VĀC:  REALITY, SPEECH AND SPEAKING IN THE

EARLY INDIAN RELIGIOUS TRADITION

VĀC: REALITY, SPEECH AND SPEAKING IN THE

EARLY INDIAN RELIGIOUS TRADITION


by

WAYNE WHILLIER


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TITLE:    VĀC:  REALITY, SPEECH, AND SPEAKING IN THE EARLY
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AUTHOR:  W. Whillier, B.A. (Sir George Williams University)


SUPERVISORS:  Professor J. G. Arapura
              Professor P. Younger


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SCOPE AND CONTENT:

          This work examines the nature and significance
          of Vāc in the Rg Veda.  It is concerned to
          explicate the nature of the relationship
          of the rsi to Vāc and to demonstrate that
          this relationship is such that the rsi-figure
          is paradigmatic of the salvational ideal of
          orthodox Indian spirituality to the extent
          that the Rg Veda must be considered foundational
          to any notion of the Indian Religious Tradition.
          Brief consideration is given to the relationship
          and status of speech and speaking in Pūrva Mīmāmsā
          and Śankara's Advaita Vedanta to demonstrate how
          these positions represent a principle of
          continuity from the Rg Veda.

PREFACE

PREFACE

My prefatory remarks will be limited to the brief

consideration of two sets of limitations within which this

study has been conducted.

The first limitation is self imposed. It involves my

basic attitude toward the subject-matter itself. It

concerns, broadly, the fundamental problem of how one might

meaningfully approach the study of the religions of other

people. This problem certainly involves the question of

methodology, but, in the first instance it involves the

attitude one has to the religions of other people.. I am

in complete agreement with Philip H. Ashby when he says,

> We know today that every religion must, not ought
> to, be understood on the basis of its own funda-
> mental and absolute presuppositions or it is not
> understood. And the unqualified certitude of the
> homo religiosus wherever found is, most certainly,
> that supreme value is present, is of the essence,
> of that to which he is committed.[1]

More often than not, Western scholars of Indian spirituality

have failed to recognize this point.

In the first chapter of this work I have grappled

with the problem of what one might consider the ". . . funda-

mental and absolute presuppositions . . ." of Indian

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[1]
    Philip H. Ashby, "The History of Religions and the
Study of Hinduism", HOR; Essays in Divinity, Vol. I, ed.
Joseph M. Kitagawa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1967, p. 148.

spirituality. My problem has been this: How is it possible to understand the ". . . fundamental and absolute presuppositions . . ." of Indian spirituality without resorting to a fundamentalism? Rather than resorting to fundamentalism I have chosen to concentrate on what I consider to be a fundamental factor pertaining to ". . . the essence of that to which he (i.e., the orthodox Indian) is committed". That factor is a basic attitude towards reality as a whole and the relationship of the individual to the whole. I have concentrated in Vāc to draw this question into focus. Vāc seemed like the best topic in that, because it is central to Vedic religion and the phenomenon of Veda itself, it allows one to consider religious texts within the framework of the phenomenon of religion.

India has long recognized two approaches to the symbolism of the Vedas: (1) parokśa, the esoteric way, and (2) nidāna, the method of symbol association. I have used the latter method simply because I do not have the linguistic capability to use the former.

This raises the second point of limitation. My

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2

V. S. Agrawala, Vision in Long Darkness, Varanasi: Bhargava Bhushan Press, 1963, p. v.

primary concern is the study of religion, and not linguistics.
I have done no original translations of the texts involved.
In the case of the Rg Veda I have used two sets of trans-
lations - one in German, the other in English - and where
they differ I have referred back to the Sanskrit to find
the basis of difference. Unless otherwise acknowledged, all
general references apply to Hymns of the Rgveda, 2 Vols.
Ralph T. H. Griffith, trans., Varanasi: Vidya Vilas Press,
1963 (fourth edition). It would have been preferable to
have been able to translate the material, but because of the
vast amount of material covered, it became impractical.
Where I considered entire hymns, I used Geldner's German
rendition of the Sanskrit. His approach is interpretive,
but consistent throughout, and generally valid. Where I
have found it to be invalid I have given the basis for my
judgment.

The linguistic limitation is not, in my opinion, a
terribly serious one. Geldner's translation is generally
respected; where it is called into question on points of my
concern I have pointed to the criticism and the reasons
for it. The linguists have long had their due in the Indian

texts. Often the question of Vedic religion was secondary to them and their theories on Vedic religion demonstrate this. My primary interest is in putting forth an "under-standing" of Vedic religion, in the sense considered above. I have applied linguistic tools to this end rather than consider them an end in themselves.

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CHAPTER I

## 1. Scope and Objective of the Work

Three questions arise when undertaking a study of
this sort: "Why?", "Where?", and "How?". The latter are
interrelated academic questions, basically methodological
in nature, which arise in great part due to the overwhelming
complexity of the material available and the disparity of
accord between those scholars who have dealt with it
previously. They are questions which can only be resolved
through careful delineation of the scope of the topic at
hand, and the context and perspective from within which
the study will be carried out. The question of "Why" one
chooses such a topic is more personal than academic.

### Why

This study was motivated by the conviction that in
India language has long been understood in such a manner as
to be of central significance within the salvational aspira-
tions of the Indian religious mind.

My interest in the problem of language in Indian

thought was initiated by my studies in Western philosophy. The Western scholar who is true to himself must recognize that fact because he does not stand within the Indian Tradition. He can never be a serious spokesman for it for he can never possess the claim to authority which the Tradition gives to those within its fold. He is left with the difficult and dangerous task of interpretation. That philosophic problem which has interested me most regarding India is the very problem which I have found most difficult to comprehend within my own Tradition: it is the question of the status of language within the context of religious experience.

To understand the problem of language in the modern West one must eventually confront one of the most profound thinkers of our time, Martin Heidegger. During one such confrontation I happened across two references which have never ceased to stimulate my sense of wonder regarding both the East and the West. The first is a short statement which is in the first paragraph of one of Heidegger's works on language. He says provocatively, "Der mensch spricht . . . .

Als der Sprechende ist der Mensch: Mensch."[1]   The other

is the last line of Stefan George's poem "The Word":

"Where word breaks off no thing may be."  Heidegger comments

at length on this line, and it is worth quoting him in part

for it serves to illustrate how one sentence can stir a

sense of wonder in a Tradition as alien and wonderful as

that of India, while at the same time provide a guideline

for the furtherance of that wonder:

> . . . "Where the word breaks off no thing may be."
> . . . this line makes the word of language, makes
> language itself bring language to itself, and says
> something about the relation between word and
> thing.  The content of the final line can be
> transformed into a statement thus:  "No thing is
> where the word breaks off."  Where something
> breaks off, a breach, a diminuation has occurred.
> To diminish means to take away, to cause a lack.
> . . . No thing is where the word is lacking, that
> word which names the given thing.  . . . Thus the
> puzzle remains:  the word of language and its
> relation to the thing, to everything that is - that
> it is and the way it is.[2]

My debt to Heidegger, within the limits of this work, consists

of the fact that the insights which he gave me into my

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[1]
Heidegger, _Unterwegs zur Sprache_, p. 1.
[2]
Heidegger, _On the Way to Language_, Peter D. Hertz,
transl. 60-62. (The essay entitled "Die Sprache", to which
note 1 refers, is not included in the English translation.)

Tradition also provided me with a key that opened the door to a most central and fascinating question of another Tradition. To see the centrality of this question within both Traditions has made Indian religion more meaningful for me. The relationship between word and thing is one which has been of central importance in Indian thought, but not as a puzzle throughout. In certain hymns[3] of the Ṛg Veda the question is problematic but it is clear that even within the Ṛg Veda the vision of the ṛṣis came to be understood as a model of the resolution of the dilemma. This was in the formulation of a clear understanding of the role of language and the relationship between speech and speaking, and people and things. They saw a two-sided alliance between speaking and silence and the problematic came to be not the marvel that "der mensch spricht" but the fact that people speak when they should not.

Language is regarded in two senses: (1) as the matrix of reality itself which reveals itself through the

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3
    This point is discussed more fully in Chapter II.

vision of the Vedic seers. Here, to use Heidegger's phrase, ". . . language brings language to itself. . . ." It is not a case of "Der mensch spricht" for the ṛṣi, as a personality, does not speak. He is the medium of reality as speech. Speech as "revelation"[4] is non-personal. (2) If speech which is the highest reality expresses itself fully and impersonally in the "revelation" which is Veda, then all true speech is contained in Veda and is impersonal, or better, trans-personal, in nature. Everything which is true has been "revealed"; everything else which is said is less than true or real. 'People-talk' is non-Vedic talk; reality distorted by the taint of individuality and personalism. Thus one who sees speech clearly recites Veda if one must speak: doing so, one no longer speaks, but language speaks through one. In the final analysis silence is the highest form of speaking.

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[4] For discussion of the applicability of the term "revelation" to the Indian context see Paul Younger, Introduction to Indian Religious Thought, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972, pp. 80-88. Hereafter cited as Introduction. The question of "revelation" is discussed again in Chapter III of this work.

Where

The object of this work will be to examine the relationship between language and the phenomenon of the religious experience in an attempt to determine the relationship between speech and personhood, or better, to ascertain the broad relationship between language and ontology.

I have used two phrases which are of special import and are deserving of further consideration in that they raise major problems:  (1) "salvational schema" indicates that the concern is with language and that type of experience which is understood to be of a <u>religious</u> nature, and which takes place within an ordered view of reality as a whole, and (2) "Indian religious tradition". I use the word "tradition"[5] to imply that reality is understood as a whole, and, this being the case, <u>all</u> experience within the context of "tradition" in the sense in which it will be used here is to be understood as being of a religious nature.

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[5] I use the term "tradition" in a very specific sense; part of what follows will make explicit exactly what that sense is.  See note 35, this chapter, for an explanation of the form in which the word is used here.

The question of "tradition" must be dealt with because of its centrality to the thesis of this work. What the term signifies within the Indian context has aroused much controversy, and the opinions regarding this question are many and varied. It is necessary, therefore, that my understanding of the term, the reasons for my interpretation, and the relationship of my understanding to that of others be made clear. This will serve to justify my choice of texts, the manner in which I have used the material therein, and, ultimately, serve as the foundation upon which the central thesis of this work is to be built.

My thesis is: that a study of the relationship between language and ontology indicates that there is indeed a "salvational schema" present in portions of the Ṛg Veda which stands as a paradigmatic model of the order of right relation between the individual and reality as a whole, and although the form in which this model is expressed changes, the essence of the model persists as the core of what right relation means on into the later classical philosophical "tradition". The "salvational

schema" contained in the Ṛg Veda which is reflected in the model which right relation to language presents, presupposes a metaphysic. Because of this metaphysic I intend to show that I am justified in including the Ṛg Veda within the context of the Indian "tradition" when many other Western scholars have felt they could not do so.

## The Importance of the Question of "Tradition"

Clarification of the use of the term "tradition" regarding the Vedic literature is of vital importance, for how one understands the scope and applicability of the term will determine what a "religious experience" means in that the "tradition" provides the context and synthesis of all such experience.

For the non-Indian scholar the question of "tradition" raises serious methodological problems. The non-Indian must always struggle for credibility - not so much from his own kind, for this is primarily a matter of technique, but from those from within the "tradition" for whom authentication rests upon conviction rather than scholarly evidence. This is

so because much of the research done on India, despite the
tremendous contributions made to scholarship, has proven,
for methodological reasons, to be fundamentally offensive
to what India holds most dear, i.e. the integrity of the
"tradition" as they understand it:  that is, that the
"tradition" is continuous, integral, and rooted in Veda.

Generally, scholarship on India by Westerners has
been characterized by the attempt to mold the material into
patterns in keeping with the conditions common to the
Western world-view.  Marlya Falk[6]  characterizes these two
related presuppositions:  (1) ". . . ethnological generaliza-
tions in the light of 'primitive' standards of thinking . . .,"
and (2) ". . . philosophical generalizations from points of
view of Western thought considered universally valid . . . ."
I shall consider these presuppositions from two perspectives:
(1) to determine their influence on scholarship on India by
forcing unjustifiable categories upon Indian thought, and (2)
to see in what manner these presuppositions, although the basis
of many problems, point to the possible resolution of these
problems.  The presuppositions mentioned tend to set up sets of

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[6] Marlya Falk, Nāma-Rūpa and Dharma-Rūpa, p. 1.

false distinctions which call into question the use of the term "tradition" and complicate the question of "where to begin". The distinctions may be classified as being literary, religious, philosophical, or historical; they are not always distinct in themselves, but the one feature they share in common is that they are the product of Western scholarly technique, and more often than not they serve to fragment a "tradition" which India insists is unitary.

### "Tradition" and the Question of "Continuity"

Much has been said regarding the relationship between the various texts as to the "continuity" of content. Winternitz made a radical distinction between the early and later Vedic texts on the basis of descriptive cultural differences. He said,

> In the Vedas we find an active, joyful, warlike
> people, of simple, and still partly savage habits.
> Singers implore the gods for help against the enemy,
> victory, glory, and booty, wealth, gold, cattle,
> rain, children and long life. As yet, we do not
> find in the songs of the Rig Veda that effemenite,
> ascetic, and pessimistic trait of the Indian
> character which we shall meet again and again in
> Indian literature.[7]

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[7] Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 73.

Subsequent research has shown that this statement is perhaps an over-simplification of both aspects of the culture. The radical distinction which Winternitz makes has been drawn into question by the findings that perhaps the "feminine" aspect of which he speaks is perhaps foundational to the very earliest elements of Indian culture[8] and that those elements which some Western scholars have been eager to label as pessimism are perhaps based in a fundamental optimism of the loftiest sort.[9] Of interest is the fact that Winternitz makes his distinction on purely descriptive grounds. He sees the question of "continuity" in such terms, while others have emphasized quite different issues to the point that the term "continuity" should be understood only in the sense in which it is being used within a given argument. In fact, much of the confusion in the question of "continuity" arises out of confusion in the use of the term "continuity".

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[8]
Gonda, Change and Continuity, p. 13.

[9]
Gonda, Change, p. 7. See also P. Younger, The Birth of the Indian Religious Tradition or Studies in the Concept of Dukkha.

While Winternitz makes a radical distinction within
the śruti literature, Renou[10] points to a break at a later
period. In fact, his distinction rests on that between the
śruti and smṛti texts. He sees no opposition at all between
the Upaniṣads and the Brāhmaṇas.[11] He does say that "The
Vedic and the Upaniṣadic texts both seek the same end, but
they use different means."[12] The difference of means he
characterizes as a difference between mythological invention
and speculative inquiry, but with both functioning to the
same end. He says "In richness of mythological invention
and assured handling of mythical themes, the Ṛgveda was
destined to have no successor: Vedism is a mythology that
is broken off abruptly."[13] His distinction thus far, then,

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[10]
It was perhaps Renou's publication of The Destiny
of the Veda in India, first published as Le destin du Veda
dans l'Inde, in "Etudes Vediques et panineenes," VI (Paris,
1960), which raised the question of the continuity of the
Indian Tradition anew, and pointed to the paradoxes inherent
in the question.

[11]
Renou, Religions of Ancient India, p. 27.

[12]
Ibid., p. 18.

[13]
Ibid., p. 23.

is one of form rather than function and objective.  The real

distinction he sees to fall between what he calls "Vedism"

and the advent of "Hinduism":

> Religious terminology is almost completely trans-
> formed between the Veda and the Epic or the Puranas,
> a fact which has not been sufficiently emphasized;
> the old terms have disappeared or have so changed
> in meaning that they are hardly recognizable; a new
> terminology comes into being.[14]

Renou, then, does not argue against the integrity of the

śruti literature, but, rather, for it.  In fact, he argues

against those who maintain that the main distinguishing

difference between early and late Vedic literature is the

arrival of the doctrine of karma-saṃsāra,[15]  or the moral

order of rebirths.  He says,

> There can be no greater blessing than never to
> die; not to escape from rebirth, which was to be
> the desire of classical India . . . .[16]

And of the distinctions between the Vedas proper and the

Upaniṣads he says,

> . . . the old term rta, with its wide range of
> associations, has been replaced by satya, which
> means exactitude.  There are isolated passages
> in the Upaniṣads in which the word karman is
> used in the sense of a good or bad action on the
> moral plane; but it is never used for the present
> effect of a past action of the foreseeable con-
> sequence of an action performed in the present,

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[14]
  Ibid., p. 47.

[15]
  Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Vol. 1,
Part 1, p. 225.

[16]
  Renou, Religions, p. 27.  For a discussion of the
Vedic view of death see Sten Rodhe, Deliver Us from Evil, pp.
81-105.

conceptions which constitute the essential
meaning of the word in later usage.[17]

Karma-saṃsāra, which many hold to a great point of difference
[18]
between the Vedas and the Upaniṣads  is a doctrine of epic

or "Hindu" making.  Renou holds that the śruti literature –

the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and Upaniṣads – form a

single block which, although differing in form of expression

serve the same function which is the prolongation of life
[19]
and the attainment of "this worldly ends".

He sees the change of form through the Ṛg Veda to

the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads as a movement from the

intuitive mytho-poetic outpourings of the ṛṣi to the

"practical minded elaborations" of the Brāhmaṇas ("Mythopoetic

activity ceases", he says, "when the mind turns to magic, for

magic establishes a direct contact between the performer and
[20]
the effect he desires to produce.")    to the ingressive

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[17]
    Renou, Religions, p. 29.
[18]
    See Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, pp.
280-289.
[19]
    This phrase should be understood as it applies to the
broad framework of a "salvational schema", and not as it might
apply to the analysis of Winternitz or to that of Max Weber's
The Religion of India, or Albert Schweitzer's Indian Thought
and Its Development.  The most significant of "this worldly
ends" in Indian spirituality is a salvational one which is best
indicated by the term mokṣa.  What is at question is how one
understands the scope of the end, and not the end itself.
[20]
    Renou, Religions, p. 21.

reflection of the Upaniṣads. He says that "In this way

the Veda comes full circle and epitomizes the whole course

of the evolution of Indian thought."[21]  It is a circle of

vision, ritualization, and reflection, all directed to the

same objective.

In support of the view that the relationship between

the texts is best characterized as one of both "change" and

"continuity", Gonda[22] and van Buitenen[23] have shown that

many central concepts of the later period function with

essentially the same root meaning as they bore earlier, and

that many of the prime differences in meaning are as a

direct outgrowth of their earlier usages. Both men have

tended to analyse the literature in terms of the integral

growth of the "tradition" by meeting the "tradition" on

its own terms – that is, without forcing the material by

imposing ethnological or philosophical generalizations – and,

without compromising the rigors of Western scholarship.

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[21]
Ibid., p. 25.

[22]
J. Gonda, Change and Continuity.

[23]
See his study on "Akṣara" in JAOS, No. 79, pp.
176-187, "Studies in Sāṃkhya (II); Ahaṃkāra", JAOS, Vol. 77,
pp. 15-25, "Vācārambhaṇam", Indian Linguistics, Vol. 16,
pp. 157-162.

Gonda while arguing for "continuity" is careful to point

out that, ". . . continuity is no identity, that is to say

that culture elements which are preserved are nevertheless

subject to change and transformation."[24]   Again, the emphasis

is put on form as an element of change.  He criticizes those

who have made too much of the factors of difference[25]   within

the "tradition" as well as those Indian[26]   "Traditionalists"

who have failed to recognize genuine change within the

"tradition", when he says,

> Those authors who enlarge on the great and undeniable
> differences between Vedism and Hinduism, emphasizing
> that the former was polytheistic and the latter
> comprised some practically monotheistic religious,
> that the great ideal of Hinduism, mokṣa, like the
> great importance attached to yoga, the guru, temple
> rites, etc., was foreign to the Veda in the proper
> sense of the term, and so on, these authors too often
> overlooked that there are on the other hand many
> points in which important culture traits of the
> latter great period do not appear to have considerably
> departed from what was characteristic of the earlier
> centuries.  Too often they failed to draw attention
> to a great variety of elements which though chronologically
> Vedic and incorporated in the corpora of Vedic literature
> precluded phenomena or institutions which are generally
> regarded as typically 'Hinduist' and disregarded what
> notwithstanding considerable differences points to
> unmistakable continuity.  . . . Whereas they were first

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[24]
    Gonda, Change, p. 17.
[25]
    Specifically, Von Glasenapp and Hopkins.
[26]
    C. Kunhan Raja, Poet-philosophers of the Ṛig Veda,
1963, provides a good example.

and foremost captivated by the changing scene of
outward forms and interested in tracing 'historical
developments', the attention of traditional Indian
scholarship was not rarely arrested by those elements
which, actually or in appearance, remained in the
course of time unaltered, and by that which may be
said to reflect a deeper meaning underlying the
outward phenomena, or, by their 'mystical' or
philosophical background. . . . Indian traditionalists
on the other hand failed to recognize that continuity
is no identity . . . .[27]

Paul Younger has given serious consideration to the
questions of "tradition" and "continuity"; his conclusions[28]
must be considered because they are original, provocative,
and founded on quite different considerations than those
discussed thus far.

Younger states that, ". . . it was the Buddha's message
and the Upanisadic insights which combined to formulate the
central religious understanding which was to be the Indian
Religious Tradition."[29]  He would, with Winternitz, but contra

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[27]
   Gonda, Change and Continuity, 16-17.

[28]
   Paul Younger, The Indian Religious Tradition,
Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakshan, 1970, p. 31, hereafter
cited as Tradition. In the two books, Introduction and Tradition
Younger appears to put forth two different attitudes as to the
place of Rg Veda within the "Tradition". This is due in great
part to the different methodologies employed. Both claim to
put forth an interpretation; the latter is much more concerned
with historical problems. Both books are frought with minor
form errors which in the final analysis do not detract from the
central arguments which are presented in a bold and original way.
In referring to his conclusions, I refer to those of the earlier
work.

[29]
   Younger, ibid., p. 31.

Renou and Gonda isolate not only the Indus civilization, but also the Vedic texts from what he understands to be the core of the "tradition". [30]    He excludes the Vedic civilization

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[30]
          He hints at continuity from the Indus civilizations when he talks of possibility of the persistence of elements which he feels may re-emerge in the Epic period.  He mentions similarities in the art of Mohenjo-daro and that of the Śunga period, but is careful to point out that Sullivan in "A Re-Examination of the Religion of the Indus Civilization", has called such associations into question.  My attitude to the Indus question is this:  to argue that the three-headed figurine of Mohenjo-daro represents a proto-Śiva as Marshall has done (Sir John Marshall et al, Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilization, Vol. I, Ch. 5) is no more convincing than Sullivan's argument that the various figurines bear more resemblance to other widely diverse findings such as the Heidelburg Madonna, and therefore, have little relationship to later Indian religion.  The premises upon which such hypotheses are founded are untenable.  I agree with Gonda when he says:

> It can hardly be denied that the religious ideas of those peoples which constituted the substratum have contributed a great deal towards the formation of the concepts underlying the later Hindu cult, theology and mythology.  The apparent reproductions of sacral objects or scenes on the pre-historic objects may have contained the germs of various ideas and conceptions of the historical period.  It may even be conceded that not rarely the Vedic traits of Hinduism were really superimposed on their pre-Vedic or non-Vedic core.  The only thing I wish to do here is to indicate the fact that these 'substratum hypotheses' implicitly or explicitly involve doubt, or even negation, of Vedic-Hinduist continuity, that is to say, negation of that very unbroken tradition which has among the Hindus of all times always been beyond dispute.                    Change and Continuity, p. 13.

Such enterprises are not only an offense to the "tradition"

because it is not compatible with his definition of "tradition"

which he understands as "a conscious authoritative selection

of religious experience".[31]    However, it is not made clear

why this definition excludes the Vedic civilization from the

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30 (continued)
in that they call into question that which the "tradition"
considers to be its very foundation, but they also result in
an infinite regress of theories and categories which undermine
those factors which make the "tradition" distinctive.  Renou
sums up the pitfalls of this particular type of historical
orientation to the study of religion when he says,

> If we wished to attempt a definition and classification
> of the essentials of Indian religion we could take
> as our starting-point religion as it is today, with
> its multiplicity of local cults, beliefs and super-
> stitions, and its many village gods, and try to compare
> it with what we know of the ancient religion from
> literary and archaeological evidence; and we could
> then consider it in relationship to forms of religion
> outside India.  This method would inevitably result
> in a collection of miscellaneous features which
> would be conveniently termed 'non-Aryan', and which
> would really be features common to primitive religions
> all over the world.  What would remain then as a basis
> for 'classical' Hinduism?  Nothing, apart from those
> elements emanating from Vedism; and we must bear in
> mind that Vedism itself contains elements of primitive
> religion, and therefore of Hinduism (or, we might say,
> of pre-Hinduism), the existence of which at a period
> earlier than the Veda could be verified by the evidence
> of the Mohenjo-daro excavations.    Religions, p. 47.

My concern is to understand an aspect of the Indian religious
"tradition" within the terms which the "tradition" itself has set.

[31]    Younger, The Indian Religious Tradition, p. 3.

"tradition". In fact, he argues at cross-purposes on this
point. On the one hand he says of the Buddha, "In a sense
he was a "starting point" in the historical story of the
Indian Tradition, but what is more important, he was the
"starting point" in that he represented the theological
point to which the later stages in the Tradition looked in
order to identify its distinctive character and orientation."[32]
On the other hand, he says,

> . . . (one) approach to the establishment of intel-
> lectual links between the Ṛg Vedic hymns and the later
> Indian Tradition would be the examination of the goal
> of the intellectual process as understood in each
> setting. . . . the goal of the Ṛg Vedic poet was
> to get above his own sensual imagery to a "vision"
> (dhī) through which he became a participant in the
> meaning of the universe. In a similar way all the
> philosophy and art of the later Tradition was an
> attempt to express a "vision" which, reaching beyond
> this life, could participate in the meaning of the
> whole. The Upaniṣads are the purest form in which
> such a "vision" can be put into words. The Buddha
> image is the perfect realization of a Ṛg Vedic
> "vision" translated into the visual arts. . . . The
> rootage of the "vision" and therefore the whole
> intellectual process were to be more complex in the
> Tradition than they had been in the Ṛg Vedic Civilization.
> Nevertheless, when the Buddha preached his message it
> was the Ṛg Vedic Civilization to which he was indebted
> for this 'Vision of the Way Beyond' . . . .[33]

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[32]
Ibid., p. 35.
[33]
Ibid., pp. 25-26.

One reason for Younger's reluctance to include the
Rg Veda within the "tradition" may be the fact that he
discerns various attitudes concerning the nature of reality
which are to his mind sufficiently variant as to deny the
Rg Veda the firm foundation of authority which his definition
requires.  He sees the attitudes reflected in the development
of the rsi figure - from the charismatic 'hero' fighting to
establish order in both community and cosmos, to the lonely
poet trying to find a measure of stability in the sea of life,
to the 'hero' who rises above the 'fatalism' of the endless
succession of routine events to creatively reinterpret the
new established order.[34]  Thus, he chooses to concentrate on
the historical aspect of the phenomenon of the rsi rather
than examining the phenomenon in a fundamental sense in terms
of the "goal of the intellectual process".  It is my contention
that the phenomenon thus viewed does reveal a model of that
"central religious understanding" which is the core of what
the "tradition" means to those who are within it in India.

The argument turns back to the use of the words
"tradition", "authority", and the meaning of the term

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[34]
Ibid., pp. 14-25.

"religious experience" within the context that the former

signify.

A definition of the term 'tradition' which is very

appropriate to the Indian religious 'tradition' is cited

by Rowland in his book The Art and Architecture of India:

> Tradition . . . embraces the whole of a civilization,
> in all its modes and departments, and tends to the
> obliteration of all antitheses, such as 'sacred and
> profane', even 'creator and creation'. A truly
> traditional civilization has its roots fixed in a
> doctrine of the purely metaphysical order. This
> doctrine gives to the whole a principal or sufficient
> cause. The other constituents of the Tradition,
> whether ethical, social, or artistic, down to the
> most petty activities of daily life, all derive
> their authority from this doctrine, to be exercised
> in their prescribed spheres. Ideas of a metaphysical
> order are the cement which binds every part together.
> . . . The mechanism by which the Truth is made to
> circulate through the body is the Tradition from Master
> to pupil, which stretches back into the past and
> reaches forward into the future.[35]

I use this definition because, in summary form, it most fully

expresses as I understand it what India has understood her

use of the term "tradition" to signify. Through the use of
the term thus understood, [36] it is possible to avoid most of

the prejudices, pitfalls and frustrations that have plagued

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[35]
      B. Rowland, The Art and Architecture of India.
Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967 (third edition), p. 6; citing
Marco Pallis, Peaks and Lamas (London, 1939).

[36]
      It is with this understanding in mind that the term
is henceforth used without quotation marks and is capitalized,
i.e. Tradition.

some Western scholars which have been discussed above. For
Younger, "tradition" is defined as ". . . a conscious
authoritative selection of religious experience, (and,
therefore) these civilizations (Indus and Ṛg Vedic) cannot
properly be spoken of as parts of the Indian Religious
Tradition."[37]    On the other hand, for India that thought
which has been accepted as orthodox, in keeping with
"authority", and therefore within the Tradition, has been
that which accepts as unquestionable revealed truth that
body of literature - part of which Younger does not consider
to be within the Tradition. All of the orthodox schools of
Indian philosophy accept as a pramāna, śabda, or valid verbal
testimony which is the revealed truth of the Vedas. The
Ājīvakas, Lokāyatas, Buddhists and others who refused to
accept the truths of the Vedas as being a priori were
considered unorthodox[38]  and out of the fold of the tradition

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[37]
    Younger, The Indian Religious Tradition, p. 3.
[38]
    Opinions regarding the orthodoxy of Buddhism are
divided. Winternitz states that " . . . even the Buddhists,
who deny the authority of the Veda, yet concede that it was
originally given or 'created' by God Brahman: only, they
add, it has been falsified by the Brahmans, and, therefore,
contains so many errors." History, p. 48. Renou, in
examining the Buddhist literature, states that the case is
"varied"; the canonical texts are derogatory, the post-
canonical texts more so. (L. Renou, Destiny of the Veda in
India, pp. 27-30, and notes). It would appear that the
Buddhists found the Vedas not merely erroneous, but downright
offensive: Winternitz does not cite a reference to "God
Brahman" and I have not found one in that context.

for that reason.

Thus, for those of the Tradition, the Vedas have served as the criterion for the ". . . selection of religious experience". One either has valid religious experience or one does not just as when – if it is the case that a true, i.e. metaphysically rooted, Tradition obliterates the distinction between the sacred and the profane within the Tradition itself - one is either within the Tradition and therefore in the sacred or outside of the Tradition and in the profane.[39] For this reason the Jains and all other unorthodox movements have always been considered entirely wrong on the fundamental issues by the orthodoxy, i.e., entirely wrong in that the core truths which these movements espoused lacked the backing of the only authority which the orthodoxy recognized as valid.

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[39]
I am aware of the implications of this assertion for the study of Indian spirituality. It calls into question the applicability of the sacred/profane within the context of the Tradition. The Tradition is by definition sacred and to apply the distinction of the sacred and the profane to the Tradition, as many contemporary historians of religion are prone to do, is a contradiction in terms.

## Tradition and 'Religious Experience'

The Tradition defines what is a valid and what is
an 'invalid' religious experience.  To answer the question,
"What is a religious experience?" outside of the context of
the authority of a Tradition is as problematic as the question
"What is religion?".  Serious consideration of questions of
such magnitude must necessarily fall beyond the scope of this
study.  Much work has been done in this area, but the
[40]
questions remain unanswered.

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40
     That such a reconsideration of these questions is
warranted seems apparent by the fact that claims made thus
far as to the 'universal' factors inherent in the phenomenon
of religion fall short of being universal.  Theravāda Buddhism
which holds 'soulessness' (anātta) as a central tenant; that
all life is suffering, and that all of reality is flux stands
as an embarrassment to many scholars.
     One outstanding example can be found in the work of
Rudolf Otto, Das Heilige.  He relates the questions of 'religion'
and 'religious experience' directly when he says, "Das wovon
wir reden und was wir versuchen wollen einigermassen anzugeben,
namlich zu Gefühl zu bringen, lebt in allen Religionen als ihr
eigentlich Innerstes und ohne es wären sie garnicht Religion."
(C. H. Beck'she Verlagsbuch-handlung (Oscar Beck) Munchen
1963, p. 6).  He says that the term which best describes that
which stimulates such feeling is 'Numinose'.  ". . . diese
Kategorie vollkommen sui generis ist so ist sie wie jedes
ursprüngliche und Grund-datum nicht definibel im strengen Sinne
sondern nur erorterbar." (p. 7).  He sees the feeling as one
of 'Abhangigkeitsgefuhl', of mysterium tremendum: "Gefuhl des
mysterium tremendum, des schauervollen Geheimnisses.  Das Gefuhl
davon kann mit milder Flut das Gemut durchziehen in der Form
schwebender ruhender Stimmung versunkener Andacht:  es kann
so übergehen in eine statig fliessende Gestimmtheit der Seele

To attempt to define "religion" or "religious experience" in strictly psychological or sociological categories, or by using terms such as "dependence" or "creatureliness" fails to bring into adequate focus a fundamental aspect of the religious life -- the very practical aspect of what is essentially and in the first instance an individual concern.

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40 (continued)

die lange fortwährt und nachzittert bis sie endlich abklingt und die Seele wieder im Profanen lässt. Es kann auch mit Stössen und Zuckungen plötzlich aus der Seele herforbrechen. . . . Es kann zu dem stillen demütigen Erzittern und Verstummen der Kreatur werden vor dem - ja wovor? Vor dem was im unsagbaren Geheimnis über aller Kreatur ist." (p. 14). I have not found that such descriptions apply to the Buddhism presented in the Pali texts. The erorterbar which he uses to amplify his understanding of the term 'Numinose' as far as Buddhism goes concentrate on that of T'ang and Sung China (p. 87) and not that form which would not tolerate the term 'Seele' and denies that there is any sort of 'unsagbaren Geheimnis über aller Kreatur'. For further discussion of this point within the context of Otto's role in the history of the phenomenology of religion, see C. H. Long, "Archaism and Hermeneutics", HOR, pp. 69-70.

The fallacy inherent in scholarship of this sort -- the fallacy of super-imposing "generalizations from points of view of Western thought considered universally valid (in Otto's case, as Long points out, the theory of a religious a priori wherein "Religious expressions and their peculiar modalities are manifestations of a sui generis religious consciousness", (Ibid., p. 69) -- has been described well by Younger; he speaks of it as the 'attempt to construct a theology of all religions':

> Such an endeavor may someday be possible if in the
> course of history the religious traditions of mankind

It is individual in the sense that by, with, and
through it the individual is integrated with his whole
environment, with existence in its totality.  Thus religion
is the individual's assertion of existence.  It means that
the man who realizes himself to be incomplete seeks whole-
ness.  Religion is founded upon a fundamental sense of the
intrinsic "wrongness of existence"[41]  with the hopeful

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40 (continued)
are shared to the point where some future generation
feels that it is heir to them all.  At that time
the formulations of theology of the approaches to
truth would all be set forth on the basis of a common
tradition and a common experience.  But we have not
yet arrived at a common tradition and a common
experience, and universal theological systems at
present must be either missionary enterprises
projecting one set of experiences on all men, or
abstractions which have nothing to do with concrete
religious life.                    (Introduction, p. 11.)
41
     J. G. Arapura, Religion as Anxiety and Tranquility,
The Hague, Mouton and Co., 1972, see Chapter 6.
     The phrase "wrongness of existence" is used to offset
terms like "practicality" and "assertion of existence" which
are decidedly biased toward the Western world view.  Arapura
distinguishes the sense of the "wrongness of existence" as a
fundamental ontological principle.  Thus, Long's criticism
that hitherto, all methods used to relate phenomenology to
history have been inadequate in that "All have made a direct
relationship between historical expressions and a law of
ontology" ("Archaism and Hermeneutics", p. 73), is not applicable
in that while his concern is with symbolic representations of
religious experience the concern here is with first principles,
the non-mediated, non-representational fundamental experiential
condition.  This is in keeping with the dominant Indian attitude

possibility held open that the situation might be righted.
The "practicality" of religion resides in the real possibility
of rectification.  In the case of India, the authority of the
Tradition is sustained by the fact that it is able to provide
consistent witness to the practicality of its position.

The Indian Tradition has insisted that the authority
of its position is self-validating in experience and that,
the revelation of _Veda_ aside, the truth claims are borne out
in experience.  In the _Ṛg Veda_ the symbols of religious
experience are in perceptual rather than conceptual terms;
as _dṛṣti_ - perception or vision.

The "_dhī_" of the _ṛṣis_ and the transcription of the
"vision" into sacred poetry expresses more than an act of
the creative imagination:  it is a particular model of
existence which is paradigmatic.  It is because their hymns
were experientially based that the poets could offer first-
hand advice as to the practicalities of lived involvement
with the transcendent.  Gonda speaks of the practicality of

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41 (continued)
that there is no categorical distinction between being and
knowing.  The designation of the fundamental experiential
condition as "religious" is also not meant to designate a
categorical distinction, for such would be out of keeping with
the understanding of Tradition as outlined here.  The use of
such terminology reflects the attempt to evaluate the phenomenon
within the context of an established, if not appropriate,
framework of discussion.

ancient Indian religion which he describes as "Sorge fur

Heil und Wohlsein im Weitesten Sinne, in dieser Welt und

im Jenseits, also eine entschieden praktische angelegenheit."[42]

The concern for "das Heil" is certainly central to the Vedic

world-view,[43] as well as any other which can, within this

understanding, properly be called religious, and, to this

end, every religion must consider itself "practical".  This

is to say no more than that all religion takes place in a

ritual context, using the term "ritual" in a broad sense to

denote an action or set of actions which serve to satisfy

an individual's sense of fitness within a larger context of

reality.[44]  The term "ritual" as used here denotes those

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[42]
     J. Gonda, Die Religionen Indians, Vol. I:  Veda und
alterer Hinduisinus (Series:  Die Religionen der Menschheit,
ed. C. M. Schroder, Vol. XI; Stuttgart:  W. Kohlhammer Verlag,
1960), p. 15.

[43]
     See Sten Rodhe, Deliver Us from Evil, who speaks of
the many concerns from which Vedic man sought deliverance.
Gonda, in his Loka gives detailed elaboration on the complica-
tions of the phrase "in dieser Welt und im Jenseits".

[44]
     For Eliade, a ritual act is an act which has
"religious intent".  Sacred and Profane, p. 87.

actions which serve to homologize the temporal and the
transcendent.  Such actions are 'religious' by the simple
fact that, as Eliade says, ". . . such actions are in-
accessible to a non-religious man".[45]

What is important is the manner in which "practicality"
can be understood in the Vedic context as a paradigmatic
mode of existence, not _toward_ reality, but as the expression
or embodiment of a greater reality which is transparent to
particular personhood.  The visions as portrayed in the hymns
are not of the nature of deductions from experience.  They
are expressions of the experience itself; not the dichotomized
experience of mundane existence but of the perception in
transcendence of the ultimate kinship of all worlds.  Agrawala
describes such perception as the exercise of the third eye
of wisdom: ". . . the faculty of intuiting the truth of the

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[45] Mercea Eliade, _Sacred and Profane_, p. 71.  J. G.
Arapura, in an article, "Philosophy, Mythology and the Renewal
of Comparative Religions", p. 218, says of ritual that
". . . ritual is that act which we perform of which the end
in no wise can be literally conceived but only mythically,
that is by way of myths.  Clearly each individual act by
itself is not a ritual.. . .  But when we take the totality
of all acts of man, whether it has a symphonic unity or not,
no end can be conceived literally but only mythically.  Now
actual religious rituals dramatize and enact the ritual that
life itself is, including its mythically perceived end."

Cosmos and its Source by direct perception . . . 'non-
mediate perception" . . .," [46] the "mental eyes of Rg Veda
10.18.3."

The term "practical" suggests to the Western mind
the dichotomy between practical/theoretical, but that
understanding does not apply to the Vedic Tradition where
theory and practice serve the same end:

> . . . the concept of Veda ("tradition") enables
> the individual to give meaning to his varied
> experiences. Because it is designed to give
> meaning to experience, the Veda was expressed
> in psychological language. This experiential and
> psychological language avoided the dichotomy
> between ontological and sociological language
> which has been characteristic of the West. As a
> result, questions of truth and behavior are never
> separated, and there is no pendulum swing from
> ontological statements that have no relevance to
> experience, to behavioristic statements that are
> unable to talk about the meaning of life. . . . The
> Veda sets forth patterns that are living and experien-
> tial, and raises these patterns into a structure of
> meaning that related man's experience to the highest
> reality.[47]

This end, in terms of the larger context of reality,
is a ritual one. "Decidedly practical" indicates the
fundamental importance of the question of resolution in
reference to the functional aspect of formal ritual on the

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[46]
Agrawala, Vision in Long Darkness, p. 1.
[47]
Younger, Introduction, pp. 81-82.

one hand, and, on the other, to the totality of experiential

involvement characterized by the vision experience and the

spontaneous witness to that experience in the outpouring of

the sacred Word, which is reality witnessing unto itself.

The question of what is decidedly practical is the question

of right relation to the sacred Word.

W. Norman Brown speaks of the general problem of

such practicality in the Vedic context as the problem of

"correct or right behavior . . ."[48]    He states that,

> Correct or right behavior is viewed as a personal
> responsibility . . . .  Particular application of
> the idea of duty appears as early as the Rig Veda.
> There it starts with the notion that our cosmos
> contains two opposing forces:  that of ordered
> operation, progress, and harmonious cooperation of
> the parts; and that of disorder, chaos, destruction.
> The universe in which we live is held to operate
> under a code or set of principles to keep it going,
> and this code, this body of cosmic truth or order,
> has the name satya or rta.  But disorder, anti-order,
> known as anrta, is ever beating at our universe,
> tending to disrupt or destroy it.  To keep our
> universe operating smoothly, every being has a
> function.  Gods have their specific functions; human
> beings have their functions.  No two gods have the
> same function, and human beings' functions also
> differ.  Each god and each human must assiduously

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[48]
W. Norman Brown, Man in the Universe:  Some Cultural
Continuities in India.  Berkeley:  University of California
Press, 1970, p. 10, hereafter cited as "Man".

devote himself to his function. If he fails in per-
forming it, to that extent the operation of the
universe is impaired. The word for this individual
function is vrata (RV 9.112), and so important is
the concept that in post-Vedic times the word comes
to mean a solemn, religious vow . . . .[49]

Within the definition of Tradition used here all acts

are religious acts in that, from the "practical" aspect of

the religious life, every feature of existence is significant.

The interrelated nature of every aspect of an individual's

existence came to be expressed by the term "dharma".[50] The

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[49]
   Ibid., pp. 10-11.

[50]
   On the term "dharma" in Vedic thought see J. Gonda,
"Het Begrip Dharma In Het Indische Denken", Tijdschrift voor
Philosophie, Vol. 20, 2, 1958, pp. 213-68. I have used the
term here to characterize the totality of involvement of the
rsi as the 'hero' of the community, and the fact that it is
only correct performance of proper ritual by those who are
qualified which maintains not only the community, but, because
it is itself a microcosm, the world and the cosmos as well.
Thus, in 1.174.50, proper sacrifice bestows immortality upon
the rsi, and in 10-16, the Sun, which was brought forth by the
first primordial sacrifice (5) exists as the 'quickening spirit'
and the 'breath' of the Earth. The ritual preserves the realm
of light which Indra won with his vajra when he killed Vrtra.
(See Norman W. Brown, "The Creation Myth of the Rig Veda",
JAOS, Vol. 62, pp. 85-98 on the Indra/Vrtra conflict.) More
directly, where Brhaspati, the poet of poets (2.23.1) rescues
the cows (light, speech) from the darkness of the cave of the
Panis; without the sacred Word and the forces of light (Agni).
(10.130.4) "Closely was Gāyātrī conjoined with Agni . . ." all
would remain concealed in darkness and indiscriminate chaos
(10.129.3). Thus, the ritual act is the most practical of all
actions in terms of Lokasaṁgraha. As Renou puts it, "The duty
of the rsis was to ensure the ordered functioning of the world
and religious ceremonial by reproducing the succession of cosmic
events, the ordo rerum, in their acts and in the imagery they
conceived." Religions of Ancient India, p. 17.

terms "vrata" and "dharma"  both signify the unitary relation-
ship between being and doing, concept and precept.  Only the
ṛṣis saw dharma directly, and Veda is the record of those dhīh.
Only they had the gift of non-mediated perception.  Nir. 120
states that, "Seers had direct intuitive insight into duty.
They by oral instruction handed down the hymns to later
generations, declining in (power of) oral communication, com-
piled this work, the Veda . . . in order to comprehend their
meaning."

## How

The question of how to conduct such an inquiry has
been touched upon in the elucidation of the questions "Why?"
and "Where?".  A brief summary will serve to make explicit
what was implicit in the foregoing discussions.  It will serve
to reinforce my claim for the interrelatedness of the questions
and their centrality to the unique problems inherent in the
study of Vac.

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51
    Gonda makes the association between these terms on
p. 218 and p. 223 in his "Het Begrip Dharma In Het Indische
Denken".

In the section "Where?", I have argued for an under-
standing of Tradition which allows for the reality of change
within the authority of a model of continuity which is based
on the persistence of an experientially-grounded truth
claim.

I have argued that the foundation of this truth claim
is discernable in the Rg Veda in the form of the model which
the ṛṣi provides for practical resolution to a fundamental
concern which is the predicament of wrong relation. In that
this model stands as the authenticating guide as to what is
right and wrong relation, I conclude that the Vedas -- noting
that the discussion has centered on the Rg Veda -- must be
considered as the foundation of tradition and, therefore, the
starting-point for one outside of the Tradition of an inquiry
into Indian spirituality. This conclusion is consistent with
the manner in which the Indian religious Tradition has under-
stood its own foundations.

The texts of Rg Veda span a period of perhaps a
thousand years, and because they represent a latent and
fragmented record of what was originally an oral tradition,
their precise chronology is impossible at present to determine.
Of this problem Renou says, ". . . no definite chronology can

be established, and this is an embarrassment to Western
scholars."[52]   Much effort has been made to overcome this
embarrassment.   In fact, the majority of nineteenth century
scholarship was obsessed with this problem, the result of
which was, as Renou points out, that ". . . various erroneous
speculations on the chronology of the Veda were advanced, and
these did great disservice to the subject."[53]

The argument on the question of the scope and nature
of Tradition appears at first sight to be based on purely
historical differences.  But this is the case only among
Western scholars, for the West and the East regard history in
different ways:  In the West, history has generally come to
be regarded as a process characterized by the progressive un-
folding of truth.  Because of this, chronology has figured
central in the Western world-view, for it is by chronology
that one has a gauge for truth.  India has never subscribed
to the linear theory of history.  There, the rhythms and
cycles of the perpetual recurrence of day upon night and

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[52]
Renou, _Religions of Ancient India_, p. 2.  A recent
attempt to deal with this question is the work by M. N. Law,
_Age of the Rgveda_, 1965.  The work provides a good history of
the debate.

[53]
_Ibid._, p. 3.

season upon season led to the understanding that what the West sees as "origination" is in fact "repetition", and that time as history always ultimately turns in upon itself in the unalterable rhythm of the recurrence.

One may say that India has a mythology of recurrence, but the understanding of reality as recurrence cannot be classified as pure theoria. In orthodox Indian religion, conception and perception are seen as complementary modes of relation between individual awareness and reality as an integral whole.

In such a context change is not in terms of the fundamental structures of consciousness, but in the way the fresh data from the ever-deepening experience of consciousness is applied to the fundamental structure. Thus, although the symbols merge and transform, the structures of those symbols as that which they point to and participate in remain basically the same. The dialectic between what has often been called the mythological and conceptual modes of consciousness[54] is

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[54] This distinction is expressed in various ways. Ernst Cassirer speaks of "synthetic supplementation" and "mythic/ideation"; see his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. II; Essay on Man; "Myth and Religion", pp. 72-108; Language and Myth. Eliade uses the terms "Sacred/Profane" and "archaic/modern"; see his Images and Symbols and Sacred and Profane. I do not recognize such distinctions to be valid within the understanding of Tradition as discussed above. Some of the implications of applying such distinctions to the Indian context are discussed further in Chapter III of this work.

expressive of this deepening experience, and the reflection upon it. Within the intellectual tradition this points up the fact that continuity is the necessary prerequisite for any change that might take place. Change in this sense represents a fresh expression of that continuity. Further, to understand the central problem in the attempt to make sense of the Indian world-view as an issue on the choice between theories of history is to deny the dynamic of consciousness upon which that world-view rests.

What begins as a historical question becomes, from the phenomenological standpoint, inquiry into the structure of the dynamics of consciousness. It must be stressed here that I am not against the historical concern, but, rather, the phenomenon which is my central concern, is, as will be seen, best characterized as being a-historical, or trans-historical. Just as this dynamic must be considered as central to an adequate understanding of continuity within change, so must it figure prominently in any discussion of Tradition where Tradition is seen as the criterion against which all truth claims are judged.

55

Consciousness is considered here in "phenomenological" rather than psychological terms; the phenomenon of religious consciousness in India prohibits any rigorous distinction between behavioral and sociological categories. Consciousness, as I am concerned with it, is expressed in terms of the dynamics inherent in the quest for resolution of the fundamental question through right relation to Vāc. I am concerned with the structural model which the consciousness of the ṛṣi exemplifies in the dynamics of the dual role which the ṛṣi embodies -- from the mere poet caught up in "sorge" or lived-world personal realities, to the visionary as a model of the transcendence of personal categories through right relation to Vāc. This model is the medium of Tradition as "revelation", and, as well, the enduring criteria against which Tradition judges itself.

I do not claim that it is the only possible model. Its primary significance lies in the fact that it is clearly foundational to the Tradition, and in that although the form

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The problems inherent in understanding "phenomenology" as a methodology have been raised in this chapter and will be of concern throughout this work. It is discussed at some length in Chapter IV, n. 5. Although the question of methodology is important it has been considered only in those contexts where it is obviously a problem, and only to the extent that such problems concern the subject of this work. For this reason, such considerations have been dealt with in the footnotes rather than the body of the work.

in which it is expressed changes, the structure of the model
endures within the Tradition. Hence my method will be to
interpret the weaving of structures of data relative to the
phenomenon of religious experience, as presented in the texts.
The presuppositions which govern the selection of data concern
the experience factor which I have defined in fundamental terms
as it relates to the question of "religion".

Thus, my method will be phenomenological -- to examine
evidence of religious experience as it relates to language, and
"interpretive" in that I will assemble the data acquired
phenomenologically into constructs of meaning, the defining
lines of which will be the understanding of Tradition as dis-
cussed earlier.

The language questions will be considered in three
closely related sets which are the basis of the following three
chapters: (1) Speech in itself (Vāc), (2) Speech (Vāc) the
speaker, and the nature of that which is spoken, and (3) a
combination of both as Vāc pertains to Vedic cosmology/cosmogony.

These distinctions are nothing more than organizational
conveniences: clearly, the centrality of Vāc as śruti to the
question of Tradition illustrates that Vāc is reflective of a

sophisticated Weltanschauung which necessarily has a bearing on the other sets, especially (3) where, in some respects one is dealing with a Weltbild. This distinction is often expressed as one between metaphysics and myth in studies on the nature of the third distinction, but I will argue that this distinction is valid only as a heuristic device, and that the problems which arise within the third set, some of which were discussed in the preceding chapter, do so only when this fact is lost sight of. Weltbild is always transparent to Weltanschauung. However, it is the unique nature of Indian religion, within the context of Tradition, that the two exist side by side. This point is hardest to argue in the Ṛg Veda. Thus, selective but detailed consideration has been given to the Ṛg Veda. I have employed categorical distinctions and heuristic devices as a matter of expediency; to avoid reductionism I have abandoned these tools whenever necessary. Distinctions, methodological or categorical are means, not ends in themselves. In the end, the texts must be allowed to speak for themselves. I have tried to do this by moving with the texts. To attempt to comprehend the imagery of the Ṛg Veda without "moving" with it can be likened (to use

a Vedic image) to trying to milk a cow without pulling on the teats.

One runs the risk of moving too fast or too far and ending up in a seeming incomprehensible quagmire of identifications, associations and allusions. However, one feature of the Vedic understanding of Vāc is the fact that there are indications that the question of Vāc was understood within the complex of a metaphysic to which Vāc itself was central. These indications, although not systematically presented, serve to compliment the spider's-web of images and symbols within which the question of Vāc is framed.

CHAPTER II

# CHAPTER II

## SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERM "VĀC"

### General Observations

Many facts are given concerning the nature of Vāc.
She was born from the Akṣara (3.55.1). Prajāpati is the son
of Vāc. She was born from the heavens in the days before
time (3.39.2). She was the essence of the primordial
sacrifice (10.130), and was the first sacrificial material.
She is the warp and woof of all creation (10.130; cf. 6.9.3).
She is the herald of both worlds (1.173.3). She is rooted
in the Akṣara, and knows no herdsman (3.57.1), so that through
her multitude of names She has many abodes (10.114.8). Her
revelation as name is the greatest treasure (10.71.1); she
has been established as seven paths of Light (the seven rṣis)
or the seven rivers of Vāc (1.32.12), which are the pillars
of creation, offering refuge to the troubled mortal (10.5.6).
She is the "Gladdener" who yields food and vigour to man
(8.89.11).

Vāc is hidden from the ordinary mortal for She is the ancient secret of the forefathers (3.39.2): "The sages guard the Holy Order and keep the names concealed within them" (10.5.2). In 7.82.10, Aditi and Vāc are associated (Savitar's Song of Praise): Vāc is the "God who strengthens the law." The greatest portion of her remains hidden: Akṣara is her highest portion; she inhabits the three realms. Ordinary men speak only of one-quarter of her; only the Brāhmans know all four divisions (1.164.45). One must strive for effectual Vāc (5.34.11), and this is characterized as being a laborious enterprise (5.47.1). She transcends normal comprehension (8.89.10). She must be revealed (10.114.9). She is "seen" but only in the "mind's eye" (10.130.6), and expressed through poetic wisdom (4.11.3). Vāc-Sarasvatī strengthens the thoughts of man (6.61.4).

She is kept secret by Agni (4.5.3), who is inspired by Vāc (3.27.9). Vāc is the Mother (5.47.1) to the Father (Agni) (6.10.2). In her highest form (Akṣara) she is well guarded (10.5.2). As effective ritual speech she is fleeting (8.89.10). In speaking of the ignorant man (Nir. 1.19), it is said that she is selective to whom she reveals herself: "He who hath made him doth not comprehend him: from him who saw him surely

is he hidden" (1.164.23): yet, in praise of one who under-
stands (Nir. 1.19), ". . . to another hath she shown her
beauty (as poetic wisdom) as a fond well-dressed woman to
her husband (10.71.4)."

One must be worthy of revelation: ". . . the voice
he heard yields neither fruit nor blossom. No part in Vāc
hath he who hath abandoned his own dear friend (Nir. 1.20:
"Friend" = Vāc) . . . even if he hears her still in vain he
listens: naught he knows of righteous action (10.71.5,6)."
The false attainment of Vāc by the sinful leads to entrapment
rather than transcendence (10.71.9). She presents herself in
the midst of god-like speakers (8.89.10). She is the result
of deeds well done (ŚB 2.5.2.6 ff.),[1] simply because she is
revealed in poetic inspiration and never 'understood': "What
sage hath learned the meter's application? Who hath gained
Vāc, the Spirits aim and object" (10.114.9). The mystery of
the meter is spoken of again in 10.130.3-6: "What were the
hymn, the chant, the recitation, when to the Gods all deities
paid worship? Closely was Gāyatrī conjoined with Agni; and
closely Savitar combined with Uśṇih". By this knowledge men,
through the vision of the "mind's eye" were made rsis (v. 6).
(cf. also Ad.B. III.13 where Prajāpati allots meters to the gods.)

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[1] Jules Eggling, trans. Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, 5 Vols, SBE,
F. Max Müller, ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1963.

Whatever the enigmatic and fleeting nature of Vāc, two things were understood clearly: (1) true speech presents itself through inspiration only in the ritual context, and (2) there were rigid linguistic criteria for discriminating between the poetic wisdom of transcendence and mere poetic talent. The meter of poetic revelation is correspondent to Vāc as meter which is based on the highest syllable (1.164.23-24).

He who opposes tradition and thus stands against Vāc must die (10.125.6; ŚB 3.5.1.21; 6.1.1.9). Vāc, as śruti, is the foundation of Tradition.

In summary, Vāc is the multiform manifestation of the highest reality, the Imperishable Syllable, which is a mystery (1.164.39). She is revealed through vision to the worthy ṛsis as name in meter, verse, song, or mantra; as mantra, she is the "holy gift from mortal men" (8.9.16). The Akṣara expresses itself as the basis of the mystical riddle (brahman) (1.164.35). She represents the self-revelation of Wisdom through the Word: thus the dedication of 10.71 to Jñānam. Geldner, in commenting on 10.125.8, goes as far as to identify it with the Brahman-Ātman doctrine. He says, "So ist das Lied eine Vorstufen der Prāṇa-Brahman-Ātman-Lehre. Vgl. die Verherrlichung der Vāc 8,100,10

(101,13-16?); T.Br. 2.8.8.4 fg. und RV. 10.71. Auch die Selbstoffenborung der Wissenschaft in den versen das Nir. 2,4."

The formalization of the potential of the Akṣara occurs through its manifestation as particularization in name (language is made manifest by those who are wise in spirit in 10.71.2), on the one hand, while, on the other hand, through right relation to Vāc the rṣi overcomes the "profitless illusion" (10.71.5) of the particularization of mundane reality in the transcendent vision of the One, "the Swift moving" Akṣara (7.36.7).

## Occurences and Meaning

In various grammatical forms[2] the term "Vāc" occurs frequently[3] in the Ṛg Veda, primarily in the ninth mandala.[4] There has been little agreement among those who have tried to categorize the meaning of the term on a purely linguistic basis.[5] Max Muller was perhaps the first to make a simple distinction which the linguists have adhered to:[6] that is,

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[2] Hermann Grassmann, Wörterbuch Zum Ṛgveda, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1964, lists nominitive, vocative and accusative forms of the noun.

[3] Ibid., Grassmann lists 71 occurrences.

[4] 29 times: Singh, Vedic Etymology, p. 204.

[5] Grassmann lists 16 categories of the use of the term; Singh gives twelve.

[6] Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862, p. 79.

between the use of the term as a "personified" deity, and

other uses.  This distinction is seen to correspond with the

classification of the first and last mandalas as the "later"

texts in which such "personification" occurs.

The presumption that the "personification" of Vāc is

a "later development of Vedic religion" has been called into

question,[7]  as has the thesis that the first and tenth mandalas

represent "later" texts.[8]  My task here will be to argue that

it is artificial to distinguish between the "personified" and

"non-personified" uses of the term, for Vāc is essentially non-

personal, and the language of personhood is not applicable to

the question.

It is said that Vāc exists as far as prayer extends

(10.114.8); she pervades the entire universe.  In 10.5.6, she

is the axis between the transcendent and mundane realms, and in

1.173.9, it states that the voice of the priest, as Vāc, goes

between both worlds.  She manifests one-quarter of herself in

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[7] Bernard Essers, Vāc, Groningen, thesis, 1952.  This is
the only major work written on Vāc.  Essers is concerned with
the structure and development of god-consciousness as reflected
in Vāc and its relationship to ritual.  He reverses the thesis
that 'personification' is a later development.  He sees the
Sarasvatī-Vāc association of the Brāhmaṇas as depicting a transition
in the inspirational model from abstraction to nature expression,
and uses Chān. Up. 4.5 ff. as support for his argument (pp. 140 ff.).
The author disagrees with and argues against Esser's thesis on the
development of Vāc in the next chapter; he argues that Vāc is
essentially ". . . te persoonlijk . . ." while I argue that the
unique feature of Vāc lies in the fact that it is in itself totally
non-personal.

[8] C. Kunhan Raja, Asya Vāmasya Hymn, Madras:  Ganesh and
Co. (Madras) Private Ltd., 1956, pp. xxvii ff.

the mundane world as the prayer, sacred song, or brahman. This reveals a basic fact which is consistent with the occurrence of the term throughout the Ṛg Veda. The term is always used to refer to any sound which is called "speech" when it is perceived to be a spontaneous response to an intimate relation with a "power".[9]

As 'voice', ". . . singers in their song uplift their voices . . . with steady purpose . . ." (6.67.10; see also 2.21.6; 7.22.3). As the faculty of speech we are told that Soma, in his search for the gods, raised his voice, and ". . . flowed upon his way . . ." (9.78.1), and that, ". . . this Soma flows along, raising a vigorous voice that wakens with the dawn" (9.84.14; see also 9.86.33) Vāc is speech or decree in 10.166.3; 1.79.10; 5.76.1. She is prayer, song, chant, hymn in 1.40.6; 1.53.1; 1.92.9; 1.112.24; 1.130.9. She is the meter of the hymn, or a line of the verse in ŚB 8.5.4.1; 10.5.2.15. She does not express herself solely through humans, for it is said that the frogs in inspiration lifted up their voice (8.103.1), and in 8.89.11, it is said that, ". . . animals of

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[9] The term "power" is discussed on p. 51 ff.

every figure speak to her . . .." The priest speaks to the
Soma-stones, and they carry the speech to Indra (10.94.1).
She is a supra-natural controlling "power", transcendent and
imminent in 1.164.45; 10.71.1; 10.114; 10.125, and in AV 9.12.5
and 10.2.7. She is the "continuous voices in the wood (9.7.3),
who was born from the Akṣara" (3.55.1).

The term which is used to denote mundane sound, outside
of the context of the "power" relation is "svana".[10] In the
Ṛg Veda it is used to denote the sound of the wind (9.70.6), or
the sound of fire (1.104.11; 10.3.5), or the sound of rain
(9.41.3), or of water in general (10.75.3). The term is also
used in this way in the Gītā in 1.39; 12.39; 19.13.

Because the distinction between Vāc as supra-natural
expression of "power" and svana as mere mundane "sound" is
clear throughout the Ṛg Veda it is improbable that as Max Müller
declared, "The Brahmans in the hymns of the Veda, raised language
to the rank of a deity, as they did with all things of which they
knew not what they were."[11]

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[10]
    Singh, Vedic Etymology, p. 204.
[11]
    Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, p. 79.

## The Inter-relatedness of Phenomena

In the Vedas there is a multiplicity of associations of relationship between the vast range of powers and the mediums through which these powers are manifest. The complexity of these phenomena has led to theories on the nature of Vedic religion[12] which recent scholarship has shown to

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[12] H. Oldenberg in his Ancient India-Its Language and Religions, Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1962 (reprint, no original date given), pp. 45-83, gives a brief account of the difficulties encountered in the attempt to understand the nature of Vedic religion, and some of the early theories regarding the nature of it. Max Müller, in his Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religions, as Illustrated by the Religions of India, London: 1878 and later editions, speaks of the evolution of religion through the physical, anthropological and psychological stages. He considers the religion of the Vedas an example of the first, "the babbling of child-humanity" (quoted in Ranade, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. Poona: 1927, p. 3). It was Müller who first coined the term 'henotheism' which describes an essential fact of Indian religious life which is the tendency to associate or identify a variety of powers or attributes of distinct entities or powers to a single power, god, person, or entity at a particular time. This tendency, the operation of it, and the understanding of reality on which it is founded is the topic of this part of our discussion: the 'nature of Vedic religion', the 'relationship of the Vedic Pantheon', the question of 'polytheism' versus 'monotheism' and the development from one to the other are, by their very magnitude, beyond the scope of this discussion although it is hoped that examination of the phenomenon with which we are concerned here, because of its centrality to the Indian religious consciousness, will shed some small amount of light upon these questions.

be simplistic.[13]

Renou holds that this tendency to seek principles of association is inherent in the Indian mentality.[14]   He says, "The Indian mind is constantly seeking hidden correspondences between things which belong to entirely distinct conceptual systems."[15]   The presupposition that the various conceptual systems are "entirely distinct" no longer seems as valid as it once did in light of recent scholarship.[16]   It is clear

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[13]
Especially Gonda's Some Observations on the Relations Between "Gods" and "Powers" in the Veda, a propos of the Phrase 'SŪNUḤ SAHASAH'.  The Hague:  Mouton and Co., 1957.  He demonstrates that on the basis of the nature and complexity of "power relationships", the historical and theological classifications of earlier studies are abusive to what is essentially a profound and sophisticated view of Reality.

[14]
L. Renou, Religions of Ancient India, New York: Schocken Books, 1968, p. 18.

[15]
Ibid., p. 18.

[16]
Gonda, Observations, illustrates that, with regard to power relationships, the fact that they were perceptually founded rather than conceptually fabricated renders the idea of "conceptual distinctions" inapplicable here:  "conceptual distinctions" have been the obsession of Western scholars while in India no rigorous separation of concept and precept has been recognized within the religious life.  Gonda shows that categorization on the basis of precepts is impossible due to the integral understanding of reality in India.  Renou seems to tend in this direction of interpretation when he speaks of a sort of "collective yoga" (Religions, p. 18), developing apparently as early as the

(continued)

that such associations in the Vedic literature are associations

perceptually based. Only in a secondary sense do they represent

a "conceptualization". Further, India has not recognized a

fundamental distinction in the different darśanas – they are

regarded as different approaches (views) of a single truth.

The terms most frequently used to describe this

tendency are 'bandhutā' and 'nidāna' which refer to connections

between seemingly different things, connections which are not

discernable to those who are lacking in vision (dhīḥ). These

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16 (continued)
Ṛg Veda, but he does not follow his point up. Gonda elaborates
further on this idea in his study Ojas and Augos, pp. 74 ff. He
speaks of the necessity of making distinctions in the use of
terminology and the applicability of such distinctions within
different contexts. His concern is a phenomenological one. He
says,

> . . . The ancient Indians and their relatives in Iran
> assumed the existence of a large number of 'power
> substances' which though often partly identical in
> scope and function, or co-operating in producing the
> same or similar effects, possessed, as a rule, enough
> distinctive traits of characteristics to be marked
> out from each other. The use of such vague and general
> terms as power, and especially the predelection for a
> term coming of a tainted stock like mana . . . may . . .
> easily lead us to overlook distinctions which in such a
> complicated and almost systematised culture as the ancient
> Indian was, are real and essential. Ojas and Augos, p. 74.

It should be noted that in Observations which is a later work con-
cerned entirely with Indian religion his distinctions are concerned
with the scope and, primarily, function of powers, and his phenomeno-
logical use of the reference material illustrates that such
distinctions are far from absolute.

17

terms are most frequently applied to the Brāhmaṇas,  but it

has been shown that the phenomenon is not restricted to the

Brāhmaṇic literature, but persists throughout the śruti texts

in various manners which bear different but related designa-
18
tions.    The meaning of the term 'upaniṣad' indicates that

the Tradition understood the inter-relatedness of the śruti in

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17
　　　　For a brief discussion of this point see Ranade,
History, Vol. II, pp. 61-63.
18
　　　　Renou makes this point with sufficient authority that
his argument deserved to be quoted in full:

> It is known that the Rgveda presupposes a system of
> correlations and homologies between the divine and the
> ritual world (that which we believe, is designated by
> the term rta); it is no less evident, even though less
> often noted, that the basis of the thought of the
> Brāhmaṇas-Āraṇyakas-Upaniṣads consists in bringing out
> some of these similarities (those which have a justifica-
> tion for the understanding of the described rite or myth.
> This is what the Brahmanas call nidāna or bandhutā . . .
> or further, occasionally, āyatana "place (ideal)"
> pratiṣṭhā "point of support (symbolic)" . . . saṃpad
> "(numerical) congruence" . . . ādeśa "(correlative)
> indication". The very word upaniṣad strictly speaking sig-
> nifies "the relation between two semantic planes, oriented
> sometimes to ādhyātman, sometimes to adhidaivatam" . . .
> in liaison with the verbal expression upa-as which itself
> implies an equivalence, ātmanam upasita atmety evopa.
> . . . Also cf. Pratīka in the sense of "symbol" or vidyā
> in the sense of "knowledge" (consisting of understanding
> a correlation). Already the Rgveda, hymn X, 130 relative
> to the creation of the Sacrifice had put among the
> essential elements of the sacrifice, beside pramā "norm"
> and pratimā ("counter-norm, rejoinder"), the nīdana,
> that is to say the "link expressed or felt between the
> act and the object which animates it". But nothing of . . .
> the "chains of ontological agreements" any longer subsist
> in the "smārta" portion of the Veda; the Kalpa, in
> particular, is exclusively technical and strictly
> descriptive . . . while the Brāhmaṇas have nothing of the
> kind. Renou, Destiny of the Veda in India, pp. 76-7, n. 7.

[19]

such a manner.

Myths in the Brāhmaṇas which attempt to explain how the bandhus came about do so in picturesque language describing various competitions between the gods, with the bandhus as reward.[20]    The myths are inadequate as explanations in themselves

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[19]
     Renou, Religions, p. 18:
In the Upaniṣads, all these correspondences are reduced to the comprehensive equation ātman/brahman, which appeared to the new kavis as a résumé of the whole of Vedic thought.  The word upaniṣad itself, as it is first used in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, means only 'equivalence'. According to S.B. X,4,5,1, the function of the upaniṣad is to formulate:  Agni is the Wind, Agni is the Sun, Agni is the Year.  Hence the aim of the whole of Vedic thought may be expressed as the attempt to formulate upaniṣads (or, "equivalences").
This is another fact in support of the argument that the śruti literature is an integral unit and must be regarded as such in any understanding of the Tradition.
[20]
     See Ranade, History, Vol. II, pp. 61-62.  One example cited to illustrate the point:
The gods did not agree as to which one of them should drink first of King Soma:  They desired each of them: 'Let me drink first, let me drink first."  They coming to an agreement, said:  "Come:  let us run a race. Whichever of us wins he shall drink Soma first."  "All right."  They ran a race.  As they started forward, in the course of the race, Vāyu got ahead and took the lead.  . . . Now Indra perceived of Vāyu, 'He is winning.' He ran up to his side saying, "Let us share together, and so let us both win."  Vāyu answered, "No:  I alone shall win."  "A third for me:  so let us win together," said Indra.  "No," he replied: "I alone shall win."  "A fourth for me:  so let us win together," persisted Indra. "Be it so," replied Vāyu.  . . . Hence Indra has a quarter as his portion, Vāyu three-quarters. (Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, II, 25).

but they point to the fact that the bandhus were formed on the

basis of intimate 'power relationships' rather than super-

ficial descriptive or symbolic similarities.  Thus Ranade says:

> . . . through what causes or circumstances can things
> have a relation of bandhutā between them subsequently
> leading to an assertion of their downright identity?
> To the Brāhmaṇa seer this does not appear to have been
> a very great problem.  One thing is quite clear.  It
> was not a case of mere symbolism.  This latter idea
> is for the most part foreign to Hindu religious
> philosophy.  Even the images worshipped in later Hindu
> temples are not to be viewed as mere symbols or represen-
> tatives.  They are permeated by actual divine presence;
> and there is a regular ceremony (the Prāṇapratishthā)
> for invoking the spirit of God to abide within it.  The
> Brāhmaṇas at any rate show clear indications of a belief
> in the presence of some subtle, secret, and mystic bond
> connecting a thing and its bandhus, and the bandhus
> amongst themselves.  The bond is subtle, and none but
> priestly wisdom could discover it; and it is hidden,
> for, Parokshapriyā hi Devāḥ:  the Gods love what is
> hidden.[21]

Further, it can be said that the seers understood the relation-
[22]
ships in perceptual rather than conceptual terms.

[23]

The dynamics of the power relations are very complex.

The term frequently used to denote such power is 'tejas' (energy).

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[21]
    Ranade, History, Vol. II, pp. 62-63.
[22]
    Ranade, Ibid., p. 63, cites what can only be considered
feeble attempts to understand the phenomena in 'conceptual' rather
than 'perceptual' terms:  many such attempts involve speech through
the development of fanciful etymologies and the attempt to relate
the power exchange to the relationship between the meters of the
sacred hymns to the correct performance of ritual action.
[23]
    See Gonda's Observations, and Ojos and Augos.  Full
discussion of these relations is well beyond the scope of this
thesis; they will be discussed here and elsewhere only as they
pertain to Vāc and only where they pertain to the very core of
the argument.

Rather than being a subjective fantasy, it was understood as
an actual internal force which could inhere in gods, people
(particularly the ṛṣis), and things.  Something or someone
possessed of tejas is spoken of not as being possessed of
tejas, but of being tejas itself.  Here it functions as a
proper name, denotative of a model of relation which, in the
case of ṛṣi, is transcendent of these factors of individuality
and personality of the ṛṣi involved.  Gonda says that, ". . . an
enumeration of entities or phenomena which, each of them, is a
tejas is given in MBH. 13,104,62 ff.:  fire, cow, brahman, sun,
man . . ..  Great ṛṣis, earth, fire, are elsewhere (13,22,10)
likewise called tejas."[24]  The term indicates a substantial
relation which transcends descriptive differentiations.[25]

The 'power' can be assumed (ŚB. 5,2,3,8), endowed or
'sprinkled' (ŚB. 5.3,5,8).  It is not a 'spiritual' phenomena
in that the tejas may assume a material form such as where the
sun is called the tejas of the year (ŚB. 10,2,6,2):  this is

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[24]
 Cited in Observations, p. 62.

[25]
 'Tejas' cannot be understood as a proper 'essence':
ŚB. 10,6,5,2 speaks of both the tejas (energy) and the rasa
(essence) of the Primeval Man.  The transformation of tejas
into fire is a modification of form within a single set; the
essence (rasa) is not modified, but is expressed in another
form or medium.  Thus fire and the Primordial Man are one in
essence and identical while the form of that essence which is
expressive of as a tejas or 'energy' manifestation varies.

further evidence of the perceptual nature of the phenomenon of
power relation in support of the argument that the bandhutā
associations are experientially grounded. The power can be
transferred (ŚB. 6,7,1,4;9) between the "entirely distinct"
realms of the animate and inanimate. It can be detached from
the bearer or medium (ŚB.7,4,1,39), or it might be stolen (JB.
1,160; 2,242). The power may simply depart from the medium
(ŚB. 12,7,2,1) which is especially relevant in the case of the
ṛṣis who strive to maintain the gift of the 'vision' (dhī).
The power can be transformed in form as in ŚB. 10,6,5,2
where the tejas of the Primeval Purusha was transformed into
fire. Thus when it says that a thing is transformed into or
becomes something else apparently quite different the trans-
formation must be understood to occur only at the phenomenal
level with regard to the form (rūpa) of the power. This is a
crucial point if we are to understand the complexity of different
symbols which are used interchangeably to refer to Vāc.

Another crucial point with regard to the ṛṣis and the
capacity for vision is found in the context of ŚB. 12,7,2,4;
12,7,3,12: here the Aśvins are called tejas, and they are also
called the visual faculty. If one sacrifices to these gods the
capacity for vision as well as tejas will be given to the sacrificer

by the priest. The relationship between tejas and the eyes
is also mentioned in ŚB. 12,7,1,2.[26] In AV. 1,35,3 we are
told that a priest reciting an incantation has sufficient
mastery over tejas that he can inject the power into someone
else. Gonda[27] points out that the mundane and the supra-
mundane co-operate in generating mediums of power. AV. 1,35,3
provides an example where the mundane and the supra-mundane
are expressed within a single phenomenon: the individual
personality as poet (kavi) in conjunction with the trans-
personal or transcendental vision becomes a rsi, and is
able thereby to generate further mediums of power.[28] This
two-fold role, which the term rsi denotes, resides in the
trans-formative ability of the tejas (energy, power) through

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[26]
        The importance of the power relations to the capacity
for 'vision' of the rsi which determines the proximity of the
rsi to reality in itself through transcendence in Vāc will be
discussed in full below.

[27]
        See Observations, p. 60.

[28]
        The rsi as a trans-personal model of right relation
to reality through speech is the topic of the following chapter
and will be discussed in full there. Note number 33 of this
section anticipates the argument.

various rūpas. Thus, a medium or bearer which is the form

(rūpa) of a power is that power, and, in turn, has the reciprocal

capacity to generate that power. Here association is identity.

## Nāma-Rūpa

Philosophically, this phenomena was understood within

the question of the relationship between name and form (nāma and

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29
The idea of the two-fold role is one that is central
to the Indian mentality. It is the idea that one entity can
embody two mutually contradictory elements in harmony. This
can be seen not only in the rsi, but in the character of various
deities in the Hindu pantheon such as Śiva and Kālī. Often it
appears in the combination of a deity and the consort. It is
also fundamental to the Indian understanding of the nature of
history where novelty does not occur. Moore expresses it in
the following manner:

> . . . destruction is only reproduction in another
> form; and as creation is a modification of a pre-existing
> formation of matter, the creative, as well as the
> destructive power, is thus admitted to be also, although
> less evidently, in constant action. Such action is,
> however, inevitable in its results, and the principle
> or power exciting it, is less ardently, and less
> consciously, invoked and propitiated than its destructive
> precursor; although their reciprocal action and reaction
> have caused a sort of unity of character.
> (Hindu Pantheon, p. 5.)

For the Indian religious mind the distinctions such as creation/
destruction, personal/impersonal, etc. are not absolute in
themselves but serve, rather, within a complex which is dialectical
in nature to point beyond such distinctions to the integrity of
reality.

30
Gonda, Observations on Gods and Powers, pp. 97-98.

31

rupa):   they provided a metaphysical analysis for the bandhutā

and an explanation as to why "bonds" of relation could be drawn

between what appear to be "entirely distinct" entities to the

undiscerning observer.

Polynomy, in the Vedic context, is not simply the

indication of a 'highly personal' relation wherein the names

and attributes of many gods have been combined in one.   Rather,

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31
        Ranade, History, Vol. II, pp. 63-4, relates the
questions of bandhu and nāma-rūpa, as does Gonda in Observations,
pp. 45-58.   The more obviously 'philosophic' aspects of this
question with regard to metaphysics and personhood will be
dealt with again.   The references to nāma and rūpa used here
which are non-Upaniṣadic are considered by the author to be
'philosophic' in nature by virtue of their centrality to the
metaphysics of Vāc.
        The one major work written on the subject of nāma-rūpa
is interesting and provocative; Marlya Falk, Nāma-Rūpa and
Dharma-Rūpa:   Origin and Aspects of an Ancient Indian Conception.
Calcutta:   University of Calcutta Press, 1943.   The work is
inadequate in that the author draws relationships between
symbols without providing adequate justification for doing so.
This is most evident in the section on the Ṛg Veda where she
claims the concepts originate:   her argument presumes a meta-
physic which is dualistic in form, but she does not demonstrate
how this is anything more than a presumption within the context
of the Ṛg Veda itself.
        The most comprehensive work on the phenomenon of names
and naming is Gonda's Notes on Names and the Name of God in
Ancient India, Amsterdam:   North-Holland Publishing Company, 1970.
Of particular interest are pp. 7-37, and pp. 79-90.

it is that, according to Gonda,

> The idea underlying these names, is irrespective of
> the vagueness of the conception of the divine powers,
> no doubt the conviction that every superhuman potency
> or phenomenon has two aspects, which can for the sake
> of simplicity be called 'personal' and 'impersonal',
> or -- to express it otherwise -- the belief that there
> must be sentient and rational beings 'possessing',
> supervising and representing the mighty and often
> dangerous powers which make their presence felt in the
> universe . . . The endless repetition of these qualifi-
> cations of the gods is not only a poetical device; it
> serves to strengthen and stimulate the god's powers
> and faculties and his readiness to give evidence of
> them.[32]

The name is thought to bear the particular power essence of

the person or thing it denotes; the name is that which is

infinite (Bṛh. Up. 3.2.12) only the form is phenomenal and

finite. To gain control over a group of people one must know

all their names (AV.712.2); likewise for control over bodily

sores one must know their proper names (AV.6.83.2).

The reality of name is identical to the highest reality

which is ground of all speech, and, therefore, all particularity

as individuality in name and form. Nāma is the power behind

all rūpa; thus we are told that Tvashtar formed the Parents

through the process of naming. It is in conjunction with forms

(the meter of Mantra) that the pari-nāma the Akṣara manifests

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[32]
    Gonda, Observations, p. 50.

itself. Similarly, as in RV 8,41,3 and 5, it is through the
power of name as the matrix of form that the transcendental
Vāc manifests itself as the revealed Word.

By the metaphysic implied all language is etiological
in that the essence of reality in name is transcendent of
that which a particular name denotes, be it a 'power', a
person, an object or any other phenomenal reality of particular
designation. Thus the constant interchange between the mundane
and the transcendent which is expressed in the many symbols
denoting the different names, roles and functions of Vāc,
as well as the ambiguous figure of the individual personality
of the kavi (poet)[33] who transcends his individuality in the
vision (dhī) exemplify both sides of what Gonda[34] has called
the 'personal' and 'impersonal' aspects of the power relation.

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[33]
    C. Kunhan Raja, in his Poet-Philosophers of the Rgveda:
Vedic and Pre-Vedic, Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1963, says of
such ambiguity:

> The ordinary elements in a poet, like the ordinary man,
> remain within him along with the immortal element which
> is special in the poet [rsi]. The body and other
> features in a poet are in common with the ordinary
> mortals. When he becomes immortal (when the 'poet'
> transcends his individuality and personality through
> the vision) it is only in a certain factor in him that
> there is his speciality, not found in common man. (p. 30).

The question of the two-fold nature is the central
concern of the next chapter.

[34]
    Observations, p. 50.

Several significant conclusions can be based on the
preceding discussion: (1) the Vedic understanding of power
relationships was sufficiently complex and subtle that there
is no basis for characterizing the texts, as Max Müller did,
as the "babbling of child-humanity";[35] (it calls into question
the many theories regarding the "primitivism" of the Vedic
world-view). (2) that this understanding is grounded in the
reality experience rather than being conceptual fabrications,
and (3) that this understanding of the nature of power relation-
ships allows for the association and finally, identification of
different 'power mediums'. When imagery is understood within
the synthesis of a metaphysic it becomes methodologically sound
to collate the random specific references to Vāc together with
those power mediums with which Vāc is associated or identified,
for by the metaphysics of Vāc all associations with Vāc are
ultimately identifications with Vāc.

Studies[36] on RV 1.164.39,41,42,45 indicate that there
is good reason to understand the question of Vāc in metaphysical

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35

Cited in Ranade, History, Vol. II, p. 3. See note #12,
this chapter.

36

Two studies are of primary importance here: J. A. B.
vanBuitenen, "Akṣara", JAOS, Vol. 79 (1956) pp. 176-187 con-
siders the passages in question and relates his findings to
later texts; Norman W. Brown, "Agni, Sun, Sacrifice and Vāc:
A Sacerdotal Ode by Dīrghatamas", JAOS, Vol. 88 (1968) pp. 199-218
considers the passages within the limits of 1.164. V. S.
Agrawala, Vision in Long Darkness, Varanasi, 1963, is of little
use in that he employs the parokśa, or esoteric way, to gather
together a vast range of information without providing any clear
indication of how this material can be related.

terms. These passages provide the basis from which the later
and more systematic philosophies of language developed.[37]

The passages in question have been translated by
Norman W. Brown[38] as follows:

39. The aksara of the rc, on which the gods
in highest heaven have all taken their seat –
what will he who does not know it accomplish
by means of the rc. Just those who know it
sit together.[39]

41. The buffalo cow (Vāc) lowed, fahsioning
the tumultuous chaotic floods, having become
one-footed, two-footed, four-footed, eight-
footed, nine-footed, she who in highest
heaven has a thousand syllables.[40]

42. From her (Vāc) flow forth the (heavenly)
oceans, in consequence of which the four
directions exist. From her flows the aksara;
on it this entire (organized) universe
has its existence.[41]

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[37]
Renou, Destiny of the Veda in India, p. 34: "It
would be convenient to say a word here on the philosophers of
language, whose speculations, it is known, have their roots
in the most ancient Veda. The famous verse in catvāri vāk
parimitā padāni, RV, II (sic), 164, 45, corroborated on the
vivid register by the catvāri śṛnga of RV, IV, 58,3, is, so
to speak, the character of this philosophy."

[38]
"Agni, Sun, Sacrifice and Vāc", pp. 216-17.

[39]
ṛico akshare parame vyoman yasmin deva adhi visve
nisheduḥ / yas na veda kim ṛica karishyati ya it
tad vidus ta ime sam āsate. (39)

[40]
gaurīr mimāya salilāni takshaty ekapadī dvipadī sā
catushpadī / ashṭāpadī navapadī babhūvushī
sahasrāksharā parame vyoman (41)

[41]
tasyāḥ samudrā adhi vi ksharanti tena jīvanti
pradiṣaṣ catasraḥ / tataḥ ksharaty aksharaṃ
tad viṣvam upa jīvati (42)

45. Vāc was divided into four parts. These
those Brāhmaṇas with insight (and hence
immortality) know. Three parts, which are
hidden, mortals do not activate; the fourth
part they speak.[42]

He understands the importance of vv. 39-42 to be in the fact

they offer an account of the origin of unorganized matter

from Vāc. He says, "Thus Dīrghatamas indicates the place of

the aksara in the cosmic evolution: it provided the mantras

which the first sacrificers used to organize the unorganized

material of the universe and to produce the Sun."[43] On vv.

41-42 van Buitenen states that, "Already in the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā

aksara claims the position of a supreme principle, without

however for a moment ceasing to mean "syllable".[44] He also

relates the aksara to the ritual context in a manner which

supports the position stated earlier regarding the question of

Tradition and continuity; that is, that the question of Vāc

provides a model which serves as a central principle of

continuity within the Tradition. He says,

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[42]
catvāri vāk parimitā padāni tāni vidur brāhmaṇā
ye manīshiṇaḥ / guhā trīṇi nihitā neṅgayanti
turīyaṃ vāco manushyā vadanti (45)
[43]
"Agni, Sun, Sacrifice and Vāc", pp. 209-10.
[44]
"Akṣara", p. 177.

> . . . for speech, that is the ritually powerful
> utterance, to be effective at all, it must be
> spoken in conjunction with the ritually powerful
> fire of the sacrifice. But this fire, too, is
> effective only in conjunction with the appropriate
> formulae. Together they originate, inseparable,
> in the womb of the true order [cf. RV 6.16.35-36].
> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> The birth of Word and Fire is a cosmic event which
> is reproduced in the sacrificial area but happened
> primordially, at the beginning of creation. But
> once reproduced in the sacrificial area, this area
> itself becomes the matrix of the cosmic order: it
> is the source from which the brahman is born to
> beget offspring again, the source of the ever-
> lasting continuity of the true order which, after
> its first initiation in heaven, is perpetuated
> ever since. Every single term at some time will
> become the epitome of this total conception:
> etaj jyotir etad aksaram etat satyam etad brahma −
> it is almost a refrain in the upaniṣads.[45]

He makes it clear that the question of continuity is at stake

when he states that,

> Unless we understand the significance of the
> ritually effective Word for a class of priests for
> whom the cosmic order was predicated upon the
> ritual order, and the significance of the actual
> manifestation of that Word in the embryonic
> Syllable which grows into the fully potent brahman,
> we shall misunderstand the more advanced speculations
> which are inspired by this central ritual event.[46]

There seems to be an ambiguity inherent in the language used

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[45]
   Ibid., p. 178.
[46]
   Ibid., p. 179.

here:  terms like "origination", and "beginning" are not compatible with "actual manifestation".  Akṣara as the basis of "actual manifestation" as brahman or name indicates an understanding of reality which is essentially metaphysical and out of keeping with the language of "creativity".

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VĀC AND RṢIS

The purpose of this chapter will be to inquire into
and elaborate upon, through interpretation, the structures
of the model of consciousness which the rṣi-figure examplifies.
In this context the inquiry into the structures of this model
will be at the same time an inquiry into the structure of
reality itself, for, as the Sacred Word stands to the rṣi
they, in terms of that which is Real, are one and the same in
that it is through the consciousness of the rṣi as "vision"
(dhīh) that reality expresses itself as that which is heard,
śruti.

The phenomenon of the Veda presents itself first and
foremost as the phenomenon of language and revelation; that
is, that which is known, Veda, is that which is heard, śruti,
by way of the vision, dhīh, of that which is heard. To see
in a particular way is to hear that which is most sacred and
most real, and that is to know. That which is to be heard
reveals itself, it appears as that which is.

It is significant that the most sacred literature in
India, the very fountainhead of the Hindu tradition is called

śruti. Śruti denotes "that which is heard", and we are told
that the medium of "that which is heard" is the transcendental
vision, dhīḥ, of the r̥ṣi, the hero-poet. Such seeing as the
medium for a higher listening bespeaks the nature of the
hymns of these texts as the sacred revelation of a reality
which presents itself to a select few. My concern will be
to demonstrate how the relationship of the r̥ṣi to the language
of revelation, the śruti hymns, functions as a structural
model of the experience of transcendence.

The relationship of the terms "veda", "śruti", and
"dhīḥ" ("veda" or that which is known; "śruti" that which is
heard as that which is known; "dhīḥ" the vision by which that
which is heard as the known is presented) indicates the
centrality of the r̥ṣi as the model of right resolution to
Reality by virtue of the fact that the term "r̥ṣi" implies a
unique relation to language. To be discerning, to "see" (dhī),
is to be in right relation to Vāc. Language is that which is
the Real. To be Real is one with Vāc. Vāc is that which is
Real: to be Real means to be one with Vāc.

Because Veda and the r̥ṣis are inter-related in their
common matrix which is Vāc how one understands Veda will at

the same time be a reflection of how one interprets the
phenomenon of the ṛṣi. The ṛṣis were the seers of mantra,
and, at the same time, the speakers of that which was seen.
The product of such speaking is Veda. Herein lies the
question raised earlier of how one is to understand the
significance of Veda regarding the question of Tradition.
The Tradition has insisted that the language of Veda is
of the nature of revelation (śruti) while Western scholars
of the Veda have, as Renou has done, characterized it as
an "invention" which is "mythological" in nature. He says,
in speaking of the uniqueness of the Ṛg Veda: ". . . in
richness of mythological invention and assured handling of
mythical themes, the Ṛgveda was destined to have no successor;
Vedism is a mythology that is broken off abruptly."[1]

There is a fundamental conflict here in that the
terms "revelation" and "invention" contradict one another:
certainly no Western scholar who studies India, and who
understands himself to be within the fold of the truth claims
and authority structures of a non-Indian tradition which is
based on revelation, would accept an understanding of that

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[1]
Renou, Religions of Ancient India, p. 23.

revelation as fabrication or invention.  The West understands

the reality of revelation to be essentially historical.  When

the question of the relationship between mythology and

revelation has arisen in the West it has also been understood

in historical terms.  In this light, Eliade, an earnest

student of the phenomena of myths and myth-making speaks of

the historical reality of Jesus as the Christ at the point

where "Time itself is ontologised".[2]  If history is the arena

of that which is Real, then it follows that that which is non-

historical is non-real, untrue.

Van Buitenen discussed the term "revelation" and

its implications in the Indian context.  He says,

> The word 'Revelation' itself is deceptive.  The
> Veda is by no means considered God's word.  At
> no specific point of time did God interrupt the
> course of history by the revealing of a new truth.
> Revelation is neither theistic nor historic.  Nor is
> it a 'Holy Writ'.
> In its entirety the Veda stands revealed at
> the beginning of creation, it is given with the
> world.  At its dawn the ancient seers (ṛṣis) saw
> the Veda, which they thence transmitted to their
> pupils . . . .  It is not historic, in the sense
> that it is datable; for when creation gives way to
> dissolution and recreation, the Veda re-emerges with
> the world itself.  Being eternal, it is simultaneous;
> any part may be used to elucidate any other part

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[2] Eliade, Images and Symbols, p. 169.

within each of the two Portions.  Knowledge of it is
not a matter of course, but the fruit of laborious
and assiduous study . . . .  And the student, thus
engaged in the sacred study, is conscious of continuing
a life line which for us stretches back over a hundred
and fifty generations; but to him to eternity.[3]

It is useful at this point to anticipate part of the
discussion of the next chapter to further clarify the question
of the nature of "revelation".  The darśanas of Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā
hold opposing views of the question:  the former hold that śruti
is created by God, while the latter maintain that śruti is the
matrix of reality itself.  Śruti is eternal, pre-existing both
men and gods, unalterable, and infallible.  The view put forward
by Śaṅkara incorporates the view of Mīmāṁsā within the under-
standing of Brahman as the Sole Reality.  Thus, Śaṅkara maintains
that, "The authoritativeness of the Vedas has been proved 'from
its independence', based on the original (eternal) connection of
the word with its sense ('the thing signified')."[4]  He does not
hold with the sphoṭavādins that the word is the material cause

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[3]
     J. H. B. van Buitenen, Chapters in Indian Civilization,
Vol. I, pp. 3, 4.

[4]
     Vedānta Sūtras, George Thibaut, trans. Vol. I, p. 201.

of the world: Brahman is the material cause of the world. The phrase, "origination of the world from the 'word'" refers to the fact that, ". . . while there exists the everlasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connection with their eternal sense . . . the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origination from those words."[5] He does not equate śruti with the Real as does Mīmāṁsā. Even the distinction that Brahman is the material cause of the world is purely heuristic.

The weight of Śaṅkara's argument falls on his understanding of the relationship of Brahman to the phenomenon of nāma-rūpa: Brahman stands before the creation of the world. Creation as "Being" takes place through the development of nāma-rūpa, which prior to creation are called "Non-being"[6] in reference to the potentiality of Brahman. "Creation" of śruti, then, refers to the making manifest as a particular existent or "Being" that which hitherto had existed in the latent causal condition of "non-being". The world of particulars is dissolved into the condition

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[5] Ibid., p. 203. See Chapter V, n. 55 on sphoṭavāda.

[6] Ibid., p. 267.

on "non-being" at the end of each kalpa, and is made manifest by

Prajāpati (Brahman within the limiting adjuncts of nāma-rūpa).

Thus, Śaṅkara states that: "We therefore conclude that before

the creation the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of

Prajapati the creator, and that after that he created the things

corresponding to those words."[7]    Śaṅkara adds:

> As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all
> kalpas and as the Lords are able to continue their
> previous forms of existence, there manifest themselves,
> in each new creation, individuals bearing the same
> names and forms and the individuals of the preceding
> creations, and owing to this equality of names and
> forms, the admitted periodical renovations of the
> world in the form of general pralayas and general
> creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness
> of the Veda.[8]

For Śaṅkara the Veda both "Is" and "Is not" eternal,

as well as being both "Is" and "Is not" created.[9]    Within the

understanding of Brahman as the non-dual Real Veda is the latent

potential of the Real.  The manifestation of Veda is not

exhaustive of that potential, and it is therefore not definitive

of it.  The manifestation "Is not" in the sense that Brahman "Is"

because, as a manifestation, it is subject to the condition of

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[7]
Ibid., p. 204.

[8]
Ibid., p. 215.

[9]
On this point see Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy,
Vol. I, pp. 442-43, and Chapter V of this work.

pralaya and cannot exist for all time as Brahman does.  The

manifestation "Is" in that the Brahman is the basis (adhiṣṭhāna)

of all manifestation.

"History", or the realm of manifestation which is

māyā is understood in the same 'neither/nor' sense.  It is not

a reality in itself in that Brahman is the only Real, while,

on the other hand, it is not an unreality in that even as an

illusion it is based on that which is Real.  History as it is

understood in the West is, from the Indian standpoint, based

upon an untenable distinction.  To say that 'history' "Is"

in Śaṅkara's sense is to commit oneself to the most positive and

illuminative aspects of ajñāna.  To say that history is as a

reality in itself as in the West is to fall victim to the most

negative and shrouding aspects of avidyā.

The Indian position is founded upon the understanding

that all ontological distinctions are the result of a cognitive

malfunction which is essentially a misorientation in terms of

the Real.  The Gītā provides a good illustration of this point,

and relates it to the 'historical' question and the question of

'revelation':  Kṛṣṇa appears to Arjuna.  But this appearance

cannot be said to be a coming into existence for Kṛṣṇa is

described as the

> ". . . infinite Lord of Gods, in whom the world
> dwells, thou the imperishable, existent, non-existent,
> and beyond both."[10]

In that Kṛṣṇa is beyond both existence and non-existence his
appearance before Arjuna must be understood as an appearance
which both "Is" and "Is not" existence in the sense discussed
above. It might be called an 'inhistorization' but that would
also be incorrect for Kṛṣṇa says of himself,

> of creations the beginning and the end,
> And the middle too am I, Arjuna.[11]

Kṛṣṇa is the initiator, sustainer, and terminater of the
historical order. There is no objective order of history apart
from himself within which he might appear. In that he is beyond
the existent and the non-existent which is the realm of the
created-historical the 'inhistorization' "Is not" in that it
cannot exist beyond for all time as Kṛṣṇa in his fullness does;
again, the 'inhistorization' "Is" in that Kṛṣṇa is the adhiṣṭhāna
of all manifestation.

It is interesting that after having declared a multitude
of examples of rūpas which are infinite, Kṛṣṇa says,

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10

The Bhagavad Gītā, Franklin Edgerton, trans. New York:
Harper and Row, 1964. This translation is used throughout.
ananta deveśa jagannivāsa
tvam akṣaraṁ sad asat tatpataṁ yat (XI.37,c-d)
11
sargāṇām ādir antaś ca
madhyaṁ cai 'vā 'ham arjuna (X.32,a-b)

> I support this entire
> World with a single fraction (of Myself) and remain so.[12]

The 'neither/nor/both' relation applies here too. It is as with

the point made regarding the Veda; that is, the infinite variety

of rūpas manifestations of the Divine potential are neither

exhaustive nor definitive of that potential.

Arjuna is incapable of perceiving the marvelous rūpas

of Kṛṣṇa with his mundane eyes. Kṛṣṇa says,

> But thou canst not see Me
> With this same eye of thine own;
> I give thee a supernatural eye;
> Behold my mystic power as God![13]

This would indicate that the 'revelation' of Chapter XI com-

pletely transcends immediate historical and personal categories.

The mundane vision which is inadequate is a constituent of the

antaḥkaraṇa which is the basis of the construct of delusion

(XVIII.60,c: "mohat") known as the person 'Arjuna': transcendence

of the immediate limitations of the faculty which is definitive

of a particular condition of personhood is not the transcendence

of the phenomenon personhood itself. It is a supra-personal,

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12
  viṣṭabhyā 'ham idaṁ kṛtsnam
  ekāṁśena sthito jagat (X.42,c-d)
13
  na tu māṁ śakyase draṣṭum
  anenai 'va svacakṣuṣā
  divyaṁ dadāmi te cakṣuḥ
  paśya me yogam aiśvaram (XI.8)

not non-personal condition.  Because this act of transcendence

is supra-personal can be understood in the "Is", "Is not"

sense.  Consider the statement by Kṛṣṇa:

> If clinging to egotism
> Thou thinkist 'I will not fight!'
> Vain is thy resolve;
> (Thine own) material nature will coerce thee.[14]

Kṛṣṇa attempts to make the point throughout the Gītā that

Arjuna should understand the lived-world reality in supra-

personal terms.  Over-riding the frustrations of his personal

concerns is the unalterable reality of the impersonal guṇa

complex which he embodies.  The complex "Is" his in the sense

that the order of the complex is expressive of a particular

existential dharma/karma causal fact.  The complex "Is not"

his in that the self-generative dynamic of the complex is

transcendent of the particular existential expression of that

causal fact as the person Arjuna.  The reality of the guṇa

complex "Is" to the extent that the reality of Arjuna as an

effective causal agent "Is not".

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[14]
yad ahaṁkāram āśritya
na yotsya iti manyase
mithyai 'ṣa vyavasāyas te
prakṛtis tvāṁ niyokṣyati (XVIII,59)

Arjuna's predicament arises from his fundamental delusions regarding the nature and function of the laws of dharma and the reality of karma. This delusion is expressed by his insistence on viewing these principles in an ethical sense, and in seeing the reality of these principles as arbitrary and secondary to his personal concerns. He sees karma in terms of ethical options rather than as a biological law. In the context of pointing out a basic difference between the India and the West, Betty Heimann states that,

> . . . the Western interpretation of karma in a merely ethical sense is not only incorrect in its specified context, but also overlooks the wider possibilities. Even when it is taken in an ethical sense, Indian and Western types of responsibility are incongruous because of the different evaluations of the Person. Western ethics sees individual responsibility towards fellow-men and God only: Indian ethics feels a quasi-neutral responsibility towards all cosmic growth. Nothing gets lost, and everything – thought and deed alike – equally materializes and attracts its due results. In India it is assumed that Nature works via 'Person'. Persons and objects alike are carriers of cosmic dynamics.[15]

This is an interesting distinction for it points out clearly that India and the West have exactly reverse attitudes to the questions of Nature, the Real and what it means to be a person. It is significant because it reaffirms the fact that Western

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[15] Facets of Indian Thought, p. 176.

categories of understanding are for the most part more a detriment than a help in attempting to understand India. Here, however, the distinction between the West and India is extremely helpful in the attempt to understand Arjuna's predicament. Arjuna's predicament lies in the fact that he understands in a way which is fundamentally wrong: he understands it in what Betty Heimann has characterised as Western terms, i.e. as being "man centered".

That the predicament is, so to speak, larger than Arjuna himself is indicated by the fact that it is centered on dharma and the guṇas which are the foundation of all mundane reality. The framing of the question of resolution in terms of dharma at once depersonalizes the question and renders the predicament out of which the question arises universal. This transforms the question of resolution to the Real from what could otherwise be a mere arbitrary subjectivism into a universal imperative. It affirms the centrality of the "historical" or existential factor as a fundamental personal condition, but within a context which is, finally, trans-historical and non-personal. It indicates also that right relation involves the transcendence of a cognitive condition which both "Is" and "Is not" a

transcendence of empirical reality. It "Is not" in that to
fulfill one's dharma is to function in total accord with the
'law' of Nature itself. It "Is" in that mokṣa is transcendent
of dharma and therefore, empirical reality itself.

The quest for mokṣa which is the highest objective
of Indian spirituality does not represent a denial of or flight
from the Real. To the contrary, mokṣa must be understood as
the affirmation of that which is Real in itself through the
transcendence of that mode of the Real which neither "Is" Real
in itself, nor "Is not" Real in itself. Mokṣa is not "world
and life negation".[16] It is the transcendence in right cognition
of the negative factor of the "Is"/"Is not" status which both
world and life have. It is the realization of that which lies
beyond the contradiction of the affirmation/negation contradiction.
The aspiration to mokṣa is the aspiration to be Real in a manner
which is non-contradictory. Mokṣa presupposes dharma which is
the regulative basis of world and life, but is not identical to
dharma in that the fulfillment of dharma is not an expression
of transcendence. The fulfillment of dharma is supra-individual

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[16]
The view that Indian spirituality represents "world
and life negation" was put forward by Albert Schweitzer in his
Indian Thought and Its Development, Mrs. Charles E. B. Russell,
trans., Boston: Beacon Press, 1957 (first published in English
in 1937).

and supra-personal in that it represents the truest possible
relation to that which is Real within the limitations of that
context.  On the other hand, mokṣa is liberation from the
limitations of that context to the relationless condition
which is non-individual, and non-personal.

## Ritual, Time and History

Vāc, its manifestation in dhī and expression as
mantra within the timeless (a-historical) center of the ritual
context provides a framework for the understanding of transcendence
from within the historical complex.  In this context one cannot
ignore the significance of vratra-dharma if one is going to
understand the ṛṣi as a viable model of resolution.  It is the
immediate historical or existential foundation in vratra which
makes the ṛṣi figure significant as a paradigm of the practica-
bility of transcendence.  The condition of individual sorge
within the context of a real historical or existential predicament
and the resolution of that predicament through the transcendence
through dhī of personhood and therefore historicity are both
embodied in the ṛṣi.

Eliade has called the combination of transcendence and

historicity the "transhuman quality of liturgical time" -- a
[17]
distinct characteristic of religious man in general.

Eliade observes that,

> . . . the religious man lives in two kinds of time,
> of which the more important, sacred time, appears under
> the paradoxical aspect of circular time, reversible and
> recoverable, a sort of eternal mythical present that
> is periodically reintegrated by means of rites.  This
> attitude in regard to time suffices to distinguish
> religious from nonreligious man; the former refused
> to live solely in what, in modern terms, is called the
> historical present; he attempts to regain a sacred time
> that, from one point of view, can be homologised to
> eternity.[18]

Within the Tradition as defined here one cannot speak

of two "times" for the integral nature of the metaphysical

foundation of the Tradition forbids such distinctions.  All who

are _within_ a given Tradition are religious by definition.  In

India, the centrality of the obligations of _vratra-dharma_

render it impossible for one to refuse to live in the "historical

present".  _Vratra-dharma_ concerns the immediate historical

moment as the expression of the reality of the fulfillment of the

past, a reality which is the determining factor of the future.

The present, therefore, cannot be isolated from the past or the

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17
   Eliade, _Sacred and Profane_, p. 71.
18
   _Ibid._, p. 70.

future.  The totality of this conditioning is representative of

what it means to exist within a Tradition.  These terms indicate

the homologization of times and that they are grounded in a

metaphysic whereby no categorical distinction can be made

between the "temporal" and the "eternal", or, within the fullness

of the metaphysics of Tradition, the past, present, and future.

Thus, the integrating factor of Tradition itself as a metaphysical

reality cannot be understood as being periodically operative.

This is why the dual role of poet-visionary provides a model

of resolution which is "practical" or existentially meaningful

for all times precisely because rsi is a product of the

historical present in this sense.

The rsi is paradigmatic, then, in two ways:  (1) in

regard to the fulfillment of the reality of vratra in the

immediacy of the historical moment which is inclusive of all

moments.  This is a supra-personal model.  Thus, the rsi is

regarded as the paradigm of the fulfillment of dharma by the

later Tradition.  Here the rsi is paradigmatic of "religious

man in general", and (2) regarding the transcendence of vratra

and all historical categories.  This is a non-personal model.

Here the rsi is regarded by the later Tradition as paradigmatic

of the realization of moksa. Through supra-personal involvement

in the rites which are the foundation of the temporal order the

rsi attains transcendence which is non-personal identification

with the Real which is Vāc.

The issue of the nature and status of time is considered

in RV I.164.12:

> They (some) [those whose vision does not penetrate the
> mystery] say the father, five-footed, with twelve aspects,
> affluent, is in the upper half of the sky; others here
> say the wide-seeing one (the Sun) [Agni in its atmospheric
> manifestation] is set in motion in the seven-wheeled,
> six-spoked (car) in the lower (half).[19]

W. Norman Brown's commentary on the passage is useful to help

illustrate the centrality of Vāc to the ritual in the perpetual

struggle for light and life:

> Two different views of Time of the Year, which is
> equivalent to, or controlled by, the Sun. One view
> is that he is in the upper half of heaven and is therefore
> supreme. The other view, which is that of the poet, is
> that the Sun is only the lower half; the upper half is
> the abode of Vāc . . . (as in stanza 10: . . . On top
> of yonder sky, they say, is Vāc, who knows all but does
> not enter [enlighten?] all).[20]

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[19]
    W. Norman Brown, Trans., "Agni, Sun, Sacrifice and Vāc:
A Sacradotal Ode by Dīrghatamas", JAOS, 88, 1968, p. 212.

    pañcapādam pitaram dvādaṣākritim diva āhuḥ pare
    ardhe purīshinam / atheme anya upare vicakshanam
    saptacakre sahlara āhur arpitam (12)
[20]
    Ibid., pp. 212-13.

The highest of the four parts of Vāc (v. 45) is that of which one attains a portion, when approached by the firstborn of Ṛta, Agni (v. 37). Thus, the Brahman priest, the wielder of the mysterious riddle is the highest heaven of Vāc (v. 35): Geldner 3.55.1: "Once as the early morning red broke, there unfolded itself, the first Akṣara in the wake of the Cow." Geldner comments that "Once" signifies the time of the first ṛsis: "Path of the cows" is equivalent to 1.158.2 where it means either (1) place of sacrifice, or (2) the freeing of the Paṅis' cows as in 10.71 where light (Vāc) is freed from the bonds of darkness (ignorance). That which reveals itself as that which is heard abides within (the Heart: cf. 10.123.3). The priest through the sacred fire and speech, as functionary and visionary, maintains the temporal order and reaffirms the eternal. The vision of the ṛsi is the penetration of the mysteries of the darkness to the light of the One (1.164.6) which is the foundation and integrating principle of the created order. In BAU 1.3.28, the sacrificer prays:

> From the Unreal lead me to the Real!
> From Darkness lead me to Light!
> From Death lead me to Immortality![21]

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[21] Cited in W. Norman Brown, Man in the Universe, W. Norman Brown, trans., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p. 16.

The ritual sustains Sūrya who maintains time (vv. 11-16; 48) and supports the worlds (2.6, 10.11,31). Vāc, by virtue of her centrality to the ritual both sustains the phenomenal order wherein the question of the necessity of right relation arises, and provides the context and means for the resolution of the question.

I.164.19 illustrates not only the centrality of ritual, but that all times - past, present, and future - are bound up in the historical present through the correct performance of ritual.

> Those (rites) which lie in the future also lie, they [those whose minds are unfettered and see clearly (v. 37), who are ripe in mind and in spirit discerning (v. 5) of the mysterious (v. 37)] in the past; those which lie in the past; they say, also lie in the future. What things, O Soma, you and Indra did, they, as though yoked to the chariot pole of the atmosphere, continue to draw it.[22]

The "mysterious" referred to here is, after v.4, 5, 8,9 the mystery of the cows: Agni withholds the secret which is the knowledge of the path of the Bird which is Vāc:

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[22]
    W. Norman Brown, trans., "Agni, Sun, Sacrifice and Vāc", p. 213.

> ye arvāñcas tāṅ u parāca āhur ye parāñcas tāṅ u arvāca āhuḥ / indraṣ ca yā cakrathuḥ soma tāni dhurā na yuktā rajaso vahanti (19)

> What shall I proclaim of these words.  They
> speak without fault of the secretly-held
> mystery of the cows – [the secret] that they
> [the words] have opened as a lock [is opened],
> He (Agni) withholds (as secret) the beloved top
> of the Earth, the path of the Bird.
> This is that great countenance of the great
> Gods who walks ahead, followed by the morning
> cow.  In the place of concealment I found the
> lite countenance of Truth hurrying on.[23]

"This" of v. 9 refers to a manifestation of illumination on

the analogy of the order of natural phenomenon.  In the ritual

context it would refer to Agni; analogically it refers to Sūrya

(in I.115.1 Agni and Sūrya are identified).  Geldner sees the

"cow who walks ahead" as the calf Agni, and the 'morning cow"

as Uṣas.

These verses raise two important points regarding

the reference to the "mystery of the Cows" in the context of

the rites; both points involve the centrality of Vāc to the

ritual context in that the mystery of time as the ordered

sequence of phenomena past, present, and future is bound up with

the mystery of the rite which the mystery of Vāc is central to.

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[23]
This is my translation from Geldner's German:

8.  Was soll mir von diesem Worte verkündet werden?  Sie
    sprechen sich tadelnd aus über das geheim gehaltene
    Rätsel der Kühe, / das sie aufgeschlossen haben wie
    ein Tor [Oder:  wie einen Verschluss.].  Er [Agni]
    bewahrt [Als sein Geheimnis.]  Den lieben Gipfel der
    Erde, die Spur des Vogels.
9.  Dies ist jenes grosse Antlitz der grossen (Götter),
    welchem vorangehenden die morgendliche nachfolgt.  Ich
                                                (continued)

The points are: (1) The "Mystery of the cows" points to the concealedness of Vāc; (2) That Agni is the guardian of the secret of this mystery indicates the revealedness of Vāc, the context within which revelation which is the ritual situation wherein Vāc is manifest in the most immediate sense. The imagery used also indicates the nature of the conditions of concealment and revelation. The former is the condition of darkness which is ignorance and it is likened to the restrictive darkness of the cave in which the cows (Vāc) are hidden. The latter is the condition of illumination which is knowledge as insight into the dark mystery of the cave, and it is likened to the expansive character of the forces of illumination which mark the transition from night into day in the phenomenal order of recurrence.

Among the natural powers of illumination Agni is pre-eminent as the one not subject to the vicissitudes of natural

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23 (continued)
  fand das an der Stätte der Wahrheit erstrahlende (Antlitz)
  im Verborgenen, das eilig gehende, eilige.

  pravācyam vacasaḥ kim me asya guhā
  hitam upa niṇig vadanti / yad usriyā-
  ṇām apa vār iva vran pāti priyaṃ rupo
  agram padam veḥ (8)

  idam u tyan mahi mahām anīkaṃ yad
  usriyā sacata pūrvyaṃ gauḥ / ṛitasya
  pade adhi dīdyānaṃ guhā raghushyad
  raghuyad viveda (9)

recurrence. Thus, Agni is the guardian of the secret of the Bird. This means that the abiding presence of Agni in the ritual context is indicative of the abiding presence of Vāc.

The above two points will now be considered in detail:

I.

To speak of the "mystery of the cows" as the concealedness of Vāc is to speak of that fundamental condition of the human predicament which is rooted in a sense of the wrongness of existence which is a sense of wrong relation to that which is Real in itself, Vāc. Dīrghatamas illustrates this when he speaks of the condition of being, "unripe in mind, in spirit undiscerning . . ." (I.164.5), and when he declares, "What thing I truly am I know not clearly: mysterious, fettered in my mind I wander." (I.164.37) He is fettered in that he does not know that which is Real, Vāc, and his mind wanders aimlessly in search of the Real. His mind does not have the focus of the vision (dhī). He cannot see that which is Real because something is lacking in his sense of discernment. The problem lies within him in that, ". . . from him who saw him surely is he hidden" (I.164.32). That which reveals itself remains hidden to those who do not know clearly. Yet, in an earlier verse Dīrghatamas

provides a clue to the particular type of knowing which is a
seeing clearly of that which reveals itself as that which is heard,
śruti. He says, "I ask, unknowing . . . as one all ignorant for
the sake of knowledge." (I.164.6). To be unknowing is to be, as
stated in the previous verse, "Unripe in mind, in spirit un-
discerning . . ." Knowing that he is undiscerning he then says
"I ask", and with this what was for him mere unknowing is
transformed and he is ". . . all ignorant for (the) sake of
knowledge." "All ignorant" is the discerning that that which
reveals itself remains hidden; the knowing that he does not know.
The awareness that, as in 10.71.4: "One man hath ne'er seen Vāc
and yet he seeth; one man hath hearing but hath never heard her."
With this he abandons the folly of his own unripe mind; when
he says "I ask" he gives up his own mental resources which
resulted in undiscerning to "all ignorance" which is complete
receptivity. Thus, he experiences the answer to the question
he poses in verse four: "Who may approach the man who knows,
to ask it?" He may now approach.

Those who know, those for whom that which reveals
itself and stands in revelation as that which is heard rather
than being hidden, are the rsis: "I ask, unknowing, those who
know, the sages . . .." They are the discerning ones. In

total receptivity he stands before the models of receptivity,
the recipients of the vision of that which is heard.  The
condition of the human predicament which is an intrinsic
wrongness, an inability, an unwillingness to abandon what
Dīrghatamas refers to as the "unripe mind" is overcome in
receptivity which is the right relation to that which reveals
itself as that which is heard.  Right relation is the receptivity
to the revelation of speech as Veda, that which is heard, śruti.

The foundational condition which brings right relation
is the knowledge which is the realization that true inquiry
lies within the individual, beyond the fetters of the wandering
mind:  "Ye thoughtful men inquire within your spirit . . ."
(10.81.4).  Therein lies the potential for the experience of
speech as the highest reality.  Thus in 10.71.3, it is stated
that "Speech harbours within the rsis who bring her forth . . .."

## 10.108

In this hymn the "mystery of the cows" involves the
concealedness of Vāc as a loss of Vāc.  The loss, the theft of
the cows by the Paṇis,[24]  represents a return to primeval darkness.

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[24]
Geldner speaks of the relationship between the Paṇis and
Vala: "Im ganzen Liede werden sie nur im Plural genannt.  Ein
zweites N. pr. des Mythos is vala.  Dies bezeichnet die Berghöhle
und ihren Wächter (10.67.7).  Wahrscheinlich is Vala der Chef der
Paṇis.  In 10.108 wird er nicht genannt.  An der Identität beider
Personlichkeiten ist nicht zu zweifeln, obwohl beide nur 6,39,2;
10.67.6 zusammen genannt werden.  Die Kühe des Vala (10,67,6;68,5)
sind dieselben wie die vom Paṇi eingesperrten (1.32,11).  Vgl. auch
2.24.6b mit 10.68.6d."  10.67; 68 are discussed in detail in the
next chapter.

The account is set in the imagery of the original creation myth where Indra slays the demon of chaos and darkness, separates the Sat from the Asat, and, thereby, establishes the realm of light and Order. The account in10.108 represents a partial assimilation of the original account to the understanding of Vāc as the Real and the ṛsis as the maintainers of the Real.[25] That it is a partial assimilation is seen in the fact that although Indra is mentioned in the ʰmymn his role is secondary to that of Bṛhaspati. The figure of Indra seems to loom in the background for no other purpose than to legitimate the heroic feat of Bṛhaspati. Also, the hound of Indra, Saramā, which has an independent role in the original account, seems in this hymn, especially v. 11, to be identified with Bṛhaspati. Up to verse 11 the exchange alternates between the Paṇis and Saramā.[26] From v. 5:

5. (The Paṇis:)
   These are the kine which, Saramā, thou seekest,
       flying, O Blest One, to the ends of Heaven.
   Who will loose these for thee without a battle
       Yea, and sharp-pointed are our warlike weapons.[27]

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25
    The 'original' myth, the assimilation of it, and the significance of the elements involved are discussed in the next chapter.
    26
    The translation used is that of Ralph T. H. Griffith, Hymns of the Rgveda, Vol. II.
    27
        imā gāvaḥ sarame yā aichaḥ pari divo antān
        subhage patantī / kas ta enā ava sṛijād anydhvy
        utāsmākam āyudhā santi tigmā (5)

6. Even if your wicked bodies, O ye Panis, were arrow-
proof, your words are weak for wounding.
And were the path to you as yet unmastered, Brihaspati
in neither case will spare you.[28]

The "sharp-pointed weapons" of the Panis to their sharp-
ness or effectiveness of speech. Thus, their "words are weak
for wounding" indicates that the Panis do not have access to the
true _brahman_. In 2.24.8 Brhaspati is likened to an archer, and
his bow has the string of Rta. In _AV_ 11.10-12 Brhaspati is
possessed of the _brahman_ which he uses against the enemies of
Speech. His arrows are sharpened by the _brahman_. Celdner
understands v. 6,c to refer to the fort or cave of the Panis.
Thus, even if the _brahman_ cannot pierce their bodies, and even
if their fortress cannot be broken they are not safe from the
power of Brhaspati.

7. Paved with the rock is this our treasure-chamber;
filled full of precious things, of kine and horses.
These Panis who are watchful keepers guard it. In
vain hast thou approached this lonely station.[29]

"Paved with rock: would be the "path" of v. 6: it is hard to
traverse, i.e. the "path" to Vāc, the "path of the Bird" is

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28
asenyā vah panayo vacāṅsy anishavyās tanvah santu
pāpīh / adhrishto va etva astu panthā brihaspatir va
ubhayā na mrilāt (6)

29
ayam nidhih sarame adribudhne gobhir asevebhir vasubhir
nyrishtah / rakshanti tam panayo ye sugopā reku padam
alakam ā jagantha (7)

difficult to attain.

> 8. Ṛishis will come inspirited with Soma, Aṅgirases
>    unwearied, and Navagas.
>    This stall of cattle will they part among them;
>    then will the Paṇis wish these words unspoken.[30]

Geldner's translation of this is interesting:

> 8. Es werden die Ṛṣi's, durch Soma scharf gemacht,
>    hierher kommen: Ayāsya, die Aṅgiras' und Navagva's.
>    Die werden die eingesperrte Herde der Kühe under sich
>    teilen. Dan sollen die Paṇi's dieses Wort sich
>    entfahren lassen! (emphasis added)

His commentary on 8-d is significant:

> "D.h. sie mögen es in deren Gegenwart wiederholen.
> vaman eigentlich: 'sie mögen es ausspeien' . . . . Auch
> 4,58,2 vom Wort. Dort das Sich entfahrenlassen eines
> Geheimnisses."

The rsis seek out the herd which is Vāc. They 'look it up', so

to speak. The Paṇis "spitting out" indicates the spontaneity of

the revelation of the mystery, and is probably an allegorical

reference to the manner in which Vāc erupts forth from the rsi

who is inspired with Soma. The parting of Vāc among them

probably refers to the division of roles in the rite as in

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[30]
eha gamann rishayaḥ somaṣitā ayāsyo aṅgiraso navagvāḥ /
ta etam ūrvam vi bhajanta gonām athaitad vacaḥ paṇayo
vamann it (8)

10.71.11:

> One plies his constant task reciting verses: one sings
> the holy psalm in Ṣakvarî measures.
> One more, the Brahman tells the lore of being, and
> one lays down the rules of sacrificing.[31]

9. Even thus, O Saramā, hast thou come hither, forced
   by celestial might to make the journey.
   Turn thee not back for thou shalt be out sister: O
   Blest One, we will give thee of the cattle.[32]

10. Brotherhood, sisterhood, I know not either; the dread
    Aṅgirases and Indra know them.
    They seemed to long for kine when I departed. Hence
    into the distance be ye gone, O Paṇis.[33]

11. Hence, far away, ye Paṇis! Let the cattle lowing
    come forth as holy Law commandeth,
    Kine which Bṛihaspati, and Soma, Ṛishis, sages and
    pressing-stones have found when hidden.[34]

The role of Saramā in these verses is very confusing. If

v. 10, a-b is an assertion of Saramā's independence which it

appears to be, then v. 9, a-b is out of place. V. 9. a-b

portrays Saramā to be somewhat of a muse of Vāc. "Brotherhood"

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31
This is Griffith's translation; the verse is dis-
cussed below on pp. 139,140.

32
eva cā tvaṃ sarama ājagantha prabādhitā sahasā daivyene /
svasāram tva kṛiṇavai mā punar gā apa te gavāṃ subhage
bhajāma (9)

33
nāhaṃ veda bhrātṛitvaṃ no svasṛitvam indro vidur aṅgirases
ca ghorāḥ / gokāmā me achadayan yad āyam apāta ita
paṇayo varīyaḥ (10)

34
dūram ita paṇayo varīya ud gāvo yantu minatīr ṛitena /
bṛihaspatir yā avindan nigūlhāḥ somo grāvāṇa ṛishayas
ca viprāḥ (11)

may refer to the sense of community, what Geldner calls the "Freundschaft", which is felt by those who have a kinship to Vāc, as in 10.17.1.

Geldner's translation of 10.108.11 is more complete than Griffith's, and indicates more of the nature of the rsi:

> Hebt euch in die Ferne so weit als möglich, ihr Paṇi's! Auf dem rechten Wege sollen die brullen Kühe hereausgekommen, die Bṛhaspati im Versteck fand und Soma, die Pressteine und die redegewaltigen Ṛṣi's! (emphasis added)

"Vipra", the 'quivering one' is associated by Renou[35] with mystical quivering. He associates it with "vakroti", "tortuous speech". As such it relates to v. 7 of 10.108, the reference to the cave being "paved with rock", and the general difficulty of attaining right relation to Vāc. It also helps make more sense of the rsis being "durch Soma sharf gemacht" as in Geldner's translation of v. 8. What is more important is the fact that "vipra" indicates something about the actual phenomenon of inspiration. All of this serves to integrate the last verse into the preceeding portions of the hymn, and draw it all into the ritual context.

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35

    Renou, Religions of Ancient India, p. 10.

II.

The nature of the relation between the revelatory aspect of Vāc and the principles of illumination will be considered in three parts: (1) re-examination of I.164,19 and general consideration of the principles involved, (2) examination of 10.177 and (3) consideration of the phenomenon of dhī.

(1)   I.164.19:

> Those (rites) which lie in the future also lie,
> they [those whose minds are unfettered and see
> clearly (v. 37), who are ripe in mind and in
> spirit discerning (v. 5) of the mysterious (v. 37)]
> in the past; those which lie in the past, they say,
> also lie in the future. What things, O Soma, you and
> Indra did, they, as though yoked to the chariot pole
> of the atmosphere continue to draw it.[36]

On this passage W. Norman Brown comments that there is:

> Affirmation of the effectiveness of both past and
> future rites if they are identical. By means of
> them the things, that is the heroic deeds . . .
> (of Indra as hero and visionary who killed
> Vṛtra), or the celebration of the sacrifice which
> Indra and Soma did in the past will be duplicated
> in the future. The atmosphere (rajas) is mentioned
> here because it was there that Indra, aided by Soma,
> fought his battle with Vṛtra.[37]

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[36]
   W. Norman Brown, trans., "Agni, Sun, Sacrifice and Vāc",
p. 213.

[37]
   Ibid., p. 214.

The relationship between Soma and Indra, Agni and Sūrya is very involved. They are considered here only to the extent necessary to demonstrate the centrality of Vāc to the above passages.

Through the rites all times are united in harmony with the great cosmic event where Indra, with the elements of sacrifice, yoked to the sacred fire as Sūrya defeated the force of darkness, and, because they did "continue to draw it", made "time" itself possible. Thus the rite maintains the triumph of light won by Indra and Soma, and, through Agni, the day as "time" recurs. I.164.30 states:

> In the midst of the (three) homes (of Agni)
> lies the breathing swift-moving, living, restless
> enduring One (neut.). The (immortal) life of the
> dead one (the Sun that died the previous evening)
> fares according to his constituent nature.
> The immortal has a common origin with the mortal.[38]

W. Norman Brown's comment on this verse indicates the centrality of Vāc to the question. He says:

> The Sun acquired an immortal life-force through
> receiving a portion of Vāc (stanza 37), but
> its body is mortal. Hence the hymn can say that,
> when the new Sun is born, the immortal life-force
> and the mortal casing of it have a common origin
> (sayoniḥ). We may probably assume at this point

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38

Ibid., p. 215.
anac chaye turgātu jīvam ejad dhruvam
madhya ā pastyānām / jīvo mritasya carati
svadhābhir amartyo martyenā sayoniḥ (30)

that the reborn Sun appears above the horizon in the atmosphere, which is the middle one of Agni's three homes . . ..[39]

The chariot of Sūrya is described in detail in 10.85:[40]

7.  Thought was the pillow of her couch, sight was the
       unguent for her eyes:
    Her treasury was earth and heaven when Sūryâ
       went unto her Lord.

8.  Hymns were the cross-bars of the pole, Kurîra-
       metre decked the car:
    The bridesmen were the Aśvin Pair:  Agni was
       leader of the train.

9.  Soma was he who wooed the maid:  the groomsmen
       were both Aśvins, when
    The Sun-God Savitar bestowed his willing Sūryâ on
       her Lord.

10.  Her spirit was the bridal car; the covering thereof
       was heaven:
    Bright were both steers that drew it, when Sūryâ
       approached her husbands home.

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39
    Ibid., pp. 30-1.
40
    Translation by Ralph T. H. Griffith, Hymns of the
Rgveda, Vol. II.

cittir ā upabarhaṇaṃ cakshur ā abhyañjanam / dyaur
bhūmiḥ kosa āsīd yad ayāt sūryā patim (7)

stomā āsan pratidhayaḥ kuriraṃ chanda opaṣaḥ / sūryāyā
aṣvinā varāgnir āsīt purogavaḥ (8)

somo vadhūyur abhavad aṣvināstām ubhā varā / sūryam
yat patye ṣaṅsantīm manasā savitādadāt (9)

mano asyā ana āsīd dyaur āsīd uta chadiḥ / ṣukrav
anaḍvāhav āstām yad ayāt sūryā griham (10)

riksāmābhyām abhihitau gāvau te sāmanāv itaḥ /
ṣrotraṃ te cakre āstāṃ divi panthāṣ carācaraḥ (11)

11. Thy steers were steady, kept in place by holy
       verse and Sâma-hymn:
    All ear were thy two chariot wheels:  thy path
       was tremulous in the sky.

12. Clean, as thou wentest, were thy wheels:  wind
       was the axle fastened there.
    Sûryâ, proceeding to her Lord, mounted a spirit-
       fashioned car.

    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

14. When on your three-wheeled chariot, O Aṣvins, ye
       came as wooers unto Sûryâ's bridal,
    Then all the Gods agreed to your proposal:
       Pushan as Son elected you as Fathers.

15. O ye Two Lords of lustre, when ye to Sûryâ's
       wedding came,
    Where was one chariot-wheel of yours?  Where stood
       ye for the Sire's command?

16. The Brahmans, by their seasons, know, O Sûryâ,
       those two wheels of thine:
    One, kept concealed, those only who are skilled
       in highest truths have learned.

According to v. 1 the Real (satyam) is the base of

the Earth, while Sūrya sustains the heavens.  S. S. Bhawe [41]

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suci te cakre yātyā vyāno aksha āhatah / ano
manasmayaṃ sūryarohat prayati patim (12)

yad asvinā prichamānāv ayātaṃ tricakreṇa vahatuṃ
sūryāyāḥ / viṣve devā anu tad vām ajānan putrah
pitarāv avṛiṇīta pūshā (14)

yad ayātam ṣubhas patī vareyaṃ sūryām upa /
kvaikaṃ cakraṃ vām āsīt kva deshṭrāya tasthatuḥ (15)

dve te cakre sūrye brahmāṇa ṛitutha viduḥ / athaikaṃ
cakraṃ yad guha tad addhātaya id viduḥ (16)

41

"The Conception of Muse Poetry in the Ṛgveda", *Journal
of Bombay University*, 19, Vol. 2, pp. 19-27.

considers 10.85 to be an allegorical account of the illuminative
source of poetic inspiration. He states that, ". . . Sūrya's
going to her husband (v. 7; cf. 10.12) symbolizes the wedding
of poetry with the deity. And, consequently, Sūrya's marriage
with the Aṣvins or with Soma signifies the offering of Vedic
songs to them."[42] The Aṣvins are the husbands of Sūrya in
3.39.1, and 1.62.11. Sūrya chooses the Aṣvins as husbands in
4.43.6; 7.69, and 10.85.15.

Geldner in his commentary on 9.72.2 says that the Sun's
daughter (sūryāsya duhitā) is Vāc. In 3.53.15 Sahasparī "speaks"
the Sun's daughter. Of note is 10.85.6 where Sūrya's garment
is said to be embellished by the gāthā which is called "bhadra",
auspicious. In 3.39.2 the term is applied to prayer, while
10.71.4 refers to the appearance of Vāc as a "fond well-dressed
woman". C. Kunhan Raja, in commenting on 1.164.29[43] says that,

> Perhaps the idea is that poetry first arises in the
> mind and is making the sound of poetry within
> and then when it is recited it shines out like the
> lightening. It looks as if the garment covering
> it is removed and that it is thus exposed very
> clearly.[44]

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[42]
   Ibid., p. 25.
[43]
   V. 29, c-d, which he translates: "She with her shrilling
cries hath humbled mortal man, and turned to lightening, hath
stripped off her covering robes." Poet-Philosophers, p. 29.
[44]
   Ibid., p. 29.

In different contexts the chariot is said to have different number of wheels. In 1.164.19 the chariot with the single wheel is Sūrya (v. 2), and the spokes are the year (v. 11), or perhaps the five spokes are the seasons on the basis of 10.85.16. The chariot of seven wheels in 1.164.3 may be the chariot of kala, as in AV 19.53.1, and, if so, the chariot pole of 1.164.19 would be Agni as the axis of the sun in its daily movement. The two wheels of 10.85.16, one of which is secret except to those skilled in the highest truths (mastery of Vāc as poetic meter?) are thought by Griffith to refer to the phenomenal world and the world beyond. It may, however, refer to Sūrya and Soma (the sun and the moon) as the wheels of time in the succession of days and nights, as in 10.85.18, 19. Agni as the "leader of the train" (v. 8) would be more meaningful in this sense. 10.85.16 is very similar to 1.164.45 which speaks of the four parts of Vāc, the highest portion of which only the Brahmans know, i.e. those who are "skilled in the highest truths".

In 8.105.15 Vāc is the immortal Navel, Aditi. 1.164.2 mentions the three-naved wheel. W. Norman Brown[45] points out that the wheel often refers to the sun, and, following Yakśa, he holds that the three refer to the three seasons of the year.

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[45] "Agni, Sun, Sacrifice and Vāc", p. 211.

However, in view of the allusions to the rite throughout the hymn it might just as well refer to the sacrificial circle itself and the three central elements (navels) Vāc, Agni, and Soma. In 10.177, which is considered below, Agni protects the way of the sun, protects the Navel which is at the same time Vāc.

The three abodes of Agni in 1.164.19 may, following Brown's interpretation of v. 30 (above) refer to the three times of past, present, and future. Or, if the reference in v. 19 applies to Soma rather than Agni, it may be, after Kieth, [46] to the three tubs of the ritual, or, perhaps more significant in this context, to the three vats of Soma which Indra drinks before battling with Vṛtra (1.32.3).

10.109 is interesting in that there Soma steals the wife of Brahman (Brahman = Brahmaṇaspati/Bṛhaspati). Sāyaṇa, commenting on 10.109.6, refers back to 10.85.40 and the marriage relation. Perhaps Vāc is the wife of Bṛhaspati there. Soma, then, steals Vāc who is really the wife of Bṛhaspati. However, in 9.83.1, Soma is identified with Bṛhaspati. In AV 14.2.54 Bṛhaspati's wife is Sūrya (= Vāc).

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[46] A. B. Kieth, Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upaniṣads, HOS, Vol. 31, p. 168.

In 6.59.2 Indra is the brother of Agni and they are said to have a common mother, while in 9.96.5 ff. Soma is said to be Indra's father. Through drinking Soma the light of Agni/ Sūryā is acquired. In 1.34.2 Vāc = the Sun's daughter: She brings Soma and is therefore called 'beloved of Soma'. Indra drinks of the Soma, the source of light, to battle and slay Vṛtra, the demon of darkness; Soma is therefore called Vṛtra-slayer. Through drinking Soma Indra makes the sun rise and the light appear. In 1.82.5,6 Soma is portrayed as the source of Indra's potency. It was with drinking Soma that Indra became mighty (4.18.5), while, according to 4.18.12, Indra cares only for Soma. The relationship between the power of Soma and Indra's need of it is carried to the point where Indra is portrayed almost as a degenerate, completely helpless without the Soma.

W. Norman Brown translates 1.164.4, a-b as, "Who saw the newborn structured on (Agni or possibly the Sun) when the unstructured one (Earth) bore him?"[47] He sees one likely explanation of the passage to be that the poet is putting forth the position that the Sun, the sustainor, the Cause (of time) was at first concealed and was revealed at the first sacrifice;

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[47] "Agni, Sun, Sacrifice and Vāc", p. 211.

cf. v. 7 where the sun is spoken of as a bird, from whose head
the rays (cows) draw milk. That is, from the unstructured
Source (Sūryā/Agni/Soma) the structured appears as Vāc, which
is the mystery made manifest. The Source, as in v. 6, the One
(probably Vāc of v. 46) as the Unborn (Sun) is "unstructured"
as the basis of the multiplicity of the many cows or light abodes
(daman), the many abodes of Agni, and the many abodes of Soma.
Also, Soma's being brought to earth is referred to in bird
imagery in 4.26.27, and in 1.8.3 while in 7.15.4 Agni is
called the eagle of heaven.

Both Agni and the Sun are the unmanifest. Of interest
also is the fact that Indra's mother kept him in concealment
until he was ready (through Soma) for battle with Vṛtra (4.184.5).
In 5.2.2 Agni's mother also hides him from his father.

W. Norman Brown's translation of 1.164.1, c-d ("I have
seen the lord of the tribes (Agni) with his seven sons (priests)") [48]
and his commentary thereon serves to reaffirm the centrality of
Agni to the sacrificial ritual and the phenomenon of the transcen-
dental vision. He says,

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[48]
Ibid., p. 210.
tṛītiyo bhrātā ghṛitapṛiṣhtho asyātrāpaśyam viśpatim
sapta putram.

In announcing his vision (apaśyam) Dīrghatamas seems to indicate that the setting of the vision is the sacrifice in which he is participating; this would be the significance of the adv. atra "here", . . . . A sacrificial setting for such a transcendental vision is also indicated in RV 10.72.1, where the speaker, after raising the question of the origin of the gods, says that someone may see them in a later age when the hymns are being chanted . . . .[49]

He adds,

The three brothers are the three forms of Agni: (1) the original form of Agni as "firstborn of the rta (prathamajā rtasya in stanza 37; also in RV 10.5.7); (2) the lightening; and (3) the terrestial Agni . . . . . . . Agni's seven sons are the seven technical priests required by the full ritual, all of whom are separately designated by function in RV 2.1.2 . . . .[50]

The making manifest of that which is hidden occurs through

the transcendental vision (dhī) which takes place within the

illuminative context of the rite to which Agni is central.

[51]

(2)    10.177 (The Bird)

1.   The Bird, bedecked with the magic of the Asuras, is
     seen in the hearts and spirits of those (who are)
     knowledgeable in speech. Within the Oceans the Seers [52]
     see him: the masters seek the trail of the lightstream.

Geldner comments that the reference to the Asura's magic might

mean in the sense of a 'magic ointment', i.e. the Bird is invisible

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49
  Ibid., p. 210.
50
  Ibid., p. 210.
51
  This is my translation from Geldner's German: Both the
German and Sanskrit texts are provided:

     Geldner relates the Bird to Vāc: "Der Vogel is das innere
     Light der seherischen Erkenntnis und Erleuchtung im Herzen
                                                    (continued)

to all except the kavis who know speech. In 10.67.5 "Ocean is

the same as the cave of the cows. In 10.123.3 the "Ocean" is

the same as the heart[53] in this stanza. There, the waves of

the Ocean are said to be that visible portion of speech.

> 2. The Bird carries the spirit of Vāc: this the
> Gandharvas proclaimed in the Mother's womb. This
> lightening-like, sun-like knowledge the Seers
> guard at the station of Truth.[54]

The role of the Gandarvas here is similar to that in 10.123.4

where it is said that they found the immortal waters. AV 2.1.3:

Poetic art originates from Sun - Gandharva as the Sun is the

father of the rsi.

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51 (continued)
(vgl. 6.9,4-5), ebenso 10.189,3b. Seine wahre Natur als
Light verrat sich durch den Ausdruck marīcīnām in 1d. Im
Herzen erkennen die Seher den wahren Quell des Gedankens,
der Rede in sich birgt. Von da aus steigt die dichterische
Erkenntnis in Form der Rede auf, die in 3.39,1 als auffliegender
Vögel dargestellt wird."
52
  1. Den mit des Aṣura Zauber bestrichenen Vogel sehen
     im Herzen, im Geiste die Redekundigen. Inmitten
     des Ozeans schauen (ihn) die Seher; die Meister suchen
     die Spur der Lichstrahlen.

     Patamgam aktam aṣurasya māyayā hṛidā paṣyanti manasā
     vipaṣcitah / samudre antaḥ kavayo vi cakshate marī-
     cīnām padam ichanti vedhasaḥ (1)
53
     Beldner's translation of "manasā" as "heart" is con-
sidered below.
54
  2. Der Vogel trägt im Geiste die Rede, diese verkündete
     der Gandharva im Mutterleib. Diese aufblitzende,
     sonnenhafte. Erkenntnis hüten die Seher an der Statte
     der Wahrheit.

     patamgo vācam manasā bibharti tām gandharvo 'vadad
     garbe antaḥ / tām dyotamānām svaryam manīshām ṛitasya
     pade kavayo ni pānti.

55

In 10.5.2 the Seers cover the trail of Truth; they have the highest names wrapped in secret. Also, in 3.5:

> 5. Agni covers the dear highest top of the Earth, the Path of the Bird: the youngest protects the way of the Sun, Agni protects the Navel.[56]

Geldner holds the "navel" to be a reference to the sacrifice.

> 6,c-d. . . . the fatty rich tube of food, the path of the Bird - all that is protected by Agni continuously.[57]

Geldner relates the 'tube' to the cow's udder of 3.55.13 ("In which world did the cow hide her bag, the Iḷā (Sāyaṇa: Iḷā is the Earth swelled with the milk of Truth)") in reference to the hiddenness/revelation of Vāc as in 3.55.1, "Once as the early morning red broke, there unfolded itself the first akshara in the wake of the cow." "Once" refers to the time of the first ṛṣis; "path of the cow" is as in 1.158.2. It indicates either

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55

2,c-d. Die Seher hüten der Wahrheit Spur; sie haben ihre höchsten Bezeichnungen in ein Geheimnis gehüllt.

ritasya padaṃ kavayo ni pānti guhā nāmāni dadhire parāṇi.

56

5. Er hütet den lieben Gibfel (Den höchsten oder äussersten Punkt) der Erde, die Spur des Vogels; der Jungste hütet den Weg der Sonne. Agni hütet im Nabel (der Erde?) den Siebenköpfigen; der Aufrechte hütet den aufmunterer (?) der Gotter.
On the "Path of the Bird", Geldner comments: "Es ist etwas, was das menschliche Auge nicht wahrnimmt, ein göttliches Geheimnis."
Pāti priyaṃ ripo agram padaṃ veḥ pāti yahvaṣ caraṇaṃ sūryasya / pāti nābhā saptaṣirshāṇam agniḥ pāti devānām upamādam ṛishvaḥ (5)

57

6.c-d. Den schmalzreichen Schlauch der Speise, die Spur des Vogels, das (alles) hutet Agni unablässig.

(1) the place of the ritual, or (2) the freeing of the cows of the Paṇis as in 10.71 where Bṛhaspati frees the cows of speech thus bringing light into creation through speech.

> 3.  I saw the Herdsman on his way, walking to and fro, without resting. He covers himself in the waters which flow in the same and opposite direction, and he moves himself to and fro in the creation.[58]

The stanza is as 1.164.31 where it refers to Sūrya. In this context, however, and in light of the centrality of Vāc to the preceeding stanzas, it probably refers here to "herdsman" in the sense that Bṛhaspati is the herdsman of the cows of the Paṇis. One significant difference in the assimilation of the elements of the Indra-Vṛtra creation account is that Bṛhaspati through his intimate relation to Vāc (Bṛhaspati/Brahmaṇaspati/ Vācaspati, etc.)[59] absorbs and integrates the role of Saramā (cf. 1.63.3) in that Bṛhaspati is both the seeker and that which is sought. Thus, the cows as speech (which is Bṛhaspati) need no herdsman in 3.57.1. "Herdsman" in 10.177.3 does not imply an independent element.

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57 (continued)
sasasya carma ghṛitavat padaṃ ves tad id agnī rakshaty aprayuchan (6.c-d).

58
> 3.  Ich sah den Hirten auf seinen Wegen hin und her gehen, ohne zu rasten. Er hüllt sich in die Gewässer, die in gleicher und in entgegengesetzter Richtung laufen, und er bewegt sich hin und her in den Geschöpfen.
> apaṣyam gopām anipadyamānam ā ca parā ca pathibhiṣ carantam / sa sadhrīcīḥ sa vishūcīr vasāna ā varīvarti bhuvaneshv antaḥ (3)

59
See Chapter Four for further discussion of this set of identifications.

"Water" is not problematic in light of 10.71.5; it relates to the flow as descent and recovery of Vāc in revelation. The image of Sarasvatī relates this twofold aspect. Thus, Yāska (11.26) states that Sarasvatī (which is Vāc in 7.95) makes the great Ocean manifest, i.e. makes the secret of the heart manifest, and that, therefore, speech belongs to the highest atmosphere, or, as in 1.164.34, the highest heaven where speech abides. Thus, in 10.125.7 Vāc says, "On the world's summit I bring forth the Father (Heaven or Sky); my home is in the waters, in the ocean, in the unfathomed depth of water."[60] And, in 8.54.4 Sarasvatī protects the song as well as the seven rivers which are the seven ancestral rsis or the seven streams which flowed from Vrtra's belly and made their way to the celestial ocean (1.32.2).

(3)    dhī: "Vision"

Central to this consideration is the difficult passage,

8.59.6:    indrāvaruṇā yad rsibhyo manīṣām vāco matim srutam adattam agre / yāni sthānāny asrijanta dhīrā yajñam tanvānās tapasābhy apasyam.

Gonda[61]    translates this passage to mean:

Indra and Varuna, when you gave, in the beginning to the

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[60]
Hymns of the Rgveda, Vol. II, Ralph T. H. Griffith, trans.
[61]
Gonda, Vision of the Vedic Poets, p. 211.

seers inspiratory thought, thought realized in speech (vāco matim . . .), knowledge as heard and transmitted by poets, eulogists, priests, I perceived by means of the internal heat of ecstasy (tapasa) over which places those who have received (the) visions (dhīraḥ), performing worship emitted them.[62]

As Renou points out,[63] the significance of the passage lies in the fact that it gives an account of the three modes of the activities of the ṛṣi as seer, poet and functionary. This involves the vision itself, the transformation of the vision into actuality of the liturgical song, and the context and conditions of the vision and the transformation of the vision. This indicates that the vision cannot be considered as a phenomenon in itself.

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[62]

The translations of this passage are extremely variant:

Thou, Hero, hast performed thy hero deeds with might,
yea, all with strength, O strongest One.
Maghavan, help us to a stable full of kine, O
Thunderer, with wondrous aids. (6)  (Griffith)

Indra und Varuṇa, als ihr im Amfang den Ṛṣi's
Nachdenken, ausgedachte Rede ("thought realized
in speech"), Gelehrsamkeit verliehet, da ergossen
die Weisen diese als Gedichte, während sie das Opfer
vollzogen:  (das) erschaute ich mit heissem Bemuhen (6)
(Geldner)

Geldner's translation does not differ essentially from that of Gonda. I have used the latter because the translation is interpretive, and the interpretation is included within the translation itself whereas in Geldner's case it is included in the notes.

[63]

Renou, Et. ved. et pan., VII, p. 88; cited in Gonda, Vision of the Vedic Poets, p. 211.

The following discussion consists of two parts:
(a) the vision and transformation of the vision into speech
(mantra) and (b) the relationship between vision and immortality.

(a)

Dhī as a power phenomenon is a medium from the powers
to rsis and from the rsis to the powers. In the relationship
the power is involved in two ways - in the willingness and
capacity to provide the vision, and in the capacity to promote
spiritual receptiveness and stimulation within the individual.
There is an essential ambiguity here for the lines of power
relation are not distinct. On the one hand, the rsi is dependent
on the powers for the vision, while, on the other hand, the
vision is obtained, in one sense, for the sake of the powers
themselves in that the vision provides for the opportunity for
the rsi to praise the powers, praise which the powers seem to
require in that such praise strengthens them and makes their
actions effective. The rsis also require the effective actions
of the powers. In this context Gonda says of the powers that the
rsis may ". . . even be an essential factor in generating them,
preserving their specific might and in causing the powers of
nature to become and remain operative."[64]

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[64] Gonda, Vision of the Vedic Poets, p. 65.

It is not clear if the vision, as imparted by the powers, is that which maintains the mundane order, or if it is the making effective of the vision by the ṛṣis which maintains the order of the gods. Dhī is not considered as an end in itself. It is one aspect of the inseparable relation between true seeing and true speaking. Gonda's interpretation of 7.94.4 indicates that dhī is not only the basis of mantra, but also the medium of it: "being desirous of help, we direct (our) firm (resolute) adoration (our) 'hymns', our 'prayers', with dhīḥ, i.e. which we have achieved by means of dhīḥ, i.e. "vision", or, which presupposes dhīḥ - to Agni and Indra."[65] His translation of 1.51.14 demonstrates the ambiguity of the power relationship even more. He says, "The well-inspired man who has transformed his vision and creative inspiration into powerful words captivates the god and holds him fast like a door-post: indro aśrāyi sudhyo nir eke pajresu stomo duryo na yūpah; the god, on the other hand, is the sole granter of possessions: indra id rāyaḥ kṣayati prayantā."[66]

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[65]
    Ibid., p. 95.
      indre agnā namo brihat suvriktim erayāmahe /
      dhiyā dhenā avasyavaḥ
[66]
    Ibid., p. 65.

In 1.51.6 the song of the ṛsi is sung at the same time
by Mitra and Varuṇa, or, perhaps, they sing the song which the
ṛsi aspires to sing in the sense that he aspires to sing along
with them.  They, in this sense, would represent a divine model.
The powers are, in this case, the masters of the vision and
they send it forth at their will.  The gods themselves are said
to possess dhī.  Gonda observes that, ". . . the dhīh ascribed
to the gods may be their extraordinary insight into the essence
of reality, and their faculty of imagination which while depending
on that insight assists them in promoting the welfare of the
world."[67]  However, 3.62.10, where the ṛsi petitions Savitar
to stimulate the prayers so that the ṛsi might attain to
Savitar's glory, indicates that the dhī was understood to be
instrumental in assisting the ṛsi to emulate the divine model.
In the case of Savitar "to emulate" would mean to become one
with the divine light.  In this sense one can understand 3.92.2
where it is said that Viśvamitra's poetry is the 'oldest paternal
song (dhī) which was born formerly of heaven', and also 8.6:[68]

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[67]
   Gonda, Vision of the Vedic Poets, p. 112.
[68]
   Hymns of the Rgveda, Ralph T. H. Griffith, trans.,

   aham id dhi pitush pari medhām ṛitasya jagrabha /
   ahaṃ sūrya ivājani (10) (emphasis added)
                                          (continued)

10. I from my Father have received deep knowledge of
    the Holy Law:
    I was born like unto the Sun.

11. After the lore of ancient time I make, like Kaṇva,
    beauteous songs,
    And Indra's self gains strength thereby.

12. Whatever ṛishis have not praised thee, Indra, or
    have lauded thee,
    By me exhalted wax thou strong.

In v. 10 and in v. 11 a-b the illumination of vision is compared
to the illumination of the Sun; that is, one, through dhī
becomes akin to the "Unborn", the "unstructured Source" 1.16.4.
Kaṇva provides the model for recitation. However, v. 11 c-d and
v. 12 refer not to the vision itself as do vv. 10, 11 a-b, but
to the vision transformed as mantra. It is the vision trans-
formed and not the vision itself which appears to be the
sustaining force which Indra required. In his commentary on
his translation of 1.164.8 a-b ("The Mother gave the sire his
share of Order: with thought, at first, she wedded him in
spirit.") C. Kunhan Raja indicates that the sustaining force of
the song is actually the knowledge which, it would appear, Indra
does not possess himself. Raja says,[69]

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68 (continued)
aham pratnena manmanā giraḥ ṣumbhāmi kaṇvavat /
yenendraḥ ṣushmam id dadhe (11)

ye tvām indra na tushṭuvur ṛishayo ye ca tushṭuvuḥ /
mamed vardhasva sushṭutaḥ (12)

69
Poet-Philosophers of the Ṛgveda, pp. 9, 11.

> The father must be the wisdom and the mother must be
> the language.  Language shared the Rta, the Law,
> along with wisdom, as father and mother do . . . .  That
> means that wisdom and language were united to each
> other . . . .  Rta is literally the evolved, moving
> world, and from this the Law of the evolved world
> became Rta.
>
> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
>
> He [the rṣi] had his thoughts and his mind.  His language
> was united with wisdom and his language took up a
> beautiful form, being pregnant with the meaning
> associated with wisdom.

Gonda's translation of 8.13.8 ("for these proclaimers, these

men who are transported with their visionary thoughts long

by means (or through) (their) dhīḥ eagerly for the attainment

of wisdom."), and his commentary on the stanza indicates that

there is a transformative quality to power of dhī.  He says on

8.13.8:

> These words hardly admit of an explication other than
> this:  men who are susceptible to extraordinary contact
> with the unseen consider the visions which they receive
> and which they attempt to give the shape of audible,
> rhythmic, and meaningful speech, a means of attaining
> to a state of mind which may tentatively be indicated
> by our expression "wisdom".  . . . As is well known
> "wisdom" was, in a primitive milieu, decidedly "practical"
> or creative in character, enabling its possessor to do
> something extraordinary, to fulfill individual wishes
> which cannot be attained by ordinary means.[70]

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70
    Gonda, _Vision of the Vedic Poets_, p. 104.

Aside from the misleading language of "creativity" of which more will be said, the emphasis on the "practical" aspect of the phenomenon of vision/recitation as an ordinary act points to resolution of the predicament of the fundamental condition through transcendence which is "extraordinary" in that it involves transcendence of that cognitive condition which is definitive of the predicament itself. "Wisdom", then, refers to a practical reality, an actual ability.

There are many references[71] which indicate that the sacred poetry was thought to possess a cleansing effect, and this effect is thought to arise through the association of the poetry with the source of inspiration understood as Soma. Thus in 9.12.4:

> Far sighted Soma, Sage and Seer, is worshipped
> in the central point
> Of heaven, the straining-cloth of wool.[72]

An important passage in this regard is 9.67.21-27. It is important because it relates Soma, Agni and Savitar to true

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[71]
  cf. 9.64.10; 96.15; 2.7; 26.1 and AV 4.24.4.

[72]
  Hymns of the Ṛgveda, Ralph T. H. Griffith, trans.

  divo nābhā vicakshaṇo 'vyo vāre mahīyate / somo
  yaḥ sukratuḥ kaviḥ (4)

speech as the braman within the context of the transformative

or purifying character of dhī, and in doing so illustrates that

dhī is an actual power which serves a practical end.

This passage has been translated as follows:[73]

21. yad anti yac ca dūrake bhayaṃ vindati mām iha /
    pavamāna vi taj jahi

    O Pavamāna, drive away the danger, whether near at hand
    Or far remote, that finds me here.

    "Eine Gefahr, die nah oder fern mich hier trifft,
    die vertreibe, o Pavamāna!"

22. pavamānaḥ so adya naḥ pavitreṇa vicarshaṇiḥ / yaḥ
    potā sa punātu naḥ

    This day may Pavamāna cleanse us with his purifying power,
    Most active purifying Priest.

    "Dieser Pavamāna, der Ausgezeichnete, der (selbst)
    ein Läuterer ist, soll uns heute mit der Seihe
    läutern."

Soma is both the Purifier and the purified, an important point in

the reciprocity of relation in the rite which Griffith fails to

note. Gonda indicates the priority of relation in his translation:

"This one being purified must now purify us."[74] In some manner

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73
    Griffith and Geldner disagree on portions of this
passage. Therefore, both translations are given after the
Sanskrit in context. Gonda disagrees with Geldner on several
significant points of emphasis so his position is included where
applicable.
74
    Gonda, Vision of the Vedic Poets, p. 105.

the power of dhī is inherent in and akin to the power of Soma itself.

> 23.  yat te pavitram arcishy agne vitatam antar ā /
>      brahma tena punīhi naḥ (emphasis added)
>
> O Agni, with the cleansing light diffused through
> all thy fiery glow,
> Purify thou this prayer of ours.
>
> "Die Seihe, die in deiner Flamme, o Agni, ausgespannt
> ist, mit der läutere unsere feierliche rede!"
>                                              (emphasis added)

On this stanza Gonda says, ". . . the prayer is somewhat more specified . . . "purify our brahma (i.e. the fundamental power manifesting itself, inter alia, in the words of the poet)"." [75] Griffith's "prayer" is inadequate for it fails to denote the proper forcefulness. On the other hand, while Gonda emphasises the power aspect, he fails to give due credit to the ritual context within which that power makes itself manifest. Geldner offers the best combination of both. His mention of the sieve ('die Seihe' = pavitram) is an improvement on Griffith. The image of sifting or straining is important - it occurs in 10.68.3 and in 10.71.2 where in both cases it refers to the sifting out, sorting out, or straining of speech to attain fruitful speech. Here the flames of Agni are seen to be a factor in the straining

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[75]
     For detailed discussion of Gonda's interpretation of the significance of the term 'brahman' see his Notes on Brahman, Utrecht, 1950.

out, the purifying the "die feierliche Rede".

24. yat te pavitram arcivad agne tena puhīhi naḥ /
    brahmasavaiḥ punīhi naḥ (emphasis added)

    Cleanse us with thine own cleansing power, O Agni,
    that is bright with flame,
    And by libations poured to thee.

    "Was deine flammende Seihe ist, o Agni, mit
    der läutere uns; durch Eingebungen feierlicher Worte
    läutere uns!" (emphasis added)

On this stanza Gonda comments, ". . . the addition is made . . .

"purify us by means of vivications, instigations or generations

of brahma": this no doubt means by stimulating the specific

power called brahma (. . . Geldner's "Eingebungen feierlicher

Worte" may for practical purposes serve as a makeshift)."[76]

No doubt an appeal is being made for the flames of Agni to act

as a sieve in the sifting-out of speech, but I cannot see why

"brahmasavaiḥ punīhi" is inadequate as "Eingebungen feierlicher

Worte" ("inspiration(al) ritual words"). Again, it serves the

valuable purpose of bringing into focus the importance of the

ritual context to the brahma, as well as the association

between illumination and inspiration. That is, it emphasizes

the very 'practical' nature of the ritual elements to the

problem of right relation to language; it is more than a mere

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[76] Gonda, Vision of the Vedic Poets, p. 105.

practicality! The close association between purification and inspiration is again missed by Griffith. Geldner's "Was deine flammende Seihe [pavitram] ist, o Agni, mit der läutere uns" is both a compliment and an imperative: "mit der läutere uns" - with that purify us!, i.e. with that sieve shall we sort out language to find the brahma.

> 25. ubhābhyāṃ deva savitaḥ pavigreṇa savena ca / mām punīhi viṣvataḥ
>
> Savitar, God, by both of these, libation, purifying power,
> Purify me on every side.
>
> "Mit beiden, o Gott Savitṛ, mit der Seihe und der Eingebung läutere mich ganz!"

Here to be purified (to be one who has been successful in the act of 'sifting-out' speech, the feierliche Worte or brahma) is to be purified with the sieve as well as inspiration or stimulation (pavigreṇa savena ca). It probably does not refer to two different sources of purification as such, as much as the ritual context within which inspiration is experienced, and the experience itself, in the sense of 10.71.4 ("And many who see have had no vision of speech . . ."). This indicates that ritual involvement per se would not guarantee dhī: the phenomenon cannot be reduced to a mere ritualistic mechanism.

Gonda adds a useful comment on this stanza in referring to the savāḥ of brahmasavaiḥ. He says, ". . . it must be remembered that the production of savāḥ is Savitar's concern."[77]

26. tribish ṭvaṃ deva savitar varshishṭhaiḥ soma dhāmabhiḥ /
agne dakshaiḥ punīhi naḥ

> Cleanse us, God Savitar, with Three, O Soma, with
>   sublimest forms,
> Agni, with forms of power and might.

> "Mit dreien (läutere) du uns, Gott Savitr,
> mit deinen höchsten Formen, o Soma, mit deinen
> Wirkenskräften läutere du uns, Agni!"

To the two elements of purification of v. 25 (pavigreṇa of Soma and savena of Savitar) is added a third factor, the dakṣa of Agni. These three are the powers of purification, all of which seem to reside in Savitar or be at the disposal of Savitar. The "dakshaih" or "Wirkenskraften" referred to Agni in this case, is referred to Soma in 10.25.1 (daksham), and in 1.139.2 [78] which Geldner translates as:

> Als ihr beide, Mitra und Varuṇa, da vom Rechten das
> Unrecht wegnahmet mit eurem Eifer, mit dem eurer
> Willenskraft eignen Eifer, da sahen wir dort an
> euren Sitzen, den goldenen (Stuhl), wenn auch nur im
> Gedanken, im Geiste, mit eigenen Augen, durch die
> eigenen Augen des Soma.

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[78]
> yad dha tyan mitrāvaruṇāv ṛitād adhy ādadāthe
> anritam svena manyunā dakshasya svena manyunā /
> yuvor itthādhi sadmasv apaṣyāma hiraṇyayam /
> dhībhis cana manasā svebhir akshabhiḥ somasya
> svebhir akshabhiḥ. (emphasis added)

This raises two points of note: (1) It is interesting that in 9.67.26 Geldner translates "agne dakshaih punīhi" as "mit deinen Wirkenskräften läutere . . . Agni" (with your effective or efficient force purify . . . Agni), while in 1.139.2 he translates "dakshasya svena manyunā" as "eurer Willenskraft eignen Eifer" (the will-power of your own zeal). His reasons for doing this are not clear, but it is plausible that the first case is an attempt to underscore the practical significance of Agni and the ritual context. This is in keeping with his translation of v. 22. (2) The dhī itself ("vision" and "thought" for "dhībhis cana manasā" in 1.139.2 rather than Geldner's "Gedanken, im Geiste") "takes place through the eyes of Soma" which are perhaps the soma-bowls.

> 27. punantu mām devajanāḥ punantu vasavo dhiyā / viśve
>     devāḥ punīta mā jātavedaḥ punīhī mā (emphasis added)
>
> May the Gods' company make me clean, and Vasus make
>   me pure by song.
> Purify me, ye General Gods; O Jātavedas, make me pure.
>
> "Es sollen mich die Götterscharen läutern,
> es sollen die Vasu's mit Verständnis läutern! Ihr
> Götter alle, läutert mich; o Jātavedas, läutere mich!"
> (emphasis added)

The (presence or active support of the) host of powers (devajanāḥ), together (viśve devāḥ) purify with dhī. Geldner's

"Verständnis" for "dhiyā" is as unacceptable as is his "Gedanken"
for "dhībhis" in v. 26: both terms tend to over-intellectualise
the phenomena.

It is important that the distinction between dhī as the
efficient or effective force or power of inspiration, and manas
(cf. 1.139.2) as a particular mode of consciousness through
which or with which the dhī is made effective be maintained.
Geldner fails to make this distinction with adequate clarity
throughout although there is an indication that he feels such a
distinction is necessary. This is seen in his translation of
1.177.1 where he forces the translation of manasā as "im Herzen,
im Geiste". Manas is not literally the "heart" or "spirit" but
a particular mode of consciousness which, in conjunction with
dhī functions to produce the vipaścitaḥ ("inspired ones") of
10.177.1. Such vipaścitaḥ are those, the ṛsis, who have
experienced right relation to Vāc. Geldner's translation of
vipaścitaḥ as "die Redekundigen" (the ones who are knowledgeable
in speech), although an interpretive rather than literal trans-
lation, is most adequate.

Although it is not perfectly clear if dhī and manas
are both faculties, or if dhī is a power acting upon the faculty

of manas to such an extent that dhī itself is understood as
being like a faculty, it is clear that both elements are in-
volved in the manifestation of Vāc as mantra.  The ṛṣi is one
who has combined the dhī with the skills of the poetic art.
He is both a visionary and a poet.  He is possessed of the
ability through the faculty of manas to "sift" that which is
heard, and to put it into acceptable form which is mantra.
On the other hand, the power of purification which allows for
this selectivity is dhī.  Thus the attainment of dhī is
the attainment of wisdom.

## 10.71:  to Jñānam

1.  Brihaspate prathamaṃ vāco agraṃ yat prairata nāma-
    dheyaṃ dadhānāḥ / yad eshāṃ sreshṭhaṃ yad aripram āsīt
    preṇā tad eshāṃ nihitaṃ guhāviḥ

    When men; Brihaspati, giving names to objects, sent
      Vâk's first and earliest utterances,
    All that was excellent and spotless, treasured within them,
      was disclosed through their affection.

    Bṛhaspati!  Das war der Rede erster Anfang, als sie
    damit hervortragen, die Namengebung zu Vollziehen.
    Das Beste und Reine, was sie hatten, das kam im Inneren
    Verschlossen durch ihre Freundschaft zum Vorschein.

    Bṛhaspati!  That was the first beginning of speech, as
    they (das Obfertier) stepped forward to effect the
    giving of names.  The best and purest which they had
    enclosed within them was illuminated by their friendship.

The differences [79] in the translations are a result of different

interpretations of two terms: (1) "dadhānaḥ" (ḍhā - to generate,

produce, effect, create) as "create" places undue emphasis on

the aspect of "creative imagination" and is out of keeping

with the Indian understanding of the nature of "revelation"

and the relationship of "imagination" to such "revelation".

"Effect" or "generate" are better in that they indicate the

making manifest of that which is "within"; (2) "guhāviḥ"

(guha (ind.), a hiding place, secret, in secret (ind. inst.);

"a-vis" (ind.), before the eyes, openly, manifestly) refers

to the manifestation of that which is "within"; Vorschein

is in keeping with the language of "vision".

> 2.  saktum iva titaūnā punanto yantra dhīrā manasā vācam
>     akrata / atrā sakhāyaḥ sakhyani janate bhadraishāṃ
>     lakshmīr nihitādhi vāci
>
>     Where, like men cleansing corn-flour in a cribble, the
>         wise in spirit have created language,
>     Friends see and recognize the marks of friendship;
>         their speech retains the blessed sign imprinted.

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79
    The differences in the translations of this hymn by
Griffith and Geldner are not all that variant. However, the
differences there are do concern this discussion. For this reason
I have included the Sanskrit text, Griffith's translation, Geldner's
German translation, my translation of Geldner's German, and a
comparison to the Sanskrit text where I feel it helps to clarify
the different positions.

Wo die Weisen mit Nachdenken die Rede gebildet haben,
sie wie Schrotmehl durch ein Sieb reinigend, da erkennen
die Genossen ihre Gnossenschaft.  Deren gutes Zeichen ist
ihrer Rede Aufgeprägt.

Where the Wise-Ones, with reflection, have formed
speech (into names) (selectively), as one sorts grain
through a sieve, (in that manner) they came to know
the comrades of their comradship.  Thereby (i.e. in
that they all have the capacity to 'sift' speech, the
capacity which is the unifying factor of the
Genossenschaft) is their speech stamped with auspicious
signs.

"Die Weisen" should be singular (dhīrā (nom. singular).)  "Manasā"
is instrumental, not locative.  Geldner's "mit nachdenken" for
"manasā", i.e. with intelligence, thought, reflection, is preferable
to "spirit".  The subject of 'c-d' is picked up and developed in
vv. 4-8.

To understand "vācam akrata" as ". . . have created
language", is, as in v. 1, out of keeping with the role of the
ṛsi as poet which is to "sift" language with skill vv. 9-10.  He
does not "create speech, but, rather, expresses it in a particular
form which is brahma. ". . . die Rede gibildet haben" expresses
this in keeping with "akrata" as "constructed, caused".

3.  yajñena vācaḥ padavīyam āyan tām anv avindann ṛishishu
    pravishṭām / tām ābhṛityā vy adadhuḥ purutrā tāṃ sapta
    rebhā abhi saṃ navante

    With sacrifice the trace of Vāk they followed, and found her
      harbouring within the Ṛishis.
    They brought her, dealt her forth in many places; seven
      singers make her tones resound in concert.

Mit dem Opfer folgten sie der Rede Spur; sie entdeckten die in die Ṛṣi's Eingegangene. Sie holten sie und verteilten sie unter Viele; ihr schreien im Chore die sieben Sänger zu.

With the sacrifice they followed the path (= padavĪyam) (to/of) speech. They discovered her in her having entered into the ṛsis (pravishṭa - one who has enetered into, or gone, or come into - is equivalent to Geldner's "Eingegangene"). They (the ṛsis) hold her and distribute her to many; she cries out in the chorus of the seven singers.

The importance of the ritual context to the manifestation of

Vāc is asserted here. Here and in v. 11 the ritual is the formal

sacrifice, while vv. 5 and 10 suggest an ascetic communal

ritual of some sort.

4. uta tvaḥ paṣyan na dadarṣa vācam uta tvaḥ ṣriṇvan na ṣriṇoty enām / uto tvasmai tanvam vi sasre jāyeva patya uṣatĪ suvāsāḥ

One man hath ne'er seen Vāk, and yet he seeth: one man hath hearing but hath never heard her.
But to another hath she shown her beauty as a fond well-dressed woman to her husband.

Und mancher, der sieht, hat die Rede nicht erschaut, und mancher, der hört, hört sie doch nicht. Und dem einen hat sie sich aufgetan wie eine verliebte, schöngekleidete Frau dem Gatten.

And many who see have not envisioned (siehen/erschauen) speech ("many who see her do not grasp her" - Geldner), and many who hear, yet they hear not. And the one she has presented herself to as a loving, well-dressed wife to her husband.

Vāc is selective in the manifestation of herself just as a wife

is selective in that she shows her charms to her husband and
not to all. [80]   Although the same imagery is used of both
there is a radical distinction between true seeing and hearing
and mundane seeing and hearing. The distinction between seeing
and hearing may refer to the two different ritual roles of v.
10 a-b. It points to the fact that that which is seen in vision
(dhī) is called that which is heard, śruti.

5.   uta tvaṃ sakhye sthirapītam āhur nainaṃ hinvanty api
vājineshu / adhenvā carati māyayaisha vācaṃ śuśruvāṅ
aphalām apushpām

> One man they call a laggard, dull in friendship:  they
>   never urge him on to deeds of valour.
> He wanders on in profitless illusion:  the Voice he
>   heard yields neither fruit nor blossom.

> Von manchem sagt man, dass er in der Genossenschaft
> steif und feist geworden sei; ihn schicken sie auch in
> den Wettkämpfen nicht vor.  Er gibt sich mit einem
> Trugbild ab, das keine Milchkuh ist, denn er hat eine
> Rede gehört, die weder Frucht noch Blüte trägt.

> Of some (i.e. some particular one within the Genossenschaft),
> one says that he has become stiff and fat; him they do
> not send along to the "Wettkämphen" (contest or debate,
> or lit. the "struggle of equals").  He (the fat one)
> presents himself with an untrue picture (in speech),
> that is not a milk-cow (i.e. is aphalām in that it is
> not effective within the rite), for he has heard (Geldner:
> "or, gelernt") a (type of) speech, that neither yields
> fruit nor blossom.

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[80]
    C. Kunhan Raja, Poet-Philosophers of the Ṛgveda, p. 60.

Geldner's "Wettkämpfen" and Griffith's "deeds of valour" both refer to the heroic situation, "vājineshu". Geldner's translation is interpretative, probably on the basis of v. 10 where he uses the word "Redekämpfen". He seems to understand the Assembly as a debating situation, and v. 10 would seem to support this. That would explain the public aspect of "Redekämpfen", but v. 5, and v. 9 c-d indicate that there is also an interior struggle involved. Renou's comments on vipra (the quivering one) are meaningful here. Indications of an interior struggle are seen in the implication of an ascetic context in vv. 5 and 9 which is in some way highly relevant to the exteriorization of dhī as mantra.

The term "māyayaisha" is found in 10.177.1 (māyayā) where it refers to the invisible nature of Vāc for the one who is not ṛsi. "Māyayaisha" as "untrue picture" indicates that there is a fundamental cognitive misorientation, and that the cause of such lies within the beholder himself. The speech of such a one is unfruitful (aphalām) in that it does not make him vājina (mighty or heroic) and he does not win food and favour in the Assembly (v. 10).

6. yas tityāja sacividaṃ sakhāyaṃ na tasya vācy api b hāgo
   asti / yad īṃ sṛiṇoty alakaṃ sṛiṇoti nahi praveda
   sukṛitasya panthām

   No part in Vâk hath he who hath abandoned his own dear
     friend who knows the truth of friendship.
   Even if he hears her still in vain he listens:  naught knows
     he of the path of righteous action.

   Wer einen mitwissenden Freund im Stiche gelassen hat,
   der hat keinen Anteil an der Rede mehr.  Was er auch hört, er
   hört es vergeblich; er kennt nicht den Weg der Tugend.

   Whoever forsakes a friend of equal understanding
   (= sacividaṃ, "intimate, belonging together"/sakhāyaṃ,
   "companions, friends":  forsakes one of the Freundschaft),
   he no longer has any part of speech.  What he hears
   he hears in vain (in that) he knows nothing of the path
   of virtue.

Forsaking a friend may refer to forsaking Vāc, the falling out

with Vāc, and therefore the select community of Vāc as in v. 8.

It may refer to v. 10 and the possibility of not winning in the

Assembly.  On the other hand it may refer to v. 7, and, in that

context it may be a threat against one who might want to deliberately

appear "more equal" than his equals.

7. akshaṇvantaḥ karṇavantaḥ sakhāyo manojaveshv asamā
   babhūvuḥ / ādaghnāsa upakakshāsa u tve hradā iva snātvā
   u tve dadṛiṣre

   Unequal in the quickness of their spirit are friends
     endowed alike with eyes and hearing.
   Some look like tanks that reach the mouth or shoulder,
     others like pools of water fit to bathe in.

> Freunde, die Augen und Ohren haben, sind sich an
> Einfallen des Geistes ungleich. Die einen erscheinen
> (wie Teiche), die bis an den Mund, bis an die Achsel
> reichen, die anderen wie Teiche, die zum Baden geeignet
> sind.

> Friends who have eyes and ears (which hear and see
> properly) i.e. those still in the Freundschaft, are
> inspired unequally. Some appear (as ponds) up to
> the mouth and shoulder, the others as ponds that
> might be used for bathing.

The reference to pools of water is probably no more than an
image to indicate the different levels of "depths" of inspiration
and use of language to express the inspiration. However, it may
refer to a sort of ritual act of initiation in keeping with the
implications of v. 5.

The reference to the one who appears as a pool wherein
the water is up to the mouth may relate to the water symbolism
with which Vāc is frequently associated. Geldner picks up the
water imagery in v. 9, perhaps for this reason. The water being
up to the mouth would indicate one whose flow of speech is one
with the resevoir of Vāc herself.

8. hṛidā tashṭeshu manaso javeshu yad brāhmaṇāḥ saṃyajante
   sakhāyaḥ / atrāha tvam vi jahur vedyābhir ohabrahmāṇo
   vi caranty u tve

   When friendly Brâhmans sacrifice together with mental
       impulse which the heart hath fashioned,
   They leave one far behind through their attainments, and
       some who count as Brâhmans wander elsewhere.

Wann die Brahmanen als Genossen zusammen opfern,
wahrend die Einfalle des Geistes im Herzen geformt
werden, da lassen sie den einen mit Bedacht abfallen;
die andern treten ab, indem ihre feierlichen Reden
Beifall finden.

When the Brahmans sacrifice together as comrades,
during (that time) the flashes of insight are formed
within the heart, they let the one (the fat one of v. 5)
deliberately fall down; the others step away while their
ceremonial speeches (= ohabrahmāṇo - referring to a
priest possessing or conveying sacred knowledge, i.e.
possessing and conveying the brahma) - find approval.

Here Geldner's translation of "hridā tashteshu manaso javeshu"

as ". . . die Einfalle des Geistes im Herzen geformt werden . .

. ." is no better than Griffith's ". . . with mental impulse
which the heart hath fashioned". Monier-Williams[81]  indicates

that "hrid" is thought to be connected with the heart, or mind

as the seat of feeling, but, that in the "older language" such

as in the Rgveda it refers more generally to the "interior",

the sense of 'within'. Thus, ". . . the impulses of the mind

(manas) formed within would be more appropriate.

9.   ime ye nārvāṅ na paraṣ caranti na brāhmaṇāso na sute-
     karāsaḥ / ta ete vācam abhipadya pāpayā sirīs tantraṃ
     tanvate aprajajñayaḥ

     Those men who step not back and move not forward, nor
        Brâhmans nor preparers of libations,
     Having attained to Vâk in sinful fashion spin out their
        thread in ignorance like spinsters.

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> Die nicht näher und nicht weiter kommen, nicht (wirkliche)
> Brahmanen sind, noch bei dem Soma mit wirken, die
> gebrauchen die Rede in übler Weise und spannen unkundig
> die fliessenden Wasser als Gewebe auf.

> Those who come neither nearer nor farther (i.e. those
> who have fallen down) are not (really) Brahmanas (and)
> cannot work with Soma (in that) they use speech in a
> foul manner (i.e. "pāpayā" - "foul" rather than Griffith's
> "sinful" in that it relates to the earlier references to
> purification) and spin speech ignorantly like a web
> over flowing water.

"Inexperienced", or "inexpert" would be better than "ignorantly"

for "aprajajñayaḥ". Here "tantra" means "warp", while "siri"[82]

means "shuttle" - both meanings are exclusive to this hymn.

The shuttles in this hymn are not the female weavers, the "spinsters"

as Griffith would have it,[83] but probably means something like

the imagery of 10.130.1 which concerns weaving. It refers to a

lack of skill in the ability to manipulate the instruments (the

instruments of the ritual perhaps) with which the fabric of

speech (perhaps the fabric of Vāc as the well-dressed wife in

v. 4) is woven. Thus they are masters of the brahma, i.e. they

do not have the sthirapītam ("strong protection"; perhaps referring

to the debate context or the exchange in the Assembly; they are

not sabhāsāhena, "superior in Assembly", v. 10) of the brahma.

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[82]
  Ibid., p. 436, and p. 1217.

[83]
  See Griffith, Hymns of the Rigveda, Vol. II, p. 485, n. 1.

Geldner's translation is highly interpretive, but it is
in keeping with the rest of the hymn, and with what has been
said regarding purification, Soma, and the sieve imagery.
"Flowing water" is meaningful in relation to Vāc-Sarasvatī.
Geldner's translation might be paraphrased as: "Those who
attempt to use speech without the necessary skill are not
"hero" (ṛṣi) in that they do not win the strength and protection
of the brahma. They operate in delusion (v. 5). They weave
speech which, unlike the purifying sieve of proper speech, is
obstructive of the flow of proper speech just as a net is
to the flow of water." The lack of skill or inexperience
(aprajajñayaḥ) refers to two factors: (1) an actual ritual
skill which might have been an ecstatic dance of some sort
which in v. 9 some cannot do because they are fat and stiff
(v. 5), and (2) a skill that lies within which is the inner
mastery of the mechanics of poetic language and imagery itself.
One who sees but has no "vision" is not capable of directing
the shuttle through the woof to form (formulate) the fabric
of the well-dressed Vāc which is the brahma. Thus in 2.85.5
c-d, Gonda translates and comments that,'"let not the thread
break when I am weaving my dhīḥ" . . . must refer to the process
of converting the inspiration into audible speech and metrical

84
stanzas.'

10.   sarve nandanti yaṣasāgatena sabhāsāhena sakhyā
      sakhāyaḥ / kilbishasprit pitushanir hy eshām araṃ hito
      bhavati vājināyo

      All friends are joyful in the friend who cometh in triumph,
        having conquered in assembly.
      He is their blame-averter, food-provider:  prepared is he
        and fit for deed of vigour.

      Alle Genossen freuen sich uber den geehrten Genossen,
      der als der Sieger in der Versammlung ankommt, denn
      er bewahret sie vor Fehle, verdient für sie Brot.  Zum
      Wettkampf vorgeschickt stellt er seinen Mann.

      All comrades are happy over the honoured friend who
      arrives, the victor in the Assembly (sabhāsāhena), for
      he saves them from failure and provides them bread.
      Sent forth to the speech-struggle (battle) (Redekampfen)
      he stands firm (vājināyo:  in reference to heroic deeds
      or nature).

Both Griffith's "blame-averter" and Geldner's "er bewahret sie vor

fehle" are inadequate for "kilbishasprit" which means "removing
                      85
or avoiding sins".    The victorious one both redeems past

failures or transgressions, and because he was the proper selection

to send to the Assembly, and in that he was receptive to dhī and

had the required skills to convert the dhī into mantra, the

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84
        Gonda, Vision of the Vedic Poets, p. 114.
85
        Monier-Williams, An English-Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 284.
The term occurs here, and only once more in Ait.Br. 1.13.

Assembly approve (v. 8) the "hero" (ṛṣi) - blame is thus

averted in that he has avoided failure. The dhī must be put

into an acceptable form and transformed into a means, as Gonda

puts it, "of overcoming difficulties . . . ."[86]   Within the

rite this would pertain to all times, past, present, and future.

11.  ṛicāṃ tvaḥ posham āste pupushvān gāyatram tvo gāyati
     ṣakvarīshu / brahmā tvo vadati jātavidyāṃ yajñasya
     mātrāṃ vi mimīta u tvaḥ

     One plies his constant task reciting verses:  one sings
        the holy psalm in Sakvarî measures.
     One more, the Brahman, tells the lore of being, and one
        lays down the rules of sacrificing.

     Der eine sitzt da, die Fülle der Verse mehrend, der
     andere singt eine Gesangesweise auf Śakvarīversen.  Der
     eine trägt als brahman das vorhandene Wissen vor, der
     andere bestimmt das Mass des Opfers.

     The one sits there, increasing the wealth of verse,
     the other sings a song of Śakvarī verse.  The one
     carries the available brahman, the other
     decides the measure of the sacrifice.

Geldner's translation of 'c' is to be preferred to Griffith's.[87]

Here "brahma" is probably pl. accusative, not nominative,

following "jātavidyāṃ" (accusative) which in this case means

"the knowledge that exists",  i.e. the brahma.[88]  Geldner's

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     86
       Gonda, Vision of the Vedic Poets, p. 114.
     87
       See D. W. Whitney, Sanskrit Grammar, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 159 (#425, d.).
     88
       Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p.
417; he cites Nir. 1.8.  The term is unique to this hymn.

"tragen" for "vadati" (√van - "to utter, speak") is inadequate.

Griffith mentions that the four functions refer to the four roles of the functionaries: 'a' refers to the Hotar; 'b' to the Udgatar; 'd' to the Adharyu. He does not account for 'c'.[89]

(b)

The three-fold role of the ṛṣi as visionary, poet and functionary involves the non-personal perception of a metaphysical first principle of reality, the personal expression or "translation" of the vision into the poetics of mantra which is then applied to a practical end within the supra-personal context of ritual. In the relationship between vision, expression, and application the Sacred Word is the instrument of Heil and Wholsein in the immediate sense in that it involves the making manifest of that which is Real in itself and the non-personal identification with the fullness of Being itself. In a secondary sense Heil as "welfare" is "well-being" through the resolution of the practical concerns of everyday existence. The former is right relation with that which transcends the temporal order, while the latter is right relation with the

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[89] Ralph T. H. Griffith, Hymns of the Rigveda, Vol. II, p. 486, n. 11.

elements of the temporal order itself.

Earlier the factors of temporality as they pertain to personhood were discussed within the framework of dharma. Having also associated vrata and dharma in an earlier context, it would be useful at this point to discuss the basis of that association.

One element which vrata (holy vow or practice) and dharma (duty) have in common is that both imply that the worldly status of an individual is reflective of a cosmic reality. Both are concerned with the realm of the phenomenal, and in that it is held that there is a first principle that transcends the phenomenal order (Vāc-akshara in the one context, Brahman in the other) it can be said that the paradoxical language of both "Is" and "Is not" applies to both. One makes a vow, or performs a rite which "Is" personal, and, at the same time, "Is not" in that it reflects a cosmic reality which is greater than himself. It is supra-personal, and concerns the functionary aspect of ritual involvement which sustains the ordo-rerum. Thus, while personal in one respect vrata need not be understood in such restrictive terms for ultimately it involves the entire cosmic order. Dharma is more obviously a universal

principle, but, phenomenologically, in terms of the object

(maintenance of Ṛta) and context (yajña) or vrata, vrata

can also be understood as a universal principle. Ritual need

not be understood as formal ritual alone, for by virtue of the

fact that individual action is reflective of, and prescriptive

of a cosmic reality all actions, especially within the under-

standing of Tradition put forth in Chapter One, are ritual

actions. All actions are either in keeping with Ṛta or are

anṛta. All actions, vows and thoughts are meaningful in terms

of Ṛta. The Tradition itself has understood man's existence

in such a comprehensive manner. R. Mukerjee illustrates this

when he says,

> Classical Brahmanical metaphor interprets not
> only creation as a cosmos cultus (yajna), but the
> symbolic distribution of the Cosmic Person into
> the ordered universe, but also the maintenance
> of the order of nature through the reciprocity
> of gods (devas) and men as represented by the
> Wheel of Sacrament (yajna cakra). These
> simultaneously emerged during the process of
> creation. The cultus is a spiritual as well as
> a physical necessity for all creatures. The
> cycle of nature (jagat cakra) is itself cultus.
> Through the impassion and desirelessness of his
> works man emulates the grand Sacrifice of the
> Cosmic Person that is creation itself. Man rises
> through the sacraments or yajna-karma from
> the material (adhibautika) to the higher
> psychic reality (adhidaiva) - the special field

of the evolution of personality (adhi yajnaoham
evatra dehe). The Indian man interprets the
Sacrament in a comprehensive spiritual way. It
embraces at once the offering of mind, senses and
objects to the fires of right enjoyment and self-
control and teh (sic!) all-pervasive symbolic
transfiguration of all activities and goals of
life as obligations . . . . Here all living becomes
symbolic, all work worship. . . . All sacraments or
sacrifices thus culminate in the inner wisdom-
sacrament (antar-yajna, pranayajna, brahman-yajna).[90]

Within this understanding it is not possible to make a valid

distinction between ritual action in a formal and a general

sense for the difference is a matter of degree.

There is, however, a difference in the scope of practi-

cality inasmuch as welfare within the framework of the poetic

out-pouring is radically different from that of the everyday

concern. In the rsi this difference is expressed in the two

modes of the seer and the poet. The difference lies in the

status of individual personality. The rsi as kavi and

functionary is paradigmatic of individuality in a supra-personal

sense in that vrata is involved, while the rsi as visionary is

paradigmatic of the transcendence of individuality and the entire

framework of vrata-concerns. The paradoxical language of "is"/"is

not" does not apply to the rsi whereas it does apply to the kavi.

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[90]
    R. Mukerjee, The Symbolic Life of Man, Bombay:  Hindu
Kitabs, 1959, p. 188.  The diacritical marks are omitted in the
source.

This point will be considered in some detail as it applies

to each case:

(1)  The rṣi as visionary:

The relationship between the rṣi and the power which

expresses itself through vision is reciprocal to the point

where the distinction is so blurred that it is difficult to speak

of relationship.  In the case of Vāc one must speak of identity

rather than relation for the power source of the vision and the

content of the vision are one and the same.  Vāc reveals itself

as itself, not _to_ the rṣi, but _through_ the rṣi.  One cannot

distinguish between the one who sees and that which is seen, for

the identity of the former is co-terminus with the reality of

the latter.  Such an experience would be non-mediated, non-

representational, and non-personal.

Renou makes a statement which is useful here.  He says,

". . . Vedism is already a _Yoga_, a collective _Yoga_ in which the

composers of the formulae, the early ancestors who inaugurated

the sacrifice and the gods who are both witnesses and participants,

all play their part."[91]  His use of the term "_yoga_" is unclear

and possibly misleading.  It might be understood in several ways.

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[91] Renou, _Religions of Ancient India_, p. 18.

Such a "collective Yoga" in the Ṛg Veda must refer not to a particular spiritual discipline,[92] but, rather, to a fundamental attitude toward reality and the relevance of individual experience within that understanding. The root "√yuj" means "to unite", "to yoke", "to join together". One such form of unification is found in the scope and function of the ritual. It has been noted that the intricate relationship between powers and power mediums implies a highly integral understanding of phenomenal reality. This might be called a yogic understanding. Vrata in a collective sense represents a form of "yoga" in that all vrata focuses on the reality of Ṛta. The ṛṣi as poet and functionary does vrata in his role as "hero" and through his performance he sustains the community in terms of its particular interests, and the ordo-rerum as well. His representation of the community is a form of "yoga" in that they are united in and through the "hero" figure.

It is through such an act which might be called an act of "yoga" that the consciousness of the poet transcends itself to the paradigmatic non-personal model. In a very general

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[92] The prāṇa exercises of the Ṛg Veda doubtless refer to a religious discipline of some sort, as do the ascetic implications of 10.71, but the first systematic account of yoga as a specific discipline appear in the Katha Upaniṣad.

statement on the nature of Indian spirituality Betty Heimann

makes several observations which might serve to clarify this

point. Her use of the term "mystic" is, I think, regrettable

because of its vagueness, but it is not altogether out of

place here. I understand the term to apply to what I have

called the "inward" nature of the quest for truth as intro-

spection, and to insight as the realization of Truth. The

term "philosopher" signifies one who strives after insight.

These qualifications considered, her observations are sufficient-

ly to the point to warrant being cited at length. She says:

> The philosopher, the mystic in the Indian sense, is the
> ideal leader of Indian society. The cosmic view −
> basic to all Indian thought − is that of the inter-
> connection of all empirical phenomena. All of them
> emanate from the same pre- and post-empirical unity
> which is only veiled, dimmed and obscured by apparent
> empirical singleness, but is yet latent and active
> in divergent appearances. By studying single persons
> and objects, the Indian philosopher tries to find the
> common ground in all of them. Step by step in uniting
> them by tracing their common essentials, the Indian
> mystic tries to restore the healthy primary unity,
> like the accurate surgeon who uses his knowledge and
> skill to heal the wound of accidental singleness and
> disturbing divergency. The split-up segments of the
> basic oneness are reunited. All the 'Here' in the
> present, past and future manifestations are only
> evidence and proof of a constant unifying and unified
> supra-temporal Beyond. The Indian philosopher-mystic
> undertakes an epistemological research with a clearly
> thought-out method and precise formulation, in order

to deduce from the 'Here' all the possible 'Heres'
the primary and latent unity. It is the latent
unity which is the life-force and the creative
impetus for all time-bound emanations, which are yet in
timeless continuity. Thus the Indian mystic helps to
lead the masses beyond their imagined isolation in
feelings and conditions, and he strives - not after
a personal emotional satisfaction alone - but after a
general enlightenment, gradually acquired, so as to
make visible the Unity behind all appearances. This
search helps him and all his followers to the right
evaluation of events, past, present and future. In
India the mystics, then, are not self-secluded single
individuals, no 'mystic Few', but the 'mystical all-in-
one'. The mystic is the leader, the educator. He is
responsible for the whole of society and its enlighten-
ment. He teaches the common truth of basic supra-
personal Reality and Unity. (emphasis added)[93]

The association of the "philosopher" in general with the

rsi might be examined at this point to illustrate the ways in

which such an association is and is not valid. Of interest in

this regard is identification of poetry and philosophy in the

Vedic literature. C. Kunhan Raja says that,

A philosopher is a poet; a man who has realised the
truth is so recognised only when he is able to express
his realisation through the medium of poetic language;
there is also an indication that poetry is the only
medium through which truth can be expressed. The
philosophy in the Veda is also a philosophy of language
and a philosophy of poetry.[94]

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93
   Betty Heimann, Facets of Indian Thought, pp. 133-34.
94
   Poet-Philosophers of the RigVeda, p. xxiv.

Transcendence of "personality" refers to transcendence of a cognitive condition which I have characterized as a fundamental sense of the wrongness of existence. In the context of RV I.164 it refers to Dīrghatamas' condition of being "fettered in mind". Thus, "personality" in this sense is akin to the later understanding of the individual person as a product of the association through primeval Nescience (avidyā) of the antaḥkaraṇaḥ (internal organ), of which the ahaṁkāra is only one factor, with the ātman which is called jīva within this association.[95] It is not possible here to speak of the "subjective" and "objective" aspects of the phenomenon in anything other than a heuristic sense because Nescience (non-knowledge or wrong-knowledge) understood as being primeval (fundamental) is the synthesising basis which makes the relationship between the associates (jīva-antaḥkaraṇa) necessary in all ways, as long as that basis endures.

In the same way the transcendence of personalisms in the vision represents the transcendence of a cognitive condition. The basis of this condition – a sense of "wrongness" the state of being "fettered in mind" which in this case is expressed as

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[95]
This doctrine is discussed in some detail in Chapter V.

the lack of right relation to Vāc – has been undercut.

The term 'dhīh' refers to both a power concept and an empirical phenomenon,[96] and yet as a cognitive act it transcends the subject/object dichotomy.

Dhīti is the faculty spoken of in visual terms by Dīrghatamas when he says, ". . . he who hath eyes sees this, the blind discerns not". Such an experience of "seeing" is suggested to be the recurrence of a single archetype; the tuning into the ever-present ground of reality with what Krṣṇa, in Gītā 11.8, calls the "divine eyes". Thus, it is not a public phenomenon, for it is not within the mundane field of vision (Katha 11.3.9). Nor can it be called private for that would imply a subjectivism which is not appropriate to the case: Arjuna, although he was the only one who could see Lord Krṣṇa, was unable to do within the scope of his own (i.e. 'personal') vision. Nirukta 1.20 speaks of the cognitive condition of the vision as a form of intuition. Gonda uses the term "wisdom" to describe the state of mind.[97] One thing is clear: the vision was thought to be beyond the realm of ordinary thought (RV 1.139.2).

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[96] Gonda, Vision of the Vedic Poets, p. 107.
[97] Ibid., p. 104.

The vision is spoken of in 1.164.1:

Of this benignant Priest, with eld grey-coloured, the
    brother midmost of the three is lighting.
The third is he whose back with oil is sprinkled.
    Here I behold the Chief with seven male children.[98]

There is an element of mysticism here. He (Dīrghatamas)
was sitting in front of the physical fire and then in
that fire he was able to see the heavenly light.
And in that heavenly Fire, he was able to vision the
wisdom, the lord of the people. . . . He would see
something in the physical phenomenon what ordinary
people cannot see.[99]

Again, it must be pointed out that the term "philosopher"
is a Western term and that one must be very clear when applying
it to the Indian context. The different orthodox "philosophies"
of India are called "darśanas". In RV 1.116.23 the term (neuter)
means "seeing, observing, looking, noticing, observation, per-
ception", while in 1.58.16 it means "intention".[100] From √dris,
"to see, to which to show", "darśa" "looking at, viewing" as
"darśana" refers to the different "views" or "viewpoints" of
the nature of reality or truth. Because all of the orthodox
schools hold the Vedas to be pramāṇa they all claim to be putting
forth different "views" of the single truth. That which they
have in common is a fundamental attitude to Veda; because of

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[98]
    Ralph T. H. Griffith, trans., Hymns of the Rigveda.
[99]
    Poet-Philosophers of the RigVeda, p. 3.
[100]
    Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, pp. 470-71.

this, their disputes on doctrine might be called a "family dispute". The tone of argument between the orthodox darśanas differs from the tone of argument between the orthodox darśanas and the non-orthodox views, for in the latter case the status of Veda itself is at stake. The term "darśana" indicates that India understood what the West calls "philosophy" consistently within a perceptual framework; ultimately the experiential factor is primary and all theoria is directed toward the experiential end. For this reason all orthodox Indian philosophy can be called soteriological. Two distinctions common in the West today do not apply to India: (1) the distinction between "theoretical" and "practical", and (2) the distinction between "philosophy" and "religion".

The use of the term "darśana" to denote a "systematic philosophy" does not apply to the Rg Veda in the sense that it applies to the six classical darśanas, but RV 1.58.16, and 116.23 use the word in the same way as the later darśanas. From this one can say that a "philosopher" of the classical period is one who expounds or clarifies a "view" or "viewpoint" within the understanding that such an exposition of the Truth is secondary to the actual realization or experience of that Truth. A

philosopher "points the way" to mokśa. In what manner might

the ṛṣi of the Ṛg Veda be called a philosopher? Here one must

take into account the two-fold nature of the ṛṣi; in doing so,

it becomes clear that the ṛṣi is a unique figure. As the

visionary the ṛṣi is paradigmatic of the realization of the

Truth. Such a realization I have said is non-mediated, non-

representational (in that it involves total identification with

the True) and non-personal (by virtue of the fact that the

realization is a total identification - in this case, with Vāc).

It involves a transcendence of the entire framework of the

particularities of the mundane historical order. It is a

cognitive condition, but because it is transcendent of the

framework of the phenomenal order, it cannot be likened to any

cognitive condition within the phenomenal order because the two

are categorically distinct. The ṛṣi, strictly within the

capacity as visionary, does not point to the True, but, rather,

embodies the True itself.

However, it is clear from RV 10.71 that the vision was

never understood as an end in itself. Vision and expression of

the vision go hand in hand. They can be separated only for the

purposes of clarification. 10.71 indicates that there is a

reciprocal relation between vision of the True, and speech of

the True as mantra, or "true" speech.

The very question of "true" speech or "false" speech as an indication of "true" or "false" vision relates to the question of Tradition as it was considered in the first chapter. It is useful at this point to recall Younger's definition of Tradition as "a conscious authoritative selection of religious experience."[101] On the basis of this understanding alone it would appear that there is no argument for not including the Rg Veda within the Tradition for it is clear that there is indeed a standard for distinguishing the "true" from the "false", and this constitutes "a conscious authoritative selection of religious experience". I hold, therefore, that Younger's argument is self-defeating in this regard.

The "Assembly" obviously plays a vital role in this distinction. The "Assembly" must have had some rule or common understanding with which to judge the contestant. I mentioned in discussing 10.71 that Geldner understands portions of the hymn as applying to a debating situation. I think he is correct in doing so, especially in that hymn. 10.71.10 indicates that it was vitally important for the one who represented the

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[101] Younger, The Indian Religious Tradition, p. 1.

group which Geldner calls the "Freundschaft" to win favour

within the "Assembly" for what was at stake was not merely

applause and the honour of having won. Recognition as "hero"

or "victor" brought favour from the "Assembly", and one aspect

of the favour was the fact that group which the speaker rep-

resented would be given food and sustenance. One had to win

for all to eat.

The phrase "conscious authoritative selection of

religious experience" applies to two related contexts:  (1) the

group from which a member was selected to stand before the

"Assembly", and (2) the "Assembly" itself.  These points and

the nature of their relatedness will now be considered in

detail:

(1)  10.71.5 makes it clear that the group of "Freundschaft"

had some method of selection to decide just who would represent

them at the "Assembly".  It is indicated that one factor might

have been the ability to endure some ascetic rite which sorted

out the "fat" and "stiff".  In v. 5 c-d, and v. 6 the judgment

is made:  he who is "fat" and "stiff" and cannot perform the

test or ritual is declared to have no part in Vāc.  He has

abandoned his friends; perhaps he has broken a vow in becoming

"fat" and "stiff". There is a clear correlation between one's access to Vāc and the mention of the "fat" and "stiff" one. He has no part in Vāc! He hears her voice, but she does not yield fruit (i.e. is aphalam) to him. V. 6 c-d indicates that all of this is a result of the fact that he does not know the path of righteous action. One would assume from this that righteous action, access to Vāc and her yielding of fruit, "true" seeing and "true" hearing is achieved only by the "not-fat", the "not-stiff". Those who do not measure up are in v. 5d said to be in a condition of māyā. It would seem that the term here should be understood as "delusion" not "illusion": it is not the māyāvāda of Advaita Vedānta, for there "māyā" as "illusion" is not only pervasive, but has a positive element. No positive element is hinted at in v. 5. He is "deluded" in that in the condition of the "fat" and "stiff" one listens but does not really hear, sees, but does not really see -- he is deluded in thinking that he could ever win a victory in the "Assembly". The other friends know this, so he will not be chosen to represent them in the "Assembly" for he is neither prepared nor fit for heroic deeds, i.e. he is not master of the shuttle and the woof with which the fabric of the brahman is woven.

V. 7 indicates that the group acknowledges different degrees of inspiration. But there seems to be two different contexts referred to: (a) vv. 1,3, and 11 refer directly to the sacrifice while v. 10 clearly refers to the context in the "Assembly". V. 8 a-b refers to the sacrifice, but c-d may well refer to the "private" initiation within the group. Geldner's translation of 8 c-d (". . . da lassen sie den einen mit Bedacht abfallen (cf. v.6); die anderen treten ab, indem ihre feierlichen Reden Beifall finden")associates it with a public ritual, while Griffith's translation ("They leave one far behind through their attainments, and some who count as Brâhmans wander elsewhere.") is ambiguous. ". . . some who count as Brâhmans . . . ," may refer to some who count themselves (in delusion, v. 5) as Brahmans, or to some who deceive the public into counting them as Brahmans (i.e. masters of the brahman riddle). V. 8 probably refers to the public ritual which, if they win favour through the one who represents them in the "Assembly", they will be hired to perform. The only objection to this would be the logical question, "Why would the "freundschaft" risk public embarrassment by allowing the "fat" and "stiff" one to get that far? V. 10 c-d might provide the answer. The mention of the victorious one as the "redeemer" and "blame-averter" may indicate this: The

group is selective within itself (v. 5); on the basis of this
selectivity they send a representative to the debate in the
"Assembly" who is victorious on their behalf.  They win favour
and are paid to do public ritual whereupon, on the basis of
vv. 8 c-d, 9, one member of the group causes them to fall into
disfavour.  They must now return to the "Assembly" and attempt
to regain favour by winning the poetic competition.  V. 11 is
an account in part of the nature of the public sacrifice.

 This interpretation makes sense of what has generally
been acknowledged to a difficult hymn.  It accounts for the
shift in both subject and context.  It calls into question
Sāyaṇa's contention that the hymn is ". . . the eulogy of the
understanding of the Veda as essential to divine knowledge."[102]
It does not, however, call into question the credibility of Veda
itself, but rather, draws into focus the core of what Veda
itself is which is revelation (dhīḥ) and translation of Vac into
mantra, and it also gives an account of some of the conditions
relevant to this phenomena.  It is an invaluable source for the
understanding of the dynamic vitality of Vedism.

(2)  The second criterion concerns the "Assembly" for it is the
"Assembly" which would sit in judgment of both the vision and

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[102] Cited in Ralph T. H. Griffith, Hymns of the Rigveda,
Vol. II, p. 486, n. 11.

the "translation" of it into audible terms.  It is the

"Assembly" who, in the final analysis, provided the initial

"self conscious criterion of valid religious experience"

which was discussed in Chapter One, which forms the foundation

of the Tradition.  It was they who determined what was valid

"revelation" (dhīḥ made audible as śruti) and what was not

valid "revelation".  The members of the "Assembly" must have

had some predetermined basis against which they would evaluate

the performance of the contestants.  Renou makes a statement

which perhaps indicates several of the factors which the

"Assembly" took into consideration.  He says,

> I imagine that the works (of the Veda)which have
> survived are those which fulfilled the requirements
> of poetic competition.  It has been pointed out that
> the hymna suggest the atmosphere of a contest in
> eloquence.  The aim was to compose on a given theme,
> or perhaps according to a given plan, not introducing
> direct accounts of the lives of the gods so much as
> veiled allusions, occult correspondences . . . such
> is still the foundation of Indian speculative
> thought.[103]

Two factors are involved here:  (1) the mastery of the poetic

art was absolutely necessary.  RV 1.164.23 says,

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[103]
Renou, Religions of Ancient India, p. 10.

> How on the Gâyatrî the Gâyatrî was based, how from
> Trishtup they fashioned the Trishtup forth.
> How from the Jagatî was based the Jagatî, --[104]
> they who know this have won immortal life.

This would indicate a fundamental difference between a mere

poet and a ṛṣi. A ṛṣi, by definition, is also a poet, but a

poet (kavi) is not necessarily a ṛṣi. On the basis of the

above stanza it would seem that the basic difference between

the two is the fact that ṛṣi is not actually involved in a

"fashioning" of the meter as such, not in the sense of

"creative imagination". The ṛṣi is the medium through which

the divine model, i.e. the Gāyatrī, makes itself manifest as

the Gāyatrī meter of the sacred song or poem. On the other

hand, the ṛṣi as kavi would involve somewhat more of a

"creative" role in that it would entail the moulding, or

forming imagery which would conform to the metric dictate. I

assume here that when Renou talks of the "given plan" or "given

theme" he is speaking of the content rather than the metric form

in which the content is expressed. This is to return to the

practical aspects of Vedism once more, but it seems clear that

the "Assembly", the representatives of the community, met in

an attempt to find some way of dealing with a situation, a

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104
     Ralph T. H. Griffith, trans., Hymns of the Rigveda.

lived-world problem, that threatened some aspect of the community at large. They would want to know something about, or find some way of dealing with a higher form of reality which would have control over or would be able to assert control over the concernful situation which brought them together. The Seer has the ability to, so to speak, "tune into" supra-mundane reality. They would sit in judgment on the authenticity of the dhīḥ by examining both the form and the content.

Although the Rg Veda depicts a maze of virtually inseparable power complexes it is clear by virtue of the simple fact that specific hymns are dedicated to specific powers or sets of power allies that Vedic man was able to distinguish correlations between particular predicaments and particular powers appropriate to those predicaments. The evolutionist presuppositions aside, herein lies the truth of what Max Müller called henotheism.[105] It would seem, then, that the "given theme" or "given plan" of which Renou speaks refers more to the content than the form of the recitation. It would probably have been assumed that anyone who stepped forth claiming to be a ṛṣi had already mastered the mechanics of the poetic art. But, on the other hand, it is possible that the "given conditions" refer to

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[105] See Chapter II, p. 40, n. 10.

a test of that assumption.

It is not reasonable to assume that the "Assembly" met merely to satisfy their sense of the aesthetic. If that were the case there would be no necessity of distinguishing between the ṛṣi and the kavi. Any poet would have done the job. However, what was needed (and the Ṛg Veda expresses it in many places as an urgent and desperate need) was poetry which accurately depicts that which is True. The only access to that which is True is through the medium of dhīḥ.

The poetry of the dhīḥ had to be faultless; as such it differed radically from everyday language and poetry. C. Kunhan Raja illustrates this distinction well when he says,

> The possible fault in the (everyday) language is that the word may not fully represent the real thing in its true nature; there may be the limitations in the language due to the personality of the speaker and his own notions about things. The exact language without fault, which represents the things of the world in their true nature, became revealed only to those who gave the first currency to the language (cf. 10.71), and it remained concealed . . . . unknown to the people at large.[106]

1.164.23 indicates that the meter of the Veda is actually the manifestation through the ṛṣi as visionary of the transcendent

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[106]
Poet-Philosophers of the Rgveda, p. 56.

form.  The implication of this is the doctrine of the eternality

of relation between word and meaning.  In this respect C. Kunhan

Raja says,

> The relation between word and meaning is eternal, without
> being created by anyone . . . . . . .  There was the dis-
> tinction between those who knew the real meaning of a
> word and those who knew only the general meaning.  It is
> the words of those who knew the real meaning that is
> called the Veda; in the Vedic collection it is only the
> poetry of those who could see the truth in its absolutely
> objective nature and who could express such truths in
> the true language, that has been incorporated; such poets
> are called the Ṛsis.[107]  (emphasis added)

In this context I would understand the term "objective" to mean

"non-personal".  One must be careful not to read into the Indian

understanding of "personhood" Western distinctions which are not

applicable.  Betty Heimann illustrates that the subject/object

dichotomy is one such distinction which does not apply.  She

says,

> . . . subjective elements like will and intention are
> considered by the Indian as an objective material
> factor.  Thought and its expression in words are just
> as material as their effects as a concrete action.
> Thus ancient Ṛgveda values the dedication of a hymn
> like a concrete material offering.  . . . The onto-
> logical foundation of Hindu thought leads to an emphasis
> on the objective, not on the subjective, aspect.  A
> striking example of this is given in Indian epistemology'
> the term for the subjectively true is satyam which means
> 'objective being'.  Everything which exists has through
> its very existence the quality of truth. . . . Western

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[107]
    This point is discussed in Chapter Five concerning the
position of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā; of note is the fact that 1.164.23
provides a solid foundation and legitimation for the position of
the Mīmāṁsākas.

> critical scepticism, on the other, with its questioning
> of all existent objective phenomena, finds its positive
> hold in the <u>Cogito, ergo sum</u>.[108]

It is precisely the fact that the phenomenon of the vision

transcends these distinctions which are the basis of the "Is"

and "Is not" paradox which makes the vision unique. Actual

translation of the vision is seen as the alignment with the

transcendent model of meter. The "Assembly" would still sit

in judgment of the validity of the content of the contestants

songs in terms of what Renou calls a "given plan" or "theme".

This raises the second factor: (2) If one takes seriously the

idea that the appearance before the "Assembly" involves a

genuine contest of debate, then one way of understanding the

basis of decision used by the "Assembly" would be to see the

situation as one wherein the contestants were given a pre-

determined set of "rules" (possibly the metric limitations)

within which they had to translate their visions on a given

theme. The advantages of such an interpretation are twofold:

(1) it allows for "personal" element, and (2) it provides a clue

to understanding the very nature of the Vedic hymns. These

points are related on the issue of the role of "imagination" in the

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[108]
<u>Facets of Indian Thought</u>, pp. 55-6.

translation of the vision, and the understanding of Veda as "mythological invention".

Betty Heimann makes the following comment to illustrate the fundamental difference in the way that India and the West understand the role of "imagination". She says,

> Fictio, from the Latin fingere, shaping or fashioning of pre-existent matter, has again developed into a predominantly negative meaning. It is generally used to mean just 'fancy', because it applies to something not to be verified by the senses. By contrast, India does make use of the term fictio in its positive import. The reality of sense-perception is here never the last and final reality. Like all empirical canons of truth, it is of only relative import. True reality lies in the constant transcendental sphere. A visualiza- tion and imagination of this highest truth is the utmost achievement to which the Indian thinker can penetrate. As such the kavi, the 'poet', is the true rsi, 'seer and saint'. Fictio, 'imagination', is the positive mental faculty which forms images beyond the external objects - presentations only of the hidden ideas and ideals which are never fully realizable and verifiable in this world.[109]

Any "creative imagination" of the rsi as kavi would not concern the question of novelty. In fact, it would seem that the essential function of the "Assembly" as those who determine that which is authoritative would argue against this possibility.

The status of śruti itself rests on this point.

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[109] Ibid., p. 174.

CHAPTER IV

COSMOGONY / COSMOLOGY

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## COSMOGONY/COSMOLOGY

### General

The work done on the cosmogony of Vedic literature has ranged from simple descriptive classification[1] through historical-philosophical studies on problems of chronological sequence[2] to phenomenological[3] analysis. While the historical-philosophical studies are of interest they are of little import to a work of this sort in that it is generally accepted that the concerns which motivated such studies and the methodologies employed in them are unsound within the context of early Indian religion.[4] The

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[1] Macdonell, The Vedic Mythology, Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1963 (reprint: no original date). This remains the best reference work on the subject. He groups the material into two broad categories (the model of mechanical production, and natural generation); no other attempt is made to systemize the material or to speculate upon it in any way. See also Edward Moor, The Hindu Pantheon. A biased book, badly written and organized, it is of use only to draw thin lines of relationship between various deities of the early and late pantheon.

[2] Deussen, Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and Ranade, Outlines of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, for example, analyse the Vedic literature in an attempt to sort out the order of 'development' in cosmogonic theories.

[3] F. D. K. Bosch, The Golden Germ, 1960. Virtually all of the works of Mircea Eliade deal with cosmogony and touch upon the Indian viewpoints at some point or other.

[4] This refers to the fact mentioned earlier that at present the evidence for precise historical dating of the texts is sufficiently lacking that theories based on such grounds are in the final analysis more speculative than anything else. This is also true for those who would attempt to illustrate the "development" of the Indian religious consciousness on the basis of presuppositions taken either from the history of Western philosophy or from the findings of comparative anthropology. I am not advocating a theory of development.

results of recent phenomenological [5] and structural [6] studies have

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The question of what exactly constitutes a "phenomenological"
study of religion varies somewhat. Some 'phenomenologists' have
been accused of being 'a-historical': F. B. J. Kuiper, in his
review of Bosh's Golden Germ states that Bosh's 'a-historical'
method was dictated by the nature of his archeological evidence.
BKI (Contributions to Philology, Geography and Ethnology), The Hague:
Royal Institute for Philology, Geography and Ethnology, 107, p. 70,
cited in The Golden Germ, p. 57, n. 5. Bosh defends his position
well by pointing out that his primary concern is with phenomenological
models.
In a brief but useful article, Robert Luyster, "The Study of Myth:
Two Approaches", Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol. 43 (1966) pp.
235-243, presents others who have been criticized severely for their
supposed total neglect of history.
Examples of the anthropological criticism of Eliade's methodology:
commenting on Eliade's Sacred and Profane, Wm. A. Lessa writes:

> Eliade has written what, for the anthropologist, must seem
> like a strange book . . . . He has made what appears to be
> an insightful synthesis of complex and varied phenomena, yet
> beneath a facade of skilful writing and brilliant speculation
> one cannot help feeling that it is something of an anachronism.
> While claiming to be an introduction to the history of religion,
> there is no history in this work, except some cubious assumptions
> regarding the sequences through which man and religion have
> passed . . . . It should be read almost as a literary effort
> rather than a work of science or history. (American Anthropolo-
> gist, LXI (1959), 1147), Ibid., p. 240.

History for the anthropologists is Boas-oriented evolutionism.
Luyster, defending Eliade against their criticism says:

> . . . he (Eliade) is a phenomenologist, one who investigates
> the nature and structure of given phenomena. To this, the
> phenomenologist must necessarily abstract common features
> from their particular historical manifestations and compose
> from these features the structures which they everywhere –
> and yet nowhere completely – disclose. (emphasis added)
> (Ibid., p. 241).

This is not being 'anti-historical' but simply to insist on the
attempt to be able to do something within the framework of a
Tradition which understands its roots to be of an 'a-historical'
nature. Phenomenologists have long rejected the theory of
'evolutionism'. Van der Leeuw, perhaps the first 'phenomenologist'
of religion, in his Phänomenologie der Religion (Tubingen, 1933)
p. 652, quotes Wach's Religionswissenschaft (Leipzig, 1924) p. 82:

shown that these methodologies are best suited to deal with the

type of texts within which the problems of cosmogony arise.

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5 (continued)

"Von einer historischen 'Entwicklung' der Religion, weisst die
Phänomenologie nichts". Raffaele Pettazzoni refers to Van der
Leeuw and Wach to make this point. Van der Leeuw (p. 642) again
quoting Wach (p. 117) talks of the relationship between phenomenology
and other methodologies:

> Soll die Phänomenologie ihre Aufgabe vollbringen, so hat
> sie die immerwährende Korrektur der gewissenschaftesten
> philologischen, archäologischen Forschung sehr nötig. Sie
> muss stets bereit sein, sich der Konfrontation mit dem
> Tatsachenmaterial zu stellen . . . . (Die) rein philologische
> Hermeneutik hat weniger weite Ziele als die rein
> phänomenologische . . . . Das Phänomenologische Verständnis
> wird aber zur reinen Kunst oder zur leeren Phantastik,
> sobald (es) sich der Kontrolle durch die philologisch-
> archäologische Deutung entzieht. R. Pettazzoni, "The Supreme
> Being: Phenomenological Structure and Historical Develop-
> ment", p. 63, n. 13.

Jean Danielou in "Phenomenology of Religions and Philosophy of
Religion" remarks on the relationship between phenomenology and
history (pp. 81-82). He says a 'decisive' contribution of phenomeno-
logy has been its ". . . recognition of the specificity of the
religious fact". (p. 81). Other useful observations can be found
in Eliade's "Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious
Symbolism", pp. 86-107.

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I use the term in its relationship to the phenomenon of
symbol relations. Thus it cannot properly be called a phenomenology
in the way that the methodology was considered in Chapter III. An
excellent example of this regarding cosmology/cosmogony in the
Rg Veda are the articles by Stella Kramrish on "The Triple Structure
of Creation in the Rg Veda", History of Religions, Vol. II, No. 1,
pp. 140-175, and Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 256-285. I do not refer to
'structuralism' as a distinct mythedology of the sort advocated by
Claud Lévi-Strauss: see "The Structural Study of Myth" in Myth:
A Symposium, ed. T. A. Sebeok, Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1958,
pp. 50-66. I agree with Paul Ricoeur's criticism of Lévi-Strauss's
methodology as found in Claud Lévi-Strauss, "A Confrontation":
". . . I see an extreme form of modern agnosticism; as far as you are
concerned there is no 'message': not in the cybernetic, but in the
keryinatic sense; you despair of meaning; but you console yourself
with the thought that, if men have nothing to say, at least they say
it so well that their discourse in (sic) amenable to structuralism. .
. ." (p. 74). It seems to me that such a method cannot help but
undermine the 'specificity of the religious fact' which Danielou sees
as a decisive contribution of phenomenology.

Much of what follows will implicitly concern the problem of methodology, primarily in a negative manner. My concern with methodology in this context is to illustrate that cosmology/cosmogony in the Indian Tradition cannot adequately be understood within the restrictions of any single procedural roadmap. In Indian thought there is no direct route from point A to point B. One is left to wander. My concern with methodology will be to point out the manner in which some of the presuppositions on which some studies on the question of cosmology/cosmogony have been based impose restrictions and conditions on both the scope of the material and the latitude of interpretation which restrict the possibility of "wandering" in that they force one to see as a thread what is essentially a spider-web. The pitfalls of this are obvious regarding the question of Vāc: in narrowing down the problem to the specifics of cosmology/cosmogony as it pertains to Vāc one is throwing open the doors to a limitless horizon at the same time by virtue of the fact of the manner in which the Tradition has understood Vāc and the central importance given to it. And this is not peculiar to the question of Vāc: in the manner in which Tradition is understood, all "ideas" and "illusions", "facts" or "fictions" are central -- there are no categorical distinctions.

Thus the negative use of Western methodologies and models is seen to have a positive function in that at some point. At that point at which the presuppositions upon which they are founded

serves to obstruct rather than further inquiry one learns more about India by demolishing such presuppositions.

Methods, models, and categorical distinctions serve a positive function in that they provide one with a point of departure. My point of departure involves two related issues:

1. To speak of "cosmogonic myths" today is to involve oneself in a controversy which has raged for many years.[7] The dispute centers on the relationship between myths of origin and myths of cosmogony. My position regarding this dispute follows that of Eliade for whom, ". . . every myth is 'cosmogonic' because every myth expresses the appearance of a new cosmic 'situation' or primeval event which becomes, simply by being thus expressed, a paradigm for all time to come."[8] My reason for accepting this definition is that it allows

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[7] The central contemporary dispute centers around the disagreement between Mircea Eliade and Raffael Pettazzoni on the relationship between myths of origin and cosmogony. Pettazzoni's position is stated most fully in his "Myths of Beginnings and Creation Myths", Essays on the History of Religions (Leiden, 1954) pp. 24-36. This holds that the subject of myth is the Supreme Being (see his article "The Supreme Being: Phenomenological Structure and Historical Development", HOR (1959) pp. 59-66). Eliade's point of view is that ". . . every myth is 'cosmogonic' because every myth expresses the appearance of a new cosmic 'situation' or primeval event which becomes, simply by being thus expressed, a paradigm for all time to come." Patterns, p. 416. He holds that all myths of origin presuppose a cosmogonic myth: M. Eliade, "The Prestige of the Cosmogonic Myth", Diogenes, (xxiii, Fall, 1958), pp. 1-13. Myth and Reality, New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 37. K. W. Bolle, The Future of Man in Myth, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968, pp. 14-30, reviews the literature in full and argues Eliade's case.

[8] Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, p. 416.

for the fullness which the metaphysics of Vāc require while others

do not do so.[9]

II. The question arises as to whether the myths of Vāc are best

termed "cosmogonic" or "cosmological".[10]    This is a matter of

interpretation which depends upon how the references are organized

and to what end they are applied. Randomly much of the material

is "cosmogonic" in that it functions in an unsystematic manner

within a multitude of contexts which attempt to offer an account,

primarily descriptive, of how the world came to be.[11]    Other

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[9]It will be shown that within the Indian understanding of
reality and history the nature of the "created order", its status
ontologically, and its significance ontically differs radically
from that of the West. A brief statement on the Indian view is
put forward by Younger in his Introduction to Indian Religious
Thought, pp. 78-81. The Western view is discussed at length in
two studies by M. B. Foster, "The Christian Doctrine of Creation
and the Rise of Modern Natural Science", Mind, Vol. 43; "Christian
Theology and Modern Science of Nature", Mind, Vol. 44.
The question of the 'Supreme Being' which has been central to
Pettazzoni's thought and the status of 'origination' have been
penultimate questions in Indian philosophy:  this is best illustrated
in the doctrines of Nirguṇa and Saguṇa in Advaita Vedānta, which is
one way of expressing the fact that the Ultimate transcends all
phenomenal categories.

[10]Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 21,
interprets Macdonell's categorization of Ṛg Vedic cosmogony as in
terms of 'mythological' and 'philosophical' categories. This
distinction might be applied to that between 'cosmogonic' and
'cosmological'. However, as the structures of Vāc are neither
exclusively 'cosmogonic' nor 'cosmological', neither are they
'mythological' or 'cosmological' by virtue of the fact that through
its metaphysical structure as a foundation of both the mundane and
the transcendent aspects of reality, or what came to be known within
Advaita Vedānta, to both lokasamvṛittisatya and paramārthasatya.  It
will be argued further that the unique nature of the Indian world
view within the understanding of Tradition as defined earlier render
the distinctions sacred/profane, mythological/philosophical
inapplicable to the Indian situation.

[11]Eliade, Patterns, p. 23.

material is more systematic, speculative, metaphysical, and attempts to deal with the question of ontology in a more complete manner. Because of the metaphysical concern, this material might best be called "cosmological".

It is evident that with regard to Vāc the two categories are not exclusive of one another -- a fact which attests to the centrality of the question of language and the multi-faceted persistence with which the question of its status was persued; the question of Vāc leads one from phenomenology through to metaphysics.[12]

This "multi-faceted" persistence is reflected in the varieties of language and models within which the cosmological/cosmogonic question is put. In anticipation of a later argument it is also intended to imply the pragmatic aspects of the question. The distinction "myth/metaphysics" is used heuristically: it is a useful device to argue that Vāc implies an understanding, the nature of which renders such distinctions artificial, in terms of the question of relation (cosmology/cosmogony).

All speaking as inquiry into or description of the problematics of origins and relations is petition for clear vision of the many facets of the principle of the Real. It is the understanding within the Tradition of Vāc as the matrix of the Real which has manifest itself in the revelation of all that is Truth (Real) as Veda, the fact that the Tradition sees itself

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[12] As discussed in notes 10 and 11 above, in that cosmology and cosmogony are concerned with the realm of deductions which Vāc as akṣara transcends.

as being rooted in the revlation of Speech which indicates that
within the Tradition all cosmogonic or cosmological descriptions,
models, speculations or fantasies are descriptions, models,
speculations or fantasies on the question of Vāc. The understanding
of revelation as the manifestation of all that which is Real
results in the equasion: "creation" = "revelation".

Thus, Speech can be seen in two modes: (1) as the basis
of mundane reality, a basis which leads to (2) transcendence beyond
particularism and personalism. The following statement demonstrates
that the modes have not been understood to be exclusive of one another:

> Speech is better than a name. Speech makes us understand the
> Rig-veda, Yajur-veda, Sāma-veda, and as the fourth the
> Atharvana, as the fifth the Itihāsa-Purāna, the Veda of the
> Vedas, the Pitrya, the Rāśi, the Dawa, the Nidhi, the Vāksvākya,
> the Ekāyana, the Deva-vidyā, the Grahma-vidyā, the Kshatra-
> vidyā, the Nakshatia-vidya, the Saipa and Devagana-vidyā;
> heaven, earth, air, ether, water, fire, gods, men, cattle,
> birds, herbs, trees, all beasts, down to worms, midges, and
> ants; what is right and what is wrong; what is true and what
> is false; what is good and what is bad; what is pleasing
> and what is not pleasing. For if there were no speech,
> neither right nor wrong would be known, neither the true
> nor the false, neither the good nor the bad, neither the
> pleasant nor the unpleasant. Speech makes us understand all
> this. Meditate on speech. (emphasis added) Chān.Up. 7, 1.1.

The difference between speech and name became the center
of a philosophic debate of major proportions in later "classical"
philosophy. The dispute will be considered in the discussion on
Mimamsa in the final chapter of this work. What is significant at
this point is the fact that the dispute was concerned with language
as it pertains to interpretation of Veda to ascertain the nature of

reality as dharma embodied in the Vedic injunctions.  In the above
passage Speech is the foundation of all objective particular
reality.  More important (a point which is central to the Gītā) only
through speech can one discriminate between dharma/adharma --
thus in the Gītā, Kṛṣṇa appears to Arjuna when dharma is threatened
to tell him how to set the situation straight.  Arjuna is told that
one transcends ego frustrations and fulfills dharma through the
realization that only the guṇas act.  (Gītā, III.27).  Speech as
Veda, is as Mīmāṁsā understands it, an eternal compendium itself
for dharma is the Real.  In inquiring into Speech one becomes one
with Speech and is master (i.e. knower) as far as speech extends:

> "He who meditates on speech as Brahman, is as it were,
> lord and master as far as speech reaches -- he who
> meditates on speech as Brahman."          Chān. Up. VII, 2.1.

The highest reality is found in and through Speech, for it
is speech itself.

The unique features of Vāc regarding the question of
origination-relation are these:  (1) Vāc is that which the question
is about in that Vāc is both the basis of relation in the mundane
world as distinguished by name and form, and it is the medium which
provides for the transcendence of such distinctions through right
relation ot Vāc as Akṣara/Aum/Brahman.  (2) Vāc as revelation is
also the form in which the question is expressed, i.e. the language
of cosmology/cosmogony.  The nature of this language has become
problematic philosophically to Western scholars who have attempted
to distinguish a difference between myth and metaphysics on

epistemological grounds.

Vedic symbolism must be understood from within the context in which it arose which is the "word-battle" and within the context in which it was applied. The "battle" was twofold involving the struggle for the attainment of right relation to Vāc and the application of the fruits of that struggle in the debate. These two factors represent the inseparable "private" and "public" aspects of the experience which makes one rsi. The visions as expressed in poetry were subjected to severe scrutiny by the Assembly: that the Assembly was able to pass judgment on both content and form of expression indicates that they held some understanding in common as to what constituted an authentic vision. This being the case, they must have understood the multitude of symbol interrelations to be integral in some manner which Western scholars have as yet been unable to comprehend. Certainly, the mythology of cosmology/cosmogony was not understood within the causal framework which Westerners try to impose upon it. There is no indication that Vedic man, nor those who followed held any absolute distinction between power and matter. Betty Heimann states the case well when she says,

> Logic, the science of actual reasoning, has no final place
> in India. With the keen sense-perception of creative
> primitivity the Indian thinker grasps natural laws and
> adapts them to human understanding, only to elevate them in
> the end to a higher intuitive vision. . . . Philosophy on
> the whole is significantly called ānu-īksikī (literally:
> 'the look along'), the perspective and collecting view of
> all things. . . . As regards also the logical process and the
> varied evaluation of its stages, the single axioms of logic
> are different in India and the West. . . . the axiom of the

'Excluded Middle' does not entirely hold good for Indian
logic. The Indian regards not even mutual negations as
one-sidedly fixed opposites. In the transcendental sphere
no distinction at all between 'A' and 'non-A' exists. But
also for the empirical sphere as such the Indian is reluctant
to split up 'A' and 'non-A' into opposites of mutual exclusion.
Life and death are combined in a series of an interrelated
sequence of growth and decay, without definite boundaries
between them.[13]

This tendency boggles the Western mind most on issues

regarding causality and causal relation. One scholar deals with

the problem of the lack of precision in logical set distinctions

by saying, "It is easy to confuse explanation and causation. . . ."

"When it believed that the mental is material, then the question

of determinism becomes acute, because freedom is necessary to

value, value to will to life, the morale of the society."[14]

It is true that a certain amount of freedom is necessary

for the fulfillment of dharma, but it is also true that India

has always held the highest form of freedom to be mokṣa which is

the total transcendence of personal categories within which the

question of freedom is usually framed. In India, the question of

freedom "in time" is seen as categorically distinct from the goal

of mokṣa which is beyond all time-space distinctions, and it is

therefore beyond causal relations. That India saw this distinction

very early is evident from Ṛg Veda 1.164 as was discussed earlier

in Chapter III.

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[13]Heimann, Facets of Indian Thought, 148-149.

[14]R. H. Smith, "Emanation or Creation: Causation in Early
India", pp. 51-57.

In the Ṛg Veda the issue of identity and relation finds
expression in the accounts of creation, in the complex interrelation-
ship of the alliances of powers throughout the entire saṁhitā, and
the effort to discern a factor of stability transcendent of all
power particulars as in 1.164, and 10.129.  In the Upaniṣads this
same issue is centered in the concept of nāma-rūpa, and as regards
the status of the individual, in the complex of the puruṣa, jīva,
ātman (and) Brahman relationship.  In both the Ṛg Veda and the
Upaniṣads the basis of the human predicament is the difficulty of
somehow expressing the relationship of the transcendent which is
verified in the ecstatic experience to the particularisms of
mundane existence.

The fundamental question which was to serve as the basis
for all inquiry into this relation was framed in the Ṛg Veda.
Repeatedly the questions are asked "What?" "Who?" "Whence?" --

1.  Who now is he, what God among the immortals . . . .
2.  Who shall to mighty Aditi restore us? . . .
                                              (1.124)
4.  Who hath beheld him as he sprang into being . . . .
    Who may approach the man who knows, to ask it?

5.  Unripe in mind, in spirit undiscerning, I ask of
    these the God's imperishable places . . . .
6.  I ask, unknowing, those who know, the seers (ṛṣis),
    as one all ignorant for the sake of knowledge, What was
    that ONE who in the Unborn's image hath established and
    fixed firm the world's six regions?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18. Whence hath the Godlike spirit its rising?

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32. He who hath made him surely doth not comprehend him:
    from him surely is he hidden.
    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37. What thing I truly am I know not clearly,
    mysterious, fetter in my mind I wander.
    (1.164)

6. Who knows and who can declare it, whence it
   was born and whence comes this creation? The
   Gods are later than this World's first
   production. Who knows then whence it first
   came into being? (10.129)

There is an intuitive realization that behind the diversities

of mundane existence there is a matrix which, although described

variously in both personal and impersonal terms, is central to the

salvational concerns of the individual as the ground of his

existence. This truth which is hidden in mystery reveals _itself in_

_itself_ as Vāc in the form of the sacred hymn to those who have the

capacity to "see". The _rsis_ are those who saw this Truth, and the

product of that experience, the hymns, are accepted by the Tradition

as reliable testimony to the reality of resolution which the _rsis_

exemplify.

Living with a power-saturated world, often victim to it,

and alienated from it, but occasionally swallowed up in the power

source and actually a medium of it in transcendence, the _rsis_

experienced the "objective" world as rooted in the same lifeforce

which served both as the instrument of their transcendence, and

as an instrument with which to distinguish that experience from

others less ultimate. This force was the power of Vāc: Vāc as

litany was the basis of transcendence, while Vāc in its relation
to nāma provided the clue to creation. The terms 'nāma' and 'rūpa'
denote the realm of phenomenal particularity, the formal mode of
the Source. Mundane experience and knowledge is limited to the
realm of names and forms. However, the "creation" itself is a
metamorphosis of the preformal One to the formless and on to the
particularity of the mundane world. The One in the preformal mode
is beyond the realm of forms, although the name, as akṣara abides
throughout. Nāma is the essence of all rūpas.

The creation of the world order and the sustaining of that
order is a result of the interaction of the central constituents
of the sacrificial ritual, Agni, Soma, and Vāc as the Sacred Song.
In this interaction, which is the essence of the sacrifice, lies
the guide to the resolution of the inquiry of the rṣis into the
nature of the Source. The model of the resolution is provided
by the relation of the rṣi.

The communion in power between the rṣi and the gods was
characterized by a spontaneous outpouring of Vāc as liturgical
poetry. The relationship of the individual to the transcendent
is morrored in its ideal form in the figure of the rṣi swallowed
up in the ecstasy of the vision (dhīḥ). Right relation to Vāc in
sacrifice, then, constitutes the model of right relation to the
stable matrix from which being emanates.

Vāc, as sacred song, in conjunction with the sacred fire,
and Soma, is one aspect of a tri-unitary medium of transcendence.

Proper understanding of this relationship is one of the prerequisites
for the attainment of "effectual speech" (5.43.11). Proper per-
formance of sacrifice led to the spontaneous recitation in the vision
which signified the receptivity of the higher powers, and which might
lead to the satisfaction of the communities' needs. In addition
to benefiting the community, the power relation, once established,
served to sustain the whole created order:

> When the cow's nectar wins the God completely, men here below
> are heaven's and earth's sustainers. (10.12.3)

The key to the problem of resolution is rooted in the experience of
the rsi.

The different constituents of the ritual, its order of
performance, and the "wonders" (3.58.3) it effected were thought
to reflect the very structure and operation of reality itself. The
gray of Dawn was the midpoint between the dark shapeless Night
(1.140.5) and the brightness of day. Symbols of darkness are used
throughout the Veda to express the mysterious or the alien, while
symbols of light express the overt, the friendly. The terrifying
shapeless Night was the great enemy against which the sacrifice
was used in the battle for light and life. Darkness symbolized
the dissolution of all form and order which the rsi sought to
maintain through the ritual. The orderly breaking of day was an
unfolding of the latent light of Night,[15] just as the orderly

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[15]Eliade, Patterns, p. 28. See the Brhaspati hymns 10.67,
10.68, below pp. 195-214. Kuipers' Cosmogony and Conception is
very informative on this point.

unfolding of creation brought forth the golden germ from the
dark and indiscriminate waters. The lack of right orientation
to Vāc is a denial of one necessary mode in the dialectic of
the cosmic function which on the phenomenal plane hurled the
maintenance of order in the community and in the recurrence of
days and seasons into chaos. Sacrifice would begin, whereupon
would follow the vision. Sacrifice and vision were complimentary
to one another.

A correspondence was seen to exist between the emergence
of the Sun from Night through Dawn and the experience of the
vision once the fire had been lit to mark the end of the night-
watch. Many passages attest to this correspondence: In 1.149.3:
"Agni is . . . Bright like the Sun . . . ." "Agni is wakened by the
people's fuel to meet the Dawn who cometh like a milch-cow. . . ."
(5.1.1) "Kindled, his radiant might is apparent, and the great
Deity set free from darkness." (5.1.2). Agni is the "Sun of men"
(1.146.4), and "Agni follows the Red Steers Law". "Agni is
wakened: Sūrya riseth from the earth. Mighty refulgent Dawn hath
shone with all her light" (1.157.1), and 3.58.1 demonstrates that
the Dawn appears to satisfy the needs of man simply because of Agni's
role: "The ancient's Milch-cow yields the things we long for: the
Son of Dakshiṇā travels between them." The interdependence of
Vāc (the Milch-cow) and Agni is clearly seen here. Agni is the medium

of the whole visible world, of all rūpas: "Far as the Wealthy One hath spread himself abroad, he is the Sire all-visible of this progeny." (1.146.1) Agni is associated with the Dawn: "She hath shone brightly like a youthful woman, stirring to motion every living creature. Agni hath come to feed on mortals' fuel. She hath made light and chased away darkness." (7.77.1) The Dawn ". . . bringeth bounty and sweet charm of voices" (7.76.7), and similarly, in 4.11.3: "From thee, O Agni springs poetic wisdom, from thee come thoughts and hymns of praise that prosper. . ." In 10.181.2,3 various symbols are used to explain that the vision is rooted in the sacrifice, and that the vision of Vāc is the secret of transcendence:

> These sages found what lay remote and hidden, the sacrifice's loftiest secret essence. From radiant Dhātar, Savitar, and Vishṇu, from Agni, Bharadvāja brought the Bṛhat. They found with mental eyes the earliest Yajus, a pathway to the Gods, that had descended.

The reality of this experience provided the Seer with a model which enabled him to frame the fundamental question in terms of the cosmic function of the sacrifice; the cosmic function being prescriptive of the worldly function of sacrifice, which was seen as the "battle for sunlight, water and life" (6.46.4), the rsi could look to the same model. Thus, creation both in the primordial sense, and in terms of the rhythmic recurrence of the days and seasons is spoken of in interchangeable symbols of water, milk, night, Dawn, Sun, Fire, and Speech. They are applied variously, not as alternative solutions to the ultimate question, but as

different modes of the same fundamental structure and function.

Central to the symbolic representation of the structure and operation of reality is the necessity for what I have called "resolution". In the broad sense this meant deliverance from the dark mystery of worldly existence with its many personal problems, through the medium of the sacrifice which was understood to be the stable center around which all gravitated. Deliverance is prescribed by the cosmic function of sacrifice wherein as vision the second descent of Vāc as Enlightenment is but one aspect of the binary dissolution/reconstitution; anxiety/bliss.

"Creation" is a manifestation. It is an expression of varying degrees of dynamic potentiality through the modes of the pre-formal and formless to the particularities of the mundane world as name and form. The first product of the process, either as the self-identity factor (ahaṁ-kāra) or the progenitor Nārāyaṇa[16] is understood as the model of the structure of phenomenal existence in its truest form. The actual process of diversification on the model of emanation from the first man or dissection of him,[17] or on a model out of the order of natural phenomenon is understood as both the means whereby diversification came about and the model for its recovery. In fact, diversification and recovery are but two aspects of one and the same thing from the integral perspective.

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[16]Muir, Original Sanscrit Texts, IV p. 29 ff. has valuable information on this point.

[17]Ibid., pp. 16-23, relates Rg Veda 10.90 to interesting parallels in the later Epic and Purāṇa literature.

The exercise of this latent power as the self-generation or self-realization of the Ultimate in manifestation is an exercise in the assertion of individuality or personhood which acts as a catalyst in the making explicit of the pre-formal. The Bhāgavata-Purāṇa, 3.20.14 ff. states that the raw elemental-stuff of creation has no vital power in its own right:

> The elements being separately unable to create, deposited, when united by the action of destiny, a golden egg formed by the elements, this egg-shell lay lifeless on the waters of the ocean. The Lord dwelt in it for a complete thousand years. From his navel sprang a lotus. . . .

That aspect which gives rise to the process is considered to be a dynamic force which is variously understood in both personal and non-personal terms. Both are expressive of the extrinsic nature of the Ultimate, according to different degrees in the particularization process. A unique feature of Vāc is that she is giving of herself in manifestation, as revelation, and requires no external factor.

The binary is the first expression of the manifestation. The relationship between the Unborn and the born is one image used to express the relationship between the actual and the potential, the phenomenal and the transcendent. With the lighting of the fire and the coming of the day, both Agni and the Sun are born. (10.177.2). The Sun, as the Unborn, is hidden in its

formless condition as the unseen light of Night (3.34.3; 3.55.11;
8.31.3,n.3; 2.38.3,4; 1.95.1), whose formless condition is transcendent
at the light of Dawn (8.41.3). Thus, Dawn is the "twin", halfway
between the formless and the particularization modes of manifestation,
and Sūrya, as the light of day, is the child of Dawn. (7.76.16).
So also is Agni the child of the firesticks, the parental pair.
The garbham[18] (germ, seed, somb or embryo) is used in the hymns
to express creation as a manifestation of life and light; thus
in 10.82.5; 10.121. ; and 10.129. . AV 4.2.8, states "(the waters)
. . . brought forth a germ (garbham), which, as it was coming to
life, was enveloped in a golden covering (ulbah hiranyauah)."

A deep rooted sense of disorientation prevails, a sense of
the intrinsic wrongness of mundane existence, which is seen as
improper relation to Vāc in sacrifice's vanishing portions (8.89.1).
To be cut off from Vāc is to be cut off from the very Imperishable
(Akṣara) itself. Deliverance, then, is the transcendence of disorder
through Vāc which, because it is hidden, is found only in sacrifice
(10.108.11).

The many references to Indra's or Bṛhaspati's cows being
stolen by the Paṇis or the Valas and the re-establishment of order
with their recovery illustrates the centrality of Vāc to the
maintenance of order.

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[18]Bosch, The Golden Germ, pp. 51-64, and Muir, Original
Sanskrit Texts, pp. 15 ff.

As the golden germ is bound in darkness, as the Sūrya is
bound by Night, as Vāc stolen by the Paṇis or Valas and bound in
the darkness of the cave, so is the mind of the ṛṣi bound without
the light of Vāc, which is the axis of his own essential relation
to the Real. The experience of this knowledge is described as
mysterious (1.164.37), just as the source of it is surrounded by
mystery (1.164.2). It is beyond common understanding, and can be
achieved only through alignment of one's being with the Source
to act as a medium for that Source, just as the poet in aligning
himself with efficacious Vāc becomes an instrument through which
Vāc flows. Thus, while the first descent of Vāc from the darkness
of the primordial center, the second descent as enlightenment
constitutes a recovery of the original condition.

3.38.1 reads: "I long to see the sages full wisdom,
how they thus formed the heavens, set the directions and held the
world apart." The allusion to the skambha in vv. 2,3 is a reference
to the Akṣara-Vāc, imminent as śruti through the ecstatic vision
(dhīḥ) of the ṛṣi. Vāc is the mainstay of all creation and the
"Knower of Speech", he who "sees" is one with the fountain. The
hymn tells of the salvational predicament in terms of visual images
and indicates that wisdom is the ability to see the essence of true
speech which is the matrix of all of that which is Real. The

account of the diversification of Vāc is recounted -- from the transcendent as the pre-formal through to the particularized phenomenon of mundane existence. The dynamic diversification of Vāc proceeds from the androgynous Bull-cow which is spoken of as the omniform of the eternal waters in v. 4. Verse 3 relates that the ṛsis, perhaps as the embodiments of Vāc, assuming mysterious natures in this world, set the world apart with measures of meter. The mystery of their natures is reflected in the images used to describe the spontaneous outpourings of the ritual chant. Meters well chosen are the formal expressions of the transcendent Akṣara and therefore these meters provide a measure and criterion which is reflective of the nature of Vāc's particularization as phenomenal reality.

Dawn - perhaps the Milk-Cow - was shaped from the diverse forms of the Bull (Indra) around Savitar. Savitar is the creative essence of Sūrya, the realized light of night, which Sāyaṅa speaks of as Sūrya before rising, the creative potential (pre-formal) as Savitṛ. After rising, in the formal expression, until sunset, it is known as Sūrya. In v. 6 the Gandharvas herald the coming of Dawn. (1.152.3). The poet asks, "Let no one debar me from enjoying the golden light which Savitar diffuses . . . he (Savitar) covers both all-fostering worlds (night = bi-unity) with praises (= hymns or forms of the particularization of Vāc-Akṣara as śruti.)"

In the manifestation sequence the more ancient Bull first
engendered offspring which was the condition for the transition
from the pre-formal to the formal through the initial self-generation
of the cow (Vāc as Savitar or night). From this condition further
particularization ensues - from the Night to the passing into Dawn
when Vāc bursts forth from within the ṛṣis. Thus Vāc is to śruti
as Night is to Day (Savitar to Sūrya). Each manifestation is a
formal expression of the potential of the former. One must strive
to see behind the phenomenal expression (the Gandharvas, the sun
rays) in v. 6.c,d, and the imagery of hymns to that which is the
source of both. The Gandharvas, which are the sun rays, guide
Sūrya's chariot (1.163.2, 10.177.2) and are singers to the powers
(10.177.2); they are the preceptors of the ṛṣis (and they revealed
Vāc as Veda. As companions of the Milk-Cow they established the
strong Bulls' forms as Savitar. The source of this wonder source
is the secret of the ṛṣis. Savitar covers both all-fostering worlds;
the formal conditions of the actual-potential created-uncreated
which are but the diverse forms of the same strong Bull. One must
see the golden rays of Savitar, as the light of the Night for it
is through the vow of Savitar that "Night" comes.[19] The metamorphosis
through the dread of Night to Dawn and on to Day is the expression

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[19]Falk, Nāma-Rūpa, p. 9.

as vision of the golden light in the form of hymns. The transitions are varying modes of the one principle. The rsis are said to be responsible for creation in many hymns for they are the mediums of the divine śruti which is the manifest expression of the transcendent Unborn, the Formless. The inquiry into Vāc leads the poet to the resolution of the fundamental question which is the revelation of the Unborn in which is expressed the poet's transcendence to rsi. Accordingly, it is stated that,

> The priests heard far away, as they are ordered, serve the
> three Nrritis, for well they know them, Sages have traced
> the cause that first produced them, dwelling in distant
> and mysterious chambers. (10.144.2)

In v. 9 of the same hymn this experience is exemplified as the model towards which men must aspire.

> What sage hath learned the meters' application?
> Who hath gained Vâk, the spirit's aim and object?
> Which ministering priest is called eighth Hero?
> Who then hath tracked the two bay steeds of Indra?

(One must struggle with the secret of the Path of the Bird (10.177.1)).

The binary principle is used so frequently to explain the basis of the world order that it becomes a striking feature of Indian thought. This is a decided characteristic of the vortex of the visionary's experience which, because of its unshakable influence, must be rooted in the foundations of the Tradition. In the Vedas one sees examples of the binary in the figure of the androgynous Bull-cow, in the relationship between Puruṣa-Vāc, Puruṣa-Virāj, and

Dakṣa-Aditi. However, also characteristic of Indian thought is its refusal to accept oppositions as mutual exclusions. It strives to integrate, appropriate, and transform exclusion into harmony. One expression of such an attempt at reconciliation is to interpret the binaries in images of the intimacy of the male-female relationship, and where this is not conceivable to see the oppositions as modes of a single transcendent principle. Both models serve the same function which is integration.

In the cosmological/cosmogonic hymns of the Ṛg Veda the Asat/Sat duo is of particular importance. The binary which is essentially a dualism is first expressed as a set of oppositions in the Indra-Vṛtra myth. Of interest is the fact that this opposition is reconciled and even transcended by Vāc in the ṛṣis' ever-deepening understanding of the status and function of "effective speech" within the framework of the question of the origin and relation of phenomenal particulars.

This fact provides a good focal point for further and more detailed discussion of the status of Vāc in terms of specific cosmological/cosmogonic figures and accounts. It will serve to substantiate the very general description which has been put forth thus far, and as well, bear out the claim made earlier, to wit., that with regard to the status of Vāc, all distinctions regarding

origins and relation are, in the final analysis, inappropriate.

## Vāc, the 'Powers' and the Seers

It is held[20] that Sūrya was the original muse of Vedic
poetry. However, it is apparent that other gods - primarily
Bṛhaspati/Brahmaṇaspati, Viśvakarman, and Prajāpati - are also
seen to be directly and intimately related to both Vāc in itself
and as it applies to the ṛṣi (the distinction is purely heuristic),
as well as being interrelated to one another, and all within the
context of solar and light imagery to such a complex extent that
it renders any distinctions beyond the purely descriptive level
out of the question. It would be useful at this point to illustrate
this point in terms of the gods mentioned: the inter-complexity
of the solar images will then be mentioned, and developed further in
the analysis of the hymns which will follow.

Van Buitenen[21] associates Brahmaṇaspati of 10.72.2 with
Viśvakarman of 8.81.3. Examination of the texts reveals this to
be a valid association: (from Geldner) 10.72.2: "Brahmaṇaspati

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[20] S. S. Bhawe, "The Conception of Muse Poetry in the Ṛg
Veda", Journal of Bombay University, Series 19, Vol. 2, Sept. 1950,
pp. 10-27.

[21] J. A. B. Van Buitenen, "Vācārambhaṇam", Indian Linguistics,
Vol. 16, 1955 (Chatterjee Volume), p. 160.

hat diese [all beings, der Götter of v. 1] wie ein Schmied

zusammenschweisst . . . (all beings are welded into a homologised

unit through some fire-like power)"; 10.81.3: "Allenthalbem Auge,

Gesicht, Arm, Fuss, schweisst er [Viśvakarman] sie mit den Armen

und den Schwingen zusammen . . . (Geldner comments: Heaven and

Earth were welded together to form an integral unit).

Van Buitenen continues:

> This one god is Viśvakarman who has not only the
> appellation Vacaspati in common with Brahmaṇaspati,
> but other features as well: both as the contexts show
> represent in some respect the sun, who separates the
> sky and earth after the nocturnal union, and in this are
> strongly reminiscent of the anonymous deity of 10.129. . .
> [which he designates in n. 18a, as Vāc].[22]

Bṛhaspati uses flames to slay his enemies (6.73.3); they are his

arrows which are his prayers (cf. Geldner on 2.24.8). He discovered

the sun, cows, and the brahman. Bṛhaspati, 'Lord of Prayer'

(= Brahmaṇaspati)[23] by means of his speech released the rays of

light which are "god-inspired speech" (Geldner on 10.67.10).

Thus, the "Lord of Vāc" first made speech manifest in the form of

the brahman which is incomprehensible to mortal men; the brahman

shattered the realm of darkness (Asat), bringing forth light (Sat)

as the emanation of Akṣara-Vāc as name.

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[22]"Vācārambhaṇam", p. 160.

[23]See Shende, "Bṛhaspati in the Epic and Vedic Literature",
pp. 227-242.

Viśvakarman is an epithet of Indra in 8.87.2, who is said to be the "gravest splendour to the sun"(2), and "radiant with light" - the 'hero' of the cosmic battle where light triumphed over darkness.[24] In 10.170.4, Viśvakarman is called Sūrya, the "light of Heaven": "In Light erstrahlend kamst du als Sonne, als Himmelslicht, von dem alle diest Geschöpfe erhalten werden, von dem Allschopfer (Viśvakarman), der alle göttlichen (Krafte ?) besitzt (Geldner)." Macdonell[25] considers that the name was chiefly an epithet of the sun-god. As Sūryā he is associated with Vāc. The two hymns dedicated entirely to him speak of Viśvakarman's intimate relation to Vāc: He is a ṛṣi, the 'Father' who came to men as an archetype (1.82.1); with mighty power he disclosed the heavens (v. 2). He is "Des Auges der Vater . . .:" Geldner relates this directly to the transcendental vision (dhīh) - "Das geistige Auge des Sehers, das in die Vorzeit schaut . . . (n. 1a)." (It is the "mind's eye" of the Seer.).

Prajāpati has an element in common with Viśvakarman and Brahmaṇaspati, in that he is described as the husband of Vāc, and even identified with her. Thus, "Prajāpati verily was here;

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24
See W. N. Brown, "The Creation Myth of the Rig Veda", JAOS, Vol. 62, 1942, pp. 85-98.

25
Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, pp. 118-119.

his partner was Vāc; he copulated with her and impregnated her;
thereupon she separated from him and bore these creatures; then
again she united with Prajāpati." (Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā 12,5)[26]. This
is similar to the binary Puruṣa/Virāj of 10.90.5, which Falk[27] has
made much of. Virāj, in AV 8.10,24, and 2.8.30, is called both
"female", and "cow" - language often applied to Vāc. In
ŚB. 3.5.1.34, Virāj is identified directly with Vāc, and is
said to have ten feet (which refers to the poetic meter). I do not
intend here to attempt to make a distinction as to which god or
power has priority with regard to its relationship to Vāc. To
the contrary: the significance of the preceeding discussion lies
in the fact that it illustrates, again, a point which has been
made often -- that is, that in the Indian consciousness
reality is experienced as being integral to the extent that such
distinctions are not valid in themselves; and are worthless and
even obstructive to the attempt to obtain a clearer understanding
of the consciousness in question.

The hymns I will examine in detail are the Bṛhaspati
hymns - 10.67, and 10.68. Others could have been chosen - these
have been selected because they are similar enough to allow for
comparison, and variant enough to provide a distinct point for

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[26]Cited in 'Vācārambhaṇam", p. 161, n. 22. For further
identification between Prajāpati and Vāc see Śat. Br. 5,1,5,6,
while Viśvakarman is identified with Prajāpati in Śat. Br. 8,2,1,10,
and 8.2.3.31.

[27]Nāma-Rūpa and Dharma-Rūpa, pp. 3-15. V. S. Agrawala,
"Fire in the Ṛigveda", p. 30, seems to add support to her case: I
find both arguments incomprehensible on the basis of the texts
themselves - too much has been made of too little, and no basis
is provided for the intricate association of symbols.

discussion. The discussion, in part, will involve a comparison

of these hymns to what has been called the "original" cosmogonic

myth of the Rg Veda,[28] the Indra-Vrtra battle.

One additional point which raises a problem for the task

of interpretation must be mentioned. As Macdonell points out[29]

Brhaspati and Agni have been extremely closely associated from the

earliest Vedic literature. Consequently, they share a remarkable

number of features in common, to the point that, in most cases,

what is said of one is said also of the other.[30]   In fact, this

is true for all of the three essential elements of the formal

ritual - Agni, Soma, and Vāc. Thus, any given symbol may, at one

time or another or at the same time, be interpreted in terms of one,

two, or all three of these factors, for in the Rg Veda in no instance

from the standpoint of the phenomenology of the religious experience

is there any indication that the ritual out of which the hymns arose,

and in terms of which the hymns 'mean' is exclusively either Agni,

Soma, or Vāc centered.[31]   My interest is in Vāc, but that does not

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[28]This is discussed most fully by W. Norman Brown in his "The Creation Myth of the Rig Veda" pp. 85-98, and more recently in his "Theories of Creation in the Rg Veda", pp. 23-34. In the latter he deals with the 'development' of 'edic cosmogony from the 'original' myth. His conclusions regarding the Brhaspati hymns, and, moreso, with the role of Vāc in the developmental process are provocative to say the least. However, to consider his argument in full would entail stepping well beyond the specific interest of this study. The task is better left for another time.

[29]Vedic Mythology, p. 103.

[30]For comparisons see Ibid., pp. 88-104, and Renou, Religions of Ancient India, p. 14.

[31]Ibid., p. 29.

and could not preclude implication of the other two aspects of the triad.

I understand the question of Vāc as central in the sense that in the first instance - that is, in that aspect of the "Redekämpfen" which indicates the private, interior, and personal struggle for that True Speech which is transcendent of personalisms - Vāc and the problems of speaking are more intimately related to the fundamental concerns of the one who aspires to speaking the Real. Therefore, my discussion of the hymns will involve the ritual implications to the extent that they involve the question of Vāc and the quest for right relation to Vāc.

## The Hymns[32]

### 10.67

1. Imāṃ dhiyaṃ saptaśīrshṇīm pitā na ṛitaprājātam
   bṛihatīm avidat / turīyaṃ svij janayad viṣvajanyo
   'yāsya uktham indrāya ṣaṅsan

1. This seven-headed poem our Father devised - She
   the poem born of Truth, on High. But only a
   quarter of this was brought forth by Ayāsya, to
   be known to all people, as he performed the song of
   praise to Indra.

"Seven-headed" may refer to the seven mouths of the seven priests' voices as in 8.51.4 or as in 4.50.5, to Bṛhaspati who there is said to have seven mouths. "Father" refers to Bṛhaspati as in 4.50.6, and 6.73.1. The Aṅgirases are called "Fathers" in 1.71.2, but are never referred to in the singular form; the singular form

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[32]These are my translations from Geldner's German rendition. The German texts as well as Griffith's translation are given in the Appendix.

relates to Agni.[33]

"Quarter" is the turīya and may refer to either 1.164.45 -
that portion of Vāc which men speak - or, as in 5.40.6, to the
fourfold repetition of the ritual hymn. In the context of vv. 4,5,
v. 1 would appear to refer to 1.164.

Ayāsya is probably an ancestor of the Aṅgirases who are
spoken of throughout the ninth book as a priestly family.

> 2. ṛitaṃ śaṃsanta ṛiju dīdhyānā divas putrāso asuryasa
>    vīrāḥ / vipram padam aṅgiraso dadhānā vajñasya dhāma
>    prathamam mananta

> 2. Speaking Truth, thinking honestly, the Sons of Heaven,
>    the heroes of Asura, the Aṅgirases, [by] following
>    the path of the Knowers of Speech [thereby] conceived
>    the first form of sacrifice. [they followed in their
>    speech the path of Bṛhaspati.]

The reference to the "heroes of Asura" represents a
departure from the Indra myth where the Asuras are demons in
opposition to the Devas, representing darkness and Asat. In
Śat. Br. 2,4,2, they are associated with darkness. Ṛg Veda 10.170
speaks of the Sun as "Asura-slayer", a title given to Agni in 7.13.
Geldner thinks that the Asura refer to Heaven: what is more likely
is that the Aṅgirases, through their relationship to Bṛhaspati as
"genuine Friends" (7) and their part in the release of Vāc (= light)
are victors over the Asuras who, representing the chaos which results
when Vāc is withheld stand in opposition to the "Glcwing-Ones" of

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[33]Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, p. 143.

v. 7. It makes more ritual sense, and v. 5 seems to bear it out.
The Aṅgirases are 'Sons of Heaven' in 10.61.

3. hansair iva sakhibhir vāvadadbhir aṣmanmayāni
nahanā vyasyan / bṛihaspatir adhikanikradad gā
uta prāstaud uc ca vidvāṅ agāyat

3. With the Friends [the Aṅgirases] who screamed like
geese, the stoney bonds, the stoney cavern shattered,
Bṛhaspati, as the Knower, struck up a tune and sang
loud, howling toward the cows.

In 10.71, the "Friends" are members of the "Freundschaft"
who have in common the factor of right relation to Vāc. "Screaming
birds" are referred to in 10.68.1. 10.177.1 speaks of the Bird
(= Vāc) as being "sheared" over with the magic of the Asuras which
makes it impossible for anyone other than a "Knower of Speech" to
"see" Vāc: this may in part explain the mention of the Asuras in
v. 2 of this hymn. That the birds "scream" and Bṛhaspati "howls"
is, I think, perhaps significant: it may point to an aspect of
my interpretation of 10.71, indicating that there is perhaps an
incomprehensible nature to that portion of Vāc which the Knowers
of Speech (= Friends) speak - incomprehensible to the ordinary
mortal because, perhaps, of the Asura's magic (cf. v. 5). It
indicates that it is a speaking which is more like yelling with
forcefulness when sounded in unison by the Friends. There may also
be an essential community (= Freundschaft) aspect to it. That
Bṛhaspati is called Aṅgirasā indicates that in both 10.68.2, and
here the name is paradigmatic.

4. avo dvābhyām para ekayā gā guhā tishṭantīr anṛitasya
   setau / bṛihaspatis tamasi jyotir ichann ud usrā
   ākar vi hi tisra āvaḥ

4. Beneath through two doors, gates, above through
   one, Bṛhaspati, searching the dark for light - for he
   had opened three doors - he brought forth the cows who
   hidden captives of injustice.

Geldner makes nothing of the three doors. It seems to me
that in light of v. 9 of this hymn, the three doors should be
interpreted in terms of 1.164.45, which speaks of the four parts
of Vāc, three of which mortals have no access to - only the
immortal have access to the fourth part. Thus in v. 9 of this
hymn Bṛhaspati becomes immortal; that is, having opened the three,
he goes beyond to the fourth, the turīya, of v. 1, where Ayāsya
brings the quarter forth as hymn. Approaching the "inviolable
cow(s)" of 1.164.40, he attains the akṣara of 1.164.39. Thus, he
is paradigmatic in that, with 1.164.38, ". . . the mortal has a common
origin with the immortal . . . ."

5. vibhidyā puraṃ ṣayathem apācīṃ nis trīṇi sākam
   udadher akṛintat / bṛihaspatir ushasaṃ sūryaṃ gām
   arkaṃ viveda stanayann iva dyauḥ

5. After he had shattered the fortress, that [lit. 'she']
   (the fortress) fell backwards - he released at once the
   three from the ocean, the mountain cave. Bṛhaspati
   found the morning's-red, the sun, the cow - he
   found the song that thunders like the heaven.

Geldner thinks that "ocean" refers to the masses of cattle which

filled the mountain cave, or, to Vala, as in v. 12, and 10.114;
7.94.12, indicates that the ocean signifies the cave. The "three" -
Uṣas, Sūrya, cattle - are found in 10.68.9 and 1.62.5.

The "three" may refer to the three forms of Vāc. In 4.50.1
Bṛhaspati is said to have three abodes. It may refer to the three
wheels of the Sun, as in 10.85.6 - the Sun, the Moon, and the third,
the Year, which only the "knowers of Truth" can see. The two
meanings are not incompatable when viewed within the entirety of
the ritual complex. The "three" could refer to Agni as the light
of day, as the night-sun, and as the astronomical day: see Geldner
on 3.55.11; cf. also 6.9.1. The knowledge of Vāc is spoken of as
being "sun-like" in 10.177.2; 4.5.8, speaks of the puzzle of the
cows which, as a secret which Agni guards, has been opened as a
gate: in 4. 9, Agni "walks ahead, followed by the morning cow"
[Geldner: "calf" - Agni, while "cow" - Uṣas], and in 1.115.1,
Agni is equated with Sūrya. In 4.5.9, Agni is the radiating
countenance of the gods which "hurries on" (from night to dawn
to day) within which one finds concealed the secret of Truth which
is the Path of the Bird (4.5,8). This relates it back to v. 3 of
this hymn which speaks of bird images and the "magic" which makes
it visible only to the "Knowers of Speech". Such seeing is within,
introspection, and, as in 10.71, the focus of the introspection is

held to be the heart. In v. 5, "ocean" might very well, as in 10.123.2, refer to the heart. The "song that thunders like the heaven" refers to the unintelligible words of Vāc as thunder (see Sāyaṅa on 8.89.10): this is consistent with the analysis of v. 3.

6. indro valaṃ rakshitāraṃ dughānāṃ kareṇeva vi cakartā raveṇa / svedāñjibhir āṣiram ichamāno 'rodayat paṇim ā gā amushṇāt

6. Indra has cut Vala, the watcher of the milk-cows, with his howl (just as though) as having cut (Vala) with his hand [as though he had an instrument in his hand]. With the sweat-dotted Aṅgirases searching for the milk, he made the Paṇi cry - he robbed his cows.

7. sa īṃ satyebhiḥ sakhibhiḥ ṣucadbhir godhayāsaṃ vi dhanasair adardaḥ / brahmaṇas patir vṛishabhir varāhair gharmasvedebhir draviṇaṃ vy ānaṭ

7. With his genuine Friends - the Glowing Ones, the Winners of Wealth - he has broken Vala who fed himself from the cows. Bṛhaspati reached with the bulls - the inheritors, those sweating from heat - the owner of wealth.

These verses in particular, but also those to follow, illustrate the complex of ambiguities which are threaded throughout the entire hymn. Here many things are talked about in many ways at the same time to the extent that one doubts that it is in order to speak of the hymn as being "cosmogonic", for the term is too restrictive. One thing is clear: the vortex of consciousness which has as its "eye" the quest for vision through right

relation to Vāc has gathered up the "original" Indra myth, made it its own, and in doing so radically transformed the structural principles of it. As Macdonell[34] notes, Bṛhaspati has become more "war-like", more Indra-like, and in v. 6, he is even called Indra. But, he has not usurped Indra's position, for his role is integral in a way which Indra's never was, and he represents a paradigmatic figure in a sense that Indra never did. He is not a "third-party" demiurge, an extraneous factor in the Asat/Sat relation, but rather, he is an integral part of the relation in that Bṛhaspati's "discovery" of the cows is essentially a "recovery" of that which is fundamentally himself. He is not the "cause" of the cosmos, he is the basis of it.

One is at odds as to how to interpret such terms as "Friends", "Glowing Ones", "Winners of Wealth", "Inheritors", and "sweating from heat": they may be allegorical, or they may be descriptive of the rigors of ritual involvement. Perhaps, in light of 10.71, "Friends" refers to those of the "Freundschaft"; "sweating" and "glowing" may perhaps refer to some ritual act within the "Freundschaft", as may be implied in 10.71.5, but in this case it would be more like an act of tapas. "Winners of wealth"

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[34] Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, p. 103.

may refer to the winning of provisions through winning of the
debate as in 10.71.10. Vala may be likened to the one who has
grown 'fat' on false speech (stolen cows) in 10.71.5.

One thing is apparent: these verses and those which follow
allude, however darkly, to a real-life situation in terms of which
Bṛhaspati was understood to be paradigmatic. This is clear in vv.
8 through 11.

8. te satyena manasā gopatiṃ gā iyānāsa ishanayanta
dhībhiḥ / brihaspatir mithoavadyapebhir ud usiryā
asṛijata svayugbhiḥ

8. With eager and truthful hearts with prayers for the
Lord of Cattle, he [the Aṅgirases] implored for the
cattle - Bṛhaspati freed the cattle along with his
allies, those that will protect one another from
disgrace.

Recall 10.71.10: "All Friends are happy over the honoured Friend,
who as the Victor arrives at the Assembly, for he saves them from
failure and provides them bread." The "allies" in this case
would be the Aṅgirases who are the Seers.

9. taṃ vardhayanto matibhiḥ śivābhih siṅham iva
nānadataṃ sadhasthe / brihaspatiṃ vṛishanaṃ śūrasātau
bhare-bhare anu madema jishṇum

9. With affectionate poems raising him up, He who roars
like a lion in his stance, we will cheer Bṛhaspati,
the Bull, he who in dual combat, who is in every fight
victorious.

In 3.2.11, Agni is said to be like a lion, while in Ś.B. III.5.1.36
Vāc refers to a roaming lion. Perhaps the "dual combat" is the
great debate: recall 10.71.10: ". . . sent forth to the great
"Redekämpfen" he stands immoveable." Bṛhaspáti, however, is
"Victor" in every fight. "Dual combat" may refer to the private
and public aspects of the struggle with speech.

> 10. yadā vājam asanad viṣvarūpam ā dyām arukshad uttarāṇi
>     sadma / brihaspatim vṛishaṇam vardhayanto nānā
>     santo bibhrato jyotir āsā

> 10. When he won the all-coloured Victor's reward the
>     many coloured cows [= the meters application, the many
>     forms of Vāc], and ascended into heaven, to the highest
>     places, whilst we raise up the bull Bṛhaspati, lingering
>     (here and) there, carrying the light in his mouth the
>     light of enlightenment in the form of god-inspired
>     speech.

This is similar to 1.164.38, where the immortal has a common
ground with the mortal, and also v. 45 of the same hymn where it
is said that those who know the highest portion of Vāc attain immor-
tality.

> 11. satyām āṣisham kṛiṇutā vayodhai kīrim cid dhy
>     avatha svebhir evaih / paṣcā mṛidho apa bhavantu
>     viṣvās tad rodhasī ṣṛiṇutam viṣvaminve

> 11. Fulfill the pleas for strength - out of your own
>     free-will you care for the needy. May all enemies
>     [of speech] stay far behind. Hear this you - heaven
>     and earth - you who produces all!

The "enemies" possibly refer to those who have fallen out with
right speech as in 10.71.9, or, perhaps better, to the Paṇis,
as in 10.108 who loom as a constant threat to Speech, symbolizing
the elusiveness of right relation to Vāc. If this were the case,
then v. 11 here would indicate both the revealing (free-will) and
concealing aspects of Vāc.

> 12. indro mahnā mahato arṇavasya vi mūrdhānam abhinad
>     arbudasya / ahann ahiṃ ariṇāt sapta sindhūn devair
>     dyāvāpṛithivī prāvataṃ naḥ

> 12. Indra cleft with power the mighty Arṇava, the head
>     of Arbuda. He killed the dragon and released the
>     seven streams. Heaven and earth help us with your
>     gods further.

Here Geldner equates Arṇava with Vala on the basis of 10.114a to
10.675b. This verse seems to be a refrain: with v. 5, it
attempts to legitimate the new paradigmatic model by relating
him to the old hero ideal.

## 10.68

The commentary on this hymn is abbreviated where it would be
redundant of the preceeding hymn.

> 1. Udapruto na vayo rakshamāṇā vāvadato abhriyaseva
>    ghoshāḥ / giribhrajo normayo madanto bṛihaspatim
>    abhy arkā anāvan

1. As watchful screaming birds swimming in the water, as the thunder of the clouds, as the roaring waves breaking against the rocks -- in this manner the songs are carried to Bṛhaspati.

Geldner's commentary on 10.123.2, indicates that the ocean (perhaps the "water" here) is the heart wherein abides the path of the Bird which is secret: the "waves" are "visible" speech, i.e. Vāc made manifest for mortals to see, but not comprehend as in v. 1 of 10.67. Bṛhaspati is in v. 12 called "cloud-like", and, as noticed regarding 10.67.5, "thunder" is the image used to signify the unintelligible words of Vāc. Of note here is the extreme forcefulness and tension of the images which are used to describe the power of Vāc; recall here the interpretation of v. 3 of the preceeding hymn - perhaps the same applies here, for the same images and relations are used. If so, then it refers to Vāc, as well as both the context and conditions in which Vāc is at the same time "revealed" and "sent forth".

2. saṃ gobhir āṅgiraso nakshamāṇo bhaga ived aryamaṇaṃ nināya / jane mitro na dampatī anakti bṛihaspate vājayāṣūnr ivājau

2. The one of the Aṅgirases [Bṛhaspati] came by and brought them (the Aṅgirases) together with the cows, like Bhaga the bridegroom Aryman like a confidant brings together the two partners of a marriage. O Bṛhaspati! Spur them on, as race horses in combat.

This is the only place in the Ṛg Veda where Bṛhaspati is directly called Aṅgirasā, i.e. one of the Aṅgirases. Here "came by" may refer to the ever-present and ever-available nature of Bṛhaspati. If so, it would clarify 10.67.10, where Bṛhaspati is talked of as "lingering here and there". That Bṛhaspati, as one of the Aṅgirases, brings those of which he is a part together supports my interpretation of 10.67.7, regarding the fundamental difference between the creation myths of Indra and Bṛhaspati; to wit., that his "discovery" is essentially a "recovery" of that which he truly is. Or, to use the language of the mountain cave used in these hymns, it is an "uncovering" of that which is. This verse indicates that that which is freely given (cf. 10.67.11) brings itself to the revelation of itself through itself.

If the verse is understood within the context of the "Freundschaft", as the first verse may be, then the last line – "Spur them on, as race horses in a competition." would refer to the Aṅgirases as the Seers within the competitive context of the debate in the Assembly. Two points are involved here: (1) the public aspect of the "Redekämpfen" and, in that it is a petition, (2) the private (interior) aspect which is the struggle to find right speech.

3.  sādhvaryā atithinīr ishirā spārhāḥ suvarṇā
    anavadyarūpāḥ / bṛihaspatiḥ parvatebhyo vitūryā
    nir gā ūpe yavam iva sthivibhyaḥ

3.  The cows, which belong to an excellent master,
    the cows which bring guests, restless, desirous,
    well-coloured and faultless in appearance, has
    Bṛhaspati poured-out - as corn from a sack - (out
    of the mountain) after he had made a way passable
    through the mountain.

The "cows which bring guests" may refer to that type of speech
which brings bounty if it finds approval, as in 10.71.8 and 10.
Or perhaps it refers to that speech which finds audience, i.e.
within the Assembly. Bṛhaspati would be the seat of inspiration
which causes speech to be poured out in total spontaneity, freely,
and flowing, no longer "restless" at being penned up within
(=Heart=Ocean=Cave=Mountain). Now, finely sifted, as in 10.71.1,
it pours forth. It refers to the rṣis' technical ability with
language. This is in keeping with the next verse:

4.  āprushāyan madhuna ṛitasya yonim avakshipann arka
    ulkām iva dyoḥ / bṛihaspitir uddharaan aṣmano gā
    bhūmyā udneva vi tvacam bibheda

4.  (From) the cradle of Truth and sweetness, cast as
    a weather-beam, Bṛhaspati has hurled a torch from
    heaven, as he brings forth the cows from the rock -
    splitting the skin of the earth as if it were water.

"Sweetness" refers to the milk of the cows: ". . . mit süssig-
keit besprengt wie . . .:" (netted with sweetness as a weather-beam).

The "torch from heaven" may be as in 5.42.2, where the rays of Sūrya open the stable portals - perhaps in the same way the doors (gates) of the "heart" are opened as may be the case in 10.67.4. The image of the torch is interesting in relation to 10.177.2,c,d: "This lightening-like, sun-like knowledge the Seers guard at the station of Truth."

The verse relates the revelatory, lightening-like flash of vision (dhīh), (which, manifest as Truth by a Knower of Speech (Redekundige) makes him Victor (hero) before the Assembly) to the ancient hero ideal, Indra. The struggle with Truth as Vāc which is won through vision, marks the transcendence from mortality to immortality, from darkness to light, just as Indra's victory over Vṛtra brought forth light from darkness, order from chaos. But, there are several important differences in the two myths which should be reviewed here. Bṛhaspati is paradigmatic of the mortal struggle (with and for Vāc) and the reality of transcendence (10.67.10), of the fact that the immortal has a common origin with the mortal - a common ground which lies within. He is both mortal and immortal in one. He is paradigmatic in that he epitomizes the homologization of distinctions of identity and relation which is so typical of the Indian approach to that which is Real. That which is hidden in secret by Agni (Vāc: 10.177.2) is freely given

by Bṛhaspati, the Herdsman (10.177.3) of the cows of light who are
Speech. He gives of himself (10.68.2) as revelation which is
"creation". "Discovery" is "uncovery" of that which lies within
the heart. Whereas Indra separates the Sat from the Asat,
Bṛhaspati makes manifest as actual that which is hidden within as
potentiality. The distinction chaos/order is no longer categorical
in the Bṛhaspati account.

5. apa jyotishā tamo antarikshād udnaḥ sīpālam iva vāta
   ājat / brihaspatir anumṛiṣyā valasyābhram iva vāta
   ā cakra ā gāḥ

5. With light he has broken through the darkness as
   wind, as a water plant breaks out of the water.
   Bṛhaspati siezed the cows of Vala, and herds them
   on as the wind the clouds.

The plant image may be significant here, for it is used throughout
Indian mythology and art to depict that understanding of the
integral nature of the Real which I have been speaking of.[35]

6. yadā valasya pīyato jasum bhed brihaspatir agnita-
   pobhir arkaiḥ / dadbhir na jihvā parivishṭam ādad
   āvir nidhīnr akṛiṇod usriyāṇām

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[35]For an interesting account of plant symbolism in Indian
art and literature, see F. D. K. Bosch, The Golden Germ. To
illustrate my point: Bosch says, ""The lotus is the waters." In
this brief formula Śat. Br. VII 4,1,8 reveals the gist of the
significance the lotus-symbol had of old for the Indian. For
these words mean: the lotus is rasa, is identical with the magic
substance drawn from the waters which is virtually one with natural
life itself, both when this life is a negation of sickness . . .
(etc.) and when it manifests itself in the fertility of women, of
fields and cattle . . . ." pp. 81-82.

6. When Bṛhaspati broke up the prison of the scornful
   Vala with his fire-glowing magic songs, he grabbed
   him (Vala), like the tongue with the teeth prepared
   food. He brought the treasure of the cows into
   the light.

This seems to refer to the force and power of inspiration. The

implications of "fire-glowing" and "magic songs" have been

discussed in the interpretations of 10.67.3,5,7 and need not be

reviewed here.

7. bṛihaspatir amata hi tyad āsāṃ nāma svarīṇām sadane
   guhā yat / āṇdeva bhittvā śakunasya garbham ud
   usriyāḥ parvatasya tmanājat

7. Bṛhaspati thought (specified through thought?)
   the names of the loud-screaming ones who were hidden
   at the place. As the brood of the bird after she has
   split the eggs, in such a manner he drove the cows as
   a brood - (he drove them) in his own person, out of
   the mountains.

Bṛhaspati is the Herdsman in 10.177.3. This does not contradict

the statement that the cow needs no herdsman in 3.57.1, for

Bṛhaspati is essentially one with the cows. The phrase "in his

own person" points to another essential difference between this

and the Indra myth: Bṛhaspati, through his intimate relation to

Vāc absorbs and integrates the role of Indra's hound, Saramā

(1.62.3) in that Bṛhaspati is both the seeker, and that which is

sought. The "bird/egg" image is probably no more than a literary

device, although it could possibly indicate the attempt to

homologize an image which occurs frequently in creation accounts.[36]

The verse may very likely indicate an attempt to redevelop the theme of the freeing of Vāc more strictly within the limits of bird imagery, and in keeping with the imagery of v. 1. Thus, Vāc is the Bird to which 10.177 is dedicated. The Bird carries the Geist of Vāc, which abides within the "heart", "smeared" with magic so that those unknowing in Vāc (=mortals) cannot see her. The "eggs" may refer to the latent Vāc which lies within, but I can find nothing to support the idea.

8. aṣnāpinaddham madhu pary apaśyan matsyaṃ na dīna udani kshiyantam / nish ṭaj jabhāra camasaṃ na vṛikshād bṛihaspatir viraveṇā vikṛitya

8. He scouted (his sight "penetrated") the mountain with its enclosure of sweetness the milk of the imprisoned cows, as a fish that lives in shallow water -- Bṛhaspati brought them forth (as a wood-carver would "bring forth") a cup (bowl) from a tree, after he burst (the rock) with his howl.

In 3.38.1 Prajāpati, the son of Vāc, is said to contemplate with the precision and skills of a carpenter. The verse lauds the power of vision, and affirms the displacement of Saramā, supporting my interpretation of v. 5. The reference to "bringing forth" also supports that interpretation.

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[36] The significance of the egg and allied symbols fall beyond the scope of this work: the reader is referred to Bosch's Golden Germ on this question.

9. soshām avindat sa svaḥ so agnim so arkeṇa vi babādhe
   tamānsi / brihaspatir govapusho valasya nir majjānam
   na parvaṇo jabhāra

9. He found the Uṣas, the sun, the fire.  He drove away
   the darkness with magic songs.  Bṛhaspati brought (the
   cows) of Vala - who boasted with the cows - as if
   taking the marrow from a joint.

"Boasted with the cows" may be a slur of the sort as that against

Indra's display of the cows in 3.32.21, or it may, as in 10.125.4-5

refer to those who do not pay proper respect to speech.  It is

interesting that while Indra requires the vajra, an extraneous

element, for the combat with Vṛtra, Brhaspati, again homologizing

the diverse factors of the Indra account, is able to provide the

effective force from within the integrity of his own being.  Thus,

"marrow from a joint" would be a reference to the ease by which

that which is within (Vāc) is drawn out.

10. himeva parṇā mushitā vanāni brihaspatināakṛipayad
    valo gāḥ / anānukṛityam apunaṣ cakāra yāt sūryāmāsā
    mitha uccarātaḥ

10. As the frost robs the trees of their leaves, in
    that way Vala longed for the cows that were
    robbed by Bṛhaspati.  He has done something unequalled,
    that cannot be repeated, for as long as sun and moon
    have their path.

[Geldner:  before the separation of day from night there had only

been eternal night.]

Recall the passage cited earlier:  ". . . if there were no speech,

neither right nor wrong would be known, neither the true nor the false, neither the good nor the bad . . . . Speech makes us understand all this." (Chān. Up. 7.1.1) Or, one could interpret it to mean that speech, having revealed itself, stands revealed for all times (as śruti). That his act is "unequalled" may indicate that despite the intimations of a similarity in the acts of Indra and Bṛhaspati, the Seer understood Bṛhaspati's role as "revealor" to be unique, i.e. by virtue of his proximity to that which is revealed, a proximity which Indra does not have.

11. abhi ṣyāvaṃ na kriṣanebhir aṣvaṃ nakshatrebhiḥ
    pitaro dyām apiṅsan / rātryāṃ tamo adadhur jyotir
    ahan bṛihaspatir bhinad adriṃ vidad gāḥ

11. The Fathers [Aṅgirases = ṛṣis] adorned the heavens with stars, as a black horse (is) decked with pearls. The darkness they moved into light, the light into day. Bṛhaspati has split the mountain, he has found the cows.

Bṛhaspati in 4.50.6 is the "Father". In relation to the ṛṣis, he is the Father of the Fathers. The verse refers to the beginning of time (the cycle of nights and days), which is the age born with the freeing of the cows; Vāc exists from the beginning of time in her manifest form (śruti?) (On the light abodes as the channels for the recovery of Vāc see Falk, Nāma-Rūpa.) Of interest in this verse is the fact that the seven streams which flowed out when

Indra slit Vṛtra's belly, are identified with the seven ancient
ṛṣis, the Aṅgirases which enforces the notion that creation is
revelation.

> 12. idam akarma namo abhriyāya yaḥ pūrvīr ānv anonavīta /
>     bṛihaspatiḥ sa hi gobhiḥ so aṣvaiḥ sa vīrebhiḥ sa
>     nṛibhir no vayo dhāt

> 12. These oblations we have made to the weather-cloud-like
>     (Bṛhaspati) who in many voices howls after the thunder.
>     So may Bṛhaspati, through sons and heroic might, bestow
>     on us cows (and) horses.

Cf. 10.67.5: 10.68.1,5: this may be an allegorical reference to
the fleetingness of Vāc, a plea for that portion of Vāc which
mortals know not of (again: thunder is the incomprehensible portion
of Vāc, the rain which follows is her sweetest portion); a plea for
that portion of speech which is manifest through ṛṣis (= "sons").

In these hymns, despite the imagery drawn from the
natural order, there is an implicit monism. Within this framework
questions on the nature of origination and causal relation are all
reduced, ultimately, to questions on the nature and conditions of
revelation. Necessary conditions for causation become necessary con-
ditions for the reception of the revelation or manifestation of that
which already is. The factors of efficiency in this context refer
to a cognitive condition rather than an objective set of relations.
The entire framework within which the West has come to understand the
causal problem, i.e. after Hume, is irrelevant in this context.

CHAPTER V

# CHAPTER V

## CONTINUITIES OF MODELS: TWO POINTS OF EMPHASIS

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the notions of reality and the relationship between the Real, speech and speaking as put forth by two classical darśanas to illustrate the extent to which the "goal of the intellectual process" in these settings, as they pertain to these questions, conform to the view in the Rg Veda as previously discussed. That view, in brief, is this: In the Rg Veda the question of how one stands in relation to that which is Real is bound up with the question of how one stands in relation to Vāc. The possibilities of relation are three-fold: personal, supra-personal, and non-personal. The rsi-figure embodies all three possibilities in his three-fold capacity as visionary, poet, and functionary. In this the rsi is a unique figure.

Part of what it means to say that the rsi is a unique figure is the fact that, as visionary, the rsi saw the Real which is the transcendent form of Vāc and served as the medium through which the Real made itself manifest as śruti. Such seeing is a non-personal role wherein the language of relation is out of place for such seeing involves the total identification of the Seer with that seen. There is an implicit monism here.

The ṛṣi as kavi exemplifies a supra-personal relation to the Real as Vāc in that as "translator" of the vision into audible terms (mantra) certain "personal" factors such as poetic skill are involved, but not in the sense of "creative" imagination. Also involved here is the capacity of the ṛṣi as functionary. In this respect I argued that vratra and dharma are similar in that as imperatives to action they must always, to some degree, involve the particular existent to whom the imperative is directed. For this reason their fulfillment must be understood in supra-personal rather than non-personal terms.

The "personal" element involves the fundamental human predicament which provides the basis for the imperative to right relation to the Real. I have called it a "fundamental" condition in that it involves the primary sense of "wrongness" or inadequacy which is co-terminus with the fact of finite existence. It is the fact of finitude, the raw basis of the historical fact of existence. It is expressed in a secondary sense in sociological, psychological, or historical terms.

The "personal" condition was discussed in two contexts; both were relevant to the question of right relation to Vāc as the Real, and both concerned the cognitive basis of wrong relation: (1) Dīrghatamas in his plight reflects the best possible condition within the framework of wrong relation, while (2) the "fat and rigid" one of 10.71.5 who operated in delusion, i.e. māyā which in 10.177.1

is an actual power, represents the worst possible condition within the framework of wrong relation.

The two darśanas which I have chosen to examine in relation to these points are Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta. I have chosen them because they represent allied but different philosophic points of emphasis. For both, however, the question of speech is important in proper relation to that which is Real, and for both such relation is understood to be non-personal. For both "relation" is understood as identification with the Real. For both wrong relation to speech is the basis of the unauthentic condition, and for both wrong relation to language involves the question of the misapplication of personalisms to language.

One point must be clarified regarding the designations non-personal, supra-personal, and personal, and the statement that the realm of vratra/dharma always involves the supra-personal. This is not so in Mīmāṁsā and the reason for this is that Mīmāṁsā sees dharma as the highest reality. The fulfillment of dharma is in fact equivalent to mokṣa for it involves the total non-personal alignment with the law of the universe which is itself non-personal. Speech is important in that the truths of dharma are manifest in śruti and how one understands śruti determines how one stands with dharma.

These positions are discussed in two sections; brief discussion of the relationship between the two is included in the first part of the second section.

## 1. Dharma and the Non-personal Character of Language in Mīmāṁsā

Dharma is the chief concern of the Mīmāṁsā darśana; it is a philosophy of involvement wherein ritual activism triumphs over metaphysical concerns. The term "dharma" has special connotations for Mīmāṁsā; it is more than mere "duty" as personal responsibility in that ultimately, the autonomy of personal or individual "duty" is subsumed under natural law, or, more fully, the dharma of the cosmos. Dharma is the Real itself, nothing transcends it.

Dharma is seen as "duty" to the extent that the individual (physically, mentally, and verbally - the latter being a particular combination of the former two, and of special interest here) acts in accordance with the eternal and unalterable Law. No static view of reality is held here -- the term "dynamic" best describes the basic nature of the Real. From this it follows that co-terminous with dharma as the "dynamic of Being" is its microcosmic counterpart, that which the basis for any individual relation to the Real, the imperative to action. Thus, the inquiry into the nature of dharma is focused on the Vedas which are dharma made manifest by the ṛsis.

The r̥ṣis exemplify the fulfillment of dharma in that the dynamics

of the r̥ṣis lived-world involvement correspond totally with the

dynamics of Being itself. Dharma did not originate with the r̥ṣis.

They are the mediums through which the eternal Law made itself

manifest. In the sense that the r̥ṣis are paradigms of the complete

identification with the eternal dharma they can be said to be

manifestations of dharma itself. Such a manifestation which is

total identification signifies not the inhistorization of a

transcendent principle, but, rather, the transcendence of all

of the fallacious categories of distinction which serve to

obscure the Real. Thus, the r̥ṣi does not create, but proclaims

that which is while that which the r̥ṣi is paradigmatic of is an

integrative relationshp to the Real. The integrating with and

becoming one with that which is Real (dharma) and authentic

represents a drawing away from and transcending of that which

is fallacious and unreal (adharma).

Dharma is manifest as śruti. Inquiry into the nature of

dharma is inquiry into the meaning of śruti. In the narrow sense

such inquiry serves to determine the correct format of ritual

involvement which must be followed exactly. In the broad sense

the inquiry into dharma concerns the ritual nature of all acts

within the framework of Tradition as discussed earlier. In the

latter context inquiry into dharma is inquiry into the fundamental

significance of existence, for the significance of

individual existence is proportional to the degree that the

existence of the individual is an expression of dharma.

Mīmāṁsā considers the Vedas - Jaimini speaks of the Rgveda, the

Sāmaveda, and the Yajurveda -- as precise, unerring, and un-

contradictory proclamations of dharma.[1] On the interpretation

of the reciprocal relationship between dharma and action[2] the truth

statements of the Vedas are seen as positive injunctions to action

through sacrifice.[3] Hence, the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras of Jaimini are, to

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[1]Prabhākara considers only the Vedas śabda-pramāṇa while
Kumārila includes the words of all trustworthy persons. Dasgupta,
History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 397.

[2]Desire is the link between the injunction and the act,
but the interpretations as to the specific significance of desire
differ; Prabhākara (whose position is closest to that of Jaimini)
opposes Kumārila in insisting that duty is for duty's sake, and that
individual practical concerns are of no relevance in light of the
overpowering nature of dharma. He would undercut all personal
individual interests.

[3]Jaimini says:
An act of sacrifice is the chief thing, and it is obligatory.
Its sanctifying affect exists in all things, and it is
performed for the sake of that affect. An act of sacrifice
makes for the purification of a proper person, and it should
be performed for the sake of that purification. Sacrifice
is associated with Dharma (the law of rightousness) because
its object is purification, and it is linked up with purifica-
tion; and that is the reason why sacrifice should be performed.
Indeed, purification and sacrifice are synonymous terms.
Mīmānsā: The Secret of the Sacred Books of the Hindus, trans.
N. V. Thadani, p. 212 (IX.1,1-4)

Both Kumārila and Prabhākara agree that Action is of primary
significance in the Vedas, but whereas Kumārila divides the Veda into
vidhivāda (injunctions) and arthavāda (explanations) Prabhākara
maintains that the arthavāda are authoritative when they help in the
performance of dharma (anvitābhidānavāda), a view which is closer to
the position of Jaimini in the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra, G. Jha, Pūrva Mīmāṁsā
in Its Sources, ed. S. Radhakrishnan, pp. 177-182.

a great extent, discourses on methodology. He puts forth Mīmāṁsā as
basic guidelines through the establishment of maxims of interpreta-
tion, the mastering of which allows one to penetrate through Vedic
literalism to the true message which is that the Vedas are really
an exposition of the attributes of Nature. Action, as the "Law
of Life" and the foundation of dharma is the object of the
exposition. In a systematic manner the laws are clarified, and
interrelated -- from Nature, to Man, to the gods, to the planets-
and on down to man in particular, and such everyday chores as
cooking, etc. -- into a harmony of Natural Law. In their present
form the śruti texts appear disjointed and inconsistent and
antithetical to the most fundamental presuppositions of inter-
pretation which would verify that the Vedas proclaim a unified
and consistent message. In an attempt to do this a philosophy
of language analysis was developed, the basis of which was the
presupposition that all words are eternal, and that all words
are denotative in nature. This idea is but an extention of the
idea that the Vedas are eternal in nature, i.e. that they are
neither created by the ṛṣi nor delivered by God, but, rather, that
they are eternally self-existent in themselves. On this basis
meaning was also understood to be eternal. For Mīmāṁsā, particularly
Jaimini, "meaning" and "dharma" are synonymous. The main thrust of

Mīmāṁsā philosophy was directed to the task of developing a philosophy of language and a hermeneutic which would penetrate the degenerations of literalism which are the result of the misapplication of personalisms in the use of language to find the eternal meaning of the Vedas.

## Word and Meaning

In searching for the true meaning of a word there are several types of pravṛttinaimitta to be considered. This too is a development from the basic understanding of the eternality of Veda. If words and that which they "mean" are eternal, and it is assumed that this meaning is undefilable, then it must be calculated just how the apparent defilement came about. The term "pravṛttinimitta" refers to the process of manifestation of the eternal word into concrete form as Veda. It is the efficient cause of the word's appearance, of its form, śabdha. Analysis of the cause of the form leads to discernment of the process which brought about defilement of the eternal meaning. The various forms are:[4]

(1) jāti,[5] or "birth"; this is the most general for if a word

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[4]Conducted correctly, the classification is not arbitrary for the eternal nature of the word-referent relationship cannot be overlooked: "Thus words are called jātiśabdaḥ or saṁskāraśabdaḥ because they ultimately stand for jāti and saṁskāra." G. V. Devasthali, Mīmāṁsā: The Vākya Śāstra of Ancient India, Vol. I, p. 61. Practically the methodology is justified after the fact on the basis of consistency.

[5]Devasthali, Mīmāṁsā, p. 55.

denotes nothing else, it denotes "birth", (2) yaugika śabdhas,[6] or "connection"; this indicates a word created especially for, and dependent upon another word, (3) saṁskāra,[7] or "memory", "collection"; here the problem is between the relation of the worldly and the non-worldly usages (laukika and alaukika), (4) saṁbandha,[8] or "association"; this concerns words related on the basis of use (artha) rather than etymology, i.e. as in the relationship of the terms "father" and "son", and (5) rūdhi,[9] or "development"; the growth of an explicit reference out of a general term. The basis of comparison for each classification is the common or worldly use (laukika). However, all of the efficient causes refer to the expressed meaning (vācyārtha). Jaimini succinctly states both the necessity for and the problems of the method of classification:

> We cannot say that the common meaning of a word is its real meaning, because it does not give us a proper connection between things, and so we get no meaning at all; and, as we do not get any satisfactory result, we have to think of another method of interpretation . . . in some cases we have to choose the meaning that suits the context best.[10]

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[6] Ibid., pp. 55–56.

[7] Ibid., p. 56.

[8] Ibid., p. 57.

[9] Ibid., pp. 59, 60, 61.

[10] Thadani, Mīmāṁsā, p. 85 (IV. ii, 12–14).

In the final analysis the accuracy of the classifications - particularly
and most obviously in the case of the Vedas - will be determined by
the extent to which such classifications are conducive to the inter-
pretation of the general context as dharmic injunction. Hence the
variability of interpretation is conditioned by consistency rather
than individual preference as intimated in the above statement
while, ultimately, consistency is found only in terms of that which
the words eternally "mean".[11] Although the worldly use (laukika)

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[11]"We cannot say that this is but one of the many ways of
understanding the text, because if we have a different meaning, we
find that there is no close connection between its different parts.
Nor can we say that the cause of this interpretation is the desire
to get particular explanation, because the rules of interpretation
are fixed . . . ." Ibid., p. 125. The insistence of Mīmāṁsā on
the doctrine of the eternality of meaning is based on the under-
standing that the referends of words are universals, and that
universals are the presupposition of all knowledge. The opposite
view, apohavāda, is put forth by the Buddhists, and one consequence
is that the Buddhists reject śruti as a basis of pramāṇa. Mīmāṁsā
holds that words mean objects while the Buddhists hold that words
and objects are totally different, objects being beyond words with
no correspondence between the two. Words denote particulars, and
the denotation of one particular entails the negation (apoha) of
all other particulars. The understanding of "orthodoxy" within
the framework of the Tradition which is rooted in revelation was
discussed in Chapter I; clearly the apohavādins, because of their
rejection of śruti do not fall within that understanding of
orthodoxy. For that reason the doctrine has not been considered at
length. On apohavāda see R. C. Pandey, The Problem of Meaning in
Indian Philosophy, pp. 200f.

is the basis for the initiation of the inquiry, it is retained as
a category among several (saṁskāra); in this connection, intention
(prayojona) is also a consideration in the search for the eternal
meaning. The undercutting of intention does not, however, completely
undercut the role of the individual. Words and their referent are
eternally existent, but the human is involved as the agency which
affects the manifestation of the word, or, so to speak, exposes
it. Although practically convenient from the standpoint of the
salvational concern of the individual, the factor of intention is
not necessary as any guarantor of the status of word. For Mīmāṁsā
"salvational concern" is the concern to achieve total correspondence
between the orientation of individual action and the eternal law
which transcends all individual actions. The involvement of the
individual is purely non-personal in nature; it is a mere co-
ordination of the vocal equipment with the eternal words which, in
the final analysis, represent the dharmic law itself, in its first
moment. The degree to which the involvement is non-personal is
correspondent to the degree which the universal dharma is manifest
on the action of a particular individual. Ideally, this is the
total of the human contribution, but in this it is applicable only
to the ṛṣis. In fact, everyone but the ṛṣis has "fallen" (i.e. is
adharma) by the misapplication of the eternal word through worldly
(laukika) use.

In the task of interpretation, the only acceptable meaning is the vācyārtha, the expressed meaning of the text in disguise. The various other alternatives in interpretation are rejected on the basis of the understanding that the truths or dharmic injunctions which the texts reveal are not apauruṣeya, i.e. not "not-of-man" in the sense that such truths which are eternal and therefore not created by a god, are made manifest by the ṛṣis. This is a significant distinction for it is this understanding which allows the Mīmāṁsākas to maintain, without contradiction, the eternality of śruti and the centrality of the ṛṣis as the proclaimers of dharma and, at the same time, as paradigms of the fulfillment of dharma. It is in this light that the role of the ṛṣi is totally non-personal.

The Mīmāṁsākas hold that meaning is not arbitrary. That the task of interpretation is to screen out the application of personalisms in the understanding and application of language within a context which is decidedly transpersonal is seen in that in the distinction between yaugikārtha (etymology) and rūḍhārtha (signification), the latter is considered primary.[12] Also, the establishment of the connection (tad yoga) between the principal meaning (mukhyārtha), and the precise meaning (lokṣanā) is dismissed as inadequate on the

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[12]S'abara agrees with Jaimini on this point. Devasthali, Mīmāṁsā, pp. 74-5.

grounds that because intention is ultimately laukika, the objects

of it are contaminated. Stipulated definition is accepted as a

means of knowledge in anuvāda (in explanation of an independent

and novel apprehension)[13] which amounts to nothing more than a

practical concession for the use of language in its "fallen"

condition as a worldly medium of expression, but because of the

contextual presuppositional conditioning of lokṣāna (definition)

it can be said to be doṣa (fallacious) regarding Ultimate Truth

(dharma). According to Mīmāṁsā epistemology, apprehensions, and

only apprehensions, are valid. All other relationships are

unnatural, i.e. their artha is not antpattika (inborn, inherent),

nitya (eternal), or apauruṣeya (not-of-man). Lokṣanā (literal

meaning) is the lesser of evils in that it renders the text useless

(anarthakaya)[14] rather than offering an outright distortion of it;

that is, by definition it makes no pretentions to have any applica-

bility to Ultimate Truth (dharma) one way or the other.

Once properly interpreted it will be seen that each term

or varna has its own signification. One word can convey only one

artha (use). Hence, because each word or aspect of a word denotes

a specific purpose in terms of action it is not possible to speak of

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[13]Ibid., pp. 91-2.
[14]Ibid., p. 93.

a modification in meaning without violating the eternal status of the śabda-pramāṇa (as the precondition to, in their eternality, and the witness to the relationship of dharma/action).[15] To insist on such modification results in the doṣa (fallacy) called abhidhāna-vipratipatti, which is defined by Śabara as the ". . . incongruity between the words uttered and the sense intended to be conveyed."[16] The incongruity is a consequence of the violation of the non-personal role of the individual. As the effector of the manifestation of the eternal word the individual has no option to distort the denotation with worldly or personal intention.

The basis of the unity of meaning begins with the particular word. Each aspect of a word represents an action or part of an action, and in terms of the dynamics of the dharmic law each action is relative to both a separate purpose and effect:

> Words have their meaning, even as qualities convey their own idea; and that is the best meaning which cannot be substituted by any other. A word can have but one real meaning because it can refer to but one impelling force.[17]

Thus, for Jaimini, the import of words lies in the fact that they stand for action -- they "mean" dharma both in regard to the word as a unit, and the atomic constituents of it. Initially, the

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[15] Thadani, Mīmāṅsā, p. 130 (VI.iii.11-12).

[16] Devasthali, Mīmāṁsā, p. 76.

[17] Thadani, Mīmāṅsā, p. 90 (IV.iii.11-13).

concern is with the word as a whole, but if it does not satisfy the criterion, i.e. a meaning which is consistent with the dharmic injunctions of the text, the constituents are examined.[18] The explanation of the meaning of a word can be obtained by associating it with some special meaning - not as an arbitrary stipulated definition, but, rather by taking the common meaning which one has heard, and dividing it into parts; that is, by breaking the word down into its natural components.[19] The important point is that the first resort is to the common meaning, an idea which reflects the understanding that in some way the worldly use of the word is still the key to the higher, uncorruptable and eternal meaning.

Jaimini extends the idea that the principle of unity is the basis of the word into the theory that a group of words forms a vākya if it meets the three stipulations that (1) the constituents, although examined individually nonetheless express an expectancy for one another, (2) the constituents be within the same context, and (3) that the constituents yield one signification.[20] Each aspect, then, be it within the individual word, or between the words of a vākya has a meaning, a signification in terms of the metaphysics of

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[18]Thadani, Mīmāṁsā, p. 77 (III.viii, 35-6).

[19]Ibid., p. 82 (VII.iv, 22).

[20]Devasthali, Mīmāṁsā, p. 187.

dharma, and its microcosmic counterpart, action, which is of prime
salvational concern to the individual -- an individual concern
which is the aspiration to transcend personal individuality through
correct performance of dharma.  There is, however, no metaphysics
of relation as a thing-in-itself which unifies the various parts;
this is done through the unity of the eternal truth of dharma
which they reflect and "mean".  The relationship (sambandha)
between form (śabdaḥ), and use (artha) is not of samsila (attachment
in immediate context), or samyoga (conjunction).  It is described
as being pratyāyaka-pratyāyyabhāva (causing to know or understand,
to encourage in the sense of mutual enlightenment).[21]  The truth of
the nature of this relation is witnessed to by the very nature of
the Vedas.  Jaimini holds that

> The text is so arranged that each part of a word has a bearing
> on the idea of the principal word, and can be explained in its
> light; and it is in this manner that the whole text has been
> integrated.[22]

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[21]Devasthali, Mīmāṃsā, p. 37.

[22]There is a major exception to this rule as in the case
where ". . . we are dealing with the great forces of Nature in their
relation to their objects; for these are major ideas, and so the
words describing them are complete in themselves, without reference
to the principal word in the text".  (Thadani, Mīmāṃsā, p. 354, n.1).
Mīmāṃsā disagrees with Nyāya that the Veda is the work of God; the
Vedas are eternal, written neither by man, nor God; they are
manifested through the ṛṣi.  The śabda (word), in its eternal relation,
is simply a manifestation of the eternal varna, and for this reason
it is, to a degree, arbitrary as to exactly which form is taken as
the final standard, i.e. "If there are a number of principal words in
a sentence, they should be regarded as synonyms; and all kinds of
actions associated with them should be referred to them alike."  Ibid.,
p. 104 (V.ii, 1--2).

There is no reductionist methodology operating here, for Jaimini
insists that "a fundamental word cannot be obtained from another or
a different form of the same word".[23]  A word is divided, if
necessary, into letters and each is treated like a word in itself
rather than a reduction of a more complex form.[24]  Compounds are non-
real (except in "worldly" use).  The emphasis is on combination
rather than construction.  Each new word (constituent) has nothing
in common with the parent word; it is their common relationship to
dharma which unifies the constituents with the parent, or the
extended combinations of phrase or sentence.  Relation is not held
to be a metaphysical thing-in-itself.  There is a serial inter-
connectedness of the constituents within the complex of the eternal
varna, but only with respect to the various injunctions to action,[25]
i.e., in terms of the time continuim, but this interconnectedness is
not in the sense of a necessary interdependence.[26]  The term "krama"
applies both to the relationship the words bear to one another and

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[23]Thadani, Mīmānsā, p. 168 (VI.iii, 40).

[24]Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 395.

[25]"It is obvious that the parts of a word must be connected
with one another, because they represent the law of life (action)."
Mīmāmsā p. 354, n.2.

[26]This is a consideration of time rather than a regulation
of it: "The Krama method of reciting the text does not regulate
time required to pronounce a word, but is connected with the method
of interpretation." Ibid., p. 1-2 (V.i, 21-22).

the methodology to be employed in the correct interpretation of the
texts (i.e. progression of meaning). Thus we are told that "When
we pronounce a word according to krama (progression of meaning), the
word itself should remain intact, even though it is changed."[27]
Upon this idea is based the insistence on correct utterance by the
individual speaker, as demonstrated by the claim that, "aśabdas owe
their origin to the want of capacity to go through the elaborate
process of uttering a word without committing a mistake."[28] This is
another example of the manner in which any sense of individuality as
personal option is undercut in favor of the eternal word.

In considering the krama method of interpretation it is
necessary to emphasize the status that Mīmāṁsā accords to
individual words. The advocates of the sphoṭa theory[29] maintain
that language is unitary to the extent that the sentence is seen as
the minimum unit for communication, or the establishment of meaning.
Words out of context are meaningless.[30] On the other hand, while

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[27] Ibid., p. 102 (IV. i, 17).

[28] Devasthali, Mīmāṁsā, p. 25.

[29] The sphoṭa is held to be the substantial eternal verbum.
For more on this point see Sastri, Philosophy of Word and Meaning,
and also his "Meaning and the Word", in Oriental Thought.

[30] One modern western position on the question of 'meaning
in context' is illustrated by the Oxford philosopher, J. L. Austin,
in his essay "The Meaning of a Word", in Philosophy and Ordinary
Language. Charles E. Caton, ed., Oxford, 1963.

Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā agree that the sentence is a unit of meaning and communication, they disagree on the significance of the contextual relationship of words. Nyāya advocates the antiabhidhāna concept, i.e. that words are related in a sentence and that the sentence is a construct of words.[31] Here context is stressed. The independence of words is maintained, but the meaning of the word in relation to the meaning of the sentence is determined by context. The word is not strictly seen as a thing-in-itself. The abhiditanvaya theory is upheld by Mīmāṁsā; here words are regarded as independent. They are united in a sentence in the sense that a sentence is merely a combination of words.[32] Words are meaningful in themselves, but to the individual the sentence is necessary to complete the meaning in that the sentence offers a fuller elaboration of dharma.

The Vedas are the basis of the entire philosophy of language, and it is held that in the eternal and perfect nature of śruti each part of the text, in its true sense, follows the other in succession.[33] This is the basis of the integrated design of the texts, as well as justification for the krama method of interpretation. The method is applicable to all literature and speech because it is successful in the Vedas; all true speech is drawn from śruti.[34]

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[31]Devasthali, Mīmāṁsā, p. 68.

[32]Ibid., p. 69.

[33]Thadani, Mīmāṁsā, p. 100 (V.i,1).

[34]Ibid., p. 172 (VII.i,10-11).

For Mīmāṁsā there is something which is the particular
meaning of every particular word, or more radically, of every
particular constituent of every particular word. That "something"
is dharma, the dynamic Real, in its various aspects. Each word,
or part of a word, is, in actuality, a name to the extent that it
stands for a particular referent. However, to the extent that the
word is merely an external manifestation of the eternal varna it
cannot be called a "name" as such, i.e. in the sense that it
designates a particular existent. At this point, the ambiguity of
the relationship between the word and dharma as action becomes
problematic. If one inquires into the nature of a certain word or
part of a word by asking the question, "What is in (the word) x?"
one would be told that 'That which is in (the word) x is an injunction
to action (dharma).' More accurately, 'that which (the term) x
"stands for" (or "is" as the manifestation of the eternal varna)
is "dharma" which, because it is the meaning of the sacred texts,
and because one is salvationally concerned is seen as something which
one should emulate.' To understand what (the term) x "means" is to
understand the nature of the activity which x stands for. The
ambiguity is presented in that the Real which the word stands for
is dynamic while, on the other hand, the relation between the word
and the referent (dharma) is static if the two are considered

distinct.  Although the relation is not held to be a thing-in-itself,
it is a necessary relation in the eternal identification of the
word-referent.  By this identification the word itself is, in a
sense, the highest reality by virtue of its inseparable association
with dharma.

For Jaimini language is an instrument of higher reality in
that it is the medium (manifestation) of dharmic injunctions.  In that
the denotations of words are eternal (in reference to dharma), and in
that the relation between the word and that action which it "means" is
unalterable, dharma and the word are inextricably bound together.
The reality of the world is presupposed by Mīmāṁsā in the sense
that the world functions as the arena of dharma, and to the extent
that the practical reality of the world expresses (or conforms to)
dharma, the world and one's active involvement in it is real or
authentic.  This correspondence of practical worldly activity with
the dharmic law is understood to be the model of existence which
is examplary.  Through conformance to the "word" as dharmic
injunction one achieves the highest possible level of existential
authenticity which is fulfillment of dharma.  This ideal is examplified
in the rṣis as portrayed in the Vedas which are the completely accurate
proclamation of reality as dharma and the word.  Just as the rṣi
experienced the vision of the eternally existent Vāc by transcending

the obscurities of personal worldliness, so also does the Mīmāṁsāka
strive to coordinate the totality of his lived-world involvement
with the laws of dharma as represented by the words of the Vedas.
One strives to become a medium for the dynamic manifestation of the
real. The Vedas, as presented through the ṛṣis, are the expression
of such manifestation. They are dharmic. They are not the product
of experience, but, rather, the immediate expression of experience
itself.

In no authentic sense can language be used as an instrument
of personal expression. Where it is applied as such, with the
overtones of personal intention, it is unauthentic (as doṣa)
particularly for Jaimini and Prabhākara. Kumārila, on the other hand,
does accept the śabda-pramāṇa of trustworthy persons, the criterion of
which is their compatibility with the Veda. His position is essentially
the same. However, the significant point of his distinction is that
he makes more allowance for the possibility of the total fulfillment
of dharma. For Kumārila the ṛṣis are a paradigm of the fulfillment
of dharma and it would appear that he holds that it is practically
possible for the ṛṣis to be emulated, contrary to the claim of
Nirukta 1.20. The personality of one who emulated the ṛṣis does
not enter the question, for to emulate the ṛṣis is to transcend the
factors of personalisms which are the foundation of worldliness.
Thus, Kumārila's reference to "trustworthy persons" refers to those

who are trustworthy to the extent that they have transcended the normative factor of personhood which is worldliness. Such a person would not be a "person" in the sense that the term is applied to other people. Such a one would be a _ṛṣi_.

Worldly use or the personalized use of language is responsible for the establishment of the unauthentic condition of the individual; that is, through the misapplication and misunderstanding of the true significance of language existence is rendered non-dharmic. Of interest is the fact that common usage is understood to be the starting point for the interpretive enterprise. This points to the notion that although everyday language is a deterioration of an ideal, it still reflects that ideal, however darkly. In this respect, everyday language provides the means for the realization of the dharmic ideal. The correction of everyday language - in the obliteration of intention - in proper interpretation for the establishment of the correct meaning, and in the faultless recitation of language once the ideal meaning has been established - is at the same time the correction of the fallacious personal existential condition.

## GENERAL

Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are traditionally regarded as

complimentary aspects of a single darśana; the task of the
former is the development of a methodological basis for inquiry
into the dharmic injunctions of the Vedas, while in the case of
the latter, particularly Śaṅkara, the concern is with the develop-
ment of the doctrine of Brahman, which Śaṅkara understands to be
the subject of the Vedas. To facilitate its task, Mīmāṃsā
developed a philosophy of language which Śaṅkara adheres to,
although his philosophic interests are of a different sort.

Śaṅkara acknowledges his indebtedness to the dharma-school
of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā as the precursors of his analysis. His doctrine of
salvation demands that he maintain dharma, in accordance with the
Veda, while at the same time reinterpreting it within the structure
of Vedantic gnosticism. Therefore, dharma should be considered
together with his understanding of māyā, mokṣa, and vidyā. Śaṅkara
offers not so much a deviation from the traditional Mīmāṃsā as an
extension of that position within a monistic metaphysic of salvation,
and the adjustments required thereby.

On the question of dharma and its relevance to salvation
(mokṣa) Śaṅkara takes exception to the contention of the Mīmāṃsā
school that dharma is the central concept of the religious quest.
He states that,

> . . . the unembodied state called 'final release' (mokṣa) is
> declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined
> by Vedic injunctions. If it were the effect of merit it
> would not be denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure.[35]

Śaṅkara maintains that knowledge is superior to and independent of

action:

> But what the Vedānta-texts really teach as the object of
> knowledge is something different from the embodied Self,
> viz. the non-transmigrating Lord who is free from all
> attributes of transmigratory existence such as agency and the
> like and distinguished by freedom from sin and so on, the
> highest Self. And the knowledge of that Self does not only
> not promote action, but rather cuts all action short . . . .[36]

He holds, therefore, that, ". . . for release to be the result of

true knowledge it must be concluded that Vedic texts on Brahman

aim at cognition, not injunction."[37]

True knowledge is the realization of the truth of the

identity principle. But release is more than mere acknowledgement

of tad ekam, it is the abandonment of all of the principles of

selfhood in the Absolute. The cognitive function of such a realiza-

tion is the synthesis of the subject/object dichotomy to Pure Being.

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[35]Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, 2 Vols., George Thibaut,
trans., New York: Dover Publications, 1962 (reprint of the 1890
edition of Vols. 34 and 37 of the Sacred Books of the East), Vol. I,
p. 27. Consideration of Śaṅkara's position is limited to this set
of texts.

[36]Ibid., II, p. 290.

[37]Ibid., II, p. 165.

At this point knowledge (jñāna) completely transcends mundane discursive cognition and worldly involvement.

Like Jaimini, Śaṅkara recognizes the Vedas to be the infallible example of the word, and that he holds the Vedas to be independent. The basis of such independence and unity is the external word which, as in Mīmāṁsā, is held to have the power of denotation either in its entirety, or through its constituents. It is the assumption that each and every word, and that each part of a word has denotive power which leads him to reject the sphoṭa theory wherein it is held that the eternal verbum is substantial in form and that the smallest component of meaning is the sentence. For Śaṅkara meaning, based on the particular denotation, is compounded rather than constructed; he therefore subscribes to the krama (progressive meaning) method of interpretation as advocated by Jaimini. Both the substantial relation of the sphoṭa theory and the establishment of relation as a metaphysical thing-in-itself (Vaiśeṣika) are rejected. The eternality of the word is maintained by referring it to the mind of Prajāpati prior to creation. Therefore, creation is not held to be the product of the word as in the sphoṭa theory. The emphasis that denotation is in terms of universals rather than particulars accounts for the ambiguity of the denotive capacity of a particular word, as well as avoiding the

Vaiśeṣika position that relation is an enternal reality in itself.

Śaṅkara maintains that any distinction of the Self as anything other than Brahman, i.e. 'tat tvaṁ asi', is a condition of avidyā, and an expression of existential unauthenticity. If looked at from the two standpoints of the micro/macrocosmic analogy avidyā can be understood in a two-fold sense: from the human perspective it is a cognitive misjudgment, a maintenance of the unauthentic condition, while from the perspective of the Ultimate, avidyā is a testament to the efficiency of the divine "creativity" (śakti or māyā). The distinction of the self as a personal being through ahaṁkāra and the "objective" (māyā) reality of the world is the product of speech. Thus, while on one hand speech is the instrument of the unauthentic condition (avidyā) in the capacity of the word to denote existential particulars, it enjoys, on the other hand, a very positive status in that it serves as an effective means for the attainment of the knowledge which is the realization of the unicity of Brahman. Śruti is not an end in itself, but the means to an end. Descriptive language is meaningful only in a negative sense. Brahman is the sole Reality, therefore predicative statements are meaningful only to the extent that they apply to Brahman.

## ŚAṄKARA'S POSITION

The question of the relationship between Brahman and the world is a causal question. Vedānta holds the position known as satkāryavāda on the issue of causality. The cause alone is real, the effects are mere appearances: this is called vivarttavāda. Vivarttavāda stands in opposition to the pariṇāmavāda of Sāṁkhya which is the position that the effects are real and distinct developments out of the potentiality of the causal condition. In his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras Śaṅkara argues against pariṇāmavāda. He does this through the use of the dialectic by using the language of pariṇāmavāda to undercut pariṇāmavāda. In studying Śaṅkara's position one must constantly bear this fact in mind in order to avoid attributing pariṇāmavāda to Śaṅkara. The language of pariṇāmavāda, i.e. the use of such terms as "potentiality", may be used without violating the position of the satkāryavādins only if such language is used in a heuristic or dialectic sense within the framework of māyāvāda. Within that context the implications of pariṇāmavāda will have the same status as those of māyāvāda: that is, real effects as modifications of causal potential are neither sat "is" nor asat "is not". It is with this understanding that I use such language. Śaṅkara uses such language to discuss

the paradox of the causal question in general,[38] and in particular,

as it applies to discriminative knowledge.[39]

One important feature of Śaṅkara's arguments in his commentary

to the Vedānta Sūtras is his use of the dialectic to demolish other

positions. His central concern is to uphold the doctrine of the

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[38]In reference to "Higher than the high Imperishable": "Here
the term 'Imperishable' means that undeveloped entity which represents
the seminal potentiality of names and forms, contains the fine parts
of the material elements, abides in the Lord, forms his limiting
adjunct, and being itself no effect is high in comparison to all
effects . . . ." Ibid., I, p. 140.

[39]Before the rising of discriminative knowledge the nature of
the individual soul, which is (in reality) pure light, is non-
discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts consisting of
body, senses, mind, sense-objects and feelings, and appears as
consisting of the energies of seeing and so on . . . . Thus the
discriminative knowledge, affected by śruti, on the part of the
individual soul which previously is non-discriminated as it were from
its limiting adjuncts, is (according to the scriptural passage
under discussion) the soul's rising from the body, and the fruit of
that discriminative knowledge is the accomplishment in its true
nature, i.e. the comprehension that its nature is the pure Self. . . .
. . . The individual soul is therefore called 'That whose true nature
is non-manifest' merely on account of the absence of discriminative
knowledge, and it is called 'That whose nature has become manifest'
on account of the presence of such knowledge. . . . . . . . Thus the
difference between the individual soul and the highest Lord is owing
to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality, since, like ether the
highest Self is not in real contact with anything." Ibid., I, p.
187.

uniformity of Brahman. Rather than positing this doctrine as a

first principle and arguing for it in a logical and systematic

manner he emphasizes, dialectically, the logical paradoxes of

māyā and avidyā. In doing so he turns logic against itself just as he

uses the language and logical distinctions of other doctrines to

undercut those positions until, finally, all alternatives having

been demolished Śaṅkara's position triumphs, so to speak, by

default.[40] Thus, Śaṅkara does not, in fact, argue for a particular

position as much as he discusses the inherent logical fallacies of

other positions. He uses the same method within the framework of

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     Betty Heimann summarizes these points well when she says,

The method applied in Indian epistemology is that of gaining
higher knowledge through discussion. One standpoint is first
pronounced, and then confronted and denounced by a second, a
third or further pakṣas 'wings or viewpoints'. Finally the
highest, or at any rate the at present no-more-refutable,
notion is reached. . . . It is divergency which helps to elucidate
the comparatively higher, i.e. the wider, grasp of the problem
in hand. Saṁvāda, 'discussion', instead of vivāda, 'dispute',
is the methodological means of gathering all the different
facets of truth, which is only indirectly and gradually
approachable. Here comparison (and in a way also the
highest graduation at present attainable) is applied to an
attempt to reach beyond merely empirical factors. The true
Summum, however, still lies beyond, and not within, the relative
sphere of all formulation. As long as formulation prevails,
the Summum, the neti-neti, the 'neither this nor that alone',
i.e. the truly pūrṇam, indistinct fulness and the all-embracing
Highest, is not yet reached. All formulations and definitions
(Latin fines) are still bound to form and limitation, and do
not penetrate to the core of truth. The transcendental Divine
lies beyond all gradations and comparisons within the unalterable
transcendental Positive. Facets of Indian Thought, pp. 170-171.

his discussion of the ambiguous nature of the reality of Īśvara, māyā and avidyā to avoid having these misunderstood as an assertion of pariṇāmavāda. It is because Śaṅkara turns the dialectic against his own position that he speaks of Brahman as both Being and Non-Being. Brahman is neither a logical postulate nor a non-logical postulate. On the other hand it is a logical postulate in the sense that it is the "at present no-more refutable notion", while, at the same time it is a non-logical postulate in that Brahman is the coincidentia oppositorum of factors which are logically contradictory of one another.

Brahman is the Ultimate, 'that which is',[41] the Real, the True.[42] Brahman, referred to by the neuter pronoun 'it',[43] is

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[41]"As the cause, i.e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz, the world, is in all time only that which is." Vedānta Sūtras, I, p. 332.

[42]"By the term 'the True' there is meant the highest Brahman; for Brahman is the Real, and it is called the 'true' in another scriptural passage. . . ." Ibid., I, p. 167.

[43]Betty Heimann discusses the general significance of the neuter in Indian thought. She says:

> Hindu cosmology, since the epochs of the Ṛgvedic speculations, accepts as the only true datum satyam (neuter!), 'Being'. This indistinct Being may be divided into actual momentarily existent and potentially existent reality. Satyam comprises all material and intellectual existence, potential and actual reality. The Upaniṣads make use of this neutral term of an intentional vagueness in their mahā-vākyas, 'Great Sayings', when they acclaim Brahman as the Satasya satyam, 'the reality of all realities' of this world, of epistemological, intellectual and also material manifestations. Brahman is the all-embracing Neuter, the potency of all possible 'He's' and 'She's' nameable and knowable, which primarily and finally are submerged in the grand 'It'. Facets of Indian Thought, p. 163.

beyond being,[44] the totality of 'that which is', and beyond Non-
being[45] as well.  It is the undifferentiated transcendental Absolute[46]
which is above classification or description in anything other than
a negative sense (neti, neti).  The negative method serves a positive
function in the attempt to comprehend Brahman.  Śaṅkara says,

> This passage ("Not so, not so."), we conclude, conveys
> information regarding the nature of Brahman by denying
> the reality of the forms fictitiously attributed to it;
> for the phrase, 'not so, not so!' negatives the whole
> aggregate of effects superimposed on Brahman.[47]

Śaṅkara holds that the highest end of man is the realization
of Brahman as the sole reality:

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[44]"Brahman which is mere Being cannot spring from here being,
since the relation of cause and effect cannot exist without a certain
superiority (on the part of the cause).  Nor again can Brahman spring
from that which is something particular, since this would be contrary
to experience (so therefore there is no origin of that which is
(Brahman))."  Vedānta Sūtras, II, p. 160.

[45]". . . while the term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which
is differentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being' denotes
the same substance previous to its differentiation, i.e. that Brahman
is, in a secondary sense of the word, called Non-being previously
to the origination of the world."  Ibid., I, p. 267.

[46]". . . it is incapable of receiving any accretion and is
eternally pure."  Ibid., I, p. 34.

[47]Vedānta Sūtras, II, p. 169.

> . . . the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end
> of man, since it destroys the root of all evil such as
> Nescience, the seed of the entire saṃsāra.[48]

> . . . you are rather to dissolve by true knowledge the universe
> of effects, which is the mere product of Nescience, and to
> know that one Self, which is the general abode, as uniform.[49]

Sankara uses the doctrine of _māyā_ to deal with the question of the

relationship of the diversities of phenomenal reality to Brahman.

Through the _māyā_ doctrine he resolves the dilemma of the contradiction

between the interior realization of uniformity and the objective

experience of diversity. _Māyā_ is of central importance for it is

only through the ambiguous nature of _māyā_ that one is able to

consider the Absolute in that the Absolute is the basis (_adhiṣṭhāna_)[50]

on which _māyā_ appears. The _māyā_ doctrine allows one to make logical

distinctions in the attempt to understand dialectically that which

is beyond the scope of logic.[51] Dasgupta expresses this point well.

He says that:

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[48]Ibid., I, p. 14.

[49]Ibid., I, p. 155.

[50]Dasgupta, _History of Indian Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 246.

[51]Ibid., pp. 442-43. The basis of the dialectic is understood
by Betty Heimann to be a unique feature of Indian thought:
> The unique characteristic of Indian thought is a simultaneous
> moving on two levels: the empirical and the transcendental.
> The transcendental is assumed to be ever present. _Brahman_,
> the 'It', is postulated to be before and after, yet also
> within, all empirical phenomena. _Facets of Indian Thought_, p. 70.
Māyāvāda is an example of the attempt to express the two levels of
understanding within a single principle. It is in this sense that I
have referred to the 'ambiguous' nature of _māyā_.

Māyā . . . is a category which baffles the ordinary logical
division of existence and non-existence and the principle
of the excluded middle. For the māyā can neither be said
to be "is" nor "is not" (tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīyā).
. . . The world is said to be false -- a mere product of māyā.
The falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained
as involved in the category of the indefinite which is
neither sat "is" nor asat "is not". Here the opposition
of the "is" and "is not" is solved by the category of time.
The world-appearance "is not", since it does not continue
to manifest itself in all times, and has its manifestation
up to the moment that the right knowledge dawns. It is not
therefore "is not" in the sense that a "castle in the air"
or a hare's horn "is not", for these are called tuccha,
the absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said
to be "is" or existing, since it appears to be so for the
time the state of ignorance persists in us. Since it exists
for a time it is sat (is), but since it does not exist for
all times it is asat (is not). . . . the falsehood of the
world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears to
be the reality or an expression or manifestation of the
reality, the being, sat, yet when the reality is once
rightly comprehended, it will be manifest that the world never
existed, does not exist, and will never again exist.[52]

From within the māyā complex, māyā stands as an incomprehensible

obstruction to any effort to glean knowledge of the Brahman whereas

from the standpoint of the realization of the identity of the Self

with Brahman which is the transcendence of the distinctions which

characterize personality (jīva-antahkarana) and finitude māyā is

no more than a potential effect of the Brahman to which it is

identical.[53]

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[52]
Ibid., pp. 442-43.
[53]
". . . the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume
a bodily shape formed of Māyā . . . ." Ibid., p. 80.

When Śaṅkara says that the Brahman has two natures[54] and

goes on to speak of these natures as being exclusive of one another

he is making a heuristic rather than an ontological distinction.[55]

Creation is the result through the action of Brahman as

Isvara (Kārya-Brahma).[56] It is the product (karya) of the Brahma

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54

"Brahman is apprehended under two forms; in the first place
as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the
evolutions of name and form [i.e. the multiformity of the created
world]; in the second place as being the opposite of this, i.e. free
from all limiting conditions whatever." Ibid., I, p. 61. Also,
Brahman possesses a double nature, ". . . according as it is the
object either of Knowledge of Ignorance. As long as it is the object
of Nescience, there are applied to it the categories of devotee,
object of devotion, and the like." Ibid., I, p. 62.

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We are told that there can be no modification in Brahman
for Brahman is unborn (Ibid., I, p. 349); also, ". . . the (alleged)
break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience." Ibid.,
I, p. 352. This represents one main point of difference between
Śaṅkara and the Sphotavādin, Bhartṛhari. Sastri contrasts the two
positions: "That the Kālaśakti is ultimately real and has the same
ontological status as the Eternal Verbum does not seem to admit of doubt.
But Śaṅkara would never accept the ultimate reality of any power
(śakti) co-existing with the Absolute . . . Śaṅkara would not admit
the possibility of the relation of identity except as a metaphorical
expression." The Philosophy of Word and Meaning, p. 62.

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". . . no soul, apart from the Lord, possesses the power of
evolution; and if any have such power it is dependent on the highest
Lord." Ibid., I, p. 97.

power (śakti-māyā-Īśvara).[57] The personal Īśvara is the actualisation

of the creative potential[58] (from the finite perspective, or logically)

as māyā (distinction)[59] which is relative in that, although it is the

first determination it is qualified as determination. Brahman in its

qualified sense (saguṇa) is the realised potentiality (realised as

Nescience)[60] of the Ultimate, and as such it represents the goal of

the spiritual enterprise which is an objective pursuit,[61] i.e. the

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[57]We are told that Brahman has all power although it does
not possess bodily organs of action. Ibid., I, p. 355. ". . .
Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power
of Māyā . . . ." Ibid., I, p. 362.

[58]". . . that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence
is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i.e.
different from the embodied Self, is the creative principle of the
world." Ibid., I, p. 344.

[59]"Although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless
may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature
an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience."
Ibid., I, p. 355.

[60]". . . Brahman, although one only, is, owing ot its manifold
powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects . . . ." Ibid.,
I, p. 347.

[61]"Hence as he who does not reach the form of the double-
natured highest Lord which is divorced from all qualities stops at
that form which is distinguished by qualities, so also, unable to
reach unlimited power within the latter form, he stops at limited
lordly power." Ibid., II, p. 417. Were anything but the qualified
Lord meant, the distinctions between the individual and the goal, etc.,
because Identity is the nature of the Absolute, could not be maintained.
The appropriation of the truth of the realisation of 'tat tvām asi'
is the absolute interiority of consciousness as Self which is the
overcoming of consciousness in its discursive capacity; at this point
of absolute Identity, distinctions are not logically possible.
Practical possibility is another problem; one exists not in opposition
to the Absolute, but, rather, as an instrument of its pure creativity,
i.e. one exists logically, as, ultimately, māyā exists logically. One
both "is" and "is not".

attainment of Brahma-Loka. The Ultimate (nirguṇa, i.e. as pure
potentiality) beyond the characterisations[62] of Being and Non-
Being is the Real. Isvara (=śakti=māyā)[63] is the ground of 'that-
which-is' as phenomenal reality, and it is in this sense that the
identification of ātman/Brahman if it is seen as something that
one is conscious of rather than as, in the sense of full
identification, must be understood in terms of ātman/Īśvara[64] (that
is, differentiation, in the sense of immediacy rather than distinction,
in terms of potentiality). In that the differentiation concerns
immediacy rather than distinction it can still be said that Brahman
is the Self of everything[65] within the immediacy of its own
potential as creativity and Will.

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[62]". . . all statements regarding difference have reference
to the difference of Brahman's limiting adjuncts only, not to any
difference affecting Brahman's own nature." Ibid., II, p. 178.

[63]". . . there is only one highest Lord ever unchanging,
whose substance is cognition, and who, by means of Nescience, manifests
himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg appears in different
shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that Lord there is
no other substance of cognition . . . ." Ibid., I, p. 190.

[64]"Thus the difference between the individual soul and the
highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality,
since, like either, the highest Self is not in real contact with
anything." Ibid., I, p. 187.

[65]". . . the universal rulership implied in the statement
that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created beings,
inclusive of the gods . . . is an appropriate attribute of the highest
Self," Ibid., I, pp. 131-2.

The distinction – between the qualified and the unqualified –
represents the logical poles in Śaṅkara's use of the dialectic.
The unqualified, that which is beyond the distinctions (phenomenal)
of name and form[66] (in which respect it is not, nor can it become
an object of knowledge for men or gods)[67] is accepted as the Real
although it can never be determined as such through discursive
thought.[68] The qualified Brahmā, never to be accepted by the

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[66]"By that element of plurality which is the fiction of
Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is
evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either
as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of
this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its
true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted
above the phenomenal universe." Ibid., I, p. 352. "But, excepting
Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and form, since
the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms.
Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be
accomplished by anything else but Brahman . . ." Ibid., I, p. 233.
Both references demonstrate that any distinction must be logical
rather than practical or actual.

[67]"For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot
become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no
characteristic marks . . . inference also and the other means of
proof do not apply to it; but like religious duty, it is known solely
on the ground of hold tradition . . . the cause of this world is not
to be known even by divine beings [Īśvara] of extraordinary power
and wisdom." Ibid., I, p. 307.

[68]"Brahman is that whose nature is permanent purity, in-
telligence, and freedom; it transcends speech and mind, does not fall
within the category of 'object', and constitutes the inward Self of
all." Ibid., II, p. 168.

learned as an end in itself,[69] either as māyā, or in its immediate

relationship to māyā bears witness to the totally transcendent nature

of the Brahman as well as the finitude of the mundane mind. Śaṅkara

calls for the transcendence of the objective distinctions of

phenomena to metaphysics and that which is beyond distinction. One

must get beyond cosmogony and cosmology which is the realm of

Isvara. Śaṅkara states that

> . . . we must remember that the scriptural doctrine of creation
> does not refer to the highest reality; it refers to the apparent
> world only, which is characterised by name and form, the
> figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that
> Brahman is the Self of everything.[70]

Śaṅkara inquires into the nature of that which is beyond, and then

proceeds to answer his own question:

> What then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord
> can refer previously to the origin of the world? Name and form,
> we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with
> Brahman, nor as different from it, unevolved but about to be
> evolved.[71]

The kind of knowledge to which he refers is totally different than

mundane knowledge of phenomena and time relations (saṁsāra).

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[69]"Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts
of name and form . . . He (the Lord) stands in the realm of the
phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the so-called jīvas (indivi-
dual souls) or cognitional Selfs (vigñanātman), which indeed are
one with his own Self . . . . Hence the Lord's being a Lord, his
omniscience, his omnipotence, etc., all depend on the limitation due
to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality none of
these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by
right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever." Ibid., I, p. 329.
Also, ". . . as he who does reach that form of the double-natured
highest Lord which is divorced from all qualities stops at that
form which is distinguished by qualities, so also, unable to reach
unlimited power within the latter form, he stops at limited lordly
power." Ibid., II, p. 417.
    [70]Ibid., I, p. 357.
    [71]Ibid., I, p. 50.

Objective 'knowing' is replaced by pure intuition of

Being:

> And the knowledge of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release results in a perception, i.e. the intuition - sakshatkara - of Brahman.[72]

All distinctions are obliterated in the realisation of the

Identity with the Absolute (tat tvam asi). Prior to the realisa-

tion of the ultimate truth the Absolute is a logical postulate,

and after the realisation of that truth the qualified Brahma or

Isvara is nothing more than a creative possibility of the Brahman.[73]

Sankara speaks of Isvara in three different ways: (1) as

the basis of the created order:

> The entire evolution of names and forms . . . all this manifold evolution according to species and individuals can surely be the work of the highest Lord only . . . ,[74]

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[72]Ibid., I, p. 300.

[73]Dasgupta notes that,
"In the Vedanta system Isvara has but little importance for he is but a phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and both jiva and Isvara are but illusory impositions on it."                      History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p.477.

[74]Vedanta Sutras, II, p. 97.

(2) Īśvara is likened to a magician in that he is the creator of an

illusion:

> . . . the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of
> the world (as the magician) . . . by his rulership he is the cause
> of the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the
> magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion
> . . . ,[75]

(3) Īśvara is the causal potentiality of Brahman:

> For that causal potentiality (the previous seminar condition of
> the world dependent upon the Lord) is of the nature of Nescience;
> it is rightly denoted by the term 'undeveloped'; it has the
> highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the nature of an
> illusion; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the
> transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the unconscious-
> ness of their individual character.[76]

Betty Heimann makes the following observation on the sig-

nificance of the use of such superlatives as "highest Lord":

> The Superlative, it is true, tries to approach the infinite
> sphere. As such two different kinds of Superlative are
> introduced: the fixed Superlative of empirical gradation
> and the unfixed Superlative, the so-called Elative of vague
> import. The Superlative proper designates the highest degree
> of the quality known, for which a higher quantity is stated
> via Comparative and Superlative. This kind of Superlative
> is comparison developed to its highest quantity. Here we
> remain in the range of empirical values. Śaṅkara, the
> Vedāntist philosopher, makes use of this empirical Superlative
> in his laukika interpretation for the understanding of the
> masses. As such he assigns to Brahman the term tatama, 'the
> most expanded' (from the root √tan).[77]

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[75] Ibid., I, p. 290.

[76] Ibid., I, p. 243.

[77] Heimann, Facets of Indian Thought, p. 171.

The third example above indicates that Śaṅkara uses the Superlative
in both ways regarding Īśvara as causal potentiality. The first
example is more strictly a case of Śaṅkara's laukika interpretation,
although all three are laukika in that they concern the phenomenal
(saguṇa) rather than metaphysical (nirguṇa) order.

However, the difference must remain a purely theoretical
one in that Nescience (māyā, from the perspective of the divine) has
no truly objective status, although it is, so to speak, a very
positive effect as viewed from the wrongness of the human perspective.[78]
Actually the Brahman is one and unmodified as the totality - nothing
less, nothing more - of that which is,[79] including māyā.[80] Māyā
as a condition of the Real cannot be discarded -- it must be seen
for what it is as a condition of the pure potentiality of Brahman.
To place the emphasis where it belongs, i.e. on the Real in respect
to its potentiality as māyā, māyā has a positive aspect.[81] Its
wrongness as an impediment to salvation is the wrongness of the human
condition misapplied.[82] This is clearly seen in the problems of
using analogical language to speak of the Ultimate.

To say that "Brahman is the Self of everything" and that

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[78]In short, māyā, from the divine side of the micro/macrocosmic
analogy represents the positive force of the divine creativity, while
from the human perspective it is philosophically equivalent to avidyā,
or the ignorance of the true identification of the Self as Brahman, i.e.
'tat tvām asi', in which capacity it is negative, and an obstruction to
the realisation of the spiritual ideal, i.e. identification with Brahman.

[79]"There is no origin of that which is (because Being can't
arise from being, and nor can Brahman arise from the particular)."
Vedānta Sūtras, II, p. 19.

[80]". . . the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume

therefore "Qualities of the Self belong to Brahman also" is to

make a statement of fact which is sensible only within an understanding

of the inverse nature of analogical language; that is, I think that

in this sense "analogy" must be considered dialectically, not in

the sense as a distinction in classification, but, rather, as a

step beyond the impossibility of the classification of distinction

which is implied of the Absolute by the terms "neti, neti".[83]

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[80] (continued)
bodily shape formed of māyā, in order to satisfy his devout
worshippers." Ibid., I, p. 80.

[81] Sankara holds that it is the fact that māyā equals Nescience
which makes liberation possible. Ibid., II, p. 174.

[82] "(the soul) . . . erroneously considers itself to be limited
by name and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes
their attributes to itself." Ibid., I, p. 139. Also, "And the
individual soul is to be considered a mere appearance of the highest
Self . . . . And as that 'appearance' is the effect of Nescience,
it follows that the saṁsāra which is based on it [the appearance] is
also the effect of Nescience, so that from the removal of the latter
there results the cognition of the soul being in reality nothing but
Brahman." Ibid., II, p. 68.

[83] ". . . that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence
is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i.e.
different from the embodied Self, is the creative principle of the
world." Ibid., I, p. 344. ". . . we have to understand that the bliss
of Brahman is not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or
abode, the one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss." Ibid., I,
p. 73. "They (students of Vedānta) likewise know that what is denoted
by the term 'thou' is the inward Self (pratyagātman); which is the
agent in seeing and hearing, is (successively) apprehended as the
inward Self of all the outward unvolucra beginning with the gross
body (cp. Taitt, Up.), and finally ascertained as of the nature of
intelligence." Ibid., II, p. 335.

Thus it can be said that Brahman is intelligence, or, from "this side", "like" intelligence,[84] etc. But within the monistic or "non-dual" structures no distinction is implied for,[85] in the last word, the "analogy" is within the potentialities of Brahman - or between pure potentiality, and potentiality as possibility (śakti, or māyā). So, (the term) "also" in the statement, "qualities of the Self belong to Brahman also" and all other such comparative or analogical references, are not references to distinctions or determinations of the Absolute, but, rather, they are assertions of the unitary nature of the Identity of the One.[86]

This inverse nature of analogy is necessarily operative in any discussion or description of Brahman in its qualified sense (the presupposition being that with regard to Brahman as nirguṇa

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[84]". . . Brahman is of the nature of intelligence." Ibid., I, p. 264. ". . . scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelligence, is devoid of any other characteristics, and is altogether without difference . . . ." Ibid., II, p. 156. "For Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belongs to the individual soul, belongs to Brahman also." Ibid., I, p. 111. ". . . Now, if the individual soul is nothing but that highest Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul's essential nature also . . . ." Ibid., II, p. 34.

[85]"We therefore look on the relation of the highest Self and the soul as analogous to that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole the snake is one, non-different, while an element of difference appears if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, erect posture and so on." Ibid., II, p. 174.

[86]"As thus the soul [as long as involved in the saṁsāra] has for its essence the qualities of its limiting adjuncts, it is spoken of as minute. The case is analogous to that of Brahman . . . ." Ibid., II, p. 45. Within the māyā, complex, ajñāna equals the limiting adjuncts in Brahman. Ibid., II, p. 153.

no discussion can take place, i.e. it is _neti, neti_). Thus the

philosophic enterprise, as well as the religious quest (as a

salvational endeavour) must necessarily (that is, "practically")

stop short of the Ultimate. In the establishment of an analogy only

Isvara, the sum of the transcendental Universals, which as a

determination of the Absolute is qualitative can be the object for

the discursive dichotomies from "this side".[87] So it can be said

that the "Brahman cannot be reached by an act of going,"[88] for (the

term) "going" implies distinction. One cannot be said "to go" to

where one already is (_tat tvām asi_). On the other hand, one can

"go" to Īśvara[89] in that any relationship with Isvara is within

an ontological schema wherein distinctions in identities (actual

or otherwise) can be logically as well as practically maintained.

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[87]"Hence as he who does not reach that form of the double-natured highest Lord which is divorced from all qualities stops at that form which is distinguished by qualities . . . ." _Ibid._, II, p. 417.

[88]Regarding the progression of the soul 'to what is higher than that': "This is the release by successive steps which we have to accept on the basis of the scriptural declarations about the non-return of the souls. For we have shown that the Highest cannot be directly reached by the act of going . . . . The texts about going therefore all belong to the lower knowledge." _Ibid._, II, pp. 391-94.

[89]". . . the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of Māyā, in order to gratify thereby his devout worshippers." _Ibid._, I, p. 80. "Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart." _Ibid._, I, p. 114.

Although Īśvara is the ultimate "by default"[90] in that only a

determination can be cognitively known, he implies,[91] logically if

not practically, the non-determinate metaphysical Absolute above

and beyond ontological distinctions.[92]  However, within the pseudo-

practicalities[93] of contingent reality, and free from the discursive

perspective of the "individual" (ahaṁkāra=māyā) the Brahman, through

its creative capacity, Īśvara, is understood in terms of a series of

gross and subtle states (potentialities) of formal manifestation.[94]

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[90]"Hence, the Lord's being a Lord, his omniscience, his
omnipotence, etc., all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts
whose Self is Nescience; while in reality none of these qualities
belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by right knowledge,
from all adjuncts whatsoever." Ibid., I, p. 329. "But by the
meditation on the highest that which hidden (viz. the equality of
the Lord and the soul, becomes manifest); for from him [the Lord] are
its [the soul's] bondage and release . . . . Do you mean to say that
the individual soul has no common attributes with the Lord? We do
not maintain that; but we say that the equality of attributes,
although existing, is hidden by the veil of Nescience." Ibid., II, p. 139.

[91]"No limit, on the other hand, can be admitted of the might
of the highest Lord, as appears from the passage (Bri. Up. IV, 4,22),
'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all
things. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be
confounded;' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all
limiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye
and the sun cannot be the highest Lord." Ibid., I, p. 79.

[92]"By that element of plurality which is the fiction of
Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as
well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing
or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent
world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature
it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal
universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of
Nescience originates entirely from speech only . . . ." Ibid., I, p. 352.
(nāma-rūpa = māyā = avidyā).

[93]Primeval Nescience provides the basis for all practical
life. Ibid., II, p. 156.

[94]" . . . Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through

They represent the "mediums" (= māyā) of Personality or creativity (ātman=

Īśvara) which is immediate, but not particular or determinate.   They

can be considered Real only in relation to the Universals which are

Real in themselves (as capacities of Brahman).[95]   (Such Universals

are not generalities from particulars,[96] but, rather, transcendentals

which are universal in that they are unitary and beyond particularism.)

The wrongness of the analogical insight lies in this one-way contingency

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94 (continued)
the mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual
soul, agent, enjoyer."  Ibid., I, p. 104.  "The entire evolution of
names and forms which is seen, e.g. in fire, sun, moon, lightening, or
in different plans such as kusa-grass, kasa-grass, palasa-trees, or
in various living beings such as cattle, deer, men, all this manifold
evolution according to species and individuals can surely be the work
of the highest Lord only, who fashioned fire, water, and earth . . . ."
Ibid., II, p. 97.  ". . . the evolution of names and forms was preceeded
by the tripartition, the evolution of each particular name and form
being already explained by the account of the origin of fire, water,
and earth.  Ibid., II, p. 98.

[95]Regarding Ch. U. 6,8,2 - "For indeed, my son, mind is fastened
to prāṇa:" Śaṅkara maintains that prāṇa denotes Brahman because prāṇa
is connected with the characteristic marks of Brahman, i.e. "All beings
merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise, which declares that
the origination and retraction of all beings depend on prāṇa, clearly
shows prāṇa to be Brahman."  Ibid., I, p. 86.  "If we therefore meet
with the clause 'to prāṇa mind is fastened' in a section (of the sacred
texts) of which the highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a
moment suppose that the word prāṇa should there denote the ordinary
breath which is a mere modification of air."  Ibid., I, p. 87.

[96]"For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot
become an object of perception; and there are in its case no characteristic
marks . . . inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it;
but like religious duty, it is known solely on the ground of holy
tradition . . . . . . .the cause of this world is not to be known even
by divine beings (Īśvara) of extraordinary power and wisdom."  Ibid., I,
p. 307.

(Nescience)[97] directed from the "objective cognitive reals" to the
transcendental Universals. (That the "objective cognitive reals" are
philosophically equivalent to $\underline{māyā}$ as $\underline{avidyā}$[98] is demonstrated by the
fact that "reals" (the realization through $\underline{sakṣātkāra}$ of the truth
of the interior Self as '$\underline{tat\ tvām\ asi}$')[99] equal $\underline{vidyā}$ ($\underline{jīva}$ as $\underline{ātman}$)
which results in $\underline{mokṣa}$, or the obliteration of the "individual"
personal self[100] which is the basis of multiplicity.

That the analogical methodology is suseptible to misinter-
pretation prompts Sankara to continually reaffirm the metaphysical

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[97]"In the case of Brahman the limiting adjuncts are, moreover,
presented by Nescience merely." $\underline{Ibid}$., II, p. 153.

[98]Nescience is the basis of the practical distinction between
knowledge, object of knowledge, and the person. $\underline{Ibid}$., I, p. 6. "These
subtle elements - heat and so on - which constitute the abode of hearing
and the other organs persist up to the 'union', i.e. up to final release
from the $\underline{saṃsāra}$, which is caused by perfect knowledge." $\underline{Ibid}$., II, p.
371. ($\underline{vidyā}$ = $\underline{mokṣa}$ (= release from $\underline{māyā}$ = release from $\underline{saṃsāra}$), or
$\underline{avidyā}$ = $\underline{saṃsāra}$).

[99]"With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the
distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically
assumed, as long as we have not learned -- from the passage, 'That art
thou' -- that the Self is one only." $\underline{Ibid}$., I, p. 115.

[100]". . . but the passages such as 'Thou art That,' 'I am Brahman',
leave nothing to be desired because the state of consciousness produced
by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self." $\underline{Ibid}$., I, 326.

unity of Brahman.[101] Thus, ontologically it can be said that

Brahman is aksara,[102] prāṇa,[103] name,[104] or silence[105] without

contradicting the metaphysical unity of the Absolute. For Śaṅkara

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[101] ". . . every effect, which is produced, is produced in such a way as not to be separated from other in place as well as in time, and either itself is non-separated in place and time from Brahman, hence, if there are known Brahman and its effects, the either is also known." Ibid., II, p. 8.

[102] ". . . we take akshara to mean either 'the Imperishable' or 'that which pervades' on the ground of either of which explanations it must be identified with the highest Brahman." Ibid., I, p. 170. Also, ". . . Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether." Ibid., II, p. 110.

[103] "For Scripture says of prāṇa also, that it is connected with marks characteristic of Brahman. The sentence, 'all these beings merge into breath along, and from breath they arise,' which declares that the origination and retraction of all beings depend on prāṇa, clearly shows prāṇa to be Brahman." Ibid., I, p. 86. Also, "Those, i.e. the sense organs -- denoted by the term 'prāṇa'-- and the elements of him who knows the highest Brahman, are merged in the same highest Brahman. . . . And when parts that are due to Nescience are dissolved through knowledge it is not possible that a remainder should be left. The parts therefore enter into absolute non-division from Brahman." Ibid., II, p. 377.

[104] "Having thus declared the different abodes of that true Brahman with reference to the gods and with reference to the body, and having, in what follows, identified its body with the sacred syllables (bhuh, etc.), the text teaches its two secret names (upanishad), 'Its secret name is ahar' with reference to the gods; and 'its secret name is aham' with reference to the body. Ibid., II, p. 216. . . . but as each secret name is taught only with reference to the one Brahman as conditioned by a particular state, the name applies to Brahman only in so far as it is in that state. (Therefore the names must be held apart.)" Ibid., II, p. 217.

[105] ". . . Bhava, being questioned about Brahman by Vashkalin, explained it to him by silence . . . 'Silent is that Self.'" Ibid., II, p. 157.

there is no possibility for symbolic knowledge of Brahman.  He

states that,

> We must not, . . . attach to symbols the idea of Brahman.  For
> he, i.e. the mediating person, cannot comprehend the heterogeneous
> symbols as being of the nature of the Self.  Nor is it true that
> the symbols are of the nature of the Self, because as being
> effects of Brahman they are of the nature of Brahman; for (from
> their being of the nature of Brahman) there results the non-
> existence of (them as) symbols.  For the aggregate of names and
> so on can be viewed as of the nature of Brahman only in so far as
> the individual character of those effects of Brahman is sublated;
> and when that character is sublated how then can they be viewed
> as symbols, and how can the Self be apprehended in them?[106]

True analogy is tautological in that it involves the identification

of the Brahman as that which "is" with itself.  This is expressed

in the Brahman/Ātman identification.  Thus the mahāvākya "tat tvaṁ asi"

(That (Brahman) art thou) can be reduced to "That (It, Brahman) is" if

"thou" is understood to refer to the ātman.  If, however, one interprets

the "thou" as referring to the jīva it is quite another case.  Ātman

and jīva differ in that the latter denotes the Self in association

with the personal individuating factors of the antahkaraṇa.  The basis

of this association is ajñāna, while the result of it is that the Self

as jīva must endure the diversities of mundane experience.  Thus the

jīva is identical to the Brahman proportional to the extent that it

is associated with the positive aspect of the ajñāna factor.  That is,

to the extent that it is unencumbered by the negative influence of

personality.  The term "jīva" refers to a phenomenon.

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[106]Vedānta Sūtras, II, p. 341.

Consequently, any attempt to establish an analogical association between the Self as _jīva_ and the Real must be contained within the framework of the phenomenal order, and must refer to the Real as it expresses itself within that order. This involves two possibilities which correspond to the twofold aspect of the _jīva_ as the Self in association with the _antaḥkaraṇa_. One would be to emphasize the personal element and to establish random associations from that basis. The other would involve the de-emphasis of the personal element in the association between the _jīva_ and _Īśvara_ which is the phenomenal aspect of Brahman. Both approaches are based on _avidyā_ and are restricted to the realm of _māyā_. However, whereas the former concerns _avidyā_ in its most negative and veiling sense (_āvaraṇa_)[107] the latter concerns _avidyā_ in its positive and generative (_vikṣepa_)[108] sense.

By emphasizing the positive aspects of the reality of _māyā_ Śaṅkara is able to put forth what might be called an ontological argument for the existence of Brahman. He says,

> . . . the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the Self of everyone. For everyone is conscious of the existence of Self, and never thinks 'I am not'.[109]

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[107] Dasgupta, _History of Indian Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 475.

[108] _Ibid._, p. 475.

[109] _Vedānta Sūtras_, I, p. 14.

Śaṅkara is not positing a subjectivism[110] here, but rather, he is
asserting that Brahman is the adhiṣṭhana of all reality.[111] All
statements of association should be understood in this light, for
this is the basis of the notion of the "positive" aspect of
māyāvidyā ajñāna. Dasgupta discusses the "positive" aspect of ajñāna
within the framework of the understanding of Brahman as Satcitananda.
He says,

> Ajñāna is . . . considered to have both its locus and object in
> the pure cit. It is opposed to the states of consciousness,
> for these at once dispel it. The action of this ajñāna is
> thus on the light of reality which it obstructs for us, so
> long as the obstruction is not dissolved by the states of
> consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not only with
> regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness but
> also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss;
> so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in
> our pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing
> the pure cit is indicated by the fact that the full infinite
> bliss constituting the essence of Brahman is obstructed; and
> as a result of that there is only an incomplete manifestation

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[110] Betty Heimann points out that,
. . . the principle of individualization is solely an empirical
fiction which hinders natural, inborn knowledge and has to be
given up in the end. Even during the time of its effectiveness
in action the Ahaṁ kāra is never considered as a specific
quality of the human individual alone, nor, in a wider sense,
of an individual in the animate sphere alone. . . . Ahaṁkāra
thus means nothing else but the principle of individuation,
the distinction by name and form (nāma-rūpa), irrespective of
its psychological or merely cosmic form of appearance. . . . No
basis is given in Indian thought for any genuine subjectivism
in a Western sense . . . . Facets of Indian Thought, p. 53.

[111] Śaṅkara considers the import of similar statements:
'Omnipresent and eternal like the ether' 'The Brahman is visible,
not invisible, the Self that is within all' (Bri. Up. III, 4,1);
'Self only is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25,2); 'Brahman only is all
this, it is the best' (Mu. Up. II, 2,11): from all these passages
we ascertain that the highest Brahman is present everywhere, within
everything, the Self of everything, and of such a Brahman it is

of the bliss in our phenomenal experiences of pleasure.[112]

It is the reality of the partiality which allows Sankara to make the distinction between figurative statements which are false,[113] and figurative statements which, although within the realm of māyā, are more than simply figurative.[114]   The "more than" refers to the functional, i.e. dialectical value of such statements, not as assertions, but as affirmations of Brahman as adhiṣthana.

Ultimately, with regard to the actual realization of the identity of the Self and Brahman, all statements and cognitive

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[111] (continued)
altogether impossible that it ever should be the goal of going. For we do not go to what is already reached; ordinary experience rather tells us that a person goes to something different from him.
                                        Vedānta Sūtras, II, p. 394.
[112]
       History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 458.
[113]
       "As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body while still alive."
                                        Vedānta Sūtras, I, p. 43.
[114]
       ". . . so the passage 'that is the Self, that art thou, O Svetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature . . . (i.e. therefore the word 'Self' is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense)."                     Ibid., I, p. 56.

determinations have no import, for,

> Brahman is that whose nature is permanent purity, intelligence, and freedom; it transcends speech and mind, does not fall within the category of 'object', and constitutes the inward Self of all. (II. 168)[115]

They have an interim value in that they lead one to the realization

that,

> A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet Self.' -- that means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the outer organs such as speech, etc., and abide within the mind only; he should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external objects within the intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision, recognizing that within the great Self, i.e. the individual soul or else the fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm Self, i.e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole chapter treats.[116]

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[115] Ibid., II, p. 168.

[116] Ibid., I, p. 241.

APPENDIX

The following are the texts of Geldner's[1] German trans-
lations and Griffith's[2] English translations of <u>RV</u> 10.67; 68:

10.67    <u>An Bṛhaspati</u>

1. Diese siebenköpfige Dichtung erfand unser
   Vater, die aus der Wahrheit geborene, hohe.
   Wohl ein Viertel (davon) brachte der allen
   Völkern bekannte Ayāsya hervor, als er das
   Loblied auf Indra vortrug.

   This holy hymn, sublime and seven-headed, sprung
        from eternal Law, our sire discovered.
   Ayâsya, friend of all men, hath engendered the
        fourth hymn as he sang his laud to Indra.

2. Wahrheit sprechend, redlich denkend haben
   die Söhne des Himmels, die Mannen des Asura,
   die Aṅgiras' den Redukundigen zu ihrer Wegspur
   machend die erste Form des Opfers ersonnen.

   Thinking aright, praising eternal Order, the sons
        of Dyaus the Asura, those heroes,
   Aṅgirases, holding the rank of sages, first
        honoured sacrifice's holy statue.

3. Mit den Freunden, die wie die Gänse schrieen,
   die steinernen Bänder sprengend hat Bṛhaspati,
   den Kühen zubrüllend, den Ton angestimmt und
   laut gesungen als Kundiger.

   Grit by his friends who cried with swan-like
        voices, bursting the stony barriers of the prison,
   Brihaspati spake in thunder to the cattle, and
        uttered praise and song when he had found them.

4. Unten durch zwei, oben durch eine (Tür) hat
   Bṛhaspati die in den Banden des Unrechts versteckten
   Kühe, im Dunkeln das Licht suchend, herausgeholt,
   denn er hatt die drei (Türen) geoffnet.

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[1]
<u>Der Ṛig-Veda: Aus Dem Sanskrit Ins Deutsche Und Mit Einem
Laufenden Kommentar Versehen</u>, K. F. Geldner, trans. HOS, Vol. 35,
pp. 241-45.

[2]
<u>The Ṛigveda</u>, Vol. 2, Ralph T. H. Griffith, trans., pp.
479-81.

Apart from one, away from two above him, he drave
    the kine that stood in bonds of falsehood,
Brihaspati, seeking light amid the darkness, drave
    forth the bright cows: three he made apparent.

5. Nichdem er die Burg zerspalten hatte, dass sie
    sich hintenüber legte, erloste er auf einmal
    die Drei aus dem Meere: Brihaspati fand die
    Morgenröte, die Sonne, die Kuh; (er fand) den
    Gesang wie der Himmel donnernd.

    When he had cleft the lairs and western castle,
        he cut off three from him who held the waters.
    Brihaspati discovered, while he thundered like
        Dyaus, the dawn, the Sun, the cow, the lightening.

6. Indra hat den Vala, den Bewacher der Milchkühe,
    durch sein Gebrüll wie mit der Kand zerschnitten.
    Mit den Schweissbetupften die Milch suchend
    brachte er den Pani zum Weinen; er raubte
    seine Kühe.

    As with a hand, so with his roaring Indra cleft
        Vala through, the guardian of the cattle.
    Seeking the milk-draught with sweat-shining
        comrades he stole the Pani's kine and left them weeping.

7. Mit seinen wahrhaften Freunden, den Erglühenden,
    den Schätzegewinnern hat er (den Vala) gesprengt,
    der Von den Rindern sich nährte. Brahmanaspati
    gelangte mit den Bullen, den Ebern, den vot Hitze
    Schwitzenden, in den Besitz des Reichtums.

    He with bright faithful Friends, winners of booty,
        hath rent the milker of the cows asunder.
    Brihaspati with wild boars strong and mighty,
        sweating with heat, hath gained a rich possession.

8. Sie eiferten wahrhaften Herzens mit Gebeten den
    Rinderherrn an, inn um die Rinder anflehend. Brhaspati
    liess die Kühe heraus mit seinen Verbündeten, die
    sich gegenseitig vor Unehre schützen.

    They, longing for the kine, with faithful spirit
        incited with their hymns the Lord of cattle.
    Brihaspati freed the radiant cows with comrades
        self-yoked, averting shame from one another.

9. Mit lieblichen Gedichten ihn erhebend, der wie
   der Löwe an seinem Stande brüllt, wollen wir
   dem Bṛhaspati, dem Bullen, dem im
   Zweikampf, in jedem Streite Siegreichen,
   zujubeln;

   In our assembly with auspicious praises exalting
      him who roareth like a lion,
   May we, in every fight where heroes conquer,
      rejoice in strong Brihaspati the Victor.

10. Wann er den allfarbigen Siegerpreis gewonnen hat
    und zum Himmel aufgestiegen ist zu den
    höchsten Sitzen, indem wir den Bullen Bṛhaspati
    erheben, da und dort weilend, im Munde das
    Licht tragend.

    When he had won him every sort of booth and gone
       to heaven and its most lofty mansions,
    Men praised Brihaspati the Mighty, bringing
       the light within their mouths from sundry places.

11. Erfüllet die Bitte zur Kräftigung, denn ihr
    nehmet euch aus eigenem Antrieb selbst des
    Dürftigen an! Alle Unbilden sollen dahinten
    und fern bleiben! Dies höret, Himmel und Erde,
    die ihr alles zuwege bringet!

    Fulfil the prayer that begs for vital vigour:  aid
       in your wonted manner even the humble.
    Let all our foes be turned and be driven backward.
       Hear this, O Heaven and Earth, ye All-producers.

12. Indra spaltete mit Macht des mächtigen Arṇava,
    des Arbuda Haupt. Er erschlug den Drachen,
    liess die sieben Ströme laufen. Himmel und
    Erde, helft uns mit den Göttern weiter!

    Indra with mighty strength hath cleft asunder
       the head of Arbuda the watery monster,
    Slain Ahi, and set free the Seven rivers.  O
       Heaven and Earth, with all the Gods, protect us.


10.68  An Bṛhaspati

   1. Wie im Wasser schwimmende wachsame Vögel, wie
      die Donner des Gewölks, wie die den Fels durch-
      brechenden Wogen rauschend, so schrieen die
      Gesänge dem Bṛhaspati entgegen.

Like birds who keep their watch, plashing in
   water, like the loud voices of the tundering rain-cloud,
Like merry streamlets bursting from the mountain,
   thus to Brihaspati our hymns have sounded.

2. Der Angirasische (Brhaspati) kam herbei und hat (sie)
mit den Kühen zusammengebracht wie Bhaga den Werber
(Aryamann) mit der Braut. Wie ein Vertrauensmann
zwei Ehegatten, so macht er sie einig: "O Brhaspati,
sporne sie an wie Rennpferde im Wettkampf!"

The Son of Angiras, meeting the cattle, as Bhaga,
   brought in Aryaman among us.
As friend of men he decks the wife and husband:
   as for the race, Brihaspati, nerve our coursers.

3. Die Kühe, die einem trefflichen Herrn gehören,
die Gäste bringen, die rührigen, begehrenswerten,
schönfarbigen von tadellosem Aussehen, hat
Brhaspati, nachdem er sich den Weg hindurch
gebahnt hatte, aus den Bergen ausgeschüttet
wie Korn aus den Sacken.

Brihaspati, having won them from the mountains,
   strewed down, like barley out of winnowing-baskets,
The vigorous, wandering cows who aid the pious,
   desired of all, of blameless form, well coloured.

4. Die Wiege der Wahrheit mit Süssigkeit
besprengend wie der Wetterstrahl, der die Fackel
des Himmels herabschleudert, hat Brhaspati, als
er die Kühe aus dem Fels herausholte, die Haut
der Erde wie durch Wasserflut gespalten.

As the Sun dews with meath the seat of Order, and
   casts a flaming meteor down from heaven,
So from the rock Brihaspati forced the cattle,
   and cleft the earth's skin as it were with water.

5. Mit Licht hat er die Finsternis aus dem
Luftreich getrieben wie der Wind die Sīpāla-
pflanze aus dem Wasser. Brhaspati packte die
Kühe des Vala und trieb sie vor sich her wie
der Wind die Wolke.

Forth from mid-air with light he drave the darkness,
   as the gale blows a lily from the river.
Like the wind grasping at the cloud of Vala,
   Brihaspati gathered to himself the cattle.

6. Als Bṛhaspati das Gefängnis des Hohn
bietenden Vala erbrauch mit seinen wie Feuer
glühenden Zauberliedern da packte (ass) er (sie)
wie die Zunge mit den Zähnen die angerichtete
(Speise). Er brachte den Schatz der Kühe und Light.

Brihaspati, when he with fiery lightnings cleft
    through the weapon of reviling Vala,
Consumed him as tongues eat what teeth have
    compassed: he threw the prisons of the red cows open.

7. Bṛhaspati gedachte nänlich des Namens dieser
Lautbrüllenden, der an dem Orte verborgen war,
Wie die Brut des Vogels, nachdem sie die Eier
gespalten hat, so trieb er in eigner Person die
Kühe (als die Brut) des Bergens heraus.

That secret name borne by the lowing cattle
    within the cave Brihaspati discovered,
And drave, himself, the bright kine from the
    mountain, like a bird's young after the eggs disclosure.

8. Er erspähte die mit einem Fels verschlossene
Süssigkeit wie einen Fisch, der im seichten
Wasser wohnt. Bṛhaspati holte sie heraus wie
einen Becher aus dem Baum, nachdem-er (der Fels)
mit lautem Brullen gesprengt hatte.

He looked around on rock-imprisoned sweetness
    as one who eyes a fish in scanty water.
Brihaspati, cleaving through with varied clamous,
    brought it forth like a bowl from out the timber.

9. Er fand die Uṣas, er die Sonne, er das Feuer;
er vertrieb durch Zauberlied die Finsternis.
Bṛhaspati holte (die Kühe) des Vala, der mit den
Kühen prunkte, wie das Mark aus dem Gelenk.

He found the light of heaven, and fire, and Morning;
    with lucid rays he forced apart the darkness.
As from a joint, Brihaspati took the marrow
    of Vala as he gloried for his cattle.

10. Wie die Bäume ihre vom Frost geraubten
Blätter so vermisste Vala die von Bṛhaspati
(gebraubten) Kühe. Etwas Unnachahmbares hat er
getan, das sich nicht wiederholt, solange Sonne
und Mond abwechselnd aufgehen werden.

As trees for foliage robbed by winter, Vala mourned
for the cows Brihaspati had taken.
He did a deed ne'er done, ne'er to be equalled,
whereby the Sun and Moon ascend alternate.

11. Die Vater schmückten den Himmel mit den
Gastirnen aus wie einen Rappen mit Perlen.
Die Finsternis verlegten sie auf die Nacht, auf
den Tag das Lucht, Brhaspati spaltete den Fels,
er hat die Kühe gefunden.

Like a dark steed adorned with pearl, the Fathers
have decorated heaven with constellations.
They set the light in day, in night the darkness.
Brihaspati cleft the rock and found the cattle.

12. Diese Vergeugung haben wir dem wetterwolken-
gleichen (Brhaspati) gemacht, der in vielen
(Stimmen dem Donner) nachbrüllt. So moge uns denn
Brhaspati durch Kühe, Rosse, er durch Söhne
und Mannen Kraft verleihen.

This homage have we offered to the Cloud-God who
thunders out to many in succession.
May this Brihaspati vouchsafe us fulness of life
with kine and horses, men, and heroes.

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