant. Second, the military and political

interest - above all the detailed knowledge of military events - indicates a contemporary source of the type associated with the character of Philistus. Finally, the scheme of Diodorus' text - above all the dramatic change of emphasis from a conflict involving Siceliot and Carthaginian to a consideration of the career of Dionysius - confirms the supposition that the influence of Philistus is of major significance.

Two problems, however, remain, which are of great importance in determining more decisively the fact that Philistus' authority is the predominant influence underlying Diodorus' narrative. First, there is the problem of whether any evidence exists, indicating that Diodorus read and utilized the works of Philistus. Second, of major importance is a consideration of the political viewpoint of Philistus, which, it has been shown, appears in the narrative of Diodorus.

The use of Philistus by Diodorus is most probable, when it is remembered that contemporaries of Diodorus referred to Philistus' authority. Indeed, a revival of interest in Philistus is clearly discernable towards the end of the first century B. C. The reasons for the renewed interest in Philistus' works after a lapse of three centuries will be discussed below, in connection with the discussion of the political views of Philistus. Suffice it to indicate at this point that the interest in Philistus as reflected by

Diodorus' contemporaries, Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in itself testifies to the unlikelihood that Diodorus would not have consulted the testimony of Philistus for his account of Western Greek affairs.[16]

Moreover, Diodorus himself refers to Philistus' role as a historian on numerous occasions. He observes that the first history of Philistus ended with the capture of Acragas and a period of eight hundred years and that Philistus continued with four books on Dionysius I. Later he notes the culminating point of the history of the first five years of the reign of Dionysius II. Finally, Diodorus mentions the fact that Athanas of Syracuse's work, though it began with Dion's expedition, was prefixed by a summary of the previous seven years, from the point where Philistus' work ended. Upon two occasions, Diodorus draws attention to Philistus in a political context as the man who later wrote the history.[17]

A clear association of Philistus with Diodorus' text is provided by the evidence of a fragment dealing with Dionysius' war plans against Carthage. It is placed in the eighth book of Philistus - a fact which indicates that it occurred in the first book of the Περὶ Διονυσίου[18] Reference is made to the weapons, engines of war and ships, all of which figure prominently in Diodorus' narration of Dionysius' preparations against Carthage. As has been noted in the previous chapter, this narrative forms the basis of

any evaluation of the text's attitude towards Dionysius. It is clearly of crucial importance to Diodorus' source. Hence on the basis of the fragment from Theon, it is not wrong to assume that they derive ultimately from Philistus. Consideration of the political viewpoint of Philistus will merely strengthen the basis of this assumption.

It is, however, clear that ultimate identification of Philistus as a source for Diodorus depends upon a consideration of the political viewpoint of Philistus. Without the adoption of such a procedure, it could be claimed that the chapters on the preparations for war against Carthage, and indeed the fact that a contemporary, primarily concerned with military affairs is indicated, merely illustrates the situation whereby ultimately the source employed by Diodorus was Philistus. The same argument would apply to the nature of the arrangement of the text, which it could be claimed was inevitably utilized by a later source, dependent upon the authority of Philistus. Indeed most scholars, including Laqueur, have argued that whatever influence Philistus exerted upon Diodorus' text, derives from Timaeus' use of Philistus. The significance of Timaeus' evidence as a source for Diodorus will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. However, at this point it may be clearly stated that the chief problem is to determine the nature of Philistus' sympathies and the extent to which these are reflected in Diodorus' narrative.

It has already been noted that Philistus belonged to the φίλοι of both Dionysius I and of his son. It was to be expected that the picture which he painted of the tyrant would certainly not be entirely unfavourable. Certainly, Philistus' support for Dionysius during the latter's coup and the revolt of the Syracusan citizen body suggests that even if Philistus took it upon himself to criticize certain aspects of Dionysius' rule, it is unlikely that he would have condemned the exercise of the despotate as such. His role as the leader of the faction opposed to the Platonic reform suggests that, in spite of his exile, he never abandoned his belief in totalitarian rule.

Another factor might possess certain relevance. The fact that Philistus had to endure an exile gives rise to the suggestion that Philistus wrote in the Περὶ Διονυσίου a eulogy of the tyrant in order to effect his recall.

In other words, two reasons for believing that Philistus painted a favourable portrait of Dionysius can be supplied. First, it can be claimed perhaps that the maintenance and restoration of Philistus' position depended upon his ability to portray Dionysius in a favourable light. Second, a desire to bear greater charity towards Philistus could induce us to consider Philistus' close association with the tyrant's court a consequence of the fact that Philistus discovered in the despotate of Syracuse

certain qualities worthy of his admiration. Hence it could be argued, originated his favourable picture of Dionysius I. Both views, it must be stressed, are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

It is noteworthy that both views emerge in a consideration of the ancient testimony. Inevitably, the simpler solution has more often been adopted. Thus the general tendency was to adopt the view that Philistus painted a favourable view of Dionysius because his position depended upon it. Dionysius of Halicarnassus claimed that Philistus displayed a character which was obsequious, subservient, mean and petty. Plutarch appears to have shared the opinion of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, when he accused Philistus of being the greatest lover of tyrants alive. Pausanias went even further, when he supplied a reason for Philistus' favourable picture of the tyrant. He declared that because Philistus wanted to be recalled from exile, he left out the worst deeds of the tyrant.[19]

Thus it is clear that Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch and Pausanias attributed the worst possible motives to the favourable picture given of Dionysius in the Περὶ Διονυσίου However, it must be stressed that these writers lived between three and five centuries after the events described. Consequently it is clear that their evidence in itself represents a late tradition. Further, although mention of the hostile tradition towards Dionysius

which grew up in the years immediately following the tyrant's death anticipates the course of this enquiry, the question of the hostile legacy stemming from the Athenian stage, the Academy, the peripatetic biographers and Timaeus cannot be avoided at this stage. The very real possibility always exists that Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch and Pausanias, when confronted with the strange fact that the historian was able to portray in a favourable light the man who had become through the ages the classic example of the tyrant both in the later Greek sense and in the modern sense of the word, decided to adopt the view espoused initially by the philosophic opposition and especially popularized by the historian Timaeus.

The problem is, therefore, to determine whether any evidence exists suggestive of the fact that such a view was not the only one held by the ancient sources. A vital clue is provided by Cornelius Nepos' reference to Philistus as "hominem amicum non magis tyranno quam tyrannidi."[20] Columba assumed that the reference echoed the sentiments expressed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch and Pausanias. In a somewhat uncritical fashion, he assumed that this evidence was indicative that Philistus kept silent concerning Dionysius' crimes, and, indeed, in the Περὶ Διονυσίου offered an apology for that ruler's atrocities. In other words, he accepted the hostile tradition uncritically.[21] Laqueur similarly adopted this viewpoint, concentrating

upon Pausanias' claim that the work was a means whereby Philistus attempted to effect his recall. It is clear that Laqueur was motivated by a desire to explain the apparent contradiction between the hostility of Timaeus towards Dionysius and the very different attitude of Philistus, whom he considered to be Dionysius' lackey. He seems simply to have assumed that because Timaeus was motivated by purely emotional feelings, therefore Philistus was similarly directed. Because Timaeus hated tyrants, Philistus must have adulated them.

Nepos' reference, however, indicates that Philistus' attitude towards Dionysius was not merely a result of circumstances of a personal nature. It was not merely motives of friendship and loyalty or a desire to effect a return from exile that dictated Philistus' pattern of thought in the Περὶ Διονυσίου The implication of Nepos is clear: that the allegiance of Philistus could have been gained by any despot and not merely by Dionysius. It would appear that Philistus felt that under certain circumstances, tyranny as an institution was justified. This seems to have been the case with Syracuse under Dionysius. The context of the remark in connection with the return of the historian, indicating a difference of opinion over politics, certainly confirms this conclusion.

Thus the testimony of Cornelius Nepos suggests that Philistus' work on Dionysius was not merely a collection

of obsequious remarks about the tyrant. Moreover, the testimony of Plutarch and Cicero confirms the view that the Περὶ Διονυσίου was a work recommending the institution of tyranny as a vehicle of successful statecraft. Plutarch records that Philistus was the only historian sent by Harpalus to Alexander in Asia. It is to be doubted whether Alexander consulted this work to learn about the West for possible future involvements there. Indeed as Wilcken and Brown suggest, the particular philosophy of the history of Dionysius must have appealed strongly to Alexander.[22] In many ways, Dionysius foreshadowed Alexander. He created a mighty empire and stood against a great barbarian power - Carthage. He devised new weapons and ships, constructed notable fortifications, and was personally characterized by daring and will-power, lacking all scruples.

Cicero's brother, Quintus, moreover, emulated Alexander by reading Philistus on campaign.[23] In the latter case, it is significant that evidence exists indicating that it is the Περὶ Διονυσίου which is referred to. "Me Magis de Dionisio delectat, ipse enim est veterator magnus et perfamiliaris Philisto," writes Cicero.

Thus it is clear that the evidence of Cornelius Nepos, Plutarch and Cicero indicates that there existed a body of tradition which regarded Philistus' work on Dionysius the Elder as a tract on political statecraft, promoting the institution of tyranny per se, and that it did not merely represent the viewpoint of an individual,

promoting the fame of Dionysius for personal reasons.

It is not difficult to perceive the authority of Philistus in Diodorus' narrative. Indeed, it has been argued in the previous chapter that basically the portrait of Dionysius as found in books thirteen and fourteen is not hostile in nature. Rather, it seeks to portray the tyrant as an individual, willing to experiment in every manner possible, unwilling to allow considerations of sentiment to intervene and impede the successful completion of his projects. This is precisely the portrait which the evidence of Nepos, Plutarch and Cicero suggests. It would appear then, that to Philistus, Dionysius' despotate was justified precisely because it appeared to represent the only means whereby the Punic threat could be erased and the civilization of Western Hellas be conserved.

There is no doubt that the passages dealing with the building of the wall, the planning of the war against Carthage, the double marriage of Dionysius, and Dionysius' declaration of war against Carthage, reflect the point of view of Philistus.[24] Most modern authorities including Laqueur, De Sanctis and Stroheker conceded the likelihood of the assumption, though they argued that Diodorus merely assumed this point of view, because he happened to discover its reflection in Timaeus.[25] Their conclusions were dependent upon two considerations. First, as has been noted, the Philistus fragment cited by Theon, clearly

declares that in book eight of his history, Philistus dealt with Dionysius' preparations for his expeditions against Carthage and discussed the arms, ships and instruments of war. It is, therefore, clear that both Philistus and Diodorus spent much detail on Dionysius' preparations for his expedition against Carthage, and it is logical to assume that Diodorus' information derives ultimately from Philistus. Equally important is the consideration that these chapters portray Dionysius in a most favourable light. The emphasis throughout the narrative is upon the fact that Dionysius is the saviour of Hellas against Carthage. Upon Dionysius, the fortunes of the Siceliots rest. The fact that details about the internal situation and the distrust against Dionysius are wanting is of crucial importance for the thesis of Laqueur and Stroheker.

The problem is to determine whether Philistus' influence is generally submerged by the approach adopted by the later hostile tradition, as represented by Timaeus. It is significant that even Laqueur was willing to admit the existence of more extensive evidence of Philistus' influence. For example, Philistus was attributed the narrative describing Philistus' paying of the fine imposed upon Dionysius . Laqueur also suggested that the second instance where Philistus' role in maintaining Dionysius' rule appears, during the Syracusan revolt, can similarly

be attributed ultimately to Philistus.[26] Laqueur went further and suggested that Dionysius' appeal for the recall of the exiles on humanitarian grounds contains part of the original Philistus, whereas the note on the fact that Dionysius wanted thereby to succeed in his own aims derives from Timaeus' personal comments which were added to those of his source.[27] Laqueur also believed that the picture describing how Dionysius attracted to himself the Geloans came from Philistus, with Timaeus' comment that the Geloans hated the aristocrats. Other instances of Philistus' authorship singled out by Laqueur include the Geloan entreaty for help and Dionysius' promise to return, and Dionysius' speech to the Syracusans where he declares that in view of the traitorous dealings of his colleagues, he was obliged to lay down his command. The popular response is attributed to Philistus, while Timaeus is supposed to represent the image of intrigue.[28] The reference to the Peisistratean precedent of a bodyguard comes from Timaeus, while the account of the marriage reflects Philistus' history. Laqueur stresses that the association of the marriage with a desire to make firm the tyranny is an addition from Timaeus.[29] Anticipating Adamesteanou, Laqueur accepts the common view that the account of the battle of Gela derives from Philistus, who was present.[30] The retreat of Dionysius which appears to reflect a hostile source, derives from Timaeus.[31] The account of the dinner

given by Dionysius to the soldiers after the double marriage similarly echoes Philistus.[32] Later the Greeks attack the Phoenicians in their cities, drive them out and seize Phoenician property in Syracuse.[33] Again Laqueur believes that most of this information comes from Philistus, who aims to represent Dionysius in a favourable light. He adds, however, that the remark ἁἰπερ γὰρ τὴν Διονυσίου τυραννίδα μισοῦντες derives from the hostile authority, Timaeus. Thus Laqueur concluded that at the basis of Timaeus' account which Diodorus utilized, lay the favourable testimony of Philistus.[34]

That Laqueur was willing to consider considerable influence on the part of Philistus upon Diodorus is certainly significant. At the same time, it must be stressed that Laqueur insisted that this influence was indirect, utilized through the agency of Timaeus. As such it would appear to affect the thesis of the present writer that Philistus was used directly by Diodorus, and that his influence was preeminent and not of subsidiary importance. Laqueur's thesis is, however, as unacceptable in this case as in his reconstruction in his article upon Timaeus. The objection to Laqueur's claim that Timaeus is solely responsible for the text's so called hostility has already been noted in the first chapter. Indeed, the thesis outlined in the article on Philistus stands or falls on the degree to which the article on Timaeus is acceptable

or not. Its rejection in the present case, therefore, automatically eliminates its consideration in the study on Philistus.

More important is the question whether the Περὶ Διονυσίου is purely a work of flattery and, therefore devoid of authentic historical data, considered in a critical light. This problem has already been viewed in connection with the evidence for the political attitude of Philistus, and it has been shown that the testimony of Cornelius Nepos, Plutarch's Alexander and Cicero suggests that the Περὶ Διονυσίου was intended as more than the means of maintaining or effecting the restoration of a position of favour at the tyrant's court. It seems to have been a textbook on political statecraft. Further, the reputation accorded Philistus and his description as a Thucydidian indicates beyond doubt, that the basis of Laqueur's thesis possesses little validity. Philistus was clearly more than a mere panegyrist.

It is, therefore, clear that Laqueur's division between the data deriving from Philistus and Timaeus is highly artificial. There is no evidence to suggest that Philistus denied the totalitarian aspect of Dionysius' rule. The evidence concerning Philistus' role in maintaining the hegemony of the tyrant is sufficient in itself to indicate this. Particularly noteworthy are the incidents in which Philistus paid the fine imposed upon

Dionysius and bade the tyrant resist the revolt of the Syracusan citizen-body. The statement concerning the "dragging of the tyrant by his legs", if not deriving from Philistus' own mouth, certainly echoes the sentiments of the historian. Consequently, passages which refer to Dionysius' seizure of power within Syracuse or his attacks upon Greek cities are to be regarded as equally based upon the authority of Philistus. The important point to observe is that Dionysius is constantly the focal point of attraction from his debut after the capture of Acragas. The coup, for example, or the narrative of the cavalry revolt or the account of the war with Carthage is written from the point of view of Dionysius. It has been shown that sympathies are not entirely with the masses, and are certainly not associated with the Chariestatoi, who appear in a most unfavourable light.[35]

Philistus' point of view is very discernable in the earlier portions of the narrative. It has been argued that Philistus seems to have regarded Dionysius as the champion of Hellenism against Carthage. It follows from this that he cannot have placed much hope in the Siceliot position prior to the appearance of Dionysius. Indeed, such an impression is gained from the text's portrayal of the Siceliot position in the Selinuntine, Himeraean and Acragantine campaigns. Although there is no doubt that sympathy is directed towards the Siceliot cause, it must

be stressed that there exists full awareness of serious weaknesses, impeding the successful resistance of the Siceliots. Above all, the Siceliots appear to have lacked unity within themselves. This lack of cohesion is a noticeable motif pervading the notices on Acragantine economic life, and there is little doubt that the excursus originally derives from Philistus. Two points reveal this fact. First the fact that details of significance emerge with the appearance of the Syracusan force suggests a contemporary and a Syracusan. Secondly the motifs of the excursus, which significantly pervade the whole of book thirteen, are of vital importance for the main theme of this book: the weaknesses and dangers threatening the Siceliots.

The fact that the details about Acragas derived from the Περὶ Σικελίας need not affect the issue in any way, and the association of the main theme of the excursus with the contents of the Περὶ Διονυσίου is most probable in view of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' remark concerning the unity of the two books. He writes ἔστι δὲ μία, καὶ τοῦτο γνόιης ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους τῆς Σικελικῆς [36]

The division indicated by the nomenclature differentiation is, therefore, hardly realistic and merely reflects the change in the nature of the contents, and the fact that with the Περὶ Διονυσίου concentration upon the fortunes of an individual became more apparent. This conclusion

is supported by the Theon fragment which, by attributing the chapters on Dionysius' preparations for the great war against Carthage to the eighth book of Philistus' history, reveals complete ignorance of any division occurring after the capture of Acragas.

The nature of Philistus' political views are more clearly revealed by two further considerations: Philistus' career in the years immediately preceding his exile and the exile itself; and the close association of Philistus with Thucydidean historiographical techniques.

Evidence for Philistus' role in the years preceding his exile is certainly vague.[37] Diodorus' testimony appears to be of negligible value beside Plutarch's account. Plutarch's narrative of the circumstances leading to the exile has no reference to the parallel exile of Leptines, Dionysius' brother. In other words, Philistus is the central attraction. As Gitti observed, clearly no sympathy is shown towards the historian.[38] The source is certainly more sympathetic towards the philosophic school, and most probably representative of the Platonic or Timaeus-type approach. Leptines and Philistus are regarded as collaborators of the tyranny. Lack of sympathy towards Philistus' marriage to Leptines' daughter is a noticeable feature. Indeed Plutarch declares that the best course is neither to praise nor gloat over Philistus' conduct.[39] Clearly, the implication is that Philistus' role can

hardly be defended, though gloating is to be discouraged. In contrast, Diodorus' account is more impartial. Reference to the personal motif, involving the secret marriage, is lacking. In general, Diodorus' narrative is less full. No dogmatic assertion as to Diodorus' source can be made. The common view that Ephorus is represented is certainly attractive, and its plausibility will be examined in a subsequent chapter. Two points are, however, significant. The fact that Diodorus' account is not hostile suggests that it antedates the hostile tradition of the Academy and Timaeus. Second, the very scantiness of its details suggests Philistus' influence. As will be shown below, this passage certainly seems to belong to a source other than Philistus. A change of source has clearly taken place. Even so, the main point to observe is that no substantial evidence existed about the exile in the period immediately following its occurrence. This presupposes the fact that Philistus did not cover it at all or hardly at all.

The situation surrounding Philistus' career in the early 380's is therefore, imperfectly known. Moreover, though Plutarch's Dion provides details about his exile, there is in existence no substantial information about Philistus' career immediately preceding this event. Recourse has, therefore, to be directed towards later information,particularly from Pliny. It will then be necessary to associate the results with the scanty details

provided by Diodorus' narrative.

Pliny's reference to the fossa Philistina is a starting point of any investigation into the nature of Philistus' policy in the Northern Adriatic.[40] Gitti's article on this issue has resulted in an effective refutation of attempts to identify the fossa Philistina with the Adria referred to by Plutarch in his account of the place of exile of the historian.[41] Gitti has distinguished between the Philistina branch of the Po and the canal, Philistina; the former to the north of the delta; the latter in an unidentifiable place, certainly not near Adria. Gitti concludes that a vast hydraulic system bore Philistus' name, as a tribute to the important role played by the historian as administrator of this region. Certainly, he is correct to observe that this work cannot be associated with a man in disgrace and exile, but is rather to be regarded as characteristic of the efforts of an official or governor. Plutarch mentions that Philistus was phrourarch of Syracuse and he does not deny the possibility of his occupying other offices. Therefore, it seems that these projects belong to the period preceding Philistus' exile, before 384/3, during which Philistus was governor of this area.

It is to be conceded that Gitti's thesis is not confirmed by more direct evidence as found in Diodorus' or Plutarch's testimony. Certainly, it has not gone unchallenged. Altheim argued for an Illyrian origin of

the name Philistina and Gitti himself admitted the possibility of an Etruscan origin.[42] More important was Calabi's argument as to whether under a tyrant, an official could give his name to public buildings.[43] Indeed, it was claimed that this appeared to be more in accordance with Roman experimentation. Against such reasoning, it must be observed that Philistus was one of Dionysius' chief supporters. It is possible that precisely because he grew too powerful, he antagonized Dionysius. This certainly may have been a factor, contributing to the historian's exile.

More important is Calabi's suggestion that Pliny's citation refers to a nickname, reflecting popular tradition. A comparison with Peisistratus' position during his second exile in the Thermaic gulf and Thrace, and the case of Miltiades I in the Thracian Chersonese is relevant.[44] Calabi offers the interesting hypothesis that Philistus sought refuge in the Northern Adriatic, in an area colonized by Greeks, but not under Dionysius' control. Being both rich and powerful, he was able to undertake projects of colonization himself.

In general, Gitti's thesis still holds more attraction. Calabi's hypothesis is only valid as long as it is agreed that Dionysius' tyranny represented the old type of absolute rule. However, this was clearly not the case. There is no doubt that Dionysius was an innovator and in some respects, a forerunner of the military monarchs

of the Hellenistic age.[45]

The problem is to date Philistus' activity more precisely. For this dependence must essentially be placed upon the scanty details provided by Diodorus, and to a lesser extent, Polybius and Justin. Dionysius' alliance with the Gauls is associated by Justin with the war against Croton of 389/8 B. C. and the Gallic destruction of Rome of 387/6 B. C.[46] Thus Dionysius took advantage of the divisions between the Gauls and the Etruscans. Contemporary or a little before the Gallic alliance was the foundation of Lissos.[47] The year 385/4 B. C. is associated by Diodorus with the foundation of Pharos and Dionysius' war against the Illyrians and Etruscans. A year before, occurred Dionysius' alliance with Alcetas. It is in such a context that the foundation of Adria is to be placed. It was no doubt especially associated with the Gallic alliance and the Lissos venture. The activities against Pharos, Etruria and Epirus mark a second phase. The foundation of Issa, Ancona, Numana, though not securely dated, are clearly to be placed in this period.

The year 388 thus marks the first affirmation of Syracusan dominance of the Adriatic and 384 signalled the end of the vital four-year period. Gitti's reconstruction would certainly tend to suggest that a prime mover in these events was Philistus. The problem is to determine whether Philistus' activities in the Northern Adriatic had

a bearing upon Philistus' exile in any way. One suggestion has already been brought forward: that Philistus' activities in the North constituted a serious threat to Dionysius' maintenance of power, or at least appeared to do so.

Such a reconstruction is supported by the evidence provided about Philistus' exile.[48] Diodorus attributes the exile to the madness of the tyrant as a result of his literary failures at the Olympic games. Plutarch provides a more positive motive: Philistus' marriage to Leptines' daughter.[49] Again Diodorus does not seem to be echoing Philistus; probably his source was Ephorus, who far from the scene of action and in no sense a real contemporary, provides a less sound and rather gossipy account. Plutarch's testimony seems more personal and accurate. The view that the marriage to Leptines' daughter caused Dionysius' anger cannot be regarded as incorrect. However, there is a strong possibility that Plutarch's account had laid too much stress upon a comparatively unimportant feature of a very real crisis. Certainly, literal acceptance of this view attributes to Dionysius no small degree of insanity. It has been conjectured that these events mask a palace plot by individuals who had been faithful and, at this point, revolted. This latter stage, it is claimed, was marked by Philistus' marriage to Leptines' daughter. Yet as Gitti has observed, a party alliance and not a palace plot is suggested.

Hence it is likely that the motive found in Plutarch, though certainly not of negligible value, should be relegated to a subordinate position. It does appear that a conflict of ideals characterized the rift with Dionysius. A clue is certainly furnished by the evidence concerning Leptines, Dionysius' brother. The evidence suggests that Dionysius realized that Leptines was not an adversary but a dissident. Thus in 388 B. C., Leptines betrayed distinct kindness towards the Greeks of Southern Italy. For this he was accordingly honoured by that element.[50] Precisely what Leptines represented can be variously interpreted; he may be regarded as a philhellenist, patriot or simply a sentimentalist. The latter view is, however, most unlikely in view of the fact that the marriage alliance indicates that Philistus approved of him, and that Philistus' history, as has been seen, was certainly devoid of sentimental considerations. It would, therefore, appear that Philistus favoured Leptines' policy of peaceful relations with the Greeks of South Italy. Three facts support this conclusion at this stage. First, as has been seen, Philistus' disgrace was accompanied by similar treatment of Leptines. Second, both individuals entered into a marriage alliance. Hence the likelihood that Philistus shared Leptines' political views. Finally the evidence noted above concerning Philistus' transactions in the Adriatic indicates that the historian favoured

peaceful acquisition of Italian territory and colonization projects to military aggrandizement.

Again the citation from Nepos provides the vital clue. Gitti correctly observed that the tradition preserved in the statement that Philistus was "hominem amicum non magis tyranno quam tyrannidi" represented a minority but highly significant viewpoint which grasped the true character of Philistus' contribution to historical thought.[51] Indeed Nepos' claim that he discussed the historian in his special book on the Greek historians certainly suggests that he read Philistus in the original and was, therefore, able to appreciate the true significance of the historian's views on Dionysius without being affected by the later hostile tradition. It must be emphasized that the context of Nepos' statement with reference to the historian's return under Dionysius II and his call to save the Greek West, indicates that the difference was not over minor technical details but concerned a serious division over political matters.

The details about the political career of Philistus support this view. As has been noted, Philistus played a vital role in the coup of 405 B. C. and in persuading Dionysius to maintain his position during the Syracusan revolt of 403 B. C. Moreover, he was governor of Ortygia, phrourarch and commander-in-chief under Dionysius II. In a true sense, he may be described as "l'artefice della

fortuna di Dionisio".[52]

The supposition that the crux of the dispute between Dionysius and Philistus concerned the tyrant's policy towards the Italiots is supported and accounted for by the sparse evidence which exists for the period immediately preceding Philistus' disappearance from the political scene at Dionysius' court. Four events are recorded: the failure of the second Punic War; the war in South Italy; the failure with Carthage in the war, culminating in the battle of Cronium and Cabbala; and the Adriatic schemes of Dionysius, in which Philistus appears as the chief architect. Clearly then, it was a period essentially of failure, with the exception of the Adriatic ventures. Two points are especially significant. First, the fact that while Dionysius was failing, his chief minister was achieving notable success raises the possibility of inevitable friction between the two, and probable suspicion by the tyrant of Philistus' actions. The marriage of Philistus with Leptines' daughter must certainly have increased the tension. Second, these events must clearly have produced in the historian serious reconsideration of the question of the wisdom of Dionysius' new policies as regards the Italiots. Certainly, the contrast between the tyrant's policies in Magna Graecia and those of both Leptines and Philistus, particularly the latter's is noticeable. The fact that Leptines appears to have disapproved of his brother's aggressive policies in

South Italy and the fact that he appears to have reached some understanding with Philistus as the marriage and exile accounts reveal, supports the contention that the Italian problem lay at the root of the dispute, culminating in the exile of Leptines and Philistus.

Two further facts support the thesis outlined above, that Philistus' dispute with Dionysius involved the historian's disapproval of Dionysius' acts of belligerency against the Greeks of South Italy. First, it is significant that no evidence exists for renewed colonization in the North in the period following the exile of Philistus. Yet the return of Philistus coincides with the establishment of two new foundations in Apulia.[53] In other words, a renewal of the old Adriatic schemes is clearly discernible. Again, it is not difficult to associate the reintroduction of these projects with the reappearance of Philistus upon the political scene.

Second, as has been indicated in the analysis of Diodorus' text, the chapters in which Siceliot patriotism find their fullest expression occurs in the contrast of the tragedy of the Greek failure in the last decade of the fifth century with the successes achieved during the great conflict of 398/6 B. C. under the aegis of Dionysius. Henceforth the interest lessens decisively. Very little attention is focused upon the second war with Carthage. As regards the account provided of the hostilities with the

Italiots, the patriotic motive is totally absent. Circumstances certainly necessitated such a procedure. It would be difficult to voice patriotic sentiments in a description of hostilities waged between Greek and Greek. More important, however, is the fact that for the first time anecdotal material distinctly hostile, in a moral sense, to the tyrant makes its appearance. The tyrant's cruelty to Phyton is discussed, and in the narrative of the third Punic War, Leptines' bravery is stressed.[54] The narrative is still relatively full, and there is consequently no reason to assume an abrupt change of source utilized. Hence the presence of disapproval as seen expecially in the case of Phyton, and the lack of nationalistic ideals as seen in the description of the great Punic War suggests that the source of Diodorus disapproved, or certainly was less than enthusiastic about Dionysius' wars against the Italiots. Thus again an identification with Philistus is suggested.

The evidence certainly does tend to suggest that Philistus' aim was to achieve unity between the Greeks of South Italy and Sicily. His work was idealistic in the sense that he entertained the prospect of Siceliot retaliation against Semitic aggression. No doubt, the wars against Naxos, Catane and Leontini were unavoidable in the context of the ancient hostility. The same could be said of the hostile relations with Rhegium. However, the fact

was that Dionysius' schemes against the Italiots clashed noticeably with the Adriatic ventures, with which Philistus was intimately connected. There was thus a serious conflict of ideals within the mind of Philistus. The Sicilian historian, while realizing the necessity of maintaining Empire against Carthaginian aggression, regretted the existence of hostilities with Greeks, in particular with the Italiots. The Adriatic schemes were aimed at the creation of a protectorate for the Greeks and the establishment of stability along the border with the Illyrians. Dionysius' war with the Italiot League in a sense negated all that which the Adriatic schemes implied. Such a scheme is certainly echoed in Diodorus' narrative.

Thus it appears that Philistus' rift with Dionysius was particularly serious, in that it involved a conflict over the conduct of state policy. In a more precise sense, the issue concerned the nature of the policy to be directed towards Italy.

The serious nature of the schism is well illustrated by a consideration of the length and nature of Philistus' exile. Again the problem is the conflict of the traditions of Diodorus and Plutarch. The problem concerns the place and length of the exile. Diodorus makes Thurii the place to which Leptines and Philistus were banished. Plutarch says that Philistus was sent εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν.[55] Elsewhere Plutarch supplies Epirus as the place of exile. Whereas

Diodorus makes Philistus return with Leptines under Dionysius I, Plutarch claims that he was exiled for twenty years and only returned after Dionysius' death. Again, it is clear that in spite of the bias in Plutarch, most probably reflecting the Timaeus tradition, his authority is the preferable account because it is the more detailed, while the other tradition which is found in Diodorus, is vaguer, more confused and devoid of critical sense and depth. Moreover, it is for this reason unlikely to have derived from Philistus, whose exile limited the amount of information available to later sources,including Diodorus. In a more precise sense, the text of Diodorus is deficient in three respects. First,it seems clear that Philistus' exile was longer than a few years. Indeed,Diodorus' source appears to have confused Philistus' return with Leptines' recall. For the latter event, there is clear evidence. Leptines was needed to fight the battle of Cronion in 374 B. C. However, there is no reason to associate this cause with the return of Philistus. A further fact is to be observed. The evidence for Philistus' late return is not merely associated with the probable Timaeus tradition which is found in Plutarch's Dion. Nepos also testifies to a return following the death of Dionysius I. It is significant that evidence which has already been discussed, indicates that Nepos read Philistus. It is, therefore, conceivable that Nepos found the information about a twenty

year exile in Philistus as well as in the later tradition. It accordingly seems logical to assume that the Timaeus tradition was merely echoing the earlier Philistus account and probably derived from the first book of Philistus, dealing with Dionysius II.

Jacoby, however, felt that a short exile was more probable. First he produced the psychological argument. A despot such as Dionysius would be inclined to change his mind abruptly. Therefore, he claimed that Dionysius relented and posted Philistus in the Northern Adriatic as administrator in Adria. In other words, the theory of Philistus' honorary exile was advanced. Basic to this theory was Plutarch's εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν The weaknesses in this theory have been effectively exposed by Gitti.[56] In the first place, Gitti has noted that there is the problem of whether an exile could live in a city of the Syracusan Empire. The answer was that Philistus was not, in fact, an exile but a governor of Adria. The chief evidence was the fossa Philistina of Pliny. The first objection is that Ἀδρία in the masculine is always used to refer to the sea and not to the city.[57] Second, even if Adria is indicated, it is certainly strange that Plutarch elsewhere appears to contradict himself by giving Epirus. Clearly then, Adria is employed in a general sense and does not refer to a precise colony. It was in this sense that Plutarch's source, Timaeus, used the word, which no doubt derived from an

earlier authority, probably Philistus himself.[58]

Further, Plutarch clearly indicates that an exile in a very real sense was involved. Hence he writes τὸν δὲ Φίλιστον ἐξήλασε Σικελίας φυγόντα παρά ξένους τινὰς εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν. ξένους, φυγόντα certainly indicates that Philistus did not go to a place within Dionysius' empire.[59] Philistus' lament for the destiny of Leptines' daughter indicates that a real exile took place.[60] The thesis propounded above that Philistus engaged in intense political activity renders unlikely the view that Philistus had the leisure to write his history, while serving Dionysius I. Moreover, as has been seen, Philistus was a young man in 405 B. C., and it is doubtful whether he possessed at this stage, the capabilities and potential for composing a history which later historians likened to the product of Thucydides. The very earliest that the Περὶ Σικελίας could have been written was 396 B. C., the date when the evidence generally appears to suggest that Thucydides published his history. Indeed, it is only in such a context that the Thucydidean influence can be explained. A later date is more likely in view of Philistus' activity on behalf of Dionysius I Certainly the Περὶ Διονυσίου must have been composed during the exile from 383 to 368. Even if Pausanias' view that its composition was the means whereby the historian hoped to gain readmission to Syracuse is hardly to be regarded as the decisive factor, Pausanias' testimony

certainly indicates the existence of a reliable tradition, attributing the four books on Dionysius the Elder to the period of exile. Moreover, this tradition indicates that the exile was of considerable duration, thus confirming the authenticity of the testimony of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos over against that of the less reliable Diodorus. It may be noted that Philistus' last work on Dionysius II was most probably a posthumous publication.

A further point is relevant. The theory that Philistus' exile was not really an exile is confronted with the contradiction inherent in an exile's position in strategically important territory of Dionysius' empire. Finally, one must beware of considering Dionysius' empire in terms of the Roman Empire, or the modern state. Rather it must be viewed as consisting of politically fragmented units. Hence an escape like that effected by Philistus was relatively easy.

Nor can greater confidence be placed in Jacoby's other two points. Since Leptines was soon recalled, and since Philistus had married Leptines' daughter, he claimed that Philistus was recalled. It is certainly a weak argument and by no means conclusive. Further, the case of Philistus can in no respect be compared to that of Leptines. The evidence concerning Philistus' career and, in particular, the Northern Adriatic schemes, suggests that Philistus would have appeared a far greater threat than Leptines. The

marriage certainly worked more to the advantage of Philistus.

Finally, Philistus, Jacoby argues, had dealt with Dionysius to the end of his reign. This could not have been done with any degree of success had Philistus been in exile for any length of time. The difficulty with this interpretation is that Jacoby wrongly assumes that Philistus must have dealt with the whole of Dionysius' reign in relative detail. Certainly no evidence suggests that the title Περὶ Διονυσίου necessarily embraced all the events of Dionysius' reign with equal emphasis.

Diodorus' testimony is also weak as regards the date of the exile. He dates it to the Olympiad of 386/5. As Grote long ago observed, this date is not an Olympiad. Further, similar events are dated to the ninety-eighth Olympiad of 388/7 B. C.[61] Probably the ninety-ninth Olympiad of 384 B. C. is meant. Therefore, the terminus post quem is 384/3 B. C.

Thus Diodorus' testimony, deriving as has been seen, probably from a source other than Philistus and perhaps Ephorus, is less reliable than Plutarch's account for three reasons. First, he is in error as regards the length of Philistus' exile. Second, he appears to have confused the fate of Philistus with that experienced by Leptines. Finally, the date of the event is inaccurate.

The following conclusion thus clearly emerges. Both Philistus and Leptines were exiled in 384/3 B. C.;

the former to Epirus and the latter to Thurii. Leptines was soon recalled, but Philistus remained in exile. In Epirus, he wrote his history, particularly concentrating upon Dionysius' career. It was in exile that his beliefs and ideals were crystallized, and he published his convictions concerning the necessity of the maintenance of despotic power in Sicily. In 366 B. C. he returned from exile and found himself in a position to effect the realization of his theoretical conclusions.

It has been further argued that basic to Philistus' scheme was the conception of unity amongst the Greeks of the West in face of the Punic threat. Dionysius' policy towards the Italiots consequently occupied a secondary place in Philistus' thoughts and the evidence of Diodorus' text suggests that this was accompanied by distinct moral censure. Philistus' role in the Northern Adriatic which contrasted strikingly with the hostilities waged by Dionysius against the Italiots supports this conclusion.

It would, moreover, appear that this scheme of thought affected the scale of the books of the Περὶ Διονυσίου Book one of the work, as has been seen, contained an account of the preparations of Dionysius against Carthage. It began with the events following the fall of Acragas. In other words, the crisis leading to Dionysius' coup within Syracuse was the first topic considered. Columba suggested that the fourth book contained the narrative of the Italian

War and obviously concluded with Dionysius' death.[62] The implication is clear: that little space was spent on the hostilities with Carthage, following the disaster to Himilcon's army. Within such a scheme, the two middle books would concern themselves with the Great Punic War of Dionysius, which accordingly became the central episode of the narrative. Probably the chief part of book two concerned the capture of Motya, while book three centred around the destruction of the Punic host. Thus it would appear that the early period, including the Great Punic War, was treated with considerably more detail than the subsequent period. One reason for this is the fact that Philistus' exile imposed obvious restrictions upon the availability of evidence. This is certainly a major factor accounting for the abrupt termination of material available to Diodorus for the last two decades of Dionysius' reign. However, it does not explain the emphasis upon the Punic War and the difference of the nature of the treatment of the subject in relation to that accorded to the later wars with Carthage and the conflict with the Italiot League. Clearly then, Philistus' history of Dionysius I did not deal with the whole of Dionysius' reign in equal detail. The chief interest was the conflict with Carthage from 398 to 396 B. C. To this the historian devoted three out of four books. The circumstances of the exile in the periphery of the Empire of Dionysius certainly limited the

sources of material available. Indeed, of necessity, Philistus was obliged to concentrate his interest upon the years of Dionysius' rule, during which he was intimately connected with governmental circles. However, a more important consideration accounts for the prominence accorded the first Punic War of Dionysius. In the narrative of the war, Philistus was able to give full expression to his ideals of Siceliot despotism and unification against the barbarian invader.

2. Philistus, Thucydides and Diodorus

A final consideration, affecting any assessment of Philistus' work and its place within the scheme of Diodorus, involves the Thucydidean associations of the historian, found in Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Quintilian. In a letter to his brother Quintus, Cicero writes, "Siculus ille capitalis, creber, acutus, brevis paene pusillus Thucydides." He goes on to express preference for the books which discussed Dionysius. "Me magis de Dionysio delectat, ipse enim est veterator magnus et perfamiliaris Philisto."[63] In the De Oratore, he writes,

> "hunc [Thucydides] consecutus est Syracusanus Philistus qui quum Dionysii tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumpsit in historia scribenda, maximeque Thucydidem est ut mihi videtur imitatus."[64]

In the Brutus, Philistus is again bracketed with Thucydides, when Brutus laments the fact that these historians do not receive the honour due to them.[65] In the De Divinatione,

Philistus is referred to as "doctus homo et diligens".[66]

Dionysius of Halicarnassus also connects Philistus with Thucydides. He observes the neatness of his style (στρογγύλος) the fact that his work is well constructed (πυκνὸς) that it is logical but inferior to Thucydides in respect to beauty of expression (ἐνθυμηματικὸς, καλλιλλογία) It is mediocre and cheap (μικρὸς, εὐτελής)[67]

Quintilian likewise connects Philistus with Thucydides. He describes Philistus as "imitator Thucydidis et ut molto infirmior ita aliquatenus Lucidior".[68]

The question which must be asked is, how far these comments are intended to refer to the stylistic abilities of the two historians and how far they are to refer to the question of content and treatment of the subject matter? Quite clearly, the two most important sources which affect this question are Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, since Quintilian does little more than indicate a connection. Particularly valuable in this respect are the remarks of Coppola regarding a possible papyrus fragment from Philistus' Περὶ Σικελίας.[69]

As regards Cicero's remarks, the reference to Philistus being creber, acutus and brevis refer to the style of the historian. When he, however, refers to him as "doctus et diligens, he seems to be referring to the content. Dionysius of Halicarnassus' references to Philistus'work as neat, well put together, logical but lacking beauty of

expression are all stylistic arguments. His description of it as mediocre and cheap, on the other hand, seems to have bearing upon the content.

Clearly the πυκνὸς of Dionysius corresponds to the brevis and creber of Cicero. The ἐνθυμηματικὸς likewise corresponds to the acutus of Cicero.

The real difference between the views of the two writers is that whereas Cicero thinks Philistus to be a pusillus Thucydides, Dionysius considers him to be inferior to Thucydides. The question then is, how can the discrepancy between the two writers be explained? Two answers to the problem can be provided. In the first place, like Coppola, we may conclude that the remarks of Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus are not to be applied to the same parts of Philistus' work. On the other hand, it can be argued that the answer to the question is to be found in the political views of Philistus.

Coppola suggested that whereas Cicero referred to the Περὶ Διονυσίου Dionysius of Halicarnassus' comments concern the Περὶ Σικελίας The reason for Cicero's preference for the Περὶ Διονυσίου is that these books, being concerned with events in which Philistus himself participated, are likely to have been more subjective and personal. The Περὶ Σικελίας, on the other hand, contained uninteresting narrative.[70]

Support for Coppola's theory seems to come from

Timaeus' reference to Philistus as tedious and clumsy.[71] The fact that Plutarch cites Timaeus in connection with his research upon the life of Nicias might indicate that Timaeus' criticism applies to the Περὶ Σικελίας. Certainly the evidence which we have does suggest that the Περὶ Διονυσίου was a more personal work than the Περὶ Σικελίας.[72]

Mention of the fact that the Περὶ Διονυσίου was a more personal work results in the second solution to the problem. It has, indeed,already been argued that a consideration of Philistus' career sheds considerable light upon the precise manner in which the work on Dionysius was more personal than the earlier effort. Such a conclusion was confirmed by the invaluable evidence of Nepos who certainly read Philistus in the original, and was reinforced by two valuable notices in Plutarch and Cicero. The latter reference, in connection with the correspondence with Q. Cicero, is particularly valuable, in that it serves to confirm the conclusion derived from the other Ciceronian material, indicating the orator's preference for Philistus and the suggested associations of this favour with the political ideology of the Syracusan historian. The problem, therefore, is to determine to what extent the identification of Philistus with Thucydides effects our understanding of Philistus' view of Dionysius. I shall accordingly now attempt to compare the ideology of

Thucydides and Philistus.

The immediate problem is to discover the political viewpoint of Thucydides. Initially, we are faced with the problem whether Thucydides' so-called impartiality precludes successful determination of the historian's bias and sympathies. C. N. Cochrane's central thesis in particular would appear to imply the impossibility of such an aim.[73] The implication of this conclusion is serious. If it is argued that Thucydides has no personal viewpoint, it will be impossible to attempt an identification of Thucydides' political thought with that of Philistus.

Cochrane claimed that by adopting the Hippocratic method of prognosis whereby facts were simply stated and issues formulated, Thucydides made his chief contribution to the development of Greek historiography. The important effect was that the reader was now in a position to judge for himself. Hence resulted the so-called aloofness or impartiality of Thucydides characterized by the logoi or speeches which Thucydides considered likely to have been spoken by the characters appearing in the pages of the history, and the erga, the facts furnished without the accompanying opinions of the author.

Such an approach involves a considerable oversimplification of the issues involved. In the first place, had Thucydides been as detached as the results of Cochrane's thesis appear to suggest, it is difficult to

account for the tendency of modern authorities before Cochrane to detect a distinct development of Thucydidean thought as reflected by textual analysis. The more recent efforts to trace consistency and unity of thought are certainly not to be regretted. However, the old school of Thucydidean research has produced an awareness of the existence of a considerable degree of tension in a man constantly assailed by new ideas. Thus as Andrewes has observed, the problem of the development of Thucydides' thought and the changes in the dating of the text is of vital importance, even though it must be conceded that the results are often most uncertain.[74]

Secondly, there is the problem of the speeches. Thucydides certainly never admits that the speeches reflect his interpretation of the events. However, as most modern scholars agree, this seemingly was his purpose. As regards the statement of I. 22, it must be stressed that Thucydides merely calls for the employment of caution in respect to the facts. He does not, however, declare that speculation upon the facts is to be avoided at all costs. Further, it is difficult to appreciate what exactly is meant by complete impartiality as regards Cochrane's claim that facts are merely represented in order to stimulate the reader's potential for independent judgment. Perhaps the most significant case is the Archaeology. It is true that certain facts are presented from which deductions are to

be sought. However, it is very clear that Thucydides is determined that the reader should derive specific implications from his narrative. In short, the Archaeology is based upon Thucydides' own theorizing upon the social, economic and political development of Greece from the period of the Minoan thalassocracy to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides' aim is to explain why he considered the Peloponnesian War more significant than any previous war.

It is, moreover, clear that personal judgments are reflected throughout the history. We may note Thucydides' verdicts regarding the potential might of Thrace or the horror of the capture of Mycalessus or the Athenian shock after the naval defeat off Euboea.[75] Opinions abound. Thus the Athenians are rebuked for condemning Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon in 424 B. C. The method of the investigation of the Hermae is likewise criticized. The five thousand are praised. Imperialist motives account for the great Athenian expedition to Sicily.[76] Judgments on the actions of individuals are frequent. Cleon is the "most violent of the Athenians", devising "mad" plans, opposing peace for personal reasons, over-confident and over-optimistic.[77] Themistocles and Pericles are, without doubt, the most favoured political personages in the history, and in two significant passages openly praised.[78]

It is, therefore, clear, that the theory of the impartial Thucydides has little to commend it. Therefore, any attempt to dismiss the Philistus associations on the grounds that whereas the Syracusan historian wrote a work commending tyranny as an institution, Thucydides' history is impartial, cannot be accepted. It is consequently necessary to examine in precise detail the nature of Thucydides' sympathies and bias in order to examine the possibility of common political and ideological tendencies with Philistus. The problem is indeed serious. On the one hand, we are confronted with the Athenian historian who writes about democratic Athens and is seemingly favourably disposed towards the Periclean regime. On the other hand, there appears Philistus, whose work is a testimony, advocating the maintenance and development of tyrannical power as epitomized by the person of Dionysius I. The question which thus arises is whether consideration of Thucydides' political views, in fact, supports the contention that Thucydides himself may not have been totally averse to acceptance of the solution to Siceliot difficulties, offered in the Περὶ Διονυσίου

The first problem is to evaluate Thucydides' attitude towards the democracy as practiced at Athens. Not only will such a procedure clarify the nature of the relationship of Thucydides and Philistus. It will also significantly affect the reconstruction of Sicilian

history in the period of Dionysius. One fact is clear: that enthusiasm for the masses is noticeably absent. Moreover, it is clear that Thucydides' disfavour seriously distorts the realities of the situation.

The first point to observe is that it is the people who are held responsible for Athens' ultimate disaster.[79] The culminating tragedy is the Sicilian expedition which is the classic Thucydidean example of popular expansionist aims.[80] However, it is no exaggeration to state that the chief theme of the history in the years following Pericles' death is the rejection by the demos of the cautious Periclean policies. Pylos, Delium and Melos are the most significant landmarks.[81]

There is no doubt that Thucydides' ideal political hero is Pericles, and that the failure of his successors lay in their inability to emulate the policies which he followed.[82] However, Thucydides believed that even in Pericles' case, demagogic arts were necessary. Hence the people's distrust of Pericles led ultimately to the removal of Pericles from office. The appeal of the political leader to the people in the third speech is indicative of the degree to which the impatience of the populace could lead to a considerable amount of strain. The people desired to hear not the truth but what simply appealed to them. Pericles accordingly had to appeal to the power and glory of the city.[83] Thucydides' view of the citizens of Athens

thus accords with that of the Old Oligarch, the Comic poets and Plato.[84] It is clearly associated with the Athenian power drive which the Athenians in the history even refer to themselves.[85]

The unreliability and the potential for instability which characterized the masses is encouraged by the failure of the popular leaders. The latter either lack Pericles' foresight, and ability to act upon it, or his incorruptibility. Whereas a character like Nicias lacks the former two qualities of foresight and the ability to act upon it, Alcibiades who does possess them is spurred on by personal ambition and is unpatriotic and not above money.[86] Above all, the failure of Pericles' successors is epitomized by the person of Cleon, who inflames the dangerous desires of the people. Under the stress of war, the βίαιος διδάσκαλος the populace is led astray by these popular leaders, practicing demagogic arts.[87]

Thucydides accordingly expounds the thesis that the fall of Athens was due to the failure of its citizens to follow the paths tracked by Pericles. The Thucydidean ideal is, therefore, the Periclean epoch, which contrasts noticeably with the subsequent era. Pericles was able to control the masses: his successors were either unable to do so or deliberately encouraged the insatiate desire of the populace for the acquisition of more.[88] Above all, avoidance of plans involving the acquisition of a land empire is noted

in connection with Pericles. It follows, therefore, that Thucydides placed little confidence in the ability of the citizen-body of Athens. It is, moreover, significant that many scholars have simply accepted the viewpoint of Thucydides and regarded the death of Pericles as resulting in a significant change in the direction of foreign policy from sane to irresponsible procedures.[89]

The problem is threefold: to determine precisely in what way the death of Pericles marks a total revision of previous policy; what precisely is not Periclean in the policies of men like Cleon and Alcibiades; and consequently why the masses are to be held responsible? Ehrenberg concedes that the "imperialism of the war years was a heritage, however misunderstood, of Pericles' policy" and that "the Athenian character had certainly not undergone any fundamental change."[90] Such statements certainly allow variation of interpretation: however, their effect is largely nullified by references to the subsequent irresponsible leadership and "mass instincts" and to Alcibiades' refusal to accept any limits to Athenian expansion.

The fact is that Thucydides' distaste for the democratic regime of Cleon and his successors has seriously distorted the realities of the political situation.[91] Three facts are clear: that the picture provided of Cleon and his successors is grossly distorted; that the contrast

between Periclean policy and that espoused by the so-called demagogues is more apparent than real and that Athenian policy during the Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian Wars follows a uniform pattern.

There is no doubt that Cleon's role is especially significant, in that it epitomizes the post-Periclean democracy. There is some reason to believe that Thucydides deliberately minimized the role of the other personages to highlight the character of Cleon. Hyperbolus, who according to the historian, was μοχθηρός and was, in fact, the victim of a deal by Alcibiades and Nicias, is not dealt with on the obvious occasion: the ostracism is noted later in 411 B. C. Similarly, while Androcles is not named as opponent of Alcibiades in 415 B. C., his murder in 411 B. C., prior to the revolution of the Four Hundred, is observed.[92]

It must be stated immediately that the fact that Aristophanes confirms Thucydides' picture of Cleon, does not testify to the accuracy of the picture provided. However, it cannot be denied that Athens' allies remained loyal before Cleon's treatment of Scione and that the Eastern Greeks did not revolt en masse after the Sicilian debacle. In other words, Cleon's policy may not have been entirely justified. It may also be doubted whether Athens could afford ships and money for the Cleon-type terrorism. As regards the Amphipolis campaign, though Thucydides was

not completely aware of Cleon's intentions, the fact is that Cleon did expose the right wing.[93]

Finally, Thucydides refers to Cleon as πιθανώτατος and βιαιότατος. De Wet has argued that these words are not necessarily derogatory since the former appears in a neutral sense in Diodorus, Plutarch and Aristophanes. They merely indicate that Cleon was forceful - a quality necessary before the assembly.[94]

At the same time, there is no doubt that Cleon is treated rather unfairly, and it does seem that Thucydides' desire to single out Cleon as representative of the failure of the Athenian democracy in the post-Periclean era, has distorted the realities of the situation. As regards the Mytilenean debate, both Cleon and Diodorus appear clearly interested in maintaining the Empire. Even De Wet, who accepts the Thucydidean picture of post-Periclean Athens, observes that the Lesbian revolt provoked the possibility of an Ionian, Persian and Spartan alliance. As such, it constituted a serious danger to the maintenance of the Empire just as the Samian revolt did in 441 B. C.[95] In such circumstances, Cleon's proposals can certainly be comprehended as justified in a political context, even if they appear brutal.

Woodhead observed that the Amphipolis campaign was preceded by most adroit manipulation which yielded significant results. Thucydides, however, remains silent

where epigraphic evidence has to be relied upon. The discontent of the hoplites with Cleon is recorded,[96] but as Woodhead observes, Thucydides, though willing to record it in the case of Cleon whom he clearly despises, refuses to discuss evidence of a similar nature in the case of Pericles who is his hero. Indeed, Diodorus' picture is much fairer to Cleon.[97]

Woodhead's consideration of the Sphacteria incident and Cleon's election as strategos confirms the impression that Thucydides is deliberately aiming at blackening the character of Cleon and the democracy which supported him.[98] Cleon's rejection of the Spartan terms is not necessarily to be regarded as a foolish act, for it is difficult to perceive what problems it would have solved. Cleon's demands would have disrupted the Peloponnesian alliance. Yet Thucydides, in spite of De Wet's protests, clearly employs the words πιθανώτατος and δημαγωγὸς to smear Cleon. Further, Cleon's reply which might have been crucial is simply omitted, or perhaps deliberately suppressed. Finally, the Spartans are said to have had common sense, while the Athenians want more.[99] Clearly, a vague statement set in an unclear context is apparent.

The description of Cleon's election as strategos is accompanied by nasty innuendos.[100] Thus γνοὺς is employed thrice. The σώφρονες and Nicias are clearly

favoured, and the fact that they are pleased at the prospect of Cleon's defeat is clear. Cleon succeeds, yet to Thucydides it is an enterprise of a maniac.[101] Thucydides overcomes the difficulty of how such an apparently mad enterprise gained the support of the people by assuming that the mob is foolish. Consequently, the whole enterprise is to be regarded as folly.

Thus the evidence of the Mytilene affair, the Sphacteria incident, Cleon's election and the Amphipolis campaign suggests undue prejudice and bias on the part of Thucydides.[102]

Four other considerations affect the validity of Thucydides' assessment of the failure of the Athenian democracy following the death of Pericles: the intrigues with Argos in the years following the Peace of Nicias; Athen's treatment of Melos in 416 B. C.; the context of the Sicilian expedition of 416 B. C.; and the problem whether in 432/1 B. C., Athens was spoiling for war with the Peloponnesians, and whether the contrast between Pericles and his successors is as sharply defined as Thucydides implies.

Athens' aims in regard to Argos are according to De Romilly deliberately obscured in order that Thucydides might stress that this policy represented a decisive break from Periclean precedents.[103] Against the viewpoint of Thucydides, two points are to be stressed. First, Thucydides

himself admits that Sparta with Argos as an ally, posed a serious threat to Athens.[104] Second, the enterprise proved successful. Sparta was so seriously affected that she appears to have been unable to rally to the defence of Melos. Indeed Argos proved to be an important ally of Athens.[105] Moreover, Alcibiades' policy was no innovation. Themistocles' intrigues appear to have led to the establishment of democracy at Argos, and after the fall of Cimon, Athens moved towards Argos.[106] In spite of Thucydides' realization of these facts, he appears to have continued to have regarded it as an adventurous policy, since it represented the aims of the war party and implied the creation of an Athenian land empire.

Even if in the case of Argos, it could be maintained that the events following the Peace of Nicias signified the rejection of Periclean policy concerning the avoidance of projects involving the acquisition of a land empire, no such defence could be summoned in the case of Melos. To Thucydides, the subjection of Melos on the eve of the expedition to Sicily marked a culminating point in the dangerous post-Periclean imperialism pursued by the demagogues. At the time the whole incident appears to have commanded little attention.[107] It is certainly difficult to appreciate Thucydides' disgust at the venture. It was consistent with the Periclean policy espoused by Nicias to concentrate upon the existing naval empire. Indeed,

Nicias had led the first expedition against Melos himself. As such it was necessary to guard against Sparta.[108] It is, moreover, possible that Melos was a tributary member of the Athenian Empire, for, as Treu suggests, she seems to appear in the assessment of 425 B. C., providing only partial payment. The consequences are serious. In the first place, it would seem that the expedition against her was justified. Secondly, it would follow that Thucydides deliberately omitted these facts. It must be stressed that this theory is not fool-proof. Eberhardt questioned whether the inscription dealt with Melos, and whether the assessment of 425 B. C. could not be arbitrary. Further, he was unconvinced of the importance of the financial support given by Melos to Sparta.[109] The main point, however, is that the capture of Melos did not involve an infringement of Periclean policy since it implied the maintenance of the sea empire.

According to Thucydides, Athenian power lust reached its zenith with the Sicilian expedition. Again the evidence suggests that Thucydides has seriously distorted the realities of the situation in order to castigate the Athens of the demagogues. At this point the notorious problem of Thucydides' concept of the causes of the Peloponnesian War enters the scene. The fact is that "Thucydides tried to understand the mind of the people who decided to fight rather than the traditions and interests

which were involved in the fight."[110] Hence there is undoubtedly a great deal to be said for the attractive, though often ignored, or rejected, thesis propounded by F. M. Cornford in the beginning of this century, that Thucydides failed to perceive that the Western policy of Athens is the clue to the comprehension of Athenian aims throughout the fifth century, and is a major cause of the outbreak of war in 431 B. C. Consequently, the Athenian expedition of 416 B. C. is not to be regarded as an isolated incident and as an example of Athenian irresponsibility.[111]

Certainly, it is conceivable that a new commercial and sea-faring element began to exert significant influence upon Athenian policy. Even if economic motives are not adduced, there is no doubt that the West figured prominently in Athenian policy. Two facts are particularly significant. First, there is the question of the relationship of the first and second Peloponnesian Wars. On both occasions, Athenian motives are identical: to secure the Western route. Above all, hostilities centred around Boeotia, the Megarid and Corinth. Megara who possessed the ports of Pegae and Nisaea was the key. In 461, Athens formed an alliance with Megara and built the long walls from Megara to Nisaea. As a result, she incurred the hatred of Corinth.[112] Similarly in 431, the immediate cause of the war was Athens' alliance with Corcyra, a Corinthian colony commanding the route to

the West. Another factor was the Megaraean decree and the annual invasions of the Megarid. Significantly, Cleon insisted upon the possession by Athens of Nisaea and Pegae after the capture of Pylos. It is to be noted that it was only after the capture of Boeotia that Sparta intervened in the first Peloponnesian War. Corinthian pressure largely brought her in, in 431 B. C. Finally Cornford observes that both wars are marked by large scale overseas expeditions. The expedition to Egypt may possibly be associated with the question of Egyptian trade.

Secondly, it is to be observed that the Archidamian War is certainly related to these events. With the exception of the revolt of Lesbos, Pylos and Brasidas' northern campaign, the West appears to be the key. Into this scheme can be fitted Phormio's victories in the Corinthian gulf; the attempt to effect the detachment of Acarnania; the establishment of a democracy at Corcyra; the capture of Minoa; the first voyage to Sicily; Demosthenes' campaigns in Leucas and Aetolia; the second Athenian expedition to Sicily and the attempted settlement of Corcyra; Cleon's demands for Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaea; the Boeotian intrigue over the port of Siphae; the Acarnanian operations and the capture of Oeniadae.

Moreover, Thucydides' view of the great Sicilian expedition overlooks the fact that direct Athenian relations with the Western Greeks long antecede the Peloponnesian War.

Certainly, Themistocles' career indicates a distinct interest in the West. Hence the naming of his daughters, Sybaris and Italia, his seeking of refuge in Corcyra, the threat to evacuate to Siris in 480 B. C. and his attack upon Hiero.[113] Pericles was certainly interested in this area. Hency the Segestan alliance of 458/7 or 454/3, the alliance with Leontini and Rhegium, in 433/2 B. C., the foundation of Thurii in 445 and the Corcyraean alliance of 432 B. C. Diodorus notes Athens ancient interest in Sicily and Plutarch dates these relations to 432 B. C.[114]

It is, moreover, clear that Thucydides' view of Athenian policy in Sicily 427-24 B. C. is self contradictory.[115] On the one hand, Thucydides regards the expedition as illustrative of Athenian irresponsibility under the inferior successors of Pericles.[116] In general, he shows little interest in these events, and emphasizes that he intends to record only those events which he considers to be important.[117] His aim is to stress the unjust condemnation of the generals, which is characteristic of the post-Pylos spirit.[118] Three reasons are given for the expedition, one of which might appear to support the thesis that the main features of the venture was its insanity. Thucydides implies that the conquest of Sicily was already intended in 427 B. C.[119] Westlake accepted Thucydides' thesis as typical of the demagogic spirit. However, the evidence of Thucydides himself certainly does not support this view.[120]

Two other reasons for the first expedition are

provided by Thucydides, and these clearly are more in accordance with the realities of the political situation. First there is the economic motive, whereby Athens' aim was to stop the transfer of corn supplies to the enemy. Indeed, the danger of Syracuse's crushing Athens Western allies was very real. Further Corcyra, weakened by stasis could certainly not be relied upon.[121] More important is the third claim that political and military aid to the Peloponnesians could thereby be impeded. Thucydides openly refers to this factor upon an earlier occasion and places this argument in the mouths of the Corcyraeans, Segestans, Alcibiades and Euphemus of Camarina. It is also implied by statements of Hermocrates and Athenagoras.[122] Therefore, the possibility of hostilities emerging from the West is a factor certainly not to be discounted. Indeed this was clearly a major factor and its objectives were gained at the Peace of Gela of 424 B. C. Not acquiescence but approval is the expression used by Thucydides to refer to the attitude of the Siceliot states.[123]

As regards the expedition sent to Sicily in 416 B. C., Athenian conquest of the Siceliot states is similarly unlikely. It is true that more specific evidence appears to exist in support of this claim. Thucydides refers to Alcibiades' eagerness for promoting the expedition and his desire to conquer Sicily and Carthage. Hermocrates similarly advocates the dispatch of an embassy to Carthage because the

latter is said to fear Athens as much as Syracuse does. Finally Alcibiades recalls how Athens aimed ultimately at conquering Carthage.[124]

It is to be noted that this evidence is confined to the persons of Alcibiades and Hermocrates, who upon these occasions are addressing large gatherings and have their own axes to grind. Further, it is not without significance that Alcibiades does not mention the designs on Carthage in the speech to the Athenian assembly,[125] which accordingly appears as a monopoly of Alcibiades' own person. Finally as M. Treu has observed, Thucydides' narrative contains two theses in direct contradiction with one another.[126] At the council with Nicias and Lamachus, Alcibiades proposed a scheme of alliances, beginning with Messana and the Sicels.[127] In fact Messana, like Camarina, proved uncooperative. However, Naxos joined Athens, as did Catana, by a ruse.[128] Moreover, even after Alcibiades' recall, the same policy pursued. Hence, as Treu observes resulted the dispatch of the trireme on a mission of friendship to Etruria and Carthage,[129] and the attempted alliance with Himera and the Sicels.[130]

There is no doubt that the thesis that Alcibiades attempted to create a grand alliance against Selinus and Syracuse is the more accurate.[131] As has been seen, the facts support it. Moreover the debate between Alcibiades and Nicias on the eve of the departure of the expedition clearly

indicates that whereas Nicias opposed alliances, Alcibiades was in favour of such a procedure.[132]

The problem is to account for the fact that to Thucydides the Sicilian expedition was aimed at conquest. Treu felt that basically the picture provided is of Alcibiades, the hero of the Ionian War, to which the evidence of Plutarch testifies, and that the reality of the situation of Alcibiades as colleague of Nicias and Lamachus has been forgotten. Hence the attribution of grandiose designs to that personage.[133] In other words, Treu's solution is to assume the existence of two different pictures, originating from different periods. It is however, a solution which can neither be substantiated nor refuted effectively.

Alternatively, there is the solution offered by Brunt that Thucydides overemphasized the part played by Alcibiades because he received his information from Alcibiades personally. Hence it is argued that the famous chapter sixty-five of book two which describes the personal attacks, resulting from the rivalry of the politicians seeking to ingratiate themselves with the people, is an attack on those elements hostile to Alcibiades, who ruined the success of the Sicilian expedition. The implication is certainly there, that had the people trusted Alcibiades, the catastrophe in Sicily would have been avoided. Whether or not Thucydides' view was the result of a personal association with Alcibiades, this passage certainly indicates

that the ultimate blame for the expedition rests with the demos. Thucydides again asserts the opinion that the demos and the demagogues are the cause of Athens' ruin. If Brunt's view is accepted in its entirety, Thucydides' theory is certainly weak. The demos' distrust of Alcibiades was certainly warranted by that individual's subsequent career. Second, such a viewpoint is challenged by the contrary thesis, indicating that Alcibiades favoured a policy of alliance. However, against Brunt, it must be stated that Alcibiades' name is undoubtedly to be associated with the demagogues, attempting to gain the demos' favour. Thus the third solution emerges. Alcibiades is attacked by Thucydides too, since he is classed with those leaders conducting for Athens adventurous policies which depart from the projects laid down by Pericles. Thus the aim of the thesis concerning the revolutionary post-Periclean nature is again to castigate the democracy of the demagogues. Moreover, the thesis is openly contradicted by the facts.[134]

A final point is that Thucydides in his desire to lay stress upon the innovatory nature of Athenian meddling in the West, had deliberately obscured the Periclean role in these developments. He does not mention the foundation of Thurii and Athens' alliance with Leontini and Rhegium on the eve of war in 433 B. C. Pericles, moreover, is not associated with the Corcyraean alliance. There is only a brief reference to commercial benefits derived from the

alliance. Finally, as Cornford stressed, Thucydides does not attribute the degree of importance to the Megarean decree provided by Aristophanes, Diodorus and Plutarch. The conclusion is inescapable: Thucydides deliberately obscured Athenian policy towards the West before 432 B. C. in order to stress the fact that the later Athenian entanglements were rash, completely novel and opposed to Periclean precedent.

It thus appears that Thucydides' views of Athenian policy in the West completely distort the realities of the situation. Clearly ties existed between Athens and the West throughout the fifth century. It is also evident that the Western issue was a primary factor leading to hostilities in 459 and 431 B. C. Indeed, in the Archidamian War, Athens appears to have aimed at securing the route to the West. This is particularly the case with the expedition of 427-424 B. C., which in aim differed negligibly from that resulting in the dispatch of the armada in 416 B. C. There were two possible motives. The first, the economic motive, appears on the whole to be of subsidiary importance, in spite of the views stated by Cornford and Grundy.[135] Athens' aims appear basically political and military: to prevent aid from the Western Dorian states who were encroaching upon the territories of her own Ionian allies. The peace of Gela of 424 B. C. gave Athens what she wanted. Renewed danger from Syracuse and Selinus necessitated a second

intervention. It is true that in scale the later expedition differed considerably from those sent during the Archidamian War: in aim they differed little.

Thucydides, by deliberately ignoring early Athenian policy in the West, by disassociating it from Pericles, by regarding the expeditions of 427-424 B. C. in isolation and considering them typical of the irresponsibility which characterized the regime of the demagogues, and by stressing the immensity of the folly of the great expedition as an act of aggression, succeeded in portraying the Athenian demos in an exceedingly poor light, and indeed, in openly criticizing the Athenian democracy. Again, as in the case of Cleon, Melos and Argos, Thucydides attempted to blacken the case for the post-Periclean democratic regime. Again he was contradicted by the realities of the situation, which revealed patently the extent of his anti-democratic bias.

A final consideration confirms the conclusion already strikingly apparent, that there is little evidence for the sharp division in policy created by Thucydides between the Periclean hegemony and the regime which succeeded it. There is no doubt that the events leading to the outbreak of war in 431 B. C. reveal a new expansionist policy, in many ways reminiscent of Athens' adventurous policies which led to the first Peloponnesian War. In other words, there is little validity in the thesis that in the course of the Archidamian War, the new radical party espoused far more adventurous

policies than those pursued by Pericles.[136]

Two facts can clearly be stated: that Athens in the period following the conclusion of the Thirty Years Peace was spoiling for war; and that Thucydides, though betraying a distinct lack of concern for the general interests at stake, was, as a result of his concentration upon the individuals in his history, able to appreciate this fact. Certainly, a bolder policy in the North and West is indicated in the decade preceding the outbreak of hostilities. Hence the foundation of Brea and Amphipolis in 445 and 437 B. C., the alliance with Perdiccas of Macedon in 436 B. C., the Pontic expedition of 435/4, the ultimatum to Potidaea of 432 and the gaining of the support of Sitalces of Thrace who in turn brought back Perdiccas' support. In the West this period is marked by the capture of Naupactus and Chalcis in 456 B. C., the alliance with Segesta in 458/7 or 454/3, the Amphictionic League in 450, Rhegium and Leontini in 443/2 and Corcyra in 433, the foundation of Thurii in 444/3, Phormio's expedition to Acarnania, the Megarean decree and the attack upon Aegina in 432, the negotiations with Corcyra, Cephallenia, Zacynthus and Acarnania in 431, and the subsequent operations against Corinth, Megara, Atalante and Naupactus.[137] Clearly then the year 445 B. C. does not mark a change of policy in any important sense, and Chambers was correct to regard the Thucydidean view of the failure of demagogic Athens as

a serious generalization and oversimplification of the facts.[138]

Although Thucydides does not deal with this factor in detail, there is little doubt that he is completely aware of the situation. Again we are confronted with the old problem of Thucydides' concept of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. Certainly there is little evidence to support the view that Thucydides regarded Athens as the aggressor in a moral sense.[139] However it is equally clear that he is well aware of the fact that Athens forced the war upon Sparta. Three facts reveal this. First, there is Thucydides' general theory of Athenian imperialism. Throughout his history he lays stress upon the imperialism of Athens.[140] Both Athens and her accusers recognize this fact. Indeed when Athens is accused of ambition and a will to dominate, she replies by accepting the arguments of her opponents. The key is Athens' control of the sea and the motive does not reside in a will to support democracies or Ionian causes, but in action and power. There is, furthermore, no doubt that Thucydides is thinking of an unpopular imperialism, though Athens' wrongs are not really discussed. Athens is thus the power, forcing war upon Sparta.

Secondly, the significance of the narrative of the Pentecontaetia is clearly to illustrate the way in which Athens' actions forced Sparta to decide upon war. As an account of the rise of Athenian power, it follows logically

the Archaeology and the Athenian and Corcyraean speeches dealing with the Athenian power drive. As such, it supports the general thesis noted above and found throughout the history that it is Athens' polypragmosyne that decisively affects the course of events, and, therefore, is a prime factor in the course of events leading to the outbreak of hostilities. However, the excursus has an additional purpose: to explain Sparta's fear which led her to act.[141] As Walker observed, the excursus, placed after the Corinthian argument aimed at obtaining decisive action from Sparta, provides the reader with the problem now facing Sparta. She is propelled by Athenian daring. The source of this fear is the ἀληθεστάτα πρόφασις as opposed to the generally accepted cause or pretext of the Corcyraean and Epidamnian affairs. The excursus explains the growth of Athenian control over the Eastern Greeks, the construction of the walls and of the Piraeus which were basic to Athenian naval hegemony; the control gained over the money of the League; and the growth of the Empire. Further, as Walker has shown the method also emphasizes the growth of Athenian power.[142]

Finally, Sealey has observed that Thucydides' use of the aorist in connection with the Athenians' forcing the Spartans to fight (ἀναγκάσαι)[143] suggests not a gradual process but specific acts. As a result, they were frightened (φόβον παρεχοντος) because of the power growth (μεγάλους γιγνομένους) Sealey logically assumes that Thucydides

who does not mention specific acts in this context but only by chance elsewhere,[144] nevertheless is thinking of those events of 433/2 B. C., which suggested that a serious threat was evolving against her from Athens.

Thus the evidence of Thucydides' general concept of Athenian imperialism, of the role of the Pentecontaetia excursus and of the historian's use of the aorist to describe Spartan obligation to commence hostilities, suggests that Thucydides was very well-aware of the fact that the decade following the conclusion of the Thirty Years Peace was not one of restraint.

The conclusion is clear: that Thucydides' division of Periclean and post-Periclean foreign policy is highly artificial and designed to prove the incompetence of the demos under the popular leaders, the demagogues. It can, therefore, be established that Thucydides was not favourably disposed towards popular government as such. The problem is whether a more positive conclusion can be reached regarding the nature of Thucydides' political views.

At this point, there emerges the basic problem of the Epitaphios, which it could be argued is a eulogy of practical Athenian democracy which must have appealed to Thucydides. Four points seriously affect the validity of this viewpoint. First, there is no reason to identify the ideals of the Epitaphios with the Thucydidean viewpoint.[145] Certainly, the evidence cited above indicates Thucydides'

lack of confidence in the democratic regime. Cleon, in particular, is representative of the democracy's failure.

Second, while it is true that the Epitaphios deals with Athens' spiritual superiority which stems from her cultural preeminence, as regards the constitutional aspect, it is certainly a most general type of praise, which, as De Romilly observed, could be applied to the "ancestral constitution"of the conservatives. The laws are mentioned but not discussed. The general spirit which inspires them is explored. Hence stems the insistence upon Pericles' moderate rule. Most important is the fact that a contrast is delineated between the progressive aspect of Athens and the narrow calculating Sparta. Athens' quest for glory is the key to the speech. The speech is clearly an attack upon the ἀπράγμονες and it thus is intimately associated with Pericles' first speech, where the Athenian leader attacks those who would relinquish empire in the name of virtue and, indeed, with the third speech, where tyranny of empire is demanded. Certainly, the Epitaphios is not concerned with moral issues. Thus, though Pericles appears as the individual holding the balance between audacity and moderation, he is clearly an imperialist, concerned with maritime domination. As such he is no moderate, and the Epitaphios serves to compliment this picture.[146]

Third, it is clear that the Epitaphios is not a praise of democracy as such, but a eulogy of the Athenian democratic government under Periclean rule. To quote

Chambers, "Thucydides found no fault with democracy as long as Pericles led it, but without such a leader, the working of a free state could lead to very bad government."[147]

Finally, as Oliver has shown, the praise of the Epitaphios is accorded not to democracy but to a mixed constitution of a more oligarchic or implicitly monarchic type.[148] First, it is significant that Pericles stresses the uniqueness of the constitution in a manner similar to that of Xenophon for Sparta and Aelius Aristeides for Rome. This in itself indicates a non-democratic parallel. Secondly, Pericles does not say that it is democracy but that it is called democracy. The ὄνομα μέν implies a contrast of ...δέ Thirdly, it has isonomia, the characteristic of democracy, which is equality in private disputes. The oligarchical feauture stressed is the preference for arete in public office. The sortition principle is certainly omitted. Thus it is clear that democratic association is absent, and that an oligarchical atmosphere is very apparent.

Oliver further notes that the third ingredient which could not be mentioned openly in such a context was monarchy. But monarchy is certainly found elsewhere, in connection with Thucydides' assessment of Pericles.[149]

It is, therefore, clear, that the Epitaphios cannot be cited as evidence of Thucydides' pro-democratic sympathies, and that this testimony merely serves to

confirm the view expounded above, that Thucydides was unsympathetic to democracy as such. It would appear that he was in favour of restricted government of a tyrannical, or at the very least, oligarchical type.

It is, moreover, clear that both the evidence of Thucydides and that of other contemporary and later sources indicates that Periclean rule possessed distinct aristocratic, and even tyrannical features. The aristocratic nature of Periclean rule is indicated by two facts.[150] First Pericles is associated politically with Cimon, who was married to an Alcmaeonid.[151] Secondly, the picture of Pericles as democratic leader is extremely uncertain. As Sealey has shown, the reform of the Areopagus was inevitable after the constitutional developments of 487 B. C., whereby the archons were henceforth chosen by lot. Pericles' association with the reform of Ephialtes is brief, casual and tendentious. The payment of jurors is seen as a purely administrative measure to ease pressure resulting from the growth of the Empire. Finally, the citizen law is not to be regarded as characteristic of democracy alone.[152] In short, Pericles appears to be more of an aristocrat than a democrat, in spite of Plutarch's contention that whereas in early life Pericles was a democrat, he later became an aristocrat.[153]

Thucydides' sympathy towards Pericles is easily explained. To quote Syme with reference to the historian's

maternal Philaid descent, "therefore Thucydides is linked to the older Hellas of the aristocratic tyrants and the dynastic families, to the men who were too big for the polis of citizens because of their power, their resources and their fame outside their own cities. The men, it might happen, who are suitable candidates for being thrown out by ostracism."[154] This fact explains Thucydides' hostility towards the demagogues, especially Cleon, and, in general, towards the democracy of the post-Periclean epoch. It also explains his sympathy for Theramenes and the constitution of the Five Thousand which, characterized by a restriction of the franchise to five thousand citizens, based upon property qualification and the abolition of pay for the holding of an office, was a restricted constitution of an oligarchic type, and not a moderate democracy as has often been assumed. Thucydides' favour towards Pericles, Antiphon who favoured a narrow oligarchy, and the oligarch Phrynichus, is similarly accounted for.[155] Clearly then, even though as J. H. Finley has argued, the favour shown towards Pericles might indicate opposition to the old conservatives of the Cimon type, it is clear that Thucydides' social background prevented any decisive change of attitude on the part of the historian. He remained the supporter of the concept of a restricted political control, and was openly contemptuous of democratic government per se. The Cimon-Pericles antithesis thus counts for little in any

attempt to assess the political viewpoint of Thucydides.

It is further not difficult to associate aristocratic sympathies with a systematic theory of tyranny. Tyrants of the archaic age, notably Peisistratus and Gelon, worked through the old aristocracies. In fact, Gelon was invited to the tyranny by the Gamoroi. They often originated from noble families. Most notable is the case of the Cypselids of Bacchiad descent. Pericles, as is well known, was an Alcmaeonid and associated by marriage with Cimon. It is no exaggeration to state that both to Thucydides and other contemporary writers, he possessed to no small degree the attributes of the tyrannos.

The problem is to consider the criterion whereby Thucydides judged a man to be a great political leader. A comparison of the Thucydidean and Platonic approach is instructive. Attention is to be drawn towards the person of Archelaus, king of Macedon from 413 to 399 B. C. Plato, in the Gorgias, has no doubt of the fact that he is an unjust man. He bases his view upon two facts. First, he murdered his uncle Alcetas and his cousin Alexander; second, instead of seeing to the education of his brother, he threw him into a well. When however, Thucydides discusses Archelaus, he does not show any interest in these murders. He, in fact, omits to mention them. He is only interested in his political greatness, and brings forward the claim that Archelaus did more for his country than his eight

predecessors, by his construction of roads and fortresses.[157]

Of more direct relevance is the view given by both writers of Pericles. According to Plato, a good ruler needs dikaiosyne, and sophrosyne. Rulers like Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles, on the other hand, have stuffed the cities with harbours, arsenals, walls and such like trash.[158] Thucydides, on the other hand, admires Pericles and all that he stands for. Indeed,Thucydides' history is a study of Periclean rule and an analysis of the failure of Pericles' successors.

Thus whereas to Plato, happiness dependent upon justice is the basis for any assessment of politically important individuals, to Thucydides the criterion is the material prosperity of the state.[159] It is certainly wrong to declare that Thucydides' history is devoid of moral considerations.[160] However, it certainly seems that Thucydides is inconsistent on this point. From a moral point of view, for example, it is difficult to see why the Melian episode or the Sicilian expedition were more to be condemned than acts undertaken under the aegis of Pericles, such as the actions against Samos and the Egyptian enterprise. Certainly, the assessment of Pericles is not founded upon moral considerations. The pride with which Pericles speaks of the numbers of Greeks conquered in comparison to past efforts, in the third speech is evidence enough. When he declares ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτην Gomme is

surely correct to translate, "it is now like a tyranny, which we know, it is a crime in popular opinion to seize, but which it is very dangerous to let go."[161] Pericles is thus the epitome of the institution of tyranny. To quote Thucydides himself, Pericles is the first man, the most powerful of those leading the state, less led by the people than leading them. Athens is nominally a democracy, but in reality the rule by the first man.[162]

Again it is clear that Thucydides' view of Pericles is founded upon the realities of the situation. Walker, Morrison and Ehrenberg correctly distinguished between the theoretical democracy and the monarchical element. In theory, Pericles' power rested in the strategia. In fact, except in the crisis of war, his hand could be seen behind the elections. It was precisely because he had the confidence of the people, which stemmed from his ability, command of speech and persuasive powers, that the tyrannical aspect of his rule was effectively hidden. Yet, as Ehrenberg observes, "his auctoritas was greater than his potestas." It is also to be observed that in his position vis à vis his colleagues he clearly anticipated the later strategos autokrator.[163] Further, in a general sense, Pericles' power was supreme after the ostracism of Thucydides the son of Melesias.

Thucydides' picture of the tyrant Pericles is, moreover, confirmed by the evidence of the other forms of contemporary testimony. First, the testimony of the comic

poets is to be noted. Cratinus' comedy, the Cheirones tells of the great tyrant who is born of the union of Cronus and stasis. His concubine, Hera Aspasia is the child of debauchery. As Ehrenberg suggests, the statis reference is perhaps to the ostracism of Thucydides the son of Melesias. In the Ploutoi of Cratinus, there is a reference to the tyrannical Zeus, expelled by the demos who liberated the Titans. Further, the evidence of Cratinus is confirmed by Plutarch's reference to the fact that Pericles had been shy to enter politics because of his likeness to Peisistratus. Plutarch cites Ion of Chios in connection with Pericles' boastfulness and arrogance, and the result is Plutarch's view of the demagogic Pericles becoming aristocratic.[164] Another manifestation of the tension caused by Pericles' position of power seems to be revealed by Sophocles' attack on Creon in the Antigone and upon Oedipus in the Oedipus Tyrannus, and as Ehrenberg has revealed, it is only in such a context that Spartan motives in connection with the Alcmaeonid curse, can be conceived.[165]

Perhaps more controversial, though it would appear, equally if not more decisive, is the evidence of Herodotus regarding the famous debate between the Persian grandees concerning the ideal constitution.[166] Four facts suggest that Herodotus speaks with the Periclean image before him. First, the efficiency of the monarch, especially in war is noted by Darius. Second, monarchy prevents the corruption

of popular government. Third, the monarch is the idol of the people. Finally, Otanes suggests that the king should submit to the popular vote and that the monarch acts for the people.[167]

The circumstances surrounding such a thesis have been compared by Morrison to the situation at Rome after 70 B. C., where clear signs of the developing monarchy as revealed by the career of Pompey are apparent. That such a development never actually took place is partly due to the very effectiveness of the democratic machine. But as Morrison points out, a major factor was the weakness of the Athenian aristocracy, which "bred for that hour no Caesar but an Alcibiades."

Certainly, it is no exaggeration to state that the Athenians seem to have been obsessed with the idea of monarchy. Morrison points to the use of monarchia by Aristophanes in the Wasps, when in 422 Alcibiades began his career. As has been seen Sophocles and Cratinus are intrigued by monarchy or tyranny. Aeschylus is conscious of the need for a tyrant. The culminating point of the Eumenides is the acceptance of the Erinyes, who in their transformed state, reflect monarchical or tyrannical power. In the Supplices submission to the divine order, no matter how harsh, is ultimately imperative. Prometheus cannot escape the yoke of the tyrant Zeus. Finally, in the Supplices of Euripides, Theseus is described as the young and noble shepherd for

want of which many states have perished, lacking a leader.[168] Clearly, Theseus rules a democratic city, and whereas the people have the power, they are obliged to perform whatever the shepherd demands.[169] In a general sense, it cannot be denied that sympathetic feelings were directed towards the Peisistratids who had brought unity to Athens by ending local aristocratic power.

There is no doubt that the acute consciousness of the tyrannical element as a necessity in the body politic was heightened by the very real manifestation of autocratic tendencies revealed by the career of Pericles. The contemporary testimony of Cratinus, Sophocles and Herodotus is of particular importance and confirms and explains the viewpoint of Thucydides. It is to be emphasized that not only is this tyrannical power invested in the person of Pericles: it is associated with the whole Athenian Empire, and epitomized by Pericles himself. Thus the enslavement of Naxos is noted without a note of condemnation.[170] More important is the evidence of the speeches. It is true that a distinct moral antipathy characterizes the Mytilenean debate and Melian dialogue.[171] However, more significant evidence is that provided by the humane Athenian ambassadors and Pericles himself in the third speech.[172] Athens thus replies by accepting her opponents' arguments. It must be stressed that this ability to achieve progress on the part of Athens is a source of admiration to Thucydides, and contrasts

noticeably with that historian's view of Spartan lethargy.

Thus it is clear that Thucydides betrayed himself to be an exponent of tyrannical theory. There is little doubt that the image of the man, well versed in the intricacies of power politics appealed strongly to him. The epitaphios, though seemingly a eulogy of the workings of Athenian democracy, despite its grandeur, is little more than a panegyric of Periclean policy within a strongly aristocratic setting, and must not be viewed in isolation from the other speeches of Pericles, particularly the third. The fact is that Thucydides could not escape from his aristocratic background. Hence his distaste for authentic democratic government, and, indeed, his highly biased account of Athenian domestic and foreign policy, which he dismissed contemptuously.

At this point, it is possible to trace distinct parallels with Diodorus' narrative, which has been identified with the authority of Philistus. Most important is the identical attitude to the demos. It has been shown that while Dionysius allowed accepted constitutional procedure to function wherever possible, the text portrays him as an individual unwilling to allow the demos to impede the successful completion of his projects. Further, the demos is definitely regarded as incompetent, both under Dionysius and in the period immediately preceding his rise. Indeed, the text seems deliberately to have intended to minimize

the effectiveness of the role of the Syracusans and their allies. As such, it accords with Thucydides' picture of the incompetent Athenian demos.

Second, Thucydides appears to have anticipated Philistus/Diodorus in promoting tyranny, albeit in a more subtle way. The Thucydidean Pericles thus anticipates Philistus' portrait of Dionysius. Dionysius' policy like that of Pericles is based upon practical realities. Sentiment in the form of respect for democratic procedure is clearly there, though occupying a subordinate position and dependent upon its usefulness. Hence pride in Siceliot accomplishments, mingled with disappointment at Siceliot failure, necessitated the presence of the person of Dionysius. In a similar fashion, Thucydidean pride in Athens and that city's democracy is, to a certain degree, negated by his realization of the necessity of the presence of Pericles at the helm.

Finally, it is significant that the Philistus/Diodorus promotion of tyranny, like the Thucydidean counterpart, is set in an aristocratic context. Sartori has observed that two chief terms are used to describe Dionysius in Diodorus' text: tyrant and dynast.[174] Not all Sartori's conclusions can be accepted with equal confidence. First, he concludes that the word tyrant has a hostile connotation and that it therefore derives from Timaeus, while dynast, which is a less hostile term, is therefore to be associated with Ephorus. The discussion in

the first chapter, it is hoped, has effectively eliminated the validity of such a consideration. Tyrannos in a pre-Plato context need not be particularly hostile, and if Diodorus took his information from Philistus, there is no reason to regard it as such. It must be stressed that the fact that it expresses arbitrary use of power does not necessarily indicate the source's hostility. Further, as has been observed, the theory that every hostile reference stems from Timaeus possesses little attractiveness. More confidence can, however, be placed in Sartori's conclusion that dynasty is a neutral term, not associated with the military or unconstitutional aspect of Dionysius' rule, possessing a distinct diplomatic and territorial sense, whereby Dionysius' hegemony gains a more legal and respectable image. Tyrannos, however, emphasized the illegal aspect of Dionysius' power.

Thus as dynast, Dionysius goes against Hipponium, transfers the inhabitants to Syracuse and gives the territory to the Locrians. Similarly the Spartans support the dynasts of Persia and Sicily. Here dynast as a general term corresponds to the Great King. In the episode of Damon and Phintias, the word used to describe the benevolent ruler is dynast. The statement that Dionysius conserved his power for thirty years contains the word dynasty. Again a negative non-constitutional concept is implied.

Dionysius is accused of aiming at dynasty over all

Sicily. Here the idea of potential power is delineated. Most interesting is the prooemium to book fourteen. When Diodorus discusses the miserable position of Dionysius, he mentions the fact that "although fortunate, he was dynast." Again the neutral word is significant: its association with being fortunate gives it this meaning. Aristos pretends to work with the people against the dynasty. The dynast is presented with the Punic ambassadors. Carthage concludes a treaty with the dynast. The note on Dionysius' death observes that he held his dynasty for thirty years. Later it is stated that Dionysius II received the greatest dynasty in Europe. Philistus is most faithful to the dynasties and servile to the tyrannies.[175]

It is, therefore, clear that the word dynast or dynasty is generally used to provide a non-constitutional portrait of Dionysius. It is a neutral term and can express the potential power of Dionysius. It almost legalizes the hegemony. Two further facts are clearly revealed by a general consideration of the use of the word. First, dynast can refer to a sovereign or a restricted oligarchy. Second, the same word was associated with the transfer of power from father to son.

Illustrative of this thesis is Herodotus' reference to the dynasts of Boeotia.[176] Clearly, dynasty is not necessarily monarchy. Sophocles, speaking of the preference of tyranny to arche and dynasty indicates this fact as well

as the fact that dynasty differs from monarchy.[177] Thucydides likewise uses the word to describe many despots having power.[178] Andocides in 407 B. C. uses the word to describe men setting up a dynasty against democracy.[179] The sense here is clearly oligarchical. In Xenophon, the Boeotian oligarchs and Persian grandees are attributed the word.[180] In Isocrates, dynasty represents an ancient political and social group.[181] Yet individuals like Dionysius, Philip, Timotheus of Heraclea Pontica, Cleomides of Mytilene and, indeed, Peisistratus, are dynasts. In general, the word does not possess a hostile connotation. To Demosthenes also the word can refer to an individual or to the many.[182] To Plato, dynasts are bracketed with tyrants and orators on the one hand; on the other, with oligarchs. It is not necessarily tyrannical, but it is certainly not democratic since it denies the popular vote. Dynast is a general word describing a source of power which can be good or bad and can refer to one or many rulers.[183] Finally to Aristotle, dynasty is non-democratic and unconstitutional and constitutes an oligarchy. Aristotle differs from Plato by distinctly classing it as a worse type of oligarchy.[184]

Three conclusions follow. First, the word dynast has an aristocratic or oligarchic connotation; second, it is a word which can apply to an individual or to many rulers; third, in Diodorus/Philistus, it tends to legalize Dionysius' hegemony.

The use of the word dynasty gains added significance in the context of a consideration of the nature of Dionysius' government, which certainly gave the appearance of an oligarchy. Hence the use of the words dynast and dynasty is based upon the realities of the situation. The crux is Dionysius' council of friends, which included Heloris, Philistus, Leptines and Polyxenus. In 389 B. C. Leptines was in command of the fleet.[185] He was first succeeded by his younger brother Thearidas, and then by Dion. Dion was later given a diplomatic post.[186] Polyxenus, Dionysius' brother-in-law was ambassador to Sparta and Corinth in 397/6 B. C. and commander of a naval contingent in 387 B. C.[187] In 382, Leptines was colleague of Dionysius as commander of the army.[188] Philistus' role has already been extensively discussed. He was commander of Ortygia and governor of the Adriatic coast under Dionysius I, and navarch under the younger Dionysius.

Marriage alliances were crucial for maintaining this oligarchic type of government. When in 406 B. C. Dionysius married Hermocrates' daughter and give his sister to Polyxenus, his bride's uncle, he was, according to Diodorus, deliberately aiming at the creation of a governing class.[189] Dionysius failed to gain an alliance with Rhegium by such means. The result was the double marriage with the Locrian Doris and the Syracusan Aristomache, Hipparinus' daughter and Dion's sister.[190] Dionysius' daughters, Dikaiosyne

and Arete, married their uncles, Leptines and Thearidas. Later Arete married Dion, the son of Hipparinus.[191] Still later, Dionysius II married Sophrosyne, Aristomache's daughter.[192] In such circumstances, the full significance of Philistus' secret marriage to Leptines' daughter can be appreciated. It has been argued that the alliance masked significant ideological divergencies. However, in itself, it marked the disruption of the delicate network of marriage alliances created by the tyrant. Philistus, it must be stressed, was a wealthy and influential figure. As such, his action must have been regarded by Dionysius as a potential threat, particularly when viewed against the background of the divergent views on the question of the nature of the direction of Italian policy.

Thus it is clear that Dionysius' rule, which began constitutionally with the strategia, became a union of friends and family, bound by political and military ties. To these Dionysius gave his best land and houses in Ortygia.[193] This dynastic arrangement is found in the three honorary Athenian inscriptions.[194] In the first, honours are given to Dionysius, his brothers, Leptines and Thearidas, his uncle, Polyxenus and perhaps others where mutilation prevents further identification. In the second, a crown is given Dionysius and his two sons, in addition to a grant of Athenian citizenship. In the third, an alliance between Athens and the lord of Syracuse and his descendants is sworn

by the official organs of the Athenian and Syracusan states. Thus there is a clear personal and dynastic basis to Dionysius' rule. This oligarchy is based upon the personality of Dionysius, whose rule is popular in nature and based upon opposition to the old oligarchy. This is most significant. Later tradition, it will be shown in a subsequent chapter, stemming from Plato and reaching its height in the writings of Timaeus, stressed Dionysius' opposition to the old oligarchy. In other words, he was seen simply as a demagogue and despot, and no awareness of the fact that he created a new aristocracy was shown. Yet the narrative of Diodorus is well-aware of this fact.

Again a correspondence between the political thought of Thucydides and Philistus is apparent. Thucydides seemingly rebelled against the environment into which he was born. Yet he could not escape it entirely. His history is coloured by aristocratic prejudice towards the democracy of the so-called demagogues. He remained very much a conservative in spirit if not in fact. The political thought of Diodorus' text is similarly orientated. Without betraying sympathy towards the old oligarchy, it is acutely aware of the oligarchic element in Dionysius' regime, which it favours. Hence Dionysius' power is often referred to as dynasty, a term which tends to give it a significant degree of respectability. The conclusion is evident: the Thucydidean qualities in the narrative echo the testimony

of Philistus. Philistus could no more escape the environment to which he belonged than could Thucydides.

Finally, the respective attitudes of the two historians towards the role of the populace in this aristocratic or oligarchic context supports this identification. Thucydides is certainly proud of Athenian polypragmosyne and the Epitaphios is a eulogy of the democracy. Similarly Philistus/Diodorus is aware of the qualities of the Syracusan democracy. Just as under Pericles a democracy flourishes, so under Dionysius the democratic exterior is maintained. Officially Dionysius was strategos autokrator. It is significant that the Syracusans and not Dionysius appear on coins. Diodorus' testimony indicates that the assembly ratifies formally. The inscription referred to above supports this evidence. Though no evidence exists, it is very possible that the council sat. Commanders and navarchs continued. Diodorus clearly indicates that the office of strategos autokrator was created because of the emergency of the Punic threat. It was a legal and extraordinary office. Aspects of illegality only emerged with the acquisition of a bodyguard and the continued occupation of the office.

Thus a clear corresponding pattern of political thought is discernable between Thucydides and Philistus/ Diodorus. Both historians share a common distrust of democracy, in spite of possessing distinct pride in its

achievements. Similarly they are both attracted by totalitarian rulers. In Thucydides' case, it is true, the adherence to tyranny as an institution is very definitely veiled. But it clearly does exist. And it is a short step from the Thucydidean/Pericles to the Philistus/Diodorus portrait of Dionysius.Finally, a definite oligarchical or aristocratic sentiment, based upon the realities of the respective situations, affects the attitude of the historians towards democratic government and despotic power. In the case of Philistus/Diodorus/ the key is the use of words dynasty and dynast.

Jaeger doubted the possibility of any association between Periclean Athens and the Syracuse of Dionysius.[195] One crucial argument however, testifies to the validity of such an association: indeed, of great significance is a consideration of Thucydides' views of the political capabilities of Syracuse in the period of the Athenian expedition, and his attitude towards Hermocrates.

There is no doubt that the character towards whom Thucydides betrays the greatest degree of sympathy after Pericles is Hermocrates. Indeed, he is made to possess distinctly Periclean type qualities. He is depicted as a man of integrity and principles, who does not worry about gratifying the mob. He espouses pan-Siceliot policies and is not interested in selfish isolation for the individual Siceliot states. He is characterized by personal qualities

of bravery and warmth. His opponent is a Cleon type figure, Athenagoras, who employs the traditional tyrant scare to effect his aims. Hermocrates is enlightened in contrast to the squabbling demagogues. He espouses a moderate form of democracy. Moreover, he effects Syracuse's successful resistance because he is the leader of a Periclean-type democracy. The Syracusans are ὁμοιοτρόποι as the Athenians.[196] They have vigour and tendencies to innovate.[197] They are δημοκρατουμέναι They win because gradually they become less overawed by the invader and because of their new kind of ships.[198] Their's is a naval victory, stemming from their democratic reforms.[199]

In short, Hermocrates appears as a Periclean-type figure. Accordingly, the same prejudice as affects the portrait of Pericles must be assumed present in the picture of Hermocrates. Thus clearly according to Thucydides, the Syracusan democracy was successful as long as Hermocrates was in control. However, there was little attraction in a democracy where politicians like Athenagoras assumed control. It follows that the same worth must be attributed Thucydides' remarks on the Syracusan democracy as to his comments upon Athenian democratic experimentation. As has been argued, the polypragmosyne of Athens, invested in the naval hegemony, was admired so long as Pericles was on the scene. The same criterion must be applied to Thucydides' favourable impression of the Syracusan democracy.

Westlake in an important paper on Hermocrates accepted the Thucydidean version somewhat uncritically.[200] He argued that Thucydides "cannot be considered gullible,"[201] and simply ignored the possibility that the historian might be considerably biased. He felt that Thucydides wrote on Hermocrates early in his life before Hermocrates had openly entertained tyrannical designs, which Westlake felt were thrust upon him by political necessity. Against such reasoning, it has been shown that tyranny and tyrants were not offensive to Thucydides' reasoning. Indeed his distaste for democracy was much stronger. Democracy was a viable proposition only as long as the princeps was there to direct it. Finally, it is a fact that Thucydides' spiritual disciple, Philistus, openly espoused the cause of tyranny.

Westlake similarly accepted the Thucydidean view that Hermocrates represented a policy aimed exclusively at Pan-Siceliot union, a policy which implied peaceful cooperation between the Siceliot cities, on the one hand, and the avoidance of entanglements with mainland Greece, on the other. As such, he associated Hermocrates with the fourth century concept of κοινὴ εἰρήνη.

Against such reasoning, two points must be stated. First, Thucydides admired the democratic and naval achievements which gave rise to Syracusan polypragmosyne. Clearly the results which this quality achieved in the case of Athens - the creation of an arche whose basis was the

absolute power of an individual - were likely to follow the similar developments at Syracuse under Hermocrates. Second, Westlake's conclusion that Hermocrates cannot have approved of Syracusan intervention in Leontini's affairs after the Peace of Gela of 424 B. C., because this would induce Athenian interference in Western Greek affairs, is not supported by the evidence. It is clear that at Gela, Hermocrates was concerned with the immediate prospect. Athenian aims were accomplished by the Peace, and there is no reason to doubt that Hermocrates knew this. His views could change according to circumstances. Westlake ignores the possibility of a more complex situation. He is too much under the influence of the Thucydidean Pericles type. Further, the annexation of Leontini was accomplished by Dionysius, who initially was a follower of Hermocrates. As will be seen below, the aims and accomplishments of the two men were not dissimilar. Third, as Westlake himself observes, one passage clearly implies Hermocrates' censure of the Siceliots for not aiding the Peloponnesians in the Archidamian War.[202] It is thus evident that a pan-Siceliot policy to the exclusion of intervention in the East was not a reality. Indeed, in view of the importance of the West to the major Greek powers, it is to be doubted whether it was ever evisaged as such by any Siceliot statesman, including Hermocrates. Finally, clear proof that this was, in fact, the case is furnished by the fact that Thucydides himself

admits that it was Hermocrates who urged the Syracusans to send a fleet to the aid of Sparta. Indeed Hermocrates himself went with the expedition.[203]

Clearly then, Thucydides' adulation for the Periclean type statesman has obscured the realities of the situation, just as consideration of the Epitaphios might do, without reference to Pericles' third speech. Hermocrates clearly entertained the prospect of Syracusan domination of Sicily and was not averse to interfering in the affairs of the East, if these worked to the advantage of his projects. In every sense, he was a practical politician. As such he appealed to Thucydides.

A further fact is significant. The evidence suggests that Hermocrates' aim was the seizure of the tyranny of Syracuse, and that his attitude towards the democracy was not characterized by deep loyalty. Diodorus states openly that the Syracusans did not recall Hermocrates because they feared that he had designs upon the tyranny.[204] Westlake betrayed scepticism about this statement, and argued that the individuality of Hermocrates aroused Syracusan fears concerning his aims at the despotate.[205] In itself, this is no reason to doubt that Diodorus' statement is correct, and that the people were right to fear him. Westlake further argues that, convinced of the defects of the Syracusan democracy, Hermocrates was obliged to act as he did. Yet is this not the same as Dionysius' policy,

which was justified by the Punic danger? This certainly appears to have been Philistus' view as it is reflected in Diodorus' text. Similar sentiments account for Thucydides' viewpoint. Finally, Westlake argues that Hermocrates feared that Carthage would threaten the Siceliots. Against this, it is clear that his very actions aroused Carthaginian alarm, and contributed to the invasion of 407/6 B. C.

Diodorus' reference in itself would not be sufficient evidence to conclude that Hermocrates was opposed to the Syracusan democracy. However, confirmatory evidence is supplied by Thucydides.[206] In 415/14 B. C. Syracusan hopes were low, following the Athenian victory. The Athenians were planning an attack upon Syracuse itself, for which purpose, having returned to Catane, they were making attempts to procure money from Athens and her Sicilian allies, food and stores for the attack upon Syracuse, more allies, and cavalry from Athens and her Sicilian allies. Hermocrates attributed the failure of the Syracusans to lack of discipline and military practice, and advocated two moves. First, he recommended a lessening in the numbers of the generals: those who were elected were to have full powers and the confidence of all. He believed that by such a course of action, preparations could be kept orderly and secret. Second, he advised constant military preparations under skilful commanders, the increase in the number and the improvement of the discipline of the heavy armed, pay being

given to those who were unable to afford the cost of the array. Hermocrates' advice was heeded, and it was decreed that at the next election, the numbers of the generals were to be reduced to three.

Hermocrates' advice was adhered to.[207] As a result of these reforms, it is clear that Syracusan politics were controlled by three men with absolute powers. Further, it is clear that of the three, ultimate sovereignty rested with Hermocrates. This is inferred from the following facts. Nothing is known about Hermocrates' two colleagues, Heracleides and Sicanus, except that they were later deposed together with Hermocrates. However, Hermocrates is clearly the preeminent personality in Syracusan affairs from 424 B. C. to his deposition.[208]

Hermocrates' designs upon the despotate of Syracuse are recorded elsewhere in Thucydides.[209] Just before the arrival of the Athenian fleet, Hermocrates and Athenagoras conclude the debate of the assembly. Thucydides notes how Hermocrates was distrusted by most of the assembly, led by Athenagoras. The main point to observe is Athenagoras' claim that the oligarchs had formulated their story of the Athenian invasion to get power for themselves. Most interesting is the rebuke of the young oligarchs who seek power and office before the legal age. He asserts that democracy is the rule of the whole people and oligarchy of only a part. In a democracy, the rich guard the public

purse, the wise give counsel and the people listen and decide. In an oligarchy, the few have the advantage, and the many have the disadvantage. Athenagoras concludes by promising the rich and noble a share of democracy, at the same time warning them that if they want more, they will lose everything.

In this speech, the following points are clearly indicated. First, Hermocrates appears to have aimed at the possession of political power for himself and his followers. Second, Athenagoras, Hermocrates' political rival, represented the Syracusan populace and stood for the maintenance of the democracy. This fact is indicated by Thucydides' reference to him as popular leader (δήμου τε προστάτης) and by his assertion that only a few believed Hermocrates (ὀλίγον δ'ἦν πιστεῦον τῷ 'Ερμοκράτει)

It is clear that the evidence of Thucydides, as found in the speech of Athenagoras, and Diodorus are agreed upon one point: that Hermocrates' political aims did not accord with those of the majority of the people. Precisely what constitution Hermocrates aimed at establishing is the subject of controversy between Thucydides and Diodorus, the former attributing oligarchical designs to Hermocrates, the latter tyrannical ones. Generally, the Thucydidean viewpoint has been accepted and a type of synthesis has been effected. It has been argued that at heart Hermocrates was an oligarch, working for the

good of the Siceliot cause, but gradually realizing that his ideals would not be successfully effected, he determined upon seizing the despotate. Such reasoning clearly underlies the thought of Holm, Freeman, Stroheker and Westlake.[210] Hermocrates thus emerges as a Dion-like figure or perhaps Plato's philosopher king.

Such a situation requires two comments. First, if it is accepted that Hermocrates was an oligarch, therefore Athenagoras' suspicions were correct and Hermocrates was a threat to the democratic government. It follows that little of a positive nature can be derived from Thucydides' recognition of the fact that it was because Syracuse was a naval democracy that she triumphed. As in the case of Periclean Athens, it was the individual, in this case, Hermocrates, who counted. It follows that in the case of Syracuse, Thucydides again allowed his aristocratic background and prejudice towards democracy to gain the upper hand. His favour towards Hermocrates and Syracusan government arose from the fact that the democracy closely resembled the Periclean democracy before its corruption in the hands of the demagogues.

Second, it is clear that the evidence suggests that Hermocrates was aiming at tyrannical power.[211] The reform noted by Thucydides, combined with the fact that whereas Hermocrates is the preeminent personality, his colleagues are unknown, already suggests this fact. It must also be

remembered that Dionysius was a follower of Hermocrates.[212] Further, Dionysius obtained power by methods which were substantially the same as those employed by Hermocrates. It has been seen that Hermocrates proposed and even effected the limitation of the numbers of the generals from fifteen to three. It was also observed that Hermocrates was one of those three. Similarly Dionysius began his rise to power by carrying a vote for the deposition of the generals, as a result of which new generals were chosen, one of them being Dionysius. The next move of Dionysius was the elimination of his colleagues.[213] Hermocrates' plans did not develop as far as Dionysius' and thus it cannot be determined how far they would have led. At the same time, it is significant that both men attempted to gain predominance by similar methods.

It is, moreover, noteworthy that Dionysius emulated Hermocrates in espousing Siceliot nationalism. Hence, Hermocrates' incursions into Carthaginian territory in Sicily and the championing of the bones of the dead.[214] As regards the exiles for whose return Dionysius pressed, whatever their merits, it is a fact that the followers of Hermocrates comprised the same elements as aided in the establishment of the despotate of Dionysius.

It is further to be observed that the Syracusans were always suspicious of Hermocrates. This is seen by the fact that Athenagoras was supported by the majority

of the people. In the despondency which followed the Syracusan defeat in the first battle of the war, Hermocrates managed to win approval for his reforms of the strategia. The Athenian capture of Epipolae and the destruction of the two counter works increased their despondency. Charges were laid against the generals who were replaced by three new men, Heracleides, Eucles and Tellias.[215] What is interesting to observe is that, although Hermocrates and his colleagues were deposed, nevertheless the reforms of Hermocrates were not altered. This seems to indicate the fact that the Syracusans realized that the reforms of Hermocrates made for efficiency: at the same time, they distrusted Hermocrates.

Subsequently, Hermocrates attempted to eradicate this distrust. He seemingly accepted the sentence of banishment, despite the pleas of his men that he should retain command.[216] At the same time, however, he planned his return, building triremes and hiring mercenaries. The failure of his plans in Sicily against the Carthaginians' possessions was followed by his championing of the corpses of Himera. The bones were received and Diocles was banished. Yet Hermocrates was still not granted readmittance. Forced entry into Syracuse was the only way left open. The sequel was Hermocrates' death.[217]

Thus positive evidence indicates that Hermocrates was aiming at the despotate of Syracuse. The evidence of

the reforms, the fact that Hermocrates was the preeminent member of the new board of generals, the fact that Dionysius was Hermocrates' follower, the similarity of methods employed by both persons to effect their predominance, the fact that the supporters of Dionysius were originally Hermocrates' followers, and the ever-present distrust which the Syracusan demos bore towards the person of Hermocrates - all this supports Diodorus' claim that Hermocrates aimed at the tyranny.

In view of the discussion of Thucydides' view of Pericles and the Athenian democracy,the fact that Thucydides admired a person like Hermocrates is certainly not strange. F. Grosso argued that scholars like Westlake were wrong to regard Hermocrates as the ideal statesman, and that to Thucydides he was a potential tyrant.[218] Certainly, as has been seen, the evidence indicates that Thucydides was well aware of Hermocrates' aims. However, this need not eliminate the fact that to Thucydides, Hermocrates was a Periclean-type figure. Grosso fails to consider the possibility of divergence of opinion within Thucydides regarding the historian's sympathies - a fact well illustrated in the case of Thucydides' conception of Pericles. The association of Philistus and Thucydides thus becomes most likely. Thucydides' interest in Hermocrates was paralleled by Philistus' interest in Dionysius. Both historians possessed a certain attachment towards values of democracy and

patriotism. These were, however, subordinated to political necessity, which created despotic figures like Hermocrates and Dionysius. Thucydides, disappointed with the Athens of his maturity, found hope in the Syracusan democracy of Hermocrates. He clearly witnessed the later career of Hermocrates and the rise of Dionysius. Yet Syracuse had solved her political problems. Hence his favour towards the Western despots. Philistus in a real sense continued to espouse the political ideals of Thucydides and in a spiritual sense, the Περὶ Διονυσίου is a sequel to Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War.

It need hardly be stated that the attempt to equate Periclean Athens with the Syracuse of Dionysius considerably oversimplifies a most complex issue. It is clear that the personal power of Dionysius ultimately depended upon the power of the sword to a much greater extent than did that of Pericles. It is also a fact that the mercenaries, bodyguard, slaves and undesirables constituted a vital support for the tyrant. Moreover, the plundering of the temples and heavy taxation testify to the autocracy which existed. It is also a fact that the arche of Dionysius anticipated the major power structures of the Hellenistic age. Philistus himself was aware that Dionysius was more than the first among equals. The account of the double wedding and of Dionysius' magnanimity illustrate this. Moreover Livy observes that the grandchild of Hieron II,

Hieronymus, emulated Dionysius by adopting a bodyguard, four grey horses and a chariot and a purple cloak and a diadem. Also Duris of Samos notes the use of the golden-type diadem by Alexander, the Spartan Pausanias and Dionysius.[219]

At the same time five facts are to be noted. First, the mercenaries were needed against Carthage. Their presence need not be interpreted as being chiefly to suppress popular discontent against the tyrant. Dionysius' need of this element was very real. Second, the plunder and taxation was clearly necessary for defence and the pursuit of war. Complaints about taxation are not merely representative of totalitarian regimes, and the evidence merely suggests that Dionysius had above average resourcefulness. Nor must it be forgotten that another picture exists which depicts the existence of a cooperative basis to Dionysius' hegemony. This is, indeed, essentially reproduced by Diodorus from Philistus, and it will be seen, seems to be confirmed by the testimony of Theopompus. The weaknesses in employing the Theodorus' speech as illustrative of the text's hostility have been demonstrated.[220] Certainly a popular basis to Dionysius' rule is suggested by the facts that the tyrant ruled for thirty-eight years without experiencing a violent death. Moreover, though Plato, in the seventh letter, mentions that he did not find the situation in Sicily under Dionysius I to his liking, all he

is able to complain about is the fact that the people indulge overmuch in sex and drinking. Certainly, he has nothing to say about their slavery to the despot. Real hostility appears to have been directed towards the Ionian foe. The evidence, it has already been seen, indicates less friction with the Dorian bloc, which could even secede if it so desired. Fourthly, the evidence of Lysias regarding the laying waste of Sicily must be placed within the context of Athenian hostility to the tyrant and cannot simply be produced as authentic Sicilian data. Finally, it is to be observed that the monarchical aspect of Dionysius' hegemony only became clear as the reign drew on. It must have been particularly apparent in the later years, which followed the conclusion of peace with the Punic and Italiot foe.

It is further to be noted that the picture provided by Diodorus/Philistus seems to reflect the early development and not the ultimate evolution. In the later years of the reign of Dionysius, it is true, that the popular element counted for far less: in the early years, however, it must clearly have counted for a great deal more. Therefore it would appear that Philistus/Diodorus reflects the authentic situation at the beginning of Dionysius' reign. It may further be claimed that the hostile tradition, when it depicted Dionysius as monarch, drew much of its information from the evidence of the later years of the tyrant's rule.

It was argued in the analysis of Diodorus' narrative

that, despite obvious interest in the reality of power politics, the narrative attributed Carthage's ultimate failure as much to moral deficiencies and the forces of divine nemesis as to practical considerations. The problem, therefore, emerges whether it is possible to equate such an approach with the rationalism of the Thucydidean Philistus. There are, in fact, two problems. First, it must be asked whether Philistus was a pure rationalist? If he was, it would be difficult to equate Philistus with Diodorus' text. Second, there is the problem of the degree of rationality which characterized the history of Thucydides.

Philistus was, in fact, well aware of the existence of divine intervention in the affairs of men. Two fragments particularly indicate this. The first narrates how the mother of Dionysius, when pregnant had a dream, foretelling the future greatness of Dionysius. She is recorded to have dreamt that she gave birth to a baby satyr and that she was told of its future happiness and greatness by the Galeatae. Another fragment records how Dionysius' horse got stuck in a bog. It is related that Dionysius was unable to pull out the horse. Later, however, it came to Dionysius with a swarm of bees in its mane. Shortly afterwards, Dionysius became tyrant.[221]

The significance of these citations is that, as well as furnishing direct evidence to the effect that Philistus sympathized with Dionysius, they indicate that

for all the rationalism that a pupil of Thucydides might possess, Philistus was acutely conscious of the existence of divine intervention in human affairs. Consequently, there is no difficulty in the equating of the thesis concerning Carthage's failure found in Diodorus' text with the authority of Philistus.

Equally important is the question whether Thucydides showed any interest in the problem of divine intervention, and whether he would have approved of the thesis propounded in Diodorus' narrative concerning Carthage's collapse as due to the Punic State's moral failure.

One fact is clear: Thucydides never denied the possibility of divine intervention. Thus he mentions earthquakes as signs of coming events.[222] Though he does not openly accept this evidence, he certainly does not deny it. In the first book, Thucydides speaks about the calamities of war and refers to the droughts, famines and plagues together with the eclipses and earthquakes.[223] It is significant that he makes no distinction between the two types of evidence, and that while he merely states facts, he reserves judgment on the question of his own personal belief. Tyche makes its appearance upon numerous occasions, and represents the unknown in contrast to the known or γνώμη.[224] It is clearly more than chance. The Melians associate it clearly with the divine,[225] though Thucydides nowhere implies the worship of chance. Hence

Cornford refers to tyche as "mythical" and not "religious". In respect to the curses in the story of Cylon and Pausanias, it is clear that Thucydides' reserve need not imply scepticism and disbelief. Finally, though it is true that Thucydides is sceptical of omens, as Cornford has observed, the pure rationalist would only have referred to the mutilation of the Hermae with reference to the recall of Alcibiades.[226]

It is, therefore, clear that the theory of the purely rational Thucydides is as unattractive as that of the impartial and purely scientific Thucydides of Cochrane. A further fact may be stated. It is apparent that Thucydides was intimately concerned with the moral failure which accompanied the outbreak of the war. As well as glory, war was accompanied by extremes of brutality. It was for this reason that he explained his greater interest in the Peloponnesian War than in the comparatively brief Persian Wars, in the important twenty-third chapter of the first book. For the same reason, Thucydides stressed comparatively unimportant events like the civil war in Corcyra, the Plataean war, the treatment accorded Melos in 416 B. C., the destruction of Boeotian Mycalessus, and the classic statement on Nicias, a man "least worthy of such a fate".[227] As such, Thucydides was clearly a moralist.[228]

It is, moreover, clear that a pattern emerges not dissimilar to that found in Diodorus' text. Post-Periclean

Athens is affected by a similar malady as Diodorus' Carthage. As Wallace has noted, Thucydides' work is on a certain level to be regarded as a history of the tragedy of Athens. It is literature as well as history. To quote Wallace, "one can hardly deny that in some sense Cleon and Alcibiades embody the arrogant delusion of their city; and the defeat of Athens, when it comes, has the inevitability of tragedy."[229]

Such a view, however, clashes with Cochrane's thesis that Thucydides was a pure rationalist, opposed to superstition and religion. Against Cochrane, it is to be observed that, as has been seen, the question of Thucydides' religious views is not as simple as has often been assumed. Moreover, it is clear that the moral tone cannot be ignored. Cleon certainly is the epitome of unrestrained brutality. He is the "most violent of the citizens", a man who conducts insane policies. He is confident in his luck and urges the Athenians to covet more, in spite of the warning of the Lacedaemonians on the reversal of fortune. Cleon's role is commented upon by Diodorus: the contrast is between human power and external fortune. Desire and Fortune take advantage of faults of character, produced by wealth and poverty.[230] Cornford has observed that Pausanias' career similarly resembles that of Cleon. It is a story of imperialism, treachery, boasting, oriental behaviour, culminating in the scene in the brazen house.

Cleon, however, epitomizes the hybris of Athens.

Fortune leads the Athenians on. Hence the treatment of the Athenian generals sent to Sicily.[231] The Melian affair describes how the Athenians equate the doctrine of right as might with the divine. The dialogue represents hybris and ate. The Melians are told of the futility of hope in tyche and elpis. Nicias later warns the Athenians against uncertain failure and the unattainable.[232] As Cornford has observed, the comments upon Alcibiades' private vices are aimed at indicating the extent to which Alcibiades' impiety and madness corresponds to that of the Athenians, particularly in respect to their recent treatment of the Melians.[233]

Athens is thus driven by hybris, epitomized by Cleon and Alcibiades. A clear parallel with Diodorus' narrative is thus apparent. Athens' failure has much in common with the tragedy of Carthage, culminating in the debacle of 396 B. C. Himilcon's career closely resembles that of Cleon. Both cities and both individuals are led on by an insatiable desire for more. The inevitable result is divine intervention and the destruction of the impious.

Thus it is probable that Philistus followed Thucydides by adopting both the rational and non-rational characteristics of the older historian into his scheme. Dionysius emerged as a Periclean-type figure, while Carthage's destructive process resembled closely that endured by post-Periclean Athens.

The parallel with Thucydides may be carried further.

It is clear that the fact that both historians suffered exile profoundly influenced the nature of their work and the development of their respective political ideals. This experience certainly brought maturity of judgment to both historians. The exile of Thucydides appears to have coloured the historian's political viewpoint. The personal factor deriving from hostility to Cleon is one aspect of the situation. More important, Thucydides' own experiences appear to have been regarded by the historian as typical and representative of the kind of spirit which characterized the Athens of the historian's maturity and was largely responsible for his city's ultimate doom. Similarly, I have suggested that Philistus' exile was as much due to ideological and political differences with Dionysius as to purely personal factors. Accordingly, it is clear that the problem of decay began to exercise as much the mind of Philistus as that of Thucydides. This took two forms. On the one hand, it assumed a consideration of the factors which accounted for Carthage's fall. However, it is equally clear that the same issue concerned the problem of the failure of Dionysius in his later years. The clue was again found to exist in the Thucydidean concept of the insatiability of states in their conduct of foreign policy. To Thucydides, Athens failed when she began to concentrate upon the land empire and a sphere to which her natural abilities were not commendable. To Philistus, Dionysius was successful when

he united the Siceliots against Carthage, and thereby posed as champion of Western Hellenism against Punic barbarism. Disaster threatened when Dionysius turned his wrath against Magna Graecia and meddled in a sphere over which he had no claim. The failure with Carthage in the later conflicts might appear to have revealed the wisdom of Philistus' thesis. From a historical point of view, the innovatory nature of Dionysius' policy is certainly apparent. The censure found in the pages of Diodorus' text suggests the validity of the above reconstruction.

In one important respect, the exile affected Philistus differently from Thucydides. To Thucydides, exile was an opportunity to gain information from a wider area. Philistus' task was very different from that of Thucydides. His field was in one sense narrower. His interest centred upon Syracuse and Dionysius. Once Philistus had relinquished his position by Dionysius' side, it was inevitable that his sources of information should diminish. Accordingly the extent of interest of his account would diminish. Hence, it is not surprising that it is precisely after Philistus' exile that the narrative of Diodorus becomes empty. The narrative of Dionysius' last twenty years is extremely meagre.

However, it must be stressed that the exile factor is not the only, and perhaps not the chief reason for the lack of interest shown in Dionysius for the last twenty

years of his reign. Philistus' aim was to portray the achievements of the Syracusan tyranny, and there is no doubt that the evidence suggests that the period of success was the period of the great conflict with Carthage. Hence Philistus was inclined inevitably to concentrate on this period and that immediately preceding, which witnessed the Siceliot collapse, before the appearance of Dionysius. Indeed, the narrative found in the thirteenth and fourteenth books of Diodorus are equally balanced, the former revealing the helplessness of the Greek cause and the latter its solution.

A further factor supports the theory that Philistus made the narrative of the great war central to his scheme: the disinterest shown by Diodorus' text in the colonization schemes of the 380's in which, as Gitti has suggested, Philistus himself participated. These facts are recorded, but very sketchily. The events significantly took place before Philistus' exile. Therefore, two conclusions are possible. Either the information derived ultimately from Philistus or from some other source. If it is argued that it derived from another source, the conclusion is inescapable: Philistus did not mention these events because he considered them unimportant. Hence Diodorus had to gain information from another source. Alternatively, it could be argued that Philistus did provide this information. Even then, it would have to be conceded that Philistus was not

greatly interested in incorporating the details of the colonization schemes in his history. Whatever solution is adopted, it is clear that Philistus remained a true Thucydidean, in that economic affairs, unless they had a direct bearing upon military and political events and personalities, were to be excluded from the basic thesis of his work. The emphasis was placed upon military and political affairs, and the grandeur of Siceliot resistance to Carthage. The economic importance of the Northern Adriatic schemes appears to have been ignored.

It is noteworthy that Philistus' most important work derived its significance from the fact that like Thucydides, Philistus was a contemporary, able to assess the political importance of events in which he himself participated. Thucydides regarded the study of contemporary history as the really worthwhile task. He did not say that the study of the past was altogether irrelevant. Where he differed from Herodotus was in his belief that the past must be treated not for its own sake but for confirming his views of the present. Thus Thucydides narrowed his canvas to a considerable extent.

It is true that Philistus did not adhere rigidly to this principle, for the Περὶ Διονυσίου was preceded by seven books, dealing with Sicilian history from earliest times to the capture of Acragas. Thus, there is little doubt that Philistus did not entirely abandon the Herodotean

approach, and he clearly did not limit himself in the way that Thucydides did. In no way can the Περὶ Σικελιάς be compared to the Archaeology of Thucydides, for the latter was not a digression, but a vehicle, whereby the historian, through the use of τεκμήρια or σημεῖα, was able to confirm his views of the present.

However, more precise consideration of the nature of the Περὶ Σικελίας reveals that Philistus' abandonment of Thucydidean methodology was not as drastic as might appear at first sight. In the first place, it is clear that the early history of Sicily was covered with great brevity.[234] By book three already, Philistus was discussing Hippocrates and Gelon.[235] Now the Suda reports that the main interest of the Περὶ Σικελίας was the struggle with the Greeks. Book seven obviously discussed the two Punic invasions at the end of the fifth century. Therefore the struggle with Athens most probably occupied the sixth book. The papyrus whose significance was first discussed by Coppola, suggests that part of book five dealt with the relations of Athens with the Sicilian states during the Archidamian War.[236] Certainly, as has been seen, the third book discussed the Deinomenids. Therefore it is clear that the period from the fall of the tyrants to the great expedition of 416 occupied books four and five, and that a large part of these books was devoted to the first encounter. In other words, five out of seven books dealt with the period 480-405 B. C.

It follows that most of the Περὶ Σικελίας was devoted to contemporary or near contemporary history. Ancient and mythical events were probably confined to the first two books.

It was noted above that the last book of the Περὶ Σικελίας was most likely associated with the first book of the Περὶ Διονυσίου . Mazzarino, moreover, argued that a precise relationship existed between Philistus' views of the Athenian-Syracusan conflict and the Punic-Siceliot encounter.[237] His views were based upon a consideration of the papyrus testimony for the first Athenian-Siceliot encounter in comparison to the Thucydidean account. He concluded that a distinct Siceliot point of view characterized the papyrus, and that whereas to Thucydides the events of 427/4 B. C. were of subsidiary importance to the events of the Archidamian War, the Philistus papyrus associated the expedition very closely with the later encounter of 415/13 B. C.[238] Mazzarino further argued that to Philistus, both episodes foreshadowed the events of the epoch of Dionysius. These events marked the beginning of a new political conscience and the formation of a unified front against the enemies of Syracuse and her Siceliot allies. The clue was the fall of Acragas which, Mazzarino believed, convinced Philistus of the importance of a revolutionary figure like Dionysius. Book six closed with the victory over Athens and book seven witnessed the

destruction of the Siceliot cities. The next four books, dealing with Dionysius, attempted to provide a solution to the problem, and it follows that in the sixth book a partial answer was given with a consideration of Hermocrates, the spiritual precursor of Dionysius.

The conclusion is clear: even in the Περὶ Σικελίας Philistus was not unconcerned with the events of Dionysius' reign. Philistus considered the data before him in the light of subsequent events. This is probably one reason why the nearer he came to his own times, the fuller the narrative proved to be - although the obvious fact must not be forgotten that the further back he went, the less detailed was the information available to him. It is thus apparent that Philistus, in a less precise sense, was employing the Thucydidean approach, whereby the facts of ancient history were to be employed to confirm the present.

There is no doubt that Philistus' greatness is to be associated with the events he described, of which he was a contemporary. The plague, the building of the walls, the preparations for war against Carthage, the siege of Motya, the destruction of Acragas and the battle of Gela of 405 B. C. - such events in the vividness of the description, reflect the authority of a contemporary. It is, indeed, not without significance that Cicero expressed distinct preference for the Περὶ Διονυσίου, no doubt because of the very fact that it was the work of a contemporary. There

is no doubt that the same qualities pervaded the later sections of the Περὶ Σικελίας which contained descriptions of events in which Philistus himself participated, or which his oral sources probably witnessed. In this context, the evidence of the papyrus noted by Coppola is particularly relevant. Coppola accepted the fact that this evidence indicated that Philistus as a Sicilian and contemporary was better informed in political and military matters. Momigliano, Perotta and Mazzarino were, moreover, in essential agreement on this matter.[239]

The Philistus/Thucydides association is supported by two other factors. First, there is the fact already noted by Volquardson that the description of the plague which struck the Carthaginian camp and probably goes back to Philistus, closely resembles the account given of the plague found in Thucydides.[240] It is perhaps significant that in Diodorus' text, the plague is placed in a context of Punic moral, political and social collapse. It thus bears a close relationship to Thucydides' plague. It is also noteworthy that far more detail is accorded this plague than Diodorus' description of the plague at Athens, which probably derives from Ephorus.

Second, as Hejni has observed, the chronological scheme, especially that found in the Sicilian portions, reflects an historian, utilizing the Thucydidean method.[241] It is true that Dionysius of Halicarnassus attacks the

κατὰ θέρη καὶ χειμῶνας arrangement of Thucydides and adds that no historian after Thucydides adopted this method.[242] However, as Hejni has observed, the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia adopted such a procedure. It is, therefore, not inconceivable that Philistus, who, as has been seen, is bracketed with Thucydides by Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus himself and Quintilian, utilized the same scheme.[243] It must, however, be admitted that, in itself, this is certainly not decisive evidence. At the same time, it is significant that after book fourteen, this arrangement is not found: a fact which strongly suggests that Diodorus' source had changed, and as has been seen, the Sicilian portions of Diodorus' history, do appear to have witnessed a source change in book fifteen.

3. Conclusion

At this point, the reasons for assuming that Philistus was the source exerting the greatest influence over Diodorus, may be summarized. First, it has been argued that the testimony of a contemporary is undoubtedly present in Diodorus' pages. Moreover, it is the voice of a Syracusan in governmental and military circles, interested primarily in Syracuse, politics and war, possessing detailed knowledge of Carthaginian affairs. Further, the method whereby the material was divided between the first and second parts of Diodorus' work is reflected in Diodorus' text. It has been shown that the testimony of Diodorus

itself strongly suggests Diodorus' use of Philistus. More important, the political viewpoint of the text, which is clearly aimed at promoting tyranny as an institution to end Siceliot misfortunes, and is not concerned with simple flattery, seems to reflect the political sympathies of the Syracusan historian. Further, the emphasis upon Dionysius' achievement in the great Punic war, the comparative lack of interest for the Italian wars, and the apparent moral disapproval for the war in Magna Graecia in a portion of the text which still seems to derive from Philistus is in accord with the realities of the political situation and reflects the political and ideological differences of opinion between Dionysius and Philistus.

It has further been shown that ancient authorities identified Philistus with the historiographical methods of Thucydides. To a great extent, this identification rested upon stylistic considerations. Political similarities are, however, also suggested. Both writers attributed importance to the plague not merely for itself but for its social, political and moral effects as well. Moreover, far greater importance is attributed to this plague than to the earlier plague in Diodorus which affected Athens, and to which Thucydides devoted considerable detail. It is significant that a chronological system based upon dating by summers and winters which is common to Thucydides and books eleven to fifteen of Diodorus and is particularly

found in the Sicilian portions, terminates at the point where Philistus' authority would have ceased.

Above all, the political ideas reflected in Diodorus' text suggests use of a writer strongly influenced by Thucydidean methods of reasoning. A distinct lack of interest in economic affairs is apparent, and certainly suits a follower of Thucydides. Hence the disinterest in the projects in the Northern Adriatic and the concentration upon political and military affairs in the narrowest of senses. Also significant is the fact that Philistus' greatest products were works on contemporary affairs, and even in the Περὶ Σικελίας , the evidence suggests that the data provided was viewed from a contemporary standpoint

Philistus' history of Dionysius appears to have contained two main theses, which combined both rational and non-rational attitudes. The fall of Carthage, on the one hand, was a result of an unwillingness to curb the bounds of her desire for more. Her imperialism, epitomized by the Cleon-like figure of Himilcon, was insatiable. Hence it earned the wrath of the gods. On the other hand, Philistus, the politician and military man, the practical statesman and spiritual disciple of Thucydides, was well aware of the existence of the human element. He concluded that the Siceliot success was as much due to the personality of Dionysius as to the intervention of divine wrath.

Both theses seem to have been derived from

Thucydides. Athenian imperialism had refused to acknowledge the existence of natural bounds. Her lust for power had caused her own doom. True in Thucydides, this factor is not as apparent as in Diodorus' narrative: yet its existence is, none the less, a fact. It has, moreover, been conjectured that the evidence suggests that the same thesis as was applied to Carthage, was connected by Philistus with Dionysius' later failure. Again the theme seems to have been the necessity of controlling the excesses of imperialistic ambition.

More important, it is clear that Philistus' views on tyranny, oligarchy and democracy, represented an adoption of the Thucydidean viewpoint. It has been shown how, in spite of superficial attraction towards democracy, Thucydides was unable to break entirely with the environment into which he had been born. He remained throughout his life an aristocrat, suspicious of democratic government, controlled by individuals who did not belong to the old ruling class. He regarded democracy as such as incompetent. He only favoured it in the narrowest of forms, when it was, in fact, indistinguishable from oligarchy. Hence derived his approval of the consitution of the Five Thousand, and of individuals like Phrynichus or Antiphon. Philistus too, as Diodorus' narrative reveals clearly, regarded Dionysius' despotate as an oligarchy. Hence the frequent allusion to dynast or dynasty.

Equally important is the fact that Thucydides' distrust and contempt for democratic government drew him towards rulers with distinct totalitarian tendencies. Thucydides' hero, Pericles, is the classic example of the leader who was regarded both by Thucydides and other contemporaries as harbouring tyrannical designs over his native city. Even more significant is the fact that the individual towards whom Thucydides showed the most favour after Pericles was Hermocrates, Dionysius' leader in his early years. It is true that his admiration for Hermocrates is coupled with distinct consciousness of the democratic polypragmosyne of the Syracusans. However, this evidence bears as little relevance to the realities of Thucydides' political ideology as the Epitaphios does. To Thucydides, in theory it was the aristocrat or oligarch Hermocrates, the opponent of the demagogue Athenagoras, who represented the ideal ruler. The facts of the situation reveal that it was the tyrant that impressed Thucydides.

Thus a direct link between Thucydides and Philistus is indicated, and there is no reason to doubt the fact that Thucydides would have approved of Philistus' views of Dionysius. It must be remembered that Thucydides knew of Hermocrates' attempts to seize the tyranny of Syracuse, and that the historian lived long enough to witness the consolidation of Dionysius' tyranny. Accordingly it follows that Philistus'exposition of Dionysius' rule was in a

real and obviously more apparent sense Thucydidean. His work was a plea for totalitarian rule. Indeed such a solution alone ended the Siceliot crisis. Just as Thucydides had crystallized his thoughts upon witnessing the capitulation of Athens in 404 B. C. and had concluded that democracy as such had led to the disaster and that the only salvation was to be sought in Pericles or a Periclean-type figure or constitution, so too Philistus, faced, on the one hand, by the great victory of Syracuse over Athens in 413 B. C., and on the other, by the destruction of the ancient foundations of Selinus, Himera, Acragas and Gela, seems to have concluded that democracy alone could not solve the Siceliot problem, and that the only answer was to be found in the tyrant ruler Dionysius, who had fulfilled Siceliot aspirations in a manner not dissimilar to that of Hermocrates in 413 B. C.

Thus it was as a work of political statecraft and an espousal of despotism that Philistus' work earned its chief reputation. Here indeed is a clue to the problem of the revival in the popularity of Philistus in the first century, B. C. It is significant that second century Roman writers do not refer to the historian. Indeed the Republican spirit which regarded Eastern monarchs with contempt and as effeminate, was unlikely to feel attraction towards the proponent of monarchy and Hellenistic type kingship. However, in the first century, as a result of

the civil wars and the rise of military despots, the problem of absolutism began increasingly to occupy men't thoughts. Hence references to the historian increased considerably. Thus, even a writer like Dionysius of Halicarnassus who was essentially concerned with Philistus' sytle, regarded him as a model of rhetorical style and classed him with Thucydides, Xenophon and Theopompus.[244]

It is perhaps not without significance that all three writers like Philistus were concerned with the problem of absolutism and monarchy. The relevance of Thucydides has already been discussed. Xenophon's political ideas found particular expression in the Cyropaedia, Agesilaus and Hieron. Theopompus' two major works, the Hellenica and Philippica were centred around the strong personalities of Lysander and Philip II of Macedon. Thus four writers whose interest in absolutism gained considerable importance, were classed together by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in a non-political context, even though their association seems to have been essentially political. It is perhaps, not without significance that it was Cicero, the adherent of Pompeius Magnus, who was particularly attracted by the Dionysian books. It is indeed tempting to suggest that he was able to discern the political relevance of Philistus, and realize that the essential thesis of Philistus' historical thought was a plea for the establishment of totalitarian rule within an aristocratic context and the disavowal of sentimental attachment to ideals of democracy.[245]

IV

DIODORUS, PHILISTUS AND THE SICELIOT-PUNIC ENCOUNTER

It was argued in the previous chapter that the Thucydidean Philistus is the source which exercised the most considerable influence upon Diodurus. It was further shown, that a similar political viewpoint, based upon a very real antipathy towards democracy, which they regarded as incompetent, characterized both historians. In the case of Thucydides, it appears that the bias of the historian distorted the realities of the situation. No clear cut-division, in fact, characterized the policies of Periclean from post-Periclean Athens. The concept of the incompetent demagogue thus proved to be a myth, utilized by Thucydides to prove the validity of his concept regarding the fall of Athens.[1]

The question which inevitably presents itself is whether a similar bias on the part of Philistus is discernable, and whether as a consequence the realities of the political situation have been distorted to such a considerable extent, as appears to have been the case with Thucydides. In fact, it will be shown that the view of the Syracusan demos and the Siceliot states prior to the rise of Dionysius has been seriously misrepresented and that a far greater degree of unity characterized the Siceliot cause

prior to the rise of Dionysius. Indeed, it will be apparent that so considerable was the strength of the Greeks that the text's representation of Punic policy has to be totally reversed. Both theses of Philistus/Diodorus will accordingly require significant modification. The aim of this chapter will thus be to indicate that evidence of a more negative nature will confirm the conclusion noted in the previous chapter that Philistus was Diodorus' source. In other words, it will be demonstrated that Philistus emulated Thucydides in actually distorting the realities of the political situation.

It is first necessary to indicate that the Siceliot State posed a serious threat to Carthage and that it was Siceliot strength that forced Carthage to intercede in 410/9 B. C. This will involve a consideration of three separate but intimately connected problems. First, an examination of the internal Punic situation in the fifth century will indicate that a serious political crisis had evolved, necessitating Punic intervention in Sicily. Second, it will be necessary to seek the cause of the internal crisis at Carthage in the growth of Siceliot power. Third, it will be demonstrated that the first invasion set in motion an additional crisis which further endangered Carthaginian security and rendered renewed Punic intervention both desirable and inevitable.

1. Punic Internal Affairs 410/9 B C

Diodorus' account of the Carthaginian reaction to the Segestan appeal of 410 B. C. presents Punic hostilities as being motivated by a three-fold consideration. The acquisition of the strategically important Segesta was in itself an extremely attractive proposition. Syracusan predominance in Sicily as a result of the collapse of the great Athenian expedition furnished the Carthaginians with their defensive argument. Hannibal who is described as φύσει μισέλλην by his insistence swayed public opinion in favour of intervention.[2]

Clearly the text regards the part played by Hannibal in the proceedings as the decisive factor. This is indicated not merely by the explicit statement that Hannibal desired to avenge his father's disgrace and contribute to the growth in Carthage's imperial prestige. The whole course of the campaign of 409 B. C., as described by Diodorus, is characterized by clear indications that neither Selinus, the enemy of Segesta, on the one hand, nor Syracuse, from whom the real danger to Carthaginian control of North-Western Sicily might stem, were the ultimate goals. Thus one of the purposes of the joint Carthaginian and Segestan embassy to Syracuse was Hannibal's hope to gain Syracusan neutrality. Further, Diodorus says that Hannibal determined to leave his ships and wage war by land in order that the Syracusans might see that his enterprise was in no way directed against

them. He also records the fact that the conquest of Selinus left Hannibal free to fulfil his personal errand against Himera, and avenge his grandfather. Diodorus' contrast between Hannibal's treatment of Selinus and that accorded Himera is noteworthy. While only the walls of Selinus were destroyed, Hannibal's desire was to raze Himera to the ground. His aim was to avenge his father's exile and the death of Hamilcar and the one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers. Other evidence confirms this fact: the restoration of Empedion's property; the freedom accorded to his kin; the permission granted by Hannibal to the Selinuntines who had escaped to dwell in the city and cultivate its fields upon payment of tribute to Carthage.[3]

Thus there is little doubt that the destruction of Himera is regarded as the determining factor underlying Carthaginian actions, and that the onus of responsibility is made to rest upon Hannibal.

Immediate acceptance of Diodorus' thesis is qualified by an important consideration. A significant development of a constitutional nature, referred to by Justin, took place in the middle of the fifth century.[4] As a result the quasi-monarchical predominance of the Magonid family, which had characterized Carthaginian government for well over a century disappeared, to be replaced by an administration of an oligarchical character. The chief difficulty resides in the position occupied by the king,Hannibal, which is

difficult to reconcile with the supposed suppression of Magonid supremacy.

In the following discussion, it is hoped that concentration upon three interrelated topics will result in effective elucidation of the situation. First, an examination of the reform itself will show that the reform resulted not in the complete elimination of the Magonids, but merely in the temporary suppression of Magonid political aspirations. Such a conclusion will involve the rejection of a recent attempt at solving the problem. It will then be necessary to explain the Magonid role in the period 450-10 B. C. It is hoped that concentration upon the nature of Punic kingship will clarify this aspect of the problem. It will, moreover, be demonstrated that the peculiar nature of Carthaginian kingship and its association with the Magonid dynasty, is illustrative of the degree of tension which was liable to affect seriously the equilibrium of the Carthaginian political arena and contributed to the crisis in 410 B. C., which resulted in the appointment of Hannibal as king in Sicily. Finally,an attempt will be made to assign the direct cause of the crisis to a peculiarity in the Punic constitution, which, upon rare occasions, invested the key to decisive political action in the hands of the populace.

Justin XIX. 2. I-6 is the sole authority for the internal reorientation, resulting in the curbing of Magonid

power. The text reads as follows:

> Interea Hamilcar bello Siceliensi interficitur, relictis tribus filiis, Himilcone, Hannone, Giscone. Asdrubali quoque par numerus filiorum fuit, Hannibal, Asdrubal et Sapho. Per hos res Karthaginiensium ea tempestate regebantur. Itaque et Mauris bellum inlatum et adversus Numidas pugnatum et Afri compulsi stipendium urbis conditae Karthaginiensibus remittere. Dein cum familia tanta imperatorum gravis liberae civitati esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et iudicarent, centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur qui reversis a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesque respicerent.

Thus according to Justin, Magonid power was controlled by one hundred judges, chosen from the senate. The duty of this body was to demand an account from the generals of their proceedings in order that they might act in a constitutional way.

The magistracy of the Hundred is also referred to by Aristotle who identifies it with the Spartan Ephorate. Aristotle's information is somewhat confused. Probably the Hundred consisted of one hundred and four members. No doubt the title, Hundred is the result of the desire to refer to the magistracy in terms of a convenient round number. It is not clear who elected the Hundred. At one point, Aristotle argues that the Karchedonioi did so; elsewhere, it is stated to be the duty of the Board of Five.[5]

The date of the introduction of the Hundred was commonly considered to be about 450 B. C. The basis of this contention lay in Justin's statement that one

generation of the Magonid line survived to exercise a predominant role in Carthaginian affairs.[6] Further it has been assumed that a period of twenty to thirty years in control would be needed to fulfil the African conquests, referred to by Justin. By 410 B. C. these conquests had certainly been accomplished.[7]

Warmington accepted the traditional dating of the end of Magonid predominance and, at one time, G. Picard took a similar point of view. Picard, however, at a later period, accepted the revised dating of L. Maurin.[8]

It must be stressed that Maurin did not deny the possibility that the oligarchy established some control over Carthaginian affairs in the middle of the fifth century. His main contention was that the evidence for the dating of the reform to the middle of the fifth century lacked a sufficient degree of validity. The consequence of this theory was significant, in that it implied that the Magonid banishment took place, not in the middle of the fifth century but in the first decade of the fourth. Moreover, acceptance of Maurin's thesis disposed of the problem of accounting for Hannibal's presence in Carthage in 410/9 B. C. and the continued occupation of the Magonids in a position of supremacy.

Unfortunately Maurin's interpretation is of a most hazardous nature. The basis lay in his interpretation of Justin XIX . 2 . 1-6. The crux, he argued, was the word

"dein", which according to Maurin implied that the notice on the establishment of the Hundred followed a general discussion on Magonid rule and its importance. Thus, according to Maurin, the narrative of Justin is to be divided into three parts. The first part contains a discussion of Magonid greatness. In the second, the fall of the Magonid house is considered. Finally, there is a return to the detailed discussion and the career of Himilco. Maurin would thus date the establishment of the Hundred to 396 B. C. In this scheme, it follows the failure of Himilco's coup. Picard presented a modified version of Maurin's thesis by dating the reform to 373 B. C.

Against Maurin, it must be stated that Justin's account can hardly be regarded as a general observation on the Magonids. Specific reference is made to the sons of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal. It is noteworthy that Himilcon, Hannibal's colleague in 406 B. C. is not mentioned with the sons of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal. Indeed there is no reference at all to the mission of Hannibal in 410/9 B. C. and the joint mission with Himilcon in 406/5 B. C. The Justin passage is only concerned with the generation of the battle of Himera and its successor generation. Reference to the third generation is completely lacking until the notice on Himilcon's expedition against Dionysius.

It is, moreover, clear that Justin's account of the return of Himilcon has no reference to the fact that the

Hundred was established after this event.[9] Maurin himself observed that Diodorus does not mention this reform as being a consequence of Himilcon's failure. It is true that, in itself, Diodorus' disinterest would imply little, for clearly that author's interest in Carthaginian history is confined to Carthage's relationship with the Siceliots. Hence his omission of reference to Carthaginian affairs in the period 480/10 B. C. Yet Diodorus' text and Maurin's reconstruction of Carthaginian events leading to Himilcon's suicide indicate clearly that the Sicilian author's knowledge of Carthaginian affairs is by no means limited in scope as far as concerns periods of Siceliot-Punic hostilities. Hence it is likely that Diodorus would have mentioned the establishment of the Hundred, had it taken place in 396 B. C. and followed Himilcon's downfall.

Two other difficulties require closer scrutiny. First, if the reform seemingly dated by Justin to the 450's was aimed, as indeed Justin claims, to curb Magonid power, how has it resulted that Hannibal and Himilcon, both Magonids, are entrusted with supreme military and regal office.[10] Secondly, why is it that if the Hundred was established in the middle of the fifth century, no evidence is supplied for the period following? In other words, its influence appears negligible.

To a certain extent, the problem of the continued existence of prominent Magonids in office, is explained

by consideration of the Carthaginian governmental structure. Ancient authorities were in little doubt concerning the aristocratic nature of the state. Aristotle affirms this fact upon two occasions in the Politics.[11] The result was the general admiration of Aristotle, Polybius, Eratosthenes, Cato and Cicero.[12] Punic inscriptions testify to the existence of a caste system which was operated by the time of the Punic wars with Rome, and to particular families occupying priestly offices. Greek and Roman writers called these aristocrats endoxoi, epiphaneis, epiphanestatoi, aristoi, nobiles and optimates.[13]

More significant is the earlier evidence of Aristotle, confirmed by Isocrates that the Carthaginian State possessed an oligarchical feature.[14] To Aristotle, the fact that election was based upon wealth made the state oligarchical. This quality made the Carthaginian system diverge from aristocracy towards oligarchy. The part played by merit was the aristocratic feature. It was a source of regret to Aristotle that wealth was more honoured than worth. Elsewhere Aristotle alludes to the fact that office was the prerogative of the wealthy, and in this assertion he is supported by Diodorus and Polybius who saw Carthaginian lust for wealth as the determining factor in all their transactions.[15]

It is, therefore, clear that Carthaginian government was by the middle of the fourth century in the hands of a

few families, who retained power among themselves, and, on the whole, preserved office for members of these families alone. The power of this group rested upon wealth which was the chief assurance of office. It appears logical to associate such circumstances with the reform mentioned by Justin. Indeed Aristotle's oligarchic state appears to have been established in the 450's.

In such circumstances, the complete disappearance of the Magonids from the Carthaginian political scene is a situation to be viewed with extreme incredulity. The Magonids survived the Himera debacle of 480 B.C. Justin attributes the conquest of North Africa to them. It is they who control the executive. It is the Magonids who, therefore, provide the substantial portion of financial support for the inland expedition. No evidence of the confiscation of Magonid property is possessed. Indeed, it would appear that the Magonid family continued to play a major role in Carthaginian affairs, though no longer a dominant one. A wealthy family like the Magonids would have no difficulty in obtaining a position within the capitalist clique. Indeed, as Picard claimed, a gradual change is to be considered, whereby the king in the fifth century, had to take account of the shipowners before organizing an expedition.[16] In such circumstances, it is not strange to witness the presence of Hannibal in Carthage as king and supreme military commander.

Further, as will be indicated, the Magonids were distinguished for their military preeminince. Their dismissal would not only have resulted in the loss of a vital defence factor. The popularity of this family could have occasioned the growth of serious discontent on the part of the Punic demos.

The supposed references to this event are of most negligible validity. The only definite evidence of expulsion refers to that experienced by Giscon.[17] Diodorus certainly does not associate this event with the establishment of the Hundred or any oligarchical coup. Indeed, he does not mention such events at all. Further, the political circumstances surrounding Giscon's exile as reported by Diodorus are certainly suspect.[18]

The information about the exile of Hannon is inconclusive. Any attempt to effect permanent association with the son of Hamilcar of Himera is, at the most, hypothetical.[19]

Justin's information merely discusses a curbing of Magonid monarchical power. Giscon's exile could have resulted from circumstances entirely independent of the events surrounding the establishment of the Hundred. The simple fact is that the evidence of Justin does not indicate that the Magonids were ejected from the Carthaginian political scene in the latter decades of the fifth century. It merely establishes the fact that attempts by prominent

individuals of the Magonid, or, indeed, of any other family to establish absolute monarchical rule were henceforth checked.

There remains the difficulty of the absence of evidence of action taken by the Hundred. It is noteworthy that for the period after 396 B. C., the evidence is also very limited. Picard notes correctly that the Libyan revolt is unlikely to have encouraged the Punic aristocracy to assert itself and not accept suppression.[20] As regards the fifth century, there is again a lack of adequate literary testimony. Two facts can, however, be stated. First, it can be argued that the very effectiveness of the Hundred's control in the mid-fifth century discouraged ambitious kings or generals from attempting to operate extra-constitutional projects. Indeed it is hoped that consideration of the evidence for Punic affairs in 410 will indicate that only the appearance of a very real crisis and the consequences experienced by the constitutional machine, created a situation which proved singularly favourable for Magonid machinations.

However, evidence of a more positive nature is certainly not lacking. It is possible to see the hand of the Hundred in the exile of Giscon, even though this does not imply that Giscon's exile was a result of the revolution which led to the creation of the Hundred. Hannibal's reluctance to command in Sicily in 406 B. C. could reflect

his fear of the Hundred.[21] The first direct evidence of the existence of a real threat to the status quo is revealed by a consideration of the adventurous career of Himilcon. Himilcon's suicide certainly suggests anticipation of any action by the Hundred.[22]

Two conclusions thus emerge. First, it is clear that the establishment of the Hundred is to be dated to the middle of the fifth century. Second, it does not appear that the creation of the Hundred is synonomous with a general banishment of the Magonids. Indeed, such an expulsion is inconceivable in view of the character of the Punic ruling class, the popularity and military preeminence of the Magonids, and the absence of adequate testimony.

The character of Punic politics, particularly in the years following the establishment of the Hundred, and its relationship with Magonid aspirations is clearly illustrated by a consideration of the nature of Carthaginian kingship and the powers associated with this office.[23]

It is clear that until the end of the fourth century, the kingship was not an annual office. Thus Hamilcar was appointed in 311 B. C. as one of the epiphanestatoi until 309 B. C., the year of his death. It is only at the latter point that his kingship is observed.[24] In 406 B. C., Hannibal was sent out as general; Himilcon was general but subordinate.[25] Clearly Hannibal was still basileus. When Hamilcar died, he was accorded proskynesis.

Beloch was surely correct to regard such grief on the part of the Carthaginian people as incompatible with a system of annual sovereigns.[26]

Second, it is to be observed that Carthage possessed only one king at a time: dyarchy was a late feature. Evidence concerning Hamilcar in 480, Hannibal in 409, and Hamilcar in 311 indicates this clearly.[27] A further fact which can be stated is that the king appears to have been elected.[28]

It is, moreover, clear that even though the basileus was not limited to an annual tenure of office, it cannot be inferred that he occupied his position for life. The possibility of his being superceded was very real. This must have been particularly the case after the creation of the Hundred.[29]

Further, although the basileus alone possessed the royal title, it does not follow that sole military command was his.[30]

It is noteworthy that the evidence of the king's election is always associated with the wars waged against the Siceliots. In times of crisis, a king could be elected. Upon such occasions, he was likely to assume a great deal of importance. This does not preclude the peace time existence of the kingship. Indeed, Aristotle did not regard the kingship as characteristic of times of war, but as a regular feature of the Carthaginian constitution. The

cause of the constant identification of regal election and the commencement of hostilities against the Siceliots, is partly derived from the fact that Greek writers generally discussed Carthage in connection with her wars in Sicily. Yet, it must be remembered that for most of the fourth century, Carthage was fighting the Siceliots. Indeed Carthage's failure to settle the Sicilian problem was the principal difficulty with which that state had to contend. It is, therefore, clear that the office of king became increasingly identified with military leadership and crisis. Indeed, the evidence suggests that it was the general practice to appoint or reconfirm a king in office, whenever a crisis, involving military commitment on the part of Carthage, materialized.

Most significant is the fact that the ancient testimony clearly indicates that regal office was a Magonid monopoly. For the period 550-396 B. C. this fact is well attested.[31] The evidence concerning the monarchical position after the crisis of 396 B. C. certainly cannot be as firmly substantiated: however, indications of nomenclature do certainly suggest continued Magonid occupation of the office of king.[32]

The evolution of such a situation is comprehensible in view of the military reputation enjoyed by the Magonid family. Indeed extensive testimony concerning Magonid military prowess exists. The sources indicate that a

mystique attached itself to members of the family, with the result that the person of Hamilcar of Himera crystallized into a cult.[33]

Thus the following facts can be established regarding the Carthaginian basileus. He was a non-annual magistrate who possessed no guarantee of office for a lengthy period of time. Though sole commander of the Punic force, his power could be curtailed by the appointment of a colleague, who could possess considerable authority and even assume command of the fleet. Though the office of king was elective, the evidence clearly suggests that the Magonid family tended to retain its hold upon the position. This seems certainly to have been the case during periods of crisis involving hostilities with the Siceliot states.

Consideration of the Carthaginian kingship reveals that for the Magonid family it became a means of obtaining power, albeit a limited one. Such a fact explains to a great extent the nature of Punic policy in the middle of the fifth century.

There is little doubt that Magonid aspirations were intimately associated with the kingship. Indeed possession of this position guaranteed several advantages. In the first place, as has been observed, the Magonid line was associated closely with regal office. This arose to a great extent from the popularity of the family which stemmed from its martial prowess. Thus even when the oligarchy

attempted to limit the effectiveness of the Magonid king by the appointment of a colleague, the choice inevitably appears to have fallen upon a member of the same family. Hence the effectiveness of this method of checking the power of the monarch was largely blunted.

A second advantage which favoured the possessor of the Punic kingship lay in the fact that theoretically there was no time limit. As a result, far-reaching policies could be initiated and effected. Finally, the existence of a state of war inevitably worked to the advantage of the incumbent of regal office.

At the same time, it must be stressed that Magonid power as related to the monarchy was severely limited. In the first place, the various checks inherent in Carthaginian constitutional procedure, served as a deterrent to Magonid ambitions. Clearly, the sovereign was not powerful enough to establish a despotate, for his power could always be curtailed by a co-general or dismissal from office. The threat of prosecution by the Hundred was an additional factor likely to dissuade an over-ambitious Magonid from extra-constitutional designs. However, such methods were only employed as a last resort.

Oligarchic predominance depended ultimately upon two factors. First, it was essential to maintain the direction of foreign and domestic policy. In other words, unity of purpose within the ruling clique was desirable. Second, avoidance of war was imperative to secure suppression

of Magonid military achievement. It is these two developments which appear to have ensured Carthage's disinterest in large scale military manoeuvres in the years following the conquest of the African hinterland and resulted in a seventy-year cessation of hostilities with the Greek states of Sicily.

It could conceivably be argued that under such circumstances the complete eradication of the Magonid threat was desirable. As has, however, been shown, no evidence for such an expulsion exists. Further, there is no reason to doubt the fact that the Magonids constituted a section of the Punic oligarchy. Their association with the conquest of the interior certainly suggests their continued presence. Their military prowess rendered their appearance at the military helm a decisive factor. Certainly any attempt by the oligarchic machine to effect their dismissal would weaken the military potential of the Punic state. In addition, the popularity of the Magonids might reveal the folly of hasty removal. Clearly popular discontent was a force to be reckoned with.

Thus complete removal of the Magonids from the Carthaginian political scene was undesirable. As a result, there existed a permanent threat to the maintenance of the status quo. The oligarchy had to maintain unity within its ranks and ensure that the Punic State avoid large scale hostilities.

The Carthaginian reaction to the Segestan appeal resulted in the renewal of warfare with the Siceliot states. More important, it placed the conduct of war in the hands of the grandson of Hamilcar, who was able to employ the new situation to effect the operation of his own personal vendetta against Himera.

Clearly, the oligarchic machine failed to function in 410/9 B. C. The renewal of hostilities with the Siceliot states heralded the abandonment of the policy pursued during the previous seventy years. Further, the Magonid family appears to have assumed a position of considerable importance. It is true that to a certain extent developments within the Siceliot camp were responsible for the creation of such a situation. However, it must be asked whether internal factors affected the situation in any way, and whether Carthage's decision to dispatch a force to Sicily was motivated purely by external factors, such as the growth of Syracuse. Indeed,it is clear that the evidence of Diodorus indicates that changes within the Punic State were of the utmost significance in determining the course towards war. Above all, testimony associated with the powers of the Punic populace indicates the existence of a very real division of opinion within the oligarchy, creating circumstances which favoured the resurgence of Magonid fortunes.

Very little information is provided regarding the power of the Carthaginian demos. The evidence for the

period of the second Punic war with Rome has little relevance and may, therefore, be dismissed from the present context. The popular voice appears, however, to have had considerable influence in the events surrounding the periplus of Hannon.[34] Justin also supplies testimony concerning the possession of significant powers by the demos. He states that Malchus and his men were exiled by the people. When the king returned, he pardoned all, except those directly concerned with the attack upon him.[35]

For the period which follows the establishment of the Hundred, it would appear, as Gsell observed, that under a regime which represented a closing of the ranks, the demos lost its powers.[36]

Diodorus' description of the situation in Carthage on the eve of the Punic invasion creates a problem for voting rights on the part of the demos are clearly here indicated.[37] The text notes that the Segestan envoys laid their business before the Gerousia.[38] After this, nothing more is heard of the council. The Karchedonioi elected Hannibal. The same element feared Syracuse, who had defeated Athens. It was the people who comprehended the strategic importance of Selinus. The demos was advised by Hannibal. Finally, it was the people who replied to the ambassadors in favour of help to Segesta.

Diodorus' account thus appears to place ultimate responsibility for the declaration of war upon the

Carthaginian populace. Two other facts confirm this impression. First, it appears that the Segestans asked the aid of the city and promised to place Segesta in their hands. Second, the account given of the reception awaiting Hannibal upon his return is certainly suggestive of the fact that Hannibal's mission took the form of a popular enterprise.[39]

It is, moreover, clear that throughout the fourth century, the demos played a decisive role in the declaration of war against the Siceliots. This is certainly the case in 407, 392 and 383 B. C.[40] A more detailed description is given in the narrative for 397 B. C. The text records how Dionysius' herald submitted the declaration to the senate, and how the latter, after considering the contents, brought it to the people. Significantly, it was the people who decided that the best course of action was to await the Syracusan initiative.[41]

Finally, Diodorus' description of the events of 310 B. C. suggests decisive influence on the part of the popular assembly. Diodorus observes that the council reprimanded all the commanders of the fleet because they had allowed Agathocles' army to set foot in Africa. The appointment of the rivals Hanno and Bomilcar followed. The significant point to observe is that in the middle of the sentence, there is a dramatic change from singular to plural. The Gerousia is followed by a plural verb. It is

tempting to agree with Gsell that οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι should qualify ἀπέδειξαν[42]

A key passage for the interpretation of those texts is the statement of Aristotle regarding voting procedure at Carthage. Aristotle states that reference of some matters and not others to the popular assembly rested with the kings in consultation with the elders, in case they agreed unanimously, but that failing that, these matters rested with the people, and when the kings introduced business to the assembly, they did not merely let the people sit and listen to the decisions that had been taken by their rulers, but the people had the sovereign decision and any person could speak against the proposals introduced.[43]

Aristotle's evidence indicates three facts. First, the opening statement concerning the type of matters submitted by agreement to the assembly suggests that unimportant subjects might be taken to the people. Second, the implication is clear: where major decisions were involved and no disagreement between king and gerontes existed, no recourse was directed to the assembly. Certainly the period following the establishment of the Hundred, which represented a closing of oligarchic ranks, is unlikely to have witnessed an appeal to the popular assembly. During this period, it would appear that the kings who were most probably Magonids, were obliged to act in cooperation with

the oligarchy.

Third - and most important for our consideration of the crisis of 410/9 B. C. - it seems that in cases where there was a difference of opinion between king and council, the practice was to consult the popular assembly. Significantly, it was the king who introduced business to the assembly. Finally, it is implied that such affairs were of major importance. Indeed, only a serious problem is likely to have caused such a state of affairs. An issue in which the alternative of peace or war was involved, is obviously to be considered under such a category.

The situation described by Diodorus appears to correspond closely to that found in the Politics. Indeed, Diodorus' account of the events of 407, 397, 392 and 383 clearly indicates that the demos played a decisive role.[44] The narrative of 410, as well as indicating this, stresses the existence of a close relationship between the king and the demos. Indeed Hannibal appears to derive his power from the people. It is true that the more detailed account of the events of 397, as well as the narrative of the events of 407, 392 and 383 B. C., while aware of the importance of the part of the demos, omits reference to the role of the king. However, the description of the events of 410 clearly illustrates this feature, and it is to be assumed that the monarchical element is to be associated with all the crises involving the commencement of hostilities with the Siceliot states.

Other facts show the existence of a serious division of opinion concerning the nature of the response to be given to the Segestan envoys. Policies were divided at Carthage. There existed a fear that Syracuse might be antagonized. The view is distinctly upheld that it was Hannibal who was in favour of intervention.[45] The paucity of the original numbers appears to suggest less than wholehearted support for the expedition from the oligarchy.[46] Hannibal's unwillingness to assume command in 407 B. C. and the appointment of a junior colleague, Himilcon, perhaps indicates senatorial hostility towards Hannibal.[47]

The establishment of a Punic colony in Sicily in 407 B. C. as a prelude to the invasion of 406 B. C. has possible relevance for the crisis of 410/9 B. C. The colony of Therma included Carthaginian citizens.[48] Aristotle noted that since the power of the nobility rested upon wealth, they were able to send the people to appointments in the cities (of the Empire). Thus they healed the social problem and stability resulted.[49]

Two facts are significant. First, Therma was the first Punic colony founded in Sicily. Clearly important reasons accounted for adoption of such a procedure. Second, the cause of the foundation of Therma might possibly possess some relevance. Though it is possible that the establishment of the colony was a move undertaken for purposes of defence, it is equally probable that another reason was the disposal

of a hostile citizen body, whose presence in Carthage in 410/9 B. C. had temporarily upset the functioning of the oligarchic machine, and who continued to represent a very real threat to oligarchic suzerainty. Thus employment of the information of Aristotle and Diodorus tends to confirm the thesis that Hannibal and the populace united to effect a drastic revision of Punic policy towards the Siceliot states.

Thus it appears that in the middle of the fifth century, the hegemony of the Magonid family was terminated. The main result of the oligarchic revolution was the creation of the institution of the Hundred. As a result, Punic government was controlled by a group of wealthy families, which included the Magonid line. Certainly, no evidence exists, suggesting that family's expulsion. Their disappearance from the Punic political scene is rendered improbable in view of the fact that the Magonids represented an important capitalist and military element in the Carthaginian State. Finally, it is clear that any attempt on the part of the oligarchic machine to eliminate the Magonids could have resulted in serious popular dissent.

It is, therefore, not strange to find Hannibal as king in 410/9 B. C. The popularity of the Magonid family and the reputation accorded it in military matters led to that dynasty's association with the monarchical office. Certainly such an identification is particularly relevant

in periods of warfare.

Oligarchical power rested upon the control of Punic policy, avoidance of warfare, and lack of disunity within its ranks. In the last resort, various checks could be employed such as the dismissal from office, the appointment of a colleague and prosecution by the Hundred. It must be stressed that the association of the Magonids with regal office limited to a considerable extent the effectiveness of these somewhat drastic measures. Hence the appointment of Himilcon in 407 B. C. and not the elevation of a non-Magonid.

In 410/9 B. C., the oligarchic machine ceased to function. Failure to maintain a policy of peace towards the Siceliots is one manifestation of the weakness inherent in the oligarchic camp. More important, the course of events suggest that a lack of maintenance of a harmonious policy led to the acceptance of the Segestan alliance.

It has been suggested that the Magonids represented the war party, favouring acceptance of the Segestan alliance. The majority of the oligarchic clique preferred the continuance of a policy of peace with the Siceliot states. As a result of the division of opinion, the king was empowered to appeal to the popular assembly. The favour of the demos towards the Magonid line assured that party of success in carrying the motion, favouring the alliance with the Elymian State. The inevitable result was the commencement

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of hostilities, culminating in the destruction of Himera.

It has further been suggested that the appointment of the unwilling Hannibal in 406 B. C., Hannibal's association with a colleague and the foundation of Therma reflect senatorial policy aimed at elimination of the Magonid threat which had materialized in 410/9 B. C. Hannibal's unwillingness to assume command in 406 B. C. appears indicative of that general's fear of the oligarchic machine and its weapon - the Hundred. The appointment of Himilcon certainly weakened Hannibal's authority. Finally, it has been argued that the colonization of Therma was employed to effect the disposal of hostile elements within the citizen body, who had played a major role in the Magonid coup of 410/9 B. C. However, such means were considerably limited in view of the association of the Magonids with the regal office. Himilcon's coup revealed the ineffectual nature of the oligarchic attempts.

It may be objected that direct testimony of a convincing nature is noticeably absent, to indicate the validity of the thesis herein propounded. It is true that no text declares openly that a dispute between Hannibal and the oligarchic clique, which resulted in an appeal to the people, led to the Punic invasion. However, as has been argued, such a reconstruction explains certain difficulties, and is supported by a considerable amount of evidence.

First, it has been shown, if the traditional dating

for the establishment of the Hundred and the overthrow of the Magonid hegemony is accepted, the difficulty remains of attempting to explain Hannibal's ability to gain senatorial support for his own very personal designs against Himera. It is doubtful whether a united oligarchy would have been willing to support such an undertaking. Second, a drastic revision of foreign policy as is implied by the commencement of hostilities with the Siceliots is likely to have produced a division of feeling. The fact that no hostilities had existed for seventy years, and that these years had brought prosperity to the Punic state indicates the gravity of the dilemma into which the oligarchy is likely to have been plunged. Clearly then, testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the crisis is not lacking.

Direct evidence of the existence of division of feeling within oligarchic ranks is certainly not absent. Tension between Hannibal and the oligarchy is suggested by the evidence concerning the events leading to the second Punic invasion. Further, Diodorus' testimony does indicate that the assembly played a decisive role in the events of 410/9 B. C. Finally, there is little doubt that consideration of the text's information reveals that Hannibal enjoyed popular support.

In such circumstances, it can, therefore, be established that an oligarchic coup characterized the 450's,

and that a major factor in the decision to renew war with the Siceliots in 410 was a temporary but highly decisive alliance between a section of the oligarchy, centering around the Magonid family, and the popular assembly.

2. The Siceliot Threat

It is clear that the evidence for the Punic internal situation suggests that a crisis of considerable proportions had so affected the populace and a section of the oligarchy, that Hannibal was able to utilize the circumstances to carry out his own personal vendetta against Himera. Since action was conducted against Selinus and Himera, it is clear that the source of danger derived ultimately from the Siceliots. The problem is, therefore, to determine as precisely as possible the nature of the Siceliot threat, which induced Punic intervention. In the following section, it will be shown that a threat did, in fact, materialize. The danger possessed four aspects. First, it assumed the form of an attack upon Punic commerce. Second, there was the factor of political unification by the Siceliots. A complication arose in the form of a rupture between Carthage and her ancient ally, Selinus. Third, Athen's elimination from the West considerably increased the danger to Carthage. Finally, it will be necessary to assess these facts in relation to the course of Punic policy in the period 480-410 B. C.

The Syracusan victory over Athens accelerated the

democratic tendencies of the Siceliot state. The democratic regime is headed by one Diocles who is described as τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἐνδοξότατος[51] The latter is associated with the constitutional reform whereby the presidency of the assembly was transferred to other magistrates taken by lot.[52] It is probably at this time that the repeal of Hermocrates' reforms of the strategia took place.[53]

The tendency towards extreme democracy is undoubtedly to be associated with the growth of the Syracusan navy in the war with Athens.Thucydides, who was only too aware of the compatibility of sea power and democratic government, observed how Athens failed when attacking cities of similar characteristics, possessing democratic governments.[54] Thucydides' earlier reference to the Syracusan naval reform supports this claim. Indeed the sailor ruled Syracuse, for the state was dependent upon the sailor.

The full significance of the new Syracusan navy was only first realized in 406 B. C. Syracuse, after the return of the ships from the East, was now predominant in Syracusan waters. The first clash in the war of 406 was a sea fight in which Syracuse won a victory. For the first time, a war between Carthage and the Siceliots had begun with a sea encounter, and the Syracusans had hindered the landing of a Punic force. Until then, the very fact that the Syracusans did not possess a navy of any significance had rendered a sea offensive on Carthage's part futile. At this stage,

however, Hannibal's prime concern was the control of the sea in order to ensure the safety of his transport ships.[55] Land operations occupied a secondary place in his scheme. The events of 397 B. C. also indicate Syracusan naval supremacy.[56]

Indeed a serious threat to Carthage's maritime supremacy made its appearance.[57] This supremacy was vital for Punic interests, in that the State's wealth depended upon commercial enterprise.[58] Classic evidence of Carthaginian policy is furnished by Polybius' two Romano-Punic treaties, which may be compared to the Phoenician-Assyrian treaty of 677 B. C. and are not to be seen in isolation.[59] Carthage's recognition of Roman supremacy in the treaty of 509 B. C. ensured the exclusion of Roman shipping from the Western Mediterranean:[60] the treaty of 348 B. C. marked an extension of the terms of the original treaty.[61] An extension of commercial rights is indicated by the permission to plunder Latium. A combination of political, cultural and commercial factors appear to underline Carthage's first conflicts with the Greek world. Two Greek pirates with whom she came in contact are known: Dionysius of Phocaea and Postumius of Etruria.[62] The Atlanta incident provides clear evidence of Carthage's determination to exclude rivals.[63] Carthage's great commercial ventures are the products of the mid-fifth century and are marked by the conquest of the African hinterland,

Himilcon's voyage along the Gallic and Spanish coast and Hannon's circumnavigation of Africa. Dio Chrysostom noted that Hannon's voyage "transformed the Carthaginians from Phoenicians into Africans. Due to his efforts, they lived in Africa rather than in Phoenicia, became very wealthy, acquired many markets, ports and ships, and ruled on land and sea."[64] To Aristotle, the Carthaginian state was oligarchical because the main interest was the acquisition of wealth.[65]

In such circumstances, it is clear that the creation of a powerful Syracusan navy was bound to cause alarm within Carthaginian ranks. At the same time, it is clear that purely political factors cannot be dissociated from such considerations.

There is little doubt that the collapse of the Athenian expedition resulted in the growth of Siceliot imperialistic tendencies, which proved to represent a serious threat to the Carthaginian position in Sicily. One manifestation of the changed political situation has been noted: the growth of the vigorous naval democracy of Syracuse. Another factor was the noticeable lack of discord among the Siceliots. It is clear that Carthage's pretext for intervention was the Segestan appeal. Yet the war between Segesta and Selinus was not a war between Siceliot and Siceliot but between Siceliot and Elymian. The hostilities between Syracuse and Ionian Catane and Naxos

were probably the decisive factor in the Punic success against Selinus. Yet two points are to be observed. First, it is clear that once the common danger was realized, a very real peace appears to have been agreed upon between Syracuse and the Ionian states.[66] Secondly, the Ionian problem was ancient and, indeed, was only terminated by Dionysius' harsh treatment. As such, it must not be viewed in isolation from the united Dorian front, to which the evidence clearly testifies. The fall of Himera was due to fear of a Carthaginian attack upon Syracuse. Evidence for stasis within the Siceliot states is small and of negligible value.[67] A small pro-Carthaginian party appears at Selinus. Himera provides no evidence of such a clique. Solidarity characterizes Syracuse: the firm resistance to Hermocrates is indicative of the solidarity of the democratic regime.[68] The "Greeks who pitied" are probably survivors from the Athenian armament.[69]

A further factor in the situation is the defection of Selinus from the Punic cause. In the war of 480 B. C., Selinus was openly on Carthage's side.[70] At some time between 580 and 510 B. C., a war occurred between Carthage and Selinus. Henceforth Selinus appears to have pursued a policy directed towards peace with Carthage, friendship with Himera, and hostility towards Syracuse. The evidence is admittedly meagre. Epigraphic evidence from Olympia suggests hostility to Syracuse and Gelon.[71] This would imply

friendship towards Carthage. Numismatic evidence indicates ancient ties between Selinus and Himera, whose tyrant Terillus, after being ejected by Gelon's ally, Theron of Acragas, appealed for aid from Carthage with the support of Anaxilas of Rhegium.[72] It appears that Selinus' pro-Carthaginian sympathies can be traced to the period after the death of Dorieus. Euryleon gathered the survivors and seized the Selinuntine colony of Minoa, and then freed Selinus from the tyrant Peithagoras. He then made himself tyrant of Selinus, but was soon killed. It seems that Peithagoras represented those elements favouring a policy of peace towards Carthage and the Phoenician colonies in Sicily, while Euryleon supported the pro-Greek elements. It would appear that upon the overthrow of Euryleon, Selinus returned to its pro-Carthage position.[73] Finally a small piece of evidence in the form of a defixio of Selinus, which is dated to the sixth or fifth century, possessing the name τυρρανά may indicate Selinuntine pro-Barbarian sympathies.[74]

The chief point to observe is that the alliance between Selinus and Syracuse in 410 B. C. annulled the entente which had existed between Selinus and Carthage for one hundred and fifty years. Perhaps the origin of the dispute with Segesta contained the seeds of the future schism with Carthage. It has been suggested that Selinus desired a harbour in the north of the island for communications with Spain and Etruria. The chief evidence

is in the form of Selinuntine coins found in the hoards of Tarragona.[75] This indicates interest by Selinus in Spain, and possible interference in Carthaginian mercantile spheres. Perhaps a cooling-off of the ancient friendship accompanied these developments. Two other facts might have influenced the course of events. First, the cultural and religious emphasis upon the Semitic as opposed to the Hellenic of the years following the battle of Himera, is likely to have contributed to the growth in divergence between Carthage and the Siceliot states, in particular with Selinus. Finally, the fact that Gisco sought refuge in Selinus might be indicative of the existence of a strained relationship between Selinus and Carthage.

Thus the threat posed by Syracusan naval strength and the lack of dissention which characterized the Siceliot states, was intensified by Syracuse's alliance with a state which had been Carthage's foremost Siceliot ally, and whose borders approached perilously close to her own.

There is no doubt that Athenian aims in Sicily approximated closely to those of Carthage. It is true that references in Thucydides allude to hostile designs of Alcibiades towards Carthage. Alcibiades himself mentions his projects against the Punic state. Hermocrates refers to Carthage's fears of Athens.[76] It must, however, be stressed that both Alcibiades and Hermocrates have their own axes to grind. It is significant that Alcibiades' aim was to gain

Peloponnesian support against Athens, but what must be stressed is the fact that he does not speak of the plans against Carthage before the assembly.[77] There is little doubt that had Alcibiades seriously threatened Carthage, Thucydides would have put these plans in his mouth. Further as M. Treu has observed, Thucydides' narrative contains two theses in direct contradiction to one another.[78] The second depicting Alcibiades as the promoter of a scheme of alliances, appears to ignore Alcibiades' Western designs of conquest. Most significant is the fact that Nicias, presumably with Lamachus' consent, after Alcibiades' recall, sent a trireme on a mission of friendship to Carthage.[79] There is little doubt that this event comes within the sphere of Alcibiades' policy, for, first, Alcibiades' plans were equally binding upon Lamachus and Nicias; second, no change of plan is noted; and finally, there is no change in the nature of the strategia. As Treu has observed, the evidence supports the second thesis namely that Alcibiades entertained no hostile intent against Carthage. Such a conclusion is inescapable in the context of Alcibiades' relations with Messana and Catane, and Thucydides' account of the debate preceding the expedition, which clearly depicts Alcibiades as the formulator of a policy of alliance. The cause of this confusion is perhaps due to a telescoping of later events and the substitution of Alcibiades, the champion of the Ionian War for Alcibiades, the partner of

Nicias and Lamachus. Equally important is the argument that Thucydides overemphasized Alcibiades' importance because he received his information from Alcibiades personally. Finally, the anti-democratic bias could be responsible for seriously distorting the realities of the situation.[80]

The evidence of Plutarch concerning Athenian designs against the West merely represents current gossip and is not to be regarded as representative of public policy.[81] The conclusion is clear: Athens and Alcibiades desired the creation of an alliance of Greeks and Barbarians against Syracuse, into which scheme Carthage belonged.

The existence of a policy of friendship between Athens and Carthage is supported by other evidence. An identification of interest is implied by the fact that many of Athens' allies later joined Carthage. Segesta had old ties with Athens, dating from 453 B. C. and before appealing to Athens in 416, Segesta appealed to Carthage.[82] The capture of Hykkara in the first year of the expedition did not provoke Carthaginian hostility, even though this lay to the West of the haven, Panormus.[83] Athens sought Etruscan aid. Indeed the Etruscans offered aid before being asked to provide it.[84] The trireme sent to the Etruscan cities also went to Carthage. Clearly, Carthage did not send aid, for mention of Carthaginian aid would, without doubt, have been made in Thucydides' catalogue of the allies of Athens and

Syracuse.[85] The important fact is that aid was sought from Carthage. Such a situation is inconceivable in the context of a hostile relationship. Further, direct Etruscan support for Athens is only possible in view of the existence of a close friendship, characterizing Etruscan-Punic relations.[86]

The Siceliot allies of Athens and Carthage appear to have been identical. The evidence suggests that Athens' allies, Naxos and Catane did not identify themselves with the Siceliot cause in the last decade of the fifth century. They are not found identifying themselves with the cause of Dionysius. They do not appear to have joined the Siceliot League. No evidence for their secession from the League is provided. They do not appear in the treaty between Dionysius and Carthage,[87] and Naxos and Catane are the first cities attacked by Dionysius.[88] A further fact is the Leontini clause of the treaty between Dionysius and Carthage, which appears to be based upon Athenian policy towards Leontini.[89]

Further, the evidence suggests refusal on Carthage's part to aid Syracuse. Hermocrates attributed the Carthaginian failure to intervene on Athens' side to fear of Athens. A system of alliances is recommended, including the dispatch of an embassy to Carthage.[90] What must be stressed is that there is no direct evidence that an embassy was sent. Yet that it was sent is certainly suggested.

In Hermocrates' speech, the allies to be won over

are not Siceliots. First, the Sicels: those on the coast were to be confirmed in their alliance and those of the interior were to be won over. The Italiots were either to be gained as allies or, at least, they were to promise not to receive the Athenians in their havens. An attempt was to be made to obtain direct help in Sicily from Corinth and Lacedaemon, who were, at the same time, to stir up war at home. Finally, Hermocrates hoped to gain the support of Carthage, who, since she was afraid of Athens, was to help Syracuse against the common enemy.

Thucydides records how the Syracusans, fearing that the Sicels might join the enemy, sent garrisons to the subject places and envoys to the independent Sicel towns. Thus it is clear that a very real attempt was made to win over the Sicels.[91]

Thucydides notes the cool reception accorded the Athenians by the Italiots.[92] Taras and Locri even refused the Athenians anchor and the taking of water. The Rhegines were somewhat more hospitable, giving them permission to draw up their ships on shore and rest. They were allowed only food and rest. A market was found for them outside the city in the precinct of the Rhegine Artemis. The envoys alone were allowed in the city, only to be told that Rhegium would not act alone for either side, but would do whatever was agreed upon by the other Italiots.

These events reveal a strong tendency towards

Italiot unity. One cause may have been distrust of the vast Athenian armament, as Justin suggests.[93] At the same time, this cannot alone account for the vaccilation of Rhegium,[94] Athens' oldest ally amongst the Italiots, whose territory had been the base for Athenian operations in 427 B. C. Thus it appears that the chief clue to the unfriendliness of the Italiot cities, including Rhegium,is to be found in the effects of Syracusan diplomatic intrigues in this area.

Finally, there are the Peloponnesian allies. Thucydides, in fact, records a Syracusan embassy to Corinth and Sparta, which changed the course of the war, for it resulted in the dispatch of Gylippus to the West.[95]

Envoys were thus sent to the Italiots, Sicels and Peloponnesians as Hermocrates advised. The question then arises whether it is not conceivable that envoys were sent to Carthage as well. It is true that there is no direct reference. Yet for this, there may be a perfectly logical explanation. The envoys to the Peloponnesians, Italiots and Sicels appear to have met with some success at least. The Peloponnesians provided open-hearted aid; the Sicels were divided, the majority supporting Athens; the Italiots pursued an attitude which was distinctly hostile to Athens, which was probably the result of Syracusan diplomacy. Nothing is recorded concerning Carthage. One of two facts is indicated. First, Carthage may not have performed

direct action in favour of either of the protagonists. It certainly does not prove that no embassy at all was sent to Carthage. The one fact which appears to be indicated is that nothing came of the embassy which was sent upon Hermocrates' advice to Carthage. Alternatively, it is possible that the embassy advocated by Hermocrates to Carthage was not, in fact, sent, precisely because the Syracusans realized the futility of such action in face of the existence of relations of friendship between Athens and Carthage.

Both interpretations of the evidence concerning Syracusan hopes for a Punic alliance point to the existence of an understanding, probably unwritten, between Athens and Carthage. It is possible that Meritt's conclusion, that heralds came from Carthage in connection with the Carthaginian attack of 407/6 B. C., is to be doubted. More certain, however, is the fact that the Athenians had sent a mission to negotiate with Hannibal and Himilcon in Sicily. Now, it can be argued that by 407 B. C. the situation had changed and the danger of Athenian predominance in the West was unlikely. At the same time, it is to be doubted whether, had Athens formulated a distinct policy against Carthage about the time of the Athenian expedition to Sicily, Carthage would have been inclined to negotiate with her in the period immediately following.[96]

Caution characterizes the years following the

battle of Himera. The Etruscan loss of Latium cannot have been without influence upon the policy of Carthage, for the Etruscan ruling class was now cut off from the homeland except by sea. Another Etruscan setback was the defeat at the hands of Aristodemus of Cumae. The fact that ties between Carthage and the Eastern Mediterranean were severed as a result of the wars waged by the Delian League against Persia also contributed to Carthage's cautious Sicilian policy. Economic changes, characterized by reluctance to import from the Greek world and religious changes revealing strong emphasis upon the Semitic as opposed to the Hellenic, were followed by the Magonid conquests in Africa. These developments culminated in the establishment of the Hundred and the curbing of Magonid predominance. In short, a policy of caution aimed at avoiding an entanglement in Sicilian affairs appears to have been pursued.[97]

At the same time, the significance of the battle of Himera can be overstressed.[98] One fact alone indicates this: why was no attempt made to follow up the victory? It appears that there was a lack of confidence on the part of the Siceliots to undertake the conquest of North-West Sicily. Tradition concerning the battle and the subsequent treaty clearly indicates Siceliot caution. Pindar speaks as if a renewed Carthaginian attack were inevitable.[99] A moderate sum of two thousand talents was

paid by Carthage, who was obliged to enforce the construction of two temples, in which the terms of the treaty were to be recorded.[100] The spirit of moderation underlines the picture of Gelon prevailing upon the Carthaginians to abandon the practice of human sacrifice.[101]

That Carthage was not entirely disinterested in developments in Sicily is illustrated by three facts. First, a pro-Carthaginian party represented by a certain Empedion, appears to have existed in Selinus before 409 B. C.[102] This party appears to have been very small for, in the first place, kindness is only accorded by Hannibal to Empedion and his kinsmen. It is possible that Empedion represented an oligarchical clique within Selinus, courting the favour of Carthage. Diodorus' use of the word kinsmen would perhaps imply the fact that Empedion headed a faction which was formed by uniting a number of families. A second reason for regarding the party of Empedion as forming only a minority of the citizen population of Selinus is the fact that it was unable to prevent the Selinuntine embassy from being sent to Syracuse, declining arbitration. Clearly this party existed in the city before Selinus' capture by Hannibal. It seems to have been consolidated some time between the battle of Himera in 480 B. C. and the invasion of 409 B. C. Carthaginian motives might have been occasioned by Selinuntine encroachment of Punic interests in Spain.[103] Aware of the inevitability of a clash between Selinus and

Segesta and of her interests regarding the outcome of the issue, the Punic state inaugurated intrigues within the city with which hostilities were likely to commence.

In 410 B. C. following the Selinuntine invasion of undisputed Segestan land, Segesta, as well as appealing for aid to Carthage, promised to become a Carthaginian dependency.[104] This passage by itself implies the fact that Carthage had certainly not been disinterested in developments in Sicily for some time before embarking upon her policy of open hostility to the Siceliot cities towards the end of the fifth century B. C. Clearly Segesta would not have taken such a drastic step as offering to become part of Carthaginian territory, had previous relations not existed between Carthage and herself. The Segestan embassy to Carthage in 416 confirms the existence of relations between Carthage and Segesta, effected before 410.[105]

Finally, Diodorus' reference to the Carthaginians who had homes in Syracuse and the Phoenicians dwelling amongst the other Siceliots provides additional evidence for the possibility of Carthaginian intrigues during the seventy-year period of apparent lack of hostilities.[106]

One fact is clear: that the cautious policy of Carthage during the period 480/10 B. C. does not imply disinterest in Siceliot affairs. The close identity of Athenian and Punic aims necessitated only a minimal amount of direct interference in Siceliot affairs.

Generally, interference of a more direct nature was confined to the area bordering the Phoenician sector of the island. It was only with the appearance of a major threat in 410/9 B. C. that more positive action was taken, and even then, as has been seen, it was not a harmonious decision on Carthage's part.

It is thus clear that the growth of Siceliot unity and the threat to Punic commercial enterprises combined with Selinus' defection from the Punic alliance and the elimination of Athens from the West necessitated, in the view of certain elements within the Punic state, immediate intervention. It has been suggested that it was this crisis which led to a revival of Magonid aspirations.

That a division of feeling existed regarding the nature of the policy to be conducted against the Siceliots is in no way surprising. The adoption of a policy, which would clearly result in hostilities, was a serious enough issue to encourage dispute. This was particularly the case after a seventy year period of peace which had brought Empire and prosperity to the Punic State. At the same time,the emergence of a powerful Syracuse, the unification of Dorian Sicily, the threat to Punic commerce posed by the new political situation, the defection of Selinus, the elimination of Athens and the danger of Syracusan encroachment upon the Phoenician sector of the

island as a result of the Segesta-Selinus conflict, - these were all factors which would weigh heavily with a party favouring intervention in Sicilian affairs. The populace composed largely of Punic sailors, would certainly favour intervention in view of the serious threat posed by the Syracusan naval democracy. Hence popular support of Hannibal was, in fact, inevitable.[107]

Such a situation favoured Magonid designs upon the hegemony of the Punic state. Certainly,it enabled Hannibal to undertake his personal vendetta against Himera. In other words, it is suggested that a combination of personal motives and reasons of state account for the commencement of hostilities in 409 B. C. To the Punic state, the necessity of checking Syracusan threats upon North Western Sicily and the direct Selinuntine threat was the primary concern; to Hannibal and the Magonids, the crisis created a situation whereby the family disgrace might be avenged.

Indeed, it is only upon such an interpretation that the text's claim that Hannibal's private designs were the decisive aims of the expedition, can be comprehended. By itself this thesis would be difficult to accept. In conjunction with the interpretation submitted above of the motives of the Carthaginian state, this view becomes comprehensible. Certainly information about private grudges and personal motives as contributory factors towards the declaration of war cannot be dismissed. However, we

should remember that ancient historians tended to view such motives in isolation.[108]

Gsell rightly observed that the main aim of the oligarchy was the acquisition of wealth, and that this contrasted sharply with Magonid type imperialism which hindered the mercantile progress of the oligarchy. The ruling class realized that war encouraged the appearance of popular leaders, who constituted a serious danger to the status quo. However, regarding the events of 410, Gsell apparently accepted the fact that an agreement had been concluded between the Magonids and the rest of the oligarchy.[109] This approach has been adopted by Picard who argues that political divisions were forgotten under a "sacred union" and that Carthage had been preparing for many years to attack the Siceliots.[110]

This view appears somewhat less than realistic in view of the evidence which suggests that the seventy year interval between the battle of Himera and the dispatch of Hannibal was one in which the Carthaginian government showed itself unwilling to intervene unless directly threatened. Attempts to associate religious changes with political developments do not command a great deal of confidence. They merely indicate emphasis upon the Phoenician or Semitic as opposed to the Greek. This need not imply an accompanying crusading spirit against Hellenism in Sicily.[111] Further, this approach tends to

assume a link between the expeditions of 409 and 406/5 B. C. The fact is that Diodorus does not associate the two attacks. Further, he makes it clear that Hannibal showed no real interest in the war of 406 B. C., whereas the campaign of 409 B. C. was, in a real sense, his own personal war.

Finally, Gsell's claim fails to explain the restoration of the Magonids and the assumption of the Sicilian command by Hannibal. The evidence concerning Carthaginian internal politics throughout the fourth century most certainly does not indicate that the year 410/9 marks the initiation of a period of cooperation between Magonid and aristocracy.

3. The Causes of the Second Punic Intervention

Just as in 410/9 B. C., Carthage had been faced by a real threat from the Siceliots, so too the invasion of 406 B. C. was occasioned by developments among the Siceliots. Indeed, it was the rise of a unified Siceliot League, occasioned by the invasion of 409 B. C., that was the direct cause of the second invasion. As a result of the League's rise, Carthage saw herself faced by a very real danger.

One fact is clear: that Carthage, after the capture of Himera, had no intention of resuming aggressive activity against the rest of Siceliot Sicily. After the capture of Himera, Hannibal's work was done. He dismissed

his Sicilian allies and Campanian mercenaries, left some African troops to garrison the Sicilian towns, and then returned triumphantly home.[112] These events merely confirm the fact that Hannibal, throughout the expedition, aimed at avenging his grandfather's disgrace and restoring Magonid fortunes. As regards the Punic state in general, the destruction of Selinus marked the achievement of her aims and the restoration of stability in North Western Sicily. Furthermore, as Freeman pointed out, numismatic evidence confirms the fact that Carthage concentrated her attention upon her possessions in Sicily. Segesta's subordination is confirmed by the fact that Segestan coinage now comes to an end. In 410, Greek legends are replaced by Phoenician ones on the coinage of Motya and Panormus. Himera seems to imitate this coinage before the siege. Hence it has been suggested that Carthage struck these before the siege to indicate that Carthaginian influence would be paramount there.[113]

That Carthage, after the capture of Himera, had no desire to conquer Sicily, is, above all, indicated by the fact that she does not appear to be maintaining any party within the enemy ranks, which shows that either Carthage had abstained from attempting to win over a party from among the Siceliots, or that, if such a party did exist, she refused to adhere to their proposals. It is true that we know little of the internal political developments of the Siceliot cities during this period.

Two facts are, however, clear. First, Carthage made no attempt to intervene in the dispute between Hermocrates and Diocles. Hermocrates employed the Siceliot nationalist cry as a weapon of political propaganda. There is no evidence, however, to indicate that Diocles ever entered into treasonable negotiations with the enemy. Second, it has already been noted that it is in this period that the Siceliot states resolved their difficulties and unified themselves under Syracuse.

The period between the capture of Himera and the second Punic invasion witnessed the creation of the Siceliot League. Diodorus, probably reflecting Philistus' desire to minimize the importance of the League's role, has, as has been shown, deliberately obscured these developments and attempted to regard Siceliot success as due more to Punic errors than to their own ability.[114] Yet clear evidence for the League's formation and development does exist.

The first traces of the League are to be found in the period of the Selinuntine campaign. Negotiations between the various cities led to the conclusion of an alliance at some period before the fall of Selinus. The difficulty is to determine whether the League broke up before the second Carthaginian invasion. In actual fact, it does not appear that the League dissolved itself after the fall of Himera, even though, as has been seen, Carthage

at that time does not appear to have formulated any definite policy towards the other Siceliot cities. It is stated in the text that before embarking upon the war, the Carthaginians received ambassadors censuring them for the war and requiring them for the future to desist from hostilities.[115] This passage implies two facts: that Syracuse had not continued her war with Naxos and Catane; and that she had entered into an agreement with certain of the Siceliot cities, and became their leader and spokesman. Such an ultimatum cannot have been delivered by Syracuse unless she had been able to gain the support of the other Siceliot cities.

The problem is to determine the extent of the League. Acragas and Gela were the first cities to join Syracuse.[116] The text does not state whether the peace treaty between Syracuse and the Chalcidian cities was followed by a symmachia. It cannot, therefore, be determined whether Catane and Naxos joined the League. If they did join in 409 B. C., it is very probable that they dropped out by the time of the second Carthaginian invasion. The fact that these two cities are the notable absentees from the treaty of 405 B. C., that they are allied in 403 B. C., and that Dionysius later attacked them, suggests that they maintained, at the very least, an attitude of neutrality. It may be objected that it is unlikely that such an attitude was maintained in face of the common danger from Carthage. The validity of such an objection is to be doubted in view

of the fact that Carthage's policy, as will be seen, was not simply to annex, but to dissolve Siceliot union, as manifested in the Siceliot League. Further, cooperation between barbarian and Greek is not inconceivable in view of Selinus' pro-barbarian sympathies in the period before her alliance with the Syracusan bloc.[117] Finally, these states were not immediately threatened by Carthage.

Thus it is clear that originally the League consisted of Syracuse, Acragas, Gela and Himera. It is possible that the Chalcidian cities also joined. It seems most probable that Camarina joined as well. It is true that this city is not named until the second invasion. This fact might, however, merely be the result of the text's general disinterest in the position of the allies. It is to be noted that there is only one reference to the Acragantines and Geloans. This is when they agreed to aid Selinus only with Syracuse as leader. This merely shows that these cities prevailed upon Syracuse to end her war with the Chalcidians. After this, Acragas and Gela are not mentioned. It follows that Camarina played no part in the negotiations leading to the creation of the Siceliot League. It does not follow that she did not join the League.

It is clear that the Elymians and Sicani supported Carthage. They are referred to in the treaty together with

the Phoenician colonies as the "ancient colonies of Carthage".[118] The real problem, however, is to determine in what ways these peoples together with the Phoenicians became subordinated to Carthage. Evidence is deficient on this question.

In chapter fifty-nine of book thirteen, the Sicani and Siceli join Carthage: in chapter sixty-two, Hannibal is said to have dismissed his Sicilian allies.[119] No doubt, the Sicani and Siceli are these allies.[120] They are not heard of in the second war. The only reference to the Siceli occurs in the treaty. They are bracketed together with the Leontines and Messanians.[121] Now the Leontines and Messanians both joined the Siceliot League. The text is explicit concerning the Messanians. They joined the Siceliots who were going to the aid of Acragas.[122] The evidence about the position of the Leontines is less explicit. Two facts are, however, known. First, Leontini had been a Syracusan outpost since 422 B. C. Second, Syracuse's control of Leontini is indicated by her bestowal of Leontini upon the exiles from Acragas.[123] It is, therefore, clear that the Sicels had transferred their allegiance from Carthage to Syracuse. They are probably the οἱ ἐκ τῆς μεσογείου[124] They joined about the same time as the Messanians, Leontines, Lacedaemonians and Campanians.

To sum up, the original members of the League

were Syracuse, Gela, Acragas, Camarina, Himera and Selinus, and perhaps Naxos and Catane. The latter two cities certainly appear to have dropped out during the second war. By 406 B. C., the support of Leontini, Messana, the Sicels, Sparta and the Campanians appears to have been gained, while that of the defeated Selinus and Himera was obviously rendered negligible.

The strength of the League lay first in its voluntary nature. Diodorus observes that after the Carthaginians had laid siege to Acragas, help came from the other Greek cities because the Siceliots feared lest a similar fate to that experienced by the Selinuntines and Himeraeans should befall the besieged.[125] Diodorus is thus quite clearly of the opinion that the growth of Siceliot unity during this period was inspired by fear of a Carthaginian attack - a danger which the activities of Hermocrates in North West Sicily had made more likely. There does not seem to be any reason for doubting that this was, in fact, the case. It is also to be remembered that Acragas and Gela were not asked by Syracuse to join forces against Carthage. It was they who put the proposals before Syracuse.[126] Thus the Siceliot League appears to have been a voluntary association. The Siceliot cities believed that their autonomy was threatened. Hence they formed the alliance. This is significant, for it shows that members were not coerced into joining. This implies that Syracuse's predominance was, to a certain extent, checked. An

organization formed by the voluntary efforts of its members must, by its very nature, adhere to the opinions of the majority. Herein, however, lay a source of its strength, for such a body was less likely to dissolve itself: fear of Carthage acted as a deterrent.

It is true that the League's formation was in no small measure due to the strength and reputation of Syracuse, which stemmed ultimately from that state's victory over Athens. Hence derived Hannibal's caution as regards Syracuse, and, indeed, the decision to intervene against Selinus.[127] Thus the League's title appears to have been οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι[128] At the same time, it must be emphasized that economically Syracuse was to a great extent dependent upon her allies. The preeminence of Acragas' wealth, above all, indicates this.[129]

Moreover, it is clear that the constitutional machinery limited Syracuse's power to a considerable extent. There are two references to an assembly: a third assembly is suggested, which resulted in the declaration of war against Carthage.[130] Two councils are noted.[131] The assembly at Acragas reveals the fact that the commander-in-chief, Daphnaeus, did not have great powers. He does not appear to have attempted to prevent the stoning of the four Acragantine generals: if he did, he clearly did not succeed. It is Menes of Camarina who appears to play the chief part

in the proceedings. Attacks also appear to have been directed against Dexippus the Lacedaemonian.[132]

The evacuation of Himera appears to have been decided upon by an assembly of the League. Diocles advised evacuation.[133] The Himeraeans opposed the plan at first. Realizing that this was the only course that could be taken, they submitted. It is significant that Diocles was only able to advise: he sought approval for his plan.[134]

The decisions to evacuate Acragas and Gela appear to have been taken by councils: the assembly does not appear to have been convened. The generals and commanders decided upon the evacuation of Acragas. Gela was abandoned after Dionysius had convened a council of his friends. The names of a few of the generals are recorded. The commanders-in-chief were first, Diocles, then Daphnaeus and finally Dionysius. It follows that the Syracusan leader became leader of the whole force. There is a reference to the admirals and to five Acragantine generals.[135] One of these was Argeius: he was the only one of the Acragantine generals to escape the wrath of the assembly. Two other generals here referred to are Menes of Camarina and Dexippus the Lacedaemonian.

It certainly appears that the evacuation of Gela was effected by a resolution of the council and of the generals of the whole League. The "friends" referred to are in all probability to be identified with the generals

and commanders who voted for the evacuation of Acragas. No reference to any change in the composition of the generals and commanders is given.

It thus appears that all major decisions were entrusted either to the assembly of the League or to a council consisting of generals from the allied states. In both cases, there is no evidence indicating that Syracuse forced the cities of the alliance to support measures which were brought forward.

Diodorus' evidence clearly indicates that Carthage was alarmed by the trends in Sicily. Certainly she realized that the situation had changed drastically for the worse. To strengthen her position in Sicily, she founded a colony, Therma.[136] The importance of this venture is that it was the first colony of Carthage.[137] Carthage's alarm is also indicated by the fact that the numbers of the army were increased. The Punic host consisted of Spaniards, Balearic islanders, Africans, Carthaginian citizens, Phoenicians, Mauretanians, Numidians and Campanians. According to figures cited on the authority of Timaeus, they amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand men. The less reliable Ephorus swelled this figure to three hundred thousand.[138] The main point is that it was thus a greater armament than that which had been sent against Selinus and Himera.

According to Diodorus, the cause of the conscription of such a great armament was the result of the elation of

the Carthaginians over their success in Sicily, which made them eager to become lords over the whole island.[139] Holm, Freeman and Berve simply accepted this statement. That this was the cause of the Punic invasion is to be doubted. First, it must be asked how did Diodorus or his source actually know this? As has been seen, Carthage's whole policy in the fifth century revealed a definite reluctance to control Sicily, except for the North Western part. It has been indicated that this policy was not substantially altered during the course of the expedition against Selinus and Himera. Why Carthage should now determine upon direct annexation of all Sicily is difficult to understand. Diodorus' statement cannot be accepted without definite proof of the fact.

At the same time, it is not difficult to see why Diodorus or his source or sources came to such a conclusion. The vast Punic armament; the colonization of Therma; the fact that Hannibal now waged war against Syracuse whose independence he had promised to respect in the earlier campaign - all these facts had to be explained in some way. The solution seemed obvious: Carthage was intending at long last to annex the whole island. Further, such a situation would have appealed to Diodorus' source. It would certainly have been identifiable with Philistus' view of Carthage as being driven by lust for conquest.

Hermocrates' incursions into Punic territory

in North Western Sicily certainly emphasized to the Carthaginians the extent to which the Siceliots constituted a danger. In this connection it may be noted that some authorities have regarded Hermocrates' activities as the excuse employed by Carthage for attacking the Siceliots. The validity of such a theory is, however, to be doubted. In the first place, the text does not state such a thesis. Hermocrates is certainly not described as representative of the Syracusan government. Further, he was dead by the time of the second invasion. These facts render doubtful the theory that Hermocrates' activities seriously alarmed Carthage in themselves.[140] They were, however, in appearance a manifestation of Siceliot imperialism. The significance of Hermocrates' later career lies in its relationship to the growth of Siceliot unity.

Three other arguments may be cited in favour of the view that the direct cause of the second Carthaginian invasion was the growth of the Siceliot League, the aim of Carthage being to check Siceliot predominance in the island.

First, there is the question of the character of the expedition. One difference from the previous expedition was that it had more in common with a state effort than an enterprise inspired by the blood lust of a prominent individual. There is no hint at all of the existence of a group of senators being opposed to the expedition as there seems to have been in 410 B. C. On that occasion, Hannibal had to

press the Senate to declare war against Selinus.[141] Upon the later occasion, the Senate was enthusiastic and Hannibal, who was unwilling to go, was forced to comply with the demands of the state. One cause lay in the trust which was naturally accorded the victor of Selinus and Himera. Two other factors are, however, of no less importance. First, as has been seen, there is the popularity of the Magonids with the masses and the factor of Magonid ambition. Second, as has been suggested, the appointment of Hannibal may have been devised by the oligarchs as a means of checking the Magonid threat.[142]

Hannibal's initial relations with Acragas are noteworthy. We are told that he offered that city the alternative of alliance or neutrality with friendship for Carthage.[143] This indicates that Hannibal did not wish to waste time, men and supplies in fighting Acragas. He preferred to secure either the alliance or neutrality of Acragas. Again, it is clear that his chief aim was to check Siceliot union.

Third, there is the evidence of the treaty between Carthage and Dionysius.[144] When Carthage's object upon inaugurating the expedition is born in mind, it becomes evident that the treaty was in no way dishonourable to her. Carthage's policy was to prevent Siceliot union under the aegis of Syracuse. The status occupied by the various cities differed considerably.

First, there were those communities which came under direct Carthaginian rule: the Phoenician colonies, the Elymians and the Sicans. Second, it seems that Carthage exercised a great deal of control over the Selinuntines, Acragantines, and Himeraeans of Therma. The text states that the Geloans and Camarinaeans were to dwell in walled towns and pay tribute to Carthage. This probably means that they were tributaries, having their own laws and magistrates as opposed to Selinus, Therma and Acragas who were subjects and could probably have Punic garrisons. At the same time, it is clear that Carthaginian control over Himera/Therma was checked. Cicero makes the following observation.

> Himera deleta quos civis belli calamitas reliquos fecerat, ii se Thermis conlocarent in isdem agri finibus nec longe ab oppido antiquo. 145

Now Diodorus clearly refers to the Himeraeans in connection with the treaty. It is evident that after the capture of Himera, the site was recolonized. Furthermore, evidence exists concerning this event. When Hermocrates recolonized Selinus, the text observes that he had with him one thousand Himeraeans.[146] These Himeraeans are in all probability to be identified with the Himeraeans who appear in the treaty and are referred to by Cicero.

Ziegler was of the opinion, that the Himeraean recolonization was the decisive influence which resulted

in Carthage's conclusion of the treaty.[147] He argued that the text's account of this event came where now in chapter one hundred and fourteen of book thirteen, there is a lacuna. This is very probable. Ziegler's claim must however, be qualified in one respect. It is to be doubted whether Carthage regarded the resettlement entirely with disfavour. She may have felt that the Himeraeans would regard Dionysius with disfavour just as the other Siceliots from Selinus, Acragas, and Gela did. As such, the Himeraean resettlement was not altogether unfavourable to Carthage's schemes. At the same time, is must be stressed that the Himeraeans would be loath to cooperate with Carthage. Further, the Dorian element in Sicily, on the whole, does not appear to have been too antagonistic to Dionysius.[148]

The treaty proclaimed the independence of the Sicel communities, Leontini and Messana. Most important is Leontini's position. Syracuse, in fact, was robbed of what had been for nearly two decades Syracusan territory. Further, Leontini now contained the tyrant's enemies from Gela, Camarina and Acragas.[149]

The recognition of Dionysius as lord of Syracuse, it is true, was important in that it marked the first step whereby Dionysius became ruler of most of Sicily and Magna Graecia. At the same time Carthage and even Dionysius could not have realized this fact. Indeed to Carthage, the

establishment of a despotate of Syracuse was probably a guarantee against the revival of the Siceliot League.

Finally, it is significant that the Chalcidians are not mentioned in the treaty. Indeed, their desertion from Dionysius and the Siceliot League in not mentioned at all. It is, however, a fact that these cities were earlier allies of Athens, that Dionysius made war upon them, after peace had been concluded with Carthage, and that an alliance was concluded between Naxos, Catane and Leontini in 404/3 B. C.[150]

It is true that Diodorus implies that Carthage was forced to agree to Dionysius' terms, because of the plague. However, two points are to be observed. First, the lacuna in the text presents the possibility of other factors contributing to Carthage's decision. Second, the plague, it has been seen, is a constant feature in Diodorus, deriving probably from Philistus and aimed at the depiction of divine nemesis. In view of the fact that the text seems to derive from Philistus, it is to be doubted that it is a mere chimaera. Overemphasis upon this feature would, however, appear to obscure the very real advantages to Carthage of the treaty: the disruption of the Siceliot League.

Indeed, as a result of the treaty, five types of communities existed in Sicily. The first four were recognized by the treaty. The Phoenicians, the Elymians

and Sicans inhabited Carthaginian territory. Direct control was exercised over Selinus, Himera/Therma and Acragas, though the evidence of Himera suggests that a certain degree of independence was exercised by these inhabitants. The Siceliot cities, Messana and Leontini, were fully independent. Naxos and Catane seem to have occupied a similar position, though their independent status was not recognized by the treaty. Finally, there was Syracuse, independent under the lordship of Dionysius. Carthage had checked the danger of a coalition of Greek states in two ways. First, some of the cities were subject to Carthage, while others were independent. Second, Syracuse was prevented from leading the other Siceliots. In Carthage's eyes, Syracuse was controlled, first by the person of Dionysius. Second, she was faced with the hostility of the exiled Siceliots at Leontini and the Chalcidians.[151]

That Carthage's fears were not unfounded is indicated by the evidence which clearly indicates the success of the League. Syracuse's assumption of the leadership was marked by her appeal to the Greeks of Sicily, South Italy and Sparta.[152] The confidence of the Siceliots in Syracuse was reinforced by the victory of a number of Syracusan vessels over some Punic ships. This success was important enough for Carthage to realize that the real danger came from Syracuse for Hannibal sent

fifty ships to prevent Syracuse from following up this victory, and to secure a safe passage for his army.[153] The very fact that Syracuse decided to help Acragas is indicative of unity amongst her citizens and certainly suggests peace with Naxos and Catane.

The great vitality shown by the Siceliots is indicated by two other facts: they managed to secure the aid of the Spartan force under Dexippus; and they seized the opportunity to wrest from Carthage the Campanian mercenaries, who had quarrelled with her over pay.[154] It is, furthermore, possible that the Siceliot League was negotiating with a party within Carthage's ranks. The evidence for this comes from Polyaenus, where we read that messages were given to the Punic fleet which were not to be opened and that the foreparts of the lights were to be covered to stop deserters.[155]

The beginning of the narrative of the Acragantine campaign reveals the fact that Carthage was made to feel the full effect of Siceliot union.[156] The description of the hysteria accompanying the destruction of the tomb of Theron, as well as furnishing evidence for Philistus' thesis regarding Carthage's moral decline, is indicative of a very real fear of the Siceliot foe amongst the Carthaginians. Subsequent events revealed that this fear was certainly justified. The situation following the battle was extremely critical for the Carthaginians.[157]

Two facts are clearly indicated. First, it seems that the Carthaginian army was afraid to engage the Siceliot army in open battle. This implies the fact that the Carthaginians placed no confidence in the numerical superiority of their army and that they realized the military predominance of a numerically inferior yet unified Siceliot force. Second, the narrative reveals clearly that the Siceliots were succeeding in a policy involving the employment of starvation tactics, the aim being to arouse discontent among the mercenaries. The great degree of success with which the Siceliots had met is revealed by the statement that Himilcon saw in the capture of the supply fleet the "only hope of salvation". Diodorus' reference to the overconfidence of the Syracusans similarly indicates the extent of the Punic plight.

Thus it is clear that the evidence of Diodorus suggests steady progress on the part of the Siceliot League against Carthage. It is thus clear that Carthage's decision to intervene in 406 B. C. was based upon the emergence of a very real threat to the maintenance of her Sicilian hegemony.

It is, moreover, clear that economic factors influenced Carthage's decision, just as they had done in 409 B. C. It was shown in the analysis of Diodorus' narrative that the text is well aware that Carthage coveted Siceliot wealth. Hence derived the initial attack upon

Acragas.[158] Certainly to Philistus and indeed to Timaeus, this aspect was symptomatic of Punic lust for power and more, which met a fitting penalty in the course of subsequent events. However, the evidence clearly suggests that more serious considerations influenced Punic actions. Indeed, the Carthaginians appear to have been under considerable financial embarrassment.

Four citations do indeed indicate the existence of such a state of affairs. First, the text records that Hannibal bore no grudge against Selinus, his chief desire being the destruction of Himera. Hence he allowed the Selinuntines who had escaped to till the soil upon payment to Carthage. Second, after the capture of Himera, the Campanians complained that they had not been paid adequately. Later the text notes that they joined the Acragantines in 406 B. C. During the course of the Acragantine campaign, the Carthaginians suffered through lack of food. This might imply financial weakness. The food shortage, it is to be noted, was extremely serious, for it induced the Campanians to threaten secession. Finally, there is the question of the treaty between Carthage and Dionysius. It is recorded that Himilcon was forced to make peace: ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόμενος .

In view of the fact that stress is laid upon the fact that Gela and Camarina are to pay tribute to Carthage, this might indicate that the text not only saw in the plague

the circumstances which determined Himilcon but also in the financial embarrassment which characterized the Punic failure.[159]

Thus some evidence certainly indicates that one motive for Punic aggression was desire for Punic profit. Two aspects of the Punic military problem account for Carthage's problems: the machines and the mercenaries.

References to the military machines of Carthage are extensive.[160] Their presence implies considerable expense. Not only must the cost of the machines themselves be considered. The question of the transportation of these machines must be constantly born in mind.

Though Carthage's advantage over the Siceliots lay, to a certain extent, in the fact that she possessed machines which the Siceliots could not match, the success of the conflict was, according to the text, basically due to a superiority in respect to numbers. This fact, it is true, is probably associated with Philistus' aim to stress the cowardly nature of the barbarians. At the same time, he was well informed about the Punic position, and there is no reason to deny the validity of the claim that Carthage relied heavily upon mercenaries. The Selinuntines fear the vastness of the Carthaginian armament. On three occasions the victory over Selinus is ascribed to superior numbers. Carthage has reserves, whereas Selinus has none. Reinforcements bring about a Punic victory in the street

fighting. Whereas the Selinuntines are steadily reduced, the barbarians are constantly reinforced.[161]

The same theme characterizes the Himeraean campaign. Twenty thousand additional soldiers helped Hannibal invest the city. The waves of new troops enabled him to wear down the defenders. The Carthaginian success is due to the fact thatHannibal was able to reinforce his troops with soldiers coming down from the hills.[162]

The employment of mercenaries accounts for the numerical superiority of the Carthaginians. The evidence is extensive. The preliminary operations of 410 B. C. were in the hands of five thousand Libyans and eight hundred Campanians. These were the Campanians who had previously served Athens and were now won over by an offer of horses and high pay. Iberians as well as Libyans were enrolled by Hannibal. Greek mercenaries were also enrolled. Twenty thousand additional Sicels and Sicans, who are later dismissed together with the Campanians annoyed at the meagre payment given them, are also referred to. Before the second invasion, Libyans and Phoenicians are enrolled together with the Carthaginian citizens. Mercenaries are derived from Iberia and the Balearic Islands, from the allied Maurusians and Nomads and those nations dwelling around Cyrene. Finally, Campanians were enrolled.[163]

The main point to observe is that it is obvious

that Carthage relied heavily upon her mercenary force. The fact that the mercenaries swelled Carthage's numbers to a considerable extent, meant that she could always rely upon reinforcements. This fact proved particularly advantageous during the first Punic War. Carthage's victories were to a great extent based upon the fact that a constant supply of reinforcements was at her call. The second Punic War witnessed an altered situation. The League consisted not only of Siceliot cities, but also of men, contributed by Sparta and the Campanians. Thus the Siceliots also enrolled mercenaries. Their importance is indicated by the fact that throughout the narration of the second Punic War, references of the type recorded in the narration of the Selinuntine and Himeraean campaigns to the numerical inferiority of the Siceliots are conspicuously absent.

Carthage's employment of mercenaries, and particularly of the Campanians was largely conditioned by the fact that they werethe most efficiently trained men. In other words, the numerical factor was not the sole criterion. Carthage's reliance upon the Campanians was clearly revealed by the episode of the Campanian revolt. Himilcon was obliged to go to great lengths to bargain with them. Furthermore, the text clearly indicates that the mercenaries played a prominent role in the fighting. It was the mercenary element which bore the brunt of the

initial operations and first broke into the city. It was the Campanians who argued that they had been chiefly responsible for the Carthaginian success, and that they had not been paid according to their worth. The great importance of the Campanians is well illustrated by the text's statement that the Carthaginians enrolled Campanians because they knew that the Campanians who had previously fought for them, had joined the Siceliots.[164]

It is thus clear that the real strength of the Carthaginian army lay in its use of military machines unknown to the Siceliots, and in its enrollment of mercenaries. It is furthermore apparent that as a result, expenditure was high. Finally, because of this, the expedition began to take on the character of an enterprise, embarked upon for the sake of pecuniary advantage.

This economic motive cannot be regarded as much a cause of the Carthaginian invasion as a result of it. It is significant that stress on the greed of the Punic invader is conspicuous in the narrative of the second Carthaginian invasion. Particularly important is the positioning of the Acragantine excursus. Certainly it is conceivable that by the time of the second invasion, Carthage's financial difficulties were beginning to be felt. Indeed the difficulties over the pay question with the Campanians bears witness to the emergence of this problem. Carthage's difficulties naturally multiplied

greatly with the increase of her mercenary force.

Thus Carthaginian intervention in Sicilian affairs in 406 B. C. was determined by two developments, resulting from the first Punic War. Most important was the rise of the Siceliot League. Economic data provided by the text is aimed at stressing the barbarity of the Carthaginians. However, there is little doubt that economic motives played some part in determining Carthage upon a policy of intervention in Siceliot affairs.

4. Conclusion

The evidence thus suggests that far from being disinterested and a prey to Carthaginian power lust, it was the Siceliots who both in 410/9 and 407/6 B. C. constituted a serious threat to Punic power, not only in Sicily, but in the whole Western Mediterranean. Siceliot power stemmed from the Syracusan democracy, which was not divided and helpless to the extent Philistus, Diodorus' chief source considered it to be. The threat upon both occasions was both political and economic. The first Punic intervention was occasioned by the growth of a unified Siceliot power, centred around the vigorous Syracusan naval democracy. This development in particular threatened Punic commerce, upon which the Punic state depended. The defection of Selinus posed a serious threat to North Western Sicily, where Punic control was predominant.

Athens' elimination increased Carthaginian anxiety, since Athenian interests had, in fact, secured Punic interests. All these factors induced ultimate Carthaginian intervention, though, as has been argued, the majority of the Punic oligarchy still proved unwilling to intervene against the Siceliots. However, a division within the governing body, centred around the Magonid family, the rise of popular dissent from the Punic sailor who was directly threatened by the danger posed to Punic shipping, and the existence of a peculiar feature of the Punic constitution, whereby power was invested with the Punic demos, resulted in the decision to send Punic armaments into Sicily after a cessation of hostilities for a period of seventy years.

Carthage herself initiated the process which culminated in the second invasion. The rise of a unified Siceliot League and the severe economic strain imposed by the demands of renewed warfare in 409 B. C. were the chief factors accounting for the second attack. The danger clearly appeared more direct in 406 B. C. for now the decision to intervene was universal and little discontent within and against the governing class was manifested.

Thus in two respects, it is clear that both Thucydides' and Diodorus' theories about the decline of democracy were not substantiated by the evidence of the facts which they provided. In the first place, just as Thucydides seriously underestimated the effectiveness of

the Athenian democracy, so too Diodorus' source wrongly ignored the Siceliot League and the emergence of a vital threat to Punic hegemony. Second, both historians possessed identical views on imperial failure. Insatiable lust for conquest accounted, according to Thucydides, for the failure of the Athenian Empire. Carthage's unbounded imperialism similarly resulted in tragedy. To Thucydides and Diodorus who it has been argued echoes Philistus, nemesis was a major influence upon such developments. In both cases gross oversimplification accompanied the exposition of these theses. In the case of Thucydides, the division between Periclean and post-Periclean imperialism was more apparent than real. As has been seen, the excesses ascribed to the demagogues were not inconsistent with Periclean precedents and were largely hypothetical. Similarly Diodorus,seemingly echoing Philistus, created an imaginary Carthaginian imperialism based upon power lust. In fact, as has been shown, it was Carthage that was the more threatened power.

In a third way, Philistus/ Diodorus reveals weaknesses which characterized Thucydides. It was argued that disinterest in the Northern Adriatic schemes in which Philistus himself participated, which is reflected in the text, stems from Philistus, who in true Thucydidean fashion, refused to regard purely economic matters as vital for a history concerned essentially with political and military

affairs. Disinterest in economic phenomena is similarly revealed in Philistus/Diodorus' concept of the causes of the Punic wars. In this respect, the problem is not dissimilar to that involving consideration of Thucydides' concept of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. As has been seen, Thucydides clearly failed to present adequately the significance of the West and, indeed, the economic relevance of Athenian Western schemes. Similarly, in Diodorus' account, little interest is betrayed in the threat to Punic maritime supremacy and Carthage's interest in Siceliot wealth is viewed merely as a manifestation of Punic barbarity and not as evidence of serious economic weakness, brought on by the first encounter with the Siceliots. Both historians viewed the issues of causes from the viewpoint of the individuals involved and ignored the wider considerations. Carthage's invasion stemmed from her insatiable appetite for conquest, as epitomized by the figure of Himilcon, just as Athens' policy was dictated by persons of the genre of Cleon. The wider political and economic issues were simply ignored.

Clearly then the Syracusan democracy and the government of the other Siceliot states were not as inefficient as Philistus indicated them to be. The relevance of this fact is significant for consideration of the nature of the support given to Dionysius. It would imply that Dionysius was not able to dupe the

masses of Syracuse and, indeed,of the other Siceliot cities, as the text would have us believe. Unfortunately adequate evidence is lacking on this issue precisely because the text's interest in Dionysius has obscured the role of the Syracusan populace and governments of the other cities of the Siceliot League. However, it is significant that the only extensive evidence provided concerning independent action by the Syracusan democracy and the governments of the other Siceliot states clearly reveals the unacceptability of the text's thesis regarding the Siceliot failure. On the contrary, it was the Siceliot states rather than Carthage that initiated the process leading to the commencement of hostilities.

Three facts, however, do support the contention submitted above, that Dionysius' relations with the Siceliots, including the Syracusans, was not simply based upon the tyrant's superior grasp of the intricacies of power politics, and that there was substance to the continuance of democratic procedure at Syracuse under Dionysius. Certainly, as has been seen, the evidence suggests that the machinery of democratic government was not abandoned. Moreover, in the crisis of 405 B. C., the opposition to Dionysius was certainly not negligible. The problem concerns the <u>strategia</u>. The disappearance of Daphnaeus, Diocles; successor, from the text, is followed by references to στρατηγοὶ and τῶν ἐφ'ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένων

The Syracusans are criticized for electing generals of the type who risked the destruction of Sicily. Again, there are no direct references to Daphnaeus.[165] The narrative of the deposition of the generals similarly ignores Daphnaeus' existence.[166] Daphnaeus only reappears to be put to death with a certain Damarchus. Both men are described as τῶν ἀντιπραξάντων αὐτῷ τοὺς δυνατωτάτους. Two difficulties are apparent. First, this is the first clear reference to the existence of opposition to Dionysius. Second, Daphnaeus was clearly elected by the whole Syracusan demos,[167] and the extreme democracy appears to have existed right through this troubled period. Daphnaeus cannot, therefore, be identified with the chariestatoi. Clearly then, we possess some evidence indicating the existence of constructive opposition on the part of certain elements of the demos.

It was seen in the analysis of Diodorus' text that Dionysius' relationship with the Siceliot cities was placed upon a voluntary basis. Secession was tolerated. Clearly then, Dionysius merely continued to follow the precedent of the Siceliot League. Finally, as regards Dionysius' hostilities against Siceliot and Italiot cities, it must be stressed that reference is merely made to the Chalcidian element in Sicily and the allied Rhegine bloc. It follows that Dionysius' policy differed little from

that pursued by the Syracusan democracy throughout the fifth century, and was based upon an amicable relationship with the Dorian group.

It would, therefore, appear erroneous to assume that Dionysius' hegemony was purely military in nature. Philistus was certainly aware that more complexity characterized Dionysius' rule. However, he clearly emphasized the military nature to the detriment of the constitutional aspect. Certainly, it is clear that Dionysius' support was not based purely upon mercenaries and desperadoes. Not only did he work through the voluntary cooperation of the demos: he, moreover, gained the support of a section of the wealthy class. Philistus is described as οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην and his role in paying the fine imposed upon Dionysius certainly confirms this fact.[168] Clearly the division into chariestatoi and demos is erroneous. This is confirmed by the fact that the marriage to Hermocrates' daughter and his arrangement of the marriage between his own sister and Hermocrates' brother-in-law, Polyxenus, were contracted explicitly to draw a distinguished house into relationship with him to consolidate his tyranny.[169] Finally, as has been seen, use of the word dynasty or dynast indicates clearly that Philistus/Diodorus was well aware of the role of the oligarchy in the power structure of Dionysius' state.

To conclude, it appears that Philistus considerably

underestimated the role of Siceliot resistance. His adherence to the principle of tyranny which arose from the apparent concrete failure at Selinus, Himera and Acragas, convinced him of the necessity of dictatorship for the Siceliot cities. The successes of the despotate in the great Punic war provided Philistus with the proof he required to substantiate his thesis. As a member of the wealthy classes, belonging to the aristocratic inner circle of government, his environment contributed significantly to reinforce his anti-democratic prejudices. At the same time, as the analysis of the text has shown, Philistus was aware of the continued operations of the organs of democratic government and of the voluntary basis of Dionysius' relations with other Siceliot cities. In this respect, Philistus' adherence to Thucydidean ideas is most closely perceived. Both historians, though conscious of the existence of democratic government, preferred to advance monarchical principles of government, set in an oligarchic or aristocratic context, and ignore the democratic environment. In so doing, they considerably distorted the historical realities and advanced theories on the rise and fall of empires which were clearly not substantiated by the evidence.

V

PHILISTUS' PLACE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH CENTURY GREEK MONARCHICAL THEORY

Consideration of the political ideology of Philistus and, indeed, of Thucydides, cannot be examined in isolation from the general development of political thought in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Artistic achievement seldom, if ever, exists in a vacuum; and the case of the Thucydidean approach is certainly no exception. There is little doubt that the attractiveness of monarchy as a form of government was beginning increasingly to be appreciated by major literary personalities, long before the emergence of effective Macedonian imperialism and the creation of the Hellenistic power blocs.

The aim of this chapter is first, to determine the cause and character of this development and the nature of the contribution of Philistus and his spiritual mentor, Thucydides. Second, it is hoped to assess the extent to which the approach of Philistus and Thucydides stood aloof from the general tendency which reached fruition in the mid-fourth century.

It must be stated immediately that the association of literary figures with despotic overlords is not a particularly novel feature by the fourth century. Distinguished lyric poets of the sixth century worked in

close contact with the powerful tyrants of Corinth, Samos and Athens. The case of Sicily is certainly no exception. The Deinomenids of Syracuse welcomed the Siceliot Epicharmus, Simonides of Ceos, Bacchylides, Pindar and Aeschylus. The latter two are particularly relevant since both came from democratic Athens.

Moreover, not only do we discover the absence of contention on this issue in practice: it is also most apparent on a purely theoretical level. As has been seen, Herodotus even offers a convincing defence of monarchy. There is, moreover, no doubt that its antecedents can be found in Solon.[1]

However, it is clear that monarchical theory developed in a much fuller sense as a result of political changes in the latter part of the fifth century. It was argued in a previous chapter that the association of Pericles with tyrannical designs was very real and that the Thucydidean image was based upon the realities of the situation, to which other contemporary evidence bears testimony. However, the emergence of such a pattern cannot be considered in isolation from the general political developments of the period. In the first place, there is the very real fact of the increased importance of states with distinct monarchical characteristics. This occurred in the periphery of the Greek world, and not in states with the developed polis. Archelaus of Macedon, Jason of Pherae,

Evagoras of Cyprus, as well as Dionysius of Syracuse provided new relevance for the theory of one-man rule. One result was the abandonment of the Athenian ideal and the willingness to compromise with new forces not necessarily comparable with Athens.

Even more significant is the blend of radicalism and reaction produced by the political, social and economic crisis of the Peloponnesian War.[2] In Athens, a major factor in the crisis was the rise of new leaders of the Cleon type, totally divorced from the aristocratic background of a Pericles. Aristocratic resentment inevitably resulted. Most appealing to this element were the debates centred around the nomos-physis issue. Ultimately it produced the argument that moral law was mere convention, and the corollary: the equation of might with right. Theoretically, it meant the return to aristocratic rule and the rejection of democratic government: in practice, it resulted in the establishment of one-man rule.

Practical examples illustrate this clearly. Alcibiades was the central figure in the revolution of 411 just as Critias was in 404 B. C. The harmosts theoretically took orders from Sparta: in fact they possessed considerable initiative. Lysander was unable to fit into the Spartan political structure. Hence arose the conflict with Agesilaus, and Lysander's later

intrigues, including the evolution of his theory of elective monarchy.[3]

Euripides, who went to Pella in 408 B. C., wrote a play on Archelaus' ancestor and namesake called χαριζόμενος τῷ Ἀρχελάῳ in which an ideal portrait of the son of Temenos is provided. Similarly, Xenophon's political thesis centred around the issue of one-man rule. In the Agesilaus and Cyropaedia, he appears as a reactionary who looks back to tribal kingship. His old admiration for Sparta as manifested in the Agesilaus was shattered by Sparta's collapse. Realizing the presence of the tyrant, he hoped for the tyrant's conversion to monarchy. Thus the Hieron, probably dating from 360-353 B.C., marked the final stage of Xenophon's acceptance of monarchy. Yet the dynamic quality in man remained his chief theme. It is noteworthy that in the Agesilaus and the Lacedaemonian Constitution, kingship was emphasized to the detriment of other political institutions, and, as Weathers has observed, this is even evident in the Anabasis, where the view is distinctly upheld that the removal of the ideal man is accompanied by the collapse of the institutions of the state. The fact is that Xenophon felt that because not all men were virtuous and disciplined, the only chance lay in the ideal ruler. In a similar manner, Antisthenes, realizing the decay of Sparta, saw a wise and benevolent monarch, guiding morality.

Plato's thought follows a similar pattern. Indeed to Plato one-man rule provided the best possibilities for unhindered action. In the Republic, the philosopher kings ruled the majority because Plato was confident that the demos could not grasp at the truth. In the Laws, the attitude to this element was essentially the same. In the seventh Letter, the people are only capable of the pleasures of life. On a practical level, this attitude led Plato to attempt to influence Dionysius II and Hermias of Atarneus. Plato's choice of Dionysius II is incomprehensible for the latter's indulgence in his cups was a matter of common repute. Plato's final projects in the eighth letter concern the creation of a triumvirate from Dionysius I's own family. It could be argued that Plato hoped to work through Dion who was addicted to Plato's philosophic ideas. Yet the fact is that Dion had achieved fortune and renown in the service of Dionysius I. Finally, it must be stressed that Plato was very much attracted towards the thirty tyrants, at first, and that it was their failure and not their initial coup that disillusioned Plato.[4]

It is thus clear that a conflict between monarchic and oligarchic ideas and conservatism and radicalism is apparent. Attempts to limit democracy instead of resulting in a restoration of oligarchic power, led inevitably to the espousal of one-man rule. Thus movements which began in

a highly conservative spirit, culminated in radical departures, involving monarchic-type hegemonies. Moreover, a move away from Athens is discernable. This too resulted from disinterest in the ideal of the democracy which Athens epitomized and from the growth in the importance of monarchies in the periphery of the Greek world.

It is, moreover, clear that in the case of Isocrates, an individual emerges to whom the hegemony of his heart is Athens and yet who is unable to distinguish clearly between voluntary union and enforced hegemony. The ideal and the reality are strikingly at variance.[5] The fact is that Isocrates' major concern was not the restoration of democracy or fifth century Athens, but the problem of Panhellenic union and hegemony. As such he was clearly in the tradition of Gorgias who in his Olympic discourse of 392 B. C. recommended the union of Greece under Athens against Persia, and Lysias, who at Olympia in 388 B. C promoted a similar project, not only against Persia but against Dionysius as well. However, Isocrates refused to limit himself to Athens alone. In the Panegyricus of 380, he recommended spontaneous union against Persia on the basis of Greece's cultural superiority or παιδεία as epitomized by Athens, and the solution of the social evil through the acquisition of Persia's wealth. It is true that Isocrates' aim is the growth of the Second Athenian Sea League. But it is significant, as Momigliano has

observed, that Isocrates' love for Athens is intimately connected with his admiration for Timotheus. His support for the aristocratic-type leadership of Timotheus rather than for communal policy is also seen in the Plataicus of 371, where again a plea for the League is apparent. In the subsequent years, this dream for the restoration of Athenian power dissolved, and Isocrates openly turned to individuals like Alexander of Pherae, Dionysius of Syracuse and Archidamus of Sparta. There is little doubt that he had a very real sympathy for monarchy. In Cyprus, the combat of Greek civilization with the Phoenician element is invested in the personalities of Evagoras and Nicocles. In the Archidamus, Spartan possession of Messenia is justified. Isocrates never proceeded to a theoretical justification of monarchy as Xenophon did in the Hieron, and he oscillated between ideas of spontaneous union and regal rule. However, in 378/7, Isocrates clearly showed where his sympathies lay. In the Areopagiticus, internal reform was suggested: election was to replace the use of lot; and the powers of the Areopagus were to be extended. By this time, it is clear that democracy held little practical attraction for Isocrates. Ultimately Isocrates felt that Philip could effect the realization of his dreams of union against the barbarian. In the Panathenaica of 342-339, Agamemnon is like Philip who unites Hellas and wars against the Trojan. Clearly, Isocrates was not willing to plunge into conflict with

Philip in the manner of a Demosthenes.

Naturally Philips' position was somewhat embarrassing. Isocrates' departure from the ideals of the Panegyricus was now more apparent. The solution to this difficulty was the adoption of the concept of Europe. The ancient division between Greek and barbarian became one between Europe and Asia. Hellenic was replaced by European. Significantly, the Peace of Antalcidas had made Europe free and given Asia to Persia.[6] In the Helen of 380 B. C. the opposition of Europe and Asia was dated to the Trojan War, which was the cause of the division between Europe and Asia. In the Panegyricus, it appears that the Great King had divided the fate of Europe and Asia by the peace of 387 B. C.[7] Consequently, Asia had to be taken.

Isocrates, by stressing this idea of Europe, was able to assimilate Macedonia, Thrace, Italy, Gaul and Spain. Clearly, however, the main purpose was to bring Philip who possessed a non-Hellenic background into the picture.[8] Thus Isocrates decided to call Philip European as opposed to the Asiatic Great King. Hence were justified Macedonian expansion in Greece and the conquest by the Heracleidae, whose descendant was Philip, of the realms of the Achaemenid.

Thus it is clear that despite an earlier tendency to support a revival of Athenian hegemony, based upon her democracy and ancient cultural preeminence, Isocrates was

quite prepared to allow such considerations to disappear, when they prevented the realization of his ideal of Panhellenic union against Persia. Indeed, Greece herself could be subordinated to the concept of Europe.

It is most significant that the evidence suggests that the Isocratic historians, Ephorus and Theopompus, similarly subordinated such ideals as democracy, Athens and, indeed, Greece to considerations of hegemony, absolutism and conquest of Asia.

Ephorus followed Isocrates in contrasting Greek and barbarian and adopting the necessary corollary that the barbarians were the natural enemies of the Greeks. From this, he concluded that one power had to possess hegemony over all Greece. Hence Ephorus stressed the universality of Greek history from the Dorian invasion to contemporary times. Thus the Persian Wars were fought for the common liberty of the Greeks; Gelon liberated all Greece and not merely theSiceliots; Carthage and Persia were allied against Greece; the Athenians who perished in Egypt were likened to the Greeks who fell at Thermopylae; and the Peace of Callias was stressed.[9] This attitude as Momigliano has shown, is very apparent in Diodorus' narrative, which seems to be based largely upon Ephorus. Sparta, Thebes and Macedon are considered as well as Athens. Thus in 400 B. C., Sparta's decline is due to the abandonment of the Lycurgan system and of the forces

of ὀμόνοια and ἀνδρεία and the failure to rule the allies justly.[10] The evidence suggests favour to Athens' hegemony. Thus the help afforded the Thebans and the liberation of the Cadmea and the aid to the Spartans at Leuctra is relevant. Athens is μεγαλόψυχος καὶ φιλάνθρωπος.[11] Thebes seems to lack παιδεία and ἀγωγή for her maintenance of hegemony. This leads naturally to lack of ὁμιλία πρὸς ἀνθρώπους The hegemony of Thebes rests not on the Thebans as a whole, but upon Pelopidas and Epaminondas, particularly the latter who does possess paideia.[12] Philip possesses the qualities of Athens, Sparta and Thebes. He has the ἀρετή of Epaminondas, the ἀνδρεία of Sparta, and the μεγαλοψυχία of Athens. Further he has εὐσεβία in contrast to Phocian ἀσέβεια[13]

It is thus evident that to Ephorus, Greece as a whole counted, and Athens' predominant role was considerably curtailed. Ephorus certainly aimed to take his account of Greek history to Chaeronea, and perhaps Alexander, whose career could be regarded as the culminating point of the Isocratean ideal. Unfortunately, death intervened, and Ephorus' son, Demophilus, had to continue the task: there is no reason to doubt that Ephorus ultimately dropped Athens and incorporated Macedon into his scheme. Like Isocrates, Greece was overshadowed by the concept of Europe. Thus in the preface to book sixteen of Diodorus, Philip is described as having constituted the most powerful

European monarchy. With the force acquired in Europe, he was able to effect the dissolution of the Persian Empire in Asia.

Theopompus' literary output similarly derives its significance from the fact that Athens and all which she represents ceases to count exclusively. Second, this abandonment of the state, epitomizing democracy and supreme cultural and political development, led Theopompus to espouse monarchical type institutions. These tendencies are already found in the early Hellenica which as a continuation of Thucydides was likely to possess less individuality than the mature Philippica. The terminating date of the work, 394 B. C., is significant. It would appear that Theopompus' interest was centred upon Sparta, for in that year the battle of Cnidus shattered the extreme form of Spartan hegemony.[14] It certainly appears that the central figure of the Hellenica was Lysander, who is praised for his good work, help to princes and private citizens, self control and freedom from drunkeness and sexual vice.[15] This suggests that Theopompus was impressed by the austerity and discipline of Sparta which led her on the path to empire. Moreover, it seems probable that Lysander was regarded as the precursor of Philip in standing against Persia, since the battle of Cnidus was lost to Conon of Athens who had Persian support.

Thus it is clear that Theopompus in his first work turned from Athens to Sparta and made his central

figure the despotic Lysander. Further, concentration upon the latter took the form of Panhellenism. These tendencies were continued in the Philippica. Macedon was now the central attraction and Philip epitomized the Panhellenic aspect. Indeed, a period of unity, ended with the Spartan hegemony, and was continued with the rise of Macedon. Hence the gap of 394-360 B. C.[16] Finally, it is significant that Theopompus like Isocrates and Ephorus replaced Greece by Europe, thereby incorporating Macedon into the scheme. In a famous passage, Theopompus wrote that Europe had not seen such a man as the son of Amyntas,[17] who is thus monarch, not of Greece, but of a wider area. Theopompus appears to have stressed the importance of consolidation within Europe. Philip, the Phocians and the Amphictionic council are the central issues: a great European state is visualized, set over against the Asiatic one.

Thus Isocrates and the Isocratic school of historiography, by abandoning the Athenian fifth-century ideal of that state's democracy's lead in Hellas, were steadily drawn towards a conception, based upon monarchical hegemony. The very real fact of the increased importance of monarchy in the fourth century and, in particular, the rise of Macedon, was, of course, a major factor determining such a development. However, it is equally certain that the conservatism of the type which manifested itself in Plato and Xenophon and in the careers of Alcibiades,

Lysander and Critias, lay at the root of the Isocratean conception of monarchy. In the first place, as has been seen, Isocrates' admiration for Athens does not appear to have been derived from particular enthusiasm for the democracy. Rather, it was the figure of Timotheus that exerted the greatest influence upon Isocrates. Moreover, the evidence of the Areopagiticus provides decisive evidence of Isocrates' limited conception of Athenian democracy. The transition to Evagoras, Nicocles, Dionysius and Philip is easily comprehensible.

The evidence for Ephorus is less clear and based essentially upon book sixteen of Diodorus, in particular the prooemium. Further, the premature termination of Ephorus' history prevents precise assessment of that historian's viewpoint. However, there is little doubt that Philip certainly marked the culmination of Isocratean ideals in the history of Ephorus.

In the case of Theopompus, the evidence is more positive. There is no doubt that Theopompus was distinctly antagonistic to democracy and favourably disposed towards governments of limited franchise such as oligarchy and monarchy. Moreover, his distaste for democracy was accompanied by a middle class type of moral censure. Theopompus clearly hated democracy and vice which he bracketed together. At the same time, he was strongly attached to oligarchical or monarchical type figures, such

as Cimon, Alcibiades, Agesilaus, Lysander and Antisthenes.[18] Thus he disapproved of the Byzantines frequenting taverns after the introduction of democracy, of the Arcadians dining with slaves at festivals, and even of Isocrates' teaching for money.[19]

Even more significant is Theopompus' attitude to Athens and her leaders.[20] It is certain that he blamed Eubulus' distribution of wealth for Athens' easy capitulation to Philip. The picture of Cimon lavishing his wealth and of the luxury of Chares supports this view of the corruption of the Athenian demos.[21] Connor's conclusion is that Theopompus' aim in his digression on the Athenian demagogues in book ten of the Philippica was to show that Philip's success was natural because of the inner weakness of Athens.[22] Indeed, a major aim of Theopompus was to consider the decline of the Athenian democracy. According to Theopompus' reasoning, this was due to men like Cimon and Thucydides the son of Melesias, as well as to the Cleon types. The immediate cause of the digression seems to have been a discussion of Eubulus' and Callistratus' financial policy. Pericles, with his policy of payment for offices was perhaps a successor of Cimon, when he carried the process one stage further, by substituting payment from state funds for largesses from private wealth. Certainly, according to Theopompus, by Cleon's time, bribery had become a habit among the demagogues.[23]

Theopompus' attack upon the vices of tyrants is most instructive. He can only attack Dionysius I for promoting luxury and debauchery among his subjects. However, as regards Cleomenes, tyrant of Methymna, praise is given for the despot's ability to suppress vice, luxury and lawlessness.[24] Fritz's conclusion is thus most plausible: the criticism of Dionysius was that the tyrant made the people enjoy themselves in sin to secure his own position, while Cleomenes aimed at a law-abiding state. Again it is clear that the writer is a conservative who is contemptuous of democratic rule. Theopompus' disapproval of Dionysius did not stem from the fact that the ruler was a dictator, but from the fact that his regime possessed democratic features.

Hermias of Atarneus is attacked for his low origins and early violent career; however, he is praised for his aristocratic firm rule.[25] Again it is clearly the sentiments of a snobbish aristocrat that are being echoed. Thus to Theopompus, the main issue was the maintenance of stability. Hence his praise for tyrants and his anti-democratic sentiments with their strong moral tone.

It is only upon such an interpretation that Theopompus' attitude to Lysander and Philip, the central figures of his major works can be comprehended. Above all, there is the notorious difficulty of Philip, a man, according to Theopompus of the type not produced by former

ages, who is nevertheless extravagant, flattered by wicked men, a despot who constructs the city for perjurers and sycophants, a debauchee and alcoholic, a corrupter of his associates and a promoter of slaughtered despots.[26] Indeed, it is clear that Theopompus' attitude was very mixed. On the one hand, he appears to have appreciated the fact that Philip brought stability to Greece. As an Isocratean, he may have evisaged as the result of this stability, the effective assault upon Asia.[27]

At the same time, Philip is attacked for his lack of morals. Lysander, on the other hand, is praised for his high moral standards.[28] Two reasons have been provided for Theopompus' distaste for the Macedonian hegemony in contrast to Lysander's. Fritz argues that the Macedonian were semi-barbarians, whereas the Spartans possessed inborn aristocratic qualities. This is a distinct possibility, yet as Fritz himself observes, if this was the case, Theopompus' view was certainly not realistic, for Lysander's actions and designs for an elective monarchy clearly posed a serious threat to the oligarchic power structure of Sparta.[29]

Indeed, more satisfactory is Momigliano's conclusion that Theopompus' dissatisfaction derived from the fact that Philip's character initiated a process of intrigues, culminating in Pausanias' murder of Philip. To Theopompus, Philip was the most gifted political figure ever produced by

Europe, who was destroyed by his dissolute character. Thus Theopompus distinguished between Philip's capacity and personal failings.

Certainly, there is no doubt that Theopompus was deeply disappointed with Macedon's achievement. He wrote no history of Alexander and his letters to Alexander were uninteresting in comparison to those sent to Philip. To quote Fritz "he was not the patriarchal monarch and protector of hierarchic social order, of whom Theopompus had dreamt."[30]

It is thus apparent that Theopompus' excessive interest in the private lives of the chief figures in his historical works is not simply the result of cynicism and a desire to humiliate persons politically in the forefront.[31] Rather, it results from and is characteristic of the historian's aristocratic conservatism and distrust of qualities associated with the masses. Like Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates and Ephorus, his faith in democracy has disintegrated to be replaced by conviction in monarchical predominance. Like Plato, he was contemptuous of the demos whom he associated with vice. The monarch had to be untainted by the blemishes of the "majority". Philip, despite his political successes, failed because of his private vices and as such he was no more successful than the Athenian state had been under Cimon or Eubulus.

Thus it is clear that political developments of

the late fifth and early fourth century, associated with the increased importance of monarchies on the periphery of the Greek world and the crisis of democracy as a result of the convulsion of the Peloponnesian War, resulted in renewed interest on the part of major intellectual figures in one-man hegemony devoid of Athenian association. A desire for renewal of the old and the restoration of aristocratic preeminence led, in fact, to the espousal of monarchical concepts.

In such circumstances, Philistus' work on Dionysius takes its place alongside the works of Xenophon and the Isocratean school, and is not to be regarded as existing in isolation. Literary figures in their dislike of democracies became increasingly attracted towards monarchs. Thus Isocrates was drawn towards Evagoras and Nicocles amongst others, Euripides and Thucydides to Archelaus, and Xenophon towards Agesilaus and Persia. Philistus' association with Dionysius is thus to be viewed in a wider context. In the first place, he is representative of the anti-democratic movement. Second, like Xenophon, the Isocratic school and Plato, he is a conservative monarchist. Finally, the choice of Sicily as a centre of Hellenic civilization is to be regarded as typical of the general swing away from Athens.

Dionysius as an usurper must have been acutely sensitive of the intellectual climate of his age, and of

the importance of monarchical theory. Plutarch records that Dionysius told his mother that he could harm a city's laws but not her nature.[32] Certainly, this citation bears testimony to the tyrant's interest in the nomos-physis controversy. The fact that he called his daughters, Dikaiosyne, Sophrosyne and Arete suggests, as Stroheker observed, that Dionysius was attempting to legitimize his despotate.[33] Certainly, Dionysius was a man of learning. The Suda notes that he wrote comedies, tragedies and histories. The tragedies were regarded as poor in form and content and often more suited to comedy. In 388 B. C. the tyrant's work received scant appreciation at the Olympic games.[34] Political changes characterized by the entente with Athens may have influenced the decision to reward Dionysius the first prize at the Lenaean games, despite their poor quality. However, three citations do suggest a political context for these plays. One fragment declares that anxiety is for every man, for only the gods are completely happy. More important is the citation which records that tyranny is the mother of injustice. Finally, a third fragment refers to the shining eye of justice.[35] Certainly it appears that Dionysius was eager to justify his rule and grant it legality, and it seems that the evidence of the names of Dionysius' daughters is confirmed by the testimony of the fragments of Dionysius' own works. It would appear

that in his endeavour to justify his rule from a philosophic point-of-view, he differed from Philistus, whose picture of Dionysius was based upon purely practical consideration and was devoid of ethical factors, except in the case of Carthage and the Italiots. Dionysius' attitude certainly does explain the attraction of major literary personages towards his court.

On the whole the evidence suggests that the literary figures who frequented Dionysius' court were unable to maintain a cordial relationship with the tyrant. We know that Dionysius' visitors included the tragedian Antiphon, Xenarchos who wrote a play about the cowardly Rhegines and the philosopher, Aristippus of Cyrene.[36] About these personages, little evidence is provided. More interesting testimony is provided about Philistus, Plato and Philoxenus of Cythera. Philistus' experiences have been fully dealt with. Philoxenus, the most distinguished representative of the dithyramb, quarrelled with Dionysius in 390 B. C. and was thrown into the quarries, officially either for seducing the tyrant's mistress, Galatea or for criticizing Dionysius' works. We know that in 388 B. C., he depicted Dionysius as a Cyclops and it is most probable that political differences contributed to Philoxenus' fate.[37]

Most famous of all was the visit of Plato in 388, which clearly reveals the strain imposed by the relationship between the tyrant and the scholars at his court. Various

authorities give different accounts of this visit. Diodorus claims that Dionysius called Plato to Sicily and treated him with honour, and that differences between the two men resulted in Dionysius' having sold him in a Syracusan slave market. Ultimately, Plato was freed by friends and able to go home. Cornelius Nepos argued that Dion was behind Dionysius' invitation to Plato. Philodemus connects his appearance at Syracuse with the philosopher's visit to the Pythagoreans of South Italy. He adds that Dionysius sold him to a Laconian who brought him to Aegina. Plutarch claimed that fate brought Plato to Syracuse and Dion, and that conversation on the topic of justice upset Dionysius. Dion succeeded in getting his friend aboard the ship of a certain Spartan, Pollis, who was told by Dionysius either to set him on the high seas or sell him into slavery.[38]

The stages whereby this tradition arose cannot be determined: however, it is clear that it results from the fact that little is known about an incident about which Plato himself says little. Dionysius' complicity in the sale is certainly to be doubted. It is possible that Plato came to Sicily by chance, that he met Dion who introduced him to Dionysius, and that subsequent discussions between the two men resulted in their estrangement. However, in view of the admittedly meagre but significant evidence of the fragments of Dionysius' own works, the nomenclature

of Dionysius' daughters, the general attraction of literary figures to Dionysius' court, and the interest of Philistus and Plato in monarchical government, there is little doubt that Plato's visit was not purely incidental. The seventh Epistle clearly states Plato's intentions. Dissatisfied with the course of events at Athens, the oligarchic revolution of 404, the restored democracy and the death of Socrates, Plato sought his answer in philosophy. Dionysius, as has been seen, was keenly interested in contemporary philosophic discussion. Whether Plato seriously thought that he could influence Dionysius is doubtful in view of the fact that Dionysius was Plato's senior. However, it seems certain that he hoped to work through Dion, a younger person who was open to the philosophic influence.

Though Dionysius' theoretical intentions corresponded closely to those of Plato, and aimed at legitimizing his rule, disagreement with Plato was inevitable. To Plato, ethics formed the indispensable basis for hegemony. As has been seen, in the Gorgias, dikaiosyne and sophrosyne were the necessary ingredients in the ruler and not his ability to make the city famous politically. It is true that Dionysius in theory aimed at the achievement of these qualities, and that in the process, he named his daughters Arete, Dikaiosyne and Sophrosyne. However, the fact is that Platonic ideology,

when pursued to its logical conclusion, involved the disintegration of Dionysius' empire.

Though Philistus' political viewpoint appears to have corresponded much more closely to that of Dionysius, as espouser of a policy of rëal politik, the crisis experienced by both Plato and Philistus at Dionysius' court was basically not dissimilar, and is representative of the general failure on the part of fourth century literary figures to transfer to practical reality, the results of individual theorizing. Plato and Philistus like Xenophon, Isocrates, Ephorus and Theopompus, despairing of democratic government, decided upon one-man rule as the ideal form of government. It is true that ethics counted for more in Plato and Xenophon and, indeed, in Theopompus, than in Philistus. Yet it is a fact that at no time did Plato advocate a return to democracy. In the Republic, supreme control was vested in the hands of the philosopher kings, and in the Laws, Plato hoped for the conversion of the young tyrant. On a practical level, Plato turned to the thirty tyrants, Dionysius II, Dion and Hermias of Atarneus. Finally, he recommended that a triumvirate formed from the family of the elder Dionysius rule Syracuse.

The parallel may be carried further. Each of these figures were unable to satisfy themselves fully, even when they felt that they had discovered their ideal

statesman. As has been seen, the evidence suggests that Dionysius' treatment of the Greeks of South Italy is at the root of the break with Philistus. The fact is that the nature of Dionysius' power could not tolerate interference of any type from philosopher or historian, if this challenged the basis of his power. The ideal was not represented by the reality. Xenophon and the Isocratics appear to have undergone a similar disillusionment. Thus Xenophon's faith in Spartan hegemony as represented by Agesilaus was broken with that state's collapse, and in the Hieron, the tyrant had to be replaced by the benevolent ruler. Isocrates turned from one ruler to another, and it is doubtful whether Philip, in fact ultimately satisfied him. Ephorus seems to have been attracted by the Macedonian monarchy, but the incomplete nature of his work and the sparseness of the testimony precludes dogmatic assertions as to whether Ephorus discovered a satisfactory ultimate solution. Certainly, Theopompus' disillusion with Philip, as has been seen, is adequately documented.

Such disillusion is understandable when it is remembered that all these writers represent a conservative element with strong idealistic and, indeed, moral tendencies. The application of this idealism inevitably incurred deep disappointment when faced with the historical realities. Hence Philistus' ideal of Western Greek union against Carthage was contradicted by Dionysius' South Italian

policy, which stemmed from the realities of the situation. Similarly Plato's hopes for an ethical basis for Dionysius' rule were simply not practically effective, and one suspects that similar factors underline Philoxenus' breach with the tyrant. Moreover, the examples of Xenophon and Theopompus provide clear illustrations of the incompatibility of the ideals of the "cultured" conservatives with the practical examples of Sparta and Macedon.

Thus Philistus' conception of Dionysius and monarchical rule is clearly representative of the general tendencies, characteristic of the late fifth and early fourth centuries. The problem remains to determine more precisely the position of Philistus in the development of historiography, in particular to examine whether Philistus is to be regarded as a Thucydidean or Isocratean in sentiment. In fact, it is clear that elements, representative of both schools are apparent in Philistus. Philistus' conception of Western Greek union against Carthage seems to anticipate the panhellenic ideals of the Isocrateans. However, it must be remembered that Thucydides too had advocated the importance of unity, as epitomized by the Athenian hegemony. Further, though it seems that Theopompus regarded Philip as the champion of Hellenism against Persia, it is possible that the emphasis was upon the political stability brought by Macedon to the Greek world rather than the crusade against Persia. The move away from Athens may

appear a betrayal of the Thucydidean ideal of Athens. Yet is is to be observed that the evidence clearly indicates that Thucydides himself was attracted by Syracusan polypragmosyne and the Periclean Hermocrates.

Third, like Isocrates, Ephorus and Theopompus, Philistus was drawn towards a monarchical form of government, as opposed to the democratic type. Yet in this respect, he can also be regarded as Thucydidean, for Thucydides was certainly more impressed by individuals like Pericles and Hermocrates than the Athenian demos. Finally, it is clear that the strong moral tone of Philistus, as found in Diodorus' text, owes as much to Thucydides as it anticipates Theopompus.

In this connection, the antithesis between Theopompus and Thucydides is hardly as decisive as claimed by Connor. Connor argued that whereas Thucydides was impartial, the later historian was distinctly anti-Athenian; whereas the former was a sceptic, the latter was a cynic; whereas the latter was interested in personalities and their private lives, the former was differently inclined.[39] On all counts, Connor clearly generalizes excessively. As has been seen, Thucydides is by no means impartial. Hence his distorted view of demagogues and post-Periclean Athens. Indeed, he does bring his own personal judgments into the narrative. More important, Thucydides is by no means devoid of

moralizing tendencies. His attitude to Athenian imperialism is distinctly moralistic. Hence the contrast between the Epitaphios, The Mytilenean debate and the Melian dialogue. Finally, his interest in leading personalities and their failings is clearly apparent in the case of Alcibiades.

However, the fact is that the ancient testimony clearly regarded Philistus as a Thucydidean. Two reasons would appear to account for this development. First, stylistic considerations may have led to this comparison. Yet, as has been argued above, stylistic and political considerations cannot be entirely divorced. Thus it seems likely that the identification of the two writers stemmed from their common championship of tyrannical rule, devoid of moral panhellenistic overtones. It is true that both historians discussed moral considerations, but it must be emphasized that neither author judged his ideal ruler from a moral point of view. Thucydides' moral judgment was placed upon the Athenian demos, and Philistus/Diodorus' moral assessment concerned Carthage. Pericles and Dionysius -certainly as champion against Punic imperialism- were totally unaffected by such considerations. Adherence to these monarchical figures was based entirely upon their political effectiveness. Here Xenophon and the Isocratics departed from the Thucydidean conception, and with Theopompus, a crucial stage in the development of Greek

historiography ,with emphasis upon the private failings of the central figures of history ,is clearly reached.

VI

THE TRADITION AFTER PHILISTUS AND DIODORUS' TESTIMONY

1. The Testimony of Ephorus and Theopompus

Theopompus' interest in the private failings of figures of political importance stemmed from the conviction that great capability was often rendered futile by immoral conduct. There seems little doubt that Theopompus' emphasis upon vice and degeneracy was closely associated with the political effects which arose from them. However, Theopompus' example was emulated by less discerning historians whose works took little cognizance of the nature of the political importance of the individuals about whom they wrote. Dionysius' political importance led to an association of the tyrant with such a hostile testimony. Of primary importance was, of course, the account of the historian, Timaeus of Tauromenium. However, that historian's testimony is merely the culminating point of earlier developments. It is accordingly necessary to trace the development of the hostile tradition which revised the account of Philistus, and determine the extent to which this account influenced Diodorus' testimony.

Two historians who certainly discussed Dionysius in the course of their work on the history of mainland Greece were Ephorus and Theopompus. Little is known about

their attitude towards the tyrant, but the evidence suggests that they did not adopt an essentially hostile approach.

It would appear that Ephorus treated the early Sicilian tyrants and the war of 480 B. C. in book twelve, which probably ended with Ducetius' death.[1] Books thirteen to fifteen appear to have covered the Peloponnesian War, and perhaps book fifteen dealt with the Athenian expedition to Sicily. Fragment 68 refers to Entella and is associated with book sixteen of Ephorus' history. Entella was given to the Campanian allies of Dionysius in 403 B. C. Later, after these Campanians had rejoined Carthage, the city was attacked and destroyed by Dionysius.[2] Therefore Barber suggests that book sixteen of Ephorus ended with the treaty of 392 B. C. between Dionysius and Carthage.[3] Two references to Pharos, Dionysius' colony of 388 B. C. and to the city, Herbita which was attacked by Dionysius in 403 B. C. suggests that book twenty-eight discussed Dionysius. Book twenty-nine continued the discussion of Sicilian history, and appears to have dealt with the period following the death of the elder Dionysius to Timoleon. Hence fragment 221 refers to Timoleon's suppression of his brother's attempted tyranny.

The evidence thus indicates that Ephorus certainly discussed Sicilian history in books twelve, sixteen, twenty-eight and twenty-nine. Dionysius I was probably discussed in books sixteen and twenty-eight. It would

appear that Sicilian history after the collapse of the Athenian expedition was pursued after Ephorus had completed his narrative of the Peloponnesian War, and that discussion of the crisis of 410-5 B. C. led inevitably to an account of the early years of Dionysius in book sixteen. Indeed, this book seems essentially to have been concerned with Punic-Siceliot hostilities 410-392 B.C., which resulted in the creation of Dionysius' empire. The penultimate book of Ephorus' history appears to have discussed Dionysius' later career, after the initial struggle with Carthage had been terminated.[4]

So little is known about Ephorus' account of Sicilian history that it is impossible to prove that Diodorus' account derives from Ephorus. To a certain extent, the answer to this problem is determined by whether it is accepted that Ephorus was Diodorus' main source for the history of the Greek mainland. If it is accepted that Ephorus was Diodorus' source for this portion of his history, it will be very difficult to argue that Diodorus did not read Ephorus for the narrative of Sicilian affairs. Certainly, there is no doubt that Diodorus saw Ephorus' narrative of Sicilian history. Further, his narrative was not as hostile as that of Timaeus. Hence Ephorus' favourable account in contrast with Timaeus' attack upon Philistus.[5] However, it is difficult to maintain that Ephorus' influence was decisive.First,

there is the fact that Diodorus' account is lengthy and only becomes sketchy with the departure of Philistus. Hence I believe that it reflects the testimony of a native historian, particularly interested in Sicily and not an historian to whom Sicilian affairs did not form the crux of the narrative. The antithesis between the fullness of the narrative for the first two decades of Dionysius' reign and the later two decades cannot be accounted for by Ephorus, but by Philistus, whose exile, it has been seen, lasted until the death of Dionysius I. Moreover, as has been indicated in the analysis, the testimony of a contemporary is suggested in the full narrative of the first two decades. Ephorus can hardly be classed as a contemporary, and he was certainly far from the field of action. The vividness of the detail certainly suggests a contemporary, well-acquainted with the Sicilian position. Again Philistus is a much preferable candidate.

More probable is the view advanced by Schwartz that Diodorus relied heavily upon Ephorus in the portions following the abrupt termination of the detailed narrative.[6] In other words, it is conceivable that Diodorus in book fifteen utilized Ephorus. It would appear, on such an interpretation, that Diodorus, with Philistus' detailed narrative exhausted, was obliged to consult the testimony of an historian whose account was much briefer. The discrepancy in the two accounts of Dionysius' embassy to

the Olympic games suggests a source change.[7] The fact that Diodorus had used Ephorus for his narrative of Greek affairs, renders credible the view that he, at this point, used the account of Ephorus. Naturally it is impossible to be dogmatic on this point. There is some reason to regard Theopompus as the new source employed. The agreement of Diodorus and Ephorus over Pharos certainly proves very little. Indeed, if Diodorus did base his account of Dionysius' later reign upon Ephorus' testimony, the fragmentary nature of the information renders impossible any attempt to seek Ephorus' viewpoint in Diodorus' text.

An alternative view is that Theopompus was the source of Diodorus in book fifteen. It is clear that Diodorus saw Theopompus' excursus on Sicily from the Philippica. The fact that Diodorus refers to only a part of the Philippica, that dealing with Sicily, indicates that Diodorus had seen the work and was writing down his information from memory.[8]

Consideration of the precise nature of Theopompus' excursus, however, renders this view most unlikely. It began, not as Diodorus says, in book forty-one, but in book thirty-nine because the eight fragments cited from the Sicilian books derive from books thirty-eight and forty. Diodorus declares that three books were devoted to the excursus. Therefore, it would appear that books thirty-nine to forty-one and not forty-one to forty-three

constituted the excursus. The digression seems to have followed an account of Macedonian operations in Epirus.[9] A discussion on the Western Mediterranean seems to have followed the narrative on Sicily to book forty-three. This is indicated by the fact that fragments 199 to 204 from book forty-three are chiefly concerned with the West. Thus Westlake concludes that Diodorus' confusion stemmed from his erroneous association of the number of the books with the general excursus on the West.[10]

Diodorus says that after the beginning of the tyranny of the elder Dionysius, Theopompus covered a period of fifty years and ended with the expulsion of the younger Dionysius. The problem is that the period of 405 to 343 covers more than sixty years. It is, therefore conceivable that the excursus began with the establishment of Dionysius' empire in 392 B. C. - a logical date which marked a similar division in Ephorus' history, - and that the earlier part of Dionysius' reign occurred in the Hellenica.[11]

It is clear that Dionysius I was not dealt with in great detail in the excursus of the Philippica. First, there is only one fragment which belongs to the books on Sicily which mentions Dionysius, and this merely notes that he was the father of Hipparinus and Nysaeus. The rest refer to Dionysius II and not to the elder Dionysius. The absence of references to Dionysius is particularly

striking when it is remembered that three-fifths of the period dealt with Sicily under Dionysius. It is true that the absence of references to Dionysius I could be a coincidence. However, other facts suggest that this was not the case. First, one fragment from book thirty-nine refers to the intemperance of Apollocrates, the eldest son of Dionysius II and his estrangement from his father.[12] Since Dionysius II was born in 398 B. C., it is clear that Apollocrates belonged to the generation which flourished after Dionysius I's death.[13] Second, fragments 192 and 194 refer to events occurring in book forty, after Dionysius' withdrawal. Third, the one fragment about Dionysius I, which attacks the tyrant for promoting luxury and debauchery, derives from book twenty-one.[14] It forms part of a general attack upon Greek tyrants, including Peisistratus.[15] It is, moreover, clear that Dionysius himself is not attacked for his own personal moral deficiencies, but merely for the fact that he encouraged dissoluteness in others. Finally, as Westlake observes, it is strange that Athenaeus should quote from book twenty-one and mention no attack on Dionysius I, deriving from the later Sicilian excursus.[16] The evidence clearly indicates that Theopompus' research into the moral failings of prominent political figures, did not discover a great deal in the case of the elder Dionysius. In the light of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' remarks on the thoroughness of

Theopompus' research, it is to be concluded first, that Theopompus' digression on Sicily in the Philippica did not involve Dionysius I in great detail.[17] Second, it would appear that Theopompus did not write a particularly hostile account of Dionysius I. Third, it may be suggested that he, in fact, admired the political acumen of Dionysius, and included his opinion in the possible digression in the Hellenica. Finally, it would appear that Theopompus aimed at tracing the fall of Dionysius' empire, and that he found the cause of its collapse in the dissolute figure of the younger Dionysius, whose failings corresponded closely to those of Athens and Philip, who also figure prominently in the Philippica.

That Dionysius II was the central figure of the excursus in the Philippica is confirmed by the fact that Dion and Timoleon do not appear to have been attributed as much importance as in the traditions of Plato and Timaeus. Theopompus seems to have dealt with the corrupting powers of Dion. Certainly, he was highly critical of Plato. The main point, however, is that Theopompus, unlike later authorities, concentrated upon Dionysius II, whose corruption was regarded as responsible for the decline of Dionysius I's empire. Clearly, the tradition of Plato and Timaeus gained many adherents: however, there is no doubt that Theopompus was the chief influence upon Athenaeus,[18] and, more important, upon Trogus Pompeius. Theopompus'

influence is indicated by the very title of the latter's work, Philippica. More important is the fact that the account provided of Sicilian affairs in Justin's epitome clearly echoes Theopompus, for the rise of Dionysius is simply omitted and to quote Westlake "to Justin the ignominious career of Dionysius II was the only noteworthy feature of Sicilian history of the middle of the fourth century."[19] Moreover no hostility to Dionysius is evident in the epitome. Finally, Justin's account is part of a general excursus on the West.

In such circumstances, decisive influence of Theopompus' excursus upon Diodorus is unlikely, in spite of the fact that Diodorus does seem to have read the excursus. It is true that Theopompus' hostility does not appear to have been manifested towards Dionysius I and that, as has been seen in the analysis, Diodorus' text is not especially hostile to Dionysius. However, it is to be observed that no evidence of Theopompus' scheme is manifested in Diodorus' text. Moreover, as in the case of Ephorus, it is unlikely that the vividness of detail which we would associate with a contemporary like Philistus, would characterize Theopompus' work. Moreover, the moral tone of Theopompus is most definitely absent from Diodorus' text. Finally, the fact that Theopompus does not appear to have attacked Dionysius' moral failings suggests that the information in book fifteen does not derive from that

historian.

In conclusion, it is evident that Diodorus consulted both Ephorus and Theopompus. However, there is little reason to suppose that these historians exercised decisive influence upon Diodorus. It is possible that their influence is to be found most decisively in book fifteen of Diodorus. However, the moral censure directed towards the person of Dionysius, which is a notable characteristic of these chapters, suggests use of other sources, for, as has been seen, Ephorus' and Theopompus' accounts do not appear to have been really hostile. Certainly the case against the use of Theopompus is particularly strong: Ephorus' presence is perhaps more probable."

2. The Development of the Hostile Tradition

The growth of the hostile tradition certainly stems from developments of a political and intellectual nature, which took place during the life time of Dionysius I, and it is, indeed, strange that Ephorus and Theopompus were comparatively uninfluenced by these tendencies, for both historians came from Athens, the city most responsible for this movement. In the case of Theopompus, the difficulty can be easily resolved. Theopompus, the evidence suggests, was an historian of considerable individuality who, despite an undoubted interest in the

private failings of individuals in his histories, was unlikely to employ evidence of doubtful authenticity merely for creating sensational effects. It must be stressed that emphasis upon vice in Theopompus was very much dependent upon political considerations. Therefore, it is clear that Theopompus was unwilling to utilize current gossip at Athens. In the case of Ephorus, a solution is more difficult to achieve. Again, it has to be conceded that probably a degree of integrity impeded Ephorus' use of contemporary gossipy material. Ephorus' universalism may have led to the adoption of this attitude. Finally, it is clear that at this stage, the hostile tradition was not fully developed. Hence, its preeminence in Ephorus and Theopompus is most unlikely.

The hostile tradition originated not in Sicily but in Athens, and is associated with the peculiar position occupied by Dionysius. The extent of Dionysius' empire, occupying as it did, most of Sicily and Southern Italy, and maintaining notable economic control over the Northern Adriatic, was a new phenomenon in the Greek world, and certainly foreshadowed the huge Hellenistic power blocs. As a result of such developments, Dionysius began to be regarded as second only to the Great King. Thus we read in Diodorus διόπερ οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν τότε δυναστῶν λέγω δὲ τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα καὶ τὸν Σικελίας δυνάστην Διονύσιον. Because of this, according to Ephorus, he was feared in old

Greece: οὗτος γὰρ (Διονύσιος) ἦλθε βουλόμενος μὲν τῷ σχήματι Λακεδαιμονίοις βοηθῆσαι κατὰ Ἀθηναίων τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ βουλόμενος τὴν'Ελλάδα μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου μερίσασθαι ἐκείνου δηλώσαντος αὐτῷ ὡς'Εφορος ἱστορεῖ.[20] It is most likely that Diodorus is echoing the sentiments of Ephorus. Certainly, the second passage which definitely stems from Ephorus is illustrative of the Athenian conception of the Western empire, and though it appears that Ephorus' testimony does not reflect an essentially hostile attitude towards Dionysius, this citation from his history clearly illustrates the circumstances which gave rise to Athenian hostility. Syracuse is bracketed with Athens' foes, Persia and Lacedaemon. Indeed Syracuse supported Sparta, whose interests in the West had been represented by the Dorian bloc under Syracuse throughout the fifth century.

Athenian hostility to Dionysius is well-documented and stems from Dionysius' support of Sparta during the years 393-87 B. C. In 394 B. C. we find Athens honouring Dionysius together with his brother Leptines and Thearidas and his brother-in-law, Polyxenus.[21] Later Conon sent an embassy to Syracuse.[22] This failed to achieve anything substantial, for we find Polyxenus, heading the Italiot and Siceliot ships with Antalcidas, the aim being to persuade Athens to agree to the King's Peace.[23]

In the years which follow, Dionysius appears to

have met with ridicule from the comic poets. In a play of Philoxenus of Cythera, Dionysius appeared in the guise of a Cyclops.[24] Strattis provided a picture of Dionysius, the cruel tyrant who did not wish to singe his beard.[25] Eubulus wrote a play called Dionysius, and no doubt a similar hostile viewpoint was provided.[26]

Criticism of Dionysius was by no means confined to the Attic stage. In 388 B. C., Lysias saw Dionysius as the enemy of the Greeks in their endeavour to achieve freedom.[27] He was placed by the side of the Great King. In the seventh Platonic Epistle, Plato's dissatisfaction with the position in Syracuse in 388 B. C. is voiced.[28] Isocrates in the Panegyricus notes in 380 B. C. the slavery of Sicily and the laying waste of Italy.[29]

In 371, however, Isocrates changed his tone because of the altered political situation in Greece. The letter indicating this changed attitude is dated after the battle of Leuctra. Spartan hegemony was as a result ended. Athens thus appears to have again turned to Syracuse. Hence Isocrates asked Dionysius to save Greece.[30]

The increased friendship towards Dionysius is attested by two inscriptions of 368 B. C. The first contains a probouleuma of the Athenian boule, referring to Dionysius' proposals in furtherance of the peace congress at Delphi to which he sent envoys. It praises Dionysius for upholding the King's Peace and grants him and his sons

golden crowns and the freedom of the city. The second decree of 367 B. C., as well as honouring Dionysius, contains the terms of a treaty concluded with him. Each side is to help the other against their enemies. Dionysius' phrourarchs appear on the decree taking the oaths.[31]

Thus Athens constantly attempted to woo Dionysius, who,until Leuctra,remained a firm ally of Sparta. Athens' frustration as revealed by the testimony of Ephorus, Lysias and Isocrates was very real and was based upon serious political developments. Her irritation took a most vitriolic form in comedy and there is little doubt that much later anecdotal material originated from the Athenian stage. It is true that by 371 B. C., relations between Athens and Syracuse were of a more cordial nature. However, there is little doubt that the popular concept of the Syracusan despot had taken form.

A second influence upon the formation of the hostile tradition was the failure of Plato to effect the conversion of Dionysius II to his philosophical viewpoint. Dionysius was denounced by Speusippus as godless and wicked.[32] Demosthenes, attacking Aischines, likened his opponent to Dionysius. Indeed Aischines took offence at this comparison.[33] To Aristotle Dionysius had become the example of the demagogic tyrant.[34]

Certainly, Plato is the key to these late developments. To Plato, tyranny marked the ultimate corruption of the

civic body politic. Most interesting is the picture provided in the Republic.[35] Orators champion the people against the supposed designs of the rich. Allegations of an attack upon the tyrant's life follow, and a bodyguard is employed. The tyrant burdens the citizens with taxation, confiscates temples and stirs up wars to make the presence of strong leadership essential. Much of this corresponds to the picture in Diodorus' text: the ruse to obtain a bodyguard, the enrollment of foreign mercenaries, the deliberate attack upon the rich, the ignorance of the masses. However, in two respects, it differs. First, the patriotic element is entirely lacking. Second, no indication is provided of the oligarchic character of Dionysius' hegemony and of the support of Philistus. Thus by concentration of certain particulars and avoidance of others, Plato's portrait, in fact, marks a radical departure from that found in Diodorus. For this reason, it is dangerous to assume that the Platonic picture is found in Diodorus.[36] On the contrary, Plato took what suited him from Philistus or, indeed, from oral tradition, and by a process of skilful selection, considerably distorted the realities of the situation.

One clear example exists of Plato's ability to falsify facts. In the seventh letter, it is recorded that Dionysius I saved many Greek cities. The eighth letter also noted this fact.[37] Here it is stated that in the

crisis of 405 B. C., two strategoi autokratores were chosen. These were Dionysius and Hipparinus, the father of Dion. However, this point is not noted by Diodorus. According to the latter, only one strategos autokrator was chosen - Dionysius.

In fact, the connection between Dionysius and Hipparinus was later. In 405 B. C. Dionysius married Hermocrates' daughter and gave the latter's brother to his sister.[38] He, however, appears on the Athenian inscription of 393 B. C. honouring Dionysius.[39] This is accounted for by the fact that in 398 B. C. Dionysius had married Aristomache together with the Locrian, Doris.[40] Therefore, the connection with Dionysius dates from 398, and only took place after the death of Hermocrates' daughter.

In 367 B. C., Dion championed Aristomache's sons, Hipparinus and Nisaeus, Doris' son, DionysiusII, however, prevailed.[41] Thus it appears that Plato had a special reason for placing Hipparinus as a colleague of Dionysius in 405 B. C. His aim was probably to add to the validity of Dion's plan.[42]

The eighth letter notes after Dion's death, Plato's plan of dividing the monarchy between three priest kings.[43] They were to be the two sons of the elder Dionysius, on the one hand, and the grandson of Hipparinus and the son of Dion, on the other. This plan closely

resembles Dion's of 367 B. C.

It is further to be observed that when Diodorus notes the marriage of Dionysius to Aristomache, he does not mention Aristomache's father's name. He merely refers to her father as τῶν πολιτικῶν τὴν ἐπισημοτάτην.[44] As has been argued, Philistus' attitude is echoed. In other words, it might indicate the philosopher's view of the state was of no interest to the historian. To Plato, on the other hand, Hipparinus and Dion were the all important persons.

Certainly by the beginning of the third century, a considerable amount of hostile material had accumulated, originating from Athenian comedy and reinforced by the philosophic opposition. This hostile tradition appears to have found its way into peripatetic biography. We know that Phaenias wrote a work on the Sicilian tyrants and Satyrus wrote on the younger Dionysius. Unfortunately little is known about these works. It can be stated that the peripatetics were clearly gossipy writers, for gossips like Athenaeus preserved their traditions. Certainly the fashion of the time was to typify lives of luxury and the excesses of the absolutism of the tyrants. Phaenias' work on the Sicilian tyrants may thus have anticipated Suetonius' Caesars.[45]

The circumstances surrounding the growth of the anecdotal material indicates the importance of maintaining

caution in respect to their authenticity. The material is Athenian and not Sicilian and based upon comic fabrication, Platonic distortion and peripatetic interest in gossip.

The anecdotes themselves deal with the tyrant's personal relations with his family and friends, his tyrannical behaviour towards the citizens of his empire, and his cruelty in warfare. Most of them belong to the first group, where Dionysius is depicted as the suspicious monarch, secure behind his fortifications, mistrusting Philoxenus and Plato and even his old mother. The second group discusses the bodyguard, secret police and financial pressure imposed upon the citizens. Certainly, they reflect the classic picture of the tyrant, found in Plato and in Aristotle.[46] It has been suggested above that the picture of Dionysius' cruelty in war might derive from Philistus, and thus antedate the later developments.

In general, the anecdotes mostly represent the results of political theorizing and are rarely conceived in a critical light. The case of Leptines' death is certainly illustrative of the manner in which such traditions arose. Plutarch ascribes it to jealousy by the tyrant of his brother. Aelian says that Dionysius could have saved Leptines in the sea fight. Diodorus merely observes Leptines' brave death at Cronion, commanding one wing.[47] Thus it is clear that the early tradition,

probably representing Ephorus or Philistus, merely stated the fact that Leptines had the weaker force. Later sources elaborated this point with the result that Dionysius' placing of Leptines became a deliberate act, arising out of the tyrant's jealousy for his brother. The story of Plato's enslavement probably arose through similar circumstances.[48] The main point to stress is their unreliable nature, which stemmed from the fact that at their root lay Athenian comedy, philosophic theorizing and gossip, particularly associated with the peripatetics.

3. Timaeus

The development of the hostile tradition culminated with the history of Timaeus. The evidence of two fragments reveal clearly Timaeus' hostility towards Dionysius. The first fragment records the dream of a Himeraean woman.[49] We read how this lady saw Dionysius in heaven next to Zeus. He was red-haired and chained, and is described as the spirit of Sicily who, once freed, would ravage these lands. Later, when this woman saw him in person, she collapsed with a scream. Three months later she was dead, having been secretly murdered at Dionysius' orders.[50]

The second fragment notes the fact that the tragedian Euripides died in the same year in which Dionysius, the epitome of tragedy was born.[51]

Polybius supports the evidence of these two fragments, when he endeavours to show how Timaeus discovered

the traits of individuals from their writings.[52] Hence Homer is a glutton because he feasts his heroes constantly. Similarly Aristotle who provides recipes has culinary interests. Polybius also mentions Dionysius whose effeminate tastes, according to Timaeus, are revealed by his interests in bed hangings and the study of woven work. The reference is to Διονυσίος ὁ τυράννος and no doubt, as Walbank suggests, the elder Dionysius is clearly indicated.[53]

Consideration of Timaeus' hostility towards Dionysius is explained largely by personal factors. Indeed, it is illustrative of the changing ideals which characterized historical writing from the Classical to the Hellenistic periods. Thucydides, Philistus, Ephorus and Theopompus, despite their personal involvement in the happenings which they recorded, based their assessment of human achievement upon political considerations. In the case of Thucydides, for example, in spite of that historian's personal grievances against Cleon, it is clear that the main reason for Thucydides' hostility was based upon the premise that it was individuals of the Cleon-type that caused the collapse of Athens. Thucydides, further, was quite willing to oppose the policies of his probable kinsmen Cimon, because of his own belief that Periclean policy was the only hope of salvation for Athens. Similarly Theopompus' criticisms of Philip were clearly not based upon personal

motives. In fact, Theopompus greatly admired Philip. The attack upon Philip's private failings, as has been seen, was justified, according to Theopompus, by political considerations. Philistus' motivation is similarly to be delineated. There is no doubt that Philistus admired Dionysius and that his position depended upon maintenance of the tyranny. However, the evidence certainly suggests that the cause of the schism between the tyrant and his chief minister lay essentially in Philistus' ideological and political opposition to the tyrant's activities in South Italy.

Timaeus is, however, the product of a different age. In his history, personal experiences and animosity are the preeminent factors and it is, indeed, fortunate that the events of his life and those of his father are well-documented, for they explain clearly the cause of Timaeus' hostility towards Dionysius. Timaeus was the son of Andromachus, who,noted for his high mindedness and wealth, gathered the Naxian survivors who had escaped when their town had been destroyed by Dionysius, and colonized Tauromenium.[54] Further, it seems that Andromachus had helped Timoleon.[55] It certainly appears that Andromachus had been a tyrant. It is true that according to tradition, Timoleon was a hater of one-man-rule. This is the reason given for his murder of his brother who aspired to the tyranny of Corinth.[56] At the same time,

it is important to note that according to Marcellinus, Timaeus praised Timoleon immoderately because he had not overthrown the one-man-rule of his father Andromachus.[57]

Other evidence exists, which proves beyond a doubt that Timaeus' hero was Timoleon.[58] At one point, Polybius informs his readers that Timaeus exalted his hero above the gods, and at the same time had the nerve to convict Callisthenes of flattery.[59] Plutarch, speaking about the acts of Timoleon, says, quoting Timaeus, that if the distressing incident about Timoleon's brother is omitted, Sophocles' words "o gods, what love and affection was joined in him", might be applied to him.[60] Finally, Cicero, writing to L. Lucceius, the historian, expresses the wish that somebody should do for him what Timaeus had done for Timoleon and Herodotus for Themistocles.[61]

It is thus clear that the personal experiences of Timaeus' father rendered Timaeus automatically hostile to the memory of the Dionysii. It is, moreover, most probable that Timaeus received his information from his father personally.[62] Two conclusions result. First, Timaeus' treatment of the Dionysii was highly subjective in comparison with Philistus' Περὶ Διονυσίου Second, the tradition about Timoleon is similarly suspect, in spite of the fact that it formed the basis for the two biographies of Timoleon by Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos, as well as for Diodorus' account.[63]

Timaeus' own experiences under Agathocles tended to reinforce the historian's antagonism towards the Dionysii. Polybius and Diodorus both note that Timaeus was extremely antagonistic towards Agathocles.[64] That this should have been so is not strange. Agathocles, it appears. was the man who banished Timaeus from Sicily. Diodorus says that Timaeus was banished from Sicily by Agathocles.[65] Polybius and Plutarch provide us with information as to Timaeus' whereabouts during these years. Polybius, quoting the thirty-fourth book of Timaeus, notes that Timaeus lived for fifty years in Athens.[66] Plutarch states that Timaeus wrote his history in Athens.[67] Thus it is clear that Timaeus was banished by Agathocles from Sicily and that he spent his exile in Athens.[68]

There is little doubt that the exile affected his attitude in his history towards Agathocles to a considerable extent.[69] It has already been seen that Polybius and Diodorus noted Timaeus' excessive bias against Agathocles. We have, moreover, some evidence of the methods employed by Timaeus in blackening the portrait of Agathocles. Evidently he took delight in stressing Agathocles' lowly origins. He noted how the tyrant began life as a potter, and then abandoned the smoke and clay to come to Syracuse.[70] According to Polybius, Timaeus erred in regarding lowly origins as a disgrace. To elevate oneself as Agathocles had done was an act worthy of praise.[71]

The account given by Diodorus of Agathocles' childhood seems to derive from Timaeus. It is recorded how Carcinus of Rhegium, when his wife was pregnant, requested some Carthaginians to ask at Delphi about the future of his unborn child. The oracle is recorded to have foretold the distress which the boy would bring upon the Carthaginians and all Sicily. The story goes on to narrate how the mother hid the boy from his father who later acknowledged him. It is then noted that Agathocles became a potter. This event was followed by the death of his father. He took Syracusan citizenship at the time when Timoleon offered it. His mother then dedicated a statue, around whose hips bees swarmed. This was interpreted as a sign of future greatness.[72]

The motifs of the pregnancy, of the swarm of bees, of the foretelling of the future greatness of Agathocles, as I have shown, all resemble Philistus.[73] The emphasis upon the idea that Sicily and Carthage will suffer distress from the man clearly echoes Timaeus.[74] It seems that Timaeus used Philistus and transformed his account to fit in with his own thesis. Indeed, as will be shown below, evidence does exist indicating how Timaeus distorted Philistus to establish the validity of his account of Dionysius. It is thus clear that this passage of Diodorus appears to derive from Timaeus.

A final passage to be noted also comes from Diodorus.[75]

The text notes that Agathocles ended his life in a manner fitting his wickedness. As Timaeus is quoted immediately afterwards, there is no reason to doubt that this phrase, if it does not reproduce Timaeus, directly echoes him.

It is thus apparent that the hostility which appears in Timaeus' history towards Agathocles was the result of the historian's own experiences at the hands of that despot. Timaeus' hostility towards tyranny as such may have been further increased upon his consideration of his father's position as regards Dionysius II and Timoleon. It clearly resulted in the historian's unbounded admiration for Timoleon. Further, it is clear that not only were Agathocles and Dionysius II the objects of Timaeus' hostility. It has been seen that the attitude of Timaeus towards Dionysius I was a none-too-friendly one. Clearly to Timaeus, Dionysius was a tragedy for Sicily.

Two other facts clearly influenced Timaeus' political viewpoint towards the Sicilian tyrants. First, the influence of contemporary Athenian society must have been of considerable importance. It is interesting to observe that Timaeus praised Demosthenes and the orators, but condemned Callisthenes for paying divine honours to Alexander.[76] It is thus clear that he was opposed to Alexander. Hence, as Momigliano suggests, his hatred for Dionysius corresponded to Athenian sentiment.[77] Thus Timaeus showed a distinct lack of interest in the Orient and

the absolute monarchs, and directed his polemics against Aristotle, Callisthenes, the philo-Macedonian Theophrastus and Theopompus. His favouritism towards Timoleon and Hermocrates was quite consistent with this attitude.[78] Second, Timaeus' favour towards Rome elucidates the nature of his attitude to the Sicilian tyrants. It results from his indifference to the great monarchies and his hatred of tyrants. The result was inevitable admiration for a republic like Rome.[79]

Timaeus' approach to his task was clearly facilitated by the fact that he spent his exile in Athens. Indeed, it seems likely that his picture of Dionysius was more Athenian than Sicilian. The fact that Athens was the storehouse of hostile tradition, and the fact that Timaeus' bookishness is well-attested, indicates that the books in which Dionysius was discussed, reflected the Athenian viewpoint. We may conjecture that a Platonic or Aristotelian Dionysius emerged, and that the narrative contained a considerable amount of material derived from the Athenian comedy. The two fragments of the Himeraean woman and the synchronization of the tyrant's birth with the death of Euripides clearly indicate the nature of the material contained in Timaeus' exposition.

Timaeus' work, moreover, took the form of a polemic against Philistus. Timaeus certainly considered Philistus tedious and clumsy. Diodorus noted the difference of

opinion between the two historians about the question whether or not the Sicani were the first inhabitants of Sicily. Finally, Plutarch noted that Timaeus slandered Philistus because the latter was zealous and faithful to the tyranny.[80]

Thus it is clear that Timaeus read Philistus. The last citation is especially significant. It indicates the fact that, although Timaeus used Philistus, his estimate of the tyrant differed radically from that of the earlier historian.

Two examples illustrative of Timaeus' method of effective change in Philistus' account are to be observed.[81] Theon, the Alexandrian grammarian, notes the lavish funeral of Dionysius and quotes as his authority the eleventh book of Philistus.[82] Now Moschion notes the same story, quoting, however, Timaeus.[83] Plutarch mentions this on the authority of Philistus. He says οἷον τραγῳδίας μεγάλης τῆς τυραννίδος ἔξόδιον θεατρικὸν γενομένην.[84] This certainly cannot come from Philistus. On the contrary, it appears that Plutarch had read Timaeus, for as has been seen, it was Timaeus who regarded Dionysius' tyranny as a great tragedy.

Clearly Timaeus tampered with Philistus. The same subject received distinctly different treatment by the two historians. To Philistus, Dionysius received a funeral fitting his greatness. To Timaeus, on the other hand, it formed a brilliant conclusion to the tragedy of

his tyranny. Plutarch, in fact, took over the polemic of Timaeus against Philistus.

The example noted above provides an instance of Timaeus' ability, not so much to falsify as to alter his source's comments. On one occasion, Timaeus actually falsifies his evidence. Though Philistus is not cited, it is most likely that Timaeus is dealing with Philistus. Certainly, he is changing a more favourable source's opinion. I refer to the description of the death of Dionysius in Plutarch's Dion.[85] We read that Dion failed to confer with Dionysius in the interest of Aristomache's children because of the intervention of the physicians who wanted to gain the confidence of the younger Dionysius. Timaeus, however, not satisfied with describing the friends of Dionysius II as flatterers, goes further and accuses them of murder. Plutarch is quite clear of the fact that the tradition that the physicians murdered Dionysius derives ultimately from Timaeus.[86]

Though it is possible that Timaeus used Ephorus and Theopompus, it is clear that Timaeus' interest was centred upon Philistus. Two facts particularly influenced this decision. First, it was advisable to employ a Sicilian source whose information was fuller. Theopompus' testimony was, moreover, severely limited in that information prior to Dionysius' debut was absent. Second, Philistus' view of Dionysius proved to represent the exact

antithesis of Timaeus'. Hence Timaeus' refutation of Philistus' testimony was imperative. As has been seen in the case of the issue of the Sicani, it is clear that Timaeus' polemic was certainly not confined to consideration of Dionysius' career.

Thus three characteristics are particularly to be associated with the Timaeus tradition. First, Timaeus was able to offer a different interpretation of the facts recorded by Philistus. Secondly, he does not seem to have been averse to actually falsifying the evidence of his predecessor. Third, he could make use of the hostile literature contained in the libraries of his country of refuge.

It is, moreover, possible that Timaeus' history offered a carefully developed theory of decline and that the historian's views on Dionysius are merely part of this scheme.[87] Two subjects discussed by Timaeus would tend to suggest such a pattern: Acragas and Empedocles.

There is no doubt that Timaeus discussed Acragas and that the excursus as found in Diodorus appeared in the pages of Timaeus, even though, as has been suggested, they derive ultimately from Philistus. Four points would indicate this. First, Timaeus appears to have written about Acragantine affluence in a corresponding part of his history.[88] Second, Diodorus is not alone in attributing the information about this subject to Timaeus. It is clear

that Timaeus' notices on Empedocles are also found in book fifteen.[89] Aelian, quoting Timaeus, refers to the same strigils and oil flasks as Diodorus.[90] Both Diogenes Laertius and Diodorus receive information about racehorses from Timaeus. Diogenes Laertius mentions the racehorses of Empedocles' grandfather and namesake and refers to his father, Meton's victory at the seventy-first Olympiad.[91] This citation may be compared to Diodorus' reference to the fact that Exaenetus of Acragas won the stadion in the ninety-second Olympiad.[92]

Third, it is to be noted that the other references in Diodorus to the wealth of Acragas - the notice on the bull of Phalaris - in book thirteen is quoted on the authority of Timaeus.[93]

Finally, as has been observed in the analysis of Diodorus' text, a condemnatory tone prevails throughout the excursus. As such, it has been suggested that it derives from Philistus. Timaeus, however, clearly employed it for his own purpose, to epitomize the Siceliot failure in the fourth and third centuries.

Timaeus' viewpoint is similarly discernible in his account of Empedocles. We read in Diogenes Laertius that Timaeus claimed that Empedocles displayed opposite views on politics and poetry. In the former, he appeared modest and reasonable; in the latter, boastful and conceited. He declared Χαίρετ' ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητὸς πωλεῦμαι.[94]

Timaeus, moreover, denied the stories about Empedocles' death. There appear to have been two accounts. According to Heracleides Ponticus, a sacrifice took place in the field of Peisianax, following Empedocles' raising of a woman from the dead. While the company slept, Empedocles disappeared. Later a servant remembered that he had heard a voice calling Empedocles in the night and seen a light in the sky, together with the glow of torches. After this, a certain Pausanias ordered that divine honours be paid the philosopher. According to Hippobatus, Empedocles jumped into the crater of Mount Aetna, soon after which one of his sandals was thrown out.

Timaeus doubted the authenticity of these accounts. First, he argued that the origin of these stories is to be connected with the fact that Empedocles disappeared mysteriously in the Peloponnese. Second, it is this which accounts for the fact that there is in existence no tomb. Third, Peisianax was a Syracusan and not an Acragantine. Finally, Timaeus claimed that Empedocles would not have jumped into a crater to which he never referred.[95]

Timaeus' hostility to Empedocles is clearly revealed in his account of Empedocles' political conversion. According to Aristotle, he was a champion of freedom, hating one-man-rule of every kind. Xanthus of Lydia said that he declined the kingship because he preferred a frugal

life. Timaeus, however, associated Empedocles' induction into politics with his annoyance at a dinner table. He records how the host required that the wine be drunk only after a certain guest had arrived. Empedocles disapproved. The man upon arrival was pronounced to be master of the feast. Empedocles now declined to drink at the man's bidding. Given the alternative of drinking or being drenched with the wine, Empedocles accused his host of attempting to set up a tyranny, and the latter was sentenced to death together with his master.[96]

This is a difficult episode to comprehend clearly. Two points are, however, significant. First, it illustrates the extreme luxury which existed in Acragas. It would, therefore, appear to come from the same pen as the account in Diodorus. A similar emphasis upon the demoralizing aspect of this excess of wealth is apparent. At the same time, the picture given of Empedocles is a none toofavourable one.

Finally, it is to be observed that Timaeus noted that Empedocles was excluded from the discussions of the Pythagoreans because he stole his master's discourses.[97]

The main point to observe about these citations is that they are distinctly hostile to the preeminent Acragantine. Empedocles is accused of being conceited. Timaeus is sceptical about the stories of his death. His political conversion is a result of his irritation at a dinner table.

His intellectual abilities were so small that he had to resort to employing the ideas of his master.

This hostility is especially interesting when considered by the side of Polybius' remarks about Timaeus' attitude towards the preeminent personalities of Sicily. He remarks:

> "Timaeus introduces such long speeches and shows such zeal in making Sicily the greater part of Hellas, and the deeds there the more conspicuous than those in the rest of the world and the Sicilian men as the wisest amongst those most distinguished for wisdom, and the Syracusans as the greatest and most outstanding leaders amongst the statesman." 98

The evidence concerning Timaeus' attitude towards Dionysius, Empedocles and Acragantine prosperity openly contradicts this statement. It implies the fact that Timaeus certainly looked with disfavour upon the events in Sicily from the end of the fifth century B. C. It would seem that his attitude towards Acragas and Empedocles was determined by that which he bore towards Dionysius and Agathocles. In an attempt to discover the cause of the Siceliot collapse before the tyrants, he assumed it to be the result of failure within the Siceliot camp. Certainly to Timaeus, Dionysius was a tragedy for Sicily. The tragedy which was Dionysius, however, was only part of the general tragedy of the Siceliot decline. Hence his attitude towards Acragas and its distinguished personality, Empedocles. The only Siceliot who lived in the fourth century and received

Timaeus' praise was Timoleon, and, as has been seen, the historian's motives appear to have been personal.

It is thus clear that when it suited Timaeus, he adopted the sentiments expressed by his chief source, Philistus. Hence the Acragantine excursus, which clearly originated from Philistus, was assimilated into the scheme of Timaeus. Its role had, however, changed. To Philistus, it represented the Siceliot failure which rendered necessary the person of Dionysius. To Timaeus, Acragas, Empedocles and Dionysius were all part of one malady.

The details known about the chronology of Timaeus' history tends to confirm the impression that Timaeus' main aim was to concentrate upon the woes which overtook Sicily in her later days. Certainly, the historian's emphasis upon more recent events stemmed from the obvious fact that information for the earlier period was inevitably more scarce. However, the personal factor counted clearly for a great deal.[99]

Fragment 18 refers to the battle of Helorus in which Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, defeated Syracuse. The scholiast cites book ten.[100] Fragment 21 notes how Gelon gave his sisters in marriage to Aristonous and Cronicus. The second book is quoted. Perhaps for β,(ι)β should be substituted.[101] Therefore this fragment would appear to come from the twelfth book. The reference to Hykkara in fragments 23 and 24 in book thirteen seems to correspond

to the reference in Thucydides.[102] Therefore it refers to the Sicilian expedition.

Thus far, the following facts can be established. Book ten dealt with the end of the sixth and the early fifth centuries. Book eleven discussed Gelon and Hieron. The fragment on the marriage would appear to refer to the succession crisis. Hence it can be concluded that book twelve discussed the death of Hieron. Probably the first Athenian expedition to Sicily was also dealt with in book twelve and the great expedition occupied book thirteen.

Diodorus places a reference to the wealth and hospitality of Tellias of Acragas in book fifteen. Clearly we are here dealing with the Punic siege of Acragas. Therefore the wars against Selinus and Himera were placed in the fourteenth book, while the second invasion occupied book fifteen.[103] De Sanctis has disposed of the problem of the fragment concerning the woman of Himera's dream. ζ should be (ι)ζ. Instead of six, sixteen is referred to. Equally difficult to accept is Polybius' attribution of Hermocrates' speech at Gela and Timoleon's speech to book twenty-one.[104] Thus most scholars argue that Polybius is in error. In the first place, it is unlikely that the two speeches were placed in the same book. Second, while Hermocrates' speech is much more likely to be in books thirteen, fifteen or sixteen, the speech of Timoleon is probably between books twenty-two

and twenty-eight.[105]

Fragment 32 on Damocles' flattery of Dionysius II is placed in book twenty-two.[106] Thus book twenty-two began the account of Dionysius II. It follows that books sixteen to twenty-one covered the period of Dionysius I.

Thirty-eight books are cited, and it is unlikely that more existed. Diodorus, when discussing the bias of Timaeus towards Agathocles, observes that Timaeus dealt with Agathocles in five books.[107] Therefore, it would appear that books thirty-four to thirty-eight covered Agathocles. It follows that books twenty-two to thirty-three covered the period 366 to 317 B. C., and it is possible, as Walbank has suggested, that Timoleon was discussed in books twenty-two to twenty-eight.[108] Certainly books twenty-two to thirty-three averaged an Olympiad per book.

The details devoted to these years is understandable in view of Timaeus' sympathies for Timoleon and his interest in the reconstruction after the "hateful" rule of the Dionysii.[109] Moreover, it is not difficult to comprehend why Agathocles was treated much more briefly, and only an average of five and a half years were spent on each book. First, there is the fact of Timaeus' disgrace and exile from Sicily. Certainly, as Kothe observed, all connections with Sicily were severed and the historian's friends were either dead or killed by Agathocles.[110] Second, a consequence

of Timaeus' exile was his complete ignorance of military affairs. Hence he is unlikely to have provided much information about Agathocles' military campagins. Finally, the great hatred which he bore towards Agathocles is likely to have stifled any attempt to dwell in detail and provide prominence to Agathocles' defence of the Siceliots against Carthage.

Thus it is clear that books fourteen to thirty-eight dealt with the period of Siceliot failure. Clearly then, the decline of Western Hellenism was the subject which interested Timaeus most.

There is little doubt that Timaeus' chief theme appealed strongly to a certain element in third and second century Rome, as a result of which Philistus' works, which began to appear considerably dated, were almost totally eclipsed. Clearly this interest stemmed from the historian's view of Rome which in Timaeus' scheme bore an intimate relationship with the problem of the Siceliot decline. Dionysius of Halicarnassus notes that Timaeus was the first historian after Hieronymus to discuss Roman antiquity.[111] As Jacoby has noted, it is Timaeus' interest in the fortunes of Rome that, above all, justify the importance which was attributed to him.[112] Timaeus appears to have been the first to have appreciated the importance of the emerging Rome. Timaeus' appreciation of Rome's importance was no mean achievement, in that the historian anticipated Polybius

in a conclusion which was far more evident after the wars with Hannibal, Antiochus and Perseus.

Timaeus certainly penetrated Rome in the third century with the Roman conquest of Sicily. The history must have appealed to the philhellenist group of Roman aristocrats, and thus have exerted considerable influence upon Fabius Pictor.[113] The theme which criticized one-man rule clearly harmonized with Roman feelings towards effeminate Hellenistic kingship. Indeed, Timaeus' hostility towards the tyrants of the West brought in its wake, at the very least, disinterest in the Graeco-Macedonian monarchies and sympathy for the emerging republic of Rome. Of significance is the date which ended Timaeus' work. The ancient enemy of the Greeks now faced Pome. After the defeat of one enemy, Pyrrhus, now the older enemy, Carthage was confronted by Rome. Rome thus emerged as the champion of the Greeks against their old enemy.

Timaeus' popularity is above all indicated by the fact that Polybius saw fit to devote one half of his twelfth book to criticizing him.[114] On one occasion, Polybius complains that Timaeus' reputation resides in the fact that he was able to criticize earlier writers.[115] It results from his ability to employ illogical arguments and appear to tell the truth.[116] Finally, Polybius asks how could a man like Timaeus acquire such a reputation - a

man who has the nerve to call himself an historian?[117]

The importance which was attributed to Timaeus is also indicated by the fact that Polybius states that he will begin his work at the point when the Romans first crossed from Italy, in the one hundred and twenty-ninth Olympiad,[118] the two introductory books bridging the gap where Timaeus left off. The fact that Polybius saw himself as the successor of Timaeus is in itself an admission by the later historian of the fact that Timaeus was recognized as the foremost historian at that time.[119]

Polybius' hostility can only be justified if it is argued that Polybius' contention was based upon considerations of authenticity. Thus Levi argued that at the root of this hostility lay Polybius' conception of the pragmatic function of historiography.[120] Indeed, Polybius argued that history, when robbed of truth, was an idle tale.[121] Thus he accused Philinus and Fabius Pictor of neglecting the virtue of impartiality, from which utility derived. For the same reason, Polybius felt that a knowledge of places and public service was necessary. Hence Timaeus' bookishness was attacked. Within this scheme can be found Polybius' attack upon rhetoric, which had certainly characterized historical writing since Isocrates. Polybius classified historians in two camps: those giving false facts through ignorance and those intending to falsify.[122] Timaeus was accused of following the persuasive school. As a result,

Timaeus' false speeches were attacked.[123] It is thus clear that Polybius' desire for authenticity led to his attack on the bookishness, rhetorical tendencies and ignorance of geography and public service of Timaeus.

More important is the personal element, where again Polybius clearly betrayed himself to be a successor of Timaeus.[124] First, there is the fact that Polybius' universal outlook resulted in automatic resentment of the fact that such great popularity accrued to an historian who made Sicily and Magna Graecia the centre of the stage. Certainly to Polybius, Timaeus was a typical provincial, possessing a refugee mentality, a romantic at Athens, unconcerned with the major political developments of the Hellenistic East.

This is undoubtedly an unfair criterion by which to judge Timaeus. In the first place, it is a most narrow utilitarian point of view which ignored the Herodotean type of interest in the past for its own sake. More important is the fact that Timaeus' theme was a great one. Under Dionysius I and Agathocles, Sicily had become a Mediterranean power and discussion of the conflict between Greek and barbarian in the West was certainly not reflective of a provincial approach.[125]

Two other factors are clearly most pertinent. Timaeus was regarded as an authority on early Rome and as such anticipated Polybius in a conclusion which had

become more evident by the time Polybius began to compose his history. Further, Polybius was clearly irritated by the fact that Timaeus was the man who first drew attention to the West.

That the personal element underlies Polybius' attack upon Timaeus is clear. For similar reasons, he assaulted Theopompus for his attack upon Philip and his inability to appreciate the role of the rising power of Macedon.[126] Similarly, Polybius was not perturbed by Aratus of Sicyon's attack upon his former ally, Antigonus Doson.[127] Personal factors also account for Polybius' hostility towards Philip V. The latter was the benefactor of the Peloponnese against Sparta, and Greece and not Philip should, in Polybius' eyes, have been the centre of history.

It must be stressed that Polybius was considerably indebted to Timaeus. As has been seen, he saw fit to continue from the point where the earlier historian left off. Further, the vitriolic attacks upon Timaeus were clearly derived from Timaeus' own techniques. Timaeus, though in the tradition of the logographers and Herodotus as regards geographical interest, certainly foreshadowed Polybius and Poseidonius in this respect. Finally, Timaeus' place in the development of historiography was secured by his formulation of a precise chronological scheme.

Thus Timaeus, in spite of rhetorical tendencies, his

provincialism, bookishness, personal ignorance of geography, his prejudice against the tyrants and his adulation of Timoleon, was clearly a major figure of the Greek literary scene in the third century.[128] Most important are the two facts that his political ideology appealed strongly to the third and second century Roman mind, and that Polybius was himself considerably indebted to Timaeus, despite his polemic against him. In such circumstances, it is clear that Philistus' ideological position was almost totally eclipsed, and it might appear initially that Diodorus' main, if not sole source, was inevitably Timaeus.

Certainly, it cannot be denied that Diodorus used Timaeus. The evidence of the citations from the thirteenth and fourteenth books and Diodorus' advice on the necessity of caution as regards the Agathocles books, clearly indicates this.[129] Yet, as has been argued above, it is most inadvisable to assume on the basis of the Timaeus fragments that the whole text derives from Timaeus or that Timaeus is the major influence upon Diodorus. Further, as has been seen, there is no doubt that Diodorus saw the accounts of Ephorus and Theopompus - a fact which supports the chief contention of this thesis, that Philistus was used by Diodorus.

Certainly the fragments of Timaeus as found in Diodorus' thirteenth and fourteenth books suggest Diodorus' use of Timaeus. Most of these references concern a

difference of opinion over numbers between Timaeus and other authorities, notably Ephorus. Ephorus provided the more adventurous figures and Timaeus defended the more cautious estimate. This indicates that Diodorus betrayed interest in the debate and that he, therefore, singled out Timaeus as the authority championing the conservative viewpoint.[130] Similarly, he consulted Timaeus on Acragas' wealth. Indeed to Timaeus, this episode played a key role in determining the Siceliot failure. However to conclude from such references that the excursus derives from Timaeus alone is most unwise in view of the adequate testimony indicating Timaeus' ignorance of geography. Further, it is certainly hazardous, on the basis of a few citations, to suggest that Timaeus' political thought is reflected throughout the text.

Indeed certain more positive factors preclude the assumption of such a conclusion. First, the fact is that hostility to Dionysius as such is noticeably absent until the later chapters of the fourteenth book and is only fully apparent in the fifteenth book. Had the influence of Timaeus been decisive upon Diodorus, information of the type which ultimately derived from Athenian comedy, Platonic moral censure and gossipy details such as characterized Hellenistic literature, would have been expected. Yet the emphasis throughout is upon the effectiveness of Dionysius in combating Carthage and defending Western Hellenism. It is true that a change of tone is discernible in the

narrative of the Italian war. Yet even here, it has been suggested, that the influence of Philistus is most probable.

Second, it has been shown that Timaeus dealt with Dionysius in six books. Philistus, on the other hand, devoted four books to discussing the tyrant. Most probably Timaeus dealt more fully with Dionysius' later years, and at least two books were devoted to these two decades. Yet the influence of such material upon Diodorus' text is negligible. Indeed, the fact that the full narrative ends at the point where Philistus went into exile suggests the use by Diodorus of Philistus and not Timaeus. It has been argued by certain scholars, that this fact merely indicates that Timaeus relied on Philistus, and that, therefore, his own narrative was obliged to impose upon itself the limitations of Philistus. Yet no source indicates such a possibility. The fact is that Timaeus had at his disposal a new type of material of an inferior nature which could fill adequately the lacuna left by Philistus, and had Diodorus relied upon Timaeus, he could have employed this evidence to discuss the period 387/67 B. C. It is true that Timaeus used Philistus. However, it is significant that the examples of Timaeus' ability to falsify Philistus are found in Plutarch and not Diodorus' text. A final fact to observe is that by the time Diodorus composed his Bibliotheke, Timaeus' primacy as an historian of the West had been effectively challenged by a revival of interest in Philistus.

Political circumstances, it has been shown, favoured this revival of interest in Philistus, a fact to which the evidence of Cicero, Cornelius Nepos and Dionysius of Halicarnassus provides adequate testimony. Moreover, a clear tendency to revise the picture which had achieved popularity in the Hellenistic world, is apparent. Nepos, who, as has been seen, almost certainly read Philistus and seems to have been greatly influenced by him, is the most conspicuous example. He describes Dionysius as a brave and skilful commander, averse to sensuality, luxury and avarice, covetous of nothing, able to preserve his power with good fortune and live to over sixty, without seeing the funeral of any of his offspring. The domain is described as existing in a flourishing condition. In general, this is a very different picture from that suggested by the preface to Diodorus' fourteenth book, and the anecdotes concerning the mistrustful despot, ravaging Sicily and oppressing its inhabitants with mercenaries and taxes. According to Cornelius Nepos, Dionysius was "nullius rei cupidus nisi singularis perpetuique imperii".

Cicero who similarly read Philistus, in spite of the fact that he was not averse to accepting the hostile testimony upon occasion, wrote "de hoc homine a bonis auctoribus sic scriptum accepimus summam fuisse eius in victu temperantiam."[131] The case of Plutarch is not dissimilar. On the one hand, he was quite prepared to

employ the hostile legacy: on the other hand, he certainly saw Philistus' history, and, as has been seen, warned his readers against the excesses of the Timaeus bias. It is, moreover, clear that he was strongly influenced by the tradition stemming from Philistus. At one point, Dionysius censures his son for violating the wife of a Syracusan citizen, warning him that such actions will lead to his inability to inherit his father's empire. He advises his son that "drinking cups do not make a friend; that resolute action is necessary; that the soul when relaxed, is like a bow which breaks, when too tightly stretched." Dionysius, moreover, wrote a letter to Speusippus condemning his hedonism. Plutarch also records a conversation between Philip II and Dionysius II about Dionysius' avoidance of drink.[132] It is possible that Theopompus' censure of the younger Dionysius is here reflected: at the same time, the Philistus portrait is more than hinted at. The main point to stress is that the Timaeus tradition appears to have been seriously challenged, as a result of which a less hostile attitude associated largely with Philistus towards the elder Dionysius was clearly apparent.

Thus it is clear that the chief authorities on Dionysius I, Ephorus, Theopompus and Timaeus were all seen by Diodorus. It is possible that the less distinguished representatives, Polycritus of Mende and Silenus of Caleacte

are also represented.[133] Also he might have seen the works of Dionysius I, Hermias of Methymna and Alcimus Siculus. Polybius might also have been used. Certainly, Diodorus' citation of Polycritus suggests that he might have seen this authority.[134] The fact that he does mention Philistus frequently combined with the fact that Philistus was enjoying a significant revival in popularity in the first century certainly indicates use by Diodorus of the testimony of Dionysius' minister. In such a context Diodorus' reference to τινες has a very real validity.[135] Clearly Diodorus consulted a number of sources at a time. Moreover, it has been argued that definite evidence exists of Diodorus' personal contribution.[136]

The fact that Diodorus consulted a number of authorities need not, however, be indicative of equal influence exerted by each of these sources. It can, therefore, on the basis of the analysis and identification with Philistus, be concluded that the authority upon whom Diodorus relied the most was Philistus. Certainly, he adopted Philistus' political sentiments to a considerable degree, while those traditions which were hostile to Dionysius and reached fruition in the Hellenistic age and are especially associated with Timaeus, exercised a minimum amount of influence upon Diodorus.

VII

DIODORUS' HISTORIOGRAPHICAL AIMS AND THE PLACE OF THE ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΟΥ IN THE BIBLIOTHEKE

In the preceding chapter, an attempt has been made to answer the question of the number of sources employed by Diodorus for his account of Dionysius I and to assess the extent of their influence. It has been concluded that Diodorus was fairly catholic in his taste, consulting the testimonies of Philistus, Timaeus, Ephorus, Theopompus and Polybius, and possibly the evidence of Polycritus of Mende, Hermias of Methymna, Alcimus Siculus and Silenus as well. However, it has been further noted that, despite employment of many authorities for Sicilian history, the evidence strongly suggests that Philistus was the source exerting the major influence upon Diodorus.

These two conclusions raise a number of issues which involve a consideration of Diodorus' Bibliotheke as a whole, and which ultimately have an important influence upon motives determining Diodorus' preponderant use of Philistus as a source for his account of Dionysius I. First, it must be asked whether it was, indeed, the practice of Diodorus to consult numerous sources for his narrative as our analysis has suggested? Second, there is the problem of what determined the choice of a source

on Diodorus' part? Third, and as a consequence of the second question, did Diodorus impose his own scheme upon his history? Finally, in the light of our solutions to these problems, can Diodorus' choice of Philistus as his principal source be explained as deriving from considerations of Diodorus' historiographical objectives?

Diodorus' use of many authorities is well illustrated by a consideration of the prefaces of the Bibliotheke. Since the preface contains the exposition of the historian's philosophy of history, it clearly constitutes vital evidence regarding the extent of the historian's indebtedness to a single or many sources. Laqueur argued that Diodorus received his prefaces from Ephorus.[1] His claim has little validity since it presupposes the fact that Ephorus was the only authority to write such a type of preface.[2] Moreover, it is clear that the influence of Timaeus is also to be found. Polybius notes the preface of Timaeus' sixth book which took the form of a defence of declamatory writing and an attack upon Ephorus. Both subjects appear in the prooemium to Diodorus' twentieth book. Moreover, as Kuntz has observed, both Diodorus and Timaeus discussed individual aspects of their research, such as the difficulties encountered in collecting their evidence. Even the κατὰ γένος arrangement need not be regarded as specifically deriving from Ephorus, since the same method is found in the geographical introduction of the first two books of Timaeus'

history.[3]

It is, moreover, clear that the prefaces of Diodorus do not follow a consistent pattern. Whereas the prefaces to books sixteen and seventeen are in the form of an encomium to the heroes of these books, Philip and Alexander, books eleven to fifteen and eighteen to thirty-two seem to merely state the themes. Books one to three are mere summaries, while four and five discuss historiographical themes. The prooemium to the whole work in book one is most strange. This consists of a praise of history, a polemic against Diodorus' predecessors, a personal declaration, a summary of the whole work, a note on chronology and a capitatio benevolentiae. Yet a clear statement of the basic method employed is missing. The personality which emerges in book sixteen and seventeen is noticeably absent. The problem of the kata genos method in relation to the annalistic method is not discussed. It is not difficult to agree with Kunz's observation, "Etwas vom wichtigsten fehlt also in diesem Prooemium."[4]

Polybius could certainly have constituted the main influence upon Diodorus in the first prooemium. Thus both historians discuss their respective travels[5] and the fact that historians have erred because of their ignorance of geography.[6] Similarly, they both declared that, although most writers were concerned with individual wars, they had concentrated upon the interconnection of political events.[7]

Finally, both stress the importance of the whole and universal rather than the parts and particulars.[8]

The change in the nature of the prefaces in books sixteen and seventeen is easily explained. The termination of the history of Ephorus necessitated the employment of a new source. Clearly, Ephorus could not be employed for passages which he did not himself write.

Finally, it is clear that other sources introduced their narratives by similar procedures and there is no reason to doubt that Diodorus saw their products. Callisthenes, in his general prooemium, discussed the basic historiographical question which, as has been seen, Diodorus ignored.[9] Theopompus in the Philippica gave proof of his qualifications, introduced polemics against his predecessors and an encomium on Philip, the central figure of this work, and summarized the narrative that was to follow.[10] Duris offered a defence of tragic history against Ephorus' and Theopompus' method.[11] Cratippus gave a personal statement and effected a comparison with his predecessors.[12] Polybius discussed the importance and usefulness of history and the historian's own personal methods in composing his history.[13] Dionysius of Halicarnassus took as his subject the worth of history, criticized his predecessors and gave a personal declaration of his own personal technique of historiography.[14]

Diodorus was thus the inheritor of Hellenistic

methodology, and it is a gross oversimplification to declare that Diodorus' use of the prooemium derives from Ephorus.[15] The simple fact that Ephorus was not a source for the later part of Diodorus' history and, in fact, could only be used for books eleven to sixteen strengthens the validity of this opinion. Thus consideration of Diodorus' use of the prooemium indicates that Diodorus used many sources.

The same argument would apply to the claim that Ephorus' moralizing tendencies appear in Diodorus' text. Other historians, Theopompus and Timaeus, as has been seen, were also accustomed to moralize, and it cannot be concluded simply that this tendency alone is reflective of one particular source. Similarly, the practice of effecting praise or blame cannot be associated with Ephorus, when, for example, Caesar is praised by Diodorus.[16] Indeed, it will be shown below that Diodorus' own scheme accounts for such tendencies and that he deliberately used sources which would supply him with material to effect agreement with the central thesis of his work.

It is thus apparent that Diodorus did not limit himself in any way as far as his sources were concerned. If necessary, he consulted a large number of authorities. The prefaces certainly reflect the views of a considerable number of sources, and the basic themes of the Bibliotheke cannot be simply attributed to one particular source. This

data thus confirms the conclusion arrived at through the detailed examination of the chapters dealing with Dionysius I, where it was shown that Philistus, Timaeus, Ephorus, Theopompus, Polybius, Polycritus of Mende and possibly Hermias, Alcimus and Silenus were all consulted.

The problem, therefore, is to determine what considerations induced Diodorus to select a particular source for the composition of his history. Two reasons, can, in fact, be provided. First, there is the obvious fact of the availability and popularity of a particular historian's work. For this reason, Diodorus obviously chose a source like Ephorus for the history of Greece until the siege of Perinthus of 341 B. C., supplemented by Demophilus' account of the Social War and Hieronymus of Cardia for the Diadochi, and Polybius for the narrative of the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean. For the same reason, the popularity of Timaeus in the Roman world renders inevitable Diodorus' use of that writer's narrative. However, modern historians tend to forget that a revival in Philistus' popularity is a notable characteristic of the years in which Diodorus flourished. Consequently omission of Philistus' testimony is most unlikely.

Equally important is the fact that Diodorus appears to have selected his material to correspond with the main purpose of the Bibliotheke. Here the problem of the unity in thought in Diodorus emerges. One aim of Diodorus was

certainly to present a clear and concise account in order that his reader might avoid reading lengthy treatises. Hence the use of many different sources by Diodorus. The latter's aim was also to place the events of the past in a clear chronological framework before his Greek and Roman readers. However a far more significant purpose accounted for the composition of Diodorus' history.

It is probable that Stoic ideals influenced the course of Diodorus' narrative.[17] It has, moreover been suggested that Diodorus received his knowledge of Stoicism from Polybius or Poseidonius.[18] Two features of Diodorus' work might serve to support the contention that Diodorus is strongly influenced by Stoic thought: the fact that Diodorus wrote a universal history; and the fact that it is characterized by a strong moral tone. The scope of Diodorus' work might appear to support the first fact. Diodorus himself divided his history into three parts.[19] The first went up to the Trojan War; the second continued to the death of Alexander; and the third ended with the archonship of Herodes in 60/59 B. C. Book seventeen which dealt with Alexander the Great marked the end of the first historical period. It is, indeed, possible that Alexander's career marked a climax in Diodorus' universal scheme.[20]

However, it would be wrong to view Diodorus as an universal historian in the sense of a Polybius or Poseidonius or, indeed, a Pompeius Trogus or Nicolaus of Damascus.

Clearly the inter-relationship of events was of no interest to Diodorus. The histories of the various nations were dealt with separately and not linked in any decisive way.[21] Certainly, the terminal date of 60 B. C. is insignificant when compared with Polybius' date of 146 B. C.[22] It is further to be observed that Polybius and Poseidonius, the two most likely sources for such an approach, were employed for periods of Diodorus' history of which only fragments survive. It is, therefore, difficult to effect decisive conclusions upon the basis of such an agreement. Furthermore, as will be shown below, Diodorus' conception of the pragmatic quality of historical writing is not based upon a desire to present advice in a political and military sense: the emphasis is clearly upon ethics and morals. In the preface, Diodorus declares that to write universal history is to be the servant of the divine providence, and that universal history unites in its composition all mankind. The idea of providence directing the motion of the stars and the lives of mankind is also employed.[23] Thus the chief idea is of the unity of the universe. Hence perhaps Diodorus' favour towards the Indians who had a law against the existence of slavery, and his pity for the Egyptian slaves and the slaves in the Spanish mines might reflect Stoic influence.[24] In this context Farrington has explained Diodorus' sympathy for the slaves who revolted in 135-2 and 104-2 B. C., and his Utopian image of the islands of

the Sun, "the uneasy conscience of the educated slaves".[25]

Thus it is clear that it would be difficult to state dogmatically that the universal aspect of Diodorus' Bibliotheke derives from Stoic thought, though Stoic influence is undoubtedly to be suspected. Two other points tend to minimize the importance of this factor. First, Busolt already admitted that Epicurean influence is also possible,[26] and indeed, the various philosophic schools of the Hellenistic world can hardly have avoided exercising influence upon Diodorus. Even if the conventional view of Diodorus as an historian only capable of reproducing his sources is accepted it is to be conceded that the ideas associated with the chief philosophic schools would have found their way into many of Diodorus' sources.

It is further to be observed that, though it is to be conceded that Diodorus was probably influenced to a certain degree by Stoic thinking, it must not be concluded that Diodorus was a philosopher,a fact which even Busolt admitted.[27] Indeed, it is clear that Diodorus' chief aim was to inspire nobility and high morals. As such, it is impossible to single out a particular influence. Certainly Stoicism cannot alone be seen as a source for such an approach. As has been seen, Ephorus, Theopompus, Timaeus and even Thucydides were not averse to a tendency to moralize. Thus it is clear that one feature which unifies

Diodorus' work is a tendency to moralize, and abundant testimony can support this thesis. The significance of this fact is that the various sections of Diodorus' Bibliotheke are thus closely related, and Bury, by not realizing the interconnections of the history, appears to have failed to appreciate that Diodorus' interest lay in the quantity and variety of the situations of history, which would illustrate his central moral thesis.[28]

Diodorus' beliefs include divine nemesis,[29] the expediency of justice and virtue as opposed to destruction resulting from vice,[30] the importance of eusebia,[31] nemesis produced by man's overstepping his bounds[32] and tyche which subordinates man and should make him humble.[33] These ideas are backed up by motifs of restraint,[34] clemency,[35] mildness,[36] pity[37] and humility.[38]

Pronouncements upon individuals, based upon the above opinions, are frequent. Diodorus' aim is to show that the good receive rewards and to provide incentive for men of the future to emulate.[39] Pythagoras has sophrosyne,[40] patience and courage and is averse to luxury. Gelon has epieikia, philanthropia, bears good fortune anthropinos,[41] and dislikes pomp and luxury. Epaminondas has epieikia, megalopsychia, arete, andreia and philanthropia.[42] Philip possesses eusebia and philanthropia.[43] Alexander possesses epieikia, arete, megalopsychia and regard for tyche.[44] Hamilcar Barca is humane, acting according to

tyche,[45] and the same qualities are found in Hannibal.[46] Epieikia, philanthropia and respect for tyche characterize Aemilius Paullus.[47]

At the other extreme, Sardanapallus is censured for debauchery and Pausanias is attacked for his tryphe.[48] Philomelus and the Phocians had asebia and paranomia.[49] Marius' downfall results from pleonexia, cruelty and his refusal to heed tyche.[50]

Less prominent individuals receive similar praise and censure. The decision to include mythology in the Bibliotheke was largely conditioned by Diodorus' moralizing bent. Diodorus, indeed, was well aware of the fact that major historians did not include mythology in their histories.[51] Thus Zeus possesses eusebia, epieikia, philanthropia and all aretai.[52] Aeolus has eusebia, philanthropia and dikaiosyne,[53] and Heracles has eusebia.[54] Jason has epieikia and megalopsychia,[55] and Castor and Polydeuces have eusebia and dikaiosyne,[56] qualities shared by Admetus.[57] Achises bears eusebia to the gods,[58] and Sesostris has epieikia and eusebia.[59] The Egyptian kings and Cyrus possess similar qualities.[60] Battus of Cyrene has epieikia and Pittacus of Mytilene has every virtue.[61] To Aristeides, homilia and dikaiosyne are attributed.[62] Theron has philanthropia and epieikia,[63] Dion has epieikia and Timoleon has all aretai.[64] Eumenes possesses philanthropia and insight into the workings of tyche.[65] Ptolemy I is

accorded epieikia.[66] Scipio Africanus' enjoyment of good fortune is matched by his ability to accept tyche, anthropinos.[67] Scipio Aemilianus too knows the power of tyche and possesses virtues.[68] Philopoemen also has virtues[69] and Arsaces of Parthia has epieikia, and philanthropia and shuns tryphe.[70] Alexander Zabinas has virtues,[71] Caesar amongst other qualities has epieikia.[72] Rome has epieikia, anthropia and dikaiosyne.[73]

Antiochus III lacks eusebia.[74] Cambyses does not know how to bear his good fortune anthropinos, and Tyndarides is defiant and impudent.[75] Cleon, Chares and the Persian Bagoas have paranomia.[76] Harpalus is lawless and succumbs to tryphe.[77] Philip V has asebia and is arrogant in the enjoyment of good fortune.[78] Andriscus possesses every vice, including paranomia and pleonexia.[79] Ptolemy Physcon[80] and Demetrius I[81] have vices. The paranomia of the Jews is contrasted with Roman epieikia and the Jews have misanthropia.[82] Tryphe is a common characteristic, affecting Ninyas, king of Assyria, Cleonymus of Sparta and Tarentum, Antander, brother of Agathocles, Hieronymus of Syracuse, Ptolemy Philopater, Prusias, Alexander Balas, Antiochus Cyzicenus, the Etruscans, the Sybarites and Rome after the Punic Wars.[83]

Diodorus' account of the actions of individuals illustrates these theories. Tantalus experiences punishment because he fails to act anthropinos, when blessed with good

fortune.[84] The same reason accounts for the Sybarite failure.[85] Cleophon disregards the hazards of tyche.[86] The Carthaginians realize the manner in which fortune changes.[87] Agathocles feels the power of fortune.[88] Asebia accounts for the death of huntsmen who failed to dedicate a boar's head to Artemis.[89] Himilcon is punished for his sacrilege of the temple of Demeter and Kore.[90] Bura and Helike suffer for asebia[91] as do Philomelus and the Phocians.[92] Asebia is the cause of Agathocles' death.[93] Philip II is successful because of his eusebia.[94] Divine nemesis is meted out to the Argive demagogues for butchering the wealthy[95] and is received by the Carthaginians for their cutting off the hands of captured sailors.[96] Marius and Cinna receive nemesis from Sulla.[97] Of a similar nature is the nemesis of the mocker who finds his name among the proscribed.[98] Perilaus, the contriver of the bull of Phalaris, burns within its figure.[99] Olympias dies in accordance with her cruelty,[100] and the slave owners suffer for their wrongs with the slave uprising.[101] Finally, it is clear that in the speeches and Diodorus' own comments in the history, the familiar motifs of tyche, epieikia, euergesia, nemesis and philanthropia occur.[102]

Thus it is clear that certain general sententiae appear throughout the Bibliotheke and that upon them Diodorus bases his views of the various personages and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of their actions. The

chief theme espoused is that of man's righteousness towards the gods and man and the recognition of tyche. The fact that this theme is so widespread indicates that Diodorus cannot have been as dependent upon his sources as most scholars argue, unless the absurd argument is employed that Diodorus' sources had common views. At the same time, it is clear that Diodorus' choice of sources was largely dictated by consideration of the basic thesis which he sought to propound.

It is certainly clear that often Diodorus chose historians not for their approach to morals but because of their popularity and quality as historians. Two examples noted by Drews show that if necessary Diodorus was quite prepared to go further than the sources which he employed. Both cases are derived from Polybius, the chief historian whose output is substantial, and they suggest the possibility that Diodorus adopted a similar procedure if he felt that his other sources required revision.[103] Drew's first example concerns the dysentry experienced by Prusias' soldiers, which is definitely associated by Diodorus with Prusias' sacrilege. In Polybius, the facts are stated but no identification of the two occurrences is effected.[104] The same situation characterizes the two historians' view of the death of Antiochus Epiphanes. Polybius mentions Antiochus' plunder of the temple of Tabae: Diodorus clearly associates this

event with the king's death.[105]

These two examples clearly illustrate how dangerous it is to assume that Diodorus simply received his moralizing tone from his sources. The historian's own personal contribution has also to be considered. Moreover, it seems likely that Diodorus at times employed lesser authorities to enhance the effectiveness of the theories which he proposed. For example the eulogy of Epaminondas which observes the epieikia and megalopsychia of that leader does not appear to be derived wholly from Ephorus. Agesilaus is described as living slightly earlier than Epaminondas, Pelopidas and Conon, and the Athenians from Solon to Pericles are listed as living during the times of the Medes and Persians. As Drews notes, such a statement is unlikely to derive from Ephorus who according to Josephus was "accurate",[106] and the narrative, therefore, is most likely derived from Ephorus. Aristoxenus and Diodorus' personal knowledge of history. Similarly, in the account of the Sacred War, Diodorus' own influence against Demophilus' is clearly discernible, when Diodorus emphasizes the fact that the rise of Philip resulted from his protection of Apollo. Diodorus shows how the Phocian women who had put on golden necklaces from Delphi were punished according to their impiety, while Philip became leader because of his reverence towards the oracle.[107]

Consideration of Diodorus' prefaces, as has been

seen, confirmed the view that Diodorus used many sources. The prefaces, moreover, reveal the employment of some degree of individuality on the part of Diodorus. As M. Kunz has observed, two questions ultimately determine whether the prefaces are Diodorus' own or those of the source he used.[108] First, there is the problem of style and content. If a uniform style is evident, it could be concluded that it derives chiefly from Diodorus. Also, there is the problem of whether the uniform aspect is only external. Second, a comparison with Diodorus' sources is necessary. Five conclusions were noted by Kunz. First, she observed a clear vocabulary poverty and an inability of Diodorus to express himself. Second, she noted a difference between the richer and more logical sections of the prefaces and the commoner transitionary passages. Also in this connection, the summaries had a form, content and choice of words of an identical type.

Third, it followed that the preface, on the one hand, and the transitions and summaries, on the other, came from different sources. The richer section, therefore, depended upon Diodorus' source. Fourth, Kunz observed that the difference between the individual prefaces indicated that Diodorus followed different sources, and that he changed his information by adding and omitting facts. Finally, it is to be concluded that, on the one hand, it is unwise to speak of great originality or

subjectivity on the part of Diodorus whereby unity was imposed in a significant sense. On the other hand, Diodorus certainly did contribute himself to the composition, even if his contribution was, on the whole, dull, repetitious and uninspiring.

Finally, Diodorus' tendency to err certainly would be indicative of individuality, if not of the most praiseworthy kind. Laqueur observed that in the beginning of book thirteen, Diodorus claimed that that book would end with the beginning of the second Punic War against Dionysius.[109] Yet book thirteen, in fact, ends with the termination of the Peloponnesian War and the conclusion of the first war against Dionysius.[110] It is possible that Diodorus found that he had too much material, and that he had, therefore, to close his book earlier than anticipated. However, this is unlikely, in view of his statement that he had completed what he had intended. The error seems to be due to Diodorus himself.

Thus consideration of Diodorus' Bibliotheke as a whole confirms the two conclusions suggested by the detailed examination of the chapters devoted to Dionysius I, that Diodorus consulted many sources and that the evidence of Diodorus' own personality is clearly apparent. Though he utilized the output of many authorities, his choice was not haphazard and was based upon his conception of history, whereby the Bibliotheke was employed as a vehicle for his

moralizing tendencies. As such, the evidence discussed confirms the conclusion arrived at previously that Diodorus' own personal contribution is clearly discernible. If necessary, Diodorus derived conclusions from his sources where these had not previously existed. Moreover, evidence for Diodorus' individuality was discovered from two other sources of evidence: Diodorus' contribution in the prefaces and his own liability to error.

This conclusion is confirmed by the work of J. Palm on the purely philological aspects of Diodorus' history. By concentrating upon the relationship of Diodorus' style to that of his sources and by observing the particulars of Diodorus' style, Palm concluded that Diodorus modernized his material and effected changes if necessary.[111]

Thus it is clear that the approach of most scholars since Volquardson is at variance with the realities of the situation. The assumption either that Diodorus employed one source at a time or that he was a scissors-and-paste historian oversimplifies a situation of far greater complexity. Clearly, as R. K. Sinclair suggests, in every case a detailed examination is necessary.[112] In the case of Diodorus' chapters on Dionysius, there is no doubt that many sources were employed, and a general consideration of the Bibliotheke tends to confirm this impression.[113]

In such circumstances, it is not difficult to appreciate the cause of Diodorus' specific interest in the testimony of Philistus. As has been seen, Philistus' narrative, as found in Diodorus, presented a thesis on Punic decline based upon moral considerations. Carthage's power lust is described as knowing no bounds, for which divine nemesis inevitably ensued. Himilcon's career epitomized the Carthaginian failure in a manner not dissimilar to that of Cleon in the case of Athens in Thucydides' text. Thus Diodorus was able to obtain material which was of crucial importance for his main thesis. It is possible that Diodorus developed the ideas found in Philistus just as, it has been seen, he did in the case of Polybius' testimony. And it is conceivable that the thesis of Carthage's decline was not so directly stated as it is in Diodorus, and that it closely resembled the Thucydidean parallel. However, there is little doubt that this information was consistent with the main argument of the Bibliotheke: the necessity of respect towards man and gods and reverence for tyche.

Diodorus' desire to base his narrative largely upon the authority of Philistus seems to have led him to contradict himself in the preface to book fourteen. Indeed, in the preface, Diodorus promises that he will denounce the thirty tyrants and Dionysius. Diodorus writes:

> "Dionysius, the tyrant of the Syracusans, although he had been the most fortunate of such rulers, was constantly plotted against while alive, was compelled by fear to wear an iron corselet under his tunic, and has bequeathed since his death his own life as an example to all ages for the maledictions of men."

This passage is intended to illustrate Diodorus' earlier statement that:

> "wicked men leave to posterity an undying image of their whole life; for...the life which has preceded death becomes far worse throughout all time for the evil memory that it enjoys."[114]

In spite of this statement, as I have attempted to demonstrate earlier, little censure characterizes book fourteen.[115] Certainly no evidence of plots against the tyrant is provided. The type of material which would have supported this thesis has survived in the testimonies of other writers like Plutarch and Cicero. For example, the case of the tyrant's murder of his mother or of the crucifixion of the barber who boasted that he had the razor at the tyrant's throat could have been cited. No information is provided by Diodorus about Dionysius' informers or about the construction of the trench and drawbridge or about the murder of the youth who had been entrusted with Dionysius' sword while he played ball. Nor do we hear of Dionysius' murder of Aristomache's mother for supposedly having prevented her daughter's conception or of Dionysius' suspicion of clever men or

of the tales of Dionysius and his daughters who would singe his beard.[116] The evidence of the preface certainly suggests that Dionysius knew about this anecdotal material. He had no doubt seen it in the pages of Timaeus' history. The conclusion is clear: in the prooemium, Diodorus was echoing the popular view as represented by Timaeus; in the narrative, however, Diodorus was obliged to rely chiefly upon the authority of Philistus. Essentially, there was little of a hostile nature in Philistus, with which to substantiate the claim of the preface. True the speech of Theodorus might be conceived as hostile to Dionysius: yet none of its information corresponds to the views found in the preface. Moreover, as I have shown, the speech can certainly not be adduced as evidence for the text's hostility towards Dionysius. Diodorus' choice of Philistus, as has been seen, was conditioned by two factors: the fact that Philistus was enjoying a revival in the first century B. C.; and the fact that Philistus' moralizing tendencies in the case of Carthage could be easily incorporated into the general scheme of the Bibliotheke. However, the inclusion of Philistus involved the abandonment of Diodorus' plan to portray Dionysius as illustrative of the unfortunate end which the impious encountered. Thus a contradiction occurred between the popular view and Philistus' view of Dionysius. It is true that Diodorus consulted many sources and that he was capable of changing the testimony of his

sources to make them correspond with his main thesis. However, in the case of Dionysius, it is clear that the task of effecting a change of viewpoint proved excessively difficult. Moreover, as has been seen in the case of Timaeus' books on Agathocles, Diodorus was distrustful of Timaeus' bias. This suggests that he was disinclined to incorporate Timaeus into the Philistus narrative. Hence a discrepancy between the thesis of the preface and that of the narrative was inevitable, and it is true to say that Timaeus' influence, despite the Timaeus citations, was considerably limited.

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this study has been to determine the source or sources exerting an influence upon Diodorus' chapters on the elder Dionysius. Inevitably such an enquiry has necessitated an examination of the development of the tradition about the Syracusan tyrant. It has been shown how disillusion with Athens and her democracy and the rise of monarchies in the periphery of the Greek World in the late fifth and early fourth centuries resulted in a strong conservative reaction on the part of the chief literary figures. Though the aim was to seek the restoration of the situation existing before the emergence of democracy, in fact the formation of monarchical theory was effected. Thucydides certainly belonged to this movement and the Thucydidean conception was clearly developed by Philistus. To Philistus, the despot Dionysius was the only effective response to the Punic threat, just as to the Athenian historian the greatness of Athens depended upon the monarch, Pericles.

The development of the hostile tradition was an outgrowth of the strained political situation between Dionysius and Athens in the years before Leuctra. The evidence suggests that Ephorus and Theopompus were unaffected by these developments. Popular animosity revealed itself in the comic theatre - the source of the

later anecdotal tradition. Plato's experiences under Dionysius I and the debacle with Dionysius II led to clear hostility, emanating from the Academy. The hostile tradition found fertile ground in the Hellenistic age, in particular with the peripatetic biography. This process culminated in the history of Timaeus of Tauromenium. There is no doubt that to Timaeus, the tyrants from Dionysius I onwards were the cause of the Siceliot woes. Timaeus, though a Sicilian, wrote an account which was more Athenian than Sicilian. It is true that he seems to have used Philistus: yet there is no doubt that he distorted the earlier Sicilian's account to a considerable extent. Timaeus' hostility to Dionysius resulted from his own personal experiences under Agathocles, and from those of his father Andromachus under Timoleon. Two factors account for Timaeus' popularity in the Graeco-Roman world of the third and second centuries. First, there was his lack of interest in, and animosity towards monarchical regimes and their adherents, which was an aspect certainly most appealing to Roman governmental circles. Second, and largely as a result of such a political viewpoint, Timaeus showed considerable favour towards the Roman Republic. By the first century B. C., however, the evidence suggests a revival in the popularity of Philistus' historical work. The Syracusan historian's political philosophy began to possess more relevance

to the contemporary political situation, and effectively challenged the supremacy of Timaeus' portrait of Dionysius I. Diodorus, it has been shown, employed all the major sources on Sicily and perhaps even used less familiar authorities. The fact that he cited Timaeus proves little, since the political philosophy of the text is not consistent with Timaeus' authorship but is consistent with the Περὶ Διονυσίου of Philistus. Indeed, it has been argued that the source exerting the greatest influence over Diodorus was Philistus.

First, it has been argued that the vividness of the narrative indicates the use of a contemporary source. Second, the interest in war and politics likewise suggests Philistus, especially since Timaeus does certainly appear to have been deficient in these respects. Third, Philistus' division between the Περὶ Διονυσίου and the Περὶ Σικελίας is suggested by the format of Diodorus' text. Fourth, the political ideology of Philistus is clearly apparent. Fifth, the hypothesis has been presented that the change in tone which characterizes the account of the war with the Italiots, reflects Philistus' disapproval. Sixth, the lacuna in the text for the last twenty years of Dionysius' reign corresponds to the exile of Philistus. Finally, it has been demonstrated thatThucydidean characteristics are abundant: the plague, the chronological scheme, the lack of interest in economic phenomena; the overwhelming absorption

in contemporary affairs; the Dionysius-Pericles parallel; Thucydides' sympathies for Hermocrates; the strong aristocratic background; and the distorted view of the democracy's capabilities, common to both Thucydides' and Diodorus' narratives.

The arguments against a decisive influence on the part of Timaeus are equally significant. First, absence of gossipy and hostile material of the type associated with Athens and Timaeus, is a noticeable feature. Second, this fact gains added significance when contrasted with Diodorus' statement in the preface to the fourteenth book, which clearly echoes the Timaeus-type tradition. Third, Diodorus clearly realized the extent of Timaeus' bias in respect to the books dealing with Agathocles. There is no reason to doubt that a similar feeling towards the Dionysius' books is a major factor determining his choice of Philistus in preference to Timaeus as a major authority. Fourth, Dionysius' later career was not discussed by Diodorus in detail. We know that Timaeus spent two extra books on Dionysius. These probably dealt with the tyrant's later years. Finally, there is the fact that by Diodorus' time, Philistus' testimony was gaining added importance. Hence there is little validity in the claim that Timaeus was the most important authority on Western affairs and that Diodorus automatically consulted Timaeus as his major source.

Diodorus' choice of Philistus as his chief source results from three factors. First, the revival in importance of Philistus rendered his choice inevitable. Second, Diodorus was well aware of Timaeus' bias in respect to the Siceliot tyrants. Finally, Philistus'conception of the Punic moral failure was in accord with the chief thesis of the Bibliotheke.

The conclusions arrived at, present serious implications for the question of the character of Dionysius' rule. Emphasis of most modern accounts of Dionysius is placed upon the repressive nature of Dionysius' hegemony. The present analysis of the Dionysius' tradition, however, adds a new dimension to the problem. It is clear that the popular picture as found in, for example, Freeman and Finley[1] is singularly one-sided, and ignores the fact that Diodorus' text, the major source for Dionysius, is well aware of the fact that Dionysius' control was to a large extent popular and based upon a cooperative understanding. This relationship manifested itself, on the one hand, in the associations between Dionysius and the citizen body of Syracuse, and on the other in the entente between Syracuse and the Siceliot League. It has been shown that the speech of Theodorus cannot be employed as evidence to indicate the repressive nature of Dionysius' rule. In fact, the very opposite is suggested. The existence of a popular basis to Dionysius' rule is confirmed by the

Thucydidean associations of Philistus. To a large extent, Philistus' own attempt to subordinate the Siceliot role in the invasions of the last decade of the fifth century would appear to confirm the traditional picture. However, the limited extent to which this picture is substantiated serves to confirm the present writer's thesis. Clearly, the Syracusans were not the sheep, Philistus represented them to be. Thus the evidence of Philistus tended to support the view regarding the repressive rule.

The existence of a genuine cooperative relationship between the tyrant and his subjects is supported by other evidence. First, there is the fact that the testimony of Theopompus certainly does not appear unfavourably disposed towards Dionysius. Theopompus' hostility is focused upon the younger Dionysius and, as such, supports the picture preserved by Philistus. Second, it must be remembered that the hostility of Dionysius was directed essentially against the Ionian element in Sicily and that the tyrant thus inherited an ancient feud. With the Dorian bloc, however, little real hostility is indicated. Therefore, the destruction of Catane, Naxos and Rhegium can hardly be adduced as evidence for Dionysius' oppressive rule within Syracuse and the Dorian cities, who had formed the nucleus of resistance to Carthage in the wars of 409/8 and 406/5 B. C. Third, it has been argued that the

evidence of Dionysius' financial policy amounts to very little, and is a characteristic not necessarily applicable solely to totalitarian regimes. Moreover, Dionysius cannot be held alone responsible for the destruction of the Greek cities. On the one hand, Carthage's contribution was very real. On the other hand, the chaos of the years following Dionysius' death is obviously to be associated largely with defects in the political ability of Dionysius II. As regards Dionysius' mercenaries, it is clear that this element was very much needed against Carthage, and that Dionysius was no innovator. In fact, mercenaries had been employed by the Syracusan democracy against Carthage during the invasion of 406/5 B. C. It is, therefore, erroneous to associate the mercenaries solely with Dionysius' policy towards the Syracusans.

That a popular basis to Dionysius' rule was very real is indicated by the evidence of Plato. In the seventh Letter, Plato voices his dissatisfaction with the situation in Sicily under Dionysius I. Yet, all that he can find to criticize is the fact that the populace indulged overmuch in sex and drink. It is not inconceivable that Plato found the popular support for the tyrant distasteful. Such a conclusion would certainly accord with the views expressed in the Republic and Laws and with Plato's attraction towards despotic individuals - Hermias of Atarneus, Dionysius II, Dion and the Thirty Tyrants. As has been seen,

the Platonic picture is, indeed, confirmed by Theopompus' testimony.

The respect of the tyrant for constitutional procedure is, moreover, confirmed by the facts that the Boule appears on the inscriptions concerning the treaties between Athens and Dionysius and that the Syracusans and not Dionysius appear on coins.[2] In addition, attention has been drawn towards the unreliable nature of the hostile tradition, based as it was upon Athenian political opposition, comic invention, Platonic distortion, peripatetic gossip and the highly subjective and unreliable testimony of Timaeus of Tauromenium. Finally, it is a fact that in face of this very powerful hostile testimony, a tradition survived, portraying Dionysius in a more favourable light. That such a tradition could survive at all testifies to its strength. It, moreover, furnishes clear evidence of the fact that Dionysius' rule was not exclusively based upon terror and the sword, and that the Philistus portraits as found in Diodorus is based upon the realities of the situation in the late fifth and early fourth centuries B. C.

Certainly, it is not claimed that Dionysius' control of Syracuse and the Sicilian arche was based upon support from the demos alone. There was much in the regime which could be regarded as monarchical or oligarchical- a fact which, it has been shown, Philistus was well aware of. Ortygia and the bodyguard are certainly relevant. At the same time, however, this is only one aspect of a far more

complex situation. There is no doubt that a strong cooperative basis existed-a factor which, above all, accounts for the ability of Dionysius to have maintained his hegemony over Syracuse and the Empire for thirty-eight years.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1
A. Holm, Geschichte Siziliens in Altertum (Leipzig, 1870), II, 340; E. A. Freeman, History of Sicily (Oxford, 1892), III, 607.

2
M. Kunz, Zur Beurteilung der Prooemium in Diodors historische Bibliothek, Diss. (Zurich, 1935)

3
P. Treves, Review of Kunz, op. cit., Athenaeum, XV (1937), 221-22; P. Treves, "Per La Critica e l'annalisi del libro XVI di Diodoro", A.S.N.P., Ser. 2, VI (1937), 255-79.

4
J. Palm, Über Sprache und Stil des Diodorus von Sizilien (Lund, 1955).

5
R. Drews, Historiographical Objectives and Procedures of Diodorus Siculus, John Hopkins Diss. (1960); R. Drews, "Diodorus and his Sources", A.J.Ph. LXXXIII (1962), 383-392.

I

1
Chr. Volquardson, Untersuchungen uber die Quellen die griechischen und sicilischen Geschichte bei Diodorus XI-XVI (Kiel, 1868).

2
Ed. Schwartz, s. v. "Diodoros", P. W. K., Real-Encyclopadie, Va, cols. 685-6.

3
E. Bachof, "Timaeus als Quelle für Diodor XIV. 54-78", N. J. C. P., Abt. I, XXV (1879), 161-173; E. Bachof, "Timaeus als Quelle Diodors für die Reden des dreizehnten und vierzehnten Buches", N. J. C. P., Abt I, XXX (1884), 445-78. Here Bachof concludes (p. 477) "So mussen wir annehmen dasz die darstellung Diodors der wirklichkeit nicht entspricht dasz gewahrsmannes lesen, der ist Timaeus."

4
R. Laqueur, s. v. "Timaeos", P. W. K., Real-Encyclopadie, ser. 2, LVI, cols. 1076-1203.

5
F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (Leiden, 1950), IIIb, No. 566. Komm (Text), 529, 541.

6
K. F. Stroheker, Dionysius I. Gestalt und Geschichte der Tyrannen von Syrakus (Wiesbaden, 1958), pp. 11-31. Much of the information found in these pages derives from two earlier studies by Stroheker: "Timaeus und Philistus", Satura Otto Weinreich (Baden-Baden, 1951), pp. 139-161; Platon und Dionysios",/CLXXIII (1952), 225-259.

H. Z.

7
G. De Sanctis, Ricerche sulla storiographia Siceliota (Palermo, 1958), p. 37; G. Busolt, "Diodors Verhaltnis zum Stoizismus", N. J. C. P. Abt. I, XXXV (1889) 303; F. L. Schoenle, Diodors Studien Diss. (Berlin, 1891), p. 4; F. Sartori,"Sulla Δυναστεῖαdi Dionisio il vecchio nell opera Diodorea", C. S., I (1966), 6; F. Sartori. Review of Stroheker's Dionysius I, Athenaeum, XXXVII (1959) 209-210. R. H. Drews, Historiographical Objectives and Procedures of Diodorus Siculus, John Hopkins Dissertation (Baltimore, 1960), p. 148; 157; A. G. Woodhead,

The Greeks in the West,(London, 1962) p. 88; C. Wachsmuth, Über das Geschichtswerk des sikelioten Diodoros (Leipzig, 1892), II p. 10 (Reprinted in C. Wachsmuth, Einleitung in das Studien der alten Geschichte, p. 101); G. L. Barber, The Historian Ephorus (Cambridge, 1935), pp 160-169; S. Luria, "Zum Problem der griechisch - Karthagischen Beziehungen", A. Ant. Hung., XII (1964), 59; Gsell. S. Histoire Ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris, 1920), III, 3. N. 2.; H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen (Munich, 1967) II, 63; P. E. Arias, Dionigi il vecchio (Catania, 1942), pp. 3-4.

8
R. Lauritano, "Sileno in Diodoro?",Kokalos, II (1956), 206-18

9
M. Kunz, Zur Beurteilung der Prooemium in Diodors historischen Bibliothek, Diss. (Zurich, 1935), p. 17, "Hier is zweifellos Ephorus Hauptquelle. Er wird aber kontaminiert mit dem Chronographen und vielleicht auch noch mit irgendeinem sizilische Autor.", Thus Kunz does not accept the inevitability of a change of source from Ephorus on the part of Diodorus. It also appears that the Sicilian author does not have to be Timaeus. On p.13 and 17, however, she accepts the authority of Timaeus for parts of book IV and V, VIII and XX of Diodorus. On p. 19 she does accept Timaeus with Ephorus as Diodorus' authority. It is strange that she does not explicitly associate Timaeus with books XII-XV.

10
Thus in XIII. 60. 3, the text gives eighty thousand Barbarians. This approximates to the hundred thousand given by Timaeus in XII. 54. 5, as opposed to the two hundred thousand of Ephorus. It also approximates to the forty thousand and twenty thousand of XIII.59.6.

11
Diod. XIII. 81. 4-84. 6

12
Diod. XIII. 90. 2.

13
Diod. XIII. 83. 2.

14
Diod. XIII. 85. 3.

15
Diod. XIII. 87. 4-5; 88. 7; 93.I.4;96.I.

16
Diod. XIII.90.3;84.3. Both give the number at two hundred thousand.

17
(i) Thus Diod. XIII.54.5/ Jacoby, F. Gr. Hist., III b, No. 566, F. 103. cf.IIa. No. 70. F. 201. Ephorus gives two hundred thousand Punic foot and four thousand horse; Timaeus gives one hundred thousand at the most.
(ii) Diod. XIII.60.5/Jacoby, op.cit. III b, No. 566, F. 104. cf. IIa, F. 202: six thousand Carthaginians slain according to Timaeus; twenty thousand according to Ephorus.
(iii) Diod. XIII.80.5/Jacoby, op. cit.III b, No. 566, F. 25+c, cf. IIa, F. 203; Carthaginian forces in the second invasion are one hundred and twenth thousand according to Timaeus and three hundred thousand according to Ephorus.
(iv) Diod. XIII.109.2/Jacoby, op. cit.IIIb, No. 566, F. 107: whereas others give fifty thousand soldiers, Timaeus gives thirty thousand Punic infantry, one thousand cavalry and fifty vessels.
(v)Diod. XIV.54.5/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 108. cf. II a, No. 70, F. 204.: three hundred thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry according to Ephorus; Timaeus gives at the most one hundred thousand troops plus an additional thirty thousand enlisted in Sicily.

18
Diod. XIII.81.3.

19
Diod. XIII.85.1.

20
Diod. XIII.82.6/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 26a.

21
Diod. XIII.83.2./Jacoby, op. cit.IIIb, No. 566, F. 26a.

22
See belowpp.I47-53,I97-209,2I4,2I9,476-77

23
See above p.I2.

24
See above p.II

25 Diod. XIII.108.4./Jacoby op. cit.,IIIb, No. 566, F. 106.
Diod. XIII. 85.3./Jacoby op. cit.,IIIb, No. 566, F. 27
Diod. XIII.90.4-6/.Jacoby op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 28a.

26 To be discussed in detail below pp 495-5I2

27 See A. Holm, Geschichte Siziliens in Altertums (Leipzig, 1874), II, 340; E. A. Freeman, History of Sicily (Oxford, 1892), III, 607.

28 The case for book XVI and its account of Philip II is certainly valid. See A. D. Momigliano, "Le Fonti della storia Greca e Macedone nel libro XVI di Diodoro", R. I. L., LXV (1932), 523-543; N. G. L. Hammond, "The Sources of Diodorus Siculus for Book SVI", C. Q., XXXI (1937), pp. 79-91. Though against this view, see P. Treves, "Per la critica e l'annalisi del libro XVI di Diodoro", A. S. N. P., ser. 2, VI (1937), 255-79, It must be stressed that this should not imply that the same approach is necessarily valid for the Sicilian chapters.

29 See below p. 495.

30 Diod. XIII.54.5; 60.5;80.5;XIV.54.5-6.

31 Diod. XIV.54.5. cf.76.2.

32 Bachof in N. J. C. P., XXV (1879), 161. following Holm, op. cit., II, 340.

33 Diod. XII.37;XIII.103.

34 See Volquardson, op. cit., p.9. This conclusion was accepted by most scholars, even if indirect influence, generally via Timaeus, was felt to exist. One scholar who did not deny the possibility of Diodorus' use of Philistus directly was S. Hejni, "Das Geschichtswerk des Philistos von Sizilien", Studio Antiquo A. Salac

Septuagenario Oblata. (Prague, 1955), p. 34. See below chapter III, for discussion of Philistus and his position in the Bibliotheke.

35
This part ended with the capture of Acragas, see below p. 22I.

36
Plut. Dion. XXXV.5.. See note 8 of Chapter III, p. 57I.

37
Diod. XI.38;XIII.35.3.

38
Diog. Laert. II.63;Arist.Mirab. Auscult., II2a.

39
The Aristotle reference clarifies the issue.

40
Diod. XIII.109.2./Jacoby, op.cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 107.

41
See Holm, op. cit. p. 342. cf. Schwartz, op. cit. col 685-86; F. W. Walbank "The Bull of Phalaris" C. R., LIX (1945), 39-42, while accepting the reading of Diodorus, concludes that Diodorus drew only upon general recollections. The most important piece of evidence brought forward by Walbank is the fact that Polybius omits any reference to the role of Scipio in sending it back to Acragas, the implication being that it had not taken place yet.

42
See R. Drews, "Diodorus and his sources", A. J. Ph., LXXXIII (1962), 383-392.; R. Drewes, Historiographical Objectives, pp. 84-86. cf. Diod.XXXI.35 and Polyb. XXII.15. 13-15; Diod. XXXI.18a and Polyb. XXXI.9.4.

43
Polyb. XII.25.4./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 28b. Here we read that when Polybius was at Carthage in 146 B. C., he found a bull with a door for placing victims in. Polybius thought that it was of non-Carthaginian origin. He therefore concluded that Timaeus lied in refuting the existence of a bull in Acragas.

A third reference to Phalaris' bull and Timaeus' authority comes from the scholiast on Pindar Pyth.1.185./ Jacoby, op. cit.IIIb. No. 566, F. 28c. Here we read that according to Timaeus, the Acragantines cast the bull of Phalaris into the sea, and that the one exhibited in the

was not that of Phalaris, but an image of the river Gela.

44 T. S. Brown, Timaeus of Tauromenium (California, 1958), p. 55, notes how Timaeus was probably right. His theory rests on the assumption that Timaeus, Diodorus and Polybius were not liars. Diodorus' and Polybius' bulls can thus be identified. Now Diodorus was wrong in saying that Timaeus denied the bull's existence. He was, therefore wrong in saying that the bull was sent back to Acragas. He had no proof at Acragas that the bull which he saw was Phalaris'. His proof that he had no evidence that the bull came from Carthage is a weak argument. We cannot, therefore, say that it, in fact, did come from Carthage. Therefore, concludes Brown, Timaeus was probably right.

45 Diod. XIII.61.1;63.1.

46 Diod. XIII.33.2-3; cf 34. 6-35.

47 Diod. XI. 76.3;89; XIII.35.2; 54.3; 81.4-84; 86.2; 113.3; XIV.7.1-5; 16.1-4; 18; 48.2; 53.3; 62.3; 63.1; 95.2; 105.2; III.1; XVI.70.6; 83.2; 90.1.

48 Diod. XIII.35.3; XVI.70; XI.38.

49 See the above discussion on the Timaeus fragments in book XIII.pp. I2-I4.

50 Diod. XIV.59; 88; 96; XVI.7; 68.

51 A. Holm, op. cit., II, p. 369

52 Diod. XXI.17.1./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 4a.
Polyb. XII.25h,1./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 34.
Plut. De Exil.14./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 4e.

53 Polyb. XII.27.4-6.

54 Diod. XIV.16.

55 Holm. op. cit., p. 371.

56 Diod. IV.24;80.

57 Diod. XIV.9.

58 Diod. XIV.78.7; 95.

59 Diod. XIV.95.

60 Diod. XVI.82.4; 83.3.

61 Polyb. XII.4a.5-12a; 13-15; 23-25.

62 Polyb. XII.3-4; 4b.c.d; 25d.e.f.g.h.

63 Polyb. XII.24.

64 Polyb. XII.25k; 26; 26a.

65 See T. S. Brown, Timaeus of Tauromenium, pp. 71-90 cf K. F. Stroheker, Dionysius I p 11-31; Satura Otto Weinreich. p. 139-161; H. Z., CLXXIX (1952), 225-259.

66 Thus Volquardson, op. cit., pp. 85 ff.

67 Diod. XIII.92.3

68 Diod. XIII.93.2.

69 Diod. XIII.94-95.

70 Diod. XIV.9; 14.2; 88.

71
Diod. XIV.45.1.

72
Diod. XIV.46.2.

73
Diod. XIV. 65-69.

74
Diod. XIV.75.3.

75
Diod. XIV.102.3.

76
Diod. XIC.105.2.

77
Diod. XIV.109.

78
Diod. XIV.112.

79
Diod. XV.74.

80
Diod. XVL.70.

81
Diod. XVI.82.

82
Thus destruction of Messana in XIV.68.5, and 56.I; Dionysius' policy to distract the Siceliots from the real issued in XIV.68.4, and 41.I; unwillingness of Dionysius to destroy the Carthaginian army in XIV.68.I, and 75.3 and in XIII.112.1 and XIV.7.1; Slavery of Catane and Naxos in XIV.66.4; 68.3, and 14-15; Treachery over Gela and Camarina in XIII.111.5 and XIV.68.2; Treaty in XIII.114.1, and XIV.68.2; 3000.00 Carthaginian dead at Himera in XIV.67.1, XI.20.2; 22.4; XIII.59.5; 94.5; Dionysius as public clerk in XIV.66.5, and XIII.96.4; Dionysius' plunder of temples in XIV.65.2; 67.4.69.2.

83
Plato Republic. VIII.565ff. See discussion below pp.457-66.

84
See Stroheker, Dionysius I, pp. 18-22.

85
Stroheker, Dionysius I pp. 18-22.

86
On Philistus see chapter III below. p p.225 ff.

87
Cornelius Nepos Dion.III.2; hominem amicum non magis tyranno quam tyrannidi

88
See below p p. 256 ff.

89
Diod. XIII.91.4.

90
Polyb. XII.26b.4.

91
Diod. XXI.17.3; Polyb. VIII.12.12; XII.15.

92
Pindar Pyth. III.85; Isocrates Evagoras. 40; See A. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants (London, 1956), p. 24.

93
Isocrates Panath. 8; Aristot. Metaphys. 1060 a25. See H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek English Lexicon, 7th ed.; revised by H. S. Jones (Oxford, 1940), p. 1978.

94
Aristot. Nicom. Ethics.1095 b.22.

95
E. Bachof, N. J. C. P., XXX(1884), 445-478. This view has also been adopted by S. Luria, A. Ant. Hung, XII (1964) 62-3; J. Luccioni, La Pensee Politique de Platon (Paris, 1958) p. 84.

96
Diod. XIV.66.2; 55.5.

97
Diod. XIV.68.6; 61.4.

98
Diod. XIV.68.5; 55.4.

99
Diod. XIV.68.5; 61.5 cf Bachof. N.J.C.P., XXX. (1884).

100 Diod. XIV.68.2; XIII.111.5.

101 Diod. XIV.67.4.

102 Diod. XIV.65.2; 65.7.

103 See Diod. XIV.45.2; 61.3; 96.2; 7.5; 9.5; 65.2-3.

104 Diod. XIV.70.3; 64.5.

105 Diod. XIV.66.4; 68.3.

106 Diod. XIII.52; XX.1-2.

107 Thus Diod. XIV.66.3 echoes XIII.22.4.XI.25.5; 26.6.

108 Gelon as βασιλεύς Diod. XI.38.2; 38.7; cf. Gelon as τύραννος in Herod. VII.157; 163; Aristot. Politics. V.2.6; 9.23 (1302b. 1315b); Aelian XIII.37; Justin XXIII.4.4.

109 Clearly Himera supersedes Salamis (See Diod. XI.23.). Three factors count: the battle gave courage to the Greeks before Salamis; whereas the Persians and their king escaped, the Carthaginians and their king all perished; whereas Pausanias and Themistocles were disgraced, Gelon was honoured. The latter aspect possesses three aspects. First, Gelon grows old; second, he dies esteemed by the people; third, he manages to preserve the kingship for three members of his household,-Gelon himself, Hieron and Thrasybulus.

It was such a type of passage that provoked Polybius' anger and the attack of Polyb. XII.26b, for Timaeus' long-windedness and his obvious aim; to glorify Sicily's achievements.

110 C. H. Oldfather, Diodorus, Loeb Classical Library, IV, p. 187.

111 Bachof, N.J.C.P., XXX, (1884), 472.

112
Jacoby op. cit., III b, No. 566, F. 22./Polyb. XII, 25k.

113
Plut. Nicias, XXXVIII.4; Comparison of Timoleon and Aemilius Paullus, II.2.

114
See below chapter VI, pp.466 ff.

115
Diod. XIV.70.

116
Aretes occurs in chapter 70 and Aristos in chapter 10.

117
Bachof, N.J.C.P., XXX (1884), 478 "den widersprich zu lösen, brauchte er seine verräter. Und dazu dientem ihm die spartanischen Kriegsvogte."

118
Diod. XIV.64.5.

119
Diodorus notes the Syracusan fear that Hermocrates might declare himself tyrant (Diod. XIII.75.5), Thucydides (VI.72-75.) gives details of Hermocrates' constitutional programme which gave effective control to its author. Athenagoras is aware of Hermocrates' designs upon the despotate (Thuc. VI.36-40). Hence Holm, op. cit., II.86, sees Hermocrates as an aristocratic type tyrant (cf. Freeman, Hist. Sicily, III,29.).

This is confirmed by four pieces of evidence. First, it is significant that Dionysius is Hermocrates' follower (Diod. XIII.75.9). Second, Dionysius favours the recall of the exiles who had been banished together with Hermocrates (Diod. XIII.92.4-7). Third, there is the factor of Syracusan suspicion (Thuc. VI.103.4) and Hermocrates' final intrigues (Diod. XIII.63.75.). Finally Diocles is the democratic leader to whom Hermocrates is opposed (Diod. XIII.19.4; 34.5).

120
Diod. XIII.85.3; 87.4.5; 88.7; 93.1.4; 96.1.

121
Diod. XIII.55.4; 57.5; 58.2; 90.2; III.6; XIV.42.3; 51.5; 73.5; 74.2; 76.3.

122
Also Diod. XI.89.9; XV.24; 74;XVI.79-80.

123
Diod. XIII.59; 86; 90; 96.5; 108; 114. XIV.41; 45; 47; 63,1-2; 70, 4-6; 73; 74; 76; 77.

124
Philistus' political viewpoint will be discussed in detail in chapter III.See below p.

125
i.e. Diod. XV.24.

126
R. Drewes, Historiographical Objectives pp. 79 and 86; R. Drewes, "Diodorus and his Sources", A.J.Ph., LXXXIII (1962), 383-392.

127
See below pp.320-22.

128
Diod. XIII.59.4; 62.4.

129
Discussed in chapter III, below p.332C. Hejni, "Das Geschichtswerk des Philistos von Sizilien als Diodors Quelle ", Studio Antiquo A. Salac Septuagenario oblata, (Prague, 1955), pp. 31-35.

130
R. Laqueur, s.v. "Timaeos", P.W.K., Real-Encyclopadie, ser. 2, VI a, cols. 1076, 1203.

131
A. Holm, op. cit., II, 340; E. A. Freeman, Hist. Sicily, III, 607; N. G. L. Hammond, "The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI", C. Q., XXXII (1937), 79; T. S. Brown, "Timaeus and Diodorus' Eleventh Book", A. J. Ph., LXXIII (1952), 339, cf. p. 345, "but he(Diodorus) does cite Philistus and Duris which proves that his local Sicilian information came from more than one source. Can it be seriously argued that he failed to consult the celebrated Antiochus of Syracuse, he being a Sicilian, when Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Strabo, both outsiders, did so ?" cf. p. 355, n.96.

132
Brown, A. J. Ph., LXXIII (1952), 340-41.

133
Loc. cit.,

134
Diod. XIII.88.9.

135
Diod. XIII.55.7-55.8.

136
Diod. XIII.56.4: ἐξέωσε τοὺς Σελινουντίους
Diod. XIII.56.8: ἐξεώθησαν οἱ Σελινούντιοι

137
Diod. XIII.59.7. cf XIV.8.3.

138
Thus Laqueur claims that Diod. XIII.109.1 and 110.5 come from Ephorus, while 109.5 and 110.2-4 come from Timaeus.

139
Diod. XIV.7.4 XIII.88.8.

140
Diod. XIV.8.3 XIII.88.2.

141
Diod. XIV.9.3. XIII.88.6.

142
Diod. XIV.8.3. XIII.59.7.

143
Diod. XIV.50.3; 59.7.

144
Diod. XIV.61.2b.cf. XIII.61.2; XIV.57.1.

145
Diod. XIV.100.1.

146
Diod. XIII.44.1-2; 55.7; 62.5; 85.4; 88.1-5.

147
Diod. XIII.44.4; 54.3; 56.1; 59.1-3; 59.9; 61.3; 61.6.

148
Diod. XIII.85.3; 87.4-5; 88.7; 93.I; 93.4; 96.1.

149
Diod. XIII.90.2; 83.2.

150
Diod. XIII.55.4-5; 57.3-5; 58.1-2; 62.4; 89.3; 108.6; 108.8.

151
Diod. XIII.86.1-3[a];114.2b.

152
Diod. XIII.90.4.

153
Diod. XIII.43.5; 59.5-6.

154
Diod. XIII.54.6; 59.6.

155
Diod. XIII.111.1; 111b-113.

156
Diod. XIV.7.6. XIII.112.7.

157
Diod. XIV.7.6. XIII.113.3.

158
Diod. XIV.7.6. XIII.114.2.

159
Diod. XIV.8.5. XIII.91.4.

160
Diod. XIV.41.1 (cf. XIII.114.2b); 45.3; 47.2b-3.

161
Diod. XIV.49.3; 51.1; 53.1-3;

162
Diod. XIV.51.7-52.1b (cf. XIII.56.6).

163
Diod. XIV.40.3; 45.5; 46.2-3; XV.13.1-5; 14.3-4.

164
Diod. XIV.55.4; 54.2.

165
Diod. XIV.55.6-7a. cf. XIV.48.4; 54.2; 58.1a; 75.6; 54.6; 75.7.

166
Diod. XIV.95.4-7; 96.1; 87; 88.

167
Diod. XIII.54.2; 54.4.

168
cf. XIV.18 & 41.1-2.

169
Diod. XIV.41.3; 42.2.

170
Diod. XIV.41.3; 42.2.

171
Diod. XIV.41.3; 42.1.

172
Diod. XIV.43.4; 44.1.

173
Diod. XIV.46.5; 47.1.

174
Diod. XIV.50.1; 50.2.

175
Thus the double reference to the siege of Selinus (Diod. XIII.54.7; 55.5.) is,according to Laqueur indicative of a single authority. Because the space in between is concerned with the Selinuntine appeal and the resistance of the Selinuntines, particularly of the women and children as well as with an account of the battle, Laqueur identifies this extract with the authority of Timaeus.

176
Diod. XIII.33.2-3.

177
Diod. XIII.34.4-6.

178
Diod. XIII.35.

179
Laqueur's treatment of the Diocles tradition is especially important for the question of the authenticity of the legislator of that name. If Laqueur's arguments are accepted, this will result in the possible conclusion that Ephorus was the more reliable historian than Timaeus, because, whereas the latter erred in identifying the mythical lawgiver with the historical Diocles, Ephorus

possessed the historical insight to distinguish between the two. See especially the discussion of E. Pais, "A Proposito della legislazione di Diocle Siracusano", S.I.F.C., VII (1899), 5-98; G. De. Sanctis, "Diocle di Siracusa", S.I.F.C., XI (1903), 433-445.

180
Diod. XIII.58.1-2.

181
Diod. XIII.59.9-60.

182
Diod. XIII.63;75.

183
Diod. XIII.85.3b-5.

184
Lagueur makes the main text read οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰς δυνάμεις διαβιβάσαντες εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπέστειλαν πρέσβεις.

The insertion from ἀνέζευξαν to περιέλαβον is from Timaeus.

185
Diod. XIII.86.1-3.

186
Diod. XIII.87-88.1.

187
Diod. XIII.88.

188
Diod. XIII.91b-96.4.

189
Diod. XIII.91-3.

190
Diod. XIII.92.4.

191
Diod. XIII.91.3-92.3.

192
Polyb. XII.4a.

193
Diod. XIV.10.2; 10.3.

194
Diod. XIV.10.2: τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ... τυραννίδα and 10.3. καὶ τῷ ἐπαγγειλάμενος τοὺς...κατέστησε. 10.4 ὡς ἂν
It is interesting to note that when it suits Laqueur, he can associate one of his interpretations with the authority of Diodorus himself. Again as in the case of the Timaeus interpolations, he is working in a purely arbitrary manner. Clearly such hypothetical interpolations can be associated with any authority. External evidence does not count, and Laqueur's highly personal conclusions are the decisive elements.

195
Thus in Diod. XIV.44-45, Ephorus is supposed to be concerned with events in S. Italy, while Dionysius' plans for his great war with Carthage come from Timaeus. In other words, local patriotism is identifiable with Timaeus. Whereas in chapters 14, 15 and 16, it was details of less importance that derive from Timaeus, now the main event, the great war with Carthage, is associated with Timaeus. This merely indicates the arbitrariness of Laqueur's very personal approach. The method is the same, but the results are very different, cf Laqueur's reconstruction of chapters 51 and 54 of book XIV.

196
Diod. XIV.50.3; 48.3.

197
Diod. XIV.50.3.

198
Diod. XIV.49.1; 50.1; 54.5.

199
Diod. XIV.56.1 (600+); 54.5 (1000+).

200
Diod. XIV.56.3-6.

201
Diod. XIV.56-57.

202
Diod. XIV.61.1b-4a (Timaeus); 1a+3a (Ephorus).

203
Diod. XIV.63.3a+3b.

204
Diod. XIV.72-76; 100-103.

205

F. Sartori, "Su Dionisio il Vecchio nell 'opera Diodorea", C. S., I (1966), 6. This is a general comment not based, however, upon a detailed analysis of Laqueur's article. cf. T. S. Brown, "Timaeus and Diodorus' Eleventh Book", A. J. Ph. , LXX III (1952), 340-41; 353. Brown (op. cit., p. 355) writes, "an identification should be made on the basis of correspondence in thought rather than similarities in vocabulary and style". R. K. Sinclair, "Diodorus Siculus and the writing of History", P.A.C.A., VI (1963), 41, writes, "It is hardly satisfactory to insist that a particular detail could have been drawn only from the particular fragment which happens to have been preserved. "He also asks whether errors could not have resulted from the process of abridgement and transcription.

II

1 Diod. XIII.90;96.5;108.2.

2 Diod. XIII.109.

3 Diod. XIII.111-112.

4 Diod. XIII.113.

5 Diod. XIII.114.

6 Diod. XIV.2.2.

7 Diod. XIV.8.

8 Diod. XIV.9.

9 Diod. XIV.15-16.

10 Diod. XIV.40.

11 Diod. XIV.46.5-47.1-3.

12 Diod. XIV.47-60.

13 Diod. XIV.61-70.3

14 Diod. XIV.70.4-77

15 Diod. XIV.87-88.

16 Diod. XIV.90.

17
Diod. XIV.91.1.

18
Diod. XIV.100-108; 111-112.

19
Diod. XIV.109.

20
Diod. XV.6-7; 13-17; 73-74

21
See below pp.391-2,403-404.

22
Thus the Rhegines are drawn into the war after the conquest of Naxos and Catane in 399 B. C. (Diod.XIV.40.). In 398, Dionysius fears Rhegium and Messana (Diod. XIV.44.3.). In 394, the Rhegines took in the exiles, settled the Catanians and Naxians in Mylae, and besieged Messana (Diod. XIV.87.). In 393, Magon renewed hostilities with Messana. Dionysius responded by defeating the Carthaginians and commencing hostilities against Rhegium. A truce of one year followed. (Diod.XIV.90.). The result was the creation of the Italiot League. (Diod. XIV.91.1). The war with the Italiot League occupies XIV.100-108 and 111-112, and culminates in the capture of Rhegium in 387 B. C.

23
Thuc. VI.88.6; VII.53.2; 57.11.

24
Diod. XV.14.3-4. Diodorus attributes economic motives to the clash and singles out the plunder of the temple at Agylle (port Pyrgi).

25
Diod. XIII.112.1-2 (Dissatisfaction leading to the revolt of the knights);
Diod. XIV.41.1 (Dionysius' aim); 68(Theodorus).

26
See below discussion on Syracusan democracy pp. 316 ff, 521 ff.

27
Diod. XIV.108.112

28
Diod. XIII.44.4-5.

29 Diod. XIII.56.1.

30 Diod. XIII.56.2.

31 Diod. XIII.54.5; 55.3.

32 Diod. XIII.59.1.

33 Diod. XIII.59.9.

34 Diod. XIII.60.1-7

35 Diod. XIII.59.9.

36 Diod. XIII.61.5-6

37 Diod. XIII.79.8; 86,4.

38 Diod. XIII.86.4-6.

39 Diod. XIII.87.1-2

40 Diod. XIII.87.3.

41 Diod. XIII.88.1.

42 Diod. XIII.91.2.

43 Diod. XIII.56.2.

44 Diod. XIII.34.6.

45 Diod. XIII.59.1.

46
Diod. XIII.59.9.

47
Diod. XIII.61.3.

48
Diod. XIII.81.2.

49
Diod. XIII.86.5.

50
Diod. XIII.87.3.

51
Diod. XIII.88.8.

52
Diod. XIII.91-96.

53
Diod. XIII.109.1.

54
Diod. XIII.109.2.

55
Diod. XIII.109.3-5.

56
Diod. XIII.111.3.

57
Diod. XIII.114.1.

58
Diod. XIV.7.1; 7.5.

59Diod. XIV.7.5-9.

60
Diod. XIV.8.

61
Diod. XIV.10.4.

62
Diod. XIV.14-15.

63
Diod. XIV.40.1.

64
Diod. XIV.40.6-7.

65
Diod. XIV.41.2; 42.1+3; 43.3-5; 44.1.

66
Diod. XIV.41.6; 44.3-6.

67
Diod. XIV.45.

68
Diod. XIV.45.5.

69
Diod. XIV.46.3+5; 47.1.

70
Diod. XIV.47.4-6; 48.1.

71
Diod. XIV.48.3; 49.3; 51.1+5; 52.5-6.

72
Diod. XIV.48.4-5; 49.3.

73
Diod. XIV.49.2; 50.1-2.

74
Diod. XIV.49.3-4.

75
Diod. XIV.53.

76
Diod. XIV.53; 54.4.

77
Diod. XIV. 54.4.

78
Diod. XIV.55.2.

79
Diod. XIV.55.7.

80
Diod. XIV.58.1.

81 Diod. XIV.58.2; 59.5.

82 Diod. XIV.61.1-2.

83 Diod. XIV.62.1.

84 Diod. XIV.64.4-5.

85 Diod. XIV.65.2; 66.3.

86 Diod. XIV.67.2-3.

87 Diod. XIV.67.4-7.

88 Diod. XIV.69.2.

89 Diod. XIV.69.4.

90 Diod. XIV.70.1.

91 Diod. XIV.72.

92 Diod. XIV.75.1-3,6-9.

93 Diod. XIV.78.3.7

94 Diod. XIV.87.1.4; 88.2-5.

95 Diod. XIV.90; 95.3.

96 Diod. XIV.91.1.

97 Diod. XIV.95.6-7.

98
Diod. XIV.96.3-4.

99
Diod. XIV.100.1.

100
Diod. XIV.100.1-3; 102.2-3; 103.1-4; 104.1+3; 105.1-3; 106.1+3; 107; 108; 111; 112.

101
Diod. XIV. 109.3.

102
Diod. XV.6; 13+14.

103
Diod. XV.14.4; 15.3.

104
Diod. XV. 15.4; 16.1.

105
Diod. XV.16.

106
Diod. XV.17.2.

107
Diod. XV.17.5.

108
Diod. XV.73.1.

109
Diod. XIII.33-35; 63; 75.

110
Diod. XIII.75.9; 75.4.

111
Diod. XIII.59.1-3.

112
Diod. XIII.55.4.

113
Diod. XIII.55.8; 59.9.

114
Diod. XIII.60.1.

115
Diod. XIII.56.5.

116
Diod. XIII.90; 108.1.

117
Diod. XIII.108.4; 111.2+5.

118
Diod. XIII.59.3.

119
Diod. XIII.58.1.

120
Diod. XIII.44.4; 54.3; 54.5.

121
Diod. XIII.55.3.

122
Diod. XIII.56.1-2.

123
Diod. XIII.55.3; 56.1-2.

124
Diod. XIII.59.1.

125
Diod. XIII.59.9.

126
cf. Diod. XIII.59.1; 59.9.

127
Diod. XIII.79.8.

128
Diod. XIII.80.6.

129
Diod. XIII.81.2.

130
Diod. XIII.79.8; 80.6.

131
Diod. XIII.86.4-5.

132
Diod. XIII.87.1.

133
Diod. XIII.87.5.

134
Diod. XIII.87.2-3.

135
Diod. XIII.88.4.

136
Diod. XIII.88.5.

137
Diod. XIII.88.7; 89.

138
Diod. XIII.89.4; 91.2.

139
Diod. XIII.93.1.

140
Diod. XIII.93.5; 96.1.

141
Diod. XIII.108.5.

142
Diod. XIII.109.1.

143
Diod. XIII.114.1.

144
Diod. XIV.47.6.

145
Diod. XIV.56.2; 56.3-6; 88.5.

146
Diod. XIII.82.6; 83.2.

147
Diod. XIII.90.3-4; 89.1.

148
Diod. XIII.87.

149
Diod. XIII.109. D. Adamesteanou,"Osservazioni sulla battaglia di Gela del 405 B. C.", Kokalos, II (1956), 142

150 Diod. XIII.43.5-6.

151 Diod. XIII.44.1.

152 Diod. XIII.44.6.

153 Diod. XIII.58.1.

154 Diod. XIII.59.3.

155 Diod. XIII.62.5-6.

156 Diod. XIII.80.2.

157 Diod. XIII.80.2-5.

158 Diod. XIII.86.1-3.

159 Diod. XIII.88.2.

160 ibid.

161 Diod. XIII.88.3.

162 Diod. XIV.54.5-6.

163 Diod. XIV.55.1.

164 Diod. XIV. 56.1.

165 Diod. XIV.58.4.

166 Diod. XIV.58.3.

167 Diod. XIV.56.3-6.

168
Diod. XIV.59.3-4.

169
Diod. XIV.62.3.

170
Diod. XIV.63.1-2; 70.4-71; 63.3-4.

171
Diod. XIV.77.5; 77.3.

172
Diod. XIV.77.6.

173
Diod. XIV.95.1.

174
Diod. XIV.43.5-6; 80.2.

175
Diod. XIII.43.4.

176
Diod. XIV.76-77

177
Diod. XIII.44.6; 80.2-5; XIV.54.5-6; 95.1.

178
Diod. XIII.58.1; 62.5; 86.1-3; 88.2-3; XIV.62.1-4; 76.3-4.

179
Diod. XIII.59.3; 62.5; 86.3; XIV.55.1

180
Diod. XIII.88.3; XIV.56.1; 56.3.

181
Diod. XIII.91.3.

182
Diod. XIII.92.1.

183
Diod. XIII.92.5-7; 96.1-2.

184
Diod. XIII.93.3; 96.1-2.

185 Diod. XIII.92.2.

186 Diod. XIII.93.2.

187 Diod. XIII.95.6.

188 Diod. XIII.96.1.

189 Diod. XIII.96.2; 111.6; 94.1-2.

190 Diod. XIII.95.6; 91.4-5; 92.3; 93.3; 96.1.

191 Diod. XIII.92.3.

192 Diod. XIII.93.3; 96.1.

193 Diod. XIII.92.5-7.

194 Diod. XIII.93.3.

195 Diod. XIII.93.1.

196 Diod. XIII.96.1.

197 Diod. XIII.96.1.

198 Diod. XIII.96.2.

199 Diod. XIII.96.2.

200 Diod. XIII.92.1; 95.3; 94.2.

201 Diod. XIII.94.1; 93.3.

202
Diod. XIV.7.6.

203
Diod. XIV.7.7.

204
Diod. XIV.7.3-5; 78.1-3.

205
Diod. XIV.8.4; 67.3; 78.1-3.

206
Diod. XIV.8.6.

207
Diod. XIV.9.3.

208
Diod. XIV.9.9.

209
Diod. XIV.7.6.

210
Diod. XIV.14.6-7; 15.1-2; 78.7.

211
Diod. XIV.95.6.

212
Diod. XIV.7.1.

213
Diod. XIV.7.1.

214
Diod. XIV.7.1-3; 9.8; 7.7; 8.4; 8.6.

215
Diod. XIV.7.7.

216
Diod. XIV.8.2.

217
Diod. XIV.9.8.

218
Diod. XIV.70.3.

219
Diod. XIV.14.6-7.

220
Diod. XIV.14.8.

221
Diod. XIV.15.1-2.

222
Diod. XIV.14.1; 15.2-3; 40.1.

223
Diod. XIV.15.4; 40.1.

224
Diod. XIV.96.4.

225
Diod. XIV.78.5.

226
Diod. XIV.78.5.

227
Diod. XIV.106.3; 107.2.

228
Diod. XIV.107.2.

229
Diod. XIV.41.1; 68; 75.3.

230
Diod. XIV.45.1.

231
Diod. XIV.45.5-6.

232
Diod. XIV.67.3; 69.2; 65.2-3.

233
Diod. XIV.65.3; 68.3; 65.4; 69.4.

234
Diod. XIV.66.1-3.

235
Diod. XIV.66.4; 68.3.

236
Diod. XIV.68.5.

237
Diod. XIV.67.3.

238
Diod. XIII.91.3-5.

239
Diod. XIII.92.5.

240
Diod. XIII.93.2-3.

241
Diod. XIII.94.1.

242
Diod. XIII.94.1-3.

243
Diod. XIII.95.3.

244
Diod. XIII.94.3; 95.5.

245
Diod. XIV.14.8.

246
Diod. XIV.45.1.

247
Diod. XIV.45.2.

248
Diod. XIV.61.

249
Diod. XIV.64.

250
Diod. XIV.70.3.

251
Diod. XIV.96.2.

252
Diod. XIV.88.5.

253
Diod. XIII.92,5-6.

254
Diod. XIV.41.2; 44.3.

255
Diod. XIV.45.3.

256
Diod. XIV.45.4.

257
Diod. XIV.45.5-46.

258
Diod. XIV.75.2.

259
Diod. XIV.41-44.

260
Diod. XIII.113.3.

261
Diod. XIV.102.3.

262
Diod. XIV.107.4-5.

263
Diod. XIV.9.4.

264
Diod. XIV.14,6-7.

265
Diod. XIV.14.4; 15.1.

266
Diod. XIV.41.1.

267
Diod. XIV.78.5.

268
Diod. XIV.44.

269
Diod. XIV.74.

270
Diod. XIV.96.3.

271
Diod. XIV.100.1.

272
Diod. XIV.9.5.

273
Diod. XIV.45.5; 70.3; 7.5.

274
Diod. XIV.102.

275
Diod. XIV.105.3-5.

276
Diod. XIII.112.5.

277
Diod. XIII.95.6; XIV.8.5-6.

278
Diod. XIV.7.1.

279
Diod. XIV.88.3-5.

280
Diod. XIV.108.6.

281
Diod. XIV.41-43.

282
Diod. XIII.55.2-3.

283
Diod. XIII.55.2-5.

284
Diod. XIII.56.6.

285
Diod. XIII.56.7.

286
Diod. XIII.57.2.

287
Diod. XIII.57.3.

288
Diod. XIII.58.2.

289
Diod. XIII.61.5.

290
Diod. XIII.62.4.

291
Diod. XIII.108.6; 108.8.

292
Diod. XIII.89.3.

293
Diod. XIII.56.4.

294
Diod. XIII.59.9.

295
Diod. XIII.60.2.

296
ibid.

297
Diod. XIII.59.8.

298
Diod. XIII.60.3.

299
Diod. XIII.62.1.

300
Diod. XIII.60.2.

301
Diod. XIII.81.1.

302
Diod. XIII.108.9.

303
Diod. XIII.85.3.

304
Diod. XIII.60.5.

305
Diod. XIII.60.7.

306
Diod. XIII.57.1.

307
Diod. XIII.57.3.

308
Diod. XIII.58.1.

309
Diod. XIII.58.2.

310
ibid.

311
ibid.

312
Diod. XIII.62.3.

313
Diod. XIII.58.2.

314
Diod. XIII.89.1.

315
Diod. XIII.90.2.

316
Diod. XIII.111.3-4.

317
Diod. XIII.111.4-6.

318
Diod. XIII.59.9.

319
Diod. XIII.89.2.

320
Diod. XIII.59.4; 62.4.

321
Diod. XIV. 18.4-7.

322
Diod. XIV.41.2.

323
Diod. XIV.41.6.

324
Diod. XIV.42.1.

325
Diod. XIV.42.5.

326
Diod. XIV.43.1.

327
ibid.

328
Diod. XIV.43.4-44.2.

329
Diod. XIV.44.3.

330
Diod. XIV.44.3-8.

331
Diod. XIV.45.2.

332
Diod. XIV.45.4.

333
Diod. XIV.46.1.

334
Diod. XIV.46.2.

335
Diod. XIV.46.4-5.

336
Diod. XIV.46.5; 47.

337
Diod. XIII.44.3.

338
Diod. XIII.55.6.

339
Diod. XIII.60.7.

340
Diod. XIII.87.1-2.

341
Diod. XIII.87.3.

342
Diod. XIII.87.4.

343
Diod. XIII.87.5.

344
Diod. XIII.88.5.

345
Diod. XIII.88.7.

346
Diod. XIII.88.8.

347
Diod. XIII.91.1-3.

348
Diod. XIII.91.4-92.

349
Diod. XIII.92.3.

350
Diod. XIII.92.4.

351
Diod. XIII.93.1.

352
Diod. XIII.93.3.

353
Diod. XIII.93.5.

354
Diod. XIII.94.1-3.

355
Diod. XIII.95.1.

356
Diod. XIII.94.2.

357
Diod. XIII.95.4-6.

358
Diod. XIII.96.2.

359
Diod. XIII.112.4.

360
Diod. XIII.92.3.

361
Diod. XIV.7.1.

362
Diod. XIV.7.6.

363
Diod. XIV.9.1.

364
Diod. XIV.9.4.

365
Diod. XIV.9.5.

366
Diod. XIV.10.3.

367
Diod. XIV.10.4.

368
Diod. XIV.14.7.

369
Diod. XIV.40.

370
Diod. XIV.45.2.

371
Diod. XIV.56.3.

372
Diod. XIV.61.1-3.

373
Diod. XIV.64.3.

374
Diod. XIV.64.5.

375
ibid.

376
Diod. XIV.70.1.

377
Diod. XIV.70.3.

378
Diod. XIV.96.2.

379
Diod. XIII.54.1,5; 80.2-5.

380
Diod. XIII.55.2.

381
Diod. XIII.55.5.

382
Diod. XIII.56.1.

383
Diod. XIII.55.2; 55.7; 56.5; 56.8; 59.7; 60.6.

384
Diod. XIII.60.2.

385
Diod. XIII.60.6.

386
Diod. XIII.60.3.

387
Diod. XIII.88.2.

388
Diod. XIII.58.2.

389
Diod. XIII.57.1.

390
Diod. XIII.57.2-3.

391
Diod. XIII.58.2.

392
ibid.

393
Diod. XIII.59.4; 62.4.

394
Diod. XIII.62.3; 79.8; 80.1; 111.4.

395
Diod. XIII.58.1.

396
Diod. XIII.62.4.6; 89.1; 90.3-5; 108.3.

397
Diod. XIII.57.3.

398
Diod. XIII.62.3-4.

399
Diod. XIII.86.1-4; 90.2.

400
Diod. XIII.59.2.

401
Diod. XIII.86.1.

402
Diod. XIII.86.2-3.

403
Diod. XIII.90.1.

404
Diod. XIII.90.2.

405
Diod. XIII.111.5.

406
Diod. XIV.45.5; 46.2.

407
Diod. XIV.46.3.

408
Diod. XIV.46.4.

409
Diod. XIV.47.5.

410
Diod. XIV.48.1.

411
Diod. XIV.51.4.

412
Diod. XIV.52.2.

413
Diod. XIV.52.1.

414
Diod. XIV.52.3-5.

415
Diod. XIV.53.1.

416
Diod. XIII.57.2.

417
Diod. XIV.53.3.

418
Diod. XIV.63.1-2.

419
Diod. XIV.70.4.

420
Diod. XIV.73.3-4.

421
Diod. XIV.76.1.

422
Diod. XIV.76.2.

423
ibid.

424
Diod. XIV.76.4.

425
Diod. XIV.77.1.

426
Diod. XIV.77.4.

427
ibid.

428
Diod. XIV.77.5.

429
Diod. XIII.81.1-3.

430
Diod. XIII.90.3-4.

431
Diod. XIII.55.5.

432
Diod. XIII.57.3.

433
Diod. XIII.62.4.

434
Diod. XIII.62.6.

435
Diod. XIII.90.2.

436
Diod. XIII.96.5.cf.90.4.

437
Diod. XIII.108.3.

438
Diod. XIII.108.4.

439
Diod. XIII.111.2.

440
Diod. XIII.90.4; 96.5; 108.2; 108.3; 111.2.

441
Diod. XIII.81.1-3.

442
Diod. XIII.84.5.

443
Diod. XIII.89.1.

444
Diod. XIII.89.3.

445
Diod. XIII.90.3.

446
Diod. XIII.82.8.

447
Diod. XIII.83.1.

448
Diod. XIII.83.2.

449
Diod. XIII.84.4.

III

1
See Pausanias V.23.6./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, F. 57b.

2
Plut. Nicias XIX./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T.2.

3
G. De Sanctis, Ricerche sulla storiographia Siceliota (Palermo, 1958), p. 17.

4
See F. Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, (Komm), pp. 496-514.

5
See Suda, s.v.Φίλισκος ἢ Φίλιστος ; Cicero De. Orat. II,13.57./Jacoby op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 1A, 17 b.

6
Diod. XIII.91.4; XIV.8.5; XV.7.3; Plut. Dion XI.5./ Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb. No. 556, T. 3a, 4, 5c.

7
Diod. XIII.91.4./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T.3A

8
The dictum that a tyrant should not flee, but should be dragged by the legs which is attributed in Diodorus XIV.8.5/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 4., to Philistus, is associated by the same author, in a later context, with Megacles, Dionysius' brother-in-law (XX.78.3). The authenticity of the latter reference seems certainly to be supported by Plutarch's claim (Dion XXXV.2./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T.9d, F.59. cf. No. 566, F. 115.) that Timaeus attributed this remark to Philistus himself. It is, therefore possible that the reference in XIV.8.5, reflects the viewpoint of Timaeus, or is representative of the Timaeus type tradition. However, as De. Sanctis suggests (Ricerche p.19.), there is no reason to doubt that Philistus would be likely to place these words in the mouth of a character in his history. Laqueur (s.v. Philistos" in P.W.K. Real-Encyclopadie,XIX.col. 2410) similarly believes that such a remark undoubtedly

represents the viewpoint of Philistus. Upon such an interpretation, the view that the remark is representative of a hostile Timaeus tradition loses its strength and attractiveness. In other words, it matters little whether Megacles or Philistus made the statement. The statement itself seems to be representative of the authentic Philistus viewpoint. Further, as has been seen, there is little doubt that Philistus was intimately connected with the inner circle of Dionysius. As one of the φίλοι his absence from the negotiations leading to the decision of Dionysius to continue to resist appears most unlikely. Therefore, even if it is argued that the actual statement about the tyrant's being dragged by his feet was not made by Philistus, there is no doubt that similar sentiments were expressed by Philistus. For the details of Philistus' political viewpoint see the discussion below pp. 234 ff.

9
See below pp237fcf. Plut. Dion. XI.4-7./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 5c.

10
Diod. XV.7.3./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb; No. 556, T.5b. According to Plutarch (Dion XI.6.) his banishment was the result of his marriage to Leptines' daughter. As will be shown below, this statement, though ultimately reliable is a dangerous generalization, which masks a far more complicated situation. It clearly stems from the common practice of classical historians to discover personal motives, divorced from general issues, at the root of major events. Such causes, though often reliable, have never to be viewed in isolation, for such a procedure is inevitably accompanied by a great degree of artificiality.

11
See discussion below pp. 248-54.

12
Plut. Dion. XIV.4./Jacoby, op. cit.,IIIb, No. 556, T. 6A. cf. in general, Plut. Dion. XI-XIX: Diod. XV.7.3./Jacoby,op. cit.,IIIb, No. 556, T. 5a; Diod.XVI. 16./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T.9c.

13
The reference in XIII.35.3, to the use of Diocles' laws in the time of Timoleon and Hieron indicates the employment of much later information. Volquardson (Untersuchungen uber die Quellen die griechischen und sicilischen Geschichten bei Diodorus XI-XVI (Kiel 1868),

p.101) already identified this information with Timaeus. The arguments against the adoption of such an approach have been discussed in chapter I,p.26,29. The first main point is that Diodorus might have received the information from a source later than Timaeus, or even derived his account from common knowledge. More important, the use of later information need not preclude use by Diodorus of an earlier, and indeed, contemporary source like Philistus.

14

See above p p.224 ff.
The military factor is clearly illustrated by D. Adamesteanou, "Osservazione sulla battaglia di Gela del 405 B. C.", Kokalos, II (1956), 142-157. Adamesteanou examined Diodorus XIII.108-111, from a topographical point-of-view, in the light of recent excavations, with the aid of plans and an aerial photograph. He concluded that the information could only come from a contemporary source, identified as Philistus. Thus p 157, "E impossibile infatti immaginare alla base della descrizione un autore che non abbia conosciuto de visu l'andamento delle operazioni... è talmente corrispondente alla realtà dei fatti che e necessario ammettere che questa fonte vada ricercata in qualche autore contemporaneo." cf. G. Colomba, "Filisto storico del IV Secolo", A.S.S., N. S. XVII (1892), 275-311, esp. p.286 "come uomo di armi, egli dovea naturalmente avere una competenza speciale nelle narrazioni di carattere militare." Cf. R. Lauritano "Ricerche su Filisto", Kokalos, III(1957), pp. 98-122.

15

Diod. XIII.103.3; XV.89.3./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb. No. 556. T.11. It is to be observed that Cicero (Ad Quint. Fratr. II.11.4./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 17a,) speaks of the two corpora (Περὶ Σικελίας, Περὶ Διονυσίου)

16

See below p338 See R. Laqueur, s.v."Philistos", P.W.K. Real-Encyclopadie, XIX.col. 2418. G. L. Barber argues against the use of Philistus (The Historian Ephorus (Cambridge, 1935), p. 166-167. He notes the infrequency of the citations, and concludes that Diodorus was lazy, and that Isocratean similarities indicate use of

Ephorus. The latter claim is certainly not decisive, and Diodorus' supposed laziness, is certainly not substantiated by the evidence, - a fact revealed by the enquiry of chapter one, and the discussion below on Diodorus'use of sources generally and the historian's political ideas. See chapter VII , pp.495 ff.

17
See Diod. XIII.103.3; XV.89.3; XV.94.4.cf.XIII.91.4; XIV.8.5.

18
Theon Progym. II.68.17.Sp./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, F. 28. καὶ παρὰ Φιλίστωι ἐν μὲν τῆι ὀγδόηι τα περὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν τὴν ἐπὶ Καρχηδονίοις Διονυσίου τοῦ τυράννου καὶ τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τῶν νεῶν καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων

19
Dion. Halic. Ad. Pomp. 4./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556 T. 16b: ἦθος δὲ κολακικὸν καὶ φιλοτύραννον ἐμφαίνει καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶμικρολόγον . μιμ III.2: Φιλίστος θεραπευτικόντων τυράννον
Plut. Dion. XXXVI; Nicias. I./Jacoby, op. cit., No. 556, T. 23a, 16; Dion. XI. βεβαιότερον τῇ τυραννίδι Jacoby, op. cit., III b, No. 556. T. 5c. cf. Diod. XVI.16.3./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 9c. Pausanias I.13.9./ Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 13a.

20
Cornelius Nepos III.2/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556. T. 5d.

21
Colomba, op. cit., p. 286.

22
Plut. Alexander. VIII.3./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb. No. 556, T. 22. See T. S. Brown, "Alexander's Book Order (Plut. Alex. VIII)", Historia, XVI (1967), 366 ff. U. Wilcken, Alexander the Great, translated by G. C. Richards (London, 1967), p. 225-6; Freeman. History of Sicily, III,603-4.

23
Cicero, Ad Quint. Fratr. II.11.4./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 17a.

24
Diod. XIV.18; 41-44.

25
R. Laqueur, s.v. "Philistos", P.W.K. Real-Encyclopadie, XIX b, col. 2419; G. De Sanctis, Ricerche, p. 37 ff; cf. works cited by K. F. Stroheker in Chapter I, note 65; Sir E. Bumbury, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, III. p.297; Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556 (Komm), p. 501; Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, IIa,(Strassbourg, 1914), 402; E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums (Stuttgart, 1902), V. 4,65.

26
Diod. XIII.91.4; XIV.8.5.

27
Dioc. XIII.92.6-7.

28
cf. Diod. XIII.93.5; 94.1-4.

29
Diod. XIII. 95.5; 96.3

30
Diod. XIII.109.4-110.

31
Diod. XIII.112-113.

32
Diod. XIV.45.1.

33
Diod. XIV.46.2.

34
Thus Laqueur, P.W.K. R.E., XIX b, col. 2421, "Wir brauchen diese Dinge nicht weiter ins einzelne zu verfolgen: im Grunde genommen ist es ja klar daß hinter der Darstellung des Dionysius, der ein mächtiges Reich im Kampfe gegen die Karthager geschaffen hat, ein Historiker stehen muß der diese Tat bejahte-und das war Philistos."

35
See above chapter II on Chariestatoi and demos, pp.175ff. See above chapter III, n. 8. p. 571.

36
Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 12./Dion. Halic. Ad Pomp. 5.

37
Diod. XV.7.3; Plut. Dion. XI.

38
A. Gitti, "Ricerche sulla vita di Filisto, Adria ed il luogo dell 'esilio", M.A.L., Ser. 8a, IV,4 (1952), 225-273.

39
Plut. Dion. XXXVI

40
Pliny. N. H. III.121.

41
See discussion below pp.248ff.

42
A. Gitti. "Sulla Colonizzazione Greca nell 'alto e medio Adriatico", pp. VII (1952), 16 against Altheim, Geschichte der lateinischen Sprache (Frankfurt, 1951).

43
I. Calabi, Paideia, XL (1954-5), 55-57.

44
See H. T. Wade Gery, "Miltiades", J. H. S., LXXI (1951), 212-221 Reprinted in Essays in Greek History (Oxford, 1958), pp. 155-171.

45
eg J. B. Bury "Dionysius I", Cambridge Ancient History, VI (1927), 135; J. B. Bury, History of Greece, 3rd ed., revised by R. Meiggs (London, 1951), p.665. See general discussion in K. F. Stroheker, Dionysius I, pp. 6-7.

46
Justin XX.5.4; cf. Polyb. I.6; Diod. XIV.113. For the extent of Dionysius' empire see Gitti, P.P. VII (1952), 161-191, supported by A. J. Graham, Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece (Manchester, 1964), p. 208.

47
Diod. XV.13.

48
See A. Gitti Studi su Filisto. Le Cause dell'esilio (Bari, 1953).

49
Diod. XV.7.3; Plut. Dion. XI.4.

50
Diod. XIV.102-3. See Gitti, Studi su Filisto, p.13 ff.

51
See Cornelius Nepos Dion. III.2.

52
Gitti, Studi Su Filisto, p. 23.

53
Diod. XVI.5.

54
Diod. XIV.112; XV.17.

55
Diod. XV.7.3; Plut. Dion. XI: Plut. De Exilio. XIV.

56
Gitti, M.A.L., ser. 8a. IV,4 (1952), 239 ff.

57
See Gitti M.A.L., ser. 8a, IV,4 (1952), 243, citing Hecataeus of Miletus (frag. 90.), Theophrastus (Hist. Plant. IV.5.6.), Theopompus (Jacoby, op. cit., I (Komm), p. 334), Isocrates (V.21), Ephorus (in Pseudo Skymnos 491) and Pseudo Skylax (Muller F. H. G. F.27).

58
Gitti, M. A. L., ser. 8a. IV, 4 (1952), 244, "In ogni caso, dopo le considerazione fatte, possiamo dire che l'opinione del Des Vergers, Holm, Colomba ecc che Plutarco abbia affermato che Filisto si recò ad Adria non puo sostenersi: l'unica base che nelle fonti scritte avrebbe la teoria d'un Filisto esiliato ad Adria e una falsa interpretazione."

59
Gitti, loc. cit., "L'ospilita ricevuta da chiunque sia nel suo esilio, mostra all'evidenza che Filisto è un vero bandito, un esilit o, un φυγων cf. R. L. Beaumont, "Greek Influence in the Adriatic Sea before the Fourth Century", J. H. S., LVI (1936), 203. However, Beaumont concludes from this that Philistus was not a governor, and that Dionysius did not control the whole Adriatic, his aim being merely the control of the shore against Greece. Beaumont's thesis is, however, quashed by Gitti's revised dating of the exile and the problem of the Fossa Philistina. Gitti is followed in essentials by A. J. Graham, op. cit., p. 208.

60
Plut. Tim. XV.10/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, F. 60.

61
Diod. XIV. 109.6. G. Grote, History of Greece, X (2nd ed.; London, 1869), 312.

62
Columba, op. cit., p. 284.

63
Cicero Ad Quint. Fratr. II.11.4./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 17a.

64
Cicero De Oratore, II. 57. cf./Jacoby op. cit., IIIb. No. 556, T. 17b.

65
Cicero Brutus. LXVI./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556. T. 21. "Amatores huic desunt sicut multis iam ante seculis et Philisto Syracusano et ipsi Thucydidi."

66
Cicero De Divinit. I.39./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 24.

67
Dion. Halic. Ad Pomp. 4./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 16b.

68
Quint. Instit. Orat. X.1.74./Jacoby; op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 15c.

69
See G. Coppola, "Una Pagina del Περὶ Σικελίας di Filisto in un papiro Fiorentino", R. F. I. C. N. S., VIII (1930), 449-466 (esp. 462-466).

70
As Coppola has shown the papyrus discussed would indicate this fact.

71
φορτικὸν καὶ ἰδίωτην Plut. Nicias. I./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 23b.

72
Plut. Dion. XXXV.cf. De Sanctis, Ricerche p. 19.

73
C. N. Cochrane, Thucydides and the Science of History (Oxford, 1929).

74
A. Andrewes, "The Mytilene debate", Phoenix, XVI (1962), 71. cf. A. Andrewes, "Thucydides and the causes of war", C. Q., N. S., IX (1959), 223; A. G. Woodhead, "Thucydides' Portrait of Cleon", Mnemosyne, ser. 4, XIII (1960), 292; A. Leskey, A History of Greek Literature (2nd ed.; London, 1966), p. 462.

75
Thuc. II.97; VII.30; VIII.96. See L. Pearson, "Thucydides as Reporter and Critic", T. A. Ph. A., LXXVIII (1947), 37-60. cf. W. Jaeger, Paedeia. The Ideals of Greek Culture, translated by G. Highet, (2nd Engl. ed.; Oxford, 1947), I, p. 38, "His occasional digressions on the problems of early history are either incidental or else written to explain the present by the past. The aim of the Archaeology is to show the importance of the past in relation to the future." cf. J. H. Finley, Jnr, Thucydides (Michigan, 1963), pp. 82-92; D. Grene, Greek Political Theory. The Image of man in Thucydides and Plato (Chicago, 1950), pp. 49-53; A. Leskey op. cit., p. 458.

76
Thuc. IV.65; VI.53; VIII.97.2; VI.61.1.

77
Thuc. III.36.6; IV.39.3; V.16.1; V.7.3.

78
Thuc. I.138; II.65.

79
See especially J. H. Finley Jr., Thucydides; J. H. Finley, Jr. "The Unity of Thucydides History", Three Essays in Thucydides (Harvard, 1967), pp 118-169, reprinted from Studies presented to W. S. Ferguson, H. S. Ph., supplementary Volume I (1940), 255-98; A. G. Woodhead, Thucydides on the Nature of Power (Cambridge, Massachusetts), pp 43 ff. /1970,

80
Thuc. VI.24.4; 31.6; VII.75.7. On rejection of Periclean policy see Thuc. I.144.I; II.65.7; IV.17.4; 21.2.

81
Thuc. IV.41.4 (Pylos); IV.92.2 (Delium); V. 97 (Melos).

82
See E. Bayer, "Thucydides und Pericles", W. J. A., III (1948), 55A, 3, 1-57; J. Vogt, "Das Bild des Pericles bei Thucydides", H. Z., CLXXXII (1956), 249-266, cf. J. H. Finley, Thucydides, pp. 56-249, 302-306; Three Essays pp.154-161.

83
Thuc. II.35.2; 41.2.

84
Especially Plato Gorgias. 515 c.

85
ie in Thuc. I.76.3.cf.II.63.1, where Pericles warns of the dangers of submission. cf. II.64.3 and II.8.4. Vogt, op. cit., p. 266, concludes "Aber noch in der letzten Bearbeitung seines Werkes zeigt er uns in der schreckenerregenden dritten Rede einen Pericles, der sein Volk in despotischer Weise zum Durchalten zwingt, einen Politiker ohne Alternative, einen führer in völliger Erstarrung." On the Athenian power drive, see J. H. Finley, Thucydides, p.143, 150-155; J. De Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, translated by Philip Thody (Oxford, 1963), pp.19 ff.

86
See Thuc. V.43.2; VI.15.2; VIII.47.1.cf.II.60.5; II.65

87
Thuc. III.82.2. Thus Pericles' warning of I.140.1; II.61.1: his fear of revealing the true position of the Athenian cause II.62.1: Pericles as a stabilizing influence; II.65.5.

88
Thus F. Wasserman, "Thucydidean Scholarship 1946-56", C. W., L (1956), 95. "Thucydides leaves no doubt that a new Pericles might have mastered the crisis of a long war."

89
eg. J. H. Finley, Thucydides pp.136 ff; Three Essays, pp. 154 ff. cf. B. X. De Wet, "Periclean Imperial Policy and the Mytilenean Debate", A. Class, VI (1963), 106-124. De Wet accepts the Thucydidean picture of the cautious Pericles aiming at the conservation of the sea Empire after 446 B. C. He argues for a moderate type of imperialism, and (p.118) speaks of

the fact that there was no Pericles present to curb the demos' passions. According to De Wet, Cleon lacks moderation and an appreciation of the cultural values of Athens. The fact that half of Diodotus' and Cleon's speech deals with the question of debate in the assembly is indicative of a desire to show the failure of the new democracy (p 120). Cleon and Diodotus the cold rationalist contrast with the ideals of the Epitaphios and the assessment of Pericles' heirs in 11,65.

The same idea is espoused by F. Wasserman, "Post Periclean Democracy in action: the Mytilenean Debate", T. A. Ph.A., LXXXVII (1956), 27-41. Thus (p. 33) Cleon is described as a "vulgarized Pericles", echoing Pericles' phrases, he epitomizes the immorality of the actions of the Hellenic world as seen in the Plataean debate of III. 53-67., which is the counterpart to the Mytilenean affair. (cf. A. Andrewes, "The Mytilene Debate", Phoenix, XVI (1962), 75) Diodotus is a second best to Pericles, concentrating on reasons of State. W. concludes that the debate is a compliment to Pericles' statement of I.114.4 where Pericles says, "I am more worried about our own faults than about the plans of our enemies."

V. Ehrenberg adopts the same procedure in, "Polypragmosyne: a study in Greek Politics", J. H. S., LXVII (1947), 46-67. Thus (p. 48) on Periclean imperialism which "did not originate from lust for power, but derived from a deep love of Athens and was subordinate to higher ideals in which power politics were to be merged into one with cultural supremacy and brilliance. However idealized Thucydides' picture of Pericles and Periclean democracy may be, there was a fundamental difference between his policy, at least after 446 B. C. and that of his successors. Under Pericles' leadership, Athenian polypragmosyne was turned into a useful and inspiring activity of a people, politically and spiritually alive, although it remained a tyranny, a burden and a danger for the states under Athenian rule, and thus a potential danger to Athens herself". cf. p.51,"Athenian imperialism was not the same under Pericles as it was under Cleon or Alcibiades, although the Athenian character had certainly not undergone any fundamental change...while Pericles declared that Athens could not relinquish power, Athens refused to accept limits to its expansion he knew by this [Pericles'] policy, Athens had grown into the school of Hellas. But he was also a rationalist and moralist who saw the dangers of unrestrained activity, irresponsible leadership and mass instincts." cf. p. 53, "he believes in power. He knows the evil of corrupt men holding power, but he does not know that power corrupts." cf. Sir. R. Syme,

"Thucydides", P. B. A., XLVIII (1960), 50, "One cannot help being attracted to Thucydides' sympathy of Pericles."

90
Ehrenberg, op. cit., p. 51.

91
Argued by W. G. Woodhead, "Thucydides' portrait of Cleon", Mnemosyne, ser. 4, XIII (1960), 289-317, and noted by W. P. Wallace, "Thucydides", Phoenix, XVIII (1964), 251.

92
Thuc. VIII.73.3;65.2. See Andrewes, Phoenix XVI (1962), 75ff; J. B. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians (London, 1908), pp. 122-23.

93
Andrewes, op. cit., p. 78, 82

94
See B. X. De Wet, "A note on Woodhead's portrait of Cleon", A. Class V (1962), 64-67.

95
De Wet, A. Class., VI (1963), 116.

96
Thuc. V.7.2.

97
Diod. XII.74.

98
Woodhead, op. cit., pp.289ff.

99
Thuc. IV.21;22.

100
Thuc. IV.27-29.

101
Thuc. IV.39.3.

102
Woodhead op. cit., pp. 289 ff. cf. A. Leskey, op. cit., p. 456

103
Thuc. V.43.2. See De Romilly, op. cit., pp. 196-200.

104
Thuc. V.43.3 (Alcibiades); cf. 36.1.

105
Thuc. VI.29.3; 61.5; 68.2.

106
Thuc. I.135.3; 102.4.

107
See De Romilly, op. cit., p. 272 ff.

108
Thuc. III.91.1; VI.10.5; II.7.

109
M. Treu, "Athen und Melos Der Melierdialog des Thukydides", Historia, II (1953/4), 253-273; W. Eberhardt, "Der Melierdialog und die Inschriften", Historia VIII (1959), 284-314. In support of Eberhardt see M. Chambers, "Studies in Thucydides 1957-62", C. W., LXII (1957), 12; M. Amit, "The Melian Dialogue and History", Athenaeum, III-IV (1968), 221; A. E. Raubitchek, "War Melos tributsflichtig?", Historia, XII (1963), 78 supports Treu and argues for the possibility that Ephorus was convinced of the fact that Melos rebelled from Athens.

110
A. D. Momigliano, "On the Causes of War in Ancient Historiography", Acta Congressus Madvigiani, I (1954), 199-211. Reprinted in Secondo Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici (Rome, 1960), pp. 13-27 & Studies in Historiography (London, 1966), pp. 112-126 (esp. p.118).

111
F. M. Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus (London, 1907).

112
Thuc. I.103.

113
Plut. Them. XXXII,2; Herod. VIII,62; Plut. Them. XXV; Thuc. I.136.

114
1. G. I^2, 19./M. N. Todd, A. Selection of Great Historical Inscriptions (2nd. ed.; Oxford, 1933), I, No. 31./R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1969), No. 37; $1.6.I^2$, 52./Tod, op. cit., I, No. 57./Meiggs and Lewis, op. cit., No. 63; $1.6.I^2$, 51./Tod. op. cit., I, No. 58/Meiggs and Lewis, op. cit., No. 64. cf. Diod. XII.54; Plut. Pericles. XX; Plut. Alcib. XVII.

115
See H. D. Westlake, "Athenian aims in Sicily, 427-424 B.C.

A Study in Thucydidean motivation", Historia, IX (1960), 385-402.

116
Thuc. IV.65.4.

117
Thuc. III.90.1.

118
Thuc. IV.65.3.

119
Thuc. III.86.4.

120
Westlake argued that the use originally of twenty ships indicates that initially lack of enthusiasm characterized the venture. Only later were forty additional ships sent out (Thuc. III.115.3-5.). Against Westlake, it is clear that a division of opinion continued. Hence the use of the ships to help Corcyra and to patrol the Peloponnesian coast (Thuc. IV.2.3-4.). Hence more acceptable are the other views; that the purpose of the expedition was to provide military exercise; or that it took the form of preventive action against Western aid to the Peloponnesians, either political or economic in nature.

121
Thuc. III.86.4.

122
Thuc. II.7.2; I.36.2; I.44.3 (Corcyraeans); VI.6.1 (Segestans at Athens in 416 B. C.); VI.18. (Alcibiades at Athens); VI.83.2; VI.84 (Euphemus); VI.34.8 (Hermocrates); VI.36.4 (Athenagoras).

123
Thuc. IV.65.2.

124
Thuc. VI.15.2; 34.2; 90.2.

125
Thuc. VI.16-18.

126
See M. Treu "Athen und Karthago und die thukydideische Darstellung", Historia, III (1954/5), 41-57.

127
Thuc. VI.48.

128
Thuc. VI.50; 51.

129
Thuc. VI.88.6. As Treu observes, Alcibiades' plans were binding upon Nicias and Lamachus: no change in plan is observed by the text; the nature of the strategia is not changed; and it is conceivable that some preliminary relations with Etruria and Carthage had been effected.

130
Thuc. VI.62.

131
To quote P. A. Brunt, "Thucydides and Alcibiades", R. E. G., LXV (1952), 59-96, "Alcibiades" aim was to weave a grand alliance against Syracuse and Selinus in Sicily."

132
cf. Thuc. VI.9-13; 17; 18.

133
See Plut. Alcib. XXXVIII,2.

134
Plut. Alcib. XVII. observes that the people had been held in check by Pericles and that the latter's death resulted in increased meddling in Sicily. He also notes how Alcibiades dreamt about Carthage and Libya and a grand alliance against Sparta. The young were persuaded to share his dreams. The old merely stirred up the young by thoughts of former conquests. An interest in military geography was noted and maps were drawn up. Elsewhere (Nicias,XII), maps of the Sicilian and Libyan regions are noted, the aim being the entire conquest of the Western Mediterranean. This evidence might appear to confirm the Thucydidean thesis of conquest. Against this view, two points are to be noted. First Alcibiades is said to have dreamt of alliance against Sparta, and not necessarily of conquest of the West; second, the latter is only associated with popular imagination. Freeman, History of Sicily, III, Note VII, 636-41, has noted three stages. The first consists of vague ideas. In the second stage, ideas

are hoped for and discussed. Finally these ideas are openly discussed in the assembly. Freeman concludes that the second stage had been arrived at, in the Athens of 416 B. C., and that Hermocrates did not simply invent his claim about Athenian designs upon Carthage, but based his theory on current gossip at Athens (Thuc. VI.34.2). What must be stressed is that even if certain elements seriously considered the possibility of an attack upon Carthage and the whole of the West, this must not be confused with public policy.

135

F. M. Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus (London, 1907); G. B. Grundy, Thucydides and the History of his age (London, 1911), pp. 315-332, 366ff. Cornford concentrated upon the influence of the new Piraeus element when she took action against Megara. Grundy and he saw the necessity of controlling the corn supply as a cause of Athenian intervention in the north West. Similarly both writers felt that Corinth was the most threatened member of the Peloponnesian League, while the inland communities felt the loss of imported corn. Pressure was thus laid upon Sparta by Corinth,which is the key to the situation.

It is certainly true that Thucydides leaves no doubt of the fact that Corinth is the major power in favour of war, and that she exerts the most considerable influence upon Sparta. Further,Sparta's reluctance is suggested by her later interference in the so-called First Peloponnesian War. Indeed there is not a little truth in the view that Thucydides failed to appreciate the importance of the West as a factor leading to the outbreak of war in 431 B. C., and determining Athenian policy throughout the century.

Two facts, however, must be stated. First, it is certainly a gross generalization to state that Thucydides was ignorant of the importance of economic factors as determinents, influencing the cause and course of war. Indeed, the greatness of the whole conflict arose from the material resources of the chief combatants (Thuc. I.1.1.). Archidamus declared that "war is less a matter of arms than money" (I.82.2;88.1). Pericles speaks of economic surpluses rather than forced contributions as supporting war (I.141.5) and the Athenians argue that material resources must accompany intelligence(V.103.1). Hermocrates looks to Carthage's gold and silver (VI.34.2). See S. B. Smith, "The Economic Motive in Thucydides", H. S. Phil., LI (1940), 267-301. At the same time, it must be stressed that this is a very limited interest.

Second, it must be stated that the thesis about the threat to Corinth's economic welfare, drawing Sparta into the conflict, requires considerable qualification. The following points made by G. Dickins, "The true causes of the Peloponnesian War", C. Q., V (1911), 238-248, are still relevant. First, it is clear that Sparta was herself seriously threatened by a strong Athens which had repaired her fleet, crushed the revolts against her, and was intriguing in the North West, West, and North Eastern Aegean. Second, Dickins observes that hostility from Corinth only emerges in 334 B. C. and therefore after 445, whereas Sparta is continuously hostile from 480 B. C. Thirdly, there is the fact that the Attic trade monopoly of the West would affect Sparta nearly as much as it would Corinth. Fourthly, Sparta's reluctance to fight is due as much, if not more to other factors: internal divisions, the conventional nature of her warfare, and her simple desire to get Athens out of the North-West, after which peace was agreeable. Further, there is the fact that it is certainly hazardous to attribute modern economic motives to the ancients, who, on the whole, were less keenly aware of their significance. As regards Corinth's threat to secede to Argos, there is no mention of such considerations. Archidamus and Sthenelaidas certainly do not mention the possibility.

To conclude, it appears that the economic motive, though it cannot be totally discounted, is less important than Cornford or Grundy maintained. Certainly the Western policy of Athens is a major key to the understanding of the manoeuvreings of the Pentecontaetia and Peloponnesian War. However, the military and political significance is probably more to the point. Hence Thucydides, though wrong to dismiss the Sicilian expedition as due to demagogic irresponsibility after Pericles' death, is not entirely wrong to play down the economic factor.

136

See A. B. West, "Pericles' political heirs", C. Phil., IX (1924), 120-146, 201-228. West accepts the view of the new radical movement of the post-Periclean era, though he argues that it only gradually emerged, and created a split with the Periclean peace party of Nicias. He dates this movement to the period following the Sicilian and Aetolian adventures, and argues that the Pylos episode is the first manifestation. As has been indicated above, Athenian interest in the Corinthian Gulf and Sicily is certainly not representative of a radical change of policy. Further,the unreliability

of Thucydides' portrait has been shown to reflect a considerable degree of bias on Thucydides' part.

137
M. H. Chambers, "Thucydides and Pericle", H. S. Phil., LXII (1957), 79-91.

138
Chambers, loc cit., is supported by the conclusion of Dickins, C. Q., V (1911), 248 that "there was more than one Alcibiades living." (ie in 431 B. C.).

139
A. W. Gomme, Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford, 1959), (Henceforth referred to as H. C. T.), I, 152, suggests that Thucydides may have thought Athens to be the aggressor morally.

140
Especially indicated by De Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, pp. 19 ff. and J. H. Finley, Thucydides, pp. 143, 150-155.

141
Thus F. E. Adcock, "Thucydides in book I", J. H. S., LXXI (1951), 10; Gomme, H. C. T., I, 152.

142
P. K. Walker, "The Purpose and Method of the Pentecontaetia", C. Q., LI (1957), 27-38. Walker particularly discusses the walls, Aegina and Thasos. I find it difficult to agree in entirety with H. D. Westlake, "Thucydides and the Pentecontaetia", C. Q., XLIX (1955), 53-67, who argues that the excursus is a work of Thucydides' exile, on the ground that little information is provided on individuals like Cimon and Pericles and on major battles and motives, the contrasting apparent knowledge of Spartan motives, the detailed knowledge of Egypt in connection with the Egyptian campaign, and the detailed knowledge about the more recent Samian War. First, Westlake seems to misunderstand the significance of the Pentecontaetia excursus as a continuation of the Archaeology. (See esp. J. H. Finley Thucydides p. 137 and D. Grene, op. cit., pp. 50,53). The common aim is to describe naval growth as seen in Crete and Athens and, indeed, the general growth of power blocs, as indicated by the cases of Minos and Agamemnon. Hence no particular interest in details of the battles, individuals or policies is necessary. It may be noted that the speeches

and comments certainly make Pericles the central figure of the history. Second, Westlake ignores the role of the Pentecontaetia excursus as the ἀληθεστάτα πρόφασις Details would be out of place,if they did not illustrate the growth of Athens' and Sparta's increasing fear.

Regarding Thucydides' claim that no interest was shown in the period (I.97.2.), this need not imply the fact that Thucydideswould therefore, deal in detail with the period.

More serious is the statement about Hellanicus. It is possible to argue that it is an interpolation, providing a terminus ante quem (Thus Adcock, op. cit., p. 11, following K. Ziegler, Rh. M., LXXVIII (1924), 66, n.2.). An alternative view is possible. Thucydides makes three statements. First, there is the note on the omissions of his predecessors. There follows the observation that Hellanicus' work was characterized by brevity and chronological inaccuracy. Finally, there is the statement that Thucydides' is useful "at the same time" to explain the establishment of the Athenian Empire. It would appear that only the first and last statements regarding the omissions of his predecessors and the necessity of explaining the rise of Athens refers to Thucydides' aim. The middle statement, if not an interpolation, is a general comment not associated with the historian's aim.

Certainly Westlake's argument is possible, but it is not the only and most logical explanation for the brevity of the narrative of the Pentecontaetia.

Nor can more certainty be attributed to Westlake's second thesis, that the accounts of Themistocles and Pausanias are early, and later interpolated into the history, thus reflecting early romantic popular tradition of the Herodotean type. The interest in Themistocles stems from the fact that Themistocles was the driving force behind the creation of the Athenian Empire. Also it is to be remembered that Themistocles was the epitome of Athenian innovation tendencies. Hence the detailed account of his duping the Spartans, where the contrast between lethargy and progress is most apparent. At first sight, Pausanias' position is unaccountable. Two possibilities must, however, be considered. His role leading to the formation of the Delian League was of great importance. Perhaps of greater significance, Pausanias stands out as an untypical Spartan. He represents innovation, while Sparta stands for reaction. Sparta lacks men like Pausanias. Hence she cannot assume the importance

in the Greek World as Athens does. Yet Sparta has stability. Pausanias, with his tendencies for innovation of the Athenian type, epitomizes the forces of instability. Yet, it is to be noted that Gomme, H. C. T., I, 27, regards the Themistocles-Pausanias excursus as "quite unnecessary for Thucydides' purpose ".

143
R. Sealey, "Thucydides, Herodotus and the Causes of War", C. Q.,N. S. V (1957), 1-11. For a gradual process ἀναγκάζειν would be used.

144
Sealey C. Q., V (1957), 10 refers to Corcyra, Phormio in Ambracia, Potidaea, Megara and Aegina.

145
Thus M. A. Levi, "In Margine a Tucidide", P. P., VII (1952), 97; M. H. Chambers, "Thucydides and Pericles", H. S. Phil., LXII (1957), 81; A. Leskey, op. cit., p. 461, however, assumes that the ideals of the Epitaphios are those of Thucydides.

146
See De Romilly, op. cit., p. 153. Yet Gomme, H. C. T., II, 124, sees a contradiction with the third speech.

147
M. H. Chambers, H. S. Phil., LXII (1957), 81; M. F. McGregor, "The Politics of the Historian Thucydides", Phoenix, X (1956), 100, " in praising Pericles, he did not perceive that he was praising democracy."

148
J. H. Oliver, "The Praise of Periclean Athens as a Mixed Constitution", Rh. M., XCVIII (1955), 37-40. cf. J. S. Morrison, "The place of Protagoras in Athenian Public Life 460-415", C. Q.,XXXV (1941),12.

149
Oliver, op. cit., pp. 37-40; Thuc. II.65.9.

150
See R. Sealey, "The Entry of Pericles into History", Hermes, LXXXIV (1956), 234-247.

151
Thus Plut. Cimon, XIV.4, on Pericles' cooperation with Cimon when the latter was put on trial after his

return from the siege of Thasos in 463/2 B. C. The agent was Elpinice and the source was Stesimbrotus. cf. Theopompus (Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 88) on the recall of Cimon by Pericles and Elpinice. Finally, Cimon's last operations on Cyprus appear to have been the product of secret negotiations with Pericles (Plut. Moralia. 812F; Pericles X.5). On Cimon's wife as an Alcmaeonid, Isodice by name, see Plutarch, Cimon, IV.10; XVI.1. See J. H. Finley, Thucydides, pp. 9-20, on Thucydides' connections with the Philaids on his maternal side. cf. McGregor, op. cit., pp.94-95.

152

Sealey Hermes, LXXXIV (1956) also argues that like Cimon, Pericles was favourably disposed towards Sparta and for war with Persia. He also suggests that the anti-Spartan policy was a late feature, emerging in 432 B. C. As has been argued above, the evidence throughout the 450's, 440's and 430's suggests the very opposite, and that there is little to distinguish Periclean from post-Periclean policy towards the Peloponnesus.

153

Sealey correctly argues that Pericles emerges as a corruptor of the demos through the oligarchic fabrication of the late 5th and early 4th centuries. The problem was to account for the rise of the demagogues, and inevitably as Cornford has shown, not entirely incorrectly,Pericles was held responsible. This is essentially the viewpoint of the old oligarch and Theopompus.

154

Syme, op. cit., p. 40; McGregor, op. cit., p. 102, "he ended his life a confirmed oligarch who never renounced the creed of his father."

155

See T. A. Sinclair, A History of Greek Political Thought, (London, 1951), p. 98 ff; H. D. Westlake, Individuals in Thucydides (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 5-15. Westlake, "Nicias in Thucydides", C. Q., XXXV (1941), 58-59 argues that Thucydides cannot be attached to any one party, and that the historian was more Periclean than Pericles himself. The latter fact is certainly clear. Hence his idealized and incorrect contrast of Pericles with the demagogues. Whether, however, he cannot be attached to one party is more debatable. It

is true that in a precise sense he was no oligarch. As will be shown below, he was clearly anti-democratic, and very little separated him from the pro-tyrant Philistus.

The thesis of F. Wasserman, "The Speeches of King Archidamus in Thucydides", C. J., XLVIII (1953), 193-200, would appear to support the view that Thucydides had more in common with oligarchs than democrats. Wasserman notes the emphasis upon sophrosyne and eunomia which is considered to represent a "type of conservatism". Archidamus is compared to the great old man of Athenian tragedy, the Five Thousand and Pericles.

There are, however, serious problems. True, the identification of the Five Thousand and Pericles is not difficult. However, it is to be doubted whether Sparta's case can have been applied to Athens. Thus when Wasserman speaks of the "Greece of Pericles and Archidamus turning to the Greece of Sthenelaidas, Alcibiades, Lysander and Critias", his statement bears little relationship to the realities of the situation. The case of Lysander and Critias is most doubtful, since the eighth book stopped before discussion on these characters. There is no evidence for the Lysander-Critias association equated with the Sparta-Athens identification. It must, moreover, be asked with what authority does Wasserman speak of the demagogic ephor, Sthenelaidas (p. 94). The implication is serious. There is, however, no reason to assume that in Thucydides' mind Sparta's problems paralleled Athens', that she too suffered from Cleon-type politicians, and that a division between oligarchic/aristocratic types and demagogic democrats marked the course of the Peloponnesian War. It must be asked what evidence exists for assuming that Archidamus worked against a party of the youth? There is indeed no reason to assume Archidamus to be the representative of the "old" against the new party under Sthenelaidas. Indeed to Thucydides, Spartan motivation is more complex. Above all, Sparta is pushed by Corinth who considerably complicates the issue. The conflict between the old and the young is doubtful and certainly oversimplifies the problem. Further, Wasserman's identification of Archidamus with sobriety and the Pericles-type is misleading. He is a national type, representing Sparta's conservatism as opposed to Athenian polypragmosyne. He is not associated by Thucydides with navy and democracy and Periclean-type imperialism. Finally, there is the question of Wasserman's argument that Thucydides wanted cooperation

between Athens and Sparta, through the agency of these similar types, Archidamus and Pericles. This thesis is highly speculative. It is to be doubted whether Thucydides desired cooperation until the Thucydidean-Periclean policy was ensured by such an entente.

156
J. H. Finley, Thucydides, p. 3-35; Syme, op. cit., p. 51, "a lucid and non practicing oligarch".

157
Plato Gorgias, 471; Thuc. II.100.2.

158
Plato Gorgias, 518 E-519 A.

159
A. W. Gomme, "Thucydides and Fourth Century Political Thought", More Essays in Greek History and Literature (Oxford, 1962), p. 128, correctly observes that it is wrong to regard Plato Gorgias. 470 D-471 C, as a definite rebuttal of Thucydides II.100.2. Certainly there is no contrast between the conventional φόγος and ἐγκώμιον However a distinct difference of attitudes on the part of the two writers cannot be denied.

160
Thus A. W. Gomme, More Essays, p. 129

161
A. W. Gomme, H. C. T., II.175 on Thuc. II.63.2. Perhaps popular opinion did not regard it as such a crime. The more philosophic hostile view of Tyrannis is the product of fourth century philosophic speculation. See below p.457.See Woodhead, Thucydides on the Nature of Power pp. 84-89.

162
Thuc. I.39.3; 127.3; II.65.

163
See V. Ehrenberg, Sophocles and Pericles (Oxford, 1964), p. 75ff; Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates (London, 1968), pp. 230-38; E. M. Walker, Cambridge Ancient History, IV, 155; J. S. Morrison, "The Place of Protagoras in Athenian Life 460-415", C. Q., XXXV (1941), II; W. G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy (London, 1966), p. 183ff. Woodhead, Thucydides on the nature of Power p. 89, distinctly states that Pericles was no tyrant, but an individual

who appealed to the "hearts and affections of men". In spite of Woodhead, it is a fact, as has been shown, that the historian disliked democracy, and, as will be indicated, he was attracted towards the tyrant figure of Hermocrates. McGregor "The Politics of the Historian, Thucydides", Phoenix X (1956), 97-98, points to the facts that citizens governed, the ecclesia decided policy, free elections existed, Pericles was always responsible to the sovereign demos, and that Pericles faced opposition from Thucydides the son of Melesias in 444 and was deposed in 430. Against McGregor, these facts do not affect the view of Thucydides and other sources that Pericles
164 resembled an autocrat.
Cratinus F. 24; Plut. Pericles. VII.1; V.3.

165
V. Ehrenberg, Sophocles and Pericles, p. 105 ff; From Solon to Socrates, p. 23

166
Herod. III.80-82.

167
Thus J. S. Morrison, C. Q., XXXV (1941), 12.

168
Euripides Supplices, 403.

169
See Morrison, "Pericles Monarchos", J. H. S., LXX (1950), 76-77; A. W. Gomme, "Pericles Monarchos - A Reply", J. H. S., LXX (1950), 77, is unconvincing. The first point Gomme makes is that the Greek background cannot be reconciled with this description of Darius and the Persians. Against this it is to be noted that this does not presuppose the use of the Persian parallel for the Greek view. Aeschylus, for example, was willing to equate barbarians and tyranny (thus the Erynes in the Eumenides and the Egyptians in the Supplices.)

Second, Gomme argues that the experience of Greek tyranny and not monarchy is stressed. This is a weak argument: the main issue is absolute rule. Further, the influence of tyranny, as has been shown in the text was considerable.

Finally, Gomme points out that there is no evidence to suppose that Herodotus was hostile to Pericles. Against this, it must be stated that not only an enemy is capable of criticism. Sophocles who was Pericles'friend, seems to have criticized him (Thus Ehrenberg, Sophocles and Pericles). Aeschylus,

who accepted democracy in the Prometheus Vinctus, was well aware of its dangers, as manifested in Prometheus' irresponsibility or his αὐθαδία

170
Thuc. I .98.4.

171
Thuc. III.37.4; V.85.

172
Thuc. I .75-77.

173
Discussed by De Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, pp. 77-82,and Finley, Thucydides, pp. 127,154 Why Thucydides admired the polypragmosyne of Pericles and disapproved of its later manifestation is difficult to determine in spite of the attempts of eg. Finley and Ehrenberg. See n. 77 above; cf. A. H. M. Jones, "The Athenian Empire and its critics", C. H. J., IX (1953), 1-26. Reprinted in Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1957), pp. 41-72. Whether Thucydides was justified in describing the Athenian Empire as oppressive is doubtful. Thus Jones, loc. cit.; G. E. M. De Ste. Croix, "The Character of the Athenian Empire", Historia, III (1954/5), 1-41; H. W. Pleket, "Thasos and the Popularity of the Athenian Empire", Historia, XII (1963), 70-77. Against this, see T. J. Quinn "Thucydides and the Unpopularity of the Athenian Empire", Historia XIII, (1964), 257-66, supporting D. W. Bradeen, "The Popularity of the Athenian Empire", Historia, X (1960), 257-269.

174
For what follows see F. Sartori, "Sulla Δυναστεῖα di Dionisio il Vecchio nell'opera Diodorea", C. S., I (1966), 3-66.

175
Diod. XIV.107.2; XV.23.5; X.3-4; XIII.96.4; XIII.112.1; XIV.2.2; XIV.10 2.4; XV.15.1-2; XV.16.2; XV.73.5; XVI.16.3.

176
Herod. IX.2-3.

177
Sophocles Oed. Tyr.5 92-3.

178
Thuc. II.102.6 (Alcmaeon's sons); III.62.3 (Thebans); IV.78.3; 126.2 (Thessalians Brasidas); VI.38.3 (Hermocrates).

179
Andoc. Orat. VII.

180
Xen. Hell. V.4.46; Cyrop. VIII.8.20

181
eg. Isox. Panag. IV.80-81; 105.

182
See Sartori, C. S., pp. 40-42.

183
Plato Gorgias, 479 A; 492 B; 524 D; 526 B; Republic 499 B; 502 A; 540 D; Laws.680 B; 710 E; 711 C; Epistles 325 B; 326 B. Sartori op. cit., pp. 44-46.

184
Aristot. Polit.1272 B. 2-3; 1272 B. 9-11; 1292 B. 7-10; 1293A. 30-32; 1292 B. 9-10; 1298 A. 32-33; 1306-1308. Sartori op. cit., pp.47-50.

185
Diod. XIV.48.4; 53.5; 59.7; 60.4; 72.1; 102.2-3.

186
Diod. XIV.102.3; Plut. Dion VII.2; V.4; Corn. Nepos Dion. I.4-5

187
Xen. Hell. V.1.26.

188
Diod. XV.17.1-2.

189
Diod. XIII.96.3.

190
Diod. XIV.44; XVI.6.2.

191
Diod. XV.7.4; Plut. Dion VI.1

192
Plut. Dion VI.1.

193
Diod. XIV.7.4-5.

194
See M. Tod. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, II, Nos. 108, 133, 136.

195
W. Jaeger, Paideia, I.409-10, "the despot Dionysius did not really succeed in inducing the citizens of Syracuse to cooperate governing it in such a way that (as Pericles) advised every individual should divide his life between his private vocation and his public duties; that was impossible in the absence of some extra interest, and true insight into the life of the state."
The crux is, of course, the Epitaphios. However, as has been argued, it is not democratic government which it eulogizes.

196
Thuc. VI.20.3; VII.55.2; VIII.96.5.

197
Thuc. VII.21.3-4; 37.1; 70.3; 55.2.

198
Thuc. VII.34.7.

199
Thuc. VII.49.2; II.89.8; VII.62.2; I.49.2. G. F. Bender, Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides, Diss. (Wurzburg, 1938), concludes that Hermocrates was the closest to the Periclean ideal. J. H. Finley Jr. A. J. Ph., LXI (1940) 249, in the review of Bender's work criticizes B. for overlooking the role of democracy in Hermocrates' achievement. Finley thus accepts uncritically the Thucydidean picture of democracy.

200
H. D. Westlake, "Hermocrates the Syracusan", B. R. L., XLI (1958), 239-68; cf. H. D. Westlake, "Thucydides' Narrative of the Sicilian Expedition", P. C. A., L (1953), 27.

201
Westlake, B. R. L., XLI (1958), 244.

202
Westlake, B. R. L., XLI (1958), 248 on Thuc. VI.34.8.

203
Thuc. VIII.26.1.

204
Diod. XIII.75.5.

205
Westlake, B. R. L., XLI (1958), 263.

206
Thuc. VI.72-75.

207
It is to be noted that Thucydides VI.73, implies that the fifteen generals were deposed, and the three including Hermocrates elected immediately. That this was not so is indicated by Thucydides VI.96.3, where Hermocrates and his colleagues appear several months later as having only just then entered office.

208
Both Plutarch Nicias XVI.5, and Diodorus XIII.4.1, though they mention the reforms, fail to indicate that they were enacted through the agency of Hermocrates. Plutarch may perhaps be excused on account of the nature of his work. Diodorus,however, is clearly guilty of shielding vital information in his process of compression, because the main interest of the reform lies in its association with Hermocrates.

209
Thuc. VI.36-40:

210
Freeman. Hist. Sic., III, 507 writes "his tendency was to oligarchy; he might conceivably have been driven into tyranny". cf. Freeman, Sicily, Phoenician Greek and Roman (London, 1892), p. 146. Holm, Gesch. Sizil., II.86 sees Hermocrates as an aristocratic type tyrant, "ein zweiter Gelon niemals ein Dionys geworden". This is basically the view of Stroheker, Dionysius I, p. 34, and Westlake, B. R.L., XLI (1958); L. Pareti, Sicilia Antica (Palermo, 1959), p. 154 considers him a representative of the conservative moderates.

211
Lenschau, P. W. K., Real-Encyclop., VIII A,col.885 and J. Bayet, La Sicile Grecque (Paris, 1930), p. 32 accept Diodorus' assertion.

212
Diod. XIII.75.9.

213
Diod. XIII.94.5.

214
Diod. XIII.63.

215
Thuc. VI.103.4.

216
Xen. Hell. I.1.27.

217
Diod. XIII.63;75.

218
See F. Grosso, "Ermocrate di Siracusa", Kokalos, XII (1966), 102-43.

219
Livy XXV.5.4; Duris in Jacoby, op. cit., II A, No. 76, F. 14. See Stroheker, Dionysius I, pp. 147-84. On Dionysius' financial policies, see C. H. Bullock, "Dionysius of Syracuse Financier", C. J. XXV (1930), 260-70; A. J. Evans in Freeman, Hist. Sicily, IV. Supplement III, 230ff; A. J. Evans,"Some new lights on the Monetary Frauds of Dionysius", N. C., ser. 3, XIV (1894), 216ff.

220
As argued by S. Luria A. Ant. Hung., XII (1964), 62-63 and J. Luccioni, La Pensée Politique de Platon, p. 84. On Plato's attitude to one-man-rule, see below, chapter V. p.424

221
Cicero De Divin. I.39./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, F.57a.
Cicero De Divin. I.75./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, F.58.

222
Thuc. II.8.3; M. I. Finley, "Thucydides the Moralist", Aspects of Antiquity (London, 1968), p. 49, argues that it is impossible to state what Thucydides' religious views were.

223
Thuc. I.23.3.

224
Thuc. IV.17.4; 64.1; 64.2; 11.64.

225
πιστεύομεν τῇ τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θείου μη ἐλασσώσεσθαι
ὅτι ὁσιοι πρὸς δικαίους ἱστάμεθα

226
See Cornford, op. cit., pp. 174, 216-17.

227
See especially Thuc. VII.29 (Mycalessus), and VII.86.5 (Nicias' fate). See A. W. Gomme, H. C. T. I, 89. cf. A. W. Gomme, "Thucydides, the Greatest War in Greek History", Essays in Greek History and Literature (Oxford, 1937), pp. 116-124; Grene, Image of Man, p. 84; De Wet, A. Class., VI (1963), 106-124; A. Andrewes, Phoenix, XVI (1962), 64-85; Wasserman, T. A. Ph.A., LXXVIII (1947), 18-36; Wasserman, T. A. Ph. A., LXXXVII (1956), 27-41.

228
Noted by F. Wasserman, "Thucydidean Scholarship 1946-56 ", C. W. L (1956), 91; A. W. Gomme, "Thucydides and Fourth Century Political Thought", More Essays. p. 129; A. Leskey, op. cit., p.480. M. I. Finley, "Thucydides, the Moralist", Aspects of Antiquity. pp. 51, 56.

229
W. Wallace, "Thucydides", Phoenix, XVIII (1964), 256.

230
Thuc. III.36.3; IV.39.3; IV.17; III.45.4.

231
Thuc. IV.65.

232
Thuc. VI.9.3; 13.1.

233
Cornford, op. cit., p. 205. De Romilly, op. cit., p. 307 ff.considers the possibility of Cornford's thesis without citing his authority.

234
Thus De Sanctis, Ricerche p. 25. T. S. Brown, "Alexander's book order (Plut. Alex.8)", Historia, XVI (1967), 365 wrongly asserts that only by book eight was Philistus a contemporary. In fact, he is a child by book six.

235
Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, F. 15

236
See R. F. I. C., N. S.,VIII (1930), 449-466.

237
S. Mazzarino, "Tucidide e Filisto sulla prima spedizione Ateniese in Sicilia", B. S. C., XVII (1939), 5-72.

238
Mazzarino did indeed argue that Thucydides later came to Philistus' point of view, and that evidence of this new conception is found in the speech of Hermocrates which does not harmonize with the narrative of the events in Sicily of 427-24 B. C.

239
A. D. Momigliano, "Il Nuovo Filisto e Tucidide", R. F. I. C., VIII (1930), 467-70, argued that Philistus relied on local, more or less, exact information. I Perrota, "I Papiro Fiorentino di Filisto", S. I. F. C., VIII (1930), 311 argues against a contradiction on the note on Chareades' death in Thuc. III,90. Perrota claimed that it was only a general note not necessarily clashing with the evidence of the papyrus (followed by De Sanctis, Ricerche, p. 34.). Otherwise there is no real confusion between the two Locrian attacks which, in fact, constitute one attack, seen in two different aspects (cf. Mazzarino, B. S. C., XVII (1939), 5-72.

240
See Volquardson, op. cit., p. 107; Diod. XIV. 70.4-71; Thuc. II. 49-50; Athenian plague in Diod. XII.45.2. cf. D. Page, "The Plague at Athens", C. Q., N. S., III (1953), 97-119, for its identification with measles. Against Page, see W. P. MacArthur, "The Athenian Plague. A. Medical Note", C. Q., N. S., IV (1954), 171-174.

241
S. Hejni, "Das Geschichtswerk des Philistos als Diodors Quelle",Studio Antiquo A. Salac Septuagenario Oblata (Prague, 1955), pp. 31-35.

242
Dion. Halic. De Thuc. IX p. 337.18.

243
Examples from books XI-XVI: Sicilian portions, XI.91.2(451 B. C); XIII.44.6(410); 88.4(406); 91.1 (406); 96.5(406); 108.2(405); XIV.70.4(396); 88.2 (394); 100.5(390); XV.73.4(368). Non-Sicilian, XI.27.1(479); XIII.49.2(410); XIV.35.7(400); 79.3(396);

XV.12.2(385); 41.4(374); 43.4(374); 70.1(368).

244

Moreover the stylistic considerations cannot be entirely divorced from the political factor. De Sanctis, Ricerche , p. 40, believed that speeches of a Thucydidean type characterized Philistus. In other words speeches were used to explain political circumstances and were not simply employed as exercises in rhetoric. Hence one reason for Dionysius of Halicarnassus' opposition. Manni, Kokalos, III (1957), p. 136 considers Philistus a historian rather than an orator. T. S. Brown, Historia, XVI (1967), 365 ignores the possibility of a Philistus revival by asserting that tyranny was unpopular.

245

Cicero De Orat. II, 13. 57./Jacoby, op. cit., III b, No. 556, T. 17b. See Columba, op. cit., p. 289.

IV

1
Thucydides ignores a number of general considerations. First, there is the fact of the general economic and military developments of the democracy. Second, there are the cultural achievements of the democracy to be considered. It must, moreover, never be forgotten that the intellectuals were in no way isolated from the democracy. Furthermore, it was a direct democracy, which functioned extraordinarily well, survived to 362 B. C. and only suffered two oligarchic revolutions. It was a democracy which needed men like Cleon and rarely committed violent excesses in contrast to those perpetrated under the auspices of the oligarchs. Pericles indeed owed his position to this democracy. Clearly, the evidence suggests that the Athenian Empire was generally popular. See De Ste. Croix, Historia, III (1953/4), 1-41; Jones, C. H. J.,IX (1953), 1-26; M. I. Finley, "The Athenian Demagogues, P. &. P., XXI (1962), 3-22; M. I. Finley, "Plato and Practical Politics", Aspects of Antiquity, pp. 82-3; W. G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy (London, 1966), pp. 13ff.

2
Diod. XIII.43.4-6.

3
Diod. XIII.43.6; 54.5; 59.3-5.

4
Just. XIX.2.1-6.

5
Arist. Politics. 1272b-1273a.

6
Hamilcar's sons, Hannon, Himilcon and Giscon together with Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Sapho, who are described as sons of Hasdrubal (Just. XIX.2.1-2.). This Hasdrubal is noted as a son of Magon the Great, the founder of the Magonid line, who was succeeded by his brother. The latter was the Great Magon's son Hamilcar (Just. XIX.2.6.). Herod, VII.165-166 refers to Hamilcar as the son of Hannon. This has led Beloch, "Die Konige von Karthago", Klio, VII

(1907), p. 24, to suggest that Hamilcar was, in fact, not a brother of Hasdrubal, but a son of Hasdrubal's brother.

7
Libyans are found in the preliminary detachment sent by Carthage to Sicily in 410 B. C., and in Hannibal's force, where they are distinguished from the mercenaries (Diod. XIII.44.1; 54.1). In the great enrollment of 406 B. C., they are mentioned together with the Phoenician allies and Carthaginian citizens, and the allied kings and nations of the Maurusians, Nomads and others dwelling by Cyrene (Diod. XIII.80.2-4). Carthagian control must have been consolidated by 410; hence their enrollment in the expeditions of 410/9 B. C. and 406/5 B. C.

8
B. H. Warmington, Carthage (London, 1960), p. 51; G. Picard, Carthage (London, 1964), pp. 82-83, 184; Louis Maurin, "Himilcon le Magonid, crises et mutations a Carthage au debut du IV siecle avant J. C.", Semitica, XII (1962), 5-43; G. Picard and C. Picard, The Life and Death of Carthage (London, 1968), pp. 59, 86, 108. Whereas Picard later accepted Maurin's view, he earlier dated the constitutional change to some time after 480 B. C., since he saw the end of Magonid predominance as a direct result of the battle of Himera. The very fact that the Magonids were able to conduct the African conquests and direct state policies is indicative of the unlikelihood of such an assumption. It seems that Picard is influenced by the claim of Diodorus XIII.43.5, that Giscon, the father of the Hannibal of 410/9 B. C. was exiled because of his father's defeat in 480 B. C. Against Diodorus, Justin implies that the collapse of authority of Hanno Giscon, Himilcon, and Hasdrubal's sons, Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Sapho, clearly took place a considerable time after 480 B. C.

9
Justin XIX.3.

10
Hannibal as grandson of Hamilcar and son of Giscon (Diod. XIII.43.5). Himilcon is described as of the same family by Diodorus XIII.80.2. (ἐκ τῆς αυτῆς συγγενεῖας and τὸν Ἄννωνος. This Hannon is identified by Beloch as the brother of Giscon. (Just. XIX.2.1.). He was, therefore, Hannibal's cousin (See Picard,

Life and Death of Carthage, pp. 61 and 84 and Maurin, op. cit., p. 13 on the difference of age, where Himilcon is placed in the third generation).

11
Aristot. Politics. 1273 a; 1293 b.

12
Aristot. Politics. 1272 b; Polyb. VI.43.1; 51.2; Eratosth ap. Strabo. 1.4.9; Cato ap. Serv. in Aen. IV.682; Cicero De Republica, II.23. Admiration for the mixed constitution is found in Cato ap. Serv. in Aen. 682, Cicero De Rep. II.23, and Polyb. VI.51.2.

13
See S. Gsell. Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris, 1913), II,pp. 236-7.

14
Aristot. Politics. 1273a-1273b; Isocrat. Nicocles. III.24.

15
Aristot. Politics. 1292b.15; Diod. V.38; Polyb. VI.56.2; IX.11.2.

16
See Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 85.

17
Diod. XIII.43.5.

18
The direct association of Giscon's exile with the defeat of 480 B. C. is doubtful in view of the continued activity of the Magonids in North Africa, noted by Justin. There is no reason to deny the authenticity of the exile of Giscon. That the battle of Himera was sought as a pretext is equally probable. More questionable is the supposition that Giscon was exiled very soon after 480 B. C.

19
See Diod. XIII.43.5. The claim of Daebritz, s. v. "Hannon", P. W. K., Real-Encyclop. VII, col. 2353, and Picard, Carthage, p. 83, that Hannon was exiled together with Giscon is not substantiated by any direct evidence. The Hannon referred to by Pliny, VIII.55, Plutarch Praec. Reip. III.9 and Aristotle

Politics 1307a,5 seems to correspond to the Hannon who was a commander of the Carthaginian force during the wars of the latter part of the reign of the Elder Dionysius (Just. XX.5) and the princeps Carthaginiensium who was crucified for an attempted coup (Just. XXI.4; XXII.7.10.).

20
Maurin, in fact, argues that instances of action by the Hundred are very late. He furnishes two examples. First, he observes Magon's suicide through fear of court condemnation and crucifixion (Plut. Timol.22.). Second, he notes the manner in which the oligarchy managed to control the generals in the late fourth century. However, this evidence and that concerning the Great Hannon does not mention any trial. Even if, as is conceivable, the hand of the Hundred is seen here, it cannot be regarded as extensive evidence. See Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 129 on the importance of the Libyan revolt which leads Picard to conclude that the suppression of the Magonids occurred much later than Himilcon (ie. c. 373 B. C.).

21
Diod. XIII.80.2.

22
Discussed fully by Maurin, Semitica, XII (1962), 5-43.

23
Reference is made to the Greek title. As is well established this is not simply a translation of the Phoenician Shophet. Thus Gsell op. cit., p. 192, observes Livy's reference to the principle magistrate of Gades as Shophet in 206 B. C. (Livy XXVIII.37.2) and the use of the word shophet for the principle magistrates of Carthage's Empire in Punic and Latin inscriptions. (following Meltzer, Geschichte der Karthager (Berlin, 1896), II, p. 418, confirmed by the Pyrgi inscriptions. See Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 80; cf. Justin XXXI.2.6; comparison of the Carthaginian princeps with the Roman consul. As Gsell observed, Shophet seems also to have been a name. Thus perhaps Sapho, the son of Hasdrubal (Just. XIX.2.2.). Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 119, cites Chronicles I.8.35 for the similar use of Melech as a name. The authentic title was probably Melech, no doubt confused by Justin XVIII.7. with Malchus.

24
Diod. XIX.106.2; XX.33.2.

25
Diod. XIII.80.1-2.

26
Diod. XX.33.2.

27
Thus Beloch, Klio, VII (1907) against Meltzer, op. cit., p. 125 on the chief text, Corn. Nepos. Hann. VII.4. "ut enim Romae consules, sic Karthagine quotannis bini reges creabantur". Aristotle's comparison (Politics, 1272b.) of Carthaginian and Spartan kingship is not aimed at comparison of respective diarchies, but at showing common characteristics of a general nature. Thus the Carthaginian mess tables are compared to the Spartan phiditia, the Hundred to the ephorate, the kings and elders to the Spartan kings and elders.

28
Herodotus VII.166, for Hamilcar in 480 B. C.; Diod. XIII.43.3-5, for Hannibal; Diod. XIX.106.2 and XX.33.2, for Hamilcar the son of Giscon. See Beloch Klio, VII (1907), 27ff.

29
This would account for the suicide of Himilco which can best be explained as a result of fear of being superceded. See Maurin, op. cit.,5ff.; Justin XVIII.7.4, (Malchus); Aelian V. H. XIV.14; Pliny VIII.55; Plut. Praec. Reip III.9 (Hannon); Diod. XIII.43.5 (Giscon); cf. Gsell. op. cit., II, 189-90.

30
See Diod. XX.10, where two generals are sent in 310 B. C. At the battle of the Crimisus, there are two strategoi. The eldest Hasdrubal is king. The younger, Hamilcar does not possess the regal title (Plut. Tim. XXV). A similar situation is seen in the case of the forces sent against Timoleon. One king is called by Plutarch, Magon (Plut. Tim. XVII.22.). Diodorus calls the king Hannon. Meltzer, op. cit., I, p. 117 met this difficulty by assuming an error on the part of Diodorus. Beloch, however, concluded that Diodorus had confused the naval commander noted by Plutarch Tim. XIX, with the king.

The events of 406 B. C. provide another example. Himilcon is Hannibal's junior colleague who succeeds Hannibal at Acragas and is regarded by Diodorus XIV.54.5 as king for the first time. Himilcon's commander of the fleet in Sicily succeeds Himilcon after the latter's suicide (Diod. XIV.59.1; 76.4; 95.2. cf. Justin XIX.3, for a slightly different account) Later he is called basileus (Diod. XV.15.2-3.).

Thus it can be seen that the fourth century practice was to divide the military command and maintain at the same time the monarchical concept.

31

See above note 6 p.603.

32

Himilcon's successor is his junior colleague Magon (Diod. XIV.59.1; XV.15.2-3). The latter's possession of the name of the founder of the dynasty strengthens the supposition regarding his association with the Magonid line. Another Magonid name, Hanno, follows (Justin XXI.4.1.). There follows the familiar Himilcon and Giscon (Polyaen. V.11.). Then appears another Magon and not another Hannon (See note 30 above). Popular nomenclature appears at the Crimisus: Hasdrubal the king and Hamilcar the general (Plut. Tim. 25). Giscon is then recalled (Diod. XVI.81.3) and is probably made king, as his son is later made king (Diod. XX.33.2). Finally a Hamilcar appears fighting against Agathocles (Justin XXII.2.5; Diod. XIX.71.6; 72.2).

Thus the names of the Carthaginian kings suggests that even in the fourth century, the monarchs came from the Magonid line. It is to be observed that nomenclature of dynasties is generally conservative. Even Picard Life and Death of Carthage,p. 128 agrees that the dynasty probably survived Himilcon.

33

Thus Maurin cites the following passages: Magon "non minus bellandi arte quam virtute" Magon's sons, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar "per vestigia paternae virtutis decurrentes, sicuti generi, ita et magnitudine patris successerunt death of Hasdrubal," veluti cum duce vires Poenorum cecidissent." Just. XVIII.7.19; XIX.1.1-8). The descendants of Hasdrubal and Hamilcar are described as "familia tanta imperatorum". (Just. XIX.2.5.). Diodorus emphasizes the fact that Hannibal's election was based upon the fact that he was the grandson of Hamilcar who was killed at Himera

(Diod. XIII.43.5). Diodorus further stresses the fact that Himilco belonged to the same family as Hannibal (Diod. XIII.80.2). Hamilcar's heroism in 480 B. C. (Herod. VII.167) may be compared to Hasdrubal's death on the battlefield in Sardinia (Just. XIX.1.). On the cult of Hamilcar, see Diod. XIII.62.4-5. On the joyous reception of Hannibal at Carthage, see Diod. XIII.62.6. cf. Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 82, on the religious issue.

34
Geogr. Graec. Min. I.p.1.

35
Just. XVIII.7.2-16.

36
Gsell, op. cit., II, p. 23, n. 9.

37
Diod. XIII.43.4-5.

38
Picard's claim, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 84 that the earliest reference to a council of elders is Diod. XIV.47, is contradicted by the evidence of XIII.43.

39
Diod. XIII.43.3; 62.6.

40
Diod. XIII.79.8; XIV.95.1; XV.16.1.

41
Diod. XIV.47.2.

42
Diod. XX.10.1; Gsell, op. cit., II.222, n.9.

43
Aristot. Polit. 1273a.

44
Picard's claim Life and Death of Carthage, p. 84, that the evidence suggests that the kings could not undertake military campaigns without the permission of the assemblies oversimplifies the issue and ignores the vital evidence of Aristotle.

45
Diod. XIII.43.5.

46

46
Five thousand Africans and eight hundred Campanians (Diod. XIII.44.1-2.).

47
Diod. XIII.80.1.

48
Diod. XIII.79.8.

49
Aristotle Politics, 1273 b. 20-24. In 1272 b. 30-34, Aristotle argues that a good proof of the constitution's stability is the faithfulness of the population to the state. The result is the absence of civil strife, in any degree, and of tyranny. This would indicate that no serious crisis had developed of which Aristotle and the Greek world knew. Yet this evidence does not deny the possibility of a crisis. The words to note are ἄξιον εἰπεῖν Indeed, it is significant that elsewhere Aristotle notes the conspiracy of Hannon ἔαν τις μέγας ἡ καὶ δυνάμενος ἔτι μείζων εἶναι ἵνα μοναρχῇ ὥσπερ... ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἄννων (Polit. 1307a. 3-5). See also Plutarch's remarks on the savage, sullen and disagreeable Carthaginian populace (Praec. Reip. III.9.).

50
See Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 122, against W. Seston, "Des Portes de Thugga a la constitution de Carthage". R. H., CCXXXVII (1967), p. 277ff. for the existence of popular assemblies of the Graeco-Roman type.

51
Diod. XIII.19.4.

52
Diod. XIII.34.6. On the problem of the legislation attributed to Diocles, see W. T. Arnold, History of Rome (London, 1871), I, 368-9; G. Grote, History of Greece (London, 1869), X, 537; E. Pais, "A Proposito della legislazione di Diocle Siracusano", S. I. F. C., VII (1899), 75-98; W. Huttle Verfassungsgeschichte von Syracus (Prague, 1929), pp. 85-98; A. Holm, op. cit., II, 418; E. A. Freeman, Hist. Sicil., III, 728; V. Costanzi, "Sguardo sulla politica di Siracusa della fine della guerra con Atene alla fondazione della tiranide di Dionisio", R. S. A., II (1896),61;

G. De Sanctis, "Diocle di Siracusa", S.I. F. C., XI (1903), 433-445 cf. Ἀτθίς Storia d. rep. Ateniese (Rome, 1898), p. 35; J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte (Strasbourg, 1914), I.308; II,p. 81, n. 2.

53
Thus A. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants (London, 1956), p. 137.

54
Thuc. VII.55.2. Earlier Nicias had observed the similarity of the Sicilian cities to Athens (VI.20.3). See J. H. Finley, Thucydides, p. 237; Three Essays on Thucydides, pp. 150ff; A. D. Momigliano, "Sea Power in Greek Thought", C. R., LVIII (1944), . 1-7. (Reprinted in Secondo Contributo alla Storia Degli Studi Classici (Rome, 1960), pp. 57-67.) The association of the Syracusan democracy with the navy is already noted by W. T. Arnold, History of Rome, I,366, and Beloch, Griechische. Geschichte, II,402.

55
See F. Graefe, "Karthagenische Seestrategie im Jahre 406 v Chr", Hermes, LII (1917), 317-20.

56
Thus Himilcon's first attack was aimed at destroying the small shipping in the harbour in order that Dionysius might be compelled to send back part of his fleet from Motya to Syracuse (Diod. XIV.49.1.). Himilcon manned the "best" triremes in order to seize the vessels on the land. His aim was to become master of the sea (κυριεύων τῆς θαλάττης Two results would follow: Motya would be relieved and the war would be transferred to Syracuse. Then (50.3) we read that Dionysius' force was more numerous, Himilcon failed. He believed that a sea fight would be futile since the ships of the enemy doubled his numbers (50.4).

57
Polyb. VI.52 notes Carthage's ancient Maritime supremacy.

58
This is not to be regarded as a form of mercantilism or hegemony based upon trade. Its aim was to safeguard Punic interests against those of the Greeks. See the remarks of G. Picard, Carthage, p. 93; cf. Gsell, op. cit., p. 242, "En géneral elle ne se montra pas impérialiste dans sa politique exterieur. Riche, elle tenait plus encore à conserver sa fortune qu'à courir

des risques pour l'accroître."

59
For the authenticity of the treaty of 509 B. C., see L. R. Beaumont,"The Date of the First Treaty between Rome and Carthage", J. R. S., XXIX (1939), 74-86; cf. A. Toynbee, Hannibal's Legacy (Oxford, 1965), I, p. 528; N. Lewis and M. Rheinhold, Roman Civilization (Columbia, 1951), I, 70; on the Assyrian-Phoenician treaty see R. Laqueur " Σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, Hermes, LXX I(1936), 469-72.

60
Polyb. III.22.5.

61
Polyb. III.24.2.

62
Herod. VI.17; Diod. XVI.82.3.

63
Thus Beaumont, J. R. S., XXIV (1939), 83-84.

64
Dio Chrys. XXV. Bibliography of the maritime expeditions in Picard, Carthage, pp. 184, 194.

65
See above p.349.

66
Diod. XIII.56.2.

67
Diod. XIII.59.3.

68
See above chapter III,pp.313ffon Hermocrates' tyrannical designs.

69
Diod. XIII.58, refers to the Greeks in the service of Carthage who were aroused to pity as a result of the wrongs inflicted upon the Selinuntines by Carthage. There is no other reference to Greek mercenaries in the service of Carthage. There are three possibilities regarding the origin of this element. It might have derived from the Greek homeland, Sicily or Magna Graecia.

It is to be observed that when Diodorus does not refer to the people of individual Siceliot cities and groups them together, he either refers to them as συμμάχοι of the Syracusans (thus XIII.55.3; 59.9) or as Σικελιῶται (XIII.35.3; 55.1; 61.1; 63.5; 80.4; 91.2; 109.4; 110.4; 110.6; 113.4). The word employed by the text to describe the Greeks of Sicily collectively is Σικελιῶται It is true that upon two occasions the word Ἕλληνες is used. The precise nature of these references is to be observed. Upon the first occasion (Diod. XIII.57.1), it is specifically used to denote the contrast between the positions of the vanquished and the conquerors. The antithesis between the two peoples is indicated. For the second reference (Diod. XIII.88.5), there is also justification. By this time, the allies from the Greek mainland had joined the ranks of their Western brethren. Further, it is to be observed that reference is here not to the Siceliots, but to the "position of the Greeks" (τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑποθέσεως)

Thus it is clear that when the text speaks about the acts of the Sicilian Greeks, it refers to them as Σικελιῶται It may also be noted that there is a reference to the Συμμάχοι ἀπὸ Σικελίας of the Carthaginians who were sent home after the capture of Himera (XIII.62.5). It could be argued that these were the Ἕλληνες at Selinus. On the other hand, it seems more likely that these allies were either Phoenicians from the Siculo-Phoenician inhabitants of the island, or Elymians from Eryx or Segesta, or indeed Sicels and Sicans who, we know, joined Carthage (Diod. XIII.59.6). The text would explicitly state as elsewhere that they were Greeks, referring to them as Σικελιῶται or Ἕλληνες ἀπὸ Σικελίας

It is unlikely that they were Italiots. The text refers to the Greeks of Southern Italy as Ἰταλιῶται Ἕλληνες ἀπο Σικελιας.
(Diod. XIII.109.1; 110.5; 109.5; 110.2-4.).

Probably the Ἕλληνες came from the Greek homeland. It is possible that they came directly from Athens, for Athens had probably established relations with Carthage (See below pp.375ff). More probable is the view that they came from survivors of the Athenian expedition. Three facts indicate such a possibility. First, there is the problem of why these Greeks are referred to only upon one occasion and in such a peculiar context. Second, they are not referred to, when Diodorus notes the enrollment of the Athenian armament (Diod. XIII.44.1). Two conclusions follow; they were too insignificant to record-a fact which would indicate that they were not enrolled with

the other mercenaries; and they were probably enrolled later.

Second, it is clear that a few, who had fought on the Athenian side, had managed to escape. Diodorus XIII.33.1, records "how such of the Athenians who possessed a better education were rescued from there by the younger men, and were thus saved." Thucydides VII.85.4 noted how many of the Athenian armament escaped after they had become slaves and made their way to Catane. There is some evidence which suggests that the lot of the captives was alleviated somewhat by their employment as teachers of the youth. Thus a proverb arose: he is either dead or teaching letters (Zenob. IV.17.). Further, Plutarch records that favour was shown to those who could repeat the choruses of Euripides (Plut. Nic. XXIX.).

Third, it is to be noted that the original eight hundred Campanians of Hannibal had been previously in the service of Athens (Diod. XIII.44.1-2). This means, in fact, that they had been without occupation for three years. Therefore, it appears that the Greeks who according to Diodorus were in the service of Carthage, were, in fact, the survivors of the Athenian expedition, who like the Campanians, had been wandering around Sicily until Carthage made use of them.

70
Diod. XI.21.5.

71
Megarean exiles appear at Selinus. As Dunbabin suggests, this seems to date from the period just before the fall of Megara Hyblaea, and two factors may account for their decision: the fact that Selinus was Megara's colony; and that Selinus was out of reach from Gelon. See T. J. Dunbabin, The Western Greeks (Oxford, 1948), pp. 334, 417.

72
Stylistic similarities noted by A. H. Lloyd, "The Coin Types of Selinus and the Legend of Empedocles", N. C., 5th ser., XV (1935), 73-93, esp. 81. and followed by Dunbabin, op. cit., p. 338

73
Thus Dunbabin, op. cit., p. 352.

74
Dunbabin, op. cit., p. 352.

75
Dunbabin, op. cit., p. 326, citing Noe, Greek Coin Hoards[2], p. 278.

76
Thuc. VI.15.2; 90.2; 34.2.

77
Thuc. VI.16-18.

78
M. Treu, "Athen und Karthago und die thukydideische Darstellund", Historia, III (1954-5), 41-57.

79
Thuc. VI.88.6.

80
Treu, op. cit.,pp. 41ff.; P. A. Brunt, "Thucydides and Alcibiades", R. E. G., LXV (1952), 59-96; cf. above, pp. 278 ff

81
Plut. Alc. XVII; Nicias, XII; E. A. Freeman, Hist. Sic., III, n. 7, 636-41.

82
M. Tod. op. cit., I, No. 31; R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, op. cit., No. 37; Diod. XII.82.7.

83
Thuc. VI.62.3.

84
Thuc. VI.88.6; VII.53.3; 57.11.

85
ie in Thuc. VII.57-58.

86
Most relevant is Aristot. Polit. 1280 a.36.

87
Diod. XIII.114.1.

88
Diod. XIV.14.ff.

89
See Thuc. VI.84.3.cf. VI.87.2. Thus Treu op. cit., pp. 41 ff.

90
Thuc. VI.34.

91
Thuc. VI.45.

92
Thuc. VI.44.

93
Justin IV.4.3.

94
Tod, op. cit., I, No. 58. Meiggs and Lewis, op. cit., No. 6.

95
Thuc. VI.73; 90; 91.

96
B. Meritt, "Athens and Carthage", H. S. Phil., Supplementary Volume (1940), 247-253; K. F. Stroheker, "Athen und Karthago", Historia, III (1954), 163-171; S. Luria, A. Ant. Hung., XII (1964), 56 is unconvincing in an attempt to prove that Athens and Carthage were not allies. As has been argued, the evidence of the Athenian trireme cannot be said to prove that Carthage favoured Syracuse. The trireme was sent Περὶ φιλίας (Thuc. VI.88.6). See R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, op. cit., No. 92.

97
B. H. Warmington, Carthage, pp. 51 ff; Picard, Carthage, pp. 82 ff; Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, pp. 108-115.

98
Thus R. Hackforth, Cambridge Ancient History, IV (1926), 381.

99
Pindar Nem. IX, 28 ff.

100
Diod. XI.26.2.

101
Schol. Pind. Pyth. II.2; Plut. Apophth. Gelon I.

102
Diod. XIII.59.3.

103
See above pp.373-4.

104
Diod. XIII.43.

105
Diod. XII.82.7.

106
Diod. XIV.46.1-2.

107
See Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 122.

108
See A. D. Momigliano, "Some Observations on Causes of War in Ancient Historiography", Acta Congressus Madvigiani. Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Classical Studies, I (1958), pp. 199-211. Reprinted in Secondo Contributo Alla Storia Degli Studi Classici (Rome, 1960), pp. 13-27; Studies in Historiography (London, 1966), pp. 112-116. See Studies, p. 125, on the importance of traditional enmities, and the role of popular assemblies in the declarations of war.

Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 101, accepts literally the theory of Hannibal's hatred and associates this with the theory that Hannibal may have been seriously afraid of suffering the same fate as his grandfather. For the latter fact, however, there is certainly no evidence. The chief point to observe is that Picard ignores the unfortunate tendency of ancient historians to stress the personal factor in isolation. He fails to effect a distinction between the personal reasons and state reasons.

109
Gsell, op. cit., II, 242, 433; III, p. 4.

110
Picard, Carthage, p. 93.

111
S. Luria, A. Ant. Hung., XII (1964), has shown that the conflict was not one of civilizations. Three points are relevant. First, it is a fact that Hermocrates was quite willing to seek Carthaginian help (Thuc. VI.34.2.). Second, the Siceliot aim was personal freedom from any foe, Greek or Barbarian (Diod. XIII. 79.8). Finally, Diodorus clearly indicates that

Dionysius' wars were not waged for cultural reasons (Diod. XIV.45; 95; XV.15; 16.3; 17.5; 73.1) and the present reconstruction of the wars of 409 and 406 B. C. would support this contention. However, as has been shown, the text, reflecting Philistus,does see the conflict in terms of a cultural clash.

112
Diod. XIII.62.6

113
E. A. Freeman, Hist. Sicily, III,492; G. F. Hill, Sicilian Coins (London, 1903), pp. 135, 139 ff; Charles Seltman, Greek Coins (2nd ed.; London, 1955), pp. 130, 136.

114
See above, chapter II, pp.I36ff.

115
Diod. XIII.79.8.

116
Diod. XIII.56.1-2.

117
Or witness Athenian and Spartan policy towards Persia in the Decelean war, or Athenian relations with Carthage (See above p p.375ff.).

118
Diod. XIII.114.1.

119
Diod. XIII.59.6; 62.5.

120
See above, n. 69. p p.6I2-I4.

121
Diod. XIII.114.1.

122
Diod. XIII.86.4-5.

123
Thuc. V.4; Diod. XIII.89.4.

124
Diod. XIII.86.4-5.

125
Diod. XIII.86.4.

126
It is stated that Acragas and Gela waited for Syracuse to lead them. This seems to show that they influenced Syracuse's decision.

127
Diod. XIII.54.5; cf. discussion above pp.369ff.

128
Diod. XIII.55.3; 59.9.

129
As indicated by the excursus in Diodorus. Equally important is the fact that Acragas, together with Gela and Camarina had to melt down reserves in order to issue gold coins, See C. Seltman, Greek Coins, p. 137.

130
Diod. XIII.61.3; 87.4; 79.8.

131
Diod. XIII.88.8; III.I.

132
Diod. XIII.87.4.

133
Diod. XIII.61.3.

134
Diod. XIII.61.3.

135
Diod. XIII.61.3; 87.5.

136
Diod. XIII.79.

137
It has been suggested that an additional reason for the dispatch of the colony was an attempt to eliminate the social problem created during the crisis of 410/9 B. C. See above p.364.

138
Diod. XIII.80.2-5.

139
Diod. XIII.80; Holm, Gesch. Sizil., II, 87; Freeman, Hist. Sicily, III, 509; H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen (Munich, 1967), I, 220.

140
This theory is accepted by Holm, op. cit., II, 87; Freeman, op. cit., III, 509; Gsell, op. cit., III,4; Warmington, Carthage, p. 70; Picard, Life and Death of Carthage, p. 103; M. I. Finley, Ancient Sicily (London, 1968), p. 71.

141
Diod. XIII.43.5.

142
Diod. XIII.80.1; See above p. 364.

143
Diod. XIII.85.2.

144
Diod. XIII.114.1.

145
Cicero Verr. II.86.

146
Diod. XIII.63.3.

147
K. Ziegler, s. v. "Thermai", P. W. K., Real-Encyclop. ser. 2, VA, col. 2379.

148
As Ziegler observes Himera was originally Chalcidian and Doric. In 476 B. C. new Dorians arrived. From 426 to 415, the Athenians failed to win over Himera because the Dorian element which predominated, was larger. The new settlement appears to have been entirely Dorian. Proof is found in the Dorian Θερμιταν on coins and inscriptions (See I. G. XIV, 313-347); British Museum Catalogue, Sicily, p. 83: observe Hera's head; reverse young Heracles.

149
Diod. XIII.89.4; 113.4.

150
See A. J. Evans, "Contributions to Sicilian

Numismatics", N. C., ser. 3, XVI (1896), 128-135; G. K. Jenkins, "Greek Coins recently acquired by the B. M.", N. C., ser. 61, XV (1955), 134. See Diodorus on the Chalcidian War: XIV.14 notes the capture of Aetna and of the exiles who had gone there; XIV.15, Catane betrayed by Acesilaus; cf. Thuc. VI.50.3 for the existence of a pro-Syracusan party in Catane in 415 B. C.; Diod. XIV.15, the betrayal of Naxos by Procles; Diod. XIV.15; 40.1; 66.4; 68.3, the enslavement of Naxos and Catane; Diod. XIV.15, Catane given to Dionysius' Campanians and Naxos razed to the ground; Diod. XIV.15, the submission of Leontini.

151
For this reason, I find it hard to accept Warmington, Carthage, p. 87, who says, "it can hardly be believed that Himilcon would have made peace without an attempt on the greatest prize in Sicily." Such a statement ignores the purpose of the expedition. which was to disband the Siceliot League. H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford, 1933), p. 66, seems to adopt the same attitude as Warmington.

152
Diod. XIII.81.2.

153
Diod. XIII.80.6-7.

154
Diod. XIII.62.5.

155
Polyaen.V.10.2.

156
Diod. XIII.85-86.

157
Diod. XIII.88.

158
See above, chapter II, pp.I97ff.

159
Diod. XIII.59.3; 62.5; 85.4; 88; 114.1.

160
Diod. XIII.54.2; 54.6; 55.2; 55.6; 56.3; 59.7; 86.3; 96.5; 108.8.

161
Diod. XIII.55.2; 56.5; 56.8.

162
Diod. XIII.59.6; 59.7; 60.1.

163
Diod. XIII.44.1; 44.6; 54.1; 58.1; 59.6; 62.5; 79.8; 80.2; 80.3.

164
Diod. XIII.88.2; 44.1; 55.7; 62.5; 80.4.

165
Diod. XIII.88.7; 88.8; 91.2.

166
Diod. XIII.96.3.

167
Diod. XIII.86.4.

168
Diod. XIII.91.4.

169
Diod. XIII.96.3.

V

1
See K. F. Stroheker, Dionysius I, pp. 88-89; K. F. Stroheker, "Zu den Anfangen der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik", Historia, II (1954), 383 ff.

2
K. von Fritz, "Conservative Reaction to One Man Rule in Ancient Greece", P. S. Q., LVI (1941), 51-83; E. R. Goodenough, "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship', Y. Cl. S., I (1928), 55 ff. V. Ehrenberg, "The Fourth Century as Part of Greek History", Polis und Imperium (zurich, 1965), p. 39.

3
See Plut. Lysander; Diod. XIV.13; Arist. Polit. V.1.5. 1301 B.

4
Plato Epistle VII & VIII. See M. I. Finley, "Plato and Practical Politics", Aspects of Antiquity (London, 1968), pp. 77, 79, 82-85. For a more orthodox view, see H. Berve, "Dion", H. Z., CLXXXIV (1957), 1-18. Stroheker, Dionysius I, p. 95; On Xenophon, see Goodenough, op. cit., p. 55, "with his eyes on Cyrus and Spartaalike, his ideal state is clearly that dominated by an absolute ruler who surpasses his subjects, in every way, physically, mentally and morally. The sanction of monarchy is the legal, moral and philosophical character of the ruler and his action." See also G. J. D. Aalders, "The Date and Intention of Xenophon's Hiero", Mnemosyne, ser. 6, IV (1953), pp. 208-215. W. Weathers, "Xenophon's Political Idealism", C. J., XLIX (1953-4), 317-21, 330.

5
A. D. Momigliano, Filippo il Macedone (Florence, 1934), pp. 183 ff; A. W. Gomme, "The End of the City State", Essays, p. 267, criticizes Isocrates' choice of leaders and cites the cases of Jason and Dionysius, ignoring the political significance of Dionysius.

6
Xen. Hell. V.1.31; Diod. XIV.110.3.

7
Isocrates Helen. 51; Panegyricus 179-80; 176; 187.

8
See A. D. Momigliano,"L'Europa come concetto politico presso Isocrate e gli Isocratei", R. F. I. C., N. S. XI (1933), 477-87 (Terzo Contributo (Rome, 1966), pp. 489-497.). It must be remembered that the concept of "Europe" which is found in Herodotus and probably goes back to the late sixth century, B. C., is a by-product of relations between the Greek world and the Persian Empire.

9
See Diod. XI.3; Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 70, F. 186; Diod. XI. 77; Diod. XII.4.6; cf. Jacoby, op. cit., No. 70, F. 86 and Diod. XI.1, on the Invasion of 480 B. C.

10
Diod. VII.12.8; 3; XI.46.3 (Pausanias); XIV.2.1; XV.28.2. See A. D. Momigliano, "La Storia di Eforo e le Elleniche di Teopompo", R. F. I. C. N.S. XIII (1935), 180-204, esp. 195-204.

11
Diod. XV.26; 63. See Momigliano, R. F. I. C., N. S., XIII (1935), 199. cf. L. Pearson, "Lost Greek Historians Judged by their Fragments", G. &. R., XII (1943), 142-3, 43-56; G. L. Barber, The Historian Ephorus (Cambridge, 1935), p. 79.

12
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 70, F. 119; Diod. XV.60.2; XV.50.4; 52.7; 81.1; 88.4; 52.7.

13
Diod. XVI.1.4-6.

14
See A. D. Momigliano, "Studi sulla storiographia Greca del IV Secolo A. C.", R. F. I. C., N. S. IX (1931), 230-242; 335-353.

15
Athenaeus XII.543b./Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 20. cf. Plut. Lysander XXX

16
K. von. Fritz, "The Historian Theopompus. His Political Convictions and his Conception of Historiography", A. H. R., XLVI (1941), 765-87. (Reprinted as "Die Politische Tendenz in Theopomps Geschichtsschreibung", A.& A. IV (1954), 45-65.).

17
Polyb. VIII.11.1/ Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 27.

18
See von Fritz, A. H. R., XLVI (1941); Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 88-89 (Cimon); F. 288 (Alcibiades); F. 22 (Agesilaus), F. 20, 333 (Lysander; F. 295, 259 (Antisthenes).

19
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 26, 215, 25.

20
See R. T. Connor, Theopompos and Fifth Century Athens (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

21
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 99, 89, 213. R. T. Connor, "Theopompus' treatment of Cimon", G. R. B. S., IV (1963), 107-114.

22
Connor, Theopompos and Fifth Century Athens, pp. 67, 71.

23
See Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, no. 115, F. 94; Connor, Theopompos and Fifth Century Athens, p. 75.

24
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 134, 227; Fritz, A. H. R., XLVI (1941), 777.

25
Jacoby, op. cit., IIb, No. 115, F. 291, 250.

26
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 127, cf. f.224, 81, 205, 209, 225, 110, 282, 235, 210.

27
A. D. Momigliano, R. F. I. C., N. S. IX (1931), 477-87 and R. F. I. C., N. S. IX (1931), 230-42,

335-53, does assume this. Fritz, A. H. R., XLVI (1941), 765-87, argues that Persia did not interest Theopompus, and that stability resulting from hegemony and the fulfillment of the Panhellenic ideal was the factor about Philip which interested Theopompus. It is true that the Isocratic debt does not preclude independent thinking by Theopompus as regards Persia's position. However, the evidence concerning the Hellenica of Theopompus and Lysander's role, in conjunction with the significance of Hellenic union against Persia in Isocrates' thinking, does tend to render Fritz's conclusion doubtful.

28
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 20.

29
Diod. XIV.13; Plut. Lysander XXIV - XXVI; Aristot. Polit. V.1.5, 1301 b; Fritz A. H. R., XLVI (1941), 781-783.

30
Fritz, A. H. R., XLVI (1941), 784.

31
Such an approach was, indeed, pursued by Gilbert Murray, "Theopompos or the Cynic as Historian", Greek Studies (Oxford, 1946), pp. 149-170, and has been revived by R. T. Connor, "History without Heroes. Theopompos' Treatment of Philip of Macedon", G. R. B. S., VIII (1967), No. 2, 133-154.

32
Plut. Solon. XX.4.

33
Stroheker, Dionysius I, p. 96; Stroheker, Historia II (1954), 408 ff; Plut. De Alex. Magn. Fort. 2.5. p. 338c.

34
Diod. XV.7.3; XIV.109.6.

35
See Stroheker, Dionysius I, p. 97.

36
Stroheker, Dionysius I, p. 100.

37
Stroheker, Dionysius I, p. 99.

38
Stroheker, Dionysius I, p. 101-107; cf. W. H. Porter, "Plato's First Visit to Sicily", Hermathena, LXI (1943), pp. 48 ff; G. C. Field, Plato and his Contemporaries (2nd ed.; London, 1948), pp. 17-18.

39
See R. T. Connor, Theopompos and Fifth Century Athens, pp. 106-7, 118-20, 123.

VI

1
The following reconstruction is based upon G. L. Barber, The Historian Ephorus, pp. 41-48; cf. Ed. Schwartz, s. v. "Ephoros", P. W. K., Real-Encyclop. VII, col. 15.

2
Diod. XIV.9; 48.5; 53.5.

3
Barber, op. cit., p. 45.

4
Though Sicily was treated separately from the history of the Greek mainland, it is not to be assumed that it was the general practice of Ephorus to treat his subject as episodic history or unified in theme. Diodorus V.1.4 argues that Ephorus wrote his history κατά γένος Yet as R. Drews has shown ("Ephorus and History Written κατά γένος ", A. J. Ph., LXXXIV (1963), 244-55), this is not to be interpreted as episodic history. First, this is an unnatural translation. Second, there is no evidence that Ephorus worked against the Thucydidean syncronistic system. Indeed, Thucydides sometimes backtracks and there is little to distinguish the probable Ephorus chapters in Diodorus from Thucydides' chapters. Third, accepting the view that Diodorus' chief authority for 5th and 4th century Greek affairs was Ephorus, Diodorus certainly does not appear experienced enough to adopt episodic history into an annalistic framework. Therefore, it can be concluded that basically, Ephorus followed the synchronistic pattern.

Episodic history is thus only found in the early periods discussed by Ephorus. Indeed, such treatment was necessary for any discussion of the seventh and sixth centuries B. C., when the existence of a weak chronology and the poverty of source material warranted such an approach. Therefore, Drews concludes correctly that it is most likely that probably less than a quarter of Ephorus' history was episodic.

Diodorus' statement (V.1.4.), is not indicative of the fact that in Ephorus, one theme

occupied one book, for, in the first place, it assumes that Diodorus merely copied Ephorus (Against this see above chapter I and below chapters VI, and VII pp. I6,493 ff. More important is the fact that it is clear that more than one book was devoted to one person. Thus two books appear to have been devoted to Philip and three to Dionysius I.

5
See Plut. Dion XXXVI.2.

6
Ed Schwartz, s. v. "Diodoros", P. W. K. Real-Encyclopadie, V, col. 681. Accepted with reserve by G. L. Barber, The Historian Ephorus, p. 168.

7
Diod. XIV.109; XV.7.

8
Diod. XVI.71.3. This is the view of N. G. L. Hammond, "The Sources of Diodorus Siculus, Book XVI", C. Q., XXXII (1937), 142; followed by H. D. Westlake, "The Sicilian Books of Theopompos' Philippica", Historia, II (1953/4), 288.

9
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 183.

10
Westlake, Historia, II (1953/4), 290.

11
Thus Hammond, op. cit., p. 142-3. Westlake, Historia, II (1953/4), 291 is unconvinced by Hammond's argument and claims that the error arose from confusion over the first and second expulsion of Dionysius II, and that Diodorus connected the fifty-year period with the first expulsion. His arguments against Hammond are most unconvincing. First, he notes the greatness in scale of the Hellenica need not be attributed to the inclusion of a Sicilian digression. Second, he observes that the Hellenica as a continuation of the history of Thucydides, is unlikely to have discussed Sicily since Thucydides only mentioned the West, when it became directly involved with the affairs of the Greek mainland. Third, Westlake argues that Xenophon who also continued Thucydides, did not discuss Sicily in his Hellenica, except for a few

brief references. Finally, according to Westlake, Diodorus' wording indicates the beginning of the tyranny of Dionysius. Against Westlake, four facts are to be noted. First, Theopompos was not a Thucydidean. Second, Thucydides too digressed. Third, Theopompos is not a Xenophon, but an Isocratean universalist. Finally, if the Philippica could embrace a Sicilian excursus, there is no reason to doubt that the Hellenica could do the same. Indeed, an excursus on the rise of Dionysius would be particularly relevent to the main theme of the Hellenica, Lysander's monarchy.

12
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 185.

13
Diod. XIV.44.6-7.

14
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 134.

15
Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 135-136.

16
Athenaeus X.435D-436B.

17
See Dionysius of Halicarnassus De Compositione XXIII, where it is stated that Theopompus, who like a researcher in the tribunal of Hades, and a surgeon attacking sick organs, lays bare apparent virtue and hidden vice. cf. W. Rhys. Roberts, "Theopompus in the Greek Literary Critics", C. R. XX (1908), 118-122.

18
Athenaeus X.435a and 436b./ Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 115, F. 185-88

19
See Westlake, Historia, II (1953/4), 299.

20
Diod. XV.23; Schol. ad Aristeid, Panath.1./Jacoby, op. cit., IIb, No. 70, F. 211

21
M. N. Tod, op. cit., II, No. 108.

22
Lysias XIX.19.

23
Xen. Hellen. V.1.26.

24
Athenaeus I.6 f; Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 290. Dated according to P. Maas, P. W. K., Real-Encyclop, XX col, 192, to 389 B. C. According to Athenaeus, the play was Philoxenus' revenge for being imprisoned, after he had attempted to seduce Galatea, the tyrant's mistress.

25
F. 6. This led to the growth of the anecdotes about Dionysius' cutting of his beard. See Stroheker, Dionysius I, p. 23.

26
F. 25. Stroheker, Dionysius I, p. 23

27
Lysias Orat. XXXIII.5.

28
Plato Epistle VII.326B-328D.

29
Isocrates Paneg. 126; 129.

30
Isocrates Epist. I.

31
M. N. Tod. op. cit., II, Nos. 133, 136.

32
Speusippus Ad Phil. 10,in polemic against Isocrates.

33
Aeschines On the Embassy, X.

34
Aristot. Politics 1305a.21ff.

35
Plato Repub. VIII.565ff. Such an identification is to be found in G. C. Field, Plato and his Contemporaries (London, 1930), p. 128; E. Barker,

Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors (London, 1918), p. 300; J. Luccioni, La Pensée Politique de Platon (Paris, 1958), pp. 78, 80-81. The Peisistratean parallel is also significant. Thus Luccioni, op. cit., pp. 80-81, though (pp. 86-86) he does suggest that Plato's tyrant largely reflects Dionysius II, and that the Republic was revised after the second visit of 367 B. C.

36
Thus Stroheker, H. Z., CLXXIX (1952), 225ff. assumes that Diodorus contains the Platonic picture as found in Timaeus.

37
Plato Epist. VII.327-331; Epist. VIII.353ff.

38
Diod. XIII.96.3.

39
Tod. op. cit., II, No. 108.

40
Diod. XIV.44.4.

41
Plut. Dion. VI.2; Corn. Nepos Dion. II.4.

42
B. Niese, s. v. "Dionysios", P. W. K. Real-Encyclop. Va, p. 883, accepts the evidence of the letter. Beloch, Griech. Gesch., IIa, p. 410, doubts it. It is to be noted that the evidence of the epistle was accepted by Aristotle who alludes to Hipparinus' help to Dionysius in 405 B. C. (Polit. V.1306a.) and by Plutarch, Dion. III.4.

43
Plato Epist. VIII.357.

44
Diod. XIV.44.8.

45
See D. R. Stuart, Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography (California, 1928), pp. 133, 159.

46
Discussed by Stroheker Dionysius I, pp. 18ff.

47
Plut. De Alex. Magn. Fort. II, 5, p. 338B; Aelian V. H. XIII.45; Diod. XV.17.1.

48
Stroheker H. Z., CLXXIX (1952), 225-259. cf. W. H. Porter, "The Sequel to Plato's first visit to Sicily", Hermathena LXI (1943), 46-55; C. H. Bullock, Dionysius of Syracuse Financier", C. J., XXV (1930), 261 ignores the difficulties of the origin and transmission of this material. For example, he accepts literally the narrative of Philoxenus' breach with Dionysius.

49
Schol. Aeschin II.10./ Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 29.

50
The significance of red hair is seen in Pseudo Aristotle's Physiognomica where red heads are identifiable with rogues: οἱ πυρρόι ἄγαν πανούργοι

51
Plut. Quaest. Conv. VIII.1.1. p. 717c./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 105.

52
Polyb. XII.24.2.

53
F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford, 1967), II, 380. (Henceforth cited as H. C. P.)

54
Diod. XVI.7.1./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T.3a.

55
Plut. Tim. X.6./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 3b.

56
Diod. XVI.65.

57
Marcellinus Vita Thucyd. XXVII./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 13.

58
See Ed. Schwartz, "Timaeos Geschichtswerk", Hermes, XXXIV (1899), 481-93. p. 490 "Timaeos Lieblinghelden".

59
Polyb. XII.23.4/ Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 119a.

60
Plut. Tim. XXXVI.2/Jacoby, op. cit., No. 566, F.119b.

61
Cicero Ad. Fam. V.12.7/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 119c.

62
Thus H. D. Westlake, Timoleon and his Relations with the Tyrants (Manchester, 1952), p. 5. Westlake thinks that Polybius exaggerated Timaeus' praising of Timoleon. Against Westlake the two passages cited in the text from Plutarch and Cicero are to be noted.

63
Two other factors complicate the Timoleon tradition: Timoleon's own propaganda and Plutarch's biographical technique. As a result the astuteness and political genius of Timoleon is obscured. See H. D. Westlake Timoleon and his Relations with the Tyrants, p. 2. On the importance of the Timaeus tradition in Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos, see H. D. Westlake, "The Sources of Plutarch's Timoleon", C. Q., XXXII (1938), 65-74 (esp. 67-70). Westlake argues that Plutarch and Nepos relied upon a peripatetic biography, based upon Timaeus, and that Plutarch supplemented this by consulting Timaeus. This is indicated by three facts: the closeness of the two accounts as opposed to Diodorus who relied directly upon Timaeus; the brevity in contrast to the length of Timaeus; and the personal nature of Nepos' life, which indicates a biography of the peripatetic school.

64
Polyb. VIII.10.12; XII.15; Diod. XXI.17.3. Diodorus' advice is that the Agathocles' books are to be disbelieved.

65
Diod. XXI.17.1/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T.4a.

66
Polyb. XII.25h.1/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F.34.

67
Plut. De Exil. XIV./Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T.4e.

68
It is difficult to determine the exact date of Timaeus' exile. Laqueur, P. W. K. Real-Encyclop, s. v. "Timaeos", ser. 2, VIa, cols. 1077-88, places the date of the order of banishment between 317 and 310 B. C. He, therefore, reasons, that Timaeus must have returned between 267 and 260 B. C. (ie. accepting Polyb. XII.25h.1). (Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, Komm, p. 532, dates the beginning of the exile before 316/15.).

Against Laqueur, Brown, Timaeus of Tauromenium (California, 1958), pp. 3, 6, argues that 317/10 B. C. is only the date of his official banishment, and that Timaeus could have left Sicily at an earlier date. He brings forward three arguments. First, he notes that Diodorus XXI.17, comments upon his inability to resist Agathocles during his banishment and his damning of him in his history after his death. Brown notes two points which would suggest that the Agathocles' books were written after Agathocles' death and before Pyrrhus' arrival (ie. c289-278 B. C.). Therefore 339-328 B. C. is the date which he gives for Timaeus' arrival at Athens. First, he argues that such bias could only arise upon his return to Sicily now in such a terrible plight. Second, he refers the reader to the fact that Timaeus appears to have been ignorant of military and political matters (Polyb. XII.25g,3; 25h,1; Cicero, De Orat, II,55-58). Brown argues that being the son of Andromachus, he would have acquired such knowledge, had he lived in Sicily to a grown age.

F. W. Walbank, H. C. P., II, p. 398, suggests that the reference to the fifty-year period need not mean a return after fifty years. Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, Komm, p. 532, argues that he did not, in fact, return, and that he received his information almost entirely from the library at Athens. Certainly, Polybius' accusation of Timaeus' bookishness can be substantiated. Little evidence of his direct knowledge of Western geography is apparent. The exception might appear to be Acragas, yet as has been argued, this seems to derive from Philistus. Certainly,

Timaeus is hardly ever cited for topography,cities, rivers and sights of wonder. His knowledge of Naples and Campania need not be personal. His information about Southern Italy, Adria and the East, need not be the result of direct acquaintance. The evidence for his having visited Massalia, Liguria, Spain and South Gaul is weak.

69
See the remarks of F. W. Walbank, "Polemic in Polybius", J. R. S., LII (1962), 12.

70
Polyb. XV.35.2/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, F. 124c.

71
Polyb. XV.35.6-8.

72
Diod. XIX.2-3.

73
See above chapter III, p.320.

74
Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 29, 105.

75
Diod. XXI.16.5/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 123a.

76
Polyb. XII.12b,2/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 155.

77
See A. D. Momigliano, "Atene nel III secolo A. C. e la scoperta di Roma nelle storie di Timeo di Tauromenio", R. S. I. N., LXXI (1959), 529-556. (Reprinted in Terzo Contributo I,pp.23-51), p. 541, "il suo odio per il tiranno Dionisio corrispondera a sentimenti ateniesi."

78
Timaeus' attitude towards Hermocrates thus differed considerably from that of Philistus. Both historians admired Hermocrates, yet for entirely different reasons. To Philistus and indeed Thucydides, he was a Periclean-type tyrant with an aristocratic background. To Timaeus on the other hand, he is

the epitome of democracy and its instrument, rhetoric.

79
Momigliano, R. S. I. N., LXXI (1959), 549.

80
Plut. Nicias I/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 18; Diod. V.6.1/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 38; Plut. Dion. XXXVI.1.

81
See K. F. Stroheker, Satura, p. 147; H. Z. CLXXIX, (1952), 240.

82
Theon II.68.17 sp/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, F. 28.

83
Athenaeus VI.40. p. 206e/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 112

84
Plut. Pelop. XXXIV.1.

85
Plut. Dion.VI.2/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 109.

86
A third example cited by Brown, Timaeus of Tauromenium, pp. 77-78, is less sound. During the revolt of 404/3 B. C., Timaeus attributes the dictum that "a tyrant should be dragged away by the leg" to Philistus. Plutarch, however, attributes the remark to a different person - a fact recorded by Philistus himself. (Plut. Dion. XXXV.6/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 115). Brown, thus argued that Timaeus deliberately attributed this remark to Philistus to fit in with Timaeus' own account of Philistus' being dragged by his feet, a version based not on Ephorus who simply records Philistus' suicide, but Timonides of Leucas, who observes that Philistus was captured alive, maltreated by the Syracusans, beheaded, dragged through Achradina by children, and thrown into a quarry. (Plut. Dion. XXXV.3-5/Jacoby, op. cit., IIa, No. 70, F. 219 and IIIb, No. 561, F. 2). It follows, according to such reasoning that Diodorus XIV.108, which does attribute the advice to Philistus, derives from Timaeus.

Such a reconstruction thus challenges the present writer's contention that Diodorus essentially used Philistus for his account of Dionysius I. Against such a conclusion, two points are to be noted. First, it is very possible that the sentiment of the remark echoes Philistus or that Philistus put this advice in to another individual's mouth. In other words, Timaeus probably did not invent the remark. Second, Diodorus could have erred in his transcription of Philistus. It is significant that elsewhere Diodorus (XX.78.3) attributes the remark to Megacles, Dionysius' brother-in-law. This was probably the individual to whom Philistus attributed the remark. cf. chapter III, n. 8, above, p.57I.

87
This thesis is propounded by Brown, Timaeus of Tauromenium pp. 71-90.

88
Diod. XIII.83.2/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 26a

89
Diog. Laert. VIII.51/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 26b. cf. Diod. XIII.83.2/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 26a.

90
Aelian V. H., XII.29/Jacoby, op. cit., IIb, No.566, F. 26c. cf. Diod. XIII.83.2/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 26a.

91
Diog. Laert. VIII.51.

92
Aelian V. H. XII.

93
Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 28.

94
Diog. Laert. VIII.66/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 6

95
Diog. Laert. VIII.67-70; 71-72/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No.566, F. 6.

96
Diog. Laert. VIII.63/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F.134.

97
Diog. Laert. VIII.54/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 14.

98
Polyb. XII,26b,4-5/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 94.

99
Three works are, in fact, attributed to Timaeus: a history, a work about Pyrrhus and a treatise on the Olympic victors. The history is generally referred to as ἱστορίαι (Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F.1a, 5,11a, 16, 17, 23, 26b, 28a, 32, 33, 153). It is also referred to as Ἰταλικὰ καὶ Σικελικὰ and Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ Σικελικά (Suda, s. v. Φίλιστος/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 1.). We possess a reference to it as Σικελίκαι Ἱστορίαι (Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 43a), as Σικελικά (Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 83.) and as Historia de Rebus Populi Romani (Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566. F. 42a.).

There are two references to the Ὀλυμπιονίκαι (Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 1,10.). Polybius notes the book, dealing with Pyrrhus, τὰ περὶ Πύρρου (Polyb. XII,46/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F.36). Cicero (Ad.Fam. V.12.2/Jacoby IIIb, No. 566, T.9) compares the Bellum Pyrrhi with Callisthenes' Phocicum Bellum and Polybius' Bellum Numantinum. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. I.6/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 9b) indicates this to be a special work. De Sanctis (Ricerche, p. 48) regards it as an appendix to the main σύνταξις, including within its limits the events from Pyrrhus' departure to the beginning of the first Punic War with Rome. Unfortunately, we do not know whether this work was in one book or divided into a number, whether it was a small pamphlet or a substantial work.

100
Schol. Pindar Nem. IX.95a/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 18.

101
Thus De Sanctis, Ricerche, p. 43. Schol. Pindar Nem. IX. 95a/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 556, T. 21.

102
Thuc. VI.62.3-4; Athenaeus VII.132 p. 327 B; XIII.54-55. p. 588B-589A/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 23,24.

103
De Sanctis, op. cit., p. 43; J. Beloch, "Die okonomie der Geschichte des Timaeus", N. J. C. P., CXXIII (1881), 701.

104
Polyb. XII.25k.3; 25.7; 26a.

105
Thus De Sanctis, op. cit., p. 51; J. Beloch. op. cit., p. 700; Ed. Schwartz, Hermes, XXXIV (1899), 489; F. W. Walbank, H. C. P., p. 384, who argues that the excerptor is in error.

106
Athenaeus VI.p.250A/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No.566. F. 32.

107
Diod. XXI.17.3.

108
Walbank, H. C. P., p. 384.

109
See H. D. Westlake, "The Sources of Plutarch's Timoleon", C. Q., XXXII (1938), 67.

110
H. Kothe, "Zur Okonomie der Historien des Timaios", N. J. C. P., XXIX (1883), 809-10.

111
Dion. Halic. Ant. Rom. I.6.1/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 9b.

112
Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, Komm, p. 537; Momigliano R. S. I. N., LXII (1959), 533.

113
A. D. Momigliano, R. S. I. N., LXXI (1959), 554. Evidence for the popularity of Timaeus at Rome. See Varro De Re Rustica. II.5.3/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 42; Cicero Ad. Att. VI.1.18/ Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 29; Cicero Brutus. LXIII/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, F. 138.

114
Before Polybius, Timaeus was attacked by Istros and Polemon. See Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, Komm, p. 526

115
Polyb. XII.25c.1-2.

116
Polyb. XII.26d.1.

117
Polyb. XII.28.6.

118
Polyb. 1.5.1/Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, T. 6a. cf. Komm, p. 526

119
For Greece, he followed Aratus' account (Polyb.1.3.2.).

120
M. A. Levi, "La Critica di Polibio a Timeo", Miscellanea di Studi Alessandrini in Memoria di Augusto Rostagni (Turin, 1963), pp. 195-202.

121
Polyb. 1.14.6.

122
Polyb. XII.12b.

123
Polyb. XII.25b.

124
See F. W. Walbank, "Polemic in Polybius", J. R. S., LII (1962), 1-12; "Three Notes on Polybius", Miscellanea Rostagni, pp. 203-213; Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, Komm, p. 526.

125
See A. H. McDonald's review of T. S. Brown, Timaeus of Tauromenium, J. H. S., LXXIX, (1959), p. 188; De Sanctis, Ricerche, p. 83; Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, No. 566, Komm, p. 536.

126
Polyb. VIII.10.5-6.

127
Plut. Cleom., XVI.3; See F. W. Walbank, J. R. S., LII (1962), 1-12.

128
Thus De Sanctis, Ricerche, p. 69, "Timeo nonostante i suoi difetti, deve essere considerato come uno dei massimi storichi antichi e uno di quelli che hanno recato il maggior contributo al progresso della storiografia. I suoi difetti d'altronde, se possono renderci antipatico il suo carattere personale, non oscurano sostanzialmente i suoi meriti di storiografia e quello inanzitutto di aver posto per primo le basi scientifichi alla storiografia del mondo occidentale." Though for an opposite view see H. kothe, N. J. C. P., XXIX (1883), 813.

129
In Chapter I. pp.I0-I4.

130
No doubt Timaeus echoed the more authentic estimate given by Philistus.

131
Corn. Nepos De Reg. II.2; Cicero Tusc. Disp. V. 57.

132
Plut. Moralia. 175e; 176a; 782c; 792c; Athenaeus VII.279e; XII.546 d; Plut. Tim. XV.4. See A. P. McKinley, "The 'Indulgent'Dionysius" T. A. Ph. A., LXX (1939), 51-61. The account of the tyrant's death through drinking (Diod. XV.74) is contradicted by the testimony of Nepos and Plutarch, which clearly depicted Dionysius I as a particularly sober individual in contrast to his son.

133
This is the view of R. Lauritano, "Sileno in Diodoro?", Kokalos, II (1956), 206-216; followed by E. Manni, "Sileno in Diodoro?", A. A. P., ser.4a, XVIII (1957-8), part 2, pp. 81-88; E. Manni, "Recenti studi sulla Sicilia Antica", Kokalos VII (1961), 237; Jacoby, op. cit., IIb, No. 175, pp. 900 ff. Athenaeus XII, p. 542a.

Silenus certainly wrote a Sicelica. The chief argument of Lauritano is that Diodorus' criticism of Timaeus (eg. the case of the Agathocles books, and the Bull of Phalaris) indicates that Diodorus was following the criticism of a later source. Therefore, Silenus, who was a contemporary of Hannibal and

perhaps lived till 146 B. C. was the source (Corn. Nepos, Hannib. XIII.13.) This is, of course, most unconvincing and presupposes Diodorus' inability to engage in critical comment alone. Against such a view, see below, chapter VII, p.495. On Hermias, Dionysius I, Alcimus Siculus and Polycritus of Mende, see Jacoby, op. cit., IIIb, Nos. 557, 558, 559 and 560.

134
See chapter I, above, p.21.

135
Diod. XIII.109.2.

136
See chapter I, above, pp.22-23.

VII

1
R. Laqueur, "Die Proöemien. Die Disposition", Hermes, XLVI (1911), 161-206, 321-54.

2
Thus M. Kunz, Zur Beurteilung der Proöemium in Diodors historischen Bibliothek, Diss. (Zurich, 1935), p. 36, n. 51, "Laqueur scheint die bettreffende Stelle ubersehn zu haben; sonst konnte er kaum die Singularitat der ephorischen Proöemien so sehr betonen."

3
M. Kunz, op. cit., p. 38; Polyb. XII.28.12ff.

4
M. Kunz, op. cit., p. 74.

5
Diod. I.4.1; Polyb. III.59.7; Kunz, op. cit., pp.79-80.

6
Diod. I.4.1; Polyb. III.58.2.

7
Diod. I.3.2; Polyb. I.4.3.

8
Diod. I.3.8; Polyb. I.4.7.

9
Jacoby, op. cit., IIb, No. 124, F. 44.

10
Jacoby, op. cit., IIb, No. 115, F. 24- 27.

11
Jacoby, op. cit., IIb, No. 76, F. 44.

12
Jacoby, op. cit., IIb, No. 64.

13
Polyb. I.1-5.

14
Dion. Halic. Ant. Rom. I.1-5.

15
Kunz, op. cit., p. 87, "Diodor hat die späteren Proöemium sicher auch jemandem abgeschrieben; diese späteren Quellen mussen also auch in "ephorischer" Art geschrieben haben. Diodor nur von Ephorus abhängen zu lassen, ist eine viel zu einseitige Theorie." cf. p. 110.

16
Diod. XXXII.27.3.

17
Thus G. Busolt, "Diodors Verhältnis zum Stoizismus", N. J. C. P., I (1889), 297-315; C. Wachsmuth, Uber das Geschichtswerk des Sikelioten Diodoros (Leipzig, 1892), p. 18 (Reprinted in C. Wachsmuth, Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte (Leipzig, 1895), p. 93); B. Farrington, Diodorus Siculus. Universal Historian (Swansea, 1937), Reprinted in Head and Hand in Ancient Greece (London, 1947), pp. 55-85; M. Pavan, "La Teoresi storica di Diodoro Siculo", R. A. L., XVI (1961), 19-52, 117-151.

18
This is not, however, likely. A. D. Nock, "Poseidonius", J. R. S., XLIX (1959), 5 argues against the view that the prooemium to book one is derived from Poseidonius. First, he notes that the language is Diodoran. Second it suits Diodorus' work, but not the time limit of Poseidonius' work. Finally, he regards the ideas as the sentiments of a "small man with pretensions... and with a tinge of Stoicism ". None of these are decisive arguments, though as has been argued, Polybius is a possible source for the general preface to the whole work.

19
Diod. I.4.6.

20
Wachsmuth, Uber das Geschichtswerk des Sikelioten Diodoros, p. 6.

21
See R. H. Drews, Historiographical Objectives p. 10ff, 132.

22
R. H. Drewes, Historiographical Objectives, p. 132.

23
Farrington, op. cit., pp. 80 ff.

24
Diod. II.39.5; 41.5; III.12-14; V.35-38.

25
In the fragments of book XXXV and XXXVI. See Farrington, op. cit., p. 83

26
G. Busolt, op. cit., p. 305-306.

27
G. Busolt, op. cit, p. 314, "er war kein wirklicher Philosoph, sondern ein frommer dogmatischer Moralist... trotz der im Geiste der Stoa gehaltenen Einleitung ist Diodors Weltgeschichte keineswegs von einer wahrhalft philosophischen Auffassung durchdrungen und getragen."

28
J. B. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians, p. 236; R. Drews, "Diodorus and his Sources", A. J. Ph., LXXXIII (1962), 383-92. cf. Historiographical Objectives, p. 22 ff.

29
Diod. X.16.2; XXXIV-V.28.2.

30
Diod. IX.18.1; XVIII.47.3; Proocemium to book XV; XIV.2.1; IX.33.1.

31
Diod. VIII.15.1-4.

32
Diod. XX.13.3; XXVII.6.2.

33
Diod. XXXI.12; XVIII.59.5-6; XXV.5.3; XXXI.4.1; XXVII.1.2; XVII.38.6.

34
Diod. I.77.10; V.31.5; XVIII.67.

35
Diod. XXI.14.3.

36
Diod. I.93.4; V.29.5; XXXIV-V.2.33.

37
Diod. XVII.38.4-7.

38
Diod. XXXIII.8.1.

39
Diod. X.12.

40
Diod. X.12.

41
Diod. XI.26.1-4; 67.2; 38.2.

42
Diod. XV.88.1-4; 57.1; 39.2-3;

43
Diod. XVI.1.4; 60.4; 64.2-3; 38.1-2; 8.2.

44
Diod. XVII .38.3-7; XVII.2.2; 4.1-3; 37.3-6; 69.4; 104.4; 106.2; 69.5; 74.4; 84.1; 69.9; 73.1; 76.1; 16.3-4; 40.1; 72.1; 86.3; 89.3; 93.4; 95.1; 97.3; 100.1; 104.1; 116.4; 73.4; 89.6.

45
Diod. XXV.3; XXIV.13.1.

46
Diod. XXVI.16.1; 14.1.

47
Diod. XXX.23.1-2.

48
Diod. II.23; XI.33.1.

49
Diod. XVI.56.4; 56.8; 57.3; 61.1; 64.1.

50
Diod. XXXVIII-IX,6.

51
Diod. IV.1.2.

52
Diod. V.71.3; 71.6; III.61.4-5.

53
Diod. V.7.7.

54
Diod. IV.22.4-5.

55
Diod. IV.53.1-3.

56
Diod. VI.6.1.

57
Diod. VI.8.

58
Diod. VII.4.1-4.

59
Diod. I.55.10-12.

60
Diod. I.70-71; IX.24.1.

61
Diod. VIII.30.1; IX.11.1-2.

62
Diod. XI.46.4.

63
Diod. X.28.3; XI.53.2.

64
Diod. XVI.20.6; XVI.65.2.

65
Diod. XVIII.40.4; 41.6; 42.1; 60.1.

66
Diod. XVIII.14.1; 33.3; XIX.55.5; 56.1.

67
Diod. XXVII.6.2.

68
Diod. XXXII.23;24; XXXI.26.5-27.1.

69
Diod. XXIX.18.1.

70
Diod. XXXIII.18.1.

71
Diod. XXXIV-V.22.

72
Diod. XXXII.27.3.

73
Diod. XXX.23.2; XXXII.4-5; XXXIII.27.2; XXXIV-V.33.5.

74
Diod. XXVIII.3.1; XXIX.1; 15.1.

75
Diod. X.14.2; XI.86.4.

76
Diod. XII.55.8; XV.95.3; XVI.47.4.

77
Diod. XVII.108.4-6.

78
Diod. XXVIII.2; 5; 7.1; 9.1; XXVIII.3.1.

79
Diod. XXXII.9a.

80
Diod. XXXIII.12; 23; XXXIV-V.14.1.

81
Diod. XXXIII.4.1; 9.1.

82
Diod. XL.2-3; XXXIV-V.1.1-5.

83
Diod. II.21.1-2; XX.104.3-4; XX.16.1; XXVI.15.1; XXX.17.1; XXXI.15.1; XXXIII.3; XXXIV-V.34; V.40.4; VIII.18.1; XXXVII.3.2.

84
Diod. IV.74.2.

85
Diod. X.23.1.

86
Diod. XIII.53.2.

87
Diod. XIV.46.4; 76.1.

88
Diod. XX.30.1.

89
Diod. IV.22.4.

90
Diod. XIV.63.1.

91
Diod. XV.48-49.

92
Diod. XVI.24; XVI.31.4.

93
Diod. XX.101.1-4.

94
Diod. XVI.1.4; 38.2; 60.4; 64.3.

95
Diod. XV.58.4.

96
Diod. XIX.103.5.

97
Diod. XXXVIII-IX.6.1.

98
Diod. XXXVIII-IX.19.1.

99
Diod. IX.18.1.

100
Diod. XIX.11.6-7.

101
Diod. XXIV-V.2.1-48.

102
ie. in Nicolaus' speech tyche, Diod. XIII.20.5; 21.2; 21.4-5; 24.5; 27.6; epieikia and euergesia in Seleucus I's letter to his son, the future Antiochus I, XXI.21; ideas of epieikia, euergesia, nemesis and tyche in Scipio's speech, XXVII.13-18; Diodorus XXXI.3.1; 3.3, when he comments upon Roman success after Popilius Laenas' ultimatum leading to Antiochus IV's retreat from Egypt, introduces a consideration of the terms Tyche, epieikia and philanthropia.

103
See R. Drews, A. J. Ph., LXXXIII (1962), 383-92; Drews, Historiographical Objectives, pp. 84-86.

104
Diod. XXXI.35; Polyb. XXXII.15.13-14.

105
Diod. XXXI.18a; Polyb. XXXI.9.4.

106
Diod. XV.88; Josephus Contra Apionem I. 67. The remarks of D. Lewis, "Ithome Again", Historia, II (1954), 417, are relevant". His (ie. Ephorus') style was criticized, it is true, but attacks on his accuracy were comparatively rare. He could not compete with Thucydides in power or Herodotus in charm, but he was taken as factually reliable, probably on the assumption not uncommon in our own day that anyone so dull, must at least be accurate.

107
cf. Athenaeus VI.232d-233a, and Diodorus XVI.64.2-3. See Drewes, A. J. Ph., LXXXIII (1962), 383-92; cf. Historiographical Objectives, pp. 121-137.

108
M. Kunz, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

109
R. Laqueur, "Diodorea", Hermes, LXXXVI (1958), p. 281.

110
Diod. XIII.1.3; 114.3.

111
J. Palm, Uber Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien (Lund, 1955), p. 94.

112
R. K. Sinclair, "Diodorus Siculus and the Writing of History", P. A. C. A., VI (1963), 36; S. Usher, "Some Observations on Greek Historical Narrative 400-1 B. C.", LXXXI (1960), 362, "The very title of the work βιβλιοθήκη Ἱστορική suggests a compilation rather than a critical and original account, though it would be doing Diodorus less than justice to regard his history as a collection without a recasting of different sources." The remarks of Grote, as recorded by Mrs. Grote, are perhaps pertinent. See

(A.J.Ph.)

The Personal Life of George Grote, (London, 1873), p. 49, citing Grote's journal of December 9th, 1873, "Employed all my reading time this day upon Diodorus and got through eighty pages, taking notes. He seems a more sensible writer than I had expected." Freeman, Hist. of Sicily, III, p. 610 speaks of the coexistence of "transparent gauze"and "good cloth".

113

Examples of such oversimplification are numerous, G. De Sanctis, Ricerche, p. 77, writes, that Diodorus is "un mediocrissima compilatore senz'arte e senza pensiero", cf. p. 83 "Ma Diodoro, come s'e già detto, non è che un miserabile compilatore." Similarly A. D. Momigliano, s. v. "Diodorus", Encyclopedia Italiana, pp. 924-925, writes, "La sua opera non ha percio alcun valore di pensiero, ma ha in compenso un importanza eccezionale, per un altro rispetto: che Diodoro non avenda alcun criterio e alcun motivo per trasformare le sue fonti." cf. C. Wachsmuth, Uber das Geschichtswerk des Sikelioten Diodoros, II, p. 3, "Damentsprechend stellt sich diese Weltgeschichte bei genauer Prufung als ein Aggregat von Excerpten heraus, die ganz roh neben einander gelegt sind: es ist eben nur eine βιβλιοθήκη Ἱστορική wie Die, sein Werk selbst nannte, d. h. eine sammlung verschiedenster historischer Werke (natürlich in Auszügen) kein neues selbstandiges Buch." cf. p.6, "sklavische Abschreiberei". cf. p. 12; cf. H. D. Westlake, "The Sicilian Books of Theopompos' Philippica", Historia II (1953/4), 300, "Diodorus is an historian of so little originality that his indebtedness to his sources, is by no means confined to the facts with which they supply him. He also derives from them, to a large extent, the general colouring of his narrative, including his presentation of the leading characters and conception of the central theme. Where his principal authority may be identified with some degree of confidence, he provides a mirror in which a picture of the authority is reflected, though the outline may be somewhat blurred." cf. A. W. Gomme "The End of the City State", Essays in Greek History and Literature, p. 247: Diodorus as a man of "such little judgment".

114

Diod. XIV.1-2.

115

The same applies to the thirty tyrants. Hence Drews Historiographical Objectives and Procedures of Diodorus Siculus, p. 86, concludes that the prooemium contains

different material from the text, and that Ephorus in the main text, failed to supply Diodorus with adequate material for his thesis.

116

Plut. De Malig. Herod. II, 5. p338B; De Garrulitate XIII.p. 508F; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. V.20.57; Plut. Dion. III.3; II.3-5.

CONCLUSION

1
E. A. Freeman, History of Sicily, IV, p. 59, "He destroyed the political freedom of his own city." p. 209," he [Dionysius] had destroyed the freedom of his native city." cf. Freeman, Sicily, Phoenician Greek and Roman (London, New York, Fischer Unwin, Putnam, p. 195. Stroheker, Dionysius I p. 178, argues that the popular image had no substance. M. I. Finley, History of Sicily, p. 87, argues that the people were mere pawns. cf. L. Pareti, Sicilia Antica, p. 187; J. Bayet, La Sicile Grecque, p. 40. For a particularly hostile view, see M. L. W. Laistner, A History of the Greek World 479-323 (3rd ed.; London, 1957), p. 280, "In short, we may believe that the ancients who appraised him as a tyrant with few redeeming qualities were in the main justified and far nearer the truth than those modern writers who have portrayed him as the forerunner, both in statecraft and military genius, of Philip and Alexander of Macedon." Laistner accepts uncritically the hostile tradition and regards the Diodorus narrative as essentially hostile. A similar picture is found in G. Morrow, Studies in the Platonic Epistles (New York, 1961), p. 146.

2
K. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte II^2 ,105; W. Huttle, Verfassungsgeschichte von Syrakus (Prague, 1929), p. 100

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